The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary 9781509933471, 9781509933495, 9781509933488

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THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS This second edition of the first commentary of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in English, written by experts from several EU Member States, provides an authoritative but succinct statement of how the Charter impacts upon EU, domestic and international law. Following the conventional article-by-article approach, each commentator offers an expert view of how each article is either already being interpreted in the courts, or is likely to be interpreted. Each commentary is referenced to the case law and is augmented with extensive references to further reading. This is a much-welcomed new edition of the authoritative guide to the Charter. Second Edition

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The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights A Commentary Second Edition

Edited by

Steve Peers Tamara Hervey Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward

HART PUBLISHING Bloomsbury Publishing Plc Kemp House, Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford, OX2 9PH, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland HART PUBLISHING, the Hart/Stag logo, BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2021 Copyright © The editors and contributors severally 2021 The editors and contributors have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as Authors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright ©. All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright ©. This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 (http://www. nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3) except where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2021. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN:  HB: 978-1-50993-347-1 Hart Publishing HB: 978-3-406-76965-8 (Beck) HB: 978-3-8487-8612-1 (Nomos) ePDF: 978-1-50993-348-8 ePub: 978-1-50993-350-1 Typeset by Compuscript Ltd, Shannon To find out more about our authors and books visit www.hartpublishing.co.uk. Here you will find extracts, author information, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our newsletters.

Foreword KOEN LENAERTS*

It is now just over a decade since the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union entered into force together with the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, as primary EU law on an equal footing with the EU Treaties. It is, moreover, just over two decades since the Charter was first proclaimed as an indicative catalogue of rights at Nice on 7 December 2000. Of course, fundamental rights protection in the law of the Union predates the Charter, having been recognised as a general principle of law over fifty years ago, first in 1969 in Stauder v City of Ulm1 and then even more explicitly a year later in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case.2 However, there is no doubt that the Charter has, particularly since its formal entry into force, afforded much greater visibility to the rights that it protects and, in so doing, has significantly enhanced legal certainty for those seeking to rely on those rights. The timeliness of the Charter’s elevation to primary law status can hardly be over-estimated. Europe, and indeed the wider world, face myriad and ever-greater fundamental rights challenges. Authoritarian regimes the world over are increasingly strident and open in their disregard for fundamental rights and in their insistence that the way in which they treat their own citizens is no one else’s business. The ubiquity of digital communications has also raised new and difficult issues surrounding respect for fundamental rights, in particular as regards the right to respect for private and family life and the right to the protection of personal data, not only by State authorities but also by private corporations which may well be headquartered outside the jurisdiction in which the effects of alleged breaches of those rights are being felt. The need to ‘lock down’ entire societies in the face of the ongoing global pandemic – a development that is unprecedented in modern times – has also thrown into sharp relief the potential fragility of rights and freedoms that were previously taken for granted in democratic societies, as decisionmakers have grappled with the competing imperatives of respect for those rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and of the need to prioritise public health and to save lives, on the other. As the European Union has confronted these challenges, the Charter has served as an anchor in troubled waters, providing all three branches of government, at both European and Member State level, with an indispensable tool for ensuring that all action undertaken under Union law remains grounded in the values on which the Union is founded. This Commentary, to which several dozen of the most distinguished lawyers and academics from across Europe, including a number of my judicial colleagues at the Court of Justice, have contributed will, in my opinion, provide invaluable assistance to all those seeking to carry out the vital work of putting the Charter’s provisions into effect. In practical terms, Part I will be of particular value to those who wish to ascertain the specific scope and meaning of the provisions

* President of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Professor of European Union Law, University of Leuven. 1 Judgment of 12 November 1969, Stauder v City of Ulm, Case 29–69, EU:C:1969:57. 2 Judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 11–70, EU:C:1970:114.

Foreword

of the Charter. Each Charter article is analysed in turn, taking account of its wording, context and objectives, as well as the relevant case law of the CJEU that has interpreted it. Whether practicing lawyer, academic researcher, or interested European citizen, anyone who wishes to learn more about the rights that are protected by the Charter, and the way in which it operates to ensure such protection in practice, will, I believe, find answers to his or her questions in the pages of this part of the Commentary. Part II, to which I myself have contributed a chapter, seeks to take a step back and to provide a more reflective and contextual overview of particular aspects of the operation of the Charter. Each chapter approaches the Charter from a different analytical standpoint. While some authors focus on fundamental rights protection in specific fields or on particular aspects of that protection that are currently dominating the case law – in particular, the law of international protection, developments relating to the principle of mutual trust, fundamental social rights and the obligation to provide effective remedies to enforce Charter rights – others explore the interaction between the Charter, as the catalogue of fundamental rights applicable under EU law, and systems of national or international law. Finally, Part III of the Commentary contains one single contribution assessing an important subject tangential to the Charter, namely the prospects for EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, in accordance with Article 6(2) TEU. In conclusion, the Commentary provides a comprehensive guide to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union from a broad range of different perspectives and I thoroughly recommend it to anyone who has an interest, whether practical or academic, in the application of fundamental rights in the EU legal order.

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Editor’s Preface Second Edition Fundamental human rights. The phrase resonates in so many ways – historically, politically, socially, rhetorically, and legally. The notion of inalienable rights, which inhere in human beings merely by reason of their humanity, and apply regardless of nationality, race, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability and other categories, is not only a crucial part of Europe’s history, and its emergence from its dark past of the early 20th century. It is also an essential touchstone in contemporary times: we cannot assume that striving for equal dignity for all human beings, and constraining the power of those who govern, is somehow no longer necessary. A global pandemic is just one of the challenges of the first part of the 21st century in which human rights have a critical role to play. Other challenges include how best to uphold the rule of law in contemporary democratic societies, where populism seems to be enjoying renewed voter support – a matter on which courts across the globe, including the CJEU, are being invited to rule. The contemporary contexts are of course important, but our core focus here is EU human rights law. While originally the Council of Europe was the institutional context for the development of human rights in Europe, the EU became involved in human rights from at least the 1970s onwards. This initial development, however, was in the context of the CJEU’s jurisprudence, rather than in a single human rights instrument such as the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or European Social Charter. It was not until the late 1990s that the idea of a fundamental rights instrument for the EU was realised in practice. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which enshrines certain civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights in EU law, was given full legal effect by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. This brief description belies a long and convoluted journey which began with a decision of the European Council in 1999 to draw up a Charter of Fundamental Rights and resulted quite quickly in the publication of a first draft in 2000. By December 2000, the Charter had been enshrined in the Treaty of Nice. But between 2001 and 2004 the Charter became enmeshed in the ultimately unsuccessful effort to introduce an EU Constitutional Treaty, and by the end of 2004, with votes in the Netherlands and France having gone against the Constitutional Treaty, it appeared that the Charter would remain forever in legal limbo. Remarkably, it was revived by the Treaty of Lisbon, which at the same time provided for the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the latter has not taken place, the place of the Charter in EU law is now secure: the Charter provides a standard against which the EU institutions, and, in some circumstances, institutions of the Member States are held to account. The rhetorical power of human rights is undeniable. But in this book, our focus is on their legal status. The idea that human beings have rights that are legally enforceable against institutions of public power (typically, institutions of government in a state) is one of the most powerful aspects of human rights. Human rights thus embody important constitutional principles, including the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. These principles are far from secure in contemporary Europe: human rights vigilance constitutes an important tool against excesses of power. As the EU has taken on greater public authority, particularly in areas where its actions affect matters that profoundly relate to human beings (such as their freedoms, dignity, and equality), the need for subjecting the EU’s decision-making to human rights review

Editor’s Preface Second Edition

has become ever more pressing. Whatever doubts may have existed about the importance or legal status of the Charter during the early years of its gestation and infancy, there can be no doubt that it now plays this important role. Having come of age, the Charter now takes its place among the catalogue of international human rights instruments. Each of the general editors of this volume has long been concerned with understanding the Charter and we have all written, spoken and taught about it; in Angela’s case, before working at the CJEU, she advised clients on its impact and appeared as counsel in leading human rights cases. In 2003, when the shape of the Charter was known but its ultimate fate remained unclear, two of us, Tammy and Jeff, writing in the Foreword to the book Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart, 2003) wondered whether “the inclusion of economic and social rights in the Charter would signal a change of status of these values within the EU’s legal order?” Only months later, Steve and Angela, writing in the Foreword to the book The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart, 2004) expressed the opinion that “the Charter seems set to play an increasingly pivotal role in the development of the complex legal and constitutional order of the European Union”. It turns out we were both right and wrong. Right because the Charter has assumed huge significance within the EU legal order, wrong perhaps in anticipating that the status of social rights would change quite so fundamentally. But as many of the commentaries in this book demonstrate, there have been significant changes, even in the field of social rights. What this Second Edition of our Commentary demonstrates most emphatically, and to our great delight, is the depth of scholarship that has developed around the Charter. When we began this project we had hoped to assemble an expert team to help us; what became apparent very quickly was that we were able to attract many of the best and most interesting scholars currently at work in European law and human rights. We have been fortunate to retain most of the authors from the first edition, and to add some outstanding new contributors. Working on the project during a global pandemic was far from easy. Many of us were juggling teaching and meetings from home, home schooling and other caring duties, alongside our research commitments. The text of this Second Edition reflects developments up to May 2021, which is the date on which our contributors were last invited to amend their chapters. To all our contributors, those who accepted our invitation to update their earlier work, and those who for various reasons were unable to join us this time, but on whose earlier work we build for the Second Edition: sincere and most heartfelt thanks. It is with a suitable sense of awe that we now stand back and admire your craftsmanship and skill. The Charter is a major part of the landscape of EU law, and our contributing authors have provided a sparkling examination of it. The book has more than 50 contributing authors, which means that our list of thank yous and acknowledgements is inevitably a long one. First and foremost we thank our authors, who without exception accepted our invitation to contribute without hesitation, and who have brought an infectious enthusiasm to the project. We cannot single out authors for individual praise, but we thank Elspeth Guild for putting at our disposal her firm’s office in London, where our first editorial planning meeting, for the first edition, took place, and Richard Hart, for his enthusiastic backing of such a gargantuan project in the form of an Article by Article commentary on the Charter, at the project’s genesis. We also thank former President Skouris and President Lenaerts of the CJEU, who each have kindly accepted our invitation to write the Forewords for the first and second editions respectively, and who have supported the project since its inception. We have leant heavily on our publisher, whose staff has been exemplary in their professionalism and skill; Sinead Moloney and Richard Cox at Hart Publishing, as well as Christopher Long who copy edited the book, have all made signal and vital contributions. We are particularly grateful to Sinead for her patience, especially during the pandemic’s early months. viii

Editor’s Preface Second Edition

Finally, and with sincere apologies to anyone whose contribution we may have inadvertently overlooked, we thank our families and colleagues for their forbearance and support during the long and occasionally stressful process of bringing the Second Edition of this gargantuan book to completion. Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner, Steve Peers and Angela Ward London Nottingham Luxembourg September 2021



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Contents Foreword��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� v Editor’s Preface Second Edition���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������vii List of Contributors���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� xxxix Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 1 – Human Dignity���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3 Catherine Dupré Text of Explanatory Note on Article 1���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3 A. Field of Application of Article 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 4 B. Interrelationship of Article 1 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������������� 6 C. Sources of Article 1�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7 I. ECHR��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7 II. Council of Europe Treaties����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8 III. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 9 IV. Relevant EU Law������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10 V. Other Sources: National Constitutions�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10 D. Analysis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 II. Scope of Application������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14 III. Specific Provisions���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16 IV. Limitations and Derogations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20 V. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21 E. Evaluation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22 Article 2 – Right to Life�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25 Elizabeth Wicks Text of Explanatory Note on Article 2�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25 Select Bibliography�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25 A. B. C.

Field of Application of Article 2���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26 Interrelationship of Article 2 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������������� 28 Sources of Article 2 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29 I. ECHR������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29 II. UN Treaties���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30 III. Other Sources������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 30

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D. Analysis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 II. Scope of Application������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 III. Specific Provisions���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 IV. Limitations and Derogations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 36 V. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 36 E. Evaluation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 38 Article 3 – Right to the Integrity of the Person����������������������������������������������������������������������������39 Steve Peers Text of Explanatory Note on Article 3�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39 Select Bibliography�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39 A. Field of Application of Article 3���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 40 B. Interrelationship of Article 3 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������������� 42 C. Sources of Article 3 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 43 I. ECHR������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 43 II. UN Treaties���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 43 III. Council of Europe Treaties��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 43 D. Analysis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 II. Scope of Application ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 44 III. Specific Provisions���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 45 IV. Limitations and Derogations ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 55 V. Remedies ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 56 E. Evaluation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 56 Article 4 – Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment�������59 Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo Text of Explanatory Note on Article 4�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59 Select Bibliography�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59 A. Field of Application of Article 4���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 61 B. Interrelationship of Article 4 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������������� 64 C. Sources of Article 4 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 66 I. ECHR������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 66 II. UN Treaties���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 67 III. Council of Europe Treaties��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 69 D. Analysis ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 70 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 70 II. Scope of Application������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 71 III. Specific Provisions���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 75 IV. Limitations and Derogations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 86 V. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 89 E. Evaluation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 91

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Article 5 – Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour����������������������������������������������������������������93 Heli Askola Text of Explanatory Note on Article 5�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 93 Select Bibliography ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 94 A. Field of Application of Article 5���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 95 B. Interrelationship of Article 5 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������������� 96 C. Sources of Rights under Article 5�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 97 D. Analysis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 98 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 98 II. Scope of Application������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 99 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 100 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 113 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 113 Article 6 – Right to Liberty and Security�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������115 Daniel Wilsher Text of Explanatory Note on Article 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 115 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 116 A. Field of Application of Article 6�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 116 B. Interrelationship of Article 6 with Other Provisions of the Charter����������������������������������� 118 C. Sources of Article 6 Rights����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 119 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 119 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 121 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 121 IV. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 122 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 122 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 122 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 123 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 125 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 127 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 147 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 148 Article 7 (Private Life, Home and Communications) – Respect for Private and Family Life������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������151 David Mangan Text of Explanatory Note on Article 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 151 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 151 A. Field of Application of Article 7 (Private Life, Home and Communications)������������������� 152 B. Interrelationship of Article 7 with Other Provisions of the Charter����������������������������������� 153 C. Sources of Article 7 Rights����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 153 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 154 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 154 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 154 

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III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 164 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 189 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 191 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 192 Article 7 (Family Life Aspects) – Right to Respect for Private and Family Life����������������������195 Miriam Kullmann Text of Explanatory Note on Article 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 195 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 195 A. Field of Application of Article 7�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 195 I. Gender Equality ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 196 II. Children’s Rights ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 199 III. Free Movement, Immigration and Asylum ���������������������������������������������������������������� 201 B. Interrelationship of Article 7 with Other Provisions of the Charter����������������������������������� 204 C. Sources of Article 7 Rights����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205 II. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 205 III. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 208 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 210 I. General Remarks ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 210 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 211 III. Specific Provisions ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 216 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 225 V. Remedies ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 229 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 229 Article 8 – Protection of Personal Data��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������231 Herke Kranenborg Text of Explanatory Note on Article 8������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 231 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 231 A. Field of Application of Article 8�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 232 I. EU Acquis on Data Protection Before the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 232 II. EU Acquis on Data Protection After the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 233 III. The Scope of Application of the EU Acquis on Data Protection�������������������������������� 235 B. Interrelationship of Article 8 with Other Provisions of the Charter����������������������������������� 237 I. Article 7 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life)��������������������������������������������� 238 II. Article 10 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion)�������������������������������������� 242 III. Article 11 (Freedom of Expression and Information)������������������������������������������������ 243 IV. Article 17 (Right to Property)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 246 V. Article 21 (Prohibition of Discrimination)����������������������������������������������������������������� 247 VI. Article 42 (Right of Access to Documents)����������������������������������������������������������������� 247 VII. Article 47 (Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial)������������������������������������� 249

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C. Sources of Article 8 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 251 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 251 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 253 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 254 IV. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development������������������������������������� 256 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 256 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 256 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 256 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 263 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 280 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 286 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 287 Article 9 – Right to Marry and Right to Found a Family�����������������������������������������������������������291 Steve Peers Text of Explanatory Note on Article 9������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 291 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 291 A. Field of Application of Article 9�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 291 B. Interrelationship of Article 9 with Other Provisions of the Charter����������������������������������� 296 C. Sources of Article 24 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 297 I. ECHR ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 297 II. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 298 III. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 300 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 302 I. General Remarks ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 302 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 302 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 303 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 309 V. Remedies ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 311 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 312 Article 10 – Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion�������������������������������������313 Ronan McCrea Text of Explanatory Note on Article 10���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 313 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 313 A. Field of Application of Article 10������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 313 B. Interrelationship of Article 10 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 315 I. Religious Freedom and Free Expression���������������������������������������������������������������������� 316 II. Discrimination on Grounds of Religion���������������������������������������������������������������������� 317 III. Exemptions from Non-Discrimination Duties for Individuals���������������������������������� 321 IV. Religious Discrimination, Neutrality and the Right to Run a Business��������������������� 321 V. Duties of Neutrality as a Limit on Religious Expression at Work������������������������������ 322 C. Sources of Article 10 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 324 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 325 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 325 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 325 

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III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 326 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 326 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 329 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 330 F. Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 331 Article 11 – Freedom of Expression and Information���������������������������������������������������������������333 Lorna Woods Text of Explanatory Note on Article 11���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 333 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 333 A. Field of Application of Article 11������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 334 B. Interrelationship of Article 11 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 336 C. Sources of Article 11 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 337 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 337 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 337 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 341 IV. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 341 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 343 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 343 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 344 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 351 IV. Limits and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 354 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 362 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 362 I. The Right to Transmit�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 363 II. Intermediary Liability��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 365 III. Right to a Forum����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 366 IV. The Right to Search������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 366 V. Pluralism����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 367 VI. Copyright and Freedom of Expression������������������������������������������������������������������������ 368 Article 12(1) – Freedom of Assembly and of Association���������������������������������������������������������371 Filip Dorssemont Text of Explanatory Note on Article 12(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 371 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 371 A. Field of Application of Article 12(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 372 B. Interrelationship of Article 12(1) with Other Provisions of the Charter���������������������������� 375 C. Sources of Article 12(1) Rights���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 377 I. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 377 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 377 III. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 378 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 379 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 379 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 379

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III. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 387 IV. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 389 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 392 Article 12(2) – Freedom of Assembly and of Association���������������������������������������������������������395 Jo Shaw and Lamin Khadar Text of Explanatory Note on Article 12(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 395 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 395 A. Field of Application of Article 12(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 396 B. Interrelationship of Article 12(2) with Other Provisions of the Charter���������������������������� 396 C. Sources of Article 12(2) Rights���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 397 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 397 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 397 III. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 398 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 398 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 398 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 402 III. Detailed Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 402 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 404 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 404 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 404 Article 13 – Freedom of the Arts and Sciences���������������������������������������������������������������������������405 Debbie Sayers Text of Explanatory Note on Article 13���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 405 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 405 A. Field of Application of Article 13������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 406 B. Interrelationship of Article 13 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 407 C. Sources of Article 13 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 408 I. ECHR ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 408 II. UN Treaties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 409 III. Council of Europe Treaties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 414 IV. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 415 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 416 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 416 II. Scope of Application ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 417 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 419 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 424 V. Remedies ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 426 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 427 Article 14 – Right to Education����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������429 Gisella Gori Text of Explanatory Note on Article 14���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 429 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 429 

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A. Field of Application of Article 14������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 430 B. Interrelationship of Article 14 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 435 C. Sources of Article 14 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 436 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 436 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 438 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 439 IV. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 440 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 441 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 441 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 442 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 445 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 446 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 447 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 447 Article 15 – Freedom to Choose an Occupation and Right to Engage in Work����������������������449 Eleni Frantziou and Virginia Mantouvalou Text of Explanatory Note on Article 15���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 449 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 449 A. Article 15 and the Scope of EU Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 450 B. Interrelationship of Article 15 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 451 C. Sources of Article 15 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 453 I. European Convention of Human Rights and European Social Charter�������������������� 453 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 454 III. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 455 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 456 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 456 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 456 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 457 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 458 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 459 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 460 Article 16 – Freedom to Conduct a Business������������������������������������������������������������������������������463 Michelle Everson and Rui Correia Gonçalves Explanatory Note on Article 16����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 463 Selected Bibliography��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 463 A. Field of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 464 I. Freedom to Conduct Business as a Human Right������������������������������������������������������� 466 II. Freedom to Conduct a Business as an Element of the European Economic Constitution������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 466 B. Relation of Article 16 to Articles 15 and 17 of the Charter�������������������������������������������������� 468 C. Sources of Law������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 470

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D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 473 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 473 II. Scope of Application of Article 16������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 475 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 477 IV. Limitation to and Derogations from the Application of Article 16��������������������������� 483 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 487 E. Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 488 Article 17(1) – Right to Property�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������489 Ferdinand Wollenschläger Text of Explanatory Note on Article 17(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 489 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 489 A. Field of Application of Article 17(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 491 B. Interrelationship of Article 17(1) with Other Provisions of the Charter���������������������������� 492 C. Sources of Article 17(1) Rights���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 493 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 493 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 494 III. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 494 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 495 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 495 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 496 III. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 503 IV. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 517 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 517 Article 17(2) – Right to Property�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������519 Paul Torremans Text of Explanatory Note on Article 17(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 519 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 519 A. Field of Application of Article 17(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 519 B. Interrelationship of Article 17(2) with Other Provisions of the Charter���������������������������� 521 C. Sources of Article 17(2) Rights���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 523 I. The Human Rights Approach to Copyright in International Instruments��������������� 524 II. The Human Rights Approach to Other Intellectual Property Rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights�������������������������������������������������������������������� 529 III. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 529 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 531 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 531 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 531 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 532 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 548 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 549 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 550



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Article 18 – Right to Asylum��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������551 Maarten den Heijer Text of Explanatory Note on Article 18���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 551 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 551 A. Field of Application of Article 18������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 552 B. Interrelationship of Article 18 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 553 C. Sources of Article 18 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 555 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 555 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 555 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 558 IV. Constitutional Traditions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 559 V. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 560 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 561 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 561 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 562 III. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 568 IV. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 570 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 571 Article 19 – Protection in the Event of Removal, Expulsion or Extradition���������������������������573 Elspeth Guild Text of Explanatory Note on Article 19���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 573 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 573 A. Article 19 and the Scope of EU Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 574 B. Interrelationship of Article 19 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 575 C. Sources of Article 19 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 576 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 576 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 576 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 578 IV. Other Treaties���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 578 V. Relevant EU Law����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 578 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 581 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 581 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 583 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 583 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 593 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 593 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 594 Article 20 – Equality Before the Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������597 Mark Bell Text of Explanatory Note on Article 20���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 597 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 597 A. Field of Application of Article 20������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 597 B. Interrelationship of Article 20 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 599 xx

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C. Sources of Article 20 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 602 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 602 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 602 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 602 IV. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 603 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 603 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 603 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 603 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 605 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 607 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 610 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 611 Article 21 – Non-Discrimination������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������613 Claire Kilpatrick and Hanna Eklund Text of Explanatory Note on Article 21���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 613 Select Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 613 A. Field of Application of Article 21������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 614 B. Interrelationship of Article 21 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 616 C. Sources of Article 21 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 618 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 618 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 618 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 619 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 620 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 620 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 622 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 629 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 634 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 636 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 637 Article 22 – Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity���������������������������������������������������������639 Rachael Craufurd Smith Text of Explanatory Note on Article 22���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 639 Select Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 639 A. Field of Application of Article 22������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 640 B. Interrelationship of Article 22 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 644 C. Sources of Article 22 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 647 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 647 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 649 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 651 IV. Other������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 652 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 652 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 652 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 656 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 658 

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IV. Limitations and Derogations ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 663 V. Remedies ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 664 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 666 Article 23 – Equality between Women and Men������������������������������������������������������������������������667 Dagmar Schiek and Biljana Kotevska Text of Explanatory Note on Article 23���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 667 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 667 A. Field of Application of Article 23������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 668 B. Interrelationship of Article 23 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 670 I. Article 23 and Articles 20 and 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 670 II. Article 23 and Other Charter Articles�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 672 C. Sources of Article 23 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 673 I. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 673 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 674 III. EU Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 675 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 677 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 677 II. Paragraph 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 677 III. Paragraph 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 683 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 687 I. Opportunities���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 687 II. Shortcomings���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 691 III. Conclusion�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 692 Article 24 – The Rights of the Child��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������693 Ruth Lamont Text of Explanatory Note on Article 24���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 693 Select Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 693 A. Field of Application of Article 24 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 693 B. Interrelationship of Article 24 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 703 C. Sources of Article 24 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 705 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 705 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 707 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 711 I. General Remarks ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 711 II. Scope of Application ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 713 III. Specific Provisions ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 714 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 720 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 721 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 723

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Article 25 – The Rights of the Elderly������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������725 Colm O’Cinneide Text of Explanatory Note on Article 25���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 725 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 725 A. Field of Application of Article 25 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 726 B. Interrelationship of Article 25 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 728 C. Sources of Article 25 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 729 I. ECHR ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 729 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 730 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 731 IV. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 732 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 734 I. General Remarks ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 734 II. Scope of Application ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 736 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 738 IV. Limitations and Derogations ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 739 V. Remedies ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 739 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 739 Article 26 – Integration of Persons with Disabilities����������������������������������������������������������������743 Charlotte O’Brien Text of Explanatory Note on Article 26���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 743 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 743 A. Field of Application of Article 26������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 743 B. Interrelationship of Article 26 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 746 C. Sources of Article 26 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 750 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 750 II. UN Treaties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 753 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 757 IV. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 759 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 760 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 760 II. Scope of Application ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 765 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 768 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 774 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 775 E. Evaluation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 777 Article 27 – Workers’ Right to Information and Consultation within the Undertaking������779 Filip Dorssemont Text of Explanatory Note on Article 27���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 779 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 779 A. Field of Application of Article 27������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 780 B. Interrelationship of Article 27 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 780 

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C. Sources of Article 27 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 782 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 785 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 785 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 786 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 787 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 792 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 796 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 798 Article 28 – Right of Collective Bargaining and Action������������������������������������������������������������801 Catherine Barnard Text of Explanatory Note on Article 28���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 801 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 801 A. Field of Application of Article 28 CFREU���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 802 B. Interrelationship of Article 28 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 806 I. Other Provisions in the Charter����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 806 II. Protocol 30 and Brexit�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 806 C. Sources of Article 28 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 807 I. Right to Bargain Collectively���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 807 II. Right to Take Collective Action������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 809 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 812 I. General Remarks ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 812 II. Scope of Application: Definition of Terms������������������������������������������������������������������ 812 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 815 IV. Limitations and Derogations ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 822 V. Remedies ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 823 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 825 Article 29 – Right of Access to Placement Services��������������������������������������������������������������������827 Jeff Kenner Text of Explanatory Note on Article 29���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 827 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 827 A. Article 29 and the Scope of EU Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 828 B. Interrelationship of Article 29 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 830 C. Sources of Article 29 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 830 I. Council of Europe: European Social Charter�������������������������������������������������������������� 830 II. UN Treaties (Including Monitoring Bodies’ Positions)���������������������������������������������� 831 III. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 832 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 832 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 832 II. Scope of Application ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 834 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 834 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 834 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 834 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 835 xxiv

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Article 30 – Protection in the Event of Unjustified Dismissal��������������������������������������������������837 Jeff Kenner Text of Explanatory Note on Article 30���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 837 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 837 A. Article 30 and the Scope of EU Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 838 B. Interrelationship of Article 30 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 844 C. Sources of Article 30 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 848 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 848 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 849 III. ILO��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 849 IV. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 850 V. National Constitutional Laws��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 851 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 852 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 852 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 854 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 856 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 868 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 871 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 872 Article 31 – Fair and Just Working Conditions�������������������������������������������������������������������������875 Alan Bogg and Michael Ford Text of Explanatory Note on Article 31���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 875 Select Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 875 A. Article 31 and the Scope of EU Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 876 B. Interrelationship of Article 31 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 879 C. Sources of Article 31 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 881 I. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 882 II. Other Sources ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 885 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 888 I. General Remarks ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 888 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 895 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 899 IV. Limitations and Derogations ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 910 V. Remedies ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 916 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 919 Article 32 – Prohibition of Child Labour and Protection of Young People at Work�������������923 Helen Stalford and Nuno Ferreira Text of Explanatory Note on Article 32���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 923 Select Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 923 A. Field of Application of Article 32������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 924 B. Interrelationship of Article 32 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 928 C. Sources of Article 32 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 930 I. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 930 

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II. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 930 III. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 931 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 932 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 932 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 933 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 936 IV. Limitations and Derogations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 938 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 940 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 942 Article 33 – Family and Professional Life�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������943 Jeff Kenner and Katrina Peake Text of Explanatory Note on Article 33��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 943 Select Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 943 A. Field of Application of Article 33������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 944 B. Interrelationship of Article 33 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 947 C. Sources of Article 33 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 950 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 950 II. UN Treaties ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 952 III. The European Social Charter and Revised European Social Charter������������������������ 955 IV. Other Sources ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 961 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 969 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 969 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 971 III. Specific Provisions and Issues�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 972 IV. Limitations and Derogations ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 979 V. Remedies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 980 E. Evaluation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 983 Article 34 – Social Security and Social Assistance���������������������������������������������������������������������985 Oxana Golynker Text of Explanatory Note on Article 34���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 985 Select Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 985 A. Field of Application of Article 34������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 986 B. Interrelationship of Article 34 with Other Provisions of the Charter��������������������������������� 988 C. Sources of Article 34 Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 988 I. ECHR����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 988 II. UN Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 991 III. Council of Europe Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 992 IV. Other Sources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 994 D. Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 995 I. General Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 995 II. Scope of Application����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 995 III. Specific Provisions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 999

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IV. Limitations and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1005 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1005 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1005 Article 35 – The Right to Health Care���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1007 Tamara Hervey and Jean McHale Text of Explanatory Note on Article 35�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1007 Select Bibliography ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1007 A. Field of Application of Article 35 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1007 B. Interrelationship of Article 35 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1008 C. Sources of Article 35 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1008 I. ECHR��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1008 II. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1009 III. Council of Europe Treaties ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1010 IV. Other Sources�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1012 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1012 I. General Remarks �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1012 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1013 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1014 IV. Limitations and Derogations ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1022 V. Remedies �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1023 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1023 Article 36 – Access to Services of General Economic Interest������������������������������������������������1025 Erika Szyszczak Text of Explanatory Note on Article 36�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1025 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1025 A. Article 36 and the Scope of EU Law������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1026 B. Interrelationship of Article 36 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1026 C. Sources of Article 36 ‘Rights’ and ‘Principles’��������������������������������������������������������������������� 1027 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1027 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1027 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1028 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1028 IV. Limitations and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1036 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1037 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1037 Article 37 – Environmental Protection�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1041 Elisa Morgera and Gracia Marín Durán Text of Explanatory Note on Article 37�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1041 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1041 A. Field of Application of Article 37���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1042 B. Interrelationship of Article 37 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1043 

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C. Sources of Article 37������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1045 I. EU Law������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1045 II. National Constitutional Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1046 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1048 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1048 II. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1049 III. Legal Nature���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1053 IV. Limitations and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1055 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1058 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1060 Article 38 – Consumer Protection���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1065 Steve Weatherill Text of Explanatory Note on Article 38�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1065 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1065 A. Field of Application of Article 38���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1065 B. Interrelationship of Article 38 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1066 C. Sources of Article 38 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1066 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1068 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1068 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1069 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1069 IV. Limitations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1083 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1084 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1084 Article 39 – Right to Vote and to Stand as a Candidate at Elections to the European Parliament����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1085 Jo Shaw and Lamin Khadar Text of Explanatory Note on Article 39�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1085 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1085 A. Field of Application of Article 39���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1086 B. Interrelationship of Article 39 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1087 C. Sources of Article 39 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1088 I. ECHR��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1088 II. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1089 III. Council of Europe Treaties����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1090 IV. Other Sources�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1090 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1091 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1091 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1097 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1098 IV. Limitations and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1104 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1108 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1109 xxviii

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Article 40 – Right to Vote and to Stand as a Candidate at Municipal Elections�������������������1113 Kees Groenendijk Text of Explanatory Note on Article 40�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1113 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1113 A. Field of Application of Article 40���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1114 B. Interrelationship of Article 40 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1114 C. Sources of Article 40 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1115 I. ECHR��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1115 II. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1115 III. Council of Europe������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1116 IV. Other Sources�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1117 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1117 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1117 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1118 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1119 IV. Limitations and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1121 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1121 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1121 Article 41 – The Right to Good Administration�����������������������������������������������������������������������1125 Paul Craig Text of Explanations on Article 41—Right to good administration����������������������������������������� 1125 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1125 A. Article 41 and the Scope of EU Law������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1126 B. Interrelationship of Article 41 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1127 C. Sources of Article 41 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1127 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1127 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1127 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1128 III. Specific Provisions ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1132 IV. Limitations and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1151 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1151 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1151 Article 42 – Right of Access to Documents�������������������������������������������������������������������������������1153 Ivan Lazarov Text of Explanatory Note on Article 42�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1153 Selected Bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1153 A. Field of Application of Article 42���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1154 B. Interrelationship of Article 42 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1154 C. Sources of Article 42 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1155 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1156 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1156 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1157 

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III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1160 IV. Limitations and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1161 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1170 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1171 Article 43 – European Ombudsman������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1173 Ian Harden Text of Explanatory Note on Article 43�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1173 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1173 A. Field of Application of Article 43���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1173 B. Interrelationship of Article 43 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1176 C. Sources of the Article 43 Right�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1176 I. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1176 II. Council of Europe Treaties����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1177 III. Other Sources�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1177 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1179 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1179 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1180 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1187 IV. Limitations and Derogations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1190 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1190 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1193 I. The Ombudsman Remedy as an Alternative Route to Redress�������������������������������� 1193 II. The Ombudsman Remedy as an Instrument of Public Participation���������������������� 1195 III. Future Trends�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1197 Article 44 – Right to Petition�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1199 Mats Lindfelt Text of Explanatory Note on Article 44�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1199 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1199 A. Field of Application of Article 44���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1199 B. Interrelationship with Other Provisions of the Charter���������������������������������������������������� 1200 C. Sources of Article 44 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1201 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1202 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1202 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1203 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1205 IV. Limitations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1206 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1207 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1207 I. A Tool for Democratic Control���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1207

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Article 45 – Freedom of Movement and of Residence�������������������������������������������������������������1211 Eleanor Spaventa Text of Explanatory Note on Article 45�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1211 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1211 A. Field of Application of Article 45���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1211 B. Interrelationship of Article 45 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1212 C. Sources of Article 45 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1213 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1213 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1213 II. Scope of Application—Article 45(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������� 1214 III. Right to Move, Right to Enter and Right to Exit���������������������������������������������������� 1214 IV. Right to Reside���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1215 V. The Right to Move and Claims against the Member State of Origin�������������������� 1221 VI. Nature of Charter Rights—and Purely Internal Situations����������������������������������� 1223 VII. Article 45(2)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1224 VIII. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1224 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1225 Article 46 – Diplomatic and Consular Protection�������������������������������������������������������������������1227 Eileen Denza Text of Explanatory Note on Article 46�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1227 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1227 A. Field of Application of Article 46���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1228 B. Interrelationship of Article 46 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1229 C. Sources of Article 46 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1229 I. Commission Research and Council Directive�������������������������������������������������������� 1230 II. National Implementing Measures��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1232 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1232 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1232 II. Background—Diplomatic Protection, Protection by Diplomatic Missions and Consular Protection������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1234 III. Scope of the ‘Right’ to Protection���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1236 IV. Whether ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in the Formal Sense is Covered������������������������ 1237 V. Specific Provisions���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1239 VI. Limitations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1242 VII. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1242 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1243 Article 47 – Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial�������������������������������������������������1245 Angela Ward Text of Explanatory Note on Article 47�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1245 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1246 A. Field of Application������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1250 B. Interrelationship with Other Provisions of the Charter���������������������������������������������������� 1250 

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C. Sources and Content of Article 47�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1251 I. Elements of Article 47���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1251 II. The ECHR as a Source of Article 47 Rights������������������������������������������������������������ 1253 III. The General Principle of Effective Judicial Protection������������������������������������������� 1255 IV. Judicial Review in the EU’s Composite Legal Order���������������������������������������������� 1259 D. Specific Provisions (Meaning)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1261 I. The Right to an Effective Remedy under the First Paragraph of Article 47���������� 1261 II. The Principle of Equivalence and the First Paragraph of Article 47��������������������� 1307 III. Damages for Breach of the Charter as a Remedy under the First Paragraph of Article 47�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1315 IV. The Right to an Effective Remedy under the First Paragraph of Article 47 and Challenge to EU Measure��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1322 V. Article 47(2)—An Independent and Impartial Tribunal Previously Established by Law��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1339 VI. Article 47(2)—A Fair and Public Hearing within a Reasonable Time������������������ 1358 VII. Article 47(2)—The Possibility of Being Advised, Defended and Represented������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1373 VIII. Article 47(3)—The Right to Legal Aid�������������������������������������������������������������������� 1376 IX. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1382 Article 48 (Administrative Law) – Presumption of Innocence and Right of Defence����������1385 Hanns Peter Nehl Text of Explanatory Note on Article 48�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1385 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1385 I.

ARTICLE 48(1)—PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE����������������������������������������������������� 1386

A. Field of Application of Article 48(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1386 B. Interrelationship of Article 48(1) with Other Provisions of the Charter�������������������������� 1387 C. Sources of Rights under Article 48(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1388 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1389 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1389 II. Scope of Application������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1390 III. Specific Provisions: Substantive Content of Article 48(1)������������������������������������� 1392 IV. Limitations and Derogations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1397 V. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1397 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1398 II. ARTICLE 48(2)—RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE��������������������������������������������������������������� 1399 A. Field of Application of Article 48(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1399 B. Interrelationship of Article 48(2) with Other Provisions of the Charter�������������������������� 1400 C. Sources of Rights under Article 48(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1401 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1401 I. General Remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1401 II. Scope of Application������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1402 III. Specific Provisions: Substantive Content of Article 48(2)������������������������������������� 1402 IV. Limitations and Derogations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1408 V. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1408 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1410 xxxii

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Article 48 (Criminal Law) – Presumption of Innocence and Right of Defence��������������������1413 Debbie Sayers Text of Explanatory Note on Article 48�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1413 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1413 I.

ARTICLE 48(1)—PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE����������������������������������������������������� 1414

A. B. C.

Field of Application of Article 48(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1414 Interrelationship of Article 48(1) with Other Provisions of the Charter�������������������������� 1415 Sources of Rights under Article 48(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1415 I. ECHR��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1415 II. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1417 III. Council of Europe Treaties����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1418 IV. The Directive on the Strengthening of Certain Aspects of the Presumption of Innocence���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1419

II. ARTICLE 48(2)—RIGHTS OF THE DEFENCE��������������������������������������������������������������� 1419 A. Field of Application of Article 48(2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1419 B. Interrelationship of Article 48(2) with Other Provisions of the Charter�������������������������� 1422 C. Sources of Rights under Article 48(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1423 I. ECHR��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1423 II. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1427 III. Other Sources�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1429 D. Analysis of Article 48����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1429 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1429 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1431 III. Specific Provisions: Substantive Content of Article 48 �������������������������������������������� 1432 E. Limitations and Derogations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1466 F. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1467 G. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1468 Article 49 – Principles of Legality and Proportionality of Criminal Offences and Penalties��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1473 Valsamis Mitsilegas and Emmanouil Billis Text of Explanatory Note on Article 49�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1473 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1473 A. Field of Application of Article 49���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1474 B. Interrelationship of Article 49 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1474 C. Sources of Rights and Guarantees under Article 49����������������������������������������������������������� 1475 I. UN Sources������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1475 II. ECHR �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1477 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1489 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1489 II. Legality������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1490 III. Proportionality������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1498 E. Limitations and Derogations – Article 49(2) of the Charter��������������������������������������������� 1505



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F. Remedies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1506 G. Evaluation ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1507 Article 50 – Right not to be Tried or Punished Twice in Criminal Proceedings for the same Criminal Offence�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1509 Jonathan Tomkin Text of Explanatory Note on Article 50�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1509 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1509 A. Field of Application of Article 50���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1510 I. Criminal Law��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1512 II. Administrative Law Proceedings and Sanctions������������������������������������������������������� 1514 B. Interrelationship of Article 50 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1515 C. Sources of Article 50 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1515 I. ECHR��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1516 II. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1518 III. Other Sources�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1520 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1521 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1521 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1522 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1528 IV. Limitations and Derogations ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1545 V. Remedies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1547 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1549 Article 51 – Field of Application������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1553 Angela Ward Text of Explanatory Note on Article 51�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1553 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1554 A. Field of Application of Article 51���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1557 B. Interrelationship of Article 51 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1558 I. Article 51(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1558 II. Article 51(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1567 C. Sources of Article 51 Rules�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1567 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1570 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1570 II. Specific Provisions (Meaning)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1572 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1607 Article 52 – Scope and Interpretation of Rights and Principles���������������������������������������������1611 Steve Peers and Sacha Prechal Text of Explanatory Note on Article 52�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1611 Select Bibliography ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1613 A. Field of Application of Article 52 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1614 B. Interrelationship of Article 52 with Other Provisions of the Charter ������������������������������ 1614 C. Sources of Article 52 Rules�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1615 xxxiv

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D. Analysis �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1615 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1615 II. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1616 E. Evaluation ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1673 Article 53 – Level of Protection��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1675 Bruno de Witte Text of Explanatory Note on Article 53�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1675 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1675 A. Sources of Article 53������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1676 B. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1676 I. Relation with the Rest of European Union Law�������������������������������������������������������� 1677 II. Relation with International Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1678 III. Relation with National Constitutions������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1679 IV. An Exception to the Primacy of EU Law?������������������������������������������������������������������ 1681 V. The Legal Significance of Article 53 �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1684 VI. Article 53 and the ECHR�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1688 C. Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1689 Article 54 – Abuse of Rights�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1691 Lorna Woods Text of Explanatory Note on Article 54�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1691 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1691 A. Article 54 and the Scope of EU Law������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1692 B. Interrelationship of Article 54 with Other Provisions of the Charter������������������������������� 1692 C. Sources of Article 54 Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1692 I. ECHR��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1692 II. UN Treaties������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1693 III. Council of Europe Treaties����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1694 IV. Other Sources�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1696 D. Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1696 I. General Remarks��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1696 II. Scope of Application��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1697 III. Specific Provisions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1700 IV. Limits and Derogation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1703 E. Evaluation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1703 Part II – Reflections on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights The Place of the Charter in the European Legal Space������������������������������������������������������������1711 Koen Lenaerts and José Antonio Gutiérrez-Fons A. The Scope of Application of the Charter���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1712 I. The Charter and the Member States�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1713 II. The Charter and the EU Institutions������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1718 III. The Charter and Individuals: The Question of Horizontal Direct Effect���������������� 1719 

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B. The Charter and Primary EU Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1721 I. The Charter and the Treaties�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1721 II. The Charter and General Principles of EU Law�������������������������������������������������������� 1725 C. The Charter and the Common Constitutional Space�������������������������������������������������������� 1727 I. The Charter and the ECHR���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1727 II. The Charter and the Constitutional Traditions Common to the Member States����������1730 D. Concluding Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1733 The Asymmetrical Impact of Article 47 of the Charter on National and EU Remedies�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1735 Albertina Albors-Llorens A. Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1735 B. National Remedies: The Right to Effective Judicial Protection as Part of a Network of EU Principles and Constitutional Developments����������������������������������� 1736 I. Effective Judicial Protection and the Rewe Principles of Effectiveness and Equivalence������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1737 II. Effective Judicial Protection, Article 19(1) TEU and the Collaborative Duty of National Courts��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1743 III. Article 47 and the Harmonisation of National Remedies���������������������������������������� 1749 C. EU Remedies: The Right to Effective Judicial Protection as a Catalyst for Gradual Change������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1750 D. Conclusions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1754 The Charter and Universal Human Rights Instruments��������������������������������������������������������1757 Allan Rosas A. Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1757 B. The Relevance of International Human Rights Instruments for the Development of EU Fundamental Rights�������������������������������������������������������������� 1759 C. Examples from Pre-Charter Case Law�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1763 D. Human Rights Instruments in EU External Relations������������������������������������������������������� 1765 E. The Lisbon Treaty, the Charter and Universal Instruments���������������������������������������������� 1768 F. Conclusions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1771 Mutual Trust and the Charter: A Salutary Irish Example�������������������������������������������������������1773 Gerard Hogan A. Hampshire County Council v CE������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1773 B. Whether there is a Jurisdiction to Extend Purposes of Article 33(5) of the Brussels II bis Regulation?������������������������������������������������������������������ 1777 C. The Judgment of the Court of Justice in the Hampshire Cases����������������������������������������� 1778 D. Jurisdictional Issue��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1780 E. Hampshire (No. 3): Back to the Irish Court of Appeal������������������������������������������������������� 1782 F. The Judgment in Hampshire (No. 4)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1784 I. Had there Been Material Non-Disclosure?���������������������������������������������������������������� 1784 II. The Substantive Appeal���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1785 G. The Judgment in Hampshire (No. 5)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1786 H. Conclusions�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1788 xxxvi

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The Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the EU Member States (as Reflected in the Work of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency)�������������������������������� 1791 Gabriel N Toggenburg A. Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1791 B. The FRA: The EU’s Fundamental Rights Body������������������������������������������������������������������ 1792 C. The Agency and the Charter: A ‘Close Connection’����������������������������������������������������������� 1795 D. The Charter and the National Judiciary: Increased Engagement�������������������������������������� 1799 E. The Charter and National Law Making: Marginal Role����������������������������������������������������� 1802 F. The Charter and National Executive: Lack of Engagement����������������������������������������������� 1804 G. Outlook: Avenues to Unfold the Charter’s Potential at National Level����������������������������� 1805 The Charter and the General Court������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1809 Alexander Kornezov A. Cross-Cutting Effects of the Charter����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1810 I. The Right to Effective Judicial Protection����������������������������������������������������������������� 1810 II. The Right to Sound Administration�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1819 III. Intermediate Conclusion�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1823 B. Case Law Significantly Impacted by the Charter���������������������������������������������������������������� 1824 I. Anti-Trust Law������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1824 II. Restrictive Measures��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1827 III. Banking Union������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1829 IV. Staff Law���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1832 C. Case Law Less Affected by the Charter�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1834 I. Intellectual Property��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1834 II. Anti-dumping������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1835 III. State Aid���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1835 IV. Access to Documents�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1836 V. Agriculture������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1837 VI. Public Procurement���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1837 VII. Contractual Liability��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1837 D. Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1838 The ‘Dublin Regulation’ and the Charter: An Impetus for Change���������������������������������������1839 Doyin Lawunmi A. Sovereignty Clause��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1840 B. Minors and Families������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1846 C. Right to an Effective Remedy���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1849 D. Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1854 Fundamental Social Rights in the Charter – Are They Rights? Are They Fundamental?������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1855 Niilo Jääskinen A. Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1855 B. A Short History of EU Fundamental Social Rights������������������������������������������������������������ 1856



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C. Nature and Effects of Fundamental Social Rights�������������������������������������������������������������� 1859 I. Philosophical Foundations of Fundamental Social Rights��������������������������������������� 1859 II. Effects of Fundamental Social Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1861 D. Protection of Fundamental Social Rights in a Multi-level Constitutional Structure and their Legal Effects in Case Law of the Court����������������������������������������������� 1862 E. From an Exception to the Fundamental����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1868 Part III – Commentary on the Treaty of EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights EU Accession to the ECHR���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1873 Tobias Lock PROTOCOL (No 8)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1873 Select Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1874 A. B. C. D. E. F.

History of EU Accession to the ECHR�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1875 EU–ECHR Relations in the Absence of a Formal Relationship����������������������������������������� 1875 I. Dialogue between the Two Courts����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1876 II. Member State Responsibility under the ECHR��������������������������������������������������������� 1876 Why Accession?�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1878 The Draft Accession Agreement������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1879 I. The Autonomy of EU Law as an Overarching Theme���������������������������������������������� 1879 II. The Co-respondent Mechanism�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1880 III. The Prior Involvement of the ECJ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1881 IV. Inter-party Disputes���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1881 Legal Hurdles: Opinion 2/13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1882 I. Shortcomings of the DAA Identified in Opinion 2/13��������������������������������������������� 1882 II. Criticism of Opinion 2/13������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1884 Future of Accession�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1885 I. Pathways to Accession in Light of Opinion 2/13������������������������������������������������������� 1886 II. Continued Desirability of EU Accession to the ECHR��������������������������������������������� 1890

Appendix........................................................................................................................................1891 Index..............................................................................................................................................1927

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List of Contributors Pekka Aalto is a Référendaire in the chambers of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen at the Court of Justice of the European Union. Albertina Albors-Llorens is Professor of EU Law, Fellow of St John’s College and Member of the Centre for European Legal Studies at the Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. Anthony Arnull is Barber Professor of Jurisprudence at Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham. Diamond Ashiagbor is Professor of Labour Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Heli Askola is an Associate Professor at the Monash Law Faculty. Catherine Barnard is Professor of EU Law and Employment Law and Fellow of Trinity College, University of Cambridge. Mark Bell is Regius Professor of Laws and a Fellow of Trinity College Dublin. Emmanouil Billis is Research Group Leader at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law in Freiburg, Germany (formerly Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law). Alan Bogg is Professor of Labour Law, University of Bristol; Emeritus Fellow, Hertford College, Oxford. Anne Charbord is a Consultant on Human Rights and a Guest Lecturer at the Vienna Master of Arts in Human Rights. Shazia Choudhry is a Reader in Law at Queen Mary, University of London. Rui Correia Gonçalves is a Senior Teaching Assistant and PhD Student at Birkbeck School of Law, University of London. Cathryn Costello is the Andrew W Mellon University Lecturer in International Human Rights and Refugee Law, at the Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, and a Fellow of St Antony’s College. Paul Craig is Emeritus Professor of English Law at St John’s College, Oxford. Rachael Craufurd Smith is Reader in EU Law at the School of Law, University of Edinburgh. Deirdre Curtin is Professor of European Law at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Olivier De Schutter is Professor of International Law at the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. Eileen Denza was a Legal Counsellor, Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce, Council to the Committee, House of Lords and a Visiting Professor at University College London. Filip Dorssemont is Professor of Labour Law at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) and the Free University of Brussels (VUB), Belgium.

List of Contributors

Catherine Dupré is Associate Professor in Comparative Constitutional Law at the University of Exeter. Hanna Eklund is Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Michele Everson is Professor of Law at Birkbeck College, University of London. Nuno Ferreira is Professor of Law at the School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex. Eleni Frantziou is Associate Professor in Public Law & Human Rights, University of Durham. Michael Ford QC is a barrister at Old Square Chambers. María-Teresa Gil-Bazo is Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Navarra, Spain. Oxana Golynker is Lecturer in Law at the University of Leicester. Gisella Gori is Senior Adviser, Council of Europe Liaison Office to the European Union, Brussels. Paul Gragl is a Lecturer in Law at Queen Mary, University of London. Kees Groenendijk is Professor emeritus of Sociology of Law and Migration Law at the Center for Migration Law, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands. Elspeth Guild is Professor of European Immigration Law at the University of Nijmegen, Netherlands, and also a partner at the London law firm Kingsley Napley. José Antonio Gutiérrez-Fons is a Référendaire in the cabinet of President Koen Lenaerts at the Court of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg. Ian Harden is Honorary Professor at The University of Sheffield, School of Law and Visiting Professor, College of Europe, Bruges. Maarten den Heijer is an Assistant Professor of International Law at the University of Amsterdam. Tamara Hervey is Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law, City, University of London. Herwig CH Hofmann is Professor of European and Transnational Public Law and Jean Monnet Chair in the Centre for European Law at the Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance of the University of Luxembourg. Gerard Hogan The Hon Mr Justice Hogan is a judge at the Supreme Court of Ireland. Liisa Holopainen is a Legal Officer at the Unit for EU Litigation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Niilo Jääskinen is an Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Jean-Paul Jacqué is Emeritus Professor at the University of Strasbourg and Honorary DirectorGeneral of the Council of the European Union. Jeff Kenner is Rights Lab Professor of European Law at the University of Nottingham. Lamin Khadar is a Researcher at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. xl

List of Contributors

Claire Kilpatrick is Professor of International and European Labour and Social Law at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Alexander Kornezov is a Judge at the General Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Biljana Kotevska is Research Coordinator at the European Policy Institute, North Macedonia. Herke Kranenborg is Professor of European Data Protection and Privacy Law at Maastricht University and Member of the Legal Service of the European Commission. Miriam Kullmann is Assistant Professor at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Ruth Lamont is Senior Lecturer in Family & Child Law at The University of Manchester. Doyin Lawunmi is Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Union. Ivan Lazarov is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Koen Lenaerts is President of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg and Professor of European Law at the University of Leuven, Belgium. Mats Lindfelt is Director of Research Services at Åbo Akademi University. Tobias Lock is Jean Monnet Chair in EU Law and Fundamental Rights, Maynooth University. David Mangan is Lecturer in law at Maynooth University. Virginia Mantouvalou is Professor of Human Rights and Labour Law at the Faculty of Laws, University College London. Gracia Marín Durán is Associate Professor in International Economic Law, University College London, Faculty of Laws. Ronan McCrea is Senior Lecturer in Law at University College London and Visiting Professor at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. Jean McHale is Professor of Health Care Law and Director for the Centre for Health Law, Science and Policy at Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham. Joana Mendes is Associate Professor of European Law at the University of Amsterdam. Sabine Michalowski is Professor of Law at the University of Essex. Valsamis Mitsilegas is Professor of European Criminal Law and Global Security and Deputy Dean for Global Engagement (Europe) at Queen Mary University of London. Violeta Moreno-Lax is a Lecturer in Law at Queen Mary, University of London. Elisa Morgera is Professor of Global Environmental Law at the University of Strathclyde Law School, Glasgow. Hanns Peter Nehl is a Legal secretary working in the Chambers of Judge Viktor Kreuschitz at General Court of the European Union. Manfred Nowak is Professor of International Law and Human Rights at the University of Vienna and Director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights,Vienna. 

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List of Contributors

Charlotte O’Brien is a Professor of Law at York Law School, University of York. Colm O’Cinneide is Professor of Constitutional and Human Rights Law at University College London. Elina Paunio is a Référendaire in the cabinet of Advocate General Nils Wahl at the Court of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg. Katrina Peake is Rights Lab Visiting Fellow in Slavery and Decent Work, at the University of Nottingham. Laurent Pech is Professor of European Law at Middlesex University London. Steve Peers is Professor of European Law at the University of Essex. Sacha Prechal is Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union and Professor of European Law at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. Clara Rauchegger is an Assistant Professor of European Law and Technology Law at the University of Innsbruck. Allan Rosas is Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges and the University of Helsinki and a Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Debbie Sayers is a legal research consultant at Peters and Peters LLP and runs the legal research consultancy interalia.org.uk. Dagmar Schiek is a full professor (Synnott Family Chair in European Union Law) in the school of law at University College Cork and a honorary professor at Queen’s University Belfast. Jo Shaw is Salvesen Chair of European Institutions at the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh. Dinah Shelton is Professor of International Law at George Washington University, Washington DC. Eleanor Spaventa is Professor of European Union Law at Durham University. Helen Stalford is a Professor of Law at the School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool. Erika Szyszczak is Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Sussex. Gabriel N Toggenburg is Senior Legal Advisor in the Directorate of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Visiting Professor at the University of Graz. Jonathan Tomkin is a Barrister and a Member of the Legal Service of the European Commission. Paul Torremans is Professor of Intellectual Property Law and co-director of the University of Nottingham Commercial Law Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences. Jens Vedsted-Hansen is a Professor of Law in the School of Law at Aarhus University, Denmark. Angela Ward is a Legal Secretary in the chambers of Advocate General Tanchev at the Court of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg and a Visiting Professor at Birkbeck College, University of London. Steve Weatherill is the Jacques Delors Professor of European Law at the University of Oxford. xlii

List of Contributors

Robin White is Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Leicester, and a Judge in the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal. Elizabeth Wicks is a Professor of Human Rights Law at the University of Leicester. Daniel Wilsher is Professor in Law at The City Law School, London. Bruno de Witte is Professor of Law at Maastricht University and at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence. Ferdinand Wollenschläger is Chair of Public Law, European Law and Public Commercial Law at University of Augsburg. Lorna Woods is Professor of Internet Law at University of Essex.



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Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

2

Article 1* Article 1 Human Dignity Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 1 The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrined this principle in its preamble: ‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ It results that none of the rights laid down in this Charter may be used to harm the dignity of another person, and that the dignity of the human person is part of the substance of the rights laid down in this Charter. It must therefore be respected, even where a right is restricted.1

Select Bibliography M Avbelj, ‘Human dignity and EU legal pluralism’ in G Davies and M Avbelj (eds), Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law (Cheltenham, E Elgar, 2018) 95. P Becchi and K Matthis (eds), Handbook of Human Dignity in Europe (Cham, Springer, 2019). D Bedford, ‘Key Cases on Human Dignity under Article 3 ECHR’ 2 (2019) European Human Rights Law Review 185. S Blömacher, Die Menschenwürde als Prinzip des deutschen und europäischen Rechts (Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 2016) 267–92. A Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015). M Borowsky, ‘Artikel 1’ in J Meyer (ed), Charta der Grundrechte der EU (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014) 94–137. M Borowsky, ‘Artikel 1’ in J Meyer (ed), Charta der Grundrechte der EU, 5th edn (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2019) 81–101. G Braibant, La Charte de Droits Fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne Témoignage et Commentaires (Paris, Seuil, 2001). L Burgogne-Larsen (ed), La dignité saisie par les juges (Brussels, Bruylant, 2010). C-A Chassin, ‘La notion de dignité de la personne humaine dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice’ in A Biad and V Parisot (eds), La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Bilan d’application (Brussels, Anthemis: Nemesis, 2018) 137. M Di Ciommo, Dignità umana e Stato costituzionale: la dignità umana nel costituzionalismo europeo, nella costituzione italiana e nelle giurisprudenze europee (Florence, Passigli Editore, 2010).

* This is a substantially revised version of the 2014 edition, which will be referred to below as relevant. The author wishes to thank Professor Armin von Bogdandy for awarding her a Max Planck Visiting Fellowship in June and July 2018, which made it possible to update the non-English bibliography, and Stephen Skinner (University of Exeter) for his careful reading and checking of this text. Thanks are also due to Martin Borowsky who kindly sent her the 2019 version of his commentary on Art 1 EUCFR forthcoming at the time. 1 These explanations appear to be largely drawn from a statement by Roman Herzog on 15 June 2000, see Ph Wallau, Die Menschenwürde in der Grundrechtordnung der europäischen Union (Bonn, Bonn University Press, 2010) 57.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

E Daly, Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions and the Worth of the Human Person (Philadelphia PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). C Dupré, ‘Dignité dans l’Europe constitutionnelle: entre inflation et contradictions’ in J Ziller (ed), L’Européanisation des droits constitutionnels à la lumière de la Constitution pour l’Europe (Paris, l’Harmattan, 2003) 121–35. ——, ‘Human Dignity in Europe: A Foundational Constitutional Principle’ (2013) 19 European Public Law 319–40. ——, The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015). P Gilabert, Human Dignity and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018). R Gröschner, A Kapust and OW Lembcke (eds), Wörterbuch der Würde (Paderborn, W Fink, 2013). P Grossi, ‘Dignità umana e libertà nella Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell’Unione Europea’ in M Siclari (ed), Contributi allo Studio della Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell’Unione Europea (Torino, G Giappichelli, 2003) 41–46. P Häberle, Europäische Verfassungslehre, 6th edn (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009). HD Jarass, Charta der Grundrechte der EU (Munich, Beck, 2016) 43–48. J Jones, ‘“Common Constitutional Traditions”: Can the Meaning of Human Dignity under German Law Guide the European Court of Justice?’ (2004) Public Law 167–87. ——, ‘Human dignity in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Interpretation by the European Court of Justice’ (2012) 33 Liverpool Law Review 281–300. J P Marguénaud, ‘Principe de dignité et Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme’ in B Feuillet-Liger and K Orfali (eds), La dignité de la persone: quelles réalités? (Brussels, Bruylant, 2016) 235–49. M Olivetti, ‘Dignità Umana’ in R Bifulco et al (eds), L’Europa dei diritti: Commento alla Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell’ Unione Europea (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001) 38–45. ——, ‘Article 1—Human Dignity’ in WBT Mock and G Demuro (eds), Human Rights in Europe, Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Durham, NC, North Carolina Academic Press, 2010) 3–11. I Ordeñana Gezuraga (ed), La Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y su Reflejo en el Ordenamiento Juridíco Español (Pamplona, Thomson Reuters, 2014). AL Pap, Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy (Oxon, Routledge, 2018) 126–63. JL Requero Pagés, ‘La “Dignidad de la Persona” como Categoría Conceptual en el Derecho de la Unión: Experiencias, Possibilidades y Perspectivas’ in R Chueca (ed), Dignidad Humana y Derecho Fundamental (Madrid, Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitutcionales, 2015) 279–94. S Rixen, ‘Die Würde und Integrität des Menschen’ in FSM Heselhaus and C Nowak (eds), Handbuch der Europäischen Grundrechte (Munich, Beck, 2006) 335–63. F Sacco, ‘Note sulla dignità umana nel diritto costituzionale europeo’ in SP Panunzio (ed), I diritti ­fondamentali e le Corti in Europa (Naples, Jovene Editore, 2005) 585–621. F Schorkopf, ‘Würde des Menschen’ in D Ehlers (ed), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten (Berlin, De Gruyter, 2009) 485–505. M Schwarz, ‘Die Menschenwürde als Ende der europäischen Wertegemeinschaft?’ (2011) 50 Der Staat 533. K Schwarzburg, Die Menschenwürde im Recht der europäischen Union (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012). Ph Wallau, Die Menschenwürde in der Grundrechtsordnung der Europäischen Union (Bonn, Bonn University Press, 2010). E Webster, Dignity, Degrading Treatment and Torture in Human Rights Law: The Ends of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Abingdon, Routledge, 2018).

A.  Field of Application of Article 1 01.01 Article 1 is potentially far-reaching as, according to the EU Charter preamble, it protects the central position of the individual in all the activities of the EU; this is reflected through numerous 4

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references to (human) dignity both in EU secondary legislation2 and soft law provisions.3 In particular, the Annual Reports of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) have evaluated an increasing range of EU actions through the prism of dignity. The treatment of third-country nationals, and specifically of asylum seekers, in relation to conditions of reception, detention and (forced) return, is by far the most significant issue, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The 2013/33/EU Reception Conditions Directive pays particular attention to issues such as residence, medical care, education and access to the labour market, with special protection granted to ‘vulnerable persons’ (Art 21) and minors (Arts 23 and 24).4 Directive 2008/115/EC on ‘common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals’ explicitly requires that ‘third-country nationals in detention should be treated in a humane and dignified manner with respect for their fundamental rights’ (para 17, preamble).5 Central to this is the requirement that ‘detention shall take place as a rule in specialised detention facilities’ and that ‘third-country nationals in detention shall be kept separated from ordinary prisoners’ (Art 16.1). Secondly, the FRA Reports reflect the growing attacks on dignity due to racism, hate crime and violence against women.6 Thirdly, related to this are issues of discrimination due to sex and gender identity, nationality and age, which are framed and assessed by reference to dignity. Finally, issues of social exclusion due to poverty and age have been approached through the prism of dignity, with specific references to homelessness and to criminalisation of homelessness violating human dignity and equal treatment.7 Crucially, Article 1 EUCFR also affects primary legislation in three ways, which have gained 01.02 significance in recent years. Firstly, Article 2 TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (hereafter TEU) enshrines human dignity as the first of its foundational values (together with ‘freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights’).8 Secondly, Article 1 EUCFR may

2 Eg: Directive 2003/9/EC, 27 January 2003, with reference to Art 1 EUCFR (recital 5); Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 29 April 2004, on the right of citizens of the EU and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (recital 5); Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection (recital 16). See also Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code); Regulation (EC) 810/2009 establishing a Community code on visas (Visa Code) (Art 39); Regulation 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and the Council on the European Borders and Coast Guard (recital 49 and Arts 21(4) and 35 (2)); Council Regulation 2016/369 on the Provision of Emergency Support within the Union (Art 3); Regulation 375/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council Establishing a European Humanitarian Voluntary Aid Corps (Arts 3 and 4). 3 Eg: Recommendation of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 December 2006 on the protection of minors and human dignity (2006/952/EC); EU Commission Communication on use of security scanners, COM (2010) 0311 final, with explicit reference to Art 1 EUCFR at para 15. 4 Council Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and the Council laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast): full respect of human dignity when in detention (para 18) and explicit references to Arts 1 and 4 (para 35); see eg Case C-601/15 PPU (Grand Chamber) J.N. v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie ECLI: EU:C:2016:84. The Commission 2016 proposal (COM (2016) 465 final) for revising this Directive also emphasises the ‘full respect of human dignity’ (pp 3, 10–11). 5 Directive 2008/115/EC, Art 8.4; see also Schengen Borders Code (Regulation 2016/1624). See Cases C-181/16 (Grand Chamber) Sadikou Gnandi v Etat Belge ECLI:EU:C:2018:465, and C-474/13 (Grand Chamber) Thi Ly Pham v Stadt Schweinfurt, Amt für Meldewesen und Statistik ECLI:EU:C:2014:2096. 6 FRA 2011 Report, 173 and 223; FRA 2012 Report, 188; and FRA 2016 Report, 170 and 175. 7 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on a European homelessness strategy, 25–26 June 2014, COR-2014-02234-00-00-AC-TRA (EN): ‘homelessness is the most extreme form of social exclusion, and violates human dignity’ (para 2). See also Case C-67/14 (Grand Chamber) Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Nazifa Alimanovic and Others ECLI:EU:C:2015:597 [45], in which the CJEU noted that the main function of the ‘social assistance benefits’ at the heart of the dispute ‘is in fact to cover the minimum subsistence costs necessary to lead a life in keeping with human dignity’, thus largely endorsing the phrasing of the German law-maker, though without reference to Art 1 EUCFR. 8 See the Resolution of the European Parliament on Hungary, 12 Sept 2018, P8-TA-PROV (2018) 0340.



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Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

influence the Union’s external action under Article 21 TEU.9 Thirdly, Article 49 TEU provides that a commitment to promoting Article 2 TEU values—and therefore human dignity—is a requirement for candidate countries to EU accession. Therefore Article 1 EUCFR, together with the whole of Title I, can usefully provide a more precise meaning for human dignity as a foundational value under Article 2 TEU and set the benchmark for the Union’s commitment to human rights protection, both within the EU and outside the EU in its dealings with third countries and international institutions. 01.03 Finally, under Article 51 EUCFR, human dignity protection becomes relevant to Member States’ actions ‘with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’.10 In this respect, all states are affected by the EUCFR, ie including Poland and the UK (ie before Brexit) which had demanded that Protocol 30, concerning the legal effect of the Charter, be attached to the Treaties as a condition of their signing and ratifying the Lisbon Treaty. This was clarified by the CJEU, which held that Protocol 30 was not to be understood as an opt-out clause.11

B.  Interrelationship of Article 1 with Other Provisions of the Charter 01.04 Article 1 EUCFR is clearly related to all the rights enshrined under Title I ‘Dignity’, namely the right to life (Art 2), the right to the integrity of the person (Art 3), the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (Art 4), the prohibition of slavery, forced labour and human trafficking (Art 5). The Charter further identifies two groups of people for whom special dignity protection is acknowledged. These are the elderly, who have ‘rights to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life’ under Article 25,12 and workers, whose dignity is awarded special protection under Article 31, together with health and safety requirements.13 01.05 Moreover, due to the unique foundational importance of human dignity (as reflected in the preamble’s second paragraph, which echoes and develops Article 2 TEU (‘Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’), the other rights enshrined in the Charter can also be understood as flowing from human dignity. The explanations of the Charter make explicit that dignity ‘constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights’. Some of the most obvious connections can be noted here (with no claim of exhaustivity). As dignity is generally understood as the freedom to shape one’s life, the rights under the Freedoms title become relevant, especially privacy (Art 7). Moreover, all rights included under the Equality title are most certainly connected to dignity; this flows from the equally shared humanity of human beings (regardless of their particular differences) and from the fact that the EU is a political and economic order founded on 9 Art 21.1: ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by … democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity.’ See K Schwarzburg, Die Menschenwürde im Recht der europäischen Union (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012) 325–34; and JR Marin Aís, ‘The Contribution of the EU to the Development of Customary Norms in the Field of Human Rights Protection’ in P Eeckhout and M López-Escudero (eds), The European Union’s External Relations in Times of Crisis (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) 271–96. 10 B v Bockel and P Wattel, ‘New Wine into old Wineskins: The Scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU after Akerberg Fransson’ (2013) European Law Review 866. See also the chapter on Art 51 in this volume. 11 Case C-411/10 (Grand Chamber) NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, with a comment by J Buckley (2012) European Human Rights Law Review 205. 12 See chapter on Art 25 in this volume. 13 See chapter on Art 31 in this volume.

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Art 1 – Human Dignity

e­ quality. Particularly relevant is the integration of persons with disabilities (Art 26). Similarly, the Solidarity rights, notably the right to social assistance and social security (Art 34), and the right to health care (Art 35), are also connected to Article 1. Furthermore (as mentioned above) workers’ rights to health, safety and dignity are specifically listed under Article 31. Noteworthy in its connection to the dignity protection duty of Article 1 is Article 36, which guarantees access to services of general economic interest. Finally, as dignity is very much about placing individuals at the centre and protecting them in their relations with power, the Justice rights must also be included here, with two rights of especial relevance. The right to an effective remedy (Art 47) is arguably a condition sine qua non for an effective guarantee of human dignity, with the CJEU opening up the possibility for building a bridge between the two in its LM ruling of July 2018.14 In addition, the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties under Article 49 have triggered judicial discussion (if not dialogue) on human dignity in relation to the European Arrest Warrant. Lastly, it has to be noted that human dignity, which has been likened to a ‘mother right’15 01.06 could also lead to the ‘discovery’ of new rights, ie rights not listed in the EUCFR, so as to afford protection against breaches that could not be anticipated at the time of drafting the Charter. The wording of Article 1 clearly allows for this possibility, as it presents human dignity in a distinct and separate way from the remaining Title I rights. This approach would be in line with some Member States’ practice and CJEU case law on dignity and could open up some valuable connections with, eg, the right to a healthy environment.16

C.  Sources of Article 1 While the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is explicitly referred to in the preamble 01.07 of the Charter, the principal influence on the drafting of Article 1 appears to have come from the Member States’ constitutions and in particular the German constitution.17 However, with regard to human dignity, the drafting of the EU Charter is uniquely innovative both in relation to existing international law texts and to the constitutions of EU Member States.

I. ECHR As the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not contain an explicit dignity 01.08 provision, it could not be used as a model or a source of inspiration for the drafting of Article 1 EUCFR. However, considering the obligation under Article 52(3) EUCFR to construct the EU Charter with reference to the case law on the ECHR, ECHR case law could usefully be referred to by the CJEU in due course, particularly on Article 3 ECHR, despite an apparent reluctance to do so in a systematic and elaborate manner.18

14 Case C-216/18 PPU (Grand Chamber) LM ECLI:EU:C:2018:586. 15 A Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), 156–67; see also M Borowsky, ‘Artikel 1’ in J Meyer (ed), Charta der Grundrechte der EU (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2019) para 37. 16 E Daly and J May, ‘Bridging Constitutional Dignity and Environmental Rights Jurisprudence’ (2016) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 218. 17 Comprehensive accounts of the drafting process of Art 1 EUCFR were produced by Borowsky, ‘Artikel 1’ (n 15) para 7–26; see also Wallau (n 1) 49–79. 18 J Krommendijk, ‘The Use of ECtHR Case Law by the Court of Justice after Lisbon: The View of Luxembourg Insiders’ (2015) Maastricht Journal of European Law 812.



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01.09

The East African Asians v UK case contains one of the first references to dignity, in relation to the prohibition against racial discrimination.19 An explicit statement of the European Court of Human Rights’ general commitment to dignity guiding the interpretation of the ECHR can be found in the so-called marital rape ruling, in which the Court held that ‘the very essence [of the ECHR] is respect for human dignity and human freedom’.20 In that particular case, the emphasis on dignity echoed ‘the essentially debasing character of rape’, from which the Court concluded that prosecuting a rapist husband under the UK common law could not be construed as a retroactive punishment under Article 7 ECHR. This dignity formula was subsequently and notably used by the ECtHR in the Pretty case, where the Court referred to it in connection to Article 8 and concluded that the decision to seek assisted suicide falls under the scope of this provision as it affected the quality of the applicant’s life in the last stages of her illness.21 The significance of the dignity reference here was to shift the focus of Article 8 from privacy to quality of life. It has to be noted, however, that this did not alter the formal hierarchy of ECHR rights, so that the right to life under Article 2 could not be interpreted as the right not to live. Overall, while the ECtHR formula is worded differently from Article 1 EUCFR, there seems to be a strong correlation between the ECtHR’s commitment to protecting human dignity and the protection duty under Article 1 EUCFR. The lack of a codified dignity provision has led to a diffuse protection of human dignity by 01.10 the ECtHR, whereby almost every ECHR right can be constructed and developed with reference to human dignity,22 with special emphasis on the absolute prohibitions of Articles 323 and 4 ECHR.24 ECHR case law has already proved a useful point of reference for developing Article 1 EUCFR (see section D.II below). An explicit commitment to dignity under the ECHR was confirmed in the preamble of the 01.11 Additional Protocol 13 concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, which reads: ‘everyone’s right to life is a basic value in a democratic society and the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings’ (emphasis added). As will be seen below, by the time this protocol was signed in 2002, the Council of Europe had already enshrined dignity in the specific context of the Oviedo Convention.

II.  Council of Europe Treaties 01.12 References to ‘human dignity’ within the Council of Europe started appearing in the late 1970s, with the first mention being found under the Declaration on Human Rights of the Committee 19 East African Asians v UK (1973) 3 EHRR 76, para 192: ‘the racial discrimination, to which the applicants have been publicly subjected by the application of … immigration legislation, constitutes an interference with their human dignity which … amounted to “degrading treatment” in the sense of Article 3 of the Convention’. See also Tyrer v UK App no 5856/72 (25 April 1978) [33]. Generally, see: H J Sandkühler, ‘Menschenwürde, Menschenrechte und die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention’ in S Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (ed), Vom Recht auf Menschenwürde: 60 Jahre Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (Tübingen, Mohr-Siebeck, 2013) 25–33. 20 SW v UK App no 20166/92 (22 Nov 1995) [44]. 21 Pretty v UK App no 2346/02 (29 July 2002) [65]: ‘The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. Without in any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under article 8 that notions of the quality of life take on significance.’ 22 A Elvira, ‘La Dignidad Humana en el Tribunal de los Derechos Europeos’ in R Chueca (ed), Dignidad Humana y Derecho Fundamental (Madrid, Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales, 2015) 201–20. 23 E Webster, ‘Dignity, Degrading Treatment and Torture’ in Human Rights Law: The Ends of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Abingdon, Routledge, 2018); D Bedford, ‘Key Cases on Human Dignity under Article 3 ECHR’ (2019) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 185. 24 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (7 January 2010).

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of Ministers of 27 April 1978.25 The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine signed at Oviedo in 1997 (CETS No 168) is the first CoE convention explicitly to enshrine dignity, under Article 1.1: ‘Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regards to the application of biology and medicine.’26 The Oviedo Convention does not define dignity but, nevertheless, may be relevant to understanding the general meaning of Article 1 EUCFR. For instance, its emphasis on the ‘interests and welfare of human beings’ (Art 2) may help develop the notion of the central place of the individual, as referred to in the EUCFR preamble. The whole Convention may also become relevant for the interpretation of the right to physical and mental integrity under Article 3 EUCFR due to their linkage with biomedical issues. Secondly, in 2005 the Council of Europe adopted a Convention on Action against Trafficking 01.13 in Human Beings (CETS No 197), the main concern of which is ‘dignity and integrity of the human being’, as indicated in its preamble (second sentence).27 The explanations of the Convention make it clear that ‘trafficking treats human beings as a commodity to be bought and sold’28 and the Convention considers that trafficking constitutes a violation of human dignity. The Convention pays particular attention to educational programmes for boys and girls about ‘the importance of gender equality and the dignity and integrity of every human being’ (Art 6.d), together with victims’ repatriation in ‘safety and dignity’ (Art 16.1–16.2).

III.  UN Treaties The protection of human dignity by international law is as diffuse as it is far-reaching, and only 01.14 the main texts can be mentioned here.29 The preamble to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 is referred to in the explanation to the EUCFR, indicating that the EUCFR is espousing this spirit of international human rights law. The key dignity provisions of the Declaration are Article 1 (‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’), Article 22 (‘Everyone, as a member of society has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of this personality’) and Article 23(3) (‘Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection’). The Declaration never became binding but was influential on the drafting of subsequent conventions, as well as Member States’ constitutions. The two International Covenants adopted 25 ‘In the conviction that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, both at national and international level, is a continuing task and that the individual rights arising out of man’s human dignity conserve their prime value and importance throughout the changes and evolution of society’, Declaration on Human Rights, Committee of Ministers, 27 April 1978 (para 4): https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId= 0900001680536865, identified by I S Garbizu, ‘Artículo 1: La dignidad humana, germen de derechos y libertades’ in I Ordeñana Gezuraga (ed), La Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y su Reflejo en el Ordenamiento Juridíco Español (Pamplona, Thomson Reuters, 2014) 45. 26 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=164&CM=8&DF=09/01/2013&CL=ENG. 27 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=197&CM=8&DF=09/01/2013&CL=ENG. 28 Explanatory Report, p 27. 29 P Capps, Human Dignity as the Foundations of International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009); C Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 85–91, and A Gattini, R Garciandia and P Webb (eds), Human Dignity and International Law (Leiden, Brill-Nijhoff, 2020).



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in 1966 contain further specific references to human dignity. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights refers to dignity under Article 10 (‘All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’). The 1966 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights refers to dignity in relation to a right to education ‘directed at the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity’ under Article 13. Finally, the 1949 Geneva Conventions have a common Article 3, which protects the wounded and sick of armed forces in the field (I), the wounded, sick and shipwrecked of the armed forces at sea (II), prisoners of war (III) and civilian persons in time of war (IV) against ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’.30 01.15 The EUCFR broadly echoes these international conventions in enshrining dignity in a similarly prominent manner, with references to dignity in the preamble and in the first article. Moreover, all these texts emphasise the inherently human quality of dignity, as well as, importantly, its indivisibility: dignity is protected by both International Covenants; the EUCFR embraces civil and political rights, as well as solidarity and labour rights. Moreover, the common picture that arises out of these texts is that dignity is intended to acknowledge the richness of humanity and to protect people accordingly, especially when they find themselves in a situation of significant imbalance of power vis-à-vis fellow human beings, eg in care, in the workplace or in detention.

IV.  Relevant EU Law 01.16 Chronologically, Article 1 of the Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms adopted by the European Parliament on 12 April 1989 can be considered as the first formal ancestor of the EUCFR and was prepared ‘to supplement the Maastricht Treaty’ on the initiative of two MEPs.31 This Declaration constitutes the very first indication of the EU’s awareness of dignity’s importance and of its attempt to protect it. Dignity was given a prominent position and was enshrined under Article 1, which reads: ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable’. This Declaration did not come into force, but the ECJ has created its own concept of dignity in a few, but significant, rulings.

V.  Other Sources: National Constitutions 01.17 Most EU Member States’ constitutions enshrine dignity, either in the opening section on the structuring principles of the constitution, or under the first two provisions in their fundamental rights sections.32

30 See www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp. 31 See also: Resolution of the European Parliament of 16 March 1989 on ethical and legal problems related to genetic engineering; and Council Recommendation 98/560/EC of 24 September 1998 on the development of the competitiveness of the European audiovisual and information services industry by promoting national frameworks aimed at achieving a comparable and effective level of protection of minors and human dignity: Garbizu (n 25) 45. 32 In chronological order: Italy (Arts 3, 36 and 41); Germany (Art 1); Sweden (Arts 1 and 2); Greece (Art 2); Portugal (Arts 1, 13, 26 and 59); Spain (Art 10); Hungary (Art 54, 1989); Romania (Art 3); Slovenia (Arts 21 and 34); Estonia (Art 10); Slovakia (Arts 12 and 19); Lithuania (Arts 21 and 25); Czech Republic (Art 1 and Art 10 Charter); Latvia (Art 95); Belgium (Art 23); Poland (Art 30), Finland (Art 1). C Dupré, The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (Oxford, Bloomsbury/Hart, 2015) 121–35; P Becchi and K Matthis (eds), Handbook of Human Dignity in Europe (Cham, Springer, 2019). Beyond Europe, see: E Daly, Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions and the Worth of the Human Person (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

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The German constitution is without doubt the constitution that has most explicitly influenced 01.18 the drafting of Article 1 EUCFR, due to the repeated contributions of Roman Herzog (former president of the German Federal Constitutional Court and of the Federal Republic of Germany, and chairman of the Convention that drafted the Charter) to this effect, since the beginning of the drafting process.33 According to Herzog, dignity reflects the Union’s commitment to human rights protection and highlights the centrality of human beings within the EU legal order. Restating this commitment was particularly necessary considering the context of the Charter’s adoption, namely the recent collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe bringing to the fore the fragility of democracy and the pervasiveness of dictatorship in Europe. For these reasons, it seemed clear to the drafters that dignity ought to be the most important of the Charter’s fundamental rights. The final phrasing of Article 1 EUCFR is, however, not a verbatim copy of its German counterpart.34 Until the coming into force of the Charter, ie in the absence of a codified provision for human 01.19 dignity in EU primary law, German constitutional case law was the most influential, if not always explicit, source of inspiration for Advocates General in developing human dignity.35 This was very clear in the Opinion of AG Tesauro under the P v S and Cornwall case in 1996, with references to German constitutional case law at paras 20 and 21. These references were omitted in the ECJ ruling, which, however, constructed discrimination on the ground of sex ‘as a failure to respect dignity and freedom’ (para 22).36 This reference was repeated in the AG’s Opinion under K B v National Health Service Pensions Agency, Secretary of State for Health (para 77) and implicitly endorsed by the ECJ in its ruling,37 which again did not refer to German case law (but instead to the Goodwin v UK case, para 33). Although close reading and cross-referencing are necessary to identify this influence, German case law has definitely shaped the ECJ’s construction of human dignity in relation to sexual discrimination in these cases. German case law was also considered by AG Stix-Hackl in her Opinion under the Omega ruling, which includes the German understanding of dignity in the survey of ‘common constitutional traditions’ (paras 73–88).38 The ECJ acknowledged this (para 34),39 but constructed its own understanding of human dignity as a general principle of law and considered that the particular constitutional status and nature of human dignity in German constitutional law was ‘immaterial’ (para 34). With regards to the use of constitutional traditions common to the Member States, this ruling was significant as, while the ECJ was obviously being influenced by German law (due to the case originating in

33 W Karl, ‘Die Rolle der Menschenwürde in der EU-Verfassungsdebatte’ in M Fisher (ed), Der Begriff der M ­ enschenwürde (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2005) 27; and Borowsky, ‘Artikel 1’ (n 15). 34 Art 1 German Constitution reads: ‘1. Human dignity is inviolable. To protect and to respect it shall be the duty of all state authority. 2. The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. 3. The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.’ M Mahlmannn, ‘The Basic Law at 60: Human Dignity and the Culture of Republicanism’ (2010) German Law Journal 9 and H Dreier, ‘Human Dignity in German Law’ in M Düwell et al (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 375–385. 35 J Jones, ‘“Common Constitutional Traditions”: Can the Meaning of Human Dignity under German Law Guide the European Court of Justice?’ (2004) Public Law 167; and H Schulze-Fielitz, ‘Verfassungsvergleichung als Einbahnstraße? Zum Beispiel der Menschenwürde in der biomedizinischen Forschung’ in A Blankenagel et al (eds), Verfassung im Diskurs der Welt, Liber Amicorum für Peter Häberle (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2004) 355. 36 Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143. 37 Case C-117/01 KB National Health Service Pensions Agency, Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-541. 38 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen-und-Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn (18 March 2004), Opinion of AG Stix Hackl. 39 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen-und-Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.



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Germany, where dignity has a particular constitutional prominence), it explicitly detached its construction of this concept from its national source. 01.20 The EU Charter allows for references to Member States’ construction of fundamental rights as an interpretation aid under Article 52(4) EUCFR, providing that ‘fundamental rights [resulting] from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States … shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions’. Two recent developments deserve attention. Firstly, the muted judicial dialogue between the CJEU and the German Federal Constitutional Court underlying the CJEU’s construction of human dignity reached a defining stage in 2015, when the German Court asserted its own understanding of human dignity and set out in no uncertain terms a framework of interpretation for the CJEU’s construction of Article 1 EUCFR, in what has been promptly labelled the ‘Solange III ruling’.40 The German Court brought to the fore the German constitution’s commitment to human dignity under the combined Article 1 and Article 79(3) (the so-called eternity clause), and marked the boundaries of its own hermeneutic territory by invoking the ‘acte clair’ theory and by performing an ‘identity review’ of the European Arrest Warrant. In so doing, the German Court arguably reminded the CJEU of the significance of the EU’s commitment to respecting and protecting human dignity under Article 1 EUCFR, a commitment that the CJEU had somewhat hastily forgotten in its Melloni ruling delivered a few weeks before in favour of the principle of primacy of EU law.41 While the German Court took care to emphasise its EU-friendly approach, its judgment leaves little doubt as to the direction the CJEU’s future construction of human dignity ought to take. Secondly, took place two years before the new Hungarian Fundamental Law adopted in 2011 departs from European constitutionalism in almost all features, including its understanding of, and commitment to, human dignity.42 The FIDESZ-led government has promoted a communitarian concept of dignity anchored in a troubling combination of extreme Christian values, a nationalist, xenophobic, and (more recently) homophobic and transphobic agenda.43 In 2016, the packed Hungarian constitutional court developed its own version of constitutional identity review and widened the gap between the EU and the Hungarian concepts of human dignity even more.44 While human dignity—as it is enshrined in most constitutional orders across the EU—could become an effective factor of integration, and the engine driving an EU system of human rights protection, the risk of it becoming a powerful locus of disagreement and controversy, with a potentially divisive impact, has never been so real. However, as is discussed below, the CJEU appears in no rush to elaborate its interpretation of Article 1 EUCFR.

40 2 BvR 2735/14, Mr R v Order of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Order of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (second senate) of 15 December 2015 comment by J Nowag (2016) Common Market Law Review 1441–54. See also: M Hong, ‘Human Dignity, Identity Review of the European Arrest Warrant and the Court of Justice as a Listener in the Dialogue of Courts: Solange III and Aranyosi’ (2016) European Constitutional Law Review 549–63. 41 Case C-399/11 (Grand Chamber) Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, and A Torres Perez, ‘Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue’ (2014) European Constitutional Law Review 308. 42 C Dupré, ‘Human Dignity: Rhetoric, Protection and Instrumentalisation’ in GA Tóth (ed), Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law (Budapest, CEU Press, 2012) 143–70. 43 AL Pap, Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy (London and New York, ­Routledge, 2018). See the Proposal for a 9th Amendment to the 2010 Fundamental Law, submitted on 10 November 2020. See T Drinóczi, ‘Hungary has sped up its sliding down the slope towards authoritarianism: the proposed 9th Amendment and accompanying laws’, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 21 Nov 2020: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/11/ hungary-has-sped-up-in-its-sliding-down-the-slope-towards-authoritarianism-the-proposed-ninth-amendment-andaccompanying-laws/ (accessed 28 November 2020). The amendment was adopted in December 2020. 44 G Halmai, ‘Abuse of Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court on Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law’ (2008) Review of Central and East European Law 23–42.

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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks Until the coming into force of the Charter, human dignity had largely been a judge-made concept, 01.21 constructed on a rather ad hoc basis.45 Therefore, despite the Charter preamble’s claim only ‘to make those rights more visible’, Article 1 EUCFR represents the first codification of human dignity in EU primary law, giving it not only prominent visibility, but also, crucially, unprecedented normative strength. Human dignity is a new phrase in the language of EU constitutionalism: it is a new foundational value (the first one under Article 2 TEU) and the first fundamental right under the Charter.46 The normative status of dignity in the EU Charter (as under the Lisbon Treaty) is typical of constitutional texts founding a new order and is in line with constitutional codifications of dignity since WWII in Europe.47 In fact, it may not be a complete coincidence that the idea of a Human Rights Charter and the process of drafting it started in 1989 (with the above mentioned European Parliament Declaration), the year the Berlin Wall came down, and re-started in 1999 at the Cologne summit, when drafters might have felt that Europe could never be safe enough from totalitarianism.48 The repetition of dignity in strategic places (preamble, Title I, Arts 1, 25 and 31) indicates that dignity could potentially have a very far-reaching effect on EU law and its approach to human rights under the Lisbon Treaty. However, human dignity is also a legal concept notorious for its challenging complexity, as is 01.22 borne out in EU law, where it has at least four different legal definitions:49 as a ‘general principle of law’ (Omega), as the first foundational value (Art 2 TEU), as a right, and as the basis of rights (Art 1 EUCFR). In terms of substance, human dignity has tended to be used by judges to protect the core attributes of humanity, an issue that does not always have a pre-determined answer and that often lies at a crossroads of apparently conflicting values.50 Due to these reasons, law-makers tend to leave it undefined, and judges have engaged differently with this concept.51

45 E Dubout, ‘La dignité dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés’ in L Burgogne-Larsen (ed), La dignité saisie par les juges en Europe (Brussels, Bruylant, 2010) 115; M Di Ciommo, Dignità umana e Stato c­ ostituzionale: la dignità umana nel costituzionalismo europeo, nella costituzione italiana e nelle giurisprudenze europee (Florence, Passigli Editore, 2010) 197; M Rau and F Schorkopf, ‘Der EuGH und die Menschenwürde’ (2002) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2448; M Schwarz, ‘Die Menschenwürde als Ende der europäischen Gemeinschaft?’ (2011) Der Staat 537–38; C-A Chassin, ‘La notion de dignité de la personne humaine dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice’ in A Biad and V Parisot (eds), La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Bilan d’application (Brussels, Anthemis: ­Nemesis, 2018) 137; and M Avbelj, ‘Human Dignity and EU Legal Pluralism’ in G Davies and M Avbelj (eds), Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law (Cheltenham, E Elgar, 2018) 95. 46 M Olivetti, ‘Dignità Umana’ in R Bifulco et al (eds), L’Europa dei diritti, Commento alla Carta dei Diritti ­Fondamentali dell’ Unione Europea (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001) 38–45 and C Dupré, ‘Human Dignity in Europe: A Foundational Constitutional Principle’ (2013) 19 European Public Law 319. 47 Dupré, The Age of Dignity (n 32) 53–81. 48 EO Eriksen, ‘Why a Constitutionalised Bill of Rights’ in EO Eriksen, JE Fossum and AJ Menéndez (eds), The ­Chartering of Europe: The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003) 48–70. 49 C Dupré, ‘Article 1: Human Dignity’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, CH Beck/Hart Publishing/Nomos, 2014) 19. 50 M Borowsky, ‘Wertkonflikte in der Europäischen Union, eine Problemskizze’ in HJ Derra (ed), Freiheit, Sicherheit und Recht, Festschrift f. J Meyer zum 70. Geburtstag (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006) 49–69; and M Düwell, ‘Human Dignity: Concepts, Discussions and Philosophical Perspectives’ in Düwell et al (n 34) 23. 51 L Ackerman, Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South Africa (Cape Town, Juta & Co, 2012); D Grimm, ‘Dignity in a Legal Context: Dignity as an Absolute Right’ and JP Costa, ‘Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ both in C McCrudden (ed), Understanding Dignity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 381–92 and 393–402; and Barak (n 15) 69–103.



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II.  Scope of Application 01.23 The scope of Article 1 is unusually wide due to the dual nature of dignity under the EU Charter, ie both a right and ‘the real basis of fundamental rights’.52 In conceptual terms this may not be an easy tension to reconcile. In practical terms, however, dignity’s dual legal nature under the Charter is likely to prove beneficial as it offers flexibility to protect human beings in the most appropriate way. Indeed, the Charter’s driving logic is a teleological one, as indicated in the preamble, namely ‘to place the individual at the heart of the EU activities’. As a result, alleged victims of human dignity breaches, as well as the CJEU, should always be able to rely on dignity regardless of whether dignity is at stake as a right or as ‘the basis of rights’. 01.24 The CJEU has referred to Article 1 in a few judgments but very often by the Grand Chamber and never on its own, preferring to combine it with Article 4 EUCFR (prohibition on torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 7 (right to privacy), often to strengthen the protection granted by these rights. In a loose chronological order, the dignity case law has involved three broad types of issues since 2011.53 Firstly, the CJEU had to clarify the meaning and scope of the ‘minimum reception conditions’ that Member States have to guarantee under Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers pending a decision on which Member State is responsible for their application.54 The Court noted the requirement to interpret this Directive by reference to its overall scheme and purpose, in particular with reference ‘to ensure full respect for human dignity and to promote the application of Articles 1 and 18 (right to asylum)’ (para 42). Building on this and reiterating the importance of ‘Article 1 of the Charter, under which human dignity must be respected and protected’, the Court found that the minimum standards of reception must be granted to asylum seekers ‘even for a temporary period of time after the making of the application for asylum and before being actually transferred to the responsible Member State’ (para 56), with the financial cost of providing these conditions having to be borne by the (temporary) host State (para 59).55 In that ruling, the CJEU confirmed the welfare dimension generally attributed to human dignity in Member States,56 and more widely recognised in academic scholarship.57 In Zubair Haqbin decided eight years later, the Court highlighted the connection between ‘the requirement to ensure a dignified standard of living’ under recital 35 of Directive 2013/33 and the ‘application of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’. It repeated its construction of ‘human dignity within the meaning of that article’ developed in the case of Jawo (discussed below) a few months earlier as requiring that ‘the person concerned not finding himself or herself in a situation of extreme material poverty that does not allow that person to meet his or her most basic needs such as a place to live, food, clothing and personal hygiene, and that undermines his or her physical or mental health or puts that person in a state of degradation incompatible with human dignity’.58 52 2018 Report on the Application of the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights, COM (2019) 257 Final, 36. 53 Case law development until 2011 is discussed in Dupré, ‘Article 1: Human Dignity’ (n 49) 15–18. 54 Case C-179/11 Cimade and GISTI v Ministre de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-Mer, des Collectivités territoriales et de l’Immigration ECLI:EU:C:2012:594. 55 See also Case C-79/13 Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers v Selver Saciri et al ECLI:EU:C:2014:103 [33]–[35]. Under Directive 2003/9/EC, financial allowances to asylum seekers must be sufficient to enable minor children to be housed with their parents so that the family unity of asylum seekers may be maintained. 56 Dupré, ‘Article 1: Human Dignity’ (n 49) 17–18; M Simpson, ‘“Designed to Reduce People … to Complete Destitution”: Human Dignity in the Active Welfare State’ (2015) European Human Rights Law Review 66. 57 B Klein Goldewigt, Dignity and Human Rights: The Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002); see also, AJ Menéndez, ‘Rights to Solidarity’ in Eriksen, Fossum and Menéndez (n 48) 178; see S­ chwarzburg (n 9) 135–50. See also M Nowak, Human Rights or Global Capitalism: The Limits of Privatization (­Philadelphia, Pennsylvania University Press, 2017). 58 Case C-233/18 Zubair Haqbin v Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers ECLI:EU:C:2019:956 [46].

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The reference to Article 1 in relation to a ‘dignified standard of living’ strengthened that requirement and in particular the Court held that sanctions for asylum seekers’ inappropriate behaviour may not deprive them of these living conditions. This connection with Article 1 might also be understood as elevating the legal status of specific welfare provisions under the Charter, such as Article 14 (education), Article 34 (social security and social assistance), Article 35 (health care), Article 36 (access to services of general economic interest) or Article 37 (environmental protection). This further resonates with an increasing awareness of disastrous consequences of years of austerity—directly or indirectly—inflicted by the EU,59 and in particular in relation to growing homelessness, considered as a violation of human dignity by the Committee of the Regions.60 The second broad type of dignity issues involves a combination of Article 1 EUCFR with Article 7 EUCFR (the right to private and family life) and was triggered by methods deployed to ascertain the credibility of asylum seekers invoking their homosexuality as a ground for persecution in their home country. In the first ruling delivered in 2014,61 the CJEU found that subjecting homosexual ‘applicants to possible “tests”, in order to demonstrate their homosexuality or even the production by those applicants of evidence such as films of their intimate acts’ infringed human dignity under Article 1 EUCFR (para 65). Four years later,62 the Court confirmed its approach in relation to other types of tests, apparently less intrusive, and found that ‘an expert’s report by a psychologist’ entailing exploratory examination, an examination of personality and several personality tests, namely the “Draw-a-person-in-the-rain” test, the Rorschach and the Szondi tests’ have to comply with the Charter rights, ‘such as the right to human dignity, enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter, and the right to respect for private and family life guaranteed by Article 7 thereof ’ (para 35). The CJEU focused its reasoning on Article 7, which the Court held was breached due to the lack of proportionality between the seriousness of the interference in the applicant’s private life and the overall aim of the Directive 2011/95 (para 59). With the third type of issues, the CJEU considered Article 1 in relation to the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 4 EUCFR. Most cases on these issues arose out the Dublin system of asylum, including the first ruling on human dignity, ie NS of December 2011.63 Five years later in CK, the Court noted the ‘fundamental importance [of Art 4], to the extent that it is absolute in that it is closely linked to respect for human dignity, which is the subject of Article 1 EU Charter’.64 This close linkage between Article 1 and Article 4 was confirmed in Ibrahim (delivered on 19 March 2019)65 and was the basis for the Court to hold in the cases of Ibrahim and of Jawo (delivered the same day) that the timing of exposure to such level of mistreatment over the course of the asylum procedure is ‘immaterial’.66 The Court of Justice determined the engagement of Article 4 by reference to the case law of the ECtHR on Article 3 ECHR,67 and it insisted as a result on ‘a particularly high level of severity’ (Jawo [92] and Ibrahim [90]). In Ibrahim, the 59 Y Varoufakis, Notre Printemps d’Athènes (Lonrai, Editions Les Liens qui Libèrent, 2015). 60 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on a European homelessness strategy (n7). 61 Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 (Grand Chamber) A, B, C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie ECLI:EU:C:2014:2406. The EU Commission 2016 proposal for an Asylum Qualification Regulation emphasised the need to respect asylum seekers’ right to human dignity when assessing their credibility. 62 Case C-473/16 F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal ECLI:EU:C:2018:36. 63 NS (n 11). 64 Case C-578/16 PPU CK v Republika Slovenija ECLI:EU:C:2017:127 [59]. See also Case C-353/16 (Grand Chamber) MP v Secretary for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2018:276 [36]. 65 Joined cases C-297/17, C-318/17, C-319/17 and C-438/17 Ibrahim v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Taus Magamadov, ECLI:EU:C:2019:219 [87]. 66 Ibrahim (n 65) [87] and C-163/17 Abubacarr Jawo v Bundesrepublic Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:218 [90]. 67 C K (n64) [67–68] with specific reference to Paposhvili v Belgium (App no 417138/10 of 13 December 2016); Jawo [91–92] with specific reference to M.S.S v Belgium and Greece (App no 30696/09 of 21 Jan 2011). Ibrahim referred to Jawo, but not to specific ECHR case law [89].



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Court appeared to take ownership of ECHR case law and no longer defined the threshold of severity by reference to it, but exclusively by reference to Jawo (para 92) as ‘a situation of extreme material poverty’.68 The connection with human dignity is the Court’s main justification for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust amongst member states, to advise the referring member state’s court to engage in the two-step test that it set out in Aranyosi,69 and to assess the risk of the asylum seeker being subjected to a breach of his or her human dignity if transferred to a different member state. 01.25 Finally, while development in positive law is limited, the connections between Article 2 TEU (the foundational values) and the EU Charter have to be noted here. The LM case of July 2018 built a bridge between Article 2 TEU and the EU Charter by connecting the rule of law and Article 47 EU Charter.70 A second reference to connections between Article 2 TEU and Articles 1 and 4 EU Charter as ‘enshrining one of the fundamental [sic] values of the Union and its member states’ is to be found in Jawo.71 Given that human dignity is both the first foundational value of the EU under Article 2 TEU and the first right under the EUCFR, there is ample scope for substantiating Article 2 TEU values with reference to the whole of Title I of the EU Charter, and therefore for assessing the multi-faceted deterioration of democracy across EU Member States from the perspective of human dignity.

III.  Specific Provisions 01.26 CJEU case law on Article 1 EUCFR is still limited and, in the absence of a judicial interpretation of human dignity comparable to those put forward by the European Court of Human Rights in Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia72 or in Bouyid v Belgium,73 the 2018 Annual Report on the Application of the EU Charter provides a useful self-contained definition in the following terms: ‘human dignity … is the basis of all fundamental rights. It guarantees the protection of human beings from being treated as mere objects by the state or by their fellow citizens. It is a right, but also part of the essence of all other rights. Therefore it must be respected when any other rights are restricted. All subsequent rights and freedoms on dignity, such as the right to life and the prohibition of torture and slavery, add specific protection against violations of human dignity. They must be equally upheld in order to protect other rights and freedoms in the Charter, for example the freedom of expression and freedom of association. None of the rights laid down in the Charter may be used to harm the dignity of another person.’74 (a)  ‘Human Dignity’ 01.27 Dignity is one of the most difficult concepts to understand and to define in law. Intuitively and legally, it has to do with notions of (self-) respect, autonomy, privacy, integrity and 68 Ibrahim (n 65) [90]. This was confirmed a few months later in the joined cases C-540/17 and C-541/17 ­Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Adel Hamed and Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Amar Omar ECLI:EU:C:2019:964 [39] (only available in French and German) as ‘dénuement matériel extrême’. 69 Joined Cases C-404/15 (Grand Chamber) and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen ECLI:EU:C:2016:198. 70 C Dupré, ‘The Rule of Law, Fair Trial and Human Dignity: The Protection of the EU Values after LM’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Piotr Bogdanowicz, Iris Canor, Christoph Grabenwarter, Matthias Schmidt and Maciej Taborowski (eds.), Defending Checks and Balances in the EU Member States: Taking stock of Europe’s Actions (Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer 2021) 431–442. 71 Jawo (n 66) [80]. 72 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (7 January 2010) [282]. 73 Bouyid v Belgium App no 23380/09 (28 September 2015) [45]–[50] and [81], [87]–[90], [100]–[111]. 74 2018 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 52) 36.

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self-determination. In a manner typical of human rights conventions, the EUCFR does not define ‘dignity’. As a result, some scholars have suggested that dignity should remain conceptually open,75 so that it continues to be an ‘anthropological reservoir of meaning’ (anthropologisches Sinnreservoir),76 from which we can keep deriving new ways of defining and protecting humanity. In this respect, the closest synonym to ‘human dignity’ offered by the Charter is perhaps the preamble’s phrase, ‘placing the individual at the heart of [EU] activities’. The shaping of human dignity by (constitutional) lawyers in Europe has been mostly (if not exclusively) influenced by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant,77 and his reflection on dignity and humanity has been received (and simplified) as the prohibition on instrumentalisation or objectification of human beings.78 This injunction always to treat a person as an end in herself, and not merely as a means is arguably at the heart of the EU Charter, with the prohibition on degrading and humiliating people and on reducing them to slaves. If the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings (Art 3(2)(c)) corresponds to an unlikely risk at the time of the Charter’s adoption and coming into force, the ‘prohibition of making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain’ (Art 3(2)(b)) reflects some very real concerns.79 Under the Charter, dignity is an exclusively human quality:80 it is qualified as ‘human’, and all 01.28 the rights guaranteed under Title I protect the most essential attributes of humanity.81 Protection of the uniqueness of humanity is explicitly enshrined in the prohibition of reproductive human cloning, that is, the deliberate engineering of two (or more) genetically identical human beings. Under Articles 25 and 31, the Charter confirms that dignity applies to human beings in more concrete situations, such as work and old age, which represent frequent threats to human dignity.82 Human dignity therefore does not apply to non-human entities, such as institutions, corporations or states. With the rise of new biotechnological possibilities (and potentialities), defining humanity is, however, becoming increasingly complex, often raising questions that have yet to be answered. Reference to human dignity can prove useful in seeking to draw some boundaries. This is well illustrated by the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (AI) which aim to construct a suitable framework for uses of AI with explicit reference to human dignity under Article 1 EUCFR.83 In so doing, they arguably acknowledge a new normative layer of humanity’s definition, namely the cognitive capacity and processes that make each of us unique and ontologically undetermined.84 Finally, it has to be noted that the EU protects human

75 F Sacco, ‘Note sulla dignità umana nel “diritto costituzionale europeo”’ in SP Panunzio (ed), I diritti fondamentali e le Corti in Europa (Naples, Jovene Editore, 2005) 596. 76 S Rixen, ‘Würde des Menschen als Fundament der Grundrechte’ in FSM Heselhaus and C Nowak (eds), Handbuch der Europäischen Grundrechte (Munich, CH Beck Verlag, 2006) 345; and P Häberle, Das Menschenbild im Verfassungsstaat, 4th edn (Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 2005). 77 R Gröschner, A Kapust and OW Lembcke (eds), Wörterbuch der Würde (Paderborn, W Fink, 2013) 13–121; T E Hill, ‘Kantian Perspectives on the Rational Basis of Human Dignity’ in Düwell et al (n 34) 215. 78 Tyrer v UK (n 19) [33]: ‘Thus, although the applicant did not suffer any severe or long lasting physical effects, his punishment—whereby he was treated as an object in the power of the authorities—constituted an assault on precisely that which it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 (art. 3) to protect, namely a person’s dignity and physical integrity. Neither can it be excluded that the punishment may have had adverse psychological effects. The institutionalised character of this violence is further compounded’, emphasis added. 79 Case C-377/98 Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2001] ECR I-7079. 80 Borowsky, ‘Artikel 1’ (n 15) para 41, see case C-364/13 (Grand Chamber) International Stem Cell Corporation ECLI:EU:C:2014:2451 involving Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. 81 Dupré, The Age of Dignity (n 32) 43–50. 82 FRA 2018 Report, 3, 9–35. 83 Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, High Level Expert Group on AI, April 2019. 84 J Lacroix and M Foessel, ‘Pourquoi Lefort “compte”: Avant-Propos’ (2019) Esprit 42–48.



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dignity without defining it by reference to higher values, whatever these may be, and under both Article 2 TEU and Article 1 EUCFR human dignity is the highest value. The meaning of dignity and its scope of protection may therefore not be defined by reference to other, ie cultural, religious or indeed economic, values. Worded in this abstract manner, human dignity is embodied in individual human beings who are engaged in a constantly evolving set of complex relationships,85 without ever being defined through their belonging to pre-determined communities. The EU Charter can therefore be understood as a key framework within which to facilitate these ­interactions, while always protecting the centrality and uniqueness of individual human beings. 01.29 Built into the concept of dignity is the ontological equality of all human beings, and the EU Charter is designed to protect all human beings (Title III), regardless of their nationality or citizenship status.86 Significantly, as discussed above, human dignity has been a primary tool used by the CJEU to protect non-EU nationals, with most Article 1 case law so far involving asylum seekers. Moreover, the abstract nature of human dignity makes this concept a primary tool to consider and protect human beings in a holistic manner,87 a quality that has proved useful in practice for addressing compounded breaches of dignity at the intersection of several d ­ imensions of humanity, eg being homosexual, a non-EU national seeking asylum and very seriously ill. (b) ‘Inviolable’ 01.30 The term ‘inviolable’ is equally difficult to understand.88 It should not be understood as a descriptive term, so as to avoid the misleading perception that the EU is a sort of paradise, where dignity can never be breached in practice. It is more helpful to understand dignity’s inviolability as the EU commitment to do everything possible to avoid breaching human dignity. In this sense, dignity’s inviolability becomes the axiomatic foundation of the whole EU, echoing the ‘inalienable and sacred rights of Man’ of the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.89 Furthermore, the codification of human dignity as inviolable expresses the post-war promise ‘never again’ to let the destruction of humanity and of democracy happen, and captures the memory of the time of inhumanity and anti-democracy.90 Renewed after the collapse of communism in 1989, this commitment extends to all forms of systematic destruction of humanity and of totalitarianism.91 As a result, the reference to inviolability places human beings at the top of the EU normative pyramid (if this can be visualised in this way) and prescribes that the power

85 J Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). 86 In terms of political theory this goes back to the work of H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1973) and A Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity and International Law (Oxford, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012), see also S Baer, ‘Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of Constitutionalism’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal 417. 87 C Dupré, ‘Unlocking Human Dignity: Towards a Theory for the 21st Century’ (2009) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 190; M Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Belknapp, Harvard University Press, 2011). 88 F Weber, ‘Unantastbarkeit’ in Gröschner, Kapust and Lembcke (n 72) 198–99; Dupré, Age of Dignity (n 32) 165–70; M Rothhaar, Die Menschenwürde als Prinzip des Rechts; Ein rechtsphilosophische Rekonstruktion (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2015) 43–57; Borowsky, ‘Artikel 1’ (n 15) para 33. 89 ‘The Charter provides that … human dignity should be intended as something of a “sanctuary” or, perhaps as a kind of “no man’s land” where outside powers—whether public or private—have no access’, Olivetti (n 46) 8. 90 C Joerges, M Mahlman and U Preuβ (eds), “Schmerzliche Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit” und der Prozeβ der Konstitutionalisierung Europas (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), with thanks to Borowsky, ‘Artikel 1’ (n 15) para 7; and D Fraser, ‘Dead Man Walking: Law and Ethics after Giorgio Agamben’s Auschwitz’ (1999) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 397–417. 91 Dupré, Age of Dignity (n 32) 66–70.

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balance between human beings and the EU is tipped in favour of the former, so that none of the EU (economic and financial) activities may ever deprive human beings of their humanity. Therefore, considering human dignity to be the ultimate benchmark and compass for the EU 01.31 and its legal developments means that human dignity operates as a principle of interpretation— as well as a substantive good that deserves the highest degree of protection.92 As such, it involves a rethinking of the ultimate purpose (and nature) of the EU and brings into sharp relief the transformative role of the EU Charter.93 Some of this reordering of EU priorities could be seen in the so-called Omega ruling (delivered before the Charter came into force), in which the CJEU held that the fundamental freedoms had to be interpreted in compliance with the principle of human dignity.94 For all these reasons, human dignity is a crucial tool of European constitutionalism in times of crisis, namely when the foundations of democracy and human rights are being systematically challenged. (c)  ‘Duty to Respect and Protect’ This laconic statement masks a very complex debate and reality about the protection of dignity 01.32 under the EU Charter.95 At a first reading, ‘respect and protect’ indicates the classic distinction in liberal democracy between a negative duty (not to interfere with dignity) and a positive duty (to take active steps to ensure that dignity is not breached). This distinction is developed in the core prohibitions under Title I EUCFR and in line with positive obligations imposed on Member States under the ECHR. The protection duty is very far-reaching. Firstly, as discussed above, it has a clear preventive 01.33 function in relation to torture, degrading and inhuman treatment, and the CJEU has established that human beings are protected against ‘a real risk’ of being subjected to treatments incompatible with Article 1 and Article 4, and not only against actual breaches (that is a posteriori). While the CJEU has so far not explicitly elaborated on the specific duty of protection under Article 1 EUCFR, its interpretation arguably follows a similar logic as that of Article 3 ECHR case law.96 Secondly, this duty of protection is so strong that it has led the CJEU to revisit the principle of mutual trust or confidence with regard to both the Dublin framework97 and the European Arrest Warrant, by developing a two-step test in Aranyosi.98 Thirdly, the duty of protection arising out of Article 1 entails positive obligations on the host Member State to guarantee asylum seekers the minimum reception conditions of a dignified existence compatible with Article 1 and Article 4 EUCFR, even for a temporary period (eg pending their application being considered). Member States can do this in kind or through a financial allowance, which must be sufficient to allow children to be housed with their parents.99 Finally, while Member States and the Union are explicitly identified as having prime respon- 01.34 sibility for enforcing this duty under Article 52, this protection also includes private parties

92 JL Requejo Pagés, ‘La “Dignidad de la Persona” como Categoría Conceptual en el Derecho de la Unión’ in R Chueca (ed), Dignidad Humana y Derecho Fundamental (Madrid, Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales, 2015) 282. 93 AJ Menéndez, ‘Finalité through rights’ in Eriksen, Fossum and Menéndez (n 48) 30–48; and G Palmisano (ed), Making the Charter of Fundamental Rights a Living Instrument (Leiden and Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2014). 94 CT Smith and T Fetzer, ‘The Uncertain Limits of the European Court of Justice’s Authority: Economic Freedom versus Human Dignity’ (2004) 10 Columbia Journal of European Law 445. 95 Schwarzburg (n 9) 325–34. 96 C. K. and Others (n 65) [67]–[68]. 97 NS (n 11) [86]–[94]; C. K. and Others (n 65) [60]. 98 Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru (n 69). See also LM (n 14). 99 Cimade and GISTI (n 54) and Federaal Agentschap (n 55).



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(Drittwirkung).100 Three broad points support this. First is the ‘inviolability’ of dignity, ie the fact that human dignity would no longer be ‘inviolable’ if its violation by private parties could not be sanctioned. Secondly, all Title I rights, which can be understood as the core components of human dignity, also apply between private parties, who are certainly not exempted from the duty of respect and protection. While the CJEU has not developed this explicitly so far, its references to Article 3 ECHR in human dignity case law indicate that, should the facts create a suitable opportunity, it would develop horizontality of human dignity protection.101 This is strengthened by reference to Article 3 ECHR case law, which recognise the horizontal effect of prohibition of ill treatment.102 Finally, the foundational dimension of dignity under both Article 2 TEU and the EUCFR would be depleted of its substance if dignity had no impact on private relations.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 01.35 The inviolable nature of human dignity means that protection of human dignity is most definitely absolute: human dignity is the EU’s greatest value and its first foundational value without which the EU loses its raison d’être. In particular, human dignity’s inviolability means that its protection may never be waived, even and especially in situations of emergency. While the EU Charter contains no provision comparable to Article 15 ECHR, an uninterrupted protection of all Title I rights can arguably be constructed out of the principle of inviolability, a requirement already identified by the CJEU in relation to Article 4 EUCFR.103 Conversely, it is suggested that a situation of constitutional emergency may be identified when the Title I dignity rights face a serious risk of, or indeed are, being breached in a systematic manner. In the lack of clear guidance from the law or legal scholarship (or indeed from politics), it is further argued that the serious risk of systemic breach of a single dignity right (eg Art 4 EUCFR) should be enough to constitute an attack on Article 1 EUCFR and, beyond this, to raise concerns about the foundations of the EU under Article 2 TEU. 01.36 The CJEU has so far been quite hesitant to address human dignity claims under Article 1 head on, preferring instead side references and an argumentative focus on a specific dignity right under Title I, as illustrated by the case law on Article 4 EUCFR discussed above. As a result, it may also be so rarely used by judges as to be at risk of disappearing from their radar and, in the worst-case scenario, acquiring paradoxically a mere rhetorical status. In this respect, the case MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department of April 2018104 raises concerns about the CJEU’s understanding of, and commitment to, the inviolability of human dignity under Article 1 EUCFR. On the one hand, the CJEU emphasised the connection between Article 4 and Article 1 and the ‘absolute nature’ of Article 4 (para 36). On the other hand, it held that for the purposes of Directive 2004/83/EC the concept of ‘torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin’ (Art 15(b) Directive) requires an intentional deprivation of medical and psychiatric care and that ‘torture or inhuman or degrading treatment’ cannot be found to be the result of ‘general shortcomings in the health system of the country of origin’ (para 51). While the CJEU ultimately justified its distinction by reference to the overall purpose of Directive 2004/83/EC and the clarification of applicants’ eligibility for ‘subsidiary protection’,

100 Olivetti (n 46) 10, and H Jarass Charta der Grundrechte der EU (Munich, Beck, 2016) 47. 101 NS (n 11); Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru (n 69). 102 C Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights: Commentary (München, Beck/Hart Publishing/Nomos/ Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2014) 40–41. 103 Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru (n 69) [86]. 104 MP (n 64).

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its reasoning creates at least two disturbing discrepancies: it departs from established case law under Article 3 ECHR,105 and it is inconsistent with the principle of inviolability under Article 1 and the overall purpose of the Charter which, according to its preamble, is ‘to place the individuals at the heart of the EU activities’. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that the CJEU is only one of the EU institutions and one of the constitutional actors responsible for protecting the EU and its foundational values.

V. Remedies A well-known paradox of the EUCFR under the Lisbon Treaty (and one of its shortcomings) is 01.37 that the Charter does not create any new remedies to render human rights fully effective. One option provided by the EU Treaty under Article 6.2 is for the EU to become a member of the ECHR,106 but this was put on hold in December 2014 following the CJEU Opinion 2/13.107 Future accession to the ECHR is required under Article 6.2 TEU, therefore leaving open the possibility for alleged victims to take action against the EU before the ECtHR for breaches of the ECHR by the EU. Recent developments, particularly in the wake of the LM case of July 2018, seem to indicate expected collaboration between the CJEU and the ECtHR, whereby in instances where EU Charter rights (eg Art 47) fail to be adequately protected in a Member State through EU law mechanisms, the ECHR individual remedy might then offer a last safety net for guaranteeing EU Charter rights.108 The lack of a specific remedy for EU Charter rights, however, does not mean that human 01.38 dignity breaches cannot be addressed by the CJEU at all. Remedies and sanctions for breaches of dignity stretch across the full span of EU provision in this respect, ie from interpretation issues (preliminary rulings) to sanctions under Article 7 EU Treaty.109 The most frequent remedy for dignity breaches has so far been a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, with many of these through the urgent procedure (PPU) (see section D.II above). This is how most future cases will likely continue to arise too, due to the necessity of clarifying the respective meanings of dignity under the EUCFR and Member States, particularly in those Member States where dignity is well embedded in the constitutional culture. Moreover, in terms of judicial uses, the argument of dignity has proved to be more effective as a hermeneutic tool, deployed by courts to clarify and—crucially—to transform the meaning of a range of legal provisions and human rights, as illustrated in CJEU dignity case law so far.110 Additionally, while none has been brought so far, an action in annulment (under Art 263 TFEU) for breach of dignity may be possible, particularly as the ‘institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’ are bound by dignity under Article 51 EUCFR. This, however, may not be the easiest route for individuals

105 C Bicknell, M Evans and R Morgan, Preventing Torture in Europe (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2018) 63. 106 P Gragl, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). 107 Opinion 2/13 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454; S Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a ­Nightmare’ (2015) German Law Journal 213. The accession process started again in October 2019: https://www.coe.int/en/web/ human-rights-intergovernmental-cooperation/accession-of-the-european-union-to-the-european-convention-onhuman-rights. 108 Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality and Arthur Celmer (no5) [2018] IEHC 639 [124]. Generally: J Gerards, ‘Relationship between the Convention and the EU’ in P v Dijk, F v Hoof, A v Rijn and L Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2018) 331. 109 D Kochenov and A Jakab (eds), The Enforcement of EU Values: Ensuring Member States Compliance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017). 110 S Rixen highlights the ‘discourse structuring function of dignity’, above n 71, 348.



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to pursue as access to the CJEU is notoriously very restricted. In the absence of a specific EU remedy against human rights breaches, Member States are likely to offer a more effective and user-friendly route to address and redress dignity breaches. In these situations, domestic judges, applicants and their lawyers will find in the EUCFR a welcome clarification of the supranational concept of dignity and its specific core rights under Title I. They might also combine these with the ECHR case law and be inspired by the ECtHR’s fluid and creative approach to dignity so far. 01.39 Finally, it is important to bear in mind that human dignity is also the first foundational value of the EU under Article 2 TEU, and that as such it can be protected through the Article 7 TEU procedure.111 Fundamentally anchored in a political logic and ultimately requiring a majority to be triggered, Article 7 has proved to be of very limited usefulness in what has been called the rule of law crises in relation to Poland and Hungary.112 Defining what the rule of law (as per Art 2 TEU) entails and identifying an appropriate standard for the purpose of assessing Member States’ compliance with EU law have been particularly problematic. The same might not be quite so true of human dignity, despite its often criticised abstraction. From the perspective of Article 7 TEU, human dignity has two advantages over the rule of law principle: one is that the EU Charter provides a rich and multidimensional definition of this concept in terms of unacceptable treatments of human beings (that can be further substantiated by ECHR case law), and the other is its inviolable nature under Article 1 EUCFR, which allows for no bargaining with other values and no constitutional pluralism. With this in mind, identifying the tipping point between a repetition of individual breaches of Article 1 EUCFR and all other dignity rights under Title I EUCFR, on the one hand, and the requirement to trigger Article 7 TEU, on the other, is crucial.

E. Evaluation 01.40 The EU law developments of human dignity since the previous edition of this commentary was published are noteworthy on several accounts. Firstly, there has been a steady stream of high profile (mostly Grand Chamber) cases, albeit a very small proportion of the overall CJEU case law on EU Charter rights. Article 1 codification has therefore not opened the gates towards an inflationary use of the human dignity argument and the Court of Justice has been extremely cautious to retain this exceptional commitment for exceptional situations, preferring to develop specific dignity rights, such as Arts 4, 7 or 18 EUCFR. However, since the Charter came into force Article 1 case law has not gone in the directions opened by pre-Lisbon case law as might have been expected: there has been no further development of the Omega approach to dignity and the more ethical questions on the boundaries of humanity have been approached only in a very tangential manner with reference to previous case law (ie Brüstle) rather than with an explicit discussion on Article 1. Secondly, what is striking about both the CJEU case law and secondary EU law are the uses of human dignity to protect all human beings, with a specific focus on those who are often stigmatised by certain sections of the population and political parties, typically third-country nationals, refugees and asylum seekers, and homosexuals. This can largely (if not exclusively) be explained by the wider migration issues that the EU has had to face in recent years. It is also interesting to note from the Fundamental Rights Agency Reports that the EU is increasingly approaching the protection of humanity through the prism of human dignity,

111 L Besselink, ‘The Bark, the Bite and the Howl’ in D Kochenov and A Jakab (n 104). 112 G Halmai, ‘The Possibility and Desirability of Rule of Law Conditionality’ (2018) The Hague Journal on Rule of Law https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-018-0077-2.

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giving greater visibility to the diversity of people living in the EU and to their wide and unequal living conditions. In addition, while not all secondary law is phrased with explicit reference to Article 1 EUCFR, the language of human dignity and, with it, the commitment to protect it are gradually finding their way into the regulation of a whole range of situations, especially those where the imbalance of power among fellow human beings is at its greatest. The Fundamental Rights Agency, however, noted in its 2017 anniversary Report that there is still a long way to go to line up EU actions and law with its human rights commitments.113 At the time of writing three issues remain open. The first involves addressing the increasing 01.41 and increasingly acute and persistent poverty among the people living in the EU, largely but not exclusively due to EU economic policies in response to the 2008–10 financial crisis. The second cause for concern is the deep and radical challenge to the commitment to human dignity under Article 1 EUCFR and, beyond, to the foundations of the EU itself, which started in Hungary with the adoption of its new Fundamental Law in 2010 and is gaining momentum across Europe. While the causes of the attraction for authoritarianism are numerous and yet to be fully understood, financial crisis and the deteriorating quality of democracy may not be unrelated to these developments.114 In this respect, the complete invisibility of human dignity in the discussion on the quality of the rule of law under Article 7 TEU is particularly disturbing as it arguably reveals the EU’s lack of awareness of its own constitutional identity and foundations, as well as its failure to engage with the memory of its historical origins as the promise ‘never again’ to allow the rise of undemocratic government and the destruction of humanity. Finally, the Covid 19 pandemic needs to be mentioned because of the systemic breaches of the dignity title rights, and especially of the right to life, all across the EU. The commitment to the inviolability of human dignity calls for—at the very least—a full and rigorous public investigation to identify the causes of so many and so avoidable deaths, so that lessons may be learned.

113 ‘But daunting challenges remain, and recent developments underscore how quickly laboriously accomplished progress can be undone. Across the EU, the fundamental rights system is increasingly under attack—dismissed as political correctness gone awry, as benefitting only select individuals, or as hampering swift responses to urgent challenges. While civil society organisations and individuals have shown remarkable dedication in helping to protect fundamental rights and have played a very positive role, they make for easy scapegoats in such a hostile political environment.’ FL Seidensticker and M O’Flaherty, FRA 2017 Report, 3. 114 M Funke, M Schularick and C Trebesch, ‘Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870–2014’ (2016) European Economic Review 227–60.



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Article 2* Article 2 Right to Life 1 Everyone has the right to life. 2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 2 1.

Paragraph 1 of this Article is based on the first sentence of Article 2(1) of the ECHR, which reads as follows: ‘1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law …’

2.

The second sentence of the provision, which referred to the death penalty, was superseded by the entry into force of Article 1 of Protocol No 6 to the ECHR, which reads as follows: ‘The death penalty shall be abolished. No-one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.’

Article 2(2) of the Charter is based on that provision. 3.

The provisions of Article 2 of the Charter correspond to those of the above Articles of the ECHR and its Protocol. They have the same meaning and the same scope, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter. Therefore, the ‘negative’ definitions appearing in the ECHR must be regarded as also forming part of the Charter: (a) Article 2(2) of the ECHR:

‘Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.’

(b) Article 2 of Protocol No 6 to the ECHR:

‘A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions …’

Select Bibliography L Early, A Austin, C Ovey and O Chernishova (eds), The Right to Life Under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Twenty Years of Legal Developments since McCann v the United Kingdom (Wolf, Oisterwijk, 2016). R Hood and C Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective, 5th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). D Korff, The Right to Life: A Guide to Implementation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Handbook No 8) (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2006). B Mathieu, The Right to Life (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2006). A Plomer, ‘A Foetal Right to Life? The Case of Vo v France’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Reports 311. * This contribution reflects developments up to the end of 2018.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

S Skinner, Lethal Force, the Right to Life and the ECHR: Narratives of Death and Democracy (Oxford, Hart, 2019). E Wicks, The Right to Life and Conflicting Interests (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010). ——, ‘A, B, C v Ireland: Abortion Law under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Reports 556. ——, ‘The Meaning of Life: Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human Rights Treaties’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Reports 199. J Yorke, ‘The Right to Life and Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Council of Europe’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 205. —— (ed), Orientations of the Right and Value of Life (Farnham, Ashgate, 2010).

A.  Field of Application of Article 2 02.01 The right to life may be the right with the least obvious application to EU law. At a superficial level, it may appear that Union law does not directly engage with the right to life: it does not subject citizens to the death penalty, nor use lethal force in law enforcement, and nor do the Member States when implementing Union law. Nevertheless, the EU is increasingly extending its influence into fields with some relevance to the preservation of the right to life of EU citizens. First, there is the obvious field of criminal justice—which is the field in which the right to life is most commonly infringed under other treaties. The EU took its first tentative steps into the criminal justice arena when the Maastricht Treaty enabled judicial cooperation in criminal matters under the third pillar. The Lisbon Treaty increased the EU’s influence in this area by providing for a new legal framework for criminal legislation, and the Stockholm Programme1 formed the agenda for EU justice and home affairs legislation from 2010 to the end of 2014. While not directly engaging the right to life, the EU’s involvement in matters of criminal justice and security will increase the potential for engagement with this right. In addition, the EU’s criminal law relations with third states may raise a particular issue in respect of states that have not abolished the death penalty, while EU rules on exports of goods that could be used for capital punishment also raise right to life issues. Following a proposal made by the Commission in January 2014, the EU further strengthened such rules in November 2016 by adopting an amendment to Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 (the Anti-Torture Regulation).2 02.02 Secondly, the EU’s increasing involvement in issues of healthcare also has the clear potential to engage right to life issues. In addition to the explicit obligation under the Treaty of Maastricht (Art 152) to ensure a high level of health protection in all Community policies and activities, the free movement provisions have also been utilised in the healthcare context to facilitate access to medical treatment, while the Patient’s Rights Directive3 explicitly aims to promote cooperation on healthcare and further facilitate access to cross-border healthcare.4 The right to receive medical treatment in another Member State has been recognised as an aspect of free movement to provide and receive services. The right to life may be of some relevance in respect of a right to receive life-sustaining treatment (or even, perhaps, in relation to a state’s obligation to provide 1 ‘The “Stockholm Programme”—An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens’ [2010] OJ C115/1. 2 Regulation 2016/2134 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2016 amending Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, OJ L338/1. See also European Commission, 2016 Annual Report on the Application of the Charter (https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/ your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights/application-charter/annual-reports-application-charter_en). 3 Directive 2011/24 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45. 4 For more information on freedom of services as regards healthcare, see TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004).

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life-sustaining treatment for a patient unable to provide consent). For example, the claim in Peerbooms, where a Dutch health insurance fund denied reimbursement of medical costs for a Dutch citizen in a coma who was referred to a specialist clinic in Austria, may have been strengthened if the patient’s right to life was a factor added to his right to receive services.5 The right to life could also, however, be used as a factor cautioning against access to medical services in another Member State, if the service sought is assisted suicide or euthanasia.6 While such treatment might be regarded as a service to which the free movement provisions would generally apply,7 if it is regarded as contrary to the right to life (which is by no means certain) then EU law may no longer be in a position to facilitate access to such services, potentially justifying Member States restricting access to such services. Similar factors may be at play in respect of cross-border abortions. The European Court of Justice 02.03 has confirmed in Society for the Protection of the Unborn (Ireland) Ltd v Grogan and o­ thers that abortion is a service qualifying for free movement.8 In this case, however, the Court was reluctant to engage with the rights issues and rejected an argument that a prohibition on information relating to the availability of abortions in other states violated the freedom to provide and receive services due to the lack of a commercial element to the service provision in this case. Presumably if such a commercial element did exist, EU law would have been more substantively engaged by the facts of the case. Furthermore, it is potentially significant that arguments about the morality of abortion were held not to affect whether or not it is a service. So, because abortion is lawful in, for example, the UK, the historical Irish argument of its immorality is regarded as irrelevant to its protection under the EU’s free movement provisions. However, an obligation to respect the right to life might change that perspective if, and only if, the right is viewed as being engaged by the termination of a pregnancy. The controversial application of the right to life to a foetus will be considered below. Ireland has recently radically changed its approach to abortion but it remains very restricted in Malta. The European Migrant Crisis beginning in 2015 has also challenged the EU to take steps to 02.04 prevent the loss of human life. The European Agenda on Migration was adopted in 2015, while the EU–Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 required all new irregular migrants and asylum applicants arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands whose applications for asylum have been declared unfounded or inadmissible, or who have not applied for asylum, to be returned to Turkey. The compatibility of this EU–Turkey Statement with fundamental rights was raised before the Court in an action for annullment but the case was dismissed because the international agreement was concluded by the Member States and not the EU.9 EU support for the Italian and Greek rescue operations, as well as the European Border and Coast Guard’s Triton and Poseidon operations and Operation Sophia, is also relevant to the right to life.10 A final potential field of application for the right to life within EU law is in the context of armed 02.05 conflict. The EU has a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and has launched over 30

5 Case C-157/99 Geraets Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ (2001) 62 BMLR 101. 6 Voluntary active euthanasia is lawful, in strictly defined circumstances, in both the Netherlands and Belgium. It is prohibited in other Member States. 7 See S Michalowski, ‘Health Care Law’ in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 295–96. 8 Society for the Protection of the Unborn (Ireland) Ltd v Grogan and others [1991] ECR I-4703. See G de Búrca, ‘Fundamental Human Rights and the Reach of EC Law’ (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 283; D Rossa Phelan, ‘Right to Life of the Unborn v Promotion of Trade in Services: The ECJ and the Normative Shaping of the EU’ [1992] 55 Modern Law Review 670. 9 Cases T-192/16, NF v European Council, Order of the General Court of 28 February 2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:128; T-193/16, NG v European Council, ECLI:EU:T:2017:129; ve T-257/16, NM v European Council, ECLI:EU:T:2017:130. 10 The European Commission’s 2017 Annual Report on the Application of the Charter claims that these operations have contributed to saving more than 620,000 lives in the Mediterranean Sea.



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CSDP missions since 2003. There are currently 10 ongoing civilian missions and six ­ongoing military missions/operations across Europe, Africa and the Middle East.11 At the Bratislava Summit of September 2016, EU leaders agreed to further strengthen EU c­ooperation in the area of security and defence. This has led to an implementation plan on security and defence, a European defence action plan and increased cooperation between the EU and NATO. In 2017, all EU Member States except for three countries (Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom) further strengthened their cooperation in defence matters by setting up a permanent structured ­cooperation (PESCO). While there are difficult questions of jurisdiction, ­derogation and necessity to be settled before a death in conflict can engage the right to life (discussed in ­section D.II below), the EU’s increased involvement in global matters may, alongside its increased involvement in the criminal justice and healthcare arenas, render the right to life a relevant and enforceable aspect of the Charter.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 2 with Other Provisions of the Charter 02.06 The right to life has a complex relationship with the concept of human dignity (Art 1), as reference to issues such as ‘dying with dignity’ illustrates. Article 1 of the Charter states that ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’ As the Explanations make clear, dignity is a right in itself and also a basis for all fundamental rights. As the basis of the right to life, it emphasises the significance of dignity in human life,12 and ensures that a focus on the economic and social context of life is not overlooked. As a right in itself, however, it may caution against the preservation of life in circumstances where the dignity of the individual is undermined. For example, a positive obligation under the right to life to preserve the life of a comatose patient may conflict with the obligation under the right to dignity to respect and protect human dignity at all times. The potential for conflict depends entirely upon the interpretation placed upon dignity; a controversial and ambiguous issue. Dignity can be viewed as either empowerment or constraint. It can sometimes reinforce a right of autonomy, and at other times limit it.13 It is when reinforcing autonomous choice that dignity may conflict with the right to life, but the concept has another side and thus it may strengthen the protection for human life under the Charter by precluding the limitation of the right to life in a manner that would violate the concept of human dignity. Thus, while the use of lethal force by the state is permitted when absolutely necessary in order to prevent unlawful violence, a shoot to kill policy that degrades the dignity in all human life might, perhaps, raise issues under Article 1. In such a way, the right to dignity could consolidate the right to life. 02.07 The right to life might, in some circumstances, conflict with Article 4’s prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Due to Article 52(3), this right has the same meaning and scope as Article 3 ECHR which has conflicted with the right to life under the ECHR in cases involving the force-feeding of prisoners. For example, in X v FRG14 the European Commission of Human Rights was asked to consider the compatibility of the force-feeding of a

11 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/. 12 E Wicks, ‘The Meaning of Life: Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human Rights Treaties’ (2012) 12 (2) Human Rights Law Review 199. 13 D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) 46. 14 X v FRG (1984) 7 EHRR 152.

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prisoner with Article 3’s prohibition on degrading treatment. The Commission concluded that force-feeding would breach Article 3, but was required under Article 2’s protection for the right to life. The Commission utilised the concept of best interests in order to justify the life-saving intervention. Usually, however, and certainly in the non-custody scenario, it will not be reasonable (and therefore, as we shall see, not required under Article 2) for the state to take steps to save life which involve subjecting an individual to degrading treatment. In line with Article 1’s elevation of the principle of human dignity, the absolute nature of the prohibition on degrading treatment means it will usually triumph when pitted against the limited nature of the right to life. As the provision of healthcare appears to be a particularly significant context in which the 02.08 right to life might come into play in the EU context, it may also be worth noting the right’s potential connection to Article 35’s right of access to preventive healthcare and right to benefit from medical treatment. An expansive interpretation of the right to life would itself incorporate a (limited) right to access life-saving treatment. The limited nature of the positive obligations imposed by the right to life, however, and particularly the pragmatic recognition of the need to balance the provision of healthcare against the reality of limited resources, means that in practice it will be difficult to utilise Article 2 to gain access to treatment. Article 35 may provide a more effective route for such an argument, although its wide-ranging limitation to ‘the conditions established by national laws and practices’ suggests it also may provide scant assistance to the EU citizen unable to obtain necessary but unaffordable life-preserving treatment. Finally in the healthcare context, Article 3’s explicit protection for the right to respect for physical and mental integrity and for free and informed consent of patients might bring it into conflict with a state’s positive obligation to preserve life in circumstances where consent is withheld. As with Article 4, however, it is unlikely that the limited positive obligations inherent in the right to life would outweigh the core negative obligations on states to respect a patient’s autonomy (at least while that patient retains mental capacity). Article 19(2) prohibits, inter alia, the removal, expulsion or extradition to a state where there 02.09 is a serious risk of being subjected to the death penalty. This supplements Article 2, which will also serve to prevent extradition from a European state to a state which still imposes the penalty (as discussed in more detail below).15

C.  Sources of Article 2 Rights I. ECHR The explanations to the Charter clarify that the first paragraph of Article 2 is based upon the 02.10 first sentence of Article 2(1) ECHR, which states that ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’. While the ECHR terminology presupposes an existing right to life, one that is merely given legal recognition by this provision, the wording of Article 2 of the Charter accords the right to everyone. This different approach is unlikely to have much, if any, significance in practice. The second sentence of the ECHR’s protection of the right to life is omitted from Article 2 of the Charter, but this explicit prohibition on the intentional deprivation of life will be implicitly incorporated into the Charter by means of Article 52(3) (which ensures that the right to life in the Charter will have the same meaning and scope as the ECHR right to life on which it is based),

15 For further discussion of the relationship between Art 19(2) and Arts 2 and 4, see the chapter on Art 19 in this volume.



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as too will the permitted limitations on the right to life also contained in that sentence. These, as the explanations to the Charter specify, permit the deprivation of life when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in one of three criminal justice scenarios: in defence of any person from unlawful violence; to effect a lawful arrest or prevent escape; or to quell a riot or insurrection. 02.11 The second paragraph of this provision is based upon Article 1 of Protocol No 6 to the ECHR, which abolishes the death penalty in times of peace. Protocol No 6 makes explicit provision for the lawful imposition of the death penalty in time of war or imminent threat of war (Art 2 of Protocol No 6). This limitation is, therefore, also regarded as forming part of the Charter due to Article 52(3). All Member States have also ratified Protocol No 13 to the ECHR, which prohibits the death penalty in times of war. This additional protection is lacking from the Charter, although Article 53 will ensure that the less strict rule in the Charter will not be interpreted as adversely affecting the greater protection offered to the right to life in Europe by means of Protocol No 13. 02.12 The European Court of Human Rights has adopted an expansive interpretation of the right to life under the ECHR, extending its protection of human life by imposing positive, as well as negative, obligations upon contracting states. As Article 2 of the Charter is to be given the same meaning and scope as Article 2 of the ECHR, which, according to the explanations, includes the determination of these by the Strasbourg Court, the right to life under the Charter not only prohibits the intentional deprivation of life but also requires that reasonable steps are taken in order to safeguard lives.16

II.  UN Treaties 02.13 The right to life is also protected in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 6(1) states that ‘Every human being has the inherent right to life. This life shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.’ The main distinction between this protection of the right to life and that found in the ECHR, on which the Charter’s provision is based, is that the ICCPR’s prohibition on deprivation of life applies only to arbitrary deprivations. While this may, at first glance, appear to be a much more limited protection for life than the prohibition of all intentional deprivations of life under the ECHR, the case law of the Human Rights Committee has ensured that the content of the rights are almost identical, by introducing the concepts of proportionality and necessity into the permissible use of lethal force.17 The remainder of Article 6 provides detailed provisions relating to the permissible use of the death penalty, which are of no relevance within Europe where the death penalty is prohibited, at least during times of peace, due to Protocol No 6 to the ECHR.

III.  Other Sources 02.14 The right to life also finds some, limited, protection under international humanitarian law. While human beings can be classified as legitimate military targets, the use of force against them must be proportionate and necessary. Furthermore, civilians are immune from direct attack.18

16 Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245; Reps 1998-VIII, para 115. 17 Suarez de Guerrero v Colombia (Communication 45/1979). 18 Arts 51(2) and 52(1) Protocol I Geneva Conventions. The prohibition of the killing of civilians was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons case ((1996) ICJ Reps 226, 257).

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There is also some protection of civilians from indiscriminate attack, and the unsavoury concept of collateral damage is only acceptable if the numbers of civilian deaths are proportionate to the military aim sought.19 Intentional direct attacks on civilians, causing excessive loss of life to civilians in otherwise legitimate military attacks, and killing a combatant who has surrendered are also recognised as war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998.20 The protection offered by this criminalisation of conduct during hostilities arguably goes further than the protection afforded by the right to life in human rights treaties due to the problematic issue of jurisdiction in respect of protecting the lives of the individuals of one state against the armed forces of another.21 The right to life has strong religious and philosophical roots, and a special value has 02.15 ­traditionally been given to human life in all human societies. Most Member States include the right to life in their constitutions and the basic prohibition on state killing of individuals is firmly rooted throughout Europe and beyond. In addition to constitutional declarations of the right to life, domestic implementation of the right can be seen through criminal law, with criminal ­prohibitions on the taking of life backed up by effective police forces and criminal justice systems. The civil law also plays a part (for example in the context of negligent deaths), as does wider social assistance, for example by means of social security payments and an accessible healthcare system. Protecting the life of those within its jurisdiction is one of the core responsibilities of all governments.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks Article 2 of the Charter protects the right to life in broad terms. As it has the same meaning and 02.16 scope as Article 2 ECHR, it can confidently be asserted that the right includes both negative and positive obligations which will be imposed upon the institutions of the EU as well as Member States when implementing EU law. Intentional deprivations of life by these bodies will be prohibited unless they fall within one of the limited exceptions contained within Article 2 ECHR (and discussed below). Furthermore, these bodies will be required to take all appropriate steps to preserve human life. The death penalty is prohibited absolutely in peacetime, although its imposition in times of war remains somewhat ambiguous. These issues will now be considered in greater detail.

II.  Scope of Application The question of the personal scope of the right to life protected in the ECHR remains ambiguous, 02.17 nearly seven decades after its drafting. Article 2 ECHR extends the right to ‘everyone’, but it is unclear whether or not this includes a foetus. The European Court of Human Rights (and previously the European Commission of Human Rights) has faced this precise question on a number of occasions, but has thus far declined to provide an unambiguous answer. In Vo v France, the Strasbourg Court had to decide whether the right to life of a foetus had been 19 ‘Excessive’ damage to civilians is expressly prohibited in Art 51(5)(b) Protocol I Geneva Conventions. 20 Art 8(2)(b)(i)–(vi). 21 Bankovic v Belgium ECHR 2001-XII; Issa v Turkey App no 31821/96 (ECtHR, 16 November 2004); Al-Skeini v United Kingdom ECHR 2011, 1093.



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violated when a negligent act of a doctor, which fatally harmed the foetus, was not subject to criminal sanction. The Court, somewhat ingeniously, evaded the core issue, first, by concluding that it would be neither desirable nor possible to answer in the abstract whether an unborn child is given protection under Article 2 and, secondly, by concluding that it was also unnecessary to decide the issue on the facts of the case before it because, even if this foetus did have a right to life, it was not violated by the French laws which had provided civil, although not criminal, consequences for the harm. This consideration of the precise requirements of the right to life for a foetus without any prior conclusion on whether such a right exists has been subject to much criticism.22 In A, B, C v Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights recognised an emerging European consensus on the provision of lawful abortion beyond the ground of saving the life of the mother, although it continued to permit Ireland to benefit from a wide margin of appreciation which justified constitutional protection of the right to life of the foetus (subject only to the conflicting right to life of the mother).23 Despite a clear trend towards more liberal abortion laws in Europe, the right to life may yet provide some protection for the life of the unborn. While Member States remain divided on the issue, the European Court of Human Rights has chosen to defer to national priorities. Whether the Court will remain content in the future to abdicate its decision-making responsibility on this divisive issue remains open to doubt.24 02.18 In terms of jurisdictional scope, the key question in the context of the right to life is whether deaths during war or armed conflict engage the right. This will be a potentially significant issue in respect of the EU’s military deployments under its Common Security and Defence Policy, discussed above. Under Article 15 ECHR, the right to life is one of only four Convention rights described, at least in part, as non-derogable, meaning that even in times of war or public emergency, the right to life must be protected. Article 15(2) provides an exception to the general non-derogability of the right to life, however, in respect of ‘deaths resulting from lawful acts of war’. Although it might appear that this exception is only engaged when a state party derogates, in Hassan v United Kingdom25 the Strasbourg Court suggested that a formal notice of derogation is not necessary in order for the requirements of Convention rights to be watered down in times of international armed conflict by means of reference to international humanitarian law. This approach introduces flexibility into state obligations to respect the right to life in times of conflict, irrespective of whether a formal notice of derogation has been issued, although this approach will only apply where it is specifically pleaded by the state. There are certainly examples of the Strasbourg Court strictly enforcing the right to life in times of armed conflict.26 02.19 Another significant restraint upon the application of the right to life to deaths during armed conflict stems from the interpretation of the word ‘jurisdiction’ found within Article 1 ECHR. Under this provision, the right to life, and all other rights and freedoms, is required to be secured only to those within the contracting states’ jurisdiction. While the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed that the jurisdictional competence of a contracting state 22 For example, Judge Rozakis (joined by four other judges) recognised that ‘reliance on the procedural guarantees of Article 2 to determine whether or not there has been a violation presupposes the prima facie applicability of that ­Article’. (Vo v France App no 53924/00 (GC, 8 July 2004), Separate Opinion of Judge Rozakis, Joined By Judges Caflisch, Fischbach, Lorenzen And Thomassen, para 5.) See also A Plomer, ‘A Foetal Right to Life? The Case of Vo v France’ [2005] HRLR 311. 23 A, B, C v Ireland App no 25579/05, Merits (ECtHR, 16 December 2010). The constitutional protection of the right to travel abroad for an abortion was a crucial factor in the Court’s judgment. As has already been mentioned above, a comparable right to travel to other Member States for medical services, including abortion, can also be found in EU law. 24 See E Wicks, ‘A, B, C v Ireland: Abortion Law under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 556 for discussion. 25 Hassan v United Kingdom App no 29750/09 (GC, 16 September 2014). 26 Isayeva v Russia App no 57950/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 2005) provides an example of the enforcement of the right to life by the Strasbourg Court in respect of the use of heavy combat weapons on civilians during an armed conflict.

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is ­‘primarily ­territorial’,27 it has also recognised an extension of that obligation where ‘as a ­consequence of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—that state in practice exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory’.28 Thus, while deaths of foreign civilians caused by aerial bombing will not engage the right to life, a ground invasion followed by occupation may do so. In Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, the Court further developed its approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction. In this case, it was satisfied that the UK exercised ‘authority and control’ over south-east Iraq and was thus responsible for deaths caused by its security ­operations there.29 The right to life under the ECHR, and thus the Charter, therefore has the potential to extend beyond the boundaries of the Member States, and also to govern their behaviour beyond Europe if those states cause death during the course of military operations elsewhere in the world.

III.  Specific Provisions The European Court of Human Rights views the right to life as ‘one of the most fundamental 02.20 provisions in the Convention’ and therefore it considers that ‘its provisions must be strictly construed’.30 This means that the ‘absolutely necessary’ exception to the prohibition on intentional deprivations of life is regarded by the Court as ‘a stricter and more compelling test of necessity’ than is to be found in the other Convention Articles.31 In practice, this means that the force used by agents of the state must be strictly proportionate to the aim pursued. So, for example, while Article 2(2) permits the use of lethal force to effect a lawful arrest, the Court has held that it can never be absolutely necessary to use lethal force to arrest a non-violent suspect if he is posing no threat to life or limb, even if the failure to use lethal force will result in the suspect’s escape.32 When considering the use of lethal force in defence of unlawful violence, the Court will look not only at the actions directly responsible for the death but also at the planning and control of the police or military operation.33 An armed operation must be planned, controlled and conducted in a manner that reduces, as much as possible, the risk to life of both the public and the suspect. The state is thereby given a greater responsibility than is an individual member of society who uses lethal force in self-defence: the state must do all that it reasonably can in order to avoid a risk to life developing through the course of its operation. In McCann, the UK was criticised for failing to do so during an armed operation that led to the shooting of three IRA suspects. Those in control of the operation failed to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that their intelligence assessments might be erroneous, and also failed to stop the threat at an earlier stage before any immediate threat to life could be perceived to exist. It was these failures that led the UK into actions incompatible with the right to life. The Court has been far more tolerant, and thus Article 2 ECHR far more forgiving, of honest 02.21 mistakes as to the absolute necessity of the use of lethal force. In cases where there is a genuine threat posed by the suspect but some doubt about whether lethal force was really necessary in order to counter that threat, a judgement made on the ground by trained individuals under





27 Bankovic

v Belgium ECHR 2001-XII [59]. v Turkey App no 31821/96 (ECtHR, 16 November 2004) [69]. v United Kingdom ECHR 2011, 1093. 30 McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97 [147]. 31 Ibid [149]. 32 Nachova v Bulgaria ECHR 2005-VII. 33 McCann (n 30). 28 Issa

29 Al-Skeini

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significant pressure is unlikely to be found to violate Article 2. In Armani Da Silva v United Kingdom,34 the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that the existence of ‘good reasons’ for an honest belief in the need for lethal force should be determined subjectively.35 In other words, the Court will consider whether the belief was subjectively reasonable, having regard to the circumstances that existed at the time.36 By contrast, however, if a mistake is made as to the very existence of a threat, then it is less likely that the honesty of the mistake could justify the state killing. This can be demonstrated by Gül v Turkey,37 where police officers opened fire on an unknown target behind a closed door in a residential apartment. While it was possible that the officers had mistaken the sound of the door bolt being drawn back for the sound of the occupant of the flat opening fire at them, their reaction of ‘opening fire with automatic weapons on an unseen target in a residential block inhabited by innocent civilians, women and children’ was, in the Court’s view ‘grossly disproportionate’.38 The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 2 in this case and was able to distinguish it from the earlier case of Andronicou and Constantinou v Cyprus,39 where it was held not to be disproportionate for the police to open fire at an identified hostage-taker who was known to be in possession of a gun and had already fired at an officer. It appears, therefore, that while a killing by a state agent that is not objectively necessary may escape sanction under Article 2 ECHR if based on an honest misjudgement (that was subjectively reasonable) as to what level of force will counter a known threat to life, a blatantly disproportionate reaction that is not linked to a genuine threat will not be regarded as ‘absolutely necessary’. 02.22 In terms of the positive obligation recognised by the European Court of Human Rights under Article 2 ECHR, this rests upon the interpretation of what is reasonable in all the circumstances. In Osman v United Kingdom,40 the Court held that Article 2(1) ‘enjoins the state not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’.41 This means that state authorities must do all that could reasonably be expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge.42 The Court recognised, however, that this obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.43 Both limited resources and the state’s obligations to respect other rights may excuse the state from taking steps to preserve life. In Osman itself, concerning a failure by the police to prevent a death, the rights of the suspect to due process prevented any violation of Article 2, while the limited availability of resources to fund public healthcare has prevented the success of claims for the provision of particular medical treatments that could save life.44 However, the positive obligation element of the right to life remains a significant obligation on contracting states, and violations of it have been found in contexts as diverse as the absence of an effective criminal law regime in a region of Turkey,45 a failure to provide timely and adequate



34 Armani

Da Silva v The United Kingdom App no 5878/08 (GC, 30 March 2016). [245]. 36 Ibid [248]. 37 Gül v Turkey App no 22676/93 (ECtHR, 14 December 2000). 38 Ibid [82]. 39 Andronicou and Constantinou v Cyprus (1997) 25 EHRR 491; 1997-VI. 40 Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245; Reps 1998-VIII. 41 Ibid [115]. 42 Ibid [116]. 43 Ibid. 44 Pentiacova v Moldova (2005) 40 EHRR SE23. 45 Mahmut Kaya v Turkey [2000] ECHR 129. 35 Ibid

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medical care to a prisoner in custody46 and a failure to safeguard the public from the possibility of a lethal explosion at a hazardous waste site.47 The positive obligation to safeguard lives is an important development of the demands placed upon state authorities by the right to life and one that will doubtless be further developed in the future. One possible aspect for development in the EU context might be an obligation to use available EU instruments to prevent, i­nvestigate and prosecute crimes causing a loss of life, where there is a cross-border element involved. EU instruments of potential relevance in this context would include the EU mutual assistance convention,48 the European arrest warrant, the European Protection Order Directive,49 and the EU’s mutual assistance and extradition treaties with third states.50 The relationship between the right to life and the death penalty is a notoriously difficult 02.23 one. Within Europe the trend towards complete abolition of the death penalty has occurred independently of the right to life. All contracting states to the Convention are legally obliged by Protocol No 6 to abolish the penalty in peacetime and by Protocol No 13 to abolish it during times of war. In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom51 the Court suggested that the second sentence of Article 2 ECHR (under which the death penalty is explicitly permitted) had now been amended by state practice, including ratification of these protocols.52 Under Article 2 of the Charter, the death penalty is explicitly prohibited along the same lines as Protocol No 6. The only circumstances in which the death penalty could legitimately be imposed under the Charter is, therefore, during times of war or imminent threat of war. Due to all Member States ratifying Protocol No 13, however, it is to be hoped that the death penalty is a thing of the past within Europe. Indeed, when Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán launched a debate on the reintroduction of the death penalty in 2015, the criticism which followed, for example by President Juncker, emphasised that the Charter prohibts the death penalty and Hungary soon clarified that it had no intention of reintroducing the death penalty.53 A more pressing circumstance in which the death penalty issue may arise is in respect of extradition from a European state to a state which still imposes the penalty. The European Court of Human Rights has previously utilised Article 3 ECHR and its absolute, non-derogable, prohibition on inhuman or degrading punishment to prevent such extraditions.54 In addition, the imposition of the death penalty following an unfair trial will also infringe Article 3 and thus serve to prevent extradition.55 Furthermore, in Al Nashiri v Poland,56 Poland was held liable under the Convention for its part in CIA ­rendition

46 Augvelova v Bulgaria App no 38361/97 (Judgment of 13 June 2002). 47 Öneryildiz v Turkey [2004] ECHR 657; (2005) 41 EHRR 20. 48 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union [2000] OJ C197. 49 Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the European protection order [2011] OJ L338/2. 50 See, eg, the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United States of America [2003] OJ L181/34 and the Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States of America [2003] OJ L181/27. 51 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom App no 61498/08 (GC, 2 March 2010), ECHR 2010 (extracts). 52 Ibid [120]. 53 European Commission, 2015 Annual Report on the Application of the Charter, 36, (https://ec.europa.eu/info/aiddevelopment-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights/application-charter/ annual-reports-application-charter_en#previousreports). 54 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439. Interestingly, in this case it was not the imposition of the penalty itself that falls foul of this prohibition, but rather the circumstances surrounding the penalty, including the so-called ‘death row phenomenon’: the mental anguish faced by the condemned prisoner while enduring a long wait for execution on death row. 55 Ocalan v Turkey ECHR 2005-IV. 56 Al Nashiri v Poland App no 28761/11 (24 July 2014).



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activities, including under Articles 2 and 3 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 6 due to the substantial and foreseeable risk that the applicant could be subjected to the death penalty following his transfer for trial before the military commission at Guantánamo Bay.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 02.24 Article 2 of the Charter corresponds to Article 2(1) and Protocol No 6 of the ECHR and therefore, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, has the same meaning and scope as those provisions. The limitations contained within Article 2(2) of the ECHR permitting the use of lethal force when ‘absolutely necessary’ for a number of law enforcement reasons, as discussed above, will limit the application of the Charter’s right to life. The Charter’s own limitation clause in Article 52(1) identifies many of the concepts at the heart of the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of the limitations to the right to life, such as legality, proportionality, necessity and the rights of others. To the extent that the ECHR limitations are stricter, they will take precedence due to the requirement that the Charter’s right to life have the same meaning and scope as that found in the ECHR on which it is based. However, to the extent that Article 52(1) imposes any greater restrictions upon the use of lethal force by the state, it might enable Union law to provide more extensive protection for the right to life (as explicitly envisaged in Article 52(3)). The requirement that any limitation must ‘respect the essence’ of the right to life is the only aspect that could perhaps achieve this. It should also be reiterated here that the Explanations to Article 1 make clear that human dignity must be respected even when a right is limited. Any intentional deprivations of life, therefore, must not infringe the idea of human dignity, even if they are regarded as absolutely necessary under the right to life. 02.25 The Charter’s prohibition of the death penalty will similarly be limited by the exception contained within Protocol No 6 in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war. All Member States have signed Protocol No 13 to the ECHR, however, which also prohibits the death penalty in times of war. As suggested above, Article 53 of the Charter suggests that the less strict rule in the Charter should not be interpreted as adversely affecting the greater protection offered to the right to life in Europe by means of Protocol No 13. Thus, Article 2(2)’s prohibition of the death penalty may indeed be as absolute as it, at first glance, appears to be. 02.26 The right to life is one of only four non-derogable rights within the ECHR, meaning that it cannot be suspended even in times of war or public emergency. However, as noted above, there is a potentially significant exception to the general non-derogability of the right. Under Article 15(2), a contracting state may suspend the application of the right to life to ‘deaths resulting from lawful acts of war’. No European state has done so, however. It should also be noted that even if a notice of derogation were issued in respect of Article 2, it would need to satisfy the requirements of Article 15, including the requirement that the measures taken in response to the specified war or public emergency be ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. There is no general exception to the prohibition on intentional deprivations of life in times of war or public emergency under the ECHR or, therefore, the Charter. Finally, if the Member State wanted to derogate from its obligations pursuant to EU law, such a derogation would also have to be consistent with Article 347 TFEU.

V. Remedies 02.27 The question of remedies in the context of the right to life is somewhat ironic as the person whose right to life has been violated is unlikely to be alive to benefit from any subsequent remedy. This is not inevitably the case, however, because the European Court of Human Rights has recognised 36

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the application of the right to life to the use of non-lethal force. In Makaratzis v Greece,57 the applicant was not killed during a pursuit by the police and there was no intention to kill him, but the degree and type of force used was held by the Strasbourg Court to engage Article 2. Although the use of potentially lethal force was held to be justified on the facts, the Greek authorities had not provided sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness, abuse of force and avoidable accident58 in order to avoid a real and immediate risk to life. A substantive violation of the right to life was, therefore, found by the Court despite the fact that nobody had died as a result of the police action. In this, admittedly rare, situation a remedy, such as compensation, can be provided directly to the victim whose life was put at risk. In cases where the violation of the right to life has resulted in a person’s death, it usually falls 02.28 to the family to seek a remedy. Under the ECHR, the victim test for admissibility has often been satisfied by relatives of the deceased, and some have succeeded in obtaining compensation for the right’s infringement. A vital substantive aspect of the right to life under the ECHR, and other international documents,59 is the requirement of an effective investigation into killings and, crucially, disappearances. This element was first mentioned in McCann, where the Strasbourg Court established a duty upon contracting states to undertake effective investigations into killings on the basis that ‘a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State would be ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by State authorities’.60 For this reason, the Court held that Article 2 requires by implication that there be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed by agents of the state or otherwise. Subsequent cases determined that the requirement of an effective and independent investigation into deaths arising from the state’s use of force is all the more important when the precise circumstances of the death remain unclear,61 and that it is not confined to cases where it has already been established that the death was caused by agents of the state. Furthermore, in Timurtas v Turkey62 the application of this requirement was confirmed as applying to a person who has disappeared. In these circumstances, the Court will also relax its evidential expectations so that ‘sufficient circumstantial evidence, based on concrete elements’ will suffice for a conclusion that an individual detained by the state must be presumed to have died in custody.63 The Court also made the significant observation that the prompt judicial intervention required by Article 5 of the ECHR may be crucial to the detection and prevention of life-threatening measures in violation of Article 2.64 Perhaps the most crucial remedial action of all, in the context of the right to life, is the pre- 02.29 vention of death, and therefore the availability of interim measures has great relevance to the effective enforcement of the right. This issue has caused the Human Rights Committee (HRC), under the ICCPR, some concern. For example, in Paindiong v Philippines,65 the state executed the three authors of a complaint after receiving the HRC’s request to refrain from causing the death until the HRC had had the opportunity to consider the matter. The HRC responded by issuing a

57 Makaratzis v Greece [2004] ECHR 694; (2005) 41 EHRR 49. See also Vilnes and Others v Norway App no 52806/09 and 22703/10 (5 December 2013). 58 Makaratzis ibid [58]. 59 This obligation also exists under the ICCPR: Baboeram et al v Suriname (Communications 146, 148–154/1983); Herrera Rubio v Colombia (Communication 161/1983); Sanjuán Arévalo v Colombia (Communication 181/1984). 60 McCann (n 30) [161]. 61 Kaya v Turkey (1998) 28 EHRR 1; Reps 1998-I. 62 Timurtas v Turkey ECHR 2000-VI. 63 Ibid [82]. 64 Ibid [89]. 65 Paindiong v Philippines (Communication 869/1999).



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strong condemnation of the state’s actions, emphasising that the availability of interim measures is ‘essential to the Committee’s role’ and the flouting of such measures ‘undermines the protection of Covenant rights’.66 A similarly stringent approach must be adopted by the European manifestations of the right to life.

E. Evaluation 02.30 The right to life is admittedly not the most relevant of fundamental rights within the context of EU law. Nonetheless, as the EU expands its competencies and influence, it is important that this crucial right be adequately protected. While it might be assumed that the right to life is already sufficiently respected within Europe, the issues brought before the European Court of Human Rights over the last few decades illustrate that human life remains vulnerable to state abuse and neglect. The use of lethal force by law enforcement agencies, extradition of prisoners to non-European states where they may face the death penalty, military engagements, and the lack of adequate resources to save all possible lives are just some of the issues facing the governments of Europe. When these issues are coupled with ongoing differences of opinion as to the beginning and end of appropriate legal protection for human life (in the context particularly of abortion and assisted dying), it becomes apparent that the right to life remains a core protection for the people of Europe from their governments and its place in the Charter rightly confirms that it should also be at the heart of future development of the EU.

66 Ibid, para 5.4. Similar condemnation followed the execution by Trinidad and Tobago of the author of a pending communication in Ashley v Trinidad & Tobago (Communication 580/1994).

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Article 3* Article 3 Right to the Integrity of the Person 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity. 2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular: (a) the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures laid down by law; (b) the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons; (c) the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain; (d) the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 3 1.

2.

3.

In its judgment of 9 October 2001 in Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR-I 7079, at grounds 70, 78 to 80, the Court of Justice confirmed that a fundamental right to human integrity is part of Union law and encompasses, in the context of medicine and biology, the free and informed consent of the donor and recipient. The principles of Article 3 of the Charter are already included in the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, adopted by the Council of Europe (ETS 164 and additional protocol ETS 168). The Charter does not set out to depart from those principles, and therefore prohibits only reproductive cloning. It neither authorises nor prohibits other forms of cloning. Thus it does not in any way prevent the legislature from prohibiting other forms of cloning. The reference to eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons, relates to possible situations in which selection programmes are organised and implemented, involving campaigns for sterilisation, forced pregnancy, compulsory ethnic marriage among others, all acts deemed to be international crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998 (see its Article 7(1)(g)).

Select Bibliography D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford, OUP, 2001). R Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity, Ethical Pluralism, and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnologies’ in T Murphy (ed), New Technologies and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2009) 19–84. A-M Farrell, ‘The Politics of Risk and EU Governance of Human Material’, (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 41. M Favale and A Plomer, ‘Fundamental Disjunctions in the EU Legal Order on Human Tissue, Cells and Advanced Regenerative Therapies’ (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 89. M Flear, A-M Farrell, T Hervey and T Murphy, ‘A European Law of New Health Technologies?’ in M Flear, A-M Farrell, T Hervey and T Murphy (eds), European Law and New Health Technologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 389–414.

* This chapter was written by Sabine Michalowski in the first edition. It has been updated by Steve Peers in the second edition.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

S Hennette-Vauchez, ‘Biomedicine and EU Law: Unlikely Encounters?’ (2011) 38 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 5. JR Herrmann and B Toebes, ‘The European Union and Health and Human Rights’ (2011) European Human Rights Law Review 419. A Plomer, ‘After Brüstle: EU Accession to the ECHR and the Future of European Patent Law’ (2012) 2 Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 110. H Roscam Abbing, ‘Health Law: Facing the European Challenges’ (2010) 17 European Journal of Health Law 1–10. S Wheatley, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity in the Resolution of Certain Ethical Questions in Biomedicine’ (2001) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 312.

A.  Field of Application of Article 3 03.01 Article 3(1) guarantees physical and mental integrity without relating the concept of integrity to particular areas of life, while Article 3(2) makes special provision for integrity in the fields of medicine and biology. With regard to the protection and improvement of human health, according to Article 6 of the TFEU, the EU has the ‘competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States’. Article  9 of the TFEU provides that ‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of … a high level of … protection of human health.’ Public health issues may also incidentally arise in the context of a number of substantive policy areas in which the EU holds legislative powers, including consumer policy, environmental policy, and social policy. 03.02 The main provision defining the EU competence in the area of health is Article  168. Article 168(1) obliges the EU to ensure a high level of human health protection in the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities. This means that EU activities in all areas, including, for example, the achievement of the internal market, should actively promote health protection and be ‘directed towards improving public health, preventing physical and mental illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health’. 03.03 Article 168(2) stipulates that the EU can coordinate and support the activities of the Member States in the areas mentioned in Article 168. Under Article 168(4)(a), the European Parliament and Council are given the power to adopt measures to set high standards of quality and safety of organs and substances of human origin, blood and blood derivatives. The Blood Safety Directive,1 for example, was based on this provision, as were the Human Tissue Directive2 and the Organ Safety Directive.3 Article  168(4)(c) provides competence for ‘measures setting high standards of quality and safety for medicinal products and devices for medical use’. However, measures taken under Article 168(4) ‘shall not affect national provisions on the donation or medical use of organs and blood’ (Art 168(7)), as the competence regarding health policies and the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care lies primarily with the Member States. 03.04 Health-related measures can also be based on the general competence of approximation of laws under Article 114 of the TFEU, if the absence of at least a certain level of harmonisation

1 Directive 2002/98/EC setting standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage and ­distribution of human blood and blood components [2003] OJ L33 (based on former Art 152(4)(a)). 2 Directive 2004/23/EC on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells [2004] OJ L102 (based on former Art 152(4)(a)). 3 Directive 2010/53/EU on standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation [2010] OJ L207 (as corrected: [2010] L243/68).

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would adversely affect the functioning of the internal market.4 The Clinical Trials Directive,5 and the Advanced Therapy Regulation,6 for example, were adopted on this basis. The right to free movement of goods as well as the freedom to provide and receive services 03.05 and the freedom of establishment incidentally award healthcare-related rights, such as the right to be reimbursed by one’s health insurance scheme for medicinal products7 and medical treatment bought in another Member State,8 rights now protected by the Directive on the Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare9 which is based on both Articles 114 and 168 of the TFEU. The relevance of the right to physical and mental integrity as protected by Article  3 for 03.06 areas of EU competence is not obvious at first sight. However, the ECJ stressed in Netherlands v European Parliament and Council that it has the power, ‘in its review of the compatibility of acts of the institutions with the general principles of Community [now EU] law, to ensure that the fundamental right to human dignity and integrity is observed.’10 The right to integrity thus pervades all areas of EU law and policy. Furthermore, the exercise of EU competence in the areas of medicine, biology and health provides some room, and in fact potentially a need, to integrate concerns related to the right to physical and mental integrity. In this respect it has been argued that ‘[r]emoving differences in the interpretation of individual and social human rights principles by health systems means that undue barriers to the EU free movement principles in health care are prevented.’11 This has found some reflection in the Directive on Cross-Border Healthcare. While it primarily aims at regulating the right to receive cross-border medical care, it incidentally touches upon matters of particular relevance in the context of Article  3 of the Charter when it refers in Recital 5 to the Council Conclusions on Common values and principles in European Union Health Systems12 which, in turn, mention consent to treatment as one of these values and principles. Moreover, some norms of EU law, such as the directives on biotechnological inventions,13 clinical trials, and tissue and organ quality and safety, seem to ‘directly aim at biomedical issues’,14 even though they are technically based on the various competency norms mentioned above. In particular the Directive on Biotechnological Inventions has even been described as ‘an instance of direct incorporation of ethics within EU law’,15

4 See, eg, Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573, para 37. See also H Roscam Abbing, ‘Health Law: Facing the European Challenges’ (2010) 17 European Journal of Health Law 1–10, 4. 5 Directive 2001/20/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use [2001] OJ L121, replaced by Reg 536/2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and ­repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, [2014] L158/1. 6 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007 on advanced therapy medicinal products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 [2007] OJ L324, amended by Regulation 1235/2010, [2010] OJ L348. 7 Case C-120/95 Decker v Caisse de Maladie Employés Privés [1998] ECR I-1831. 8 Case C-158/96 Kohll v Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ (2001) 62 BMLR 101; Case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel v Alliance Nationale des Mutualités Chrétiennes (ANMC) [2001] ECR I-5363. 9 Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L88, Art 5, subject to the provisions in Chapter III of the Directive. 10 Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR-I 7079, 70. 11 Roscam Abbing (n 4) 9. 12 [2006] OJ C146/01. 13 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and Council of the European Union of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L213. 14 S Hennette-Vauchez, ‘Biomedicine and EU Law: Unlikely Encounters?’ (2011) 38 Legal Issues of Economic I­ ntegration 5, 9; see also M Favale and A Plomer, ‘Fundamental Disjunctions in the EU Legal Order on Human Tissue, Cells and Advanced Regenerative Therapies’ (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 89, 92–93. 15 Hennette-Vauchez (n 14) 18.



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which is reflected in Recitals 16 and 37 to 45 to that directive. Indeed, it seems as if in certain highly sensitive areas, including the commercialisation of the human body and other matters dealt with by Article  3, there is a perceived need for the stipulation of some form of ethical consensus in order to promote the internal market.16 03.07 Article 3 can also become relevant with regard to EU measures that are designed to promote public health, or restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by Member States based on considerations of public health.17 In both scenarios, the rights guaranteed by Article 3 set limits to the possible restrictions on individual freedoms in the name of public health.18

B.  Interrelationship of Article 3 with Other Provisions of the Charter 03.08 Under the ECHR, the right to physical and mental integrity is protected by Article 8(1) as part of the right to private life.19 Article 7 of the Charter, the right to respect for private and family life, is based on Article 8(1) of the ECHR and should therefore, according to the Explanatory Notes to the Charter,20 be given the same scope and interpretation. This could lead to considerable overlap between Articles 3 and 7 of the Charter, as both would seem to be involved where the right to physical and mental capacity is engaged. However, the inclusion of Article 3 in addition to Article 7 suggests that Article 3, rather than the more general provision of Article 7, kicks in where physical and mental integrity are at issue, particularly when this occurs in the context of medicine and biology. Given the close link between physical and mental integrity and health, Article 3 might to some extent overlap with Article 35, the right to health care, which incidentally protects physical and mental integrity by imposing a positive obligation on states to provide access to health care. 03.09 The practices expressly mentioned and outlawed in Article  3(2) of the Charter, ie eugenic practices, using the human body for financial gain, and reproductive cloning, are closely related to the protection of dignity which is, in a more general form, guaranteed by Article 1. Article 3 might also, to some extent, overlap with Article  2, the right to life, which can be affected, for example, where an individual refuses to consent to life-sustaining medical treatment.21 Article 4, the right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, may be engaged by behaviour that could also give rise to a violation of Article 3, for example where the provision of non-consensual medical treatment reaches a level of particular seriousness.22 A potential conflict between Article 3 and Articles 7 and 9 (the right to marry and found a family) could arise in the context of the prohibition of cloning, where reproductive cloning might be the only possibility to have a genetically related child.

16 See also T Hervey and H Black, ‘The European Union and the Governance of Stem Cell Research’, (2005) 12 ­Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 11, 47–48. For a discussion of a market-based approach to new health technologies see G Bache, M Flear and T Hervey, ‘The Defining Features of the European Union’s Approach to Regulating New Health Technologies’ in M Flear, A-M Farrell, T Hervey and T Murphy (eds), European Law and New Health Technologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 21–24. 17 See Arts 45(3) and 52 of the TFEU. 18 Roscam Abbing (n 4) 8. 19 X and Y v Netherlands Series A, No 91 (1985) [22]; Stubbings et al v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 213 [61]. 20 Charter 4471/00 Convent 48 of 20 September 2000. 21 X v Germany (1984) 7 EHRR 152. 22 See, eg, VC v Slovakia App no 18968/07 (Decision of 8 November 2011) [118]–[120].

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C.  Sources of Article 3 Rights I. ECHR Article 3 guarantees the right to physical and mental integrity which, according to the European Court of Human Rights, forms part of the right to private life guaranteed by Article  8 of the ECHR.23

03.10

II.  UN Treaties As stressed in the explanatory notes to Article 3, the prohibition of eugenic practices is partly 03.11 based on Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute. To a limited extent, Article 3 finds a basis in Article 7 of the ICCPR which stipulates that ‘no 03.12 one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation’. To the extent that it applies to decisions related to reproductive health, Article 3 finds some 03.13 support in Article 16 of CEDAW which highlights women’s rights ‘to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights’.

III.  Council of Europe Treaties The most important source of Article  3 is to be found in the Convention for the Protection 03.14 of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997 (Oviedo Convention).24 Of particular importance are Article 5 on consent, and Article 21 regarding the prohibition on the use of the human body for financial gain. The latter is reiterated in Article 21 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin.25 The Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings,26 provides the basis for the prohibition of reproductive cloning in Article 3. The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes,27 highlights the importance of free and informed consent with regard to genetic testing (Art 9), and the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research28 emphasises it with regard to research (Art 14).

23 Jehovah’s Witnesses v Russia App no 302/02 (Decision of 10 June 2010) [135]; see also Pretty v UK App no 2346/02 (Decision of 29 April 2002) [63]. 24 At the time of writing, the following states had not ratified the Oviedo Convention: Andorra, Armenia, Austria, ­Azerbaijan, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine and UK. 25 At the time of writing, it was ratified by Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Moldova, Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and North Macedonia. 26 At the time of writing, it was ratified by Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, Romania, ­Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and North Macedonia. 27 At the time of writing, it was ratified by Czech Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal and Slovenia. 28 At the time of writing, it was ratified by Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, ­Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey.



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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 03.15 Usually, general human rights documents, ie those that do not specifically deal with the ­protection of individual rights in the particular context of biomedicine, tend to limit themselves to guaranteeing personal integrity implicitly, for example as part of the right to private life.29 The Charter, however, devotes a whole provision to the protection of physical and mental integrity. The general protection of physical and mental integrity guaranteed by Article 3(1) is complemented by Article 3(2) which grants express protection to integrity against particular risks to this right that could arise in the fields of medicine and biology. To this effect, Article 3(2) emphasises the need for free and informed consent, and prohibits eugenic practices, the commercialisation of the human body, and human reproductive cloning. 03.16 Despite the limited EU competence in the fields of medicine and biology, some of the issues addressed in Article 3(2) of the Charter have found their way into EU legislation. The consent requirement has, for example, been included in the Human Tissue Directive (Art 13), the Organ Safety Directive (Art 14), and the Clinical Trials Directive (Art 3(2)). They all require consent but leave the details of how to regulate the procurement of free and informed consent to the Member States. The prohibition of using the human body for financial gain is reflected in the principle of altruism and voluntary and unpaid donations as expressed in Article  12 of the Human Tissue Directive, Article 20 of the Blood Safety Directive, Article 13 of the Organ Safety Directive and Recital 15 of the Advanced Therapy Regulation. The Clinical Trial Directive expresses a similar thought when prohibiting in Articles 4(d) and 5(d) financial incentives other than compensation for participation in clinical trials. The principle of the non-commodification of the human body has, in addition, been of importance in the context of the Directive on Biotechnological Inventions. Article 5 of that directive declares the unpatentability of the human body and Article 6(2)(c) states that to grant a patent for the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes would be contrary to the ordre public or morality.30 The prohibition of cloning is endorsed by Article 6(2)(a) which declares patents of processes for the cloning of human beings to be against the ordre public and morality. 03.17 The rights and principles protected under Article  3 of the Charter have thus influenced EU legislation, and in areas of EU competence moreover set standards regarding the national implementation of the relevant directives in the Member States.

II.  Scope of Application 03.18 Whereas under the ECHR, the patient’s right to physical and mental integrity receives only incidental protection under Article 8(1)31 and, in particularly severe cases, under Article 3,32 the Charter expressly recognises the right to integrity as a fundamental right, thereby highlighting its significance. To determine the scope of application of Article 3, the various rights and interests protected by that provision need to be distinguished. The right to physical and mental integrity as protected under Article  3(1) can be claimed by all individuals, from competent adults to

29 As in Art 8(1) of the ECHR. 30 For a discussion see Case C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace eV [2012] All ER (EC) 809 (ECJ (Grand Chamber)). 31 X and Y v Netherlands (n 19) [22]; Stubbings et al v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 213 [61]. 32 See, eg, X v Denmark (1983) 32 DR 282; Herczigfalvy v Austria Series A, No 242-B [82]; Hurtado v Switzerland Series A, No 280 (1994) [74]; D v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 423 [53].

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incompetent adults and children. It is more difficult to establish who can invoke the protection granted by Article 3(2) of the Charter. The requirement of free and informed consent to medical procedures clearly protects competent adults, ie persons who can give such valid consent, against the imposition of medical procedures against their wishes. The Oviedo Convention, as well as the Clinical Trial Directive, suggest that the consent requirement also applies to incompetent individuals, as both documents contain provisions to protect the integrity of individuals who are not able to give free and informed consent, be it a mentally incompetent adult or a child lacking the necessary maturity.33 Their protection is achieved through the relevant national provisions governing the authorisation of medical procedures on their behalf, for example through the means of proxy consent.34 This suggests that under the Charter, a violation of an incompetent individual’s right to integrity could, for example, be claimed where he/she was used as subject in clinical trials without the requisite proxy consent. The remaining three scenarios mentioned in Article 3(2) are formulated as prohibitions rather 03.19 than individual rights. It is therefore not immediately obvious whether they are primarily aimed at preventing certain practices, or also confer individual rights on those directly concerned and affected by them. In the context of human reproductive cloning, an individual right that could be affected is particularly difficult to conceive, as the prohibition of the practice as such hardly leaves room for the conception of individuals who could then claim to be victims of a violation. However, if cloning of human beings for reproductive purposes ever became a technical possibility, a violation of this prohibition that results in the birth of a person through this technique could potentially violate that individual’s Charter right under Article 3(2). The rights of the person whose genetic information was cloned might also be affected. Regarding the prohibition of eugenic practices and the commercialisation of the human body, it is easier to think of situations in which individuals may claim a violation, for example where they were subjected to sterilisation based on their ethnic origin or disabilities, or to trafficking in body parts or to having their consent induced by financial incentives.

III.  Specific Provisions (a)  The Meaning of Physical and Mental Integrity Physical integrity relates to the right to be free from interferences with one’s body. This poten- 03.20 tially includes a whole range of issues, from torture to physical invasions in the context of clinical trials or unwanted forms of medical treatment.35 According to the European Court of Human Rights, for the right to physical integrity of a mentally competent adult patient ‘to be meaningful, patients must have the right to make choices that accord with their own views and values, regardless of how irrational, unwise or imprudent such choices may appear.’36 This suggests that, in the context of EU health policies, healthy behaviour can be encouraged, but not imposed on the individual who chooses not to adopt it. Mental integrity refers to freedom from psychological pressure and the imposition of mental 03.21 suffering. The European Court of Human Rights touched upon the meaning of mental integrity in the case of Jalloh v Germany. That case concerned the administration of medication that





33 See

Arts 6 and 7 of the Oviedo Convention and Arts 3 to 5 of the Clinical Trials Directive. also Glass v UK App no 61827/00 (Decision of 9 March 2004) [70] and [72]. 35 Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia (n 23) [135]; see also Pretty v UK (n 23) [63]. 36 Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia (n 23) [136]. 34 See

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causes a person to vomit, to a person suspected of having swallowed illegal drugs, without that person’s consent. The Court held that the imposition of such treatment by force in order to overcome the applicant’s resistance violated Article 3 of the Convention, because of the anxiety this must have caused him, and because of his ‘mental suffering while he waited for the emetics to take effect.’37 Thus, mental integrity seems to refer to mental suffering, anxiety, indignity and humiliation resulting from the forced administration of unwanted medical interventions or other forms of degrading treatment. In Dordevic v Croatia, the European Court of Human Rights referred to psychological integrity as being protected by the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.38 03.22 Dordevic v Croatia clarifies that the right to integrity not only encompasses a negative right to be free from state interference, but also a positive duty to guarantee the individual’s integrity, for example in the form of providing protection from interferences by others, in that case harassment over several years of a physically and mentally disabled man by children in his neighbourhood. (b)  Requirement of Free and Informed Consent 03.23 Under the ECHR the right to physical and mental integrity is regarded as part of the right to ­private life under Article  8(1) and is therefore closely linked to the right to autonomy.39 The right to integrity includes protection from compulsory medical treatment of competent patients which is achieved through the requirement of consent.40 With regard to incompetent individuals, the consent requirement is aimed at ensuring the existence of proxy consent prior to m ­ edical interventions. In Glass v UK, the European Court of Human Rights held in this respect that medical treatment of a minor without parental consent interfered with the minor’s right to ­private life, in particular in the form of the right to physical integrity.41 03.24 The express recognition of the principle of informed consent in the Charter confirms its fundamental importance in the area of medicine and biology, and sets a minimum standard for the applicable consent laws of the Member States. The close link between integrity and dignity becomes apparent here, as any conduct that interferes with a person’s integrity or sense of self-worth, such as medical treatment without consent, might be regarded as an attack on that person’s dignity.42 03.25 The principle of informed consent can, for example, become relevant in the context of the coordination of Member States’ policies on the prevention of disease or of incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health under Article 168. Such measures, for example in the context of the prevention of the spread of diseases like AIDS, will have to respect the principle of informed consent, so that compulsory measures violating the integrity of the person, such as mandatory testing, would in principle violate Article 3 of the Charter. 03.26 The reference to ‘informed’ consent indicates the extent to which the individual concerned needs to be provided with information about the intervention at issue. This follows from Article 5 of the Oviedo Convention, which states that the ‘person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences

37 Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (Decision of 1 July 2006) [79]. 38 Dordevic v Croatia App no 41526/10 (Decision of 24 July 2012) [152]. 39 Pretty v UK (n 23) [61]. 40 Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia (n 23) [135]. 41 Glass v UK (n 34) [70]. 42 David Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value—Part I’ (1999) Public Law 682–702, 685–86, and ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value—Part II’ (2000) Public Law 61–76, 67–68.

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and risks’. Where the person is incompetent to consent, the information needs to be provided to the proxy-decision-maker (Art 6(4) of the Oviedo Convention). While it is up to each Member State to regulate the details of the applicable consent procedures,43 some EU legislation specifies the informed consent requirement in particular areas. Article  13(2) of the Human Tissue Directive, for example, demands that ‘donors, their relatives or any persons granting authorisation on behalf of the donors are provided with all appropriate information’. This includes, according to the Annex to the Directive, the purpose and nature of the procurement and its consequences and risks. And Article  3(2)(d) of the Clinical Trials Directive requires that the trial subject or his/her legal representative give written consent after being informed of the nature, significance, implications and risks of the clinical trial.44 An interesting Strasbourg case shedding light on the scope of the informed consent requirement 03.27 is that of VC v Slovakia45 concerning the sterilisation of a Roma woman in a Slovakian hospital. The woman had been in labour for several hours when she was told that she should have a sterilisation during her Caesarean section because future pregnancies would cause a serious risk to her own life and that of the future child. She was asked to sign a note indicating that she had requested a sterilisation, which she did. The applicant later alleged that she had not understood what a sterilisation was, that she had thought the procedure she had agreed to was life-saving, and that she had not been duly informed of the nature and implications of the procedure, or of potential alternatives. The medical records produced by the hospital only showed a typed entry in the delivery 03.28 notes that ‘Patient requests sterilisation’,46 but there was no indication that the applicant had been ‘fully informed about her health status, the proposed procedure and the alternatives to it’.47 The Court regarded this as incompatible with ‘the principles of respect for human dignity and human freedom embodied in the Convention and the requirement of informed consent laid down in … international documents’.48 To ask the applicant to make such a far-reaching decision ‘while she was in labour and shortly before performing a Caesarean section clearly did not permit her to take a decision of her own free will, after consideration of all the relevant issues and, as she may have wished, after having reflected on the implications and discussed the matter with her partner.’49 Stressing the fundamental importance of informed consent for any medical procedures to be carried out on a mentally competent woman, save in emergencies,50 the Court dismissed as paternalistic and untenable the Government’s arguments that the procedure was necessary at that point in time to prevent a future risk of life-threatening health complications because of the applicant’s failure to undergo regular check-ups. It regarded the violation as sufficiently serious to find a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, the right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment,51 which made a separate examination of a violation of the right to private life under

43 See, eg, Art 13(1) of the Human Tissue Directive which states that ‘[t]he procurement of human tissues or cells shall be authorised only after all mandatory consent or authorisation requirements in force in the Member State concerned have been met’; and Art 14 of the Directive on standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation. 44 See also Arts 28 to 35 of the Regulation on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing ­Directive 2001/20/EC (n 5). 45 VC v Slovakia App No 18968/07 (Decision of 8 November 2011). 46 Ibid [111]. 47 Ibid [112]. 48 Ibid [112]. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid [110]. 51 Ibid [120].



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Article 8(1) superfluous in so far as the alleged violation consisted in the sterilisation without her full and informed consent.52 03.29 This confirms that an invasion of the physical integrity of a competent person cannot be justified in order to preserve that person’s health or life against his/her wishes.53 It also shows that the mere fact that a person signed a consent form does not necessarily mean that his/her right to integrity was not violated. Rather, such a result depends on whether the consent was effective, which requires that the person was given all the information necessary to make an informed decision, and that far-reaching non-emergency decisions are made in circumstances which allow for deliberation and for taking in and weighing all the relevant considerations. 03.30 Problems regarding the adequacy of the provision of information and the use of traditional consent forms have recently been highlighted in an entirely different context, that of the use of nanomedicine. New technologies can raise particular problems regarding the requirement of informed consent because of the uncertainties in respect of the risks they pose. In its Opinion on the ethical aspects of nanomedicine, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies emphasises in this respect that: In view of the knowledge gaps, and the complexity of the matter, concerning the long-term effects of nanomedical diagnostic and therapeutic tools, it may be difficult to provide adequate information ­concerning a proposed diagnosis, prevention and therapy needed for informed consent.54

03.31 It concludes that ‘attempts to provide adequate and understandable information and obtain consent … cannot exclusively be met by informed consent forms signed by patients’55 and suggests that research is needed ‘at national and European level to develop improved methods of providing information and obtaining consent’56 in the context of new technologies. (c)  The Prohibition of Eugenic Practices 03.32 According to the Explanatory Notes to the Charter, the prohibition of eugenic practices ‘relates to possible situations in which selection programmes are organised and implemented, involving campaigns for sterilisation, forced pregnancy, compulsory ethnic marriage among others’. The listed prohibited practices have an obvious link with integrity, as they relate either to compulsory selection programmes based on eugenic considerations, or to campaigns which might affect the freedom of choice of the individuals concerned. Because of this, victims of such practices are already protected by the right to integrity in Article 3(1), and, to the extent that these practices involve medical procedures, eg in the case of sterilisations, by the requirement of informed consent set out in Article 3(2) of the Charter. The prohibition adds to the protection of the general right to physical and mental integrity the express condemnation of these practices in the fields of biology and medicine. This presumably means that consent to these practices which qualify as international crimes, either by a competent individual him/herself, or by a proxy in cases of incompetent persons, would be invalid. 03.33 Not all of the practices listed in Article  7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute and mentioned in the Explanatory Notes to the Charter relate to the fields of medicine and biology to which Article 3(2) 52 Ibid [144]. 53 See also Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia (n 23) [135], and Pretty v UK (n 23) [63]. 54 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission, Opinion on the ­ethical aspects of nanomedicine, Opinion No 21, 17 January 2007, para 4.3.2. For further discussion see Jean McHale, ‘Nanomedicine and the EU: Some legal, ethical and regulatory challenges’, (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 65, 80–81. 55 Ibid, para 5.7. 56 Ibid.

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of the Charter applies. For the purposes of Article 3, sterilisations might be the most relevant of these practices. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine the exact scope of Article  3(2) of the Charter in this respect, as it is not clear what concept of eugenics it adopts. The term eugenics originally referred to activities that are directed at ‘improving’ the genetic stock of the human species,57 for example based on disability or ethnic origin. Nowadays it is frequently used in order to describe any decisions that are based on genetic abnormalities, whether or not the decisions were made in order to ‘improve’ the genetic design of the human species. Sterilisations of disabled women, for example, are often seen as having eugenic connotations,58 even though they will usually be justified as being necessary in the best interests of the woman concerned. A case shedding some light on the human rights implications of sterilisations for ethnic 03.34 reasons is the European Court of Human Rights decision in VC v Slovakia.59 In addition to the violation of Article  3 discussed above in the context of informed consent, the Court decided that the Government had violated its positive obligation under Article 8 ‘to secure through its legal system the rights guaranteed by that Article, by putting in place effective legal safeguards to protect the reproductive health of women of Roma origin in particular.’60 This was based on the Court’s evaluation of several reports before it that showed that the improper use of sterilisations in Slovakia ‘affected vulnerable individuals belonging to various ethnic groups … [and] that the Roma population of eastern Slovakia had been at particular risk’61 because of ‘negative attitudes towards the relatively high birth rate among the Roma compared to other parts of the population, often expressed as worries of an increased proportion of the population living on social benefits.’62 From the fact that ‘the entry in the “Medical history” part of the record of the applicant’s 03.35 pregnancy and delivery, under the sub-section entitled “Social and working conditions, especially during the pregnancy”, simply stated: “Patient is of Roma origin”’,63 the Court deduced ‘a certain mindset on the part of the medical staff as to the manner in which the medical situation of a Roma woman should be managed’.64 The Court criticised, in particular, the lack of a policy according to which ‘special care was to be … exercised to ensure that the full and informed consent of such a patient was obtained before any sterilisation was contemplated.’65 Nor was there sufficient indication that the patient’s interests were effectively guaranteed through her active involvement in the decision-making process. The Court concluded that ‘the absence at the relevant time of safeguards giving special consideration to the reproductive health of the applicant as a Roma woman resulted in a failure by the respondent State to comply with its positive obligation to secure to her a sufficient measure of protection enabling her to effectively enjoy her right to respect for her private and family life.’66 While it is not clear whether under the Charter this case would qualify as falling under the 03.36 prohibition of eugenic practices, it exemplifies the link between integrity, informed consent and the prohibition of eugenic practices. Even though the protection of women who are

57 Francis Galton, Inquiries into the Human Faculty and its Development (Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1998) 24–25. 58 For a discussion see, eg, Sarah Bowers, ‘The Intellectually Impaired in Society: The Ethics and Implications of ­Sterilisation and Genetic Control’ (1997) UCL Jurisprudence Review 117. 59 VC v Slovakia (n 45). 60 Ibid [145]. 61 Ibid [146]. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid [150]. 64 Ibid [151]. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid [154].



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discriminated against based on ethnic considerations can to some extent be achieved through the right to integrity and the requirement of consent, the prohibition of eugenic practices might raise sensitivity to the particular issues that can come into play in the context of sterilisations, thereby adding another layer of protection in the form of policies that actively protect the integrity and decision-making abilities of members of vulnerable groups. (d)  Prohibition on Making the Human Body and its Parts a Source of Financial Gain 03.37 Article 3(2) contains another prohibition, that of making the human body and its parts a source of financial gain. This principle is based on Article 21 of the Oviedo Convention which, according to the Explanatory Notes to that Convention, must be understood in the light of the principle of human dignity which would be adversely affected by the sale of body parts. Equitable compensation for expenses, for example in the case of organ or tissue donations, is, however, permitted. 03.38 The principle of the non-commercialisation of the human body and its parts is also reflected in several EU directives. The Organ Safety Directive in Article 13 requires that Member States ‘ensure that donations of organs from deceased and living donors are voluntary and unpaid’. Member States can compensate living donors for their expenses and loss of income related to the donation, but such compensation should be regulated in a manner that avoids creating financial incentives or benefits for a potential donor.67 Recital 19 justifies the principle of altruism for organ and tissue donations by highlighting the link between organ quality and safety and unpaid donations: Even if the process is developed in accordance with appropriate quality standards, a clinical history obtained from either a potential living donor or the relatives of a potential deceased donor who are seeking financial gain or are subjected to any kind of coercion might not be sufficiently accurate in terms of conditions and/or diseases potentially transmissible from donor to recipient.

03.39 In addition to organ quality and safety, Recital 19 indirectly relies on considerations of dignity and integrity by citing Article 3(2) of the Charter and Article 21 of the Oviedo Convention as provisions that back the principle of the non-commercialisation of the human body. 03.40 The Human Tissue Directive states in Recital 18 that, ‘[a]s a matter of principle, tissue and cell application programmes should be founded on the philosophy of voluntary and unpaid donation’, the reason being that this ‘may contribute to high safety standards for tissues and cells and therefore to the protection of human health’ (Recital 19). While Recital 22 vows to respect the principles of the European Charter and to take account of the Oviedo Convention and its protocols, this is a general reference to the importance of these documents, not a particular reference to provisions regarding the non-commodification of the human body, as in the Organ Safety Directive. Unlike Article  13 of the Organ Safety Directive, Article  12(1) of the Human Tissue Directive uses aspirational rather than obligatory language when stating that Member States ‘shall endeavour to take the necessary measures to encourage voluntary and unpaid donations of human tissues and cells with a view to ensuring that, insofar as is possible, they are obtained from such donations’.68 Nevertheless, Article 12 immediately limits this potential discretion when continuing that, while Member States may define the conditions under which compensation may be granted to donors, such compensation must be ‘strictly limited to making

67 For a discussion of this approach with further references to the academic debate see A-M Farrell, ‘Adding Value? EU Governance of Organ Donation and Transplantation’ (2010) 17 European Journal of Health Law 51, 72–73. 68 See Favale and Plomer (n 14) 105–106.

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good the expenses and inconveniences related to the donation’. The discretion thus points more towards potential imports of tissue from paid donors from outside of the EU than to opening the possibility of meeting the demand by providing financial incentives to donors that go beyond compensation. Like the Human Tissue Directive, the Advanced Therapy Regulation69 which covers methods 03.41 such as gene therapy, somatic cell therapy, and tissue engineering, emphasises in Recital 15 that, ‘as a matter of principle, human cells or tissues contained in advanced therapy medicinal products should be procured from voluntary and unpaid donation’ and justifies this with reference to the principle of solidarity as well as health and safety concerns. Unlike the Human Tissue Directive, the substantive provisions of the Regulation do not mention the principle of unpaid donations.70 The Blood Safety Directive also emphasises, in Recital 23, the importance of encouraging 03.42 voluntary and unpaid donations, as they are ‘a factor which can contribute to high safety standards for blood and blood components and therefore to the protection of human health’. Like the Human Tissue Directive, it requires no more than that ‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to encourage voluntary and unpaid blood donations with a view to ensuring that blood and blood components are in so far as possible provided from such donations’ (Art 20). Unlike the Human Tissue Directive, however, no limitations as to the potential compensation of blood donors are included in the Directive, thereby allowing Member States to take different approaches regarding the award of financial incentives for blood donations.71 These different pieces of EU legislation have in common that they justify reliance on the 03.43 principle of altruism primarily in order to enhance the quality and safety of donated organs, tissue and blood. The assumed link between altruism and the quality and safety of donated material is strongly contested, as is the belief that it is impossible to guarantee the quality and safety of donated material through efficient control measures where donations are made for reasons of financial gain.72 However, even if the counter-arguments were to gain force, thereby challenging the main justification behind the principle of altruism adopted by the various directives, the prohibition in Article 3(2) of the Charter would prevent any policy change at EU level. Paid donations, even if not objectionable on safety and quality grounds, would still have to be prohibited based on considerations of dignity and integrity. Nevertheless, while the Charter determines the EU approach to the ethical questions underlying the principle of altruism and the non-commodification of the human body, the ethical values expressed in Article 3(2)(c) stand in contrast to ‘the reality of a thriving and lucrative European and, indeed, global market in human biological materials, such as blood and various types of tissue’.73 Indeed, the CJEU has assumed the continued existence of this market, ruling that Article 3(2)(c) of the Charter must be used to interpret VAT law requiring a VAT exemption for human blood, and limiting that exemption to blood supplied for medical purposes as distinct from ‘industrial’ blood plasma used in commercial production.74 69 Regulation (EC) 1394/2007 on advanced therapy medicinal products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC [2007] OJ L324. 70 For a discussion see Favale and Plomer (n 14) 110. 71 For a critical discussion see A-M Farrell, ‘Is the Gift Still Good? Examining the Politics and Regulation of Blood Safety in the European Union’ (2006) 14 Medical Law Review 155; and A-M Farrell, ‘The Politics of Risk and EU Governance of Human Material’ (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 41. 72 For a critical analysis with further references to the academic discussion see, eg, Farrell (2006) (n 71) 160–62 in relation to blood donations. 73 M Flear, A-M Farrell, T Hervey and T Murphy, ‘A European Law of New Health Technologies?’ in M Flear, A-M Farrell, T Hervey and T Murphy (eds), European Law and New Health Technologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 389–414, 407. 74 Case C-412/15 TMD Gesellschaft für transfusionsmedizinische Dienste mbH v Finanzamt Kassel II – Hofgeismar, ECLI:EU:C:2016:738.



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03.44

03.45

03.46

03.47

03.48

Given the unequivocal prohibition in Article 3(2) on making the human body the source of financial gain, it is open to discussion whether the Blood Safety Directive, the Human Tissue Directive and the Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products Regulation are compatible with the Charter, as they only encourage, rather than require, that donations are unpaid. All would depend on how the line between financial gain—which is prohibited—and equitable compensation for expenses—which is acceptable according to the Explanatory Notes to the Oviedo Convention—is drawn. The Charter does not answer that question but any compensation beyond expenses would presumably violate Article 3(2)(c). In protecting integrity through a prohibition of making the human body and its parts the source of financial gain, Article  3(2)(c) might protect the physical integrity of donors against harm from financially induced donations and recipients against the safety and quality issues that could potentially arise as a consequence, but such a protection comes at the cost of a sweeping denial of integrity in the form of autonomous decision-making in this respect. The prohibition offers protection to incompetent individuals from exploitation by unscrupulous proxies, but only in the form of commercialisation, not against being subjected to altruistic donations. Regarding competent individuals who might want to sell body parts, their integrity is already protected from exploitation through the requirement of informed consent. While it could be argued that consent to sell a body part will frequently not be free,75 this is a question that could be accommodated in the context of a thorough examination of whether, in any particular case, free consent was present.76 Health concerns for the donor and the recipient could be addressed through the same procedures that apply in the context of altruistic donations. The crucial issue of the right to integrity of the recipient, where demand cannot be met through a system of altruistic donations, remains unaddressed. Indeed, it is not clear whether the general prohibition in Article 3(2)(c) leaves room for balancing the individual interests at stake in any given case, as the provision seems to postulate a general policy required by human rights considerations, rather than an individual right that might be counterbalanced by the rights of others. A different problem related to the non-commercialisation of the human body arises in the context of the Biotech Directive. According to Article  5(1), the human body and the simple discovery of one of its elements are not patentable. This changes, however, where ‘[a]n element [was] isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process’ (Art 5(2)). Article 6(1) states that inventions are considered ‘unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality, and Article  6(2)(c) specifically mentions the unpatentability, on that basis, of ‘uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes’. Recital 16 stipulates that ‘patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person’, and Recital 42 excludes the patentability of ‘uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes’ unless the relevant invention is ‘for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it’. The interpretation and scope of these prohibitions came to the test in Brüstle v Greenpeace,77 a case about the patentability of an invention that involved the production of neural precursor 75 For a discussion of this highly controversial issue see, eg, D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford, OUP, 2001) 212–15. 76 See also T McConnell, Inalienable Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2000) 131; and N Duxbury, ‘Do Markets Degrade?’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 331–48, 345. 77 For a case giving this provision an extensive interpretation see Case C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace eV [2012] All ER (EC) 809 (ECJ (Grand Chamber)) [32] with reference to Recital 16 of the Directive. For an interesting discussion of the decision see Bache, Flear and Hervey (n 16) [32]–[34].

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cells which required the use of stem cells obtained from a human embryo at the blastocyst stage which would result in the destruction of the embryo. Upon reference by the German Federal Court of Justice, the ECJ had to decide how human embryo is defined under Article  6(2)(c), whether reference to the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes in Article 6(2)(c) includes their use for research purposes; and, whether the exclusion of patentability applies to inventions whose purpose is not the use of a human embryo, but concerns a ‘product whose production necessitates the prior destruction of human embryos or a process … which requires a base material obtained by destruction of human embryos.’78 While the Advocate-General in his Opinion referred, inter alia, to Articles 1, 3(1) and 3(2)(c) 03.49 of the Charter as relevant EU provisions, though without analysing their impact, the ECJ did not make any reference to the European Charter in Brüstle. Regarding the question of the scope of the non-commercialisation of the human body and its parts, the Court in Brüstle adopted a very extensive approach. First, regarding the question of how to define the point at which protection against commercialisation should be awarded, the ECJ acknowledged that ‘the definition of human embryo is a very sensitive social issue in many Member States, marked by their multiple traditions and value systems’,79 but held that the directive necessitated a uniform EU-wide interpretation of what is meant by human embryo.80 According to the ECJ, respect for human dignity as required by the context and aim of the directive demand a broad definition of human embryo81 which includes ‘any human ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and any non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis.’82 The ECJ answered the second question by deciding that ‘the exclusion from patentability 03.50 concerning the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes in Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive also covers use for purposes of scientific research’83 because ‘the grant of a patent implies, in principle, its industrial or commercial application.’84 With regard to the final question, the ECJ gave the term ‘use for commercial and industrial purposes’ a far-reaching interpretation by extending the exclusion from patentability contained in Article 6(2)(c) to the use of human embryonic stem cells that were derived from the previous destruction of a human embryo, even where the destruction occurred long before the implementation of the invention.85 Unfortunately, the ECJ did not elaborate on what concept of dignity it relied on to come to this conclusion, nor did it establish the existence of a European consensus according to which the destruction of human embryos violates human dignity and therefore requires the denial of patenting rights for any downstream use of inventions that derive from such a destruction.86

78 Ibid [47]. 79 Ibid [30]. 80 Ibid [26]. 81 Ibid [34]. For a critical discussion of this approach and definition, see A Plomer, ‘After Brüstle: EU Accession to the ECHR and the Future of European Patent Law’ (2012) 2 Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 110, 136–38; S Harmon, G Laurie and A Courtney, ‘Dignity, Plurality and Patentability: the Unfinished Story of Brustle v Greenpeace’ (2013) European Law Review 92, 95–98 and 100; T M Spranger, ‘Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 October 2011’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1197, 1202 and 1206. 82 Bache, Flear and Hervey (n 16) [38]. 83 Brüstle v Greenpeace eV (n 77) [46]. 84 Ibid [41]. 85 Ibid [49]. 86 For a forceful critique of this part of the decision see, in particular, Plomer (n 81) 126 and 131–33. See also M Varju and J Sandor, ‘Patenting Stem Cells in Europe: the Challenge of Multiplicity in European Union Law’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1007–38, 1031–35.



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03.51

As Article 3(2) of the Charter does not provide a specific definition of what is meant by ‘the human body and its part’, it seems as if the broad approach adopted in Brüstle to the definition of human embryo as well as to its commercial and industrial use would be compatible with that provision, though by no means required. Indeed, according to Strasbourg jurisprudence which refers to the European Group of Ethics in Science and New Technologies’ view that ‘because of a lack of consensus, it would be inappropriate to impose one exclusive moral code’ on research on human embryos,87 a wide margin of appreciation exists regarding the question of when life begins and should be afforded protection.88 It is likely that a similar approach would be adopted under Article 3(2)(c) of the Charter thus leaving it to Member States whether or not to extend the prohibition of the commercialisation of the human body to the commercial use of cells derived from embryo destruction. (e)  Prohibition of Human Reproductive Cloning

03.52 Reproductive cloning of a human being means that a human being will be created not from a fertilised egg combining the genetic material of the egg and the sperm providers, but from an egg the nucleus of which is replaced with the genetic material from another person’s cell. The resulting embryo would then only have the genetic make-up of the cloned person, ie would be genetically identical with another human being.89 The prohibition contained in Article 3(2)(d) of the Charter in this respect is based on the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings. The Explanatory Notes to the Charter specifically emphasise that other forms of cloning are not affected by the prohibition. This leaves open the possibility of therapeutic cloning, ie cloning in order to create cells, tissue or organs that might be used for therapeutic purposes.90 03.53 The main reason why the Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention prohibits human cloning is that it amounts to an instrumentalisation of the clone, which is regarded as contrary to human dignity. In addition, para 3 of the Explanatory Report to the Protocol specifies that cloning bears the danger of making it possible to predetermine the human genetic constitution, thus raising fears of the creation of ‘designer babies’. The Protocol further justifies the prohibition on the grounds that the technique might imply medical, psychological and social difficulties for all individuals involved. 03.54 Human reproductive cloning is not yet a medical possibility, and its outright prohibition might have the effect of making the development of the relevant technologies improbable. The EU’s negative attitude regarding reproductive cloning has, for example, found its way into the Union’s research framework programmes by excluding the provision of funding for research related to human reproductive cloning.91 Recital 40 and Article  6(2)(a) of the Biotech Directive declare human cloning to be against l’ordre public and morality and exclude it from patentability, thus

87 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission, Opinion on the ethical aspects of research involving the use of human embryo in the context of the 5th Framework Programme, Opinion No 12, 23 November 1998, para 2.4. 88 Vo v France (2005) 40 EHRR 12 [82]. See also Plomer (n 81) 126–28. 89 Apart from the mitochondrial DNA. For a detailed analysis of the technical, legal and ethical issues involved in ­cloning, see I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law, 3rd edn (London, Butterworths, 2000) 1247–68. 90 Favale and Plomer (n 14) 102. For a discussion of therapeutic cloning see Hervey and Black (n 16). 91 See, eg, Art 6(2) of Decision 1982/2006/EC concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007–2013) [2006] OJ L412. For a discussion, see Hennette-Vauchez (n 14) 9; Favale and Plomer (n 14) 94.

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further expressing not only rejection of this technique, but moreover discouraging its technical advancement. The link between the prohibition of reproductive cloning and the right to physical and mental integrity is unclear, as it is not obvious whose right to physical or mental integrity could be affected by reproductive cloning. If it were the right of the person whose genetic material is being used for cloning, that right could effectively be protected by an informed consent requirement. To prohibit reproductive cloning, on the other hand, might violate rather than enhance integrity, as it deprives individuals of the possibility to resort to this technique, whatever the reasons why they might choose to do so if reproductive cloning ever became available (potential reasons varying from the impossibility otherwise to have a genetically related child, the wish to produce a genetic copy of oneself, or to produce a genetic copy of someone else, for example to replace a lost relative or to create a compatible organ donor). If the prohibition of reproductive cloning aimed at protecting the rights of the child that has not yet been conceived, this would pose several difficulties. First, it is problematic whether a person can have any rights prior to conception, and if so, whether such a right can be violated by being conceived. As the claim would then have to be based on being harmed by having been conceived through a prohibited technique, this might conflict with the strong views held in most, if not all, EU Member States against the idea that being alive can be regarded as harmful.92 Secondly, it is not clear which rights of the clone might potentially be affected. One argument against cloning is related to the potential health risks this method poses to both the mother and the child. There is moreover widespread concern that being conceived through cloning might violate the dignity or autonomy of the clone who, as the argument goes, is treated as a means to an end, rather than as an end in him/herself, as he/she is created for a specific purpose.93 Furthermore, the genetic identity with another person is regarded as threatening the clone’s sense of uniqueness and individuality.94 This, of course, is highly controversial and more and more voices reject these arguments as being based on misconceived genetic determinism and on a problematic application of the ‘no one shall be treated merely as a means to an end’ formula, as it is not at all clear that the clone would be reduced to serving someone else’s purposes, rather than being valued as a human being with his/her own worth.95 Nevertheless, the inclusion of the prohibition of human reproductive cloning in Article 3(2)(d) of the Charter means that at EU level, the ethical question has been clearly decided against reproductive cloning and the interests of the person who might want to resort to reproductive cloning in order to realise his/her reproductive rights.

03.55

03.56

03.57

03.58

IV.  Limitations and Derogations As the protection of physical and mental integrity is based on the provisions of the European 03.59 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, the right can, according to Article 26 of that 92 Such an approach has been rejected in wrongful life cases, that is cases in which a child that was born with severe disabilities claims compensation on the grounds that had the mother been adequately informed, she would not have conceived or would have aborted the child; see, eg, McKay and another v Essex Area Health Authority and another [1982] 2 All ER 771; BGHZ 86, 240; and the French legislation of 10 January 2002 on the subject, Assemblée nationale, proposition de loi relative à la solidarité nationale et à l’indemnisation des handicaps congénitaux. 93 See, eg, HFEA/HGAC, Cloning Issues in Reproduction Science and Medicine—A Consultation Document, 1998, para 4.5. 94 Ibid para 4.7. 95 For an excellent discussion see, eg, J Robertson, ‘Liberty, Identity and Human Cloning’ (1998) 76 Texas Law Review 1371; see also J Harris, Clones, Genes, and Immortality (Oxford, OUP, 1998) 26–37; Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 75) 158–64.



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Convention, be restricted in the interest of public safety, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of public health, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Comparable restrictions also apply based on Article 8(2) ECHR. According to Strasbourg jurisprudence, the right to integrity cannot be legitimately restricted on paternalistic grounds, ie in order to protect a competent individual against their own autonomous choices, even if they might put the person’s health at risk.96 Nevertheless, under the Charter this is clearly a possibility, given that the prohibitions listed in Article 3(b) to (d) limit the autonomous decision-making of the competent person in the relevant areas.

V. Remedies 03.60 Litigation because of a violation of Article 3(2)(a) might arise, for example, where the adequacy of the information is at issue in the context of informed consent. An EU citizen travelling to another Member State to receive medical treatment, for example, might rely on Article  3 if the information provided prior to the treatment did not meet the standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights in VC v Slovakia,97 because the person was not provided with all relevant information in order to make an informed decision, or because the person was not given the time and space that was necessary to make an informed choice. Another scenario in which the consent requirement might be violated is that of a person donating organs or tissue in a Member State which did not adequately implement the consent requirements contained in the Human Tissue Directive. 03.61 Regarding the principle of the non-commercialisation of the human body, it might be interesting to test whether its status as a Charter right or principle under Article 3(2)(c) would make it possible for individuals to challenge the violation of this right where they were, for example, induced by financial incentives to donate blood or eggs.98

E. Evaluation 03.62 Article  3 seems to be a two-edged sword. While it highlights the importance of the right to physical and mental integrity and of the principle of informed consent, the three prohibitions contained in Article 3(2), though formulated as if they were designed to shape and strengthen the individual right to physical and mental integrity in the areas of medicine and biology, in fact not only outlaw certain activities in the name of protecting individual integrity, but at the same time put limitations on the exercise of the individual right to integrity in order to serve an objective vision of human dignity. 03.63 This tension becomes clearest in the context of Article 3(2)(c), the prohibition of making the human body and its parts the source of financial gain. It seems as if the general prohibition of the sale of body parts aims less at the protection of the integrity of the individual whose body is at issue, than at condemning the commodification of the human body as an infringement of human

96 See also Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia (n 23) [135], and Pretty v UK (n 23) [63]; VC v Slovakia (n 45) [113]–[114]. 97 Ibid. 98 For a comparable point regarding a repentant seller of an organ, see R O’Connell and S Gevers, ‘Fixed Points in a Changing Age? The Council of Europe, Human Rights, and the Regulation of New Health Technologies’ in M Flear, A-M Farrell, T Hervey and T Murphy (eds), European Law and New Health Technologies (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 46–69, 65.

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dignity, regardless of whether the individual concerned has given free and informed consent.99 Indeed, the prohibition on the sale of body parts limits the autonomy of individuals wishing to be involved in such activities, instead of enhancing it. To override individual autonomy in the name of dignity reflects a particular, rather paternalistic, vision of human dignity,100 which is also apparent in the Oviedo Convention.101 Thus understood, human dignity protects the intrinsic worth of the individual as defined from an objective perspective, and/or the dignity of the human species as such,102 rather than reinforcing the autonomous person’s claim that his/her freely made choices be respected.103 The concept of dignity reflected in the prohibition of the commercialisation of body parts consequently seems to be based on the assumption that there is a need to limit individual choice in order to protect an objective societal definition of dignity, and autonomous individuals against their own autonomous actions. The Explanatory Notes to Article 3 do not address this obvious tension between individual 03.64 rights and universalised notions of human dignity. However, it seems fair to say that ‘in bioethical contexts, “human dignity” is … often appealed to by those who seek to prevent change’,104 and that the vision of human dignity underlying the prohibitions in Article  3(2) does not intend to promote individual rights, but rather aims at ‘asserting collective control over individual choice’.105 It then does not seem correct to characterise the prohibitions contained in Article 3(2) as modern,106 ultramodern107 or post-modern or third-generation108 rights, as they do not grant rights, but rather impose restrictions on the exercise of rights. That the drafters of the Charter have chosen to impose with unusual specificity a particular 03.65 vision of human dignity in the medical and biological context109 might be explained by a desire to declare a system of fundamental values that represents the European identity.110 Indeed, it seems as if the main aim behind the prohibitions contained in Article 3(2) of the Charter is to present certain values as so fundamental that they represent what the European Union stands for,111 and that every deviation from these values, even by autonomous individuals, threatens this consensus and with it the ethical foundations of the society the European Union has chosen to be. Reliance on the Oviedo Convention and the Additional Protocol on Human Reproductive Cloning as main authority for an expression of the values protected under Article 3(2) is, however, problematic, given that the documents have not been ratified by all of the EU Member States.

99 In favour of such an approach see, eg, S Wheatley, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity in the Resolution of Certain Ethical Questions in Biomedicine’, (2001) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 312, 323. 100 For a detailed discussion of what they call ‘human dignity as constraint’ see Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 75) 29–47. 101 See also Favale and Plomer (n 14) 99–101. 102 For a discussion in the context of the Oviedo Convention see O’Connell and Gevers (n 98) 67. 103 For a detailed discussion of what they call ‘human dignity as empowerment’, see Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 75) 9–28. 104 H Kuhse, ‘Is There a Tension between Autonomy and Dignity?’ in P Kemp, J Rendtorff and N Mattson Johansen (eds), Bioethics and Biolaw, vol II (Copenhagen, Rhodos International Science and Art Publishers and Centre for Ethics and Law, 2000) 61–74, 62. 105 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 75) 44. 106 M Gijzen, ‘The Charter: A Milestone for Social Protection in Europe?’ (2001) 8 Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 33–48, 41. 107 D Curtin and R van Ooik, ‘The Sting is Always in The Tail. The Personal Scope of Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 8 Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 102–14, 104. 108 L Betten, ‘Current developments: Community Law. Human Rights’ (2001) 50 International Current Law Quarterly 690–701, 692. 109 AW Heringa and L Verhey, ‘The EU Charter: Text and Structure’ (2001) 8 Maastricht Journal of European & ­Comparative Law 11–32, 18. 110 Editorial Comments, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights still under Discussion’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 1–6, 4. 111 Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 75) 65.



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Article 4* Article 4 Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 4 The right in Article 4 is the right guaranteed by Article 3 of the ECHR, which has the same wording: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ By virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter, it therefore has the same meaning and the same scope as the ECHR Article.

Select Bibliography M Cherif Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law: Sources, Subjects, and Contents, 3rd edn (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). S Carrera, M de Somer and B Petkova, The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Fundamental Rights Tribunal—Challenges for the Effective Delivery of Fundamental Rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security, No 49/August 2012). Council of Europe, ‘Secretary General’s supplementary report under article 52 ECHR on the question of secret detention and transport of detainees suspected of terrorist acts, notably by or at the instigation of foreign agencies’ (2006) 13 SG/Inf, 14 June 2006. P van Dijk, F van Hoof, A van Rijn and L Zwaak, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 5th edn (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2018). C Droege, ‘Transfers of detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and contemporary challenges’ (2008) 90 (871) International Review of the Red Cross 669–701. ——, ‘“In Truth the Leitmotiv”: The Prohibition of Torture and other Forms of Ill-Treatment in International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 (867) International Review of the Red Cross 515–41. European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Justice, Freedom and Security, Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its impact on EU Home Affairs Agencies, Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office, Study 2011. Fundamental Rights Agency and Council of Europe, Fundamental rights of refugees, asylum applicants and migrants at the European borders (Fundamental Rights Agency and Council of Europe, 2020). M Gibney and S Skogly (eds), Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). MT Gil-Bazo, ‘Refugee Protection under International Human Rights Law: From Non-Refoulement to Residence and Citizenship’ (2015) 34 (1) Refugee Survey Quarterly 11–42. DJ Harris, M O’Boyle and C Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018). JA Hessbruegge, ‘European Court of Human Rights Protects Migrants Against “Push Back” Operations on the High Seas’ (2012) 16 (14) ASIL Insights. Human Rights Watch, ‘The EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in the Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece’ (September 2011). Y Ktistakis, Protecting Migrants Under the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter. A Handbook for Legal Practitioners (Council of Europe, 2013). * This chapter was written by Manfred Nowak and Anne Charbord in the first edition. It has been updated by MariaTeresa Gil-Bazo for the second edition.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

FM Mariño Menéndez, ‘The Prohibition of Torture in Public International Law’ (2018) 391 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 102–85. ——, ‘Recent Jurisprudence of the United Nations Committee against Torture and the International Protection of Refugees’ (2015) 34 (1) Refugee Survey Quarterly 61–78. M Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2011). V Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe. Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017). M Nowak, ‘Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ in A Clapham and P Gaeta (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). ——, ‘What Practices Constitute Torture?: US and UN Standards’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 809–41. ——, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl, NP Engel Verlag, 2005). ——, ‘Challenges to the Absolute Nature of the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment’ (2005) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 674–88. —— and R Janik, ‘Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ in A Clapham, P Gaeta and M Sassoli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). —— and E McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture—A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). Panel of Eminent Persons on the initiative of the Swiss Government on the occasion of the 60th a­ nniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Human Rights’, Geneva 2008 (Progress Report prepared by the Panel’s Rapporteur Manfred Nowak) 12 et seq. J Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, Vol IV, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958). T Rodenhäuser, Detainee transfers under IHL of IAC and under IHL of NIAC, (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 2018). NS Rodley, ‘The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law’ (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 467–93. —— and M Pollard, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011). P Ronchi, ‘The Borders of Human Rights’ (2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 20, 23. C Ryngaert, ‘Clarifying the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 28 (74) Merkourios, Case Note, 57–60. W Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010). ——, ‘The Crime of Torture and the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2006) 37 (2) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 349–64. ——, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003). H Tretter, ‘Kommentar zu Artikel 3 EMRK’ in K Korinek and M Holoubek (eds), Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht, Teil III Grundrecht (Vienna, Springer, 2011). O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edn (Munich/Oxford, CH Beck/Hart, 2008). UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Geneva, UNHCR, 2007). UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism (A/HRC/4/88). UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Reports to the Commission on Human Rights (UN Doc E/CN4/2006/6); To the Human Rights Council: UN Doc. A/HRC/7/3, UN Doc A/HRC/10/44/Add.2, UN Doc A/HRC/10/44/Add 3, UN Doc A/HRC/13/39/Add 5; To the General Assembly: UN Doc A/64/215). UN, Joint Report Of Four Special Procedures On Secret Detention In The Fight Against Terrorism (UN Doc A/HRC/13/42). 60

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Art 4 – Prohibition of Torture

A.  Field of Application of Article 4 The scope of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in Article 4 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: EUCR) is defined in Article 51 EUCR. Article 4 EUCR is addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and to the Member States only when they are implementing European Union law. With the broadening of internal competencies in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), including the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, and the broadening of external competencies in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is increasingly relevant for EU institutions, bodies and agencies. The area of JHA has an important impact on the lives of EU citizens. It covers areas such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police cooperation and criminal law. The Treaty of Lisbon developed the area of ‘freedom, security and justice’, further developed by the EU’s New Strategic Agenda 2019–2024, adopted by the European Council in June 2019,1 which increases EU competencies in the fields of internal security, terrorism, immigration, asylum and external border control. The treatment of individuals is key in all of these areas, which can provide grounds for the application of Article 4 EUCR. By way of example, the Common European Asylum System—and the ‘Dublin Regulation’, which determines the responsible Member State for examining an asylum application—is based on the principle of mutual trust, which presumes that all EU Member States are safe for asylumseekers, insofar as they respect the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, such as those relating to their treatment during the determination of their status, including any detention periods. Consequently, a violation of the absolute prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in a Member State responsible for asylum applications could entail the responsibility, not only of that particular Member State, but also of any other Member State involved in sending asylum seekers there. Both the ECtHR and the CJEU have examined this issue, stating that the presumption of equivalent human rights protection was rebuttable, and that the automatic application of the Dublin Regulation in cases where Member States knew about the risk of ill-treatment was incompatible with states’ human rights obligations.2 In order to assist Member States and EU institutions on JHA, a number of working parties and committees,3 as well as specialised bodies,4 have been set up. Those in charge of the areas of freedom, security, and justice (FRA, Frontex, EASO and Europol) are especially concerned with the effective implementation of Article 4 EUCR. Broadly speaking, these agencies are to act as a platform for cooperation between Member States. However, their mandates allow for some flexibility in their scope of action,5 and it is not impossible to conceive of situations in which

1 Council of the European Union, Conclusion, 20 June 2010, Doc. EUCO 9/19. 2 See MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011) and, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department and ME and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] OJ C274/21 and OJ C13/18 (CJEU). 3 Eg the CATS (Coordinating Committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters), the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum and the COSI (Committee on Internal Security). 4 These include FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights), Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union), Europol (Law Enforcement Agency of the European Union), Eurojust (European Agency for the fight against serious organised crime) and EASO (European Asylum Support Office). 5 See European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Justice, Freedom and Security, Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its impact on EU Home Affairs Agencies, Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office, Study 2011. Key findings: ‘EU home affairs agencies



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the line between ‘coordination’ and ‘conducting operations’ becomes blurred.6 In the case of a violation of Article 4 EUCR, issues about the responsibility of the EU itself under the EUCR would be raised, as well as questions as to the respective responsibility of the EU agencies7 and the Member States involved.8 04.05 On 23 September 2020 the European Commission that took office in December 2019 adopted a New Pact on Migration and Asylum,9 together with new legislative proposals in the fields of asylum and migration, including on procedures on international protection, search and rescue operations, and the screening of third country nationals at external borders, all areas where Article 4 EUCR plays a key role. 04.06 The EAW is another measure that that merits discussion, since it could give rise to Member States’ responsibility for violations of Article 4 EUCR.10 The EAW is founded on the principle of mutual trust among EU Member States in the field of fundamental rights. This means, inter alia, trusting that prison conditions and prison regimes in other Member States do not amount to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and that vulnerable populations are properly cared for in the requesting state. It is possible to draw inferences from the rulings on the common asylum system referred to earlier, and note that the presumption of protection should be equally rebuttable.11 In the case of a surrender where the executing state finds that there exists, for the individual who is the subject of the European arrest warrant, a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 4 EUCR prevents the executing state from surrendering the individual. Instead, it must ask the issuing state for further information that allows the executing state to discount the existence of such a risk, and it must postpone the execution of the EAW until that time. If the existence of that risk cannot be discounted within a reasonable time, the executing judicial authority must decide whether the surrender procedure should be brought

have confirmed themselves as distinct forms of EU regulatory agency. Their scope of action and tasks are not fully predetermined and defined in their founding regulations, at times allowing for the flexible accommodation, and sometimes extension, of their competences to new domains on an ad hoc basis. The three agencies have been granted important operational tasks that go beyond mere “regulatory activities”. Yet their dominant framing as depoliticized “coordinators” or “facilitators” of Member State actions has increased their relative autonomy, in some cases preventing a proper democratic scrutiny of the nature and impact of their activities and evading questions of accountability, responsibility and liability in cases of alleged unlawful actions, including potential fundamental rights breaches and risks.’ Available at www. europarl.europa.eu/studies. See also S Carrera, M de Somer and B Petkova, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Fundamental Rights Tribunal—Challenges for the Effective Delivery of Fundamental Rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security, No 49/August 2012. 6 Eg Frontex joint operations and Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs), Europol Joint Investigation Teams. Other cases could include funding or logistics provided for specific operations conducted by Member States, or the provision of personnel to carry out operations. 7 See Art 263 TFEU, which provides for a review of acts of EU agencies when they are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, thus allowing the Court to hold agencies accountable for violations of the Charter. 8 See in particular Art 80 TFEU which states that EU policies on border checks, asylum and immigration shall be governed by ‘the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility’ between the Member States. 9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 23 September 2020, COM(2020) 609 final. 10 See Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA [2002] OJ L190, amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA [2009] OJ L81. It is any judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest or surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution, executing a custodial sentence or executing a detention order. The Framework decision subjects it to human rights obligations: ‘This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European Union.’ 11 See MSS v Belgium and Greece (n 2) and NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department (n 2).

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to an end, as its execution would be itself in breach of the Charter.12 Other mutual recognition instruments, such as the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and the transfer of prisoners within and between EU countries are also affected by the treatment of individuals, in particular detention conditions. Externally, respect for human rights features among the key objectives of the EU’s CFSP, with 04.07 the fight against torture and ill-treatment in prominent position. The EU has adopted guidelines, which provide practical guidance in contacts with third countries at all levels, as well as in multilateral human rights fora, in order to support and strengthen ongoing efforts to prevent and eradicate torture and other ill-treatment throughout the world.13 While the promotion of the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment may be essential in the EU’s relationship with non-Member States and external partners, the EU is itself bound to respect this prohibition in all aspects of its CFSP. EU involvement in multinational missions and EU operations is one specific area of the 04.08 CFSP that might be particularly relevant for the application of Article 4 EUCR. This includes, for instance, the European Naval Force Somalia—Operation Atalanta, whose mandate includes powers to arrest, detain and transfer persons suspected of intending to commit, committing or having committed acts of piracy or armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.14 In the context of police or military operations where individuals can be detained and detainees transferred, the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, as well as its corollary, the principle of non-refoulement, apply. The ECtHR has consistently held that a state is bound to respect the rights under the ECHR—including the principle of non-refoulement relating to torture or ill-treatment—where the state has established effective control and authority outside its territory, including on the high seas.15 It is also important to mention the upgrading, with the Lisbon Treaty, of all former European 04.09 Commission Delegations into European Union Delegations, as part of the establishment of the European External Action Service. With this process, Union delegations, their staff and their property benefit from privileges and immunities equivalent to those enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.16 Should a person take refuge in an EU delegation, the prohibition of refoulement relating to torture or ill-treatment should apply, as

12 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Judgment of 5 April 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, para 104. 13 See Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines on EU Policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (2019 Revision of the Guidelines)’, 16 September 2019, 12107/19. 14 See Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. Art 2, which deals with the mandate, states that Atalanta shall (d) take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present; and (e) in view of prosecutions potentially being brought by the relevant states under the conditions in Art 12, arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery in the areas where it is present and seize the vessels of the pirates or armed robbers or the vessels caught following an act of piracy or an armed robbery and which are in the hands of the pirates, as well as the goods on board; See also Art 12(2), which states that ‘No persons … may be transferred to a third State unless the conditions for the transfer have been agreed with that third State in a manner consistent with relevant international law, notably international law on human rights, in order to guarantee in particular that no one shall be subjected to the death penalty, to torture or to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.’ 15 See Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom App no 55721/07 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 7 July 2011); Hirsi Jamaa et al v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012). 16 Art 5.6 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU).



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the key issue is not whether an international border has been crossed but whether there is a risk of ill-treatment.17

B.  Interrelationship of Article 4 with Other Provisions of the Charter 04.10 Torture constitutes one of the most direct and brutal attacks on the core of human dignity and personal integrity. Torture aims at breaking the will of the victims and to degrade them to a powerless tool in the hands of the perpetrators. Whereas slavery dehumanises human beings de jure by taking away their recognition as a person before the law, torture dehumanises them de facto. No provision in international human rights law establishes a clearer link between the rights to human dignity and to the recognition of a legal status of human beings on the one hand and the prohibition of slavery and torture on the other hand than Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.18 While Articles 3 and 4 of the ECHR, which formed the basis for the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 EUCR, define the right to human dignity and personal integrity only in negative terms (prohibition of torture and slavery), other human rights treaties link these prohibitions to a positive human right. Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), eg, first recognises the human right to respect of the physical, mental and moral integrity of every person before it stipulates the prohibition of torture and the right of detainees to be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. Similarly, Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) ensures that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 04.11 Article 4 EUCR must, therefore, be interpreted in the context of all other human rights enlisted in the first chapter entitled ‘Dignity’. According to Article 1, human dignity is inviolable and must be respected and protected. The notion of dignity as the essential distinguishing feature between human beings and other creatures constitutes the fundamental philosophical idea underlying the concept of inalienable human rights as developed in the Age of Enlightenment. Philosophers like Immanuel Kant grounded the claim of human dignity and the uniqueness of human beings in human free will, in the capacity for moral choice and individual autonomy.19 In this sense, all human rights are based on the moral and philosophical foundation of human dignity, although the concept of human rights is much broader and not all violations of human rights constitute at the same time an attack on human dignity. By creating a chapter on dignity, the EUCR constitutes the first human rights instrument to attempt to define those rights that are most directly linked to the notion of human dignity. In addition to the significance of human dignity as a fundamental value underlying the very concept of human rights,20 Article 1 EUCR 17 Several ECtHR cases support this position. See Al-Sadoon and Mufdhi v UK App no 61498/08 (25 March 2009) and Hirsi Jamaa et al v Italy (n 15). 18 Art 5 of the African Charter reads as follows: ‘Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.’ 19 Cf, eg, ‘Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Human Rights’, prepared by a Panel of Eminent Persons on the initiative of the Swiss Government on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Geneva 2008 (Progress Report prepared by the Panel’s Rapporteur Manfred Nowak, 12 et seq). 20 See in this sense also, eg the Preambles to the UN Charter 1945 (‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’) and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (‘Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’).

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also recognises the right to human dignity as a separate human right with corresponding obligations of others. In this respect, Article 1 EUCR was inspired by both Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 194821 and Article 1 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) of 1949.22 The meaning of the right to human dignity as a separate human right can be interpreted as a reaction to the systematic denial of human dignity during the Nazi Holocaust and was further developed in the rich case law of the German Constitutional Court. The CJEU has since defined respect for human dignity as a general principle of law.23 The other rights in Chapter I of the EUCR, namely the right to life (Art 2), the right to the 04.12 integrity of the person (Art 3) as well as the prohibition of torture (Art 4) and slavery (Art 5) directly follow from the inviolability of human dignity. The five rights enumerated in the chapter on dignity overlap with each other to some extent. Article 2(2) stipulates, eg, in the context of the right to life, that no one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed. But the absolute prohibition of the death penalty in fact derives more from the growing conviction in Europe and other parts of the world that capital punishment, similar to corporal punishment, constitutes an inhuman and degrading punishment, as prohibited by Article 4.24 Article 3 EUCR, which guarantees the right to physical and mental integrity of the person, primarily deals with threats to this right deriving from new scientific developments in the fields of medicine and biology which traditionally have been addressed in the context of the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment. For example, the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment in Article 7 of the CCPR explicitly includes the obligation that ‘no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation’, which can also be found in Article 3(2) EUCR. This and other specific rights spelled out in Article 3(2) EUCR, such as the prohibition of eugenic practices, the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain, and the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings correspond also to the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and its Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings adopted by the Council of Europe in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Similarly, the prohibition of slavery, servitude, forced labour and other slavery-like practices, such as trafficking in human beings in Article 5 EUCR are closely related to the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment in Article 4. In certain ancient cultures, for example, testimonies of slaves were only valid before the courts if confirmed under torture. In certain cases, trafficking of human beings can amount to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment if the state fails to fulfil its due diligence and rehabilitation obligations in terms of the prevention of trafficking and the protection of individual victims.25

21 Art 1 UDHR: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and human rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ 22 Art 1(1) Grundgesetz: ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.’ 23 See the commentary on Art 1 by Catherine Dupré in this volume with further references. 24 The prohibition of capital punishment as the ultimate form of a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment is, eg, underlined by Art 37(a) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and a rich case law of domestic courts, most notably the South African Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3. The same holds true for the EU Guidelines on the death penalty (General Affairs Council of 16 June 2008), and the repeated calls by the UN General Assembly on its Member States to establish a moratorium on the death penalty: see GA Res A/RES/62/149 (adopted on 18 December 2007, by a vote of 99 in favour to 52 against, with 33 abstentions), A/RES/63/168 (adopted on 18 December 2008, by a vote of 104 in favour to 54 against, with 29 abstentions), A/RES/65/206 (adopted on 21 December 2010, by a vote of 108 in favour to 41 against, with 36 abstentions), A/RES/67/177 (adopted on 20 December 2012, by a vote of 111 votes in favour, with 41 votes against and 34 abstentions). 25 Cf, eg, the general report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture to the Human Rights Council of 15 January 2008 focusing on strengthening the protection of women from torture (UN Doc A/HRC/7/3, paras 56–58) and the report on his mission to the Republic of Moldova of 12 February 2009 (UN Doc A/HRC/10/44/Add 3, para 52).



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These close links between the different rights contained in Chapter I need to be taken into account when interpreting Article 4 EUCR. 04.13 In addition to the rights contained in Chapter I entitled ‘Dignity’, other rights of the EUCR also show a close relationship with the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in Article 4. While the principle of non-refoulement has been developed by the ECtHR, the UN Committee Against Torture, and other international treaty monitoring bodies on the basis of the prohibition of torture, Article 19(2) EUCR contains an explicit ‘right of non-refoulement’: ‘No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ Apart from reaffirming the close relationship between the prohibition of torture and the prohibition of the death penalty, this provision also makes clear that the prohibition of refoulement not only relates to the risk of torture, as explicitly provided for in Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture, but goes beyond and also covers the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as developed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Since torture constitutes a widely used method of persecution which often leads torture survivors to seek refuge in another country, including Member States of the EU, there is also a link with the right to asylum in Article 18 EUCR. Certain groups, such as children, the elderly and persons with disabilities are particularly vulnerable to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. The prohibition of torture and illtreatment shall, therefore, be kept in mind when interpreting and applying specific human rights of such groups, as spelled out in Articles 24, 25, 26 and 32 EUCR. The aspiration of the Union, as stipulated in Article 25, to recognise and respect the rights of the elderly ‘to lead a life of dignity and independence’ may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to children and persons with disabilities.

C.  Sources of Article 4 Rights I. ECHR 04.14 The wording of Article 4 EUCR is identical to Article 3 of the ECHR and the Explanations refer directly to this provision. As stipulated in Article 52(3) EUCR, the meaning and scope of the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment shall, therefore, be the same as in Article 3 ECHR. This means that the rich case law of the ECtHR and the former European Commission of Human Rights shall be the primary source of interpretation of the rights contained in Article 4 EUCR.26 This applies, inter alia, to the scope and definition of the different forms of ill-treatment and the absolute nature of their prohibition,27 including the absolute prohibition of corporal punishment,28 the duty to protect human beings from ill-treatment by private actors,29 the duty to investigate all allegations and suspicions of torture 26 On the case law of the European Court of Human Rights see, eg, P van Dijk, F van Hoof, A van Rijn and L Zwaak, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 5th edn (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2018), DJ Harris, M O’Boyle and C Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018), and H Tretter, ‘Kommentar zu Artikel 3 EMRK’ in K Korinek and M Holoubek (eds), Österreichisches Bundesver­fassungsrecht, Teil III Grundrecht (Vienna, Springer, 2011). 27 The Greek Case (Commission, 31 May 1968); Denmark v Greece App no 3321/67, Norway v Greece App no 3322/67, Sweden v Greece, App no 3323/67, Netherland v Greece App no 3344/67 (1969) 12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights; Ireland v UK, 18 January 1978, Series A, No 25; Aksoy v Turkey App no 21987/93 (18 December 1996); Aydin v Turkey App no 23178/94 (25 September 1997); Selmouni v France App no 25803/94 (28 July 1999); Ilhan v Turkey App no 22277/93 (27 June 2000). 28 Tyrer v UK App no 5856/72 (25 April 1978). 29 A v UK App no 25599/94 (23 September 1998); Osman v UK App no 23452/94 (28 October 1998); Pretty v UK App no 2346/02 (29 April 2002).

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and ill-treatment,30 the duty to criminalise torture,31 the duty to exclude evidence extracted by torture,32 the duty to provide victims of torture with adequate reparation for the harm suffered33 and other positive obligations of states. The Strasbourg case law under Article 3 ECHR also covers minimum conditions of detention,34 solitary confinement,35 incommunicado detention and enforced disappearance,36 the principle of non-refoulement in relation to expulsion and extradition,37 including diplomatic assurances,38 and extraterritorial obligations.39

II.  UN Treaties The wording of Article 3 ECHR was inspired by Article 5 of the UDHR (1948) which reads: ‘No 04.15 one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Whereas the reference to ‘cruel treatment or punishment’ was deleted in Article 3 ECHR, other universal and regional human rights treaties, including Article 7 of the CCPR (1966),40 Article 5(2) of the ACHR (1969), Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, Articles 1 and 16 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT, 1984)41 and Article 8(1) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004), follow the formulation in the Universal Declaration. In practice, however, there is little difference, as the meaning of cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment is more or less the same.42 In addition to the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish- 04.16 ment, Article 7 CCPR also stipulates that ‘no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation’. This provision is further elaborated in Article 3 EUCR. Article 7 CCPR is also closely related to Article 10 CCPR, which guarantees that ‘all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’. Article 10(3) further stipulates that the ‘penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social ­rehabilitation’.

30 Ribitsch v Austria App no 18896/91 (4 December 1995); Assenov and Others v Bulgaria App no 24760/94 (28 October 1998); Labita v Italy App no 26772/95 (6 April 2000). 31 MC v Bulgaria App no 39272/98 (4 December 2003). 32 Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (11 July 2006). 33 Assanidze v Georgia App no 71503/01 (8 April 2004). 34 The Greek Case (n 27); Soering v UK App no 14038/88 (7 July 1989); Kudla v Poland App no 30210/96 (26 October 2000); Kalashnikov v Russia App no 47095/99 (15 July 2002); Van der Ven v the Netherlands App no 50901/99 (4 February 2003). 35 Rohde v Denmark App no 69332/01 (21 July 2005); Ramirez Sanchez v France App no 59450/00 (4 July 2006); Mathew v the Netherlands App no 24919/03 (29 September 2005). 36 Kurt v Turkey App no 24276/94 (25 May 1998). 37 Soering v UK (n 34); Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden App no 15576/89 (20 March 1991); D v UK 146/1996/767/964 (2 May 1997); Jabari v Turkey App no 40035/98 (11 July 2000); El Masri v ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ App no 39630/09 (13 December 2012). 38 Chahal v UK App no 22414/93 (15 November 1996); Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey App nos 46827/99, 46951/99 (4 February 2005); Saadi v Italy App no 37201/06 (28 February 2008); Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK App no 8139/09 (17 January 2012). 39 Al-Sadoon and Mufdhi v UK (n 17); Al-Skeini and others v UK (n 15). 40 All EU Member States are a party to the CCPR. 41 All EU Member States are a party to CAT. 42 Cf FM Mariño Menéndez, ‘The Prohibition of Torture in Public International Law’ (2018) 391 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 102–85; FM Mariño Menéndez, ‘Recent Jurisprudence of the United Nations Committee against Torture and the International Protection of Refugees’ (2015) 34 (1) Refugee Survey Quarterly ­61–78; and M Nowak and E McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture—A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 558.



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This specific provision on the minimum rights of detainees also includes the segregation of accused persons from convicted prisoners and the separation of juveniles from adults. The provisions of Articles 7 and 10 CCPR have been further interpreted by the UN Human Rights Committee in the state reporting procedure under Article 40 CCPR, including by so-called General Comments,43 and in the individual complaints system in accordance with the first Optional Protocol to the CCPR 1966.44 Notwithstanding certain differences in the jurisprudence between Strasbourg and Geneva, the issues dealt with by the Human Rights Committee are very similar to those covered by the ECtHR. 04.17 The UN CAT has been elaborated in reaction to the systematic practice of torture in Latin America and other regions and contains a number of detailed provisions and positive obligations of states parties aimed at preventing torture and ill-treatment, at combating impunity and bringing the perpetrators of torture to justice and at providing victims of torture with an effective remedy and adequate reparation for the harm suffered. Article 1 CAT contains a legal definition of torture, which has been inspired by the case law of the former European Commission of Human Rights in the Greek Case45 and which is also increasingly used in the recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Article 2(2) CAT reaffirms the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture: ‘No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.’ Article 3 CAT contains an explicit prohibition of refoulement: ‘No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’ The provisions of the Convention have been interpreted in the practice of the UN Committee against Torture in the State reporting procedure, the inquiry procedure and the individual complaints procedure in accordance with Articles 19, 20 and 22 CAT.46 04.18 In 2002, the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly.47 As the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, it provides for a system of preventive visits to all places of detention, such as prisons, police lock-ups, military detention facilities, psychiatric hospitals and special detention facilities for minors, irregular migrants, drug-users etc. These visits are carried out by the UN Subcommittee on Prevention and by so-called National Preventive Mechanisms to be established by all states parties.48 04.19 Torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including corporal punishment, are also prohibited in times of armed conflicts, whether international or non-international. Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 reads as follows: each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction … To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned

43 See General Comments 7/16 (1982), 9/16 (1982), 20/44 (1992), 21/44 (1992). 44 Cf M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl, NP Engel Verlag, 2005), 157 et seq, 241 et seq. 45 The Greek Case (n 27). 46 Cf FM Mariño Menendez, and Nowak and McArthur (n 42). 47 As at 7 March 2013, except for Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, all EU Member States had signed OPCAT. Apart from Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Italy, all signatories were parties, either through ratification or accession. 48 Cf Nowak and McArthur (n 42) 879 et seq.

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persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture … (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.

Other provisions of international humanitarian law in this respect include Article 75(2) of 04.20 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts which stipulates that ‘murder, torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental; corporal punishment; and mutilation … are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents’.49 Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions constitute war crimes which are subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC)50 and ad hoc international criminal tribunals. Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of the Rome Statute of the ICC mentions ‘torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments’ as an example of grave breaches and, consequently, war crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Similarly, acts of ‘committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’ are cited in Article 8(2)(b)(xxi) as examples of other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict and, therefore, as war crimes subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction. With respect to non-international armed conflicts, the acts of ‘violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture’, as well as ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’, are to be considered as serious violations of common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, thereby equally amounting to war crimes in accordance with Article 8(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Rome Statute. In addition to war crimes, the ICC is also competent to hold individual perpetrators of crimes 04.21 against humanity accountable, irrespective of whether these crimes have been committed in times of war or peace. The term ‘crimes against humanity’ is defined in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute as ‘any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: … (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; … (i) Enforced disappearance of persons … (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’. The legal definition of torture as a crime against humanity in Article 7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute is similar to the definition in Article 1 CAT.51

III.  Council of Europe Treaties In addition to the ECHR, the Council of Europe adopted other treaties related to the prohibition 04.22 and prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987) is the first 49 Cf J Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, Vol IV, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, 1958); W Schabas, ‘The Crime of Torture and the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2006) 37 (2) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 349–63; C Droege, ‘“In Truth the Leitmotiv”: The Prohibition of Torture and other Forms of Ill-Treatment in International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 (867) International Review of the Red Cross 515–41; M Nowak and R Janik, ‘Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ in A Clapham, P Gaeta and M Sassoli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions. A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 50 All EU Member States are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. 51 See below, section D. On the Rome Statute see W Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010); M Cherif Bassiouni (ed), International Criminal Law: Sources, Subjects, and Contents, 3rd edn (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008); O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edn (Munich/Oxford, CH Beck/Hart, 2008).



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treaty that established a system of preventive visits to places of detention. In accordance with Article 1, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT)52 was established in 1989, consisting of a number of experts from all states parties (presently 47) with different professional backgrounds, including lawyers, doctors, psychologists, social workers etc: ‘The Committee shall, by means of visits, examine the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of such persons from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ On the basis of hundreds of regular and ad hoc visits to all Member States of the Council of Europe, the CPT has developed minimum standards of detention53 which are also taken into account by the ECtHR when interpreting Article 3 ECHR. 04.23 Other relevant Council of Europe treaties include the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997),54 with two Optional Protocols, the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005),55 the Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (2011)56 and the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Violence and Sexual Abuse (2007).57

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 04.24 The absolute prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment— or the right to physical and spiritual integrity—enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies.58 As such, it has taken on special status in the protection of human rights under international law:59 it is one of the few absolute and non-derogable human rights, a standing shared only with the prohibition of slavery, slave trade, servitude, and the retroactive application of criminal law.60 It is considered as part of customary international law and ranks as jus cogens under international law, pursuant to article 53 VCLT.61 The particular severity of torture is also reflected in the fact that it is subject to universal criminal jurisdiction under the principle aut dedere aut judicare.62 Because the impact of torture is immensely traumatic on the individual who has suffered it 04.25 and because full restitution to the status before the infliction of severe mental or physical pain is not possible,63 much focus has been placed on prevention. Both at the international and at the European levels, external independent monitoring bodies have been set up to carry out

52 All EU Member States are parties to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and to the CPT. 53 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), CPT Standards, available at www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards.pdf. 54 As at 27 April 2020, all EU Member States are parties except for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK. 55 All EU Member States are parties to the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. 56 As at 27 April 2020, all EU Member States are parties except for Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom. 57 As at 27 April 2020, all EU Member States are parties except for Ireland. 58 Soering v UK (n 34) para 88. 59 M Nowak, CCPR Commentary (n 44) p 157. 60 M Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture, UN Doc A/HRC/13/39/Add 5, para 40. 61 M Nowak, CCPR Commentary (n 44) pp 157–58. 62 See Art 5 CAT. 63 M Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture, UN Doc A/HRC/13/39/Add 5, para 173.

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­ nannounced and regular visits to places of detention.64 This is the most innovative and effective u means to prevent torture and to generate timely and adequate responses to allegations of abuse and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials.65 Combating impunity is one of the key challenges of the fight against torture and ill-treatment. 04.26 Under international law, states have an obligation to take positive measures to protect ­individuals from acts of torture and ill-treatment,66 included those committed by private individuals,67 to investigate allegations68 and to bring suspected perpetrators to justice.69 The ECtHR has also clarified states’ obligations with regard to extraterritorial State action, also in an effort to combat impunity.70 As such, EU states have an obligation not only to respect the absolute prohibition of torture, 04.27 but also to fulfil and protect this right. Yet, despite the legal consecration of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment and the comprehensive legal framework, in recent years many challenges have been brought to this absolute prohibition. In Europe, as in many parts of the world, these have been in relation to security. Two particular problematic issues can be highlighted in this context. The first is the fight against terrorism, where legal challenges have been brought to the absolute nature of the prohibition of non-refoulement before the ECtHR.71 The second is the issue of asylum, where two of the few and possibly most important cases that have been decided by the CJEU vis-à-vis Article 4 have dealt with the application of the EU’s asylum policy.72

II.  Scope of Application Regarding the material scope of application of Article 4 EUCR, the ECtHR has expressed clearly 04.28 that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 ECHR. The threshold is relative, depending on the circumstances of the case,73 and the Court has clarified that certain acts which are currently falling outside the scope of Article 3 might in the

64 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), whose mandate derives from European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1987/89; the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT), established pursuant to the provisions of Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT2002/06. See sections C.II and III, above. 65 M Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture, A/HRC/13/39/Add 5, para 157. 66 See Art 4 CAT: ‘1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture. 2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature’. 67 ECtHR, A v UK (n 29) para 22: ‘The Court considers that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals.’ 68 ECtHR, Assenov and Others v Bulgaria (n 30) para 102 and Labita v Italy (n 30) para 131: ‘where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other agents of the state unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the state’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in … [the] Convention”, requires that there should be an effective official investigation. The investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible’. Otherwise, ‘the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity’. 69 Ibid. 70 See section D.II, below, on the scope of application. 71 See section D.IV on limitations, below. 72 NS and ME [No 2] and Case C-465/07 Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-921. 73 See eg Ireland v UK (n 27) para 162 and Soering v UK (n 34) para 100.



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future meet the required level of severity.74 All forms of physical and mental ill-treatment which fall within the scope of Article 3 are prohibited with equal force.75 04.29 The EUCR does not address the issue of its application ratione loci. It is nonetheless a key question in the context of the EU’s overseas action, in particular where the EU contributes to multinational operations76 or has stand-alone missions, and EU delegations. International human rights bodies have held that human rights obligations apply not only to the territory of a country, but also abroad,77 when state authorities have the overall control over a territory78 or over an individual.79 This so-called ‘state agent authority and control’ model has also been the one largely adopted by the ECtHR.80 In the 2001 Bankovic case,81 however, on the alleged violation of the right to life by NATO’s 1999 aerial bombardments in Serbia, the Court excluded the extraterritorial application of the ECHR by applying the limiting ‘spatial’ model of jurisdiction.82 In the case of Al-Skeini,83 which dealt with the killing of civilians by British troops during the British occupation of South East Iraq, the Grand Chamber tried to reconcile the two models. The Court stated that the deaths fell within state jurisdiction because the British troops were exercising authority and control as well as—in the specific and exceptional circumstances of the case—public powers in the Basra region.84 Thus, the Court largely followed the state agent authority and control model, while using the spatial model to mitigate and limit its impact.85 In the Grand Chamber case of Hirsi Jamaa,86 which dealt with a so-called ‘push back operation on the high sea’, Italian coast guards intercepted the boats of Somali and Eritrean nationals who

74 See Selmouni v France (n 27) para 101. 75 The material scope of application of Art 4 EUCR is largely dealt with in section D.III, below. One specific issue not dealt with in this chapter is that of the scope of application of non-refoulement as protected by Art 3 ECHR versus the principle of subsidiary protection under the EU’s Qualification Directive. See Art 19 EUCR, below, and the CJEU case of Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris (n 72). 76 See C Droege, ‘Transfers of detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and contemporary challenges’ (2008) 90 (871) International Review of the Red Cross, 669–701. 77 ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, Advisory Opinion 8 July 1996, para 25; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 9 July 2004, paras 106–11. 78 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31, para 10. 79 Human Rights Committee, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, 29 July 1981 UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 and CAT Committee, Conclusions and Recommendations, United Kingdom, CAT/C/CR/33/3, para 4(b). 80 Overall control over a territory: see, eg: Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (ECtHR, 28 November 1996), in which the Court held that the responsibility of a contracting party could also arise when as a consequence of military action— whether lawful or unlawful—it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory, para 52. Control over an individual: eg Issa v Turkey App no 31821/96 (ECtHR, 16 November 2004): ‘a State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State’s authority and control through its agents operating—whether lawfully or unlawfully— in the latter State’, para 71. 81 Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 12 December 2001). 82 Ibid, para 80: ‘the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating … in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space … of the Contracting States. The [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] clearly does not fall within this legal space. The Convention was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States.’ 83 Al-Skeini and others v UK (n 15). 84 Ibid, paras 136–50. 85 For a discussion on this case, see C Ryngaert, ‘Clarifying the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 28 (74) Merkourios Case Note, 57–60 and P Ronchi, ‘The Borders of Human Rights’ (2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 20, 23. See also critically M Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2011); M Gibney and S Skogly (eds), Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 86 Hirsi Jamaa et al v Italy (n 15). See also the comment by JA Hessbruegge, ‘European Court of Human Rights Protects Migrants Against “Push Back” Operations on the High Seas’ (2012) 16 (14) ASIL Insights.

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tried to reach the coast of Italy from Libya, and returned them to Libyan authorities. The Court unanimously ruled that Italy had effective control and authority over the applicants on board its ship, and therefore Article 3 of the ECHR, and the principle of non-refoulement attached to it, applied. This case provides key guidance for the responsibility of the EU should individuals take refuge in EU delegations.87 In application of Article 52(3) EUCR,88 the CJEU should adopt the same approach as the 04.30 ECtHR to allow a broad extraterritorial application of the Charter, within the scope of application of the EUCR, which in accordance to Article 51 EUCR is limited to EU law. In each case, the CJEU will therefore need to carefully examine whether the EU institutions, bodies or agencies operating abroad are implementing EU Law. In this context, the Charter would likely apply to EU delegations and missions. Regarding its application to Frontex or member States’ operations on the high seas, the CJEU would need to consider whether these specific actions are carried out in the pursuance of EU law, such as in the implementation of the EU’s border code,89 or the EU’s qualification directive, which does not have a territorial limitation.90 A broad approach to the extraterritorial application of the EUCR, similar to that of the 04.31 ECtHR, would ensure that Article 53 EUCR91 is fully respected, and would avoid any divergence of application between the ECHR and the Charter regarding the application ratione loci of rights in Europe, as well as protection gaps for individuals. This would also ensure that the ECtHR continues to apply its Bosphorus doctrine.92 The CJEU may however wish to go even further and adopt a strict ‘State agent authority and control’ model, thereby closing the door to cases in which a state party can perpetrate human rights violations on the territory of another state which it could not perpetrate on its own territory. Regarding the personal scope of application,93 in the context of the EU’s CFSP—either stand- 04.32 alone EU missions or in the context of EU participation to broader NATO- or UN- umbrella missions—a key question is that of attribution of responsibility. Should a violation of the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment or a violation of the principle of non-refoulement take place in this context, is the troop- or police- contributing country responsible for the violation, the EU, the UN or a combination thereof?94 It should be noted at the outset that the

87 Embassy grounds may be compared to a ship on the high seas, as they constitute an area of almost exclusive jurisdiction outside the territory of the state to which the embassy belongs. See JA Hessbruegge (n 86). 88 ‘Insofar as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the [ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.’ 89 See Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2006] OJ L105/0001–32, which states in Art 3 that it shall apply to any person crossing the internal or external borders of Member States, without prejudice to the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards non-refoulement. 90 The Directive on Asylum procedures would likely not be the basis in EU law for such operations, as it applies to all asylum applications made in the territory including at the border or in the transit zones of the Member States, and to the withdrawal of refugee status, and not in cases of requests for diplomatic or territorial asylum submitted to representations of Member States. See Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection [2013] OJ L 180/60, Art 3. 91 ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of Application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the [ECHR], and by Member States’ constitutions’. 92 According to this case law, the ECtHR does not review EU legislation based on a presumption of equivalent protection of human rights. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005). 93 For the horizontal effect of the prohibition, see section D.III(h), below. 94 For a discussion on the issue of attribution, see C Droege, ‘Transfers of detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and contemporary challenges’ (n 76).



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­ rinciple of responsibility of international organisations for human rights violations is estabp lished under international law95 and that because of its nature in international law, the norm contained in Article 4 EUCR applies as much to Member States as to the EU and other organisations involved in multinational operations.96 04.33 International human rights bodies97 and international doctrine98 provide some guidance. The ECtHR has also examined this question. In the Bosphorus case, it held, inter alia, that while a state was not prohibited by the Convention from transferring sovereign power to an international organisation in order to pursue cooperation in certain fields of activity, the state remained responsible for all acts and omissions of its organs, regardless of whether they were a consequence of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations.99 In the Grand Chamber case of Behrami and Saramati,100 the ECtHR found that the detention of individuals by national contingents, within KFOR mandate, could be attributed to the UN because ‘the UNSC retained ultimate authority and control and that effective command of the relevant operational matters was retained by NATO’. In the case of Al Jedda,101 which dealt with detention in Iraq by British forces, the Court came to a very different conclusion. It applied the test of ‘effective control’ contained in the ILC’s DARIO, and concluded that the applicant was within the authority and control of the United Kingdom throughout.102 In this case, the Court used the criteria developed in Behrami and Saramati (‘ultimate authority and control’) and the one developed by the ILC (‘effective control’). What is clear from these two cases is that the authorisation of the UN Security Council to carry out an operation will not be sufficient to attribute responsibility to the UN for acts carried out by other organisations or troop contributing countries. In light of the multitude of actors on the ground, and the complication due to the fact that they can have two competing chains of command, final attribution of responsibility will depend on a sober analysis of the mandate for the operation as well as facts on the ground, which will gravitate around the question of ‘effective control’. It cannot be excluded that the CJEU would recognise

95 See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.778 (DARIO). 96 See ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion of 20 December 1980, para 37. 97 The Human Rights Committee has stated that ‘a State party must respect the rights laid down in the Covenant to … those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation’, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 13, para 10. 98 Art 7 (former Art 5) of the ILC DARIO states that ‘the conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct’. Art 8 may also be relevant: ‘The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization shall be considered an act of that organization under international law if the organ or agent acts in an official capacity and within the overall functions of that organization, even if the conduct exceeds the authority of that organ or agent or contravenes instructions’ (n 95). 99 Bosphorus (n 92) para 152. For CJEU case law on this issue, see Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351, paras 283–85. 100 Behrami v France App no 71412/01 and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway App no 78166/01 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 2 May 2007). 101 Al-Jedda v UK App no 27021/08 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011). 102 The UN Security Council had neither effective control nor ultimate authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops within the Multi-National Force and that the applicant’s detention was not, therefore, attributable to the UN. The internment took place within a detention facility controlled exclusively by British forces, and is therefore attributable to UK forces. Ibid, paras 84–85.

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that responsibility be shared between two or more actors, even though the ECtHR has never addressed this question.103

III.  Specific Provisions (a)  Definition of Torture and Other Forms of Ill-Treatment Article 4 EUCR prohibits different forms of ill-treatment without defining them: torture as the 04.34 most severe form of ill-treatment carrying a special stigma, followed by inhuman treatment and punishment, as well as degrading treatment and punishment as the least severe form. These notions can also be found with identical wording in Article 3 ECHR on which, according to the Explanations, Article 4 EUCR was modelled. Since both provisions are identical, Article 52(3) EUCR is applicable which stipulates that the meaning and scope of Article 4 shall be the same as in Article 3 ECHR. However, this provision ‘shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’. Article 3 ECHR on its part is based on Article 5 UDHR which also includes the prohibition of cruel treatment and punishment and which formed the basis for Article 7 CCPR and similar provisions in other universal and regional human rights treaties. Article 1 CAT is the only provision in a human rights treaty containing a legal definition of the term ‘torture’. In Article 7(2)(e) ICC Statute we find a similar, but not identical definition of ‘torture’ as a crime against humanity. The other types of ill-treatment, ie cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment are, however, neither defined in Article 16 CAT nor in the Rome Statute. Since all these terms are based on Article 5 UDHR, since the UN definition in Article 1 CAT was based on the case law of the former European Commission of Human Rights in the Greek Case, and since the ECtHR in its recent jurisprudence increasingly refers to the definition in Article 1 CAT, relevant UN treaties will also be taken into account for the interpretation of these terms in Article 4 EUCR.104 In principle, we find in the literature and jurisprudence two different approaches of attempt- 04.35 ing to distinguish torture from other forms of ill-treatment: one was introduced by the former European Commission of Human Rights in the Greek Case105 and focuses on the purpose as the most important distinguishing element; the other one was introduced by the European Court of Human Rights in the Northern Ireland Case106 and considers the intensity of pain and suffering as the decisive criterion by introducing a kind of sliding scale of suffering, starting from degrading and humiliating treatment, via cruel and inhuman treatment, up to torture requiring very serious and cruel suffering of the victim. For various reasons, the approach of the European

103 On all these issues, see C Droege, ‘Transfers of detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and contemporary challenges’ (n 76). 104 It should be noted that para 8 of Council Regulation 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, states: ‘it is considered appropriate to apply the definitions of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment laid down in the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and in Resolution 3452 (XXX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations. These definitions should be interpreted taking into account the case law on the interpretation of the corresponding terms in the European Convention on Human Rights and in relevant texts adopted by the EU or its Member States.’ 105 The Greek Case, Commission (n 27) 186: ‘all torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment also degrading. The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation, is unjustifiable … Torture … has a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment. Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience.’ 106 Ireland v United Kingdom App no 5310/71 (18 January 1978).



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Commission, which was used and further developed by the United Nations when defining torture in Article 1 CAT and which was further refined by the UN Committee against Torture and different UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture, seems to us the more convincing approach aimed at defining the different forms of ill-treatment.107 04.36 According to Article 1 CAT, the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

04.37 For the purpose of crimes against humanity, as stipulated in Article 7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute, ‘torture’ means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.

04.38 Comparing both UN definitions, the ICC definition lacks the elements of the purpose108 and of the involvement of a public official, but adds the element of the custody or direct control of the perpetrator over the victim. Using both definitions in light of the ordinary meaning of these terms, the following definitions of the different forms of ill-treatment emerge: —— Torture is the deliberate infliction of severe pain or suffering on a powerless person for a specific purpose. —— Inhuman treatment or punishment is the infliction of severe pain or suffering when at least one of the qualifying criteria of torture (intention, purpose or powerlessness of the victim) is missing. —— Degrading treatment or punishment is the infliction of pain or suffering in a particularly humiliating manner. 04.39 The threshold of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, applies to both torture and inhuman treatment or punishment, whereas degrading treatment can be inflicted with a lower threshold of pain or suffering. Whether the threshold of pain or suffering required for degrading treatment/punishment or of severe pain or suffering required for inhuman treatment/suffering or torture is reached can only be assessed on a case by case basis taking into account both objective and subjective criteria, including the age, gender, religion and vulnerability of the victim. The requirement of intention means that torture can never be inflicted by negligence, gross 04.40 negligence or recklessness. If a detainee is forgotten in a cell and slowly starves to death, the

107 For the legal reasoning see NS Rodley, ‘The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law’ (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 467–93; MD Evans, ‘Getting to Grips with Torture’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 365–83; N Rodley and M Pollard, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011); M Nowak, ‘Challenges to the Absolute Nature of the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment’ (2005) 23 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 674–88; Nowak and McArthur, CAT Commentary (n 42); M Nowak, ‘What Practices Constitute Torture?: US and UN Standards’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 809–41. 108 In relation to torture as a war crime in Art 8 ICC Statute, the Elements of Crime has introduced the purpose element again. See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3(part II-B), adopted on 9 September 2002, available at www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/Pages/legal%20tools.aspx.

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mental and physical suffering is extremely severe, but such treatment can never qualify as torture, because the elements of intention and purpose are missing. The classical and still most widely used purpose of torture is the extraction of a confession, 04.41 which is later to be used as evidence in criminal or other proceedings. Intelligence agencies usually do not extract a confession, but use torture to extract relevant information on terrorist networks, future attacks or similar issues of their concern. Other purposes of torture mentioned in Article 1 CAT include intimidation, discrimination and punishment of the victim. The requirement of powerlessness means that the victim must be under the custody or other 04.42 forms of direct control of the perpetrator, as required by Article 7(2)(e) ICC Statute. If the police inflict severe pain on a person by means of batons, tear gas or similar weapons for the purpose of self-defence, or of effecting the lawful arrest of a person, dispersing a violent demonstration or quelling a riot of persons who resist such measures by using violence themselves, such action can never be qualified as torture because the persons concerned are not (yet) under the custody or direct control of the police, ie they are not powerless. If the police conduct such law enforcement measures in a proportional manner, they do not even amount to any violation of the right to personal integrity or dignity even though extremely severe pain or suffering might have been inflicted. If the facts reveal excessive (non-proportional) use of force, these measures amount to inhuman treatment provided that the threshold of severe pain or suffering was reached, or to degrading treatment if pain or suffering was inflicted in a particularly humiliating manner. Once the person has been arrested, handcuffed and is lying on the street and, therefore, is under the control of the police and powerless, any further beatings and violence against him or her may amount to torture, provided that they reach the threshold of severe pain or suffering and are inflicted for a certain purpose, such as intimidation or punishment. The typical situation of torture occurs in an interrogation room, where the police clearly send the message to the victim that he or she is powerless and, therefore, should ‘cooperate’, ie tell them what they want to hear. The feeling of powerlessness is often underlined by specific measures, such as forced nudity, hooding, handcuffs and shackles, suspension in a painful and humiliating position, incommunicado detention etc. It is the deliberate infliction of severe pain or suffering on a person in such a vulnerable and powerless situation and the aim of breaking the will of the victim that lead us to use the word ‘torture’, with the special stigma attached to this particularly horrendous form of ill-treatment. Although Article 1 CAT requires the involvement of a public official, this element of the 04.43 definition has lost much of its importance and was finally deleted in Article 7(2)(e) of the ICC Statute. Even in Article 1 CAT, mere consent or acquiescence by a public official or ‘other person acting in an official capacity’ is sufficient to satisfy the involvement of the State. If the police or prison guards force a detainee to torture another detainee, this would be a clear case of torture at the instigation of public officials. If private individuals, criminal gangs, rebels or terrorist organisations torture another individual, and the police watch them without intervening, this would be a typical case of torture by consent. But acquiescence can be interpreted in a fairly broad manner. If female genital mutilation (FGM) conducted by private individuals constitutes a routine traditional practice in a particular society, and the respective government takes no meaningful action to stop such practice, this can be interpreted as torture by acquiescence of public officials.109 This interpretation corresponds to the general requirement of the state obligation to

109 See, eg, the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture concerning women and torture, UN Doc A/HRC/13/39 (2010).



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protect human beings against torture, as required by the UN Human Rights Committee110 or in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.111 04.44 Finally, the question arises as to what significance the ‘lawful sanctions clause’, contained in both Article 1 CAT and Article 7(2)(e) ICC Statute, might still have today? A thorough analysis of this provision in light of its wording, its context, object and purpose as well as the travaux préparatoires reveal that it cannot be interpreted in any meaningful manner and must, therefore, be considered as obsolete.112 (b)  Interrogation Techniques Amounting to Torture 04.45 Torture is usually applied behind closed doors. Apart from certain practices, where torture is used for the purpose of intimidating, discriminating or punishing the victims, torture is applied as a method of ‘softening up’ detainees for the purpose of interrogating them. The vast majority of torture cases around the world occur in the context of criminal investigations. Persons suspected of having committed a crime are arrested by law enforcement bodies and brought to a police station for a first interrogation. If a suspect remains silent, or refuses to admit the crime they are suspected of, interrogators may resort to torture as a method of extracting a confession. As soon as the suspect signs a confession, torture usually stops and they are transferred from police custody to a pre-trial detention facility. Military or intelligence officers or special police forces investigating organised crime, corruption or terrorism are usually less interested in a confession than in extracting from detainees information relevant to their own work. 04.46 Torture methods range from simple beatings with fists and batons, to the most cruel forms of physical torture, such as electric shocks, burnings, suspension in painful positions, rape and other forms of sexual torture, waterboarding or mutilation, and to highly sophisticated methods of psychological torture, including sensory deprivation, forced nudity, prolonged solitary confinement, disorientation, sleep deprivation, threats and mock executions, exploitation of individual phobia, and exposure to constant noise or extreme temperatures.113 (c)  Conditions of Detention Amounting to Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 04.47 Article 5 ECHR permits in certain cases (punishment by a court, pre-trial detention of criminal suspects, detention of aliens pending deportation etc) and under specific conditions deprivation of personal liberty. But detention does not imply that detainees lose other human rights and

110 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Art 7 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 1 (1994) 30. 111 A v UK (n 29); Osman v UK (n 29). 112 Cf Nowak and McArthur, CAT Commentary (n 42) 79 ff. 113 See UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Global study of 5 February 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, paras 50–57; Aksoy v Turkey (n 27); Aydin v Turkey (n 27); Selmouni v France (n 27); Cakici v Turkey App no 23657/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1998); Dikme v Turkey App no 20869/92 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000); Ilascu v Moldavia and Russia App no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004); Corsacov v Moldavia App no 18944/02 (ECtHR, 4 April 2006); Mikheyev v Russia App no 77617/01 (ECtHR, 26 January 2006); Menesheva v Russia App no 59261/00 (ECtHR, 9 March 2006); Diri v Turkey App no 68351/01 (ECtHR, 31 July 2007); Maslova and Nalbandov v Russia App no 839/02 (ECtHR, 24 January 2008); Akulinin and Babich v Russia App no 5742/02 (ECtHR, 2 October 2008); Khadisov and Tsechoyev v Russia App no 21519/02 (ECtHR, 5 February 2009); Kopylov v Russia App no 3933/04 (ECtHR, 29 July 2010); Carabulea v Romania App no 45661/99 (ECtHR, 13 July 2010); Bekirski v Bulgaria App no 71420/01 (ECtHR, 2 September 2010); Gelayevy v Russia App no 20216/07 (ECtHR, 15 July 2010); Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v Ukraine App no 42310/04 (ECtHR, 21 April 2011). Cf eg Tretter (n 26) 109 ff; for the UN HRC cf several decisions against Uruguay, Bolivia, Colombia, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Georgia, in Nowak, CCPR Commentary (n 44) 161 ff.

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freedoms. In principle, detainees should be able to enjoy all other human rights and freedoms (eg the rights to life, education, health care, vote, privacy, freedom of expression and religion) in the same way as other human beings unless certain restrictions necessarily follow from the fact of being deprived of the right to personal liberty (eg restrictions of freedom of assembly). This ‘principle of normalisation’, as practised eg in the Danish prison system,114 derives from the general rule that limitations of human rights shall be applied restrictively, as underlined in Article 52(1) EUCR,115 from Article 10 CCPR, which stresses the reformation and social rehabilitation of prisoners as the essential aim of the penitentiary system, from rule 5 of the revised European Prison Rules and similar standards developed by the CPT116 and the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.117 ECHR standards on detention require that a situation be construed as falling within the scope of Article 5 ECHR. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary,118 the Court found that the applicants (asylum-seekers held in facilities at the Hungarian-Serbian border) did not fall within the scope of Article 5, since they were free to leave the premises and enter Serbia or return to their country of origin. However, the same situation has been interpreted differently in the case of FMS, where the Advocate General argued that the possibility to leave the premises for Serbia did not constitute true liberty, and therefore considered that the conditions in the Hungarian-Serbian border premises amounted to deprivation of liberty and thus invoked protection under EU Law, which in accordance with Article 52(3) of the EUCR can afford more extensive protection than the ECHR.119 Unfortunately, the reality of human rights protection in situations of detention in most 04.48 countries, including in Europe, looks totally different. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has identified a global prison crisis.120 The CPT has published hundreds of reports in relation to Council of Europe Member States pointing out serious shortcomings in the respective prisons, pre-trial detention centres, police lock-ups, psychiatric hospitals, migration detention centres and other facilities where human beings are being detained. Often, detainees are deprived of effective access to food and medical care, the facilities are constantly overcrowded, in a deplorable physical state without adequate space, bedding, light, air, heating, sanitary facilities etc. At a certain point, these cumulative conditions of detention and violations of human rights reach a level of suffering that infringes upon the right to human dignity. In many cases, the UN Human Rights Committee has found a violation of the right of detainees under Article 10 CCPR to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.121 Since the ECHR does not contain a similar human right of persons deprived of their liberty 04.49 or a general right to human dignity comparable to Article 1 EUCR, the ECtHR developed its

114 Cf the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture on his mission to Denmark of 18 February 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/10/44/Add.2. 115 See section D.IV, below. 116 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), CPT Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1—Rev 2011, Section II—Prisons. 117 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its Resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, UN Doc A/RES/43/173 (1988). 118 Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, App no 47287/15 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 21 November 2019). 119 Joined Cases C-924/19 and C-925/19 PPU FMS, Advocate General Conclusions, 23 April 2020, paras 177 and 179. 120 See Reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in UN Doc A/64/215 (3 August 2009), paras 38–60, A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 (5 February 2010), paras 229–37. 121 See Nowak, CCPR Commentary (n 44) 244 ff.



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jurisprudence in respect to the rights of detainees on the basis of Article 3 ECHR. In Kudla v Poland, the Court stated that the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance.122

04.50 In Kalashnikov v Russia and many subsequent judgments relating to a variety of European States the Court used similar language.123 04.51 In an increasing number of judgments on conditions of detention, the ECtHR has relied on reports of the CPT.124 In its case law, the Court attaches particular importance to the lack of medical treatment125 and to the vulnerability of certain groups, including persons with disabilities.126 The practice of weekly strip-searches in a Dutch high-security prison was considered as diminishing human dignity and constituting degrading treatment.127 The use of prolonged periods of solitary confinement may constitute inhuman treatment, although the ECtHR seems to be fairly reluctant to find respective violations of Article 3 ECHR.128 Prolonged periods of incommunicado detention and the enforced disappearance of persons amounts, however, to inhuman treatment or even torture.129 (d)  Excessive Use of Police Force Amounting to Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 04.52 While torture presupposes a situation where the victim is under the total control (usually custody) of the perpetrator, inhuman or degrading treatment can also occur outside detention if the security forces use excessive force when arresting a person, dissolving a public gathering, quelling a riot, acting in self-defence or in the defence of others against violent attacks. While most of the violations of Article 3 ECHR established by the ECtHR relate to detainees, the Court found

122 Kudla v Poland (n 34), para 94. 123 Kalashnikov v Russia App no 47095/99 (ECtHR, 15 September 2002); Poltoratskij v Ukraine App no 38812/97 (ECtHR, 29 April 2003); Yankov v Bulgaria App no 1509/05 (ECtHR, 22 April 2003); Iorgov v Bulgaria App no 40653/98 (ECtHR, 11 March 2004); Alver v Estonia App no 64812/01 (ECtHR, 8 November 2005); Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine App no 54825/00 (ECtHR, 5 April 2005); McGlinchey and Others v UK App no 50390/99 (ECtHR, 29 April 2003); Kadikis v Latvia App no 62393/00 (ECtHR, 4 May 2006); MSS v Belgium and Greece (n 2). 124 Aerts v Belgium App no 25357/94 (ECtHR, 30 July 1998); Dougoz v Greece App no 40907/98 (ECtHR, 6 March 2001); Tekin Yildiz v Turkey App no 22913 (ECtHR, 10 November 2005); Alver v Estonia (n 123); MSS v Belgium and Greece (n 2). 125 Ilhan v Turkey (n 27); Papon v France App no 54210/00 (ECtHR, 25 July 2002); Keenan v UK App no 27229/95 (ECtHR, 3 April 2001); Mouisel v France App no 67263/01 (ECtHR, 14 November 2002); McGlinchey and Others v UK (n 123); Hüseyin Yildirim v Turkey App no 2778/02 (ECtHR, 3 May 2007); Kucheruk v Ukraine App no 2570/04 (ECtHR, 6 September 2007); Paladi v Moldova App no 39806/05 (ECtHR, 10 March 2009); Denis Vasilyev v Russia App no 32704/04 (ECtHR, 17 December 2009); Rokosz v Poland App no 15952/09 (ECtHR, 27 July 2010); Logvinenko v Ukraine App no 13448/07 (ECtHR, 14 October 2010). 126 Herczegfalvy v Austria App no 10553/83 (ECtHR, 24 September 1992); Price v UK App no 33394/96 (ECtHR, 10 July 2001); Matencio v France App no 58749/00 (ECtHR, 15 January 2004). 127 Van der Ven v the Netherlands (n 34). 128 Cf Öcalan v Turkey (2005), Reps 2005-IV; Ramirez Sanchez v France (n 35); Rohde v Denmark App no 69332/01 (ECtHR, 21 July 2005); Messina v Italy App no 13803/88 (ECtHR, 26 February 1993); Erdem v Germany App no 38321/97 (ECtHR, 5 July 1999); Ilascu v Moldova and Russia (n 113). 129 Aksoy v Turkey (n 27); Kurt v Turkey (n 36); Lyanova and Aliyeva v Russia Apps nos 12713/02, 28440/03 (ECtHR, 2 October 2008). Whereas the ECtHR, however, only considers the relatives of disappeared persons as victims of a violation of Art 3 ECHR (see critically Tretter (n 26) 105 ff), UN treaty bodies also regard the disappeared persons themselves as victims: cf Nowak, CCPR Commentary (n 44) 175 ff; El-Megreisi v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc CCPR/ C/50/D/440/1990 (1994); El Hassy v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc CCPR/C/91/D/1422/2005 (2007); Dev Bahadur Maharjan v Nepal, UN Doc CCPR/C/105/D/1863/2009 (2012).

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inhuman and degrading treatment outside detention only in relatively few cases of excessive force during arrests130 or public gatherings.131 The Austrian Constitutional Court, on the other hand, has developed a rich jurisprudence under Article 3 ECHR in relation to excessive use of police force outside detention.132 (e)  Inhuman or Degrading Punishment The most obvious example of inhuman and degrading punishment is corporal punishment in all 04.53 its forms, including as a judicial sentence or as disciplinary punishment in prisons, the military or schools. Already in 1978, the ECtHR had decided by means of a dynamic interpretation of Article 3 ECHR that birching of a juvenile as a traditional judicial punishment on the Isle of Man was no longer compatible with a modern understanding of human rights in Europe: in Tyrer v UK, the Court held that the ‘very nature of judicial corporal punishment is that it involves one human being inflicting physical violence on another human being. Furthermore it is institutionalized violence’, and ‘constituted an assault on precisely that which it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely a person’s dignity and physical integrity’.133 In 1982, the UN Human Rights Committee noted in a General Comment that the prohibitions of Article 7 CCPR ‘must extend to corporal punishment, including excessive chastisement as an educational or disciplinary measure’.134 In 2000, the Committee strongly confirmed this legal opinion unanimously in the landmark decision of Osbourne v Jamaica:135 ‘Irrespective of the nature of the crime that is to be punished, however brutal it may be, it is the firm opinion of the Committee that corporal punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 7 of the Covenant.’ This jurisprudence was later confirmed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,136 the UN Committee against Torture (despite the ‘lawful sanctions clause’ in Article 1 CAT),137 various reports of UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture,138 and by the European Committee of Social Rights even in relation to corporal punishment of children within the home.139 Despite the fact that the ECtHR never arrived at the legal opinion that the death penalty as 04.54 such constitutes inhuman and degrading punishment,140 there can be no doubt that both the Council of Europe and the European Union consider capital punishment in all its forms as a violation of the right to human dignity.141 This trend towards abolition of the death penalty in Europe (with the exception of Belarus) is underlined by the sixth and 13th AP to the ECHR, 130 Denizci et al v Cyprus Apps nos 25316/94, 25317/94, 25318/94, 25319/94, 25320/94, 25321/94, 27207/95 (ECtHR, 23 May 2001); Berlinski v Poland Apps nos 27715/95, 30209/96 (ECtHR, 20 June 2002); Ahmet Özkan et al v Turkey App no 21689/93 (ECtHR, 6 April 2004). 131 Günaydin v Turkey App no 27526/95 (ECtHR, 13 October 2005); Iribarren Pinillos v Spain App no 36777/03 (ECtHR, 8 January 2009). 132 Cf Tretter (n 26) 79 ff. 133 Tyrer v UK (n 28), para 33. 134 HRC, General Comment 7/16, para 2. 135 HRC, Osbourne v Jamaica, No 759/1997, para 3.3. 136 Decision of 11 March 2005 in Winston Caesar v Trinidad and Tobago, Series C No 123. 137 Cf Nowak and McArthur, CAT Commentary (n 42) 561 ff. 138 Cf UN Doc E/CN.4/1993/26, para 593; E/CN.4/1997/7, para 8; A/60/316, para 28; A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, paras 209–228. 139 Cf eg the collective complaints of OMCT v Greece, Belgium and Ireland (Nos 17, 18 and 21/2003) finding violations of Art 17 of the European Social Charter. 140 Cf the case law of the ECtHR relating to the death penalty in Tretter (n 26) 156 et seq. But see, on the contrary eg the landmark 1995 judgment of the South African Constitutional Court in State v Makwanyane and Mchunu, Case No CCT/3/94. 141 On the universal trend towards abolition of capital punishment see, eg Nowak and McArthur, CAT Commentary (n 42) 564 ff; W Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also UN General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/62/149 (2007), A/RES/63/168 (2008), A/RES/65/206 (2010), A/RES/67/177 (2012).



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adopted in 1983 and 2002 respectively, and by the absolute prohibition of the death penalty in Article 2(2) EUCR. These provisions have clearly superseded the provision of Article 2(1) ECHR, which had originally considered the death penalty as an exception to the protection of the right to life. Even if the ECtHR would still consider the death penalty as compatible with the ECHR, Article 52(3) EUCR would apply according to which this provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection. 04.55 Life imprisonment without possibility of early release has been found by the ECtHR in principle as a violation of Article 3 ECHR.142 In relation to children, this rule has been explicitly laid down in Article 37(a) CRC. Since Article 10(3) CCPR stipulates that the reformation and social rehabilitation of prisoners constitutes the essential aim of the penitentiary system, life imprisonment without the possibility of early release seems also to be in contravention of this provision. Imprisonment for a period which is out of proportion to the seriousness of the crime committed may, in exceptional cases, also constitute inhuman or degrading punishment.143 Depending on the circumstances, certain punishments of hard labour, internal exile, solitary confinement, ‘chain gangs’ and other forms of restraint may also be considered as inhuman or degrading punishment.144 (f) Obligations of the EU and its Member States to Respect the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment 04.56 At first glance, the negative formulation of Article 4 EUCR145 underlines the negative obligation to respect, ie not to interfere with this right. According to Article 51 EUCR this prohibition is addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. There are not many instances in which EU institutions and bodies are in a position of exercising power that might lead to cases of torture and other forms of ill-treatment as described above. 04.57 The broadening of EU competencies in the areas of justice and home affairs, including the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, as well as in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, has, however, rendered the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment increasingly relevant for EU institutions, bodies and agencies. While still rare, there are now cases where the EU can inter alia arrest and detain individuals, transfer detainees or remove foreigners from EU territory. This can be explicitly stated, as in the case of the European Naval Force Somalia, whose mandate includes the detention of suspected pirates with the aim of transfering them to competent authorities to be prosecuted. There is also a more complex situation, found mainly in the context of migration and border control, in which the EU’s home affairs agencies such as FRA, Frontex, EASO and Europol work together with Member States in implementing EU policies and regulations. The spotlight has mostly been on Frontex, whose role was enhanced in 2011146 in light of the EU objective to introduce integrated border management.147

142 Wynne v UK App no 67385/01 (ECtHR, 16 October 2003); Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008); Einhorn v France App no 71555/01 (ECtHR, 16 October 2001); Léger v France App no 19324/02 ECtHR (11 April 2006). 143 V v UK App no 24888/94 (ECtHR, 16 December 1999). 144 Cf Nowak and McArthur, CAT Commentary (n 42) 566. 145 ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 146 Amended in 2011: Regulation (EU) 1168/2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 147 See Council Conclusions on Integrated Border Management, Justice and Home Affairs meeting 4–5 December 2006, which states that European border management includes ‘operational cooperation between Member States as ­coordinated

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Much criticism has arisen due to its often imprecise mandate,148 which can have the effect of blurring the responsibility for the conduct of operations between the Agency and the Member States.149 Whether the mandate is explicit or not, EU agents may find themselves in situations where they 04.58 could directly engage in acts of torture or ill-treatment. The negative formulation of Article 4 is thus fully relevant, not only for Member States, but also for the EU and its agents. Indeed, in application of Article 51 EUCR, a violation of Article 4 EUCR could in principle engage the responsibility of the EU institutions themselves, of one of the EU agencies or ­bodies,150 of Member States, or a combination thereof.151 Finally, it should again be noted that in order to ensure the full applicability of Article 51, and to avoid any accountability vacuum, it will be essential for the CJEU to recognise the extraterritorial application of Article 4 EUCR.152 (g) Obligations of the EU and its Member States to Fulfil the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment Despite the negative formulation of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, all human rights 04.59 create corresponding positive obligations to fulfil such rights. A good example of a special treaty which only contains positive obligations to fulfil the prohibition of torture is CAT. In addition to the general duty of states parties under Articles 2(1) and 16(1) to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the other provisions contain very specific obligations to criminalise torture (Art 4), to bring perpetrators of torture to justice in accordance with the principles of territorial, personal and universal jurisdiction (Arts 5–9), to train law enforcement personnel (Art 10), to systematically review interrogation methods and prison rules (Art 11), to conduct prompt and impartial investigations of every allegation or suspicion of torture or any other form

by [Frontex]’. Frontex carries out operations on the EU’s land, sea and air borders, and its Regulation states that it ‘shall facilitate and render more effective the application of existing and future Union measures relating to the management of external borders’ by ‘ensuring the coordination of the actions of the Member States in the implementation of [Union measures relating to the management of external borders], thereby contributing to an efficient, high and uniform level of control on persons and of surveillance of the external borders of the Member States.’ Art 1 of amended Regulation (EC) 2007/2004. 148 Frontex sets up teams of joint border guards (Member States should contribute to these teams, as well as Frontex with border guards seconded by Member States to Frontex on a semi-permanent basis. The teams are under the supervision of a Frontex Coordination Officer) which ‘assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical or operational assistance’, and ‘provide Member States with the necessary support, including coordination and organization of joint return operations’. These teams also take part in RABITs (n 6). Frontex organises joint operations and pilot projects, and may itself initiate them in cooperation with the Member States concerned and in agreement with the host Member States. It should also be noted that the Regulation also places an important focus on fundamental freedoms, including by providing for a Fundamental Rights Strategy. See Regulation (EU) 1168/2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 149 Frontex operations include joint return operations by air and maritime interception of vessels (eg HERA I, II, and III), which have been alleged to deter or stop migrants from crossing EU sea borders. In the context of the RABIT operation in Greece, it has been alleged that Frontex facilitated the transfer of migrants to detention centres in Greece which did not meet international standards (as later ruled by the ECtHR in the case of MSS). For more on the role of Frontex, see: V Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe. Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017); S Carrera, M de Somer and B Petkova, The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Fundamental Rights Tribunal—Challenges for the Effective Delivery of Fundamental Rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security, No 49/August 2012; Human Rights Watch, The EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in the Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece, September 2011. 150 See also Art 263 TFEU. 151 For more on this discussion, see section D.II on the scope of personal application. 152 For more on this discussion, see section D.II on the scope of territorial application.



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of ill-treatment (Arts 12–13), to provide an effective remedy and adequate reparation to victims of torture (Art 14), and to exclude information and confessions extracted by torture as evidence in any legal proceedings (Art 15). 04.60 In its case law on Article 3 ECHR, the ECtHR developed similar obligations of states parties to fulfil the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment,153 above all to investigate all allegations and suspicions of torture,154 to enact and enforce proper legislation,155 to exclude evidence obtained by torture,156 to train personnel and provide procedural safeguards,157 and to grant redress and compensation to victims of torture.158 04.61 Consequently, EU institutions and bodies must also take positive measures to fulfil the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. The positive measures adopted by the EU should not duplicate the existing measures adopted by states. Rather, they should aim primarily at ensuring that there are no legal or accountability gaps or grey areas for violations of the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment by EU institutions and bodies or by Member States when they are implementing Union law. These gaps and grey areas will likely mainly be found in domains of new EU competencies, some of which have already been identified in Part A. While situations where the agents of EU institutions or bodies have the power to violate the provisions of Article 4 EUCR are rare, situations in which no Member State can be found responsible are nonetheless conceivable. Should such a situation arise, given the legal nature of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment and the gravity of the crime, it needs to be fully accounted for and the EU must ensure that accessible remedies for the victim exist. In order to ensure that the positive measures to be adopted by the EU cater to these various situations, it will be important to break down the complex responsibility attribution between the EU, its institutions, bodies and agencies, and those of Member States, bearing in mind that responsibility can be shared. It should be noted that key challenges here include the absence of full EU competencies in the field of criminal law,159 as well as the absence of independent EU bodies to investigate such crimes. 04.62 A complex question is whether the EU could ‘criminalise torture’.160 The answer would require a detailed examination of its competency to do so,161 as well as questions of added value and respect for the principle of subsidiarity, which are beyond the scope of this chapter. It can,

153 Cf APT/CEJIL, Torture in International Law—A guide to jurisprudence, 65 ff. 154 Ribitsch v Austria (n 30); Aksoy v Turkey (n 27); Assenov et al v Bulgaria (n 30); Labita v Italy (n 30); Salman v Turkey (2000), Stefan Iliev v Bulgaria App no 53121/99 (ECtHR, 10 May 2007). 155 MC v Bulgaria (n 31); A v UK (n 29); Macovei et al v Romania App no 5048/02 (ECtHR, 21 June 2007). 156 Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (ECtHR, 11 July 2006). 157 Raninen v Finland App no 20972/92 (ECtHR, 16 December 1997); Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine App no 54825/00 (ECtHR, 5 April 2005); Andronicou and Constantinou v Cyprus App no 25052/94 (ECtHR, 9 October 1997). 158 ECtHR, Assanidze v Georgia App no 71503/01 (ECtHR, 8 April 2004). 159 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can adopt under Art 83 of the TFEU directives with minimum rules on EU criminal law for different crimes. Art 83(1) provides that measures can be adopted concerning a list of 10 explicitly listed offences, which include terrorism, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of women and children, and organised crime. These merit an EU approach due to their particularly serious nature and cross-border dimension. Art 83(2) allows the establishment of ‘minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to a harmonisation measure’. This clause does not list specific crimes, but makes the fulfilment of certain legal criteria a precondition for the adoption of criminal law measures at EU level. Note that Denmark is not participating and that Ireland only participates in the adoption and application of specific instruments after a decision to ‘opt in’. For guidance on where the EU should adopt such measures, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law’ COM/2011/0573 final. 160 Or ‘adopt a directive with minimum rules’ as provided for by Art 83(2) TFEU. 161 Key articles would include Arts 52(2) and 52(3) of the EUCR, Art 6 TEU and Art 83(2) TFEU.

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however, be argued that common rules on how to ensure implementation of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment with a requirement for criminal sanctions for respective violations could contribute to a more uniform enforcement of the prohibition across EU states, including the obligation to investigate and the level of sanction. They could also assist in ensuring accountability where EU agents are directly involved in acts of torture or ill-treatment, and that those who violate the prohibition of torture or ill-treatment do not hide behind borders or take advantage of the differences between legal systems to evade accountability. Without being exhaustive, other positive measures that the EU could adopt include compul- 04.63 sory training on standards of detention, prison conditions, and even the treatment of individuals during interrogations where the EU and its agents are directly or indirectly in charge of arrests and detention of individuals. All EU agents involved directly or indirectly in the transfer of detainees or the transfer of individuals to third countries should also be trained on the absolute prohibition of refoulement.162 Finally, the EU might also need to address the issue of detention conditions. As we have already noted, detention conditions in Member States impact on a number of instruments developed by the EU, in particular those based on mutual trust in the area of freedom, security and justice. While detention conditions and prison management are largely the responsibility of Member States, the EU may have an interest in adopting minimum rules to address the serious shortcomings in prisons, pre-trial detention centres, police lock-ups, psychiatric hospitals, migration detention centres and other facilities identified earlier. (h) Obligations of the EU and its Member States to Protect Private Individuals from Torture and Ill-Treatment Finally, the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, although primarily relating to conduct 04.64 by public officials as stated in Article 1 CAT, also creates obligations to protect human beings against similar conduct by private individuals. In A v UK, which involved the caning of a boy by his stepfather, the ECtHR held that Article 3 ECHR ‘requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals’.163 Based on Article 52(3) EUCR, this jurisprudence of the ECtHR also applies to the EU. 04.65 Within the scope of EU law, the EU has an obligation to take measures to prevent torture and ill-treatment from being committed by private individuals. Otherwise, the EU and its institutions could in theory be held responsible for not protecting individuals within their jurisdiction from treatment prohibited by Article 4 EUCR administered by non-state actors. One area where

162 Note that the Revised Frontex regulations provide that ‘all border guards and other personnel of the Member States who participate in the European Border Guard Teams, as well as the staff of the Agency, have received, prior to their participation in operational activities organised by the Agency, training in relevant Union and international law, including fundamental rights and access to international protection and guidelines for the purpose of identifying persons seeking protection and directing them towards the appropriate facilities’; ‘[t]he Agency shall establish and further develop common core curricula for the training of border guards and provide training at European level for instructors of the national border guards of Member States, including with regard to fundamental rights, access to international protection and relevant maritime law’; and ‘[t]he Agency should provide training, including on fundamental rights, access to international protection and access to asylum procedures, at European level, for instructors of the national border guards of Member States and additional training and seminars related to control and surveillance at the external borders and removal of third-country nationals illegally present in the Member States for officers of the competent national services’. 163 A v UK (n 29) para 22. See also Osman v UK (n 29); Z et al v UK App no 29392/95 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001); Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (ECtHR, 12 October 2006); Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Georgia App no 71156/01 (ECtHR, 3 May 2007).



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this might be particularly relevant is the so-called ‘Euro-crimes’,164 for which the EU can adopt minimum rules on EU criminal law according to Article 83 TFEU. These include terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children. These crimes often amount to treatment contrary to Article 4 EUCR committed by private individuals, which the EU has an obligation to prevent.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 04.66 One of the key aspects of the prohibition of torture is its absolute and non-derogable nature under international law. The absolute nature of the prohibition of torture means that it is not superseded by any other right or concern: it must be respected no matter the circumstances, and irrespective of the individual’s behaviour. This is clearly the case for Article 3 of the ECHR, as confirmed by the ECtHR.165 This absolute prohibition is also unambiguously stated in Article 2(2) of CAT and in Article 7 CCPR, as well as by international humanitarian law.166 This means that torture must not be balanced against national security interests or even the protection of other human rights. No limitations are permitted on the prohibition of torture.167 04.67 The prohibition of torture is also non-derogable under international law. Article 15(2) ECHR states that no derogation from Article 3 can be made even in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of a nation. Article 2(2) CAT provides that no derogation can be made to the prohibition of torture even under circumstances such as war, threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, while Article 4(2) CCPR makes clear that no derogation can be made even in times of emergency or armed conflict. 04.68 The Charter does not refer to the nature of Article 4 or to the possibility of derogating from it. However, based on Article 52(3) of the Charter, which states that the meaning and scope of Charter rights shall be the same as those laid down in the ECHR, Article 4 has to be interpreted as being both absolute and non-derogable.168 It should be highlighted that in the ECHR context, the prohibition of refoulement stems from Article 3 and, like the prohibition of torture, is absolute and applies irrespective of the victim’s conduct.169 Although the Charter has dedicated

164 These are crimes that necessitate an EU approach, due to their particularly serious nature and cross-border dimension, according to the Treaty itself. Most of the crimes are already covered by pre-Lisbon legislation, which is updated. 165 See Ireland v UK (n 27) para 163: ‘The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4 (P1, P4), Article 3 (art. 3) makes no provision for exceptions and, under Article 15 §2 (art. 15–2), there can be no derogation therefrom even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.’ See also Soering (n 34) para 88. 166 Common Art 3 to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as Art 75(2) of the 1977 Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Finally, Art 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that ‘No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.’ 167 See Nowak, CCPR Commentary (n 44) 157, and Special Rapporteur on Torture, A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, para 41. 168 See also the explanations to Art 52(3) of the Charter: ‘Paragraph 3 is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the Charter and the ECHR by establishing the rule that, in so far as the rights in the present Charter also correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights, including authorised limitations, are the same as those laid down by the ECHR. This means in particular that the legislator, in laying down limitations to those rights, must comply with the same standards as are fixed by the detailed limitation arrangements laid down in the ECHR, which are thus made applicable for the rights covered by this paragraph, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of Union law and of that of the Court of Justice of the European Union’; [2007] OJ C303/33. See also Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659. 169 See Soering (n 34) and Chahal v UK (n 38). This has also been affirmed by the CAT Committee: see for example Concluding Observations, Canada, UN Doc CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, 7 July 2005; and the Human Rights Committee: see, for example, Concluding Observations, Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 20 April 2006.

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a separate article to this prohibition, Article 19,170 the absolute nature of non-refoulement, which comes from Article 3 ECHR, should apply to Article 19. Challenges have been brought to this absolute prohibition. In the European context, these have mainly been in the area of security, justice and freedom. Both within and outside the EU framework, European states have been engaged in countering terrorism, a fundamental security challenge for many regions of the world. Without doubt, terrorism is a grave and legitimate concern, and states have an obligation to take measures to counter it. These measures must, however, always be lawful and comply with the international human rights framework. In their counter-terrorism policies, many states have tried to act outside the human rights framework, by placing the terrorism threat in the category of exceptional circumstances that require exceptional measures. Specific legal challenges have been brought to the absolute prohibition of refoulement, inter alia by EU Member States. In 2005, in a case that was struck out by the ECtHR,171 the governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and the UK intervened in order to require the ECtHR to review its jurisprudence on the absolute prohibition of refoulement.172 They argued that not doing so could force them to keep on their territory individuals suspected of or convicted of terrorism, without being able to try them, which posed a great risk to the community.173 In the case of Saadi v Italy, the governments of Italy and the UK both supported a position that would in effect have withdrawn the absolute nature of the prohibition of refoulement. This case allowed the ECtHR to reaffirm and clarify the absolute nature of the prohibition and refuse any ‘balancing act’ between the risk of torture on the one hand and the threat to national security on the other. The Court noted that the threat which terrorism presents to the community cannot call into question the absolute nature of Article 3.174 The Court recalled that since protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country, would run a real risk of being subjected to such treatment. As the Court has repeatedly held, there can be no derogation from that rule. The conduct of the person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account.175 Other challenges which have been brought to the absolute and non-derogable nature of the prohibition of torture and refoulement include attempts to apply territorial limitations to these prohibitions. The Court’s developing jurisprudence on extraterritorial application has blocked these attempts.176 The use of diplomatic assurances177 to deport or return terrorist suspects to countries where they would normally be at risk of torture is another means that has been used by States to circumvent the absolute prohibition of torture. At least one EU country has signed several such agreements,178 while the Council of Europe had discussed the possibility of developing 170 Art 19(2) EUCR: ‘No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 171 Ramzy v Netherlands App no 25424/05 (ECtHR, 20 July 2010). 172 See Chahal v UK (n 38). 173 Observations of the governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and the United Kingdom in the case of Ramzy v the Netherlands (n 171). 174 Saadi v Italy (n 38), para 137. 175 Ibid, para 138. See also MT Gil-Bazo, ‘Refugee Protection under International Human Rights Law: From Non-Refoulement to Residence and Citizenship’ (2015) 34 (1) Refugee Survey Quarterly 11–42. 176 See section D.II, above. 177 These are agreements between two countries—the deporting country and the country of return, in which the country of return engages itself to refrain from torturing the individual returned. These agreements are also known as Memoranda of Understanding. For a full discussion, see the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 paras 240–43. 178 The UK has concluded general memoranda of understanding with third countries, such as Jordan, Libya, Lebanon and Algeria. See E/CN.4/2006/6, para 29; Nowak and McArthur (n 42) 216, fn 474.



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­ inimum standards for their application.179 These agreements have also been severely criticised m by human rights experts.180 Without clearly opposing them, the ECtHR has stated that the existence of these agreements does not absolve ‘the Court from the obligation to examine whether such assurances provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of treatment prohibited by the Convention. The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time’.181 This has also been the position of the Human Rights Committee182 and the CAT Committee.183 In the more disturbing case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK,184 the ECtHR examined the diplomatic assurances received by the British government from the Jordanian government and concluded that despite the documented real risk of ill-treatment upon return without the assurances, these mitigated the risk so that ‘the applicant’s return to Jordan would not expose him to a real risk of ill-treatment’.185 For the first time in its history, however, the ECtHR accepted that there was a real risk that upon return he would be tried in breach of the absolute prohibition on the use of evidence obtained by torture, which constitutes a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice.186 04.73 It is in the period since 2001 that the absolute and non-derogable nature of the prohibition of torture was put into question for the first time since the existence of the United Nations, even in democratic states. It was for good philosophical and historical reasons that states agreed in the aftermath of the Nazi Holocaust that the prohibition of torture should be guaranteed under international human rights law, as one of the few absolute and non-derogable rights. History, including the recent context of the global ‘war on terror’, shows that putting into question the absolute prohibition of torture means opening a Pandora’s Box. It will take many years until the global damage that was inflicted on the prohibition of torture187 as a rule of jus cogens is repaired.188

179 This possibility gave rise to much criticism and was abandoned. See Human Rights Watch, ‘No Guidelines on Empty “No Torture” Promises’, 3 April 2006. 180 See Special Rapporteur on Torture, E/CN.4/2006/6, para 28–33; A/HRC/10/44/Add.2, paras 66–69 and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, A/HRC/4/88, para 9. 181 See Saadi v Italy (n 38), para 148. 182 Mohammed Alzery v Sweden, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, 10 November 2006. 183 Agiza v Sweden, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, 20 May 2005. 184 Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK (n 38). 185 Ibid, paras 190–207. 186 The ECtHR noted that it ‘considers that the admission of torture evidence is manifestly contrary, not just to the provisions of Art 6, but to the most basic international standards of a fair trial. It would make the whole trial not only immoral and illegal, but also entirely unreliable in its outcome. It would, therefore, be a flagrant denial of justice if such evidence were admitted in a criminal trial’; para 267. 187 One particularly striking example is the issue of extraordinary rendition. According to UN, EU and Council of Europe investigations, European states have been complicit in rendition, notably by providing airspace and airports to rendition flights. See M Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture, UN Doc A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, paras 244–45 and the joint report of four special procedures on secret detention in the fight against terrorism, UN Doc A/HRC/13/42 (2010). See also D Marty, ‘Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member States: second report’, Doc 11302 rev, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights/Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 11 June 2007; Council of Europe, ‘Secretary General’s supplementary report under article 52 ECHR on the question of secret detention and transport of detainees suspected of terrorist acts, notably by or at the instigation of foreign agencies’, SG/Inf(2006)13, 14 June 2006; EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, ‘Opinion n°3/2006: The human rights responsibilities of the EU Member states in the context of the CIA activities in Europe (“Extraordinary renditions”)’, 25 May 2006; as well as the work of the ‘TIDP Temporary Committee’ set up by European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on 15 December 2005 to investigate the alleged illegal transfer of detainees and the suspected existence of secret CIA detention facilities in the European Union and in candidate countries, Final Report A6-0020/2007; and the European Parliament Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI)), 14 February 2007. 188 See M Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture, A/HRC/13/39/Add.5, para 45.

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V. Remedies Article 47 of the EUCR provides for the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial for anyone 04.74 whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Union have been violated. Regarding the specific right to an effective remedy and full reparation for victims of torture, Article 14 CAT provides that each state party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, the victim’s dependants are entitled to compensation. The rights enshrined in Article 14 should be seen as a specific manifestation of the general right of victims of human rights violations to a remedy and adequate reparation, as laid down in various international and regional human rights treaties.189 In addition, Article 4 EUCR as developed by the ECtHR also contains in itself the right to have all allegations and suspicions of torture investigated,190 and the right to redress and compensation for victims of torture or ill-treatment.191 Where the violation of Article 4 EUCR occurs in the implementation by the Member State of EU law, the first point of contact for an individual will most likely continue to be national jurisdictions. However, with the increase of competencies of the EU in areas where violations of Article 4 are possible, and with the submission of these areas to the jurisdiction of the CJEU,192 it is very likely that the CJEU will face an increase of the number of cases dealing with alleged violations of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment.193 It is worth highlighting that the competencies of the CJEU regarding fundamental rights have not brought a new procedure specific to fundamental rights, and that alleged victims of such violations access the CJEU through the general existing procedures. These have not been devised with victims of human rights violations in mind, and therefore do not cater to their needs particularly well.194 With regard to access to the Luxembourg jurisdiction by alleged victims of torture or ill- 04.75 treatment, the first point to be made is that admissibility requirements for individuals can be an important impediment to actions being brought, as individual applicants must always prove that they are directly and individually affected by the measure in question.195 In addition, some actions before the Court are not particularly relevant in cases of human rights violations.196 Key actions will be actions for damages197 and the preliminary question procedure exercised through national judicial review.198 In the latter case, however, the decision to bring the case before the Luxembourg jurisdiction will largely depend on the national judge. An important power,

189 Eg Art 2(3) CCPR, Art 13 ECHR. See also ibid, paras 167–85. 190 Ribitsch v Austria (n 30); Aksoy v Turkey (n 27); Assenov et al v Bulgaria (n 30); Labita v Italy (n 30); Salman v Turkey (2000), Stefan Iliev v Bulgaria App no 53121/99 (ECtHR, 10 May 2007). 191 Assanidze v Georgia App no 71503/01 (ECtHR, 8 April 2004). 192 In particular migration, asylum and border control. See Art 67 TFEU. 193 See S Carrera, M de Somer and B Petkova, The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Fundamental Rights Tribunal—Challenges for the Effective Delivery of Fundamental Rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No 49, August 2012. 194 This is particularly problematic for allegations of torture where the alleged perpetrator is an EU agency or an EU agent. 195 Eg annulment procedures, Art 263 TFEU. 196 Eg action for failure to act, Art 265 TFEU. Note, however, that this procedure may be used to hold the EU bodies responsible for any failure to meet their positive obligations to fulfil and protect the right to personal integrity and human dignity. See sections D.III(g) and (h), above. 197 Art 340 TFEU: ‘In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.’ 198 Art 267 TFEU.



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­ owever, is brought by Article 263 TFEU which provides that the CJEU ‘shall review the legalh ity of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’. This permits ‘home affairs’ agencies to be held accountable should they be found in violation of the EUCR.199 Another important development is Article 267 TFEU, which states that should a preliminary question be raised on the interpretation of the Treaties or regarding the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the CJEU shall act with the minimum of delay.200 In cases where there is a risk of refoulement, the CJEU should make full use of the interim measures at its disposal.201 04.76 The CJEU’s remedial action is also limited by its competencies. By way of examples, Article 276 TFEU provides that ‘[i]n exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the [CJEU] shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’. By way of further example, Frontex’s revised regulations provide that ‘the home Member State shall provide for appropriate disciplinary or other measures in accordance with its national law in case of violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations in the course of a joint operation or pilot project’. 04.77 The challenge for the CJEU is to ensure that it can deliver the same or a higher level of protection as the ECtHR from both a substantive and a procedural point of view. It will have to overcome procedural and competency obstacles in an area where the growing competencies given to the EU and its agencies are not always explicit. Crucially, judicial protection of Article 4 EUCR implies, first, the ‘absorption’ of the large case law of the ECtHR,202 and, second, that individuals whose rights have been—or will be—violated have access to an effective remedy. On the first point, in two key Article 4 cases, the CJEU has followed the reasoning of the ECtHR on the substantive content of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment.203 There are, however, still a number of issues that will constitute ‘test cases’ for the CJEU to prove that it can provide similar protection to the ECtHR, such as the extraterritorial application of the EUCR. Regarding the second point, key challenges include adequate access to the Court by the individual, with the possibility of full reparation, as well as the use of effective interim measures where there is a risk of irreparable harm to be caused to the individual. The Court will need to prove it is able to protect individuals and fulfil its enhanced fundamental rights role beyond questions of interpretation and legality. 199 S Carrera, M de Somer and B Petkova, The Court of Justice of the European Union (n 193). 200 Ibid. 201 For direct actions, see Art 83 of the Rules of Procedure. In the case of preliminary questions, the Court largely depends on national procedural options. For more on this topic, see S Carrera, M de Somer and B Petkova, The Court of Justice of the European Union (n 193). 202 As provided for in Art 52 EUCR. In the case of NS and ME (n 72), the CJEU followed the reasoning of the ECtHR in the case of MSS v Belgium and Greece (n 2), while in the case of Elgafaji (n 72), the CJEU reconciled EU legislation on subsidiary protection with ECtHR jurisprudence on non-refoulement. 203 In the case NS and ME (n 72), the CJEU examined ‘Dublin transfers’ from the UK and Ireland to Greece. Following the ECtHR in the case MSS (n 2), the CJEU noted that the presumption of compliance with fundamental rights by EU Member States is rebuttable where Art 4 is at risk of being violated. In Elgafaji (n 72), the CJEU dealt with the interpretation of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. In particular, the Court examined whether Art 15(c) of the Directive which grants subsidiary protection to civilians subject to ‘serious harm if returned to their country of residence’ because of ‘serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’ corresponds to Art 3 of the ECHR, or if it provides supplementary protection.

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E. Evaluation The prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment constitutes the core of the human right to personal integrity and dignity. Since torture and slavery are considered as the most direct and brutal attacks on the very essence of human dignity, their prohibition under international law is absolute and non-derogable, even in times of war, terrorism and other threats to national security. As the formulation of Article 4 EUCR is identical to that of Article 3 ECHR, the rich case law of the ECtHR needs to be taken into account. In addition, the practice of other monitoring bodies, such as the CPT, the UN Human Rights Committee, the CAT Committee, the SPT and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture provide important sources of interpretation. Apart from the obligation to respect the absolute prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, ie to refrain from practicing torture and ill-treatment, standard setting and jurisprudence have also developed a broad range of positive obligations to fulfil this right and to protect individuals against violations by other private individuals, such as domestic violence against women and children. The broadening of EU competencies in the areas of justice and home affairs, including the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, as well as in the EU’s CFSP has rendered the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment increasingly relevant for EU institutions, bodies and agencies. While still rare, there are cases where the EU can arrest and detain individuals, transfer detainees or remove foreigners from EU territory. In order to assist Member States and EU institutions on justice and home affairs, a number of working parties, coordinating committees and specialised bodies, such as FRA, Frontex, Europol, Eurojust and the EASO have been set up. Within the scope of activities of these bodies the line between mere coordination and conducting operations often becomes blurred and EU agencies themselves may be held responsible for violations of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, including the principle of non-refoulement. The ‘Dublin Regulation’, the EAW, the European Evidence Warrant, Europol joint investigation teams and similar tools of police and judicial cooperation are based on the reciprocal trust that the right to asylum and other human rights, including the right of detainees to be treated with dignity, are equally protected in different EU Member States. As the well-known cases of MSS, before the ECtHR, as well as NS and ME, before the CJEU show, this presumption is highly rebuttable and the transfer of asylum-seekers and detainees between EU Member States may amount to a violation of Articles 4, 18 and 19(2) EUCR. Within the framework of the CFSP, the most obvious example where EU institutions may be held directly accountable for torture and ill-treatment is in the field of EU police and military missions and operations, such as Operation Atalanta against piracy off the coast of Somalia. As the ECtHR has emphasised in a number of judgments, including in Al-Skeini and Hirsi Jamaa, the ECHR must be applied extraterritorially whenever state authorities have the overall control over a territory or over an individual. This case law must, of course, also be applied to EU police and military missions, which have the explicit mandate to detain individuals. Since such missions often take place in the context of broader UN- or NATO-led peace operations, the difficult legal question arises as to who is accountable for a violation of Article 4 EUCR: the troop- or policecontributing country, the EU, NATO or the UN? The jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this respect, above all the controversial judgments in Behrami and Saramati as well as in Al Jedda, is far from clear, and the CJEU might be requested to clarify the responsibility of the EU in this respect. This leads to the equally important question of how victims of a violation of their rights under Article 4 EUCR can hold the respective EU institutions, bodies and agencies directly accountable before the CJEU. The traditional procedures under Articles 263, 265, 267 and 340 TFEU are not well equipped to provide victims of human rights violations with an effective remedy,

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as ­envisaged by Article 47 EUCR, directly invoked before the CJEU. Once the EU accedes to the ECHR (as established by Article 6 TEU), victims will be able to bring their cases against the EU before the Strasburg Court. But the ECtHR will apply Article 3 ECHR rather than Article 4 EUCR, and an important chance to show that the protection of the EUCR might go beyond that of the ECHR will be missed. Yet, the opposite may also be true, if the ECtHR is forced to take into consideration caselaw from the CJEU which provides more extensive protection on Article 4 EUCR than the ECtHR is willing to afford under Article 3.

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Article 5 Article 5 Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour 1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 3. Trafficking in human beings is prohibited.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 5 The right in Article 5(1) and (2) corresponds to Article 4(1) and (2) of the ECHR, which has the same wording. It therefore has the same meaning and scope as the ECHR Article, by virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter. Consequently: —— no limitation may legitimately affect the right provided for in paragraph 1, —— in paragraph 2, ‘forced or compulsory labour’ must be understood in the light of the ‘negative’ definitions contained in Article 4(3) of the ECHR: ‘For the purpose of this article the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not include: (a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the ­provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such detention; (b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service; (c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community; (d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.’

Paragraph 3 stems directly from human dignity and takes account of recent developments in organised crime, such as the organisation of lucrative illegal immigration or sexual ­exploitation networks. The Annex to the Europol Convention contains the following definition which refers to trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation: ‘traffic in human beings: means ­subjection of a person to the real and illegal sway of other persons by using violence or menaces or by abuse of authority or intrigue with a view to the exploitation of prostitution, forms of sexual exploitation and assault of minors or trade in abandoned children’. Chapter VI of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, which has been integrated into the Union’s acquis, in which the United Kingdom and Ireland participate, contains the following wording in Article 27(1) which refers to illegal immigration networks: ‘The Contracting Parties undertake to impose appropriate penalties on any person who, for financial gain, assists or tries to assist an alien to enter or reside within the territory of one of the Contracting Parties in breach of that Contracting Party’s laws on the entry and residence of aliens.’ On 19 July 2002, the Council adopted a framework decision on combating trafficking in human beings (OJ L 203, 1.8.2002, p. 1) whose Article 1 defines in detail the offences concerning trafficking in human beings for the purposes of labour exploitation or sexual exploitation, which the Member States must make punishable by virtue of that framework decision.

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Select Bibliography J Allain, ‘On the Curious Disappearance of Human Servitude from General International Law’ (2009) 11(2) Journal of the History of International Law 303. ——, ‘R v. Tang—Clarifying the Definition of Slavery in International Law’ (2009) 10(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 246. ——, ‘The Definition of Slavery in International Law’ (2009) 52(2) Howard Law Journal 239. ——, ‘Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia: The European Court of Human Rights and Trafficking as Slavery’ (2010) 10(3) Human Rights Law Review 546. B Andrees and A Aikman, ‘Raising the bar: the adoption of new ILO standards against forced labour’ in P Kotiswaran (ed.), Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labor and Modern Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 359–94. H Askola, Legal Responses to Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation in the European Union (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007). ——, ‘Violence Against Women, Trafficking, and Migration in the European Union’ (2007) 13(2) European Law Journal 204. ——, ‘Illegal Migrants, Gender and Vulnerability: the Case of the EU’s Returns Directive’ (2010) 18(2) Feminist Legal Studies 159. MC Bassiouni, ‘Enslavement as an International Crime’ (1991) 23(2) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 445. J Berman, ‘(Un)Popular Strangers and Crises (Un)Bounded: Discourses of Sex-Trafficking, the European Political Community and the Panicked State of the Modern State’ (2003) 9(1) European Journal of International Relations 37. ——, ‘Biopolitical Management, Economic Calculation and “Trafficked Women”’ (2010) 48(4) International Migration 84. A Bosma and C Rijken, ‘Key Challenges in the Combat of Human Trafficking: Evaluating the EU Trafficking Strategy and EU Trafficking Directive’ (2016) 7(3) New Journal of European Criminal Law 315. J Chuang, ‘Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law’ (2014) 108(4) American Journal of International Law 609. P Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). H Cullen, ‘Siliadin v France: Positive Obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2006) 6(3) Human Rights Law Review 585. MB Dembour and T Kelly (eds), Are Human Rights for Migrants? (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011). S Farrior, ‘Introductory Note to European Court of Human Rights: Rantsev v. Cyprus & Russia’ (2010) 49(2) International Legal Materials 415. J Fudge and P Herzfeld Olsson, ‘The EU Seasonal Workers Directive: When Immigration Controls Meet Labour Rights’ (2014) 16(4) European Journal of Migration and Law 439. Fundamental Rights Agency, Severe Labour Exploitation: Workers Moving Within or into the European Union (Vienna, FRA, 2015). ——, Out of Sight: Migrant Women Exploited in Domestic Work (Vienna, FRA, 2018). A Gallagher, ‘Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis’ (2001) 23(4) Human Rights Quarterly 975. ——, ‘Recent Legal Developments in the Field of Human Trafficking: A Critical Review of the 2005 European Convention and Related Instruments’ (2006) 8(2) European Journal of Migration and Law 163. ——, The International Law of Human Trafficking (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010). ——, The Right to an Effective Remedy for Victims of Trafficking in Persons: A Survey of International Law and Policy. Consultation of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children on the right to an effective remedy for trafficked persons (Bratislava, 2010). ——, ‘The International Legal Definition of “Trafficking in Persons”: Scope and Application’, in P Kotiswaran (ed.), Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labor and Modern Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 83–111. J Goodey, ‘Migration, Crime and Victimhood’ (2003) 5(4) Punishment and Society 415. 94

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D Harris, M O’Boyle, E Bates and C Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018). J Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’ (2000) 38(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 751. International Labour Office, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. Forced Labour and Forced Marriage (Geneva, International Labour Office, 2017). J Orbie and O Babarinde, ‘The Social Dimension of Globalization and EU Development Policy: Promoting Core Labour Standards and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2008) 30(3) Journal of European Integration 459. R Pati, ‘States’ Positive Obligations with Respect to Human Trafficking: The European Court of Human Rights Breaks New Ground in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia’ (2011) 29(1) Boston University International Law Journal 79. S Peers, ‘Immigration, Asylum and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 3(2) European Journal of Migration and Law 141. ——, ‘Legislative Update EU Immigration and Asylum Law 2010: Extension of Long-term Residence Rights and Amending the Law on Trafficking in Human Beings’ (2010) 13(2) European Journal of Migration and Law 201. R Piotrowicz, ‘Irregular Migration Networks: The Challenge Posed by People Traffickers to States and Human Rights’ in B Bogusz et al (eds), Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 137–55. ——, ‘States’ Obligations under Human Rights Law Towards Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings: Positive Developments in Positive Obligations’ (2012) 24(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 181. V Stoyanova, ‘L.E. v Greece: Human Trafficking and the Scope of States’ Positive Obligations under the ECHR’ (2016) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 290. ——, ‘Sweet Taste with Bitter Roots: Forced Labour and Chowdury and Others v Greece’ (2018) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 67. B Sullivan, ‘Trafficking in Women: Feminism and New International Law’ (2003) 5(1) International Feminist Journal of Politics 67. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Providing Effective Remedies for Victims of Trafficking in Persons (Vienna, UNODC, 2016). ——, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (Vienna, UNODC, 2018).

A.  Field of Application of Article 5 Article 5 provides that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced 05.01 or compulsory labour and that trafficking in human beings is prohibited. The European Union measures that fall within the scope of Article 5 overwhelmingly focus 05.02 on the last limb concerning the prohibition of trafficking in human beings, where the EU has had some competence (as part of Justice and Home Affairs) since Maastricht. Under existing EU competence, trafficking in human beings is understood and targeted primarily as a serious form of crime with cross-border implications. Specific EU legislation on trafficking has been adopted, starting with a 1997 joint action, which was superseded in 2002 by the Framework Decision on Trafficking in Human Beings.1 This in turn was replaced by a more comprehensive directive in 2011.2 The 2011 Directive is supplemented by the 2004 Directive on residence

1 Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA on combating trafficking in human beings [2002] OJ L203/1. 2 Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA [2011] OJ L101/1.



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permits to ­victims of trafficking who cooperate with authorities, which remains in force.3 As ­discussed below, trafficking in human beings is, as well as a serious form of crime, a multifaceted phenomenon which touches indirectly on various other policy areas, including those involving violence against women, children’s rights, rights of victims of crime and irregular migration. The Commission adopted an EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings in 2012. This was followed by a 2017 Communication in which the Commission identified three priority areas for future action: disruption of the traffickers’ business model; rights for victims of trafficking; and further development of a coordinated and consolidated response, both within and outside the EU.4 05.03 The reach of Article 5 is significantly limited by EU law. As per Article 51, Article 5 is addressed to the Union institutions with due regard to subsidiarity and applies to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law; nor does it establish any new powers for the Union. This is of course the reason why the Union’s role within the scope of Article 5 is largely if not completely limited to measures related to trafficking. Many of the measures relevant to Article 5 that concern slavery, servitude and forced labour fall mostly under Member State competence, unlike trafficking where some EU action is specifically foreseen. Moreover, the practices mentioned in Article 5 typically involve horizontal violations, that is, they are perpetrated by private individuals5—they are rarely vertical, committed by state (let alone EU) agents. However, recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has greatly developed the notion of positive obligations pertaining to the subject matter of Article 5, and the scope of the relevant duties is potentially significant. Recent discussions on the issue of tackling slavery and abusive labour conditions in global supply chains via corporate due diligence requirements also suggest the possibility of further legal developments in this area.6 The EU context may thus in the future become more relevant not only with regard to trafficking but also slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 5 with Other Provisions of the Charter 05.04 Because of the evolving and multi-dimensional nature of slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour and trafficking, there is much crossover between Article 5 and various other provisions of the Charter. To begin with, Article 5 is embedded in Chapter I of the Charter, under the heading ‘Dignity’, and the practices prohibited under Article 5 are typically considered to be violations of human dignity (Art 1).7 They are also linked to other articles in Chapter I, including the integrity

3 Directive 2004/81/EC on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the ­competent authorities [2004] OJ L261/19. 4 Reporting on the follow-up to the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of trafficking in human beings and i­dentifying further concrete actions, COM(2017) 728 final, 4 December 2017. 5 Eg R Piotrowicz, ‘States’ Obligations under Human Rights Law towards Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings: Positive Developments in Positive Obligations’ (2012) 24(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 181, 186. 6 Eg European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2017 on the impact of international trade and the EU’s trade policies on global value chains, P8_TA(2017)0330. 7 Dignity of the human person is often considered to be the basis of fundamental rights—eg the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) speaks of ‘the inherent dignity’ of human beings as the ‘foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ (preamble).

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of the person, especially the prohibition on making the human body a source of financial gain (Art 3) and the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Art 4). Slavery, servitude, forced labour and trafficking also touch on various ‘freedoms’ in Chapter II, 05.05 such as liberty and security of person (Art 6) and the right to engage in work, freedom to choose an occupation and equality of working conditions (Art 15). ‘Equality’ rights in Chapter III are also relevant: for instance, trafficking, in particular for sexual exploitation, is typically a ­gendered phenomenon rooted in inequality between men and women (Art 23). Article 5 also has a link with the rights of the child when children are affected (Art 24). Chapter IV, Solidarity, connects Article 5 with workers’ rights more broadly, for instance in relation to the right to fair and just working conditions (Art 31) and the prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Art 32). As slavery, servitude, forced labour and trafficking are often perpetrated against migrants with few legal migration opportunities and/or irregular status, Article 5 is also connected to limitations on the freedom of movement and residence (Art 45).

C.  Sources of Rights under Article 5 There are numerous international and European treaties that inform the content and 05.06 interpretation of Article 5. Most importantly, the wording of Articles 5(1) and 5(2) is taken from Article 4 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).8 The only change is that Article 5 of the Charter leaves out paragraph 3 of Article 4 ECHR (which defines instances of work that shall not be deemed to constitute forced or compulsory labour, such as military service) and adds instead a new paragraph 3 on trafficking in human beings, which is now explicitly prohibited in a separate paragraph, yet grouped together in the same article as slavery, servitude and forced/compulsory labour. International concerns over slavery, the slave trade, forced labour and trafficking in human 05.07 beings (at one time referred to as the ‘white slave traffic’) are long-standing, and international agreements on these topics pre-date the birth of the modern human rights movement by several decades (and by much longer than that, in the case of slavery and the slave trade). Several of these international agreements remain important regarding slavery, the slave trade and servitude9 and forced labour.10 The concepts of slavery, servitude and forced and compulsory labour should be interpreted in line with these treaties, as well as emerging case law from the ECtHR.11 With regard to trafficking, the various older international instruments12 have been surpassed 05.08 by recent treaties, which are relevant for the interpretation of Article 5. The 2000 United Nations 8 As discussed below (and also confirmed in the Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C303/17), Art 52(3) of the Charter provides that insofar as the Charter contains rights which ‘correspond to rights guaranteed by’ the ECHR, the ‘meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same’ as in the ECHR. Union law can provide more extensive protection. 9 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (Slavery Convention), 1926 (60 LNTS 253); ­Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956 (266 UNTS 40). 10 Forced Labour Convention 1930 (ILO Convention No 29, 39 UNTS 55); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (ILO Convention No 105, 320 UNTS 291). Note also that in 2014, a Protocol to the 1930 Forced Labour Convention was adopted—this is discussed below under the section on forced labour. 11 See Art 52(3) of the Charter and Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C303/17. 12 1904 International Agreement for the Suppression of the Slave Trade (1 LNTS 83); 1910 International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (III LNTS 278); 1921 Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children (9 LNTS 415); 1933 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age (150 LNTS 431); 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (96 UNTS 271).



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Trafficking Protocol (Palermo Protocol)13 gave impetus to the adoption of the first significant EU law measure, the 2002 Framework Decision, and greatly influenced its definition of trafficking. The 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings14 created a more detailed regional framework for tackling trafficking in Europe that further develops the Palermo Protocol’s three-pronged approach based on prosecution, protection of victims and prevention of trafficking. The ECtHR has made use of both instruments in the context of Article 4 ECHR. 05.09 The EU instruments that have been adopted to tackle trafficking and, to some extent, illegal immigration, are important normative sources in this area. Somewhat unsurprisingly, considering the limitations of Article 51, the Court of Justice of the European Union has not had many opportunities to discuss the subject matter of Article 5. One can find occasional references to slavery, forced labour and trafficking in case law—for instance, the applicant’s fear of slavery was raised in Samba Diouf15 and in Danqua16 the applicant argued she feared being subjected to a form of ritual servitude, but both cases were mostly about asylum procedures. The possible effect of slavery or forced labour on the system of generalised tariff preferences was mentioned in DuPont Teijin Films.17 The General Court of the European Union raised the issue of possible extraterritorial impacts of some of the Charter provisions, including the ‘prohibition of slavery and forced labour’ in Fronte Polisario18 but given the subsequent appeal and denial of standing by the Court of Justice, the case law in relation to trade agreements remains embryonic.19 However, given how significantly the law on slavery, servitude, forced/compulsory labour and trafficking has been developed by the ECtHR, it looks increasingly likely that the Court of Justice will eventually have to address Article 5 more directly.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 05.10 It is the addition of Article 5(3), prohibiting trafficking in human beings, that explains much of the current political and legal purchase of Article 5. Trafficking in human beings has rapidly moved ‘to the mainstream of international political discourse’20 and this has not only resulted in significant international and regional action to address trafficking as a form of organised

13 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children supplementing United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, A/53/383, Annex II (Palermo Protocol). It entered into force on 25 December 2003 and has 173 parties (as of December 2020), including the EU and all EU Member States. 14 CETS No 197, ratified by 47 states (as of December 2020). All EU Member States are now parties to it, after recent ratifications by Greece (2014), Estonia (2015) and the Czech Republic (2017). See also the Explanatory Report accompanying the Convention. On the Convention, see A Gallagher, ‘Recent Legal Developments in the Field of Human Trafficking: A Critical Review of the 2005 European Convention and Related Instruments’ (2006) 8(2) European Journal of Migration and Law 163. 15 Case C-69/10 Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, Judgment of 28 July 2011. 16 Case C-429/15 Evelyn Danqua v Minister for Justice and Equality, Ireland, Attorney General, Judgment of 20 October 2016. 17 Case T-113/00 DuPont Teijin Films Luxembourg SA, Mitsubishi Polyester Film GmbH and Toray Plastics Europe SA v Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR II-3681. 18 Case T-512/12 Front populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario) v Council of the European Union, Judgment 10 December 2015, para 228. 19 Case C-104/16 P, Council of the European Union v Front Populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario), Judgment 21 December 2016. 20 Gallagher (n 14) 163.

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transnational criminal activity, but it has also revived almost-dormant debates regarding forced labour, servitude and slavery. Concerns over the subject matter of Article 5 have moved up the agenda since the 1990s, when widespread reporting of exploitative migration, especially cross-border trafficking of women and girls into prostitution, became a high-profile concern.21 It has turned out that far from being eradicated, as once thought, trafficking and forced labour, and even servitude and slavery (often lumped together, somewhat misleadingly, under the umbrella term ‘modern slavery’22), are persisting in the world, including in developed regions such as Europe.23 The European Union’s efforts to tackle trafficking (and, to a much lesser degree, slavery and 05.11 forced labour) should be seen in the context of growing concerns over irregular migration and transnational crime, with which trafficking has come to be associated since the 1990s.24 Migration became a political and security issue at the same time as the Europeanisation of migration policy took off in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty.25 The connections made between migration, organised crime and security have raised the profile of trafficking in human beings, especially trafficking for sexual exploitation, and generated criminal justice strategies aimed at improving cooperation between states. However, the responses have been less sophisticated when it comes to recognising and remedying the plight of migrants subjected to exploitation.26 Some of the broader issues around Article 5 thus relate to the general tension between a rights-based approach to immigration and asylum and the desire of states ‘to control their borders and populations as an essential aspect of their sovereignty’.27 At the same time, the overwhelming focus on the migration-exploitation nexus has arguably deflected attention from exploitation that is not directly tied to migration and/or prostitution.28

II.  Scope of Application Entitled ‘Prohibition of slavery and forced labour’, Article 5 in fact covers (a) slavery and servitude, 05.12 (b) forced or compulsory labour, and (c) trafficking in human beings. Slavery is considered one of the most egregious human rights violations, involving control over a person that is akin to ownership. Servitude is an aggravated form of forced labour, entailing coercion and denial of freedom. Forced/compulsory labour is work performed under constraints which limit the 21 On the gender dimensions and gender politics involved in the rise of concerns over trafficking, see eg B Sullivan, ‘Trafficking in Women: Feminism and New International Law’ (2003) 5(1) International Feminist Journal of Politics 67; J Berman, ‘(Un)Popular Strangers and Crises (Un)Bounded: Discourses of Sex-Trafficking, the European Political Community and the Panicked State of the Modern State’ (2003) 9(1) European Journal of International Relations 37. 22 On the importance of terminology, see J Chuang, ‘Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law’ (2014) 108(4) American Journal of International Law 609. 23 See eg International Labour Office, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. Forced Labour and Forced Marriage (Geneva, ILO, 2017); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (UNODC, 2018). 24 Berman (n 21); H Askola, Legal Responses to Trafficking in Women for Sexual Exploitation in the European Union (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007); H Askola, ‘Violence Against Women, Trafficking, and Migration in the European Union’ (2007) 13(2) European Law Journal 204; J Berman, ‘Biopolitical Management, Economic Calculation and “Trafficked Women”’ (2010) 48(4) International Migration 84. 25 J Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’ (2000) 38(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 751. 26 J Goodey, ‘Migration, Crime and Victimhood’ (2003) 5(4) Punishment and Society 415; Askola, ‘Violence Against Women’ (n 24). 27 S Peers, ‘Immigration, Asylum and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 3(2) European Journal of Migration and Law 141. 28 For studies that seek to shift this focus, see Fundamental Rights Agency, Severe Labour Exploitation: Workers Moving Within or into the European Union (Vienna, FRA, 2015); Fundamental Rights Agency, Out of Sight: Migrant Women Exploited in Domestic Work (Vienna, FRA, 2018).



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autonomy of the subject but fall short of servitude. Finally, trafficking in human beings is a more complex legal construction that tackles the process that may lead to exploitation, including slavery, servitude and forced labour, without focusing on the end condition as the definitive harm. 05.13 As with much of the rest of the Charter, in principle Article 5 applies to all persons, whether or not they are EU citizens, wherever Union law applies to their situation. Often, though not always, victims of exploitative practices are third country nationals; and migrants who are in an irregular situation can be particularly vulnerable to abusive practices such as forced labour. As Article 5 only applies vertically, that is, to EU institutions and Member States when they are implementing Union law, its scope is greatly limited, as discussed above. Trafficking is the one area falling within Article 5 where there is a clear set of EU rules. These rules are now based on Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which gives the Union the competence to develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, inter alia, ‘the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings’. The provision allows the Union to adopt measures to combat trafficking in persons, in particular women and children. Article 83 TFEU entails the power to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions regarding trafficking. 05.14 Unlike trafficking in human beings, which partly falls under EU law, slavery, servitude and forced and compulsory labour do not generally fall under EU competence (though tangential connections can be made). Moreover, slavery, servitude and forced labour have until recently attracted reasonably little human rights case law.29 However, because of increased awareness of trafficking, with which they are linked in complex ways, slavery, servitude and forced labour are also now experiencing renewed jurisprudential interest that has led to rapid developments with regard to positive obligations, especially by the ECtHR. In this context, drawing the conceptual boundaries between slavery, servitude, forced labour and trafficking has proved difficult. These developments are focusing much-needed attention to the interrelationships between slavery, servitude, forced labour and trafficking and some may in time affect the EU even outside the well-established trafficking area. For instance, frequently raised questions about the presence of slavery and abusive labour conditions in global supply chains and the possible need for European legislation to tackle exploitative extraterritorial practices suggest there is potential for further European legal developments in this area.

III.  Specific Provisions (a)  ‘No One Shall be Held in Slavery or Servitude’ 05.15 The prohibition of slavery has a particular legal character. It is a rule of customary international law of jus cogens level (a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted) and a legal obligation erga omnes.30 ‘Slavery’ is defined in the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery31 as ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’ (Art 1(1)). This definition of slavery covers both de jure

29 D Harris, M O’Boyle, E Bates and C Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018). 30 See further MC Bassiouni, ‘Enslavement as an International Crime’ (1991) 23(2) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 445. 31 Above n 9.

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(status) and de facto (condition) slavery.32 The 1926 Convention requires states to prevent and suppress the slave trade and to bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms. The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery provides also for the abolition of practices ‘similar to’ slavery, that is, debt bondage, serfdom, servile marriage and exploitation of children and their labour (Art 1). These four servile statuses can overlap with slavery proper but are to be abolished independently of the prohibition of slavery. ‘Servitude’ is a slightly more difficult concept to pin down. The four instances of servile prac- 05.16 tices that are ‘similar to slavery’ according to the 1956 Supplementary Convention were originally conceived as institutions of ‘servitude’, which, apart from its link to practices that are ‘similar to slavery’, does not have an international instrument that defines it.33 Servitude is generally understood as ‘human exploitation falling short of slavery’34 and less severe than slavery in that it does not require the exercise of powers attaching to ownership. Servitude is included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms’, Article 4 UDHR)35 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which repeats the prohibition against slavery and the slave trade as well as servitude (Art 8(1)–(2)). In Europe, Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights includes both slavery and servitude as non-derogable rights, but offers no definition for either concept. Until recently there was little case law to elucidate on these concepts but this has been rapidly 05.17 changing. The 2005 ECtHR case Siliadin v France36 involved a Togolese girl who had been held for four years as an unpaid live-in domestic worker in Paris. Her passport was taken from her and she worked 15-hour days with no days off, was never paid and did not attend school. Her fear of deportation was used by her employers as a way of controlling her. The employers were initially convicted of ‘obtaining services without payment’, but not of the more serious charge of ‘subjecting someone to working and living conditions that are incompatible with human dignity by taking advantage of vulnerability or a state of dependence’. Even the former conviction was quashed on appeal, although the employers were required to pay civil damages. Before the ECtHR, the applicant’s argument was that France had failed in its positive obligation to have in place adequate criminal offences to protect her from servitude and debt bondage, serfdom and the exploitation of children and their labour (as in the 1956 Convention) as well as forced labour.37 The ECtHR held that Article 4 had been violated. However, the applicant’s treatment did not 05.18 breach the prohibition against slavery. The Court stated that ‘the evidence does not suggest that she was held in slavery in the proper sense, in other words that [the perpetrators] exercised a

32 J Allain, ‘The Definition of Slavery in International Law’ (2009) 52(2) Howard Law Journal 239, 273. This definition was reproduced in substance in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2187 UNTS 90) regarding ‘enslavement’ as a crime against humanity—see Art 7 of the ICC Statute. ‘Enslavement’ is defined as ‘the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children’. 33 J Allain, ‘On the Curious Disappearance of Human Servitude from General International Law’ (2009) 11(2) Journal of the History of International Law 303, 304. 34 Ibid. 35 About the links between the drafting of the 1956 Convention and the UDHR, see Allain, ‘Curious Disappearance’ (n 33). 36 Siliadin v France, App no 73316/01, ECHR 2005-VII. 37 Siliadin (n 36) paras 65, 90–102.



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g­ enuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of an “object”.’38 As commentators have noted, the Court’s take on slavery as classic ‘chattel slavery’39 is in contrast with the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which in the Kunarac40 case took the much broader view that contemporary forms of slavery go beyond chattel slavery.41 Instead the ECtHR found that the applicant’s situation involved both servitude and forced labour. Regarding servitude (about the forced labour aspect, see the section below), the ECtHR relied on (for instance) the 1956 Convention. It argued that servitude ‘means an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the use of coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of “slavery”’.42 It found that the applicant had been held in servitude because she was required to perform forced labour for ‘almost fifteen hours a day, seven days per week’, had not chosen to work for the perpetrators, was a minor as well as vulnerable and isolated and entirely at the perpetrators’ mercy; she was also afraid of arrest and had no freedom of movement or free time.43 05.19 Most interestingly, the ECtHR confirmed in Siliadin that obligations under Article 4 entail a positive dimension: a requirement for states to regulate and seek to prevent actions by private parties that may violate Article 4. States therefore have to ensure they adopt sufficient criminal law provisions (as opposed to simply civil compensation) and guarantee effective prosecution of practices falling under Article 4.44 These were not at the time explicitly criminalised under French law, and gaps in legislation had resulted in insufficient penalisation of the applicant’s employers.45 While the ruling was generally welcomed as emphasising the importance of having in place laws to deter practices such as slavery, servitude and forced labour, as Cullen notes, this case placed much (and perhaps too much) faith in the criminal law as the main remedy for human rights violations, ‘with the risk that states will ignore other obligations towards victims’.46 05.20 Soon after, the ECtHR was given a chance to revisit its jurisprudence in Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia47 and the Court took the opportunity to move away from its narrower pronouncements on slavery in Siliadin and also to develop further its view on positive obligations under Article 4. Rantsev has been hailed as a ‘landmark’ judgment.48 The case concerned a 20-year-old Russian woman, Oxana Rantseva, who was trafficked from Russia to Cyprus (under a so-called ‘artiste’ visa scheme, generally known to be used for trafficking and controlling migrant women in

38 Siliadin (n 36) para 122. 39 See Allain, ‘Definition of Slavery’ (n 32) on why this statement is arguably not based on a sound logic. He argues that the 1926 Convention also covers de facto slavery, where someone is held in a condition of slavery (as opposed to having the status of a slave). See also The Queen v Tang (2008), HCA 39, Judgment of 28 August 2008, where the Australian High Court concluded that slavery covers both de jure and de facto slavery (and is therefore broader than the ECtHR’s take in Siliadin), though they did not endorse the very broad definition in Kunarac. 40 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96–23 & 23/1, Judgment of 12 June 2002. 41 See further H Cullen, ‘Siliadin v France: Positive Obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2006) 6(3) Human Rights Law Review 585, 592; J Allain, ‘R v. Tang—Clarifying the Definition of Slavery in International Law’ (2009) 10(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 246, 246–47; Allain, ‘Definition of Slavery’ (n 32), 242–43. 42 Siliadin (n 36) para 124. 43 Siliadin (n 36) paras 123–29. 44 Siliadin (n 36) para 112. 45 Siliadin (n 36) para 148. 46 Cullen, ‘Positive Obligations’ (n 41) 590. 47 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, App no 25965/04 (ECHR, 2010). 48 S Farrior, ‘Introductory Note to European Court of Human Rights: Rantsev v. Cyprus & Russia’ (2010) 49(2) International Legal Materials 415, 417; R Pati, ‘States’ Positive Obligations with Respect to Human Trafficking: The European Court of Human Rights Breaks New Ground in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia’ (2011) 29(1) Boston University International Law Journal 79, 82.

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prostitution in Cyprus). She was allegedly subjected to sexual exploitation in a cabaret, and died as a result of injuries sustained when she (apparently) jumped from a balcony in an attempt to escape her employers. A subsequent inquest in Cyprus, however, found there was no evidence that suggested criminal liability of a third person for her death. The case was brought by her father, who argued there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition against torture), Article 5 (right to liberty) as well as of Article 4. Regarding trafficking and Article 4, the ECtHR stated that ‘the Court considers it appropriate 05.21 in the present case to examine the extent to which trafficking itself may be considered to run counter to the spirit and purpose of Article 4 of the Convention such as to fall within the scope of the guarantees offered by that Article without the need to assess which of the three types of proscribed conduct are engaged by the particular treatment in the case in question’ (emphasis added).49 The Court then went on to say trafficking in human beings clearly falls under Article 4,50 for which reason the case is also further examined under the section on trafficking (see below). Regarding the issue of positive obligations, the ECtHR elaborated further on their scope and extended them to trafficking as well as other practices covered by Article 4. In terms of their legal and regulatory framework, states must ‘put in place adequate measures regulating businesses often used as a cover for human trafficking. Furthermore, a state’s immigration rules must address relevant concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking’.51 States must have in place a sufficient framework to prohibit and punish those who violate Article 4 (as per Siliadin), and they must also take ‘operational measures to protect victims, or potential victims’ (though ‘impossible or disproportionate’ burdens should not be imposed on the authorities).52 The Court also stated there is a procedural obligation to investigate situations of potential trafficking and to cooperate effectively with the relevant authorities of other states concerned.53 While Rantsev is not specifically about slavery and servitude, and thus does not elaborate 05.22 further on the meaning of the concepts or the content of positive obligations in relation to slavery and servitude, in CN and V v France54—another domestic servitude/forced labour case involving migrant girls, this time from Burundi—the ECtHR stated that ‘servitude corresponds to a special type of forced or compulsory labour or, in other words, “aggravated” forced or compulsory labour’ and that what distinguishes servitude is ‘the victim’s feeling that their condition is permanent and that the situation is unlikely to change’.55 The Court reiterated that states have an obligation to penalise and prosecute situations of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour and again found that France had not complied with its duties, because (as in Siliadin) its legal and administrative framework was insufficient for that purpose. In the similar case of CN v United Kingdom,56 the ECtHR recognised that domestic servitude ‘involves a complex set of dynamics, involving both overt and more subtle forms of coercion, to force compliance’.57 The Court found the UK’s efforts to take operational measures to protect the Ugandan victim were insufficient, at least in part because of a defective legal framework which did not sufficiently address domestic servitude as distinct from trafficking in human beings.





49 Rantsev

(n 47) para 279. (n 47) para 282. 51 Rantsev (n 47) para 284. 52 Rantsev (n 47) paras 285–87. 53 Rantsev (n 47) paras 288–89. 54 CN and V v France App no 67724/09 (Judgment 11 October 2012). 55 CN and V (n 54) para 91. 56 CN v United Kingdom, App no 4239/08 (Judgment 13 November 2012). 57 CN (n 56) para 80. 50 Rantsev

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05.23

The current trend towards reading positive obligations into Article 4 ECHR has many consequences for EU Member States, which are under a far greater obligation than initially thought to put in place legal frameworks against human exploitation falling under Article 4 ECHR. Depending on the scope of these obligations, these developments could also have consequences for the Union, despite the apparent limitation in Article 51 of the Charter. Areas such as external relations and trade policy will increasingly have to take this case law into account. There is growing interest in adopting legislative measures to require disclosure of business practices impacting on human rights and to address supply chains via due diligence requirements.58 Similarly, these developments may be relevant for the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which is one of the EU’s main instruments for the unilateral promotion of human rights and for linking human and labour rights to trade policy. The GSP now allows for the withdrawal of preferences where beneficiary countries violate any of the relevant human rights conventions, one of which is the ICCPR.59 In extreme cases such a withdrawal might be considered more than merely ‘allowed’ with regard to states that arguably tolerate slavery or servitude contrary to Article 8 ICCPR (about forced labour, see below).60 Similarly, the fear of slavery and servitude that that was raised by the applicants (asylum seekers) in Samba Diouf and Danqua may be a harbinger of further asylum and immigration cases where the EU’s acquis in the area may be challenged as allowing for repatriation migrants into de facto circumstances of slavery or servitude (despite slavery formally being abolished in most countries).61 (b)  ‘No One Shall be Required to Perform Forced or Compulsory Labour’

05.24 Forced and compulsory labour, while serious, carry less strict condemnation than slavery or servitude, and often cover less permanent situations. The meaning of forced and compulsory labour harks back to the widely ratified conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on ‘forced labour’, the 1930 Forced Labour Convention (ILO Convention No 29) and the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO Convention No 105).62 Convention No 29 requires parties to ‘suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period’ (Art 1). Article 2 defines forced or compulsory labour to mean ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’, that is, not freely chosen work. Article 2 also defines some instances that are not compulsory or forced labour.63 Convention No 29 is now complemented by a protocol adopted in 2014, which creates obligations to prevent forced

58 See eg Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups. 59 There is also special incentive arrangement to encourage states to ratify international conventions. Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008; see also Annex VIII to the GSP Regulation. 60 See J Orbie and O Babarinde, ‘The Social Dimension of Globalization and EU Development Policy: Promoting Core Labour Standards and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2008) 30(3) Journal of European Integration 459, about human rights and trade/development policy. 61 See Samba Diouf and Danqua, above n 15 and 16. 62 Above n 10. Convention No 29 has been ratified by 178 states, and Convention No 105 by 176 states, including all EU Member States (December 2020). ILO also has two conventions on the abolition of child labour, C-138 Minimum Age Convention (1973) and C-182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999). All four are so-called ‘core’ ­conventions of the ILO. 63 Compulsory military service, normal civic obligations, compulsory labour as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, work performed in cases of emergency and minor communal services.

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labour, to protect victims and to provide access to remedy, such as compensation for material and physical harm.64 Convention No 105 supplements the 1930 Convention, incorporating further provisions on the abolition of certain forms of forced or compulsory labour—for instance when used as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system (Art 1). The prohibition against forced and compulsory labour in Article 5 of the Charter must again 05.25 be read in light of that context and Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, from where it has been copied. While prohibiting forced or compulsory labour in broad terms, the provision is not non-derogable and it provides, like Convention No 29, for instances that do not constitute such labour: (a) work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention or during conditional release from such detention; (b) any service of a military character or service exacted instead of compulsory military service; (c) service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community; and (d) work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. By virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter, the meaning and scope of the Charter provision must be the same as in the ECHR. Until recently, relatively few cases on forced and compulsory labour had been brought under 05.26 Article 4 ECHR. Most cases have involved forced labour demanded by the state and in most of these no violations were found. One of these was Van der Mussele v Belgium, where a Belgian pupil advocate sought to argue that having to provide free lawyer’s services to indigent defendants amounted to forced or compulsory labour. The Court relied on the definition of forced labour in ILO’s Convention No 20 and held that the applicant had entered the profession knowing this might occasionally be required, it was part of the normal conditions of the exercise of his profession, and part of ‘normal civic obligations’ allowed under Article 4(3).65 Similar unsuccessful cases have also been brought by an ophthalmologist66 and a doctor.67 Work performed during detention has also given rise to unsuccessful attempts to argue violations of Article 4.68 More recently, in Chitos v Greece69 the Court found a violation in the case of an army officer who had been forced to pay an immediate and significant fee (109,527 euros) to the state in order to resign before the end of his 12-year period of service. While it was permissible to impose a fee for those who resigned early, the procedure for buying back the remaining years of service had failed to strike a fair balance between the rights of the applicant and the public interest. Starting with the above-discussed 2005 case Siliadin, the Court has had to examine the appli- 05.27 cability of the prohibition on forced labour in a number of more disturbing contexts involving vulnerable migrants exploited by private individuals. It will be remembered that in Siliadin, it was found that the applicant, a Togolese girl who worked as a live-in domestic worker, had been subjected to forced labour (as well as servitude). Though she had not been threatened with a penalty, she was in a similar situation because ‘she was an adolescent girl in a foreign land,

64 Protocol P029 of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (17 Member States have ratified this as of December 2020). See further B Andrees and A Aikman, ‘Raising the bar: the adoption of new ILO standards against forced labour’ in P Kotiswaran (ed.), Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labor and Modern Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 359–94. 65 Van der Mussele v Belgium, App no 8919/80. 66 Steindel v Germany, App no 29878/07. 67 Adıgüzel v Turkey, App no 7442/08. 68 See eg Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, App no 7906/77 (regarding work done in the ordinary course of detention) and Stummer v Austria, App no 37452/02, Judgment 7 July 2011 (about the affiliation of prisoners to an old-age pension system). 69 Chitos v Greece, App no 51637/12 (Judgment 4 June 2015).



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­ nlawfully present on French territory and in fear of arrest by the police’.70 The Court relied on u ILO’s Convention No 29, and said that, considering these factors, the applicant was performing ‘involuntary work exacted under the menace of any penalty’ (the penalty in this case being her fear of arrest because of her irregular status).71 In CN and V v France,72 also in the context of domestic work, the Court said that the type and amount of work were relevant for assessing whether the work is ‘forced’ or something that can reasonably be expected. It held that in the case at hand, 16-year-old CN had been forced to work—threats to remove her from the country were made against her, she had been made to work seven days a week and without her help a professional paid employee would have had to be hired.73 As with the servitude aspect, the Court found that France’s failure to put in place an effective legislative and administrative framework to respond to forced labour breached its positive obligations under Article 4. 05.28 In Chowdury and Others v Greece,74 the ECtHR further clarified some issues about the meaning of forced labour. The case involved 42 Bangladeshi migrant workers who had no work or residence permits but had been recruited to pick strawberries on a farm in Greece. The applicants were obliged to work in difficult physical conditions under the supervision of armed guards; they were not paid their wages and lived in makeshift huts. They went on strike a couple of times, but eventually continued to work as they were afraid that if they left, they would never get their wages. Some were shot and injured by the guards. The Court found the applicants had been subjected to forced labour and trafficking (but not servitude as was the case in Siliadin and CN and V v France). In relation to forced labour, the ECtHR distinguished the treatment of the applicants from servitude on the basis that servitude involves the victims feeling that their condition was permanent whereas the applicants, as seasonal workers, could not have that feeling.75 However, their treatment amounted to forced labour. Noting that the applicants’ initial consent to work needed to be ‘assessed in the light of all the circumstances’, the Court said it was ‘­necessary to take into account, in particular, the nature and the volume of the activity in question’.76 It found that many factors made the applicants vulnerable to exploitation, including the employer’s unscrupulous conduct, their fear that if they stopped working they would never be paid and their irregular migration status, which made them fear the authorities.77 The Court held that Greece had fallen short of its positive obligations because of the failure of the authorities to adopt protective operational measures and conduct an effective investigation.78 The case is significant as it involves adults who initially consented to work but were vulnerable to severe exploitation because of their irregular migration status.79 However, Chowdury and Others also suggests the ECtHR is still struggling with the conceptual relationship between trafficking and the practices specifically mentioned in Article 4. Some elucidation was provided by the Grand Chamber in SM v Croatia,80 which also confirmed forced prostitution can be considered as a form of forced or compulsory labour (see further the discussion on trafficking below).

70 Siliadin (n 36), para 118. 71 Siliadin (n 36) paras 113–20. 72 CN and V (n 54). 73 CN and V (n 54) paras 73–79. 74 Chowdury and Others v Greece, App no 21884/15 (Judgment 30 March 2017). 75 Chowdury (n 74) para 99. 76 Chowdury (n 74) paras 90–91. 77 Chowdury (n 74) paras 95–97. 78 Chowdury (n 74) paras 110–23. 79 V Stoyanova, ‘Sweet Taste with Bitter Roots: Forced Labour and Chowdury and Others v Greece’ (2018) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 67. 80 SM v Croatia, App no 60561/14 (Grand Chamber Judgment 20 June 2020).

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As discussed under the section on slavery and servitude, the expansion of positive obligations, 05.29 depending on their eventual reach, has consequences for Member States and possibly also for the EU. For instance, the Directive on employer sanctions,81 which prohibits the employment of illegally staying third country nationals, requires Member States to put in place mechanisms for third country nationals to claim any outstanding remuneration from their employers (Art 6). It must also be a criminal offence (not just an infringement) to employ persons in particularly exploitative working conditions or to employ victims of trafficking (Art 9). Questions can, however, be asked about whether the Directive provides, for instance, clear enough guidance for Member States about how to ensure that their legal frameworks sufficiently enable migrants to enforce employment rights. The Directive on seasonal workers seeks, among other things, to protect newly admitted seasonal workers from outside the EU from exploitation by incorporating some labour rights and accommodation standards and imposing sanctions on employers who breach their obligations.82 It again remains to be determined whether these measures go far enough to protect migrants in light of the ECtHR’s evolving approach to positive obligations. Finally, the EU’s role as a norm exporter may again prove to be relevant, for instance in the context of development aid or the Generalised System of Preferences (and this is indeed more likely regarding forced labour, considering how widespread it is compared to slavery or servitude). GSP preferences can be withdrawn in circumstances of serious and systematic violation of human and labour rights instruments, including any form of forced labour as defined by the ILO Conventions.83 In practice, suspension of GSP preferences has rarely been used and remains controversial.84 (c)  ‘Trafficking in Human Beings is Prohibited’ Trafficking in human beings is the most complex of the practices included under Article 5 of the Charter. Until 2000, there was no commonly accepted definition of trafficking, but the Palermo Protocol agreed on the following definition:

05.30

‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.85

The definition introduced by the Palermo Protocol contains three elements—the ‘action’ 05.31 (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons), the ‘means’ (threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments to person having control), and the ‘purpose’ (exploitation, including exploitation of prostitution, other sexual exploitation, forced

81 Directive 2009/52/EC providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals [2009] OJ L168/24. 82 Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers [2014] OJ L 94/375. For a critical analysis, J Fudge and P Herzfeld Olsson, ‘The EU Seasonal Workers Directive: When Immigration Controls Meet Labour Rights’ (2014) 16(4) European Journal of Migration and Law 439. 83 Annex VIII to the GSP Regulation (above n 59) includes both Convention No 29 and Convention No 105. 84 The EU withdrew Myanmar’s preferences in 1997 because of a systematic use of forced labour, following action initiated by the ILO. The EU re-established Myanmar’s preferential trading rights in 2013. 85 Art 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol (n 13).



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labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs). All three elements have to be made out in order for the activity in question to constitute trafficking in human beings. Trafficking is thus a complex legal construction that goes beyond the end result—such as slavery, servitude and forced labour—to target the processes that lead to an exploitative situation. An exploitative situation includes, but is not limited to, slavery, servitude and forced labour, while sexual exploitation is commonly believed to be the most common end-purpose of trafficking.86 Despite its complexity, the definition has been hailed a milestone, and the Palermo Protocol is considered to be an important first step in creating consensus on the need to address trafficking in human beings.87 05.32 Trafficking in human beings is legally complex and also more controversial than the other aspects of Article 5 of the Charter, because it raises contested issues of sexual morality and gender relations as well as the treatment of migrants, including those in an irregular situation. The Palermo Protocol is primarily a criminal justice instrument targeting trafficking as a form of transnational organised crime and as a security threat, seeking to strengthen law enforcement and criminal justice cooperation.88 ‘Trafficking in human beings is prohibited’, as per Article 5 of the Charter, reflects the same emphasis, focusing on prohibition and the use of criminal justice as a method of deterrence. This approach can easily lead to destination states viewing ­individuals who have been trafficked as complicit in their exploitation and ignoring their precarious situation as vulnerable persons in need of protection and assistance, particularly so if they are migrants with an irregular status in the destination country.89 Trafficked migrants have often not been recognised as victims of a serious crime, but detained as irregular (or smuggled) migrants, without access to assistance and services (for instance legal assistance and medical care), and then removed, sometimes to face potential harm from their traffickers. They can also be prosecuted for immigration violations or involvement in unauthorised work or prostitution. However, the Palermo Protocol contains only ‘soft’ and mostly optional provisions to improve the protection of trafficked persons.90 05.33 In Europe, the adoption of the Palermo Protocol prompted further activity both by the European Union and the Council of Europe. The EU’s Framework Decision of 2002 first addressed trafficking at the EU level as a response to a perceived need to harmonise criminal definitions and sanctions.91 It was not, however, concerned with protecting the human rights of trafficked persons (nor does Article 5 of the Charter mention those harmed in the course of ­trafficking). The Framework Decision was followed by the 2004 Directive on short-term

86 See eg United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (n 23). On the controversies over ‘sexual exploitation’ in the definition, see A Gallagher, ‘Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis’ (2001) 23(4) Human Rights Quarterly 975; Sullivan (n 21). EU Member States are affected by trafficking for sexual exploitation as well as other forms of trafficking—see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Second report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings (2018) as required under Article 20 of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, COM(2018) 777 final, 3 December 2018. 87 See Gallagher (n 86); A Gallagher, ‘The International Legal Definition of “Trafficking in Persons”: Scope and Application’, in P Kotiswaran (ed.), Revisiting the Law and Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labor and Modern Slavery (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017) 83–111. 88 Gallagher (n 86). 89 MB Dembour and T Kelly (eds), Are Human Rights for Migrants? (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011). For an eloquent elaboration on the dual nature of the trafficked migrant as both a victim and a perpetrator, see Berman, ‘Biopolitical Management’ (n 24). 90 See Arts 6–8 of the Palermo Protocol (n 13); also Gallagher (n 86); R Piotrowicz, ‘Irregular Migration Networks: The ­Challenge Posed by People Traffickers to States and Human Rights’ in B Bogusz et al (eds), Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004). 91 Above n 1.

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r­esidence permits to third country nationals who are victims of trafficking.92 This Directive aimed to encourage victims to cooperate with law enforcement authorities by providing some of them with temporary residence permits and some assistance. Because of concerns that it would be used as a backdoor by irregular immigrants, the Directive adopted a minimalist version of the national regimes already established in some Member States. It is not a victim protection measure and has been criticised for its low standards regarding the treatment of victims.93 The modest impact of the Directive even as an instrument of law enforcement has been acknowledged.94 The Council of Europe has sought to add value to the general criminal justice cooperation 05.34 framework through a more human rights sensitive approach to trafficking. The 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings95 takes the Palermo Protocol’s definition as the starting point and builds on its criminal justice approach, focusing however more attention to the protection of and assistance to victims through more generous and less discretionary provisions. States are obliged, for instance, to ensure that they have a proper victim identification process in place and to protect the private life and identity of victims.96 States must offer basic assistance to victims (including housing and access to emergency medical treatment) and provide a 30-day ‘recovery and reflection period’ during which time trafficked persons are both supported and expected to decide whether or not to cooperate with law enforcement (in which case a further extension of residence is contemplated).97 States must also provide for victims’ right to compensation, facilitate their return with regard to their safety and promote gender equality.98 The Trafficking Convention also provides for a monitoring body established to supervise the implementation of the obligations of the Convention, Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA).99 The Council of Europe’s activities in this field aimed to shift the emphasis of anti-trafficking 05.35 action and did prompt the EU to adopt the so-called Recast Trafficking Directive that replaced the 2002 Framework Decision in 2011.100 The Directive widens the definition of trafficking (to include begging, exploitation of criminal activities and removal of organs, Article 2), provides for increased sentences (Art 4), widens jurisdiction (Art 10) but also includes new provisions regarding victims of trafficking (Arts 8, 11–17). The influence of the human rights approach established in the Council of Europe Trafficking Convention is visible in the Directive, for instance in its rules on the establishment of effective identification procedures and its provisions on initial assistance and support for trafficked persons not being conditional on the victim’s willingness to cooperate in the criminal investigation.101 The Directive also provides for 92 Above n 3. 93 Piotrowicz (n 90); Gallagher (n 14); Askola, Legal Responses (n 24). 94 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2004/81 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities, COM (2010) 493, 15 October 2010; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of Directive 2004/81 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities, COM(2014) 635 final, 17 October 2014. 95 Above n 14. 96 See Arts 10–11 of the Convention. 97 See Arts 12–14 of the Convention. 98 See Arts 15–17 of the Convention. 99 See Arts 36–38 of the Convention. 100 Above n 2. Regarding transposition, see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and The Council assessing the extent to which Member States have taken the necessary measures in order to comply with Directive 2011/36/ EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims in accordance with Article 23 (1), COM(2016) 722 final, 2 December 2016. 101 Art 11 of the Directive.



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non-penalisation of victims of trafficking102 and includes specific protections for child victims.103 Many of the amendments on the position of trafficked persons were adopted through pressure from the European Parliament.104 While the EU’s approach is still focused on criminal justice, and modest in terms of some aspects such as prevention, the Recast Directive constitutes an improvement, as does the fact that all Member States have, as of 2017, ratified the Council of Europe Convention as well.105 05.36 However, as discussed above, the case of Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia has in some ways superseded some of the EU’s specific anti-trafficking efforts. It will be remembered that Rantsev concerned the trafficking for sexual exploitation of a young Russian woman, Ms Rantseva, to Cyprus. She was admitted to Cyprus on a so-called ‘artiste’ visa (a short-term visa which rendered visa-holders dependent on their employer, who applied for the permit). After she had run away from the cabaret where she had been working, she was found by her employers and taken to a police station because her employer now wanted her deported so that he could replace her. The police found no immediate grounds to deport Ms Rantseva, but instead of releasing her, they handed her over to the cabaret’s owner, who took her to an apartment belonging to an employee. She was later found dead below the balcony of the same apartment. The inquest in Cyprus found she had died as a result of injuries sustained when she jumped from the balcony. No third party involvement was investigated. 05.37 As mentioned above, the ECtHR stated in Rantsev that there was no need to discuss the concepts of slavery, servitude and forced/compulsory labour separately in these circumstances. It stated that ‘trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, often for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere’.106 The teleological finding that ‘trafficking itself, within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol and Article 4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking Convention, falls within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention’107 allowed the Court to hold that states have positive obligations under Article 4 to take action against trafficking and to elaborate on the measures states must take. These include, as above, a duty to put in place criminal law measures to penalise and prosecute trafficking but also to regulate businesses used as a cover for human trafficking and to address concerns relating to the encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking via immigration rules.108 States must also take operational measures to protect victims or potential victims, investigate situations of potential trafficking and cooperate effectively with authorities of other states.109 The Court found that Cyprus had inadequately protected Ms Rantseva while she was still alive and failed to punish those responsible for her exploitation and ill-treatment.110 Russia too had failed to effectively investigate suspicions of trafficking.111

102 Art 8 of the Directive. 103 Arts 13–16 of the Directive. 104 S Peers, ‘Legislative Update EU Immigration and Asylum Law 2010: Extension of Long-term Residence Rights and Amending the Law on Trafficking in Human Beings’ (2010) 13(2) European Journal of Migration and Law 201. 105 See eg A Bosma and C Rijken, ‘Key Challenges in the Combat of Human Trafficking: Evaluating the EU Trafficking Strategy and EU Trafficking Directive’ (2016) 7(3) New Journal of European Criminal Law 315. 106 Rantsev (n 47) para 281. 107 Rantsev (n 47) para 282. 108 Rantsev (n 47) paras 284–85. 109 Rantsev (n 47) paras 286–89. The Court relied on both the Palermo Protocol and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention to support its findings. 110 Rantsev (n 47) paras 290–300. 111 Rantsev (n 47) paras 301–09.

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Despite its important ruling on positive obligations, the Court’s approach is conceptually 05.38 imprecise in conflating trafficking with the other aspects of Article 4 and not recognising that trafficking consists of action and means as well as (intended) exploitation.112 It was not discussed in Rantsev whether the facts would also have sustained a claim of slavery and/or servitude and/ or forced labour. The blanket statement that Article 4 now covers trafficking also raises some doubt about the scope of the Court’s broad approach to states’ duties under Article 4. As Craig notes, ‘the line between prohibition and positive action can be a fine one’.113 What is clear is that Rantsev significantly pushed the boundaries, also potentially affecting EU measures in this area. ‘Trafficking in human beings is prohibited’, as per Article 5(3) of the Charter, implies a more narrow criminal justice approach—as in Siliadin—than that taken in Rantsev. Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that rights covered both in the Charter and the ECHR should be the same in ‘meaning and scope’. In Rantsev, trafficking was held to fall under Article 4 ECHR in general and the statement in Article 5(3) of the Charter cannot limit the scope of Article 4. Therefore, for instance the statement in Rantsev that ‘a State’s immigration rules must address relevant concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking’,114 taken seriously, may pose a challenge to Member States, which have in place restrictive policies and rules regarding immigration and residence of third country nationals that arguably render some migrants vulnerable to exploitation. Indeed, the EU’s own approach, including its Directive on employer sanctions115 and Directive on seasonal workers116 (discussed above) may also be open to questions about their actual effectiveness in preventing trafficking and protecting migrants from exploitation.117 Since Rantsev, the ECtHR has had the opportunity to consider trafficking in a number of 05.39 other cases. LE v Greece118 concerned a Nigerian national who was forced into prostitution in Greece and who had to wait nine months before being recognised as a victim of trafficking. The Court reiterated its stance in Rantsev regarding positive obligations and found that Greece had failed to take protective measures and to conduct an effective investigation and criminal prosecution.119 The case did not, however, clarify the relationship between trafficking and the other practices mentioned in Article 4.120 Nor did the above-mentioned Chowdury and Others v Greece,121 in which the Court found 42 Bangladeshi migrant workers had been subjected to both forced labour and trafficking in human beings. Like Rantsev, the Chowdury judgment is conceptually unhelpful and does not systematically clarify the interrelationships between forced labour, trafficking and exploitation. In 2018, in SM v Croatia,122 a case involving a Croatian woman (possibly) forced into prostitution in Croatia, the ECtHR held that Article 4 applies in cases involving human trafficking or, in a further expansive move, ‘exploitation of prostitution’,

112 Allain, among others, is critical of the Court’s approach, which he thinks ‘has muddied the waters as to where legal distinction should be made regarding various types of human exploitation’. J Allain, ‘Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia: The European Court of Human Rights and Trafficking as Slavery’ (2010) 10(3) Human Rights Law Review 546, 546. 113 P Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 467. 114 Rantsev (n 47) para 284. 115 Above n 81. 116 Above n 82. 117 See eg Bosma and Rijken (n 105). Note that Art 79 TFEU allows policy to be adopted ‘for the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat … trafficking in human beings’. 118 LE v Greece, App no 71545/12 (Judgment 21 January 2016). 119 Stoyanova (n 79). 120 V Stoyanova, ‘L.E. v Greece: Human Trafficking and the Scope of States’ Positive Obligations under the ECHR’ (2016) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 290. 121 Chowdury (n 74). 122 SM v Croatia, App no 60561/14 (Judgment 19 July 2018).



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even in the absence of an international element. Finally, in TI and Others v Greece123 the Court again found Greece’s response to an alleged case of trafficking for sexual exploitation insufficient. 05.40. SM v Croatia included an important dissenting opinion critical of the court’s development of the scope of Article 4, for instance to the contested issue of exploitation of prostitution, ‘without proper discussion or explanation, and without clarity or openness’.124 A Grand Chamber referral was requested. The Grand Chamber, seeking to ‘clarify certain aspects of its case-law’125 confirmed its stance, in Rantsev, that trafficking is covered by Article 4, however ‘only if all the constituent elements (action, means, purpose) of the international definition of human trafficking are present’.126 It then went on to confirm that the definition of trafficking covers trafficking within a state and, noting differences between states concerning their approaches to prostitution, that forced prostitution is covered by virtue of its similarity with forced or compulsory labour.127 The Grand Chamber also confirmed that the positive obligations under Article 4 include a duty to have in place a legislative and administrative framework to prohibit and punish trafficking, a duty to take operational measures to protect victims or potential victims, and a procedural obligation to investigate situations of potential trafficking.128 It was this last obligation that Croatia was found to have violated. These clarifications, especially on the issue of forced prostitution, are welcome, though they do not address the basic problem, which is that the precise boundaries between trafficking on the one hand and forced labour, servitude and slavery on the other remain elusive. The Court’s recent case law continues to build on its initial approach adopted in Rantsev, 05.41. including its identification of a set of positive obligations. These obligations at present still largely focus on actions expected of actors in the criminal justice system, highlighting the basic issue with the adequacy of anti-trafficking frameworks as identified by Gallagher: States are able to record relatively high and improving levels of conformity with international legal rules related to trafficking in large part because those rules, in the end, do not demand a great deal. They request but do not demand that States take positive action to address the root causes of trafficking, not least ‘the merciless Moloch of capitalism that fattens on underpaid labour.’ They acknowledge the link between trafficking and the labor migration that greases the wheels of the global economy without requiring States to provide individuals with safe and legal avenues through which to move. They affirm the principle of non-discrimination without insisting that the rules, attitudes, and practices that render women, children, and migrants most vulnerable to trafficking-related exploitation be immediately and comprehensively dismantled.129

Although these criticisms still retain much of their force, the ECtHR has taken some steps in the ­direction of demanding that states develop legal and regulatory frameworks that effectively protect individuals, including irregular migrants, from practices falling under Article 4. This development, if it is to have the desired effect, must extend beyond criminal law to requiring that other systems ­entrenching the vulnerability of migrants and preventing them from enforcing their labour rights be equally subject to scrutiny.

123 TI and Others v Greece, App no 40311/10 (Judgment 18 July 2019). 124 SM v Croatia (n 122), dissenting opinion of Judge Koskelo, para 21. 125 SM v Croatia (n 80) para 277. 126 SM v Croatia (n 80) para 290. 127 SM v Croatia (n 80) para 295–300. 128 SM v Croatia (n 80) para 306. 129 A Gallagher, The International Law of Human Trafficking (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), 501. See also Berman, ‘Biopolitical Management’ (n 24), who also unpacks the various ways in which the narrative of anti-trafficking is limited.

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IV.  Limitations and Derogations Some of the issues of limitations and derogations have been dealt with above, but for the 05.42 sake of clarity this section briefly revisits the topic with reference to Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter. Article 52(1) requires that any derogations to Charter rights fulfil the criteria of legality, proportionality and necessity. Article 52(2) provides that rights based on the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. Article 52(3) provides for the same ‘meaning and scope’ for ECHR rights which are also recognised in the Charter. Article 53 provides that nothing in the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights as recognised for instance in the ECHR. The prohibition of slavery in Article 4 of the ECHR is absolute and the prohibitions against 05.43 slavery and servitude are non-derogable and may not even be suspended during a public emergency. Because of Article 52(3), this will presumably be the case for the relevant parts of Article 5 of the Charter as well, regardless of Article 52(1).130 Regarding forced and compulsory labour, there are four categories of obligatory service which are permitted under Article 4(3) of the ECHR. Though these have been cut from Article 5 of the Charter, by virtue of Article 52(3) they will also apply to Article 5.131 It is unlikely that further limitations than those explicitly allowed by Article 4 ECHR would be justifiable under Article 52(1) with regard to forced or compulsory labour. As to trafficking, the current situation is intriguing, as discussed above. Rantsev means that 05.44 trafficking in human beings now falls under Article 4 ECHR, despite there being no reference to trafficking in Article 4 ECHR at all, and that a host of still-evolving positive obligations apply to trafficking (as well as to slavery, servitude and forced labour). Article 5(3) of the Charter, on the other hand, says that ‘Trafficking in human beings is prohibited’, which suggests, as discussed, an arguably more narrow (criminal justice) approach to trafficking that simply requires criminalisation. By virtue of Article 52(3) and Article 53 of the Charter trafficking is now already included under Article 5 of the Charter regardless of the specific obligation in Article 5(3) and the narrower statement of Article 5(3) of the Charter cannot limit the scope of Article 5, which is derived from Article 4 ECHR. The current scope of the Treaty competence on trafficking is arguably somewhat wider than what seems to be envisaged by Article 5(3), so in line with Article 52(2), there is some scope in the future, for instance, that the effective prevention of trafficking, as per Article 79 TFEU, requires more extensive measures than those currently in place.

V. Remedies The issue of remedies is particularly difficult in the context of practices falling under Article 5, 05.45 as has become evident in connection with trafficking in human beings.132 Many of these issues also apply to slavery, servitude and forced labour, especially where victims of such practices are third country nationals and/or are in an irregular migration situation. Not all Member States have sufficiently implemented the standards set by the relevant EU instruments, and trafficked persons (and other victims of exploitation) are still not consistently identified as victims and therefore are not always able to access adequate support and remedies.133

130 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17. 131 Ibid. 132 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Providing Effective Remedies for Victims of Trafficking in Persons (Vienna, UNODC, 2016). 133 COM(2018) 777 final, above n 86; see also COM(2016) 722 final, above n 100.



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This means that despite the formal availability of (at least some) remedies, many trafficked persons are never identified, they often lack information about their rights, and detention and removal of irregular migrants (in line with the so-called Returns Directive134) means accessing remedies for such migrants can be very difficult or indeed impossible, especially when persons are swiftly returned to their country of origin (some trafficked persons are also at risk of further human rights violations and re-trafficking after repatriation). Other contributing factors are inadequate legal frameworks and failure to provide all victims with information about their rights, legal assistance and support.135 Therefore remedies need to be assessed not only in terms of the notional existence of sufficient mechanisms for restitution (including rehabilitation) and compensation (for instance from the offender), but above all in terms of the practical accessibility of these avenues for migrant victims who may not be aware of their rights and may be in an irregular situation. 05.46 Following Rantsev, states may be obliged to provide remedies if they have failed to take reasonable steps to prevent violations of Article 4 or to protect potential or actual victims of such violations. Cases under Article 4 are however still relatively rare. The most extensive instrument on remedies in the specific context of trafficking is the Council of Europe Convention (the Palermo Protocol, in contrast, is quite equivocal about remedies136). The Council of Europe Convention requires that victims are provided with information on how to obtain compensation and access to legal assistance and that victims have a right to compensation from convicted traffickers (with regard to both material injury, for instance medical costs, and non-material injury, for example suffering); states are also required to adopt measures to guarantee the compensation of victims.137 Insofar as the ECtHR is now using the Council of Europe Convention as its main guideline on the treatment of victims and the scope of positive obligations, this development makes the existing EU measures in this area—in particular the Directive on short-term residence permits138—seem rather modest and open to questions about whether they sufficiently ensure access to protection and remedies. The Recast Trafficking Directive has made some improvements in this regard, for instance providing that victims must have access to legal counselling and (with limitations) legal representation, including for the purposes of claiming compensation139 and that victims must have access to existing schemes of compensation to victims of violent crimes of intent.140 These specific rules on trafficking victims complement the more general rules in the Directive on compensation of crime victims141 and the Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime.142

134 Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348/98. About the directive, see H Askola, ‘Illegal Migrants, Gender and Vulnerability: the Case of the EU’s Returns Directive’ (2010) 18(2) Feminist Legal Studies 159. 135 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (n 132). See also COM(2018) 777 final, above n 86. 136 The Palermo Protocol (n 13) has few provisions on the treatment of victims and they remain largely discretionary— Art 6 requires states eg to consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims and to ensure that their domestic legal systems contain measures that offer victims of trafficking the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage suffered. 137 Above n 14, Art 15. See also the Explanatory Report, above n 14, 30–32. 138 Above n 3; see COM(2014) 635 final, above n 94. 139 Above n 2, Art 12(2). 140 Above n 2, Art 17. 141 Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to compensation to crime victims [2004] OJ L261/15. 142 Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime [2012] OJ L15/57.

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Article 6 Article 6 Right to Liberty and Security Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 6 The rights in Article 6 are the rights guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR, and in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, they have the same meaning and scope. Consequently, the limitations which may legitimately be imposed on them may not exceed those permitted by the ECHR, in the wording of Article 5: ‘1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2.

Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.’ The rights enshrined in Article 6 must be respected particularly when the European Parliament and the Council adopt legislative acts in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, on the basis of Articles 82, 83 and 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, notably to define common minimum provisions as regards the categorisation of offences and punishments and certain aspects of procedural law.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

Select Bibliography M Mancovei, The Right to Liberty and Security of the Person: a Guide to the Implementation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Handbooks, No 5 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). R Powell, ‘The Right to Security of Person in European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence’ [2007] EHRLR 649. S Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). D Wilsher, Immigration Detention: History, Law, Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012).

A.  Field of Application of Article 6 06.01 Under Article 51 of the Charter, Article 6 is addressed to the institutions of the EU but binds the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. For a long period following its inception, neither the law of the European Union nor its institutions had much relevance to the issue of liberty of the person. The fields covered by EU law were remote from the exercise of sovereign power in policing, security and immigration. After, successively, the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties, however, immigration, asylum and aspects of criminal justice have come to fall under both the ordinary legislative procedure and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. With the increasing integration of these functions provided for by the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, there are now significant fields where the scope of Union law extends to matters that potentially engage Article 6. The Union itself has a number of institutions which, whilst not physically engaged in arrest or detention, nevertheless direct policies and actions that may lead to such measures, particularly in relation to asylum policy, external border control, cross-border crime and the execution of the European Arrest Warrant. These include Eurojust, European Police Office (Europol), European Judicial Network, the putative European Public Prosecutor and the External Borders Agency (Frontex). 06.02 Most importantly, Member States also now act to arrest and detain persons pursuant to provisions of Union law, most obviously in the field of migration and asylum but also during cooperation in criminal proceedings. The sharp rise in movements of asylum seekers into Europe by sea and land during 2014–16 led to intense enforcement activity at national and EU level leading to serious rule of law concerns.1 Two significant policies in this regard were the Commission’s ‘A European Agenda on Migration’2 and the EU–Turkey statement of 18 March 2016. Both of these led to greater funding and logistical support to prevent irregular entry to the EU by asylum seekers and to secure their expulsion.3 Although still physically conducted by agents of Member States, detention thus became more closely linked to EU asylum policy during this period. Furthermore, the facilitation of the return of persons to other Member States to serve terms of imprisonment or to face potential detention under immigration powers depends upon mutual

1 The existing legal frameworks within some Member States were already inadequate for complying with the rule of law requirements in relation to the detention of migrants arriving by sea. See the Grand Chamber judgment in Khlaifia and others v Italy App no 16483/12 (Judgment of 15 December 2016) ruling that Art 5(1), 5(2) and 5(4) ECHR had been breached due to a lack of national legal authority to detain. 2 COM (2015) 240 final. 3 In J.R. v Greece App no 22696/16 (Judgment of 25 January 2018) the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a breach of Art 5(2) had occurred when detainees were not given adequate information as to the reason for their detention (which was based upon the EU-Turkey agreement which had just entered into force). Their detention for one month in a ‘hot-spot’ to identify them and decide if they fell within the terms of the agreement was, however, lawful under Art 5(1)(f).

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confidence in Member States’ adherence to fundamental rights standards in detention. Whilst initiatives relating to arrest and detention at Council of Europe level have been long-standing, the EU has itself increased policies to harmonise such standards as cross-border cooperation has proceeded. The Council of the EU issued a ‘Roadmap’ for strengthening the rights of suspects and the European Council’s justice and home affairs Stockholm programme of 2010–14.4 The common standards contained in the EU legislative output emerging from this has underpinned the principle of mutual recognition based upon mutual trust in Member States’ revamped criminal justice systems. Finally, there has always been scope for the fundamental rights protection, now embodied in the Charter, to apply to migrant EU citizens and their family members who find themselves subject to detention in another Member State under the principle set out in Rutilli.5 This principle should extend to long-term resident non-EU citizens, who are increasingly integrated with Union citizens pursuant to EU secondary legislation. The specific instruments where Member States implement Union law pertinent to Article 6 06.03 are increasingly numerous. In the criminal field, the most important measure is the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant6 which authorises arrest and detention pending return of criminal suspects and those convicted of crimes to other Member States. Proceedings regarding the European Arrest Warrant have been held by the Court of Justice to engage the Charter Article 6.7 The Framework Decision on Mutual Recognition of Criminal Convictions requires that the Member State of residence take back and imprison those persons convicted and deprived of their liberty in other Member States.8 The Framework Decision on Supervision Orders9 provides a mechanism for mutual recognition of alternatives to custodial orders made in respect of non-residents who are prosecuted or convicted in other Member States. Pursuant to the Roadmap for strengthening the rights of suspects, three directives have been passed which create harmonised standards in relation to access to interpreting services, information and lawyers alongside one on the presumption of innocence for persons arrested pursuant to criminal proceedings and under the European Arrest Warrant.10 Finally, under the ne bis in idem provisions of the Schengen Implementing Convention (Arts 54–56), when a Member State proposes to sentence a defendant who has already been convicted for the same acts in another Member State, they must reduce the sentence to take account of time already served. 4 European Council, ‘The Stockholm Programme—an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’ [2010] OJ C115, 3.2.6, which stated that ‘efforts should be undertaken to strengthen mutual trust and render more efficient the principle of mutual recognition in the area of detention’. V. Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’, Yearbook of European Law 31 (2012), pp. 319–372. K. Lenaerts, ‘La vie après l’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not Blind) Trust’, Common Market Law Review 54 (2017), pp. 805–840. 5 Case C-36/75 Rutilli v Minstre de l’Intérieur [1975] ECR 1219. 6 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. 7 Joined Cases C-508/18 and C- 82/19 PPU OG and PI (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 27 May 2019) [68]; Case C-261/09 Gaetano Mantello ECR [2010] I-11477 and Case C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu (Judgment of the Grand ­Chamber of 29 January 2013). 8 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of enforcement in the European Union [2008] OJ L327/27. 9 Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA on the application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision as an alternative to provisional detention [2009] OJ L294/20. 10 Directive 2010/64 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L280; ­Directive 2012/13 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L142/1; Directive 2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty [2013] OJ L294/1 and Directive 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L65/1.



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06.04

In the field of migration and asylum there are also a great number of measures impinging upon personal liberty. For Union citizens and their families of any nationality, the Citizens Directive11 impliedly authorises detention pursuant to deportation or removal. In the field of asylum there are four measures pursuant to the Common European Asylum policy which bear upon personal liberty. The Asylum Reception Conditions Directive12 partially regulates freedom of movement and detention during the asylum procedure. The Dublin III Regulation13 determines the criteria for returning asylum seekers to other Member States to consider their asylum claims and indirectly bears upon their rights pending such return. The Refugee Status Directive14 determines aspects of the recognition process for asylum seekers and therefore impinges on their potential liability to detention during the procedure. This Directive also grants a right of free movement to those recognised as refugees or given subsidiary protection. Finally, the Asylum Procedures Directive governs appeal rights in refugee status determination, but also touches upon detention.15 06.05 In relation to non-asylum migration measures, the most significant measure authorising detention is that in relation to irregular migrants under the Returns Directive,16 which creates a detailed legal code to ensure the removal of migrants in respect of whom a removal order has been made. There is also an implied power to use force in the Common Borders Code.17 The Long-residence Directive confers powers of expulsion and/or withdrawal of residence permits on public policy grounds, and therefore impliedly authorises detention.18 Similar considerations apply to the Family Reunification Directive,19 which gives powers to expel third-country national family members.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 6 with Other Provisions of the Charter 06.06 The most obvious general point of contacts between Article 6 and other parts of the Charter are in relation to Article 1, the obligation to respect and protect human dignity, and Article 4, the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This is because,

11 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/ EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC ([2004] OJ L158/77, and corrigenda [2004] OJ L229/35 and [2005] OJ L197/34). 12 Directive 2013/33/EU laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) [2013] OJ 180/96. 13 Regulation (EU) 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member States responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one Member State by a third-country national (recast) [2013] OJ L180/31. 14 Directive 2011/95/EU on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ L337/9. In relation toIreland, which did not opt in to the newer version, the old version applies: Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L304/12, and corrigendum [2005] OJ L204/24. 15 Directive 2013/32/EU on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status [2013] OJ L180/60. 16 Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying thirdcountry nationals [2008] OJ L348/98. 17 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 establishing a community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2016] OJ L77/1. 18 Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2004] OJ L16/44. Arts 6, 12, 17 and 22 set out substantive and procedural protection against expulsion or deportation that mirrors some of the concepts found in relation to EU citizens. For a detailed analysis see S Peers, ‘Implementing Equality? The Directive on Long Term Resident Third Country Nationals’ [2004] 29(4) European Law Review 437. 19 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/1.

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according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, as explained below, the conditions of detention themselves affect the legality of detention. The distinction between a restriction on liberty and a deprivation of liberty has yet to be explored in Union law. There are Charter provisions which are pertinent to this issue. Specifically for Union citizens, Article 45(1) grants the right to move and reside freely within the Member States. This provision must, however, be read in light of the Treaty restrictions on the free movement rights of EU citizens which do permit exclusion or deportation in certain cases. Ancillary detention is permitted in such cases. For non-EU citizens, Article 45(2) says that freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the treaties, to such persons who are legally resident in a Member State. The Charter also acknowledges the right of asylum in Article 18 and this engages those aspects of refugee law which impinge upon detention. The prohibition on collective expulsion of aliens in Article 19(1) means that detention cannot be used for this purpose. The right of children to have their best interests made a primary consideration and to maintain contact with their parents, both of which are acknowledged in Article 24(2)(3), are relevant to detention practice. The common connection between arrest, detention and the rule of law, particularly in the con- 06.07 text of criminal prosecutions, means that the Charter provisions under the ‘Justice’ chapter are also particularly relevant. Article 41 requires the Union and its agencies to practise good administration, which includes the right to be heard, to access the file and to have reasoned decisions. This obligation also applies to Member States when they take measures within the scope of EU law such as detention pursuant to removal of non-EU citizens.20 Article 47 requires that persons whose rights are violated must have an effective remedy and a fair hearing within a reasonable time.21 The Court of Justice has indeed in some cases referred solely to Article 47 rather than Article 6 in relation to the duty to uphold judicial review of detention.22 Article 48 affirms the presumption of innocence for detainees who have been charged. Article 49 requires that no one should be punished without law. Article 50 prohibits double jeopardy. In applying this prohibition, regard must be had to the more detailed ne bis in idem rules of the Schengen Implementing Convention (Arts 54–56), which require time already served to be taken into account. Detainees may seek to invoke any of these Charter provisions to challenge aspects of their prosecution and thereby, in an ancillary manner, their detention. However, in general terms, detention is not unlawful retrospectively simply because the prosecution or conviction which led to it is subsequently withdrawn or quashed.

C.  Sources of Article 6 Rights I. ECHR Article 6 corresponds to Article 5 ECHR. Article 52(3) of the Charter indicates that rights which 06.08 correspond to rights contained in the ECHR have the same meaning and scope. Despite this, the Court of Justice has in fact made clear several times that its approach to Article 6 does not seek to

20 Case C-383/13 M.G. and N.R. v Staatssecreataris van Veiligheid en Justititie (Judgment of 10 September 2013) [35]. 21 Case C-146/14 PPU Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi (Judgment of 5 June 2014) saw the Court rely on Arts 6 and 47 to find that a person must be given written reasons for an extension of their initial detention under the Returns Directive. 22 Case C-924/19 FMS and others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 14th May 2020 in which the detention of asylum-seekers and irregular migrants was reviewed entirely by reference to the relevant EU legislative scheme and Article 47.



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simply mirror that of the European Court of Human Rights.23 The reasons24 given by the Court are that the ECHR has not been formally incorporated into EU law and that the Explanations to the Charter confirm that the requirement in Article 52(3) must not ‘adversely [affect] the autonomy of Union law and of that of the Court of Justice of the European Union’.25 The Court has thus attempted to maintain a delicate balance between an autonomous EU approach to Article 6 and one that engages with relevant Article 5 ECHR case-law. To this end, the Court commonly undertakes to adopt its own interpretation of the meaning of Article 6 based upon EU law principles whilst, in the same judgment cross-referring to European Court of Human Rights caselaw when this is supportive of its interpretation.26 Furthermore, the Court has also sometimes, when considering remedies against detention within the context of EU legislation, relied upon the autonomous general EU law guarantee of judicial protection contained in Article 47 of the Charter instead of calling upon the more specific protections of Article 6.27 One important example of the autonomous nature of Article 6 can be seen in relation to the grounds of detention permitted under it compared to the six enumerated grounds under Article 5 ECHR. The Explanations to the Charter suggested that ‘only the specific justifications for detention that are listed in Article 5 ECHR are permitted under Article 6 Charter’.28 Despite these strong textual indications, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice29 has instead held that this is not the case and that detention may be justified based upon the need to ‘genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’ as set out in Article 52(1). This meant that, in that instance, EU legislation authorizing asylum-seekers to be detained to secure national security and public order, a ground not recognised in Article 5 ECHR, was not invalid as it pursued a general interest of the Union and was subject to adequate safeguards.30 Article 3—the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment—also informs the regulation of detention; conditions of detention that fall below appropriate standards for the detainee may also generate an infringement of Article 5. Article 2 of Protocol No 4 to the ECHR provides that ‘everyone lawfully’ within the territory of a state has the right to liberty of movement and choice of residence, subject only to necessary and proportionate restrictions. Thus alternative measures restrictive of liberty falling short of detention, such as reporting and residence requirements, are also subject to legal regulation under the Protocol. All Member States (except Greece) have ratified this Protocol; however, Article 45(1) of the Charter confers this right only upon all Union citizens. By contrast, under Article 45(2), third-country nationals must be legally resident and Member States are given a discretion as to whether to grant such lawful residents this right. There is thus some scope for conflict between the Charter and the Protocol, despite the obvious common heritage. Article 4 of Protocol No 4 provides a prohibition on the collective expulsion of aliens. This implicitly means that detention to effect collective deportation is also not permitted. Article 19(1) of the Charter clearly embodies this prohibition. The case

23 Case C-601/15 PPU JN v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie (Judgment of 15 February 2016) [45]. 24 The initial statement of the general principle that the ECHR was not part of EU law was made in Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 26 February 2013). 25 Ibid. [47–50]. 26 Ibid [78–81]. Case C-294/16 PPU JZ v Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź – Śródmieście (Judgment of 28 July 2016) [50–52]. 27 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). 28 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02). 29 Case C-601/15 PPU JN v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie (Judgment of 15 February 2016) [47]–[50]. 30 Ibid [53]. The Court of Justice also found that this was not inconsistent with the Strasbourg Court decision in Nabil and others v Hungary App no 62116/12 (decision of 22 September 2015) but that case was not authority for the national security or public order as a free-standing ground of detention.

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law of the ECtHR on Article 5 ECHR is particularly pertinent. It is notable that the Strasbourg Court has, in respect of immigration and extradition cases at least, adopted a different approach to that followed by the Human Rights Committee in relation to Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

II.  UN Treaties The embodiment of this most fundamental right is found in Article 9 of the Universal 06.09 Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’. This is complemented by UDHR Article 13(1), which confirms that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence with the borders of each State’. These basic ideas were developed in Article 9 ICCPR, and in particular Article 9(1): ‘Everyone has the rights to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.’ The interconnection with conditions of detention is made clear in Article 10 ICCPR—the right of all detained persons to be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and the obligation to separate accused from convicted prisoners. Article 12 ICCPR confirms the right of all persons lawfully within the territory to freedom of movement. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on the ICCPR, arising in relation to individual complaints under Article 9, has been extensive and influential globally, if not in Europe.31 The mechanisms to combat torture and inhuman and degrading treatment in the Convention 06.10 Against Torture (CAT) are very pertinent to detention. The monitoring procedure set up by the Optional Protocol to the CAT provides for more detailed visits to detention centres. The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 1988 provides a comprehensive code covering the due process rights of detainees whilst the conditions of detention are regulated by the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners 1990. Also important have been the monitoring reports and standard-setting by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, whose remit covers all the appropriate international instruments relating to liberty of the person.32 As regards the specific position of children, Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the 06.11 Child (CRC) confirms that in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. This is given specific expression in Article 37 CRC, which sets out a prohibition on arbitrary detention of children but also that detention is to be used only as measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.

III.  Council of Europe Treaties Pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 06.12 Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, there is an obligation on states to allow visits by monitors to all persons deprived of their liberty by a public authority. The monitoring reports 31 See A Conte and R Burchill, Defining Civil and Political Rights: the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2nd edn (London, Ashgate, 2009). The crucial decision arose in A v Australia, Communication No 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (30 April 1997), in which the Human Rights Committee concluded that immigration detention must be necessary and proportionate to meeting the needs of immigration control or public order. 32 For a summary of WGAD’s approach to the detention of immigrants and asylum seekers, see Deliberation No 5, Report of WGAD, Commission on Human Rights, 56th Session, E/CN.4/2000.4.



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of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture are important indicators of evolving standards, both as regards due process and conditions of detention. They have been summarised into general standards.33 In relation to the development of human rights standards amongst Council of Europe members, both the Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly have issued important guidance in relation to detention. Most importantly, for those convicted of crimes or on remand pending trial, the European Prison Rules provide a very detailed set of standards of treatment and due process rights.34 For immigration and asylum detainees, important guidelines have also been issued.35 Similarly the European Commissioner for Human Rights has produced a number of important monitoring reports on individual countries’ detention practices.

IV.  Other Sources 06.13 National constitutions all contain a prohibition on arbitrary detention in various forms, as this is one of the most well-established fundamental rights. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CSR) contains a number of important references to liberty of the person which are pertinent to both asylum seekers and those with full refugee status. Thus Article 9 confirms that states may take ‘provisional measures’ (including detention) essential to national security pending recognition of refugees. Under Article 26 CSR there is a right to freedom of movement for refugees lawfully in the territory of a state. Under Article 31 CSR (1) no penalties may be imposed on refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge coming directly on account of illegal entry and (2) restrictions on movement of such refugees must be necessary. Guidelines on the detention of asylum seekers have been produced by the Executive Committee that oversees the CSR and by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.36

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 06.14 A right to liberty is one of the oldest and most well-established within liberal societies. It has close links with the establishment of the rule of law in relation to the exercise of governmental power over civil society. As such, the right to liberty is better viewed as a right not to be

33 Committee for the Prevention of Torture, The CPT Standards [CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1—Rev.2006]. 34 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules. For a detailed history see D van Zyl Smit and A Snacken, Principles of European Prison Law and Policy: ­Penology and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). 35 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2003)5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on measures of detention of asylum seekers. This was cited by the Court of Justice in Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22, para.218). Committee of Ministers, Twenty guidelines on forced return (2005). Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1547 (2002) Expulsion procedures in conformity with human rights and enforced with respect for safety and dignity. Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1707 (2010) on detention of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in Europe. Recommendation Rec (2003)5 was cited by the Court of Justice in Case C-61/11 PPU El Dridi [2011] 3 CMLR 6 [43]. The European Committee on Legal Co-operation has now produced a draft Codifying Instrument of European Rules on the Administrative Detention of Migrants, 18 May 2017. 36 Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (Geneva, UNHCR, 2012). This was cited by the Court of Justice in Case C-601/15 PPU JN v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie (Judgment of 15 February 2016 (para.63), Case C-18/16 K v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie (Judgment of 14 September 2017) (para. 43) and also Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22, para.218).; UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 44 (1986) Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers.

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detained arbitrarily. Originally this was conceived of solely in procedural terms: detention must follow due process of law. In modern human rights law, however, the right increasingly comprises both procedural and substantive components. The state is obliged to detain only according to transparent and clear legal authority, whilst the grounds of detention should generally be linked to sufficiently pressing goals of public policy to support removal of liberty and they should be necessary and proportionate. Furthermore, the conditions of detention themselves and their effects upon particular detainees have increasingly come to be evaluated against the nature of the state’s public policy goals using proportionality analysis. The Union has increasingly come to adopt public policy goals which impinge upon personal 06.15 liberty for their fulfilment. The most direct of these is in relation to asylum and border policy where the Union’s goal of preventing unlawful migration and secondary movements, particularly of asylum seekers, within Europe has led to the imposition of common obligations, including the use of detention powers. More recently the EU has funded the creation of closed ‘hot-spots’ to process asylum claims. The Union has also expressed its own shared public policy in relation to the creation of criminal offences for conduct that has a trans-border element or impinges upon the fulfilment of Union policy goals.37 The final main area of Union activity is more about facilitation of Member States’ criminal justice policies through cooperation to render more rapid returns of suspected and convicted criminals in other Member States. The Court of Justice has now given several judgments in which Article 6 was directly relied 06.16 upon. Importantly, these cases mostly concerned the detention of asylum applicants.38 The liberty of asylum seekers, regardless of their mode of entry, has thus been recognised as being of particular concern to the Court. The Court has, however, found EU legislative measures authorising detention in such cases to be compliant with Article 6.39 This said, its interpretations of the relevant EU legislation have also sought to ‘read down’ provisions to ensure compliance with its interpretation of Article 6.40 The Court has also found that some Member States’ domestic legislation or procedures when implementing Union law in relation to asylum seekers must be changed to comply with Article 6.41 By contrast, in cases involving detention pending removal of irregular migrants, the Court of Justice has focused upon the purpose of the legislative scheme, which it views as designed to efficiently secure expulsion, rather than having recourse to any Article 6 discussion.42 The Court has more recently relied upon the Article 47 right to an effective remedy—rather than Article 6—when detention has occurred in violation of the rules of an EU legislative scheme authorising detention.43

II.  Scope of Application (a)  Relationship with Free Movement Law and Purely Internal Situations The right of EU citizens to move and reside freely within the Union pursuant to Articles 20 and 06.17 21 TFEU necessarily entails respect for the right to liberty and security of the person. This right 37 For a case in which EU law could mandate the use of detention as a punitive measure to enforce EU law within Member States see Case C – 752/18 Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV v Freistaat Bayern (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 19th December 2019). 38 Case C-528/15 Al Chodor [2017] 4 WLR 125; JN (n 23) and Case C-60/16 Mohammad Khir Amayry v M ­ igrationsverket (Judgment of 13 September 2017). 39 JN (n 23). 40 Mohammad Khir Amayry (n 38). 41 Al Chodor (n 38). 42 Case C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev [2009] ECR I-11189. 43 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22).



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is embodied in Article 45 of the Charter. The Court of Justice has often ruled against obstacles to such movement when imposed by Member States. In Oulane44 an EU citizen was present in another Member State with a temporary right of residence as a recipient of services.45 The European Court of Justice held that, whilst Member States could impose a penalty for failure to hold an identity document, ‘[d]etention and deportation based solely on the failure of the person concerned to comply with legal formalities concerning the monitoring of aliens impair the very substance of the right of residence conferred directly by Community law and are manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the infringement’.46 The failure to comply with such rules did not constitute a threat to public policy or security.47 There had to be a core security justification for detention such as that the migrant would commit criminal acts.48 Detention orders, like deportation, can be justified, but only based on the express deportation grounds of public policy, security or health set out in TFEU.49 06.18 For non-EU citizens, only those who have stayed for a qualifying period in a Member State and are long-residence acquire free movement rights under Union law. Whilst this confers powers of expulsion and/or withdrawal of residence permits on narrow public policy grounds, there is no mention of detention.50 There is only an oblique reference, in that Member States expelling a non-EU citizen ‘shall take all the appropriate measure to effectively implement it’.51 Similar considerations apply to the Family Reunification Directive.52 This gives rights to non-EU citizens to join and reside with their non-EU resident families in the Union.53 There are public policy exclusion and expulsion powers,54 but again there is no requirement to implement these orders by arrest and detention.55 06.19 The concept of obstacles to free movement may also have relevance for detention pursuant to criminal offences under Article 5(1)(a) ECHR. The Court of Justice has been willing to rule that penalties which are disproportionate in their impact on the ability of EU citizens to exercise their freedom of movement may be in breach of EU law.56 Therefore any detention pursuant to

44 Case C-215/03 Oulane (Judgment of 17 February 2005). 45 Specifically, at the relevant time he had a right to stay up to three months in order to receive services under Art 56 TFEU in addition to any rights derived from EU citizenship. The modalities of exercising this right, including the right to enter based upon presentation of an identity card or passport, were set out in Directive 73/148/EC on the removal of restrictions on the movement and stay of nationals of the Member States in relation to establishment and receiving services. They now fall within Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 46 Oulane (n 44) [40] (emphasis added). 47 Ibid [41]. 48 Ibid paras 9 and 11 state the facts in terms which indicate that a fear of absconding was the ground for detention, but the referring court did not put its questions on that basis. The ECJ found that ‘the questions referred are, however, based on the assumption that there was no genuine and serious threat to public policy’ (para 42). Any preventive detention would have to relate to crime serious enough to justify deportation under EU law. 49 Ibid [41]. 50 Arts 6, 12, 17 and 22 set out substantive and procedural protection against expulsion or deportation that mirrors some of the concepts found in relation to EU citizens. For a detailed analysis, see Peers (n 18). 51 Art 22(3). 52 Directive 2003/86 [2003] OJ L251/12. 53 Art 6. 54 According to Recital 14, ‘public policy may cover a conviction for committing a serious crime’; and someone who ‘belongs to an association that supports terrorism, supports such an association or has extremist aspirations’ may fall within the ambit of public security and policy. 55 We can also mention the Students Directive, which provides common standards for admission of students from outside the Union, but no express discussion of detention powers in the Directive. Council Directive2016/801 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing [2016] OJ L132/21. 56 Case C-193/94 Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I-929.

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such a sentence would have to cease although it seems unlikely that such detention would breach Article 5(1)(a) until the national criminal law had been declared in breach of EU law.57 For EU citizens imprisoned in their own Member State who have never crossed a border, however, the orthodox position is that they are caught by the ‘purely internal situation’ rule and cannot rely upon free movement rights to challenge their criminal conviction.58 (b)  Personal and Territorial Scope The right to liberty is one possessed by all natural persons, regardless of nationality or immi- 06.20 gration status. The geographical scope of the right may extend beyond the territorial waters of the Member States; to the extent that Union agencies and/or Member States engage in actions outside the borders of the Union which affect personal liberty, they may be bound by Article 6.59 The use of naval or coastguard operations against migrant smuggling vessels, which forms part of Union policy to combat illegal migration, may therefore engage Article 6 to the extent that physical restraint is exercised over individuals.60 Detentions that are conducted by the authorities of non-EU countries which border the Union would not ordinarily lead the Member States or the EU institutions to incur Article 6 obligations, even though the Union increasingly provides funds and training for border control operations to its neighbours.

III.  Specific Provisions As noted above, whilst the explanatory notes on the Charter state that the rights in Article 6 06.21 have the same meaning and scope as Article 5 ECHR, as noted above, the Court of Justice has stated that the ECHR has not been incorporated into EU law by accession and the autonomy of EU law must not be compromised.61 The Court of Justice has therefore striven to develop its own interpretations of Article 6 whilst at the same time taking into account the case-law on the ECHR. The Court of Justice has at times viewed the Strasbourg case-law as a minimum standard that it may be appropriate for Article 6 to exceed.62 Other decisions have seen the Court of Justice take the view that the EU has legitimate interests that support detention that is not strictly permitted by Article 5 ECHR.63 Thus, the extensive Article 5 ECHR case law of the Strasbourg Court surveyed below is coming to function more as a background cross-check on the meaning of Article 6 of the Charter as the Court of Justice develops its own autonomous

57 See the principle in Benham v UK App no 19380/92 (Judgment of 10 June 1996), (1996) EHRR 293, that conviction and detention by courts of competent jurisdiction are valid in terms of Art 5(1)(a) (even though later quashed), in the absence of proof of acting ultra vires in terms of national law or bad faith, or other failure to attempt to apply the relevant national legal framework. 58 Case C-299/95 Kremzow v Austria [1997] ECR I-2629. It must be questioned now whether this principle has been altered by the case law on EU citizenship conferring rights to reside and move even upon those who have not left their own Member State. See Case C-34/09 Zambrano (Judgment of 8 March 2011). 59 See Regulation 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 [2019] OJ L295/1. Article 80 requires that the agency ‘shall guarantee the protection of fundamental rights in the performance of its tasks under this Regulation in accordance with relevant Union law, in particular the Charter, and relevant international law, including the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol thereto, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement.’ 60 Hirsi Jamaa v Italy App no 27765/09 (23 February 2012), which ruled that taking immigrants in naval vessels back to a third country constituted collective expulsion in breach of Art 4 Protocol 4 ECHR. 61 Case C-601/15 PPU JN v Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie (Judgment of 15 February 2016) [45]. 62 Al Chodor (n 38). 63 Case C – 752/18 Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV (n 37) and Case C-601/15 PPU JN (n



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view of, for example, when restrictions on liberty meet the test of legality64 or are justified and proportionate.65 For these reasons, this section will not seek to reproduce all the Strasbourg case law, but rather to focus upon those areas that are of particular relevance as falling within the scope of Union law. Applicants detained by Member States within the scope of Union law will continue to have a choice about whether they use the Strasbourg system or seek a reference to the Court of Justice (or indeed use both avenues). (a)  Definition of Deprivation of Liberty 06.22 The reference to ‘liberty’ does not denote any broader concept of freedom in general but is merely a right not to be subjected to arbitrary bodily restraint. Furthermore, the primary focus of Article 5 ECHR is upon regulating deprivation of liberty; ‘security’ of the person does not raise distinct considerations.66 The Strasbourg Court has distinguished restrictions on liberty, such as residence requirements, from deprivations of liberty amounting to an infringement of Article 5.67 The distinction is, however, one of fact and degree, and not kind, with the duration, conditions, effects and manner of detention being relevant, along with the particular type of detainee held.68 In Amuur v France69 holding the asylum applicants in locked hotel rooms for several weeks was a deprivation of liberty. The possibility of withdrawing their protection claims did not mean that their detention could be seen as consensual given the serious consequences of doing so.70 In Saadi v UK, asylum seekers were held in closed facilities permitting some degree of movement inside a perimeter for seven days to process their claims. This was also held to be a deprivation of liberty for Article 5(1) purposes.71 The distinction between restriction and deprivation of liberty has been endorsed and closely followed by the Court of Justice. Most importantly in JZ72 the Court conducted its own review of the meaning of detention and found that it includes ‘any measure or set of measures imposed on the person concerned which, on account of the type, duration, effects and manner

64 Al Chodor (n 38) arguably went further than the relevant ECHR case law requiring the quality of law to be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable. 65 Mohammad Khir Amayry (n 38) [43]–[47] setting the reasonable detention period at two months in certain Dublin Regulation cases. 66 Bozano v France (1986) Series A no 111, (1987) 9 EHRR 297. Contrast with the broader approach of the Human Rights Committee in relation to Art 9 ICCPR in Communication No 195/1985, Delgado Paez v Colombia, 23 August 1990 (CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985) where it was held that the state was under an obligation to protect individuals threatened by death and other threats to personal security. 67 See Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR 333 and Engel v Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 in which the Court distinguished between a deprivation of liberty and a mere restriction on liberty which is now regulated by Art 2 Protocol No 4. 68 Engel v Netherlands (n 58). Thus confining soldiers to barracks was not a deprivation of liberty, whilst keeping them in locked cells was. 69 Amuur v France (1996) 22 EHRR 533. The Court said that ‘such holding should not be prolonged excessively, otherwise there would be a risk of it turning a mere restriction on liberty—inevitable with a view to organising the practical details of the alien’s repatriation or, where he has requested asylum, while his application for leave to enter the territory for that purpose is considered—into a deprivation of liberty’. 70 For similar reasoning surrounding the holding of asylum seekers for three weeks in closed facilities at the Hungarian ‘border zone’ see Ilias v Hungary App no 47287/15 (14 March 2017). In this case leaving the zone would have meant that asylum claims were treated as abandoned. 71 See Saadi and Others v United Kingdom App no 13229/03 (29 January 2008) where detention in a military barracks which allowed movement within it but not beyond it was held to be caught by Art 5(1). See also Executive Committee of UNHCR, Standing Committee, ‘Detention of Asylum seekers and Refugees: the Framework, the Problem and Recommended Practice’ (15th meeting, 4 June 1999, EC/49/SC/CRP13) which confirms airport transit zones are places of detention. 72 Case C-294/16 PPU JZ (n26).

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of implementation … deprive the person concerned of his liberty in a way that is comparable to imprisonment.’73 The Court has applied a similar approach to cases which have involved interpretation of EU legislation on detention. Thus in FMS74 the requirement that asylum-seekers reside in a closed transit zone within which their movements were limited and monitored and which they could not leave lawfully amounted to ‘detention’.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations (a)  Detention Must be Both Legal and Non-Arbitrary The concept of preventing arbitrariness in detention decisions is crucial to Article 5 ECHR.75 06.23 This comprises both complying with national law regarding the substantive and procedural grounds for detention and also complying with constraints imposed by Article 5 and its jurisprudence. Under the ECHR jurisprudence, the list of grounds permitting detention under Article 5(1) is thus exhaustive. As discussed above, however, this is not the position under Article 6 of the Charter due to the Court of Justice’s decisions in JN76 and Deutsche Umwelthilfe.77 It is notable that Article 5 ECHR case-law imposes no general requirement that detention must be ordered by a court. Whilst Article 5(4) ECHR requires that detainees have access to judicial review in all cases, only criminal suspects must be brought by the government before a court under Article 5(3). The main safeguard against arbitrariness therefore lies in ensuring that national laws and practices are sufficiently clear and transparent and that courts can assess the character and legality of detention, rather than in judicial pre-authorisation.78 There is a positive obligation upon states to protect individuals against arbitrary detention where they are aware or ought to be aware that it is occurring.79 This is designed to ensure protection for those held by private actors such as hospitals and security firms which increasingly supplement state actors in the management of prisons and detention centres. (b)  Detention Must be in Accordance with the Law The most basic requirement here under Article 5 ECHR is that detention be in ‘accordance with 06.24 a procedure prescribed by law’. This means first that there must be a legal framework authorising detention.80 Furthermore, the national rules governing the detention must be complied with.81 The Court of Justice and the EU legislature have become increasingly important in relation to

73 Ibid [[47] This test was correctly found to be the same as that adopted in by the Strasbourg court in its case-law [51–52]. On the facts, whilst accepting it was not its role to decide that question, the Court strongly indicated to the national court that measures such as night-time curfews, electronic-tagging, reporting to police obligations and bans on foreign travel were mere restrictions on liberty and not equivalent to detention.[54] 74 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). The Court here was interpreting ‘detention’ in relation to that term as used in the Reception Condition Directive 2013/33/EU (n 11). 75 Bazorkina v Russia App no 69481/01 (27 July 2006), (2008) 46 EHRR 261 [146]. 76 JN (n 23) [47]–[50]. 77 Case C – 752/18 Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV v Freistaat Bayern (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 19th December 2019). 78 Bazorkina v Russia (n 64) [146]. 79 Storck v Germany App no 61603/00 (16 June 2005), (2006) 43 EHRR 96. 80 Khlaifia and others v Italy App no 16483/12 (Judgment of 15 December 2016) where there was a violation of Art 5(1)(f) because the authorities at reception centres on Lampedusa, Italy had no legal power under national law to detain migrants. 81 Benham v UK (n 49); Riad and Idias v Belgium App nos 29787/03 and 29810/03, in which the authorities continued to detain after judicial orders to release had been made.



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the issue because of the growing authorisation of detention pursuit to EU law within the migration and criminal justice fields. Where there is more than one source of ‘law’, such as national and EU law, they must both be complied with.82 EU directives must be implemented in national law but are sometimes incorrectly transposed or neglected altogether. The principle of legal certainty suggests that detainees should be able to easily know the sources of law relied upon for their detention and the limitations upon this power. Indeed, the Court of Justice in Al Chodor required Member States to implement a directive authorising detention by creating a specific legislative code to improve transparency.83 This is increasingly important because EU law provides both the only grounds for detention and time limits under the Framework Directive on the European Arrest Warrant, the Returns Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive and the Dublin III Regulation. Depending upon the precise circumstances, it might be that a combination of domestic and EU norms should therefore be considered binding. Certainly, in relation to Article 3 ECHR at least, the European Court of Human Rights has found that breach of a Directive can contribute to creating Member State liability.84 06.25 Strasbourg case-law holds that where the applicable law states that the detention power may only be exercised when strictly necessary, failure to show how this condition was met renders the decision discordant with the law.85 The laws must be operated in good faith and must not involve, for example, the use of deception to induce persons to surrender themselves.86 Merely procedural errors will, however, not infringe the principle.87 More importantly, even if the national rules are complied with, the Convention requires these to meet minimum standards of clarity and accessibility. In Amuur v France,88 the detention procedures were contained in an unpublished circular which was not available to lawyers or detainees and did not state clearly the limits upon detention nor the available judicial remedies; this was a breach. The Court of Justice’s decision in Al Chodor is an example of where the need transparency was taken further by requiring legislation setting out the basis for detention. The detainee should have the reasons for detention and remedies explained to them in their own language, be afforded access to an interpreter and be given the possibility of contacting a lawyer.89 There must be a reasoned decision which shows how the detention is justified in terms of the national legal framework.90 Overall, the rules governing detention must enable the detainee to understand the basis for detention, set out the conditions for any prolongation and provide predictable guidelines as to its exercise.91 The Court of Justice has not found that any applicable EU legislation authorizing detention fails to meet the standard of legality.

82 Paci v Belgium App no 45597/09 (Judgment of 17 April 2018) but the Court noted that only where the national authorities’ interpretation of national or EU law was arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable would there be a violation. 83 Al Chodor (n 38) which interpreted the Directive’s requirement that an absconding risk be based upon ‘objective criteria defined by law’ required that these criteria themselves be set out in an ‘act which is binding and foreseeable in its application’. A settled administrative that had been upheld as lawful by the national courts was not sufficient. This arguably went further than the relevant ECHR case law which in immigration detention cases has allowed settled case-law setting out controls on detention combined with administrative practice to meet the test that law be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable. See J.N. v United Kingdom, Application No. 37289/12 (19 May 2016). It is not clear if the Court of Justice’s ruling on the Returns Directive has any wider application that would require criteria supporting detention in other contexts being set down in national legislation. 84 MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (21 January 2011) [263]. 85 Rusu v Austria App no 34082/02 (2 October 2008). 86 Conka v Belgium App no 51564/99 (5 February 2002), (2002) 34 EHRR 1298. 87 Mooren v Germany App no 11364/03 (9 July 2009). 88 Amuur v France (n 73). See also Al Chodor (n 38) above for a more demanding approach. 89 Conka v Belgium (n 74). 90 Lokpo v Hungary App no 10816/10 (20 September 2011). 91 Baranowski v Poland App no 28358/95 (Judgment of 28 March 2000).

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(c)  Imprisonment After Conviction by a Court In its case law on Article 5(1)(a), the ECtHR has found that the crucial issue is that imprison- 06.26 ment follows conviction by an independent court, with power under domestic law to order the detention in question, which is separate from both the executive branch of government and the parties.92 The imprisonment may commence immediately upon conviction whilst an appeal is pending.93 The strength of the actual evidential and legal basis for the underlying conviction are not normally relevant to this justification for detention.94 This said, a conviction based upon a flagrant denial of justice in a foreign state would mean detention could not be justified under Article 5(1)(a).95 Time spent in detention is not rendered unlawful by the subsequent quashing of the conviction upon which it was based.96 The returning of convicted prisoners to detention after their release on licence falls within Article 5(1)(a) so long as there is a sufficient connection between the original conviction and any new risk posed by the prisoner.97 The Strasbourg Court has approved preventive detention, following conviction by a court, where the sentencing court later rules that the prisoner’s release would be a danger to public security so long as the power is not one that was created to apply retrospectively to persons already convicted.98 Where a prisoner has been detained based upon a criminal conviction that breaches EU law, 06.27 the position under Article 5(1)(a) is unresolved. Whilst subsequent quashing by a higher court does not normally render detention outwith Article 5(1)(a), different considerations may apply when a conviction breaches well-established EU law principles and therefore, arguably, a national court lacks jurisdiction to impose liability.99 The most important limits in general terms are those relating to directives. Because these instruments normally require national implementation, there is a risk of legal uncertainty. The Court of Justice has therefore held that national courts must not use a directive as the basis for imposing or worsening criminal liability that did not clearly arise under national law.100 Furthermore, EU measures must not found the basis for criminal liability which is imposed retrospectively.101 More specifically, a series of decisions by the Court of Justice in relation to unlawful migra- 06.28 tion have limited the ability of Member States to impose criminal sanctions for immigration offences. The Court found that the administrative provisions in the Returns Directive must be complied with to secure speedy expulsions of non-EU citizens.102 Member States were not allowed to impose detention linked to criminal conviction for an illegal stay before the administrative measures had been applied. This means that imposing liability for offences of failing to leave after a removal order had been served or illegal entry were in breach of Union law.103 92 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp (‘Vagrancy’) v Belgium App nos 2832/66, 2835/66 and 2899/66 (Judgment of 18 June 1971), Series A no 12. 93 Wemhoff v Germany App no 2122/64 (1968) Series A no 7, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 455. 94 Weeks v UK App no 9787/82 (1987), Series A no 254, (1988) 10 EHRR 293. 95 Willcocks and Hurford v UK App no 43759/10 (Judgment of 8 January 2013), noting that ‘a “flagrant denial of justice” is a stringent test of unfairness. It goes beyond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the trial procedures such as might result in a breach of Article 6 if occurring within the Contracting State itself. What is required is a breach of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 which is so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that Article’ (para 77). 96 X v Austria App no 3245/67 (Judgment of 4 February 1969). 97 Stafford v UK App no 46295/9 (2002) 35 EHRR 1121. 98 Schmitz v Germany App no 30493/04 (Judgment of 9 June 2011). 99 Benham v UK (n 49) held that apart from lack of bona fides, conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction generally justifies detention under Art 5(1)(a). 100 Case 80/86 Kopinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969. 101 Case 63/83 R v Kent Kirk [1984] ECR 2689. 102 El Dridi (n 29). 103 Case C-329/11 Achughbabian [2012] 1 CMLR 52.



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Member States have the power to impose ‘penal sanctions’ under national law on irregular migrants only after the administrative measures have been applied and failed. A fine for an illegal stay may be imposed, but not detention in lieu of payment, unless removal is not possible at that time.104 06.29 It is EU policy to ensure mutual recognition of criminal convictions and sentences by the Member States to allow migrant prisoners convicted in one state to be returned to complete their sentences in their home states. This is facilitated by a Council Framework Decision.105 This permits the Member State imposing the conviction to return a national to their Member State to service their sentence. The Court of Justice has held that whilst early release is a matter for the home Member State, the sentence itself is governed by the convicting State.106 Finally, the existence of mutual recognition of Supervision Orders under the Framework Decision means that EU criminal courts should not impose a custodial sentence on a non-resident where a noncustodial sentence would be given to a resident. To do so would be discriminatory on grounds of nationality/residence, and would arguably breach Article 5 ECHR combined with Article 14 ECHR. It would also breach more general EU standards relating to free movement and the equal treatment of Union citizens under Articles 18 and 20 TFEU. This is because to imprison a person because they are non-resident indirectly discriminates on grounds of nationality. Whilst formerly the absence of a system of mutual recognition of non-custodial orders might have justified such discrimination, the new legislative framework means this can no longer be the case.107 (d)  Detention for Non-compliance with a Lawful Court Order or to Secure Compliance with a Legal Obligation 06.30 The first part of Article 5(1)(b) ECHR pertains to the process by which a court seeks to secure the attendance of a witness at trial, or that a witness undergo a medical examination. Wilful failure to pay a tax could also support detention.108 The Court of Justice has held that detention ordered by a court to compel obedience to an order to implement EU law may be compliant with Article 6 so long as there are sufficient safeguards in the form of legal certainty and alternative measures having failed.109 Whilst Article 5(1)(b) on its face authorises detention to compel repayment of a contractual debt, Article 1 of the Fourth Protocol to the Convention states that ‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation’. The second part of Article 5(1)(b) is more controversial, because it allows a nonjudicial body to detain a person to secure compliance with administrative or security operations. The classic example would be enforcing attendance for military service. The ECtHR has held that legal obligations entailing the risk of detention must be specific and should clearly state that liability to detention arises in such cases.110 Article 5(1)(b) does not entail a more general power to detain to prevent crime or threats to public order or safety. All such detention must conform to the principle of proportionality and thereby strike a reasonable balance

104 Case C-430/11 Md Sagor (Judgment of 6 December 2012). 105 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments imposing sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty [2008] OJ L327/27. 106 Case C-554/14 Atanas Ognyanov intervening party: Sofiyska gradska prokuratura, (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 8 November 2016) on the interpretation of Article 17. 107 Case C-224/00 Commission v Italian Republic (Judgment of 19 March 2002) which confirmed that the absence of mutual recognition meant that non-residents could be subject to different measures relating to criminal penalties. 108 Benham v UK (n 49). 109 Case C – 752/18 Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV (n 37). 110 Lawless v Ireland App no 332/57 (Judgment of 1 July 1961), Series A no 3; Engel v Netherlands (n 58).

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between the fulfilling of the legal obligation and the deprivation of liberty. This requires an examination of the object of the legal obligation, the characteristics of the person detained and the duration of detention.111 (e)  Detention Pending Trial: The Arrest Period and the Remand Period Article 5(1)(c) authorises and regulates detention pursuant to criminal proceedings from arrest through to trial and acquittal or conviction. It must be read with Article 5(3), which governs the arrest period and any remand in custody. The literal text of Article 5(1)(c) contemplates detention in three cases: (1) where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed, but also (2) when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent the commission of an offence, or (3) to prevent someone fleeing having done so. Although this apparently permits preventive detention, case law has determined that the power to detain under Article 5(1)(c) generally arises only where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a specific offence has been committed. Only a concrete and specific threat can support preventive detention.112 Because most acts preparatory to the commission of serious crimes are themselves crimes, there is rarely a need to rely upon the preventive detention justification. Furthermore, in any event, the purpose of detention must be to bring the suspect to trial before the competent authority.113 Although Article 5(1)(c) does not itself impose a duty to use arrest as a last resort, national law often will require proof that arrest is necessary in order to investigate the suspected crime because of a risk of absconding. The arrest of a person should be effected on the basis of a warrant issued by a competent court, but in urgent cases police may arrest without a warrant. The standard of proof is that of ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an offence has been committed, which entails facts or information that would satisfy an objective observer.114 The appraisal of whether evidence meets this standard is generally for the national court to decide, subject only to oversight by the European Court of Human Rights. In combating terrorism, a lighter evidential burden is imposed, but there must still be objective evidence of the commission of an offence.115 Whilst the initial grounds for arrest must conform to Article 5(1)(c), thereafter, continued detention must comply with Article 5(3), which requires that a suspect be both brought promptly before a judicial officer following arrest and thereafter tried within a reasonable time or released on bail pending trial. ‘Promptly’ does not mean a set period in all cases but in ordinary criminal cases, not involving national security, several days is the limit.116 Detention beyond this period is unlawful unless a derogation under Article 15 has been validly entered.117 Even in cases involving a derogation, however, a period of two weeks in incommunicado detention was a breach of Article 5(3).118 The officer before whom the detainee is brought must be sufficiently independent of the prosecution process.119 Once the detainee has been brought before a judicial officer, there is a presumption that they must be released on bail120 unless their detention pending trial is necessary. The case law goes

111 Vasileva v Denmark App no 52792/99 (Judgment of 25 September 2003). 112 Guzzardi v Italy (n 58). It is still not finally settled as to whether the competent authority itself may order preventive detention instead of trial. 113 Lawless v Ireland (n 118). 114 Erdagoz v Turkey App no 21890/93 (Judgment of 22 October 1997). 115 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK App no 37555/97 (Judgment of 16 October 2001). 116 Brogan v United Kingdom (1988) Series A no 145-B, (1989) 11 EHRR 117. 117 Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom (1993) Series A no 258-B, (1994) 17 EHRR 539. 118 Aksoy v Turkey App no 21987/93 (18 December 1996), (1997) 23 EHRR 553. 119 Assenov v Bulgaria App no 24760/94 (28 October 1998), (1998) 28 EHRR 652. 120 McKay v United Kingdom App no 543/03 (3 October 2006 [GC]), (2007) 44 EHRR 827.



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beyond the text of Article 5(3), which appears to permit detention which is not necessary so long as the trial takes place within a reasonable time. Even where there is strong evidence that the accused has committed a serious offence, this does not in itself justify remand beyond a short period.121 Mandatory pre-trial detention is unlawful, as each case must be assessed individually.122 The Strasbourg Court has not given an exhaustive list of the grounds for remanding in custody but has thus far endorsed the use of pre-trial detention to prevent absconding, the commission of offences or interference with the trial processes.123 The national court must consider whether a risk of absconding can be avoided by bail or other restrictions124 and these must be tailored to the individual detainee’s financial situation rather than set at an excessive or fixed level.125 In the case of non-resident defendants, the possibility of imposing an EU Supervision Order must be considered as an alternative to custody, where there are concerns about absconding to another Member State. 06.35 The substantive grounds for remand must be reviewed and justified on an ongoing basis, even if the initial remand in custody was justified.126 Even where the substantive grounds for remand are adequate, the period of detention itself must also be reasonable which is assessed in view of all the circumstances of the case. The starting point is that detention infringes a fundamental right of a person presumed to be innocent, and the authorities therefore have to show that they acted with special diligence in bringing the case to trial.127 Where there have been significant periods of inactivity in the prosecution lasting months (sometimes resulting in pre-trial detention for several years), a violation of Article 5(3) has been found.128 06.36 In the EU context, there are wide variations in the rules and processes in the different Member States regarding pre-trial detention. These divergences are significant in the context of the European Arrest Warrant for two reasons. First, the possibility that a person surrendered will be subject to a long period of pre-trial detention may raise an issue of fundamental rights for the surrendering court. The European Council identified this as an obstacle to judicial cooperation in the Stockholm programme. Second, the availability of the European Arrest Warrant procedures means that there is an alternative to pre-trial detention to secure their appearance in cases where a suspect lives in another Member State.129 Previously, criminal courts might choose to detain pending trial (or impose a custodial sentence) simply because they feared that a person would abscond back to their home country and that ensuring their return to face trial (or their completion of a non-custodial sentence) would be difficult. Compliance with Article 5(3) ECHR would require that a court consider these less restrictive measures as an alternative to remand in custody. (f)  Detention of Minors 06.37 Article 5(1)(d) permits detention of minors for the purpose of educational supervision or to bring them before a competent legal authority (usually the juvenile courts seized of non-criminal

121 Tomasi v France (1992) Series A no 241-A, (1993) 15 EHRR 1. 122 Caballero v United Kingdom App no 32819/96 (8 February 2000), (2000) 30 EHRR 643. 123 Barfuss v Czech Republic App no 35848/97 (31 July 2000), (2002) 34 EHRR 948; Assenov v Bulgaria (n 105); Wemhoff v Germany (n 102). 124 Wemhoff v Germany (n 102). 125 Punzelt v Czech Republic App no 31315/96 (25 April 2000), (2001) 33 EHRR 1159. 126 McKay v UK (n 106). 127 Wemhoff v Germany (n 102). 128 Kauczor v Poland App no 45219/06 (3 February 2009); Pilla v Italy App no 64088/00 (2 March 2006). 129 Pirozzi v Belgium (Appn no. 21055/11, Judgment of 17 April 2018) upholding the use of the EAW procedures to detain a fugitive for return to serve his sentence.

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cases). It does, however, preclude detention under any other heading of Article 5 such as pursuant to criminal proceedings. The official age of majority varies between states. The concept of a ‘minor’, however, has an autonomous meaning for Article 5(1)(d) purposes which is distinct from national law and is presently 18.130 Under the first limb, the detention must have genuine educational aspects in order to be lawful. Where a boy was detained in an adult prison, prior to placement, because no suitable juvenile institution would accept him immediately, there was a violation.131 This said, the concept of ‘educational supervision’ is flexible and not to be equated with traditional classroom teaching; the crucial issue is that a caring regime, including education elements, is provided. (g)  Detention for the Purpose of Health or Social Protection On a literal reading, Article 5(1)(e) permits detention of a wide group of persons without court 06.38 order including drug addicts, alcoholics, the mentally ill and those with infectious diseases. In practice, the ECtHR has limited this wide power in several respects. First, it requires that detention be used only to protect the safety of either the detainee or the public.132 Second, such detention must only be used when necessary and no alternative means for protecting the public less draconian than detention will suffice.133 Finally, the detention must strike a reasonable balance between the public interest and the liberty of the detainee. In the special case of persons with mental illness, the Court has imposed more detailed guidance in the case of Winterwerp v Netherlands,134 where it said that mental illness must be established by objective medical evidence, that the condition must make detention necessary, that the detention must be justified on an ongoing basis and, later, that the place and conditions of detention must be suitable—a hospital or clinic, not a prison.135 The Court of Justice has also ruled that proceedings criminal proceedings that may, without resulting in criminal conviction, lead to detention of persons with mental illness on public safety grounds must be subject to the procedural safeguards for criminal suspects set out in EU law.136 This is on the basis that Article 5 ECHR lays down a positive obligation on the State to protect the liberty of vulnerable individuals within its jurisdiction.137 Where however the relevant national proceedings involve compulsory committal to a psychiatric hospital for therapeutic purposes independent of any criminal proceedings, they fall outside the scope of EU law and therefore the Charter and other EU legislative safeguards do not apply.138 (h)  Detention for Immigration Control and Extradition Purposes The most important areas of Union competence and law-making impinging on liberty relate 06.39 to immigration powers over non-EU citizens and the extradition of suspects and convicted

130 Koniarska v UK App no 33670/96 (admissibility decision of 12 October 2000). 131 Bouamar v Belgium (1988) Series A no 129. 132 Litwa v Poland App no 26629/95 (Judgment of 4 April 2000), (2011) 33 EHRR 1267. 133 Enhorn v Sweden App no 56529/00 (Judgment of 25 January 2005), (2005) 41 EHRR 633. 134 Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979) Series A no 33, (1979–80) 2 EHRR 387. 135 Aerts v Belgium App no 25357/94 (Judgment of 30 July 1998), (1999) 29 EHRR 50. 136 Case C-467/18 PPU EP v Rayonna Prokuratura Lom, KM, HO (Judgment of 19 September 2019). In particular ­Directive 2012/13 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, Directive 2013/48 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and Directive 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings. 137 Stanev v Bulgaria, App No 36760/06 (Judgment of 17 January 2012). 138 Case C-467/18 PPU EP [66–67].



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criminals. Both these restrictions on liberty fall under the justification in Article 5(1)(f), and there is extensive Strasbourg case law interpreting this provision that will be set out below. (i)  No Requirement that Detention be Necessary in Immigration Cases 06.40 The Strasbourg Court has contrasted Article 5(1)(f) with detention under the other headings of Article 5(1) by ruling that each individual detention decision need not be necessary and proportionate to secure the deportation or extradition of a detainee, nor to prevent their illegal entry.139 This is in principle a marked difference from the position under the Charter Article 52(1) which requires any interference with Article 6 rights to be shown to be necessary and proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate goal. As we shall see however, the Court of Justice has generally found that where the EU legislators have provided specific grounds for detention of immigrants, these meet the test of proportionality.140 This also contrasts with remand pending prosecution, which requires a specific public policy reason, such as a risk of absconding, for continuing detention pursuant to Article 5(3).141 The basis for this distinction is that sovereign states have the right to control their borders and that aliens without permission to remain do not have the same general right to liberty as citizens. Whilst there is generally no requirement142 that detention be necessary, the Strasbourg Court has adopted a wider test of arbitrariness to Article 5(1)(f) that comprises factors which do look at overall proportionality: to avoid being branded as arbitrary … such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that ‘the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country’ … and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.143

06.41 Thus in Saadi144 the applicant, who had entered illegally and then sought asylum, was not considered a flight risk but was held for seven days in a closed reception centre as part of the processing of his asylum claim. The Grand Chamber accepted that this period of detention in relatively relaxed conditions with access to lawyers and interpreters did not breach Article 5(1)(f). It ruled that, until a detainee had been given permission to enter or stay, such detention was sufficiently closely linked to the prevention of unauthorised entry even when a detainee had presented himself voluntarily to make an asylum claim. Detention of asylum seekers for processing their claims, whilst not formally subject to different principles to those governing detention of immigrants generally, is likely to infringe Article 5(1)(f) if the conditions or the duration are significantly more restrictive of liberty than those in Saadi, in the absence of other special factors, such as a flight risk.145

139 Chahal v UK App no 22414/93, (1997) 23 EHRR 413 [112]. 140 JN (n 23). 141 See Scott v Spain (1997) 24 EHRR 391; Caballero v UK (n 130) February 2000; Barfuss v Czech Republic (n 131). 142 A strand within the Court’s case law has begun to emerge suggesting that alternatives to detention should be considered, particularly when removal is delayed and is unlikely to be executable in the near future. Yo-Ekale v Belgium App no 10486/10 (Judgment of 20 March 2012). 143 Saadi v UK (n 63). 144 Ibid. See also Riad and Idiab v Belgium App no 29787/03 (Judgment of 24 January 2008) [77]. 145 See Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-seekers and Alternatives to Detention (n 30). The Strasbourg court has sometimes, however, made decisions that are more permissive. Thus, in the case of Malta, policies of mandatory detention lasting for periods amounting to several months whilst asylum claims by those making irregular arrivals by sea were processed, though considered ‘odd practices’ which called into question the government’s good faith, were not found to be inherently non-compliant with Art 5(1)(f): Jama v Malta App no 10290/13

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As discussed below, EU legislative measures regarding immigration and asylum detention have 06.42 in fact increasingly circumscribed the power of detention by tying it to specific grounds not rooted solely in irregular status or a removal order. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice has implied a power for Member States to detain individuals for a brief but reasonable time to verify whether a third-country national is an irregular migrant.146 During this time they must act with diligence and once it has been established that the migrant has no right to remain on their territory they must issue a return order and proceed to enforce it. The object of that procedure is the physical transportation of the person concerned outside the Member State concerned147 and it should take place as soon as possible in accordance with the time limits and criteria in the Returns Directive.148 In keeping with the factors set out in Saadi, the conditions of detention for minors and 06.43 other vulnerable groups raise particular issues and may breach Article 5 (as a distinct ground to any breach under Article 3 ECHR). In Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium,149 a five-year-old unaccompanied minor was detained for two months in a centre designed for adults. She was not assigned any specialist care, counselling or education. The Court found a breach of Article 3 and referred to the obligation of the state to enable effective protection to be provided, particularly to children and other vulnerable members of society, which should include reasonable measures to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge.150 In the case of Muskhadziyeva v Belgium151 a family including four children aged between seven months and seven years were held together for one month in a closed detention centre designed for adults. In this case, the Court found a violation of Article 3 in respect of the children, despite the presence of their parents, because of the duration of detention, the age of the children, the medical evidence of psychological damage to one of them caused by ongoing detention, and because of persistent adverse reports on the centre by independent monitors.152 The Court also found a violation of Article 5(1)(f) in the case of the children because the means used, including the place and conditions of detention, were not closely linked to the objective of processing their cases.153 These cases reflect consideration of Article 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 06.44 Child, which requires that any detention ‘shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time’, and Article 3, which requires that ‘the best interests of the child’ be the guiding standard for states parties. The Committee on the Rights of the Child said that unaccompanied children should not in general be detained, but where this was exceptionally necessary the underlying approach to such a programme should be ‘care’ and not ‘detention’.154 This has been extended by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of

(Judgment of 26 November 2015) [146]. This said, detention for over six months to process an asylum claim was held to be excessive and outside the Saadi principles. See Suso Musa v Malta App no 42337/12 (9 December 2013) [102]. Similarly, detention for three months to process an asylum claim was held to breach Art 5(1)(f) in Kanagaratnam v Belgium App no 15297/09 (Judgment of 13 December 2011) but this case involved a family with children. 146 Achughbabian (n 91) [31]. 147 Ibid [37]. 148 Ibid [45]. 149 Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium App no 13178/03 (12 October 2006). See also Kanagaratnam v Belgium App no 15297/09 (Judgment of 13 December 2011). 150 Ibid [53]. 151 Muskhadziyeva v Belgium App no 41442/07 (19 January 2010). 152 Ibid [57]–[63]. 153 Ibid [73]–[75]. 154 General Comment No 6, ‘Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin’, 1 September 2005, CRC/GC/2005/6 [63].



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Migrants, who said in 2009 that children should not be deprived of liberty as a sole consequence of their migratory status, and that unaccompanied migrant children should not be detained at all.155 (j)  Duration of Detention in Immigration Cases 06.45 The Strasbourg Court has recognised that detention could be indefinite under Article 5(1)(f) if a state were able to justify detention merely by showing that immigration or extradition proceedings remained ongoing. Instead, a state must show that such proceedings are being pursued with ‘due diligence’.156 This requires a fact-specific examination of the steps taken by the authorities to process the proceedings, the complexity of the case and responsibility of the detainee for prolonging their detention. Long periods of detention have sometimes been found to be compliant with Article 5(1)(f). For example, in Chahal, detention for six years in total, including periods of six and seven months waiting for initial and fresh decisions from the immigration authorities, was held not to be a violation because of the serious nature of the case and the complexity. By contrast, in another case, involving extradition, the Court ruled that delays of three and 10 months violated Article 5(1)(f).157 In Singh v Czech Republic,158 immigration detention of two and half years was criticised because it contained long periods of inactivity by the authorities when faced with practical obstacles to removal. Such obstacles to removal may require the detaining state to act ‘vigorously’ to secure travel documents or to negotiate with foreign states to satisfy the test.159 06.46 Expulsion must be a realistic prospect, to justify continued detention. Where a state accepts that it cannot deport a person due to a legal or other obstacle that is not likely to be removed within a foreseeable period, then there is no justification for detention under Article 5(1)(f).160 In Mikolenko v Estonia161 the detainee had said at the outset he would not cooperate with documentation procedures and there was no readmission agreement with his country of nationality. The Court said that it must have become clear quite soon that expulsion attempts were bound to fail.162 The Strasbourg Court found a breach due to the lack of a realistic prospect of his expulsion and the domestic authorities’ failure to conduct the proceedings with due diligence.163 The Court also noted that he had been released on bail eventually without incident and therefore the authorities had at their disposal measures other than the applicant’s protracted detention in the absence of any immediate prospect of his expulsion. This case suggests that the longer detention is prolonged, particularly where it becomes clear that removal will not be possible within a foreseeable period, the greater the obligation to consider using alternative means such as release on bail, even if this was not required at the outset.164

155 Annual report of the Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights of Migrants, Jorge Bustamante, 14 May 2009 A/HRC/11/7 at para 106. 156 Kolompar v Belgium (1993) 16 EHRR 197. This can be seen as derived from the more general principle of effectiveness which is used by the Court in relation to all articles of the Convention. See eg Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305. 157 Quinn v France (1995) 21 EHRR 529. 158 Singh v Czech Republic App no 60538/00 (Judgment of 25 January 2005). 159 Raza v Bulgaria App no 31465/08 (11 February 2010). 160 A and others v United Kingdom App no 3455/05 (19 February 2009 [GC]), (2009) 49 EHRR 29. 161 Mikolenko v Estonia App no 10664/05 (Judgment of 8 October 2009). 162 Ibid [64]. 163 Ibid [68]. 164 Yo-Ekale v Beligum App no 10486/10 (Judgment of 20 March 2012) [124] where the granting of interim measures by the Strasbourg court meant that removal was no longer possible. This, combined with the applicant’s ill-health and

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(k)  Discussion of EU Immigration and Asylum Measures Pertinent to Article 5(1)(f) ECHR Measures taken by the European Union and their application by the Member States must comply 06.47 with Article 6 of the Charter and the principles set out above in relation to Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The following discussion considers some of the main EU measures in this context. (l)  Immigration Measures The common code165 on border movements sets out the rules governing non-EU citizens seeking 06.48 to enter the Union at the border of any Member State.166 Persons not fulfilling the requirements for entry ‘shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States’.167 Where this occurs, ‘border guards shall ensure that a third-country national refused entry does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned’.168 This authorises physical restraint in cases of resistance, but ‘any measures taken in the performance of [border guards’] duties shall be proportionate to the objectives pursued by such measures’.169 Guards must also not discriminate on specified grounds and must ‘fully respect human dignity’.170 These provisions permit detention. They may be consistent with Article 5(1)(f) ECHR in that they seek to prevent unlawful entry into the Union but they must be operated in accordance with the principles discussed above. (m)  Detention of Resident Third-Country Nationals The Long-resident Directive confers powers of expulsion and/or withdrawal of residence per- 06.49 mits on public policy grounds, and therefore impliedly authorises detention.171 Member States expelling a non-EU citizen ‘shall take all the appropriate measures to effectively implement it’.172 Similar considerations apply to the Family Reunification Directive,173 which gives rights to nonEU citizens to join and reside with their non-EU resident families in the Union.174 There are public policy exclusion and expulsion powers175 but again there is no requirement to implement these orders by arrest and detention.176 These implied powers of detention must be operated in a manner consistent with the principles discussed above.

her having a stable address, meant the authorities’ failure to consider alternatives to detention rendered this a breach of Art 5(1). 165 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 establishing a community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2016] OJ L77/1. 166 The exceptions are refugees, asylum seekers and those benefiting from EU free movement rights as family members (Art 3). 167 Art 14 (1). 168 Art 14(4) (emphasis added). 169 Art 7(1). 170 Art 7(1)(2). 171 Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2004] OJ L16/44. Arts 6, 12, 17 and 22 set out substantive and procedural protection against expulsion or deportation that mirrors some of the concepts found in relation to EU citizens. 172 Art 22(3). 173 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/1. 174 Art 6. 175 Under Recital 14, ‘public policy may cover a conviction for committing a serious crime’, and public security and policy may include someone who ‘belongs to an association that supports terrorism, supports such an association or has extremist aspirations’. 176 We can also mention the Students Directive 2016/801 (note 55), which provides common standards for admission of students from outside the Union, but no express discussion of detention powers in the Directive.



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(n)  Detention in Asylum Claims 06.50 The EU measures bearing on the detention of asylum seekers are not found in a single instrument. The most important source, however, is the Reception Conditions Directive, which governs the treatment of all asylum seekers from outside the EU during the processing of their claims and any appeals against refusal of asylum. It also covers fresh claims made subsequent to earlier claims being rejected.177 The Court of Justice has, on several occasions now, expressly invoked Article 6 of the Charter when interpreting this Directive’s detention powers.178 The Court has thereby found the Directive’s detention powers compatible with Article 6, whilst also placing important limits upon them. Whilst an asylum application or appeal against refusal of asylum is ongoing, this Directive applies, even where deportation or removal orders are in place. The Court of Justice has held that only when no such asylum application or appeal is on foot will the Returns Directive apply to regulate, inter alia, detention of migrants subject to return orders.179 This means that detainees move in and out of the two detention regimes—pertaining to asylum and removal—depending on whether they have an ongoing asylum claim. The time limits imposed by the Returns Directive are held in abeyance whilst an asylum claim is considered. Whilst Article 9 of the Asylum Procedures Directive gives an asylum applicant a right to remain until their asylum claim is determined, the Grand Chamber has ruled that that does not render the detention powers in the Reception Conditions Directive inconsistent with Article 6 of the Charter.180 Certain national courts had referred this question because of an alleged inconsistency between the Directive and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.181 The Court of Justice made clear that the EU is not bound by the ECHR and that the Charter must be interpreted to respect the Union’s status as an autonomous legal order.182 It held that the Directive’s range of safeguards, if adhered to, mean that detention upon the permitted grounds pending consideration of an asylum claim was a suitable, necessary and proportionate restriction upon Article 6 rights read with Article 52(1).183

177 See R (on the application of ZO (Somalia) and others) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellants) [2010] UKSC 36 for a decision by the Supreme Court in the United Kingdom which was acte clair and not referred to the Court of Justice. 178 JN (n 23) Also Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n22). 179 Kadzoev (n 35). 180 JN (n 23). 181 Nabil and others v Hungary App no 62116/12 (decision of 22 September 2015). In this case the applicants had entered Hungary illegally and were detained, after being served with expulsion orders, on the ground that they had refused to leave and were frustrating their expulsion. They then claimed asylum and were held for four months, based upon the initial detention decision, whilst their claims were considered. The Strasbourg Court viewed this as detention pending their deportation under Art 5(1)(f) second sentence and noted that, therefore, ‘any deprivation of liberty will be justified only for as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress’ (para 29). The Dutch courts referring cases to the Court of Justice queried whether, when no removal decision was in place, detention under EU law was inconsistent with the ruling in Nabil. This was, however, a misreading of Nabil itself, where the Strasbourg Court said ‘the pending asylum case does not as such imply that the detention was no longer “with a view to deportation”—since an eventual dismissal of the asylum applications could have opened the way to the execution of the deportation orders’(para 38). This said, the Nabil Court’s view that its case law on detention ‘with a view to deportation’ was in play is arguably inconsistent with the ruling by the Grand Chamber in Saadi v UK (n 63) which had held that detention during an asylum claim merited strict controls, including as to duration (see 06.40 above). The Court in Nabil noted the Saadi decision but appeared to think it was not relevant because in that case the asylum seeker had not been subject to a removal order and so fell under the ‘preventing’ illegal entry limb of Art 5(1)(f). That is arguably an unduly narrow reading of Saadi. 182 Para 45–47. 183 Paras 54–70. The Court in JN considered that Art 8 overall provided an exhaustive list of grounds for detention and that it required that alternative measures be found to be ineffective, detention be for as short a time as possible, information be given to the detainee, judicial remedies be available and, importantly, the ground reflected those set out in the relevant UNHCR Guidelines (n 30).

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The most basic rule is that by virtue of Article 26 of the Procedures Directive no one may be 06.51 detained solely because they have made an asylum claim. That Article also confirms they must have access to speedy judicial review of detention. The Reception Conditions Directive184 sets out detailed grounds and regulates conditions for detention.185 Article 7 confirms the basic right to free movement within the territory.186 Article 8 holds that any use of detention must be shown to be necessary, after an individual assessment has been made and when less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively. There must be a reasoned decision given for detention.187 The grounds of detention in Article 8(3) are exhaustive.188 They are (a) to verify identity or nationality; (b) to determine the elements on which an asylum claim is based where this would not otherwise be possible because of, in particular, a risk of absconding;189 (c) to decide, in the context of a procedure, on an applicant’s right to enter the territory;190 (d) to effect removal under the Returns Directive where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the application for international protection was made merely to delay or frustrate the return decision;191 (e) when national security or public order requires it;192 and (f) to fulfil the procedure for returns to another Member State under Article 28 of the Dublin Regulation. The Directive does not contain a maximum period of detention for all asylum seekers, but this must be as short as possible, and accompanied by due diligence in procedures.193 It is arguable that where detention is purely administrative, as under headings (a) and (c), it must not exceed the short period of seven days that formed the benchmark in Saadi. Detention under (f) must be justified separately under the specific rules (and follow the time limits) set out in the Dublin Regulation (see below for discussion) which must be considered as lex specialis. Under Article 9 Reception Conditions Directive, detention may be ordered by judicial 06.52 or administrative authorities. If authorised by an administrative body it must, however, be judicially reviewed speedily ex officio and/or at the request of the detainee.194 This provision appears to permit Member States to choose not to require automatic judicial review so long as detainees can themselves initiate speedy proceedings. There must be reviews of detention at

184 Directive 2013/33/EU (n 12). 185 Ibid Arts 8–11. These provisions reflect very closely the grounds set out in UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 44 (1986) Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers. 186 Directive 2013/33/EU (n 12) Art 7. 187 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). 188 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). The lack of funds of the applicants and thus their vulnerability to destitution was not a ground for detention. Indeed the Court found that the obligation to provide for the housing needs of asylum applicants under Article 26 of the Reception Conditions Directive required the national courts to provide a remedy for violation of that right under Article 47 of the Charter. 189 Grounds (a) and (b) were found to be compatible with Art 6 on proportionality basis in Case C-18/16 K v ­Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie (Judgment of 14 September 2017). 190 This is a reference to the Article 43 of the Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU (n 15) that permits Member States to hold applicants at the border in cases covered by Article 31(8) and Article 33 (inadmissible applications). The Court held in Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22) that such detention could not exceed the four week limit set out in Article 43. 191 Detention under heading (d) should be viewed as occurring under the Reception Conditions Directive during the period when a protection claim made by a detainee is under consideration and attracts the same guarantees. Thus, a basic right to freedom of movement, arising from Art 7 of the Reception Conditions Directive, attaches to all persons making a protection claim. A person who is validly detained under the Returns Directive when they make their protection claim is, in principle, entitled to be released whilst their claim is ongoing, as their status is then governed by the Reception Conditions Directive. Certainly a fresh decision on the necessity of detention must be made. Time stops running for the purposes of the Returns Directive detention time limits. These matters were confirmed by the CJEU in Kadzoev (n 35) in relation to the previous version of the receptions conditions Directive, which did not contain ground (d). 192 Ground (e) was held to be compatible with Art 6 in JN (n 23) so long as the detainee represents ‘a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’(para 65). 193 Directive 2013/33/EU (n 12) Art 9(1). Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). 194 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22) the Court also relied upon Charter Article 47.



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reasonable intervals, particularly when it is prolonged or new information bearing on its justification arises.195 The Directive requires that accommodation be specifically provided for this purpose (Art 14) unless exceptional circumstances apply (Art 14(8)) justifying a short period in non-suitable accommodation. Unaccompanied minors must be housed with relatives, foster carers or in accommodation centres that have special provision for minors (Article 19). For minors generally, there is an obligation to provide education (Article 10), but this may occur within an accommodation centre. Whilst there is no general obligation not to detain minors, their best interests must be a primary consideration (Article 18). To comply with the case law on Article 5 ECHR, minors should not be detained for long, and should be kept only in facilities that are caring and educational in nature. 06.53 Detention pursuant to the transfer of asylum seekers to other Member States under the Dublin Regulation196 has generated significant case law. Article 28 (2) permits detention only when there is a significant risk of absconding, based upon an individual assessment. Detention must be proportionate and used only when other non-custodial alternatives cannot be effectively applied.197 The duration of detention must be as short as possible and not longer than the time reasonably necessary to process the transfer with due diligence. Most importantly, there is now an express requirement to release a person in detention when the time-table to effect transfers is not met.198 Thus a take-charge or take-back request must be made within one month of the asylum application. The detainee must be released if this exceeded. A reply should be issued within two weeks by the requested Member State. Failure to do so means the request is deemed accepted. The transfer must occur within six weeks of this implied acceptance (or of the date of an express acceptance if earlier). The detainee must be released if these time limits are breached (after a maximum of 12 weeks in effect). The six weeks clock stops running if a detainee obtains suspension of the transfer pending appeal or review.199 Where detention begins after the transfer has been accepted but before execution, the Court has relied upon Charter Article 6 to hold that, on proportionality grounds, detention can last no more than two months.200 (o)  Detention Pursuant to Expulsion under the Returns Directive 06.54 The most important Union law authorising detention is the Returns Directive. It provides a comprehensive system for regulating detention in all cases when a third-country national is found to be illegally present in the EU. This Directive also applies to asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected if they have no valid permission to stay and no asylum appeal ongoing.201 In FMS202 the requirement to reside in a closed transit zone within which the applicants’ movements were limited and monitored and which they could not leave lawfully amounted to ‘detention’ for the purposes of the Directive. The Directive contains elements that go beyond the obligations set out by the Strasbourg Court under Article 5(1)(f). Thus a period allowing voluntary return must be considered before detention and expulsion are ordered unless there is a risk of absconding, the migrant’s stay was fraudulent or there is a risk to public policy or



195 Ibid Art 9.

196 Regulation

(EU) 604/2013 (n 13).

197 Ibid Art 28(3). 198 Regulation

(EU) 604/2013 (n 13) Art 28(3). Art 28(3) third para. 200 Mohammad Khir Amayry (n 38) [45]–[48]. 201 Kadzoev (n 35). 202 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). 199 Ibid

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security (Art 7). Detention is only lawful where there is a risk of absconding or the immigrant hampers the removal process (Art 15(1)). No other ground is permitted such as public security or the destitution of the detainee.203 Detention must therefore be necessary to prepare or carry out the removal process. Detention must be for as short a period as possible and only maintained whilst removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence. Detention must cease immediately when it appears that there is no longer a reasonable prospect of removal.204 Detention may be initially ordered by administrative or judicial bodies but if the former must be subject to speedy judicial review ex officio or at the behest of the detainee.205 Most importantly, the periods of detention are regulated and explicitly limited under Article 15, which imposes time limits of six months (Art 15(5)). This may be extended by a further 12 months where the removal is being delayed because of non-cooperation by the detainee or third countries (Art 15(6)).206 There is an obligation to respect the right to be heard before making an extension order.207 A failure to respect this means the order must be annulled but only if consultation could have led to a different decision.208 The Court of Justice held that the detainee must be given written reasons for the extension because of the general principle of legality recognised by EU law, combined with Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter.209 Such an extension must be subject to authorisation by a judicial body with full power to rule upon all relevant matters of fact and law, including an individual assessment of whether extended detention is merited or whether alternative means are appropriate.210 In Kadzoev211 the Court held that there is a reasonable prospect of removal only where it appears that the migrant will be admitted to a third country within the 18-month period provided for in Article 15(5) and (6).212 Thus, that period performs a double function: it is the limit on pre-removal detention and the benchmark for assessing whether there is a reasonable prospect of removal.213 This is, however, potentially inconsistent with the Strasbourg judgment in Mikolenko214 which held that where a detainee refuses from the outset to cooperate then there can be no realistic prospect of removal and the further detention is a breach of Article 5(1)(f). The judgment in Kadzoev, however, makes clear that detention under the Returns Directive cannot exceed the 18-month limit set in Article 15(6); where this is reached, the detained migrant must be released immediately, regardless of public order concerns, because the removal process is then at an end.

203 Kadzoev (n 35) and Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). 204 Kadzoev (n 35). 205 Article 15(2). 206 There must be a causal connection between the non-cooperation and the delay to removal. Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi (n 21) [82]. 207 M.G. and N.R. (n 20) [35]. 208 Ibid [38]–[40]. 209 Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi (n 21) [44]–[52]. 210 Ibid [62]–[64]. The Court also ruled that such extension cannot be justified solely because an applicant does not have an identity document (para.74). 211 Ibid, noted by G Cornelisse (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 925. 212 Ibid [64]–[66]. 213 This contrasted with the approach of Advocate General Mazák, who emphasised that the Directive’s provisions on maximum limits of detention were an expression of the principle of proportionality, which is referred to in Recital 16. Finally, he took the view that ‘reasonable prospect of removal’ in Art 15(4) means ‘realistic prospect’ of carrying out the removal within a ‘reasonable time’. No such realistic prospect exists where it is unlikely that a third country will agree to admit the detained migrant in the ‘reasonably near future’, or where removal on the basis of a readmission agreement is not possible within a ‘reasonable period’. 214 Mikolenko (n 142).



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(p)  Detention Pursuant to the European Arrest Warrant 06.55 The expedited criminal procedures under the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (‘EAW’) have correctly been viewed by the Court of Justice as a type of extradition proceedings and therefore subject to the same principles as set out above for Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.215 Recital 12 states that the Framework Decision ‘respects fundamental rights and observes the principles … reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’. The Strasbourg court has held that the arrest of a subject pursuant to the EAW can be compliant with the principle of legality where the relevant national laws are sufficiently clear and have been followed.216 The EAW system is based upon mutual recognition between the judicial authorities of the Member States and this rests upon the premise of mutual confidence in their compliance with the Charter rights in all aspects of their treatment of detainees.217 For this reason, the enumerated grounds in Articles 3,4 and 5 for refusing to execute an EAW are in principle exhaustive.218 However the Court has confirmed that the executing judicial body is entitled to postpone (or even terminate) the surrender procedure if, after making enquiries of the issuing state, it concludes that there is a real risk that the individual detainee will be subjected to prison conditions that violate Charter Article 4 (Article 3 ECHR) by amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment219 or Charter Article 47 the right to a fair hearing.220 The detainee must then be released but may be subject to conditions to prevent their absconding pending a final decision on the surrender procedure.221 The Strasbourg court has endorsed the principle of the presumption of equivalent human rights protection under EU law, first set out in the Bosphorus Airways decision,222 in relation to the EAW Framework Decision.223 It has held therefore that the twin conditions224set out in Michaud and Avotins may be considered to apply in relation to the EAW system. These conditions are that the executing judicial authorities have no discretion left to them as a result of EU law obligations and that they have deployed the full potential of the supervisory mechanism provided for by European Union law.225 This said, the Strasbourg court has also found that the mutual-recognition mechanisms must not leave any gap or particular situation which would render the protection of the human rights guaranteed by the Convention manifestly deficient.226 Thus, the principle of mutual recognition must not be applied in an automatic or mechanical way.227 So where a detainee produced

215 Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 16 July 2015) [57]. 216 Pirozzi v Belgium (Appn no. 21055/11, Judgment of 17 April 2018). 217 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru (Judgment of 5 April 2016) [75]. 218 Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 26 February 2013). Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru [80]. 219 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru [90] Case C-220/19 PPU ML (Judgment of 25 July 2018). L. Mancano, ‘Storming the Bastille: Detention Conditions, the Right to Liberty and the Case for Approximation in EU Law’, Common Market Law Review 56 (2019), pp. 61–90. 220 See Case C-216/18 PPU, LM (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 25 July 2018). 221 Ibid [102] referring to Articles 12 and 17(5) of the Framework Decision. 222 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland (Appn no 45036/98 Judgment of Grand Chamber of 30 June 2005). 223 Pirozzi v Belgium (Appn no. 21055/11, Judgment of 17 April 2018); Romeo Castaño v Belgium (Appn no 8351/17 Judgment of 9 July 2019); Bivolaru and Moldovan v France (Appns no 40324/16 and 12623/17 Judgment 25 March 2021. 224 Michaud v France (no. 12323/11, §§ 112–15, ECHR 2012). Avotins v Latvia (Appn no 17502/07 Judgment of Grand Chamber of 23 May 2016). 225 Michaud v France (no. 12323/11, §§ 112–15, ECHR 2012). 226 Avotins v Latvia (Appn no 17502/07 Judgment of Grand Chamber of 23 May 2016) [para 116]. 227 Bivolaru and Moldovan v France (Appns no 40324/16 and 12623/17 Judgment 25 March 2021 [para 105].

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‘weighty and detailed evidence pointing to systemic or generalised shortcomings in the prisons of the issuing State’228 the reassurances of the issuing authorities were on the facts insufficient to rebut the solid factual basis that existed that there was a real risk to the applicant of being exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment on account of his conditions of detention. The Court of Justice has also confirmed that because the issue of an EAW is capable of 06.56 impinging on the right to liberty of the person concerned, enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, any decision to issue an EAW must meet the requirements inherent in effective judicial protection.229 The Strasbourg court has ruled that, in assessing whether detention meets the Article 5(1) standard of legality, it is for the national courts to decide if there has been compliance with the rules surrounding the European Arrest Warrant procedures unless their views are arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.230 An EAW is defined as a judicial decision issued in one Member State with a view to securing the arrest and surrender of a requested person for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.231 Because the EAW is a ‘judicial decision’ it can only be validly issued by a ‘judicial body’.232 The Court of Justice has given a number of judgments on the question of the meaning of a judicial body.233 Given the purpose of the EAW is both to facilitate investigation of crime as well as ensure the apprehension of convicted criminals, the Court has taken the view that a judicial body must be construed as designating, more broadly, the authorities participating in the administration of criminal justice in that Member State, as distinct from, inter alia, ministries or police services which are part of the executive.234 This said, whilst a public prosecutor is capable of constituting a ‘judicial body’ they must not be exposed to the risk that their decision-making power is subject to external directions or instructions, in particular from the executive, such that it is beyond doubt that the decision to issue a European arrest warrant lies with that authority and not, ultimately, with the executive.235 A public prosecutor who is not fully independent may still issue an EAW so long as the arrest warrant is subject, in order to be transmitted to the executing Member State, to endorsement by a court which reviews them independently and objectively.236 Furthermore, the Court of Justice has held that Article 8 of the Framework Decision requires there be two stages in the process at which judicial scrutiny must arise—the issue of the national arrest warrant and then the issue of an EAW.237 A failure at either stage, if not cured after making enquiry of the issuing Member State, means the executing authority must decline to surrender the detainee.238

228 Bivolaru and Moldovan v France (Appns no 40324/16 and 12623/17 Judgment 25 March 2021 [para 143]. 229 Joined Cases C-508/18 and C- 82/19 PPU OG and PI (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 27 May 2019) [68]. 230 Paci v Belgium App no 45597/09 (Judgment of 17 April 2018).The Belgian courts ruled that Article 5(3) of the Framework Decision on the EAW meant that the applicant should be held in detention by the Belgian authorities whilst his prosecution and appeals were processed. This entailed delaying his return to Italy to serve his sentence. 231 Ibid Art 1(1) defines the European arrest warrant as ‘a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order’. 232 Framework Decision Article 6. 233 For a broader concern about systematic deficiencies regarding the impartiality of judges in the issuing Member State entitling the executing authority to decline to do so see Case C-216/18 PPU, LM (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 25 July 2018). 234 C-452/16 Krzystof Marek Poltorak (Judgment of 10 November 2016) [35]. 235 Joined Cases C-508/18 and C- 82/19 PPU OG and PI (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 27 May 2019) [73]. 236 Case C-489/19 PPU NJ in the presence of Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Judgment of 9 October 2019) [49]. 237 Case C-241/15 Niculaie Aurel Bob-Dogi (Judgment of 1 June 2016) [56]. 238 Ibid [66].



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06.57

The Framework Decision itself does not contain a detailed regulatory code on arrest and detention as distinct from the main proceedings. In fact, the main Article authorising arrest (Art 12) refers only to national law: When a person is arrested on the basis of a European arrest warrant, the executing judicial authority shall take a decision on whether the requested person should remain in detention, in accordance with the law of the executing Member State. The person may be released promptly at any time in conformity with the domestic law of the executing Member State, provided that the competent authority of the said Member State takes all the measures it deems necessary to prevent the person absconding.

Article 12 appears to assume that a person will be arrested at the outset and that only thereafter will release be considered. This is not inconsistent with Article 5(1)(f) ECHR in so far as the arrest relates to a person ‘against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’. The Strasbourg court’s case-law on Article 5(1)(f) has generally held that detention need not be necessary so long as extradition proceedings are on foot and pursued with due diligence.239 However the Court of Justice has confirmed that because Article 6 rights are qualified by Article 52(1), detention must be necessary and proportionate to the goal of law enforcement.240 This suggests that an executing judicial authority must consider whether detention is necessary from the outset whilst the EAW proceedings are on foot. The Court has also confirmed that the detaining judicial body must be satisfied that EAW procedure is being processed with due diligence and that the duration of the detention is not excessive.241 06.58 The duration of detention is in principle limited due to the Framework Decision’s detailed time-table for processing EAW applications. Article 17 (1) states such requests must be dealt with as a matter of urgency. Article 17(3) requires a final decision on execution of the warrant to be made within 60 days after the arrest in most cases, or 10 days if the detainee consents to their surrender. This may be extended by 30 days (Article 17(4)). Beyond this, only ‘exceptional circumstances’ may support a further delay (Article 17(7). Surrender must take place as soon as possible and in any event within 10 days of the final decision (Art 23(2)). This may only be extended by 10 days due to circumstances beyond the control of any of the Member States (Art 23(3)). Surrender may be suspended for serious humanitarian reasons but once these cease to exist a new date must be agreed and the surrender follow within 10 days of this date (Art 23(4)). Importantly, upon expiry of these time limits ‘if the person is still being held in custody he shall be released’ (Art 23(5)). The Court of Justice has however ruled that failure to comply with the Article 17 legislative time limits for reaching a final decision does not absolve the executing judicial authority from complying with an EAW and does not mandate release from detention.242 This said, the Court has held that prolonging the detention of a person due to non-compliance with Article 17 requires careful assessment in terms of due diligence and proportionality.243 The Court held that the judicial authority, when making this assessment, must look at any failure to act on the part of the authorities, the contribution of the detainee, the potential sentence, the risk of the person absconding and the fact that the Article 17 time limits are, in principle, sufficient to process cases.244

239 Chahal v UK App no 22414/93, (1997) 23 EHRR 413 [112]. 240 Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan [55–60]. 241 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 5 April 2016). 242 Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan [42]. 243 Ibid [58]. 244 Ibid [58–60].

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Other provisions in the Framework Decision relating to the main proceedings also provide 06.59 procedural guarantees pertinent to Article 5 ECHR. Thus Article 11 provides the detainee with the right to know about the warrant and its contents and to be assisted by a lawyer and interpreter in accordance with national law. Compliance with Article 5(1)(f) ECHR would also require a separate reasoned decision on the reason for detention. Whilst a detainee ‘shall be heard by a judicial authority’ pending a decision on the execution of a European Arrest Warrant (Art 19), this provision does not, however, explicitly state that the detainee may challenge the legality of the detention itself as required by Article 5(4) ECHR. The Court of Justice’s case-law clearly contemplates the possibility of effective judicial review of detention collateral to an EAW as inherent in Article 6.245 Where the real concern relates to issues of criminal procedure in the issuing Member State and/or the validity of an EAW, rather than any specific complaint about the detention itself, the Court of Justice has held that the relevant right is not Article 5 ECHR (and Art 6 of the Charter), but rather the right to a fair trial and an effective remedy (Charter Arts 47 and 48).246 When a Member State has substantial grounds for believing that a person detained pursuant to 06.60 return to a Member State under the European Arrest Warrant has been convicted there due to a flagrant violation of Article 6 ECHR fair trial procedures then continued detention would not be lawful as it would violate Article 5(1).247 Under the Strasbourg court’s policy of recognising EU law’s system for the protection of human rights, discussed above in relation to Michaud, such that a decision to surrender a suspect to the issuing Member State will only violate Article 6 ECHR fair trial guarantees if it is manifestly deficient.248 (q)  The Right to be Informed of the Reasons for One’s Arrest Under Article 5(2), everyone, not just criminal suspects, has the right to be told promptly in 06.61 simple, non-technical language so that he understands the essential legal and factual reasons for his arrest.249 The obligation is imposed so that a person may then seek to challenge their detention under Article 5(4). The information need not be as detailed as that required to be provided to a person facing a criminal charge under Article 6(3)(a) ECHR. The requirement that it be provided promptly does not mean it must all be given at the moment of arrest. What is required depends upon the specific features of each case. Thus an interrogation a few hours after arrest which revealed the reasons to the detainee was held to be compliant.250 Sometimes the reasons may be obvious to the detainee without her needing to be told, as in the case of a person who presented forged identity papers to the police and was arrested upon the discovery of the forgery.251 For detainees who do not speak the language of their place of arrest, interpreters must

245 Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan [58]. 246 Ciprian Vasile Radu (n 7). 247 Case C-411/10 NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Judgment of 21 December 2011) in which the Court of Justice ruled it breached the Charter to order removal to a Member State where a breach of Art 4 would occur. ­Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey App nos 46827/99 and 46951/99 (Judgment of 4 February 2005), 41 EHRR 494 (discussion in Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan) and Othman v UK App no 8139/09 (Judgment of 17 January 2012) both conclude that expulsion to face a criminal trial which would be in flagrant violation of Art 6 ECHR is impermissible. See also, as regards Art 5 ECHR itself, Drozd and Janousek v France and Belgium App no 12747/87 (Judgment of 26 June 1992) where a previous conviction in a third country in flagrant denial of justice would render detention pursuant to international cooperation arrangements unlawful. Sejdovic v Italy (Appn no 56581/00 Judgment of Grand Chamber of 1 March 2006) on trial in absentia. 248 Pirozzi v Belgium (Appn no. 21055/11, Judgment of 17 April 2018). 249 Kerr v UK App no 40451/98 (admissibility decision of 7 December 1999). 250 Murray v UK (1994) Series A no 300-A, (1995) 19 EHRR 193. 251 Dikme v Turkey App no 20869/92 (Judgment of 11 July 2000).



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be provided promptly to enable the reasons to be given. These obligations have been confirmed now by the Court of Justice252 and now find some expression in Union law through the Directive on the Right to Information in Criminal Proceedings253 but also, for detention more generally, in the right to good administration.254 (r)  The Right to Test the Legality of Detention 06.62 The Court of Justice case-law has gone beyond that of the Strasbourg court in relation to the right to judicial protection in detention cases. This is because under the Charter all interferences with rights must be subject to a proportionality test set out in Article 52. This has been applied by the Court of Justice in relation to Article 6 by requiring an individualised assessment of legality and proportionality in some areas.255 As noted above however, the Court has in other contexts held that the specific legislative time-scales or justifications for detention are lawful and proportionate and thus limited the scope for such individualised proportionality assessments.256 06.63 The Strasbourg court has by contrast generally required only a more basic right of habeas corpus under Article 5(4) ECHR aimed at testing the legality of any detention. This is not a right to challenge all elements of fact and discretion supporting the detention. Rather it is the right to have a court review those elements that are essential to the detention being ‘lawful’.257 This is in contrast to the case of criminal suspects, where the court acting under Article 5(3) must be empowered to review whether there is sufficient evidence to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed. For those detained following conviction by a court under Article 5(1)(a), the original trial usually provides adequate safeguards with respect to Article 5(4).258 These judicial safeguards in relation to criminal suspects and convicts, must be read now, in the EU context, in light of the case-law above on the principle of mutual recognition set out in the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. 06.64 For the Strasbourg court, the main importance of Article 5(4) therefore lies in cases of administrative detention under Articles 5(1)(b), (d), (e) and (f). In fact, the European Court of Human Rights has decided that in the case of persons detained for therapeutic purposes, the reviewing court must ensure that the Winterwerp criteria (see above) are met and so its review power must be wider than just legality.259 The position of immigration detainees was left uncertain by the decision Chahal which found that the domestic court had been unable to comply with Article 5(4) because it could not see and assess for itself the national security evidence relied

252 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). 253 Directive 2012/13 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L142/1. 254 M.G. and N.R. (n 20) [35]. 255 Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan [55–60]; Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen (Judgment of Grand Chamber of 5 April 2016) in the context of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. 256 Mohammad Khir Amayry (n 38) in the context of the Dublin III Regulation. Also JN (n 23) Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n22) in relation to the Receptions Conditions Directive. 257 E v Norway (1990) Series A no 181, (1990) 17 EHRR 30. Without ruling in relation to Charter Art 6 in general, the Court of Justice has found that judicial review must extend to the facts and merits in relation to detention under the Returns Directive. See Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi (n 21) [62]–[64]. 258 But see Hussain v UK App no 21928/93 (Judgment of 21 February 1996) for an exception when the parole board had the power to recall into detention a prisoner released on licence after the alleged commission of further offences. Its findings were reached unfairly and in breach of Art 5(4), because no oral hearing was held and the applicant did not have access to the file. Similar considerations arose when convicted juvenile prisoners were held at Her Majesty’s pleasure, Singh v UK App no 23389/93 (Judgment of 21 February 1996) or adults following completion of the punitive element of a life sentence, Stafford v UK (n 85). Here, where continued detention depends upon assessment of dangerousness, the parole board must hold procedurally fair hearings enabling the detainees to see the file and challenge witnesses. 259 H v UK App no 45508/99 (Judgment of 5 October 2004), (2005) 40 EHRR 761.

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upon by the government to support detention. This is despite the fact that the Strasbourg court in that case found that detention in immigration proceedings did not need to be shown to be necessary to protect public security or prevent absconding. This apparent contradiction may be explained on the basis that when the state does choose to base immigration detention on such considerations, the reviewing court should have the power to enquire into the factual basis for that specific ground and not simply conduct a review of legality.260 An Article 5(4) ECHR court must be independent and offer adequate procedural guarantees, 06.65 but it need not be part of the standard judicial machinery.261 The procedural requirements will vary according to the type of detention under challenge but equality of arms and the right to be heard are essential.262 An adversarial oral hearing is required in cases involving criminal suspects or where detention depends upon an assessment of the detainee’s dangerousness or likely conduct.263 Reviews must be available speedily both after the initial arrest and at reasonable intervals thereafter if the circumstances supporting detention vary over time. The proceedings must also be conducted with due diligence. In a simple case, an initial review should not have taken three weeks to hear, whilst in more complex cases where medical evidence must be gathered a longer period might be acceptable.264 Article 5 only requires automatic judicial review of detention in cases where a suspect is detained pursuant to criminal proceedings (see Art 5(1)(c) and Art 5(3)). However, in Shamsa v Poland265 the Strasbourg Court said in an immigration case, strictly obiter, that ‘detention that goes beyond several days which has not been ordered by a court or judge or other person authorised to exercise judicial power cannot be considered “lawful” within the meaning of Article 5(1)’. The Court argued that this was implicit from a review of Article 5 and in particular Articles 5(4), 5(3) and 5(1)(c).Under the equivalent EU legislation relating to asylum-seekers and migrants subject to return decisions, which has been upheld by the Court of Justice, the requirement is that detainees have the possibility to seek speedy judicial review but not that it is mandatory.266

V. Remedies Neither Article 6 nor other provisions of the Charter directly provide for the nature of remedies 06.66 in relation to any breach of the right to liberty. The Court of Justice has now decided a number of cases now in which it has held that detention occurring within the scope of EU law requires effective judicial protection pursuant to either Article 6267 or Article 47268 of the Charter. This entails at the very least a power to declare detention unlawful and to order the detainee’s release.269 It flows from the primacy of EU law and that national courts must assume such a jurisdiction and create such a remedy if one does not exist in national law.270 The most obvious remedy for

260 Chahal v UK (n 121). 261 Weeks v UK (n 82); Assenov v Bulgaria (n 105). 262 Niedbala v Poland App no 27915/95 (Judgment of 4 July 2000). 263 Wloch v Poland (Judgment of 19 October 2000), (2002) 34 EHRR 229. 264 Baranowski v Poland (n 79). Over two months to obtain medical reports was, however, unacceptable. 265 Shamsa v Poland App nos 45355/99 and 45357/99 (Judgment of 27 November 2003). 266 Case C-924/19 FMS and others (n 22). 267 JN (n 23). 268 Case C-924/19 FMS and others in which the legislation regulating detention of asylum-seekers and irregular migrations was held to ‘give concrete form, in the sphere in question, to the right to effective judicial protection safeguarded in Article 47 of the Charter …’[290] ‘Article 47 is sufficient in itself and does not need to be made more specific by provisions of EU or national law in order to confer on individuals a right on which they may rely as such.’ [140] 269 Ibid.[294]. 270 Ibid.[140–143].



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unlawful detention would be an order declaring the detention to be unlawful and ordering it to cease or not be recommenced without a change of circumstances.271 Interpreting Article 6 in conformity with Article 5 ECHR would mean applying Article 5(4), which requires a court to order release in such circumstances. The Court of Justice has, however, held in a case involving expulsion of an immigrant, that a decision to detain taken in violation of the right to be heard does not automatically mean detention must cease.272 It depends upon assessing whether the outcome of the decision could have been different if proper consultation had occurred.273 The Court of Justice has also held that, even where detention is found to be lawfully imposed under the relevant EU legislation, national courts must have the power to substitute their decision for that of the administrative authorities by ordering alternative measures to detention.274 06.67 Beyond the remedy of release, Article 5(5) ECHR imposes an obligation to provide everyone who has been a victim of a breach of Articles 5(1)–(4) with compensation. This goes beyond the standard right to an effective remedy for the other Convention rights which is given by Article 13. This provision has not been the subject of extensive development through jurisprudence by the Strasbourg Court. The cases suggest that where national law rules totally prevent compensation being awarded where a breach of Article 5(1)–(4) ECHR has occurred, this amounts to a breach of Article 5(5).275 Rejection of an immunity from suit does not amount to strict liability; a fault test may be imposed. The Court of Justice has generally left remedies for violation of EU rights to the national courts subject to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.276 Where EU law has been wrongly implemented or applied, there is in principle a remedy in damages under the Francovich doctrine.277 This requires the breach to be sufficiently serious.278 It is therefore an open question as to how far the Court of Justice may adopt a test of strict or fault-based liability for unlawful detention or other breaches of Article 6.279 Where detention has been ruled unlawful, the Court of Justice has held that national courts must be able to grant interim remedies and order the financial support or accommodation of destitute asylum-seekers released from custody.280

E. Evaluation 06.68 The inclusion of the right to liberty in the Charter reflects its status as one of the most historically significant and well-established rights recognised by liberal democracies. With the expansion of 271 See Case C-704/17 DH joined party Ministerstvo vnitra (Opinion of Advocate General Sharpton of 31 January 2019 holding that pursuant to Charter Articles 6 and 47, national courts must have the power to review detention even after the detainee is released: ‘courts can mark and declare the fact that the detention was unlawful. That puts the legal record straight.’ [36–39] Although the case concerned detention pursuant to Directive 2013/33/EU (n 12), the observations were made in relation to detention within the scope of EU law. 272 M.G. and N.R. (n 20). The Court surprisingly made no reference at all to Art 6 of the Charter in its decision. This shows again the different approach taken between cases involving, as here, irregular migrants in removal proceedings, as contrasted with asylum seekers where Art 6 is considered to be in play. 273 M.G. and N.R. (n 20) [40]. 274 Case C-924/19 FMS and others [293]. 275 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK (n 101); Hood v United Kingdom App no 27267/95 (18 February 1999), (2000) 29 EHRR 365. 276 See Case C-704/17 DH joined party Ministerstvo vnitra [n 262]. 277 Case C-6&9/90 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 278 Case C-46/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany [1996] ECR I-1029. 279 Case C-924/19 FMS and others discusses the general rule that EU law does not require national courts to create new remedies unless ‘no legal remedy exists that would make it possible to ensure, even indirectly, respect for the rights that individuals derive from EU law.’[143]. 280 Ibid. [296–299] where the authorities had denied the obligation to offer such assistance arising from Article 26 ­Directive 2013/33/EU.

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Union competence, law-making and, occasionally, even administrative action into the areas of criminal justice and immigration, it has become of greater relevance. The EU’s promotion of cross-border cooperation between Member States in returning individuals to face custody brings the diversity of national standards and processes under greater scrutiny. Thus European Union law now covers the physical restraint of convicts, suspects and immigrants with a view to their extradition to other Member States or expulsion from the Union. The Court of Justice has begun to develop Article 6, particularly in relation to the detention of asylum seekers, returnable migrants and those held in relation to the European Arrest Warrant. The Court has so far found all EU legislation authorising detention compatible with Article 6. It has thus not found any such provisions to be inherently disproportionate. The Court has however been forceful in ruling against Member States’ attempts to exclude effective judicial protection of detainees. It has also strictly applied legislation that sets out time-limits for the processing and/or detention of individuals. The ‘due diligence’ standard derived from Strasbourg case-law is therefore given more definite and restrictive constraints in the EU context. There remains, however, a tension between protecting the liberty of individuals whilst promoting the Union’s policies of mutual recognition in criminal justice and control of the external border in asylum and immigration. The jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court is becoming less important in these areas as the Court of Justice engages with the extensive EU legislation in these fields and develops its own autonomous approach.



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Article 7 (Private Life, Home and Communications)* Article 7 Respect for Private and Family Life Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 7 The rights guaranteed in Article 7 correspond to those guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR. To take account of developments in technology the word ‘correspondence’ has been replaced by ‘communications’. In accordance with Article 52(3), the meaning and scope of this right are the same as those of the ­corresponding article of the ECHR. Consequently, the limitations which may legitimately be imposed on this right are the same as those allowed by Article 8 of the ECHR: ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’

Select Bibliography LFM Besselink, ‘Respecting Constitutional Identity in the EU’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 671–93. C Costello, ‘Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 287–339. C Docksey, ‘Ministerio Fiscal: Holding the line on ePrivacy’ (2019) 26 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 585–94. S Greer, J Gerrards, R Slowe, Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the European Union: Achievements, Trends and Challenges (Cambridge, CUP, 2018). E Guild & E Mendos Kuşkonmaz, ‘EU exclusive jurisdiction on surveillance related to terrorism and serious transnational crime: case review on Opinion 1/15’ (2018) 43 European Law Review 583–97. C Kuner, ‘International agreements, data protection, and EU fundamental rights on the international stage: Opinion 1/15, EU-Canada PNR’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 857–82. C Kuner, LA Bygrave, C Docksey, L Drechsler (eds), The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A Commentary (Oxford, OUP, 2020). K Lenaerts, ‘Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 779–93. S Lieven, ‘Case Report on C-411/10, NS and C-493/10, ME and Others, 21 December 2011’ (2012) 14 European Journal of Migration and Law 223–38. T Lock, ‘Rights and Principles in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 1201–26. * This chapter was written by Jens Vested-Hansen in the first edition. It has been updated by David Mangan in the second edition.

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P Lorenzen et al (eds), Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention [ECHR Commentary], 3rd edn (Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing, 2011) Commentary on Article 8: J Vedsted-Hansen. O Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016). D Mangan, ‘Beyond Procedural Protection: Information Technology, Privacy, and the Workplace’ (2019) 44 European Law Review 559–71. N Purtova, ‘The law of everything. Broad concept of personal data and of future EU data protection law’ (2018) 10 Law, Innovation and Technology 40–81. M Zalnieriute, ‘Developing a European Standard for International Data Transfers after Snowden: Opinion 1/15 on the EU-Canada PNR Agreement’ (2018) 81 Modern Law Review 1046–63.

A.  Field of Application of Article 7 (Private Life, Home and Communications) 07.01A Though economical in its text, Article 7 CFR continues to create a remarkable volume of case law and commentary, to the extent that this volume separates Article 7 rights into two separate chapters. The present entry focuses on private life, home and communications—a trio of s­ ettings that could be treated by individual chapters themselves.1 Since the first edition of this book in 2014, case law surrounding Article 7 CFR has grown, particularly in relation to information technology where Article 7 has often been considered in conjunction with Article 8 CFR (the latter is a separate chapter here). This overlap offers an opportunity for greater articulation. It also poses challenges. Each article’s common origin in Article 8 of the ECHR2 as well as the instruction of Article 52(3) CFR (‘the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention’) render the similarity evident. 07.02A By the time of the Charter’s coming into force, the ECtHR had already established a broad interpretation of ‘private life’ and ‘home’ based on Article 8 ECHR.3 Société Colas Est v France4 further developed the interpretation of ‘home’ to include legal persons claiming to have a home. The case was brought before the ECtHR by three companies whose offices had been searched by the French competition authorities. The Court drew from its earlier decision in Niemietz v Germany where the French and German definitions of ‘home’ extended to business premises.5 Referring to the Convention as a ‘living instrument’, the Court held that ‘in certain circumstances the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention may be construed as including the right to respect for a company’s registered office, branches or other business premises’.6 The understanding from Société Colas Est has been subsequently upheld.7

1 While the ‘family life’ aspects of Art 7 CFR are discussed in a separate chapter, there is a narrow and often inseparable link with those aspects of Art 7 concerning the protection of ‘private life, home and communications’. This is the case, for example, where migrants can argue that their removal would threaten both their private life and their family life. This chapter overlaps to an extent with the separate chapter on the ‘family life’ aspects of the provision. 2 Art 7 CFR largely repeats the text of Art 8(1) ECHR, with the former adding communication as an area of protection for privacy. 3 Niemietz v Germany (ECtHR, Judgment 16 December 1992). 4 Société Colas Est and Others v France (ECtHR, Judgment 16 April 2002). 5 Niemietz [30]. 6 Société Colas Est [41]. 7 Cf ECtHR judgments in Buck v Germany (28 April 2004) [31], Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria (28 June 2007) [60], Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v Norway (14 March 2013), ­Saint-Paul Luxembourg SA v Luxembourg (18 April 2013), Sharxhi v Albania (11 January 2018).

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This interpretation resulted in the adjustment of the CJEU’s practice, that had previously 07.03A rejected the applicability of Article 8 ECHR on commercial premises.8 Citing the ECtHR’s ruling in Société Colas Est, the CJEU accepted the applicability of that provision on measures taken by state authorities in the business premises of companies, regardless of the fact that these are organised as legal persons.9 Confirming the connection with the Charter, the Court stated that ‘the need for protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention by public authorities in the sphere of the private activities of any person, whether natural or legal, constitutes a general principle of EU law’, while also referring to Article 7 CFR.10

B.  Interrelationship of Article 7 with Other Provisions of the Charter Aside from the ‘family life’ aspects of Article 7, several Charter provisions interact with 07.04A ­‘private life, home and communications’. Identified above, Article 8 (the right to protection of personal data) interacts with the more robustly worded Article 7 in ways that are still ­evolving. Depending upon the situation, Article 7 CFR may also be connected to Article 3 (right to the integrity of the person) and Article 24 (rights of the child). Article 17 (right to property) may be of particular relevance to the protection of the home under Article 7. As well, Article 33 (family and professional life) touches on a facet of family life. As with other ­provisions of the Charter, Articles 47 (right to an effective remedy), 51(the Charter’s field of application), as well as 52 (scope and interpretation of rights and principles)11 all bear upon the rights set out in Article 7. Interrelationship may also be found in particular areas. For example, in the workplace, Article 7 may be related to unfair dismissal (Article 30) or health and safety (Article 31).

C.  Sources of Article 7 Rights The influence of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights has been noted. 07.05A Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognises that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon honour and reputation. Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prescribes that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on honour and r­eputation’.

8 Cf Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission (CJEU, Judgment 21 September 1989). 9 Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères (CJEU, Judgment 22 October 2002) [29]. 10 Case T-135/09 Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA v European Commission (CJEU, Judgment 14 November 2012) [40]. An appeal of this decision was later dismissed: Case C-37/13 P Nexans France SAS and Nexans SA v European Commission (CJEU, Judgment 25 June 2014). 11 Art 52 contains four components to a limitation ‘on the exercise of the rights and freedoms’ in the Charter: 1) the limitation is provided for by law; 2) it respects the essence of the particular right or freedom; 3) it complies with the ­principle of proportionality; and 4) it meets objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others, and is necessary.



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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 07.06A The wording of Article 7 speaks to its general application to any field of EU law where overlapping elements of the right may be affected. These aspects of Article 7 have, like ‘family life’, increased attention on the ECtHR’s case law as well as its interpretation by the CJEU. As the Explanatory Notes to the CFR articulate, since Article 7 CFR (like Art 8 ECHR) is a qualified right, any interference with the protected rights will be prohibited unless it falls within the limitations permitted by Article 52 CFR, corresponding with Article 8(2) ECHR.

II.  Scope of Application 07.07A The concept of private life has a separate meaning as an autonomous concept of both ECHR and EU fundamental rights law. Additionally, there are instances when private life is linked to the concepts of family life, home and communication. Thus, private life is to be considered as an overarching concept in relation to the other rights elements under Article 8 ECHR12 and similarly in Article 7 CFR. Based on the ECtHR interpretation of Article 8 ECHR, the concept of private life can be characterised as encompassing the physical, psychological and moral aspects of the personal integrity, identity and autonomy of individuals.13 07.08A Article 7 CFR does not entirely encapsulate the ECtHR’s expansive interpretation of Article 8 ECHR. This provision also finds expression in Article 3 CFR (right to the integrity of the person), Article 8 CFR (right to data protection), Article 24 CFR (rights of the child), and aspects of Article 33 CFR (family and professional life), as well as Article 37 CFR (environmental protection). (a)  Private Life 07.09A The precise meaning of private life, as distinguished from family life, home and communications, can be difficult to define in abstract terms, and the distinction will in practice often be of minor importance inasmuch as the general applicability of Article 8 ECHR or Article 7 CFR will be beyond doubt. Nonetheless, ECtHR judgments normally specify which of the four aspects under Article 8 ECHR are at stake in the individual case. In some instances this may be a matter for further elaboration in order to clarify the distinction for either practical or principled reasons, depending on the circumstances of the individual case. 07.10A An example is a case concerning same-sex relationships, which traditionally have been considered exclusively as a feature of private life, but not recognised as family life under Article 8 ECHR. This longstanding practice may in itself be seen as an illustration of the inseparability of family life and private life, given the historical and political circumstances underlying the traditional legal qualification of such intimate relationships. However, against the background of the ‘rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples in European states’, as well

12 P Lorenzen et al, Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention [ECHR Commentary], 3rd edn (Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing, 2011) 649–53. 13 See, as significant examples, Pretty v United Kingdom (ECtHR, Judgment 29 April 2002) [61]; Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom (ECtHR, Judgment 11 July 2002) [90]; Evans v United Kingdom (ECtHR, Judgment 10 April 2007) [71]; and A, B and C v Ireland (ECtHR, Judgment 16 December 2010) [212].

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as certain provisions of EU law reflecting a tendency to include same-sex couples in the notion of ‘family’, the ECtHR in 2010 considered it ‘artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8’. Consequently the relationship of a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership was held to fall within the notion of ‘family life’ under Article 8.14 In another case that dealt with the state’s positive obligation to provide for efficient procedures to establish paternity, in order to avoid leaving the child in a state of uncertainty concerning the biological truth about her personal identity and the legal relationship to the putative father, the Court held that, in the absence of such procedures, no family tie had been established between the child and the alleged father, and the issue to be decided under Article 8 ECHR was therefore one pertaining to the child’s private life.15 The decision in Niemietz v Germany has grounded a broad interpretation of private life. 07.11A Defining private life in more general terms, the ECtHR emphasised that it was neither possible nor necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of ‘private life’. Elaborating upon its reluctance to provide a definitive statement of private life, the Court wrote that it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.16

The scope for developing relationships with other human beings prompted the Court to include 07.12A professional and business activities within the scope of ‘private life’. The importance of this wider conception of private life meant that the concept was not limited simply to a cloistered setting. The Court further stated that there appeared to be no reason of principle why this understanding of the notion of ‘private life’ should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world. This view is supported by the fact that … it is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an individual’s activities form part of his professional or business life and which do not. Thus, especially in the case of a person exercising a liberal profession, his work in that context may form part and parcel of his life to such a degree that it becomes impossible to know in what capacity he is acting at a given moment of time.17

From this portion of Niemietz, the ECtHR has expanded upon private life in the workplace con- 07.13A text, particularly where workplace surveillance has been conducted. There is a connection here with commentary on communications. The Court has required employers to notify ­workers that they are being monitored in some form. In Halford v UK18 and Copland v UK,19 the failure to warn regarding at-work monitoring of email and internet usage (respectively) ­violated the

14 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (ECtHR, Judgment 24 June 2010) [90]–[95]. As regards EU law developments, reference was made in para 26 of the judgment to Art 9 CFR, Art 4(3) of Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification, and Art 2(2) of Directive 2004/38 concerning the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Notably, an attempt to refer the case to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR failed, according to a Panel decision of 22 November 2010. On this judgment, see Lorenzen et al, 707–08. 15 Mikulic v Croatia (ECtHR, Judgment 7 February 2002) [51]–[55]. 16 Niemietz v Germany (ECtHR, Judgment 16 December 1992) [29]. 17 Niemietz [29]. 18 [1997] ECHR 32, [45]. 19 [2007] ECHR 253, [42].



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employee applicants’ reasonable expectation of privacy. In Köpke v Germany,20 covert surveillance was permissible because it had been limited to two weeks in duration and targeted two employees who had been suspected of theft. The investigation concluded that the applicant had been the culprit. In Bărbulescu v Romania, the Court found the employer’s monitoring of the worker’s social media activity (both his work and personal accounts) violated his right to private life. With regards to the concept of privacy at work, the Grand Chamber wrote: ‘an employer’s instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero’.21 In Antović and Mirković v Montenegro,22 the Court found that a reasonable expectation of ­privacy was a guiding factor, but not itself conclusive.23 Situating the decision within an analysis of the nature of the university workplace, the Court found that university teachers’ workplaces included amphitheatres where ‘they not only teach students, but also interact with them, thus developing mutual relations and constructing their social identity.’24 Surveillance for a legitimate purpose (theft of the employer’s goods in this case) and conducted without notice may be justifiable. In López Ribalda and Others v Spain,25 the employer’s conduct had been proportionate considering the degree of intrusion into employees’ privacy factored together with the ‘legitimate reasons’26 justifying installation of surveillance technology. The employer’s decision to install the surveillance equipment had been based on a ‘reasonable suspicion that serious misconduct has been committed and the extent of the losses identified in the present case may appear to constitute weighty justification.’27 07.14A The ECtHR decisions leave room for further engagement. This scope includes elaborating upon what is meant by ‘an employer’s instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero.’ Looking to Bărbulescu, there appears to be a simple remedy for employers: give notice to workers of steps being taken to monitor them. For this reason, ‘the prohibition on reducing workplace privacy to zero (where work is a space for self-development) is incongruent with the simple threshold of notice and consent to monitoring as set out in Bărbulescu.’28 For this reason, the ECtHR’s concept of a right to workplace privacy remains difficult to discern. 07.15A The CJEU set out its view on monitoring of spaces for security purposes (through, for example, closed-circuit television (CCTV)) in TK v Asociatia de Proprietari bloc M5A-ScaraA.29 On the basis of an interference with his private life, TK challenged the legality of the several video cameras set up in the common areas of the apartment building in which he owned a unit. The cameras had been installed for the legitimate purpose of ensuring the safety of individuals and property.30 They recorded all traffic within these areas without the consent of those captured on the recordings. The case was brought under the Data Protection Directive.31 The CJEU assessed whether the principles relating to data quality (Article 6) and the criteria for making

20 Köpke v Germany (ECtHR, Judgment 5 October 2010). 21 Bărbulescu v Romania (ECtHR, Judgment 5 September 2017) [80]. 22 Antović and Mirković v Montenegro (ECtHR, Judgment 28 November 2017). 23 Ibid [43]. 24 Ibid [44]. 25 López Ribalda and Others v Spain (ECtHR, Judgment 17 October 2019). 26 Ibid [134]. 27 Ibid. 28 D Mangan, ‘Beyond Procedural Protection: Information Technology, Privacy, and the Workplace’ (2019) 44 European Law Review 559–71, 568. 29 C-708/18 TK v Asociatia de Proprietari bloc M5A-ScaraA (CJEU, Judgment 11 December 2019). 30 ‘[T]he referring court notes that thefts, burglaries and acts of vandalism had occurred before the video surveillance system was installed’: M5A-ScaraA [45]. 31 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of ­individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data ([1995] OJ L281/31).

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data processing legitimate (Article 7) (both of the Data Protection Directive) read in light of Articles 7 and 8 CFR precluded national law from authorising such a video surveillance system. The CJEU found there was no such preclusion in this instance. The decision comingled Articles 7 and 8 CFR. The legitimate interests ‘must be present and effective as at the date of the data processing and must not be hypothetical at that date’.32 Where there are derogations or limitations of the protection of personal data, it must be done in a manner that is strictly necessary. Factoring in ‘the seriousness of the infringement of the data subject’s rights and freedoms’, the referring court must assess whether the video surveillance system fulfilled the legitimate interests set out in the Data Protection Directive (Article 7(f)).33 (b) Home The right to respect for home in Article 7 CFR also has a wide interpretation, including that of 07.16A an individual consumer as well as premises used for professional or commercial purposes. The CJEU has built upon the case law of the ECtHR in this area. The right may be most apparent in cases of eviction. This facet of Article 7 has been raised in mortgage-related instances34 where the debtor has failed to meet its obligations and the terms affecting this arrangement may be challenged as unfair, premised on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position.35 In this line of argument, there is an overlap between Articles 7 and 47 CFR. In McCann v UK, the ECtHR wrote of an individual’s loss of home in relation to Article 8 of 07.17A the Convention: The loss of one’s home is a most extreme form of interference with the right to respect for the home. Any person at risk of an interference of this magnitude should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant principles under Article 8 of the Convention, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his right of occupation has come to an end.36

The CJEU, in Monika Kušionová, cited the above passage from McCann and discussed the matter in relation to Article 7 CFR noting the importance in considering ‘the consequences of the eviction of the consumer and his family from the accommodation forming their principal ­family home’.37 In its 2014 ruling of Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García,38 the Court found there to be a violation of Article 47 CFR where there was no opportunity for a stay (by the court of first instance) to mortgage enforcement proceedings where the debtor/consumer may not appeal against the order dismissing his/her objection to the enforcement; though the creditor may appeal against a decision to terminate proceedings or order the disapplication of an unfair term. The matter again came before the Court through another reference in 2015. On this occasion, the Court found there to be no CFR violation.39 In particular, the Court noted that the reformed

32 M5A-ScaraA [44]. The Court added: ‘It cannot, however, be necessarily required, at the time of examining all the circumstances of the case, that the safety of property and individuals was previously compromised.’ 33 M5A-ScaraA [56]–[60]. 34 Here, the issue surrounds Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts ([1993] OJ L95/29). 35 This premise was identified by the Court as the basis for Directive 93/13: Case C-169/14 Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García (CJEU, Judgment 17 July 2014) [22]. 36 McCann v UK (ECtHR, 13 May 2008) [50]. 37 Case 34/13 Monika Kušionová v SMART Capital as (CJEU, Judgment 10 September 2014) [63]–[67]. 38 Case C-169/14 Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García (CJEU, Judgment 17 July 2014). 39 ‘[U]nlike the procedural rule at issue in the case that led to the judgment in Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, (C-169/14, EU:C:2014:2099, paragraph 43), such a national provision no longer exposes the consumer, and possibly his



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07.18A

07.19A

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07.21A

law (from when it first reached the Court in 2014) would not affect the right to respect for the home as protected by Article 7 CFR.40 In line with the broad definition of private life, the ECtHR has also interpreted the concept of home as including premises used for professional or commercial purposes. Niemietz again provides a point of departure. Referencing its discussion of private life, the Court expressed concern over the ‘same risk of inequality of treatment’ if a narrow interpretation of ‘home’ had been adopted.41 The Court noted the broader connotations of ‘home’ (domicile) in the French language version of the Convention as well as the interpretation of ‘home’ in German courts.42 When the matter involves professional or business activities, consistently drawing precise distinctions between private residences and commercial premises was unlikely. Harmonising the interpretations of ‘private life’ and ‘home’ (as including certain professional or business activities or premises) protected the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities in a manner that expressed ‘the essential object and purpose of Article 8’.43 Still, Contracting States would not be unduly impeded because interference in accordance with Article 8(2) permitted a potentially more ‘far-reaching’ entitlement.44 A police search of a law office, in Xavier Da Silveira, had an EU law dimension, in that the contested search had been carried out by the French police in a residence in France in which a Portuguese lawyer occasionally carried out his professional activities. The fact that he was not formally registered as a lawyer permanently practising in France was held to be immaterial, since he had his main law office in another EU Member State, and the ECtHR found the search to be in violation of Article 8 ECHR due to the absence of procedural safeguards that are of crucial importance in case of searching of law offices.45 The above-mentioned judgments in which the ECtHR established its broad interpretation of the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘home’ concerned liberal professions, such as practising lawyers. Subsequent cases have applied that wider approach to the interpretation of legal persons claiming to have a ‘home’ within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR. An important step towards clarification of the status of legal persons in this regard was taken in the CJEU decision of Société Colas Est (discussed at the outset of this chapter) where the search of business premises constituted a violation of Article 8. Characterising the Convention as a ‘living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’, the Court wrote that the ‘time had come’ to include ‘the right to respect for a company’s registered office, branches or other business premises’ within Article 8 ECHR.46 The scale of the operations (conducted in order to prevent the disappearance or concealment of evidence of anti-competitive practices) justified the interference with the applicant companies’ right to respect for their premises. In the absence of adequate and effective safeguards against abuse, the Court held—‘even supposing that the entitlement to interfere may be more far-reaching where the business premises of a juristic person are concerned’—the impugned operations in the competition field could not be regarded

family, to the risk of losing his dwelling in a forced sale, in a context where mortgage enforcement proceedings may not be stayed by the court dealing with the substance of the case and where the court responsible for enforcement may have, at most, undertaken a summary assessment of the validity of the contractual term upon which the seller or supplier bases his application’: Case C-539/14 Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García (CJEU, Order 16 July 2015) [41]. 40 Ibid [46]. 41 Niemietz [30]. 42 Ibid [18]. 43 Niemietz [31]. 44 Ibid [30]–[31]. See also Bernh Larsen Holding [104]. 45 Xavier Da Silveira v France (ECtHR, Judgment 21 January 2010) [37]–[41]. 46 Société Colas Est [41].

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as strictly proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.47 This interpretation of ‘home’ has been upheld in later cases concerning legal persons under Article 8.48 The CJEU subsequently adjusted its practice regarding the applicability of Article 8 on 07.22A commercial premises.49 Adopting the interpretation of Article 8 in Société Colas Est, the CJEU accepted the applicability of Article 8 ECHR to measures taken by state authorities in the business premises of legal persons.50 Pursuant to Article 52(3) CFR, this reading also applies to Article 7 CFR. In Nexans, the CJEU confirmed ‘the need for protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention by public authorities in the sphere of the private activities of any person, whether natural or legal’ as a ‘general principle of EU law’ as laid down in Article 7 CFR.51 Article 8 ECHR’s expanding interpretation has also revealed conceptual limits to the material 07.23A scope of protection of legal persons with respect to ‘private life’ and ‘home’. An association or a company cannot claim protection under these terms against factual circumstances that can only be suffered as interferences by physical persons. For instance, negative environmental impact on the premises of a company cannot be considered an infringement with the right to respect for the ‘home’ of that legal person because such interferences can be experienced by physical persons only. Consequently, in such circumstances, the legal person will be able to claim as a victim under Article 34 in respect of Article 8 ECHR exclusively on behalf of its employees or, for an association, its members.52 This signifies a potentially important distinction between legal and natural persons in terms 07.24A of the protection of the corresponding rights under Article 7 CFR.53 Arguably, distinguishing between the two types of beneficiaries of these Charter rights might have a relatively stronger practical impact on the protection of domiciles and other private spheres of commercial companies in the Charter context than under Article 8 ECHR. This seems to follow from the requirement under Article 51 CFR of a link to the scope of EU law in order for Member States to be bound by the Charter, insofar as such link is likely to exist more frequently for legal persons in the context of EU law.

47 Ibid [49]. 48 Cf ECtHR judgments in Buck [31]; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev [60]; Bernh Larsen Holding AS; and Saint-Paul Luxembourg. 49 Cf Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission (CJEU, Judgment 21 September 1989). 50 Roquette Frères [29]. 51 Nexans v Commission [40]. 52 Cf Asselbourg and Others and Greenpeace Association-Luxembourg v Luxembourg (ECtHR, admissibility decision 29 June 1999). In this case, the applicant non-governmental organisation and a number of physical persons complained of damage to the environment that ‘affected their quality of life and deprived them of the peaceful enjoyment of their homes (or of their registered office in the case of the association Greenpeace), in such a way as to infringe their right to respect for their private and family life’. The Court’s consideration that this association ‘cannot claim to be the victim of an infringement of the right to respect for its “home”, within the meaning of Art 8 of the Convention’ merely because it has its registered office close to the source of pollution, therefore appears to be equally valid to the notions of home, private life and family life under Art 8 ECHR. Cf the Court’s more general statement, with reference to the aforementioned decision, in admissibility decision of 7 February 2006, Michel Besseau et autre c France, concerning ‘nuisances ou de troubles qui ne peuvent être ressenties que par des personnes physiques’. See also admissibility decision of 10 July 2006, Sdruzeni Jihoceske Matky c République tchèque, in which the ECtHR noted that the applicant association was ‘une personne morale, qui ne saurait se prétendre victime d’une violation des droits personnels dont les titulaires ne peuvent être que les personnes physiques, tels les droits à la vie et à la santé. Elle ne saurait non plus invoquer le droit au respect de son “domicile”, au sens de l’article 8 de la Convention, du seul fait qu’elle a son siège près de la centrale qu’elle critique, lorsque l’atteinte à ce droit résulte de nuisances ou de troubles qui ne peuvent être ressentis que par des personnes physiques’. 53 Art 8 CFR applies to natural persons: Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft. V Nemzeti Adó-és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó-és Vám Főigazgatóság (CJEU, Judgment 17 December 2015) [79].



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The relevance of this distinction between legal and physical persons can be illustrated by a CJEU case in which a preliminary ruling was sought concerning the validity of provisions of secondary EU law laying down an obligation to publish data relating to the beneficiaries of funds under the common EU agricultural policy. Here the Court held that ‘the right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal data, recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual’ and that the limitations which may lawfully be imposed on the right to the protection of personal data correspond to those tolerated in relation to Article 8 ECHR.54 As regards the validity of two of the disputed provisions, the Court stated: It must be recalled, in the first place, that the publication required by Article 44a of Regulation No 1290/2005 and Regulation No 259/2008 implementing that article identifies by name all beneficiaries of aid from the EAGF and the EAFRD, among whom are both natural and legal persons. Having regard to the observations in paragraph 52 above, legal persons can claim the protection of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter in relation to such identification only in so far as the official title of the legal person identifies one or more natural persons.55

07.26A The distinction between legal and natural persons was operationalised by the Court in declaring the disputed provisions of the two Regulations invalid insofar as, with regard to natural persons who were beneficiaries of EAGD and EAFRD aid, those provisions impose an obligation to publish personal data relating to each beneficiary without drawing a distinction based on relevant criteria; such as, the periods during which those persons have received such aid, the frequency of such aid, or the nature and amount thereof.56 To the contrary, with regard to legal persons ‘in so far as they may invoke the rights conferred by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter’, the Court took the view that the obligation to publish following from the disputed EU provisions did not go beyond the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality. In this connection the Court made the following more general observation: The seriousness of the breach of the right to protection of personal data manifests itself in different ways for, on the one hand, legal persons and, on the other, natural persons. It is necessary to point out in this regard that legal persons are already subject to a more onerous obligation in respect of the publication of data relating to them. Furthermore, the obligation on the competent national authorities to examine, before the data in question are published and for each legal person which is a beneficiary of EAGF or EAFRD aid, whether the name of that person identifies natural persons would impose on those authorities an unreasonable administrative burden.57

07.27A The Court therefore held that the EU law provisions, the validity of which were questioned by the referring court, observed, in so far as they concerned the publication of data relating to legal persons, a fair balance in the consideration taken of the respective interests in issue.58 07.28A Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion in Etat du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg v B59 suggests a further consideration regarding the legal and natural persons distinction. The case focuses on an order of the Luxembourg tax authorities requesting the release of documentation. As it relates to Article 7 CFR, the legal issue was whether the ‘third parties concerned [to an

54 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen (CJEU, J­ udgment 9 November 2010) [52]. 55 Ibid [53] (emphasis added). 56 Ibid [92]. 57 Ibid [87] (emphasis added). 58 Ibid [88]. 59 Case C-245/19 Etat du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg v B (CJEU, Opinion of the Court of Justice 2 July 2020).

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information order] must have an effective remedy against the information order issued by the requested authority. In this regard, it is of significance whether the rights of the aforementioned groups of persons under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter (respect for private life, protection of personal data) may have been violated.’60 As noted, Article 7 CFR includes: any information related to an identified or identifiable individual;61 and activities of a professional or business nature, including the associated transactions, as well as banking data.62 Elaborating on the effect on Article 7 rights for third parties, the Advocate General wrote: ‘the request for information and the subsequent order issued by the requesting authority could be based on incorrect facts concerning third parties. The transfer of the data to a public authority gives an unknown person access to that data, irrespective of whether the owner of the data has consented to this. However, this is precisely what Article 7 of the Charter seeks to prevent. This example illustrates the practical need of the third parties concerned for effective remedies against such injunctions.’63 Both this request and the obligation of another party to follow it constitute an interference. Within the context of the joined cases, the AG concluded that there ‘may’ be a violation of third parties’ Article 7 rights.64 The Covid-19 pandemic has caused a notable increase in teleworking where individuals carry 07.29A on their work, where possible, within their homes. The (further) blurring of work and home lives raises questions centred around Article 7 CFR, whether it be private life or home.65 Teleworking (from home) will be an area to observe in regard to Charter rights. (c) Communications The express right to respect for communications can be seen as a supplement to the protection 07.30A of private life and home. In Article 7 CFR the term ‘communications’ has replaced ‘correspondence’ in Article 8 ECHR because communications ‘accounts for technological developments’.66 The change in nomenclature should not be taken as a criticism of the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 8 ECHR which has found that the Convention right includes a range of technical forms of communication such as, telephone calls and conversations, email, and other forms of internetbased communication.67 The protection extends whether or not the communication is still being processed or has already been received and stored by the addressee. In practice, the protection of communications under Article 7 CFR often overlaps with these other rights elements, particularly the right to respect for private life.68 The protection of communications includes not only correspondence of a personal or 07.31A intimately ‘private’ nature between individual physical persons, but also correspondence with professional and commercial content.69 In addition, communications are protected regardless of

60 Etat du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg [46]. 61 Volker und Markus Schecke [52]. 62 MN and Others v San Marino (ECtHR, Judgment 7 July 2015) [51]. 63 Etat du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg [92]. 64 Etat du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg [98]. 65 For discussion on teleworking in the pandemic cf D Mangan, E Gramano, M Kullmann, ‘An unprecedented social solidarity stress test’ (2020) 11 European Labour Law Journal 247–75. 66 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C3030/20. 67 Cf Halford v UK; Copland v UK; Bărbulescu v Romania. 68 Cf Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft v Nemzeti Adó-és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó-és Vám Főigazgatóság (CJEU, 17 December 2015); Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal (CJEU, Judgment 2 October 2018). 69 Cf ECtHR judgments in Kopp v Switzerland (25 March 1998); Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v Austria (16 October 2007); and Iliya Stefanov v Bulgaria (22 May 2008) (these three decisions concern searches in law offices); Bărbulescu v Romania.



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the fact that they are being initiated, received or stored at the workplace.70 In the work setting, the ECtHR’s statement that ‘an employer’s instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero’71 suggests that communications technology (as a means for private social life to intrude upon the workplace) will remain a source of further judicial treatment. Communications and data protection have intersected in some of the high-profile decisions of the CJEU. The data protection aspects of Article 7 CFR are considered later in this chapter. Although communications is the focus of this section, the cases also show how information technologies convey data along with their communications.72 07.32A Digital Rights Ireland73 stands out in this discussion for its impact on private life considerations, but also for the fact that it was the first case to invalidate EU secondary law in its entirety based solely on the CFR. The applicant challenged the validity of the Data Retention Directive74 which sought to harmonise Member State provisions related to the retention of data generated or processed by publicly available electronic communications services or networks ‘in order to ensure that data are available for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, including organised crime and terrorism’.75 In its preliminary ruling, although finding the public security objectives justified the retention of the identified data,76 the CJEU invalidated the Data Retention Directive because ‘all traffic’77 was to be retained by communications services for between six and 24 months (which the Court found was not strictly necessary) and the data collected permitted ‘very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives’ of the data subjects by national authorities,78 thereby interfering with the right in Article 7 (and 8) CFR. 07.33A In Tele2,79 the CJEU invalidated national legislation on a similar basis. The challenged Swedish legislation80 required the ‘general and indiscriminate retention’81 of all traffic and location data for all subscribers using electronic communications. Electronic communications service providers were obliged to do this continuously. Tele2 Sverige, in response to Digital Rights Ireland, told the Swedish telecommunications authority that it would cease retaining the required information. Tele2 brought this action against the Swedish authority; which found Tele2 in violation of national law. Similar to the Data Retention Directive, this law failed the

70 Cf ECtHR judgments in Halford v United Kingdom; Copland v United Kingdom; Bernh Larsen Holding; Bărbulescu v Romania. 71 Bărbulescu v Romania (ECtHR, Judgment 5 September 2017) [80]. 72 For the purposes of the E-Privacy Directive, it was held that ‘communications’ was understood broadly so as to include both data related to users as well as data related to specific communications: Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal (Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, 3 May 2018), [54], endorsed by the court in Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal (CJEU, Judgment 2 October 2018) [41]–[42]. 73 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (CJEU, Judgment 8 April 2014). 74 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC ([2006] OJ L105/54). 75 Digital Rights Ireland [24]. 76 Ibid [41], [44]. 77 Ibid [56]. 78 Ibid [27]. 79 Joined Cases 2013 & 698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Others (CJEU Judgment 21 December 2016). 80 The law is outlined in Tele2 [14]-[15]. It was transposing into Swedish law Art 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) ([2002] OJ L201/37), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 ([2009] OJ L337/11). 81 Tele2 [103].

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proportionality analysis, insofar as the measures exceeded what was strictly necessary to serve the objective of crime detection and prevention. The impugned legislation affected ‘all persons using electronic communication services, even though those persons are not, even indirectly, in a situation that is liable to give rise to criminal proceedings.’82 Article 15(1) of the E-Privacy Directive permitted relevant authorities access to the location and traffic data from electronic communications where the objective pursued by that access is restricted ‘solely to fighting serious crime’ (where such access is subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority, and where there is a requirement that the data concerned should be retained within the European Union).83 WebMindLicenses Kft84 was another matter related to the detection of crime-related activities. 07.34A In the context of alleged tax fraud, the applicant brought a claim against the Hungarian National Tax and Customs Authority alleging the Tax Authority had obtained evidence against WebMindLicences by intercepting telecommunications and seizing emails through a parallel criminal investigation.85 Since Article 8 ECHR is interpreted as having the same meaning as Article 7 CFR,86 intercepting telecommunications and emails constitutes an interference with rights in both Articles.87 In this instance, the Tax Authority interfered with the applicant’s Article 7 rights.88 The CJEU in WebMindLicenses Kft instructed the national court reviewing the case to employ this common analysis. If it found a breach of Article 7, the evidence was to be disregarded and the Tax Authority’s decision annulled.89 In Ministerio Fiscal,90 another instance of crime-related activities, the CJEU considered a 07.35A police request for a wide range of electronic communications information over a 12-day period in response to a mobile phone theft. The incident and report arose on 15 February 2015. About a week later, the police sought an order from the investigating magistrate requesting electronic communications service providers to deliver a list of all telephone numbers activated between 16 and 27 February 2015, along with the International Mobile Equipment Identity code (IMEI code) of the stolen mobile telephone; as well as ‘the personal data relating to the identity of owners or users of the telephones corresponding to the SIM cards activated with the code, such as their surnames, forenames and, if need be, addresses.’91 Denying the request (by order of 5 May 2015), the magistrate held that the measures requested would ‘not serve to identify the perpetrators of the offence’. The Court did not respond to the questions posed in the reference because ‘the request concerns only whether, and to what extent, the objective

82 Ibid [105]. 83 Ibid [125]. 84 Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft v Nemzeti Adó-és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó-és Vám Főigazgatóság (CJEU, ­Judgment 17 December 2015). 85 Concern regarding banking and financial information in relation to crime has been an area of growing concern. In addition to WebMindLicensse Kft, other CJEU decisions related to finance and crime are discussed in this chapter. It is worth noting the more recent Directive on this topic: Directive (EU) 2019/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 laying down rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences, and repealing Council Decision 2000/642/JHA ([2019] OJ L186/122–37). While privacy is not frequently mentioned, Recital 27 speaks to respecting the right to privacy. 86 Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres (CJEU, Judgment 15 November 2011) [70]. 87 WebMindLicenses [71]–[72]. 88 Ibid [80]. 89 Ibid [91]. Since the rules for taking evidence regarding VAT fraud is for Member States to determine and is not part of EU law, there is a limitation in this area as to what may be referred to the CJEU. Cf Cases C-469/18 and C-470/18 IN, JM v Belgische Staat (CJEU, Judgment 24 October 2019). 90 Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal (CJEU, Judgment 2 October 2018). 91 Ibid [20].



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pursued by the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is capable of justifying the access of public authorities, such as the police, to such data, without the other conditions for access deriving from Article 15(1) forming part of the subject matter of the request.’92 The case focused on Article 15(1) of the E-Privacy Directive which permitted Member States to adopt measures that restricted rights under the Directive when it was necessary in relation to criminal offences.93 07.36A The Court distinguished the ruling in Digital Rights Ireland (and Tele2) from the facts in Ministerio Fiscal.94 In Digital Rights Ireland, the retention and communication of traffic data under the Data Retention Directive95 constituted ‘particularly serious interferences with the rights guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8’ CFR.96 In Ministerio Fiscal, the CJEU found that the access in question was distinct from Digital Rights Ireland (as well as Tele2) because the request sought to link ‘the SIM card or cards activated with the stolen mobile telephone … during a specific period, with the identity of the owners of those SIM cards.’97 This request for access did not ‘allow precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data is concerned.’98 In assessing whether the intervention with Article 7 (and 8) CFR ‘must be regarded as “serious”’,99 the CJEU found that this access would not be a serious interference with the fundamental right(s) of individuals whose data is concerned.100 As well, it would be justifiable, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the E-Privacy Directive, by the objective of preventing, investigating, detecting and processing criminal offences generally (while also incorporating the criteria from Tele2).101 The decision accorded subscriber data (name, IMEI) similar protection to traffic data (in Digital Rights Ireland). This is an important aspect of the judgment because, in part, the Directive’s ‘safeguards cannot be circumvented by creating a separate category of subscriber data.’102

III.  Specific Provisions (a)  Union Citizenship 07.37A The implications of Union citizenship for Article 7 CFR have emerged more directly with cases coming before the CJEU pertaining to security measures seeking to detect and prevent terrorism. Personal information ranging from passenger name records (PNR) to biometric data have been subject to mass collection and processing, thereby calling attention to the effect of these steps on Article 7 CFR.

92 Ibid [49]. See also the more extensive engagement by the Advocate General: Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal (­Opinion AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, 3 May 2018) [93]–[101]. 93 Ministerio Fiscal [39]. 94 Distinctions from these decisions were also pointed out by the Advocate General: Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal (Opinion AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, 3 May 2018) [32] ff. 95 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, [2006] OJ L 105/54. 96 Ministerio Fiscal [25], [51]. See also Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal (Opinion AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, 3 May 2018), [76]–[77]. 97 Ibid [60]. 98 Ibid [60]. 99 Ibid [58]. 100 Ibid [62]. 101 Ibid [62]–[63]. 102 C Docksey, ‘Ministerio Fiscal: Holding the line on ePrivacy’ (2019) 26 Maastricht Journal of European and­ Comparative Law 585–94, 592.

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(i)  Name and Personal Identity Based upon the discussion of Article 52(3) in the Explanations to the CFR, the identity of ­ physical persons (as one of the core aspects of private life protected by Article 8 ECHR) would also be covered by Article 7 CFR. An individuals’ identity includes the physical, psychological and social identity, consisting of such features as name, family origin, ethnic background, gender identification, sexual orientation, sexual life,103 and possibly the ‘arbitrary denial of citizenship’.104 The ECtHR has often considered name issues under both private life and family life as a ‘means of personal identification and of linking to a family’, thereby reflecting the inseparability of these two notions.105 While society and the state have legitimate interests in regulating the usage of names, such public law aspects are in themselves well in line with the perception of private life as encompassing rights to establish and develop relations with other human beings, including in professional and commercial relations.106 From the perspective of Article 7 CFR, personal identity may seem to be of tangential relevance. Features of this aspect of private life may not have any significant link to EU law as it stands today. Nonetheless, ‘a person’s name is a constituent element of his identity and of his private life, the protection of which is enshrined’ in Article 7 CFR and in Article 8 ECHR.107 Issues of personal identity have touched upon Union citizenship. The importance of these issues stem from the challenges, not to mention the inconvenience, posed to private and professional lives by state documents in which names are incorrect or ambiguous in some manner. The CJEU deliberated on the Charter’s link with the scope of EU law in Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein, where an Austrian national, resident in Germany, had been precluded by Austrian law (on the abolition of the nobility) from bearing the title of ‘Fürstin von’ that she had acquired in Germany by being adopted by a German national with a similar title of nobility. Challenging the correction of her name in the Austrian register of civil status, the Austrian national argued that the amendment of her surname which she had used continuously for 15 years constituted interference with her right to respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR, and that the interference was with an established right acquired in good faith and therefore could not take place without a particular necessity to do so. As a preliminary observation the CJEU noted that although, as EU law stands at present, the rules governing a person’s surname and the use of titles of nobility are matters within the competence of the Member States, these states must comply with EU law when exercising that competence.108 In this regard Article 21 TFEU applied to the applicant’s situation because she, in her capacity as Union citizen, had made use of the freedom to move and reside in another Member State than that of her nationality. The Court therefore found it necessary to examine in

103 Dadouch v Malta (ECtHR, Judgment 20 July 2010) [47]–[48], where marital status was found to constitute part of an individual’s personal and social identity. 104 Genovese v Malta (ECtHR, Judgment 11 October 2011) [30], [33]; Ramadan v Malta (ECtHR, Judgment 21 June 2016) [62], [84] (where no violation of Art 8 ECHR was found). 105 Burghartz v Switzerland (ECtHR, Judgment 22 February 1994) [24]. See also ECtHR judgments in Ünal Tekeli v Turkey (16 November 2004) [42]; and Daróczy v Hungary (1 July 2008) [26]. 106 Cf Ünal Tekeli [42]: ‘Article 8 of the Convention does not contain any explicit provisions on names, but as a means of personal identification and of linking to a family, a person’s name nonetheless concerns his or her private and family life. The fact that there may exist a public interest in regulating the use of names is not sufficient to remove the question of a person’s name from the scope of private and family life, which has been construed as including, to a certain degree, the right to establish relationships with others.’ 107 C-103/13 U v Stadt Karlsruhe (CJEU, Judgment 2 October 2014) (Opinion of 30 April 2014 of AG Jääskinen) [25]. 108 Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein (CJEU, Judgment 22 December 2010) [38].



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the light of this provision the refusal by the Austrian authorities to recognise all the elements of a surname obtained by means of adoption in Germany.109 07.42A Issues raised by conflicts of name legislation between Member States, due to differences between the law of a Member State of nationality and the Member State of actual residence, had been dealt with by the CJEU in previous cases on the basis of Articles 17 and 18 TEC on Union citizenship.110 As regards children with the nationality of two Member States, the Court had already held that a discrepancy in surnames is liable to cause serious inconvenience for those concerned at both professional and private levels resulting from, inter alia, difficulties in benefiting, in the Member State of which they are nationals, from the legal effects of diplomas or documents drawn up in the surname recognised in another Member State of which they are also nationals. Such serious inconvenience could likewise arise where a child has only one single nationality, because [i]t matters little in that regard whether the discrepancy in surnames is the result of the dual nationality of the persons concerned or of the fact that, in the State of birth and residence, the connecting factor for determination of a surname is residence whilst, in the State of which those persons are nationals, it is nationality.111

07.43A In the case of Sayn-Wittgenstein the CJEU included references to the Charter in its reasoning on the effects of conflicting name legislation, yet apparently with limited impact. The Court noted that a person’s name is a constituent element of his identity and of his private life, the protection of which is enshrined in Article 7 CFR and in Article 8 ECHR. Quoting the ECtHR interpretation, the CJEU stated that even though the latter provision does not refer to it explicitly, a person’s name ‘as a means of personal identification and a link to a family, none the less concerns his or her private and family life’.112 In line with its previous case law, the CJEU continued its examination on the basis of the Treaty provisions on Union citizenship by stating that national legislation which places certain nationals of the Member State concerned at a disadvantage ­simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21 TFEU on every citizen of the Union. The Court further stated that obliging a person who has exercised his right to move and reside freely in the territory of another Member State to use a surname, in the Member State of which he is a national, which is different from that already conferred and registered in the Member State of birth and residence is liable to hamper the exercise of the right, established in Article 21 TFEU, to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.113

07.44A As such difference in surnames is liable to give rise to doubts as to the person’s identity and the authenticity of the documents submitted, or the veracity of their content, the Court ­concluded that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to recognise all the elements of the ­surname of their national, as determined in Germany where she was residing and as entered for 15 years in the Austrian register of civil status, was a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 21 TFEU.114 109 Ibid [39], [42]. 110 CJEU judgments in Cases C-148/02 Garcia Avello (2 October 2003) and C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul (14 October 2008). While the Court made no mention of the CFR in these rulings, Advocate General Sharpston referred to Art 24 CFR as well as human rights treaty provisions on rights of children in her opinion of 24 April 2008 on Grunkin and Paul [9]. 111 Grunkin and Paul [23]–[24]. 112 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein [52]. 113 Ibid [53]–[54], referring to Grunkin and Paul and other CJEU rulings. 114 Ibid [67]–[71].

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This restriction was considered justified however, since the law on the abolition of the nobility 07.45A was an element of national identity, in the context of Austrian constitutional history, which should be taken into account when striking a balance between legitimate interests and the right of free movement under EU law, and that justification was to be interpreted as reliance on public policy.115 In its consideration of the proportionality of the restriction, the Court referred to the principle of equal treatment as a general principle of EU law, enshrined in Article 20 CFR, and to Article 4(2) TEU concerning respect for the national identities of Member States, holding that there was no doubt that the objective underlying the abolition of the nobility, that of observing the principle of equal treatment, was compatible with EU law. Consequently, the CJEU considered the public policy grounds as being proportionate, and therefore not unjustifiably undermining the freedom to move and reside enjoyed by Union citizens.116 A person’s name as an element of identity and of private life as enshrined in Article 7 CFR earned only sporadic mention as a preliminary point in the Court’s reasoning; while this Charter provision was generally absorbed by considerations of free movement for Union citizens under Article 21 TFEU. In its final assessment of the proportionality of the restriction imposed by the national measure, the Court referred to Article 20 CFR on equality before the law as a basis for justifying the public policy aim of abolishing the nobility. Subsequent CJEU rulings on legislative conflicts between Member States regarding the names 07.46A of physical persons have followed the pattern of reasoning applied in Sayn-Wittgenstein. The questions referred to the Court in Runevic-Vardyn derived from the refusal by Lithuanian authorities to amend the birth certificate and marriage certificate of a Lithuanian national and her Polish husband so as to comply with the spelling rules of the latter’s Member State of nationality.117 Recognising the importance attached to Union citizenship which is ‘intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’, the Court again considered the situation to fall within the scope of EU law, as both of the applicant spouses had exercised their freedom to move and reside in Member States other than those of their origin, and Article 21 TFEU therefore constituted the relevant link between the Charter and EU law.118 The Court referred to Article 7 CFR and Article 8 ECHR as a preliminary point;119 while basing its examination of the existence of a restriction on freedom of movement and residence and of the justification for such restriction primarily on Article 21 TFEU.120 The national authorities’ refusal to amend certificates of civil status was examined as a matter of restriction on freedom of movement and residence, rather than as one of interference with—or lack of action to respect—the right to respect for private and family life under Article 7 CFR. The Charter was again quoted in the context of the justification test, where Article 7 CFR was supplemented by Article 22 CFR on respect for cultural and linguistic diversity, along with Articles 3(3) and 4(2) TEU.121 Article 7 CFR has been a more pronounced issue where personal identity comes under 07.47A the scope of security measures. The Court in Stadt Karlsruhe122 focused more directly on Article 7 CFR where the applicant had ceased using his birth surname upon marriage.

115 Ibid [83]–[84]. See, on the constitutional aspects of the case, LFM Besselink, ‘Respecting Constitutional Identity in the EU’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 671–93. 116 Ibid [89]–[95]. 117 Case C-391/09 Malgozata Runevic-Vardyn and Lukasz Pawel Wardyn (ECtHR, Judgment 12 May 2011). 118 Ibid [60]–[65]. 119 Ibid [66]. 120 Ibid [69]–[82] and [83]–[93], respectively. 121 Ibid [89], [86]. See the brief comment on this case in Besselink, 680. 122 C-103/13 U v Stadt Karlsruhe (CJEU, Judgment 2 October 2014).



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His passport contained both his married surname and birth surname (the latter on another line and identified as such). The applicant requested his passport be changed to ensure clarity regarding his (married) surname. This was refused. The CJEU ruled that the relevant Regulation 2252/2004123 must be interpreted with regards to Article 7 CFR. And so, ‘where a Member State whose law provides that a person’s name comprises his forenames and surname chooses nevertheless to include the birth name of the passport holder in … the machine readable personal data page of the passport, that State is required to state clearly in the caption of those fields that the birth name is entered there.’124 07.48A Foreshadowing a wider discussion below on data protection, security measures entailing mass data collection, retention, and dissemination have emerged as a particularly fraught area with regards to Article 7 CFR (as well as Article 8 CFR). While information technology garners much of the attention in these cases, geopolitics can additionally play a role.125 The fundamental rights implications arose where there had been a convergence of technological capabilities regarding data collection and processing with steps to detect and prevent terrorism commencing at the turn of the twenty-first century.126 Regarding Passenger Name Records (PNR), the EU/Canada Agreement permitted ‘the systematic and continuous transfer of PNR data of all air passengers flying between the European Union and Canada.’127 The Court found the Agreement exceeded what was strictly necessary in relation to information processed. The agreement also failed to provide sufficient protections (as the articulation of the data needed lacked precision) in violation of Articles 7, 8, 21 and 52 CFR with regards to PNR data128 and sensitive data.129 The Court identified several points as falling short of limiting the collection, retention and disclosure of data to what was strictly necessary, including: the five-year data retention period for all passengers after they departed Canada;130 and the potential disclosure of this data by Canadian authorities to third parties.131 07.49A The issue of temporary residence permits to EU Member States for third-country nationals forms another aspect of how personal identity and security intersect under Article 7 CFR. Third-country nationals’ obligation to cooperate in the collection, recording, and retention of their machine-readable personal data in the form of biometrics (facial image and 10 fingerprints) was at issue in Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid.132 The processing of this personal data affected these individuals’ respect for private life. The issuance of temporary residence permits to third-country nationals (here, Turkish nationals) was conditional upon the collection, recording and retention of their biometric data in a central filing system. Moreover, this national rule

123 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States [2004] OJ L385/2. 124 Stadt Karlsruhe [51]. A.G. Jääskinen touched on the Art 8 CFR aspects in his Opinion of 30 April 2014 [26], [43]. 125 M Zalnieriute, ‘Developing a European Standard for International Data Transfers after Snowden: Opinion 1/15 on the EU-Canada PNR Agreement’ (2018) 81 Modern Law Review 1046–63. 126 Cf E Guild & E Mendos Kuşkonmaz, ‘EU exclusive jurisdiction on surveillance related to terrorism and serious ­transnational crime: case review on Opinion 1/15’ (2018) 43 European Law Review 583–97. 127 Re EU-Canada Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement (CJEU, Judgment 26 July 2017) [127]. Elaborating upon the potential violation of Art 7 CFR, the Grand Chamber wrote [128] that ‘the data may, inter alia, reveal a complete travel itinerary, travel habits, relationships existing between air passengers and the financial situation of air passengers, their dietary habits or state of health, and may even provide sensitive information about those passengers, as defined in art 2(e) of the envisaged agreement.’ 128 Ibid [155]–[163]. 129 Ibid [166]–[167]. 130 Ibid [206]–[207]. 131 Ibid [213]–[217]. 132 Case C-70/18 Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v A, B, P (CJEU, Judgment 3 October 2019).

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meant that the collected data could then be shared with third parties for the purpose of detecting, investigating, and preventing offences (including those of a terrorist nature). The referring court found that this constituted a ‘new restriction’ (coming after the signing of an association agreement between the EEC and Turkey). The Court, however, found the restriction justifiable based upon the objective of preventing and combating identity and document fraud. (b)  Family Reunification This area relates more directly to the family life aspect of Article 7 CFR. The discussion below 07.50A does not advance an argument against this dominant character. Instead, it points out that there remain some intersecting aspects of family and private life. Advocates General opinions have touched upon this connection more so than the CJEU. (i)  Family Members of Union Citizens While the Charter of Fundamental Rights seems to have limited impact on the general delimita- 07.51A tion of Union citizens’ residence rights under Directive 2004/38,133 one might expect it to be considered relevant to the interpretation of the specific Directive provisions dealing with the right of residence for family members of Union citizens, in particular those family members who are third-country nationals. As the right of residence for these family members in a Member State exists as a derivative of their Union citizen relative, such cases can raise issues concerning private and family life, as protected under Article 7 CFR. The Charter, however, has only been a marginal source of reference in CJEU rulings. An illustrative example is Rahman, in which the Court was asked to clarify the interpretation 07.52A of Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38 concerning Member States’ duty to facilitate entry and residence for relatives of Union citizens not falling within the definition of family members in Article 2(2) of the Directive, who are nonetheless dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen.134 The Court’s ruling made no mention of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, despite the Advocate General having relied upon the Charter in his examination of the questions raised concerning the interpretation of the Directive. According to the Advocate General, the margin of discretion accorded to Member States in connection with ‘facilitating’ the entry and residence of relatives under Article 3(2) of the Directive is limited in two ways. First, the national measure at issue must not have the effect of unjustifiably impeding the exercise by the Union citizen of his right of free movement and residence within the territory of the Member States.135 Second, the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Member States is limited by the obligation to respect the right to private and family life, enshrined in Article 7 CFR, which, by virtue of Article 6(1) TEU, has acquired the same legal value as the Treaties.136 As regards the latter source of limiting Member States’ discretion under Article 3(2) of the 07.53A Directive, the Advocate General pointed to the CJEU case law recognising the fundamental right

133 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/ EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] 158/77 ­(Citizens’ Rights Directive). Recital 31 of the Directive expressly states that it respects the fundamental rights and ­freedoms set out in the Charter. 134 Case C-83/11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Muhammad Sazzadur Rahman, Fazly Rabby Islam, and Mohibullah Rahman (CJEU, Judgment 5 September 2012). 135 Ibid (Opinion of 27 March 2012 of Advocate General Bot) [69]. 136 Ibid [70], further elaborated upon in [71]–[77].



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to family life as forming part of the general principles of EU law.137 In Metock, the Court stated that ‘if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in the host Member State, the exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed’.138 Reference was also made by the Advocate General to the Dereci judgment in which the CJEU—observing that Article 7 CFR contains rights which correspond to those guaranteed by Article 8(1) ECHR, and that the meaning and scope of the former article are to be the same as those laid down by the latter article, as interpreted by the case law of the ECtHR—held that the referring court in that case had to examine whether the refusal of the right of residence of the applicants, who were non-Member State nationals and members of the family of a Union citizen, undermined the right to respect for private and family life.139 07.54A In his thorough examination of the fundamental rights aspects of the question of interpretation of Directive 2004/38, the Advocate General further mentioned the ECtHR’s rulings that Article 8 ECHR does not guarantee foreign nationals ‘a right to choose the most suitable place to develop family life’, and does not impose on a state ‘a general obligation to respect immigrants’ choice of the country of their matrimonial residence and to authorise family reunion in its territory’.140 Nevertheless, the ECtHR has held that Article 8 ECHR may give rise to positive obligations inherent in effective respect for family life, meaning that a state is required to let a person enter its territory.141 On the basis of this interpretation, the CJEU has held that, while the ECHR does not guarantee the right of a foreign national to enter or to reside in a particular state, refusing to allow a person to enter or reside in a state where close members of his family are living may amount to an infringement of the right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Such an interference will, the Advocate General pointed out, infringe the ECHR if it does not meet the requirements of Article 8(2) according to which it must be in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that paragraph, and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.142 07.55A The combination of the right of residence attached to Union citizenship and the protection of private and family life, as implemented by EU law, may therefore effectively establish a right of residence for members of the family of the Union citizen. In the Advocate General’s opinion, this right need not be reserved for the closest family members. Whilst Article 8 ECHR guarantees only the exercise of the right to respect for an ‘existing’ family life, and whilst it has been held, in the specific area of entry, residence and removal of non-nationals, that the family had to be limited to the ‘core family’, the ECtHR nevertheless generally adopts a broad conception of family life, characterised by the presence of legal or factual elements pointing to the existence of a close personal relationship, which makes it possible to include, under certain circumstances, ties between grandparents and grandchildren or ties between brothers and sisters. Even de facto relationships lacking any blood ties have been regarded as constituting ‘family life’.143 Assuming that the principle of non-discrimination does not allow a family definition with ‘variable

137 Ibid [71]. 138 Case C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (CJEU, Judgment 25 July 2008) [62]. 139 Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres (CJEU, Judgment 15 November 2011) [70]–[72]. 140 Rahman (Opinion of 27 March 2012 of Advocate General Bot) [72]. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid [73], referring to Case C-109/01 Hacene Akrich v Secretary of State for the Home Department (CJEU, Judgment 23 September 2003) [59]. 143 Ibid [74]–[75].

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geometry’ depending on whether the members of the family of the Union citizen concerned are themselves Union citizens or nationals of a non-Member State, and that, when defining the scope of the fundamental right to private and family life, the notion of family also cannot vary according to the more or less strict definitions under the provisions of secondary law, the Advocate General concluded that the fundamental right to private and family life may, in principle, be relied on by all categories of persons mentioned in Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38.144 Similar differences in the interpretive approach and the pattern of reasoning can be found in 07.56A other significant CJEU rulings concerning the right of residence for family members of Union citizens. Thus, even while the reference for preliminary ruling in the Zambrano case made no mention of Article 7 CFR, it included Articles 21, 24 and 34 CFR, and the applicant had been alleging infringement of Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 of ECHR Protocol 4 before the national court, the CJEU based its ruling in the case exclusively on Article 20 TFEU without any explicit examination of the possible impact of CFR provisions.145 The Advocate General, on the other hand, had referred to Articles 7 and 24 CFR and examined the fundamental right to family life under EU law.146 The subsequent CJEU case attempting to clarify the scope of the Zambrano doctrine on 07.57A residence right for the third-country family members of Union citizens—in order not to deprive such citizens of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’147—adopted the same approach as the CJEU by examining the impact of Union citizenship merely on the basis of Article 20 TFEU. Having concluded on this aspect, the Court briefly discussed the right to respect for private and family life, referring to Articles 7 and 51 CFR and Article 8 ECHR, and made the following statement of more general relevance for the understanding of the interrelation between the Charter and the ECHR: Thus, in the present case, if the referring court considers, in the light of the circumstances of the disputes in the main proceedings, that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings is covered by European Union law, it must examine whether the refusal of their right of residence undermines the right to respect for private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the Charter. On the other hand, if it takes the view that that situation is not covered by European Union law, it must undertake that examination in the light of Article 8(1) of the ECHR.148

The consideration of the third-country family members’ actual dependency on the Union 07.58A ­citizen, underlying the Court’s reasoning in such cases, was eloquently explained by the Advocate General who stated that they are ‘based on the premiss that “the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen” within the meaning of the abovementioned judgment in Ruiz Zambrano does not include the right to respect for family life enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in Article 8(1) of the ECHR.’149 The different approaches taken by the Advocate General and the Court are reflected again in 07.59A the CJEU ruling in Iida where the Court found no connection with EU law, and consequently held the Charter inapplicable with no specific discussion of the impact of Articles 7 and 24.150





144 Ibid

[76]–[77]. C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’employ (CJEU, Judgment 8 March 2011) [31], [35], [40]–[45]. 146 Ibid (Opinion of 30 September 2010 of Advocate General Sharpston) [61]–[66]. 147 Ibid (Judgment 8 March 2011) [42]. 148 Dereci [72]. 149 Ibid (Opinion of 29 September 2011 of Advocate General Mengozzi) [37]. 150 Case C-40/11 Yoshikazu Iida v Stadt Ulm (CJEU, Judgment 8 November 2012) [78]–[80]. 145 Case

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The Advocate General, on the other hand, upon detailed examination reached the following interim conclusion: it must therefore be stated that, in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 6(1) and (3) TEU, and in particular in the light of those enshrined in Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a parent who has a right of custody and is a third-country national can, in order to maintain a personal relationship and direct parental contact on a regular basis, have a right of residence in the Member State of origin of his child who is a Union citizen under Articles 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU, if the child has moved from there to another Member State, exercising his right of free movement. For such a right of residence to exist, the denial thereof must have a restrictive effect on the child’s right to freedom of movement and must be regarded as amounting to a disproportionate interference with fundamental rights in the light of the abovementioned fundamental rights. This is a matter for assessment by the referring court.151

07.60A The joined cases of O, S and L concerned more complex family configurations, involving not only the third-country parent of a child holding Union citizenship, but in addition a second third-country parent and a third-country child born from the marriage of these two parents. Here the Court held that Article 20 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from refusing to grant a third-country national a residence permit on the basis of family reunification where that national seeks to reside with his spouse, who is also a third-country national and resides lawfully in that Member State and is the mother of a child from a previous marriage who is a Union citizen, and with the child of their own marriage, who is also a third-country national, provided that such a refusal does not entail, for the Union citizen child concerned, the denial of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by the status of citizen of the Union. The latter would be for the national court to ascertain, yet the CJEU added that this would be without prejudice to the question whether, on the basis of other criteria, inter alia by virtue of the right to the protection of family life, the right of residence of the third-country applicants could still be refused.152 Notably, this aspect of the case was decided by the Court without reference to the Charter, while Articles 7 and 24 CFR were mentioned subsequently in the judgment in connection with the interpretation of the Family Reunification Directive.153 07.61A In Ymeraga, another decision pertaining to the scope of the Zambrano doctrine on residence rights for third-country family members of Union citizens, the referring court had, in addition to Article 20 TFEU, expressly asked whether the Charter rights, guarantees and obligations, in particular those under Articles 20, 21, 24, 33 and 34 CFR, confer a right to family reunification upon a sponsor who is a Union citizen. Despite the absence of reference to Article 7 CFR, the Court’s answer is of interest also in the context of the protection of private and family life under this provision. Upon holding that the refusal of residence right to the third-country family members would not have the effect of denying the applicant Union citizen the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of his status as citizen of the Union,154 the Court explained that to determine whether the refusal is a situation involving the implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51 CFR, it must be ascertained among other things whether the national legislation at issue is intended to implement a provision of European Union law, what the character of that legislation is, and whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by 151 Ibid (Opinion of 15 May 2012 of Advocate General Trstenjak) [70]–[88]. 152 Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L (CJEU, Judgment 6 December 2012) [58]–[59]. 153 Ibid [75]–[80]. 154 Case C-87/12 Ymeraga v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration (CJEU, Judgment 8 May 2013) [39].

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European Union law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting that law, and also whether there are specific rules of European Union law on the matter or capable of affecting it.155 The Court held as follows: While the Law on freedom of movement is indeed intended to implement European Union law, it is none the less the case that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings is not governed by European Union law, since Mr Kreshnik Ymeraga cannot be regarded as a beneficiary of either Directive 2004/38 or, as regards the applications at issue in the main proceedings, Directive 2003/86, and the refusal to confer a right of residence on Mr Kreshnik Ymeraga’s family members does not have the effect of denying him the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of his status as citizen of the Union. In those circumstances, the Luxembourg authorities’ refusal to grant Mr Kreshnik Ymeraga’s family members a right of residence as family members of a Union citizen is not a situation involving the implementation of European Union law within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter, so that its conformity with fundamental rights cannot be examined in the light of the rights established by the Charter.156

The CJEU in Coman and Others157 discussed Article 7 CFR (particularly the overlap of family 07.62A and private life) as adjacent to the more prominent free movement rights under TFEU Article 21(1). The legal issue before the Court was intricate: whether ‘spouse’ in the Citizens’ Rights Directive158 included ‘a third-country national of the same sex as the Union citizen whose marriage to that citizen was concluded [during a period of genuine residence] in a Member State in accordance with the law of that state’.159 The gender-neutral nature of ‘spouse’ meant that the term encompassed a same-sex spouse of an EU citizen. While the Court affirms Member States’ freedom to determine whether or not to allow marriage between same-sex couples, they ‘must comply with EU law’ permitting free movement and residence.160 To find otherwise, the Court asserts, would make the freedom dependent upon the Member State.161 Though ‘spouse’ necessarily involves ‘family life’, it additionally touches upon private life, as both are guaranteed under Article 7 CFR. The CJEU appears to adopt the ECtHR’s decisions in which same-sex couples’ Article 8 ECHR rights have been articulated as crossing private and family life.162 (c) Asylum In its principled preliminary ruling from 2011 on the question of Member States’ obligation 07.63A to apply the Dublin Regulation163 in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the CJEU was requested to consider in particular Articles 1, 4, 18, 19 and 47 CFR, the Charter

155 Ibid [41]. 156 Ibid [42]–[43] (emphasis added). 157 Case C-673/16, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne (CJEU, Judgment 5 June 2018). 158 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC ([2004] OJ L158/77; corrigenda [2004] OJ L229/35, and [2005] OJ L197/34). 159 Coman [35]. 160 Ibid [38]; Garcia Avello [25]; Grunkin and Paul [16]; C-438/14, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff (CJEU, Judgment 2 June 2016) [29]. 161 Ibid [39]. 162 Ibid [48]–[50]. Cf ECtHR, Vallianatos and Others v Greece (Judgment 7 November 2013) [73]. 163 Regulation 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national [2003] OJ L50/1.



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­ rovisions most likely to have direct relevance to the examination of asylum applications.164 The p Court stated in general terms that Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation grants Member States a discretionary power which forms an integral part of the Common European Asylum System, and that discretionary power must be exercised in accordance with the other provisions of the Regulation.165 As the discretionary power conferred on the Member States by Article 3(2) of the Regulation forms part of the mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for an asylum application provided for under that regulation and, therefore, merely an element of the Common European Asylum System, the Court concluded that a Member State which exercises that discretionary power must be considered as implementing European Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.166 07.64A The general principle thus confirmed by the CJEU must be considered equally valid to cases in which the Dublin Regulation is being applied to circumstances falling within the scope of Article 7 CFR, at least insofar as the ‘sovereignty clause’ in Article 3(2) of the Regulation is concerned. This question was raised before the CJEU in the subsequent case of K v Bundesasylamt,167 yet the Court did not find it necessary to rule on this specific question. The main proceedings concerned an asylum-seeker, K, who had made her first asylum application in Poland and who, without awaiting the conclusion of the examination of that application, subsequently left Poland and entered Austria irregularly in order to join one of her adult sons already enjoying refugee status there along with his spouse and their three children. As K lodged an asylum application in Austria, the Austrian asylum authorities requested Poland to take back K in accordance with the Dublin Regulation, and Poland agreed to do so. Against that background, the Austrian asylum authorities rejected K’s asylum application, and K appealed that decision to the asylum court. 07.65A Due to the fact that K’s daughter-in-law, already staying as a refugee in Austria, was dependent on K because she had a newborn baby and was suffering from serious illness and handicap following a traumatic occurrence that had taken place in a third country, and K had become her confidante and had appropriate professional experience too, the Austrian asylum court considered that the ‘humanitarian clause’ in Article 15, or even Article 3(2) of the Regulation, should be taken into account in deciding whether Austria would be responsible for examining K’s asylum application. In that connection the asylum court considered that Article 15 as a lex specialis takes precedence over the general rules on the distribution of responsibility among Member States laid down in Articles 6–14 of the Regulation, and that the application of Article 3(2) is subsidiary to the application of Article 15 of the Regulation. Against the background of K’s family situation, the Austrian court referred two questions to the CJEU, one about the interpretation of Article 15 of the Regulation in such circumstances, and one about the interpretation of Article 3(2) in circumstances where the responsibility otherwise provided for by the criteria in the Dublin Regulation will result in an infringement of Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR, and Article 4 or Article 7 CFR, as well as the delimitation of the notions of ‘inhuman treatment’ and ‘family’ in these provisions of the ECHR and the CFR. 164 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS v Secretary of State for Home Department and M and Others v Refugee ­Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (CJEU, Judgment 21 December 2011) [86], [94], [106], [113]–[115]. 165 Ibid [65]–[66]. 166 Ibid [68]. Notably, the Court essentially limited its examination to Art 4 CFR (ibid [70]–[108]), stating that Arts 1, 18 and 47 CFR did not lead to a different answer to the questions raised by the national courts (ibid [109]–[115]). See the thorough analysis of the CJEU ruling in C Costello, ‘Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 287–339, 324–35, esp 327–28, and S Lieven ‘Case Report on C-411/10, N.S. and C-493/10, ME and Others, 21 December 2011’ (2012) 14 European Journal of Migration and Law 223–38. 167 Case C-245/11 K v Bundesasylamt (CJEU, Judgment 6 November 2012).

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As regards the first question, the CJEU ruled that in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, Article 15(2) of the Dublin Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State which is not responsible for examining an application for asylum pursuant to the general criteria laid down in the Regulation becomes so responsible. It is for the Member State which has become responsible within the meaning of that Regulation to assume the obligations which go along with that responsibility, and it must inform in that respect the Member State previously responsible, in the actual case Poland. The Court further stated that this interpretation of Article 15(2) also applies where the Member State which was responsible pursuant to the general criteria in the Regulation did not make a request in that regard, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the second sentence of Article 15(1). In the light of this interpretation of Article 15(2) of the Regulation, the CJEU held it unnecessary to rule on the second question concerning Article 3(2).168 However, the Advocate General had made a proposal for an answer to this question as well, confirming that the interpretation adopted in the 2011 ruling mentioned above is also valid to the circumstances of K’s application for asylum. Thus, in the same manner as a Member State’s decision to examine an asylum application under Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation is a national measure implementing that Regulation, meaning that the Member State must comply with the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights pursuant to Article 51 CFR, this reasoning is also applicable to the ‘humanitarian clause’ in Article 15 of the Regulation. As a result of this obligation to comply with the Charter, Member States may under certain circumstances be under a duty to exercise their right to examine an asylum application for humanitarian reasons according to Article 15 of the Regulation, if it is established that there would otherwise be a serious risk of unduly restricting the asylum-seeker’s rights under the Charter.169 The Advocate General further considered that the relationship between K and her grandchildren might fall within the concept of ‘family life’ in Article 7 CFR since the existence of family life is not contingent on cohabitation, so that the transfer of K as an asylum-seeker to Poland might constitute interference with her right to respect for family life as protected by Article 7 CFR.170 In the Advocate General’s opinion, the definition of ‘family life’ as established in the ECtHR case law under Article 8 ECHR should be considered equally relevant to Article 7 CFR.171 In a preliminary ruling concerning the permissibility of transfer of unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers to another Member State under the Dublin Regulation, the CJEU referred specifically to Article 24 CFR in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Regulation.172 While the relevance of Article 24 CFR as lex specialis seems quite obvious in such circumstances, issues of respect for private life under Article 7 CFR could arguably have been raised as well, yet the latter provision was examined neither by the Court nor by the Advocate General. The sexuality of asylum-seekers has also been assessed as an area of potential infringement of Article 7. On this issue, Directive 2004/83/EC173 (on the minimum qualifications for

168 Ibid [54]–[55]. 169 Ibid (Opinion of 27 June 2012 of Advocate General Trstenjak) [63]–[65], referring to NS and ME (translation by J Vedsted-Hansen, as the opinion is not available in English). 170 Ibid [74]. 171 Ibid [92]. In this connection the Advocate General referred to Case C-400/10 PPU J McB v LE (CJEU, Judgment 5 October 2010) [53]. 172 Case C-648/11 MA, BT and DA v Secretary of State for the Home Department (CJEU, Judgment 6 June 2013) esp [56]–[60]. 173 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third ­country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted ([2004] OJ L304/12 and corrigenda [2005] OJ L204/24 and [2011] OJ, L278/13).



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asylum-seekers) has been a focal point. In X, Y, Z,174 it was held that deportation of asylum-seekers to their home countries where homosexuality is punished with imprisonment interferes with Article 7 CFR. There is a level of nuance to this decision with regards to persecution pursuant to the Directive, which itself draws from Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention. Therefore, the relevant acts must be ‘sufficiently serious’ as to constitute a ‘severe violation of basic human rights’ to the unconditional rights, from which there can be no derogation (pursuant to Article 15(2) ECHR). Article 8 ECHR (corresponding to Article 7 CFR) is not among the fundamental rights from which no derogation is possible. Legislation criminalising homosexual acts falls short of the sufficiently serious threshold in order to constitute persecution.175 However, ‘a term of imprisonment which sanctions homosexual acts and which is actually applied in the country of origin which adopted such legislation must be regarded as being a punishment which is disproportionate or discriminatory and thus constitutes an act of persecution.’176 07.70A A, B, C177 concerned third country nationals who applied for asylum in the Netherlands fearing persecution in their native countries on account of their homosexuality. Their applications were rejected for differing reasons for each, ranging from an absence of credibility, implausibility, vagueness and being perfunctory. The Court considered whether Article 4 of Directive 2004/83/ EC (read in light of Articles 3 and 7 CFR) imposed ‘certain limits when [relevant authorities] assess the facts and circumstances concerning the declared sexual orientation of an applicant for asylum, whose application is based on a fear of persecution on grounds of that sexual orientation.’178 The Court ruled that the provision in question, read in line with Article 7 CFR, must be interpreted as precluding competent national authorities from carrying out detailed questioning as to asylum applicants’ sexual practices.179 (d)  Protection of the Environment 07.71A Although Article 8 ECHR can, in certain circumstances, impose on states an obligation to­ protect individuals against environmental disturbances, especially pollution of air and noise,180 this dimension of respect for private life, family life and home has so far only been the basis of little case law in the context of Article 7 CFR. The limited potential of Article 7 CFR in this regard can be illustrated by the infringement proceedings, where the Commission alleged Austria to have failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 28 and 29 TEC by prohibiting lorries of over 7.5 tonnes carrying certain goods from using a motorway section in the Inn Valley. The Austrian government invoked its obligation to ensure respect for the private and family life of citizens, enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8(2) ECHR, including the right to be protected against harm to health and the quality of life, and argued that a fair balance had been struck between the interests involved, in accordance with the line of case law from the CJEU, thus justifying the prohibition.181

174 Joined Cases C-199-201/12 X, Y, Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel (CJEU, Judgment 7 November 2013). 175 Ibid [55]. 176 Ibid [61]. 177 Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13, A, B, C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (CJEU, Judgment 2 December 2014). 178 Ibid [48]. 179 Ibid [72]. 180 J Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Article 7 (Private Life, Home and Communications)’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014) [7.64A]. 181 Case C-28/09 European Commission v Republic of Austria (CJEU, Judgment 21 December 2011) [83], [118].

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This, however, was not accepted by the Court as justification of the traffic prohibition, which 07.72A was regarded as constituting a measure with equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on the free movement of goods.182 While overriding requirements of protection of the environment can justify such national measures, the Court emphasised that this would only be so if the measures are suitable for securing the attainment of that objective, and do not go beyond what is necessary for attaining it.183 The Court further stated that, before adopting a measure ‘so radical as a total traffic ban on a section of motorway constituting a vital route of communication between certain Member States’, the Austrian authorities were under a duty to examine carefully the possibility of using measures less restrictive of freedom of movement.184 On this basis, the Court concluded that it had not been shown that the two principal alternative measures put forward by the Commission as measures less restrictive of the free movement of goods were not appropriate, and Austria had therefore not fulfilled its obligations under Articles 28 and 29 TEC.185 (e)  Data Protection Data protection as an aspect of the right to respect for private life and home, and communica- 07.73A tion remains a developing area within the spectrum of EU fundamental rights. Communications technologies have become an important tool for private life. Data as a by-product of these communications furthers the convergence of considerations. Individually or in the aggregate the data collected can reveal details about an individual’s private life. Aside from the revelatory concerns, data protection is itself a separate protected right under Article 8 CFR. And so, often Articles 7 and 8 CFR have been considered together. CJEU decisions concerning respect for private life and data protection may have been the most notable in recent years. Although data protection may no longer be the ‘poor relation’ of other fundamental rights,186 it may be subject matter that is not as well understood because of the technologies that have pushed data protection to the forefront of legal discourse. The revelation by Edward Snowden in 2013 not only added notoriety to data collection and processing, but they also illustrated the intrusive potential on the private lives of individuals. The interconnection between Articles 7 and 8 CFR will likely continue as the CJEU and other institutions, such as the European Data Protection Supervisor,187 engage in considering these rights together. Though it was not decided under the Charter, the decision in Bodil Lindqvist v Sweden188 07.74A forms not only a starting point, but also an illustration of how private life in the twenty-first century includes data protection. Ms Lindqvist was a catechist at her parish in Sweden. On the website she established for the church, she revealed personal details about her colleagues, including their family circumstances, personal telephone numbers and, in one case, the medical reason for one colleague working part-time. She neither informed nor obtained the consent from these colleagues. The Swedish data protection authority charged her with breaching the Swedish Data

182 Ibid [117]. 183 Ibid [125]. In that connection, the Court made further reference to the objectives of the protection of health and of environmental protection laid down in Arts 2 and 3 TEC and in Arts 35 and 37 CFR; cf ibid [120]–[121]. 184 Ibid [140]. 185 Ibid [148]–[151]. 186 As it seemed to be prior to Treaty of Lisbon’s entry into force: C Kuner, ‘International agreements, data protection, and EU fundamental rights on the international stage: Opinion 1/15, EU-Canada PNR’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 857–82, 857. 187 See for example guidance from the EDPS: European Data Protection Supervisor, EDPS Guidelines on assessing the proportionality of measures that limit the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data (12 December 2019). 188 C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist v Sweden (CJEU, 6 November 2003).



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Protection Act.189 The Swedish Court of Appeal referred the case to the CJEU. Bodil Lindqvist argued that her activities fell within the domestic purpose exemption. The CJEU interpreted the exemption as a provision that ‘must therefore be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people.’190 Since her activities fell outside of the exemption, she was required to have processed the data fairly and lawfully. 07.75A Several years later, the CJEU returned to this matter in Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů.191 This time it applied the Charter. Mr Ryneš installed a CCTV camera outside his house as a security measure (a response to earlier vandalism of his property). The camera recorded (and stored) movements on his own property, the public sidewalk and his neighbour’s entrance. The camera was advantageous when his house was once again vandalised (windows being broken). The camera was used to identify two individuals; one of whom queried the lawfulness of the camera’s position. The incident was found to fall within the purview of the Data Protection Directive: the subject captured on camera constituted personal data and recording was found to be within the application of Article 3(1) (automatic processing of personal data), but the case centred around the domestic purposes exemption.192 The Court ruled against Mr Ryneš, finding that his camera usage fell outside of the domestic purposes exemption because it covered ‘even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal or household’ activity for the purposes of the second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46.’193 The narrow construction of the domestic purposes exemption was prompted by the activity being liable to infringe upon ‘fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy’.194 07.76A The Bodil Lindqvist and Ryneš rulings speak to the capture area of Article 7 with regards to data processing. They illustrate how the individual becomes a data processor as well as the associated obligations with that status. However innocuous the means may be, there is a thin line between an individual in a domestic circumstance and one moving beyond that situation. It has been contended that a distinction with these decisions may be that the data subjects lacked control over their personal data.195 Bodil Lindqvist and Ryneš may also illustrate how personal data may be construed so broadly that it may result in ‘system overload’.196 07.77A Since the last edition of this book, the Data Protection Directive has been replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).197

189 This legislation implemented Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data ([1995] OJ L281/31). 190 Bodil Lindqvist [47]. 191 C-212/12 (11 December 2014). 192 This is now found in Art 2(2)(c) of the GDPR with wording that is largely similar to that in the 1995 Directive. 193 Ryneš [31]–[33]. 194 Ibid [29]. 195 Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016), 146. 196 N Purtova, ‘The law of everything. Broad concept of personal data and of future EU data protection law’ (2018) 10 Law, Innovation and Technology 40–81. 197 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of ­natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L 119/1. A commentary on the GDPR is: C Kuner, LA Bygrave, C Docksey, L Drechsler (eds), The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A Commentary (Oxford, OUP, 2020).

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(i)  Intersection of Articles 7 and 8 CFR Overlap between Articles 7 and 8 must be foreseeable given each article’s common origin in 07.78A Article 8 of the ECHR. A complicating factor in relation to data protection remains the influence of Article 8 ECHR on both of these CFR articles:198 where there is ‘correspondence’ with Article 7 CFR, but Article 8 CFR has several sources including being ‘based’ upon both Article 8 ECHR as well as Council of Europe Convention (No 108).199 Although it forms general principles of EU law (pursuant to Article 6(3) TEU), the ECHR has not been formally incorporated into EU law. Therefore, the examination of EU law is assessed against the Charter.200 The importance in delineating the parameters of each of these CFR Articles rests in clarifying 07.79A how they interact with and may be separate from each other. The Article 8 right is ‘closely connected with the right to respect of private life expressed in Article 7 of the Charter.’201 This connection seems to be more of an intermingling of the two rights in certain circumstances: ‘it should be borne in mind that the right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal data concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual’.202 In this formulation, Article 7 constitutes a broad statement regarding the respect for private life. Conversely, Article 8 provides for protection in processing of personal data. And yet, this same personal data can simultaneously affect private life. Where these two articles intersect, Article 7 forms a broader protection of a right to respect for private life, home, and communications; whereas Article 8 seems to be a particularised subset of privacy focusing upon personal data. The CJEU’s Opinion 1/15 illustrates this confluence. Fingerprints and facial images fall within Article 7’s wide scope, which concerns ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual’.203 This same data, though, must also be protected and processed fairly pursuant to Article 8 CFR.204 The CJEU has released a number of decisions dealing with the rights set out in Articles 7 and 07.80A 8 CFR. These articles’ combined importance has been recognised,205 but beyond this further elaboration as to a more detailed articulation of the remit of each Article has been sparing. This intersection, insofar as cases have reached the CJEU, originates in information technology and the capacity therein to form a repository of a wide range of information. An online search engine constitutes a primary means of accessing this information because it lists (in some structured and comprehensible form) the results of a search across a wide range of websites. This access point ‘is liable to affect significantly fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data’.206 The information retrieved through such a search ‘potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of [an individual’s] private life and which without the search engine, could not have been 198 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C3030/20. The point remains pertinent as it has been referred to in decisions including, for example, Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) (CJEU, Opinion 26 July 2017) [171]. 199 Council of Europe Convention (No 108) of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to ­Automatic Processing of Personal Data. 200 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson (CJEU Judgment 26 February 2013) [44], [48]; Case C-524/15 Menci, (CJEU Judgment 20 March 2018) [22], [24]; Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems (CJEU, Judgment 16 July 2020) [97]–[101]. 201 Volker und Markus Schecke [47]; Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10 Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos ­Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v Administración del Estado (CJEU, Judgment 24 November 2011) [41]. 202 Volker und Markus Schecke [52]. Cf Schwarz [26]; Opinion 1/15 [122]–[123]; Digital Rights Ireland [29]; Schrems (2020) [170]. 203 Opinion 1/15 [122]; Volker und Markus Schecke [52]; Schwarz [26]. 204 Opinion 1/15 [123]. 205 Digital Rights Ireland [53]; Google Spain [53]; Schrems (2015) [39]. 206 Case C-131/12 Google Spain v AEPD (CJEU, Judgment 13 May 2014) [80].



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interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty … and [then] to establish a more or less detailed profile of [that person].’207 The emphasis in this chapter is on the aspects of respect to private life, home, and communications. Aside from the comingling with Article 8, Article 7, in this context, is juxtaposed with Article 11 CFR, particularly the ‘right’ to ‘impart and receive information.’ The content of each of these other Articles is discussed in subsequent chapters to this book. (ii)  The Right to Private Life in Data Protection Situations 07.81A The preliminary ruling in Volker und Markus Schecke concerned the validity of secondary EU law provisions laying down an obligation on Member States to publish data relating to the beneficiaries of funds under the common EU agricultural policy. The Court referred to both Articles 7 and 8 CFR, stating that the fundamental right recognised in the latter provision is ‘closely connected with the right to respect of private life expressed in Article 7 of the Charter.’208 The Court further held that ‘the right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal data, recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual’, and that the limitations which may lawfully be imposed on the right to the protection of personal data correspond to those tolerated in relation to Article 8 ECHR.209 Importantly, the CJEU set out its interpretive approach: Article 52(1) of the Charter accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights such as those set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.210

The CJEU’s approach consisted of assessing whether the ‘essence’ of the right has been respected by the limitations set out in the challenged law. The analysis then turns to proportionality: whether the measures taken meet genuine objectives of general interests and whether the steps taken are limited to those which are strictly necessary.211 07.82A Against this background, the CJEU examined the interference and the justification of that interference with ‘the rights recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter’.212 In this consideration, courts must bear in mind that the EU institutions are obliged to balance, before disclosing information relating to a natural person, the European Union’s interest in guaranteeing the transparency of its actions and the infringement of the rights recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. No automatic priority can be conferred on the objective of transparency over the right to protection of personal data.213

07.83A The Court declared the disputed provisions of two Regulations invalid in so far as, with regard to natural persons who are beneficiaries of EAGD and EAFRD aid, those provisions impose an obligation to publish personal data relating to each beneficiary without drawing a distinction

207 Ibid [80]. 208 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert [47]. 209 Ibid [52]. 210 Ibid [50]. 211 This approach can be seen in subsequent decisions such as Tele2 [94]. President Lenaerts, extra-judicially, wrote of this formulation: K Lenaerts, ‘Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 779–93. 212 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert [56]–[89]. 213 Ibid [85].

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based on relevant criteria such as the periods during which those persons have received such aid, the frequency of such aid or the nature and amount thereof.214 As a consequence of this CJEU ruling, the Commission has prepared a modified proposal on the publication of information on beneficiaries of EU agricultural funds.215 Competition law additionally gives rise to issues of data protection and confidential treatment 07.84A of information; such as, where publication of Commission decisions concerning cartels may disclose information allegedly covered by business secrecy. In this area both Article 7 and Article 8 CFR seem to be applied, as illustrated in the Pilkington case where the applicant invoked the duty to protect personal data under Article 8 CFR, and the General Court based its ruling on considerations of Article 7 CFR as well as Article 8 ECHR and Article 339 TFEU.216 The Court referred to the latter provision as conferring a fundamental right to protection of professional secrecy, and made the following statement: As the Court of Justice has recognised in its judgment in Case C-450/06 Varec … referring to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’), it may be necessary to prohibit the disclosure of certain information which is classified as confidential, in order to protect the fundamental right of an undertaking to respect for its private life, enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms … and in Article 7 of the Charter, it being made clear that the concept of ‘private life’ cannot be interpreted in such a way that the commercial activity of a legal person is excluded. Moreover, the Court of Justice added that it had already acknowledged that the protection of business secrets is a general principle and that the undertaking concerned might suffer ‘extremely serious damage’ if there were improper communication of certain information.217

Notably, in the order on the appeal brought by the Commission, the CJEU upheld the General 07.85A Court’s ruling as regards the duty to protect secret information, despite finding an error of law in considering that the alleged breach of the applicant’s fundamental right to protection of professional secrecy, enshrined in Article 339 TFEU and Article 8 CFR, and of that company’s right to an effective judicial remedy, enshrined in Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 CFR, were in themselves sufficient for the purpose of establishing the likelihood of serious and irreparable harm in the particular circumstances of the case.218 Referring to Article 8 CFR rather than to Article 7 CFR, the Court considered that the condition relating to urgency was satisfied in the case, since it had been established to the requisite legal standard that the applicant was likely to suffer serious and irreparable harm.219 The CJEU referred to both of the two Charter provisions in combination in a preliminary 07.86A ruling concerning the interpretation of the Data Protection Directive. It was here emphasised that the balancing of the opposing rights and interests as required by this Directive must take account of ‘the significance of the data subject’s rights arising from Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter’.220

214 Ibid [92]. 215 Amendment to the Commission proposal COM (2011) 628 final/2 for a Regulation on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, COM (2012) 551 final. Cf report of 8 May 2013 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘2012 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,’ COM (2013) 271 final, p 6. For further developments, see the commentary on Art 52 in this volume. 216 Case T-462/12R European Commission v Pilkington Ltd (CJEU, Order 11 March 2013) [9], [31], [39], [44]–[50], respectively. 217 Ibid [44]. 218 Case C-278/13 P(R) European Commission v Pilkington Ltd (CJEU, Order 10 September 2013) [44]. 219 Ibid [59]. 220 Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10 Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v Administración del Estado (CJEU, Judgment 24 November 2011) [40].



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In this regard the Court observed that, unlike the processing of data appearing in public sources, the processing of data appearing in non-public sources necessarily implies that information relating to the data subject’s private life will thereafter be known by the data controller and, as the case may be, by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed. This ‘more serious infringement of the data subject’s rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter’ must be properly taken into account by being balanced against the legitimate interest pursued by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed.221 07.87A While the CJEU has thus demonstrated, as a matter of principle, the need to interpret Article 8 CFR on data protection in accordance with the general right to respect for private life under Article 7 CFR by way of the combined application of both provisions, in other parts of the case law concerning data protection issues the Court has based its rulings on the examination of Article 8 CFR alone.222 (iii)  The Material and Territorial Scope of the Right to Erasure 07.88A The right to erasure (or the right to be forgotten223) has been a familiar phrase since the decision in Google Spain.224 Costeja González, a Spanish national resident in Spain, complained to the Spanish data protection authority based upon the Data Protection Directive that information was available online (through a Spanish newspaper as well as the Google search engine) regarding his status as a debtor. These reports were from about 10 years prior to the applicant complaining to the Member State authority. The complaint focused upon the Directive, but also Article 8 CFR. The CJEU also ruled on Article 7 in its decision. The Court ruled that an individual could request a search engine to remove personal data that was inaccurate, out-of-date, inadequate, irrelevant, kept beyond a necessary time period, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing, inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive for the purposes of data processing (though the considerations may differ where the individual played a role in public life225). Since this information’s availability on search engine results was ‘liable to constitute a more significant interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to privacy’ (in addition to the provisions in the Data Protection Directive),226 ‘the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made’, even when the publication itself may be lawful.227 The CJEU elaborated upon the right to delisting from search engine results within the context of Articles 7 and 8 CFR: As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of the

221 Ibid [45]. 222 See, for instance, CJEU judgments in Cases C-543/09 Deutsche Telekom AG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (5 May 2011) [49], [52], [53], [66] and C-614/10 European Commission v Republic of Austria (16 October 2012) [36]. However, the opinion of 17 February 2011 of Advocate General Trstenjak on the former case, C-543/09 [128], included reference to Arts 7 and 8 CFR in common. 223 The GDPR uses both phrases in Art 17, though the right to erasure is given prominence. Erasure has a longer history in this context. Art 12(b) of the Data Protection Directive used the term erasure. Preceding both the DPD and the GDPR, Art 8 (c), (d) Convention 108 also used erasure. It is now found in Art 9(e) of the latest version of Convention 108. 224 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and another v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (CJEU Judgment 13 May 2014). 225 ‘[T]he interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question’: ibid [99]. 226 Ibid [87]. 227 Ibid [88].

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operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name.228

It should be noted that this case was limited to delisting of online search engine results (the reports in question remained publicly available).229 Google Spain did not establish a right to erasure of information from the internet as a whole.230 Rather, it reduced the opportunities for easily finding such material online. The decision also did not preclude seeking out offline versions of the article (kept for example in library archives).231 The CJEU’s ruling in Google LLC v CNIL232 carried on from Google Spain. Both decisions 07.89A considered the ‘right to erasure’ as it is called in the GDPR. Google Spain gave effect to this right in the form of delisting search results from online search engines. CNIL considered the territorial scope of such delisting. CNIL had notified Google that any granting of a delisting request by a natural person applied to all domain name extensions of its search engine. Google refused to do so. Google had contended that it could delist search items within the national territory in question (here France) through ‘geo-blocking’.233 CNIL delves into the intersection of the rights in Articles 7 and 8 CFR, but it also draws attention to the ‘freedom of information of internet users’.234 In finding there to be no obligation on search engine operators to delist search results globally, the CJEU ruled that these operators ‘cannot be required … to carry out a de-referencing on all the versions of its search engine.’235 In arriving at this assessment, the CJEU did not find any wording in either the Data Protection Directive or the GDPR which would exceed the EU territory.236 These laws, though, did apply to all versions of the search engine throughout the Union.237 Nevertheless, the public interest in accessing information may not be consistent throughout the Union. Conversely, the individual’s right to private life (and protection of personal data) may not be the same throughout each Member State.238 This obligation may be more extensive for search engine operators within the EU because the CJEU has charged them with taking, if necessary, ‘sufficiently effective measures to ensure the effective protection

228 Ibid [99]; see also [81]. This passage was reiterated in Case C-507/17 Google LLC v CNIL (CJEU, Judgment 24 September 2019) [45]. 229 See also the commentary in H Kranenborg, ‘Article 17 Right to Erasure (“Right to be Forgotten”)’ in C Kuner, LA Bygrave, C Docksey, L Drechsler (eds), The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A Commentary (Oxford, OUP, 2020), 479. 230 It also did not consider any interaction with Art 11 CFR (right to freedom of expression and information). 231 Further questions may be raised stemming from Google Spain. In Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v Poland (ECtHR, Judgment 16 July 2013), two Polish lawyers had successfully sued in defamation against a Polish newspaper for the print version of an article. However, they did not make any arguments at the time regarding the simultaneously published online version. This second case focused on the newspaper article which remained online. Although argued as an infringement of respect for private life (Art 8 ECHR), the ECtHR rejected this proceeding as having already been dealt with in the first proceeding. It was satisfied with the Warsaw Court of Appeal’s finding that a comment should be added to the online article outlining the result of the first civil proceeding [66]. Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski illustrates that it would be unwise to address the print and online versions of impugned publications separately. Additionally, the decision suggests that complete erasure of impugned materials may be quite difficult. 232 Case C-507/17 Google LLC v CNIL (CJEU, Judgment 24 September 2019). In CNIL, the court applied both the Data Protection Directive (where Art 12(b) and Art 14(1)(a) applied) as well as the GDPR (where Art 17 applied). 233 ‘[T]he internet user is now automatically directed to the national version of Google’s search engine that corresponds to the place from where he or she is presumed to be conducting the search, and the results of that search are displayed according to that place, which is determined by Google using a geo-location process’: Ibid [42]. 234 Ibid [60]. 235 Ibid [65]. 236 Ibid [62]. 237 Ibid [66]. 238 Ibid [67].



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of the data subject’s fundamental rights.’239 Some complications arise at the decision’s end. The CJEU returned to the question of global delisting and wrote that it did ‘not prohibit such a practice’.240 In elaborating upon this possibility, the Court pointed to the remit of Member State authorities (supervisory or judicial) to ‘weigh up’ the matter.241 07.90A Although it did not touch upon Article 7, the later CJEU decision in Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Ltd242 continues the CJEU’s engagement with delisting and its territorial scope. This case focused upon comments made in Austria against an Austrian politician (Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek) which were found to be defamatory by an Austrian court. Access to the impugned content was disabled within Austria. The Austrian Supreme Court referred to the CJEU the question whether the E-Commerce Directive243 (Article 15, which places no general obligation on service providers to monitor content) allowed the injunction to extend globally and to statements with an ‘equivalent meaning’.244 The Court ruled that Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive did not preclude a Member State court from ordering a service provider to remove (or block access to) content identical to the content which had been declared unlawful. Furthermore, a Member State court may also order content ‘equivalent to the … information which was previously declared to be unlawful’ to be removed or blocked. Finally, the scope of such an order may be worldwide.245 The Court was satisfied that the monitoring which would be required by service providers in this instance was sufficiently specific. Articles 15 and 18 of the E-Commerce Directive were read as providing for an injunction to protect an individual’s reputation, but that this injunction ‘may not be pursued by imposing an excessive obligation on the host provider’.246 It seems that obliging ‘the host provider concerned to carry out an independent assessment of that content’247 or imposing ‘on the host provider an obligation to monitor generally the information which it stores, or a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity’248 would constitute an excessive obligation. Glawischnig-Piesczek prompts further queries in regard to the E-Commerce Directive, such as whether service providers’ would retain their ‘technical, automatic and passive nature’;249 and whether the extraterritorial effect of such an injunction should be assessed in reference to public and private international law.250 (iv)  The ‘Essence’ of Article 7 07.91A The territorial scope discussion, which was part of the right to erasure above, leads into another area of significant development by the CJEU. Here too, Article 7 formed the basis 239 Ibid [70]. 240 Ibid [72]. 241 AG Szpunar contended that delisting should be EU-wide, but not global: Case C-507/17 Google LLC v CNIL (Opinion of AG Szpunar Judgment 10 January 2019) [63], [78]. 242 Case C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited (CJEU Judgment 3 October 2019). 243 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market ([2000] OJ L178/1). 244 See Glawischnig-Piesczek [36]–[41] where the Court elaborates. 245 Ibid [53]. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Google Inc v Equustek Solutions 2017 SCC 34, upheld a global injunction against Google. Of note, the Equustek facts differed. Equustek alleged that Datalink designed and sold counterfeit versions of its product. Although an injunction against the sales had been obtained, it was alleged that Datalink continued its sales online relying upon search engines to direct customers. Google would block access to a specific page, but Datalink would establish a new website in turn. 246 Glawischnig-Piesczek [44]. 247 Ibid [45]. 248 Ibid [46]–[47]. 249 Cf Case C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited (Opinion of AG Szpunar Judgment 4. June 2019) [36]. 250 Ibid [42].

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to invalidate EU law, Member State law, as well as agreements between the EU and other jurisdictions. As noted above, Digital Rights Ireland remains of immense importance in EU law because this was the first case to invalidate EU secondary law in its entirety based solely on the CFR. Digital Rights Ireland challenged the validity of the Data Retention Directive, which had an objective that ‘data are available for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, including organised crime and terrorism’.251 In its preliminary ruling, which came in the context of the widely discussed revelations by Edward Snowden of the US National Security Agency (NSA)’s capacity to access data held by US technology companies, the CJEU found the interference with Article 7 (and 8) CFR to be ‘wide-ranging’252 ­(echoing the opinion of the Advocate General253) because the data to be retained permitted ‘very precise ­conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives’ of the data subjects by national authorities.254 Ultimately, the Directive failed at the proportionality stage of analysis where the measures were not limited to what was strictly necessary. Establishing interference with Article 7 does not require the applicant to show the information 07.92A on private life was sensitive or that individuals were inconvenienced.255 The CJEU set out a threshold for interference with Article 7 which is not tied to incurring some form of harm. Demonstrating interference is sufficient. A further infringement would arise when authorities accessed this retained data.256 In this case, the CJEU determined the interference did not affect the essence of the Article 7 right because the Directive obliged Member States to ensure ‘appropriate technical and organisational measures are adopted against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration of the data’.257 The Court concluded that the public security objectives justified the retention of the identified data.258 The Court seemed to distinguish between access to the content of communications (which would affect the essence of Article 7 CFR) and data (such as metadata259). The distinction remained curious because the Court identified earlier in the decision the potential that ‘data, taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained’.260 Rather, the Court found the Directive failed on the proportionality analysis. The retained data was not limited to what was strictly necessary, because the Directive required the retention, for a period of between six and 24 months, ‘of all traffic data concerning fixed telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet telephony’ which affected the rights of ‘practically the entire European population’.261 Where Digital Rights Ireland undid an EU Directive, Tele2262 invalidated Member State law. 07.93A As discussed in the Communications section above, Tele2 successfully challenged the Swedish 251 Digital Rights Ireland [24]. 252 Ibid [37]. 253 Case C-293/12 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón (Opinion 12 December 2013) [77]–[80]. 254 Digital Rights Ireland [27]. 255 Ibid [33]–[34]. 256 Ibid [35]. 257 Ibid [39]–[40]. 258 Ibid [41], [44]. 259 ‘Providers of publicly available electronic communications services, and of public communications networks, process substantial amounts of personal data in connection with communications, billing, interconnection payments, marketing, and other activities. Along with this information, there are data concerning details of sources, destinations, dates, times, and types of communication, as well location information in respect of mobile phone use. This information is normally called “metadata”’: E Guild and S Carrera, ‘The political and judicial life of metadata: Digital Rights Ireland and the trail of the Data Retention Directive’ (2014) 65 CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe 1–15, 1. 260 Ibid [27]. 261 Ibid [56], [64]. 262 Joined Cases 2013 & 698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Others (CJEU Judgment 21 December 2016).



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legislation in question, which the Court found required the ‘general and indiscriminate retention’263 of all data for all subscribers using electronic communication. The Swedish legislation was not found to compromise the essence of Article 7. Rather, like the Data Retention Directive, it failed the proportionality analysis insofar as the measures exceeded what was strictly necessary to serve the objective of crime detection and prevention: the legislation ‘is comprehensive in that it affects all persons using electronic communication services, even though those persons are not, even indirectly, in a situation that is liable to give rise to criminal proceedings.’264 The EU Directive the Swedish law was transposing, in the CJEU’s judgment, precluded the legislation from taking the steps it did for the purpose of fighting crime.265 07.94A Moving beyond EU or Member State law, in October 2015, the CJEU found (what is more commonly known as) the Safe Harbour agreement266 invalid in Schrems.267 Safe Harbour was an agreement between the EU and the US regarding third-country data transfers (from the EU to the US) whereby the EU Commission had determined there was an adequate level of protection for individuals whose data was being transferred.268 Schrems continued the scrutiny of US practice concerning data that was initiated in Digital Rights Ireland.269 The CJEU invalidated Safe Harbour on the basis that it interfered with respect for private life through ‘legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter’.270 While in other decisions there has been more connection between Articles 7 and 8, in Schrems it would seem that greater emphasis was placed on Article 7. Safe Harbour failed to establish ‘any possibility for an individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data, [and the absence of any legislation providing for a remedy] does not respect the essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter’.271 This was sufficient to invalidate the argument without moving on to a proportionality analysis;272 a contrast with Digital Rights Ireland where there was no interference with the essence of Article 7 CFR (even though there was mass collection of data), but the Directive failed on the proportionality analysis. Writing extra-judicially, President of the CJEU Lenaerts vested much in this decision. For him, 07.95A Schrems stated that the essence of fundamental rights would not be compromised, even in regard to national security.273 This message to EU political institutions entrenched (building upon the wording of Article 52(1)) a threshold for protection of rights centring around the concept of a right’s essence. In Schrems, Safe Harbour ‘emptie[d] those rights of their content [and] call[ed]

263 Ibid [103]. 264 Ibid [105]. 265 Ibid [112], [125]. 266 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce ([2000] OJ L215/7). 267 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (CJEU, Judgment 6 October 2015). 268 Five years later, the CJEU ruled the successor to Safe Harbour (Privacy Shield) to also be invalid. That decision is discussed later in this section on data protection. 269 This point was made by the referring court: Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 [13]. 270 Schrems [94]. This finding seems to be at variance to that in Digital Rights Ireland [39] when there was no interference with the essence of Art 7 regarding widespread data retention even though it affected ‘the entire European population’ [56]. In this case, the Directive failed on the proportionality analysis. 271 Schrems [95]. 272 Ibid [98]. 273 K Lenaerts, ‘Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 779–93, 782.

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their very existence into question274 because, in terms of respect for private life, ‘there was simply no privacy as [US] authorities could have unlimited access to the content of all the personal data transferred from the EU to the US.’275 Schrems identified for future consideration questions surrounding the accessibility of challenges to third-country regimes. The rather lengthy process for such complaints in this case was: individuals (such as Schrems) bring complaints to national authorities within Member States; followed by national court proceedings; which then may proceed to the CJEU for only a preliminary ruling on the matter. In July 2020, the CJEU found the successor to Safe Harbour (called Privacy Shield276) to also 07.96A be invalid.277 While the referring Irish court identified the provisions from the Data Protection Directive, the CJEU applied the GDPR because the Data Protection Commissioner had not yet rendered a decision (having only put forward a draft decision278) and the Data Protection Directive had been repealed in favour of the GDPR by the time the case came to the CJEU.279 Article 46 GDPR required the third country to have in place ‘appropriate safeguards’ as well as ‘enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects’. Schrems (2020) engaged with two main points for the purposes of this chapter. First, it assessed the validity of Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) agreed between private parties in light of the CFR.280 Second, it assessed whether the bulk data transfer from the EU to the US pursuant to the Privacy Shield agreement was valid, again against the CFR. Pursuant to a decision of 5 February 2010 (which was amended on 16 December 2016),281 07.97A the Commission had set out standard contract clauses to be used for the purposes of third-country data transfers. The CJEU in Schrems found ‘nothing to affect the validity of [the SCC] decision’.282 The standard contract clauses were valid, particularly with regards to Article 7. The CJEU’s decision on standard contract clauses, though, was filled with qualifications. For example, the Court identified the potential for parties to supplement guarantees in the SCCs.283 These clauses impose obligations on parties insofar as the controller or processor is charged

274 Ibid 784. 275 Ibid. 276 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield ([2016] OJ L207/1). 277 Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems (CJEU, Judgment 16 July 2020). 278 Ibid [56]. 279 Ibid [97]–[99]. 280 Ibid [105]. Transfers may also be made pursuant to ‘binding corporate rules’ as set out in Arts 46(2)(b) and 47 GDPR. According to a survey by the International Association of Privacy Professionals and EY, standard contractual clauses are the preferred method for facilitating data transfers from the EU to the US (where 88 per cent of respondents preferred SCCs and 60 per cent followed Privacy Shield: IAPP-EY, IAPP-EY Annual Governance Report 2019, https://iapp. org/resources/article/iapp-ey-annual-governance-report-2019/. 281 The interpretation and validity of Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46 ([2010] OJ L39/5), as amended by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2297 of 16 December 2016 ([2016] OJ L344/100) (‘the SCC Decision’). 282 Schrems (2020) [149]. 283 ‘[I]t may prove necessary to supplement the guarantees contained in those standard data protection clauses. In that regard, recital 109 of the regulation states that “the possibility for the controller … to use standard data-protection clauses adopted by the Commission … should [not] prevent [it] … from adding other clauses or additional safeguards” and states, in particular, that the controller “should be encouraged to provide additional safeguards … that supplement standard [data] protection clauses”’: ibid [132]. The EDPB also identified the potential need to supplement guarantees: European Data Protection Board, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-311/18—Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems’ (23 July 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/20200724_edpb_faqoncjeuc31118_en.pdf.



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with ensuring there are ‘appropriate safeguards’ (Article 46(1) GDPR) and where there are deficiencies to ‘compensate’ the data subject for them (Recitals 108 and 146 GDPR).284 If this cannot be achieved, the controller, processor, or competent supervisory authority must suspend or end the data transfers.285 Parties286 have a continuing obligation to ensure protections for data subjects, measured by Articles 7, 8, and 47 CFR. 07.98A In contrast to SCCs, the Privacy Shield Decision (forming the basis of this part of the reference to the CJEU) was binding on supervisory authorities and could only be displaced by the Court finding the decision invalid. Concerns centred around the US failing to provide an adequate level of protection with regards to the bulk transfers of data to US public authorities. The Court found a need for clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in question and imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose data has been transferred have sufficient guarantees to protect effectively their personal data against the risk of abuse. It must, in particular, indicate in what circumstances and under which conditions a measure providing for the processing of such data may be adopted, thereby ensuring that the interference is limited to what is strictly necessary.287

These considerations were heightened where there was automated processing of personal data.288 The reasons for the Court rendering Privacy Shield invalid289 focused on the inadequacy of safeguards, including:290 the absence of limitations on the power to implement surveillance or guarantees for persons targeted by these programmes;291 the lack of actionable rights in courts before US authorities for data subjects;292 the failure to ‘delimit in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the scope of such bulk collection of personal data’;293 as well as the lack of independence of the ombudsperson (an addition in Privacy Shield from Safe Harbour).294 These reasons tied together Articles 7, 8 and 47 CFR. In Schrems (2020), the discussion of the essence of the Article 7 right seemed to shift to the right to redress in Article 47. As of 10 August 2020, a joint statement from the EU and the US stated that discussions had been initiated in response to the 16 July 2020 decision of the CJEU.295 07.99A Though pre-dating Schrems (2020), the Court’s Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement)296 confronted the type of wide-ranging collection, retention, and sharing of data seen in the Digital

284 Ibid [131]–[133]. 285 Ibid [135]. 286 Bear in mind that the ‘data importer’ (third-country party) ‘agrees and warrants’, among other items, to ‘inform promptly the data exporter of its inability’ to comply with these measures as set out in clause 5(a) of the Annex to the SCC Decision. 287 Schrems (2020) [176]. 288 Ibid. 289 Ibid [199]–[201]. 290 More precisely, the CJEU wrote that the ‘Privacy Shield Decision [could] not ensure a level of protection essentially equivalent to that arising from the Charter’: ibid [181]. 291 Ibid [180]. 292 ‘[N]ot providing for any possibility for an individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him or her, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data, does not respect the essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter’: ibid [187]. 293 Ibid [183]. 294 Ibid [195]–[197]. 295 European Commission, ‘Joint Press Statement from European Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross’ (10 August 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/joint-press-statementeuropean-commissioner-justice-didier-reynders-and-us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-7-august-2020-2020aug-07_en. 296 Re EU-Canada Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement Opinion 1/15 (CJEU, Opinion of the Court 26 July 2017).

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Rights Ireland decision297 as well as the Schrems decisions. In Opinion 1/15, there had been some question as to the basis of the Agreement; that is, whether it was a security matter or was based upon data protection. The Court found a joint basis for the agreement between data protection and public security.298 The case came to the CJEU as a request for an opinion by the European Parliament pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU.299 The substance of the agreement between the EU and Canada regarding Passenger Name Records (PNR) fell within this broad definition because ‘the envisaged agreement permits the systematic and continuous transfer of PNR data of all air passengers flying between the European Union and Canada.’300 In order to be justifiable, there must be clear and precise rules to determine the scope and application of the step in question, as well as minimum safeguards for data subjects.301 The communication of this personal data (whether or not it was sensitive data) to a third-country, whatever its subsequent use, as well as the negotiated framework of retention, use, and subsequent transfer all constituted interference with Article 7 CFR.302 The ‘essence’ of the right, however, was not interfered with because, it would seem, in order to ensure public security, the measure revealed limited information concerning the individual’s private life and this data was restricted to air travel between Canada and the EU.303 Still, Opinion 1/15 found the Agreement went beyond what was strictly necessary (as the articulation of the data needed lacked precision304) in violation of Article 7 (and 8) CFR with regards to PNR data,305 including sensitive data.306 The Court identified, among other points, the five-year data retention period for all passengers after they departed Canada,307 and the potential disclosure of this data by Canadian authorities to third parties308 as falling short of limiting the collection, retention, and disclosure of data to what was strictly necessary.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations According to Article 52 CFR, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recog- 07.100A nised by the Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the

297 Before this case arose, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) raised concerns regarding the Agreement’s compatibility with (among other points) the Charter: EDPR, ‘Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposals for Council Decisions on the conclusion and the signature of the Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data’ 30 September 2013, https://edps.europa. eu/sites/edp/files/publication/13-09-30_canada_en.pdf. 298 Opinion 1/15 [108]. 299 European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2014 on seeking an opinion from the Court of Justice on the compatibility with the Treaties of the Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record, 2014/2966(RSP). 300 Opinion 1/15 [127]. Elaborating upon potential regarding violation of Art 7 CFR, the Grand Chamber wrote [128] that ‘the data may, inter alia, reveal a complete travel itinerary, travel habits, relationships existing between air passengers and the financial situation of air passengers, their dietary habits or state of health, and may even provide sensitive information about those passengers, as defined in art.2(e) of the envisaged agreement.’ 301 Opinion 1/15 [141]. 302 Opinion 1/15 [124]–[125]. On the irrelevance of whether the information was sensitive or otherwise, see also Digital Rights Ireland [33] and Schrems (2015) [87]. These same points also interfered with Art 8. 303 Opinion 1/15 [150]. 304 The required data covered ‘“all available contact information (including originator information)” … [which did] not define in a sufficiently clear and precise manner the PNR data to be transferred’: ibid [156]. 305 Ibid [155]–[163]. 306 Ibid [166]–[167]. The Court also referred to the GDPR. 307 Ibid [206]–[207]. 308 Ibid [213]–[217].



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need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. This approach to limitations of the rights protected by Article 7 CFR is somewhat different from that laid down in Article 8(2) ECHR, specifying the requirements of the legal basis for the interference, understood to require both accessibility and precision of the legal basis, as well as those of legitimate aim and proportionality of such interference. Whereas the interpretation and application of Article 8 ECHR established by the ECtHR undoubtedly has implications for the meaning and scope of the rights under Article 7 CFR, as stipulated by Article 52(3) CFR,309 the CJEU may be invited to apply the more flexible approach to the examination of limitations that apparently follows from Article 52(1) CFR. Since such an approach to judicial review would seem to be well in line with the Court’s method of testing restrictions or barriers to the exercise of freedoms under EU law, this will not necessarily result in less strict review of limitations of Charter rights than what might follow from the formally more structured assessment of interferences under Article 8(2) ECHR. This is due to the margin of appreciation that has often been granted to respondent states by the ECtHR in Article 8 cases. 07.101A The regulatory areas examined seem to indicate that the CJEU is often prepared to accept the reasons invoked by Member States for the limitation of Charter rights. This may, on the other hand, to some extent, be balanced by the fact that the CJEU appears to more readily qualify such limitations as ‘interferences’ with the exercise of fundamental rights protected by Article 7 CFR, whereas the ECtHR in important areas under Article 8 ECHR examines the issues subject to review as matters of positive state obligations, in some instances possibly resulting in a considerable margin of appreciation being granted to the respondent state. 07.102A The Article 7 right is not absolute.310 And yet, President Lenaerts contended that ‘the essence of a fundamental right places an absolute limit on the limitations that may be imposed on the exercise of that fundamental right.’311 To a certain extent, then, there is a core to Article 7. Based upon the line of data protection decisions in recent years, this core may be limited but it may not preclude legal recourse for individuals to challenge such a limitation. The EDPS called the necessity and proportionality aspects of Article 52 CFR ‘an essential dual requirement’312 as they permit limitations provided for by law and which respect ‘the essence of those rights’ so long as they are proportional: ‘if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.313 Limitations provided for by law, in Article 52(1), ‘implies that the legal basis which permits the interference with those rights must itself define the scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned’.314 It is also considered ‘in relation to [its] function in society’, but this is not elaborated upon in CJEU cases.315 In the context of national security, the Court in Opinion 1/15 offered the following commentary on proportionality with regards to Article 7: the legislation in question which entails the interference must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in question and imposing minimum safeguards,

309 See generally the commentary on Art 52 CFR in this book. 310 Schrems (2020) [171]. 311 Lenaerts 786. 312 European Data Protection Supervisor, EDPS Guidelines on assessing the proportionality of measures that limit the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data (12 December 2019), 3. 313 Art 52(1),(2). 314 Opinion 1/15 [139]; Schrems (2020) [175]. 315 The point is only identified in several decisions such as: Volker und Markus Schecke [48]; Schwarz [33]; Opinion 1/15 [136]; Schrems (2020) [172].

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so that the persons whose data has been transferred have sufficient guarantees to protect effectively their personal data against the risk of abuse. It must, in particular, indicate in what circumstances and under which conditions a measure providing for the processing of such data may be adopted, thereby ensuring that the interference is limited to what is strictly necessary. The need for such safeguards is all the greater where personal data is subject to automated processing. Those considerations apply particularly where the protection of the particular category of personal data that is sensitive data is at stake.316

Lenaerts wrote extra-judicially of a ‘respect-for-the-essence-test’ which precedes the propor- 07.103A tionality analysis. Schrems (2015) illustrated the application of this test. While the essence derives from Article 52(1) CFR,317 Lenaerts noted the concept’s longer history, dating to 1949, in National Constitutions.318 He explained it as follows: The essence is defined as a ‘hard nucleus’ that guarantees to each and every individual a sphere of liberty that must always remain free from interference. That nucleus is, in my view, absolute in so far as it may not be subject to limitations. Once it is established that the essence of a fundamental right has been compromised, the measure in question is incompatible with the Charter. This is so without it being necessary to engage in a balancing exercise of competing interests.319

As well, a measure may be found to be incompatible with the Charter and therefore prima facie invalid. But, compatibility with the Charter at this first step does not assure the measure will be proportional during the second step of analysis.320 To Lenearts, a clear message had been sent: ‘a constant reminder that our core values as Europeans are absolute and, as such, are not up for balancing.’321

V. Remedies A significant impact of Article 7 CFR, as regards the existence and contents of remedies 07.104A against Member State measures affecting fundamental rights, stems from the right under Article 47 CFR to an effective remedy before a tribunal for everyone whose rights and freedoms as guaranteed by EU law are violated. The Schrems decisions of 2015 and 2020 evidence this point. In line with Article 13 ECHR, this provision is to be understood as protecting not only actual victims of a violation of a Charter right, but any physical or legal person who has an ‘arguable claim’ of a violation. Within the regulatory areas protected by Article 7 CFR, the Charter right to an effective remedy 07.105A is of particular importance to persons who claim data protection violations. This is due to the specific requirement in Article 47 CFR that the remedy must include a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. These requirements have apparent similarities with those laid down in Article 6 ECHR. The Charter essentially extends ‘fair trial’ requirements similar to those protected by the ECHR to cases that have previously not been encompassed by such standards. As an illustration of the practical impact of this Charter protection, it could be mentioned that the Dublin III Regulation includes a provision stipulating

316 Opinion 1/15 [141]. This passage is largely repeated in Schrems (2020) [176]. 317 The article itself is based upon CJEU case law: ‘Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2007/C 303/02). 318 Lenaerts 780. 319 Ibid 781. 320 Ibid. 321 Ibid 782.



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that applicants for international protection shall have an effective remedy, in the form of appeal or review, in fact and in law, against a transfer decision, before a court or tribunal.322 In addition, it is stipulated that this remedy shall have some form of suspensive effect,323 just as there must be access to legal assistance for the persons concerned.324

E. Evaluation 07.106A Although the CJEU systematically emphasises fundamental rights, not least those protected by Article 7 CFR, in the various regulatory areas where they have actual or potential impact, thereby providing significant contributions to the interpretation of this Charter provision and to the delimitation of its scope of applicability according to Article 51 CFR, there are quite striking differences in the interpretive approach taken and the pattern of reasoning presented by the Court and the Advocates General. As illustrated in the case law concerning family members of Union citizens, the Advocate General appeared more inclined towards examining the Charter issues of potential relevance, while the Court often examined the impact of Union citizenship merely on the basis of Article 20 TFEU. 07.107A The difference may, in some instances, be explained by the simple fact that the Advocate General’s examination made it clear that no fundamental rights issue could be raised under the Charter. This is reflected in the Court’s statement on the interrelation between the Charter and the ECHR in the Dereci case. It was here explained that if the referring court considers that the situation in the main proceedings is covered by EU law—and only then—it will have to examine whether the refusal of right of residence undermines the right to respect for private and family life provided for in Article 7 CFR; whereas, if it takes the view that that situation is not covered by EU law, then it must undertake that examination in the light of Article 8(1) ECHR.325 07.108A At the same time, however, this points to a significant limitation of the scope of applicability of Article 7 CFR as regards the consideration of third-country family members’ residence rights derived from dependency on the Union citizen. As explained by the Advocate General in the Dereci case, the Court’s reasoning in such cases is likely to be based on the underlying premise that ‘the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen’ does not include the right to respect for family life enshrined in Article 7 CFR and in Article 8(1) of the ECHR.326 Even while the latter part of the statement may perhaps be questionable, the point made regarding the limited scope of Article 7 CFR seems to be persuasive. This will probably have a particular impact on those cases on residence rights for third-country family members that raise complex issues of assessing the scope and contents of ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’.327 The Court’s approach essentially means that either the Union citizen and his or her family members will be protected by Article 20 TFEU as well as Article 7 CFR, or they will be considered as excluded from the scope

322 Cf Art 27 of Regulation 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State ­responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a thirdcountry national or a stateless person [2013] OJ L180/31. 323 Ibid, Art 27(3). 324 Ibid, Art 27(5). 325 Dereci [72]. 326 Ibid (Opinion of 29 September 2011 of Advocate General Mengozzi) [37]. 327 Ruiz Zambrano [42].

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of EU law altogether and consequently referred to the potentially more limited protection of the right to family reunification under Article 8 ECHR. The wide scope of application of Article 8 ECHR already established in the ECtHR case 07.109A law, as well as the inseparability of the four rights elements under this provision, seem to be reflected in the interpretation and application of Article 7 CFR. This is not only the case insofar as physical persons are concerned, but is bound to have potentially important influence on the practical impact of this Charter provision in a variety of legal situations of special relevance to legal persons, not least due to the fact that this category of beneficiaries of the Charter rights is occurring quite frequently within the area of commercial activities that are often particularly affected by EU law. According to President Lenaerts, the CJEU’s decisions regarding information technology 07.110A deploy a particular approach regarding the essence of the right (which cannot be eliminated) followed by a proportionality analysis. This approach resulted in CJEU judgments touching upon third country law. The Schrems decisions as well as Opinion 1/15 expanded the Charter’s reach (through Article 7) to circumstances involving third party countries and the law of those countries. In the course of its adequacy assessments of American and Canadian law, the CJEU cannot escape making some evaluation of those laws as compared to those of the EU. The EU has, wisely it may be argued, been ahead of other jurisdictions when it comes to data protection, with the 1995 Data Protection Directive followed by the GDPR (in force as of May 2018). This does not overlook that EU laws may establish a sort of hegemony with regards to matters surrounding rights to private life, home, and communications (as well as family life). Together Schrems (2015), Schrems (2020), and Opinion 1/15 set out a requirement for EU political institutions to establish agreements with third-countries that give effect to the ‘essence’ of the right to private life in a broad form.328 These decisions outline a one-way movement from the EU to third-countries in which some form of replication of EU law has been sought out. Again, the EU took a global lead in this area and so the comments here do not take away from the significance of this step. Rather, there may be further scope for dialogue329 on means of protecting rights (such as Article 7 CFR). The series of data protection decisions culminating in the 2020 decision of Schrems sets out 07.111A a few points. Article 7 plays a central role as we proceed further with digitalisation. Interference with Article 7 will continue to be claimed in conjunction with Article 8 in complaints around digital collection, retention, dissemination, and processing. There are also some complications which emerge from this overlap, centring around each Article’s particular roles in data protection instances. By its wording, Article 7 remains more open-ended when discussing privacy in the settings of private life, home and communications. As a result, the Article 8 protection of personal data may seem like a subset of privacy (and therefore Article 7), when this right in fact stands alone. Protection of personal data implicates privacy, but it is more particularised in that it considers the means by which personal data are processed. Article 7, then, forms more of a residual right with regards to privacy. When considered in the Schrems decision of 2020, the GDPR must be layered into the factors considered. Multi-factoral deliberations are not necessarily problematic. However, this mixture can present challenges in the future.

328 Though the essence of which right may shift, depending upon the circumstances before the Court: Cf Schrems (2020) where the essence of Art 47 was the focus; as compared to Schrems (2015) where the essence of Art 7 had been of central concern. 329 Outside of the courts, the tenor of the point here may be part of on-going discussions regarding adequacy decision. Cf European Commission, ‘Adequacy Decisions’, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/internationaldimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en#documents.



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07.112A

As it relates to the situation in Schrems (2020), the CJEU outlined the interconnection as follows: Thus, access to a natural person’s personal data with a view to its retention or use affects the fundamental right to respect for private life guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, which concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual. Such processing of data also falls within the scope of Article 8 of the Charter because it constitutes the processing of personal data within the meaning of that article and, accordingly, must necessarily satisfy the data protection requirements laid down in that article.330

07.113A Article 7 CFR considers the right to respect for the ‘private life, home and communications’ as well as the protection of fundamental rights as a general principle of EU law. Still, the CJEU has not clearly delineated between fundamental and human rights. The matter carries importance because of the way in which the CJEU has more recently placed an emphasis on its jurisprudence regarding fundamental rights. Although the ‘meaning and scope’ of Article 7 ‘are the same as the corresponding’ Article 8 ECHR,331 the CJEU’s increased reliance upon its precedents as opposed to ECtHR case law prompts some consideration regarding the relationship between the two courts,332 especially the treatment of Article 7 CFR and Article 8 ECHR.333 In relation to the ‘essence’ of fundamental rights such as Article 7, it may be wondered whether this discussion may inform the distinction between principles and rights.334

330 Schrems (2020) [170]. 331 ‘Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2007/C 303/02). 332 A relationship that has been described as which has been described as ‘strained’: S Greer, J Gerrards, R Slowe, Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the European Union: Achievements, Trends and Challenges (Cambridge, CUP, 2018) 326. 333 The difference between the ECtHR’s statement in Bărbulescu (workplace privacy may not be reduced to zero) and the essence of rights as outlined by the CJEU may be further considered. 334 Cf T Lock, ‘Rights and Principles in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 1201–26.

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Article 7 (Family Life Aspects)* Article 7 Right to Respect for Private and Family Life Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 7 The rights guaranteed in Article 7 correspond to those guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR. To take account of developments in technology, the word ‘correspondence’ has been replaced by ‘communications’. In accordance with Article 52(3), the meaning and scope of this right are the same as those of the corresponding article of the ECHR. Consequently, the limitations which may legitimately be imposed on this right are the same as those allowed by Article 8 of the ECHR: ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ This chapter will concern itself with the family life aspects of Article 7 only.

Select Bibliography R Caracciolo di Torella, ‘The changing shape of the “European family” and fundamental rights’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 80. S Choudhry and J Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010). M González Pascual and A Torres Pérez (eds), The Right to Family Life in the European Union (Abingdon, Routledge, 2017). C McGlynn, ‘Families and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights: progressive change or entrenching the status quo?’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 582. ——, Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge, CUP, 2006). H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). H Toner, Partnership Rights, Free Movement and EU Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004).

A.  Field of Application of Article 7 The concept of ‘family life’ or any rights to it within EU law has been evolving over a number of 07.01B years, on an ad hoc basis and in a number of overlapping areas of EU competence such as the free movement of workers,1 social security and pensions,2 and equal treatment in employment * This chapter was written by Shazia Choudhry in the first edition. It has been updated by Miriam Kullmann for the second edition. 1 K Lundström, ‘Family life and the freedom of movement of workers in the European Union’ (1996) 10 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 250. 2 D Ackers, Senior Citizenship? Retirement, Migration and Welfare in the European Union (Bristol, Policy Press 2002).

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between women and men.3 What is particularly noteworthy about these developments is that they have taken place without any formal reference being made to families within the treaties and in the absence of the formation of a specific competence in the family law field. They have also taken place, it would seem, without any specific intention of introducing EU family-related provisions, emerging instead as a subsidiary and inevitable consequence to the successful functioning of the EU internal market and the necessary political integration that that has entailed. As a result, there exists a whole raft of both soft law and binding measures which are neither comprehensive nor coherent but have, regardless, resulted in a steady increase in the regulation of families and therefore of ‘family life’ by the EU. There has, however, been some acknowledgment of these developments and the need to monitor EU policies and provisions which concern families. The setting up and funding of the European Platform for Investing in Children (EPIC),4 through which the EU hopes to engender more family-friendly policies, is intended to help children and their families facing challenges that exist in the current economic climate in Europe through providing information about policies within the EU. It thus represents a significant shift towards the development and monitoring of EU-wide policies concerning the family. The potential reach of Article 7, in particular with a view to the aspect of family life, is wide-ranging and as a result it would be impossible to examine each possible area of application in this Chapter. However, three overlapping zones of application within EU law can be identified as having particular potential to trigger the application of Article 7, and these will be examined in turn.

I.  Gender Equality 07.02B The first zone is that of gender equality,5 which, because it is based on the equal-pay principle (set out in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU), is an official policy priority of the EU.6 In addition, according to Article 8 of the TFEU, equality between women and men is a fundamental principle of the EU to be promoted through all EU activities. As a result, a comprehensive legislative framework for promoting gender equality has been created, entailing the adoption of 13 Directives in the field of equal treatment covering access to work, goods and services, training, promotion and working conditions, including equal pay and social security benefits.7 Of these provisions, a number have directly impacted upon families and ‘family life’: equal pay,8 equal treatment,9 maternity rights,10 the protection from discrimination relating to sexual orientation,11 3 S O’Leary, ‘Resolution by the Court of Justice of Disputes Affecting Family Life’ in T Hervey and D O’Keeffe (eds), Sex Equality in the European Union (Chichester, Wiley 1996). 4 See http://europa.eu/familyalliance/about/index_en.htm. 5 See also the chapters of this commentary on Art 23 (equality between women and men) and Art 33 (family and professional life) which overlap with the family life aspects of Art 7. 6 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality. 7 See the commentary on Art 20 (right to equality before the law). 8 See for example, Art 157 TFEU and Art 4 of Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23. 9 Directive 2006/54/EC. 10 See the Maternity Leave (or Pregnant Workers) Directive (Directive 92/85/EEC) [1992] OJ L348/1. On the potential link between this Directive and Art 7 of the Charter, see the Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-167/12 CD v ST [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:169. 11 In establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, Directive 2000/78/EC [2000] OJ L303/16 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. This Directive was not adopted in Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, in which the CJEU ruled that EU law did not prohibit such discrimination on the grounds that sexual orientation discrimination as this did, at that time, fall outside EU competence. The decision was widely criticised for retreating from the principle of prohibiting discrimination based on sex, established in the earlier CJEU decision in Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council

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as well as work-life balance.12 In terms of policy, since 1996 the Commission pursues a dual approach of targeted measures to achieve gender equality, combined with strengthened gender mainstreaming by systematically including a gender perspective in all stages of policy design in all EU policy areas, internal and external.13 The first comprehensive policy framework was adopted in 200014 and was followed in 2006 by the Roadmap for equality between women and men.15 The Gender Equality Strategy 2020–25 identified the following six priority fields: being free from violence and stereotypes, thriving in a gender-equal economy, leading equally throughout society, gender mainstreaming and an intersectional perspective in EU policies, funding actions to make progress in gender equality in the EU, and addressing gender equality and women’s empowerment across the world. By including the ending of gender-based violence and stereotypes, the Commission continues the path set out in the ‘Women’s Charter’,16 an issue which has a particularly significant impact upon family life.17 The first concrete step in this direction came as part of the Stockholm programme which sets 07.03B out the EU’s priorities for the area of justice, freedom and security for the period 2010–14.18 The Directive on the European Protection Order,19 passed within the competence created by Article 82(1) of the TFEU, provides that judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions. The Directive also enables anyone protected under criminal law in one EU state to apply for similar protection if they move to another Member State, and will apply to victims or possible victims who need protection ‘against a criminal act of another person which may, in any way, endanger his life, physical, psychological and sexual integrity … as well as his dignity or personal liberty’. Such acts could include harassment, abduction, stalking and ‘other forms of indirect coercion’ and should be of significant benefit to victims of domestic violence. However, the effectiveness of a measure which is based upon mutual recognition rather than harmonisation has been questioned, and particularly so when the available research has demonstrated that there is an insufficient level of uniformity amongst protection measures across Member States.20 A minimum

[1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:170, a case in which the CJEU recognised that gender reassignment is covered by the right not to be discriminated against based on sex. See also the commentary on Art 20 (the non-discrimination clause of the Charter). 12 Directive (EU) 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers, repealing Directive 2010/18/EU [2019] OJ L188/79, to be transposed by 2 August 2022. 13 ‘Incorporating equal opportunities for women and men into all Community policies and activities’, COM (96) 67; and most recently ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025’, COM (2020) 152). Gender equality is also promoted with the financial support from the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, Creative Europe, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the InvestEU Programme. The funding aims at supporting actions to promote women’s labour market participation and work-life balance, invest in care facilities, support female entrepreneurship, combat gender segregation in certain professions and address the imbalanced representation of girls and boys in some sectors of education and training. 14 ‘Towards a Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001–2005)’, COM (2000) 335. 15 ‘A Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men 2006–2010’, COM (2006) 92. 16 ‘A Strengthened Commitment to Equality between Women and Men’, COM (2010) 78 final. 17 It will also have a significant impact upon child victims of domestic violence. EU provisions discussed in this chapter will thus have an indirect impact upon children when being applied to adult carers who are victims of domestic violence; however, children may also apply for protection orders in their own right within some Member States, and that protection will also be capable of recognition under the European Protection Order. For specific detail on EU provision on child protection, see the commentary on Art 24 in this volume. 18 Building on the achievements of its predecessors, the Tampere and Hague programmes, it aims to meet future challenges and further strengthen the area of justice, freedom and security with actions focusing on the interests and needs of citizens. The programme provided that there should be mutual recognition for all types of judgments and decisions of a judicial nature, which may be either criminal or administrative. 19 Directive 2011/99/EU on the European protection order [2011] OJ L338/2. 20 See S van der Aa, ‘Protection Orders in the European Member States: Where Do We Stand and Where Do We Go from Here?’ (2012) 18 European Journal on Criminal Policy & Research 183.



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level of harmonisation of laws in this area may thus be necessary to fully realise the Directive’s potential.21 A further and important step towards the eradication of gender-based violence was the adoption on 18 May 2011 of a package of measures22 aimed at strengthening the rights of victims of crime, and which recognised the gender dimension to victims’ rights. In its communication on ‘Strengthening victims’ rights in the EU’ the Commission noted that Women are particularly exposed to hidden and unreported forms of violence. The Council of Europe estimates that 20–25% of European women experience physical acts of violence at least once during their adult lives, 12–15% find themselves in a relationship of domestic abuse, and more than 10% suffer sexual violence.23

07.04B These concerns led to the passage of the Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,24 discussed below. The communication goes on to identify victims of gender-based violence as being particularly vulnerable, and the need to ensure the safety and protection of individuals who are exposed to repeat violence by the same perpetrator as being of the utmost importance. To facilitate this, the European Commission made it clear that crucial protection such as restraining and protection orders obtained on behalf of victims should be transferable to another EU Member State if the victim moves or travels there. The package therefore led to the adoption of a horizontal Directive25 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, replacing the 2001 Framework Decision;26 a Regulation on the mutual recognition of civil law protection measures27 (complementing the Directive on the European Protection Order) and a Communication28 setting out the Commission’s position on actions in relation to victims of crime. Actions to prevent and combat all forms of violence against children, young people and women have also been pursued under the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme 2014–20, which aims to contribute to the prevention of, and the fight against, all forms of violence occurring in the public or the private domain against children, young people and women, by taking preventive measures and by providing support and protection for victims and groups at risk.29 The large number of acts of violence among young people has also led the Commission to include the objective of combating violence against women in projects under the ‘Youth in action’ programme 2007–13,30 an objective which was not included in the Erasmus+ Programme.31

21 ibid. 22 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, COM (2011) 275 final. 23 ‘Strengthening victims’ rights in the EU’, COM (2011) 274 final. 24 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, the non-Member States which have participated in its elaboration and the EU, in Istanbul on 11 May 2011. In order to enter into force, the Convention requires 10 ratifications, including at least eight Member States of the Council of Europe. Ratified to date by Albania, Italy, Montenegro, Portugal and Turkey. 25 Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime [2012] OJ L315/57. 26 Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings [2001] OJ L82/1. 27 Regulation (EU) 606/2013 [2013] OJ L181/4 aims to ensure that victims of domestic violence who benefit from a protection measure taken in one Member State are provided with the same level of protection in other Member States (as regards civil law) should they move or travel there. Such protection should be awarded without the victim having to go through additional procedures (Art 4). 28 ‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies’, COM (2011) 573 final. 29 These were previously funded under the Daphne programme. 30 Decision No 1719/2006/EC establishing the ‘Youth in Action’ programme for the period 2007 to 2013 [2006] OJ L327/30. 31 Regulation (EU) 1288/2013 establishing ‘Erasmus+‘: the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing Decisions 1719/2006/EC, 1720/2006/EC and 1298/2008/EC [2013] OJ L347/50.

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II.  Children’s Rights The second zone of application is that of children’s rights complemented by EU policies on social 07.05B exclusion and the closely related aim of the eradication of child poverty within the EU. The basis of EU competence in these related areas can be found in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which states that the Union ‘shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between men and women, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.’ Furthermore, children who are nationals of a Member State are also citizens under Article 20(1) of the TFEU and are thus able to rely on the ensuing rights of Union citizenship. There is also a considerable amount of ‘soft law’ in this area, for example, the articulation of the importance of the reduction of child poverty as an important EU objective, since ‘despite overall progress in the labour market, this figure (at 19% the risk of poverty among children in the EU is higher than that of the general population) has remained unchanged since 2000.’32 The EU has also addressed child health and development, as described in the WHO European strategy for child and adolescent health and development. Furthermore, the European Commission has stated that the best means of overcoming child poverty is by ‘addressing the issue on all fronts and striking the appropriate balance between targeting the family and the child in its own right. This entails combining strategies to increase parents’ access and attachment to employment with enabling services and with income support that minimise the risk of creating trap effects’33 Hence, the EU advises all of its Member States to apply a balanced policy mix. However, as with family life, the Union’s competence over children and children’s rights appears to be very limited in terms of direct references in the Treaty,34 and any extension of competence in this area has been incidental to other policy aims. Nonetheless, the impact of such provisions on the lives of children has been significant.35 Recognising the importance of this area, the European Commission has set up the ‘EU Agenda on the Rights of the Child’36 and created an inventory of how EU law affected children’s rights. In doing so, it identified the policy area and associated competence in the EU Treaties, the rights in the Charter and in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990.37 The following policy areas were identified as having a direct impact upon children: asylum and migration;38 child health, safety and welfare;39 child poverty and social exclusion;40 child labour;41 children’s participation; civil justice

32 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—Proposal for the Joint Report on social protection and social inclusion 2008, COM (2008) 42 final. 33 ibid. 34 See the commentary on Art 24. 35 ibid. 36 ‘Communication from the Commission—An EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child’, COM (2011) 60 final. 37 Commission Staff Working Document ‘Preliminary Inventory of EU Actions Affecting Children’s Rights’ SEC (2006) 889. 38 See, for example, Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, amending Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/ EEC and 93/96/EEC. 39 See, for example, Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of toys [2009] OJ L170/1, based on Art 95 EC (now Art 114 TFEU). 40 See the OMC (Open Method of Coordination) on Social Protection and Social Exclusion, established under the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion launched in 2010. Policies established under this platform specifically refer to the eradication of child poverty. As follows from the European Commission’s Political Guidelines for 2019–2024, the Commission aims to establish a European Child Guarantee to combat poverty. 41 See Directive 94/33/EC on the Protection of Young People at Work [1994] OJ L216/12, based on Art 118a EEC (now Art 153 TFEU).



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and family law matters;42 education;43 environment; media and internet;44 non-discrimination; and violence against children.45 There are areas of EU law where children have been addressed directly, despite a generic competence base; each of these areas is examined specifically in the commentary on Article 24 of the Charter.46 07.06B Two areas in particular need to be specifically addressed in this chapter. The first area concerns the regulation of cross-border family law and the development of private international law rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in family law matters.47 Increased migration within the EU has resulted in an increase in cross-border family law disputes, which has had significant implications for national legal regimes that are left to ensure that the contact and residence of the children of parents living in different Member States is effectively regulated. The most significant legislative instrument in this area is Brussels IIa Regulation, which regulates the jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of divorce and parental responsibility judgments, and also provides additional measures to tackle parental child abduction between the Member States. However, as Lamont notes,48 despite initially excluding some children from the scope of the original Regulation and failing to specifically identify children’s interests, the Brussels IIa Regulation nonetheless incorporates specific reference to children’s rights49 and the need for decisions to be taken in the child’s best interests and for the child to be heard in proceedings which affect them.50 Besides the Brussels IIa, which is to be replaced by Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 (recast) as of 1 August 2022,51 two other instruments are of importance: a Regulation governing the cross-border enforcement of maintenance obligations arising from family relationships, including maintenance for children52 and a Directive to encourage cross-border mediation of disputes.53 Although both instruments have a significant impact upon families caught in a cross-border dispute, it should be remembered that it is still

42 See, for example, Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility [2003] OJ L338/1, to be replaced by Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (Recast) [2019] OJ L178/1 as of 1 August 2022; Regulation (EC) 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [2009] OJ L7/1; Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters [2008] OJ L136/3, and in general H Stalford, ‘Brussels II and Beyond: A Better Deal for Children in the European Union?’ in K Boele-Woelki (ed), Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe (Antwerp, Intersentia 2003). 43 The Education and Training 2020 Framework states that the rate of early leavers from education and training aged 18–24 should be below 10 per cent. 44 See the Report from the Commission on Protecting Children in the Digital World, COM (2011) 556 final. See J Savirimuthu, ‘The EU, Online Child Safety and Media Literacy’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Children’s Rights 547. 45 See, for example, the specific reference in Art 83(1) of the TFEU to serious crime including the trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and children, and Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims [2011] OJ L101/1, which includes specific support for children and takes account of their particular vulnerabilities as a victim of trafficking. The more extensive nature of the obligations towards children contained in the Directive stem from Arts 82(2) and Art 83(1) of the TFEU and the direct reference to crimes against children as an aspect of the competence base in the Treaty. 46 Council of Europe and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European law relating to the rights of the child (2017), available at https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-ecthr-2015handbook-european-law-rights-of-the-child_en.pdf. 47 Art 81 of the TFEU. 48 See the commentary on Art 24 of the Charter. 49 See Stalford, ‘Brussels II and Beyond: A Better Deal for Children in the European Union?‘ (n 42). 50 In the rules on jurisdiction under Art 12; and in relation to international child abduction under Art 11(2). 51 Regulation (EU) 2019/1111, replacing Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 as of 1 August 2022. 52 Regulation (EC) 4/2009. 53 Directive 2008/52/EC.

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the national court that takes the substantive decision in relation to the child’s future welfare and the interaction between national family law and EU law.

III.  Free Movement, Immigration and Asylum The second area affecting children concerns freedom of movement, immigration, family 07.07B reunification and asylum, which is the third and final identifiable zone of potential application of Article 7. This zone has had significant impact upon the family life of both children and adults and will thus be dealt with together.54 The first category to consider is EU citizens and their family members’ rights to move freely and reside within the territory of the Member States. Free movement of persons constitutes one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market. In addition, citizenship of the Union confers a primary and individual right to move and reside freely on the territory of the Union, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and to the measures adopted to give it effect (Art 18 of the TEU). Such limitations and conditions are to be found in the Directive on the right of citizens of the Union to move and reside freely within the Member States,55 which brought together the piecemeal measures found in the complex body of legislation that had previously governed this area and introduced a number of rights for EU citizens and their family members who may or may not be EU citizens themselves. First, the Directive includes the right for all union citizens to enter another Member State for less than three months by virtue of having an identity card or valid passport. Family members who do not have the nationality of a Member State enjoy the same rights as the citizen whom they have accompanied.56 The right of residence for more than three months is, however, subject to certain conditions,57 but once those conditions are satisfied, family members of the citizen will obtain the right to remain without satisfying the conditions on an individual basis. Second, the Directive confers a right of permanent residence in the host Member State after a five-year period of uninterrupted legal residence, provided that an expulsion decision has not been enforced against them. The same rule applies to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have lived with a Union citizen for five years. The right of permanent residence is lost only in the event of more than two successive years’ absence from the host Member State. Third and finally, Union citizens qualifying for the right of residence or the right of permanent residence and the members of their family also benefit from equal treatment with host-country nationals in the areas covered by the Treaty. However, the host Member State is not obliged to grant entitlement to social security during the first three months of residence to persons other than employed or self-employed workers and the members of their family.58 There are, however,

54 For specific detail on how this issue has affected children see the commentary on Art 24. 55 Directive 2004/38/EC. 56 They may be subject to a short-stay visa requirement (ie no more than 90 days in any 180-day period) under Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement [2018] OJ L303/39 (Art 4). Residence permits will be deemed equivalent to short-stay visas. 57 They must either be engaged in economic activity (on an employed or self-employed basis) or have sufficient resources and sickness insurance to ensure that they do not become a burden on the social services of the host Member State during their stay; or be a family member of a Union citizen who falls into one of the above categories. The Member States may not specify a minimum amount which they deem sufficient, but they must take account of personal circumstances. 58 Equally, host Member States are not required, prior to the acquisition of the permanent right of residence, to grant maintenance aid for studies, including for vocational training, in the form of grants or loans to these same persons. Family members, irrespective of their nationality, will be entitled to engage in economic activity on an employed or self-employed basis.



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restrictions on the right of entry and the right of residence on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, but these are the only grounds upon which Union citizens or members of their family may be expelled from the host Member State. Furthermore, any measures taken which affect freedom of movement and residence must comply with the proportionality principle and be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Such conduct must represent a sufficiently serious and present threat which affects the fundamental interests of the state. Previous criminal convictions do not automatically justify expulsion.59 The implications for the family life of the individual against whom such measures are being taken are obvious, and as a result the Directive provides for the assessment a number of factors before an expulsion decision can be taken. These include the period for which the individual concerned has been resident, his or her age, degree of integration and family situation in the host Member State and links with the country of origin. Only in exceptional circumstances and for overriding considerations of public security, can expulsion orders be served on a Union citizen if he has resided in the host country for ten years or if he is a minor. Lifelong exclusion orders cannot be issued under any circumstances and individuals who are subject to exclusion orders can apply for the situation to be reviewed after three years. The Directive also makes provision for a series of procedural guarantees and for the abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience in which case Member States may adopt the necessary measures to refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by the Directive. 07.08B In terms of immigration, the EU has been developing a common immigration policy for Europe since 1999. The competence to create EU-wide immigration and visa rules60 derives from Title V of Part Three of the TFEU61 and its creation of the area of freedom, security and justice.62 There are common rules that allow citizens of countries outside the EU to work or study in an EU country, that allow citizens of countries outside the EU who are staying legally in an EU country to bring their families to live with them and/or to become long-term residents, as well as shared visa policies that enable non-EU citizens to travel freely for up to three months within Europe’s single travel zone, the Schengen area.63 However, it is the right to family reunification that has proved to be the biggest source of immigration into the EU and without which family life would prove to be impossible for the majority of immigrants. The main legislative provision in this area is the Directive on the right to family reunification64 which determines the conditions under which family reunification is granted, as well as the rights of the family members concerned.65 On the basis of this Directive, legally residing non-EU nationals can bring their spouse, under-age children and the children of their spouse to the EU state in which they are residing. EU states may also authorise reunification with an unmarried partner, adult dependent children, or dependent older relatives. Once in the EU, eligible family members receive a residence permit and obtain access to education, employment and to vocational training on

59 See the commentary on Art 19 of the Charter for further detail on the right to protection from removal, expulsion and extradition. 60 EU-wide immigration rules generally apply in 25 of the EU’s 27 countries. Denmark does not apply EU-wide rules which relate to immigration, visa and asylum policies, and Ireland chooses, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not to adopt EU rules on immigration, visa and asylum policies. 61 See on policies on border checks, asylum and immigration, Arts 77–80. 62 Which is based on the Tampere (1999–2004), Hague (2004–09) and Stockholm (2010–14) programmes. 63 The concept of free movement of persons came about with the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and the subsequent Schengen Convention in 1990, which initiated the abolition of border controls between participating countries. Being part of the EU legal and institutional framework, Schengen cooperation has gradually been extended to include most EU Member States as well as some non-EU countries. 64 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/12. 65 Member States that do not participate in the Directive are Denmark and Ireland.

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the same basis as other non-EU nationals; after a maximum of five years of residence, family members may apply for autonomous status, if the family links still exist. However, the right to family reunification is also subject to respect for public order and public security, and EU states may also choose to impose other conditions such as the requirement for a non-EU national to have adequate accommodation, sufficient resources and health insurance, and may impose a qualifying period of no more than two years. Family reunification can also be refused for spouses who are under 21 years of age. Moreover, polygamy is not recognised; only one spouse can benefit from the right to family reunification. EU states may also ask third country nationals to comply with integration measures. The potential application of Article 7 of the Charter is thus substantial and has been confirmed by the CJEU,66 which has stated that EU states must apply the Directive’s rules in a manner consistent with the protection of fundamental rights, notably regarding family life and the principle of the best interests of the child. In terms of policy, early on, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum67 and the Stockholm Programme68 have identified family reunification as an issue where EU policies should be further developed, with a particular focus on integration measures and in November 2011, the European Commission launched a broad consultation on family reunification69 in order to assess whether any policy follow-up is necessary. However, even though the Directive has been applicable for some time, there remain a few problematic cross-cutting issues with the application of the Directive, as follows from a Commission Communication from 2014, relating to integration measures, stable and regular resources, the need to take into account effectively the best interest of the child and the more favourable provisions for the family reunification of refugees.70 And, as reported in 2019, these core issues remain a challenge for some Member States, which should pay specific attention to the paramount importance of the fundamental right of respect for family life, the rights of the child and the right to an effective remedy.71 Finally, asylum is a fundamental right, and according to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the 07.09B protection of refugees, granting it is an international obligation.72 With this in mind, the EU have established a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and to that end, several legislative measures harmonising common minimum standards for asylum were adopted. Three of the most important measures on asylum state that the principles recognised by the Charter will be observed,73 specifically define the term ‘family members’,74 and thus have significant potential for interpretation under Article 7 of the Charter. The Directive on the Reception of Applicants

66 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, para 38. 67 Of 24 September 2008, not published but available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_ security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/jl0038_en.htm. A New EU Pact on Asylum and Migration was expected to be published in 2020. 68 ‘The Stockholm Programme—An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’ [2010] OJ C115/8. 69 Green Paper on the right to family reunification of third-country nationals living in the European Union (Directive 2003/86/EC) COM (2011) 735 final. 70 Commission guidance for application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification COM (2014) 210 final. 71 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of Directive 2003/86/ EC on the Right to Family Reunification COM (2019) 162 final. 72 The core Treaty provision pertaining to asylum is Art 78 TFEU on the common asylum policy. See the commentary on Art 18 (right to asylum) for further detail. 73 Recital 35 of Directive 2013/33/EU laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection [2013] OJ L 180/96; Recital 16 of Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ L337/9; Recital 14 of Regulation (EU) 604/2013 [2013] OJ L180/31 (Dublin Regulation). 74 Art 2(c) of Directive 2013/33/EU; Art 2(j) of Directive 2011/95/EU; Art 2(g) of Regulation (EU) 604/2013.



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for International Protection states that if applicants are provided with housing, Member States shall take appropriate measures to maintain as far as possible ‘family unity’ as present within their territory and that they are assured of the protection of their family life.75 The Directive on Qualifications of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection states that Member States shall ensure that family unity can be maintained, and makes provision for the family members of the refugee or person with subsidiary protection who do not individually qualify for refugee status to receive certain benefits.76 Finally, the ‘Dublin’ Regulation determines which EU state is responsible for examining an asylum application. Recital 16 states that family unity should be preserved in so far as this is compatible with the other objectives pursued by establishing criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application. The Regulation also establishes a hierarchy of criteria on which EU Member States should examine the application for asylum, and places the principle of family unity as the first criterion to be followed.77

B.  Interrelationship of Article 7 with Other Provisions of the Charter 07.10B The reference to ‘family life’ within Article 7 is not limited by specific reference to a context, and as such has the potential to apply to any situation within the scope of EU competence which impacts upon family life. There will, however, be a number of other Charter provisions which will overlap and interact with the ‘family life’ aspect of Article 7. The most obvious is Article 24, which concerns the rights of children who as family members will also have a separate claim to family life themselves. These claims may, however, conflict with claims made by other family members (who may be adults or children themselves) and the interests of the state. Where such conflicts exist, a difficult balancing exercise must take place to ascertain how such disputes are decided and it is here that the interrelationship with the other Charter provisions can be seen. First, Article 24 states that in any action taken by public authorities or private institutions the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration, which may sometimes result in either those interests being elevated above those of an adult or of the state.78 An example of the former case would be where there are allegations of violence and abuse against a family member in which case the positive obligations which should arise from Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (right to integrity of the person) and 4 (obligation to prohibit torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) will be of particular relevance. An example of the latter would be where there is a threat of removal, expulsion or extradition, or a request for asylum, and here Articles 18 and 19 would also need to be considered. Other articles will be of relevance according to the subject matter of the claim. Thus, any claims for family life which concern gender equality may also require a consideration of the impact of Articles 9 (right to marry and found a family), 21 (non-discrimination), 23 (equality between men and women) and 33 (the legal, social and economic protection of the family).

75 Art 12 of Directive 2013/33/EU. 76 Arts 23 and 24 of Directive 2011/95/EU. 77 The EU state responsible for examining the application is the one where the applicant has a member of his or her family legally present. See Arts 7–10 of Regulation (EU) 604/2013. Art 11 makes further provision where several members of the same family submit an application to one Member State and the application of the criteria would lead to their separation. 78 See S Choudry and H Fenwick, ‘Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 453, on how the ECHR conducts this exercise.

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Claims which concern the way family life is conducted may also require, depending upon the subject matter, a consideration of Articles 10 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), 14 (right to education), 17 (right to property), 22 (cultural, linguistic and religious diversity), 25 (rights of the elderly), 26 (integration of persons with disabilities), 34 (social security and assistance), 35 (healthcare) and 45 (right to freedom of movement and residence).

C.  Sources of Article 7 Rights I. ECHR The explanations to the Charter state that the rights guaranteed in Article 7 correspond to those 07.11B guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR79 as well as Article 16 of the European Social Charter (ESC). Furthermore, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, the meaning and scope of this right are the same as those of the corresponding article of the ECHR. Article 8 of the ECHR is a qualified right; the rights contained in the first paragraph may be justifiably interfered with on the basis of the limitations set out in the second paragraph. The article has four components: privacy, family life, home and correspondence. As a result, a wide array of case law has emanated from its provisions and there have been particularly significant developments in respect of the notion of family life within the context of a number of areas of the law, some of which will be directly referable to the areas of EU competence outlined previously. In addition, as Ovey and White80 note, since each right is reinforced by its context, the grouping together of these four rights within the same article further strengthens the protection given by it. The requirement to provide ‘respect’ for private and family life, home and correspondence has reinforced the development of positive obligations under the Article because it requires Member States to take positive action, rather than to simply refrain from interfering with the rights protected. Positive obligations upon Member States may also arise with respect to protecting an individual against interferences by another individual. As a result, a rich and substantive amount of case law has been built up by the ECtHR regarding the scope and application of Article 8, which can be drawn on with regard to the interpretation of Article 7 of the Charter. However, it is important to remember that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR represents the minimum level of protection under Article 7; Article 52(3) of the Charter also states that the interpretation of the meaning and scope of the ECHR rights shall not prevent EU law from ‘providing more extensive protection’. These issues will be explored further in the sections below.

II.  Council of Europe Treaties There are a number of Conventions through which the Council of Europe has sought to protect 07.12B aspects of family life about which certain points can be made. First is how the creation of a number of Conventions has demonstrated, over a series of decades, the increase in awareness of the rights of children and perhaps the concomitant need to make up for the lack of specificity of these rights within the ECHR. There are a number of Conventions in this area. The Convention

79 Except that the word ‘correspondence’ has been replaced by ‘communications’. 80 C Ovey and R White, The European Convention on Human Rights, Jacobs and White (4 edn, Oxford, OUP 2006) 241–42.



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on the Adoption of Children81 ensures that national law on the protection of children applies not only to adoptions of children from the parties but also to those of children from other states, and contains a core of essential provisions on adoption practice which each party undertakes to incorporate in its legislation, and a list of supplementary provisions to which parties are free to give effect. Thus, under the Convention’s essential provisions, adoption must be granted by a judicial or administrative authority, the decision to authorise the adoption of a child must be freely accepted by the parents and the adoption must be in the interest of the child. In some cases, the Council of Europe has been ahead of the ECtHR; the object of the rules embodied in the Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock,82 is to bring their legal status into line with that of children born within wedlock, and thereby to contribute to the harmonisation of the relevant legislation of parties,83 something that the ECtHR subsequently ruled was a requirement of the ECHR.84 The Convention’s main provisions therefore relate to paternal and maternal affiliation, recognition, denial and contesting of paternity, the assignment of parental responsibilities, and children’s succession rights. Procedural protection has also been provided to children who are required to be removed from one state to another in the form of the Convention on the repatriation of minors85 which applies to minors in the territory of a Contracting State whose repatriation is requested by another Contracting State for one of a number of specified reasons.86 The Convention also applies to the repatriation of minors whose presence in its territory a Contracting State deems to be incompatible with its own interests or with the interests of the minors concerned, provided that its legislation authorises the removal of the minor from its territory. Finally, the right of children to be involved in legal processes that concern them and for their views to be taken into consideration have also been recognised. The Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights87 which aims to protect the best interests of children by providing a number of procedural measures to allow children to exercise their rights and sets up a Standing Committee to keep under review problems relating to the Convention. Thus, the Convention includes measures which aim to promote the rights of the children, in particular in family proceedings before judicial authorities. As a result, the Convention states that children should be allowed to exercise their rights (for example, the right to be informed and the right to express their views), either themselves or through other persons or bodies. Among the 81 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, on 24 April 1967. Entered into force: 26 April 1968. It has been ratified by Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, and the UK. 82 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, on 15 October 1975. Entered into force: 11 August 1978. Ratified by Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the UK. 83 However, as not all parties are able to achieve this objective immediately, the Convention provides for a system of reservations enabling parties to work towards it gradually. Reservations may be made in respect of a maximum of three of the nine articles entailing an obligation, but such reservations are valid for a maximum of five years, after which they have to be reconsidered. 84 See Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979). 85 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, in The Hague, on 28 May 1970. Entered into force: 28 July 2015. It has been ratified by Italy, Malta, and Turkey. 86 These are: the presence of the minor in the territory of the requested state is against the will of the person or persons having parental authority in respect of him; or the presence of the minor in the territory of the requested state is incompatible with a measure of protection or re-education taken in respect of him by the competent authorities of the requesting state; or the presence of the minor is necessary in the territory of the requesting state because of the institution of proceedings there with a view to taking measures of protection and re-education in respect of him. 87 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe and the non-Member States which have participated in its elaboration, in Strasbourg, on 25 January 1996. Entered into force: 1 July 2000. Ratified by Albania, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the Ukraine.

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types of family proceedings of special interest for children that are listed are those concerning custody, residence, access, questions of parentage, legitimacy, adoption, legal guardianship, administration of property of children, care procedures, removal or restriction of parental responsibilities, protection from cruel or degrading treatment and medical treatment.88 Second, the Conventions have served to reflect changes in attitudes across Member States and 07.13B to ensure the removal of provisions that conflict with the case law of the ECtHR. Both points can be illustrated by the Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised),89 which was created in order to take account of social and legal developments and to ensure that the existing Convention (outlined earlier) is in keeping with the ECHR. New provisions introduced by the Convention include the requirement for the father’s consent in all cases and that the child’s consent is necessary if the child has sufficient understanding to give it. Significantly, the Convention is also extended to include heterosexual unmarried couples who have entered into a registered partnership in states which recognise that institution, and leaves states free to extend adoptions to homosexual couples and same-sex couples living together in a stable relationship. The new Convention also strikes a better balance between adopted children’s right to know their identity and the right of the biological parents to remain anonymous. Third, the Conventions reflect the consequences of migration and the impact this can have 07.14B upon families that have separated. Practical protection is provided by the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children90 which protects custody and access rights in international situations and provides for free, prompt, non-bureaucratic assistance from central authorities designated by each party in discovering the whereabouts and restoring custody of a child improperly removed.91 The Convention deals with various situations and offers specific solutions. For instance, if application is made within six months of the improper removal of a child, restoration of custody is to be immediate and subject to no condition other than the establishment of certain facts.92 The Convention on Contact concerning Children93 concerns two issues which have caused 07.15B increasing disquiet to Member States. The first relates to the issue of contact with children and 88 Furthermore, each party is required to specify at least three categories of family proceedings to which this Convention is to apply. The Convention is also intended to facilitate the implementation by parties of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 89 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe and the non-Member States which have participated in its elaboration, in Strasbourg, on 27 November 2008. Entered into force: 1 September 2011. Ratified by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, and Ukraine. 90 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, in Luxembourg, on 20 May 1980. Entered into force: 1 September 1983. All Member States have ratified this Convention except: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Monaco, Russia, San Marino, and Slovenia. 91 Application for the restoration of custody of a child may be made directly either to a court or to the central authorities of any party concerned. Central authorities are required to assist the applicants in their action; to discover the whereabouts of the child; to avoid, in particular by any necessary provisional measures, prejudice to the interests of the child or of the applicant; to secure the recognition or enforcement of the custody decision; and to secure the delivery of the child to the applicant where enforcement is granted. 92 These are: that the child was improperly removed, that the child and both parents had as their sole nationality the nationality of the state in which the decision on custody was made and that, in addition, the child had his habitual residence in that state; or that the child has not been repatriated after the exercise of access abroad, in violation of the conditions governing exercise of the right of access. If these conditions are not met but the application is lodged within the six-month time-limit, restoration of custody is subject to stricter conditions. Once the six-month time-limit has expired, restoration of custody is subject to more numerous conditions, since the child may already be integrated into a different environment. 93 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, the non-Member States which have participated in its elaboration and the EU, in Strasbourg, on 15 May 2003. Entered into force: 1 September 2005. Ratified by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Malta, Romania, San Marino, Turkey and Ukraine.



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the possible restrictions thereto when these are considered necessary in the best interests of the child. The second is the inherent problems with respect to the exercise of contact which have given rise to significant disputes in many countries. Disputes relating to contact are often long and difficult for the parties concerned and raise problems as regards making, modifying and enforcing court orders relating to contact in addition to the difficulties created by geographical separation, which brings with it the application of different legal systems, different languages as well as cultural differences. The aim of the Convention is therefore to improve certain aspects of the right of national and transfrontier contact and, in particular, to specify and reinforce the basic right of children and their parents to maintain contact on a regular basis as elucidated by the ECtHR.94 In this respect, the object of the Convention is to determine the general principles to be applied to contact orders, as well as to fix appropriate safeguards and guarantees to ensure the proper exercise of such contact and the immediate return of children at the end of the period of contact. It establishes cooperation between all the bodies and authorities concerned with contact orders and reinforces the implementation of relevant existing international legal instruments in this field.95 07.16B Finally, the Conventions can serve to illustrate, as with the rights of children, the recognition of a new area of concern across Member States and a concomitant commitment to providing the cross-border protection of the relevant rights where required. The new landmark Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence96 opened the path for creating a legal framework at pan-European level to protect women against all forms of violence, and prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence against women and domestic violence. It also establishes a specific monitoring mechanism in order to ensure effective implementation of its provisions by the parties.

III.  UN Treaties 07.17B International law recognises the fact that the family plays an essential and central role in human society.97 The family is perceived to be ‘the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.’98 As a result, the right to family life has been recognised as a fundamental right in international law and is enunciated in all major international instruments and conventions.99 First and foremost is Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of 94 According to the case law of the ECtHR ‘“respect” for a family life … implies an obligation for the State to act in a manner calculated to allow these ties to develop normally’ (Scozzari and Giunta v Italy App no 39221/98 and 41963/98 (ECtHR, 13 July 2000)). This right may be extended, if necessary, to include contact between a child and other persons than his or her parents, in particular when the child has family ties with such a person. 95 The Convention also addresses non-Member States of the Council of Europe and will therefore also be open to their accession to this Convention. 96 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, the non-Member States which have participated in its elaboration and the EU, in Istanbul on 11 May 2011. Entered into force: 1 August 2014. Not ratified by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. 97 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Protection of the family: contribution of the family to the realization of the right to an adequate standard of living for its members, particularly through its role in poverty eradication and achieving sustainable development’, Human Rights Council, 31st session, A/HRC/31/37, 29 January 2016. 98 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A, UN GAOR, 3d Sess, Part 1, Art 16(3), at 74, UN Doc A/810 (1948). 99 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art 23(1) (reiterating that which is stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 providing that ‘[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that … [t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society’. For similar ­sentiments,

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Human Rights100 (UDHR), upholding the family as the natural and fundamental unit in society. It establishes the right of men and women to marry and found a family; their equal rights as to the marriage, and that consent to marriage should be freely given. As a resolution, the UDHR is not itself formally legally binding, however, it has established important principles and values which have been elaborated in later legally binding UN treaties, recommendations and resolutions.101 These include: Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR),102 which reiterates some basic rights concerning family life and then goes on to establish further rights of pregnant mothers to maternity leave and social security; Article 23 of the ICCPR,103 which guarantees the right to a family; the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with special reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally,104 which provides important guidelines for the fostering and adoption, including inter-country adoptions of children who lack appropriate parental care; and the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages,105 which reiterates the right to full consent and also requires states to establish a minimum age for marriage, as does the Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages.106 There are also a number of UN population and development documents, including the 1994 Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action, the 1968 Tehran Declaration and the 1985 Fourth World Conference in Beijing which all contain provisions regarding the rights of individuals to family planning. Finally, there are a number of UN treaties relating to specific categories of persons which can also be used to protect the right to family. For refugees, there is Article 12 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,107 which includes guidelines and principles established under the auspices of see the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, GA Res 2542, UN GAOR, 24th Sess, Supp No 30, at 49, UN Doc A/7630 (1969) (stating that the family is ‘[a] basic unit of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members, particularly children and youth’). Similar provisions may be found in various regional conventions, such as: American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 2 May 1948, OAS Res XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser L V/II 82 doc 6 rev 1 at 17 (1992) (Art VI: ‘Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection thereof ’); American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov 1969, Art 17(1), 9 ILM 673, 680 (‘The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state’); Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, Art 18(1), 21 ILM 58, 61 (‘The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical and moral health.’). 100 The UDHR (1948) (Art 16) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. General Assembly res 217A (III), 10 December 1948. 101 Moreover, a number of its provisions have become part of customary international law. 102 The ICCPR (1966) (Art 10) was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entered into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Art 49. It elaborates the principles laid out in UDHR and is legally binding on all states who have signed and ratified its provisions. 103 The ICCPR elaborates the principles laid out in UDHR and is legally binding on all states who have signed and ratified its provisions. Art 23 states: ‘1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.’ Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entered into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Art 49. 104 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/85 of 3 December 1986. 105 521 UNTS 231. Entered into force 9 December 1964. 106 GA res 2018 (XX), 20 UN GAOR Supp (No 14) at 36, UN Doc A/60141 (1965). 107 Adopted on 28 July 1951 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950. Entered into force 22 April 1954, in accordance with Art 43.



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the UN High Commissioner for Refugees strengthening provisions regarding refugee rights of the family. For women, there is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,108 which includes provisions on marriage and nationality (Art 9), equality and consent, rights and responsibilities within marriage, family planning, guardianship and adoption, women’s right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation, ownership and property, minimum age for marriage, and compulsory registration of marriages (Art 16). For children, there is the Convention on the Rights of the Child,109 which addresses their rights concerning their separation from parents (Art 9), family reunification (Arts 10 and 22) and measures for children lacking parental care (Art 20, 21). Finally, for migrant workers there is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrants Workers and Members of their Families,110 the most recent of the main UN human rights treaties, which entered into force on 1 July 2003. The Convention explicitly refers to migrant workers and ‘members of their family’, defined as ‘persons married to migrant workers or having with them a relationship that, according to applicable law, produces effects equivalent to marriage, as well as their dependent children and other dependent persons who are recognised as members of the family by applicable legislation or applicable bilateral or multilateral agreements between the States concerned’ (Art 4). The treaty recognises that ‘the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State, shall take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the unity of the families of migrant workers’. States are also expected to facilitate family reunification, and the treaty stipulates that states ‘shall favourably consider granting equal treatment, as set forth in paragraph 2 of the present article, to other family members of migrant workers’ (Art 44). Members of the families of migrant workers shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals with regard to access to education, social and health services and participation in cultural life. States also have to facilitate integration of children of migrant workers in the local school system, particularly in respect of teaching them the local language and the mother tongue and culture (Art 45). Finally, the treaty stipulates that in the case of the death of a migrant worker or dissolution of marriage, the state of employment shall favourably consider granting family members of that migrant worker residing in that state authorisation to stay (Art 50).

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 07.18B Article 7 is addressed to the protection of the right to family life within EU law, and as such has general application to any field of EU law where family life may be affected. Furthermore, the fact that it replicates Article 8 of the ECHR, has arguably led to an increase in the influence of the ECtHR’s case law with regard to its interpretation by the CJEU,111 the case law of which has, in turn, had some effect upon the reasoning of the ECtHR with respect to Article 8.112 Thus, the 108 Opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 640 (VII) of 20 December 1952. Entered into force 7 July 1954, in accordance with Art VI. 109 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. Entered into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with Art 49. 110 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990. Entered into force 1 July 2003. 111 McGlynn argued, prior to the Charter coming into effect, that although the CJEU had referred to Art 8 of the ECHR, it had done so with little effect. See C McGlynn, Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge, CUP 2006). 112 Some authors see this as evidence of a remarkable level of convergence between the two legal orders in certain areas. See S Morano-Foadi and S Andreadaksi, ‘The Convergence of the European Legal System in the Treatment of Third

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CJEU has applied Article 8 ECHR in a number of judgments to emphasise the obligation on national authorities to take into account the right to family life and respect of proportionality,113 and correspondingly Strasbourg has referred to the treatment of transsexuals by the CJEU in considering their Article 8 rights.114 The CJEU has also specifically endorsed the view that the interpretation of Article 7 of the Charter should be the same as the interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR.115 The similarity between Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter also means that a number of matters may be confidently asserted. First, the scope of the family life aspects of Article 7, as with Article 8 of the ECHR, is wide-ranging and its application will be relevant to a number of overlapping contexts. The well-established case law of the ECtHR in this area has already served as an important source in its application in certain areas and may thus also therefore serve as a good illustration of the potential scope of Article 7 in others. Second, Article 7 of the Charter, as with Article 8 of the ECHR, will include both negative and positive obligations which will be imposed upon the institutions of the EU as well as Member States when implementing EU law. Third, Article 7, as with Article 8 of the ECHR, is a qualified right; thus, any interference with family life will be prohibited unless it falls within the exceptions contained within it. These issues will now be considered in greater detail.

II.  Scope of Application The precise scope of the application of Article 7 will essentially turn upon the interpretation 07.19B of two issues: what is meant by ‘family life’ (ie, its material scope),116 and to whom this right will apply (ie, its personal scope).117 These issues have formed the subject of much discussion amongst academics, policy makers and legislators over the last few decades due to a number of significant changes to family forms and the changes in legal status that they have brought about. Families can now be found in a variety of forms, including the purely biological, the adoptive, the foster and the step where a change in the definition of parenthood which has moved beyond the purely biological towards recognition of the psychological bond between a child and her carer, which may sometimes be strong enough to trump the former. This rise in the importance of psychological parenthood has also arguably been responsible for the increase in the status and rights of same-sex and transgender parents and wider family members such as grandparents, who are increasingly playing an important role in the care of children.118 Country Nationals in Europe: the ECJ and ECtHR Jurisprudence’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 1071 and FG Jacobs, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of Justice: The Impact of European Union Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights’ in J Kokott et al. (eds), The Future of the European Judicial System in a Comparative Perspective: 6th International ECLN-Colloquium/ IACL Round Table Berlin, 2-4 November 2005 (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2006). 113 In relation to family members of EU citizens, see, eg, Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:434; Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Georgios Orfanopoulos and Others and Raffaele Oliveri v Land Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:262; and Case C-127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:449. 114 See Goodwin v United Kingdom App no 17488/90 (ECtHR, 27 March 1996), in which the ECtHR referred to the CJEU’s judgment in Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:170. 115 Case C-400/10 PPU J McB v LE [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:582 and Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:662. 116 According to Tryfonidou, Art 7 of the Charter consists of four (sub-)rights: the right to private life, the right to family life, the right to a home, and the right to communications. A Tryfonidou, ‘EU Free Movement Law and the Children of Rainbow Families: Children of a Lesser God?’ (2019) 38 Yearbook of European Law 220, 250. 117 I Danėlienė, ‘Who is Entitled to the Right to Respect for Family Life Under the European Union Law?’ (2019) 110 Teisė 24. 118 See, eg, A Tryfonidou, ‘The Parenting Rights of Same-Sex Couples under European Law’ (2019) 25 Marriage, Families & Spirituality 176.



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07.20B

The way in which family life is conducted has also changed. The impact of immigration and migration has been significant and has resulted in family life being conducted within a variety of different social, cultural and religious contexts all of which are regularly being taken into account in law and policy making and the adjudication of family law proceedings. The diverse nature of families and family life is reflected across the Member States, however, due to differences in national experiences and understandings of these concepts it is clear that a lack of consensus remains as to what is meant by family life and to whom the right can apply. This has meant, in the Strasbourg Court’s case, that a wider margin of appreciation is often given in cases concerning family life which relate to particularly sensitive or moral issues and where there is an insufficient consensus across Member States to find that a breach of Article 8 has occurred.119 This has had inevitable implications for the way in which the ECtHR has approached the question of how to define family life and to whom it can apply. 07.21B An examination of the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence reveals that when looking at the question of whether family life has been established, the ECtHR will first consider the form of the family and, as such, considers whether it corresponds to what it has referred to as ‘a conventional family based unit’, which will consist of a heterosexual married couple who may or may not have children.120 Such families are automatically accorded family life and thus placed at the top of an evidentiary hierarchy, where nothing more is required to demonstrate family life. It is also clear that there is no requirement for members of such units to continue to live together121 or remain married, as family life will be in existence by virtue of fulfilling this norm alone. It is no surprise therefore that the ECtHR has been charged with privileging the traditional or ‘ideal’ family form; however, this is something about which the ECtHR has been unapologetic. The ECtHR has often reiterated that marriage confers a ‘special status’ upon those who enter into it, something which is quite obviously underscored by the protection of the right to marry as a separate article within the convention itself.122 However, its stance must also be explained as a reflection of the continuing privileging of it by most, if not all, of the contracting states. In other words, this is an inevitable consequence of the operation of the margin of appreciation by a supranational court.123 07.22B Although problematic, what is often obscured in such discussions is the fact that by privileging marriage in this manner the court is demonstrating what is arguably the real focus of the court: to ascertain the intention to create family life. As a result, marriage represents, in purely evidential terms, the ultimate evidence of the intention to create family life. One advantage that appears to have emerged from this approach is that other, similar, public and legal undertakings such as civil partnerships could also be afforded the same treatment124 and family life, as with married

119 As an example, this was the reason why breaches were not found to have occurred for a number of years with respect to the inability of transsexuals to marry (see Cossey v the United Kingdom App no 10843/84 (Commission Decision, 27 September 1990), paras 38–40; Sheffield and Horsham v the United Kingdom App no 22985/93 and 23390/94 (ECtHR, 30 July 1998), paras 57–61; and X, Y and Z v United Kingdom App no 21830/93 (Commission Decision, 22 April 1997), paras 44, 52. 120 This particular privilege, as Costello emphasises, ’reflects patriarchal, hetero-normative, and ethnocentric value judgments.’ C Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (Oxford, OUP 2016) 105. 121 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK App no 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81 (ECtHR, 28 May 1985). 122 See Shackell v United Kingdom App no 45851/99 (ECtHR, 27 April 2000) where the Court held that the difference of treatment for the purposes of the grant of social security benefits, between an unmarried applicant who had a long-term relationship with the deceased, and a widow in the same situation, was justified, marriage remaining an institution that was widely accepted as conferring a particular status on those who entered into it. 123 See R Bernhardt, ‘The Convention and Domestic Law’ in RSJ Macdonald, F Matxcher and H Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 123. 124 See S Choudry and J Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law (Oxford, Hart 2010) ch 4 on marriage for further details of this approach.

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couples, could arise in relation to any children either born or adopted within a civil partnership. With respect to family forms outside of either marriage or a civil partnership, it is fair to say that the court will adopt a somewhat functional test of whether they will constitute family life which, again, demonstrates a certain preoccupation with the intention behind the arrangements. It should also be noted that this functional approach has been facilitated by the Court’s recognition of the changes in family form and structure that have occurred over the years, made possible by the evolutive and dynamic nature of the Convention. Thus, an unmarried couple may establish family life if certain factors are present,125 such as whether the couple live together, the length of their relationship and whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children together or by any other means.126 These factors have also been used to extend the concept of family life from unmarried couples who have children to others. Thus, family life was found to be in existence in relation to a transsexual father and his child born as a result of AID,127 an uncle and nephew,128 and a grandparent and grandchild.129 At the same time, the lack of existence of such factors has been applied to hold against the establishment of family life, and thus it will not be held to be in existence by the mere donation of sperm130 or in relation to stillborn children.131 The existence or non-existence of ‘family life’ has thus become, in essence, a question of fact depending upon what the ECtHR has referred to as ‘the real existence in practice of close personal ties’,132 and to a certain extent reflects a recognition of the psychological parent over the biological. Nonetheless it is clear that when examining whether family life is in existence, the ECtHR will first consider whether there is evidence of an intention to create family life by virtue of form before moving to function. A married couple will thus have established family life with each other and with any of their children and any other forms of relationship will, in essence, have to satisfy the ‘function’ test. The Strasbourg Court’s approach to same-sex relationships, however, has shifted significantly. 07.23B Historically, the ECtHR chose to find that adverse treatment on the basis of an individual’s sexual orientation was unjustifiable in relation to the respect for private life rather than family life.133 In addition, there were a number of decisions134 concerning same-sex relationships where the ECtHR declined to find that the Article 8 right to family life had even been engaged.135 However, in a decision in 2010 it chose to specifically address the issue of whether a same-sex relationship could constitute ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8. In Schalk and Kopf v Austria136 two same-sex applicants alleged a breach of their Articles 12 and 14 rights (in conjunction with

125 L v the Netherlands App no 45582/99 (ECtHR, 1 June 2004). 126 Kroon and Others v the Netherlands App no 18535/91 (ECtHR, 27 October 1994). 127 X, Y and Z v United Kingdom App no 21830/93 (Commission Decision, 22 April 1997). 128 Boyle v United Kingdom App no 16580/90 (ECtHR, 28 February 1994). 129 L v Finland App no 25651/94 (ECtHR, 27 April 2000). 130 M v the Netherlands App no 16944/90 (ECtHR, 8 February 1993). 131 Znamenskaya v Russia App no 77785/01 (ECtHR, 2 June 2005). 132 K and T v Finland App no 25702/94 (ECtHR, 12 July 2001). 133 These cases concerned, for example, the criminal prohibition of consensual, private same-sex sexual activity: Dudgeon v United Kingdom App no 7525/76 (ECtHR, 22 October 1981); Norris v Ireland App no 10581/83 (ECtHR, 26 October 1988) and prohibitions on same-sex relationships within the military: ADT v United Kingdom App no 35765/97 (ECtHR, 31 July 2000), para 38; Sutherland v United Kingdom App no 25186/94 (ECtHR, 1 July 1997), para 57. 134 Estevez v Spain App no 56501/00 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001). Even in Karner v Austria App no 40016/98 (ECtHR, 24 July 2003), para 33 note that the Court did not find it necessary to determine the notions of ‘private life’ or ‘family life’, because it considered that, in any event, the applicant’s complaint related to the manner in which the alleged difference in treatment adversely affected the enjoyment of his right to respect for his home guaranteed under Art 8. 135 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom App no 33985/96 and 33986/96 (ECtHR, 27 September 1999); Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom App no 31417/9 and 32377/96 (ECtHR, 27 September 1999). 136 Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010).



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those under Art 8) by the failure of the Austrian state to make provision for same-sex marriage. Although no breach was ultimately found,137 the ECtHR nonetheless took the opportunity to address its previous case law on this point and declared that due to a rapid evolution of attitudes towards same-sex couples in the Member States, which had in turn led to a considerable number of those states affording legal recognition to such couples, it was ‘artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8.’ Consequently, the facts of the case were capable of falling within the notion of both ‘private’ and ‘family’ life within the meaning of Article 8.138 Of particular note is the reference to the provisions of two EU Directives with respect to same-sex couples: the Family Reunification Directive and the Citizens’ Rights Directive, part of the ‘growing tendency to include same-sex couples in the notion of “family”.’139 While the ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf v Austria, had to determine whether Austria should have provided the applicants with an alternative means of legal recognition of their partnership, in Oliari the applicants had no opportunity to enter into a civil union or registered partnership (in the absence of marriage) in Italy.140 Ruling that the ‘continuing international movement towards legal recognition, to which the Court cannot but attach some importance’, the ECtHR found Italy’s refusal to legally recognise a same-sex union to be a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.141 Strasbourg’s approach to the status of same-sex individuals in relation to children with whom 07.24B they do not have a biological link has also gone through a similar shift. In Fretté v France,142 the ECtHR found that the refusal to allow a gay man to adopt a child because of his sexual orientation did not constitute a breach of his right to private life under Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14, rather than his ‘family’ life. A wide margin of appreciation was applied due to ‘the delicate issues raised in the case’, which touched on areas where there was little common ground amongst the Member States. Although some movement did occur on the issue of samesex adoption in EB v France,143 where the ECtHR found, by a small majority, that a refusal to allow an individual in a same sex relationship to adopt a child as a single person did constitute a breach of both her Article 8 and 14 rights. However, it should be noted that the claim was made in relation to sexual orientation discrimination rather than the family life of the applicant. As a result, the claim was made on the private life aspects of Article 8 only.144 Any inroads made in EB have arguably been cancelled out by the very recent decision of Gas and Dubois v France,145 where the ECtHR seems to have switched back to a more restrictive stance upon the issue. The case concerned the refusal of an applicant’s request for the adoption of the child of her same-sex

137 See the discussion of this case in the commentary on Art 9. 138 Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010), paras 91–95. The ECtHR, however, ruled in Ratzenböck and Seydl v Austria that same-sex couples who are allowed to marry but not to register their partnership are not in a relevantly similar or comparable situation with same-sex couples whose relationship can only be legally recognised through a registered partnership but not a marriage. Ratzenböck and Seydl v Austria App no 28475/12 (ECtHR, 9 April 2018). 139 Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010), para 93. 140 Oliari and Others v Italy App no 18766/11 and 36030/11 (ECtHR, 21 July 2015). 141 ibid, para 178, with reference to Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom App no 28957/95 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002), para 85 and Vallianatos and Others v Greece App no 29381/09 and 32684/09 (ECtHR, 7 November 2013), para 91. 142 Fretté v France App no 36515/97 (ECtHR, 26 February 2002). 143 EB v France App no 43546/02 (ECtHR, 22 January 2008). 144 In distinguishing the case from Fretté, the ECtHR reiterated that differences based on sexual orientation required particularly serious reasons by way of justification but, nonetheless, found that, in this case, no such reasons had been advanced by the government. Further, although Art 8 did not imply such a right, given that French law allowed single persons to adopt, thereby opening up the possibility of adoption by a single homosexual such as the applicant, the refusal of EB’s adoption application had been based on discriminatory grounds. 145 Gas and Dubois v France App no 25951/07 (ECtHR, 15 March 2012).

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partner with whom she had entered into a civil partnership, which was not found to be a breach of either Article 14 or Article 8. However, in doing so the ECtHR concentrated its reasoning on Article 14 and barely acknowledged the case law on this area concerning Article 8, making no statement upon which aspect of Article 8 they were referring to when finding that no breach of it had occurred. However, in a later decision the ECtHR specifically addressed the question of whether the relationship between a same-sex couple and a child could come within the meaning of ‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8, although it was careful to distinguish the facts from those of Gas and Dubois.146 In X and Others v Austria147 two women who live in a stable homosexual relationship com- 07.25B plained about the Austrian courts’ refusal to grant one of the partners the right to adopt the son of the other partner without severing the mother’s legal ties with the child (second-parent adoption). In its consideration of Article 8, the ECtHR reiterated that the relationship of a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto relationship falls within the notion of ‘family life’, just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation would, citing both Schalk and Kopf and Gas and Dubois v France in support.148 However, what should be noted is that the reference to Gas and Dubois v France is to its admissibility decision,149 rather than its more recent judgment. This was presumably because it was only in the former that the Court had decided that the relationship between two women who were living together having entered into a civil partnership, and the child conceived by one of them by means of assisted reproduction but being brought up by both of them, constituted ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, whereas in the latter no reference was made to this point at all. As a result, the ECtHR found that the relationship between all three applicants amounted to ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. This was due to the following reasons: the fact that the first and third applicants in the present case formed a stable same-sex couple; that they had been cohabiting for many years; the second applicant shared their home and his mother and her partner cared for him jointly.150 What must be remembered, however, is that a finding that a same-sex relationship is capable of 07.26B coming within the notion of family life will not necessarily translate into a finding that a breach of Article 8 and/or Article 14 has occurred. It may still be difficult to establish that the alleged discrimination is unjustified, due to the Court’s general policy of protection of the traditional family and the child’s best interests. Thus, in X and Others v Austria, although the Court found that a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 8 had occurred on account of the difference in treatment of the applicants in comparison with unmarried different-sex couples in which one partner wished to adopt the other partner’s child, it also found that no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 was found when the applicants’ situation was compared with that of a married couple in which one spouse wished to adopt the other spouse’s child. Further, although in Karner v Austria,151 the ECtHR found that the narrow interpretation of the relevant Rent Act which had prevented a surviving partner of a same-sex couple from taking over a tenancy was a breach of his Article 8 and Article 14 rights, it also stated that ‘the protection of the family in the traditional sense’,152 even in cases concerning





146 See

the discussion of this case in the commentary on Art 9. and Others v Austria App no 19010/07 (ECtHR, 19 February 2013). 95. 149 Gas and Dubois v France App no 25951/07 (ECtHR, 15 March 2012). 150 See the discussion of this case in the commentary on Art 9 for details on the outcome. 151 Karner v Austria App no 40016/98 (ECtHR, 24 July 2003). 152 ibid, para 41. 147 X

148 ibid, para

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differences of treatment based on sexual orientation, may, in appropriate circumstances, be a weighty and legitimate enough reason which would justify a difference in treatment. In sum, the application of a wide margin of appreciation where any such discrimination is founded on the belief that it is necessary to protect the conventional family form and the interests of children, may hinder the chances of a successful claim under the family life aspects of Article 8. 07.27B Nonetheless, while there may be a privileging of marriage with respect to the engagement of family life under Article 8(1),153 any difference in treatment towards children which is rooted in family form will fail to satisfy the Article 8(2) test. Both the ECtHR and the Council of Europe154 have demonstrated their commitment to the equal treatment of children born within and outside of marriage which is, in turn, in line with a number of international and regional instruments,155 all of which prohibit discrimination on the grounds of birth. Thus, in Marckx v Belgium156 the ECtHR held that although it was not a requirement of Article 8 that a child or parent be entitled to a share in the estate, or for a parent to leave property in a certain way, it would constitute a breach of their Article 8 and Article 14 rights if any such provision discriminated between legitimate and illegitimate children. Thus, once family life has been established, the ECtHR makes no distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate family, and prohibits discrimination grounded on birth. Given that Article 52(3) of the Charter states that insofar as the Charter contains rights which 07.28B correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR ‘the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention’, there is more than a reasonable prospect of the CJEU interpreting the question of family life under Article 7 of the Charter in the same way. However, it must also be recalled that the Charter further states that this ‘shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ As a result, the CJEU must follow existing ECHR interpretations of the meaning of family life and to whom it applies; however, it is free to go beyond this interpretation and increase the scope and application of Article 7 if a greater level of protection is desired. The CJEU’s approach to Article 7 will now be examined in the next section.

III.  Specific Provisions 07.29B The definition of the family, and who is included within it, are questions that have arisen within a variety of different contexts within EU law. However, it is community legislation and case law within the fields of free movement, migration, immigration and asylum which have proved to be the best source of identifying how these questions have been answered. Two particular issues have emerged: the treatment of cohabiting heterosexual couples, and the treatment of same-sex couples, both of which have implications for the EU’s approach towards not only the family but also towards gender equality.

153 The ECtHR has held on a number of occasions and over a variety of contexts that differences in treatment between married and unmarried couples can be justified if there is a rational basis for doing so, and a wider margin of appreciation will be accorded—eg McMichael v United Kingdom App no 16424/90 (ECtHR, 24 February 1995) and Saucedo Gomez v Spain App no 33784/94 (ECtHR, 26 January 1999). 154 In accordance with the European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock, 15 October 1975— see also the Committee of Ministers Policy referred to in Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979). 155 Art 2 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 2.1 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and Art 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. 156 Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979) and Johnston v Ireland App no 9697/82 (ECtHR, 18 December 1986).

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(a)  The Married Heterosexual Norm A number of commentators157 have identified a certain privileging of the traditional, married 07.30B and heterosexual family by both the political and judicial institutions of the EU. Two judgments in particular are cited by commentators as evidence of EU’s bias towards the heterosexual family. In Grant v South West Trains158 the Court’s refusal to extend the scope of Article 141 EC (now Article 157 TFEU) and the Equal Pay Directive159 to cover discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation meant that same-sex couples could not qualify for the payment of employees’ family benefits, and in D and Sweden v Council160 the CJEU held that same-sex relationships, even if legally registered under national laws, remained distinct from marriage and could not be treated in the same way as marriage.161 The position, however, has since been rectified by the CJEU under Directive 2000/78162 which prohibits such discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.163 In contrast, the act of marriage has always, even if withdrawn from, conferred privileges not only upon the spouses of EU citizens but also their descendants. In Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department164 the CJEU adjudged that the children of a citizen of the EU who resided in a Member State on the basis of their parent’s rights of residence as a migrant worker in that Member State were entitled to continue that residence regardless of the fact that the parents of the children had meanwhile divorced and the fact that only one parent was a citizen of the EU. The position was updated to include registered partnerships with the passage of the Directive on the right of citizens of the Union to move and reside freely within Member States165 (the Citizens’ Rights Directive): Article 18 provides that the dissolution of a marriage or registered partnership will not necessarily result in the loss of the right to residence.166 Furthermore, any right of residence will be preserved up to the point of dissolution. As a result, parties in a state of separation, even with the intention to divorce at a later date, can still qualify for a right of residence as a family member on the basis of the Directive.167

157 See TK Hervey, ‘Migration Workers and Their Families in the European Union: the Pervasive Ideology of Community Law’ in J Shaw and G More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1995) 91, 106; and C McGlynn, ‘A Family Law for the European Union?’ in J Shaw (ed), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (2000) 223, 240, 241, amongst others. 158 Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:63. 159 Then Directive 75/117/EEC [1975] OJ L45/19, which has been repealed by Directive 2006/54/EC. 160 Case T-264/97 D v Council of the European Union [2001] ECLI:EU:T:1999:13. 161 ibid, paras 26, 37. 162 Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 163 See the judgments in Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:179 and C-147/08 Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:286. The CJEU confirmed the principle that in all EU Member States where marriage is reserved for different-sex partners and a separate registered partnership law for same-sex couples exists, employment-related payments such as benefits under pension plans must be equal for same-sex registered partners and married partners. Difference of treatment between registered partners and married partners constitutes direct discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. 164 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:493 where they satisfy the conditions laid down in Arts 12(2) and 13(2) of Directive 90/364/EEC, which require that the persons concerned can, among other conditions, show, before acquiring the right of permanent residence, that they themselves satisfy the same conditions as those referred to in Art 7(1)(a), (b) or (d) of that Directive. For an appraisal of the case law on this point see Advocate General Bot’s Opinion in Case C-529/11 Olaitan Ajoke Alarape and Olukayode Azeez Tijani v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:290. 165 Directive 2004/38/EC. 166 It provides that in the event of the death or departure of the Union citizen, divorce, annulment of the marriage or termination of a registered partnership, the members of his family can acquire the right of permanent residence after residing legally for a period of five consecutive years in the host Member State. 167 Case 267/83 Aissatou Diatta v Land Berlin [1985] ECLI:EU:C:1985:67. This case was seen by a number of commentators to imply that the rights of a migrant worker’s spouse may be extinguished on divorce, but Art 18 of Directive 2004/38



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07.31B

This is in stark contrast to the position on cohabitants (both heterosexual and homosexual). The position was set out in the late 1980s CJEU in Netherlands v Reed,168 where the CJEU held that a ‘spouse’, for the purpose of the grant of free movement ‘family rights,’ is to be limited to married persons, and does not therefore include cohabitees, either heterosexual or homosexual. Nearly two decades later the EU failed to take the opportunity to equalise the position between cohabitees and married couples on joining their partners with the passage of the Citizens’ Rights Directive,169 although it did introduce a route whereby it is at least possible for cohabitants to obtain the right of residence on the basis of their partner’s free movement rights. If a cohabiting couple has not formalised their relationship by entering into a registered partnership, they will fall under the rules on unregistered partnerships which, under the Citizens’ Rights Directive, obliges Member States to ‘facilitate entry and residence’ to unregistered partners who are in a ‘durable relationship’.170 07.32B This applies equally to couples of the opposite sex and to same-sex couples for whom the position has also not been equalised. Thus, if a same-sex couple is married in their home state and the host state recognises the validity of same-sex marriages, then the individual will have the right of a spouse, under the Citizens’ Rights Directive, to join their partner.171 If the couple has entered into a registered partnership in their home state then an individual may be able to join their partner in the host state as if they were a spouse. If the host state’s national law treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage, then an individual has the right to join their partner as if they were a spouse.172 If the host state does not treat registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage then the couple will fall under the rules on unregistered partners in a ‘durable relationship’. A registered partnership that is not recognised in another Member State, however, is considered as attesting a long-term relationship. EU law therefore places no obligation on Member States to allow or recognise registered partnerships. This is quite clearly different to the concrete right to join their partner enjoyed by a spouse, who, unlike cohabitant couples, is not required to provide evidence that their relationship is ‘durable’, and unlike same-sex couples is not subject to the additional uncertainty of how each Member State chooses to view them. The Citizens’ Rights Directive provides that the Member State concerned shall ‘undertake an extensive examination of the personal circumstances and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these people.’173 Some uncertainty may have been taken away by the CJEU in Coman.174 In this case, which concerned a same-sex marriage between Mr Coman (an EU national from Romania) and Mr Hamilton (a non-EU national from the US), the CJEU ruled that even if Romania does not recognise same-sex marriages, a matter falling within the competence of Member States, it has

later clarified that this would not necessarily be the case. See L Ackers, Shifting Spaces: Women, Citizenship and Migration Within the European Union (Bristol, Policy Press 1998)—. See also the discussion concerning the applicability of these provisions to separated couples in Case C-40/11 Yoshikazu Iida v Stadt Ulm [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:691 below. 168 Case 59/85 Netherlands v Reed [1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:157. 169 Directive 2004/38/EC, which partly repealed Regulation (EC) 1612/68 upon which this case had been decided. 170 Art 3(2). 171 Currently the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden enable same-sex couples to be legally married. However, still some Member States (Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) do not recognise the validity of same-sex marriages. In these states same-sex spouses will probably not be recognised as ‘spouses’, but as registered partners. 172 The following Member States do not provide for registered partnerships that have effects equivalent or comparable to marriage: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. 173 Art 3(2) last sentence of Directive 2004/38/EC. 174 Case C-673/16 Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.

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to comply with Article 21(1) of the TFEU. Thus, a Member State is obliged to recognise samesex marriages, lawfully concluded in another Member State, ‘for the sole purpose of enabling such persons to exercise the rights they enjoy under EU law’. The CJEU, though, emphasised that the same-sex marriage was concluded ‘during the period of their genuine residence in another Member State’, which seems to stress the importance of durability.175 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that EU nationals have a right to lead a ‘normal family life’ in the host Member State and in the Member State of which they are a national when returning to the home state.176 Thus, despite some inroads, it can be said that marriage is still accorded a privileged status 07.33B by the EU; however, the manner in which this occurs has arguably become less consistent. Although, there are similar provisions in the Family Reunification Directive177 which sets out that Member States may authorise the entry of unmarried partners with whom the sponsor is in a duly attested stable long-term relationship, and registered partners provided certain conditions are met, spouses are, on the face of it, in exactly the same position.178 This was confirmed in the first case in which the CJEU was asked to specifically consider the compatibility of EU legislation with Article 7 of the Charter.179 In European Parliament v Council of the European Union,180 no less than the European Parliament sought the annulment of various parts of the Family Reunification Directive on the basis that they did not respect the right to family life and the right to non-discrimination. After a comprehensive review of ECtHR case law, the CJEU found that although the right to family life included the right to family reunification,181 Article 7 did not, however, create an individual right of entry for family members, but rather an opportunity of entry which is subject to the margin of appreciation as applied by individual Member States. However, although spouses are not accorded privileged status in terms of the opportunity to enter, privileging nonetheless occurs in the process; unlike cohabitants, spouses are not required to provide any evidence of the stability or length of their relationship. This clear difference in treatment in the directive was further compounded by the failure on the part of the European Parliament to even raise this as an issue as part of the discrimination claim,182 which at best could be seen as evidence of ambivalence towards the issue or at worst, as evidence of an intention to continue the privileging of marriage within EU law. The provisions on asylum are similar in the requirement upon cohabitants to provide evi- 07.34B dence of stability but different in the additional requirement of comparable treatment by individual Member States. Thus, the Directive on Reception Conditions for Asylum-seekers includes unmarried partners in a stable relationship within the definition of family members, but only where ‘the law or practice of the Member State concerned treats unmarried couples in a way comparable to married couples under its law relating to third-country nationals’.183 Although the Directive does not refer to same-sex couples specifically, it is presumed that this leaves 175 ibid, para 40. 176 ibid, para 32. 177 Directive 2003/86/EC, see Art 4(3). 178 Set out in ch IV of Directive 2003/86/EC. 179 In Khachab, the Court ruled that Member States have ‘to examine applications for reunification with a view to promoting family life’, laid down in Art 7. Case C-558/14 Mimoun Khachab v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Álava [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:285, para 28. 180 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:429. 181 The CJEU also confirmed that the provisions must be read in conjunction with the obligation to have regard to the child’s best interests, recognised in Art 24(2) of the Charter, and taking account of the need, expressed in Art 24(3), for a child to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship with both his or her parents. See on this, for instance, Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2012:776, paras 76–80, and Case C-635/17 E v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:192, paras 55–58. 182 The Commission raised issues concerning the treatment of minor children in the Directive alone. 183 Art 2(c) of Directive 2013/33/EU.



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individual Member States free to interpret the provisions relating to unmarried partners as equally applicable to them. The same definition is given in the Directive on Qualifications for Becoming a Refugee or a Beneficiary of Subsidiary Protection Status184 and in the Directive on Asylum Procedures of the Dublin Regulation.185 A clear hierarchy has thus been established within these fields of competence with regard to cohabitants (which may include same-sex couples who may be married or in a registered partnership). At the top are those coming within the Family Reunification Directive in sharing the dubious status of holding the equality of opportunity to enter a Member State with spouses. In the middle are those cohabitants who come within the Citizens’ Rights Directive who do not have an equal right of residence with spouses but who have the possibility of acquiring it, provided an evidential hurdle is cleared. Finally, at the bottom are those cohabitants who come within the various asylum provisions who have to clear two evidentiary hurdles in order to access the same benefits as spouses. 07.35B Ultimately, the clearest point which emerges from this analysis is that, regardless of which category they are in, cohabitants continue to be at the bottom of the EU family tree by virtue of the requirement to produce some kind of evidence concerning the stability and nature of their relationship in order to access any of the opportunities available within these areas of EU competence.186 An argument could thus certainly be made concerning the incompatibility of the definitions of family members contained within these provisions with regard to not only Article 7 but a number of the other fundamental rights contained in the Charter; however, in doing so it is clear that current Strasbourg case law concerning Article 8 cannot be relied upon. This is ostensibly due to the fact that the provisions referred to appear very much to be in line with Strasbourg’s approach in placing form over function as a means of determining who has access to the protection afforded to a ‘family member.’ Strasbourg has, as outlined in the above section, consistently accorded marriage a special status by virtue of it being sufficient evidence alone of the requisite level of stability of a couple and their intention to remain together. All other relationships outside of marriage are subjected, in essence, to an examination of its functions to ascertain whether family life is sufficiently in existence to warrant the label of ‘family member’ and thereby access the benefits this status may bestow. 07.36B Thus, if any claim concerning the compatibility of these provisions with the Charter were to succeed, it would require the CJEU to go beyond the interpretation of the fundamental rights involved as currently provided for by the ECtHR. In addition, being able to claim the right to family life is just one part of the process and does not guarantee that any breach of it will be upheld. Article 7, like Article 8 of the ECHR, is a qualified right. As a result, once the applicability of the article has been established, the court must then examine whether any of the specified limitations set out in Article 8(2) apply before a breach of the right can be found. Furthermore, in assessing any limitations both the principles of proportionality and the margin of appreciation will be applied. However, it is the latter principle that has proved to be of particular importance in cases concerning family life before the ECtHR where its approach has been to accord a wide margin of appreciation to areas that are particularly sensitive to national opinion.187 If the CJEU follows the approach of the ECtHR with regard to such areas then, even if family life is found, a wide margin of appreciation may be applied and the likelihood of a breach being found may be low. It is thus somewhat unsurprising that although there are now a number of



184 Art

2(j) of Directive 2011/95/EU. 2(i) of Regulation (EU) 604/2013. 186 See the discussion concerning Case C-400/10 PPU J McB v LE [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:582 below. 187 See Choudry and Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law (n 124) ch 1. 185 Art

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judgments specifically concerning claims made in relation to Article 7 of the Charter, none have yet raised the compatibility of the definitions of ‘family members’ within these provisions. Cases have instead been concerned with various attempts to subject the exercise of the rights of family members to procedural restrictions and conditions (examined in the next section) and whether the subject at issue concerns the implementation of EU law. The CJEU’s approach to the latter is particularly crucial when it is recalled that the Charter will only apply to areas where EU law is being implemented. Thus, even if an individual is able to establish family life and come within the protection of Article 7 of the Charter, any such protection can only be triggered if the subject matter of the claim lies within the scope of EU law. (b)  The Scope of EU Law and Citizenship The importance of whether the subject matter of the claim lies within the scope of EU law has 07.37B been made evident in a series of recent cases concerning the rights conferred by the status of citizenship, particularly the right to move to and reside in any Member State (Art 21 TFEU) and the derivative right of residence which may be granted to the caregiver of a citizen who is a dependent child.188 Traditionally, a cross-border element has been necessary for any of these rights and the application of EU law to be triggered, and until the decision in Zambrano189 the absence of this element would have resulted in the situation being regarded as a purely internal one, to be regulated by national law. The case itself concerned Mr and Mrs. Zambrano, Colombian nationals who had come to Belgium and applied for asylum and had their applications denied. Two of the Zambranos’ children were, however, born in Belgium and were granted Belgian nationality. At various points in time, Belgian authorities had rejected Mr and Mrs Zambrano’s applications for residence permits and had denied Mr Zambrano unemployment benefits on grounds that he had been employed without a work permit. Mr Zambrano challenged these decisions, arguing that he enjoyed a right to residence and access to employment directly by virtue of the EC Treaty or, at the very least, that he enjoyed the derived right of residence, recognised in by the CJEU in Chen for the ascendants of a minor child who is a national of a Member State and that, therefore, he was exempt from the obligation to hold a work permit. In a landmark decision, the CJEU, without making any reference to Article 7,190 held that 07.38B Article 20 of the TFEU precludes a Member State from refusing a third-country national upon whom his minor children, who are EU citizens, are dependent, a right of residence in the Member State of residence and nationality of those children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to that third country national, in so far as such decisions deprive those children of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights’191 attaching to the status of EU citizen. Thus, even wholly internal situations could seemingly be brought within the scope of EU law, ­provided the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights test could be satisfied. Had this position been maintained, the reach of not only the Citizens’ Rights Directive but also the

188 Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:639. 189 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 190 Groussot and Thor Petursson observe a certain ‘minimalism’ in the Court’s case law, in particular where it decides cases either based on EU fundamental rights or on other rights. X Groussot and G Thor Petursson, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Five Years on: The Emergence of a New Constitutional Framework?’ in S de Vries, U Bernitz and S Weatherill (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument: Five Years Old and Growing (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 149–50. 191 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, para 42.



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applicability of the Charter would significantly have been increased; however, the precise scope of the Zambrano exception was revisited by the CJEU in two further cases which re-emphasised the requirement for a cross-border element. 07.39B In McCarthy,192 a dual UK and Irish national who had not resided in another Member State sought to rely on EU law in order to secure a right of residence for her Jamaican husband. McCarthy had never been in a position of employment, was not self-sufficient and relied on social welfare benefits. Following her marriage to Mr McCarthy, a Jamaican national without a right of residence in the UK, she applied for and received an Irish passport. Relying on her status as an Irish citizen resident in the UK, she sought a right of residence in the UK as an EU citizen based on the Citizens’ Rights Directive, and at the same time Mr McCarthy sought a right of residence as the spouse of an EU national. Mrs McCarthy’s request was refused on the grounds that she did not qualify for permanent residence under the Directive because she was not a worker, a self-employed person, nor a person of sufficient independent means, and after a number of appeals the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom requested a preliminary ruling on an interpretation of the Directive from the CJEU. This time the CJEU held that the Directive was inapplicable, as it only applied to situations where a Union citizen has moved to another Member State and concerned the conditions of residence of a Union citizen in another Member State. As a national of the UK, Mrs McCarthy’s residence there could not be subject to conditions; Article 21 of the TFEU193 could also not be relied upon. The CJEU was careful to distinguish the case from its ruling in Zambrano; the fact that Mrs McCarthy had never exercised her right of free movement did not necessarily preclude her relying on her status as a Union citizen. Nonetheless, no element of the situation of Mrs McCarthy, as described by the national court, indicated that the national measure at issue in the main proceedings had the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights associated with her status as a Union citizen, or of impeding the exercise of her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, in accordance with Article 21 of the TFEU. As a result, in contrast with Zambrano, the national measure at issue in the main proceedings did not have the effect of obliging Mrs McCarthy to leave the territory of the EU. The situation was therefore held not to be governed by EU law, and as a consequence Mr McCarthy did not enjoy a right of residence under EU law. 07.40B In Dereci,194 the question was whether several Austrian citizens, who had also not exercised their right to free movement, could rely on EU law in order to obtain a right of residence for their relatives. The Court adopted the same position as in McCarthy, further clarifying that the Zambrano exception ‘refers to situations in which the Union citizen has, in fact, to leave not only the territory of the Member State of which he is a national but also the territory of the Union as a whole.’195 Whether this would be the case in the particular situation at hand is, ultimately, for the national court to assess; but the fact that family reunification may appear ‘desirable to a national of a Member State, for economic reasons or in order to keep his family together in the territory of the Union’196 is, the Court stated, not enough in itself to bring an otherwise internal situation within the scope of EU law. As a result, this judgment, while preserving the Zambrano exception

192 Case C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:277. 193 Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties, and by the measures adopted to give them effect. 194 Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:734. 195 ibid, para 66. 196 ibid, para 68.

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has significantly narrowed it to cases of absolute dependence of the citizen on a ­third-country national,197 such as the relationship of a caregiver to a child, which, it also follows from O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto198 and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L199 cannot include a step-parent. In the joined cases of O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto200 and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L,201 07.41B Advocate General Bot considered whether a third-country national could claim a derivative right of residence from his stepchild (a Union citizen), and the exact scope of the application of the Zambrano principles within this context. He advised that the Zambrano exception applied only to ‘situations in which the Union citizen has no other choice but to follow the person concerned, whose right of residence has been refused, because he is in that person’s care and thus entirely dependent on that person to ensure his maintenance and provide for his own needs.’202 This would not therefore include ‘third-country nationals who exercise no responsibility, either parental or financial, over the Union citizen.’203 The CJEU seems to have followed this approach in holding that Article 20 of the TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from refusing to grant a third-country national a residence permit on the basis of family reunification where that national seeks to reside with his spouse, who is also a third-country national and resides lawfully in that Member State and is the mother of a child from a previous marriage to a Union citizen, and with the child of their own marriage, who is also a third-country national. However, this was subject to the caveat that such a refusal does not entail, for the Union citizen concerned, the denial of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by the status of citizen of the Union as confirmed by Zambrano.204 This question was a matter for the national court to establish, and when making that assessment, the national court must take into account whether the mothers of the Union citizens hold permanent residence permits in the Member State in question, so that, in law, there is no obligation either for them, or for the Union citizens dependent on them, to leave that Member State or the EU as a whole. Although the CJEU stated that all the circumstances of the case must be taken into account, it also approved the opinion of the Advocate General that it is the relationship of dependency between the Union citizen who is a minor and the third country national who is refused a right of residence that is liable to jeopardise the effectiveness of Union citizenship, since it is that dependency that would lead to the Union citizen being obliged, in fact, to leave not only the territory of the Member State of which he is a national but also that of the European Union as a whole, as a consequence of such a refusal.205 What is particularly noteworthy about this judgment is that despite the fact the case clearly centred on arguments pertaining to the family life of the applicants, there was a complete lack of reference to

197 See A Hinarejos, ‘Citizenship of the EU: clarifying “Genuine Enjoyment of the Substance” of Citizenship Rights’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 279, 279–82, amongst others, for an analysis of these cases, and D Kochenov, ‘The Essence of EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last Ten Years of Academic Debate: Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon?’ (2013) 62 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 97, for a recent consideration of their implications for EU citizenship. 198 Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2012:776. 199 ibid. 200 ibid. 201 ibid. 202 ibid, para 44, with reference to Case C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:277, para 48 and Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:734, para 63. 203 Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2012:776, para 45. 204 ibid, para 41. 205 ibid, para 56.



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Article 7 of the Charter in its discussion of the questions put before the Court. Curiously, however, the applicability of Articles 7 and 24 was discussed in relation to the interpretation of the Reunification Directive which was not the subject of the specific questions put before it.206

07.42B The decision in Dereci has thus confirmed the restricted reach of the Charter within this context; it is only those citizens who are able to fit into the rather narrow criterion specified who will be able to additionally claim the protection of Article 7. Those citizens who fall outside of the criterion but who, nevertheless, have just as compelling claims to family life, will not.207 These cases have also served to demonstrate the irony of the limitations imposed by Article 51(1) of the Charter in that in those situations in which reliance upon a fundamental rights argument would be most needed, Article 7 will not, at the moment, bind Member States, and when Article 7 is applicable it will be redundant in light of an infringement of citizenship rights already having been established.208 (c)  The Scope of EU Law—Domestic Violence 07.43B The commitment to the eradication of domestic violence has been stated in a number of EU policy documents and with the provision of funding outlined above. The application of fundamental rights to such situations has been acknowledged for some time amongst those working within the field and in particular by feminist and human rights activists.209 The human rights claims involved in situations on domestic violence have also been considered by the ECtHR in a number of recent cases where the applicability of Articles 2, 3 and 8 has been confirmed with respect to the threat to life, the threat of torturous and degrading and humiliating treatment, and the impact upon the family life of the victims. However, all these cases involved victims who made clear their desire to end the relationship with the perpetrator and were seeking protection from the state in doing so. Those familiar with the field will also know that these cases are complex and often involve victims choosing to return to their violent partners even after instigating proceedings against them. Various explanations for this behaviour, ranging from Stockholm Syndrome to learned helplessness, have been offered in the literature, and fierce debates continue as to whether the autonomy of the victim in withdrawing her cooperation from prosecution of the perpetrator should be respected, or whether the interests of society in condemning such behaviour is sufficient to override the wishes of the victim.210 This particular issue is yet to be brought before the ECtHR, although it has been posited that where Member States do continue with prosecutions in such cases it would be justifiable and proportionate to do so.211

206 ibid, paras 75–80. 207 The right to family life was specifically considered by the Court, but only insofar as making the point ‘if the referring court considers, in the light of the circumstances of the disputes in the main proceedings, that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings is covered by EU law, it must examine whether the refusal of their right of residence undermines the right to respect for private and family life provided for in Art 7 of the Charter. On the other hand, if it takes the view that that situation is not covered by EU law, it must undertake that examination in the light of Art 8(1) of the ECHR.’ Unfortunately, the Court left the issue of whether the current situation falls within the scope of EU law to be determined by the referring court—see Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:734, paras 70–72. 208 A Lansbergen, ‘Case Summary and Comment: Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres’ at http://eudo citizenship.eu/docs/Dereci%20Case%20Summary%20and%20Comment.pdf. 209 See S Choudry and J Herring, ‘Righting Domestic Violence’ (2006) 2 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1. 210 See S Choudry, ‘Contact, Domestic Violence and the ECHR’ in Current Legal Issues (Oxford, OUP 2012), for a review of this literature. 211 ibid—within the context of child contact.

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In Sanchez,212 the CJEU was presented with an opportunity to rule on this exact issue. Two 07.44B men having been convicted for domestic violence had also had imposed upon them an ancillary penalty which prohibited any contact with the respective victims, the partners of the perpetrators, for a period of more than one year. At the request of the partners, both men resumed cohabitation with their partners after some days and were convicted for contempt of court. The appeals court decided to refer to the CJEU as to compatibility of the national provisions at issue with the Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings.213 The CJEU found that Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as not precluding the mandatory imposition of an injunction to stay away for a minimum period, provided for as an ancillary penalty by the criminal law of a Member State, on persons who commit crimes of violence within the family, even when the victims of those crimes oppose the application of such a penalty. The outcome of this case should have been a victory for those activists seeking confirmation 07.45B that states are entitled to override victims’ wishes in the interests of wider society without fear of acting contrary to their right to family life. However, the CJEU completely sidestepped the entire issue by following the opinion of Advocate General Kokott in ruling that the Spanish court’s questions essentially related to substantive criminal law, since they concerned the legality and proportionality of a minimum sentence with regard to the crime of domestic violence, and that the Framework Decision was aimed exclusively at harmonising the approach to be taken toward victims in criminal procedure.214 Because the substantive law at issue did not fall within the scope of the Framework Decision, it held that any fundamental rights issue raised in this respect for the victim was outside the scope of the fundamental rights laid down in the Charter215 and concluded that the issue of an obligatory additional restraining order in the case of domestic violence, and its possible implications on victims, was outside the scope of EU law. This line of reasoning is not only disappointing from the point of view of failing to take 07.46B advantage of the opportunity to make visible the EU’s commitment to the eradication of genderbased violence but it is also seemingly flawed. Not only did the judgment itself fail to refer to the Charter but, in addition, the opinion of the Advocate General paid scant attention to the existing ECtHR case law on this area by failing to engage with the argument from Spain that its stance on the issue was based on this case law, referring instead in just one footnote to a single ECtHR judgment.216 Furthermore, there was no justification or assessment of the relevant ECtHR case law in either the judgment or the Opinion as to the distinction made between the applicability of the Charter to substantive criminal law and not to criminal procedure.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations Article 7 of the Charter does not contain the equivalent of the limitation clause seen in Article 8(2) 07.47B of the ECHR. However, the explanatory text to Article 7 of the Charter makes it clear that the rights it provides are intended to be subject to the limitations set out in Article 8(2) of the ECHR.217 Limits on the right to family life can, under the terms of Article 8(2) of the ECHR, be 212 Joined Cases C-483/09 and C-1/10 Criminal proceedings against Magatte Gueye and Valentín Salmerón Sánchez [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:583. 213 Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA [2001] OJ L82/1, replaced by Directive 2012/29/EU. 214 Joined Cases C-483/09 and C-1/10 Criminal proceedings against Magatte Gueye and Valentín Salmerón Sánchez [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:583, paras 50–51. 215 ibid, para 69. 216 AG Kokott referred to the case of Opuz v Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECtHR, 9 June 2009). 217 See also the explanations to Art 52(3) of the Charter.



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limited only if the limitations are ‘prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health of morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. These limitations have generated a significant amount of case law and, in certain contexts, have allowed for a finding that the breach of family life has been justified. Given that Article 7 of the Charter is intended to mirror the protection given by Article 8 of the ECHR, these limitations are likely to be important in the interpretation of when a breach of family life can be upheld under EU law. (a)  Citizenship and Migration 07.48B Claims with regard to the breach of family life are often made in respect of decisions by Member States concerning the conferral of the right to reside or migrate to a Member State, and the expulsion of individuals from Member States. Under the ECHR, the main point to note at the outset is that protection is provided for all people under Article 8, irrespective of nationality or citizenship. Once an individual has established that they are able to claim family life, the central question for the ECtHR is then whether the state’s refusal of leave to enter, remain or expel deprives the applicant of the opportunity to benefit from his right and whether this deprivation is a proportionate response to the legitimate aim being pursued. In making this assessment, the ECtHR must also ensure that a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community. The key question in deciding whether the refusal constitutes an interference with the right to respect for family life, which must then be justified by the state, is whether or not there are obstacles to conducting family life abroad. This may involve the citizen having to be exiled from his or her own state, but if this is assessed as not being unreasonable, the ECtHR will consider that there has been no interference and so uphold the state’s decision. 07.49B In contrast, under EU law, a person seeking protection from a refusal of leave to enter or remain or expulsion is subject to different treatment according to his or her nationality or citizenship status, and this has, it has been argued, created a stratification of rights between different people living within the EU.218 At the top are Union citizens and their family members who are afforded enhanced protection by virtue of the right to free movement legislation, and at the bottom are third-country nationals with no connection with EU citizens, who acquire EU rights through a variety of instruments219 based on Article 79 TFEU (ex Art 63(3) TEC, as amended) and who are afforded lesser protection from expulsion. Although this fundamental difference in protection has not in itself been challenged under Article 7, the CJEU has, nonetheless, reiterated the need to consider the impact upon the right to family life when Member States wish to make use of the derogations contained in these instruments. The CJEU has thus applied the case law under Article 8 of the ECHR in a number of judgments220 concerning the status of family members of EU citizens to emphasise the obligation on national authorities to take into account the right to family life and respect of proportionality and this has continued since the Charter has entered into force. 07.50B Iida v Stadt Ulm221 concerned a Japanese applicant resident in Germany and the basis of his marriage to a German citizen. The wife, with their child, moved to Austria but the parents had

218 Morano-Foadi and Andreadaksi, ‘The Convergence of the European Legal System’ (n 112). 219 Such as the Family Reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86/EC); the Students and Researchers Directives (Directive (EU) 2016/801 [2016] OJ L132/21); and the Returns Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC [2008] OJ L348/98). 220 Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:434; Case C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hacene Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607; Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Georgios Orfanopoulos and Others and Raffaele Oliveri v Land Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:262; Case C-127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:449. 221 Case C-40/11 Yoshikazu Iida v Stadt Ulm [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:691.

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joint custody of the child, who regularly visited her father. The case concerned the refusal of the German authorities to provide him with a right of residence, based on being a family member of a Union citizen. The Advocate General found that, although an applicant could not derive a right of residence in the Member State of origin from the Citizens’ Rights Directive when the Union citizen had moved to another Member State, a parent who has custody rights and who is a thirdcountry national may, in order to maintain a personal relationship and direct parental contact on a regular basis, have a right of residence in the Member State of origin of his child who is a Union citizen under Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, if the child, exercising his or her right of free movement, has moved from there to another Member State. In order for such a right of residence to exist, the denial thereof must have a restrictive effect on the child’s right of free movement and must be regarded as constituting a disproportionate interference with Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter.222 Rahman223 concerned the interpretation of Articles 3(2) and 10(2) of the Citizens’ Rights 07.51B Directive and, in particular, what the obligation to ‘facilitate’, in accordance with national legislation for the entry and residence of ‘any other family members’ who are dependants of a Union citizen, entails. The Advocate General clarified that, unlike family members under Article 2(2), members of the extended family as defined in Article 3(2) do not have a right to entry and residence into a Member State. He considered that although the facilitation obligation is formulated in general terms, this did not mean that Member States have unfettered freedom to facilitate, as they wish, entry and residence for persons coming within the scope of that provision. In his opinion, the ‘margin of discretion accorded to the Member States’ on this matter is limited in two ways.224 First, in application of the criterion developed in previous cases,225 the national measure at 07.52B issue must not have the effect of unjustifiably impeding the exercise by the Union citizen of his right of free movement and residence within the territory of the Member States by, for example, forcing the Union citizen to leave the territory of the host Member State, or even to leave the territory of the EU altogether. Second, by the obligation to respect the right to private and family life, enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter, the meaning and scope of which the CJEU has held should be the same as those laid down by Article 8 of the ECHR.226 As a result, ‘the combination of the right of residence attached to Union citizenship and protection of private and family life, as implemented by EU law, may therefore effectively establish a right of residence for members of the family of the Union citizen.’227 What is noteworthy, however, is that despite this reliance

222 See also Case C-133/15 HC Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank and Others [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:354, para 62; Case C-82/16 KA and Others v Belgische Staat [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:308, para 50. 223 Case C-83/11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Muhammad Sazzadur Rahman and Others [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519. 224 Case C-83/11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Muhammad Sazzadur Rahman and Others [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:174, Opinion of AG Bot, paras 68–70. 225 C-353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:559; Case C-208/09 Ilonka SaynWittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:806; Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:277. 226 See Case C-400/10 PPU J McB v LE [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:582, para 53; Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci and Others v Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:734, para 70; Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses kft v Nemzeti Adóés Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó- és Vám Főigazgatóság [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, para 70. 227 Case C-83/11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Muhammad Sazzadur Rahman and Others [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519, para 74. See also Case C-145/09 Land Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:708 and Case C-165/14 Alfredo Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, in which the CJEU emphasised the importance of Art 7 of the Charter when considering the expulsion of a union citizen under the provisions of the Citizens’ Rights Directive.



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upon the provisions of the Charter in the interpretation of the Directive, the CJEU failed to make any mention of it in its subsequent ruling.228 07.53B The Charter has also been used to limit the ‘margin of manoeuvre’ that Member States have with regard to the conditions that they may impose under Article 7 of the family reunification directive upon the sponsor concerning the stability and regularity of their resources. In Chakroun,229 the CJEU found that since authorisation of family reunification is the general rule, the faculty provided for in Article 7(1)(c) must be interpreted strictly. Furthermore, it found that the margin for manoeuvre which the Member States are recognised as having must not be used by them in a manner which would undermine the objective of the Directive, which is to promote family reunification, and the effectiveness thereof. The provisions of the Directive, particularly Article 7(1)(c), must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights and, more particularly, in the light of the right to respect for family life enshrined in both the ECHR and the Charter. In this case this mean that the Netherlands could not require the sponsor, in cases of family formation, to have resources equivalent to 120 per cent of the minimum wage. (b)  Other Procedural Protection 07.54B Interferences in the right to family life can occur in other contexts where EU law is being implemented. Where such interferences occur, the question under Article 7 of the Charter, as with Article 8 of the ECHR, remains the same. Can such interference be justified with reference to one of the legitimate aims, and is the response of the Member State a proportionate response to the aim being pursued? J MCB v LE230 concerned an unmarried Irish couple. On their separation, the mother left the Member State of the last habitual residence of the family (Ireland), taking the common children, for whom she had sole parental responsibility, with her to the UK. In the course of proceedings instituted by the father in Ireland to enforce the return of the children, the question referred to the CJEU was whether Article 2(11) of Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial and parental responsibility matters precluded a Member State from requiring by its law that the father of a child who is not married to the mother shall have obtained an order of a court of competent jurisdiction granting him custody in order to qualify as having ‘custody rights’ which render the removal of that child from its country of habitual residence wrongful for the purposes of Article 2(11) of that Regulation. 07.55B The Court found that it did not and, moreover, that such a requirement was not contrary to Article 7 of the Charter. This finding was based upon specific case law on this point from the ECtHR where the child of an unmarried couple was taken to another state by its mother, who was the only person with parental responsibility for that child. In that regard, the ECtHR had ruled, that national legislation granting, by operation of law, parental responsibility for such a child solely to the child’s mother is not contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR, interpreted in the light of the 1980 Hague Convention, provided that it permits the child’s father, not vested with parental responsibility, to ask the national court with jurisdiction to vary the award of

228 Case C-83/11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Muhammad Sazzadur Rahman and Others [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:519. This judgment clarified that, unlike family members under Art 2(2), members of the extended family as defined in Art 3(2) do not have a right to entry and residence into a Member State. However, the Court specified the procedural requirements that Member States need to adhere to if they are to comply with the requirements of the Citizens’ Rights Directive. 229 Case C-578/08 Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:117. 230 Case C-400/10 PPU J McB v LE [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:582.

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that responsibility.231 The ‘interference’ with the unmarried father’s right to family life in ­requiring him to first obtain an order of custody from the Irish courts was therefore justifiable and proportionate to the aim being pursued.

V. Remedies Given the diverse fields of law to which family life can be applied, the applicable remedies are 07.56B likely to depend on the context of the case. In some cases, Article 7 may be invoked as a ground for judicial review of a legislative act such as the Family Reunification Directive, in which case the remedy could be the annulment of the legislative act, or an element thereof. Other cases are likely to concern the denial of a benefit to a specific individual, such as a right of residence, where the remedy may entail a reconsideration of the original decision, rather than an annulment of the underpinning legal act. What has become clear from cases concerning both Article 7 and Article 8 is that significant latitude is given to Member States with regard to the interpretation and implementation of the guarantees contained. Both the ECtHR and the CJEU have often left the substantive decision to national courts, choosing instead to provide guidance as to the principles that govern the applicability of the Articles. This has been particularly evident with regard to cases concerning migration and citizenship where the proportionality tests can be very fact dependent and where some latitude has been given to Member States within the legislative provisions themselves with regard to the implementation of what are often politically sensitive issues. That is not to say that national courts are given an unfettered discretion. The CJEU has also made it clear in cases such as Chakroun232 that the latitude or margin will be narrowed in cases where a strict applicability of the terms is indicated by the legislative provisions themselves.

E. Evaluation The inclusion of the right to family life in the Charter is significant when it is recalled that 07.57B family law has not generally been acknowledged as being within the specific competence of EU law. As a result, it indicates a clear commitment to acknowledging the ever-increasing and often indirect impact upon the family life of EU and non-EU citizens of EU law. The CJEU has stated on a number of occasions that the scope and interpretation of the right to family life under Article 7 of the Charter will be the same as that under Article 8 of the ECHR, which will no doubt lead to an increase in the pervasive influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in this area which, in contexts such as migration, has clarified the importance of ensuring that any measures that interfere with family life must be proportionate and justifiable. In other contexts, such as maintaining a hierarchy of relationships capable of coming within the definition of family life, it may not. The real challenge therefore lies in the CJEU’s willingness to go further than Strasbourg in its interpretation of the guarantees contained in Article 7, as allowed for by Article 51 of the Charter. To date, there appears to be little evidence that this will occur, save for the opening up of a possibility of a same-sex couple being able to claim family life under the Family Reunification Directive, in Rahman. Moreover, there is some evidence of a more restrictive

231 Guichard v France App no 56838/00 (ECtHR, 2 September 2003); see also, to that effect, Balbontin v United Kingdom App no 39067/97 (ECtHR, 14 September 1999). 232 Case C-578/08 Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:117.



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approach to the question of family life; the joined cases of O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto233 and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L234 demonstrate a rather restrictive view of family life in reducing the status of step-parent to the question of responsibility and resources and ignoring the importance of the psychological bond with the child. Fundamental to this challenge, however, has to be the CJEU’s approach to the applicability of the Charter. The development of EU family law and policies are particularly dependent upon and sensitive to interpretations regarding the scope of EU law when it is recalled that this is an area that is outside of a specific EU competence. The opportunity presented by the inclusion of the right to family life in Article 7 of the Charter can only be fully realised therefore if the Charter is found to be applicable. It is concerning that, so far, the CJEU has adopted a rather restrictive approach with regard to the applicability of the Charter and, therefore, Article 7, to questions concerning citizenship and domestic violence, and appears to contradict the often-stated commitment to guaranteeing the values contained within it.

233 Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2012:776. 234 ibid.

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Article 8* Article 8 Protection of Personal Data 1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 8 This Article has been based on Article 286 of the EC Treaty and Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data1 as well as on Article 8 of the ECHR and on the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, which has been ratified by all the Member States.2 Article 286 of the EC Treaty is now replaced by Article 16 TFEU and Article 39 TEU. Reference is also made to Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data.3 The above-mentioned Directive and Regulation contain conditions and limitations for the exercise of the right to the protection of personal data.

Select Bibliography M Brkan and E Psychogiopoulou (eds), Courts, Privacy and Data Protection in the Digital Environment (Edward Elgar, 2017). L Bygrave, C Docksey and C Kuner (eds), Commentary on the EU General Data Protection Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2019). J-H Dietrich and S Sule (eds), Intelligence Law and Policies in Europe. A Handbook. (München, CH Beck/ Hart, 2019). C Docksey, ‘Four Fundamental Rights: Finding the Balance’ [2016] International Data Privacy Law 195–209. E Ehmand and M Selmayr (eds), Datenschutz-Grundverordnung. Kommentar. (München, CH Beck, 2018). S Gurthwirth (ed), Reinventing Data Protection? (Berlin, Springer, 2009). H Hijmans and HR Kranenborg, Data Protection anno 2014: How to Restore Trust? (contributions in honour of Peter Hustinx), (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2014). H Hijmans, The European Union as a Constitutional Guardian of Internet Privacy and Data Protection: The Story of Article 16 TFEU (Berlin, Springer, 2016). HR Kranenborg and LFM Verhey, De Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming in Europees en Nederlands perspectief (Deventer, Kluwer, 2018). O Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (London/Dublin/Edinburgh, Oxford University Press, 2015). * The author wishes to thank Jonathan Tomkin for his valuable comments on a previous version of this chapter and Zuzanna Gulczynska for her assistance in the preparation of this chapter. The views expressed in this contribution reflect the author’s personal opinion. 1 [1995] OJ L281/31. 2 See Convention of 28 January 1981 of the Council of Europe for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, ETS 108. 3 [2001] OJ L8/1.

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B Siemen, Datenschutz als europäische Grundrecht (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2006). AK Woods, ‘Litigating Data Sovereignty’ [2018] The Yale Law Journal 328–406.

A.  Field of Application of Article 8 08.01 It follows from Article 51 of the Charter that the limits to the field of application of the right to data protection are defined by the Treaties. When looking at the Treaties, as well as the areas covered in secondary legislation on data protection, it can safely be concluded that Article 8 has an exceptionally broad field of application encompassing all areas of EU competence. 08.02 Before turning to the EU acquis under the current treaties and secondary legislation, the chapter will briefly outline the development of data protection prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty thereby enabling the reader to understand the important steps taken in this area as well as to understand the nature and structure of the current body of secondary legislation.

I. EU Acquis on Data Protection Before the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty 08.03 Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, there was no express legal basis for the adoption of data protection rules in the former first pillar area. Acts on data protection were based on the general harmonisation clause for the internal market, Article 95 EC Treaty (now Art 114 TFEU). These Acts were the General Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, as well as the complementary Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications (the ‘e-Privacy Directive’).4 The legal basis for the internal market was reflected in the objective of both instruments, namely to protect the right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data as well as the free movement of personal data.5 A third data protection directive adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC Treaty was Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of communications data (the ‘Data Retention Directive’).6 This directive was declared invalid by the Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland in 2014 as it did not comply with Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter.7 08.04 The EC Treaty still contained a reference to data protection in Article 286. This provision declared all existing Community Acts (Directive 95/46/EC and the predecessor of the current e-Privacy Directive8) applicable to the Community institutions and bodies. Despite this ‘declaration’, an additional regulation was adopted in 2001 containing data protection rules for the Community institutions and bodies, Regulation (EC) 45/2001. This Regulation transposed (mainly) the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC to the EU level and established, as required by the second paragraph of Article 286 EC Treaty, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) as an independent supervisory authority responsible for monitoring the application of the rules by the Community institutions and bodies. EU bodies established on the basis of the former second and third pillar either were not subject to any EU rules on data protection, or had their own specific data protection rules (such as Europol and Eurojust).

4 [2002] OJ L201/37 as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC [2009] OJ L337/11. 5 See Recital 3 and Art 1 of Directive 95/46/EC. 6 [2006] OJ L105/54. 7 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 [69]. See on this case below section D.IV. See also O Lynskey, ‘’The Data Retention Directive is incompatible with the rights to privacy and data protection and is invalid in its entirety: Digital Rights ‘Ireland’ [2014] Common Market Law Review 1789–1812. 8 Directive 97/66/EC [1998] OJ L24//1.

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No legal basis for the adoption of data protection rules was provided for in the former second 08.05 pillar, the common foreign and security policy. For police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (the former third pillar area), a legal 08.06 basis was provided in the former EU Treaty to take common action including the processing and exchange of personal data subject to ‘appropriate provisions on the protection of personal data’ (see Art 30(1)(b) of the former EU Treaty). This led to the adoption of data protection rules for specific data processing operations, such as the exchange of data under the Prüm Decision and the Swedish Initiative, the creation of large-scale databases (eg the Visa Information System (VIS), the Schengen Information System (SIS) and Eurodac) or the rules on data protection for Europol and Eurojust.9 A more overarching instrument on data protection for the area of police and judicial coopera- 08.07 tion in criminal matters was adopted in 2008, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.10 Although indeed overarching, the Framework Decision had some substantive carve-outs. It excluded from its scope data processing operations in the Member States with no cross-border element (domestic data processing). Also specific acts adopted under the former third pillar which had their own complete and coherent set of data protection rules, as just discussed, fell outside the scope of the Framework Decision.11 Domestic processing of personal data for law enforcement activities remained subject to the national law of the relevant Member State, which still had to comply with the Council of Europe Convention on data protection (‘Convention 108’) and the requirements under Article 8 ECHR.12

II. EU Acquis on Data Protection After the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty led to considerable changes in the basic legal architecture 08.08 of the right to data protection in the EU. The Charter of Fundamental rights, containing the right to protection of personal data, became legally binding and the same right was also explicitly recognised in the Treaties. The right can be found in Article 16 TFEU and is also referred to in Article 39 TEU. Article 16 TFEU grants everyone the right to the protection of personal data concerning them 08.09 and constitutes a self-standing legal basis for EU rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. Article 16 TFEU in fact covers all areas of EU law, including the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.13

9 The Prüm Decision refers to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA [2008] OJ L210/1, the Swedish initiative refers to Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA [2006] OJ L386/89. The VIS was based on Regulation (EC) 767/2008 [2008] OJ L218/60. The second generation SIS (SIS II) was based on Regulation 1987/2006 [2006] OJ L381/4 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA [2007] OJ L205/63. Council Regulation 2725/2000 [2000] OJ L316/1 established Eurodac. For Europol, the rules were laid down in Council Decision 2009/371/JHA [2009] OJ L121/37, and for Eurojust in Council Decision 2009/426/JHA [2008] OJ L138/14. 10 [2008] OJ L350/60. 11 See Recital 39 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 12 Above n 2. See further sections C.I and C.III below. 13 Declaration 21 to the Lisbon Treaty states that specific rules on the protection of personal data and the free movement of such data in the fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation based on Art 16 TFEU may prove necessary because of the specific nature of these fields. See [2008] OJ C115/345. See also H Hijmans & A Scirocco, ‘Shortcomings in EU data protection in the third and the second pillars. Can the Lisbon Treaty be expected to help?’ [2009] Common Market Law Review 1485–1525.



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08.10

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Article 39 TEU states that in accordance with Article 16 TFEU, data protection rules shall also be adopted with regard to the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of the common foreign and security policy laid down in Chapter 2 TEU (the former second pillar). Article 39 TEU only derogates from Article 16 TFEU as regards the legislative procedure. Instead of the ordinary legislative procedure, which is provided for in Article 16 TFEU, a decision for the common foreign and security policy shall be adopted by the Council only. Both Article 16 TFEU and Article 39 TEU state that compliance with the data protection rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities. This is the only substantial element of both Articles. Unlike Article 8(2) of the Charter, Articles 16 TFEU and 39 TEU do not lay down in a more specific manner the conditions under which personal data may be processed.14 In 2016, two new data protection instruments were adopted on the basis of Article 16 TFEU, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive (EU) 2016/680. The first, better known as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), replaced Directive 95/46/EC as of May 2018. The second, Directive (EU) 2016/680 (the ‘Law Enforcement Directive’), contains data protection rules for the law enforcement sector and replaced Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. The Law Enforcement Directive had to be transposed by the Member States in May 2018. The GDPR left the e-Privacy Directive untouched, but announced that it would subsequently be reviewed in order to ensure consistency with the GDPR.15 In January 2017, the Commission tabled a proposal for a new e-Privacy Regulation.16 However, due to disagreement within the Council, the EU legislator has not yet adopted the new legislation at the time of writing. Therefore, the GDPR and the e-Privacy Directive will continue to co-exist for a while. The legislator foresaw that such a situation could arise and included Article 95 in the GDPR which states that the GDPR will not impose additional obligations on natural and legal persons in relation to matters subject to specific obligations with the same objective set out in the e-Privacy Directive.17 The scope of the Law Enforcement Directive was expanded compared to Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. The Law Enforcement Directive also applies to domestic processing of personal data by competent authorities for law enforcement purposes. However, the directive left untouched specific provisions on the protection of personal data in Union legal acts that entered into force before the adoption of the directive.18 The Law Enforcement Directive required the European Commission to review these acts and to assess the need to align them with the Law Enforcement Directive.19 On 24 June 2020, the Commission published a Communication in which it identified 26 Union acts falling under the review exercise. Out of these 26 acts, the Commission concluded that 16 did not need to be amended while 10 of them required amendment.20 Several new initiatives in the area of police and judicial cooperation already took into account the Law Enforcement Directive, such as the establishment of the Entry-Exit System (EES) and the introduction of ETIAS, the European Travel Information and Authorisation System.21 14 See Opinion A-1/15 on the draft agreement between Canada and the EU on transfer of Passenger Name Records (PNR) from the EU to Canada [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2016:656 [120]. 15 See Recital 173 of the GDPR. 16 See COM(2017) 10. 17 In Directive (EU) 2018/1972, [2018] OJ L321/36, the definition of ‘electronic communications service’ was broadened to encompass so-called over-the-top services, such as Skype and Whatsapp. As a consequence, the ePrivacy Directive, which relies on this notion as defined in, now, Directive (EU) 2018/1972, also applies to these services since 21 December 2020. 18 See Art 60 of the Law Enforcement Directive and n 9 above. 19 See Art 62(6) of the Law Enforcement Directive. 20 See COM(2020) 262. 21 See respectively Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 [2017] OJ L327/10 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1240 [2018] OJ L236/1.

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In December 2018, Regulation (EC) 45/2001 on data protection rules for the EU institu- 08.15 tions and bodies was replaced by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.22 The new regulation applies to all Union institutions and bodies, except Europol and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) until the moment their founding regulations are adapted.23 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 contains a chapter that relates specifically to the processing of operational personal data by Union bodies, offices and agencies when carrying out activities in the context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters or of police cooperation.24 Such a chapter was not included in the initial proposal of the European Commission but was inserted upon instigation of the European Parliament.25 Resistance within the Council delayed the adoption process and explains why Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 did not enter into force on the same date as the GDPR, as had been foreseen in the initial proposal. The temporary non-application of the regulation to Europol and the EPPO was part of the final compromise. Since the act establishing Eurojust was discussed and revised around the same time as Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, Eurojust was brought within the scope of application of the regulation, albeit that for Eurojust the date of application was delayed by one year, namely 12 December 2019.26 At the time of writing no data protection rules have been adopted on the basis of 08.16 Article 39 TEU for the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of the common foreign and security policy.

III.  The Scope of Application of the EU Acquis on Data Protection In terms of EU competence, the power to adopt rules on data protection presently covers all 08.17 areas of EU law. When looking at the current body of secondary legislation, a large part of this competence has already been exercised. The territorial, material and personal scope of application of the secondary legislation on data 08.18 protection will be further discussed in section D.II. However, two issues are highlighted already in the current section. The first is the exclusion from the scope of the secondary legislation of processing of personal data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law. The second issue is the exceptionally broad scope of application of the right to data protection. As regards the first issue, both the GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive exclude from 08.19 its material scope the processing of personal data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law.27 In Recital 16 activities concerning national security are mentioned as an example. In fact, in light of the broad interpretation of the scope of application of the data protection rules discussed below, activities concerning national security are clearly the main example. The exclusion reflects Article 4(2) TEU, which states that national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.

22 [2018] OJ L295/39. 23 See Art 2(3) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. In 2016 a new regulation was adopted for Europol, still including a self-standing data protection regime, see Regulation (EU) 2016/794 [2016] OJ L135/53. Also the regulation of 2017 establishing EPPO contains an elaborate self-standing regime on data protection, which is to a large extent based on the content of the Law Enforcement Directive, see Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 [2017] OJ L283/1, Arts 47–89. In Art 2(4) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 it is stated that the regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by missions referred to in Articles 42(1), 43 and 44 TEU. 24 See Art 2(2) and Chapter IX of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. 25 COM(2017) 8. 26 See Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 [2018] OJ L295/138. 27 See Art 2(2)(a) of the GDPR and Art 2(3)(a) of the Law Enforcement Directive.



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08.20

The exclusion of national security activities might seem obvious at first sight, however, it does raise questions concerning the situations in which such activities require the involvement of private actors. In particular following the ruling of the Court of Justice in Tele2 Sverige, it was argued that EU law applies to the activities of the private entities involved, and can have a spillover effect on the way in which the state authorities responsible for national security may act when data is collected from such private entities.28 08.21 In Tele2 Sverige, the Court considered that national law requiring telecommunications ­providers to retain certain telecommunications data for law enforcement purposes fell within the scope of the e-Privacy Directive, despite the fact that activities concerning law enforcement were explicitly excluded from the scope of that directive.29 The Court considered that the retention requirement was imposed on the telecommunications providers who were clearly covered by the e-Privacy Directive, that the obligation in the e-Privacy Directive to keep communications confidential applied towards all third parties and that the e-Privacy Directive provided for possible restrictions of the rights and obligations in the directive for, inter alia, the objective of law enforcement.30 Following this, the Court concluded that the e-Privacy Directive applied to the retention obligation, but also to the rules on access to the retained data by law enforcement authorities. 08.22 Also the objective of national security is, on the one hand, explicitly excluded from the scope of the e-Privacy Directive, and, on the other hand, occurs as an objective for restrictions of rights and obligations contained in the e-Privacy Directive. The only difference with the objective of law enforcement is that the exclusion of activities concerning national security finds its basis in an explicit provision in the basic treaties, namely Article 4(2) TEU. For the Court it made no difference. In Privacy International and La Quadrature du Net ao, the Court applied its reasoning in Tele2 Sverige to comparable measures for the purpose of safeguarding national security.31 Legislative measures that regulate the activities of the telecommunications providers that entail the processing of personal data fall within the scope of the e-Privacy Directive.32 It is only where Member States directly implement measures that derogate from the confidentiality ­requirement in the e-Privacy Directive, without imposing processing obligations on providers, that the situation falls outside the scope of the e-Privacy Directive.33 Similar reasoning can be applied to the GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive, which have similar exclusion and derogation clauses.34 08.23 As regards the second issue, namely, the exceptionally broad scope of EU data protection rules, the Court in the first case on Directive 95/46/EC, dating from 2003, was asked to clarify the applicability of the directive.35 It concerned a case in which Austrian public undertakings, Österreichischer Rundfunk and others, refused to communicate certain personal data of their employees to the Austrian Court of Auditors for control. It was argued that the situation did not

28 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige and Watson [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:970. 29 See Art 1(3) of the e-Privacy Directive. 30 See Tele2 Sverige (n 29) [67]–[81]. The possibility of restrictions can be found in Art 15 of the e-Privacy Directive. 31 See Case C-623/17 Privacy International [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:790 and Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18 La Quadrature du Net ao [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:791. See on the scope of Union law and national security S Sule, ‘National Security and EU law restraints on Intelligence Activities’ in J-H Dietrich & S. Sule (eds), Intelligence Law and Policies in Europe. A Handbook. (München, CH Beck/Hart, 2019). 32 See La Quadrature du Net a.o. (ibid) [96]. 33 Ibid [103]. 34 ‘’ See, as regards national security, (n 28) and Art 23(1)(a) of the GDPR and Art 13(3)(d), Art 15(1)(d) and Art 16(4(d) of the Law Enforcement Directive. See in relation to the GDPR also La Quadrature du Net ao (n 32) [102], [207]–[211] and Case C-311/18 Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems (‘Schrems II’) [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 [85]. 35 Joined Case C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:294.

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fall within the scope of the former Directive 95/46/EC, an internal market instrument, since the objective of the control by the Austrian Court of Auditors served a public interest and because the control did not obstruct the free movement of workers between Member States. In its ruling the Court considered that recourse to the Treaty’s internal market provisions as 08.24 a legal basis did not presuppose the existence of an actual link with free movement between Member States in every situation referred to by the measure founded on that basis.36 According to the Court, the applicability of Directive 95/46/EC could not depend on whether specific situations had a sufficient link with the exercise of the free movement of, in that case, w ­ orkers. According to the Court, a contrary interpretation could make the limits of the field of ­application of the directive particularly unsure and uncertain.37 With this ruling, the Court ‘saved’ the effet utile of Directive 95/46/EC. It would indeed have 08.25 become almost impossible to draw a clear line between what would and what would not have been covered by the directive. However, the ruling was quite far-reaching. AG Kokott, when reflecting on the scope of Directive 95/46/EC in the Satamedia case, concluded, with reference to the Court ruling in Österreichischer Rundfunk, that the broad scope of Directive 95/46/EC ‘reaches almost beyond the establishment of the internal market’.38 She underlined that Directive 95/46/EC covers purely domestic operations and that where the directive is to be applied, the protection of cross-border activities is the exception.39 The GDPR is no longer a classical internal market instrument, as it is based on the self- 08.26 standing legal basis for rules on data protection contained in Article 16 TFEU. A reference to ‘the free movement of data’ can still be found in Article 16 TFEU, which could have implied the need for a cross-border element. However, in Land Hessen, the Court confirmed the approach in Lindqvist, which, according to the Court, applied a fortiori in relation to the GDPR.40

B.  Interrelationship of Article 8 with Other Provisions of the Charter Article 8 interacts with several other provisions of the Charter. The right to data protection 08.27 is most closely related to the right to privacy (Article 7) in which it finds its origin. The right to data protection intends to protect interests that underlie the right to privacy but also other fundamental rights, such as the right to non-discrimination (Article 21). Since the right to data protection regulates the processing of information about individuals, it 08.28 has an obvious impact on rights which also concern information, such as the freedom of expression (Article 11) or the right of public access to documents (Article 42). These rights do not necessarily reflect the same interests. Whereas the right to data protection essentially protects the individual interest of the data subject to keep information secret, the right to freedom of expression or the right of public access to documents, rather serve the public interest of disclosing information. This can lead to situations of conflict. In her opinion in Satamedia AG Kokott concluded that the situation of a conflict between 08.29 different fundamental rights is a ‘characteristic’ of the interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC.41 36 Ibid [41]. 37 Ibid [42]. 38 Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:266 [53] (Opinion of AG Kokott). 39 Ibid [52]. See for the exclusion of household activities section D.II(b). 40 Case C-272/19 VQ v Land Hessen [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:535 [66]–[67]. 41 See Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-73/07 (n 40) [44]. See also C Docksey, ‘Four fundamental rights: finding the ‘balance’ [2016] International Data Privacy Law 195–209.



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Conflicts do not arise exclusively in connection with the ‘informational’ rights just mentioned. Conflicts can also arise when other individuals have a claim under one of the other Charter rights.42 For instance, reliance on the right to data protection can obstruct the collection of evidence or can prevent the instigation of judicial proceeding if the identity of the person accused of a wrongdoing is not revealed. This might raise issues under Article 47 of the Charter, which in turn, can prevent a person from enforcing other fundamental rights, such as the right to property in Article 17 of the Charter.

I.  Article 7 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life) (a)  The Difference between Privacy and Data Protection 08.30 The origins of the right to data protection lie in the right to privacy. Therefore, Article 8 is closely linked to Article 7 of the Charter, which enshrines the right to respect for private and family life, home and communications. For an international human rights instrument, the Charter is unique in recognising the right to data protection as a right separate from the right to privacy. For instance, the right to data protection as such cannot be found in the ECHR. 08.31 Like Article 7 of the Charter, Article 8 ECHR recognises the right to respect for private and family life, including one’s home and correspondence. In the 1970s the question emerged within the Council of Europe as to whether the right to privacy was capable of addressing the challenges posed by the technological developments of that time, in particular the introduction of the computer. This finally led to the adoption in 1981 of a separate Convention on data protection, the aforementioned Convention 108, which entered into force in 1985 and was modernised in 2018.43 08.32 Despite the existence of Convention 108, Article 8 ECHR still played an important role in the area of data protection. In its case law under Article 8 ECHR, the ECtHR departed from the classical interpretation of privacy protection (‘the right to be left alone’) and developed a much broader notion of privacy, expanding it to also cover activities outside the classical private sphere of the individual, such as professional or business activities.44 The Court insisted on several safeguards against abuse, in particular when personal data was used in the law enforcement area.45 Also on horizontal issues, ie when personal data was processed by other private persons, the Court developed requirements under Article 8 ECHR.46 From the substantial body of case law a non-exhaustive list of requirements can be derived which reflects several of the requirements contained in Convention 108.47 In 1997, the ECtHR made an explicit link between Article 8 ECHR and Convention 108 in its ruling in Z v Finland.48 08.33 There is an ongoing debate in legal literature on the actual difference between the right to privacy and the right to data protection.49 A conceptual link between both rights was made

42 A situation of conflict can also emerge from two different claims under the right to data protection. This will not be further discussed. 43 Above n 2. See Amending Protocol of 17–18 May 2018, CETS: 223. See on the modernisation further www.coe.int/ en/web/data-protection/convention108/modernised and section C.III below. 44 See Niemietz v Germany App no 13710/88 (ECtHR, 16 December 1992) A-251-B and further section C.I below. 45 See eg Weber and Saravia v Germany (admissibility) App no 54934/00 (ECtHR, 29 June 2006) [93]–[95] and further section C.I below. 46 See eg K.U. v Finland App no 2872/02 (ECtHR, 2 December 2008). 47 See further sections C.I and C.III below. 48 Z v Finland App no 22009/93 (ECtHR, 25 February 1997), RJD 1997-I [95]. 49 See, amongst others, H Hijmans, The European Union as a constitutional guardian of Internet Privacy and Data Protection: the story of Article 16 TFEU (Berlin, Springer, 2016), O Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law

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through the introduction of the notion of informational self-determination, which implies control over one’s own personal information. Some assume data protection ensures informational self-determination, and subsequently argue that privacy is in fact a right to informational self-determination and thus equals data protection. Back in 1970, Westin stated that ‘[p]rivacy is the claim of individuals … to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’.50 The ECtHR has considered that Article 8 of the ECHR provides for the right to ‘a form of informational self-determination’, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that their Article 8 rights may be engaged.51 However, the notion of informational self-determination, which has German roots 08.34 (­informationelle selbstbestimmung), is not how data protection is generally considered in Convention 108 and within the EU.52 Informational self-determination implies that consent to data processing is the key notion for lawful data processing. However, before its modernisation, the notion of consent did not play a prominent role in Convention 108.53 In EU secondary legislation on data protection, consent became more important, but was still only considered to be one of the grounds for legitimate processing.54 The EU data protection rules looked beyond consent and created a system of checks and balances, laying down right and obligations and possible limitations of these rights and obligations, which ensured lawful processing including where the consent of the person involved was not obtained. It is precisely this system of checks and balances which was envisaged with the introduction 08.35 of a separate right to data protection in the Charter. The proposal to formulate it as a right to informational self-determination was rejected.55 In that respect, the explanations clearly state that Article 8 is, amongst others, based on Convention 108 and Directive 95/46/EC. Contrary to most other rights in the Charter, Article 8 contains specifications which reflect several key elements of the system of checks and balances. Amongst these specifications is the condition that personal data must be processed on the basis of the consent of the person concerned, or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.56 The right to privacy and the right to data protection are closely linked, but should not be seen 08.36 as one and the same right. The inclusion of a separate right to data protection in the Charter confirms and reflects the elaborated and conclusive system of checks and balances which ensures lawful processing of personal data.

(London/Dublin/Edinburgh: Oxford University Press, 2015), C Docksey, ‘’Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter:’ two distinct fundamental rights’, in A Grosjean (ed.), Enjeux européens et mondiaux de la protection des données personelles (Éd Larcier 2015) 63–89, J Kokott and C Sobotta, ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’, in H Hijmans and HR Kranenborg, Data protection anno 2014: how to restore trust? (contributions in honour of Peter Hustinx) (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2014) 83–96, PJ Hustinx, ‘’EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed General Data Protection ‘Regulation’ in Collected courses of the European University ‘Institute’s Academy of European Law, 1–12 July 2013. 50 AF Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1970). 51 See Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland App no 931/13 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017) [137]. See also ML and WW v Germany App no 60798/10 and 65599/10 (ECtHR, 28 June 2018) [87]. 52 See on this notion M Albers, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005). 53 The notion of consent only appears in Art 15(3) of Convention 108 in relation to the provision of assistance to data subjects resident abroad. 54 See Art 7 of Directive 95/46/EC and now Art 6(1) of the GDPR; see also section D.III(b) below. 55 See speech of P Hustinx (EDPS) of 10 May 2012, ‘The EU Data Protection reform: New fundamental rights ­guarantees’, to be found at www.edps.europa.eu >> ‘Publications’ >> ‘Speeches’, p 4. 56 See on the relationship between this particular condition in Art 8 and Art 52(1) of the Charter section D.IV below.



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(b)  Privacy and Data Protection in the Case Law of the Court of Justice 08.37 The Court of Justice expressed itself several times on the right to privacy in relation to the right to data protection, or the secondary rules on data protection. Read together, this case law does not reveal a consistent approach on the matter. 08.38 The first time the two Charter rights were mentioned together was in Promusicae.57 The Court seemed to consider both rights as a reflection of the same right to privacy, referring to both as a single right.58 In subsequent case law the Court was clearly steered by the wording of Article 1 of the former Directive 95/46/EC that laid down the objective of the directive, namely to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.59 In Rijkeboer the Court considered that the right to privacy meant that the data subject may be certain that her or his personal data are processed in a correct and lawful manner, which meant in the case at issue that the data were accurate and that they were only disclosed to authorised recipients.60 08.39 The right to privacy and the right to data protection were considered in greater detail in the Schecke ruling of 2010. This case concerned the validity of EU law requiring the publication of identification details and the amount of subsidies received by beneficiaries from agricultural funds.61 The Court assessed the validity of the EU law in the light of Article 7 and 8 of the Charter. According to the Court the right to data protection was ‘closely connected’ with the right to respect of private life expressed in Article 7 of the Charter.62 Because the information about the farmers became available to third parties, the publication constituted an interference with the right to privacy.63 Moreover, since the publication constituted processing of personal data it fell under Article 8 of the Charter.64 Despite the distinction made between the scope of application of the two rights, the Court seemed to consider the right to data protection a subset of the right of privacy: the right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal data, recognised by Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual … and the limitations which may lawfully be imposed on the right to the protection of personal data correspond to those tolerated in relation to Article 8 [ECHR].65

08.40 The Court took Articles 7 and 8 together and applied a ‘classical’ fundamental rights approach to the possible justification of an interference with both rights as developed by the ECtHR under Article 8 ECHR. Subsequently, the Court referred to Article 52(3) of the Charter, but when actually assessing the matter the Court only concentrated on Article 52(1). The Court considered: Since the publication of data by name relating to the beneficiaries concerned and the precise amounts received by them from the [EU funds] constitutes an interference, as regards those beneficiaries, with the rights recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, and since such processing of personal data is not based on the consent of those beneficiaries, it is necessary to examine whether the interference is justified having regard to Article 52(1) of the Charter.66



57 See

Case C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:54. [65]. 59 See Art 1(1) of Directive 95/46/EC. 60 See C-553/07 Rijkeboer [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:293 [49]. 61 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker and Markus Schecke [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:662. 62 Ibid [47]. 63 Ibid [58]. 64 Ibid [60]. 65 Ibid [52]. 66 Ibid [64]. 58 Ibid

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It is of note that in relation to Article 8 of the Charter, the Court in this passage referred only to the consent of the beneficiaries and ignored the addition in Article 8(2) that processing can also be based on ‘some other legitimate basis laid down by law’.67 The approach in Schecke, taking Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter together and concentrating only on the lack of consent of the beneficiaries for moving to an assessment under Article 52(1), comes close to an understanding of the right to data protection as a right of informational self-determination, which, as explained, would be contrary to the intention of the legislator. In later case law the Court did include the full text of Article 8(2) of the Charter in its analysis, although it did not change much to the approach in Schecke. In Schwarz, which concerned the conformity with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of the requirement in Council Regulation 2252/2004 to include fingerprints in passports and travel documents, the Court first considered that the persons applying for passports could not be deemed to have consented to that processing.68 Next, it assessed whether the processing of fingerprints could be justified on the basis of some other legitimate basis laid down by law, the requirement in Article 8(2) of the Charter, following which it assessed the matter under Article 52(1) of the Charter.69 In Digital Rights Ireland (DRI), which led to the invalidation of the Data Retention Directive, the Court considered more closely the distinction between the right to privacy and the right to data protection. The Data Retention Directive required that, with the exception of the content of communications, data be kept for a period to be decided by the national legislator of between six months and two years. The Court considered that the retention of the data by the telecom operators for law enforcement purposes directly and specifically affected the private life of the persons concerned and, furthermore, since it constituted the processing of personal data within the meaning of Article 8 of the Charter it necessarily had to satisfy the data protection requirements arising from that article.70 In DRI, the Court also expressed itself on the essence of both rights. Because the retention obligation did not concern the content of communication, the essence of the right to privacy was not adversely affected.71 Nor did it adversely affect the essence of the right to data protection since the Data Retention Directive contained a provision requiring the operators, without prejudice to the former Directive 95/46/EC and the ePrivacy Directive, to respect certain principles of data protection and data security.72 However, in the Tele2 Sverige ruling of 2016, which concerned Member States’ legislation laying down similar data retention measures, the distinction between the right to privacy and the right to data protection disappeared again. The Court saw a serious interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 7 and 8 of the Charter and considered that since the content of communication was not stored the essence of both rights was not adversely affected.73 In the opinion on the draft agreement between Canada and the EU on transfer of Passenger Name Records from the EU to Canada (hereinafter: ‘the PNR Opinion’), the Court again made a distinction between both rights when assessing whether the essence of the rights was adversely affected. The essence of the right to privacy was not adversely affected since, although the data at issue could reveal very specific information concerning the private life of a person, the nature





67 Earlier

in the ruling, the Court referred to both grounds for processing, ibid [49]. OJ L385/1. See Case C-291/12 Schwarz [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2013:670 [32]. [33]–[34]. 70 See Digital Rights Ireland (n 7) [29]. 71 Ibid [39]. 72 Ibid [40]. 73 See Tele2 Sverige and Watson (n 29) [100] and [101]. 68 [2004] 69 Ibid

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of the information was limited to certain aspects of that private life, in particular, relating to air travel between Canada and the EU.74 Since the purposes of the processing were limited in the agreement and rules were included which intended to ensure, inter alia, the security, confidentiality and integrity of the data and to protect it against unlawful access and processing, neither the essence nor the right to data protection was affected.75 However, after recalling that Article 8(2) of the Charter guarantees that persons whose personal data have been collected have the right to access that data and to have it rectified, the Court continued with stating that Article 7 means that the person concerned may be certain that her or his personal data are processed in a correct and lawful manner (with reference to Rijkeboer) and that in order to carry out the necessary checks, that person must have a right of access to the data relating to her or him which is being processed.76 From the case law discussed, it can be concluded that the Court does not apply a consistent 08.46 approach to the distinction between Article 7 and Article 8 of the Charter. Often, the two rights are assimilated and an assessment is made whether the infringement of the two rights can be justified under Article 52(1) of the Charter. It seems the Court feels compelled to distinguish between the two when it has to consider whether there has been an interference with the two rights and whether the essence of both rights have not been adversely affected. As to the interference with both rights, the Court often formulates more extensively why there is an interference with the right to privacy and then limits itself to stating that there is also interference with the right to data protection because the measure at issue ‘constitutes processing of personal data’.77 As regards the essence of both rights, the Court has shown a willingness to carry out a more substantive assessment of the distinction between the two rights. However, when doing so, the Court seems quite ready to find that the essence of the right to data protection is respected as long as the measure at issue contains certain provisions on data protection, in particular on data security. All in all, one gets the impression that the Court, when it comes to an assessment in the light of the Charter, is more comfortable with addressing the matter under the right to privacy rather than under the right to data protection. The subsequent assessment of whether the measure meets the conditions of Article 52(1) of the Charter leads to Court into the more ‘classical’ fundamental rights approach to the matter (see further section D.IV).

II.  Article 10 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion) 08.47 In Jehovan todistajat, a case concerning the Jehovah’s Witnesses community, a conflict between the rules on data protection and the freedom of religion of Article 10 of the Charter was brought before the Court of Justice for adjudication.78 When performing door-to-door preaching activities the Jehovah’s Witnesses took certain notes on the persons visited. It was argued by the Jehovah’s Witnesses community that this activity fell outside the scope of the data protection rules as it constituted a purely personal activity.79 The underlying argument was that the application of the EU data protection rules to the data collection by Jehovah’s Witnesses would constitute an ‘intolerable and disproportionate interference with the freedom to preach’.80 74 See Opinion A-1/15 (n 14) [150]. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid [218]–[219]. 77 See eg Case C-207/16 Ministerio Fiscal [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:788 [51]. See also Schrems II (n 36) [170]. 78 Case C-25/17 Jehovan todistajat [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:551. 79 See Art 3(2), second indent, of Directive 95/46/EC and Art 2(2)(c) of the GDPR. See on the exclusion for purely personal or household activities section D.II(b) below. 80 See Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-25/17 (n 80) ECLI:EU:C:2018:57 [50].

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The Court decided against the Jehovah’s Witnesses community. The Court recalled that the 08.48 right to freedom of conscience and religion implies the freedom to manifest religion or belief, in worship, reaching, practice and observance. It underlined the broad understanding of the concept of ‘religion’ covering the forum internum as well as the forum externum, the latter being the manifestation of religious faith in public, which includes the right to attempt to convince other persons, for example by means of preaching. However, the Court concluded that although the door-to-door preaching activities of the member of a religious community is protected by Article 10(1) of the Charter, that fact does not confer an exclusively personal or household character on that activity.81 The Court considered that the activity was directed outwards from the private setting of the member who engage in preaching and that at least some of the data collected was made accessible to a potentially unlimited number of persons within the congregations of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community.82 The Court did not go into whether the subsequent application of the data protection rules 08.49 would lead to a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of religion. However, since the issue was explicitly discussed during the proceedings, as reflected in the opinion of AG Mengozzi, one can derive from the Court’s ruling that it saw no particular issue in this respect. AG Mengozzi had explicitly concluded that the application of the data protection rules did not constitute a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of religion, if it constituted an interference at all.83

III.  Article 11 (Freedom of Expression and Information) The right to freedom of expression (Art 11 of the Charter) is about imparting and receiving 08.50 information. The right to data protection has a dual relationship with this right. On the one hand, data protection rules aim to reach a harmonised level of data protection ensuring the free flow of information, including in the context of the freedom of expression. On the other hand, data protection rules might require a restriction of the freedom of expression. In that respect, there is an obvious tension between the two rights. A balance between the underlying interests of both rights should be found. Too much room to process data under the heading of the freedom of expression might render data protection meaningless. However, as AG Kokott also observed in her opinion in the Satamedia case, a strict application of the data protection rules could substantially limit freedom of expression.84 This would do no justice to the equal importance of both fundamental rights as recognised in the Charter. The potential conflict between both rights is explicitly recognised in Article 85 GDPR. 08.51 Member States shall by law reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to the GDPR with the right to freedom of expression and information. Member States must provide for exemptions or derogations from the GDPR for processing carried out for journalistic purposes or the purpose of academic, artistic or literary expression, if they are necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and information. Exemptions or derogations are possible from almost all chapters of the GDPR. No exceptions or derogations are possible with regard to the chapter on judicial remedies, liability and sanctions.85





81 See

Jehovan todistajat (n 80) [46]–[49]. [44]–[45]. 83 Ibid [50]. 84 See Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-73/07 (n 40) [43]. 85 See chapter VIII of the GDPR. Chapters I, X and XI are also excluded. 82 Ibid

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08.52

A similar provision existed in the former Directive 95/46/EC, Article 9. In the Lindqvist ruling of 2003, the Court of Justice was asked whether, despite the existence of Article 9, the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC as such brought about a restriction which conflicted with the general principle of freedom of expression.86 Lindqvist concerned the publication by a private person of certain personal data of others on an internet website. The Court did not consider that Directive 95/46/EC as such would restrict freedom of expression. It considered that it was for the national authorities and courts responsible for applying the transposing national law in such a way as to ensure a fair balance between the rights and interests in question, including respect for fundamental rights.87 08.53 Article 9 of Directive 95/46 EC was further clarified by the Court of Justice in the Satamedia ruling of 2008.88 The case concerned the further commercial distribution by newspaper or SMS of personal data about income taxes paid which was already made public by the government. The Court gave a very broad interpretation to the provision. It considered that the fact that the publication of data within the public domain was done for profit-making purposes did not preclude such publication being considered as an activity undertaken solely for journalistic purposes.89 Article 9 did not only apply to media undertakings but also to every person engaged in journalism. Activities could be classified as journalistic if their object was the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit them.90 The broad interpretation of the notion of ‘journalistic activities’ was again confirmed by the 08.54 Court of Justice in the Buivids case.91 The question in that case was whether putting a film on YouTube by someone who openly filmed a police officer when being interrogated, constituted a journalistic activity. The Court considered that not all information published on the internet, involving personal data, comes under the concept of ‘journalistic activities’.92 Still, the Court took the view that the activity in the case at issue might have been done solely for journalistic purposes, provided its sole objective was the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, which was for the referring court to determine.93 In this respect, the Court pointed at the fact that, according to person who uploaded the video, it was published on an internet site to draw to the attention of society alleged police malpractice which, as the person had claimed, occurred while he was making his statement.94 According to Article 85 of the GDPR Member States must provide for exemptions or deroga08.55 tions from the GDPR for processing carried out for journalistic purposes (or the purpose of academic, artistic or literary expression) if they are necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and information. This requires a balancing of the rights to data protection and freedom of expression and information. In relation to the right to be forgotten and internet search engines, the Court of Justice acknowledged in Google LLC that the interest of the public in accessing information, which is protected under Article 11 of the Charter, may vary from one Member State to another, which means that the result of weighing up that interest and the rights to privacy and data protection is not necessarily the same for all

86 See Case C-101/01 Lindqvist [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:596 [72]. 87 Ibid [90]. 88 See Satamedia (n 40). 89 Ibid [59]. The word ‘solely’ disappeared in Art 85 of the GDPR, but can still be found in Recital 153 of the GDPR. 90 Ibid [61]. Despite the broad interpretation, the Court of Justice did not consider the activities of an internet search engine as a journalistic activity. See Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL & Google Inc. [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 [85]. 91 Case C-345/17 Buivids [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:122. 92 Ibid [58]. 93 Ibid [69]. 94 Ibid [60].

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Member States.95 However, the Court pointed at the consistency mechanism in the GDPR which, according to the Court, provides the national supervisory authorities with the instruments and mechanisms necessary to reconcile a data subject’s rights to privacy and the protection of personal data with the interest of the whole public throughout the Member States.96 In its case law, the Court of Justice seems cautious in giving substantive guidance on the 08.56 balancing exercise. By contrast, the interaction between privacy and the freedom of expression has been considered extensively by the ECtHR. When reconciling the two rights, the ECtHR has paid particular attention to the public status of the persons involved. According to the ECtHR, persons who have entered the public arena, such as politicians, are required to accept a greater degree of tolerance regarding the publication of information about them.97 However, public figures, especially if they did not deliberately choose to be in the public arena, are not without protection. In Von Hannover v Germany, which concerned the publication of pictures of Princess Caroline of Monaco, the ECtHR considered that anyone, even if they are known to the general public, must be able to enjoy a ‘legitimate expectation’ of protection of their private life.98 In balancing the two fundamental rights at stake, the ECtHR paid specific attention to whether 08.57 the publication of personal information contributed to a debate of general interest.99 What constitutes a subject of general interest depends on the circumstances of the case. In this respect the ECtHR has recognised the existence of such an interest not only where the publication concerned political issues or crimes, but also where it concerned sporting issues or performing artists.100 However, the rumoured marital difficulties of a president, or the financial problems of a famous singer, were not deemed to be matters of general interest.101 Other elements the ECtHR took into account for the balancing exercise were the subject of the news report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the method of obtaining the information and the content, form and consequences of the publication.102 The ECtHR was confronted with the follow-up to the Satamedia ruling of the Court of 08.58 Justice.103 Despite the broad interpretation given by the Court of Justice to the notion of ’ journalistic activities’, the Finnish court concluded that the activities of Satamedia could not be qualified as such. In order to assess whether the activities were journalistic, the national court did not just check whether the activities had as sole object the disclosure to the public of information, opinion or ideas, but used the criterion of whether the publication of the information contributed to a public debate. Since it did not, the national court concluded that the activities were not journalistic. It could be argued that the Finnish court took a more restrictive approach than the Court of Justice in the Satamedia ruling. However, the ECtHR stayed away from expressing itself on this. It recalled the judgment of the Court of Justice, but noted that the national court came to its conclusion with an acceptable reasoning attaching importance to both rights.104

95 See Case C-507/17 Google LLC [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 [67]. 96 Ibid [68]–[69]. 97 See eg Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) A-103 [42]. 98 See Von Hannover v Germany App no 59320/00 (ECtHR, 24 June 2004) [69]. 99 Ibid [60]–[65]. 100 See Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) App no 40660/08 (ECtHR, 7 February 2012) [109]. 101 Ibid. 102 See Couderc and Hackette Filipacchi Associés v France, App no 40454/07 (ECtHR, 10 November 2015) [93]. This case gives a very elaborate overview of the different criteria. 103 See Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland App no 931/13 (ECtHR 21 July 2015). 104 Ibid [69]–[72]. The conclusion was confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR to which the case was referred, see Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland (n 53).



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08.59

In Buivids, the Court made a distinction between, first, determining whether a matter constitutes the disclosure to the public of information, opinions and ideas and, second, determining whether the exemptions or derogations provided for in the national law are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing the freedom of expression.105 The latter implied a balancing exercise which, according to the Court in Buivids, indeed had to take into account the relevant case law of the ECtHR. The Court of Justice, with reference to the Satamedia ruling of the ECtHR, pointed at several elements from that case law, such as the contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree of notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and the manner and circumstances in which the information was obtained and its veracity.106 Similarly, according to the Court, the possibility for the controller to adopt measures to mitigate the extent of the interference with the right to privacy had to be taken into account.107

IV.  Article 17 (Right to Property) 08.60 A potential conflict with the right to property (Art 17) as well as the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Art 47, see below) was discussed in both Promusicae and Scarlet Extended.108 The cases dealt with the issue of file sharing which supposedly infringed copyrights. The Court was asked to provide guidance on the balancing of the rights of intellectual property holders against the right to personal data protection of the persons sharing the information, having regard to the role of the Internet Service Provider (ISP) as an intermediary. 08.61 In Promusicae, the Court of Justice concluded that EU law does not require the Member States to lay down an obligation on ISPs to communicate personal data in order to ensure effective protection of copyright in the context of civil proceedings.109 The Court underlined that when transposing the relevant directives and interpreting the national law transposing the directives, Member States should take care to rely on an interpretation which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights involved.110 08.62 The Promusicae ruling implies that an obligation on ISPs to communicate personal data of its costumers is also not forbidden by EU law. In Bonnier Audio, the Court indeed considered that the obligation to communicate personal data to private persons in civil proceedings, under the conditions set out in Swedish law, was likely, in principle, to ensure a fair balance between the protection of IP rights and the protection of personal data.111 However, it follows from Scarlet Extended that ISPs cannot be obliged to introduce a system for filtering all electronic communications passing through its network, as a preventive measure aimed at blocking the transfer of files which are shared in breach of copyright.112 The Court considered that such a monitoring system would infringe, inter alia, the right to data protection of the costumers.113 105 See Buivids (n 93) [68]. 106 Ibid [65]–[66]. 107 Ibid [66]. 108 See Promusicae (n 59) and Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:771. 109 The EU law referred to is Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic Commerce [2000] OJ L178/1, Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10, Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157/45 read in conjunction with the ePrivacy Directive. 110 See Promusicae (n 59) [70]. 111 See Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio AB [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:219 [57]–[60]. 112 See Scarlet Extended (n 110) [54]. 113 Ibid [50]. See also Case C-360/10 SABAM [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:85. See in relation to this subject also P Van Eecke, ‘Online service providers and liability: A plea for a’ balanced approach’ [2011] Common Market Law Review 1455–1502.

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V.  Article 21 (Prohibition of Discrimination) The right to data protection has been linked to the prohibition of discrimination, which in the 08.63 Charter is enshrined in Article 21. The automated processing of personal data easily allows the categorisation of individuals, which might lead to stigmatisation and discriminatory action. In the Explanatory Report to Convention 108, non-discrimination is mentioned as one of the fundamental rights the enjoyment of which might be adversely affected by an unfettered exercise of the freedom to process information.114 The enhanced protection given to certain special categories of data in Article 9 of the GDPR (including data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs and data concerning health and a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation) can be explained by the particular risk of stigmatisation and discrimination posed by the processing of such data. Data protection was dealt with by the Court of Justice in connection with non-discrimination 08.64 in the Huber ruling of 2008.115 This case concerned a German central register of foreign nationals in which all foreign nationals were registered. No distinction was made between nationals from other EU Member States and nationals from outside the EU. No comparable register existed for German citizens. The Court agreed with Mr Huber, who was an Austrian citizen, that, as regards foreign nationals being citizens from other EU Member States, this constituted an unjustified discrimination between EU citizens. This decision was based on Article 12 of the EC Treaty (now Art 18 TFEU). No reference was made to the Charter.

VI.  Article 42 (Right of Access to Documents) The right of data protection can also collide with the right of public access to documents. The 08.65 potential conflict between both rights is explicitly recognised in Article 86 GDPR. Article 86 GDPR states that personal data in official documents held by a public body may be disclosed in accordance with Union or Member State law to which the public body is subject in order to reconcile public access to official documents with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to the GDPR. Other than with the right to freedom of expression, the provision does not provide for the possibility of Member States to lay down any derogations or restrictions to the provisions of the GDPR. Article 86 GDPR seems to have a declaratory rather than a normative value. Article 42 of the Charter lays down the right of access to documents held by EU institutions, 08.66 bodies, offices and agencies. Individuals cannot invoke this provision against public authorities in their Member State. Whether such a right exists at national level depends in the first place on national law. However, the case law of the ECtHR reveals a gradual acceptance of a right of access to information held by public authorities as part of the right to freedom of expression, as laid down in Article 10 ECHR. In Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, the ECtHR considered that the time had come to clarify the classic principles on access to information under Article 10 ECHR.116 It considered that the right of access was not necessarily restricted to public watchdogs but could be invoked by any individual in circumstances where the information is instrumental for the individual’s exercise of her or his right to freedom of expression, in particular the freedom to receive an impart information, and where its denial constitutes an interference with that right.117



114 See

Pt 25 of the Explanatory Memorandum, ETS 108. C-524/06 Huber [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:724 [75]–[77]. 116 See Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary App no 18030/11 (ECtHR, 8 November 2016) [156]. 117 Ibid. 115 See

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08.67

08.68

08.69

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In the same ruling the ECtHR gave more specific guidance on the relationship of the right of public access with the right to privacy in Article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR acknowledged that the request for access concerned personal data, but added that it did not involve information outside the public domain. It concluded that the privacy rights of the persons concerned (these persons were public defenders) would not have been negatively affected had the request for access been granted.118 In this respect, the ECtHR pointed at the fact that the information related predominantly to the conduct of professional activities in the context of public proceedings and that these professional activities could not be considered to be a private matter.119 At EU level, the collision of the right to data protection and the right of public access to documents contained in Article 42 has led to a substantive body of case law of the Luxembourg Courts. The leading case is Bavarian Lager.120 The case concerned a request for public access, on the basis of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001,121 to the minutes of a Commission meeting which contained the names of EU officials, national civil servants and business representatives. The Commission refused to disclose the names of the persons who, after consultation, were opposed to the disclosure. These persons were in fact the business representatives. The Commission relied on Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, which determines that access to a document should be refused if it would undermine the protection of ‘the privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data’ (at the time this was Regulation (EC) 45/2001, which has since been replaced by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725). Bavarian Lager, supported by the EDPS, argued that this provision required a first assessment under the right to privacy before turning to the specific data protection rules. Such an assessment would lead to the conclusion that the right of privacy of the individuals concerned would not be undermined by the disclosure. The Commission, on the other hand, argued that the provision should be seen as a direct referral to Regulation (EC) 45/2001. When applying Regulation (EC) 45/2001, and its Article 8 in particular, the person requesting access to the documents should establish the necessity of the public disclosure, which Bavarian Lager had not done since, under Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, requests for public access to documents do not have to be reasoned.122 The Court followed the reasoning of the European Commission: since Bavarian Lager had not provided any express and legitimate justification or any convincing argument in order to demonstrate the necessity for those personal data to be transferred to him, the Commission had not been able to weigh up the various interests of the parties concerned.123 The Bavarian Lager ruling did not provide any answer as regards the threshold that had to be met in order to establish the necessity to disclose personal data.124 However, the General Court considered this question in several subsequent rulings. In Dennekamp, which concerned a request by a journalist for the names of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who

118 Ibid [198]. 119 Ibid [194]–[195]. 120 See C-28/08 P Bavarian Lager [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:378. See on the relation between EU rules on public access and data protection, HR Kranenborg, ‘Access to documents and data protection in the European Union—On the public nature of ’ personal data’ [2008] Common Market Law Review 1079–1114. 121 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 [2001] OJ L145/43. 122 See Art 6(1) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. Art 8 of Regulation (EC) 45/2001 was replaced by Art 9 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 which intended to codify the case law of the Court of Justice. 123 See Bavarian Lager (n 122) [78]. 124 See on this issue the EDPS Additional Background Paper of 24 March 2011 on public access to documents containing personal data after the Bavarian Lager ruling, to be found at www.edps.europa.eu.

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were ­joining an additional pension scheme, the Court established a high threshold and decided that the necessity was not established.125 In a second case, instigated by the same applicant regarding the same information (Dennekamp II), the General Court annulled a second refusal of the European Parliament. The Court did not accept the reasoning of the applicant that publication of the data was necessary for informing the public and enabling it to take part in a debate on the legitimacy of the scheme. It did, however, accept the necessity of having access for the aim of bringing to light potential conflicts of interest.126 According to the Court, disclosure would not prejudice the legitimate interests of the MEPs as the personal data belonged’ in the public sphere of MEPs’.127 The necessity for the disclosure of personal data in the public interest was also established 08.72 by the Court of Justice in ClientEarth which concerned a request for access to an EU guidance document on the interpretation of a certain provision relating to the acceptance of substances when placing plant protection products on the market. A draft version of the document contained remarks of appointed experts. The Court concluded that the disclosure of the information was necessary to ensure transparency of the process of adoptions of a measure likely to have an impact on the activities of economic operators, in particular, in order to appreciate how the form of participation by each expert in that process might, through that expert’s own scientific opinion, have influenced the context of that measure.128

VII.  Article 47 (Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial) The potential conflict between the right to data protection and the right to an effective remedy, 08.73 was briefly touched upon when discussing the right to property in section B.IV. In Promusicae the Court of Justice concluded that the different directives at issue allowed for the national legislator to strike a fair balance between the different fundamental rights at stake.129 The impossibility to instigate court proceedings without identification details of the alleged 08.74 perpetrator also occurred in Rigas Satiksme.130 Following a road traffic accident, in which a bus collided into a car door that had been opened suddenly by a taxi passenger, the applicant, an insurance company, turned to the police to get hold of the identity of the passenger. The taxi driver could not provide sufficient details to identify the passenger. Without specific reference to Article 47 of the Charter, the Court considered that a law providing for access to such data in these circumstances could reflect a fair balance between the opposing rights and interests at issue. However, such a law did not exist in the case.131 Another way in which Article 8 and Article 47 interrelate is through the incorporation of the 08.75 requirement of an effective judicial remedy in the secondary legislation on data protection.132 In Puškar the question was asked whether, in light of the provision in the former Directive 95/46/ EC on remedies and of Article 47 of the Charter, Member State law could require a data subject to exhaust the administrative remedy available before the national supervisory authority, prior

125 Case T-82/09 Dennekamp v European Parliament [2011] ECLI:EU:T:2011:688. See also Case T-190/10 Egan and Hacket v European Parliament [2012] ECLI:EU:T:2012:165. 126 Case T-115/13 Gert-Jan Dennekamp [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:497 [87] and [113]. 127 Ibid [121]. 128 See Case C-615/13 P ClientEarth [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:489 [55]–[56]. 129 See Promusicae (n 59) [68]. 130 Case C-13/16 Rigas Satiksme [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:336. 131 Ibid [29]–[34]. See on this ruling also section D.III(b) below. 132 See Chapter VIII of the GDPR and Chapter III of the Law Enforcement Directive. See on remedies also section D.V.



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to bringing a case before a judicial authority.133 The Court concluded that Article 47 of the Charter did not preclude such a rule, provided that the practical arrangements for the exercise of the administrative remedy did not disproportionately affect the right to an effective remedy before a court.134 08.76 In cases in which the level of data protection in third countries was considered, the Court of Justice paid particular attention to the presence of legal remedies in the third country in order to have access to personal data relating to the data subject or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data. In the two Schrems cases, in which the Court respectively declared the Safe Harbour adequacy decision of the European Commission and its successor, the EU-US Privacy Shield decision invalid, one of the elements with which the Court took issue was the absence of a legal remedy in the United States for EU data subjects in case the US national security agencies had access to the personal data transferred under those adequacy decisions.135 In the opinion on the draft agreement between Canada and the EU on transfer of Passenger Name Records from the EU to Canada the Court concluded that the air passengers did have a legal remedy before a tribunal.136 08.77 In Puškar, Article 47 was also invoked from the angle of the right to a fair trial. The applicant had found out that he appeared on a black list used by the national tax authorities. The applicant got hold of the list, which also included other persons, and used the list as evidence in the national judicial procedure. The national court rejected the evidence since the applicant had obtained the list in breach of the data protection rules. The Court of Justice considered that rejecting the evidence in so far the personal data of the applicant was concerned seemed disproportionate having regard to the data subject’s right of access under the data protection rules. However, the Court pointed at the possibility in Directive 95/46/EC to restrict the right of access. Whether there was a national law validly doing so, required further analysis by the referring court.137 08.78 The Puškar case touched upon an issue which is not addressed in EU law, namely whether evidence collected in breach of the data protection rules can be used as evidence in legal proceedings. The Court of Justice addressed the matter in La Quadrature du Net ao, which concerned evidence obtained on the basis of a national law which required the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data but which was found to be in breach of Union law.138 The Court considered that it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights that individuals derive from Union law, provided the principles of equivalence and of effectiveness are respected.139 According to the Court the latter requires national criminal courts to disregard information and evidence obtained by means of the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data in breach of EU law, in the context of criminal proceedings against persons suspected of having committed criminal offences, where those persons are not in a position to comment effectively on that information and that evidence, they pertain to a field of which the judges have no knowledge and are likely to have

133 See Case C-73/16 Peter Puškar [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:725. 134 Ibid [76]. 135 See Case C-362/14 Schrems [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 [95] and Schrems II (n 36) [186]–[199]. See further section D.III(g). 136 See opinion A-1/15 (n 14) [227]. 137 See Puškar (n 135) [94]–[98]. 138 See La Quadrature du Net ao (n 32) [213]–[228]. See on this ruling also section D.IV(d). 139 Ibid [223].

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a preponderant influence on the findings of fact.140 Further guidance can also be found in the case law of the ECtHR.141

C.  Sources of Article 8 I. ECHR Article 52(3) of the Charter states that the meaning and scope of a Charter right corresponding to a right in the ECHR shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. In that respect, it is clear that Article 7 of the Charter corresponds to Article 8 ECHR. With regard to Article 8 of the Charter, the relation with Article 8 ECHR is bit less straightforward. As the Court of Justice stated in Tele2 Sverige in the context of Article 52(3), Article 8 of the Charter concerns a fundamental right which is distinct from that enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter and which has no equivalent in the ECHR.142 The explanations state that Article 8 of the Charter is based, amongst others, on Article 8 ECHR. However, as the description in section B.I has shown, the inclusion of a right to data protection in the Charter separate from the right to privacy confirms and reflects the elaborated and conclusive system of checks and balances which ensures lawful processing. In that respect, as the explanations state, Article 8 is also based on Convention 108 and the former Directive 95/46/EC. The case law of the ECtHR under Article 8 ECHR is obviously relevant when applying the right to data protection, but not necessarily conclusive when assessing whether a situation is compliant with Article 8 of the Charter. As mentioned in section B.I(a), a non-exhaustive list of requirements under Article 8 ECHR can be derived from the Court’s case law which corresponds to several of the specific requirements of the right to data protection. Since the relevant case law of the ECtHR is quite voluminous, only some main elements of the case law will be highlighted. In the Niemietz ruling of 1992, the ECtHR gave a broad interpretation to the notion of private life.143 It considered that the notion was not restricted to an ‘inner circle’ in which an individual may live his own personal life.144 The Court saw no reason to exclude activities of a professional or business nature from the notion of private life.145 With this ruling, the Court to a large extent aligned the scope of privacy with the scope of the data protection rules, which do not distinguish between private or professional data. In Amann the Court considered that ‘the storing by a public authority of information relating to an individual’s private life amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8 [ECHR]’.146 Article 8 ECHR also applies to data protection issues in horizontal situations, ie processing of personal data by other private persons. Case law shows that, in order to establish whether there is an interference with the right to respect for private life, the ECtHR took into account 140 Ibid [227]. 141 See eg Dragoş Ioan Rusu v Romania App no 22767/08 (ECtHR, 31 January 2018) [49]–[57], Bykov v Russia App no 4378/02 (ECtHR, 10 March 2009) [69]–[83], Khan v the United Kingdom App no 35394/97 (ECtHR, 4 October 2000) [34]. 142 See Tele2 Sverige (n 29) [129]. 143 See Niemietz v Germany (n 46). 144 Ibid [29]. 145 Ibid. 146 See Amann v Switzerland App no 27798/95 (ECtHR, 16 February 2000), RJD 2000-I [65].



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the reasonable privacy expectation of the person concerned. For instance, cases concerning employers having accessed the professional mailbox of employees or the placing of secret camera surveillance to control the conduct of employees fell within the scope of Article 8 ECHR because the employee, being unaware of the possible access to his mailbox or of the surveillance, could have had a reasonable privacy expectation.147 Even the person who was informed about the fact that he could use his professional mailbox only for professional matters made a successful claim under Article 8 ECHR since, according to the ECtHR, the private social life of the person involved could not be reduced to zero.148 08.84 Article 8(2) ECHR requires that an interference with the right to respect for private life is (1) in accordance with the law, (2) serves a legitimate purpose and (3) is necessary in a democratic society. 08.85 As to the first condition, it is established case law that the law must be adequately accessible and foreseeable, which means that it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual to regulate her or his conduct.149 These requirements have been particularly important in cases in which the ECtHR assessed the justification of secret measures of surveillance.150 The Court has considered that foreseeability in this context ‘cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly’.151 However, according to the Court in Weber and Saravia, the ‘domestic law should be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measure’.152 08.86 As to the second and third condition, it is established case law of the ECtHR that ‘an interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduces by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”’.153 Domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of Article 8 ECHR.154 In S and Marper, the Court underlined that the need for such safeguards is all the greater where the protection of personal data undergoing automatic processing is concerned, not least when such data are used for police purposes.155 According to the Court ‘the domestic law should notably ensure that such data are relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored; and preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required for the purpose for which those data are stored’.156 In Breyer, the ECtHR considered the ‘level of interference’ when assessing the proportionality of a national measure requiring the registration of

147 See Halford v United Kingdom App no 20605/92 (ECtHR, 25 June 1997) [48], Copland v United Kingdom App no 62617/00 (ECtHR, 3 April 2007) [42]. 148 See Bărbulescu v Romania App no 61496/08 (ECtHR, 5 September 2017). 149 See eg S and Marper v United Kingdom App nos 30562/04 and 30566/04 (ECtHR, 4 December 2008), RJD 2008 [95]. 150 See eg Weber and Saravia v Germany (admissibility) (n 47) [93]–[95], Roman Zakharov v Russia App no 47143/06 (ECtHR, 4 December 2015), Szabó en Vissy v Hungary App no 37138/14 (ECtHR, 12 January 2016), Centrum för Rättvisa v Sweden App no 35252/08 (ECtHR, 19 June 2018) and Big Brother Watch ao v United Kingdom App no 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECtHR, 13 September 2018). 151 See Weber and Saravia v Germany, ibid [93]. 152 Ibid. 153 See eg S and Marper v United Kingdom (n 152) [101]. 154 Ibid [103]. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid.

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holders of prepaid SIM-cards, concluding that the interference caused by such a measure was of a rather limited nature.157 The case law of the ECtHR shows that many elements can play a role when the Court assesses 08.87 whether the collection, storage and/or use of information relating to the private life of individuals complies with the above requirements. The Court has taken into account, among others, the nature of the data,158 the period of retention,159 (again) the privacy expectation of the person concerned,160 the public status of the person concerned,161 the possible control mechanisms given to the person concerned (the right of access to the data),162 the presence of independent oversight mechanisms,163 and whether security measures have been put in place.164

II.  UN Treaties The right to privacy can be found in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 08.88 (1948): ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks’. The right is also enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 08.89 (ICCPR), which has been ratified by all EU Member States. Article 17 states that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks’. In General Comment No 16, the Human Right Committee (HRC) elaborated on the right 08.90 enshrined in Article 17 ICCPR.165 It stated, inter alia, that: [e]ffective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that information concerning a person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for purposes incompatible with the Covenant. In order to have the most effective protection of his private life, every individual should have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form, whether, and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data files, and for what purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain which public authorises or private individuals or bodies control or may control their files. If such files contain incorrect personal data or have been collected or processed contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual should have the right to request rectification or elimination.166

Most of the decisions of the HRC following complaints brought under Article 17 ICCPR 08.91 dealt with more classical private and family life issues. There are a few decisions with explicit reference to the protection of personal data. In Sayadi ao v Belgium, for instance, the applicants complained about the inclusion of their names and contact details on UN sanctions lists, which

157 See Breyer v Germany App no 50001/12 (ECtHR, 30 January 2020) [92] and [95]. 158 See eg Z v Finland (n 49). 159 See eg Catt v United Kingdom App no 43514/15 (ECtHR, 24 January 2019) [119]. 160 See eg Krone Verlag GmbH v Austria App no 34315/96 (ECtHR, 26 February 2002). See also Von Hannover v Germany (n 100). 161 See eg Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) [42]. 162 See eg Leander v Sweden App no 9248/81 (ECtHR, 26 March 1987) A-116 and Gaskin v United Kingdom App no 10454/83 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989) A-160 [49]. 163 See eg Klass v Germany App no 5029/71 (ECtHR, 6 September 1978) A-28 [50]. 164 See eg I v Finland App no 20511/03 (ECtHR, 17 July 2008) [38]–[40]. 165 CCPR, General Comment No 16, adopted on 8 April 1988 during the 32nd session. 166 Ibid Pt 10.



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were available to everyone on the internet.167 The HRC found a violation of Article 17 ICCPR. The dissemination of personal information about the applicants constituted an attack on their honour and reputation, in view of the negative association that some persons could make between the applicants’ names and the title of the sanctions list.168 The names were transmitted to the UN Sanctions Committee by the Belgium government while the outcome of a criminal investigation against these persons was still unknown. After the investigation was dismissed, the names were not removed from the list for which the HRC held the Belgium government responsible.169 08.92 In Van Hulst v The Netherlands the complaint concerned the allegedly unlawful retention of tapped telephone conversations the applicant had with his lawyer.170 As to the data protection part of the claim, the HRC stated that the right to privacy implies that every individual should have the right to request rectification or elimination of incorrect personal data in files controlled by public authorities.171 However, in the case at hand, it considered the separate storage of the recordings of the applicant’s conversations not unreasonable. 08.93 In N.K. v The Netherlands the Committee found a violation of Article 17 ICCPR.172 The case concerned the Dutch DNA Testing Act which required the public prosecutor to order that a DNA sample be taken from a person who has been convicted of an offence for which pre-trial detention may be imposed or an offence with a maximum prison sentence of at least four years. The DNA sample was stored in a database so that it could be used in the future for the purposes of criminal investigation. The applicant in the case, a minor, was convicted for an act of public violence and theft in association with others following which a DNA sample was taken. With reference to General Comment No 16 the Committee recalled that even though, in society, the protection of privacy is necessarily relative, the competent authorities should only be able to obtain information relating to an individual’s private life if such information is essential in the interest of society.173 The relevant legislation must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which the interference may be permitted. A decision to make use of such authorised interference must be made only by authority designated under the law and on a case-by-case basis. The Committee concluded that this interference with the privacy of the applicant in the case at hand, although lawful under Dutch law, was not proportionate to the legitimate aim of prevention and investigation of serious crimes.174 Amongst others, the Committee criticised the automatic nature of the testing order, and the limited possibilities for weighing of interests before the public prosecutor issued the order. The Committee noted that there were some exceptions, but that these were narrowly construed and did not include consideration for the age of the offender.175

III.  Council of Europe Treaties 08.94 It has already been mentioned that in 1981 the Council of Europe Convention 108 was adopted for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data. The Convention aimed ‘to secure in the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular

167 CCPR, Communication

No 1472/2006, CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, views adopted on 22 October 2008. Pt 10.12. 169 Ibid Pt 10.13. 170 CCPR, Communication No 903/2000, CCPR/C/82/D/903/2000, views adopted on 1 November 2004. 171 Ibid Pt 7.9. 172 CCPR. Communication No 2326/2013. CCPR/C/120/D/2326/2013/Rev. 1, revised views adopted on 10 January 2018. 173 Ibid Pt 9.5. 174 Ibid Pt 9.11. 175 Ibid Pt 9.7 and 9.10. 168 Ibid

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his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him’.176 The Convention introduced definitions of several key notions, such as ‘personal data’, ‘automatic processing’ and ‘controller of the file’ and provided the basic principles for data processing, gave rules on the transborder flow of data between the parties and on a system of mutual assistance.177 The Additional Protocol, adopted in 2001, added provisions on the establishment of independent supervisory bodies and introduced rules on the transfer of data to third countries.178 55 countries, including all EU Member States, have ratified Convention 108. 44 countries, including 22 EU Member States, ratified the Additional Protocol.179 For the EU Member States the more detailed Directive 95/46/EC diminished the importance of Convention 108. For the law enforcement sector, the Convention played a role in situations which were not covered by the former Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.180 Following the entry into force of Convention 108 in 1985, the Committee of Ministers adopted a list of recommendations on a variety of specific data processing situations. It adopted, inter alia, recommendations which dealt with the protection of personal data for social security purposes, the protection of personal data in the area of telecommunication services or the protection of privacy on the internet.181 For the police sector, Recommendation No R(87)15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector played an important role. As with the EU secondary legislation on data protection, Convention 108 and the Additional Protocol were revised. The two main objectives were to deal with challenges resulting from the use of new information and communication technologies and to strengthen the Convention’s effective implementation. To prevent any inconsistencies with the new EU rules on data protection, the European Commission actively participated in the revision process of Convention 108.182 The revision process led to the adoption in May 2018 of a protocol amending Convention 108, which is indeed consistent with the main content of the new EU rules on data protection.183 From the date of entry into force, the additional protocol will be repealed since its substance was incorporated in the amended Convention 108. The amending protocol will enter into force three months after the date on which all parties to Convention 108 have expressed their consent to be bound by the protocol.184 In order to avoid that a single country could block its entry into force, the contracting parties agreed that after a period of five years following the opening date for signature, the protocol will enter into force in respect of the states which have expressed their consent to be bound by it, provided that the protocol has at least 38 parties. All provisions of the amended Convention 108 shall have effect between these countries. At the time of writing 33 countries signed the amending protocol, including 26 EU Member States. Nine countries had ratified the amending protocol.

176 See Art 1 of Convention 108. 177 See respectively Art 2, Chapters II, III and IV of Convention 108. 178 Additional Protocol to Convention 108 of 8 November 2001 regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows, ETS 181. 179 Malta and Slovenia have not signed the Additional Protocol. Belgium, Greece and Italy have signed Additional Protocol 181, but had not ratified it at the time of writing. 180 See also section A.I above. 181 See respectively Recommendation No R(86)1 of 23 January 1986, Recommendation No R(95)4 of 7 February 1995 and Recommendation No R(99)5 of 23 February 1999. A full list of relevant recommendations can be found at www.coe. int >> ‘Rule of Law’ >> ‘Data Protection’. 182 More information on the modernisation of Convention 108 can be found at www.coe.int/en/web/data-protection/ convention108/modernised. 183 Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108), CETS 223. 184 See Art 37(1) of the amending protocol.



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IV.  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 08.99 On 23 September 1980, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted Guidelines on the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data.185 These Guidelines were developed in parallel with Convention 108 of the Council of Europe, and contained many comparable elements. For instance, the definitions of ‘personal data’ and ‘data controller’ given in both instruments were essentially the same.186 Also, most of the principles defined in Convention 108, such as the purpose limitation principle, and the data quality principle, could in substance be found in the Guidelines as well. 08.100 Due to the adoption of Convention 108 and, later on, the EU legislation on data protection, the Guidelines were mainly directly relevant for the non-European Members of the OECD. The Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, for instance, incorporated the Guidelines with only minor changes.187 08.101 As with the EU secondary legislation on data protection and Convention 108, the OECD Guidelines were reviewed.188 On 11 July 2013, the new guidelines were adopted.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 08.102 Article 8 of the Charter contains several specifications of what the right to data protection entails. As stated in the explanations to the Charter, Article 8 is based on Convention 108 and the former Directive 95/46/EC. Both instruments contain further specifications and details. The overview given in this section will be restricted to a relatively general and selective description of the different (groups of) provisions contained in the data protection rules, especially the GDPR. Special attention is given to provisions on which the Court of Justice has expressed itself. 08.103 After a discussion of the scope of application of the GDPR (subsection II), several specific provisions of the GDPR will be analysed (subsection III). These are the general principles of processing, the lawfulness of processing, processing of sensitive data, provisions on transparency, specific rights of the data subject, the responsibility of the controller, the provisions on transfer of personal data to third countries and the supervision of all rules by the independent supervisory authorities. This section closes with two parts on limitations and derogations (subsection IV) and on remedies (subsection V).

II.  Scope of Application 08.104 The scope of application of Article 8 has already been described in terms of EU policy areas it may cover. However, analysing the scope of application of the right to data protection also requires 185 The guidelines can be found on the OECD website: www.oecd.org >> ‘Topics’ >> ‘Digital’. The OECD has 37 members, of which 22 are EU Member States. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta and Romania are not member of the OECD. The other OECD Members are: Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. The European Commission takes part in the work of the OECD as provided by the Supplementary Protocol to the Convention on the OECD of 14 December 1960. See on the OECD Privacy Guidelines, OECD Paper, ‘Thirty years after the OECD Privacy Guidelines’ (2011), to be found at www.oecd.org >> ‘Topics’ >> ‘Digital’ >> ‘OECD privacy guidelines’. 186 Compare Art 1(a) and (b) of the Guidelines with Art 2(a) and (d) of Convention 108. 187 OECD Paper, ibid p 4. 188 More information can be found at www.oecd.org >> ‘Topics’ >> ‘Digital’ >> ‘OECD privacy guidelines’.

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a more detailed assessment. The secondary EU legislation defines the territorial, material and personal scope of the right to data protection for the policy area covered by the instrument. (a)  Territorial Scope Data protection is perhaps one of the clearest examples of how internet challenges the legal boundaries between the EU and the rest of the world. In an internet environment, for instance by use of cloud computing services, it is not always easy to determine where personal data is actually processed and subsequently to define which law is applicable. And even if the applicability of the law is established, it might be difficult to enforce such law. Against this background, the GDPR has simplified the rules on applicability, compared to Directive 95/46/EC. The basic rule in Article 3(1) is that the GDPR applies when processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller (the person responsible for the data processing) or a processor (the person processing the data on behalf of the controller) in the EU. This is regardless of whether the processing takes place in the EU or not. According to Article 3(2), the GDPR also applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the EU, where the processing activities are related to (a) the offering of goods or services to such data subjects in the EU, or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the EU.189 If the GDPR is applicable on the basis of Article 3(2) the controller outside the EU must in principle appoint a representative in the EU.190 It follows from Article 3 GDPR that the territorial scope of the GDPR is particularly wide. Companies with no establishment in the EU can still be bound directly by the GDPR if they offer goods or services to data subjects in the EU. In that respect, the mere accessibility of the company’s website in the EU, of an email address or of other contact details, or the use of a language generally used in the third country where the controller is established, is insufficient to ascertain the intention of offering goods and services to persons in the EU. Factors such as the use of a language or a currency generally used in one or more EU Member States with the possibility of ordering goods and services in that other language, or the mentioning of customers or users who are in the EU, may make it apparent that the controller envisages offering goods or services to data subjects in the EU.191 The European Data Protection Board (EDPB), which brings together the supervisory authorities of the EU Member States and the EDPS, issued guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR.192 In the Google Spain SL case the Court of Justice considered the data processing activities of Google Inc in the US to take place within the context of the activities of the establishment of Google in Spain, despite the fact that the Spanish establishment was only responsible for the advertisement activities of Google and did not process the personal data at issue.193 The case concerned a Spanish individual who asked Google Spain to delete a reference to him on a website of a Spanish newspaper which appeared when searching on his name, thereby invoking his so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ (see also section D.III(e)). The Court justified its wide

189 See Art 3(2) of the GDPR. According to Art 3(3), the GDPR also applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the EU if the controller is established in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law. See on the territorial scope of the GDPR M Gömann, ‘The new territorial scope of EU data protection law: deconstructing a ‘revolutionary achievement’’, [2017] Common Market Law Review 567–90. 190 See Art 27 of the GDPR. 191 See Recital 23 of the GDPR. 192 See guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3), to be found at www.edpb.europa.eu. 193 See Google Spain SL (n 92) [42]–[60].



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i­nterpretation of the provision on territorial scope by the objective of Directive 95/46/EC of ensuring effective and complete protection of the fundamental rights of natural persons.194 08.109 The Google Spain SL case led to three further preliminary rulings, one of which specifically addressed the issue of territorial scope.195 If the right to be forgotten is successfully invoked, should Google give worldwide application to this right, or only within the EU, or even only within the Member State concerned? In Google LLC, the Court considered that, although the Union legislator could have the competence to require dereferencing on all the versions of the search engine, thereby giving it worldwide effect, the GDPR only regulates the issue within the Union.196 It followed that there is no obligation to carry out a worldwide dereferencing.197 Dereferencing should, in principle, be carried out in respect of all the Member States for searches on the basis of the data subject’s name conducted from the territory of the Union.198 According to the Court, the search engine operator must take, if necessary, sufficiently effective measures to ensure the effective protection of the data subject’s fundamental rights, which seems to refer to measures establishing the geographical location of the user of the search engine.199 The GDPR also has a certain extraterritorial ‘effect’ through its rules on transfer of personal 08.110 data to third countries. This will be discussed in section D.III(g). (b)  Material Scope 08.111 Article 2 of the GDPR defines the material scope of the GDPR setting out both what is and what is not covered. What is covered is all processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. What is not covered is processing of personal data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope EU law, processing of personal data by Member States when carrying out activities in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Chapter 2 of Title V TEU), by competent authorities falling under the Law Enforcement Directive, or by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. Personal data processing by EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies also falls outside the scope of the GDPR as they are covered by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. (i)  What Is Covered? 08.112 To understand the positive description of what is covered by the GDPR, a further clarification of several notions used in Article 2 is needed. These are: ‘personal data’, ‘processing’ and ‘filing system’. All three notions are defined in Article 4 of the GDPR. Personal data is ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’.200 08.113 ‘Any information’ is truly any information. In Nowak, the Court considered that the wide concept of the notion of ‘personal data’ meant that ‘any information’ is not restricted to information that is sensitive or private, but ‘potentially encompasses all kinds of information, not only

194 Ibid [53]. 195 See Case C-507/17 Google LLC (n 97). The two other cases are Case C-136/17 G.C. ao [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:773 and Case C-460/20 TU and RE v Google LLC (still pending). 196 Google LLC, ibid [58] and [61]. 197 Ibid [64]–[65]. 198 Ibid [66]–[69]. 199 Ibid [70]. The Court underlined that these measures themselves should meet all the legal requirements. 200 Art 4(1) of the GDPR. See on the notion of ‘personal data’ Opinion 4/2007 of the former Article 29 Working of 20 June 2007, to be found at https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_ en.htm.

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­ bjective but also subjective, in the form of opinions and assessments, provided it‘relates’ to the o data subject’.201 In Satamedia, the Court of Justice made clear that also information which is made publicly available is still covered by the notion of ‘personal data’.202 Whether information relates to a person, depends on whether ‘the information, by reason of its content, purpose or effect is linked to a particular person’.203 In Nowak the written answers given during an exam as well as the comments of the examiner, constituted the personal data of the candidate who took the exam.204 The person concerned must be identifiable, which widens the notion of ‘personal data’ even further. According to the definition of ‘personal data’ in Article 4(1) GDPR, an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person. Even if the identity of the person is not directly know, one can speak about personal data if there are still ways to identify the person. Recital 26 of the GDPR states that to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used either by the controller or by any other person. Account should thereby be taken of all objective factors, such as costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. In Breyer, the Court of Justice considered that dynamic IP addresses could constitute personal data even though the additional information necessary to identify the user of a website were held not by the online media services provider, but by that user’s Internet Service Provider.205 The Court referred to the language in the recital that identification by any other person should be taken into account. However, according to the Court, there should be legal means available to enable the media services provider to get hold of the additional data, implying that if the law prohibits such collection, the IP address would not constitute personal data.206 This element of ‘legal means’ does not occur in the GDPR. Finally, the information should relate to a natural person, which means that data about deceased persons or legal persons are not considered personal data.207 If the official title of a legal person incorporates the name of one or more natural persons, the communication to a public authority of nominative and financial data relating to such a legal person might constitute a limitation of the right to respect for private life guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter.208 The second notion, processing of personal data, concerns all activities done with personal data from the moment of collection to the moment of erasure. According to the definition in Article 4(2) of the GDPR, processing constitutes ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction’. The list is long, but not exhaustive.

201 Case C-434/16 Peter Nowak [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:994 [34]. 202 See Satamedia (n 40) [35]–[37]. 203 Peter Nowak (n 206) [35]. 204 In Joined Cases C-141/12 and C-372/12 Y.S. [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081, the Court of Justice concluded that the legal analysis contained in the file of an asylum seeker did not constitute his personal data. 205 Case C-582/14 Patrick Breyer [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:779 [39]–[44]. 206 Ibid [47]. 207 See Recital 27 of the GDPR. See however section D.II(c) on the personal scope below. 208 See Volker and Markus Schecke (n 63) [53] and Case C-78/18 Commission v Hungary [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:476 [125].



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08.118

Reference is made to processing ‘whether or not by automatic means’. This links to the description of the material scope of the GDPR. Processing by non-automatic means also constitutes processing, but the GDPR only applies if such (purely) manual processing concerns data which is part or intended to be part of a filing system. Such a filing system, the third notion distinguished above, is ‘any structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria’.209 Recital 15 of the GDPR makes clear that manual processing in unstructured files should not be covered by the rules. The GDPR applies when the files are structured according to specific criteria. Excluding the purely manual and unstructured processing of personal data reflects the roots of data protection: the introduction of the computer which made it possible to easily structure and search personal data. 08.119 The manual processing exclusion seems to be more and more outdated. Yet, in Bavarian Lager, which concerned the public disclosure upon request of personal data in official documents, AG Sharpston made creative use of this exception to justify the disclosure of the names of the business representatives in the minutes of the meeting.210 However, the Court did not follow the Advocate-General in this respect. (ii)  What Is Not Covered? 08.120 Activities that fall outside the scope of EU law are not covered by the GDPR. This is a limitation which was already discussed in section A.III. Another exclusion is data processing by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As explained in section A.II such activities should be subject to separate rules, based on Article 39 TEU, still to be adopted. Data processing by EU institutions and bodies is subject to Regulation 2018/1725. 08.121 Also excluded from the scope of the GDPR is the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including safeguards against and the prevention of threats to public security.211 The exclusion corresponds to the material scope of the Law Enforcement Directive.212 A competent authority is any public authority competent for pursuing the objectives just mentioned, or any other body or entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise public authority and public powers for these objectives.213 If a competent authority processes personal data for an objective not covered by the Law Enforcement Directive, the GDPR applies, unless it falls under any of the other exclusions in Article 2(2) GDPR. 08.122 A last exclusion in Article 2(2) GDPR concerns data processed by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. The exception, which already existed in the former Directive 95/46/EC, was used to argue the non-applicability of the EU data protection rules for situations which had no link with the internal market.214 In Lindqvist, the person involved was a volunteer for the Swedish Church who made a website containing practical information for persons preparing for confirmation. This information included a brief description of colleague volunteers and their contact details. In the case before the Court of Justice, it was argued that

209 Art 4(6) of the GDPR. 210 See Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-28/08P Bavarian Lager v Commission (n 122) ECLI:EU:C:2009:624 esp Chapter VII.A. 211 See Art 2(2)(d) of the GDPR. 212 See Art 2(1) of the Law Enforcement Directive. 213 See Art 3(7) of the Law Enforcement Directive. 214 See also section A.III above.

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Ms Lindqvist’s activities were essentially not economic, but charitable and religious.215 The Court, however, repeated its considerations from the Österreichischer Rundfunk ruling, stating that no actual link with free movement between Member States was required.216 Since charitable and religious activities were not mentioned in the exclusion clause of the former Directive 95/46/EC, the Court considered that such activities were not excluded from the scope of the directive.217 Also the household exception did not apply to the activities of Ms Lindqvist. According to the 08.123 Court the exception relates only to activities which are carried out in the course of the private or family life of individuals, which was clearly not the case with the processing of personal data consisting in the publication on the internet which made those data accessible to an indefinite number of people.218 Also in Ryneš, the Court qualified the matter as falling within the scope of the former Directive 95/46/EC.219 The case concerned an individual who had placed a surveillance camera on his house covering the entrance of the house, but also part of the street which belongs to the public space. The Court considered that the exclusion for purely personal and household activities should be interpreted narrowly.220 Since the video surveillance covered a public space and was accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data, it could not be regarded as a purely personal or household activity.221 In Jehovan todistajat, discussed in section B.II, the Court seemed to develop a standard test 08.124 from Lindqvist and Ryneš, considering that an activity cannot be regarded as being purely personal or household where its purpose is to make the data collected accessible to an unrestricted number of people or where the activity extends, even partially, to a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data.222 The doorto-door preaching and note taking of the Jehovah’s Witnesses fulfilled both elements of the test and therefore fell within the scope of the former Directive 95/46/EC.223 The household exception plays a role when defining the different data protection responsibili- 08.125 ties of actors involved in online social networks, such as Facebook and LinkedIn. In an opinion on this issue, the EU data protection supervisors gathered in the former Article 29 Working Party (now: the EDPB) concluded that users of such social networks were in the first place data subject, but in the second place also processing personal data of others. In principle, the authorities considered such processing activities by users as falling within the scope of the household exemption.224 However, under certain circumstances the activities of a user could extend beyond a purely personal or household activity, for instance if the social network is used as a collaboration platform for an association or a company.225 The Article 29 Working Party stated that a high number of contacts could be an indication that the household exception does not apply.226 The question of course is where to draw the line. It should be noted however that the provider of a social network service cannot invoke the exemption.227

215 Lindqvist (n 88) [38]. 216 Ibid [40]–[42]. See section A.III above. 217 Ibid [44]–[45]. See also section B.II above. 218 Ibid [47]. 219 Case C-212/13 František Ryneš [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428. 220 Ibid [28]–[29]. 221 Ibid [33]. 222 Jehovan todistajat (n 80) [42]. 223 Ibid [44]–[45]. 224 See Opinion 5/2009 of the former Article 29 Working Party of 12 June 2009, to be found at https://ec.europa.eu/ justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm, p 5. See on the EDPB section D.III(h) below. 225 Ibid p 6. 226 Ibid. 227 See also Recital 18 of the GDPR.



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08.126

When drawing up the proposal for the GDPR, the Commission tried to change the household exception in light of developments such as online social networks, but it finally kept the current language of the exclusion.228 (c)  Personal Scope

08.127 Every data subject, ie every identified or identifiable natural person to whom information relates, can invoke her or his rights under the GDPR. Legal persons cannot be considered data subjects, and cannot invoke any rights under the GDPR. Under the ePrivacy Directive this is different. The ePrivacy Directive complements the GDPR for the telecommunications sector. Moreover, it provides for the protection of the legitimate interests of subscribers that are legal persons.229 For instance, the spamming of legal persons should also be based on their prior consent.230 In that respect, the ePrivacy Directive goes beyond the personal scope of the GDPR. In Recital 12 it is underlined that the ePrivacy Directive does not oblige the Member States to also extend the application of GDPR to the protection of the legitimate interests of legal persons.231 08.128 Another key actor when talking about data protection is the controller. This is any natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body responsible for compliance with the data protection rules.232 The controller is the person who, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and the means of the processing of personal data. If two or more controllers are jointly responsible they are considered joint controllers. Their respective responsibilities for compliance with the obligations under the GDPR must be laid down in an arrangement between them.233 08.129 The controller should be distinguished from the processor, who is the natural or legal person who processes personal data on behalf of the controller.234 In such a situation, the controller remains responsible for ensuring that the processing of the personal data is in compliance with the GDPR. The processor also has certain own obligations and responsibilities under the GDPR, for instance to ensure the security of the processing.235 The relationship between the controller and the processor must be governed by a contract or other binding instrument.236 08.130 It is important, especially for the data subject, to be clear who is the controller, as the proper addressee in the event that data protection rights are not complied with. In practice, however, it is often difficult to determine who the controller is. Complicated legal business constellations, the outsourcing of processing activities and technological separation of different parts of a processing operation, may lead to a jungle within which it is hard to define who the controller is.237 08.131 Questions on controllership reached the Court of Justice in a number of cases. In Google Spain SL the Court considered that the operator of a search engine can be regarded as controller since the processing of the personal data by the search engine can be distinguished from and is additional to the processing carried out by the publisher of the websites.238 It is the search engine 228 See Art 2(2)(d) of the proposed Regulation, COM(2012) 9. In the leaked draft version of the proposal (to be found at www.statewatch.org/eu-dp.htm), reference was made to an indefinite group of persons, see Art 2(5)(d). 229 See Art 1(2) of the ePrivacy Directive. 230 See Art 13(1) of the ePrivacy Directive. 231 It should be noted that Convention 108 indicates the possibility for parties to apply the Convention also to legal persons, see Art 3(2)(b) of Convention 108. 232 See Art 4(7) of the GDPR. 233 See Art 26 of the GDPR. 234 See Art 4(8) of the GDPR. 235 See Art 32 of the GDPR. 236 See Art 28 of the GDPR. 237 See Guidelines 07/2020 of the EDPB on the concepts of ‘controller’ and ‘processor’ in the GDPR, to be found at www.edpb.europa.eu. 238 Google Spain SL (n 92) [33]–[35].

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operator who determines the purpose and means of that additional processing. However, the Court added that the search engine operator must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities that the activity meets the requirements of the data protection rules.239 In Wirtschaftsakademie the Court decided that the person creating a fan page on Facebook was 08.132 jointly responsible with Facebook, even though the administrator of the fan page itself did not have access to data and only had limited influence on the data processing by Facebook.240 The Court considered that for joint responsibility it was not required for each of the controllers to have access to the data concerned. According to the Court the responsibility of the administrator of the fan page appeared even greater as the mere consultation of the fan page by visitors automatically started the processing of their data by Facebook.241 The Court underlined that the existence of joint responsibility did not necessarily imply equal responsibility of the various operators involved in the processing. Since the operators might be involved at different stages of the processing and to a different degree, the level of responsibility of each of them should be assessed with regard to all the relevant circumstances of a particular case.242 The Court developed its case law further in FashionID, which dealt with the level of respon- 08.133 sibility of the administrator of a website outside the Facebook context who adds the Facebook like button to his website.243 The like button allowed Facebook to obtain personal data from visitors to the website regardless of whether or not the visitor had a Facebook account or clicked on the like button.244 The Court looked at the stage at which the administrator was involved and concluded that the administrator and Facebook determined jointly the purposes and means of the collection and disclosure by transmission of the personal data of visitors to the website.245 However, the administrator could not be considered controller for processing operations that preceded or were subsequent in the overall chain of processing.246 In Jehovan todistajat, the Court concluded that the Jehovah’s Witnesses community was controller even though it did not give written guidelines or instructions in relation to the data processing by its witnesses.247 According to the Court, the preaching activity was still organised, coordinated and encouraged by that community.248

III.  Specific Provisions (a)  General Principles Article 5 of the GDPR contains the general principles relating to processing of personal data. 08.134 Several of these principles can be seen as an expression of the general principle of proportionality. The principles are the following: a) b)





principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency; principle of purpose limitation;

239 Ibid

[38]. See also G.C. ao (n 199) [37]. C-210/16 Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:388. 241 Ibid [36]–[42]. 242 Ibid [43]. This consideration was repeated in Jehovan todistajat (n 80) [66]. 243 See Case C-40/17 FashionID [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:629. 244 Ibid [75]. 245 Ibid [79] and [81]. 246 Ibid [74]. 247 See Jehovan todistajat (n 80) [75]. 248 Ibid [70]. 240 Case

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c) d) e) f) g)

principle of data minimisation; principle of accuracy; principle of storage limitation; principle of integrity and confidentiality; principle of accountability.

08.135 The first principle combines several basic legal principles. The requirement that data is processed lawfully is further elaborated in Article 6 GDPR which will be discussed in section D.III(b) below. That processing of personal data should be fair can also be found in Article 8 of the Charter. Under the former Directive 95/46/EC the notion also occurred and was used by the Court of Justice as a fall back requirement in the absence of certain specific rules, in particular as regards transparency.249 In the GDPR transparency has been added as a separate element of the first principle and was elaborated in several provisions of the GDPR which will be further discussed in section D.III(d). In Orange Romania, the Court of Justice referred to the notion of fair processing to consider that a contract should not mislead the data subject as to the possibility of concluding that contract without providing consent to the processing of certain personal data which was not necessary for the performance of the contract.250 08.136 The principle of purpose limitation can also be linked to the text of Article 8 of the Charter which requires that data must be processed for specified purposes. However, the GDPR goes a bit further and expresses more explicitly that the processing by controller should be limited to the specified purpose: the data should not be further processed in a way that is incompatible with those purposes. This principle constitutes one of the cornerstones of data protection. The purpose limitation principle is not absolute. The GDPR creates some room to manoeuvre, by stating that further processing of the data is allowed if it is compatible with the initial purpose. In addition, according to Article 6(4) of the GDPR, deviation from the purpose is possible if provided for by law for one of the objectives indicated in Article 23(1) of the GDPR, which is the clause allowing for restrictions of the scope of certain rights and obligations in the GDPR.251 08.137 The issue of ‘compatible use’ is controversial. The former Directive 95/46/EC did not provide substantive guidance on how to define the compatibility of further processing, which had led to diverging practices in the Member States. The GDPR sheds some further light on the matter. In Article 5(1)(b), in which the principle is laid down, a couple of examples of compatible further processing are already given: further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes is not considered to be incompatible with the initial purpose.252 General additional clarification can be found in Article 6(4) of the GDPR. If the further processing is not based on the consent of the data subject or on an EU or Member State law which pursues one the objectives in Article 23(1) of the GDPR, the controller must ascertain whether the processing for another purpose is compatible with the initial purpose, taking into account, inter alia: —— any link between the initial purpose and the purpose for the intended further processing; —— the context in which the personal data were collected —— the nature of the personal data;

249 See

Case C-201/14 Smaranda Bara ao [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:638 [34]. Case C-61/19 Orange Romania [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:901 [48]–[49]. 251 See on Art 23 of the GDPR further section D.IV(b) below. 252 Some of these examples also occurred in Art 6(1)(b) of Directive 95/46/EC. 250 See

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—— the possible consequences of the intended further processing for the data subject; —— the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or pseudonymisation. The principle of data minimisation requires that personal data are adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.253 The principle of accuracy requires the data to be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. Every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay.254 The principle of storage limitation requires the deletion or anonymisation of personal data once identification is no longer necessary for the purposes for which the data are processed. What constitutes a necessary and reasonable retention period can only be established with a view to the circumstances of a specific case. For the telecommunications sector specific rules on retention of telecommunications data are laid down in the ePrivacy Directive. Traffic data, which is data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a communication on an electronic communications network or for the billing thereof, must be deleted or anonymised when the data is no longer necessary for the purpose of the transmission of a communication.255 Data kept for billing purposes is permissible only up to the end of the period during which the bill may lawfully be challenged or payment pursued.256 Location data may be kept longer for marketing purposes, but only with the consent of the subscriber, which can be withdrawn at any time.257 The obligation to delete or anonymise can be derogated from in national legislation under the restrictions laid down in Article 15 of the ePrivacy Directive, which is the equivalent of Article 23 of the GDPR. Article 15 was at the basis of EU and national measures on data retention, which has led to several important rulings of the Court of Justice, which will be discussed further in section D.IV below. The principle of integrity and confidentiality requires that data are processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures.258 The principle is further elaborated in Articles 32 to 34 GDPR on security of processing. The principle of accountability, which is placed in a separate paragraph 2 of Article 5 GDPR, refers to the responsibility of the controller. The controller is responsible for, and must be able to demonstrate compliance with the six previous principles. This principle is further elaborated in Chapter IV of the GDPR and will be discussed in section D.III(f) below.

08.138

08.139

08.140

08.141

08.142

(b)  Lawfulness of Processing Article 8 of the Charter indicates that data must be processed on the basis of the consent of 08.143 the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. As stated, by providing legitimate grounds for data processing other than the consent of the data subject, Article 8 goes beyond what has been described as informational self-determination.259 Article 6 of the





253 See

Art 5(1)(c) of the GDPR. Art 5(1)(d) of the GDPR. 2(b) and 6(1) of the ePrivacy Directive. 256 Art 6(2) of the ePrivacy Directive. 257 Art 6(3) of the ePrivacy Directive. 258 Art 5(1)(f) of the GDPR. 259 See section B.I above. 254 See

255 Arts

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GDPR contains a further elaboration of the legitimate grounds and is a further expression of the lawfulness of processing which is part of the first general principle in Article 5 of the GDPR. The list of grounds in Article 6 is exhaustive and restrictive.260 The grounds are: a) b) c) d) e) f)

the consent of the data subject; the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; compliance with a legal obligation; the protection of the vital interest of the data subject; the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or the third party to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.

08.144 Four types of grounds can be distinguished. First, grounds which are based on the will of the data subject (sub a and b); second, grounds which have a basis in EU or Member State law (sub c and e); third, a ground which can be applied directly (sub d) and, fourth, a ground that relies on a balancing exercise performed by the data controller (sub f). 08.145 The grounds mentioned in Article 6(1)(b)–(f) all require that the data processing must be necessary. As with the principles discussed in section D.III(a), the requirement of necessity derives from the general principle of proportionality. The necessity of the data processing is not required when it is based on the consent of the data subject. However, as with all other grounds, data processing on the basis of the consent of the data subject should still comply with the general principles. The notion of necessity will be discussed further in section D.IV below. 08.146 At present, Convention 108 does not contain a similar list of legitimate grounds for processing. Even the consent of the data subject is not mentioned as ground for legitimate processing.261 In the amending Protocol it is stated that data processing can be carried out on the basis of the free, specific, informed and unambiguous consent of the data subject or of some other legitimate basis laid down by law.262 08.147 The description below will be restricted to the grounds contained in Article 6(1)(a), (c), (e) and (f) GDPR.263 (i) Consent 08.148 Consent is defined in the GDPR as ‘any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her’.264

260 See Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10 ASNEF and FECEMD [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:777 [30]. For private entities covered by the ePrivacy Directive, the grounds for data processing are more limited. See Art 6 of the ePrivacy Directive which can be considered lex specialis on this point. 261 As already mentioned in section B.I, the notion of consent only appears in Art 15(3) of Convention 108 in relation to the provision of assistance to data subjects resident abroad. 262 See Art 5(2) of the consolidated version of Convention 108. Information on the modernisation of Convention 108 can be found on the website referred to in n 171 above. 263 For a more elaborate discussion of all the grounds, see L Bygrave, C Docksey and C Kuner (eds), Commentary on the EU General Data Protection Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2019) and E Ehmand and M Selmayr (eds), DatenschutzGrundverordnung. Kommentar. (München, CH Beck, 2018). 264 See Art 4(11) of the GDPR. The EDPB published guidelines on the notion of ‘consent’, see Guidelines 05/2020 to be found at www.edpb.europa.eu.

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Compared to the former Directive 95/46/EC the conditions for consent to be valid have been clarified and strengthened. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity do not constitute consent.265 The Court of Justice in Planet49 confirmed that consent given in the form of a preselected tick in a checkbox does not imply active behaviour on the part of a website user.266 The controller must be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to the processing of her or his data.267 If consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent must be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters.268 The data subject has the right to withdraw consent at any time. This will not affect the lawfulness of the processing based on consent before the withdrawal.269 For the continuation of the processing, another legitimate ground should be found, otherwise the data processing has to be terminated and the data deleted. The right to withdrawal of consent was taken over from the ePrivacy Directive in which consent has the same meaning as in the GDPR.270 Consent must be ‘informed’, which implies that the controller must provide the data subject 08.149 with information relating to all the circumstances surrounding the data processing, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, allowing the data subject to be aware of, inter alia, the type of data to be processed, the identity of the controller, the period and procedures for that processing and the purposes of the processing.271 This information must enable the data subject to be able to determine easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give.272 Consent is not ‘freely’ given if there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the con- 08.150 troller, in particular where the controller is a public authority.273 When assessing whether consent is freely given, account must be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract.274 The terms of the contract should not mislead the data subject in that respect.275 In the light of the requirement that consent should be freely given, the question, when access to a website is made dependent on the acceptance of cookies, is whether the acceptance constitutes freely given consent, in particular if the cookies are not necessary for having access to the website, eg if it concerns third party tracking cookies. This question was raised during the proceedings in the Planet49, but was in the end not answered by the Court of Justice.276 In the case of sensitive data (see below), only the explicit consent of the data subject can 08.151 legitimise the processing of such data.277 Since the conditions for consent have generally been strengthened the added value of the adjective ‘explicit’ might be limited.





265 See

Recital 32 of the GDPR. Case C-673/17 Planet49 [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:801 [52]. See also Orange Romania (n 256) [37]. 267 See Art 7(1) of the GDPR. 268 See Art 7(2) of the GDPR. See on this provision Orange Romania (n 256) [39]. 269 See Art 7(3) of the GDPR. 270 See Art 2(f) of the ePrivacy Directive. 271 See Orange Romania (n 256) [40]. 272 Ibid. 273 See Recital 43 of the GDPR. 274 See Art 7(4) of the GDPR. 275 See Orange Romania (n 256) [41]. 276 See Planet49 (n 272) [64].According to Art 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive use of cookies should be based on consent. 277 See Art 9 of the GDPR. 266 See

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(ii) Compliance with a Legal Obligation and the Performance of a Task Carried Out in the Public Interest 08.152 The grounds contained in Article 6(1)(c) and (e) are the main grounds for processing of personal data by public authorities.278 Processing on these grounds requires a further law (either EU or Member State law).279 Article 6(2) and (3) GDPR allows this law ‘to adapt the application of the rules of ’ the GDPR. For a regulation, this is a remarkable provision as it deviates from the general nature of a regulation taking precedence over Member States’ law. 08.153 Article 6(3) GDPR requires the law to meet an objective of public interest and to be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. From Article 6(4), which was discussed in the context of what constitutes a compatible purpose, it can be derived that a law which requires or allows the processing for a purpose other than for which the data were initially collected can only serve one of the public interests listed in Article 23(1) GDPR. Moreover, it is stated in Article 6(4) that such law should constitute a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society in order to safeguard that objective. See further on this section D.IV(b). (iii)  Legitimate Interests of the Controller 08.154 Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR contains a ground for processing for the legitimate interests of the controller or of a third party. This ground has turned out to be an important residual category in practice, especially for the private sector. Although the impact on the rights to privacy and data protection of the data subject should already be taken into account when assessing the necessity of the processing, the Union legislator decided to explicitly underline this element in Article 6(1)(f). In Rigas Satiksme the Court of Justice distinguished three cumulative conditions in Article 6(1)(f): first, the pursuit of a legitimate interest, second, the need to process the personal data for the purpose of the legitimate interest pursued, and, third, the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person concerned should not take precedence.280 The balancing exercise the provision entails depends on the individual circumstances of the particular case in the context of which the controller must take account of the significance of the data subject’s rights arising from Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.281 08.155 The legitimate interest attached to accessing data was pleaded in the Rigas Satiksme ruling considered above, concerning an insurance company which turned to the police to get hold of the identity of the passenger of a taxi who had caused an accident. The insurance company had argued that it had a legitimate interest in having access to the data, namely to instigate legal proceedings, and that therefore the police could disclose the data on the basis of the predecessor of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, namely Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC. The Court considered that Article 7(f) did not, in itself, set out an obligation to disclose data in the interest of a third party, but expressed the possibility of processing data such as the communication to a third party of data necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the third party.282 According to the Court Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC did not preclude such communication in the event that it is made on the basis of national law.283 278 These grounds were at stake eg in Rundfunk (n 37) [66], Case 342/12 Worten [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:355 [34] and Puškar (n 135) [106]. 279 See Art 6(2) and (3) GDPR. 280 See Rigas Satiksme (n 132) [28]. See for an application of the three conditions also Case C-708/18 TK [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:1064 [40]–[60]. 281 See ASNEF and FECEMD (n 266) [39]–[40]. 282 Ibid [26]. 283 Ibid [27].

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With this last statement the Court addressed an issue which had led to diverging interpreta- 08.156 tions under the former Directive 95/46/EC, namely whether public authorities should be able to invoke the ground of Article 7(f) at all. The legitimate ground for their processing activities is in principle covered by the ground for compliance with a legal obligation or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. The reason for rejecting Article 7(f) as a legitimate ground for the public sector could be found in the unequal relationship between the controller (the public authority) and the data subject. Still, the provision has been used in some Member States, for instance, to justify the disclosure of certain personal data documents held by public authorities which had to comply with the fundamental right of public access to documents.284 By requiring a law to be in place as a precondition for the granting of access of personal data in Rigas Satiksme, the Court seemed to interpret the rules in a manner consistent with the approach taken in the GDPR. In Article 6(1) it is explicitly stated that the legitimate interest ground does not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks. (c)  Sensitive Data Data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or 08.157 trade-union membership, genetic data, biometric data (if used for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person), data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation are considered to be of a particular sensitive nature requiring stricter protection. This is not reflected in Article 8 of the Charter, but can be found in Convention 108 and the EU secondary legislation on data protection which contains specific rules for the processing of so-called special categories of data.285 In Recital 51 of the GDPR these data are referred to as data the processing of which could create significant risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms. The ECtHR has confirmed the special nature of medical data in the context of the right to privacy of Article 8 ECHR: ‘[t]he protection of personal data, in particular medical data, is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life’.286 Also personal data revealing political opinion fell among the special categories of sensitive data attracting a heightened level of protection, according to the ECtHR.287 The processing of sensitive data is in principle prohibited.288 However, there is a list of grounds 08.158 on which processing still can take place. This list, contained in Article 9(2) of the GDPR, is more restrictive than the one in Article 6. For instance, the prohibition is lifted if a data subject explicitly consents to the processing. As already discussed, the added value of the adjective is debatable (see section D.III(b)). The ground of Article 6(1)(f) does not reappear in Article 9. This raised a particular issue in relation to the activities of Google. It followed from the Google Spain SL ruling that the data processed by Google in the operation of its search engine was based on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR.289 The question arose whether the prohibition of, now, Article 9 GDPR applied when Google was processing sensitive data. Obviously, when operating the search engine Google did not distinguish between sensitive and regular data. The question was answered in G.C. ao. The Court concluded that Article 9 GDPR indeed applies to the processing of sensitive data by an

284 See Opinion 5/2001 of the former Article 29 Working Party of 17 May 2001, to be found at https://ec.europa.eu/ justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm. 285 See Art 6 of Convention 108, Art 9 of the GDPR and Art 10 of the Law Enforcement Directive. 286 I v Finland (n 167) [38]. 287 Catt v United Kingdom (n 162) [112]. 288 See Art 9(1) of the GDPR. 289 See Google Spain SL (n 92) [73].



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operator of a search engine. However, with a view to the responsibilities, powers and capabilities of the operator of a search engine, the prohibition and restrictions, as well as the exceptions to these, apply on the occasion of a verification performed by that operator following a request by the data subject.290 When confronted with a request for dereferencing, the operator must still balance the interest of the person concerned and the interests of the users of the search engine.291 08.159 Several grounds for processing of sensitive data in Article 9(2) require a basis in Union or Member State law.292 For a regulation, such heavy reliance on Member State legislation is quite peculiar. In particular Article 9(2)(g) gives Member States quite some leeway to adopt laws as it allows the processing of sensitive data if such processing is necessary for ‘reasons of substantial public interest’. This general clause contains wording taken from Article 52(1) of the Charter, since it requires the law to be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject. 08.160 Somewhere in between regular and sensitive data are personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures. Such processing can be based on the grounds in Article 6(1) but, according to Article 10 GDPR, must be carried out only under the control of official authority or when the processing is authorised by Union or Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Any comprehensive register of criminal convictions must be kept only under the control of official authority. (d) Transparency 08.161 Clarity about what is going to happen, is happening, or has happened with personal data is crucial for the person concerned. Without such clarity the data subject’s right to, for instance, object or have the data rectified (see below) would become superfluous. Being well informed was discussed earlier, in the context of the consent of the data subject as a legal ground for processing. 08.162 The right of access to one’s own personal data is contained in Article 8 of the Charter. However, the Court has also recognised a right to be actively informed under Article 8. In Tele2 Sverige, which concerned the issue of data retention, the Court required that the competent national authority who has access to the data retained by the telecom operator should notify the person affected, under the applicable national procedures, as soon as that notification was no longer liable to jeopardise the investigations being undertaken by those authorities.293 In the PNR Opinion, the Court recalled this consideration and explained that notification is necessary to ensure that the person concerned can be certain that her or his personal data are processed in a correct and lawful manner and is able to exercise her or his right of access and, if appropriate, rectification of that data, and, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, to an effective remedy before a tribunal.294 08.163 In the GDPR, transparency is included in the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency and was materialised and elaborated in Articles 12 to 15 of the GDPR. The provisions put an obligation on the controller to properly inform the data subject before engaging in the processing of her or his personal data.295 This obligation is the proactive counterpart of the reactive



290 See

G.C. ao (n 199) [47]–[48]. [66]. 292 See Art 9(2)(b),(g), (h), (i), (j) of the GDPR. 293 Tele2 Sverige (n 29) [121]. 294 Opinion A-1/15 (n 14) [219]–[220]. 295 See Arts 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46/EC. 291 Ibid

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right of access to personal data of the data subject (see below). In Rijkeboer, the Court of Justice made clear that the active provision of information by the controller at the moment of collection did not reduce the obligation placed on the controller to give a data subject access to the information when he or she invokes her or his right of access.296 Articles 13 and 14 contain a list of information to be provided to the data subject when collecting data from her or him directly (Article 13) or via someone else (Article 14). The list includes the identity and contact details of the controller, the contact details of the data protection officer (if any), the purpose of the processing, the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data and any transfer to a third country the controller intends to undertake. The right of access to one’s own personal data has long been recognised by the ECtHR as an element of the right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR.297 The right of access can be invoked by the data subject at any time. Under the GDPR, the data subject can acquire ‘a copy’ of the personal data undergoing processing.298 The precise meaning of this notion is yet to be clarified. Under the former Directive 95/46/EC, the data subject could require the communication ‘in an intelligible form’ of the data undergoing processing.299 The right of access was invoked in Y.S. in order to get access to the complete file of the applicant, who was an asylum seeker.300 The file was held by the Dutch immigration authorities and contained factual information about the situation of the asylum seeker and a legal analysis following which his request for a residence permit was rejected. The Court of Justice considered the legal analysis to fall outside the scope of the notion of ‘personal data’, inter alia, because qualifying such information as personal data would enable the asylum seeker to request access to that part of the file on the basis of the data protection rules.301 According to the Court, extending the right of access to the legal analysis would not in fact serve the purpose of the data protection rules, but rather the purpose of rules on access to administrative documents.302 In Nowak, which concerned a request for access to the answers and comments on the answers in an exam, the Court did not place the requested data outside the scope of the notion of ‘personal data’, but pointed at the fact that the right of access could be restricted, inter alia, for ‘other important objectives of general public interest in the Union or of a Member State’.303 In Rijkeboer, the question was asked whether an individual’s right of access concerning the recipients of the data and the content of the data communicated could be limited in time for a period of one year. In the Netherlands, information about who received information from local authority personal records was deleted after one year. Local authority personal records contained basic registration data (such as personal identity number, civil status, nationality etc.) about inhabitants. The Court distinguished between the personal data as such (the ‘basis data’) and a second category of data which relates to what has happened with the basic data, for instance, to whom the data has been sent. The Court considered that, although the former Directive 95/46/EC was not explicit on this, the right to access to information necessarily related to the past.304 The Court considered that the length of time the basic data were stored could constitute a useful parameter





296 Rijkeboer

(n 62) [69]. Leander v Sweden (n 165) and Gaskin v United Kingdom (n 165). 298 Art 15(3) of the GDPR. 299 Art 12(a) of Directive 95/46/EC. 300 See Y.S. (n 209). See on the notion of ‘personal data’ further section D.II(b) above. 301 Ibid [46]. 302 Ibid [46]–[47]. 303 See Peter Nowak (n 206) [61]. 304 See Rijkeboer (n 62) [54]. 297 See

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for determining the storage period for the second category of data.305 However, in Rijkeboer, the basic data were stored for a very long time. The Court considered that the data subject’s interest in having access to the information could diminish in time in certain cases, and that the storage of such data for a long time could constitute an excessive burden on the controller.306 A time-limit had to be fixed for the storage of the second category of data which constituted a fair balance between the interest of the data subject and the burden for the controller.307 In the Rijkeboer case, the Court considered one year too short a storage period, which did not constitute a fair balance.308 08.169 The duty to inform the data subject and the right of access to one’s own personal data can be limited under the conditions of Article 23 of the GDPR.309 In particular in the national security or law enforcement sector these elaborations of the transparency principle are under pressure. It goes without saying that prior information to the data subject can undermine an investigation. From the Tele2 Sverige ruling it can be derived that notifying the person concerned can indeed be omitted as long as it is liable to jeopardise the investigations being undertaken by the competent authorities.310 In its case law, the ECtHR has made clear that lack of ‘live’ transparency should be compensated by clear and detailed rules to which the performance of secret investigations are subject.311 There should furthermore be additional guarantees in place. For instance, in Leander v Sweden, the ECtHR accepted a restriction of the right of access under Article 8(2), inter alia, because there was independent control.312 08.170 The Law Enforcement Directive gives Member States the possibility to restrict by law the right of access if it constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in order to avoid obstructing official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures, to avoid prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, to protect public security, national security, or the rights and freedoms of others.313 In case of a restriction of the right of access, the Law Enforcement Directive provides for the possibility of the exercise of the right through the competent supervisory authority.314 The supervisory authority will inform the data subject at least that all necessary verifications or a review by the supervisory authority have taken place. (e)  Rights of the Data Subject 08.171 Transparency of processing, including the right of access, is necessary to enable the data subject to exercise other rights enshrined in GDPR or to instigate judicial remedies.315 In Article 8 of the Charter, only one of these other rights is mentioned, namely the right to have data rectified. The GDPR adds to this the right to have the data erased (the ‘right to be forgotten’), the right to restriction of processing, the right to data portability, the right to object and the right not to be subject to automated decision making.316 305 Ibid [58]. 306 Ibid [59]. 307 Ibid [64]. 308 Ibid [66]. 309 See on Art 23 of the GDPR further section D.IV(b) below. 310 Tele2 Sverige (n 29) [121]. 311 See section C.I above and Weber and Saravia v Germany (n 47). 312 See Leander v Sweden (n 165). 313 Art 15(1) of the Law Enforcement Directive. 314 Art 17 of the Law Enforcement Directive. 315 See Rijkeboer (n 62) [51]–[52]. The judicial remedies will be discussed in section D.V below. 316 See respectively Arts 17, 18, 20, 21 and 22 of the GDPR. The conditions for possible restrictions of these rights are laid down in Art 23 of the GDPR, which will be discussed in section D.IV below.

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The expansion of the right to erasure to also include a right to be forgotten and the right to data portability were presented as new rights in the GDPR. Still, after the Google Spain SL ruling of the Court of Justice, which was based on the existing right to erasure, the Court already came far in recognising a right to be forgotten. The Court considered that when Google was confronted with a request by a natural person for removal of a link in the search results on that person’s name, in a balancing of the different interests as stake the interest of the data subject should, as a rule, override.317 However, certain circumstances could tip the balance in favour of the other interests which would merit not delisting the search results. According to the Court this depended on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest of the public in having that information, an interest which could vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.318 In Article 17 of the GDPR the right to be forgotten is more clearly regulated. The reasons for requesting the erasure are listed as well as the exceptions on which the controller may rely. In case the controller has made the personal data public, he is obliged to take reasonable steps, including technical means, to inform controller which are processing the data that the data subject has requested the erasure.319 The second ‘new’ right in the GDPR was the right to data portability. Basically, the data subject must be able to carry over her or his data from one controller to the other (for instance switching between two social networks). Subject to certain further conditions to be met, the controller must provide the data in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format.320 The right to restriction of processing allows the data subject to require the controller to restrict the processing of data in case the accuracy is contested, the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the deletion, the controller no longer needs the data but the data subject still needs the data for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or if the data subject has invoked her or his right to object and the controller is verifying whether its own legitimate grounds overrides those of the data subject.321 The controller can no longer process the data (except storing it) unless it is based on the data subject’s consent, for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another person or for reasons of important public interest.322 The right to object gives the data subject the opportunity, on grounds relating to her or his particular situation, at any time, to object to processing of her or his personal data if this processing is based on ground 6(1)(e) (performance of a task carried out in the public interest) or ground 6(1)(f) (legitimate interest of the controller or a third party). The controller must stop the processing unless they can demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.323 Compared to the former Directive 95/46/EC, the burden of proof switched from data subject to controller.324 In case of an objection against direct marketing, the controller simply has to comply with the right invoked by the data subject.325 317 See Google Spain SL (n 92) [81]. 318 Ibid. These criteria resemble the case law of the ECtHR when reconciling the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, see section B.III above. 319 Art 17(2) of the GDPR. 320 See Art 20(1) of the GDPR. The EDPB published guidelines on the right to data portability, see WP242 rev.01 to be found at www.edpb.europa.eu. 321 See Art 18(1) of the GDPR. 322 See Art 18(2) of the GDPR. 323 See Art 21(1) of the GDPR. 324 See Art 14 of Directive 95/46/EC. 325 See Art 21(2) and (3) of the GDPR.



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08.177

The GDPR also contains the right not to be subject to automated individual decision-making.326 Decisions which produce legal effects concerning the data subject or similarly significantly affect her or him may not be based solely on automated processing, including profiling. Profiling is defined as any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.327 In its case law, the Court has shown particular concern in situations in which profiling of individuals may occur. As regards the retention of telecommunications metadata, the Court considered that the retained data provided the means of establishing a profile of the individuals concerned which is no less sensitive, having regard to the right to privacy, than the actual content of communications.328 Automated decision-making, including profiling, is still possible if the data subject consents to it or if it is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller. The data controller must implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, including at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision. Automated decision-making, including profiling is also possible when it is authorised by EU or Member State law to which the controller is subject and the law lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.329 (f)  Responsibility of the Controller

08.178 In the GDPR, an attempt was made to put more emphasis on the own responsibility of the controller. Instead of being prescriptive in detail on what the controller should do, the GDPR leaves more room to the controller by putting emphasis on the result and the ability to demonstrate compliance rather than on the means to get to the result. The principle of accountability (see section D.III(a)) requires the controller to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure and be able to demonstrate compliance with the regulation. In doing so, the controller must take into account the nature, scope, context and purpose of the processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights of the data subject.330 08.179 Despite the intended approach, the GDPR still contains several provisions which set out in detail what the controller should do in order to be compliant with the GDPR. This concerns not only the transparency requirements discussed above, but also obligations to keep records of processing operations.331 It is also spelled out when and how a data protection impact assessment should be performed, following which the controller is obliged to consult the supervisory authority before starting the data processing activity if it turns out that the processing would result in a high risk to the rights of the data subject.332 Other obligations include security of processing and the establishment of a data protection officer (DPO).333 The provisions on security

326 See Art 22 of the GDPR. 327 See Art 4(4) of the GDPR. 328 See La Quadrature du Net (n 32) [117]. 329 See Art 22(2) of the GDPR. The EDPB published guidelines on automated individual decision-making and profiling, see WP251 rev.01 to be found at www.edpb.europa.eu. 330 See Art 24(1) of the GDPR. 331 See respectively Arts 30 and 35 of the GDPR. 332 See Arts 35 and 36 of the GDPR. 333 See respectively Arts 30–34 and 37 of the GDPR. Not all controllers need to designate a DPO. According to Art 37(1) in any case: public authorities (except for courts acting in their judicial capacity), controllers (or processors) whose core activity is data processing which requires regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale and

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of processing include the obligation to notify a security breach to the supervisory authority and, in case of high risks, to the data subjects concerned as well. This obligation, which should also lead to increased awareness, was taken from the ePrivacy Directive which introduced the obligation for the telecommunications sector already in 2009.334 In the context of the obligations of the controller, the GDPR also lays down the principles 08.180 of privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default.335 Privacy-by-design implies that the controller should take into account the data protection principles from the first moment of determining the means of processing and during the processing operation that follows. To that extent, the controller must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures. Such measures could consist, inter alia, of minimising the processing of personal data, pseudonymising personal data as soon as possible, transparency with regard to the functions and processing of personal data, enabling the data subject to monitor the data processing, enabling the controller to create and improve security features.336 Privacy-by-default means that measures are in place that ensure that, by default, only personal data are processed which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing. The controller is the addressee of these principles. However, often controllers are confronted with devices or software that was developed without taking account these principles. This situation is addressed in the recitals of the GDPR, but not in any binding provision. It is stated that when developing, designing, selecting and using applications, services and products that are based on the processing of personal data or process personal data to fulfil their task, producers of the products, services and applications should be encouraged to take into account the right to data protection when developing and designing such products, services and applications and, with due regard to the state of the art, to make sure that controllers and processors are able to fulfil their data protection obligations.337 (g)  Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries Article 8 of the Charter does not address the situation in which personal data are transferred to 08.181 a third country. Still, when considering the provision in the former Directive 95/46/EC on third country transfers in the first Schrems case, the Court indicated that this provision implemented the express obligation laid down in Article 8(1) of the Charter to protect personal data and that the provision intended to ensure that the high level of that protection continues where personal data is transferred to a third country.338 The Court repeated this statement in the PNR Opinion.339 In the second Schrems case (‘Schrems II’), the Court pointed at Article 44 GDPR, entitled ‘General principle for transfers’, which lays down that all provisions on third country transfers shall be applied in order to ensure that the level of protection of natural persons guaranteed by the GDPR is not undermined.340 The rules on third country transfers were put under pressure due to the emergence of the 08.182 internet. In the Lindqvist case of 2003, the person involved was not only charged for having

controllers (or processors) whose core activities consist of processing on a large scale sensitive data. The EDPB published guidelines on Data Protection Officers, see WP243 rev.01 to be found at www.edpb.europa.eu. 334 See Art 4(3) of the ePrivacy Regulation. The provision was introduced by Directive 2009/136/EC [2009] OJ L337/11. 335 See Art 24 of the GDPR. 336 See Recital 78 of the GDPR. 337 Ibid. 338 See Schrems (n 137) [72]. 339 See Opinion A-1/15 (n 14) [134]. See on Opinion A-1/15 K Kuner, ‘International agreements, data protection, and EU fundamental rights on the international stage: Opinion 1/15, EU-Canada PNR’ [2018] Common Market Law Review 857–82. 340 See Schrems II (n 36) [92].



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published personal data of others on a website without a legitimate ground, but also for transferring the data to a third country by putting the data on the internet.341 The Court was asked whether this was a correct reading of the directive. In order to prevent the third country rules in Directive 95/46/EC from largely blocking the use of the internet (in effect, all third countries connected to the internet should then be checked for the adequacy of their data protection rules before anything could be put on the internet), the Court considered that third country transfer rules in the directive only referred to a direct transfer. Between Ms Lindqvist putting personal data on an internet page and the person actually visiting the page and ‘receiving’ the personal data, were several steps, to be taken by hosting and internet service providers, so no direct transfer had taken place.342 08.183 The rules on transfer of personal data to third countries and international organisations in the GDPR build on the approach of Directive 95/46/EC but are far more developed. The primary basis for transfers to third countries (or international organisations) is (still) an adequacy finding of the European Commission.343 So far, the list of third countries that were found to ensure an adequate level of protection is modest.344 In the first Schrems case, in which the Court invalidated the Safe Harbour decision, a particular Commission adequacy decision concerning the United States, the Court considered that an adequate level of protection must be understood as a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is ‘essentially equivalent’ to that guaranteed within the European Union.345 The elements the European Commission has to take into account when assessing the level of protection in a third country are spelled out in Article 45(2) GDPR. These elements are not limited to verifying the existence of data protection rules, but require a more general assessment of the rule of law situation in the third country, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, other relevant legislation, including concerning public security defence and national security, the existence of independent oversight and relevant international commitments. In order to meet the standards for an adequacy decision, third countries have adapted their data protection rules, or made specific arrangements. In this respect, the GDPR has an indirect extraterritorial effect. 08.184 In the absence of an adequacy decision, transfers are also possible if appropriate safeguards are provided for by the controller (or processor). This can, inter alia, be done with use of standard data protection clauses, adopted by the European Commission, or binding corporate rules approved by the competent supervisory authority.346 In Schrems II, in which the Court invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield decision of the Commission—the successor of the Safe Harbour decision—it also confirmed the validity of a decision of the Commission laying down standard contractual clauses. The Court considered that appropriate safeguards must be capable of ensuring that data subjects are afforded a level of protection essentially equivalent to that which is guaranteed within the EU.347 The responsibility lies with the controller. In order to be able to rely on the standard contractual clauses the controller must verify, on a case-by-case basis and,

341 Lindqvist (n 88). 342 Ibid [61] and [69]. 343 See Art 45 of the GDPR. 344 Countries on the list are Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay, the US (limited to the scope of the Privacy Shield) and since January 2018 Japan (for the commercial sector). See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacyprotection-personal-data-non-eu-countries_en. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein have incorporated the GDPR in the EEA Agreement. Personal data can flow to these countries as if they were Member States. 345 See Schrems (n 137) [73]. 346 See Arts 46 and 47 of the GDPR. 347 See Schrems II (n 36) [96].

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where appropriate, in collaboration with the recipient of the data in the third country, whether the law of the third country of destination ensures adequate protection of personal data transferred pursuant to standard data protection clauses.348 Where necessary, the controller needs to provide additional safeguards to those offered by these clauses.349 Following the judgment, the European Data Protection Board provided guidance on additional safeguards to be offered by controllers who consider transferring personal data to a third country on the basis of standard contractual clauses.350 The European Commission published modernised standard contractual clauses, incorporating certain elements of the Court’s ruling in Schrems II.351 In the absence of an adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards, transfers are also possible 08.185 on the basis of derogations for specific situations.352 Article 49 GDPR provides a list of grounds for the transfer, including the explicit consent of the data subject or the necessity for an important reason of public interest, which has to be recognised in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject.353 According to the EDPB, the derogations must be interpreted restrictively so that the exception does not become the rule.354 (h)  Independent Supervisory Authorities: Essential Components of Data Protection Article 8(3) of the Charter states that compliance with data protection rules shall be subject to 08.186 control by an independent authority. The requirement of oversight by an independent authority can also be found in Article 39 TEU and Article 16(2) TFEU. Article 8 is the only provision in the Charter which specifically requires oversight of the right by an independent authority. The idea that such supervisory authorities are actually necessary for the proper function- 08.187 ing of the right has developed gradually. In Convention 108, the establishment of independent supervisory authorities was not foreseen. Only with the Additional Protocol 181 in 2001 was the provision of one or more authorities made obligatory for ensuring compliance with the national law giving effect to Convention 108.355 In the modernised Convention, the requirement to have supervisory authorities is integrated in the convention itself.356 According to Recital 62 of the former Directive 95/46/EC, the existence of independent 08.188 supervisory authorities constituted an ‘essential component’ of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. This statement has been repeated by the Court of Justice in cases in which it had to rule on the alleged lack of independence of supervisory authorities in Germany (at Länder level), Austria and Hungary.357 The Court considered the existence of independent supervisory authorities an essential component of data protection. In Commission v Germany the Court referred in this respect only to Recital 62 of Directive 95/46/ EC.358 In Commission v Austria and Commission v Hungary the Court did not directly refer to

348 Ibid [134]. 349 Ibid. 350 See Recommendations 1/2020 and 2/2020, to be found at https://edpb.europa.eu. 351 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12740-Commission-ImplementingDecision-on-standard-contractual-clauses-between-controllers-and-processors-located-in-the-EU (not yet adopted at the time of writing). 352 See Art 49 of the GDPR. 353 See Art 49(4) of the GDPR. 354 See Guidelines 2/2018, to be found at www.edpb.europa.eu. 355 See Art 1(1) of Additional Protocol 181. See also Art 25 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 356 Art 15 of the modernised Convention 108. 357 Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:125; Case C-614/10 Commission v Austria [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:631 and Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:237. 358 Commission v Germany, ibid [23].



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the recital, but linked the consideration to Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46/EC, Article 8(3) of the Charter and Article 16(2) TFEU.359 By doing so, the Court underlined that the consideration that independent supervisory authorities are an essential component of the right to data protection is not something that comes from the level of secondary law, but is part of primary EU law, including the Charter. In the PNR Opinion, the Court referred to settled case law according to which the establishment of an independent supervisory authority is an essential component of data protection, referring only to primary EU law. The fact that such oversight was lacking in Canada for the data processed under the draft agreement was one of the points of criticism of the Court.360 08.189 In the cases against Germany and Austria the Commission questioned the independence of the supervisory authorities. In Germany it concerned the authorities at Länder level which supervised the processing of personal data outside the public sector. These authorities were subject to state scrutiny and therefore not independent from the public sector. However, according to the German government, the fact that these authorities were independent vis-à-vis the actors they supervised, was sufficient.361 In the Austrian case the independence of the federal data protection authority was at stake. There were several practical links between the authority and the Federal Chancellery which the authority was supposed to supervise. However, in the Austrian law it was clearly stated that the Members of the authority were not bound by instructions of any kind in the performance of their duties.362 In the case against Hungary the term of office of the supervisor was terminated by law before the expiry of that term, while according to the Commission independence of the supervisor entailed an obligation for Hungary to allow that authority to serve his or her full term of office. 08.190 In Commission v Germany the Court gave a wide interpretation to the notion of complete independence: [it] precludes not only any influence exercised by the supervised bodies, but also any directions or any other external influence, whether direct or indirect, which could call into question the performance by those authorities of their task.363

08.191 The Court added that the authorities ‘should remain above any suspicion of partiality’.364 In the German case, and also in the Austrian case, the situation did not fulfil these requirements. In Commission v Austria, the Court underlined that the wording ‘with complete independence’ should be given an autonomous interpretation, independent from the notion of independence explained in the Court’s case law under the preliminary rulings procedure.365 In Commission v Hungary the Court considered that if it were permissible for every Member State to compel a supervisory authority to vacate office before serving its full term, in contravention of the rules and safeguards established in that regard by the legislation applicable, the threat of such premature termination to which that authority would be exposed throughout its term of office could lead it to enter into a form of prior compliance with the political authority, which is incompatible with the requirement of independence.366 According to the Court that was true even where the premature termination of the term served came about as a result of the restructuring or changing



359 Commission

v Austria (n 337) [36]–[37]. Commission v Hungary (n 337) [47]–[48]. A-1/15 (n 14) [228]–[231]. 361 Commission v Germany (n 337) [16]. 362 Commission v Austria (n 337) [42]. 363 Commission v Germany (n 337) [30]. 364 Ibid [36]. 365 Commission v Austria (n 337) [40]. 366 Commission v Hungary (n 337) [54]. 360 Opinion

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of the institutional model. Such a restructuring or change had to be organised in such a way as to meet the requirement of independence laid down in the applicable legislation.367 In the GDPR, the establishment of the independent supervisory authority is regulated in detail, 08.192 incorporating the Court’s case law.368 These elaborate provisions should diminish the wide variety in the way in which the supervisory authorities were set up in the Member States under the former directive in terms of independence, nomination procedures, actual powers and tasks, and resources.369 Although the setting up of a supervisory authority remains a matter of national law, much of its substance is determined by the GDPR. It contains provisions on how independence should be ensured, how members of the authority should be nominated, the competences of the authorities and a long list of tasks and powers.370 New, compared to Directive 95/46/EC, is the power for supervisory authorities to impose administrative sanctions.371 For some breaches of the data protection rules, fines can go up to 20,000,000 EUR or 4 per cent of the worldwide annual turnover whichever amount is higher.372 It is clear that the possible imposition of such fines contributed hugely to the effective implementation of the data protection rules within the EU since the application of the GDPR in May 2018. A particular issue was raised in the earlier mentioned Schrems case regarding the competences 08.193 of the Irish supervisory authority in relation to adequacy decisions of the European Commission. The Irish authority had declared itself not competent to assess whether the level of protection ensured by the Safe Harbor Decision of the Commission was in line with the Charter. The reason was that the authority did not have the authority to declare a decision of the Commission invalid, which is the exclusive competence of the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice considered that the Irish supervisory authority was competent to assess the matter and that is should, in case it would find that the objections advanced by the person lodging a complaint were well founded, be able to engage in legal proceedings.373 According to the Court it was up to the national legislature to provide for such an avenue, which would in the end enable the national court to refer the matter to the Court of Justice.374 Under the former Directive 95/46/EC, all supervisory authorities of the EU Member States 08.194 and the EDPS were grouped in a Working Party which advised the European Commission. This was based on Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, and therefore called ‘the Article 29 Working Party’. Since the GDPR is a regulation instead of a directive, the consistent application of the directly applicable rules had to be better assured. Therefore, the Article 29 Working Party was upgraded from a pure advisory body to an EU body with legal personality, the European Data Protection Board. The EDPB still issues advices and guidelines, but can also take binding decisions.375 The EDPB secretariat is provided by the EDPS.376 To further ensure consistency, rules on c­ ooperation

367 Ibid. 368 See Arts 51 to 59 of the GDPR. 369 See the Report of the Fundamental Rights Agency of May 2010 on the roles of national data protection authorities, to be found at http://fra.europa.eu >> ‘Information Society, Privacy and Data Protection’. 370 According to Art 55(3) of the GDPR, supervisory authorities are not competent to supervise processing operations of courts acting in their judicial capacity. 371 See Art 83 of the GDPR. 372 See Art 83(5) GDPR. 373 See Schrems (n 137) [65]. See also Schrems II (n 36) [107]. 374 Schrems Ibid. 375 See for a list of tasks of the EDPB, Art 70 of the GDPR. The EDPB has published guidelines on a wide variety of issues in the GDPR, see www.edpb.europa.eu >> ‘Our Work & Tools’ >> ‘GDPR: Guidelines, Recommendations, Best Practices’. 376 See on the EDPB Art 68 to 76 of the GDPR. This underlines the independent nature of the EDPB. The secretariat of the former Article 29 Working Party was provided by the European Commission.



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and a so-called ‘consistency mechanism’ were introduced.377 In cross-border data processing operations the authority of the Member State in which the controller has its main establishment will be the lead authority.378 Through cooperation with the other supervisory authorities concerned, the lead authority comes to a decision. In case of disagreement between the authorities the matter can be brought to the EDPB which can take a binding decision.379 The system should assure a one-stop-shop for companies that operate on a transnational scale within the EU. In Google LLC the Court of Justice acknowledged the potential for a consistent approach to data protection in cross-border cases through the consistency mechanism.380 However, the new system raises many practical and legal questions which still need to be clarified. Such clarity should, in the first place, be provided by the EDPB itself and, in the second place, by the national court and ultimately the Court of Justice. In a Communication evaluating two years of application of the GDPR, the European Commission stated that it was still too early to fully assess the cooperation between the authorities and the functioning of the consistency mechanism.381 Nonetheless, the Commission observed that authorities had not made full use of the tools the GDPR provides and that further progress was needed to make the handling of cross-border cases more efficient and harmonised across the EU.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations (a)  Relationship between Articles 7, 8 and 52 08.195 Article 52 of the Charter addresses the possible limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms of the Charter. According to Article 52(1), any limitation must be provided for by law, respect the essence of the rights and freedoms and respect the principle of proportionality. Limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. That a limitation should be provided for by law is in fact a repetition of the specification in Article 8(2) that the data processing, if not based on the consent of the person concerned, should have a basis in law. This is a bit peculiar: Article 52(1) states that the condition in Article 8(2) that data processing must be based on the consent or a legitimate basis laid down by law may be limited, but only if this is provided for by law (and complies with the other conditions of Article 52(1)). 08.196 This particularity is caused by the fact that in the Charter, contrary to the ECHR, the limitation clause of the relative rights is not included in the individual provisions, but detached from all and applied in a horizontal manner. Although this might work well for many rights enshrined in the Charter, such as the right to privacy in Article 7, it does not fit well with the right to data protection as laid down in Article 8. The right to data protection, as already referred to in section B.I, constitutes the heading of a set of rights and obligations and limitations of these rights and ­obligations, which are put together as an elaborate system of checks and balances. Therefore, one cannot actually speak about a limitation of the right to data protection as such which could be justified under the conditions of Article 52(1).

377 See Arts 60 to 67 of the GDPR. 378 A definition of ‘main establishment’ can be found in Art 4(16) of the GDPR. The EDPB has published guidelines on the notion of ‘lead authority’, see WP244 rev.01 to be found at www.edpb.europa.eu. 379 See Arts 65 and 66 of the GDPR. 380 See Google LLC (n 97) [68]–[69]. The functioning of the consistency mechanism is the subject of a preliminary ruling which was still pending at the time of writing, see C-645/19, Facebook Belgium ao. 381 COM(2020) 264.

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Applying a general limitation clause as foreseen in Article 52(1) on the right to data protec- 08.197 tion as such would only work if the right would be construed as a right to informational selfdetermination, as described in section B.I above. Any processing of personal data without the consent of the data subject should then be justified in accordance with Article 52(1). However, this would disregard the difference between the right to privacy in Article 7 and the right to data protection in Article 8. Furthermore, as explained, it was not the idea to create a right to informational self-determination when a separate right to data protection was inserted in the Charter, which, as follows from the explanations, was moreover based on the former Directive 95/46/EC. (b)  Secondary EU Law on Data Protection The secondary EU law on data protection actually incorporates the limitation clause of Article 52(1) of the Charter. In Article 13 of the former Directive 95/46/EC exemptions and restrictions of the scope of the obligation and rights provided for in the directive, with the exception of the provision containing the legal grounds for processing, were allowed if laid down in a legislative measure and when it constituted a necessary measure to safeguard a list of interests, varying from national security to the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others. The provision allowed the restriction of rights but also a deviation from the purpose limitation principle. In the GDPR the general clause for restrictions of obligations and rights contained in the GDPR is Article 23. A restriction may be imposed by way of a legislative measure when it respects the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard an expanded list of interest compared to the list contained in Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC. The new list includes also ‘other objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a Member State’.382 The wording of Article 23(1) is close to the wording of Article 52(1) and even adds a phrase which does not occur in the Charter, but is taken from the ECHR, namely that the restriction must be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. Although this phrase did not occur in Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC it is not new in the secondary legislation on data protection, in Article 15 of the ePrivacy Directive, which is the equivalent of Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC, similar wording was included. Article 23 of the GDPR does not permit deviation from the purpose limitation principle. However, such deviation is still possible under the conditions of Article 6(4) of the GDPR which refers back to Article 23 GDPR (see section D.IV(b)). Article 6(4) provides that a change of purpose is allowed on the basis of a law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 23(1) GDPR. Apparently the EU legislator considered the conditions for change of purpose better placed in Article 6 of the GDPR, the provision on lawfulness of processing, than in Article 23 of the GDPR. This rather complicated structure illustrates the close connection between restrictions in the meaning of Article 52(1), on the one hand, and the legitimate basis laid down by law as required by Article 8 of the Charter, on the other hand. The grounds for processing in Article 6(1) of the GDPR for which a law is required (the legal obligation and performance of a task carried out in the public interest) are not seen as restricting the right to data protection, but simply as grounds which make the processing lawful, reflecting Article 8 of the Charter. Article 6(3) of the GDPR requires that such a law meets ‘an objective of public interest’ and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. If a law intends to deviate from the initial purpose, or intends to restrict ­certain rights and obligations in the GDPR, the law at issue is put to the test of Article 52(1) of the



382 See

Art 23(1)(e) of the GDPR.

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Charter, as the wording of Article 6(4) and 23(1) of the GDPR show. It is questionable whether this distinction has any meaningful consequences. The difference should probably be found in the wider range of possible objectives that can be pursued under Article 6(1), rather than in a difference in the assessment of the necessity of the processing. That being said, one would then need to distinguish between objectives of ‘public interest’ (Article 6(4) of the GDPR), objectives of ‘general interest’ (Article 52(1) of the Charter) and the objectives listed in Article 23(1) of the GDPR. This, however, is a distinction which is difficult to make. (c)  The Relation between Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) in the Case Law of the Court of Justice 08.202 In section B.I it was concluded that the case law of the Court of Justice does not show a consistent approach to the distinction between Article 7 and Article 8 of the Charter. The distinction occurs mainly (not always) when the existence of an infringement of both rights is assessed and when the Court considers whether the essence of both rights is adversely affected. When it comes to the subsequent assessment of the justification of the infringements under Article 52(1) of the Charter, both rights are in most cases taken together. 08.203 The Court has not given much weight to the phrase in Article 8(2) of the Charter that personal data can also be processed without consent, namely on ‘some other legitimate basis laid down by law’ in relation to Article 52(1) of the Charter. Initially, the Court, in Schecke, even disregarded this part of Article 8(2), and assessed the matter directly under Article 52(1).383 In later case law the phrase was expressly referred to in the Court’s considerations but that did not prevent the Court from moving directly to the analysis under Article 52(1) of the Charter. 08.204 In the PNR Opinion, the Court paid some further attention to Article 8(2) and the phrase of ‘some other legitimate basis laid down by law’. It considered that the purpose for which the data were processed under the PNR agreement was different from that for which the data were collected by air carriers. Consequently, the processing could not be considered as based on the consent of the air passengers to the collection of that data by the air carriers for reservation purposes and it therefore required either new consent of the air passengers or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.384 Subsequently, the Court moved to assessing whether the PNR agreement constituted such other legitimate basis laid down by law, within the meaning of Article 8(2).385 It allowed the Court to address the criticism of the European Parliament, who had requested the Court of Justice for the opinion, that the PNR agreement did not constitute a ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 8(2) and Article 52(1) of the Charter. When rejecting the criticism of the European Parliament on this point the Court in fact put the requirement of ‘some other legitimate basis laid down by law’ from Article 8(2) on the same footing as the requirement for a law in Article 52(1) of the Charter.386 The Court concluded this part of the PNR Opinion by stating that the transfer of the PNR data to the Canadian authorities would be based on ‘some other basis’ that is ‘laid down by law’, within the meaning of Article 8(2). However, whether that basis was legitimate within the meaning of that provision was an issue which the Court considered ‘indissociable from the question whether the objective pursued by the envisaged agreement is an objective of general interest’.387 The requirement that the law should meet an objective of general interest refers to Article 52(1) of the Charter.



383 Volker

and Markus Schecke (n 63). eg Opinion A-1/15 (n 14) [142]–[143]. 385 Ibid [144]. 386 Ibid [146]. 387 Ibid [147]. 384 See

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Despite the specific and distinct attention given in the PNR Opinion by the Court to Article 8(2), it is apparent from the PNR Opinion that the Court equates the requirement of ‘some other legitimate basis laid down by law’ of Article 8(2) to the requirement of a law in Article 52(1) of the Charter. Admittedly, the Court can hardly be blamed for doing so. In situations in which a law lays down an obligation to process personal data in the public interest, it is difficult to make a meaningful distinction between the assessment under Article 8(2) and under Article 52(1). This was also illustrated by the construction chosen in the GDPR as explained in the previous section. It should be noted that the Court does not always move to an assessment under Article 52(1) of the Charter when asked about the permissibility of a national measure in light of the EU data protection rules. In Puškar, which concerned the use of a blacklist by tax and law enforcement authorities, the Court considered that as long as the conditions governing the legal processing of personal data under the former Directive 95/46/EC were fulfilled, the processing was deemed to satisfy also the requirements laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.388 No attention was given to the particular phrase in Article 8(2) that processing can have some other legitimate basis in law. In Deutsche Post the Court considered a German law on taxation exclusively under the secondary EU legislation on data protection, without a reference to the Charter at all.389 It is doubtful whether for the present discussion any broader conclusions can be drawn from these cases. It has already been stated that the approach of the Court, taking Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter together and concentrating only on the lack of consent of the data subjects for moving to an assessment under the general limitation clause in Article 52(1), comes close to an understanding of the right to data protection as a right of informational self-determination (see also section B.I). This still holds true, but the statement should be put in perspective. The cases discussed, although often addressing the processing of personal data by private entities (telecoms operators, airlines), in the end all concerned the relationship between individuals and the government. It is inherent to the rule of law that such situations are covered by a law which meets the requirements set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter. In horizontal relations, ie the processing of data by private persons, it is not the EU or Member State law as such which is at issue, but the practical application of the data protection rules allowing the processing without consent. This refers more concretely to the ground for processing for a legitimate interest of the controller as laid down in Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR. According to the Court this ground necessitates a balancing of the opposing rights and interests concerned, in the context of which account must be taken of the significance of the data subject’s rights arising from Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.390 Article 52(1) of the Charter does not come into play in this assessment, although the balancing test resembles the proportionality test to a large extent.

08.205

08.206

08.207

08.208

(d)  Substantive Elements in the Case Law of the Court of Justice on Article 52(1) In Schecke the Court considered that the right to data protection is not an absolute right, but must 08.209 be considered in relation to its function in society.391 Article 52(1) of the Charter requires that a limitation must be provided for by law and respect the essence of the rights and freedoms.392 A limitation must also respect the principle of proportionality, which means the limitation is





388 Puškar

(n 135) [102]. C-496/17 Deutsche Post [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:26 [53]–[70]. 390 See Google Spain SL (n 92) [74]. 391 Volker and Markus Schecke (n 63) [48]. 392 The condition that the essence of the right or freedom should be respected was discussed in the previous section. 389 Case

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necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 08.210 The requirement that a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights must be provided for by law implies that the legal basis which permits the interference with those rights must itself define the scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned.393 This requirement is closely related to the proportionality of the measure. 08.211 Following settled case law of the Court of Justice, the principle of proportionality requires that a measure is appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.394 As to the necessity of a measure, the Court held in Schecke, which concerned the publication of details about the amount of EU subsidies received by farmers, that the interest pursued by the data processing should be balanced against the interference with the right for privacy and the protection of personal data of person concerned.395 In that respect, derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.396 The Court considered that it should be assessed whether the intended objective could not be pursued by measures which interfere less with the right of the data subjects concerned. In the Schecke case the Court referred to the possibility to limit the publication of data by name according to the periods for which aid was received or the frequency or nature and amount of the aid received.397 Since there was no indication that the Council and the Commission took into consideration such less intrusive means, the Court declared the EU measure at issue, invalid.398 08.212 In Ministerio Fiscal the Court made clear that the objective pursued by a measure must be proportionate to the seriousness of the interference with the fundamental rights in question.399 Ministerio Fiscal was a follow-up to the Tele2 Sverige ruling, again concerning national legislation based on Article 15 of the ePrivacy Directive requiring the retention of data by telecoms operators for law enforcement purposes. In Tele2 Sverige the Court considered that with a view to the seriousness of the interference of access to data which allowed precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons concerned (the Court referred in essence to the impact of possible profiling), in the area of law enforcement, only the objective of fighting serious crime was capable of justifying such access.400 However, in the case of Ministerio Fiscal access by law enforcement authorities was only aimed at data identifying the owner of a SIM card and not the communication as such. In those circumstances the Court considered that when the interference that such access entails is not serious, such access was capable of being justified by the objective of preventing, investigating, detecting and prosecuting criminal offences generally.401 As to the seriousness of an interference the Court, in Rigas Satiksme, considered that it is possible to take into consideration the fact that the seriousness of the infringement of the data subject’s fundamental rights resulting from the processing can vary depending on the possibility of accessing the data at issue in public sources.402

393 PNR Opinion A-1/15 (n 14) [139]. See also Schrems II (n 36) [175]. 394 See Volker and Markus Schecke (n 63) [74]. 395 Ibid [77]. 396 Ibid [77]. 397 Ibid [81]. 398 Ibid [89]. 399 Ministerio Fiscal (n 79) [55]. 400 See Tele2 Sverige (n 29) [115]. For a further discussion see I Cameron, ‘Balancing data protection and law ­enforcement needs: Tele2 Sverige and Watson’ [2017] Common Market Law Review 1467–96. 401 Ministerio Fiscal (n 79) [57]. See also La Quadrature du Net ao (n 32) [140], [152]–[153] and [157]. Further guidance on the severity of the interference in the context of law enforcement access to telecommunications data may be expected from Case C-746/18 H.K. (still pending). 402 Rigas Satiksme (n 132) [32].

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According to the Court in the PNR Opinion, in order to comply with the requirement for a law 08.213 and the proportionality of a measure, the law which entails the interference must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure in question and impose minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose data are processed (in the PNR Opinion: transferred to Canadian authorities) have sufficient guarantees to protect effectively their personal data against the risk of abuse.403 It must, in particular, indicate in what circumstances and under which conditions a measure providing for the processing of such data may be adopted, thereby ensuring that the interference is limited to what is strictly necessary. The need for such safeguards is all the greater where personal data is subject to automated processing. Those considerations apply particularly where the protection of the particular category of personal data that is sensitive data is at stake.404 In DRI, the Court concluded that the data retention Directive did not lay down clear and pre- 08.214 cise rules governing the extent of the interference in order to ensure that it was limited to what is strictly necessary.405 In the subsequent Tele2 Sverige ruling the Court set out the substantive and procedural conditions that should be in place for the retention of the data and the subsequent access to it by law enforcement authorities. The Court considered, inter alia, that retention, as a preventive measure, should be targeted, based on an objective criteria that establish a connection between the data retained and the objective pursued.406 In addition, there should be security measures in place which protect the data against the risks of misuse and against unlawful access.407 Furthermore, the data should be kept within the EU.408 As to the conditions for access to the retained data, the Court considered that these should include prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body and an obligation for the competent authority to notify the person concerned as soon as that notification is no longer liable to jeopardise the investigations.409 Member States also had to ensure review by an independent authority as required by Article 8(3) of the Charter.410 In Privacy International and La Quadrature du Net ao the Court of Justice was asked to clarify 08.215 its ruling in Tele2 Sverige.411 Despite vehement pleas from several Member States submitting observations in the cases to actually revise the case law, in particular on the requirement of targeted retention, the Court essentially confirmed its position in the Tele2 Sverige ruling. It insisted on the targeted nature of a preventive retention measure.412 However, the Court saw room for generalised and indiscriminate retention of telecommunications metadata for a limited period of time, when there are sufficiently solid grounds for considering that a Member State is confronted with a serious threat to national security ‘that proves to be genuine and present or foreseeable’.413 Moreover, the Court considered acceptable the generalised and indiscriminate retention of only IP addresses assigned to the source of communication, albeit for a limited period, and generalised and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users.414 Finally, the Court did not exclude measures that allow recourse to the expedited retention of metadata



403 Opinion 404 Ibid.

A-1/15 (n 14) [141].

405 Digital

Rights Ireland (DRI) (n 7) [65]. Sverige (n 29) [108]–[112]. 407 Ibid [122]. 408 Ibid. 409 Ibid [120]–[121]. See on the notification also section D.II(d) above. 410 Ibid [123]. 411 See Privacy International (n 32) and La Quadrature du Net ao (n 32). 412 See La Quadrature du Net ao, ibid [146]–[150]. 413 Ibid [137]–[138]. 414 Ibid [152]–[159]. 406 Tele2

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already lawfully kept by providers in order to shed light on serious criminal offences or attacks on national security where such offences or attacks have already been established or their existence may reasonably be suspected.415 Such a measure should be limited to data that can, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, shed light on such an offence or attack.416

V. Remedies 08.216 The secondary legislation on data protection incorporates the requirement for an effective judicial remedy contained in Article 47 of the Charter. Whereas in the former Directive 95/46/ EC this was done in rather general terms, in the GDPR the possible judicial and administrative remedies are spelled out in greater detail.417 08.217 A data subject who considers her or his rights were breached can lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority or go to the national court against the data controller (or processor).418 Complaints of unfair data processing can in many cases also be brought before a national ombudsman. In these situations, an overlap exists between the competences of both the data protection supervisory authority and the ombudsman. At EU level, the EDPS and the European Ombudsman have signed a Memorandum of Understanding in order to avoid duplication and inconsistent application of the data protection rules.419 08.218 The right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority cannot be found in Article 8 of the Charter. Still, the Court considered in Schrems that the right of data subjects to lodge with the supervisory authority a claim for the purpose of protection their fundamental right is guaranteed by Article 8(1) and 8(3) of the Charter.420 A complaint can be lodged in particular with the supervisory authority in the Member State of the data subject’s habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement.421 08.219 Lodging a complaint is without prejudice to the possibility of instigating court procedures, and vice versa. In Puškar the Court of Justice was asked to assess whether a requirement to exhaust administrative remedies (ie lodging a complaint with the supervisory authority) before being able to instigate court procedures was contrary to Article 47 of the Charter.422 The Court considered that the requirement limited the right to an effective judicial remedy, but could be justified, provided that it did not lead to a substantial delay in bringing legal action, that it involved suspension of the limitation period of the rights concerned and that it did not involve excessive costs.423 08.220 The GDPR lays down that an effective remedy should be available against a legally binding decision of the supervisory authority.424 This right can be invoked by the data subject, who can also instigate court proceedings against inaction by the supervisory authority.425 Controllers or other persons concerned by the legally binding decision of the supervisory authority have a

415 Ibid [160]–[165]. 416 Ibid [165]. 417 See Art 22 of Directive 95/46/EC and Chapter VIII of the GDPR. 418 See resp. Art 77 and Art 79 of the GDPR. 419 [2007] OJ C27/21. This MOU was updated in 2017, see https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/ourwork-by-type/memorandum-understanding_en. 420 See Schrems (n 137) [58]. 421 See Art 77(1) of the GDPR. 422 See Puškar (n 135). See also section B.VII above. 423 Ibid [62] and [76]. 424 See Art 78 of the GDPR. 425 See Art 78(2) of the GDPR.

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right to challenge the decision in court as well. As explained, the EDPB can take binding decisions in the context of the consistency mechanism.426 Any challenge against this decision should be brought before the Court of Justice under the conditions laid down in Article 263 TFEU.427 When instigating court proceedings against the controller, the data subject should in principle 08.221 turn to the court of the Member State where the controller has its main establishment. However, alternatively, the data subject may bring proceedings before the court of the Member State where the data subject has her or his habitual residence, unless the controller is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers.428 This alternative possibility reflects the idea of ‘proximity’, ie that the data subject should be able to turn to a court which are close to her or him. Any person who suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of 08.222 the GDPR has the right to receive compensation from the controller or the processor for the damage suffered.429 The reference to ‘any person’ implies this provision is not limited to data subjects. Where more than one controller or processor is involved in the same processing each of them can be held liable for the entire damage. This specific provision envisages the effective compensation of the data subject. The GDPR states that a controller or processor that paid the full compensation for the damage suffered is entitled to claim back from the other controllers or processors involved that part of the compensation corresponding to their parts of responsibility for the damage.430 It follows that controllers and processors should make proper arrangements between themselves before engaging in data processing operations. The data subject can mandate a non-profit organisation to lodge a complaint on her or his 08.223 behalf with the supervisory authority or to exercise her or his rights to a judicial remedy or to compensation.431 The non-profit organisation must be properly constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, must have statutory objectives which are in the public interest, and must be active in the field of the protection of data subjects’ rights and freedoms with regard to the protection of their personal data.432 Member States can choose to allow such non-profit organisations to lodge complaints or instigate court proceedings also without a mandate of the data subject.433

E. Evaluation With the ongoing technological developments and the increasing use of information 08.224 communication technologies throughout the private and public sectors, sound and effective protection of personal data is becoming increasingly important. The cross-border flow of information, including personal data, has exploded in the past decades, and calls for an international approach on how to protect such data. Differences between states in the way in which data is protected might seriously hamper the new economy from further expanding. At the level of the EU, the growing importance of the right to data protection and the need to having





426 See

section D.III(h) above. Recital 143 of the GDPR for an explanation. 428 See Art 79(2) of the GDPR. 429 See Art 82(1) of the GDPR. 430 See Art 82(5) of the GDPR. 431 See Art 80(1) of the GDPR. 432 Ibid. 433 See Art 80(2) of the GDPR. 427 See

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08.225

08.226

08.227

08.228

adequate, harmonised rules on data protection was recognised in the Lisbon Treaty, with the introduction of specific provisions on data protection in Article 16 TFEU and Article 39 TEU which gave the EU competence to adopt rules on data protection in all EU policy areas. The self-standing legal basis for EU legislation on data protection in Article 16 TFEU has so far led to the adoption of the GDPR, the Law Enforcement Directive and Regulation 2018/1725 for the EU institutions and bodies. A revision of the e-Privacy Directive is still pending. In particular the GDPR, which applies since May 2018, has precipitated a wave of data protection compliance within the European Union, and beyond. The GDPR and the considerable attention given to it, has in the first place created awareness about the existence of data protection rules. Although often perceived as new, it should be underlined that the rules contained in the GDPR are to a large extent similar to the rules previously contained in the former Directive 95/46/EC. The ‘compliance stress’ to which the GDPR has led is mainly due to the introduction of high fines which can be imposed by the supervisory authorities. The supervisory authorities do not hesitate to use it, as the French supervisory authority (the CNIL) showed when issuing a fine of 50,000,000 EUR on Google in January 2019.434 Amidst all this, the right to data protection, as enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter, has its own role to play. As explained in this chapter, the right to data protection constitutes the heading of a set of rights and obligations and limitations which are put together as an elaborate system of checks and balances. This makes the right to data protection different from the right to privacy, and gives it a nature which goes beyond informational self-determination. Several key elements of the system of checks and balances are reflected in Article 8 of the Charter. Article 8 builds on the secondary legislation on data protection, and in turn, the secondary legislation implements Article 8 of the Charter.435 In its case law the Court of Justice has lifted substantive elements from the secondary EU legislation on data protection to the level of primary law by formulating them as requirements under the Charter. Examples are the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisor, the requirements in relation to third country transfers and the specific safeguards that are required for access to data which was mandatorily retained for law enforcement purposes on the basis of Union or Member State law. The right to data protection, together with the right to privacy in Article 7 of the Charter, has been shown to be an important tool for the Court of Justice to put itself forward as a strong defender of the fundamental rights contained in the Charter. Following an analysis in the light of Article 7 and 8 of the Charter the Court has declared invalid EU law on the public disclosure of data about recipients of EU funds, the Data Retention Directive and the Safe Harbour and EU-US Privacy Shield decisions of the European Commission. Furthermore, the Court gave a negative opinion on the draft agreement between Canada and the EU on transfer of Passenger Name Records from the EU to Canada and formulated strict conditions on national measures on data retention. This is a track record no other right in the Charter can match. In lifting substantive requirements to the primary EU level, the Court of Justice has to a certain extent limited the room to manoeuvre of the EU legislator. Following the case law on the data retention measures, Member States have been struggling to apply the requirement of targeted retention, as set out by the Court in the Tele2 Sverige ruling, in particular for data retention as a preventive measure. The issue of data retention is one of the reasons why the proposal for an e-Privacy Regulation was still blocked in the Council at the time of writing. This was due to lengthy discussions on whether the implications of the Tele2 Sverige ruling and the subsequent



434 See

435 See

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www.cnil.fr/fr/la-formation-restreinte-de-la-cnil-prononce-une-sanction-de-50-millions-deuros-lencontre-de-la. eg Google Spain SL (n 92) [69].

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rulings in Privacy International and La Quadrature du Net could somehow be softened by the EU legislator. However, as most of the considerations of the Court are based directly on the Charter, there seems little room to do so. However, it should obviously be welcomed that the Court of Justice takes the right to 08.229 data protection in the Charter seriously. It should not be forgotten that often the substantive requirements which the Court formulates under Article 8 can also be found in the modernised Convention 108 of the Council of Europe or can be derived from the case law of the ECtHR to which the Court of Justice regularly refers. The right to data protection in Article 8 of the Charter, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, serves as an important assurance that the key elements of data protection will be upheld whatever plans the Union legislator might have. And this is precisely the function the Charter should have.



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Article 9* Article 9 Right to Marry and Right to Found a Family The right to marry and to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws ­governing the exercise of these rights.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 9 This Article is based on Article 12 of the ECHR, which reads as follows: ‘Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family according to the national laws governing the exercising of this right.’ The wording of the Article has been modernised to cover cases in which national legislation recognises arrangements other than marriage for founding a family. This Article neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to unions between people of the same sex. This right is thus similar to that afforded by the ECHR, but its scope may be wider when national legislation so provides.

Select Bibliography S Choudhry and J Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010). TK Hervey, ‘The Right to Health in European Union Law’, in TK Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003). ——, ‘We Don’t See a Connection: “The Right to Health” in the EU Charter and European Social Charter’, in G de Búrca and B de Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). —— and J McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004). J McHale, ‘Fundamental Rights and Health Care’, in E Mossialis et al, Health Systems Governance in Europe, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010). H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012).

A.  Field of Application of Article 9 Marriage and the formation of a family are areas which are without a specific competence in 09.01 EU law. However, as with other areas concerning family life,1 this has not prevented an indirect development of these concepts within areas of other relevant and often overlapping competences. There are three such areas which have had particular relevance to the right to marry and found a family.

* This chapter was written by Shazia Choudhry in the first edition. It has been updated by Steve Peers in the second edition. 1 See the chapter on Art 7 (family life) for a comprehensive review of the development of a European Union family law and policy.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

09.02

The first area is equal treatment and freedom from discrimination. The principle of equal treatment constitutes a fundamental value of the European Union, and in pursuance of this Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, introduced as Article 13 EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam, extended the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited to sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. Consequently, two new EU Directives were enacted in the area of non-discrimination: the Racial Equality Directive2 and the Employment Equality Directive.3 However, protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is only provided by the Employment Equality Directive in the area of employment and work.4 Steps have also been taken with regard to discrimination based on gender identity; the revision of the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive in 20025 made it clear that discrimination linked to a transgender person’s identity or to the process of gender reassignment would henceforth be in breach of that Directive, and the adoption of the so-called ‘Recast Directive’ (2006/54/EC)6 consolidated these provisions further by taking into account the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisprudence on gender identity, which affirmed that equal treatment legislation in matters of employment and occupation, on equal pay and social security benefits, is applicable to transgender people. In addition, the Court pronounced that equal treatment for transgender people has to be applied on the basis of the acquired gender after a gender reassignment, and not the sex given at birth.7 09.03 Future action has also been provided for; Article  10 TFEU states that in ‘defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’ To date, there have been a number of policy and funding commitments within the field. First, there was the Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination,8 involving the expenditure of EUR100 million over the period 2001 to 2006, to fight discrimination in a number of areas, including sexual orientation. Following on from this, the Commission’s 2008 Communication on ‘Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed commitment’9 established

2 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180. 3 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and o ­ ccupation [2000] OJ L303. The Directive prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion and belief, age, disability and sexual orientation, and covers the fields of employment and occupation, vocational training, and membership of employer and employee organisations. 4 It is nonetheless very significant in that it effectively reversed the consequences of the decision of the European Court of Justice that EC law did not prohibit such discrimination on the grounds that sexual orientation discrimination was outside EU competence (see Case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains [1998] ECR I-621. 5 See Recital 3 of Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (text with EEA relevance) [2002] OJ L269/15–20 which introduced an explicit reference to discrimination based on ‘gender reassignment’. This is the first explicit mention of gender reassignment by an EU Directive, although it does not feature in the operative part of the legislation. 6 Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation [2006] OJ L204/23–36. 7 See Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1994] ECR I-02143; Case C-117/01 KB v National Health Service Pensions Agency [2004] ECR I-541; Case C-423/04 Sarah Margaret Richards v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] ECR I-3585; and Case C-451/16 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ECLI:EU:C:2018:492. 8 Council Decision 2000/750/EC establishing a Community action programme to combat discrimination (2001 to 2006) [2000] OJ L303. 9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed commitment (SEC(2008) 2172)/COM (2008) 0420.

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the framework for the Commission to carry out different activities aiming to fight against discrimination10 on different grounds, including sexual orientation. In pursuance of this it has launched the PROGRESS programme11 which ran from 2007 to 2013 with a budget of €743 million, subsequently incorporated into the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme from 2014 to 2020. The aim of the programme is to provide financial support for the implementation of the European Union’s objectives in the field of employment and social affairs, diversity and combating discrimination is one of the five fields of specified activity. On 2 July 2008, the European Commission proposed a Directive12 that would ban discrimination on the grounds of age, disability, religion or belief and sexual orientation in all areas of EU competence. The proposed Directive, if adopted, will extend protection from discrimination to the areas of social protection, social advantages, and access to goods and services and would eliminate the hierarchy of rights that currently exists in the EU by giving the listed grounds the same protections guaranteed under the Race Directive. In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as enacted by the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, includes in Article 21(1) a general prohibition of ‘any discrimination based on any ground, such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’. Finally, in terms of gender identity, the European Parliament adopted a landmark resolution in June 2010, the ‘Figueiredo report’,13 calling for an inclusive EU gender equality strategy, specifically addressing issues linked to gender identity. The second area of application is the cross-border recognition of marriages, partnerships 09.04 and parenthood (adoption, fostering and parental responsibility) and the impact this has upon the free movement of EU citizens and third country nationals in addition to general EU immigration and asylum policy. The most significant legislative instrument with regard to cross-border recognition is Brussels II Revised,14 which regulates the jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of divorce and parental responsibility judgments, and also provides additional measures to tackle parental child abduction between the Member States. Brussels II Revised also incorporates specific reference to children’s rights15 and the need for decisions to be taken in the child’s best interests and for the child to be heard in proceedings which affect them.16 Since Brussels II Revised, two further steps have been taken: a Regulation governing the cross-border

10 The Commission is using the ‘Non-discrimination and diversity’ strand of the PROGRESS programme to finance projects carried out in EU countries and other participating countries. Its aim is to support national authorities in: developing their national policy to combat discrimination and promote equality beyond legislation; fostering the dissemination of information on EU and national policy and legislation in the anti-discrimination field; identifying best practices which may be transferable to other participating countries and implementing more effectively their legislation on non-discrimination adopted following the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Framework Directive. 11 Decision No 1672/2006/EC establishing a Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity— PROGRESS [2006] OJ L315; Regulation 1381/2013 establishing a Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme for the period 2014 to 2020 [2013] OJ L354/62. 12 Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, ­disability, age or sexual orientation, COM (2008) 426 final. 13 European Parliament resolution of 17 June 2010 on assessment of the results of the 2006–2010 Roadmap for Equality between women and men, and forward-looking recommendations (2009/2242(INI)). 14 Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility [2003] OJ L338; replaced by Regulation 2019/1111 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction, [2019] OJ L178/1. 15 See H Stalford, ‘Brussels II and Beyond: A Better Deal for Children in the European Union?’, in K Boele-Woeki (ed), Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003). 16 In the rules on jurisdiction under Art 12; and in relation to international child abduction under Art 11(2).



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enforcement of maintenance obligations arising from family relationships, including maintenance for children was adopted in 200917 and the adoption of a Directive to encourage cross-border mediation of disputes.18 Both instruments will have a significant impact upon families caught in a cross-border dispute, although it should be remembered that it is still the national court that takes the substantive decision in relation to the child’s future welfare and the interaction between national family law and European Union law. 09.05 There are also a number of legislative instruments of relevance within the fields of migration, immigration and asylum. These directives and the rights that are bestowed by them are essentially categorised by the residential status of the person within EU law.19 It is within these Directives that we find reference to certain conditions which have been implied into the right to marry by a range of national and international legal sources, despite the lack of reference to them within Article  9 of the Charter or Article  12 of the ECHR. These conditions refer to two main areas of concern. The first is the need to ensure that marriage is only entered into by parties who have achieved a sufficient level of physical and emotional maturity. The second is the need to ensure that both parties have given their full and free consent to the marriage. These issues have been a matter of international concern for some time but have become increasingly relevant as part of the fight against the rise in human trafficking, particularly of girls and women.20 As a result, Article  4 of the Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the Right to Family Reunification states that Member States may require ‘in order to prevent forced marriages’ and to ‘ensure better integration’ the sponsor and his/her spouse to be of a ‘minimum age’, before the spouse is ‘able to join him/her’. Sham marriages, which are entered into solely for immigration purposes are also a concern. Accordingly, Article 16 of the Family Reunification Directive states that Member States may reject an application for entry and residence for the purpose of family reunification, or withdraw or refuse to renew the family member’s residence permits, where it is shown that: ‘the marriage, partnership or adoption was contracted for the sole purpose of enabling the person concerned to enter or reside in a Member State’.21 09.06 The third area of application is the regulation of health services, which will be of particular relevance to the right to found a family in terms of access to reproductive treatment and services. The primary responsibility for the organisation and delivery of healthcare is to a large extent left to each Member State. However, the scope of operation of the European Union in the area of health has been significantly expanded by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which contains a number of provisions which form the legal basis for both current and future EU action in this area. Article 4 of the TFEU sets out the areas in which the EU shares competence with Member States; one such area is ‘common safety concerns in public health matters’. Article 6 TFEU sets out the areas in which the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States; one such area is the ‘protection and improvement of human health’. Finally, Articles 9 and 168 TFEU state that the EU shall take into account the protection of human health when defining and implementing all of its policies and activities and provide the legal scope for protecting people from health threats and disease, for promoting healthy lifestyles and helping national authorities in the European Union cooperate on health issues. 17 Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [2009] OJ L7/1. 18 Directive 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters [2008] OJ L136/3. 19 See the chapter on Art 7 (family life) for a full discussion of this area and the relevant Directives. 20 The EU has taken significant action within this area. See its pages at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_ freedom_security/fight_against_trafficking_in_human_beings/ for further details. 21 See Case C-109/01 Hacene Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607 [57].

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In terms of policy, the European Union’s strategy for protecting and improving human 09.07 health is chiefly implemented through the Commission’s health programmes—the Programme of Community action22 in the field of public health 2008–13 followed the first Programme of Community action in the field of public health (2003–08) which financed over 300 projects and other actions. It has in turn been followed by the Health for Growth Programme for 2014 to 2020,23 which aims to support and complement the work of Member States to achieve the following four objectives: developing innovative and sustainable health systems; increasing access to better and safer healthcare for citizens; promoting health and preventing disease; and protecting citizens from cross-border health threats. Public health is a wide-ranging area which, as the EU Portal on Public Health demonstrates,24 09.08 covers a range of issues and categories of persons. In terms of the right to found a family, however, it is EU action concerning cross-border health care services which is of particular relevance. There are two main legislative bases which require consideration. The first is with regard to the coordination of social security. The EU rules, contained in Regulations (EC) 883/200425 and (EC) 987/200926 contain a system of coordination for persons who move within the EU. The rules were extended in 2003 to cover all third-country nationals legally resident in the EU and ‘in a situation which is not confined in all respects within a single Member State’. Further, Regulation (EU) 1231/201027 provides in effect a ‘bridge’ that allows all third-country nationals legally resident in one EU country, but featuring a cross-border element of some sort with another EU country, to benefit from the EU coordination rules. This covers practical issues such as enjoying the same rights as EU citizens to receive all necessary medical care during a temporary stay in another Member State (an entitlement evidenced by the European Health Insurance Card) which may be relevant for those citizens who require medical treatment and services when accessing reproductive services abroad. The second basis is the combined effect of the freedom to provide services (Art 56 of the 09.09 TFEU) and the freedom of movement (Art 48 of the TFEU) within the EU. These articles formed the basis of a number of successful attempts28 at the CJEU at enforcing the right of patients to travel abroad to access healthcare services, which led to the passage of Directive 2011/24/EU29 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. The Directive applies to individual patients who decide to seek healthcare in a Member State other than the Member State of affiliation. It does not apply, however, to services in the field of long-term care; allocation of and access to organs for the purpose of organ transplants and public vaccination programmes against infectious diseases. Member States are under a number of obligations under the Directive. First, they must ensure that the healthcare providers on their territory apply the same scale of fees for healthcare for patients from other Member States, as for domestic patients in a comparable

22 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/programme/policy/2008–2013/index_en.htm. 23 Regulation 282/2014, [2014] OJ L 86/10. 24 http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/index_en.htm. 25 [2004] OJ L166. 26 [2009] OJ L284. 27 [2010] OJ L344/1. Denmark is not bound by or subject to the application of Regulation (EU) 1231/2010, nor of Regulation (EC) 859/2003. The EEA states and Switzerland do not apply either Regulation. 28 Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie (Kohll) [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-120/95 ­Nicolas Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés (Decker) [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-157/99 BSM Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and HTM Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen (Smits and Peerbooms) [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99 VG Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and EEM van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen (Müller-Fauré) [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-372/04, The Queen, ex p Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325. 29 Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare [2011] L88/45.



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medical situation.30 Second, the Member State of affiliation must ensure the costs incurred by an insured person who receives cross-border healthcare are reimbursed, if the healthcare in question is among the benefits to which the insured person is entitled in the Member State of affiliation.31 Third, the Member State of affiliation can determine the healthcare for which an insured person is entitled to assumption of costs and the level of assumption of those costs, regardless of where the healthcare is provided.32 Finally, the Member State of affiliation can also prescribe a list of the categories of healthcare that require prior authorisation of the cross-border treatment.33 09.10 Accessing medical treatment and services for reproduction across the EU will also raise issues concerning the free movement of goods, notably the movement of cells and tissues. This has also necessitated legislation in order to protect public health and to prevent the transmission of infectious diseases by human cells and tissues used for therapeutic purposes. The European Union Tissues and Cells Directives (EUTCD) introduced common safety and quality standards for human tissues and cells across the European Union. The purpose of the Directives was to facilitate safer and easier exchange of tissues and cells (including human eggs and sperm) between Member States and to improve safety standards for European citizens. The European Tissues and Cells Directive or the Parent Directive (Directive 2004/23/EC)34 concerns standards for donation, procurement and testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution. The First Technical Directive (Directive 2006/17/EC)35 covers donation, procurement and testing. The Second Technical Directive (Directive 2006/86/EC)36 covers standards for traceability, notification of serious adverse reactions and events, and requirements for coding processing, preservation, storage and distribution.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 9 with Other Provisions of the Charter 09.11 The reference to marriage and the founding of family within Article  9 is without a specific ­context and as such has the potential to apply to any situation within the scope of EU competence which impacts upon these areas. There will, however, be a number of other Charter provisions which will overlap and interact with Article  9. In terms of the right to marry the most obvious is Article 7, which concerns the right to private and family life. This is because its equivalent under the ECHR, Article 8, has been claimed in addition and in conjunction with the right to marry under Article 12 ECHR. The concepts of both private and family life as developed by the ECtHR have thus been of particular relevance to transgender and same-sex ­individuals

30 Art 4, para 4. 31 Art 7, para 1. 32 Art 7, para 3. 33 Art 8. 34 Directive 2004/23/EC on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells [2004] OJ L102/48. 35 Directive 2006/17/EC implementing Directive 2004/23/EC as regards certain technical requirements for the­ donation, procurement and testing of human tissues and cells [2006] OJ L38/40. 36 Directive 2006/86/EC implementing Directive 2004/23/EC as regards traceability requirements, notification of serious adverse reactions and events and certain technical requirements for the coding, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells [2006] OJ L294/32. See subsequently Directive 2015/565 amending Directive 2006/86/EC as regards certain technical requirements for the coding of human tissues and cells ([2015] OJ L 93/43) and Directive 2015/566 implementing Directive 2004/23/EC as regards the procedures for verifying the equivalent standards of quality and safety of imported tissues and cells ([2015] OJ L93/56).

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seeking the right not only to marry but also to preserve their rights of privacy and family life—to a mixed degree of success, depending upon the context of the claims.37 There are also a number of other articles within the Charter which will carry additional weight in the making of such arguments: the right to dignity under Article 1, the right to equality under the law (Art 20), the right to equality between men and women under Article 23 and the right to freedom from discrimination under Article 22. In terms of the right to found a family, Article  7 will again be of particular significance, 09.12 given that this right includes areas of the law concerning procreation and reproductive rights as well as adoption. Claims made concerning the ability to adopt will also draw in Article 24, which concerns the rights of the child, who will also have a separate claim to family life under Article 7. Here, a potential conflict may arise between the interests of the child and that of the state which must ensure that children are placed for adoption with appropriate adoptive parents. The interpretation of ‘appropriate’ within this context has resulted in a number of conflicts in some Member States, where same-sex and single parents have been deemed to be unsuitable candidates for adoption. Additional claims by these individuals may also be made under Article 1 (dignity) and Article 21 (non-discrimination). Claims made concerning reproductive rights may also engage Article 3 (right to integrity), Article 35 (right to healthcare) and Article 45 (freedom of movement and residence). As with the right to marry, Strasbourg jurisprudence in relation to the corresponding articles under the ECHR (particularly Art 8) will be of particular relevance.

C.  Sources of Article 24 Rights I. ECHR The Explanations to the Charter state that Article 9 is based upon Article 12 of the ECHR, which 09.13 reads as follows: ‘Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family according to the national laws governing the exercising of this right.’ The Explanations go on to state that the wording of the article has been modernised to cover 09.14 cases in which national legislation recognises arrangements other than marriage for founding a family. Specifically, Article 9 neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to unions between people of the same sex. In addition, by its use of the wording ‘these rights’, Article 9 of the Charter approaches the rights contained—the right to found a family and the right to marry—as two different and separate rights, which implies that a causal connection between the two is not required. These rights are thus similar to that afforded by the ECHR, but their scope may be wider when national legislation so provides. However, it is also clear from the wording of Article 52(3) of the Charter38 that the principles established by the ECtHR in relation to the corresponding ECHR article: Article  12 will serve as a guide to the minimum level of protection that can be realised. Article 12 secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry and to found a family, 09.15 however, the right to divorce cannot be derived from it.39 The terms of the article also makes it 37 Claims by transgender applicants have been successful with regard to the right to marry, but less so with regards to the parenting aspect of family life. Similarly, claims by same-sex applicants have been more successful under the privacy elements of Art 8 of the ECHR than the family life aspect. 38 Which sets out that the meaning and scope of Charter rights are the same as those of the corresponding article of the ECHR. 39 Johnston v Ireland (1987) 9 EHRR 203 [52], where the Court concluded that the travaux préparatoires disclosed no intention to include in Art 12 any guarantee of a right to have the ties of marriage dissolved by divorce.



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clear that the right is subject to the national laws of the Contracting States. This is not to say, however, that the right will be subject to any national law. The ECtHR has held on a number of occasions that any limitations set by national laws must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired.40 The role of national law is therefore to ‘govern the exercise of the right’41 and this will include rules relating to the formalities of marriage, such as notice and licensing and more substantive rules on matters such as capacity, consanguinity and consent. National law may also introduce prohibitions on the basis that they are necessary to protect the interests of the wider society such as the prohibition of bigamous and polygamous marriages. Any such restrictions must, however, be in pursuit of a legitimate aim and must be proportionate; the very essence of the right must be retained. Thus, in B v UK42 the Court held that where an applicant could only exercise her right to marry her father-in-law by the passage of a private Act of Parliament, the impediment placed on such marriages served no useful purpose of public policy. The inconsistency between the stated aims of the incapacity and the waiver applied in some cases not only undermined the rationality and logic of the measure, but also served to reduce the significance that the Court would otherwise attach to the legislature’s consideration of the matter.43 The Court has also made it clear that any temporary prohibitions upon the right to marry, even if the legitimate aim being advanced is to protect the institution of marriage, will constitute a breach of the right. In F v Switzerland,44 a three-year prohibition on the applicant’s ability to remarry was thus determined to have affected the very essence of the right and was therefore held to be disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued. 09.16 The question to be asked in any claim brought under Article  12 is therefore, whether the alleged restriction restricts or reduces the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired, so as to be disproportionate to any legitimate aim pursued. Before answering this question, however, the Court, will first determine the extent, if any, of the margin of appreciation that it is to apply. The Court has often acknowledged that exercising the right to marry will often engage issues of social and legal policy and has indicated that it will be slow to intervene where the reason for introducing the restriction is justified on these grounds. It has also stated that ‘given the sensitive moral choices concerned and the importance to be attached in particular to the protection of children and the fostering of secure family environments’, it ‘must not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of the authorities who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society’.45 The application of these principles by the ECtHR is evidenced in a number of different areas which will be examined in later sections.

II.  Council of Europe Treaties 09.17 There are a number of Conventions which are relevant to the right to marry and found a f­ amily. First, there is the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance,46 which may be of assistance to those seeking fertility and pregnancy-related treatment. Under this Convention,

40 Rees v the United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56 [50]; F v Switzerland (1988) 10 EHRR 411 [32]. 41 Hamer v UK (1979) 4 EHRR 139 [60]. 42 B v UK (2005) 42 EHRR 195. 43 Ibid [40]. 44 F v Switzerland (1987) ECHR 32. 45 B and L v UK (2006) 42 EHRR 11. 46 Opened for signature on 11 December 1953 and entered into force 1 July 1954. Ratified by Belgium, Denmark, ­Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

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parties undertake to ensure that the nationals of other parties, who are lawfully present in their territory and who are without sufficient resources, are entitled to the same social and medical assistance as their own nationals. A further Protocol47 opened in Strasbourg for signature by the Members of the Council of Europe who have signed the principal agreement extended the benefit of the provisions of the Convention to refugees. In terms of adoption, the Convention on the Adoption of Children48 ensures that national law 09.18 on the protection of children applies not only to adoptions of children from the parties, but also to those of children from other states, and contains a core of essential provisions on adoption practice which each party undertakes to incorporate in its legislation, and a list of supplementary provisions to which parties are free to give effect. Thus, under the Convention’s essential provisions, adoption must be granted by a judicial or administrative authority, the decision to authorise the adoption of a child must be freely accepted by the parents and the adoption must be in the interest of the child. Further, the Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised)49 was created in order to take account of social and legal developments and to ensure that the existing Convention (outlined earlier) is in keeping with the European Convention on Human Rights. Significantly, the Convention is also extended to include heterosexual unmarried couples who have entered into a registered partnership in states which recognise that institution and leaves states free to extend adoptions to homosexual couples and same-sex couples living together in a stable relationship. In terms of marriage, in 2005 the Council of Europe adopted a resolution50 on forced 09.19 marriages and child marriages. The resolution defines forced marriage as the ‘union of two persons at least one of whom has not given their full and free consent to the marriage’,51 and child marriage as the ‘union of two persons at least one of whom is under 18 years of age’.52 It urges states to ratify relevant international treaties, comply with the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation (2002) on the protection of women against violence, set the minimum age for marriage at 18 years, and consider criminalising acts of forced marriage. Although not yet in force, the new landmark Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence53 is a further illustration of the Council’s commitment to combating two issues of particular relevance to the rights contained in Article 9 of the Charter. Article 37 of the Convention requires parties to take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the intentional conduct of forcing an adult or a child to enter into a marriage is criminalised and to ensure that the intentional conduct of luring an adult or a child to the territory of a party or state other than the one she or he resides in with the purpose of forcing this adult or child to enter into

47 ETS No 014A. 48 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, on 24 April 1967. Entry into force: 26 April 1968. It has been ratified by Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, ­Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of ­Macedonia and the UK. 49 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe and the non-Member States which have ­participated in its elaboration, in Strasbourg, on 27 November 2008. Entry into force: 1 September 2011. Ratified by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain and the Ukraine. 50 Resolution 1468(2005). 51 Ibid para 4. 52 Ibid para 7. 53 Open for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe, the non-Member States which have participated in its elaboration and the European Union, in Istanbul on 11 May 2011. In order to enter into force the Convention requires 10 ratifications, including at least eight Member States of the Council of Europe. So far the following Member States have ratified it: Albania, Italy, Montenegro, Portugal and Turkey.



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a marriage is also criminalised. Article 39 requires parties to take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conducts are criminalised: (a) performing an abortion on a woman without her prior and informed consent; (b) performing surgery which has the purpose or effect of terminating a woman’s capacity to naturally reproduce without her prior and informed consent or understanding of the ­procedure.

III.  UN Treaties 09.20 International law recognises the fact that the family plays an essential and central role in human society. The family is perceived to be ‘the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State’,54 and therefore the right of all to marry and found a family is protected in human rights law. However, perhaps in recognition of the many diverse forms of families and marriages that exist, a particular form of family unit has not been specified within international human rights law. The right of same-sex couples to marry can, nonetheless, be implied from a number of provisions concerning the right to marry and have a family, the right to equality and freedom from discrimination. Article  16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights55 (UDHR) upholds family as the natural and fundamental unit in society and recognises the right to equality and non-discrimination (Art 2). It also establishes the right of men and women to marry and found a family; their equal rights as to the marriage, and that consent to marriage should be freely given. As a resolution, the UDHR, it is not itself formally legally binding, however, it has established important principles and values which have been elaborated in later legally binding UN treaties, recommendations and resolutions.56 This includes Article 23(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),57 which recognises the ‘right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and found a family.’ Furthermore, the right to equality and non-discrimination is a cross-cutting issue of concern in different UN human rights instruments, such as Articles 2 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2(2) ICESCR, Article 2 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 7 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In addition, one of two major UN human rights treaties explicitly established to prohibit discrimination is on the ground of gender: the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 09.21 In terms of forced marriage, a number of international human rights treaties make it clear that no marriage should be entered into unless consent is freely given by the intending spouses. The forced marriage of girls under 18 is an area of particular concern. The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages58 reiterates the right

54 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A, UN GAOR, 3d Sess, Part 1, Art 16(3), 74, UN Doc A/810 (1948) (hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 55 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (Art 16) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. General Assembly res 217A (III), 10 December 1948. 56 Moreover, a number of its provisions have become part of customary international law. 57 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1966 and entered into force in 1976 in accordance with Art 49 It elaborates the principles laid out in UDHR and is legally binding on all states who have signed and ratified its provisions. 58 521 UNTS 231, entered into force 9 December 1964.

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to full consent and also requires states to establish a minimum age for marriage as does the Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages.59 However, the Convention itself does not stipulate a minimum age, nor does the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which defines a child as any person under 18 but allows states to specify their own age limits for different matters under national law. In terms of the right to found a family, the right of individuals to freely determine the number 09.22 and spacing of their children has been recognised in a number of UN population and development documents including the 1994 Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action, the 1968 Tehran Declaration and the 1985 Fourth World Conference in Beijing, which all contain provisions regarding the rights of individuals to family planning However, the right has not been enshrined in a legally binding human rights treaty, and the whole issue of family planning remains a controversial one for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, some work has been done in relation to adoption and fostering. Article  23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights60 (ICCPR) which guarantees the right to a family; the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with special reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally61 which provides important guidelines for the fostering and adoption, including inter-country adoptions of children who lack appropriate parental care. Finally, there are a number of UN treaties relating to specific categories of persons which 09.23 cover a range of issues relevant to Article 9. For refugees, there is Article 12 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,62 which includes guidelines and principles established under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to strengthen provisions regarding refugee rights to family. For women, there is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,63 which includes provisions on marriage and nationality (Art 9), equality and consent, rights and responsibilities within marriage, family planning, guardianship and adoption, women’s right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation, ownership and property, minimum age for marriage, and compulsory registration of marriages (Art 16). Finally, for migrant workers there is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,64 which is the most recent of the main UN human rights treaties, entering into force on 1 July 2003. The Convention explicitly refers to migrant workers and ‘members of their family’ and states that they shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals with regard to access to education, social and health services and participation in cultural life.

59 GA res 2018 (XX), 20 UN GAOR Supp (No 14), 36, UN Doc A/60141 (1965). 60 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights elaborates the principles laid out in UDHR and is legally binding on all states who have signed and ratified its provisions. Art 23 states: ‘1. The family is the natural and ­fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.’ Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Art 49. 61 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/85 of 3 December 1986. 62 Adopted on 28 July 1951 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and ­Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 1950. Entry into force 22 April 1954, in accordance with Art 43. 63 Opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 640(VII) of 20 December 1952, entry into force 7 July 1954, in accordance with Art VI. 64 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990, entered into force on 1 July 2003.



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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 09.24 Article 9 is addressed to the protection of the rights to marry and found a family within European Union law, and as such has general application to any field of EU law where these rights may be affected. It should also be noted that Article 9 of the Charter approaches the rights at stake, ie the right to found a family and the right to marry, as two different and separate rights, ­suggesting that the former is not necessarily connected with the latter. It appears from the wording, ie, the usage of the plural form ‘these rights’, that a disconnection between the right to marry and to found a family has been envisaged. In other words, a marriage does not necessarily imply procreation. This in itself signals a broader approach to Article 9 compared to eg Article 16 of the UDHR, Article 12 of the ECHR and Article 23 of the ICCPR. 09.25 The similarity between Article 12 of the ECHR and Article 9 of the Charter also means that a number of matters may be confidently asserted. First, the scope of Article 9, as with Article 12 of the ECHR, is wide-ranging and its application will be relevant to a number of overlapping contexts. The well-established case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in this area has already served as an important source in its application in certain areas and may thus also therefore serve as a good illustration of the potential future scope of Article 9 in others. Second, Article 9 as with Article 12 will include both negative and positive obligations which will be imposed upon the institutions of the EU as well as Member States when implementing EU law. Finally, as with Article  8 of the ECtHR, Article  9 has the potential to be utilised in claims which raise issues of a particularly sensitive or moral nature and/or upon which there is an insufficient consensus across Member States. As a result, a wide margin of appreciation has often been accorded in such cases by the ECtHR.65 These issues will now be considered in greater detail.

II.  Scope of Application 09.26 There have been a number of CJEU judgments that have dealt indirectly with some of the issues that have arisen under Article 12 of the ECHR—most notably, transgender and same sex rights within the field of gender and sexual orientation discrimination and the right to reproductive treatment within the field of free movement of goods and services. Nonetheless, the CJEU has yet to hear a claim based specifically on Article 9 of the Charter. As a result, the scope of application of Article 9 is, at least at present, largely dependent upon the case law emanating from Article 12 of the ECHR and to a certain extent from Article 8 ECHR (the right to private and family life) which has had an interdependent effect upon the interpretation of certain areas which fall within the scope of both articles. These areas have included transsexual rights, samesex couples rights and the right to adoption. The scope of Article 12 has been fairly wide-ranging and a number of issues have arisen with respect to the two rights contained within it, some of which are interrelated. In terms of the right to marry these have included: the rights of transsexuals to marry; whether same-sex couples should be afforded the right; and, generally, under what

65 As an example, this was the reason why breaches were not found to have occurred for a number of years with respect to the inability of transsexuals to marry (see Cossey v the United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 622 [38]–[40]; S­ heffield and Horsham v the United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 163 [57]–[61] and X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHHR 143 [44], [52]).

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circumstances is it permissible to restrict the right (eg prisoners, cultural and religious issues and immigration). Although the right to found a family would engage a number of issues such as the right to procreation and the right to adoption, cases on these areas have utilised Article 8 (the right to family life) as the main basis of the claim. These issues serve to reflect the changing nature of families and relationships and the impact of migration and immigration across Member States; however, they also demonstrate the difference in national responses and attitudes in certain areas of particular sensitivity upon which a sufficient degree of consensus is yet to emerge. As a result a larger degree of latitude may be given to Member States on such matters. These issues will be considered in detail in the next section.

III.  Specific Provisions (a)  The Right to Marry Transgender Rights One of the most significant consequences for transgender individuals in Member States that 09.27 do not yet legally recognise gender change is their inability to marry as their chosen gender. In addition, official records may continue to record the person as being of his or her original gender, causing difficulties and embarrassment. Such difficulties engage Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the ECHR, and as a result a number of challenges were taken to the ECtHR in respect of these provisions. However, in a series of cases decided between 1986 and 199866 the ECtHR applied a wide margin of appreciation, albeit by a steadily narrowing majority, to find that, although the legislation that was being challenged engaged the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article  8 and the right to marry under Article  12, no breach of either of these articles had occurred because of the lack of a European consensus on the matter.67 The Court thus found that the attachment to the traditional concept of marriage which underpins Article 12 provided sufficient reason for the continued adoption by the respondent state of biological criteria for determining a person’s sex for the purposes of marriage. Consequently, this was considered a matter encompassed within the power of the Contracting States to regulate by national law the exercise of the right to marry. Nevertheless, in each case that came before it, it became progressively clear that the Court recognised that some form of consensus amongst member states was steadily growing68 and in 2002, in two landmark decisions, the ECtHR reversed its previous decisions and substantially narrowed the margin of appreciation that it had previously applied. In Goodwin v UK 69 and I v UK 70 two transgender applicants sought a declaration that their Article 8 and 12 rights had been violated. In its judgment in favour of the applicants the ECtHR considered that the terms used 09.28 by Article  12 which referred to the right of a man and woman to marry no longer had to be understood as determining gender by purely biological criteria. In that context, the Court noted that there had been major social changes in the institution of marriage since the adoption of the Convention. Furthermore, it referred to Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 66 Rees v the United Kingdom (n 40); Cossey v the United Kingdom (n 65); Sheffield and Horsham (n 65). 67 See the discussion of this case law in Choudhry and Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010). 68 The only area in which the ECtHR was willing to find a violation was in relation to countries where people were required to carry identity cards and to produce them to officials on request, or as a condition for obtaining access to public benefits. See B v France [1992] 2 FLR 249. 69 Goodwin (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 70 I [2002] 3 FCR 613.



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European Union, which departed from the wording of Article 12.71 The Court also noted that there was widespread acceptance of the marriage of transsexuals in their assigned gender. As a result the Court found that the impossibility for a post-operative transsexual to marry in her assigned gender violated Article 12 of the Convention. Two further cases are also of interest in the present context: Parry v the United Kingdom72 and R and F v the United Kingdom.73 In both cases the applicants were a married couple, consisting of a woman and a male-to-female post-operative transsexual. They complained under Article  12 of the Convention that they were required to end their marriage if the second applicant wished to obtain full legal recognition of her change of gender. Here the ECtHR dismissed that complaint as being manifestly ill-founded. It noted that domestic law only permitted marriage between persons of opposite gender, whether such gender derived from attribution at birth or from a gender recognition procedure, while same-sex marriages were not permitted. Similarly, Article 12 enshrined the traditional concept of marriage as being between a man and a woman. The Court acknowledged that a number of Contracting States had extended marriage to same-sex partners, but went on to say that this reflected their own vision of the role of marriage in their societies, and did not flow from an interpretation of the fundamental right as laid down by the Contracting States in the Convention in 1950. The Court thus concluded that it fell within the state’s margin of appreciation to regulate the effects of the change of gender on pre-existing marriages. In addition it considered that, should they choose to divorce in order to allow the transsexual partner to obtain full gender recognition, the fact that the applicants had the possibility to enter into a civil partnership contributed to the proportionality of the gender recognition regime complained of. 09.29 Nonetheless, following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v UK, there should no longer be any legal restrictions in the Member States on transgender persons marrying a person of the opposite-sex. Moreover, given that Article  9 of the Charter does not specify the sex to which the right will apply, any claims made with regard to the recognition of transgender marriage are stronger as compared to Article  12 of the ECHR. This is because a good deal of the arguments against transgender rights to marry cited at the ECtHR centred on the requirement in Article 12 for a ‘man and a woman’ to marry and found a family, and the implications this held for same-sex marriage. The ECHR case law also implies that there are no grounds for other EU Member States to refuse to recognise such marriages. There are, however, situations where transgender persons cannot marry their partners within some Member States. This is clearly the case for transgender persons with a gay or lesbian sexual orientation. Another situation is where gender identity is not yet fully recognised within national law. In addition, some states make gender recognition conditional upon undergoing gender reassignment surgery. According to the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe74 these practices run counter to the principle of respect for the physical integrity of the person, in particular because transgender people appear to be the only group in Europe subject to legally prescribed, state-enforced sterilisation. It also raises issues with regard to Article  3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the right to the integrity of the person.75

71 At para 100. 72 Parry v UK App no 42971/05 (28 November 2006). 73 R and F v UK App no 35748/05 (28 November 2006). 74 See Issue paper on Human Rights and Gender identity or the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, CommDH/IssuePaper(2009)2. 75 The Austrian Administrative High Court and the Federal Supreme Court of Germany have ruled that ­mandatory surgery cannot be a prerequisite for gender change. After the Constitutional Court ruled against the case (VfGH 29.09.2008, B 411/08, B 412/08), the Administrative High Court made the legal change possible in 2009 (VwGH 27.2. 2009). BVerfG, 1 BvL 3/03 (6 December 2005).

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Where transgender persons consequently find themselves within unmarried partnerships, then the rules on unmarried partners will apply. These issues raise a number of concerns with regard to the freedom of movement of transgender individuals seeking to marry or have their relationship officially recognised in Member States who have not adequately implemented the established jurisprudence of the ECHR. Clearly, if the result is a difference in treatment with regard to access to social security benefits, employment, occupation and equal pay such treatment could also fall foul of the ‘Recast Directive’. These claims are now further bolstered by the Charter, specifically Article 9 as well as the right to private and family life under Article 7. They will also engage the right to dignity (Art 1), the right to equality under the law (Art 20), the right to equality between men and women (Art 23) and the right to freedom from discrimination (Art 22). However, the CJEU has to date addressed the issue as a form of discrimination, ruling against a national law which requires a transgender person not to be married to a person of the acquired gender in order to obtain the state pension.76 Same-sex Marriage The ECtHR has taken a rather conservative view on this issue by according a wide margin of 09.30 appreciation to claims made under the Article 12 seeking the recognition of same-sex marriage. As a result, it has made it clear that the right to marriage that is protected by the article is marriage between two people of the opposite sex.77 In Goodwin78 the Court noted that that the findings in the cases of Rees,79 Cossey,80 and Sheffield and Horsham81 were ‘based variously on the reasoning that the right to marry referred to traditional marriage between persons of opposite biological sex’.82 This stance has been maintained in relation to claims brought by transgender individuals who did not wish to either go through the process of remarriage83 or full gender reassignment84 to achieve legal recognition of their new gender on the basis that to do so would effectively allow same sex marriage through the back door. More recently, in the case of Schalk and Kopf v Austria85 the Court specifically confirmed that states are not obliged to ensure the right to marry to homosexual couples. Here, the applicants, a same-sex couple, wished to marry; however, under domestic law a marriage could only be concluded between persons of opposite sex. Following their subsequent constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court held that neither the Austrian Constitution nor the European Convention required that the concept of marriage, which was geared to the possibility of parenthood, should be extended to relationships of a different kind, and that the protection of same-sex relationships under the Convention

76 Case C-451/16 MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, ECLI:EU:C:2018:492, distinguishing Hämäläinen v Finland App no 37359/09 (16 July 2014) in which the European Court of Human Rights ruled that there was no breach of the ECHR when a transgender person sought to be registered as the acquired gender, because the position was not comparable with those who had that gender from birth. 77 Rees v the United Kingdom (n 40); Cossey v the United Kingdom (n 65); Sheffield and Horsham (n 65). 78 Goodwin (n 69). 79 Rees v the United Kingdom (n 40). 80 Cossey v the United Kingdom (n 65). 81 Sheffield and Horsham (n 65). 82 Goodwin (n 69) [97]. 83 Parry v UK (n 72). See also R and F v UK (n 73), decided on the same day with very similar facts and the same outcome. 84 L v Lithuania (2008) 46 EHRR 22. 85 Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (24 June 2010). There is, however, an obligation based on Art 8 ECHR to make available some form of civil status for same-sex unions: Orliari and others v Italy, Apps nos 18766/11 and 36030/11 (21 July 2015) and Orlandi and others v Italy, Apps nos 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 and 60088/12 (14 Dec 2017).



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did not give rise to an obligation to change the law on marriage. Subsequently, the Registered Partnership Act entered into force in Austria, aiming to provide same-sex couples with a formal mechanism for recognising and giving legal effect to their relationships. While the Act provided registered partners with many of the same rights and obligations as spouses, some differences remained, in particular registered partners were unable to adopt or undergo artificial insemination. Nonetheless, although the ECtHR conceded that the applicants’ relationship fell within the notion of family life, it nonetheless concluded that Article 12 did not impose an obligation on states to grant same-sex couples access to marriage. Further, it noted that despite the emerging tendency to recognise same-sex partnerships legally, this area should still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established consensus, where states enjoyed a margin of appreciation in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes. As a result, the Court ruled that there was no violation of Article 12 (right to marry), Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) or Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the ECHR. 09.31 In terms of the Charter however, Article 9, as the ECtHR noted in Schalk and Kopf,86 unlike Article  12 of the ECHR, is gender-neutral; it does not specify that marriage has to take place between a man and a woman. As a result, Article  9 allows for the argument that there is no obstacle to recognise same-sex relationships in the context of marriage.87 Indeed, as noted in the previous section, this particular feature of Article 9 was cited by the ECtHR in support of the recognition of the transgender applicants’ right to marry in Goodwin v UK.88 The difference between the two provisions is significant for two reasons. First, because it means that the scope of Article 9 is wider than that of Article 12, in that it may be extended to include same-sex marriages if allowed for by national legislation. Second, and more crucially, it provides a good basis for the CJEU to go further than the current ECtHR position in extending the protection of Article 9 to include the requirement to recognise same-sex marriage regardless of national legislation. In the event, however, the CJEU has recognised a right of residence for a same-sex spouse on the basis of the definition of ‘spouse’ in EU free movement law, bolstering that by reference to Article 7 of the Charter rather than Article 9.89 (b)  The Right to Found a Family Procreation—Access to Reproductive Services and Technology 09.32 Both the ECtHR and the CJEU are yet to decide a case brought specifically in this area which is based upon Article  12 of the ECHR and Article  9 of the Charter. Nonetheless, this does not preclude the interpretation of the right to include the right of access to new reproductive ­technologies to assist in the foundation of a family, particularly within the context of EU citizens who are increasingly willing to undergo fertility treatment and/or procure donated sperm and eggs outside of their home Member State. Moreover there is the question of who pays for such goods and services—the patient or the home Member State. Quite predictably, practice differs across Member States, with some guaranteeing access to treatment for reproductive services paid for in full or part by the state, and others who provide no state-funded treatment of this nature. Furthermore, some countries restrict access to reproductive services on the basis of regulations

86 At para 60. 87 At para 60. The court also went on to say however that ‘as matters stand, the question whether or not to allow ­same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national law of the Contracting State’ paragraph 61. 88 Goodwin v the United Kingdom and I v the United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18 [101]. 89 Case C-673/15, Relu Adrian Coman and others v Inspectoratul General Pentru Imigrări and others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.

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designed to allocate resources according to perceived need and chances of success (the existence of other children and age being factors against treatment) or on ethical and moral considerations (such as sexual orientation or gender identity). The latter question is to a large extent answered by the Directive on the Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare (detailed above). Although it gives EU citizens the right to obtain from abroad any care not requiring a hospital stay without advance authorisation, where in-patient care or certain specialised investigations are involved, Member States may create a system of prior authorisation to enable them to manage patient flows and avoid threats to the financial and operational sustainability of their health systems. In both cases, patients will only be entitled to reimbursement under this Directive up to what would have been paid for if the care was provided at home. Nonetheless the Directive clearly benefits those individuals who have the means to pay upfront for medical treatment and who seek to avoid delays in the provision of that treatment in the home Member State. Within the context of reproductive services, delay can have a crucial effect to the efficacy of the treatment and although the ability to move to another Member State to avoid such delays is thus a clear benefit of the Directive, one must also consider the inherent inequality that is implied; only those who have the resources to travel and pay for such treatment are fully able to exercise the free movement rights anticipated by the Directive.90 Combined with Article  9, the nondiscrimination principle contained in Article 21 of the Charter could thus become of relevance when addressing matters relating to the equality of access to healthcare services referred to in the right to healthcare contained in Article 35.91 In terms of ethical and moral conditions of treatment, these can be avoided either by travel 09.33 to a Member State that does not have such conditions, or in the case of an EU citizen who has moved from a more liberal funding environment to a more conservative one by challenging the difference in treatment. In both cases EU legislation concerning the free movement of goods and services will be activated.92 The ability to access healthcare services that may be prohibited or unavailable in a patient’s home Member State was first established in The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan. In this case the CJEU considered that an abortion was capable of being within the meaning of a service for the purposes of the EC Treaty when performed legally in the Member State in question. This decision went on to provide the basis for other related challenges. In R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Ex p Blood,93 a woman wished to challenge, using her rights of free movement, the refusal of the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to allow her to export the sperm of her deceased husband to another Member State in order to instigate fertility treatment. The refusal was based on the fact that she had not, as required by English law at the time, obtained written

90 D Da Costa Leite Borges, ‘Making sense of human rights in the context of European Union health-care policy: ­individualist and communitarian views’ (2011) 7(3) International Journal of Law in Context 335–56. 91 Although the reference to established national laws and practices in Art 35 may appear to limit the scope of the provision, it has been argued that the article could still be used in the future by individuals travelling to another Member State to receive treatment and then claiming reimbursement of such claims. See McHale, ‘Fundamental Rights and Health Care’, in E Mossialis et al, Health Systems Governance in Europe, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 282–314, 303 and her argument in relation to AG Opinion ­(Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer) in Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki v NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation (OAEE) [2007] ECR I-3185. 92 The right to shop around for healthcare services including those that are prohibited or otherwise unavailable in a patient’s home country was established in Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan (4 October 1991) [21], which established that a controversial medical procedure (in this case an abortion) had the status of a service within the meaning of the EC Treaty when performed legally in the Member State in question. 93 R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Ex p Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687.



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consent from her husband prior to his death. It was found, however, that under Articles 59 and 60 of the EC Treaty that Diane Blood had a directly enforceable right to receive medical treatment in another EU state, and in light of the Court of Appeal’s decision the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) granted an export licence for Mrs Blood to be treated in Belgium. Future challenges based on differences in treatment, particularly in relation to same-sex couples can thus be envisaged and it is here that the provisions of the Charter may be of relevance in bolstering the arguments, most notably Article 9, Article 21 (non-discrimination) and Article 35 (right to healthcare services). Adoption 09.34 The right to adopt a child, who is not the natural child of the person concerned, is not per se included in Article 9 of the Charter. It is also not provided for by the Convention.94 However, in a series of cases concerning claims made under Article 8 of the ECHR, the ECtHR appears to be developing the right to equal access to the right to adopt which may in turn be useful for the development of the scope of the right to found a family contained in Article 9 of the Charter. In Fretté v France95 the Court found that the refusal to allow a gay man to adopt a child because of his sexual orientation did not constitute a breach of his right to private life under Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14. A wide margin of appreciation was applied due to ‘the delicate issues raised in the case’, which touched on areas where there was little common ground amongst the Member States. Although some movement did occur on the issue of same-sex adoption in EB v France,96 where the ECtHR found, by a small majority, that a refusal tp permit an individual who was in a same-sex relationship to adopt a child as a single person was a breach of both her Article 8 and Article 14 rights, it was in relation to their approach to sexual orientation discrimination rather than the family life of the applicant, who did not help matters by basing her claim on the private life aspects of Article 8.97 Any inroads made in EB appeared to have been cancelled out by the decision in Gas and Dubois v France,98 where the Court seems to have switched back to a more restrictive stance regarding the issue. The case concerned the refusal of an applicant’s request for the adoption of the child of her same-sex partner with whom she had entered into a civil partnership which was not found to be a breach of either Article 14 or Article 8. Of particular note are the Court’s comments concerning the status of the civil partnership and the apparent lack of weight it held. Not only did the Court reaffirm the fact that marriage confers a ‘special status’, but also that ‘where a State chooses to provide same-sex couples with an alternative means of recognition, it enjoys a certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred.’99 In this case the margin was clearly very wide. However, in a very recent decision the ECtHR adopted a more liberal position, although it was careful to distinguish the facts from those of Gas and Dubois.

94 See X v Belgium and the Netherlands App no 6482/74 (Commission decision of 10 July 1975, DR 7) 75. 95 Fretté v France (2004) 38 EHRR 21. 96 EB v France App no 43546/02 (22 January 2008). 97 In distinguishing the case from Fretté the Court reiterated that differences based on sexual orientation required particularly serious reasons by way of justification but, nonetheless, found that, in this case, no such reasons had been advanced by the Government. Further, although Art 8 did not imply such a right, given that French law allowed single persons to adopt, thereby opening up the possibility of adoption by a single homosexual such as the applicant, the refusal of EB’s adoption application had been based on discriminatory grounds. 98 Gas and Dubois v France App no 25951/07 (15 March 2012). 99 Ibid 66.

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In X and Others v Austria100 two women who lived in a stable homosexual relationship 09.35 complained about the Austrian courts’ refusal to grant one of the partners the right to adopt the son of the other partner without severing the mother’s legal ties with the child (second-parent adoption). The Court found that the difference in treatment between the applicants and an unmarried heterosexual couple in which one partner sought to adopt the other partner’s child had been based on the first and third applicants’ sexual orientation. No convincing reasons had been advanced to show that such difference in treatment was necessary for the protection of the family or for the protection of the interests of the child. At the same time, the Court underlined that the Convention did not oblige states to extend the right to second-parent adoption to unmarried couples. Furthermore, the case was to be distinguished from Gas and Dubois v France, in which the Court had found that there was no difference of treatment based on sexual orientation between an unmarried different-sex couple and a same-sex couple as, under French law, second-parent adoption was not open to any unmarried couple, whether they be homosexual or heterosexual. Accordingly, the Court found that a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article  8 had occurred on account of the difference in treatment of the applicants in comparison with unmarried different-sex couples in which one partner wished to adopt the other partner’s child. However, no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 was found when the applicants’ situation was compared with that of a married couple in which one spouse wished to adopt the other spouse’s child.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations Article 9 of the Charter as with Article 12 of the ECHR does not contain a specific limitation 09.36 clause; however, as noted above, the terms of the article refer to the fact that the right is subject to the national laws of the Contracting States. National law may thus introduce prohibitions on the basis that they are necessary to protect the interests of the wider society. However, as the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has made clear, any limitations set by national laws must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired, and must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim and must be proportionate. There are two main areas which may be of particular significance as far as EU law is concerned. Immigration The first point to note about the right to marry within the context of immigration is that it 09.37 concerns the right to form a marital relationship and a family, and as such is quite distinct from the right to respect for family life, which relates to families seeking immigration authorisation on the basis of a family relationship. Potential areas of difficulty arise in relation to national laws passed by Member States aimed at combating the phenomenon of sham marriages or marriages of convenience ostensibly entered into for the purposes of circumventing immigration rules. Closely related to this issue are concerns about forced and arranged marriages and the ­distinction that should be made between the two. The EU has also taken action, and as noted above, Articles 4 and 16 of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC101 allow for Member States to take certain action against forced and sham marriages. Further, Article 35 of the Free





100 X

and Others v Austria App no 19010/07 (19 February 2013). 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, [2003] OJ L251/12.

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Movement Directive 2004/38102 allows Member States to take ‘measures to refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages of convenience’, but only if the measures are ‘proportionate’ and pass ‘the procedural safeguards provided for in Articles 30 and 31’. 09.38 There is just one case on this issue from the ECtHR, and none emanating from the Charter. In O’Donoghue v United Kingdom, the Court considered whether the Certificate of Approval scheme in the UK, which required those subject to immigration control to obtain a certificate from the Home Office before they were permitted to get married, was consistent with the Convention. The case concerned the impediments to contracting a marriage (and thus forming a family) that were imposed by the UK. The restriction was imposed by the immigration authorities on the right to marry itself, and was not a rule about the immigration consequences that might flow from the marriage. Prior to 2009, this scheme required the payment of a £295 fee, and at no time was the scheme ever applied to individuals getting married in the Church of England. The applicants claimed that they were prevented from getting married for two years, first because Mr Iwu, a Nigerian national with discretionary leave to remain in the UK, did not meet the requirements of the scheme until 2007, and then because they could not afford to pay the £295 fee. The ECtHR found a violation of Article  12, on the basis that even though the imposition of reasonable conditions on a foreign national’s ability to marry would not be a violation of Article 12, the UK scheme did violate Article 12 as the periods of time involved in the process and the fee charged were not reasonable. The scheme was not rationally connected to the stated aim of reducing the incidence of sham marriages, since when deciding whether to issue the required certificate, the determinative test was only the immigration status of the individual applicant, and no enquiries were made to establish the genuineness of the marriage. Further, they found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 12, given the less favourable treatment of those not willing and able to marry in the Church of England; and moreover, a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, given the difference in treatment of those not willing and able to marry in the Church of England. Member States must therefore be careful that any schemes designed to combat sham marriages are consistent with the approach of the ECtHR under Article 12. Cultural and Religious Issues 09.39 The ECtHR has established a number of principles with respect to restrictions imposed on the form of marriage. Firstly, the obligation to contract a marriage in accordance with forms ­prescribed by law rather than a particular religious ritual is not a refusal of the right to marry.103 This principle has also been applied to marriages conducted according to cultural rites.104 A claim made in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR is also likely to fail due to the fact that the court has held that under that article marriage cannot be considered simply as a form of expression of thought, conscience or religion but is governed by the specific provisions of Article 12.105 The question of whether a polygamous marriage is compatible with the Convention has not,

102 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, amending Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. 103 X v Federal Republic of Germany App no 6167/73 (18 December 1974). 104 Hopic and Hopic-Destanova v the Netherlands App no 13158/87 (13 August 1987). 105 Janis Khan v UK App no 11579/85 (7 July 1986).

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however, been dealt with as an aspect of Article 12 due to the fact that the one case that has been considered concerned an application for the right of entry for a polygamous wife, and the claim related to her right to respect for family life.106 In Bibi v the UK107 the applicant’s mother had been denied permission to enter the UK due to the fact that she was the first of two women who had married the applicant’s father. Section 2 of the Immigration Act 1988 provided that a woman would not be granted a certificate of entitlement to the right of abode, on the basis of a polygamous marriage, if another woman had already been admitted to the UK as the wife of the same husband. The second wife of the applicant’s father had already settled in the UK. The applicant therefore complained of an infringement of her right to respect for family life and alleged that the refusal to allow her mother to enter the UK as her father’s wife discriminated on the grounds of sex, in that it allowed the husband to choose the wife who shall join him in the UK. Although the ECtHR dealt with the claim under Article 8, some of their reasoning for rejecting the claim could foreseeably be applied to any future claims under Article  12: the interference with the applicant’s right to family life created by the refusal of entry to the UK was in accordance with the law, which was intended to prevent the formation of polygamous households, the practice of polygamy being deemed unacceptable to the majority of people who live in the UK.108 Further, a wide margin of appreciation would generally be accorded to a state concerning its immigration policy in establishing an immigration policy on the basis of family ties; Contracting States cannot be required to give full recognition to polygamous marriages which are in conflict with their own legal order.109 As a result, it is unlikely that any claims made under Article 9 (or indeed Art 7) of the Charter concerning the legal recognition of polygamous marriages will succeed. This is particularly so given that legislative provision that has been made against such recognition by the EU in the Family Reunification Directive.110

V. Remedies Given the diverse fields of law to which the right to marry and found a family can be applied, the 09.40 applicable remedies are likely to depend on the context of the case. In some cases, Article 9 may be invoked as a ground for judicial review of a legislative act, in which case the remedy could be the annulment of the legislative act, or an element thereof. Other cases are likely to concern the denial of a benefit to a specific individual where the remedy may entail a reconsideration of the original decision, rather than an annulment of the underpinning legal act. What has become clear from cases concerning both Article 9 of the Charter and Article 12 ECHR is that significant latitude is given to Member States with regard to the interpretation and implementation of the guarantees contained. Both the ECtHR and the CJEU have often left the substantive decision to national courts, choosing instead to provide guidance as to the principles that govern the­ 106 Khan v the UK App no 19628/92 (29 June 1992) did consider this specifically from the point of view of Art 12 with respect to a husband seeking the permission to enter for his second wife; however, the claim was deemed inadmissible for reasons concerning the time-limit for the submission of the application. The substantive claims under Arts 8 and 12 were not dealt with. 107 Bibi v the UK App no 19628/92 (29 June 1992). 108 Ibid [1]. The Commission noted that for centuries it has been an offence in the UK, by virtue of the criminal law on bigamy, to contract a marriage with more than one woman at a time on UK territory. 109 Referring to Alilouch El Abasse v the Netherlands App no 14501/89 (6 December 1992) [1]. 110 Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/12 Art 4(4). See also Recital 11 in the preamble, which states, ‘The right to family reunification should be exercised in proper compliance with the values and principles recognised by the Member States, in particular with respect to the rights of women and of children; such compliance justifies the possible taking of restrictive measures against applications for family reunification of polygamous households.’



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a­ pplicability of the Articles. This has been particularly evident with regard to cases concerning same-sex couples, where the proportionality tests can be very fact-dependent and where some latitude has been given to Member States within the legislative provisions themselves with regard to the implementation of what are often politically sensitive issues. That is not to say that national courts are given an unfettered discretion. The ECtHR has also made it clear in cases such as Goodwin that the latitude or margin will be narrowed in cases where a European consensus has clearly emerged on the issue.

E. Evaluation 09.41 The inclusion of the rights to marry and found a family in the Charter is significant when it is recalled that family law has not generally been acknowledged as being within the specific competence of EU law. As a result, it indicates a clear commitment to acknowledging the everincreasing and often indirect impact upon these areas of family life of both EU and non-EU citizens of EU law. The lack of specific cases on Article 9 with regard to the CJEU is unfortunate, but it is perhaps quite predictable that the CJEU will, as it has done with Article 7, make clear that the scope and interpretation of the right to family life under Article 9 of the Charter will be the same as that under Article 12 of the ECHR, which will no doubt lead to an increase in the pervasive influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in this area. The real challenge therefore lies in the CJEU’s willingness, when the opportunity arises, to go further than Strasbourg in its interpretation of the guarantees contained in Article 9 as allowed for by Article 52 of the Charter.

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Article 10 Article 10 Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 10 The right guaranteed in paragraph 1 corresponds to the right guaranteed in Article 9 of the ECHR and, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, has the same meaning and scope. Limitations must therefore respect Article 9(2) of the Convention, which reads as follows: ‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ The right guaranteed in paragraph 2 corresponds to national constitutional traditions and to the development of national legislation on this issue.

Select Bibliography There is an extensive literature on the European Convention on Human Rights, but the literature on EU law and religion is more limited. N Doe, Law and Religion in Europe (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2012). MC Foblets et al, Belief Law and Politics: What Future for a Secular Europe? (Farnham, Ashgate, 2014). F Foret Religion and Politics in the European Union: A Secular Canopy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015). R McCrea, Religion and the Public Order of the European Union (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2013). R McCrea ‘Singing from the Same Hymnsheet: What the Differences between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts Tell Us about Religious Freedom, Non-Discrimination, and the Secular State’ (2016) 5(2) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 183–210. J Rivers, ‘In Pursuit of Pluralism: the Ecclesiastical Polity of the European Union’ (2004) 7(34) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 267–91. G Robbers (ed), State and Church in the European Union, 2nd edn (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005).

A.  Field of Application of Article 10 Article 10 does not provide the Union with a roaming mandate to ensure the protection of 10.01 ­freedom of thought, conscience and religion. As Article 51(2) notes, the Charter ‘does not ­establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify the powers and

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

tasks defined by the Treaties’.1 Of course, this does not mean that the Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency may not concern itself with the protection of freedom of conscience and religion in the Member States, or that violations of religious freedom outside of the field of application of EU law may not be part of a general enquiry into whether a state is in ‘serious and persistent breach’ of fundamental rights for the purposes of having its Treaty rights suspended under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union.2 Indeed, in 2013, Member States unanimously agreed guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief3 that were intended to guide the Union in its external policy, meaning that a commitment to religious freedom ought to influence the Union’s external action. Nevertheless, in common with the other provisions of the Charter, Article 10’s function is not to confer additional jurisdiction but to act as a constraint on the Union in the exercise of its powers and functions. Article 10 binds ‘the institutions of the Union’ as well as the Member States ‘only when they are implementing EU law’.4 10.02 This means that in matters such as its dealings with the staff of its institutions and in passing legislation, the European Union must ensure adequate respect for rights of thought, conscience and religion. It also means that EU legislation will be interpreted so as to ensure protection of this right, something that is of particular relevance to matters such as anti-discrimination legislation5 and provisions regarding working time6 and animal slaughter,7 all of which can impact on religious practices. In addition, Member States, in implementing EU legislation and carrying out Treaty obligations, will be obliged to respect freedom of conscience and religion. Any derogations by Member States from, for example, the rights of free movement granted by the Treaty’s free movement provisions will have to be exercised so as not to impact unduly on religious freedom. 10.03 While the Union has long been bound to respect religious freedom as part of the ‘general principles of law’8 created by the Court of Justice to protect fundamental rights in the pre-Charter era, in the past the religious freedom aspect was rather underplayed in judgments in cases where individuals or organisations sought to exercise free movement rights for religious purposes. Cases such as Steymann,9 which analysed the free movement of persons in the context of the choice of an individual to move to reside in a religious community, and Eglise scientologie,10 which assessed the compatibility of legislation restricting the financial transactions carried out by the Church of Scientology, were both decided without explicit reference to the right to religious freedom. Now that there is an explicit commitment to protecting religious freedom in the Charter this is no longer the case and the Court of Justice has explicitly referred to the Charter in key rulings on discrimination in employment11 and asylum.12

1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01. 2 Ibid Art 51(1). 3 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief ’, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 24 June 2013. 4 Charter (n 1), Art 52(1). 5 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16–22. 6 Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [1993] OJ L307/18–24. 7 Council Directive 93/119/EC on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing [1993] OJ L340/21–34. 8 See Case 36/75 Rutili v Minstre de l’Interieur [1975] ECR 1219; Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. 9 Case 196/87 Steymann v Staatsecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 6159. 10 Case C-54/99 Association Eglise de scientology de Paris and Scientology International Reserves Trust v The Prime Minister [2000] ECR I-5475. 11 Case C-157/15 Achbita ECLI:EU:C:2017:203, Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui ECLI:EU:C:2017:204, Case C-414/16 Egenberger ECLI:EU:C:2018:257 and Case C-68/17 JQ v IR ECLI:EU:C:2018:696. 12 Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11 Y and Z ECLI:EU:C:2012:518.

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Importantly, under the case law of the ECHR,13 under the 2013 EU Guidelines14 and following 10.04 the long-standing practice of EU institutions,15 the right protected under EU law applies to both religious and non-religious beliefs. While this chapter will refer to ‘religious freedom’ in the interests of brevity, it is important to remember that EU law (unlike the law in many other areas of the world) gives equal non-religious philosophical beliefs. As will be discussed below, the right protected by Article 10 is one that can be restricted in a number of circumstances. Many of the limitations on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion that will apply to Article 10 will arise from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The explanatory text provided in relation to Article 10 that is quoted above, makes it clear that it is intended to have ‘the same meaning and scope’ as Article 9 ECHR. The jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court therefore has a key influence on the development of Article 10 within EU law, though in certain areas, most notably the area of discrimination by religious employers to maintain their ethos, EU law is carving out an independent path.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 10 with Other Provisions of the Charter The rights protected by Article 10 have a complex and at times competitive relationship to other 10.05 articles of the Charter. Sometimes the right to religious freedom and other fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing. Exercising religious freedom involves actions that trigger the protection of other fundamental rights. Freedom of conscience and religion involves the right to express one’s religious beliefs (freedom of expression, Art 11), the right to associate with other believers and form religious organisations (freedom of association, Art 12) and the right to develop a personal religious identity (the right to privacy, Art 7). Freedom of religion may also involve claims to protection from discrimination on grounds of religion (rights to equal treatment and freedom from discrimination, Arts 20 and 21). However, this is not always the case and religious freedom can also have a more directly 10.06 competitive relationship with other fundamental rights than is the case for many of the rights protected by the Charter. Daniel O’Connell, who led the movement for Catholic Emancipation in Ireland in the nineteenth century, is reputed to have said that freedom is not a finite resource, and that increasing the freedom of others enhances rather than depletes one’s own stock.16 Religious freedom claims can clash with the right to be free of discrimination and the right to respect for private life (Arts 20, 21 and 7). Avoiding restrictions on religious freedom may also involve the imposition of economic costs on employers and thus a potential clash with the freedom to run a business (Art 16). Religious freedom has also been the basis of claims to restrict freedom of expression on occasion. Finally, religious freedom can sometimes be a zero-sum game where protecting the religious freedom of one party is in direct conflict with the right of another to be spared such practices or to follow their own beliefs.

13 This principle was first stated in Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397 and has been consistently repeated by the Court in later cases. 14 n 3 above. 15 R McCrea, Religion and the Public Order of the European Union (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2013), ch 3. 16 Senator David Norris, Seanad Eireann, Debates 7 July 2010 http://debates.oireachtas.ie/seanad/2010/07/07/00007. asp.



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I.  Religious Freedom and Free Expression 10.07 The three most prominent examples of rights with which freedom of conscience and religion may clash are the right to freedom of expression (guaranteed by Art 11 of the Charter), freedom from discrimination (Arts 20 and 21) and the freedom to conduct a business (Art 16). Under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (which, as noted above, will have a heavy influence on the meaning given to the Charter by the CJEU), the right to freedom of religion has been relied upon as a reason to restrict freedom of expression. In Otto Preminger v Austria,17 the ECtHR upheld the banning of a film deemed offensive to Christians, on the basis that while believers must tolerate denial and opposition towards the doctrines of their faith: the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines. Indeed, in extreme cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them.18

10.08 The Court went on to hold that the seizure of the film was justified, as: the Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner. It is in the first place for the national authorities, who are better placed than the international judge, to assess the need for such a measure in the light of the situation obtaining locally at a given time. In all the ­circumstances of the present case, the Court does not consider that the Austrian authorities can be regarded as having overstepped their margin of appreciation in this respect.19

10.09 This idea that the protection of freedom of religion may justify restriction of speech offensive to religions was followed by the Court in Wingrove v UK20 and IA v Turkey.21 It has been an extremely controversial issue, made more so by the tensions surrounding the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper in 2006, and other controversies such as the saga surrounding the death sentence pronounced on the author Salman Rushdie. 10.10 In IA v Turkey, three of the seven judges voted to abandon the reasoning in Otto Preminger, on the grounds that it was based on an excessively timid and limited conception of free expression. In the United Kingdom in R (Green) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court22 two judges of the Administrative Court also cast doubt on the validity of such reasoning in dismissing an application to prosecute the producer of an allegedly blasphemous opera, arguing that ‘it does not seem to us that insulting a man’s religious beliefs, deeply held though they are likely to be, will normally amount to an infringement of his Article 9 rights since his right to hold to and to practise his religion is generally unaffected by such insults’.23 The 2013 EU Guidelines on religious freedom state that, provided the threshold for hate speech has not been met, the EU will ‘resist any calls for criminalization of offensive criticism of religion’, will ‘recall … that the right to freedom of religion or belief … does not include the right to have a religion or belief that is free from criticism or ridicule’ and will also recall that ‘laws that criminalize blasphemy restrict expression concerning religious or other beliefs; that they are often applied so as to persecute, mistreat, or

17 Otto

Preminger Institut v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34. [47]. [56]. 20 Wingrove v United Kingdom (1996) 24 EHRR 1. 21 IA v Turkey App no 42571/98 (Judgment of 13 September 2005). 22 R (Green) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2007] EWHC 2785 (Admin). 23 Ibid [17]. 18 Ibid 19 Ibid

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intimidate persons belonging to religious or other minorities, and that they can have a serious inhibiting effect on freedom of expression and on freedom of religion or belief; and recommend the decriminalisation of such offences’.24 Thus, the political consensus of the Member States would appear to be less favourable than the jurisprudence of the ECtHR towards the idea that religious freedom includes a right to restrict mockery or criticism of religion, perhaps reducing the potential for Article to serve as the basis for restrictions on freedom of expression.

II.  Discrimination on Grounds of Religion A second notable point of conflict between the right of freedom of conscience and religion, 10.11 guaranteed by Article 10, and other Charter rights is in the area of non-discrimination and equal treatment (Arts 20 and 21). In some ways, rights to religious freedom and freedom from discrimination can be mutually reinforcing. As Maduro AG pointed out in Coleman v Attridge Law (in an Opinion on the question of discrimination on grounds of disability), anti-discrimination laws are aimed to a significant degree at protecting the dignity and autonomy of individuals with protected characteristics.25 Religion is such a characteristic under EU legislation prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion in the area of employment (Directive 2000/78).26 This Directive enhances religious freedom by ensuring that individuals will not be disadvantaged on the basis of their faith thus enhancing their ability to choose their faith for themselves. It prohibits both direct discrimination (‘where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation [on grounds of religion] or belief ’)27 and indirect discrimination (‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief … at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons’).28 Indirect discrimination that can be ‘objectively justified by a legitimate aim and [where] the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’ is not prohibited.29 By requiring ‘apparently neutral’ practices that place individuals of a particular religion or belief at a disadvantage to be objectively justified, EU law requires a degree of active facilitation of religious choices. This approach can be seen as embodying the Charter’s commitment to freedom of religion and belief as encompassing the commitment of Articles 20 and 21 to non-discrimination. It should be noted that there is some tension between the individualistic way in which EU 10.12 law and ECHR case law view religious freedom and the ideas of collective disadvantage inherent in indirect discrimination. For the CJEU and ECtHR, religious freedom is primarily a right of individuals to choose their beliefs. This is a right that applies equally to those with non-religious beliefs. Because courts are ill-equipped to enter into theological disputes and because of the importance of protecting individual autonomy, religious freedom applies equally to individuals with idiosyncratic beliefs that depart from orthodox interpretations of the faith they follow. Therefore, in a religious freedom claim it is irrelevant that someone may be the only one of their faith who wishes to take a particular action or who holds a particular belief. This is not the case in relation to indirect discrimination on grounds of religion because indirect discrimination is concerned with compensating those whose identity means they face ‘additional headwinds’ in





24 n

3 above, Guideline 32. C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law [2008] ECR I-5603, Opinion of Advocate General Maduro. 26 n 5 above. 27 Ibid Art 2(2)(a). 28 Ibid Art 2(2)(b). 29 Ibid Art 2(2)(b)(i). 25 Case

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operating in society. Therefore some element of collective disadvantage is necessary. In Eweida v British Airways the Court of Appeal of England and Wales rejected the claim of indirect discrimination of a British Airways employee who was banned from wearing a visible crucifix over her uniform. The Court found that indirect discrimination on grounds of religion contrary to Directive 2000/78 had not been established because she was the only Christian at British Airways who had sought to do so and the necessary group disadvantage had not been established.30 10.13 Ms Eweida went on to win her case on grounds of religious freedom before the Strasbourg Court31 which held (contrary to its previous case law) that the right of employees to resign is insufficient to protect religious freedom and that Article 9 requires balancing the right to express one’s faith or to follow one’s beliefs at work with the rights and interests of others. As Article 10 of the Charter generally tracks the interpretation given to Article 9 ECHR, Article 10 can be seen as including the right to some facilitation of religious expression at work, though as discussed below, the cases on this issue before the CJEU have focused primarily on the prohibition on discrimination contained in Directive 2000/78. In addition, as is also discussed below, both European Courts have given significant scope to employers to restrict such expression in order to protect the rights of others and principles such as state religious neutrality. 10.14 Importantly, religious organisations and individuals have not simply claimed protection from discrimination, they have, in certain instances, also claimed the right to discriminate in the name of religious freedom. Religious employers have claimed a collective right to religious autonomy that they claim should override the individual religious autonomy of employees in certain circumstances. This has not merely encompassed the right to ensure religious offices are filled by those committed to the faith in question or doctrinally capable of holding such offices (as in the case of the all-male nature of the priesthood of the Roman Catholic Church). Religious organisations claim a broader right of collective autonomy under which they are to be permitted to operate organisations with significant secular functions, such as schools and hospitals, in line with their ‘ethos’, notwithstanding that such an ethos may require them to discriminate against employees on grounds such as marital status or sexual orientation. The ECtHR has been increasingly accommodating of state rules granting very wide scope for religious organisations to discriminate in order to maintain their religious ethos. In Fernandez-Martinez v Spain32 the Strasbourg Court upheld the failure to renew the contract of a laicised priest to teach religion in a public school. The decision not to renew flowed from Spanish legislation under which the consent of the local bishop was required for appointment to such posts. This decision moved away from previous case law33 under which the Court had required the balancing of the right of the employer against the right of employees to respect for their private lives, their freedom of religion and their right to be free of discrimination and moved closer to allowing states to provide the ‘pastoral exemption’ seen in American law under which religious institutions retain absolute autonomy over employment decisions in relation to roles with a religious element.34 10.15 EU law in the form of Directive 2000/78 permits, but does not require, Member States to give limited exemptions for organisations ‘the ethos of which is based on religion or belief ’, allowing

30 Eweida v British Airways EWCA [2010] Civ 80. For discussion of the tension between indirect discrimination and religious freedom, see R McCrea, ‘Singing from the Same Hymnsheet: What the Differences Between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts Tell Us About Religious Freedom, Non-Discrimination, and the Secular State’ (2016) 5(2) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 183–210. 31 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom App nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 [2013] ECHR 37. 32 Fernández-Martinez v Spain [2014] ECHR 615. 33 See Obst v Germany [2010] ECHR 425/03 and Schüth v Germany [2010] ECHR 1620/03. 34 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).

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them to discriminate on grounds of religion ‘where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person’s religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos’.35 Such organisations may also ‘require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation’s ethos’.36 As these exemptions are not mandatory but can been granted by Member States if they so choose, they cannot be seen as representing the consensus view of the extent of collective religious freedom under EU law, but rather reflect the diversity of Member State approaches in this area as well as the Union’s commitment to respecting Member State autonomy in these matters. While Article 9 ECHR, and therefore Article 10 of the Charter, do require Member States to respect the internal autonomy of religious bodies,37 the extent to which the right to freedom of belief requires exemptions from generally applicable laws outside of purely religious functions is limited, and Member States have significant leeway in balancing the clashing rights of employees to individual freedom of religion and to equal treatment, on the one hand, and the collective religious freedom of religious employers, on the other, reflected in a claim to be entitled to require employees to follow the teachings of their religious employer. However, the Court of Justice has taken a more restrictive approach than the ECtHR to these exemptions. In Egenberger38 the Court was faced with a challenge by a non-believer who was not considered for a contract to write a report on racial discrimination on behalf of a body associated with a German Protestant Church. The ad for the relevant post had specified that applicants must be members of the Protestant Church. German legislation provided that the decision of a religious body as to whether a particular role within a religious organisation needed to be limited to people of a particular faith was for the religious employer to take with the role of the courts limited to plausibility review, on the basis of the religion’s self-conception. The Court of Justice ruled that this approach granted excessive scope to religious employers to discriminate. Although the employer had cited both the guarantee of freedom of religion or belief (Art 10) and Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides that ‘[t]he Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States’,39 the Court also relied heavily on constitutional principles to bolster its conclusion that excessive leeway had been granted to religious employers by German law. The Court held that Directive 2000/78 was merely a ‘specific expression, in the field covered by it, of the general prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 21 of the Charter’ (which sets out a general ban on discrimination) and that the need under Article 47 of the Charter to provide effective judicial protection of EU law rights meant that restricting the ability of the national courts to review the decision of an employer to impose a discriminatory requirement would be contrary to EU law. The Court held that a ‘fair balance’ had to be struck between the autonomy rights of religious organisations and the right of workers to be free from discrimination and that, in the event of a dispute, it must be possible for the balancing exercise to be reviewed by a national court.40 For the Court, a fair balance meant that any discrimination on grounds of religion had to be, in the words of the Directive, ‘genuine, legitimate and justified, having regard to [the] ethos





35 n

5 above, Art 4(2).

36 Ibid.

37 Hasan

and Chaush v Bulgaria (2002) 34 EHRR 1339. C-414/16 Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV ECLI:EU:C:2018:257. 39 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C115/47, Art 17. 40 Egenberger (n 38) [45]–[59]. 38 Case

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10.17

10.18

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[of the religious employer]’. It set out a test under which religious organisations must show an ‘objectively verifiable existence of a direct link between the occupational requirement imposed by the employer and the activity concerned’.41 Thus, in order to meet the Directive’s requirements that the difference in treatment on grounds of religion be ‘genuine, legitimate and justified’ the Court held that: To be considered ‘genuine’: professing the religion or belief on which the ethos of the church or organisation is founded must appear necessary because of the importance of the occupational activity in question for the manifestation of that ethos or the exercise by the church or organisation of its right of autonomy.

To be considered ‘legitimate’ it found that the national court must ensure that the requirement of professing the religion or belief on which the ethos of the church or organisation is founded is not used to pursue an aim that has no connection with that ethos or with the exercise by the church or organisation of its right of autonomy.

And to be considered justified the CJEU set down that the church or organisation imposing the requirement is obliged to show, in the light of the factual circumstances of the case, that the supposed risk of causing harm to its ethos or to its right of autonomy is probable and substantial, so that imposing such a requirement is indeed necessary.

Finally, although a proportionality requirement is not included in the text of Article 4(2) (and is included in other Articles of the Directive), the Court held that as proportionality is a general principle of EU law, the exemption given by Article 4(2) is to be read as being subject to a proportionality requirement.42 10.20 In JQ v IR43 the Court adopted the same approach to discrimination in relation to the employees’ duty of loyalty to their employer’s religious ethos. In this case a Catholic hospital fired its Catholic director of internal medicine following his divorce and remarriage on the basis that, as a fellow Catholic, he had a higher duty of loyalty to the Catholic ethos of the hospital than non-Catholics would have in a similar role. The ruling of the Court of Justice faulted the same German legislation that the Court held had violated Directive 2000/78 in Egenberger and reiterated that any discrimination on grounds of religion (this time in relation to the intensity of the loyalty requirement) had to pass a proportionality test and had to be capable of being reviewed by the courts. 10.21 The Court of Justice therefore placed significant restrictions on the ability of Member States to permit ethos-based discrimination in religious organisations by requiring that any exemptions given from anti-discrimination rules must be limited by a proportionality requirement. This is an approach that is notably more protective of the rights of employees to be free of discrimination (and therefore more restrictive of religious freedom) than recent Strasbourg case law.44 The consistent emphasis placed by the Court on proportionality as the framework within which clashes of rights must be resolved would seem to imply that even were a loyalty to ethos duty to be imposed in a non-discriminatory way, the duty must not have a disproportionate impact on other rights such as the right to freedom of expression or privacy.

41 Ibid [63]. 42 Ibid [60]–[67]. 43 JQ v IR (n 11). See R McCrea, ‘Discrimination at Work: Can Employees Be Fired for Getting Divorced?’ (EU Law Analysis Blog, 12 September 2018) http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/09/religious-discrimination-at-work-can. html (accessed on 12 September 2018). 44 Ibid.

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III.  Exemptions from Non-Discrimination Duties for Individuals The tension between freedom of religion and belief and anti-discrimination is also seen at an 10.22 individual level. Religious individuals have claimed that the duty not to discriminate in the provision of services is itself a discriminatory infringement of their right to freedom of religion. This issue has not yet come before the CJEU but it has been before the Strasbourg Court. In Eweida and others v United Kingdom,45 as noted above, two claimants seeking exemptions from anti-discrimination policies (a Christian registrar disciplined for refusing to register same-sex civil unions, and the second involving a sex therapist dismissed for refusing to counsel same-sex couples) lost their challenges to their dismissal before the Strasbourg Court. The applicants in both cases relied on the fact that the relevant service could have been provided by colleagues while their opponents stressed the moral significance of discriminatory acts beyond deprivation of the relevant service. The Court of Justice is unlikely to be any more sympathetic to a claim that religious freedom or the ban on discrimination on grounds of religion provides a basis for opting out of non-discrimination duties. Not only does the Court of Justice usually follow the approach of the ECtHR, Directive 2000/78 specifically envisages the restriction of the duty to facilitate the religious identity of employees on the basis of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.46

IV.  Religious Discrimination, Neutrality and the Right to Run a Business In addition to anti-discrimination rights, the right of employers to conduct their business is 10.23 a further element which can be taken into account in order to place limits on facilitation of individual religious freedom in the workplace. Article 16 of the Charter protects the ‘freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and national laws’.47 This limitation was recognised in EU anti-discrimination law long before the Charter. In the Prais case,48 the Court of Justice had found that an employer’s duty to facilitate religion could extend only to a duty to take ‘reasonable steps’ to avoid setting a day for recruitment examinations that clashed with religious obligations. In other areas of anti-discrimination law the Court of Justice has cited the need to avoid placing ‘an intolerable burden on employers’49 to limit a duty to justify difference in pay between employees, while ‘justifiable operational reasons’50 were invoked to limit the duty to facilitate employees in their taking of parental leave. Thus, as I have written elsewhere, the Court has been willing ‘to circumscribe rights to equal treatment and the facilitation of individual identities in order to protect the ability of enterprises to operate efficiently within a competitive economy’.51 The clash between the right to run a business and the right to

45 Eweida and others (n 31). 46 Directive 2000/78 (n 5), Art 2(5). For broader discussion of the ruling, see F Cranmer, ‘Religion and the Genuine Occupational Requirement: Egenberger—the Judgment’ (Law & Religion UK Blog, 18 April 2018) http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2018/04/18/religion-and-the-genuine-occupational-requirement-egenberger-the-judgment/ and R McCrea, ‘Salvation Outside the Church? The ECJ Rules on Discrimination in Employment’ (EU Law Analysis Blog, 18 April 2018) http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/04/salvation-outside-church-ecj-rules-on.html (both accessed on 31 August 2018). 47 Charter (n 1). 48 Case 130/75 Prais v Council (Judgment of 27 October 1976). 49 Case C-17/05 BF Cadman v Health and Safety Executive [2006] ECR I-9583 (AGO). 50 Case C-116/06 Sari Kiiski v Tampereen kaupinki [2007] ECR I-7643 (AGO). 51 See R McCrea, Religion and the Public Order of the European Union (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2010) 155.



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adhere to one’s religion at work featured prominently in the case of Achbita,52 which, along with the decision in Bougnaoui53 (decided on the same day), represented the first major ruling of the CJEU on the issue of discrimination on grounds of religion at work. In Achbita, a female Muslim employee was dismissed for insisting on the right to wear a headscarf at work in contravention of a workplace policy banning the wearing of visible signs of religious, philosophical or political belief. In assessing whether this ban pursued a legitimate objective, the Court of Justice held that ‘the desire to display, in relations with both public and private sector customers, a policy of political, philosophical or religious neutrality, must be considered legitimate. An employer’s wish to project an image of neutrality towards customers relates to the freedom to conduct a business that is recognized in Article 16 of the Charter and is, in principle, legitimate, notably where the employer involves in its pursuit of that aim only those workers who are required to come into contact with the employer’s customers.’54 10.24 Recognising the right of an employer to control the appearance of her employees as a right to be balanced against the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of religion is, obviously, controversial but it is the inevitable consequence of the inclusion of such a wide range of rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The focus on the question of whether an employee has a customer-facing role in Achbita also raises the question of the permissibility of dress-code restrictions for those without customer-facing duties. The Court was clear that interaction with customers was a factor that increased the scope for an employer to require an employee to obey a general and systematic ban on symbols of religious, political or philosophical belief. It is unclear whether this means that it is impermissible to impose such constraints on employees without customer-facing roles. Given the controversial nature of many religious and other beliefs, it is conceivable that employers will aim to preserve workplace harmony between employees by imposing bans on symbols of belief at work. Indeed, in the well-known case of Ladele55 the objection to accommodating a registrar who refused to carry out same-sex civil partnerships came not from any clients but from her fellow employees.

V.  Duties of Neutrality as a Limit on Religious Expression at Work 10.25 The issue of neutrality requirements goes far beyond the question of the right to run a business. Debates around the idea of religious neutrality reflect fundamental disagreements about how best to manage religious diversity. One approach sees diversity as best managed by facilitating and protecting people’s ability to adhere to and express their faith in as many contexts as possible. The other approach sees diversity as best managed if people hold off expressing their particular religious identity in particular contexts and aims to develop an overarching civic identity shorn of religious specificity. Countries such as the UK have generally followed the former model and countries such as France have taken the latter approach. Given the restrictions on religious expression inherent in the French approach, French rules restricting religious symbols in state contexts such as schools and government employment have been challenged repeatedly before the European Court of Human Rights. The Court has repeatedly turned down challenges to France’s system of state secularism. It has consistently stated that secularism is in harmony with

52 Achbita (n 11). 53 Bougnaoui (n 11). 54 Achbita (n 11) [37]–[38]. 55 Eweida and others (n 31). The decision in Eweida covered four cases. The case relating to the registrar was known in the UK litigation as Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357.

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the values of the Convention. In Ebrahimian v France56 Strasbourg judges upheld the ­application of the restriction on the wearing of religious symbols to virtually all state jobs (in this case a woman working on a temporary contract in a public hospital). It is therefore unlikely that the CJEU would find a violation of the Charter were rules imposing visible religious neutrality on civil servants to come before it. Neutrality obligations can weigh more heavily on minority religions as what is thought of 10.26 as neutral may often reflect dominant cultural norms that have themselves been shaped by the historically dominant religion. The opportunistic embrace of principles such as secularism by those with a wider anti-migrant or xenophobic agenda is a notable feature of contemporary European politics. The Court of Justice has made a contribution in this area. Although in Achbita and Bougnaoui it was willing to uphold the imposition of a neutrality requirement even in the private sector, the Court took steps to prevent opportunistic exploitation of neutrality requirements. In Achbita the Court found that a requirement of visible neutrality amounted to indirect, not direct, discrimination. This was because it referred to visible signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs and thus ‘covers any manifestation of such beliefs without distinction’. The Court therefore concluded that the rule ‘must … be regarded as treating all workers of the undertaking in the same way, by requiring them, in a general and undifferentiated way, inter alia, to dress neutrally, which precludes the wearing of such signs’.57 This meant that the ban would be justified if it satisfied a proportionality test. However, the Luxembourg Court also held that national courts needed to verify that bans on religious symbols were seen as appropriate only when part of a neutrality policy that was ‘genuinely pursued in a consistent and systematic manner’.58 Where the ban was not systematic but targeted a particular faith (as in the case of Bougnaoui where the plaintiff alleged that she was dismissed for failing to comply with a customer desire for ‘no veil next time’) it would be considered directly discriminatory and could only be accepted under the terms of Directive 2000/78 if justified by a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’.59 The Court of Justice has taken an important step in these cases in this regard. By insisting that 10.27 bans on religious symbols can be justified only if part of a genuinely systematic and generally applicable prohibition on the display of visible symbols of all kinds of religious, philosophical or political belief, the Court has sought to ensure that the sometimes justifiable desire to curtail expression of controversial beliefs in the workplace cannot be used as a means to selectively target unpopular minorities.60 Finally, in relation to the idea of religious neutrality, the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 10.28 indicates that certain limits on religious influence over law are required by the liberal democratic nature of the Convention. In Refah Partisi v Turkey the Court held that the dissolution of a political party that was held to desire to establish a theocracy was consistent with the ECHR on the basis that theocracy was inconsistent with the liberal democratic system of government envisaged by the Convention.61 Such a limitation is consistent with the wording of Article 9(2) ECHR which notes that religious freedom can be restricted when ‘necessary in a democratic society … for the

56 Ebrahimian v France [2015] ECHR 1041. 57 Achbita (n 11) [30]. 58 Ibid [40]. 59 Bougnaoui (n 11) [14] and [30]–[35]. 60 See R McCrea, ‘Faith at Work: The CJEU’s Headscarf Rulings’ (EU Law Analysis Blog, 17 March 2017) http://­ eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/03/faith-at-work-cjeus-headscarf-rulings.html. For the contrary view see E Spaventa, ‘What is the Point of Minimum Harmonization of Fundamental Rights? Some Further Reflections on the Achbita Case’ (EU Law Analysis Blog, 21 March 2017) http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/03/what-is-point-of-minimumharmonization.html (both accessed on 31 August 2018). 61 Refah Partisi v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1.



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protection of public order … or the rights and freedoms of others’. A similar commitment to some limitation on religious influence over law and politics can be seen in EU law in the Charter’s commitment to liberal democracy and the ECHR,62 in the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty, which speaks of the ‘cultural, religious and humanist heritage of Europe’, and in Directive 2000/78, which largely repeats the limitations on religious freedom set out in Article 9(2) ECHR. The process of accession of new members also reflects this commitment, with applicant states having been required to decriminalise homosexuality,63 to refrain from criminalising adultery64 and to accept ‘democratic secularism’.65 Therefore, religiously motivated actions that aim at undermining the secular nature of the legal and political systems may be considered to fall outside the protection of the Charter.

C.  Sources of Article 10 Rights 10.29 Freedom of conscience and religion is well-recognised as a fundamental right and can be found in almost all of the major human rights instruments. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,66 Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights67 and Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief68 all endorse freedom of religion and conscience in remarkably similar terms to Article 10 of the Charter. The Refugee Convention recognises persecution on religious grounds as a basis for asylum (Article 1).69 10.30 However, as noted above, by far the greatest source of law for Article 10 of the Charter is Article 9 of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR related to it. The explanatory text that accompanies the Charter, as we have seen, makes it clear that Article 10 is intended to have

62 Charter (n 1), Preamble. 63 McCrea, Religion and the Public Order (n 15) 202–05. 64 Ibid 205–08. 65 Ibid 182. 66 Art 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance’. 67 Art 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads: ‘1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.’ 68 Art 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief reads: ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching.’ 69 Art 1 of the Refugee Convention gives the right to asylum to anyone who, ‘owing to well-founded fear of being ­persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’

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the same meaning as Article 9. Furthermore, given the importance attached by the CJEU to the ECHR in determining the content of the ‘general principles of law’ which have been a feature of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence for over 40 years and which continue to constitute an element of EU fundamental rights, the Convention’s approach to freedom of conscience and religion will be a major determinant of the content of Article 10 of the Charter. Finally, EU legislation may also be relevant to the rights protected by Article 10 (particularly 10.31 Directive 2000/78 but also legislation in a range of other areas such as animal welfare70). Such legislation does not amend or qualify the text of Article 10 but may provide a background of norms which may inform the meaning attributed to the Article by the Court of Justice. Furthermore, the Court of Justice has held that the duty not to discriminate on grounds of religion in Directive 2000/78 represents a codification of a general principle of law and is accordingly directly effective horizontally as well as vertically.71

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks The fact that the meaning of Article 10 will largely be determined by the jurisprudence of the 10.32 ECtHR in relation to Article 9 ECHR should not prove problematic for the CJEU, which had limited pre-existing case law in the area of freedom of conscience to reconcile with the Charter, and whose general principles of law have always relied heavily on Strasbourg case law.72 As noted above, in relation to the issue of discrimination by religious employers in order to protect the ethos of religious bodies, the CJEU’s interpretation of Directive 2000/78 has been more restrictive than the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of Article 9, with the Court of Justice insisting that any such exemptions be limited by a requirement that any discriminatory decision satisfy a proportionality test. Aside from that difference both Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts have seen religious freedom as a largely individual right centred on the freedom to choose one’s beliefs and are committed to equal treatment of religious and non-religious beliefs.

II.  Scope of Application As its wording makes clear, Article 10 applies to thought, conscience and religion. Non-religious 10.33 viewpoints are therefore also covered. The Strasbourg institutions have recognised beliefs such as pacifism,73 veganism74 and opposition to abortion75 as coming within the ambit of Article 9 ECHR, provided that they ‘attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’.76 This broad approach was confirmed in the CJEU decision in Y and Z, which noted the broad definition given to the concept of religion in the Directive regulating asylum77 and in the rulings in the discrimination cases of Achbita and Bougnaoui which also showed a ­commitment to treating expressions of religious belief and non-religious belief equally.





70 See, eg, Case

C-426/16 Liga van Moskeeën en islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen et al v Vlaams Gewest. v IR (n 11). 72 n 8 above. 73 Arrowsmith v United Kingdom App no 7050/75 (1978) 19 DR 5. 74 H v United Kingdom (1993) 16 EHRR 44. 75 Knudsen v Norway (1986) 8 EHRR 45. 76 Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293 [36]. 77 Y and Z (n 12). 71 JQ

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10.34

Article 10 also covers acts that are a manifestation of religion and belief as well as the simple holding of beliefs. In Y and Z the CJEU refused to hold that restriction of the manifestation of religious belief was necessarily less severe than interference with the right to hold a belief.78 As with all provisions of the Charter, and as already noted, Article 10 binds the institutions of the Union and Member States when they are implementing or derogating from EU law but does not confer new competence on the Union in the area of religious freedom.

III.  Specific Provisions 10.35 According to established case law of the ECtHR, the right to freedom of religion and conscience covers two distinct rights: an almost absolute right to protection of a forum internum, within which people must be free to choose their own belief, and a limited right to manifest such beliefs and a more qualified right to manifest such religious beliefs. 10.36 Article 10 fits into a growing EU legal presence in religious matters. It may impact on the interpretation of Treaty provisions such as those in Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides that the Union ‘respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States’ and which undertakes to maintain a structured dialogue with churches and ‘philosophical and non-confessional organisations’.79 As discussed above, it has also featured in key rulings on discrimination law such as Achbita and Egenberger. 10.37 Beyond anti-discrimination, the Union has also enacted law in areas such as animal welfare (in relation to religious slaughter)80 and broadcasting (in relation to restrictions on discriminatory broadcasts and advertising during the broadcast of religious services) that relate to religious activities. Finally, Article 10 contains a specific provision relating to the right to conscientious exemption 10.38 ‘in accordance with national laws’. Although the Court of Justice has been willing to intervene to impose compliance with equality norms in the military context,81 the Union generally does not have jurisdiction over matters such as national defence so this provision may be of limited impact.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations (a)  Forum Internum and Manifestation 10.39 Article 10 of the Charter does not contain the equivalent of the limitation clause seen in Article 9(2) ECHR. However, the explanatory text makes it clear that the rights it provides are intended to be subject to the limitations set out in Article 9(2). 10.40 The right to hold a belief has generally been regarded as absolute. This does not mean that adverse consequences may not, in limited circumstances, flow from the fact that an individual holds particular beliefs. The CJEU has found,82 and EU policy guidelines envisage,83 that Member States may make citizenship or residence conditional on migrants satisfying integration tests,



78 Ibid.

79 Treaty

on the Functioning of the European Union (n 39) Art 17. 93/119/EC (n 7). 81 Case C-285/98 Kreil v Germany [2000] ECR I-69. 82 Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769. 83 ‘EU Guidelines’ (n 51) ch 6, 224–27. 80 Directive

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and some Member States have refused citizenship or residence on the basis that the individual in question holds beliefs that are inconsistent with values such as gender equality.84 However, although the Charter distinguishes between the right to hold and the right to 10.41 manifest beliefs, the CJEU has not viewed the right to manifest religious belief as being of lesser importance. In the Y and Z decision, the Court of Justice explicitly considered Article 10 for the first time. It was faced with a reference from a German court dealing with the case of Muslims from the Ahmadiyya sect, who claimed they would be persecuted if they publicly followed their faith in Pakistan. The German Court requested an interpretation of the notion of ‘persecution’ in relation to Council Directive 2004/83/EC which, inter alia, sets down minimum standards in relation to asylum.85 It asked whether only interference with the ‘core area’ of religious freedom, rather than all acts that would violate Article 9 ECHR, constitutes such persecution and, if so, whether public manifestation of a religious faith could fall within such a core. The Court declined to divide freedom of religion into core and non-core areas. This, it said, would be inconsistent with the broad definition of religion given by the Directive, which covered ‘the holding of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief ’.86 Accordingly, the Court decided that interference with the manifestation of religious freedom, as well as the ‘forum internum’ of private belief could, if appropriately severe, constitute persecution for the purposes of the Directive. The Charter did not play a major role in this case, as the Court’s conclusion was driven more by the wording of the relevant directive than Article 10(1). It is however, notable that the judgment explicitly states that Article 10(1) of the Charter ‘corresponds to Article 9 ECHR’87 and that freedom of religion is ‘one of the foundations of a democratic society’, a ‘basic human right’; but nevertheless, a right that could be restricted, all of which is very much in line with existing Strasbourg case law. (b)  A Limited Right to Facilitation of Manifestation As discussed above, the decision in X and Y shows that the CJEU views manifestation as key to 10.42 religious freedom and cases such as Achbita, as well as the ECtHR decision in Eweida, show that restrictions on religious freedom in areas such as the workplace must be shown to be proportionate. Article 10 does, therefore, potentially require active facilitation of religious freedom to some degree. However, it is also clear that manifestation of religion and belief can be restricted on a number of grounds. Limits on the broader right to manifest (rather than merely to hold) religious beliefs can, under the terms of Article 9(2) ECHR, be limited if the limitations are ‘prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health of morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.88 These limitations have inspired a growing case law which grants significant latitude to states to restrict manifestation of religious belief in particular contexts. Given that Article 10 of the Charter is intended to mirror the protection given by Article 9 ECHR, it was not ­surprising

84 Ibid 237–53. See also Conseil d’Etat, Decision 286798, Faiza M, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ceta/id/ CETATEXT000019081211/. 85 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or Stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L304/12; addendum [2005] OJ L204/24. 86 Y and Z (n 12). 87 Ibid. 88 European Convention on Human Rights, Art 9(2).



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that EU law also gives significant scope for the limitation of religious freedom. As discussed above, CJEU case law allows a restriction of the right protected by Article 10 on the basis of the need to protect the rights of others, such as the right of others to be free of discrimination89 and the right to run a business.90 It has also limited Article 10 rights in the name of the more abstract principles such as the idea of religious neutrality91 and the need to ensure that any measures taken to accommodate religious freedom are proportionate.92 (c)  Generally Applicable Rules and Article 10 10.43 Indeed, overall, the Court of Justice has been reluctant to read exemptions into generally applicable laws on the basis of Article 10. In Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Jehovan todistajat93 the Court found door-to-door preaching and retention by Jehovah’s Witnesses of notes with information on those preached to did not fall within the exception for purely personal or household activities provided by EU data protection law. The Court rejected the argument that Article 10 of the Charter meant that, because this preaching was a personal religious practice of members of a religious community, an exemption from data protection legislation ought to be given. It accepted that the activity of preaching door to door was protected by Article 10 but found that did not mean that such an activity had to be considered to fall within the exemption. Instead it found that because preaching ‘extends beyond the private sphere of a member of a religious community who is a preacher’ it cannot be seen as falling within the category of purely personal or household activities.94 10.44 The Court of Justice has been reluctant to interfere with rules that are formally neutral and generally applicable, even where the rules in question were either motivated by a reaction to, or have a heavier impact on, a particular faith. Thus, in Achbita the Court was willing to characterise a rule banning all religious, philosophical or political symbols as one which ‘must … be regarded as treating all workers of the undertaking in the same way, by requiring them, in a general and undifferentiated way, inter alia, to dress neutrally, which precludes the wearing of such signs’.95 This is an approach that may be hard to avoid given the strong commitment in the ECHR case law on Article 9 and in EU law more generally to treat religious and non-religious beliefs equally. Moreover, when there were allegations, as in Bouganaoui, that the restriction was not generally applied but targeted at a particular faith, the Court was clear that such a restriction was directly discriminatory and could only survive if justified by a genuine and determining occupational requirement.96 10.45 Similarly in Liga van Moskeeën en islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen et al v Vlaams Gewest97 the Court was faced with a reference from a Belgian court querying the validity of Regulation 1009/2009, Article 4(4) of which exempted religious slaughter of animals from compliance with animal cruelty laws provided that such slaughter took place in an approved slaughterhouse that met the hygiene requirements set out in a 2004 Regulation. The Flemish

89 Egenberger and JQ v IR (n 11). 90 Achbita (n 11). 91 Ibid. The Court of Human Rights has also upheld restrictions on religious freedom justified by the need for the state to be religiously neutral; see Ebrahimian (n 56). 92 Egenberger and JQ v IR (n 11). 93 Case C-25/17 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Jehovan todistajat ECLI:EU:C:2018:551. 94 Ibid [50]. 95 Achbita (n 11). 96 Bougnaoui (n 11). 97 Liga (n 70).

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Government decided to discontinue a previous practice of approving temporary slaughter houses for the period of the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice when there is heavy demand for halal slaughter on the basis that such temporary slaughter houses did not meet the hygiene requirements of the 2004 Regulation. A number of mosques challenged the validity of the relevant EU legislation, arguing that it violated the right to religious freedom protected by Article 10. The Court of Justice upheld the validity of the legislation. It accepted that ritual slaughter 10.46 fell within the bounds of religious freedom but noted that Article 4(4) provided an exemption permitting it to take place. The requirement that such slaughter take place in an approved slaughter house ‘applies in a general and neutral manner to any party that organises slaughtering of animals and applies irrespective of any connection with a particular religion and thereby concerns in a non-discriminatory manner all producers of meat in the European Union’.98 Requiring that slaughter take place in an approved slaughterhouse aimed at ensuring both limitation in animal suffering and protection of human health and, accordingly, no violation of Article 10 had occurred.99 The referring court had noted that the restriction meant that there was insufficient capacity to meet the demand for ritually slaughtered meet in the Flemish region during the Feast of Sacrifice. However, the Court of Justice held that validity of the Regulation across the entire Union could not be prejudiced by specific local conditions in parts of Flanders.100 The referring Court had only asked for guidance on the question of the validity of the Regulation. It had not asked the Court of Justice for guidance on whether the interpretation of the Regulation in the specific case ought to provide for such an exemption and accordingly the Court of Justice did not discuss that issue. (d)  Secularism and Limits on Religion in Public Institutions Though it sees religious freedom as one of the most important freedoms,101 the Strasbourg 10.47 Court has also seen politically ambitious religion as a threat to liberal democracy and has been willing to restrict religious freedom on that basis. In addition to the restrictions on religious dress in state contexts discussed above,102 in Refah Partisi v Turkey103 the Court upheld the dissolution of a political party that was alleged to aim at the introduction of a theocratic regime in Turkey. The Court held that theocracy was incompatible with the Convention, and that states were justified in taking restrictive measures to prevent it. Such an approach is consistent with that of EU institutions which have insisted, in the context of the enlargement process, that limitation on the political and legal influence of religion is a requirement of membership of the Union.104

V. Remedies The question of remedies and Article 10 is most likely to arise in relation to the interpreta- 10.48 tion of national legislation implementing EU law in areas such as employment discrimination. Member States have long been constrained to respect the fundamental rights reflected in the Union’s general principles of law in implementing and derogating from EU law.105 The Charter





98 Ibid

[61]. [66]–[68]. 100 Ibid [73]–[78]. 101 Thlimmenos v Greece (2000) 31 EHRR 411. 102 Ebrahimian (n 56). 103 Refah Partisi (n 61). 104 ‘EU Guidelines’ (n 51) ch 6. 105 See ERT (n 8). 99 Ibid

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reinforces this obligation. There is also the possibility that EU secondary legislation may be found to breach Article 10 and may therefore be void. The most important cases of Achbita, Bougnaoui, Egenberger and JQ v IR all came to the Court via references from national courts under Article 267. It is notable that in the first three of those cases the Court of Justice did not content itself with giving broad guidance but gave a strong steer to the national courts as to how they should approach the key issues of distinguishing between indirect and direct discrimination (Achbita and Bougnaoui) and in relation to the requirements of proportionality (Egenberger and JQ v IR) in the individual cases. In addition, in Egenberger and JQ v IR, the Court of Justice held that the principle of non-discrimination contained in Directive 2000/78 was a codification of the self-executing general principle of non-discrimination in EU law and was therefore binding horizontally as well as vertically.106 In the Liga van Moskeeën case on the other hand, the Court restricted itself to answering the question posed on the validity of the legislation in question and avoided ruling on whether the legislation as applied by the Flemish Government may have violated the Charter.

E. Evaluation 10.49 Article 10, like Article 9 ECHR, begins with the words ‘Everyone has the right …’, thus reflecting the fact that the protection of freedom of thought, conscience and religion under the Charter is oriented towards protecting a largely individual right, albeit that it can be exercised in community with others and by collective institutional means. The grouping of ‘thought, conscience and religion’ together reflects the predominant Western view of religion as a matter of individual belief, rather than a matter of behaviour and following a certain way of life.107 This is reflected in the commitment seen in Achbita to treating religious freedom as primarily a matter of individual choice of beliefs and the consequent commitment to treating religious and non-religious beliefs equally. There is, of course, nothing wrong with the fundamental rights documents of a community of European states reflecting predominant European ideas of religion, and such cultural conceptions of religion may reflect deep moral norms in relation to what it is that is morally valuable about religious freedom. This may, however, mean that religions whose formative cultural influences are non-European may struggle to fit their claims into the structures of Article 10 to a greater degree. Furthermore, Article 10 is linked to a broader network of individual autonomy rights in matters 10.50 such as privacy (Art 7), freedom of expression (Art 11) and freedom of association (Art 12), all of which reflect the Union’s stated desire to place ‘the individual at the heart of its activities’.108 Thus the commitment in Article 10 is part of a wider commitment to individual autonomy and which values religious freedom as a means through which individuals can construct their own identity and come to their own conclusions on fundamental matters.109 This is a very secular view of religion, which, as I have written elsewhere, sees it as worthy of protection only ‘insofar as our commitment to human autonomy compels us to ensure that all items are on the “menu”

106 Egenberger and JQ v IR (n 11). 107 See W Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and the End of Religion (New York, Macmillan, 1963) chs 2 and 3, which states that the notion of religion, let alone the primacy of particular beliefs as opposed to a religious way of life, is alien outside traditional European religions. 108 Charter (n 1), Preamble. 109 For liberal defences of religious freedom see R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1977) 272–73 and C Laborde Liberalism’s Religion (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2017).

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in the cultural and philosophical restaurant’.110 Such a view is in some ways inconsistent with the collective claims of many religions which, as Delacoura notes, draw strength from ‘socialisation, worship and the existence of taboos’111 and which have had a very complex and conflicted relationship to individual autonomy over the centuries. This emphasis on religious freedom as an element of individual autonomy is reflected in the 10.51 fact that the main right protected by Article 9 ECHR and Article 10 of the Charter is one of private, individual autonomy. Religious freedom beyond the personal and private zone is, to a significant degree, a zero-sum game where more freedom for one party results directly in less religious freedom for another. Thus, European fundamental rights norms have been willing to give states a relatively free hand to restrict religious freedom in public contexts in order to balance it against other rights such as freedom from discrimination. Though heavily focused on individual autonomy in religious matters, European fundamental 10.52 rights norms are also underpinned by significant recognition of the cultural importance of religion for European states. Particular religious traditions have had formative influences on national identity and national symbols and freedom of religion has not been held to require states to remove religiously specific cultural symbols from public contexts.112 EU anti-discrimination legislation also permits Member States to facilitate the continued role of religious institutions in areas such as education and healthcare by disapplying some anti-discrimination laws to their employment practices, though it has required that any such exemptions satisfy a proportionality test.

F. Conclusion The overall picture is of an EU legal order that is reluctant to interfere with substantive Member 10.53 State choices in relation to the relationship between religion, state and law but which is willing to intervene at the edges to ensure that restrictions on religious freedom are applied in ways that do not target particular faiths and are not disproportionate. Thus, Member States may require employers to allow religious symbols at work or may permit them to impose a neutrality requirement, but they must not allow bans that selectively target the symbols of one faith. Similarly, Member States can grant or refuse exemptions to religious employers from anti-discrimination rules but they must ensure that any exemptions given are proportionate in their impact on the rights of employees. While some may regret the failure of EU law to take a strong stand either in favour of institutional 10.54 religious autonomy or against discrimination in the workplace, European institutions, particularly judicial institutions, simply do not have the democratic legitimacy to impose sweeping changes on relationships between state and particular faiths in an area as sensitive as this so a degree of pragmatic compromise and tolerance of divergent approaches amongst Member States is inevitable. Given the political salience of the issues underlying these cases, the fact that the Court of Justice has adopted a cautious approach is not surprising. There is no consensus in Europe about how best to approach the issue of religion’s role in public life in the context of religious and demographic change. Various countries have tried different approaches. Some countries, such as the UK, have felt it best to allow religious expression in a wide range of public contexts. Others,

110 ‘EU Guidelines’ (n 51) 111. 111 K Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for International Relations (London, IB Tauris, 1998) 11. 112 Lautsi v Italy, App 30814/06 (Grand Chamber, 1 March 2011).



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such as France, have taken the opposite approach and have pursued a policy that sees coexistence as best served by a degree of reticence in relation to religious expression in non-private contexts. Each approach has its critics. Many French people see the approach adopted in France as overly restrictive, just as many British people argue that cohesion and coexistence have not been well served by the UK’s approach. Other states, like the Netherlands, have switched to some degree from one approach to the other. 10.55 The fact that pan-European institutions have not stepped in and imposed what people view as ideal solutions is more of a reflection of a healthy degree of doubt than anything else. Europe is undergoing changes in its religious make up that are without precedent. For centuries, the vast majority of Europeans were Christian. We are moving to a situation where in the space of a few decades the majority of Europeans are likely to be non-religious with a large, intensely religious Muslim minority in many countries. This is a change of such magnitude that it is simply impossible to know how it is going to turn out. Things may work out well or they may not. But it is certain that there will be enormous unanticipated outcomes, positive and negative, and significant issues to deal with along the way. No one has, as yet, identified the best way to manage this changing religious situation. Countries with integrationist approaches and countries with multiculturalist approaches each have their problems. It would represent an extraordinary degree of confidence for the ECtHR or the CJEU to think it could identify and impose a single ideal approach for all its states. It is much more sensible to allow Member States to experiment with different approaches but to ensure that, in doing so, the states remain within the bounds of basic liberal, democratic and egalitarian norms. 10.56 Although their ambitions must necessarily be limited, European institutions can still play a valuable role. The Court has ensured that the state power to regulate religious life cannot be used as a means to harass religious minorities. It has also ensured that traditional symbolic arrangements that are actively oppressive cannot stand. In relation to discrimination on grounds of religion at work, EU anti-discrimination law, while giving Member States broad latitude, has also ensured that individual religions cannot be selectively targeted by supposedly ‘neutral’ rules.

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Article 11 Article 11 Freedom of Expression and Information 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 11 Article 11 corresponds to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which reads as follows: ‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold ­opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’ Pursuant to Article 52(3) of the Charter, the meaning and scope of this right are the same as those ­guaranteed by the ECHR. The limitations which may be imposed on it may therefore not exceed those provided for in Article 10(2) of the Convention, without prejudice to any restrictions which the competition law of the Union may impose on Member States’ right to introduce the licensing ­arrangements referred to in the third sentence of Article 10(1) of the ECHR. Paragraph 2 of this Article spells out the consequences of paragraph 1 regarding freedom of the media. It is based in particular on Court of Justice case-law regarding television, particularly in Case C-288/89 (Judgment of 25 July 1991, Stichting Collective Antennevoorziening Gouda and others [1991] ECR I-4007), and on the Protocol on the system of public broadcasting in the Member States annexed to the EC Treaty and now to the Treaties, and on Council Directive 89/552/EC (particularly its seventeenth recital).

Select Bibliography E Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). P Cavaliere, ‘An Easter Egg in the Charter of Fundamental Rights: The European Union and the Rising Right to Pluralism’ (2012) 2 International Journal of Public Law & Policy 357. R Craufurd Smith, Broadcasting Law and Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997). C Geiger and E Izyumenko, ‘Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity through Freedom of Expression’ (2014) 45 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 316. A Hagen Meyer, ‘Nutrient Profiles: Advertising Ban Violates the Law of the European Union’ (2012) 7 European Food and Feed Law Review 62–73. D Jancic, ‘The European Political Order and Internet Piracy: Accidental or Paradigmatic Constitution-Shaping?’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 430.

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E Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015). SR Mehta, ‘Sir Thomas’ Blushes: Protecting Parliamentary Immunity in Modern Parliamentary Democracies’ (2012) European Human Rights Law Review 309. J Morijn, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 15. S O’Leary, ‘Balancing Rights in a Digital Age’ (2018) Irish Jurist 59. H Randall, ‘Commercial Speech under the European Convention on Human Rights: Subordinate or Equal?’ (2006) Human Rights Law Review 53. JP Sluijs, ‘From Competition to Freedom of Expression: Introducing Article 10 ECHR in the European Network Neutrality Debate’ (2012) Human Rights Law Review 509. J van Hoboken, Search Engine Freedom (Kluwer Law International, 2012). Ad van Loon, ‘Freedom versus Access Rights in a European Context’ in CT Marsden (ed), Regulating the Global Information Society (Abingdon, Routledge, 2000). L Woods, ‘Freedom of Expression in the European Union’ (2006) 12 European Public Law 371.

A.  Field of Application of Article 11 11.01 Article 11 identifies two distinct rights: freedom of expression; and freedom and pluralism of the media. Given that ‘everyone’ has the freedom of expression, it may be inferred that freedom of the media is a sub-set of freedom of expression; this position is also implied by the Explanations. Freedom of expression is described as including a number of distinct elements: —— the right to hold opinions; —— the right to impart information and ideas; and —— the right to receive information and ideas. These elements seem not to be exhaustive: the second sentence to Article 11(1) states that freedom of expression ‘shall include’ these freedoms. 11.02 The text of Article 11(1) refers to freedom to impart and to receive ‘regardless of frontiers’. In this, it reflects the main human rights texts.1 Article 11(2) is silent on this aspect, although media organisations may be some of the key actors in facilitating trans-border information exchanges. This cross-border element parallels the four Treaty freedoms, particularly Article 56 TFEU. 11.03 In addition to the relevance of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Explanations link Article 11 to the CJEU’s jurisprudence on general principles, supporting an interpretation of scope in similar terms.2 Much of the Court’s jurisprudence, including Gouda3 referred to in the Explanations, deals with the media and the importance of pluralism and the Explanations link these cases specifically to Article 11(2). 11.04 In ERT, which concerned a broadcasting monopoly, the Court reiterated that it would only have jurisdiction to undertake a human rights review within the scope of EU law.4 Although

1 Association Ekin v France App no 30882/96, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-VIII concerning the prohibition in France of a book on the historical, cultural, linguistic and socio-political aspects of the Basque conflict. Relevant French law permitted the banning of foreign books. Apart from the width of the term ‘foreign’, this law appeared to be in direct conflict with the actual wording of Art 10(1) ECHR. See also Art 19(2) ICCPR. 2 For an argument that the terms of Art 51 EUCFR should not detract from the pre-existing case law see eg K Lenaerts and JA Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principals of EU Law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629, 1658–60. 3 Case C-288/89 Stichting Collective Antennevoorziening Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007 (Judgment 25 July 1991). 4 Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis [1991] ECR I-2925 [42]–[43]. The explanations to the EUCFR state that Art 51 follows this line of case law, though some commentators have suggested

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crucial, the boundary between EU law and national law (internal situation) is uncertain. The case law on freedom of expression demonstrates a broad interpretation of the scope of EU law. First, the area constituting derogation has been held to fall within its sphere.5 Second, a generous approach has been taken as to when the criteria for EU law’s application are satisfied.6 There are some exceptions. In Grogan the Court took a strict line on the existence of a service within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU.7 Grogan may be limited to its facts; it concerned information on the termination of pregnancies, a politically sensitive question in the Member State concerned.8 Beyond this, Member States’ regulatory structures and attempts to support public service will be reviewed by reference to EU competition and free movement law (as recognised in the Explanations), thus falling within EU law even as regards matters that are state responsibility.9 EU legislation must be interpreted in the light of general principles10 and legislation enacted at EU level, such as the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)11 and the e-Commerce Directive,12 specifically note the need to respect freedom of expression.13 While the AVMSD only partially harmonises the field, remaining national regulation falls within the scope of EU law and such regulation cannot constitute a secondary control on free movement.14 Member States’ implementation of directives likewise falls within the scope of EU law and, indeed, it is here that the difficulties often arise.15

that there are differences: NN Shuibhne, ‘Margins of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement Law’ (2009) European Law Review 230, 242. Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson (Judgment 26 February 2013) reiterates the link between Art 51(1) EUCFR and ERT [19], adopting a broad approach to the scope of EU law [28], in contrast to the suggestions of the Advocate General; see also Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (Judgment 21 May 2019) [AG64] et seq. 5 See eg Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659; Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-und Vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689. Other commentators have suggested that once a derogation has been established, the matter should fall outside EU law: see eg FG Jacobs, ‘Human Rights in the European Union: The Role of the Court of Justice’ (2001) 26 (4) European Law Review 331, 337. Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025 is potentially broader, as it concerned a national measure which benefited from the ‘Keck exception’; J Kühling, ‘Fundamental Rights’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart publishing, 2010) 500. For a review see: H Kaila, ‘The Scope of Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the Member States’ in P Cardonnel, A Rosas and N Wahl (eds), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System. Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). 6 See eg Joined Cases C-51/96 and 191/97 Christelle Deliège v Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL [2000] ECR I-2595. On the free movement case law generally, see J Morijn, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 15. 7 Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) v Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685. 8 The Court’s reasoning was criticised: contrast approach by ECtHR in Open Door Counselling Ltd v Ireland Series A no 246 (1992) 14 EHRR CD 131. 9 Eg Case C-492/17 Südwestrundfunk v Tilo Rittinger and Others (Judgment 13 December 2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:1019; for more general discussion see L Woods ‘Public Service Media in the Era of Austerity: EU Law and National PSM Provision’ in Koltay (ed), Media Freedom and Regulation in the New Media World (Budapest, Wolters Kluwer Hungary, 2014). 10 Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971 [87]; Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others (Judgment 20 May 2003) [68]. 11 Council Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [2010] OJ L95/1 as amended by Directive EU/2018/1808 [2018] OJ L303/69 (AVMSD), formerly the Television without Frontiers Directive, Directive 89/552/EC. 12 Directive 2000/31, e-Commerce Directive [2000] OJ L178/1, Recital 9. 13 Recitals 48 and 55 AVMSD (n 11). 14 Joined Cases C-34–36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen v De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB (C-34/95) and TV-Shop i Sverige AB (C-35/95 and C-36/95) [1997] ECR I-3843; Joined Cases C-244/10 and C-245/10 Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S METV (C-244/10) and Roj TV A/S (C-245/10) v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Judgment 22 September 2011). 15 See discussion in Case C-101/01 Lindqvist (n 11) [82]–[87] and views of the Advocate General in Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk (Judgment 22 January 2013), regarding the different balancing to take place at Member State level and EU level.



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11.05

The obligation to respect freedom of expression also applies to the EU institutions, including their relationship with their employees.16

B.  Interrelationship of Article 11 with Other Provisions of the Charter 11.06 Freedom of expression is closely linked to Article 10 which protects freedom of thought, c­ onscience and religion, as well as Article 12 on freedom of assembly and of association.17 Article 13 protects freedom of the arts and the sciences separately, though in many systems this freedom is part of freedom of expression.18 In Pelham, the Advocate General noted that, while the Charter recognises freedom of the arts separately, in the Convention it must be inferred from Article 10 ECHR.19 Artistic speech might then be protected by both articles. Likewise, Article 22 on cultural religious and linguistic diversity20 can be seen as a specific manifestation of expression. The right to receive information creates links with two further rights: Article 36 on access to services of general economic interest21 (as regards public service broadcasting and, arguably, access to the internet); and Article 42 Right of Access to Documents. Cultural rights can be seen as giving rights to specific groups; the same can be said of Article 24, which provides for the rights of the child.22 11.07 Potentially operating more in tension with freedom of expression are: respect for private and family life (Art 7); Article 8 on the protection of personal data;23 and the somewhat unusual right to protection of intellectual property (Art 17).24 Rights such as privacy and copyright do not, however, always limit freedom of expression. Copyright protects an author’s expressive rights. The CJEU, in its case law on surveillance, has recognised that privacy may underpin freedom of expression.25 Undermining the privacy (and anonymity) of communications may have a chilling effect on speech.26 16 Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-1611; and as a means of protection: Case C-163/10 Patriciello [2012] 1 CMLR 11 concerning parliamentary immunity. 17 The Strasbourg Court has held freedom of association must be understood in the light of freedom of expression and freedom of belief: United Communist Party of Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 121 [42]. 18 See generally, E Barendt, Academic Freedom and the Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 17. 19 Case C-476/17 Pelham (Judgment 29 July 2019) [AG91]. Eg Müller v Switzerland App no 10737/84 Series A no /133, (1991) 13 EHRR 212, which concerned an artist’s exhibition, was brought under Art 10 ECHR. 20 See eg Case C-134/10 Commission v Belgium (must carry obligation) (Judgment 3 March 2011); Case C-368/95 Familiapress (n 5). 21 The Explanations refer specifically to the Protocol on Public Service Broadcasting. 22 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG [2008] ECR I-505. 23 See eg Case C-101/01 Lindqvist (n 10). The ‘media exception’ may be particularly relevant in the context of freedom of expression cases: C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinaporssi Oy et Satamedia Oy [2008] ECR I-9831 [52]–[56]; Case C-345/17 Buivids v Datu valsts inspekcija (Judgment 14 February 2019) [50]. 24 C-283/11 Sky (n 15)—claimed right to short reporting infringed right to property, although based on need to ensure viewer access to news; Case C-145/10 Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, Axel Springer AG, Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH, Spiegel-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co KG, Verlag M DuMont Schauberg Expedition der Kölnischen Zeitung GmbH & Co KG (Judgment 1 December 2011) [134]—reproduction of a photograph without consent; Case C-469/17 Funke Medien v Germany (Judgment 29 July 2019)—leaked reports published on a newspaper website in full and without commentary; Case C-476/17 Pelham (n 19)—two-second sample of music used without consent; Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online v Volker Beck (Judgment 29 July 2019)—text of a manuscript made available without context. 25 Case C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, M ­ inister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, The Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, Ireland and the Attorney General (11 June 2012) on, inter alia, whether Directive 2006/24/EC is compatible with freedom of expression; see similarly Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige v Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and ors [GC] (Judgment 21 December 2016) [93] and [101]. 26 Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council on the implications of States’ surveillance of communications on the exercise of the human rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression

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C.  Sources of Article 11 Rights I. ECHR As stated in the Explanations, Article 11 EUCFR corresponds to Article 10 ECHR. Article 10(1) 11.08 has been broadly interpreted (see D.II). For example, the role of the press and the significance of media pluralism have been recognised (see further D.III and E), and the impact of the last sentence of Article 10(1) ECHR, which could have allowed wide regulation of the media by the state, has been limited.27 The ECHR is distinctive by comparison both to other international human rights standards 11.09 (see ICCPR at C.II) and Article 11 EUCFR in that it has a relatively lengthy list of exceptions. The impact of this is limited: these exceptions do not have automatic priority over freedom of expression28 but must be weighed on the facts according to criteria set down in Article 10(2) ECHR. Article 10(2) provides three conditions for the limitation of rights in Article 10(1) ECHR: the interference is prescribed by law; it aims to achieve a legitimate objective identified in Article 10(2) ECHR, or is a licensing regime under the last sentence of Article 10(1) ECHR; and the interference is necessary in a democratic society.29 Additionally, Article 14 ECHR, which protects against discrimination, requires any exception to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.30 All Member States have ratified the ECHR, but there are reservations in relation to Article 10. 11.10 Malta deposited a reservation specifying that its code of conduct for public officers precludes such officers from taking an active part in political discussions or other political activity during working hours or on official premises. Spain further declared that its system of broadcasting licensing was compatible with the last sentence of Article 10(1) ECHR.

II.  UN Treaties (a)  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 11.11

Article 19 ICCPR specifies: 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

A/HRC/23/40 [24] and [30]; Surveillance and human rights—Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression A/HRC/41/35 [21] et seq. 27 Groppera Radio AG and Others v Switzerland App no 10890/84 Series A no 173 (28 March 1990): ‘the purpose of the third sentence of Article 10(1) of the Convention is to make it clear that states are permitted to control by a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects. It does not, however, provide that licensing measures shall not otherwise be subject to the requirements of Article 10(2), for that would lead to a result contrary to the object and purpose of Article 10 taken as a whole’. 28 E Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 65. 29 Noted in Case C-368/95 Familiapress (n 5) [24]–[26]. 30 Donaldson v UK App no 56975/09 (2011) 53 EHRR 14. See similarly Art 2(1) ICCPR.



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11.12 Additionally, Article 20 ICCPR prohibits propaganda for war (Art 20(1)) or hate speech (Art 20(2)). 11.13 The Human Rights Committee (HRC)31 issued General Comment 34 on Article 19,32 an extensive document summarising the HRC’s approach and emphasising freedom of speech as a ‘meta-right’, essential for the exercise of other rights and forming a cornerstone of democracy.33 As well as containing negative obligations, states parties are required to ensure that the rights contained in Article 19 are given effect in the domestic law of the state; states may thus be subject to positive obligations under Article 19. States must ensure that persons are protected from acts by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Article 19. The General Comment gives the example of the new media: signatory states should foster access to these means of communication.34 Article 19(2) ICCPR protects all forms of expression and the means of their dissemination, including the non-verbal, and the subject matter is irrelevant—commercial speech as well as political speech is in principle protected, although the rights cannot be held by a corporation.35 While there are exceptions to the freedom of expression, the General Comment emphasises that these are to be interpreted restrictively. Article 20 is treated as lex specialis in respect of Article 19(3) and must therefore also satisfy the proportionality requirements.36 It is possible for speech to be taken outside Article 19 by reference to the abuse of rights doctrine under Article 5 ICCPR. Hate speech, including that against women, has become more of a concern as a result of increased internet use.37 All Member States of the EU have ratified the ICCPR,38 though a number of them have lodged 11.14 reservations to ensure that neither Article 19 nor Article 20 ICCPR conflicts with the requirements of Article 10 ECHR (see Austria, Belgium, France and Germany). Italy entered a reservation in relation to the licensing of radio and television in relation to Article 19(3) ICCPR; Luxembourg and the Netherlands also had concerns about licensing, albeit in relation to Article 19(2) ICCPR. Malta entered reservations parallel to those it entered regarding Article 10 ECHR and political activities of public officers; it also entered a reservation regarding political activities of aliens. A number of states have had concerns about the application of Article 20 ICCPR, and have 11.15 sought to limit it.39 Thus both Belgium and Luxembourg declared that they did not consider

31 Established under Art 28 ICCPR, but as the ECJ recognised in Case C-249/96 Grant v South West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-621, the HRC is not a court and its findings have no binding force in law. They are however persuasive as it is the sole body authorised to give authoritative interpretations of the ICCPR. 32 General Comment No 34 on Art 19, adopted during the 102nd session (2011). For discussion see M O’Flaherty, ‘Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 627. 33 This fundamental status has been long recognised within the UN. In its first session, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(I) stating ‘Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and … the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated’. 34 General Comment No 34 (n 32) [15]. 35 Communication 360/1989 A Newspaper Company v Trinidad and Tobago and Communication 361/1989 A Publication and a Printing Corporation v Trinidad and Tobago. 36 General Comment No 34 (n 32) [48] and [50]–[52]. See further Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, A/HRC/22/17/ Add.4, 11 January 2013. There is a general comment on Article 20 ICCPR, General Comment No 11, but it is brief and dates from 1983. 37 Human Rights Council, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, A/HRC/38/L.10/ Rev.1, 4 July 2018; Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against, its causes and consequences on online violence against women and girls from a human rights perspective, A/HRC/38/47, 18 June 2018. 38 The ECJ recognised the ICCPR as a basis for general principles quite early—see for example Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3285. 39 See variously the reservation entered by Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

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themselves obliged to enact legislation in the field covered by Article 20(1) ICCPR, and that Article 20 ICCPR as a whole would be applied taking into account the rights to freedom of thought and religion, freedom of opinion and freedom of assembly and association. (b)  Convention on the Rights of the Child The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which all Member States have ratified, 11.16 also contains rights pertaining to freedom of expression, in Articles 13, 17, 30 and 31.40 Article 13 CRC specifies that a child’s freedom of expression ‘shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice’.41 The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; or (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

While this text mirrors Article 19(3) ICCPR, there is no mention of Article 20 ICCPR issues. The 11.17 exceptions here and in Article 19(3) ICCPR are possibly narrower than those found in Article 10 ECHR. Further, the idea of a child’s choice in Article 13(1) is not subject to express age limitation (or parental control42), unlike the other provisions. Article 17(e) suggests the need for age rating systems and UNICEF guidance on the scope of Article 13 CRC states that the right of the child is limited by the consideration that ‘the information is not damaging to them or others’.43 Unsurprisingly, some Member States have entered reservations to ensure compatibility with Article 10 ECHR.44 Article 17 CRC further provides that: 11.18 States Parties recognize the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that the child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health. To this end, States Parties shall: (a) Encourage the mass media to disseminate information and material of social and cultural benefit to the child and in accordance with the spirit of Article 29; (b) Encourage international co-operation in the production, exchange and dissemination of such information and material from a diversity of cultural, national and international sources; (c) Encourage the production and dissemination of children’s books; (d) Encourage the mass media to have particular regard to the linguistic needs of the child who belongs to a minority group or who is indigenous; (e) Encourage the development of appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being, bearing in mind the provisions of Articles 13 and 18 [parental responsibilities].

40 See generally E Lievens, S Livingstone, S Mclaughlin, B O’Neill and V Verdoodt, ‘Children’s Rights and Digital Technologies’ in U Kilkelly and T Liefaard (eds), International Human Rights of Children (Singapore: Springer, 2019). 41 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien (n 22) [AG88]; Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769 [37]. 42 See reservation entered by Poland. 43 UNICEF, Rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, available at http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/ Rights_overview.pdf. 44 Austria, Belgium.



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11.19 Subsequent provisions reaffirm these elements by providing for the right of the child to ­participate in (age-appropriate) cultural life, and to use his or her own language.45 Note that this is a positive obligation imposed on the signatory states, rather than constituting an obligation as against the media.46 Nonetheless, some reservations have been entered regarding the freedom of the press (and the media generally).47 11.20 There are three optional protocols. The second, the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, requires states to prohibit child pornography. (c) UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 11.21 This Convention, which came into force on 18 March 2007, aims to promote respect and dialogue between cultures. The European Union is a party to the Convention. Article 2 specifies that cultural diversity is predicated on respect for human rights, specifically freedom of expression. Accepting the principle of equality of all cultures, states are nonetheless permitted to adopt measures aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions within its territory. A qualified obligation was imposed to create an atmosphere in which cultural diversity could, broadly speaking, flourish—both in terms of creating and accessing cultural expressions. An international fund was established under the Convention. (d)  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 11.22 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has been ratified by the European Union and its Member States as well as by neighbouring countries, for example Bosnia and Herzegovina. Article 21 provides: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities can exercise the right to freedom of expression and opinion, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas on an equal basis with others and through all forms of communication of their choice, as defined in article 2 of the present Convention, including by: a) Providing information intended for the general public to persons with disabilities in accessible formats and technologies appropriate to different kinds of disabilities in a timely manner and without additional cost; b) Accepting and facilitating the use of sign languages, Braille, augmentative and alternative communication, and all other accessible means, modes and formats of communication of their choice by persons with disabilities in official interactions; c) Urging private entities that provide services to the general public, including through the Internet, to provide information and services in accessible and usable formats for persons with disabilities; d) Encouraging the mass media, including providers of information through the Internet, to make their services accessible to persons with disabilities; e) Recognizing and promoting the use of sign languages.

(e)  UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 11.23 The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) does not identify freedom of expression specifically. The Committee established under the Convention 45 Arts 30 and 31 CRC. 46 Note General Comment No 16, which provides guidance on how to ensure that the activities and operations of business enterprises do not adversely impact on children’s rights, see [58]–[60]. 47 By Austria.

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to monitor its implementation has issued a number of recommendations. Notably, in Recommendation 35 it stated that violence against women could occur in all spaces including ‘technology-mediated environments, such as contemporary forms of violence occurring in the Internet and digital spaces’. According to Recommendation 19 adopted by the CEDAW Committee, violence for CEDAW includes ‘acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty’, which will catch some forms of speech.

III.  Council of Europe Treaties There are a number of CoE treaties which affect freedom of expression. The Convention on 11.24 Transfrontier Television is the ‘sister’ Convention to the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (see C.IV(a)), although it has not been updated recently. Two conventions address the expressive rights of those who form part of minority groups: the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The Convention on Cybercrime is relevant as far as pornographic speech is concerned (Art 9, child pornography); it also covers terrorism and hate speech in its protocol. The Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) also contains provisions relevant to freedom of expression. Article 17 envisages that the media will set guidelines and self-regulatory mechanisms to prevent violence against women and to enhance respect for their dignity.48 The Convention also envisages the criminalisation of certain forms of violence that relate to sexist hate speech, notably stalking and sexual harassment: eg psychological violence (Art 33); stalking (Art 34); and sexual harassment (Art 40).

IV.  Other Sources (a) EU The AVMSD49 provides minimum harmonisation of national legislation of all audiovisual 11.25 media, both traditional TV broadcasts and on-demand services. It also identifies certain content (eg hate speech) which is to be prohibited, as well as content which should not be seen by minors. There are limitations on advertising, including sponsorship and product placement. The 2018 amendment to the directive puts obligations for the first time on ‘video-sharing platforms’. It also contains provisions to ensure access to media for those with disabilities. Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 11.26 electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (the e-Commerce Directive) establishes harmonised rules on matters such as the transparency and information requirements for online service providers, commercial communications, electronic contracts and limitations of liability of intermediary service providers. It is this latter element that is potentially significant for online free speech. The Commission has proposed the introduction of a ‘Digital Services Act’.50 While conditional immunity provisions remain, the proposal introduces a “good Samaritan” clause,

48 This provision is noted briefly in the Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in Pryanishnikov v Russia, App no 25047/05 (judgment 10 September 2019). 49 Directive 2010/13/EU The Audiovisual Media Services Directive (codified version) as amended (n 11). 50 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (COM (2020) 825 final), 15 December 2020.



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tighter rules regarding the take-down of illegal content and notice and action mechanisms, and imposes a duty of due diligence on certain service operators. 11.27 Certain other specific pieces of EU legislation limit certain types of speech. The Framework Decision on racism and xenophobia51 seeks to ensure that racism and xenophobia are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties in the Member States of the European Union. Similarly, the Directive on Combating Terrorism52 seeks alignment between the national rules of the various Member States. The directive defines the terrorist offences and lays down the penalties that Member States must incorporate in their national legislation. In addition, Member States must take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt removal of online content constituting a public provocation to commit a terrorist offence.53 A further proposal to take greater steps to combat terrorism has been agreed.54 Comparably, Directive 2011/93/EU on Combating the Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography55 establishes minimum rules in the EU concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, in this context specifically child pornography. In addition, there are a number of other non-binding instruments, some of which are aimed 11.28 at protecting children specifically,56 others at dealing with problems in the online environment, eg disinformation.57 There are a number of directives which provide protection for intellectual property rights, 11.29 specifically copyright, and thereby limit users’ free speech insofar as it is dependent on use of copyright material. Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive58 and Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive59 provide enforcement mechanisms, including injunctions to require internet intermediaries to take down content, intermediary immunity notwithstanding. Article 17 of the new digital copyright directive60 contains the conditions on which platforms retain immunity in respect of copyright infringement which inter alia involves making best efforts to ensure infringing content is not available and to take it down swiftly.61 51 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2008] OJ L328/55. 52 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating ­terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA [2017] OJ L 88/6 (Terrorism Directive). 53 Article 21(1) Terrorism Directive (n 53). 54 Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online’ COM (2018) 640 final; final agreed text not yet available. 55 Directive 2011/93/EU on Combating the Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography (replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA) [2012] OJ L26/1. (Note in some documents this directive is shown as 2011/92/EU, which is an error: see Corrigendum to Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA [2012] OJ L18/7). 56 Commission, ‘Communication—European Strategy for a better internet for children’ COM (2012) 196 final, 2 May 2012; Commission, ‘Communication on protecting children in the digital world’ COM (2011) 556 final, 13 September 2011; Commission, ‘Communication on the protection of consumers, in particular minors, in respect of the use of video games’ COM (2008) 207 final, 22 April 2008. 57 Commission, ‘Communication on tackling online disinformation: a European approach’ COM (2018) 236 final, 26 April 2018; Commission, ‘Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online’ C (2018) 1177 final, 1 March 2018; Commission, ‘Communication—Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards enhanced responsibility of online platforms’ COM (2017) 555 final, 28 September 2017. 58 Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167. 59 Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L195/16. 60 Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/ EC and 2001/29/EC [2019] OJ L130/92. 61 For general analysis see eg M Senftleben, ‘Bermuda Triangle: Licensing, Filtering and Privileging User-Generated Content Under the New Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market’ (2019) 41 EIPR 480.

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The Trade Secret Directive62 was enacted to prohibit the unlawful acquisition, disclosure or use 11.30 of a trade secret as defined in the directive. During the legislative process concerns were raised as to the possible impact of the directive on journalists and whistleblowers. Article 5 provides for exceptions for exercising the freedom of expression and Recital 19 reiterates the importance of investigative journalism. The EU has also recently agreed the Whistleblower Directive (due to be implemented 11.31 December 2021),63 which requires Member States to put in place measures to protect whistleblowers and encourage free speech; national security lies outside its scope. (b)  Council of Europe While the Council of Europe has agreed a number of recommendations which affect all con- 11.32 texts of speech (eg Recommendation (97) 20 on Hate Speech; Recommendation (2007) 1805 on blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion; Recommendation CM/Rec (2013) 1 on gender equality and media; and Recommendation (2014) 7 on the protection of whistleblowers), a number affect the media specifically, such as Recommendation 2007 (2) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Media Pluralism and Diversity of Media Content, Recommendation (97) 21 on the media and promotion of a culture of tolerance and Recommendation CM/Rec (2018) 1 on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership. Moreover, the Council of Europe has carried out a significant amount of work on the interrelationship between human rights—specifically freedom of expression—and new media. A non-exhaustive list comprises: • • • • • • •

•

Recommendation CM/Rec (2018) 7 on Guidelines to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of the child in the digital environment; Recommendation CM/Rec (2018) 2 on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries; Recommendation CM/Rec (2016) 5 on Internet freedom; Recommendation CM/Rec (2014) 6 on a Guide to human rights for Internet users; Recommendation CM/Rec (2012) 4 on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking services; Recommendation CM/Rec (2012) 3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the protection of human rights with regard to search engines; Recommendation CM/Rec (2008) 6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on ­measures to promote the respect for freedom of expression and information with regard to Internet filters; Recommendation CM/Rec (2007) 16 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on ­measures to promote the public service value of the Internet.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks Freedom of expression is of fundamental importance, both in terms of an individual’s devel- 11.33 opment and with respect to democratic society. This importance has been recognised in the 62 Directive 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against unlawful acquisition use and disclosure [2016] OJ L157/1. 63 Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law [2019] OJ l 305/17.



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jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court in particular, whose views the CJEU has in general terms adopted.64 The CJEU has held that the meaning and scope of Article 11 is the same as that of Article 10 ECHR.65 So, freedom of expression ‘[enables] expression to be given to opinions which differ from those held at an official level’.66 The Court has also accepted the significance of the press/journalist in terms of functioning as a ‘watchdog’.67 Nonetheless, freedom of expression is not an unlimited right and a number of pieces of EU law limit freedom of expression in the public interest (see section C.IV above). 11.34 Freedom of expression has also been recognised as a general principle of EU law by the CJEU.68 The CJEU’s general principles jurisprudence has referred to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. These three strands of case law (Charter, general principles and ECHR) seem to be similar69 and much of the analysis in this chapter is, due to the comparative paucity of jurisprudence on Article 11 EUCFR, based on Article 10 ECHR. 11.35 Despite this similarity, the subject matter of the cases has tended to be different under the Convention and within the EU. Many of the Strasbourg cases have dealt with issues such as defamation and privacy, subjects which tend to fall outside EU law.70 Before the CJEU, the vast majority of cases have dealt with the media sector as businesses. As such, in addition to dealing with the tension between the right to private life and freedom of expression, many of the cases involve commercial speech (especially advertising), and illustrate the tensions between commercial freedom and public interest regulation and even (media) freedom of speech and regulation in the general interest.71 A developing issue relates to the relationship between non-discrimination rules and speech.72

II.  Scope of Application 11.36 Freedom of speech may be exercised by individuals73 and legal persons74 (and in this there is a difference in approach between the ECHR and EUCFR on the one hand, and the ICCPR on the

64 Case C-316/09 MSD Sharp & Dohme GmbH v Merckle GmbH (Judgment 5 May 2011) [AG76], and case law cited; more recently Joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2/Watson (n 25) [93]; Case C-507/18 NH v Associazione ­Avvocatura per i diritti LGBTI—Rete Lenford (judgment 23 April 2020) [48]. 65 Case C-345/17 Buivids (n 23), [65]. 66 Case C-340/00 P Commission v Cwik [2001] ECR I-10269 [22]. 67 Case C-421/07 Damgaard [2009] ECR I-2629 [AG81], citing The Observer and The Guardian v United Kingdom Series A no 216 (1991) [59]. 68 Case C-260/89 ERT (n 4) [41]; Case C-219/91 Ter Voort [1992] ECR I-5485 [35]. 69 For a general review, see L Woods, ‘Freedom of Expression in the European Union’ (2006) 12 European Public Law 371, though note developments since then. On problems regarding the displacement of unwritten general principles by the Charter see eg: Editorial comments, ‘The scope of application of the general principles of Union law: An ever expanding Union?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1589, 1595; K Lenaerts and JA Gutierrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ (n 2) 1658–60. On this relationship in the context of Art 8 ECHR see Case C-40/11 Yoshikazu Iida v City of Ulm (Judgment 8 November 2012). 70 Cases do arise though defamation may not be central to the issues referred: eg Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Ltd (C-161/10) (Judgment 25 October 2011); Case C-291/13 Papasavvas v O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia Ltd (Judgment 11 September 2014). 71 Case C-368/95 Familiapress (n 5); Case C-283/11 Sky (n 15). 72 Case C-54/07 Feryn (Judgment 10 July 2008); Case C-81/12 Asociația Accept (Judgment 25 April 2013); NH (n 65)—note NH was the first of these three cases to consider Article 11 directly. 73 Eg Case C-219/91 Ter Voort (n 69). 74 Eg Case C-283/11 Sky (n 15); see also M Julicher, M Henriques, AA Blai and P Policastro, ‘Protection of the EU Charter for Private Legal Entities and Public Authorities? The Personal Scope of Fundamental Rights within Europe Compared’ (2019) 15 Utrecht Law Review 1.

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other). It is unlikely that the Charter would permit a state to distinguish between categories of person and the level of free speech that they each have,75 a consideration important in a Union seeking to encourage free movement. Individuals working for the institutions, whether as politicians or civil servants, may in principle benefit from freedom of expression, including the right to comment on the activities of the Union, though the European Court of Human Rights has accepted that they may be subject to some restrictions.76 The protection of whistleblowers has been recognised as important.77 The CJEU has followed the Strasbourg Court’s lead in this, including the proviso that the freedom of officials to speak may be subject to some limitations depending on the nature of their duties.78 Article 11(2) does not attribute the freedom of the media to any particular group of rights-holders; the phraseology is that of a right that must be respected. This leaves open the question of who, if anyone, may enforce it. The ECHR requires that claimants be a victim; actio popularis are not permitted.79 The Luxembourg Courts have not ruled on this issue, but rules of standing (both from national courts relating to a preliminary ruling reference, or the rules for judicial review at EU level) are likely to limit claimants. Freedom of expression may give rise to territorial jurisdictional questions, especially given 11.37 the cross-border nature of much of the internet.80 From the perspective of the Strasbourg court, the state’s ability to claim jurisdiction is a question for national courts applying private international law.81 In terms of an individual seeking to bring an action under the Convention, Article 1 ECHR provides that the states are to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction’ the Convention rights. In Ben El Mahi v Denmark, individuals resident in Morocco sought to argue violation of their rights under Article 9 ECHR in conjunction with Article 14 as a result of the publication in Denmark of cartoons that contained caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. The Court reiterated that jurisdiction is primarily territorial and only in exceptional circumstances would a State have responsibility for acts outside its territory. In this case, the Court found no jurisdictional link. The Court had the opportunity to consider jurisdiction in relation to the bulk surveillance of internet traffic carried out by the UK in Big Brother Watch but did not; the UK Government did not raise any argument on the basis of Article 1 ECHR.82 There is no direct equivalent to Article 1 ECHR in the Charter. Within the EU, jurisdictional questions have arisen through questions relating to the location 11.38 of the establishment of a service provider, and thereby the Member State with regulatory competence, or concerning the Brussels Regulation conflicts but have tended to be framed by

75 D Feldman, ‘Content Neutrality’ in Loveland (ed) Importing the First Amendment: Freedom of Speech and Expression in Britain, Europe and the USA (Oxford, Hart publishing, 1998) 147. 76 Hadjianastassiou v Greece, (Judgment 16 December 1992), [46]; Wille v Liechtenstein, (Judgment 28 October 1999), [64]. 77 Guja v Moldova [GC] App no 14277/04 (Judgment 12 February 2008) establishing a 6-stage frame for analysis; Heinisch v Germany App no 28274/08 (Judgment 21 July 2011); Matúz v Hungary App no 73571/10 (Judgment 21 October 2014). 78 Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission (n 17); note also impact of Whistleblowers Directive (n 64). 79 Altug Taner Akcam v Turkey App no 27520/07 (Judgment 25 October 2011): a concrete interference is not required, but the claimant must be directly affected by the impugned measure. This is not understood in the same way as the same phrase in EU law. The ICCPR also excludes class actions. 80 Note also the general difficulties regarding ‘communication freedoms’ in the context of the internet and conflict of laws: Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate (n 68), Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón. 81 National courts have asserted jurisdiction without challenge in a number of cases involving the internet: Premininy v Russia App no 44973/04 (Judgment 10 February 2011), concerning hackers in Russia targeting a US bank; Perrin v UK (dec) App no 5446/03, ECHR 2005-XI in relation to publication of obscene material by a French national living in the UK to a website operated from the United States. 82 Big Brother Watch v UK App nos 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (Judgment 13 September 2018) [271]; the case has been referred to the Grand Chamber.



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ordinary law issues.83 There have been no cases dealing with the territorial scope of the rights from outside the EU. Circumstances might arise in which those who are based outside the EU might seek to rely on Article 11 EUCFR: for example, companies seeking information with regard to competition enforcement proceedings, individuals challenging Council decisions or individuals or companies challenging decisions taken under secondary Union legislation, such as AVMSD or the Information Society Directive.84 In these cases, the body against whom the right is relied fall within EU law. 11.39 Although Article 11 EUCFR refers to the right of expression, it does not define what is meant by ‘expression’. Under the ECHR, ‘expression’ covers a range of forms, not just speech. Article 10 applies to action85 and expressive behaviour.86 It includes the right not to speak87 although the right to be silent in the context of the investigation of offences is dealt with as a matter of the right to a fair trial and not to incriminate oneself in Articles 47 and 48 EUCFR.88 While the right to freedom of expression is granted to both speaker and audience, it does not constitute the right to be listened to. In the context of online communications, it would not necessarily include the right to algorithmic amplification of a message. Freedom of expression covers ‘not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed but also the form in which they are conveyed’.89 It applies whether the communication is effected orally or in written, printed or electronic form.90 Bloggers and other forms of social media are protected.91 In L’Oreal v eBay, the listings uploaded by users to eBay’s marketplace were communications within Article 11 EUCFR (and Article 10 ECHR).92 Article 10 ECHR covers hyperlinks.93 Questions that have not yet been addressed by either European system are whether the act of coding or programming is protected expression94 and whether data flows themselves constitute a form of expression. These questions point to another issue: the extent to which (direct) human control must be involved in originating or selecting the content to constitute expression. This is significant given the development of machine-to-machine communication, machine learning and artificial intelligence.

83 Eg Case C-194/16 Bolagsupplyningen and Ilsjan [GC] (Judgment 17 October 2017), noted L Lundstedt, ‘Putting Right Holders in the Centre: Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan (C-194/16): What Does it Mean for International Jurisdiction Over Transborder Intellectual Property Infringement Disputes?’ (2018) IIC 1022. 84 AVMSD (n 11); Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167. For an example of a challenge involving the Charter from outside the EU see Case T-262/15 Dmitrii Konstantinovich Kiselev v Council of the European Union (Judgment 15 June 2017). 85 Hashman and Harrup v UK App no 25594/94, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-VIII, (2000) EHRR 24, who disrupted a hunt by blowing a horn and hallooing. 86 For a discussion of the Court’s recent approach to expressive conduct see R. Ó Fathaigh and D. Voorhoof ‘Article 10 ECHR and Expressive Conduct’ (2019) 24 Communications Law 62. 87 Young, James and Webster v UK Report 14 December 1979, B.39 (1984), p 48; K v Austria Report of 13 October 1992, A.255-B, p 38. 88 Case C-481/19 DB v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob) (Judgment 2 February 2021). 89 De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium App no 19983/9 (Judgment 24 February 1997) Reports 1997-I [48]. 90 Case C-316/09 MSD Sharp (n 65) [AG81]. 91 Yildirim v Turkey App no 3111/10 (Judgment 18 December 2012); Delfi AS v Estonia App no 64569/09 (Judgment 10 October 2013). 92 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie and L’Oréal (UK) Ltd v eBay International AG, eBay Europe SARL, eBay (UK) Ltd [2011] ECR I-6011,[AG49] and [AG157]. 93 Magyar Jeti ZRT v Hungary App no 11257/16 (Judgment 4 December 2016); cf approach of CJEU in relation to copyright in Case C-160/15 GS Media v Sanoma (Judgment 8 September 2016). 94 Discussion in the US has included the question of whether publishing source code is a speech act: see L Tien, ‘Publishing Software as a Speech Act’ (2000) 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 629; R Post, ‘Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment’ (2000) 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 713.

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Freedom of expression covers political, cultural and artistic speech as well as commercial 11.40 communications;95 the frivolous and humorous, as well as the serious. Parody was recognised as a form of expression by the CJEU in Deckmyn, concerning the scope of exceptions to copyright.96 Article 10 ECHR ‘gives everyone the right to express opinions, however questionable or shocking, minority or extravagant they may be’.97 The right protects unpopular or offensive speech, including that expressed in strong terms. For example, in Mătăsaru v Moldova the conviction of an anti-corruption activist for installing two sculptures (one of a penis, the other of a vulva) outside a prosecutor’s office violated the activist’s freedom of expression.98 In Constantin Film Produktion, the CJEU accepted that freedom of expression could apply to the word mark, ‘Fack Ju Göhte’, preventing it from being rejected as a trade mark on grounds of morality.99 Hate speech or incitement to violence100 may be excluded from the scope of protection in the interests of protecting tolerance and pluralism. Any speech which falls within the scope of the right may be subject to limitation,101 provided the terms of Article 52(3) EUCFR are respected. Insofar as there are boundaries between different types of speech protected by freedom of expression, it is in the context of assessing the justifiability of any restrictions (see D.IV).102 Article 11 EUCFR covers the right to hold opinions, as do Article 10 ECHR and Article 19 ICCPR. 11.41 ‘Opinion’ is an ambiguous word, and the Strasbourg Court has not attempted a definition. It can be understood in two senses. It may be contrasted with facts (see para 11.41), but it may also refer to one’s internal processes and the right to think, including the right to change one’s mind for whatever reasons. In this sense, there is a potential overlap with the scope of Article 10 EUCFR. Following General Comment 34, freedom of opinion cannot be limited under the ICCPR,103 though Article 10 and Article 52(1) envisage that it may be. The CJEU has recognised that limits on rights must respect the essence of those rights.104 Whether this requirement could raise the level of protection of opinion to that under the ICCPR is unknown. Any attempt to indoctrinate, force or coerce people into holding or not holding certain opinions is impermissible.105 It has

95 Advocate General Alber in Case C-71/02 Karner (n 5) [AG75], Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and C ­ ouncil [2000] ECR I-8419; Case C-157/14 Neptune Distribution (Judgment 17 December 2015) [64]; Case C-555/19 Fussl Modestrasse Mayr GmbH v SevenOne Media GmbH (Judgment 3 February 2021), [81]; and European Court of Human Rights: Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany (20 November 1989) Series A no 165, [25] and [26], and Casado Coca v Spain (24 February 1994) Series A no 285-A, [35] and [36]. 96 Case C-201/13 Deckmyn, Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Vandersteen, et al (Judgment 3 September 2014) [27], [34]. The relationship between copyright and its exceptions in the light of freedom of expression is discussed at section E. The Strasbourg Court has also recognised parody as, in principle, being protected by Article 10: see M’Bala M’Bala v France App no 25239/13 (Decision 20 October 2015). 97 Handyside v UK App no 5493/72 (Judgment 7 December 1976); Leander v Sweden App no 9248/81 (Judgment 26 March 1987), (1987) 9 EHRR 433; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway App no 21980/93 (Judgment 29 May 1999), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-III; Feldek v Slovakia App no 32686/96 (Judgment 12 July 2001), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-VIII. 98 Mătăsaru v Moldova App no 69714/16 and 71685/16 (Judgment 15 January 2019). 99 Case C-240/18 P Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (Judgment 27 February 2020). 100 See further para 11.78. 101 See eg Sunday Times v United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (1979) 2 EHRR 245; Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (Judgment 8 July 1986), (1986) 8 EHRR 407; De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium (n 93); Dalban v Romania App no 28114/95 (Judgment 28 September 1999), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-VI. Note some concerns about the Court’s approach in the face of terrorism: eg S Sottiaux, ‘Leroy v France: Apology of Terrorism and the Malaise of the European Court of Human Rights’ Free Speech Jurisprudence’ (2009) EHRLR 415. 102 Casado Coca v Spain (n 96) [35]; Case C-421/07 Damgaard (n 68). 103 General Comment No 34 (n 32) [5]. 104 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2/Watson (n 25) [94]. 105 Kjeldsen (1979–80) 1 EHRR 711 [53]; HRC Communication No 878/1999, Kang v Republic of Korea, Views adopted on 15 July 2003.



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been suggested that state propaganda or one-sided reporting in government-controlled media could therefore constitute a violation of this aspect of freedom of expression even if it also constitutes protected expression itself.106 11.42 In its other meaning, opinion protects the expression of unproven assertions, views or appraisals, irrespective of their quality or subject matter, although such expression may be limited (see D.IV below). Protection is drawn broadly, so as to cover indisputable and disputable; correct and incorrect. In the case of a statement of fact, the Strasbourg Court acknowledged that it is possible to prove the truth of the facts, which is impossible in cases of value judgment.107 Thus, a requirement to prove opinions itself infringes freedom of speech.108 Even where a statement amounts to a value judgment, there must be a sufficient factual basis to support it, failing which it will be excessive.109 This principle applies to all users and not just the media.110 Of course, the boundary between the fact and opinion is not clear-cut and falls to the state authorities to decide.111 While concerns about the effect of ‘fake news’ increase (for eg concerns about impact on the right to free and fair elections), there is equally a worry about the threat to freedom of expression posed by measures to counter disinformation and misinformation.112 The right protected by Article 11(1) EUCFR, like its counterparts, is double-sided. As well as 11.43 providing for a speaker’s right, it also creates an audience’s right—a right to receive information.113 This right is generally limited to the information that a speaker wishes to make available,114 although in recent cases the Court has not always included this proviso.115 Save for some specific rights to seek public information,116 it does not constitute a right to force someone to speak. Some directives do provide for rights to certain categories of information.117 The Court has linked the right to access information to its importance for the exercise of speech rights. It will assess the question according to a number of criteria: (a) the purpose of the information request; (b) the nature of the information sought, ie ‘public interest’ information; (c) the particular role of the

106 T Marauhn, ‘Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Assembly and Association’ in Ehlers (ed), European ­Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Berlin, De Gruyter Recht, 2007) 99 [4]; the General Court seemed to accept that a journalist engaged in propaganda was exercising his right to speech, though it did not fall within the high protection of political speech: Case T-262/15 Kiselev (n 84). 107 Bladet Tromsø (n 98) [65]. 108 Feldek (n 98) [75]; Case C-200/07 Alfonso Luigi Marra v Eduardo De Gregorio and Antonio Clemente [2008] ECR I-7929 (concerning a leaflet issued by a Member of the European Parliament containing insulting remarks) AG’s opinion. 109 Jerusalem v Austria App no 26958/95 ECHR 2001-II [43]; reiterated Annen v Germany App no 3779/11 (Judgment 18 October 2018) [25]. 110 Egill Einarsson v Iceland App no 24703/15 (Judgment 7 November 2017) [40]. 111 Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v Austria (Judgment 13 November 2003), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-XI [40]. 112 United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and ‘Fake News’, Disinformation and Propaganda (FOM.GAL/3/17), 3 March 2017. 113 Case C-477/10 P Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s. (Judgment 28 June 2012); see in the context of Art 19, Mavlanov and Sa’di v Uzbekistan Communication No 1334/2004 (UN Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004), 19 March 2009. 114 On the sorts of sources, see T Marauhn, ‘Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Assembly and Association’ (n 107). 115 See eg Advocate General in Case C-283/11 Sky (n 15). See also commentary on Art 42 in this volume. 116 Case C-139/07 P Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, AG’s Opinion; see Art 42 EUCFR and see General Comment No 34 (n 32) [18]. As regards the ECHR, the Court has held that individuals are entitled to health-related information under Art 8 ECHR: Guerra v Italy App no 14967/89, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, no 64. Under CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee has suggested that women should be entitled to information about sexual health: CEDAW General Recommendation No 24: Women and Health. 117 Eg Directive 2003/4 on public access to environmental information [2003] OJ L 41/26. Some of the directives dealing with distance selling and with the internet require certain information to be given in the interests of consumer protection and transparency; Art 6 Directive 2000/31 (n 12).

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seeker of the information in “receiving and imparting” it to the public (public interest actors such as journalists, NGOs, academics and even some bloggers being given specific recognition118); and (d) whether the information was ready and available- public authorities should not be required to collect or create information.119 Linked to discussions about the right to receive information is a different aspect of the freedom 11.44 of expression: the right to access infrastructure or dissemination networks. This aspect was first recognised in Autronic by the Strasbourg Court, as part of the Court’s position that the right covers the form and means as well as the content, and by the CJEU in de Coster.120 That case concerned the right to install a satellite dish to receive television. In Kabel Deutschland concerning broadcasters’ access to telecommunications networks, the CJEU commented, ‘it is appropriate to stress the importance of the fundamental freedom to receive information of which the recipients are end users and which the Member States must guarantee’.121 Here the right described was that of the audience, though the applicant in the case was the media company. The European Court of Human Rights in the Pirate Bay decision,122 which concerned a claim by those providing a file-sharing site and who specifically disassociated themselves from the content shared, reiterated both the importance of the internet and the fact that ‘Article 10 applies not only to the content of the information but also to the means of transmission or reception’. So Article 10 seemingly applies to the provision of software and intermediary services as well as infrastructure, though whether the actors providing them have independent, and potentially conflicting rights, from those of the service user has not been fully explored (see section E). The main emphasis in the case law under Article 10 ECHR has been on negative obligations; 11.45 that is, stopping states from interfering with private actors’ freedom of expression. The cases about access to infrastructure introduce questions about the extent to which Article 10 gives rise to positive obligations; that is, where the state must take action. The CJEU has been silent on positive obligations under the Charter in its jurisprudence.123 The text of Article 11 refers specifically to ‘interference by public authority’. While this might suggest that positive obligations under Article 11 are thereby limited, the use of the word ‘includes’ means that this is not an exhaustive definition.124 Moreover, the CJEU has—in its acceptance of Article 10 ECHR jurisprudence—downplayed any difference in text between the two provisions. The Strasbourg Court has noted that Article 10 can be invoked before the Court, not only 11.46 in vertical relations but also in horizontal ones, and that a court decision in a conflict between

118 The ECHR jurisprudence has developed in this regard: Kenedi v Hungary App No 31475/05 (Judgment 26 May 2009); Youth Initiative for Human Rights v Serbia App No 48135/06 (Judgment 25 June 2013); Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary (Judgment 14 April 2009) approved in Case C-213/15 P Commission v Breyer (Judgment 18 July 2017) [AG88]; Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law v Ukraine App no 10090/16 (Judgment 26 March 2020). 119 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság App no 18030/11 (GC) (Judgment 8 November 2016) [157–70]; for general discussion see eg Maija Dahlberg ‘Positive obligations and the right of access to information in the European Convention on Human Rights: yes or no?’ [2019] EHRLR 389. 120 Autronic AG v Switzerland (Judgment 22 May 1990) Series A no 178, p 23 [47]; Case C-17/00 de Coster v Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael [2001] ECR I-9445. 121 Case C-336/07 Kabel Deutschland Vertrieb und Service GmbH & Co KG v Niedersächsische Landesmedienanstalt für privaten Rundfunk [2008] ECR I-889 [33]. See similarly, General Comment No 34 (n 32) [15]. 122 Pirate Bay: Neij and Sunde Kolisoppi v Sweden App no 40397/12 (Decision 13 March 2013). 123 For discussion see M Beijer, The Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU: The Scope for the Development of Positive Obligations (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017). The CJEU has developed positive obligations under the Treaties: Case C-265/95 Commission v France (Angry Farmers) [1997] ECR I-6959; cf Case C-112/00 Schmidberger (n 5). 124 Cf M Brkan, ‘Freedom of Expression and Artificial Intelligence: On Personalisation, Disinformation and (Lack Of) Horizontal Effect of the Charter’ (not yet published) available: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3354180, [3.1.2].



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private parties is also considered as a measure of the state.125 To determine whether positive rights might arise, the court will consider the kind of expression rights at stake; their capability to contribute to public debate; the nature and scope of restrictions on those rights; the ability of alternative venues for expression; and the weight of countervailing rights of others or the public.126 This fair balance approach is different from the application of a ‘three-stage’ test (see section D.IV below) typically undertaken with regard to negative obligations. Applying these considerations in Appleby, the Court rejected the claim by campaigners of a right to a forum on privately owned (but publicly accessible) land.127 In the Pussy Riot case, the Court re-affirmed its approach in Appleby that Article 10 does not bestow an automatic ‘freedom of forum’, even in relation to publicly owned properties.128 Further: holding an artistic performance or giving a political speech in a type of property to which the public enjoys free entry may, depending on the nature and function of the place, require respect for certain prescribed rules of conduct.129

The impact of this on user claims to use specific online services is discussed at section E. Other examples of positive obligations include rights against dismissal,130 including for trade union activities;131 protection from harassment,132 violence133 and an obligation on the part of state authorities to ensure that journalists could access their workplace.134 These are all examples of a form of positive obligation under which the state is under an obligation to take action to prevent private actors from interfering with the exercise of freedom of expression by others.135 11.47 A second aspect of a positive obligation is when the state is required to put in place measures to achieve certain goals.136 This positive obligation may also be used to justify freedom of access to government information.137 The rights derived from this form of positive obligation may be broad. Within the case law, there is a less developed strand of jurisprudence which, given the role of the media in the functioning of democracy, emphasises the need for states to take action to ensure a pluralistic media ecology (see section D.III) and which is implicit in the ECJ’s comments on access to infrastructure already noted.138 11.48 The scope of what constitutes an interference with freedom of expression is wide and is closely linked to the question of determining who is a victim under the Article 10 case law.139 In addition 125 Palomo Sánchez and Others v Spain App no 28955/06 [GC] (Judgment 12 September 2011) [60]. 126 Appleby v UK App no 44306/98, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-III, [42]–[43] and [47]–[49]. 127 Ibid; cf Women on Waves v Portugal App no 31276/05 (Judgment 3 February 2009). 128 Mariya Alekhina and Others v Russia App no 38004/12 (Judgment 17 July 2018) (“Pussy Riot”); cf Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft and publisuisse v Switzerland App no 41723/14 (judgment 22 December 2020) discussed Section E. 129 Pussy Riot, ibid, [213]. 130 Fuentes Bobo v Spain App no 39293/98 (Judgment 29 February 2000) [38]. 131 Palomo Sánchez (n 125) [60]—though no violation on the facts of this case. 132 Ismayilova v Azerbaijan App nos 65286/13 and 57270/14 (Judgment 10 January 2019) [158]. 133 Özgür Gündem v Turkey App no 23144/93, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-III [42]–[43]; Dink v Turkey App no 2668/07 (Judgment 14 September 2010) [137]. 134 Frasil˘a and Ciocirlan v Romania App no 25329/03 (Judgment 10 May 2012). 135 Some commentators argue that the state is under an obligation to act to discourage certain forms of speech/behaviour: A Nieuwenhuis, ‘A Positive Obligation Under the ECHR to Ban Hate Speech?’ (2019) Public Law 326; A Dimopoulos, ‘Balancing Disability Protection Against Freedom of Speech: Should an Offence of Incitement to Disability Hatred Be Introduced?’ (2015) Public Law 79. 136 For one categorisation of positive obligations see eg A Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002) 225–27. 137 Társaság A Szabadságjogokért v Hungary App no 37374/05 (Judgment 14 April 2009). 138 Centro Europa 7 Srl and Di Stefano v Italy App no 38433/09 (Judgment 7 June 2012); Case C-336/07 Kabel ­Deutschland (n 121). 139 Altug Taner Akcam v Turkey (n 80) [67].

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to criminal penalties, fines or awards of damages, it would cover injunctions and bans, blocking and filtering140 as well as take-down notices. Licensing and ownership requirements would also be caught.141 More subtle or indirect forms of restriction include distributed denial-of-service attacks,142 company registration or structural requirements,143 intellectual property rights,144 a requirement to de-index content from a search engine,145 or limiting access to services (eg by age)146 and advertising rules limiting the products that may be advertised or limiting the timing or frequency of advertising. Regulation in general, requirements for compulsory membership of professional associations, or the registration of titles each constitutes interference though they may be capable of justification.147 Cases of interference have been found where individuals have modified their behaviour as a result of the impugned legislation, or because they are of a class of persons who risk being directly affected by it.148 In Petropavlovskis, however, the Strasbourg Court did not find Article 10 ECHR engaged by Latvia’s refusal to grant cititizenship to the applicant, a decision which was influenced by the applicant’s public statements.149 The reasoning in this case, heavily influenced by the fact that there is no right to acquire a particular nationality, may be better regarded as exceptional. Sanctions, particularly criminal penalties, for speech may have a “chilling effect”, even where a person has been acquitted.150 Since the meaning of expression and restriction is so broad, the main emphasis in the case law has been on the limits and exceptions to the right.

III.  Specific Provisions Perhaps the most distinctive element of Article 11 EUCFR, and one that distinguishes it in 11.49 structure from Article 10 ECHR, is the provision expressly dealing with the media: Article 11(2). This makes the media freedoms independent of the general right to freedom of expression. Article 11(2) states two things: first, that the media shall enjoy freedom of expression; and, secondly, that Member States must ensure media pluralism. While the former does not imply the

140 See eg Recommendation CM/Rec (2008) 6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on measures to promote the respect for freedom of expression and information with regard to Internet filters; Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) (Judgment 24 November 2011); Case C-401/19 Poland v European Parliament and Council (nyd). 141 See in the context of Art 19 ICCPR, Mavlanov and Sa’di v Uzbekistan Communication No 1334/2004 (UN Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004), 19 March 2009. 142 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the protection of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association with regard to privately operated Internet platforms and online service -providers, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 7 December 2011 at the 1129th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 143 Case C-288/89 Gouda (n 3). 144 See eg Case C-283/11 Sky (n 15). 145 Council of Europe Recommendation (2012) 3 on the protection of human rights with regard to search engines [12] et seq. Case C-131/12 Google Spain (Judgment 13 May 2014); M.L. and WW v Germany App no 60798/10 (Judgment 28 June 2018) [90]; Case C-507/17 Google LLC v CNIL (judgment 24 September 2019). 146 Council of Europe Recommendation (2012) 4 on the protection of human rights with regard to social networking sites [10] et seq. 147 General Comment No 34 (n 32). 148 Open Door (n 8). 149 Petropavlovskis v Latvia App no 44230/06 (Judgment 13 January 2015); cf Wille v Liechtenstein App no 28396/95 (GC) (Judgment 28 October 1999). See also Harabin v Slovakia App no 58688/11 (judgment 20 November 2012) [151] concerning the removal of a judge based on the appraisal of his professional qualification. 150 Association Ekin (n 1); and Aktan v Turkey App no 20863/02 (Judgment 23 September 2008) [27]–[28]; Goodwin v UK App no 17488/90 (Judgment 27 March 1996) [39]; Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others v Turkey App no 28255/07 (Judgment 8 October 2013) [63]; whether there is a consistent meaning and usage of this concept is another question. The application of this doctrine is discussed in Rónán Ó Fathaigh, ‘Article 10 and the chilling effect principle’ (2013) 3 EHRLR 304.



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latter, pluralism does imply media freedom. It is, however, not yet clear whether media pluralism should be viewed as an independent right seen as imposing positive obligations on the state, a ground on which freedom of expression may be justified, or both. In a number of recent cases, the CJEU has linked media pluralism to cultural policy rather than framing it as an aspect of freedom of expression.151 11.50 Given technological developments and the rise of user-generated content, the boundary between the media and others may be difficult to define in practice. The CJEU, when considering whether citizen journalism may benefit from protections awarded to journalists (in the context of data protection rules), has held that terms such as ‘journalist’ should be interpreted broadly. As regards journalism, according to that Court it means ‘the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit them’.152 The Court also stated that this could not mean everything, seemingly suggesting that the factors used to balance freedom of expression and privacy might be relevant (see D.IV). There is to date no complete definition of the media in EU law (as opposed to the definitions in the AVMSD,153 which aims at identifying certain sections of the media). Within the Council of Europe, a broad, functional view has been taken of the meaning of journalists,154 and recognition has also been given to other actors which exercise a watchdog role.155 In Rebechenko, a case concerning a user whose YouTube channel had more than 2,000 subscribers and whose video was viewed more than 80,000 times, the Strasbourg Court found the reach of the material a relevant factor in determining that that the case should be determined on the basis of the principles applied to the free press.156 Although the ECHR does not expressly refer to media freedom, the Strasbourg court’s 11.51 jurisprudence on Article 10 has always emphasised the role of the media,157 describing it as having a ‘pre-eminent role … in a State governed by the rule of law’.158 It allows the public ‘one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion on the ideas and attitudes of their political leaders’.159 Journalists have a role in reporting on matters of public interest more generally, for example the behaviour of industrialists and other private actors.160 Not only does the public have a right to receive such information, the media have a duty to impart it.161 The media have some freedom in choosing how to do so,162 including ‘recourse to a degree of exaggeration or provovation’.163 Journalists have the right to maintain the confidentiality of their sources (although this may in some instances be overridden).164 Further, journalists might be allowed

151 Case C-87/19 TV Play Baltic v Lietuvos Komisija (Judgment 11 December 2019); Case C-719/18 Vivendi SA v Autorita per le Garanzie nelle Communicazioni (Judgment 3 September 2020) but cf Case C-555/19 Fussl (n 95). 152 Case C-73/07 Satamedia (n 23) [61]; Case C-345/17 Buivids (n 23) [53], discussed U. Smartt ‘Are bloggers and YouTubers journalists?’ (2020) 42 EIPR 728. 153 Directive 2010/13/EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive (n 11) Article 1. 154 Recommendation CM/Rec (2016) 4 on the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalist and Other Media Actors; Recommendation No R (96) 4 on The Protection of Journalists in Situations of Conflict and Tension; Kiliç v Turkey App no 22492/93 [93]. 155 Magyar Helsinki Bizottsag v Hungary [GC] App no 18080/11, [165]–[168]. 156 Rebechenko v Russia App no 10257/17 (Judgment 16 April 2019) [25]. 157 Lingens v Austria Series A no 103 (Judgment of 8 July 1986) [41]–[42]. 158 Castells v Spain Series A no 236 (Judgment 23 April 1992) [43]. 159 Ibid. 160 Fressoz and Roire v France [GC] App no 29183/95 (Judgment 21 January 1999) Reports 1999-I [50]; Bergens Tidende and others v Norway App no 26132/95 (Judgment of 2 May 2000) Reports 2000-IV [51]. 161 Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland Series A no 239 (Judgment 25 June 1992) [59]–[70]. 162 Jersild v Denmark Series A no 298 (Judgment of 23 September 1994) [31]; De Haes and Gijsels (n 89) [46]. 163 Gelevski v North Macedonia App no 28031/12 (Judgment 8 October 2020) [29]. 164 Goodwin (n 150); Sanoma Uitgevers v NL [GC] App no 38224/03 (Judgment 14 September 2010); Becker v Norway App no 21272/12 (Judgment 5 October 2017); Recommendation No R (2000) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

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some leeway in their investigative techniques.165 News-gathering is an essential preparatory step in journalism and an inherent, protected part of press freedom.166 Penalties on journalists for doing their job have particularly serious consequences.167 Media freedom is not, however, unlimited—it may need to be balanced against other interests.168 Moreover, the special position of the journalist is to some extent linked to the journalist’s compliance with standards of media ethics.169 The Court in Ricci170 took into account Ricci’s failure to observe the ethics of journalism to find that his conviction for disclosing confidential images did not itself entail a violation of his right to freedom of expression. The nature and severity of the penalty imposed on him, however, did constitute a violation. Journalistic ethics are based on journalists’ obligations to act in good faith and ‘provide accurate and reliable information’.171 This obligation is more about the process of fact-checking and verifying information within the context of perishable news stories than a requirement for absolute truth. The strength of the obligation to verify is related to the seriousness of the allegations.172 The CJEU’s acceptance of the body of Strasbourg jurisprudence on journalism/media has left unanswered the question of whether this jurisprudence is seen, in the EU context, as constituting freedom of the media for the purposes of Article 11(2), or whether it is also part of the general freedom of expression (available to all) under Article 11(1). The Explanations tie Article 11(2) to the CJEU’s general principles jurisprudence and the case of Gouda,173 one of a number of cases considering state regulation of the broadcast media and the right of entities to broadcast across borders. In Gouda, a group of cable operators challenged the Dutch limitations on the broadcast of advertising. The Court’s starting point was the freedom to provide services. It determined that the Dutch rules constituted a restriction on that freedom, so the question was justification, and it was here that the need to protect media pluralism was put forward. The Court accepted the principle, but on the facts held the measure disproportionate. Licensing and control of access to frequencies is thus permissible in principle, but must be proportionate and achieved by a transparent and non-discriminatory process.174 This is in line with Article 10(1) ECHR, which as noted at para 11.08 above specifically recognises the possibility of licensing media operators, although such licensing should be in the public interest and subject to the requirements of Article 10(2) ECHR (see further section D.IV).175 The Strasbourg Court been prepared to uphold broadcast licensing regimes provided they aimed at a public interest objective and were applied in a non-discriminatory manner. They are not limited to precluding illegal content. The majority of the cases concerned advertising restrictions (specifically the quantity of advertising), although the issue of impartiality and

165 Cumpănă and Mazăre v Romania [GC] App no 33348/96, Reports 2004-XI (Judgment 17 December 2004) [96]. 166 Butkevich v Russia App no 5865/07 (Judgment 13 February 2018) but cf Pentikäinen v Finland [GC] App no 11882/10 (Judgment 20 October 2015). 167 Jersild (n 162) [35]; Tolstoy Miloslavsky v the United Kingdom Series A no 316-B (Judgment 13 July 1995). 168 Tammer v Estonia App no 41205/98, Reports 2001-I (Judgment 6 February 2001); on privacy see para 11.//. 169 Bédat v Switzerland no 56925/08 (GC) (judgment 29 March 2016), [58]; Magyar Jeti ZRT (n 93) [64]; Colombani and others v France App no 51279/99, Reports 2002-V (Judgment 25 June 2002) [65]; McVicar v the United Kingdom App no 46311/99, Reports 2002-III (Judgment 5 May 2002). 170 Ricci v Italy App no 30210/06 (Judgment 8 October 2013); see also Sellami v France App no 61470/15 (Judgment 17 December 2020). 171 Björk Eiđsdóttir v Iceland App no 46443/09 (Judgment 10 July 2012) [70]. 172 Radio France and Others v France App no 53984/00 (Judgment 30 March 2004) [39]. 173 Gouda (n 3). 174 Case C-380/05 Centro Europe 7 [2008] ECR I-349. 175 See for example Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v Bulgaria App no 38743/97 (Judgment 11 October 2007), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-IX; Meltex Ltd and Mesrop Movsesyan v Armenia App no 28341/95 (Judgment 17 June 2008), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-V; Centro Europa 7 (n 138) (ECHR).



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political advertising has arisen.176 In Murphy, the prohibition on religious advertising was accepted as justified; the fact that other forms of venues for advertising remained available was a factor that the Court took into account.177 This point was also made in Animal Defenders; it additionally recognised the risk of groups that were financially powerful being able to distort democratic debate through easy access to influential media.178 The case law is somewhat uncertain in this area, however.179 11.56 A licensing procedure implies a possibility of sanctions; this is permissible under Article 10 provided Article 10(2) is respected.180 11.57 The Explanations also refer to the Television without Frontiers Directive (now AVMSD).181 It provides for partial,182 minimum harmonisation of broadcast media regulation (now including some online services), and specifically includes some restrictions on speech (hate speech, speech injurious of minors and some commercial speech). It also contains positive obligations, which can also impinge on broadcasters’ editorial choices. 11.58 Although regulation tends to be regarded as a restriction on freedom of expression, it may be necessary to ensure that a wide range of content is universally available, thus supporting pluralism and respecting the potential audience’s rights to receive (or to seek) information. This point is implicitly recognised by the reference to the Protocol on Public Service Broadcasting183 in the Explanations. While states are not obliged to establish public service broadcasting systems, any public service broadcaster must be independent and provide diverse and accurate information.184 Both European courts have accepted that media monopolies are hard to justify.185 The Court has accepted the principle of pluralism in other media too; Familiapress concerned measures to support pluralism in the context of magazines.186 Presumably its approach would apply across all (professional) media.

IV.  Limits and Derogations 11.59 The structure of the Convention is different from that of the Charter. In the Convention the grounds of derogation from the right are specific to that right. The limitations on the freedom of expression are found in Article 10(2) and the last sentence of Article 10(1). The Charter in Article 52(1) provides for an expectation applicable to a number of rights (including Article 11). Rather than list specified categories of permitted exceptions as Article 10(2) ECHR does, Article 52(1) is general and open to interpretation. Article 10(2) also states that the right ‘carries with it duties and responsibilities’, a phrase that has had particular relevance in relation

176 RJ Huggett v UK App no 24744/94 (Decision 28 June 1995) DR82, 98; Sc X and the Association of Y v UK App no 4515/70 (Decision 12 July 1971) Yearbook 14, 538. 177 Murphy v Ireland App no 44179/98 (Judgment 10 July 2003), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-IX. 178 Animal Defenders International v UK App no 48876/08 (GC) (Judgment 22 April 2013). 179 VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland App no 24699/94, ECHR 2001-VI; TV Vest v Norway App no 21132/05 (Judgment 11 December 2008). Another case is pending: De Pracomtal and Foundation Jérôme Lejeune v France App nos 34701/17 and 35133/17. 180 Sigma Radio Television Ltd v Cyprus App nos 32181/04 and 35122/05 (Judgment 21 July 2011); Medya FM Reha Radyo ve ÿletiÿim Hizmetleri A.ÿ. v Turkey App no 32842/02 (Decision 14 November 2006). 181 Audiovisual Media Services Directive (n 11). 182 Joined Cases C-34–36/95 De Agostini and TV-Shop (n 14) [26]; Case C-244/10 Mesopotamia Broadcast (n 14) [34]. 183 Protocol 27 On The System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States, Recital 1. 184 Manole and Others v Moldova App no 13936/02 (Judgment 17 September 2009). 185 Informationsverein Lentia App nos 13914/88, 15041/89, 15717/89, 15779/89, 17207/90 (1993) 17 EHRR 93; see further E.V. 186 Case C-368/95 Familiapress (n 5).

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to cases relating to the duties of civil servants (para 11.36) and in relation to journalistic ethics (para 11.52). This condition is not found in the Charter. Nonetheless, the Explanations in relation to Article 52(3) EUCFR, which deals with the consistency between the Convention and the Charter, state ‘the meaning and scope of those rights, including authorised limitations, are the same as those laid down by the ECHR’. Note, however, that Article 52(1) specifies that any ­limitation—in addition to being lawful and proportionate—must ‘respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’—a phrase also not found in Article 10 ECHR. While the CJEU has referred to this element, it has not yet elaborated what it might mean in the context of free speech.187 Insofar as this might indicate a narrow interpretation of any exceptions, this would be acceptable as Article 52(3) makes clear that more extensive protection than that provided under the ECHR is permissible. In general terms, the provisions permitting restrictions are interpreted restrictively. Borrowing from the approach of the Strasbourg Court, the first stage of any assessment is 11.60 whether the restriction (in relation to a negative obligation) is for a legitimate aim as identified in the EUCFR. The difference in approach between the Convention and Charter raises the question of whether the ‘general interest’ grounds referred to in Article 52(1) are the same as for Article 10(2) ECHR.188 The grounds listed in Article 10(2) ECHR comprise: national security,189 territorial integrity190 or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,191 for the protection of health or morals,192 for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,193 or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.194 The Explanations state that ‘the reference to general interests recognised by the Union covers both the objectives mentioned in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union and other interests protected by specific provisions of the Treaties such as Article 4(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 35(3), 36 and 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’. While the ECJ has defined the overriding interests for the Treaty freedoms as an open class, it is suggested that acceptable grounds in relation to Article 11 EUCFR cannot be wider than those in Article 10(2) ECHR, given the terms of Article 52(3) EUCFR. Given the breadth of grounds listed in Article 10(2) this is unlikely to prove problematic in practice. Areas in which there is EU regulation restricting speech (eg prohibitions on child 11.61 pornography,195 the protection of children from age inappropriate content196 or the regulation of advertising) are likely to fall within the public interest grounds described by Article 10(2) ECHR,

187 Eg NH (n 65) [51]. 188 General Comment No 34 in relation to Art 19(3) suggests that the limitations on various rights are based on different grounds and that they are not interchangeable: (n 32) [22]. 189 Eg Observer and Guardian v UK App no 13585/88 (Judgment 26 November 1991); Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v the Netherlands App no 16616/90 (Judgment 9 February 1995); Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01 (GC) (Judgment 10 December 2007). 190 Eg Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey App nos 23927/94 and 24277/94 (GC) (Judgment 8 July 1999); cf Sürek v Turkey (No. 3) App no 24735/94 (GC) (Judgment 8 July 1999). 191 Eg Incal v Turkey App no 22678/93 (GC) (Judgment 9 June 1998); Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v Austria App no 15153/89 (Judgment 19 December 1994); Pentikäinen v Finland App no 1182/10 (GC) (Judgment 20 October 2015). 192 Eg Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (Judgment 7 December 1976); cf I.A v Turkey App no 42571/98 (Judgment 13 September 2005). 193 Fressoz and Roire (n 160); Bédat (n 169). 194 Nikula v Finland App no 31611/96 (Judgment 21 March 2002); Morice v France App no 29369/10 (GC) (Judgment 23 April 2015). 195 Karttunen v Finland App No 1685/10 (Decision 10 May 2011); states may be under a positive obligation under Art 8 to protect minors. 196 See eg Recommendation CM/Rec (2018)7 of the Committee of Ministers, Guidelines to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of the child in the digital environment, available: https://rm.coe.int/guidelines-to-respect-protectand-fulfil-the-rights-of-the-child-in-th/16808d881a.



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and consequently Article 52(1) EUCFR. A similar point may be made in relation to restrictions on speech arising from equalities legislation.197 11.62 There is no analogous statement to the last sentence of Article 10 ECHR in the EUCFR, though the text of Article 11(2) expressly recognises media plurality which could imply media regulation (see para 11.47). 11.63 In general, the Strasbourg Court’s approach to assessing whether a state measure falls within a legitimate aim has been ‘succinct’,198 rarely finding against a state on this basis. In Baka the dismissal of a judge as a result of his comments was held not to serve a legitimate aim.199 The case of Bayev concerned a ban on homosexuality in which the Court considered a range of legitimate aims and found the ban served none of them.200 A chamber judgment found that rules prohibiting voters from publishing photographs of ballot papers did not serve a legitimate aim.201 The Court of Justice tends also not to investigate too closely Member States’ objectives in terms of derogations from Treaty freedoms, focussing more on questions of proportionality.202 11.64 The requirement that a restriction be prescribed by law implies a certain qualitative assessment. A norm must be ‘formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct … [and] … to foresee … the consequences which a given action may entail’.203 Absolute certainty is not required.204 Usually a law in the EU context will be a written document, but given the coverage of EU law, it may also include unwritten sources (such as the common law), provided they are sufficiently precise.205 The Strasbourg Court has repeatedly stated that a law has to be public, accessible, predictable and foreseeable and must not leave the authorities implementing the law with too much latitude.206 Thus, in Gawęda, it held that a provision which gave the national courts the power to refuse registration of a periodical if it were ‘in conflict with reality’ was ‘not formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct’.207 Too much discretion cannot be allowed to administrative or judicial bodies with delegated power.208 The domestic legal system must include safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power.209 Even in cases relating to national security or the fight against organised crime, the wording of the law must still be sufficiently clear so as to give individuals an adequate indication of the legal conduct and the consequences of acting unlawfully.210

197 Eg NH (n 65) [53]. 198 Magyar Ketfarku Kutya Part v Hungary App no 201/17 (Judgment 23 January 2018) [40]. 199 Baka v Hungary GC App no 20261/12 (Judgment 23 June 2016) [155]–[156]. 200 Bayev v Russia App no 67667/09 (Judgment June 2017) [65] et seq. 201 Magyar Ketfarku Kutya Part (n 198). This case has been referred to the Grand Chamber. 202 Eg Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen-under Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberburgermesterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. 203 Sunday Times (n 101) [49]. 204 Ibid. 205 Sunday Times (n 101); Groppera (n 27); Autronic (n 120); cf Hashman and Harrup (n 86) concerning the scope of conduct contra bonos mores. 206 Petra v Romania App no 27273/95 (23 September 1998), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII, no 92. A similar approach is taken by the HRC: Communication No 578/1994, de Groot v The Netherlands, Views adopted on 14 July 1995. 207 Gawęda v Poland App no 26229/95 (Judgment 14 March 2002), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-II. Presumably such rules could now (given the accession of Poland to the EU) be considered for compatibility with Arts 49 and 56 TFEU. 208 See similarly The Word ‘Laws’ in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 of 9 May 1986, Series A no 6; Concluding Observations on Kyrgyzstan’s Initial Report, 24 July 2000, CCPR/CO/69/KGZ [21]. 209 Bulgakov v Russia App no 20159/15 (Judgment 23 June 2020) [31]—this case is one of a number against Russia concerning excessive internet blocking and which set down limitations on the circumstances in which blocking would be acceptable. 210 Leander (n 97).

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The adjective ‘necessary’ involves, for the purposes of Article 10(2) ECHR, two elements. First 11.65 there must be a ‘pressing social need’ and, secondly, although ‘[t]he contracting states have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists’, the interference must be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and ‘the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it’ must be ‘relevant and sufficient’.211 The intensity of review may vary as the ‘margin of appreciation’212 will be wider in some cases (eg moral and commercial) than others (political speech and speech relating to the public sphere)213—though the boundaries between these categories may be difficult to determine.214 For political speech, states have the narrowest margin of appreciation.215 Matters of public concern or public interest have been understood broadly. They include: 11.66 public hearings within Article 6(1) ECHR; the public interest in the transparency of political life; information on the ideas, attitudes or conduct of prominent politicians, or possibly the behaviour of leading industrialists and companies;216 as well as a public debate which is actually being conducted.217 The importance of political speech means that the politicians and public officials must accept criticism of their behaviour and policies, even criticism that is robust, not completely accurate218 or even obscene; this is not so for private individuals.219 Even in the case of politicians such criticism should be directed to their public role and not their private life (see further 11.75).220 In the Strasbourg jurisprudence the role of the media as watchdog is often linked to political speech and treated similarly (see D.III), and the CJEU has referred to this jurisprudence approvingly. While journalistic ethics provide some contraints, the important role of journalism (and whistleblowers) make it harder to justify restraints on the basis of confidentiality of information, at least as it relates to matters in the public interest and any such restriction would be closely scrutinised.221 Despite their likely political significance, cases pertaining to national emergency222 and national 11.67 security will enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.223 Terrorism and extreme speech may also justify greater repressive measures.224 Nonetheless, the Court will examine whether the speech

211 The Observer and The Guardian (n 68), accepted in Case C-274/99 P Connolly (n 17). 212 TA O’Donnell, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1982) 4 Human Rights Quarterly 474, 475. See eg for a review: AT Yutaka, The Margin of ­Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002); Y Arai-Takahati, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004). 213 Thorgeirson (n 161) [64]; approved Case C-200/07 Alfonso Luigi Marra v Eduardo De Gregorio and Antonio Clemente [2008] ECR I-7929 [AG36]. 214 Casado Coca v Spain (n 95) [35]; Case C-421/07 Damgaard (n 68). 215 Sunday Times (n 101); Jersild (n 162); Thorgeirson (n 161). 216 Kuliś and Różycki v Poland (Judgment 6 October 2009). 217 Case C-73/07 Satamedia (n 23) [AG73], citing News Verlags GmbH & Co KG App no 31457/96, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-I [56]; Editions Plon App no 58148/00, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004-IV [44]; Stoll App no 69698/01 (Judgment 10 December 2007) [122]; Lingens App no 9815/82, Series A no 103 [42]. 218 Macovei v Romania, App no 53018/14 (Judgment 28 July 2020); cf Sanocki v Poland (judgment 17 July 2007). 219 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v Austria App no 68354/01 (Judgment 25 January 2007); Palomo Sánchez and Others v Spain App nos 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 (Judgment 12 September 2011). On the boundary between public and private see eg Balaskas v Greece App no 73087/17 (Judgment 5 November 2020) [47]–[50]. 220 Eg Prunea v Romania App no 47881/11 (Judgment 8 January 2019). 221 Guja v Moldova App no 14277/04 (GC) (Judgment 12 February 2008); Heinisch v Germany App no 28274/08 (judgment 21 July 2011). 222 Art 15 ECHR, though the Court might draw this category narrowly. 223 Contrast Zana v Turkey App no 18954/91 (1999) 27 EHRR 667 [60]–[62] and Surek and Ozdemir v Turkey App no 23927/94 (1999) 27 EHRR 667. 224 Eg Brind v UK App no 18714/91 Decision 9 May 1994); see also Purcell and Others v Ireland App no 15404/89, (Decision 16 April 1991).



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in issue is extreme.225 It has emphasised that terrorism legislation should not be interpreted overbroadly.226 The Court commented that the public has the right to be informed of critical views ‘unless they advocate recourse to violent actions or bloody revenge, justify the commission of terrorist acts in pursuit of their supporters’ goals and can be interpreted as likely to encourage violence by instilling deep-seated and irrational hatred towards specified individuals’.227 11.68 Discriminatory speech can raise issues of public interest or be viewed as political speech. Where issues are raised in connection with which, there is no “uniform European conception”, states may enjoy a wider margin of appreciation. 11.69 States usually enjoy a greater range of discretion in relation to speech involving morality, obscenity or blasphemous expression and religion.228 The Court has sought to draw a boundary between criticism of religion and gratuitously offensive expression,229 but this is a difficult line to maintain, especially when humour is in issue. The Court has recognised the value of artistic speech as part of ‘the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds’, essential for a democratic society.230 Nonetheless, its jurisprudence has not been consistent,231 perhaps in part because of a very broad approach as to when artistic speech might be in issue.232 If we see artistic speech as falling in the ‘second rank’ of protection in the Strasbourg Court’s 11.70 hierarchy of values, then commercial speech (advertising) occupies the third rank,233 where states enjoy a greater margin of appreciation in determining limits to it.234 This does not mean any restriction on commercial speech will be acceptable. In Sekmadienis,235 adverts for clothes referred to ‘Jesus’ and ‘Mary’ were fined for being contrary to public morals because of the sensitivity of religious symbols. The Strasbourg court found a violation of Article 10. While the adverts were not intended to contribute to public debate, neither were they gratuitously offensive or profane. Whether Sekmadienis is in line with cases on profane artistic speech, or even other cases on humour in advertising,236 is questionable. The boundary of commercial speech and political advertising, especially as regards issue-based advertising (as opposed to advertising related to elections), is unclear with an uncertain line of jurisprudence.237 Commercial speech is particularly significant in the context of the EU, especially as regards the regulation of advertising.

225 D Ortner, ‘Conscientious Offenders: Russia’s Ban on “Extremist” Religious Literature, and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 56 Virginia Journal of International Law 147; Engels v Russia App no 61919/16 (Judgment 23 June 2020) [29–30]—information on bypassing content controls ‘cannot be reduced to a toll for malevolently seeking to obtain extremist content’. 226 Altan v Turkey App no 13237/17 (Judgment 20 March 2018); Alpay v Turkey App no 16538/17 (Judgment 20 March 2018) [179]–[181]. 227 Alpay, ibid, [179]. 228 Eg E.S. v Austria App no 38450/12 (Judgment 25 October 2018). 229 A. Koltay ‘The Freedom and Restriction of Blasphemy’ in J. Temperman and A. Koltay (eds) Blasphemy and Freedom of Expression: Comparative, Theoretical and Historical Reflections after the Charlie Hebdo Massacre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); see eg Leroy v France App no 36109/03 (Judgment 6 April 2009). 230 Pussy Riot (n 128), [203]. 231 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler (n 218); Otto Preminger Institute v Austria App no 13470/87 (Judgment 20 September 1994); but cf A.I (n 191); E Polymenopoulou ‘Does One Swallow Make a Spring? Artistic and Literary Freedom at the European Court of Human Rights’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 511. 232 Polymenopoulou, ibid, 536. 233 D Harris, M O’Boyle, E Bates and C Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 614. 234 Case C-249/09 Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet (Judgment 5 May 2011) [AG50]; Patriciello (n 17) [35]. 235 Sekmandiensis v Lithuania App no 69317/14 (Judgment 30 January 2018). 236 Société de Conception de Presse et d’Édition et Ponson v France App no 26935/05 (Judgment 5 June 2009). 237 Contrast eg Animal Defenders (n 178) and Mouvement raëlien v Switzerland App no. 16354/06, (GC),(Judgment 13 July 2012) and see para 11.55.

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The CJEU has repeatedly recognised that commercial speech is protected by Article 11.238 In general, the Court has dealt with the appropriate value of advertising through a proportionality analysis (discussed below).239 Under the Convention, when states must balance human rights against each other, the Court usually allows a wide margin of appreciation, an approach adopted by the CJEU in Fussl.240 It has also held that this balance is for individual Member States to find both in implementing directives and in applying them, taking into account the principle of proportionality.241 While the EU courts have not explained the need for a margin of appreciation doctrine, they have referred to the doctrine, as can be seen in Dynamic Medien.242 There the ECJ noted that the conception of the rights of the child might vary on a cultural basis giving Member States a definite margin of discretion.243 It remains uncertain whether the EU courts ascribe the same meaning to the margin of appreciation as the Strasbourg Court.244 In United Pan-Europe Communications Belgium, the CJEU assessed the Member States as having a wide margin of appreciation, but then imposed a strict process requirement for the award of a benefit, the ‘must-carry’ status.245 In Fussl the Court suggested the margin of appreciation was particularly important given the complex and fluctuating nature of advertising.246 In other cases, the CJEU has not mentioned the margin of appreciation at all. The focus is on the question of proportionality,247 which is also a general principle of EU law. Proportionality is essentially a test of the means chosen to achieve the ends taking into account the importance of any countervailing interests, and it will be a fact specific analysis. Within both systems, proportionality is generally accepted as having three elements: suitability, necessity and proportionality strictu sensu. The focus is usually on the last of these, but in Navalnyy v Russia (No. 2) the Court considered the case of a house arrest which also affected the applicant’s freedom of expression as communication was prohibited. The formal justification for the applicant’s house arrest was his risk of absconding. The Court noted that ‘there was no link between the restrictions on the applicant’s freedom of expression and the indicated risks’.248 Any assessment will take into account the type of speech, its content and its context. For example, poetry is not only likely to have a smaller audience than, for example, audiovisual content, but its audience engages with it differently. Where violence or threats are in issue, strong sanctions are more likely to be justified. Two cases which concerned the wearing of political symbols came to different conclusions. In Vajnai there was no evidence of a risk of public order and the symbol could bear a multitude of meanings.249 In Donaldson, the symbol was inextricably linked to the conflict in Northern Ireland, so its public display could be inherently divisive and

238 Note, however, Case C-240/18 P Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (Judgment 27 February 2020) [56]–[57]; Case C-555/19 Fussl (n 95) [81], [91]. 239 Case C-71/02 Karner (n 5) [51]. 240 Case C-555/19 Fussl (n 95), [93]. 241 Case C-345/17 Buivids (n 23) [50]. 242 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien (n 22). 243 Ibid [43]–[45]. 244 See formulation in Case C-112/00 Schmidberger (n 5) [82]; Case C-250/08 United Pan-Europe Communications Belgium [2007] ECR I-11135 [44]–[45]; Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien (n 22); Case C-555/19 Fussl Modestrasse Mayr (n 95). 245 Case C-250/08 United Pan-Europe Communications (n 244) [46]–[49], but contrast Case C-134/10 Commission v Belgium (must carry obligation) (n 20) [53] concerning the criteria for awarding ‘must-carry’ status under Directive 2002/22/EC, Art 31, in which the Court referred to ‘margin of discretion’. 246 Case C-555/19 Fussl Modestrasse Mayr (n 95), [91]. 247 Case C-71/02 Karner (n 5). 248 Navalnyy v Russia (No 2) App no 43734/14 (Judgment 9 April 2019) [79]. 249 Vajnai v Hungary App no 33629/06 (2010) 50 EHRR 44.



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had frequently exacerbated existing tensions in Northern Ireland; further, the ban was limited in scope to serving prisoners outside their cells.250 The context of states which ‘experienced the Nazi horrors’ is a ‘weighty factor’ for the Strasbourg court.251 The CJEU, in the context of advertising, has recognised the need to ensure accurate and transparent information concerning the characteristics of (certain) goods due to the high level of protection awarded to public health in the EU.252 In the context of tobacco advertising, the CJEU upheld a prohibition on advertising because of the risk that even regulated advertising would ‘exploit the vulnerability of consumers of tobacco products who, because of their nicotine dependence, are particularly receptive to any element suggesting there may be some kind of benefit linked to tobacco consumption’.253 11.75 When balancing rights, it is not possible to state that one right will automatically have priority over another. In Satamedia, for example, the ECJ noted that it is not possible to give automatic priority to freedom of expression over data protection and privacy.254 11.76 In balancing between freedom of expression and privacy, the Strasbourg court has identified a range of factors which should be taken into account in a proportionality analysis, bearing in mind the margin of appreciation.255 This approach has been accepted by the CJEU.256 The starting point is that the result of the balancing exercise should be the same regardless of whether the complainant claims a violation of privacy or an undue restriction of the freedom of expression. National courts should consider the following: —— —— —— —— ——

does the article contribute to a debate of general interest; how well known is the person who is the subject of the disclosure; the prior conduct of the person concerned; the content and consequences of the publication; the circumstances under which photos were taken are to be considered (were they taken with the person’s consent, openly or surreptitiously, or even by illicit means?); —— the reliability of the journalistic information; and —— the severity of the sanction imposed by the courts.257 Articles aimed at satisfying the curiosity of the public as to intimate aspects of a person’s private life are unlikely to fall within matters of general interest to society.258 11.77 In other instances when balancing rights, the CJEU has not always carried out a thorough review of the proportionality of the measure;259 implicitly this may fit with the broader margin of

250 Donaldson v UK (n 30). 251 Annen v Germany (No 6) App no 3779/11 (Judgment 18 October 2018) [29] citing Perinçek v Switzerland App no 27510/08 (GC) (Judgment 15 October 2015), [243]. 252 Case C-157/14 Neptune (n 95) [74], citing Hertel v Switzerland (Judgment 25 August 1998), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI, [47]. 253 Case C-547/14 R, on the application of Philip Morris Brands SARL, Philip Morris Ltd, British American Tobacco UK Ltd v The Secretary of State for Health (Judgment 4 May 2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:325, [2016] 3 WLR 973 [160]. 254 Case C-37/07 Satamedia (n 23). 255 D Voorhoof, ‘Freedom of Expression versus Privacy and the Right to Reputation’ in S Smet and E Brems (eds), When Human Rights Clash at the European Court of Human Rights: Conflict or Harmony? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017). As regards use of copyright to limit reporting see Sky (n 16) and the cases of C-469/17 Funke Medien (n 24) and C-516/17 Spiegel Online (n 24) in section E. 256 Eg Buivids (n 23), Opinion [61]. 257 Von Hannover (No 2) v Germany [GC] App no 40660/08 and 60641/08; Axel Springer v Germany [GC] App no 39954/08 (Judgment 7 February 2012). 258 See eg Dupate v Latvia App no 18068/11 (Judgment 19 November 2020) [51]. 259 See eg Case C-479/04 Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet [2006] ECR I-8089 [62]–[65], although the AdvocateGeneral notes this in passing [AG70]; note width of choice in the case of Council decision: Case T-262/15 Kiselev (n 84), [88] and [120].

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appreciation that would be found in these circumstances under the ECHR. For example, in the case of Painer,260 which concerned the need to balance copyright with users’ freedom of expression, the CJEU dismissed the issue by saying that a fair balance had been struck between the rights in the drafting of the provision in question,261 which allowed use of the work provided the author was attributed (ss further E.VI). Of course, proportionality is assessed differently when the EU’s legislative choices, rather than Member States’ legislation, are in issue.262 The Equal Treatment Directive263 provides for equality in access to employment and is an 11.78 expression of the general prohibition of discrimination in Article 21 EUCFR. In a number of cases, private individuals have been penalised for expressing the view that they would not employ members of groups protected by the directive. Although these rules infringe freedom of expression, they have been held to be proportionate because the directive covers only statements that ‘constitute discrimination in employment and occupation’264 even though the field of application of the Equal Treatment Directive has been interpreted broadly. The severity of the interference is a factor in assessing proportionality more generally, as can 11.79 be seen in the Open Door case.265 There the blanket nature of the prohibition on expression was a factor in a finding of a violation.266 Criminal penalties may only be justified where the countervailing interest is particularly strong.267 Although the Court has tended to view prior restraint as a serious restriction,268 the Strasbourg court has not always found it disproportionate, nor even subjected such restraints to serious scrutiny.269 In the ECHR case of Yildirim, however, a blocking order that was very wide was held to be disproportionate; it gave rise to ‘ancillary censorship’.270 Such orders are equivalent to banning a newspaper or television station,271 and require strong procedural safeguards against abuse. The CJEU has taken a similar approach.272 In L’Oréal v eBay the Advocate General noted the importance of procedural due process in ensuring that a take-down notice system did not unnecessarily curb the freedom of expression of internet users.273 The scope of Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 Charter are wide, but some forms of expression 11.80 fall outside their protection.274 Abuse of rights is dealt with in Article 54 EUCFR. The equivalent approach in the Convention is found in Article 17. According to consistent case law Article 17 should only be used exceptionally.275 The distinction between hate speech and ‘challenging’ speech on a matter of

260 Case C-145/10 Painer (n 24) [134]–[135]; on copyright see further E-VI. 261 Art 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29. 262 Case C-283/11 Sky (n 15) [50]. 263 Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ l303/16. 264 NH (n 65), [52]. 265 Open Door (n 8). See also Ricci (n 170). 266 Open Door, ibid [73], though the nature of the information would also have been a factor. See similarly, Campbell v UK App no 13590/88 Series A no 233 (Judgment 25 March 1992); Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs (n 190). 267 Perinçek (n 251). 268 Gawęda (n 207), [40]. 269 Muller v (n 19) as artistic speech. 270 Yildirim (n 91). 271 OOO Flavus v Russia App nos 12468/15, 23489/15, 19074/16 (Judgment 23 June 2020) [37]. 272 See also Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH (Judgment 27 March 2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:192, concerning inter alia the feasibility and proportionality of blocking measures. 273 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA v eBay (n 87) [AG155]–[AG159]. The Court did not address the point. 274 Case C-245/10 Mesopotamia Broadcast (n 15) [AG 68]. 275 Eg Belkacem v Belgium App no 34367/14 (Judgment 27 June 2017) [31].



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public interest is, however, a fine one.276 It is not clear when instances of hate speech should be dealt with as abuse of rights or under the derogation from free speech.277 In a number of cases, even where the Court does not rely on Article 17, it has struck out an application for violation of Article 10 on the basis the application is manifestly ill-founded.278

V. Remedies 11.81 Freedom of expression is most likely to arise in the context of a shield, for example in the context of prosecutions for not complying with advertising regulations or in relation to take-down notices. As a sword, freedom of expression may most clearly arise in the context of access to information. Attempts to use freedom of expression to challenge regulatory regimes (such as must-carry obligations, or the short reporting rules) have met with limited success. In general terms the CJEU has accepted the principle of regulation and has focused instead on proportionality on the relevant measures.

E. Evaluation 11.82 The right to freedom of expression in Article 11 is a broad one and, despite the difference in structure between Article 11 EUCFR and Article 10 ECHR and the circumstances in which cases tend to arise, both provisions seem to have a similar scope. The general principles by which possible infringements of freedom of expression are well-established, even if there is criticism as to the Court’s approach in any given case particularly where sensitive issues (insults to religion; national security and hate speech) are in issue. 11.83 The jurisprudence in relation to positive obligations, as well as the boundary between positive and negative obligations, is less clear. Arguably, the positive obligations under Article 10 are weak by comparison, for example, to Article 8 ECHR, and the EU’s approach not well elaborated. For example, while both courts have emphasised the importance of pluralism this tends to be of relevance justify state action, rather than in identifying when it should act (see further E.V). The High-level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism has highlighted concentration of media ownership as a concern from the perspective of pluralism. The European Parliament has called repeatedly for legislation but none has been forthcoming. 11.84 Questions have been raised about the level of protection awarded to rights found within the scope of protection under general principles, especially where they run contrary to Treaty freedoms.279 In Schmidberger, the Court had to balance the right of free movement against the 276 Case C-245/10 Mesopotamia Broadcast (n 15); Note also Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on racism and xenophobia (n 52). ECHR judgments include Sürek v Turkey (No 3) (n 190); Lehideux and Isorni v France, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII, [53]; Witzch v Germany App no 7485/03 (Decision 13 December 2005); Erbakan v Turkey App no 59405/00 (Decision 6 July 2006); Belkacem (n 275); ROJ TV A/S v Denmark App no 24683/14 (Judgment 17 April 2018) (Art 17 applied); cf Féret v Belgium App no 15615/07 (Judgment 16 July 2009); Perinçek (n 251) (Art 17 not applied). 277 IA (n 192), but cf Aydin Tatlav v Turkey App no 50692/99 (Judgment 2 May 2006); M Oetheimer, ‘Protecting ­Freedom of Expression: The Challenge of Hate Speech in the European Court of Human Rights Case Law’ (2009) 17 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 427; A Buyse, ‘Dangerous Expressions: The ECHR, Violence and Free Speech’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 491; P. Lobba, ‘Holocaust Denial before the European Court of Human Rights: Evolution of an Exceptional Regime’ (2015) 26 EJIL. 237; and H. Cannie and D. Voorhoof, ‘The Abuse Clause and Freedom of E ­ xpression in the European Human Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection’ (2011) 29 NQHR 54. 278 Eg Lilliendahl v Iceland App no 29297/18 (Decision 12 May 2020). 279 L Woods, ‘Freedom of Expression in the European Union’ (2006) 12 European Public Law 371.

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right of environmental protesters to free movement. It did so on the basis that neither right was unlimited, and that a balancing exercise should be carried out. This balancing exercise was a form of extended proportionality review which led to the CJEU finding in favour of the state’s decision to allow the protest. Unfortunately, the CJEU has not been consistent in its approach to this issue. Commentators have argued that its case law could be understood as describing the relationship between human rights protection and the four freedoms in three different ways: that fundamental rights protection constitutes a ground of public policy within the Treaty derogation from free movement; that protection of human rights is an overriding interest of public interest; or that such protection constitutes a third independent ground of restriction of Treaty freedoms.280 Beyond this, new issues arise for both courts from the need to apply principles from the 11.85 traditional speech environment to the more complex, digital environment. The CJEU has had to deal with the impact of intellectual property rights (especially copyright) on freedom of expression.

I.  The Right to Transmit As noted, ‘expression’ is a broad term and has been interpreted dynamically, in particular taking 11.86 account of changes in technology. This can be seen in the Strasbourg Court’s approach to the introduction of satellite technology.281 Against this background, Advocate General Kokott suggested that the freedom should be understood, ‘in the sense of freedom of communication’.282 It is unclear what this would mean or what the consequences of such a right would be.283 The suggestion that the right to freedom of expression includes a free-standing transmission 11.87 right is a novelty, although arguably based on Convention cases such as Autronic.284 In the context of traditional communications, the mechanism of dissemination or transmission is protected by Article 10 but as part of the content provider’s right.285 The Advocates General emphasised, however, that freedom of expression covers not just the right to express one’s own ideas but also ‘the transmission of third-party ideas and information’286 which suggests a free-standing right even of the intermediaries that play no part in the formulation or expression of the content. Despite the comments of the Advocates-General, the CJEU itself has not directly ruled on this point. In eBay, the CJEU did not consider the issue of whether the shopping platform should be considered to have freedom of expression.287 In McFadden, which concerned injunctions on a cafe providing a free wifi service to prevent copyright infringement by its users, the Court noted that the injunction would interfere with the business rights of the cafe and the freedom of expression of the users;288 a similar approach is taken in UPC Telekabel Wien.289 280 J Morijn, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution’ (n 6); V Hatzopoulos, Regulating Services in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 163–66; see different balances in Case C-555/19 Fussl (n 95). 281 Autronic (n 120). 282 Case C-37/07 Satamedia (n 23) [38]. 283 See eg J d’Arcy, ‘Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Right to Communicate’ (1969) 118 European Broadcasting Union Review 14–18 and more recently Article XIX, Statement on the right to communicate by Article 19 global campaign for free expression (Document WSIS/PC-2/CONTR/95-E) 14 February 2003 available at: http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/ md/03/wsispc2/c/S03-WSISPC2-C-0095!!PDF-E.pdf. See also the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1981) 121. The scope and desirability of such a right is still debated. 284 Autronic (n 120). 285 See eg Güdenoglu v Turkey App no 42599/08 (Judgment 29 January 2013). 286 Case C-316/09 MSD Sharp (n64) [AG81]. No authority is given for this proposition. 287 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal (n 92); the Advocate General raised the issue of freedom of expression but considered it in the context of users’ rights, not those of the platform [AG157]. 288 Case C- 484/14 McFadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (Judgment 15 September 2016) [82]. 289 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien (n 269) [47].



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11.88

Does either court mean to suggest that all actors who are involved in the provision of internet access have a speech right independent of the end users providing content and which, it is to be assumed, those intermediaries could exercise to the detriment of end users? For example, has an internet access company a right under Article 10 ECHR or Article 11 EUCFR to challenge net neutrality rules?290 Yet, net neutrality has been recognised as important to ensure freedom of expression.291 Presumably some balancing of rights would come into play. The EU has dealt with many of the issues through secondary legislation. The telecommunications regime contains provisions for telecommunications access and universal service, and the recitals to the directives acknowledge Article 10 ECHR. In the cases relating to the telecommunications infrastructure and the must-carry obligations, though, the CJEU has preferred to rule without basing its determination on freedom of expression.292 The rights of intermediaries have arisen before the Strasbourg Court. The Grand Chamber deci­ 11.89 sion in Delfi concerned the liability of a news portal for the comments of its users, some of which contained offensive material, including threats directed against an individual.293 Delfi argued that this liability contravened Article 10 ECHR. The Court’s reasoning in coming to a finding of non-violation suggests that such hosting would fall within Article 10. MTE v Hungary reaf­ firmed the point, the Court finding that holding the website liable for the comments of others constituted a violation of its Article 10 rights.294 In both Delfi and MTE, the hosts had effectively chosen the topic on which third-party comments were made. Does freedom of expression arise when the platform has little engagement with the content? In Hoiness, another news portal was in issue; here the forums were not so closely connected to the news article. While the Court notes this, it does so as a factor in assessing proportionality, not in assessing whether the portal was exercising its right to freedom of expression.295 The Court assumed freedom of expression in its admissibility decision in the case of the file-sharing platform, Pirate Bay.296 It has reiterated that any restriction on the means of dissemination interferes with the right to receive and impart information.297 While Pirate Bay had less engagement with the substance shared, it has a role in encouraging the sharing, as recognised by the CJEU in Stichting Brein v Ziggo.298 In Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt, the Strasbourg Court held that a mobile phone app which facilitated the taking and sharing of photographs was protected by Article 10 because it had a communicative function.299 This ruling was based on the rights of the users not of the app. The question might be addressed in a pending case, Telegram.300 The case concerned the fine imposed on the messenging app for not complying with an official order to disclose information that would facilitate the decryption of encrypted user messeges. Telgram claims infringement of Article 10 and its right to impact information. 290 This argument was made in the context of a First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s attempt to bring in net neutrality rules: Verizon Communications Inc v Federal Communications Commission (D C Cir, No 11-1355, 14 January 2014). 291 Council of Europe, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on network neutrality [6]. 292 Case C-250/06 UPC Belgium and Others (Judgment 3 March 2011); Case C-154/09 Commission v Portugal [2010] ECR I-127. 293 Delfi (n 91); noted N Cox, ‘Delfi v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 77 MLR 619. 294 MTE v Hungary App no 22947/13 (Judgment 2 February 2016). 295 Hoiness v Norway App no 43624/14 (Judgment 19 March 2019) [71]. Note this case was brought under Art 8 by the subject of the comments that Norway had not sufficiently protected her rights as regards her unsuccessful defamation actions. 296 Pirate Bay decision (n 122). 297 Eg Kablis v Russia App no 48310/16 and 59663/17 (Judgment 30 April 2019) [80]. 298 Case C-610/15 Stichting Brein v Ziggo (Judgment 14 June 2017) [36]–[38]. 299 Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (n 197); see also Pendov v Bulgaria App no 44229/11 (Judgment 26 March 2020). 300 Telegram Messenger LLP and Telegram Messenger Inc v Russia App no 13232/18 (not yet decided).

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II.  Intermediary Liability The Strasbourg case law leaves unclear the issue of when hosts could legitimately be held liable 11.90 for content, an issue to a large extent already dealt with by legislation in the EU, though the legislation is under review. An admissibility decision under Article 8 suggested that liability should not arise for a passive host unless they failed to act expeditiously in removing or disabling access to it once they became aware of its illegality.301 This tracks the boundary for intermediary liability in the e-Commerce Directive. In Delfi, the Strasbourg Court proposed a’differentiated and graduated approach [that] requires that each actor whose services are identified as media or as an intermediary or auxiliary activity benefit from both the appropriate form (differentiated) and the appropriate level (graduated) of protection’.302 MTE was distinguished from Delfi on the basis of the size of the portal, the economic purpose underpinning the provision of the comments section, and the nature of the speech (which according to Judge Kuris in a concurring opinion was not capable of being viewed in advance as ‘clearly unlawful’). Judge Kuris in MTE suggested that cases would be dealt with very much on their own facts. Bearing in mind the specific nature of the internet which has both positive303 and negative304 aspects, the Court developed distinct factors to be considered: —— —— —— ——

the context of the comments; the measures applied by the company in order to prevent or remove defamatory comments; the liability of the actual authors as an alternative to intermediary liability; and the consequences for the company.305

The content of the comments would be taken into account (in Delfi the fact that the speech was deemed to be hate speech was a significant factor306), but other factors seem to relate to the processes the platform has in place to deal with potentially unlawful content.307 In terms of balancing users’ rights, in Telekabel Wien the CJEU envisaged the state safe- 11.91 guarding the procedural rather than substantive aspect of the rights.308 While Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive precludes general monitoring, it does not preclude an intermediary being required to ‘seek and identify’ information equivalent to material considered illegal.309 In GoogleSpain, which concerned the so-called right to be forgotten, the Court determined that privacy and data protection rights would be likely to overrule free speech rights,310 although it did identify a number of factors to be taken into account which reflect the general approach taken by the ECtHR to the balance between freedom of expression and privacy (see para 11.75).

301 Tamiz v UK App No 3877/14 (Decision 19 September 2017), cited by Magyar Jeti (n 93) [67]. 302 Delfi (n 91) [113]. 303 Yildirim (n 91). 304 Egill Einarsson (n 110) [46]. 305 Delfi (n 91) [142]–[143]; MTE (n 294) [69]; Hoiness (n 295) [67]. 306 Delfi (n 91) [114] and [162]; cf Pihl v Sweden App no 74742/14 (Decision 7 February 2017) [23]–[25]. 307 See discussion in T Quintel and C Ullrichn, ‘Self-Regulation of Fundamental Rights? The EU Code of Conduct on Hate Speech, Related Initiatives and Beyond’ in B Petkova and T Ojanen (eds), Fundamental Rights Protection Online: The Future Regulation Of Intermediaries (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3298719. 308 C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien (n 269) [57]. 309 Case C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Ltd (Judgment 22 November 2019) [AG74-75]. 310 C-131/12 Google Spain (n 145) [99]. See RH Weber and UI Heinrich, ‘Internet Intermediaries as Judges of Conflicts Between the Right to Be Forgotten and the Freedom of Expression’ (2015) in András Koltay (ed), Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression (Budapest, Wolters Kluwer, 2015).



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III.  Right to a Forum 11.92 Most, if not all, services constituting the internet are provided by private actors. As human rights tend to operate vertically this means that individuals are unlikely to have a direct claim under Article 10 to access those services; service providers prima facie fall outside the personal scope of Article 10 and, by virtue of the interpretative rules in Article 52(3) of the Charter, Article 11 also. Moreover, the status of the CJEU’s jurisprudence as to the horizontal effects of the Charter, specifically Article 11, is uncertain. As noted at para 11.45, while the Court has recognised that positive obligations may arise under Article 10,311 the bar is comparatively high. A key element is whether the bar to the claimed forum had the effect of preventing any effective exercise of freedom of expression. This would be a hard argument with which to succeed should there be more than one relevant operator312 -as there are with social media platforms—though the impact might depend on how similar in terms of features and reach the Court requires such services to be. 11.93 Similar problems occur in the traditional media sector. There has been debate about the extent to which content providers have the right of access to third parties’ airtime or the right of would-be broadcasters to receive a broadcasting licence.313 In the unusual case of Khursid Mustafa, the state was held to have failed in its positive obligations in the context of a dispute between landlord and tenant where the landlord forbade the installation of a satellite dish; at the time, satellite television was the only mechanism by which the applicant, who was an immigrant, could receive programming from his country of origin.314 The argument is less likely to be successful where the service provider is exercising its own freedom of expression. In Remuszko, which concerned the refusal of a newspaper to publish a paid-for advertisement, the Court held that the newspaper had the right to determine its own policies in respect of advertisements. Furthermore, freedom of the press ‘necessitates that the press enjoys freedom to determine its commercial policy in this respect and to choose those with whom it deals’.315 The same principles apply with regard to editorial content.316 In the more recent case Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft, the applicant complained about an obligation imposed on it (as a result of a court case) to broadcast an advert that was damaging to its reputation.317 The Strasbourg Court found no violation here, but in coming to this conclusion it emphasised that the applicant was granted its broadcasting licence to fulfil a public service task and that it received public funding, thus restricting its freedom of choice, and that the advert covered a matter of public interest. While access to infrastructure is covered by the EU communications regime, including net neutrality318 and must carry rules,319 obligations on other intermediaries are not dealt with by EU legislation.

IV.  The Right to Search 11.94 The new technologies also raise the question of whether there is a separate right to seek information or to search; this is different from the right to request information (discussed at 11.43). 311 Appleby (n 126). 312 The Court has raised the question of the obligations of a state in the context of media monopolies: Saliyev App no 35016/03 (Judgment 21 October 2010) [53]; Manole (n 184); see further E.V below. 313 E Barendt, Broadcasting Law: A Comparative Study (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) Ch 2; Murphy (n 178), [61]. 314 Khurshid Mustafa et Tarzibachi v Sweden App no 23883/06 (Judgment 16 December 2008). 315 Remuszko v Poland App no 1562/10 (Judgment 16 July 2013) [79]. 316 Saliyev (n 312) [53]; Manole (n 184). 317 Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft (n 128). 318 Regulation 2015/2120, Open Internet Regulation [2015] L310/1. 319 Directive 2018/1972 European Electronic Communications Code [2018] OJ L321/36, Art 114.

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Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 EUCFR are silent about the right to seek; Article 19 ICCPR expressly mentions it. There are two linked issues: the first concerns surveillance; the second the quality of the resulting information. Assuming such a right exists, as is the case with library records, it would be impinged upon should 11.95 the details of individuals’ searches be recorded. There would be a chilling effect, potentially limiting individuals’ choices about information sought (see 11.04). This issue has been recognised, but it is mainly considered in the context of privacy and data protection.320 While the ECJ recognised in SABAM that a filtering system may infringe the service users’ ‘freedom to receive or impart information’,321 it did not elaborate on this point. Indeed, since the case relies heavily on another copyright enforcement case, Scarlet Extended, it may be argued that the Court had another concern in mind: that the filtering software would censor legal content.322 The existence and scope of a right to seek remain open questions, especially in the light of developments in EU secondary legislation which seek to impose greater obligations on intermediaries to prevent certain content.323 The second aspect concerns the neutrality or accuracy of search engine results or “recommender 11.96 algorithms”.324 Some commentators have suggested that search engines should be regulated to ensure that the results are not skewed by political or commercial motives. There are also concerns about ‘filter bubbles’ and the spread of unreliable information. Presumably, even if the service operator were deemed to have expression rights in terms of the priority it awarded individual results, such rights could be outweighed by audience rights. In the context of broadcasting, electronic programme guides are regulated so that access to places on the electronic programme guide is allocated on non-discriminatory terms. The significance of the internet as a source of a wide range of content has been accepted by the Council of Europe.325

V. Pluralism Article 11(2) EUCFR can be seen as giving specific expression to a positive obligation on the state 11.97 regarding pluralism of the media. The extent of this obligation is unclear. The requirement to ‘safeguard’ can be seen in a number of ways. Does it require Member States to protect the level of pluralism that already exists, or is it an instruction to improve the level of pluralism? Further, pluralism can also be seen as relating to content diversity (internal pluralism), which might be related to pluralism in society in general, and that relating to the market structure (external pluralism). Content quotas and support for public service broadcasting support content diversity but have not typically been seen as constituting rights to freedom of expression. Indeed, they may rather have been seen as restrictions that needed to be justified.326 In Lentia, the European

320 See Directive 2002/58 e-Privacy Directive [2002] OJ L201/37 as amended (further revision underway). The concern is not limited to internet searches and cookies, but could cover other types of surveillance and other forms of transmission network, see Joined Case C-203/15 and C-698/15 Watson (n 25). For a review of the law relating to broadcasters, see I Walden and L Woods, ‘Broadcasting Privacy’ (2011) 3 Journal of Media Law 117. 321 Case C-360/10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV (Judgment 16 February 2012) [48]. 322 Scarlet Extended (n 140) [52]—this reasoning is worrying as it seems to suggest that the freedom of expression finds its limit in ‘lawful communications’. 323 Eg Art new copyright directive (n 60), discussed Senftleben (n 61); Terrorism Directive (n 53). The Copyright Directive is subject to a challenge by Poland: Case C-401/19 (n 139). 324 See further eg S Eskens, N Helberger and J Moeller, ‘Challenged by News Personalisation: Five Perspective on the Right to Receive Information’ (2017) 9 Journal of Media Law 259. 325 Recommendation CM/Rec (2007) 16 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on measures to promote the public service value of the Internet. 326 Eg Groppera (n 27).



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Court of Human Rights accepted that the audience has a right to receive a wide range of information and that the state is the ultimate guarantor of media pluralism,327 though the extent of any consequent obligations was not clear.328 Meltex reaffirmed that, in licensing decisions, states could not be arbitrary,329 but in Manole the Court went further.330 The case concerned the state broadcaster in Moldova, which was effectively the main source of Moldovan news on television. Employees were laid off, and complained of state interference in editorial decisions. The Court found a violation of Article 10 ECHR. Reaffirming the state’s positive obligations, it held that there was: a duty on the State to ensure, first, that the public has access through television and radio to impartial and accurate information and a range of opinion and comment, reflecting inter alia the diversity of political outlook within the country.331

11.98 Beyond the AVMSD, Article 11(2) EUCFR and the case law of the ECJ recognise the space for Member States to regulate for media pluralism,332 but the EU courts have not to date expressed an obligation on the Member States so to do. Furthermore, despite the recognition of the importance of state support for content pluralism, within the EU any such measures are still checked for compliance with competition, state aid and free movement rules.333 11.99 The European Court of Human Rights has used pluralism in the context of structural questions too. Licensing can be used to control both the number and nature of those participating in the media environment. Indeed, the Court has been used to challenge state media monopolies.334 In this, parallels with the ECJ’s case law on free movement of services and competition can be seen. In ERT, for example, the Greek broadcasting monopoly was unacceptable not only in the context of freedom to provide services but also in the context of ensuring a range of voices could be available.335 Commentators concerned about pluralism336 have expressed concern about the concentration of media undertakings, but so far there has been no binding expression of the idea that states must take action on this basis.

VI.  Copyright and Freedom of Expression 11.100 The Sky case337 concerned the right to short reporting provided in the AVMSD. Article 15 AVMSD provides that, for the purpose of short news reports, any broadcaster established in the European Union may access footage of events of high interest to the public which are transmit 327 Lentia (n 185). 328 R Craufurd Smith, Broadcasting Law and Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) 179–80, 196; Case C-353/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-4069 [29]; Case C-288/89 Gouda (n 3); Case C-148/91 Verenigen Veronica Omroep Organisatie v Commissariat voor de Media [1993] ECR I-487. 329 Meltex (n 175//). 330 Manole (n 184). 331 Ibid [100]. See also [107]. 332 Case C-288/89 Gouda (n 3); and in the context of magazines: Case C-368/95 Familiapress (n 5). 333 See eg Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Application of State Aid Rules to Public Service Broadcasting [2009] OJ C257/1; Case E 4/2008, Sweden, Aid to the press; Case C-199/06 Centre d’exportation du livre français (CELF) and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication v Société internationale de diffusion et d’édition (SIDE) [2008] ECR I-469; TV Play (n 151) and Vivendi (n 151). 334 Lentia (n 185); Radio ABC v Austria App no 19736/9220 (20 October 1997), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI 53. See similarly General Comment No 34 (n 32) [40]. 335 Case C-260/89 ERT (n 4); cf Vivendi (n 151). 336 See eg Council of Europe Media Diversity in Europe, December 2002, H/APMD (2003)1; Final Report of the High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, 21 January 2013, available: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/ high-level-group-media-freedom-and-pluralism. 337 Case C-283/11 Sky (n 15).

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ted on an exclusive basis by another broadcaster. They have a choice of footage and pay only the additional costs to the exclusive right holder. Sky challenged this provision on the basis of intellectual property and the right to carry on a business. The ECJ held that these rights, albeit found in the Charter, could be restricted for legitimate aims. In determining such legitimate aims, the Court recognised two aspects of freedom of expression: the fundamental freedom to receive information, guaranteed under Article 11(1) EUCFR, and the promotion of pluralism of the media in the production and programming of information under Article 11(2).338 This case, while it emphasises that some information may be more significant than others, is primarily concerned with ensuring a plurality of sources for newsworthy information at least. Whether the CJEU would always limit the copyright holder’s rights in this way is far from 11.101 certain: significantly the restriction on Sky was derived specifically from EU secondary legislation. The Advocate General, in a case involving the sampling of music and conflicting artistic rights (those of the person sampling and those of the person with the rights in the original music), asked: Is it conceivable for a painter to rely on his freedom of creation so as not to pay for his paint and paintbrushes?339

The judgment in this case, handed down the same day as judgments in two other copyright cases,340 shows a marked disinclination on the part of the CJEU to disturb the balance between copyright owner and user that had been struck by the legislation. Specifically, the CJEU has repeatedly held that the freedom of information and freedom of the press—even in cases of public interest—are not capable of justifying, beyond the existing exceptions and limitations provided by the directive, further exceptions to copyright.341 The earlier case of Deckmyn concerned the scope of one such exception: use of copyright materials for parody.342 The case concerned a calendar which included a drawing which was a clear reference to a popular comic book, but the calendar had racist overtones with which the authors of the comic book objected to be associated. The question was whether the calendar constituted a parody within the scope of the Information Society Directive. The CJEU recognised that a balance between the rights of the copyright holder and the parodist would be in issue and that that balance should be achieved on a case by case basis. Given the discriminatory nature of the calendar, it determined that copyright holders ‘have, in principle, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the work protected by copyright is not associated with such a message’.343 The extent to which this approach reflects the content of the speech itself, and may therefore be limited to similar facts, or is based on the views of the copyright holders is unclear.

338 Ibid [51]–[52]. 339 Case C-476/17 Pelham (n 19) [AG 92]. 340 Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online (n 24) concerning the making available online of the text of a manuscript without the author’s added comments in the context of a story of public interest; Case C-469/17 Funke Medien (n 24) concerning the publication of military status reports. See also Case C-161/17 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Renckhoff (Judgment 7 August 2018) [41], concerning the re-posting of a photograph without the copyright holder’s consent and distinguishing this from providing a hyperlink to infringing material. 341 The Advocate General in Funke Medien (n 24) and Spiegel Online (n 24) relied on Pirate Bay (n 122) and Ashby Donald v France App no 36769/08 (Judgment 10 January 2013), neither of which involved journalism but pirate content and fashion photographs respectively. 342 Case C-201/13 Deckmyn (n 96). 343 Case C-201/13 Deckmyn (n 96), [31]; cf reasoning of Advocate General [AG 85].



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Article 12(1) Article 12(1) Freedom of Assembly and of Association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 12(1) Paragraph 1 of this Article corresponds to Article 11 of the ECHR, which reads as follows: ‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.’

The meaning of the provisions of paragraph 1 is the same as that of the ECHR, but their scope is wider since they apply at all levels including European level. In accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, limitations on that right may not exceed those considered legitimate by virtue of Article 11(2) of the ECHR. This right is also based on Article 11 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Paragraph 2 of this Article corresponds to Article 191 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Select Bibliography B Bercusson, ‘Freedom of assembly and of association’, in B Bercusson (ed), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006) 133–69. G Braibant, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (Paris, Seuil, 2001) 122–27. A Carillon, Les sources européennes des droits de l’Homme salarié (Brussels, Bruylant, 2006). M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 248–86. P Ducoulombier, ‘Liberté de réunion et d’association’, in F Picod and S van Drooghenbroeck, Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2018) 273–85. C Fenwick, ‘Minimum Obligations with respect to Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, in A Chapman and S Russel (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002) 53–86. F Dorssemont, ‘The right to form and join Trade Unions for the Protection of his interests under Article 11 ECHR’ (2010) 1 European Labour Law Journal 185–235.

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AW Heringa and F Van Hoof, ‘Freedom of association and assembly’, in P Van Dijk, F van Hoof, A Van Rijn and L Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006) 817–40. T Jacobs, ‘Article 12-Freedom of Assembly and of Association’, in F Dorssemont, K Lörcher, S Clauwaert and M Schmitt, The Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2019) 315–29. C La Hovary, Les droits fondamentaux au travail (Paris, PUF, 2009) 59–74. P Lorber, ‘Labour Law’, in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 211–30. V Mantouvalou, ‘Is there a human right not to be a union Member? Labour rights under the European Convention on Human Rights’, in C Fenwick and T Novitz, Human Rights at Work (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 439–62. B Ryan, ‘The Charter and Collective Labour Law’, in T Hervey and J Kenner, Economic and Social Rights (Oxford, Hart publishing, 2003), 67–90. F Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme, (Paris, PUF, 2011) 608–32.

A.  Field of Application of Article 12(1) 12(1).01 According to Article 51, the Charter is addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The most immediate application of the Charter for the institutions and the bodies of the Union relates to the issue of the freedom of association of workers employed by these institutions as well as to the issue of political parties at Union level. Both issues are of no immediate relevance to Member States. They have an internal dimension, as they are related to industrial relations within the institutions of the European Union, or relate to the political functioning of those institutions. They relate to ‘organic’ or institutional EU law, as opposed to material EU law. Both issues are situated at a European level. 12(1).02 In this respect, it is worthwhile recalling that Regulation (EEC) 31,1 (EAEC) 11, laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, which dates back to 1962, recognised freedom of association to the benefit of the staff members of the major European institutions. The European Central Bank is not covered by these Regulations. The Conditions of Employment for Staff (1998) which have been adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB are mute on the issue of freedom of association. A decade of a single-channel system of industrial relations at the ECB dominated by the presence of an elected staff committee was followed by the introduction of a legal framework (Guiding Principles, 2008) adopted by the Governing Council for the recognition of information sharing and consultation with trade unions at the European Central Bank. Soon after the adoption of the Framework, a Memorandum of Understanding was concluded between the European Central Bank and International and European Public Services Organisation. In sum, the legal framework for industrial relations has been transformed over a decade from a single-channel system (staff committee) into a dual-channel system (staff committee and trade unions). However, in Carlos Bowles versus ECB, the Civil Service Tribunal decided to annul a decision of the ECB to refuse a financial bonus, based upon the discriminatory nature of this decision. According to the rules and policies of the ECB, such a bonus required an excellent state of service assessed over a period of two previous years. Mr Bowles enjoyed a full



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dispensation from his normal contractual work. According to the ECB this precluded in se such an excellent assessment and hence the financial bonus concerned. Since the Civil Service Tribunal referred to Article 12 CFREU in the judgment prior to qualifiying this decision as discriminatory, it is consistent to argue that this discrimination was linked to the right to organize.2 As far as the relevance of Article 12(1) for the issue of material EU law and its implementation by the Member States is concerned, the practical relevance of Article 12(1) seems to be severely limited due to the formal exclusion of the issue of ‘the right of association’ from the competences in the field of social policy. However, this impression must be mitigated, for four reasons. First, there are limits to the exclusion. The exclusion of the ‘right of association’ in Article 153 TFEU needs to be situated in the social policy context. The ‘right of association’ is excluded simultaneously with the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs. It is my view that ‘the right of association’ in Article 153 has no generic meaning. It ought to be restricted to the topical issue of the right of employees and employers to organise. Indeed, judged otherwise, an exclusion of the generic issue of the right of association from a title dedicated to social policy would be ill-considered. In other words, the exclusion extends neither to ‘civic’ and ‘political’ matters in the meaning of the Charter, nor in my view to ‘commercial’ or ‘economic’ matters. However, insofar as the right of association for the defence of workers’ or employers’ interests is at stake, the exclusion cannot be circumvented by having recourse to competences defined in other policy titles of the TFEU. In a well know opinion to the Laval case, Advocate General Mengozzi stated that ‘If the effectiveness of Article 137(5) EC is to be upheld, the Community institutions could not of course resort to other legal bases in the Treaty in order to adopt measures designed to approximate the laws of the Member States in this field.’3 Secondly, the exclusion in my view neither precludes nor invalidates legislative intervention which is merely indirectly related to trade union issues. By way of comparison, it has been argued that the exclusion of pay does not prevent the prohibition of unequal treatment in the field of pay as a competence in the field of social policy.4 In the same vein, it can be argued that the exclusion does not prevent combating unequal treatment in the field of trade union matters. In fact, a number of legislative interventions seek to combat discrimination in trade union matters. The oldest example dates back to 1968—Regulation 1612/68, which guaranteed free movement of workers. This Regulation has since been repealed, but integrated as Article 8 of Regulation 492/20115 on the free movement of workers. A worker who is a national of a Member State and who is employed in the territory of another Member State shall enjoy equality of treatment as regards membership of trade unions and the exercise of rights attaching thereto. This provision does not impinge upon the autonomy of trade unions to draft internal rules regarding membership. These rules should however be applied without any nationality based discrimination of a worker moving freely from one Member State to another. The scope of trade union rights would seem to be a matter of the law of individual Member States. Nevertheless, a hard core of trade union rights is identified. Thus trade union rights need to include the right to vote and to be eligible for the administration or management posts of a trade union. The approach of trade union rights is purely internal. It does not extend to rights related to the promotion and defence of workers’ interests at all. The fact that the collective dimension is being

2 Case F-94/14, Carlos Bowles versus ECB (Civil Service Tribunal, 17 December 2015. (In the same vein: Case F-94:15, Olivier Seigneur versus ECB (Civil Service Tribunal, 17 December 2015). 3 Opinion of P Mengozzi related to Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11779 [58]. In the same vein: T Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 162. 4 See P Rodière, Traité de droit social de l’Union européenne (Paris, LGDJ, 2008) 32. 5 Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement of workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141.



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disregarded is coherent with the main focus of the Regulation, which is about the right of an individual exercising his freedom of movement. The Race Directive 2000/436 as well as the Framework Equal Treatment Directive 2000/787 apply in relation to ‘membership of and involvement in an organisation of workers or employers or any organisation whose members carry on a particular profession, including the benefits provided by such organisations’. The perspective adopted continues to be internal. The right to organise does not seem to relate to trade union action in defence of workers’ or employers’ interests. Thirdly, as evidenced by the infamous Viking and Laval cases, the mere fact that a fundamental right is being excluded in Article 137(5) TCE (Art 153(5)) from the competences does not generate an ‘immunity’ from other conflicting EU principles, eg from (fundamental) economic freedoms. However, in assessing the impact of those economic freedoms on the right to organise, fundamental rights as recognised by the Charter will have to be taken into account by the Court of Justice as well as by domestic jurisdictions upholding EU law. In fact, the Court of Justice as well as the Advocates General referred to the Charter in both cases which were related to a conflict between economic freedoms and the right to take collective action as guaranteed by the Charter.8 In sum, though neither the TFEU nor the Charter provide a legal basis for a legislative competence, the right to association is relevant for the material scope of EU law. As a fundamental principle of EU law, it will need to be taken into account in the application and interpretation of material primary and secondary EU law. Fourthly, irrespective of the exclusion of the right of association in Article 153, Article 12(1) continues to be fully relevant, due to its recognition of the freedom of peaceful assembly. Though Article 153 excludes the right to strike from the EU competences under the Social Policy Title, it does not exclude the freedom of peaceful assembly. The latter concept might serve as an expedient to construe a legislative competence related to peaceful assembly in defence of workers’ or employees’ interests. The latter could hardly be disputed in the case of the exercise of the freedom of assembly outside working hours. It might be more problematic in the case of the exercise of the freedom of assembly during working hours which coincides with a strike. The ECtHR has in recent case law related to Article 11 preferred to construe such strikes primarily or even exclusively as an issue of the freedom of assembly rather than as an issue of trade union freedom.9 However, the recognition of the freedom of assembly is irrelevant to assess the issue of competence. Article 51 indeed states that the Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties. The freedom of association and the freedom of assembly are intertwined with the right to take collective action. Since the first are declared outside Title IV of the Charter, these rights can be used to circumvent the exclusion of the rights of Title IV in the Protocol on the application of the Charter of fundamental rights in the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom.

6 [2000] OJ L180. 7 [2000] OJ L303. 8 See Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11779 [90]; (see especially the opinion of AG Mengozzi, delivered on 23 May 2007 [69]–[73]) and Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I 10779 [43]. 9 Karaçay v Turkey App no 6615/03 (ECtHR, 27 March 2007); Urcan and others App nos 23018/04, 23034/04, 23042/04, 23071/04, 23073/04, 23081/04, 23086/04, 23091/04, 23094/04, 23444/04 and 23676/04 (ECtHR, 17 July 2008); Saime Özcan v Turkeye App no 2953/04 (ECtHR, 15 September 2009); Kaya and Seyhan v Turkey App no 30946/04 (ECtHR, 15 September 2009); and Dilek and others v Turkey App nos 74611/01, 26876/02 and 27628/0257 (ECtHR, 28 April 2008).

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B.  Interrelationship of Article 12(1) with Other Provisions of the Charter As is evidenced by the case law of the ECtHR, it is artificial to dissociate the freedom of (trade 12(1).12 union) association from the exercise of the freedom of expression. For this reason, Article 12(1) of the Charter is intertwined with Article 11. In some recent cases which are indeed related to trade union action in defence of workers’ interests, the Court has sought to interpret alleged violations of Article 10 (freedom of expression) ‘in the light’ of Article 1110 Trade union actions indeed tend to defend and promote workers’ interests based upon profound convictions related to social justice. Trade union action is about pushing demands. It necessarily expresses an opinion. In older cases, the ECtHR has protected the negative freedom of association by interpreting Article 11 in the light of Article 10. It argued that trade union membership might be related to explicit political and ideological visions upon which a trade union has been founded.11 Compulsory membership can constitute an interference with the freedom of expression. The nexus between the freedom of expression and the freedom of association is evidenced by the fact that both have been introduced in the Charter under the heading ‘Freedom’, whereas rights which are explicitly related to the defence of workers’ and employers’ interests have been introduced under the heading ‘Solidarity’. The dissociation of the right to organise from the notion of solidarity is unfortunate. It tends to amount to an excessive impetus on the individual dimension of this right.12 The conceptual nexus between the freedom of association and the freedom of collective 12(1).13 bargaining and of the right to collective action has been developed progressively by the Court on European Human Rights. Hence, there is a conceptual link between Article 12(1) and Article 28 of the Charter. In the very first case related to the freedom of trade union association (in 1975), the ECtHR ruled that the phrase ‘for the protection of his interests’ was not redundant.13 The idea that trade unions should have means to protect the interests of their members has been reiterated ever since, in constant case law.14 As a matter of principle, the Court recognised that the telos of the right to organise could be used to develop corollary rights which are essential or necessarily inherent to the right to organise. Restrictions to corollary rights which are essential to the freedom of association need to pass the test of Article 11(2). It has thus recognised the right to be heard as well as the freedom of collective bargaining as essential trade union prerogatives.15 Though denying that the right to take collective action is such an essential means, it did consider that this right could not be dissociated from the right to organise in Enerji.16 Though it is difficult to understand how a right which is interwoven with the right to organise does not strike its essence, the right to collective action falls within the ambit of Article 11 ECHR. Restrictions to the right to take collective action need to pass the test of Article 11(2) ECHR.

10 See eg Palomo Sánchez and others v Spain App no 28955/06 (ECtHR, 12 September 2011). 11 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom App no 7601/76 and 7806/77 (ECtHR, 13 August 1981); and Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark App nos 52562/99 and 52620/99 (ECtHR, 11 January 2006). 12 See in this respect T Jacobs, ‘Article 12-Freedom of Assembly and of Association’, in F Dorssemont, K Lörcher, S Clauwaert and M Schmitt, The Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2019) 317. 13 National Union of Belgian Police App no 4464/70 (ECtHR, 27 October 1975), Series A, 19. 14 See Wilson and Palmer App nos 30668/96, 30671/96, 30678/96, 30668/96 (ECtHR, 2 July 2002), ECHR 2002-V [42]; Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen App no 68959/01 (ECtHR, 21 April 2009) [24]; Demir and Baykara ECHR 2008-II [141]. 15 See National Union of Belgian Police App no 4464/70 (ECtHR, 27 October 1975), Series A, 19 and Wilson and Palmer App nos 30668/96, 30671/96, 30678/96, 30668/96 (ECtHR, 2 July 2002). 16 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen App no 68959/01 (ECtHR, 21 April 2009).



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12(1).14

The need to build on such a teleological interpretation of Article 12 of the Charter in order to recognise the freedom of collective bargaining as well as the right to take collective action is less stringent under the Charter. Both freedoms indeed have been recognised in Article 28 of the Charter. For three reasons such a teleological interpretation still makes sense. First, the recognition of the freedom of collective bargaining as well as of the right to take collective action is much more ambiguous than the recognition of the freedom of association. Indeed, Article 28 does not recognise both freedoms ‘as such’. The proclamation has been solely made ‘in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’. A similar clause of ‘accordance’ has not been reiterated in Article 12(1) of the Charter. If taken literally, this means that there is no substantive limit to the restrictions that could be imposed on the basis of Union law and national laws and practices. Formally speaking, these restrictions do not even constitute external restrictions to the rights granted under the Charter. Union law and national law define the extent to which the freedom of collective bargaining and the right to take collective action have been recognised under the Charter. In other words, the formula amounts to the imposition of internal restriction of a semantic nature. This technique has been adopted in the formulation of several rights of the Charter (Arts 14, 16, 18, 30, 34, 45). In my view, such an interpretation needs to be reconciled with the canon of interpretation enshrined in Article 52 of the Charter. This indeed obliges the institutions and the Member States to which the Charter is addressed to interpret ‘rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention’. Furthermore, the meaning of the latter needs to be defined in a way which is consistent with the case law of the Strasbourg Court. In the Preamble, the Charter is indeed qualified as a reaffirmation of the rights as they result from inter alia the ECHR and the case law of the Court of Justice. In an important explanation related to Article 52, the Presidium has highlighted that: The meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those instruments, but also by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of Justice of the European Communities.

12(1).15 Secondly, though the Charter is more prolific in the formulation of fundamental workers’ rights as opposed to the ECHR, in many perspectives it does not reach the level of protection advocated in specialised international instruments related to economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, a right to co-determination, or to a fair or just remuneration, has not been recognised, despite the fact that the EU is competent in that field. Insofar as those rights could be construed as an issue of the right of association for the protection of workers’ interests, Article 12(1) as a general norm could prove to have an added value. 12(1).16 Thirdly, the phrase ‘for the protection of his interest’ has not been reiterated in Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. This provisions only states: ‘Officials shall be entitled to exercise the right of association; they may in particular be members of trade unions or staff associations of European officials.’ The provision is mute on the telos of such a right. Furthermore, with the exception of the ECB, the staff regulations of the EU institutions are mute on the issue of the right to strike. This loophole is partially remedied by agreements which have been concluded with trade unions active at EU institutions. Some of these agreements concluded with the European Commission and the European Parliament regulate recourse to strike action. These agreements refrain from formally recognising a right to strike. In fact the ‘s’ word is meticulously avoided, in favour of more descriptive formulas, such as ‘collective refusal to work’ or ‘work stoppage’. 12(1).17 In so far as Article 12 is applicable in political matters and highlights the quintessential role of political parties at Union level in contributing to express the political will of the citizens of the 376

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Union, a nexus with the issue of citizenship is obvious. Articles 39 and 40 which relate to a right to vote and stand as a candidate at the European as well as municipal elections, illustrate the various levels at which the freedom of association can and needs to be protected and promoted.

C.  Sources of Article 12(1) Rights Though the Explanation only refers to the ECHR and the Community Charter of the 12(1).18 Fundamental Social Rights of Workers as a source of inspiration, the freedom of association has been recognised in human rights charters of both civil and political rights as well as in charters of economic, social and cultural rights. Whereas the first type of charters pay tribute to the freedom of association in a generic way first, illustrated by a reference to trade union freedom, the latter are solely devoted to the right to organise of workers and employers. For a more detailed and elaborated codification of the principles of the freedom of association, two ILO Conventions (nos 87 and 98) are paramount.17 As a general rule, instruments related to civil and political rights are ambiguous in determining whether the right to organise also extends to employers and their organisations. The exclusive use of the semantics ‘trade union’ (syndicat) contributes to such ambiguity. International instruments related to civil and political rights also enshrine the freedom of peaceful assembly, contrary to instruments related to economic, social and cultural rights.

I.  Council of Europe Treaties Article 12 of the Charter is very reminiscent of Article 11 of the European Convention on 12(1).19 Human Rights. It integrates the recognition of the freedom of peaceful assembly and the freedom of association into one provision. Furthermore, it illustrates the generic recognition of the freedom of association by reference to the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s interests. However, the scope of the provision of the Charter differs in so far as it enumerates other matters than trade union matters. Furthermore, it also indicates another type of association in an explicit way, ie political parties. Another difference relates to the fact that the European Convention explicitly allows lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the state. The Revised European Social Charter is mute on the issue of peaceful assembly. Article 5 12(1).20 of the Revised European Social Charter contains an elaborate provision dealing with the ‘the freedom of workers and employers to form local, national or international organisations for the protection of their economic and social interests and to join those organisations’. It provides leeway to the contracting parties to determine the extent to which the guarantees of Article 5 will apply to the police and the armed forces. The revised European Social Charter recognises the freedom of collective bargaining for trade unions, employers and their organisations and the right to take collective action for employers and workers in a distinct provision.18

II.  UN Treaties The ICCPR recognises the right of peaceful assembly (Art 21) and the right to freedom of 12(1).21 association (Art 22) in two distinct provisions. It illustrates a generic recognition of the





17 See 18 See

in this respect: C La Hovary, Les droits fondamentaux au travail (Paris, PUF, 2009) 59–74. Art 6 of the Revised European Social Charter.

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freedom of association, by reference to the (individual) right to form and join trade unions for the protection of the individual’s interests. The ICESCR is mute on the issue of peaceful a­ ssembly. Article 8 recognises a right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of choice, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. Article 8 explicitly does not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the state. The ICESCR has integrated a set of trade union rights as well as the right to strike into one and the same provision. It does not formally pretend that the right to call for a strike is an exclusive trade union prerogative. It is mute on the freedom of collective bargaining, which is considered to be a classical trade union prerogative in many Member States. The latter could be considered to fall within the ambit of the collective right of trade unions to function freely.19 Article 8 contains a safeguard or non-regression clause to the benefit of the Convention no 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise.

III.  Other Sources 12(1).22 As elucidated by the Explanation of the Presidium, the drafting of Article 12 has been ‘also’ based on Article 11 of the Community Charter of Fundamental workers’ rights. The latter is mute on the issue of peaceful assembly. It attributes the right of association to employers and workers in order to constitute professional organisations or trade unions of their choice for the defence of their economic and social interests. 12(1).23 Unlike the Charter of Nice, the Community Charter is explicit in its recognition of the negative right to organise. Other provisions of the Community Charter make reference to the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements under the conditions laid down by national legislation and practice, as well as to the right to have recourse to collective action in the event of a conflict of interests. This right also includes the right to strike. 12(1).24 The Community Charter provides leeway to the internal legal order of the Member States to determine under which conditions and to what extent the trade union rights apply to the armed forces, the police and the civil service. 12(1).25 The most specialised and elaborate instruments related to the right to organise are two ILO Conventions, nos 87 and 98, which were adopted in the aftermath of the Second World War. Both conventions refer in their title to the concept of the freedom of association and or the right to organise. Neither one of these concepts has been defined in an abstract way, but both conventions contain elaborate rules on the issue. Both conventions have been monitored by a specialised supervisory bodies of the ILO, the Freedom of Association Committee, which ever since 1951 has dealt with cases of alleged violation of the freedom of Association. The right to organise is also enshrined in the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work. 12(1).26 Last but not least, both the freedom of association as well as the freedom of assembly are common to (written) constitutional traditions of the Member States. Some Member States (eg the Netherlands and Belgium) have neglected to modernise their constitutions so as to safeguard the right to form and join trade unions. However, an interpretation of these constitutions as a living instrument might be sufficient means to interpret such a generic recognition in a more

19 M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 275–77 and C Fenwick, ‘Minimum Obligations with respect to Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, in A Chapman and S Russel (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002) 65–66.

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specific way. Despite this general and more specific recognition of the freedom of association in the vast majority of human rights instruments, the European Pillar of Social Rights is mute on the freedom of association and on the right to form and join trade unions.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks Article 12 deals with two separate issues. The first relates to the right to freedom of peaceful 12(1).27 assembly. The second is elaborated in much more detail. It relates to the freedom of association. The right to freedom of association is recognised at all levels and in various matters, some of 12(1).28 which are spelled out. The levels refer to geographical level, whereas the matters are intertwined with the ambit wherein the objectives of an association can be situated. In this respect, it is worthwhile to indicate that according to the Explanation, the added value of Article 12 of the Charter would reside in its ‘wider scope’, since it would indeed apply at ‘all levels, including the European level’. The precise scope of this explication seems to suggest that the ECHR would only apply at a national level. In my view, this interpretation needs to be mitigated. Insofar as a violation of Convention rights would occur at transnational level, involving a liability of various contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, no objection exists to a combined responsibility of several Member States. The Rantsev case20 pays witness to such an approach, accepting a combined responsibility on the of both Russia as well as Cyprus for the transnational trafficking of women between those countries.

II.  Scope of Application (a)  The Freedom of Peaceful Assembly The freedom of peaceful assembly has been given scant attention. However, the formulation 12(1).29 does not deviate from the summary character of provisions in other human rights charters. In the ECHR as in the ICCPR, the freedom of assembly is covered on the condition that it is ‘peaceful’. The prohibition of an assembly which cannot be considered ‘peaceful’ will not ­constitute a restriction of the fundamental right. It simply falls outside the ambit of the Charter. In other words, there is no means to exercise the freedom of assembly in a way which is not peaceful. Such an act cannot be considered as the exercise of a fundamental right. A similar conceptual problem arises while defining the notion of collective action under Article 28 of the Charter. Despite the fact that the Presidium’s explanations do not provide much guidance, it is ­reasonable to suggest that only peaceful collective actions are covered by that provision. Thus, the ILO Freedom of Association Committee has always taken a favourable stance vis-à-vis alternative modes of collective action as long as they continue to have a pacific character.21 The ECtHR has scrutinised to what extent a contracting party could have reasonably 12(1).30 disqualified an assembly as being peaceful.22 It recognises that contracting parties have a broad

20 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App No 25965/04 (ECtHR, 7 January 2010). 21 See Freedom of Association, 5th edn (Geneva, ILO, 2006) www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--normes/documents/publication/wcms_090632.pdf (no 545). 22 See AW Heringa and F Van Hoof, ‘Freedom of association and assembly’, in P Van Dijk, F van Hoof, A Van Rijn and L Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006) 821.



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margin of appreciation to assess whether a demonstration could affect public safety and order. Furthermore, the Court has imposed a positive obligation on contracting parties to ensure that the freedom of assembly can be exercised in a peaceful way. Thus, public authorities are required to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully. Thus, participants should be protected against physical assault by their opponents. 12(1).31 The broadest way to interpret the notion of peacefulness, is in my view a negative approach. An assembly ceases to have a peaceful character, in case of recourse to violence against third parties or against private property. Such an approach generates the subsequent question how to define ‘violence’. Thus, the question arises of whether acts which physically ‘block’ others and restrict their ‘freedom’ without recourse to physical assaults or without fear of intimidation can be considered to be peaceful. In my view, they are not per se violent. They might constitute peaceful resistance. A typical example was a sit-in on a public road which interfered with access to an American army base. Such forms of action used to be seen by the Commission of Human Rights as an expression of the freedom of peaceful assembly.23 12(1).32 In Barraco v France the ECtHR ruled that a collective action organised by a drivers’ union fell within the ambit of the right to peaceful assembly. In the facts of the case, a truck driver participated in a so-called ‘snail operation’ (operation escargot), obstructing completely the traffic on the public highway by driving slowly and stopping.24 12(1).33 The CJEU ruling in Schmidberger25 may be pointed to by analogy. In that ruling, the European Court of Justice accepted the Austrian government’s reliance on freedom of peaceful assembly as a ground for restricting the free movement of goods. Several environmental activists in that case had blocked the Brenner Pass. A goods carrier invoked the free movement of goods to hold the Austrian state liable for damage suffered by it. In contrast to Schmidberger, the French government did not attempt to invoke its duty to respect the freedom of peaceful assembly in the landmark case Spanish Strawberries. In this infraction procedure, the Commission criticised the failure of the French authorities to repress actions for over a decade by French farmers against carriers of imported fruit and vegetables.26 The Commission argued that the obligation to ensure the free movement of goods required a Member State to take all necessary and proportionate measures in order to prevent the free movement of agricultural products from being obstructed by criminal acts of private individuals. It was claimed that these products had been ‘dumped’ on the French market. The actions concerned have been described as ‘the interception of lorries transporting such products in France and the destruction of their loads, violence against lorry drivers, threats against French supermarkets selling agricultural products originating in other Member States, and the damaging of those goods when on display in shops in France’. The Court in fact qualified these acts as violent. It ruled that state liability under the free movement of goods

23 X v Federal Republic of Germany App no 13079/87 (Commission of Human Rights, 6 March 1989), Decisions and Reports (DR) 60, 256. 24 Barraco v France App no 31684/05 (ECtHR, 5 March 2009). The Court assessed that a criminal prosecution against one of the drivers participating could be considered to be justified in view of the fact that there was a legitimate goal (protection of public order and of the rights and freedoms of others) and that the restriction could be considered to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. See also Lörcher, who argues that this judgment amounts to the recognition of the strike in order to participate in a manifestation (das recht auf Proteststreik). In this respect: K Lörcher, ‘Internationalen Rechtsgrundlagen des Streikrechts’, in W Däubler (ed), Arbeitskampfrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011) 178. 25 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republic of Austria (CJEU, 12 June 2003), Reports of Cases 2003 I-05659. For a commentary on this decision, see: F Dorssemont, ‘“Met de vlam in de pijp …” Vrijheid van vergadering en meningsuiting, recht op collectieve actie versus vrij verkeer: primaat of belangenafweging?’ [2004] Arbeidsrechtelijke annotaties 77–93. 26 Case C-265/95 Commission v France (Spanish Strawberries) [1997] ECR I-6959.

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was also triggered where a Member State abstains from adopting the measures required in order to deal with obstacles to the free movement of goods which are not caused by the state. The principle that Member States could be held liable for their refusal to act againt private citizens creating an obstacle to the free movement of goods was codified in the subsequent Monti Regulation 2679/98.27 The Council was seemingly aware of the essential difference between the actions of the French farmers, and collective actions of workers. The guerrilla techniques of the French farmers could not be related to a right to collective action, for two reasons. First, the French farmers engaged in violence against property, and to a lesser extent against persons. Secondly, the collective action was not an action by workers, but rather by entrepreneurs. Thus the Monti Regulation limited the doctrine developed in Spanish Strawberries. It did not aim to clarify, but to correct. The regulation sought to immunise in an explicit and unconditional manner ‘the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in Member States, including the right or freedom to strike’. It specified that these rights ‘also include the right or freedom to take other actions covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member States’. In the aftermath of a Viking and Laval, the Commission drafted a proposal ‘on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services’.28 Despite the fact that the Commission has since decided to withdraw this proposal, a comparison between the two safeguard clauses is worthwhile. At first sight, Article 1 of the draft proposal seems to repeat the immunisation mechanism of the Monti Regulation, albeit in a literal manner. The formula is even more specific. Contrary to the Monti Regulation, however, the draft proposal explicitly states that ‘the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take collective action in accordance with national law and practices’ is not affected. This clarification is extremely helpful, due to the often neglected impact of the Viking and Laval judgments in the field of collective bargaining. In both cases, the collective actions are inextricably linked with the freedom of collective bargaining. In Viking the International Transport Workers’ Federation had blacklisted a particular shipowner. In view of the Flag of Convenience campaign, the ITF had urged its members to exercise their negative freedom of collective bargaining in a concerted way. With the exception of the union of the country from which the ships were financially controlled, members were called upon not to conclude collective agreements with the Finnish shipowner. The economic benefit of an establishment of the shipowner in Estonia would be lost. The shipowner sought after all to sign a collective agreement with an Estonian union, to be applied to the crew of the Rosella. In Laval, another kind of boycott was undertaken. The collective action was undertaken in order to force a Latvian subcontractor to accede to a Swedish collective agreement. Unfortunately, the CJEU did not examine whether the freedom of collective bargaining was a general principle of European law that had to be weighed against economic freedoms. It only considered the right to collective action.

27 Council Regulation (EC) 2679/98 on the functioning of the internal market in relation to the free movement of goods among the Member States [1998] OJ L337. 28 COM (2012) 130. G Orlandini, ‘La proposta di regolamento Monti II ed il diritto di sciopero nell’Europa post-Lisbona’ (thesis, University of Siena) www.europeanrights.eu/public/commenti/Monti_II_final.pdf 16–17. N Bruun, Andreas Bücker, Filip Dorssemont ‘Balancing Fundamental Social Rights and Economic Freedoms: Can the Monti II Initiative Solve the EU Dilemma?’ (2012) 28 (3) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 279–306; M Rocca, ‘The proposal for a (so-called) Monti II Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services’ [2012] European Labour Law Journal.



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The draft proposal affirms in a subsequent provision that the rights to collective action and collective bargaining are however limited by the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. The immunisation is therefore deficient and unconvincing. The same observation is valid for the inefficient Monti-clause which has now been enshrined in the Posting of Wokers’ Directive due to its recent amendment.29 In fact, The Court of Justice has indicated that this clause will not preclude that the right to take collective action in a context of posting will need to be assessed in the light of fundamental economic freedoms, as interpreted by the CJEU.30 The observation that economic freedoms are limited by the right to collective action seems to be the spoonful of sugar to help the medicine go down. The idea that economic freedoms and fundamental rights are mutually restrictive was expressed previously by Advocate General Trstenjak in her Opinion in Commission v Germany.31 The CJEU did not adopt such a formula, which was clearly inspired by the intention to silence the criticism that Viking and Laval had generated. The more broadly the term ‘peaceful’ is interpreted, the more the notion of ‘peaceful assembly’ 12(1).43 may be used as a means to exert pressure on employers. In this respect, a sit-in on the public highway or before an entrance gate to a company can be considered to fall within the ambit of ‘peaceful assembly’. Despite the fact that the European Social Charter explicitly refers to the notion of ‘collective 12(1).44 action’, the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) until now has not given much guidance on the peaceful character of those actions.32 A recent collective complaint procedure introduced by the Belgian trade unions and ETUC was aimed at clarifying the question as to what extent the right to take collective action involves a right to picket, and to what extent this allows trade unions to block the entrance of a plant.33 The Committee provided some guidance as to the extent of the right to take collective action under Article 6 RESC. It held that ‘Article 6§4 of the Revised Charter encompasses not only the right to withholding of work but also other relevant means, inter alia, the right to picketing. Both these components deserve consequently a comparable degree of protection.’34 The Committee did not define the precise scope of the right to picketing, seeming to suggest 12(1).45 that this cannot be reduced to a mere exercise of the freedom of assembly and of expression. However, picketing procedures ‘operating in such a way as to infringe the rights of non-strikers, through for example the use intimidation or violence’ fall outside the ambit of Article 6 RESC.

29 See Article 1Directive (EU) 2018/957 of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. 30 Case C-620/18, Hungary versus EP (CJEU, 8 December 2020). 31 See Opinion of AG Trstenjak with regard to Case C-271/08 Commission v German Republic [2010] Reports of Cases I-07091. 32 See F Dorssemont, ‘La (non) conformité du droit belge relative à l’action collective par rapport à la Charte sociale européenne’ in P Humblet, Actualités du dialogue social et du droit de grève (Waterloo, Kluwer, 2009) and S Evju ‘The right to collective action under the European Social Charter’ (2011) (3) European Labour Law Journal 201–203. 33 See decision of the ECSR related to Collective Complaint No 59/2009 European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)/ Centrale Générale des Syndicats Libéraux de Belgique (CGSLB)/Confédération des Syndicats chrétiens de Belgique (CSC)/ Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (FGTB) v Belgium www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/ CC59Merits_en.pdf. For commentary, see F Dorssemont, ‘Libres propos sur la légitimité des requêtes unilatérales contre l’exercice du droit à l’action collective à la lumière de la Décision du Comité européen des droits sociaux (Réclamation collective no 59/2009)’ in PP Vangehuchten and Y Ficher (eds), Actions orphélines et voies de recours en droit social (Limal, Anthémis, 2012) 129–48 and P Lyon-Caen, ‘La décision du 13 septembre 2011 du Comité européen des droits sociaux à la lumière de la jurisprudence des organes de contrôle de l’O.I.T.’, in PP Vangehuchten and Y Ficher (eds), Actions orphélines et voies de recours en droit social (Limal, Anthémis, 2012) 121–29. 34 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/CC59Merits_en.pdf.

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This approach did not extend to a consideration of whether picketing actions blocking access 12(1).46 to enterprises without having recourse to intimidation or violence fall per se beyond the scope of the RESC. The French language version, however, makes it clear35 that collective actions do not just have to infringe the rights of non-strikers, but also have to make use of ‘intimidation or violence’ in order to fall outside the RESC. Furthermore, the Committee did not state that these action need to be ‘peaceful in nature’. It only stated that they should not be violent, ie based on the use of intimidation or violence. Since obstructive physical blockades without the use of violence fall within the scope of the 12(1).47 freedom of assembly, these actions will need to be taken into account, in the case of workers’ protest which conflicts with fundamental economic freedoms. (b)  Freedom of Association In view of the fact that the maintenance of public order is an exclusive competence of the Member States, the recognition of the freedom of assembly will rarely be relevant to the European institutions or to the Member States in implementing EU law. The freedom of association has the potential to be of a much greater relevance. Thus, the case law of the CJEU is not entirely mute on this issue. Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the freedom of association was recognised as a general principle of EU law in the high-profile Bosman case.36 The argument was invoked by a federation of football clubs, to restrict the freedom of movement of workers. Whereas a football player, Bosman, argued that the internal rules laid down by the federation to which his club was affiliated restricted his freedom to move within the European Union as a worker, the Belgian federation concerned argued that a judicial scrutiny of those provisions in the light of that freedom would unduly restrict its own freedom of association. The Court ruled that the freedom of association had to be recognised as a general principle of EU law since it was enshrined within the ECHR and resulted from common constitutional traditions. The fact that the Court felt obliged to recognise the freedom of association, suggests that it recognises a link between that freedom and the issue of the internal autonomy of these associations in laying down rules. However, the Court did consider that the rules laid down by such associations could not be ‘seen as necessary to ensure enjoyment of that freedom by those associations, by the clubs or by their players, nor can they be seen as an inevitable result thereof ’.37 This recital was sufficient to reject the argument. The precise meaning of this recital is somewhat puzzling. The approach of the Court seems to prefigure its posterior ruling in Albany. In Albany, the Court ruled that ‘certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements between organisations of employers and workers’.38 The Court tried to prevent this conflict in nuce by declaring that collective agreements did not fall within the scope of the competition rules. One might argue that according to the Court, in Bosman such an inherent contradiction between competition rules and freedom of association did not exist. If internal autonomy with regard to transfers of football players was indeed a necessary precondition for the effective enjoyment of the freedom of associations, an inherent contradiction

35 ‘… de nature à porter atteinte à la liberté des non-grévistes, par l’utilisation d’intimidations ou de violences, l’interdiction de ces modalités de mise en œuvre ne saurait être considérée comme contraire au droit de grève reconnu à l’article 6§4.’ www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/CC59Merits_fr.pdf. 36 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de Football association and others v Bosman and others [1995] ECR I-4921. 37 Ibid [79]–[80]. 38 Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, ECR I-5751 [59].



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would certainly exist. The reference to the absence of necessity and inevitability is similar to the Court’s posterior analysis of the conflict between the right to collective action and the fundamental freedoms of establishment in the posterior Viking case. In Viking both the Court as well as the Advocate General rejected the idea that there was an ‘inherent contradiction’ between the right to take collective action and the freedom of establishment. The Court stated that ‘it cannot be considered that it is inherent in the very exercise of trade union rights and the right to take collective action that those fundamental freedoms will be prejudiced to a certain degree’.39 In the same vein AG Maduro, denying the analogy with Albany, declared that ‘the provisions on establishment and the freedom to provide services are by no means irreconcilable with the protection of fundamental rights or with the attainment of the Community’s social policy objectives’.40 Given the fact that the Court considered the rules related to free movement to be applicable in the absence of such a contradiction, a balancing exercise would have been a coherent way to proceed in Bosman. This was the way the Court proceeded in the Viking case. However, in Bosman the Court refused to examine whether the restriction to the free movement of workers could be justified by the respect for the internal autonomy of professional organisations, and whether such a restriction was indeed proportionate. The so-called Albany immunity only relates to genuine collective agreements between both sides of industry. Agreements concluded between federations of agricultural trade unions of farmers and slaughterers will fall outside that immunity. They do not relate to measures for improving conditions of work and employment Though the conclusion of such agreements is related to the defence of the interest of the members, the Court did not accept that Article 12 of the Charter could be used to circumvent, or even restrict the competition rules established by the TFEU. Though the Court did recognise that these federations could legitimately defend the interests of their members, it ruled that they could not ‘in the present case plead the freedom of association in trade unions to justify specific actions which are contrary to Article 81(1)EC’.41 In sum, the reasoning of the Court seems to suggest that the ‘freedom of association’ as recognised in the Charter has no impact either on the application of competition rules or on freedom of movement rules. No balancing seems to have taken place. This approach is mirrored by the approach the EU legislator adopts to collective agreements which might contain discriminatory clauses. These clauses need to be considered null and void. In a recent case, the Court has ruled in fact that the freedom of collective bargaining as enshrined in Article 28 of the Charter needs to be exercised in conformity with secondary EU law. Hence, it cannot be invoked to mitigate the application of the Framework Directive 2000/78.42 The recognition of the freedom of association in the Bosman case has no immediate relation to trade unions. The federations concerned were no trade unions organising workers but were more akin to employers’ organisations. The instruments which were scrutinised primarily created obligations among employers in case of transfer of ‘workers’. In sum, the case has no bearing on the issue of the right to organise in a context of industrial relations, ie the right to trade union association. On the other hand, AG Jacobs in Albany did consider a more specific right to form

39 Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I 10779 [52]. 40 Opinion of AG Maduro in C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I 10784 [23]. 41 Cases T-217/03 and T-245/03 Fédération nationale de la coopération bétail and viande (FNCBV), Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles (FNSEA), Fédération nationale bovine (FNB), Fédération nationale des producteurs de lait (FNPL), Jeunes agriculteurs (JA) v Commission [2006] ECR II-5000 [101]. 42 Joined Cases C-297/10 Sabine Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and C-298/10 Land Berlin v Alexander Mai (CJEU, 8 September 2011).

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and join trade unions to be a general principle of EU law.43 The AG based that reasoning on the principles laid down in the Bosman and Maurissen judgments. Since the latter is a staff case, it is hazardous to state that the Court was in fact developing ‘general’ principles of EC law. The only immediate tribute to the freedom of association in the context of industrial relations was made in the Werhof case.44 The Court construed that the freedom of association entailed a negative right of employers not to organise. Furthermore, it ruled that such a right was at stake, insofar as employers were being forced to apply employment conditions enshrined in a collective agreement signed by an employers’ organisations to which they were not affiliated. The judgment may be criticised in so far as the Court pretends that Gustafsson45 would warrant the thesis that an obligation to apply a collective agreement to which he is not a party would affect an employer’s negative freedom to organise.46 In fact, a closer reading of Gustafsson reveals quite the opposite. The reasoning of the Court could in fact turn out to be dramatic in view of the obligation of a foreign service-provider to apply collective agreements which were made generally applicable. In Viking and Laval the Court also reiterated the idea that freedom of association is recognised as a general principle, though both cases deal with the right to have recourse to collective action. The reference to the freedom of association suggests that there is conceptual link between the right to take collective action and the freedom of association. It would be hazardous to state that the Court considers this link to be an exclusive one. In other words, the Court did not necessarily adopt an organic view on the right to take collective action, nor did it suggest that wildcat strikes organised outside a trade union would not be protected as a general principle. The judgments are mute on this issue. Article 12 recognises the freedom of association in both a generic and a specific way. The specific way relates to political, trade union and civic matters. Despite the fact that trade union matters are being mentioned, the provision seems to be repetitive where it also clarifies that this ‘implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection his interests’. This impression should be mitigated. The more elaborate formula regarding ‘trade unions’ indicates an objective. The Court of Human Rights has indicated that these words are not redundant.47 On the basis of this formula, the Court has recognised a state obligation to have recourse to means which enable trade unions to effectively protect the interests of their members. This teleological formula has not been repeated to the benefit of political organisations or in the context of associations versed in ‘civic’ matters. The reference to trade unions inevitably raises the question whether employers associations can qualify as trade unions in the meaning of Article 12(1). In an interesting commentary, Bercusson48 has shown that the French language version of trade union matters (‘le domaine syndical’) could apply to employers’ associations. Insofar as these associations cannot be construed as ‘trade unions’ (syndicats), they can be considered as associations active in the field of trade union matters. Though such an interpretation makes sense, it does not alter the question whether ‘employers’ associations’ can be qualified as trade unions in the meaning of the last part of the provision. The question is relevant, insofar as the teleological coda might serve as a tool for a progressive development of the content of the recognition. 43 Joined opinion of AG Jacobs delivered on 28 January 1999 in Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, reference for a preliminary ruling: Kantongerecht Arnhem—Netherlands, [139]. 44 Case C-499/04 Hans Werhof v Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & Co KG (CJEU, 9 March 2006). 45 Gustafsson v Sweden App no 15573/89 (ECtHR, 28 March 1996). 46 Case C-499/04 Hans Werhof v Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & Co KG (CJEU, 9 March 2006) [33]. 47 National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium App no 4464/70 (ECtHR, 27 October 1975). 48 B Bercusson, ‘Freedom of assembly and of association’, in B Bercusson (ed), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006) 162.



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In the past, the Court of Human Rights has adopted a pragmatic attitude. It could be argued that the issue of whether an association in the meaning of Article 11 constitutes a ‘trade union’ is irrelevant. Such a group will fall within the scope of Article 11 ECHR. This definitional issue has been dealt with explicitly in only one decision, Sigurjónsson,49 in which the question arose as to whether an association (Frami), to which taxi drivers had to belong to obtain a government licence, could be regarded as a trade union. The Icelandic government did not agree with this characterisation. At issue in this case was whether, based on a statutory provision, Iceland could make granting a licence to drive a taxi dependent on prior membership in Frami. The statutory provision created a pre-entry closed shop. The government assumed that ‘trade unions’ concerned worker organisations which defended the interests of their members in conflicts with their employer. Frami, the organisation in dispute, consisted primarily of persons working independently without staff. The Court refused to clarify the definitional scope of the term ‘trade union’. It commented that Frami could in all respects be characterised as an association. It considered ‘that it was not necessary to decide whether Frami’ could also be regarded as a trade union, ‘since the right to form and join trade unions in that provision is an aspect of a wider right to freedom of association rather than a separate right.’50 This approach is based, however, on the unproven assumption that the protection conferred by the right to organise lacks specificity. Insofar as the ECtHR attaches certain corollary rights to the right to organise which are not inherent in freedom of association, the importance of the definition remains intact. In the case concerned, the Court only had to deal with the individual dimension of the right to organise. In my view, the issue of specific corollary rights is more likely to come into play with regard to cases dealing with the collective dimension of the right to organise. At present, the case law of the Court does not provide a decisive indication of how to solve the scope of the notion ‘trade union’. The use of the terms ‘trade union’ and ‘syndicat’ in the official French and English versions of the European Convention gives rise to the question of whether these terms embrace employers’ organisations too. If the answer is affirmative, this implies that these terms have an autonomous significance. The term ‘syndicat’ in the French Waldeck-Rousseau Act covers people engaging in a profession (une profession).51 This description makes the use of this legal framework accessible only to those employers who themselves engage in a profession. Traditional employer organisations are not organised in the form of ‘syndicats’, but of ‘associations’. The ‘association’ is governed by a different legal framework. Employers’ organisations cannot in any way be characterised as ‘trade unions’ within the meaning of Article 1 of the British Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act (‘TULRCA’). They are not associations consisting wholly or mainly of workers. In my view, it is worthwhile to interpret the notion of trade unions under Article 11 of the European Convention in a way which is consistent with the scope ratione personae of the right to organise in more specialised international instruments. ILO Convention No 87 (1948) defines workers’ and employers’ organisations within the meaning of the Convention as ‘any organisation of workers or of employers for furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers’. Employers are unambiguously included within the scope of the right to organise. Article 5 of the Revised European Social Charter expressly applies to employers and workers alike. Like the European Convention, Article 8 of the ICESCR does not make clear who holds the right to organise.

49 Sigurdur 50 Ibid

Sigurjónsson v Iceland App no 16130/90 (ECtHR, 30 June 1993). [32].

51 See Art L411-2, Code du Travail. For a commentary, see: R Brichet, Associations et syndicats (Paris, Litec, 1992) 444–51.

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In at least two cases, the Court has considered Article 11 of the European Convention to be 12(1).66 applicable to employers who claimed that they had been put under an illegitimate pressure to join an employers’ organisation. In Gustafsson52 and Kellermann,53 the references to the right to organise were implicitly applied 12(1).67 to employers arguing that their freedom not to join an employers’ organisation was being curtailed. The employers in these cases were being pressured through collective actions to become parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Neither employer was a member of the employer organisation which had signed the industry-wide collective bargaining agreement. Becoming a party to the agreement did not imply any obligation to join these organisations. The Court expressly took into account the state’s discretionary authority to shape systems of collective bargaining in deciding that this form of pressure did not represent a restriction of the negative freedom of association. The state’s authority to regulate collective actions tended to increase the scope of collective bargaining agreements. It was deemed a ‘social and political issue’ with a ‘sensitive character’. It is my view that the Court was aware that it had to deal with an issue of the freedom of association in the field of industrial relations. In this respect, it acknowledged that the case raised sensitive social and political issues ‘in achieving a proper balance between the competing interests’ and that there was ‘a wide degree of divergence between the domestic systems in the particular area under consideration’.54 Thus, it can be argued that the Court was perfectly aware that it was dealing with the right of employers to join a ‘trade union’ in the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention. In my view, Article 14 of the Convention constitutes a compelling reason to recognise the right to organise to employers and workers alike. The association in the field of civic matters tends to honour the role of non-governmental 12(1).68 organisations.55 These organisations need to be situated within civil society. The distinction with political parties is self-evident. The distinction with trade unions is unfortunate, since the latter include some of the oldest non-governmental organisations. The former Constitutional Treaty did contain an interesting article which enshrined a right to democratic participation for representative associations and civil society. This principle of participatory democracy was held to be a cornerstone of the democratic life of the Union.56

III.  Limitations and Derogations As indicated previously, in some of the cases, the freedom of association has been invoked in 12(1).69 vein by the parties in the procedure in order to restrict or exclude the application of c­ ompetition rules and free movement rules. Despite a formal tribute to the freedom of association, no ‘genuine’ balancing has taken place. One might argue that in these cases, the freedom of association is being restricted to a hard core of forming and joining an association. Parties were unable

52 Gustafsson v Sweden App no 15573/89 (ECtHR, 25 April 1996). See L Schut, ‘De cao als spin in het web: het recht om geen cao af te sluiten valt niet onder artikel 11 EVRM’ [1998] NCJM Bulletin, 18–36. 53 AB Kurt Kellermann v Sweden App no 41579/98 (ECtHR, 1 July 2003). 54 Gustafsson v Sweden App no 15573/89 (ECtHR, 25 April 1996) [45]. 55 See G Braibant, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (Paris, Seuil, 2001) 124. 56 Art I-47: The principle of participatory democracy 1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action. 2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society. 3. The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent.



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to argue that they could shield their internal autonomy of their capacity to conclude agreements from competition or free movement rules. In Schmidberger57 the Austrian state argued that ecological activists blocking the Brenner Motorway on a Friday were exercising a right to freedom of peaceful assembly as well the freedom of expression. In this case, the Court balanced the conflicting rights at stake. Hence, they could successfully invoke a right to freedom of assembly and to freedom of expression. It claimed that the obligation of the Austrian state to uphold these rights justified a restriction to the free movement of goods. The Court recognised that the freedom of assembly (and of expression) constituted general principles of EU law. It recognised a need to reconcile ‘the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights in the Community with those arising from a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty and, more particularly, the question of the respective scope of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and of the free movement of goods, where the former are relied upon as justification for a restriction of the latter’.58 In casu, the application of the proportionality test proved to be beneficial to the Austrian state. It was not held liable for authorising its citizens to exercise their freedom of assembly. Despite the positive outcome of the case for the Austrian state, and implicitly for the ecological activists concerned, the reasoning of the Court is far from unproblematic. In fact, it is not even without contradictions. A close scrutiny of the balancing operation reveals to what extent the free movement of goods did actually restrict the exercise of the right to the freedom of assembly. The Court meticulously scrutinised the circumstances of the case in order to assess ‘whether a fair balance was struck between those interests’,59 despite the fact that it recognised a broad margin of discretion. The Court appears to urge Member States to submit the exercise of the freedom of assembly to a preliminary request addressed to the administrative authorities. The Court has insisted frequently that the interference with the free movement of goods was limited in time and space. It considered that the circumstances characterising it are clearly distinguishable from the situation in the case giving rise to the judgment in Spanish Strawberries. It also seemed to impose a duty on the state to adopt various administrative and supporting measures in order to limit as far as possible the disruption to road traffic. By far the most problematic part of the judgment relates to the fact that the professed objective of the demonstration has been taken into account, despite a previous consideration stating that ‘the specific aims of the demonstration are not in themselves material in legal proceedings such as those instituted by Schmidberger’.60 Despite this seemingly deferential attitude towards the autonomy of activists in defining the objectives and the goals of their demonstration, the Court continues by insisting on the fact that the activists manifested an opinion which it considered to be of importance to society. The Court then insisted that the purpose of the demonstration was not to restrict trade in goods of a particular type, or from a particular source. In sum, the Court seems to outlaw the exercise of the freedom of assembly and of expression, if it seeks to contest the economic foundations of the Common Market. This impression is only mitigated by the subsequent consideration that the French farmers in Spanish Strawberries not only attempted to

57 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republic of Austria (CJEU, 12 June 2003), Reports of Cases 2003 I-05659. 58 Ibid [77]. 59 Ibid [81]. 60 Ibid [66].

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prevent the movement of goods by demonstrating, but that they also acted to achieve this goal by a policy of physical obstruction and destruction of goods in transit to or through France. In this respect, it is worthwhile to point out a striking difference with the collective actions at stake in Viking and Laval. The collective actions of the French farmers did obstruct the free movement of goods in a direct manner, whereas the impact of the collective actions on the economic freedoms was much more indirect. These actions only restricted the freedom to provide services by means of a collective agreement that the collective action sought to prevent (Viking) or to achieve (Laval).

IV. Remedies The issue of remedies with regard to the freedom of association and assembly is difficult to grasp from an EU law perspective. First, EU directives in the field of labour law seldom provide sanctions. Secondly, there is in fact no specific competence for the EU legislator to legislate on the issue of the freedom of assembly, whereas the issue of the freedom of association (in the field of social policy) has been excluded. The case law of the ECtHR provides a useful insight into what the obligation of the state to ensure the freedom of association might entail in the field of sanctions. Hower, the Charter does not oblige the Member States to provide these sanctions in their domestic legal order. This case law is relevant to the obligations of the EU institutions in regard of their staff. The issue of ‘remedies’ of violations of the freedom of association and assembly, including the right to organise, cannot be addressed in a general manner. Many factors complicate a generic response to the question of the appropriate remedies. First, the potential infringers of these rights can be state actors as well as private actors. On the victim side, individuals and/or or collective actors might appear. Another issue to be considered might be the potential difficulty to identify the economic damages which might stem from such violations. Thus, it is impossible to calculate which benefits might have sprung from an effective enjoyment of the right to organise for the defence of workers’ interests in case of a violation. As far as the freedom of assembly is concerned, the most common restriction to the right to organise relates to the obligation to request an approval from an administrative authority to organise a demonstration. It seems essential that a refusal to authorise a demonstration could be challenged in summary proceedings. Judged otherwise, such a preventive restriction of the freedom of peaceful assembly seems to be illusory. It is vital that some fundamental rights can be exercised within a timeframe that is relevant. As far as the right to organise is concerned, the individual dimension needs to be distinguished from the collective dimension. Whereas the individual dimension affects a citizen wishing to join or not to join a trade union, the collective dimension refers to rights of the members taken collectively, or to prerogatives of the trade union (or employers’ association). A refusal to recruit a worker or a dismissal of a worker for reasons of his affiliation to an association might constitute an act of discrimination. In Danilenkov, the ECtHR qualified employers’ practices of union-busting directed against a union’s membership as an act of discrimination. The Court stated: The wording of Article 11 explicitly refers to the right of ‘everybody’, and this provision obviously includes a right not to be discriminated against for choosing to avail oneself of the right to be protected by trade union, also given that Article 14 formed an integral part of each of the Articles laying down rights and freedoms whatever their nature [see National Union of Belgian Police, cited above (n 43) at

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para 44]. Thus the totality of the measures implemented to safeguard the guarantees of Article 11 should include protection against discrimination on the ground of trade union membership which, according to the Freedom of Association Committee, constitutes one of the most serious violations of freedom of association capable to jeopardise the very existence of a trade union.61

12(1).83 In casu the Court had to examine a range of union-busting practices committed by the Kaliningrad Commercial Seaport Co Ltd against dockers affiliated to a trade union called DUR. The union had organised a strike over pay, working conditions and health and life insurance. The employer decided to assign some DUR members to reserve teams, which were not performing at full capacity. As a result, the earnings of these dockers were substantially reduced. The DUR officials ceased to be involved in monitoring the exams related to health and safety regulations. As a result, a disproportionate number of DUR members failed to pass these exams. Some DUR members were made subject to disciplinary sanctions that were proved to be unjustified. After an attempt failed to make some DUR members collectively redundant, they were transferred to part-time jobs. The trade union had to cope with an alarming drop in membership. 12(1).84 Danilenkov has introduced the notion of anti-union discrimination. This notion provides prospects for more judicial activism in the field of violations of the positive freedom of association. These violations often raise an issue of equal treatment of a busted union in respect of other trade unions which are treated more favourably. 12(1).85 The refusal to recruit organised workers, the discrimination against workers during their employment and the dismissal of organised workers because of their union membership are the most classic examples of this. The Compilation of Decisions of the Freedom of Association Committee of the ILO condemns ‘sanctions against workers because they attempt to constitute organizations’.62 It describes anti-union discrimination as one of the most serious violations of freedom of association. It contains an extensive chapter on ‘the protection againt anti-union discrimination’, which describes a whole range of sanctions in the field of employment (at the moment of hiring, during employment and at the moment of dismissal).63 12(1).86 The Compilation has rightly pointed out the difficulty for workers to furnish proof of an act of anti-union discrimination of which they have been the victim.64 Some managerial decisions which adversely affect the employment relation of unionised workers or trade union leaders can be presented as falling within the margin of appreciation which is inherent in the exercise of the managerial prerogative to manage human resources or to conduct the business. In this respect the Compilation recalls ‘the full importance of Article 3 of Convention no 98’, which provides that ‘machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established where necessary to ensure respect for the right to organize’. It is unclear to what extent this vague provision warrants a reversal of the burden of proof, once the alleged victim is able to establish facts from which it may be presumed that there has been a case of anti-union discrimination.65 12(1).87 The Danilenkvov judgment suggests that a criminal provision prohibiting union-busting might be counterproductive. Though this highlights the need of civil sanctions combatting discrimination, no requirement of a reversal of the burden of proof is being proposed. Some of the Russian judges had denied their competence in the matter, holding that the existence of discrimination could be established in criminal proceedings only, due to the existence of

61 Danilenkov and others v Russia App no 67336/01 (ECtHR, 30 July 2009) [123]. 62 International Labour Office, Freedom of Association, Compilation of decisions of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO (Geneva, 2018) no 513. 63 Ibid nos 1072–1186. 64 Ibid no 1141. 65 In this respect, see per analogiam Articles of EC Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78.

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a criminal prohibition on anti-union discrimination. This required the victims of an alleged anti-union discrimination to prove a direct intent ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ on the part of one of the company’s key managers to discriminate against the trade-union members. Furthermore, the Court observed that the victims of discrimination only have a minor role in the institution and conduct of criminal procedures. The concept of discrimination could urge the Court in future to accept a reversal of the burden 12(1).88 of proof, once some facts indicate that there is a strong presumption that the exercise of the managerial prerogative could have been inspired by an intent to discriminate. Such a reversal of the burden of proof would force management to show in more detail that the contested practices can indeed be justified by the proper conduct of their business and that the choice of the workers affected by these practices was not related to their affiliation. In Danilenkov, the Court only indicated that it would be wrong to exclude the enforcement of a prohibition against discrimination through civil procedures and to require the proof ‘beyond doubt’ of a direct intent to discriminate.66 It did not state that these civil procedure ought to allow a reversal of the burden of proof. In the recent Aguilera Jiménez case, the Court had to assess whether the stante pede dismissal of some unionised workers who had published a satirical cartoon in a union magazine featuring a human resources manager and two of their colleagues in a compromising position could constitute a violation of the freedom of expression as well as of the freedom of association. The Court refused to accept that the decision interfered with the freedom of association, insofar as the plaintiffs were unable to establish sufficient indications that their dismissal was retaliatory (une acte de représailles) in view of their membership of a trade union. Hence, the Court seemed to have upheld a judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court in the same dispute. The Spanish Constitutional Court indeed required that the plaintiffs were able to provide sufficient indications of a direct intention to restrict the freedom of trade union association.67 The request of a ‘direct intention’ is troublesome, if applied to discrimination disputes. It seems to refer to a ‘subjective’ element, which is extremely difficult to prove. In sum, the difference between the formula applied by the Court in Aguilera Jiménez and the ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a direct intent beyond’ which the Court disapproved of in Danilenkov is very shallow. It is to be regretted that the Court did not examine whether there were sufficient indications that the dismissal was ‘objectively’ related to the exercise of trade union freedom. Thus, it was beyond doubt that the cartoon was part of a trade union magazine and that its publication was indeed related to a dispute between the trade union and the employer. In a more recent judgment, the Court had to rule on a dismissal case concerning a member 12(1).89 of the British National Party, whose affiliation became apparent once he was a candidate in the municipal elections.68 Despite the fact that this judgment is unlikely to find great favour among many trade union activists, it can be construed as a judgment advocating a genuine reversal of the burden of proof in the case of discrimination in the field of the freedom of association. The employer, who was a subcontractor working for the municipality in transporting disabled people who were primarily Asian, summarily terminated the agreement on the ground that its continuation might entail ‘potential health and safety risks as the applicant’s continued employment would give rise to considerable anxiety among passengers and their carers’ It also invoked a concern for its reputation and the economic risk of a loss of its contract with Bradford City Council. 66 Danilenkov and others v Russia App no 67336/01 (ECtHR, 30 July 2009) [143]. 67 Aguilera Jiménez and others v Spain App nos 28389/06, 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06, 28961/06 and 28964/06 (ECtHR, 8 December 2009) [11] and [39]. 68 Readfurn v United Kingdom App no 47335/06 (ECtHR, 12 November 2012).



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12(1).90

Though the Court did show some consideration for the concern of the employer that the ‘applicant’s membership of the BNP could have impacted upon Serco’s provision of services to Bradford City Council, especially as the majority of service users were vulnerable persons of Asian origin’, it objected to the absence of a recourse under UK law to challenge the dismissal as being unfair. In the case concerned, such a remedy was not available due to the lack of sufficient seniority (less than one year). 12(1).91 The Court considered in this respect that ‘a claim for unfair dismissal under the 1996 Act would be an appropriate domestic remedy for a person dismissed on account of his political beliefs or affiliations. Once such a claim is lodged with the Employment Tribunal, it falls to the employer to demonstrate that there was a “substantial reason” for the dismissal.’69 12(1).92 In sum, the Court seems to insist on a specific remedy to combat discrimination on account of political beliefs or affiliations. The remedy it is suggesting allows the plaintiff to ask compensation for unfair dismissal and provides him with the opportunity to reverse the burden of proof. There is no reason why the Court’s approach could not be extrapolated to discrimination on account of non-political beliefs, such as trade union convictions. 12(1).93 In Belgium and Italy, a victim of discrimination on the basis of trade union membership is not required to establish the exact amount of the damages. He or she can request a fixed amount of compensation provided by law. This technique might be a further means to alleviate the procedural burden of the victim of a discrimination.

E. Evaluation 12(1).94 In view of the comprehensive character of the Charter combining so-called civil and political, as well as so-called economic, social and cultural rights, the Convention drafting the Charter was confronted with a choice. It could have taken inspiration from the instruments related to civil and political rights or from those related to economic, social and cultural rights, or it could have tried to combine the best of both worlds. The Convention decided to align Article 12 to the formula of Article 11 of the ECHR, disregarding to some extent the more specific provisions related to the right to organise. Furthermore, in an alleged need to ‘modernise’ the formula of Article 11 of the ECHR, other associations than trade unions have been referred to in an implicit or explicit way. The latter should not necessarily amount to a ‘devaluation’ of the right to organise, nor should it be an obstacle to attribute specific attributes related to the freedom of association to the sole benefit of trade unions. The most important of these attributes, ie means to protect workers’ interests, have been consecrated in their own right in Article 28 of the Charter. Hence, the need to ‘codify’ the hard core of the case law of the Strasbourg Court related to the right to organise was not urgent. The fact remains that the Charter does not integrate the negative dimension of the freedom of association, which was progressively developed in the case law of the Strasbourg Court. Bercusson has pointed out that Article 52(3) of the Charter generates a conceptual hurdle in interpreting this omission. Insofar as this Article invites the interpreter to interpret the Charter in line with the ECHR and the subsequent case law, it can be argued that the negative freedom of association is enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter. Insofar as the absence of the negative freedom of association can be considered as constituting a more extensive protection, the case



69 Ibid

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law of the ECtHR related to the negative freedom of association could actually be circumvented or disregarded.70 In my view, the Convention has missed an opportunity to define the objectives of trade union membership in a more explicit way. In more specific instruments, the objectives are set in a more specific or a more ambitious way.71 Thus, the nature of the interests at stake is described explicitly and broadly as ‘social and economic interests’. Furthermore, trade unions are presented as being ‘in the offensive’. They do not just ‘protect’ or ‘defend’, they ‘promote and further’ interests. Furthermore, the (partial) alignment on more specific instruments would have helped to clarify beyond doubt that the more specific formula is applicable to employers’ associations in the field of industrial relations. In my view, the Charter provision has the potential to be relevant in those fields where EU law has in fact regulated associations. These fields basically relate to company law. In this respect, there is a huge gap between the matters which are being mentioned (political, trade union and civic) on the one hand, and the acquis of secondary EU law which relates to economic matters. Whether the abstract recognition of the freedom of association will be helpful in overcoming the jurisdictional restrictions to the freedom of collective bargaining and the right to have recourse to take collective action is questionable. The recognition of the right to take collective action did not prevent the Court from restricting the right to take collective action in a way which, according to the ILO CEACR, is at odds with ILO standards. Nor did the subsequent recognition of the freedom of collective bargaining in Commission v Germany induce the Court to abandon its application of the proportionality test. In my view, the prospects of a potential impact might change if the European Union were indeed to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, and if the Strasbourg Court applied the canon of interpretation set forward in Demir and Baykara. The latter would impel the Strasbourg Court to reject restrictions to the right to take collective action which are incompatible with international standards. Finally the formal recognition of the freedom of association has the potential to become relevant in a near future for the benefit of the employees of the European institutions. The protection of the individual freedom to form and join trade unions will not be sufficient to improve industrial relations at the level of EU institutions. A progressive development of other corollary rights is needed. This inevitably requires the collaboration of at least one European institution which is an employer as well, to develop the substance of the freedom of association to the staff of European institution. The prospects that the Court of Justice (Civil Service Tribunal) might indeed play such a role seem poor, to judge by the recent case of M Heath v BCE.72 The Civil Service Tribunal was asked to rule on the implications of Article 28 of the Charter for the way a pension reform was conducted at the ECB. The case was brought to the Tribunal by a retired employee of the ECB, who challenged the annual adjustment of his retirement benefits for the year 2010. The ECB argued that the absence of a bargaining procedure did not deprive the employees of their right under Article 11 of the ECHR to form and join trade unions. Furthermore, it recalled that the Strasbourg Court did not prevent exemptions applicable to civil servants, such as the employees of the ECB.

70 B Bercusson, ‘Freedom of assembly and of association’, in B Bercusson (ed), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006) 161. 71 See Art 5, Revised ESC (‘for the protection of their economic and social interests’); Art 8, ICESCR (‘for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests’); Art 10, ILO Convention No 87 (‘for furthering and defending the interests of workers or employers’). 72 Case F-121/10M Heath v BCE (CJEU, 29 September 2011) [110]–[23].



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The Civil Service Tribunal ruled that neither Article 28 of the Charter nor Article 11 ECHR provides an obligation to conclude a collective agreement, nor to introduce a bargaining procedure. The Tribunal paid a formal tribute to Article 6(2) of the European Social Charter (ESC), which enshrines an obligation ‘to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary negotiations between employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements’. According to the Tribunal this obligation does not entail an obligation to introduce a bargaining procedure. It was construed as a provision merely ‘encouraging’ such procedures. Nor could such an obligation according to the Court be deduced from Article 11 ECHR.73

73 See in this respect: F Dorssemont, ‘The Constitutional Court of Justice and the right of collective bargaining: Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes Part II’, in Liber amicorum (Bari, Caucci editore, 2012) 109–14.

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Article 12(2) Article 12(2) Freedom of Assembly and of Association 1. … 2. Political parties at Union level contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 12(2) 1. … 2. … 3. Paragraph 2 of this Article corresponds to Article 10(4) of the Treaty on European Union.

Select Bibliography L Bardi et al, ‘How to Create a Transnational Party System’, Study for the European Parliament, European Parliament, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2010) (Doc No PE 425.623). S Day, ‘Between “Containment” and “Transnationalization”—Where Next for the Europarties?’ (2014) 49 Acta Politica 5–29, doi:10.1057/ap.2013.23. Grasso, Giorgio & Perrone, Roberto. ‘European Political Parties and the Respect for the Values on Which the European Union Is Founded Between the European Legislation and the National Laws’ (2019) 25(4) European Public Law 665–688. S Hix, and C Lord, Political Parties in the European Union (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997). T Jansen and S v Hecke, At Europe’s Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People’s Party (Berlin, Springer, 2011). K Johansson, ‘The Emergence of Political Parties at European Level: Integration Unaccomplished’, in L Pehrson, L Oxelheim, S Gustavsson (eds), How Unified Is the European Union? European Integration Between Visions and Popular Legitimacy (Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer, 2009). S Lightfoot, Europeanizing Social Democracy?: the Rise of the Party of the European Socialists (New York, Routledge, 2005). K Johansson and T Raunio, ‘Political Parties in the European Union’ (26 April 2019) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/ acrefore-9780190228637-e-1153. A Maurer, M Jopp, M McGinley, R Parkes et al, ‘Feasibility of a Future European Statute of European Political Parties: Legal Framework and Desirable Provisions’, Study for the European Parliament, European Parliament, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2007) (Doc No PE 393.249). J Morijn, ‘Responding to “Populist” Politics at EU Level: Regulation 1141/2014 and Beyond’ (2019) 17 (2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 617–40, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz030. F Saitto, ‘European Political Parties and European Public Space from the Maastricht Treaty to the Reg. No. 1141/2014’ (2017) 2 Rivista di Diritti Comparati 23. J Shaw and S Day, ‘Developing Political Parties in the European Union: Towards a European Party Statute?’ in K Ewing and S Issacharoff (eds), Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006).

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——, ‘The Evolution of Europe’s Transnational Political Parties in the Era of European Citizenship’ in T Börzel and R Cichowski (eds), The State of the European Union, Vol VI: Law, Politics, and Society (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). S v Hecke, ‘Do Transnational Party Federations Matter? (and Why Should We Care?)’ (2010) 6(3) Journal of Contemporary European Research 395–411.

A.  Field of Application of Article 12(2) 12(2).01 Article 12(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) is a declaratory and framework provision setting out a political vision. As such, its legal effect is bound to be limited. Thus far, the provision has yet to be interpreted in the CJEU, and the wording of the provision, prima facie, creates no discernible rights or obligations for individuals or public authorities. However, the provision does arguably have normative force for the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and, of course, for the political parties at Union level1 themselves, through its commitment to a particular political vision. What is most important is its interrelationship with provisions of the EU Treaties which permit the implementation of much at least some of the vision expressed in Article 12(2) CFR.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 12(2) with Other Provisions of the Charter 12(2).02 Article 12(2) CFR is closely related to Article 11 CFR on freedom of expression and to Article 12(1) CFR on freedom of assembly and association. The nature of the relationship can be discerned from the preamble to the 2014 European Parliament and Council Regulation on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations: Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter state that the right to freedom of association at all levels, for example in political and civic matters, and the right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers, are fundamental rights of every citizen of the Union; European citizens should be enabled to use those rights in order to participate fully in the democratic life of the Union; Truly transnational European political parties and their affiliated European political foundations have a key role to play in articulating the voices of citizens at European level by bridging the gap between politics at national level and at Union level.2

12(2).03 Furthermore, Article 12(2) CFR is also closely related to Article 39 CFR which provides citizens of the Union with the right to vote and to stand as candidates at elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which they reside, under the same conditions as nationals of that state. 1 The so-called European political parties (or ‘Euro-parties’) within the European Union are transnational federations of national/regional parties, organised as autonomous or semi-autonomous entities at the European level. See J Shaw and S Day, ‘Developing Political Parties in the European Union: Towards a European Party Statute?’ in K Ewing and S Issacharoff (eds), Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) and J Shaw and S Day, ‘The Evolution of Europe’s Transnational Political Parties in the Era of European Citizenship’ in T Börzel and R Cichowski (eds), The State of the European Union, Vol VI: Law, Politics, and Society (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). 2 Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations [2014] OJ L317/1.

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C.  Sources of Article 12(2) Rights Article 12(2) CFR is in most respects unique to the European Union and to the project of 12(2).04 European integration. In that context, it is hard to regard it as having any specific roots in international law. However, given that, as has already been noted, the provision is conceptually linked to the rights of citizens of the Union to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections and to the freedoms of expression, association and assembly, it will be useful to note the relevant international and regional human rights law sources.

I. ECHR 12(2).05

Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (1950) provides that: 1.

2.

Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

12(2).06

Article 11 ECHR provides that: 1. 2.

Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or the administration of the State.

Article 3, Protocol 13 ECHR provides that:

12(2).07

The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.

II.  UN Treaties 12(2).08

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provides that: 1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. 2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.





3 Protocol

1 was signed in Paris on 20 March 1952.

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3.

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. [Emphasis added.]

12(2).09 Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) provides that: Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity […] without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. [Emphasis added.]

III.  Other Sources 12(2).10 As we have already noted, Article 12(2) is unique to the European Union context, and indeed the key sources for this provision are to be found in the EU Treaties themselves. Article 10(4) TEU provides that: Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.

12(2).11 Article 224 TFEU provides that: The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, by means of regulations, shall lay down the regulations governing political parties at European level referred to in Article 10(4) of the Treaty on European Union and in particular the rules regarding their funding.

12(2).12 Another key legal source, to be discussed in more detail below, from which Article 12(2) CFR indirectly takes inspiration, is Article 21(1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (the German Constitution), which provides that: Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organisation must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 12(2).13 The gradual constitutionalisation of Euro-parties in the context of European integration was initiated by a limited legal recognition of their (envisioned) role at the European level in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, along with embryonic references to democracy as a founding principle of the European Union in the case law.4 In its earliest iteration, what is now Article 10(4) TFEU appeared as Article 138a TEC: Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.

4 See Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council of the European Union [1980] ECR 03333; Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 01339; and Case T-135/96 Union Européenne de l’artisinat et des petites et moyennes enterprises (UEAPME) v Council of the European Union [1998] ECR II-02335.

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The emphasis in this first iteration was on the role that it was anticipated Euro-parties can play 12(2).14 in the European integration process, not only in expressing the will of citizens of the Union but, perhaps more importantly at this stage of the EU’s development, in helping to foster a European political conscience. It is apparent, then, that from the very outset this was a provision that emerged out of a distinct historical process (European integration), which cannot usefully be understood away from that context. The general view is that Article 138a found its way into the Treaty as a result of pressure applied 12(2).15 jointly by the leaders of the three party federations which were in existence at the time (the European People’s Party, the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Communities, and the Federation of European Liberals and Democrats).5 Certainly, there was a joint initiative by these parties to secure some form of legal recognition of the role they felt they played within the Union and on the basis of a meeting of the Secretary Generals of the three parties, a joint press release was issued on 12 December 1990 which stated that: Since their foundation in the mid-1970s, the European People’s Party and the Confederation of Social Democratic Parties in the European Community, and also the Federation of European Liberals and Democrats, have all in their own way made major contributions to European integration … [A]ll three European parties or federations of parties stress their common responsibility for the proper functioning of democracy and for the success of the European Union … They take it as read that, without parties to express the political will of the citizens, there is no democracy! This holds good at all levels of political representation, and logically for the European Community as well, and above all for the European Union.6

On the back of the press release, a joint letter was sent from the chairs of Euro-parties to the 12(2).16 presidents of the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the European Commission, calling for the inclusion, in the Treaty of Maastricht, of a provision on the role of Euro-parties in shaping political consensus and political will.7 The first draft of the provision, as proposed by the Euro-parties, was in the following form: European Parties are essential to integration within the Union. They are integral to building consensus and expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union. European parties are the federative associations of national parties with a presence in the majority of EU Member States, sharing the same aims and political direction, and forming a single group in the European Parliament. They must give a public account of where their funding comes from.

This draft was based largely on Article 21(1) of the German Constitution (set out above) which, 12(2).17 Jansen and van Hecke have suggested, illustrates that the role envisioned for Euro-parties by the drafters was essentially the same as that of political parties in the national context.8 Ultimately, the definition of ‘European parties’ included in the draft provision was dropped, leaving only the rather broad declaratory statement that became Article 138a. Jansen and van Hecke suggest that the final provision that made it into the Treaty ‘articulated the recognition that if the further unification of Europe were to be successful and a transnational system of government were to be effective, then the further development of European party structures would be necessary’.9

5 See D Dinan, Ever Closer Union (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), S Lightfoot, Europeanizing Social Democracy?: the Rise of the Party of the European Socialists (New York, Routledge, 2005) and S Hix and C Lord, Political Parties in the European Union (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997). 6 See partially reproduced in T Jansen and S v Hecke, At Europe’s Service: The Origins and Evolution of the European People’s Party (Berlin, Springer, 2011) 190. 7 Ibid 191. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid 194.



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12(2).18

The Euro-parties also hoped that the provision could serve another purpose. The party federations then existed in a condition of legal uncertainty in that they had no formal legal status and could not employ personnel, execute contracts or issue receipts for donations. It was for this reason that for a long time the Euro-parties merely ‘piggy-backed’ upon the party groups in the European Parliament, even though in some respects the party alignment has always differed between the two. Some of the EP groups have been coalitions of several Euro-parties. It was therefore hoped that a constitutional recognition of the role and function of the parties would serve as a legal base for efforts of the parties to secure formal legal status. However, despite efforts made to broaden the scope of Article 138a in the years following its introduction, and to adopt legislation inspired by this provision, no further formal legal developments occurred until after the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice in 2001. With the Treaty of Nice came the introduction of a legal basis for the regulation of Euro-parties in what became Article 191 TEC: The Council … shall lay down the regulations governing political parties at European level and in particular the rules regarding their funding.

12(2).19 This addition created a political and legal opportunity structure for the creation of European-level regulation and recognition of Euro-parties and complemented the process of constitionalisation with what has been described as the beginning of a process of ‘institutionalisation’.10 The changes to Article 191 TEC quickly produced concrete results, and in 2003 the European Parliament and Council adopted Regulation 2004/200311 on regulations governing political parties at European level and rules governing their funding. The Regulation defined a political party at European level as a body with members that are either citizens gathered together in the form of a political party, or political parties which together form an alliance. Under the terms of the Regulation, financing was granted to the Euro-parties under the EU budget on the condition that they were incorporated as separate legal entities with registered offices in the Member State in which they are incorporated (most Euro-parties are currently registered under Belgian law as nonprofit-making associations). Moreover, Euro-parties were required to demonstrate that they were represented or had been voted for in at least one quarter of the Member States and that they conformed to certain basic requirements, such as having a statute, a set of principles and a political programme.12 The adoption of this measure, although relatively modest in its effects and achievements, did at least bring to an end the considerable legal uncertainty described above. 12(2).20 In 2005, under the terms of Article 12 of the Regulation, the Parliament adopted a non-legislative Resolution (2005/2224),13 in which it noted that further development of a democratic EU that was ‘close to its citizens’ was a precondition for public support for European integration and that deeper reflection on the future of Europe required a ‘comprehensive dialogue with its citizens, and political parties at European level must play a key role in this dialogue’.14 The Resolution called for a ‘genuine European party statute’ establishing the rights and obligations of Euro-parties and enabling them to attain a legal personality based on Community law. The Resolution also noted that there was a ‘gulf between many members of the public and the European institutions’,

10 J Shaw and S Day, ‘The Evolution of Europe’s Transnational Political Parties’ (n 1) 151. 11 Regulation (EC) 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding [2003] OJ L297/1. 12 To be precise, they must show either that they have received, in at least one quarter of the Member States, at least three per cent of the votes cast in each of those Member States at the most recent European Parliament election or that they are represented, in at least one quarter of Member States, by Members of the European Parliament or in the national Parliaments or regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies. 13 European Parliament resolution on European political parties (2005/2224). 14 Ibid.

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and one of the reasons for this was that there had been ‘inadequate political communication or information about European policy’. The Resolution also urged that ‘political parties at European level must take on a further role than solely that of umbrella organisations and become active proponents of European policy options’, and moreover, that Euro-parties were ‘a key element in the process of forming and voicing European public opinion’.15 There was, then, the emergence of a discernible emphasis on dialogue ie not only on the role that Euro-parties should play in expressing the will of EU citizens, but also on the role they should play in communicating EU policy to the citizens. The emphasis is a reflection of the concerns about widespread negative sentiment towards the EU on the back of the failed Constitutional Treaty referendums in France and the Netherlands (which had taken place just a few months prior to the Resolution). Indeed, the Commission, also stirred by the failed referendums, had just launched its ‘Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’, in order to promote a dialogue with European citizens.16 The Resolution ultimately resulted in Regulation 1524/200717 (amending Regulation 2004/2003), and in a feasibility study for a European party statute.18 The new regulation altered the rules with respect to funding in respect of certain details and entitled European political foundations19 to qualify for financing under the EU budget. Meanwhile, the feasibility study concluded that Article 191 TEC (relevant parts now in Article 224 TFEU) could operate as a legal basis for the establishment of a European party statute and suggested the adoption of a regulation to that end.20 Later legislative measures have brought the position closer to this goal. The 2007 Lisbon Treaty divided the earlier provision into two parts, ie Article 10(4) TEU and Article 224 TFEU,21 and the sentence on Euro-parties being ‘important as a factor for integration within the Union’ was dropped. It is not apparent why this occurred or if it is of any significance. However, one possibility is that it was one further consequence of the failed Constitutional Treaty referendums in France and the Netherlands and the dampening of the federalist spirit. On the other hand, Article 10(4) TEU could now be seen as part of a stronger focus on democracy within the post-Lisbon Treaties. In the years following the Lisbon Treaty, the debate around the institutional development of Euro-parties revolved around two main issues. On the one hand, calls for a European party statute refused to subside and, on the other hand, there were increasing calls for the development of transnational party lists for European Parliament elections. 15 Ibid. 16 K Johansson, ‘The Emergence of Political Parties at European Level: Integration Unaccomplished’ in L Pehrson, L Oxelheim and S Gustavsson (eds), How Unified Is the European Union? European Integration Between Visions and Popular Legitimacy (Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer, 2009) 170. 17 Regulation (EC) 1524/2007 [2007] OJ L343. 18 A Maurer, M Jopp, M McGinley, R Parkes et al, ‘Feasibility of a Future European Statute of European Political Parties: Legal framework and desirable provisions’, Study for the European Parliament, European Parliament, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2007) (Doc No PE 393.249). 19 Ie research and advocacy organisations which are usually close to, but independent from, a Euro-party. 20 See Maurer, Jopp, McGinley, Parkes et al (n 18) 10. 21 This peculiar arrangement was a consequence of the political deliberation process which climaxed with the shelving of ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’. The first draft of the Constitution only mentioned that ‘Political parties at European level contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union’. Although Members of the European Parliament made numerous requests to change the wording of the provision to reflect Art 191 in its entirety (and even to supplement it with new wording regarding internal party democracy), the Chairman of the Praesidium determined that the inclusion of any further text should be left to the Member States themselves. Ultimately, the second paragraph of Art 191 TEC was included in the Constitutional Treaty, but separately from the first paragraph, under the institutional provisions section. The Treaty of Lisbon kept the two separate provisions rather than consolidating them and this resulted in Art 10 TEU and Art 224 TFEU. See J Shaw and S Day, ‘The Evolution of Europe’s Transnational Political Parties’ (n 1) 31 and 32.



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In 2014, a new regulation replaced Regulation 2004/2003,22 after further pressure from the European Parliament to provide a universal legal status for Euro-parties and foundations under EU law.23 The 2014 regulation created a registration procedure, specified the need for parties to fulfil conditions to obtain recognition and established an Authority for European political parties and European political foundations. As discussed below, the Authority has substantial powers to verify the compliance of the European political parties with European values and has the power to de-register European political parties.24 This compliance procedure represents an important micro-level instrument for contesting the impact of the negative dynamics of populism upon some aspects of European politics.25 The regulation was further amended in 2017 and 2018.26 12(2).26 Meanwhile, the saga of transnational party lists has failed to produce similar results for either the 2014 or 2019 EP elections. Proponents of transnational party lists have argued for the introduction of a single EU-wide constituency for, say, 25 MEPs, in addition to the existing nationally or regionally drawn constituencies. However, despite support for this proposal within the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, MEPs have regularly delayed a binding vote on transnational lists.27 The stumbling blocks appear to be opposition from Eurosceptic national parties and fears that transnational election lists might create two classes of MEP and weaken the influence of smaller member states in the Parliament by effectively diluting their representation.28 In 2018, the idea was rejected by the European Parliament and shelved by the European Council.29 12(2).25

II.  Scope of Application (a)  Legal Scope 12(2).27 As already indicated, Article 12(2) CFR is merely declaratory in nature and has no legal effect.

III.  Detailed Analysis (a)  Normative Scope 12(2).28 While Article 12(2) has no scope in a legal sense, it would not be inappropriate to suggest that it has some normative scope both for the institutions and for the Euro-parties. Article 12(2) is essentially a statement of intent and as such represents a promise to be fulfilled at some future point in time. However, the scope of such a normative obligation is very much open to debate.

22 Regulation 1141/2014 (n 2). 23 European Parliament resolution on the application of Regulation (EC) 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding (2010/2201), based on the Giannakou Report for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, A7-62/2011. 24 F Saitto, ‘European Political Parties and European Public Space from the Maastricht Treaty to the Reg. No. 1141/2014’ (2017) 2 Rivista di Diritti Comparati 2; Grasso, Giorgio & Perrone, Roberto. ‘European Political Parties and the Respect for the Values on Which the European Union Is Founded Between the European Legislation and the National Laws’. European Public Law 25, no. 4 (2019): 665–688. 25 J Morijn, ‘Responding to “Populist” Politics at EU Level: Regulation 1141/2014 and Beyond’ (2019) 17 (2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 617–40 https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz030. 26 The consolidated text is available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014R1141-20190327. 27 C Brand, ‘MEPs Delay Vote on Trans-National List’ (11 March 2012), available at www.europeanvoice.com. 28 Ibid. 29 ‘EU Parliament Rejects Transnational Lists’ (Euronews, 2 February 2018) https://www.euronews.com/2018/02/07/ eu-parliament-rejects-transnational-lists.

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Shaw and Day adopt a threefold typology which is helpful here to understand the various possible perspectives on the normative content of Article 12(2).30 A first perspective views the EU as an intergovernmental rather than transnational project, and the Euro-parties as forums for the pursuance of bi/multi-lateral relations. From this perspective the major function of Euro-parties should be to pursue and facilitate the goals of their national party members.31 A second perspective views Euro-parties as ‘value added meta networks with a political and organisational reach’ within the context of an emerging transnational institutional framework. From this perspective the major function of Euro-parties should be to ease cooperation between national parties by way of coalition-building and lobbying so as to better influence law and policy. The Euro-parties would step in to perform the jobs that national parties, acting alone, would not be able to undertake.32 A final perspective is the somewhat idealistic and federalist vision that has already been discussed above, which views Euro-parties as representative vehicles for an emerging European polity, apostles of European integration and two-way conduits for both EU policy and citizens’ sentiment. As Shaw and Day suggest, ‘[e]ach of these visions of the Euro-party can be seen as valid projections of the hopes, aspirations and indeed intentions of some of those working within the framework of Euro-parties’.33 Nevertheless, it is not clear that Euro-parties are empirically able to live up to any of these typologies at present.34 Johansson argues that on the basis of Regulations 2004/2003 and 1524/2007, the life of the Euro-parties has recently entered a new phase in that, thanks to the increased funding available to them, they are becoming more autonomous in relation to both their national member parties and their respective groups in the European Parliament and that they are no longer merely ‘umbrella organisations’ for national parties.35 But both Johansson and van Hecke suggest that the ability of Euro-parties truly to impact upon EU policy remains yet to be proved.36 Nevertheless, Johansson suggests that when taken together, the recent constitutional and institutional changes indicate the increasing relevance of Euro-parties.37 He argues that, since the Treaty of Maastricht, acting in their self-interest with the ‘aim of enhancing their own standing in the political system of the Union’, the Euro-parties have seized opportunities and in ‘piecemeal and incremental fashion’ increased their regulation.38 While it may be clear that regulation has increased (albeit from a complete absence of regulation prior to 2004, to the modest regulation that is in place today), it will require more than just legal tinkering if the Euro-parties are to one day, in the words of the Commission, ‘articulate the voices of the citizens at European level’.

30 J Shaw and S Day, ‘Developing Political Parties in the European Union’ (n 1) 301. Day has also recently used the twofold typology of ‘idealists’ and ‘realists’ to categorise views on the extent to which the developmental potential of the Europarties (created by the legal framework discussed above) should translate into actual development. See S Day, ‘Between “Containment” and “Transnationalization”—Where Next for the Europarties?’ (2014) 49 Acta Politica 5–29, doi:10.1057/ap.2013.23. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 See S v Hecke, ‘Do Transnational Party Federations Matter? (… and Why Should We Care?)’ (2010) 6 (3) Journal of Contemporary European Research 395–411. 35 See Johansson (n 16) 174. 36 Ibid, and v Hecke (n 34). 37 See Johansson (n 16) 173. 38 Ibid.



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And as Bardi et al say, ‘A transnational party system requires more than simply the presence of transnational parties’.39 It also requires real societal cohesion, which cannot be engineered by law.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 12(2).35 Article 12(2) CFR is merely declaratory in nature and has no legal effect. There are, therefore, no limitations or derogations.

V. Remedies 12(2).36 Article 12(2) CFR is merely declaratory in nature and has no legal effect. There are, therefore, no remedies for breach.

E. Evaluation 12(2).37 Looking over the history of the legal developments of the Treaty provisions on which Article 12(2) CFR is based, one is left with the impression that although the early years after the Treaty of Maastricht and the introduction of Article 138a EC saw a number of constitutionalising and institutionalising legal developments these developments were at best preparatory in nature, in light of the rather grand aims expressed at various points by the Parliament and the Commission. However, they did lay the groundwork for Euro-parties to receive formal consti­ tutionalisation in 2014. Yet even now, it is unclear whether these parties can, in the future, play a significant role in European polity formation and emerge as a crucial link between the citizens of the Union and its institutions. Perhaps even these more recent legal developments are merely skirting around the issue and in their modesty reflect a lack of political will, exacerbated by the failed constitutional referendums, the sovereign debt crisis and most recently—after the e­ lections of 2019—the rise of a more significant populist bloc in the European Parliament. 12(2).38 Indeed, given the rather sombre political and economic climate of recent times, it seems unlikely that Euro-parties will live up to the third vision of the threefold typology articulated above any time soon. All the same, what it empirically means for Euro-parties to ‘contribute to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union’ is yet to be determined, and only time will tell.

39 L Bardi et al, ‘How to Create a Transnational Party System’, Study for the European Parliament, European Parliament, Policy Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2010) (Doc No PE 425.623).

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Article 13 Article 13 Freedom of the Arts and Sciences The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 13 This right is deduced primarily from the right to freedom of thought and expression. It is to be exercised having regard to Article 1 and may be subject to the limitations authorised by Article 10 of the ECHR.1

Select Bibliography E Barendt, Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative Study (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010). P Bárd, ‘The rule of law and academic freedom or the lack of it in Hungary’, (2018) European Political Science 19(1). K Beiter, T Karran, K Appiagyei-Atua, Academic Freedom and Its Protection in the Law of European States: Measuring an International Human Right, European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 3 (2016) 254–345. R Chapman, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications’ (2009) 8 Journal of Human Rights 1–36. IG Cram and H Fenwick, ‘Protecting free speech and academic freedom in universities’, 81(5) Modern Law Review, 825. TA Faunce, ‘Will international human rights subsume medical ethics? Intersections in the UNESCO Universal Bioethics Declaration’ (2005) 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 173–78. J Heathershaw, S Furstenberg, and T Prelec, ‘The UK’s internationalised universities and the protection of academic freedom’, The Foreign Policy Centre. T Karran, ‘Academic freedom in Europe: time for a Magna Charta?’ (2009) 22(2) Higher Education Policy 163–89. T Karran, ‘Academic freedom in Europe: reviewing UNESCO’s recommendation’ (2009) 57(2) British Journal of Educational Studies 191–215. T Karran and L Mallinson, Academic Freedom in the UK: Legal and Normative Protection in a Comparative Context. Report for the University and College Union (Lincoln, 2018). T Lock, ‘Rights and Principles in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, (2019) 56(5) Common Market Law Review 1201. N Lucchi, The Impact of Science and Technology on the Rights of the Individual, (Switzerland, Springer International Publishing, 2016). E Polymenopoulou, ‘Does One Swallow Make a Spring? Artistic and Literary Freedom at the European Court of Human Rights’ 16(3) Human Rights Law Review 511–39. K Roberts Lyer and A Suba, ‘Closing Academic Space: Repressive State Practices’, in Legislative, Regulatory and Other Restrictions on Higher Education Institutions (Washington DC, International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, 2019).



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E Tritsmans, ‘Warning! You’ll be shocked! Dealing with offensive art: Erotic art and hate art in translation perspective’, in B Demarsin et al (eds), Art and Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) ch 3. UK House of Lords EU Select Committee, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment, 10th Report’, Session 2007–8, HL Paper 6. D Voorhoof et al, ‘Freedom of Expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, IRIS Themes, vol III, 5th edn (Strasbourg, Audiovisual Observatory, 2020). J Vrielink, P Lemmens, S Parmentier and the LERU Working Group on Human Rights, ‘Academic Freedom as a Fundamental Right’, December 2010. J Wyndham, ‘Scientific freedom: What do human rights have to do with it?’ (2010) June University Values.

A.  Field of Application of Article 13 13.01 Article 13 covers three distinct but related concepts: artistic, scientific and academic freedom. Artistic and scientific freedom must be exercised free from constraint, whereas academic freedom is to be respected. There is no explanation in Article 13 for the variation in the wording of Member States’ obligations, and until its recent consideration by the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’), it had been arguable that the distinction was intended to indicate that Article 13 was non-justiciable.2 The CJEU has confirmed this is not the case. 13.02 The European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) contains no similar provision. However, the Explanations to the Charter confirm these freedoms are primarily deduced from the freedoms of thought and expression, and that they are subject to the limitations set out in Article 10 of the ECHR. They must also be exercised consistently with Article 1 of the Charter which sets out the right to human dignity. The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has considered artistic, scientific and academic freedom within the scope of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 10 (freedom of expression). The rights can be seen as concomitant freedoms, but they may also have to be balanced directly against each other: one person’s freedom to express themselves may outrage another’s freedom of belief or religion. The case law from the ECtHR confirms that clear responsibilities accompany the right to express one’s opinion, and that the state may act to protect the beliefs of others.3 Care must also be taken to ensure that religious values are not used to suppress artistic, scientific and academic freedoms. The freedoms are not without limit.4 13.03 From an EU law perspective, although ECtHR case law will be taken into account when considering the ambit of Article 13, following the CJEU’s recent consideration of academic freedom under Article 13 in European Commission v Hungary, it is evident that the scope of these freedoms in EU law may extend beyond those already articulated by ECtHR jurisprudence.5 13.04 In terms of Article 13’s field of application, Article 51 of the Charter confirms that its rights and freedoms apply primarily to the institutions and bodies of the Union, and that it is binding on Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. In other words, purely domestic issues will not be affected by the Charter. However, the Explanations to the Charter confirm it is binding on the Member States when they act within ‘the scope of Union law’, which reflects the

2 See Case C 476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, ECLI:EU:C:2019:624 and Case C-66/18, European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792. The cases are discussed at paras 13.41 and 13.61 respectively. 3 Wingrove v United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1996:1125JUD001741990 [52]. 4 Chassagnou v France, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:0429JUD002508894. 5 See Case C-66/18, European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792 [227].

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pre-existing position in relation to Member States’ obligations to respect fundamental rights.6 Any concern about possible contradiction between these two phrases has been resolved by the Court of Justice of the EU, which held in the case of Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, that Article 51(1) of the Charter ‘confirms the Court’s case law relating to the extent to which actions of the Member States must comply with the requirements flowing from the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union’.7 The freedoms set out in Article 13 may become important when the Union or Members States 13.05 act in a variety of areas. For example, when considering broadcasting regulation or the freedom of the internet, when criminalising particular types of speech, when legislating to protect intellectual property rights or personal data, and when taking action on the funding of scientific research, the establishment or arrangement of higher education institutions or the conduct of clinical trials or the free movement of knowledge. These areas may become more relevant to Union activity. Article 13 was not considered, beyond a reference to the existence of the right, in the Commission’s first five Annual Reports on the Charter.8 However, the 2015 report referred to the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE’s) Opinion on the Ethics of New Health Technologies and Citizen Participation which made specific reference to Article 13.9 In the 2017 report, note was made of the European Commission’s infringement proceedings against Hungary on the grounds that its Higher Education Law were found to be incompatible with the rights to education, academic freedom (Article 13) and the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16).10 This case concluded in a judgment in October 2020 and is discussed below at paragraph 13.61. It should also be noted that, in November 2018, the European Parliament adopted a recommendation to make academic freedom a human rights consideration in the EU’s external action, calling for a recognition that ‘claims to academic freedom fall under existing human rights law, derived from the right to education and the rights to freedom of expression and of opinion’.11

B.  Interrelationship of Article 13 with Other Provisions of the Charter The freedoms outlined in Article 13 could interact with a variety of other Charter rights and 13.06 freedoms. For example: (i) Article 1—The right to human dignity. Article 13 is described as being specifically restricted by the need to be exercised ‘having regard’ for Article 1. (ii) Article 3—The right to the integrity of the person. It contains specific restrictions applicable to the fields of medicine and biology such as the need for free and informed consent. It also prohibits making the human body and its parts a source of financial gain.12 This reflects the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. (iii) Article 7—Respect for private and family life. For example, the right to privacy can encompass questions of personal autonomy and the physical and psychological integrity of the individual which could be engaged by the scientific research. 6 See, eg, Case 5/88 Wachauf, ECLI:EU:C:1989:321. 7 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105 [18]. 8 Commission Annual Reports on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. 9 European Commission, 2015 report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, p 69. 10 European Commission, 2017 report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, p 61. 11 European Parliament, ‘Defence of academic freedom in the EU’s external action’, P8TA(2018)0483, 29 November 2018. 12 See Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523.



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(iv) Article 8—Protection of personal data. Data protection laws may restrain academic research.13 (v) Article 10—Freedom of thought. (vi) Article 11—Freedom of expression. (vii) Article 14—Right to education. This is connected to academic freedom in relation to the right to teach and to be taught. It also fosters social inclusion and personal fulfilment of the citizens.14 (viii) Article 17—Right to property in relation to intellectual property. This may protect academic and scientific research and works of art. Intellectual property may also place limits on artistic expression. (ix) Article 22—Cultural religious and linguistic diversity. For example, artistic works afford the opportunity to take part in cultural, political and social exchanges.15 (x) Article 36—Access to services of general economic interest. This could relate to access to the Internet, and restrictions on access could impinge upon freedom of expression.

C.  Sources of Article 13 Rights I. ECHR 13.07 The ECtHR has ruled that freedom of expression constitutes ‘one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man.’16 Even speech and actions which shock, offend or disturb are protected.17 13.08 Article 10 protects freedom of expression. It confirms: (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. (2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

13.09 The ECHR also protects freedom of thought in Article 9. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, and to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance; (2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 13 See D Erdos, ‘Freedom of Expression Turned on its Head? Academic Social Research and Journalism in the European Union’s Privacy Framework’, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 53/2011. 14 See Council Conclusions of 11 May 2010 on the social dimension of education and training [2010] OJ C135/02. 15 Müller v Switzerland, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1988:0524JUD001073784. 16 Handyside v UK, ECLI: CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372 [49]. 17 Ibid.

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Thus, Articles 9 and 10 are qualified rights which can be limited only by prescribed restrictions.18 13.10 The ECHR contains no specific provision on the freedom of scientific research, or the arts 13.11 or on academic freedom. However, the ECtHR has confirmed that Article 10 is broad enough to cover these freedoms.19 In relation to artistic freedom, the ECtHR will consider the medium involved, the audience and the impact of the work when looking at whether any interference is legitimate. Similarly, although academic freedom is not explicitly provided for in the ECHR, the ECtHR has considered issues regarding freedom of expression under Article 10.20 The ECtHR has also considered the right to freedom of expression in the context of scientific research.21 It has confirmed that scientists in academia also enjoy the freedom to express their views and opinions freely ‘even if controversial or unpopular in the areas of their research, professional expertise, and competence’.22

II.  UN Treaties (a)  Artistic Freedom 13.12

Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) 1948 provides that: 1.

Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share scientific advancement and its benefits. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 19(2) of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) makes specific reference to artistic expression by guaranteeing the right to:

13.13

seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds … in the form of art or through any other media of his choice.

13.14

Article 19(3) confirms: The exercise of the rights … carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.23

The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has considered the application of restrictions on this 13.15 right.24 In Hak-Chul Shin v Republic of Korea, the HRC found a violation of Article 19 where an artist’s painting was confiscated by the government on the grounds that it contravened a

18 Art 17 ECHR may also restrict the operation of freedom of expression as it provides that no one may use the rights guaranteed by the Convention to seek the abolition or limitation of rights guaranteed in the Convention. Thus, individuals cannot rely on a human right to undermine the human rights of others, for example with speech that incites racial violence. 19 Müller (n 15) [27]. 20 Taner Akçam v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:1025JUD002752007; Hasan Yazıcı v Turkey, CE:ECHR:2014: 0415JUD004087707; Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2014:0527JUD000034604. 21 Hertel v Switzerland, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1998:0825JUD002518194. 22 Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2014:0527JUD000034604 [40]. 23 Additionally, Art 20 ICCPR prohibits propaganda for war (Art 20(1)) and hate speech in Art 20(2). 24 It should be noted that, in Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG ECLI:EU:C:2008:85, the CJEU confirmed it will take account of such international instruments when applying the general principles of ­Community law [39].



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national security law as an ‘enemy-benefiting expression’.25 The HRC confirmed that freedom of expression protected ideas imparted ‘in the form of art’ and restrictions had to be interpreted narrowly. The state must clearly justify how the particular work of art could be restricted under Article 19(3). 13.16 The HRC has also issued General Comments on Freedom of Expression. General Comment No 10 deals with restrictions on the right under Article 19(3).26 General Comment No 34 sets out the Committee’s approach to the right and highlights it as a cornerstone of democracy.27 Additionally, the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights devoted her annual report to the Human Rights Council, in June 2013, to the issue of ‘the right to artistic freedom’. 13.17 Artistic freedom of expression is also addressed in Article 15 of the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which is discussed below. 13.18 All Member States have ratified the ICCPR. (b)  Scientific Freedom 13.19 Article 27 of the UNDHR guarantees the right to share in the benefits of scientific advancement but it does not create a right to scientific freedom as such. 13.20 In relation to freedom of the sciences, Article 15 of the ICESCR confirms that state parties recognise the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

13.21 Furthermore, 1.

2. 3.

The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.

13.22 The ICESR contains so-called non-justiciable human rights although its optional protocol has recently become operational after receiving the requisite number of ratifications. Its rights are to be achieved progressively.28 All EU Member States have ratified or acceded to the ICESCR. Article 15 effectively repeats the language of Article 27 of the UNDHR, but Wyndham has 13.23 noted that: What the language of Article 15 potentially adds to the traditional framework is three-fold: first, the specific focus on scientific research demonstrates the value placed on science, when conducted responsibly, as contributing to human rights; secondly, the focus on science also provides a rallying point to unite

25 Communication No 926/2000 (UN Human Rights Committee), 6 March 2004. 26 General Comment No 10 on Freedom of expression, Article 19, 29 June 1983. 27 General Comment No 34 on Article 19, adopted during the 102nd session (2011) [28]. See also Communication No 2627/2015 (UN Human Rights Committee), 27 November 2017. 28 General Comment No 3 on the nature of States parties’ obligations in Art 2(1), 14 December 1990.

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the global scientific community when faced with common threats and challenges; and, finally, the broad reference to ‘freedom indispensable for scientific research’ has potentially wider-ranging applications than the human rights traditionally relied upon by the scientific community.29

The Committee on the ICESCR has adopted a General Comment on Article 15(1)(c), the right 13.24 of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. This confirms that ‘[t]he right … derives from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons’. In 2020, the Committee on the ICESCR published a further General Comment setting out ‘core obligations’ under Article 15 of the Covenant.30 These obligations include access to science, removing unlawful barriers to female participation, ensuring people have access to the basic education and skills necessary for the comprehension and application of scientific knowledge and the distinguishing of science from pseudoscience which is very clearly not protected by Article 15. Indeed, the General Comment requires states to ‘establish protective measures in relation to messages from pseudoscience, which create ignorance and false expectations among the most vulnerable sectors of the population’. It also states that state parties must ‘adopt mechanisms to protect people from harmful consequences of false, misleading and pseudoscience-based practices, especially when other economic social and cultural rights at risk’ as one of their ‘core obligations’ under the treaty. Thus, it has been said that ‘[s]cientific freedom must be construed more narrowly than academic freedom. It protects those who truly engage in science. The protection of academic freedom is broader because of the inherent nature of the academic enterprise as a forum where different ideas—some good some bad—are debated and subjected to intellectual scrutiny. This includes pseudoscience.’31 Finally, it should be noted that, at the international level, there also are restrictions on scientific 13.25 freedom to safeguard humanity and human dignity. For example, Article 7 ICCPR prohibits the carrying out of scientific or medical experimentation on human beings without their consent. The UN has also produced soft law aimed at protecting people against the misuse of medical and biological advances. For example, the UN Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (the Declaration of Manila) 1981 prohibits human cloning.32 It confirms that ‘freedom of research, which is necessary for the progress of knowledge is part of freedom of thought’.33 The Declaration confirms the individual’s right to respect for their dignity regardless of their genetic characteristics and it includes principles on prior-informed consent, confidentiality of data, and protection of public health. Additionally, an International Declaration on Human Genetic Data was agreed on 16 October 2003. It sets out rules for the collection, use and storage of human genetic data and provides a universal framework of principles and procedures to guide States in the formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments in the field of bioethics. Finally, a Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of 19 October 2005 aims to provide a

29 J Wyndham, ‘Scientific freedom: What do human rights have to do with it?’ (2010) June University Values. See also GJ Benston, ‘Government Constraints on Political, Artistic, and Commercial Speech’ (1987–88) 20 Connecticut Law Review 303. 30 General Comment No. 25 (2020) on science and economic, social and cultural rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/25, 30 April 2020. 31 A Boggio, ‘Academic freedom and scientific freedom: convergence and divergence’, Science for Democracy, 28.10.20, available at: https://sciencefordemocracy.org/academic-freedom-and-scientific-freedom-convergence-and-divergence/. 32 Art 11. 33 Art 12(b).



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comprehensive framework of principles to ensure that biomedical activities are in conformity with international human rights law.34 (c)  Academic Freedom 13.26 Academic freedom is included as part of the guarantee of free speech under Article 19 ICCPR. In Faurisson v France, the HRC refused to find a violation following a complaint by a university professor who had given a magazine interview in which he expressed doubt on the use of gas chambers for murder at Auschwitz. He was prosecuted under the ‘Gayssot Act’ (which makes it a criminal offence to question the findings of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal). The HRC held that this did not restrict his freedom of expression and academic freedom, because he had been convicted for violating the rights and reputations of others. The Committee refused to offer protection to someone who, ‘under the guise of historical research’, made accusations that falsified and distorted the facts that occurred during the Second World War.35 Such statements were capable of strengthening anti-semitic feelings.36 13.27 The UNHRC has also considered the impact of laws which may be applied in such a way as to restrict academic freedom and quash discourse or criticism. The case of Aduayom et al v Togo concerned two teachers at the University of Benin who were arrested on the grounds of lèse-majesté.37 The charges were later dropped but they lost their posts. The claimed they were being ‘persecuted for having carried, read or disseminated documents that contained no more than an assessment of Togolese politics, either at the domestic or foreign policy level’.38 The Committee agreed and found a violation of Article 19.39 In similar vein, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression has noted: Restrictions on academic freedom are both ancient tools to limit the sharing of information and knowledge and the questioning of received wisdom, and contemporary tools to repress information and ideas that Governments often find threatening. Yet, without academic freedom, all societies lose one of the essential elements of democratic self-governance: the capacity for self-reflection, for knowledge generation and for a constant search for improvements of people’s lives and social conditions.40

13.28 Academic freedom is also integral to the protection of the right to education. The right to education is enshrined in numerous international instruments, particularly, Articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR. The Committee on ICESCR has adopted a General Comment on the right to education confirming that it ‘can only be enjoyed if accompanied by the academic freedom of staff and students’ and that ‘staff and students in higher education are especially vulnerable to political and other pressures which undermine academic freedom’.41 13.29 However, the primary source of the definition of academic freedom at international level is UNESCO’s Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel.42 34 See TA Faunce, ‘Will international human rights subsume medical ethics? Intersections in the UNESCO Universal Bioethics Declaration’ (2005) 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 173–78; R Andorno, ‘Global bioethics at UNESCO: in defence of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights’ (2007) 33 Journal of Medical Ethics 150–54. 35 Faurisson v France, Communication No 550/1993, 8 November 1996 [7.6]. 36 Ibid. 37 Aduayom et al v Togo (CCPR/C/57/D/422/1990). 38 Ibid [3.1]. 39 Ibid [7.4]. 40 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/75/261, 28 July 2020 [54]. 41 General Comment 13 (1999) on the right to education at [38]. 42 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel, 11 November 1999. For further discussion, see T Karran, ‘Academic freedom in Europe: reviewing UNESCO’s recommendation’ (2009) 57(2)

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The Recommendation is not binding, but it reflects a measure of international consensus on the meaning of the term. It specifies a range of parameters which are deemed important to creating academic freedom: freedom of expression is only one of these parameters. They include: 1. Institutional autonomy.43 Universities, academic departments, etc, have the right to preserve and promote the principles of academic freedom in the conduct of both internal and external affairs. 2. Individual rights and freedoms.44 These rights are linked to freedom of opinion, freedom of speech and expression and freedom of association. This has been said to include the freedom to study, the freedom to teach, and the freedom of research and information.45 These freedoms should include the right to information and the right to protect that information.46 It is possible that conflict may arise between individual and institutional autonomy. 3. The protection provided by the state. The UNESCO Recommendation specifically refers to avoiding ‘untoward political pressures, which could undermine academic freedom’ due to the ‘vulnerability of the academic community’. States may also have to take steps to protect freedom of speech and intellectual property rights.

The UNESCO Recommendation also deals with self-governance and collegiality, the duties and responsibilities of academics and the safeguarding of tenure. In 2020, a report was produced by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 13.30 of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, cited the UNESCO Recommendation and confirmed that ‘[a]cademic freedom is not only about individual human rights protection by traditional State actors. It also involves institutional protections—autonomy and self-governance, themselves rooted in human rights standards—to guarantee the freedom for those pursuits.’47 The Recommendation was also cited by the CJEU in 2020 in Case C-66/18, European Commission v Hungary, where the Court noted: the Court considers it helpful, for the purposes of clarifying the various elements inherent in academic freedom and of determining whether the measures at issue constitute limitations on that freedom, to take into consideration the content of Recommendation 1762 (2006), adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 30 June 2006 and entitled ‘Academic freedom and university autonomy’, from which it is apparent that academic freedom also incorporates an institutional and organisational dimension, a link to an organisational structure being an essential prerequisite for teaching and research activities. Also relevant is point 18 of the Recommendation concerning the status of higher-education teaching personnel, adopted on 11 November 1997 by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco), meeting in Paris from 21 October to 12 November 1997, at its 29th session, according to which ‘autonomy is the institutional form of academic freedom and a necessary precondition to guarantee the proper fulfilment of the functions

British Journal of Educational Studies 191–215. See also T Karran and L Mallinson, Academic Freedom in the UK: Legal and Normative Protection in a Comparative Context, Report for the University and College Union (Lincoln, 2018). 43 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel, 11 November 1999 [17]. 44 Ibid [27]. 45 See detailed discussion in J Vrielink, P Lemmens, S Parmentier and the LERU Working Group on Human Rights, ‘Academic Freedom as a Fundamental Right’, December 2010. 46 See Goodwin v United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1996:0327JUD001748890 in relation to a journalist’s right to protect information, and Gillberg v Sweden, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:0403JUD004172306 [122], which considered this in respect of an academic’s freedom of expression. 47 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, A/75/261, 28 July 2020 [9].



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entrusted to higher-education teaching personnel and institutions’. Point 19 of that recommendation makes clear that ‘Member States are under an obligation to protect higher education institutions from threats to their autonomy coming from any source’.48

13.31 This is a timely focus of attention on the issue of academic institutional freedom. Reports have demonstrated that attacks occur around the world, including in the EU, on scholars, students, staff, and their institutions.49 Operating in an increasingly translational context, it has also been noted that the risks to academic freedom ‘are enhanced by market mechanisms that generate unregulated competition between universities over the funding they offer and national security responses from democracies, which directly restrict academic freedom’.50 A study by the LERU Working Group on Human Rights has looked in detail at the scope of academic freedom as a fundamental right.51 It noted that many European constitutions may protect the right to academic freedom at an individual or institutional level, or both. They may also set out the state’s obligations in respect of promoting the freedom.52 However, it has also been noted that many countries in Europe do not meet the UNESCO Recommendation’s standards.53 Its soft-law status and a ‘creeping managerialism’ within universities are said to prevent the genuine development of academic freedom.54 These developments have led Barnett to conclude that ‘academic freedom is not taken away; rather, the opportunities for its realisation are reduced’.55

III.  Council of Europe Treaties 13.32 In respect of scientific freedom, the Council of Europe has issued Recommendations which place limits on the acceptable scope of scientific research: for example, Recommendation 1100 (1989) on the use of human embryos and foetuses in scientific research, and Recommendation No R (90) 3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning medical research on human beings. It has also agreed a Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (the Oviedo Convention).56 Its Explanatory Report notes that ‘[s]cience, with its new complexity and extensive ramifications … presents a dark side or a bright side according to how it is used.’57 The Convention was drafted to ensure that the ‘beneficial side prevails’. It contains general principles preventing the infringement of human rights and dignity.

48 ECLI:EU:C:2020:792 [227]. 49 See ‘Scholars at Risk, Free to Think: Report of the Scholars at Risk Academic Freedom Monitoring Project’, available at: www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Scholars-at-Risk-Free-to-Think-2019.pdf. 50 J Heathershaw, S Furstenberg, and T Prelec, ‘The UK’s internationalised universities and the protection of academic freedom’, The Foreign Policy Centre, 29.9.20, available at: https://fpc.org.uk/the-uks-internationalised-universities-andthe-protection-of-academic-freedom/. The Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group’s (AFIWG) has created a model code of conduct designed to embed more transparency and accountability in the UK universities’ international activities, available at: https://hrc.sas.ac.uk/networks/academic-freedom-and-internationalisation-working-group/ model-code-conduct. 51 Vrielink, Lemmens, Parmentier (n 45). 52 Ibid. 53 Karran (2009) (n 42). 54 Ibid. 55 R Barnett, Higher Education: A Critical Business (Buckingham, Open University Press, 2007). 56 ETS No 164. This has been ratified by the following EU Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. See R Andorno, ‘The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection of Human Rights and Health Law’ (2005) 2 Journal of International Biotechnology Law 133–43. 57 Para 2.

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It reinforces the freedom of scientific research subject to the provisions of the Convention and other legal provisions to ensure the protection of the dignity of human beings.58 The Convention has four protocols: the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human 13.33 Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin;59 the Aditional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings;60 the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes;61 and the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research.62 In respect of academic freedom, the Committee of Ministers adopted, in 2000, a Recommendation 13.34 underlining aspects of academic freedom in academic research.63 The Parliamentary Assembly also adopted a Recommendation in 2006 requesting that the Committee of Ministers ‘strengthen its work on academic freedom and university autonomy as a fundamental requirement of any democratic society’.64 This is known as the Council of Europe Declaration on Academic Freedom.65 Reference was made to the 2006 Recommendation by the CJEU in Case C-66/18, European Commission v Hungary.66 The Council of Europe has also agreed the following Conventions which touch upon aspects of academic freedom: the European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas leading to Admission to Universities;67 the European Convention on the Academic Recognition of University Qualifications;68 the European Convention on the General Equivalence of Periods of University Study;69 and the Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region.70 Finally, the Parliamentary Assembly issued Resolution 1510 (2006) on 28 June 2006 in relation 13.35 to freedom of expression and respect for religious beliefs. It confirms that ‘the culture of critical dispute and artistic freedom has a long tradition in Europe and is considered as positive and even necessary for individual and social progress’.71

IV.  Other Sources Internationally, countries vary in the constitutional protection they offer these freedoms. 13.36 For example, in Canada and the United States, there is no specific constitutional safeguard so 58 See for example, Arts 15 and 16 of the Convention. This provision is mirrored in Art 3 of the Charter in so far as it addresses the protection of persons submitting to scientific research. 59 ETS No 186. This has been ratified by the following EU Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain. 60 ETS No 168. This has been ratified by the following EU Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 61 ETS No 203. This has been ratified by the Czech Republic, Portugal and Slovenia. 62 ETS No 195. This has been ratified by the following EU Member States: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. 63 Recommendation R (2000) 8 of the Committee of Ministers of 30 March 2000 on the research mission of universities. 64 Recommendation 1762 (2006) of the Parliamentary Assembly of 30 June 2006 on ‘Academic Freedom and University Autonomy’. 65 This was referred to in the case of Sorguc v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:0623JUD001708903. 66 ECLI:EU:C:2020:792 [227]. 67 ETS No 015. This has been not yet been ratified by the following EU Member States: Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary. 68 ETS No 032. This has not yet been ratified by the following EU Member States: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg. 69 ETS No 138. This has been ratified by the following EU Member States: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Sweden. 70 ETS No 165. This has not yet been ratified by Greece. 71 At [9]. See also Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2011) on a new notion of media which considers artistic expression as a media objective.



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protection rests, as with the ECHR, with the protections for freedom of thought and expression.72 Other countries expressly recognise freedom of research and teaching and the freedom of arts and science. For instance, Article 5 of the German Constitution states that ‘Art and science, research and teaching are free’; Article 33 of the Italian Constitution establishes that ‘The arts and sciences as well as their teaching are free’, and Article 59 of the Slovenian Constitution states that ‘Freedom of scientific research and artistic endeavor shall be guaranteed.’73 Further information is found in a recent European study which has detailed and assessed the right to academic freedom within EU Member States.74 13.37 Other relevant provisions in international documents include the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical Association of 1964, which provides a set of ethical principles regarding human experimentation. The EU has also established a European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) to examine ethical questions arising from science and new technologies and issue opinions to the European Commission in connection with the preparation and interpretation of Community legislation or policies. The EU has also legislated in the area of clinical trials, for example the Clinical Trials Regulation 2014.75

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 13.38 The freedoms set out in Article 13 form part of the so-called ‘free market’ of ideas, facilitating the self-development and fulfilment of the individual. They may be seen as collective as well as individual freedoms, promoting the development of democracy and the cultural health of society.76 These freedoms enable individuals to research, to question, to challenge and to provoke. They are rooted in the idea of personal moral autonomy, and an absence of constraint can enhance their realisation. 13.39 In this way, Article 13 can be seen as a manifestation of the long-established rights of freedom of thought, speech and expression. Such fundamental rights have been recognised in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice as part of the general principles of Union law.77 The Court of Justice has held that freedom of expression is particularly important because it ‘[enables] expression to be given to opinions which differ from those held at an official level’.78 13.40 The importance of such freedoms to functioning democracies is axiomatic. Hence, it is likely that the core freedoms within Article 13 may become increasingly engaged by Union and EU Member State activity. For example, broadcasting or publication of art across borders is a fact of life with the internet: constraints on the content of the internet may engage different elements of Article 13. The Bologna Process and the work of the EU in building a European area of research will inevitably require reliance on consistent standards relating to academic freedom.79 Similarly,

72 The First Amendment to the Constitution in the US and Article 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 73 See Vrielink, Lemmens, Parmentier (n 42); Karran (n 45). 74 K Beiter, T Karran, K Appiagyei-Atua, ‘Academic Freedom and Its Protection in the Law of European States: Measuring an International Human Right’ (2016) 3 European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 254–345. 75 [2014] OJ L158/1. 76 The concept was developed by JS Mill, ‘On Liberty’ (1859), although he did not use the term. 77 Case C-260/89 ERT, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 [41]. 78 Case C-340/00 P Commission v Cwik ECLI:EU:C:2001:701 [22]. 79 The Bologna Process represents an attempt by European countries to ensure comparability in the standards and quality of higher education qualifications.

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scientific research may be subject to commercial pressures or it may be highly contentious and require both EU protection and restriction. It will also be important to note the capacity of these freedoms to be engaged by the assertion or protection of other rights and freedoms in the Charter.80 It is, therefore, significant that the CJEU has confirmed the justiciability of Article 13 in two recent 13.41 cases. In Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, members of the German band Kraftwerk commenced legal proceedings in Germany for the sampling of one of its songs.81 The German court referred a series of questions to the CJEU on the issue of EU law on copyright and related fundamental rights, including Article 13 of the Charter. The CJEU concluded that sampling, without authorisation, infringed the rights of the producer but the use of a sound sample in a modified, unrecognisable, form to the ear in another phonogram did not infringe those rights. The CJEU balanced the various rights at play, concluding that an interpretation that would allow right holders to prevent this form of artistic expression in relation to very short samples would fail to strike a fair balance between the fundamental rights at stake.82 In reaching this conclusion, the CJEU concluded that sampling constituted a form of artistic expression which was covered by freedom of the arts, as protected in Article 13.83 In Case C-66/18 Commission v Hungary, discussed in more detail below at paragraph 13.61, the CJEU considered one aspect of Article 13, the scope academic freedom as a fundamental right, identifying two core components: an institutional element and an individual.84 This contradicts early concerns that the freedoms in Article 13 may be ‘of a different nature’ to the rights set out elsewhere in the Charter and that they will be considered merely declaratory principles, justiciable only for interpretative purposes.85

II.  Scope of Application It has been noted that, in the text of the Article, the freedoms in Article 13 are not defined, but 13.42 the term ‘the arts’ implies a broader range of disciplines than visual art and will undoubtedly include literature and the performing arts, for example music, dance, theatre, and film. The CJEU has only considered the scope of freedom of the arts in one case. In Case C 476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, CJEU concluded that sampling constituted a form of artistic expression protected by Article 13.86 However, the scope of artistic expression has been reasonably well defined by the ECtHR and it entails consideration of the duties of the person exercising the right, the freedoms of others and the nature of the margin of appreciation allowed to each state. This is discussed in more detail in the next section. Article 13 also prohibits constraints on scientific research.87 This carries negative and 13.43 positive obligations. The term scientific research is not defined but the freedom arises from

80 See for example, the Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the proposed data protection reform package, FRA Opinion—2/2012, October 2012. 81 Case C 476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, ECLI:EU:C:2019:624. 82 Ibid [34]. 83 Ibid [35]. 84 Case C-66/18, European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792. 85 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Tenth Report, Session 2007–08, 26 February 2008 [5.16]. 86 Case C 476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, ECLI:EU:C:2019:624 [35]. 87 As with all the freedoms set out in Art 13, this does not mean that restrictions are not possible, but that they are only possible under the strict conditions provided in Art 52 (1) of the Charter, ie ‘isubject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of other’.



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the importance of the ‘free market’ of ideas in which the truth should prevail.88 Just as we may question the nature of art, we can also question the term science. One definition is that ‘science [is] … knowledge that is testable and refutable, in all fields of inquiry, including social sciences, and encompassing all research’.89 UNESCO’s Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers confirms that: the term ‘the sciences’ signifies a complex of knowledge, fact and hypothesis, in which the theoretical element is capable of being validated in the short or long term, and to that extent includes the sciences concerned with social facts and phenomena.90

This is why scientific knowledge attracts special protection and it is distinguished from pseudoscience. The freedom to carry out scientific research may have a direct impact on individuals, and, in this way, it engages other rights. This is most likely to occur in the case of biological and genetic research where it may conflict with moral conceptions of the right to life or the dignity or integrity of human beings. 13.44 Academic freedom has been held by the CJEU to include elements set out in the UNESCO Recommendation, including institutional autonomy.91 13.45 The freedoms under Article 13 are broad and will be engaged, under Article 51, by action at the Union level and implementing acts of Member States acting within the scope of those laws. The expression of these freedoms may also be engaged by action aimed at protecting other rights. For example, a Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU stressed ‘the importance of promoting the representation of the female image in a way that respects women’s dignity, and of combating persistent gender stereotypes, in particular the prevalence of degrading images, whilst fully respecting freedom of expression and freedom of the press’, reflecting the fact that such measures can potentially engage Article 13 if they place limits on material falling within the scope of the freedom of artistic expression.92 The contentious parts of the motion were rejected before it was passed, but this type of measure can potentially engage Article 13 if it places limits on material falling within the scope of the freedom of artistic expression.93 Additionally, data protection and intellectual property rights legislation may also engage Article 13. As noted, in Case C 476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, the CJEU will aim to strike a fair balance between the fundamental rights at stake, namely intellectual property rights and artistic expression covered by freedom of the arts, as protected in Article 13.94 13.46 The freedoms set out in Article 13 would appear to be capable of exercise by individuals and legal persons.95 It is also possible that the right will have territorial implications in the sense of those wishing to publish their opinions across different forms of media from outside the EU.96

88 AR Chapman, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications’ (2009) 8 Journal of Human Rights 1–36. 89 See the Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, ‘The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’, A/HRC/20/26, 14.5.12 [24]. 90 UNESCO General Conference, 39th, 2017, ANNEX II Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers, 13 November 2017. 91 Case C-66/18, European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792. 92 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on eliminating gender stereotypes in the EU (2012/2116(INI)) 6 December 2012. 93 The rejected parts of the report were paras 7, 14, the second part of 17, 18, 19, 41 and 51, and Recitals K and P. 94 Case C 476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, ECLI:EU:C:2019:624 [34]. 95 For example, Case C-219/91 Ter Voort, ECLI:EU:C:1992:414. See Professor Woods’ commentary on Art 11. 96 See Professor Woods’ commentary on Art 11.

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III.  Specific Provisions The stated aim of Article 13 is to free the arts and scientific research from restraint and to respect 13.47 academic freedom. However, it is clear that these freedoms may be restrained in specifically enumerated circumstances. Thus, the extent of any freedom will depend as much on the acceptable limits that can be placed upon it as the nature of the act itself. (a)  Freedom of the Arts We have noted that the term ‘the arts’ is not defined in the Charter or its Explanations, but that it 13.48 can be considered to include all forms of artistic expression including, film, music, theatre as well as visual art. The scope is potentially broad, for example, the CJEU has held that sampling music constitutes a form of artistic expression protected by Article 13.97 The ECtHR has not defined ‘artistic expression’, nor has it distinguished between its different forms. Its primary focus has been to assess the legitimacy of restraints upon it. In such cases, the clash of interests between those wishing to impart information and those receiving it has had to be finely balanced and, as always in matters of morality, the ECtHR offers state parties a wide margin of appreciation. For example, in Müller v Switzerland, Müller organised an art exhibition at which he exhibited 13.49 paintings which were deemed obscene by the Swiss courts.98 He was convicted and fined and his paintings were confiscated. The ECtHR considered whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim to meet a ‘pressing social need’. It concluded that there had been no violation of Article 10 ECHR. There was no uniform conception of public morals in Europe, so the Swiss courts had not been unreasonable to uphold the conviction and the fine. The duties and responsibilities to be exercised by those who have freedom of expression also had to be considered and the Court took note of the fact that the exhibition was open, and promoted, to all. The margin of appreciation was an important determining factor in finding no violation. Similarly, in Wingrove v UK, a case concerning an allegedly blasphemous video, the ECtHR 13.50 held that the state was in a better position to judge the line between freedom of expression and the protection of morals. The state was permitted a wide margin of appreciation and no breach of Article 10 was found.99 The ECtHR held that: A wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion. Moreover, as in the field of morals, and perhaps to an even greater degree, there is no uniform European conception of the requirements of ‘the protection of the rights of others’ in relation to attacks on their religious convictions. What is likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a particular religious persuasion will vary significantly from time to time and from place to place, especially in an era characterised by an ever growing array of faiths and denominations. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements with regard to the rights of others as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ intended to protect from such material those whose deepest feelings and convictions would be seriously offended.100

97 Case C 476/17, Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, ECLI:EU:C:2019:624 [35]. 98 Müller (n 15). 99 Wingrove (n 3). 100 Ibid [58]. See also Otto Preminger-Institut v Austria, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1994:0920JUD001347087 where the ECtHR held that the state party was entitled to balance the applicant’s freedom of expression with ‘the protection of the rights of others’, namely the right to respect for religious feelings, and it concluded that the Austrian authorities did not exceed their margin of appreciation.



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13.51 However, in Karatas v Turkey, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 in a case concerning a Turkish national of Kurdish origin who had published a collection of poems entitled ‘The song of rebellion’.101 He was accused of disseminating separatist propaganda and sentenced to imprisonment. Copies of the poem were confiscated. The Court noted the narrow scope under Article 10(2) for restrictions on freedom of expression which touched upon political debate on matters of public interest. This was because governments had to be subject to the close scrutiny of public opinion. It was permissible for states to regulate the expressions of opinion to protect public order against the incitement of violence and a wide margin of appreciation permitted in this regard. However, the ECtHR also noted that the form of the expression in this case was artistic and that it worked through a medium, poetry, which had a limited audience. This reduced the potential impact of these views on national security or public order. Further, the Court concluded that the aggressive tone of the poems was less a call to violence than an expression of deep distress.102 The Court concluded that the penalty was disproportionate to the aims being pursed. It noted: ‘Article 10 includes freedom of artistic expression—notably within freedom to receive and impart information and ideas—which affords the opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds … [I]t must be remembered that Article 10 protects not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed but also the form in which they are conveyed.’103 13.52 In Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v Austria, the ECtHR also considered the form of artistic expression when determining whether the constraint upon it was lawful.104 The Austrian courts granted an injunction against the exhibition of a painting by Otto-Muhl, which depicted various public figures (including Mother Theresa) and several political figures in graphic sexual positions. This was permitted by the Austrian courts on the grounds that the painting was a debasement of the applicant’s public standing. The ECtHR held that the aim of the interference was purely the protection of an individual’s rights rather than public morals as the government claimed. It also noted that the caricature-like nature of the painting suggested that it was both artistic expression and social commentary. The court injunction was not time limited and left the directors of the galleries unable to exhibit the painting. It was, therefore, disproportionate to the aim pursued, and unnecessary in a democratic society. 13.53 Consequently, any attempt to restrict forms of expression in broadcast or other media will have to pay due regard to the impact of the restraint on the arts, bearing in mind the purpose and lawfulness of the restraint and the nature of the medium used. (b)  Freedom of Scientific Research 13.54 The Explanations to the Charter link the protection of scientific research to freedom of thought and expression in the ECHR. The term ‘scientific research’ is not defined further. 13.55 The EU has defined ‘research’ as ‘creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications’.105 Research can lead to innovation and this is also an area where the Union has been active.106 Innovation is ‘the ability to take new ideas and

101 Karatas v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:0708JUD002316894. 102 Ibid at [52]. 103 Karatas v Turkey (n 101) [49]. See also Alinak v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2005:0329JUD004028798. 104 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v Austria, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2007:0125JUD006835401. 105 Art 2 of the Council Directive on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research [2005] OJ L289/15. 106 Commission Communication, ‘Reviewing Community innovation policy in a changing world’, COM (2009) 442 final.

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translate them into commercial outcomes by using new processes, products or services in a way that is better and faster than the competition’ and in this way research directly feeds into social and economic development.107 Knowledge can be shared through education and training linking both scientific research and academic freedom. There are several areas where the need to protect scientific freedom may be engaged by EU 13.56 action. For example, Article 179(1) TFEU confirms that ‘the Union shall have the objective of strengthening its scientific and technological bases by achieving a European research area in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely, and encouraging it to become more competitive, including in its industry, while promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of other Chapters of the Treaties’. The free movement of knowledge has been called the ‘fifth freedom’ of the Union and aims to reduce the obstacles to the cross-border mobility of researchers.108 The Commission has also adopted a European Charter for Researchers and a Code of Conduct for their recruitment.109 Further, the Europe 2020 strategy identifies three key drivers for growth, to be implemented 13.57 through concrete actions at EU and national levels.110 This includes smart growth (fostering knowledge, innovation, education and digital society). Two of these flagship initiatives are specifically linked to education and training. In relation to the funding of scientific research, ‘Horizon 2020’ sets the rules for EU funding until 2020.111 This includes establishing ethical principles for the funding of human embryonic stem cell research.112 Research in this sensitive area has also been considered by the Court of Justice in the case of Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace, where the Court ruled that patent protection for inventions based on human embryonic stem cells was forbidden in the EU because the destruction of human embryos for scientific research violated the principle of respect for human dignity.113 Decisions not to fund specific types of scientific research may constitute constraints on scientific freedom. The Explanations confirm that, despite the wording of Article 13, scientific freedom can be 13.58 restrained. The ECtHR has not explicitly carved out a right to scientific freedom but, in the case of Hertel v Switzerland, it considered restraints on freedom of expression in the context of scientific research.114 In this case, the Court found that an injunction on the publication of the work of a scientific researcher who made claims about the safety of microwave ovens would have a disproportionate impact and would constitute the effective censoring of the his work. (c)  Academic Freedom The US Supreme Court has held that ‘academic freedom … is of transcendent value to all of us 13.59 and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.’115 Article 13 requires ‘respect’ for academic freedom without further definition of the term 13.60 or explanation of the distinction in the state’s obligations. It is clear, however, that academic

107 Nedis and Byler, ‘Creating a National Innovation Framework’ (2009) April Science Progress. 108 Commission Communication, ‘Better careers and more mobility: a European partnership for researchers’ COM (2008) 317 final. 109 The Charter gives researchers the same rights and obligations wherever they may work and aims at increasing transparency and openness in recruitment processes. Member states have no obligation to implement it. 110 COM (2010) 2020. 111 COM (2011) 809 final. 112 Art 16. 113 Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace (18 October 2011). 114 Hertel (n 21). 115 Keyishian v Board of Regents of the University of New York 385 US 589 (1967).



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freedom could involve matters which relate to artistic expression and scientific research. The Explanations state that these freedoms arise from freedom of expression and freedom of thought, but international commitments suggest that, in the case of academic freedom, they may come to mean more than that. 13.61 The principle of university autonomy and academic freedom is well-established in Europe, and universities have committed themselves to respecting those freedoms under the Magna Charta Universitatum of 1988. Member States also have a variety ways of achieving this and academic freedom may be protected by national constitutions as an individual or a collective right, or both.116 Academic freedom is not only a good in itself, it has wider societal benefits. It makes it possible for universities to serve the common good of society through research and through disseminating knowledge and understanding, and through fostering independent thinking and expression in academic staff and students.117 The CJEU confirmed that university autonomy is an aspect of academic freedom in European Commission v Hungary.118 Noting that it has an individual dimension associated with freedom of expression, the CJEU discussed the 2006 Recommendation drafted by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (see paragraph 13.34) and noted the importance to universities of institutional protection, an ‘autonomous organisational structure. necessary for conducting their academic research and for carrying out their educational activities’.119 Consequently, internationally, academic freedom is viewed as a collective and individual freedom and academic freedom under Article 13 should be seen in this wider European context. 13.62 In terms of its individual dimension, academic freedom clearly overlaps with freedom of expression.120 If academic freedom is to be seen as an articulation of free speech rights, it could be argued that it attracts a specific weight because of the importance attributed to academic opinion within our wider democratic culture. However, it has been said that academic freedom cannot be invoked as a justification for verbally abusing or defaming people and it ‘does not amount to an unlimited freedom of the academics to speak openly on any subject’.121 The ECtHR has confirmed that the substance of this limitation might lie in the scope of the academic’s competence or expertise, confirming in Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v Turkey that academic freedom includes the right to disseminate information, to conduct research and to distribute knowledge without restriction and that it: is not restricted to academic or scientific research, but also extends to the academics’ freedom to express freely their views and opinions, even if controversial or unpopular, in the areas of their research, professional expertise and competence. This may include an examination of the functioning of public institutions in a given political system, and a criticism thereof.122

13.63 The CJEU confirmed the breadth of the right in European Commission v Hungary: academic freedom in research and in teaching should guarantee freedom of expression and of action, freedom to disseminate information and freedom to conduct research and to distribute knowledge and truth

116 Vrielink, Lemmens, Parmentier (n 45). The report appraises the variety of national constitutional protections. 117 See also G Boulton and C Lucas, What are universities for? (Leuven, LERU, 2008). 118 Case C-66/18, European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792. 119 European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792 [228]. 120 Taner Akçam v Turkey (n 20). 121 E Barendt, ‘Academic Freedom and the Law’, summary of the International Law Discussion Group meeting held at Chatham House on Wednesday, 8 December 2010, p 2. 122 CE:ECHR:2014:0527JUD000034604 [40]. This was cited with approval by the CJEU in Case C-66/18, European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792 [225].

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without restriction, although it should be made clear that that freedom is not restricted to academic or scientific research, but that it also extends to academics’ freedom to express freely their views and ­opinions (ECtHR, 27 May 2014, Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v Turkey, CE:ECHR:2014:0527JUD000034604, § 40).123

The ECtHR has confirmed that academic freedom extends beyond freedom to speak on their 13.64 topic of expertise to freedom to speak about the university system. In Sorguc v Turkey, the applicant, in a conference paper, criticised the system for the appointment and promotion of academics at his university.124 An assistant professor brought civil proceedings for compensation against him, claiming this was an attack on his reputation. Sorguc was fined. The Court held that he had raised an opinion of importance on which he had some evidence and had not named the individual. It specifically cited the Council of Europe’s Declaration on Academic Freedom in finding a violation and held ‘the importance of academic freedom, which comprises the academics’ freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work and freedom to distribute knowledge and truth without restriction’.125 The distinctive and important nature of academic writing was noted in Sapan v Turkey.126 13.65 In this case, the applicant published a book on the emergence of stardom as a phenomenon in Turkey. It was partly based on his doctoral thesis, and featured a well-known pop singer. The singer complained that this was an infringement of his image and personality rights. An order that the book be seized was eventually lifted after two years and eight months, but the singer’s damages claim was allowed to proceed. The ECtHR saw the book as a serious academic analysis of the social phenomenon of stardom using scientific methods which could not be compared with the tabloid press or gossip columns. It held that there were no relevant or sufficient reasons to justify the seizure of the book, and that Article 10 had been violated. Similarly, in Cox v Turkey, an American university lecturer was banned from re-entering Turkey on the ground that she would undermine ‘national security’ after expressing opinions on Kurdish and Armenian questions.127 The Court found a violation of Article 10 because of the social importance of academics being allowed to express their expert opinions. In Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v Turkey, the ECtHR confirmed that the principle of academic 13.66 freedom should be broadly interpreted and ‘may include an examination of the functioning of public institutions in a given political system, and a criticism thereof ’.128 Erdoğan was a law professor who had published an article in an academic journal questioning whether a decision of the Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party had been justified on legal grounds. Three of the judges started defamation proceedings. The domestic court had found some parts of the article to be defamatory. The ECtHR found an infringement on Erdoğan’s Article 10 right to freedom of expression on the grounds that the interference with the Article 10 right, although prescribed by law and pursuing a legitimate aim, was not ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In a concurring opinion, Judges Sajó, Vučinič and Kūris considered the scope of academic freedom and the special level of protection it was entitled to: We submit that in determining whether ‘speech’ has an ‘academic element’ it is necessary to establish: (a) whether the person making the speech can be considered an academic; (b) whether that person’s

123 Ibdi [225]. 124 Sorguc v Turkey (n 65). 125 Ibid [35]. 126 Sapan v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:0608JUD004410204. 127 Cox v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:0520JUD000293303. 128 Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v Turkey, CE:ECHR:2014:0527JUD000034604 [40]. See also Kula v Turkey, ECLI:CE:EC HR:2018:0619JUD002023306, [38].



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public comments or utterances fall within the sphere of his or her research; and (c) whether that ­person’s statements amount to conclusions or opinions based on his or her professional expertise and ­competence. These conditions being satisfied, an impugned statement must enjoy the utmost protection under Article 10.129

They attached significant weight to the fact that this was a constitutional law professor expressing his informed opinion.130 13.67 Barendt argues that academic freedom is not just a special version of free speech.131 It includes forms of activity beyond speech, comprising of: individual claims to academic freedom which include the freedom of expression; claims by academic institutions to institutional autonomy; and the claim of individual academics to participate in university government.132 It also engages both personal rights and professional responsibilities. These protections are also set out in UNESCO’s Recommendation. The CJEU has now read them into Article 13, confirming that the freedom goes beyond the protection of freedom of expression to engage issues of autonomy and institutional governance.133 The ECtHR has also found that protection of academic freedom will also lead to a requirement to provide procedural safeguards for professors and lecturers on dismissal.134 The importance of promoting institutional autonomy is reflected in the creation of the European University Association’s University Autonomy Tool to compare university autonomy in 29 European higher education systems. It focuses on four autonomy areas—organisational, financial, staffing and academic autonomy—and ranks countries according to the level of autonomy they have in each of these.135 Identifying, and defending, the scope of the right has become pressing issue as ‘[s]ignificant violations of academic freedom and institutional autonomy threaten democracy. Sadly, their frequency is on the rise.’136

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 13.68 The Explanations to the Charter confirm that the freedoms set out in Article 13 are to be exercised having regard to Article 1, and may be subject to the limitations authorised by Article 10 of the ECHR. Article 1 of the Charter concerns respect for human dignity, and is particularly pertinent in relation to scientific research. Thus, for example, research in the field of life sciences will be restricted by the need to ensure respect for human life and human dignity, usually by following rigorous ethical principles.137 Article 10(2) ECHR enumerates specific, permissible

129 Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v Turkey, CE:ECHR:2014:0527JUD000034604, concurring opinion [7]. 130 Ibid [8]. 131 E Barendt, Academic Freedom and the Law: A Comparative Study (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) ch 1. See also T Karran, ‘Academic Freedom in Europe: Time for a Magna Charta?’ (2009) 22(2) Higher Education Policy 163–89. This sets out a working definition of academic freedom which goes beyond freedom of expression to specify the rights, duties and limitations inherent in the concept. 132 Barendt, ibid, p 10. 133 European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792 [222]–[228]. 134 Lombardi Vallauri v Italy App no 39128/05 (ECtHR, Judgment of 20 October, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009).:1020 JUD003912805. 135 The University Education association University Autonomy Tool, available at: https://www.university-autonomy.eu/. 136 The Declaration of the Global Forum on Academic Freedom, Institutional Autonomy, and the Future of Democracy, 21 June 2020, [9]. 137 Report of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 15 July 2000; www.europarl.europa.eu/ charter/civil/pdf/con233_en.pdf.

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restrictions which constitute lawful interference with artistic, academic or scientific freedom of expression. For example, the interference must be: —— prescribed by law: a law has to be public, accessible, predictable and foreseeable; —— necessary: this means it must comply with a ‘pressing social need’;138 —— in pursuit of a legitimate aim: this means the aims specified in Article 10(2): (i) the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety; (ii) the prevention of disorder or crime; (iii) the protection of health or morals; (iv) the protection of the reputation or rights of others; (v) preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence; or (vi) maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary; —— and proportionate: the Court will consider whether a measure is proportionate to its aim or whether it can be achieved by less intrusive measures.139 The Court will also consider whether the interference falls within the margin of appreciation. This is a method of balancing national interests in a supranational organisation by deferring to democratically elected decision-makers. The margin will be wider in areas concerning morals and the Court will consider if it was ‘possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals.’140 Thus, it will rarely interfere with domestic laws which relate to questions of public decency and morality if there is no European consensus on the issue.141 The Court of Justice has similarly concluded, in relation to Article 11 of the Charter, that the right to freedom of expression carries limits, asserting that ‘the discretion enjoyed by the national authorities in determining the balance to be struck between freedom of expression and [public interest] objectives varies for each of the goals justifying restrictions on that freedom and depends on the nature of the activities in question. When the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a discussion of public interest and, in addition, arises in a context in which the Member States have a certain amount of discretion, review is limited to an examination of the reasonableness and proportionality of the interference.’142 Additionally, artistic, scientific and academic freedom may be protected by intellectual property laws, but they may also be limited by them. For example, in L’Oréal SA v eBay International, the Opinion of AG Jääskinen noted that ‘[in] so far as the legal protection of trade-marks with a reputation as brands is enhanced it becomes more and more important to ensure that freedom of expression relating to parody, artistic expression and critique of consumerism and mockery of life styles related to it is not unduly hampered.’143 In relation to academic freedom, in European Commission v Hungary, Hungary had argued that academic freedom under Article 13 (and Article 14(3), which related to freedom to found educational establishments, and Article 16 of relating to the freedom to conduct business) must be exercised with due respect for democratic principles and within the framework of national provisions governing the exercise of those freedoms and that it was not an unlawful limitation on the right if the Member State was regulating an economic activity with the aim of enabling

138 Handyside (n 16). See Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v Turkey, CE:ECHR:2014:0527JUD000034604 [40]. See also Kula v Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0619JUD002023306, [32]. 139 Lingens v Austria, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1986:0708JUD000981582. 140 Handyside (n 16) [49]. 141 See Müller (n 15), Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria (ECLI:CE:ECHR:1994:0920JUD001347087, and Wingrove (n 3). 142 Case C-421/07 Damgaard, ECLI:EU:C:2009:222 [27]. 143 Opinion of AG Jääskinen Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA v eBay International ECLI:EU:C:2010:757 [48].



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others to exercise those freedoms. The CJEU confirmed that the Hungarian measures constituted limitations on the rights under Article 13 because they were ‘capable of endangering’ academic freedom’ and that this could not be justified by any objective of general interest recognised by the EU under Article 52(1) of the Charter.144

V. Remedies 13.73 The Charter protects individuals and legal entities against actions by the EU institutions that are not in conformity with fundamental rights. Article 47 of the Charter confirms that ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article’. Remedies sought will depend on the subject matter of the case and the nature of the interference but could include removal of injunctions, damages or a request for a state to take positive action to protect freedoms. 13.74 Article 51(1) of the Charter confirms that: The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.

In terms of seeking a remedy, it should be noted that rights and principles are treated differently within the Charter. This reflects the customary division between those rights which are considered binding and justiciable at international law and those which are considered largely aspirational.145 The Charter does not identify which of its provisions are rights, which are freedoms and which are principles, and this is a difficult distinction to discern. 13.75 The distinction has consequences in practice as, according to Article 52(2), principles are not necessarily justiciable: The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.

Consequently, although ‘principles do not … of themselves give rise to directly enforceable rights, they may influence the Court of Justice (or domestic court) when interpreting the nature and extent of rights afforded by Union law or by national legislation implementing Union law’.146 The Explanations to Article 52(5) also remark that, in some cases, an Article of the Charter may contain both elements of a right and of a principle. 13.76 The ruling in European Commission v Hungary confirms that the academic freedom under Article 13 is justiciable, with its deep connection to the fundamental right to freedom

144 European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:792 [228], [239]–[243]. 145 This is reflected in the division of social, economic and cultural rights and civil and political rights in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, and between the ECHR and the Social Charter on the Council of Europe context. 146 House of Lords EU Select Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, 10th Report 2007–08, HL62-I [5.20]; NM de Sadeleer, ‘Enforcing EUCHR Principles and Fundamental Rights in Environmental Cases’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 39–74. See also C Hilson, ‘Rights and Principles in EU Law: A Distinction without Foundation?’ (2008) 15(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 193–215 and T Lock, ‘Rights and Principles in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, (2019) 56(5) Common Market Law Review 1201.

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of expression explored.147 Likewise, it was acknowledged in Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, that freedom of the arts is a right to be balanced against other rights within the EU legal space.148 It is submitted that, given the similar relation of all components of Article 13 to freedom of expressions and the health and progress of civil society, they are all equally likely to be found justiciable.

E. Evaluation Article 13 protects specific types of free expression rights that EU Member States have deemed particularly significant. In Handyside v United Kingdom, the ECtHR noted that ‘freedom of expression … is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population’.149 The right to free expression would be meaningless if it only protected popular or publicly acceptable expression and the protection in Article 13 is essentially aimed at forms of expression which can be simultaneously contentious and vital to the common good. However, the freedoms under Article 13 are not unlimited and Article 10 provides that their exercise ‘carries with it duties and responsibilities’.150 They are also subject to the enumerated limitations under Article 10(2) which are aimed at protecting the ‘greater good’. This makes the limits of protection difficult to discern as any determination on a restriction invariably entails a moral judgement: as Tritsmans contends ‘one man’s art is another man’s vulgarity; art can edify or even heal but it has also the power to enrage’151 The protection of potentially unpopular, shocking and publicly contentious forms of expression allows these freedoms to contribute the ‘exchange of ideas and opinions which is essential for a democratic society’.152 The need to protect the arts and scientific research from constraint emanates from their social, political and cultural importance. For example, artists may produce work which has a social and political purpose beyond aesthetics and, as a consequence, there ‘is a deeper ground on which the protection of art is based, emphasising the intrinsic value of art. Indeed it seems that in some indefinable, almost visceral sense, we know that artistic expression is of special significance to mankind’.153 Similarly, scientific freedom may drive progress and societal change and may lead us to question fundamentally what we know about ourselves and the world we live in. Like academic research, it has a value beyond free expression: it may work globally, provoking political, ethical and religious debate around academic opinions and activities and their worth to society. All these freedoms may conflict with deep-seated religious beliefs or moral ideologies; they may challenge orthodoxies and threaten the status quo. This is both a cause for concern and a reflection of their inherent value and it makes the extent of permissible restrictions difficult to determine. The ECtHR has, through the margin of appreciation, largely left complex judgments on moral issues to state parties. Article 13 is new in the sense that it articulates these freedoms for the first

147 European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:79 [224]–[227]. 148 Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, ECLI:EU:C:2019:624. 149 Handyside (n 16) [49]. 150 See Wingrove (n 3) [52]. 151 E Tritsmans, ‘Warning! You’ll be shocked! Dealing with offensive art: Erotic art and hate art in translation perspective’, in B Demarsin et al (eds), Art and Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) ch 3, p 66. 152 Vereinigung Bildender Künstler (n 104) [26]. 153 S Kurzweg, ‘Live Art and the Audience: Toward a Speaker-Focused Freedom of Expression’ (1999) 34 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 437.



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time within the EU context as specific individual rights, explicitly defined as arising out of the well-established freedoms of expression and speech. The CJEU has demonstrated a willingness to articulate aspects of Article 13 more explicitly while considering the balance of Article 13 freedoms with other fundamental liberties. In complex times, in the presence of anti-democratic tendencies within society, it is essential that those with knowledge and expertise are able to speak out and that the rights of individuals to creative expression are defended. It is not difficult to envisage that these the freedoms may have to be interpreted with more clarity in an EU context to ensure their protection. For example, it has been noted that academic freedom ‘is intrinsically linked to the rule of law and fundamental rights’.154 Consequently, Public authorities and the academic community alike must be vigilant in addressing and challenging such violations, and the responsibility for doing so does not stop at institutional or national borders. An attack on the freedom of one member of the academic community or the autonomy of one institution is an attack on the fundamental values of our democracies, regardless of where it takes place.155

154 P Bárd, ‘The rule of law and academic freedom or the lack of it in Hungary’, (2018) European Political Science 19(1). 155 The Declaration of the Global Forum on Academic Freedom, Institutional Autonomy, and the Future of Democracy, 21 June 2020, [9].

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Article 14* Article 14 Right to Education 1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing training. 2. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory education. 3. The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 14 1.

This Article is based on the common constitutional traditions of Member States and on Article 2 of the Protocol 1 (hereinafter Article 2P1) to the ECHR, which reads as follows: ‘No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.’ It was considered useful to extend this Article to access to vocational and continuing training (see point 15 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and Article 10 of the Social Charter) and to add the principle of free compulsory education. As it is worded, the latter principle merely implies that, as regards compulsory education, each child has the possibility of attending an establishment which offers free education. It does not require all establishments which provide education or vocational and continuing training, in particular private ones, to be free of charge. Nor does it exclude certain specific forms of education having to be paid for, if the State takes measures to grant financial compensation. In so far as the Charter applies to the Union, this means that in its training policies the Union must respect free compulsory education, but this does not, of course, create new powers. Regarding the right of parents, it must be interpreted in conjunction with the provisions of Article 24.

2.

Freedom to found public or private educational establishments is guaranteed as one of the aspects of freedom to conduct a business but it is limited by respect for democratic principles and is exercised in accordance with the arrangements defined by national legislation.

Select Bibliography G Demuro, ‘Article 14’, in WBT Mock (ed), Human Rights in Europe: Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2008) 88. G Gori, ‘Towards an EU right to education’, European Monographs 28, (Kluwer International, 2001). S O’Leary, ‘The relationship between Community citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights in Community law’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 154. ——, ‘Equal treatment and EU citizens: A new chapter on cross-border educational mobility and access to student financial assistance’ (2009) 34 European Law Review August. D Kochenov and R Plender, ‘EU citizenship: from an incipient form to an incipient substance? The discovery of the Treaty text’ (2012) European Law Review 4. * The author is currently Senior Political Adviser at the European Union Delegation to the United States. The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the institution mentioned above.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

A.  Field of Application of Article 14 14.01 Differently from the right to life or the right to liberty and security, any examination of the field of application of Article 14 requires taking into account, first, that the right to education has a meaning and a scope specific to the EU context, since it draws its origin from economic integration, in particular the freedom of movement of workers and the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of nationality. This provision also draws its origin from the freedom of establishment and to provide services, and, more recently, European Union citizenship. Against this background and through a piecemeal approach, the Court of Justice has developed in a string of case law a whole range of individual educational rights, which have been partially consolidated by subsequent treaty amendments1 and secondary legislation2 and are now also enshrined in Article 14 of the Charter. The emergence of a European citizenship and the evolution of the right to free movement and residence for EU nationals have reinforced this development. Additionally, rules concerning third country nationals, including as regards access to education, have been progressively refined. 14.02 While only vocational training3 and not education was contemplated in the EEC treaty, the Court started to build a Community competence in the subject-matter by providing equal educational and training rights to migrant workers and their family members. Regulation 1612/68 on the free movement of workers4 provided for the right to vocational training for migrant workers themselves (Art 7) and for access to education and training for their family members (Art 12). Through the combined application of these provisions and the right of migrant workers to equal treatment as regards social benefits (para 2 of Art 7) the Court was able to affirm that children of migrant workers were entitled to equal treatment with the nationals of the host Member State not only as regards access to education, but also with respect to all facilities provided to facilitate educational attendance, which included admission fees and maintenance grants.5 This case law was extended in 2013 to include children of frontier workers, who cannot be discriminated against on the basis of residence when compared to persons residing in the Member State where the frontier workers carry out their activity, but do not reside.6 When subsequently presented with a series of cases, mainly preliminary rulings, concerning equal access to education and vocational training by EU nationals, including as regards fees and maintenance grants, the Court

1 Consolidation occurred with the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced Arts 126 and 127, Education, vocational training and youth, subsequently renumbered as Arts 165 and 166, Education, vocational training, youth and sport, in the 2010 consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2 Directive 93/96 EEC on Students Residence [1993] OJ L317/59, as repealed by Directive 2004/38 EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territories of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 3 The wording of Art 128 EEC was quite vague: ‘The Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, lay down general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both of national economies and of the Common Market’. 4 The basic measures employed by the Court have been Art 12 of the EEC Treaty and EEC Regulation 1612/68 on the free movement of workers ([1968] OJ L257/2), in particular its Art 12. This Regulation has been repealed by Regulation (EU) 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. The new text has codified the relevant case law; however, the articles relevant to this analysis have not undergone substantive changes. Art 12 has become Art 10. 5 Cases 9/74 Casagrande [1974] ECR 773; 235/87 Matteucci [1988] ECR 5589; C-3/90 Bernini [1992] ECR I-1071; C-308/89 Di Leo [1990] ECR I-4185; and 389/87 and 390/87 GBC Echternach and A Moritz [1989] ECR 723. 6 Case C-20/12 Giersch [2013] ECR-I 411. The case concerned children of frontier workers employed in Luxembourg who were refused financial aid to pursue higher education studies in another Member State from Luxembourg, on the basis that they did not reside in the Grand Duchy.

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generally followed a twofold track—whether the applicant qualified as a worker or just as a student. On the one hand, the line of jurisprudence concerning the status of worker shows how generously the Court interpreted Article 39 TEC (currently Art 45 TFEU) and the secondary legislation applicable in order to guarantee equal treatment including as regards social benefits. The extensive interpretation of the retention of the status of worker and the link between the previous working activity and the studies engaged were the basic criteria referred to by the Court in its case law.7 The Gravier case, on the other hand, inaugurated a line of jurisprudence which provided EU 14.03 nationals moving only for study purposes with a right to equal treatment as regards access to education and vocational training to the exclusion of maintenance grants. By applying the general principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality (Art 12 TEC, currently Art 18 TFEU) to the extensive interpretation of Article 128 EEC (currently Art 166 TFEU) as providing a competence sufficient to lay down a vocational training policy,8 the Court was able to recognise for students an equal right of access to education. Therefore, the imposition of higher registration fees on Community nationals was held to constitute discrimination on grounds of nationality and was thereby contrary to the Treaty. Higher education was then deemed to fall under the notion of vocational training to the extent that it prepares the student for an occupation.9 Finally, the right of residence for students followed as a direct corollary of the right of access 14.04 to education, since the latter was senseless if the individual was not permitted to live in the country where the education was provided.10 Directive 93/96 on the right of residence of students codified this right. That Directive has since been repealed by Directive 2004/38, which establishes the following conditions students must fulfil to enjoy the right of residence for more than three months (Art 7): (i) be enrolled at a private or public establishment for the principal purpose of following a course of study, including vocational training; (ii) have comprehensive sickness insurance; (iii) have sufficient resources for themselves and their families not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. The notion of European Union citizenship (Art 17 TEC) and its interpretation as ‘the 14.05 fundamental status of nationals of the Member States enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality’11 has provided a new impetus for the development of educational rights in the EU context. EU citizenship was not meant to extend the material scope of the Treaty and Article 18 TEC (currently Art 21 TFEU) reiterated that the rights of movement and residence of EU citizens are subject to the limitations and conditions laid down not only by the Treaty, but also by secondary legislation. However, in

7 The Court included trainee teachers and part-time worker with a pay lower than the minimum income as long as the activity was effective, genuine and not merely ancillary to the studies to be engaged (Cases 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035; 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121; 39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3161; and 197/86 Brown [1988] ECR 3205). 8 The content of Arts 126 and 127 EC Treaty represented, at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, the transposition of the Court of Justice acquis communautaire concerning the material extension of Community education and vocational training policies starting from Art 128 EEC. Arts 126 and 127 (currently Arts 165 and 166 TFEU), in fact, provided a clear-cut legal basis for a whole range of activities carried out on the basis of the Court of Justice case law, for example as regards higher education. However, while legitimising a competence developed by the Court, the institutionalisation allowed the Member States to impose their vision on how the European Union was to deal with education and vocational training activities. EU competencies are just complementary to those of the Member States, which latter remain fully responsible for the content and organisation of their education and vocational training systems. EU institutions are deemed to only enhance and support the Member States’ cooperation. 9 Cases 293/83 Gravier [1985] ECR 593 and 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379 [15]–[20]. The Court has reaffirmed that both higher education and university education constitute vocational training in Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969. 10 Case C-295/90 European Parliament v Council [1992] ECR I-4915 [15]. 11 Case 147/03 (n 9) [45], which continues: ‘subject to such exceptions as explicitly provided for’.



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a series of cases dealing with students’ equal access to higher education, and equal treatment as regards social benefits and maintenance grants, the Court used the notion of citizenship to extend the material scope of educational rights of students. Once again this happened through the combined application of EU citizenship and Article 18 TFEU (direct and indirect discrimination on the ground of nationality). When dealing with restrictions to access to higher education, such as additional requirements imposed to holders of foreign diplomas or numerus clausus applying to non-resident students,12 the Court held that the opportunity for students coming from other Member States to gain access to higher education ‘constitutes the very essence of the principle of free movement of students guaranteed by the Treaty’. Therefore, students may rely on Articles 18 (non-discrimination) and 21 TFEU (European citizenship) to move and reside freely on the territory of the host Member State. These provisions also preclude any measures which even indirectly discriminate against or restrict access to education of EU citizens coming from other Member States, unless these measures are objectively justified and proportionate to the aim pursued. 14.06 In the cases dealing with students’ equal treatment as regards to non-contributory social benefits (Grzelczyk), and maintenance grants (Bidar), the Court of Justice affirmed that as EU citizens and lawful residents in another Member States, students were entitled not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality, to the extent that these areas fell under the material scope of the Treaty.13 The Court found this to be the case on the basis of the Treaty provisions on education and vocational training, as well as, if relevant, secondary legislation, that is Directive 93/36 as subsequently repealed by Directive 2004/38. Directive 93/96 subjected the recognition of a right of residence for economically inactive students to the conditions relating to the possession of sufficient resources and medical insurance coverage.14 It also explicitly established no right to maintenance grants. Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 made equal treatment for maintenance grants subject to the acquisition of permanent residence.15 In both the Grzelczyk and Bidar cases the Court founded its reasoning on the Treaty articles relating to free movement of EU citizens and non-discrimination, and eluded the secondary law provisions’ application: in the former case because Directive 93/96 did not explicitly preclude students from accessing non-contributory social benefits; in the latter because Directive 2004/38 was adopted but not yet transposed. This allowed the Court some flexibility to interpret the notion of permanent residence in Bidar. While it considered that maintenance loans or grants could only be provided to students showing a certain degree of integration in the society of the host Member State, it decided that a three-year period of lawful residence coupled with the fact that the applicant had received a substantial part 12 Respectively, Case 147/03 (n 9), and Case C-73/08 Bressol and others [2012] ECR I-2735. The former dealt with additional qualifications requirements imposed by Austria upon non-nationals seeking access to a specific higher or university course, which the Court of Justice did not find justified. In Bressol, Belgian legislation had restricted the number of non-resident students who might enrol (numerus clausus) for the first time in medical and paramedical courses. Being a preliminary ruling, the Court concluded that it was for the competent national authorities to assess in depth whether the legislation was justified in light of the objective of protection of public health. 13 See Case C-184/99 Grzelcczyk [2001] ECR I-6193 concerning a French national who had worked part-time in Belgium during the first three years of his university studies. After a maintenance grant was withdrawn from him by reason of his nationality, he applied for the minimex, a non-contributory social benefit. See also Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119 concerning a French citizen who applied for a maintenance grant in the UK. 14 Social security of students is also regulated by Regulation 1408/71 as repealed by Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1. 15 Art 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 reads: ‘By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the host Member State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of residence, or, where appropriate the longer period provided in Article 14(4)(b), nor shall it be obliged, prior to the acquisition of the right to permanent ­residence, to grant maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training, consisting in student grants or student loans to persons other than workers, self-employed persons, persons who retain such status and members of their families.’

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of his secondary education in that same state were sufficient to provide him with the right to equal treatment as regards maintenance grants. In subsequent case law, the Court of Justice has consistently reiterated its interpretation of 14.07 Articles 18 and 21 TFEU as providing students with the right to free movement and equal access to education, but it also clarified the scope of this equal treatment in relation to maintenance loans or grants. In the Förster case,16 the Court reiterated that students may rely on Article 18 TFEU with regard to social benefits or maintenance grant in the state where they have resided lawfully for a certain period. However, by reference to Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38, which was by then fully in force, it considered that the five-year requirement was legitimate to ensure that the student has attained a certain level of integration in the Member State in question.17 In so doing, the Court seemed to give priority to secondary legislation over Treaty provisions ruling in favour of a ‘blanket requirement’, ie the five-year residence, which in previous case law relating to the same provisions had appeared to be unlawful.18 However, subsequently, the Court has clarified its reading of Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 by interpreting its paragraph 1 as ‘merely a specific expression’ of Article 18 TFEU, and requiring its paragraph 2, which provides for derogation to the principle of non-discrimination, ‘to be interpreted narrowly’19 and in accordance with the related Treaty provisions.20 When applied to maintenance loans or grants, this interpretation allowed the Court to conclude that reduced transport fares granted to students represent aid to maintenance, but do not fall under Article 24(2), since the latter only cover ‘student grants or student loans’. Having ruled out that considering reduced transport fares a family benefit consisted in indirect discrimination against students who move to Austria only for study purposes, the Court affirmed that enrolment in a public or private establishment for the principal purpose of following a course of study, including vocational training, was a sufficient proof of a genuine link of integration of the student in the host Member State. Residence and other requirements as gauges of integration have been further defined in case 14.08 law with an original twist: the students claiming grants and loans to study abroad were nationals of the Member States providing such grants and loans. Once again, it is thanks to the status of being a citizen of the Union (Article 20(1)) that, first, a student can claim the rights conferred by that status also against his/her own Member State of origin. Second, national legislation putting nationals of a Member State at a disadvantage when they exercise their right to move and reside in another Member State contravenes Article 21(1).21 In Prinz and Seeberger, the Court refined the residence condition concluding that three years of uninterrupted residence in the Member State

16 Case C-158/07 Förster v Hoofdirectie van der Informatie Beheer Groep [2008] ECR I-8507. 17 The Förster case concerned a German national settled in the Netherlands. While pending the transposition of the Directive at issue, the Dutch government issued a policy rule imposing a five-year residence requirement in order for students to become entitled to maintenance grants. The Court also made a distinction with the Bidar ruling by making reference to the fact that the UK legislation imposed not only a residence requirement, but also the status of ‘settled person’. However, this legislation also precluded the possibility of students acquiring such status while studying, and this independently from their degree of integration in society. 18 See S O’Leary, ‘Equal treatment and EU citizens: A new chapter on cross-border educational mobility and access to student financial assistance’ (2009) 34 European Law Review, August. 19 Case C-75/11 Commission v Austria (4 October 2012). The case concerned reduced transport fares for Austrian students, which in principle are granted only to students whose parents are in receipt of family allowances. 20 Joined Cases C-22/08 and 23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-4585 [44]. 21 Joined Cases C-11/06 and 12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161 [22–25]; Joined Cases C-523/11 and 585/11 Prinz and Seeberger [2013] ECR I-524 [23–27]. The cases concerned German nationals who were precluded from receiving an education grant to study in another Member States because, in the first case, the ‘first-stage condition’ (according to which higher education studies of at least one year must have been undertaken in the Member State of origin), and, in the second, they did not satisfy the requirement of permanent residence in their state of origin for at least three years before commencing their studies abroad.



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of origin to benefit from an education grant to study abroad is too general and exclusive to be proportionate and necessary to attain the government’s objective, in the present case avoiding an unreasonable financial burden. Such condition hinders the pursuit of studies in another Member State. Similarly, in Morgan and Bucher, it is the ‘first-stage condition’, according to which higher education studies of at least one year must have been undertaken in the Member State of origin in order to receive the grant, which was judged too general and exclusive to reach that same objective. The level of integration in these cases was considered better vindicated by criteria, such as the applicants being nationals of the Member State, having been educated there for significant periods, and their family living and working in the country. 14.09 To a lesser extent than free movement provisions, the evolution of the right to education in the EU context is also linked to the Treaty provisions relating to freedom of establishment and freedom of providing and receiving services. With market integration the ultimate goal, the Court extended to Community nationals the right recognised by Member States to their own citizens to establish private schools. In an early case, Humbel, the Court did not openly recognise education as a service, but such a conclusion could be inferred from the Court’s affirmation that public education could not be considered a service for the purpose of Article 49 TEC (currently Art 56 TFEU), because it was not provided for remuneration.22 Subsequent case law endorsed this conclusion: inasmuch as education is provided for remuneration, it may be defined as a service, and Articles 43 TEC (freedom of establishment, currently Art 49 TFEU) and 49 (freedom to provide services) apply. This implies that Community nationals may not be hindered from establishing private schools or carrying out activities concerning private teaching in other Member States.23 Additional case law relative to the freedom of establishment concerned the recognition of qualifications.24 14.10 Finally, several pieces of legislation have reorganised the right of access to education for third country nationals, either family member of a European Union citizen or moving independently. Third country nationals who are family members of EU citizens and who are resident or permanent residents (after five years of residence) are entitled to equal treatment as regard access to education, including grant maintenance for studies and vocational training.25 Third-country nationals who wish to move and reside in a Member State for educational purposes fall under Council Directive 2004/114/EC, which defines the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of study, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service beyond three months’ duration.26 The criteria for admission of students are the availability of adequate resources for studying, staying and return travel costs and admission to an education establishment, including payment of fees, and prior knowledge of the language. Students can also move from one Member State to another to pursue further studies, though it is required that these are related. Also, third country nationals who have been residing continuously and legally for five years in a Member State—though not for studying or vocational training purposes— and may become permanent residents, enjoy equal treatment with EU nationals as regards, inter alia, education and vocational training, as well as social benefits and social assistance.27

22 Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5371. 23 Case 147/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1637 [9] and [10]. 24 Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 631. 25 Art 24 of Directive 2004/38 EC (n 2). 26 Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third country nationals for the purposes of study, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service [2004] OJ L375/12. The Commission has proposed a revised directive on this issue (COM (2013) 151). 27 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2004] OJ L16/44) Art 11(1)(b). Art 4(2) of the Directive provides that periods of residence for study purposes or vocational training only count for half for the purpose of fulfilling the five-year requirement.

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Migrant workers, third-country nationals’ family members, and third-country nationals who have obtained or who are seeking international protection are also entitled to education.28 At first glance, issues pertaining to the right to education, such as freedom of teaching and 14.11 freedom to be taught, covered by paragraph 3 of Article 14, seem unconnected with the exercise of free movement and migration of EU citizens. Accordingly, in this regard the impact of the Charter in practice would appear remote. However, as will be demonstrated in section D, these components of the right to education are connected, though more loosely, with EU law, in particular through the application of the principle of non-discrimination.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 14 with Other Provisions of the Charter Considering how the right of access to education and vocational training has evolved in the 14.12 EU, Article 14 interacts with the other Charter provisions which lay out the foundation of the notion of free movement and non discrimination for EU nationals. Thus, it is linked to Article 45 (freedom of movement and residence for EU citizens) and, as also mentioned by the official Explanations, to Article 15 (freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work) as far as vocational training is concerned. Article 21 (non-discrimination) is also relevant since it prohibits any discrimination based on various grounds, eg sex, race, ethnic or social origin, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation, and on the basis of nationality.29 While equal treatment for Member States nationals has been pivotal for the emergence of education rights in the EU context, discrimination on other grounds than nationality is also relevant. Secondary EU antidiscrimination legislation prohibits discrimination as regards access to vocational training and education on the basis of some of the grounds mentioned by Article 21, thereby creating new venues for vindicating the right of access to education.30 Paragraph 2 of Article 34 (social security and social assistance) is also relevant, to the extent 14.13 that much of the recent litigation defining the scope of the equal right to access to study assistance for nationals of other EU Member States relies on the evolution of EU secondary legislation, as well as national law and practices relating to freedom of movement. The consolidation by Directive 2004/38 of the five-year residence requirement and the application of the notion of ‘habitual residence’ is a case in point (Förster). Finally, Article 14 also interacts with Article 10 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) and Article 24 (the rights of the child). 28 Directive 2003/86 ([2003] OJ L251/12) Art 14(1)(a) (family reunion); Directive 2011/98 ([2011] OJ L344/1) Art 12(1)(c) (migrant workers); Directive 2009/50 ([2009] OJ L155/17) Art 14(1)(c) (highly skilled workers); Directive 2011/95 ([2011] OJ L337/9) Art 27 (refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection); Directive 2001/55 ([2001] OJ L212/12) Art 14 (temporary protection); and Directive 2003/9 ([2003] OJ L31/18) Arts 10 and 14 (asylum-seekers). The latter Directive has recently been replaced: see Arts 14 and 16 of Directive 2013/33 ([2013] OJ L180/96). 29 Art 21 of the Charter reads: ‘1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 2. Within the scope of application of the treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on ground of nationality shall be prohibited.’ 30 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation ([2000] OJ L303/16) prohibits discrimination in access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience (Art 3(b)) on grounds of religion and belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin ([2000] OJ L180/22) prohibits discrimination as regards both vocational training defined as in the previous Directive, but also education (Art 3(b) and (g)) on the grounds of racial and ethnic origin. Directive 2006/54 ([2006] OJ L204/23) prohibits sex discrimination as regards vocational training (Arts 1(a) and 14(1)(b)).



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C.  Sources of Article 14 Rights I. ECHR 14.14 According to the ‘correspondence’ rule established by Article 52(3) of the Charter, when the rights of the latter instrument correspond to those provided by the ECHR, their meaning and scope, including (according to the explanations to the Charter) any limitation, are the same. In practice this means that the meaning and scope of Article 14 cannot be ‘less’ than the meaning of Article 2 of Protocol 1, as defined not only by the Convention itself but also (according to the explanations to the Charter) by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The aim of Article 52(3) is at the same time to provide a ‘lower’ benchmark which cannot be breached without preventing the Union from providing a broader protection of any fundamental right. The Explanations to Article 52 to the Charter at point 2 indicates that correspondence while clarifying that the scope of Article 14 is broader as a result of the inclusion of vocational training.31 14.15 Although prima facie paragraph 1 of Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR (hereinafter 2P1) would appear to be a freedom right (‘No person shall be denied the right to education’), it has been held by the European Court of Human Rights to provide the right of everyone under the jurisdiction of the state to be granted equal access to the existing education institutions.32 In the Strasbourg Court’s opinion, the negative formulation of the first paragraph of Article 2P1 ‘indicates that the Contracting parties would not be required to establish at their own expenses, or to subsidise education of any particular type or at any particular level’. In other words, this provision is not interpreted as meaning that parents can require the state to provide a particular form of education.33 Nonetheless, Article 2P1 carries a positive obligation for the state, since access to the existing institutions implies, on the one hand, the existence and the maintenance of a minimum education provided by the state, and, on the other hand, that the state must afford effective access to these institutions once they exist.34 Such an interpretation of the Convention is necessary to ensure that the rights it protects are ‘practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory’.35 14.16 The ECtHR case law has further defined the material scope of the right to education. Access concerns all level of education, the ECtHR having recently confirmed that higher education is included in the right to equal access to the existing institutions.36 But the state is entitled to set entry conditions, such as the previous achievement of a certain level of education, admission examinations, numerus clausus (Belgian linguistic case), and even fees on the basis of the education level.37 These measures, however, must be justified by the limited availability of places and be non-discriminatory. The right to education also implies the corollary right of having the qualifications obtained recognised in the host state, and it may not be denied as a consequence

31 Explanations to Art 52 reads: ‘Articles where the meaning is the same as the corresponding Articles of the ECHR, but where the scope is wider: … Article 14(1) corresponds to Article 2 of the Protocol to the ECHR, but its scope is extended to cover access to vocational and continuing training, Article 14(3) corresponds to Article 2 of the Protocol to the ECHR as regards the rights of parents’. 32 Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in the education in Belgium v Belgium [Belgian linguistic case] (ECtHR, Judgment of 23 July 1968), A Series no 6. This jurisprudence was reiterated inter alia by Leyla Sahin v Turkey App no 44774/98 (Judgment of 10 November 2005) [GC]; Orsus and others v Croatia App no 15766/03 (Judgment of 16 March 2010) [GC]. 33 Leyla Sahin ibid [135]. 34 Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria App no 5335/05 (Judgment of 21 June 2011) [49]. 35 Leyla Sahin (n 32) [136]. 36 Ibid [137]–[142], where other several cases are quoted. 37 In Ponomaryovi the ECtHR considers to fall within the state’s margin of appreciation the possibility of imposing fees for higher education.

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of the application of the second sentence of Article 2P1.38 The Court thus considered the first paragraph of Article 2 to be predominant on the second, since ‘it is onto this fundamental right [to education] that is grafted the right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions’.39 Finally, the right of access must be non-discriminatory, as it results from the combined application of Article 2P1 and Article 14 of the ECHR. The ECHR applies to everyone under the state’s jurisdiction; however, early case law restricted 14.17 the personal scope of Article 2P1. In the Foreign students case, the former European Commission on Human Rights denied that Article 2 granted individuals a right to challenge the refusal of an extension of their resident permits.40 The Commission held that unless returning to the home country threatens other fundamental human rights protected by the Convention, Article 2 does not limit the power of states to decide who resides on their territory. It thus can be concluded, as a corollary, that foreigners cannot claim admittance to a contracting party in order to receive education only on the basis of Article 2. What this provision ensures is the right to equal access once the individual is granted the right to reside in the country on the basis of national laws, thus making it a ‘static right’. Recent case law reiterated this approach when affirming that the imposition of fees to attend secondary education to non-nationals on account of their nationality and immigration status was not justified. The applicants inadvertently found themselves in the situation of aliens lacking permanent residence permits, and the authorities did not take into account their degree of integration in the society.41 The second paragraph of Article 2P1 entails freedom of education in its ‘freedom to be 14.18 taught’ dimension since it guarantees the freedom of parents to have their children receive the education and teaching which accords with their religious and philosophical convictions. At the same time it imposes the positive obligation on the contracting parties to respect, when exercising the functions they assume in that area, this right of the parents. However, the Court allows the state a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps which are necessary to ensure compliance with the Convention, with due regard to the resources of the individuals and of the community. In a string of case law relating to the place of religion in school curricula,42 the most recent being that concerning the compatibility with the requirement of Article 2P1 of the crucifix in Italian state-school rooms,43 the Court has reiterated that Article 2P1 is the lex specialis in relation to Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) and has defined the scope of this margin of appreciation. In the opinion of the Court, the state remains competent for the content of teaching and the curricula, which may include education or knowledge of a directly or indirectly religious or philosophical kind, as well as for the organisation of the school environment. However, since paragraph 2 of Article 2P1 aims at safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in education, ‘it requires the State, in exercising its functions with regards to education and teaching, to take care that information or knowledge, included in the curriculum, is conveyed in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner’.44

38 In the Campbell and Cosans case (Judgment of 25 February 1982, A Series no 48), the young Cosan was denied his right to education because of his parents’ refusal to accept corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure, the reason why he was suspended. 39 Decision, Danish sex education case, B Series no 21 [53]. 40 Foreign Students App no 7671/76 (Decision of 19 May 1977), DR 9, 185. The case in exam never reached the Court. 41 Ponomaryovi (n 34) [63]. 42 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (Judgment 7 December 1976), Series A no 23 [50]–[53]; Folgerø and others v Norway [GC] App no 15472/02, ECHR 2007-VIII; Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey App no 1448/04, ECHR 2007-XI [84]. 43 Lautsi and others v Italy App no 30814/06 (Judgment of 18 April 2001). 44 Folgerø (n 42) [85].



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Accordingly, the limit to the state’s margin of appreciation consists in the prohibition to pursue any proselytism or indoctrination that might be considered as encroaching upon parents’ religious and philosophical convictions. Thus, the Court has considered as falling within the margin of appreciation of the state the fact that a Norwegian syllabus and a Turkish syllabus devoted a larger share to Christianity or Islam, due to the relevance of each religion in those countries. Similarly, the presence of the crucifix in class in Italy was not deemed to go beyond this margin, since it is a passive symbol not deemed to influence children to the same extent as teaching; it was not attached to any compulsory teaching of Christianity; and arrangements were provided by state schools for other religions.45 14.19 Finally, paragraph 2 of Article 2P1 is deemed to apply also to private schools to the extent that the Commission affirmed that it prohibits a state from preventing parents from arranging the education of their children outside the state school system.46 While the doctrine is not unanimous on this point, it is clear that the Court excluded that the state could ensure compliance with paragraph 2 by allowing a private system to exist, and contributing financially to it.47

II.  UN Treaties 14.20 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art 26 of UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 13 of the CESCR), and the Convention on the rights of Children (Arts 28 and 29 of the CDC) provide for the right to education. Although all these provisions encompass a notion of the right to education meant as freedom of education,48 they focus on its relevance as a social and positive right. Article 13 CESCR best expresses the social dimension of the right to education when it affirms that the right for everyone to receive education implies the obligation of states ‘to develop and maintain a system of schools and other education institutions in order to provide education to everybody, if possible, free of charge’.49

45 While in Lautsi the Court found no violation of Art 2P1, in the Folgerø case it held that this provision was violated by reason of the fact that notwithstanding the many arrangements put in place, Norway did not take sufficient care to ensure that the information and knowledge included in the curriculum was conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner for the purposes of Art 2P1. 46 Decision, Danish sex education case, B Series no 21 [53]. 47 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (n 42). 48 Art 13(4), for example, reads: ‘No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this article and to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.’ 49 Art 13 reads: ‘1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; (c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; (d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education; (e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.’

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The General Comments relating to these provisions develop further this social dimension of the right to education.50 The reason why the international notion of the right to education is more progressive is due to the open programmatic character of these instruments and their softer mechanisms of protection. However, this same protection is at the origin of the weaker impact that the UN conventions have had on the domestic legal order in comparison with other international instruments, such as the ECHR and the TEU.

III.  Council of Europe Treaties The revised European Social Charter has completed the pre-existing provisions on vocational 14.21 guidance and training (currently Arts 9 and 10) with the provision of a general right to education in Article 17 which deals with the right of children and young persons to social, legal, and economic protection.51 Article 17(1) guarantees the right to education for all children, which means the establishment and maintenance of sufficient and adequate institutions and services for the purpose of education.52 This has been interpreted as implying that primary and secondary education must be free of charge, accessible and effective.53 Equal access is to be guaranteed for all children, including those belonging to vulnerable groups, if needed through special measures. Similarly to the evolution in the EU context, the European Committee of Social Rights, which is the body devoted to assess the conformity of national laws and practice to the Charter, interpreted the provisions concerning vocational training (Arts 9 and 10) as including not only secondary vocational education, but also university and non-university higher education ‘as far as they provide students with the knowledge and skills necessary to exercise a profession’.54 The European Social Charter guarantees equal access to vocational training, which implies (i) abolishing or reducing any fee or other educational cost which represents financial obstacles for some students; and (ii) granting financial assistance either universally, or subject to a means test, or awarded on the basis of merit. Financial assistance, which may take the form of scholarships or loans at preferential interest rates, must at least be available for those in need and shall be adequate. Finally, equal access to vocational training, including equal treatment as regards financial assistance, must be guaranteed to non-nationals. Under the Charter, this means that no length of residence is required from students and trainees residing in any capacity, or having authority to reside in reason of their ties with persons lawfully residing on the territory of the Party where they start the training.55

50 See, for example, General Comment 11 (1999), Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights, which affirms ‘free of charge’ to be an unequivocal requirement for primary education, although the states parties are under the obligation of a progressive implementation. 51 The Revised European Social Charter entered into force in 1999 and is gradually replacing the initial 1961 Social Charter. The Revised version has been currently ratified by 32 (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine) of the 47 Council of Europe Member States. However, another 11 Member States are still bound by the 1961 version, thereby bringing the total number of ratifications to 43 (Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom). 52 Art 17(1)(a) reads: ‘to ensure that children and young persons, taking account of the rights and duties of their parents, have the care, the assistance, the education and the training they need, in particular by providing for the establishment or maintenance of institutions and services sufficient and adequate for this purpose’. 53 Council of Europe, ‘The right to education under the European Social Charter’, www.coe.int/t/dGHl/monitoring/ Socialcharter/Theme%20factsheets/FactsheetEducation_en.pdf. 54 ECSR Conclusions 2003, France, p 131. 55 ECSR, Conclusions 2008, Vol 1, France, p 325. France has been found not to be in conformity with the Charter because of a length of residence requirement imposed on applicants.



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IV.  Other Sources 14.22 When defining the scope and meaning of the rights contained in the Charter, Article 52(4) makes reference to the constitutional traditions of the Member States, which have represented one of the sources the European Court of Justice made use of when building its doctrine for the protection of fundamental rights. The Explanations to the Charter underline that the reference to the Member States’ constitutional traditions, however, shall not be held to be the ‘common lowest denominator’, but rather that the Charter’s rights must be interpreted ‘in a way offering a higher standard of protection which is adequate for the law of the Union and in harmony with the common constitutional traditions’. 14.23 It can be safely affirmed that all the EU Member States’ constitutions provide for a right to education comprising an individual right to education and freedom of education.56 The former consists in the right which everyone enjoys to receive free basic education and be granted equal access to all levels of education. Freedom of education further separates into freedom of teaching and freedom to be taught, the latter of which encompasses the freedom of parents and students to choose the education most suitable to their personal convictions. Although differently classified in the different European constitutional traditions (self-executing individual right, droit de créance (FR), diritto soggettivo a prestazione (IT), derecho a dimension prestacional (SP)), the right to education may be considered an individual right only to the extent that it is recognised as the duty of the state to implement it. Government intervention is necessary for this right to become effective and consequently enforceable in courts. This applies also to those constitutional clauses that, by employing the formula ‘everyone has the right to education’, seem to imply its immediate applicability. 14.24 At compulsory school level the individual right to education means free compulsory primary and lower secondary education provided by the public system. While public authorities are under the duty to provide this education, they are not obliged to satisfy any citizens’ demands for specific education, but to put in place a system compatible with their resources. The provision of state education does not prevent private schools from being established; however, the state cannot rely on the existence of a private sector to remain inactive. In many Member States free primary or compulsory schooling means not only the right of access without charge, but also the provision of what is necessary to children to ensure that education is effective (eg educational materials, food, transportation). As regards upper secondary education and higher education, states generally recognise the right to equal access. This means that states not only are not obliged to satisfy any demand for higher education, but they may also impose fees, limit the offer of education and, accordingly, restrict access on the basis of legitimate reasons (numerus clausus), subject however to the condition of providing equality of access. 14.25 Freedom of education consists of freedom of teaching and the freedom to be taught. The former means that teaching must be neutral and not ideologically oriented by the state. This ‘classical’ freedom presupposes a state’s non-interference once the education system has been established and organised through legislative and regulatory power, though it is to be presumed that this implies respect for democratic principles. Freedom to be taught means that pupils and those who care for them, generally their parents, must be free to choose a different education

56 The following analysis is based on constitutional provisions and related case law of a non-exhaustive list of Member States. As a consequence of different constitutional traditions, some constitutions contain very long provisions detailing the right to education (eg Belgium—Art 24, Italy—Art 34, the Netherlands—Art 23, Portugal—Art 74 and Spain—Art 27). Others contain a very short provision which is expanded through legislation (eg Denmark—Art 76, Finland—Sec 13, France, Ireland—Art 42).

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system more suitable to their religious or philosophical convictions than the public should they so wish. This brings along the related freedom to set up private education institutions reflecting these convictions.57 Practically, the state shall leave parents free to educate their children at home or in private schools. Moreover, this choice can be effective only to the extent that it is not influenced by other factors, such as the cost or the availability of services (food, transportation). This shifts the focus on private schooling which presupposes the state’s intervention in terms of provision of a legal framework and, at times, subsidies. These two conditions are necessary for a private school sector to run in parallel with the public system. However, while the state can impose rules that the private sector must comply with in order to be officially recognised and financially supported, it remains responsible for ensuring that private schools respect the basic patterns of public education and the democratic principles. The above definitions correspond to what is constitutionally guaranteed in several Member 14.26 States and what also represents the backbone of the interpretation given to right to education provided by Article 2P1 of the ECHR examined above.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks While when analysing Article 14 of the Charter a comparison with Article 2 Protocol 1 of the 14.27 ECHR is needed, any interpretation of this Charter provision must also take into consideration: (i) the original evolution of a ‘right to education’ proper to the EU legal context as a consequence of the free movement of workers first and European Union citizens afterwards; (ii) the fact that the rights guaranteed by the Charter which are ‘based on’ the Treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and limits imposed by the Treaties (Art 52(2)); and (iii) the transnational nature of the EU right to education, which also brings along some limits to its enjoyment. The combined effect of these three factors is fundamental to understanding the impact that the Charter may have as regards educational rights. The fundamental rights recognised by the Charter are relevant for EU citizens, to the extent that these rights fall within the competence of the Union so that the institutions can take action, which may need further implementation by the Member States. The EU (or rather the Community at the time) has progressively developed a competence to carry out action in the fields of education and vocational training as a consequence of market integration. This competence has been built up step-by-step by the Court of Justice, first, to cover as many situations as possible to facilitate the integration of migrant workers and their families;58 and, second, to include Community nationals moving only for study purposes. Free movement of these students was also justified from the perspective of studies being a preparatory step for their future economic activity.59 However, the strict legal framework imposed on these competences when they have been institutionalised by the Member States in the Maastricht Treaty is the

57 Belgian and Spanish case law are particularly exhaustive on this composite nature of freedom of education. See, respectively, Cour d’Arbitrage, Decision no 18/93, (1993) AIJC 254, and STC 13/2/81, BJC Sistematizada, 1982–1, 29. 58 In the Casagrande case (n 5), the Court affirmed: ‘Although educational and training policy is not as such included in the spheres which the treaty has entrusted to the Community institutions, it does not follow that the exercise of powers transferred to the Community is in some way limited if it is of such a nature as to affect the measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that of education and training.’ 59 In the Gravier case (n 9), the Court affirmed: ‘access to vocational training is in particular likely to promote free movement of persons throughout the Community, by enabling them to obtain a qualification in the Member State where they intend to work’.



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direct consequence of their ‘spill-over’ evolution from economic integration. Indeed to prevent this spill-over from continuing, EU competences, as provided by Articles 165 and 166 TFEU, are, on the one hand, limited since they are merely complementary to those of the Member States, which remain fully responsible for the content and the organisation of their education and vocational training systems.60 On the other hand, economic integration is no longer the engine for development it has been in the past. However, EU citizenship, which meanwhile has become the ‘fundamental status’ enabling equal treatment of EU nationals, has replaced economic integration. Since the consolidation of the Community competences has excluded individual education and training rights from the scope of the new articles, the areas of EU and Member States’ action which may still impact on the right to education are those related to EU citizenship and free movement, as demonstrated by the most recent case law of the Court of Justice.61 This brings in the third factor mentioned above, that is the ‘transnational’ nature of the right 14.28 to education in the EU context. While ‘the rights in question originate at national level’,62 they apply cross-border in reason of the EU legal order and the application of the principle of equal treatment. Member States remain the providers of education, since the EU legal order will most probably never entail such a role for the EU institutions. However, the EU legal order allows EU citizens moving to another Member State to enjoy the same right to education that this state provides to its own citizens, as well as to continue benefitting from the rights provided by their Member State of origin when exercising their right to free movement. Thus, EU citizens may claim a right to equal access to education in any Member State as a consequence of the prohibition against direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality or other grounds, such as race or ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, etc, imposed by EU law. Therefore, free movement, with all conditions and limitations set by the treaties remains a pre-condition to enjoyment of these rights. In light of Article 52(2), this may imply a limited impact for the Charter.

II.  Scope of Application 14.29 In view of the preceding remarks, it follows that the right to education assumes a specific meaning in the EU legal order. On the one hand, as foreseen in the Explanations, Article 14 is based on Article 2P1 and reflects the constitutional traditions of the Member States; but, on the other hand, it is also based on the EU law in reason of its evolution in the EU legal order. Accordingly, if Article 14’s material and personal scope largely overlaps with Article 2P1 ECHR and its case law, it also differs in several aspects. As regards the material scope, Article 14 and Article 2P1 ECHR share common features: they 14.30 both encompass a right to education consisting of an individual right of equal access to all levels of education and to the existing institutions. The respect of the state’s power and duty to organise the education system may be implied from Article 2P1,63 and is explicitly affirmed by Articles 165 and 166 TFEU and reiterated by the Court of Justice case law.64 However, Article 14

60 Case C-73/08 Bressol (n 12) EU action is mainly directed to develop cooperation activities, such as the mobility programmes and exchange of information and experience. 61 Case C-75/11 Commission v Austria (n 19); Joined Cases C-523/1 and 585/11 Prinz and Seeberger (n 21). 62 S O’Leary, ‘The relationship between Community citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights in Community law’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 154. 63 The Strasbourg Court’s case law however has openly recognised the role of the state as organiser of the education system; see recently Ponomaryovi (n 34). 64 Case C-73/08 Bressol (n 12) [28]: ‘it should be recalled that whilst European Union law does not detract from the power of the Member States as regards the organizations of their education systems and of vocational training pursuant to Articles 165(1) and 166(1) TFEU’.

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also represents the consolidation of the right to education for EU citizens developed in the context of free movement. Accordingly, ‘when exercising the [organisational] power, Member States must comply with European Union law, in particular the provisions on the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States’, and when they guarantee equal access they must comply with the principle of non-discrimination (direct and indirect) on the basis of nationality.65 This implies that, as regards equal treatment for access to education, Article 14 goes beyond what is provided by the ECHR, by reason of the goal of integration which presides over the development of this right in the EU context. Similarly, and as noted in the Explanations, as regards freedom of education under its dimension of freedom to establish private schools, the material scope of Article 14 goes well beyond the Convention through the combined application of the principles regulating freedom of establishment and to provide services, and non-discrimination for nationals of other Member States. However, as regards the respect of the religious and philosophical conviction of parents, which pertains to the organisation of the education system, there is so far no example of involvement of the Court of Justice. It may nonetheless be advanced that such a case could reach the EU jurisdiction in the context of the free movement of a EU citizen claiming that the education system of another Member State to which he/she, or her children, have gained access to, does not respect his/her religious or philosophical convictions. Differences are more visible with respect to the personal scope of these provisions. The ECHR 14.31 applies to all persons under the jurisdiction of the state, and this includes both nationals and non-nationals. Often applications to the ECtHR are introduced against a state party by its own nationals when they still feel that their human rights have been prejudiced notwithstanding the exhaustion of all internal remedies. However, the personal scope of the Convention is ‘static’ in the sense that Article 2P1 may be invoked only by those people already under the jurisdiction, irrespective of them being nationals or aliens and of the kind of relationship they have with the state. Thus, the Convention does not extend to cover the process of acquiring a status under the jurisdiction of the country.66 Moreover, the state remains sovereign to define who is under its jurisdiction and, as regards access to education, the Court has implied this to require being legally resident. Therefore, Article 2P1 does not allow transnational mobility for study purposes: equal chances to participate to education are provided only once nationals or non-nationals are in the same position. The EU, however, presupposes a cross-border dimension for the right to education to become 14.32 operative. Individual rights are provided by the Member State to which the EU citizen has moved: this implies not only to be non-nationals but also to hold the nationality of a Member State and fulfil certain conditions in order for a right of residence in the host country to be recognised (Directive 2004/38).67 Third-country nationals can also be granted access under certain conditions. Moreover, for a more enhanced equal access, additional lawful residence requirements must be met. Thus, from this perspective it may be argued that the Article 2P1’s personal scope is wider because it also includes residing third country nationals who are not entitled to full equal treatment under EU law.68 Nonetheless, the dynamic approach to individual rights of the EU

65 Case C-73/08 Bressol (n 12) [28]–[29]. 66 Some case law relative to Art 8 ECHR seems however to contradict this. 67 These are the requirements: (i) to be enrolled at a private or public establishment for the principal purpose of following a course of study, including vocational training; (ii) to have comprehensive sickness insurance; (iii) to have sufficient resources for themselves and their families not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State. 68 See the EU legislation concerning third country nationals’ access to education, referred to in section A above.



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goes further, as regards substance, than the ECHR system. The EU legal order implies a concept of trans-nationality which overcomes the boundaries of states and obliges all Member States to grant to EU citizens, without discretion, the same protection they afford to their own citizens, as well as equal treatment of their own citizens who decide to study in another Member State. 14.33 Enhanced lawful residence requirements come into play when it is a question of access to financial assistance or non-contributory social benefits. The case law described in section A demonstrates that the Court of Justice is ready to continue to substantiate a right to education providing for equal treatment on the basis of the EU Treaty provisions on EU citizenship and free movement and a flexible approach to the interpretation of secondary legislation implementing these provisions.69 The more open interpretation of the ‘permanent residence’ requirement of Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 in Bidar was tightened in Förster. In the former case, the Court considered the national requirement of ‘permanent residence’ to be satisfied by the student’s degree of integration in the society as resulting from the three-year period of lawful residence and the fact that the applicant had received a substantial part of his secondary education in that same state. In the latter case, a pre-set ‘five years’ residence’ criterion provided by secondary legislation was held to be a reasonable and certain requirement to gain access to maintenance grants. However, the Court has subsequently struck the balance between treaty provisions and secondary legislation in favour of the former, thereby reaffirming the predominance of citizenship and free movement to ensure equal treatment for students.70 Against the treaty provisions on citizenship, it has qualified the imposition of ‘a sole condition of residence’ as too general and exclusive to be proportionate and necessary and indicated that national courts should take into account other criteria substantiating the student’s level of integration. However, it is worth noting that these cases concerned either children of workers or frontier workers, or nationals of the Member State under scrutiny,71 and not a Bidar-like student. 14.34 Finally, the scope of Article 14 is defined by Article 51(1), which horizontally restraints the Charter’s application to the action of: (i) the institutions and bodies of the Union, and (ii) the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. Institutional action can only remotely infringe this right since the right to education in the EU legal context exists primarily as a transnational right and the Member States retain intact their competence as providers of education. Institutions’ actions, nonetheless, can infringe this right indirectly in case of legislation regulating free movement and residence in the following two circumstances: (i) when the legislation in question is contrary to the current meaning of this right in the EU context; and (ii) when the legislation in question goes against the Court of Justice’s case law relating to financial assistance for students (an area which is more developed under EU law). From this perspective, the Förster case could be looked at as a ‘missed opportunity’ for the Court to reaffirm its criterion of ‘a certain degree of integration in the society’ to prevail over the clear-cut five-year long residence requirement imposed by Directive 2004/38. It cannot be excluded that the qualification of the level of integration witnessed in recent jurisprudence for children of frontier workers or own nationals would extend also to students in general.

69 In Case C-73/08 Bressol (n 12) [33] the Court affirmed: ‘Students … may rely on the right enshrined in Articles 18 and 21 TFEU to move and reside freely within the territory of a Member State, without being subject to direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality’. 70 In Case C-75/11 Commission v Austria (n 19) the Court held that Art 24(1) of Directive 2004/08 specifies Art 18 TFEU. 71 Case C-542/09 Commission v Netherlands [2012] ECR 346. In Case 20/12 Giersch (n 6) national courts should consider the fact that the children probably resided with the frontier worker in a neighbouring Member State. In Case 8888 Prinz and Seeberger (n 21), the national courts should consider the fact that the applicants were nationals of the Member State, had been educated there for significant periods, and their families were living and working in the country.

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Member States’ action can more easily infringe the right to education when transposing or 14.35 derogating from EU law related to freedom of movement and residence in a way that is contrary to the body of case law examined above.

III.  Specific Provisions Article 52(3) of the Charter provides for the overall coherence between the two instruments protecting fundamental rights, that is the ECHR and the Charter itself. In accordance with this provision, when the Charter rights correspond to ECHR provisions, ‘the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the same Convention’. Article 52(3) aims at providing, at the same time, a ‘lower’ benchmark which cannot be breached without preventing the Union from providing a broader protection of any fundamental right. The Explanations to Article 52 to the Charter at point 2 indicate that correspondence while clarifying that the scope of Article 14 is broader as a result of the inclusion of vocational training.72 The positive formulation of paragraph 1 in comparison with Article 2P1 ECHR does not make a difference, since the ECtHR has interpreted the Convention provision as entailing a positive individual right to access to the education provided by the States Parties to the Convention. Article 14 reflects Article 2P1 and also codifies the jurisprudential evolution of the EU rights to education elaborated taking as a starting point the right of migrant workers and their family to equal treatment and culminating with students’ freedom of movement inasmuch as EU citizens through the extensive interpretation of vocational training. In a nutshell, the material scope of the EU right to education, currently, consists of (i) the right to access to education and vocational training, ie the right to study, train and research in another country of the EU under the same conditions as the nationals of the host country; (ii) the right of residence in that country, at least, for the length of the study course; and (iii) ancillary social rights, such as social security cover and certain social benefits, maintenance aid and maintenance grants. The provision of educational services in another Member State is also contemplated, as well as the establishment of private schools. Thus, as allowed for by Article 52(3), Article 14 provides for a more extensive protection pertaining to the specific nature of the EU integration process and not only with regard to vocational training as mentioned in the Explanations. More precisely, paragraphs 1 and 2 mean that, when moving to another Member States, EU citizens enjoy the right to receive free basic compulsory education and to be granted equal access to all level of education. In the words of the Court of Justice, ‘the opportunity to gain equal access to [higher] education represents the very essence of the principle of free movement for students’.73 The Gravier jurisprudence explains why access to vocational training is contemplated by paragraph 1, while the progressive recognition of equal treatment as regards fees, maintenance grants, and other measures facilitating attendance explains paragraph 2’s reference to the possibility of free compulsory education. Paragraph 3 of Article 14 provides for freedom of education. While the component of this freedom related to the possibility of running private schools without discrimination has been recognised in the EU context, the reference to the respect for the religious and philosophical

72 The Explanations to Art 52 read: ‘Articles where the meaning is the same as the corresponding Articles of the ECHR, but where the scope is wider … Article 14(1) corresponds to Article 2 of the Protocol to the ECHR, but its scope is extended to cover access to vocational and continuing training, Article 14(3) corresponds to Article 2 of the Protocol to the ECHR as regards the rights of parents.’ 73 Case C-73/08 Bressol (n 12) [79].



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convictions of parents is innovative. As demonstrated abundantly by the ECtHR case law, this respect touches the core of any education system since it relates to its organisation. The fact that the EU itself cannot deal with such dimension of education, because it does not have the competence to do so, explains the reason for making reference to national laws governing the issue. Indeed, Article 51(2) of the Charter explicitly excludes that this document enlarges the EU’s competences. This does not exclude however that the Court could, one day, be called upon to decide about the respect of educational choices of EU citizens in a host Member State in terms of non-discrimination.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 14.40 The overarching limitation to the interpretation of the right to education provided by Article 14 follows from Article 52 of the Charter. The right to education in fact falls under the scope of both paragraphs 2 and 3 of that provision: Article 14 corresponds prima facie to Article 2P1 of the Convention, but, because of its evolution in the EU legal order, to the extent that it is linked to the free movement of EU citizens, it is also a right which is ‘based on the Community Treaties and the Treaty on European Union’. It follows from this ‘double nature’ that the right to education must be exercised ‘under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’. It has been amply demonstrated in the previous paragraphs what these conditions and limits are. More specifically, the actual limitations applicable to the right to education for EU nationals follow from the residence restrictions imposed by the secondary legislation, in particular Directive 2004/38 (see section A). 14.41 As a rule, freedom of movement of EU citizens may be derogated when justified on grounds of public policy, public security, and public health and the derogatory measures must be appropriate, proportional to the goal to achieve, and comply with the fundamental rights of the individual subject to them.74 The Court of Justice has applied its traditional doctrine also to the free movement of students in relation to equal access to higher education and vocational training. When considering national legislation restricting access, the Court has affirmed that these restrictions must be ‘limited to what is necessary in order to obtain the objectives pursued and must allow sufficiently wide access by the students to higher education’.75 In the Bressol case, Belgium claimed that an influx of students from other Member States was deemed to put at risk the quality of the training and the long-term quality of the health system. The Court concluded that the Belgian legislation imposing restrictions on the enrolment for the first time of non-resident students in medical and paramedical courses was incompatible with Articles 18 and 21 TFEU unless justified by the objective of protection of public health.76 Similarly, the Court has rejected residence conditions restricting access of students to education grants based on budgetary constraints, as advanced by Germany and Luxembourg. In the Giersch case, while recognising Member States’ competence to organise their system of education grants to achieve budgetary objectives, the Court nonetheless concluded that the sole criterion of residence goes beyond what is necessary to attain such objectives and listed a series of alternative measures

74 See Cases: 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219; C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925; and C-368/95 Familiapress v Bauer [1997] ECR I-3689. 75 Case C-73/08 Bressol (n 12) [79]. 76 The Court analysed at length the arguments presented by the Belgian government, thereby providing detailed guidelines to the national court as to how to strike the balance between the two competing objectives.

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which could achieve that same goal (eg financial aid conditioned to the student returning to the provider country after the study abroad to work and reside).77 The Court of Justice, on the contrary, has not recognised as applicable to teachers any 14.42 derogation to freedom of movement of workers in reason of participation to employment in the public service. Starting from the status of trainee-teacher, the Court has progressively affirmed that the provisions of free movement of workers cover all kinds of teaching activities.78 According to the Court, employment in the public service means ‘those posts which involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and in the discharge of functions whose purpose is to safeguard the general interest of the State or of other public authorities and which therefore requires a special relationship of allegiance to the State on the part of persons occupying them and reciprocity and duties which form the foundation of the bond of nationality’.79 Teaching activities would not fall under this definition.

V. Remedies Most of the evolution of the EU’s competence in relation to education and vocational train- 14.43 ing has occurred through the case law of the Court of Justice via preliminary rulings or interinstitutional litigation. Thus, the EU offers an indirect protection of the right to education because it is for the national court to deal with any national proceeding and refer an issue to the EU Court in the form of a preliminary ruling. It is also for the national jurisdiction to take the final decision. Therefore, it may be assumed that litigation on national legislation implementing treaty provisions or secondary legislation dealing with the equal access to education and vocational training before the Court of Justice would continue to be the main venue for redress. From this perspective the Charter does not provide an additional remedy because it applies to the action of the EU institutions and bodies and to the Member States when implementing EU law. Given the fact that competence to provide education remains with the states, and that the EU competences in this respect are limited to favouring cooperation, Article 14 would become relevant mainly in litigation concerning freedom of movement and equal treatment, most probably in combination with Article 45 of the Charter.

E. Evaluation Since the drafters of the Charter have been particularly careful in laying down clear limitations 14.44 to the potential impact of the Charter by way of reference to the existing conditions and limits defined by the treaties (Art 52(2), where the Charter rights are based on the Treaties), the legal framework of the EU notion of the right to education has been determined from the outset. While in the past the Court of Justice did not refer to the right to education as a general principle

77 Case C-20/12 Giersch (n 6) [79]. In that same case, the Court also concluded that the residence requirement was appropriate, but beyond what was necessary to attain the legitimate objective of Luxembourg to increase the proportion of the resident population with a higher degree to develop national economy. 78 See Cases: 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wurttemberg [1986] ECR 2121; 33/88 Allué and Coonan v Universitá degli Studi di Venezia [1989] ECR 1612 (university foreign language assistants); C-4/91 Bleis v Ministère de l’Education Nationale [1991] ECR I-5627 (secondary school teacher); and C-290/94 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-3285 (all teaching activities). 79 Case Lawrie-Blum (n 78) [27].



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of Community law to ensure its protection in the EU legal order, but rather protected it within the scope of free movement, it could now do so because the Charter represents the binding catalogue of EU fundamental rights. However, as witnessed by case law following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,80 the Court of Justice is rather continuing to afford protection of the right to education in connection with the likewise fundamental freedoms of free movement and residence of EU citizens. Thus, the Charter does not challenge how the right to education has been, and may continue to be protected in the EU context. It is the state which must establish an education system, make it accessible to everyone, and ensure the enforceability of the right to education. The EU legal order recognises this state power and ensures the equality of treatment for EU citizens with respect to access to the national education systems and to the related benefits. However, if the state were to remain inactive, the EU would be powerless since the organisation of education lies outside its competence as foreseen in Articles 165 and 166 TFEU. 14.45 Nonetheless, qualifying the educational rights as developed in the EU context as composing a fundamental right to education for EU citizens advances the recognition of the relevance of European integration to the individuals. Even if it does not add substance to the right itself, it stands to witness that the integration process has made it possible for EU citizens, through the principle of equal treatment, to enjoy rights otherwise beyond their reach. 14.46 It remains fairly safe to conclude that no major developments will occur as a consequence of the Charter in respect of the right to education. The Charter could rather help with the refinement of the so-called ‘ancillary rights’ relating to the right to education, such as equal access to social benefits, maintenance aid and grants, etc. As it is, the case in general for the catalogue of rights provided by the Charter, Article 14, alone or in combination with Article 45, could serve the role of providing an additional legal benchmark against which to check EU institutions’ legislation and Member States’ related implementation to guarantee equal access to education and training. It is surprising that the Court remains reluctant to seize the occasion of the recent cases dealing with education to recognise this role for Article 14.



80 Case

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Article 15* Article 15 Freedom to Choose an Occupation and Right to Engage in Work 1. Everyone has the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation. 2. Every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State. 3. Nationals of third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States are entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 15 Freedom to choose an occupation, as enshrined in Article 15(1), is recognised in Court of Justice case law (see inter alia judgment of 14 May 1974, Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491, paragraphs 12 to 14 of the grounds; judgment of 13 December 1979, Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727; judgment of 8 October 1986, Case 234/85 Keller [1986] ECR 2897, paragraph 8 of the grounds). This paragraph also draws upon Article 1(2) of the European Social Charter, which was signed on 18 October 1961 and has been ratified by all the Member States, and on point 4 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 9 December 1989. The expression ‘working conditions’ is to be understood in the sense of Article 156 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Paragraph 2 deals with the three freedoms guaranteed by Articles 26, 45, 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, namely freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. Paragraph 3 has been based on Article 153(1)(g) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and on Article 19(4) of the European Social Charter signed on 18 October 1961 and ratified by all the Member States. Article 52(2) of the Charter is therefore applicable. The question of recruitment of seamen having the nationality of third States for the crews of vessels flying the flag of a Member State of the Union is governed by Union law and national legislation and practice.

Select Bibliography P Alston, ‘The General Comments of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2010) 104 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (The American Society International Law) 4–7. D Ashiagbor, ‘The Right to Work’ in G de Búrca and B de Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). ——, The European Employment Strategy: Labour Market Regulation and New Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). M Bell, ‘Walking in the Same Direction? The Contribution of the European Social Charter and the European Union to Combating Discrimination’ in G de Búrca and B de Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). H Collins, ‘Is there a Human Right to Work?’ in V. Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work—Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford, Hart, 2015).

* This chapter was written by Diamond Ashgiabor in the first edition. It has been updated by Virginia Mantouvalou and Eleni Frantziou in the second edition.

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M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998). S Deakin, ‘Article 1—The Right to Work’ in N Bruun, K Lorcher, I Schoemann and S Clauwaert (eds), The European Social Charter and the Employment Relation (Oxford, Hart, 2017) 147. J Elster, ‘Self-realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life’ (1986) Social Philosophy & Policy 97–126. ——, ‘Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?’ in A Gutmann (ed), Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988). E Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in the European Union: A Constitutional Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2019). B Hepple, ‘A Right to Work?’ (1981) 10 (1) Industrial Law Journal 65–83. D Little, ‘Job Elster’ in W Samuels (ed), New Horizons in Economic Thought: Appraisals of Leading Economists (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1992). V Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford, Hart, 2015). ——, ‘Work and Private Life: Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania’, (2005) European Law Review 575. G Mundlak, ‘The Right to Work: Linking Human Rights and Employment Policy’ (2007) 146 (3–4) International Labour Review 189–215. C O’Cinneide, ‘The Right to Work in International Human Rights Law’ in V Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work—Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford, Hart, 2015). A Supiot et al, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).

A.  Article 15 and the Scope of EU Law 15.01 As the Explanations to the Charter acknowledge, from its earliest jurisprudence, the Court has sought to reassure Member States that EU law respects facets of the right to work which are contained in national constitutions, such as the right freely to choose and practise one’s trade or profession.1 15.02 Early case law highlights the potential of the right now enshrined in Article 15 to constrain EU legislative and administrative action, granting individuals a right enforceable as against EU institutions. This is exemplified in Hauer,2 in which it was argued that the prohibition on new vine plantings imposed by Commission regulation infringed the applicant’s fundamental freedom to pursue her occupation as a wine-grower; and in Keller, where it was argued that Council Regulations limiting the terminology which German producers could use to describe their table wines were incompatible with the freedom to pursue their trade, guaranteed in the Grundgesetz (the German Basic Law).3 15.03 However, the Court also acknowledged in Nold that the right to work can be limited to accommodate the overall objectives of the EU, provided that its substance remains untouched.4 The reason for this is that Article 15 interacts with the economic freedoms central to the internal market, which are now contained in Articles 26, 45, 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—the freedom of movement for workers, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. These freedoms, alongside the competences of the Union in the coordination of social policy set out in Chapter X TFEU (and, particularly, Articles 153 and 156 thereof, which are specifically mentioned in the Explanations), provide a context for delineating the right to work within EU law.

1 Case

4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491 [12]–[14]. 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727 [31]–[32]. 3 Case 234/85 Keller [1986] ECR 2897 [8]. 4 Nold (n 1) [14]. 2 Case

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These dimensions of the right to work can be seen in the way in which the separate subsections 15.04 of Article 15 are addressed to different right-holders. First, the broadest manifestation of the right to work, enjoyed by ‘everyone’, is the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen occupation (Art 15(1)). But for EU citizens, this right also entails the more specific freedom to engage in cross-border economic activity as a worker, self-employed person or service provider, conferred by the TFEU and reflected in Article 15(2). According to the Court of Justice, a logical component of this right of citizens to move freely is that they also enjoy a right to work: in Collins, the Court noted that EU citizens are entitled to equal treatment with nationals not only in respect of access to work, but also with regard to the social and tax advantages associated with employment.5 So, a defining feature of the right to work in Article 15 is that it very much reinforces the freedom of EU citizens to be economically active across the territory of EU Member States. Indeed, where the right to work is invoked against Member State restrictions on the single market, such as in Gardella (concerning the recognition of work in another Member State for pension purposes), AV and BU and Haralambidis (concerning appointments to port authorities), the Court has treated the market freedoms as a lex specialis for Article 15.6 In contrast, the right of third-country nationals to work and to choose an occupation does 15.05 not encompass rights to free movement between Member States. Rather, as Article 15(3) makes clear, their rights have a specifically EU dimension only once third-country nationals acquire authorisation to work within a Member State, which then entitles them to treatment equivalent to EU citizens in respect of their working conditions.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 15 with Other Provisions of the Charter The freedom to choose, which is at the heart of Article 15, encapsulates a liberty-right of each 15.06 individual to pursue an occupation without arbitrary restrictions.7 At a general level, it can be said that Article 15 resonates with Article 1 of the Charter, on human dignity, because the freedom not to be forced to work is justified by the value of dignity. The right to work links to the concept of dignity in another sense, too: that the content of the work must be dignified or decent. Related to the notion of free choice of work is Article 5 of the Charter, which prohibits slavery and forced labour: the compulsion to engage in labour, or the condition of servitude, would be egregious breaches of the principle in Article 15. Article 15 also resonates strongly with Article 16 of the Charter, which protects the freedom to 15.07 conduct a business—and indeed, both Articles are based on case law in which the Court recognised the freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity.8 Nevertheless, the Court has sought to clarify that, albeit linked, these provisions have a different scope: Article 16 exemplifies the freedom of enterprise, whereas Article 15 is addressed to individuals seeking to participate in the free market.9 In this sense, Article 15(2) can be seen as complementing Article 45 of the Charter, 5 Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703. 6 Case C-233/12 Gardella [2013] EU:C:2013:449 [39]; Case C-465/18 AV and BU [2019], EU:C:2019:1125 [31]; Case C-270/13 Haralambidis [2014] EU:C:2014:2185 [61]–[62]; see also Case C-237/18 Stiernon [2018] EU:C:2018:630 [22]–[24]. 7 On this aspect of the right to work, see H Collins, ‘Is there a Human Right to Work?’ in V Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 17 at 21. 8 Nold (n 1). 9 Case 134/15 Lidl [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:498 [26]; For a fuller analysis, see the Opinion of AG Bobek in this case, EU:C:2016:169 [20]–[30] and, especially, [27].



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15.08

15.09

15.10

15.11

which confers on every EU citizen the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Equally, if one considers Article 15 as enshrining a right to be economically active in the labour market, then it presupposes a right to access employment without being arbitrarily excluded, and a right not to be deprived of work without some form of due process. Article 15 thus interacts with a series of provisions of the Charter dealing with non-discrimination, working conditions and protection from unjustified dismissal. The absence of any possibility to engage in work can negatively impact the right to private and family life, enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter. In line with Article 15(3), the Charter right to work does not regulate the parameters of granting authorisation to work in the EU.10 However, in M v Ministerstvo vnitra, the Court’s Grand Chamber endorsed the analysis of Advocate General Wathelet, who argued that, taken in conjunction with Article 7, it may be found to amount to a right not to be excluded from the labour market in certain circumstances (eg refugees released from prison, who are precluded from exercising the right work yet cannot be returned to their state of origin).11 With regard to non-discrimination in employment, there is already a long tradition—as seen in the interpretation of the European Social Charter (ESC)—linking prohibition of discrimination in respect of access to employment with the overall right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen occupation.12 A similar linkage between non-discrimination and the right to work can be seen in the context of the EU Charter, and in particular Articles 21 and 23 of Title III on Equality, which enshrine an open-ended right to non-discrimination and a more specific protection of gender equality, respectively. Exclusions from the labour market attributable to a failure to accommodate, eg a person’s age, gender or disability, have been related to Article 15 both by the Court and in a series of Opinions by Advocates General.13 Furthermore, the right to work encompasses more than freedom from coercion or freedom of occupation. The right to work in the broader sense entails a more positive dimension, which neatly ties Article 15 to aspects of Title IV on Solidarity. More specifically, the right to work presupposes a right to have work (which suggests a concomitant duty on the state or on employers to provide work), thus linking this provision to the right to access a free placement service, found in Article 29 of the Charter. The right to work also presupposes rights at work, such that the work is dignified or decent—what one might think of as the job security and ‘fair working conditions’ aspects of the right to work. This is in line with the decent work agenda of the International Labour Organisation. Similarly, as the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights asserts: Work as specified in article 6 of the Covenant [the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] must be decent work. This is work that respects the fundamental rights of the human person as well as the rights of workers in terms of conditions of work safety and remuneration.14

10 On this point, see the Opinion of AG Szpunar in Case C-544/15 Fahimian [2016] EU:C:2016:908 [29]. 11 Joined Cases C-391/16 M v Ministerstvo vnitra and C-77-78/17 X v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides [2019] EU:C:2018:486 [109]; and Opinion of AG Wathelet in the same case, EU:C:2018:486 [134]. 12 D Ashiagbor, ‘The Right to Work’ in G de Búrca and B de Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe (Oxford, OUP, 2005) 252–53. 13 See, eg, Case C-159/10 Fuchs and Köhler [2011] EU:C:2011:508 [62]–[63]; Case C-141/11 Hörnfeldt [2012] EU:C:2012:421 [37]; Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-546/11 Dansk Jurist [2013] EU:C:2013:68 [71] (age discrimination); Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-312/17 Bedi [2018] EU:C:2018:336 [51] (disability discrimination); Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-356/09 Kleist [2010] EU:C:2010:532 [51] (gender discrimination). 14 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No 18 on the Right to Work’, adopted 24 November 2005, UN Doc E/C 12/GC/18, 6 February 2006 [7].

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On the basis of an understanding of the right to work as a right to decent work, Articles 27 (work- 15.12 ers’ right to information and consultation) and 28 (right to collective bargaining and action) also have strong connections with the provision, because the protection of these rights can be viewed as essential for decent work. The right to work further links with the right to fair and just working conditions in Article 31 of the Charter, which has started to feature prominently in recent case law.15 Similarly, any failure to protect workers against unlawful dismissal contrary to Article 30 could well amount to a breach of Article 15. The right to protection from ­unjustified dismissal is a provision which can be seen as a necessary corollary of the right to work, in two respects: first, dismissal deprives an individual of the ability to exercise their freely chosen ­occupation; second, dismissal without good cause diminishes the quality of the chosen work. Article 15 also chimes with Article 32 of the Charter on the prohibition of child labour and 15.13 protection of young people at work: the two provisions are mutually reinforcing, although they approach the same issue in different ways. Article 32 is motivated by a concern to protect children from economic exploitation, whilst Article 15 focuses on work being freely chosen. In the same way that slavery or forced labour would violate the right to work, so the exposure of children to work which is likely to interfere with their development or physical or mental health, or which is exploitative economically, would likewise run contrary to the principles underpinning Article 15. Finally, Article 15 can be related to procedural rights and, especially, the right to an effective 15.14 remedy, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. That is because, whereas the right to work may be subject to restrictions imposed, for example, by criminal law, as the Court affirmed in PI, the justifiability and proportionality of such restrictions is strongly compromised when they are not accompanied by a statement of reasons or follow a clear and transparent administrative process.16

C.  Sources of Article 15 Rights I.  European Convention of Human Rights and European Social Charter The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) makes no express reference to the right to 15.15 work, but the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has derived aspects of the right from Article 8 of the Convention, which protects the right to private life.17 In addition, Article 4 of the ECHR prohibits slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour, a provision that is related to a right to decent work, as analysed earlier, but also to free choice of work. The aspects of the right to work which have been recognised by the Strasbourg Court via these provisions can be seen as constituting a minimum obligation in the interpretation of Article 15 of the Charter, in line with Article 52(3) thereof. This reinforces the argument that Article 15 relates to aspects of private and family life and that it may give rise to a series of obligations not to be excluded from work in the absence of a meaningful choice to seek work elsewhere, as highlighted in section B above. Additionally, the Council of Europe’s other human rights instrument, the ESC, prominently 15.16 features the right to work in Article 1.18 Article 1(1) of the ESC provides that the right to work is

15 See, eg, Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Bauer [2018] EU:C:2018:871; Case C-684/16 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft [2018] EU:C:2018:874; and Case C-55/18 CCOO [2019] EU:C:2019:402. 16 Case C-230/18 PI [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:383 [81], [91]. 17 See Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania 2004-VIII DR; 42 EHRR 104. For analysis, see V Mantouvalou, ‘Work and Private Life: Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 573. 18 See C O’Cinneide, ‘The Right to Work in International Human Rights Law’ in Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work (n 7) 99, and S Deakin, ‘Article 1—The Right to Work’ in N Bruun, K Lorcher, I Schoemann and S Clauwaert (eds), The European Social Charter and the Employment Relation (Oxford, Hart, 2017) 147.



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best understood as an obligation of the state (to maintain a high and stable level of employment). Article 1(2) highlights the economic freedom aspect (the right of the worker to earn his or her living), whereby the Contracting Parties undertake ‘to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon’. 15.17 The European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) views Article 1(2) as the core of the right, which it interprets as including a prohibition of discrimination in employment, the prohibition of forced labour and the prohibition of practice that interferes with the right to earn a living in a freely chosen occupation.19 Still, although the focus in the ESC is on making work available for those who are seeking it, in interpreting the obligation imposed on states, the ECSR has been careful not to equate the right to work with a duty on states to guarantee a job for everyone who wants one.20 Rather, the ECSR understands the objective of full employment in Article 1(1) as requiring states to adopt a coherent employment policy which aspires to full employment. Moreover, the ECSR has deemed the right to work to be of ‘fundamental importance’ since 15.18 the effective exercise of several essential rights contained in the ESC—rights to just conditions of work, to safe and healthy working conditions, to fair remuneration and to organise and bargain collectively—is ‘inconceivable unless the right to work is guaranteed first’.21 This suggests that there is a relationship of indivisibility and interdependence between these rights, with the right to work being a pre-condition for the enjoyment of other rights. It is significant that, as the Explanations to the Charter note, Article 15 is rooted in the freedom, 15.19 recognised in Article 1(2) ESC, to choose one’s economic activities, rather than in the other ESC subsections which locate the right to work in the idea of access to, and availability of, work. So, the most prominent dimension of the ESC’s understanding of the right to work—namely, the right to have work made available, implying a duty on the state to provide work—is missing from the EU’s version of this right. Furthermore, despite the fact that other ESC rights are protected in the Charter’s Solidarity Title, neither the Explanations to the Charter nor the Court’s case law attribute them to the right to work.

II.  UN Treaties 15.20 Article 23(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that ‘Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment’. Several UN legal instruments recognise the right to work as a fundamental right. In particular, 15.21 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) deals with this right arguably more comprehensively than any other instrument. There is a range of jurisprudence, offering guidance in the construction of the right to work, including the Draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,22 and the General Comment on the right to work.23

19 O’Cinneide, ibid 115. 20 Council of Europe, European Social Charter: A Short Guide, 2000, 119. 21 Council of Europe, European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusion I (First Supervision cycle, 1969–70, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom) 13. 22 Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 23 General Comment No 18 (n 14). See G Mundlak, ‘The Right to Work: Linking Human Rights and Employment Policy’ (2007) 146 (3–4) International Labour Review 189–215.

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The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued a General Comment on 15.22 Article 6 of the ICESCR on the right to work. Whilst not legally binding, the General Comments issued by the Committee carry ‘considerable legal weight’.24 As Alston notes, the Committee seeks to maximise the value of its General Comments by making them ‘relatively detailed, closely aligned to the text of the Covenant, and overtly interpretative’,25 with Article 6 being interpreted as ‘laying down specific legal obligations rather than a simple philosophical principle’.26 General Comment No 18 makes mention of the right to work in Article 6, which is the proclamation of the right in a general manner, and then explains that Article 7 (right to fair and just working conditions) further develops the individual dimension of the right to work, and Article 8 (trade union rights) develops its collective dimension.27 It claims that Articles 6, 7 and 8 are interdependent.28 From the wording of the General Comment, it is a right that every human being has simply by virtue of being human. In addition, the right to work is recognised in the following UN instruments: 15.23 —— Article 8 paragraph 3(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); —— Article 5 paragraph (e)(i) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; —— Article 11 paragraph 1(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; —— Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and —— Articles 11, 25, 26, 40, 52 and 54 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

III.  Other Sources Beyond the sources already listed, a number of regional instruments recognise the right to work, 15.24 which can offer interpretive value for Article 15—albeit not mentioned in the Explanations or the Court’s rulings. These include the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Art 15) and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 6). These instruments affirm the principle that respect for the right to work imposes on states parties an obligation to take measures aimed at the realisation of full employment.29 Article 15 of the African Charter, in particular, focuses on the right to work ‘under equitable 15.25 and satisfactory conditions’, and to receive equal pay for equal work, whilst the Additional Protocol to the American Convention talks of the right to work as including ‘the opportunity to secure the means for living a dignified and decent existence by performing a freely elected or accepted lawful activity’. This highlights the notion of the right to work as an essential means for realising other human rights, and as inherent and integral to human dignity.

24 M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998) 91. 25 P Alston, ‘The General Comments of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2010) 104 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (The American Society International Law) 4–7. 26 General Comment No 18 (n 14) 2. 27 General Comment No 18 (n 14) [2]. 28 General Comment No 18 (n 14) [8]. 29 General Comment No 18 (n 14).



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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 15.26 Is the right to work an economic freedom only, imposing primarily duties to refrain from interference? Or is the right to work better conceived as having positive dimensions, allowing individuals to attain self-realisation through work?30 Does exploitative work comply with the requirements of the right to work? 15.27 Whilst drawing upon Article 1(2) ESC, and thus recognising the economic freedom aspect of the right to work, Article 15 of the EU Charter makes no mention of full employment or the duty of the state to provide employment. The core of the right to work is located in the freedom to earn a living in a freely chosen occupation,31 coupled with the free movement rights granted to those who are also EU citizens.32 15.28 The right to work as contained in Article 15, therefore, has a relatively narrow theoretical base and justification, when compared with the way in which the right to work is recognised in ILO, Council of Europe or UN instruments. Whilst Article 15 places emphasis primarily on one dimension of the right to work, elsewhere there is a clearer articulation of a number of distinct but interdependent elements of this right. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights identifies three elements: availability, accessibility and acceptability/quality of work. Availability refers to the need for states to have in place specialised services to assist and support individuals to find employment: this much is reflected in Articles 1(3) and 1(4) of the ESC as well, which place an obligation on Contracting Parties to establish or maintain free employment services, and systems of vocational guidance or training. Accessibility of work requires measures to prohibit discrimination in entry to the labour market or particular jobs. Acceptability and quality speak to the need to guarantee just and favourable working conditions.33 15.29 On the one hand, Article 15 has generally supported the interpretation of market freedoms alongside other fundamental rights, such as Article 47 and the provisions of the Solidarity chapter. On the other hand, its influence on accessibility of work has been more limited, while it has not had any apparent influence on the availability of work through, for instance, the introduction of a positive obligation to secure employment.

II.  Scope of Application 15.30 The right to work is addressed to ‘Everyone’, a more generous personal scope than other rights connected to the right to work: for example, the right to protection against unjustified dismissal in Article 30 is addressed to ‘Every worker’, as is the right in Article 31(2) to limits on working hours and to annual leave. The wide scope of the main provision in Article 15(1) also stands in contrast to the more particular specification of beneficiaries in Articles 15(2) and 15(3): explicit mention is made of the rights of third-country nationals authorised to work in the territories of the Member States to working conditions which are equivalent to those of citizens of the Union. Thus, it would seem from an initial reading of the provision that the related right to equal treatment in work enjoys a narrower personal scope than the basic right to work.



30 Collins

(n 7) 32. (n 12) 242. 32 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-119/04 Commission v Italy [2006] EU:C:2006:65 [36]. 33 General Comment No 18 (n 14) [12]. 31 Ashiagbor

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The breadth of the right enshrined in Article 15(1) has nevertheless not resulted in a positive 15.31 interpretation of the right to work as a right to access work, even though this has occasionally been suggested—albeit in a limited way and within the bounds of Article 51 of the Charter—in Opinions of Advocates General.34 Similarly, there is no case law under Article 15 that scrutinises measures to combat 15.32 unemployment or foster access to employment. First, the Charter’s protection of a right of access to a placement service (Article 29) has not been mentioned in any final judgments to date, thus preventing a concrete linkage between the right to work and the state obligation to assist job-seekers. Secondly, in ONEm and M, the Court refused to attach to Article 15(2) a requirement to pay unemployment benefits to part-time workers (as would have been the case for job-seekers), thus failing to build into its reasoning a discussion of whether the Charter right to work amounts to a right to decent work.35 The Court’s interpretation of the scope of the protection in Article 15 thus raises questions as 15.33 to whether this right should be further aligned with the sources of the right to work in European and international human rights law. Indeed, Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. As highlighted earlier, the Strasbourg Court has recognised aspects of the right to work as concrete elements of the right to private and family life and has also decided a line of cases on servitude, and forced and compulsory labour.36 The other international statements of rights on which the Charter draws in its preamble, including the ESC, do not benefit from a similar interpretive provision to the one involving the ECHR. Bob Hepple argued that, by analogy with the respect granted to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, interpretations by the European Committee of Social Rights under the ESC should be of at least persuasive value.37 While that is indeed suggested by the Explanatory note to Article 15, the Court has never actively used interpretations of the ESC to support its reasoning in judgments regarding this provision.

III.  Specific Provisions As the Explanations make clear, Article 15(3) is based on Article 153(g) TFEU, which empowers 15.34 the Union to support and complement the activities of Member States with regard to conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory. Article 15(3) recognises the right to work of third-country nationals, but does so only to the 15.35 extent that they are authorised to work in the territories of the Members States. In other words, Article 15(3) does not change the legal position of third-country nationals in terms of rights of access to national labour markets or free movement within the EU.38 To do so would have had the effect of extending EU competence—modifying the powers of the Union, contrary to the restriction in Article 51(2) of the EU Charter. Furthermore, Article 52(2) of the EU Charter is

34 See, in particular, the Opinion of AG Wathelet in M (n 11) and the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Bedi (n 13). 35 Case C-284/15 ONEm and M [2016] EU:C:2016:220 [33]–[34]. 36 Siliadin v France App no 73316/01 (Judgment of 26 July 2005); Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (Judgment of 10 January 2010); Chowdury and Others v Greece App no 21885/15 (Judgment of 30 March 2017). 37 B Hepple, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 30 (2) Industrial Law Journal 225–31, 226. 38 There is no single treaty base granting rights to third-country nationals (TCNs), although Art 79 TFEU refers to the development of a common immigration policy, which would encompass conditions of entry and residence and the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State.



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applicable: rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. 15.36 Second, third-country nationals are granted entitlement to equivalent, not equal, working conditions to those of citizens of the Union. At first sight, therefore, Article 15 does not extend the principle of equal treatment to third-country nationals with regard to rights at work. As the Explanatory Document confirms, ‘working conditions’, for this purpose, are to be understood in the sense of Article 156 TFEU. This suggests an exclusion of a right to fair remuneration, since Article 153(5) TFEU puts pay outside the competence of Union social policy. 15.37 Having said that, it is clear from elsewhere in the Charter that third-country nationals are entitled to protection against unjustified dismissal (Art 30), to working conditions which respect their health, safety and dignity (Art 31(1)) and to limits on maximum working hours, rest periods and annual leave (Art 31(2)) since these rights apply to ‘every worker’. Furthermore, the Explanations also note that Article 15(3) has been based on Article 19(4) of the European Social Charter. Article 19 ESC deals broadly with the right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance; with Article 19(4) more specifically and expressly requiring that Contracting Parties secure for migrant workers lawfully within their territories ‘treatment not less favourable than that of their own nationals’ with regard to remuneration and other working conditions; trade union membership and the benefits of collective bargaining. 15.38 Despite the fact that several employment rights are protected in the EU Charter and that, as analysed above, important links can be drawn between these provisions and the right to work, mentions of the right to work in the Court’s interpretations of these rights remain scarce.39

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 15.39 Article 15 does not contain any express limitations on the right to work, although it is of course subject to the final provisions of the Charter and, in particular, the pronouncement in Article 52(1) that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms in the Charter must ‘be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’, and subject to the principle of proportionality. As made clear in some of the earliest of the Court’s human rights jurisprudence, rights freely to choose and practice one’s trade or profession can, if n ­ ecessary, be restricted: such rights may be subject to limitations laid down in accordance with the public interest or subject to limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the Union, on condition that the substance of these rights is left untouched.40 15.40 This approach has been confirmed in more recent case law.41 The following more specific trends with regard to limitations of the right to work may be observed. First, when it comes to Member State limitations, the Court appears to assess their justifiability by employing a reasonableness analysis, generally accepting national measures that pursue a legitimate aim and

39 A detailed search on curia.europa.eu of Article 15 on August 5 2019 (search terms “15 of the Charter”, “15(1) of the Charter”, “15(2) of the Charter”, “15(3) of the Charter” on 5 August 2019 revealed that this provision was been mentioned in 13 judgments and orders and 16 Opinions at the Court of Justice level (as well as in four judgments by the General Court). Update of 9 November 2020: the provision was also mentioned in the judgment of the Court in AV and BU (n 6) on 19 December 2019. This is overall a low number of judgments at the Court of Justice level and can be contrasted to provisions with which the right to paid annual leave is closely related, such as the freedom to conduct a business, which has been mentioned in at least 33 judgments (based on the same search for Article 16). 40 Nold (n 1) [12]–[14]. 41 PI (n 16) [66]; see also Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis [2016] EU:C:2016:972 [70].

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do not compromise the essence of the right to work.42 As highlighted earlier, though, the intensity of the Court’s scrutiny varies, and has been closer to a strict proportionality standard where the right to work is restricted in a procedurally unfair manner or coincides with discrimination.43 Secondly, in tune again with its early case law, the Court has consistently resisted an understanding of the freedom to choose an occupation and to engage in work as a right to work free of regulatory restraints. It has thus taken a cautious approach towards challenges to EU measures perceived as rendering work more difficult or restricted, such as fishing quotas,44 rules on professional privilege45 and asset-freezing (restricting not the possibility of work, but the enjoyment of its fruits by barring access to funds).46

V. Remedies How should the right to work, prevalent in so many human rights instruments, be enforced? 15.41 To talk meaningfully about remedies, one needs to clarify, as Hepple does, against whom this right can be asserted: the state; the employer, or other workers and trade unions.47 Instruments such as Article 1(1) ESC and the ILO Employment Policy Convention No 122, 15.42 which premise the right to work on overcoming unemployment, promoting full employment, and making work available, arguably cannot be the subject of individual rights but, according to Hepple, fall purely within the realm of social policy.48 Article 15 of the Charter entails differences in this regard. Not only is it couched in the language of rights, rather than aspirational principles (a critique applicable to some of the employment rights listed within the Solidarity chapter, such as Article 27),49 but, as noted earlier, it had already been recognised before the Charter’s entry into force as a possible limit on EU legislative action.50 Indeed, individuals have, albeit perhaps not as frequently as with other provisions of the Charter, successfully invoked the right to work to challenge the legality of certain Member State measures, thus having those measures invalidated and/or securing compensation, as appropriate. For example, the Court has found that the closure of business premises on suspicion of unauthorised prostitution taking place therein, with no possibility to challenge the closure decision and without the grounds being communicated to the owner, constituted a breach of Article 15 in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter.51 It follows that Article 15 entails a duty to respect the right of individuals to freely enter a chosen profession by the EU and the Member States, and allows its enforcement against EU and Member State authorities before national and EU courts. But there is a broader question of whether a state-backed right to work follows from Article 15, 15.43 as well. Jon Elster, reflecting on the value of meaningful work for self-respect, contemplates a legally enforceable right to work as embedded in the modern welfare state.52 Whereas, ultimately, Elster rejects such a role for the state, arguing that the necessary state subsidy for work would 42 See, eg, Case C-447/15 Muladi, EU:C:2016:533 [51]; Gardella (n 6) [39]. See also the Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-190/16 Fries [2017] EU:C:2017:225 [65]–[78]. 43 PI (n 16) [81]; Haralambidis (n 6) [61]. 44 See, eg, Case C-611/12 P Giordano [2014] EU:C:2014:2282. 45 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:229 [159]. 46 Case T-216/17 Mabrouk [2018] ECLI:EU:T:2018:779 [101]–[114]. 47 B Hepple, ‘A Right to Work?’ (1981) 10 (1) Industrial Law Journal 65–83. 48 Ibid 70. 49 On this, see further: Lord Goldsmith QC, ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ (2001) 38 (5) CML Rev 1201. 50 Nold (n 1); Hauer (n 2); Keller (n 3). 51 PI (n 16) [91]. 52 J Elster, ‘Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?’ in Amy Gutmann (ed), Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988).



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undermine the satisfaction and self-respect that one could derive from it,53 a series of other duties lie in the grey zone between respect and active fulfilment of the right to work, which need to be considered. 15.44 First, there are duties to protect this right by preventing third parties—such as employers or trade unions—from interfering with its enjoyment. It is under this rubric that one can consider job security and fair working conditions or decent work aspects of the right to work. The obligation on states to protect the right to work—rather than simply not to interfere with it—requires measures to prevent the violation of this right by individuals, groups (eg trade unions) and corporations, through appropriate legislative action. As already highlighted under D.II above, this is an aspect of the right to work that neither the Charter’s text nor the Court’s case law grapple with. A limited exception to this resides in cases dealing with the right to non-discrimination, where the Court has acknowledged the need for Member States to ‘promote diversity in the workforce’ in line with the Preamble to Directive 2000/78, when read in the light of the right to work—yet, this case law concerns the interpretation of existing legislation already listing this goal, rather than an active duty, eg to legislate for diversity.54 15.45 Secondly, the question identified by Bob Hepple, namely whether the right to work may be addressed not only to state actors but also to private parties themselves, remains a pressing one.55 The Charter of Fundamental Rights is capable of horizontal application in principle and the Court has found that some of its provisions which concern working conditions, as well as the right not to be discriminated against, enjoy horizontal direct effect.56 At least through its interaction with other provisions of EU law, therefore, the right to work can indirectly be invoked in disputes governed by private law in the courts of the Member States and may thus create obligations for private actors, such as employers and trade unions. In turn, to the extent that the right to work may be violated in cases of unjustified dismissal, remedies drawn from national employment law, such as reinstatement, will also be relevant here.57 Nevertheless, the right to work has not featured formally (ie by specific mention of Article 15) in case law in this field, so that it remains unclear whether it is in itself capable of forming the basis of remedies against private parties (eg in the positive sense of being provided with work). This can give rise to questions as to whether—and, if so, how—it could be used in cases of conflict between the market freedoms of the employers or with the rights of those employers, such as their freedom to conduct a business, protected by Article 16 of the Charter.58

E. Evaluation 15.46 Human rights instruments which recognise the ‘right to work’ rarely interrogate or question what is meant by ‘work’. Work is not an uncomplicated good. Not all types of work should 53 Ibid 74. See also Little (n 28). 54 Hörnfeldt (n 13) [37]; Fuchs and Köhler (n 13) [63]. 55 See further on this E Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in the European Union: A Constitutional Analysis (Oxford, OUP, 2019). 56 See, respectively: Bauer (n 15); and Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH [2010] ECR I-365; Case C-193/17 Cresco Investigation GmbH [2019] EU:C:2019:43. 57 J Howe, ‘Why Do So Few Employees Return to their Jobs? In Pursuit of a Right to Work Following Unfair Dismissal’ in Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work (n 7) 255. 58 See, for example, Case C-438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation & The Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line. ABP & Oü Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, where the Court’s analysis was based on the market ­freedoms, rather than the right to work of the posted workers. For further discussion of this point, see Frantziou (n 56), ch 5.

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be viewed as compatible with the right to work. This is particularly evident when this right is analysed in light of its underlying principles of non-exploitation or self-realisation. It has been argued that exploitative work can violate the right to work,59 and it has also been suggested that there should be a distinction between ‘work’ and ‘labour’.60 On the analysis that grounds the right to work on a principle of non-exploitation, workplace exploitation of undocumented workers, for instance, may violate aspects of the right to work. On the analysis that grounds the right on self-realisation, work is limited to jobs that have an opportunity for self-realisation, while labour is the performance of a task dictated by someone else. The Charter’s understanding of ‘work’ is still very much rooted in work as economic activity. 15.47 There is scope, however, as illustrated in human rights theory and in other human rights instruments such as the ICESCR and the African Charter, to develop the right to work as more than a means to attain an adequate standard of living, and more than wage labour or professional activity.





59 V

Mantouvalou, ‘The Right to Non-Exploitative Work’ in Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work (n 7) 39. (n 7) p 36.

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Article 16 Article 16 Freedom to Conduct a Business The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices is recognised.

Explanatory Note on Article 16 This chapter is based on Court of Justice case law which has recognised freedom to exercise an ­economic or commercial activity (see judgments of 14 May 1974, Case 4/73 Nold EU:C:1974:51, [1974] ECR 491, paragraph 14 of the grounds, and of 27 September 1979, Case 230-78 SpA Eridiana and others EU:C:1979:216, [1979] ECR 2749, paragraphs 20 and 31 of the grounds) and freedom of contract (see inter alia Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing judgment, Case 151/78 EU:C:1979:4, [1979] ECR 1, paragraph 19 of the grounds, and judgment of 5 October 1999, Case C-240/97 Spain v Commission EU:C:1999:479, [1999] ECR I-6571, paragraph 99 of the grounds) and Article 119(1) and (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which recognises free competition. Of course, this right is to be exercised with respect for Union law and national legislation. It may be subject to the limitations provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter.

Selected Bibliography B Bercusson ‘The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 279. LFM Besselink ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon: The Interaction between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and National Constitutions’ (General Report at the XXV FIDE [Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen] Congress, Tallinn, 31 May 2012), https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/1863964/122194_The_Protection_of_ Fundamental_Rights_post_Lisbon_FINAL_corrected.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=pt&client= firefox-b-d, accessed 5 April 2021. M Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’ in J Shaw & G More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995). ——, ‘The European Crisis of Economic Liberalism: Can the Law Help?’, in E Nanopoulos and F Vergis (eds) The Crisis behind the Eurocrisis: The Eurocrisis as a Multi-Dimensional Systemic Crisis of the EU (Cambridge University Press, 2019). E Gill-Pedro, ‘Freedom to Conduct Business in EU Law: Freedom from Interference or Freedom from Domination?’ (2017) 9(2) European Journal of Legal Studies 103. PH Goldsmith ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ (2001) 38(5) Common Market Law Review 1201. X Groussot, L Pech & GT Petursson, ‘The Scope of Application of EU Fundamental Rights on Member States’ Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication’, Eric Stein Working Paper No 1/2011, https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/228150881_The_Scope_of_Application_of_Fundamental_Rights_ on_Member_States%27_Action_In_Search_of_Certainty_in_EU_Adjudication, accessed 5 April 2021. C Joerges, ‘What is Left of the Integration through Law Project? A Reconstruction in Conflicts-Law Perspectives’ in K Günther and S Kadelbach (eds), Legal Cultures, Legal Transfer, and Legal Pluralism (Campus, 2012).

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C Joerges & F Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 1. M Markakis, ‘Can Governments Control Mass Layoffs by Employers? Economic Freedoms vs Labour Rights in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis’ (2017) 13(4) European Constitutional Law Review 724. M Monti, ‘EU Competition Policy After May 2004’ (speech at the Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, 24 October 2003), https://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-03-489_en.htm, accessed 5 April 2021. E Peel & GH Treitel, Treitel on the Law of Contract (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007). H Schwier, Der Schutz der ‘Unternehmerische Freiheit’ nach Artikel 16 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (Peter Lang, 2012). D Spielmann, ‘Article 16—Liberté d’Entreprise’, in EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (eds), Commentary of The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (June 2006) 158, https://sites.uclouvain.be/cridho/documents/Download.Rep/NetworkCommentaryFinal.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021. A Supiot, ‘A legal perspective on the economic crisis of 2008’ (2010) 149 International Labour Review 151. A Tryfonidou, ‘Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 36. A Wigger, Competition for Competitiveness: The Politics of the Transformation of the EU Competition Regime (Rozenberg Publishers, 2008).

A.  Field of Application 16.01 The inclusion of Article 16, or an express commitment to ‘the freedom to conduct business’, within the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is highly controversial, and understandably so.1 Article 16 is sourced, not from amongst the positive norms of an existing canon of international law, in which it is noticeable only by its absence; instead, it is drawn from the ‘constitutional traditions’ of the EU Member States,2 where it most commonly finds an implied place by virtue of its judicial extrapolation from constitutionally-secured rights to property and to work. Article 16 of the Charter is accordingly intimately connected with the more usually expressed constitutional norms of the ‘freedom to work’ (Article 15) and the ‘right to property’ (Article 17). It is, however, also vitally distanced from them. Just like rights to work and to property, Article 16 may be reducible to a fundamental right of dignity (Article 1 CFREU),3 whereby human self-expression and self-sustenance is assured by means of secured pursuit of economic activity. At the same time, however, and far beyond core, or ‘existential’, rights of freedom to conclude a contract, or to initiate economic activity, the freedom to conduct a business, in its broader performative character, is one which also recognises the existence and impact of an ‘entrepreneurial’ element within human affairs. It thus may also imply a far deeper and constitutionallysecured commitment to the maintenance of a specified form of political economy, or a distinct form of economic and social organisation. 16.02 Such a constitutional commitment was clearly expressed within the complex series of provisions of the Weimar Constitution of 1919 (Articles 151–56), which included the first express modern normative dedication ‘to individual economic freedom’ (Article 151, para one,

1 See ‘The Future Status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (Session 2002–03, 6th Report, HL Paper 48), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldeucom/48/48.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021. 2 Case 4/73 Nold EU:C:1974:51, [1974] ECR 491, para 13. 3 The freedom to conduct business is located within the Chapter of the Charter on Human Dignity.

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sentence one). Vitally, Articles 151–56 concomitantly established a social-economic order within Germany, which was secured by Weimar’s Economic Constitution.4 Within this constellation, a ‘principled obligation’ to secure economic freedom contrasted starkly with the Constitution’s ‘subjective rights’ to, for example, religious freedom, and determined that the conduct of business within the nascent republic would be unfolded within a legislative, rather than judicially-driven, programme. The Constitution did not allow for unfettered pursuit of entrepreneurial goals by means of establishment of ‘individual economic freedom’ as a subjective right. Instead, the legislative programme prescribed by the Constitution provided for the balancing of business freedoms, property rights and labour interests within a ‘socialised economy’.5 Seen in this light, the vital questions to be asked with regard to the character and extent of 16.03 Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights must therefore be, first, does the freedom now extend beyond an existential function, as laid down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its seminal Nold jurisprudence? Second, is the freedom to be viewed as a ‘subjective right’, asserting and securing the unrestricted entrepreneurial spirit of the individual European? Or, alternatively, is the freedom to conduct business under Article 16 to be understood better as a principle forming a part of a far wider European Union commitment to a specific from of social-economic organisation and, if so, which one? Given the European Union’s enduring commitment to establishment of an internal European market, or a ‘highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’ (Article 3(3) TFEU), the answers to these questions might, at first glance, appear simple. Just as in Weimar, the complex of rights in the Charter continues to seek to hold the Union to its own principled commitment to establish an economic and social order that balances labour and production interests within its long-standing system of ‘embedded liberalism’.6 Nevertheless, the unique formulation of Article 16 within the Charter, or one which demands 16.04 that the ‘freedom to conduct business’ is exercised ‘in accordance with Union law and national law and practices’, both reveals the high level of political compromise that has accompanied and dictated the form of its inclusion within the Charter, and hints at continuing discord within the member states, and between the member states and the Union about the exact nature of Europe’s Economic Constitution, as well as its relationship with Europe’s social order. In the terms of this analysis, the sphere of application of Article 16 within European law must accordingly be treated in two distinct ways: On the one hand, and with due regard to the vital place of individual economic freedom within the founding human rights jurisprudence of the CJEU, Article 16 can and must be examined as an ‘economically-neutral’ legal instrument, or simple human right, closely related to rights of property and work, and securing, at its settled core, the existential status of the individual European, or her economic opportunity within the ‘marketplace’, broadly defined. On the other hand, however, and taking the understanding of the European Parliament as a template for its institutional reach,7 Article 16 may also be seen as an organisational principle, or a re-affirmation, and integral part of the EU’s effort to establish a post-national political economy, or its own Economic Constitution.

4 H Schwier, Der Schutz der ‘Unternehmerische Freiheit’ nach Artikel 16 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (Peter Lang, 2012). 5 Ibid. 6 A Wigger, Competition for Competitiveness: The Politics of the Transformation of the EU Competition Regime (Rozenberg Publishers, 2008) 151 ff. 7 D Spielmann, ‘Article 16—Liberté d’Entreprise’ in EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (eds), Commentary of The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2006) 158, https://sites.uclouvain.be/ cridho/documents/Download.Rep/NetworkCommentaryFinal.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021.



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I.  Freedom to Conduct Business as a Human Right 16.05 Strikingly, the construction of the freedom to conduct business as a primary human right ­coincides with the birth of human rights law within the European legal order as a whole. In its Nold judgment of 1974, the then European Court of Justice first confirmed its famous recognition in Stauder,8 that, to the degree that human rights may be derived from the constitutional traditions of the Member States, they will also form a part of the European legal order; and did so, in this case, with specific reference to fundamental freedoms to work, and to engage in commerce and other professional activities.9 Once again reflecting the close relationship of business freedom with rights to property and work, the Court of Justice subsequently unfolded the freedom within a formulation designed to secure the human dignity of individual Europeans within the marketplace by guaranteeing, first, their freedom to engage in commerce, and secondly, their contractual autonomy. 16.06 Confirming Nold in the subsequent case of SpA Edriana,10 the Court expressly recognised that a guarantee for the exercise of economic activity was a fundamental right, whose protection formed a part of the general Community interest.11 Subsequently, protection was extended to the maintenance of the market position of commercial actors, as well as to the process of private economic planning.12 In turn, however, contractual freedom was also drawn within the ambit of the freedom to conduct business; albeit initially so, only within the negative formulation of the Court in the case of Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing.13 Dismissing a preliminary reference questioning the discretion allowed to the Member States in the matter of the award of European sugar production quotas, the Court of Justice nevertheless directly addressed the claimant’s plea that they had thereby suffered unwarranted intrusion into their private autonomy, or freedom to contract with their sugar suppliers. In the opinion of the Court, European legal measures restrictive of contractual freedom would only be admissible where they gave explicit authority to a specified public authority to intervene into private contractual relations, and further where they also stipulated the exact forms and procedures to be followed in such cases.14 This implicit recognition for a right to private autonomy and contractual freedom was subsequently concretised in the Court’s annulment of a European Commission Decision, made within the ambit of European agricultural guarantees, itself nullifying Spanish government aid given to agricultural concerns, on the basis that pre-dated contracts designed to bring individual producers within the temporal limits of the scheme were ‘fraudulent.’ For the Court, the designation of the contracts as fraudulent was an intrusion into the private autonomy and contractual freedom of market actors, which might only be undertaken in the light of an express authority to do so, laid down clearly in a European legal instrument.15

II. Freedom to Conduct a Business as an Element of the European Economic Constitution 16.07 Although never a classical fundamental right, in the sense, say, of religious freedom, the ­freedom to conduct a business, as a corollary to rights to property and work, may, at least since the 8 Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm EU:C:1969:57, [1969] ECR 419. 9 Nold (n 2) para 14. 10 Case 230-78 SpA Eridiana and others EU:C:1979:216, [1979] ECR 2749. 11 See Schwier (n 4) p 96. 12 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973 and Joined Cases 63 and 147/84 Finsider v Commission EU:C:1985:358, [1985] ECR 2857. 13 Case 151/78 Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing EU:C:1979:4, [1979] ECR 1. 14 See Schwier (n 4) 105. 15 Case C-240/97 Spain v Commission EU:C:1999:479, [1999] ECR I-6571, para 99.

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eighteenth century, or the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ led by Adam Smith, be argued to form an (implicit) core guarantee for individuals seeking to secure their existence within the on-going historical effort to overcome feudalism, and to establish and to defend an autonomous sphere of market exchange from unjustifiable state intrusion. And, in these ‘existential’ terms, the field of application of Article 16 is a wide one indeed, applying, in principle, to all of the commercial and contractual activities of individual Europeans within the Union, to the exact degree that these activities can and may be restricted by European law. Equally, however, the emergence of an explicit guarantee for individual economic freedom within the Charter is also indelibly marked by the constitutional history of the twentieth century, and its efforts to establish specific forms of national political economy, and, as such, may also be viewed as re-affirmation of the Union’s core mission to re-establish a concept of political economy beyond the boundaries of the nation state. Support for this assertion may be found in the European Parliament’s Commentary on the 16.08 Charter. In this analysis, the primary limitation placed upon the personal exercise of Article 16 by Article 52(1) of the Charter is the European common interest expressed within the, then, Article 4 of the European Union Treaty: ‘qui insiste certes sur le principe d’une économique de marché où la concurrence est libre’, and which commits the member states and the institutions of the European Union to ‘l’instauration d’une politique économique fondée sur l’êtroite coordination des politiques économiques des Etats membres, sur le marché intérieur et sur la definition d’objectifs communs, et conduit conformément au respect du principe d’une économie ouverte où la concurrence est libre.’16 Concomitantly a limitation on the boundless exercise of the economic freedom of the 16.09 individual European, as well as a constituting of the European political economy, these underlying integrative principles of the Union—now reproduced, in vitally modified form, in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (see below)—accordingly describe the forms of business conduct that might be exercised within Europe’s Economic Constitution. In this view, the core essence of the freedom to conduct business is one of a general principle of economic autonomy that unfolds within the prescribed contours of the legal-economic institutions of the European Economic Constitution. In the terms of the cited Commentary, the primary legal vehicles of Europe’s Economic Constitution which pertain to Article 16 are therefore: —— European competition law (Articles 101 and 102), as well as legislative provisions of European competition policy;17 —— State Aids law (Articles 107 and 108 TFEU); —— the free movement of goods (Article 30 TFEU); —— as well as, the ‘four freedoms’ of work, establishment, services and capital (Articles 45, 49, 56 and 63 TFEU), together with legislative programmes of liberalisation designed to give them effect.18

16 See above, n 7. 17 Most importantly, the 2004 ‘Reform Package’—Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition essentially altered the way in which anticompetitive conduct, such as cartels and other restrictive b ­ usiness practices, were prosecuted in the EU. The longstanding centralised administrative ex ante notification regime for ­commercial intercompany agreements was abolished, and replaced with a decentralised ex post private enforcement regime. Second, the Merger Regulation 4064/89 was replaced by the Merger Regulation 139/2004, which entailed a ­revision of the substantive measurement used for the assessment of mergers. Furthermore, it allocated more investigatory powers to the Commission. 18 Including legislative programmes to liberalise state services (eg, Commission Directive 96/19/EC on the achievement of full competition on the telecommunications market [1996] OJ L074/13) and more general measures, such as European Parliament and Council Directive 97/67/EC on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service [1998] OJ L15/14.



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16.10 Accordingly, in this field of principled application within the European Economic Constitution, the vital question raised for this analysis, is one of which is the exact vision of economic (and social) order that it embodies.

B.  Relation of Article 16 to Articles 15 and 17 of the Charter 16.11 According to various commentators, one possible source for Article 16 within international law is Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts’), to which Article 1(2) of the European Social Charter is argued to be equivalent (‘the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon’).19 The settled jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has nevertheless always reproduced various of the Member States’ constitutional traditions, using its case law to establish a very close relationship between the freedom to conduct a business, now explicitly normativised in Article 16, and the freedom to pursue an occupation, now given force in Article 15. According to the Court’s historic jurisprudence, the freedom to pursue business coincides with the right to work and both constitute general principles of EU law.20 This potential cross-over between Articles 16 and Article 15 of the Charter is similarly reproduced with regard to Article 17 and the right to property. Deviating from the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights—or, its restricted interpretation of the right to property within the European Convention on Human Rights21—the Court of Justice has consistently recognised that the freedom to conduct a business is a corollary of the right to property,22 itself held to form one of the general principles of EU law.23 16.12 The readiness of the historic Court, not simply to create rights to work and to property, but also to extrapolate a freedom of business from them, reveals its broader aspiration to institutionalise an internationalised Economic Constitution, which is also founded in protection for the entrepreneurial instincts of the individual European. In contrast to the ECtHR, which has made it clear that the right to property ‘does not guarantee the right to acquire possessions’,24 the simple equation by the Court of Justice of rights to work and to property with a freedom to conduct business appears to broaden the scope of an existential sphere of subjective economic freedom for the individual European, in order to include within it a performative or entrepreneurial economic role. Nevertheless, the extent of this performative element within the sphere of economic protection established, was, historically speaking, always subject to its

19 Spielmann (n 7) 158. 20 Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest EU:C:1991:65, [1991] ECR I-415, paras 72–77; Case C-177/90 Kühn EU:C:1992:2, [1992] ECR I-35, para 16; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council (n 12) para 78; Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council EU:C:2004:497, [1994] ECR I-7789, para 51; and Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf EU:C:1997:377, [1997] ECR I-4475, para 72. 21 According to the judgment in Marckx v Belgium [Series A no 31 (1979) 2 EHRR 330, para 50], Art 1 of Protocol no. 1 applies only to existing possessions and ‘does not guarantee the right to acquire possessions’. In Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden [Series A no 52 (1982), 5 EHRR 35, para 61], the European Court of Human Rights decided that Art 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three distinct rules: the first rule, of a general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; the third rule recognises that the States are entitled to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. 22 Case 59/83 SA Biovilac NV v European Economic Community EU:C:1984:380, [1984] ECR 4057, para 21. 23 See, in particular, the judgment in Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz EU:C:1979:290, [1979] ECR 3727, paras 17–23; and judgment in Case 265/87 Schräder v Hauptzollamt Gronau EU:C:1989:303, [1989] ECR 2237, paras 13–17. 24 See above, n 21.

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own immediate self-limitation. Rights to work, property and the freedom to conduct business within the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice were enunciated only as general ‘principles of European law’ and were thus readily subject to the imitations placed upon them by Community and national legislation deemed to be ‘in the interest of the Community’.25 With regard to the new Charter, however, this raises an immediate point of interest. Once the 16.13 Charter became legally binding, and thus a core element of the Union’s legal order, the general principles of EU law could no longer be regarded as the exclusive guiding norms to ensure the protection of fundamental rights within the Union.26 Instead, the Charter has become the starting point for the Court for assessing the compatibility of an EU measure or a national provision with EU fundamental rights.27 As Groussot, Pech, and Petursson have noted, the general principles of EU law, as they have stemmed from Article 6(3) of the Treaty on European Union, are now only ancillary to the Charter and they may be relied on by the Court only to the degree that they may be deployed expand the material scope of the Charter in their character as ‘external norms’, equivalent to, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.28 In general terms, the conclusion to be drawn from this is that the general principles of EU law no longer constitute autonomous standards of protection;29 a conclusion, which brings a degree of legal uncertainty as to the scope of application of EU fundamental rights, since it is conceivable that there might be a complex overlapping between these two kinds of norms.30 At another level, however, the legal distinction between general principles of European law and the ‘rights’ enshrined by the Charter, also raises an immediate point of interest with regard to the entrepreneurial element within the freedom to conduct business. Might this ‘freedom’ now be understood to be less a principle and more a subjective right, subject to a lesser degree of limitation, especially as regards its application to European and national law? At the level of formal constitutional adjudication, distinctions in terminology do matter. 16.14 Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Charter appear to form a closely interrelated complex of fundamental rights and freedoms, which are now autonomous standards of protection. Nevertheless, the unique formulation of Article 16 as a ‘freedom’ to be exercised ‘in accordance with Union law and national law and practices’, raises an assumption that its exercise is limited, by contrast to rights to work and property. Above all, and bearing in mind the lack of clarity, which the Charter itself establishes with regard to its varied use of the terms ‘rights’, ‘freedoms’ and ‘principles’,31 a necessary question arises as to whether Article 16 is a ‘freedom’, implying its unfettered exercise in the absence of restraint or control over an action, especially from the state; or, whether it is better to be understood as a ‘principle’, to be exercised to the degree that it is implemented by law. For some within the European legal world, the subordinate nature of Article 16 might be 16.15 assumed to be very clear. Thus, AG Bobek had very little trouble in the case of Lidl GmbH in

25 See Section D. 26 X Groussot, L Pech, and G Thor Petursson, ‘The Scope of Application of EU Fundamental Rights on Member States’ Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication’ (2011) Eric Stein Working Paper No 1/2011, www.era-comm.eu/ charter_of_fundamental_rights/kiosk/pdf/EU_Adjudication.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021. 27 See ‘Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris’ (Strasbourg and Luxembourg, 24 January 2011) para 1, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021; Case C-108/10 Ivana Scattolon v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca EU:C:2011:542, [2011] ECR I-07491, Opinion of AG Bot, para 108. 28 Grussot, Pech, and Petursson (n 26) 2. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid, 16. 31 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17.



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declaring that: ‘Article 16 of the Charter allows for a greater degree of State interference than Article 15.’32 And indeed, such a reading would seem to concur first with the analysis of Lord Goldsmith, the UK Government’s representative on the Convention which drafted the Charter, who drew a clear distinction between ‘individually justiciable’ civil and political rights and modern social and economic rights which, in his opinion, are ‘usually not justiciable individually in the same way as other rights’ but instead ‘inform policy making by the legislator’.33 16.16 It would likewise appear to be supported, second, by the wording of Article 51(1) of the Charter, according to which the addressees of the provisions of the Charter shall ‘respect the rights’ and ‘observe the principles’ laid down by the Charter, whereby rights may be argued to be individually justiciable. Equally, the concomitant argument that ‘principles’ are surely to be understood as simple aspirations or objectives for some future European action establishing its own particular economic order—as well as the exact nature of the ‘entrepreneurial European’ is one with which Lord Goldsmith might agree: ‘[t]his does not mean it is for the Union to legislate in this area. Nor does this impose any requirement of Member States. It means that the Union should not violate this principle by a side wind in some other legislation within its competence.’34 16.17 Nevertheless, the point is far from settled or clear, and AG Bobek once again gives us a flavour of the difficulties that the Court has faced in differentiating between Articles 15, 16 and 17, especially where each of the rights and freedoms must be balanced against one another: ‘Despite the fact that there is a clear differentiation regarding potential limitations that may be imposed on each respective freedom, this does not shed much light on the initial definition of the scope of the right itself. Both are intrinsically linked to the performance of an economic activity. There are thus no clear-cut criteria that can be composed in the abstract to distinguish between [them].’35 The very particular political and juridical sensitivities which apply to Article 16 are at once revealed. At the level of its adjudication by the Court of Justice, a vital question must be one of whether, within the complex of protection afforded by Articles 15, 16 and 17, the freedom to conduct business is to be understood to in some way be a lesser ‘right’ to those of work and property. Alternatively, has the Court sought to strengthen the freedom to conduct business, giving it greater force as a subjective right, which enhances an existential sphere of economic freedom for the individual European?

C.  Sources of Law 16.18 The primary legal source for Article 16 must be understood to be the ‘constitutional traditions of the Member States’, in accordance with Article 52(4) of the Charter. In the absence of express counterparts within international law, and the similarly cautious approach to business freedom adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, which has limited itself to the extrapolation of a nascent right to ‘peaceful enjoyment of possessions’ from the Convention’s guarantee for property rights,36 the primary reference for the drafters of the Charter was Court of Justice

32 Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co. KG v Freistaat Sachsen EU:C:2016:498, Opinion of AG Bobek, para 25. 33 Lord Goldsmith QC, ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ (2001) 38(5) Common Market Law Review 1201, 1212. 34 Ibid. 35 See above, n 32. 36 Iatridis v Greece [1999] ECHR 1999-II, 75. In finding for a long-standing Greek proprietor of an open air cinema, subject to a sequestration order of the local authority who owned the land on which the Cinema, on the basis that he had been denied the opportunity to renew his concession, the Court implied that contractual autonomy formed a part of the Conventions’s guarantee for property rights (Art 1 ECHR).

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jurisprudence, beginning with Nold, that was itself evolved with analogous allusion to constitutional developments within the Member States. It is similarly striking, however, that, in the year of the Court’s decision in Nold (1974), explicit 16.19 national constitutional references to notions concomitant to the right to business freedom were sparse indeed, and limited to the express recognitions found in the Constitutions of Ireland (1937), Italy (1949) and Luxembourg (1948) for ‘rights of private (economic) initiative’ in industry and commerce.37 In the meantime, however, and leaving Luxembourg aside—where emergence of commercial rights appears to owe to the post-medieval continental tradition of affording legal respect to emerging trades38—subsequent iterations of business freedom within national constitutions have noticeably reproduced the post-colonial, post-civil war or post-dictatorship patterns established in Ireland and Italy. In each of these cases, the arena of personal economic initiative is contained within schemes of interwoven social and economic rights, which form a basis for legislative rather than judicial initiative, and thus also embodies, in its limitation, a founding commitment to establishment of a political economy, or socialised national economic constitution, dedicated to resolution of past social conflict. Moving on through history, and making allowance both for fundamental changes in guiding principles of economic organisation, as well as renewed emphasis upon the powers of (economic) civil society to repel dictatorial regimes, the freedoms to conduct business introduced by the Spanish (1978) and Portuguese (1982 revision) constitutions,39 in all of their difference, reproduce the same trend. Subject to simple revision procedures (Spain), or limited to ‘peaceful enjoyment of possessions’ (Portugal), constitutionally-guaranteed commercial freedoms in Portugal and Spain may be characterised by their greater degree of market-orientation, but, in essence, remain principled components within economic constitutions of post-conflict settlement and social pacification.40 To this degree, a more immediate source for the Court of Justice’s evolution of a right to 16.20 conduct business may therefore be argued to have been the constitutional and general legal traditions of the remaining Members States, in which implicit guarantees for commercial freedom have evolved: first, in the negative formulations of the atypical constitutional tradition of the United Kingdom, within the general stipulation of the rule of law that the individual elements of individual economic enterprise, such as contractual autonomy, may only be restricted by means of express legislative authority to do so;41 secondly, in the equally atypical French constitutional constellation, in the struggles of the Conseil Constitutionelle to establish a right to commercial freedom of ‘constitutional rank’;42 and thirdly, in the adjudicative endeavours of national judiciaries in Austria, Germany, Greece, Sweden and Finland to extrapolate an implicit constitutional right to conduct business from explicit constitutional guarantees for human dignity, property, work, free association and professional freedom. In large part, therefore, in their material content, a founding template for the Court of Justice’s 16.21 subsequent concretisation of the freedom to conduct business—as well as its limitation through express authorisation—in notions of the freedom to engage in commercial activity and a right to contractual autonomy,43 the constitutional traditions of the Member States may thus, in general,

37 In Arts 45, 41 and 11(5) respectively. 38 ‘Gewerbefreiheit’ was a feature of many of the legal codes of European principalities. See, for details, Schwier (n 4) 37–56. 39 Above Arts 38(1) and 61 respectively. 40 A trend similarly reproduced in the new constitutions of Eastern Europe. 41 See E Peel & GH Treitel, Treitel on the Law of Contract (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2007). 42 See Schwier (n 4) 80. See, also, less controversial judicial efforts to establish commercial freedom as an independent constitutional norm in Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands, 84–89. 43 Ibid, for very useful details, 69–89.



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be argued to support the construction of Article 16 as a limited right of existential dignity within the context of a market society, broadly defined. Nevertheless, and returning directly to the question of whether Article 16 must also be understood in the far broader terms of a reiteration of a European commitment to a specific form of political economy and market within the Union, one constitutional tradition, above all others, may be argued to have had its fundamental impact upon the evolution of the European Treaties. Seen in this specific light, the emergence of the European Economic Constitution, which, with its dual legal-economic institutions of competition law and free movement, as well as degree of recognition for the residual competence for Member State social orders, has in large part been influenced by German constitutional traditions and, above all, by the concept of ordo-liberalism, or the notion of an ‘ordered economy’, constituted and guaranteed by primary law, and balanced against social commitments.44 The failure of the Grundgesetz to include an express provision, guaranteeing commercial 16.22 freedom, may be explained by the degree of suspicion exhibited within post-war Germany towards the social pluralism of the Weimar Constitution, which was deemed to have contributed to political instability. Nevertheless, the notion of an economic constitution proved to be far from dead within German intellectual thought, as the ideas of the Freiburg School, and more particularly, the partnership of Walter Eucken (an economist) and Franz Böhm (a lawyer), successfully colonised the left-leaning notion of the normativised national political economy, to give it new life in an anti-statist form, which vitally also sought to control private concentrations of economic power within the market.45 In this new constellation of the Republic’s Economic Constitution, which found vitally authoritative support, both amongst leading political figures, such as Ludwig Erhardt (Germany’s first Finance Minister), and within the Bundesverfassungsgericht, constitutional guarantees for commercial activity were joined together with legislative programmes of competition policy for a dual purpose. On the one hand, the state would, as far as possible, restrict its general interventions into the market.46 On the other, concepts of fair competition would nonetheless demand wide-ranging policy-led intervention, in order to prevent concentration of economic power within private hands and the abuse of dominant market positions.47 Within a sphere of German constitutional adjudication, the particular influence of ordo-liberal 16.23 conceptions may be identified, not simply in the Constitutional Court’s very early extrapolation of a subjective right to conduct business from the Constitution’s general guarantee for individual freedom (Article 2(1) GG),48 but also in its refusal to extend the notion of the free exercise of a profession (Article 12(1) GG), in order to include a guarantee for a subjective right to free competition.49 Although the individual German would be protected from unwarranted state intrusion into their economic activities, such protection could not extend to a competition policy, where the primary role of ensuring an open competitive order would fall to government, which would be similarly charged with the task of securing free, fair and ‘equal’ competition.50 Similarly, 44 See C Joerges, ‘What is Left of the Integration through Law Project? A Reconstruction in Conflicts-Law Perspectives’ in K Günther and S Kadelbach (eds), Legal Cultures, Legal Transfer, and Legal Pluralism (Campus, 2012). 45 Ibid, with reference to the founding of the concept of Economic Constitution by the left, of ‘Franz Neumann’. See, also, Wigger (n 6). 46 Schwier (n 4) 42. 47 See, in particular, Wigger (n 6). 48 ‘Elfes-Urteil’, BverfGE 6, 32. A right subsequently enhanced and detailed with similar reference to constitutional guarantees for freedom of profession (Art 12 GG), property rights (Art 14), as well, as rights of economic association (9(1)GG). 49 See, with copious references to prevailing German legal opinion, Schwier (n 4) 45. 50 Note the congruence with the language deployed by the European Parliament’s commentary on the Charter (‘egalité’), n 7 above.

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at the level of the overall constitutional order, the exercise of freedom within German’s economic order, needed likewise to be balanced against, or distinguished from the Republic’s social order, encapsulated in the dedication of the Grundgesetz to the establishment of a Sozialstaat. In the terms of this analysis, it is accordingly this ‘dual’ character of the constitutional 16.24 guarantee for the conduct of business, not only as subjective right, but also as programme for the establishment of equality of opportunity within a ‘competitive’ marketplace, which hints at the large degree of influence that ordo-liberal thought has historically had upon Europe’s Economic Constitution. In part, a simple function of the significant political role played by post-war German politicians within negotiations on the founding Treaties, as well as the long-standing exercise of influence by German functionaries over the activities of Competition Directorate within the European Commission,51 the European impact of ‘Ordnungspolitik’ may be traced in the development of European free movement law, founded in the specifically European principle of non-discrimination, as well as strong institutions of European Competition law. Equally, however, and mirroring internal German tensions between the legal securing of the economy favoured by ordo-liberals and its growing distance from the ‘redistributive’ functions attributed to the social order, or Sozialstaat, in the 1960s and 1970s, the often contentious relations between European economic and social orders may similarly be argued to be reflected in the constant struggle of the historical Court of Justice to delineate, or to limit, the impact of its de facto market liberalising jurisprudence within the (social) legal orders of the member states.52

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks Very early on in the development of Article 16 jurisprudence, Advocate General Bot signalled the 16.25 determination of the Court of Justice to maintain continuity. Paragraph 29 of his opinion in the case of Sky Österreich,53 indicated an intention to treat Article 16 within the Court’s established line of case law on the extent of the freedom to conduct business: It is clear that the right to property, like the right freely to exercise an economic activity, is one of the general principles of the law of the Union. However, those principles are not absolute but must be viewed in relation to their social function. Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on use of the right to property, and to freely to pursue an economic activity, provided that those restrictions correspond to an objective of general interest pursued by the Union and do not constitute, with regard to the objective pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference affecting the very substance of the rights thus guaranteed.

Subsequently confirmed in a host of cases,54 the ‘settled’ notion that fundamental economic 16.26 rights do ‘not enjoy absolute protection under EU law, but must be viewed in relation to [their]

51 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann is deserving of specific mention within this context. See, for full details, Wigger (n 6). 52 See, in particular Joerges (n 44). It is similarly noteworthy that the greatest contribution made to European academic thought by ordo-liberals was that made by Alfred Müller-Armack, and uncomfortable companion to Eucken within the Freiburg School and a fierce opponent of the socialisation of the Economic Constitution; see, for personal details, Wigger (n 6) pp 68 ff. 53 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich v Österreichischer Rundfunk EU:C:2013:28, Opinion of AG Bot. 54 See, in particular, cases dealing with impacts of economic restrictions on individuals, Case T 383/11 Makhlouf v Council EU:T:2013:431, para 97, Case T-153/15 Mohamad Hamcho and Hamcho International v Council EU:T:2016:630, Case T-154/15 Aiman Jaber v Council EU:T:2016:629, Case T-155/15 Khaled Kaddour v Council EU:T:2016:628.



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function in society’,55 is nevertheless still contested in substance and in effect, as the Court has struggled for consistency in application of tests of strict legality versus tests of (differentiated forms of) proportionality. Above all, the notorious cases of Alemo-Herron and AGET Iraklis56 have raised considerable concerns, both as regards the evolution of Article 16 as an absolute, subjective right with unquestioned horizontal application, and in relation to the ability of national governments and/or the EU to restrict the subjective exercise of Article 16 in pursuit of the general interest, and in particular, for the benefit of the securing of principles of labour law (see below for full details).57 However, the fraught context of the evolution of the freedom to conduct business within the EU is just as surely a chronicle foretold. Eduardo Gill-Pedro has cogently captured the problem inherent to any effort to make the freedom to conduct business justiciable: should courts faced with such a normative claim restrict themselves to securing the simple right of the individual to conduct their business only insofar as the law allows them to (non-interference); or, by contrast, should the courts seek to protect individual business operations from other rights or interests which interfere with them (non-domination)?58 Corresponding with the historical distinction between freedom to conduct business as an existential right versus freedom to conduct business as a performative, entrepreneurial right, as well as with the opposition made between the freedom as a subjective right versus the freedom as a part of an aspirational legislative programme, the conundrum is only heightened within the EU context. As noted above, the freedom to conduct a business has never been explicitly normativised within international law. This historical absence, however, is easily explained. Given the necessarily intimate relationship of notions of a right to individual economic freedom with broader efforts to construct the national political economy, as well as an overriding certainty that the international economy operated within ‘a state of nature’, the economically-active subject was always a stranger to the international legal order. With the advent of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, however, European law began to establish itself in direct opposition to this dictum. Where the purpose of the European Economic Community was to forge a common market, and where the then European Court of Justice very early on afforded the individual European a startling new status as economic subject of European law,59 the effort to tame the state of economic nature in Europe, as well as a commitment to individual economic freedom, began to extend across national frontiers within the continent. 16.27 Seen in this light, the tale of the emergence of an explicit ‘freedom to conduct business’ within Article 16, is also a story about the unfolding of a founding aspiration to establish and to maintain a political economy within the European Communities through the medium of law, and through establishment of a European Economic Constitution within the Treaty of Rome.60 In immediate counterpoint, however, Article 16, and an explicit notion of individual economic freedom, nonetheless now finds its permanent place in the EU order, not within a clear statement of the contours of European Economic governance, but within the Charter’s Chapter on human dignity. At the same time, an indication of on-going disquiet and political compromise with

55 Case T-383/11 Makhlouf v Council EU:T:2013:431, para 97. 56 Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd EU:C:2013:521 and Case C-201/15 Anonymi Geniki Etairia Tsimenton Iraklis (AGET Iraklis) v Ypourgos Ergasias, Koinonikis Asfalisis kai Koinonikis Allilengyis EU:C:2016:972. 57 See, in particular, E Gill-Pedro, ‘Freedom to Conduct Business in EU Law: Freedom from Interference or Freedom from Domination?’ (2017) 9(2) European Journal of Legal Studies 103, with many references to the wider literature. 58 Gill-Pedro (n 57). 59 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL EU:C:1964:66, [1964] ECR 585 and Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos EU:C:1963:1, [1963] ECR 1. See, for the concept of the European Economic Citizen, M Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’ in J Shaw & G More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995). 60 See Joerges (n 44).

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regard to the maintenance of the autonomy of the national economy, the schematic positioning of Article 16 also signals a potential retrenchment of the freedom to conduct business as a ‘classical’, or existential human right deriving simply from a need to also ensure individual accrual of the benefits of property interests and the right to work. Seen in this light, Article 16 inevitably builds a battlefront between differing conceptions of individual economic freedom, as well as the place of the economically active individual within the national and within the European economy.

II.  Scope of Application of Article 16 Alemo-Herron has been described as a decision so ‘“downright odd” that it deserves to be ­“consigned to the bottom of an icy lake” and forgotten about.’61 And indeed, the judgment seems set to be one that will be ‘distinguished’, or set aside, in subsequent Court of Justice jurisprudence.62 Nevertheless, to the degree that Alemo-Herron might be argued to be a logical extrapolation of liberalising or deregulatory trends within EU law (see below), its de facto assertion of a subjective right to freedom to conduct a business above lawful UK legislation affording UK workers a higher standard of protection in transposition of the Acquired Rights Directive,63 provides an immediate illustration of the inevitable complexities of judicial application of Article 16. Certainly, the Charter itself indicates in Article 52(5) that, in its character as principle, rather than right, Article 16 should and will not give rise to any direct cause of action against Union institutions or Member States’ authorities. Instead, as ‘principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers’, Article 16 would only become relevant within the judicial setting, where such implementing acts are interpreted or reviewed. Nevertheless, uncertainties remain, especially with regard to Article 51(1), which restricts its application to the Member States to those situations ‘when they are implementing Union law’,64 but which just as surely must still be subject to the same confusion that has bedevilled the Court’s historic fundamental rights jurisprudence, with regard to the reach of those rights, both as they apply to national implementing measures, and to the degree that they deviate from them.65 In this setting, Alemo-Herron, asserting a right to contractual autonomy above the higher (labour law) protections of UK legislation implementing the Acquired Rights Directive appears to drive a horse and carriage through any European legal insistence that Article 16 would never have horizontal effect or that it would have limited application to domestic legislation. Defendants to the action, Parkwood Leisure had refused to comply with UK legislation requiring them to abide by the dynamic terms and conditions negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement concluded with the National Joint Council for Local Government Services. Parkwood, a private firm, was not a member of the Joint Council or party to subsequent collective bargaining negotiations and

61 Gill-Pedro (n 57) 129, citing Stephen Weatherhill. 62 See, in particular, Iraklis (n 56) and commentary to it, in M Markakis, ‘Can Governments Control Mass Layoffs by Employers? Economic Freedoms vs Labour Rights in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis’ (2017) 13(4) European Constitutional Law Review 724. 63 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L 82/16. 64 Groussot, Pech, and Petursson (n 26) 2. 65 See, in particular, the distinction made between the Wachauf (Case 5/88 EU:C:1989:321, [1989] ECR 2609) line of jurisprudence, and the ERT (Case C-260/89 EU:C:1991:254, [1991] ECR I-2925) line of jurisprudence.



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refused to extend the benefits of any such agreements to employees which were negotiated post their assumption from the local council. For the Third Chamber of the Court, Article 16 was central to the situation: ‘In the light of Article 3 of Directive 2001/23, it is apparent that, by reason of the freedom to conduct a business, the transferee must be able to assert its interests effectively in a contractual process to which it is party and to negotiate the aspects determining changes in the working conditions of its employees with a view to its future economic activity.’66 16.32 Couching its justification for rejection of the UK’s facilitation of dynamic clauses within collective bargaining agreements within a Wesentlichkeits test (essence of the right), the Third Chamber nevertheless seemed to radically extend the scope of application of Article 16: ‘In those circumstances, the transferee’s contractual freedom is seriously reduced to the point that such a limitation is liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business.’67 Succinct and to the point. But what of established legal principles holding that the right to conduct a business can be restricted by law serving the public interest, in this case labour law (see below)? What of the autonomous right of the UK to legislate for higher standards? What of the assumption that the principle of freedom to conduct business should not have horizontal direct effect? Surely, with Alemo-Herron, the Court simply elevates Article 16 to a subjective right, readily enforceable against national law and between private parties? As noted, Alemo-Herron is an outlier in European jurisprudence. However, it can also be 16.33 viewed as an extreme example of developing trends within European Law. Certainly, some jurists might still cling to a restrictive reading of Article 52(2), under which ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’,68 and refuse horizontal direct effect for the Charter. Nevertheless, this restricted view of the scope of application of the Charter has been challenged in general, and has been specifically doubted with regard to the more general treatment of economic freedoms within the EU legal order.69 So, it may be argued, the cases of Viking and Laval not only established the horizontal direct effect for freedoms of establishment and services under the TFEU (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU), but also suggest that the right to collective action as enshrined in Article 28 of the Charter has commensurate horizontal direct effect.70 Seen in this light—one of the readiness of the Court of Justice to establish true protection for the rights of the individual European—it might be argued that the Court of Justice is amenable to the creation of a form of ‘indirect’ horizontal effect for rights and principles contained within the Charter.71

66 Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd EU:C:2013:521, para 33. 67 Ibid, para 35. 68 Case C-282/10 Dominguez EU:C:2012:33, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras 80–83, where the AG considered that the ‘wording of Article 31 of the Charter could induce the belief that horizontal effect is to be attributed to this provision and that it is to directly apply to the situation between employers and employees … [obliging] private individuals to guarantee fair and reasonable working conditions’, but finally rejected the presumption. 69 See LFM Besselink, ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon: The Interaction between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and National Constitutions’ (General Report at the XXV FIDE [Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen] Congress, Tallinn, 31 May 2012) 19, https://pure. uva.nl/ws/files/1863964/122194_The_Protection_of_Fundamental_Rights_post_Lisbon_FINAL_corrected.doc+&cd= 1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=pt&client=firefox-b-d, accessed 5 April 2021. In our analysis, Art 28 CFREU (right of collective bargaining and action) is afforded—at the very least—an indirect form of horizontal effect by these cases, to the degree that service providers will also be required to demonstrate before national courts that collective labour agreements and any strike action in support of them have a ‘disproportionate’ impact upon their own business. 70 Case C-438/05 Viking EU:C:2007:772, [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05 Laval EU:C:2007:809, [2007] ECR I-11767. 71 See, eg, the Court’s Judgment in Dominguez, whereby AG Trstenjak’s concerns about Art 31(2) EU Charter are disregarded. Stating that ‘the entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave must be regarded as a particularly important principle of European Union social law from which there can be no derogations and whose implementation by the

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This ‘indirect’ application of the rights of the Charter, or establishment of a form of 16.34 quasi-horizontal effect for its provisions—whether expressed as rights or principles—likewise finds its own fascinating application with regard to Article 16, and in particular, with regard to the cases of Scarlet Extended72 and Netlog73, each referred to the Court of Justice by national courts under Article 267 TFEU. Dealt with in far greater detail below, both cases concerned the compatibility with EU law of injunctions sought at national level by web-based copyright holders against internet service providers (ISPs), demanding that ISPs install expensive software, or establish monitoring systems to guard against potential copyright infringement by unauthorised third parties. Finding in each case for the ISP, the Court of Justice not only struck a blow for ‘internet freedom’, but also demanded that, in its application of EU intellectual property law, ‘national authorities and courts must, in particular, strike a fair balance between the protection of the intellectual property right enjoyed by copyright holders and that of the freedom to conduct a business enjoyed by ISPs pursuant to Article 16 of the Charter’.74 Within this new and unexpected scenario, one which requires a national court issuing an injunction under national law, in order to enforce EU intellectual property law, also to balance the right of property (Article 17) against the freedom to conduct business, both in fact and de jure elevates the principle of the freedom to conduct business to a private obligation—or ‘quasi-subjective’ right—that must be enforced by national law between private individuals within the sphere of application of the European legal order.75

III.  Specific Provisions The striking elevation of the freedom to conduct business to a quasi-right that might be enforced 16.35 between private parties in cases involving national law designed to give effect to European legislation, cannot but be viewed as a substantive enhancement of the legal protection afforded the individual European by the Charter. At the same time, however, this development also confirms that the Charter may prove to be a useful weapon in the armoury of the Court of Justice in its own efforts to enunciate the substantive nature of the European Economic Constitution. To date the Court has confirmed that, in line with its established case law, commencing with Nold, the freedom to conduct business under Article 16 will continue to encompass, not only a freedom to engage in commercial activity, but also a principle of contractual autonomy. In doing so, however, the Court has similarly raised potential for mismatch between the notion of free and fair competition, as pursued by the Union and Commission under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and its own independent vision of fair business dealings within the European Economic Constitution.

competent national authorities must be confined within the limits expressly laid down by [Directive 2003/88]’, the Court left a final decision on how to repair deficient French legislation to the national court. At the same, however, the enunciation of an absolute right to have paid leave left no room to doubt that the national court was obliged by EU law to establish appropriate working regulations between employer and employee. 72 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended EU:C:2011:771, [2011] ECR I-11959. 73 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog EU:C:2012:85. 74 Scarlet Extended (n 72) para 46. 75 Note that the concept of private individual will also include legal persons (Case C-279/09 DEB v Germany EU:C:2010:811, [2010] ECR I-13849): It should be noted in that connection that, although the explanations relating to the Charter do not provide any clarification in this regard, the use of the word ‘Person’, in the German language version of Art 47, as opposed to the word ‘Mensch’, which is used in numerous other provisions—for example, in Arts 1, 2, 3, 6, 29, 34 and 35 of the Charter—may be an indication that legal persons are not excluded from the scope of that article (para 39). Note also that the Court of Justice has extended the scope of application of the Charter to subject matter arising between the years 2005 and 2007, before it came into force (Dominguez (n 65)).



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(a)  Freedom to Engage in Business under Article 16 16.36 Since the passage into binding force of the Charter, the Court has confirmed application of the principle of the freedom to conduct business to implementing acts of the institutions of the European Union, and to those of the member states. In the case of EMA,76 an application made by a pharmaceutical company for annulment of a decision of the European Medicines Agency (EMA), requiring the applicant to undertake certain clinical trials amongst children, in order to receive a marketing authorisation for a pharmaceutical product (‘perflubutane’) under EU pharmaceutical rules,77 was assessed in the light of Article 16. In the opinion of the Court, and although justified by the general-interest objective pursued by Regulation No 1901/2006 of improving health in the general population, ‘the interpretation of Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 1901/2006 contained in the contested decision’ did constitute ‘a restriction of the right of pharmaceutical companies to conduct their business freely’ (paragraph 91). Equally, in the case of Deutsches Weintor eG v Land Rheinland-Pfalz,78 the decision of German authorities in the Rhineland-Palatinate to oppose the marketing of ‘easily digestible’ wine, on the basis that this constituted a ‘health claim’ with regard to the properties of alcohol, which is prohibited by EU law, resulted in a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. Once again dismissing the action on the basis that EU regulations served a legitimate community interest in the establishment of a high level of protection for human health, the Court nevertheless recognised the relevance of Article 16 to the case, noting, however, that it must also be balanced against Article 35 of the Charter, or the right to health (paragraphs 44 and 45). 16.37 Similarly, in each of these cases, the Court of Justice has confirmed its historic jurisprudence, or its finding that freedom to conduct business extends beyond protection afforded to individuals to establish a commercial activity, in order to encompass the performative element of how business is conducted. Both pharmaceutical regulation and regulation for the protection of the health of consumers may be regarded as posing a potential obstacle to the exercise of commercial freedom. In terms of the exact reach of Article 16, therefore, the critical question has become one of the delineation of its jurisdiction, of the extent to which the Court is prepared to move beyond the classical formulation of protection for human dignity through a guarantee ‘for the peaceful enjoy of possessions’, in order to establish a positive principle of economic self-expression, or guarantee for particular forms of business conduct. 16.38 Prior to the coming into force of the Charter, the Court had already confirmed that the principle of protection for freedom to conduct business would extend to protection for the established market position of an undertaking, as well as to the need for an undertaking to maintain a degree of certainty with regard to its own economic planning.79 In the meantime, the Court has added one further area of substantive protection for commercial undertakings, that of protection for commercial secrecy. The case of Interseroh,80 decided in March 2012, also proves to be of general interest with regard to the application of Article 16. The Court found against the plaintiffs, Interseroh, who argued that Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation No 1013/2006 on the shipping of waste, infringed principles of business confidentiality, and thus its freedom to conduct business, requiring the firm to place its name on shipping documents, such that its intermediary position

76 Case T-52/09 Nycomed Danmark v EMA EU:T:2011:738, [2011] ECR II-8133. 77 European Parliament and Council Regulation 1901/2006 of 12 December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use [2006] OJ L 378/1. 78 Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor eG v Land Rheinland-Pfalz EU:C:2012:526. 79 Germany v Council and Finsider v Commission (n 12). 80 Case C-1/11 Interseroh Scrap and Metals Trading EU:C:2012:194.

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within the process of waste shipping would be revealed to final customers. The Court’s rejection of this plea, however, did not detract from its parallel recognition that Article 16 CFREU would extend to protection for commercial secrecy (paragraph 43). Instead, the Court noted that the provisions of Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation No 1013/2006 were ‘clear and unconditional’, such that its impact could not be ameliorated by application of the principle of freedom to conduct business. As a consequence, the Court could only apply that principle in an action for annulment of the Regulation; an action which had not been brought before it within the current proceedings (paragraph 46). In summary, then, the Court has provided protection for the conduct of business in discreet areas. However, it has yet to develop a more comprehensive set of principles to govern the performative element within the freedom to conduct business. At core, a defining and tricky question of what may or must be considered to be the core elements of business practice that are deserving of fundamental protection, this question will undoubtedly occupy the Court for the foreseeable future. Currently, however, two particular principles appears to be emerging: first, economic actors should not be subject to undue or unfair business costs; but also, and vitally so (see also below), the Court of Justice would appear to be developing the ‘matket access test’, increasingly well-known within general single market jurisprudence,81 for the purposes of delineating the performative reach of the freedom to conduct business. More recently reaffirmed in the case of Lidl GmbH,82 which doubted the proportionality of meat-labelling requirements placed upon the business by Commission Regulation 543/2008, the notion that economic actors must not be subject to undue costs, was clearly set out by Advocate General Bot in the case of Sky Österreich.83 Although finally found to be ‘proportionate’ by the Court in a balancing of the right to free business against the right to information plurality,84 the applicant’s plea for relief for the costs accruing to them under Article 15, Directive 2010/13/EU (and Austrian implementing measures) with regard to the transmission of short news extracts, for which third parties held exclusive rights, led Bot to conclude that freedom from undue costs is a core element within business freedom that is worthy of Article 16 protection. AG Bot’s formulation of a principled application of Article 16, whereby the costs imposed by regulation, where not justified by the Community interests, infringe upon business freedom, may be argued to have had a firm basis in the Court’s earlier jurisprudence in Scarlet Extended and Netlog;85 or at least to do so, to the degree that the costs imposed by one private economic operator upon another, were similarly found to infringe upon the sphere of protection afforded by Article 16. The facts of the cases are broadly similar and concern an intriguing interplay between Article 16 and Article 17, or rights to intellectual property. In Scarlet Extended, the Court decided that an injunction requiring the installation of a complicated, costly and permanent computer system at the expense of ISPs in order to filter electronic communications which use file-sharing software (‘peer-to-peer’), with a view to preventing file sharing which infringes copyright, would result in a serious curtailment of the freedom of those ISPs to conduct their business. The Court subsequently confirmed its earlier ruling in Netlog, once again in relation to an injunction which sought to impose various operating conditions upon an ISP in the service of protection of

81 See A Tryfonidou, ‘Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 36. 82 Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co. KG v Freistaat Sachsen EU:C:2016:498. 83 See n 53 above. 84 Sky Österreich (n 53), para 59. 85 See nn 72 and 73 above.



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intellectual copyright. In each case, the Court referred to Community legislation, or Article 3 of Directive 2004/48,86 which more generally details the basis upon which the holders of intellectual property may seek injunctions, in order to protect their rights, and to its particular prescription that the corrective measures demanded in injunctions must be proportionate, or, in this context, not ‘too costly’. To this degree, Court’s Judgment, may be argued to be a simple securing of the legislative policy of the Union, especially as it applies to the appropriate balance to be struck between protection of intellectual property and the overall functioning of markets. Nevertheless, paragraph 53 of the Court’s Judgment in Scarlet Extended, not only introduces a further element into the adjudicative balance, the right to free information; but, also establishes an independent role for the Court in the definition of what constitutes the core of protected business operation: Consequently, it must be held that, in adopting the [overly onerous] injunction requiring the ISP to install the contested filtering system, the national court concerned would not be respecting the requirement that a fair balance be struck between the right to intellectual property, on the one hand, and the freedom to conduct business, the right to protection of personal data and the freedom to receive or impart information, on the other.

16.43 As noted, the imposition of a duty upon national courts to balance rights of property against the freedom to conduct business in conflicts between private economic operators amounts in fact and de jure to the elevation of a freedom to conduct business to the status of private obligation or quasi subjective right. Equally, the cases of Scarlet Extended and Netlog must also be understood as immediately refuting the presumption raised by the wording of the Charter that, in the intricate complex of related rights to work, property and the freedom to conduct business, commercial freedom is the poor relation. Instead, in the Court’s emphatic view, the freedom to conduct business may, where necessary, be asserted above the right to (intellectual) property. 16.44 As a consequence, and to the degree that Article 16 may be regarded as subjective right, rather than guiding principle, it is appropriate to return to the question of whether the Court of Justice is currently engaged in establishment of a value neutral exposition of a right to business conduct founded within notions of human dignity and the existential need of individual Europeans to engage in economic activity. Or, by contrast, whether the Court is extrapolating a right to conduct business from Article 16, with a view to the legitimacy of a particular form of economic activity within Europe’s evolving economic constitution. One immediate factor, which may argue in favour of the latter interpretation, however, is the lack of attention paid in Scarlet Extended and Netlog to the Wesentlichkeits test, as enunciated by the Court of Justice in EMA,87 or the question of whether the assertion of a right to property would, under the facts, negate the freedom to conduct business in its substance. Certainly, the conditions imposed by the proposed injunctions would prove to be particularly onerous. Yet, as the Court noted in EMA, albeit in relation to costs imposed by Community legislation, ‘[T]he importance of the objectives pursued [in this case, protection of intellectual property] may justify restrictions which bring about even substantial negative consequences for certain economic operators’ (paragraph 89). On the facts of the cases

86 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L 195/16. 87 See n 76, para 89: It is settled case-law, however, that it may be restricted, provided that those restrictions correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union and that they do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference which would affect the very substance of the right so guaranteed (see, to that effect, Germany v Council (n 12) para 78; Case C-183/95 Affish EU:C:1997:373, [1997] ECR I-4315, para 42; and Case T-113/96 Dubois et Fils v Council and Commission EU:T:1998:11, [1998] ECR II-125, para 74). The importance of the objectives pursued may justify restrictions which bring about even substantial negative consequences for certain economic operators (see, to that effect, Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others EU:C:1990:391, [1990] ECR I-4023, para 17; and Affish, para 42).

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in Scarlet Extended and Netlog, ISPs would have been able to continue trading under the proposed injunctions. However, they might have been forced to do so at a disadvantaged competitive position, due to their enhanced costs. If the notion of an undue business burden may be argued to have become the first principle of application of Article 16, a second principle may now also be identified within the notion of market access, or the right of a business not to be hampered in their entry into a market. Given strongest expression in the enunciation of the principle of proportionality in the highly controversial case of AGET Iraklis88 (see below), a market access test also finds its inspirational place within the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in the case of Sony Music.89 Concluding in paragraph 81 of the judgment that an injunction protecting copyright by requiring a communication network access provider to prevent any infringements would fall under the protections of Article 17 of the Charter, the Third Chamber nevertheless also concludes in paragraph 82 that such an injunction would not only place an undue burden on the provider in the course of the conduct of their business, but would also be capable ‘of restricting the freedom available to recipients of such a service from benefiting from access to the internet’. Taken together with Scarlet Extended and Netlog, Sony Music thus not only provides us with further evidence that Article 16 is far from being a poor relation to Article 16, but also begins to hint in its determination to safeguard processes of market offer-acceptance and market access within the European economic space, of a possible rift between the Court and the Commission’s view of the emerging contours of the European Economic Constitution. Above all, in beginning to sketch out and to defend the performative elements of the freedom to conduct business, the Court would appear to be recalling its competition case law in the case of TeliaSonera,90 rejecting the drift of the Treaty of Lisbon away from the legalism, or ‘ordo-liberal’ character of the historic interpretation of the European Treaties, and towards an economic theory, or neo-liberally flavoured vision of European economic activity. Mario Monti, as Competition Commissioner, once laid claim to a more modern approach to competition and markets, noting that ‘[T]he European Commission is committed to develop a modern and efficient competition policy which reflects a realistic economic analysis of the market place’, and in which Union policymakers have ‘shifted from a legalistic approach to an interpretation based on sound economic principles’, within which protection of the ‘consumer’ is paramount.91 Yet, in TeliaSonera, the Court re-asserted the fundamental position of notions of free and fair competition within the primary law of the EU, equating the modified Article 3(1)(b) TFEU with Article 3(3) TEU, because ‘the function of those rules is precisely to prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings, and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union’ (paragraph 22, emphasis added). The distinction from Mario Monti’s analysis, the Court’s triple emphasis on public interest, and the rights of undertakings, as well as those of consumers, is striking. And, seen in this light, might not principles of undue burden, market access and the elevation of Article 16 to a subjective right in its performative elements, also signal the Court’s politically-inspired commitment to the equal protection of economic operators?

88 AGET Iraklis (n 56). 89 Case C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH EU:C:2016:689. 90 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB EU:C:2011:83, [2011] ECR I-527. 91 Mario Monti, ‘EU Competition Policy After May 2004’ (speech at the Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, 24 October 2003), https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-03-489_en.htm, accessed 5 April 2021.



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(b)  Contractual Autonomy 16.49 If the case of Alemo-Herron (see above) may be taken as confirmation that contractual autonomy will form a part of the business freedom generated by Article 16, it must similarly be distinguished as being explosive and unloved in the extent to which it will assert contractual autonomy above the legitimate interests of the Member States and European Union to regulate economic activity in pursuit of the general good. In this respect, it is therefore perhaps useful to recall, not only that contractual autonomy formed a part of the freedom to conduct business prior to entry into force of the Charter, but also that its scope was historically limited. In this context, the Opinion of AG Kokott, delivered on 17 September 2009, in the case of Alrosa,92 though not subsequently addressed by the Court, might be considered to be a better indicator of the manner in which this area of law might evolve in the future. 16.50 Alrosa concerned a commitment offered to the Commission by De Beers in 2006 to avoid the accusation of abuse of a dominant position (under what is now Article 102 TFEU). As the worldwide market leader in the diamond trade, De Beers undertook in future not to purchase any more rough diamonds from Alrosa, the second largest producer, bringing to an end a long-standing trading relationship between the two. By a decision under Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003,93 the Commission made that commitment by De Beers binding. Alrosa considered that decision to be disproportionate and took the view that its right to be heard had been infringed. The Court of First Instance annulled the decision and the Commission appealed against that judgment. The AG proposed that the Court should ‘set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance94 and dismiss the action by which Alrosa applied to the Court of First Instance for the annulment of Commission Decision 2006/520/EC of 22 February 2006.’95 16.51 In the course of his reasoning, the AG stated that ‘[C]ontractual freedom is one of the general principles of Community law. It stems from the freedom to act for persons. It is also inseparably linked to the freedom to conduct a business. In a Community which must observe the principle of an open market economy with free competition, contractual freedom must be guaranteed. The case-law of the Court of Justice also recognises that economic operators must enjoy contractual freedom’ (paragraph 225). Further, ‘[i]n adopting competition decisions the Commission is required to take account of the principle of contractual freedom and the freedom to conduct a business’ (paragraph 226). The AG nevertheless then proceeded to confirm the restricted procedural approach to contractual autonomy that the historic Court had pursued in cases, such as Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing and Spain v European Commission,96 whereby contractual freedom might be restricted following due legislative procedure: the decision was not ‘unfair, but a completely lawful means by which the Commission pursues the legitimate aim of effectively protecting competition against distortion. It is true that this has meant that Alrosa has lost its desired contractual partner for the future. However, this is one of the risks which must be borne by Alrosa, like any other economic operator in an open market economy. This does not impair the contractual freedom enjoyed by Alrosa’ (paragraphs 229 and 230).

92 Case C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa EU:C:2010:377, [2010] ECR I-5949. 93 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 94 Case T-170/06 Alrosa v Commission EU:T:2007:220, [2007] ECR II-2601. 95 Commission v Alrosa (n 105), Opinion of AG Kokott, para 274. 96 See, above, nn 13 and 15.

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IV.  Limitation to and Derogations from the Application of Article 16 The stark distinction between the reasoning of the Court in Alemo-Herron and that of the AG 16.52 in Alrosa is an immediate reminder of the potential depth of conflict surrounding Article 16, as well as its possible impacts within a real European world of socio-economic relations. AG Kokott remains true to the limited view of business freedom, deeming that contractual freedom may be restricted by due process of law. The Alemo-Herron ruling, by contrast, departs from formal legal reasoning, placing a far greater emphasis upon the status of Article 16 as subjective right, and subjecting the legislature to substantive review of its alienation of entrepreneurial conduct. This forms the core of political disquiet about the position of the freedom to conduct business within the emerging European Union Economic Constitution, where one of the primary points of concerns expressed by social and governmental interests at the national level, relates to the degree that Article 16 may impact upon the relations maintained between the European economic order and social provision within Europe, most commonly still secured within national social orders. Since its judgment in Wachauf, the Court of Justice has consistently held that the fundamental 16.53 rights it recognised, although constituting general principles of EU law, are not absolute and must be considered in relation to their social function.97 Consequently, the historic Court accepted that ‘restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those rights, in particular in the context of a common organization of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of those rights.’98 This position has been consistently re-affirmed by the Court since the passage into binding law of the Charter, most notably in the case of Makhlouf, whose statement that fundamental economic rights ‘do not, however, enjoy, under European Union law, absolute protection, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society’,99 has been cited by the Court, with full approval, in cases dealing with issues as diverse as the freezing of assets in Syria,100 the labelling of foodstuffs,101 and the licensing of gaming machines.102 And yet, recent cases, such as Alemo-Herron and AGET Iraklis103 have likewise attracted considerable critique, especially to the degree that Article 16 appears to undermine national principles of labour law. The problem, however, would appear to lie in the Court’s departure from simple review of the due process-driven legality of legislative measures restricting the reach of Article 16 (Alrosa), and its subsequent struggle to economic and social fundamental rights, as well as the legitimate general interest within the test of proportionality (see below). To recap: prior to entry into force of the Charter, the reach of the economic jurisprudence of the 16.54 Court of Justice at this vital interface between economic and social orders was clearly contained,

97 Case 5/88 Wachauf EU:C:1989:321, [1989] ECR 2609, para 18; Case C-177/90 Kühn EU:C:1992:2, [1992] ECR I-35, para 16; Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council EU:C:2004:497, [1994] ECR I-7789, para 52; Case C-44/94 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fishermen’s Organisations and Others EU:C:1995:325, [1995] ECR I-3115, para 55; Case C-22/94 The Irish Farmers Association and Others EU:C:1997:187, [1997] ERC I-1809, para 27; Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik EU:C:1998:172, [1998] ECR 1-1953, para 21; Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood EU:C:2003:397, [2003] ERC I-7411, para 68; and Joined Cases C-37/02 and C-38/02 Di Lenardo and Dilexport EU:C:2004:443, [2004] ECR I-6911, para 82. 98 Ibid. 99 Case T-383/11 Makhlouf v Council EU:T:2013:431, para 97. 100 Case T-153/15 Mohamad Hamcho and Hamcho International v Council EU:T:2016:630, Case T-154/15 Aiman Jaber v Council EU:T:2016:629, Case T-155/15 Khaled Kaddour v Council EU:T:2016:628. 101 C-157/14 Neptune Distribution v Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance EU:C:2015:823. 102 Case C-390/12 Robert Pfleger and Others EU:C:2014:281. 103 See above, n 56.



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or limited by the legitimate social aims of the member states, especially as regards the regulation of industries of public significance. The Charter nevertheless omits any specific limitation clauses for the rights and freedoms it recognises. Instead, a general limitation clause was included in Article 52, applying to all rights and freedoms the Charter recognises. Equally, although they ‘do not as such have the status of law’ and are, rather, to be viewed a ‘valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter’,104 the Explanations of the Presidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter do detail specific limitations for the exercise of Charter rights; but, similarly omit specific mention of limitations to Article 16, explaining simply that ‘[i]t may be subject to the limitations provided for in Article 52(1) of the Charter.’105 16.55 The consequent degree of legal uncertainty engendered with regard to the question of whether Article 16 will still be subject to the historic limitations placed upon the freedom to conduct business by the Court of Justice is therefore one further explanation for its unique formulation within the complex of economic rights, as a ‘freedom’ which is exercised ‘in accordance with Union law and national law and practices.’ The specific reiteration of national law and practices may thus be argued to reflect the efforts by various national positions to retrench the freedom to conduct business as a simple existential right which may still be limited by the complex web of national rules and social practices (eg, collective bargaining) which apply within national social orders. Nevertheless, an immediate question arises as to whether such concern is misplaced. Article 52(1) of the Charter reproduces the settled case law of the Court and accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter, such as the freedom to conduct a business set forth in Article 16, on the condition that those limitations are provided by law, respect the essence of the rights and freedoms in question, are subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet the objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 16.56 In the light of this formulation, the strong presumption must be one that historic limitations imposed by the Court will continue to apply. In this regard, the Court accepted prior to the introduction of the Charter that several kinds of restrictions to the freedom to conduct a business which were considered to correspond, in fact, to objectives of general interest pursued by the Union: ‘the efficient management and the simplified administration of a levy scheme, and the obligation which processors have as a consequence to pay the levy and to pass it on to their suppliers’ (Schräder v Hauptzollamt Gronau106), ‘to ensure that losses incurred by an economic sector are not borne by the Community’ (Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest107), ‘to remedy the situation of surpluses on the milk and milk products market’ (Kühn108), ‘objectives of the common agriculture policy’ (Germany v Council109), ‘the improvement of road safety’ (Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council110), ‘the structural improvement of the fisheries sector’ (The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fishermen’s Organisations and Others111), ‘to remedy a worrying economic and social situation in the inland waterways sector’ (SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf112), and ‘to combat speculative or artificial practices



104 Explanations 105 Ibid, 23.

Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 31) 17.

106 Case

265/87 Schräder v Hauptzollamt Gronau EU:C:1989:303, [1989] ECR 2237, para 18. Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest (n 20) para 76. (n 20) para 17. 109 Germany v Council (n 12) para 81. 110 Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council (n 20) para 53. 111 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fishermen’s Organisations and Others (n 97) para 56. 112 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf (n 20) para 73. 107 Zuckerfabrik 108 Kühn

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in relation to the issue of import licences, thereby precluding the possibility of a traditional operator who already has a tariff quota from being included in that same quota again as a non-traditional operator through the intermediary of another operator to which it is related’ (Di Lenardo and Dilexport113). By the same token, jurisprudence since passage into force of the Charter has repeatedly reinforced the presumption that such established limitations to the freedom to conduct business will continue to apply. Thus, in a judgment delivered on 6 September 2012, the Court even expanded the scope of limitations to be applied to Article 16, holding that objectives pursued in the field of ‘public health’ could justify restrictions upon its exercise.114 Equally, within this judgment, the Court also implied that the more general norms established within the Charter would themselves enhance potential for its limitation. Above all, in its justification for the restriction of Article 16, the Court explicitly referred to the objective recognised in the second sentence of Article 35 of the Charter (right to health care), which states that ‘a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.’115 Given the Court’s equally crucial affirmation in EMA that even those legitimate ‘objectives’ which ‘bring about substantial negative consequences for certain economic operators’ will be applied to limit Article 16,116 an immediate conclusion must be surely one that, in terms of the advent of a comprehensive scheme of personal protection for the individual European, personal economic interests within the EU are now contained within a balanced scheme of economic, social, ethical and even cultural consideration. However, such a conclusion is now in strong doubt, especially as regards the balancing of the rights contained within the Charter, and specifically so at the interface between the Union’s economic competence and the residual social competences of the member states. This qualification is relevant where Article 16 re-emerges as a ‘principle’ of European Economic Constitution, dedicated to a specific form of economic organisation. Closely related to the uncertainty which still pertains to the scope of application of the Charter, the vital issue here is not one of how Article 16 applies to the implementing acts of the Member States, but rather one of the degree to which it may be applied to judicial actions protecting the community interest in pursuit of the internal market, where national social regulation may be argued to conflict with it. The case of Iraklis,117 decided on 22 December 2016, is potentially transformational. Concerning a challenge by a cement producer (Iraklis) against a Greek law requiring prior authorisation by the Greek Labour Minister of mass collective redundancies, the judgment found that whilst a notification law would not per se breach the European provisions on collective redundancies laid down by Council Directive 98/59/EC,118 Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment) or the freedom to conduct business (Article 16), the measure at issue was not proportionate to the aims of labour protection or national economic management. The case has its own disturbing features: above all, the Opinion of AG Wahl, which pursued its own extra-legal economic theorising in asserting the counterproductive nature of the Greek law with regard to the pursuit of the object of full employment as laid down in Directive 98/59/EC; a goal the AG felt was best pursued under

113 Di Lenardo and Dilexport (n 97) para 84. 114 Deutsches Weintor eG v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (n 78) para 49. 115 Ibid, para 45. 116 EMA (n 76) para 89. 117 Iraklis (n 56). 118 Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective r­edundancies [1998] OJ L225/16.



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free market conditions.119 Nevertheless in overall reasoning and effect, the case also appears as a simple continuation of the Viking and Laval jurisprudence, affording direct horizontal effect to economic rights of establishment and services (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU),120 and similarly reproduces it failings, especially as regards the definition of proportionality.121 16.61 Certainly, although rejecting ‘the interests of the national economy’ (paragraph 72) as grounds for limitation of business freedom, Iraklis recognises a series of social rights, including labour protection, as fundamental rights within EU law. However, the rub comes in the balancing of those rights, especially where a principle of proportionality is the balancing test to be applied. The Greek law was not proportionate since it was formulated in ‘general and imprecise’ terms (paragraph 36). At core the proportionality test is reduced to a market access test122 (see above): ‘[I]n the absence of details of the particular circumstances in which the power in question [might] be exercised, the employers concerned [did] not know in what specific objective circumstances that power [might] be applied, as the situations allowing its exercise [were] potentially numerous, undetermined and indeterminable and [left] the authority concerned a broad discretion that [was] difficult to review.’123 16.62 In other words, just as Viking and Laval are celebrated as confirming rights to collective bargaining and rights to strike within the European Union, Iraklis can be viewed as a continuity case, affirming that Article 16 will be delimited in service of the general interest in labour protection. Yet, just as the proportionality test in Viking and Laval results in the assertion of an entrepreneurial right above fluid and necessarily indistinct, but socially legitimated processes of labour organisation, Iraklis asserts a notion of business certainty above fluid, but arguably democratically legitimated processes of economic review. Seen in this regard, Laval, Viking and now Iraklis might be argued to represent the apotheosis of an aggressively liberating strand within internal market jurisprudence, which, by seeking to balance economic rights with social rights in accordance with the principle of proportionality, undermines the principles of the traditional concept of the Economic Constitution, which regarded each order as separate and to be established in isolation from one another within the European and national jurisdictions.124 Far from re-affirming the social rights, the Court has undermined social principles, illegitimately subjecting social rights to the economic imperatives which arise in the act of the balancing of social and economic rights, or its pursuit of a concept of economic rather than social justice that emphasises protection for notion of ‘competitive labour advantage’ within the emerging European Economic Constitution.125 16.63 The final reason for the degree of political disquiet which has attached to Article 16 is thus revealed. Article 16 has yet to emerge as a decisive factor within jurisprudence on the liberalising

119 M Everson, ‘The European Crisis of Economic Liberalism: Can the Law Help?’ in E Nanopoulos and F Vergis (eds), The Crisis behind the Eurocrisis: The Eurocrisis as a Multi-Dimensional Systemic Crisis of the EU (Cambridge University Press, 2019), section II. 120 See, above, n 70. 121 A Supiot, ‘A legal perspective on the economic crisis of 2008’ (2010) 149 International Labour Review 151; C Joerges and F Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 1; B Bercusson, ‘The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 279. 122 Historically, always a site for the assertion of aggressively deregulatory commercial interests within Europe. See, for full details of the potential impact of the market access test in the field of the free movement of goods, A Tryfonidou, ‘Further steps on the road to convergence among the market freedoms’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 36. 123 Iraklis (n 56), para 100: see, Markakis (n 62) for paraphrasing and critique. 124 Above all, see Supiot (n 121). 125 Or the integrative ability of providers to offer cheaper services across European borders.

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reach of the four freedoms of the TFEU, especially as they relate to publicly-regulated services, or to the guarantee for free movement of goods. Nevertheless, given the close relationship of these rights with the freedom to conduct business within the EU, it is perhaps inevitable that they will do so, and particularly do so. It is accordingly, here, with regard to specification of the core nature of the freedom to conduct business within the EU, that the Court of Justice may yet face one of its greatest challenges. Above all, where Europe is slowly evolving its own interrelated complex of social, ethical, cultural and economic norms, European law may yet be required to re-assess its long-standing reliance upon the principle of proportionality. Drawn from the realm of administrative law, the concept of proportionality is rightly prized for its ability to rationalise judicial decision-making, but it has—traditionally speaking—played a far lesser role within constitutional jurisdictions concerned with the balancing of complexes of conflicting rights. Here, the Court of Justice may, in the future, be increasingly required to engage with far more contested process of socially and politically-embedded constitutional adjudication.

V. Remedies To date, little if any guidance has emerged from the case law of the Court of Justice with regard 16.64 to the specific legal remedies that may apply to Article 16. And indeed, doubts must similarly arise as to the scope of remedies that may apply to a ‘freedom’, rather than a right, a potentially greatly curtailed principle of European law (see above, Section C). Nonetheless, the freedom to conduct business must be regarded as being subject to the general principles governing the Charter as a whole. In this regard, Article 47 of the Charter lays down the general principle that, ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.’ The Court has given some guidance on the general principles applying to remedies within the Charter in the case of Unibet.126 Here, the Court gave a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the principle of effective judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community law, noting that this was ‘reaffirmed’ in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Accordingly: —— In the absence of Union rules, it is for national law to designate the competent courts and lay down the procedural rules applicable (paragraph 39). —— Union law does not create new remedies in the national courts unless it is ‘apparent … that no legal remedy existed which made it possible to ensure, even indirectly, respect for an individual’s rights under [Union] law’ (paragraph 41). —— It is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection (paragraph 42). —— The procedural rules laid down must satisfy principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Accordingly, rules governing actions to protect an individual’s rights under Union law should be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions. Moreover, they must not make it ‘practically impossible or excessively difficult’ to exercise rights conferred by Union law (paragraph 43). —— It is for national courts to interpret their procedural rules in such a way as to enable them to be implemented in a manner which contributes to the effective protection of an individual’s rights under Union law (paragraph 44).





126 Case

C-432/05 Unibet EU:C:2007:163, [2007] ECR I-2271.

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The impact of this final point can be clearly discerned in the Scarlet and Netlog jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, whereby the freedom to conduct business required establishment of a new element—consideration of the principle—within the procedures of national law governing the granting of injunctions.

E. Conclusion 16.65 The future evolution of Article 16 will undoubtedly prove to be one of the most intriguing aspects of the application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights within European law. The Court has already substantially enhanced the degree of protection for economic activity which the individual European might reasonably expect to be secured by European law. Yet, the most controversial aspect in future jurisprudence will undoubtedly be the degree to which Article 16 may be considered to be more than a retrenched right to human dignity, and may be viewed instead as an important element within Europe’s emerging Economic Constitution. Both for Union institutions and for the member states, this may prove to be a matter for concern, forming a focal point for conflict about the meaning and place of economic activity within the ever closer union of Europe. 16.66 The explicit formulation of Article 16 within the Charter must, similarly, be regarded to form a unique legal experiment. Not only is Article 16 the first explicit recognition for the freedom to conduct business with international or supranational law. Instead, when seen in contrast to national constitutional provisions, Article 16 is not a settled element within a post-conflict constitutional settlement. Rather, it emerges in the context of a unique effort to define the meaning and limitation of economic freedom within a still emerging political order.

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Article 17(1)* Article 17(1) Right to Property Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 17(1) This Article is based on Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ This is a fundamental right common to all national constitutions. It has been recognised on numerous occasions by the case law of the Court of Justice, initially in the Hauer judgment (13 December 1979, ECR [1979] 3727). The wording has been updated but, in accordance with Article 52(3), the meaning and scope of the right are the same as those of the right guaranteed by the ECHR and the limitations may not exceed those provided for there.

Select Bibliography M Aguilera Vaqués, ‘Right of Property and Limits on its Regulation’, in J García Roca and P Santolaya (eds), Europe of Rights: A Compendium on the European Convention of Human Rights (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2012) 537. T van Banning, The Human Right to Property (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002). J Basedow, ‘Die Entwicklung des Eigentumsrechts in der Europäischen Union’ (2016) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 573. JF Baur, K Pritzsche and S Pooschke, ‘“Ownership Unbundling” von Energienetzen und der europäische Schutz des Eigentums’ (2008) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 483. F Becker, ‘Market Regulation and the “Right to Property” in the European Economic Constitution’ (2007) Yearbook of European Law 254. M Buschmann, EuGH und Eigentumsgarantie (Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 2017). C Calliess, ‘Determinanten des Eigentumseingriffs in der Europäischen Union: Zur Abgrenzung von Inhaltsbestimmung, Beschränkung und Enteignung’ in M Kment (ed), Das Zusammenwirken von deutschem und europäischem Recht. Festschrift für Hans D. Jarass zum 70. Geburtstag (München, C.H. Beck, 2015). AR Çoban, Protection of Property Rights within the European Convention on Human Rights (Hants, Ashgate, 2004). * The first edition of this article was based on the author’s respective commentary on Art 17 CFR in H von der G ­ roeben, J Schwarze and A Hatje (eds), EUV-/AEUV-Kommentar (7th edn, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014).

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HJ Cremer, ‘Eigentumsschutz’ in O Dörr, G Grote and T Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar, vol 2 (2nd edn, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2013) 1466. T von Danwitz, ‘Eigentumsschutz in Europa und im Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht’ in T von Danwitz, O Depenheuer and C Engel (eds), Bericht zur Lage des Eigentums (Berlin, Springer, 2002) 215. JF Emsinghoff, Entschädigung für Eigentumseingriffe infolge rechtmäßiger Rechtsetzungsakte der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008). European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Protection of property (https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_1_Protocol_1_ENG.pdf, 2020) W Fiedler, ‘Die EMRK und der Schutz des Eigentums’ (1996) Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 354. K Gelinsky, Der Schutz des Eigentums gemäß Art 1 des Ersten Zusatzprotokolls zur europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (Berlin, Duncker & Humblodt, 1996). J Günter, Berufsfreiheit und Eigentum in der Europäischen Union (Heidelberg, CF Müller, 1998). M Hartwig, ‘Der Eigentumsschutz nach Art 1 1. Zusatzprotokoll zur EMRK’ (1999) 63 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 561. S Heselhaus, ‘Schutz von Unternehmen durch das Eigentumsgrundrecht im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht’ in T Bruha, C Nowak and HA Petzold (eds), Grundrechtsschutz für Unternehmen im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004) 97. ——, ‘Eigentumsgrundrecht’ in S Heselhaus and C Nowak (eds), Handbuch der Europaischen Grundrechte (2nd edn, Munich, CH Beck, 2020) § 36. HD Jarass, ‘Der grundrechtliche Eigentumsschutz im EU-Recht’ (2006) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1089. C Kreuter-Kirchhof, Personales Eigentum im Wandel (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2017) 473 W Leisner, ‘Der europäische Eigentumsbegriff ’ in J Ipsen, H-W Rengeling, JM Mössner and A Weber (eds), Verfassungsrecht im Wandel: Zum 180 jährigen Bestehen der Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (Cologne, Heymanns, 1995) 395. A Lucarelli, ‘Article 17—Right to Property’ in W Mock (ed), Human Rights in Europe (Durham NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2010). BM Malzahn, Bedeutung und Reichweite des Eigentumsschutzes in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (Frankfurt, Lang, 2007). J McBride, ‘The Right to Property’ (1996) 21 European Law Review 40. F Michl, ‘Grundrechtlicher Eigentumsschutz in Deutschland und Europa’ (2019) Juristische Schulung 343 and 431. C von Milczewski, Der grundrechtliche Eigentumsschutz im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Frankfurt, Lang, 1994). P Mittelberger, ‘Die Rechtsprechung des ständigen Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte zum Eigentumsschutz’ (2001) Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 364. O Müller-Michaels, Grundrechtlicher Eigentumsschutz in der Europäischen Union (Berlin, Duncker & Humblodt, 1997). U Penski and BR Elsner, ‘Eigentumsgewährleistung und Berufsfreiheit als Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs’ (2001) Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 265. E Reininghaus, Eingriff in das Eigentumsrecht nach Artikel 1 des Zusatzprotokolls zur EMRK (Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2002). HW Rengeling, ‘Die wirtschaftsbezogenen Grundrechte in der Europäischen Grundrechtecharta’ (2004) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 453. T Schilling, ‘Eigentum und Marktordnung nach Gemeinschafts- und nach deutschem Recht’ (1988) Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 177. ——, ‘Der EuGH, das Eigentum und das deutsche Recht’ (1991) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 310. P Sonnevend, ‘Eigentumsgarantie’ in C Grabenwarter (ed), Enzyklopädie Europarecht, vol 2 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014) §14. P Sturma, ‘Article 17—Right to property’ in EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (ed), Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (https://sites.uclouvain. be/cridho/documents/Download.Rep/NetworkCommentaryFinal.pdf, 2006) 163. 490

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PJ Tettinger, ‘Zum Schutz des geistigen Eigentums in der Charta der Grundrechte der EU’ in M Haesemann, K Gennen and B and A Bartenbach (eds), Festschrift für Kurt Bartenbach (Cologne, Heymanns, 2005) 43. M Thiel, ‘Europa 1992: Grundrechtlicher Eigentumsschutz im EG-Recht’ (1991) Juristische Schulung 274. R White and C Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010). L Wildhaber, ‘Die neuere Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte zum Eigentumsschutz’ in H Bauer et al (eds), Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Warsaw, Wolters Kluwer Polska, 2012) 95.

A.  Field of Application of Article 17(1) The right to property has to be respected, according to Article 51(1), by EU institutions, ­bodies, 17(1).01 offices and agencies as well as by the Member States—in the latter case, however, only when national authorities implement EU law (cf 51.67 ff). The amount of property-related EU legislation, some also requiring additional implementing acts on the national level, and thus the field of application of Article 17(1) has been steadily increasing: unbundling measures or the obligation to grant competitors access to one’s network in the area of network industries such as the telecommunication or energy sectors;1 workers’ participation provided for by EU labour law;2 the freezing of funds of persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism;3 restrictive measures adopted to maintain peace and international security;4 measures to ensure the stability of the banking system of the euro area as a whole;5 access to environmental information regarding companies;6 rules limiting the use of one’s property in view of environmental considerations such as planning law7 or rules on emissions;8 the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union;9 rules on securities10 or insolvency.11

1 Access: Arts 60, 61, 62, 68, 74 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 [2018] OJ L321/36. Unbundling: Art 9 Directive (EU) 2019/944 [2019] OJ L158/125; Art 21 of Directive (EU) 2016/797 [2016] OJ L138/44. See also JF Baur, K Pritzsche and S Pooschke, ‘“Ownership Unbundling” von Energienetzen und der europäische Schutz des Eigentums’ (2008) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 483; F Becker, ‘Market Regulation and the “Right to Property” in the European Economic Constitution’ (2007) Yearbook of European Law 254, 258 ff. 2 See Council Directive 2001/86/EC [2001] OJ L294/22; Council Directive 2003/72/EC [2003] OJ L207/25. Also J Heuschmid, Mitentscheidung durch Arbeitnehmer (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009). 3 Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002 [2002] OJ L139/9 last amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1473 [2020] OJ LI334/1; Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001 [2001] OJ L344/70 last amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1163 [2019] OJ L 182/33; Directive (EU) 2015/849 [2015] OJ L 141/73 last amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843 [2018] OJ L 156/43. 4 See Case C-72/15 Rosneft ECLI:EU:C:2017:236 (28 March 2017); Case C-358/15 P Bank of Industry and Mine v Council EU:C:2016:338 (12 May 2016) [55]. 5 See Joined Cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15 P and C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB ECLI:EU:C:2016:701 (20 September 2016) [66 ff]; Case T-107/17 Steinhoff et al v ECB ECLI:EU:T:2019:353. 6 Case C-442/14 Bayer CropScience ECLI:EU:C:2016:890 (23 November 2016). 7 Directive 2011/92/EU [2012] OJ L26/1 last amended by Directive 2014/52/EU [2014] OJ L124/1; Directive 2012/18/ EU [2012] OJ L197/1. 8 Directive 2010/75/EU [2010] OJ L334/17. 9 Directive 2014/42/EU [2014] OJ L127/39. See M Simonato, ‘Extended confiscation of criminal assets: limits and pitfalls of minimum harmonisation in the EU’ (2016) 41 EL Rev 727, 735 ff. 10 Directive 98/26/EC [1998] OJ L166/45 last amended by Regulation No. 909/2014/EU [2014] OJ L257/1; Directive 2002/47/EC [2002] OJ L168/43 last amended by Directive 2014/59/EU [2014] OJ L173/190; Art 9 Directive 2011/7/EU [2011] OJ L48/1; Directive 2014/59/EU [2014] OJ L173/190 last amended by Directive 2017/2399/ EU [2017] OJ L345/96. Cf for an overview J Basedow, ‘Die Entwicklung des Eigentumsrechts in der Europäischen Union’ (2016) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 573, 583 ff. 11 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 [2015] OJ L141/19 last amended by Regulation 2018/946/EU [2018] OJ L171/1. Cf for an overview Basedow (n 10) 588 ff.



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B.  Interrelationship of Article 17(1) with Other Provisions of the Charter 17(1).02 Apart from the right to property, the Charter guarantees further economic rights, namely the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work (Art 15) as well as the freedom to conduct a business (Art 16). The ECJ often does not differentiate between the right to property and these rights with the necessary precision, but simply refers to both at the same time without ruling on their interrelationship.12 Still, differentiation—as emerging in recent case law of the ECJ13—is essential in order to contour these guarantees.14 Since the current market position does not constitute property within the meaning of Article 17 due to its volatility, measures restricting the possibility to act on the market and to carry out business activities are not covered by the right to property, but only by the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work or by the freedom to conduct a business respectively;15 in contrast, Article 17(1) extends to measures related to the substance of an enterprise16 like the seizure of property (cf, also with regard to the wide understanding of the ECHR provision on property, 17(1).21f below).17 In particular cases, both aspects may be affected so that both guarantees apply.18 The suggested distinction has been established in German constitutional law differentiating between the ­protection of acquiring and acquired positions.19 17(1).03 Moreover, next to the right to property, acquired rights and legitimate expectations are protected as a general principle of Union law (cf 17(1).23 below);20 the principles established in

12 See eg Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727 [32]; Case C-63/93 Duff et al v Minister for ­Agriculture and Food and Attorney General [1996] ECR I-569 [28 f]; Case C-84/95 Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communication et al [1996] ECR I-3953 [21 f]; Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1997] ECR I-4475 [71 f]; Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik v Musik Point Hokamp [1998] ECR I-1953 [21 f]; Case C-686/18 OC et al ECLI:EU:C:2020:567 [81 ff]. With similar conclusions, J Günter, Berufsfreiheit und Eigentum (Heidelberg, CF Müller, 1998) 15 ff; M Ruffert, ‘Art 15 CFR’ in C Callies and M Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV (5th edn, Munich, CH Beck, 2016) para 20. 13 Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health et al v Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-6451 [127 f]. Cf, however, Case C-348/12 P Kala Naft v Council (28 November 2013) [119 f]; Case C-442/14 Bayer CropScience (n 6) [97 ff]; Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [143 ff]; Case T-333/10 ATC et al v Commission (16 September 2013) [188 f]; Case T-433/13 Petropars Iran Co ECLI:EU:T:2015:255 (5 May 2015) [92, 94]; Case T-817/14 Zoofachhandel Züpke ECLI:EU:T:2016:157 (17 March 2016) [123 ff]; Case T-65/14 Iranian Offshore ECLI:EU:T:2016:692 (20 June 2015) [122]; Case T-634/13 Arctic Paper ECLI:EU:T:2014:828 (26 September 2014) [47 ff]; F Shirvani, ‘Umweltschutz und Eigentum’ (2016) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Umwelt- und Planungsrecht 112, 115 ff. 14 Cf also, for the scope of Art 17(1) in view of Art 52(3), para 17(1).21 f. 15 Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health (n 13). Cf further F Michl, Unionsgrundrechte aus der Hand des Gesetzgebers (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2018) 102 ff. 16 BVerwGE 124, 47, 62; N Bernsdorff, ‘Art 15 CFR’ in J Meyer and S Hölscheidt (eds), GRC (5th edn, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2019) para 12; HJ Blanke, ‘Art 15 CFR’ in PJ Tettinger and K Stern (eds), GRC (Cologne, Beck, 2006) para 45; HW Rengeling and P Szczekalla, EU-Grundrechte (Cologne, Heymanns, 2011) para 781; Ruffert, ‘Art 15 CFR’ (n 12) para 20; H Schwier, Der Schutz der ‘Unternehmerischen Freiheit’ nach Artikel 16 der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (Frankfurt, Lang, 2008) 146 ff; R Streinz, ‘Art 15 CFR’ in R Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV (3rd edn, Munich, CH Beck, 2018) para 7; T Lock, ‘Art 17 CFR’ in M Kellerbauer, M Klamert and J Tomkin (eds), The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019) para 3. 17 Cf also Case T-200/14 Ben Ali ECLI:EU:T:2016:216 (14 April 2016) [253 ff]—relationship remains unclear, though. 18 J Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ in M Pechstein, C Nowak and U Häde (eds), Frankfurter Kommentar zu EUV, GRC und AEUV (vol I, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2017) para 45. 19 BVerfGE 30, 292, 335; E 84, 133, 157; E 88, 366, 377; W Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht (vol IV, Berlin, Springer, 2009) para 2503; M Ruffert, ‘§ 19’ in D Ehlers (ed), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, (4th edn, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2014) para 14. 20 Case C-526/14 Kotnik ECLI:EU:C:2016:570 (19 July 2016) [62 ff].

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this respect may be applied in the context of Article 17(1) when property is at stake. Article 17(2) constitutes a lex specialis for the protection of intellectual property. Finally, Article 17(1), if interpreted in line with Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the 17(1).04 ECHR, would also extend to social benefits irrespective of being contributory or tax-financed and overlap with the social Charter right to social security and social assistance (Article 34); a distinct interpretation is possible, though (cf 17(1).22).

C.  Sources of Article 17(1) Rights I. ECHR In view of controversies on the content of a right to property, the convention itself does not 17(1).05 contain such a guarantee; its details were rather negotiated subsequently and the right of property is guaranteed by a specific protocol, ie in Article 1 of the (First) Additional Protocol to the ECHR.21 Article 17(1) corresponds—as evidenced by the explanations to the Charter22—to Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR,23 which reads: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

Thus, Article 52(3) applies, which requires interpreting the meaning and scope of Article 17 17(1).06 in line with Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR (as interpreted by the ECtHR);24 nonetheless, the Charter may provide more extensive protection (cf 52.100 ff). Moreover, as long as the ECHR’s standard of protection is guaranteed, single positions qualified as property within the meaning of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR may be subsumed under different Charter provisions to allow for developing a specific interpretation of the Charter (cf 17(1).20 f with regard to professional activities and 17(1).22 with regard to social benefits). The Additional Protocol has been ratified by all Member States of the European Union; 17(1).07 however, some have declared reservations.25 21 M Hartwig, ‘Der Eigentumsschutz nach Art 1 1. Zusatzprotokoll zur EMRK’ (1999) 63 Rabels Zeitschrift für ­ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 561, 562 ff. 22 Explanations on Art 17 CFR [2007] OJ C303/17 (23). 23 See for a comprehensive and systematic overview on the ECtHR’s jurisprudence European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Protection of property (https://www. echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_1_Protocol_1_ENG.pdf, 2020). Cf on its development T van Banning, The Human Right to Property (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002) 64 ff; AR Çoban, Protection of Property Rights within the European Convention on Human Rights (Hants, Ashgate, 2004) 127 ff; A Nussberger, ‘Enteignung und Entschädigung nach der EMRK’ in O Deppenheuer and F Shirvani (eds), Die Enteignung (Berlin, Springer, 2018) 89. 24 See Case C-384/17 Link Logistik N&N ECLI:EU:C:2018:810 (4 October 2018) [43]; Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others ECLI:EU:C:2017:448 (13 June 2017) [49]; Case C-398/13 P Inuit ECLI:EU:C:2015:535 (3 September 2015) [61]; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi [2008] ECR I-6351 [356]; Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali ECLI:EU:T:2018:487 (13 July 2018) [271]; Case T-256/11 Ezz ECLI:EU:T:2014:93 (27 February 2014) [211]. Cf, however, 17(1).20 ff for the protection of business interests and of social benefits. 25 See ‘Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.009—Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ as of 10/02/2021 available on https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-ontreaties/-/conventions/treaty/009/declarations (10 February 2021).



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II.  UN Treaties 17(1).08 On the international level,26 the right to property is—following a controversial process of negotiation27—guaranteed by Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,28 whereas neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR contain a respective right;29 the latter only protects everyone’s right ‘(t)o benefit from the protection of moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is an author’.30 While the aforementioned guarantees apply to all persons subject to a state’s jurisdiction irrespective of nationality, international economic law offers foreigners additional protection: the standards of ­customary international law related to the expropriation of foreigners and the rules of international investment law have to be mentioned in this context.31

III.  Other Sources (a)  National Constitutional Law 17(1).09 The right to property forms part of the Constitutional traditions common to the Member States.32 Hence, according to Article 52(4), it shall be ‘interpreted in harmony with those traditions’ (cf 52.151 ff). (b)  EU Law 17(1).10 Article 345 TFEU stipulates that ‘(t)he Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership’. To the extent property-related decisions of the Member States are considered protected by this provision, which is controversially

26 Cf for an extensive overview on international standard setting van Banning (n 23) 33 ff; U Kriebaum, E ­ igentumsschutz im Völkerrecht (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2008). 27 Van Banning (n 23) 36 ff; Çoban (n 23) 126 f. 28 Cf for more details van Banning (n 23) 35 ff. 29 Cf ibid 42 ff. 30 Art 15(1) lit c; cf in this respect Art 17(2). 31 Cf for an overview M Herdegen, Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (12th edn, München, CH Beck, 2020) 338 ff; idem, Principles of International Economic Law (2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016) 411 ff. 32 Case 4-73 J Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities [1974] ECR 491 [14]; Case 44/79 Hauer (n 12) [17]—Austria: Art 5 together with Art 6 Austrian State Basic Law; Belgium: Art 16 Const; Bulgaria: Art 17 Const 1991; Cyprus: Art 23 Const; Czech Republic: Arts 3 and 112 para 1 Const together with Art 11 Czech Declaration of Human Rights; Denmark: § 73 para 1 Const; Estonia: § 32 Const; Finland: § 15 Const; France: Arts 2 s 2, 17 Decl of Human and Civil Rights; Germany: Art 14 German Basic Law; Greece: Art 17 Const; Hungary: Art 13 para 1 Const; Ireland: Art 43 Const; Italy: Art 42 Const; Latvia: § 105 Const; Lithuania: Art 23 Const; ­Luxembourg: Art 16 Const; Malta: Arts 32, 36 f Const; Netherlands: Art 14 Const; Poland: Art 21 Const; Portugal: Art 62 Const; Romania: Art 44 Const 2003; Slovakia: Art 20 Const; Slovenia: Art 33 Const; Spain: Art 33 Const; Sweden: c 2 § 15 Const; United Kingdom: Art 1 Pt II, Sch 1 Human Rights Act 1998. With the same conclusion but acknowledging differing levels of protection, see P Sonnevend, ‘§ 14. Eigentumsgarantie’ in C Grabenwarter (ed), Enzyklopädie Europarecht (vol 2, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014) para 11. Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 2, identifies three aspects of the common European constitutional tradition: the guarantee of private property including protection against arbitrary deprivation of possessions, the possibility to expropriate possessions provided compensation is paid and the possibility to restrict the use of property by the legislator; disagreeing, W Leisner, ‘Der europäische Eigentumsbegriff ’ in J Ipsen, HW Rengeling, JM Mössner and A Weber (eds), Festschrift Carl Heymanns Verlag (Cologne, Heymanns, 1995) 395, 400 f, doubts the ­existence of a substantial common constitutional tradition. Cf for a broad comparative analysis JF Emsinghoff, ­Entschädigung (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008) 75 ff; Günter (n 12) 50 ff; C von Milczewski, Der grundrechtliche Schutz des Eigentums (Frankfurt, Lang, 1994) 157 ff; O Müller-Michaels, Grundrechtlicher Eigentumsschutz in der Europäischen Union (Berlin, Duncker & Humblodt, 1997) 101 ff; S Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ in S Heselhaus and C Nowak (eds), Handbuch der Europäischen Grundrechte (2nd edn, Munich, CH Beck, 2020) paras 15 f.

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discussed, the European Union must not interfere; this limitation may also be considered when ­determining the scope of Article 17.33 Nonetheless, Article 345 TFEU does not preclude property ­definition at EU level (cf 17(1).01).34

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks The right to property was first mentioned in the Nold case handed down on 14 May 1974,35 and 17(1).11 then explicitly acknowledged in the Hauer case handed down on 13 December 1979.36 It has been well-established ever since.37 Article 17(1) sentence 1 protects the right to property and to bequeath one’s possessions. 17(1).12 Article 17(1) sentences 2 and 3 allow for limitations, namely with regard to deprivation and to regulating the use of one’s property. Moreover, although the right to property also extends to intellectual property,38 the Charter has opted for a specific provision on intellectual property in Article 17(2) ‘because of its growing importance and Community secondary legislation’.39 The first draft proposal of the praesidium to the Convention of 24 February 2000 regarding 17(1).13 civil and political rights already included a right to ownership (Art 16): ‘Everyone is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one may be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and in the cases and subject to the conditions provided for by law and subject to fair [prior] compensation’.40 The subsequent debates in the Convention centred on the modalities of compensation (point of time and extent), on the inclusion of a right of inheritance and of further types of limitations besides deprivation, on the protection of possessions acquired illegally and on the question of how to phrase the social obligations property entails.41 The respective state of discussion was reflected in numerous draft proposals42 before the right to 33 Cf only Basedow (n 10) 576 ff; C Calliess, ‘§ 20’ in D Ehlers (ed), Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten (4th edn, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2014) para 7 f; Frenz (n 19) paras 2790 f, 2940 f; J Kokott, Das Steuerrecht der Europäischen Union (München, CH Beck, 2018) 195; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 46. 34 Basedow (n 10) 578 ff, 590; C Calliess, ‘Determinanten des Eigentumseingriffs in der Europäischen Union: Zur Abgrenzung von Inhaltsbestimmung, Beschränkung und Enteignung’ in M Kment (ed), Das Zusammenwirken von deutschem und europäischem Recht. Festschrift für Hans D. Jarass zum 70. Geburtstag (München, CH Beck, 2015) 7 ff, 14 f; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 28 ff; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) paras 9, 25, 46; Michl (n 15) 94 f. Too restrictive U Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ in K Stern and M Sachs (eds), GRC (München, Beck, 2016) paras 15 f. 35 Case 4-73 Nold (n 32) [14]. Restrictive: Joined Cases 36–38/59, 40/59 Präsident Ruhrkolen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH, Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH, Mausegatt Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH and I Nold KG v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1960] ECR 887, 920: ‘On the other hand, the law of the Community as laid down in the ECSC Treaty does neither include a written nor an unwritten general principle of law that acquired possessions must not be touched.’ 36 Case 14/79 Ralph Loebisch v Council of the European Communities [1979] ECR 3679 [16 f]. 37 Cf Joined Cases 154/78, 205/78 et al SpA Ferriera Valsabbia et al v Commission of the European Communities [1980] ECR 907 [88 f]; Case 59/83 SA Biovilac NV v European Economic Community [1984] ECR 4057 [21 f]; Case C-347/03 Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia and ERSA [2005] ECR I-3785 [119]; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [355]. 38 Case C-479/04 Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet [2006] ECR I-8089 [65]; Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU [2008] ECR I-271 [62]; also Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 12) [21 f]. 39 Explanations on Art 17 CFR [2007] OJ C303/17 (23). 40 CHARTE 4137/00 CONVENT 8. 41 See also Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) paras 7 f. Cf for a summary of the discussions in the Convention N Bernsdorff and M Borowsky, Die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2002) 196 ff, 304 ff, 366, 386. 42 CHARTE 4284/00 CONVENT 28 of 5 May 2000; CHARTE 4360/00 CONVENT 37 of 14 June 2000; CHARTE 4200/00 CONVENT 45 of 28 July 2000; CHARTE 4470/00 CONVENT 47 of 14 September 2000; CHARTE 4470/1/00 REV 1 CONVENT 47 of 21 September 2000.



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ownership found its final wording in the Draft Charter of 28 September 2000.43 The distinct protection of intellectual property was added to the Charter only comparatively late, namely in the draft proposal of the praesidium of 28 July 2000.44

II.  Scope of Application (a)  Personal Scope 17(1).14 The right to property may be claimed—in line with the wording of the Article itself (‘person’) and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR—by natural as well as by legal persons.45 Entitlement depends neither on the place of residence or of the registered office46 nor on nationality.47 Whether public entities such as public undertakings may rely on Article 17 remains controversial and has not yet been settled by the Court. It is not excluded by the wording simply referring to a ‘person’ which may also include public entities;48 moreover, as in the case of private persons, state measures may also negatively affect the property of public entities.49 Consequently, many commentators afford protection to public entities at least in certain cases, either for public undertakings in general (cf, moreover, in the context of the market freedoms Article 54 TFEU)50 or for mixed-economic undertakings (ie in which private persons hold shares),51 where the entity has a certain amount of autonomy vis-à-vis the state,52 when no state authority is exercised53 or if not fulfilling duties in the public interest.54,55 However, being addressees of the 43 CHARTE 4487/00 CONVENT 50 of 28 September 2000. 44 CHARTE 4420/00 CONVENT 45 of 28 July 2000. 45 Joined Cases 154/78, 205/78 et al Ferriera Valsabbia (n 37) [88 f]; Case 59/83 Biovilac (n 37) [21 f]; Case C-265/87 Hermann Schräder HS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co KG v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237 [13 f]; C Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ in C Calliess and M Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV (5th edn, Munich, CH Beck, 2016) para 5; Frenz (n 19) paras 2806 f; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 42; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 52; HD Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ in HD Jarass (ed), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (3rd edn, Munich, Beck, 2016) para 17; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 6; A Lucarelli, ‘Article 17—Right to Property’ in W Mock (ed), Human Rights in Europe (Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2010) para 2; D Ehlers, ‘Grundrechtsbindung und Grundrechtsschutz von Unternehmen im deutschen und europäischen Recht’ (2019) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 397, 405; J Schwarze, ‘Der Grundrechtsschutz für Unternehmen in der Europäischen Grundrechtecharta’ (2001) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 517, 519. In regard to Art 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR see OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia (2012) 54 EHRR 19 [552 ff]. 46 Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 16; HD Jarass, ‘Der grundrechtliche Eigentumsschutz im EU-Recht’ (2006) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1089, 1092. 47 Case C-501/11 Schindler Holding ECLI:EU:C:2013:248 (18 April 2013)—Opinion of AG Kokott [203]; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 8. 48 Cf Case T-67/12 Sina Bank ECLI:EU:T:2014:348 (4 June 2014) [58]; restrictive, though, T Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ in M Holoubek and G Lienbacher (eds), GRC (2nd edn, Vienna, Manz, 2019) para 17. 49 Cf Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 17. 50 Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 16 (provided no public authority is exercised); further Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 42 (if acting on the market). 51 Von Milczewski (n 32) 267 ff. 52 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 5. 53 Frenz (n 19) paras 2808 f; C Kreuter-Kirchhof, Personales Eigentum im Wandel (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2017) 486 (also excluding the EU); Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 7. Combining the aforementioned criteria Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 53 (mixed-economic undertaking or autonomy and no exercise of state authority); Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 16. Cf also, but obiter, the formula in Case T-496/10 Bank Mellat v Council ECLI:EU:T:2013:39 (29 January 2013) [42]: ‘entity which participated in the exercise of governmental powers or which ran a public service under governmental control’—yet, ‘participation does not by itself imply that the applicant participates in the exercise of governmental powers or that it runs a public service’ [45]. Critical with regard to the width of the second alternative Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 7. Cf further The Holy Monasteries v Greece Series A no 301-A (1995) 20 EHRR 1 [49]. 54 Müller-Michaels (n 32) 70 f. 55 Cf further M Ludwigs and C Friedmann, ‘Die Grundrechtsberechtigung staatlich beherrschter Unternehmen und juristischer Personen des öffentlichen Rechts’ (2018) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 22, 27 f; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) paras 17, 19 (affected in its property like private actors notably if acting on the market and no exercise of state authority).

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Charter, public entities including public undertakings may not rely on Article 17.56 In this regard, it seems immaterial whether the entity exercises official authority strictu sensu (cf Article 51 TFEU) or is merely attributable to the state because of the latter’s dominant influence resulting notably from ownership or control, such as supervision or appointment of administrative, managerial or supervisory bodies (cf Article 2(1)(4) Directive 2014/24/EU, Article 2(b) Directive 2006/111/EC). For, next to difficulties in view of determining what constitutes ‘official authority’, in both cases emanations of the state bound by fundamental rights are present. Since the double role as entity bound and entitled by the Charter does not apply to public undertakings from non-EU countries, the Court, in its recent jurisprudence, has affirmed the entitlement of such entities to invoke inter alia Article 1757 without giving a definite answer for EU entities.58 It has to be added, though, notably in view of Article 52(3), that Article 34 ECHR, despite excluding governmental organisations from invoking rights guaranteed by the ECHR in view of the aforementioned double role, the ECtHR applies a restrictive understanding of such governmental organisations resulting in a wider understanding of the personal applicability of fundamental rights to public entities and undertakings than advocated here.59 Yet, hitherto, the ECJ has not generally applied the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in the Charter context, but qualified Article 34 ECHR as ‘a procedural provision which is not applicable to procedures before the Courts of the European Union’,60 notwithstanding some references.61 (b)  Material Scope Since property,62 other than eg human life, does not constitute a natural but a legal phenomenon,63 17(1).15 it presupposes a legal definition which, in view of the attribution of competences, can be found

56 F Wollenschläger, ‘Unionsrechtliche Grundlagen des Öffentlichen Wirtschaftsrechts’ in R Schmidt and idem (eds), Kompendium Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht (5th edn, Berlin, Springer, 2019) § 1 para 89a (also on further aspects discussed here). Cf for a restrictive position also BVerfG, Decision of 18 August 2020–1 BvQ 82/20, (2020) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1500, 1503 f. 57 Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [147] without reasoning; Case T-496/10 Bank Mellat v Council (n 53) [35 ff]; Case T-494/10 Bank Saderat Iran v Council ECLI:EU:T:2013:59 (5 February 2013) [33 ff]; Case T-35/10 and 7/11 Bank Melli Iran v ­Council ECLI:EU:T:2013:397 (6 September 2013) [64 ff]; Case T-10/13 Bank of Industry and Mine ECLI:EU:T:2015:235 (29 April 2015) [53 ff]; Case T-9/13 National Iranian Gas Company v Council ECLI:EU:T:2015:236 (29 April 2015) [37 ff]; Case T-578/12 National Iranian Oil Company v Council ECLI:EU:T:2014:678 (16 July 2014) [168 ff]; Case T-263/12 Kala Naft ECLI:EU:T:2014:228 (14 April 2014) [27 ff]; Case T-67/12 Sina Bank (n 48) [57 f]. Agreeing, Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 7. Cf for a critical view J Gundel ‘Anmerkung’ (2020) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1504, 1505. 58 Left open: Case C-548/09 P Bank Melli Iran v Council ECLI:EU:C:2011:735 (16 November 2011) [113]; Case T-10/13 Bank of Industry and Mine (n 57) [53 ff]; Case T-9/13 National Iranian Gas Company v Council (n 57) [37 ff]; Case T-578/12 National Iranian Oil Company v Council (n 57) [168 ff]; Case T-263/12 Kala Naft (n 57) [27 ff]; Case T-496/10 Bank Mellat v Council (n 53) [35 ff]; Case T-494/10 Bank Saderat Iran v Council (n 57) [33 ff]; Case T-35/10 and T-7/11 Bank Melli Iran v Council (n 57) [64 ff]. Formulated more open, but concerning a third-country company Case T-67/12 Sina Bank (n 48) [57 ff]. Cf on this Ehlers (n 45) 405 f. 59 The Holy Monasteries v Greece (n 53) [48 f]; Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey ECHR 2007-V [79]; Radio France et al v France, ECHR 2004-II [26]; Österreichischer Rundfunk v Austria App no 35841/02 (ECtHR, 7 December 2006) [51 ff]. Cf in more detail Wollenschläger (n 56) para 89b. 60 See eg Case T-494/10 Bank Saderat Iran v Council (n 57) [36]. Cf on the relevance of Art 52(3) Ludwigs and Friedmann (n 55), 26; further for a restrictive position on the transferability of this approach BVerfG, Decision of 18 August 2020 (n 55), 1504. 61 Case T-494/10 Bank Saderat Iran v Council (n 57) [33 ff]. 62 See for a conceptual and historic overview Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 1 ff. 63 Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 30; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 20. Disagreeing, Michl (n 15) 85 f; further in view of the ECHR ibid., 87 f; idem, ‘Eigentumsgesetzgebung im Lichte des Grundgesetzes und der Europäischen Menschen­rechtskonvention’ (2013) Juristenzeitung 504, 506 f, 511; nuanced idem, ‘Grundrechtlicher Eigentumsschutz in Deutschland und Europa’ (2019) Juristische Schulung 343, 344 ff; 431, 435 f.



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primarily on national level but also on EU level.64 The term ‘property’ within the meaning of Article 17 has to be defined autonomously on the Charter level (cf 17(1).21 ff).65 Admittedly, this autonomy is relativised by the obligation to take into account the pan-European fundamental rights standard, in particular to interpret the meaning and scope of Article 17 in line with Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR.66 17(1).16 Property extends to all pecuniary rights67 assigned to the individual in her/his private interest and as an exclusive entitlement.68 In a recent judgment, the Court defined property rights as ‘rights with an asset value creating an established legal position under the legal system, enabling the holder to exercise those rights autonomously and for his benefit’.69 A right has (amongst others) an asset value if granted for a consideration.70 Hence, the right to property encompasses not only moveable and immoveable property71 but also immaterial positions like claims of an economic value (receivables),72 rights of usufruct,73 liens,74 company shares75 or intellectual property rights.76,77 For the latter, Article 17(2) is lex specialis (cf 17(2)). Holding possession of

64 Basedow (n 10) 578 ff, 590; Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 13; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 4; idem, (n 34) 7 f, 14 f; Frenz (n 19) paras 2785 f; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 34; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 13; Sonnevend (n 32) para 30; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 14 f (but too restrictive in terms of property definition by the EU legislator). 65 Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 13; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 6; differentiating Frenz (n 19) paras 2785 f. 66 Art 52(3); cf in this respect 17(1).05 ff. 67 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk ECLI:EU:C:2013:28 (22 January 2013) [34]; Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 13; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 43; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 6; U Penski and BR Elsner, ‘Eigentumsgewährleistung und Berufsfreiheit als Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs’ (2001) Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 265, 268. Cf further Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v the Netherlands Series A no 306-B (1995) 20 EHRR 403 [53]: ‘rights and interests constituting assets’; Beyeler v Italy ECHR 2000-I (2001) 33 EHRR 52 [100]; Forrer-Niedenthal v Germany App no 47316/99 (ECtHR, 20 February 2003) [32]. 68 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (n 67) [34 f]; cf further Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt GmbH v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1994] ECR I-5555 [23]. See also Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 43; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 6. 69 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (n 67) [34]. Confirmed in Case C-398/13 P Inuit (n 24) [60]; Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2019:432 [69]; Case C-223/19 YS v NK AG ECLI:EU:C:2020:753 [90]. Cf for an ­analysis Michl (n 15) 89 ff. 70 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (n 67) [35]. 71 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 6; Frenz (n 19) para 2825. 72 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [356 ff]; Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [91]: contractual claim to occupational pension; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 6; T von Danwitz, ‘Eigentumsschutz in Europa und im Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht’ in T von Danwitz, O Depenheuer and C Engel (eds), Bericht zur Lage des Eigentums (Berlin, Springer, 2002) 262 f; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 45 f; Frenz (n 19) paras 2826 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) paras 6, 8. Cf further Case C-84/95 Bosphorus (n 12) [19 f]; Case C-503/04 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany [2007] ECR I-6153 [36]; Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (n 67) [35]; Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [146 ff]; SA Dangeville v France App no 36677/97 (ECtHR, 16 April 2002) [44 f]; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece Series A no 301-B (1994) [59]: ‘a debt in their favour that was sufficiently established to be enforceable’. 73 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [70 ff]; Wittek v Germany App no 37290/97 (ECtHR, 12 December 2002) [43]. 74 Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 44; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 8; Frenz (n 19) para 2825; cf further Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik (n 67) [53]. 75 Bramelid and Malmström v Sweden (1983) 29 DR 64, 76; M Buschmann, EuGH und Eigentumsgarantie (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2017) 101. 76 Case C-479/04 Laserdisken (n 38) [65]; Case C-275/06 Productores de Música (n 38) [62]; Case C-200/96 M ­ etronome Musik (n 12) [21 f]; Case C-277/10 Luksan ECLI:EU:C:2012:65 (9 February 2012) [66]; Case C-539/13 Merck Canada Inc. (23 October 2014)—Opinion of AG Jääskinen [14]; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) paras 15 f; Case C-264/19 Constantin Film Verleih GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2020:542 (9 July 2020) [35]; Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2019:623 (29 July 2019) [72]; Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2019:625 (29 July 2019) [56]; Case C- 476/17 Pelham u.a ECLI:EU:C:2019:624 (29 July 2019) [33]. 77 Cf on the ownership/possession of data Frenz, ‘EU-Digitalisierungsrecht. Datennutzung—Wettbewerb— Klimaschutz’ (2020) Europarecht, 210; Michl, ‘“Datenbesitz”—ein grundrechtliches Schutzgut?’ (2019) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2729; Trakman/Walters/Zeller, ‘Is Privacy and Personal Data Set to Become the New Intellectual Property?’ (2019) 50 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 937; Wischmeyer/Herzog, ‘Daten für alle?— Grundrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für Datenzugangsrechte’ (2020) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 288.

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an item entails in view of the ECtHR the presumption of having ‘a property right over that item until proof to the contrary is adduced’.78 In the Sky Österreich case the Court excluded from the scope of Article 17(1) exclusive 17(1).17 broadcasting rights acquired for a consideration—and dealt with the case under Article 16— since EU law granted competing broadcasters the right ‘to make short news reports on events of high interest to the public which are subject to [those] exclusive broadcasting rights, without the holders of such a right being able to demand compensation exceeding the additional costs directly incurred in providing access to the signal’.79 This understanding of property is—in line with AG Bot’s opinion80—objectionable though. For it grants too much discretion to the property-defining legislator. Being of an exclusive and pecuniary nature, the broadcasting right in question meets the property test; limitations to its exercise constitute regulations of the use of property and have to be justified according to Article 17(1) sentence 3. In the same vein, in a recent judgment, the Court has considered it ‘evident that, inasmuch as rights of usufruct over immovable property such as those at issue permit the usufructuary to use and enjoy that property, they have an asset value and confer on the usufructuary an established legal position, enabling him or her to exercise those rights of use and enjoyment independently, even if the possibility of transferring such rights is limited or precluded under the applicable national law. Indeed, where such rights of usufruct over agricultural land are acquired contractually, a price will, as a rule, be paid. Those rights enable their holders to make use of such land, in particular for economic purposes, or even, depending on the circumstances, to lease the land to third parties; such rights therefore fall within the scope of Article 17(1) of the Charter.’81 Article 17(1) sentence 1 limits the right to property to lawfully acquired possessions. This is 17(1).18 problematic insofar as requirements related to the acquisition of property might then determine the scope of the guarantee; hence, a legally valid acquisition of the possession does suffice.82 Yet, the Court has excluded unlawfully acquired public law positions from protection under Article 17.83 The legal estate as such, ie as the sum of all possessions, does not constitute property within the meaning of Article 17.84 Thus, the imposition of duties or taxes is widely excluded from the scope of the right to property;85 the contrary is true in case of duties or taxes directly

78 Ziaunys v the Republic of Moldova App no 42416/06 (ECtHR, 11 February 2014) [30]; cf also Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 8. 79 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (n 67) [34 f]. 80 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (n 67)—Opinion of AG Bot [36 f]. Concurring, however, and distinguishing between the position as such constituting property and a specific use precluded by the EU legislator and thus not constituting an aspect of the position in question Michl (n 15) 92 f, 103 ff. 81 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [70 ff]. 82 Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 15; Frenz (n 19) paras 2877 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 7; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 16; also W Durner, ‘§ 162’ in D Merten and HJ Papier (eds), Handbuch der Grundrechte, vol VI/1 (Köln, CF Müller, 2010) para 44; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 35; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 487 ff; HW Rengeling, ‘Die Wirtschaftsbezogenen Grundrechte in der Europäischen Grundrechtecharta’ (2004) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 453, 459; Rengeling and Szczekalla (n 16) para 808. Disagreeing: Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 7 with reference to the wording and no higher ECHR level of protection; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 51; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 30. 83 Case C-273/15 Ezernieki ECLI:EU:C:2016:364 (26 May 2016) [47 ff]—repayment of aid granted despite not satisfying eligibility criteria; C-321/15 ArcelorMittal Rodange and Schifflange ECLI:EU:C:2017:179 (8 March 2017) [37 f]—improperly issued greenhouse gas emissions allowances; see also Case C-321/15 ArcelorMittal Rodange (8 March 2017)—Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona [94 ff]. Disagreeing (repayment of state aid) Case C-81/10 P France Télécom SA (8 September 2011)—Opinion of AG Jääskinen [191]. 84 Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 51; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 22; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 6; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 52 ff. 85 Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415 [74]; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 8; von Danwitz (n 72) 268; Durner, ‘§ 162’ (n 82) para 45; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 50 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 6; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16)



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related to the acquisition, use or sale of property.86 However, it has to be noted that in its recent case law the ECtHR has followed a wider approach and extended the right to property to taxation, ‘since it deprives the person concerned of a possession, namely the amount of money which must be paid’;87 also financial penalties (of a criminal or administrative nature) have been included.88 According to Article 52(3) and (7), this interpretation—which is also confirmed by Article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR (referring to the ‘payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties’)89—also applies to Article 17.90 17(1).19 Reflecting ‘only a momentary economic position exposed to the risks of changing circumstances’, market shares do not constitute property.91 Neither are such positions protected as acquired rights or legitimate expectations.92 Likewise, ‘mere commercial interests or opportunities’ are not covered.93 Future income may only be qualified as property when ‘it has already been earned, it is definitely payable or there are specific circumstances that can cause the person concerned to entertain a legitimate expectation of obtaining an asset’.94 This test also applies to the position of the heir who, consequently, may notably rely on Article 17 from the moment of succession;95 mere expectations are not protected.96 With regard to the testator, the right to property extends, as expressed in the wording of Article 17(1), to bequeathing one’s property.97 para 6; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 52 ff. See, however, Case 265/87 Hermann Schräder (n 45) [16 f]; Joined Cases C-153/94 and C-204/94 Faroe Seafood and Føroya Fiskasøla [1996] ECR I-2465 [113 ff]; Frenz (n 19) paras 2856 f (Art 17 applied to liability to pay duties); Kokott (n 33) 196; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 493 ff. 86 Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf (n 12) [71 ff]; von Danwitz (n 72) 268; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 50 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 21 (if serious restriction); Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 25; regarding Art 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR, Jokela v Finland ECHR 2002-IV [47]. 87 Burden v the United Kingdom ECHR 2008-III 49 [59]; cf further OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia, (n 45) [552 f]. 88 S. C. Complex Herta Import Export S.R.L. Lipova v Romania App no 17118/04 (ECtHR, 18 June 2013[31 ff]; Grande Stevens and Others v Italy App no 18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10 et al (ECtHR, 4 March 2014) [184 ff]; Markus v Latvia, no 17483/10 (ECtHR, 11 June 2020) [67]: ‘a penalty may prejudice the right of property if it imposes an excessive burden on the person concerned or has a fundamental adverse effect on his financial situation’; further Case C-384/17 Link Logistik N&N (n 24) [43 ff]. 89 Cf for a diverging understanding, based on the wording ‘to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties’ as distinguished from rules stipulating taxes, Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 22. 90 Kokott (n 33) 196; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 494 f; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 19. See for penalties Case C-384/17 Link Logistik N&N (n 24) [43 ff]; Case C-501/11 Schindler Holding (n 47)—Opinion of AG Kokott [206 f]. Disagreeing in view of a similar protection with regard to the (generally applicable) principle of proportionality Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 51. 91 Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health (n 13) [128]; cf Joined Cases 154/78, 205/78 et al Ferriera Valsabbia (n 37) [89]; Case 59/83 Biovilac (n 37) [22]; Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union [1994] ECR I-4973 [79]; Case C-122/95 Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union [1998] ECR I-973 [77]; Case C-210/03 The Queen, on the application of Swedish Match AB, Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR I-11893 [73]; Case C-295/03 Alessandrini Spl et al v Commission of the E ­ uropean Communities [2005] ECR I-5673 [88]; Case C-120/06 FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and ­Commission [2008] ECR I-6513 [185]; Case T-254/97 Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH Chemnitz v Commission of the European Community [1999] ECR II-2743 [74]; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 9; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 46; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) paras 11 f. 92 Case C-59/83 Biovilac (n 37) [22 f]; Case C-295/03 Alessandrini (n 91) [89]; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health (n 13) [128]; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 46; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 14; also Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 9. 93 Case C-398/13 P Inuit (n 24) [60]. 94 Case C-398/13 P Inuit (n 24) [61], with reference to ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Portugal [GC] ECHR 2007-I 1 [64 f], and Malik v the United Kingdom App no 23780/08 (ECtHR, 13 March 2012) [93]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 7; see further Case T-256/11 Ezz (n 24) [212 ff]. Cf also Nacaryan and Deryan v Turkey App no 19558/02 (ECtHR, 8 January 2008) [44]. 95 Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 16 with fn 27; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 35. Cf also Nacaryan and Deryan (n 94) [44 ff]; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 55 f. 96 Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 16 with fn 27; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 55 f; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 35. 97 Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 16; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 55.

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It is controversially discussed whether an economic enterprise as such falls under the right 17(1).20 to property.98 In any case, the scope of protection must not go further than the protection of the foundations of the enterprise; hence, an interference with the substance of the enterprise is required,99 as with the use of the places or facilities of production.100 Business secrets may also be protected by the right to property.101 In contrast, carrying out business activities as such, like marketing products, or mere business opportunities or commercial interests and chances are not covered;102 in this case, Articles 15 and 16 apply (cf 17(1).02).103 Measures rendering completely impossible the exercise of economic activities by an undertaking are widely considered an interference with property.104 The fact that the ECtHR advocates a partially broader scope of protection of business activities 17(1).21 under Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR105 does not, despite Article 52(3) of the Charter, call for a similar interpretation of Article 17(1) of the Charter. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has to be seen against the background that the ECHR, contrary to the Charter, does not guarantee the freedom to conduct a business as a distinct fundamental right. This gap left the ECtHR securing protection by a wide interpretation of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR (as well as of Article 8 ECHR). At Charter level, however, there is no need for broadening the right to property to protect business interests in view of the respective guarantees in Articles 15 and 16 (which, of course, have to be interpreted in line with the ECHR to secure a similar level of protection).106 As long as the latter requirement is met, there is no need to realise this protection by a concurrent interpretation of Article 17 as the wording of Article 52(3) might suggest. Rather, a systematic interpretation of the Charter requires reconciling Article 52(3) with the fact that the Charter, unlike the ECHR, has opted for distinguishing property rights and

98 Affirmed by von Danwitz (n 72) 264 f; Frenz (n 19) paras 2843 f; Penski and Elsner (n 67) 269; Rengeling (n 82) 460; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 26, 35. Left open by Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 10. Cf for an overview Buschmann (n 75) 106 ff. 99 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 10; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 42. 100 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 9; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 47; Shirvani (n 13) 115 (including the right to use environmental resources). The Court in any case held that measures with the purpose to overcome the effects of a crisis do not infringe the right to property even if ‘the profitability and very existence of certain undertakings’ are affected (Case 258/81 Metallurgiki Halyps AE v Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 4261 [13]; Joined Cases 172 and 226/83 Hoogovens Groep BV v Commission of the European Communities [1985] ECR 2831 [29]); see also Case T-16/04 Arcelor SA v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2010] ECR II-00211 [154 f]. 101 Case C-1/11 Interseroh Scrap and Metal Trading GmbH v Sonderabfall-Management-Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH (SAM) ECLI:EU:C:2012:194 (29 March 2012) [43]; Case T-189/14 Deza v ECHA ECLI:EU:T:2017:4 (13 January 2017) [163]; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 47 ff. 102 Case 4-73 Nold (n 32) [14]; Joined Cases 154/78, 205/78 et al Ferriera Valsabbia (n 37) [89]; Case C-120/06 FIAMM (n 91) [185]; Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (n 67) [34]; Case C-477/14 Pillbox 38 ECLI:EU:C:2016:324 (4 May 2016)—Opinion of AG Kokott [194 ff]; Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 15; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 9; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) paras 7, 13; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 46. 103 Case C-477/14 Pillbox 38 (n 102)—Opinion of AG Kokott [182 ff]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 14. 104 Cf also Joined Cases 154/78, 205/78 et al Ferriera Valsabbia (n 37) [89]: ‘Moreover, it should be noted that no closure of an undertaking as a result of the application of [the] decision … has been recorded’; Buschmann (n 75) 106 ff; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 39, 42; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 12; Rengeling (n 82) 460. 105 Van Marle et al v The Netherlands Series B no 84 (1980) [41 f] (customer base); Fredin v Sweden Series A no 192 (1991) [40] (concession); Iatridis v Greece App no 31107/96 ECHR 1999-II 75 [54] (customer base); Buzescu v Romania App no 61302/00 (ECtHR, 24 May 2005) [81 f], [88] (customer base); Werra Naturstein GmbH & Co KG v Germany App no 32377/12 (ECtHR, 19 January 2017) [36 ff]: ‘The Court accepts that the economic interests connected with the running of the limestone quarry were “possessions” for the purpose of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 … These not only included the mining licence, but also the continued operation of the plant, machinery, roads and buildings in order to extract and process the limestone’ (para 37); Sonnevend (n 32) para 52; F Wollenschläger, Verteilungsverfahren (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2010) 111 f. 106 Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 12; Michl (n 63) 346; von Milczewski (n 32) 265 ff; also Durner, ‘§ 162’ (n 82) para 46; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 23, 32, 45.



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business-related rights. Moreover, the telos of Article 52(3), namely to secure at least a similar level of protection at the Charter level, is met. 17(1).22 Rights granted under public law schemes like social security benefits constitute property if the holder has contributed to their acquisition by eg investing money or exercising a professional activity.107 This is not the case for advantages granted within a common organisation of a market, like the commercial use of allocated reference quantities,108 unless acquired for a consideration.109 Since the ECtHR subsumes social benefits under Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR irrespective of being contributory or tax-financed,110 Article 52(3) of the Charter seems to require their inclusion also within the scope of application of Article 17(1) of the Charter.111 Again, as in the case of business-related rights (Arts 15 and 16), one may object to this understanding in view of the systematics of the Charter. For, unlike the ECHR, the Charter has recognised a right to social security and social assistance (Art 34).112 In view of its nature as a social right, the national and Union legislator enjoys a wide margin of appreciation when implementing it.113 Nonetheless, as long as a similar protection to that under Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR is guaranteed, there is no objection to establishing a distinction between Article 17(1) and Article 34 (cf 17(1).04). 17(1).23 Moreover, legitimate expectations covered by Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR are separately protected as a general principle of EU law (cf 17(1).03). (c)  Scope of Protection 17(1).24 The right to property not only offers protection from the state actively interfering with one’s possessions (negative dimension); it also confers positive obligations: administrative procedures and legal protection have to be designed in a way effectively guaranteeing the enjoyment of property in each individual case (cf 17(1).43 and 17(1).60).114 Additionally, the state is obliged

107 Case C-44/89 Georg von Deetzen v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1991] ECR I-5119 [27]; Case C-2/92 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex p Dennis Clifford Bostock [1994] ECR I-955 [19]; Case C-38/94 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex p Country Landowners Association [1995] ECR I-3875 [14]; Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [49 ff]—excluding a claim ‘to a pension of a particular amount’ [50]; Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [91]—‘contract relating to an occupational pension’ concluded with a state-controlled undertaking; Joined Cases T-466/93, T-469/93, T-473/93, T-474/93 and T-477/93 O’Dwyer et al v Council [1995] ECR II-2071 [99]; Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 13; Frenz (n 19) paras 2832 f; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 43 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) paras 10 f; J Kokott, ‘Der Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht’ (1996) 121 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 599, 607; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 499 f; von Milczewski (n 32) 252 ff; Rengeling and Szczekalla (n 16) para 811; Sonnevend (n 32) para 39; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 7; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 43. Left open for social benefits in Joined Cases 41/79, 121/79 and 796/79 Vittorio Testa, Salvino Maggio and Carmine Vitale v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1980] ECR 1979 [22]. 108 Case C-44/89 Georg von Deetzen (n 107) [27]; Case C-2/92 Dennis Clifford Bostock (n 107) [19]; Case C-38/94 Country Landowners Association (n 107) [14]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) paras 11, 14. 109 Case C-416/01 Sociedad Cooperativa General Agropecuaria (ACOR) v Administración General del Estado [2003] ECR I-14083 [50]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 11. 110 Stec et al v United Kingdom ECHR 2006-VI 131 [47 f]; Stummer v Austria ECHR 2011-V 1 [82]; Fedulov v Russia no 53068/08 (ECtHR, 8 October 2019) [65 ff]; Romeva v North Macedonia no 32141/10 (ECtHR, 12 December 2019) [37 ff]; Nechayeva v Russia no 18921/15 (ECtHR, 12 May 2020) [34 f]; also C Grabenwarter and K Pabel, EMRK (6th edn, Munich, CH Beck, 2019) § 25 para 5; Sonnevend (n 32) para 42. More restrictive K Gelinsky, Der Schutz des Eigentums gemäß Art 1 des Ersten Zusatzprotokolls zur europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1996) 40 f. 111 See also Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [49 ff]—the case itself concerned a contributory benefit, though Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 10. 112 Concurring Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 44. 113 Cf in more detail 34.23. 114 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [368 f]; Joined Cases C-399/06 and C-403/06 Hassan and Ayadi v Council and Commission [2009] ECR I-11393 [92 f]; Case T-318/01 Othman v Council and Commission [2009]

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to take measures to protect the right to property (notably against interferences of private actors or natural threats), insofar a broad legislative margin of appreciation is awarded.115 Criminal penalties for theft or rules on conflicting uses of land in planning law are examples of measures fulfilling such positive obligations.

III.  Limitations and Derogations The right to property ‘is not absolute and … its exercise may be subject to restrictions justified by 17(1).25 objectives of general interest’.116 Article 17(1) of the Charter distinguishes two specific categories of limitations and derogations: deprivation of possessions (sentence 2) and regulation of the use of property (sentence 3). After elaborating this distinction (section D.III(a)),117 the scope for possible limitations and derogations shall be examined (section D.III(b)). The ECtHR, by identifying a distinct rule in each of the three sentences of Article 1 of the 17(1).26 Additional Protocol to the ECHR, has acknowledged the possibility of interference with the peaceful enjoyment of property (para 1 sentence 1) not constituting a deprivation (para 1 sentence 2) or a control of the use of property (para 2) as a residual category,118 which is also of (limited) relevance in the Charter context (D.III(c)). At the outset, it has to be noted that there is no interference with the right to property if the 17(1).27 person concerned has effectively waived her/his right to property; this, however, requires an explicit and voluntary consent in full awareness of the circumstances.119 Moreover, with regard to state aid measures taken to rescue credit institutions in the context of the financial crisis, the Court has rejected an interference with the right to property if ‘burden-sharing measures on which the grant of State aid in favour of a bank showing a shortfall is’ made ‘dependent’ by the EU do not result in a loss exceeding the loss suffered in the alternative scenario of ‘a court insolvency order because no State aid is granted’.120 Since the right to property protects specific positions

ECR II-01627 [91 f]; Case T-107/17 Steinhoff et al v ECB (n 5) [98]; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 54 ff; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 16; Lock, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 5; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) paras 8, 18; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 36; cf further Case C-417/11 P Bamba v Council ECLI:EU:C:2012:718 (15 November 2012) [84 f]. Similarly regarding Art 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR Jokela (n 86) [45]; Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine ECHR 2002-VII 95 [96]; Fuklev v Ukraine App No 71186/01 (ECtHR, 7 June 2005) [90 f]. See also Michl (n 63) 347; von Milczewski (n 32) 273 ff. 115 Sovtransavto Holding (n 114) [96]; Öneryildiz v Turkey ECHR 2004-XII 79 [134 f]; Budayeva and Others v Russia ECHR 2008-II 267 [172], [175]; Kolyadenko and Others v Russia App no 17423/05 et al (ECtHR, 28 February 2012) [213]; Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 18; Abukauskai v Lithuania, no 72065/17 (ECtHR, 25 February 2020) [54 ff]; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 55; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 24; Michl (n 63) 347; von Milczewski (n 32) 247 f; ­Shirvani (n 13) 116; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 18. In Case C-296/93 French Republic and Ireland v Commission of the European Communities [1996] ECR I-795 [63 f] the Court denied an infringement of the right to property when refraining from intervention buying. 116 Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [51]; further Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [355]; Joined Cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15 P and C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising (n 5) [69]; Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [148]; Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [91]; Case T-65/14 Iranian Offshore (n 13) [122]. 117 It may be noted that in its recent Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [92] the Court has not distinguished the aforementioned categories with regard to cuts in occupational pensions granted on a contractual basis, but simply spoken of a ‘limitation’ of and ‘restriction’ on the right to property. 118 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden Series A no 52 (1985) 7 EHRR. CD256 [61 f]; cf further Solodyuk v Russia App no 67099/01 (ECtHR, 12 July 2005) [29]; R White and C Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 478 f, 503 ff. 119 Joined Cases 41/79, 121/79 and 796/79 Vittorio Testa (n 107) [19]; cf further Case C-526/14 Kotnik (n 20) [72]; F Wollenschläger, ‘Budgetöffentlichkeit im Zeitalter der Informationsgesellschaft’ (2010) 135 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 364, 385. 120 Case C-526/14 Kotnik (n 20) [73 ff]. Cf further A von Bonin and M Olthoff, ‘Zulässigkeit der Bankenmitteilung und der Gläubigerbeteiligung bei der Rettung und Abwicklung von Banken’ (2016) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 778, 780 f.



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and not the abstract value of a person’s assets, this judgment must not be generalised in such a way that compensation would exclude an interference from the outset; rather, this aspect has to be considered on the level of justification.121 (a)  Deprivation of Possessions and Regulating the Use of Property (i)  Regulating the Use of Property 17(1).28 The term ‘regulating the use of property’ must be interpreted broadly. It covers all measures defining or limiting the exercise of property rights. Article 17(1) sentence 1 mentions—not exhaustively—the possibility ‘to own, use, dispose of and bequeath’ one’s possessions.122 The use of possessions may be regulated by normative and individual measures;123 thus, in view of the former (ie the possibility of normative limitations), there is no requirement of a particular individualisation of the owner.124 Measures regulating the use of property have to be distinguished from a deprivation of possessions (cf 17(1).33 ff).125 Measures only indirectly affecting the right to property, ie not intended as a regulation of the 17(1).29 latter or not directed towards it, may also qualify as an interference with this right.126 Yet not all measures somehow affecting property are covered. Rather, a property-specific context has to be established.127 This has to be assessed in view of the contribution of the state action to the interference, the intensity of the infringement and/or the intention of public authorities. In the context of the freedom to exercise an economic activity (Arts 15 f), the Court has required ‘a sufficiently direct and significant effect’ for a measure to qualify as an interference.128 Similarly, in a case regarding intellectual property the Court held that ‘distortions of competition … result(ing) from the overall prohibitions of rental … would not be the direct consequence of the contested provisions, which do not necessarily have either the object or the effect of encouraging interested parties systematically to prohibit the rental of their products solely for the purpose of eliminating competitors from the rental market’.129 Moreover, in order to guarantee an effective protection of property rights, factual limitations 17(1).30 of the right to property also must be justified; often only the residual guarantee of Article 17(1) sentence 1 will apply (cf section D.III(c) below).130 In view of the need to define property (cf 17(1).15), some commentators differentiate between 17(1).31 rules defining the right to property and those limiting the same and only consider the latter as a measure in need of justification.131 Such a distinction, however, neglects the fact that a definition of property pro futuro may affect current positions negatively and thus may constitute

121 See also Case C-526/14 Kotnik (n 20)—Opinion of AG Wahl [71 ff]. 122 In favour of a broad definition Case 44/79 Hauer (n 12) [19]; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) paras 11 et 13; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 37; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 19; von Danwitz (n 72) 269. Cf in more detail Michl (n 63) 105 ff. 123 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 13; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 19. 124 Unclear and to be disregarded if meaning the contrary: Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt (n 68) [23]. 125 Case 44/79 Hauer (n 12) [19]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 19. 126 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus (n 12) [22]; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 14; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 59; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 20; Penski and Elsner (n 67) 269; Rengeling and Szczekalla (n 16) para 810. Disagreeing—except for existence-threatening interferences—Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 73 f. 127 Cf Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 12) [28]; Joined Cases C-435/02 and C-103/03 Axel Springer AG v ­Zeitungsverlag Niederrhein GmbH & Co Essen KG [2004] ECR I-8663 [49]. 128 Joined Cases C-435/02 and C-103/03 Axel Springer (n 127) [49]. 129 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 12) [28]. 130 Similarly, but rejecting a residual guarantee Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 22. Cf for a destruction of property Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia App nos 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 2005) [233]. 131 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 12.

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a limitation; moreover, also irrespective of this, any definition of property must be subject to the test whether the competing interests have been balanced in a proportionate way.132 (ii)  Deprivation of Possessions A deprivation of possessions means a formal expropriation which may be based on legislative 17(1).32 acts or measures implementing them, ie a measure completely and permanently depriving the owner of her/his property.133 The ECtHR speaks of a ‘transfer of ownership’.134 A decisive factor for distinguishing measures regulating the use of property from those 17(1).33 depriving a person of her/his possessions is the objective of the measure.135 A regulation of the use of property does not constitute a deprivation if the owner of the property ‘remains free to dispose of it or to put it to other uses which are not prohibited’.136 According to the jurisprudence of the Court, a deprivation of possessions requires not only 17(1).34 that a person is deprived of her/his property but also that the latter is transferred to another person. AG Wathelet has defined such direct expropriations as ‘measures of nationalisation or dispossession by formal transfer of title or physical seizure’.137 Thus, the duty to destroy or slaughter live fish susceptible to certain diseases without any compensation does not constitute a deprivation of property.138 Neither has the Court qualified the freezing of financial assets as a measure to fight terrorism or crime as a deprivation of property.139 Yet, the property itself does not need to be transferred as long as the deprivation is of benefit to another person as the Court has ruled in view of the ex lege cancellation of rights of usufruct over land: ‘Cancellation of such a kind thus, by definition, deprives the persons concerned—in a compulsory, complete and definitive manner—of those rights of usufruct to the benefit of the legal owners of the land.’140 Finally, to qualify as a deprivation, property does not need to be transferred to a public authority; rather also transfers to private persons are covered.141

132 See also Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 58. Formulating an exception in for that case Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 12. 133 Ibid para 14; Frenz (n 19) paras 2897 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 17. Denying a EU competence for deprivations in EU regulations Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 64 f, 77 (in view of Art 345 TFEU). 134 Sporrong and Lönnroth (n 118) [63]. 135 Case 44/79 Hauer (n 12) [19]; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [358]; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 18; von Danwitz (n 72) 270 f; see also Frenz (n 19) paras 2905 f; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 504 f; Müller-Michaels (n 32) 45 ff. 136 Case 44/79 Hauer (n 12) [19]. 137 Case C-284/16 Achmea BV ECLI:EU:C:2018:158 (6 March 2018)—Opinion of AG Wathelet [221 n 177]. See also for a confiscation entailing a transfer of ownership Yașar v Romania no. 64863/13 (ECtHR, 26 November 2019) [49]. 138 Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood [2003] ECR I-7411 [58 f]. More precisely AG Mischo, Hauer (n 12) [93]: ‘We are, in such a case, poles apart from the appropriation of a private person’s property by the public authority, such as the compulsory purchase of a building. There is no transfer of ownership in property of definite economic value to satisfy a need in the general interest. There is only property which, even if it may possibly still hold some economic value, must be eliminated and which therefore no longer has any prospect of being sold for profit.’ Similarly Durner, ‘§ 162’ (n 82) para 53. Cf further von Milczewski (n 32) 286 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 17; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 40. Disagreeing, Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 23; Lock, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 8; White and Ovey (n 118) 490 (deprivation); S.A. Bio d’Ardennes v Belgium no 44457/11 (ECtHR, 12 November 2019) [47 ff]. 139 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [358]; Joined Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council et al ECLI:EU:C:2012:711 (15 November 2012) [120]; Case T-190/16 Azarov ECLI:EU:T:2018:232 (26 April 2018) [49]; Case T-245/15 Klymenko ECLI:EU:T:2017:792 (8 November 2017) [200 f]; Case T-149/15 Ben Ali ECLI:EU:T:2017:693 (5 October 2017) [158]; Case T-720/14 Rotenberg ECLI:EU:T:2016:689 (30 November 2016) [167]; Case T-200/14 Ben Ali (n 17) [232]; Case T-65/14 Iranian Offshore (n 13) [121 ff]; Case T-516/13 CW v Council ECLI:EU:T:2016:377 (30 June 2016) [162]; Case T-273/13 Sarafraz ECLI:EU:T:2015:939 (4 December 2015) [199]; Joined Cases T-307/12 and T-408/13 Mayaleh ECLI:EU:T:2014:926 (5 November 2014) [175]. 140 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [81]. 141 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [84 f].



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17(1).35

Furthermore, in the context of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR, de facto expropriations (ie limitations of the right to property not qualifying as formal expropriations but entailing similarly negative consequences for one’s property) are considered a deprivation of one’s possessions, in order to guarantee an effective protection of the right to property.142 The ECtHR has seen such a de facto expropriation in the case of turning a private ground into a public forest,143 its usage for public construction without formal expropriation144 and in the destruction of a building,145 but not in the ‘inability to recover possession of [one’s] property occupied by tenants, for more than 13 years, in the framework of housing protection of tenants affected by restitution of expropriated or nationalised properties to former owners’.146 The same approach seems to underlie the jurisprudence of the ECJ when the Court denied a deprivation of possessions in the case of a prohibition on using specific certificates of origin for wine by reasoning that ‘it does not exclude any reasonable method of marketing the … wines concerned’.147 A contrario one may conclude that severe restrictions of the exercise of the right to property may constitute a deprivation of possessions although the (formal) position as owner of the property is not altered. However, the Court has not yet explicitly acknowledged this category and formulated criteria.148 At any rate, the Court has qualified the freezing of financial assets in the context of fighting terrorism and crime as a severe restriction of the exercise of the right to property but not as (de facto) expropriation.149 17(1).36 For reasons of legal certainty and in order to develop a stringent dogmatic of the right to property, it seems preferable not to recognise the category of de facto expropriation as a third type of limitation to the right to property.150 Such a step is not required in view of effective

142 Sporrong and Lönnroth (n 118) [63]; Brum˘arescu v Romania ECHR 1999-VII 201 [76]; Zammit and Vassallo v Malta no 43675/16 (ECtHR, 28 May 2019) [52]; Frenz (n 19) paras 2900 f; M Aguilera Vaqués, ‘Right of Property and Limits on its Regulation’ in J García Roca and P Santolaya (eds), Europe of Rights: A Compendium on the European Convention of Human Rights (Leiden, Nijhoff, 2012) 537, 549 ff; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 18; BM Malzahn, Bedeutung und Reichweite des Eigentumsschutzes in der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (Frankfurt, Lang, 2007) 219 ff; E Reininghaus, Eingriff in das Eigentumsrecht nach Artikel 1 des Zusatzprotokolls zur EMRK (Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2002) 71 ff; Sonnevend (n 32) para 64. 143 Köktepe v Turkey App no 35785/03 (ECtHR, 22 July 2008) [84 f]. 144 Gianni et al v Italy App no 35941/03 (ECtHR, 30 March 2006) [81 f]. 145 Zammit and Vassallo v Malta (n 142) [52, 54]; cf further Allard v Sweden ECHR 2003-VII 207 [50] (without explicitly mentioning a de facto expropriation). Cf, however, Baykin and Others v Russia no 45720/17 (ECtHR, 11 February 2020) [62]: ‘mesure de réglementation de l’usage des biens’. 146 Kasmi v Albania no 1175/06 (ECtHR, 23 June 2020) [Summary and 72]. 147 Case C-347/03 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (n 37) [122]; cf also Case 44/79 Hauer (n 12) [19]; Case T-190/16 Azarov (n 139) [61]: ‘Solche Umstände liegen bei befristeten Sicherungsmaßnahmen auf der Grundlage der angefochtenen Rechtsakte, von denen behauptet wird, es handele sich um eine faktische Enteignung, nicht vor’; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 20; Calliess, ‘Determinanten des Eigentumseingriffs’ (n 34) 12 f; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 505 f; Lock, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 8. Cf also Case C-277/10 Luksan (n 76) [70]. 148 Cf also Case C-284/16 Achmea BV (n 137)—Opinion of AG Wathelet [221 ff]: the ‘Court’s case-law on Art 17 of the Charter is not developed’ with regard to indirect expropriation, ‘that is to say, regulatory expropriations and the so-called “creeping expropriations”’. This concept ‘is more fluid and covers measures of interference, without dispossession, with the right of ownership and of enjoyment of the investment. The arbitral tribunals have established a number of criteria in order to distinguish between an indirect expropriation and the normal use of the State’s regulatory power, namely the degree of interference with the right of ownership, the aim and the context of the State measures at issue and whether those measures breach reasonable expectations as to the economic performance of the investment.’ Creeping expropriations are ‘indirect expropriations which take place gradually and are brought about by a series of measures, none of which in itself constitutes an expropriation but the cumulative effect of which is to destroy the value of the investment’. 149 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [358]; Joined Cases T-307/12 and T-408/13 Mayaleh (n 139) [175]. Cf also Case T-190/16 Azarov (n 139) [61]. Cf for a critical view Lock, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 8. 150 Concurring Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 41. Disagreeing, Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 19; Calliess, ‘­Determinanten des Eigentumseingriffs’ (n 34) 13 ff; HP Folz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ in C Vedder and W Heintschel von Heinegg (eds),

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protection of the right to property since regulation of the use of property with severe negative effects on the latter has to meet high (proportionality) standards in order to be justified. Moreover, compensation may be awarded beyond a deprivation of property, albeit not as a strict rule (Article 17(1) sentence 2 of the Charter), but as a more flexible requirement of the principle of proportionality. (b)  Legality of Limitations and Derogations to the Right to Property The differentiation between the two types of limitations—regulation of the use of property and 17(1).37 deprivation of possessions—is also relevant for the standards applicable in view of justification. (i)  Deprivation of Possessions Article 17(1) sentence 2 sets up three requirements necessary to justify a deprivation of pos- 17(1).38 sessions: a ‘deprivation may occur only where it is in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss.’151 Moreover, in a recent judgment, the Court has held Article 52(1) applicable in addition.152 Since the proportionality test is already implied in Article 17(1) sentence 2 (cf 17(1).40), the applicability of Article 52(1) is of relevance in view of the obligation to respect the essence of the right to property (cf 17(1).57). First, the conditions of the deprivation must be ‘provided for by law’ which requires, following 17(1).39 the ECtHR’s jurisprudence,153 that ‘a clear, foreseeable and accessible legal framework’ for restrictions exists.154 In this respect, ‘the mere fact that’ the legal basis covers ‘numerous measures … or that they have a broad scope does not mean that that law lacks clarity, precision or predictability’.155 Expropriations by both the legislator and the administration are permitted.156 Second, the deprivation of possessions must be in the public interest. This is ruled out if the 17(1).40 underlying objectives are disproportionate in view of the right to property: ‘It follows from a reading of Article 17(1) of the Charter in conjunction with Article 52(1) thereof … that when the public interest is invoked in order to justify a person being deprived of his or her possessions, compliance with the principle of proportionality as required by Article 52(1) of the Charter must be ensured with regard to the public interest concerned and the objectives of general interest

Europäisches Unionsrecht (2nd edn, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2018) para 6; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 61 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 19; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 504 ff, 523 f; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 22; M Ludwigs, ‘Der Atomausstieg und die Folgen: Fordert der Paradigmenwechsel in der Energiepolitik einen Paradigmenwechsel beim Eigentumsschutz?’ (2016) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1, 3; Penski and Elsner (n 67) 269; Reininghaus (n 142) 93; Rengeling and Szczekalla (n 16) para 820; Sonnevend (n 32) para 66; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 59 ff. 151 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [87]. See for an account on the case law of the ECtHR on the issue of restitution White and Ovey (n 118) 495 ff. 152 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [88]; further Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 66; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 37. 153 See eg Kurić and Others v Slovenia ECHR 2012-IV 1 [341]: ‘According to the Court’s established case-law, the ­expression “in accordance with the law” requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, and it also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects.’ 154 Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [268 ff]—quotation [272]; more precisely Frenz (n 19) paras 2912 f; Michl (n 63), 434; von Milczewski (n 32) 272 f. Cf for the applicability of the principle of clarity Frenz (n 19) para 2914; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 26. 155 Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [274]. 156 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 24.



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which the latter encompasses.’157 An expropriation in favour of a private person is possible if it is motivated by considerations of public interest.158 17(1).41 Third, a fair compensation for the loss must be paid in good time. This requirement was controversially discussed in the pre-Charter era.159 Although Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR does not explicitly mention this requirement, it has been acknowledged in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and has been derived from the principle of proportionality.160 A fair compensation cannot be equated with the genuine value.161 Yet, it must be calculated on the basis of the current market value; in exceptional cases considerations, such as the realisation of fundamental institutional or economic reforms (in particular nationalisations) or of measures to promote social justice, may justify a deviation from the full market value.162 Ordinary cases of expropriations realised by individual measures do not fall under this exception, though.163 When assessing the market value, all circumstances of the particular case have to be taken into account;164 all factors relevant for determining the market value have to be considered adequately; rules exclusively privileging the state, such as an irrebuttable presumption that the value of the property increased for example simply because a new major road was built next to the expropriated land, must not be applied.165 In view of the requirements to pay compensation in good time and to base expropriations on 17(1).42 an adequate legal basis, a rule determining the amount and the modalities of compensation has to be set up in advance—a requirement which remained highly controversial in the Convention,

157 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [89]—emphasis added. See also Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 66; Lithgow et al v United Kingdom Series A no 102 (1986) 8 EHRR 329 [120]; The Holy Monasteries v Greece (n 53) [70 f]: ‘An interference with peaceful enjoyment of possessions must strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights … The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 (P1-1) as a whole … including therefore the second sentence, which is to be read in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first sentence … In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measure depriving a person of his possessions’; von Danwitz (n 72) 253 f, 273; Frenz (n 19) paras 2915 f, 2921 f; Gelinsky (n 110) 102 ff; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 66; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 28; Malzahn (n 142) 191 ff; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 49. 158 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [84 f]; James v United Kingdom Series A no 98 (1986) 8 EHRR 123 [40 f]; Frenz (n 19) para 2917; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 27; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 27; Müller-Michaels (n 32) 90 f; Reininghaus (n 142) 139 ff; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 81; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 44; cf further (with a particular focus on Spain) D Utrilla Fernández-Bermejo, Expropiación forzosa y beneficiario privado— Una r­ econstrucción sistemática 2015 (Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2015) 102 f. 159 Cf for a detailed discussion Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 20. 160 James (n 158) [54]; Lithgow (n 157) [121]; The Holy Monasteries (n 53) [70 f]; Papachelas v Greece ECHR 1999-II 1 [48]; Kozacio˘glu v Turkey App no 2334/03 (ECtHR, 19 February 2009) [64]. Cf, for the discussion on the ECHR level, Aguilera Vaqués (n 142) 554 ff; Çoban (n 23) 210 ff; Gelinsky (n 110) 108 ff; Müller-Michaels (n 32) 91 ff; Reininghaus (n 142) 209 ff. In favour of a general obligation to pay compensation see W Fiedler, ‘Die EMRK und der Schutz des Eigentums’ (1996) Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 354, 355 f; E Riedel, ‘Entschädigung für Eigentumsentzug nach Artikel 1 des Ersten Zusatzprotokolls zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention’ (1988) Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 333, 338; Gelinsky (n 110) 118 ff; disapproving, KH Böckstiegel, ‘Gilt der Eigentumsschutz der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention auch für Inländer?’ (1967) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 905. 161 Case C-284/16 Achmea BV (n 137)—Opinion of AG Wathelet [225]. 162 James (n 158) [54]; Lithgow (n 157) [121]; The Holy Monasteries (n 53) [71]; Papachelas (n 160) [48]; Scordino v Italy ECHR 2006-V 91 [95 f] (comprehensive illustration of the precedents); Kozacio˘glu (n 160) [64]; Emsinghoff (n 32) 53 ff; Frenz (n 19) paras 2932 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 29; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 47. More generous Lucarelli, ‘Article 17—Right to Property’ (n 45) para 6. 163 Lithgow et al (n 157) [121]; Scordino (n 162) [102]; Frenz (n 19) para 2933; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 47 (as a rule). 164 Cf Lithgow et al (n 157) [123 f]; Papachelas (n 160) [53 f]; Frenz (n 19) paras 2934 f. 165 Papachelas (n 160) [53 f]; Kozacio˘glu (n 160) [69 f]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 29.

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however.166 Otherwise, the deprivation of possessions is illegal.167 This applies to formal as well as, if recognised, to de facto expropriations.168 In its recent judgment Commission v Hungary of 21 May 2019, the Court has stressed this requirement and ruled that ‘a rule of national law depriving a person of his or her property must provide, in a clear and precise manner, for that loss to give rise to an entitlement to compensation and for the conditions of that compensation.’169 In contrast, the existence of general norms on compensation is not sufficient to meet this requirement: ‘the possibility of referring to the general rules of civil law … cannot satisfy the requirements arising under Article 17(1) of the Charter. Moreover, even if it were legally possible for a Member State, under that provision, to make private parties responsible for the payment of compensation for deprivations of property which have been caused exclusively by the State itself, a reference of that kind to civil law would in the present case place on the usufructuaries the burden of having to pursue the recovery, by means of procedures that may prove lengthy and expensive, of any compensation which might be payable to them by the landowner. Such rules of civil law do not make it possible to determine easily and in a sufficiently precise and foreseeable manner whether compensation will in fact be able to be obtained at the end of such procedures nor do they disclose the nature of any compensation there may be.’170 Thus, the Court’s judgment in Pesce et al of 9 June 2016 in which the Court held Article 17 to be a sufficient basis for compensation applicable when EU secondary law does not provide such a claim171 may be considered overruled, if it were to be understood contrary to the aforementioned interpretation of Article 17(1), which is not entirely clear, though.172 In addition to these three requirements and again following the ECtHR’s interpretation of 17(1).43 Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR,173 a further procedural condition qualified as inherent in that provision applies, demanding that ‘the applicable procedures must also afford the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of putting his case to the competent authorities’,174 or, more precisely, ‘a procedure … which ensures an overall assessment of the consequences of expropriation, namely, an award of compensation that is related to the value of

166 See for an overview of the discussion in the Convention Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) paras 7 ff. Against the requirement of a rule determining the compensation in advance Frenz (n 19) para 2929; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 68; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 30; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 520; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 29; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 46; in favour: M Pechstein, ‘Enteignung durch Unionsrecht’ in FJ Peine and HA Wolff (eds), Nachdenken über ­Eigentum: Festschrift für Alexander v Brünneck zur Vollendung seines siebzigsten Lebensjahres (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011) 198, 208; left open Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) paras 19; Sonnevend (n 32) para 71. 167 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 26; Folz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 150) para 8; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 82. ­Disagreeing Frenz (n 19) paras 2929 f; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 68; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 30; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 520; Rengeling and Szczekalla (n 16) para 818. Admitting exceptions: Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 29. Left open by Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 19. 168 Reininghaus (n 142) p 233; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 82. Disagreeing in case of de facto expropriations Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 26; further Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 68. 169 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [126]. 170 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [127]. 171 Joined Cases C-78/16 and 79/16 Pesce and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:428 (9 June 2016) [85 f]. Left open in Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [276]: ‘even assuming that the requirement that any restriction of the right to property be laid down in law requires that the procedure for compensation of the loss resulting from such a restriction be, as the case may be, also laid down in law’ [see further 314]. 172 See the reference to national law in the Opinion of AG Bot in that case (ECLI:EU:C:2016:340) [139]; moreover, it may be argued that in view of the measure in question no criteria for a deprivation of property where formulated. 173 See Jokela (n 86) [45]: ‘Although Art 1 of Protocol No. 1 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the proceedings at issue must also afford the individual a reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the responsible ­authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures interfering with the rights guaranteed by this provision. In ascertaining whether this condition has been satisfied, a comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures’. 174 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [368]; further Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [281].



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the expropriated possession, a determination of the recipients of compensation and any other issues relating to the expropriation’.175 This, however, does not mean ‘that the interested person must, in all circumstances, be able to make his views known to the competent authorities prior to the adoption of measures infringing his right to property’.176 Exceptions may be made, for instance, in case of particular urgency, as long as at least judicial protection is guaranteed.177 (ii)  Regulations of the Use of Property 17(1).44 Article 17(1) sentence 3 of the Charter allows for regulation of the use of the right to property which is provided for by law and necessary for the general interest. The legal basis must be sufficiently precise (cf 17(1).39).178 The requirement of necessity has to be interpreted in the light of the jurisprudence179 and the general rule for limitations laid down in Article 52(1).180 Hence, a regulation of the use of property has to meet the proportionality test and respect, which constitutes a separate criterion (cf 17(1).57), the essence of the right to property.181 Compensation may be required for reasons of proportionality, but not as a rule.182 The Court has not required compensation in the case of the duty to destroy or slaughter live fish susceptible to certain diseases.183 (iii)  Test of Proportionality 17(1).45 The test of proportionality is based on a four-step approach: the legitimate objective, appropriateness (suitability), necessity and proportionality (appropriateness) of the measure in view of the aims pursued each have to be scrutinised strictu sensu (cf 52.65 ff). In its jurisprudence, the ECJ often does not clearly distinguish these steps, which is essential for applying the law in a rational way and thus for protecting individual freedom,184 and also Article 52(1) sentence 2 is worded imperfectly in this regard. Yet, examples to the contrary exist: in the Schräder case, for instance, the Court has acknowledged that according to the principle of proportionality measures with negative effects on the exercise of fundamental rights ‘are lawful provided that the measures are appropriate and necessary for meeting the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question … [The negative effects] must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued’.185 175 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [128]. 176 Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [281]. See also—in the ECHR context—Mamatas and Others v Greece App nos 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14 (ECtHR, 21 July 2016) [139]. 177 Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [281 f]. 178 Sonnevend (n 32) paras 68, 75; Frenz (n 19) para 2975; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 32; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 510. 179 See Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 12) [21]; Case C-295/03 Alessandrini (n 91) [86]; Case C-347/03 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (n 37) [125]. 180 Calliess (n 33) ‘§ 16.4’ para 42; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 72. Disagreeing: Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 18; Michl (n 63) 432 f; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 19. 181 Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [92]; Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 27; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 72; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) paras 31 ff; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) para 84. 182 Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 31; Lock, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 10; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 53. 183 Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture (n 138) [79 f]; cf further S.A. Bio d’Ardennes (n 133) [50 ff]. 184 See Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf (n 12) [67]; Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [54 ff]: objective of general interest, suitability and necessity. Also Günter (n 12) 27 f. 185 Case C-265/87 Hermann Schräder (n 45) [21]; cf further Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, F ­ isheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health ex p Fedesa and others [1990] ECR I-4023 [13]; Case C-189/01 H Jippes et al v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2001] ECR I-5689 [81]; Joined Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P ­Stichting Al-Aqsa (n 139) [122 f]; Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (n 67) [50]; Case T-190/16 Azarov (n 139) [57]; Case T-245/15 Klymenko (n 139) [207]; Case T-256/11 Ezz (n 24) [205 ff]. Cf also Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 513 ff; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 32. In favour of a three- or four- (including legitimate goal) step test, Frenz (n 19) paras 2618 f.

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An objective is legitimate if it serves the public good or the protection of rights and freedoms 17(1).46 of other persons (Art 52(1) sentence 2).186 Such objectives may be derived from the general (Art 3 TEU) or particular aims of the Union (eg Art 21(2) TEU with regard to the common foreign and security policy, Art 39(1) TFEU within the framework of the common agricultural policy, Art 167 TFEU regarding protection of cultural heritage),187 from the grounds for justification established in the context of the fundamental freedoms188 and from international obligations of the Union.189 In this respect, the objectives of health190 and consumer protection,191 maintaining peace and international security,192 the aims listed in Art 21(2)(b) and (d) (consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights as well as fostering the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty),193 ensuring the stability of the banking system of the euro area as a whole,194 rationalising ‘public spending in an exceptional context of global financial and economic crisis’195 as well as the protection of the environment (including access to environmental information)196 have been recognised. Next, the measure in question must be factually suitable to meet the objectives pursued, ie 17(1).47 contribute to their achievement,197 and necessary (Art 52(1) sentence 2). The latter requires that ‘when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, the least onerous measure must be used’.198 Finally, a measure is proportionate strictu sensu if the conflicting interests have been balanced 17(1).48 fairly: ‘[T]he interests involved must be weighed having regard to all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck between those interests’.199

186 See also Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council [2004] ECR I-7789 [53]. 187 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 12) [23]; Joined Cases C-92/09 and 93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen [2010] ECR I-11063 [68]; Case T-190/16 Azarov (n 139) [53]; Case T-245/15 Klymenko (n 139) [204]; Case T-516/13 CW (n 139) [167]; Frenz (n 19) paras 2622 f; Ruffert, ‘Art 15 CFR’ (n 12) para 14. 188 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 12) [23]; Case C-245/01 RTL Television GmbH v Niedersächsische Landesmedienanstalt für privaten Rundfunk [2003] ECR I-12489 paras 70 f; Frenz (n 19) para 2621. 189 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 12) [25]; Frenz (n 19) para 2626; Ruffert, ‘Art 15 CFR’ (n 12) para 14. See also text of explanations on Art 52 of the Charter [2007] OJ C303/17, 32: ‘The reference to general interests recognised by the Union covers both the objectives mentioned in Art 3 of the Treaty on European Union and other interests protected by specific provisions of the Treaties such as Art 4(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Arts 35(3), 36 and 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.’ 190 Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees [1997] ECR I-4315 [43]. 191 Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt (n 68) [25]. 192 Case C-548/09 P Bank Melli Iran v Council (n 58) [115]; Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [150]; Case C-358/15 P Bank of Industry and Mine v Council (n 4) [57]; Case C-600/16 P National Iranian Tanker Company EU:C:2018:966 (29 November 2018) [77, 84]; Case C-225/17 P Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others ECLI:EU:C:2019:82 (31 January 2019) [104]; Case T-715/14 NK Rosneft ECLI:EU:T:2018:544 (13 September 2018) [209]; Case T-10/13 Bank of Industry and Mine (n 57) [91]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 33. 193 Case T-256/11 Ezz (n 24) [199]; Case T-187/11 Trabelsi v Council ECLI:EU:T:2013:273 (20 May 2013) [80]; further Case T-190/16 Azarov (n 139) [53, 55]. 194 Joined Cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15 P and C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising (n 5) [71]; Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [254]. 195 Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [56]. 196 Case C-442/14 Bayer CropScience (n 6) [99]; further Case C-416/10 Krizan ECLI:EU:C:2013:8 (15 January 2013) [114]; Case 240/83 Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs d’huiles usagées (ADBHU) [1985] ECR 531 [13]; Case T-634/13 Arctic Paper (n 13) [56]. 197 Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany (n 91) [86]; Jarass (n 45) ‘Art 16 CFR’ para 24. 198 Case 265/87 Hermann Schräder (n 45) [21]; cf Case C-331/88 Fedesa and others (n 185) [13]; Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 12) [26]; Case C-189/01 H Jippes (n 185) [81]; Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland (n 186) [57]; Frenz (n 19) paras 2638 f; Jarass (n 45) ‘Art 16 CFR’ para 25. 199 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659 [81]; cf Case C-331/88 Fedesa and others (n 185) [17]; Case C-183/95 Affish BV (n 190) [42 f]; Case C-317/00 ‘Invest’ Import and Export GmbH and Invest Commerce SARL v Commission of the European Communities [2000] ECR I-9541 [60]; Blanke, ‘Art 15 CFR’ (n 16) para 44; Jarass (n 45) ‘Art 16 CFR’ paras 26 f.



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The greater the weight of the public interest pursued, the wider the scope for limitations.200 Conversely, intensive negative effects on the exercise of the right to property require correspondingly important objectives of public interest.201 Furthermore, it is of relevance if the person concerned is able to avoid the limitation—also by accepting higher costs202—if the limitation is compensated by other advantages203 or if only a temporary204 or urgent205 or long-term206 measure is at issue. Where appropriate, transitional rules or hardship clauses have to be provided to mitigate the interference.207 Compensation for limiting the right to property may be required in particular cases; there is no general obligation to pay compensation, though.208 17(1).50 Illegally acquired property—if deemed to fall within the scope of application of the right to property (cf 17(1).18)—only enjoys a limited level of protection.209 When balancing the competing interests, the protection of acquired rights and legitimate expectations has to be taken into account.210 17(1).51 An interference with the right to property based on mere suspicion and investigative measures may not under all circumstances meet the proportionality test; at any rate, strict standards of justification apply requiring, inter alia, a thorough establishment of the facts of the case.211 With regard to penalties, ‘the principle of proportionality requires, first, that the penalty imposed corresponds to the seriousness of the offence and, second, that the individual circumstances of the particular case are taken into account in determining the penalty and fixing the amount of the fine’.212 17(1).52 A possible infringement of Articles 34, 35, 49 and 56 TFEU may also constitute interferences with Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter.213 Generally speaking, an unjustified restriction of the fundamental freedoms will not be in conformity with the right to property.214 Thus, a separate examination of the right to property is not necessary.215 17(1).49

200 Case C-317/00 Invest (n 199) [60]; Jarass (n 45) ‘Art 16 CFR’ para 26. 201 Cf Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 37. 202 Case C-44/89 Georg von Deetzen (n 107) [29]; Case C-177/90 Kühn v Landwirtschaftskammer Weser-Ems [1992] ECR I-35 [17]; Case C-347/03 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (n 37) [133]; Joined Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P Stichting Al-Aqsa (n 139) [128]; Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR II-3305 [459]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 37. 203 Joined Cases 41/79, 121/79 and 796/79 Vittorio Testa (n 107) [20]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 37. 204 Case 44/79 Hauer (n 12) [28]; T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health (n 202) [460]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 37. 205 Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture (n 138) [79]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 36. 206 Joined Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P Stichting Al-Aqsa (n 139) [120]. 207 See Case C-68/95 T Port GmbH & Co KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung [1996] ECR I-6065 [40]; Case C-347/03 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (n 37) [133]; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [364]; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 38; conferrable to the right to property, W Frenz, ‘Die europäische Berufsfreiheit’ (2008) Gewerbearchiv 465, 471 f; Frenz (n 19) paras 2641 f; Jarass (n 45) ‘Art 16 CFR’ para 28; Ruffert, ‘Art 15 CFR’ (n 12) para 18; concerning the requirement of transitional rules following from the principle of proportionality in context of the free movement of goods: Case C-463/01 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Germany [2004] ECR I-11705 [78 f]; Case C-309/02 Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co, S Spitz KG v Land Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECR I-11763 [79 f]. 208 Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture (n 138) [64 f], [85]; Case C-347/03 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (n 37) [123]; Case C-56/13 Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági Zrt ECLI:EU:C:2014:352 (22 May 2014) [48]; Becker (n 1) 284; Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 20; Frenz (n 19) paras 2985 f; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 38. 209 Cf Art 17(1) sentence 1; Bernsdorff, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 20; Frenz (n 19) para 2984; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 37. 210 Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 9. 211 Joined Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P Stichting Al-Aqsa (n 139)–Opinion of AG Trstenjak [70 f]. 212 Case C-384/17 Link Logistik N&N (n 24) [45]. Cf also Case C-255/14 Chmielewski ECLI:EU:C:2015:475—Opinion of AG Wathelet, [36 ff]. 213 Case C-390/12 Pfleger ECLI:EU:C:2014:281 (30 April 2014) [57]; Case C-98/14 Berlington ECLI:EU:C:2015:386 (11 June 2015) [90]. 214 Cf Case C-390/12 Pfleger (n 213) [59]; further (generally assumed) Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 40. 215 Case C-390/12 Pfleger (n 213) [60]; Case C-98/14 Berlington (n 213) [90 f]; Case C-322/16 Global Starnet Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2017:985 (20 December 2017)—Opinion of AG Wahl [61]; Cf also Joined Cases C-52/16 and C-113/16 SEGRO ECLI:EU:C:2018:157 (6 March 2018) [127 f].

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Finally, the Court has acknowledged a procedural dimension of the principle of proportionality. 17(1).53 For, in its ruling on the legality of publishing beneficiaries of agricultural subsidies in an internet database, the Court has held this measure to be infringing the right of data protection since it was not discernible that the Union legislator had considered alternatives ‘which would be consistent with the objective … while at the same time causing less interference’.216 (iv)  Standard of Review Regarding the standard of review, the Court has often awarded a broad margin of discretion 17(1).54 to the institutions of the Union and to the Member States when implementing Union law,217 namely in the areas of transport,218 common agriculture policy,219 common foreign and security policy,220 public spending,221 environmental law (emission certificates)222 and economic policy.223 This has been justified with reference to the ‘political responsibilities’224 assigned to the Union legislator in the context of the CAP, which implied its primacy in balancing the conflicting interests in order to realise the organisation of the common market,225 with reference to economic decisions ‘in an exceptional context of global financial and economic crisis’,226 with reference to the necessity to assess politically, economically or socially complex situations227 or with reference to difficulties when prognosticating further developments.228 Correspondingly, only apparently unsuitable229 or apparently inappropriate230 measures have 17(1).55 been held disproportionate as well as cases where ‘the institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion’.231 Below this threshold it does not matter ‘whether

216 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Schecke (n 187) [81]. Also Wollenschläger, Verteilungsverfahren (n 105) 363. 217 Case C-44/94 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations and others [1995] ECR I-3115 [56 f]. 218 Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 Spain and Finland (n 186) [56]. 219 Case C-265/87 Hermann Schräder (n 45) [22]; Case 113/88 Karl Leukhardt v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen [1989] ECR 1991 [20]; Case C-331/88 Fedesa and others (n 185) [14]; Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany (n 91) [89]; Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt (n 68) [21]; Case C-189/01 H Jippes (n 185) [82]; Case C-347/03 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (n 37) [131]. 220 Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [145]. 221 Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [56]. 222 Case T-634/13 Arctic Paper (n 13) [59]. 223 Case C-296/93 French Republic and Ireland (n 115) [31]; Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [57]. Cf for a discussion of the jurisprudence of the ECJ—also in view of the freedom to exercise a profession or an economic activity— Schwier (n 16) 239 ff; M Vögler, Defizite beim Schutz der Berufsfreiheit durch BVerfG und EuGH (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2001) 173 ff. 224 Case C-265/87 Hermann Schräder (n 45) [22]; Case C-331/88 Fedesa and others (n 185) [14]; Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany (n 91) [89, 91]; Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt (n 68) [21]; Case C-347/03 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (n 37) [131]. 225 Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany (n 91) [91]. 226 Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [56 f]. 227 Case 113/88 Karl Leukhardt (n 219) [20]; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health (n 13) [52]; Case C-380/03 Federal Republic of Germany v Council and Parliament of the European Union [2006] ECR I-11573 [145]; Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [146]; Case C-225/17 P Iran Shipping Lines (n 192) [104]; Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [290]. 228 Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany (n 91) [90]; Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [290]. 229 Case C-265/87 Hermann Schräder (n 45) [22]; Case C-331/88 Fedesa and others (n 185) [14 f]; Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany (n 91) [90]; Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt (n 68) [21]; Case C-347/03 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (n 37) [131]; Case C-189/01 H Jippes (n 185) [82]; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health (n 13) [52]; Case C-380/03 Federal Republic of Germany (n 213) [145]; Case T-634/13 Arctic Paper (n 13) [59]. 230 Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt (n 68) [27]; Case C-504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow GmbH v Landrat des Landkreises Bad Doberan [2006] ECR I-679 [36]; Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [146]; Case T-149/15 Ben Ali (n 139) [167]: manifestly inappropriate. 231 Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [290].



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the measure adopted by the legislature was the only one or the best one possible’.232 In addition, a decision of the Union legislator containing prognostic elements and thus necessarily implying a certain level of uncertainty is only rejected ‘if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to [the legislator] … at the time of the adoption of the rules in question’.233 Nonetheless, the legislator is obliged to adapt its measure when its assessments turn out to be incorrect in the future.234 In particular, in the context of a common market organisation, limitations of fundamental rights necessarily implied by the organisation are generally held justifiable.235 17(1).56 This limited and often quite superficial236 review has led to severe criticism by many commentators.237 Of course, a broad scope of discretion granted to the legislator is not problematic per se. However, an effective protection of fundamental rights requires a careful review in each case as to whether and to what extent a margin of appreciation may be awarded, and requires a stricter control of its limits and a more thorough scrutiny of EU measures; this is the direction in which the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the dogmatics of European fundamental rights have to be developed.238 Initial positive developments in this regard have already become manifest in recent (and also less recent) rulings of the Court,239 for example the interpretation of secondary law240 and of margins of discretion241 in light of fundamental rights as well as a thorough review of (prognostic) measures.242

232 Case C-189/01 H Jippes (n 185) [83]. 233 Case C-280/93 Federal Republic of Germany (n 91) [90]; also Joined Cases 267–285/88 Gustave Wuidart and others v Laiterie coopérative eupenoise société coopérative and others [1990] ECR I-435 [14]; Case C-189/01 H Jippes (n 185) [84]; Case C-504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow (n 230) [38]. 234 Case C-504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow (n 230) [40]. 235 Case C-295/03 Alessandrini (n 91) [91]. 236 See Case 113/88 Karl Leukhardt (n 219) [20]; also Günter (n 12) pp 28 f; Schwier (n 16) 237 ff. A medium level ­scrutiny may be found in Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [56 ff]; Case C-442/14 Bayer CropScience (n 6) [97 ff]; Joined Cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15 P and C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising (n 5) [70 ff]. 237 Ruffert, ‘Art 15 CFR’ (n 12) paras 17 f; S Storr, ‘Zur Bonität des Grundrechtsschutzes in der Europäischen Union’ (1997) 36 Der Staat 547; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) paras 5 f, ‘Art 16 GRC’ para 4; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 30 f, 48. Cf for a more positive view Blanke, ‘Art 15 CFR’ (n 16) para 11; M Hilf and S Hörmann, ‘Der Grundrechtsschutz von Unternehmen im europäischen Verfassungsverbund’ (2003) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1, 6 f; C Nowak, ‘§ 34’ in SF Heselhaus and C Nowak (eds), Handbuch der Europäischen Grundrechte (2nd edn, Munich, CH Beck, 2020) para 53,; E Pache, ‘Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung der Gerichte der Europäischen ­Gemeinschaften’ (1999) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1033, 1040; W Schroeder, ‘Neues zur Grundrechtskontrolle in der Europäischen Union’ (2011) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 462, 463. 238 See also Durner, ‘§ 162’ (n 82) para 57; W Frenz, ‘Annäherung von europäischen Grundrechten und Grundfreiheiten’ (2011) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 961, 963; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 516 f, 524; Nowak (n 223) ‘§ 30’ para 64; Rengeling and Szczekalla (n 16) paras 771, 793; Ruffert, ‘Art 15 CFR’ (n 12) para 18; Schwier (n 16) 243 ff. 239 See also Buschmann (n 75) 158 ff; Folz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 150) para 12; Kühling, ‘Art 17 GRC’ (n 18) para 32. Reserved, though, Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 13. 240 Joined Cases C-90/90 and C-91/90 Jean Neu and others v Secrétaire d’Etat à l’Agriculture et à la Viticulture [1991] ECR I-3617 [13]; Case C-307/91 Association Agricole Luxlait v Victor Hendel [1993] ECR I-6835 [12 f]; Case C-403/09 Jasna Deti ˇcek v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193 [53 f]; Case C-400/10 J McB v LE [2010] ECR I-8965 [60 f]; Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) [2011] ECR I-11959 [42 f]; Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-13905 [75 f]. See to the contrary, however, Case C-416/10 Krizan (n 196) [115]: ‘As regards the proportionality of the infringement of the right of property at issue, where such an infringement may be established, it is sufficient to state that Directive 96/61 operates a balance between the requirements of that right and the requirements linked to protection of the environment.’ 241 Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609 [22]; Case C-68/95 T Port (n 207) [40 f]; Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [285 ff]; Case T-634/13 Arctic Paper (n 13) [50 ff]. 242 Case C-189/01 H Jippes (n 185) [85 f]; Joined Cases C-37/02 and 38/02 Di Lenardo Adriano Srl and Dilexport Srl v Ministero del Commercio con l’Estero [2004] ECR I-6911 [83 f]; Case C-504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelo (n 230) [37 f]; also Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health (n 202) [452 f]. Cf however, Case C-348/12 P Kala Naft (n 13) [120].

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(v)  Essence of the Right to Property The guarantee of the essential content of a right (cf 52.65 ff)—which has to be distinguished 17(1).57 from the test of proportionality according to the wording of Article 52(1) sentence 1 of the Charter—constitutes an ultimate threshold. The essence of the right to property is disrespected when the guarantee of property is deprived of its substance, but not when affected only marginally or partially or when only modalities of its exercise are regulated.243 The latter also applies in case of temporary or reversible infringements.244 The test as to whether the essence of the right to property was respected must not be limited to cases of deprivation245 since it may not be ruled out that regulating the use of property could also disrespect this requirement. Some commentators question whether the essence-test has an autonomous meaning since it does not formulate any further requirements beyond those of the proportionality test.246 However, in line with the distinction in Article 52(1) sentence 1 and the Court’s jurisprudence, both requirements, ie respecting the essence of the right of property and the principle of proportionality, have to be distinguished.247 At any rate, fundamental rights protection must not be reduced to a merely essence-based test.248 (vi) Examples The Court has confirmed the conformity of restrictive measures adopted to maintain peace 17(1).58 and international security249 and to combat crime250 with Article 17(1), as well as of measures

243 Case 59/83 Biovilac (n 37) [22]; Case C-177/90 Kühn (n 202) [17]; Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [55]; Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [92]; Case C-686/18 OC et al (n 12) [88 f]; Case C-393/19 OM ECLI:EU:C:2021:8 [55]. 244 Case T-190/16 Azarov (n 139) [58]; Case T-245/15 Klymenko (n 139) [208]; Case T-149/15 Ben Ali (n 139) [173]; T-346/14 Yanukovych ECLI:EU:T:2016:497 (15 September 2016) [169]; Case T-224/14 CW ECLI:EU:T:2016:375 (30 June 2016) [184]; Case T-256/11 Ezz (n 24) [209]. 245 Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [92]. Cf, however, Case T-634/13 Arctic Paper (n 13) [57]; Case T-631/13 Raffinerie Heide ECLI:EU:T:2014:830 (26 September 2014) [59]; Case T-630/13 DK Recycling und Roheisen ECLI:EU:T:2014:833 (26 September 2014) [58]; Case T-629/13 Molda ECLI:EU:T:2014:834 (26 September 2014) [59]; Case T-614/13 Romonta ECLI:EU:T:2014:835 (26 September 2014) [61]; Müller-Michaels (n 32) 52 ff. 246 Buschmann (n 75) 174 ff; Kühling (n 18) para 44; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 25, 85, 87; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 54. 247 Case C-12/11 McDonagh ECLI:EU:C:2013:43 (31 January 2013) [61]; Case C-390/12 Pfleger (n 213) [58]; Case C-258/14 Florescu and Others (n 24) [53 ff]; Case C-442/14 Bayer CropScience (n 6) [98]; Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [88]; Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [92]; Case T-190/16 Azarov (n 139) [48, 53]; Case T-245/15 Klymenko (n 139) [199, 204]; Case T-149/15 Ben Ali (n 139) [161]; Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [289]; Case T-634/13 Arctic Paper (n 13) [57 f]; Case T-256/11 Ezz (n 24) [196, 200]; Case T-187/11 Trabelsi v Council (n 193) [81]; similarly ­Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) para 78, 85; Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 32a, ‘Art 52 CFR’ para 28; Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 85, 87; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 37; left open Frenz (n 19) para 2995. 248 In this regard see S Drechsler, ‘Der EuGH auf dem Weg zu einer Dogmatik der Wirtschaftsgrundrechte?’ (2016) Europarecht 691, 701—respecting the essence of the right to property within the meaning of Art 52(1) sentence 1 of the Charter has to be distinguished from not impairing ‘the very substance of the right’ used to refer to a disproportionate restriction (cf for the latter Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [355]: ‘Consequently, the exercise of the right to property may be restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of public interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the right so guaranteed’; similarly Case C-416/10 Krizan (n 196) [113]; Joined Cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15 P and C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising (n 5) [70, 74]; Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [148]; Case C-358/15 P Bank of Industry and Mine v Council (n 4) [56]; Case C-686/18 OC et al (n 12) [85]; Case C-393/19 OM (n 239) [53, 55]; Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [253]). 249 See Case C-72/15 Rosneft (n 4) [143 ff]; Case C-358/15 P Bank of Industry and Mine v Council (n 4) [55 ff]; Case T-153/15 Hamcho ECLI:EU:T:2016:630 (26 October 2016 [119 ff]; Case T-715/14 NK Rosneft (n 192) [197 ff]. See also Case C-600/16 P National Iranian Tanker Company (n 192) [77, 84]; Case C-225/17 P Iran Shipping Lines (n 192) [104]. 250 Case T-190/16 Azarov (n 139) [47 ff]; Case T-245/15 Klymenko (n 139) [198 ff]—no limitation ‘to the value of the assets allegedly misappropriated’ [210].



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to ensure the stability of the banking system of the euro area as a whole251 or ‘the long-term funding of State-funded retirement pensions and narrowing the gap between the levels of those pensions’252 and of rules on access to environmental information concerning companies.253 Moreover, even if a justification of the deprivation of property has been rejected in casu, the objectives of ‘preserving the farming of agricultural land by means of owner-occupancy and of encouraging a situation where agricultural property is lived on and farmed predominantly by the owners, as well as of preserving a permanent population in rural areas as a planning measure and of encouraging a reasonable use of the available land by resisting pressure on land’ and ‘of maintaining a distribution of land ownership which allows the development of viable farms and sympathetic stewardship of green spaces and the countryside’ have been qualified as falling ‘within one or more public-interest grounds’ in the sense of Article 17(1), like the objectives ‘to remedy infringements of national legislation on exchange controls or to combat abusive practices aimed at circumventing applicable national law’.254 Finally, the Court saw a ‘disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very substance of ’ the right to property in a national rule providing ‘that the property of a third party acting in good faith used to commit an aggravated smuggling offence may be the subject of a confiscation measure’ and required an accordingly narrow interpretation of Article 2(1) of Framework Decision 2005/212.255 (c) Interferences with the Peaceful Enjoyment of Property Other than by Deprivations or Regulations of the Use of Property 17(1).59 Despite a wide understanding of the possibility to regulate the use of property within the meaning of Article 17(1) sentence 3—as proposed here256—there might be further interferences with the right to property an effective protection of that fundamental right requires to cover. Hence, the ECtHR understands the guarantee of ‘the peaceful enjoyment of … possessions’ enshrined in Article 1(1) sentence 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR as a residual category.257 This interpretation also applies to Article 17(1) sentence 1.258 Important examples are measures with uniquely factual consequences which cannot be interpreted as a regulation of the use of property such as the destruction of possessions.259 As far as a possible justification is concerned, the standards outlined above for regulation of the use of property apply.260

251 See Joined Cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15 P and C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising (n 5) [66 ff]; Case C-686/18 OC et al (n 12) [90 ff]; Case T-786/14 Bourdouvali (n 24) [251 ff]; T-680/13 Chrysostomides, K. & Co. ECLI:EU:T:2018:486 (13 July 2018) [252 ff]; Case T-107/17 Steinhoff et al v ECB (n 5) [105] f. Cf SL Shaelou and A Karatzia, ‘Some preliminary thoughts on the Cyprus bail-in litigation: a commentary on Mallis and Ledra’ (2018) 43 EL Rev 249, 262 f, 267. 252 Case C-223/19 YS (n 69) [92]. 253 Case C-442/14 Bayer CropScience (n 6) [97 ff]. 254 Case C-235/17 Commission v Hungary (n 69) [91 f], [124]. 255 Case C-393/19 OM (n 243) [55 ff]. 256 Cf in the context of the ECHR also White and Ovey (n 118) 503 f. 257 Sporrong and Lönnroth (n 118) [61 f]; cf further Solodyuk (n 118) [29]; Çoban (n 23) 186 ff (with criticism); White and Ovey (n 118) 479, 503 ff. 258 Similarly Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 23. Disagreeing, Calliess, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 11, Frenz (n 19) para 2892; Heselhaus, ‘§ 36’ (n 32) paras 32 f, 58; Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 53) 506 ff; Sonnevend (n 32) para 57; Ziniel, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 48) para 38; cf in this respect also Case 44/79 Hauer (n 12) [19]: ‘Having declared that persons are entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of their property, that provision envisages two ways in which the rights of a property owner may be impaired, according as the impairment is intended to deprive the owner of his right or to restrict the exercise thereof.’ 259 Cf Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva (n 130) [233]; cf further Jarass, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 45) para 41. 260 Cf Broniowski v Poland ECHR 2004-V 1 [150]: ‘Both an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and an abstention from action must strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights … The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Art 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a whole. In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of

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IV. Remedies National and EU measures interfering with the right to property may be challenged according to 17(1).60 the general rules of EU and national procedural law. It has to be pointed out that Article 17(1) also requires effective legal remedies in order to establish an appropriate protection of private property in each particular case.261

E. Evaluation In view of the economic origin of European integration and related regulatory activities of 17(1).61 the Communities, it is no surprise that the right to property had already been recognised in the 1970s as a fundamental right protected by European law. Since private property is vital for a decentralised, free-market economic order, Article 17 constitutes—next to the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work (Art 15 of the Charter) as well as the freedom to conduct a business (Art 16 of the Charter)—one of the basic pillars of the economic constitution of the Union.262 In view of the growing number of regulatory activities of the EU in the economic area, the importance of the right to property has increased;263 moreover, it also gains importance beyond the economic sphere. All the more, contouring the proportionality test is of essence to guaranteeing individual freedom. A further dogmatic challenge not only for EU fundamental rights law in general but also when developing Article 17 in particular is to further contour the Charter rights. First steps may be observed, such as the Court establishing a general definition of property. Other questions remain open, though, such as the entitlement of (certain) public entities or the acknowledgement of de facto expropriations. The challenge of contouring the Charter rights also relates to the model role of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR. Interpreting the Charter must take account of the ECHR standards (cf Art 52 para 3) while creating a distinct guarantee of EU law not neglecting the peculiarities of the Charter visà-vis the ECHR.264 This may require different dogmatic approaches while offering a similar level of protection such as with regard to the qualification of business-related measures for which the Charter, unlike the ECHR, offers specific protection (Arts 15 and 16) or the protection of social rights (explicitly covered by Art 34).

proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measures applied by the State, including measures depriving a person of his or her possessions. In each case involving the alleged violation of that Article the Court must, therefore, ascertain whether by reason of the State’s action or inaction the person concerned had to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden’; further K Kaiser in U Karpenstein and FC Mayer (eds), EMRK (2nd edn, Munich, Beck, 2015) Art 1 ZP I para 34; White and Ovey (n 118) 504 f. 261 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi (n 24) [368 f]; Joined Cases C-399/06 and C-403/06 Hassan and Ayadi (n 114) [92 f]; Case T-318/01 Othman (n 114) [91 f]; Streinz, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 16) para 8. Similarly for Art 1 of the ­Additional Protocol to the ECHR, Jokela (n 86) [45]; Sovtransavto Holding (n 114) [96]; Beshiri et al v Albania nos 29026/06 et al (ECtHR, 17 March 2020) [176]—with regard to Article 13 ECHR; Markus v Latvia (n 88) [67, 72 f]. See also von Milczewski (n 32) 273 ff. 262 Cf Frenz (n 19) para 2494. 263 See also Durner, ‘§ 162’ (n 82) para 2. 264 Cf for a critical view of the lacking contours of this guarantee Vosgerau, ‘Art 17 CFR’ (n 34) paras 29 ff.



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Article 17(2) Article 17 Right to Property 1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. 2. Intellectual property shall be protected.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 17(2) This Article is based on Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ This is a fundamental right common to all national constitutions. It has been recognised on numerous occasions by the case law of the Court of Justice, initially in the Hauer judgment (13 December 1979, ECR [1979] 3727). The wording has been updated but, in accordance with Article 52(3), the meaning and scope of the right are the same as those of the right guaranteed by the ECHR and the limitations may not exceed those provided for there. Protection of intellectual property, one aspect of the right of property, is explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2 because of its growing importance and Community secondary legislation. Intellectual property covers not only literary and artistic property but also patent and trademark rights and associated rights. The guarantees laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property.

Select Bibliography AR Chapman, ‘Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right (Obligations Related to Article 15(1) (c))’ (2001) XXXV (3) Copyright Bulletin 4–36. P Oliver and C Stothers, ‘Intellectual Property Under the Charter: Are the Court’s Scales Properly Calibrated?’ (2017) 54(2) Common Market Law Review 516–66. P Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights, Vol XVIII, Information Law Series, 3rd edn (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2015). J Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or Harmonising? The Court of Justice, the Right to Property and European Copyright Law’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 65–78.

A.  Field of Application of Article 17(2) Article 17(2) covers ‘intellectual property’. Our attention will therefore turn to the definition of the concept of intellectual property, but due to Article 51, which specifies that the provisions of

17(2).01

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

the Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law, Article 17(2) only has relevance to the extent that EU law affects intellectual property rights. 17(2).02 Whilst the core of intellectual property is fairly well defined, there is no single accepted definition of the concept of intellectual property. The text of the explanations does not help either, as it merely restates the core intellectual property rights by referring to copyright, patents and trade marks. To these core rights are added ‘associated rights’. Two forms of associated rights could be suggested in the absence of any definition or indication in the article and the explanations to it. On the one hand there are rights that are linked to the core rights, in the sense that supplementary protection certificates are closely linked to patents, appellations of origin are linked to trade marks, and artistic design rights are closely linked to literary and artistic property. On the other hand there are peripheral intellectual property rights that are associated with the core rights, as they equally protect intellectual or artistic creation. Here the examples of the design right, the sui generis database right and the right in semiconductor topographies come to mind. It is probably fair to say that these are all ‘intellectual property’, as they are treated as such by the European Commission and in a number of international instruments. There is however no universally accepted definition1 and it is therefore not clear where intellectual property stops. It is unlikely that Article 17(2) was ever intended also to cover things such as breach of competence, passing-off and unfair competition. These may be too peripheral and they do not involve property in the sense as set out by Article 17. But Article 17(2) does not provide certainty on this point. 17(2).03 Article 51 of the Charter is less of a restriction than may seem to be the case at first glance. Article 17(2) does not seem to cover the complex cases such as breach of competence, unfair competition and passing-off, and there is a fair bit of EU legislation affecting intellectual property rights outside these complex cases. Both in the area of trade marks and design rights there are unitary Community rights put in place by means of Regulations, ie EU Trade Marks2 and Community Designs.3 These exist in parallel with national rights, but the latter have been harmonised on virtually every point by a Directive whose provisions run in parallel with those of the relevant Regulation.4 That leaves very little to purely national provisions that can use the escape route of Article 51. Copyright presents a more complex picture. There is no EU Copyright and there are merely Directives dealing with certain aspects of copyright, even if these Directives increasingly are of a horizontal nature.5 But in interpreting the provisions of these Directives the 1 Compare the definitions found in Art 1 TRIPS Agreement 1994 and the WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook (https://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/) respectively. 2 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark [2017] OJ L154/1. 3 Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community Designs [2002] OJ L3/1. 4 Directive 2008/95/EC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2008] OJ L299/25. EC Parliament and Council Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs [1998] OJ L289/28; Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC [2019] OJ L 130/92. 5 EC Council Directive 93/98 harmonizing the terms of protection of copyright and certain related rights (1993) OJ L290/9, now codified as Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (codified version) [2006] OJ L372/12; EC Council Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ L122/42, now codified as Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs (codified version) [2009] OJ L111/16; EC Council Directive 92/100 on rental rights and lending rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property [1992] OJ L346/61, now codified as Directive 2006/115/EC on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version) [2006] OJ L376/28; EC Council Directive 93/83 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable re-transmission [1993] OJ L248/15; EC Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10.

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Court of Justice of the European Union increasingly feels obliged to define general copyright concepts, such as what amounts to a ‘work’, and what meets the ‘originality’ standard, even if they have no place in the Directive. Add to that concepts such as ‘communication to the public’ that are in the Directives and it becomes clear that EU law now affects the whole of the core aspects of copyright. Related issues such as the database right6 and the right in semiconductor topographies7 originate entirely in EU Directives, and for them Article 51 has no relevance at all as a potential escape clause. In the patent area things used to be more of a problem. There were supplementary protection certificates8 and a directive on biotechnological patents,9 but the core instrument, the European Patent Convention, never was an EU instrument. All that is set to change radically, with the adoption in 2012 of Regulations creating a unitary patent for the EU, which will link that Convention to the EU legal order, although the unitary patent does not cover Croatia and Spain, and the exact starting date still remains somewhat uncertain.10 Add to that the impact of free movement law, competition law11 and the common commercial policy12 on intellectual property rights, as well as the fact that the EU increasingly becomes a party to international intellectual property instruments13 and it is clear that the impact of Article 51 of the Charter as a restriction on the scope of Article 17(2) is minor, or should one say (almost) minute.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 17(2) with Other Provisions of the Charter Intellectual property was not always considered to deserve the status of a fundamental right. 17(2).04 Instead the discussion focused on the interaction between intellectual property and fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and information, which is guaranteed in Article 11.14 In the exercise of the latter the use of copyright material and potentially of registered trade marks may be inevitable, but the holders of these intellectual property rights may object to such use and exercise their right to prohibit it. Starting from this focal point, two approaches to this interaction can be distinguished.15 The 17(2).05 first approach is based on the conflict model and sees copyright and other intellectual property rights as being in fundamental conflict with human rights. The proponents of this approach argue 6 EC Parliament and Council Directive 96/9 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L77/20. 7 EC Parliament and Council Directive 87/54 on the legal protection of topographies of semiconductor products [1987] OJ L24/36. 8 EC Council Regulation 1768/92 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products [1992] OJ L182/1, now codified as Regulation (EC) 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (codified version) [2009] OJ L152/1. 9 EC Parliament and Council Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L213/13. 10 Regulation (EU) 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection [2012] OJ L361/1. 11 See eg Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Éireann & Independent Television Publications Ltd v EC Commission [1995] ECR I-743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718. A detailed and complete analysis is found in chs 18 and 27 of P Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law, 8th edn (Oxford, OUP, 2016). 12 See eg Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim KG and ors v Swingward Ltd and ors (No 2) [2007] 2 CMLR 52. A detailed and complete analysis is found in chs 18 and 27 of Torremans (n 11). 13 Such as the TRIPS Agreement. 14 Art 11 Freedom of expression and information: ‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers …’. 15 LR Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?’, Loyola-LA Public Research Paper No 2003-27; Princeton Law & Public Affairs Working Paper No 03-15, pp 1–2.



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that strong intellectual property rights are bound to undermine human rights and in particular economic, social and cultural aspects of human rights. This leads to an incompatibility that can only be resolved through the recognition of the primacy of human rights whenever a conflict arises. This solution imposes itself in the view of its proponents because in normative terms human rights are fundamental and of higher importance than intellectual property rights.16 They would in the process prefer not to grant intellectual property rights the status of fundamental rights or human rights. And even as a fundamental right, if it has to have that status, eg as a result of Article 17(2), intellectual property has a lower status than the right to freedom of expression. It is submitted that this approach focuses, maybe unduly so, primarily on the practical effects of certain forms of intellectual property rights in specific situations. In doing so it does not address the broader picture, involving the function and nature of the elements involved in the interaction. The second approach comes to the interaction between intellectual property rights and human rights from this broader perspective. Looking at it from that perspective, both intellectual property rights and (other) human rights deal with the same fundamental equilibrium. On the one hand there is a need to define the scope of the private exclusive right that is given to authors as an incentive to create and as recognition of their creative contribution to society broadly enough to enable it to play its incentive and recognition function in an appropriate and effective way, whilst on the other hand there is the broader interest of society that the public must be able to have adequate access to the fruits of authors’ efforts. Both intellectual property law and human rights law try to get the private–public rights balance right, and as such there is no conflict. Both areas of law may not, however, define that balance in exactly the same way in all cases. There is therefore a compatibility between them, rather than a consensus.17 17(2).06 The Court of Justice of the European Union has also held that a balancing act is called for, eg when they specifically imposed restrictions on the right of freedom of expression in favour of the protection of intellectual property rights in the Laserdisken case.18 The Court also adopted that approach in the interrelationship between the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, now guaranteed in Article 16 of the Charter,19 and intellectual property rights. The freedom to pursue a trade or profession could be subject to restrictions in as far as such a restriction is required to provide a balance with, and to safeguard the very substance of, intellectual property rights, in casu an element of copyright.20 17(2).07 There is also an interrelationship with the freedom of the arts and sciences, which is guaranteed in Article 13.21 Artistic activity and scientific research may require the use of copyright material and if reproduction or communication to the public is required these may be withheld on the basis

16 See eg United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Resolution 2000/7 on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub/2/2000/L.20, preamble § 11 and R Howse and M Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organisation, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Policy Paper (2000), 6. 17 See eg United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd session, Item 4 of the Provisional Agenda, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner, E/CN.4/Sub/2/2001/13, 5. 18 Case C-479/04 Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet [2006] ECDR 30, at paras. 60–66. See below at D.III(c). 19 Art 16 Freedom to conduct a business: ‘The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices is recognised.’ 20 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik GmbH v Music Point Hokamp GmbH [1998] ECR I-1953 [21]. See below at section D.III(c). 21 Art 13 Freedom of the arts and sciences: ‘The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.’

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of the exclusive right of the copyright holder. The same can apply to trade marks and scientific research may require the use of patented technology. It is then the right of the owner of the patent to grant or withhold a licence. The exercise of intellectual property can therefore restrict the freedom of arts and sciences. But in certain scenarios, the counter-argument applies. There are indeed cases in which copyright and other intellectual property rights offer the protection that is necessary to attract the necessary investment of time and money that the arts and sciences need to flourish and that would not be made available in the absence of at least the potential of intellectual property protection. Similarly, the right to education, as guaranteed in Article 14,22 can be affected as the use of copyright and patented material may be required in the exercise of that right and that may clash with the power of the holder of intellectual property rights to withhold a licence, or even with the right to seek payment for the grant of a licence. The right to the protection of personal data, as guaranteed in Article 8,23 may also interact with intellectual property rights and a balance between both may need to be struck. This can occur for example when a copyright owner requests the identity of alleged infringers from an internet service provider, as demonstrated by the Bonnier case.24 A final but major interrelationship exists with the right to health care. Patents in particular (but to an extent also trade marks) tend to push up the price of pharmaceutical products that are vital in the context of health care. The right of access to health care provided for in Article 3525 of the Charter may therefore potentially be impeded. Once more, a balancing act is called for. The Court of Justice of the European Union formally enshrined the need for a balancing act between intellectual property as a fundamental right on the one hand and other fundamental rights on the other hand in the Promusicae case26 and strongly confirmed it in the Scarlet Extended case.27 The latter case also explicitly excludes absolute protection for IP. More recent cases that emphasise the need for a balancing act are Mc Fadden28 and Telekabel Wien.29

17(2).08

17(2).09

17(2).10

17(2).11

C.  Sources of Article 17(2) Rights It has not always been obvious to see intellectual property as a fundamental right, and in terms 17(2).12 of approach and sources a clear distinction needs to be drawn between copyright on the one hand, and patents and trade marks on the other hand. The presence of moral rights in copyright

22 Art 14 Right to education: ‘1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing training …’. 23 Art 8 Protection of personal data: ‘1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected ­concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified …’. 24 Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio AB v Perfect Communication Sweden AB [2012] 2 CMLR 42; [2012] ECDR 21. For a UK example in the context of the Norwich Pharmacal balancing act see Golden Eye (International) Ltd, Ben Dover Productions and others v Telefonica UK Ltd and another [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch) and on appeal [2012] EWCA Cv 1740. 25 Art 35 Health care: ‘Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.’ 26 Case C-275/06 Productores de Musica de España (Promusicae) v Telefonica de España SAU [2008] ECR I-271 [62]–[70]. 27 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM Scrl [2012] ECDR 4 [43]–[50]. 28 Case C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2016:689. 29 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH ECLI:EU:C:2014:192.



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may rightly or wrongly have made copyright the more obvious, if not the stronger, contestant for fundamental right status.

I.  The Human Rights Approach to Copyright in International Instruments 17(2).13 Let us for a moment leave behind legal concepts and consider the factual starting point. Broadly speaking we are essentially concerned here with creative works, creations of the mind and elements of cultural heritage which are of particular value to society. Society finds it is therefore in its best interest to offer some form of protection to the creators of these works. Interests in material goods are protected by means of physical possession of the goods, which then gains legal recognition in the form of a property right. Whoever produces the goods and has them in his or her possession will be given property rights in the goods. Similarly, protection for creative works is offered along the property route. As these works are immaterial in nature30 the factual element of physical possession is not available here and cannot form the basis of the property right. That (intellectual) property right is therefore created as a legal fiction, but it serves the same purpose. It is important to note though that the way society and the legal system on its behalf deal with creative works is to turn them into property rights. Behind any property there is an owner, and it is important to note also at the outset that the legal fiction that is copyright as a property right refers in this respect to the creator or author behind the work, in the absence of the concept of a person having the physical goods in his or her possession in relation to immaterial property. This is important to keep in mind in a human rights context. Apart from the obvious references to copyright as such, the debate will also need to deal with the human rights aspects of property rights and personality rights.31 17(2).14 The importance of the act of creation and the link with the creator in relation to rights that may flow from it has also been emphasised by René Cassin, one of the architects of the current human rights framework. In his view, the ability and the desire to develop intellectual and creative activities from which copyright works may result is potentially found in all human beings. As such it deserves respect and protection in the same way as all other basic faculties that are common to all men. This would mean that creators can claim rights by the very fact of their creation. This is a broad statement and it is by no means clear that such rights are by definition human rights and that they must cover all creations and necessarily take the format of an exclusive right in such creations.32 Further analysis is therefore warranted. (a)  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 17(2).15 The first key provision in an international instrument that identifies copyright as a human right is found in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.33 According to Article 27, everyone has first of all ‘the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting

30 They are indeed to be distinguished from their material support or carrier. 31 See AR Chapman, ‘Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right (Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c))’ (2001) XXXV (3) Copyright Bulletin 4–36, 5. 32 R Cassin, ‘L’intégration, parmi les droits fondamentaux de l’homme, des droits des créateurs des oeuvres de l’esprit’ in Mélanges Marcel Plaisant: Etudes sur la propriété industrielle, littéraire et artistique (Paris, Sirey, 1959) 229 and M Vivant, ‘Le droit d’auteur, un droit de l’homme?’ (1997) 174 Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquité 60, 87. 33 Art 27: ‘(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and ­material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.’ See JAL Sterling, World Copyright Law, 2nd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 43.

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from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’. But it is equally important to note another element of the same article where it is stated in the first paragraph that ‘everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits’. This first paragraph of Article 27 clearly has historical roots. The Universal Declaration of 17(2).16 Human Rights was drafted less than three years after the end of the Second World War, and science and technology as well as copyright-based propaganda had been abused for atrocious purposes by those who lost the war (and arguably, also by those who won it). Such an abuse had to be prevented for the future, and it was felt that the best way forward was to recognise that everyone had a share in the benefits and that at the same time those who made valuable contributions were entitled to protection. That process was of a human rights nature, as the series of rights and claims made in Article 27 are considered to be universal and vested in each person by virtue of their common humanity. It should in this context also be remembered that the human rights that were articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are held to exist independently of implementation or even recognition in the customs or legal systems of individual countries. They are after all such important norms that they create prima facie obligations to take measures to protect and uphold these rights. This obligation particularly applies to governments, as they are supposed to act in the common interest of humanity.34 And ‘[b]ecause a human right is a universal entitlement, its implementation should be measured particularly by the degree to which it benefits those who hitherto have been the most disadvantaged and vulnerable’.35 It should not simply serve one group in society that already occupies a privileged position. The benefit that is produced for ‘everyone’ should also go beyond the ability to draw some benefit from the applications of intellectual property, ie the better goods and services that are made available as a result. Enjoyment of the arts and especially participation in the cultural life of society are clearly broader concepts that go further and involve elements of sharing at all levels and stages. That brings us back to paragraph two of Article 27. This is not inasmuch a tool to implement 17(2).17 paragraph one as a complimentary provision that sets up a right to the protection of moral as well as material interests. The protection of moral and material rights of authors and creators is clearly exactly what is covered by the area of law known as copyright, and this second paragraph of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must therefore be seen as elevating copyright to the status of a human right; or maybe it is more appropriate to say that the Article recognises the human rights status of copyright. The roots of this second paragraph of Article 27 go back to two influential elements. In the first place there was the original suggestion made by the French delegation which had a double focus. On the one hand the emphasis was placed on the moral rights of the author, which centred on his or her ability to control alterations made to the work and to be able to stop misuses of the work or creation. On the other hand there was the recognition of the right of the author or creator to receive a form of remuneration for his or her creative activity and contribution.36 Secondly, the Mexican and Cuban members of the drafting committee argued that it made sense to establish a parallelism between the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration on the Rights and

34 See JW Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1987) 3. 35 AR Chapman, ‘A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science’, WIPO Panel Discussion on Intellectual Property and Human Rights (8 November 1998), 2, available at http:// www.wipo.org. 36 See J Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) 220.



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Duties of Man that had at that stage been adopted very recently.37 Article 13 of the latter dealt with intellectual property rights by stating that: [E]very person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits that result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries. He likewise has the right to the protection of his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or artistic works of which he is the author.38

17(2).18 Despite these rather clear and explicit roots, it is not necessarily clear what motivated those who voted in favour of the adoption of the second paragraph of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. What we know is that the initial strong criticism that intellectual property was not properly speaking a human right or that it already attracted sufficient protection under the regime of protection afforded to property rights in general was eventually defeated by a coalition of those who primarily voted in favour because they felt that the moral rights deserved and needed protection and met the human rights standard and those who felt the ongoing internationalisation of copyright needed a boost and that this could be a tool in this respect.39 17(2).19 This is of course not the strongest basis for a strong argument that copyright is beyond doubt a human right and in theory things are not helped a great deal either by the fact that as a United Nations General Assembly action the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is merely aspirational or advisory in nature. But where initially Member States were not obliged to implement it on this basis, it has now gradually acquired the status of customary international law and of the single most authoritative source of human rights norms. That has in turn greatly enhanced the standing of copyright as a human right, even if the economic, social and cultural rights, of which copyright is one, are still seen as weaker provisions than those dealing with basic civil and political rights.40 The exact ramifications of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are also not always clear,41 but what is clear is that copyright as a human right requires there to be a balance between the concepts expressed in Article 27(1) and those expressed in Article 27(2) as they are linked in the drafting of the provision.42 Nevertheless, national courts have used it to protect the interests of authors on a couple of occasions.43 For example, in a judgment dated 29 April 1959 the Court of Appeal in Paris granted Charlie Chaplin, a British national, the rights of a Frenchman in France in relation to his moral rights on the basis of an assimilation based on Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration when he wished to object to the unauthorised addition of a sound track to one of his movies.44 Similarly Article 27(2) played a prominent role in the granting of the status of author, and with it moral rights, in the first judgment in the John Huston—‘Asphalt Jungle’ saga, where colour rather than sound was added

37 Chapman, ‘Approaching Intellectual Property’ (n 31) 11. 38 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Approved by the ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, 30 March to 2 May 1948, Final Act of the Ninth Conference, pp 38–45. 39 Morsink (n 36) 221. 40 Chapman, ‘A Human Rights Perspective’ (n 35) 7. 41 Cassin (n 32) 225. 42 See Villalba, ‘Volviendo a justificar el derecho de autor—Revalidating Copyright’, paper delivered at the ALAI 2007 conference in Punta del Este, to be published in the proceedings of that conference, para 8. 43 See F Dessemontet, ‘Copyright and Human Rights’ in J Kabel and G Mom, Intellectual Property and Information Law: Essays in Honour of Herman Cohen Jehoram, Vol VI, Information Law Series (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998) 113–20. 44 Société Roy Export Company Establishment et Charlie Chaplin v Société Les Films Roger Richebé (1960) 28 RIDA 133 and [1960] Journal du Droit International 128, annotated by Goldman.

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to the movie.45 Whilst both cases deal primarily with moral rights, the concept of authorship also has economic rights aspects and it is clear that Article 27 covers both economic and moral rights and therefore the whole of copyright. (b)  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights This Covenant is to be seen as a follow up action on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 17(2).20 Important, though, is the fact that this follow-up action took the form of a Treaty, and that as such it can impose legally binding obligations to implement its provisions on states that became contracting parties to it. Every EU Member State has ratified the Covenant. Article 15 of the Covenant is very clear in this respect and imposes a number of responsibilities 17(2).21 and steps to be taken by Contracting States, in the following way: (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. (2) The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, development and the diffusion of science and culture. (3) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. (4) The States Parties to the Present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields.

These obligations apply to the substantive rights granted in paragraph one of Article 15 of the 17(2).22 Covenant and which are very much based on Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such they comprise the rights of everyone (a) to take part in cultural life, (b) to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications and, most importantly for our current purposes, (c) to benefit from the protection of the moral and the material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. However, this provision no doubt gains in importance in the light of the absence in the Covenant of a provision dealing with property, which at the time of the Universal Declaration was still seen as clearly the stronger and more obvious human right which could also cover most of the intellectual property issues. If we look in a bit more detail at the substantive provision contained in Article 15(1)(c) of the 17(2).23 Covenant, the clear starting point is that an obligation is imposed upon the contracting parties to protect the moral and material interests of authors and creators.46 In essence there is therefore an obligation to implement copyright as a human right and to put in place an appropriate regime of protection for the interests of authors and creators.47 But a lot of freedom is left to contracting states in relation to the exact legal format of that protection. The human rights framework in which copyright is placed does however put in place a number of imperative guidelines: —— Copyright must be consistent with the understanding of human dignity in the various human rights instruments and the norms defined therein. 45 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, judgment dated 23 November 1988, 139 (1989) RIDA 205, annotated by Sirinelli and [1989] Journal du Droit International 1005, annotated by Edelman. 46 Chapman, ‘A Human Rights Perspective’ (n 35) 15. 47 See also A Bertrand, Le droit d’auteur et les droits voisins, 2nd edn (Paris, Dalloz, 1999) 81.



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—— Copyrights related to science must promote scientific progress and access to its benefits. —— Copyright regimes must respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. —— Copyright regimes must encourage the development of international contacts and ­cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields.48 17(2).24 In looking at this framework it should not be forgotten that its genesis was troubled and cumbersome. Various proposals were made to include intellectual property rights in the Covenant, all of them attracted severe criticism and some were rejected. However, whenever a draft Covenant without an intellectual property rights clause in it was submitted for further discussion a new proposal to include intellectual property rights was tabled and in the end the incorporation into the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of an intellectual property clause was approved by a vote of 39 to 9, with 24 Member States abstaining.49 The Covenant then came into force several years later on 3 January 1976.50 17(2).25 It is of course interesting to look back at these instruments that enshrine copyright as a human right and the way in which they came into being, especially as the copyright community all too often simply ignores this aspect of copyright. However, one should not look at this simply as a historical accident. One should also try to identify its implications for copyright and the conclusions that should be drawn from it. The first thing to note is that copyright has a relatively weak claim to human rights status, as its inclusion in the international human rights instruments proved to be highly controversial. And in the end the copyright and intellectual property components of the various articles were only included because they were seen as tools to give effect to, and to protect, other stronger human rights. The second conclusion flows from this first one. The various elements in the articles dealing with copyright and intellectual property are interrelated, which means for example that the rights of authors and creators must be understood as essential preconditions for cultural freedom and for the participation and access to the benefits of scientific progress. The fact that the rights of authors and creators can also stand in their own right is instead an ancillary point. The third point takes this interaction one step further. Copyright and intellectual property rights are not simply preconditions. Not only do they need to exist to facilitate cultural participation and access to the benefits of scientific progress, they should also make sure that the other components of the relevant articles in the international human rights instruments are respected and promoted. In this sense the rights of authors and creators should not only enable but also facilitate rather than constrain cultural participation and access to scientific progress. A fourth implication of all this is that the international human rights instruments deal with copyright and intellectual property rights as such.51 They do no delineate the scope and the limits of copyright. The determination of the substance of copyright is an issue that is left to the legislature.52 17(2).26 Maybe it is worth adding at this stage that one can only talk in terms of a human right when the pre-normative state of a claim has been turned into a normative state that is recognised by the social group concerned. Additionally the norm must fit the existing normative order in a

48 Chapman, ‘A Human Rights Perspective’ (n 35) 7. 49 M Green, ‘Background Paper on the Drafting History of Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, submitted for the Day of General Discussion on Article 15(1) of the Covenant, 9 October 2000, E/C.12/2000/15, 8–12. 50 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3, GA Res 2200(XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16), p 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), was adopted on 16 December 1966. 51 Chapman, ‘Approaching Intellectual Property’ (n 31) 13. 52 See H Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 40.

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coherent way, it must be considered to represent a basic freedom, ie an essential social condition for the better development of the individual, and finally it must be perceived as being of universal reach.53 Broadly speaking, copyright seems to meet these requirements and its inclusion in the international human rights instruments seems justifiable on that basis, but it remains to be seen how all these elements really fit together in practice in relation to copyright. The common theme that seems to emerge and an understanding of which seems to be essential 17(2).27 to understand how copyright operates as a human right is that of the balancing of rights and interests. Two kinds of balancing act appear to be necessary. The first one relates to the balance that is inherent to copyright itself and that involves both the private interests of authors and creators and the wider public interests of society as a whole.54 We will now briefly look at other intellectual property rights and we will then turn our attention to this particular balancing act. But, on top of that, one has to acknowledge that copyright as a human right is just one element of the international human rights instruments. Surely copyright as a human right will also have to be seen in relation with other human rights. Here again a balancing of rights, albeit be it of a different nature, will be unavoidable, and we will deal with this at a later stage.

II. The Human Rights Approach to Other Intellectual Property Rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights confers a right to the protection of the 17(2).28 moral and material interests in scientific production. Similarly, Article 15 of the International Covenant refers to science on top of culture. There is of course no reason to exclude scientific works from the scope of copyright, especially as Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention 1886 specifically includes scientific works in the scope of copyright. It is nevertheless arguable that the wording of the human rights instruments is broader and goes beyond the field of copyright. From an intellectual property perspective the field covered traditionally by patent law could also be involved. The link is much weaker though, and apart from a broad statement that the interests of an inventor should be protected, there is very little guidance to be derived from these provisions for the exact scope and content of patent law. Trade marks, as the third major intellectual property right, seem to be entirely unaffected.

III. ECHR More interesting in this respect is the link to human rights through the property provisions in 17(2).29 the European Convention.55 It should in this respect be kept in mind that property was also seen as a key element in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but that it had shrunk away when the International Covenant came along. Article 1 of the first Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which has been ratified by every EU Member State, is the key provision on this point: (1) Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 53 Vivant (n 32) 73. 54 See Sterling (n 33) 40. 55 See Oliver and Stothers, ‘Intellectual Property under the Charter: Are the Court’s scales properly calibrated?’ (2017) 54 (2) CMLR 517.



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(2) The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

17(2).30 The role of Article 1 of the first Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to intellectual property rights was examined carefully by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Anheuser-Busch v Portugal.56 Anheuser-Busch had applied to register its ‘Budweiser’ trade mark in Portugal. This was opposed by their rivals Budejovicky Budvar, who relied on a bilateral treaty between Portugal and the Czech Republic protecting geographical indications. The Portuguese Supreme Court eventually ruled in favour of Budejovicky Budvar. Anheuser-Busch argued that they had acquired a property right through their application and that the retrospective application of the bilateral treaty interfered with their property right in a way that is prohibited by Article 1 of the first Protocol. 17(2).31 For our current purposes it is important to note that the European Court of Human Rights accepts that property or the concept of ‘possession’ in Article 1 of the first Protocol is not limited to material property, and can also include immaterial property such as intellectual property rights. In relation to patents the Court referred to its judgment in British-American Tobacco Company v Netherlands.57 In relation to copyright reference was made to the judgment in Melnitchouk v Ukraine58 and the Court then applied the same logic to trade marks in the case at issue.59 Slightly more controversial was the issue whether a mere application for an intellectual property right could also come within the scope of Article 1 of the first Protocol. The Court argued that economic interests flow from the mere application, despite the fact that it is at best provisional and that a successful opposition can annul any interest. But under Portuguese law, a mere application makes licences and transfers of rights possible, as well as infringement proceedings. Despite the fact that it remains precarious and dependent on the eventual success of the registration this is, in the view of the Court, sufficient to bring the mere application also within the scope of Article 1 of the first Protocol.60 17(2).32 The next step was then to examine whether the actions of the Portuguese state, effectively the judgment of the Portuguese Supreme Court, amounted to the kind of interference with property that Article 1 of the first Protocol rules out. The Court came to the conclusion that it did not, as the judgment of the Supreme Court was based in law and had nothing arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable in it. There was therefore no interference with the property right in the sense required by Article 1 of the first Protocol.61 As a result, Anheuser-Busch was unsuccessful in the end. 17(2).33 Interesting as the case may be on its facts, it adds little to the debate for our current purposes. On the positive side we learn that intellectual property is also for human rights purposes a form of property and that as such the human rights instruments will grant it some form of protection. That also seems to apply to applications to register intellectual property rights. On the negative side, we learn little, if anything at all, about the scope of form these intellectual property rights themselves should take. The influence on the shape of substantive patent or trade mark law seems negligible. Nothing is also said about the interaction with other aspects of human rights law.



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73049/01 Anheuser-Busch v Portugal ECHR 2007-I. Tobacco Company v Netherlands [1995] A Series no 331. 58 Case 28743/03 Melnitchouk v Ukraine CEDH 2005-IX. 59 Case 73049/01 Anheuser-Busch (n 56) [72]. 60 Ibid [78]. 61 Ibid [87]. 57 British-American

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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks Article 17(2) limits itself to a mere statement: ‘Intellectual property shall be protected.’ The fact that it is the second paragraph of the property protection clearly suggests that that protection shall be based on the property model. In a sense Article 17(1) will be applied mutatis mutandis to intellectual property. The explanations make that point clearly by stating that ‘the guarantees laid down in paragraph 1 shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property’. The right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath intellectual property requires little comment as the same property approach applies. Suffice it to say that in relation to immaterial property the enforcement of rights is essential if the right is to be used effectively. Again expropriation in the public interest and subject to fair compensation is merely the application of the property rule to intellectual property. And finally, the use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. This provides an interesting tool to balance rights. Leaving the application mutatis mutandis of Article 17(1) to one side, there is very little guidance on offer for the specific content of intellectual property rights. Article 17(2) does not set out what the content of intellectual property legislation should be. It is, however, clear that Article 17(2) is merely the continuation of an ongoing international trend. International instruments increasingly see intellectual property and its protection as a fundamental right. The Charter does not innovate on this point and it adds little further detail or clarification. As has become clear above, the fundamental rights status of intellectual property is not particularly strong. The explanation to Article 17(2) does not change that impression when it puts the focus on the economic importance of intellectual property rights as the reason for their inclusion as a fundamental right: ‘Protection of intellectual property, one aspect of the right of property, is explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2 because of its growing importance and Community secondary legislation’. Important as intellectual property as a fundamental right may be, it clearly cannot overrule strong historical fundamental rights such as the right to freedom of expression. Article 17(2) does not provide a tool to balance fundamental rights, but as with other international instruments that were referred to above, the key element that follows from a declaration that intellectual property rights are to be protected as fundamental rights is that of the balancing of rights, balancing fundamental intellectual property rights with other fundamental rights.

17(2).34

17(2).35

17(2).36

17(2).37

II.  Scope of Application Article 17(2) does not define intellectual property in any way and neither is an internationally 17(2).38 accepted definition readily available. The explanations make it clear that copyright, patents and trade marks are included and the addition of the concept of ‘associated rights’ must mean that designs are also covered. The preceding paragraphs have already illustrated abundantly that the focus in this area is clearly on copyright and that most remaining issues arise in relation to patents and trade marks. These are the key rights and the economic value is located here. By covering these rights Article 17(2) achieves its aim, even if it is not clear how far beyond them its scope of application extends. And any conflict between the fundamental right of intellectual property and other fundamental rights with which there exists an interrelationship is also most likely to arise in relation to copyright, patents or trade marks. In other words, whilst the absence of a precise definition and scope is to be regretted from an academic point of view, it is unlikely to give rise to many problems in practice.

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III.  Specific Provisions (a)  Statement of Principle in Need of a Balance 17(2).39 Intellectual property shall be protected. This is the specific provision found in Article 17(2). That does not leave a lot of things open for discussion. It is a property form of protection that is envisaged in Article 17, but apart from that it is a mere statement of principle. 17(2).40 What has become clear from the preceding paragraphs though is that intellectual property is not a particularly strong fundamental right that dominates all other fundamental rights on the one hand and that on the other hand there is a strong interrelationship, if not potential conflict, with other fundamental rights. What is therefore of the essence is the balancing of rights and the way to do so.62 Again Article 17(2) itself does not offer guidance. Intellectual property rights protect private interests and other fundamental rights, such as the right to education and the right to freedom of expression, protect public interests. Reconciling these is the key issue. There is therefore a need for a balancing act. As Audrey Chapman put it: To be consistent with the full provisions of Article 15 [of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights], the type and level of protection afforded under any intellectual property regime must facilitate and promote cultural participation and scientific progress and do so in a manner that will broadly benefit members of society both on an individual and collective level.63

17(2).41 The emphasis here is on the broad public interest of society, but any level of intellectual property protection will also give rights to the individual right-holder. The private interest of the author, creator and eventually of the copyright-holder is an inevitable component of the equation. Somehow a balance will need to be struck between these interests, as stronger individual rights inevitably impinge on the interests of society as a whole and vice versa.64 This balance between public and private interests is not an external element for copyright or indeed any other intellectual property right. On the contrary, it has been internalised by copyright and it is part of its fundamental nature.65 Copyright is therefore familiar with this balance of interests.66 On the one hand there is the need to protect the individual interest of the author in order to encourage further creation that results in the author being given a certain amount of exclusivity in relation to the exploitation and use of his or her work and on the other hand there is the public interest of society as a whole to have access to culture and to copyright works as a tool for progress and improvement. 17(2).42 The issue arises also in relation to trade marks. Trade marks are often used or parodied in the course of media campaigns, to criticise the behaviour of the right-holder,67 eg in relation to its environmental or health policies. Freedom of expression again enters the picture and the property right of the right-holder will need to be balanced with it.68 Trade mark law has less internalised the balancing act though. The same applies to patents, which often need to be balanced with a

62 This crucial point is the key element in the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union. See Case C-275/06 Promusicae (n 26) [62]–[70] and Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended (n 27) [43]–[50]. 63 Chapman, ‘Approaching Intellectual Property’ (n 31) 14. 64 See Schack (n 52) 41. 65 Compare in this respect the wording of Art 1 para 8 s 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America in which Congress is vested with the power ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries’. 66 Report of the High Commissioner (n 17). 67 See eg Michelin v CAW Canada (1996) 71 CPR (3d) 348. 68 Canada: British Columbia Automobile Association v Office and Professional Employees’ International Union (2001) 10 CPR (4th) 423 (BCSC); South-Africa: Laugh It Off Promotions CC v Sabmark International et al (2006) 1 SA 144 (CC).

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right to health and a right to research and study. In terms of internal balance in patent law, one can refer to the exclusion from patentability of methods of treatment of the human body. On this point the right to health prevails. But there will also need to be an external balance between the right to health in Article 35 of the Charter and intellectual property, here patents, in Article 17(2) of the Charter. That balancing exercise can be seen at work in the TRIPS Protocol, concluded also by the EU, that accepts limitations on the exercise of patent law in order to achieve an appropriate balance with the right to health of citizens (also in third countries).69 The CJEU has on a couple of occasions tried to provide some guidance on the operation of the 17(2).43 balancing act. In one case70 the conflict of interest existed between, on the one hand, the copyright of the right-holders whose works were accessed and downloaded without permission through a platform operated by the defendant and, on the other hand, the operator’s right to run a business and the users’ right of freedom of information. The Court accepted that none of the rights could be respected in an absolute way, but it also accepted that closing off the internet connection of the platform would unduly impact on the right to conduct a business. And an obligation to examine all communication passing through the network would also be too tough a restriction, impacting on the rights of the users. The right balance was, according to the Court, found in an injunction that imposed password-restricted access to the platform, whereby the users had to leave behind their identity details. That would not stop potential copyright infringement, but it would guarantee the essence of all rights. Copyright-holders could use the identity of the users to enforce their rights, the platform operator could continue its business and the users had access to the information, even if they could be liable if they dealt with copyright material without prior authorisation. Respecting the essence of each right was the key to the balance. The same, somewhat vague, guidance is found in another, somewhat older case. Here the internet service provider was obliged to block access to certain sites, but the injunction allowed them a choice of the means to put that into practice. It was also important that they had the option to avoid liability. The user retained access to legitimate sources of copyright works and the holder of the copyright saw an improvement in terms of enforcement through a reduction in infringement.71 The need for a balance that takes us away from granting a kind of unrestricted monopoly 17(2).44 property right is also inherent in the wording of Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights where it requires states to make sure that everyone will be able ‘to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’. Enjoying a benefit from such protection is clearly not the same as enjoying an unrestricted monopoly property right. In practice, copyright insures the balance in many ways, for example by means of limitations and exceptions to copyright infringement rules. This is an example of an attempt to strike the balance by drafting the rule in such a way that its effect in all practical cases is to achieve a proper balance between the various interests. On top of that there are also external correction mechanisms that interfere whenever the rule would not achieve the balance in a particular, ie peculiar, set of circumstances. What we are dealing with bears close resemblance to the abuse of rights scenario. The use of competition principles in relation to copyright can serve as a good example to clarify the concept of balancing interests in copyright.

69 Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, adopted on 14 November 2001, see http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm. For the Protocol, see [2007] OJ L311/35. 70 Case C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2016:689. 71 Case C-314/12 Telekabel Wien (n 29).



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(b)  Copyright’s Relationship with Other Human Rights 17(2).45 We already suggested above that a second part of the balancing act relates to the relationship between copyright and other human rights. Already intuitively one assumes that human rights must have equal value when compared to one another, and that one cannot simply overrule the other. This must add yet another factor to consider when one works out the balance between public and private interests. The way we have looked at that balance up to now reflects very much the content of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in both of which elements referring to the public as well as the private interest are brought together. But, in addition to that, the balance between these interests must be struck with the primary objective of promoting and protecting human rights. That must be the overall aim of the international human rights instruments, of which the clause considering copyright as a human right forms part.72 17(2).46 Article 5(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights backs this up from a legal point of view by stating that: [n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.

17(2).47 A similar provision is set out in Article 54 of the Charter. Copyright and its balance between public and private interests must therefore put in place a regime that is consistent with the realisation of all other human rights.73 The right of freedom of information and of access to information74 provides a good example of another fundamental human right that needs to be respected, but the implementation of which alongside the implementation of copyright as an exclusive right in some of that information might create problems in a number of circumstances and will therefore call for a careful balancing of all the rights and interests.75 The aim must be to respect both rights to the optimal or maximum extent possible. Maybe the suggestion of the German Constitutional Court that the freedom of access to information can still be guaranteed in those cases where whoever seeks access does not get that access for free but against the payment of a fee in respect of the copyright in the information can serve as an example here. Access is guaranteed, but it is not entirely free access, and on the other hand copyright is respected by means of the remuneration whilst giving up the right to refuse to grant a licence as a part of the exclusive right in the work.76 The balancing act can be seen at work in the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 17(2).48 judgment in the Laserdisken case. Laserdisken objected to the introduction in EU copyright of a right of distribution that was only exhausted once the recording of a cinematographic work had been placed onto the single market with the consent of the right-holder (first sale). This restricted Laserdisken’s ability to sell imported recordings, and they argued that this also involved a violation of the right of the citizens of the EU to receive information and their freedom of expression. Having accepted that the right to freedom of expression, as well as the property right, are part of the EU legal order, the Court rejected Laserdisken’s argument, because the rights were



72 Report

of the High Commissioner (n 17). Intellectual Property’ (n 31) 14. 74 As found for example in Art 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 75 Bertrand (n 47) 81. 76 Schack (n 52) 42. 73 Chapman, ‘Approaching

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not absolute and needed to be balanced with the interests of the owners of copyright. Or as the Court put it: regarding the freedom to receive information, even if the exhaustion rule laid down in Art 4(2) of Directive 2001/29 may be capable of restricting that freedom, it nevertheless follows from Art 10(2) of the ECHR that the freedoms guaranteed by Art 10(1) may be subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the public interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that provision and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, to that effect, Herbert Karner Industrie Auktionen GmbH v Troostwijk GmbH (C-71/02) [2004] ECR I-3025; [2004] 2 CMLR 5 at [50]). In the present case, the alleged restriction on the freedom to receive information is justified in the light of the need to protect intellectual property rights, including copyright, which form part of the right to property.77

The approach is not limited to the balance between freedom of expression and intellectual prop- 17(2).49 erty. It applies to the balance with other fundamental rights too. The Metronome Music case is a good example as the Court held that the right of property and the freedom to pursue a trade may be restricted, here in order to achieve a balance with the rental and lending right of the copyright owner. This became very clear in paragraph 21 of the judgment: Furthermore, according to settled case law, the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, and likewise the right to property, form part of the general principles of Community law. However, those principles are not absolute but must be viewed in relation to their social function. Consequently, the exercise of the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession may be restricted, provided that any restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the European Community and do not constitute in relation to the aim pursued a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed.78

The same kind of balance between various human rights is also found in a slightly different 17(2).50 context when attention is turned to national constitutions and the way in which they protect copyright as a human right; this could be relevant to the interpretation of the Charter, pursuant to Article 52(4). Some of these constitutions, such as those of Sweden79 and Portugal,80 have a direct copyright clause, but most of them protect copyright as a human right by bringing aspects of it under other constitutional provisions covering other fundamental rights. The German Constitution is an example in point. The German Constitutional Court has intervened in copyright cases on many occasions, despite the fact that the German Constitution does not have a copyright clause. Instead, there is a consensus in Germany that parts of copyright are covered by the property clause in the Constitution. In particular the economic rights part of copyright can be considered as immaterial property and hence entitled to protection under the right of fundamental respect for property.81 Moral rights on the other hand refer to the author and show a strong overlap with personality rights.82 The latter are also specifically protected by

77 Case C-479/04 Laserdisken (n 18) [64]–[65]. 78 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 20) [21]. See section B above. 79 C 2, § 19 of the Swedish Constitution of 1 January 1975. 80 Art 42 of the Portuguese Constitution of 2 April 1976. 81 Schack (n 52) 40–43. 82 See G Schricker (ed), Urheberrecht: Kommentar, 2nd edn (Munich, Verlag CH Beck, 1999) Vor §§ 12 ff, Nos 1–13, pp 243–47; A Lucas and H-J Lucas, Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, 2nd edn (Paris, Litec, 2001) 303, § 367; Poullaud-Dulian, ‘Droit moral et droits de la personnalité’ [1994] G, I, Jurisclasseur Périodique 3780; and Anne Bragance v Michel de Grèce, Court of Appeal Paris [1989] 4 RIDA 301, annotated by Sirinelli.



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the German Constitution.83 These separate aspects of fundamental rights protection then have to be put together to come to an overall protection for copyright as a fundamental human right. This clearly does not simply amount to an adding-up exercise.84 The individual components may overlap and they protect different interests which may enter into conflict with one another when pushed to extreme heights of protection. Here too a balancing of these different fundamental rights will be required. 17(2).51 Exactly how this balancing works out and exactly where the balance lies varies also from case to case. The higher the level of creativity and the more important the input of the creator is, the stronger the human rights claim of copyright will be. Not all works and not all situations will give copyright the same strength in its claim to human rights status and in its balancing exercise with other human rights.85 (c) Intellectual Property’s Relationship with Other Fundamental Rights in the Charter: The Starting Point 17(2).52 There is little doubt about the fact that this balancing act will also need to operate in the context of the EU Charter. Intellectual property as a fundamental right under Article 17(2) will need to be balanced with other fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom of expression86 and the right to education. The relative strength of each right, the interests involved and the particularities of each case will play their role, as the same mechanism applies. As has already been seen on a couple of occasions, copyright cases are more prominent and more developed in this respect, but there is no reason to assume that when confronted with the question the courts will apply the same balancing exercise, using the same mechanism, in respect of trade marks87 and patents.88 The EU Court of Justice was asked to apply its balancing approach in the context of the Charter 17(2).53 in two cases that involved attempts by copyright owners to involve internet service providers in their attempt to enforce their copyright against acts of illegal downloading and sharing of their works. They wanted the personal data of the clients involved to be revealed. In other works, on the one hand the right to property and Article 17(2) were engaged and on the other the right to private life and respect for personal data.89 In the Promusicae case the Court put it in the following way: 62. It should be recalled that the fundamental right to property, which includes intellectual property rights such as copyright (see, to that effect, Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet (C-479/04) [2006] ECR I-8089; [2007] 1 CMLR 6 at [65]), and the fundamental right to effective judicial protection constitute general principles of Community law (see respectively, to that effect, R (on the application of Alliance for Natural Health) v Secretary of State for Health (C-154/04 & C-155/04) [2005] ECR I-6451; [2005] 2 CMLR 61 at [126] and the case law cited, and Unibet (London) Ltd v Justitiekanslern (C-432/05) [2007] 2 CMLR 30 at [37] and the case law cited).

83 Schack (n 52) 39–40. 84 See Schricker (n 103) Nos 14–17, pp 247–49. 85 See Vivant (n 32) 103 and 105. 86 See eg Case 160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:644 [45]. 87 Canada: British Columbia Automobile Association (n 68); South-Africa: Laugh It Off Promotions (n 68). Compare the earlier Canadian case Michelin v CAW Canada (n 67). 88 For a critical approach that prefers not to qualify patents as fundamental rights, see Dreyfuss-Cooper, ‘Patents and Human Rights: Where is the Paradox?’ in W Grosheide (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights, A Paradox (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009). 89 For a UK example in the context of the Norwich Pharmacal balancing act involving Art 8 of the Charter, as well as Art 17, see Golden Eye (International) Ltd and others v Telefonica UK Ltd and another (n 24).

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63. However, the situation in respect of which the national court puts that question involves, in addition to those two rights, a further fundamental right, namely the right that guarantees protection of personal data and hence of private life. 64. According to recital 2 in the preamble to Directive 2002/58, the directive seeks to respect the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter. In particular, the directive seeks to ensure full respect for the rights set out in Articles 7 and 8 of that Charter. Article 7 substantially reproduces Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 4 1950, which guarantees the right to respect for private life, and Article 8 of the Charter expressly proclaims the right to protection of personal data. 65. The present reference for a preliminary ruling thus raises the question of the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of different fundamental rights, namely the right to respect for private life on the one hand and the rights to protection of property and to an effective remedy on the other. 66. The mechanisms allowing those different rights and interests to be balanced are contained, first, in Directive 2002/58 itself, in that it provides for rules which determine in what circumstances and to what extent the processing of personal data is lawful and what safeguards must be provided for, and in the three directives mentioned by the national court, which reserve the cases in which the measures adopted to protect the rights they regulate affect the protection of personal data. Secondly, they result from the adoption by the Member States of national provisions transposing those directives and their application by the national authorities (see, to that effect, with reference to Directive 95/46, Lindqvist at [82]). 67. As to those directives, their provisions are relatively general, since they have to be applied to a large number of different situations which may arise in any of the Member States. They therefore logically include rules which leave the Member States with the necessary discretion to define transposition measures which may be adapted to the various situations possible (see, to that effect, Lindqvist at [84]). 68. That being so, the Member States must, when transposing the directives mentioned above, take care to rely on an interpretation of the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order. Further, when implementing the measures transposing those directives, the authorities and courts of the Member States must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those directives but also make sure that they do not rely on an interpretation of them which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other general principles of Community law, such as the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, Lindqvist at [87]; and Ordre des Barreaux Francophones and Germanophone v Conseil des Ministres (C-305/05) [2007] 3 CMLR 28 at [28]).90

Having established the balancing exercise in a Charter context, the Court then applied it to a 17(2).54 request to install a permanent filtering system to prevent copyright infringement. The Court ruled that such a request would distort the balance in favour of the intellectual property right: 43. The protection of the right to intellectual property is indeed enshrined in article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of that provision or in the Court’s case law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected. 44. As [62]–[68] of the judgment in Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU (C-275/06) [2008] ECR I-271; [2008] 2 CMLR 17; [2008] ECDR 10 make clear, the protection of the fundamental right to property, which includes the rights linked to intellectual property, must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental rights.





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45. More specifically, it follows from [68] of that judgment that, in the context of measures adopted to protect copyright holders, national authorities and courts must strike a fair balance between the protection of copyright and the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals who are affected by such measures. … 49. In those circumstances, it must be held that the injunction to install the contested filtering system is to be regarded as not respecting the requirement that a fair balance be struck between, on the one hand, the protection of the intellectual-property right enjoyed by copyright holders, and, on the other hand, that of the freedom to conduct business enjoyed by operators such as ISPs. 50. Moreover, the effects of that injunction would not be limited to the ISP concerned, as the contested filtering system may also infringe the fundamental rights of that ISP’s customers, namely their right to protection of their personal data and their freedom to receive or impart information, which are rights safeguarded by arts 8 and 11 of the Charter respectively.91

17(2).55 There is also no doubt that the Metronome Music92 and Laserdisken93 cases could also be seen as examples in a Charter context, involving the freedom to pursue a trade and the freedom of expression. 17(2).56 Whilst it is clear that article 17(2) deals with all intellectual property rights, the recent case law has been concerned almost exclusively with copyright. That is the right that gives most rise to problems. The CJEU has made it clear that copyright and by extension other intellectual property rights are not absolute rights.94 Let us therefore look at the balance with other fundamental rights that function as external balancing factors and at the way in which that balance panned out through the case law of national and international courts over the recent years. (d.1) Copyright as a mere exception to freedom of expression 17(2).57 One extreme view on the relationship between copyright and the right to freedom of expression and information is the view that copyright is nothing more than an exception to the right to freedom of expression. If one takes an absolute view of the right to freedom of expression any exclusive right that stops a person from merely copying some else’s expression and words when expressing themselves is after all a restriction on the absolute right to freedom of expression. Copyright as a tool to enable cultural access could also lead to the conclusion that it is an integral part of the right to freedom of expression and information. And there is a convergence in rationale and principals involved between copyright on the one hand and the right to freedom of expression and information on the other hand.95 This view is reflected in Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, where intellectual property is protected within the framework of the right to freedom of expression and information.96

91 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended (n 27) [43]–[45] and [49]–[50]. 92 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik (n 20) [21]. See section B above. 93 Case C-479/04 Laserdisken (n 18) [64]–[65]. See section B above. 94 Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 56 and Case C-476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Haas v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, at paragraph 32. 95 C. Geiger, ‘Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property’ in P. Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, Kluwer Law International (3rd ed, 2015), 115, at 130. 96 J.M. Otero, ‘La protección constitucional del derecho de autor: Análisis del artículo 20.1b/ de la Constitución española de 1978’, [1986] La Ley II 370 and F. Bondia, Propiedadintelectual. Su significado en la Soiedad de la Información, Trivium (1988), at 94 and 105, cited by J. Rodriguez, ‘ A Historical Approach to the Current Copyright Law in Spain’ [2006] 28(7) EIPR 389, at 393.

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(d.2) Freedom of expression as an external balancing factor to copyright But even if one merely sees copyright and freedom of expression and information as two 17(2).58 separate fundamental rights this often results in the primacy of the right to freedom of expression, which than acts as an external limit to copyright. Freedom of expression is seen as a very strong fundamental rights and the property based rights such as copyright are often considered to be less strong. National courts have gone down this path on a number of occasions. A case that demonstrates this clearly is the Dafurnica decision of the District Court of the Hague from 2011.97 ‘Darfurnica’ is a painting from the Danish artist Nadia Plesner that criticizes our society’s current media culture that seems to prioritise entertainment over serious news items. Plesner took the then crisis in Darfur as an example and included an African child that seems to hold a Louis Vuitton bag, as well as a Chihuahua in the painting whose of overall impression links it with Picasso’s Guernica painting. Plesner’ painting is part of an art series by the name of ‘Simple Living’ highlighting the paradox between the luxury Louis Vuitton product and the famine striking in Africa Louis Vuitton was no pleased and sued for copyright infringement. Louis Vuitton succeeded with the copyright claim in the preliminary proceedings,98 but that decision was overruled by the District Court. The District Court held that the artist’s right to freedom of expression should prevail. Her fundamental right to freedom of expression prevailed over the fundamental right of copyright of Louis Vuitton.99 The balance is therefore struck at a level external to copyright. One should note however that the District Court explicitly sees Plesner as a parodist. That brings also an internal element into the equation as there is a parody exception in copyright. (d.3) The need to strike a balance external to copyright There have also been a number of cases in France that have used other fundamental rights as 17(2).59 an external limit to copyright, which is not really surprising for a country with strong moral rights.100 The best known of these cases is after all the case in which Victor Hugo’s heirs tried to invoke the moral rights of the author which they were entitled to exercise after his death to prevent a sequel to his famous work ‘Les Misérables’ being written by a third party. The case went all the way up to the Cour de Cassation, the French Supreme Court and in the judgment priority is given to the third party’s right to freedom of expression, ie in this case their freedom of artistic creation. The French Supreme Court relied strongly on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights or ECHR and held that freedom of expression and creativity prevented the original author of the work or his heirs from hindering the production of a sequel after the exclusive economic right in the original work had expired.101 Obviously, this was subject of the moral rights of paternity and integrity of the original work that was in a sense being adapted by the production of the sequel, but that does not detract from the conclusion that the right of freedom of expression is being used here as an external limit to copyright.102 97 Nadia Plesner Joensen v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, District Court of The Hague, 4 May 2011, IER 2011/39. 98 Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Nadia Plesner Joensen, District Court of The Hague, 27 January 2011, LJN: BP9616 KG RK 10-214. 99 L. Guibault, ‘The Netherlands: Darfurnica, Miffy and the Right to Parody!’, (2011) 2 J. Intell. Prop. Info. Tech. & Elec. Com.L.236, at 237. 100 C. Geiger, ‘Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination?’ (2018) 8 UC Irvine Law Review 413, at 441–442. 101 Hugo v Plon SA, Cass., 1e civ., Jan. 30 2007, (2007) 38 IIC 736, 738. C. Geiger, ‘Copyright and the Freedom to Create—A Fragile Balance’, (2007) 38 IIC 707. 102 Hugo v Plon SA, Cass., 1e civ., Jan. 30 2007, (2007) 38 IIC 736, 738.



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17(2).60

The Cour de Cassation returned to the topic in 2015. This time the case arose in the always tricky copyright context of the creative re-use of copyright protected photographs in a painting. Whereas the lower court had ruled that the painting infringed the copyright in the photographs the Supreme Court reversed that finding of infringement. Once more the judgment relies on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights to advocate strong protection for the freedom of expression of the painter and to let it take precedence over the copyright in the photographs. It was stated in the judgment that the Court of Appeal had failed to show exactly how the fair balance between the freedom of expression and the copyright had been achieved and that the Court of Appeal did not sufficiently justify its decision in light of the importance attached to the right to freedom of expression in the European Convention on Human Rights.103 One needs to highlight the facts of the case though, as they illustrate that the new creation was rather different from the old ones, reducing the impact on the copyright in the latter and therefore also the value of the copyright interests in the balancing act. The painter had argued that his artistic approach consisted of using in coloring photographs taken from advertising and modify these further in order to provoke thinking through a departure from the original theme and by expressing a totally different one.104 The delicate nature of the balancing exercise is further illustrated that upon referral the Court of Appeal of Versailles held that the copyright in the photographs had been infringed, giving precedence to copyright in this case.105 Be that as it may, the case clearly demonstrates that the French Supreme Court accepts the need to achieve a balance between the fundamental right involved and will an a case by case manner establish a fair balance between copyright and the right to freedom of expression.106 (d.4) A balance that does not always tilt in the same direction

17(2).61 One should not derive from these high profile cases that the balance struck at the external level will always tilt in favour of the right to freedom of expression. A relatively recent judgment of the Court of First Instance in Paris makes that very clear. American artist Jeff Koons had made a sculpture that had been inspired by a French photograph. Despite there being a need to put Koons’ right to freedom of expression into the balancing exercise with copyright the court held that the statue infringed the copyright in the photograph and gave precedence to copyright.107 The key element in this case’s balancing act that determined its outcome seems to have been the fact that Jeff Koons could not justify the need of using the photograph representing of a couple of children in his artistic speech and expression without the authorization of its author. That meant that there was no evidence for the fact that a full implementation of the copyright of the photographer would have restricted Koons’ freedom of expression in a disproportionate manner, as he may have obtained a licence had he requested one. Despite the different outcome, this case also highlights the need to carry out a balancing act between the various fundamental right involved. And yet again there is a factor external to copyright involved in the balance and the balance is struck outside copyright.108 The decision was recently upheld by the court of appeal with a

103 Cass., Bull. 1e civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. civ. I, No. 13-2739. 104 E. Rosati, Not Sufficiently ‘Transformative’ Appropriation of a Photograph Held Infringing by French Court’, (2018).13 J. Intell. Prop. L.& Prac. 525. 105 March 16, 2018, No. 15/06029. 106 C. Geiger, ‘Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination?’ (2018) 8 UC Irvine Law Review 413, at 441–442. See also Cass. Crim, 20th June 2018, n° 17-86402 and German Federal Supreme Court, 21st February 2019, I ZR 98/17, I ZR 99/17 and I ZR 15/18. 107 TGI Paris, Mar. 9, 2017, No. 15/01086. 108 C. Geiger, ‘Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination?’ (2018) 8 UC Irvine Law Review 413, at 442–443.

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judgment emphasizing once more the need to strike a balance between the various ­fundamental rights and a clear reference in this respect to the Ashby Donald case in the European Court of Human Rights to which I will turn shortly.109 (d.5) Case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights The Court of Justice of the European Union has on numerous occasions looked at the relation- 17(2).62 ship between copyright, and other intellectual property rights, on the one hand and fundamental rights on the other hand.110 Until very recently these cases generated a clear guiding principle but little by way of additional detail. The guiding principle to return in each of these cases is the idea that intellectual property rules need to be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights.111 One needs to take account of other fundamental rights and the interests they represent. The detail that was missing was how this should be done precisely. Many authors has assumed that this pointed in the direction of an external balance, meaning that additional special exceptions and limitations to copyright were possible when the balancing act with other fundamental rights dictated so.112 Freedom of expression interests for example could tilt the balance in their favour even if there was no specific exception in the copyright instrument. A new exception would then be created to safeguard the freedom of expression interest (even if it has to be acknowledged that in practice most copyright systems have an exception along fair use or fair dealing lines for the purposes of review and criticism or news reporting). But that had not been spelled out by the Court of Justice of the European Union. A balance internal to copyright could also be used to interpret copyright in the light of other fundamental rights. One then defines the scope of the exclusive rights and the exceptions and limitations to them in the light of other fundamental rights, making sure that copyright can be used as a tool whilst not unduly restricting the interests of other fundamental rights. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg also turned its attention to the relation- 17(2).63 ship between copyright and the right to freedom of expression. In two judgments in early 2013 it made it clear that copyright is subjected to an external freedom of expression examination, as copyright imposed restrictions on expression can interfere with Article 10 European Convention on Human Rights.113 Ultimately, the court did not find any violation of Article 10 though.114

109 CA Paris, pole 5-1, 17 December 2019, RG n° 17/09695. 110 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM scrl ECLI:EU:C:2011:771; Case C-145/10 Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH ECLI:EU:C:2011:798; Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog ECLI:EU:C:2012:85; Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH en Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH ECLI:EU:C:2014:192; Case C-201/13 Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen and others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132; Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and others ECLI:EU:C:2016:644; Case C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2016:689. 111 J. Griffiths, ‘Constitutionalising or harmonising—the Court of Justice, the right to property and European copyright law’ 38 (2013) European Law Review (1), 65–78. 112 J. Griffiths, ‘Taking Power Tools to the Acquis—The Court of Justice, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and European Union Copyright Law’, in C. Geiger, C. Nard and X. Seuba (eds), Intellectual Property and the Judiciary, Edward Elgar Publishing (2018), 144, S. van Deursen and T. Snijders, ‘The Court of Justice at the Crossroads: Clarifying the Role for Fundamental Rights in the EU Copyright Framework’ (2018) 49(9) IIC 1080 and C. Geiger and E. Izyumenko, ‘Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way’, CEIPI Research Paper 2018-12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3293735 (accessed 31st January 2020). 113 Case 36769/08 Ashby Donald and Others v France ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908; Case 40397/12 Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v Sweden [“The Pirate Bay”] ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712. 114 C. Geiger and E. Izyumenko, ‘Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity through Freedom of Expression’ 45 (2014) (3) IIC 316 and C. Geiger and E. Izyumenko, ‘Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way’, CEIPI Research Paper 2018-12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3293735 (accessed 31st January 2020), at 5.



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The publication of fashion photographs outside the accreditation of the photographers was an infringement of the copyright interest of the fashion houses and was after balancing not overruled by the right to freedom of expression of the fashion photographers in Ashby Donald.115 And in the Pirate Bay case the Court held that sharing, or allowing others to share, files of this kind on the Internet, even copyright-protected material and for profit-making purposes, was covered by the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but it considered that the domestic courts had rightly balanced the competing interests at stake, ie the right to receive and impart information and the necessity to protect copyright, when convicting the applicants.116 (e) The recent debate in the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union 17(2).64 Eventually, the issue of the relationship between copyright, as part of the fundamental property right in article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on the one hand and, and the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information in article 11 of that Charter of Fundamental Rights, on the other hand, became the crucial issue in two important cases that were referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary decision. Given the importance of the matter, and most crucially the question whether the balance can merely be established inside copyright or whether external factors can decide the matter and go beyond what copyright allows, the Court decided to deal with the matter in front of its Grand Chamber. The seminal judgments in both cases delivered by the Court on 29th July 2019. (e.1) The case as it arose in Funke Medien 17(2).65 The first of these two cases is Funke Medien v Bundesrepublik Deutschland117 and the case is often referred to as the Afghanistan papers case. The German armed forces conducted an operation abroad in Afghanistan and in accordance with German Law the Federal Republic of Germany prepared a military status report on a weekly basis. The aim of the report is to brief Parliament on the military operation abroad and as such the Afghanistan papers were sent to selected members of Parliament that are members of the relevant Parliamentary committees and to various ministries. The papers are confidential in nature and they are therefore classified documents that cannot be made available to the public. The Federal Republic of Germany published at the same time summaries of the papers, without the confidential elements, and there are no restrictions on making these summaries available to the public, as there name public briefings clearly indicates. 17(2).66 Despite the fact that these Afghanistan papers contain a lot of factual information, the German Government considered that they were covered by copyright. The government officials writing the papers on a weekly basis had to decide what information they would include under the various roughly standardized headings and, even more importantly, they then had to write up the summary of the information under each of the headings. The resulted in the creation of a literary work for the purposes of copyright and as they were government employees creation the literary work in the course of their duties the copyright in the Afghanistan papers was owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. Or, that was at least the position of the German government in the case at issue and for our current purposes there is no need to go into the detail of the debate on the originality of the Afghanistan papers. 17(2).67 The copyright case at issue arose when the German newspaper Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung wanted access to the Afghanistan papers, rather than to the publicly available summaries,



115 Case 116 Case

117 Case

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to publish them, at least in part, on its website that is operated by Funke Medien. The application for access was refused by the German authorities on the grounds that the weekly Afghanistan papers contained information that was vital for the security of the German armed forces on the ground in Afghanistan. Their lives and other security interests could be put at risk if the papers, rather than the cleaned up summaries, were made available to the public. Despite being referred to the summaries by the authorities, Funke Medien managed, one way or another, to gain access to the Afghanistan paper and published large parts of them on the website. The Federal Republic of Germany then sued Funke Medien for the infringement of its copyright in the Afghanistan papers and requested an injunction based on that copyright to stop further publication of the Afghanistan papers.118 In its defence, Funke Medien argued that its behaviour was covered by certain limitations 17(2).68 and exceptions in article 5 of Directive 2001/29,119 but crucially for our current purposes, it also relied independently on article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In short, it argued that behaving as it did, it merely exercised its right to freedom of expression and information or, if one wishes to put it that way, its freedom of the press. The clear implication was that if copyright stood in the way the right to freedom of expression and information should be given the higher importance and it should prevail. Technically speaking that would have as an effect that a new exception and limitation to the exclusive economic rights of the author in copyright would be created outside the list of exceptions and limitations in article 5 of Directive 2001/29. There would be an external factor creating a new balance external to copyright. The crucial question, for our current purposes, that was referred to the Court of Justice of 17(2).69 the European Union is therefore whether the fundamental rights of freedom of information or freedom of the media that are contained in article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union can justify exceptions or limitations to the exclusive rights of authors to reproduce and communicate their works to the public, including the right to make works available to the public that are set out in articles 2 and 3 of Directive 2001/29, beyond the exceptions or limitations provided for in Article 5(2) and (3) of that Directive.120 (e.2) The case as it arose in Spiegel Online The second of these two cases is Spiegel Online v Volker Beck.121 Volcker Beck wrote a contribu- 17(2).70 tion to a book on the topic of criminal policy in the area of sexual offences committed against minors in 1988. There is an argument, pursued over the years by Mr Beck, that the publisher of the book changed the title of the book and shortened one of Mr Beck’s sentences. Clearly, the content of the article started to become a problem for Mr Beck when he became a member of the German Federal Parliament, the Bundestag, in 1994 and ever since he has made efforts to distance himself from the article and its content. During the election campaign in 2013 the contribution resurfaced from the archives and clearly 17(2).71 embarrassed Volcker Beck. He sent the manuscript to various newspaper editors with details of the amendments that had according to him been made without his permission, but importantly he did not grant them permission to publish the contribution or parts of it. Instead he published

118 Ibid., paragraphs 9–11. 119 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167/10. 120 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 15. See T.-E. Synodinou, ‘Recent Evolutions in Digital European Copyright law’, [2019] 1 RPIN 2, at page 6. 121 Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625.



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it himself on his website with a clear mention that he distances himself from the text as published as the latter had been distorted by the publisher of the book. 17(2).72 All of this made Spiegel Online decide to get to the bottom of this via their Internet news portal. This resulted in the publication through that portal of an article that demonstrated that Mr Beck was lying and that the central statement in his contribution had not been altered by the publisher of the book. The piece argued that Mr Beck had misled the public over the years and to further back up that claim Spiegel Online added hyperlinks to the original versions of the manuscript and the contribution to the book.122 17(2).73 Mr Beck reacted by bringing a case for copyright infringement in these works against Spiegel Online. Both at first instance and on appeal the German courts ruled in favour of Volker Beck, as the whole work had been copied and communicated to the public. A final appeal was launched against these decisions in front of the Bundesgerichtshof and here the fundamental rights argument took centre stage. In line with the French Supreme Court’s decision mentioned above the German Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, had after all raised the option of testing national legislation that implements EU directives, in this case Directive 2001/29, against the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law.123 That brings us back to the question whether and how the balance between copyright as part of the fundamental right of property in article 17 on the one hand and the right to freedom of expression and information in article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on the other hand needs to be achieved. Is this to be done inside copyright through the interpretation and implementation of article 5 of Directive 2001/29 or can this be done externally and can additional exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights of copyright be imposed that result from that right to freedom of expression and information and that aim to safeguard the interests of that fundamental right in the balance with copyright?124 The other issues in the case are less relevant for our current purposes and can be left to one side. But it is clear that the Court of Justice of the European Union now had two important cases in front of it, in which a decision on the interaction between copyright and other fundamental rights in the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union was the key issue. (e.3) The decisions of the Grand Chamber 17(2).74 The issue of the potential for external exceptions or more precisely exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights of copyright that go beyond the exceptions and limitations provided for in article 5 of Directive 2001/29 therefore became the key question which the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union needed to answer in the cases Funke Medien and Spiegel Online. 17(2).75 The Court starts its analysis by repeating that recital 32 of Directive 2001/29 makes it clear that the list of exceptions and limitations in article 5 of the directive is an exhaustive list. Member States are under no obligations to implement each and every one of these exceptions and limitations, but the list is exhaustive, meaning the member states can merely choose from the exceptions and limitations on the list.125 That point was indeed already made by the Court in earlier judgments such a Renckhoff126 and Soulier and Doke.127 122 Ibid., at paragraphs 10–13. 123 Ibid., at paragraph 14. 124 T.-E. Synodinou, ‘Recent Evolutions in Digital European Copyright law’, [2019] 1 RPIN 2, at page 7. 125 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 56 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 41. 126 Case C-161/17 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff EU:C:2018:634, at paragraph 16. 127 Case C-301/15 Marc Soulier and Sara Doke v Premier ministre and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication EU:C:2016:878, at paragraph 34.

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It then turns to the need for there to be a fair balance of rights. The Court sees this as a vital 17(2).76 component of Directive 2001/29 and as a component that operates at the same level as the idea that the list of exceptions and limitations is an exhaustive one. The Court derives from recitals 3 and 31 of Directive 2001/29 that the harmonisation put in place by that directive aims to safeguard a fair balance between the interest of the owners copyright and related rights in the protection of their intellectual property rights as they are guaranteed as fundamental property rights by Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on the one hand, and the protection of the interests and fundamental rights of users of protected subject matter, and in particular their freedom of expression and information that is guaranteed as a fundamental right of utmost importance by Article 11 of the Charter, on the other hand. The public interest is also part of the balancing act that is particularly important in the electronic environment dominated by the internet.128 The Court refers in this respect especially to paragraph 41 of its earlier Renckhoff decision.129 And a further reference to the balancing of right is found in another seminal judgment of the court in the Pelham case.130 That, of course, begs the question how such a fair balance is to be achieved. But the combination 17(2).77 of the fact that the court sees the balance as a vital component of Directive 2001/29 on the one hand and the fact that it cuts off the obvious option to introduce additional exceptions and limitation in the copyright regime established by directive 2001/29 by reiterating that the list of exceptions and limitations in article 5 of the Directive is an exhaustive list clearly points in the direction of a solution that is to be found inside Directive 2001/29 and therefore also inside copyright. The Court argues on that basis that the elements for the balance of rights are found in the directive with on one side the exclusive right in its articles 2 to 4 and on the other side the exceptions and limitations in its article 5. In transposing these articles into national law and later in applying them member states must put the balance of rights into practice. The court refers on this point back to the Promusicae case where it made a similar point.131 The concept is clearly that in defining the exclusive rights when transposing articles 2 to 4 of Directive 2001/29 the member states must already take into account no just the interests of copyright and the principle of the high level of protection given to the author that is often mentioned in EU copyright law, but also of the interests of other fundamental rights that are contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.132 The same applies when the national regime of exceptions and limitations is defined on the basis of article 5 of Directive 2001/29.133 And, obviously, the regime of exceptions and limitations can assist in adjusting and fine-tuning the balance in relation to the exclusive rights. The exceptions and limitations can accommodate the interests of other fundamental rights despite the apparent strength of the exclusive rights in appropriate circumstances.134 128 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 57 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 42. 129 Case C-161/17 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff EU:C:2018:634, at paragraph 41. 130 Case C-476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Haas v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, at paragraph 33. 131 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU EU:C:2008:54, at paragraph 66. 132 C. Geiger and E. Izyumenko, ‘Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way’, CEIPI Research Paper 2018-12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=3293735 (accessed 31st January 2020), at 9. 133 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 58 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 43. 134 C. Geiger and E. Izyumenko, ‘Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way’, CEIPI Research Paper 2018-12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=3293735 (accessed 31st January 2020), at 9.



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17(2).78

The court then places that balance of rights and the fundamental rights involved in it in the context of the constitutional traditions that are common to the member states and the guidelines found in the international protection of human rights instruments of which the member states are signatories. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is a reflection of these constitutional traditions and international instruments and as such the fundamental rights involved in it are not new. They are already part of the national systems of the member states and as such as fundamental norms they have also already been reflected in the national laws, including the national copyright acts, when they were drafted.135 17(2).79 It does therefore not come as a surprise that one of the goals of intellectual property right in general, and of copyright in particular, is to guarantee freedom of expression and the public’s right to information.136 The court finds a reflection of that goal in article 5(3) (c) and (d) of Directive 2001/29, when they provide exceptions and limitations to the exclusive right of copyright for quotations for purposes such as review and criticism and reproduction of works by the press. Here the interests reflected in article 11 of the Charter can clearly be given precedence over the exclusive right of the copyright owner, but the interest of the latter are also taken into account in the balancing act as a proper acknowledgment of the name of the author is guaranteed, as the court already pointed out in the Painer case.137 These exceptions are particularly relevant in the tow case before the court, as they take account of the freedom of the press of both Spiegel Online and Funke Medien.138 Coming back to the balancing exercise the court also points out that article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29 also has a role in making sure that the interest of the copyright owner are taken into account by requiring that the exceptions and limitations that are implemented in national law are only applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work or other subject matter and which do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the copyright owner.139 Reasoning a contrario, one arrives at the conclusion that allowing each member state to provide 17(2).80 additional exceptions and limitation, even in order to protect the interests of fundamental rights, beyond the exhaustive list that could then be seen as the list limited to the copyright interests, would put the effectiveness of the harmonization of copyright through the directive in danger and the legal certainty objective would not be achieved.140 That would not be acceptable as the crucial importance of this effectiveness and legal certainty was already pointed out in the Svensson case.141 In addition, recital 32 of directive 2001/29 demands that the member states apply the exceptions and limitations consistently and the court has held that that leads also to the conclusion that member states cannot broaden the scope of individual exceptions and limitations.142 These are further arguments against allowing the introduction of additional exceptions and limitations

135 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 59 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 44. 136 P. Torremans, ‘Copyright (and other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human Right’, in P. Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights, Kluwer Law International (3rd ed, 2015), pp. 221–254. 137 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and others ECLI:EU:C:2013:138, at paragraph 135. 138 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 60 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 45. 139 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 61 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 46. 140 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 62 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 47. 141 Case C-466/12 Nils Svensson e.a. v Retriever Sverige AB ECLI:EU:C:2014:76, at paragraphs 34 and 35. 142 Cases C-572/13 Hewlett-Packard Belgium SPRL v Reprobel SCRL EU:C:2015:750, at paragraphs 38 and 39 and C-435/12 ACI Adam BV and others v Stichting de Thuiskopie and Stichting Onderhandelingen Thuiskopie vergoeding EU:C:2014:254, at paragraph 27.

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on the basis of fundamental rights such as the right to freedom of expression and information contained in article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.143 The Court of Justice of the European Union therefore comes on the basis of exactly the same 17(2).81 reasoning to the conclusion in both cases that freedom of expression and information and freedom of the press, as they are enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are not capable of justifying, a derogation from the author’s exclusive rights of reproduction and of communication to the public beyond the exceptions and limitations provided for in Article 5 of Directive 2001/29.144 One has to assume that the same approach will apply to all fundamental rights and therefore 17(2).82 eg also to the freedom to conduct a business. Competition law, as referred to above, may play an important role in this area, but it cannot cover all scenarios. Suffice it to refer here to the Dior v Evora case,145 where on the basis of the doctrine of exhaustion in trade mark law the CJEU decided that copyright was ancillary and should follow suit. That meant that the use of a copyright protected image was possible even in the absence of a copyright exception that covered such use. Indeed, the commercial exceptions in copyright law are far and few between and have a narrow scope. But arguably one cannot apply Dior v Evora any more in the blunt way the judgment itself seems to suggest. If one is to frame the approach in the new doctrine one may have to argue that this is covered by the quotation exception in copyright.146 This may be a first example of the broad interpretations of the copyright exceptions and limitations to which this new approach will lead.147 (f) Where are we now? These two cases have clearly brought the debate on the balance between copyright and the right 17(2).83 to freedom of expression and information to a close. Two key elements emerge from the conclusion reached by the Court of Justice of the European Union. On the one hand, copyright is not an absolute property right despite its fundamental right 17(2).84 status in article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The principle that a balance needs to be struck between copyright and other fundamental rights such as the right to freedom of expression and information contained in article 11 of the Charter is clearly recognized as a principle of EU law in general and EU copyright law in particular. On the other hand, and perhaps even more importantly, the idea of an external balance that 17(2).85 could give rise to additional exceptions and limitations to protect the interest of other fundamental rights that had been put forward by some academic authors and for which they seemed to have found support in certain decisions of national courts clearly no longer has a future. The Court of Justice of the European Union has clearly ruled that there is no place for such additional external exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights. Instead the balance needs to be struck internally, inside copyright itself. This is to be done by taking all fundamental rights and their

143 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 63 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 48. 144 Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 64 and Case C-516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, at paragraph 49. 145 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV ECLI:EU:C:1997:517 and Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20th October 1995. 146 T. Synodinou, ‘Wider implications of the CJEU’s Case law on Other Fundamental Rights: Is the freedom of expression the only “victim” of Spiegel Online?’, presentation at the 6th Annual Conference on Media & Communication Law: Digital Platforms & Social Media: Legislative Developments & Current Challenges, Athens 7th February 2020. 147 See C. Geiger and E. Izyumenko, ‘The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the EU and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some Way to Go!’ 51 (2020) (3) IIC 282.



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interests into account when defining the exact scope of the exclusive rights and by establishing the contours of the national regime of exceptions and limitations. One should in this respect also note that the national cases to which authors referred also often used exceptions such as parody as a copyright hook for their decisions, so they were at least in part already internal balancing decision even if they left open the door for external factors. 17(2).86 Maybe one should no primarily see these judgments as decision that close off the option of external balancing instruments based on other fundamental rights, but rather as enabling decisions in the sense that they give national legislators and courts an additional amount of flexibility when the implement and interpret both the exclusive rights and the exceptions and limitations put in place by directive 2001/29, including the three-step-test. That additional amount of flexibility and a sense of creativity will be required to build and interpret a limitations and exceptions regime that is fit for purpose in the sense that it can strike the right balance between copyright and other fundamental rights on all occasions.148 No doubt hard cases will arise that are hard to predict, but in which clearly the interests of freedom of expression, eg to reveal crimes and injustices based on unpublished works, need to take the upper hand in the interest of justice. Maybe the exception in article 5 of the directive for the purposes of public security will in those cases need to be interpreted widely and creatively as the internal solution of last resort. 17(2).87 But overall, the decisions in Funke Medien and Spiegel On-line must be welcomed, as they guarantee a consistent approach along the lines of copyright and the balancing of fundamental rights. These decisions not only allow for consistency, they also stimulate the internal dynamic of copyright. That combination is particularly welcome, as it also does away with an unduly restrictive approach towards exceptions and limitations in copyright. That now outdated approach itself had also almost encourage cries for external regulation. The new approach mirrors the evolution we have seen in recent years in the area of competition law, where the emphasis has also shifted to the internal dynamics in copyright and a balancing exercise that is based on the essence of copyright. Relying on the internal strength and flexibilities of copyright in a consistent approach that balances all fundamental rights in the same comprehensive way must be a step forward.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 17(2).88 A peculiar aspect of intellectual property rights is the fact that limitations and exceptions are built into the intellectual property rights themselves. Intellectual property rights statutes themselves limit the scope of the exclusive rights that are granted. This is the case for the Trade Mark Directive and Regulation and the Design Directive and Regulation, and in copyright this has been achieved by means of a directive.149 The same is achieved in patent law in national patent laws. Reference can therefore be made to sections D.I to D.III, without the need to duplicate that analysis here. 17(2).89 This makes the intellectual property system easily compatible with Article 52 of the Charter. That article defines in its paragraph 1 the scope of the rights also by reference to exceptions and limitations: Scope of guaranteed rights 1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be ­provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of 148 C. Geiger and E. Izyumenko, ‘The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the EU and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some Way to Go!’ 51 (2020) (3) IIC 282. 149 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10.

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­ roportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of p general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

The balancing act, based on the existence of other rights and freedoms, also fits in perfectly with 17(2).90 the second sentence of this first paragraph. Limiting intellectual property rights in the public interest, as shown for example above in the competition law case study, is also possible on this basis. It is clear though that balancing cannot mean doing away with the essence of the IP right (or of the other right or freedom involved), however extreme the harm one is trying to prevent may be.150 It is in this context also important to note that a clear picture emerges when one consideres 17(2).91 the limitations and exceptions to copyright. It is not that of an absolute property right. Instead copyright as a property right emerges as a rights that is limited in scope in order to guarantee the proper functioning of other fundamental rights and to enable authors of new works to rely on the works of other authors without undue restrictions. It is for our current purposes important to note that these restrictions and limitations operate inside copyright.151 The balancing act that is taking place is an internal one, inside copyright, rather than an external one.152 The interests that are taken into account, such as those of other fundamental rights, are clearly located outside copyright, as these fundamental rights apply across the board and are not limited to the copyright sphere, but the limitations and restrictions to which they lead are not external ones. They are not foreign to copyright and do not overrule the exclusive right established by copyright. Instead they operate inside copyright and the scope of the exclusive rights of copyright is shaped inside copyright to accommodate these wider interests.153

V. Remedies To put it in a slightly polemic way, intellectual property rights are essentially negative rights to 17(2).92 stop others from committing certain acts that are exclusively reserved for the right-holder. In such a context enforcement and remedies take on an important role. It does not come as a surprise therefore that the EU has legislated in this field and that has resulted in a detailed Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.154 The Directive provides for fair and equitable measures to enforce intellectual property rights and a range of remedies, including interim measures. Mirror provisions can be found at the international level in the TRIPS Agreement. This approach is fully in line with the approach in Article 47 of the Charter: 17(2).93 Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 150 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich ECLI:EU:C:2013:28. 151 P. Torremans, ‘Copyright (and other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human Right’, in P. Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights, Kluwer Law International (3rd ed, 2015), pp. 221–254. 152 C. Geiger, ‘Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination?’ (2018) 8 UC Irvine Law Review 413, at 432. 153 See also Tuileries, French Supreme Court—Cour de Cassation, 4 July 1995, [1995] 17 RIDA 259. 154 Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L195/16.



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17(2).94 It is also important to note that key cases such as Promusicae and Scarlet Extended that were discussed above arose in an enforcement context, when copyright owners tried to get internet service providers involved in the enforcement of their rights. In Scarlet Extended the Court explicitly rejected the imposition of a general injunction obliging the service provider to filter out infringing downloads.155

E. Evaluation 17(2).95 By including in Article 17(2) intellectual property as a fundamental property-style right, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights joins a list of international instruments that have already done so. Historically the reasons and the exact implications of such an inclusion were not always clear, and Article 17(2) does not add any further clarifications or definitions. 17(2).96 The clear motivation for the elevation of intellectual property right to the status of fundamental right is its current economic importance for the European Union. The explanations to Article 17(2) spell this out as follows: ‘Protection of intellectual property, one aspect of the right of property, is explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2 because of its growing importance and Community secondary legislation’. Both the internal development of intellectual property rules at EU level and the external enforcement of intellectual property in relations with third countries become elevated to a level of urgency and receive a strong form of justification if intellectual property rights are seen as fundamental rights. The case law does not, however, offer any evidence that the recognition as a fundamental right was used by the courts to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights. 17(2).97 Owing to their relatively weak status as fundamental rights, intellectual property rights will need to be balanced against other (stronger) fundamental rights, especially as the unrestricted enforcement of intellectual property rights is liable to affect certain fundamental rights negatively.



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Article 18 Article 18 Right to Asylum The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (­hereinafter referred to as ‘the Treaties’).

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 18 The text of the Article has been based on TEC Article 63, now replaced by Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which requires the Union to respect the Geneva Convention on refugees. Reference should be made to the Protocols relating to the United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaties, and to Denmark, to determine the extent to which those Member States implement Union law in this area and the extent to which this Article is applicable to them. This Article is in line with the Protocol on Asylum annexed to the Treaties.

Select Bibliography H Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006). P Boeles, M den Heijer, G Lodder and K Wouters, European Migration Law, 2nd edn (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2014). M Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (Cambridge, CUP, 2007). M-T Gil-Bazo, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Right to Be Granted Asylum in the Union’s Law’ (2008) 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly 33–52. GS Goodwin-Gill and J McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2007). A Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol II (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1972). ——, Territorial Asylum (Stockholm, Almqvist, 1980). K Hailbronner (ed), EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Commentary (Munich, CH Beck, 2010). JC Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2005). JC Hathaway and M Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge, CUP, 2014). L Kowalczyk and M Versteeg, ‘The Political Economy of the Constitutional Right to Asylum’ (2017) 102 Cornell Law Review 1219–1321. J McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford, OUP, 2007). S Meili, The Constitutional Right to Asylum: The Wave of the Future in International Refugee Law? (2018) 41 Fordham International Law Journal 383–424. N Mole and C Meredith, Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2011). V Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (Oxford, OUP, 2017). F Morgenstern, ‘The Right of Asylum’ (1949) 26 British Yearbook of International Law 327–57. N Oudejans, ‘Asylum. A Philosophical Inquiry into the International Protection of Refugees’, (Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2011). S Peers, V Moreno-Lax, M Garlick and E Guild (eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary. Volume 3: EU Asylum Law (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2015).

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

ME Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits (Cambridge, CUP, 2009). S Sinha, Asylum and International Law (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). K Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2009). A Zimmerman (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford, OUP, 2011).

A.  Field of Application of Article 18 18.01 The text and Explanations of Article 18 reveal a desire to tie up the right to asylum with the existing Union asylum acquis and with restrictions in Protocols to the Treaties. First, the reference to ‘the Treaties’ points to the legal basis of former Article 63 EC Treaty and current Article 78 TFEU for developing a common policy on asylum.1 That policy comprises a series of regulations, Directives and other measures, which comprehensively deal with the legal status of third-country nationals who seek and are granted asylum in the EU.2 18.02 Second, in referring to the Protocols relating to the United Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaties, and to Denmark, the Explanations suggest that the right to asylum is only addressed to these countries in so far as they partake in the common policy on asylum. Although the United Kingdom opted in to all ‘first-phase’ asylum instruments that were adopted in the years 2001–05, it has, apart from the Dublin Regulation, chosen not to participate in the revised, ‘second-phase’ asylum instruments of 2011–13. Ireland signed up to all first-phase asylum instruments except for the Reception Conditions Directive, but, like the United Kingdom, only partakes in the revised Dublin Regulation. Denmark does not take part in any of the secondary asylum instruments, although—being a signatory to the Schengen Treaties—it did apply the first-phase Dublin Regulation as national law3 and notified that it would implement the revised Dublin Regulation in Danish law.4 18.03 Third, the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union, annexed to the TEU and TFEU, aims to exclude EU citizens from enjoying the right to asylum in another 1 See also CHARTE 4137/00 CONVENT 8, 6. 2 Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof [2001] OJ L212/12; Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers [2003] OJ L31/18; Regulation (EC) 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national [2003] OJ L50/1; Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L304/12; Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on p ­ rocedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ L326/13. Most of these instruments were amended in the years 2011–13, but not all Member States partake in the revised legislation and remain bound by the original versions: Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as ­beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary p ­ rotection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L337/9; Regulation (EU) 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) [2013] OJ L180/31; Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L180/60; Directive 2013/33/EU laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L180/96. 3 Council Decision 2006/188/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark extending to Denmark the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national and Council Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention [2006] OJ L66/37. 4 Decision by Denmark to implement the Dublin Regulation in national law, Council doc. 12219/13 of 12 July 2013.

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Member State. The manner in which the Explanations refer to that Protocol (‘in line with’) is rather indistinct. This reflects, together with the explicit choice to omit in the text of Article 18 any indication as to who the beneficiaries of the right to asylum are, the most contested and ultimately unresolved debate on this provision during the drafting stages, namely whether the right should accrue to everyone, including EU citizens, or to nationals of third countries only.5 The Protocol has been critiqued, for it would be at odds with the Refugee Convention and proceed from the misplaced assumption that the Member States are no longer able to produce refugees.6 In the absence of a clear choice as to the personal scope of Article 18, its field of application 18.04 chiefly depends on whether a Member State acts in the scope of Union law.7 It is clear that primary and secondary EU law comprehensively regulate the rights and benefits of nationals from third countries who seek protection in one of the Member States, and that Article 18 governs the interpretation and application of that field of EU law. The references to the Treaties and the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union in the text and Explanations serve to make clear, further, that Article 18 cannot have the effect of bringing EU citizens within the ambit of the common asylum policy. Yet, because the Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union has brought applications for asylum by EU citizens in another Member State within the ambit of primary Union law, one may assume that national legislation which gives effect to that protocol must comply with Article 18 of the Charter.8

B.  Interrelationship of Article 18 with Other Provisions of the Charter It transpires from the Charter’s drafting history that the right to asylum is closely connected to 18.05 several other Charter rights. Initially, the right to asylum was grouped in one article, together with the prohibition of collective expulsion.9 At a later stage, it was decided to retain a provision that would only deal with the right to asylum and to create a separate provision, which would become Article 19, that would deal with the prohibitions of collective expulsion (Art 19(1)) and refoulement (Art 19(2)).10 The prohibition of refoulement had in the early drafting stages been taken up in a second sentence in Article 4, dealing with the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment.11 As is discussed below, the right to asylum is commonly understood as encompassing a 18.06 range of distinct rights that govern the relationship between a person who seeks or is in need

5 CHARTE 4332/00 CONVENT 35, 496–528; CHARTE 4333/00 CONVENT 36, 5. See further M-T Gil-Bazo, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Right to be Granted Asylum in the Union’s Law’ (2008) 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly 33–52, 43–45. 6 Eg G Noll, Negotiating Asylum. The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2000) 553. 7 A Member State acts within the scope of EU law not only when it implements Union law, but also when it exercises discretionary power granted by EU law, such as when exercising an option to consider an asylum application which is not its responsibility. See Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS and Others (Judgment of 21 December 2011). 8 Cf Declaration (No 48) Relating to the Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam: ‘The Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union does not prejudice the right of each Member State to take the organisational measures it deems necessary to fulfil its obligations under the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees.’ 9 CHARTE 4137/00 CONVENT 8, 6. 10 CHARTE 4333/00 CONVENT 36, 5. 11 CHARTE 4284/00 CONVENT 28, 4.



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of international protection and the petitioned state, starting with the issues of being allowed entry into the state’s territory and of being admitted to a status determination procedure, and concluding with the attainment of a durable solution. Although the prohibition of refoulement is central to asylum, the institution of asylum is not limited to non-refoulement.12 The placement in the Charter of the right to asylum in addition to the prohibition of refoulement constitutes recognition of the autonomous meaning of asylum as individual right.13 This corresponds with the structure of the refugee rights regime of the 1951 Geneva Convention, which sets forth a list of entitlements that accrue to a refugee on the basis of his or her attachment to the asylum state.14 These include the prohibition of refoulement, and there are guarantees relating to non-discrimination, juridical status, gainful employment, welfare and administrative assistance. Further, the regime for the treatment of refugees is informed by general standards of international human rights law, which purports precisely to guarantee basic rights to everyone, regardless of nationality or legal status. 18.07 Since asylum is meant to offer solace to individuals fleeing persecution and to grant them the opportunity to fully realise their rights, Article 18 may be understood as the refugee’s vehicle for being able to invoke other Charter rights.15 Those Charter Articles which are not restricted to Union citizens may be relied on in such contexts as the reception and treatment of asylum seekers, the organisation of the asylum procedure, the treatment of persons who have been granted asylum, and the treatment of failed asylum seekers. Of particular relevance are Article 15(3), guaranteeing equivalent working conditions for nationals of third countries who are authorised to work, and Article 47, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. 18.08 It is well-established case law of the European Court of Human Rights that the vulnerable position of asylum seekers may warrant special attention in interpreting and applying human rights. The ECtHR has for example held that the place and conditions of detention of asylum seekers, pending a procedure to decide on their right of entry, must be appropriate in view of their background of having fled their own country;16 that there is a duty to provide accommodation and decent material conditions to impoverished asylum seekers;17 and that the nature of the harm that might occur upon return enlivens special requirements for the examination and judicial review of asylum claims.18 The CJEU has in its asylum case law referred to, inter alia, Articles 1 (human dignity), 4 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 6 (right to liberty and security), 7 (respect for private and family life), 10 (freedom of religion), 21 (non-discrimination), 41 (right to good administration) and 47 (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial) of the Charter.19

12 A Grahl-Madsen, Territorial Asylum (Stockholm, Almqvist, 1980) 50; UNHCR Statement on the right to asylum, UNHCR’s supervisory responsibility and the duty of states to cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its ­supervisory responsibility, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5017fc202.html, para 2.1.3; N Oudejans, ‘Asylum. A Philosophical Inquiry Into the International Protection of Refugees’ (Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2011) 184–97. 13 See also the rationale for including the right to asylum in CHARTE 4137/00 CONVENT 8, 6. 14 On this structure see JC Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2005) 154–92. 15 For Arendt, the essence of the refugee problem was that it placed individuals outside any organised community and thus deprived them of the only framework in which the Rights of Man can be realised. Refugees are without ‘the right to have rights’. H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland OH, The World Publishing Company, 1958) ch 9. 16 Amuur v France ECHR 1996-III [43]; Saadi v the United Kingdom [GC] App no 13229/03 (ECtHR, 2008) [74]. 17 MSS v Belgium and Greece [GC] App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 2011) [250]–[251], [263]. 18 Jabari v Turkey ECHR 2000-VIII [50]; Saadi v Italy [GC] App no 37201/06 (ECtHR, 2008) [142]; Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v France ECHR 2007-II [66]. 19 Case C-179/11 Cimade and GISTI (Judgment of 27 September 2012); Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf [2011] ECR I-7151; Case C-277/11 MM (Judgment of 22 November 2012); Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11 Y and Z (Judgment of 5 September 2012); Joined Cases C-199/12 to C-201/12 X, Y and Z (Judgment of 7 November 2013).

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C.  Sources of Article 18 Rights I. ECHR The Comparative Table drawn up during the Charter’s drafting stages somewhat awkwardly con- 18.09 nected the provision containing the right to asylum and the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens with Articles 3 and 4 Protocol No 4 ECHR, laying down the prohibition of expulsion of nationals and the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, respectively.20 The ECtHR has consistently affirmed that the right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols.21 A proposal to include a right to seek, receive and enjoy asylum in the Second Protocol to the ECHR was defeated.22 The key ECHR right benefiting refugees is thus the right not to be expelled to a country where their life or freedom is in danger, which is implicit in Article 3 ECHR, corresponding to Articles 4 and 19(2) of the Charter. So long as a person seeking or in need of protection is within the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, he must be secured the rights and freedoms of the ECHR (Art 1).

II.  UN Treaties Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims in Article 14 that everyone, 18.10 except those who are prosecuted for non-political crimes or for acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, no such right is codified in UN Treaties. Article 14 UDHR guarantees the rights ‘to seek’ and ‘to enjoy’ asylum, and does not assume a right to be granted asylum. That provision is therefore commonly understood as referring, first, to the right of the state to grant asylum to a non-national and the corresponding duty of the home state to respect such a grant, and secondly, to the individual right to escape persecution and to seek refuge elsewhere.23 The Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees, which forms the 18.11 centrepiece of contemporary refugee protection, is grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although it only alludes to a right of asylum in its preamble,24 the 1951 Convention defines who the beneficiaries of protection are and what the content of protection is. The 1967 Protocol constitutes the only amendment of the 1951 Convention, and removed its geographic and temporal limits.25 In contrast to preceding international refugee

20 CHARTE 4140/00 CONVENT 9, 7. 21 Vilvarajah and Others v the United Kingdom (1991) Series A no 215 [102]; and Ahmed v Austria ECHR 1996-VI [38]. 22 Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 293 (1961) on the Right of Asylum, 26 September 1961; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 434 (1965) on the Granting of the Right of Asylum to European Refugees, 1 October 1965; Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Resolution 14 (1967) Asylum to Persons in Danger of Persecution, 29 June 1967; Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 18 November 1977. 23 A Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol II (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1972) 100–02; H Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (Hamden, Archon, 1968) 421–22. See also the UDHR’s travaux préparatoires: UN Doc E/CN.4/21, Annex F; UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.57, p 11; UN Doc A/C.3/253; UN Doc A/C.3/SR.121; UN Doc E/800; UN Doc A/C.3/244. 24 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, preamble: ‘considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation’. 25 Strictly speaking, the 1967 Protocol is not an amendment, since it may be acceded to without first becoming party to the Convention and because it incorporates Arts 2 to 34 of the Convention by reference in Art 1(1). Protocol Relating



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instruments, which applied to specific groups of refugees, the 1951 Convention endorses a single definition of the term ‘refugee’ in Article 1. Central in that definition is protection against political or other forms of persecution. The refugee definition expands on Article 14(2) UDHR, in that it excludes those for whom there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed international crimes, serious non-political crimes, or are guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Art 1F). Also excluded are persons who receive protection from a United Nations agency other than the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), such as refugees from Palestine who fall under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (Art 1D). Nor does the Convention apply to those refugees who have a status equivalent to nationals in their country of asylum (Art 1E). 18.12 The Refugee Convention contains a catalogue of rights and benefits which are to be accorded to refugees (Arts 3–34). These give expression to the notion that the refugee cannot invoke the protection of his country of nationality and that he should therefore be able to rely on the protection of another state, ie international protection. Some rights see to reinstating the refugee as an object of international law, by way of compensating for the effective loss of his nationality, such as the rights on personal status (Art 12), intellectual property (Art 14), administrative assistance (Art 25), identity papers (Art 27) and travel documents (Art 28). Other rights respond to the specific refugee experience, including the duties not to penalise refugees for having gained illegal entry (Art 31) and not to refoule them (Art 33). Further, the Convention sets forth a range of socio-economic rights, in the spheres of employment, equal treatment, property rights, housing, education and public relief, that should integrate refugees in the economic system of the country of asylum (Arts 3–8, 13–15 and 17–24). Finally, the Convention contains some rights relating to the various conceivable durable solutions for refugees, including naturalisation (Art 34) and resettlement (Art 30). The personal scope of these rights varies according to the residence status of the refugee.26 The Refugee Convention is ratified by all Member States. The European Council agreed in the 2009 Stockholm Programme that the Union should seek accession to the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol, subject to a report from the Commission on the legal and practical consequences.27 That report has not been forthcoming, however, and later strategic agendas omitted the issue of accession. It follows from the CJEU’s case law, nonetheless, that because the Refugee Convention is explicitly mentioned in both Article 78(1) TFEU and Article 18 Charter, Union law must be in accordance with it and that the Court is competent to review that compatibility.28 This may also imply that the Court interprets the provisions of the Refugee Convention.29 However, the Court is not competent to test Member State activity against the Convention that is outside the scope of EU law.30 18.13 The interpretation and application of the Refugee Convention is guided by the work of UNHCR, which by virtue of the Convention’s preamble is charged with the task to supervise international conventions providing for the protection of refugees. Article 35 of the Convention

to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267. See further P Weis, ‘The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and Some Questions Relating to the Law of Treaties’ (1967) 42 British Yearbook of International Law 39–70; Hathaway (n 14) 110–12. 26 Extensively Hathaway (n 14) 154–92. 27 [2010] OJ C115/1 para 6.2.1. 28 Case C-181/16 Gnandi ECLI:EU:C:2018:465; Joined Cases C-391/16, C-77/17 and C-78/17 M and Others ECLI:EU:C:2019:403. 29 Case C-31/09 Bolbol EU:C:2010:351; Case C-364/11 El Kott EU:C:2012:826. 30 Case C-481/13 Qurbani ECLI:EU:C:2014:2101.

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obliges Contracting States to cooperate with UNHCR and to facilitate its duty of supervising the Convention. Particularly authoritative, because they reflect the consensus of states, are conclusions adopted by UNHCR’s governing body, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (EXCOM), which consists of representatives of states and functions independently from UNHCR.31 EXCOM conclusions are periodically compiled.32 UNHCR’s Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status contains a comprehensive set of guidelines on how to determine who is a refugee.33 The Handbook, as well as UNHCR’s complementary Guidelines on International Protection, Guidance Notes on thematic legal or procedural matters and country-specific Eligibility Guidelines, constitutes important interpretive legal guidance for national authorities, including courts, in status determination proceedings. The 1957 Agreement and 1973 Protocol relating to Refugee Seamen expand on Article 11 of 18.14 the 1951 Convention and provide a solution for those refugees who serve as crew members of a ship but cannot set foot on any land, because they have no country of asylum.34 The Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen holds that such refugees must be regarded as lawfully staying in the territory of the Contracting Party under whose flag he has served as a seafarer for a total of 600 days within a period of three years, on ships calling at least twice a year at ports in that territory (Art 2). The Agreement has been ratified by a minority of Member States. Article 11 of the Refugee Convention merely obliges the flag state to give ‘sympathetic consideration’ to refugee seamen. UN human rights treaties of general applicability, in particular the ICCPR and ICESCR, which 18.15 refer to the rights of ‘everyone’, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of nationality or statelessness, inform the standard of treatment of persons who seek, are granted or are refused asylum.35 Some rights recognised in the ICCPR are, however, expressly applicable only to citizens (eg Art 25), while some apply only to aliens (eg Art 13). The Human Rights Committee has, in a fashion much similar to the ECtHR in respect of Article 3 ECHR, interpreted Article 7 ICCPR as prohibiting states parties from exposing persons ‘to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement’.36 An explicit prohibition of forced expulsion that would result in a danger of subjection to torture is further expressed in Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. The second paragraph of that prohibition states that a consistent pattern of gross and massive violations of human rights are circumstances which a state should take into account when deciding on expulsion. The Committee Against Torture has produced an impressive set of views on the expulsion of refused asylum seekers.37 The Convention on the Rights of the Child informs decision-making in respect of minor 18.16 asylum seekers. The ECtHR and the CJEU increasingly often employ the principle of the child’s best interests, which is also contained in Article 24 of the Charter, in asylum cases 31 Established by UN Doc E/RES/672 (XXV). 32 See UNHCR, ‘Conclusions adopted by the Executive Committee on the International Protection of Refugees 1975–2009’ (Conclusion No 1-109), available at http://www.unhcr.org; UNHCR, ‘A Thematic Compilation of Executive Committee Conclusion’, 6th edn, June 2011, available at http://www.unhcr.org. 33 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Reissued December 2011, UN Doc HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.3. 34 Agreement Relating to Refugee Seamen, 23 November 1957, 506 UNTS 125; Protocol Relating to Refugee Seamen, 12 June 1973, 965 UNTS 445. See further P Weis, ‘The Hague Agreement Relating to Refugee Seamen’ (1958) 7 I­ nternational and Comparative Law Quarterly, 334–48. 35 Art 2(1) ICCPR; Art 2(2) ICESCR; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15, The position of aliens under the Covenant, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 1, 189. 36 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Art 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 9, 200 para 9. See extensively K Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2009) 359–423. 37 See extensively Wouters ibid 425–524, and the analysis of Art 4 of the Charter by M Nowak in this volume.



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involving minors.38 Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is specifically addressed to refugee children. It obliges state parties to ensure that refugee children receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance to enable them to exercise their rights and to trace the parents or other members of the family of any refugee child in order to obtain information necessary for reunification with his or her family.

III.  Council of Europe Treaties 18.17 A number of Council of Europe treaties specifically address the needs of refugees. First, the European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees, which is ratified by a majority of Member States, aims to facilitate travel for refugees residing in the territory of Contracting Parties.39 To that purpose, it exempts refugees who are lawfully resident in the territory of a Contracting Party, on a reciprocal basis, from the obligation to obtain visas for entering or leaving the territory of another Contracting Party, provided they hold a refugee travel document and their visit is of not more than three months’ duration. This Agreement remains salient in the relations of Member States with third countries which are a member of the Council of Europe and whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders pursuant to the Visa Requirement Regulation.40 18.18 Second, the Protocol to the European Convention on Consular Functions concerning the Protection of Refugees withdraws refugees from the consular protection of the state of their nationality while assuring them that of the state of their habitual residence.41 The Protocol builds on Article 47 of the European Convention on Consular Functions, which already states that consular functions exercised by a state over one of its nationals who is a refugee need not be recognised. The Protocol has not entered into force however, and is ratified by only one Member State. The Convention did enter into force in 2011 but is not ratified widely.42 18.19 Third, the European Agreement on Transfer of Responsibility for Refugees aims to solve difficulties, when refugees move from one country to another, in determining which state is responsible for issuing or renewing a given refugee’s travel documents.43 The Agreement sets forth the basic rule that responsibility for a refugee is considered to be transferred to a second state, following ‘two years of actual and continuous stay in the second state with the agreement of its authorities or earlier if the second State has permitted the refugee to remain in its territory either on a permanent basis or for a period exceeding the validity of the travel document’ (Art 2). Although Article 5 of the Agreement defines responsibility narrowly as only pertaining to the issuing of a travel document, the Explanatory Report explains that ‘it is implicit that following

38 Case C-648/11 MA and Others [2013] OJ C225/18; Rahimi v Greece App no 8687/08 (ECtHR, 5 April 2011); Popov v France App nos 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR, 19 January 2012); Tarakhel v Switzerland App no 29217/12 (ECtHR, 4 November 2014). See generally the analysis of Art 24 of the Charter by R Lamont in this volume. 39 European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees, 20 April 1959, ETS 31. 40 Regulation EU 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement [2018] OJ L303/39. Beneficiaries of international protection who have been issued a residence permit by a Member State already enjoy free travel within the Schengen area by virtue of Art 21 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement [2000] OJ L239/19. 41 European Convention on Consular Functions, 11 December 1967, ETS 61; Protocol to the European Convention on Consular Functions concerning the Protection of Refugees, 11 December 1967, ETS 61A. 42 Attempts to include a similar provision in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 261, were unsuccessful. See UN Doc A/Conf 25/L 6, UN Doc A/Conf 25/C 1/L 124, UN Doc A/Conf 25/C 1/L 124/ Rev 1, UN Doc A/Conf 25/ C 1/L 160. 43 European Agreement on Transfer of Responsibility for Refugees, 16 October 1980, CETS 107.

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such transfer the second State must grant to the refugee the rights and advantages flowing from the Geneva Convention’.44 Article 6 of the Agreement further states that the transfer of responsibility obliges the second state to facilitate family reunification of the refugee. The Agreement, which was ratified by 10 Member States as of December 2020, is especially relevant under EU law in respect of refugees who have obtained long-term resident status in accordance with Directive 2003/109/ EC as amended by Directive 2011/51/EU and enjoy a conditional right of residence in the other Member States. Even though Union law has thus facilitated the free movement of beneficiaries of international protection, it has not developed its own rules on transfer of protection.45 It follows that EU law does not explicitly prohibit a Member State from extraditing or expelling a third-country national who has obtained refugee status in another Member State.46 The revised European Social Charter, although its scope ratione personae is more limited 18.20 for reason of its Appendix excluding aliens who are not lawfully resident or working regularly within the territory of the party, includes many social rights which are set out in the 1951 Geneva Convention, such as employment rights, social security and assistance, education and housing rights.47 Under the Appendix, refugees falling within the scope of the Refugee Convention are entitled to treatment as favourable as possible, and in any case not less favourable than under the obligations of the Refugee Convention or any other existing international instrument applicable to refugees. Article 6(4)(g) of the European Convention on Nationality obliges Contracting States to 18.21 facilitate in its internal law the acquisition of its nationality for recognised refugees who are lawfully and habitually resident on its territory.

IV.  Constitutional Traditions Asylum as an individual right has found recognition in the constitutions of a range of Member 18.22 States, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Croatia.48 Article 33(8) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of 2 April 1967 provides: ‘The right of asylum shall be guaranteed to foreigners and stateless persons who are the object, or are under grave threat, of persecution as a result of their activities in favour of democracy, social and national liberation, peace among peoples, freedom or rights of the human person.’ Article 53 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic of 1 September 1991 provides: ‘The Slovak Republic shall grant asylum to aliens persecuted for the exercise of political rights and freedoms. Such asylum may be denied to those who have acted in contradiction with fundamental human rights and freedoms. A law shall lay down the details.’

44 Explanatory Report to the European Agreement on Transfer of Responsibility for Refugees, CETS 107 para 31. 45 Extensively S Peers, ‘Transfer of International Protection and European Union Law’ (2012) 24 International Journal of Refugee Law 527–60. 46 Cf M.G. v Bulgaria App no 59297/12 (ECtHR, 25 March 2014); Shiksaitov v Slovakia App no 56751/16 (ECtHR, 10 December 2020). 47 The European Committee of Social Rights has extended the scope of some provisions of the ESC to persons in an irregular status: International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (‘FIDH’) v France, Complaint No 14/2003, decision on the merits of 8 September 2004; Defence for Children International (DCI) v The Netherlands, Complaint No 47/2008, decision on the merits of 20 October 2009; Defence for Children International (DCI) v Belgium, Complaint No 69/2011, decision on the merits of 23 October 2012; Conference of European Churches (CEC) v The Netherlands, Complaint No 90/2013, decision on immediate measures of 25 October 2013. 48 This enumeration is not intended to be exhaustive. See, in respect of France, Italy and Germany: H Lambert, F Messineo and P Tiedemann, ‘Comparative Perspectives of Constitutional Asylum in France, Italy and Germany: Requiescat in Pace?’ (2008) 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly 16–32. On Spain, see Gil-Bazo (n 5), 47.



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Article XIV(3) of Hungary’s Fundamental Law of 18 April 2011 provides: ‘Hungary shall grant asylum to all non-Hungarian citizens as requested if they are being persecuted or have a wellfounded fear of persecution in their native countries or in the countries of their usual residence due to their racial or national identities, affiliation to a particular social group, or to their religious or political persuasions, unless they receive protection from their countries of origin or any other country.’ Article 56(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 provides: ‘Foreigners shall have a right of asylum in the Republic of Poland in accordance with principles specified by statute.’ Article 18(2) of the Constitution of Romania of 21 November 1991 provides: ‘The right of asylum shall be granted and withdrawn under the provisions of the law, in compliance with the international treaties and conventions Romania is a party to.’ Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia of 23 December 1991 provides: ‘Within the limits of the law, the right of asylum shall be recognised for foreign nationals and stateless persons who are subject to persecution for their commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ Article 43 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992 provides: ‘The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic shall grant asylum to aliens who are being persecuted for the assertion of their political rights and freedoms. Asylum may be denied to a person who has acted contrary to fundamental human rights and freedoms.’ Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia of 22 December 1990 provides: ‘Foreign citizens and stateless persons may obtain asylum in Croatia, unless they are prosecuted for nonpolitical crimes and activities contrary to the basic principles of international law.’ Further, some constitutions, while not referring to asylum, do protect against extradition or expulsion, see eg Article 5(2) of the Constitution of Greece of 11 June 1975 (‘The extradition of aliens prosecuted for their action as freedom-fighters shall be prohibited’) and section 9 of the Constitution of Finland of 11 June 1999 (‘A foreigner shall not be deported, extradited or returned to another country, if in consequence he or she is in danger of a death sentence, torture or other treatment violating human dignity’).

V.  Other Sources 18.23 Articles 44 and 70 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 73 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions contain special provisions for protecting refugees when the country in which they have taken refuge is involved in a war with their country of origin.49 18.24 The Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1967 and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1977 set forth the principles on which state practice in the field of asylum should be based.50 Both declarations underscore that the grant of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act that is incidental to the state’s sovereignty and should therefore be respected by all other states. They also refer to the duty of non-refoulement.51 The UN Declaration was adopted in anticipation of a UN Treaty that would set forth the principles and rules of international law

49 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. 50 Council of Europe, Declaration on Territorial Asylum (n 22); UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 December 1967, UN Doc A/RES/2312 (XXII). 51 The Council of Europe Declaration does so indirectly, via the principles set out in Resolution (67) 14 of 29 June 1967 on Asylum to Persons in Danger of Persecution.

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relating to the right of asylum but which was never adopted.52 The Council of Europe Declaration was adopted in lieu of a Council of Europe instrument that would give legal recognition to the practice of granting asylum in Council of Europe Member States.53

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks States have consistently refused to accept an international obligation to grant asylum, if it would 18.25 imply a right of entry and abode. The reluctance to accept a duty to admit refugees explains the half-hearted reference to the right ‘to seek and enjoy asylum’ in Article 14 UDHR and the failed attempts to conclude a Convention on Territorial Asylum at the levels of the United Nations and the Council of Europe.54 The Refugee Convention stops short of creating a right to obtain asylum, although it protects against expulsion and guarantees socio-economic guarantees for refugees who have been admitted into the state’s territory. The absence of asylum as an individual right in international law contrasts with the common 18.26 practice of virtually all developed states to grant asylum based on objective criteria, which are most typically derived from the Refugee Convention. In the regions of Africa and America, practices of granting asylum were elevated in regional human rights conventions, with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights speaking of ‘the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum’ and the American Convention on Human Rights proclaiming ‘the right to seek and be granted asylum’.55 Although these Conventions entertain stronger wording than Article 14 UDHR, seemingly investing the individual with an enforceable right to receive asylum if the conditions are met, the Conventions also link the right to ‘the laws of those countries and international conventions’ and ‘the legislation of the state and international conventions’, respectively.56 It is tempting to conceive Article 18 of the Charter in much the same way. It is surely an attempt at codifying existing asylum practices of Member States—which in the meantime became the object of Union law—but it also reflects a concern not to extend the right to asylum beyond existing legal provisions.57 This corresponds with the Charter’s guiding principle that it does not create new rights, but rather reaffirms the rights as they result from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States. In traditional international law, asylum was understood only as a right belonging to the state 18.27 that could be invoked against the state whose nationality the asylum seeker possesses, ie a right to

52 See UNGA Res 1400 (XIV) of 21 November 1959, UNGA Res 3272 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974, and UNGA Res 3456 (XXX) of 9 December 1975. An inconclusive Conference on Territorial Asylum was held in 1977: UN Doc A/ Conf 78/12. See Grahl-Madsen, Territorial Asylum (n 12), 61–66 and P Weis, ‘Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum’ (1979) 50 British Yearbook of International Law 151–71. 53 Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 293 (1961) on the Right of Asylum, 26 September 1961; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 434 (1965) on the granting of the right of asylum to European refugees, 1 October 1965. 54 nn 50 and 51 above. See also GS Goodwin-Gill and J McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 358–69. 55 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217, Art 12(3); American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123, Art 22(7). 56 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights interpreted Art 22(7) as recognising a right to obtain asylum only if the right is established in domestic law. See The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al v United States, Case 10.675 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 13 March 1997) [151]–[154]. 57 This also transpires from the travaux préparatoires, see esp CHARTE 4332/00 CONVENT 35, 495–528.



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refuse extradition.58 This meaning is still salient and confirmed in the Declarations on Territorial Asylum as adopted in the United Nations and the Council of Europe, as well as in the ICJ’s Asylum Case.59 Whereas the state’s right to grant asylum on its territory (territorial asylum) is uncontested, its right to grant asylum within the territory of another state to one of the latter’s nationals (extraterritorial or diplomatic asylum) is far more controversial, since it cannot benefit from the shield of territorial sovereignty.60 In Latin America, agreements have been concluded that regulate the exercise of diplomatic asylum.61 Attempts to conclude a UN Treaty on diplomatic asylum have failed, questioning the competence of states to grant it in opposition to demands of the territorial state.62 Secondary EU law expressly omits scenarios of diplomatic asylum from its scope.63 The CJEU has found, further, that requests for diplomatic asylum (or “humanitarian visas”) fall outside the scope of the Visa Code and are therefore not protected by Article 18.64 Despite its unfortunate drafting compared to most Charter rights (‘The right to asylum shall 18.28 be guaranteed’—omitting a reference to ‘everyone’ or, as the Praesidium of the Convention had originally proposed, ‘Persons who are not nationals of the Union’65), there should be no doubt that Article 18 is an individual right and extends beyond an act of mercy by the state. This transpires from the very nature of the Charter as a human rights instrument, and is moreover evident from the drafting history—the Convention being particularly concerned with the question of whether it was wise to extend the individual right to EU citizens.66 Although the CJEU’s pronouncements on Article 18 are relatively scarce, it steadfastly treats Article 18 as an individual right.67

II.  Scope of Application 18.29 The simple reference in Article 18 to ‘the right to asylum’ gives rise to questions of personal and material scope. What is asylum, and who are its beneficiaries? The additional references to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the Treaties do not provide much clarity, since they are worded sufficiently openly (‘with due respect’, and ‘in accordance with’) to allow for an understanding that the right to asylum is not to be equated with the terms of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the Treaties. These references at least indicate, however, that the rules of the Geneva Convention and the requirements of the Treaties are to be respected.68 The CJEU has been asked to explain the content of Article 18 on multiple occasions, but tends 18.30 to give merely circumstantial meaning to it—and has often interpreted it jointly with other Charter rights, especially Article 19(2) and Article 47.69 It is clear from the Court’s case law, 58 Eg F Morgenstern, ‘The Right of Asylum’ (1949) 26 British Yearbook of International Law 327–57. 59 Colombia v Peru [1950] ICJ Rep 266. 60 Ibid 274; F Morgenstern, ‘“Extra-Territorial” Asylum’ (1948) 25 British Yearbook of International Law 236–61. 61 See esp Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, 29 December 1954, 1438 UNTS 101. 62 UNGA, Question of Diplomatic Asylum. Report of the Secretary-General, 2 September 1975, UN Doc A/10139. 63 See Directive 2013/32/EU, Art 3(2); Directive 2013/33/EU, Art 3(2). 64 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X ECLI:EU:C:2017:173. 65 CHARTE 4137/00 CONVENT 8, 6. 66 n 5 above. 67 Case C-180/17 X and Y ECLI:EU:C:2018:775; Case C-175/17 Belastingdienst v Toeslagen ECLI:EU:C:2018:776; Case C-181/16 Gnandi ECLI:EU:C:2018:465; Joined Cases C-391/16, C-77/17 and C-78/17 M and Others ECLI:EU:C:2019:403; Joined Cases C-297/17, C-318/17, C-319/17 and C-438/17 Ibrahim ECLI:EU:C:2019:219; Case C-638/16 X and X ECLI:EU:C:2017:173. 68 NS and Others (n 7) [75]. The words ‘in accordance with’ are commonly employed by the Union legislator in the meaning of ‘in compliance with’. Cf Art 78 TFEU, stipulating that the common policy on asylum must be ‘in accordance with’ the Geneva Convention, which does not have the effect of restricting the scope of the common asylum policy to that of the Geneva Convention. 69 See NS and Others (n 7); Gnandi (n 67); Belastingdienst v Toeslagen (n 67); X and Y (n 67). In Halaf, the Court found that there was a need to explain the content of Article 18: Case C-528/11 Halaf [2013] OJ C225/12.

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nonetheless, that the scope of Article 18 is broader than the issue of refoulement. In Commission v Hungary, the CJEU based the duty to properly and promptly register asylum applications partly on Article 18.70 In Slovakia and Hungary v Council, the CJEU explained the Council Decisions prescribing the relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to the other Member States as “crisis-management measure[s], taken at EU level, whose purpose is to ensure that the fundamental right to asylum, laid down in Article 18 of the Charter, can be exercised properly.”71 In Ibrahim, the Court found that a practice of systematically granting subsidiary protection status instead of refugee status is not only in violation of the Qualification Directive, but also of Article 18 because it is at odds with the Refugee Convention.72 In M and Others too, the Court used Article 18 as a vehicle to interpret the Qualification Directive in line with the Refugee Convention—to the effect that persons whose refugee status is revoked for public order reasons in line with the exception of the second paragraph of Article 33 Refugee Convention, cannot be stripped of refugeehood as such.73 We may conclude that Article 18 informs and protects the full panoply of rights associated with asylum: (access to) the procedure, status, protection from refoulement and even the delicate matter of sharing the burden. We may also conclude that the CJEU is incrementally giving more teeth to Article 18, even though it remains hard to identify cases in which a novel interpretation of the asylum acquis is decisively based on it. It can be inferred from NS and Others that Article 18 cannot be construed so as to require 18.31 a Member State that transfers an asylum applicant to another Member State pursuant to the Dublin Regulation to be satisfied of the existence and accessibility of a functioning asylum system in the receiving Member State, beyond the threshold of ‘systemic deficiencies,’ which sprouts from Article 4 of the Charter.74 The Court hence suggested that, in the context of inter-state removal (expulsion), no additional protections can be derived from Article 18 of the Charter. Because the Charter sets the right of asylum and the prohibition of refoulement apart (and construes the latter in line with existing international obligations—see Art 19(2) of the Charter), the Court had good reason not to conflate the two rights and to apply in this case only the rule of non-refoulement, and to do so in line with the norm’s ordinary meaning in international human rights law. It is well-established in Strasbourg case law that an expelling state is not required ‘to only return an alien to a country which is in full and effective enforcement of all the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention’.75 Similarly, the CJEU dispelled the argument that any infringement of secondary Union asylum legislation would preclude a transfer.76 The same reasoning is followed in the context of inter-Member State removals of recognised asylum beneficiaries as opposed to asylum seekers.77 The reference in Article 18 to the Geneva Convention could be taken to suggest that asylum 18.32 coincides with the protection regime of that Convention. It would follow that asylum accrues

70 Case C-808/18 Commission v Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029 [102]. 71 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovakia and Hungary v Council ECLI:EU:C:2017:631 [343]. 72 C-438/17 Ibrahim ECLI:EU:C:2019:219. 73 Joined Cases C-391/16, C-77/17 and C-78/17 M and Others ECLI:EU:C:2019:403. 74 NS and Others (n 7) [114]–[115]. See contra the submission of UNHCR: ‘Written Observations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department in United Kingdom; ME and Others v Refugee Application Commissioner and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in Ireland, 1 February 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10’, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d493e822.html paras 23–32. The CJEU later extended protection from refoulement beyond the scope of systemic deficiencies: Case C-578/16 CK and Others ECLI:EU:C:2017:127. 75 F v the United Kingdom (dec) App no 17341/03 (ECtHR, 22 June 2004). Cf Art 9(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU, which speaks of ‘a severe violation of basic human rights’ as a condition for acquiring refugee status; X, Y and Z (n 19) [51]. 76 NS and Others (n 7) [85]. 77 Ibrahim (n 72).



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only to refugees as defined in the Geneva Convention and that its content equates to Articles 3–34 of the Geneva Convention. This reading finds support in Article 78(1) TFEU, which distinguishes between measures on ‘asylum’, ‘subsidiary protection’ and ‘temporary protection’. The special label of asylum is apparently reserved for refugees and the umbrella term of ‘international protection’ presented as encompassing ‘asylum’, on the one hand, and ‘subsidiary protection’ on the other hand.78 This understanding resonates, further, with the definition of ‘application for asylum’ in the first-phase asylum instruments, which define ‘applications for asylum’ as requests for international protection under the Geneva Convention.79 18.33 However, the word ‘asylum’ was not used in any of the definitional provisions of the first-phase Qualification Directive which incorporated subsidiary protection in the Union asylum regime. That Directive instead defined ‘international protection’ as being comprised of refugee status and subsidiary protection status.80 This approach, effectively replacing the term asylum with ‘international protection’, surfaces in all revisions of the first-phase instruments.81 In non-legislative EU discourse, including the multi-annual programmes and the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, asylum is commonly used as a shorthand for activity that is based on current Article 78 TFEU.82 The CJEU also recognised the separate nature of the institutions of asylum and refugeehood. It considered in B and D that the more favourable standards clause of Article 3 of the Qualification Directive did not preclude a Member State from granting ‘a right of asylum under their national law to a person who is excluded from refugee status pursuant to Article 12(2) of the directive, provided that that other kind of protection does not entail a risk of confusion with refugee status within the meaning of the directive’.83 In referring to the words ‘another kind of protection’ of Article 2(g) of Directive 2004/83, the CJEU thus equated ‘protection’, granted on whatever ground, with asylum.84 The case concerned the possible grant of German constitutional asylum on the basis of Article 16a of the Grundgesetz to two persons who were excluded from refugee status under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. 18.34 The CJEU’s interpretation of asylum in B and D corresponds with the term’s ordinary meaning in international law. Asylum simply describes any form of protection a state decides to grant to a person on its territory or in some other location against another state.85 Although the Refugee Convention has become the primary international basis for granting asylum, it does not equate asylum with refugee status and does not prevent asylum from being granted on other grounds, be they national or international.86 There is indeed ample national practice of granting asylum 78 Also see the Statement of reasons of the Praesidium for including the right to asylum in the Charter: ‘The text of paragraph 1 is based on Article 63 TEC which incorporates the Convention on Refugees into Community Law.’ CHARTE 4284/00 CONVENT 28, 21. 79 Regulation EC 343/2003, Art 2(c); Directive 2003/9/EC, Art 2(b); Directive 2005/85/EC, Art 2(b). 80 Directive 2004/83/EC, Art 2(a). 81 Directive 2013/32/EU, Art 2(b); Directive 2013/33/EU, Art 2(a); Regulation EU 604/2013, Art 2(b); Directive 2011/95/ EU, Art 2(a). 82 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999; the Hague Programme [2005] OJ C53/1; the Stockholm Programme [2010] C115/1; European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, Council Doc 13440/08; A European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final. 83 Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09 B and D [2010] ECR I-10979 [121]. 84 Ibid [116]. 85 Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees (n 23) 3; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 54) 355–56. The Institute of International Law defined asylum as ‘the protection which a State grants on its territory or in some other place under the control of certain of its organs, to a person who comes to seek it’. Institute of International Law: Resolutions Adopted at its Bath Session, September 1950, reprinted in (1951) 45 American Journal of International Law 15–23, 15. 86 See inter alia EXCOM Conclusion No 82 (XLVIII) 17 October 1997 para d(i), referring in the context of ‘asylum’ to the Refugee Convention and to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85; Council of Europe, Declaration on Territorial Asylum (n 22) [2], referring to persons protected by the Refugee Convention as well as to ‘any other person they [the Member States of

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for a wide range of humanitarian considerations.87 These reflect historical and cultural traditions which often predate the Refugee Convention. It should further be observed that, in the European context at least, the institution of asylum 18.35 can no longer be meaningfully disconnected from general human rights standards. Apart from the incorporation of subsidiary forms of protection in EU asylum law, the treatment of refugees and also the eligibility criteria and procedural standards for granting refugee status are informed by general human rights treaties, especially the ECHR. For example, the provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which apply equally to applications for refugee status and subsidiary protection status, draw from the extensive case law of the ECtHR; and the common provisions on assessment of applications for international protection laid down in Articles 4–8 of the Qualification Directive are based not only on a common interpretation of the Refugee Convention but also on standards developed by the ECtHR.88 In the EU, therefore, ECtHR case law has penetrated the refugee regime to a considerable extent. This does not mean that Article 18 applies to any form of asylum a Member State chooses to 18.36 grant. But it does allow for an interpretation that its content draws not only from the Refugee Convention, but also from human rights treaties of general applicability and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. The travaux préparatoires support this understanding, as attempts to unambiguously restrict the right to asylum to persons covered by the Refugee Convention were defeated.89 As noted above, in Gnandi, the CJEU not only interpreted Article 18 in conformity with the Refugee Convention, but also aligned that interpretation with the relevant case law of the ECtHR on the right to an effective remedy.90 The judgment seems to confirm, therefore, that the content of Article 18 may be informed by sources other than the Refugee Convention. Asylum as an individual right has found recognition in the constitutions of a range of 18.37 Member States, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Croatia (see section C.IV above). Although asylum is not included in the constitutions of all Member States, the Explanations to Article 52(2) of the Charter say that the concept of ‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’ does not apply only where there is a ‘lowest common denominator’. It transpires from those constitutions that contain a provision on asylum that the concept is not necessarily restricted to persons who meet the refugee definition, even though some constitutional provisions contain language resembling that of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention.91 It is, however, often the law, and not the constitution, which defines the conditions for exercising asylum.92 It has been observed, moreover, that in respect of some Member States, constitutional asylum has converged the Council of Europe] consider worthy of receiving asylum for humanitarian reasons’.; UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum (n 50), Art 1(1), defining asylum with reference to Art 14 UDHR without mentioning the Refugee Convention. See further A Grahl-Madsen, ‘The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of Refugee Law’ (1966) 3 Journal of Peace Research 278–89, 283, noting that ‘the Refugee Convention has no bearing on the question of asylum in a narrow sense’. 87 It transpires that in France, Italy and Germany asylum exists as a directly enforceable constitutional right of which the personal scope differs from that of the Refugee Convention: Lambert et al (n 48), 19, 22 and 27. See also Art 56 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, devoting separate paragraphs to asylum and refugee status. On practices outside Europe: M-T Gil-Bazo and M Nogueira, ‘Asylum in the Practice of Latin American and African States’, UNHCR Research Paper No 249, January 2013. For a historical perspective: Grahl-Madsen, ‘The European Tradition of Asylum and the Development of Refugee Law’ (n 78). 88 See eg the Explanatory Memorandum: COM (2009) 551 final, 6–7. 89 CHARTE 4332/00 CONVENT 35, Amendments 415, 426, 428. 90 Gnandi (n 67). Also see Belastingdienst v Toeslagen (n 67). 91 See section C.IV above. 92 Ibid.



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with asylum granted in accordance with ordinary legislative provisions, rendering constitutional asylum of little practical relevance.93 National legislative practices of Member States on grounds for asylum obviously include the harmonised statuses of refugee protection, subsidiary protection and temporary protection, but also a wide variety of non-harmonised statuses, such as protection on medical grounds, protection for family reasons, protection of unaccompanied minors, protection of victims of trafficking or other specific offences, and protection of victims of environmental disasters.94 These national forms of protection display, however, significant variety between Member States with regard to eligibility criteria, procedures, content and duration of stay. Further, not all these forms of protection attract the label of asylum in national laws.95 18.38 Some legal writings reduce the concept of asylum to a right to seek asylum, which would primarily entail a procedural right, ie a right to apply for asylum.96 This understanding is undoubtedly informed by the steadfast reluctance of states to accept an international duty to admit refugees and the surrogate solution of the ‘right to seek asylum’ presented in Article 14 UDHR. Article 18, however, is formulated in broader terms, and expressly so. Several amendments tabled by Convention members to restrict Article 18 to a ‘right to seek asylum’ were defeated.97 Discussion as to what the right to asylum entails beyond a procedural right is hampered by the 18.39 difficulty that contemporary restatements of the right to asylum are scarce. Refugee law discourse has in recent decades focused chiefly on the eligibility criteria and contents of protection under the Refugee Convention and subsidiary regimes of protection, as these are the two internationally recognised sources of protection.98 The referral in Halaf—in which the CJEU eventually considered it to be unnecessary to delve 18.40 into the meaning of the right to asylum—was occasion for UNHCR to issue a Statement on the right to asylum.99 The Statement stresses that the principle of non-refoulement is central to the realisation of the right to asylum, but that asylum is not limited to that principle. Drawing from the earlier description of asylum in EXCOM Conclusion No 82, Article 78 TFEU and the key rights contained in the secondary EU instruments on asylum, UNHCR submits that the right to asylum in Article 18 of the EU Charter contains the following elements: (i) protection from refoulement, including non-rejection at the frontier; (ii) access to territories for the purpose of admission to fair and effective processes for determining status and international protection needs; (iii) assessment of an asylum claim in fair and efficient asylum processes (with qualified interpreters and trained responsible authorities and access to legal representation and other organisations providing information and support) and an effective remedy (with appropriate legal aid) in the receiving state; (iv) access to UNHCR (or its partner organisations); (v) treatment in accordance with adequate reception conditions; (vi) the grant of refugee or subsidiary protection status when the criteria are met; (vii) ensuring refugees and asylum seekers the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms; and (viii) the attainment of a secure status.100

93 Lambert et al (n 48) 32. 94 European Migration Network Synthesis Report, ‘The Different National Practices Granting Non-EU Harmonised Protection Statuses’, December 2010. According to the study, 22 out of 23 Member States granted some form of non-EU harmonised protection in 2010. 95 Ibid 27–90. 96 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 54) 358; T Gammeltoft-Hansen and H Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘The Right to Seek Revisited: On the UN Human Rights Declaration Article 14 and Access to Asylum Procedures in the EU’ (2008) 10 European Journal of Migration and Law 439–59. 97 CHARTE 4332/11 CONVENT 35, 496–528. 98 Gil-Bazo and Nogueira point out that this is not the case in Latin America, where asylum is part of long-standing constitutional traditions and conceptually different from refugee status: Gil-Bazo and Nogueira (n 88). 99 UNHCR Statement on the right to asylum (n 12). 100 Ibid para 2.2.9. See also Executive Committee Conclusion No 82 (XLVIII), 1997, para (d).

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This enumeration is in part based on the construction of asylum in secondary Union law. Indeed, the preambles of the legislative measures adopted on the basis of former Article 63 EC and Article 78 TFEU stipulate that their purpose is to ensure ‘full observance’, ‘full respect’ or ‘to promote the application’ of Article 18.101 The Union legislator thus agrees that the diverse aspects of asylum governed by the Reception Conditions Directive, Dublin Regulation, Qualification Directive and Asylum Procedures Directive should jointly ensure the individual’s right to asylum. The only asylum instrument not containing a reference to Article 18 of the Charter (nor indeed to the Charter at all) is the Temporary Protection Directive, although this may be explained from the fact that the text of the Charter became final during the negotiations on that Directive.102 In his opinion in Abdullahi, Advocate General Cruz Villalón adopted this construction of the right to asylum. He argued that the Dublin Regulation, together with ‘all the other provisions which together with it make up the system guaranteeing the fundamental right to asylum, must be understood ultimately as an instrument operating in the service of that guarantee’.103 Likewise, in Slovakia v Council, Advocate General Bot opined that the Council Decision on relocating asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to the other Member States not merely observed the right to asylum but ‘actively participates in the preservation of fundamental rights of applicants in clear need of international protection, as guaranteed by the Charter, and in particular by Article 18 thereof ’, as the other Member States were in a better position to process their applications.104 As was observed above (par. 18.30), the CJEU adopted this reasoning in its judgment in Slovakia and Hungary v Council.105 In a similar vein, the Court held in Commission v Hungary that the proper registration of asylum claims ultimately serves to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to asylum.106 An obvious issue with interpreting Article 18 in conformity with the asylum directives and regulations is that it tends to subordinate primary Union law to secondary Union law, potentially depriving the right to asylum of much of its practical effect. It would be more in line with the constitutional structure of Union law to assume that the contents of Article 18 do not derive directly from secondary law, but that the key rights and elements laid down therein do inform its scope. This also seems to be the approach of the CJEU, as noted above. The relation between secondary asylum legislation and Article 18 may hence be conceived, first, as secondary law executing the core aim of the Treaties (to which Art 18 refers), ie to ‘offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement’, in accordance with the 1951 Convention and other relevant treaties;107 and secondly, as expressing the common (constitutional) traditions of Member States. In lego-philosophical discourse, there is some debate as to what the final station—or, indeed, the very purpose—of asylum is. Is asylum a mere means to guarantee physical security, implying that it is inherently temporal in nature,108 or does it aspire to reinstate the asylee as a member of a political community, ultimately generating an entitlement to permanent residence or even

101 Regulation (EC) 343/2003, Recital 15; Regulation (EU) 604/2013, Recital 39; Directive 2003/9/EC, Recital 5; Directive 2013/33/EU, Recital 35; Directive 2004/83/EC, Recital 10; Directive 2011/95/EU, Recital 16; Directive 2005/85/ EC, Recital 8; Directive 2013/32/EU, Recital 60. 102 Directive 2001/55/EC. 103 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-394/12 Abdullahi ECLI:EU:C:2013:473 [41]. 104 Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-643/15 Slovakia v Council ECLI:EU:C:2017:618 [335]. 105 Slovakia and Hungary v Council (n 71). 106 Commission v Hungary (n 70). 107 Art 78(1) TFEU. 108 MA Castillo and JC Hathaway, ‘Temporary Protection’ in JC Hathaway (ed), Reconceiving International Refugee Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 1–21.



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naturalisation in the host society?109 UNHCR generally pursues the three durable solutions of voluntary repatriation to the country of origin, local integration (or assimilation) in the host country, and resettlement in a third country. These solutions are expressly mentioned in UNHCR’s Statute.110 Obviously, the refugee’s predicament and the availability of one of the durable solutions will differ from case to case. The Refugee Convention recognises that protection can come in different guises and may end in different ways. The Convention alludes to the solution of voluntary repatriation in Article 1C, to resettlement in Articles 1C(3), 30 and 31(2), and to assimilation and naturalisation in Articles 1E and 34. Secondary Union legislation provides similar flexibility, as it allows for safe third-country solutions111 and repatriation when the need for protection ends.112 Further, although the EU is not competent to regulate the acquisition and loss of nationality of refugees,113 the 2011 revision of the Long-term Residents Directive extended its scope to beneficiaries of international protection, to ensure their full integration in the Member State of residence.114 The termination of residence of an asylum beneficiary is further governed by the right to private and family life, as expulsion of settled migrants will as a rule constitute an interference with that right.115

III.  Limitations and Derogations 18.45 Like most Charter rights, Article 18 does not contain any express limitation. It is subject to the general limitation clause of Article 52(1), but further restrictions may be implied in accordance with Article 52(2) and 52(4), in so far as the right to asylum is based on the Treaties and/or the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. That the right to asylum shall be guaranteed ‘in accordance with’ the Treaties could be taken 18.46 to mean, in line with Article 52(2) of the Charter, that it is to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits of Article 78 TFEU and the Directives and regulations adopted on the basis of that provision. It would follow that the right of asylum may be subjected to additional restrictions than those allowed for under the general derogation clause of Article 52(1), holding that all limitations must be based in law and meet the tests of proportionality and necessity. Article 78 TFEU however does not, as is required by Article 52(2), provide for the right to asylum, but lays down the competence of the Union to develop an asylum policy. It is therefore questionable whether Article 52(2) applies to Article 18 of the Charter (see the commentary on Article 52).116 It is generally accepted that the right to asylum should not benefit persons who have committed 18.47 certain egregious crimes, in particular international crimes, serious non-political crimes or acts that are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This applies not only to refugee status in accordance with Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, but extends to the wider institution of asylum, as is evident from inter alia Article 14(2) UDHR and Article 1(2) of the

109 Oudejans (n 12), 196. 110 UNGA, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 14 December 1950, A/RES/428(V), c 1 para 1 and c 2 paras 8(e) and 9. 111 Directive 2013/32/EU, Arts 35–39. 112 Directive 2011/95/EU, Arts 14, 19. 113 Case C-369/90 Micheletti and Others [1992] ECR I-4239 [10]; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449 [39]. 114 Directive 2011/51/EU amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection [2011] OJ L132/1, Recitals 2, 6. 115 Üner v the Netherlands [GC] ECHR 2006-XII [59]. 116 Also see S Peers, ‘Immigration, Asylum and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 3 European Journal of Migration and Law 141–59, 157.

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UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum.117 The rationale for excluding these categories of persons is that certain acts are so grave as to render their perpetrators undeserving of international protection as refugees and to ensure that such persons do not abuse the institution of asylum in order to avoid being held legally accountable for their acts.118 The Qualification Directive incorporates the exclusion clause of Article 1F of the Refugee 18.48 Convention not only into the EU refugee regime but also into the regime of subsidiary protection and broadened the categories of excluded persons in respect of the latter regime.119 Although all excluded persons may be protected from expulsion under Article 3 ECHR and Article 19(2) of the Charter, their exclusion accords with the case law of the ECtHR, which has consistently held that excluded persons who cannot be expelled cannot derive from the ECHR entitlement to a status because ‘neither Article 3 nor any other provision of the Convention and its Protocols guarantees, as such, a right to a residence permit’.120 The application of the exclusion clauses of Article 1F was considered by the CJEU in B and D.121 The Court found that (i) the exclusion clauses serve the dual aim of excluding from refugee status persons who are deemed to be undeserving of the protection and of preventing that status from enabling those who have committed certain serious crimes to escape criminal liability; (ii) a determination of whether there are serious reasons for considering that a person has committed the acts in question is conditional on an assessment on a case-by-case basis of the specific facts; and (iii) the exclusion of a person from refugee status is not conditional on an assessment of proportionality in relation to the particular case.122 In later case law, the Court held that exclusion should be based on a full investigation into all the circumstances of the individual case and that a criminal conviction is neither necessarily sufficient nor a prerequisite.123 Further, a person who has been excluded on the basis of Article 1F of the Refugee Convention may not automatically be considered to pose a public order risk to the Member State of abode.124 The latter case dealt with persons who were excluded on the basis of Article 1F but who enjoyed residence in a Member State as a family member of a EU citizen. A further topical ground for refusing asylum is constituted by the safe third-country 18.49 exceptions.125 These proceed from the rationale that states are discharged from protecting someone who can find asylum elsewhere. The Refugee Convention allows for the withholding of refugee status if the person in question is recognised by a country as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country (Art 1E).126

117 Also see EXCOM No 82 (XLVIII) para d(i), reiterating ‘the need to apply scrupulously the exclusion clauses stipulated in Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention and in other relevant international instruments, to ensure that the integrity of the asylum institution is not abused by the extension of protection to those who are not entitled to it’; Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Resolution 14 (1967) (n 22) para 3; UNHCR Statute (n 100) para 7(d); Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 45, 20 June 1974, Art I(5). 118 UNHCR, Handbook (n 30 above) para 140; UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 September 2003, Un Doc HCR/ GIP/03/05, para 2. 119 See Art 17(1)(d) and 17(3) of Directive 2011/95/EU. Further, Art 17(1)(b) of the Directive omits the conditions that the serious crime is of a ‘non-political’ nature and that the crime has been committed outside the country of refuge prior to admission. 120 Bonger v The Netherlands (dec) App no 10154/04 (ECtHR, 15 September 2005). Also see Naibzay v The Netherlands (dec) App no 68564/12 (ECtHR, 4 June 2013); I v The Netherlands (dec) App no 24147/11 (ECtHR, 18 October 2011); I v The Netherlands (dec) App no 24147/11 (ECtHR, 10 July 2012). 121 B and D (n 84). 122 Ibid [99], [104], [111]. Cf on the issue of whether a proportionality assessment is necessary: UNHCR, Guidelines (n 1119) para 24. 123 Case C-369/17 Ahmed ECLI:EU:C:2018:713; Case C-573/14 Lounani ECLI:EU:C:2017:71. 124 Joined Cases C-331/16 and C-366/16 K and H.F. ECLI:EU:C:2018:296. 125 Directive 2013/32/EU, Arts 35 (first country of asylum), 38 (safe third country), 39 (European safe third country). 126 See also Directive 2011/95/EU, Art 12(1)(b).



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It further allows for withdrawing refugee status if the refugee has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality (Art 1C(3)). In indicating that protection becomes superfluous when a status equivalent to nationals is obtained, these provisions reveal, by implication, the essence of asylum. They also shed light on the conception of safe third-country notions in Union law, which focus chiefly on respecting the prohibition of refoulement, and much less on ensuring full-fledged asylum.127 18.50 It is not straightforward to answer the question whether the exclusion clauses and safe third-country exceptions have the effect of narrowing down the scope of Article 18, or whether their application must be considered as a limitation to the exercise of the right to asylum in the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter. The question is not without relevance, as Article 52(1) sets strict conditions for limitations of Charter rights. The argument could be that the exclusion from asylum of any person who would otherwise be entitled to it on the basis of inter alia Article 1F and safe third-country exceptions, must meet the requirements of being based in law, proportionality and necessity. The judgment in B and D appears to favour an interpretation however that the exclusion grounds are not subject to the conditions of Article 52(1).128 But the references in that case had not been based on Article 18 and only indirectly entertained questions of scope and justification of exclusion.

IV. Remedies 18.51 Given the diverse contexts to which the right to asylum may apply, the applicable remedies are likely to depend on the contents of the case. In a few cases, the CJEU has directly connected Article 18 with Article 47 guaranteeing an effective remedy.129 Remedies play a topical role in the case of expulsion, as is discussed in the commentary on Article 19, but also in respect of detention of asylum seekers, transfers pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, entry into the Schengen Area and so on. Secondary Union law devotes considerable attention to remedies in most of these spheres. One express aim of recasting the asylum directives in 2009–13 was to ensure full respect of fundamental rights as informed by developing case law of the CJEU and ECtHR, especially concerning the right to an effective remedy.130 As a consequence, the standards of the Asylum Procedures Directive, but also those on judicial review of asylum detention, have been (further) aligned with fundamental rights.131 18.52 A particular issue in the sphere of remedies concerns the denial of access to protection to asylum seekers who are interdicted at sea. Current EU law hardly offers guidance on the treatment of asylum seekers who are subjected to controls before they arrive in Union territory, but the Hirsi judgment has clarified the relevant human rights standards in respect of such activity, emphasising the necessity to make remedies effectively available.132 In 2014 a regulation was adopted that establishes rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the Frontex agency, replacing a decision that had been

127 Extensively M Foster, ‘Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protection in Another State’ (2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 223–86. 128 B and D (n 84) [107]–[111]. 129 n 67 above. 130 COM (2011) 319 final para 3.1. 131 See inter alia Art 9 of Directive 2013/33/EU. On effective remedies in the sphere of EU asylum law see M Reneman, EU Asylum Procedures and the Right to an Effective Remedy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014). 132 Secondary asylum law applies only to asylum applications made in the territories, including the territorial waters, of the Member States: Regulation (EU) 604/2013, Art 3(1); Directive 2013/33/EU, Art 3(1) and (2); Directive 2013/32/EU, Art 3(1) and (2); Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC] App no 27765/09 (ECHR, 2012).

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annulled by the CJEU.133 Although the regulation aims at ensuring that interceptions respect fundamental rights, the procedural guarantees arguably fall short of the requirements of the Hirsi judgment.134 Moreover, the regulation does not apply to unilateral maritime controls of Member States, which are far more common than those undertaken under the aegis of Frontex.

E. Evaluation The creation of the common policy on asylum was a defining moment in the European tradition 18.53 of asylum. It completed the regime of the 1951 Geneva Convention with explicit entitlements of entry and residence, and secured an equivalent status of subsidiary protection. Even though the common asylum policy was still in its formative stages when the Charter was first adopted in 2000, it paved the way for including the right to asylum in the Charter.135 Article 18, although revolutionary in that it is one of the few recognitions of asylum as a fundamental right in international law, first and foremost consolidates the achievements of the common policy on asylum. It proclaims the common understanding of asylum as it has found expression in the Treaties and secondary legislation to be a fundamental right. Given the comprehensive nature of the common asylum policy, but also the Charter’s principle 18.54 that it reaffirms existing rights, one might question what additional protection Article 18 offers. The difficulty with the right to asylum moreover is that its contents are fundamentally contested and that it is closely connected to other fundamental rights, in particular the prohibition of refoulement. As was observed in the analysis above, the CJEU is incrementally giving more teeth to Article 18. 18.55 It interprets the scope of Article 18 broadly, in line with the wide range of issue covered by secondary asylum law. It has further held that the detailed rules of the asylum acquis ultimately serve to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to asylum.136 It follows that, despite the Court’s reluctance to give (decisively) novel meaning to Article 18, its impact should not be underestimated. First, in recognising asylum as a fundamental right, with the status of primary Union law, Article 18 sets a moral compass for any current and future Union activity in the field of asylum and that of Member States when acting in the scope of Union asylum law. The recognition of asylum as fundamental right forms a crucial complement to the initial and in many respects still guiding rationale for EU cooperation in the sphere of asylum, ie that the harmonisation of standards is simply a practical means to compensate for negative effects that might result from the opening of borders. Article 18 makes clear that common reception standards, criteria for allocating asylum seekers, uniform standards for recognising refugees and common asylum procedures are not only driven by the imperative to reduce secondary movements within the EU, but should secure to persons in need of protection who arrive in the EU a genuine chance to rebuild their lives. Secondary Union law ensures and promotes the right to asylum, but is at the same time restrained by it.

133 Regulation (EU) 656/2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of ­operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union [2014] OJ L189/93. 134 This pertains in particular to the absence of guarantees, in case of disembarkation in a third country, relating to the presence of legal advisors and interpreters and the availability of a remedy before an independent authority with suspensive effect. See Hirsi Jamaa and Others (n 133) [202], [205], [206]. 135 Cf CHARTE 4137/00 CONVENT 8, 6: ‘The 1989 European Parliament Declaration contained no reference to this [the right to asylum], but no Community policy existed at the time.’ 136 Commission v Hungary (n 70) [102].



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18.56

Secondly, even though the European institution of asylum has come to fruition in the absence of a recognition of asylum as fundamental right—drawing instead from all sorts of other fundamental rights such as the prohibition of torture, socio-economic rights and the right to an effective remedy—not all questions of asylum are governed by other Charter rights. A key issue relating directly to the plight of refugees who are allowed residence concerns their inability to exercise citizenship rights and to integrate in another country, entertaining special attention in respect of questions of durable residence, socio-economic participation, family reunification and, in general, prospects of integration. 18.57 Thirdly, there are questions which are quite specific to the needs of refugees but which have been dealt with questionably in secondary law and might benefit from the guidance of Article 18. One such matter is the differentiation between the refugee rights regime and the subsidiary protection rights regime, which has survived into the second-phase Qualification Directive, although in much less extreme form, but for which it remains difficult to find objective justification.137 Another prevailing issue constitutes the manner in which the exclusion clauses have been incorporated into the Qualification Directive, including the differentiation between the refugee and subsidiary protection regimes. Further, Article 18 may well shed light, precisely because it extends beyond non-refoulement, on the criteria for applying safe third-country exceptions. 18.58 Lastly, the right to asylum attracts special significance in respect of the evolving external dimension of the EU immigration and asylum policy. Secondary asylum legislation is expressly restricted to asylum applications made in the territory of the EU, leaving open the issue of how to respect refugee rights in the context of externalised border controls such as at the high seas or foreign airports and in the cooperation with third countries.138 When such activity is in the scope of Union law, the right to asylum may fill the void left by the Union legislator. There is, in sum, ample potential for Article 18 to contribute to the continuing development of the European institution of asylum.



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Article 19 Article 19 Protection in the Event of Removal, Expulsion or Extradition 1. Collective expulsions are prohibited. 2. No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 19 Paragraph 1 of this Article has the same meaning and scope as Article 4 of Protocol No 4 to the ECHR concerning collective expulsion. Its purpose is to guarantee that every decision is based on a specific examination and that no single measure can be taken to expel all persons having the nationality of a particular State (see also Article 13 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Paragraph 2 incorporates the relevant case law from the European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 3 of the ECHR (see Ahmed v Austria, judgment of 17 December 1996, 1996-VI, p. 2206, and Soering, judgment of 7 July 1989).

Select Bibliography Collective Expulsion G Bekker, ‘Mass Expulsion of Foreign Nationals: A Special Violation of Human Rights— Communication 292/2004 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Republic of Angola’ (2009) 9 African Human Rights Law Journal 262. I Bryan and P Langford, ‘Impediments to the Expulsion of Non-Nationals: Substance and Coherence in Procedural Protection under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2010) 794 Nordic Journal of International Law 457–79. CJ Chido, ‘Peril of Movement: Migrating Roma Risk Expulsion as EU Member States Test the Limits of the Free Movement Directive’ (2011) 20 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law 233. C Cahn, ‘Racial Preference, Racial Exclusion: Administrative Efforts to Enforce the Separation of Roma and Non-Roma in Europe through Migration Controls’ (2003) 5 European Journal of Migration & Law 479. M Den Heijer, ‘Reflections on Refoulement and collective expulsion in the Hirsi case’ (2013) 25 International Journal of Refugee Law 265–90. J-M Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice Vol XLI (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). JD Howley, ‘Unlocking the Fortress: Protocol No 11 and the Birth of Collective Expulsion Jurisprudence in the Council of Europe System’ (2006) 21 Geographical Immigration Law Journal 111. J Wojnowska-Radzińska, The right of an alien to be protected against arbitrary expulsion in international law (Leiden, Hotei Publishing, 2015).

Expulsion to Torture JH Burgers and H Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A handbook on the Convention against Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, Vol IX (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988).

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A Duffy, ‘Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law’ (2008) 203 International Journal of Refugee Law 373–90. E Hamdan, The principle of non-refoulement under the ECHR and the UN Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Leiden, Brill, 2016). S Joseph, J Schultz and M Castan, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Commentary, and Materials (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004). J McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). N Mole and C Meredith, Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights, Vol IX (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2010). T Molnár, ‘Limitations on the Expulsion of Aliens Imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-A Retrospect of 50 Years’ (2018) Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law 83–104. M Nowak, E McArthur and K Buchinger, The United Nations Convention against Torture: a Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). ——, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR commentary (Kehl, NP Engel, 1993). V Vandova, ‘Protection of non-citizens against removal under international human rights law’ in A Edwards and C Ferstman (eds), Human Security and Non-Citizens: Law, Policy and International Affairs (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 495–531.

A.  Article 19 and the Scope of EU Law 19.01 The two parts of Article 19 need to be dealt with separately as their sources and interpretation are quite distinct. Article 19(1) relating to collective expulsion covers a field of law in which a fairly extensive EU competence has been exercised. First, as regards EU citizens, the rights contained in Articles 20 and 21 TFEU on moving and residing in the territory of the Member States includes an exception on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health, permitting expulsion or exclusion. This has also been transposed into secondary legislation (Directive 2004/38).1 As regards third country nationals (other than family members of EU citizens exercising Treaty rights, or Norwegians, Icelanders, Swiss and Liechtenstein nationals, who are covered by their agreements with the EU), the Returns Directive (Directive 2008/115—see below) provides a fairly comprehensive exercise of the legal base regarding the expulsion of third country nationals. This Directive does not however, apply in Denmark, Ireland or the UK. Thus the bite of the Charter provision in those three states may be somewhat compromised. 19.02 As regards Article 19(2), the Common European Asylum System includes protection for third country nationals who fear torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if sent to another country (Directive 2011/95—see below). This protection is similar to that contained in Article 19(2) and in so far as this provision mirrors Article 3 ECHR, the ECtHR has held that the scope of protection under Article 15(c) of Directive 2011/95 as regards subsidiary protection is the same as that of Article 3 ECHR.2 19.03 The problematic point regarding the application of Article 19(2) relates to EU citizens who make a claim for asylum to prevent their return to their (EU) country of origin. Protocol 24 TFEU and TEU which creates a presumption against asylum claims by EU nationals in other EU states presents a particular challenge to the scope of Article 19(2) of the Charter. The EU constitutional framework, as set out in Article 6 TEU, seems to privilege an interpretation that



1 [2004] 2 Sufi

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restrictions in Protocols do not apply to the Charter unless specifically stated. However, should this interpretation of Article 6 TEU not find favour with the CJEU, then at the least the Protocol must be interpreted in a restrictive manner and cannot undermine the essence of Article 19(2) of the Charter.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 19 with Other Provisions of the Charter Article 19 of the Charter is related to Article 47, which guarantees an effective remedy against 19.04 any alleged breach of a Charter right. The mirror provision of Article 19(1) Protocol 4 Article 4 ECHR, is the procedural right which flows from the prohibition on collective expulsion which has provided the basis for the jurisprudence by the ECtHR.3 The capacity to challenge expulsion on the basis that there has not been an individual examination of the facts and circumstances of the individual to be expelled has been the core human rights challenge to expulsions of substantial numbers of persons at a time. Article 19(1) applies to everyone. It is not limited to third country nationals or to people claiming international protection. Thus immigration status of the person is irrelevant to the effect of the prohibition. Article 19(2) Charter is closely related to Article 4 which prohibits torture, inhuman or 19.05 degrading treatment or punishment. Article 4 prohibits torture by Member States absolutely. Its equivalent provision in the ECHR, Article 3, has been interpreted by the ECtHR as including return to a country where there is a real risk of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment of punishment.4 This has given rise to a substantial jurisprudence by the ECtHR on the extent of the obligation not to return a person to a country where there is such a risk.5 By reason of Article 6 TEU, and Article 52(3) of the Charter, this would appear to make Article 19(2) of the Charter lex specialis of the general prohibition in Article 4 of the Charter, although the Court of Justice nevertheless applied Article 4 in respect of removals from one Member State to another.6 The added value of Article 19(2) is its clarity and the explicit confirmation that the Charter includes an obligation on EU states not to send someone to a country where there is a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This provision is also related to a claim for international protection and thus to Article 18 of the Charter. Those who claim Article 19(2) protection include both those who seek to avoid expulsion, and those who seek to remain on the territory of the host state because the alternative, being sent to another country, would entail an Article 4 Charter or Article 3 ECHR risk. Some individuals will have both grounds but those who fulfil only one are still protected by the article. When there is a challenge to expulsion on the basis that it would constitute a breach of Article 4 Protocol 4 ECHR, if there is no non-refoulement related claim extant, the ECtHR has held that the procedural remedies apply to determine whether the expulsion constitutes such a breach but they do not carry suspensive effect.7 The procedural requirement of Article 19(2) exists to ensure its effective application. This is considered in a

3 Specifically: Conka v Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR, 5 February 2002) RJD 2002-I; Hirsi Jamaa & Ors v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012). 4 Soering v UK App no 14038/88 (7 July 1989) Series A no 161. 5 N Mole and C Meredith, Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights Vol IX (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2010). 6 ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. 7 Khlaifia & Ors v Italy App No 16483/12 (ECtHR 15 December 2016).



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number of decisions of the CJEU such as C-175/17 X8 and C-181/16, Gnandi,9 (considered in more depth below).

C.  Sources of Article 19 Rights I. ECHR Article 19(1) 19.06 Protocol 4 Article 4 is the ECHR source of the Article 19(1) right. This provision simply states, like Article 19(1) ‘Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.’ Of the EU Member States, only Greece has not ratified this Protocol. Article 19(2) 19.07 As noted above, Article 3 ECHR is the starting place for Article 19(2) Charter. The wording is in fact the same as Article 4 Charter, with the addition of the explicit reference to non-removal. There is no direct equivalent to Article 19(2) in the ECHR as this protection is the result of the developing case law of the ECtHR (see below).

II.  UN Treaties Article 19(1) 19.08 In so far as the objective of Article 19(1) Charter is to exclude arbitrary expulsion, it finds a source in Article 9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 which prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention and exile. However this is quite a long shot. Article 13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) similarly requires procedural rights before aliens lawfully in the territory of the state can be expelled. This is a less extensive right than that in the Charter provision. The latter is not limited to aliens lawfully on the territory and provides for more than just procedural obligations. 19.09 The International Labour Organization’s Conventions 97 (1948) and 143 (1975) both contain provisions relating to the treatment of migrant workers and minimum standards of protection. However, there is no explicit mention of expulsion (collective or otherwise) in either Convention. Most EU Member States have ratified the earlier Convention but not the later one. 19.10 Article 22(1) of the UN Convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families 1990 (UNCRMW) provides that migrant workers and members of their families shall not be subject to measures of collective expulsion. This is close to the wording of Article 19(1). The remaining parts of Article 22 UNCRMW set out the procedural rights which must be accorded to migrant workers who are subject to an expulsion decision by their host state (reflecting Protocol 7 ECHR). Article 56 provides for procedural rights in respect of documented aliens who are subject to expulsion decisions. It is worth noting that no current EU Member State has ratified this convention.



8 ECLI:EU:C:2018:776. 9 EU:C:2018:465.

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Article 19(2) Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 provides for a prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Henckaerts considers that this provision does not apply extraterritorially and thus is not the equivalent to Article 19(2) Charter.10 On a historical reading, this may well be the case, but the development of the UN Bill of Rights and in particular the UN Convention against Torture (see below) would now indicate that a current interpretation of Article 5 of the Declaration should also include the extraterritorial element. Note the difference in wording between Article 5 of the Declaration and Article 3 ECHR and Article 19(2) Charter where the former provision includes the prohibition on ‘cruel’ treatment or punishment while the latter two provisions do not. Article 33(1) of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Refugee Convention) prohibits the refoulement of anyone who fulfils the criteria of Article 1 of that Convention, and thus is a refugee under that Convention. There are exceptions to this prohibition in Article 33(2) of that Convention. In so far as an individual who is seeking international protection is a refugee under Article 1 Refugee Convention that person is also likely to be a person to whom Article 19(2) of the Charter applies as well (though not necessarily, as there is the question of nexus with a ground for refugee protection).11 The interplay between refugee protection and complementary protection has been well examined by McAdam.12 Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 similarly prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The UN Human Rights Committee, which has oversight responsibility for this Convention as well as power to receive individual complaints against states which have ratified the first optional protocol to the ICCPR, has interpreted this provision as including a prohibition on sending someone to a country where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subject to the treatment set out therein.13 Article 3(1) of the UN Convention against Torture states: ‘No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’ This provision provides a basis for the wording of Article 19(2) of the Charter. In so far as the expanded interpretation of Article 3 ECHR to include return to a state where there is a substantial risk of torture was influenced by the finalisation of UNCAT and its opening for signature in 1984 (see the express reference to this in Soering14) it is safe to assume an interconnection in interpretation of the prohibition in international and regional human rights law. The UNCRMW also includes a prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 10. The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 has become relevant notwithstanding Article 1(2) which provides that the Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens. In a case pending before the ICJ at the time

10 J-M Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice, Vol XLI (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). 11 E Feller, ‘Asylum, migration and refugee protection: realities, myths and the promise of things to come’ (2006) 18(3)–(4) International Journal of Refugee Law 509–36. 12 J McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). 13 A Duffy, ‘Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law’ (2008) 20(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 373–90. 14 Soering v UK (n 4). However, unlike the Convention Against Torture, Art 3 ECHR prevents not only removal to face torture, but also removal to face other inhuman or degrading treatment.



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of writing15 a state has invoked ICERD as the basis for a prohibition of the collective expulsions of its nationals from the territory of another state. In a decision on interim measures, the ICJ granted the application of the petitioning state.

III.  Council of Europe Treaties 19.17 The Council of Europe Convention on Establishment 1955, which has been ratified by a minority of EU Member States, contains at Article 3 some protection against expulsion. Similarly, the European Social Charter 1961 also provides some protection against expulsion for lawfully ­resident migrant workers. Neither go as far or are as clear as Article 19 Charter.

IV.  Other Treaties Article 19(1) 19.18 At the regional level, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 1969 provides at Article 22(9) for freedom of movement and protection against expulsion for aliens in certain circumstances. The Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 specifically prohibits mass expulsion at Article 26(2). The Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1995 also prohibits collective expulsion at Article 25(4). 19.19 Two African conventions cover related territory: the Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa 1969 and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981 both contain provisions relating to protection of residence, the former for refugees the latter for migrants. The latter includes at Article 12(5) a specific prohibition on the mass expulsion of aliens. However this provision is specifically related to the grounds of mass expulsion: ‘The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.’ Article 19(2) 19.20 All of the above regional conventions also prohibit torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

V.  Relevant EU Law (a)  Primary Law 19.21 Articles 19(1) and (2) fit within the scope of EU law as an expression of the more general human rights obligations of the Member States contained in the UN’s international bill of rights and the ECHR. As regards EU primary law, the exception to free movement of persons on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health must be exercised consistently with Article 19. This has consequences for Articles 20 and 21 TFEU on citizenship of the Union, but also on Articles 45 (free movement of workers), 49 (the right of establishment) and 56 (provision of services). All these provisions are directly effective in EU law according to the CJEU.16 The ­provisions in Title V (the area of freedom security and justice) on third country nationals 15 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v United Arab Emirates) https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/172/orders (accessed 10 December 2019). 16 Re Art 21: Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091; re Arts 45–56, see general principles of EU law.

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are also affected, but not by primary law, as there are no directly effective treaty rights for third country nationals in this title. Article 19(1) raises issues about the right to an individual consideration of the person’s 19.22 circumstances before expulsion. Collective expulsion is excluded because each person is entitled to a consideration of his or her claim to remain on the territory separately. Thus before expulsion can be carried out each case must be considered on its facts. The rights of free movement and residence (Arts 20 and 21 TFEU) and entry and residence for economic purposes (Arts 45–56 TFEU) are subject to exceptions on the basis of public policy, public security and public health. These grounds cannot be used to justify collective expulsions of EU citizens. This is not an academic issue as the first startling judgment of the ECtHR on the basis of the ECHR Protocol 4 equivalent to this provision was in respect of Belgian authorities which were found liable for a breach of the provision on account of their collective expulsion of Slovakians.17 While the events and judgment predate the accession of Slovakia to the EU, the much publicised expulsion of Romanians from France and Italy, commencing with particular intensity in 2010 but ongoing at the time of writing, raises concerns about compliance with Article 19(1) of the Charter.18 In respect of Article 19(2), any EU citizen entitled to rely on Articles 20 and 21 TFEU to 19.23 remain on the territory of a Member State other than that of his or her underlying nationality also enjoys protection from expulsion to his or her home state if there is a real risk that he or she would suffer torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (the death penalty has been abolished in all EU Member States; see also Article 2 of the Charter) in the state to which he or she is intended to be sent. Any such expulsions would, of course, in any event have to satisfy the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38, on the free movement rights of EU citizens and their family members. A number of issues arise as regards this obligation not to send an EU citizen to his or her Member State of underlying citizenship on the basis of the risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Protocol 24 TFEU and TEU provides that there is a presumption that all EU countries are safe countries of origin as regards asylum claims by nationals of other Member States (unless a Member State makes a unilateral declaration to the contrary, which only Belgium has done).19 This Protocol is commonly known as the Aznar Protocol. Thus, while according to the Protocol, asylum claims will be inadmissible (or otherwise not taken into consideration) where made by citizens of the Union (except in Belgium, where point (d) of the Aznar Protocol requires that they must be presumed to be ‘manifestly unfounded without affecting in any way’ the decision-making process), Article 19(2) of the Charter makes no differentiation between EU citizens and third country nationals. As the explanations regarding Article 19 of the Charter specifically refer to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 3—which as the ECtHR has insisted on numerous occasions, is absolute and not liable to any exceptions20— the Aznar Protocol must be disapplied to any claim by an EU citizen based on Articles 20 and 21 TFEU and Article 19(2) Charter. 19.23 In accordance with the CJEU’s case law on the rights of Turkish workers, self-employed persons and service providers enjoy some rights to entry and residence in the Member States.They are also protected against expulsion on the same level as EU workers. Article 19(2) has specific implications for the application of the EC Turkey Association Agreement and Decision 1/80.21 17 Conka v Belgium (n 3). 18 S Carrera and A Faure-Atger, L’affaire des Roms: A Challenge to the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2010). 19 E Guild and M Garlick, ‘Refugee Protection, Counter-Terrorism, and Exclusion in the European Union.’ (2010) 29(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 63–82. 20 Saadi v Italy App no 37201/06 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008). 21 R Gutmann, ‘Schranken des Aufenthaltsrechts nach dem Assoziationsratsbeschluß Nr 1/80’ ZAR (2) (1996): 70–77.



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19.24

At the date of writing, the EU has entered into readmission agreements with the following countries: —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— ——

Hong Kong;22 Macao;23 Sri Lanka;24 Albania;25 Russia;26 Ukraine, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia and Moldova;27 Pakistan;28 Georgia;29 Armenia;30 Azerbaijan;31 Turkey;32 Cape Verde;33 Belarus34

19.25 The objective of all the readmission agreements is to facilitate the expulsion of nationals of the states parties to their country of nationality and where possible also any third country nationals who entered the territory of one of the parties after sojourning in the other party’s territory.35 All actions taken under these agreements must also be consistent with Articles 19(1) and (2) Charter. Concerns have been expressed by a variety of academics about the application of these agreements and the human rights implications.36 These concerns also engage the correct application of Article 19 of the Charter. (b)  Secondary Legislation 19.26 Articles 19(1) and (2) have implications for Directive 2004/38 on the right to move and reside of citizens of the Union for the reasons set out above in respect of their directly effective residence rights. The Directive provides further clarification of the right to move and reside of citizens of the Union and assimilates their third country family members to the position of the EU citizen principal.

22 [2004] OJ L17/23: in force 1 March 2004 ([2004] OJ L64/38). 23 [2004] OJ L143/97; in force 1 June 2004. 24 [2005] OJ L124/43; in force 1 May 2005. 25 [2005] OJ L124; in force 1 May 2006. 26 [2007] OJ L129; in force 1 June 2007. 27 [2007] OJ L332 and 334; in force 1 January 2008. 28 [2010] OJ L287/50; in force 1 December 2010. 29 [2011] OJ L52/45; in force 1 March 2011 ([2011] OJ L44/1). 30 [2013] OJ L289; in force 1 January 2014. 31 [2014] OJ L59; in force 1 September 2014. 32 [2014] OJ L331; entry into force 18 November 2014. 33 [2013] OJ L282; entry into force 1 December 2014. 34 [2020] OJ L182; entry into force 1 July 2020. 35 N Coleman, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests And Refugee Rights, Vol XVI (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009). 36 J-P Cassarino, ‘Informalising readmission agreements in the EU neighbourhood’ (2007) 42(2) The International Spectator 179–96; F Trauner and I Kruse. ‘EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements: A new standard EU foreign Policy tool?’ (2008) 10(4) European Journal of Migration and Law 411–38.

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As regards EU secondary legislation on third country nationals adopted under Chapter V 19.27 TFEU, many measures are affected by Article 19 of the Charter. These include in the irregular immigration acquis: —— —— —— —— ——

Directive 2001/40 on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions;37 Directive 2001/51 on carrier sanctions;38 Directive 2003/110 on transit for expulsion by air;39 Directive 2008/115 (Returns Directive);40 and Directive 2011/3641 replacing the Framework Decision on trafficking in persons.

Of these measures, the Returns Directive is the most immediately engaged by Article 19 of the 19.28 Charter. As this Directive sets out the conditions for the expulsion of third country nationals, it must be applied in full compliance with the Charter obligation. Of these measures only Directive 2008/115 has been the subject of interpretation by the CJEU.42 In the borders acquis the Schengen borders code is implicated,43 and in the asylum acquis the 19.29 following measures are implicated: —— —— —— ——

Directive 2001/55 on temporary protection;44 Dublin III Regulation 604/2013;45 Directive 2011/95 on refugee/subsidiary protection qualification;46 Directive 2013/32 on asylum procedures;47 and

Virtually all the EU immigration and asylum measures state, in their preambles, that they are 19.30 compliant with the Charter generally. As the Charter has the status of primary law, all these measures of secondary law are subordinate to the Charter. In the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the CEAS, it makes frequent reference to the Charter (see the commentary on Article 18).

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks Article 19(1) Collective expulsion of aliens is certainly not a recent phenomenon, but that it should be incor- 19.31 porated into human rights norms is.48 The first international Convention to include a prohibition on collective expulsion is Article 4 Protocol 4 ECHR, adopted on 16 September 1963.

37 [2001] OJ L149/34. 38 [2001] OJ L187/45. 39 [2003] OJ L321/26. 40 [2008] OJ L348/98. 41 [2011] OJ L101/1. 42 Cases: C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev [2009] ECR I-11189; C-61/11 PPU El Dridi Hassen [2011] ECR I-3015; C-329/11 Achughbabian (Judgment of 6 December 2011); Case C-430/11 Sagor (Judgment of 6 December 2012); and Case C-522/11 Mbaye (Order of 21 March 2013) and Case C-806/18 JZ (Judgment of 17 September 2020). 43 Regulation 2016/399 [2016] OJ L77/1. 44 [2001] OJ L212/12. 45 Regulation 604/2013, [2013] OJ L180/31. 46 [2013] OJ L180/1. 47 [2013] OJ L180/60. 48 Henckaerts (n 7).



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As Henckaerts points out, the Council of Europe’s Legal Committee did not propose the provision, which came from the Committee of Experts as a result of a discussion regarding variations between the ECHR and the Council of Europe’s Convention on Establishment. The Explanatory Report makes specific reference to collective expulsions which had already taken place—an apparent reference to events occurring between the two world wars. However, the provision included in the protocol is wider, and includes all collective expulsions irrespective of when they take place. One of the key issues which arises and will be considered below is what ‘collective’ means in this provision. This has been a core issue in the interpretation of the provision by the ECtHR. The issue of collective expulsion of aliens in the ECtHR jurisprudence has arisen primarily in respect of people who have applied for and been refused asylum (though not exclusively, see below). For this reason it is reasonable to place this prohibition in the same basket as the prohibition on expulsion of aliens at risk of torture (Art 19(2)). However, as will be discussed below, asylum is not the only context in respect of which issues of collective expulsion have arisen. A 2012 judgment of the ECtHR concerned interdiction on the high seas where there was a breach of this prohibition.49 19.32 Closely related to this prohibition, and indeed, to a large extent inherent to it are the procedures by which states reach decisions on expulsion. For Council of Europe states this leads in two directions. First, Article 13 ECHR provides the right to an effective remedy which is of general application to the ECHR. However, it also engages Protocol 7, Article 1 of which states: 1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in ­pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall be allowed: (a) to submit reasons against his expulsion, (b) to have his case reviewed, and (c) to be represented for these purposes before the competent authority or a person or persons designated by that authority. 2. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under paragraph 1.a, b and c of this Article, when such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security.

19.33 Two EU Member States have not (at the time of writing) ratified this protocol.50 The importance of Article 13 ECHR for the application of Article 4 Protocol 4 is particularly relevant—see below under scope. Article 19(2) 19.34 This provision as it appears in the ICCPR, the UNCAT and the ECHR has been the subject of much interpretation and jurisprudence, by the UN treaty bodies in their capacity to receive individual complaints, and by the ECtHR. It forms the basis of the widening of the grounds for asylum from the very specific definition of a refugee in the Refugee Convention—a person with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (see the commentary on Art 18)—to a wider group of persons in need of international protection. The defining feature of this wider group of people is that there is a serious risk that they will suffer torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if sent to another country. The basis of international protection on these grounds has been the subject of a fairly consistent widening in the human rights conventions adopted by



49 Hirsi

Jamaa & Ors v Italy (n 3). and the Netherlands.

50 Germany

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the international community. While the UN Convention against Torture 1984 only provides for protection in the event that the serious risk is one of torture, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence widens this to include inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and this wider formula is the one which appears in the Charter. Article 16 of the Convention for the protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 2006 prohibits the expulsion, return, surrender or extradition of a person to a state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance. Thirteen Member States have ratified this convention and a further 11 have signed it.51 The interface between refugee status and the right to remain on the grounds that return would 19.35 entail a serious risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is fairly complex.52 EU law provides for some assimilation of rights, but this is not complete (see Directive 2011/95).

II.  Scope of Application The key issue as regards the scope of application of Article 19—the exclusion of EU citizens from 19.36 applying for asylum—has been considered above.

III.  Specific Provisions Article 19(1) According to Article 52(3) Charter, the interpretation of Charter provisions which have ECHR 19.37 counterparts is to follow the latter. Accordingly, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 4 Protocol 4 is determinant as regards Article 19(1). While there has been some jurisprudence dating back to the times of the separate Commission and Court, no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 occurred during this period. Howley reviews in substantial detail the early jurisprudence including up to the Conka judgment (see below).53 In his view, the relative stability of Western Europe in the first three decades of the Protocol resulted in little jurisprudence. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall corresponded with a period of substantial movement of people across international borders (some of these being created around that time) and xenophobic resentment. He uses the expression ‘cognitive dissonance’ to describe the changing demands on human rights in Europe in the 1990s. Immigration tensions and institutional shift created pressures on the ECtHR resulting in some new directions in migrant protection and collective expulsion. The (now defunct) Commission assisted in the definition of collective expulsion as early 19.38 as 1975, when it held that this refers to any measure of an authority which compels aliens as a group to leave the country. However, it will not apply where the measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the cases of each individual in the group.54 Again, the Commission found that the fact that a number of aliens from the same country had all been refused asylum in similar terms and subject to expulsion decisions accordingly, did not mean that they had been collectively expelled when there was evidence that their cases had been individually examined.55 A number of other cases came before the Commission, but the approach

51 Only Estonia, Hungry and Latvia have yet to sign it. 52 McAdam (n 9). 53 JD Howley, ‘Unlocking the Fortress: Protocol No 11 and the Birth of Collective Expulsion Jurisprudence in the Council of Europe System’ (2006) 21 Geographical Immigration Law Journal 111. 54 Becker v Denmark App no 7011/75 (3 October 1975). 55 Alibaks & Ors v Netherlands App no 14209/88 (16 December 1988).



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was consistent—as long as there had been separate decisions, albeit very similar or identical, the expulsion decisions which were based on these decisions (refusing asylum in all cases) were not collective and therefore were not in breach of the Convention prohibition. At this point the relevance of the prohibition began to seem fairly limited. 19.39 By a judgment of 2002, the ECtHR for the first time found that there had been a breach of Article 4 Protocol 4.56 The facts were quite shocking and there is more than a whiff of racial or ethnic discrimination about the case. The Conka family were Slovak nationals of Romany origin who had applied for asylum in Belgium in November 1998.57 The grounds of their asylum claims were a series of violent ethnically motivated assaults on the family by skinheads in Slovakia in early 1998, about which the authorities took no action and made no effort to protect the family from further assault and victimisation. The Belgian authorities declared their asylum applications inadmissible in March 1999 on the grounds that the family had failed to produce sufficient evidence that their lives were at risk in Slovakia. These grounds were subsequently widened to include discrepancies in the accounts of different members of the family, which undermined the credibility of all the family members, and failure to comply with various obligations of national procedures. The family appealed against the refusal, which appeals were not successful. The family were served with expulsion orders, which they did not respect. At the end of September, together with a number of other Romany families, the Conkas received a notice requesting that they attend the police station in connection with completing their applications for asylum. The same notice had been sent to a number of Romany families from Slovakia many of whom, like the Conkas, attended at the station. They were all served with new expulsion orders, detained from 29 September 1999 until 5 October 1999, then taken to a military airport where an aircraft was waiting for them. Their seat numbers were marked on their hands with a ballpoint pen and they were expelled to Slovakia. 19.40 The Belgian Minister of the Interior replied to a parliamentary question about the matter in December 1999, stating that ‘owing to the large concentration of asylum seekers of Slovakian nationality in Ghent arrangements have been made for their collective repatriation to Slovakia’. When the matter eventually got to the ECtHR it found that there had been a violation of Article 4 Protocol 4. The reasoning of the Court was as follows. First, collective expulsion means any measure compelling aliens as a group to leave the country, unless the measures are taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the case of each individual in the group. Where the authorities claim to have made such individual decisions (as in the Conka case), the background to the execution of the expulsion orders may still play a role in determining whether there has been a collective expulsion contrary to the protocol. On the facts of the case, the Court noted that the only basis for the expulsion decision was the fact that the applicants had remained on the territory for more than three months with no reference to their asylum claims. It stated ‘in those circumstances and in view of the large number of persons of the same origin who suffered the same fate as the applicants, the Court considers that the procedure followed did not enable it to eliminate all doubt that the expulsion might have been collective.’ 19.41 The ECtHR went on then to consider the additional factors. These were: —— The political authorities had announced that there would be an operation of the kind and had given instructions to the local authorities to carry them out. —— All the aliens had been required to attend the police station at the same time.



56 Conka

v Belgium (n 3). became a Member State of the EU on 1 May 2004.

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—— The orders served on them requiring them to leave the territory were all identical in terms (even though served individually). —— It was very difficult for any of the people to contact a lawyer. —— There was no completion of the asylum procedure. On the basis of these considerations the ECtHR found that there had been a violation of Article 4 Protocol 4. This reasoning must be applicable to Article 19(1) Charter. The ECtHR again found a breach of Article 4 Protocol 4 in a 2012 case.58 This case has particularly important repercussions for the EU as the breach took place in international waters in the process of an interdiction action by the Italian authorities whereby they took people from a small boat onto their ship, and instead of taking them to Italy where they had been headed, took them to Libya whence they had left. The importance for the EU arises, inter alia, from the role of FRONTEX, the EU’s external borders agency, in coordinating Member States’ border control activities to prevent aliens entering the EU. Many of these activities include maritime operations in international waters designed to prevent the arrival of persons on small boats.59 In the Hirsi case the applicants consisted of 11 Somalis and 13 Eritreans, who were part of a group which left Libya in May 2009 on three boats aiming to land in Italy. While in the Maltese search and rescue region, three Italian Revenue Police ships intercepted the boats and transferred the people onto Italian military ships, which returned them to Libya. The Italian authorities did not, according to the applicants, inform them of where they were being taken (but confiscated all their personal effects). The applicants were forcibly removed from the Italian military ships when they got to Libya and handed over to the Libyan authorities. The Italian Minister of the Interior stated at a press conference on 7 May 2009, after the operation that the objective of the interception on the high seas had been to push migrants back to Libya on the basis of a bilateral agreement with Libya to this end. He stated in the Senate a few weeks later that 471 irregular migrants had been intercepted in this fashion on the high seas and sent to Libya under the agreement.60 The Italian authorities, which had faced down a not so dissimilar complaint to the ECtHR in 2001 regarding the push-back of people to Albania,61 argued that the complaint of Hirsi Jamaa and others was inadmissible. The ECtHR held that there is no obstacle from the wording of Article 4 Protocol 4 to its extraterritorial application. In so finding, it relied heavily on the travaux preparatoires and the Committee of Experts. Examining then, the purpose and meaning of the provision, the ECtHR held that it is essential that it be interpreted in a manner which renders the guarantees practical and effective, and not theoretical and illusory. To this end the purpose of the provision is to prevent states being able to remove certain aliens without examining their personal circumstances and consequently without enabling them to put forward their arguments against the measures taken by the authorities. It would defeat this purpose if ‘migrants, having taken to the sea, often risking their lives, and not having managed to reach the borders of a State, would not be entitled to an examination of their personal circumstances before being expelled,

58 Hirsi Jamaa & Ors v Italy (n 3). 59 S Carrera, ‘The EU Border Management Strategy: FRONTEX and the challenges of irregular immigration in the Canary Islands.’ CEPS Working Documents 261 (2007); A Baldaccini, ‘Extraterritorial border controls in the EU: The role of FRONTEX in operations at sea’ in Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges, (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 229–55. 60 W Frelick, ‘Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers’ Human Rights Watch, 2009. 61 Xhavara & Ors v Italy App no 39473/98 (11 January 2001).



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unlike those travelling by land.’ For this reason the notion of jurisdiction must follow the actions of states. 19.46 On the merits, the ECtHR relied on its judgment in Conka, that the fact that a number of aliens are subject to similar decisions does not in itself lead to the conclusion that there has been a collective expulsion so long as each person concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments against his or her expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis. On the facts of the case, once the ECtHR had held that the matter was admissible and that Article 4 Protocol 4 could apply even in international waters, the matter was lost for the Italian authorities as they accepted that they had made no effort even to identify the individuals let alone provide them with an opportunity to present their arguments individually against return to Libya. 19.47 The case was something of a cause célèbre, with both international organisations and non-governmental organisations intervening. UNHCR not only submitted written interventions but was given leave to participate at the oral hearing. Written observations were submitted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The two international organisations argued in favour of state responsibility under Article 4 Protocol 4 in the circumstances of the case. For UNHCR the issue was related to the non-refoulement obligation (see the commentary on Article 18 of the Charter). In the submissions of the UNHCHR, the prohibition contained in Article 4 Protocol 4 relied on the appearance of the prohibition in many sources of international human rights law as well as their regional counterparts as the reasons for its intervention. The submission relies on the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens adopted by the International Law Commission which defines expulsion as ‘the displacement of an individual under constraint beyond the territorial frontier of the expelling State to a State of destination.’ The UNHCR specifically states that ‘In fleeing to the high seas in hopes of escaping the rule against collective expulsion from the territory, the intercepting State runs into the alternative dilemma of possibly illegally exercise of jurisdiction on the high seas.’62 Clearly there is substantial disquiet in some international organisations about some practices among European states (though not limited to them) regarding the good faith compliance with the prohibition on collective expulsion at least in so far as high seas interception and push back of aliens is concerned. 19.48 Seven further judgments in respect of Article 4 Protocol 4 have been decided by the ECtHR. Three cases are against Russia regarding the expulsion of Georgian nationals from Russia in 2006/07,63 one of these cases is an inter-state complaint.64 These are rare in the history of the ECHR. In all three decisions the ECtHR found a violation of Article 4 Protocol 4. In all of them the context has been particularly important, the Russian authorities issued a series of measures directing their agents to expel Georgian nationals from the state irrespective of their immigration status. In Georgia v Russia the ECtHR held that the immigration status of the individual subject to a collective expulsion is irrelevant to the prohibition of such an expulsion. The ECtHR decided that the expulsions were not carried out following, and on the basis of, a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual and that this amounted to an administrative practice contrary to Article 4 Protocol 4 (para 178). However, the ECtHR refrained from determining whether the breach also engaged Article 14 (the ECHR non-discrimination provision) notwithstanding that the Russian authorities’ stated criterion for

62 UNHCR Intervener Brief Filed on Behalf of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (filed ­pursuant to leave granted by the Court on 4 May 2011) Hirsi et al v Italy. 63 The individual complaints are Shioshvili & Ors v Russia App No 19356/07, 20 December 2016 and Berdzenishvili & Ors v Russia App No 14594/07 et al, 20 December 2016. 64 Georgia v Russia App No 13255/07 3 July 2014.

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expulsion was the nationality of the individual (ie Georgian). The two decisions on the individual petitions follow the same line of reasoning as the inter-state one. Four further judgments of the ECtHR have been handed down since the ground-breaking 19.49 Conka decision and following Hirsi. In 2014 the ECtHR found a violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 against Italy and Greece in respect of the automatic expulsion of asylum-seekers who arrived from Greece to Italy on ferries without any procedural safeguards or identification.65 The reason for the finding of a violation was based on the impossibility for the asylum-seekers to challenge their refoulement before the Italian authorities. The lack of any procedural guarantees for the asylum-seekers was at the centre of the judgment.66 Because of the procedural deficiencies, the ECtHR also found that there was a breach of Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) in the context of the violation of Article 4 Protocol 4. Following the series of judgments against them, the Italian authorities appear to have made some efforts to change their practices to avoid further condemnations. In a decision in December 2016, they narrowly avoid a further decision against them on the same provision in a decision by the Grand Chamber.67 A number of Tunisian nationals who arrived in Italy on makeshift vessels and after being rescued by the Italian coastguard were transferred to various reception centres around Sicily and eventually to two boats. After some further detention on the boats they were expelled to Tunisia. The ECtHR clarified that Article 4 Protocol 4 does not prevent states from removing a number of aliens at the same time. Its purpose is to ensure that there is an examination of their personal circumstances and an opportunity to put forward their arguments against the measure taken by the authorities. The case revolved around whether there had been a sufficiently individualised examination of the case of each individual to satisfy the Article 4 test. The Court held that the fact that a number of aliens are subject to similar decisions does not in itself lead to the conclusion that there is a collective expulsion (para 239). On the facts, the ECtHR found that the individuals had been identified on two occasions and that those who made asylum applications were not subject to the expulsion procedures but were transferred to an asylum stream which had suspensive effect (para 247). According to the Court, the ECHR entitlement to a remedy against an alleged breach of Article 4 Protocol 4 does not carry suspensive effect where the individual is not claiming a right to non-refoulement. The ECtHR distinguished the case from its previous decisions in Conka, Hirsi, Georgia and Sharifi (para 252). In ND and NT v Spain68 the ECtHR did find a violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 in respect of 19.50 the expulsion of a group of persons from the Spanish enclave of Melilla to Morocco (a state of which none were nationals) without any identification or procedure. The ECtHR specifically makes reference in this decision to Article 19(1) Charter, notwithstanding that the Court is not competent to interpret EU law per se. Because the case revolved around the prevention of the individuals from entering the enclave, the question of jurisdiction (Article 1) arose, which the ECtHR settled in favour of the applicants as the fencing around Melilla consists of many rings of fence and there as no clarity that it was not already on Spanish territory. Also, the individuals seeking entry were under the effective control of the Spanish authorities, not their Moroccan counterparts (who do not appear to have been present). The ECtHR repeated its interpretation of Article 4 Protocol 4 consistently with the previous decisions. It noted that, on the facts, the individuals were part of a group of 75–80 migrants who were attempting to enter Spain irregularly





65 Sharifi 66 Ibid.

& Ors v Italie et Grece App No 16643/09, 21 October 2014.

67 Khlaifia 68 App

& Ors v Italy App No 16483/12, 15 December 2016. No 8675/15, 3 October 2017.

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across the Melilla land border. Nonetheless, their removal took place in the absence of any prior administrative or judicial decision. The individuals never had any procedure at all. There was no opportunity for any of them to explain their individual circumstances and whether there was a non-refoulement issue. For these reasons Spain was in breach of Article 4 Protocol 4 in the way in which it expelled them. Finally, in July 2020 the Chamber found a violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 by Poland in respect of the refusal of Polish Border Guards to admit asylum claims of two individuals and a family group and to effect their immediate expulsion from the Polish border. Poland has appealed the decision to the Grand Chamber.69 Article 19(2) 19.51 There is a substantial and rich jurisprudence of the ECtHR on this prohibition of return to the death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment. In the explanations, specific reference is made to the Soering judgment of the ECtHR (see the commentary on Art 4). This decision was the starting point for the development of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence e­ xtending the torture prohibition from the strict wording of Article 3 ECHR (the counterpart of Art 4 Charter) to what is now the equivalent of Article 19(2) Charter. While the two are collapsed into one provision in the ECHR, according to this jurisprudence, in the Charter they are separated out into separate provisions, with the latter aligned to the prohibition on collective expulsion found in Article 19(1). 19.52 The prohibition on return of a person to a country where he or she is likely to be subject to the death penalty arises from two protocols to the ECHR. In 1983 Protocol 6 provided for abolition of the death penalty, but there were various exceptions. In 2002 Protocol 13 banned the death penalty without exception or derogation even under Article 15 ECHR (times of war etc). Just as in the case of torture, return to the death penalty is not permissible under any circumstances. In the CEAS, the Qualification Directive 2011/95 provides at Article 15(a) that serious harm for the purposes of granting a person subsidiary protection includes the death penalty or execution (this provision is unchanged from its predecessor Directive 2004/83). The legal basis of this provision of EU secondary legislation may now also implicate Article 19(2) of the Charter. 19.53 Regarding the meaning of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, as the explanations make clear, the case law of the ECtHR is assimilated to this provision. Thus regard must be had to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on these issues. The decisions on this issue has already been dealt with in the commentary on Article 4 Charter.70 The obligations of Member States to ensure that no one is returned to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are concurrent in the Charter, ECHR, UNCAT, ICCPR and elsewhere (for instance the Refugee Convention) according to the ECtHR.71 The liability of states under Article 19(2) is that by reason of their actions the direct result is that the individual has been exposed (or would be exposed to) the prohibited treatment.72 The test is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of being subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he or she is being returned.73 So long as the answer to this question is positive, then the individual cannot be expelled to the state in question. 69 MK and Others v Poland App No 40503/17, 42902/17 and 43643/17, 23 July 2020. 70 For an excellent review of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Art 3 ECHR as a tool for those in need of international protection, please see Nuala Mole’s review published by the Council of Europe in 2010 (Mole and Meredith, n 5). 71 Soering v UK (n 4). 72 Ibid. 73 Vilvarajah & Ors v UK App nos 13163-65/87, 13447-8/87 (20 October 1991) Series A no 215.

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The explanations to Article 19(2) make specific reference to the ECtHR judgment in Ahmed 19.54 v Austria74 (as well as Soering, discussed above). This is a single example of the rich ECtHR jurisprudence in the area, and cannot be taken out of its context. In Ahmed a Somali national sought asylum in Austria. Notwithstanding the national security concerns of some Austrian authorities, he was granted protected status and a residence permit. Approximately two years later he was convicted of robbery, with a penalty of two and a half years’ imprisonment, at which point the Austrian authorities withdrew his refugee status (the Refugee Convention permits exceptions, unlike Article 3 ECHR). He claimed the protection of Article 3 ECHR against expulsion to Somalia where he still feared torture. The ECtHR confirmed that as long as the conditions which gave rise to his protection in Austria were still existent, the fact that he had been convicted of a criminal offence was irrelevant to the obligation of the Austrian authorities to allow him to continue to reside in the country where the alternative would be a return to torture. This is consistent with the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 3 ECHR as absolute and allowing no exceptions. No mention is made in the explanations to the opinions of the Human Rights Committee under Article 7 ICCPR. However, the most well-known decision by the HRC on a breach of the prohibition on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on expulsion was against an EU Member State, Sweden. In its opinion on Agiza v Sweden75 the HRC found that Sweden had failed to protect Mr Agiza from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment by allowing Egyptian and US officials to transport him from Sweden to Egypt where he was imprisoned and subjected to treatment contrary to the Convention. The HRC determined that the fact that the Swedish authorities had requested assurances from their Egyptian counterparts that if returned Mr Agiza would be treated consistently with the ICCPR indicated that the Swedish authorities were aware of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 7 ICCPR which awaited Mr Agiza. There is also a very fulsome jurisprudence of the UN Committee against Torture (CAT) on 19.55 Article 3 UNCAT and the return of people to countries where they fear torture. Again one of the most well-known involves Sweden, an EU Member State: Alzery v Sweden.76 The fate of Mr Alzery follows very closely that of Mr Agiza, and indeed they were transported together on the same privately chartered plane from Sweden to Egypt on the same day and by the same authorities. The CAT followed the finding of the HRC that like Mr Agiza, Mr Alzery had been expelled by the Swedish authorities to Egypt contrary to Article 3 UNCAT as there was a real risk he would suffer torture there and the Swedish authorities were aware of the risk at the time that they handed him over to the Egyptian and US authorities for expulsion. Most of the cases regarding Article 19(2) which have come before the CJEU relate to asylum 19.56 claims or extradition requests. The decisions fall into five main categories: first, the intersection of international commitments, mainly the Refugee Convention, and Article 19(2); secondly, the procedural requirements attendant on Article 19(2); thirdly, protection, both mental and physical health of asylum-seekers and the possibility of treatment in the state of origin or destination; fourthly, Dublin III transfers and Article 19(2); and fifthly, extradition to a non-EU state. Of general applicability, however, is the finding of the CJEU that Article 19(2) only applies to an individual who is at risk of the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment in his or her country of origin (C-542/13 M’Bodj paras 33 and 38).77





74 Ahmed

v Austria App no 25964/94 (17 December 1996) 1996-VI. v Sweden App no 233/2003 (24 May 2005). 76 Alzery v Sweden App no 1416/2005 (10 November 2006). 77 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2452. 75 Agiza

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19.57

In the first group, the intersection of international conventions and Article 19(2), among the most important decision is M, X & C,78 where the Court held that irrespective of the provisions of the Refugee Convention the rights guaranteed by the Charter, in particular Article 4 and Article 19(2), prohibit in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned, as well as removal to a state where there is a serious risk of a person being subjected to such treatment. ‘Therefore, Member States may not remove, expel or extradite a foreign national where there are substantial grounds for believing that he will face a genuine risk, in the country of destination, of being subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 April 2016, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198, paragraphs 86 to 88, and of 24 April 2018, MP (Subsidiary protection of a person previously a victim of torture), C-353/16, EU:C:2018:276, paragraph 41) (para 94)). In FMS the Court held that Article 19(2) prevents the removal of asylum seekers to their country of origin before the outcome of a preliminary ruling procedure is completed as the removal might expose them to treatment contrary to the article.79 19.58 The second category relates to procedural requirements (and thus there is substantial overlap with the chapter dealing with Article 47 Charter). Procedural remedies as part of Article 19(2) have arisen a number of times before the Court. In C-175/17 X the Court held that it is settled case law that when a Member State decides to return an applicant for international protection to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he will be exposed to a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 18 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as supplemented by the Protocol, or to Article 19(2) of the Charter, the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 47 of the Charter requires that that applicant should have available to him a remedy enabling automatic suspension of enforcement of the measure authorising his removal.80 The Court continued its reasoning, finding that the protection conferred on an applicant for international protection by the Qualification or Return Directives, read in the light of Article 18, Article 19(2) and Article 47 of the Charter, against a decision rejecting an application for international protection and imposing an obligation to return must carry a judicial remedy, although this can be limited to a single one. This is consistent with the earlier decision in Gnandi, as here, the CJEU did not consider that this extends to two levels of judicial decision (para 57). Such a single judicial instance is consistent with the principle of effectiveness. This was again confirmed in X and Z81 and FR.82 19.59 However, in C-239/14 Tall83 the CJEU held that the lack of suspensory effect of an appeal right brought against the withdrawal of social assistance which resulted from the refusal of a second asylum application after the first had been unsuccessful, is in principle, compatible with Article 19(2). This is so because the enforcement of the withdrawal of social assistance decision cannot in itself result in the national’s removal (para 56). An appeal must have suspensory effect when it is brought against a return decision whose enforcement may expose the individual to a serious risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 19(2) (para 58). The issue of access to social assistance was dealt with in C-373/13 HT84 where the Court held that the withdrawal



78 C-391/16

M, X & C ECLI:EU:C:2019:403. EU: C: 2020: 367. and Gnandi, C-181/16, EU:C:2018. 81 Case C-180/17 ECLI: EU: C: 2018: 775. 82 Case C-422/18 PPU FR ECLI:EU: C: 2018: 784. 83 ECLI:EU:C:2015:824. 84 ECLI:EU:C:2015:413. 79 ECLI:

80 ECLI:EU:C:2018:776

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of a residence permit issued to a refugee on the grounds of his involvement with an organisation on the EU list of terrorist organisations could not lead to a suspension of the rights attendant on refugee status. As the status is declaratory not constitutive, the rights continue even in the absence of a residence permit. In this case the Court only referred once to Article 19(2) Charter and the purpose is not self-evident. This line of reasoning was extended also to asylum seekers appealing against refusal of their asylum claims where the Member State had also refused social assistance. The Court held that automatic suspensive effect must also apply to an appeal against refusal of social assistance where the applicant was appealing against refusal of an asylum claim in order to prevent a violation of Article 19(2).85 This automatic suspensive effect (both in respect of expulsion and social assistance) also extends to a family member on whom the asylum seeker because of his or her state of health is entirely dependent.86 In C-585/16 Alheto87 the CJEU stated that Article 19 does not offer specific additional guidance 19.60 concerning the scope of the requirement of a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law where a decision has been taken without a personal interview (para129). In a decision which primarily deals with procedural requirements but also the issue of serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration of health of an individual whose asylum application has been rejected, C-562/13 Abdida88 (but where the appeal right is suspiciously similar to that considered in Tall against withdrawal of social assistance) the CJEU held that Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter (in conjunction with the subsidiary legislation), must be interpreted as requiring provision of a remedy with suspensive effect in respect of a return decision whose enforcement may expose the third-country national concerned to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his state of health (para 53). Further, the state must make provision for basic needs of the individual for emergency health care and essential treatment of illness (para 63). The third category of cases revolves around health issues. In a number of decisions, the CJEU 19.61 has interpreted Article 19(2) as constituting a bar to expulsion of a third country national on the grounds of the unavailability of treatment for physical or mental health conditions in the destination country. In C-353/16 MP89 it stated that ‘It follows that Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter, as interpreted in the light of Article 3 of the ECHR, preclude a Member State from expelling a third country national where such expulsion would, in essence, result in significant and permanent deterioration of that person’s mental health disorders, particularly where, as in the present case, such deterioration would endanger his life’ (para 43). The Court clarified that these are exceptional cases, where the removal of a third country national suffering from a serious illness to a country in which appropriate treatment is not available may constitute an infringement of the principle of non-refoulement. This entails also an infringement of Article 5 of Directive 2008/115, read in the light of Article 19 Charter. The link between Article 19(2) and Article 4 is clearly delineated here: only in circumstances where health, including mental health, is an obstacle to return under Article 19(2) will it also be a ground of a residence permit under the QPD: ‘a third country national who in the past has been tortured by the authorities of his country of origin and no longer faces a risk of being tortured if returned to that country, but whose physical and psychological health could, if so returned, seriously deteriorate, leading to a serious risk of him committing suicide on account of trauma resulting from the torture he was subjected to, is eligible for subsidiary protection if there is a real risk of him being intentionally deprived, in





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C-233/19 B ECLI:EU:C:2020:757. C-402/19 CPAS de Seraing ECLI: EU: C: 2020: 759. 87 ECLI:EU:C:2018:584. 88 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453. 89 ECLI:EU:C:2018:276. 86 Case

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his country of origin, of appropriate care for the physical and mental after-effects of that torture, that being a matter for the national court to determine’ (para 58). An asylum seeker whose claim, based on medical grounds, is rejected is entitled to a right of appeal with automatic suspensive effect to fulfil the requirements of Articles 47 and 19(2) Charter, but also a right of appeal with automatic suspensive effect against a decision to withdraw social assistance.90 This extends also to a parent where the asylum seeker, because of his or her state of health is entirely dependent on that parent whose presence is essential (both suspensive effect of an expulsion decision and any social assistance withdrawal decision).91 19.62 The fourth line of cases relates to Dublin III transfers—the risk of treatment contrary to Article 19(2) in the destination state which is sometimes accompanied by a serious health risk. This line of cases follows the ECtHR’s decision in MSS v Belgium and Greece,92 where it held that EU Member States cannot rely on EU secondary legislation to circumvent their Article 3 ECHR obligation (the equivalent of Article 19(2)). The issue in MSS revolved around an Afghan asylum-seeker who had first arrived in the EU in Greece but managed to leave that country and went to Belgium where he applied for asylum. The Belgian authorities, relying on EU secondary legislation, sought to return him to Greece (and in fact did so) for his asylum application to be determined there. The ECtHR found that on account of the abysmal lack of reception conditions and the blatant failure of the Greek asylum system, both Greece and Belgium were in breach of Article 3: Greece for its treatment of MSS, and Belgium for sending MSS to Greece in circumstances where either they knew or ought to have known that there would be a breach of Article 3.93 This decisions was followed by the CJEU in NS & ME94 again two joined cases about Afghan asylum-seekers who arrived in the EU first in Greece and subsequently sought asylum in Ireland or the UK. Both countries sought to expel them to Greece under the Dublin III procedures. Although the UK court made two references to Article 19(2) in its questions, the Court answered both national courts, finding that return of the Afghans to Greece would constitute treatment contrary to Article 4 Charter (see chapter above) but did not address Article 19(2). In the second case on Dublin III transfers, C-578/16 CK,95 Slovenia sought to return to Croatia a Syrian and an Egyptian notwithstanding the medical issues which had arisen for CK (the Syrian) on birth of her child in Slovenia. Although the national court referred to Article 19(2) in its questions, the CJEU determined the application exclusively on the basks of Article 4. The fifth line of decisions on Article 19(2) relates to extradition, commencing with C-182/15 19.63 Petruhhin96 and followed in C-473/15 Peter Schotthöfer & Florian Steiner GbR v Eugen Adelsmayr.97 In both cases an EU citizen, a national of one Member State was subject to (or in the second case feared) extradition proceedings between a third country and his host Member State (which was not his state of nationality). In both cases the EU citizen complained that if extradited he would be subject to treatment contrary to Article 19(2) by the state seeking the extradition. In the first case, the destination state was Russia, the state of residence Latvia and the state of nationality of the individual was Estonia, all states parties to the ECHR. The Court held that ‘The existence of declarations and accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental

90 Case C-233/19 B ECLI:EU:C:2020:757. 91 Case C-402/19 CPAS de Seraing ECLI: EU: C: 2020: 759. 92 MMS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (21 January 2011). 93 V Moreno-Lax, ‘Dismantling the Dublin System: MSS v. Belgium and Greece’ (2012) 14(1) European Journal of Migration and Law 1–31. 94 ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. 95 ECLI:EU:C:2017:127. 96 ECLI:EU:C:2016:630. 97 ECLI:EU:C:2017:633.

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rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the [ECHR]’ (para 57). Thus ECHR ratification is insufficient for the purpose of protecting the EU citizens’ Article 19(2) Charter right. In addition, ‘in so far as the competent authority of the requested Member State is in possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals in the requesting third State, it is bound to assess the existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide on the extradition of a person to that State’ (para 58). To make that assessment, the information relied upon must be objective, reliable, specific and properly updated (para 59). In the second case, the individual (an Austrian national) feared that if he went to Germany, an extradition request which was outstanding against him to be sent to the UAE would be accepted by the German authorities. The crime for which the individual had been convicted in absentia carried a possible death penalty. The Court held by order that ‘in so far as it concerns Article 19(2) of the Charter … that provision must be interpreted as meaning that a request for extradition originating from a third country concerning a Union citizen who, in exercising his freedom of movement, leaves his Member State of origin in order to reside on the territory of another Member State, must be rejected by the latter Member State where that citizen runs a serious risk of being subjected to the death penalty in the event of extradition’ (para 27).

IV.  Limitations and Derogations No limitations or derogations are permitted to either Article 19(1) or 19(2). In so far as these 19.64 two provisions mirror their ECHR counterparts, the ECtHR has made clear in the Hirsi decision (discussed above) that there can be no exception to the prohibition on collective expulsion, even if it is taking place on the high seas and outside the physical territory of the Member State, as this would defeat the objective of the prohibition. As regards the prohibition on return of a person to the death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, the ECtHR first determined the absolute nature of the provision in Chahal.98 Irrespective of state concerns regarding national security, if the objective test of a substantial risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR is fulfilled, expulsion can never be carried out lawfully. This position was reinforced by the ECtHR in Saadi,99 where the ECtHR once again held that the provision enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies and prohibits in absolute terms torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment irrespective of the victims conduct however undesirable or dangerous. Both the HRC and CAT have similarly held that Article 7 ICCPR and Article 3 UNCAT are absolute.100

V. Remedies For the purposes of both Article 19(1) and (2), remedies are of critical importance. According 19.65 to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 4 Protocol 4, the mirror image of Article 19(1), the key to a state avoiding a breach of the prohibition on collective expulsion is the application

98 Chahal v UK App no 22414/93 (15 November 1996). 99 Saadi v Italy (n 16). 100 M Nowak, UN covenant on civil and political rights: CCPR commentary (Kehl, NP Engel, 1993); M Nowak, E McArthur and K Buchinger, The United Nations Convention against Torture: a Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).



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of appropriate procedures and remedies to ensure that every individual who is under threat of expulsion has an individualised procedure and appeal right against any negative decision. This aspect of the prohibition on collective expulsion runs through the main ECtHR judgments on the issueIn the Conka decision, the lack of an effective remedy was a particularly important aspect of the judgment as the Belgian authorities argued that the complainants had a remedy in an appeal to the Conseil d’Etat. In examining the facts of the case and the accessibility of this remedy, the ECtHR found that it was not actually available to the complainants and was in fact illusory rather than real. In the Hirsi case the individuals were never even identified by the Italian authorities. The failure to have any procedure at all was at the heart of the decision. In Khlaifia,101 the case following on from Hirsi, the Italian authorities went so far as to have a procedure, albeit a cursory one, which identified the individuals who were to be expelled. The fact that any individual who sought asylum or indicated a reason for non-refoulement was moved to a separate procedure and not subject to the expulsion which took place in respect of the others was critical to the ECtHR’s finding of no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 ECHR. 19.66 As regards Article 19(2), again effective remedies are an essential element of the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 3 ECHR jurisprudence. In the ECtHR’s judgment in Chahal (see above), the fact that Mr Chahal had only a vestigial remedy because the allegations against him were of a national security nature gave rise to a finding that the UK was in breach of the effective remedy obligation in Article 13 ECHR.102 Both the HRC and CAT have equally found that access to remedies with suspensive effect is fundamental to the protection provided by Article 7 ICCPR and Article 3 UNCAT.103

E. Evaluation 19.67 Article 19 Charter presents a particularly critical challenge to the development of EU borders, migration and asylum law. As is apparent from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, HRC and CAT, EU Member States’ actions against aliens are regularly challenged on the regional and international law equivalents of Article 19. Further, in those challenges EU states are not infrequently found to have breached their human rights obligations to aliens. The most pressing area of EU law where Article 19 must be taken into account is the application of Directive 2008/115 and the EU’s CEAS. The CEAS has been under construction since the early days of the twenty-first century. It came into existence before the Charter was given legally binding force. Although all the measures of secondary legislation adopted make reference to the Charter and claim faithful obedience to it, the matter is far from clear in practice. The ECtHR has found that to be consistent with the ECHR provisions which are mirrored in the Charter, Member States are obliged to give effect to some of the CEAS measures in a manner which while permissible is clearly contrary to the CEAS objective (see Dublin II Regulation and the judgment in MSS v Belgium and Greece discussed above). The asylum procedure rules contained in Directive 2013/32104 allow for four different types of accelerated procedures where someone seeking international protection may

101 App no 16483/12, 15 December 2016. 102 For a complete examination of the right to a remedy in Art 3 ECHR cases before the ECtHR, see Mole and Meredith (n 5) 61–73. 103 D Baldinger, Asylum Procedures in EU and International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nihjoff, forthcoming 2013). 104 [2013] OJ L 180/60.

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have their application only provided with a cursory consideration and limited or even (in some cases) no remedies: —— manifestly unfounded applications (many grounds for this); —— safe third country provisions (the individual passed through a third country where he or she could have applied for asylum before arriving in the EU); —— super safe third countries (countries which are signatories to the ECHR and through which the individual passed en route to the EU); —— safe countries of origin (countries of origin of asylum-seekers which are designated as safe).105 All these truncated procedures present challenges for human rights protections under 19.68 Article 19(1) and (2) as they undermine the right to a full determination of an asylum claim and diminish the possibility of an effective remedy. The second area of EU law which must be carefully examined regarding consistency with Article 19 of the Charter is that which regulates border controls and surveillance. As discussed above, FRONTEX coordinates EU Member States’ operations on the high seas, including with the objective of pushing back aliens so that they do not arrive at the EU’s borders. Similarly, it coordinates an increasing number of charter flights for the expulsion of aliens to a common destination. As the organising principle of these expulsion flights is to travel to the ultimate destination having collected people from various EU Member States to be expelled, the risk that such practices encourage collective expulsion by Member State authorities is substantial. The reason for this is because Member States pay for the seats on each flight which they have ordered. Thus when the plane is ready, they have a substantial incentive to ensure that they have people to hand over for expulsion to that destination. As each individual is entitled to a consideration of his or her circumstances immediately before expulsion, undoubtedly authorities are reluctant to find a change of circumstances at the last minute which might disrupt an expulsion for which they are already economically engaged. In the event that this does happen, or a court orders the delay of an expulsion for the purposes of a reconsideration of the facts, the pressure quickly to find another alien to fill the newly empty seat on the plane is also substantial. Time pressure is the enemy of a comprehensive consideration of the individual circumstances of an individual’s situation let alone an independent review.

105 71 V Moreno-Lax, ‘Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea’ (2011) 23(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 174–220; C Costello, ‘Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of International Protection’ (2005) 7 European Journal of Migration & Law 35; E Guild, ‘From Persecution to Management of Populations: Governmentality and the Common European Asylum System’ (2011) 4(14) Tidsskriftet Politik 13–26.



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Article 20 Article 20 Equality Before the Law Everyone is equal before the law.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 20 This Article corresponds to a general principle of law which is included in all European constitutions and has also been recognised by the Court of Justice as a basic principle of Community law (judgment of 13 November 1984, Case 283/83 Racke [1984] ECR 3791, judgment of 17 April 1997, Case C-15/95 EARL [1997] ECR I-1961, and judgment of 13 April 2000, Case C-292/97 Karlsson [2000] ECR 2737).

Select Bibliography J Croon-Gestefeld, Reconceptualising European Equality Law—a Comparative Institutional Analysis (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017). A Dashwood and S O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997). E Ellis and P Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). G More, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: from Market Unifier to Fundamental Right’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) 517. E Muir, EU Equality Law—the First Fundamental Rights Policy of the EU (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018). A Morrone and C Caruso, ‘Art. 20 Uguaglianza davanti alla legge’ in R Mastroianni, O Pollicino, S Allegrezza, F Pappalardo and O Razzolini (eds), Carta Dei Diritti Fondamentali Dell’Unione Europea (Milan, Giuffrè, 2017) 387. L Rossi and F Casolari (eds), The Principle of Equality in EU Law (Springer International Publishing, 2017).

A.  Field of Application of Article 20 Although Article 20 is one of the most succinct provisions in the Charter, its field of application is 20.01 amongst the broadest. By proclaiming ‘everyone’ to be equal before the law, Article 20 potentially allows anyone to mount a challenge to any difference in treatment that arises in the activities of the Union’s institutions and other bodies, or within EU legislation and national implementing measures. Highly diverse areas of law can be engaged and this is reflected in the existing case law of the Court of Justice on the general principle of equal treatment. Frequently, this concerns differences of treatment that are inherent in the distribution of scarce social goods. A typical example is Karlsson and Others,1 which is cited in the Explanations attached to Article 20. This case concerned three farmers in Sweden who were subject to milk quotas following the accession of Sweden to the EU. Mr Torarp had his milk quota withdrawn when it was discovered that he



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had ceased keeping dairy cows, due to an accident that he had suffered. His application for a new milk quota was denied, because there was a requirement to be continuously engaged in production. The difference in treatment here was between those who had continuously produced milk and those who had not. In a nuanced decision, the Court held that it was not, per se, contrary to the principle of equal treatment to require continuous production, because this prevented speculative acquisition of milk quotas with a view to selling the business (including the quota) to someone else.2 Evidently, public bodies are continuously making distributive decisions in areas such as employment (eg appointment, promotion, dismissal), social welfare (eg granting benefits), taxation (eg setting thresholds and granting exemptions) and healthcare (eg access to treatment). Even where the activity does not involve distributive choices, inequalities can arise in the operation of the law and the exercise of discretionary decision-making by public bodies. For example, in Guardian Industries Corp.,3 the Court of Justice held that Article 20 of the Charter required equal treatment of different undertakings when calculating a fine for a breach of competition law. 20.02 Given the breadth of application of Article 20, it is not specifically connected to certain pieces of EU legislation. There is, of course, an obvious resonance between Article 20 and EU anti-discrimination legislation. As discussed below, this legislation seems to be even more closely linked to Articles 21 to 26 of the Charter. Nevertheless, Article 20 is not unlimited in its field of application and it is circumscribed by Article 51 of the Charter. A difference of treatment without any apparent link to the scope of EU law will fall outside Article 20.4 Yet the Court’s case law leaves considerable ambiguity on what is a sufficient connection to EU law in order to trigger the application of Article 20. Several cases can be contrasted to illustrate the grey area at the edge of the Charter’s applicability. 20.03 Hernández concerned Spanish legislation on the protection of workers’ salaries in the event of their employer becoming insolvent.5 If a worker’s dismissal was deemed by domestic law to be ‘unfair’, then there was an extended period for the guarantee of wages by the state in comparison to a worker whose dismissal was treated as ‘invalid’.6 The Court of Justice held that Article 20 could not be relied upon to challenge the difference of treatment between such workers. Although EU legislation imposes minimum requirements for the protection of wages where an employer becomes insolvent, the enhanced protection of wages at the heart of this case went beyond the minimum period demanded by EU law. As this was a case of a Member State exercising its discretion to provide more favourable protection of workers in domestic law, it did not fall within the scope of EU law.7 20.04 Baldonedo Martín concerned a difference in treatment in Spanish law between workers employed on different types of fixed-term contract.8 Interim civil servants were not entitled to any payment upon the termination of their contracts, unlike fixed-term contract staff. On the facts, the complainant’s position as a gardener could have been performed on either type of contract,9 but she had been recruited as an interim civil servant. In terms of the scope of EU law, the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work includes a prohibition on fixed-term

2 Ibid [57]. 3 Case C-580/12P Guardian Industries Corp., Guardian Europe Sàrl v Commission EU:C:2014:2363 [62]. 4 Eg Case C-178/12 Rivas Montes v Instituto Municipal de Deportes de Códoba EU:C:2013:150. 5 Case C-198/13 Hernández and others v Reino de España (Subdelegación del Gobierno de España en Alicante) and others EU:C:2014:2055. 6 Ibid [25]. 7 Ibid [45]. 8 Case C-177/18 Baldonedo Martín v Ayuntamiento de Madrid EU:C:2020:26. 9 Ibid [25].

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workers being treated less favourably than comparable permanent workers.10 The Court held that a difference of treatment between different types of fixed-term worker was not prohibited by the Framework Agreement. As this was outside the scope of the Framework Agreement, the Court also found that Article 20 could not be applied. In Milkova,11 there was a provision in Bulgarian law that required prior authorisation of the 20.05 labour inspectorate before employees with certain illnesses or disabilities could be dismissed. This did not, however, apply to those whose employment relationship was categorised as being a ‘civil servant’ (rather than ‘employee’).12 The Court held that additional protection from dismissal granted to employees with disabilities was not required by EU legislation, but it was an exercise of the discretion conferred on Member States in Directive 2000/78.13 Specifically, Article 7(2) provides ‘with regard to disabled persons, the principle of equal treatment shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to maintain or adopt provisions on the protection of health and safety at work or to measures aimed at creating or maintaining provisions or facilities for safeguarding or promoting their integration into the working environment’. Insofar as the heightened protection from dismissal for employees with disabilities was an exercise of the discretion conferred in Article 7(2) of Directive 2000/78, it fell within the scope of EU law and it had to be exercised in a manner compatible with the Charter, including Article 20.14 It is challenging to explain why the exercise of discretion by the Member State in Milkova falls 20.06 within the scope of EU law, yet it falls outside the scope of EU law in Hernández. Indeed, the Advocate-General in Milkova took the view that the Bulgarian legislation fell outside the scope of the Charter.15 Admittedly, Article 7(2) of Directive 2000/78 entailed an express conferral of discretion on Member States. Yet the Insolvency Directive in Hernández also gave a discretion to Member States ‘to apply or introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable to employees’.16 Comparing Milkova and Baldonedo Martín, it is notable that differences of treatment between civil servants and employees were brought within the scope of application of the Charter in the former case, but not in the latter. Yet neither Directive 2000/78, nor the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work, are primarily concerned with this kind of distinction. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, at this stage in the Court’s case law, the outer limits of the scope of application of the Charter remain fuzzy.17

B.  Interrelationship of Article 20 with Other Provisions of the Charter As discussed above, issues relating to unequal treatment are likely to intersect with a wide range 20.07 of other rights. A typical scenario is where a claimant might allege a breach of another Charter 10 Clause 4(1), Council Directive (EC) 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L175/43. 11 Case C-406/15 Milkova v Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia i sledprivatizatsionen kontro EU:C:2017:198. 12 Ibid [29]. 13 Council Directive (EC) 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 14 Milkova (n8) [52–54]. 15 Case C-406/15 Milkova v Izpalnitelen direktor na Agentsiata za privatizatsia i sledprivatizatsionen kontro EU:C:2016:824, Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe. 16 Art 11, Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2008/94 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer [2008] OJ L283/36. 17 See, inter alia, F Fontanelli, ‘The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States under Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2014) 20 Columbia Journal of European Law 193, 245.



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provision in combination with a claim of discrimination due to the nature of that breach. For example, in Janoha, the applicants were challenging a change to the basic annual leave entitlement of officials and staff of the European Commission.18 Previously, those working outside the EU received more days of annual leave than those working within the EU, but amendments sought to introduce equivalency between these two categories. Certain staff working for the Commission outside the EU argued that this breached Article 7 on the right to respect for private and family life (because it reduced their opportunity to spend time with their family members located within the EU) and Article 20 (because it treated those working inside and outside the EU in the same manner, even though they were in different situations). Both claims were rejected by the General Court.19 20.08 The most obvious interrelationship in the Charter is between Articles 20 and 21.Whereas Article 20 enounces a universalistic claim that ‘everyone is equal before the law’, Article 21 prohibits ‘any discrimination based on any ground’. This is accompanied by a non-exhaustive list of examples of prohibited grounds, such as sex or ethnic origin. Given that Article 21 is non-exhaustive in its prohibition of discrimination, this leaves considerable ambiguity over whether there is a distinction in the ambit or meaning of Articles 20 and 21. 20.09 Article 21 clearly echoes Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the well-established body of Strasbourg case law under that provision. Moreover, Article 21 is directly connected to EU anti-discrimination legislation, namely the various Directives on discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation.20 As a consequence, Article 21 has been invoked in high-profile litigation surrounding the interpretation of those Directives.21 In contrast, there has been less attention to the role to be played by Article 20. It is not often cited in cases arising under EU anti-discrimination legislation. 20.10 It seems artificial to construct a strict boundary between Articles 20 and 21. Whereas the former sets out a general principle of equal treatment with wide-ranging application, the latter applies this in specific situations. In this view, Article 21 emerges as a type of lex specialis in contrast to the lex generalis found in Article 20. The distinction lies in the type of differences in treatment that each covers. As discussed above, Article 20 potentially applies to any situation where the law differentiates between categories in its application. This encompasses categories that are transient in nature with no wider social meaning, such as the distinction between those who were continuously involved in milk production and those who had discontinued milk production. Article 21 is more specifically focused upon important personal characteristics that often give rise to inequalities across different aspects of social life, such as employment, education, housing, healthcare or access to services. Many of the characteristics mentioned in Article 21 are linked to well-known sources of social prejudice where there is a history of stigma

18 Case T-517/16 Janoha v Commission EU:T:2018:874. In separate proceedings, the CJEU also rejected a claim that the changes to paid annual leave breached the principle of equal treatment: Joined Cases C-119/19 P Commission v Carreras Sequeros and others, C-126/19 P Council v Carreras Sequeros and others EU:C:2020:676. 19 In relation to Art 20, the Court held that, when viewed as a whole, there was a sufficient difference of treatment within the Staff Regulations between those posted within and those posted beyond the EU: ibid [88]. Eg in addition to annual leave, there was an allowance for the time required to travel to the worker’s place of origin and this was higher for those working outside the EU. 20 For detailed analysis, see E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Olivier (eds), International and European Labour Law—Article-by-Article Commentary (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2018) part 2. 21 Eg Case C-414/16 Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV EU:C:2018:257; Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres [2011] ECR I-773.

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and disadvantage. For the most part, they are intrinsic to personal identity, such as religion or sexual orientation. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that this way of distinguishing between Articles 20 and 21 is not a complete explanation. In particular, ‘property’ is included as a prohibited ground of discrimination in Article 21. Yet property is a much less stable feature of personal identity; individuals acquire (and lose) property throughout their lives. In YS v NK AG, measures that adversely affected those receiving occupational pensions above an income threshold were challenged as, inter alia, discrimination on grounds of property. While the substantive claim failed, the Court held that the alleged discrimination was neither in breach of Article 20, nor Article 21.22 In contrast, Advocate-General Kokott considered this part of the case purely by reference to Article 21.23 The case of Glatzel entailed claims under both Articles 20 and 21, thus providing an insight 20.11 into how the Court of Justice distinguishes between these closely related provisions. Mr Glatzel had a significant visual impairment in one eye and, in accordance with standards derived from EU legislation, he was refused a licence to drive heavy goods vehicles.24 The referring court asked whether the relevant provision of EU law was compatible with Articles 20, 21 and 26 (on the integration of persons with disabilities). For the purposes of this chapter, the Court’s disaggregation of Articles 20 and 21 is revealing. The Court begins by recognising their interconnected nature: ‘the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, of which the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter is a particular expression’.25 Most of the Court’s judgment is focused upon whether the restriction imposed on drivers with a visual impairment was a form of disability discrimination. This analysis is carried out exclusively by reference to Article 21. In contrast, the Court considers Article 20 in relation to a separate argument. This concerned a difference within the relevant Directive between the standards of visual acuity required of drivers of different types of vehicle. The Directive permitted flexibility for licences to be issued in ‘exceptional cases’ for those driving certain types of vehicle (eg private cars), whereas more rigorous standards applied to those driving heavy goods vehicles. The Court considered that the difference of treatment between the drivers of different types of vehicle was a distinction that fell to be considered under the ambit of Article 20. Ultimately, though, it held that the differences in the ‘size, weight or manoeuvrability’ of the vehicles in each category, together with the numbers of people that can be carried in larger vehicles, meant that they were not comparable in nature and there was no breach of Article 20 for the legislature to draw a distinction in relation to the safety requirements for each type of licence.26 The decision in Glatzel provides a relatively clear indication that differences of treatment related 20.12 to the personal characteristics explicitly mentioned in Article 21 will normally be considered only in relation to that provision. Article 20 is, therefore, more appropriately applied to differences of treatment that are not closely linked to the characteristics mentioned in Article 21. While this helps as a general guide to distinguishing between Articles 20 and 21, a degree of overlap remains. They are not mutually exclusive, nor is it possible to draw a firm boundary line between their scope of application.





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C-223/19 YS v NK AG EU:C:2020:753 [85]. C-223/19 YS v NK AG EU:C:2020:356[105]. 24 Case C-356/12 Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern EU:C:2014:350. 25 Ibid [43]. 26 Ibid [83]. 23 Case

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C.  Sources of Article 20 Rights I. ECHR 20.13 There are connections between Article 20 and Article 14 ECHR. The Strasbourg Court has adopted a broad definition of discrimination that is similar in nature to the formulation of the general principle of equal treatment adopted by the Court of Justice (discussed further in section D). As mentioned in the preceding section, it may be more appropriate to view Article 14 ECHR as paralleling Article 21 of the Charter. This view is reinforced by the Explanations attached to the Charter, which expressly link Article 14 ECHR to Article 21, but not Article 20. 20.14 Article 14 ECHR is now accompanied by Protocol 12, which created a free-standing general prohibition of discrimination (whereas Article 14 requires a connection between the alleged discrimination and another provision of the ECHR). Although Protocol 12 is similar in language to Article 14 ECHR, its preamble refers to ‘the fundamental principle according to which all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law’. This is very similar to the language found in Article 20 of the Charter, although it should be noted that the Strasbourg Court has confirmed that the meaning of discrimination under Protocol 12 is identical to that under Article 14 ECHR.27

II.  UN Treaties 20.15 Equality before the law is a principle contained, in varying forms, within all the principal UN human rights treaties. Space does not permit a detailed analysis of each,28 but they draw inspiration from Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law’. This sentiment is reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights29 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.30 A commitment to equality before the law can also be found within the specialised treaties on equality and discrimination.31

III.  Council of Europe Treaties 20.16 As with the UN treaties, there are a variety of Council of Europe instruments that include a commitment to equality before the law. This is stated expressly within the Framework Convention on National Minorities: ‘the Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law’.32 The Revised European Social Charter contains a horizontal clause prohibiting discrimination in ‘the enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter’.33

27 Sejdic and Finic v Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC] App nos 27996/06 and 34836/06 (22 December 2009) [55]. 28 See further, W Vandenhole, Non-Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005). 29 Specifically in Art 26, but also elsewhere, eg Art 14(1). 30 Art 2(2). 31 Art 5, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Art 2, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Art 2, Convention on the Rights of the Child; Art 5(1), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 32 Art 4(1). 33 Art E.

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IV.  Other Sources While there is an array of international instruments that could have been cited as inspirations 20.17 for Article 20, in fact the Explanations attached to the Charter refer only to two sources: national constitutions and the general principles case law of the Court of Justice. The Explanations proclaim that equality before the law is ‘a principle of law which is included 20.18 in all European constitutions’. It is true that equality clauses are common, albeit expressed in slightly different terms. The wording found in Article 20 of the Charter approximates closely to Article 3(1) of the German Constitution.34 It is, though, rare for the Court of Justice to engage in detailed examination of national constitutional case law relating to the principle of equality. Given that equality before the law is a common constitutional tradition, it is unsurprising that 20.19 this is firmly embedded within the case law of the Court of Justice on the general principles of EU law. Many cases have cited the existence of a general principle of equal treatment, which has been applied across a broad spectrum of EU law.35 As stated in Glatzel and in other cases, the Court has adopted the position that the general principle of equal treatment is now enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter.36 In this respect, the main message emerging from the Court seems to be one of continuity; Article 20 represents a crystallisation of the unwritten general principle of equal treatment. So although there are other points of reference, such as international treaties or national constitutions, the predominant influence appears to be the Court’s own case law on the general principle of equal treatment.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks From the above discussion, it can be seen that ‘equality before the law’ is a norm that commands 20.20 widespread support in national and international legal instruments, as well as being a transversal principle that can be applied across many different fields of law. While the consensus surrounding the core idea facilitates its broad applicability, there remains uncertainty about how the principle should be applied in a specific case. The remainder of this section focuses on fleshing out the meaning attached to the principle.

II.  Scope of Application Article 20 provides that ‘everyone’ is equal before the law. In terms of personal scope, this clearly 20.21 covers differences in treatment between natural persons. For example, in Zoi Chatzi37 the Court of Justice invoked Article 20 when considering the rules surrounding parental leave entitlement

34 Indeed, Croon has identified certain similarities in the approach to equality reasoning between the Court of Justice and German Courts: J Croon, ‘Comparative Institutional Analysis, the European Court of Justice and the General Principle of Non-Discrimination—or—Alternative Tales on Equality Reasoning’ (2013) 19 European Law Journal 153, 159. 35 G More, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: from Market Unifier to Fundamental Right’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) 517. 36 Glatzel (n 20) [43]. See also, inter alia, Case C-21/10 Nagy v Mezgazzdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal [2011] ECR I-6769, EU:C:2011:505 [47]; Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission [2010] ECR I-8301, EU:C:2010:512 [54]; Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] ECR I-13693, EU:C:2010:806 [89]; Case C-401/11 Soukupová v Ministerstvo zemědělství EU:C:2013:223 [28]. 37 Case C-149/10 Zoi Chatzi v Ipourgos Ikonomikon [2010] ECR I-8489 [63].



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in respect of parents of twins compared with parents whose children are not born simultaneously. The case law confirms that the principle can be applied to differences of treatment between persons in their professional capacity or legal persons. In Akzo Nobel Chemicals,38 the Court cites Article 20 in relation to a distinction in the application of legal professional privilege between correspondence with in-house lawyers and that with external lawyers. Article 20 has also been applied to differences in the procedures applicable to different types of farmers with regard to awarding public funding39 and to differences in the treatment of firms when applying fines for breaches of competition law.40 Although Article 20 refers to ‘everyone’, the Court of Justice has also been willing to apply it to differences of treatment in relation to goods and services.41 In RPO,42 EU legislation permitted Member States to apply reduced rates of Value Added Tax (VAT) to printed books, which included books supplied with a physical support, such as an audio book or a book on a CD-ROM. In contrast, digital books supplied electronically were subject to the general VAT regime for e-commerce and could not benefit from the reduced VAT rates for books. The Court held that the difference in treatment between books supplied with a physical support and digital books supplied electronically could be considered for its compatibility with Article 20.43 20.22 Another issue relating to the scope of application concerns the possibility for Member States to invoke Article 20 vis-à-vis the EU institutions and other Member States. Wouters notes that although this issue has rarely reached the Court of Justice, sovereign equality between states is a general principle of international law and it can be seen in the constitutional architecture of the Union (such as the representation of all states in the key EU institutions).44 Article 20 was invoked by Advocate-General Kokott in litigation challenging the publication of recruitment notices on behalf of the Commission where there was a requirement to have a thorough knowledge of one of the EU official languages and satisfactory knowledge of either English, French or German.45 In contrast, the Court dealt with the question of discrimination on the ground of language by reference to Article 21 of the Charter.46 20.23 The scope of application of Article 20 does not extend to the treatment of third countries. This arose in litigation over EU legislation on its emission trading scheme. This treated differently flights operated between the EU and the Member States of the European Economic Area or Switzerland in comparison to flights operated between the EU and other third countries.47 The Court of Justice rejected the argument that this difference of treatment fell to be examined under Article 20: [T]he institutions and agencies of the Union are relieved of any obligation to apply the principle of equal treatment to third countries, in order to maintain their internal freedom of action in terms of policy. Accordingly, the Court has stated, in general terms, that a difference in treatment of third countries is not contrary to EU law, emphasising that there is no obligation to treat third countries equally.48

38 Akzo Nobel Chemicals (n 32) [54]. 39 Nagy (n 32) [47]. 40 Guardian Industries Corp. (n 3). 41 See also, Case C-463/12 Copydan Båndkopi v Nokia Danmark A/S EU:C:2015:144. 42 Case C-390/15 Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (RPO) and others EU:C:2017:174. 43 Ibid [38]. 44 J Wouters, ‘Constitutional Limits of Differentiation: the Principle of Equality’ in B de Witte, D Hanf and E Vos (eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2001) 301, 315. 45 Case C-566/10 P Italy v Commission EU:C:2012:368 [89], Opinion. 46 Case C-566/10 P Italy v Commission EU:C:2012:752 [75]. 47 Case C-272/15 Swiss International Air Lines AG v The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Environment Agency EU:C:2016:993 [13]. 48 Ibid [29].

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At the same time, in Opinion 1/17 on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU, the Court stated that Article 20 applied to ‘all situations governed by EU law, including those falling within the scope of an international agreement entered into by the Union’.49 Therefore, a difference of treatment between EU citizens and third country national foreign investors arising from an international agreement could be examined by reference to Article 20.50

III.  Specific Provisions Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo described ‘equality before the law’ as an ‘abstract concept’.51 20.24 This reflects the indeterminacy of the norm and Westen’s famous critique of the ‘empty idea of equality’.52 Equality is traditionally viewed as a relational concept; this assumes that whether an individual, or a group, is being treated equally can only be assessed by looking at how others are treated. Yet the fact that others may be receiving different treatment does not, in itself, indicate a violation of the principle of equality. If, for example, the state provides financial assistance to disabled people in order to help them meet additional costs relating to travel, not providing such assistance to non-disabled persons would not, prima facie, breach the principle of equality. On the other hand, if the state grants a mobility allowance to wheelchair users but not to those who are visually impaired, then there might be a breach of the principle as arguably visually impaired persons may also incur obstacles that lead to additional travelling costs. Trying to unravel the knotty question of when persons should be treated in the same way or differently lies at the heart of the equality principle. Through its prodigious case law on the general principle of equal treatment, the Court of 20.25 Justice has formulated a consistent definition of this concept. In 2007, it used the established definition when considering the meaning of equality under Article 20 of the Charter: The principle of equality and non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified.53

This expression has often been described as reflecting the Aristotelian idea that ‘likes should be 20.26 treated alike’.54 Its appeal lies in its brevity and simplicity, as well as its resonance with common understandings of what being treated equally means. Yet it provides little insight on the pivotal question of what constitutes a ‘comparable situation’. It is difficult to identify any objective yardstick or coherent legal doctrine that determines when situations will be deemed to be comparable. This has been acknowledged by Advocate-General Sharpston: ‘it is therefore clear that the criteria of relevant resemblances and differences vary with the fundamental moral outlook of a given person or society’.55 This fluidity draws into question the supposedly objective nature of

49 Opinion 1/17 EU:C:2019:341 [171]. 50 Ibid [174]. The Court held that foreign (non-EU) investors were not, however, comparable to enterprises and natural persons of the Member States, so there was no breach of Article 20. 51 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-3672 [88] (Opinion of 12 September 2006). 52 P Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982–83) 95 Harvard Law Review 537. See further, J Croon-Gestefeld, Reconceptualising European Equality Law—a Comparative Institutional Analysis (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017) ch 2. 53 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW (n 45) [56]. See also [46], where the Court cites Art 20 of the Charter. 54 D Schiek, ‘Torn Between Arithmetic and Substantive Equality? Perspectives on Equality in German Labour Law’ (2002) 18 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 149, 150. 55 Case C-427/06 Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte Altersfürsorge GmbH [2008] ECR I-7245 [44], Opinion.



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the principle of equal treatment and exposes the degree to which the application of the principle necessarily entails a subjective evaluation on the part of the judiciary. As such, it can be difficult to predict how the comparator test will be applied to a given set of facts. While there are plenty of examples in the law reports, these do not provide easy roadmaps for future litigants. 20.27 In more recent case law, the Court has begun to elaborate a more detailed definition of equal treatment for the purposes of Articles 20 and 21. The following quotation from the Milkova case (discussed above) illustrates the extended formula now used by the Court: 54. The principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, now enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter, which requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified … A difference in treatment is justified if it is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment … 56. With regard to the requirement relating to the comparability of the situations for the purpose of determining whether there is an infringement of the principle of equal treatment, that requirement must be assessed in the light of all the factors characterising those situations … 57. It must also be made clear, first, that it is required not that the situations be identical, but only that they be comparable and, secondly, that the assessment of that comparability must be carried out not in a global and abstract manner, but in a specific and concrete manner in the light of the objective and of the aim of the national legislation creating the distinction at issue … [citations omitted]56

In Milkova, the difference of treatment was between employees and civil servants in relation to dismissal procedures. The Court identified that the legislative purpose was the protection of workers with a disability, but, in the light of that objective, it could not identify a sufficient justification for treating employees with a disability differently to civil servants with a disability.57 20.28 While the Court’s definition of equal treatment most frequently leads to analysis of whether the same treatment should have been afforded, its concept of equality includes the obligation to treat different situations differently. By itself, this does not necessarily lead to a more progressive concept of equality. Historically, justifications for less favourable treatment of women and minorities have often been grounded in the supposed ‘difference’ of these groups, for example the idea that people with disabilities were not capable of participation in the labour market.58 Yet recognition of difference, and the need for its accommodation within law, can also be central to the realisation of full equality in practice.59 A promising example of the Court using Article 20 in a more nuanced fashion can be found in Zoi Chatzi. The case concerned the entitlement to parental leave in respect of the birth of twins. The Court rejected the argument that the Parental Leave Directive should be interpreted as conferring an entitlement in respect of each child born, rather than in respect of each birth.60 This meant that parents of twins would only be entitled to three months’ leave in respect of their twins, whereas parents who had two children in succession would acquire an entitlement to six months’ leave under the Directive (ie three months in respect of each birth). Nevertheless, the Court also considered whether this was consistent with Article 20

56 Milkova (n 8). 57 Ibid [60–62]. It was, though, for the national court to determine if there were any other equivalent mechanisms of protection for civil servants. 58 K Heyer, Rights Enabled—the Disability Revolution, from the US, to Germany and Japan, to the United Nations (Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 2015) 25–26. 59 Eg S Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 30. 60 Zoi Chatzi (n 37) [40] and [61].

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of the Charter. It concluded that parents of twins were not in a comparable situation to those raising a single child and, as a result of this ‘specific situation’, national schemes of parental leave needed to be adjusted to take account of the ‘particular needs’ of parents of twins.61 The contribution of this judgment to advancing equality should not be over-stated. The Court stepped timidly with regard to what adaptation of the parental leave regime is required for parents of twins; this was left to the national legislature, which was accorded a ‘wide freedom of action’.62 Perhaps, therefore, the most significant aspect of the case lies in the Court’s willingness to examine this issue through the lens of different situations requiring different treatment and using that to seek (very gently) an enhancement of the social provision for parents of twins. Moreover, it is also striking that the Court did so under the auspices of Article 20 of the Charter, rather than Article 21.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations There are no express limitations found within Article 20, but the definition of equal treatment 20.29 adopted by the Court of Justice (see section D.III) permits the objective justification of departures from equal treatment. This test must also be read in the light of Article 52(1) of the Charter, which provides that ‘limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union’. As described earlier, Article 20 can be applied to highly diverse issues. Its capacity to regulate 20.30 such disparate fields rests on its inherent malleability. McCrudden argues that, in this guise, equality is interpreted as mere rationality.63 It acts as a brake on public bodies from acting in an arbitrary or inconsistent manner. This gives it the capacity to be applied to any form of differentiation, even though the categories concerned may have no wider social significance, such as distinctions between different types of digital book (RPO) or licences to drive different types of vehicle (Glatzel). The corollary of this sweeping scope is a generous margin of discretion for the justification of unequal treatment. If the courts are only concerned with ensuring that a public body has not acted irrationally, the level of judicial scrutiny applied can be rather light. This is often evident in the approach of the Court of Justice to equal treatment issues that relate to public policy choices, especially in relation to economic regulation.64 Yet there are some situations where the Court adopts a stricter standard of scrutiny, notably in relation to employment relationships. Croon argues that the equal treatment case law of the Court of Justice displays low, intermediate and strict levels of scrutiny.65 She contends that the variation in the level of scrutiny applied can be explained by wider factors. For example, if the case discloses a risk of bias against minority or disadvantaged groups in the political system, then strict scrutiny is demanded. In contrast, if the case concerns the reconciliation of complex interests and the political decision-making process is not captured by particular interests, then a low level of scrutiny is applied. A low level of scrutiny can be found in an early challenge to the European Arrest Warrant.66 20.31 One of the traditional obstacles to extradition was the application of a requirement of ‘double criminality’; it needed to be established that the offence in respect of which the request for

61 Ibid [68] and [71]. 62 Ibid [71]. 63 C McCrudden, Buying Social Justice—Equality, Government Procurement, and Legal Change (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 513. 64 P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law—Text, Cases and Materials, 6th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 557–79. 65 Croon (n 30) 154. 66 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW (n 45).



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extradition had been issued was contrary to the criminal law of both the requesting state and the surrendering state. The European Arrest Warrant established a list of 32 offences where states cannot apply the principle of double criminality as long as the offence is punishable in the requesting state by a maximum sentence of at least three years’ detention.67 The Court of Justice was asked to consider whether there was a breach of the general principle of equal treatment in the differentiation made between the 32 listed offences and those that were not listed. In a curt response, the Court skips over the question of whether offences inside and outside the list were comparable, concluding that even if they were comparable, the distinction was objectively justified.68 In supporting this finding, the Court cites the ‘view’ of the Council that ‘the categories of offences in question feature among those the seriousness of which in terms of adversely affecting public order and public safety justifies dispensing with the verification of double criminality’.69 The Court’s willingness to accept at face value the political choice of the Council indicates that, in some cases, establishing objective justification is far from demanding. In a similar vein, the Court found no violation of Article 20 in respect of national legislation (implementing a Framework Decision) that imposed criminal penalties on those in possession of a ‘significant quantity of psychotropic substances and narcotic drugs’.70 The national court had expressed concerns that the lack of precision regarding what constituted a ‘significant quantity’ led to inconsistencies in how this was applied, but the Court held that the existence of discretion for courts did not, in itself, breach Article 20.71 Croon takes the Arcelor case as an example of an intermediate level of scrutiny.72 This concerned 20.32 a challenge to the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme.73 It was initially applied to the steel industry, but not to the plastics and aluminium sectors. The Court of Justice accepted that these producers were in a comparable situation because the greenhouse gases emitted by each were equally damaging to the climate.74 As regards the potential justification for the different treatment of similarly situated economic sectors, the Court held: in the exercise of the powers conferred on it the Community legislature has a broad discretion where its action involves political, economic and social choices and where it is called on to undertake complex assessments and evaluations … However, even where it has such a discretion, the Community legislature is obliged to base its choice on objective criteria appropriate to the aim pursued by the legislation in question … taking into account all the facts and the technical and scientific data available at the time of adoption of the act in question.75

20.33 On the facts, the Court accepted that the creation of an emissions trading scheme was sufficiently complex to warrant a gradual expansion of its activities and that commencing with the steel industry was based upon statistical evidence that demonstrated much higher levels of carbon dioxide emissions from this industry compared to those from the chemical and nonferrous metal sectors.76 This may be described as intermediate scrutiny insofar as the Court

67 Art 2(2), Council Framework Decision (EU) 2002/584 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1. 68 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW (n 45) [58]. 69 Ibid [57]. 70 Case C-634/18 Criminal Proceedings Brought Against JI EU:C:2020:455 [11]. 71 Ibid [45]. 72 Croon (n 34) 157. 73 Case C-127/07 Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v Premier Ministre and Others [2008] ECR I-9895. 74 Ibid [34]. 75 Ibid [57]–[58]. 76 Ibid [52].

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provides ­discretion for the EU legislature, but it does so within the boundaries of applying a ­proportionality test.77 Croon explains this by the combination of complex policy choices, where courts may be reluctant to intervene, but alongside the risk that certain economic interests have exercised undue influence on political decision-making.78 A strict level of scrutiny is more commonly applied to cases that involve differences of treatment 20.34 based upon personal characteristics, such as ethnic origin.79 As discussed earlier, such cases are mainly considered in relation to Article 21 of the Charter, so they are not discussed further in this chapter. In relation to Article 20, a number of cases concern differences in treatment between workers. These are not directly concerned with ‘suspect’ personal characteristics, such as disability or sexual orientation, but they clearly raise issues about fairness in the labour market and the protection of workers. As discussed above, Milkova concerned a difference of treatment in the protection of employees and civil servants in relation to dismissal procedures for workers with disabilities. The Court of Justice entered into a fairly detailed consideration of the circumstances of the case and its judgment gave a strong indication that it did not identify factors to explain the differentiation between these two categories. Likewise other cases entailing differences of treatment amongst workers might be characterised 20.35 as reflecting strict scrutiny.80 In Cordero Alonso,81 the Spanish guarantee fund dealing with the liabilities of insolvent employers covered payments due to workers in respect of judicially awarded compensation for dismissal, but not where such compensation arose from a judicial conciliation process. The Spanish Constitutional Court had previously held that such workers were not in a comparable situation, so there was no breach of the principle of equal treatment in Spanish constitutional law.82 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice reached the opposite conclusion and held that these were comparable situations and that there was no objective justification for such a difference in treatment.83 While cases such as Milkova or Cordero Alonso address sporadic issues arising from domestic 20.36 labour law, the longer-term significance of applying Article 20 to the comparative treatment of workers may lie in relation to the EU’s Directives on non-standard workers. These have concentrated upon part-time work, fixed-term work and temporary agency work.84 For each of these categories of employment relationship, efforts to improve the position of such workers have centred on the principle of equal treatment, coupled with other legislative protections. Although equal treatment is at the core of these instruments, they have been regarded as distinct from EU

77 Croon (n 34) 171. Further examples may be found in Case T-251/18 R IFSUA v Council EU:T:2020:89 [112] on the treatment of commercial and recreational fishing, or Case T-547/18 Teeaar v ECB EU:T:2020:119 [41] where the General Court held that the ECB enjoys ‘broad autonomy’ in respect of the arrangements applicable to the staff that it employs. 78 Ibid. 79 Eg Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, EU:C:2015:480 [112]. There are, however, instances where the Court adopts a more flexible approach to scrutiny in relation to differences of treatment related to personal characteristics, eg Case C-143/16 Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v Bordonaro EU:C:2017:566 [31]. 80 Although it should be noted that in Case C-258/14 Florescu and others v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu and Others EU:C:2017:448, concerning differences of treatment in pension rights between professional judges and other office holders, the Court held that the situation fell within the scope of EU law, but it did not consider whether the difference of treatment was compatible with Article 20. 81 Case C-81/05 Cordero Alonso v Fondo de Garantía Salarial [2006] ECR I-7569. 82 Ibid [23]. 83 Ibid [40]. See also Case C-442/00 Rodríguez Caballero v Fogasa [2002] ECR I-11915. 84 Council Directive (EC) 97/81 concerning the framework agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1998] OJ L14/9; Council Directive (EC) 1999/70 (n 10); European Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2008/104 on temporary agency work [2009] OJ L327/9.



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anti-discrimination legislation relating to personal characteristics, such as sex or ethnic origin. While the Court often makes reference to Article 21 when interpreting the anti-discrimination Directives, it has not made a connection between Article 21 and the Directives on non-standard work. 20.37 From an early point, however, the Court recognised that the equal treatment provisions in the Directives on non-standard work were ‘merely a particular expression of a fundamental principle of Community law, namely the general principle of equality’.85 Based on this foundation, the Court has generally applied a strict standard of scrutiny to departures from the principle of equal treatment. It has repeatedly held that equal treatment of non-standard workers is a rule of ‘particular importance’,86 or a ‘principle of EU social law’,87 which cannot be interpreted restrictively. 20.38 Notwithstanding these statements, the Court has yet to place particular emphasis upon Article 20 of the Charter when interpreting the Directives on non-standard work. As discussed earlier, the Court has, for example, rejected the idea that Article 20 could be relied upon to address differences of treatment between different types of fixed-term worker.88 In its view, these fall outside the scope of EU law because the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work is only concerned with differences of treatment between fixed-term and permanent workers.89 In Gardenia Vernaza Ayovi,90 the referring court posed the question of whether unequal treatment permitted under the Framework Agreement might nevertheless be incompatible with Article 20. The Court declined to consider whether Article 20 might offer enhanced rights, holding that inasmuch as the principle of equality before the law established in Article 20 of the Charter has, as regards fixed-term workers, been implemented at EU level by Directive 1999/70, and in particular by Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement which is annexed to that directive, the situation at issue in the main proceedings must be examined in the light of that directive and the Framework Agreement.91

V. Remedies 20.39 Given the diverse fields of law to which the principle of equal treatment can be applied, the applicable remedies are likely to depend on the context of the case. In some cases, Article 20 may be invoked as a ground for judicial review of a legislative act, such as the greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme or the European Arrest Warrant. In such cases, the remedy could be annulment of the legislative act, or an element thereof.92 Other cases are likely to concern the denial of a benefit to a specific individual, such as an agricultural grant, where the remedy may entail a reconsideration of the original decision, rather than an annulment of the underpinning legal act. One difficulty in determining the remedies for unequal treatment lies in whether the

85 Case C-313/02 Wippel v Peek & Cloppenburg GmbH & Co KG [2004] ECR I-9483 [56]. See also Case C-307/05 Del Cerro Alonso v Osakidetza-Servicio Vasco de Salud [2007] ECR I-7109 [27]. 86 Eg Case C-268/06, IMPACT [2008] ECR I-2483 [112–13]; Joined Cases C-444/09 and C-456/09, Gavieriro Gavieriro and Iglesias Torres v Consellería de Educacíon e Ordenacíon Universitaria de la Xunta de Galicia [2010] ECR I-4031 [41]; Case C-177/14, Regojo Dans v Consejo de Estado, EU:C:2015:450 [32]. 87 Eg Case C-361/12, Carratù v Poste Italiane SpA, EU:C:2013:830 [33]; Case C-596/14, de Diego Porras v Ministerio de Defensa, EU:C:2016:683 [27]. 88 Baldonedo Martín (n 8). See also Case C-20/10 Vino v Poste Italiano SpA [2010] ECR I-148. EU:C:2010:677. 89 Vino, ibid [54–55]. 90 Case C-96/17 Gardenia Vernaza Ayovi v Consorci Sanitari de Terrassa EU:C:2018:603. 91 Ibid [20]. 92 Cf Test-Achats (n 6).

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solution is ‘levelling-up’ or ‘levelling-down’. If, for example, a scheme for awarding agricultural grants is deemed to breach the principle of equal treatment because of the exclusion of certain types of producers,93 then formal equal treatment will normally leave open the possibility that the situation is remedied by removing the benefit from the existing beneficiaries.94 Nevertheless, until such time as the benefit is removed or amended for all persons, it should be extended to the currently disadvantaged category.95 Therefore, in Milkova, the Court of Justice held that ‘a national court must set aside any discriminatory provision of national law, without having to request or await its prior removal by the legislature, and apply to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by the persons in the other category’.96

E. Evaluation The Court’s position that the general principle of equal treatment is now ‘enshrined’ in Article 20 20.40 has allowed for continuity with its long-standing case law on the general principle. The postCharter case law has, nonetheless, displayed some signs of evolution. In cases such as Glatzel or Milkova, the Court’s explanation of the principle of equal treatment is more detailed than its classic formula of treating likes alike and different situations differently. The Court has fleshed out the test to be applied when considering what constitutes a comparable situation and there is also a more structured explanation of the objective justification test. This provides slightly more clarity, but this is an area of law where there remains considerable ambiguity. In particular, much depends upon the level of scrutiny that the Court applies when analysing a claim under Article 20. It is evident that in certain areas of public decision-making, the Court is reluctant to intervene. For example, in the RPO case concerning the taxation rates for different types of digital book, the Court stated that a review of tax measures would be limited to analysis of whether there was a ‘manifest error’ on the part of the legislature.97 Incrementally, the accretion of case law may yield a better understanding of those circumstances where the Court will adopt a low standard of scrutiny under Article 20 and those where review will be more intense. The post-Charter case law has now produced a fairly settled position in relation to the 20.41 distinction between Articles 20 and 21. Cases that engage differences of treatment related to personal characteristics are generally analysed under the auspices of Article 21. In a handful of cases, such as Milkova and Cordero Alonso, the Court offers a tantalising vision of Article 20 as an instrument for advancing a broader concept of ‘comparative fairness’98 in the treatment of workers. While it remains under-developed, it is possible to imagine a future where the Court uses Article 20 to expand further in this direction. This would, inter alia, resonate with the European Pillar of Social Rights. Principle 5(a) of the Pillar states that ‘regardless of the type and duration of the employment relationship, workers have the right to fair and equal treatment regarding working conditions, access to social protection and training’.99 While the Pillar is not a legally 93 Eg Case C-152/09 Grootes v Amt für Landwirtschaft Parchim [2010] ECR I-11285. 94 Eg Case C-200/91 Coloroll Pension Trustees v Russell and Others [1994] ECR I-4389 [33]. 95 Case C-401/11 Soukupová v Ministerstvo zemedelství EU:C:2013:223 [66]. 96 Milkova (n 11) [67]. 97 RPO (n 42) [54]. 98 H Collins, ‘Multi-segmented Workforces, Comparative Fairness, and the Capital Boundary Obstacle’ in G Davidov and B Langille (eds), Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 317. 99 [2017] OJ C428/10.



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binding instrument, this commitment to fair and equal treatment of workers could be advanced through a purposive interpretation of Article 20. To date, the Court has been cautious in its use of Article 20 in the case law on the treatment of non-standard workers. In comparison, it has been more willing to expand upon the implications of Article 21. This has extended to permitting it to be invoked in domestic legal proceedings between private parties: Article 21 is ‘sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such in disputes between them in a field covered by EU law’.100 It seems inevitable that the Court will, eventually, be called upon to determine whether Article 20 also confers rights that can be directly relied upon in disputes between individuals that fall within the scope of EU law.101

100 Egenberger (n 21) [76]. 101 Eg see the questions referred by the national court in Case C-574/16 Grupo Norte Facility SA v Moreira Gómez EU:C:2018:390 [28–29].

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Article 21* Article 21 Non-Discrimination 1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 2. Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 21 Paragraph 1 draws on Article 13 of the EC Treaty, now replaced by Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine as regards genetic heritage. In so far as this corresponds to Article 14 of the ECHR, it applies in compliance with it. There is no contradiction or incompatibility between paragraph 1 and Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which has a different scope and purpose: Article 19 confers power on the Union to adopt legislative acts, including harmonisation of the Member States’ laws and regulations, to combat certain forms of discrimination, listed exhaustively in that Article. Such legislation may cover action of Member State authorities (as well as relations between private individuals) in any area within the limits of the Union’s powers. In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. Paragraph 1 therefore does not alter the extent of powers granted under Article 19 nor the interpretation given to that Article. Paragraph 2 corresponds to the first paragraph of Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and must be applied in compliance with that Article.

Select Bibliography S Atrey, ‘Race Discrimination in EU Law after Jyske Finans’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 625. M Bell, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 611. E Cunniffe, ‘Non-Economic Migrants as Workers: Assessing the Right to Work for Asylum Applicants’ LLM thesis EUI 2020. G de Búrca, ‘Stumbling into Experimentalism: the EU Anti-Discrimination Regime’ in CF Sabel and J Zeitlin (eds), Experimental Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 215. R Gião Hanek and L Farkas, The Potential of the Charter in Fighting Hate: Enforcing international human rights standards through victims’ rights (EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2020/75).

* Hanna Eklund, University of Copenhagen and Claire Kilpatrick, EUI.

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K Groenendijk, ‘Citizens and Third-Country Nationals: Differential Treatment or Discrimination’ in J-Y Carlier and E Guild (eds), L’avenir de la libre circulation des personnes dans l’UE (Brussels, Bruylant, 2006) 79. C Hublet, ‘The Scope of Article 12 o f the Treaty of the European Communities vis-à-via Third-Country Nationals: Evolution at Last?’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 757. C Kilpatrick, ‘The Court of Justice and Labour Law in 2010: A New EU Law Discrimination Architecture’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 280. J Miller, ‘The European Disability Rights Revolution’ (2019) European Law Review 66. E Muir, EU Equality Law: The First Fundamental Rights Policy of the EU (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018). E Muir, C Kilpatrick, J Miller and B De Witte (eds) How EU Law Shapes Opportunities for Preliminary References on Fundamental Rights: Discrimination, Data Protection and Asylum (EUI Working Paper, 2017/17). P J Neuvonen, Equal Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law: We the Burden? (Hart 2016). R O’Connell, ‘Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to Non-Discrimination in the ECHR’ (2009) 29 Legal Studies 211. S Peers, ‘Implementing Equality? The Directive on Long-Term Resident Third-Country Nationals’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 437. D Schiek and A Lawson (eds), EU Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality—Investigating the Triangle between Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2011). I Solanke, ‘Putting Race And Gender Together: A New Approach to Intersectionality’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 723. A Ward, ‘The Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang’ (2018) 20 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 32–60. R Xenidis, ‘Transforming EU Equality Law? On Disruptive Narratives and False Dichotomies’ (2019) 18 Yearbook of European Law 2.

A.  Field of Application of Article 21 21.01 Article 21 has two limbs, a status discrimination limb (Art 21(1)) and a nationality discrimination limb (Art 21(2)). Although nationality can also be viewed as a status ground, the very two-limb structure of Article 21 of the Charter, whereby nationality discrimination is treated separately, and differently, from discrimination on other status grounds, signals the distinctive contours nationality discrimination has been given in the EU. In order to highlight and interrogate that difference, all the grounds other than nationality will be referred to as ‘status discrimination’, covered by Article 21(1), whilst nationality discrimination, covered separately in Article 21(2), will be considered as a special category in EU law. Nonetheless, their juxtaposition can open new interpretative channels between the grounds and across the two limbs.1 21.02 Both limbs of Article 21 place considerable emphasis on delimiting their fields of application. However, it can be seen that for Article 21(1) these limitations are set out only in the Explanations, whilst for Article 21(2) they are contained primarily in the Charter text itself. Whether this makes a difference depends on how the Explanations mesh with the horizontal provisions of the Charter, an issue we turn to later.2 21.03 Article 21(1) links to the large body of EU equality and anti-discrimination legislation on a range of status grounds (race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, religion and belief, 1 For instance how Advocate-General Kokott maintains that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of language in Article 21(1) is an expression of the general prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality in Case C-566/10 P Italy v Commission (Judgment of 27 November 2012, Grand Chamber) [77]. 2 Below, section IV.

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and age).3 This large body of legislation, mainly contained in directives,4 is required to be transposed at national level. Much of that legislation has been adopted under the anti-discrimination legal basis added by the Treaty of Amsterdam (now Art 19 TFEU) in addition to the specific legal basis for some of the gender equality provisions (Art 157(3) TFEU). Yet Article 21(1) EUCFR is expressed in much more expansive terms than these legal bases, in 21.04 two different ways. First, it expressly names many more status grounds than those covered in the TFEU’s legal bases: to give two examples, genetic features and membership of a national minority. Second, through its use of the phrase ‘such as’, Article 21(1) EUCFR creates an open-ended rather than a closed list of status discrimination grounds, so that it can extend to any ground of status discrimination.5 For that reason, the Explanations place extended emphasis on stressing that Article 21(1) does 21.05 not extend the field of application of EU law. It provides neither a legal basis to adopt EU legislation nor a basis for striking down national legislation which does not implement EU law. Rather, it provides a basis to review acts of EU institutions and bodies when they are exercising powers conferred under the treaties. For instance, in Kaltoft, a challenge to a national action whereby a public sector employee was dismissed from his work on grounds of obesity, which is not listed as an enumerated ground in the Framework Equal Treatment Directive (FETD), was considered out of the scope of Article 21(1).6 Furthermore, the stance taken in the Explanations would mean, for example, that a challenge to a national law distinguishing on the basis of genetic features could not be taken on the basis of Article 21(1) in the absence of a relevant link to EU law, nor could it provide the basis for a piece of EU legislation outlawing discrimination concerning genetic features. However, a challenge to discrimination against an EU staff member on the basis of genetic features could be.7 Of course, in relation to Member State action, even taking the relevant test to be that the 21.06 Member State is ‘implementing’ EU law still leaves a wide range of situations that could fall within the scope of the status-discrimination provisions of the Charter. Imagine, for instance, access to cross-border healthcare using the Patients Rights’ Directive8 being denied on grounds of morbid obesity (either covered by disability or as a non-enumerated ground). Article 21 would be engaged. Since Fransson, whenever EU law applies the Charter does too, without distinction between a narrower option of ‘implementing EU law’ for Charter applicability and a broader sphere of ‘falling within the scope of EU law’. Hence, national law not adopted to transpose

3 See, in particular, Directive 2000/43/EC [2000] OJ L180/22 (the Race Equality Directive, or RED); Directive 2000/78/ EC [2000] OJ L303/16 (the Framework Equal Treatment Directive, or FETD); Directive 2004/113/EC [2004] OJ L373/37 (Gender Equality in Goods and Services Directive); Directive 2006/54 [2006] OJ L204/23 (the Gender Equality in Employment Directive, or GEED); Directive 79/7 on gender equality in social security [1979] OJ L6/24; Directive 2010/41/EU on gender equality in self-employment [2010] OJ L180/1. 4 For a different kind of source, see, eg, EU Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2008] OJ L328/55. On this as a part of a growing EU criminal discrimination law acquis focused particularly on discriminatory hate speech and acts see Giao-Hanek and Farkas, Select Bibliography. See relatedly the EU’s moves to ratify the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on genderbased violence discussed below para 21.26. 5 See for instance how the Court in principle considers’ length of service’ as a discrimination ground falling within Article 21(1) in Case C-49/18 Escribano Vindel (7 February 2019) [58] and AG Cruz Villalón in his Opinion suggesting immigration status as a discrimination ground in Joined Cases C-443/14 and C-444/14 Alo & Osso (1 March 2016). 6 Ultimately, however, obesity qualified as a disability when certain conditions are met and as such is covered by the FETD. Case C-354/13 Kaltoft (Judgment of 18 December 2014). 7 See Case F-51/07 Bui Van (FP-I-A-1-289) in which the Civil Service Tribunal made clear that the EU Staff Regulations must be read in light of the Charter; for applications of Art 21 EUCFR see Case F-86/09 W v Commission (Judgment of 14 October 2010) (sexual orientation); Italy v Commission (n 1), in which the Grand Chamber invoked the prohibition of language discrimination in Art 21 EUCFR to annul competitions focused on only three official languages. 8 Directive 2011/24 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45. See below Section IV for an example of a case concerning access to cross-border health-care in which Article 21 of the Charter is applied.



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EU law, but which nonetheless serves to deliver an EU law obligation, falls within the scope of the Charter.9 21.07 Article 21(2), which concerns discrimination on grounds of nationality, expressly limits its field of application to the relevant provisions of the treaties, stating additionally that it is ‘without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties’. The EUCFR Explanations expressly link Article 21(2) to Article 18(1) TFEU, which provides that ‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’. Indeed the wording of Article 21(2) EUCFR and Article 18 TFEU is, in all important respects, identical. The link between Article 21(2) and a particular provision of the treaties can therefore be seen as more tightly drawn than the Charter–treaties link in respect of Article 21(1). 21.08 It is important to note that this construction accordingly is silent on a very large number of EU nationality discrimination sources, namely those relating to third-country nationals. These include the nationality discrimination guarantees in the EU’s Association Agreements10 with certain countries and directives on third-country nationals.11 This distinction between nationality discrimination between EU nationals and nationality discrimination between EU and non-EU nationals is a central one in EU law, and is an issue to which we return later.12

B.  Interrelationship of Article 21 with Other Provisions of the Charter 21.09 The Charter articles with most resonance in relation to Article 21(1) are its immediate predecessor, Article 20, providing a general guarantee of equality before the law, and Article 23 on equality between men and women. The Court regularly makes omnibus references to Articles 20 and 21 as together enshrining the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination.13 Both Article 20 and Article 23 share with Article 21 the structure of equality and non-discrimination. Indeed, in some significant gender equality cases, the Court of Justice has used both Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter.14 According gender equality its own free-standing Charter provision in Article 23, in addition to including it in Article 21, reflects the historical importance of gender as a ground of status discrimination in EU law and its extensive policy development. Prior to the new wave of EU status-discrimination legislation from 2000 onwards, which followed from the introduction of the broad status-discrimination legal basis in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty now

9 Case C-617/10 Fransson (Judgment of 26 February 2013). Note also that Mangold made it clear that the (non-Charter derived) fundamental right not to be discriminated against on grounds of age could be applied once the disputed situation fell within the scope of national laws implementing the EU Fixed-term Work Directive: Case C-144/04 [2005] ECR I-9981. It did not matter that the disputed German rule (excluding older workers from the normal fixed-term contract protection regime) was added as a subsequent derogation to the German law implementing the Fixed-term Work Directive: ‘The term “implementation” … does not refer only to the original transposition of Directive 1999/70 … but must also cover all domestic measures intended to ensure that the objective pursued by the directive may be attained, including those which, after transposition in the strict sense, add to or amend domestic rules previously adopted’. 10 See EU Association Agreement with Turkey [1977] OJ L261/60; the Euro-Med Agreements with Tunisia [1998] OJ L97, Morocco [2000] OJ L70 and Algeria [2005] OJ L265. 11 See Directive 2003/109 on long-term resident third-country nationals [2004] OJ L16/44; Directive 2003/86 on family reunion [2003] OJ L251/12. 12 See below, section II. 13 C-195/12 Industrie du Bois de Vielsalm (Judgment of 26 September 2013) [48] and Case C-634/18 Criminal proceedings against JI, (Judgment of 11 June 2020) [43]. 14 See Case C-236/09 Test-Achats [2011] ECR I-773.

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contained in Article 19 TFEU, gender equality was the sole protected ground of status discrimination in EU law and this commitment dates from the Rome Treaty’s guarantee of equal pay for equal work between women and men. In successive treaty revisions, the EU’s commitment to gender equality has been substantially enriched. If, rather than focusing on a shared structure of equality and non-discrimination, one instead focuses on the prohibited ground as constituting the basis of the relevant association with Article 21, a much larger range of Charter provisions come into view. For example, age structures the rights of the child in Article 24 and the rights of the elderly in Article 25. The integration of persons with disabilities is the focus of Article 26. Respect for cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in Article 22 links with a number of the enumerated grounds in Article 21(1).15 Further, some of the freedoms and rights protected elsewhere in the Charter have been used, within their analogues in the European Convention of Human Rights combined with its non-discrimination Article 14, to protect against discrimination. For instance, the protection of assembly and association in Article 11 ECHR has been used to protect against discrimination on grounds of trade union membership. The same can be said of the protection of freedom of thought, conscience and religion in relation to discrimination based on religion (Art 10 ECHR) as well as the protection against sexual orientation discrimination developed in relation to the right to protect family and private life (Art 8 ECHR) and racial discrimination in relation to education (Protocol 1, Art 2).16 The judicial development of status discrimination has also linked it to certain Charter provisions. The most striking linkage has been developed in the area of age discrimination between the justification of retirement regimes and the right to work in Article 15 EUCFR.17 Although looked at historically and in terms of development of the TFEU’s citizenship guarantees, Article 21(2) has most source resonance with Chapter V of the Charter on citizens’ rights, those rights are not rendered in the Charter in terms linking them to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. Indeed, there is an interesting contrast between the juxtaposition of non-discrimination and citizenship in the post-Lisbon TFEU and their separation in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Nonetheless, Article 45 of the Charter sets out the right to move and reside freely within the EU for both EU citizens and, in more restrictive language, for legally resident third-country nationals. The interpretation of equivalent treaty provisions, including Article 21 TFEU, has been closely linked to prohibiting nationality discrimination for EU citizens. Article 15(3) of the Charter is also relevant in that, under the broader rubric of protecting freedom to pursue an occupation and right to engage in work, it provides a form of equal treatment guarantee for the working conditions of those third-country nationals allowed to work in the EU.18

15 See AG Kokott’s Opinion in Italy v Commission (n 1) linking language and nationality discrimination in Art 21 EUCFR with the principle of multi-lingualism reflected in Art 22 EUCFR. 16 See, eg, Wilson, NUJ and others v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 20 (trade union membership discrimination); Eweida v UK (Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 15 January 2013) (religious discrimination); EB v France (Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 22 January 2008) (sexual orientation discrimination); DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3 (racial discrimination). 17 See C Kilpatrick, ‘The Court of Justice and Labour Law in 2010: A New EU Law Discrimination Architecture’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 280 for the origins of this linkage; C-141/11 Hörnfeldt (Judgment of 5 July 2012) [37]. 18 ‘Nationals of third countries who are authorised to work in the territories of the Member States are entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.’



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C.  Sources of Article 21 Rights I. ECHR 21.14 The Explanations relating to Article 21(1) expressly refer to Article 14 ECHR. This is the general non-discrimination provision, which provides: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’. Article 21(1) adds to this list ethnic or social origin, genetic features, belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. Although the Explanations refer to Article 14 ECHR, a closer equivalent, because its discrimination prohibition is not linked to other Convention rights,19 is Article 1 of Protocol No 12 to the ECHR, agreed in 2000 with entry into force in 2005, according to which: 1.

2.

The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.

21.15 However, to date this has been ratified by only 10 of 27 Member States. Although Article 21(2) does not refer to the ECHR, and nationality is not listed in Article 14 of the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights has made clear that it encompasses discrimination on grounds of nationality.20

II.  UN Treaties 21.16 There are multiple relevant reference points. Article 1(3) UN Charter of 1945 includes among the purposes of the UN ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’. Article 2 UDHR of 1948 provides, ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. Both 1966 Conventions on Civil and Political and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provide: ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.21 Article 26 ICCPR 1966 further provides: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’

19 Art 14 ECHR has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms’ safeguarded by the Convention. 20 Gaygusuz v Austria (1996) IV 23 EHRR 364 [42]–[52]; Luczak v Poland App no 77782/01 (Judgment of 27 November 2007); Andrejeva v Latvia App no 55707/00 (Judgment of 18 February 2009); Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria App no 5335/05 (Judgment of 21 June 2011). 21 Art 2(1) ICCPR 1966 and Art 2(2) ICESR 1966.

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To this can be added the core Conventions concerning some of the status grounds listed in Article 21(1): the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD 1965); the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW 1979);22 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 2006). The last of these is noteworthy for having been the first international human rights treaty to be ratified by the EU. The International Labour Organization provides an important relevant specialised part of the UN system. ILO Convention No 100 of 1951 deals with equal pay, whilst Convention No 111 of 1958 prohibits discrimination in the field of employment and occupation. These Conventions, ratified by all the EU Member States, are central to one of four fundamental principles and rights at work contained in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work. It is perhaps more revealing to trace how these sources are referenced in EU status-­discrimination sources, especially legislation. Tracking this legislation over time evidences a marked trend towards a richer embedding of these instruments in international human rights sources. Hence the rich body of gender equality legislation from the 1970s until the millennium is notable for its lack of references to any international human rights instruments.23 This contrasts sharply with the new generation of post-2000 directives across the grounds. Hence the two directives in 2000 introducing protection against race, disability, religion/belief, age and sexual orientation, as well as the 2004 Directive extending gender discrimination protection to goods and services, all note that the right to equality before the law and protection against discrimination constitutes a universal right recognised by the UDHR and the UN Covenants of 1966, as well as referencing CEDAW and, for the Race Discrimination Directive alone, the CERD.24 However, the Court of Justice did reference international human rights sources from an early stage in status-discrimination (gender equality) cases and has continued to do so, albeit in a non-systematic fashion.25 Linked to EU ratification of the CRPD, it has made extensive use of it to embrace a progressive understanding of a range of disability discrimination issues.26 Yet the Court of Justice has held that the CRPD is too ‘programmatic’ to be used to assess the validity of EU legislative acts.27

21.17

21.18

21.19

21.20

III.  Council of Europe Treaties Both the 1961 ESC and the Revised ESC of 1996 provide that its substantive rights should be enjoyed without discrimination, the latter expanding the range of named rights to include, for 22 These have been acceded to by all Member States and ratified by almost all. The three Baltic states need still to ratify most of these instruments and France also has a low ratification pattern. 23 There are no such references in the 1975 Equal Pay Directive (75/117) [1975] OJ L45/19, the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive (76/207) [1976] OJ L39/40, the 1979 Statutory Social Security Directive (79/7) [1979] OJ L6/24 or the 1986 Occupational Social Security Directive (86/378) [1986] OJ L225/40. The Pregnant Workers’ Directive (92/85) [1992] OJ L348/1 and the Burden of Proof Directive (97/80) [1998] OJ L14/6 reference only the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 24 Preamble (4) FETD (2000/78); Preamble (3) RED (2000/43); Preamble (2) Directive 2004/113. However, Directive 2006/54 (the consolidating Gender Equality in Employment Directive) does not follow this trend, limiting itself to referencing Arts 21 and 23 of the EU Charter. Nor does Directive 2010/41 that replaces and repeals Directive 86/613/EEC on equal treatment for self-employed men and women, which makes no reference to human rights sources, including the EU Charter. OJ references above at n 3. 25 See, eg, Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455 [20], where the Court of Justice drew on ILO Convention No 100. 26 Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 Ring and Werge (Judgment of 11 April 2013); Case C-354/13 Kaltoft (Judgment of 18 December 2014); C-395/15 Daouidi (Judgment of 1 December 2016) on the understanding of disability; Case C-406/15, Milkova (Judgment of 9 March 2017) on positive action and disability. See also C-679/16, A (Judgment of 25 July 2018), where the Convention is evoked but not used. See further J Miller, ‘The European Disability Rights Revolution’ (2019) European Law Review 66. 27 Case C-363/12 Z (Judgment of 18 March 2014).



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21.22 21.23

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example, health and association with a national minority and making clear that the enumerated grounds are non-exhaustive.28 Two of the ‘new’ status grounds in the Charter which are not mentioned in Article 19 TFEU, nationality minority membership and genetic features, link with recent Council of Europe Conventions. Article 4(1) of the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) provides that ‘[t]he Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited’.29 The inclusion of genetic features as a listed prohibited ground in Article 21 is expressly identified in the Explanations as being drawn from the 1997 Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Article 11 of which provides: ‘Any form of discrimination against a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is prohibited’. Comparing these two Conventions illustrates well the absence of any strong correlation between EU Member State ratification of a human rights measure and its inclusion in the Charter Explanations. Hence, the 1995 FCNM with a much higher ratification record and a complete roster of Member State signatures is not referred to, whilst the 1997 Biomedicine Convention is, although five Member States have not even signed it and a further five have signed but not proceeded to ratification. Moreover, the 2011 Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence is signed by all 27 EU Member States and the EU, and ratified by 21 Member States.30 The Istanbul Convention aims to contribute to the elimination of discrimination against women by specifically providing a framework for combating different forms of violence against women. In its preamble the Convention exemplifies violence against women as ‘domestic violence, sexual harassment, rape, forced marriage, crimes committed in the name of so-called “honour” and genital mutilation’. Having been adopted after the Charter came into force there is naturally no mention of the Istanbul Convention in the Charter Explanations. However, it should be noted that the Charter Explanations do not specifically mention violence against women either in relation to Article 21 or Article 23 of the Charter. However, the Charter Explanations mention ‘sexual exploitation networks’ in relation to Article 5. The Istanbul Convention, in contrast, conceptualised sexual trafficking as part of a broader structure of inequality between men and women.31

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 21.27 Article 21(1) is a pivotal Charter provision and can be seen as a significant bridge between its civil and social components. A testament to the importance of Article 21 in the Court of Justice

28 1961 ESC, Preamble; Art E Revised Social Charter 1996. Seven Member States have not ratified the Revised ESC, remaining bound by the 1961 ESC (Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain). 29 France has not signed this Convention and three EU Member States have signed but not ratified it (Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg). 30 The Istanbul Convention has entered turbulent political waters in recent years with Poland which ratified in 2015 announcing its intention to withdraw from the Convention in July 2020 and challenges for the continuing commitment by the EU to ratify. 31 It should be noted that the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, does not, differently from the Istanbul Convention, frame human trafficking as a manifestation of discrimination based on sex.

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of the European Union’s overall use of the Charter is the Commission’s annual report on the Charter. For example, in 2017 the Charter was invoked by the Court in 195 cases, of which 7 per cent primarily concerned Article 21 (in third place after Article 47 on the right to an effective remedy and Article 41 on the right to good administration).32 Its rich links with other international human rights sources, as outlined above, underline how a broad provision outlawing status discrimination is a central feature of human rights charters. The anti-discrimination on grounds of nationality limb of Article 21(2) has a more distinctive EU flavour, reflecting its long and exceptional history of opening the borders of its states to the movement of EU people, goods and services. It is well known that prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality is a central foundational element of the treaties, with the current formulation in Article 18 TFEU essentially unchanged from its formulation in Article 7 of the 1957 Rome Treaty. Nonetheless, the very two-limb structure of Article 21 of the Charter, whereby nationality discrimination is treated separately, and differently, from status discrimination, signals the distinctive contours that nationality discrimination has been given in the EU. On the one hand, it has been a central (indeed gushing) well for developing very extensive protection for EU citizens, although in order to fall within the scope of EU law there has normally been a need for a cross-border dimension before it is engaged33 and recently the Court of Justice has moved to further curtail equal treatment protection for non-economically active, albeit lawfully residing, EU citizens.34 On the other hand, throughout the development of EU citizenship rights, a restrictive approach has been taken by the Court by denying its protection to third-country nationals. In what follows (II), we first analyse some central issues concerning the scope of application of Article 21. We begin by examining its application to discrimination on the basis of thirdcountry nationality. The juxtaposition of a broad range of prohibited grounds of discrimination in Article 21 raises important issues. We consider how Article 21 is used in relation to issues of overlapping grounds and intersectional discrimination, especially in cases where nationality, ethnicity and race overlap. Finally, an important part of EU discrimination protection concerns its structures and concepts, notably the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination. We then turn to examine an interesting development (III). Status and nationality discrimination, the subject matter of Article 21, have a strong record of being thickly and innovatively developed by the Court of Justice, the EU legislature and the treaty-makers. While the Court of Justice has taken bold steps to develop the constitutional principles of status discrimination and discrimination on grounds of nationality, until recently Article 21 was not the primary source supporting either development. However, that has now changed with the recognition in 2018 that Article 21 has horizontal direct effect.35 This raises further interesting and important questions about Article 21’s place in the emerging EU fundamental rights landscape.

32 Commission Staff Working Document on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2017 accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘2017 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ COM (2018) 396 final. 33 For an exposition of the ‘wholly internal’ situation, see Case C-256/11 Dereci (Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 15 November 2011). 34 Case C-333/13 Dano (Judgment of 11 November 2014, Grand Chamber) and Case C-67/14 Alimanovic (Judgment of 15 September 2015, Grand Chamber). 35 Case C-414/16 Egenberger (Judgment of 17 April 2018, Grand Chamber).



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II.  Scope of Application 21.32 The personal scope of Article 21(1) is exceptionally broad. All persons within the EU suffering any form of status discrimination potentially fall within its scope. Moreover, since CHEZ it has been clarified that one does not have to ‘possess’ the discriminated ground in order to be encompassed by the protection against such discrimination provided for in Article 21(1).36 In CHEZ, an electricity company had placed its electricity meters in an urban area with a predominantly Roma population at an inaccessible height. According to the referring court, it was apparent from the context that the company considered that ‘persons of Roma origin make unlawful connections’ to electricity meters. The litigant in the main proceeding was not of Roma origin herself but ran a convenience store in that area. She successfully claimed that she had suffered from discrimination based on ethnic origin under both the Race Equality Directive (RED) and Article 21(1).37 21.33 It has been clear from an early stage that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality applies across all the treaty freedoms to natural persons.38 A question arises as to whether Article 21(2) applies only to natural persons or whether its protections extend to legal persons too, or even beyond persons to goods and services in the same way as Article 18 TFEU. On the basis of the Charter jurisprudence to date,39 which emphasises the need to assess each Charter provision separately, it seems likely that a broad approach to the personal scope of Article 21 will be taken. (a)  Applying Article 21 to Discrimination on the Basis of Third-Country Nationality 21.34 A central question in relation to the scope of application of Article 21(2) is whether it applies to the EU citizen/third-country national interface so that differences in treatment on this basis can be challenged. This is also a central question in relation to Article 18 TFEU which it mirrors. Neither provision textually limits itself to application to EU citizens only. In relation to Article 18 TFEU, this outcome has instead been achieved by means of judicial interpretation, notably in Vatsouras40 where the interface between EU citizens and third-country nationals (TCNs) was raised in a novel fashion as the national rule in question, in its access to social assistance, treated certain EU citizens worse than certain TCNs. The Court confirmed that the treaty’s prohibition of nationality discrimination: 52 … concerns situations coming within the scope of Community law in which a national of one Member State suffers discriminatory treatment in relation to nationals of another Member State solely on the basis of his nationality and is not intended to apply to cases of a possible difference in treatment between nationals of Member States and nationals of non-member countries.

36 Case C-83/14 CHEZ (Judgment of 16 July 2015, Grand Chamber). 37 Article 2(2)(b) RED (2000/43/EC). 38 Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497 [12]: ‘Nevertheless comparison of these different provisions shows that they are based on the same principles both in so far as they concern the entry into and residence in the territory of Member States of persons covered by Community law and the prohibition of all discrimination between them on grounds of nationality’; Case 118/75 Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185 [9]. 39 For discussion of this in the context of Art 47 EUCFR (effective judicial protection) see Case C-279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I-13849 where the Court concluded that it was ‘not impossible’ for a legal person to obtain legal aid; in relation to other Charter provisions (right to property in Art 17 and freedom to conduct a business in Art 16) their application to legal persons has been assumed: Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich (Judgment of 22 January 2013). 40 Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-4585.

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Post-Lisbon, the possibility of using the now legally binding nationality prohibition in 21.35 Article 21(2) of the Charter to modify this position became more clearly available. In Kamberaj the Court was asked about the compatibility with EU law of a regional Italian law discriminating between EU citizens and third-country nationals in the availability of housing benefit. The national court framed its questions around two centrally relevant Charter provisions, Articles 21 and 34: Does European Union law, in particular, Articles 2 [TEU] and 6 TEU, Articles 21 and 34 of the Charter and Directives 2000/43 … and 2003/109, preclude a provision of national [more correctly: regional] law … inasmuch as that provision, with regard to the allowances concerned, and in particular the so-called ‘housing benefit’, attaches importance to nationality by treating long-term resident workers not belonging to the European Union or stateless persons worse than resident Community nationals (whether or not Italian)?41

Yet, while finding in favour of the TCNs, the Court firmly turned down this invitation to use 21.36 Article 21 as a means of dealing with the discrimination between EU citizens and TCNs. Instead, it based itself on the equal treatment guarantee for third-country nationals found in the 2003 Long-Term Residents Directive, Article 11(1)(d) of which provides that long-term residents are to enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards social security, social assistance and social protection, as those concepts are defined by national law.42 Its willingness to use Article 34 of the Charter in this case serves to highlight its reluctance to use Article 21 in the context of TCNs. Even if it can be argued that the use of Article 21(2) to cover discrimination against TCNs 21.37 is difficult to maintain because of its tight linkage to Article 18 TFEU, and the jurisprudence limiting Article 18 TFEU to EU nationals, that still leaves open the use of the open-ended list in Article 21(1) as a possible means of providing nationality discrimination protection for TCNs. In fact, there are signals that the Court might be considering Article 21(1) as a possible means of protection for TCNs, although not on the basis of nationality.43 All of this demonstrates why the TCN–EU national discrimination interface is a crucial one for understanding the structure of Article 21: is Article 21(2) a lex specialis which rules out the use of Article 21(1) for nationality discrimination not covered by Article 21(2)? In the next section we will return to the increased importance of this question. While well-established, this restrictive position on the personal scope of the nationality 21.38 discrimination prohibition has been challenged by many.44 In particular, the move into EU law post-Amsterdam of provisions on visas, asylum and immigration, and the subsequent adoption of significant legislative texts relating to third-country nationals using these new competences, is argued to have made the traditional interpretation of the treaty’s non-discrimination on grounds 41 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj (Judgment of 24 April 2012, Grand Chamber) para 39. 42 The same position has been taken to the equal treatment provision (Art 12) of the Single Permit Directive (Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State [2011] OJ L343 1. The case, Martinez Silva, concerns discrimination in access to cash benefits for households with more than three minor children. The referring court did not mention the Charter, nor did the Court of Justice. Case C-449/16 Martinez Silva (Judgment of 27 June 2017). 43 In his Opinion in Joined Cases C-443/14 and C-444/14 Alo & Osso (1 March 2016) Advocate General Cruz Villalón argued that the Court should use Article 21(1) to address discriminatory treatment of different immigration statuses, ie refugees and subsidiary protection holders in Germany. The Court declined to use Article 21(1) as the Advocate General suggested. For further analyses see Cunniffe in Select Bibliography. 44 See K Groenendijk, ‘Citizens and Third-Country Nationals: Differential Treatment or Discrimination’ in J-Y Carlier and E Guild (eds), L’avenir de la libre circulation des personnes dans l’UE (Brussels, Bruylant, 2006) 79; C Hublet, ‘The Scope of Article 12 of the Treaty of the European Communities vis-à-via Third-Country Nationals: Evolution at Last?’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 757; S Peers, ‘Implementing Equality? The Directive on Long-Term Resident Third-Country Nationals’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 437.



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of nationality guarantee untenable, as a range of rights, including mobility rights, now apply under the treaty to third-country nationals as well.45 21.39 An additional argument is the compatibility of this restriction on the reach of the EU nationality-discrimination guarantee with the ECHR. As noted earlier, the Strasbourg Court has made it clear that nationality discrimination, although not expressly prohibited by Article 14 of the ECHR, falls within it. More importantly, the ECtHR has subjected nationality discrimination to strict review so that ‘[a]s a general rule, very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention’.46 21.40 However, this strict stance on nationality discrimination sits alongside a long-standing commitment by the European Court of Human Rights to recognise as lawful the EU distinction between nationals of EU Member States and third-country nationals.47 This has been repeated and elaborated in subsequent judgments applying a strict review to nationality discrimination,48 but applying that review to areas falling outside EU law. This then creates the interpretative space within which arguments about the legitimacy of the EU distinction within ECHR jurisprudence can be made: it could, for instance, be argued, that as the EU order changes, the sharp distinction between EU and non-EU nationals no longer holds true to the same extent. (b)  Juxtaposition of Prohibited Grounds in Article 21: Overlaps and Intersectional Discrimination 21.41 The relationship between the status-discrimination grounds of race and ethnic origin in Article 21(1), and the prohibition of nationality-based discrimination in Article 21(2), relates to the efforts to keep nationality discrimination as a distinct and separate regime in EU law. While the two-limb structure of Article 21 reflects this position, the juxtaposition of race, ethnic origin and nationality discrimination haunts contemporary case law. 21.42 Hence, one key question is whether EU citizens or third-country nationals who suffer ­nationality-based disadvantage can claim racial origin discrimination. This is not permitted by RED,49 Article 3(2) of which provides that it ‘does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned’. However, Article 21’s juxtaposition of racial, ethnic origin and nationality discrimination could open up a new textual space in which discrimination on these three grounds might be related more closely. A particular argument for doing so in relation to third-country nationals is that they do not, as we have seen, so far benefit from Article 18 TFEU. Already in Kamberaj, the Court refused to go beyond the limits laid down by RED to consider the applicability of the racial discrimination prohibition to third-country nationals. However, and again demonstrating the close links between racial and nationality discrimination, the Court was 45 See, centrally, the Family Reunification Directive (Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/12–18) and the Long-Term Resident’s Directive: Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2004] OJ L16/44–53. 46 Gaygusuz v Austria (n 19) [42]; see also Luczak v Poland (access to farmers’ social security scheme restricted to Polish nationals pre-EU accession) (n 19) [48]. 47 Moustaquim App no 12313/86 (Judgment of 18 February 1991). 48 Eg Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria (n 19) [54], where the establishment of EU citizenship is stressed: ‘It may also, in certain circumstances, justifiably differentiate between different categories of aliens residing in its territory. For instance, the preferential treatment of nationals of Member States of the European Union—some of whom were exempted from school fees when Bulgaria acceded to the Union … may be said to be based on an objective and reasonable justification, because the Union forms a special legal order, which has, moreover, established its own citizenship.’ 49 RED (2000/43/EC). This restriction is mirrored in Art 3(2) FETD (2000/78).

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prepared to find that a refusal to employ ‘immigrants’ constituted direct racial discrimination under RED.50 In cases concerning EU citizens, the Court’s (and notably AG Wahl’s) conceptual struggle 21.43 with overlaps between the protected grounds of race, ethnicity and nationality surfaces in Jyske Finans.51 In this case Mr Huskic and his partner, both Danish nationals, wanted to finance a car purchase with a loan from Jyske Finans. The credit institution requested additional identity documentation from Mr Huskic, but not his partner, by reference to the fact that the place of birth indicated on his driver’s licence was ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’, thus outside of the EU and EFTA. The Court does not make clear in what way the situation falls within RED’s substantive scope. We can only presume it is Article 3(1)(h) RED on access to and supply of goods. The Court does not refer to the Charter; however, it hinges its reasoning on paragraph 46 of the Grand Chamber case CHEZ from 2015, which develops a definition of ethnic origin ‘within the meaning of Directive 2000/43 and of Article 21 of the Charter’ as being ‘the idea of societal groups marked in particular by common nationality, religious faith, language, cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds’.52 With reference to CHEZ, which concerns discrimination against the Roma population in Bulgaria, the Court in Jyske Finans asserted that, first, discrimination can only be established in relation to ‘a certain’ ethnicity.53 However, as Ward points out there is no reason to deduce from CHEZ that it is a necessary requirement that ‘a certain ethnicity’ is discriminated against for the establishment of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity.54 Second, the Court held that the argument that the ‘neutral criterion at issue in the main proceedings, namely a person’s country of birth, is generally more likely to affect persons of a “given ethnicity” than “other persons” cannot be accepted’.55 This is where the ghost of Articles 21’s two-limb structure appears to make itself present, obscuring the relation between ‘ethnic origin’ and ‘nationality’ in a case where two EU citizens are treated differently. Had Mr Huskic been born somewhere within an EU Member State his case would have 21.44 been caught by Article 21(2). To take an example, Article 21(2) would have encompassed a case in which a German citizen born in Warsaw is asked to provide additional documentation in order to receive a loan in Germany on the grounds that he or she was born in Warsaw. Indeed, within the broader structure of EU law, there is a noteworthy overlap between possessing an ‘EU nationality’ and the CHEZ definition of ‘ethnic origin’. The main example is found in the preambles to the TEU and the EUCFR, which emphasise the diversity of the history, culture and traditions of the ‘peoples’ of the EU Member States. Thus, ‘nationality’, while not an autonomous concept of EU law, is intertwined with the CHEZ definition of what constitutes an ethnicity in EU primary law. Given, however, that Huskic’s ‘place of birth’ is not within an EU Member State, the Court acknowledges no link between ethnic origin, understood as a nexus of nationality, culture, history and traditions, and what the Court imprecisely, inaccurately and variously refers to as Huskic’s ‘sovereign state’, ‘nationality’ and ‘country of birth’.56 The Court’s conclusion that there is no way of understanding ‘place of birth’ as related to ethnic origin in the case at hand

50 Case C-54/07 Feryn [2008] ECR I-5187. 51 Case C-668/15 Jyske Finans (Judgment of 6 April 2017). For a thorough and piercingly critical analysis of the core components of AG Wahl’s Opinion see A Ward, ‘The Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang’ (2018) 20 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 32–60. 52 CHEZ (n 36) [46]. 53 Jyske Finans (n 50) [27] [31]. 54 See further, Ward (n 50). Also to be compared with the ECtHR’s opposite reasoning in Biao v Denmark App No 38590/10 (Judgment of 24 May 2016.) 55 Jyske Finans (n 50) [33]. 56 Jyske Finans (n 50) [18] [21] [24].



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is ­perplexing in at least two ways. First, Mr Huskic, as an EU citizen born outside of the EU, is deprived of the thick discrimination protection attributed to an EU citizen born within the EU. Second and relatedly, the crucial question that the Court of Justice fails to pose is what characteristic of Mr Huskic’s person actually triggers the additional requirement imposed by Jyske Finans, if it is not where he lives, where he works, or even his citizenship? 21.45 Does a reading of Article 21’s placement of ‘ethnic origins’ in paragraph 1 and ‘nationality’ in paragraph 2 as requiring a separation between discrimination based on ‘nationality’ and discrimination based on ‘ethnic origin’, haunt the Court’s reasoning in Jyske Finans? The answer to this question is important, especially since the Court’s reasoning is tied to both Article 21 and RED, and given the growing number of EU citizens born outside of the EU.57 21.46 There are, however, signs that the Court of Justice is ambivalent about the path of Jyske Finans.58 In relation to Article 21 of the Charter, the Grand Chamber seems to suggest a more sophisticated approach in Hungary and Slovakia v Council.59 This case concerned a Council decision from 2015 that sought to allocate third-country nationals under revised asylum application procedures (so-called ‘binding quotas’), with a view to providing assistance to Greece and Italy. Poland was among the intervening states, arguing that it could not participate in this procedure since Poland was ‘virtually ethnically homogenous’ and its population was different ‘from a cultural and linguistic point of view, from the migrants to be relocated on their territory’.60 The Grand Chamber answered that ‘considerations relating to the ethnic origin of applicants for international protection cannot be taken into account since they are clearly contrary to EU law and, in particular, to Article 21 of the Charter’.61 It is notable that the reason the Grand Chamber considers Poland’s argument to be incompatible with the protection guaranteed in Article 21 is not because of the fact that Poland refers to third-country nationals without specifying what ‘certain’ ethnicity these third-country nationals possess. It is enough that Poland singles out these third-country nationals as belonging to ‘another ethnicity’ and not being of Polish ethnicity for the argument to be contrary to the meaning of Article 21. Hungary and Slovakia v Council seems to indicate that the road taken in Jyske Finans—whereby, first, a ‘certain ethnicity’ needs to be identified as disadvantaged to establish discrimination, and, second, the place outside of the EU where one is born is delinked from the concept of ethnic origin—is far from an established interpretation of Article 21(1). More broadly, the multiplication of prohibited grounds of discrimination in EU law, includ21.47 ing within the Charter, has led to the need to consider within EU law the phenomenon of intersectional discrimination.62 By this is meant the specific disadvantage borne by those discriminated against on more than one ground. Importantly, it is not simply a matter of adding together the grounds of discrimination: hence a black woman suffers discrimination which is a distinctive melding of race and gender, at their intersection. Currently EU law does not expressly provide for intersectional discrimination protection. Article 21 of the Charter could potentially provide an important overarching resource for the adaption of EU discrimination legislation to the specificities of intersectional discrimination. 57 The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, ‘Recent Trends in EU Nationals Born Inside and Outside the EU’ (2015). 58 The First Chamber is upholding this reading in Case C-457/17 Maniero (Judgment of 15 November 2018) [47]. 59 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/17 Slovakia and Hungary v Council (Judgment of 6 September 2017, Grand Chamber). 60 Ibid [302]. 61 Ibid [305]. 62 See further Schiek, this volume; D Schiek and A Lawson (eds), EU Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality— Investigating the Triangle between Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2011); I Solanke, ‘Putting Race And Gender Together: A New Approach to Intersectionality’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 723; R Xenidis, ‘Transforming EU Equality Law? On Disruptive Narratives and False Dichotomies’ (2019) Yearbook of European Law.

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A recent example where this potential application of Article 21 was not tested is that of the 21.48 twin cases Achbita and Bougnaoui, which concerned female workers who wore headscarves because of their religious beliefs and who had been dismissed by their respective employers for this reason.63 The cases have the potential to engage multiple grounds protected by Article 21(1), namely sex, religion and ethnicity. The referring courts’ respective preliminary questions only refer to FETD, which concerns discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The circumstances of the dismissals differed and so does the Court’s reasoning. What is similar however, is that both cases are conceived as merely concerning discrimination based on religion, and that neither of the cases mention Article 21(1) of the Charter. Underlining the Court’s reluctance to use Article 21(1) is the fact that in both cases the FETD is read together with Article 10(1) of the Charter on freedom of religion.64 Article 10(1) does not, unlike 21(1), concern discrimination based on religion. Article 21(1) would have provided a more finely tuned legal framework for assessing the topical issue of Muslim women’s equal treatment in employment and occupation (in these cases in the private sector) within the EU. While refraining from speculating about the potential of a different outcome had Article 21(1)’s enumerated grounds been engaged, it should be noted that the Court of Justice has decades of experience in examining discrimination based on sex in employment and occupation. Given this background, it would have been worthwhile to assess discrimination on grounds of sex and religion together in these two cases, which concerned women’s freedom of religion in the workplace. (c)  The Structure and Concepts of Discrimination and Article 21 EUCFR Discrimination has a well-established, albeit evolving, EU law grammar, with distinctive configu- 21.49 rations in relation to particular grounds. Its core components consist of the concepts of direct65 and indirect discrimination.66 In the classical structure, direct discrimination can usually not be justified, or is subject to stricter and often legislatively defined justification—including requirements to possess a certain status to carry out given jobs (eg hiring someone of Maghreb origin to work in providing social assistance to Maghreb communities; permitting religious groups to have only male clergy)—as compared to indirect discrimination, where a broader range of ‘objective justifications’ are generally permitted. Consideration is also given to departures from symmetrical equal treatment in relation to the disadvantaged group; this may range from requiring only the disadvantaged group to be covered by the discrimination protection (eg disability in EU law) to permitting certain kinds of positive action as a tightly construed exception to an otherwise symmetrical application of the status discrimination prohibition.67 Other features include protecting complainants through special burden of proof regimes and victimisation

63 Case C-157/15 Achbita (Judgment of 14 March 2017, Grand Chamber) and Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui (Judgment of 14 March 2017, Grand Chamber). 64 Achbita (n 62) [27] and Bougnaoui (n 62) [29]. In their respective Opinions both AG Kokott (Achbita) and AG Sharpston (Bougnaoui) referred to Article 21(1). Also note that the Court references Article 16 EUCFR on the freedom to conduct a business in Achbita [38]. 65 ‘Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the [prohibited] grounds’: Art 2(2)(a) FETD (2000/78) and RED (2000/43); Art 2(1)(a) GEED (2006/54). 66 ‘Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a [prohibited status] at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’: Art 2(2)(b) FETD (2000/78) and RED (2000/43); Art 2(1)(b) GEED (2006/54). 67 As in the Court of Justice’s famous judgments on positive action in the context of gender equality, discussed by Schiek in this volume: Case C-450/93 Kalanke [1995] ECR I-3051; Case C-409/95 Marschall [1997] ECR I-6363; Case C-158/97 Badeck [2000] ECR I-1875.



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protection68 as well as requirements for special equality agencies69 and constructing ­harassment as a specific form of discrimination.70 Importantly, this family of discrimination concepts, although broadly shared, is also differentiated across the much broader set of grounds protected in EU legislative instruments since the millennium. In the EU, disability discrimination alone contains the obligation of ‘reasonable accommodation’.71 More generally there is a broader set of exceptions, justifications and derogations for the grounds other than race. Direct age discrimination, for example, is given a broad justification defence.72 21.50 What is Article 21’s relationship to this family of discrimination concepts, shared but differentiated across the grounds protected in EU treaties and secondary legislation? This is an important question because, as we have seen, Article 21 makes no reference to any of the components of this family of discrimination concepts. A representative example of how the Court relates discrimination concepts can be found in CHEZ, where the Grand Chamber asserts that Article 21 is given specific expression in ‘Article 1 and 2(1)’ of RED, which address the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination.73 A second representative example of the opposite, namely how the Court does not relate Article 21 to the discrimination concepts, can be found in Fries and Léger, where the Court addresses the question of acceptable limits to Article 21(1) under Article 52(1) of the Charter without answering the question of whether the discrimination identified is direct or indirect.74 Yet, despite this characteristically nebulous referencing when read as a whole,75 so strong is the connection of these concepts to status discrimination, especially within EU law where many of them have been extensively developed by the Court of Justice, we would suggest that Article 21 encompasses them too.76 The family of status-discrimination concepts will be most significant when the Court has to deal with those grounds in Article 21 that are not protected under the EU treaties or in EU secondary legislation.77 As we have seen, this covers grounds enumerated in Article 21 of the Charter but not elsewhere in EU law (such as genetic features discrimination) as well as those status-discrimination grounds covered but not enumerated in Article 21 (eg aesthetic appearance discrimination not covered by an enumerated ground). 21.51 Furthermore, EU nationality discrimination stands somewhat apart from ‘classic’ statusdiscrimination law. Bell accordingly argues that ‘the instrumental nature of EU law on nationality discrimination tends to detach it from the familiar concepts of anti-discrimination law’.78 21.52 Moreover, the Charter forms part of a broader pattern of constitutionalisation and institutionalisation of fundamental human rights and values in the EU. Status-discrimination norms

68 See Arts 10 and 11 FETD (2000/78); Arts 8 and 9 RED; Arts 19 and 24 GEED (2006/54). 69 Race and gender only in EU law: Art 13 RED (2000/43); Art 20 Gender ETD (2006/54). 70 ‘Harassment shall be deemed to be a form of discrimination … when unwanted conduct related to any of the [prohibited] grounds takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. In this context, the concept of harassment may be defined in accordance with the national laws and practice of the Member States’: Art 2(3) FETD (2000/78) and RED (2000/43); Art 2(1)(c) and 2(2)(a) Gender ETD (2006/54). 71 Art 5 FETD (2000/78). 72 Art 6 FETD (2000/78). 73 CHEZ (n 34) [45] [50]. 74 Case C-528/13 Léger (Judgment of 29 April 2015) and Case C-190/16 Fries (Judgment of 5 July 2017). See further, section IV below. 75 See further, section III(c). 76 A clear indicator being the way in which derogations to Article 21(1) is being continuously developed by the Court, see further section IV. 77 Differently from CHEZ (ethnic origin), Léger (sexual orientation) and Fries (age). 78 M Bell, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 611, 613.

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have been a central instance of these developments. Hence, in the TEU, non-discrimination is a core EU value (Art 2), and combating discrimination is a core objective (Art 3(3)). Two horizontal clauses in the TFEU commit the EU to mainstreaming eliminating gender inequality (Art 8 TFEU) and combating discrimination on the other legislated EU grounds in all its policies and activities (Art 10 TFEU). The EU coordinates national equality agencies (EQUINET), the creation of which are required by EU discrimination legislation, while information-gathering and analysis is driven by, in particular, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, and the EU both supports and gives institutional roles to national and transnational discrimination NGOs.79 In this perspective, Article 21, especially its status-discrimination limb, can be an additional source around which to frame a rich and recursive set of EU anti-discrimination practices. Of particular note is the European Parliament’s resolution on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States, and paragraph 21 of that resolution which links free movement and sexual orientation discrimination with Article 21 of the Charter.80 Another example of the way in which Article 21 is used by the European Parliament is to guide EU spending to advance its objectives,81 as well as in law making.82

III.  Specific Provisions The subject matter of Article 21 links it to a vast swathe of specific non-discrimination provi- 21.53 sions in EU law, both in the treaties and in legislative instruments, covering indeed much of what is considered to be the heart of EU law. Further, both status discrimination and nationality discrimination have been the focus of intense, sustained and often expansive development by the Court of Justice, the treaty-makers and the legislature. One significant feature of these developments was an intense linking and reworking of 21.54 secondary legislation on the basis of it being merely an elaboration of a primary treaty prohibition of discrimination, thereby circumventing various limits on the applicability of those secondary sources. Hence, in early gender equality cases such as Defrenne and Jenkins v Kingsgate, the Equal Pay Directive was recast as a mere working out of the treaty principle of equal pay, meaning that that principle could be applied in horizontal situations.83 Similarly, the Court has historically viewed the economic freedoms as working out the implications of the overarching principle of nationality discrimination, itself an independent source of rights. With this historical trajectory of EU discrimination law in mind, and given the more recent 21.55 legal developments we have seen so far, which certainly place the subject matter of Article 21 at the heart of the EU, the maturation of Article 21 presents a stimulating puzzle. Where

79 For analysis of these features as constituting an incipient, democratic, experimental framework, see G de Búrca, ‘Stumbling into Experimentalism: the EU Anti-Discrimination Regime’ in CF Sabel and J Zeitlin (eds), Experimental Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 215. See also E Muir, C Kilpatrick, J Miller and B De Witte (eds) How EU Law Shapes Opportunities for Preliminary References on Fundamental Rights: Discrimination, Data Protection and Asylum (EUI Working Paper, 2017/17). 80 European Parliament resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States (2017/2937(RSP)). 81 Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme for the period 2014 to 2020. 82 Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers. Recital 13 reads: ‘Enforcement of that fundamental freedom [of movement for workers] should take into consideration the principle of equality between women and men and the prohibition of discrimination of Union workers and members of their family on any ground set out in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”)’. 83 Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455 [60]; Case 96/80 Jenkins v Kingsgate [1981] ECR 911 [22].



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Member State (rather than EU) action is at stake, Article 21 has, after a long period of time, been (a) attributed horizonal direct effect, and it is (b) continually used as a primary source concerning the validity of EU legislation. Meanwhile, there are cases in which Article 21 remains (c) blatantly ignored. Briefly exploring these three stances tells further interesting and important stories about Article 21’s place in the emerging EU fundamental rights landscape. (a)  Article 21 and the General Principle of Non-Discrimination: From Supporting Role to Centre Stage 21.56 The three cardinal components of post-Lisbon EU fundamental rights policy are set out in Article 6 TEU: (a) the binding Charter with due regard for its Explanations;84 (b) the ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States which shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law;85 and (c) ECHR accession.86 Status discrimination has been a primary Court of Justice locus for creative interpretation of the first two of these. 21.57 For many years the Court did not attribute horizontal direct effect to Article 21 of the Charter. Instead, from the 2005 case Mangold onwards, it used general principles to attribute horizonal direct effect, first to age87 and later to other status-discrimination grounds.88 The core innovation of Mangold was that the Court first ‘uncovered’ a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, an unwritten source, and placed it at the centre of its judgment. Rather than asking whether such a general principle should be enforceable against a private individual, the Court reasoned that because the general principle was supreme, the national court was obliged to set aside any national law that conflicted with it. In subsequent cases, the Court confirmed this new function of the general principle.89 Thus, for over a decade Article 21 was sidelined and subsumed by this use of a general principle of status discrimination. 21.58 Finally, in 2018 in Egenberger the Court made the leap to fully equate the Charter with the non-discrimination guarantees in the treaties so that the former should also be horizontally directly effective.90 The German Protestant Church had advertised a fixed-term job to write a parallel report on the UN CERD Convention. Relying on a provision of German law, the job description required membership of the Protestant Church. The unsuccessful job applicant, Vera Egenberger, of no denomination herself, claimed discrimination based on religious belief. The Court of Justice instructed the national court that the ‘occupational requirement’ exception to equal treatment provided in Article 4(2) FETD, which the Church argued protected the membership requirement, needed to concern positions embodying the very ethos of the church. The Court went on to state that if the practice did not fall within Article 4(2), the national court needed to respect the prohibition of all discrimination based on religion, which is a general principle of EU law. Crucially, ‘that prohibition, which is laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such in disputes between individuals’.91 The Court continued: As regards its mandatory effect, Article 21 of the Charter is no different, in principle, from the various provisions of the founding Treaties prohibiting discrimination on various grounds, even where the discrimination derives from contracts between individuals ….92

84 Art

6(1) TEU. 6(3) TEU. 86 Art 6(2) TEU. 87 Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981. Mangold was the Court’s first age discrimination decision. 88 Case C-147/08 Römer (Judgment of 10 May 2011, Grand Chamber). 89 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365. 90 Egenberger (n 35). 91 Ibid [76]. 92 Ibid [77]. 85 Art

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Hence, Article 21 of the Charter has, via a different path of reasoning, supplanted the role of the Mangold general principle jurisprudence. For the first time, Article 21 was used, in the words of the Court, ‘in itself ’, in a dispute between two private parties enabling the nullification of a provision of national law.93 The language ‘in itself ’ is noteworthy given how prior to 2018 the Court cited Article 21 in cases where it deployed the horizontal direct effect of unwritten general principles. In Kücükdeveci from 2010, for instance, after affirming the existence of unwritten general principles which prohibit discrimination, the Court added that Article 21 ‘should also be noted’.94 This shift in language underlines the evolution in the Court’s view of the horizontal direct effect of Article 21. What explains the move away from the use of unwritten general principle to the attribution of 21.59 horizontal direct effect to Article 21? We would like to suggest two possible explanations. First, the Court of Justice may have taken note of the Danish Supreme Court’s high-profile and determined resistance to using general principles to strike down provisions of national law in response to the Court of Justice’s 2014 ruling in Ajos.95 In Ajos the Court of Justice found that the Danish Supreme Court was obliged to strike down a provision of national law that violated the prohibition of discrimination based on age. In its preliminary references, the Danish Supreme Court had already raised concerns that unwritten general principles were at odds with the principles of ‘legal certainty’ and ‘legitimate expectations’.96 The Court of Justice rejected these arguments.97 In response, once it gave its final verdict in 2016, the Danish Supreme Court refused to adhere to the Court of Justice’s ruling, and justified this stance by concluding that the use of unwritten general principles was not foreseen by the Danish Law on Accession to the EEC from 1972.98 We consider that this action by the Danish Supreme Court might have motivated the Court of Justice to turn to Article 21’s written prohibition of discrimination. A second, and not mutually exclusive, explanation for why in 2018 the Court of Justice chose 21.60 to base horizonal effect directly on Article 21 is that such a turn forms part of a broader shift in which the Court increasingly accords horizontal direct effect to Charter provisions, especially Article 31(2) on the right to annual paid leave.99 (b)  Article 21 as a Primary Source of Fundamental Rights Status-Discrimination Protection Since the Court of Justice used Article 21(1) to strike down a provision in an EU directive 21.61 in Test-Achats, Article 21(1) has served a role as a primary source of status-discrimination protection.100 Test-Achats concerned the legality of a provision providing for an open-ended derogation from the principle of equal treatment between women and men for various insurance premiums and benefits in a directive (2004/113) extending the gender equality guarantee to goods and services. 93 Egenberger was confirmed in Case C-68/17 IR (Judgment of 11 September 2018, Grand Chamber) and Case C-193/17 Cresco Investigations (Judgment of 22 January 2019, Grand Chamber), discussed below, section V. 94 Kücükdeveci (n 88) [22]. 95 Case C-441/14 Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S (Judgment of 19 April 2016, Grand Chamber). 96 Ibid [20]. 97 Ibid [43]. 98 In translation: ‘A situation such as this, in which a principle at treaty level under EU law is to have direct effect (thereby creating obligations) and be allowed to take precedence over conflicting Danish law in a dispute between individuals, without the principle having any basis in a specific treaty provision, is not foreseen in the Law on accession.’ Sag 15/2014, Dansk Industri som mandatar for Ajos A/S mod Boet efter A (Højesterets dom, 6 December 2016) 45. 99 Case C-684/16 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften (Judgment of 6 November 2018, Grand Chamber); C-569/16 Bauer (Judgment of 6 November 2018, Grand Chamber) and C-385/17 Hein (Judgment of 13 December 2018). 100 Test-Achats (n 14).



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21.62

Interestingly, the Belgian Constitutional Court’s reference expressly asked the Court of Justice not about the Charter but about Article 6(2) TEU (now Article 6(3) TEU), namely the provision respecting fundamental rights as general principles of Community law. However, the Court pushed it firmly towards the Charter and noted that, as the 2004 Directive expressly refers to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, these provided the appropriate benchmark for assessing the validity of the challenged provision in the Directive. But it should be noted that, as we have seen from our analysis of challenges to Member States’ status-discrimination laws, this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for use of the Charter. The Court ultimately used Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter to rule as invalid the challenged provision. 21.63 The role that Article 21(1) can play in reviewing the legality of EU secondary law is confirmed in Glatzel and Fries.101 Glatzel concerned the question of whether Directive 2006/126/ EC on driving licences, which provided for a minimum vision requirement to be able to drive heavy goods vehicles, was compatible with Article 21 (discrimination based on disability) and Article 26 of the Charter. Fries concerned the question of whether Regulation 1178/2011 on air transport, which foresees an age-limit of 65 for commercial pilots, could be found compatible with Articles 21 (discrimination based on age) and 15 of the Charter. In Glatzel and Fries the challenged piece of EU secondary legislation was ultimately declared valid and the Court made reference to Article 52(1) on the scope of the Charter. No reference was made to Article 52(1) in Test-Achats. We will return to this use of Article 52(1) in relation to Article 21 in a moment.102 Yet clearly, Test-Achats, Glatzel and Fries, when set against the other status-discrimination cases we have discussed, show that the Court is especially keen to use the Charter in relation to status discrimination by the EU institutions. The question going forward is whether Egenberger signals a rapprochement by the Court of Justice in favour of using Article 21 to strike down Member States’ legislation, actions and practices. A notable parallel development to those described above is that, in the wake of the Eurozone 21.64 crises, Article 21 has been invoked in a series of cases concerning the legality of pay cuts resulting from EU sovereign debt programmes or excessive deficit decisions. All have been rejected either because the Court found it lacked jurisdiction as the referring national court had not shown how the measure challenged implemented EU law,103 or because it found no breach.104 (c)  Ignoring Article 21 21.65 Both limbs of Article 21 raise the important question of the nature of the added value which the Charter brings to existing EU law in its application to disputes involving Member State laws and practices. Beginning with status discrimination, its added value has not been overstated in the Court’s 21.66 case record to date.105 As already noted, Article 21(1) is frequently used in a near declaratory sense to refer to FETD, GEED and to RED.106 However, this has not developed into a standard and consistent declaratory practice so that in very many cases, the status discrimination

101 Case C-356/12 Glatzel (Judgment of 22 May 2014) and Fries (n 70). See also Italy v Commission (n 1), although the Court’s judgment is based primarily on the Staff Regulation which reproduces Art 21(1) EUCFR. 102 See below, section IV. 103 Eg C-134/12 Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor (Order of 10 May 2012). 104 Eg C-49/18 Escribano Vindel (Judgment of 7 February 2019). 105 See section II above. 106 E.g. that the directive is merely ‘a specific expression’ of the general prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 21 of the Charter. See for examples of such declarations CHEZ (n 35) [42]; Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn (Judgment of 12 May 2011) [43] and C-507/18 NH (23 April 2020) [38].

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­ irectives are applied with no reference to Article 21 EUCFR.107 Further, the Court sometimes d explicitly excludes any potential application of Article 21(1) where the directives have been evoked and examined.108 However, in cases not covered by EU discrimination directives there are signs that the Charter could have genuine added value.109 This latter point, to add a further caveat, should be read together with our analysis in section II a on the modest discrimination protection of TCN’s under either limb of Article 21. The ‘adds-little’ view is also an important key through which to read Article 21(2). As noted, 21.67 Article 21(2) is worded almost identically to the TFEU’s guarantee of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (Art 18). This makes it interesting as, on one reading, it simply restates in a fundamental rights document the content and limitations of Article 18 TFEU as interpreted by the Court. If that is the case, it adds little to what is already a primary treaty right, as both the TFEU and the Charter have ‘the same legal value’. This reading may underpin the Court’s current ignoring of Article 21(2) in the many groundbreaking cases engaging nationality discrimination since the Charter was given legal effect. Among cases concerning EU citizenship, the recent Coman presents an interesting ‘adds-little’ 21.68 example.110 Mr Coman had married his American partner, Mr Hamilton, in Belgium and wished to re-establish himself, together with his spouse, in his home country of Romania. They were informed by the Romanian immigration authority that Mr Hamilton could not be considered Mr Coman’s spouse in the sense of the Citizens’ Rights Directive as Romania did not recognise same sex marriages. The referring court asked three questions in relation to Article 21, the second one being whether ‘Directive 2004/38, read in the light of Articles 7, 9, 21 and 45 of the Charter, require the host Member State to grant the right of residence in its territory for a period of longer than three months to the same sex spouse of a citizen of the European Union’. The Court of Justice constructed its affirmative answer to this question with reference to the Citizens’ Rights Directive alone and did not refer to Article 21. The first and second paragraphs of the judgment both make reference to the rights to privacy and family life in Article 7 of the Charter, throwing into relief the Court’s reluctance to use Article 21.111 As in Achbita and Bougnaoui discussed above, the Court’s reasoning on the question of potential discrimination employs Charter articles (ie Article 7 in Coman and Article 10 in Achbita and Bougnaoui) which do not address the question of discrimination.112 On the topic of citizenship, the absence of Article 21(2) as a relevant source is further 21.69 highlighted by examining key legislation on the free movement of EU citizens and the immigration of third-country nationals. All make extensive reference to Article 21 but not to its nationality discrimination limb as one might have expected, especially in the Citizens’ Rights Directive.

107 E.g. Case C-267/06 Maruko [2008] ECR I-1757 and Case C-443/15 Parris (Judgment of 24 November 2016) (sexual orientation); Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, C-132/11, Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt (Judgment of 7 June 2012), Case C-258/15 Sorondo (Judgment of 15 November 2016), Case C-423/15 Kratzer (Judgment of 28 July 2016) and Case C-159/15 Lesar (Judgment of 16 June 2016) (age); Case C-54/07 Feryn [2008] ECR I-5187 and Jyske Finans (n 48) (race); Case C-152/11 Odar (Judgment of 6 December 2012) and Case C-270/16 Ruiz Conejero (18 January 2018) (disability). 108 In Vital Pérez the Court, with reference to Article 21(1), states that it ‘examines the question of discrimination ‘solely’ in the light of the directive (FETD) and in YS of the directives (FETD and GEED) ‘alone’. C-416/13 Vital Pérez (Judgment of 13 November 2014) [25] and Case C-223/19 YS (Judgment of 24 September 2020) [25]. 109 This would follow the reasoning in Léger (n 73), where Member State legislation implementing EU law was assessed in light of the protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation as listed in 21(1) in a case where no equal treatment directive was applicable, the same pattern is visible in C-243/19 A (29 October 2020). See further section IV. 110 Case C-673/16 Coman (Judgment of 5 June 2018, Grand Chamber). 111 Ibid [49]. 112 Section II b.



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While the Citizens’ Rights Directive refers in its preamble to the prohibition of nationality discrimination, this is not linked to Article 21. Yet all these directives, concerned with granting their beneficiaries the right to be treated like a host-state national, instead extensively refer to the status discrimination limb of Article 21.113

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 21.70 Many of these have already been discussed earlier in this analysis, so we limit ourselves here to highlighting two key issues. One key issue concerns when the Charter can overcome the limitations and derogations in EU discrimination law. A second, distinct though connected, issue is how Article 21 is itself limited. 21.71 In relation to the first issue, as noted earlier when examining the structure of EU discrimination law, we saw that there is a wide and ground-differentiated set of justifications and derogations from the status-discrimination prohibitions. While the justifications and derogations from gender and race discrimination are relatively tightly drawn (although the Social Security Gender Equality Directive is a significant exception) those for age, sexual orientation, religion/belief and disability are set more widely. 21.72 In relation to the second issue, we have seen that the expansive potential scope of Article 21 is limited by the Charter itself in a number of ways. First, the nationality prohibition is expressly tied to the relevant treaty provisions, in both its own wording and in the Explanations. Moreover, this is reinforced by Article 52(2) which provides that ‘rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’. 21.73 As discussed in section II the bearing of the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination on Article 21(1) is still evolving. The use of these concepts is particularly important when defining justifiable derogations to Article 21(1). In Léger, Fries and Glatzel, the Court used Article 52(1) to define the acceptable limitations to the protection afforded under 21(1).114 In all instances, and as noted above, without specifying whether the challenged piece of legislation is directly or indirectly discriminatory, the Court established a priori discrimination under Article 21(1). The Court then turned to Article 52(1) to evaluate whether this could be considered justified. Whereas Fries and Glatzel concerned the validity of EU secondary legislation, Léger concerned national law implementing EU law. Given, as noted earlier, the Court’s track record of judicial review of EU legislation on the basis of Article 21(1), we examine its reasoning in Léger. In Léger, EU Directive 2004/33/EC, concerning certain technical requirements for blood and blood components, excluded blood donations from ‘persons whose sexual behaviour puts them at high risk of acquiring severe infectious diseases that can be transmitted by blood’. The French law implementing this provision (found in Annex III to the Directive) defined this as encompassing ‘permanent contraindication to blood donation for a man who has had sexual relations with another man’. The Court of Justice concluded that the French law, a priori ‘may discriminate against homosexuals on grounds of sexual orientation within the meaning of Article 21(1) of the Charter’.115 The Court immediately consulted Article 52(1) and affirmed that any limitation must be provided for by law and be proportionate in the sense that the limitation must be

113 See Directive 2003/109 Preamble (5); Directive 2003/86 Preamble (5); Directive 2004/38 Preamble (5), (6) and (20) (nationality discrimination) and (31) (EU Charter and status discrimination). 114 Fries (n 73), Léger (n 73) and Glatzel (n 100). 115 Léger (n 73) [50].

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necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union. The Court of Justice then asserted that the limitation was provided by law and pursued the general interest of protecting public health. While overall the Court of Justice is deferential, it instructed the referring court that the French implementation law in question could only be proportionate if scientific and technological developments do not offer a less onerous method than the exclusion of all men who have sex with men from giving blood. Léger concerns a discriminatory situation distinctly more evocative of direct discrimination 21.74 than indirect, as the French law singles out men who have sex with men. Nonetheless, Article 52(1) and the method of justification that the Court draws from it is more reminiscent of the EU law wide method for assessing indirect discrimination (or even ‘indistinctly applicable measures’, to momentarily recall internal market law). In A, by contrast, the Court uses Article 21(1) to clearly establish an ultimately justifiable case of indirect discrimination based on religion.116 The case concerns a Latvian Jehovah witness who wants his son to receive open-heart surgery without blood transfusion, a procedure available in Poland but not in Latvia. The Latvian authorities deny A’s request for prior authorisation to seek healthcare in Poland under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, and prior authorisation for reimbursement of such medical treatment under Directive 2011/24/EU on patients’ rights in cross- border healthcare. In both instances the Court finds that the rejections (in the case of reimbursement the hypothetical rejection) amount to indirect discrimination. The Court, scrupulously, goes on to examine Latvia’s motivations referring to treatment capacity and medical competence and concludes that each of these are to be considered an ‘objective and reasonable criterion’, and that, in principle, the rejection of prior authorisation is an appropriate and necessary means of achieving that aim. This means that, as we discussed earlier, the Court’s current use of justifiable derogations from Article 21(1), which unevenly engages with well-sedimented concepts of direct and indirect discrimination, complicates navigation within the terrain of EU equal treatment law. In the case of Léger this is exemplified by the Court of Justice allowing the national court to justify what appears to be direct discrimination with a method of justification more similar to that traditionally used for indirect discrimination. In A, a textbook application of the method for establishing justifiable derogations to indirect discrimination is used in relation to Article 21(1). Ultimately, as the case law stands, this crisscrossing between methods of justification under the auspices of the Charter is to the detriment of those people it sets out to protect. Further, while the status discrimination prohibition is limited only in the Explanations, 21.75 these essentially stress at some length the implications of the horizontal provision contained in Article 51 for status discrimination. Hence, echoing Article 51(2), Article 21(1) ‘does not alter the extent of powers granted under Article 19 [TFEU] nor the interpretation given to that Article’. And, underlining Article 51(1), the Explanations relating to status discrimination also stress that the Charter applies to the EU institutions and to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. This belt-and-braces approach makes the legal status of the Explanations, in particular the requirement in Article 6(1) TEU to have ‘due regard’ to them, less critical than it might otherwise be. Can Article 52 EUCFR provide some counterweight to this limiting approach in the sphere 21.76 of status and nationality discrimination? Article 52(3) provides that Charter protection should be at least co-extensive with that provided by the ECHR, whilst Article 52(4) requires that





116 A

(n 108).

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Charter rights corresponding to fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States should be interpreted in harmony with those traditions. Insofar, therefore, as greater protection is provided by either the ECHR or national constitutional traditions, Article 52 could provide a textual counterweight to the limitations on Article 21. 21.77 However, in the sphere of status discrimination, it is the EU which has generally been the front runner in developing protection, making it unlikely, though certainly not impossible, that ECHR or national constitutional protection might outpace it. In the sphere of nationality discrimination, as far as EU citizens are concerned and as the Explanations to Article 52 expressly note, EU law provides more extensive protection to them than the ECHR. Hence the limitations provided by Article 16 ECHR on the rights of aliens117 do not apply to EU citizens, though this has also been established by the Strasbourg Court.118 Earlier, we discussed whether the European Court of Human Rights’ broader protection from nationality discrimination could be used to nudge the Court of Justice into a different position under EU law in relation to comparing EU and non-EU nationals.119

V. Remedies 21.78 Historically, status discrimination has been a key area of EU law for the development of strict and extensive requirements on the effectiveness of national remedies.120 Article 21 provides an important demonstration of one of the key remedies a successful direct use of the Charter can afford. In Test-Achats it was used by the Court of Justice to invalidate provisions of a piece of EU legislation which contravened the Charter obligation not to discriminate on grounds of gender. In Egenberger, Article 21 was attributed horizontal direct effect to invalidate a national provision which violated the right to protection against discrimination based on religious belief in a dispute arising between two private parties. In Cresco Investigations, the Grand Chamber built on the horizontal direct effect attributed 21.79 to Article 21 in Egenberger by guaranteeing the right to compensation.121 Cresco Investigations concerned a provision whereby members of certain Christian churches were entitled to paid leave on Good Friday, while employees without such membership had no right to paid leave. The Court, following Egenberger, ruled that Article 21 also prohibits discrimination based on religion when it derives from contracts between individuals. It went on to state that the referring court would be obliged ‘to guarantee individuals the legal protection afforded to employees under Article 21 of the Charter and to guarantee the full effect of that article’.122 Accordingly, until the national law is altered the employer is obliged to guarantee paid leave on Good Friday to all its workers. Egenberger and Cresco Investigations represent a significant step towards placing Article 21 at the centre of legal claims for remedies for having suffered status discrimination in the EU.

117 ‘Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 (art. 10, art. 11, art. 14) shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.’ 118 Piermont v France App nos 15773/89 and 15774/89 (Judgment of 27 April 1995). 119 See above section II a. 120 C Kilpatrick, ‘Turning Remedies Around: A Sectoral Analysis of the European Court of Justice’ in G de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice. Collected courses of the Academy of European Law (11/2) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) 143. 121 Cresco Investigations (n 92). 122 Ibid [78].

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E. Evaluation Article 21 provides a highly productive vantage-point from which to analyse status and nation- 21.80 ality discrimination in EU law. Analysis from this starting point allows their evolving role and content as ‘human rights’ norms to be teased out temporally and in different EU institutional locations. The distinctive treatment of nationality discrimination in EU law, whereby it has not been used to test distinctions between EU and non-EU nationals, is cast in a different light when set against a broader human rights canvas and within a rapidly evolving EU legal order and European society. This is even more true when forms of intersectional and overlapping discrimination (like those of nationality, race and ethnicity) are taken into account. The very juxtaposition in Article 21 of nationality and status discrimination, in an omnibus 21.81 fundamental right outlawing discrimination, opens new questions and perspectives about their shared structure and field of application. We have suggested that the existence of a broad, and open-ended, discrimination Charter provision offers new possibilities and provides a resource to deal with overlapping as well as intersectional discrimination, and to develop innovative approaches to tackling discrimination. In this sense, Article 21 may act as an important bridge for the development of EU discrimination protection. While the non-use of Article 21 is still an important story to be told and examined, the article 21.82 has already been used to strike down a provision of an EU directive as invalid, which itself raises many fundamental questions about the structure of EU law and the relationship between the Court and the EU legislature, and it has been attributed horizonal direct effect. This latter development opens the door for Article 21 to play a significant role in shaping EU fundamental rights law, given the undoubted importance of both status discrimination and nationality discrimination as central and rapidly evolving areas of EU law.



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Article 22 Article 22 Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 22 This Article has been based on Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and on Article 151(1) and (4) of the EC Treaty, now replaced by Article 167(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, concerning culture. Respect for cultural and linguistic diversity is now also laid down in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union. The Article is also inspired by Declaration No 11 to the Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty on the status of churches and nonconfessional organisations, now taken over in Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Select Bibliography T Ahmed, The Impact of EU Law on Minority Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011). X Arzoz (ed), Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008). A von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as Situation, Executive, and Promoter of the International Law of Cultural Diversity—Elements of a Beautiful Friendship’ (2008) 19(2) The European Journal of International Law 241–75. R Craufurd Smith, ‘The Evolution of Cultural Policy in the European Union’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, OUP, 2011) 869–94. B de Witte, ‘Language rights: the interaction between domestic and European developments’, in AL Kjaer and S Adamo (eds), Linguistic Diversity and European Democracy (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011). P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Revised Edition: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford, OUP, 2013). Y Donders, ‘The Protection of Cultural Rights in Europe: None of the EU’s Business?’ (2003) 10/2 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 117–48. M-C Foblets and J Velaers, ‘Article 22’, in F Picod and S Van Drooghenbroeck (eds) Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Commentaire Article par Article (Brussels, Bruylant, 2018). T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights—A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) chs 1, 5, 10, 11. J Krommendijk, ‘Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles? The Role of the EU Charter’s Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice’ (2015) 22 European Constitutional Law Review 321–65. A Littoz-Monnet, The European Union and Culture. Between Economic Regulation and European Cultural Policy (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007). T Lock, ‘Rights and Principles in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, (2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 1201–26. J Morijn, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Cultural Diversity in the EU’ in E Psychogiopoulou (ed) Cultural Governance and the European Union. Protecting and Promoting Cultural Diversity in Europe (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) ch 11. P Van Parijs, Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World (Oxford, OUP, 2011). A Patten, Equal Recognition. The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014).

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S Peers and A Ward (eds), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) ch 6. E Psychogiopoulou, The Integration of Cultural Considerations in EU law and Policies (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). C Romainville (ed), European Law and Cultural Policies (Brussels, PIE Peter Lang, 2015). C Romainville, ‘Cultural Diversity as a Multilevel and Multifaceted Legal Notion Operating in the Law on Cultural Policies’ (2016) 22/2 International Journal of Cultural Policy 273–90. G Schwellnus, ‘Reasons for Constitutionalization: Non-discrimination, Minority Rights and Social Rights in the Convention on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2006) 13(8) Journal of European Public Policy 1265–83.

A.  Field of Application of Article 22 22.01 Although the 1957 EEC Treaty was motivated by a desire to prevent any repetition of the savage cultural and religious repression that characterised the Second World War, it did not address these concerns directly, save for the commitment to ‘preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’ in the preamble. Instead, mutual respect and tolerance was to be encouraged indirectly through the mechanism of economic integration.1 Concern on the part of certain Member States at the potential for EU law to erode distinctive traditions, coupled with growing recognition on the part of the European institutions that successful integration required more than simply a functioning internal market, led to the establishment in 1992 of European citizenship and adoption of a specific article on culture, now Article 167 TFEU.2 Article 167(4) TFEU sought to address Member State concerns by requiring the EU to take ‘cultural aspects into account’ in all its actions, while Article 167(1) TFEU establishes a specific basis for EU action and the development of EU policy in the cultural field. These two paragraphs are among the few foundational Treaty bases for Article 22 CFR mentioned in the explanatory notes. A further article mentioned in the explanatory notes is former Article 6 TEU, which identified 22.02 certain values fundamental to the EU legal order (paras 1–2) and the importance of respect for the national identities of the Member States (para 3). These provisions are now spread across Articles 2 and 4 TEU. Respect for diversity sustains, and is itself sustained by, certain core values identified in the TEU. These values derive from the ‘cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe’, noted in the preamble, and include ‘respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ (Art 2 TEU). This expands on the previous Article 6(1) TEU by adding the explicit reference to human dignity, equality and, of particular interest from the perspective of Article 22 CFR, minority rights. Article 2 TEU not only serves to internalise the political and ethical standards that underpin the Copenhagen accession criteria for new EU members,3 the Union is also required to promote these values in its external relations (Arts 3(1), 3(5), 8 TEU).

1 E Steyger, National Traditions and European Community Law, Margarine and Marriage (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997); E Psychogiopoulou, The Integration of Cultural Considerations in EU Law and Policies (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). 2 By the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, for a historical perspective see A Littoz-Monnet, The European Union and Culture. Between Economic Regulation and European Cultural Policy (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007) 37–70 and R Craufurd Smith, ‘Community Intervention in the Cultural Field: Continuity or Change?’ in Craufurd Smith (ed), Culture and European Union Law (Oxford, OUP, 2004) 19–78. 3 Conclusions of the Presidency of 21–22 June 1993 (SN 180/93) p 13.

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Apart from these foundational values, a number of Treaty articles expressly require the EU to 22.03 respect cultural diversity, either generally or at European, national or sub-national levels.4 One of the most inclusive provisions appears in Article 3(3) TEU, the last of the three Treaty articles mentioned in the explanatory notes to Article 22 CFR, which states that the EU ‘shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced’. Article 167(1) TFEU calls on the EU to bring the ‘common cultural heritage to the fore’, while the ‘mainstreaming’ provision in Article 167(4) TFEU similarly requires the Union ‘to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures’. Articles 167 TFEU and 3(3) TEU together establish a new framework for thinking about culture: not only do distinctive cultural expressions at the sub-national and national levels contribute to Europe’s cultural diversity, so do the many cultural practices that cross Europe’s state boundaries and are shared by various configurations of ‘European peoples’. These manifestations of diversity are now matters of European as well national concern. In contrast, Articles 4(2) TEU and 67(1) TFEU make specific reference to national, regional, 22.04 or local identity, the concern here being to shield domestic identity from erosion by EU law. Article 4(2) TEU requires the Union to respect the ‘equality of the Member States’, as well as their national identities ‘inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’. As indicated, this finds its origins in Article 6(3) TEU, though now includes the additional reference to equality and the more explicit reference to internal constitutional structures. Though the focus here is on political or constitutional identity, such identity has important cultural, religious and linguistic dimensions.5 The German Federal Constitutional Court has, for example, held that ‘cultural issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstances concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of opinion, press and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or ideology’ are all closely tied to the protection of national identity.6 Article 67(1) TFEU calls for respect for the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States within the area of freedom, security and justice, while, in the cultural context, Article 167(1) TFEU calls on the EU to contribute to the ‘flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity’. The reference to Article 6 TEU in the Explanatory Note to Article 22 CFR highlights the fact that the problematic tension between respect for diversity, on the one hand, and national identity, on the other, was built into the very foundations of the Article.7 Save in relation to discrimination, discussed below, the TFEU does not establish any specific 22.05 competence in the field of religion. On the contrary, Article 17 TFEU requires the EU to respect the status under national law of churches and religious, as well as philosophical and non-confessional, organisations. This incorporates the terms of Declaration No 11 to the Amsterdam Treaty, identified as an ‘inspiration’ for Article 22 CFR in the explanatory notes. Although Article 17 TFEU focuses on national autonomy in religious matters, as opposed to the

4 See Arts 3(3), 4(2) TEU and 67(1), 167(1), 167(4) TFEU, discussed further below. 5 Consider, for example, discussion in Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija, Lietuvos Respublikos teisingumo ministerija, Valstybinė lietuvių kalbos komisija, Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracijos Teisės departamento Civilinės metrikacijos skyrius, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291, [86]–[89] and C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806. 6 A von Bogdandy and S Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1417–54, 1439. 7 For a thoughtful exploration of this topic see A von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as Situation, Executive, and Promoter of the International Law of Cultural Diversity—Elements of a Beautiful Friendship’ (2008) 19(2) The European Journal of International Law 241–75.



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direct protection of religious freedom, its scope is limited to the status of religious associations under national law. Characterisation of religious traditions or practices as ‘cultural’, though controversial, would require the EU to take into account the impact of EU law on religious diversity through the vehicle of Article 167(4) TFEU. A requirement to respect Member State customs regarding ‘religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage’ is now contained in Article 13 TFEU, which relates to animal welfare. 22.06 The Treaty basis for the obligation to respect linguistic diversity in Article 22 CFR is also rather thin.8 Neither the first nor fourth paragraphs of Article 151 EC, now Article 167 TFEU, made reference to language, though support for literary creation, mentioned in paragraph 2, is language-based. Language is, however, regarded a key form of cultural expression, so that the reference to linguistic diversity in Article 22 CFR is adequately accounted for by Article 167 TFEU.9 Article 3(3) TEU now expressly states, as noted above, that the EU ‘shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity’, while, in the educational field, Article 165(1) TFEU requires the EU to respect the responsibility of the Member States for the cultural and linguistic diversity of their education systems. 22.07 A number of articles deal with the use of languages by, and within, the EU. Article 21 EC, now 24 TFEU, establishes the right of EU citizens to write to the EU institutions in one of the national languages specified in Article 55(1) TEU and to receive an answer in that language. These languages are listed in Regulation 1/58, as amended, and constitute the official and working languages of the institutions.10 Regulations and other documents of general application, together with the Official Journal, are to be published in these languages.11 The texts of the treaties in the official national languages are equally authentic, and where there is more than one official language the states may themselves deposit a translation in that language with the Council (Art 55 TEU). Declaration A.16 to the Treaty of Lisbon confirms that this is intended to ensure ‘respect for the Union’s rich cultural and linguistic diversity’. An important group of Treaty articles closely related to Article 22 CFR are those that establish 22.08 the principles of equality and non-discrimination and seek to combat social exclusion and promote social justice within the terms of Article 3(3) TEU.12 In relation to discrimination, the initial focus was on nationality and sex discrimination in the workplace (see Arts 18 and 157 TFEU), but the Treaty now allows a wider range of discriminatory practices to be addressed in an extended category of fields, for instance, in relation to access to goods and services (Arts 8–10 TFEU).13 Under Article 19 TFEU, secondary legislation and incentive measures can be introduced to combat discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation.14 Equality is also an underlying principle behind the status 8 X Arzoz, ‘The Protection of Linguistic Diversity through Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in X Arzoz (ed), Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008) 151–52. 9 The Preamble to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (opened for signature 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007) 2440 UNTS (hereafter ‘Convention on Cultural Diversity’) recalls that ‘linguistic diversity is a fundamental element of cultural diversity’, while in case C-222/07 UTECA v Administración General del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2009:124, the Court of Justice held that ‘language and culture are intrinsically linked’ (para 33). 10 See Council Regulation 1/58, determining the languages to be used by the European Community, [1958] OJ L363/1, consolidated text, as subsequently amended, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX: 01958R0001-20130701. 11 Ibid. 12 For discussion of the relationship between the two, see section B below. 13 Council Directive 2004/113/EC, implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L373/37. 14 Council Directive 2000/43/EC [2000] OJ L180/22; Council Directive 2000/78/EC [2000] OJ L303/16.

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of European citizenship (see Art 9 TEU). In relation to social policy, Article 153 TFEU explicitly mentions a role for the EU in supporting domestic measures to integrate persons excluded from the workplace and to combat social exclusion. Respect for cultural, religious and linguistic diversity is particularly important where the EU 22.09 acts in the field of freedom, security and justice (Title V), notably when developing common asylum and immigration rules, and supporting judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Article 67 TFEU mentions the importance of combating racism and xenophobia and the 2008 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, which requires criminal offences and minimum sanctions to be introduced relating to racism and xenophobia, was based on the precursor provisions to Articles 67 and 83 TFEU in the TEU. The Fundamental Rights Agency, which replaced the European monitoring centre on racism and xenophobia in 2007, researches and advises on the protection of fundamental rights within the EU.15 Its key reference point is the Charter, and the FRA has investigated the position of the Roma and other minority groups defined by religion or sexual orientation within the Member States.16 A range of other Treaty provisions relating to free movement, customs duties, taxation, 22.10 competition and agriculture can also operate to enhance diversity within the Member States but, as noted above, may also undermine distinctive cultural practices that cannot survive in a competitive environment. Very few of these provisions include explicit derogations for cultural purposes, rendering Article 167(4) TFEU of particular importance. Article 36 TFEU does, however, contain derogations from the free movement of goods provisions for measures designed to protect public morality, commercial property, and national treasures, all of which are potentially relevant to supporting or curtailing cultural diversity. The Court of Justice has added to these Treaty provisions by allowing a range of derogations from the free movement rules for measures that pursue certain cultural objectives, such as support for national languages, enhanced cultural understanding and media plurality, where the measures concerned do not directly discriminate against foreign goods.17 Article 107(3)(d) TFEU includes a derogation from the state aid rules for aid to promote culture and heritage conservation (Art 107(3)(d) TFEU).18 State aid for services designed to promote cultural or linguistic diversity, such as public service media, may also be shielded by the provisions on services of general economic interest in Articles 14 and 106(2) TFEU, while Protocols 26 and 29 to the Lisbon Treaty emphasise Member State discretion in relation to such services. The EU is not only itself required to respect but also has a positive duty to promote respect 22.11 for cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in its external relations. Article 167(4) TFEU is not restricted to internal affairs, while Article 3(5) TEU requires the EU, in its relations with the wider world, to promote its values, which, as noted above, include minority rights, and to contribute to the protection of human rights and mutual respect among peoples. Trade agreements relating to culture and the audiovisual sector that could prejudice cultural and linguistic diversity require Council unanimity under Article 207(4)(a) TFEU, while humanitarian assistance is to be executed

15 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007, establishing a European Union agency for fundamental rights [2007] OJ L53/1. 16 See, for example, EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Rights Report 2019 (Luxembourg, 2019), chs 3–5. 17 See, for example, Case C-379/87 Groener v Minister for Education, ECLI:EU:C:1989:599; Case C-288/89 Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others v Commissariaat voor de Media, ECLI:EU:C:1991:323; Case C-180/89 Tourist Guides Italy, ECLI:EU:C:1991:78; Case C-222/07 UTECA (n 9); and Case C-531/07 Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft v LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH, ECLI:EU:C:2009:276. 18 The Court of Justice in Case C-531/07 Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft (n 17) [32]–[33], held that what is now Art 36 TFEU did not offer protection generally to cultural diversity.



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in accordance with the principles of ‘impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination’ (Art 214(3) TFEU).19 Article 8 TEU states that EU relations with its neighbouring countries are to be founded on the Union’s values. 22.12 A number of Treaty articles lay the foundation for positive measures to support and enhance various forms of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in the EU’s internal actions. Of primary importance is Article 167 TFEU, paragraph 5 of which establishes the legal basis for recommendations and incentive measures in the cultural field, enabling the creation of a number of important funding and support programmes, most recently the Creative Europe programme for the culture and media sectors.20 The EU has also supported cultural and linguistic diversity through action in the fields of education (Art 165 TFEU), tourism (Art 195 TFEU), agriculture (Arts 38–44 TFEU), and through the social and cohesion policies (Arts 174–78 TFEU), where significant sums have been allocated to cultural projects.21

B.  Interrelationship of Article 22 with Other Provisions of the Charter 22.13 Given the broad nature of the concerns underpinning Article 22 CFR, the article has close links with many of the other Charter provisions. These articles address in a more focused way specific forms of prejudice or impediment that cultural, religious and linguistic groups tend to encounter and, given ongoing uncertainty over the impact and scope of Article 22 CFR, tend to be relied on directly by litigants wherever possible, with Article 22 CFR employed, if at all, as a subsidiary provision.22 22.14 The Title I rights to dignity, life, and physical and mental integrity, and to protection from eugenic practices, inhuman or degrading treatment, slavery or forced labour (Arts 1–5 CFR) are designed to prevent many of the practices that typically characterise the repression of cultural or religious groups. Similarly, the freedoms identified in Title II, particularly those relating to liberty and security of person; respect for personal and family life; the protection of personal data; and the right to marry and to found a family, all serve to guarantee a private zone where customs, beliefs and languages can be practised and passed on to the next generation without fear (Arts 6–9 CFR). Article 14 CFR enshrines not only the right to education but also the freedom to found educational establishments respecting both democratic principles and the rights of parents to ensure that their children are educated in conformity with their ‘religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions’. The freedoms of thought, conscience and religion; of expression and information; and 22.15 of assembly and association in Articles 10–12 CFR protect the public as well as private manifestation of practices and beliefs, facilitating engagement within and between distinct groups. Importantly, Article 10(1) CFR confirms that individuals should be free to change their religious or other beliefs, while Article 10(2) CFR recognises the right to conscientious objection, particularly relevant in areas such as military service and abortion. This latter right is, however, qualified, as are the rights to marry, found a family and to establish educational

19 For discussion of EU initiatives incorporating cultural considerations in external actions, L Richieri Hanania, ‘Trade, Culture and the European Union Cultural Exception’ (2019) 25/5 International Journal of Cultural Policy, 568–81. 20 EP and Council Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020), [2013] OJ L 347/221. 21 See further T Ahmed, The Impact of EU Law on Minority Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) ch 6, and discussion at section D.III below. 22 See further discussion at section D.III.

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establishments under Articles 9 CFR and 14(3) CFR, by the requirement that these should be in conformity with national laws. The freedom of the arts and sciences, including academic freedom, in Article 13 CFR, directly protects the diversity of cultural expressions, but also confirms that cultural and religious beliefs, however deeply held, are not beyond critical examination. The role of economic incentives in encouraging cultural creativity is recognised in the protection afforded intellectual property in Article 17 CFR. The solidarity rights in Chapter IV (particularly those to fair and just working conditions, to social security and social assistance, to healthcare and access to services of general economic interest); the citizenship rights in Chapter V (particularly those ensuring the right to vote in certain elections, to move and reside freely among the Member States and to communicate with the institutions in one of the official languages); alongside the rights to choose an occupation, to conduct a business and to own and dispose of property in Articles 15–17 CFR, are all essential for cultural and religious communities to survive and flourish. The right to asylum in Article 18 CFR enables persecuted communities to regroup on foreign soil, while the prohibition of collective expulsions in Article 19 CFR prevents the stigmatisation of specific groups, characteristic of such actions. Article 22 CFR is most closely related to the articles in Title III on equality, where it is itself located. In particular, the broad principle of equality enshrined in Article 20 CFR, and more specifically in Article 21 CFR, is designed to prevent many of the acts of exclusion or marginalisation that damage particular communities or groups. Article 21 CFR establishes a non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds for discrimination of which ethnic or social origin, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, membership of a national minority, sexual orientation and nationality are all particularly relevant to Article 22 CFR. Articles 23–26 CFR specifically address sex equality, the position of children, and the rights of the elderly to participate in cultural and social life and of the disabled to be involved in the life of the community. It is apparent that there is a potentially significant overlap between Articles 21 and 22 CFR, in that discrimination (positive discrimination apart) is indicative of a lack of respect for the target group. Article 21 CFR, however, addresses a wider range of discriminatory practices than Article 22 CFR, in that it extends to discrimination based on inherent as well as adopted attributes, such as sex or genetic features, which are not cultural. But these inherent features are often linked to distinctive cultural practices, which do fall within the scope of Article 22 CFR. On the other hand, although the list of discriminatory grounds in Article 21 CFR is expressly nonexhaustive, it focuses on national minorities, whereas Article 22 is framed in broad terms, capable of extending to all minority groups in line with Article 2 TEU. The fact that the explanatory notes to Article 21 CFR, but not Article 22 CFR, make explicit reference to Articles 18 and 19 TFEU, the Treaty Articles on discrimination, suggests that the focus of Article 22 CFR was intended to be on practices other than discrimination. On the other hand, Article 22 is located in the chapter on equality and a failure to treat cultures, religions or languages equally without a compelling justification indicates a lack of respect. Indeed, Advocate General Kokott, in Italy v Commission, regarded the principle of multilingualism, recognised in Article 22 CFR, as operating effectively only in conjunction with the general principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 20 CFR.23 Similarly, the 2005 UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity,24 ratified by the EU and discussed at section C.II below, states that ‘the diversity of





23 C-566/10

24 UNESCO

P Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2012:368 (AG) [88]. Convention on Cultural Diversity (n 9).

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cultural expressions presupposes the recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures’ (Art 2(3), emphasis added). 22.21 Given the extent to which the interests of cultural, religious and linguistic groups can be addressed through other Charter articles, it is pertinent to ask what Article 22 CFR adds to the existing list. The uncertain scope and focus of Article 22 CFR is largely a result of the political tensions that surrounded its introduction at a very late stage in the drafting of the Charter, the result of ‘behind the scenes’ bargaining.25 Although it makes no mention of minority rights, the article was very much a concession to those pressing for the inclusion of a minority-protection clause, either within Article 21 CFR or as a free-standing provision.26 As drafted, however, the specific contribution made by Article 22 CFR rests in its identification of diversity as a value in its own right; a resource for both individual and social development. Although many policies inimical to cultural, religious or linguistic diversity do involve discrimination, many do not: technological development or competitive pressures, for example, can render traditional practices uneconomic or outmoded; similarly, ready access to opportunities abroad can lead to the dissipation of distinctive communities. Tackling discrimination is thus a necessary, but may not be a sufficient step, as discussed further in section D.1 below, to ensuring cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.27 Article 22 CFR can help to shape the interpretation and application of other Charter Articles.28 22.22 It could, for example, influence the balance to be struck between the ‘freedom and pluralism of the media’ in Article 11.2 CFR, or a willingness to accommodate ‘substantive equality’ concerns and positive discrimination in the context of Article 21 CFR.29 There is considerable scope for Article 22 CFR, with its focus on group interests, to come 22.23 into conflict with other Charter articles. Religious and cultural communities are not above treating certain of their members inhumanely, or discriminating against those who do not share their beliefs. Moreover, the application of articles that seem inherently supportive of Article 22 CFR, such as the right to conscientious objection in Article 10 CFR, could lead to insufficient accommodation of members of groups with different beliefs.30 Conflicts may also arise between property rights and traditional customs, such as hunting.31 It is probable that some of the most heated conflicts will be between distinct cultural or religious groups, seeking accommodation from the other, internal to Article 22 CFR itself.32

25 G Schwellnus, ‘Reasons for Constitutionalization: Non-discrimination, Minority Rights and Social Rights in the Convention on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2006) 13(8) Journal of European Public Policy 1265–83, 1276. 26 Ibid. 27 X Arzoz, ‘The Protection of Linguistic Diversity’ (n 8) 155. 28 Performing a role similar to Art 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides that the Charter ‘shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians’. 29 See discussion of different conceptions of equality by M Bell, ‘The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination’, in T Hervey and J Kenner, Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights—A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) ch 5. 30 See, in the context of the European Social Charter, complaint no 87/2012 International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN) v Italy (European Committee of Social Rights, 3 September 2012) at: https://uniteforreprorights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CC87Merits_en.pdf. 31 Consider the ECtHR Grand Chamber ruling in Herrmann v Germany App no 9300/07, 26 June 2012. 32 Consider, for example, potential conflicts between animal welfare and religious groups, which underpinned, for example, Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen, VZW and Others v Vlaams Gewest, ECLI:EU:C:2018:335, though Art 22 CFR was not relied on, and case C-336/19, Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België e.a. and Others, ECLI:EU:2020:1031.

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C.  Sources of Article 22 Rights I. ECHR There is no direct parallel to Article 22 CFR in the ECHR, which focuses on core civil rights and 22.24 freedoms. Though the ECHR was inspired by the then-recently adopted Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),33 the provisions in Articles 22 and 27 UDHR, which concern access to culture and confirm the importance of cultural rights for personal development and dignity, were not carried through into the ECHR. Attempts to add a specific cultural protocol to the ECHR in 1997 proved unsuccessful, in part because it was argued that cultural rights were already adequately protected by the existing guarantees.34 The Convention rights to respect for private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; freedom of assembly and association; freedom for men and women to marry and found a family; and the prohibition of discrimination, which explicitly mentions association with a ‘national minority’ (Arts 8–12 and 14 respectively) can all be employed in actions designed to support cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, and to this extent may be deemed to ‘correspond’ at least in part to Article 22 CFR. It is also worth mentioning Article 2 of the First Protocol of 1952, which calls on State Parties to respect the right of parents to ensure that their children are educated ‘in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions’; Article 4 of the Fourth Protocol of 1963, which prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens;35 and Article 1 of the Twelfth Protocol of 2000, which, in relation to the enjoyment of Convention rights, prohibits discrimination ‘on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’.36 Although the ECtHR has recognised that the preservation of cultural heritage can be a 22.25 sufficiently important interest to curtail state discretion in regulating artistic and cultural expression, for instance in order to protect morals,37 it has not been prepared to accept that a general individual right to the protection of cultural heritage can be derived from Articles 8, 10 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR.38 Articles 9, 10 and 11 ECHR have been interpreted as affording a wide measure of protection to 22.26 political speech and association, including speech calling for greater rights for cultural, ethnic or religious minorities.39 States can repress political speech only in limited contexts, notably where it incites violence or threatens to undermine democratic institutions and values.40 In relation to religious speech, the Court has accepted that states may need ‘to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected’.41 The state is required, however, to be neutral in the face of different faiths

33 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, 10 December 1948, www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html. 34 Y Donders, ‘Protection of Cultural Rights in Europe: None of the EU’s Business?’ (2003) 10(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 117. 35 Of the EU Member States, Greece is not a signatory. 36 Only 10 Member States have proceeded to ratification. 37 Akdaş v Turkey, App No 41056/04, 16 February 2010. 38 Ahunbay v Turkey, App No 6080/06, 29 January 2019, though where indigenous or minority interests are at stake the court may be more receptive in line with international law. 39 Erdogdu v Turkey App no 25723/94, 15 June 2000. 40 See Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, App nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 13 February 2003 [98]. 41 Kokkinakis v Greece App no 14307/88, 25 May 1993 [33]. See also Murphy v Ireland App no 44179/98, 10 July 2003 [78].



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and belief systems, not seeking to employ its power to promote one to the disadvantage of others. Discrimination against, or repression of, religious groups or the manifestation of their beliefs by the state without compelling cause will breach Article 9 ECHR.42 Restrictions on wearing distinctive clothes in public has, for example, been held to infringe Article 9 ECHR,43 as have restrictions on airline staff wearing discreet but visible religious jewellery.44 A similar prohibition that applied to hospital nursing staff was, however, considered proportionate on the basis that this was intended to protect patient safety,45 while French restrictions on face coverings in public were upheld in SAS v France on the basis that they were designed to preserve the conditions under which individuals could live together.46 The Court did not accept that the French prohibition could be justified on the basis that it protected gender equality, in that the practice was supported by some women, or human dignity, in that wearing a face veil on religious grounds was an expression of cultural identity that contributed to the pluralism inherent in democratic societies.47 Where the policy of a state, or private, body is to guarantee non-discrimination in the provision of goods or services, it is legitimate for the organisation to expect those working for it to comply with this ethic, even against their religious convictions.48 22.27 The Court has been willing to accommodate widely different constitutional traditions regarding the secular nature or religious affiliations of state parties. The Lautsi case establishes that absolute neutrality is not required, and states may make overt reference to historical or constitutional links with particular religions or value systems.49 The Grand Chamber held that the ‘passive’ inclusion of specific religious symbols within state schools, in this case a crucifix, would be legitimate as long as it did not amount to ‘indoctrination’.50 In Dogru v France, restrictions on the wearing of religious clothing by children at school were seen as legitimate in light of France’s constitutional commitment to a secular state, though the grounds for the restriction were couched in health and safety terms.51 The ECHR affords states a wide margin of appreciation when prohibiting hate speech or holocaust denial.52 The state is also under a positive obligation to protect religious or other groups from restraints 22.28 imposed by private organisations.53 Two of the cases considered in Eweida and Others v UK (Eweida) concerned private bodies.54 In relation to requirements imposed by religious groups on their members, the Court allows a degree of latitude in order to protect the integrity and coherence of the group itself and thus the maintenance of cultural diversity.55 The ability for a

42 See Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia App no 302/02, 10 June 2010, and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova App no 45701/99, 13 December 2001. 43 Ahmet Arslan and others v Turkey App no 41135/98, 23 February 2010. 44 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom App nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, 27 May 2013. 45 Ibid. 46 SAS v France App no 43835/11, 1 July 2014. For consideration of more recent restrictions imposed by EU countries and the reactions of national courts and the UN Human Rights Committee see the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2019 Report (n 16) at 3.4. 47 Ibid [120]. 48 Eweida and Others (n 44) [105]–[109]. 49 Lautsi v Italy App no 30814/06, 18 March 2011. 50 Ibid. 51 Dogru v France App no 27058/05, 4 December 2008. 52 Norwood v UK App no 2313/03, 16 November 2004, though proper allowance has to be made for discussion of past political and historical events: Lehideux and Isorni v France App no 24662/94, 23 September 1998. The Court has accepted the legitimacy of (in some cases discriminatory) blasphemy laws, see Wingrove v UK App no 17419/90, 25 November 1996. 53 Özgür Gündem v Turkey App no 23144/93, 16 March 2000; Eweida and Others v United Kingdom (n 44). 54 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom (n 44). 55 Siebenhaar v Germany App no 18136/02, 3 February 2011, cf Schüth v Germany App no 1620/03, 23 September 2010, where a more restrictive approach was adopted.

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group member to obtain alternative work or services has been seen as precluding infringement of Article 9 ECHR, but the Court in Eweida indicated that this should not be considered decisive in the employment context.56 Given the diversity of cultural and historical factors that shape state language policies, the 22.29 ECtHR has afforded Member States a ‘particularly wide’ margin of appreciation in this field.57 Although Articles 5 and 6 ECHR require certain linguistic support for those subject to criminal prosecution, the Convention is not seen as guaranteeing the right to use particular languages when communicating with public bodies; the right to receive information from those bodies in the language of one’s choice; or a guarantee for children of access to state education in their mother tongue.58 Where communication takes place between private individuals, however, Article 10 ECHR has been held to include ‘the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas in any language that allows persons to participate in the public exchange of all varieties of cultural, political and social information and ideas’.59 In relation to the protection of ethnic and minority groups more generally, the ECtHR has 22.30 decided a growing number of cases involving various forms of discrimination or repressive state behaviour. Many of these cases have involved the Roma community, and have concerned matters such as forced sterilisations, unwarranted segregation of children in schools, and failure to investigate potentially racist motivations behind violent attacks.60

II.  UN Treaties The two UN human rights treaties of 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 22.31 Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), laid important foundations for Article 22 CFR.61 In particular, Article 18 ICCPR protects the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, while Article 27 establishes the right for ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities to ‘enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language’ in community with other members of their group. General Comment No 23, adopted by the Human Rights Committee in 1994, confirms that minority rights within Article 27 are individual rights designed to ensure ‘the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole’.62 As a result, the underlying motivation for the right is distinct from those of other Convention articles, for instance those concerned with equality and freedom of expression, that apply generally. Article 27 imposes not only a

56 Ibid [83]. 57 Sükran Aydin and Others v Turkey App nos 49197/06, 23196/07, 50242/08, 60912/08 and 14871/0950, 22 January 2013 [51]. 58 Mentzen v Latvia Dec no 71074/01, 7 December 2004; Belgian Linguistic Case App nos 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64, 23 July 1968; and see review of the case law in Sükran Aydin and Others v Turkey (n 57) [50]–[51]. 59 Sükran Aydin and Others v Turkey (n 57) [52]. 60 VC v Slovakia App no 18968/07, 8 November 2011; DH and Others v Czech Republic App no 57325/00, 13 November 2007; Nachova and Others v Bulgaria App nos 43577/98 and 43579/98, 6 July 2005. 61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS (hereafter ‘ICCPR’) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS (hereafter ‘ICESCR’). 62 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), 8 April 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5.



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duty of respect on states but also a positive duty to protect enjoyment of the right from being destroyed or violated by the actions of third parties (6,1). General Comment No 23 also notes that realisation of the right may require certain procedural rights designed ‘to ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them’ (7). The right can be called in aid by all members of minority groups, including migrants and temporary residents, within the jurisdiction of a state party and is not limited to established minorities. Culture is construed broadly to include, for example, traditional land use. The individual complaint procedure under the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant has been used to establish equal rights for religious schools to obtain state funding,63 and to hold a prohibition on public officials responding to the public in a particular language a form of discrimination contrary to Article 26.64 Article 27 does not establish a right to self-determination. The ICESCR builds on the ICCPR by recognising certain basic social and economic rights of 22.32 importance to minority or disadvantaged groups, such as access to education, and an adequate standard of living. Article 15 establishes a right ‘of everyone’ to take part in cultural life. It is thus more inclusive than Article 27 ICCPR, in embracing the interests of individuals whether or not part of specific minorities. Paragraph 2 provides that in order to achieve the full realisation of this right, states are to take those steps that are necessary for the ‘conservation, the development and the diffusion of … culture’, thereby confirming the imposition of a positive obligation to protect and support the ongoing realisation of different cultural expressions. Additional protection for children, women and racial groups is provided through the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which seeks to guarantee ethnic minority children the right to practise their own religion, culture and language (Art 30); the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women; and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.65 The 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,66 seeks to address in one document many of the concerns raised by minorities, and envisages positive measures going beyond mere protection. Article 1 provides that ‘states shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity’. UNESCO oversees a number of important declarations and conventions that address the 22.33 impact of trade and development on cultural diversity. These include the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity and the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.67 The 2005 Convention aims to promote balanced cultural exchanges between nations, and to foster ‘interculturality’ ‘in the spirit of building bridges among peoples’ (Art 1). It affirms the rights of states to take a wide range of measures to protect cultural diversity in line with guiding principles, which include the principle of equal dignity of, and respect for, all cultures (Art 2(3)). The 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage requires parties to identify and take measures to protect the intangible cultural heritage in their country, such as folklore, often associated with particular minority groups.68 63 Waldman v Canada (No 694/1996). 64 Diergaart v Namibia (No 760/1997). 65 Convention on the Rights of the Child (opened for signature 30 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 15773 UNTS; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (opened for signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS; International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (opened for signature 7 March 1966, entered into force 12 March 1969) 660 UNTS. 66 Adopted by the UN General Assembly, 18 December 1992. 67 The Declaration adopted 2 November 2001; UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (n 9). 68 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (opened for signature 17 October 2003, entered into force 20 April 2005) 2368 UNTS.

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III.  Council of Europe Treaties The Council of Europe has similarly co-ordinated a number of important conventions that deal 22.34 with discrimination and minority rights and with the preservation of cultural heritage and diversity more generally. Of primary importance are the 1995 Framework Convention on National Minorities and the 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.69 The first relates specifically to ‘national minorities’, a term that is not defined and is understood to leave a margin of appreciation for the member states in determining its domestic application, but suggests longstanding ties with the country concerned, thus excluding new migrants. By virtue of Article 5, parties agree to ‘undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage’. Not all provisions apply solely to national minorities. In order to further intercultural dialogue, for example, Article 6 calls on states to promote mutual understanding among ‘all persons living on their territory’, not merely national minorities, and to take adequate steps to protect people targeted because of their identity. The 1992 Charter concerns ‘regional or minority languages’, defined as those ‘traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State’ and which are different from the official language of the State (Art 1). The Charter identifies a range of measures designed to protect and validate such languages, which parties can, but are not obliged to, undertake and, like the 1995 Framework Convention, introduces a system of regular reporting and monitoring. Around a third of the EU Member States have still to ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, while most Member States have ratified the Framework Convention on National Minorities. Belgium, France and Greece have ratified neither treaty. Alongside these two core conventions, the 1961 European Social Charter, revised in 1996, 22.35 guarantees basic social and economic conditions for workers and their families, including migrant workers, without discrimination on grounds of ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status’ (Art E).70 Parties are required to submit annual reports, and around half of the EU Member States have agreed to allow collective complaints to be lodged with the European Committee of Social Rights, a process employed to protect Roma access to social benefits in France.71 The 2003 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, requires the criminalisation of the distribution of racist and xenophobic speech. In relation to culture more generally, the 1954 European Cultural Convention can be seen as 22.36 an early proponent of intercultural dialogue,72 calling on contracting states not only to preserve the cultural heritage within their territories (Art 1) but also to encourage their nationals to study the languages, history and civilisation of other parties and to promote the study of their own languages and civilisation abroad (Art 2). The Faro Convention recognises that ‘everyone, alone or collectively, has the right to benefit from the cultural heritage’ and the role of ‘heritage communities’ in identifying cultural heritage that they consider to be of value and

69 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (opened for signature 1 February 1995, entered into force 1 February 1998) ETS No 157 and European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (opened for signature 5 November 1992, entered into force 1 May 1998) ETS No 148. 70 European Social Charter (opened for signature 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 1965) ETS 35. 71 Complaint 63/2010 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v France (28 June 2011) at: www.coe.int/t/dghl/ monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/CC63Merits_en.pdf. 72 European Cultural Convention (opened for signature 19 December 1954, entered into force 5 May 1955) ETS No 18.



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‘wish, within the framework of public action, to sustain and transmit to future generations’.73 The 1989 European Convention on Transfrontier Television is tangentially relevant, through its introduction of television quotas for European content (Art 10) and measures designed to prevent hate speech (Art 7).74 Article 10bis of the Convention also underlines the importance of media pluralism.

IV. Other 22.37 Although almost all Member States include in their constitutions specific provisions relating to cultural, religious or linguistic diversity or minority rights, they vary widely in approach and specificity, reflecting the states’ divergent histories and constitutional traditions.75 The EU encompasses strongly secular and unitary states, such as France, as well as countries with established religions such as Malta and Denmark and those with high levels of regional autonomy such as Italy, Germany and Spain. Language policies vary widely.76 Though incremental accession by the Member States to international conventions such as the Council of Europe treaties noted above, is gradually establishing a body of established principles in the field, there remain countries, such as France, that are suspicious of any external review of policies touching on their national identity. France has thus not participated in the national minority and language regimes under the two Council of Europe conventions, and was opposed to the introduction of a specific article on minority rights in the Charter.77 As Schwellnus has observed, ‘domestic resonance’ relating to minority rights and cultural diversity thus varies greatly among the Member States.78

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 22.38

Understanding the meaning of the term ‘respect’ is central to determining the nature of the obligations that Article 22 CFR imposes on the EU and potentially Member States.79 At a minimum, respect requires no more than that attention be given to a particular interest, ensuring it is not overlooked. A more demanding conception of ‘respect’ is one that requires that a degree of deference, or weight, be given to the interest concerned, seen as having significant value in its own right. That cultural diversity has a positive value within the EU legal order is clear not only from Articles 3(3) TEU and 167 TFEU but also from the EU’s accession to the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity. From this perspective, the EU would be required to avoid wherever possible action that is detrimental to cultural, religious and linguistic diversity and to

73 Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (opened for signature 27 October 2005, entered into force 1 June 2011) ETS No 199 (Faro Convention). 74 European Convention on Transfrontier Television (opened for signature 5 May 1989, entered into force 1 May 1993) ETS 132. 75 The constitutional provisions of the Member States relating to Art 22 are detailed, with English translations, by the Fundamental Rights Agency at: https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter/article/22-cultural-religious-andlinguistic-diversity#TabNational. 76 B de Witte, ‘Language rights: the interaction between domestic and European developments’, in AL Kjaer and S Adamo (eds), Linguistic Diversity and European Democracy (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011) 167–88. 77 G Schwellnus, ‘Reasons for Constitutionalization’ (n 25) 1274. 78 Ibid 1273. 79 For helpful discussion see X Arzoz, ‘The Protection of Linguistic Diversity’ (n 8) 159–63 and A von Bogdandy and S Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy’ (n 6) 1441, fn 124.

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prefer those measures that are the least restrictive of this interest. If Article 22 CFR were to be construed as establishing substantive rights, discussed further at D.II below, then any EU action curtailing such a right would have to be supported by a compelling competing right or interest and would need to be both necessary and proportionate.80 Pushed further, ‘respect’ could also entail an EU obligation to protect right holders from actions by private parties, within the scope of EU law, that restrict enjoyment of their rights. A further conception of respect incorporates the sense of ‘to care for’ or ‘support’. Rather than 22.39 impose a negative responsibility not to harm without good cause, ‘respect’ in this sense entails a positive obligation to promote cultural diversity.81 Although Article 51(2) CFR states that the Charter should not be interpreted to create new tasks for the Union, the TFEU does impose certain positive obligations on the EU in the cultural field. These arise both when the EU pursues specific cultural policies under Article 167(1) TFEU, and when it acts on other Treaty bases, where Article 167(4) TFEU requires the Union to take culture into account not just to respect but also to promote the diversity of its cultures.82 On the other hand, the reference to both ‘respect’ and ‘promote’ in Article 167(4) TFEU suggests that the latter term was intended to add to the former, and that the more conservative, negative, understanding of ‘respect’ is correct. The EU network of independent experts in their commentary on the Charter drew a clear distinction between the requirement to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in Article 22 CFR and the power to promote cultural and linguistic diversity in the Treaty.83 This also accords with the established use of the terms, ‘respect, protect and fulfil’, to indicate three distinct correlative obligations associated with human rights.84 In this context, ‘respect’ indicates a negative obligation on the state not to restrict enjoyment of a right, ‘protect’ an obligation to prevent restrictions by private actors, while ‘fulfil’ (or as here, ‘promote’) indicates a positive obligation to support and give concrete realisation to the right as far as possible. Respect can have procedural as well as substantive dimensions, requiring those affected to be 22.40 consulted and given a voice.85 Within the EU, the advisory Committee of the Regions and European Economic and Social Committee, together represent a wide range of regional, local and civil society interests and must be consulted on legislative proposals within their fields of competence.86 Article 15 ICESCR recognises the importance of participation in the ‘definition, elaboration and implementation of policies and decisions’ that have an impact on cultural rights,87 while the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples affirms the rights of such peoples to participate in decision-making and to be consulted on matters that affect them.88 80 X Arzoz, ‘The Protection of Linguistic Diversity’ (n 8) 160 and see section D.IV below. Although this appears to go well beyond the minimal requirement in Art 167(4) TFEU to take cultural aspects ‘into account’, it could be accommodated within the second clause in Art 167(4) TFEU, which clarifies that this is ‘in order to respect and to promote’ cultural diversity. 81 For support see X Arzoz (n 8) 160–62. 82 See also the requirement to ‘enhance’ cultural heritage in Art 3(3) TEU. The Commission in its Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World, COM (2007) 242 final, p 8, identified a clear commitment to positively promote cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. 83 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, June 2006 at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf. 84 S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed. Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford, OUP, 2008), ch 3. 85 M Weller, ‘Advisory and Consultative Bodies for the Promotion of Effective Participation of National Minorities’, (2009) 16 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 593–609. 86 Art 300 TFEU. 87 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 21, 21 December 2009,E/C.12/GC/21, at 4. 88 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (A/RES/61/295), adopted 13 September 2007, Arts 18–19. In the environmental field the EU has been influenced by the UNECE, Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (adopted 25 June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001) (Aarhus Convention), which it ratified in 2005.



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22.41

The explanatory notes to the Charter do not clarify whether Article 22 CFR establishes rights or principles, a categorisation that has implications for the Article’s field of application and enforceability. A textual reading of Article 22, coupled with an understanding of the debates surrounding its drafting, suggest the latter.89 Firstly, Article 22 makes no direct reference to individual rights and focuses instead on the maintenance of a particular outcome, diversity. The linguistic formulation employed, imposing on ‘the Union’ an obligation ‘to respect’ certain interests, is also considered indicative of principles rather than rights.90 Two other articles in Chapter III of the Charter, Articles 25 and 26, employ the similar phrase ‘[t]he Union recognises and respects’ and both are identified in the Charter explanations as establishing principles. Secondly, given Member State concerns that the inclusion of a diversity article could operate as a ‘Trojan Horse’, opening the way to minority secessionist pressures, it is probable that agreement on the article was reached only on the understanding that it would not create directly enforceable rights.91 Indeed, Article 22 CFR has been characterised as a ‘rather weak provision, which appears to confer positive rights neither on individuals nor groups’.92 On the few occasions when Article 22 has been raised before the Court of Justice of the EU it has generally been associated with principles rather than rights. Thus, Advocate General Jääskinen in Anton Las referred to the protection of linguistic diversity as a principle, limited in terms of impact to the ‘institutions and bodies of the Union’,93 while Advocate General Kokott in Italy v Commission referred to the ‘principle of multilingualism’, as falling within the scope of Article 22 CFR.94 The Grand Chamber in Spain v European Parliament also considered Article 22 CFR in the context of principles rather than rights.95 22.42 On the other hand, Article 51 CFR states that rights are to be respected, while principles are to be observed and promoted, an approach reflected in the explanatory notes to Article 52 CFR. In arguing for a rights-based interpretation, Arzoz notes that the intentions of those who drafted the Charter were precisely to protect individual rights and that to construe Article 22 CFR as merely ‘celebrating or proclaiming’ the value of diversity would be ‘not only politically deceptive but also wrong’.96 Krommendijk similarly argues that Article 22 ‘has connotations of a right’ stemming from its close relationship with Article 27 ICCPR,97 which establishes, as further elucidated in General Comment No 23, the right of individuals, in community with other group members, to enjoy ‘their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language’.98

89 M-C Foblets and J Velaers, ‘Article 22’, in F Picod and S Van Drooghenbroeck (eds) Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Commentaire Article par Article (Brussels, Bruylant, 2018) 22–24; T Lock, ‘Rights and Principles in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 1201–26, 1219. 90 T Lock, ‘Rights and Principles in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 56 Common Market Law Review 1201–26, 1218, see also P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Revised Edition: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford, Oxford, 2013) 217. 91 M-C. Foblets and J. Velaers (n 89) at 12. 92 C Wallace and J Shaw, ‘Education, Multiculturalism and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ in T Hervey and J Kenner, Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights—A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 243. 93 Case C-202/11 Anton Las v PSA Antwerp NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:456 (AG) [57]. 94 Case C-566/10 P, Italy v Commission (n 23)(AG)[85-92]. Italy had characterised Art 22 as establishing a principle of multilingualism in its initial complaint in the case, see T-166/07, Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2010:393 [59]. 95 Case C-377/16 Spain v European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:2019:249 [37]. 96 X Arzoz, ‘The Protection of Linguistic Diversity’ (n 8) 160. 97 J Krommendijk, ‘Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles? The Role of the EU Charter’s Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice’, (2015) 22 European Constitutional Law Review 321–65, 333. 98 See UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No 23 (n 62).

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A third possibility is that Article 22 CFR, like the ensuing Article 23 CFR, establishes both rights 22.43 and principles.99 On this view, Article 22 CFR creates not only a specific right to challenge the curtailment of distinctive expressions by the EU institutions or Member States, when acting in the field of EU law, but also a principle that the EU should support and foster cultural, religious and linguistic diversity through legislative or executive measures, where legally and factually possible. Certain rulings hint at the possibility of a number of core rights alongside more general principles. In Spain v European Parliament, for example, the Grand Chamber held that the right to choose the language of communication with an EU institution, a right explicitly recognised in Article 41(4) CFR, was also an essential component of respect for linguistic diversity, ‘recalled’ by Article 22 CFR.100 Unlike Charter rights, which can create directly enforceable individual rights,101 according to 22.44 Article 52(5) CFR principles ‘may be implemented’, and thus become operational, through EU legislative or executive acts, or acts of the Member States ‘when they are implementing EU law’. The article further provides that principles are judicially cognisable ‘only’ when interpreting, or ruling on the legality, of such acts. There remains disagreement over whether Article 52(5) CFR limits the application of principles to measures specifically designed to give effect to the principle, or allows their application to all measures within the scope of Article 52(5) CFR, regardless of purpose.102 Most of the cases involving Article 22 CFR have concerned EU or Member States acts or measures restricting the use of certain languages in particular contexts, for instance in the employment field.103 Although the measures thus reduced linguistic diversity in these contexts, they either sought to protect certain languages or accommodate competing demands, such as administrative efficiency, and to this extent might be regarded, on a generous interpretation, as ‘implementing’ respect for diversity. It could be, therefore, that a narrow interpretation of Article 52(5) CFR is being employed by litigants in practice. A narrow interpretation is, however, particularly problematic in the context of Article 22 CFR in that it is precisely when the EU pursues non-cultural, for example economic, objectives that there is the greatest risk of the value of diversity being overlooked.104 According to the Explanations, Article 22 CFR is based on Article 167(4) TFEU, which requires the EU to take cultural considerations into account in all its actions under the Treaties, not just when pursuing cultural objectives. Article 52(2) CFR provides that Charter rights for which provision is made in the Treaties shall ‘be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’, and a key characteristic of the scope, or ‘limits’, of Article 167(4) TFEU is that it has a ‘transversal’, cross-cutting effect. Apart from ‘respect’, a number of other key terms employed in Article 22 CFR, such as ‘cultural’ 22.45 and ‘religious’, also remain undefined, rendering the exact nature of the obligations imposed on the EU and Member States difficult to gauge. In relation to ‘culture’, the European institutions have adopted an inclusive approach, interpreting the term as comprising not only the fine arts but also everyday practices and symbolic expressions, including linguistic and religious expression.105 99 Art 23 is listed as having this mixed quality in the explanatory note to Art 52 CFR. 100 Case C-377/16 Spain v EP (n 95) [36]–[37]. 101 Case C-414/16 Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie unde Entwicklung eV ECLI:EU:C:2018:257. 102 For discussion of the arguments and different perspectives, see K Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 European Company Law Review 375–403, 400; P Craig (n 90); J Krommendijk (n 97); and T Lock (n 90). 103 Case C-566/10P Italy v Commission EU:C:2012:752; Case C-377/16 Spain v EP (n 95); Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn (n 5); Case C-202/11 Anton Las v PSA Antwerp NV ECLI:EU:C:2013:239. 104 See P Craig (n 90) at 220, who considers the similarly cross-cutting precautionary principle. 105 European Commission, Communication on a European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World, COM (2007) 242 final, p 3, now replaced by a New European Agenda, COM (2018) 267 final. In this, it mirrors the definition of ‘cultural diversity’ in Art 4(1) of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (n 9) as ‘the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and societies find expression’. For further discussion see T Ahmed, The Impact of EU Law on Minority Rights (n 21) ch 6.



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Unqualified as it is, cultural diversity in Article 22 CFR can extend beyond traditional national or regional cultural expressions, to embrace immigrant and new forms of cultural expression taking root within the Union. In this respect, the article may be more inclusive than Articles 3(3) TEU and 167(4) TFEU, which refer to the diversity of the Union’s cultures, and thus could be construed as limited to those cultures that have an established presence within Europe and are in some sense ‘European’. Regarding ‘religious diversity’, the scope of Article 22 CFR is narrower than Article 17 TFEU, which expressly refers to philosophical and non-confessional organisations. Philosophical organisations of this latter type could, however, be accommodated, within the term ‘cultural’.

II.  Scope of Application 22.46 Despite being addressed to ‘the Union’, Article 22 CFR has, as noted in the previous section, been applied to both EU and domestic acts and measures.106 The Charter will only apply, however, to actions taken within the scope of EU law (Article 51(1) CFR) and does not establish any new powers or tasks for the Union (Article 51(2) CFR). The scope of EU law, though clearly fundamental for the application of Article 22, is not always clear-cut.107 Specific competence in the fields covered by Article 22 CFR is limited and explicitly stated to be supportive and supplementary to that of the Member States (Art 6 TFEU). Moreover, domestic cultural, religious or linguistic regulations, especially those seeking to protect national or regional identity, are often aimed at those residing within, or concern practices largely internal to, the state, and this internal orientation can take them outwith the reach of EU law. Similarly, measures designed to protect various cultural expressions that have only a very limited connection with, or impact on, EU rights or freedoms have also been held to fall outside the scope of EU law.108 The Court in Runevič-Vardyn held that the absence of a right to have one’s forename and maiden name amended on civil documents, such as a birth or marriage certificate, after marriage to a citizen of another Member State would not deter an EU citizen from exercising their free movement rights.109 In addition, citizenship rights would only be infringed where the domestic measure caused ‘serious’ administrative, professional or private inconvenience.110 But as is also evident from Runevič-Vardyn itself, and cases such as Anton Las, where domestic measures could restrict cross-border trade, discriminate against non-national EU citizens, or even deter their own citizens from taking advantage of the rights and freedoms offered by EU membership, EU law will generally be held to be applicable.111 The Coman case, for example, required Romania to recognise the same-sex marriage that Mr Coman, a Romanian national, had entered into while living in Belgium, even though it could continue to refuse to recognise such relationships when entered into by its nationals in the absence of any EU dimension.112 In Cresco, the Grand Chamber rejected the argument by Poland, based on Article 17(1) TFEU, that the EU did not have jurisdiction to consider whether domestic rules relating to religious holidays contravened

106 Case C-202/11 Anton Las (n 103) concerned the legality of a domestic decree. 107 For further discussion see F Fontanelli, ‘The harmonization potential of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, (2018) 2/3 European Journal of Law Reform 56–77. 108 Case C-2016/13 Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia—Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo ECLI:EU:C:2014:126 [24]–[26], in which the cultural protection objectives that underpinned the Italian planning legislation were held to have an insufficient connection with EU law. 109 Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn, (n 5). 110 Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn, (n 5) [76]. 111 Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn, (n 5); Case C-202/11 Anton Las (n 103). 112 Case C-673/16 Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.

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EU non-discrimination rules.113 There thus remains considerable scope for conflict between EU fundamental rights and values and domestic cultural, religious and linguistic policies, even if arising indirectly and ‘at the margins’. The Commission in exercising its powers to investigate Member State infringements of EU 22.47 law has at times adopted a rather cautious approach, refusing to investigate a number of cases involving fundamental rights where the link to EU law was indirect and where intervention would have propelled the EU into the middle of contentious domestic disputes.114 It did not, for example, take up the issue of the French ban on wearing the burqa in public, even though this could interfere with the free movement and economic rights of EU citizens in other Member States wishing to visit France to obtain goods and services.115 A key motivation of many of those supporting the inclusion of Article 22 in the Charter 22.48 was to enhance minority protection within the EU legal order,116 particularly given the welldocumented disparity between the level of EU concern for minority interests in relation to applicant and existing member states,117 though it is not just a minority protection clause. The article is expressly framed in general terms and the reference in the Explanatory Note to Articles 6 TEU and 167 TFEU, which variously mention national identity, national and regional diversity, the common cultural heritage and the cultures of the Union, indicates that a range of cultural, religious and linguistic expressions were intended to fall within its scope. In both Runevič-Vardyn and Anton Las Article 22 CFR was used to support state measures designed to protect and promote the majority language.118 A broad perspective is also in line with Article 2.3 of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, which establishes the principle of equal dignity and respect for all cultures, and Article 15 ICESCR, which applies to everyone, not merely minority groups and their members. Similarly, there is nothing to indicate that Article 22 CFR is concerned solely with the cultures, 22.49 religions and languages of EU citizens.119 The references to human rights and the rights of persons belonging to minorities in Article 2 TEU are unqualified and third country nationals, who have a significant presence in certain EU countries, undoubtedly contribute to the diversity of cultures present within the Union. In Ünal, Advocate General Sharpston, referring to Article 22 CFR, argued that cultural and linguistic differences between nationals and third country immigrants should be taken into account when interpreting their actions and cautioned against assuming that ‘all cultures and lifestyles are automatically assimilated into those of the host Member State when, self-evidently, they are not’.120 In Germany v Y and Z, the Court of Justice held that a third country’s refusal to allow individuals to manifest their religious beliefs in public could constitute

113 Case C-193/17 Cresco Investigation GmbH v Markus Achatzi ECLI:EU:C:2019:43 [29]–[34]. 114 See C Ladenburger (n 19) 12. Ladenburger also, however, notes sensitive instances where the Commission has intervened, notably regarding the proposed Hungarian media law in 2011 and the French expulsion of Roma EU citizens in 2010. 115 Ibid. For discussion see M Hunter-Henin, ‘Why the French don’t like the burqa: laïcité, national identity and religious freedom’ (2012) 61(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 613–19. 116 X Arzoz, ‘The Protection of Linguistic Diversity’ (n 8). 117 A von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as Situation, Executive, and Promoter of the International Law of Cultural Diversity’ (n 7); G Sasse, ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS no 2005/16. 118 Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn, (n 5); Case C-202/11 Anton Las (n 103). 119 Consider Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05, P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, in which the applicant Mr Kadi was Saudi Arabian. 120 Case C-187/10 Baris Ünal v Staatssecretaris van Justitie ECLI:EU:C:2011:510 (AG) [73]–[74]. General Comment 21 confirms that Art 15 ICESCR applies to migrants and persons living in poverty (n 87) 9–10.



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‘persecution’ within the terms of Council Directive 2004/83/EC, thus opening the way for a third country national to be awarded asylum.121 Though the ruling turned on Article 10 CFR, similar reasoning could apply in relation to Article 22 CFR. 22.50 Culture, religion and language are social phenomena, giving rise to group as well as individual interests. The cultural rights in Article 15 ICESCR can be exercised by individuals either on their own account, or in association with others, or within a community or group.122 If Article 22 CFR establishes principles, then these community interests should be taken into account when interpreting or ruling on the validity of EU legislative and executive acts or Member State measures implementing EU law, within the terms of Article 52(5) CFR. If Article 22 CFR establishes rights, then it will be necessary to determine whether these extend to interested groups or representative bodies.123 Group rights are not unproblematic, in that there are often disagreements in terms of outlook and beliefs between the group and individual members. Groups, however, can have a broader, longer-term perspective. They may also be better placed to act, for instance, where no one individual is particularly affected by a decision; where a particular right holder has conflicting interests; or where there could be negative repercussions for those who do bring proceedings.124 The ECtHR has held that ‘the ability of citizens to form a legal entity in order to act collectively 22.51 in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of association’ in Article 11 ECHR.125 In relation to religious freedom, the Court has confirmed that, apart from acting to protect its own corporate or commercial rights, a religious entity also has the right to ensure ‘judicial protection of the community, its members and its assets’.126 The same reasoning can be applied to other cultural or linguistic organisations. The EU has itself supported granting rights of defence to representative organisations in specific fields, for instance to protect equality rights,127 though, as discussed in section D.V below, the Court of Justice has maintained strict standing rules under Article 163 TFEU, which are likely to be problematic in this area.

III.  Specific Provisions 22.52

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Article 22 CFR, given its potential scope, is that it has so rarely been relied on in practice, whether in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, Commission decisions, or even secondary legislation. Even when explicitly raised by litigants, the Court has often done little more than note its existence, relying on other more clearly defined and familiar Charter provisions, such as Article 21 CFR, to do the operative work. It has been left

121 Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11 Germany v Y and Z ECLI:EU:C:2012:518. 122 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 21 (n 87) [9]. 123 For discussion of background arguments regarding whether the Charter should afford collective or purely individual rights, see G Schwellnus, ‘“Much ado about nothing?” Minority Protection and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB No 5/2001. On the relative weight to be afforded group-related and individual rights, see C Wallace and J Shaw ‘Education, Multiculturalism and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ (n 92), ch 10. 124 Consider, for example, the role of the German booksellers’ association in seeking to enforce the minimum bookpricing scheme in C-531/07 Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft (n 18). 125 Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia (n 42) [100]. The ECHR Commission was not always so receptive to religious corporations holding rights on which see: L Bloß, ‘European Law of Religion—Organizational and Institutional Analysis of National Systems and their Implications for the Future European Integration Process’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 13/03, NYU School of Law, 15–17. 126 Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia (n 42) [102]. 127 See Arts 7 and 13 of the Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC [2000] OJ L180/22.

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to a number of Advocate General opinions to explore in rather more detail Article 22’s potential role and purpose.128 The handful of Article 22 CFR cases that have reached the Court of Justice of the EU have 22.53 involved challenges to the legality of both EU acts and Member State measures capable of restricting EU rights and freedoms. The former category took the form of Member State annulment actions targeting various EU staff recruitment initiatives.129 Of particular concern was the fact that details of the competitions/application forms had not been published in all the official languages and that second language requirements, whether to be used in the competitions themselves or considered a pre-requisite for the posts, were limited to just French, German or English. Article 22 CFR here worked alongside and complemented other grounds for complaint, notably Article 1(d) of the EU staff regulations. This establishes the principle of nondiscrimination in relation to language but allows for appropriate and proportionate derogations, which can include measures to ensure operational efficiency. Article 22 CFR served to emphasise the need for any language requirements deviating from the presumption of equality to be carefully targeted and substantiated, which was ultimately held not to be the case. The opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Spain v European Parliament indicates just how searching such review can potentially be, not only in terms of evidential support but also in requiring consideration of any subconscious or in-built biases. In particular, she noted how existing practices could entrench, or ‘fix’, the position of the three specified second languages over time, even though this was not their objective. Justifications derived from a self-perpetuating system had thus to be critically addressed and, wherever possible, alternative approaches to determining the second languages, less restrictive of linguistic diversity, employed.130 The second group of cases addressed the legitimacy of domestic language rules. As with the EU 22.54 recruitment procedures above, the rules in Runevič-Vardyn and Anton Las facilitated administrative procedures, but they also sought actively to promote the use of an official language.131 Rules of this type can be introduced to protect linguistic diversity, in that even majority languages can be put under pressure by economic or cultural forces, in particular the dominance of English in international commerce. But they may also pursue nation-building objectives, such as the establishment of national identity or the integration of citizens. Certain measures of this type may have little impact on other cultural, linguistic and religious expressions but they may lead, either by design or effect, to a reduction in the status or visibility of those cultural forms and, ultimately, to the level of diversity within the country.132 Such measures can consequently run counter to the principle of equal respect, which, it has been argued at paragraph 22.20 above, underpins Article 22 CFR, and thus require compelling justification. The ‘domestic’ cases thus highlight the potential for tension between Article 22 CFR and Article 4(2) TFEU and bring into question the extent to which Article 22 can fulfill the broader minority protection goals that certain of its proponents envisaged. In Anton Las, Advocate General Jääskinen avoided such tension by holding that linguistic 22.55 diversity in Article 22 CFR relates to multilingualism at the European level, not the choices

128 For example, AG Kokott in Case C-222/07 Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) v Administración General del Estado ECLI:EU:C:2009:124; AG Jääskinen in Case C-202/11 Anton Las (n 93); and AG Sharpston in Case C-377/16 Spain v European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:2018:610. 129 Case C-566/10P Italy v Commission (n 103); Case C-377/16 Spain v European Parliament (n 95). 130 Case C-377/16 Spain v EP (AG)(n 128) 165. 131 Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn (n 5); C-202/11 Anton Las (n 103). 132 For more general discussion of the rationales that can underpin linguistic rules see A Patten, Equal Recognition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014) 188–92.



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made about language use at the domestic level, a matter of national identity.133 The case concerned a Flemish decree that required employment contracts between foreign nationals and companies established in Belgium to be drafted in the Dutch language. Such rules impeded the free movement of workers contrary to Article 45 TFEU and had thus to be supported by a legitimate objective justification. For the Advocate General, the question was therefore whether the Belgian rules contributed to national identity and the protection of an official language, not their impact on linguistic diversity and the use of other languages more widely. Ultimately, he doubted whether the ability to draft employment contracts in languages other than Dutch really posed a threat to the Dutch language in the region.134 The commercial context was different to that of, say, education, the subject of the pre-Charter Groener case,135 where official language requirements could plausibly be seen to foster a particular cultural identity. The measure was also disproportionate in that it would have been possible to allow employment contracts to be drawn-up in a language understood by the parties as well as in the required Dutch. 22.56 The Grand Chamber took a different approach and considered both Articles 22 CFR and 4(2) TEU to provide support for the domestic language rules.136 It did not explore potential tensions between the two and may have considered that respect for diversity under Article 22 CFR entails respecting the diversity of the Member States as determined by their own internal cultural and religious policies. If this is so, then the effective elision of Article 22 CFR and 4(2) TEU produces a result very similar in practice (though not theory) to that adopted by Advocate General Jääskinen, who focused on whether the state measures genuinely supported national identity. Like the Advocate General, the Court found the measures to be disproportionate on similar grounds, confirming that domestic cultural and linguistic policy may have to be modified to accommodate the demands of international trade. 22.57 In the prior Runevič-Vardyn case, which concerned standardised spelling rules introduced by Lithuania to protect its national language, the Court of Justice had similarly employed both Articles 22 CFR and 4(2) TEU to confirm the legitimacy of the Lithuanian objectives without addressing any potential conflict between the two.137 The domestic rules applied to a range of official documents, including birth and marriage certificates, which Ms Runevič-Vardyn, a Lithuanian national, and her Polish husband, wished to amend. As noted, the linguistic measures were only considered to fall within the scope of EU law where they caused ‘serious’ administrative, professional or private inconvenience, a matter that was here left to be determined by the domestic court, as well as whether the measures were proportionate and struck a ‘fair balance’ between the various interests at stake. Although the right to family and private life and the protection of the official language were mentioned in this latter context, respect for linguistic diversity was not. Arguably, the right to family and private life does not adequately reflect the interest that Ms Runevič-Vardyn and her husband had in openly manifesting their diverse cultural connections. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the handful of cases to date, particularly given 22.58 the dearth of sustained analysis as to what respect for cultural, linguistic and religious diversity entails in practice. Article 22 CFR served to underline the need for compelling justifications for 133 Case C-202/11 Anton Las (AG) (n 93) [59]. 134 Case C-202/11 Anton Las (AG) (n 93) [61]. 135 Case C-379/87 Anita Groener (n 17). 136 Case C-202/11 Anton Las (n 103). 137 Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn (n 5). Potential conflicts between free movement rules and domestic linguistic regulations are discussed by B de Witte, ‘Common Market Freedoms versus Linguistic Requirements in the EU States’, in Mundialització, lliure circulació I immigració, i l’exigència d’una llengua com a requisite (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, 2008) 109–31 and see also T Ahmed (n 21) ch 7.

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language restrictions in the EU recruitment cases; in the preliminary reference proceedings, Article 22 was employed in order to justify the state measures, not to challenge them, and operated very much as a ‘sleeping partner’ alongside, possibly even subsumed within, the requirement to respect national identity. Though reducing the scope for political tension between the EU and its Member States, such an approach diminishes the ability of the EU to provide an independent check on domestic measures, when implementing EU law, which could restrict cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. Given the lack of clarity as to the status and purpose of Article 22 CFR, we should not 22.59 be surprised that it has so rarely been employed in practice. As indicated above, however, Article 22 CFR can serve to highlight the distinct interest in protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions, alongside other interests. Cases where Article 22 CFR could have been, but were not, raised, at least to support a particular interpretation of EU secondary legislation, include the Cresco case,138 which concerned beneficial leave entitlements for certain Christian groups on Good Friday, and Liga van Moskeeën,139 which addressed a domestic prohibition on ritual slaughter outside permanent slaughterhouses, that meant the demand for ritual slaughter during a Muslim festival could not be met. Nor was Article 22CFR raised in the profoundly problematic Achbita ruling, which considered whether it was legitimate under the Equal Treatment Directive 2000/78 for a security company, in order to pursue a policy of political, philosophical and religious neutrality, to prohibit its employees from wearing headscarves at work.140 The Grand Chamber held it was a legitimate aim for the company to seek to present a neutral face, and that the measures taken were potentially appropriate and necessary, at least in relation to those employees who interacted with customers.141 Recourse to Article 22 CFR, alongside Article 21 CFR, would have further underlined the need to start from the position that diversity should be accommodated wherever possible, for instance through a suitable dress code as suggested by the Commission. If no such measures were possible, while preserving ‘neutrality’, it would still have been necessary to consider whether the right of the company to carry on its business (and retain the custom of those unwilling to engage with its employees because of their religion) was outweighed by the need to respect the religious diversity of its workforce. Nor has Article 22 CFR been employed to develop procedural rights. In Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami 22.60 and Others, the Inuit association relied, unsuccessfully, on Article 19 of the ‘soft law’ UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to argue that they should have been consulted prior to adoption of an EU regulation governing trade in seal products, but made no mention of Article 22.142 Specific references to Article 22 CFR in secondary legislation are relatively infrequent, 22.61 though it is explicitly mentioned in the current Creative Europe Programme.143 More often,

138 Case C-193/17 Cresco Investigation GmbH (n 113). 139 Case C-426/16 Liga van Moskeeën (n 32). Article 22 CFR was raised in case C-336/19, Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België e.a. and Others (n 32), founding on the disparity between the scope afforded states under Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 to regulate religious slaughter in slaughterhouses and the exclusion from the scope of that regulation of animals killed during hunting or recreational activities. The Grand Chamber, held, however that the two contexts were different and considered that the Belgian requirement of prior non-lethal stunning for animals to be religiously slaughtered constituted a proportionate restriction on religious freedom imposed on animal welfare grounds. 140 Case C-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centru, voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV ECLI:EU:C:2017:203. For commentary see J Weiler, ‘Je Suis Achbita!’ (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 879–906. 141 Case C-157/15 Samira Achbita (n 140) [35]–[43]. 142 Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union ECLI:EU:C:2013:625. 143 Regulation no 1295/2013 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) [2013] OJ L347/221, Recital 2.



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the preservation and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity is identified generally as a motivating factor, particularly, as one would expect, in measures and policy documents relating to culture, citizenship, language, and media.144 These measures have facilitated co-ordination among cultural groups, developed guidelines on good practice and provided funding, with significant financial assistance also being made available ‘indirectly’ for cultural purposes through the Structural Funds.145 One reason for limited reliance on Article 22 CFR could well be the existence of the cultural mainstreaming requirement in Article 167(4) TFEU, though the focus here is on Union action under the Treaties, not that of Member States. The impact of Article 167(4) has, however, been patchy to date and could be enhanced by drawing an express link with Article 22 CFR.146 The potential for the EU to do more to positively support the position of national minorities, their distinct languages and cultures, using a range of Treaty articles, led to the citizens’ initiative ‘Minority Safe Pack—One million signatures for diversity in Europe’.147 The initiative, which sought, in particular, the reorganisation of the regional funds to enable national minorities to play a greater role in their domestic implementation, was unsuccessfully challenged, on grounds of lack of competence, by Romania, which has faced pressure for greater territorial autonomy from Székely Land. The case thus highlighted once again the potential for EU cultural and linguistic initiatives to cut across domestic identity politics and cause tensions with the Member States. 22.62 A number of measures, such as the 2006 Services Directive, simply exclude from their scope fields where cultural diversity could be an issue.148 The Electronic Commerce Directive explicitly states in Article 1(6) that it is not to affect measures taken at Community or the national level, which respect Community law, and are intended to promote cultural and linguistic diversity or the defence of pluralism.149 In other contexts, derogations for specific cultural or religious traditions have been included, for instance, regarding Inuit hunting practices in relation to the sale of seal products in the EU;150 and for cultural and sporting events and ritual slaughter in relation to standards for animal slaughter.151 In the context of external trade, the EU has sought to preserve its freedom to protect cultural 22.63 and linguistic diversity within the framework of the WTO rules, abstaining from commitments under GATS and actively supporting adoption of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity.152 It has also sought to support cultural development and exchange with third countries

144 See, for example, Regulation no 1295/2013, ibid; Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014 of 14 April 2014 establishing the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme for the period 2014–2020 [2014] OJ L115/3, Recital 19; Council Recommendation on a comprehensive approach to the teaching and learning of languages [2019] OJ C189/15, Recital 5; and Art 1(2)(d); Directive 2010/13/EU, on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services [2010] OJ L95/1, Recital 4. 145 European Commission, ‘Culture and the Structural Funds’ at: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eu-funding/ culture-and-the-structural-funds_en.htm. 146 E Psychogiopoulou, The Integration of Cultural Considerations in EU Law and Policies (n 1). See also Commission Staff Working Paper, Operational Guidance on taking Account of Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact Assessments SEC (2011) 567 final. 147 For details see Case T-391/17 Roumanie v Commission ECLI:EU:T2019:672. 148 Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market (2006) OJ L376/36 Art 1.4. 149 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1. 150 Commission Regulation (EU) 737/2010 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 on trade in seal products [2010] OJ L216/1, discussed in B de Witte, ‘A Competence to Protect. The Pursuit of Non-market Aims through Internal Market Legislation’, in P Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislator and the Internal Market (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 25–46. 151 Council Regulation (EC) 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing [2009] OJ L303/1 Art 4. 152 D Ferri, ‘EU Participation in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Some Constitutional Remarks’, European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (EDAP) 3/2005.

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through cultural cooperation agreements, either in the form of protocols to trade deals or stand alone agreements.153

IV.  Limitations and Derogations Article 52(1) CFR requires that state or EU measures restricting the rights and freedoms in 22.64 the Charter must be provided for by law and must ‘respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’. In addition, any limitations must be ‘necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’. As there is no direct parallel to Article 22 CFR in the ECHR, there is no pre-existing list of derogations that can simply be ‘carried across’ in line with Article 52(3) CFR. Given the overlap between Articles 22 CFR and Articles 8, 9, and 10 ECHR, however, it is arguable that the derogations identified in these articles are also applicable to cases involving Article 22 CFR. Derogations potentially relevant in this context include national security and territorial integrity, public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of public health or morals, and the protection of the reputation, rights and freedoms of others.154 Article 22 CFR may come into conflict both with other Charter rights and general interest 22.65 objectives recognised by the Union. The Charter itself does not set out a hierarchy among its articles but, given the fundamental nature of the dignity rights in Title I, there will be little scope for derogation from these rights on diversity grounds to accommodate practices such as female circumcision.155 Similarly, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity cannot be called in aid to destroy the rights and freedoms of others under Article 54 CFR. The ECtHR has, by way of comparison, accepted the legitimacy of restrictions on racist and xenophobic speech, even where such views express the particular ethos and outlook of specific groups.156 Dignity rights do not, however, include protection from exposure to lifestyle choices that one simply finds strange or with which one does not agree.157 It is apparent that a number of recognised objective justifications can be employed to support 22.66 measures that restrict cultural, religious or linguistic diversity. In Italy v Commission and Spain v European Parliament, the Court of Justice confirmed that operational efficiency was a legitimate basis for constraining linguistic diversity, provided the measures taken were appropriate and proportionate.158 In Runevič-Vardyn and Anton Las, however, Article 22 was itself employed to justify restrictions on linguistic diversity but in a context where the state sought to protect and promote a national or regional language.159 As previously indicated, the potential tensions between Article 22 CFR and the protection of national identity were not here explored. Other recognised objectives that could come into play include the protection of animal welfare,160 public morality, public policy and national security. Thus, in the van Duyn case, the Court of 153 L Richieri Hanania (n 19) ‘Trade, Culture and the European Union Cultural Exception’, (2019) 25/5 International Journal of Cultural Policy, 568–81. 154 See further discussion of ECtHR case law at 22.26 above. 155 See, for a UK example, R (Williamson and Others) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15 [2005] 2 AC 246: the refusal to allow corporal punishment in schools was held to be an acceptable restriction on the parents’ religious beliefs. 156 Norwood v UK (n 44); an approach that contrasts with that of the US Supreme Court in National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie 432 US 43 (1977). 157 Consider, for an ECtHR parallel, SAS v France (n 46) [120]. 158 Case C-566/10P Italy v Commission (n 103); Case C-377/16, Spain v European Parliament (n 95). 159 Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn (n 5); Case C-202/11, Anton Las (n 103). 160 Case C-426/16 Liga van Moskeeën (n 139) and case C-336/19, Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorie van België e.a. and Others (n 32).



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Justice accepted the UK’s refusal to allow Ms van Duyn to enter the country on the basis of her membership of the Church of Scientology, which the UK considered a harmful sect.161 Property and commercial interests are also potentially relevant,162 thus a commercial interest in projecting an image of political and religious neutrality was considered a legitimate objective in the Achbita case.163 Article 22 CFR will be of particular value if it increases the intensity with which such measures are reviewed and the balance ultimately struck between competing rights and interests.

V. Remedies 22.67 Cases such as Egenberger and Cresco confirm that Charter articles that confer rights, such as Article 21, can be relied on directly by individuals, even in horizontal disputes with other individuals or companies, provided the conditions for direct effect are met.164 Moreover, Article 47 CFR establishes the right to an effective remedy, which may require domestic legislation that curtails the right to be disapplied or, as in Cresco, that entitlements wrongly withheld be made available.165 But even if Article 22 CFR establishes ‘merely’ a principle of respect, Article 52(5) CFR confirms that principles can, in certain contexts, be used to challenge the legality of EU or Member State acts, when ‘implementing’ EU law, and to aid in the interpretation of those acts. The main constraint is that principles cannot be relied on directly to found an action in domestic courts, though may be brought into play where an action can be raised on other grounds.166 Thus, in Anton Las, Article 22 was employed in a contractual dispute, the outcome of which depended on the legality of the Flemish language decree. As it happens, Article 22 was here used to support the legality of the decree but it is possible to imagine a situation in which Article 22 could be relied on in order to disapply a problematic measure, or to obtain a particular interpretation, in the course of domestic proceedings.167 When seeking to disapply or restrict the scope of a domestic measure in this way, recourse to the fundamental freedoms or citizenship rights will often provide both a sufficient basis for action and grounds for review, which may also explain why Article 22 is so rarely raised in practice. The other significant constraint that could follow from classification as a principle is that the application of Article 22 could be restricted to those acts and measures specifically intended to implement it, in line with a narrow reading of Article 52(5) CFR. 22.68 The various Member State challenges to EU recruitment initiatives in which Article 22 was raised have taken the form of annulment actions under Article 263 TFEU.168 This affords the Member States and specified EU institutions privileged status. Where a claim under Article 263 TFEU is upheld, the act in question is declared void, though the Court of Justice of the EU can decide that certain of the act’s effects should be maintained, for instance to protect legitimate expectations.169 Thus, in Italy v Commission the Court confirmed the results of the

161 Case C-41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office ECLI:EU:C:1974:133. 162 See, in particular, discussion by J Morijn, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Cultural Diversity in the EU’, in E Psychogiopoulou (ed) Cultural Governance and the European Union. Protecting and Promoting Cultural Diversity in Europe (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) ch 11. 163 Case C-157/15 Samira Achbita (n 140). 164 C-414/16 Vera Egenberger (n 101); Case C-193/17 Cresco Investigation GmbH (n 113). 165 Ibid. 166 T Lock (n 90) 1217. 167 Case C-202/11 Anton Las (n 103). 168 Case C-566/10P Italy v Commission (n 103); Case C-377/16, Spain v European Parliament (n 95). 169 Arts 264 and 266 TFEU.

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contested competition in order not to defeat the expectations of applicants who had been successful.170 Individuals wishing to bring annulment proceedings under Article 263(1) TFEU to challenge the legality of EU legislative acts must comply with restrictive standing rules and the tight two-month time-limit for commencing actions. For standing, the individual must be able to show both direct and individual concern, the latter requiring the existence of an identifying feature that distinguishes the applicant from all others affected by the provision.171 This presents particular difficulties for individuals wishing to challenge measures that affect a cultural, religious or linguistic group, in that all group members are likely to be affected in the same way. Thus, traders involved in placing seal products obtained from both Inuit and non-Inuit hunters on the EU market were unable to challenge an EU regulation governing trade in seal products, because their position was no different from other traders.172 Similar restrictions apply to representative organisations, though where the organisation has played a specific role in helping to shape the act concerned it may be afforded standing.173 The fourth paragraph of Article 163 TFEU dispenses with the requirement of individual concern in relation to ‘regulatory acts’ that do not require implementation, but this does not extend to regulations adopted under Article 289 TFEU in relation to which the general rules apply.174 The Committee of the Regions and European Economic and Social Committee can bring proceedings under Article 163(2) TFEU in order to protect their own prerogatives, which includes the right to be consulted on legislative proposals that fall within their fields of competence. It may be possible to circumvent the problem of standing by commencing proceedings in domestic courts, where standing rules tend to be more relaxed. The legality or interpretation of an EU or domestic measure may (or must) then be referred on to the Court of Justice of the European Union by means of a preliminary reference, the basis on which the domestic measures in the Runevič-Vardyn and Anton Las cases reached the Court. The Court of Justice of the EU does not have competence to review EU acts adopted under the common foreign and security policy, though it does have competence to review the legality of ‘decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons’, for instance, ‘smart sanctions’ targeting a company or individual (Art 275 TFEU).175 On the other hand, Article 276 TFEU excludes all review in relation to the actions of the police or law enforcement agencies within the field of freedom, security and justice, where targeting of minority groups could arise. Where the acts of a Member State curtailing cultural, religious or linguistic diversity fall within the scope of EU law they may be subject to investigation by the Commission under Article 258 TFEU. The Commission put pressure on Hungary to modify its controversial media law proposals in 2011, and raised questions regarding France’s policy of expelling Roma EU citizens in 2010.176 Serious breaches by a Member State of the values in Article 2 TFEU can

170 Case C-566/10 P Italy v Commission (n 103) [103]. 171 Case 25/62 Plaumann and Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95 and Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR 1-6677. 172 Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625. 173 Case T-585/93 Greenpeace and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-2205, esp [59]. Note the possible relevance of the last sentence of Art 17 TFEU. The Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions, representing local and regional interests, must be consulted on a wide range of EU matters (Arts 304 and 307 TFEU). 174 Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (n 172). 175 For discussion see P Koutrakos, ‘Judicial Review in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (2018) 67/1 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1–35. 176 See discussion in C Ladenburger (n 19) 12.



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be investigated under Article 7 TEU and ultimately sanctioned through suspension of the state’s rights under the Treaties where there is sufficient institutional support. The politically damaging nature of the proceedings means that Article 7 is very much a mechanism of last resort, though action was initiated in 2017 in relation to threats to the independence of the judiciary in Poland.177 The process remains ongoing but a recent draft interim report for the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs underlines how Article 7 TEU can be used to exert political pressure on a Member State to bring their laws into line with the Union’s founding values, including to ensure respect for minorities.178

E. Evaluation 22.73 Article 22 CFR, introduced at a late stage in the Charter negotiations, appears at first reading to be a relatively bland and innocuous provision. Appearances, however, can be deceptive, and Article 22 CFR is potentially one of the most politically explosive provisions in the Charter. Though it may go some way to protecting the diversity of the Member States in the context of an increasingly integrated European market, it has the potential to engage, as cases such as Runevič-Vardyn indicate, with the often troubled relationship between Member States and minority groups within their jurisdiction. 22.74 To date, however, Article 22 has received very little judicial or legislative attention. Reference to the Article may have been avoided precisely because of its potential to test out domestic rules and even established constitutional arrangements designed to support national identity. On the few occasions when it has been raised in legal proceedings, there has been almost no exploration of the principles that guide its application or how the Article relates to other Charter and Treaty articles. Nor has there been any sustained attempt to analyse how diversity can be measured and understood.179 Uncertainty over Article 22’s purpose and legal status as a right or principle may also explain why litigants have relied, wherever possible, on other more familiar and established rights and freedoms in the Charter or Treaties. Indeed, the requirement in Article 167(4) TFEU that the Union take culture into account in order to respect cultural diversity across all its actions makes Article 22 appear largely superfluous. 22.75 Born out of compromise, the chance of Article 22 CFR ever playing a meaningful role in shaping EU law was always slight. Article 22 CFR nevertheless confirms that respect for cultural, religious and linguistic diversity is a fundamental value of the EU, demanded of its Member States as well as applicant countries. As Advocate General Sharpston noted in Ünal, it may be easy to ‘lose sight of the extent to which the EU remains, and will continue to be, founded in diversity’.180 Article 22 CFR has the potential to make that oversight less likely and to create a framework for the EU to address the resultant tensions in a principled and equitable way in the future.

177 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law, COM/2017/0835, 20 December 2017. 178 European Parliament, Draft Interim Report, on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835—C9-0000/2020–2017/0360R(NLE)) (Rapporteur: Juan Fernando López Aguilar), 13 May 2020. 179 In relation to various ways of conceptualising linguistic diversity see P van Parijs, Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World (Oxford, OUP, 2011) ch 6. 180 Case C-187/10 Baris Ünal (n 120) [73].

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Article 23 Article 23 Equality between Women and Men Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the underrepresented sex.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 23 The first paragraph has been based on Articles 2 and 3(2) of the EC Treaty, now replaced by Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which impose the objective of promoting equality between men and women on the Union, and on Article 157(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It draws on Article 20 of the revised European Social Charter of 3 May 1996 and on point 16 of the Community Charter on the rights of workers. It is also based on Article 157(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(4) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. The second paragraph takes over in shorter form Article 157(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which provides that the principle of equal treatment does not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers. In accordance with Article 52(2), the present paragraph does not amend Article 157(4).

Select Bibliography P Ahrens, ‘The Birth, Life and Death of Policy Programmes: 35 years of EU Gender Equality Politics’ (2018) 42(1) West European Politics 45–66. F Bettio et al, The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies (Brussels, European Commission, 2012). F Beveridge and S Velluti, Gender and the Open Method of Coordination Perspectives on Law, Governance and Equality in the EU (Farnham, Ashgate, 2008). E Caracciolo di Torella and A Masselot, Caring Responsibilities in EU Law and Policy (New York: Routledge, 2020). J Conaghan (ed), Feminist Legal Studies (Abingdon, Routledge, 2009). T Freixes, ‘Article 23 Egalité entre hommes et femmes’ in EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (ed), Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Brussels, European Commission, 2006) 200–08. E Grabham, D Cooper, J Krishnadas and D Hermann (eds), Intersectionality and Beyond (Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2009). B Hepple, Equality—The New Framework, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014). T Hervey, ‘Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards’ (2005) 12(4) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 307–25. R Holtmaat and C Tobler, ‘CEDAW and the European Union’s Policy in the Field of Combating Gender Discrimination’ (2005) 12(4) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 399–425.

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E Holzleithner‚ ‘EU-rechtliche Bestimmungen zum Antidiskriminierungsverbot—Grundlagen und Anwendung’ in A Scheer, A El-Mafaalani and G Yüksel (eds,) Handbuch Diskriminierung (Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2017) 200–26. A McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2014). R Nielsen and C Tvarnø (eds), Scandinavian Women’s Law in the 21st Century (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2012). A Numhauser-Henning, ‘EU Sex Equality Law Post Amsterdam’ in H Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 145–76. D Schiek, ‘Broadening the Scope and the Norms of EU Gender Equality Law: Towards a Multi-dimensional Conception of Equality Law’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 427–66. —— and V Chege (eds), EU Non-Discrimination Law—Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensational Equality Law (Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2009). —— and A Lawson (eds), EU Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality—Investigating the Triangle between Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011). D Schiek, ‘Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to Status Socialis Activus via Two Forms of Transnational Solidarity’ in D Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 341–368. T Stang Dahl, Introduction to Women’s Law (Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1987). S Sümer, European Gender Regimes and Policies (Farnham, Ashgate, 2009). M van den Brink and P Dunne, Trans and Intersex Equality Rights in Europe—a Comparative Analysis (Brussels, European Commission, 2018). IM Young, ‘Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference’ in E Grabham et al (eds), Intersectionality and Beyond (Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 273–98.

A.  Field of Application of Article 23 23.01

23.02

Article 23 has a potentially limitless field of application. Because the division of labour and other roles between women and men lies at the core of any human society, any policy or piece of legislation will impact upon it, or be impacted upon by it. The duty to ensure equality between women and men thus affects any activity the EU engages in, as well as any implementing policies of its Member States. The EU treaties and their predecessors have from 2000 contained competences explicitly aimed at equality of women and men, partly preceded by competences contained in the Social Policy Agreement (1992).1 The oldest of these is Article 153(1) letter (i) TFEU, which repeats the wording of Article 2(1) Social Policy Agreement (1992) and allows the EU to complement and support the activities of its Member States in the field of ‘equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work’. Further, Article 157(3) TFEU provides for the adoption of ‘measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value’. This provision was first introduced as Article 141(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/1999).2 Also, Article 19 TFEU, first introduced

1 The Social Policy Agreement was concluded in 1992 by 11 out of the then 12 Member States, and annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht through a protocol. This enabled the Member States to bring forward EU social policy in parallel with the founding of Economic and Monetary Union, although the UK was strictly opposed to it. When the Treaty of Amsterdam was negotiated, the UK government had changed, and the provisions of the Social Policy Agreement were integrated into the then Treaty on European Community. The protocol and the agreement are reprinted in [1992] OJ C224/126–29. 2 The Treaty of Amsterdam was adopted in 1997, but its coming into force was delayed by referenda held in Denmark and Ireland before those Member States ratified the Treaty. It entered into force in May 1999.

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by the same treaty as Article 13 EC, enables the EU to adopt legislation combating discrimination based on sex beyond the field of employment. All these competences can be used to take measures that contribute to ensuring equality between women and men. However, the EU still lacks competences in some fields decisive for equality between women 23.03 and men. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, most core feminist legal policy fields3 such as politics on gendered violence within the family or legal restrictions of the relation of mothers and children were outside the European Communities’ competences. Since the Treaty of Lisbon integrated what remained of the ‘Third Pillar’ into the mainstream of European Union polity, this has been changed. The EU now has a competence for cooperation in police and criminal matters,4 and would thus also be able to ensure equality of women and men in this field. Coordination in civil justice may comprise some elements of family law, in particular relating to fathers’ rights over children, which can be used to prevent women from leaving a relationship tainted by physical or emotional violence.5 Although family law and policing remain national competences in the main, the EU has some opportunities to address violence against women.6 However, some policies of core relevance for equality of women and men in European societies still lie beyond the EU’s core legislative competences, while laws and policies relating to economic integration and the newly reinforced social goals of the EU will also impact upon equality of women and men. Even beyond its legislative competences, the European Union engages in coordinating policies of its Member States, notably through the Open Method of Coordination. While the resulting documents and policy processes are not legally binding, they still have considerable impact on Member States’ policies. Accordingly, Charter provisions must also be complied with when engaging in such policy processes. Policies pursuing any other aim can and must be scrutinised in order to also promote equality between women and men under Article 23. Further, the applicability of the Charter depends on the categorisation of provisions as principles 23.04 or rights. Principles can only be used to interpret EU legislation, but rights may be directly enforceable (Art 52(5)). Regarding Article 23, the explanations state that it consists of rights and principles, without any reference to its individual paragraphs.7 This corresponds to the fact that Article 23 does not contain a classical human right—ie a right to be wielded by individuals against the European Union and its Member States, restricting their actions.8 Article 23’s two distinct

3 J Conaghan (ed), Feminist Legal Studies (London, Routledge, 2009), vols I–IV. 4 See also 23.14 below, on the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention. 5 The multiple opportunities of fathers to use domestic law on custody to maintain control over a woman who has left a violent relationship (see for example C Shalansky, J Ericksen and A Henderson, ‘Abused women and child custody: the ongoing exposure to abusive ex-partners’, (1999) 29 Journal of Advanced Nursing 416–26; V Elizabeth, N Gavey and J Tolmie, ‘“He’s Just Swapped His Fists for the System.” The Governance of Gender through Custody Law’ (2012) 26 Gender and Society 239–60) are compounded by the practice of abducting children to other countries if custody or contact is denied. The insufficient protection of women by international law is well documented (CS Bruch, ‘The Unmet Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases’ (2004) 38 Family Law Quarterly 529–45). Coordination of civil procedure could be used to alleviate some of those deficits. There is some argument in academic literature that existing Regulations on recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and family responsibility can be used to address some of these concerns (see R Lamont, ‘International Child Abduction and Domestic Violence in the European Union’ in Helen Salford et al (eds), Gender and Migration in 21st Century (Ashgate: Dartmouth, 2009), 27–43). 6 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA on victims’ protection, actually mentions domestic violence against women in its recital 18, which means that its provisions have to be interpreted as to provide adequate protection in this situation. 7 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ 303/17, 32. 8 The distinction between classical human rights and modern human rights is often framed as the distinction between status negativus (in which citizens are protected against states’ and the Union’s intervention in their personal freedoms)



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paragraphs provide first a positive duty on the Union and its Member States to ensure equality (para 1), and second a modification of the prohibition of sex discrimination of Article 21 by clarifying that positive action is not excluded by this classical human right (para 2). Though some of its relevance lies in programming future politics, other aspects of Article 23 are enforceable before the Court. This creates opportunities in particular as regards programming the interpretation and application of provisions of the Charter, the EU Treaties and secondary legislation, as will be shown below.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 23 with Other Provisions of the Charter I.  Article 23 and Articles 20 and 21 23.05 Laws and policy relevant to equality of women and men can be seen as embracing two ­dimensions—a negative dimension, under which discrimination against women on grounds of sex should be prohibited, and a positive dimension under which measures are taken to ensure equality between the sexes.9 Within the Charter, the non-discrimination dimension is enacted by Article 21, while Article 23 is dedicated to the positive dimension. Further, Article 20 contains the individual right to be treated equally before the law. 23.06 The respective wording of Articles 20, 21 and 23 indicates that they each have a distinct content. Of course, an obligation to ensure equality between women and men (Art 23(1)) will include a prohibition to discriminate against women (Art 21). However, given that Article 21 contains the prohibition of sex discrimination, Article 23 must be interpreted as specifying its interpretation rather than establishing the prohibition itself. Further, while Article 20 uses the term equality in its heading, its text only uses the adjective ‘equal’, thus demanding equality as consistency10 in application of the law. The resulting obligation of administrators and courts to use the same standards for everyone in applying the law (Art 20) differs fundamentally from the grand aim of ensuring equality of women and men (Art 23). Ensuring equality aims at changing socioeconomic reality as well as at achieving de facto equality of the sexes.11 In contrast, equality before the law in Western legal thought is usually construed in line with Aristotle’s formula, which will prevent the realisation of de facto equality between groups and individuals who are constructed as unequal in social reality. The reason for this lies in the fact that, according to Aristotle, justice only required equal treatment for those who are equal. Accordingly, any inequality, whether

and status positivus (in which citizens demand that the Union and states actively create the preconditions for the enjoyment of human rights) (see on this J Kühling, ‘Fundamental Rights’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of EU Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 479–515). In modern democracies, which also provide for enjoyment of rights in so-called private spheres such as the economy and the family, a status social activus should be added, allowing individuals to cooperate in order to ward off private power rather than being forced to rely on state protection. (See on this D Schiek, ‘Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU: From Status Positivus to Status Socialis Activus via Two Forms of Transnational Solidarity’ in D Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 341–368. 9 Political science literature usually distinguishes three dimensions: non-discrimination law, positive action and gender mainstreaming: T Rees, Mainstreaming Equality in the European Union: Education, Training and Labour Market Policies (London, Routledge, 1998). 10 S Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 8–14; D Schiek, ‘Torn between Arithmetic and substantive equality?’ (2002) 18 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 149–68, 150; see further Bell’s commentary on Art 20 in this volume, 20.20–20.27. 11 On the dangers of applying equality as consistency, in other words Aristotle’s formula, in the field of sex equality law see Schiek, ‘Torn between Arithmetic and substantive equality?’ (n 10).

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socially constructed or real, can be relied upon to justify unequal treatment.12 If the duty to ensure equality between women and men is to be acquitted, any prohibition of discrimination must not be read as a specification of the Aristotelian formula. Further, since ensuring equality between women and men requires changing reality,13 it cannot be achieved by a mere prohibition to discriminate—as is also clarified by Article 23(2) with its explicit scope for positive action.14 Article 23 must thus be distinguished from formal equality before the law under Article 20 as well as from non-discrimination under Article 21, though it impacts on the interpretation and application of both those articles. If the Court of Justice refers to the Charter at all in its case law on gender equality,15 it has 23.07 not always been as clear in its analysis, partly following imprecise opinions of its Advocates General.16 First, Articles 21 and 23 are frequently mentioned together when the prohibition of sex discrimination is at stake, instead of clearly distinguishing between non-discrimination and a positive duty to ensure equality.17 More problematically, the Court and its AGs have at times been inspired by the Aristotelian formula in applying the prohibition of sex discrimination, which again contradicts Article 23. This shall be illustrated by one example, the Test Achats18 ruling on sex discrimination in insurance premiums. AG Kokott reasoned in her opinion that Articles 21(1) and 23(1) establish ‘the principle of equal 23.08 treatment and non-discrimination between men and women’, and that there is ‘no fundamental difference’ between that principle and the principle of equal treatment ‘expressed in Article 20 of the Charter’.19 Scrutinising the EU legislation’s compatibility with the prohibition of sex discrimination, AG Kokott clarified that ‘the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination, of which the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex is merely a particular expression, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified’.20 This suggests that differences between women and men can be used to justify continued discrimination of women.21 In the specific case AG Kokott concluded that discrimination of women could not be justified. The question to be decided by the Court was whether Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113 infringed the prohibition of sex discrimination. That provision allowed Member States to exempt insurance companies from that prohibition, although it should be applied to other contracts concerning access to and provision of goods and services. AG Kokott concluded that

12 Unsurprisingly, concentration camps in Nazi Germany had an abbreviated version of the Aristotelian formula on their entrance: ‘Jedem das Seine’ (‘Each as he deserves’); see A Nußberger and L Osterloh, ‘Commentary on Article 3 subsection 1 GG’, marginal note 8, in M Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz. Kommentar, 8th edn (Munich, Beck, 2018). 13 See in more detail below 23.27–23.29. 14 See in more detail below 23.37–23.48. 15 In some cases relating to gender equality, even if logged after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the Court does not refer to the Charter (eg Case C-149/10 Chatzi [2010] ECR I-8499, relating to parental leave after the birth of twins, for which the objective obligation to ensure equality between women and men under Art 23 could have been used, and Case C-123/10 Brachner (20 October 2011), on pension regimes in Austria, although AG Trstenjak referred to Arts 21 and 23 as establishing the prohibition of sex discrimination, paras 49–51 of her opinion). In other cases, even though the question for preliminary ruling explicitly included Article 23, the Court did not engage with it at all (eg Case C-335/15 Ornano (14 July 2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:564). 16 In the H v Land Berlin case, AG Mengozzi did not even mention Article 23, while the Court referred to it in passing (Case C-174/16 H v Land Berlin (07 September 2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:637). 17 See eg Case C-401/11 Soukupová (13 April 2013) [28]; Case C-236/09 Test Achats [2001] ECR I-773 [38]. 18 Test Achats (n 17) [17]. 19 Para 29 of her Opinion. 20 Para 41. 21 See also para 60 of her opinion, stating clearly: ‘Direct discrimination on grounds of sex is … permissible if … there are relevant differences between men and women which necessitate such discrimination’.



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the statistical probability of being involved in road accidents less frequently, of using medical services more frequently and of living longer results from chosen behaviour and is not based on sex. Accordingly, demanding higher insurance premiums for women in health and life insurance and for men in car insurance was unjustified sex discrimination in her view. However, she might be swayed by ‘scientific’ evidence that the caution leading women to cause fewer accidents, to seek medical advice on time and to live longer as a result of both is genetically imprinted on the female sex. Prejudices such as those have time and again been used to justify devaluation of women.22 The Court based its ruling on the principal logic of its AG with a peculiar twist. It stated that ‘comparability of situations must be assessed in the light of the subject matter and purpose of the EU measure which makes the distinction’. Considering that the Council’s stated intention had been to ensure unisex rules on premiums and benefits, the Court concluded that insurers must indeed not be allowed to discriminate against women.23 Had the Council stated that there are sufficient differences between women and men for insurers to continue their discrimination, the Court might have accepted that discrimination. This long case report demonstrates that reliance on Aristotle’s formula does not confer any valuable substantive equality rights on women, and thus contradicts Article 23. While the immediate result of the Test Achats case may be positive,24 its ideological underpinnings constitute a danger to the effectiveness of Article 23.

II.  Article 23 and Other Charter Articles 23.09 The principle of ensuring equality between women and men also constitutes a horizontal principle, which enhances the principle known as ‘gender mainstreaming’ (see below, 23.32). As such, it relates to any provision of the Charter, and demands that it is interpreted in ways that ensure equality between women and men. Two examples may illustrate the relevance of this. Reading Charter provisions in line with women’s equality is particularly challenging where the protection of a specific right is prone to entrench traditional role expectations imposed on women, which often relate to women working more and/or for less recognition than men, or to expecting women to endure violence and other restrictions of their personal freedom. In international human rights law, tensions between protection of minorities and equality of women and men as well as frictions between freedom of thought, conscience and religion and gender equality have long been acknowledged as a problem.25 Accordingly, there is a potential tension between Article 23 and Article 22, if the latter is read as not only protecting diversity, but also as sheltering the cohesiveness of cultural or religious groups. 22 Möbius’s classical treatise on the biologically induced intellectual incapacity of women (P Möbius, Über den ­physiologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes, 9th edn (Halle, 1908) may seem an outdated example. However, such research results are still achieved on ‘objective’ bases (see for current repercussions, with critical reflections, MW Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 7th edn (Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2012) chs 3 and 5). 23 Paras 29–32 of the judgment; see for a similar position C Tobler, ‘Annotation to Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL, Yann van Vugt, Charles Basselier v Conseil des ministres’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 2041, 2052–54. 24 See the annotation by Tobler, ibid, and E Ellis and P Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 206–09; see also Kilpatrick in this volume, 21.70–21.74. 25 See CCPR General Comment No 28, Art 3 (The Equality of Rights between Men and Women), adopted by the Committee at its 1834th meeting on 29 March 2000, nos 32 and 21. The issue is also discussed at length in the recent UN Working Group on the issue of discrimination of women in law and in practice’s report submitted to the Human Rights Council in June 2018 (A/HRC/38/46, 14.05.2018). On potential tensions between sex equality and religious freedom, see A McColgan, ‘Class Wars?: Religion and (In)Equality in the Workplace’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law Journal 1–29; more recently A McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2014), 150–81; on conflicts between minority protection and women’s rights, see S Moller Okin, ‘Mistress of Their Own Destiny. Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights to Exit’ (2002) 112 Ethics 205–30.

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Further, there is a potential tension between Article 23 and Article 33. Only women can give 23.10 birth, and this specific gift is made to impact on equality between women and men by social arrangements. Frequently mothers are held responsible for children beyond the act of birthing, and in extreme cases expected to deliver all the work connected to child-raising without being paid for it, to give up any employed work or any other ambition until their children can fend for themselves. Maternity can thus form a burden, shackling women to a life of dependency on others, and limit their ability to be self-contained and to choose activities other than child minding and housework for their children and their father(s). Article 33 of the Charter, in protecting families unconditionally, does not refer to those or any other damaging effects on women’s equality potentially flowing from the organisation of family life. Article 33, paragraph 2 of the same provision affords ‘everyone’ rights to maternity leave, 23.11 protection against dismissal on grounds of maternity and to parental leave—although any maternity rights can only be enjoyed by women. Its focus on leave is also unnecessarily narrow: reconciliation of paid work and unpaid work in families26 could also be achieved by demanding that the organisation of paid work and publicly financed child care should leave sufficient time for mothers and fathers to care for their children without reducing their paid work. Focusing on leave, particularly if combined with long parental leave after maternity leave, frequently leads to mothers losing any realistic prospect of a career beyond child minding and housework without pay. There is thus a potential tension between Article 33 and Article 23. This tension can be dissolved by interpreting Article 33 in line with Article 23 as to demand ways of protecting families and reconciliation that ensure equality between women and men at the same time. Other ways of protecting families and reconciliation would be unlawful as contradicting Article 23.

C.  Sources of Article 23 Rights I.  Council of Europe Treaties The ECHR states in Article 14 that its provisions must be applied without discrimination, and 23.12 Protocol No 12 provides for Article 14 to be transversally applicable.27 This prohibition against discriminating comprises sex explicitly, but the Charter does not contain any positive obligation complementing that prohibition. There is thus no equivalent to Article 23 in the ECHR.28 This corresponds to the low prominence of gender equality within the ECHR case law: the first case on sex discrimination dates from 1985, and there is as yet no case law on issues such as positive action.29 26 On this principle see in more detail E Caracciolo di Torella and A Masselot, Caring Responsibilities in EU Law and Policy (New York: Routledge, 2020); D Schiek, ‘Collective Bargaining and Unpaid Care as Social Security Risk: An EU Perspective’ (2020) 36 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 3, 387–408; see also commentary to Art 33. 27 At the time of writing Protocol No 12 was ratified by 10 EU Member States (Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain), signed by 11 (Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia) and neither signed nor ratified by six EU Member States (Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden). For current status, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/ conventions/treaty/177/signatures?p_auth=f2Zsy7s0. 28 It is worth noting that Article 5 from Protocol No 7 is also an equality provision dealing with equality in rights in relation to children and property between (heterosexual) spouses during and after marriage. There has been no case law on this provision. See P van Dijk et al (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 5th edn (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2018), 991–95. 29 On a comparison between ECtHR and ECJ case law on equality between women and men, see S Besson, ‘Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain Meet?’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 647–82; I Radačić, ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to Sex Discrimination’ [2012] European Gender Equality Review 13–22.



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The field of equality between women and men is clearly one where EU law traditionally has provided more extensive protection than the ECHR. The Charter acknowledges that the EU can be ahead of other organisations in its human rights regime, since Article 52(3) recognises that nothing shall ‘prevent Union law from providing more extensive protection’. 23.13 However, other instruments of the Council of Europe embrace equality between women and men more fully. Article 20 of the revised European Social Charter30 provides: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the grounds of sex, the Parties undertake to recognise that right and to take appropriate measures to ensure or promote its application in the following fields: a) b) c) d)

access to employment, protection against dismissal and occupational reintegration; vocational guidance, training, retraining and rehabilitation; terms of employment and working conditions, including remuneration; career development, including promotion.

23.14 The Council has adopted a special convention on combating violence against women, the Istanbul Convention, which entered into force in August 2014. It has been signed by all Council of Europe members, including the European Union and all EU Member States, save for Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. Six EU Member States and the European Union itself have not yet ratified the Convention.31 While containing some overlaps with the EU’s Victims’ Rights Directive, the ratification of the Convention is expected to enhance the direction and commitment of the Union to counter violence against women.32

II.  UN Treaties (a)  General Human Rights Instruments 23.15 As with many national constitutions in Europe, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) each include a specific clause on equality between women and men in addition to a general prohibition of discrimination on a number of grounds. Article 3 of the ICCPR and of the ICESCR require state parties ‘to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all (….)rights set forth in the present Covenant’. These follow Article 2 of each convention, under which state parties ‘guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. The structure of the rights guaranteed in Articles 21 and 23 mirrors this layout. In contrast to the Charter, Articles 2 and 3 of the UN Covenants limit their scope to the rights protected

30 The 1996 European Social Charter has been ratified by 20 Member States, while seven have only signed, but not (yet) ratified it. The former category comprises Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. 31 The Convention was adopted on 11 April 2011 and opened for signature on 11 May in Istanbul. The European Union signed it on 13 June 2017 and expected to finalise its ratification by 2019, before the European Parliament challenged the ratification before the CJEU, on grounds of the use of the inadequate legal base and the absence of mutual agreement between all Member States to be bound by it (Avis 1/19, pending). Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia are still to ratify the Convention. For current status, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/ conventions/treaty/210/signatures. 32 K Nousiainen and C Chinkin, Legal implications of EU accession to the Istanbul Convention (Brussels, European Commission, 2015) 133.

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in those Covenants, and have been considered as parasitic as a consequence.33 Only the ICCPR contains an independent prohibition of discrimination in Article 26, within which sex is named as one of the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited. (b) The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) The UN main instrument in the field of equality of women and men goes beyond establishing an 23.16 obligation to ensure equality and allowing special measures in favour of women. This convention was the first to establish an explicitly asymmetric approach to equality rights. Its Article 1 defines discrimination against women as Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.

Article 4 specifies that neither ‘temporary special measures aimed at accelerating the de facto 23.17 equality between men and women’ nor ‘special measures aimed at protecting maternity’ shall be considered as discrimination in the sense of the Convention. As regards measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality, the Convention specifies that these must be discontinued when (not if) the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. Taken together, this also indicates that the CEDAW obliges state parties to take measures which will achieve equality of opportunity and treatment for women in social reality. These provisions are frequently seen as going beyond the limited space the Court of Justice of the European Union has allowed for positive action in EU law, which of course raises the question of in how far the more restrictive approach of EU law towards ‘positive action’ may be in conflict with the CEDAW, and what consequences this may have (below, 23.45–23.47). While not a special convention on the rights of women, the 2009 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)34 is worthy of note here for its Article 6, according to which the state parties recognise the multiple nature of the discrimination faced by women and girls with disabilities and assume an obligation to undertake ‘measures to ensure the full and equal enjoyment by them of all human rights and fundamental freedoms’ including the ones enshrined in the CRPD.

III.  EU Law Gender equality is frequently considered as one of the best developed aspects of EU law,35 rang- 23.18 ing from the most developed field of social policy to an important human rights policy subject36 33 W Vandenhole, Non-Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005) 13. 34 See, for more detail on this convention, C O’Brien, Article 26, 26.31–26.45, in this volume. On the EU disability discrimination law and intersectionality see D Schiek, ‘Intersectionality and the Notion of Disability in EU Discrimination Law’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review, 35–64. 35 On the history of EU gender equality law see T Hervey, ‘Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 307–25, and the contributions to the special issue she is introducing in this article, see also S Sümer, European Gender Regimes and Policies (Farnham, Ashgate, 2009) 59–85, for more recent material see E. Holzleithner, ‘EU-rechtliche Bestimmungen zum Antidiskriminierungsverbot—Grundlagen und Anwendung’ in A Scheer, A El-Mafaalani and G Yüksel (eds), Handbuch Diskriminierung (Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2017) 200–26. 36 The elegy in the relevant chapter of one of the predecessors of this volume is characteristic in maintaining that ‘gender equality is the most robust and highly developed aspect of European Union social policy. While other areas of



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and the embodiment of developing innovative ways to regulate, such as the principle of gender mainstreaming.37 Accordingly, there are numerous emanations and assertions of this principle in European Union law and policy, including so-called soft law instruments, which are not legally binding but must be drawn upon when interpreting EU law. As concerns the latter category, the Community Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers proclaimed: 16. Equal treatment for men and women must be assured. Equal opportunities for men and women must be developed. To this end, action should be intensified wherever necessary to ensure the implementation of the principle of equality between men and women as regards in particular access to employment, remuneration, working conditions, social protection, education, vocational training and career development. Measures should also be developed enabling men and women to reconcile their occupational and family obligations.

23.19 This instrument was solemnly declared by the then EU Member States in 1989, with the UK’s abstention.38 23.20 Long before the Community Charter and the Charter of Fundamental Rights were adopted, equal treatment of men and women had been acknowledged as one of the general principles of Union law. The Court issued the pivotal Defrenne II ruling in 1976,39 just after the Council had agreed that ‘achieving equality between men and women’ in the world of work should be one of the priorities of its social action programme.40 Community legislation relating to this aim focused on equal treatment between women and men, ie non-discrimination rather than equality, a subject matter which is covered by Article 21 TFEU. Community legislation also stressed that its purpose was to ‘put into effect the principle of equal treatment’ (Art 1(1) Directive 1976/207).41 Today, the purpose of EU gender equality legislation is sometimes a dual one. For example, Directive 2006/5442 aims to ‘ensure the implementation of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation’ (Art 1(1)). 23.21 This development reflects the incremental progress of primary EU law towards recognising equality between men and women as an aim to be pursued, going beyond a prohibition of sex discrimination. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced equality between men and women as an aim of the Community (Art 2 EC), and this aim is maintained in Article 3(3) TEU. The Treaty of Amsterdam43 also introduced the Community’s obligation to ‘aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women’ in all its activities (Art 3(2) EC, now Art 8 TFEU).

social policy are characterised by shared competences and flexibility of instruments, gender equality has been described as “federalism encapsulated” … long based on an ethic of enforceable individual rights invocable against Member States and private individuals.’ C Costello, ‘Gender Equality in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 111, 111–112, references omitted. 37 F Beveridge and S Velluti, Gender and the Open Method of Coordination. Perspectives on Law, Governance and Equality in the EU (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008). 38 (1990) 1 Social Europe 45. 39 Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455. 40 [1974] OJ C13/1. 41 Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40, now superseded by Directive 2006/54/EC. 42 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23. 43 [1997] OJ C340/1.

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The same treaty introduced into Article 141(4) EC the ‘view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women’ (now Art 157(4) TFEU). This clause did not prevent the EU legislator from maintaining a focus on equal treatment. For example, the newest sex equality Directive, though based on Article 157(3), does not reaffirm the obligation to ensure full equality between men and women, but is restricted to mere equal treatment (Directive 2010/41).44 Accordingly, Article 23 is underpinned by primary and secondary EU law, both as a right and 23.22 as a principle. It reinforces the heightened position of gender equality in EU law by also giving this constitutional principle45 an elevated position within the Charter. The Charter does not offer any comparably all-encompassing provisions relating to any other inequality. Given the elevated relevance of gender equality in EU law, a commentary on Article 23 cannot cover all aspects of the debate. The subsequent sections maintain the focus on exegesis of the positive law in context with its purposes, adding some examples of practical applications. In keeping with the content of Article 23, they do not cover the prohibition of sex discrimination as such.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks As stated already, Article 23 does not establish a classical human right,46 and it consists of two 23.23 distinct paragraphs. The first paragraph establishes a positive duty to ensure equality between women and men, and impacts on all provisions of the Charter, including Article 23(2), and other Union law. Paragraph 2 is much narrower, in that it clarifies how the prohibition of sex discrimination contained in Article 21 relates to positive action. Accordingly, each paragraph of Article 23 warrants its own commentary, each of which requires an adaptation of the structure of commentaries devised for classical human rights. The scope of application (a) is followed by the substantive commentary on the specific provision (b) and a section covering judicial review and enforceability (c), since sections on limitations and derogations and on remedies have limited value for provisions mainly modifying a classical human right. Under section E an evaluation of the opportunities and shortcomings of Article 23 will be offered.

II.  Paragraph 1 Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay.

(a)  Scope of Application: Women and Men Referring to equality between women and men, Article 23 paragraph 1 seems to indicate 23.24 that it does not encompass all citizens: after all, nature does not always conform to the social convention of categorising people as either woman or man. Whatever the alleged biological basis of this categorisation—chromosomes, outer genitals, secondary sex identifiers—children

44 Directive 2010/41/EU on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L180/1. 45 S Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, ‘The Amended Equal Treatment Directive (2002/73): An Expression of Constitutional Principles/Fundamental Rights’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 327, 331–36. 46 Above, section A, 23.04.



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are born in more than two varieties. In a society which insists on two sexes only, this creates problems for those falling between the categories. Children who do not display the expected sex categories at birth are frequently still altered by risky surgery. People who perceive themselves as belonging to a different gender than their bodies suggest often feel compelled to seek surgery, rather than challenging continuing gender stereotypes that prevent them from feeling comfortable in their bodies.47 23.25 The binary model of gendered reality, according to which humankind only consists of women and men, is but a social convention, which is again closely linked to requiring women and men to perform different and complementing roles in society. These ascribed roles are ideologically connected to the ability of many women to give birth, from which women’s responsibility to deliver unpaid work in raising children and caring for other adults is derived. Since humans are brought up as women and men, most consequently identify with the corresponding values, roles and life styles of one of these identities. Mentioning only women and men, Article 23 latches onto those social conventions perceived as based on biological difference. To avoid perpetuating social inequalities entrenched in these social constructs, it is important to read the notions of women and men in Article 23 as social constructs rather than essential categories. 23.26 In academic writing as well as in EU policy documents, the notion of ‘gender’ has come to signify the social construction of women and men.48 Gender is built around social expectations of maintaining a certain organisation of society, which is at the same time closely aligned with an unequal division of labour and resources between those categorised as male and female, and a certain structure of families as the basis for the division of labour and organisation of sexuality. If the notion of women and men together constitutes gender, the notion of gender can comprise trans- and intersex persons who do not neatly fit the binary gender categories. For example, the Court of Justice has acknowledged that sex discrimination also prohibits discrimination on grounds of gender reassignment.49 In this case AG Tesauro considered that discrimination on grounds of falling ‘outside the traditional man/woman classification’ must be classified as sex discrimination.50 This indicates the need to acknowledge the terms woman and man as ends of a continuum from a biological perspective. Going further, and relating the notions to the purpose of Article 23(1) of ensuring equality between women and men, it is necessary to consider the purpose of dividing humankind into women and men. As indicated, gender theory convenes that this purpose is the definition of socio-economic role expectations around division of labour. If equality between women and men should be ensured, the need for the distinction should diminish. Acknowledging its limited value would thus already contribute to ensuring equality. As a result, gender as the notion comprising women and men can be considered as a node51 comprising not only women and men, but also

47 There is a growing body of literature on transsexual and transgender people. For an overview considering these problems as part of the gender node, see S Agius and C Tobler, Trans and Intersex People. Discrimination on Grounds of Sex, Gender Identity and Gender Expression (Brussels, European Commission, 2011) with numerous academic references. For a recent account, including an analysis of trans and intersex rights and an overview of the recent state of affairs at both EU and Member States’ level, see M van den Brink and P Dunne, Trans and Intersex Equality Rights in Europe—a Comparative Analysis (Brussels, European Commission, 2018). 48 See eg Sümer (n 35) 5–6, with further references. 49 Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143. 50 Para 17 of his opinion. 51 D Schiek, ‘Organising EU Equality Law Around the Nodes of “Race”, Gender and Disability’ in D Schiek and A Lawson (eds), EU Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality: Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender and ­Disability Discrimination (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011) 11, 24.

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trans-, non-binary,52 and intersex persons, who do not neatly fit the categories of male and female. If read in the light of its aim, Article 23(1) thus does apply to all humankind, and not only to those who fit the traditional categories of woman and man without any doubt. (b)  Specific Provision Equality between Women and Men The aim to be pursued under Article 23 is equality between women and men. Considering that 23.27 women and men are also diversified by a number of other ascribed characteristics, including alleged race, ethnic origin, bodily capacity and being disabled by society’s expectations, inequalities between women and men are also widely varied.53 With all these varieties, inequalities between women and men can still be captured in general 23.28 terms. This results from social processes causing durable inequalities54 between those categorised as female and male respectively (women and men). These inequalities privilege men over women. Women are usually made to work more, earn less for the same amount of work, and have more limited access to resources generally.55 This is achieved by structuring the division of labour between women and men along the lines pre-ordained by expectations of heterosexuality as the norm (hetero-normativity).56 While the details of inequalities between women and men differ between different societies, the burdening of women with more work, in particular more unpaid or low-paid work, than men is common to societies in all EU Member States. To a large extent, this is achieved by women delivering more unpaid work in families, caring for children, the elderly and servicing men in their reproductive needs.57 Inequalities between women and men also include sexualisation and emotionalisation of women, and the expectation that women endure physical violence, including sexual violence, and other restrictions of their physical integrity and personal liberty.58 52 A recent report on the rights of trans and intersex persons in Europe (the EU and the EEA) finds that the ECJ ‘appears to prefer a more rigid, dichotomous framework for protection’ which excludes non-binary people. In addition, the same report identifies that the ECJ approach to trans people seems to revolve around gender reassignment which is a ‘highly medicalised picture of trans people [and excludes those] trans EU citizens who cannot or will not access gender confirmation healthcare’ (van den Brink and Dunne (n 47)). For similar critique of the ‘binary construction of gender’ in the context of Art 23 see S Borelli, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ in E Ales et al (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden: Nomos and Hart, 2018), 209, 210. 53 On the notion of intersectionality see below, 23.54–23.56. 54 On the construction of durable inequalities through social interactions, see IM Young, ‘Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference’ in E Grabham et al (eds), Intersectionality and Beyond (Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 273, 275. 55 For the European Union, these indicators are reported in an annual report by the European Commission. The latest of these is available for 2018 (European Commission, Progress on Equality Between Women and Men in 2018 (Brussels, 2018), http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?doc_id=50074). Data is available on the gender pay gap, ie the difference in remuneration for comparable work by sex, which is measured annually (European Commission, The Gender Pay Gap 2016 (Brussels, 2016), available from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ Gender_pay_gap_statistics). 56 On the feminist notion of hetero-normativity, see C Ridgeway and S Correll, ‘Unpacking the Gender System’ [2004] 18(4) Gender Society 510–31; A Miller, ‘Like a Natural Woman: Negotiating Collective Gender Identity in an Alternative World’ [2007] 27(1) Sociological Spectrum 3–28. 57 The time use per gender remains one of the worst documented indicators for gender (in)equality. In 2006, ­EUROSTAT established that women work between 50 and 200% more than men on domestic tasks (Chr Aliaga, How is the time of women and men distributed in Europe? Statistic in focus 4/2006, available from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/ products-statistics-in-focus/-/KS-NK-06-004 =). ?In 2015, European Institute for Gender Equality calculated the third lowest score in the Gender Equality Index for the domain of time. This domain measures care activities (daily care activities outside of paid work, and cooking and housework) and social activities (weekly sports, cultural or leisure activities and monthly voluntary or charitable activities). Furthermore, with ‘1 point lower than in 2005 and a further 3.2 points lower than the score of 2012 […] the situation has become more unequal than it was ten years ago’ (see Gender Equality Index: https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2015/domain/time). 58 Statistical capture of violence against women is improving but remains incomplete. The EU Gender Institute nevertheless provides studies on the problem (see https://eige.europa.eu/gender-based-violence/data-collection), and has



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23.29

23.30

The EU and its predecessors have developed their approach to inequalities between women and men since 1957. From the beginning, equal pay of men and women was to be maintained by Member States. The equal pay clause was initially motivated by the desire to avoid competitive disadvantage for Member States such as France which prohibited pay discrimination.59 Since 2000, human rights protection was acknowledged as a decisive motive for the demand for gender pay equality.60 The EU legislator has initially focused on employment and occupation, including social security.61 With expanding competences (above, section A) it has also expanded gender equality legislation to new fields, such as access to goods and services.62 Further, gender equality is an element of the OMC where the EU cannot wield legislative competences.63 With all these developments, some doubt whether the Charter adds anything specifically.64 It is submitted that Article 23 does constitute change. In particular, the clause goes beyond the EU acquis developed in this field in one other important aspect, namely in the order of words. While the Treaties and secondary legislation always relate to men and women (equal treatment of men and women, equal pay), the Charter reverses the order and speaks about equality of women and men. While the egalitarian principle is maintained, the change in order also constitutes a further milestone. Naming women first, the Charter acknowledges the asymmetric character of sex inequality to the detriment of women. Asymmetry of equality rights65 is frequently used to support a reading that does not outlaw discrimination of the privileged group (or sex) in order to achieve equality in socio-economic reality. Such measures can be necessary to overcome the paradox of equality law: modern laws concerning equality and discrimination are not restricted to merely formal equality. They are more ambitious in pursuing the aim of changing socioeconomic reality in favour of those who have been at the receiving end of discrimination.66 To achieve such change, formally neutral rules are not always sufficient. At times it is also necessary to grant privileges to those who have hitherto suffered detriment. Sometimes, taking away a privileged position will also be perceived as detriment, but at times even further positive action will be required. While Article 23(2) provides a more specific rule on positive action, the wording of Article 23(1) changes the conceptual base for such positive action by acknowledging that women are those suffering from detriment, through its revised order of words. It thus suggests that positive duties and positive action are firmly based on a notion of asymmetry. Ensuring Equality in All Areas, Including Employment, Work and Pay

23.31

In requiring the EU and its Member States to ensure equality, Article 23(1) goes beyond an obligation to refrain from discrimination (Art 21) or to respect diversity (Art 22), as well as beyond

‘violence’ as one of the eight domains in its Gender Equality Index (see https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2015/ domain/violence). In 2014, FRA published the report from its 2012 survey, which remains the most up-to-date data set (see https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2014-vaw-survey-main-results-apr14_en.pdf). 59 G More, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) 517–53. 60 Case C-50/96 Schröder [2000] ECR I-743 [57]. 61 Today, the most important directives in these fields are Directive 2006/54 on equal treatment of women and men in employment and occupation and Directive 79/80 on equal treatment of women and men in social security. 62 Directive 2004/113/EC. 63 Beveridge and Velluti (n 37). 64 Costello (n 36) 112; E Ellis, ‘The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on Gender Equality’ [2010] European Gender Equality Law Review 7–13, 11. 65 On this see D Schiek, ‘Elements of a New Framework for the Principle of Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law: Directives 2000/43/EC, 2000/78/EC and 2002/73/EC changing Directive 76/207/EEC in context’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 137–57. 66 Schiek, ‘Torn between Arithmetic and substantive equality?’ (n 10).

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gender mainstreaming (Art 8 TFEU). In the British discourse, the term ‘positive duties’ is used for an obligation to ensure equality. These have recently been codified in the Equality Act,67 after having given rise to a new philosophy of human rights based on doctrines of equality law.68 In Continental Member States, the concept of positive state obligations to create preconditions for enjoyment of human rights is frequently derived from social state principles.69 In addition, some Continental constitutions explicitly demand that equality between women and men must be ensured.70 In international law this corresponds to the obligation to promote human rights. Relating to 23.32 equality of women and men, the obligation to promote the factual conditions for the enjoyment of rights has first been linked to gender mainstreaming after the 1985 UN women summit71 and was fully developed as an instrument during the 1995 UN summit on women.72 The EU Commission had actively contributed to the 1995 summit with a proposal, based on the appraisal of the gender mainstreaming strategy in its Third Action Programme for Equal Opportunities.73 Immediately after the Beijing Platform had been adopted, EU Commission74 and Council of Europe75 documents established definitions of gender mainstreaming that are still quoted as decisive. According to these, gender mainstreaming constitutes a change in strategy in that women’s equality is no longer pursued by specific instruments only, but rather through the incorporation of a gender equality perspective into developing, evaluating and improving any policy process.76 The inclusion of the gender mainstreaming principle into primary EU law was achieved with the Treaty of Amsterdam, which established the wording of today’s Article 8 TFEU (see above 23.21).

67 On this see B Hepple, Equality—The New Framework, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014) 155, 163–75. 68 S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). 69 See, for an English language overview, S Koutnatzis, ‘Social Rights as Constitutional Compromise: Lessons from Comparative Experience’ (2005) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 74–133; for the German Constitution see D Schiek, ‘Artikel 20 Abs. 1–3 V: Sozialstaat’ in E. Denninger et al (eds), Alternativkommentar zum Grundgesetz (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 2001) II. 70 For example, under s 6 of the Finnish Constitution, ‘Equality between the sexes is promoted in societal activity and working life’; under Art 1 of the French Constitution, ‘statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to positions of professional and social responsibility’; under Art 3(2) of the German Constitution, ‘the state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist’; and under Art 114 of the Greek Constitution, the ‘state shall take measures for the elimination of inequalities actually existing, in particular to the detriment of women’. The Italian Constitution stresses the obligation of the Republic and its regions to promote equal opportunity between women and men, and to remove hindrances to full equality of men and women in social, cultural and economic life, while also stressing women’s ‘essential role in the family’ (Arts 37, 48, 51, 117). Quotes are taken from J Huckerby, ‘Gender Equality and Constitutions of Europe and North America’ in UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, Gender Equality and Constitutions. Comparative Provisions (Geneva, United Nations, 2012) 1–68. 71 Sümer (n 35) 79. 72 UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Global Platform for Action—Beijing (New York, United Nation Publishing, 1995); J Rubery, ‘Gender Mainstreaming and the OMC. Is the Open Method of Coordination too Open for Gender Equality Policy?’ in J Zeitlin and P Pochet (eds), The Open Method of Coordination in Action. The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies (Brussels, PIE/Peter Lang, 2005). 73 COM 90 (449) final. 74 Communication from the Commission to the Council, ‘Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into All Community Policies and Activities’ COM (1996) 67. 75 Council of Europe: Gender Mainstreaming. Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation of Good Practices. Strasbourg (available from www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/gender-mainstreaming/ EG_S_MS_98_2_rev_en.pdf). 76 See for summaries and quotes from those instruments, Beveridge and Velluti (n 37) 17; R Nielsen, ‘Is European Union Equality Law Capable of Addressing Multiple and Intersectional Discrimination Yet?’ in D Schiek and V Chege (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law—Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law (Abingdon and New York, Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 29, 39–40.



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23.33

23.34

However, Article 23(1) once again goes beyond the established acquis. While under Article 8 TFEU the Union shall only aim to eliminate inequalities and to promote equality between men and women, Article 23(1) demands that equality must be ensured. Thus, it is not sufficient to integrate a mere gender perspective and to strive for more equality. Instead, the obligation under Article 23(1) is only fulfilled once a change in society has been achieved and secured which may well seem utopian today, given the gross inequality between women and men, which increases whenever there is some crisis leading to scarcity of resources.77 This enhanced obligation might even quell some of the criticism of gender mainstreaming EU-style, according to which gender mainstreaming is only successful for policies driven by such departments that are conscious of the needs of gender equality anyway78 or is based on a reductionist approach attributing gender inequality to some economic habits mainly.79 There is no doubt that a process-focused approach to overcoming inequalities between women and men is necessary, as a corollary to nondiscrimination policies, if socio-economic reality should be changed.80 If EU institutions are not only required to pay some attention to structures by attempting to overcome inequality, but are also under an obligation to ensure equality, this structural perspective may actually yield success. If taken seriously, Article 23 mitigates against a backlash in EU gender equality law, which has been identified by researchers from various disciplines.81 Article 23(1) is phrased more assertively than Article 8 TFEU. Accordingly, it requires more than considering gender equality in policy formulation. If inequalities between women and men persist, ensuring equality will require the taking of specific measures in favour of women overcoming factual disadvantage. The positive obligation to ensure equality of women and men aims at socio-economic reality, frequently also referred to as substantive equality or transformative equality.82 Overcoming inequalities between women and men ‘in all areas’ requires that the EU and its Member States strive for such equality, rather than only supporting formal approaches to equal treatment. Article 23(1) demands mainstreaming the obligation to ensure equality applies to all areas, while employment, work and pay are the ones stressed explicitly. The latter is in line with the origins of the EU’s gender equality policies (above, 23.29), but the Charter also clarifies that this is today only one fraction of the areas in which equality of women and men must be ensured. This obligation rests on all institutions, the judiciary in interpreting non-discrimination and other law as well as the legislator in adopting new legislation and the EU Commission in developing policies.

77 See F Bettio et al, The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies (Brussels, EU Commission, 2012); E Lombardo and M Léon, ‘Políticas de igualdad de género y sociales en España: origen, desarrollo y desmantelamiento en un contexto de crisis económica’ Investigaciones (2014) 5 Feministas 13–35 with ample data for the Spanish context. 78 Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (n 68) 192–94. 79 C Booth and C Bennet, ‘Gender Mainstreaming in the EU: Towards a New Conception and Practice of Equal Opportunity?’ (2002) 9 European Journal of Women’s Studies 430, 441; K Nousiainen, ‘Utility-Based Equality and Disparate Diversities: From a Finnish Perspective’ in Schiek and Chege (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law (n 76) 187, 190–92. 80 Accordingly, there are also optimistic assessments of the EU gender mainstreaming strategy (eg S Walby, ‘Gender Mainstreaming. Productive Tensions in Theory and Practice’ (2005) 12 Social Politics 321–43). 81 R Kuhar and D Paternotte (eds), Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe—Mobilizing against Equality (New York, London, Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017); M Verloo (ed) Varieties of Opposition to Gender Equality in Europe (New York, Routledge, 2018). 82 For example, by S Fredman, ‘Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New Definition of Equal Rights’ in I Boerefijn et al (eds), Temporary Special Measures. Accelerating De Facto Equality of Women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003) 111, 115; R Holtmaat and J Naber, Women’s Rights and Culture: From Deadlock to Dialogue (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2011) 267.

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(c)  Judicial Review, Enforceability (‘Justiciability’) As far as Article 23(1) programmes future legislation and policy development, the restrictive text 23.35 of Article 52 may lead to doubts whether the provision is open to judicial review (or ‘justiciable’, in the words of the Comments to the Charter). However, once the EU has taken legislative measures, these must at the same time ensure equality between women and men. Article 23(1) can thus be used to challenge existing legislation under Article 263 and 267 TFEU. For example, the Directive on unwelcome migrants is not only worthy of academic critique,83 but could also constitute a violation of Article 23(1), in that it does not provide specific measures to accommodate the vulnerability of female refugees in camps where refugees without regular status shall be housed. There are no provisions for adequate accommodation for pregnant women or for facilities where it is safe to give birth; and there are no precautions against placing individual women in large groups of men where they are likely to be subjected to gendered violence. Further, the EU Commission and the Council are also bound by Article 23 when engaging in policy coordination without binding legal effects. With the legally binding effect of the Charter, the question how gender mainstreaming has been applied in the Open Method of Coordination84 has become a constitutional one. Finally, Article 23(1), although not conveying individual rights, binds the judiciary at EU and 23.36 national levels in the interpretation and application of other individually enforceable rights. Such rights include the non-discrimination clauses of Article 21 and primary and secondary Union law (including Arts 18 and 157 TFEU and legislation based on Arts 19 and 157(3) TFEU). Article 23(1) thus ensures a holistic interpretation of all provisions concerning sex discrimination and other discrimination in the light of an asymmetric notion of gender equality and the duty to ensure gender equality. Mainly, an asymmetrical and proactive approach to gender equality requires pursuing substantive (and transformative) equality rather than merely formal equal treatment. There are innumerable practical applications for this within the field of sex discrimination law, as covered by Article 21, including the exact content of the prohibition of sex discrimination, the equation of sexual harassment with discrimination, and the provisions allowing limited positive action measures.85 To illustrate the opportunities created by Article 23, the evaluating section E will consider how the judiciary must, in the future, shape the concept of indirect sex discrimination, react to intersectional inequalities and shape positive action in favour of women.

III.  Paragraph 2 The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the underrepresented sex.

(a)  Scope of Application Article 23(2) specifies the prohibition of sex discrimination in so far as it clarifies the admissibil- 23.37 ity in principle of positive action. Its scope of application comprises any law or policy establishing preferences for women or men. There is no personal restriction of the scope of application. 83 H Askola, ‘Illegal Migrants, Gender and Vulnerability: The Case of the EU Returns Directives’ (2010) 18 Feminist Legal Studies 159–78. 84 Beveridge and Velluti (n 37). 85 T Freixes, ‘Article 23. Egalité entre hommes et femmes’ in EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (eds), Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Brussels, European Commission, 2006) 201–03.



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(b)  Specific Provision Origins 23.38

According to the Charter explanations, Article 23(2) originates from the Treaty provision Article 157(4) TFEU. Article 157(4) TFEU reads: ‘With a view to securing full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers’. This provision again has a specific history. It was inserted into the Treaty of Amsterdam after a particularly controversial ruling by the Court of Justice on so-called positive action in favour of women. The Kalanke ruling86 of 1995 concerned a rule specific to career development in German public services.87 The German Constitution binds public employers to a specific equality clause, which requires any decision on employment or promotion to be guided by the merit principle (Art 33(2) German Constitution). Accordingly, the person who is best qualified under a predefined set of qualifications, as assessed by public examinations or by in-post assessment following strictly formal rules, must always prevail. These rules resulted in male dominance in senior positions, which motivated the City of Hamburg to task a former judge at the Constitutional Court with drafting potential positive action measures.88 The judge came up with a ‘tie-break rule’: in order to overcome persistent under-representation of women, women could be preferred over equally qualified male competitors in employment and promotion until there were as many women as men in the relevant pay bracket. Arguably, this tie-break rule was introduced instead of requiring personnel managers to 23.39 abstain from structural discrimination which was quite usual. For example, in-post assessments traditionally tended to converge on the same grade after employees or civil servants had achieved certain seniority. As a consequence, choices for promotion were made on the basis of ‘auxiliary criteria’, mainly comprising seniority and number of dependants. Due to strict gender role expectations, the percentage of female employees in the public sector who were responsible for more than one dependant was very low: they would have one dependant if their husband earned less than themselves, or if they were unmarried mothers. Married male employees would typically have three dependants: a wife, if earning only slightly less than the husband, and two children. Seniority, too, tended to favour males in male-dominated sectors, as women had only been given a chance much more recently. The City of Bremen had dared to disable these indirectly discriminatory criteria in favour of a tie-break rule. Thus, Mr Kalanke, a married father of two children, expected to be promoted before Ms Glissman, who was younger and without children and had less seniority (despite having more professional experience, partly accumulated in the private sector). This was very important to him at the time, because any promotion after his 60th birthday would not have been reflected in his final salary pension. Understandably, he challenged the decision to promote Ms Glissman, who had been assessed as equally qualified. 23.40 The Court of Justice based its ruling on Directive 76/207 (since superseded by Directive 2006/54), which established the principle of equal treatment between men and women in employment and occupation. It also contained a clause that was meant to allow positive action,

86 Case C-450/93 Kalanke [1995] ECR I-3051. 87 For more detail on this see D Schiek, ‘Sex Equality Law after Kalanke and Marschall’ (1998) 4 European Law Journal 148–68. 88 E Benda, Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit von positiven Maßnahmen zugunsten von Frauen im Öffentlichen Dienst (Hamburg, City of Hamburg, 1986).

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Article 2(4), which read: ‘This directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunities for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities’. The Court only focused on the unequal treatment on grounds of sex, without considering the discriminatory policies which were replaced by the ‘tie-break rule’. It enounced that ‘a national rule that, where men and women who are candidates for the same promotion are equally qualified, women are automatically to be given priority in sectors where they are underrepresented involves discrimination on grounds of sex … As a derogation from an individual right laid down in the Directive, Article 2(4) must be interpreted strictly … A national rule which guarantees women absolute and unconditional priority for appointment or promotion … go[es] beyond promoting equal opportunity and overstep[s] the limits of the exception in Article 2(4) of the Directive.’89 Thus it was held that the City of Bremen should have preferred Kalanke on the basis of having a dependent wife and two children, although his professional experience was less extensive. The City decided to reassess the qualification of both candidates through an extensive interview, which resulted in Ms Glissman being considered as better qualified to fill the post. Had the City relied on independent experts instead of peer review within the same unit from the start, there would have been no case of positive action. Possibly such a policy change would have removed discrimination contravening the principle of equal treatment of women and men in the first place. The case roused considerable discussion,90 including in political circles. The imminent 23.41 negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam was utilised to draft and pass an addition to Article 119 EEC, later renumbered as Article 141 EEC, which is now contained in Article 157(4) TFEU (text quoted above at 23.38). Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 remained unchanged for the time being. This led to juridical debate on whether Article 141(4) TEC (now Art 157(4) TFEU) allowed more scope for positive action measures than the Directive.91 The Court’s Subsequent Case Law Two subsequent rulings concerning the German public service somehow softened the rigidity 23.42 of this very first case. In Marschall, the Court decided that a tie-break rule could be upheld if it contained a ‘savings clause to the effect that women are not to be given priority in promotion if reasons specific to a male candidate tilt the balance in his favour’.92 In this case, the Court considered realistically that ‘where male and female candidates are equally qualified, male candidates tend to be promoted in preference to female candidates particularly because of prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in working life and the fear, for example, that women will interrupt their careers more frequently’.93 It even realised that ‘the mere fact that female and male candidates are equally qualified does not mean that they have the same chances’,94 and concluded that ‘a national rule in terms of which, subject to a savings

89 Kalanke (n 86) [16], [19], [21], [22]. 90 The list of case annotations maintained by the Court of Justice lists no less than 83 annotations (available from http:// curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-450/93); see eg H Fenwick, ‘Perpetuating Inequality in the Name of Equal Treatment’ (1996) 18 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 263–70; L Charpentier, ‘L’arrêt Kalanke. Expression du discours dualiste de l’égalité’ [1996] Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 281–303. 91 See on this historical phase O De Schutter, ‘Positive Action’ in D Schiek et al (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 757 (pp 807–09 with further references). 92 Case C-409/95 Marschall [1997] ECR I-6363 [27]. 93 Ibid [29]. 94 Ibid [30].



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23.43

23.44

clause, female candidates for promotion who are equally as qualified as male candidates are to be treated preferentially in sectors where they are underrepresented may fall within the scope of Article 2(4) if such a rule may counteract the prejudicial effects on female candidates of the attitudes and behaviour described above’,95 before stressing that the restrictions laid down in Kalanke continued to apply.96 The Court did not refer to Article 141(4) EC, but only relied on Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207. The Badeck case, decided in 2000,97 was even more interesting, in that it covered a wide range of positive action measures. The legislation at stake contained binding targets for increasing the proportion of women employees in sectors where they had been under-represented in the past, leaving the way to achieve those targets to the employer. The employer, however, remained bound by the merit principle quoted above. Accordingly, it could only ever prefer women over men if they were at least equally qualified.98 Further, the legislation contained two cases of strict quotas. For fixed-term positions in universities, which served as a base to obtain a PhD or a Habilitation,99 the legislation established binding targets. Universities had to employ women as PhD researchers according to the percentage which they constituted among those graduates in the relevant subject who qualified for PhD research. For Habilitation, the same principle applied. This binding target was accepted, under the assumption that women could only be preferred if equally qualified.100 The Court also sanctioned a strict quota for training places, referring to the fact that these were not employment opportunities, but rather opportunities to obtain employment, without demanding equal qualification for these posts.101 The Court further limited the scope for positive action in the Abrahamsson case,102 concerning a Swedish rule under which universities could waive the requirement that the female candidate should be equally qualified to the best male competitor if employing professors in subjects where women were grossly under-represented. The Court of Justice held that such a rule went beyond the scope allowed by Directive 76/207 and Article 141(4) EC (now Directive 2006/54 and Article 157(4) TFEU). However, the Court stressed that there was ample scope for changing selection criteria in such a way as to prefer criteria that would benefit women.103 A Continued Narrow Conception of Positive Action as Exception?

23.45

In the past, the Court has clearly treated positive action as an exception from the prevailing principle of formal equal treatment irrespective of sex. It has repeatedly stated that any preference for women constitutes derogation from the right (of men) to equal treatment, and can thus only

95 Ibid [31]. 96 Ibid [32]–[33]. 97 Case C-158/97 Badeck [2000] ECR I-1875. See on this case D Schiek, ‘Positive Action before the European Court of Justice—New Conceptions of Equality in Community Law’ (2000) 16(2) International Journal for Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 251–75. 98 Paras 33, 36–38. 99 The Habilitation constitutes a higher-level PhD, traditionally a requirement for obtaining professorial office in addition to a PhD (eg in Germany, Sweden and Poland). 100 Para 41. 101 Paras 51–54. 102 Case C-407/98 Abrahamsson [2000] ECR I-5539; see also the parallel ruling on a Norwegian case by the EFTA Court E-1/02 [2004] CMLRev 245 with annotation by C Tobler. These cases prompted a specific conference and subsequent publication, A Numhauser-Henning, ‘Aiming High—Falling Short?’ Women in Academia and Equality Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2006). 103 On such strategies see De Schutter (n 91) 818–20.

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be allowed in exceptional circumstances.104 Accordingly, under the principle of proportionality, positive action can only be legitimate if it is necessary to achieve a specific aim and no measures that are less intrusive on men’s prevailing rights to equal treatment can be envisaged.105 In the four cases described above, this meant in particular that women could only profit from a preferential rule if they were assessed as equally qualified with a man in a male-dominated environment.106 This case law has already been challenged for its incompatibility with CEDAW requirements 23.46 (see above, 23.17). From the obligation of state parties to accelerate de facto equality, the CEDAW committee derives the obligation of state parties to take temporary special measures, which is the CEDAW terminology of positive action.107 Since state parties have to ensure compliance with non-discrimination by changing social reality, this may require, rather than merely allow, positive action. There is thus some doubt whether this restrictive case law was appropriate under the treaties 23.47 before the Charter became legally binding. Whether it is still adequate now cannot be derived from the text of Article 23(2) alone, which is modelled on the case law as quoted. However, as with any other norm of the Charter, Article 23(2) must be read in conjunction with Article 23(1). The question whether the restrictive approach to positive action can be aligned with Article 23(1) will be discussed under section E, since it concerns the holistic interpretation of Article 23. (c)  Judicial Review and Enforcement Article 23(2) cannot be enforced individually. This does not mean that it is not relevant for judicial proceedings. The provision must be used to interpret the ban on sex discrimination contained in Article 21. For example, Article 23(2) can be relied upon against any allegation that Article 21 prevents positive action measures, even if these have been held to be in violation of EU law before they became legally binding.

23.48

E. Evaluation 23.49

In evaluation, Article 23 clearly offers opportunities, while also having severe limitations.

I. Opportunities Article 23’s achievements mainly derive from its first paragraph, which introduces a strong posi- 23.50 tive obligation in favour of women’s equality with men, and supports an asymmetric perception of gender equality. The potential of this provision can be illustrated through a holistic interpretation

104 Kalanke (n 86) [21]–[22]; Marschall (n 92) [32]. In the subsequent cases these principles were only applied, but no further reasoning was provided. The principled priority of formal equal treatment was made explicit in a ruling on specific advantages for mothers in access to childcare facilities (Case C-476/99 Lommers [2002] ECR I-2891 [39], [47]). 105 Proportionality was explicitly mentioned in Abrahamsson (n 102) [55]. These principles have recently been confirmed in relation to positive action in favour of religious groups, see Case C-414/16 Egenberger EU:C:2018:257 [68], and Case C-193/17 Cresco Investigation GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2018:614 (25 July 2018), Opinion of AG Bobek. 106 This dogma is also upheld in academic writing, eg by De Schutter (n 91) 775–77. 107 CEDAW General Recommendation No 25: Art 4 para 1 of the Convention; see on these R Holtmaat and C Tobler, ‘CEDAW and the European Union’s Policy in the Field of Combating Gender Discrimination’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 399–425; L Waddington and L Visser, ‘Temporary Special Measures under the Women’s Convention and Positive Action under EU Law: Mutually Compatible or Irreconcilable?’ in I Westendorp (ed), The Women’s Convention Turned 50 (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2012) 33–63.



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of Article 21 and 23 relating to indirect discrimination and intersectional inequalities and of both paragraphs of Article 23 in interpreting the scope for positive action in favour of women under Union law. These examples are meant to demonstrate what a careful argumentation building on Article 23(1) can achieve for any area of European Union non-discrimination law. (a)  Revising Indirect Discrimination Law in Order to Ensure Gender Equality 23.51

23.52

Within sex discrimination law, the prohibition of indirect discrimination has been discussed as one which is closely linked to substantive equality.108 The concept of indirect discrimination, in short, states that discrimination may exist even if a rule or practice does not explicitly refer to, for example, sex, but results, in practice, in excluding women disproportionally from advantages. Prohibiting indirect discrimination may serve to prevent circumvention of a prohibition of direct discrimination, which is unrelated to substantive equality. However, targeting the practical effects of a rule, beyond its motives and even its wording, is also related to socio-economic reality, and thus based on a social engineering perspective.109 Based on the assumption that inequality between women and men is entrenched in social reality, any rule reinforcing this inequality is prima facie suspect, and discrimination is assumed. Alas, existing EU legislation and case law regarding indirect discrimination does not always embody substantive approaches to sex equality. After the harmonisation of EU sex equality law with non-discrimination law on other grounds, indirect sex discrimination is now deemed to exist ‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’.110 This definition does not necessarily require statistical evidence, which makes proving indirect sex discrimination easier than it was before. However, it also seems to introduce an element of comparison, which threatens to undermine the efficiency of the concept for achieving substantive equality. For example, the Court had held that women on on-call employment contracts were not comparable with employees on more secure contracts,111 and stated that women and men on parental leave were not comparable with men absent from work for their military service.112 This meant that the lower levels of protection against dismissal of workers on parental leave and against overly long working times of workers on on-call contracts could not be challenged under the prohibition of indirect discrimination, although these detriments affected women disproportionally. Furthermore, the case law also reinforced gender stereotypes, such as the assumption that military service is in the public interest while caring for children within the family is merely in one’s private interest, or that workers on flexible part-time employment contracts are probably secured elsewhere (through their family relations) and thus less worthy of protection.113 The feminist classic of whether care work (predominantly delivered by women) constitutes work of equal value to other work has a habit of returning to the Court. It recently decided that foster 108 Ellis and Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (n 24) 142–43. 109 These deliberations have been developed in more breadth in D Schiek, ‘Indirect Discrimination’ in D Schiek et al (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on International, Supranational and National Non-Discrimination Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 323, 327–31. 110 Directive 2006/54/EC Art 2(1)(b) for employment-related discrimination, Art 2(b) Directive 2004/113/EC for other areas. 111 Case C-313/02 Wippel v Peek and Cloppenburg [2004] ECR I-9483. 112 Case C-220/02 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB), Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten v Wirtschaftskammer Österreich [2004] ECR I-5907. 113 See for a critique of these rulings, with further references, Schiek, ‘Indirect Discrimination’ (n 109), 468–71; A Numhauser-Henning, ‘EU sex equality law post-Amsterdam’ in H Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 145–76, 169–70.

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parents, even if they are employees, cannot claim annual leave in the same way as any other employee, because carers build a personal relationship with their charges.114 The definition of indirect discrimination in the relevant EU directives is sufficiently ambiguous 23.53 as to allow a more comprehensive reading, which would also allow accommodating substantive equality. Such a reading is now required by Article 23(1). Accordingly, in the future the Court will have to start from the assumption that not only are women and men comparable in principle, but also that activities that are gendered female are comparable with activities gendered male. Under such an interpretation of indirect discrimination, the cases quoted above would have to be decided differently: for example, excluding parental leave from accruing seniority when leave for completing military service does accrue seniority would have to be classed as indirect discrimination to the detriment of women, because parental and military leave are actually considered as comparable. (b)  Intersectional Inequality Intersectional inequalities constitute a further field in which a comprehensive reading of sex dis- 23.54 crimination law in the light of the duty to ensure equality between women and men can change existing interpretations. So far, EU non-discrimination legislation protects against discrimination on the basis of six grounds (sex, ethnic and racial origin, religion and belief, age, disability, sexual orientation); Article 21 adds colour, social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property and birth as well as any other ground. Accordingly, discrimination on more than one ground is increasingly likely to be covered by EU non-discrimination law. Such discrimination is debated in socio-legal theory mainly as intersectional disadvantage,115 while the EU institutions and EU secondary legislation prefer the term ‘multiple discrimination’.116 The term intersectionality was first introduced by Crenshaw117 in order to characterise the 23.55 specific disadvantage suffered by women of colour which could not be explained by a mere addition of sex and race discrimination and overall tended to be overlooked by the law. The term has hence been used to characterise exactly this: the specific disadvantage suffered by those discriminated against on more than one ground. In recent years, there has been a legal policy debate in the European Union on whether specific legislation is needed in order for EU law to address intersectional discrimination of women.118 It has been argued elsewhere that there is scope for a teleological interpretation of the body of 23.56 EU anti-discrimination legislation to the effect that these directives already entail a prohibition of intersectional discrimination.119 Such an interpretation is now required by the obligation under Article 23(1) to ensure equality between women and men. This derives from the fact that, due to the asymmetrical character of all discrimination, intersectional discrimination is 114 Case C147/17 Sindicatul Familia Constanţa EU:C:2018:126 (20 November 2018). 115 Grabham et al (n 56); Schiek and Lawson (eds), EU Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality (n 51) 12–27; S Fredman, Intersectional discrimination in EU gender equality and non-discrimination law (Brussels, European Commission, 2016); D. Schiek, ‘Revisiting Intersectionality for EU Anti-Discrimination Law in an Economic Crisis—a Critical Legal Studies Perspective’ (2016) 2 Sociologia del Diritto 23–44; see also Kilpatrick, 21.40–21.42. 116 See, eg, Recital 17 Directive 2000/43 and Recital 19 Directive 2000/78. 117 K Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139–67. 118 See for a summary M Bell, ‘Advances in EU Anti-Discrimination Law: The EU Commission’s 2008 Proposal for a New Directive’ (2008) 3 The Equal Rights Review 7–18; D Schiek and J Mulder, ‘Intersectionality and EU Law: A Critical Appraisal’ in Schiek and Lawson (eds), EU Law and Intersectionality (n 51) 259–73. 119 D Schiek, ‘Broadening the Scope and the Norms of EU Gender Equality Law: Towards a Multi-dimensional Conception of Equality Law’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 427–66.



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suffered by women more frequently than by men. The asymmetry of discrimination means that, while each human being simultaneously has a gender, an ethnicity, an age, a sexual orientation and a religious belief (which may be atheism), not everyone suffers from discrimination in all these dimensions in equal measure. Women will suffer more from sex discrimination than men, those deemed to belong to an ethnic minority suffer more from discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, those with darker skin colours suffer more from racial discrimination than those of lighter skin colour. Accordingly, a white man considered disabled but not considered as belonging to a minority religion or as being gay will only suffer from disability discrimination, while a white woman in the same situation will suffer from discrimination at the intersection between disability and gender—and numerous examples could be added. Denying victims of intersectional discrimination the protection of EU non-discrimination law thus clearly results in more women lacking protection than men. The recent case law by the Court of Justice on justifying dismissal of women on grounds of wearing a head scarf has not, in contradiction to Article 23, taken into account that such policies only affect women, and not even discussed the impact they may have on ensuring full equality between women and men. Paying due regard to Article 23 could have improved these rulings.120 (c)  Positive Action in Favour of Women 23.57

Another example of how EU sex discrimination law can contribute to ensuring equality between women and men is the openness for positive action. In so far as paragraph 2 does not alter the wording of existing provisions in treaty and secondary law, paragraph 1 demands a purposive interpretation of its wording reflecting the asymmetric character of sex inequality. While Article 23(2) seems to maintain the restrictive approach which the Court has developed 23.58 on the basis of promotion practices in the German public service, Article 23(1) introduces a positive obligation to ensure equality from an asymmetric perspective. Under such perspectives, positive action can no longer be perceived as an exception to an individual right of men to be treated equally. Rather, positive action becomes a necessary corollary to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex. Both are two sides of the same coin. Ensuring equality requires eliminating discrimination. Since such discrimination has traditionally been to the disadvantage of women, ensuring equality requires preferential treatment of women. There is no need to read a clause allowing for such positive action narrowly, as soon as the asymmetric character of the demand to ensure equality is recognised. 23.59 Nevertheless, positive action should not be maintained forever or without limits. The obligation to ensure equality between women and men demands that special measures going beyond eliminating formal discrimination are carefully tailored to the specific field. Article 23(1) requires a targeted approach to positive action. This excludes justifying policies reinforcing women’s sole responsibility for unpaid family work.120a 23.60 In particular it is not always necessary that opportunities are only expanded to equally qualified candidates.121 This specific requirement permeating the Court’s case law on access 120 ECJ 14 March 2017 C-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV EU: C:2017:203, and C-188/15 Asma Bougnaoui and ADDH v Micropole SA EU: C:2017:204; see on these D Schiek, ‘On uses, mis-uses and non-uses of intersectionality before the Court of Justice (EU)’ (2018) 18 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 82–103. The opinion by AG Rantos to the follow-up cases again proposes to disregard the gender dimension, opinion of 21 February 2021, joint cases C 804/18 and C-341/19 EU:C:2021:144, paragraph 59. 120a ECJ 18 November 2020 C-463/19 Syndicat CFTC ECLI:EU:C:2020:932 (on special pension credits for mothers exclusively). 121 This is the preposition made by De Schutter (n 91) 775–77.

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and promotion quotas derives from specific obligations of public employers under German law. However, not all employers are required to use predefined criteria to establish qualification. It is more typical that employers maintain discretion allowing them to assemble a range of abilities in their teams. Similarly, schools, universities, teams for cultural activities or sports clubs should not have to apply predefined merit criteria to avoid discrimination claims. As we have seen, the Court of Justice waived the qualification criterion for training posts in the Badeck case.122 The same case also debated quota rules for collective bodies. Although the Court proceeded on the assumption that the relevant paragraph of the disputed legislation was not binding, the short reasoning is still worth mentioning. The Court conceded that different measures could apply for bodies that are established by election, thus suggesting that merit based on formal qualification is not the only way of deciding about access to positions.123 The 2012 Commission proposal regarding the representation of women on company boards124 23.61 constitutes a good example for the detriments of the doctrine that equal qualifications should always prevail. The disputed Commission proposal not only sets a quota for non-executive company directors, but also imposes upon companies the establishment of qualification criteria. Thus, it excludes the model which has been successful in Norway: setting a minimum quota of women, and leaving it for the specific company to decide how to achieve this.125 The present proposal also excludes the election of non-executive directors by shareholders or workers’ representatives, which constitutes an element of industrial relations in a number of Member States.126 It seems to be based on the assumption that ignorance of women’s qualification is the reason for their under-representation on boards. Empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case, but that women are not trusted for reasons of tradition, and only allowed on company boards in a crisis, which again creates suspicion against female board members.127 The proposal is thus not targeted to the field for which positive action is designed, and is overly narrow. In order for company board ‘quotas’ to be efficient, a less intrusive construction seems much more adequate to the sector’s practices in all Member States.

II. Shortcomings Despite all these positive elements, the provision also has severe shortcomings. These are rooted in the fact that it continues to relate women’s rights to men’s rights, and equality between women

122 Badeck (n 97). 123 Ibid [65]–[66]. 124 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures COM (2012) 614 fin. See on this in more detail D Schiek, ‘Gender Equality under the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union—a New Lease of Life for Positive Action?’ in J Fejø et al (eds), Liber Amicarum et Amicorum in Honour of Ruth Nielsen (Copenhagen, Jurist- og ­Økonomforbundes Forlag, 2013) 299, 313–21; see also A Masselot and A Maymont, ‘Gendering Economic and Financial Governance through Positive Action Measures The Compatibility of the French Real Equality Measure with the European Union Framework’ (2015) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 22 (1), 57–80. 125 On the different national rules to achieve the same aim, see C Tvarnø, ‘Women Quotas on Company Boards in Scandinavia and the EU’ in R Nielsen and C Tvarnø (eds), Scandinavian Women’s Law in the 21st Century (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2012), 265–83; L Senden and S Kruisinga, Gender-Balanced Company Boards in Europe—a Comparative Analysis of the Regulatory, Policy and Enforcement Approaches in the EU and EEA Member States (Brussels, European Commission, 2018). 126 A Conchon, Board Level Employee Representation Rights in Europe (Brussels, ETUI, 2011) 11–13. 127 A Haslam et al, ‘Investing with Prejudice: the Relationship Between Women’s Presence on Company Boards and Objective and Subjective Measures of Company Performance’ (2010) 21 British Journal of Management 484–97; M Ryan and A Haslam, ‘The Glass Cliff: Exploring the Dynamics Surrounding the Appointment of Women to Precarious Leadership Positions’ (2007) 32 Academy of Management Review 549–72.



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and men. Such fixation of women’s rights on equality and comparison has for a long time been the focus of feminist critique.128 23.63 Women’s law, as for example introduced by Tove Stang Dahl,129 does not necessarily relate to women and men. Instead it pursues the ‘objective to improve the position of women in law and society’,130 an objective that has also been characterised as lying at the base of feminist legal studies.131 From this perspective, women’s rights would aim at enhancing women’s capability of governing their own lives in interrelation with others.132 Any reference to men is not necessarily helpful for achieving that aim. It may even betray women’s rights, because it implies for women to assimilate to a male norm. For example, if rights must always be granted to women and men in equal measure, women could not derive rights from birthing or nursing children, as this is something men cannot do. Granting rights only for ‘those women who are able to act in the same way as men’ is thus a severe critique of EU gender policies.133 Women’s law seems to offer an alternative to this by focusing on women instead of men. Article 23 does not embrace this notion, though. 23.64 Both women’s law and the legal struggle for equality between women and men can further be criticised as being implicitly assimilationist for the mere reason that it focuses on women as a seemingly essentialist category, while there are as many differences between women as between women and men. The Nordic model of women’s law has been especially criticised: while its policy towards equalising the sexes may imply a movement towards each other, rather than of women towards men, it still maintains the perspective that differences between women and men are the main ones to be overcome.134 Despite all the potential to derive a constructive approach to intersectional inequalities from Articles 23 and 21, this limitation always harbours the danger of neglecting differences between women.135

III. Conclusion 23.65 Article 23 offers opportunities for challenging overly formal perceptions of equal treatment irrespective of sex as compromising the Union’s obligation to ensure equality. As the examples of re-constructing indirect discrimination, approaching intersectionality and embracing positive action have demonstrated, this requires a holistic reading of its two paragraphs together and in conjunction with Article 21. However, such constructions only go so far. Article 23’s continuing fixation on equality between women and men constitutes a severe restriction to mobilising law for improving women’s rights. So far, the Charter compares unfavourably to the UN CEDAW, which takes a more progressive approach to the law. 128 As indicated in A McColgan, Women under the Law: the False Promise of Human Rights (Harlow, Longman, 1999). 129 T Stang Dahl, Introduction to Women’s Law (Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1987). 130 A Hellum, ‘CEDAW and the Discipline of Women’s Law: Continuity and Change in the Understanding of Gender and Law’ in Nielsen and Tvarnø (eds), Scandinavian Women’s Law in the 21st Century (n 125) 31, 32. 131 E-M Svensson, ‘Is there a Future for Scandinavian Women’s Law?’ in Nielsen and Tvarnø (eds), Scandinavian Women’s Law in the 21st Century (n 125) 15–29, 25. Arguably, this is an outsider view. Insider feminists are prone to much more complex views. For a statement on Law, Gender and Sexualities, see J Conaghan, ‘The Making of a Field or the Building of a Wall? Feminist Legal Studies and Law, Gender and Sexuality’ (2009) 17 Feminist Legal Studies 303–07. 132 A similar starting point is taken by S Moller Okin, ‘Mistress of Their Own Destiny. Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights to Exit’ (2002) 112 Ethics 205–30. 133 S Walby, ‘The European Union and Gender Equality: Emergent Varieties of Gender Regimes’ (2004) 11 Social Politics 4, 5. Walby uses the rest of the article to de-construct this criticism and to defend the view that the EU has indeed achieved much more than a merely assimilationist gender equality regime. 134 This is also implied by the slogan ‘women are the majority, not a group’, which was used during the negotiations for the Constitutional Treaty in order to support the enhanced notion of gender equality among all the different equalities. This slogan is also taken up by S Koukoulis-Spiliotopulos (n 45). 135 Hellum (n 130) 31–61.

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Article 24 Article 24 The Rights of the Child 1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 2. In all action relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 24 This Article is based on the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child signed on 20 November 1989 and ratified by all the Member States, particularly Articles 3, 9, 12 and 13 thereof. Paragraph 3 takes account of the fact that, as part of the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice, the legislation of the Union on civil matters having cross-border implications, for which Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union confers power, may include notably visiting rights ensuring that children can maintain on a regular basis a personal and direct contact with both of their parents.

Select Bibliography E Bergamini, C Ragni (eds), Fundamental Rights and the Best Interests of the Child in Transnational Families’ (Intersentia, 2019). H van Eijken, P Phoa, ‘The scope of Article 20 TFEU clarified in Chavez-Vilchez: Are the fundamental rights of minor EU citizens coming of age?’ (2018) 43 European Law Review 949–71. I Iusmen, H Stalford (eds) The EU and the Global Protection of Children’s Rights: Norms, laws and policy dimensions (Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2015). R Lamont, ‘Mediation in EU Cross-Border Family Law’ in P Beaumont, M Danov, K Trimmings, B Yuksel (eds), Cross-Border Litigation in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017), 787–802. R Lamont, C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Cross-border Care and Adoption Proceedings in the European Union’ (2016) 38 The Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 94–102. P Rawlinson, P Fussey, Child Trafficking in the EU: Policing and Protecting Europe’s Most Vulnerable (Routledge, 2017). C Smyth, European Asylum Law and the Rights of the Child (Routledge, 2014). H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012).

A.  Field of Application of Article 24 Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union1 (TEU), states that the EU ‘shall combat social 24.01 exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between

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men and women, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.’ In addition to this general goal within Europe, Article 3(5) TEU states that, in its relations with the wider world, the EU aims to protect human rights, and particularly the rights of the child. Children who are nationals of a Member State are also citizens of the EU, according to Article 20(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union2 (TFEU). 24.02 There is no direct competence over the general promotion of children’s rights in the TFEU. Children are identified in the TFEU only in the context of the very specific competence over asylum and immigration and cross-border criminal law, part of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) within Europe. Measures for a common immigration policy tackling illegal immigration and trafficking can include specific measures to combat trafficking in women and children under Article 79(2)(d) TFEU. Article 83(1) TFEU provides competence to adopt measures on serious crime with a cross-border dimension including the trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and children. 24.03 Article 51(2) of the Charter explicitly states that it does not extend the field of application of EU law beyond the powers of the EU, or establish any new power or task for the EU. Given the EU’s limited competence over children and children’s rights, Article 24 appears relatively unimportant. However, several different aspects of EU law significantly affect children both as a group, and as individuals. Article 24 of the Charter reflects this impact and, in turn, has the potential to influence the development and interpretation of a wide range of EU measures.3 In 2011, the Commission formulated the ‘EU Agenda on the Rights of the Child’,4 which created an inventory of how EU law affected children’s rights, identifying the policy area and associated competence in the EC Treaty, the rights in the Charter and in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990.5 Whilst the exercise of creating an EU Agenda has not been repeated, the Commission has maintained an inventory of EU law related to children’s rights under the ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ portfolio of activity. It periodically updates a portfolio document ‘EU acquis and policy documents on the rights of the child’.6 This portfolio identifies the following policies with a direct impact on children: freedom of movement for workers; information, society and media; environment; consumer protection; agriculture and food safety; social policy and employment; justice, freedom and security including cross-border cooperation in criminal law and family law, and on asylum and immigration; and external relations. Despite a generic competence base, children have been directly affected by EU law in these fields, and the EU has sought to identify the impact and embed Article 24 in its activities, creating a ‘Handbook on European Law relating to the Rights of the Child’.7 24.04 The effect of the creation of the internal market on children was not immediately evident, or appreciated by the EU’s founders, and children’s rights and interests are not directly referred to

2 [2010] OJ C83/47. 3 On the development of EU law in relation to children, see H Stalford, E Drywood, ‘Coming of Age? Children’s Rights in the European Union’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 143–72. 4 Communication from the Commission ‘An EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child’ COM (2011) 60 final. 5 Commission Staff Working Document ‘Preliminary Inventory of EU Actions Affecting Children’s Rights’ SEC (2006) 889. 6 Commission JUST.C2./MFT-NCP, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/eu_acquis_rights_of_the_child_april_2019.pdf, last accessed 22 August 2019. 7 Fundamental Rights Agency (2017), https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-ecthr-2015-handbookeuropean-law-rights-of-the-child_en.pdf, last accessed 22 August 2019.

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in the internal market competence. This led to the assertion that children were ‘invisible’ in EU law.8 However, children are affected by both the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market, particularly free movement of persons and goods, and by the regulation of the internal market. Initially, children were addressed by EU law as a side-effect of the free movement of workers, but their interests have increasingly been recognised in other areas of internal market law. Children were identified as subjects of EU law on the free movement of persons in Regulation 1612/68/EEC.9 As descendants of the worker, below the age of 21, children held a parasitic right which entitled them to migrate along with free-moving workers.10 When residing in the territory, children are entitled to access the same educational opportunities as a child who is a national of the host Member State.11 The right to reside is now replaced by Article 2(2), Directive 2004/38,12 so a child of either the 24.05 EU migrant or his or her spouse or partner under the age of 21 has the right to reside with the migrant EU national in the host state, subject to a resources requirement after three months.13 Expulsion of a child may only be ordered if there are imperative public security grounds.14 Under Article 2(2), there must be a parent-child relationship, rather than mere legal guardianship of a child, for the child to qualify as a ‘direct descendant’ with a right of residence dependent on the parent.15 However, in these circumstances, there should be a balanced and reasonable assessment of whether the child under legal guardianship is a ‘family member’ of the Union citizen under Article 3(2), Directive 2004/38, taking account of the best interests of the child, and of any possible tangible or personal risks faced by the child.16 The development of the concept of EU citizenship following the Treaty of Maastricht means 24.06 that children having the nationality of one of the Member States now have an independent right of residence in EU law in a host Member State, as EU citizens.17 The loss of nationality of a

8 C McGlynn, ‘Rights for Children?: The Potential Impact of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2002) 8 European Public Law 387. 9 Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community [1968] OJ L257. Now replaced by Regulation 492/2011/EU on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. 10 Regulation 1612/68 Art 10(1)(a). Now Art 2(2)(c), Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 11 Regulation 1612/68 Art 12; under Directive 2004/38 Art 24, family members have the right to equal treatment with nationals of the host state within the scope of the Treaty, access to education is now under Art 10 Regulation 492/2011/EU. See Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, in which the CJEU held that the children of a national of a Member State who works or has worked in the host Member State and the parent who is their primary carer can claim a right of residence in the that state on the sole basis of Art 12 of Regulation 1612/68, without such a right being conditional on their having sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance cover in that state, and C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, in which the CJEU similarly gave a free-standing residence right (irrespective of their parents’ employment status) to the children of a citizen of the European Union who had installed themselves in a Member State during the exercise by their parent of rights of residence as a migrant worker in that Member State, for the purpose of attending general educational courses there, pursuant to Art 12 of Regulation 1612/68. It is possible that Art 12 of Directive 2004/38 (on the right of permanent residence of family members in the event of death or departure of the EU citizen) could be interpreted similarly, to grant such free-standing rights. Despite the existence of legal guarantees, children do experience difficulty realising their rights, particularly if they are disadvantaged. See N Harris, D Ryffe, L Scullion, S Stendahl. ‘Ensuring the Right to Education for Roma Children: An Anglo-Swedish Perspective’ (2017) 31 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 230–67. 12 Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 13 Art 7 Directive 2004/38. 14 Art 28(3)(b), Directive 2004/38. 15 Case C-129/18 SM v Entry Clearance Officer ECLI:EU:C:2019:248, para 56. 16 Ibid, paras 68–70. 17 Case C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR I-9925.



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Member State, and consequently of EU citizenship, by automatic operation of law must still have due regard to the principle of proportionality and the impact of the loss of status on other family members. This assessment under Article 20 TFEU must include consideration of the impact on any children, since the loss of EU citizenship may not be in the child’s best interests.18 24.07 Children’s rights of EU citizenship have assumed great significance because the child’s right of residence cannot be effectively realised without their dependence on their parent’s care, and in practice the child’s residence is reliant on the parent remaining with them. In this situation, the child’s right of residence as an EU citizen can actually facilitate the parent’s right of residence.19 Initially this was restricted to situations where the EU citizen child had migrated within the EU, but has been extended to purely internal situations where the refusal of a right of residence to a child’s third country national parent could result in the child leaving the EU with their parent. The denial of a right of residence to the parent would prevent the child from enjoying their right of residence as an EU citizen under Article 20 TFEU. In these circumstances, a relationship of emotional or financial dependence of the EU citizen child on their parent must be demonstrated, having regard to the best interests of the child.20 In this situation, the child’s right may be regarded as incidental to the parents’ rights, and the parasitic relationship is then operating in reverse.21 24.08 Internal market law has been directed at protecting children’s interests in the regulation of the free movement of goods and the creation of trading standards in the interests of the protection of children. Restrictions on the free movement of goods22 are legitimate to protect non-commercial interests, such as public morality and public health, including the protection of children,23 which means that children’s interests are balanced against the internal market freedom. The General Data Protection Regulation24 specifically recognises children as internet users and stakeholders in the processing of their personal data. The EU has also harmonised the standards of products aimed directly at children, notably in the Directive on the safety of toys,25 recognising the role of children as consumers with particular needs. EU consumer policy has acknowledged the more vulnerable position of children in the unfair commercial practices Directive.26 Article 5(3) of that Directive permits the assessment of advertising from the perspective of particularly vulnerable groups, including children, for its potential to distort economic behaviour by impairing a consumer’s ability to make an informed decision. Whilst this provision has been criticised for failing to take the child’s best interests as a primary consideration,27 it does reflect awareness of

18 Case C-221/17 Tjebbes ECLI:EU:C:2019:189. 19 See Case C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR I-01177 where the EU citizen child’s right of residence in the EU secured a right of residence for their third-country national parents. The importance of the child’s right of residence in securing the adult’s right of residence is demonstrated by Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375, where on similar facts to Zambrano but where the family relationship was between two adults, there was no right of residence for the third-country national. 20 Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez ECLI:C:2017:354. 21 R Lamont, ‘Free movement of persons, child abduction and relocation in the European Union’ (2012) 34 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 231, 234. 22 Art 36 TFEU. 23 Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 De Agostini [1997] ECR I-03843; Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-505. 24 Recital 38, Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data, [2016] OJ L119/1. Based on Art 16 TFEU. 25 Directive 2009/48 on the safety of toys [2009] OJ L170/1. Based on Art 95 EC (now Art 114 TFEU). 26 Directive 2005/29 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market (unfair commercial practices directive) [2005] OJ L149/22. Based on Art 95 EC (now Art 114 TFEU). 27 A Garde, ‘Advertising Regulation and the Protection of Children-Consumers in the European Union: In the Best Interests of … Commercial Operators?’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Children’s Rights 523, 530. This is also evident

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differentiated effect of commercial activity on children and the potential detrimental effects. Specific provision has also been made in relation to food, provision of fruit and milk to children in schools,28 and on infant cereal standards.29 The EU’s labour law and social policy directly regulates children as economic actors. Directive 24.09 94/33 on the protection of young people in work30 regulates the age at which children can enter into work and the conditions in which they should work to ensure that this is closely monitored throughout the Member States. This measure ensures that basic standards of protection are in place for children in work. Children also obtain indirect benefit from the social rights granted to others, particularly in the EU’s parental leave measures, which entitle parents to take leave after the birth or adoption of a child. Leave indirectly benefits the child in encouraging the parent’s presence and care following birth or adoption, but the Parental Leave Directive references Article 18(1) CRC, which identifies the common responsibilities of parents for the upbringing of their child and the child’s best interests, rather than Article 24, Charter.31 In Case C-147/17 Constanta,32 the work performed by foster carers was found to fall outside of the scope of health and safety of workers protections33 because the protection of the child’s best interests under Article 24(2) meant that this form of work fell within public service. The clearest impact of EU law on children’s interests has occurred in the development of 24.10 the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) under Title V TFEU, encompassing policies on judicial cooperation over cross-border civil and criminal law and asylum and immigration. The EU has been particularly active in regulating cross-border family law, the regulation of immigration into the EU from third countries, and tackling the trafficking of human beings both within, and from outside, the EU, all of which raise specific issues affecting children’s interests. Judicial cooperation in civil matters has been the basis for the development of private 24.11 international law rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in family law matters.34 As families have migrated throughout the EU, cross-border family law disputes have a significant impact on children whose parents may be living in different states, and ensuring that contact and residence is effectively regulated between national legal regimes has become a significant issue.35 The interaction between national family law and European law,

in Directive 2010/13 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services [2010] OJ L95/1, as amended by Directive 2018/1808, in view of changing market realities, [2018] OJ L303/69, which control broadcasting services and prohibits television advertising causing damage to minors. 28 Art 23, Regulation 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products [2013] OJ L347/671. Based on Arts 42 and 43(2) TFEU. 29 Directive 2006/125 on processed cereal-based foods and baby foods for infants and young children, [2006] OJ L339/16. 30 [1994] OJ L216/12. The Directive was based on Art 118a EEC (now Art 154 TFEU). See Stalford on Art 32 of the Charter, in this volume. 31 Recital 5, Directive 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers [2019] OJ L188/79. Based on Art 153 TFEU. G James, ‘Forgotten Children: Work-Family Reconciliation in the EU’ (2012) 34 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 363. See Costello on Art 33 of the Charter, in this volume. 32 ECLI:EU:C:2018:926, [86]. 33 Art 2, Directive 89/391 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1. 34 Art 81 TFEU. 35 R Lamont, ‘Child Abduction in the European Union: Recognizing and Regulating Care and Migration’ in J Bridgman et al (eds), Regulating Family Responsibilities (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011).



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and cooperation between national courts, is important to the overall welfare of the child at the centre of any litigation. Regulation 2201/2003 (‘Brussels II Revised’)36 regulates jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of divorce and parental responsibility judgments, and also provides additional measures to tackle parental child abduction between the Member States. Brussels II Revised incorporates specific reference to children’s rights37 and in particular the need for decisions to be taken in the child’s best interests and for the child to be heard in proceedings which affect them.38 Recital 33 states that the Regulation seeks to ensure respect for the fundamental rights of the child set out in Article 24 of the Charter. This Regulation has been recast and Brussels II (recast) will apply from 1 August 2022, repealing Brussels II Revised.39 Brussels II (recast) was negotiated and drafted with the involvement of a range of specialists and seeks to address and rectify flaws in the previous Regulation, and restates the explicit aim of the Regulation to protect children’s rights under Article 24 of the Charter in cross-border family law.40 24.12 A Regulation governing the cross-border enforcement of maintenance obligations arising from family relationships, including maintenance for children, was adopted in 2009.41 Although these obligations exist between adults, ensuring that maintenance obligations are enforced is important for the child’s welfare and the EU has engaged with this traditionally difficult area of family law to improve the enforcement of orders between Member States. In addition to the private international law rules, the EU has adopted measures potentially affecting the procedural aspects of cross-border disputes, such as a Directive to encourage cross-border mediation of disputes.42 The Directive applies to cross-border family disputes, including those relating to children, where it may be valuable in promoting cooperation between parents contesting issues of parental responsibility, potentially to the benefit of the parents and the child.43 24.13 As noted above, the TFEU refers to children in the context of EU immigration and crossborder criminal law measures. The child as a victim of crime has been a consistent focus of cross-border cooperation in criminal law. The Victims’ Directive44 is specifically linked to the need to protect child victims of sexual exploitation and trafficking within the EU.45 However, the scope of the Directive is general and protections extended to victims are not specific to children, trafficking or offences of sexual exploitation of children. Under the Directive, an individual assessment should be carried out to identify the needs of the victim and the child’s age should be taken into account during this process.46 Article 24 of the Directive contains a specific right to protection of child victims during criminal proceedings, including provision for interviews

36 Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility [2003] OJ L338. 37 See H Stalford, ‘Brussels II and Beyond: A Better Deal for Children in the European Union?’ in K Boele-Woeki (ed), Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003). 38 In the rules on jurisdiction under Art 12; and in relation to international child abduction under Art 11(2). 39 Art 105, Regulation 2019/1111 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), [2019] OJ L178/1. 40 Recitals 19, 39 and 71, Brussels II (Recast). See T Kruger, L Samyn, ‘Brussels IIbis: Successes and suggested improvements’ (2016) 12 Journal of Private International Law 132–68. 41 Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [2009] OJ L7/1. 42 Directive 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters OJ L136/3. 43 See R Lamont, ‘Mediation in EU Cross-Border Family Law’ in P Beaumont, M Danov, K Trimmings, B Yuksel (eds), Cross-Border Litigation in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017), 787–802. 44 Directive 2012/29 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, replacing Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, [2012] OJ L315/57. 45 Commission Proposal for a Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime COM (2011) 275 final, 4; Recital 7, Directive 2012/29. 46 Art 22 Directive 2012/29.

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with children to be recorded and used as evidence during trial, and a presumption in favour of treating a person of disputed age as a child. Directive 2016/680 on the processing of data for the prevention and investigation of criminal offences identifies children as ‘vulnerable’ and requiring specific safeguards in the treatment of their personal data.47 In addition to protection of children as victims of crime during the investigation and trial process, the European Arrest Warrant48 covers crimes against children, specifically the sexual exploitation of children, and child pornography, under Article 2(2). If the crime attracts a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment in the requesting state, the person accused of these crimes must be surrendered from another Member State, without having to verify the double criminality of the act. Under Article 3, a European Arrest Warrant will not be executed if the subject of the warrant is a child below the age of criminal responsibility in the executing State. The effect of including children in the competence base is also evident in Directive 2011/92 24.14 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.49 The Directive aims to provide a comprehensive approach to these criminal offences where a child is the victim, and to associated sanctions for child sexual exploitation. It refers throughout the text to the fundamental rights of children. For example, Recital 1 refers to sexual exploitation of children as serious violation of fundamental rights under the CRC and the EU Charter. The Directive defines offences of sexual exploitation and child pornography and associated penalties.50 Under Article 9(a), an offence is aggravated if the child was particularly vulnerable due to incapacity or mental or physical disability. Both Article 79(2)(d) TFEU and Article 83(1) TFEU refer to the competence of the EU to 24.15 adopt measures to tackle trafficking in human beings of which children form one particular category. The specific reference in Article 83(1) TFEU to serious crime including the trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and children has meant that there has been significant activity in legislating to address this issue. Directive 2011/36 is aimed at tackling human trafficking, including trafficking in children.51 It defines the criminal offence of ‘trafficking in human beings’ and provides for the protection of victims of trafficking. Trafficking requires the transfer or transportation of a human being through coercion or abuse of a position of vulnerability for the purposes of exploitation, which can include sexual exploitation or forced labour.52 A child is defined as anyone under 18.53 Trafficking a child is an aggravating factor justifying an increased penalty for the offence.54 Recital 8 to the Directive specifically refers to the protection of the rights of the child under Article 24 of the Charter and the UNCRC. The Directive provides specific supportive measures for children under Articles 13–15. Article 13 provides that the child’s best interests should be a primary consideration. It also states that, if there is any doubt over the age of an individual when they are identified and there is reason to believe that s/he is a child, s/he should be presumed to be a child. Articles 14 and 15 provide identified forms

47 Recitals 50 and 51, Directive 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data [2016] OJ L119/89. 48 Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1. 49 [2011] OJ L335/1, based on Art 82(2) and Art 83(1) TFEU. A child is defined by Art 2(1) as anyone under the age of 18. 50 Arts 3, 4, 5 and 6. 51 Directive 2011/36 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims [2011] OJ L101/1. 52 Art 2(1) and (3). 53 Art 2(6). 54 Art 3.



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of support to child victims of trafficking, requiring Member States to ‘ensure that the specific actions to assist and support the child victims of trafficking in human beings, in the short and long term, in their physical and psycho-social recovery, are undertaken following an individual assessment of the special circumstances of each particular child victim, taking due account of the child’s views’.55 The more extensive nature of the obligations towards children contained in this Directive stem from Articles 82(2) and Article 83(1) TFEU and the direct reference to crimes against children as an aspect of the competence base in the Treaty. 24.16 Rather than the child as a victim of crime, the EU has also developed specific provision for the interests of children who are suspects in a criminal investigation, or defendants at trial. A child is identified as ‘vulnerable and in specific need of protection’ in Directive 2016/343, which seeks to protect the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings.56 Where a person made subject to a European Arrest Warrant request would not be criminally liable under the law of the executing state because of his age (ie, s/he would be too young to be prosecuted), execution of the warrant can be refused.57 More generally, Directive 2016/800 establishes procedural safeguards for children accused of a criminal offence, aiming to protect the rights of the child and the child’s best interests for persons below 18.58 Under the Directive, an accused child has a right to information and to a lawyer through legal aid, to have a holder of parental responsibility informed, to an individual examination and a medical examination.59 Deprivation of a child’s liberty should be for the shortest possible period of time and specific guarantees are provided for children in custody, including the right to education, contact with their family, provision of programmes for reintegration to society, and the preservation of their health, and physical and emotional development.60 Children have also been identified as a vulnerable group in migration into the EU from 24.17 third states, both as refugees and as victims of human trafficking. There are restrictions imposed on migration from outside the EU but there is specific protection for children who have applied for refugee status,61 including the right to education both before62 and once a child has been granted international protection63 and provision for specific guarantees for unaccompanied minors under 18.64 Directives on the reception of refugees65 and granting or withdrawing international protection66 contain specific measures designed to address the needs of child migrants. In particular, Article 24 of the Charter and the UNCRC are cited in support of the principle that all decisions should be made with the child’s best interests as a

55 Art 14(1). See European Commission ‘Reporting on the follow-up to the EU strategy towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings’ COM(2017) 728 final. 56 Recital 43, Directive 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L65/1. 57 Art 3(3), Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. The individual subject to the warrant must not have met the age at which they will be criminally liable in the executing state, see Case C-367/16 Piotrowski ECLI:EU:C:2018:27. 58 Recitals 7 and 8, Directive 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L132/1. 59 Arts 4–8, Directive 2016/800. 60 Art 12 Directive 2016/800. 61 Directive 2011/95 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection [2011] OJ L337/10. 62 Art 14 Directive 2013/33. 63 Art 27 Directive 2011/95. 64 Art 31 Directive 2011/95. 65 Directive 2013/33 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection [2013] OJ L180/96. 66 Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection [2013] OJ L180/60.

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primary consideration.67 On reception child migrants are identified as ‘vulnerable persons’,68 and their best interests should be a primary consideration in decision-making accounting for family reunification, social development, safety and security, particularly if the child has been trafficked, and the child’s views.69 If a child is held in detention, Recital 18, Directive 2013/32 directs that the obligations in Article 37 UNCRC on child detention should be complied with. Procedures for granting international protection include obligations to conduct interviews in a child-appropriate manner by a person with knowledge of the ‘special needs’ of minors,70 and, where a child is unaccompanied, provision for a representative working in the child’s best interests to help the child benefit from rights and comply with obligations in the Directive, and prepare for interview.71 In response to the 2015/16 Middle Eastern migrant crisis, which saw large numbers of 24.18 individuals, including children, seeking to migrate into Europe across the Mediterranean, Regulation 656/201472 seeks to control the sea borders of the Union through cooperation between the Member States. It states that the rights of the child under the UNCRC and the Charter should be protected in implementing the measure,73 and in any sea operation the ‘special needs’ of children, should be addressed by participating units.74 Measures adopted in the criminal law framework against trafficking in human beings are 24.19 complementary to some asylum and immigration measures, where trafficked children may have infringed immigration rules through their forced migration. For children subject to immigration rules outside the trafficking framework, Member States are directed to consider the best interests of the child as a primary consideration when implementing EU law on asylum.75 However, the Common European Asylum System has been placed under great pressure with the mass influx of migrants across the Mediterranean in 2015/16.76 The greatest controversy in relation to child migrants has surrounded the legal position of unaccompanied minors.77 Unaccompanied minors are children under 18 who are not married and arrive in the territory without an adult responsible for them, or are left unaccompanied on arrival.78 Under Article 31(6), Directive 2011/95, individuals working with unaccompanied minors seeking asylum should receive appropriate training. Once an unaccompanied minor has been granted refugee status, Member States should ensure legal representation of an unaccompanied minor, but this right only accrues once international protection has been granted, not before.79

67 Recital 33 Directive 2013/32; Recital 9 Directive 2013/33. 68 Art 21 Directive 2013/33. 69 Art 23 Directive 2013/33. See Case C-233/18 Haqbin ECLI:EU:C:2019:956. 70 Art 15 Directive 2013/32. 71 Art 25 Directive 2013/32. 72 Regulation 656/2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union [2014] OJ L189/93. 73 Recitals 8 and 9, Regulation 656/2014. 74 Art 4 Regulation 656/2014. 75 Art 20(5) Directive 2011/95. 76 For a summary see B Efurhievwe, ‘Asylum 22: A critical analysis of crisis management under CEAS’ (2018) 32 Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 133–60. 77 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council ‘Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors (2010–2014)’ COM (2010) 213 final. See E Zschirnt, ‘Does migration status trump the best interests of the child? Unaccompanied minors in the EU asylum system’ (2011) 25 Journal of Immigration and Asylum and Nationality Law 34. 78 Art 2(h) Regulation 343/2003 establishing criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (Dublin II) [2003] OJ L50/1. 79 Art 31(1) Directive 2011/95.



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Under the Dublin II asylum system, if there is a family member in an EU Member State, that Member State should examine the child’s asylum application, otherwise it will be the state where the application is lodged, unless the child’s best interests to reunite the child with their relative if it is in the child’s best interests.80 Returning an unaccompanied minor to the Member State where their asylum application was first lodged is of particular concern where the Member State does not have the resources and facilities to deal with asylum applications.81 24.20 Unaccompanied minors are identified as a vulnerable group when required to return to their state of origin after an unsuccessful application.82 The best interests of the child should be accounted for in implementing EU law in these circumstances83 and the return of an unaccompanied minor should only be ordered once their best interests have been considered and if they can be returned to a family member, nominated guardian or other adequate reception facility.84 The detention of an unaccompanied minor, prior to their removal, should only be a measure of last resort,85 but occurs across the Member States. The child should have access to leisure facilities and education as appropriate, and in the case of unaccompanied minors, the accommodation should take account of their needs according to their age,86 but detention prior to removal remains a possibility.87 Where a child is a national of an EU Member State, but dependent on a third country national parent, the parent cannot be returned without consideration of the details of family life and the interests of their child.88 In assessing the relationship of dependency, the national court should take into account the best interests of the child including their age, physical and emotional development, emotional ties to both parents, and risks of separation from their third-country national parent.89 24.21 For children over the age of 12,90 the right of family reunification of third country national children legally resident in an EU Member State may be limited by the Member State. An unaccompanied minor aged 12–18 may have to demonstrate a condition of ‘integration’ into the Member State before family reunification and a right of residence will be granted to a relative. These distinctions, drawn on the basis of the age of the child, were unsuccessfully challenged as a breach of the child’s rights under Article 24 of the Charter. Although the status of the unaccompanied minor was accepted as requiring special protection, this was not sufficient to undermine the distinctions drawn by the Directive.91 24.22 Beyond its competence to create harmonising measures, the EU has also sought to influence other fields with an impact on children. There has been significant awareness-raising activity, including measures relevant to the location of missing children,92 the creation of a mediator

80 Art 15 Regulation 343/2003. 81 See in the European Court of Human Rights, MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09, and in the CJEU Case C-411/10 NS and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. 82 Art 3(9) Directive 2008/115 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348/98. 83 Art 5 Directive 2008/115. 84 Art 10 Directive 2008/115. 85 Art 17(1) Directive 2008/115. 86 Art 17 Directive 2008/115. 87 Art 3 Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/12. 88 Art 5 Directive 2008/115. See Case C-82/16 KA ECLI:EU:C:2018:308, para 104. 89 Case C-82/16 KA ECLI:EU:C:2018:308, para 72. 90 Art 4(1) Directive 2003/86, which permits a Member State to assess the level of ‘integration’ of a child over the age of 12 into the Member State before permitting family reunification. 91 Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-05769. 92 Commission Decision on reserving the national numbering range beginning ‘116’ for harmonised numbers for harmonised services of social value [2007] OJ L49/30.

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for cross-national child abduction cases in the European Parliament, and activities aimed at the prevention of the online exploitation of children and the creation of a ‘safer internet’ through raising public knowledge and education.93 The EU Council has adopted a Resolution on ‘The European Youth Strategy, 2019–2017’94 which aims to support children’s development and growth to autonomy, encourage children to be active citizens with a European identity, improve the impact of policy decisions on young people (particularly in employment, education, health and social inclusion), and contribute to the eradication of poverty and discrimination. The Resolution contains specific goals for connecting the EU with youth, ensuring gender equality and social inclusion, evaluation of information, mental health, rural youth, education and employment, participation in EU decision-making, and sustainability. These goals are aimed at making the EU relevant and important for its youth, and promoting engagement with children across the Member States, but seeks to encourage activity and engagement within the Member States, not just at the supranational level. These are areas where the EU’s competence is weaker, but policies directly relating to children have been developed to encourage and support activity in the Member States. The Copenhagen criteria for EU accession95 require compliance with children’s rights as a condition of accession. The EU has also adopted guidelines for the rights of the child in its external relations policies.96 In 2007, the European Commission created a role of ‘coordinator for the rights of the child’, 24.23 who endeavours to ensure that the rights of the child are considered in all policies and areas of Commission activity. The process of mainstreaming children and children’s rights consideration into EU policy is a key area of development, ensuring greater awareness during the law-making process.97 One of the most significant contributions made by the EU is in the funding of projects aimed at research into children’s rights and circumstances, both through the European Fundamental Rights Agency and other sources. This research has covered a wide range of issues, including child-friendly justice, child protection, including protection of rights and needs of careleavers, child migration including immigration and asylum and missing children, bullying and children as victims of violence. There is greater engagement with research findings to inform and develop capacity in reform of legislation, and increasing awareness of the impact of EU activity in children’s lives across Europe with reference to the rights expressed in Article 24, particularly the best interests of the child.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 24 with Other Provisions of the Charter Article 24 focuses particularly on the rights of the individual child devoid of specific context, 24.24 potentially applying wherever a child’s interests are affected. The interaction with other provisions of the Charter therefore depends on the particular circumstances, but rights which prevent abuse and provide protection of the family are particularly important. 93 Report from the Commission on Protecting Children in the Digital World COM (2011) 556 final; see J Savirimuthu, ‘The EU, Online Child Safety and Media Literacy’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Children’s Rights 547, www.­ betterinternetforkids.eu, last accessed 1 November 2019. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child is seeking to draft a General Comment on the rights of the child in the digital world. 94 [2018] OJ C456/18. 95 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council (21–22 June 1993). See H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012), 197. 96 ‘EU Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child: Leave no child behind’ (2017). 97 M Schuurman, ‘Developing a Model for Mainstreaming Children’s Rights into EU Law and Policy-Making’, in I Iusmen and H Stalford, The EU as a Children’s Rights Actor: Law, Policy and Structural Dimensions (Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2016), 49.



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24.25

The rights which prohibit abuse are clearly relevant to children, particularly: Article 4, the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment; Article 5, the prohibition on slavery and forced labour, which may be important in the context of protecting children from human trafficking;98 and Article 6, the right to liberty, which is highly relevant to child suspects in criminal proceedings, and which can be important in cases concerning immigration and asylum detention. The obligations under Articles 18 and 19(2) of the Charter on the right to asylum and protection on removal from inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment may be particularly relevant to children in this context and are also linked to the obligation to protect their welfare. Where these rights are infringed in relation to a child, the child’s rights under Article 24, and particularly the requirement to make the child’s best interests a primary consideration, will be engaged. Article 4 in particular has the potential to give rise to positive obligations to protect children from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment99 where Member States have failed to effectively implement EU law, resulting in the abuse of a child. The interaction of Article 24 with Articles 4 and 5 is most likely to be an issue in the context of child trafficking and sexual abuse, where the obligations on Member States to implement EU law, if not complied with, could have a serious impact on the welfare of children. 24.26 The realisation of children’s rights will often take place in the context of family life and the interaction of Article 24, which prioritises the rights of the individual child, with Article 7, the right to respect for private and family life, and the legal, social and economic protection of the family under Article 33(1) is crucial. Article 7 protects the right to respect to family life of all family members, not just the child, and the relationship between rights of family members and the additional children’s rights under Article 24 has been the focus of the protection of family law rights in the Charter. In EU law on cross-border family life, and in relation to the rights associated with free movement of persons and European citizenship, both Article 7 and Article 24 have been relied upon in tandem to uphold respect for the family relationships affected by the legal framework.100 However, the CJEU has not yet fully engaged with the interaction between Article 7 and Article 24 in circumstances where the adult’s rights appear to conflict with the child’s rights within the family context.101 24.27 This can be most evident both in EU law on cross-border family life, where a parent’s interests may not coincide with the child’s, but this has not yet been fully addressed or analysed by the Court in applying Articles 7 and 24. 24.28 In addition to specific rights for children, the Charter includes rights which are important for securing children’s opportunities and development and participation as children in Europe. It contains a general prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of age, which will include discrimination against minors, under Article 21.102 Article 32 on the protection of young people at work is also of clear relevance to children. Article 21 may provide protections from discrimination against child workers in terms of pay and conditions, and a child working may be regarded as an exercise of a child’s autonomy, though it may obviously in other circumstances represent

98 This link has been drawn under Art 4 ECHR, see Siliadin v France App no 73316/01 (2006) 43 EHRR 16. 99 By analogy with the obligations under Art 3 ECHR, see Z v UK App no 29392/95 [2001] 2 FCR 246. 100 The relevance of Art 8 ECHR and the protection of private and family life had already been acknowledged in EU law, see Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-06279. 101 J Herring and S Choudhry, European Human Rights and Family Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 232. See, for example on child abduction, Case C-211/10 PPU Povse ECLI:EU:C:2010:400. 102 This supports Art 19 TFEU which provides a legal basis for legislation to combat discrimination on the grounds of age, and Stalford argues should be utilised for measures specifically relevant to children. Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012), 50.

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exploitation and an abuse of their welfare and may be linked to child trafficking.103 Article 14 also guarantees the right to education, including the possibility of receiving free compulsory education. Article 26 creates additional obligations in relation to the disabled, recognising and respecting their right to benefit from measures for their independence, integration and participation in the community. The interaction of Article 24 with Article 26 in engaging with children with disabilities will be important because securing the right of a disabled child to be heard may pose particular requirements.104 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has issued a General Comment on this subject which could eventually form the basis for interpretation of the Charter on this point.105 These Articles reflect the role of children as citizens and their opportunities to participate in, and access rights as, full members of the community.

C.  Sources of Article 24 Rights I. ECHR Article 24 is not directly reflected in the provisions of the European Convention on 24.29 Human Rights (ECHR), because the Convention was not designed specifically to protect children. As human beings, children can benefit from the rights contained in the ECHR.106 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been willing to incorporate consideration of children’s rights into its case law interpreting the Convention.107 The rights contained in the ECHR, particularly Article 3 on the right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment,108 and Article 8 on the right to respect for private life, have been interpreted to provide protection for children in private law and public law disputes.109 Whilst children have the same rights as adults under the ECHR, matching the rights of children 24.30 to adults may mean that children’s rights are not adequately protected.110 The ECHR contains no guarantee of the child’s right to be heard, or that the child’s welfare is of primary, or paramount, importance.111 The ECtHR has incorporated reference to the principle of the best interests of the child, for example in Johansen v Norway112 and Neulinger v Switzerland.113 The approach of the ECtHR has attracted criticism both for failing to fully articulate a conception of the ‘best interests of the child’ in disputes under Article 8, leaving signatory states a large margin of appreciation in identifying what is in the best interests of the child,114 and for inconsistency in use of the principle of the child’s best interests in its own case law depending on context.115 The lack of participatory rights also means that the protection of the child’s welfare has a much greater

103 N Ferreira, ‘Working Children in Europe: A Socio-Legal Approach to the Regulation of Child Work’ (2017) 4 European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 43, 50. 104 See Parkes, A. Children and International Human Rights Law: The right of the child to be heard (Routledge, 2014). 105 ‘The Rights of Children with Disabilities’ General Comment no 9, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/SitePages/Home.aspx. 106 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) 35. 107 See U Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999). 108 Z v UK (n 87). 109 See eg Sahin v Germany App no 30943/96 [2003] 2 FLR 671. 110 J Herring and S Choudhry, European Human Rights and Family Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 222. 111 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) 69. 112 Johansen v Norway App no 13783/90 (1997) 23 EHRR 33. 113 Neulinger v Switzerland App no 41615/07 (2012) 54 EHRR 31. 114 M Woolf, ‘Coming of Age?’ (2003) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 205, 210. 115 Sormunen, M. ‘A Comparison of Child Protection and Immigration Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: what role for the best interests of the child?’ (2019) 31 Child and Family Law Quarterly 249, 267.



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stake in the ECHR than their right to autonomy. However, there is evidence of an emerging child-centred approach, since the Court shows greater willingness to refer to the CRC.116 The ECHR will remain relevant in protecting the rights of children in areas outside the scope of the EU’s competence, such as domestic family law, but the interpretation of the rights in the ECHR and their application to children is of relevance to other provisions of the Charter beyond Article 24, particularly Articles 7 and 4.117 24.31 In some cases, for example on asylum and immigration, the ECtHR has been asked to consider whether a Member State, in applying European law, has breached the Convention.118 Allegations that a Member State has breached the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, affecting the rights of the child, have occurred in relation to the enforcement of return orders following international child abduction issued under the Brussels II Revised Regulation.119 It is also possible for cases heard by the CJEU on the interpretation of EU law affecting children to be subsequently heard by the ECtHR for rights breaches by the Member State. This occurred in Case C-2011/10 PPU Povse,120 where the case was heard by the CJEU for interpretation of the provisions of Brussels II Revised on child abduction. In judgment, the CJEU relied on Article 24(3), Charter, arguing that the child has a right to a relationship with both parents, which took precedence over any disadvantage in moving the child. The mother subsequently issued proceedings in the ECtHR on behalf of herself and her child, alleging that enforcement of the judgment to return her daughter to Italy in accordance with the interpretation of the law provided by the CJEU would breach Article 8 ECHR.121 The ECtHR’s judgment relies on the principle of equivalent protection identified in Bosphorus;122 that the system of rights protection provided by the EU legal framework is equivalent to the Convention. Member States implementing EU obligations are deemed compliant with the rights expressed in the ECHR unless there is a demonstrable manifest deficiency. This effectively shields the CJEU from review by the ECtHR and prevents a dialogue between the two supranational courts on rights interpretation generally, and on children’s rights in particular.123 In addition, de Burca has identified that, since the adoption of the Charter, the CJEU has referring less frequently to the ECHR as authority for the interpretation of rights in its case law, limiting the scope for the influence of the ECHR rights124 in the interpretation and application of children’s rights under the Charter. The Council of Europe has engaged with children’s rights in its wider activities. In the ‘Council 24.32 of Europe Strategy for the Rights of the Child 2016–2021’,125 it identifies five priority areas: equal opportunities for all children, participation of all children; a life free of violence for all children;

116 Jacobsen, AF. ‘Children’s Rights in the European Court of Human Rights: An Emerging Power Structure’ (2016) 24 International Journal of Children’s Rights, 548, 545. 117 Full access to the case law relevant to children is available at www.coe.int/t/dg3/children/caselaw/CaseLawChild_en.asp. 118 See Tarakhel v Switzerland App no 29217/12; (2015) 60 EHRR 28 on breaches of Art.3 in the application of the Dublin II asylum and immigration rules in returning asylum seekers to Italy. 119 Sneersone v Italy App no 427/09; [2011] 2 FLR 1322; Shaw v Hungary App no 6457/09; [2012] 2 FLR 1314. 120 ECLI: EU:C:2010:400. 121 The delay in enforcing the child’s return to Italy meant that the child no longer had an effective relationship with her father in Italy, and only spoke German; returning her to Italy would have affected her relationship with younger halfsiblings born in Austria, see Povse v Austria App no 3890/11; [2014] 1 FLR 944. 122 Bosphorus v Ireland App no 45036/98; (2006) 42 EHRR 1. 123 R Lamont, ‘Commentary on Povse v Austria’ 513 in H Stalford, K Hollingsworth, S Gilmore, Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments (Hart Publishing, 2017). 124 However, since the adoption of the Charter the CJEU referred to ECtHR case law as authority for interpreting the rights engaged less frequently, see G De Burca, ‘After the Charter of EU Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator’ (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 168, 183. 125 Available at www.coe.int/en/web/children/children-s-strategy.

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child-friendly justice for all children; and rights of the child in the digital environment. As part of these activities, the Council of Europe has developed Guidelines on Child-Friendly Justice126 which the European Commission has sought to promote127 and has identified as relevant to the development of EU legislation on the rights of children as suspects in criminal proceedings.128 These developments and the close identification of goals between the EU and the Council of Europe on children’s rights means that there should be an ongoing exchange of expertise and engagement between the institutions between both bodies to promote children’s rights across Europe.129

II.  UN Treaties As the Explanation of Article 24 identifies, the underlying basis of the rights enumerated in 24.33 Article 24 is the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990 (CRC). The explanation identifies Articles 3, 9, 12 and 13 CRC as underpinning Article 24 of the Charter. These provisions are detailed aspects of the CRC and the provisions are reflected in Article 24 of the Charter, although not directly reproduced. The EU is not a signatory to the CRC, but all the Member States of the EU are signatories.130 The 24.34 UK has not incorporated it directly into its domestic law, despite having ratified the Convention.131 Unlike the ECHR, the CRC is designed specifically to protect children’s rights and account for their particular interests and it applies to human beings below the age of 18.132 It is an ambitious document which, as well as defining the civil and political rights of children, engages also with their social and economic rights, including the right to education and housing. Fortin argues that many of the CRC rights and duties are vague, requiring significant interpretation and investment in implementation at national level to be effective for children. She states that: ‘Many of the rights listed are, in reality no more than aspirations regarding what should happen if governments were to take children’s needs seriously—an insistence on certain ideals or goals.’133 The CRC is therefore a statement of principle, which has a symbolic value, as well as practical impact. The Convention has been widely adopted and now only the USA has not ratified the Convention. This popularity in part reflects the flexibility in interpretation of some of the provisions and the fact that some states have entered reservations for some articles. The CRC creates a benchmark of children’s rights across the world, but is subject to national cultural and social interpretation, which will vary greatly between states.134

126 Available at www.coe.int/en/web/children/child-friendly-justice. 127 European Commission ‘EU Agenda on the Rights of the Child’ COM (2011) 60 final, p 6. Commission officials have received training from the Council of Europe on the principles of child-friendly justice. 128 Directive 2016/800 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L132/1, Recital 7. 129 Including the Council of Europe’s other Treaties relating to children, including the Convention on the Adoption of Children, Convention on Repatriation of Minors, Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children, Convention on Contact concerning Children; Convention for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. 130 UNCRC status table available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 131 The courts may refer to the CRC and rely on its provisions in interpreting Art 8 ECHR, see ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 AC 166, 179. 132 Unless the age of majority is achieved earlier, Art 1 CRC. 133 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) 46. 134 See S Harris-Short, ‘International Human Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 130.



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24.35

The effectiveness of the CRC relies primarily on signatory states’ willingness to implement the Convention in their own domestic law. There is an obligation on state parties to report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the progress made towards the implementation of the CRC and the protection of children’s rights in the territory. States submit a report two years after ratification and then at five-year intervals. The Committee comments on the state’s compliance with the Convention, and areas for improvement are publicly available.135 Since 2014, signatory states can adopt a procedure facilitating the hearing of individual or state complaints directly by the Committee.136 An individual complaint will not be considered unless all available domestic remedies have been exhausted, and the Committee is restricted to seeking a ‘friendly settlement’137 or making recommendations to the signatory state subject to the complaint, which is expected to respond in writing, detailing the action taken.138 It is not therefore a court or adjudicatory mechanism.139 In addition to the reporting mechanisms, the Committee has developed a series of General 24.36 Comments on particular articles of the Convention, or situations where children’s rights are engaged, to assist in their implementation and effective enforcement. For example, the Committee has developed General Comments on Article 3, the principle that actions should be taken with the child’s best interests as a primary consideration,140 and Article 9, the rights of children with disabilities,141 as well as on the rights of unaccompanied or separated migrant children,142 and on children’s rights in the justice system.143 These Comments provide further guidance to signatory states on the interpretation of the CRC. The wording of the provisions of the CRC underlying Article 24 of the Charter is as follows: 24.37 Article 3 1.

In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. 3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision. …

135 For further information on the reporting process see: www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/­Reporting­rocedure. aspx. 136 Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, 2013, https:// treaties.un.org/doc/source/signature/2012/CTC_4-11d.pdf. 137 Art 9,Third Optional Protocol. 138 Art 11, Third Optional Protocol. 139 See further K Arts, ‘Twenty-Five Years of the United National Convention on the Rights of the Child: Achievements and Challenges’ (2014) 61 Netherlands International Law Review 267. 140 Committee of the Rights of the Child ‘General Comment No 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (Art 3 para 1)’ (2013). 141 Committee of the Rights of the Child ‘General Comment No 9 The rights of children with disabilities’ (2009). 142 Committee of the Rights of the Child ‘General Comment No 6 Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin (2005). 143 Committee of the Rights of the Child ‘General Comment No 21 on children’s rights in the child justice system’ (2017); ‘General Comment No 10 Children’s rights in juvenile justice’ (2007).

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Article 9 1.

States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence. 2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known. 3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests. 4. Where such separation results from any action initiated by a State Party, such as the detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death (including death arising from any cause while the person is in the custody of the State) of one or both parents or of the child, that State Party shall, upon request, provide the parents, the child or, if appropriate, another member of the family with the essential information concerning the whereabouts of the absent member(s) of the family unless the provision of the information would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. States Parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a request shall of itself entail no adverse consequences for the person(s) concerned. … Article 12 1.

2.

States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.

Article 13 CRC is linked to Article 12 CRC, but is broader in protecting the child’s right to free- 24.38 dom of expression, including the right to receive information and ideas of all kinds, subject to restrictions provided by law for the protection of rights of others or national security, public order and morals. The Explanation of Article 24 pays particular attention to the right of the child to maintain contact with both parents in Article 9 CRC because of the implications of harmonising private international family law rules on parental responsibility disputes. It does not link Article 9 CRC to Article 10(1) CRC, which covers family reunification, obliging signatory states to address this issue in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. Article 10(1) CRC is also engaged with the EU’s asylum and immigration policies developed under the auspices of the AFSJ and to EU citizenship rights, but is not referred to in the Explanation to Article 24. There is no hierarchy expressed between the rights in the Convention but the Committee on 24.39 the Rights of the Child has identified four general principles which are given greater priority in implementation. The four principles are Article 2, the prohibition of discrimination in accessing the rights contained in the CRC; Article 6, the right to life and development; Article 3, the primary consideration of the child’s best interests; and Article 12, the right of the child to be heard in proceedings affecting them.144 These rights should be considered in the interpretation and implementation of all the other rights in the CRC. Whilst theoretically none of these principles





144 Committee

of the Rights of the Child ‘General Comment No 12 (2009): The Right of the Child to be Heard’, para 2.

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is more important than any other, Article 3, the primacy of the child’s best interests, underpins all other provisions in the Convention. This is the guiding principle for all other CRC provisions and should be reflected in all other legislative and policy matters affecting children.145 Article 3 is therefore central to the operation of the CRC, although the concept of ‘best interests’ is not defined by the Convention, and it is subject to different interpretations depending on culture and circumstance.146 The child’s best interests can be reduced to material needs but should also include emotional security and psychological wellbeing and possibly moral welfare.147 Whatever the conception of the child’s welfare, it is inherent that it will include an ‘ineradicable element of values and hence subjectivity’.148 Freeman suggests that, given this ineradicable element, decisions on the child’s best interests must be well reasoned and the worst prejudice eliminated.149 24.40 The underlying values that inform the interpretation of the welfare principle can be shaped by the perspective on children’s rights that is adopted. In particular, the welfare principle may permit a paternalistic approach to children, based on their need for assistance and protection, rather than emphasising their developing autonomy and the importance of their opinion.150 As Fortin identifies, a paternalistic approach to the welfare principle is potentially in conflict with the child’s wishes and feelings if the child has expressed a different view.151 The challenge of reconciling the welfare principle with the child’s developing interest in choice as they approach adulthood, the expression of which is protected by Article 12 CRC, is a difficult tension running throughout the provisions of the CRC, has been extensively discussed by theorists,152 but has a significant practical impact in the realisation of the rights protected by the CRC.153 The UK courts and the ECtHR have been criticised for focusing on the welfare principle to the exclusion of the views of the child, and for inconsistency in approach to the weight given to the child’s views.154 24.41 In General Comment No 12 on the Right of the Child to be Heard, the Committee on the Rights of the Child suggests that there is: no tension between Articles 3 and 12, only a complementary role of the two general principles: one establishes the objective of achieving the best interests of the child and the other provides the methodology for reaching the goal of hearing the child. In fact, there can be no correct application of Article 3, if the components of Article 12 are not respected.155

24.42 From the perspective of the Committee therefore, the two articles operate together, as a process through which the child’s rights are secured. This may be the ideal outcome, but securing children’s welfare and respecting their choices at the same time remains difficult, particularly in the context of contested legal proceedings. The welfare principle and the right of the child to be heard in proceedings, underpin the 24.43 application of Article 9 CRC, the right of the child to retain contact with both parents, reflected

145 Ibid. 146 M Freeman, ‘The Meaning and Scope of Article 3’ in B Abramson (ed), A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 27. 147 Ibid 28. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) 19. 151 Ibid 23. 152 See J Eekelaar, ‘The Importance of Thinking that Children Have Rights’ in P Alston, S Parker and J Seymour (eds), Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992). 153 N Thomas and C O’Kane, ‘When Children’s Wishes and Feelings Clash with their Best Interests’ (1998) 6 International Journal of Children’s Rights 137. 154 See Woolf, ‘Coming of Age? (2003) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 205. 155 Committee of the Rights of the Child ‘General Comment No 12 (2009): The Right of the Child to be Heard’, para 74.

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in Article 24 of the EU Charter. Article 9(3) refers explicitly to the welfare principle of Article 3 CRC, in that contact with the child’s parents should continue unless it is not in the child’s best interests. However, the child’s right to be heard, as a general principle for the operation of the CRC, should also be respected in the application of Article 9. The involvement of the child in decisions affecting him or her is linked to the operation of 24.44 all provisions of the CRC, but also to the wider implementation of policy and participation in law-making and decision-making processes which aim more generally to protect children’s rights.156 The CRC therefore has significance beyond specific judicial decisions, and can inform the development of law and policy, as well as the interpretation of the law by judicial authorities. The most obvious realisation of these rights, especially Articles 3 and 12, however is often in judicial decisions where the underlying values informing the interpretation of the rights is most evident and pertinent to the outcome for the individual child. Ideally, the CRC should bring the child to the foreground of any discussion or decision and identify their interests, as expressed by children themselves. As a document which embodies aspiration, as well as concrete rights, the CRC can inspire action and this contribution to the global protection of human rights has been an important aspect of the success of the CRC.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks Article 24 does not adopt exactly the wording of the underlying provisions of the CRC, instead 24.45 reformulating the rights contained in Articles 3, 9 and 12 of the Convention with less detailed terms. It is not a direct adoption of the four general principles of the CRC, instead reflecting only two of them, Articles 3 and 9, alongside the additional concern of ensuring contact between the child and both of his or her parents, and not directly including Article 2 on non-discrimination in accessing the rights in the CRC, and Article 6 CRC on the right to life and development. Article 2 of the Charter covers the right to life, but the child’s right to development is not expressly protected. In adopting Articles 3 and 12 CRC as the basis of the provision, Article 24 embodies the conflict between child welfare and paternalism, and child autonomy through participation, the two principles which have posed challenges for the interpretation of the provisions of the CRC. McGlynn has asserted that ‘Article 24(1) is a curious mix of what might loosely be termed children’s “protection” and “empowerment” rights, which are often found to be in conflict.’157 The potential for internal incoherence of the rights expressed is evident in Articles 24(1) and (2), and there is a significant risk of prioritisation of one right, to the detriment of the other. There is no internal hierarchy expressed in the terms of Article 24; it appears to be assumed 24.46 that the rights will work together as an expression of the rights of children and this has not yet been subjected to reasoned analysis by the CJEU. The theoretical tensions between Article 24(1) and (2) are explored in the practical realisation of these rights in EU law, which has placed much emphasis on children as ‘vulnerable’. This process often takes place in the domestic legal system and is informed by national understandings of child welfare, and national processes for the hearing of children. However, in referencing Article 24, the Court has consistently 156 Ibid paras 86–88. 157 C McGlynn, ‘Rights for Children?: The Potential Impact of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2002) 8 European Public Law 387, 397.



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focused in its judgments on Article 24(2), the principle that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration,158 rather than including reference to the right of the child to be heard under Article 24(1). This undermines the importance of the right of the child to be heard in proceedings with a European dimension at national level, despite the inclusion of guarantees in EU legislation. The preliminary ruling procedure contains no provision for the hearing of children during proceedings,159 so the CJEU will be reliant on the national courts’ reports on children’s views and procedure for hearing the child. The CJEU also needs to articulate more fully the concept of ‘best interests of the child’ and how this is interpreted in EU law. Finally, the Explanation to Article 24 states that particular importance should be attached to Article 24(3), the right of the child to have contact with both parents, in the context of international family law disputes and the CJEU has yet to respond to that article in the context of Article 24(2) in securing the child’s best interests. The Court has been criticised for ‘inconsistency and arbitrariness’ in the use of Article 24 in its judgments and in the use of other sources to support its reasoning.160 24.47 In the wake of the adoption of the Charter, Stalford suggested that: The Charter is celebrated for acknowledging children’s needs and interests as distinct from other (EU adult) citizens or the family more generally, marking a welcome departure from the highly derivative body of rights historically associated with children’s entitlement at EU level.161

24.48 The inclusion of Article 24 in the provisions of the Charter was perceived as a symbolic shift to considering children as independent rights holders within the EU, rather than objects of EU law.162 The development of the EU Agenda on the Rights of the Child in 2011,163 heavily informed by Article 24, was a significant development in this regard. Article 24 has also acted as a spur to EU-level activity in researching the rights of children in a number of different contexts, including asylum and immigration, child protection and child-friendly justice.164 These developments reflect the symbolic importance of rights in shifting the perspective of the institutions of the EU, but also the practical impact encouraging consideration of the impact of EU law specifically on children. However, despite the early promise of engagement with children’s rights, the analysis of the rights contained in Article 24 has been limited, and children’s rights are not regarded as disrupting the EU legal framework in the interests of children; rather Article 24 has been interpreted as confirming and supporting particular interpretation of the existing law.165

158 See, for example, Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez ECLI:EU:C:2017:354 where the Court refers to Art 24(2), but not to Art 24(1) on the right of the child to be heard, or Art 24(3) on the right of the child to maintain a relationship with both parents. Both rights are pertinent to the proceedings, since deportation of the child’s third-country national parent would severely affect their relationship if the child remains in the EU and the child affected would hold an opinion relevant to the decision-making. 159 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [2012] OJ L265/1. 160 H van Eijken, P Phoa, ‘The scope of Article 20 TFEU clarified in Chavez-Vilchez: are the fundamental rights of minor EU citizens coming of age?’ (2018) 43 European Law Review 949, 961. 161 H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) 41. 162 H Cullen, ‘Children’s Rights’ in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 325. 163 Communication from the Commission ‘An EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child’ COM (2011) 60 final. 164 For details see https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/20190401_compilation.pdf. 165 R Lamont, ‘Protecting Children’s Rights after Child Abduction: The interaction of the CJEU and the ECtHR’ 225, in E Bergamini, C Ragni (eds). Fundamental Rights and the Best Interests of the Child in Transnational Families’ (Intersentia, 2019), 239.

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II.  Scope of Application Article 24 does not make explicit its personal scope, as it does not define the terms ‘child’ or 24.49 ‘children’. Article 1 CRC refers to children as anyone below the age of 18, but Article 24 does not include that definition. It is therefore unclear who is a ‘child’ under Article 24. This is important because of the different ages at which children receive various EU law entitlements.166 For example, under Directive 2004/38, the child of an intra-EU migrant under the age of 21 is entitled to reside in the host state with his or her parent.167 The provisions relating to parental child abduction in Brussels II Revised apply to children under the age of 16.168 The right of family reunification of unaccompanied minors over the age of 12 is limited by the Family Reunification Directive, which was accepted as a justifiable age distinction by the CJEU in Parliament v Council.169 However, in Case C-550/16 A v Netherlands170 the CJEU decided that an unaccompanied minor who is not deemed a refugee until after the age of 18 may still be treated as a minor for the purposes of family reunification. The Court suggests that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration for Member States in applying the Family Reunification Directive, and though it is not consistent in providing a child-rights based approach to this issue,171 it has recently reiterated that the best interests of the child should inform the interpretation and application of the Directive, including the assessment of age.172 A child is defined under the Victims’ Directive173 and the Sexual Abuse Directive174 as any person below the age of 18, but the Sexual Abuse Directive also accounts for the age at which a child can consent to sexual relations.175 Directive 2016/800 provides procedural safeguards to children subject to criminal prosecution applies under the age of 18, but when the suspect is now 18 and the offence was committed when the individual was under 18, Member States are ‘encouraged’ to apply the protections until the age of 21.176 Under the trafficking framework, a child is defined as anyone under 18.177 In principle, the different ages at which children accrue rights under secondary EU law should not affect whether they receive the protection of Article 24, which by implication from the CRC applies to children under the age of 18. However, the artificial distinctions drawn between children of different ages in EU law are potentially evidence of discrimination against some groups of children.178 This issue is yet to be clarified by the CJEU. The perception of legal conceptions has not been disrupted by children’s rights 24.50 perspectives. In Case C-149/10 Chatzi,179 the CJEU was asked whether parental leave under

166 See E Drywood, ‘Challenging concepts of “the child” in asylum and immigration law: the example of the EU’ (2010) 32 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 309. 167 Art 7 Directive 2004/38. 168 Art 11(1) Brussels II Revised, derived from the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980. 169 Art 3 Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/12. 170 ECLI:EU:C:2018: 248. 171 P Rodrigues, ‘Human Rights and the Best Interests of the Child in European Family Reunification Law’, 55 in E Bergamini, C Ragni (eds) Fundamental Rights and Best Interests of the Child in Transnational Families (Intersentia 2019), 67. 172 Case C-133/19 BMM ECLI:EU:C:2020:577, para 35. 173 Art 2(1)(c) Directive 2012/29 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, [2012] OJ L315/57. 174 Art 2(a) Directive 2011/92. 175 Art 2(b) Directive 2011/92. 176 Recital 12, Directive 2016/800. 177 Art 2(6) Directive 2011/36. 178 This argument was raised and rejected by the Court in Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-05769 [30]. Art 21 of the Charter on non-discrimination, including the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of age, may also form the basis for challenging these provisions. 179 ECLI:EU:C:2010:534.



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the now repealed framework agreement was a right of the child, rather than the parent, citing Article 24 in support of this argument.180 In judgment the Court did not engage closely with Article 24, instead focusing on Article 20 of the Charter on equal treatment.181 The replacement Parental Leave Directive makes reference in Recital 5 to Article 18(1) CRC on equal parental responsibilities for child development,182 but similarly does not refer to Article 24 and the best interests of the child, limiting the right of the child in conceptualising the purpose of parental leave provision. 24.51 In Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S and Maahanmuuttovirasto183 the Court, in interpreting the right to family reunification of third country nationals, stated that neither Article 7, the right to respect to private and family life, nor Article 24, deprives the Member State of their margin of appreciation in applying the law.184 This case identified that Member States retained significant discretion in the implementation of Article 24 in the national context, even when a dispute falls within its scope. In both O and S and M Maahanmuuttovirasto, and the subsequent Case C-256/11 Dereci,185 the Court stressed that the Charter is applicable only when the situation is covered by EU law (ie, the Member State is implementing EU law for the purposes of Article 51 Charter). The national court must determine first whether the situation is within EU law, and only if it is does the Charter apply. However, in Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez186 the Court appears to have used Article 24 to determine that there had been a potential breach of EU citizenship rights under Article 20 TFEU because the child’s best interests would be breached by the failure to grant a right of residence to their third-country national parent. Whilst this reasoning is not fully articulated by the Court, it potentially expands the scope of application of Article 24 in determining that the child’s best interests under the Charter, if not protected, would entail a breach of EU law.187

III.  Specific Provisions 24.52 Article 24 is one of the rights contained in the Charter specifically referred to by the CJEU and the Advocates-General. The CJEU has referred directly to the CRC to support its reasoning alongside Article 24 of the Charter,188 but this has not been in evidence in more recent judgments. Reference to Article 24 is most frequent on the context of EU cross-border family law, but the Court has yet to fully engage with the right of the child to be heard, or the right of the child to have a relationship with both parents and the relationship between these Articles with the best interests of the child. Reference is made most consistently to Article 24(2) and the obligation of the Member States to make the child’s best interests a primary consideration in their decision-making when implementing EU law. The Court has largely referred to Article 24 in support of the interpretation of provisions in secondary EU legislation, rather than considering the potential disruption children’s rights may pose to the existing legal framework. 180 Interpretation of cl 2.1 of the framework agreement on parental leave concluded on 14 December 1995 (‘the Framework Agreement’), set out in the annex to Council Directive 96/34/EC on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC ([1996] OJ L145/4) as amended. 181 Chatzi ECLI:EU:C:2010:534, [39]. 182 Recital 5, Directive 2019/1158. 183 O and S and Maahanmuuttovirasto ECLI:EU:C:2012:776. 184 Ibid [79]. 185 Case C-256/11 Dereci ECLI:EU:C:2011:734 [69]. 186 C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez ECLI:EU:C:2017:354. 187 H van Eijken, P Phoa, ‘The scope of Article 20 TFEU clarified in Chavez-Vilchez: are the fundamental rights of minor EU citizens coming of age?’ (2018) 43 European Law Review 949, 958. 188 Parliament v Council (n 73).

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Article 24 was the earliest of the rights from the Charter referred to directly by the CJEU. In 24.53 Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council, which was heard before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament sought annulment of Directive 2003/86 EC on the right to family reunification.189 The Parliament argued that the distinctions drawn in the Directive between the rights of children to family reunification at different ages190 did not respect fundamental rights, in particular, in Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR, and Articles 7, 21(1) and 24(1) and (3) of the Charter. In its judgment, the CJEU also cited Articles 9 and 10(1) CRC, which require that applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a state party for the purpose of family reunification are to be dealt with by states parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. Despite referring to the rights obligations created by several instruments, the CJEU found no breach, and the measure was upheld. Whilst it referred to the rights in Article 24, the CJEU did not closely analyse the meaning or content of the rights, instead focusing closely on the relevance of the rights to family reunification.191 The Directive contained obligations on Member States to have regard to the best interests of minor children192 but the CJEU did not define the meaning of this concept in context, or the impact of Article 24(3) on family reunification. (a)  Applying the Rights in Article 24 The potentially powerful nature of the rights in Article 24 was demonstrated in Case 24.54 C-244/06 Dynamic Medien.193 This free movement of goods case concerned national rules requiring the examination of imported videos for their suitability for viewing by children. These measures had equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, which is prohibited by Article 34 TFEU. However, the restriction was justified on the basis of the protection of young persons, which is linked to the protection of public morality and public policy justifications recognised by Article 36 TFEU. In accepting that the restriction of the free movement of goods was justified on these grounds, the CJEU relies on Article 24(1), the child’s right to such protection and care as is necessary for their wellbeing, to support its conclusions that the protection of children was a legitimate aim and that the measures were a proportionate response to protect that aim.194 The significance of this decision is in the use of a fundamental right to justify a restriction on the free movement of goods. The CJEU’s approach to this type of dispute, where the EU’s fundamental freedoms are brought into conflict with a fundamental right, had previously been questioned195 but in Dynamic Medien, the protection of children took priority over the free movement of goods. The context of the case emphasises the protective obligation towards the child and the CJEU highlights the protective element of Article 24(1), the protection and care that is necessary to the child’s wellbeing. The rights expressed in Article 24 have also been used to justify the expansion of the scope 24.55 of other substantive rights, particularly the concept of EU citizenship. This was evident in a novel way in Case C-535/06 Grunkin Paul196 where Advocate-General Sharpston referred to the

189 Ibid. 190 In particular, Art 4(1) Directive 2003/86 which permits a Member State to assess the level of ‘integration’ of a child over the age of 12 into the Member State before permitting family reunification. 191 Para 58. 192 Art 5(5). 193 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-505. 194 Ibid [52]. 195 E Spaventa, ‘Federalisation Versus Centralisation: Tensions in Fundamental Rights Discourse in the EU’ in M Dougan and S Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back and Thinking Forward (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 355. 196 Case C-535/06 Grunkin Paul [2008] ECR I-7639.



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CRC and Article 24(2). Her Opinion considers the issue of children’s surnames where a child is a national of one Member State, but resident in a different Member State, and whether this constitutes a barrier to their free movement. In Grunkin Paul, the children had to use the surname given according to the law of the state of their nationality, rather than the name they were given and which was registered at birth in a host Member State. AG Sharpston refers to Article 3(1) CRC and the corresponding right in Article 24(2), but also the right of the child to a name in Article 7(1) CRC.197 By contrast, the CJEU based its analysis on whether the rules would constitute a barrier to free movement without engaging with Article 24, or the CRC. 24.56 Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the relationship between parent and child had been used to justify continuing rights of residence under the citizenship obligations of the Treaty,198 where the child’s right of residence in the host state meant that a right of residence was granted to the parent on the basis of their need to care for the child.199 In Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano200 the CJEU held that national measures cannot deprive an EU citizen of the genuine enjoyment of their EU citizenship rights, even if they have not exercised their right to free movement. If, on denial of a right to reside to a third-country national parent, a dependent EU citizen child would effectively be forced to leave the EU Member State, accompanying their parent, the parent may derive a right of residence from their child.201 Despite deriving a right of residence from a dependent child, children’s rights were not the focus of this judgment. However, the decision in Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez,202 which considers whether a third-country national may derive a right of residence from the child even where the other parent has a right to reside in the Member State, relies on Article 24(2) and the child’s best interests in examining what is meant by ‘dependent’ and how the relationship between parent and child should be assessed by national authorities.203 The Court found that, even where the child’s other parent is an EU citizen willing to assume day-to-day care of the child, the third country national may derive a right to reside if there is a relationship of dependency, based on ‘the best interests of the child concerned, all the specific circumstances, including the age of the child, the child’s physical and emotional development, the extent of his emotional ties both to the Union citizen parent and to the third country national parent, and the risks which separation from the latter might entail for the child’s equilibrium.’204 Van Eijken and Phoa argue that in this case the Court has done its best to capture the complex relationships between parent and child.205 The focus of the judgment is on Article 24(2), and the child’s opinion on the decision, protected by Article 24(1) is not included in the assessment, despite the guarantees of the Charter. Despite the obvious relevance of Article 24(3), and the right of the child to a relationship with both parents, it is also not referred to in the judgment. The CJEU, despite engaging with Article 24, has taken a welfarist approach to decision-making and in assessments of the parent-child relationship. 24.57 The rights in Article 24 have also been applied in contexts where right discourse has only relatively recently held traction. Private international law, the rules determining where disputes should occur and under what law, and the effects of judgment, is often regarded as one step

197 Opinion [9]–[10]. 198 Art 18 EC (now Art 20(2) TFEU). 199 Case C-413/99 Baumbast v R [2002] ECR I-7091. 200 ECLI:C:2011:124. 201 Case C-256/11 Dereci EU:C:2011:734. 202 EU:C:2017:354. 203 Ibid [70]. 204 Ibid [72]. 205 H van Eijken, P Phoa, ‘The scope of Article 20 TFEU clarified in Chavez-Vilchez: are the fundamental rights of minor EU citizens coming of age?’ (2018) 43 European Law Review 949, 958.

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removed from the substantive dispute and a context in which reference to rights was of limited relevance.206 However, Article 24 makes it clear that all decisions by a public authority, including courts, must have the child’s best interests as a primary consideration. Direct reference to a child’s right to be heard in proceedings and consideration of the child’s best interests in transfer of jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in the provisions of Brussels II Revised, which regulated international child abduction and parental responsibility jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in the EU, has brought children’s rights directly into the decisionmaking in this field. The interpretation of key term of ‘habitual residence’ of the child, connecting the child to a 24.58 country for the purposes of assuming jurisdiction, has been informed in CJEU judgments by reference to the child’s best interests. In Case C-393/18 PPU UD v XD the mother had been forcibly detained by her husband from England in Bangladesh to give birth, and mother and child remained abroad. The mother sought to seise the English courts, arguing that the child was habitually resident in England, despite never having been present there. The Court had previously held that physical presence was required in the country for habitual residence to be established207 and found that it was not possible to give weight to circumstances at the expense of ‘geographical considerations’ and the EU legislature’s intentions.208 The CJEU regarded this interpretation as protecting the best interests of the child209 since it is based on determining proximity to the dispute before jurisdiction is assumed, to ensure that the best interests of the child are fully accounted for in a substantive hearing.210 The interpretation of rules of jurisdiction in the light of the best interests of the child is also evident in Case C-184/14 A v B211 where jurisdiction over a maintenance claim under Regulation 4/2009 was linked to existing parental responsibility proceedings under Regulation 2201/2003 with reference to Article 24(2). These cases demonstrate the CJEU’s willingness to use Article 24 to reinforce the legislative framework regulating private international family law in the EU, but also the increasing importance of children’s rights in this process. (b)  The Conception of the Rights Expressed in Article 24 Although the rights in Article 24 have been referred to quite extensively by the Court in cases on 24.59 European family law, some of the references have been in passing. The CJEU initially referred to Article 24 in the family law context in Case C-195/08 PPU Rinau212 in setting the tone of its judgment by identifying that Brussels II Revised stated that the fundamental rights of the child should be protected but there is no further engagement with how the law impacts on the rights of the child concerned.213 The passing engagement with Article 24 leaves many issues unresolved.

206 See JJ Fawcett, ‘The Impact of Article 6(1) on Private International Law’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1–47. 207 Case C-499/15 W v X ECLI:EU:C:2017:118. This decision was based on the criterion of proximity, but did not reference Article 24(2) Charter to support the Court’s reasoning. 208 Case C-393/18 PPU UD v XD ECLI:EU:C:2018:835 [62]. 209 Ibid [64]. 210 Ibid [63]. The English court had to rely on its residual wardship jurisdiction under national law to assume responsibility over the welfare of the child detained in Bangladesh. 211 ECLI:EU:C:2015 [46]. 212 Case C-195/08 PPU Rinau [2008] ECR I-05271. 213 This process of setting the tone by reference to Art 24 is not consistent. In Case C-497/10 PPU Mercredi the Court does not refer to the child’s rights, despite the fact that the definition of ‘habitual residence’, which was the subject of the reference, would significantly affect the child’s relationship with her father.



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24.60

24.61

24.62

In two cases, Case C-403/09 PPU Deticek214 and Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga,215 fundamental rights have been relied on by the CJEU to justify a particular interpretation of Brussels II Revised in cases of international child abduction. In both cases, reference to Article 24(3) was used to justify the return of a child to a State from which they were unlawfully removed or retained. In Deticek, the child had been removed from Italy to Slovakia by her mother following a custody decision in Italy which would have placed the child in a care home. The father sought recognition and enforcement of the Italian judgment in Slovakia, to ensure that the child returned to Italy. The CJEU made it clear that the obligation of mutual recognition of judgments in Brussels II Revised216 meant that the Italian custody judgment had to be recognised and enforced to return the child to Italy. This interpretation was justified by reference to Article 24(3) of the Charter because, if the judgment was not enforced, the father’s contact with his child would be significantly affected.217 The reference to Article 24(3) is encouraged by the Explanatory Notes on the Charter requiring special consideration of the right of the child to have contact with both parents in the context of family law. This interpretation is in accordance with the aims of Brussels II Revised in ensuring the mutual recognition of judgments throughout the Member States, and is correct on the terms of the Regulation. However, the outcome is not necessarily positive for the child, who was returned to an Italian care home and did not have residence with either her mother, or her father.218 The protection of Article 24 rights in a cross-border family context is also demonstrated by Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga,219 where a child had been unlawfully retained in Germany from Spain. The German court accepted the child’s objections to returning to Spain220 and the return of the child was initially refused. Under Brussels II Revised, the Spanish court subsequently had jurisdiction to consider the substantive custody rights of the child and order the return of the child despite the German court’s refusal.221 The Spanish court gave the child the opportunity to be heard in the substantive proceedings, but the child was not actually heard. The Spanish court subsequently ordered the return of the child, and the German court asked the CJEU whether the fact that the child had not actually been heard in the proceedings was a basis to refuse recognition of the Spanish judgment. The recognition of judgments in these circumstances is automatic and there are no defences available if the court of origin has certified the judgment.222 The Court considered Article 24(1) and suggested that the child had an opportunity to be heard in the Spanish proceedings and this was sufficient to protect the child’s right to be heard.223 The Spanish court had to ensure compliance with Article 24(1), and the German court had no role in assessing whether this obligation had been effectively carried out.224 The CJEU observes that the court hearing the substantive custody dispute must carry out the obligation to hear the child under Article 24(1), but that ‘hearing the child cannot constitute an absolute obligation, but must be assessed having regard to what is required in the best interests of the child in each individual

214 Case C-403/09 PPU Deticek [2009] ECR I-12193. 215 Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga [2010] ECR I-14247. 216 Art 21 Brussels II Revised. 217 Judgment [54]–[55]. 218 The use of Art 24 in reinforcing the application of the return of the child following an abduction was referred to and approved of in the later Case C-211/10 PPU Povse [2010] ECR I-06673. 219 Aguirre Zarraga (n 171). 220 Art 13(2) Hague Convention 1980. 221 Arts 11(6)–(8) Brussels II Revised. 222 Art 42(2) Brussels II Revised. 223 Judgment [66]. 224 Judgment [70].

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case, in accordance with Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.’225 Article 24(2) is characterised as a potential limit on Article 24(1), rather than the child’s views underpinning and assisting the court to identify what is in their best interests. The problems evident in Brussels II Revised associated particularly with the effectiveness of 24.63 guarantees for hearing the child,226 and return of the child following child abduction227 may to some extent be addressed by the recast Brussels II Regulation228 which seeks to secure the right of the child to be heard in all family proceedings under Article 21. However, this provision remains subject to national procedures and judgments regarding the age and maturity of the child and will therefore still be variable across the Member States. The relationship between the Charter obligations and national law was explored in 24.64 Case C-400/10 PPU McB229 where the mother had removed the children from Ireland to England. The parents were unmarried, so the father had no rights of custody under Irish law and could not access the remedy of return of the child under Brussels II Revised.230 The Brussels II Revised Regulation defines what constitutes a ‘right of custody’,231 but the question of attribution of rights of custody remains one of national law.232 The CJEU considered whether leaving the attribution of custody rights to national law was in accordance with Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter and concluded that the national court’s decision on custody would be in accordance with the best interests of the child under Article 24(2).233 The CJEU argued that Article 7: must be read in a way which respects the obligation to take into consideration the child’s best interests, recognised in Article 24(2) of that Charter, and taking into account the fundamental right of a child to maintain on a regular basis personal relationships and direct contact with both of his or her parents, stated in Article 24(3).234

This approach seems to subordinate Article 7, which gives rights to all members of the family 24.65 to be balanced against one another, to the obligations in Article 24. Since Article 24 is specific to the rights of the child, that may readjust the rights of family members, but the CJEU does not engage with these tensions or give guidance on balancing the interests of the parties. It is left to the national court to resolve those tensions in its decisions and for the balance of interests in awarding custody rights to be identified by national law. Article 24 could provide the basis for a legitimate restriction on Article 7 rights of the other family members. This is not an issue which arises on the face of the ECHR, and the CJEU needs to provide clearer guidance on when the protection of a child’s rights is a legitimate aim which justifies restricting the rights of other family members, and what will constitute a ‘proportionate’ restriction. There is potential here to build up on the ECHR, but the relationship will need further articulation for this to be realised. 225 Judgment [64]. 226 See T Kruger, L Samyn ‘Brussels II bis: Successes and Suggested Improvements’ (2016) 12 Journal of Private International Law 132–68. 227 J Holliday ‘Protecting the Rights of the Child: Amending the child abduction provisions under the Brussels IIa Regulation’ [2016] International Family Law 38–39. 228 Regulation 2019/1111 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast), [2019] OJ L178/1. 229 Case C-400/10 PPU McB [2010] ECR I-08965. 230 Art 2(11) Brussels II Revised requires that the removal be in breach of custody rights before an abduction under the terms of the Regulation has been established and the return remedy can operate. 231 Art 2(9) Brussels II Revised. 232 Judgment [44]. 233 Judgment [62]. 234 Judgment [60].



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IV.  Limitations and Derogations 24.66

24.67

24.68

24.69

There are no specific derogations from Article 24, although the terms of Articles 24(1) and 24(3) permit their non-application in defined circumstances. Under Article 24(1), the child’s views will be taken into consideration ‘in accordance with their age and ­maturity’. This means that if the child is deemed too young, or too immature, their views may be ­discounted as a factor in the decision. This limitation is also evident in the text of Article 3 CRC, and reflects the fact that infants and very young children will be incapable of expressing an opinion. The weight placed on the child’s views should vary depending on their capacity to understand the circumstances and respond. However, there are significant differences in the age at which some countries will hear a child during legal proceedings and take their views into account, and this variation may significantly affect the application of Article 24(1) if it is interpreted restrictively.235 The right of the child to have a relationship with both parents is similarly limited by Article 24(3) where this contact is not in the best interests of the child. This is necessary, for example, where a parent has abused a child—it will not be in the child’s best interests to have contact with that parent. However, the conception of the child’s best interests in these circumstances can be very difficult because the emphasis of Article 24(3) is on maintaining contact. Contact is presumed to be in the child’s best interests, it must be clearly demonstrated that this is not the case to undermine this presumption, using other factors which affect the best interests principle, such as the child’s own views, health, welfare and safety. However, in both these circumstances, even if the child is not heard, or contact is not maintained, it is still an application of Article 24 in accordance with its own terms, accounting for the relevant circumstances. Article 24(2) is limited in its application by the status of the best interests principle, as a ‘primary’ consideration, and in the bodies applying the principle in their decision-making. As a ‘primary’ consideration in decision-making, the child’s best interests can be overridden by other factors in the decision; it is one of several ‘primary’ factors amongst other legitimate factors. If the child’s best interests are the paramount consideration in a decision,236 the best interests factor dictates the decision-making process.237 This limits the role of the child’s best interests in decision-making as one important factor, rather than the most important factor. The bodies directed to take the child’s best interests into consideration under Article 24(2) are ‘public authorities and private institutions’. This term also limits the circumstances in which the child’s best interests will be taken into account and potentially has a very specific interpretation in EU law. This phraseology is different to Article 3 CRC, which states that the child’s best interests should be a primary consideration for public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies. The scope of Article 3 CRC therefore appears broader in specifying that courts and legislative bodies should consider the child’s best interests as a primary factor in their decision-making. However, the concept of ‘public authority’ is broad enough to encompass decisions by courts, and when making decisions within the scope of EU law, both national courts and the CJEU should comply with Article 24(2). It should also encompass the other European institutions when they are legislating and otherwise acting in a manner affecting the interests of children. Article 24(2) should also be a feature when



235 R

Lamont, ‘The EU: Protecting Children’s Rights in Child Abduction’ [2008] International Family Law 110, 112. under s 1(1) Children Act 1989 in England and Wales. J Herring and C Foster, ‘Welfare means rationality, virtue and altruism’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 480.

236 As

237 See

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national legislative bodies act to implement European directives and European law in the legal system of the Member States. These state actors clearly fall within the scope of a public authority. However, the outlying edges of the concept of a ‘public authority’ bound to comply with 24.70 Article 24(2) are not clear. Given the context of EU law, it is possible that this concept will be informed by the definition of state actor developed for the purposes of applying EU law through direct effect in the Member State legal system. The definition of a public body is very broad for the purpose of enforcing EU law against the state through direct effect,238 and includes any entity where there is some element of state participation or control in the enterprise. This broad conception would capture a very broad range of actors within the Member States when they are implementing EU law. This is potentially broadened further by the inclusion of ‘private institutions’. There is no 24.71 clear identification of what institutions this concept would cover, but McGlynn suggests that this concept is extensive enough apply the best interests principle within a family.239 It is more likely to have an impact where private actors have taken over functions previously carried out by the state, such as management of migration detention centres or victims’ services, which may now have a role in implementing European law on trafficking and asylum and immigration. This concept will have to be tested in practice before the CJEU,240 but the inclusion of private institutions in Article 24(2) makes it clear that locating the implementation of European law in non-state bodes does not avoid the guarantee provided by Article 24(2) of the Charter. It will also prevent too much pressure being placed on the conception of a ‘public authority’ for the purposes of Article 24(2) and captures the widest possible number of actors within the scope of the Article to try and ensure that the child’s best interests are taken into account in decisionmaking. The phrase ‘public authorities and private institutions’ appears to be a limitation on when Article 24(2) applies to decision-making, but in practice will not limit its effect, instead potentially broadening the number of institution taking the child’s best interests into account.

V. Remedies One of the greatest challenges posed by giving rights to children is their effective enforcement. 24.72 Children’s innate ‘powerlessness’ and dependency on adults for enforcing their rights makes realising children’s rights, and remedying their breach, inherently difficult.241 Children may be too young to take steps to enforce their rights independently of an adult, yet it may be the adults upon whom the child is dependent that play a role in the breach of the child’s rights. In protecting the rights in Article 24 therefore, there are additional challenges of practical enforceability and, whilst Article 47 of the Charter guarantees a right to an effective remedy, these challenges have to be factored into the EU’s remedial framework. The diffuse nature of legal and policy implementation in European law, between the national and the supranational, creates additional challenges for providing for the protection of children’s rights and remedying their breach.242

238 See Case C-188/89 Foster and Others v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313. 239 McGlynn (n 129) 396. 240 Hopefully the inclusion of the phrase ‘private institutions’ will avoid some of the problems that have arisen in the context of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the definition of a ‘public authority’ for the purposes of s 6 of the Act. See D Oliver ‘The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public Functions Under the HRA’ [2000] Public Law 476. 241 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) 13. 242 I Iusmen ‘Whose Children? Protecting Unaccompanied Minor Children in Europe: A Case of Diffused Responsibility?’ (2020) 28 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 925, 943.



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24.73

24.74

24.75

The relevance of the child’s perspective in seeking an effective remedy has not yet been evident in the Court. In Joined Cases C-325/18 PPU Hampshire CC v CE and NE243 three children under the age of six, all subject to public law care proceedings in England, had been removed to Ireland by their parents in breach of an English court order. The Irish court had enforced an English wardship judgment requiring the return of the children from Irish foster care to the UK without notifying the parents of the declaration of enforcement in good time. Two elder children were in the care of their father and the youngest child was to be adopted. The CJEU found that the possibility of applying for the stay of a decision is an essential safeguard of the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 Charter,244 but that the limitation period on issuance of an appeal against the judgment by the parents should be maintained to ensure legal certainty, ‘consistent with the best interests of the child’.245 Passing reference is made to the child’s best interests, without reference to Article 24 of the Charter, but the question of remedies in this situation, and the ramification of the Court’s decision is not considered from the perspective of the children at the centre of proceedings. The EU architecture is relatively difficult to access for a child. In terms of judicial remedies, Cullen has argued that the EU’s judicial system ‘is better designed for the discovery of violations of rights through inconsistencies in law rather than failures in practice to live up to the law.’246 The EU is better at monitoring whether guarantees are implemented at all, rather than at ensuring standards are reached in implementation. The procedural and value-based nature of the guarantees in Article 24 means that they will largely be interpreted and implemented at national level, with significant input of national interpretations of concepts such as ‘best interests’ and when a child is old enough and mature enough to be heard in proceedings. Unless there is a flagrant failure to protect procedural obligations, the CJEU is unlikely to interfere with national discretion. Stalford identifies that children could make use of other EU mechanisms such as the European Ombudsman or the European Parliament Petition, but that EU mechanisms are ‘distinctly arcane’ for the enforcement of children’s rights.247 Whilst the CJEU will monitor the implementation of Article 24 in the national courts, the activities of the EU in non-judicial spheres may in fact have a more significant impact on remedies for breach of Article 24 rights throughout the EU, and not just in the context of the implementation of EU law. The aim is for the EU to work together with the Council of Europe to promote the Guidelines on ‘child-friendly justice’248 throughout the Member States and incorporating the principles into future legislation. This includes promoting children’s effective access to justice, participation and appropriate representation, provision of appropriate information to children about proceedings and adequate training of professionals. DG Justice also aims to support the training of judges on child participation. These forms of activity, although not a remedy in themselves, help to embed the principles in EU legislation and also in Member States’ legal systems, hopefully reducing the circumstances in which there may be a breach. The EU has also been more active in attempting to engage children, civil society, researchers and experts in the development of legislation with an evident impact on children, such as the recast 243 ECLI:EU:C:2018:739. 244 Ibid [72]. 245 Ibid [77]. 246 H Cullen, ‘Children’s Rights’ in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 344. 247 H Stalford, ‘Journeys to European Justice: (How) Can the EU enable children to enforce their rights?’, in I Iusmen, H Stalford, (eds) The EU as a Children’s Rights Actor: Law, Policy and Structural Dimensions (Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2016), 44. 248 Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice, www.coe.int/t/dghl/ standardsetting/childjustice/Guidelines%20on%20child-friendly%20justice%20and%20their%20explanatory%20 memorandum%20_4_.pdf.

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Brussels II Regulation. As an additional motivator of activity on children’s rights in and across the Member States, Article 24 and the EU may encourage greater protection of children’s rights by national legal systems, not just when implementing EU law specifically. The problem of providing effective remedies where children’s rights are breached is a general question, not specific to the implementation of EU law, and a proactive engagement with the rights in Article 24 by the EU in a broad sense of engaging constituencies across the Member States may be valuable in securing a more effective approach in the EU.

E. Evaluation The inclusion of children’s rights in Article 24 of the Charter represents a highly significant 24.76 development for the EU. From a supranational body in which children had a tenuous foothold in the primary concerns and processes of its activities, Article 24 is a clear statement that the EU seeks to protect and promote children’s rights. Article 24 has highlighted the broad range of contexts in which children are affected by European activities and encouraged greater awareness of rights protection in a range of fields, promoting developments in new contexts such as data protection. However, in practice, the emphasis in interpreting and applying the rights expressed in Article 24 has been focused on the protection of the child; little prominence has been placed on the right of the child to be heard and to have a stake in decision-making that affects their interests or on securing this right in different types of proceedings affecting children.249 The interrelationship of the rights expressed in Article 24 has not been fully examined or analysed, to the potential loss of the participatory and empowering aspects of hearing the child’s voice, both in individual decisions, and more broadly in the EU environment. The arguments put before the Court based on Article 24 demonstrate the potential power of 24.77 framing claims on the basis of rights for the child. There have been claims for the extension of EU law into novel areas partially justified by reference to Article 24. This potential has been realised in Dynamic Medien and there was an important statement of principle in supporting citizenships and parental relationships in Chavez-Vilchez, but in the majority of cases, the rights provide a justification of existing approaches. This has been evident in both the free movement of persons and cross-border family law cases. Instead of providing an alternative basis for analysis, Article 24 provides an additional support for existing interpretations of EU law, changing the narrative but not yet providing a challenge to EU law reasoning. In this sense, the Court’s reasoning could be perceived as ultilising children’s rights to its own means, rather than fully engaging with the potential disruptive influences. The case law thus far has also demonstrated a lack of close engagement by the CJEU with 24.78 definition and interaction of the different limbs of Article 24. These are not necessarily in accordance with one another, or with the other provisions of the Charter, particularly Article 7. Article 24 represents an evolution on the ECHR and some national laws by providing express protections for children’s rights. As a supranational court with the power to define the interpretation of children’s rights across the EU, the CJEU has a potentially important symbolic role in the protection of children’s rights through Article 24. However, there has been limited dialogue between the ECtHR and the CJEU in fields affected by Article 24 and the CJEU,

249 R Lamont, ‘Mediation in EU Cross-Border Family Law’ in P Beaumont, M Danov, K Trimmings, B Yuksel (eds), Cross-Border Litigation in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017), 787–802.



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whilst aware of the relationship between the CRC and the Charter, appears more unwilling in recent decisions to refer to the CRC. Inter-institutional dialogue, both between national and supranational courts, and in the broader international context, is essential to progressing and promoting children’s rights. 24.79 Beyond the CJEU, it has been suggested that Article 24 should provide the basis for ‘childproofing’ or mainstreaming children’s rights and interests into EU law.250 The EU Agenda on the Rights of the Child stated that: ‘In the future, EU policies that directly or indirectly affect children should be designed, implemented, and monitored taking into account the principle of the best interests of the child enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the UNCRC.’251 This process should help to ensure that EU law is compliant with Article 24 on adoption, but without effective child-participation in these processes the rights expressed in the Charter are not fully protected. The General Comment on Article 12 CRC suggests that the voice of the child should be ‘the starting point for an intense exchange between children and adults on the development of policies, programmes and measures in all relevant contexts of children’s lives’.252 However, the institutions of the EU, including the CJEU, are not readily accessible to children and the expression of their interests in this environment is likely to be mediated through other actors. 24.80 However, if children’s rights were to permeate EU law, children’s rights and interests would not be confined into categories in EU law. Measures affecting children have been adopted on a broad range of competence, but the EU has focused on specific categories of vulnerable children. Article 24 could be the basis for a more coherent approach to encouraging the inclusion of children’s rights and interests across the different spheres of European activity and encouraging children’s voices and participation in a range of environments. This would provide a wider shift in perspective, and would be an important contribution to the development of the EU as an actor for the protection and promotion of human rights on a global scale.

250 M Schuurman, ‘Developing a Model for Mainstreaming Children’s Rights into EU Law and Policy-Making’, in I Iusmen, H Stalford (eds), The EU as a Children’s Rights Actor: Law, Policy and Structural Dimensions (Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2016). 251 Communication from the Commission ‘An EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child’ COM (2011) 60 final, p 4. 252 Committee of the Rights of the Child ‘General Comment No 12 (2009): The Right of the Child to be Heard’, p 7.

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Article 25 Article 25 The Rights of the Elderly The Union recognises and respects the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 25 This Article draws on Article 23 of the revised European Social Charter and Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Of course, participation in social and cultural life also covers participation in political life.

The explanation of Article 25 set out in [2007] OJ C303 includes Article 25 in its list of examples of ‘principles’ recognised in the Charter, which ‘may be implemented through legislative or executive acts’ that come within the existing competency of the EU but ‘become significant for the Courts only when such acts are interpreted or reviewed’ and do not ‘give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions or Member States authorities’.

Select Bibliography A Blackham, Extending Working Life for Older Workers: Age Discrimination Law, Policy and Practice (Oxford, Hart, 2016). P De Hert and M Eugenio, ‘Specific Human Rights for Older Persons’ (2011) European Human Rights Law Review 398–418. E Dewhurst, ‘The Development of EU Case-Law on Age Discrimination in Employment: “Will You Still Need Me? Will You Still Feed Me? When I’m Sixty-Four”’ (2013) 19(4) European Law Journal 517–44. I Doron and N Georgantzi (eds), Ageing, Ageism and the Law: European Perspectives on the Rights of Older Persons (Cheltenham, Elgar, 2018). S Fredman and S Spencer (eds), Age as an Equality Issue: Legal and Policy Perspectives (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 21–70. Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Shifting Perceptions: Towards a Rights-based Approach to Ageing’, FRA Fundamental Rights Report 2018 (FRA, 2018), available at https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ fra_uploads/fra-2018-fundamental-rights-report-2018-focus_en.pdf. N Georgantzi, ‘The European Union’s Approach towards Ageism’, in L Ayalon and C Tesch-Römer (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Ageism: Vol. 19. International Perspectives on Aging (Berlin, Springer, 2018) 341–68. A Herro, ‘The Human Rights of Older Persons: The politics and substance of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Ageing’ (2017) 23(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 90–108. T Hervey et al, ‘Long-term Care for Older People and EU Law: The position in England and Scotland’ (2012) 34(1) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 105–24. H Meenan, ‘Age Discrimination and the Future Development of Elder Rights in the European Union: Walking Side By Side or Hand in Hand?’ in I Doron and AM Soden (eds), Beyond Elder Law: New Directions in Law and Aging (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2012) 57–98. F Mégret, ‘The Human Rights of Older Persons: A Growing Challenge’ (2011) 11(1) Human Rights Law Review 37–66.

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B Mikołajczyk, ‘The Council of Europe’s Approach towards Ageism’, in L Ayalon and C Tesch-Römer (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Ageism: Vol. 19. International Perspectives on Aging (Berlin, Springer, 2018) 321–39. A Numhauser-Henning (ed), Elder Law: Evolving European Perspectives (Cheltenham, Elgar, 2017). C O’Cinneide, ‘Constitutional and Fundamental Rights Aspects of Age Discrimination’, in M Rönnmar and A Numhauser-Henning (eds), Age Discrimination and Labour Law: Comparative and Conceptual Perspectives in the EU and Beyond (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2015). D Schiek, ‘Age Discrimination before the Court of Justice—Conceptual and Theoretical issues’ (2011) 48(3) Common Market Law Review 777–99.

A.  Field of Application of Article 25 25.01 The field of application of Article 25 is potentially very wide. Its scope is not confined to particular elements of EU law or to specific areas of European regulatory activity. As a result, its provisions are capable of applying to any situation where EU law or national implementing legislation affects the rights of the elderly to enjoy a dignified and independent existence. 25.02 The extent to which EU law has a direct impact upon the lives of the elderly is limited, especially when it comes to older persons who have retired and are no longer active on the labour market. As a result, the provisions of Article 25 may have a limited role to play in the development of many aspects of European law, in particular those that relate to agriculture and fisheries, trade, the environment, transport and energy. 25.03 Nevertheless, many elements of EU law have a significant impact upon the lives of older persons. For example, aspects of EU employment and equality law protect the right of older persons to participate as equals in the labour market, in particular the prohibition on age discrimination in employment and occupation set out in Directive 2000/78/EC which has already generated a substantial body of case law.1 EU free movement rules can also have a substantial impact on the lives of older persons, including those who have left the labour market and are dependent on family members who choose to exercise their free movement rights and work in another state.2 So too may EU legislation concerned with work-life balance, as well as legislation such as the Accessibility Act3 and other measures being developed within the framework of the European Pillar on Social Rights. Furthermore, EU law on competition, public procurement and the free movement of services 25.04 plays an increasingly prominent role in regulating how social and health care services are provided

1 See eg Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981; Case C-388/07 Age Concern England (Incorporated Trustees of the National Council for Ageing) [2009] ECR I 1569; Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECR I-365; Case C-88/08 Hütter v Technische Universität Graz [2009] ECR I-5325; Case C-499/08, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark (acting on behalf of Ole Andersen) v Region Syddanmark [2011] 1 CMLR 35; Case C-45/09 Rosenbladt v Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsges mbH [2011] 1 CMLR 32; Joined Cases C-250/09 and C-268/09 Georgiev v Technicheski universitet—Sofia, filial Plovdiv [2010] ECR I-11869; Case C-341/09 Petersen v Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe [2010] ECR I-47; Case C-539/15, Daniel Bowman v Pensionsversicherungsanstal, Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 21 December 2016; Case C-143/16, Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v Antonino Bordonaro, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 19 July 2017. 2 See in particular the provisions of Arts 3(2) and 10(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 3 ‘Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services’.

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to older people, especially as private providers are becoming more involved in the provision of care services through quasi-market mechanisms in many EU member states. As Hervey et al argued back in 2012, ‘the previously held general assumption that EU law has little relevance for social services, such as long-term care for older people, is increasingly under question … EU law is [now] an important element of the policy context within which changes to the long-term care for older people … are taking place’.4 The expanding scope of EU law and related coordination activity in the field of cross-border health care can also impact on the types of medical treatment that older people can access, in particular the provisions of Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. In this regard, the provisions of Article 168(5) TFEU are particularly worth highlighting. 25.05 EU competency in the field of harmonising public health care provision is very limited, but Article 168(5) confers a limited competency on the EU institutions to co-ordinate Member State responses to ‘serious cross-border threats to health’. The potential importance of this competency for older people was graphically highlighted by the Covid-19 crisis in early 2020, where the health emergency co-ordination framework established by the Cross-border Health Threats Decision5 was widely perceived to have struggled to respond to the crisis.6 This crisis disproportionately impacted upon the elderly, because of the heightened threat coronavirus posed to their health and also because they bore the particular brunt of the sweeping social isolation measures adopted across the EU to contain this threat. As such, the EU’s evolving if under-developed health care co-ordination framework, and the wide range of financial, economic and health care co-ordination measures that have been adopted by the EU to address the Covid-19 crisis, directly impact upon the rights of the elderly as guaranteed by Article 25—and should thus be regarded as coming within its scope of application.7 Other elements of EU law relating in particular to the co-ordination of social security schemes, 25.06 the functioning of the internal market, economic and monetary policy, external development, trade and co-operation policies, and the establishment of a common area of freedom, security and justice also have the potential to affect older people in a variety of ways. For example, Directive 2012/29/EU,8 which establishes minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, requires states to take into account the personal characteristics of victims of crime, including their age.9 The pension market standardisation implemented via the 2019 pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP) Regulation similarly has a particular impact on older people.10 More generally, in Case T-531/14, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council of the

4 T Hervey et al, ‘Long-term Care for Older People and EU Law: The position in England and Scotland’ (2012) 34(1) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 105–24, 106, 122. 5 European Parliament and Council Decision (EU) 1082/2013 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC OJ L 293/1. See also European Parliament and Council Decision (EC) 2119/98 setting up a network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the Community OJ L 268/1. 6 A Alemanno, ‘Testing the Limits of EU Health Emergency Power, Verfassungsblog 2020/4/18, https://verfassungsblog. de/testing-the-limits-of-eu-health-emergency-power/. 7 For an analysis of EU competency as it relates to Covid-19, see K Purnhagen et al, ‘More Competences than You Knew? The Web of Health Competence for European Union Action in Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak’ (2020) European Journal of Risk Regulation, 1–10. doi:10.1017/err.2020.35. 8 Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. 9 Recital 56 of the Directive states that ‘[i]ndividual assessments should take into account the personal characteristics of the victim such as his or her age’. 10 Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on a pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP).



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European Union,11 the General Court accepted that decisions adopted under the excessive deficit mechanism established by Article 126 TFEU had the potential to impact upon the rights of older people as protected by Article 25. In Case T-560/15 P, LM v European Commission, the General Court also accepted that the provisions of the EU Staff Regulations relating to the pension rights of Commission staff could also impact upon the rights guaranteed by Article 25.12 25.07 The provisions of Article 25 are therefore relevant in a variety of contexts where EU law impacts upon the lives of older persons. Furthermore, as European public policy comes to grips with the complex challenges posed by the continent’s ageing population, and adjusts to the medium to long-term public health challenges posed by Covid-19, the field of application of Article 25 and the significance of its provisions is likely to expand in the years ahead. By requiring that the right of elderly people to enjoy a dignified and independent existence be respected, Article 25 sets out a legal principle that should guide the evolution of EU legislation and case law that affects older persons both individually and as a group. In addition, Article 25 should be an important reference point in the development of soft law standards through EU ‘new governance’ mechanisms, especially as they relate to issues such as demographic change and pandemic threats such as Covid-19.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 25 with Other Provisions of the Charter 25.08 Article 25 guarantees the right of older persons to a life of dignity and independence. As such, it gives specific expression to the more general right to human dignity set out in Article 1 of the Charter. It is also conceptually linked to (and overlaps with) the right to life as set out in Article 2, the right to integrity of the person set out in Article 3, the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment contained in Article 4, the right to liberty and security set out in Article 6 and the right to respect for private life contained in Article 7, all of which are concerned with protecting human dignity and autonomy. The interconnectedness of Article 25 with all these rights, taken together with the Article 33 right of the family to social protection and the right of access to health care protected by Article 35, have all been graphically illustrated by the Covid-19 crisis in 2020 and the severe impact this had on the rights of the elderly in particular. 25.09 Furthermore, the manner in which Article 25 guarantees the right of older persons to an independent life and participation in social and cultural life finds a parallel in how Article 15 guarantees the right to choose an occupation and engage in work and how Article 16 guarantees the right to conduct a business. The provisions of Article 34, which recognises the entitlement to social security and social assistance inter alia in old age are also relevant, as they also guarantee the right to a dignified existence. The provisions of Article 20 that state that everyone is equal before the law, and the guarantee 25.10 of non-discrimination (including on grounds of age) set out in Article 21, are also closely linked to Article 25. Together, these three articles establish that older persons are entitled to be treated with equal regard for their dignity, independence and right to participate in social and cultural life. The provisions of Article 25 also reflect the concept of substantive equality that underpins how the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has interpreted the rights to equality and non-discrimination set out in Article 20 and 21 and the general principle of equal treatment that forms part of the fundamental norms of EU law, in that they recognise that equality can



11 Case 12 Case

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at times only be secured by taking account of difference and making specific provision for the needs of disadvantaged groups.13 A similar logic is reflected in the gender equality provisions of Article 23, the rights of the child set out in Article 24, and the rights of persons with disabilities set out in Article 26.14

C.  Sources of Article 25 Rights I. ECHR The ECHR does not contain an equivalent right to Article 25 and its text does not contain 25.11 any explicit references to age or to the right of older persons. The provisions of Article 25 can nevertheless be regarded as being conceptually linked to the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment set out in Article 3 of the Convention, together with the Article 8 right to private, home and family life and the Article 14 right to non-discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights. The scope of these ECHR rights is more restricted than Article 25, even if they are similarly concerned with protecting human dignity and the independence of the individual.15 The case law of the European Court of Human Rights is not very developed when it comes to the rights of older persons.16 However, the Court has recognised that state parties to the Convention are subject to positive obligations to take account of the vulnerable situation of elderly persons when adopting measures that impact upon their ECHR rights. Thus, in Farbthus v Latvia, the ECtHR held that that a failure to take into account the age and health of an elderly person (in this case an 86-year-old) in imposing a prison sentence upon him for participating in Stalin’s purges in 1940–41 could constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR.17 In X and Y v Croatia, the Court concluded that an elderly person presumed to be suffering from dementia had been deprived of necessary procedural safeguards in proceedings resulting in her loss of legal capacity, and thus had been subject to a breach of her right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the Convention.18 Similarly, in McDonald v UK, the Court concluded that the withdrawal by a local authority of intimate care support previously provided to an elderly and vulnerable person lacked a sufficiently clear basis in law, and thus breached her right to a private life under Article 8.19 In Schwizgebel v Switzerland, the Strasbourg Court also recognised that discrimination on the grounds of age could constitute a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 8, even though it concluded that a refusal to authorise the adoption of a second child by the applicant on the grounds of her age did not constitute a violation of the Convention.20

13 See eg Case 319/03 Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur [2005] 1 CMLR 4 [25]. 14 See also the provisions of Art 9 TFEU, setting out the objectives of the EU: ‘in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health’. 15 H Meenan, ‘Age Discrimination and the Future Development of Elder Rights in the European Union: Walking Side By Side or Hand in Hand?’ in I Doron and AM Soden, Beyond Elder Law: New Directions in Law and Aging (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2012) 57–98, 62. 16 O De Schutter, The Prohibition of Discrimination under European Human Rights Law (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Union, 2011) 71. 17 Farbthus v Latvia App no 4672/02 (Judgment of 2 December 2004). See also Senchishak v Finland App no 5049/12 (Judgment of 18 November 2014); Contrada v Italy (No 2) App no 7509/08 (Judgment of 11 February 2014). 18 X and Y v Croatia App no 5193/09 (Judgment of 3 November 2011). 19 McDonald v UK App no. 4241/12 (Judgment of 20 May 2014). 20 Schwizgebel v Switzerland App no 25762/07 (Judgment of 10 June 2010).



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Therefore, there is some overlap between the provisions of the ECHR and those of Article 25, with both instruments recognising that elderly persons have positive entitlements to be treated with dignity and on a non-discriminatory basis in accessing social protection.

II.  UN Treaties 25.12 A similar overlap exists with several provisions of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in particular the prohibition contained in Article 7 on ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’, the right to privacy set out in Article 17, and the non-discrimination right set out in Article 26. Many of the provisions of the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also are conceptually linked to the provisions of Article 25, especially Article 7 on the right to work, the Article 9 right to social security, and the Article 15 right to take part in cultural life. However, as with the ECHR, these texts contain no explicit reference to the rights of the elderly, and in general, UN legal standards on the treatment of older persons are relatively under-developed.21 25.13 The UN Human Rights Committee has nevertheless recognised that age discrimination could constitute a violation of Article 26,22 while the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has issued a General Comment on the economic, social and cultural rights of older persons which sets out in detail the scope of their rights and entitlements under the ICESCR.23 Other UN human rights bodies have recognised that older persons may be particularly vulnerable to multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination, resulting in the denial of social protection and deprivation of their human dignity.24 25.14 A number of international policy documents setting out recommendations and principles in this field have also been endorsed by the UN General Assembly. These include the Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing of 1982, the United Nations Principles for Older Persons of 1991 (which include 18 recommendations organised on the basis of five underlying principles of dignity, independence, participation, care and self-fulfilment), and the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing of 2002. Furthermore, in January 2010, the Advisory Committee to the UN Human Rights Council 25.15 produced a report on the human rights of older persons.25 This ‘Chung Report’, named after the Committee’s rapporteur, concluded that there was a need for a new UN treaty on the human rights of older persons which would close gaps in the existing international standard and ensure that elder rights received more visibility. A 2012 report issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reached similar conclusions,26 and an Open-ended Working Group on Ageing was

21 P De Hert and M Eugenio, ‘Specific Human Rights for Older Persons’ (2011) European Human Rights Law Review 398–418, 400–04. 22 Love et al v Australia Communication No 983/2001; Schmitzde-Jong v The Netherlands Communication No 855/1999; Solís v Peru Communication No 1016/2001; and Althammer et al v Austria Communication No 998/2001 (available from www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc). 23 CESCR, General Comment No 6: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons, 12/08/1995. 24 See eg Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No 27, CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.1, para 36; M Sepúlveda, Report of the Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, Social Protection and Old Age Poverty, A/HRC/14/31, 31 March 2010; A Grover, Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Thematic Study on the Realization of the Right to Health of Older Persons, A/HRC/18/37, 4 July 2011. 25 Human Rights Council, Advisory Committee, The Necessity of a Human Rights Approach and Effective United Nations Mechanism for the Human Rights of the Older Person, A/HRC/AC/4/CRP.1, 2010. 26 E/2012/51, 20 April 2012.

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subsequently established by General Assembly Resolution 65/182 in December 2010 to explore inter alia whether such a treaty is required.27 Discussions within this framework continue, albeit at a slow pace.28 In addition, the office of the UN Independent Expert on the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Older Persons was established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2013, with the first Independent Expert taking up her role in 2014.29 The work of successive Independent Experts has focused on issues of social protection, with a series of thematic annual reports being generated since 2014.30 Therefore, while UN standards in this area are currently underdeveloped, there is a growing focus on the rights of older persons to social protection.

III.  Council of Europe Treaties One of the main sources of Article 25 are the provisions of Article 23 of the revised European 25.16 Social Charter (ESC), as the explanation of Article 25 set out in [2007] OJ C303 makes clear. As a result, Article 23 ESC is likely to be a significant reference point in how Article 25 is interpreted and applied, even if only 11 EU Member States have agreed to be bound by its provisions.31 Article 23 was the first provision in an international human rights treaty to provide specific 25.17 protection for the rights of the elderly. It requires states to establish a comprehensive floor of protection for the rights of older persons to social protection, which in turn serves to protect their privacy, dignity and independence, as well as their ability to participate in social and cultural life. Article 23 ESC—The Right of Elderly Persons to Social Protection With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of elderly persons to social protection, the Parties undertake to adopt or encourage, either directly or in co-operation with public or private organisations, appropriate measures designed in particular: —— to enable elderly persons to remain full members of society for as long as possible, by means of: (a) adequate resources enabling them to lead a decent life and play an active part in public, social and cultural life; (b) provision of information about services and facilities available for elderly persons and their opportunities to make use of them; —— to enable elderly persons to choose their life-style freely and to lead independent lives in their familiar surroundings for as long as they wish and are able, by means of: (a) provision of housing suited to their needs and their state of health or of adequate support for adapting their housing; (b) the health care and the services necessitated by their state; —— to guarantee elderly persons living in institutions appropriate support, while respecting their privacy, and participation in decisions concerning living conditions in the institution.

The European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) has interpreted Article 23 as concerned with protecting the right of elderly persons to remain full, active and participating members

27 A/RES/65/182, 21 December 2010. 28 For an overview of the dynamics of this process, see A Herro, ‘The Human Rights of Older Persons: The politics and substance of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Ageing’ (2017) 23(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 90–108. 29 A/HRC/RES/24/20, 27 September 2013. 30 For further detail on the work of the Independent Expert, see www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/OlderPersons/IE/Pages/ IEOlderPersons.aspx. 31 As of 20 March 2020, the 11 EU member states bound by Article 23 ESC are Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden.



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of society. It has concluded that ‘Article 23 of the Charter provides for the fundamental right of elderly persons to social protection … States Parties are committed to take the necessary actions to enable elderly persons to remain full members of the society and to lead independent lives in their familiar surroundings for as long as they wish and are able’.32 National measures relating to the provision of social protection and health care services to the elderly come within its field of application, along with measures which relate to the participation of older people in the labour market as well as in the social and cultural life of their society.33 However, questions of age discrimination in employment are usually viewed by the ECSR as mainly falling under the provisions of Article 1(2) (non-discrimination in employment) and Article 24 (right to protection in cases of termination of employment): the Committee has taken the view that the primary focus of Article 23 is on the social protection of older persons outside of the employment field.34 25.19 The Committee has interpreted the provisions of Article 23 as requiring states to have comprehensive age discrimination legislation in place to protect older persons against discrimination in a range of areas outside of employment, such as access to goods, facilities and services in the fields of health care, education, housing, social services, insurance and banking.35 Pensions and other state benefits must be sufficient in order to allow elderly persons to lead a ‘decent life’ and play an active part in public, social and cultural life.36 Furthermore, the needs of elderly persons must be taken into account in national or local housing policies, in particular through the provision of an adequate supply of sheltered/supported housing and assistance for the adaptation of homes.37 Health care services for older people should be accessible, adequate and sufficiently well-resourced, while states should also take effective measures to protect the rights of older persons living in care homes or receiving home care services (which should include the establishment of suitable monitoring and inspection mechanisms).38 Adequate safeguards must be built into the legal framework that relates to assisted or proxy decision-making for the elderly in order to prevent them being arbitrarily or unjustifiably deprived of their power of autonomous decision-making.39

IV.  Other Sources 25.20

Few national constitutions of EU member states contain express provisions guaranteeing the right of older persons to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social

32 Collective Complaint No. 70/2011, The Central Association of Carers in Finland v Finland, Decision on the merits of 4 December 2012, para 47. 33 ECSR Conclusions XIII-5, Finland, p 304. 34 ECSR Conclusions 2009, Andorra, p 71. 35 The ECSR requires that anti-discrimination legislation must cover a ‘sufficiently wide variety of grounds’ outside of employment to ensure that older persons can actively participate in the social and cultural life of their community, and the prohibition of age discrimination should be ‘progressively extended’ to cover all the areas mentioned above: see ECSR Conclusions 2009, Finland, p 273. 36 ECSR Conclusions 2009, Finland, p 274; Conclusions 2013, Statement of Interpretation on Article 23: Adequate resources for the elderly. 37 ECSR Conclusions 2003, Slovenia, p 530; Conclusions 2005, France, p 252. 38 ECSR Conclusions XIII-5, Finland, p 304; Conclusions 2013, Statement of interpretation on Article 23: Assisted decision-making. See also Collective Complaint No 145/2017, International Federation of Associations of the Elderly (FIAPA) v France, decision on the merits of 22 May 2019, paras 46–48. 39 ECSR Conclusions 2009, Andorra, p 71.

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and cultural life.40 The odd exception does exist: for example, Article 72 of the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 protects the rights of older persons. Furthermore, as with the ECHR, provisions of national constitutions which state that that human dignity constitutes a fundamental norm of the legal order, or which protect individual rights to privacy, non-discrimination and freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, are often assumed to cover much of the same ground as does Article 25.41 The provisions of Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social 25.21 Rights of Workers (the ‘Community Charter’) are another main source of Article 25 along with Article 23 ESC, as the explanation of Article 25 set out in [2007] OJ C303 again makes clear. These two articles are worded as follows: Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter—Elderly Persons According to the arrangements applying in each country: 24. Every worker of the European Community must, at the time of retirement, be able to enjoy resources affording him or her a decent standard of living. 25. Every person who has reached retirement age but who is not entitled to a pension or who does not have other means of subsistence, must be entitled to sufficient resources and to medical and social assistance specifically suited to his needs.

As with Article 23 ESC, the wording of these provisions is likely to be another major reference 25.22 point when Article 25 is interpreted and applied by the courts. Other international declarations also exist which relate to the rights of the elderly, including 25.23 several ILO conventions and recommendations, including in particular Convention No 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), the Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivor’s Benefits Recommendation No 131 (1967), the Older Workers Recommendation No 162 (1980) and the Termination of Employment Recommendation No 166 (1982), which states that, subject to national law and practice regarding retirement, age should not constitute a valid reason for termination of employment. The Toronto Declaration on the Global Prevention of Elder Abuse, issued in 2002 under the auspices of the World Health Organisation (WHO), may also be relevant to the future interpretation and application of Article 25.42 So too may Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)2 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the promotion of human rights of older persons, issued on 19 February 2014.43 Finally, the existence of the European Charter of the Rights and Responsibilities of Older 25.24 People in Need of Long Term Care (LTC) and Assistance should also be noted. This standardsetting instrument was published in April 2010 by the European platform of older persons (AGE), an umbrella organisation of European NGOs concerned with issues relating to the treatment of older people whose activities were subsidised by the European Commission’s Daphne III programme.44 40 C O’Cinneide, ‘Comparative European Perspectives on Age Discrimination’ in S Fredman and S Spencer (eds), Age as an Equality Issue: Legal and Policy Perspectives (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 195–218. 41 C O’Cinneide, ‘Constitutional and Fundamental Rights Aspects of Age Discrimination’, in M Rönnmar and A Numhauser-Henning (eds), Age Discrimination and Labour Law: Comparative and Conceptual Perspectives in the EU and Beyond (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2015). 42 www.who.int/ageing/publications/toronto_declaration/en/index.html. 43 B Mikołajczyk, ‘The Council of Europe’s Approach towards Ageism’, in L Ayalon and C Tesch-Römer (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Ageism: Vol 19. International Perspectives on Aging (Berlin, Springer, 2018), 321–39. 44 AGE Platform Europe, European Charter of the Rights and Responsibilities of Older People in Need of Long-Term Care and Assistance, available at www.age-platform.eu/images/stories/22204_AGE_charte_europeenne_EN_v4.pdf.



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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 25.25 Older persons are often assumed to lack flexibility, motivation, and reliable health. They are also often viewed as lacking the capacity to manage their own lives or to participate meaningfully in the life of their communities, especially after they reach an advanced age.45 These stereotypical assumptions can result in older people being subject to paternalistic decision-making by caregivers and others, which may deny them the opportunity to have a say in medical and social care decisions that affect their well-being. 25.26 Discriminatory attitudes may also impair their ability to remain active in the labour market or to engage in social and cultural activities: the European Older People’s Platform and other organisations have suggested that pervasive age discrimination is a problem across Europe.46 Furthermore, many older people are exposed to the risk of elder abuse and similar forms of mistreatment.47 They may also be at risk of poverty and social isolation.48 25.27 As discussed above, many of the rights recognised in national constitutional law or under the ECHR and similar treaty instruments are capable of being interpreted and applied so as to protect the entitlement of older persons to a dignified and autonomous existence. However, the protection they provide for the rights of older people is often limited, poorly defined or uncertain in scope.49 Furthermore few national constitutions or international human rights instruments contain express provisions guaranteeing the rights of the elderly, with the exception of Article 23 of the revised ESC and Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter (the principal sources of Article 25). As a consequence, the argument is increasingly made that the rights of older people need to be crystallised and given specific expression in international human rights law, as proposed by the findings of the UN ‘Chung report’ referred to above.50 25.28 In this respect, Article 25 is one of the more innovative, ground-breaking and potentially ‘transformative’ provisions of the Charter.51 It expressly commits the EU to recognising and respecting the rights of the elderly as a distinct group to ‘lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life’. Furthermore, it is included in Title III of the Charter, which is concerned with equality: its inclusion in this part of the Charter affirms that older persons are entitled to equality of respect and to participate as autonomous equals in social and cultural life of their community. Article 25 thus provides a focal point when it comes to the rights of the elderly—it is 25.29 designed to ensure that their specific needs are not overlooked or marginalised within the EU’s human rights framework. It complements the protection for human dignity and individual rights provided by other provisions of the Charter, by requiring the Union to pay particular regard to the rights of older persons. As the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights has put it,

45 See S Fredman, ‘The Age of Equality’ in S Fredman and S Spencer, Age as an Equality Issue: Legal and Policy Perspectives (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 21–70, esp 22–35. 46 See in general I Doron and N Georgantzi (eds), Ageing, Ageism and the Law: European Perspectives on the Rights of Older Persons (Cheltenham, Elgar, 2018). 47 See ECSR Conclusions 2009, Italy, p 430. 48 FRA, ‘Shifting Perceptions: Towards a Rights-based Approach to Ageing’, FRA Fundamental Rights Report 2018, 9–14. 49 See in general the analysis in De Hert and Eugenio (n 21) 400–04. 50 See F Mégret, ‘The Human Rights of Older Persons: A Growing Challenge’ (2011) 11(1) Human Rights Law Review 37–66. 51 See the excellent analysis in N Georgantzi, ‘The European Union’s Approach towards Ageism’, in L Ayalon and C Tesch-Römer (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Ageism: Vol 19. International Perspectives on Aging (Berlin, Springer, 2018) 341–68.

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‘with [Article 25], the Charter is signalling acceptance and respect for the fundamental rights of older people. It aims to ensure their equal participation in society and their independence, which is pivotal in shifting perceptions about people’s agency in older age … Older people are no longer perceived solely as “retired” former workers, nor as a homogenous, vulnerable group. On the contrary, they are considered largely as “persons” with rights, who deserve equal treatment and recognition of their potential to participate and contribute actively in all aspects of life, in spite of their age, and to enjoy their right to live independently and be included in the community.’52 At a minimum, the provisions of Article 25 would appear to require the EU to refrain from taking action which undermines the dignity of older people or unjustifiably limits their independence and ability to participate in social and cultural life. By extension, this implies that EU law should reflect, uphold and be compatible with the rights of older people. It appears also as if the scope of Article 25 extends to cover the entitlement of older people to be protected against abuse and discrimination by third parties, to receive social protection and medical care, and to participate in the labour market as well as in the social and cultural life of their community. (See the next sub-section for more analysis of the personal and material scope of Article 25.) As such, the commitment to respect the rights of the elderly set out in Article 25 appears to give rise to both negative and positive obligations, which should be given due weight when it comes to the framing, interpretation and application of EU legislation as well as national measures which implement EU law.53 However, the provisions of Article 25 are not drafted in a manner that appears to create directly enforceable individual rights. Instead of providing that ‘everyone has the right to …’, Article 25 commits the EU to recognising and respecting the rights of the elderly as a group. It therefore does not seem to generate subjective rights which are vested in the individual, but rather sets out objective norms relating to the treatment of older people which the Union is expected to respect. This interpretation is reinforced by the explanation of Article 52(5) set out in [2007] OJ C303, which includes Article 25 as an example of a ‘principle’, that ‘may be implemented through legislative or executive acts’ that come within the existing competency of the EU but ‘become significant for the Courts only when such acts are interpreted or reviewed’ and do not ‘give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions or Member States’ authorities’. It remains to be seen how the CJEU and national courts will interpret the provisions of Article 25. However, Article 52(7) provides that ‘due regard’ should be given to the explanation of the Charter set out in [2007] OJ C303. Furthermore, the General Court in LM v European Commission concluded that Article 25 did not give rise to a ‘subjective right’ to a minimum level of pension.54 Article 25 will therefore presumably be interpreted as establishing a ‘principle’ of EU law, rather than subjective individual rights. As such, according to the provisions of Article 52(5), it ‘may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.’ Article 25 may therefore be invoked as a ‘principle’ in the interpretation, application or review of EU law. EU legislation, acts of the EU institutions or measures taken by Member States to implement EU legislation may be overturned if they are incompatible with its provisions.





52 FRA, ‘Shifting 53 Ibid, 16–18. 54 Case

Perceptions: Towards a Rights-based Approach to Ageing’, FRA Fundamental Rights Report 2018, 16.

T-560/15 P, LM v European Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 6 July 2016, [15].

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Furthermore, EU legislation and national measures implementing EU law should be interpreted and applied in a manner that complies with the commitment to respect the rights of the elderly set out in Article 25.55 Its provisions will also need to be taken into account by the CJEU and national courts when assessing the proportionality of national measures which derogate from free movement principles, or otherwise take advantage of permissible exceptions to general requirements of EU law. 25.35 In contrast, individuals will in all likelihood be unable to rely on Article 25 to establish that they are entitled to receive particular forms of medical or social care, or to make a claim that the EU has otherwise violated their individual rights or failed to respect their subjective entitlements. However, it remains to be seen how this may limit the impact of Article 25 in practice. As Barnard has noted, the distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ within the Charter scheme is not clear-cut,56 and there may be situations where a failure to make positive provision for an individual or a group of older persons in need may constitute a failure to respect the principle of respect for the rights of older people as set out in Article 25.

II.  Scope of Application 25.36

25.37

Article 25 commits the EU to respecting the rights of the ‘elderly’, but does not define this term. Article 23 of the revised ESC, along with the various UN declarations discussed above, similarly does not define who qualifies as an ‘elderly’ or ‘older’ person. In contrast, Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter make it clear that they apply to workers who have ‘reached retirement age’ or are ‘at the time of retirement’. However, ‘retirement age’ is nowadays not a clearly defined concept. Workers retire at different ages, and many often choose to continue working beyond the ‘normal’ retirement age for their particular type of employment. Even in situations where the age discrimination provisions of Directive 2000/78/EC as interpreted by the CJEU permits employers to make use of a ‘default retirement age’ (ie where employers are allowed under EU and national law to terminate the employment contracts of employees who have reached a particular age), individual workers may continue to work for their employer on a different contractual basis, or otherwise remain active participants in the labour market. Therefore, even if Article 25 is interpreted by reference to the provisions of Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter as applying to individuals who have reached or who are nearing ‘retirement age’, this does not necessarily provide a clear definition of the group of persons whose rights are protected by Article 25. As a result, the personal scope of Article 25 remains open to interpretation—it remains to be seen which age groups will be classified by EU and national courts as being ‘elderly’. However, the importance of the rights protected by Article 25 suggests that its scope of application should be given a wide interpretation. Its provisions appear to be capable of covering both the rights of older persons who have retired and also those of older persons who remain active on the labour market: there is nothing in the text of Article 25 that limits its scope to persons who have left employment or who have otherwise ‘retired’. Furthermore, Article 25 would appear to protect all older persons and not just those in particular ‘high-risk’ categories. Its provisions protect the rights of older people to enjoy both a dignified and an autonomous existence: therefore,

55 Georgantzi, ‘The European Union’s Approach towards Ageism’ (n 51). 56 C Barnard, ‘The “Opt-Out” for the UK and Poland from the Charter of Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?’ in S Griller and J Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Vienna, Springer, 2008) 257–83, 260–61.

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the personal scope of Article 25 would appear to cover both older persons who are dependent upon others for care and support and also those who are able to lead an active, autonomous and self-sufficient existence.57 The scope of Article 25 is also not restricted to citizens of the EU or to those exercising EU free movement rights, unlike certain other Charter rights. Instead, it appears to apply to all older persons who may be subject to EU law or otherwise affected by EU measures. This may include older persons residing outside the territory of the EU, depending on the territorial scope that is given to the provisions of the Charter in general. The rights of the ‘future elderly’, ie younger age groups who will in the future near retirement age, may also receive protection under Article 25.58 Turning to the material scope of Article 25, its text commits the EU to respecting the dignity of older people, their right to enjoy an autonomous existence, and their entitlement to participate in the social and cultural life of their communities. By extension, access to health care, housing, pension rights and other forms of social support must come within its scope, insofar as this is necessary to enable older persons to enjoy a dignified, autonomous and participative existence.59 The explanation of Article 25 set out in [2007] OJ C303 makes it clear that its provisions draw upon Article 23 of the revised ESC and Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter. Their provisions establish that older persons are entitled as of right to receive sufficient social protection in the form of pensions, health care, housing and other resources where this is necessary to meet their needs. As a result, the material scope of Article 25 would seem to extend to cover the right of older persons to obtain social and medical care where this is necessary to maintain their dignity and autonomy.60 Any other interpretation would be difficult to reconcile with the relationship between Article 25 and other provisions of the Charter, and its wide-ranging commitment to protecting the fundamental rights of older persons.61 It is less clear whether the material scope of Article 25 covers the area of employment and occupation. Its provisions refer to ‘participation in social and cultural life’, not to participation in the labour market. Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has as yet made no reference in its growing case law on age discrimination in employment and occupation to the provisions of Article 25, choosing instead to refer to the guarantee of non-discrimination on the ground of age set out in Article 21.62 However, age discrimination in employment and occupation can have a negative impact on the rights of older people to enjoy a dignified and autonomous existence.63 Furthermore, in his Opinion in the case of Coleman v Attridge Law, Maduro AG recognised the link that exists between discrimination in employment and occupation and individual dignity: he stated that

57 FRA, ‘Shifting Perceptions: Towards a Rights-based Approach to Ageing’, FRA Fundamental Rights Report 2018, 15–16. 58 For analysis of the concept of the ‘future elderly’, see DP Goldman et al, ‘Consequences of Health Trends and Medical Innovation for the Elderly of the Future’ (2005) Health Affairs, 26 September 2006, pp W5-R3–W5-R15. 59 The General Court has accepted that pension entitlements may come within the scope of Art 25: see Case T-531/14, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council, Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2017. 60 Mordini has commented that the wording of Art 25 ‘rather parsimoniously’ rephrases that of Art 23 of the ESC: see E Mordini, Ageing and Invisibility (Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2010) 97. 61 In general, De Hert and Eugenio make the argument that the rights of older persons to social protection are an integral element of their fundamental rights taken as a whole: see (n 21). 62 Kücükdeveci (n 1) [22]. 63 For an analysis of how prohibiting age discrimination in the workplace helps to uphold the dignity and autonomy of older persons, see C O’Cinneide, Age Discrimination and European Law, Thematic Report of the European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field (Brussels, European Commission/MPG, 2005).



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EU anti-discrimination law is designed to ‘protect, in field of employment and occupation, people belonging to suspect classifications and to ensure that their dignity and autonomy is not compromised either by obvious and immediate or subtle and less obvious discrimination’.64 As such, a strong case can be made that the treatment of older workers in employment and occupation should be viewed as coming within the material scope of Article 25. In this and other respects, its provisions would appear to overlap with and complement the right to non-discrimination set out in Article 21.65

III.  Specific Provisions 25.43 The text of Article 25 commits the EU to respecting the rights of the elderly ‘to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life’. It therefore defines these rights as consisting of three specific elements: a) the right to a dignified existence; b) the right to an independent and autonomous existence; and c) the right to participate in social and cultural life. All three elements can be regarded as being mutually dependent and inter-linked: respect for the human dignity of older persons entails recognition of their entitlement to lead an autonomous life and to participate in social and cultural life, and vice versa. The rights set out in Article 25 would appear to give rise to a mixture of both negative and 25.44 positive obligations. EU legislation, acts of the EU institutions or national measures which give effect to EU law should not subject older people to treatment which is contrary to human dignity, or which denies them their right to lead an autonomous existence, or which discriminates against them when it comes to their participation in social and cultural life. Similarly, Article 25 requires EU law (along with national implementing measures) to respect the rights of older persons to social protection and health care. These entitlements are a necessary corollary of the right of older persons to a dignified and autonomous existence: this ‘social’ dimension of the rights of the elderly is recognised by the provisions of Article 23 ESC and Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter, which are the ‘sources’ of Article 25 and therefore should be taken into account in interpreting its provisions. Older people may also be entitled to be protected against discrimination, exploitation and elder abuse by third parties in contexts where the behaviour of private actors is subject to regulation by the EU. The EU has at present limited competency when it comes to regulating the provision of health 25.45 and social care services to the elderly. Similarly, EU law plays a limited role in protecting older persons against elder abuse and other forms of degrading treatment, or in ensuring that they are not arbitrarily or unjustifiably deprived of their autonomy and capacity to manage their own lives. However, as discussed in section A above, various aspects of EU law can nevertheless affect the lives of older persons in a variety of different ways. The provisions of Article 25 will therefore be potentially in play whenever EU law or national implementing legislation impacts upon the rights of older people to be protected against discrimination, exploitation and abuse, to enjoy access to adequate social protection and health care, and to participate with dignity and autonomy in the wider social and cultural life of their society.

64 Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law [2008] ECR I-5603. 65 In Mangold (n 1), the CJEU held that the prohibition on age discrimination in employment and occupation set out in Directive 2000/78/EC constituted an ‘aspect’ of a more general principle of equal treatment. See also the subsequent decision of the CJEU in Kücükdeveci (n 1).

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IV.  Limitations and Derogations As discussed above, the explanation of Article 52(5) set out in [2007] OJ C303 includes 25.46 Article 25 as an example of a ‘principle’. As such, according to the provisions of Article 52(5), the provisions of Article 25 are likely to be ‘judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.’ This will inevitably limit the legal impact of Article 25, as it means that its provisions cannot be relied upon to establish the existence of subjective individual rights. However, legislative and executive acts which infringe upon the rights of the elderly as protected by Article 25 will have to be shown to be objectively justified, in line with the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter, as the General Court concluded in Sotiropoulou and Others v Council.66

V. Remedies If Article 25 is interpreted as setting out a principle of EU law in line with the provisions of 25.47 Article 52(5), then the appropriate remedy for a failure to respect the rights of the elderly will usually take the form of a finding by a European or national court that the legislative or executive act in question is unlawful. This in turn will lead to the measure in question being disapplied or set aside. Alternatively, in situations where appropriate measures have not been taken to give effect to the right of the elderly, then the courts may be prepared to order that remedial measures be taken within the framework of existing EU legislation in line with the judgment of the CJEU in the case of Test-Achats.67

E. Evaluation The inclusion of Article 25 in the Charter represents an important innovation in the field of 25.48 EU human rights law. The provisions of Article 25 draw upon Article 23 ESC and Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Charter in implicitly recognising the vulnerable position of many older people and committing the EU to respecting their rights to a dignified and independent life and to participate in the social and cultural life of their communities. Article 25 thus reflects an emerging international consensus that the rights of older persons should be explicitly recognised in law.68 It affirms the importance and specific nature of these rights, and establishes that respect for these rights constitutes a fundamental principle of EU law. However, the extent to which EU law has a direct impact upon the lives of older persons is 25.49 limited. Furthermore, the scope and content of Article 25 have yet to be clarified. As discussed above, there is very little international human rights jurisprudence defining what is required to give effect to the rights of the elderly—with the exception of the case law of the European Committee on Social Rights in relation to Article 23 ESC. As yet, the CJEU has not referred to Article 25, while only two cases referencing Article 25 have reached the General Court—both of which were dismissed by the Court.69 Article 25 also rarely features in academic commentary on the Charter.

66 Case T-531/14, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council, Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2017, [88]–[90]. 67 Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v Conseil des ministres [2011] 2 CMLR 38. 68 See in general A Numhauser-Henning (ed), Elder Law: Evolving European Perspectives (Cheltenham, Elgar, 2017). 69 Case T-531/14, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council, Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2017; Case T-560/15 P, LM v European Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 6 July 2016.



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25.50

25.51

25.52

25.53 25.54

However, Article 25’s affirmation of the rights of older people is nevertheless potentially of great significance. Its provisions are relevant whenever EU law affects the provision of medical and social services to older people, regulates their access to the labour market, impacts upon their freedom of movement or social security entitlements, or otherwise impacts upon their rights to a dignified existence. For example, Article 25 should arguably be taken into account when measures such as Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare are interpreted and given effect by EU and national courts.70 Even though the CJEU has not as yet made reference to Article 25 in its case law on the age discrimination provisions of Directive 2000/7/EC, its provisions would also appear to be relevant in this context. Article 25 may also need to be taken into account when it comes to the application of EU rules that relate to the free movement of persons, in particular in relation to the rights of dependent family members, and to the protection of victims of crime. Article 25 should also be a reference point in the evolution of EU law and policy in the field of social security, anti-discrimination law, the regulation of health care and other elements of the EU’s developing social agenda—including those covered by the European Pillar of Social Rights.71 Its provisions should also be taken into account in the development of relevant technical standards through the Open Method of Co-ordination,72 the framing of EU action plans such as the European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing,73 and the framing of other ‘soft law’ standards at the EU level. In this respect, FRA have highlighted the particular importance of the monitoring and coordination process of the European Semester, and noted the potential of this mechanism to encourage a greater focus at national level on the rights guaranteed by Article 25.74 Two specific areas should be mentioned, where Article 25 may yet play a particularly significant role—notwithstanding its largely dormant status until now. First of all, it is worth noting that EU measures that relate to economic affairs and the integration of the internal market should also comply with the provisions of Article 25. As a consequence, EU measures which in effect require member states to adopt austerity measures may not be compliant with the requirements of Article 25, insofar as they have the effect of limiting access by older people to forms of health care and social support (including pension entitlements) that they require to enjoy a dignified and autonomous existence. The General Court in Sotiropoulou and Others v Council of the European Union dismissed a challenge based on Article 25 to a Decision adopted under the excessive deficit mechanism established by Article 126 TFEU relating to Greece. The claimant alleged that the decision had resulted in a substantial erosion of pension entitlements contrary to the requirements, inter alia of Article 25. However, the Court ruled that, insofar as a causal link existed between the Decision under review and the pension cuts introduced by the Greek government, the cuts were objectively

70 States may choose to invoke the provisions of Art 25 in order to justify derogations from the requirements of EU law relating to public procurement or the free movement of services, in order to protect their existing systems of providing medical and social care to older persons. 71 FRA, ‘Shifting Perceptions: Towards a Rights-based Approach to Ageing’, FRA Fundamental Rights Report 2018, 19–20. 72 O De Schutter, ‘The Implementation of Fundamental Right Through the Open Method of Co-ordination’, in O De Schutter and S Deakin (eds), Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe? (Brussels, Bruylant, 2005) 279–342. 73 See Communication of the European Commission, Taking Forward The Strategic Implementation Plan Of The European Innovation Partnership On Active And Healthy Ageing COM (2012) 83 final, Brussels. 74 FRA, ‘Shifting Perceptions: Towards a Rights-based Approach to Ageing’, FRA Fundamental Rights Report 2018, 18–19.

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justified in the interests of ensuring fiscal discipline within the eurozone.75 It remains to be seen how similar attempts to invoke Article 25 in this context will fare in the future. The second area of particular interest concerns those aspects of EU law and policy that relate 25.55 to the impact of Covid-19 virus and the economic crisis that followed the ‘lockdowns’ of 2020. As discussed in paragraph 25.05 above, the particular impact of the virus upon older people means that the requirements of Article 25 may have particular ‘bite’ when it comes to the harmonisation of cross-border health measures under the umbrella of Article 168(5) TFEU, along with the wide range of financial, economic and health care co-ordination measures subsequently been adopted by the EU to address the economic aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis. More generally, as Georgantzi has argued in a comprehensive critique of EU law and policy as 25.56 it relates to older people, ‘the EU is deeply conscious of population ageing but is less concerned with individual ageing and the human rights challenges related to ageing’.76 As she notes, ‘the EU needs to set up more cohesive and effective mechanisms to rectify the structural inequalities and prejudicial disadvantages that serve to exclude older people. A human rights-based approach is particularly well suited to promoting equality and dignity in old age’. Article 25 provides a potential locus for the development of such an approach. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen whether this potential will ever come to fruition.





75 Case

T-531/14, Sotiropoulou and Others v Council, Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2017, [88]–[89]. European Union’s Approach towards Ageism’ (n 51), 637–38.

76 Georgantzi, ‘The

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Article 26 Article 26 Integration of Persons with Disabilities The Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 26 The principle set out in this Article is based on Article 15 of the European Social Charter and also draws on point 26 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.

Select Bibliography L Clements, ‘Disability, dignity and the cri de coeur’ (2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 675. C Cojocarlu, ‘Handicapping rules: the overly restrictive application of admissibility criteria by the European Court of Human Rights to complaints concerning disabled persons’ (2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 686. Council of Europe ‘Human Rights: A Reality for All’ Disability Strategy 2017–2023’ (Council of Europe, March 2017). European Commission, ‘Definitions of disability in Europe: A comparative analysis’ (2002). European Commission Communication, ‘European Disability Strategy 2010–20: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe’ COM (2010) 636 final. EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘The right to political participation for persons with disabilities: human rights indicators’, May 2014. T Hammarberg, ‘Disability rights: from charity to equality’ (2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 638. C O’Brien, ‘Union Citizenship and Disability: Restricted Access to Equality Rights and the Attitudinal Model of Disability’ in D Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). —— ‘Equality’s False Summits: New Varieties of Disability Discrimination, ‘Excessive’ Equal Treatment and Economically Constricted Horizons’ (2011) 36(1) European Law Review 26. UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report of the European Union, CRPD/C/EU/CO/1, 2 October 2015. L Waddington, ‘Saying All the Right Things and Still Getting it Wrong: The Court of Justice’s Definition of Disability and Non-Discrimination Law’ (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 4, 576. A Ward, ‘The Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang?’ (2018) 20 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 32.

A.  Field of Application of Article 26 The declaratory tone of this provision—for recognition and respect—suggests that it creates 26.01 more an informative principle than actionable right. A right to benefit from measures ‘designed to

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

ensure … independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community’ may be a right to access whichever measures exist, but not necessarily a right to the creation of such measures where none exist. As it is the Union, rather than Member States, that is required to recognise and respect the right, this provision may indicate an avenue of action against Union institutions where Union action has interfered with a disabled person’s ability to avail themselves of national measures. Article 26 may thus be subject to a narrow interpretation as a rule of non-interference, binding only the Union, precluding its preventing an individual from benefitting from national integration measures. 26.02 A more expansive reading could style the Union’s recognition and respect as including enforcement at a domestic level. This would accord with the values and principles enshrined in the Treaties and with the Union’s obligations under international law, including the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (explored further in section C)—to which the Union is a signatory. The potential of Article 26 to increase the disability related activities of the Union and interventions of the ECJ, while ostensibly staying within Union competence,1 may lie in using the provision as an interpretative tool for the UNCRPD, which is now part of Union law. However, the CJEU has indicated that the provision may only bite in combination with other measures; in Glatzel,2 the Court found that ‘the principle enshrined’ in Article 26 ‘does not require the EU legislature to adopt any specific measure’. Rather, to be ‘fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in European Union or national law’. While finding that Article 26 ‘cannot by itself confer on individuals a subjective right which they may invoke as such’,3 that does not preclude, and even suggests, that it can be used in tandem with other provisions, perhaps strengthening, or requiring a disability-rights based interpretation of, actionable rights. 26.03 Pre-existing Union competence relating to Article 26 CFR includes a general interest in non-discrimination, expressed in Treaty affirmations—eg that the founding values of the Union include equality,4 and that the Union is committed to combatting discrimination,5 specifically including discrimination on the grounds of disability when defining and implementing Union policies and activities.6 Union institutions are empowered to take action to combat such discrimination ‘within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by the Union’.7 26.04 The Charter does not clearly alter the limits of those conferred powers for Union action in non-discrimination law, which currently operates in the economic sphere of the internal market— predominantly employment and occupation, the only area in which disability discrimination has been prohibited by Union secondary law.8 It is possible that the Article 26 phrase ‘occupational integration’ may signify a commitment to more positive duties than non-discrimination. In terms of transforming social structures, integration could open the way for thinking more creatively about accommodating measures beyond the workplace that contribute to occupational integration—such as transport, unemployment assistance and banking services—so ostensibly

1 Given the constraints of the Charter at Art 51(2): the Charter ‘does not establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties’. 2 Case C-356/12 Glatzel EU:C:2014:350. 3 Ibid, 78. 4 TEU Art 2. 5 TEU Art 3(3). 6 TFEU Art 10. 7 TFEU Art 19(1). 8 Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16.

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connected with the limited area of conferred competence. Such extension might be modelled upon the reach of measures dealing with accessibility. Directive 2016/21029 requires public sector bodies to make their websites and mobile 26.05 applications accessible, and the new Accessibility Act (Directive 2019/882)10 sets accessibility requirements for a broader range of goods and services in the internal market—computer hardware and operating systems, self-service terminals; e-readers and software; electronic communications; audiovisual media services; electronic transport services; banking services; and e-commerce services. The preamble specifically notes that the Directive is a measure to ‘promote the application of ’, inter alia, Article 26 of the Charter, stating that it ‘seeks to ensure full respect for the rights of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community’.11 Aside from these directly regulating measures, there are many and varied Union legal instruments12 that incorporate some reference to accessibility (such as Directive 2004/18 on public procurement),13 albeit usually briefly and tangentially. A similarly thematically broad approach to discrimination as that taken with accessibility might 26.06 strengthen support for the still much-debated proposal14 to extend the non-discrimination rights outlined in the Framework Directive beyond the sphere of employment and occupation, to cover goods and services, bringing disability (and age, religion and sexual orientation) discrimination protection more in line with that offered on the grounds of sex15 and race.16 The emphasis on integration in Article 26 suggests something different and additional to the 26.07 protection from discrimination already provided for in Article 21. It may indicate a positive construction of equality rights, such as that adopted in parts of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).17 Integration may have more in common with the Union value of ‘respect for human dignity’,18 and the commitment to combat social exclusion.19 There are no pre-existing general provisions in EU law on the integration of persons with disabilities; the reference to social integration and participation in life of the community may imply an ambition towards broader social objectives than have yet been adopted, or it may be a deliberately generic and abstract principle of non-interference.

9 Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of the websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies [2016] OJ L 327/1. 10 Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services [2019] OJ L 151/70. 11 Ibid, Recital (103). 12 Listed in the Appendix to Annex II to Council Decision (2010/48/EC) ‘concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ [2010] OJ L23/57–60. 13 Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts ([2004] OJ L134/114); Directive 2007/66/EC amending Council Directives 89/665/ EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts ([2007] OJ L335/31). 14 Introduced in 2008, and still the subject of Council discussions: Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation—Progress Report’, 2008/0140(CNS), 9567/19, Brussels, 24 May 2019. 15 Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L373. 16 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180. 17 F Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Conception of Rights’ (2008) 12 (2) International Journal of Human Rights 261. 18 TEU Art 2. 19 TEU Art 3(3).



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B.  Interrelationship of Article 26 with Other Provisions of the Charter 26.08 The most obviously connected provision is Article 21 on non-discrimination. It lists example grounds on which ‘any’ discrimination shall be prohibited, of which disability is one. However, for the purposes of defining Article 26, the rather wide-reaching formulation of Article 21 is unlikely to take us further than consideration of the EU’s pre-existing non-discrimination provisions. The text of explanations for Article 21 notes that this provision ‘draws on Article 13 of the EC Treaty, Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine as regards genetic heritage’, also noting that Article 21 must apply in compliance with Article 14 ECHR—insofar as the rights correspond. As explored below in section C, Article 14 ECHR is not an autonomous right and is engaged only when another element of the ECHR is at issue. Article 13 EC—now Article 19 TFEU—allows the Council to take action to combat discrimination, but unanimity, and consent of the European Parliament are required, and such action should not prejudice other Treaty provisions and must fall ‘within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union’. 26.09 Two points are worth making here—first that despite suggestions that Article 21 might underline the ‘constitutional status’ of the equality principle,20 and so perhaps the status of relevant directives as between private parties,21 rights in the Charter are subject to significant limitations. Secondly, the fact that Article 19 TFEU provides avenues of legislative action is no guarantee that they will be utilised. The tortuous journey followed by the proposal for a goods and services framework equality Directive22 demonstrates the challenges in reaching unanimity on matters of equality, especially with regard to disability and reasonable accommodation.23 It seems unlikely that Article 19 TFEU will be a springboard for much by way of legislative action in the near future. 26.10 The UN CRPD can be used as a cipher to indicate which other rights in the Charter are connected to Article 26, as the Convention provides a detailed manifesto for the integration of persons with disabilities.24 Indeed, the very ‘purpose’ of the Convention, as defined in Article 1, is to offer a disability specific perspective on all human rights—or ‘to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity’. Even before looking any further into the Convention a clear connection with the concept of dignity already emerges—underlined by the first of the ‘general principles’ of the Convention in Article 3: ‘Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons’. 26.11 Mapping this back onto the Charter it would seem that Article 26 must be connected to Article 1, which states that dignity is ‘inviolable’ and ‘must be respected and protected’. Indeed, the Commission has cited Article 1 alongside Articles 26 and 21 as indicative of a strong mandate

20 D Schiek, ‘The ECJ Decision in Mangold: A Further Twist on Effects of Directives and Constitutional Relevance of Community Equality Legislation’ (2006) 35 Industrial Law Journal 329; A Wiesbrock, ‘Case Note—Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci’ [2010] 11(5) German Law Journal 539. 21 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci v Swedex [2010] ECR I-00365. 22 Above, n 14, and discussed below, in section D.I. Progress can be charted in the Council of ministers of the EU document register: www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/int?lang=EN&typ=ADV. 23 Ibid. 24 The preamble expresses concern that ‘persons with disabilities continue to face barriers in their participation as equal members of society’. Recital (k).

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to ‘improve the social and economic situation of persons with disabilities’.25 However, in neither the Charter nor the Convention is dignity clearly defined, and there is the risk that it can mean both everything and nothing—Clements notes the ‘Delphic’ tendency of judgments that fail to define ‘indignity’,26 while dignity has been variously slammed as a ‘useless’27 and ‘stupid’28 concept. Hence Schopenhauer’s criticism, cited by Rosen, that dignity is the ‘shibboleth of all empty headed moralists’,29 a feel-good motif so all-encompassing as to be too easily malleable; for instance, arguments both for and against a right to die employ dignity-based reasoning.30 But dignity is clearly playing an increasing role in human rights protection,31 and its 26.12 prominent roles in the Charter as both a stand-alone right, and as an overlapping one with articles such as Article 26, mean that we should try to excavate some meaningful guidance from it. The Convention’s slightly longer provision may give some definitional content to the dignity principle—suggesting that autonomy and independence be prioritised, which chimes with the wording of Article 26 of the CFR. By implication, this suggests that indignity is created through conditions that de-autonomise or disempower, and which promote dependence. This reading could be congruent with the social model of disability,32 tying indignity to disabling environments and conditions, given the assertion of the European Parliament that ‘the EU approach acknowledges disability as a social construction’.33 Where autonomy and dignity crop up in human rights litigation they are typically invoked 26.13 through the right to private and family life—ie Article 8 ECHR.34 So Article 7 CFR, the Charter’s expression of the right to respect for private and family life, is also connected to Article 26 CFR. Privacy is key to questions of dignity, for example in the issue of personal care and hygiene,35 while the family is a fundamental vehicle for integration into society. Both have been jeopardised by methods of social/physical exclusion historically applied to disabled persons. Institutionalisation and poor care arrangements can result in privacy being less valued, can sever family ties, and prevent their formation. In precluding relationships that could lead to marriage/procreation, it is not only Article 7 CFR potentially being infringed, but also Article 9 CFR, on the right to marry and found a family. Even more intrusive and sinister violations of that right are posed by sterilisation practices, to which disabled people are historically more vulnerable, the implications of which are explored in more detail in section C. A key mechanism for promoting dignity, social inclusion and independent living is the provision 26.14 of welfare benefits and social care support, since such provision avoids institutionalisation and/or poverty. Disabled people are more likely to be in receipt of some sort of welfare provision such as income replacement benefits, benefits to account for extra costs created by disability,

25 Commission Communication, ‘Europe Disability Strategy 2010-20: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe’ COM (2010) 636 final. 26 L Clements, ‘Disability, dignity and the cri de coeur’ (2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 675. 27 R Macklin, ‘Dignity is a useless concept’ Editorial (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 1419. 28 S Pinker, ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’ The New Republic, 28 May, 2008. 29 M Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2012). 30 Eg JD Velleman, ‘Against the Right to Die’ (1992) 17 (6) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 665; R Cohen-Almagor, ‘The Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics and Law’ (2008) Health Law and Policy 2. 31 As noted by C McCrudden, who refers in particular to its judicial uses: ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655. 32 As outlined in M Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory To Practice (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996). 33 Research Report for the European Parliament, DG Internal Policies, ‘The Mobility and Integration of People with Disabilities into the Labour Market’ IP/A/EMPL/ST/2009-09 October 2010, available at www.iza.org/en/webcontent/ publications/reports/report_pdfs/iza_report_29.pdf, p 15. 34 R (Burke) v General Medical Council (GMC) [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 [35]; R (on the application of McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2011] UKSC 33; Napier v Scottish Ministers [2002] UKHRR 308. 35 As in the McDonald and Napier cases, ibid.



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care benefits and social services. Therefore Article 34 on social security and social assistance is linked to Article 26 CFR, even though the former’s list of social security risks does not include disability. Article 34 is essentially another ‘recognition and respect’ article, so might only offer require the Union’s to not interfere with nationally provided rights. However, even that narrow reading could prove significant should Union policies encouraging austerity and active labour market measures threaten welfare provision for disabled people, as claimed by the Spanish Committee of Representatives of People with Disabilities, quoted in the European Parliament.36 The disproportionate impact of restrictive welfare policies upon disabled persons is explored in more detail in section D.III. 26.15 Cross border social security coordination also makes it into Article 34, in subsection (2), stating that ‘everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices’. This is particularly pertinent to Article 26 CFR since it describes an area in which the Union has quite clear competence—welfare in the context of cross-border mobility—and one in which disabled persons are still at a clear disadvantage, especially if they are unable to participate in ‘the normal labour market’.37 Section D.I considers in more detail the tendency of social security coordination measures to exclude disabled persons from fully realising mobility rights. 26.16 Dignity also connects Article 26 to Article 25 on the rights of the elderly—‘The Union recognises and respects the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life’. Article 25 echoes Article 26 in the non-interference formulation— recognition and respect—and the emphasis upon social inclusion through participation and independence. Moreover, there are evident overlaps between the categories ‘elderly’ and ‘persons with disabilities’; age can cause the majority of citizens to experience disabling conditions. Indeed, it has been argued that the categories of disabled/non-disabled are artificially discrete, since disability is an experience in and out of which many of us will dip throughout the life course.38 Those of working age on incapacity benefits (which may be related to disability) tend to be, at least in the UK, disproportionately at the upper end of working age,39 while sickness and disability are likely to increase post-working age. 26.17 Given the similarity of the provisions, the differences between the explanatory notes for Articles 25 and 26 is interesting. The Article 25 notes state that ‘Of course, participation in social and cultural life also covers participation in political life.’ But this is not mentioned in the Article 26 notes, even though many disabled persons are indirectly politically excluded, or even directly and explicitly excluded (eg where mental capacity may be at issue). In a debate of the Human Rights Council on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights argued that ‘persons with disabilities continued to encounter a number of legal, physical and communication barriers in the exercise of their rights under Article 29 of the CRPD’40—which requires state parties to guarantee equal participation for disabled people in 36 Parliamentary questions 3 December 2012 E-010988-12, Raül Romeva I Rueda. 37 Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573 [24]. 38 A Silvers, ‘On the possibility and desirability of constructing a neutral conception of disability’ (2003) 24(6) Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics 471; C O’Brien, ‘Confronting the care penalty: the case for extending reasonable adjustment rights along the disability/care continuum’ (2012) 34(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 5. 39 ‘… nearly 49 per cent of contributory only ESA customers in the WRAG are aged 50 to 64’: UK Department for Work and Pensions, Equality Impact Assessment ‘Time limiting contributory Employment and Support Allowance to one year for those in the work-related activity group’ October 2011, para 32. 40 Navi Pillay in the Fourth annual interactive debate of the Human Rights Council on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Interactive debate on participation of persons with disabilities in political and public life 1 March 2012, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disability/Pages/politicalpubliclife.aspx.

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political and public life. The choice to mention political participation in the Article 25 notes, but not the Article 26 notes, could be problematic. Political exclusion experienced by the elderly may be connected to disability-related questions of mental capacity, due to dementia-related conditions.41 The question of capacity leads us to connections between Article 26 and the Articles 39 and 40 rights to vote and stand in European Parliament elections and municipal elections. But these European political rights can and are circumscribed on a fragmented, national basis, typically following the rules for national enfranchisement, such as in Lithuania where a court order declaring an individual incapable renders them ineligible to vote in national, municipal or European elections.42 In their 2010 report, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights documented the variety of approaches taken in different Member States towards political participation in the context of mental illness and intellectual disability, noting that only a minority of Member States had lifted all restrictions and opted for allowing full participation—in some cases only relatively recently (the Netherlands in 2008,43 the UK in 200644). A larger number of Member States provided for ‘limited’ political participation, while a majority of Member States directly link and limit political participation on the grounds of legal capacity. In their follow up 2014 report the Agency confirmed several restrictions were still in place45—including the German Federal Electoral Law46 which automatically disenfranchises persons whose affairs are managed by a custodian.47 This range of approaches reveals a significant contradiction in the patchwork of instruments relating to disability and social inclusion. O’Mahony48 has pointed to the tensions between the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters 2002, in which mental incapacity features in the same exclusionary clause as criminal conviction, and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which focuses on empowerment—a tension not resolved in the CFR where reference to political inclusion is conspicuously absent in Article 26. A cognate right to enfranchisement is that of access to justice. Both rights work to give individuals a ‘voice’ within their legal and political systems, and create a degree of accountability on the part of state authorities. Both are related to what Thomas Hammarberg terms the move from viewing disabled people as objects of charity, to active subjects.49 In order to benefit from ‘measures designed to ensure independence’ and to enjoy full participation in the life of the community, disabled persons need to have rights as legal actors. Hence they must be able to benefit from Article 47 of the Charter—the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. This connection is underlined by Article 13 of the CRPD on ‘access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others’, which notes the need for procedural and age appropriate accommodations to ensure disabled persons assume an ‘effective role as direct and indirect participants … in all legal proceedings.’

41 ‘The number of people suffering from dementia in Europe is estimated to be 9.9 million’, European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2011 on a European initiative on Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias (2010/2084(INI)) (B). 42 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) ‘The right to political participation of persons with mental health problems and persons with intellectual disabilities’ October 2010, 15. 43 Art 54(2)(b) repealed by constitutional amendment. 44 Electoral Administration Act 2006. 45 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘The right to political participation for persons with disabilities: human rights indicators’, May 2014. 46 See Art 13(2) of the Federal Electoral Law. 47 FRA, above n 42, p 15, and n 45, p 41. 48 C O’Mahony, ‘Council of Europe Recommendation on the Political Participation of Persons with Disabilities’ Disability Law and Policy News (21 November 2011). 49 T Hammarberg, ‘Disability rights: from charity to equality’ (2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 638.



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26.22

The question of standing is crucial for accessing effective remedies, and Article 47 of the CFR has been used in arguments for relaxing the strict approach taken to defining individual concern— the criterion required of private applicants in actions for annulment, actions for failure to act and actions for damages.50 The Court of Justice however, rejected the proposed liberalisation of the standing rules.51 The rather restrictive approach taken to individual concern is likely to be particularly problematic for disabled people, who may face considerable barriers to seeking their own remedies. Cojocarlu has noted the problems faced by third party groups wishing to take action on behalf of disabled persons—especially those with mental impairments—in the context of the standing rules in the ECtHR, especially in states where institutionalisation of the disabled is widely practiced.52 In many cases, as Cojocarlu points out, it is simply inaccurate to assume the existence of an ‘agent’—a supportive relative or guardian, who can take action. Many individuals are left effectively unprotected unless NGOs were to be granted standing. It is arguable that the Court should have stronger regard for Article 47 CFR when deciding standing questions, especially in cases that trigger Article 26.

C.  Sources of Article 26 Rights I. ECHR 26.23 There are no disability-specific provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights, or indeed provisions on social integration. The conceptually closest provision is the nondiscrimination provision—Article 14—which provides that ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’, disability constituting one such ‘other status’.53 Article 14 is clearly a parasitic provision, describing how other Convention rights should be protected, so is only engaged once another Convention right is at issue—which is similar to how the ECJ characterised Article 26 CFR in Glatzel. Article 1, Protocol 12 of the ECHR is a free-standing non-discrimination provision, applicable 26.24 to ‘the enjoyment of any right set forth by law’. Again, disability is not specifically mentioned, but would constitute one ‘other status’. But any influence of Article 1, Protocol 12 over Article 26 CFR is limited by its non-universal applicability. Ten EU Member States have signed and ratified the Protocol,54 11 have signed but not ratified,55 and six have neither signed

50 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR II-2365 [25]; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR I-6677 [2]. 51 See page 30 of the European Parliament and DG Internal Policies study on locus standi: ‘Standing up for your rights in Europe: A comparative study on legal standing (locus standi) before the EU and Member States’ Courts’ 2012, www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL-JURI_ET(2012)462478. 52 C Cojocarlu ‘Handicapping rules: the overly restrictive application of admissibility criteria by the European Court of Human Rights to complaints concerning disabled persons’ (2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 686. 53 J Stavert, ‘Case Comment: Glor v Switzerland: Article 14 ECHR, disability and non-discrimination’ (2010) 14(1) Edinburgh Law Review 141. 54 Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain. See: ‘Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 177: Protocol No 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, Council of Europe, www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/177/ signatures?p_auth=bozrCfp0. 55 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia.

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nor ratified it.56 It remains to be seen what status, if any, such non-universal protocols will have in EU law following the accession of the EU to the ECHR in its own right. The integration principle in Article 26 is also related private life as in Article 8 ECHR, especially 26.25 given the reference to independence. The particular relevance of Article 8 in a disability context has been explored in UK cases, such as those dealing with welfare benefits,57 or social care provision— decisions that impact upon a person’s ability to live independently, to exercise autonomy, and to enjoy their private life with dignity. Clements has noted that there seems to be a difference in weight attributed to Article 8 in cases where some degree of dependence is created by disability, as compared to its having been created by imprisonment, suggesting that greater obligations are recognised in the latter.58 This argument is fuelled by the different outcomes of the UK cases McDonald59 and Napier.60 In McDonald, the council had withdrawn assistance to help the claimant to get to the toilet during the night, and had decided that provision of incontinence pads was a better-value option. This was problematic for a number of reasons—not least that Ms McDonald was not actually incontinent, but needed physical assistance to mobilise—and so the decision created ‘enforced incontinence’. The Supreme Court found in favour of the council, but Baroness Hale in a strong dissenting opinion noted that a civilised society should not ‘oblige people who can control their bodily functions to behave as if they cannot do so, unless they themselves find this the more convenient course’—adding that the UK was ‘I still believe, a civilized society’.61 However, the majority instead found that either Article 8 had not been engaged, or if it had, any interference was ‘clearly’ justified under Article 8(2), as the council’s decision was a ‘proportionate means of reaching a legitimate aim’,62 with Lord Brown expressing agreement with the reasoning of Rix LJ in the Court of Appeal that the council did not demonstrate a ‘lack of respect’ for McDonald’s dignity, but just wanted to balance responsibilities with budgetary concerns.63 Such budgetary concerns are of course set to get stronger with Europe-wide public spending restraint, so that potentially pricey human rights concerns, including those falling within Article 26 CFR, may be increasingly outweighed. The judicial inclination to empathise with the council’s difficulty—and suggestion that 26.26 Article 8 can only be engaged through an intentional want of respect for the rights contained within it, might contrast with the attitude taken in Napier. There, a prisoner complained about the practice of expecting prisoners whose cells did not contain flush toilets to urinate in a bottle and defecate in a chamber pot, and then emptying them (‘slopping out’). In the Scottish Outer House Court of Session, the judge found that these conditions diminished his human dignity sufficiently seriously to infringe Article 8.64 Clements has suggested that the different approaches cannot simply be explained through reference to the imposition of a greater set of obligations to detainees, suggesting that both were effectively detained, albeit one ‘through misdemeanour, the other through age’,65 and points to a way of thinking that reduces the threshold for dignity violations for disabled people—who, ‘unlike able bodied people (for whom access to a flush

56 Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden. 57 Daly & Ors, R (on the application of) (formerly known as MA and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 58. 58 Clements, above, n 26. 59 R (on the application of McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2011] UKSC 33. 60 Napier v Scottish Ministers [2002] UKHRR 308. 61 Above, n 59, 79. 62 Ibid, 21. 63 R (on the application of Elaine McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2010] EWCA Civ 1109 [66]. 64 Above, n 60. 65 Above, n 26, 685.



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toilet is an essential ‘dignity’ requirement) … are different and untroubled by pads and special sheeting’.66 26.27 The combination of different duties of care, and different standards of dignity results in a certain fatalism, accepting disability as a given. This entails adopting a medical model since the courts do not treat society as responsible for disability, (though in McDonald we see a classic case of the social construction of disability through enforced incontinence), and so are wary of imposing positive obligations to mitigate the disability. Although Article 8 feeds into a construction of independent living, the concept at the centre of Article 26, it is not clear what effects that influence is likely to exert, given apparent expectations that some degrees of dignity and independence are sacrificed just as a fact of disability. 26.28 As issues of access to justice overlap with the promotion of integration of persons with disabilities, Article 6 ECHR must be engaged in any discussion of Article 26 CFR. A recent case in the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates that Article 6 is a crucial gateway right; in Gauer et autres v France,67 failing to file an application within a given time limit meant that the human rights at issue were not considered—the case being declared inadmissible both domestically, and then at the ECtHR itself. The case involved allegations of forced sterilisation of persons with mental impairments. During the investigation it was claimed that the alleged victims had not been represented, that no guardian was designated, and a request to allow a third party advocacy group Association de Défense des Handicapés de l’Yonne to act on behalf of the plaintiffs had been refused. The investigation chamber of the appeal court of Paris concluded that there was to be no charge against the suspects because ‘it is extremely difficult for disabled citizens to parent’.68 The relevant deadlines made the appeal against this outcome inadmissible. 26.29 This case also flags up another key convention right in the context of disability—the Article 12 ECHR right to marry and found a family—rights recognised as particularly vulnerable in the context of disability in the UNCRPD. Aspects of Articles 12 and 8 ECHR are combined in Article 23 CRPD, which specifically requires at (c) that ‘Persons with disabilities, including children, retain their fertility on an equal basis with others.’ An amicus brief submitted by national human rights institutions, drawing heavily upon the UNCRPD and raising the particular problems posed by sterilisation, concluded by stating that the Gauer case provided the ECtHR ‘with an opportunity to embed the human rights of persons with disabilities … within the system for human rights protection elaborated under the ECHR’.69 Notwithstanding the loss of this opportunity through a (possibly Article 6 engaging) time-limit issue, the case does make clear the connections between full integration of disabled persons and obstacles to Article 12 rights. Another amicus brief noted that sterilisation spoke to a widespread attitude regarding disabled women as unfit parents, attitudes which in turn limit the rights of women with disabilities ‘to experience sexuality, marriage and parenthood on an equal basis with others’.70 The brief also noted that ‘the vulnerability of women to forced sterilisation is heightened where they have a mental disability’.71 These factors are linked to Article 26 CFR, since the ability to found a family, and to establish relationships with partners and children is integral to a broader concept of social

66 Ibid, 680. 67 Gauer et autres v France App no 61521/08 (23 October 2012). 68 ECHR news 22 November 2011: ‘Case Gauer and others v. France (61521/08) forced sterilization of disabled citizens: communicated’ at http://echrnews.wordpress.com/tag/adhy/. 69 Amicus Brief regarding Application No 61521/08 Gauer & Others v France by European Group of National Human Rights Institutions, 16 August 2011, para 53. 70 Submitted jointly by the Center for Reproductive Rights, the European Disability Forum, Interrights, the ­International Disability Alliance and the Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 16 August 2011, para 36. 71 Ibid, para 25.

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integration. The CRPD preamble refers to the family as ‘the natural and fundamental group unit of society’ and declares that ‘persons with disabilities and their family members should receive the necessary protection and assistance to enable families to contribute towards the full and equal enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities’.72 In spite of the demise of official eugenics programmes, the sterilisation of disabled persons 26.30 without consent continues to be a problem—as evident in the Spanish legal sterilisation of disabled women and girls.73 A 2011 UNHCR report on forced sterilisation in Hungary, where typical targets have been racially determined, noted the tightening of conditions for sterilisation so that it shall only be carried out on health grounds ‘if other form of contraception is not possible or not applicable [for] health reasons, and the pregnancy would endanger the life, the physical integrity or the health of the woman, or the future child would probably be disabled.’74 This would likely mean a disproportionate targeting of disabled women, but also raises the questions of marginalising disabled children where parents are not themselves disabled—feeding into other influences upon Article 26 CFR such as instruments on rights of the child, explored below.

II.  UN Treaties Clearly the most directly relevant ‘other’ instrument—European or otherwise—to Article 26 26.31 CFR must be the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It is here suggested that there are two major ways in which the CRPD is a ‘source’ for Article 26—first in interpreting its terms, and secondly providing a key or cipher, as noted above in section B, to the other related rights within the Charter into which a disability-related reading should also be incorporated. It is worth noting, however, that the EU Commission passed up on the chance to give a detailed explanation of the relationship between the CRPD and Article 26 in its initial report75 to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, on the implementation of the Convention in the EU. The 75 page report mentions Article 26 once, and then only to state the text of the provision. For defining the terms of Article 26, we should look to the ‘definition’ offered of disability 26.32 in Article 1 CRPD—that ‘persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.’ This uses the medical notion of ‘impairment’ while invoking the social model of disability by locating the disadvantages of such impairments within barriers in society. The process of identifying the beneficiaries of certain rights has long relied upon the first element of that definition—the identification of impairment, with little regard for societal barriers. The CRPD requires a departure from this medical model of disability. Looking to the other terms in Article 26 CFR, the decision to accede to the UN CRPD might 26.33 help us to define independence, integration and participation, as it includes a list of instruments

72 Recital (x). 73 ‘In Spain, forced sterilisation continues to be performed on women and girls with disabilities, especially those with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities, without their consent or their understanding the purpose of the surgical intervention’; European Disability Forum & CERMI Women’s Foundation, Ending forced sterilisation of women and girls with disabilities, Joint Report, Madrid, (2017), www.edf-feph.org/sites/default/files/edf_forced-sterilisation_8-accessible_5. pdf 28. 74 UNHCR, ‘Hungary: Reports of the forced sterilisation of women 2000-2011’, www.refworld.org/docid/4f9695202. html. 75 EU Commission, ‘Report on the implementation of the Convention in the EU’, Brussels, 5.6.2014, SWD(2014) 182 final, para 9.



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described as ‘in the field of independent living and social inclusion, work and employment’.76 At the top of the list, unsurprisingly, is Directive 2000/78, but the instruments that follow are not focused upon independent living or social inclusion. The list instead containing provisions distantly connected with those concepts, since the instruments mostly deal with VAT, customs duty, and other taxation.77 For example, Directive 2003/96 appears to be listed because Article 5 allows for differentiated rates of taxation under a number of circumstances, one of which is for a set of prescribed ‘uses’: ‘local public passenger transport (including taxis), waste collection, armed forces and public administration, disabled people, ambulances.’ 26.34 A more helpful source for defining independence, integration and participation may be found in the preamble to the CRPD. The promotion of ‘the full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of their human rights and fundamental freedoms and of full participation by persons with disabilities’78 there is a ‘critical need to address the negative impact of poverty on persons with disabilities’.79 Disabled people must also have access to the ‘physical, social, economic and cultural environment, to health and education and to information and communication’.80 26.35 Article 19 of the CRPD, on ‘living independently and being included in the community’, offers some insight into what might be meant by the Article 26 CFR references to ‘independence … and participation in the life of the community’. Article 19 provides that ‘States Parties shall ‘take effective and appropriate measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion and participation in the community’, and then gives three specific instances of what this duty includes—ensuring choice over place of residence and living arrangements; access to ‘in-home, residential and other community support services … to prevent isolation or segregation from the community’; and equal provision of community services and facilities. 26.36 This could be read as a list of narrow requirements precluding forced institutionalisation, and prohibiting discriminatory service provision. But it could create stronger, positive duties—the choice of where to live could include rights to a range of suitably adapted social housing, whereas currently, even in states where institutionalisation is less of an issue, disabled persons can be on interminable housing registers waiting for appropriate accommodation, while trapped in inaccessible housing.81 It could also include a right to a decent quantity of financial assistance to pay rent. The right to assistance to support inclusion in the community could include socialisation assistance—the provision of transport, financial assistance for clubs, internet access and computing equipment—all of which could have implications for welfare cuts, such as the scrapping of the severe disability premium in the UK,82 which had been directed at lone 76 Appendix to Annex II of Council Decision (2010/48/EC) ‘concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’. 77 Eg Commission Regulation (EEC) 2289/83 laying down provisions for the implementation of Articles 70 to 78 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 918/83 establishing a Community system of duty-free arrangements [1983] OJ L220/15; Council Directive 83/181/EEC determining the scope of Article 14(1)(d) of Directive 77/388/EEC as regards exemption from value added tax on the final importation of certain goods [1983] OJ L105/38; Council Regulation (EEC) 918/83 setting up a Community system of reliefs from customs duty [1983] OJ L105/1; Council Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity [2003] OJ L283/51. 78 UN CRPD, Recital (m). 79 Recital (t). 80 Recital (v). 81 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Housing and Disabled People: Britain’s Hidden Crisis’, May 2018, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/housing-and-disabled-people-britains-hidden-crisis-mainreport.pdf. 82 Work and Pensions Committee, Third Report: ‘Universal Credit implementation: meeting the needs of vulnerable claimants’, November 2012, p 108.

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disabled people for, inter alia, the costs of assisted socialisation.83 Finally, the availability of community services and facilities may require a stronger obligation of reasonable adjustment/ accommodation—not just a prohibition on direct discrimination. There are a few other CRPD provisions which relate directly to the Article 26 CFR concept 26.37 of participation—Article 27 on ‘work and employment’ (given the Art 26 CFR reference to occupational integration); Article 29 on participation in political and public life; and Article 30 on participation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport. Article 27 outlines a ‘right to the opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted in a labour market and work environment that is open, inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities’. This may support a range of ideological approaches, including the neo-liberal tendencies of active labour market policies coercing disabled persons into the labour market. However, the phrase ‘work freely chosen or accepted’, and requirement of an ‘open, inclusive and accessible’ work environment suggests that States should promote the fulfilment of potential rather than simply withdraw welfare benefits. Hence statutory duties include the promotion of ‘employment opportunities and career advancement’,84 which is rather at odds with the expectations placed on disabled work-seekers.85 Article 29 connects the concept of participation to political life—not just through full and 26.38 effective opportunities to vote and be elected, but also through full and effective participation in the ‘conduct of public affairs’ through NGOs and political parties, and disability specific representative organisations.86 Community participation in Article 26 CFR may include such political activities; just as it could include the cultural and sporting facilities raised in Article 30, which specifically requires, inter alia, ‘access to places for cultural performances or services, such as theatres, museums, cinemas, libraries and tourism services, and, as far as possible, enjoy access to monuments and sites of national cultural importance.’87 Such social integration is related to personal development, but also to the development of society itself; the right to ‘to develop and utilize their creative, artistic and intellectual potential’ is ‘not only for their own benefit, but also for the enrichment of society’. ‘Community’ is not here a fixed and non-disabled norm into which persons with disabilities are to be admitted or assimilated—community should be dynamic and receptive, supportive of whatever ‘specific cultural and linguistic identity’ may be adopted by persons with disabilities, ‘including sign languages and deaf culture’.88 The CRPD may also be read as giving disability-specific guidance on other CFR provisions. 26.39 Article 29 CRPD may be instructive on the disability dimension of Articles 39 and 40 CFR. They provide only a brief outline of the rights to vote and stand in, respectively, European Parliament and municipal elections, but Article 29 CRPD requires states to ensure ‘that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use’,89 and to protect ‘the right of persons with disabilities to vote by secret ballot in elections and public referendums without intimidation’,90 pointing to particular physical and attitudinal obstacles that may be faced 83 Citizens Advice, Research Report: ‘Holes in the safety net: The impact on disabled people of the abolition of the severe disability premium within Universal Credit’, October 2012. 84 CRPD Art 27(1)(e). 85 The European Commission has stated that measures to reintegrate marginalised groups into the labour market be ‘increasingly based on the strong self-activity and self-responsibility of the job-seeker’. Report for the Commission The role of the Public Employment Services related to ‘Flexicurity’ in the European Labour Markets VC/2007/0927 Final report (March 2009, Policy and Business Analysis) 37. 86 CRPD Art 29(b)(1)–(2). 87 CRPD Art 30(1)(c). 88 CRPD Art 30(4). 89 CRPD Art 29(a)(i). 90 CRPD Art 29(a)(ii).



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26.40

26.41

26.42

26.43

by disabled voters. To prevent exclusion, States must also allow disabled persons to nominate an assistant to help them to vote.91 Moreover, States must enable disabled persons to ‘effectively hold office and perform all public functions at all levels of government’.92 The right to stand for election must not simply be a theoretical right; both standing and assuming office must be realistically realisable. States should also encourage disabled persons to participate in activities of NGOs and political parties.93 In a similar fashion, Article 13 CRPD offers a disability-specific reading of Article 47 CFR—the rights to an effective remedy, to a fair and public hearing, to advice, defence and representation, and to legal aid for those without sufficient resources, where necessary for access to justice. Article 13 CRPD adds that states must provide ‘procedural and age-appropriate accommodations’ for disabled persons in order to facilitate direct and indirect participation in ‘all legal proceedings, including at investigative and other preliminary stages’.94 Article 12 CRPD on equal recognition before the law also requires states to ‘recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’—a formulation which Ward has described as absurd in its absolutism, as ‘can easily be demonstrated by a person with advanced dementia, and even more so by a person in a coma’.95 However, it is submitted that the default principle of facilitating maximum legal agency on the part of disabled persons should be read into Article 47 CFR. Such mainstreaming of disability-specific concerns in the justice process extends also to imprisonment. While Article 6 CFR rather abruptly states that ‘everyone has the right to liberty and security of person’, the CRPD liberty right (in Art 14) again offers a disability-conscious reading. First, that ‘the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty’.96 Secondly, where disabled persons are deprived of liberty—eg through imprisonment—they are entitled to the provision of reasonable accommodation.97 Related to liberty and autonomy is the right to respect for ‘private and family life, home and communications’, as in Article 7 CFR. Articles 22 and 23 CRPD again provide a disability-specific reading, recognising the particular types of interference disabled persons may experience. Hence, ‘regardless of place of residence or living arrangements’, no disabled person ‘shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence or other types of communication’98—so that an assisted living arrangement should not be used as an excuse to undermine autonomy and privacy. Nor is disability to devalue the importance of privacy with regard to ‘personal, health and rehabilitation information’.99 States must recognise the right of disabled persons to marry and to found a family, and to have free choice and control over planning their families, and should provide ‘access to age-appropriate information, reproductive and family planning education’, and should not deprive them of fertility.100 Disabled persons should not be excluded from child rearing, adoption and guardianship, and are to be rendered ‘appropriate assistance … in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities’. Disabled children should be helped to stay in their families



91 CRPD Art

29(a)(iii). 29(a)(ii). 93 CRPD Art 29(b)(i–ii). 94 Art 13(1) CRPD. 95 A Ward, ‘Adults with incapacity: freedom and liberty, rights and status: Part 1’ (2011) 5 Scots Law Times 21, 24. 96 CRPD Art 14(1)(b). 97 CRPD Art 14(2). 98 CRPD Art 22(1). 99 CRPD Art 22(2). 100 CRPD Art 23(1)(b). 92 CRPD Art

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(unless necessary for the best interests of the child), and states should help families to ensure the social integration of their disabled children by providing ‘early and comprehensive information, services and support to children with disabilities and their families’.101 Article 7 CRPD on disabled children offers a connection between Article 26 CFR and Article 24 26.44 CFR on the rights of the child. The latter provides for protection and care of children (as necessary for their wellbeing); freedom to express views (and have them taken into account according to age and maturity); and the right to personal, regular and direct contact with both parents (unless not in their interests). Article 7 CRPD contains much of the same text,102 albeit specifying that each shall be enjoyed equally by disabled children. On considering the rights of disabled children, and children with disabled parents, it becomes 26.45 clear that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed and ratified by all Member States is also material to Article 26 CFR. In particular, Article 23 CRC on the rights of disabled children should be an instructive source—promoting the child’s ‘self reliance and … active participation in the community’.103 It requires the provision of assistance ‘appropriate to the child’s condition and to the circumstances of the parents or others caring for the child’.104 Such assistance should be directed to the child’s ‘achieving the fullest possible social integration and individual development’,105 which includes ‘cultural and spiritual development’. In particular, access to certain services should be facilitated—education, training, healthcare, rehabilitation, preparation for employment, and recreation.106

III.  Council of Europe Treaties The explanatory notes to the Charter invoke Article 15 of the European Social Charter. This 26.46 provision was amended in the overall ESC revision of 1996, though not all EU Member States have ratified the revised version of the ESC—Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain have all signed but not ratified it.107 Consequently there are two Articles 15 to consider—the 1961 version having two provisions, 26.47 and the 1996 three. The older version is focused on ‘vocational training, rehabilitation and social resettlement’ and requires states to provide training facilities, including specialist facilities where necessary (the first provision), and to take measures to help place disabled persons in employment, including sheltered employment (the second provision). It is worth noting here that the Czech Republic has not agreed to be bound by the first provision on training facilities, and Latvia has not agreed to be bound by either provision108—which could prove problematic for deciding the applicability of Article 26 CFR since the Article 26 principle ‘is based on’ Article 15 ESC. The newer version of Article 15 ESC is relevant to the remaining 20 Member States, and 26.48 it replaces the overall aims of training, rehabilitation and social resettlement with effective ‘independence, social integration and participation in the life of the community’, ostensibly

101 CRPD Art 23(3). 102 Apart from the last mentioned provision on parental contact; the closest correlating provision is in CRPD Art 18(2) which outlines the right of children with disabilities ‘as far as possible … to know and be cared for by their parents’. 103 Art 23(1). 104 Art 23(2). 105 Art 23(3). 106 Ibid. 107 See Council of Europe list of ratifications at www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/163/ signatures?p_auth=SCNYPcD4. 108 Council of Europe, Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.035—European Social Charter, www.coe.int/en/ web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/035/declarations?p_auth=KTzunWwi.



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redirecting attention from a potentially stripped down version of an active labour market policy to something more focused on social integration and personal fulfilment. The first two sub-sections are however redolent of the original Article 15 ESC—requiring state provision of guidance, education and vocational training,109 and promoting access to employment through encouraging recruitment and provision of reasonable adjustments, or where this is not possible, the provision of sheltered employment.110 The biggest change introduced by the 1996 revision is the introduction of the third provision for promoting ‘full social integration and participation in the life of the community’ through measures to ‘overcome barriers to communication and mobility and enabling access to transport, housing, cultural activities and leisure’,111 which may indicate the spheres of social life relevant to Article 26 CFR. However, given that seven EU Member States have not ratified the revised version, the utility of this provision—other than as informative—is questionable. Even among those states that have ratified the new ESC, not all are bound by these changes; Austria is not bound by the second provision (on recruitment and reasonable adjustment), while Romania and Slovakia have both opted out of the new third provision on social integration and community life. Bulgaria has opted out of Article 15 in its entirety.112 26.49 In conformity decisions of the of the European Committee of Social Rights, Article 15(3) has been a common source of non-conformity, with the Committee finding that various disparate provisions for disabled persons with disabilities do not amount to general enough coverage, nor do they make explicit provision for the areas stipulated in the ESC—housing, transport, telecommunications, cultural and leisure activities.113 The Committee found that as well as not providing effective access to housing, Hungary did not to provide effective remedies for those who allege disability discrimination,114 while Estonia did not have any legislation protecting from disability discrimination in the relevant areas.115 A finding against Belgium made particular reference to apparently different situations as between the Flemish, French and German-speaking regions.116 The differences between EU Member States as to which version of Article 15 applies appears to give rise to different degrees of scrutiny—making it easier for those states not bound by Article 15(3) to be found in ‘conformity’. 26.50 Other potentially relevant Council of Europe documents are the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, and the 2011 Council Recommendation on the participation of persons with disabilities in political and public life.117 The Code puts forward a number of principles— suggesting that more stringent rules must be applied to disenfranchisement than to exclusion from standing for election.118 However, the approach to legal mental capacity in the Code, has, according to O’Mahony, become unsustainable following the UNCRPD, so that the 2010 Interpretative Declaration attached to the Code appears to make enfranchisement the

109 Art 15(1). 110 Art 15(2). 111 Art 15(3). 112 See Council of Europe Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.163—European Social Charter (revised), www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/163/declarations?p_auth=Xk1U9NKT. 113 Eg European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 09/12/2016, Ireland—Article 15-3, 2016/def/IRL/15/3/EN; Conclusions 09/12/2016, France—Article 15-3, 2016/def/FRA/15/3/EN. 114 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 09/12/206, Hungary—Article 15-3, 2016/def/HUN/15/3/EN. 115 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 09/12/2016, Estonia—Article 15-3, 2016/def/EST/15/3/EN. 116 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 09/12/2016, Belgium—Article 15-3, 2016/def/BEL/15/3/EN. 117 CM/Rec(2011)14, as adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 16 November 2011 at the 1126th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 118 Ibid, point 1.1. Also, any deprivation must be in accordance with the law and proportionate.

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default position.119 But the Declaration still allows for a court-imposed restriction on voting and standing for election on the grounds of disability. The Council Recommendation of 2011 notably draws upon Article 15 ESC, including 26.51 Article 15(3)—the provision which does not bind several Member States. The Appendix states that ‘all persons with disabilities, whether they have physical, sensory, or intellectual impairments, mental health problems or chronic illnesses, have the right to vote on the same basis as other citizens, and should not be deprived of this right by any law limiting their legal capacity, by any judicial or other decision or by any other measure based on their disability, cognitive functioning or perceived capacity.’120 Similar wording is applied to the right of persons with disabilities to stand for elected office. It requires not only measures to promote participation, but the monitoring and evaluation of such participation by persons with disabilities.121

IV.  Other Sources The explanatory notes to the CFR state that while Article 26 ‘draws on point 26 of the Community 26.52 Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.’ This provision states that disabled persons ‘must be entitled to additional concrete measures aimed at improving their social and professional integration’ (emphasis added). These measures ‘must concern … vocational training, ergonomics, accessibility, mobility, means of transport and housing’ (emphasis added). So this point gives some steer, like Article 15(3) ESC, to the social spheres in which Article 26 CFR may be triggered. This Charter is of course a ‘mere political declaration’ but has nevertheless been treated as instrumental in forming initiatives and contributing to the content of the CFR. Moreover, it can be used as an interpretative aid by the ECJ. Another interpretative aid is the ILO Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled 26.53 Persons) Convention C159 (1983). This has specific economic, employment-directed objectives—even disability is defined in terms of obstacles to employment.122 The presumption appears to be that employment is the route to other forms of integration, as the convention aims to enable disabled people to secure, retain and advance in employment, and ‘thereby to further such person’s integration or reintegration into society.’123 The Convention requires signatories to establish policies specific to disabled persons in the workplace,124 including the provision of suitably trained staff responsible for guidance, training and placement of disabled persons.125 It also draws attention to the problems created by geographic considerations, as it requires measures to be taken ‘for disabled persons in rural areas and remote communities’.126 The remit of the ILO shapes its objectives, so that social and cultural integration are side effects of participation in the labour market, but this is not an ideologically neutral premise. The Convention’s utility is also limited by its non-universal status—six Member States have not ratified the convention: Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania and the United Kingdom.

119 Above, n 48. 120 Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec (2011) 14 (section 3). 121 Recommendation CM/Rec (2011) 14 point 3. 122 ILO Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) Convention C159 (1983), Art 1(1): ‘the term disabled person means an individual whose prospects of securing, retaining and advancing in suitable employment are substantially reduced as a result of a duly recognised physical or mental impairment’. 123 ILO C159 Art 1(2). 124 ILO C159 Arts 2–5. 125 ILO C159 Art 9. 126 ILO C159 Art 8.



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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 26.54 The area of EU law most pertinent to the Article 26 CFR integration principle is probably EU employment law, the only sphere in which disability-specific non-discrimination legislation has been adopted at EU level—namely Directive 2000/78 prohibiting discrimination on the ground of disability (among other grounds) in employment and occupation. Article 26 CFR refers to occupational integration, raising the question of how two different approaches— non-discrimination and integration—interact. An integration-directed approach may be more about positive rights and environmental/social constructions of discrimination, whereas other Union instruments, including Directive 2000/78 tend to promote conformity with/assimilation into existing labour market arrangements. Although equality has been described as a founding value of the Union, and non-discrimination as a common constitutional tradition prevailing in Member States,127 the raison d’etre of the Union’s interest in non-discrimination measures has stemmed from an interest in maximising the efficiency of the internal market.128 26.55 In spite of the increased competence of the Union in other social policy areas affected by discrimination, this occupational orientation has been a continuing theme. The Commission’s 2008–9 disability action plan aimed to utilise the ‘untapped potential’ of ‘disabled people [excluded from the labour market] as one of the key priority groups’ in order to combat ‘a shrinking workforce’.129 The Council of Ministers of the EU has also suggested that the rationale for addressing discrimination is because it can ‘undermine the objective of abolishing of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods and services between Member States’.130 The focus on social integration in the CFR has two potential consequences—possibly affecting the interpretation of existing instruments such as Directive 2000/78, and possibly requiring thinking beyond the confines of occupational instruments. 26.56 In terms of interpreting Directive 2000/78, the emphasis on integration in Article 26 CFR could require greater attention to be paid to combating indirect discrimination as opposed to direct discrimination, requiring a stronger commitment to tackling an able-centric environment, and aiming for structural rather than formal equal treatment. The readiness with which indirect discrimination can be justified, (‘by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’)131 and the assumption codified in Article 2(b) (ii) of Directive 2000/78 that a reasonable adjustment duty discharges any indirect equality duties, are problematic for the promotion of occupational integration of disabled people. Article 2(b)(ii) states that ‘an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice’ will not be treated as discriminating against persons with a disability if ‘as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer or any person or organisation to whom this Directive applies, is obliged, under national legislation, to take appropriate measures in line with the principles contained in Article 5 [on reasonable accommodation] in order to eliminate disadvantages entailed by such provision, criterion or practice’. But reasonable accommodation cannot be a substitute for protection from indirect

127 Art 2 of the TEU. 128 C O’Brien, ‘Equality’s False Summits: New Varieties of Disability Discrimination, ‘Excessive’ Equal Treatment and Economically Constricted Horizons’ (2011) 36(1) European Law Review 26. 129 European Commission, ‘The situation of disabled people in the European Union: the European Action Plan 2008–2009’, COM (2007) 738 final, para 2.2. 130 Council of the European Union, Note 5188/10, 13 January 2010, preamble, para 7. 131 Art 2(b)(i) Directive 2000/78.

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discrimination. Reasonable accommodation is a personalised right, to make exceptions to rules, rather than a general duty to avoid potentially exclusionary rules in the first place. And the duty can be more easily diluted; while indirect discrimination is unlawful by default unless justified, accommodations need only be entertained if the claimant has first demonstrated that they are reasonable, shifting the initial burden of proof to the claimant. The only guidance in the Directive as to the definition of ‘reasonable’ is that measures need not be taken if they ‘would pose a disproportionate burden on the employer’.132 What counts as a ‘burden’ is likely to be defined according to employer preferences, which will be primarily financial—in the short-term sense.133 Emphasising integration may renew thinking about substantive equality measures as opposed to personalised measures. It may also affect the interpretation of specific provisions and applications of the non-discrimination principle, explored below in section D.III. In terms of thinking beyond employment, we might discern some policy ambitions in 26.57 that direction in the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Commission’s 2018 Report on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights134 suggested that the Article 26 CFR principles were expressed in Principle 17 of the Pillar.135 Principle 17 states that ‘people with disabilities have the right to income support that ensures living in dignity, services that enable them to participate in the labour market and in society, and a work environment adapted to their needs’. While the Pillar occupies a curious space between politics, policy and the law, lending it ‘uncertain legal significance’,136 the text of Principle 17 suggests that measures of income support for disabled people are a policy priority for the EU. Indeed, the UN observations on the EU Commission’s report on implementation of the CRPD in the EU expresses concern about the failure to ‘explicitly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of disability and to provide reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities in the areas of social protection, health care, (re)habilitation, education and the provision of goods and services’.137 Whether or not Article 26 CFR can strengthen the case for a broader set of non-discrimination 26.58 aims, one area beyond employment which would not involve straying too far from economic aims is the proposal to extend protection from discrimination on the framework grounds (including disability) to goods and services,138 so bringing such protection more in line with that already offered on a national level in several Member States on the grounds of disability,139 and that which is already offered within EU law on the grounds of sex and race.140 The extension proposal, first put forward in 2008, has been under lengthy examination, with Parliament and Council failing to reach agreement on the content of the Directive. Though apparently agreeing on the

132 Art 5. 133 Though discrimination is not rational in the long term: E Lagerspetz, ‘Rationality and Politics in Long Term Decisions’ (1999) 8 Biodiversity and Conservation 149. 134 EU Commission, DG Justice and Consumers, 2018 report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019), 105. 135 European Parliament, Council of the European Union & EU Commission, Proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, 16 November 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/social-summit-european-pillar-socialrights-booklet_en.pdf. 136 S Garben, ‘The European pillar of social rights: effectively addressing displacement?’ (2018) 14(1) ECL Review, 210, 211. 137 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Concluding observations on the initial report of the European Union’, CRPD/C/EU/CO/1, 2 October 2015, para 18. 138 COM (2008) 426, above n 14. 139 Examples include the UK Equality Act 2010. 140 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373 [2004] 37; Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security [1979] OJ L 6/24; Directive 2000/43.



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importance of fighting discrimination, the May 2019 progress report from the Council suggests that there are some sticking points on disability; the report notes that ‘further discussions and fine tuning’ are required on the subject of ‘proportionate differences in treatment’,141 while the November 2018 progress report noted there were still differences of delegate opinions on the matter of reasonable accommodation.142 26.59 Article 26 CFR has also been cited as an influence in the development of softer policies beyond the employment sphere—the Commission refers to the provision as indicating that EU action is needed to complement national efforts ‘to create a barrier free Europe’.143 The EU Commission disability strategy 2010-2020 suggests that the EU and Member States have ‘a strong mandate to improve the social and economic situation of people with disabilities’—pointing to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Articles 1, 26 and 21. The strategy sets out a combination of soft approaches to achieving that mandate—with the EU variously ‘supporting’144 or ‘supporting and supplementing’145 national action; ‘promoting’ assorted ends (such as inclusive education,146 decent living conditions,147 the rights of people with disabilities in EU external action148) and conformity of Member State legislation on legal capacity with the CRPD;149 using funds to ‘raise awareness’ eg of the situation of disabled people living in institutions,150 and amongst disabled people of their rights;151 and combining the last two in ‘promoting awareness’ of ‘“design for all” approaches to products, services and environments’.152 However, in spite of potential relevance, the actual influence of Article 26 on work within the strategy seems to have been slight. The Commission’s 2017 Progress Report on implementation of the strategy is a 200-page document which does not mention Article 26 CFR once.153 The Charter as a whole is mentioned in passing only twice.154 26.60 An area of EU hard law related to the labour market that may be affected by Article 26 CFR is free movement law, in particular cross-border access to welfare benefits. Disabled people have typically been excluded from the full logic of Union citizenship and nationality-based equal

141 (Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation—Progress Report’, 2008/0140(CNS), 9567/19, Brussels, 24 May 2019, II(b)). 142 Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation—Progress Report’ 2008/0140 (CNS), 14253/18, Brussels, 16 November 2018, II(b)(ii). 143 European Commission, ‘A renewed commitment to a barrier free Europe’ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/ disabilities/disability-strategy/index_en.htm. 144 European Disability Strategy, above, n 25, eg to ‘make sports, leisure, cultural and recreational organisations and activities accessible’ (2.1.2). 145 Ibid, eg implementing accessibility and removing existing barriers, and improving the availability and choice of assistive technologies (2.1.1). 146 Ibid, (2.1.5). 147 Ibid, (2.1.6). 148 Ibid, (2.1.8). 149 Ibid, (2.1.3). 150 Ibid, (2.1.2). 151 Ibid, (2.2.1). 152 Ibid, (2.2.1(9)). 153 European Commission, ‘Progress Report on the implementation of the European Disability Strategy (2010–2020)’, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, 2.2.2017 SWD(2017) 29 final. 154 On p 164, to note that the Charter was referenced in Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services ([2009] OJ L 337/37), and on p 187 to note that the European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights will support the implementation of the Charter.

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treatment, because they might not be fully participating in the labour market, or following the Bettray case, where rehabilitative work might not be considered sufficiently part of the normal labour market.155 However, the CJEU has clarified that Bettray is meant to represent an unusual exception, and does not give Member States free rein to reclassify the workers in some form of supported or sheltered employment as not-workers for the purposes of Article 45 TFEU. The later case of Fenoll156 turned on whether someone performing activities in a work rehabilitation centre could be a worker; these centres were ‘non-profit making centres of a socio-medical nature for disabled persons’, which offered activities ‘of an occupational nature, medico-social support and educational assistance, in addition to living arrangements which facilitate personal development and social integration’.157 The CJEU stated that Bettray was ‘relevant only to the facts giving rise to that judgment’, namely where a person was had been employed in a national programme because he could not work in the normal labour market ‘because of his drug addiction’.158 In contrast, those working in a work rehabilitation centre, such as Mr Fenoll, must be considered workers for the purposes of Directive 2003/88, (the dispute centred on entitlement to annual leave).159 They would therefore, logically, have to be workers for the purpose of Article 45 TFEU. Whether or not a person falls within the definition of migrant worker has significant consequences for equal treatment rights. Disabled persons are disproportionately more likely to fall through the gaps of Article 7 of Directive 2004/38160 and be found to not have an EU law-based right of residence,161 while also being disproportionately more likely to be in need of some form of welfare assistance, from which the absence of a residence right excludes them. While the Commission acknowledges that the rate of poverty among disabled people is 70 per cent higher than the average,162 the risk of poverty is likely to be higher again for disabled people were they to consider migrating between Member States. The limitations and conditions placed on claiming equal access to benefits in a host state 26.61 therefore disproportionately exclude disabled persons, meaning that the rights associated with Union citizenship are unevenly distributed. Equal treatment in a host Member State is one of the twin principles of EU cross-border welfare, the other being retention of benefit rights from a home state through the coordinating mechanisms of exportation of benefits and/or the aggregation of contributions. A 2002 Commission report, noted that any suggestion that exporting benefits alone (with no need to claim benefits in the host State) could ensure that free movers had sufficient resources did not ‘stand up to scrutiny’ as the benefits in question first had to be ‘adequate to support the person in the host state’.163 Given the restrictions on which benefits can be exported,

155 Case 344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1989] ECR 01621. 156 Case C-316/13 Gérard Fenoll v Centre d’aide par le travail ‘La Jouvene’ and Association de parents et d’amis de personnes handicapées mentales (APEI) d’Avignon EU:C:2015:200. 157 Ibid, 5. 158 Ibid, 38. 159 ‘concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L299/9. 160 ‘on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ [2004] OJ L158/77–123. 161 ‘Disabled people remain at a significant disadvantage in the labour market, despite recent positive economic development, and are more often either not employed or employed in jobs requiring fewer skills.’ B Greve, The labour market situation of disabled people in European countries and implementation of employment policies: a summary of evidence from country reports and research studies (Academic Network of European Disability experts (ANED), 2009) 15. See also C O’Brien, ‘Social Blind Spots and Monocular Policy-Making: The ECJ’s Migrant Worker Model’ (2009) 46 CML Rev 4, 1107. 162 European Disability Strategy, above n 25, Introduction. 163 European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs ‘Definitions of disability in Europe: A comparative analysis’ (2002) section 6.1.



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they are unlikely to be adequate. The case law indicates a certain tendency on the part of Member States to find that benefits either fall outside of the scope of social security co-ordination,164 or that they constitute special non-contributory benefits,165 which are exempted from the usual exportability rules.166 Member States are typically reluctant, where a benefit is non-contributory, to continue paying it to someone who leaves their territory.167 26.62 This reluctance is likely to disproportionately impact upon persons with disabilities who are more likely to be receiving some form of solidaristic benefit not dependent on contributions. The UK provides a clear example of this disproportionate impact. Welfare reforms have included the actual scrapping of an income replacement benefit, Employment and Support Allowance in youth (formerly Incapacity Benefit in youth) awarded to those young people who do not have sufficient contribution records for the standard ESA. Government ministers pointed to a ruling that meant ESAiy should be considered exportable,168 and indicated that as it was never intended to be paid outside UK territory, it should not be paid at all.169 Disability Living Allowance, Attendance Allowance and Carers Allowance have also been subject to some back-and-forth exchanges between the UK and the ECJ; on receiving the ruling that each should be considered exportable (bar the mobility component of DLA),170 the UK instigated a set of conditions for exportability, not clearly permitted within the EU co-ordination rules, including requiring a continued economic link with the UK, eg through receipt of a contributory benefit. This meant that only those who had worked and earned enough to make the requisite contributions, were entitled to export the non-contributory benefits. DLA has now mostly been replaced with Personal Independence Payment (PIP), which the government originally intended to only be ‘available to people who are resident in Great Britain’,171 but this was modified in the PIP regulations,172 to allow exportation of the daily living component, albeit only in some circumstances. It looks as though the starting point for disabled people is a default of stasis, excluded from free movement by home states reluctant to export their benefits, and by host states that will not admit them to their benefits. The combined exclusionary aspects of both exportability and equal treatment principles lends credence to claims of Jerome Vignon of the European Commission that ‘disabled people can face particular disadvantages in the field of social security and other rights as European citizens, when they move from one Member State to another’.173 26.63 Article 26 CFR could provide the impetus for addressing this EU citizenship asymmetry; welfare benefits (and social services provision) in themselves may constitute examples of measures

164 As argued in Case C-43/99 Leclere [2001] ECR I-04265, Case C-215/99 [2001] Jauch ECR I-01901, and Case C-286/03 Hosse [2006] ECR I-01771. 165 See M Cousins, ‘Social Security, Social Assistance, and ‘Special Non-Contributory Benefits’: The Never-Ending Story’ (2007) 9(1) European Journal of Social Security 95. 166 If listed in Annex X of Regulation 883/2004 ‘on the coordination of social security systems’, inserted by Regulation 988/2009, [2009] OJ L284/59. Though note the exception to the exception suggested in Case C-287/05 D P W Hendrix v Raad van Bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen; EU:C:2007:494. 167 On exportation aversion tactics in the UK, see C O’Brien, Unity in Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK, (Oxford, Hart, 2017), 183–88. 168 Case C-503/09 Stewart (Judgment of 21 July 2011). 169 Chris Grayling, HL Deb 1 February 2012, cols 831–32. For a discussion of this unconvincing reasoning, see C O’Brien, ‘From Safety Nets and Carrots to Trampolines and Sticks’ in D Schiek (ed), The European Union’s Economic and Social Model in the Global Crisis (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013). 170 Case C-299/05 Commission v Parliament (action for annulment) [2007] ECR-I 08695; Case C-537/09 Bartlett [2011] OJ C186/5. 171 Department of Work and Pensions 2011, ‘Personal Independence Payment—Policy Briefing Note’ 09.05.2011 www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/pip-briefing-introduction.pdf. 172 The Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 SI 2013/377, reg 23. 173 European Commission (2002) above, n 163, p 3.

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‘designed to ensure … independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community’, whether dealing with home state benefit exportability or host state benefit equal accessibility. It could also provide a prism through which Article 45 CFR should be read—the Charter provision on the right of free movement and residence, which states without exception that ‘every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.’

II.  Scope of Application Article 26 CFR refers to ‘persons with disabilities’. But this category is defined in a variety ways 26.64 in different Member States and in different contexts, a variety which Vignon described in 2002 as ‘a major obstacle to the mutual recognition of national decisions on disability issues, and in particular of eligibility for access to specific services and facilities’.174 The Commission has also noted that ‘definitions of disability vary widely across the EU, as they are often used primarily for determining benefit entitlements and for political purposes.’175 The diversity of disability definitions could result in a rather patchy nation-dependent 26.65 application of Article 26 CFR, at odds with the idea of a European level right. Reasoning similar to that employed in Chacon Navas should be adopted—that a ‘uniform and autonomous’176 definition of disability is necessary, given the need for ‘uniform application of Community law’.177 In Chacon Navas the Court pointed out that the provisions made ‘no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope’.178 Article 26 CFR also makes no such reference to national definitions, so deference to national definitions may not be intended here, either. However, the actual definition adopted in Chacon Navas was problematic, and has been 26.66 criticised as setting a ‘high bar’179 for a successful discrimination claim, and the ‘lowest common denominator’180 for disability rights. The Court was at pains to distinguish disability from sickness, and a highly medical approach was clear; the Court accepted the referring court’s submission that reference should be had to the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) drawn up by the World Health Organisation, which treated ‘disability’ as ‘a generic term which includes defects, limitation of activity and restriction of participation in social life.’181 The Court concluded that disability in a European context should refer to ‘a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional life’.182 This definition is notable both for its medical and instrumental content—disability turns upon impairments that impair professional life—ie work. The Court drew upon aspects of Directive 2000/78 to suggest that another element of the definition of disability was necessary—it must be ‘probable that it will last for a long time’.183 In itself this is a problematic conclusion, since it implies that accommodations are not to





174 Ibid.

175 European

Commission (2010) above, n 25. C-13/05 Chacon Navas [2006] ECR I-06467, 42. 177 Ibid, 40. 178 Ibid. 179 Hosking, ‘A High Bar for Disability Rights’ (2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 228. 180 Bell, ‘The Implementation of European Anti-Discrimination Directives’ (2008) 79 The Political Quarterly 36, 39. 181 Case C-13/05 Chacon Navas, 22. 182 Ibid, 43. 183 Ibid, 45. 176 Case

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be considered reasonable or worth making for anything other than the long term, possibly failing to capture conditions with fluctuating and varying effects. 26.67 The Court has announced a move away from this medical model approach; in HK Danmark, it claimed to embrace a definition that was in line with the UN CRPD—disability as an impairment interacting with barriers so as to hinder participation ‘in professional life on an equal basis with other workers’.184 Advocate General Wahl later hailed this as a ‘paradigm shift’.185 However, in practice, the Court merely widened the definition so that it could include (the effects of) long-term sickness. It did not consider the social and environmental components of disability, so this ‘reluctant’ acceptance186 of the language of the social model was more rhetorical than anything—its focus upon impairment remained fixed, and subsequent cases show that it is ‘questionable to what extent the Court has really embraced the social-contextual model of disability’.187 26.68 In the later case of Z, the Court was presented with an ideal opportunity to discuss the ways that particular barriers can be disabling—how they can turn a condition/impairment into a disability that impedes professional life—but it declined to do so. The case concerned a woman with no uterus, who sought maternity leave to care for the baby she was having through a surrogate mother. The refusal of leave would likely create a significant employment detriment to women with similar impairments; if they cannot combine work with caring for a newborn, they face losing their jobs, which could create future labour market penalties or exclusion. The rules interacting with the impairment create the disabling effect. However, both the Advocate General and the Court simply took the old medical model line that the impairment must be disabling in itself, and not having a uterus did not in itself prevent her from carrying out her employment activities. The Advocate General found that the central question was ‘does the condition from which Ms Z suffers compromise her prospects of participating in professional life?’188 The Court stated that it was not apparent that ‘Ms Z.’s condition by itself made it impossible for her to carry out her work or constituted a hindrance to the exercise of her professional activity.’189 She was therefore not considered disabled, and the Court stated that it was not necessary to consider whether Union non-discrimination law was compatible with Article 26 CFR. The Advocate General and the Court treated the decision to have a child as a personal choice, and the inability to do so ‘by conventional means’ as unrelated to the capacity to work.190 This rather echoes the arguments made decades ago when women objected to disadvantage as a result of having babies ‘conventionally’, and it swerves the chance to discuss when an otherwise non-disabling impairment could be made a disabling one by employment practices. If the answer is never, then we do not have much of a social model at all.191 26.69 A further example of the Court paying lip service to the social model is in evidence in Kaltoft.192 There, asked whether obesity could constitute disability, the ECJ recounted the definition of disability outlined in HK Danmark, finding that obesity was not itself a disability, but it might 184 C-335/11 and C-337/11, HK Danmark, EU:C:2013:222, para 38. 185 C-363/12, Z, Opinion of AG Wahl, EU:C:2013:604, para 88. 186 N Betsch, ‘The Ring and Skouboe Werge Case’ (2013) 4 European Labour Law Journal 1. 187 L Waddington, ‘Saying All the Right Things and Still Getting it Wrong: The Court of Justice’s Definition of Disability and Non-Discrimination Law’ (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 4, 576, 583. 188 C-363/12, Z, EU:C:2013:604, Opinion of AG Wahl, para 91. 189 C-363/12, Z, EU:C:2014:159, Judgment, para 81. 190 C-363/12, Z, Opinion of AG Wahl, para 97; Judgment, 81. 191 See C O’Brien, ‘Union Citizenship and Disability: Restricted Access to Equality Rights and the Attitudinal Model of Disability’ in D Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). 192 Case C-354/13 Fag og Arbejde (FOA) acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v Kommunernes Landsforening EU:C:2014:2463 (Kaltoft).

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entail a limitation resulting from an impairment, that in interaction with various barriers could hinder participation in professional life. But it went on to give examples that showed what it really meant was that it might entail impairments which were in themselves disabilities: Such would be the case, in particular, if the obesity of the worker hindered his full and effective participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers on account of reduced mobility or the onset, in that person, of medical conditions preventing him from carrying out his work or causing discomfort when carrying out his professional activity.193

This phrasing belies a belief that it is the impairment—reduced mobility, or other medical condition, that is disabling—and ‘prevents’ the employee from carrying out work. Hervey and Rostant describe this as a ‘continued flirtation with the medical model’,194 and note that in the realm of non-ideal weight discrimination, a social model approach would mean paying attention to attitudinal barriers ‘as part of [the] consideration’ as to whether there is a disabling condition.195 Once those with disabilities have been identified, we must ask whether others—associates/ 26.70 carers of disabled persons—also benefit from Article 26 CFR, to ensure the sustainability of care arrangements that facilitate independence and community living. The wording of Article 26 CFR focuses on disabled persons, but this in itself does not rule out some entitlements for third parties, if such entitlements are necessary in order for disabled persons to benefit from Article 26-related measures. The Coleman196 case postdated the drafting of the Charter by several years, and should impact upon the definitions in the Charter as well as Directive 2000/78. According to that ruling, discrimination should be prohibited on the grounds of disability, whether one’s own or another’s disability. This is explored in more detail below, in section D.III, but for now it is submitted that the Coleman rationale can apply to Article 26 CFR—ie duties extend to carers where such duties are necessary for the fulfilment of Article 26 duties. The material scope of the Article is not very clearly delineated. It only kicks in where the 26.71 Union already has competence,197 such as the areas explored in section D.I—employment, free movement and welfare co-ordination. Article 26 itself may be further limited, as it is possible that it only confers a right to benefit from existing measures rather than creating an obligation to enact such measures. So it may be parasitic upon not only the engagement of Union law, which has a relatively limited remit as regards disability, but also upon the existence of integrating measures, which may be reasonable adjustment/accommodation in employment context, accessibility in the provision of certain consumer goods and services, and the provision of welfare benefits in the context of free movement. As Article 26 seems to bind only the Union—and then only to ‘recognise and respect’ the right 26.72 to benefit from such measures—it is difficult to identify any actionable rights it creates. Failures on the part of Member States to properly implement EU duties relating to equal treatment might not be considered an act of the Union, and so escape its application. But even when applied to Union acts, it has been dismissed as having little effect. In Glatzel, the Court acknowledged that the disputed provision was contained in a directive (regulating eligibility to drive certain vehicles with particular medical conditions) that was ‘a legislative act of the European Union implementing the principle contained in Article 26’,198 so Article 26 did apply. But it added that 193 Case C-354/13 Kaltoft, 60. 194 T Hervey & P Rostant, ‘All About That Bass? Is non-ideal-weight discrimination unlawful in the UK?’ (2016) 79(2) The Modern Law Review 248, 269. 195 Ibid, 281, emphasis in original. 196 Case C-303/06 Coleman [2008] ECR I-05603. 197 Art 51 CFR. 198 Case C-356/12 Wolfgang Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern EU:C:2014:350, 76.



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Article 26 ‘cannot by itself confer on individuals a subjective right which they may invoke’.199 It simply enshrined a principle, which to take effect must ‘be given more specific expression in European Union or national law’.200 While the Article should inform the process of interpreting and reviewing the legality of the EU measure, the Court did not actually consider it when addressing objective justification or proportionality,201 instead relying on out-of-date, poorly substantiated, and potentially stereotyping ideas of risk.202 If Article 26 can only be invoked where the Union has failed, and not when considering justification, it may amount to little more than a negative duty on the part of the Union to not create formal inequalities. However, blurry lies the line between negative and positive rights, and as will be explored below in section D.III, in the context of discrimination by association, a narrow ‘negative rights’ interpretation on the part of Union authorities—the ECJ—could deprive the measures of their full effect, interfering with their enjoyment, so that a stronger, more positive rights interpretation is needed.

III.  Specific Provisions 26.73 This section will explore how, in light of the sources examined in sections B and C, the basic concepts in Article 26 should be interpreted, and move on to explore how Article 26 CFR may affect how specific EU legal provisions are interpreted. (a)  Interpreting Article 26 CFR 26.74 Key terms/concepts to break down here include ‘independence’, ‘occupational integration’, ‘social integration’ and ‘participation in the life of the community’. Independence does not mean simply being left to fend for oneself. Rather, some forms of assistance can promote independence, as with social service support that reduces the likelihood of institutionalisation and/or social exclusion. Meaningful independence requires sufficient agency to realise certain goals/activities/ functions, and in this sense is related to concepts of autonomy and dignity. Article 19 of the CRPD on ‘living independently and being included in the community’ requires state parties to ensure disabled persons have freedom of choice of living arrangements,203 and access to a range of support services including including ‘personal assistance necessary to support living and inclusion in the community’,204 and to also ensure that community services and facilities are available to, and responsive to the needs of, disabled people.205 The Council of Europe’s disability strategy 2017–2023 emphasises the need to be able to ‘participate independently in all aspects of society on an equal basis with others’, requiring significant action on accessibility, and requiring ‘universal design’ to be ‘used as a standard for all new developments.’206 The EU legislature has recognised this to some degree, by setting accessibility requirements for some goods and services that contribute to the internal market, in the Accessibility Act.207 However, the focus is on

199 Ibid, 78. 200 Ibid. 201 A Ward, ‘The Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang?’ (2018) 20, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 32, 41. 202 See C O’Brien ‘Driving Down Disability Equality?’ (2014) 21(4) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 724. 203 Art 19(1). 204 Art 19(2). 205 Art 19(3). 206 Council of Europe ‘Human Rights: A Reality for All’ Disability Strategy 2017-2023’ (Council of Europe, March 2017), 24. 207 Directive 2019/882.

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consumer goods and services, whereas independence requires accessible (and inclusive) health, social and other public services. Independence is closely related to social inclusion, and to participation in the life of the community; the European Commission’s Progress 2017 report of the 2010–2020 disability strategy refers to the ‘principle of independent and community living’,208 bundling the two concepts together. The UK government’s Office for Disability Issues in 2008 produced a report on independent living209 that defined independent living in terms of ‘choice and control over the assistance or equipment needed to go about our daily lives’.210 The report stresses the point that requiring assistance is a universal experience, and that there should be nothing de-autonomising about it when done in the context of disability; ‘Everyone needs assistance or equipment of some kind. In our society, for example, we do not draw water from the river. Instead, we rely on water companies to provide the kind of assistance and equipment necessary and to deliver it in ways which give us choice and control (the ability to turn on the tap to get the water we need).’211 The CRPD requires ‘respect for inherent dignity and individual autonomy, including the freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons’212 as well as ‘full and effective participation and inclusion in society’.213 These provisions tie independence up with dismantling societal barriers. The Council of Europe notes the ‘paradigm shift’ from ‘the traditional medical-based approach to disability to one based on human rights’214 which requires commitment to the principles of ‘Universal Design’.215 The human rights perspective is reiterated throughout the Council of Europe disability strategy, which outlines five rights-based priority areas, based on corresponding articles of the UN CRPD.216 The Strategy thus requires a substantive rather than formal approach to equal participation. Community participation is a rather nebulous concept, as there is no standard measure of such participation for a non-disabled person. The Council of Europe emphasises that segregation from the community is not only a breach in itself of the right to live in the community, but also leads to ‘some of the most serious human rights violations in Europe’ including violence and abuse within institutions.217 For disabled persons to have full agency and equal choices, account must be taken of the rights and needs of carers and families of disabled persons. The Council of Europe’s 2006–2015 Disability Action Plan stated that participation in the life of the community required measures including ‘services and other facilities … to give people with disabilities and their families periods of support and respite’.218 The reference to families and carers suggests that ‘participation’, much like independence, requires broader thinking about substantive equality. Some further aspects of community participation can be drawn from definitions of social integration, which appear to include enjoyment of what society has to offer, such as ‘the cultural

208 European Commission, above, n 153, 62. 209 HMG, Office for Disability Issues, ‘Independent living: A cross-government strategy about independent living for disabled people’ (2008); available through the British Library: www.bl.uk/collection-items/independent-living-acrossgovernment-strategy-about-independent-living-for-disabled-people. 210 Ibid, 29. 211 Ibid. 212 CRPD Art 3 (General principles) (a). 213 CRPD Art 3(c). 214 Above, n 206, para 11. 215 Ibid, para 19. 216 Ibid, para 20. 217 Ibid, para 69. 218 Appended to Recommendation Rec (2006) 5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Council of Europe Action Plan to promote the rights and full participation of people with disabilities in society: improving the quality of life of people with disabilities in Europe 2006–2015, 3.8.2, ix.



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life of that society’.219 The Council of Europe links social integration with the, ‘conceptual and methodological sea change’ giving rise to the social model of disability. The European Commission has also referred to educational integration, with a goal of ‘inclusive, quality education and training’220 to increase knowledge and mobility. 26.79 The next key term to define in the Charter provision is in fact two key terms bundled together: ‘social and occupational integration’. While the Council of Europe adopts a human rights heavy approach to social integration, that requires tackling ‘psychological, educational, family-related, cultural, social, professional, urban or architectural’ barriers through universal design,221 the Charter’s elision of the social and the occupational suggests that the Union’s commitment to social integration may be fuelled by more economically inclined objectives. This could lead to rather thinner, more formal conceptions of integration, geared at ‘activating’ persons with disabilities. 26.80 The Union’s social and employment policies currently promote fiscal austerity, in line with the Stability and Growth Pact which was premised on public spending restraint.222 The Commission has pushed for Member States to adopt active labour market policies that rely upon punitive measures—measures aimed at benefit withdrawal, not at personal fulfilment or potential. That the EU’s primary focus is upon ‘occupational’ integration is suggested in a European Parliament report, ‘The Mobility and Integration of People with Disabilities into the Labour Market’. The executive summary includes a section on the ‘situation of people with disabilities within the European Union’. This focuses on employment, with other considerations such as health treated as stemming from the employment situation.223 Concerns about avoiding the ‘risk of disabled people with partial work capacity becoming ‘trapped’ in the disability benefit system’224 speak to some of the economic concerns underlying ALMPs—reducing the cost of benefits. The adjuration to Member States to withdraw benefits to decrease ‘the burden for the welfare system’225 reveals a particular austerity model with significant implications for disabled people. Such reductions may be least appropriate in times of recession, when those affected will find it harder to secure work, but the Commission is adamant that active labour market policies are the appropriate response to economic crisis.226 26.81 In response to a question in the European Parliament, claiming that ‘[a]usterity policies will lead to an increase in the number of people living in long-term institutional care in many Member States, and to the further social exclusion of persons with disabilities’,227 Commissioner Viviane Reding emphasised employment policies such as tax incentives for employers to recruit persons with disabilities.228 In response to a question citing evidence that care centres for persons with disabilities were facing closure, the Commission acknowledged that the financial crisis

219 Ibid, 3.2.1. 220 European Commission, above n 25, 17. 221 Committee of Experts on Universal Design, ‘Achieving full participation through Universal Design’. Adopted by the Committee on the Rehabilitation and Integration of People with disabilities (Council of Europe Publishing, 2009), 9. 222 See Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ L306/41. 223 Above n 33, p 7. 224 Ibid, p 8. 225 PES (Public Employment Services 2020 Working Group) 2011, PES and EU 2020: making the employment guidelines work. Adopted by Heads of PES in Budapest, Hungary on 23–24 June 2011, p 4. 226 European Commission, ‘Active Labour Market Policies, 2017’ European Semester Thematic Factsheet, 16 November 2016, p 2. 227 ‘Debate: The impact of austerity on the living conditions of people with disabilities’ Pervenche Berès, on behalf of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs 22 February 2013, O-000018/2013. 228 Strasbourg, CRE 12 March 2013–21.

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‘has had a strong effect … particularly on vulnerable groups like people with disabilities’, but went on to claim that the EU policy response was to ‘improve the situation of vulnerable groups by increasing their employability’.229 In other words, the Commission treats persons with disabilities as targets for welfare reduction, without engaging with the specific issues of social care services, or of reduced capacity to work. The benefits arm of the European Employment Strategy could increase poverty and social exclusion amongst disabled persons, conflicting with Article 26 CFR. The UN has drawn attention to, and criticised, the disproportionate impact that austerity measures in the EU have had upon disabled people. Its 2015 Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of the EU (on implementation of the CRPD) stated: ‘The Committee notes with deep concern the disproportionately adverse and retrogressive effect that the austerity measures in the European Union have on the adequate standard of living of persons with disabilities.’230 The Committee recommended that the EU ‘take urgent measures … to prevent further adverse and retrogressive effects of the austerity measures on the adequate standard of living of persons with disabilities’, such as ‘setting a social protection floor that respects the core content of the right to an adequate standard of living and to social protection’.231 The Commission’s response did not accept that any change of EU policy was needed; it stated that it was ‘attentive’ to the impacts of ‘budgetary consolidation measures’ and stated that it ‘encourages’ Member States to promote equal opportunities through various funding mechanisms.232 The European Commission has also suggested that the ‘benefit trap’ is an obstacle to labour 26.82 market participation.233 The language of ‘traps’ can disguise the underlying message to withdraw support, and springboard people into an often unreceptive job market. This approach is evident in the list of key challenges in a European Parliament report on the mobility and integration of disabled people,234 and in references to ‘tackling the issue of young disabled people on benefits’,235 in line with the linguistic manoeuvres by which disabled people become ‘targets’ rather than recipients of support. Employment services are exhorted to target ‘the inactive … like disabled, lone mothers, women at home, early retired, or those on sick leave’.236 The language of the EU Disability Strategy 2010–20 is loaded, declaring an intention to ‘fight those disability benefit cultures and traps that discourage [disabled people] from entering the labour market’, as well as supporting national developments of ‘active labour market policies’.237 ALMPs may be used as a prism through which Article 26 CFR is to be viewed. If this is the case, a human right will be distorted to fit a politically charged economic policy. (b)  Article 26 CFR as Interpretative Aid Having considered the terms of Article 26 CFR, we will now consider its impact on other EU ­provisions. Advocate General Poiares Maduro drew upon Article 26 when considering the 229 Answer given by Viviane Reding on behalf of the Commission 5 February 2013 E-010988/2012. 230 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report of the European Union, CRPD/C/EU/CO/1, 2 October 2015, para 66. Emphasis added. 231 Ibid, 67. 232 European Commission, ‘Reply of the European Union to the list of issues in relation to the initial report of the European Union on the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Brussels, 19.6.2015, SWD(2015), 127 final 117–20. 233 European Commission, Roadmap: European Disability Strategy ‘Initial impact assessment screening & planning of further work’ DG EMPL/G/3. 234 Above, n 33, p 13. 235 Ibid, p 56. 236 Public Employment Services 2020 Working Group 2011, PES and EU 2020: making the employment guidelines work. Adopted by Heads of PES in Budapest, Hungary on 23–24 June 2011. 237 European Disability Strategy, above n 25, p 7 No 4.



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­ ersonal scope of Directive 2000/78 in Coleman.238 The question was whether that directive’s p prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of disability meant only one’s own disability or could also include the grounds of another’s disability. The Advocate General stated that the Directive should be read within a ‘broader human rights context’, listing (albeit in a footnote) the instruments recognised in Recital 4 of the Directive, and adding the UNCRPD and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, namely Chapter III and Article 26.239 These references supported the claim that the legislation be interpreted in the light of its objectives, which required a broad approach. 26.84 Article 26 CFR was thus capable of aiding the interpretation of the Directive, notwithstanding the Charter’s then uncertain status. Having since acquired the level of primary law its role may now be bolder when it comes to interpreting other legislation. Although the Court’s judgment in Coleman did not mention Article 26 CFR, it did refer to the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, noting the need to ensure ‘the social and economic integration of disabled people’.240 The very notion of integration now seems to carry with it some of the spirit of the ‘sea change’, promoting a broad non-discrimination duty and promoting substantive equality and social integration. 26.85 The Court found that a key objective of Directive 2000/78 was creating ‘a level playing field’ in employment and occupation,241 which might be precluded by a narrow, technical reading of non-discrimination duties. Failing to protect from third party discrimination might ‘deprive that directive of an important element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection which it is intended to guarantee’.242 There are, however, limits to the help Coleman offers to employees who care for persons with disabilities. Protection from discrimination was only explicitly extended to associates in the context of direct discrimination and harassment.243 Reasonable accommodation for associates is explicitly ruled out, as the Court claimed the provisions could be ‘rendered meaningless’ or ‘prove to be disproportionate if they were not limited to disabled persons only’.244 The Court was silent on indirect discrimination by association, but the case of CHEZ245 appears to suggest that the Coleman reasoning should be applied in the context of indirect discrimination as well.246 26.86 Another judicial development of the definition of direct discrimination arises from Directive 2000/43 on racial and ethnic origin, but impacts upon Directive 2000/78 and disability. In Feryn247 the ECJ found that declaratory discrimination was unlawful. At issue was the question of whether, when an employer announced a discriminatory approach to recruitment, that announcement should form evidence of an actual discriminatory policy—or whether that announcement in itself was a discriminatory act. The Court found that such declarations were part of the recruitment process since they were ‘clearly likely to strongly dissuade certain candidates from submitting their candidature’,248 so constituted direct discrimination. To have found otherwise would, according to Advocate General Maduro, permit ‘the most blatant strategy

238 Case C-303/06 Coleman, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, 31 January 2008. 239 Ibid; fn 4 to para 7. 240 Case C-303/06 Coleman, judgment, 43. 241 Ibid, 47. 242 Ibid, 51. 243 O’Brien, above n 128. 244 Case C-303/06 Coleman, judgment 42. 245 C-83/14, CHEZ, EU:C:2015:480. 246 See A Ward, ‘The Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on Anti-Discrimination Law: More a Whimper than a Bang?’ (2018) 20 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 32, 45. 247 Case C-54/07 Feryn [2008] ECR I-05187. 248 Ibid, 25.

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of employment discrimination’ through allowing publication ‘of the discriminatory character of their recruitment policy as overtly as possible beforehand’.249 Again, the aims of social and occupational inclusion were at stake, since allowing declaratory 26.87 discrimination would ‘undermine—rather than promote—conditions for a socially inclusive labour market’.250 It seems that only directly discriminatory declarations are captured by Feryn,251 but some of the most insidious and effective forms of discrimination are indirect or relate to reasonable accommodation. What of declarations that those unable to abide by certain (discriminatory) PCPs need not apply, or that particular adjustments will not be considered? Such statements are likely to dissuade persons from applying, and if they were not to attract legal sanction, would seriously undermine the purpose of the provisions on indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodations. Article 26 CFR might be deployed in a push for a stronger commitment to inclusion and integration, and developing declaratory discrimination so that employers are expected to publicly commit to indirect equal treatment and reasonable accommodation. Article 26 CFR may also influence the interpretation given to human rights instruments 26.88 incorporated into Union law. An integration-based approach could have a significant harmonising effect upon the legal construction of mental impairments—an area of highly differentiated approaches between Member States. Presumptions in favour of loss of liberty, or of legal capacity, or of eligibility to vote may need to be dispelled, in light of the Article 12 CRPD requirement to ‘recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’. Where Union-related, human-rights-related questions about legal capacity—such as eligibility to vote in European Parliament elections—arise, it is plausible that Article 26 CFR will influence the ECJ towards adopting an agency-promoting position, taking account of the CRPD, rather than finding such instruments/concerns beyond its jurisdiction. That is not to say that the CFR would explicitly extend human rights competences (the limitations and Protocols stymie any such reading),252 but that it helps the ECJ identify where human rights should play an appropriate role in defining obligations which are clearly Union law matters. Where capacity must be recognised at an EU level, it might then make it difficult for a Member State to continue to deprive a national of the national vote on grounds such as being under partial guardianship (as in Alajos-Kiss v Hungary),253 creating some overlap—practically if not legally—with matters normally the purview of the ECtHR. Other overlaps might include questions of criminal procedure where non-nationals might 26.89 be disadvantaged (as in Cowan),254 and where, in light of Article 26 CFR, disability must be into account. The ECtHR has already found that disability should be taken into account when detaining suspects or convicts, to avoid infringing Article 3 ECHR.255 This may be construed as an obligation to extend reasonable accommodation beyond the employment sphere where human rights are at stake—accommodations which might trigger Union duties under Article 26 CFR. Cowan indicates that receipt of services across borders may be construed widely. The dimension of disability within this particular freedom may add complexity and controversy to some points

249 Ibid, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, 12 March 2008, 17. 250 Ibid. 251 And this is how the UK has interpreted it—see the explanatory notes to the Equality Act 2010. 252 Arts 51 and 53 CFR; Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom [2007] OJ C306/156. 253 Alajos-Kiss v Hungary App no 38832/06 (Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 20 May 2010). 254 Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 00195. 255 Mouisel v France App no 67263/01 (14 November 2002).



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of alleged freedom-infringement—for instance, the movement and advertising of abortion services256 and antenatal screening services. 26.90 The protection of the interests of disabled persons may also require rethinking the free movement of goods, where the limits to restrictions allowed on the grounds of ‘consumer protection’ have been criticised for focusing on non-disabled (‘reasonably circumspect’) consumers,257 potentially neglecting the special requirements of some consumers. 26.91 The potential reach of Article 26 CFR in terms of influencing other obligations, is clearly considerable, yet it seems likely that it will be sporadically and incoherently invoked, and only when there is the right alignment of Union law elements. The possibility of Article 26 CFR producing a rather ad hoc, add-on set of disability considerations, rather than a coherent strategy of rights protection, is further explored in the section below.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 26.92 It might not be straightforward to identify the effect of Article 52 CFR, which stipulates that limitations on Charter rights should be ‘provided for by law’. As Article 26 CFR is itself vague and general, it is difficult to define the right provided for by law, before arguing that any limitation must be so provided. 26.93 The limitations of other instruments may help define the limits of the Charter—such as the limits to protection from discrimination under the ECHR. Article 14 ECHR is parasitic upon other Convention rights, while the standalone provision of Article 1, Protocol 12 has not been ratified by all Member States, so that Member States may be reluctant to approve of the use of the Charter to create a strong generalised non-discrimination right (albeit just in the context of disability), thereby circumventing what might be seen as a deliberate gap. The ESC—one of the two key bases of Article 26 CFR—does contain some exceptions, though their reach will depend on interpretations of the ‘possible’; so signatory states should set up general schemes to provide education and vocational training for persons with disabilities ‘wherever possible’, and to rely on specialised schemes where not. In employment, states should encourage hiring and retention of disabled employees and require adjustment of working conditions—unless ‘not possible by reason of disability’ in which case sheltered employment should be provided. It is not entirely obvious that such definitions of impossibility are shared and uniform across businesses sited next door to each other, let alone across all signatory states. And the language of ‘possibility’ speaks to a medicalised model of disability in which the disabled should be adapted, and where they cannot conform may be segregated. It is an approach in which exclusionary practices and environments are taken for granted because of the convenience of the majority.258 26.94 A significant limitation upon Article 26 CFR is the short-term economic approach adopted by Member States and the Union when deciding what counts as a ‘reasonable’ accommodation or adjustment, since the legal provisions for such adjustments are likely to be the key special measures to which Article 26 refers, and from which disabled people are entitled to benefit. 26.95 It is also possible to identify some limits to any limitations—since related instruments must not be curbed by the Charter (Art 53). For example, the Charter should not act as a ceiling to the UNCRPD, embodying as it does, recognition of human rights to which the Union and all the Member States are party, and moreover being an instrument established years later than the 256 Case C-159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I-04685. 257 L Waddington, ‘The Internal Market and Disability Accessibility: Using EC Law to Establish an Internal Market in Disability Accessible Goods and Services’ Maastricht Working Papers 2008–3. 258 O’Brien above, n 38.

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Charter. So while Article 26 might be read as only offering a dilute right to benefit from special measures where they already exist, this cannot obviate the obligation under Article 5 CRPD to ‘take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided’.259 Where other instruments suggest expansive interpretations of the Charter, their influence 26.96 may be tempered by questions over how justiciable they are. The sources cited as origins of Article 26 are themselves difficult to rely upon. The CCFSRW is a ‘mere political declaration’,260 so of limited use when litigating. The ESC appears to have greater traction, not least as signatories are answerable to the European Committee of Social Rights, which rules on the conformity of the situation in States with the European Social Charter.261 However, it may be difficult to access the rights contained therein, as it is still a piece of international law, so again not conferring decisive rights in dualist systems, such as that of the UK, unless directly incorporated into national law. Moreover, the non-uniform nature of the ESC, due to uneven ratification of the revised version further limits its influence.

V. Remedies In the context of Article 26, we must examine both the existence and accessibility of remedies. 26.97 Dealing first with existence, direct reliance on the Charter would prove difficult for a number of reasons, but especially because of the claimed non-extension of Union competence, so that the Charter apparently only bites where other measures can be found. If a disabled claimant is unable to benefit from provisions for reasonable adjustment, the nature of the remedy will depend on context and on the Member State. Union law provides for penalties in the European Accessibility Act,262 and for individual remedies in the context of discrimination in employment and occupation, by relying on Directive 2000/78 and its national implementing measures. Discrimination remedies will typically be compensation, and are not subject to the limitations placed on other employment claims.263 However, there is no clear provision with regard to social inclusion or community participation, 26.98 though violation of Article 26 CFR in these respects will likely also involve violation of some aspects of the CRPD. As the Union is a signatory, it may be possible to rely on the Convention before the ECJ. However, it is not yet clear to what degree the ECJ would invoke the Convention, beyond making reference to it to aid interpretation of, for example, the concept of disability, as in HK Danmark. It may consider it beyond its remit264 to treat it as more than informative in such circumstances. The strong monitoring requirements built into the CRPD could give it more clout than other 26.99 international instruments—potentially leading to a remedy of change of practice. Each signatory has to designate an independent monitoring body, to promote enforcement of the convention, which reports to the convention committee. In England and Wales265 this is the Equality and Human Rights Commission; cases of infringement should be brought to the EHRC’s attention.

259 CRPD Art 5.3. 260 Eurofound, ‘Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers’, www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/ industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/communitycharterofthefundamentalsocialrightsofworkers.htm. 261 Council of Europe, European Social Charter web page www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter. 262 Directive 2019/882, Art 30. 263 Case C-271/91, Marshall, EU:C:1993:335. 264 Note the Commission’s emphasis on separation of national and EU competences when outlining EU monitoring actions: ‘Fifth Disability High level group report on the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of persons with disabilities’ (May 2012) 106, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/dhlg_5th_report_en.pdf. 265 In Scotland it is the EHRC: Scotland; in Northern Ireland it is the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland.



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In the EU, this responsibility is rather more diffused—falling to an ‘EU framework’ for promoting/ protecting/monitoring, comprised of the European Parliament’s Petitions Committee, the European Ombudsman, the European Commission, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the European Disability Forum (EDF)—an umbrella organisation of civil society organisations working in the field of disability rights. It may not be immediately obvious to someone wishing to invoke the CRPD to address an Article 26 CFR infringement where to take the complaint—and there is the risk that shared responsibility is diluted responsibility, with cases being passed on between the organisations. In any case, the framework’s tasks are rather limited—the main area of proposed activity being EU—not national—legislation and policy, so it only operates where Member States have transferred competence to the EU. It also operates within the area of internal implementation by EU institutions, ‘that is to say vis-à-vis the Union’s Public Administration, for example in relation to their employees as well as in their interaction with citizens and the public’.266 So seeking some form of remedy through monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at EU level may not be terribly fruitful, since many claims will fall within the scope of legislation implemented at Member State level, and the realm of public administration may prove rather narrow. It is not clear for instance whether this remit would capture a claim based on the failure of an EU institution to guarantee a right, which is to be provided through a third party, as opposed to direct infringements by an EU institution. It is also not clear what actions the Framework bodies would take beyond collection of information, to be reported to the UN Committee. 26.100 Where a perceived violation of Article 26 CFR is potentially discriminatory, and another ECHR right is engaged, individuals may make claims under the ECHR, which may be recognised in domestic courts—eg in monist systems or where incorporated in dualist systems, such as the UK where claimants can rely upon the Human Rights Act 1998 to incorporate ECHR rights into national law. Where such a claim is not possible, because of the domestic status of the ECHR, or where it has been defeated but appeals allowed, claimants may be able to litigate before the European Court of Human Rights. However, such a claim could not be said to be rooted in Article 26 CFR, a Union instrument, and the claim must be one of discrimination, rather than a failure to promote social inclusion, or to provide special measures to encourage social inclusion, or a failure to guarantee the full enjoyment of such measures. 26.101 Accessibility of remedies, as already noted, is of particular concern in the context of disability, where disabled persons may be effectively deprived of legal agency through the concept of capacity, or may be refused appropriate assistance, or the right to appoint an agent, thanks to limitations placed on ‘standing’, so rendering certain rights unenforceable and reducing accountability of the public authorities. Those disabled people without carers or family members to offer support and help with asserting rights should not be excluded. The particular risk of loss of agency, through absence of adequate advocacy support, for persons with disabilities, has been highlighted in the European Court of Human Rights, with the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, making an intervention in a case to support an application by an NGO on behalf of a person who had died, without a close relative or legal representative to take the case. Hammarberg criticised the ‘atmosphere of impunity surrounding abuses committed against people with disabilities’,267 and argued that not extending the standing requirements would ‘have

266 Council of the European Union, ‘Revised EU-level Framework Required by Article 33.2 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Annex to (OR. en) 6170/17, Brussels, 9 February 2017, section 2, ‘Scope’. 267 Press release, ‘Access to justice for persons with disabilities: Commissioner Hammarberg intervenes before the Strasbourg Court’ Comm DH033 (2011) Strasbourg, 18 October 2011.

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the undesired effect of depriving a particularly vulnerable group of people of any reasonable prospect of seeking and obtaining redress for violations of their human rights’.268 In the context of employment rights, organisations wishing to act on behalf of persons with 26.102 disabilities in discrimination claims may be able to draw upon Feryn.269 That case involved declarations made to the world at large, rather than to specific, identified individuals, so it would have been difficult to identify those affected if they have chosen to not apply for a job. In Feryn, the case was launched by a third party, a Belgian organisation promoting equal opportunities and opposing racism. This could provide an example for organisations promoting equal opportunities in the context of disability. Moreover, the ECJ found that appropriate remedies could include the award of damages to the body bringing the proceedings, notwithstanding that such body is acknowledged not to be the ‘direct victim’.270

E. Evaluation The emphasis on integration rather than discrimination in Article 26 could indicate, or be used to steer towards, an important new direction in thinking about disability equality within the EU. A more substantive, positive rights approach could draw from the strength of EU nondiscrimination law and the breadth of EU laws referring to accessibility, to make facilitating integration an obligation beyond the spheres of employment and occupation. Article 26 captures, as this chapter has aimed to demonstrate, far-reaching and cross-cutting principles that touch and engage a vast range of other rights, both within the CFR and in other instruments; it is, in this sense, a ‘root’ right connected to many other branches of human rights. The UN CRPD arguably provides a ‘key’ to deciphering the content of Article 26 CFR, with its many provisions offering a great deal of detail as to the possible content of the enigmatically brief Charter right. Integration entails tackling a wide variety of forms of segregation, including genetic segregation as embodied in sterilisation programmes, and also legal exclusion as highlighted by the progress of the Gauer case. Rights of participation require addressing legal agency, political agency and the problematic construct of ‘capacity’, while rights to independence, and to engage in the life of the community are inextricably linked with citizenship and autonomy, and private and family life rights, possibly forcing us to address the apparent devaluation of these rights when a claimant is disabled. Article 26 thus becomes a prism through which other rights should be considered. For example, the rights of children and the elderly must include a disability dimension to address the particular situation that disability can create in different contexts. However, the rather general wording of Article 26 creates an elusive rather than concrete right. It is not clear how much of an obligation could place on Member States to enact special measures in the first place, or how extensive such measures should be to be considered sufficient, or how extensive Member State efforts should be to facilitate usage of those measures. Article 26 CFR could be read minimally as a non-interference provision. If this were the case, the provision may be somewhat incongruent with a strong promotion of the social model of disability, and the attendant obligations outlined in the UNCRPD—an instrument that should not be watered down by the Charter. It is also not clear to what degree Article 26 addresses Member States, or if it just gives a course of action against Union institutions, a course that would be of limited use to the average citizen.



268 Ibid. 269 Case

C-54/07 Feryn.

270 Ibid, [38]–[39].

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But even then, Article 26 could still be a useful interpretative aid when deploying provisions of Union law; not only fundamental rights provisions, or discrimination/disability provisions, but also Union law on free movement, accessibility (of certain goods and services), social security and citizenship. However, Article 26 has not so been used as a mechanism for mainsteaming disability equality, or influencing the interpretation of EU law, and the constructions of disability and discrimination. Instead, it has been, at best, given a throwaway mention by EU institutions. In spite of the rhetoric, the ECJ has failed to give effect to a social model of disability in its reasoning, and it has simultaneously cited and dismissed Article 26. The Commission made no reference to it at all in its substantial review of the 2010-2020 European disability strategy. 26.107 If it does receive greater attention in the future, the influence of Article 26 may not be wholly socially progressive, given the elision of social and occupational integration. The strong traditional economic bent in Union policy, favourable to formal rather than substantive equality, could mean that rather than adopting a more expansive approach to integration, other spheres of activity might be treated as subsidiaries of the primary sphere of employment and occupation. In domestic policy in the UK, for instance, it is possible to see a demonization of non-workers, and a manipulation of the language of the social model of disability so as to treat disability as irrelevant when making welfare benefit decisions. According to extreme ALMP logic all should be treated as capable of work, without regard for the social obstacles that remain in many work places and practices, and subsequent reduced opportunities afforded to disabled job-seekers.271 This move has been fuelled by a strongly ideological (neo-liberal) appropriation of the concepts of inclusion and participation, so as to suggest that individuals each bear responsibility for getting themselves into work. In the context of the European Union, in which disability has most prominently featured in employment related provisions and employment policy, it is all too plausible that integration, independence and life in the community will be subsumed into the short-hand version—work/employment, with all the shifts in burdens of responsibility that implies. The apparent galvanisation through Article 26 of the Union’s stance with regard to integration could in fact be a means to justify taking stronger lines in favour of active labour market policies and against disability ‘benefit traps’. So, it seems that the heart of Article 26 is still all to play for—it could prove an instrument of empowerment or an aid to coercion.

271 Sainsbury notes the danger of an ‘attack on the unemployed at a time when they are least able to do anything about it’. R Sainsbury, ‘21st Century Welfare—getting closer to radical benefit reform?’ (2010) 17(2) Public Policy Research 102.

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Article 27 Article 27 Workers’ Right to Information and Consultation within the Undertaking Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 27 This Article appears in the revised European Social Charter (Article 21) and in the Community Charter on the rights of workers (points 17 and 18). It applies under the conditions laid down by Community law and by national laws. The reference to appropriate levels refers to the levels laid down by Community law or by national laws and practices, which might include the European level when Community legislation so provides. There is a considerable Community acquis in this field: Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty, and Directives 98/59/EC (­collective redundancies), 77/187/EEC (transfers of undertakings) and 94/45/EC (European works ­councils).

Select Bibliography A Alaimo, ‘Il coinvolgimento dei lavoratori nell’impresa: informazione, consultazione et partecipazione’, in S Sciarra and B Caruso (eds), Il lavoro subordinato (Torino, G Giappichelli editore, 2009) 641–707. T Blanke, ‘Workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking (Article 27)’ in B Bercusson (ed), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006) 255–89. G Braibant, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (Paris, Seuil, 2001) 171–75. F Dorssemont, ‘Worker involvement in secondary EC law prior to Recast Directive’ in F Dorssemont and T Blanke (eds), The Recast of the European Works Council Directive (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010) 31–90. ——, ‘The recast of the European Works Council Directive’, in T Blanke et al (eds) Recasting Worker Involvement (Deventer, Kluwer, 2009) 127–56. C Kollonay Lehoczky, ‘The fundamental right of workers to information and consultation under the European Social Charter’ in F Dorssemont and T Blanke (eds), The Recast of the European Works Council Directive (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010) 3–30. P Lorber, ‘Labour Law’, in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 211–30. B Ryan, ‘The Charter and Collective Labour Law’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 67–90. B Teyssié, ‘Article 27. Droit à l’Information et à la consultation des travailleurs au sein de l’entreprise’, in F Picod and S van Drooghenbroeck, Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2018) 613–21. B Veneziani, ‘Article 27. Workers’ Right to Information and Consultation within the undertaking’, in F Dorssemont, K Lörcher, S Clauwaert and M Schmitt, The Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2019) 429–63.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

A.  Field of Application of Article 27 27.01 Article 27 is bound to be extremely relevant due to a long-standing acquis in the field of ­information and consultation rights. The explanations refer to some major EU Directives in this field which were in force in 2000. This catalogue can be updated. At present, it needs to be complemented by the Framework Directive 2002/12 and the Recast Directive 2009/39. The ­‘geographical’ field of application (ratione loci) of these intertwined rights is indicated in a very summary manner, ie ‘at the appropriate levels’. The ‘personal’ scope (ratione personae) is indicated in a much more precise way. The holders of such a right are ‘workers’ or ‘their representatives’. The provision is entirely mute on the object of information and consultation (scope ratione materiae). 27.02 In my view, the mutism on the object could warrant the qualification of the right to information and consultation as constituting a ‘principle’ in the meaning of Article 52(5) of the Charter. Hence, this right would not be judicially cognisable in absence of an implementation within EU law. In my view, this flaw is far from being problematic, since the subject matter constitutes one of the most highly developed parts of EU labour law. Despite the fact that the qualification of a right as a principle does not exclude judicial cognisability, the Court missed an opportunity to provide this cognisability in Association de mediation sociale. Instead the Court ruled contrary to the opinion of the Advocate-General that Article 27 CFREU lacked ‘direct effect’, to the extent that it could not empower the French judiciary to disapply national provisions recognised to be at variance with an EU Directive implementing the right to information and consultation.1 27.03 According to the explanation, the ‘conditions’ are defined both by EU law and by national laws. In my view, this explanation is not very consistent with the main idea that the Charter is only applicable to EU institutions and to the Member States implementing EU law. Thus, it is more consistent to state that the appropriate levels regarding the right to information and consultation are defined by the EU Directives implementing such a right. The latter will obviously be implemented in their own right by national legislation and/or practices in the Member States. However, these conditions defined by national law should be consistent with the EU Directives. Insofar as these EU Directives refer to national law and practices, the latter might come into play. 27.04 An analysis of the applicable EU Directives amounts to the conclusion that the right to information and consultation will come into play at a variety of levels: —— establishment and undertaking; —— the ‘company’ in the meaning of company law; —— the group of undertakings.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 27 with Other Provisions of the Charter 27.05 The right to information and consultation cannot be dissociated from the exercise of the managerial prerogative. It constitutes a procedural restriction of the latter. The exercise of the managerial prerogative is deeply rooted in the freedom to conduct a business.2 This right is recognised 1 Case C-176/12, Association de mediation sociale, [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2. See F Dorssemont, ‘The Right to ­Information and Consultation in Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Less than a Right and Less than a Principle, just an Ordinary Provision Lacking Direct Effect?’, (2014) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 704–22. 2 See Art 16 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

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‘in accordance with Union law and national laws’. Many EU Directives have stressed the idea that the right to information and consultation should not affect the exercise of the managerial prerogative.3 The right to information and consultation needs to be distinguished from the right to 27.06 ‘negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels’ of Article 28 of the Charter. Whereas the right to information and consultation precedes the adoption of a unilateral decision by management, the right to negotiate amounts to a legal act, ie an agreement, which will be concluded by management and labour. There is another distinction that is related to the issue of the holdership of the right. The right to negotiation is attributed to workers and employers or their respective organisations. The right to information and consultation is attributed solely to workers and their ‘representatives’. Contrary to the provision related to the right to ‘negotiate’, the ‘representatives’ are not identified as such. It is not at all clear whether the ‘representatives’ involved refer to representatives designated by trade unions, or representatives which are elected by workers’ representatives. In sum, whereas the right to negotiate is being construed as a trade union prerogative, the right to information and consultation is not being approached per se in such a manner. This potential dissociation in the holdership of the right to information and collective bargaining can constitute a problem, insofar as adequate information is a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations. The question arises as to whether the right to information and consultation could be related to 27.07 other provisions which help to contextualise the right to information and consultation. In cases of restructuring, the right to information and consultation could serve as a means to prevent or mitigate collective redundancies. At first sight, it seems challenging to relate the ‘right to protection against unjustified dismissal’4 to the right to information and consultation. In Mono Car Styling5 Advocate General Mengozzi examined to what extent the violation of the right to information and consultation was intertwined with the right to protection against unjustified dismissal. The Advocate General distinguished between an employment protection aimed at combatting unjustified dismissals and employment protection related to merely irregular dismissals. He concluded that ‘Breaches of Directive 98/59, on the other hand, do not appear to be such as to justify reference to Article 30 of the Charter for, given the content of the directive, it is intended that the result of such breaches will be illegality of a formal/procedural kind.’6 In our view, Article 31 of the Charter (the right to working conditions which respect his or 27.08 her health, safety and dignity) might be relevant for the issue of information and consultation, insofar as a case could be built that worker involvement is essential to the issue of health and safety (the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity). Many arguments seem to plead in favour of such a case. Thus, the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989) insists on the adoption of measures which ‘take account, in particular, of the need for the training, information, consultation and balanced participation of workers as regards the risks incurred and the steps taken to eliminate or reduce them’ in view of the right to enjoy satisfactory health and safety conditions in his working environment.7 Article 22 of the Revised European Social Charter recognises a right to take part in the determination and 3 Part 2(c) in fine of the Standard Rules of the SE Directive; Point 3 in fine of the subsidiary requirements of the Recast Directive (EWC) 2009/38, Art 2(1)(e) of the Framework Directive ‘Decisions within the scope of the employer’s power’. 4 See Art 30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (emphasis added). 5 See Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling [2009] ECR I-6653. 6 Ibid [96]. 7 See Point 19 of the Community Charter for fundamental social rights of workers: www.aedh.eu/plugins/fckeditor/ userfiles/file/Conventions%20internationales/Community_Charter_of_the_Fundamental_Social_Rights_of_Workers. pdf (emphasis added).



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improvement of the working conditions and working environment in the undertaking. Last but not least, the Framework Directive 89/391 insists in the recitals on the necessity of ‘information, dialogue and balanced participation on safety and health at work’.8 Article 11 of the Directive adopts a very progressive stance to the issue of worker involvement. As opposed to worker involvement in scenarios of restructuring, worker representatives are not only informed and consulted, but are entitled to play a more proactive role by submitting proposals to the employer. The article refers to ‘participation’. 27.09 In Commission v Netherlands,9 the CJEU has considered that ‘the aim of the Directive is to promote balanced participation of employers and workers in activities related to protection against and prevention of occupational risks’.10 27.10 The Court has rejected the view that this objective is merely instrumental to the protection of health and safety. Though the Court had to rule in a dispute on the precedence which the Directive has given to the internal organisation of protective and preventive services, the considerations of the Court with regard to the aims of the Directive transcend the issue of the organisation of these services. It has considered that these aims are ‘not solely improving the protection of workers against accidents at work and the prevention of occupational risks, but also intending to to introduce specific measures to organise that protection and prevention’.11 The considerations are also relevant to assess the quintessential nature of other modalities of worker involvement, such as the role played by worker representatives.

C.  Sources of Article 27 Rights 27.11 As indicated in the Explanation, two obvious sources can be put forward which have stressed the fundamental character of the right to information and consultation. Both sources are fairly recent. The Explanation refers to Article 21 of the Revised European Social Charter.12 Article 21 states: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of workers to be informed and consulted within the undertaking, the Parties undertake to adopt or encourage measures enabling workers or their ­representatives, in accordance with national legislation and practice: (a) to be informed regularly or at the appropriate time and in a comprehensible way about the economic and financial situation of the undertaking employing them, on the understanding that the disclosure of certain information which could be prejudicial to the undertaking may be refused or subject to confidentiality; (b) to be consulted in good time on proposed decisions which could substantially affect the interests of workers, particularly on those decisions which could have an important impact on the employment situation in the undertaking.

27.12 This article dates back to the adoption of the 1988 Additional Protocol and has been integrated in the 1996 Revised European Social Charter. It is to be regretted that the explanation does 8 See Recital Council Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1–8. 9 Case C-441/01 Commission v Netherlands ECR I-5463. 10 Ibid [54]. 11 Ibid [38]. 12 For a more comprehensive analysis of the right to information and consultation in the RESC, see in minute detail the excellent contribution of C Kollonay Lehoczky, ‘The fundamental right of workers to information and consultation under the European Social Charter’, in F Dorssemont and T Blanke (eds), The Recast of the European Works Council Directive (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010) 3–30.

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not refer to the more specific Article 29 RESC, which recognises a right to information and consultation ‘in situations of collective redundancies’. The article adopts a less rigorous stance on the issue of the timing of the information and consultation procedure, as opposed to EU Directive 98/59. It prescribes information and consultation ‘in good time prior to such collective ­redundancies’, whereas EU Directive 98/58 obliges an employer to inform and consult as soon as he contemplates collective redundancies. The RESC illustrates how the consequences of ­collective ­redundancies could be mitigated. In this respect, it suggests, inter alia, recourse to ­accompanying social measures aimed, in particular, at aid for the redeployment. EU Directive 98/59 also ­suggests such measures, but also mentions the idea of aid for retraining workers. The Explanation also point to Articles 17 and 18 of the Community Charter of Fundamental 27.13 Social Rights of Workers. These provisions state: 17. Information, consultation and participation for workers must be developed along appropriate lines, taking account of the practices in force in the various Member States. This shall apply especially in companies or groups of companies having establishments or companies in several Member States of the European Community. 18. Such information, consultation and participation must be implemented in due time, particularly in the following cases: —— when technological changes which, from the point of view of working conditions and work organisation, have major implications for the work force are introduced into undertakings; —— in connection with restructuring operations in undertakings or in cases of mergers having an impact on the employment of workers; —— in cases of collective redundancy procedures.

The question arises whether the right to information and consultation could possibly be related 27.14 to the progressive development of the scope of Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights. In National Union of Belgian Police, the European Court of Human Rights a­ cknowledged that a police union which was not recognised as representative for the provincial and municipal civil service, had the right ‘to be heard’ by the government.13 The right of unions ‘to be heard’ is the first corollary right which the European Court of Human Rights has recognised as being ­‘necessarily inherent’ in the right to form and join trade unions to ‘protect’ the interests of workers. The Court in fact argued that the phrase ‘for the protection of his interests’ is not redundant.14 Thus the teleological coda of Article 11(1) serves as the basis for the development of corollary rights which have not been explicitly recognised. The Court ruled that a trade union has the right to make its position known to the government (as employer), to be heard and to defend the interests of its members. The union in question in fact enjoyed this right. The right to be heard needs to be distinguished from the right to be consulted. As evidenced by 27.15 the facts of the case, the trade union concerned had the right to be heard, but it did not have a right to be consulted with regard to the adoption of the regulations applicable to the municipal and provincial staff. This process needs to be distinguished from collective bargaining. The regulations were adopted through a unilateral act of the administration. They were related to the employment conditions of the entire municipal and provincial staff. Obviously, the police union was not representative at all in this respect. In contrast to several judges who issued dissenting opinions, the Court felt that the police union likewise did not have a right to be involved in the adoption of those provisions pertaining solely to police members.15





13 National 14 Ibid 15 Ibid

Union of Belgian Police App no 4464/70 (ECtHR, 27 October 1975). [39]. [49].

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27.16

The precise scope of the ‘right to be heard’ is troublesome. In National Union of Belgian Police, the Court did not provide much guidance. In Wilson the Court reaffirmed the recognition of the right to be heard as a general principle.16 In applying this general principle to the facts of the case, it elaborated on the existence of a ‘right to seek to persuade the employer to listen to what it has to say on behalf of its members’.17 Referring to the development of ‘essential elements’ in its case law, the Grand Chamber in Demir and Baykara II did not refer to ‘a right to be heard’, but solely to this more elaborated formula. Hence, there can be no doubt that these two formulas refer to an identical element considered to be inherent in the right to organise.18 27.17 The right to be heard has been construed as an essential element of trade union freedom. Its object remains unclear. The right to be informed and consulted goes further. It will force an employer to provide precise information in a more proactive manner, whereas he only has to receive a trade union which wants to be heard if it insists on being heard. The right to be heard does not in my view force an employer to substantiate the reasons why the observations expressed could not be taken into account. Furthermore, the right to be heard has been construed as an essential trade union prerogative, whereas the right to be informed and consulted can be exercised by workers’ representatives. There is no reason to assume that the latter will have to be trade union officials. 27.18 Though it would be erroneous to suggest that information and consultation rights ought to be construed as trade union prerogatives, the attribution of those rights to elected workers’ representatives might generate a risk of undermining the position of trade unions within the enterprise. Equally, however, it guarantees representation in work places where trade unions are not organised.19 27.19 Last but not least, the right to information and consultation has been given a constitutional status in some EU Member States.20 As a general rule, most of the provisions which could be used as a basis to warrant that the right to information and consultation is constitutionally anchored, do not refer as such to the existence of a right to information and consultation. Instead they use a more generic formula related to an idea of ‘participation’ of the workers in the management of the firm. Examples are legion: —— Article 46 of the Italian Constitution; —— the Preamble of the French Constitution (1946); —— Article 54 of the Portuguese Constitution (which also refers to information in an explicit way); and —— Article 19 of the Dutch Constitution. 27.20 The word ‘participation’ is somewhat ambiguous. It could refer to a generic concept like ‘worker involvement’ or to the idea that workers through their representatives have a right to co determination. This general formula was first used in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic.21 16 Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v United Kingdom App no 15573/89 (ECtHR, 2 July 2002) [42]. See also KD Ewing, ‘The implications of Wilson and Palmer’ [2003] Industrial Law Journal 1–22. 17 Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others (n 15) [44]. 18 Demir and Baykara v Turkey App no 34503/97 (ECtHR, 12 November 2008) [145]. 19 Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I-2435. 20 See in this respect T Blanke, ‘Workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking (Article 27)’ in B Bercusson (ed), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006) 269–78. 21 Art 165 of the Weimar Constitution: ‘Workers and employees are called to collaborate on equal footing with the entrepreneurs to the regulation of wages and working conditions as well as to the overall economic development of the productive forces. The organisations of workers and entrepreneurs and their agreements are recognised. Workers and employees will be represented for the furtherance of their social and economic interests in workers’ councils as well as in

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D. Analysis I.  General Remarks An analysis of the acquis of workers’ involvement Directives reveals that the European legislator regulates national as well as transnational information and consultation procedures. One can spot a certain historic fluctuation. The Collective Redundancy Directive22 and the Transfer of Undertakings Directive23 which came into being in the mid seventies, are primarily aimed at national restructuring operations. This does not prevent a transnational transfer of undertaking from falling within the scope of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive. The subsidiarity principle should not be explained in such a way that the European legislator must refrain from regulating purely national restructuring operations. The interest of the European Commission in transnational issues of worker involvement issues led to a successful breakthrough only at the beginning of the 1990s, with the adoption of the EWC Directive (in 1994).24 A second breakthrough was the SE Directive (2001).25 Workers’ participation within the Societas Europaea was already at the heart of the proposal for a Council Regulation on the statute for a European limited liability company (1970).26 The Framework Directive 2002/1427 links up again with the concern to regulate information and consultation on a national level. The amendments and rewriting of the Collective Redundancy Directive and the Transfer of Undertakings Directive in 1992, 1998 and 2001 show that this concern has been ongoing. As regards content, the legislator seems to have paid attention to the issue of permanent and general economic and social information (and consultation), as well as to that of information and consultation in extraordinary circumstances affecting workers’ interests to a considerable extent. The European legislator seems to have expended most of his efforts on the issue of information and consultation. The more delicate matter of participation—more delicate because it is more conditioned by national and ideological differences—remained mostly untouched. It is not consecrated by the Charter.

district workers’ councils at professional level as well as in the Federal workers’ council.’ (Original German: Die Arbeiter und Angestellten sind dazu berufen, gleichberechtigt in Gemeinschaft mit den Unternehmern an der Regelung der Lohnund Arbeitsbedingungen sowie an der gesamten wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der produktiven Kräfte mitzuwirken. Die beiderseitigen Organisationen und ihre Vereinbarungen werden anerkannt. Die Arbeiter und Angestellten erhalten zur Wahrnehmung ihrer sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Interessen gesetzliche Vertretungen in Betriebsarbeiterräten sowie in nach Wirtschaftsgebieten gegliederten Bezirksarbeiterräten und in einem Reichsarbeiterrät.) 22 Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16–21. 23 Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16–20. 24 Council Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees [1994] OJ L254/64–72. 25 Council Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees [2001] OJ L294/22–32. 26 [1970] OJ C124/1. 27 Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community—Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee representation [2002] OJ L80/29–34.



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27.25

In 1998 and 2001, the Directives of 1975 and 1977 respectively were repealed and replaced. In this process, a remarkable recital was added.28 In this recital, a specific reference to the Community Charter of the Rights of Workers was made. Regrettably, neither Directive refers to the Additional Protocol of the European Social Charter.

II.  Scope of Application (a) Holdership Ratione Personae 27.26 The workers’ involvement Directives aim at developing a so-called right to information and consultation or participation. The Directives clearly show that workers’ representatives have a natural vocation to exercise these rights. This, however, does not make them per se holders (in French: titulaires) of these rights. Thus, in one staff case a civil servant requested the annulment of her individual pay slip arguing that the Staff regulations on which it had been indirectly based had been amended in violation of the rights of information and consultation exercised through the staff representatives. Although this request was considered to be ill founded, it was not declared to be inadmissible because the applicant, not being a staff representative, invoked the violation of the prerogatives of these representatives.29 27.27 In our view, the right to information and consultation are best described as collective freedoms (libertés collectives). The collective character of these freedoms stems from three factors. First, these rights do not consider their holders primarily as atomised individuals of civil society, but as members of a collective. Second, these employment rights are not only collective due to the way they are exercised, their content is of a collective nature as well. The subject of the information and consultation is fundamentally the global or collective situation of workers. 27.28 However, the holders of these collective freedoms are, in our opinion, individual workers. ‘The collective’, the ‘labour’, the ‘trade union’ or the body representative of the workers is not the holder of these collective liberties. 27.29 The Community Charter construes this right to information and consultation unequivocally as a fundamental right of workers. At first sight, the wording of the Additional Protocol of the European Social Charter and the Charter of Nice is more ambiguous. The right to information and consultation is declared as a right for the benefit of workers or their representatives. The Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol explains that the use of the word ‘or’ has no exclusive meaning. The explanation seems to indicate an inclusive use. The distinction between the legal capacity to enjoy the benefits of these rights and the legal capacity to actually exercise these rights is not emphasised.30 27.30 It is remarkable that the Charter only mentions the right to information and consultation of workers in the heading of Article 27. Employee representation is only mentioned in the wording of the fundamental right following the heading. The manner in which this fundamental right is drafted seems to indicate the exercise rather than mere enjoyment of the right. The reference to employee representatives in both declarations does not seem to be an argument to edge off the thesis that employees are the real holders of these fundamental rights. On the contrary, it seems 28 Recital 6 of the Preamble of the Collective Redundancy Directive and Recital 5 of the Preamble of the Transfer of Undertakings Directive. 29 Case T-17/14, U4U, UHSU, RS and Georges Vlandas (General Court, 15 September 2016); Case T-527/16, Margarita Tapias versus Council of the European Parliament, (General Court, 12 December 2019). 30 See ‘Rapport explicatif au Protocol additionnel’ in Charte sociale européenne (Strasbourg, Editions du Conseil d’Europe, 2001) 131: ‘que les droits reconnus par ces deux dispositions peuvent être exercées par les travailleurs ou par leurs représentants, ou par les uns et les autres’.

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to emphasise the importance of employee representation in the exercise of this fundamental right. Moreover, this reference seems to create a buffer against direct or atomising employee representation systems. In the recent Mono Car Styling31 judgment with regard to the Belgian transposition of the 27.31 Collective Redundancies Directive, the Court of Justice considered that the right to information and consultation is addressed (destiné) to workers’ representatives and not to employees individually. It was said to benefit the employees as a whole. The Court did consider that the right is exercised by workers’ representatives. These elements are not at odds with the idea that employees as members of a group can be considered to be the holders of a right to information and consultation as a collective freedom. However, the Court rejected such an approach and decided to qualify the right to information and consultation as being of a ‘collective nature’. It allowed Member States to deny an individual employee’s access to justice in the event of a violation of information and consultation procedures. Thus, it seems the Court is unable to recognise that the right to information and consultation is being held by employees as opposed to workers’ representatives. The Court did not look into the human rights instruments related to information and consultation. The judgment was merely based on a teleological and systematic interpretation of the Collective Redundancies Directive. Article 7(6) of the Transfer of Undertaking Directive 2001/23 construes the right to information and consultation as a right of individuals in case of an absence of workers representatives.32

III.  Specific Provisions (a) Information The most embryonic form of ‘involvement’ is the right to information. In a number of European Directives the content of the term ‘information’ is not defined.33 The SE Directive and the Framework Directive do contain such a definition.34 The definition of the right to information violates the id per id prohibition in some languages. The Dutch versions link the right to information to the provision of data by the employer to the employee representatives in order to allow them to acquire knowledge, explore a relevant subject and assess it. The emphasis is on the auxiliary function of information, as opposed to consultation. Information does not imply the transfer of knowledge or the transfer of an opinion on certain facts. It aims at the transfer of data which constitutes the basis of knowledge and the formation of an opinion by the employee representatives. The employer’s duty to cooperate with the consultative bodies forces the former to perform this duty to inform in good faith.35 The definitions according to the SE Directive and the Framework Directive emphasise the implications of this principle with respect to the time, the manner and content of this information. Neither the Framework Directive’s nor the SE Directive’s definitions of ‘information’ make it clear that this information must be in writing. More specific clauses of these Directives do not

31 Case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling (n 4). 32 See also B Teyssié, ‘Article 27. Droit à l’Information et à la consultation des travailleurs au sein de l’entreprise’, in F Picod and S van Drooghenbroeck, Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2018) 617. 33 See, eg the Collective Redundancy Directive, the Transfer of Undertakings Directive and the EWC Directive. 34 Art 2(i) SE Directive and Art 2(f) Framework Directive. 35 For the implications of a pre-institutional and pre-negotiational duty to cooperate, see Case C-62/99 Bofrost [2001] ECR I-2579 (analysed below).



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mention the written character of this information, either. Article 2 of the Subsidiary Requirements of the EWC Directive mentions ‘the right to meet with the central management once a year, to be informed and consulted, on the basis of a report drawn up by the central management’. The extraordinary information and consultation meeting takes place on the basis of a report (oral or written?) of the central or any another management at a more appropriate level. In two Staff cases the General Court expressed a timid preference for written information in the context of a procedure to amend the Staff Regulations, but provided some leeway for the EU insitutions not to provide these documents.36 The mere fact that they did not exist was good enough reason not to communicate. Neither did the General Court insists on the obligation to draft reports following such meetings. 27.36 Neither the European Social Charter, the Community Charter, nor the Charter of Nice mentions the oral or written nature of the information. 27.37 The Recast (EWC) Directive 2009/38 defines the concept of information as ‘a transmission of data by the employer to the employees’ representatives in order to enable them to acquaint themselves with the subject matter and to examine it’.37 Furthermore, the Recast Directive indicates that ‘information shall be given at such time, in such fashion and with such content as are appropriate to enable employees’ representatives to undertake an in-depth assessment of the possible impact and, where appropriate, prepare for consultations with the competent organ of the Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of undertakings’.38 (b) Consultation 27.38 The ‘right to consultation’ can be defined best by contrasting it with a process of ‘collective bargaining’.39 Consultation is a procedure in which employees or their representatives can influence employers’ decisions. This decision takes on the form of a unilateral expression of the will. Formally, employee representatives do not take part in this final decision. The idea of ‘consultation’ suggests that there is a scope of powers exercised by the employer. A number of provisions refer to this scope as the ‘managerial prerogative’.40 27.39 The objective of collective bargaining is a meeting of the wills in a collective agreement. This implies a voluntary reduction of the unilateral managerial powers. With this procedure, certain matters are withdrawn from the scope of the managerial prerogative. As long as a certain collective agreement remains in force, its subject matter cannot be unilaterally changed by the employer. 27.40 The Collective Redundancy Directive, the Transfer of Undertakings Directive, the SE Directive and the Framework Directive seem to obscure the clear-cut distinction between ‘consultation’ and ‘collective bargaining’. According to the Collective Redundancy Directive and the Transfer of Undertakings Directive, the employee representatives, for instance, are consulted ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ (Art 2).41

36 See cases mentioned in footnote 29. 37 Art 2(1)(f) Recast Directive. 38 Ibid (emphasis added). 39 In this respect, see also O Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London, Stevens & Sons, 1972) 91–92 and T Van Peijpe, ‘Industrial Relations Processes’ in J Malmberg (ed), Effective Enforcement and EC Labour Law (The Hague, Kluwer International, 2003) 78–80. 40 Part 2(c) in fine of the SE Directive; Art 3 in fine of the EWC Directive, Art 2(1)(e) of the Framework Directives ‘Decisions within the scope of the employer’s power’. In this respect, see: R Blanpain, F Blanquet, F Herman and A Mouty, Vredeling Proposal. Information And Consultation Of Employees In Multinational Enterprises (Deventer, Kluwer, 1983) 22 and F Dorssemont, ‘Richtlijn 94/45’ [1995] Revue de droit social 462–63. See also ILO Recommendation no 94. 41 Art 2(1) Collective Redundancy Directive and Art 7(2) Transfer of Undertakings Directive.

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The SE Directive mentions consultation in the event of ‘exceptional circumstances affecting the employees’ interests to a considerable extent’. The Standard Rules determine that, in such circumstances, the representative body is entitled to express an opinion on ‘measures significantly affecting employees’ interests’. Where the competent organ decides not to act in accordance with the opinion, a further meeting will take place ‘with a view to seeking agreement’. The Framework Directive mentions the opinion of employees’ representatives followed by ‘a response and the reasons for that response’ obtained from the employer. If this exchange of opinions or dialogue concerns ‘decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual relations’, the consultation must take place ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’.42 The passage ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ expresses the objective of the consultation procedure. In the EWC Directive and the Transfer of Undertakings Directive, the objective of the consultation procedure is not clarified. The use of the terminology ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ is somewhat puzzling. It would be better not to interpret the term ‘agreement’ as a formal collective agreement. Such an interpretation seems problematic for the following two reasons. The terminology used in certain language versions (‘akkoord’, ‘overeenstemming’, ‘accord’, ‘accordo’, ‘Einigung’) is not the traditional terminology used to indicate binding collective agreements in the Member States. It is unlikely that the European legislator would have wanted the organs with traditional information and consultation obligations to obtain real power to enter into collective agreements. The Framework Directive mentions information and consultation explicitly with a view to reaching an agreement on decisions which fall within the scope of the managerial prerogative. The opposite conclusion would imply some kind of competition between employee representatives which belong to a trade union and those who do not. A number of ILO instruments emphasise the fact that information and consultation rights must not be used to undermine the position of trade unions.43 This interpretation interferes directly with the issue of employee representation. A more plausible and meaningful interpretation of the use of the word ‘agreement’ seems to be that the consultation process should not be reduced to a formal juxtaposition of a proposal for a decision from the employer’s side, and the opinion on this proposal from the employees’ side, after which the autocratic managerial decision process can continue. The Framework Directive indicates in a constructive way that the employer with a duty to consult must give reasons for not taking into account this opinion. The Court of Justice, however, does not seem to accept this interpretation. In two cases of 8 June 1994, the Court did not deem the UK legislation transposing this Directive to be in conformity with the Directive. The Commission was of the opinion that the UK Employment Protection Act and the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations had not correctly implemented the duty to consult with a view to reaching an agreement. Both Acts provided only for an obligation to consult with respect to intended redundancies, the obligation to take remarks into account, reply to these remarks and motivate rejections. The Court acknowledged the critique of the Commission.44 The Court, however, did not indicate the added value of this formula. The EWC Directive, the SE Directive and the Framework Directive give definitions for the ‘right to consultation’. The common denominator of these definitions is that consultation is indicated as a ‘dialogue’ or ‘an exchange of points of view or thoughts’.45



42 Art

4 Framework Directive. this respect, see also Art 5 ILO Convention no 135 and ILO Recommendations nos 94 and 113. 44 Case C-382/92 Commission v United Kingdom (n 19). 45 Art 2(f) EWC Directive, Art 2(j) SE Directive and Art 2(e) Framework Directive. 43 In

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The litmus test to assess the efficiency and ‘progressiveness’ of the different definitions and approaches in all of these Directives is a matter of anteriority. This matter is about the chronology of the obligation to consult. The subject and the direct cause of the obligation to consult are usually referred to as circumstances affecting the employees’ interests to a considerable extent.46 The use of the term ‘circumstances’ seems somewhat surprising. ‘Circumstances’ seems to refer to events beyond the control of the employer or undertaking, which take him by surprise or which are related to the state of affairs he happens to run into. In reality, consultation is a process of legal acts on behalf of and at the expense of the employer. This is exactly why it is invariably stated that the information and consultation procedure does not affect the ‘managerial prerogative’. In the end, the exercise of these prerogatives is the subject of the information and consultation procedure. The use of the word ‘circumstances’ seems to act as some kind of lightning rod. It distracts attention from the fact that in the end, the legal acts of the employer are at stake. Secondly, it puts up a smoke screen. It is not clarified at all whether consultation relates to decisions or to proposals of decisions. In this respect, the wording of Article 4 of the Framework Directive, in which the term ‘decisions’ is used, can only be applauded. The Directives related to workers’ involvement seem to suggest that the employer has a duty to inform and consult in circumstances affecting the employees’ interests to a considerable extent. This assumption ignores the fact that the negative impact of such ‘circumstances’ will always be caused by a decision of the employer (collective redundancy, closure). ‘Circumstances’ will never affect the employees’ interests to a considerable extent. Inevitably, the question arises whether consultation should take place before or on the moment the decision is taken. The most important international human rights instruments concerning the right to information and consultation have weighty indications that information and consultation must take place before the employer takes his decision. Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter47 mentions a ‘right to be consulted in good time on proposed decisions which could substantially affect the interests of workers, particularly on those decisions which could have an important impact on the employment situation in the undertaking’. Article 18 of the Community Charter emphasises that consultation must be implemented in due time (inter alia) ‘in connection with restructuring operations in undertakings or in cases of mergers having an impact on the employment of workers and in cases of collective redundancy procedures’. Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU stipulates that: ‘workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices.’ It does not indicate the subject of consultation.48 The use of the terms ‘restructuring’ and ‘procedures’ in the Community Charter is somewhat vague. It is not clear in which phase of the process consultation must start. According to the so-called Action Programme launched by the European Commission as a result of the Community Charter, information and consultation needed to be operated ‘before taking any decision liable to have serious consequences for the interests of workers’.49

46 In this respect see Recital 3 of the Subsidiary Requirements of the EWC Directive; Part 2(c) SE Directive. 47 For an analysis of this article, see: L Samuel, Droits sociaux fondamentaux (Strasbourg, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, 2002) 475–77; F Van Damme, ‘Les droits protégés par la Charte sociale, contenu et protée’ in J-F Akandji-Kombe and S Leclerc, La Charte sociale européenne (Brussels, Bruylant, 2001) 24–25. See also ‘Rapport Explicatif au Protocol additionnel de 1998’, nos 29–44 in Charte sociale européenne (n 29) 131–34. 48 G Braibant, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (Paris, Seuil, 2001) 171–75. 49 COM (89) 568 final, 33.

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In the Collective Redundancy Directive, wording was used which removes all doubt about the fact that the consultation procedure must take place before the employer’s decision. The Court of Justice has emphasised this anteriority abundantly in Junk50 and recently in Fujitsu Siemens.51 The duty to consult arises from the moment the employer contemplates collective redundancies. The anteriority is a function of the objective of the consultation procedure since it is primarily aimed at avoiding collective redundancies. A consultation to reduce the dimensions of or mitigate the adverse effects of the decision is a second best option. It is regrettable that the legislator has abandoned such unambiguous and progressive position in the wording of the more recent Directives. In the Subsidiary Requirements of the EWC Directive, the wording is somewhat compromised. The versions preceding the final version of the Directive mention a consultation procedure for proposed decisions whilst at the same time pointing at the responsibility of the central management for the final decision. The chosen wording does not show how the anteriority issue has been solved. This vagueness is probably intentional—to make the text capable of compromise. Whilst the Subsidiary Requirements of the Recast (EWC) Directive indicate that information and consultation must take place as soon as possible, this was omitted in the Standard Rules of the SE Directive. The general definition of the term ‘consultation’ indicates that consultation must take place ‘at a time … which allows the employees’ representatives … to express an opinion … which may be taken into account in the decision-making process.’52 It is our view that the decision-making process regarding restructuring is a strongly phased process. Schematically, four stages can be distinguished:

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(a) the moment at which the employer actually contemplates a restructuring decision; (b) the moment at which the employer makes this decision; (c) the moment at which the decision is communicated to employees’ representatives or third parties; (d) the moment at which the decision is implemented. It is completely unclear to which moment in time the chronology of the EWC and SE Directives 27.57 refers. The Framework Directive makes no reference to the chronology of the consultation procedure, 27.58 either in the definition of ‘consultation’ or in its body text. Article 4(4) of the Framework Directive mentions in rather vague terms that consultation shall take place ‘while ensuring that the timing [is] appropriate’. In the original version of this Directive, the effectiveness principle was also expressly referred to in the definition of the term ‘consultation’. The definition then added ‘ensuring that the timing, method and content are such that this step is effective’. The reference to effectiveness in Article 1(2) of the Framework Directive53 will hopefully act as a catalyst for a progressive interpretation which does justice to the principle of anteriority. The previous EWC Directive has defined consultation as ‘the exchange of views and 27.59 establishment of dialogue between employees’ representatives and central management or any more appropriate level of management’.54 The Recast Directive has added precision to this definition. Thus, consultation is being described as ‘the establishment of dialogue and exchange

50 Case C-188/03 Imtraud Junk v Kühnel [2005] ECR I-885. For an interpretation, see our annotation in (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1–17. 51 Case C-44/08 Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto v Fujitsu Siemens Computers [2009] ECR I-8163. 52 Art 2 SE Directive. 53 [1999] OJ C2. 54 Art 2(1)(f) EWC Directive.



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of views between employees’ representatives and central management or any more appropriate level of management, at such time, in such fashion and with such content as enables employees’ representatives to express an opinion on the basis of the information provided about the proposed measures to which the consultation is related, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management, and within a reasonable time, which may be taken into account within the Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of undertakings’.55 27.60 In sum, the Recast Directive has underlined the essence of timing, form and substance for information and consultation. It correctly defines information as the transfer of data rather than of knowledge. The timing, the form and substance of the communication should allow the workers’ representatives to ‘undertake an indepth assessment’—to acquire knowledge. Both definitions are in line with good legislative practices expressed in the SE Directive and the Framework Directive. 27.61 The definition of information combines elements of the definition enshrined in the latter Directives.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations (a)  Limitations of the Fundamental Right to Information and Consultation 27.62 Fundamental employment rights are hardly ever absolute rights. The right to information and consultation is no exception to this. Numerous European and international human rights ­instruments have already indicated these limitations. Below, these limitations are considered at this level first, and then analysed in the workers’ involvement Directives. (b) Limitations Ratione Personae Thresholds 27.63 Article 2(2) of the Additional Protocol of the European Social Charter (1988) gives the Contracting States the opportunity to exclude companies from the scope of application of the article if the number of employees is lower than a certain threshold determined by law or national practice.56 27.64 Neither the Community Charter nor the Charter of Fundamental Rights seems to take the scale of undertakings into account in the determination of the scope of application of rights. Title X of the TFEU refers to the right to information and consultation. Article 153(2) TFEU expressly states that such Directives shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings. 27.65 Most of the Directives scrutinised in this contribution have a minimum threshold of employment as conditio sine qua non for the actual enjoyment of the right to information and consultation. Some of these thresholds can be derived from the description of the substantive scope of application of these Directives. The threshold can mostly be derived from the stipulations describing the personal scope of application. 27.66 The definition of the term ‘collective redundancy’, for instance, implies that the Collective Redundancy Directive only applies to establishments (‘établissement’, ‘Betrieb’) normally employing more than 20 workers. This minimum threshold must relate to employment within



55 Art 56 In

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this ‘establishment’.57 The Court of Justice58 has clarified that this term should be given an autonomous Community meaning. The Framework Directive prescribes a duty to inform and consult at the level of undertakings employing at least 50 employees in any one Member State or establishments employing at least 20 employees in any one Member State. Whether this duty to inform and consult should take place at undertaking or establishment level is a matter for the Member States. It seems that the legislator has wanted to indicate that information and consultation procedures can be organised at the level of an entity with a certain form of independence (the undertaking) or at the level of a part of the undertaking (the establishment). The Appendix to the Additional Protocol also refers to the distinction between ‘undertakings’ and ‘establishments’. In spite of the fact that Article 2 of the Additional Protocol mentions information and consultation at undertaking level, the Appendix clarifies that the Contracting States are equally considered as fulfilling the obligations by developing the right to information at the level of the establishments. The Explanatory Report clarifies that these are ‘production units economically and legally bound to a single management centre’.59 The most prohibitive thresholds can be found in the EWC (Recast) Directive. The applicability of the Directive depends on a double condition regarding personnel thresholds. The effectiveness of this condition depends on whether it concerns a Community-scale undertaking or a Community-scale group of undertakings. In both cases, there must be at least 1000 employees within the Member States. The second condition is related to the transnational distribution of the work force. The second condition presupposes a ‘domestic’ work force threshold of 150 employees in at least two different Member States with at least 150 employees. The work force of 150 employees, however, is allocated differently, depending on whether it concerns an undertaking or a group of undertakings. In the first hypothesis the Community-scale undertaking must employ 150 employees in each of at least two Member States. Employment figures in different establishments of the Member State can be added up for the calculation of the threshold. In the second hypothesis, one undertaking with at least 150 workers must exist in at least two Member States. Adding up the number of workers of the undertakings in the same Member State is not allowed. A simple legal operation incorporating establishments could suffice to avoid the application of the Directive. The Transfer of Undertakings Directive imposes the obligation to inform and consult on the transferor and transferee irrespective of the number of transferred employees, let alone the number of employees in the undertaking of the transferor and the transferee. Article 7(5), however, stipulates that Member States may limit the obligations to inform and consult to undertakings or businesses which, in terms of the number of employees, meet the conditions for the election or nomination of a collegiate body representing the employees. In circumstances such as these, the requirement to inform the workers in good time of the date, the reasons and the implications of the transfer and measures envisaged still stands. The Collective Redundancy Directive does not contain a similar provision. This Directive does, however, presume the existence of so-called ‘workers’ representatives’. In these circumstances, an employer will not be able to hide behind the fact that in that particular undertaking or establishment, the legal threshold for workers’ representation was not met.

57 Art 1 of the Collective Redundancy Directive. 58 Case C-449/93 Rockfon A/S v Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark [1995] ECR I-4291. See also the analysis of C Barnard, EU Employment Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 490–92 and S Hennion-Moreau, ‘La notion d’entreprise en droit social communautaire’ [2001] Droit social 964. 59 See no 69 of the Rapport Explicatif (n 29).



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The SE Directive is the only participation Directive in which the personal scope of application is completely irrespective of the number of employees. The personal scope of application is defined in function of the capital.60 Tendenzschutz—Religion or Belief?

27.74 In the Appendix to the Additional Protocol, the personal scope of application is related to ‘undertakings’. The provided definition has an implied limitation. It relates to a purely economic concept of undertaking.61 Undertakings are referred to as only those entities producing goods or services for financial gain and with power to determine its own market policy. The aforementioned Appendix also leaves room for the so-called Tendenzschutz.62 It states that religious communities and their institutions can be excluded from the application of Article 2 of the Additional Protocol. This exclusion is not primarily based on the assumption that these institutions have no economic activities. The Contracting States can also exclude tendency undertakings (Tendenzbetrieb)63 from the scope of application as much as necessary for the safeguarding of the orientation of the undertaking protected by law. This presupposes that it will have to be proven how curtailing fundamental employment 27.75 rights will actually be necessary to guarantee the ideological orientation of the company. This is not self-evident, since this information and consultation procedure does not affect the essence of the economic power of decision. The European legislator seems to have concerned himself with the so-called Tendenzschutz 27.76 only as regards the EWC Directive. Neither the Collective Redundancy Directive nor the Transfer of Undertakings Directive contains such provisions. The sympathy for so-called ‘tendency undertakings’64 in the EWC Directive, the EWC (Recast) 27.77 Directive, the SE Directive and the Framework Directive is conditional. Members States may lay down particular provisions regarding the Tendenzschutz in their transposition law on the condition that, ‘at the date of adoption of [the] Directive such particular provisions already exist in the national legislation.’65 This rather conservative approach of the Tendenzschutz is in sharp contrast to the approach of the Tendenzschutz in Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. Article 4(2) leaves room for maintaining national legislation as well as providing future legislation after the adoption of the Directive. In the latter hypothesis, such legislation must, however, incorporate national existing practice. At the end, the article stipulates in a positive way that the Directive shall not prejudice the requirement of individuals working for the ‘tendency organisations’ mentioned in it, to act in good faith and with loyalty ‘to the organisation’s “ethos”’. The provisions regarding Tendenzschutz constitute a conflict of fundamental rights. Remarkably 27.78 enough, this conflict affects two completely different collective freedoms. The collective freedom

60 In this respect, see also the astonishment of F Fimmano, ‘Società Europea: ultimo atto’ [1994] Rivista della Società 1035. 61 In the same sense see also no 37 of the Rapport Explicatif (n 29) 133. 62 Tendenzschutz refers to the protection of the ‘tendency’ of ‘undertakings or establishments which pursue directly and essentially political, professional organisational, religious, charitable, educational, scientific or artistic aims, as well as aims involving information and the expression of opinions’ (Art 3(2) Framework Directive 2002/14). 63 The Appendix defines tendency undertakings as ‘Establishments pursuing activities which are inspired by certain ideals or guided by certain moral concepts, ideals and concepts which are protected by national legislation’. No 68 of the Rapport explicatif (n 29) 138 clarifies that this explanation was inserted in the Appendix to achieve more conformity between the German Betriebsverfassungsgesetz and the Additional Protocol. (Cf below section D.VIII.) 64 G Dole, La liberté d’opinion et de conscience en droit comparé du travail (Paris, LGDJ, 1997) 128–42 and E Verhulp, Vrijheid van meningsuituiting van werknemers en ambtenaren (The Hague, SdU, 1996) 299–301, 327–28. 65 Art 8(3) EWC Directive; Art 8(3) Recast (EWC) Directive; Art 8(3) SE Directive; Art 3 Framework Directive.

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of information and consultation is weighed against the freedom of education, ideology and religion. A collective identity conditioned by labour is opposed to a collective identity conditioned by ideology or religion. The legislator does not really solve this conflict. He does, however, offer Member States the possibility to extrapolate their own assessment of this conflict of fundamental rights to the SE or the EWC and to maintain limitations of information and consultation inspired by Tendenzschutz at undertaking or group level. It seems that the concrete scope of ‘human rights’ deemed universal or fundamental, is in fact determined by cultural and national differences. Seagoing Vessels None of the traditional international declarations (Additional Protocol of the European Social Charter, Community Charter and Charter of Nice) with respect to the right to information and consultation exclude the crews of seagoing vessels or merchant navy crews from the scope of application. The exclusion of ‘seagoing vessels’ from the scope of application of workers’ involvement Directives dates from the mid-1970s. The Collective Redundancy Directive and Transfer of Undertakings Directive exclude ‘the crews of seagoing vessels and seagoing vessels’ [sic] from their scope.66 Since both Directives were drafted expressly as minimum standards, there is room for Member States to extend the protection provided by these Directives to these categories. The exclusion of ‘seagoing vessels’ from the scope of application is terminologically somewhat unfortunate. ‘Seagoing vessels’ are in themselves incapable of falling within the substantive, territorial or personal scope of these Directives. The situation is different when it comes to the crew of seagoing vessels and their employer, as well as company activities developed by means of seagoing vessels. In the proposal of the EWC Directive, the initial approach taken was different. In principle, the crew of seagoing vessels fell within the personal scope of application of this Directive. However, subject to the principles and objectives of the Directive, and as far as deemed necessary, the Member States had the possibility to adopt special provisions applicable to the crew of seagoing vessels and adjusted to the special circumstances under which these crews have to work.67 The final version of the EWC Directive provided that the Member States can stipulate that the Directive shall not apply to merchant navy crews.68 Neither the SE Regulation nor the SE Directive contains provisions regarding the issue of the merchant navy. In the Framework Directive, an analogous but more nuanced wording was opted for. Article 3(3) authorises Member State to derogate from this Directive through particular provisions applicable to the crews of vessels plying the high seas. In the original proposal, there were no exclusion or limitation grounds whatsoever regarding the merchant navy. This unsatisfactory exclusion of seafarers was criticised on the occasion of a so-called fitness check in the area of information and consultation of workers, dealing with the Collective Redundancy Directive, the Transfer of Undertaking Directive and the Framework Directive.69 These loopholes were remedied for the sake of the principle of equality before the law by Directive (EU) 2015/1794. This directive also corrects the abilty of Member States to exclude merchant navy crews from the scope of the EWC Directive.





66 Art

1(3) Transfer of Undertakings Directive and Art 1(2)(c) Collective Redundancy Directive. 2(3) Proposal EWC Directive [1994] OJ C135. 68 Art 1(5) EWC Directive. 69 SWD(2013) 293 final, 16. 67 Art

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(c)  Limitations Ratione Materiae: Secrecy and Confidentiality 27.84 In exceptional situations, a conflict of interest can arise between the interest of workers being informed on the economic and financial situation of the undertaking and the interest of ‘the undertaking’ protecting itself against the risk of damage resulting from such information being distributed to third parties. 27.85 This field of tension is recognised by the Additional Protocol of the European Social Charter. Article 2(1) under (a) states that the disclosure of certain information which could be prejudicial to the undertaking may be refused or subject to confidentiality. 27.86 In the first hypothesis, this concerns ‘secret’ information which will only be known to the management. In practice, not only the content but also the existence of such information is a secret. Employees or their representatives might find out about the existence of this information at best when management refuses to answer certain questions, expressly referring to its ‘secret’ character. 27.87 The question whether management is obliged to mention the existence of secret information is inevitable. The second hypothesis concerns confidential information. The wording of the Additional Protocol seems to indicate that management must indicate the confidential character of the information and the legal implication that this information must not be spread amongst third parties. The Additional Protocol does not provide a single criterion to distinguish confidential from secret information. It is not clear whether management can judge at its own discretion whether or not the company’s interests need to be protected by keeping information secret or informing workers on a confidentiality basis. An argument against this discretion is that confidentiality is a less far-reaching curtailment of the right to information and consultation. 27.88 Provisions regarding secret or confidential information can be found in the EWC (Recast) Directive, the SE Directive and the Framework Directive. Neither the Collective Redundancy Directive nor the Transfer of Undertakings Directive indicates that the confidential or secret character of certain information can be used as a legitimate reason to limit the information and consultation procedure described therein. This finding can lead to only one conclusion. Such limitations must be prohibited. General provisions of domestic law regarding secret or confidential information will have to be applied in compliance with the Directives. They certainly do not apply to situations of collective redundancy or transfer of undertakings.

V. Remedies 27.89 Rights regarding involvement without efficient and dissuasive sanctioning system are normally only respected by civilised employers. Informing and consulting workers is not unrelated to a general duty to treat them with respect.70 Denial of information and consultation procedures is an undeniable sign of contempt.71 27.90 Normally, the European legislator confines himself to the prescription of rights and obligations. When it comes to the sanctioning mechanism for violating these rights and obligations, he resorts to complete mutism. This can probably be explained by the mechanisms organised at Member State level. In practice, sanctions cannot be seen separately from sanctioning systems. The autonomous organisation of these systems is an emanation of the sovereignty of Member States. It is not surprising that the European legislator refrains from prescribing a certain type

70 Cf Art 16 of the Belgian Employment Agreement Act. 71 In this respect, see the qualification of such behaviour as a form of ‘dédain’ (contempt) in the criminal case against Louis Schweitzer (Renault): Corr Brussels, 20 March 1998, Journal des Tribunaux de Travail 281, Chroniques de droit social 1998, 379.

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of sanction. The Court of Justice has stated repeatedly that Member States, when implementing Directives, must guarantee effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.72 The fact that the European legislator, completely redundantly, reminds Member States of this rule in the body of a Directive, shows the importance and the problems of sanctioning. The use of such wording in Article 8(2) of the most recent version of the Framework Directive is remarkable. This passage reminds us of similar wording used in anti-discrimination Directives.73 The EWC (Recast) and SE Directives only indicate the necessity of ‘appropriate measures’ in the event of ‘failure to comply with this Directive’. The Collective Redundancy Directive and the Transfer of Undertakings Directive do not contain any provisions in that respect. It would, however, be wrong to state that the prescription of certain sanctions does not match with the choice for a Directive as legislative instrument. In the recent anti-discrimination Directives, for instance, traditional civil law sanctions had been included, such as the invalidity of contract clauses, of provisions in collective agreements and provisions in the articles of incorporation of professional organisations.74 The Collective Redundancy Directive contains clear sanctions for failing to comply with the duty to inform and consult. Article 4 of Directive 98/59 states that ‘projected collective redundancies notified to the competent public authority shall take effect not earlier than 30 days after the notification referred to in Article 3(1) without prejudice to any provisions governing individual rights with regard to notice of dismissal’. This notification means a notification to the competent authorities of the intention of collective redundancy. This notification must provide proof that the employer has met the consultation requirement and how this was done. Without information and consultation procedure, the notification to the administrative authority will not be valid. The wording of Article 4 implies that breach of the administrative procedure and/or of the information and consultation procedure is sanctioned by the fact that the collective redundancy as legal transaction will produce no effect. The first proposal for a Framework Directive contained an analogous sanction. Article 7(3) of the original proposal read:

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Member States shall provide that in case of serious breach by the employer of the information and consultation obligations in respect of the decisions referred to in Article 4(1)(c) of this Directive, where such decisions would have direct and immediate consequences in terms of substantial change or termination of the employment contracts or employment relations, these decisions shall have no legal effect on the employment contracts or employment relationships of the employees affected. The non production of legal effects will continue until such time as the employer has fulfilled his obligations or, if this is no longer possible, adequate redress has been established, in accordance with the arrangements and procedures to be determined by the Member.75

This sanction reminds us of the proposal for the SE Directive of 1991. In this proposal, a similar sanctioning mechanism was elaborated in the event of failure to comply with the information and consultation rights of the representative body.76

72 In this respect, see the principle of ‘effective enforcement’: B Fitzpatrick, ‘Development of the principle of effective enforcement’ in J Malmberg (ed), Effective Enforcement and EC Labour Law (n 36) 43–58. This principle has been entered into the Framework Directive (Framework Directive 8(2)). The EWC Directive (Art 11(3)) only mentions appropriate measures in the event of failure to comply. Art 12(2) of the SE Directive is limited to appropriate measures in the event of failure to comply. 73 Art 15 of Directive 2000/43 and Art 17 of Directive 2000/78. 74 Art 14 of Directive 2000/43 and Art 16 of Directive 2000/78. 75 [1999] OJ C2. 76 Art 5(2)(5) Amended proposal for a Council Directive complementing the statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees in the European company [1991] OJ C138.



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E. Evaluation 27.96 When the Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted by the Convention, the Member States could already rely on a vast acquis covering information and consultation in recurring and extraordinary situation, though the Framework Directive 2002/14 had not yet been adopted. In sum, the Charter seems to consolidate and ‘constitutionalise’ a rich acquis. The reference to the Community Charter in the Agreement on Social Policy attached to the Protocol on Social Policy of the Maastricht Treaty is a prefiguration of this phenomenon of constitutionalisation. It reflects a classical paradigm of labour law as being based on the need to protect fundamental workers’ rights. The adoption of the ‘new’ EU Directives 1998/59 (collective redundancies) and 2001/23 (transfer of undertaking) referring in an innovative manner in their recitals to a right to information and consultation is consistent with this classical conceptualisation of labour law as well. Such a constitutionalisation might be beneficial to adopt a prudent approach towards attempts to attack the acquis on the basis of distinct paradigms of labour law where other considerations come into play (eg a discourse related to employability, employment policies and even—horresco referens—better or smart regulation). 27.97 The question arises whether the recognition of the right to information and consultation inside the Charter has only a retrospective value or whether it could serve as a tool for some judicial activism. This question is hard to answer. Though the CJEU is constantly forced to interpret this impressive body of EU Directives in the field of workers’ involvement, it has never referred to Article 27 to justify its interpretations. The latter certainly does not mean that the Court has not provided evidence of judicial activism in this field of EU labour law. However, the teleological method of interpretation has shown to be a sufficient technique to be on the offensive while interpreting these detailed EU Directives. One might state that there is no immediate need to build on the Charter to interpret the EU Directives in a progressive manner. 27.98 Article 27 might not be a perfectly adequate means to enhance a progressive interpretation of EU Directives, if an effet utile approach would not be sufficient to so. Indeed, the formula of Article 27 is not deprived of some major flaws. It does not reach the level of precision and clarity of the more ambitious formula of the RESC. An interpretation which is consistent with the RESC could be a way to overcome this loophole. At first sight, there are two major hurdles which complicate such an intertextual interpretation. First, the Charter does not in a general way preach such an intertextual canon of interpretation of other international human rights instruments. The only reference to such an interpretation is enshrined in Article 52(3) and refers to the European Convention on Human Rights. Neither has the Court of Justice pledged any commitment to this interpretation in a way which mirrors the Grand Chamber judgment in Demir and Baykara77 of the ECtHR. Secondly, Article 27 only recognises a right to information and consultation ‘under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices’. Insofar as it can be argued that the right to information and consultation results from constitutional traditions common to the Member States78 and insofar as the RESC can be considered to be part of that tradition, that loophole could be overcome. It is still unclear whether the much more precise and elaborate reference to the right to information and consultation in the European Pillar of Social Rights will be a lever for such a progressive interpretation of EU Directives in the ambit of information and consultation.



77 Demir 78 See

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In a very strict reading, such a coda gives an unrestricted leeway to both the European Union 27.99 and the Member States to modulate the attribution and the exercise of the right to information and consultation. In my view, such an unrestricted leeway amounts to an absurd contradiction with another major idea behind the transversal Article 52 of the Charter. Article 52(1) clearly prescribed that there is an essential hard core of the rights and freedoms granted in the Charter. In sum, the leeway given to the European Union and the Member States in my view should respect that hard core. In absence of more precise and clear criteria laid down in Article 27, the Revised European Social Charter might come into plain to delimit that essential content. This will be helpful in my view, to provide more clarity on the timing, the form and the quality of information and consultation procedures. The impressive list of limitations and derogations enshrined in EU Directives seeking 27.100 to promote a right to information and consultation could be challenged as not sufficiently honoring such a hard core. Some of these provisions, in fact generate a differential treatment between workers as holders of such a right. The essential hard core might be helpful to overcome divergencies between EU Directives as far as the formulation of the right to information and consultation is concerned or they could urge the EU legislator to continue the work of recasting these Directives in order to favour more recent and ambitious formulations of that right.



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Article 28 Article 28 Right of Collective Bargaining and Action Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 28 This Article is based on Article 6 of the European Social Charter and on the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (points 12 to 14). The right of collective action was recognised by the European Court of Human Rights as one of the elements of trade union rights laid down by Article 11 of the ECHR. As regards the appropriate levels at which collective negotiation might take place, see the explanation given for Article 27 CFREU. The modalities and limits for the exercise of collective action, including strike action, come under national laws and practices, including the question of whether it may be carried out in parallel in several Member States.

Select Bibliography E Ales and T Novitz, Collective Action and Fundamental Freedoms in Europe. Striking the Balance (Oxford, Intersentia, 2010). L Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: the emergence of an ideal and the conditions for its realisation’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1335. C Barnard (ed), (2007–08) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies chs 17–22. C Barnard, ‘The calm after the storm. Time to reflect on EU Scholarship after Viking and Laval’, in A Bogg, C Costello and A Davies (eds), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law (Cheltenham, Elgar 2016). R Blanpain and A Swiakowski, The Laval and Viking Cases: Freedom of Services and Establishment v Industrial Conflict in the European Economic Area and Russia (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2009). A Bücker and W Warneck, Reconciling Fundamental Social Rights and Economic Freedoms After Viking, Laval and Rüffert (Berlin, Nomos, 2011). ACL Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’, (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 126. KD Ewing, The Right to Strike (Oxford, OUP 1991). —— and J Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal 2. Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Article 28’, https://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/28-right-collectivebargaining-and-action. B Gernigon, A Odero and H Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike (Geneva, ILO, 2000). C La Macchia (ed), The Right to Strike in the EU The Complexity of the Norms and Safeguarding Efficacy (Rome, Ediesse, 2011). J Malmberg and T Sigeman, ‘Industrial Actions and EU Economic Freedoms: The Autonomous Collective Bargaining Model Curtailed by the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 1115. T Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford, OUP, 2003).

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S Prechal and S de Vries, ‘Seamless web of judicial protection in the internal market’ (2009) European Law Review 5. P Syrpis and T Novitz, ‘Economic and Social Rights in Conflict: Political and Judicial Approaches to their Reconciliation’ (2008) 33 European Law Review 411. For further bibliography on the judgments in various EU languages, see: www.etui.org/Topics/Social-dialoguecollective-bargaining/Social-legislation/The-interpretation-by-the-European-Court-of-Justice/ Reaction-to-the-judgements/Articles-in-academic-literature-on-the-judgements.

A.  Field of Application of Article 28 CFREU 28.01 Article 28 CFREU applies to ‘the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’ in accordance with Article 51(1) CFREU. 28.02 This right therefore applies to (i) the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and (ii) the Member States when they are implementing Union law. There is now a third potential situation: (iii) whether Article 28 can have a horizontal application in cases between private parties. We shall consider these situations in turn, and how they relate to Article 28 CFREU. 28.03 In respect of the first situation, the Charter can be used by, and against, the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in at least three ways: (1) To challenge the activities of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies when legislating or otherwise acting in the field of EU law. So if the Union tried to legislate in a way which interfered with the right to strike or engage in collective bargaining, and this could not be justified, it is likely that any such measure could be challenged as being incompatible with Article 28 CFREU. Alternatively, if one of the EU institutions breached the right to strike of its own employees, those employees1 could raise Article 28 as a ground of challenging that act (see eg Aquino2). (2) To provide a justification for EU legislation in the field. The Monti II proposal3 provides a good example of using Article 28 CFREU to justify proposed EU legislative action in this field. Article 28 is expressly referred to in the Preamble of Monti II. Monti II was actually proposed under the general legal basis, Article 352 TFEU. Article 153(5) TFEU was rejected as a legal basis because it contains an express exclusion of EU competence under Article 153 TFEU for matters concerning ‘pay the right to association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs’. Monti II was intended to help resolve the tensions between EU economic rights (the right to free movement) and national social rights (the right to strike), tensions which were highlighted by the decisions in Viking and Laval (see below).4 The Monti II proposal was subsequently withdrawn following the so-called ‘yellow card’ procedure.5 1 Case T-20/14 Huynh Duong Vi Nguyen v European Parliament EU:T:2014: 955, [33]: ‘It must be recalled that although the right to information and consultation of workers and the right to negotiation and collective action enshrined, ­respectively, in Article 27 and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, may be applicable to relations between the Union institutions and their staff, as is apparent from the judgment of 19 September 2013 in review of Commission v Strack (C-579/12 RX-II, ECR, EU:C:2013:570), the exercise of those rights is limited to cases and conditions laid down in EU law, in accordance with the very wording of those provisions.’ 2 Case T-402/18 Aquino v European Parliament, EU:T:2020:13. 3 COM (2012) 130. 4 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779 and Case 341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 5 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/letter_to_nal_parl_en.htm.

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The existence of Article 28 CFREU can also be used to justify legislating to ensure noninterference with fundamental rights. An example pre-dating the Charter illustrates this potential use: Council Regulation 2679/98,6 the so-called Monti I Regulation, set up an intervention mechanism to safeguard free trade in the Single Market. The Regulation provides that State A can complain to the Commission about obstacles to the free movement of goods which are attributable to State B—either through action or inaction—where the obstacles lead to serious disruption of the free movement of goods, cause serious loss to the individuals affected and require immediate action.7 However, any use of this complaints procedure is subject to the fundamental rights recognised in Article 2 of the Regulation (the so-called ‘Monti’ clause): This Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting in any way the exercise of fundamental rights, as recognised in Member States, including the right or freedom to strike. These rights may also include the right or freedom to take other actions covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member States.



This Regulation also provided the justification for the European Parliament to insert into its revised proposal for the Services Directive an equivalent ‘Monti’ clause,8 and again in the Macro-economic Surveillance Regulation,9 the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive10 and the Posted Workers Amendment Directive.11 (3) To steer the Court of Justice’s interpretation of, for example, a provision in a secondary measure. An example, Werhof,12 taken from the related right of freedom of association, demonstrates this. The case concerned the Transfer of Undertakings Directive 2001/2313 where the question was raised whether a transferee was bound by a collective agreement subsequent to the one in force at the time of the transfer of the business, when the transferee was not party to that later collective agreement. The Court began by recognising ‘Freedom of association, which also includes the right not to join an association or union14 … is one of the fundamental rights which, in accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, are protected in the [Union] legal order’.15 It then considered two approaches to the interpretation of the Directive. The first, the ‘dynamic’ interpretation, supported by the claimant employee, would mean that future collective agreements continued to apply to a transferee even if it was not party to a collective agreement, with the result that its

6 OJ [1998] L337/8. 7 Art 1(1). 8 Art 1(7) of Dir 2006/123 [2006] OJ L376/36. 9 Regulation 1176/2011 OJ [2011] L306/25. See also Regulation 472/2013 (OJ 2013 L 140/1) on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious ­difficulties with respect to their financial stability: Art 7 ‘The draft macroeconomic adjustment programme shall fully observe Article 152 TFEU and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Commission shall orally inform the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European Parliament of the progress made in the preparation of the draft macroeconomic adjustment programme. That information shall be treated as confidential.’ Together with Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area (OJ [2013] L 140/11), Regulation No 472/2013 forms part of the ‘two-pack’ reform to enhance economic integration and convergence between euro area Member States. 10 Directive 2014/67 OJ [2014] L 159/11. 11 Directive 2018/957 OJ [2018] L 173/24. 12 Case C-499/04 Werhof v Freeway Traffic System GmbH & Co KG [2006] ECR I-2397. 13 OJ [2001] L82/16. 14 Citing Art 11 of the European Convention and the ECtHR cases: Sigurjónsson v Iceland [1993] Series A No 264 [35], and Gustafsson v Sweden [1996] Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1996-II 637 [45]. 15 Werhof (n 8) [33].



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fundamental right not to join an association could be affected.16 The second, the ‘static’ interpretation, supported by the defendant transferee, made it possible to avoid a situation in which the transferee of a business who was not party to a collective agreement was bound by future changes to that agreement.17 This interpretation safeguarded the transferee’s right not to join an association and it was this approach that the Court chose.18 28.04 So far we have considered how the Article 28 rights can be used by and against EU institutions. We turn now to the second situation where the Article 28 CFREU rights can be used: by, and against, the Member States (and other actors such as trade unions) when acting in the field of EU law. Five situations can be distinguished: (1) When Member States are implementing EU law they will need to respect provisions of the Charter, including Article 28 CFREU. So, for example, if Member States are i­mplementing a Directive on, say, the provision of port services which requires the port to be open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, the implementation must not rule out strike action ­leading to closure of the port, unless there are justifications for its prohibition. (2) When Member States (or trade unions—see Viking and Laval below) are interfering with free movement,19 they can justify that interference on the grounds of worker protection20 which might need to be achieved through allowing (in the case of Member States), or ­calling their members to take (in the case of a trade union), proportionate strike action (again, see Viking and Laval below). In other words, the fundamental right, the right to strike or the right to engage in collective bargaining, constitutes a derogation/justification from the fundamental economic freedom (the ‘limits on rights’ situation). So, borrowing from the facts of Schmidberger,21 if a state fails to stop a strike of, for example, air traffic controllers, and that strike action interferes with the free movement of goods and people, the state can justify its (in)action by reference to its obligation to allow (proportionate) strike action to occur. (3) Connected with (2), when trade unions are interfering with (eg derogating from) another fundamental right, for example the right to equality, when engaging in collective bargaining, and that interference is permitted by, for example, secondary legislation such as the framework Directive 2000/78 on equality,22 action taken under Article 28 must be in ­compliance with EU law (see, eg Hennigs23 below).

16 Ibid [34]. 17 Ibid [35]. 18 Ibid [36]. 19 Unless it can be argued that they are not: Case C-566/15 Erzberger v TUI EU:C:2017:562, [38]–[39] ‘the p ­ articipation mechanism established by the MitBestG, which seeks to involve workers, by means of elected representatives, in the decision-making and strategic bodies of the company, is subject, in this respect, both to German company law and to German labour relations law, the scope of application of which the Federal Republic of Germany is entitled to limit to workers employed by establishments located in its territory, since such a delimitation is based on an objective and non-discriminatory criterion. [39] In the light of the above, the loss of the rights at issue in the main proceedings … cannot be held to constitute an impediment to the free movement of workers guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU.’ 20 Barnard, ‘The worker protection justification: lessons from consumer law’ in P Koutrakos, N Nic Shuibhne and P Syrpis (eds), Exceptions from EU Free Movement Law: Derogation, Justification and Proportionality (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) 106. 21 See, by way of parallel, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659. See also Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609. 22 OJ [2000] L 303/16. 23 Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10 Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land Berlin (C-298/10) v Alexander Mai. EU:C:2011:560.

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(4) When Member States are limiting a right (for example, interfering with free movement) by relying on one of the express derogations or public interest requirements), that limitation must be read subject to fundamental rights, including the right to engage in collective bargaining or the right to take collective action (the ‘limits on limits’ situation).24 So, for example, if a general strike is called across Europe to protest at austerity measures and the Belgian government closes its borders to stop strikers from other Member States entering Belgium and then marching on the EU institutions (public policy derogation to the free movement of workers/EU citizens), then weighed against Belgium’s public policy derogation (the limitations) are the individual strikers’ rights to strike and to protest (the limits on the limits). (5) When Member States (and others) are otherwise acting within the field of EU law, they must, where appropriate, respect the principles in Article 28 CFREU. So far we have considered how the Article 28 rights can be used by and against (i) EU institutions 28.05 and (ii) the Member States and social partners. We turn now to a potential third situation where the Article 28 CFREU rights might be used: (iii) against individuals. Recent case law has opened this up as a possibility. For example, in Bauer25 the Court ruled that:26 The right to a period of paid annual leave, affirmed for every worker by Article 31(2) of the Charter, is thus, as regards its very existence, both mandatory and unconditional in nature, the unconditional nature not needing to be given concrete expression by the provisions of EU or national law, which are only required to specify the exact duration of annual leave and, where appropriate, certain conditions for the exercise of that right. It follows that that provision is sufficient in itself to confer on workers a right that they may actually rely on in disputes between them and their employer in a field covered by EU law and therefore falling within the scope of the Charter.

However, it will be argued in the final section of this chapter that Article 28 may not be invoked in these horizontal cases because it is not mandatory and unconditional, given the caveats contained in Article 28 itself (‘in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’). As these examples show, Article 28 CFREU applies in a wide range of situations. Therefore, 28.06 following Viking and Laval (discussed below), it is increasingly unlikely that, outside the field of competition law,27 a party can argue that since the matter falls in the purview of collective bargaining or collective action, EU law does not apply.

24 Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689 by anolgy. 25 Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Stadt Wuppertal and Volker Willmeroth als Inhaber der TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e. K. v Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Martina Broßonn EU:C:2018:871. 26 Ibid, [85]. 27 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, [59]–[60] ‘It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers. However, the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to Article [101](1) of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment. It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty. The Court concluded that ‘despite the restrictions of competition inherent in it, a collective agreement between the organisations representing employers and workers which sets up in a particular sector a supplementary pension scheme managed by a pension fund to which affiliation is compulsory does not fall within Article [101(1) TFEU]’.



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B.  Interrelationship of Article 28 with Other Provisions of the Charter I.  Other Provisions in the Charter 28.07 Various rights for workers are scattered across the Charter. These include freedom to choose an occupation and to engage in work in Article 15 CFREU. Article 27 CFREU concerns the information and consultation of workers or their representatives. On the spectrum of intensity of worker participation, information and consultation is found at the lower end, especially where the information and consultation is provided to the individual worker (direct representation) and not to their representatives (indirect representation). Collective bargaining is seen as one of the most intense forms of worker participation and, as we have seen, is covered separately in the Charter in Article 28 CFREU. 28.08 Article 12 CFREU concerns freedom of association: Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests.

28.09 Freedom of association is an essential prerequisite to the right for trade unions to engage in collective bargaining. Collective bargaining with independent trade unions, reinforced by collective action, as provided by Article 28 CFREU, is considered one of the most effective forms of worker representation and thus, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the most legitimate form of worker protection. 28.10 A number of systems combine information and consultation provisions at firm level, often through works councils, with collective bargaining with trade unions at sectoral level. This is the dual channel model of industrial relations found in countries such as France and Germany. For those countries Articles 12, 27 and 28 CFREU operate in conjunction. 28.11 By contrast, the UK system was typically characterised as a single channel model where worker representation was conducted by recognised trade unions (at national, sectoral or plant level), supported by the sanction of collective action. Works councils or their equivalent were virtually unknown in the UK. For UK trade unions, then, Articles 12 and 28 CFREU were of considerable importance. The advent of EU law forced the UK to adapt its single channel system of industrial relations to accommodate the possibility of providing information and consultation to elected worker representatives. The UK is now described as having a modified single channel.28 In fact the legacy of single channel remains strong and there is little evidence that the information and consultation mechanisms have taken firm hold. Following Brexit, the dual channel may wither through the effluxion of time or the relevant legislation may be formally repealed.

II.  Protocol 30 and Brexit 28.12 So far we have been talking as if Article 28 contains a right to strike and that it applies to all Member States, including (pre-Brexit) the UK and Poland. Neither statement is indubitably right. Article 28 CFREU falls within Title IV of the Charter which, according to the UK at the time, contains principles not rights. If this reading is correct, then Article 52(5) CFREU applies. It says: The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States



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when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.

In other words, the principles are not directly effective; they need to be given legal effect through 28.13 EU or Member State acts. Only then will the principle have legal effect through the interpretation of those legally binding measures and in the ruling on their legality. The decision in Viking (considered below) casts doubt on the UK’s reading of Title IV since 28.14 it expressly recognises the right to strike. Anticipating such a situation, the UK (and Poland) successfully negotiated Protocol 30 which was attached to the Lisbon Treaty. Misleadingly referred to, largely for domestic political reasons, as an opt-out,29 this Protocol elaborates on the meaning of certain provisions of the Charter. Subsequently, in Saeedi the UK conceded that Protocol 30 was not an opt-out.30 However, this concession might not apply to Article 1(2) of the Protocol which provides: In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.

Article 1(2) therefore appears to suggest that if any of the provisions of Title IV, the Solidarity 28.15 Title of the Charter, contain rights not principles, then the UK and Poland might have an opt-out from those. However, even if (the UK and) Poland do enjoy a limited opt-out, litigants will still be able to resort back to relying on the general principles of law to enforce their fundamental social rights, general principles which apply equally to the UK and Poland,31 and which, following Viking, include the right to strike. This is particularly important in the UK following Brexit. After the transition period came to an end, the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 turned off the continued application of the Charter32 in respect of Great Britain but allowed the application of the general principles of law33 which had been recognised before the end of the transition period.34

C.  Sources of Article 28 Rights I.  Right to Bargain Collectively Article 12(1) of the Community Social Charter 1989 provides that ‘Employers or employers’ 28.16 organisations, on the one hand, and workers’ organisations on the other, shall have the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements under the conditions laid down by national

29 For background, see C Barnard, ‘The “Opt-Out” for the UK and Poland from the Charter of Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?’, www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/summary/barnard-uk-opt-out-and-thecharter-of-fundamental-rights/7309. 30 Saeedi [2010] EWCA Civ 990 [8]: ‘the Secretary of State accepts, in principle, that fundamental rights set out in the Charter can be relied on as against the UK, and submits that [Cranston J, the first instance judge] erred in holding otherwise … The purpose of the Charter protocol is not to prevent the Charter from applying to the United Kingdom, but to explain its effect.’ 31 Art 6(3) TEU. 32 s 5(4) EU(W)A 2018: ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part of domestic law on or after exit day.’ 33 s 5(4) EU(W)A 2018; ‘s 5(5) Subsection (4) does not affect the retention in domestic law on or after exit day in accordance with this Act of any fundamental rights or principles which exist irrespective of the Charter (and references to the Charter in any case law are, so far as necessary for this purpose, to be read as if they were references to any corresponding retained fundamental rights or principles).’ 34 For further discussion, see C Barnard, ‘So Long, Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu: Brexit and the Charter of ­Fundamental Rights’ (2019) 82 MLR 350.



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l­egislation and practice’. Likewise Article 6 of the European Social Charter 1961, under the heading ‘the right to bargain collectively’, provides: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the Parties undertake: 1. to promote joint consultation between workers and employers; 2. to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary negotiations between employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements; 3. to promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery for conciliation and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labour disputes; and recognise: 4. the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into.

28.17 Yet the legally and politically more important instruments, the ECHR and ILO Conventions, are ambiguous about the right to engage in collective bargaining. Article 11 ECHR provides: 1. 2.

Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.

28.18 This text appears to suggest that Article 11 applies to freedom of association only and at first the ECtHR was reluctant to extend it any further. For example, in Wilson and Palmer35 the ECtHR said that ‘although collective bargaining may be one of the ways by which trade unions may be enabled to protect their members’ interests, it is not indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedom’. As a result, the ECtHR found that the absence under UK law of an obligation on employers to enter into collective bargaining, did not give rise to a violation of Article 11.36 28.19 Advocate General Jacobs, in the earlier EU case of Albany,37 also thought that there was no fundamental right to bargain collectively, even though it was the freedom most fully articulated in the Union legal order.38 He said that only Article 6 of the European Social Charter 1961 expressly recognised the existence of a fundamental right to bargain. However, he then said, the mere fact that a right is included in the Charter does not mean that it is generally recognised as a fundamental right. The structure of the Charter is such that the rights set out represent policy goals rather than enforceable rights, and the states parties to it are required only to select which of the rights specified they undertake to protect. He then pointed to Article 4 of ‘the carefully drafted “Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively” [ILO Convention No 9839 which] imposes 35 Wilson and Palmer [2002] IRLR 568. 36 Ibid [45]. 37 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751 [146]. 38 Ibid [160]. 39 Since public sector workers were specifically excluded from the scope of Convention 98 (Art 6), Convention 151 gives public sector workers the right to form and join independent trade unions. In respect of collective bargaining, Art 7 provides: ‘Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for negotiation of terms and conditions of employment between the public authorities concerned and public employees’ organisations, or of such other methods as will allow representatives of public employees to participate in the determination of these matters.’

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on the Contracting States an obligation to “encourage and promote” collective bargaining. No right is granted.’40 However, the coming into force of the EU Charter, together with the fact that the right to 28.20 bargain collectively is ‘recognised both by the provisions of various international instruments which the Member States have cooperated in or signed, such as Article 6 of the European Social Charter [1961]’, combined with the recognition of the role of the social partners in Article 152 TFEU, led the Court of Justice to conclude in Commission v Germany (Occupational Pensions)41 that the right to bargain collectively is a fundamental right.42 However, it is not an absolute right: it may be subject to certain restrictions including the fact that it must be exercised in accordance with EU law,43 in particular the principle of equality,44 and with full account being taken of national laws and practices.45 The Court concluded: Exercise of the fundamental right to bargain collectively must therefore be reconciled with the requirements stemming from the freedoms protected by the FEU Treaty, which in the present instance the [public procurement] Directives are intended to implement, and be in accordance with the principle of proportionality.46

The existence of Article 28 CFREU and other changes in the international legal environment 28.21 prompted the ECtHR to change its approach to the right to engage in collective bargaining. In Demir and Baykara47 the Court said: 153. In the light of these developments, the Court considers that its caselaw to the effect that the right to bargain collectively and to enter into collective agreements does not constitute an inherent element of Article 11 … should be reconsidered, so as to take account of the perceptible evolution in such matters, in both international law and domestic legal systems … 154. Consequently, the Court considers that, having regard to the developments in labour law, both international and national, and to the practice of Contracting States in such matters, the right to bargain collectively with the employer has, in principle, become one of the essential elements of the ‘right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of [one’s] interests’ set forth in Article 11 of the Convention, it being understood that States remain free to organise their system so as, if appropriate, to grant special status to representative trade unions. Like other workers, civil servants, except in very specific cases, should enjoy such rights, but without prejudice to the effects of any ‘lawful restrictions’ that may have to be imposed on ‘members of the administration of the State’ within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 …

Demir and Baykara was thus seen as a landmark decision which also paved the way for the ECtHR to change its attitude to the right to take collective action.

28.22

II.  Right to Take Collective Action The right to strike is recognised in a number of international economic and social rights instru- 28.23 ments, including Article 13 of the Community Social Charter 1989 (on the ‘right’ to ‘resort to 40 Ibid [147]. Cf General Survey 1994, freedom of association and collective bargaining, on Conventions No 87 and No 98 [200]. 41 Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany (Occupational Pensions) [2010] ECR I-7091. This decision was confirmed in Case C-699/17 Allianz Vorsorgekasse AG v Bundestheater-Holding GmbH, EU:C:2019:290. 42 Ibid [41]. See also AG Trstenjak, ibid [4]. 43 Ibid [43]. See also Case C-447/09 Prigge v Deutsche Lufthansa [2011] ECR I-8003 [47]. 44 Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10 Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt [2011] ECR I-7965 [78]. 45 Art 52(6) CFREU. 46 Ibid [44]. 47 Demir and Baykara App no 34503/97 (2009) 48 EHRR 54.



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collective action in the event of a conflict of interests’, including the ‘right to strike, subject to obligations arising under national regulations and collective agreements’ (emphasis added).48 Article 6 of the European Social Charter (see above) also recognises ‘the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike’. 28.24 However, the right to strike is not expressly recognised by Article 11(1) ECHR.49 As with the right to collective bargaining, the ECtHR has only gradually read into Article 11 a recognition of the right to strike. The first time the Court used the language of the right to strike was in Wilson and Palmer,50 where the Court said ‘[t]he grant of the right to strike, while it may be subject to regulation, represents one of the most important of the means by which the State may secure a trade union’s freedom to protect its members’ occupational interests’.51 28.25 A new dawn signalled by Demir was confirmed in Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen.52 Turkey prohibited public sector employees from taking part in a national one-day strike to persuade the government to engage in collective bargaining. Members of the trade union who ignored the prohibition were disciplined and the union brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging that the ban on strikes interfered with their right to form and join trade unions as guaranteed under Article 11. While the Court acknowledged that the right to strike was not absolute and could be subject to certain conditions and restrictions, it held that a ban which applied to all public servants was too wide a restriction. The Court held that the disciplinary action was ‘capable of discouraging trade union members and others from exercising their legitimate right to take part in such one-day strikes or other actions aimed at defending their members’ interests’, and amounted to a threat to rights guaranteed under Article 11. The strike ban was not in response to a ‘pressing social need’, and the Turkish government had thus failed to justify the need for the impugned restriction in a democratic society. At the level of the ILO, the relevant Conventions are 87, 98 and 151. Convention 87 gives 28.26 workers the right to form and join independent trade unions. Convention 98 elaborates more specifically upon the conditions in which freedom of association can be realised, such as freedom from acts of anti-union discrimination (Art 1) and freedom from interference (Art 2).53 However, although these Conventions do not recognise the right to strike as such, the two bodies set up to supervise the application of ILO standards, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations have ‘frequently stated that the right to strike is a fundamental right of workers and of their organisations, and have defined the limits within which it may be exercised, laying down a body of principles in connection with the right to strike54—giving rise to substantial “case law” in the 48 For a full discussion of this issue, see T Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike: a Comparative Study of Standards set by the International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2003). 49 UNISON v United Kingdom [2002] IRLR 497 [35]: ‘There is no express inclusion of a right to strike or an obligation on employers to engage in collective bargaining. At most, Article 11 may be regarded as safeguarding the freedom of trade union members to protect the occupational interests of their members.’ 50 Wilson and Palmer [2002] IRLR 568. 51 Ibid [45]. 52 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey App no 68959/01 [2009] ECHR 2251. This case concerned a complaint brought by a trade union; for the Court’s position on the situation where the applicant is an individual, see eg Danilenkov v Russia App no 67336/01 (Judgment of 30 July 2009) and Saime Özcam v Turkey App no 22943/04 (Judgment of 15 September 2009) discussed in K Ewing and J Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal 2. 53 The 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work states that freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are among the four fundamental rights which ILO Member States must secure as part of their constitutional obligations of membership. 54 Citing in particular in ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, a General Survey of Conventions Nos 87 and 98, conducted in 1994 by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (1994); and in ILO, Freedom of Association, Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of

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broadest sense of the term—which renders more explicit the extent of the provisions mentioned above’.55 The Constitutional traditions of some Member States have explicitly recognised the right 28.27 to strike (eg France, Italy). In other Member States, such as Germany, the right to strike has been read into another Constitutional provision by the courts. Article 9 para 3 of the German Constitution guarantees the right of every citizen to form and join collective organisations (‘Koalitionsfreiheit’). As Kocher explains, ‘because coalitions can only act for their members effectively if they are allowed to strike in certain cases, the right to strike is considered to be a fundamental part of the freedom of association.’56 The UK’s approach is different from that of its Continental neighbours. It does not recognise 28.28 the right—but rather the freedom—to strike.57 The right to strike means that the legal order of the state must take precautions to ensure the exercise of the right, and so the strike is privileged, thus demonstrating that the legal order evaluates the pursuit of collective interests more highly than the individual obligations arising from the contract of employment. Freedom to strike, by contrast, means that the strike is legally permitted, but no special privileges are granted: the strike is tolerated, but not privileged, and the legal limits of the strike are dictated by the general legal order. The UK’s position was summed up by Maurice Kay LJ in Metrobus Ltd v Unite:58 28.29 In this country, the right to strike has never been much more than a slogan or a legal metaphor. Such a right has not been bestowed by statute. What has happened is that, since the Trade Disputes Act 1906, legislation has provided limited immunities from liability in tort. At times the immunities have been widened, at other times they have been narrowed. Outside the scope of the immunities, the rigour of the common law applies in the form of breach of contract on the part of the strikers and the economic torts as regards the organisers and their union. Indeed, even now the conventional analysis at common law is that by going on strike employees commit repudiatory breaches of their contracts of employment ….

This context helps to explain why the Court of Appeal was reluctant to follow Enerji Yapi-Yol. 28.30 Lloyd LJ noted that Enerji Yapi Yol, was a ‘more summary discussion’ than the explicit judgment of the Grand Chamber in Demir.59 Consequently, he said that ‘it would not be prudent’ to follow it. In addition he noted the need to balance the interests of the unions and their members under Article 11, against the rights of the employer under Article 1 of the First Protocol. On the facts, the Court of Appeal held that the requirements as to pre-strike notification and ballots were not onerous or oppressive and did not unduly restrict the exercise of the right to strike. However, the ECtHR has also shown signs of backtracking on its approach in Enerji Yapi-Yol. 28.31 In RMT v UK60 the ECtHR held that while ‘strike action is clearly protected by Article 11’, it declined to accept, at least in this case, that strike action was an ‘essential element’ of Article 11.61

the Governing Body of the ILO (1996). The right to strike is developed from Art 3 of Convention No 87 which establishes the right of workers’ and employers’ organisations to ‘organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes’ and the aims of such organisations as ‘furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers’ (Art 10). 55 B Gernigon, A Odero and H Guido (eds), ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike (Geneva, ILO, 2000), 8. 56 ‘Germany’ in ibid, 126. 57 R Birk, ‘Industrial Conflict: The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs’, in R Blanpain (ed), Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 3rd edn (Deventer, Kluwer, 1990) 406. The discussion that follows draws on this chapter. 58 Metrobus Ltd v Unite [2009] IRLR 851, [118]. 59 Ibid, [35]. 60 RMT v UK App No 31045/10, 8 April 2014. Discussed by J Hendy and M Ford in https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/ rmt-v-united-kingdom-sympathy-strikes-and-the-european-court-of-human-rights/. 61 Ibid [84].



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Moreover they found that although the complete ban on secondary action constituted an interference with Article 11, it was justified within Article 11(2).

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 28.32 As the discussion above indicates, the right to engage in collective bargaining and the ‘right’ to strike have both been vexed subjects not just for the EU but for other international organisations. The Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts have now recognised the right to strike. However, as the discussion below of the decisions in Viking and Laval reveal, the position in respect of the EU is more complex than would first appear.

II.  Scope of Application: Definition of Terms (a)  Collective Bargaining National Level 28.33 In its broad sense,62 collective bargaining is a process of interest accommodation which includes all sorts of bipartite or tripartite discussions relating to labour problems directly or indirectly affecting a group of workers. The discussions may take place in different fora, with or without the presence of governments, and aim at ascertaining the view of the other party, obtaining a concession or reaching a compromise. A narrower but more precise meaning of collective bargaining views it only in connection with the bipartite discussions leading to the conclusion of agreements. In this narrower sense, collective bargaining involves a process of negotiations between individual employers or representatives of employers’ organisations and trade union representatives. As a general rule, any agreement concluded may be binding not only on its signatories but also on the groups they represent. 28.34 Collective bargaining offers a variety of benefits, succinctly summarised by Advocate General Jacobs in Albany:63 It is widely accepted that collective agreements between management and labour prevent costly labour conflicts, reduce transaction costs through a collective and rule-based negotiation process and promote predictability and transparency. A measure of equilibrium between the bargaining power on both sides helps to ensure a balanced outcome for both sides and for society as a whole.

28.35 The content of collective agreements can be determined by the contracting parties but c­ omprise principally of (1) normative clauses and (2) ‘contractual’ or ‘obligatory’ clauses. The ­normative stipulations refer to the terms and conditions of work which must be observed in all the

62 See E Cordova, ‘Collective Bargaining’, in Blanpain (ibid). 63 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I–5751 [181]. Less elegantly, the General Court said in Case T-645/11 Heath v ECB EU:T: 2013: 326 [8]: ‘The right to collective negotiation, enshrined in Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is intended to enable negotiations to take place between employer and employees so as to determine working conditions. However, where the rights and duties of employees have already been sufficiently determined by provisions which are applicable and whose validity is not in doubt, the fundamental right does not require such negotiations.’

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i­ ndividual employment contracts in the enterprise concerned. These include all aspects of working conditions, wages, fringe benefits, job classifications, working hours, time off, training, job ­security, and non-contributory benefit schemes. The collective agreement can also contain collective normative stipulations relating to informing and consulting workers, worker participation and procedural rules.64 The contractual or obligatory clauses include all provisions spelling out the rights and duties 28.36 of the parties. The main duty is often the peace obligation which means that for the duration of the agreement neither of the parties is permitted to initiate industrial action against the other party with the intention of altering the conditions laid down in the collective agreement. Such an obligation is considered to be a natural consequence of collective bargaining, which is supposed to bring stability to labour relations. This obligation may be absolute, in which case the parties are obliged to refrain from all industrial action,65 or relative, in which case neither of the parties is, for the duration of the collective agreement, permitted to initiate industrial action against the other party with the intention of altering conditions laid down in the agreement.66 The relative peace obligation offers trade unions the advantage of safeguarding their right to formulate new demands if and when substantive changes in the socio-economic environment occur.67 Between European states, attitudes and approaches to collective bargaining vary considerably. 28.37 At one end of the spectrum lies Denmark, where collective agreements form the cornerstone of labour standards. At the other stood the UK, where there is a statutory presumption that collective agreements are not legally binding between the parties.68 Collective agreements do have legal effect in the UK if incorporated into the contract of employment, but equally, since collective agreements do not constitute a floor of rights, the individual contract can be used to derogate from the provisions of the collective agreements. In between lie countries such as Belgium where collectively agreed norms can be given, by law, 28.38 an erga omnes or ‘extended’ effect. Thus, the law is used to ensure that the normative terms of collective agreements are applied more generally throughout the industry or sector. The original rationale for this procedure was the need to avoid unfair competition from non-unionised enterprises, but subsequently the extension mechanism has been justified by the need to promote collective bargaining and to pursue more egalitarian goals.69 EU Level Since Maastricht, the EU social partners have a greater role. Not only must they be consulted 28.39 on proposed legislation but they can also adopt European-wide interprofessional or intersectoral collective agreements which can then be given erga omnes effect by a Council ‘decision’ (in practice a Directive). This means that the Council can effectively rubber-stamp a collective agreement negotiated by the social partners (ETUC, BusinessEurope, CEEP) and turn it into a

64 Commission, Comparative Study on Rules Governing Working Conditions in the Member States: a Synopsis, SEC (89) 1137. 65 Birk, ‘Industrial Conflict: The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs’, in Blanpain (n 60), 413. 66 Commission (n 67). 67 Cordova, ‘Collective Bargaining’, in Blanpain (n 60), 28. 68 s 179 TULR(C)A 1992. 69 Cordova, ‘Collective Bargaining’, in Blanpain (n 60), 329.



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piece of legislation which must be implemented by the Member States. Three main Directives have been adopted via this route: —— the Parental Leave Directive 96/34/EC,70 repealed and replaced by Directive 2010/18/EU;71 —— the Part-time Workers Directive 97/81/EC;72 —— the Fixed-term Work Directive 99/70/EC.73 28.40 In addition to these intersectoral collective agreements, the sectoral social dialogue has produced more than 500 texts of varying legal status, ranging from joint opinions and responses to consultations to agreements that have been implemented as EU legislation. There are a number of Europe-wide agreements, plus amendments, which have legislative force including: —— Working time of Seafarers Directive 99/63,74 as amended by Directive 2009/13/EC;75 —— Working time in Civil Aviation Directive 2000/79;76 —— Directive 2005/47 on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector;77 —— the Sharps Directive 2010/32;78 28.41 Where the Council refuses to endorse a Commission proposal to give legal force to a collective agreement, as was the case with the Hairdressers Agreement,79 the social partners remain free, according to Article 155(2) TFEU, to implement an agreement ‘in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States’—so-called autonomous agreements. Where the Commission refused to submit a proposal to Council for a decision (Directive) implementing a collective agreement, the General Court ruled in EPSU80 the Commission did not commit an error of law as to the scope of its powers.81 (b)  Collective Action 28.42 So far we have talked about collective bargaining. We turn now to examine collective action. Collective action includes working to rule and other forms of non-cooperation with the employer. However, the classic form of collective action is a strike. This was at issue in Viking. The case concerned a Finnish company wanting to reflag its vessel, the ‘Rosella’, under the Estonian flag so that it could be staffed with an Estonian crew to be paid considerably less than the existing Finnish crew. In response, the Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) threatened to go on strike. This was an example of primary industrial action (action taken by employees against their employer (A) with whom they are in dispute). Viking Line argued that this strike action would contravene Article 49 TFEU. It was granted an injunction before the High Court of England and Wales, but this was overturned by the Court of Appeal which referred the case to the CJEU. 70 [1996] OJ L145/9. 71 [2010] OJ L68/13. 72 [1998] OJ L14/9. 73 [1999] OJ L244/64. 74 [1999] OJ L167/33. 75 [2009] OJ L124/30. 76 [2000] OJ L302/57. 77 [2005] OJ L195/15. 78 [2010] OJ L134/66. 79 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1286&furtherNews=yes. See also F Dorssemont, K Lörcher and M Schmitt, ‘On the Duty to Implement European Framework Agreements: Lessons to be Learned from the Hairdressers Case’ (2019) 48 ILJ 571. 80 Case T-310/18 EPSU v Commission EU:T:2019:757. This decision is being appealed. 81 Ibid [104].

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In addition, secondary, or sympathy, industrial action (action taken by employees against 28.43 their employer (B), with whom they are not in dispute, but intended to put pressure on the employer (A) with whom there is a dispute) is covered by the phrase collective action and is also likely to be a restriction on freedom of movement. This can also be seen in Viking.82 Not only did the FSU threaten to take industrial action, but so did the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), as part of its campaign against flags of convenience (FOCs) (ie where the beneficial ownership and control of the vessel was found to lie in a state other than the flag state). In accordance with the ITF policy, only unions established in the state of beneficial ownership had the right to conclude collective agreements covering the vessel concerned. When the ITF learned of the plan to reflag the ‘Rosella’, it sent a circular to its affiliates asking them to refrain from entering into negotiations with Viking. The Court ruled that the policy pursued by ITF constituted an unjustified restriction on freedom of establishment. The phrase ‘collective action’ can also include blacking (ie not working with) certain products 28.44 or companies, and picketing at the premises of a particular employer. This can be either primary or secondary industrial action. Various sorts of blacking were at issue in Laval.83 A Latvian company won a contract to refurbish a school in Sweden using its own Latvian workers, who were paid about 40 per cent less than comparable Swedish workers. The Swedish construction union wanted Laval to apply the Swedish collective agreement but Laval refused, in part because the collective agreement was unclear as to how much Laval would have to pay its workers. There followed a range of collective action which the Court set out in some detail: —— In November there was blockading (‘blockad’) of the Vaxholm building site, consisting of preventing the delivery of goods onto the site, placing pickets and prohibiting Latvian workers and vehicles from entering the site (Laval asked the police for assistance but they explained that since the collective action was lawful under national law, they were not allowed to intervene or to remove physical obstacles blocking access to the site). —— In December the collective action directed against Laval intensified when Elektrikerna initiated sympathy action. That measure had the effect of preventing Swedish undertakings belonging to the organisation of electricians’ employers from providing services to Laval. —— In January other trade unions announced sympathy actions, consisting of a boycott of all Laval’s sites in Sweden, with the result that Laval was no longer able to carry on its activities in Sweden. Although this industrial action was lawful under Swedish law, Laval brought proceedings in 28.45 the Swedish Labour Court, claiming that this action was contrary to EU law (Article 56 TFEU). The Court of Justice essentially found in favour of Laval, as we shall see in the next section.

III.  Specific Provisions (a)  Collective Action The Judgments in Viking and Laval The section above outlined just how broad the phrase collective action can be. It also showed 28.46 how, in the cases of Viking and Laval, the Court accepted the employers’ arguments that the collective action contravened Articles 49 and 56 TFEU respectively. These decisions caused





82 Case 83 Case

C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779. C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767.

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28.47

28.48

28.49

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28.51

profound ­shockwaves to reverberate across the world of industrial relations. There are two reasons for this. First, in a number of industrial relations systems, as we have seen, the right to strike enjoys constitutional protection: strikes are presumptively lawful unless there are good reasons to the contrary. Further, in some systems, the contract of employment is suspended during strike action (thereby ensuring that strikers do not breach their contracts of employment while striking). For these and other reasons, it was argued by the trade unions that EU law should not apply to strike action since it concerned a fundamental right; the Court disagreed, noting that in decisions such as Schmidberger and Omega, the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue (freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and respect for human dignity) did not fall outside the scope of the provisions of the Treaty. Rather, it said, the exercise of those rights had to be reconciled with the requirements relating to rights protected under the Treaty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. The trade union movement was also shocked because it thought that the advent of the Charter, and Article 28 in particular, might suggest that strike action enjoyed a special status under EU law. At first the Court appeared to agree. It acknowledged in both Viking and Laval (for the first time) that the right to take collective action, including the right to strike, was a fundamental right, referring to Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the Court did say that the right to strike was subject to limits laid down by both national law and practices (eg notice and balloting rules) and Union law (eg rules on free movement considered below) and it was these combined limitations which worried the trade unions who, the Court confirmed, are bound by Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. Having established that EU law applied, the Court then followed its standard Säger84 market access approach (breach, justification, proportionality) to determine whether the strike action breached EU law. As we saw above, the Court found that the collective action did constitute a restriction on free movement and so breached Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. On justification, the Court noted in Viking that the right to take collective action for the protection of workers was an overriding reason of public interest provided that jobs or conditions of employment were jeopardised or under serious threat. On the facts, the Court suggested this was unlikely because Viking had given an undertaking that no Finnish workers would be made redundant. If, however, the trade unions could justify the collective action, the national court would have to apply the proportionality test. The CJEU then applied the strictest form of the proportionality test, unmitigated by any references to ‘margin of appreciation’. On the question of suitability, the Court said that collective action might be one of the main ways in which trade unions protected the interests of their members. However, on the question of necessity, the Court said it was for the national court to examine whether the FSU had other means less restrictive of freedom of establishment to bring the collective negotiations with Viking to a successful conclusion, and whether the FSU had exhausted those means before starting the collective action. In other words, industrial action should be the last resort. Because the case was subsequently settled, there is no national court ruling on the two issues of justification and proportionality. Turning to Laval, the Court recognised that the right to take collective action for the protection of Swedish workers ‘against possible social dumping’ was a justification but found on the facts that using collective action to force Laval to sign a collective agreement whose content on central matters such as pay was unclear could not be justified.



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The Analysis The trade unions objected to the fact that the Court applied its standard single market analysis to industrial action. They argued that the moment collective action was found to be a ‘restriction’ and thus breached EU law, the national ‘social’ interests were put on the back foot, having to be defended from the EU economic freedoms which benefit from the supremacy of EU law. And the Court has made it difficult to defend the social interests due to its strict approach to justification and proportionality. So, despite recognition of the right to strike, the limitations on the exercise of that right laid down by Union law subsumed much of the right. Given the reference in Article 28 of the Charter to the right being ‘in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’ the same restrictions would apply in respect of the Charter too. This leads Ewing and Hendy to talk of the ‘disembowelling’ in Viking of the EU right to strike. Even in a country like the UK, with the strictest strike laws in Europe, the effects of Viking, in particular, were potentially serious. As we have seen, there is no right to strike as such in the UK. Rather, the UK’s approach has been one based on immunity: collective action is an economic tort and thus unlawful unless the trade union benefits from a statutory immunity (note the parallels in approach with that of the CJEU in Viking and Laval). One of the conditions for immunity is that the trade unions are acting ‘in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute’85—the so-called golden formula. A ‘trade dispute’ is defined in section 244(1)(a)–(g) of the Trade Union Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 as a dispute between ‘workers and their employer which relates wholly or mainly’ to a list of matters including ‘terms and conditions of employment, or physical working conditions’. Further, this immunity can be lost if there is no ballot and notice to the employer in accordance with the detailed rules in the statute. However, if the trade union manages to satisfy these requirements, there is no separate obligation to show that the strike action is proportionate. The effect of the decision in Viking is to make taking strike action in transnational situations86 even more difficult than under domestic law alone. Strike action can now be justified only where both the EU rules and the national rules are satisfied. For the UK this meant that strike action could be justified only where:

28.52

28.53

28.54

28.55

(1) jobs or conditions of employment are jeopardised or under serious threat (Viking), thus apparently ruling out one of the traditional reasons for strike action, namely, to improve terms and conditions of employment. It also significantly narrows the list of justified industrial action in s 244(1)(a) to (g); (2) the strike action is proportionate (Viking); (3) UK rules on notice and balloting are satisfied (UK domestic law). And if the trade union could not satisfy these conditions, it was likely to face the threat of an 28.56 injunction by the employers and/or damages. The risk of (uncapped) damages87 prompted BALPA (the British Airline Pilots’ Association) to complain to the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, that the effect of the judgments in

85 TULR(C)A 1992 s 219. 86 Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government [2008] ECR I-1683. 87 K Apps, ‘Damages Claims Against Trade Unions After Viking and Laval’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 141.



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Viking and Laval was to expose the unions to crippling damages if they went on strike without complying with the (unclear) terms of the judgments. The Committee observed:88 with serious concern the practical limitations on the effective exercise of the right to strike of the BALPA workers in this case. The Committee takes the view that the omnipresent threat of an action for damages that could bankrupt the union, possibly now in the light of the Viking and Laval judgments, creates a situation where the rights under the Convention cannot be exercised. … The Committee thus considers that the doctrine that is being articulated in these ECJ judgments is likely to have a significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to strike in practice in a manner contrary to the Convention.

The Effect of Demir? 28.57 The tantalising question is whether the decision in Demir and Enerji Yapi-Yol will have any longterm consequences for the EU, particularly if (when?) it accedes to the European Convention. The answer may well be yes. The Court of Human Rights reached its decision based on a ‘pure’ human rights reading of the Convention. In other words, it was not and is not operating under the potentially conflicting imperatives of creating a ‘social market economy’. Thus the Court of Human Rights adopted a traditional ‘human rights’ reading of Article 11. It established that (1) prohibiting the strike breaches the fundamental (social) right, thereby requiring (2) the defendant (the employer/state) to justify the breach and show that any action constituting the breach is proportionate. Thus, the starting point of Court of Human Right’s approach is the legality of the strike action. 28.58 By contrast, the Court of Justice’s approach in Viking, while also couched in the language of rights, adopted a different starting point: (1) the strike action constitutes a restriction on free movement which then has to be (2) justified by the trade union which also must show that the strike action is proportionate. The criticism of Viking is that, despite the talk of balancing of the economic rights with social rights, the one-sided Säger analysis adopted by the Court, starting from the premise of the illegality of the strike action, inevitably led to a finding that the economic right to freedom of establishment and free movement of services prevailed over the right to strike. This prompts Ewing and Hendy to conclude that: It is difficult then to see how the ECtHR could avoid upholding Article 11 and the right to collective bargaining and to strike over the business freedoms contained in what are now Articles 49 and 56 of the TFEU. And so issues would bat to and fro between the two courts in a titanic battle of the juristocrats, each vying for supremacy in the European legal order, one determined to impale trade union rights on the long lance of economic freedom and the other subordinating economic freedom to the modest demands of human rights and constitutionalism.

(b)  The Right to Engage in Collective Bargaining 28.59 So far, we have concentrated on collective action. We turn now to collective bargaining. As we saw in section C.I above, in Commission v Germany (occupational pensions) the Court recognised the right to engage in collective bargaining was a fundamental right.89 However, as with the right to take collective action in Viking and Laval, it had to be read subject to the fundamental freedoms (and other principles such as equality law90). On the facts, a number of local authorities entered into a collective agreement with the trade unions concerning the conversion of earnings into



88 www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID:2314990. 89 Case

C-271/08 Commission v Germany (Occupational Pensions) [2010] ECR I-7091. Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10 Sabine Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt [2011] ECR I-7965.

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pension savings. The collective agreement identified a limited list of pension providers entrusted with implementing the salary conversion measure. Given the existence of this collective agreement, the local authorities did not issue a call for tenders, as required by Directive 2004/18 on public procurement, with the result that other pension providers were denied the chance to offer their services. As with Viking and Laval, the Court noted the need for balance between the competing interests 28.60 (the fundamental social right to engage in collective bargaining against the fundamental economic freedoms, freedom of establishment and free movement of services, as enshrined in the Public Procurement Directive)91 but found that this balance had not been struck on the facts because the effect of the collective agreement was ‘to disapply the public procurement rules completely, and for an indefinite period, in the field of local authority employees’ pension saving’.92 The Court rejected the German government’s argument that the Public Procurement Directives should not be applied because (1) they did not provide room for worker participation; and (2) the collective agreement was a manifestation of the principle of solidarity (with good risks offsetting the bad). However, it did say that the ‘application of the procurement procedures [do not] preclude the call for tenders from imposing upon interested tenderers conditions reflecting the interests of the workers concerned’. It also said that the Directives do not prevent ‘a local authority employer from specifying, in the terms of the call for tenders, the conditions to be complied with by tenderers in order to prevent, or place limits on, workers interested in salary conversion being selected on the basis of medical grounds.93 It added that the preservation of ‘elements of solidarity is not inherently irreconcilable with the application of a procurement procedure’.94 However, there is another emerging and increasingly important strand of case law on the 28.61 use of collective bargaining to implement directives where collective bargaining may impact on other Charter rights. The earliest case law concerns ‘first degree implementation’ where the social partners, through a collective agreement, implement a directive as a whole. This is has not raised particular issues; it is compatible with trade union powers under Article 28. ‘Second degree implementation’ which covers a range of situations, including where trade unions derogate from the terms of a directive, is more sensitive. The earliest case law, starting with Commission v Denmark,95 concerned first degree 28.62 implementation. The Court ruled that ‘Member States may leave the implementation of the principle of equal pay in the first instance to representatives of management and labour.’ The Court reached this conclusion despite that fact that neither the Treaty, at this stage, nor the directive at issue (Directive 75/117), allowed the delegation of implementation to the social partners. The Court did, however, impose some requirements on Member States if they allowed the implementation of directives by collective agreements (CAs). At paragraph 8 the Court said Member States had to ensure: by appropriate legislative and administrative provisions, that all workers in the community are afforded the full protection provided for in the directive. That state guarantee must cover all cases where effective protection is not ensured by other means, for whatever reason, and in particular cases where the workers in question are not union members, where the sector in question is not covered by a collective agreement or where such an agreement does not fully guarantee the principle of equal pay.

91 Paras 44 and 52. The Court has extended this to the field of state aid: Case C-319/07 3F v Commission [2009] ECR I-5963 [58]. 92 Ibid [53]. 93 Ibid [58]. 94 Ibid. 95 Case 143/83 EU: C:1985: 34, para 8.



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28.63 In other words, the state had to be in a position to guarantee that the content of the directive was fully implemented both in terms of personal scope and content. Subsequent case law applied these principles96 and in 1992 at Maastricht, the Treaty confirmed this as a possibility. Article 153(3) TFEU now provides: 3. A Member State may entrust management and labour, at their joint request, with the implementation of directives adopted pursuant to paragraph 2, or, where appropriate, with the implementation of a Council decision adopted in accordance with Article 155. In this case, it shall ensure that, no later than the date on which a directive or a decision must be transposed or implemented, management and labour have introduced the necessary measures by agreement, the Member State concerned being required to take any necessary measure enabling it at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by that directive or that decision.

28.64 However, subsequent case law has concerned ‘second degree implementation’, ie situations where the social partners are not implementing the directive as a whole but where they are: —— implementing the process for delivering the outcome of the directive, eg Article 1(2) of the Information and Consultation Directive 2002/14;97 —— derogating from a provision in a directive and specific articles of the directive expressly allow the social partners to do so, eg Articles 17 and 18 of the Working Time Directive 2003/88;98 —— derogating from a provision in a directive where the social partners are not expressly given a role, eg Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78;99 —— improving upon the protection in the directive, eg in the case of a minimum standards directive such as the Pregnant Workers Directive 92/85.100 In the future there is likely to be case law where the directive allows the social partners to flesh out the content of the directive (eg Clauses 4 and 5 of the Fixed Term Work Directive 99/70 or to implement key provisions of the directive but in a different way to that prescribed by the directive (eg Article 5(3) of the Temporary Agency Work Directive 2008/104101). 28.65 The common theme in this second degree implementation line of case law is the increasingly broad discretion given to the social partners but subject to the limits of complying with EU law. Hennigs102 provides a good example. The primary question raised was whether rules on pay in a collective agreement for public sector contractual employees infringed the prohibition of age discrimination in primary law (now Article 21(1) of the Charter) as given expression by Directive 2000/78, taking into account the right of parties to engage in collective bargaining guaranteed by Article 28 of the Charter. 28.66 The Court found that the system of pay at issue did create a difference of treatment based directly on the criterion of age, contrary to the directive; the question was whether it could be justified under Article 6(1) (ie whether the difference was objectively and reasonably justified by

96 See eg Case 312/86 Commission v France EU:C:1988:485; Case 235/84 Commission v Italy EU:C:1986:303. 97 OJ [2002] L 80/29 considered in Case C-405/08 Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark, acting on behalf of Bertram Holst v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening acting on behalf of Babcock & Wilcox Vølund ApS EU:C:2010:69. 98 OJ [2003] L 299/9. 99 OJ L 303/16. See eg Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10 Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land Berlin (C-298/10) v Alexander Mai EU:C:2011:560; Case C-447/09 Prigge v Deutsche Lufthansa AG EU:C:2011:573. 100 OJ L 348/1, considered in Case C-194/08 Susanne Gassmayr v Bundesminister für Wissenschaft und Forschung EU:C:2010:386. 101 OJ [2008] L 327/9. 102 Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10 Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and Land Berlin (C-298/10) v Alexander Mai. EU:C:2011:560.

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a legitimate aim, including legitimate ­employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary). The Court repeated that the social partners at national level could, on the same basis as the Member States, provide for measures which contain differences of treatment on grounds of age, in accordance with Article 6(1); ‘Like the Member States, they enjoy a broad discretion in their choice, not only to pursue a particular aim in the field of social and employment policy, but also in the definition of measures capable of achieving it.’103 The Court continued (emphasis added): 66 The nature of measures adopted by way of a collective agreement differs from the nature of those adopted unilaterally by way of legislation or regulation by the Member States in that the social partners, when exercising their fundamental right to collective bargaining recognised in Article 28 of the Charter, have taken care to strike a balance between their respective interests …. 67 Where the right of collective bargaining proclaimed in Article 28 of the Charter is covered by provisions of European Union law, it must, within the scope of that law, be exercised in compliance with that law …. 68 Consequently, when they adopt measures falling within the scope of Directive 2000/78, which gives specific expression in the field of employment and occupation to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, the social partners must comply with that directive ….

Three points are striking from Hennigs. First, the Court indicated that the nature of measures adopted by way of a collective agreement differed from the nature of those adopted unilaterally by way of legislation or regulation by the Member States because of the social partners’ ability to balance competing interests. Second, it noted the significant role played by the Charter; and third, it placed emphasis on the social partners’ responsibility for having to comply with the Directive, rather than on the Member States acting as guarantor. However, despite the emphasis on the broad discretion of the social partners, the Court found in Hennigs that they were in breach of EU law: that the determination according to age of the basic pay step on appointment of a public sector contractual employee went beyond what was necessary and appropriate for achieving the legitimate aim, relied on by the German government, of taking account of the professional experience acquired by the employee before he was appointed.104 By contrast, the Court found that it was not unreasonable for the social partners to adopt transitional measures (replacing a system of pay leading to discrimination on grounds of age by a system of pay based on objective criteria while maintaining, for a transitional period limited in time, some of the discriminatory effects of the earlier system, in order to ensure that employees in post were transferred to the new system without suffering a loss of income). The transitional measures were appropriate for avoiding a loss of income on the part of federal contractual employees, and they did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve that aim, having regard to the broad discretion enjoyed by the social partners in the field of determining pay.105 This raises a further question as to what is meant by complying with ‘EU law’. Certainly the social partners must comply with the directive but presumably they must respect other principles of EU law including Article 28 CFREU on the right to collective bargaining, or the general principles expressed by the directive, or to the general principles of EU law, including proportionality. It also raises a further question: who is ultimately responsible for complying with





103 Para 104 Para 105 Para

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EU law: is it the social partners, as Hennig might indicate, or is it ultimately the Member States acting in their guarantor capacity?106

IV.  Limitations and Derogations (a)  Limits, and Limits on Limits 28.71 As the previous section made clear, there are limits on the social partners exercising their collective bargaining functions. Those limits might be derived from EU law (the four freedoms, the EU legislation itself, and the general principles). 28.72 Article 28 of the Charter itself also contains limitations, namely national law and practices (eg notice and balloting rules) and Union law (ie strike action can only be taken to protect terms and conditions of employment and jobs which are seriously under threat, and strike action must be a last resort). Article 52(6) reiterates that ‘Full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter.’ 28.73 However, Article 52(1) recognises that there exists limits on the limits. As the General Court put it in Trabelsi,107 a limitation on the exercise of the right must satisfy three conditions: (1) The limitation must be provided by law. (2) It must refer to an objective of public interest recognised as such by the EU. (3) The limitation may not be excessive ie it must be necessary and proportional to the aim sought and its essential content (ie the substance of the right or freedom at issue) must not be impaired. The first of these conditions were considered in a staff case, Aquino108 concerning a strike by interpreters at the European Parliament. The Staff Regulations are silent on the matter of the right to strike.109 Nevertheless, following a decision by the European Parliament to change the working conditions of interpreters, the inter-trade union committee filed notice of strike action on particular dates; by a Decision of 2 July 2018 the European Parliament nevertheless requisitioned interpreters to work on those dates. The General Court said: ‘As regards the condition that the limitation be “provided for by law”, it should be recalled that the requirement that any limitation on the exercise of the right guaranteed by the Charter must be provided for by law means that the legal basis must be sufficiently clear and precise and that, by defining itself the scope of the limitation on the exercise of that right, it affords a measure of legal protection against any arbitrary interferences by those authorities.’110 The Court said that the provision on which the Parliament had relied, Article 55(1) of the Staff Regulations, ‘officials in active employment shall at all times be at the disposal of their institution’ neither lays down any ‘precise and clear limitation on the exercise of the right to strike, nor, a fortiori, provides for the use of requisitions’. It thus provides no clarification as to the scope of the limitation of the right to strike and could not serve as a legal basis for the requisition measures at issue.111 The Court therefore concluded

106 Case C 533/13 Auto- ja Kuljetusalan Työntekijäliitto AKT ry v Öljytuote ry, Shell Aviation Finland Oy EU:C:2015:173 touched upon this question but the judgment is so terse that it is difficult to extract broader principles. 107 Case T-187/11 Trabelsi v Council (28 May 2013) [79]–[81]. 108 Case T-402/18 Aquino v European Parliament, EU:T:2020:13. 109 Cases 44/74, 46/74 and 49/74 Acton and Others v Commission, EU:C:1975:42, [15]. 110 Para 66. 111 Para 73.

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that ‘the requisition measures at issue constitute a limitation on the right to strike that was not provided for by law. The decision of 2 July 2018 must therefore be annulled, in so far as it infringes that fundamental right.’112 The Court also made an award of damages to each claimant. (b)  Protocol No 30 The other major (potential) limitation on Article 28 relates to Protocol 30. As we have seen, 28.74 Article 1(2) appears to suggest that if any of the provision in the Solidarity Title are rights not principles, (the UK and) Poland will have an opt-out. It provides: In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.

Poland subsequently appeared to renege on the position it took in the Protocol. Declaration 62 28.75 appended to the Treaties provides that: Poland declares that, having regard to the tradition of social movement of ‘Solidarity’ and its significant contribution to the struggle for social and labour rights, it fully respects social and labour rights, as established by European Union law, and in particular those reaffirmed in Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

V. Remedies If one of the EU institutions, agencies or bodies has breached an individual staff member’s 28.76 Article 28 rights by bringing a claim under Article 270 TFEU113 as happened in Aquino, the individual might also bring a claim for damages. By contrast, if the EU legislature were to adopt a Regulation or Directive under the ordinary 28.77 or special legislative procedure which a trade union or an individual worker thought infringed the right to strike or the right to engage in collective bargaining, a direct action under Article 263 TFEU would be more difficult since, following Inuit I,114 it seems the traditional Plaumann115 locus standi test will apply to legislative acts. As Advocate General Jacobs said in UPA,116 the paradox of this test is that the more people affected by the rule, the less likely any individual will be able to satisfy the Plaumann test. Nevertheless, UPA has confirmed that Plaumann is still good law but that individuals without locus standi under Article 263 TFEU may nevertheless have recourse to actions in the national court and then seek a reference under Article 267 TFEU. This poses further problems as to how such actions may be framed. The individual might 28.78 allege that national law has not implemented the Directive in some way and in the course of that action, the national court is requested to make a preliminary reference on invalidity of the EU measure.

112 Para 81. 113 Art 270 TFEU provides: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between the Union and its servants within the limits and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union.’ 114 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Order of the General Court of 6 September 2011) confirmed by the Court of Justice in Case C-583/11 P (GC, 3 October 2013). 115 Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 199. 116 Case 50/00 Union de Pequeños Agricultores v Council (UPA) [2002] ECR I-6677.



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28.79

What if the challenge is to a national law which the applicant argues is contrary to Article 28? This is where the rights and principles dichotomy is relevant. Article 51(1) of the Charter says that rights must be ‘respected’, whereas principles must merely be ‘observed’. In other words, rights are legally enforceable. As for principles, Article 52(5) says: The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.

In other words, principles require further action by the EU legislature or executive or by Member States when implementing EU law. However, they are ‘judicially cognisable’ only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality. The UK had long argued that the Solidarity Title of the Charter contained only principles, not rights,117 a view apparently confirmed by the Court in in AMS.118 28.80 A trade union sought to rely on Article 27 of the Charter to challenge a private employer’s refusal to establish worker consultation mechanisms pursuant to Directive 2002/14.119 Under the French legislation implementing the directive, the employer was entitled to exclude certain categories of employment contract from the calculation of the number of employees. The CJEU found that this aspect of the French legislation was not compatible with the directive. Despite this, the remedies available to AMS were unclear given the CJEU’s consistent rejection of the horizontal direct effect of directives. One of the questions raised therefore was whether the claimants could invoke Article 27 of the Charter on the ‘right to information and consultation’ to disapply a national rule which excluded certain categories of employees from the threshold for triggering the application of the Information and Consultation Directive. 28.81 The Court thought not, noting in particular the limitations on the right contained in Article 27—that ‘“Workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking”, provides that workers must, at various levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in the cases and under the conditions provided for by European Union law and national laws and practices.’120 The Court said that it was clear from the wording of Article 27 of the Charter that, for this article to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in European Union or national law. Given this important caveat, it therefore ruled: It is not possible to infer from the wording of Article 27 of the Charter or from the explanatory notes to that article that Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/14, as a directly applicable rule of law, lays down and addresses to the Member States a prohibition on excluding from the calculation of the staff numbers in

117 Lord Goldsmith in his evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/979/97905.htm.) said that the Title IV rights are called solidarity rights, but ‘they are really social and economic rights’. He continued: ‘That was one of the biggest issues for the United Kingdom. A lot of countries want to see social and economic rights made justiciable. It is a very live issue in terms of human rights. The social charter, of course, was very much in existence at the time. The UK did not want to go further than we were already at that stage, and it was quite a neuralgic issue.’ He also explained the thinking behind Article 52(5) on principles. He said that ‘economic and social rights in the Charter were not stand-alone rights: to be justiciable they needed to be implemented either at EU or Member State level’ (ie principles). See also Lord Goldsmith, ‘A Charter of Rights, Principles and freedoms’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 1201 (www.biicl.org/files/3272_goldsmith.pdf). 118 Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale (AMS) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2. This section draws on C Barnard, ‘Are social rights “rights”?’, (2020) European Labour Law Journal DOI: 10.1177/2031952520905382. 119 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L 80/29. 120 Para 44.

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an undertaking a specific category of employees initially included in the group of persons to be taken into account in that calculation.121

It continued: Article 27 of the Charter cannot, as such, be invoked in a dispute, such as that in the main proceedings, in order to conclude that the national provision which is not in conformity with Directive 2002/14 should not be applied.

The Court emphasised the caveat found in Article 27 to ‘conditions provided for by European 28.82 Union law and national laws and practices’ in Article 27, which, it seems, deprived Article 27 of direct effect altogether, let alone horizontal direct effect.122 It is thus different, as the Court pointed out in AMS, from Article 21 in so far as the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age,123 laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals an individual right which they may invoke as such. Given the similarity in structure between Article 27 and Article 28, with both containing 28.83 references to the caveat ‘in accordance with Union law and national laws’, this suggests that Article 28 contains a principle and so does not have direct effect, vertically, let alone horizontally. It therefore cannot be used to challenge directly a rule of domestic law (or indeed a collective agreement124), in the field of EU law, which allegedly contravenes Article 28. It seems unlikely that Bauer, cited above, changes this. Bauer, which concerned Article 31(2) of 28.84 the Charter concerned the right to paid annual leave. In Bauer the Court distinguished between Article 31(2) which provides in ‘mandatory terms’ that ‘“every worker” has “the right … to an annual period of paid leave”’ without, unlike Article 27, referring to ‘the cases and … conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices’.125 Therefore, while Article 31(2) of the Charter satisfied the requirement of being ‘mandatory and unconditional’ and so could have horizontal application, Articles 27 and, presumably, 28 do not because of the caveat imposed. For this reason, they are judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of Member State acts and in the ruling on their legality.

E. Evaluation Article 28 has some value: a Charter professing to contain a comprehensive catalogue of civil and social rights would be discredited if it made no reference to the right to engage in 121 Para 46. 122 See also the AG’s Opinion on this point. Art 27 was proclaimed as a right: the scope of the right directly guaranteed by the provision is extremely weak: ‘… in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices’. This is confirmed by the fact that the article does not define any individual legal situations, leaving the European Union and national legislatures to give specific expression to the content and objectives determined by the ‘principle.’ He said the article does not determine any individual legal situations, but requires the public authorities to determine the objective content (information and consultation of workers) and certain outcomes (effectiveness of the information, representation on the basis of the levels and notice in sufficient time). 123 Citing Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365. 124 The Court avoided this question in Case C-476/12 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v Verband Österreichischer Banken und Bankiers, EU:C:2014:2332: ‘Is Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [of the European Union] to be interpreted as meaning that where, in a system of employment law in which substantial elements of minimum employment standards are established in accordance with the agreed social policy assessments of specially selected and qualified parties to a collective agreement, a point of detail in a collective agreement (albeit a point that breaches the EU law principle of non-discrimination)—in this case, the proportionate grant of child allowance in the case of part-time working—is invalid (according to national practice), the penalty of invalidity extends to all the provisions of the collective agreement relating to that area (in this case, child allowance)?’ 125 Para 84.



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collective bargaining and its corollary, the right to take collective action. However, its value may be just that: symbolic. The circumstances in which it might be enforced are few and far between and, following the decisions in Viking and Laval, the exceptions may subsume the right. In fact, for trade unions other international fora may offer more hope such as the European Committee of Social Rights126 and the ILO.127 However, these organisations lack real teeth to enforce these rights.

126 European Committee of Social Rights: ‘the scope for workers to defend their interests through lawful collective action is excessively circumscribed’ (Report published December 2010, Conclusions xix–3). See also Complaint no 85/2012 LO and TCO v Sweden, report published 20 November 2013. 127 The ILO Committee of Experts has called on the UK government to review Part V of the 1992 Act ‘with a view to ensuring that the protection of the right of workers to exercise legitimate industrial action is fully effective’ (100th Session, 2011 Report III Pt 1A).

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Article 29* Article 29 Right of Access to Placement Services Everyone has the right of access to a free placement service.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 29 This Article is based on Article 1(3) of the European Social Charter and point 13 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.

Select Bibliography P Alston, ‘The General Comments of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, (2010) 104 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (The American Society International Law) 4–7. D Ashiagbor, ‘The Right to Work’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Bruno de Witte (eds) Social Rights in Europe (Oxford, OUP, 2005). D Ashiagbor, The European Employment Strategy: Labour Market Regulation and New Governance (Oxford, OUP, 2005). J Elster, ‘Is there (or should there be) a right to work?’ in Amy Gutmann (ed) Democracy and the Welfare State (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988). European Commission, Deregulation in placement services: A comparative study for eight EU countries (Luxembourg, 1999). European Commission, The PES Network Working Paper: The Future of Work, Implication and Responses by the PES Network (Luxembourg, 2018). D Finn, The organisation and regulation of the Public Employment Service and of Private Employment and Temporary Work Agencies: the experience of selected European countries—the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom (Leicester: Learning and Work Institute, 2016). M Freedland, P Craig, C Jacqueson and N Kountouris, Public Employment Services and European Law (Oxford, OUP, 2007). B Hepple, ‘A Right to Work?’ (1981) 10:1 Industrial Law Journal, 65–83. International Labour Office, Guide to Private Employment Agencies: Regulation, monitoring and enforcement (Geneva, 2007). B Jantz, T Klenk and J Wiggan, ‘Marketization and varieties of accountability relationships in employment services: comparing Denmark, Germany and Great Britain’ (2015) 50 Administration & Society, 321–45. G Mundlak, ‘The right to work: Linking human rights and employment policy’ (2007) 146 (3/4) International Labour Review 189–215. P Teague, Economic Citizenship in the European Union: Employment relations in the new Europe (London, Routledge, 1999). V Mantouvalou, The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015).

* This chapter was written by Diamond Ashiagbor in the first edition. It has been updated by Jeff Kenner in the second edition.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

A.  Article 29 and the Scope of EU Law 29.01 As with the right to work in Article 15 of the Charter, the right of access to a free placement ­service in Article 29 is closely connected with the economic freedoms which are at the core of the EU project. Access to free placement services has come to be seen as a key prerequisite to fully realise the freedom of movement for workers guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU. Whilst Article 45 TFEU sets out the nature of the free movement right (and limitations on that right), Article 46 TFEU confers competence on the European Parliament and the Council to issue directives or regulations to bring about such free movement, and in particular, measures ‘ensuring close cooperation between national employment services.’ Further, as Article 46(d) TFEU specifies, the measures to facilitate realisation of freedom of movement for workers shall involve: setting up appropriate machinery to bring offers of employment into touch with applications for employment and to facilitate the achievement of a balance between supply and demand in the employment market in such a way as to avoid serious threats to the standard of living and level of employment in the various regions and industries.

29.02 Accordingly, a key role of the Article 29 right in the EU context is to facilitate labour market mobility, by challenging formal and informal barriers to movement, such as discrimination on the grounds of nationality; or barriers to information about access to job opportunities, qualifications, taxation, work permits and residence rights. In essence, such information services are integral to establishing a free and open labour market and facilitating the effective exercise of the right to work and the right to free movement for EU ‘workers’. 29.03 The place of the Article 29 right within the EU acquis is further reinforced through secondary legislation, based on Article 46 TFEU and its precursors, to facilitate cross-border labour mobility. One of the earliest examples of secondary legislation to secure the Treaty right to free movement for workers was Regulation 1612/68.1 This Regulation has been substantially amended over the decades. In the interests of clarity and rationality this Regulation has been consolidated in Regulation 492/2011 on free movement for workers.2 However, what has remained unchanged since 1968 is Article 5 (of both the 1968 and 2011 Regulations) which provides that: A national of a Member State who seeks employment in the territory of another Member State shall receive the same assistance there as that afforded by the employment offices in that State to their own nationals seeking employment.

29.04 Originally contained in Articles 13–18 of Regulation 1612/68, Chapter II of Regulation 492/2011 sets out in great detail (Articles 11–20) the obligation on Member States to cooperate with regard to their central employment services; to cooperate with and inform the Commission as regards machinery for vacancy clearance (ie, job placement or job brokerage); and provide up to date information concerning living and working conditions and the state of the labour market ‘as is likely to be of guidance to workers from the other Member States’. 29.05 These rights are underpinned by the work of the European network of employment services, EURES, established in 1994 as part of the regulatory framework of the free movement of workers and falling originally within the purview of Regulation 1612/68. The task of EURES is to coordinate the public employment services (PES) of Member States in order to facilitate the exercise of the right of free movement of workers by sharing data on job vacancies, job 1 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community [1968] OJ L 257/2. 2 EU Regulation (EU) 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1.

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applications and CVs. It does this by bringing together job vacancies and job applications in each Member State through a common IT platform, the Job Mobility Portal.3 It has a network of advisers who are trained specialists in job matching, placement and recruitment. EURES now includes the European Network of PES made up of the PES of all countries in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland. EURES has been re-established following the adoption of the EURES Regulation, 2016/589.4 29.06 This Regulation, as amended,5 places responsibility for the organisation of the EURES network jointly on the Commission, the recently established European Labour Authority (ELA),6 and the Member States. At European level, there will be a new European Coordination Office, established within the ELA, which will implement a coordinated strategy with the National Coordination offices of the Member States, normally their PES. Following the re-establishment of EURES, Member States may admit others, such as social partners 29.07 and private actors, to the network, including those providing regulated employment services, as EURES members, and, if they contribute to the pool of job vacancies, job applications and CVs, as EURES partners. The aim is to increase the volume and variety of the information available about job opportunities and those seeking jobs.7 EURES encourages cross-border partnerships of stakeholders outside of the network, including social partners, for co-operation in cross-border regions. Through these coordinated actions the EURES network aims to improve ‘the functioning, cohesion and integration of the labour market in the Union, including at cross-border level’.8 Whilst the right to free movement of workers is the most obvious application of Article 29 29.08 within EU law, the right of access to placement services is also relevant in the context of EU employment policy, in particular the European employment strategy. The most recent iteration of the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States was issued by Council Decision in 2018.9 Since the origins of the European employment strategy in the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, there has been a consistent emphasis on increasing labour market participation as a central plank of combating unemployment. Flexibility and adaptability (of the workforce, of employment relations) has long been at the heart of the employment strategy, with increasing emphasis placed on ‘active’ labour market policies.10 The latest guidelines thus locate the right to free placement services within this discourse, noting: Policies should aim to improve and support labour-market participation, matching and transitions. Member States should effectively activate and enable those who can participate in the labour market. Member States should strengthen the effectiveness of active labour-market policies by increasing their targeting, outreach, coverage and better linking them with income support for the unemployed, whilst they are seeking work and based on their rights and responsibilities. Member States should aim for more effective 3 Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eures/public/homepage. 4 Regulation (EU) 2016/589 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2016 on a European network of employment services (EURES), workers’ access to mobility services and the further integration of labour markets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 492/2011 and (EU) No 1296/2013, [2016] OJ L 107/1. 5 Regulation (EU) 2019/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019, [2019] OJ L 186/21. 6 The ELA, which was formally established in 2019, and becomes fully operational from 2024, is taking over the task of overseeing EURES as part of its remit for protecting the rights of mobile workers, which includes enforcement powers. See Regulation (EU) 2019/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 establishing a ­European Labour Authority, amending Regulations (EC) No 883/2004, (EU) No 492/2011, and (EU) 2016/589 and repealing Decision (EU) 2016/344, [2019] OJ L 186/21. 7 Regulation 2016/589, arts 10–12. 8 Ibid, art 6(c). 9 Council Decision (EU) 2018/1215 of 16 July 2018 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, [2018] OJ L 224/4–9. 10 See Diamond Ashiagbor, The European Employment Strategy: Labour Market Regulation and New Governance (Oxford, OUP, 2005).



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and efficient public employment services by ensuring timely and tailor-made assistance to support jobseekers, supporting labour-market demand and implementing performance-based management.11

29.09 The right of access to placement services is an important element of the EU’s recovery from the economic crisis, recognising the disparities in the economic and social performance of Member States and the interdependence of their economies and labour markets.12 Moreover, it is integral to the delivery of the inter-institutional European Pillar of Social Rights, launched in 2017,13 which sets out 20 principles for more effective social rights for citizens as a counterweight to the strict austerity measures imposed post-2008. The Social Pillar aims to support well-functioning and fair labour markets and, in the first of its three chapters, it proclaims principles and rights to promote equal opportunities and access to the labour market. The first part of Point 4a declares that: Everyone has the right to timely and tailor-made assistance to improve employment or self-employment prospects. This includes the right to receive support for job search, training and re-qualification.

29.10 One of the main outcomes of the Social Pillar has been the establishment of the ELA, which will take over the coordination of EURES, giving a higher profile to the EU’s drive to facilitate access for individuals and employers to information on their rights and obligations in cross-border situations as well as improving access to cross-border labour mobility services. The commitment to deliver on the right in Article 29 of the Charter is gaining more attention as the von der Leyen Commission has identified the implementation of the Social Pillar as a guiding principle for the 2019–24 period.14

B.  Interrelationship of Article 29 with Other Provisions of the Charter 29.11 The Charter places the right to a free placement service within the ‘Solidarity’ Title, alongside other rights in work such as the right to protection against unjustified dismissal and the right to working conditions which respect one’s health, safety and dignity. In contrast, other human rights instruments, most notably the European Social Charter (ESC), place the right to free placement services together with the right to work. 29.12 The provision of the Charter with which Article 29 enjoys the closest fit is Article 15, the freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work. Both Articles 15 and 29 are stated, in the Explanations, to derive from Article 1 ESC on the right to work. Both play a significant role in bolstering the economic freedom of movement to engage in economic activity, protected by the TFEU.

C.  Sources of Article 29 Rights I.  Council of Europe: European Social Charter 29.13 The chapeau to Article 1 ESC emphasises the duty on states to ensure realisation of the right to work. This is seen to comprise the obligation, in Article 1(1) on the state to maintain ‘as high and stable a level of employment as possible, with a view to the attainment of full employment’; the 11 Council Decision of 16 July 2018, Guideline 7. See also the European ‘Employment package’ (launched April 2012): Commission Communication, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM/2012/0173 final. 12 Ibid, recital 6 of the preamble. 13 Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights, [2017] OJ C428/10. 14 Commission, ‘Agenda for 2019-2024’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/politicalguidelines-next-commission_en.pdf.

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duty on the state in Article 1(3) in respect of ‘free employment services’ for all; and the duty in Article 1(4) with regard to provision of vocational guidance, training and rehabilitation. The European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) concluded, in 2008, that Slovakia was not in 29.14 conformity with Article 1(3) ESC on the ground that it had not been established that the right to free placement services was guaranteed.15 In particular, the ECSR had repeatedly requested up to date information, which had not been forthcoming from Slovakia, so that it could assure itself that this right was being realised, namely: information on the placement rate (the ratio of the number of placements made by the public employment services to the number of vacancies notified); on the qualifications of those working in public employment offices and their geographical coverage; and on the market share of the public employment services, measured as total number of placements as a proportion of the total number of persons recruited on to the labour market. The right in Article 29 is addressed to ‘everyone’. However, the primary and secondary EU 29.15 law which gives substance to this right, locates it as a means to facilitate the free movement of workers within the EEA and Switzerland. What of third country nationals? A second Council of Europe instrument, the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers provides, in Article 27 on the use of employment services, that Contracting Parties must recognise the right of migrant workers and of their family members officially admitted to its territory ‘to make use of employment services under the same conditions as national workers subject to the legal provisions and regulations and administrative practice, including conditions of access, in force in that State’.16

II.  UN Treaties (Including Monitoring Bodies’ Positions) Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides for the right of ‘everyone’ to the opportunity to gain a living ‘by work which he freely chooses or accepts’. A corollary of this right, in Article 6(1) is the obligation on states in Article 6(2) to achieve the full realisation of this right through, for instance, providing ‘technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment’. This focus on full employment resonates strongly with the content of the right to work in the ESC, which similarly bundles the right of access to work, with the duty on the state to provide work—and to provide employment services to facilitate this access.17 Similarly, Article 10 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women requires states to take steps to eliminate discrimination against women, inter alia, in ensuring them the same conditions as men for career and vocational guidance. Three ILO conventions are of particular importance as sources: if not direct sources of Article 29 rights, then providing significant interpretative guidance. An early ILO instrument on employment services, Convention No 88 (1948), obliges member countries to provide for a free public employment service, the purpose of which shall be to ensure ‘the best possible organisation of the employment market as an integral part of the national programme for the achievement and maintenance of full employment and the development and use of productive resources’.18 But even before this, the principle that placement services for workers and employers should be free had long been established as a standard for employment services, in ILO Convention





15 Council

of Europe, European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions XIX-1 (2008) (Slovakia) at 9–10. Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, Strasbourg, 24.XI.1977. 17 See Chapter 15 in this volume on the right to work. 18 Art 1(2) ILO Convention 88 concerning the Organisation of the Employment Service (1948). 16 European

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No 2, the Unemployment Convention, 1919; this principle was re-confirmed in the Employment Service Convention, No 88. Thus, the core principle on which Article 29 of the EU Charter is founded, that fees for employment or placement services are suspect and undermine the essence of the right, has a long pedigree. Fee-charging employment services became notorious in the 1920s due to particular abuses.19 Such abuse could range from fraudulent practices, discriminatory treatment—especially of migrant workers, to the imposition of excessive charges on vulnerable jobseekers. 29.20 Convention No 34 on Fee-Charging Employment Agencies was introduced in 1933 to prevent abuse and improve organisation of the labour market, providing for abolition of fee-charging agencies within three years of its coming into force, with certain exceptions. A subsequent Convention in 1949, the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention (Revised), 1949 (No 96), required member countries to undertake the progressive abolition of fee-charging employment agencies conducted with a view to profit.20 However, by 1997, it was felt that the environment had changed such that private employment agencies may legitimately play a part in a well-functioning labour market.21 Recognising that a rapidly changing and flexible labour market and limits on the capacities of public employment services had led to a rapid growth of private employment agencies, Convention No 181 portrayed private employment agencies in a more positive light, and instead of advocating their gradual abolition, set the general parameters for the regulation, placement and employment of workers by these agencies.22 29.21 The current situation, reflected in Convention No 181, is to retain the emphasis on job-placement services for jobseekers being free as a provision to safeguard the interests of workers, if not necessarily in the public sector, but to allow governments to grant exceptions to the principle that such services are free, if there are clearly justifiable reasons. Thus, Article 7(1) of Convention No 181 provides, subject to limited exceptions in Article 7(2), that private employment agencies ‘shall not charge directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or costs to workers’.

III.  Other Sources 29.22 The Explanations list the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers as a further source of the Article 29 right but the reference to point 13 of the Community Charter appears to be in error: point 13 refers to the right of collective bargaining; point 6, however, provides that ‘[e]very individual must be able to have access to public placement services free of charge’.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 29.23 The fundamental right conferred by Article 29 serves two distinct, rather instrumental, purposes in the EU legal order: first, as a means to underpin the freedom of movement of workers; second, as a means to underpin employment policy, in particular the European employment strategy. 19 ILO Sectoral Activities Programme, ‘Private employment agencies, temporary agency workers and their contribution to the labour market: Issues paper for discussion at the Workshop to promote ratification of the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No 181), 20–21 October 2009. 20 ILO Convention 96 Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention (Revised) (1949). 21 ILO Convention 181 Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997. See International Labour Office, Guide to Private Employment Agencies: Regulation, monitoring and enforcement (Geneva, 2007). 22 Convention 34 is now closed to ratification.

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In recent years, following the economic and financial crises and the adoption of austerity policies, the focus has shifted to the employment policy objectives with attention being given to the twin objectives of optimising job opportunities for the long-term unemployed23 and addressing persistent high levels of youth unemployment.24 The first labour exchanges established within industrialised states in the early 20th century can 29.24 be seen as a radical step: that Government should bring together people looking for work and employers looking for workers.25 In the Freedland et al book on Public Employment Services and European Law,26 the authors define public employment services as: the activity, conducted by or on behalf of the public state, of placing workers or potential workers in work or employment, and the associated activities of arranging for vocational training or other enhancements to employability.

However, they also note that the distinction between public and private employment agencies 29.25 has become increasingly blurred in recent years. It seems incontrovertible that public employment agencies are to be regulated as public activities, constituted by the state and conducted by the state (at national or sub national level).27 However, in recent years, public employment services have come to be seen as an example of a public service which could be provided by private enterprises, so that the activity can be contracted out to such enterprises. In addition, public service agencies providing such services have been increasingly seen as being in competition with private enterprises for the work of employment placement.28 As Teague notes, job placement services have gained prominence within EU Member States 29.26 as the focus of labour market policies has shifted towards active labour market policies.29 In most Member States, placement services play a key role in employment policy, sometimes given responsibility for administering social assistance but almost always responsible for job brokerage and counselling. However, Teague quotes a study which suggests that public employment services within the EU deal with only about a quarter of the unemployed when filling vacancies; namely that the job brokerage role of the public placement services is not operating ‘optimally’. Hence the move to relax restrictions on private placement services and to involve them in the EURES network. In the Macroton and Job Centre cases, the Court of Justice found the statutory monopoly over 29.27 employment placement services held by the German state and the Italian state respectively to

23 For example, the Commission, in its comments on Art 29 in the 2016 Report on the application of the Charter, notes that Council Recommendation of 15 February 2016 on the integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market, [2016] OJ C67/1, ‘recommends that long-term unemployed persons are offered in-depth individual assessments and guidance and a job-integration agreement comprising an individual offer and the identification of a single point of contact at the very latest when they reach 18 months of unemployment’. See p 217 of the Report available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamentalrights/application-charter/annual-reports-application-charter_en. 24 The Commission, in its observations on Art 29 in its 2014 Report on the application of the Charter, refers to the adoption of a Council Recommendation on high-quality traineeships of 10 March 2014, [2014] OJ C88/1, which has the objective to make it easier for young people to find high-quality work experience in another EU country. See p 109 of the Report, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/ eu-charter-fundamental-rights/application-charter/annual-reports-application-charter_en. 25 State-created public employment services have existed in the UK, for instance, for over 100 years, first established by the Labour Exchange Act 1909. 26 Mark Freedland, Paul Craig, Catherine Jacqueson, and Nicola Kountouris, Public Employment Services and European Law (OUP, 2007). 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Paul Teague, Economic Citizenship in the European Union: Employment relations in the new Europe (London, Routledge, 1999) 99–100.



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be in breach of the competition law provisions in Articles 102 and 106 TFEU. However, it is important to remember these were cases concerned with the abuse of a dominant position (by the state provider) and the economic freedom to provide services of a private brokerage agency, in order to meet demand. This jurisprudence should not be seen as undermining the right of workers and job seekers to free placement services under Article 29.30 Moreover, this liberalising approach chimes with the reform of EURES, discussed in section A above, which aims at strengthening coordination in the provision of information about opportunities for cross-border labour mobility by including regulated private providers within the network to maximising job matching though the common IT platform and regional partnerships.

II.  Scope of Application 29.28 The right of access to placement services is addressed to ‘everyone’. This is notably broader than the addressees of the subsequent article in the Charter, where protection in the event of unjustified dismissal is granted to ‘every worker’. The broader scope of Article 29 is a matter of common sense, given that it seeks to ensure access to the labour market for job-seekers and others, not solely for those who already are, or have been, workers. 29.29 The Article 29 right does, though, serve a particular purpose in the working lives of EU ‘workers’ since for this subcategory of beneficiaries, this right is interconnected with the economic freedom in Article 45 TFEU to engage in work across Member State borders.

III.  Specific Provisions 29.30 The only real question of interpretation for Article 29 relates to the meaning of ‘placement service’. EU policy discourse, in particular the definitions utilised by EURES, which is responsible for coordinating the various national public employment services, provides a useful guide. Accordingly, whilst PES are structured differently in each country, ‘all share the same basic task of contributing towards matching supply and demand on the labour market through the provision of information, placement and active support services’.31

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 29.31 Article 29 does not contain any express limitations on the right of access to a free placement service, although it is of course subject to the final provisions of the Charter, in particular, the pronouncement in Article 52(1) that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms in the Charter must be ‘be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’, and also subject to the principle of proportionality.

V. Remedies 29.32 Enforcement of the right to a free placement service is primarily through national bodies overseeing the PES and private employment agencies. In the cross-border context, the ELA has

30 Case C-41//90 Höfner and Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979; Case C-55/96 Job Centre Coop. ARL [1997] ECR I-7119. 31 EURES, https://ec.europa.eu/eures/main.jsp?catId=29&a-. See also Freedland et al, n 26 above.

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powers to develop day-to-day co-operation routines, carry out inspections and, if necessary, settle disputes.32

E. Evaluation Article 29 needs to be read closely together with Article 15 of the Charter and Article 1 ESC. 29.33 The right of access to a free placement service and the right to work, in particular in the form in which it is recognised in ILO, Council of Europe and UN instruments, has as its core the goal of reducing unemployment and encouraging access to employment services. Within the EU there is the added dimension of promoting cross-border labour mobility. It follows that the right of access to a free placement service must be understood in terms of the availability of, and access to, work for all job seekers in the Member States and across the whole of the EEA and Switzerland. Article 29 has had quite a limited impact, with no citations by the Court of Justice of the 29.34 EU, but, following the reform of EURES and the establishment of the ELA, the latter with its new coordination and enforcement functions, it has contributed to greater recognition of the importance of promoting cross-border mobility through the coordination of the work of PES and private employment agencies as a means to improve access to job opportunities, in particular for the long-term unemployed and young people. Above all, the realisation of the right in Article 29 is dependent on the effectiveness of the national PES and the investment by Member States in supporting the expert advice provided by those services.





32 European

Commission, ‘European Labour Authority’, https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1414&langId=en.

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Article 30 Article 30 Protection in the Event of Unjustified Dismissal Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 30 This Article draws on Article 24 of the revised Social Charter. See also Directive 2001/23/EC on the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, and Directive 80/987/EEC on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, as amended by Directive 2002/74/EC.

Select Bibliography S Anderman, ‘Termination of Employment: Whose Property Rights?’ in C Barnard, S Deakin and GS Morris (eds), The Future of Labour Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 101–28. B Bednarowicz, ‘Delivering on the European Pillar of Social Rights: The New Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions in the European Union’ (2019) 48 Industrial Law Journal 604. MT Carinci, ‘ILO Convention 158’ in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 1149–65. H Collins, ‘The Meaning of Job Security’ (1991) 20 Industrial Law Journal 227. ——, Justice in Dismissal (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992). ACL Davies, A Bogg and C Costello, ‘The Role of the Court of Justice in Labour Law’ in A Bogg, C Costello and ACL Davies (eds), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law (Edward Elgar, 2016) 114. B Hepple, ‘European Rules on Dismissals Law?’ (1997) Comparative Labour Law Journal 204. ——, ‘A Right to Work?’ (1981) 10 Industrial Law Journal 65. J Kenner, ‘New Frontiers in EU Labour Law: From Flexicurity to Flex-Security’ in M Dougan and S Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Forward and Thinking Back (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 279–310. ——, ‘Article 9 TFEU’ in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 13–21. S Laulom, ‘Article 30 CFREU’ in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 942–48. M Markakis, ‘Can Governments Control Mass Layoffs by Employers? Economic Freedoms vs Labour Rights in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 724. K Miller, ‘The American Employment-at-Will Doctrine and its Impact upon Employee Rights’ (2001) 5 Edinburgh Law Review 169. B Napier, ‘Dismissal—The New ILO Standards’ (1983) 12 Industrial Law Journal 17. KA Polomarkakis, ‘A tale of two approaches to Social Europe: The CJEU and the Advocate General drifting apart in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 424. J Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfer of Undertakings and the Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law’ (2013) 42 Industrial Law Journal 434. D Schiek, ‘Towards More Resilience for a Social EU—the Constitutionally Conditioned Internal Market’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 611. M Schmitt, ‘Article 24 RESC’ in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 336–39.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

A.  Article 30 and the Scope of EU Law 30.01 Article 153(1)(d) TFEU provides a legal basis for the adoption of directives in the field of ‘protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated’.1 Originating in the Social Policy Agreement annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht, 1993, this provision was incorporated into the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999, but remains dormant. As a result, Article 30 lacks the bite that would otherwise be provided by a comprehensive normative framework in EU law to protect ‘every worker’ against ‘unjustified dismissal’. However, there are many interactions with EU law, other Charter provisions and international norms that have engaged Article 30 and bring it within the scope of EU law in certain situations. 30.02 There are several reasons why a directive on unjust dismissal has not been adopted, which shine a light on some of the difficulties in converting Article 30 into a fully-fledged job security right for all workers within the scope of EU law. First, Article 153(1)(d) falls outside the ordinary legislative procedure and requires unanimity in the Council for the adoption of directives. The Member States have shown little desire to invite legislative proposals based on this provision. Secondly, the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (Social Charter),2 which stimulated social activism in the 1990s, contains no general provision on the protection of workers in the event of termination of employment. Thirdly, and by way of explanation for the above omission, such a right is absent from the European Social Charter (ESC).3 This was not rectified until the adoption of the Revised European Social Charter (RESC),4 but, as of 28 December 2020, only 20 of the EU-27 had ratified the RESC.5 Moreover, the primary source for Article 24 RESC is ILO Convention 158 on Termination of Employment, which has attracted just 10 ratifications from among the EU-27.6 Fourthly, the Commission has not acted because it has not found a compelling rationale, on its own terms, for a proposal rooted in job security over a period when, at least until the adoption of the Inter-Institutional European Pillar of Social Rights (Social Pillar) in 2017,7 the driving dynamic of EU social policy favoured ‘labour market flexibility’ and ‘light touch’ regulation. Indeed, by 2006, the Commission was suggesting that the ‘traditional model’ of labour law based on protection of an employee in a particular job was outdated.8 Instead, the Commission now favours managing employment transitions from one status to another. 30.03 The recalibration of the EU’s aims in the Lisbon Treaty has slowly engineered a shift in approach. The EU now aspires to having ‘a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’.9 Moreover, under Article 9 TFEU, known as the horizontal social clause, the EU, when ‘defining and implementing its policies and activities … shall take into account requirements linked to’, inter alia, ‘the promotion of a high level of employment

1 When read in conjunction with Art 153(2)(b) TFEU. 2 Adopted on 9 December 1989 by 11 of the then 12 Member States: www.aedh.eu/en/the-community-charter-offundamental-social-rights-of-workers-december-9th-1989/. 3 Council of Europe, European Treaty Series No 35, 18 October 1961: www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/ Html/035.htm. 4 Council of Europe, European Treaty Series No 163, 3 May 1996: www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/ Html/163.htm. 5 Adopted in 1982. See: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp. 6 Available at: www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/. 7 Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights [2017] OJ C428/10. 8 Commission Green Paper, Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century, COM (2006) 708 final. See J Kenner, ‘New Frontiers in EU Labour Law: From Flexicurity to Flex-Security’ in M Dougan and S Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Forward and Thinking Back (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 279–310. 9 Art 3(3) TEU.

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and to the guarantee of adequate social protection’.10 Article 9 does not mention the protection of workers’ interests or job security in the included ‘requirements’, but it is, nevertheless, a mechanism for ensuring that the EU’s policies and actions in the economic and social spheres should be balanced and mutually enforcing.11 The belated adoption of the Social Pillar, some eight years after Lisbon and the onset of the social and economic crisis, was an important signifier of change. Notwithstanding the lacuna in the content of Article 9, the Social Pillar includes a commitment to more transparency and a right to redress for unjustified dismissal by providing, in Principle 7, that: Prior to any dismissal, workers have the right to be informed of the reasons and be granted a reasonable period of notice. They have the right to access to effective and impartial dispute resolution and, in case of unjustified dismissal, a right to redress, including adequate compensation.

It is implicit, therefore, that Member States should have an effective system of protection against unjustified dismissal, but the Social Pillar goes further by adding a right to redress. This ‘Principle’ was to be put into legal effect by Directive 2019/1152 on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions.12 The Directive, which must be transposed into national laws of the Member States by 1 August 2022, provides ‘workers’ with a right of information about notice periods and the procedure for termination of the employment relationship.13 However, the only reference to unjustified dismissal is in the preambular reference to Principle 7.14 There is no specific mention of Article 30 of the Charter in the preamble. Article 16 of the Directive, on the right to redress, contains no express reference to unjustified dismissal despite the erstwhile commitment in the Social Pillar. It simply provides that: Member States shall ensure that workers, including those whose employment relationship has ended, have access to effective and impartial dispute resolution and a right to redress in the case of infringements of their rights arising from this Directive.

The utility of this provision will be analysed in section D.V on remedies. The EU’s caution, when it comes to legislating to protect workers against unjustified dismissal, 30.04 can, in part, be explained by the general ambiguity of the right itself. The right to protection against unjust dismissal is an essentially defensive right to protect the worker against the abuse of managerial power.15 It can apply in the context of termination of employment connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or an economic dismissal.16 Legislation on job security may deter or prevent the employer from simply firing at will, as is the norm in the United States.17 Only in some Member States is there is the possibility of reinstatement in the job. Moreover, the scope of Article 30 is limited by the caveat that the right to protection against 30.05 unjustified dismissal operates in accordance with Union law and ‘national laws and practices’. According to Article 52(6) of the Charter: ‘Full account shall be taken of national laws and 10 Emphasis added. 11 See J Kenner, ‘Article 9 TFEU’ in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 13, 14, and the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Strengthening EU cohesion and EU social policy coordination through the new horizontal social clause in Article 9 TFEU’ (own-initiative opinion) [2012] OJ C24/29, 2.1. 12 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union [2019] OJ L186/105. 13 Ibid, Art 4(2)(j). 14 Ibid, Recital 3 of the preamble. 15 See H Collins, Justice in Dismissal (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992) 1–5. 16 Art 4, ILO Convention No 158. 17 See K Miller, ‘The American Employment-at-Will Doctrine and its Impact upon Employee Rights’ (2001) 5 Edinburgh Law Review 169.



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practices as specified in the Charter’, which means, by reference to the Charter explanation, that the ‘spirit of subsidiarity’ applies. The extent to which this restricts the scope of Article 30 is doubtful but, at the very least, it ensures that where the national law and practice falls outside the scope of application of the Charter, as defined in Article 51(1), or action by Member States is optional under EU law, or international law, Article 30 will not be directly engaged. This limitation on justiciability is demonstrated by the case of Nagy,18 analysed in section D.I below. 30.06 EU law does, however, offer a degree of protection to individual workers in the event of termination of their contract or employment relationship in several specific contexts. There is potential for Article 30 be activated and for its sources in international law to be a point of reference for judicial interpretation within the scope of EU law. The case law concerning selected EU directives is analysed in section D.III. 30.07 One of these directives is the Transfers of Undertakings Directive, 2001/23,19 first adopted in 1977. It is referenced in the explanations on Article 30. The Directive seeks to safeguard the acquired employment rights of employees in the event of a business restructuring involving a change of employer. It offers protection only in the context of the termination of an employment relationship by reason of the transfer of an undertaking, business, or part thereof to another employing entity as a result of a legal transfer or merger.20 Article 4(1) provides that the transfer shall not ‘in itself ’ constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or the transferee. It does, however, allow for dismissals that may take place for ‘economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce’ (‘ETO reasons’). For example, a dismissal that takes place several months in advance of a transfer might be an ETO dismissal.21 The Directive, therefore, balances protection for employees with the commercial considerations of the transferor and the transferee. Article 4(2) is more explicit on the justice of the dismissal. It provides that if the employment contract is terminated because the transfer involves a ‘substantial change’ in working conditions to the ‘detriment’ of the employee, the employer ‘shall be regarded as having been responsible’ for the termination. 30.08 The explanations also refer to the Insolvency Directive, 2008/94/EC,22 first introduced in 1980. The Directive is primarily concerned with ensuring a ‘minimum degree’ of protection for employees in the event of their employer’s insolvency.23 Member States are required to establish a body which guarantees payment of the outstanding contractual claims of employees. Under Article 3, these payments are to include, where provided for by national law, severance pay on termination. The purpose is to provide a modicum of compensation by society for the unfairness suffered by employees in economic circumstances for which they cannot be held responsible. Fundamental rights are not at the forefront and it is noticeable that neither the Directive nor Article 30 contains a reference to Article 25 RESC, which recognises a ‘right of workers to the protection of their claims in the event of the insolvency of their employer’.

18 Cases C-488–491/12 and 526/12 Nagy Sándor and Others v Hajdú-Bihar megyei Kormányhivatal and Others, EU:C:2013:703. 19 Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the law of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16. The Directive repealed and replaced Directive 77/187/EEC and its amendment, Directive 98/50/EC. 20 Ibid, Art 1(a). 21 Case C-472/16 Jorge Luís Colino Sigüenza v Ayuntamiento de Valladolid and Others, EU:C:2018:646. 22 Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (codified version), OJ L283/36. The Directive repealed and replaced Directive 80/987/EEC and its amendments, Directives 87/164/EEC and 2002/74/EC. 23 Ibid, Recital 3 of the preamble.

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In an insolvency scenario there is no new employer to take over the ownership of the business, 30.09 but Article 8 recognises acquired rights, or a property dimension to the job, by placing an obligation on Member States to take the ‘necessary measures’ to protect employees and persons who have already left the business at the date of the onset of the employer’s insolvency, in respect of rights conferring on them immediate or prospective entitlement to old-age benefits, including survivors’ benefits under occupational pension schemes. In both of the above instances, Article 30 has the potential to buttress the rights of employees 30.10 on termination of employment. It can be argued that Article 30 is somewhat incidental as these directives are essentially concerned with managing the processes of corporate restructuring and insolvency. This may explain why the Court of Justice (CJEU) has not, to date, cited Article 30 in its judgments in cases concerning the scope of the employment protection provisions in either of these directives. It has, however, made reference to Article 16 of the Charter on the freedom to conduct a business as an inherent part of the exercise of managerial prerogative to make choices in the context of transfers.24 The Article 30 explanations make no reference to the Collective Redundancies Directive, 30.11 98/59,25 despite the fact that, alone among EU labour law directives, it is concerned exclusively with the process of termination of the employment relationship. Directive 98/59 applies in redundancy situations where an employer decides either to cease to run a business at a particular location or to reduce the number of workers employed there.26 In part, this omission can be explained by the essentially procedural objectives of the Directive, which is not directly concerned with the substantive employment rights of workers who might be affected when an employer contemplates making mass redundancies. Thus, as the CJEU has repeatedly observed, the Directive does not ‘[impinge] upon the employer’s freedom to effect or refrain from effecting collective redundancies’.27 Rather, its main purpose is to provide a framework within which the parties, including representatives of the workers, can conduct the practical arrangements and procedures for such redundancies. As such, it fits more closely with Article 27 of the Charter on the right of workers to ‘information and consultation within the undertaking’. Nevertheless, Article 30 is relevant in the context of the Directive for two reasons. Firstly, because involvement of workers’ representatives is of vital importance for individuals facing dismissal as a consequence of reorganisation. Consultation provides a framework within which fairer, more just, decisions about the dismissal of workers can be made even in situations where economic necessity makes some redundancies inevitable. Secondly, Article 30 is relevant in situations where, under Article 4(2) of the Directive, Member States grant competent public authorities powers, once they have been notified of the contemplated redundancies, to ‘seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies’. This issue was tested in AGET Iraklis,28 a rare case in which a Member State—Greece—intervened to refuse to authorise planned redundancies. This was the first case in which the CJEU applied Article 30 and its approach is therefore analysed in depth in section D.III.

24 Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure Ltd, EU:C:2013:5021, discussed in section D.III. 25 Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16 (as corrected by Corrigendum [2007] OJ L59). Directive 98/59 repealed and replaced Directive 75/129/EEC and its amendment, Directive 92/56/EEC. 26 At least 10 workers in establishments normally employing more than 20 and less than 100 workers; at least 10 per cent of workers in establishments normally employing between 100 and 299 workers; or at least 30 workers in establishments normally employing 300 workers or more—ibid, Art 1(a)(ii). 27 Case C-201/15 Anonymi Geniki Etairia Tsimenton Iraklis (AGET Iraklis) v Ypourgos Ergasias, Koinonikis Asfalisis kai Koinonikis Allilengyis, EU:C:2016:972, para 29. 28 Ibid.



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30.12

The recently adopted Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions, 2019/1152,29 is also linked to Article 30. Although it does not mention Article 30 in its preamble, it draws on Article 31(1) of the Charter concerning rights relating to working conditions and creates an obligation on Member States to ‘ensure that employers are required to inform workers of the essential aspects of the employment relationship’.30 It provides for minimum requirements relating to working conditions including a six months maximum duration of any probation period subject to certain exceptions.31 The length of probation period, and the extent to which a such period can be used, as an exception to the right not to be unjustly dismissed is analysed in section D.IV. The Directive also contains, inter alia, a right to redress for workers including those whose employment relationship has ended, discussed at paragraph 30.03 above and in section D.V below.32 Article 18 provides wide ranging protection against dismissal in the context of the exercise of rights under the Directive and is capable of being invoked in conjunction with Article 30 of the Charter. It obliges Member States to ‘take the necessary measures to prohibit the dismissal or its equivalent and all preparations for dismissal of workers, on the grounds that they have exercised the rights provided for in this Directive’.33 Moreover, workers who consider themselves dismissed for this reason, ‘may request the employer to provide duly substantiated grounds for the dismissal or the equivalent measures’ in writing.34 If the worker can show a prima facie case of dismissal on these grounds, the burden of proof switches to the employer ‘to prove that the dismissal was based on [other] grounds’.35 Whilst these protections against dismissal are strong, and may lead to a finding that a dismissal is automatically unjustified, the field of the Directive, as regards protection of working conditions, is very limited and subject to qualifications. Article 10 of the Pregnancy and Maternity Directive, 92/85,36 prohibits the dismissal of 30.13 pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding. Dismissal of these workers is deemed automatically unjustified without the need to look at motive or to use EU gender equality law to establish unequal treatment. The legislator’s rationale is the need to guarantee the right of workers falling within the scope of the Directive to health and safety protection and a right to maintain their employment rights in the job. Directive 2019/1158 on Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers,37 another measure 30.14 inspired by the Social Pillar, provides for protection of workers against unjustified dismissal

29 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union [2019] OJ L186/105. With effect from its transposition date, 1 August 2022, it repeals and replaces Council Directive 91/533/EEC on an employer’s obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship [1991] OJ L288/32. 30 Ibid, Art 4(1). Detailed provisions in Chap II, Arts 4–7. 31 Ibid, Chap III, Art 8. Other provisions in Chap III, Arts 9–14, include, inter alia, the ability of a worker to take up parallel employment, making work more predictable, and complementary measures for workers on on-demand contracts. Under Art 1(6), Member States may, ‘on objective grounds’, exclude ‘civil servants, public emergency services, the armed forces, police authorities, judges, prosecutors, investigators or other law enforcement services’ from the provisions in Chap III. 32 Ibid, Art 16. 33 Ibid, Art 18(1). 34 Ibid, Art 18(2). 35 Ibid, Art 18(3). Member States may also, under Art 18(4), introduce rules of evidence ‘which are more favourable to workers’. However, under Art 18(5), the rules on the burden of proof in Art 18(3) do not have to be applied to proceedings in which it is for the court or other competent body ‘to investigate the facts of the case’. 36 Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (10th individual Directive within the meaning of Art 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) [1992] OJ L348/1. 37 Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU [2019] OJ L188/79.

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in the context of exercising rights designed to reconcile family and professional life. It replaces and simultaneously extends the protection afforded by the Parental Leave Directive, 2010/18, with effect from 2 August 2022.38 The new Directive grants rights to workers to take parental leave and have time off work on grounds of force majeure, introduces rights to take paternity leave and carers’ leave, and extends the right to request flexible working arrangements to carers and working parents. In each case these rights can be exercised without loss of employment rights. Article 12, on protection from dismissal and the burden of proof, mirrors Article 18 of its sister Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions, discussed at 30.12 above. Workers who have applied for, or have taken, parental, paternity or carers’ leave, or have exercised the right to request flexible working arrangements, are protected from dismissal and have a right to request the reasons for their dismissal. Each of these dismissal scenarios is captured by Article 33(2) of the Charter. It is important to note, however, the link between the specific protections provided in these measures and the importance, in the wider sense, of upholding the principles of dignity and autonomy of the individual that are central to the conception of fairness in dismissal.39 Finally, Article 30 is relevant in protection against dismissal in the context of combating 30.15 discrimination, on one or more of the grounds referred to in Article 19 TFEU,40 and providing for equal treatment between men and women in employment and occupation under Article 157 TFEU. Drawing on Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, Article 14(1)(c) of the recast Directive on Equal Treatment of Men and Women, 2006/54,41 prohibits direct or indirect discrimination in relation to employment and working conditions ‘including dismissals’. Equivalent provisions can be found in Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/43,42 which prohibits, inter alia, employment-related discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, and Article 3(1)(c) of the general non-discrimination Directive, 2000/78,43 which prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation. Moreover, dismissal for reasons connected with discrimination is not valid under the norms of the ILO and the Council of Europe on protection in the event of termination of employment initiated by the employer.44 On the one hand, Article 30 appears somewhat nugatory in the non-discrimination and 30.16 equal treatment context, as it is superseded by more direct application of Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter. However, on the other hand, it has particular relevance in the context of age discrimination where, by contrast with the other grounds, directly discriminatory dismissal rules, such as a fixed retirement age, are capable of justification by an employer who can show that the provisions in question are ‘objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim’ and are proportionate.45

38 Ibid, Art 19. See Council Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC [2010] OJ L68/13. 39 Collins (n 15) 9–23. 40 Sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 41 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23. 42 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22. 43 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 44 See section C. 45 Art 6 of Directive 2000/78.



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B.  Interrelationship of Article 30 with Other Provisions of the Charter 30.17 In order to identify the relationship of Article 30 with other Charter provisions, it is necessary to conceptualise justice in the context of dismissal by an employer. Collins has identified two rationales for laws against unjust or unfair dismissal.46 First, by providing for fairness in the process and substance of dismissal, such laws respect the dignity of the individual worker and, secondly, they foster autonomy by improving a worker’s job security. Granting this right endows the worker with an interest in job security, but not necessarily an ownership or property right in the job. 30.18 Collins’ dignity rationale is immediately relevant when Article 1 of the Charter is considered. Article 1 declares that human dignity is ‘inviolable’ and ‘must be respected and protected’. Human dignity is an inherent right for all human beings derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The explanations state that ‘none of the rights’ in the Charter ‘may be used to harm the dignity of another person, and that the dignity of the human person is part of the substance of the rights laid down in this Charter’. As Article 30 is expressed positively as a right and may conflict with other rights and freedoms in the Charter, such as Article 16 on the freedom to conduct a business, this wording is important. At the very least, Article 30, read together with Article 1, indicates that, even if a decision to dismiss a worker is a legitimate exercise of the managerial prerogative, it is necessary for the employer to act rationally by respecting and protecting the worker’s right to be treated with dignity in the conduct of that dismissal.47 30.19 Article 3 brings into play Collins’ autonomy rationale. It states that ‘everyone has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity’. Success at work, or the ambition to succeed and be satisfied in the work environment, is integral to personal autonomy and physical and mental well-being. As Collins observes, dismissal from employment deprives the worker not only of their major source of income, but also leads to a loss of status. In some cases, the worker, deprived of ‘membership of the most significant community in their life’, suffers a personal impact akin to a criminal punishment.48 Dismissal without cause strikes at the personal integrity of the individual that is the root of Article 3. 30.20 Article 7 on the right for private and family life corresponds to Article 8 ECHR. It is applicable in the context of dismissals arising from surveillance of the worker and other invasions of employment privacy. Article 30 can also interact with dismissals relating to the violation of rights under Article 8 of the Charter on data protection and in connection with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.49 30.21 Article 10 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, corresponds to Article 9 ECHR. It is engaged in circumstances where termination of employment violates the freedom to hold religious or other beliefs or not to hold those beliefs.50 It can interact with Article 21 on non-discrimination on the ground of ‘religion or belief ’ in the context of dismissal as shown in the case of IR v JQ,51 discussed below at 30.74.

46 Collins (n 15) 21. 47 Ibid, 16–18. 48 Ibid, 2. 49 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1. 50 See Ivanova v Bulgaria App no 52435/99 (12 April 2007). 51 Case C-68/17 IR v JQ, EU:C:2018:696.

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Article 12 on freedom of association, sourced from Article 11 ECHR, is also relevant. The essence of this freedom is the right of all workers, as autonomous beings, to join and participate in trade unions that represent and protect their interests. The autonomy of the worker to exercise the freedom to join a trade union, or not to join,52 is jeopardised if there is no protection against dismissal for this reason. Article 5 of ILO Convention 158 identifies union membership or participation in union activities outside of working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours, as not constituting valid reasons for termination.53 Article 15 on the freedom to choose an occupation and engage in work interacts closely with Article 30. Underlying Article 15 is the notion of an autonomous ‘right to work’, although not a right to work in a particular job. Unjustified termination of employment negates the individual’s right to work and choice of occupation.54 It follows that laws on unjust dismissal should include a right to reinstatement or re-engagement in a comparable job as the most meaningful remedy to restore justice for the worker. The relationship between Article 30 and Article 16, on freedom to conduct a business, is sensitive and ill-defined. Article 16 is sourced from CJEU case law, which has recognised the freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity.55 It enshrines managerial authority as a corollary of economic freedom. Article 30 acts as a counterweight to Article 16, by limiting managerial authority to dismiss at will. Article 16, in common with Article 30, operates in accordance with Union law and national law and practices. Member States, therefore, have freedom to reconcile any conflict between Articles 16 and 30, so long as their rules are compatible with EU law and international obligations. In several cases the CJEU has been asked to balance the freedom to conduct a business with employment rights including protection against dismissal. It has tended to uphold the former over the latter. This case law is discussed in depth in section D.III. Article 17 on the right to property interacts with Article 30 only to the extent that it is accepted that there is an element of property ownership in the job for the worker. The right of the worker to protection against unjust dismissal implies that ownership of the job is not in the exclusive control of the employer. Article 30 does not, however, establish an unfettered right of the worker to ‘own’ or ‘use’ the job as a ‘lawfully acquired possession’ in the sense envisaged by Article 17. The concept of acquired property ownership rights is analogous to acquired employment rights under the Transfers of Undertakings Directive.56 Article 21 on non-discrimination and Article 23 on equality between men and women provide specific reference points for the protection of workers whose employment relationship has been terminated by reason, respectively, of discrimination on one of the grounds referred to in Article 21, at least to the extent that these replicate the grounds in Article 19 TFEU, or in the specific violation of the principle of equal treatment between men and women. In practice Articles 21 and 23 are stronger than Article 30 because, unlike Article 30, these Charter rights flow directly from TFEU provisions put into effect in the legal orders of the Member States by the transposition of Directives and underpinned by non-discrimination as a general principle of law evolved by the CJEU.

52 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom App nos 7601/76 and 7806/77 (13 August 1981). 53 Art 5(a) of ILO Convention No 158. 54 See B Hepple, ‘A Right to Work?’ (1981) 10 Industrial Law Journal 65, 76–78. 55 The explanation on Art 16 refers to, inter alia: Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491 [14]; Case 230/78 Sp A Eridinia and Others [1979] ECR 2749 [20]–[21]; Case C-240/97 Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-6571. 56 Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the law of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16.



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30.27

Article 25 on the rights of the elderly intersects with Article 30. For older workers, the right to job security and to continue in work until a time of their own choosing, is important for their ‘dignity’ and ‘independence’ as expressed in Article 25 and recognised implicitly in Article 23 RESC. Once older workers cease work they may lose an integral part of their ‘social and cultural life’. However, the CJEU has taken a somewhat converse view of the dignity of the older worker when permitting a rule allowing for compulsory retirement at the age of 67 on the basis that such a rule ‘makes it possible to avoid a situation in which employment contracts are terminated in situations which are humiliating for elderly workers’.57 30.28 Article 26 on the integration of persons with disabilities is highly relevant when evaluating Article 30. The opportunity to obtain work but also to maintain it with security is vital for the ‘social and occupational integration’ of persons with disabilities. Social inclusion through employment is at the core of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which obliges state parties to prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability with regard to ‘all matters concerning all forms of employment’, including ‘continuance of employment’.58 The CRPD has been approved by Council Decision 2010/4859 and, therefore, as the CJEU observed in Ring and Werge,60 its provisions are an integral part of the EU legal order. It follows that the disability provisions in the general non-discrimination Directive, 2000/78, must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner consistent with the CRPD.61 In that context, the CJEU proceeded to hold that Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which an employer can terminate the employment contract with reduced notice if a disabled worker has been absent because of illness, with salary paid, for 120 days during the previous 12 months, where those absences are either the consequence of the employer’s failure to take the appropriate measures in accordance with the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for disabled persons,62 or, where those absences are the consequence of the worker’s disability, unless that legislation, as well as pursuing a legitimate aim, does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim.63 30.29 Article 27 on the right of workers to information and consultation within the undertaking is concerned with the process of termination of employment, and therefore interacts with Article 30 in the specific contexts of Directive 98/59 on Collective Redundancies and Directive 2001/23 on Transfers of Undertakings.64 More generally, Article 27 places emphasis on the importance of transparency and procedural fairness in the termination of employment even in circumstances where dismissal may be otherwise be justified.65

57 Case C-141/11 Torsten Hörnfeldt v Posten Meddelande AB, EU:C:2012:421. 58 Art 27a. The CRPD is available at: www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-personswith-disabilities.html (adopted 13 December 2006). It entered into force on 3 May 2008. 59 Council Decision 2010/48/EC [2010] OJ L23/35. 60 Joined Cases C-335 and 337/11 HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, EU:C:2013:222. 61 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 62 Ring and Werge (n 60) point 3 of the operative part of the judgment. The obligation to provide reasonable accommodation is laid down in Art 5 of Directive 2000/78, ibid. 63 Ibid, point 4 of the operative part of the judgment. 64 Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16 (as corrected by Corrigendum [2007] OJ L59) and Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the law of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16. 65 Collins (n 15) 104–40. See also Arts 7–10 of ILO Convention No 158.

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Article 28 on the right of collective bargaining and action interrelates with Article 30 in two ways. First, the individual worker facing the prospect of dismissal can secure representation from a trade union, who will advocate on their behalf. Collective bargaining backed up by the ultimate threat of industrial action is a vital tool in preventing or reducing mass redundancies or mitigating their impact. The effectiveness of the interaction between Articles 28 and 30 is blunted somewhat, however, by the exclusion of the right to strike from the legal basis provisions in Article 153 TFEU. Second, those participating in collective bargaining require protection from dismissal.66 Article 31 on the right to fair and just working conditions is relevant to the extent that those seeking to exercise rights under one or more of the many directives concerning working conditions and health and safety in the working environment that relate to it, require corresponding protection against dismissal. This arises, for example, in the context of the Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions, 2019/1152,67 discussed in section A above, which provides specific protection against dismissal and a right of redress where there is an infringement of rights under the Directive. Article 33(2) is the only other right in the Charter providing express protection from dismissal. It provides that ‘everyone’ shall have the ‘right to protection from dismissal’ for reasons connected with maternity, the right to paid maternity leave and parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child. As it is sourced directly from EU legislation, discussed in section A above, it places those workers who fall within its scope with a firm foundation of employment protection without the need to draw directly on Article 30. Article 34 recognises a person’s entitlement to social security and social assistance ‘in the case of loss of employment’. It is a limited principle, governed mainly by national law, but it provides some recognition of the important role of social security in cushioning the worker against the worst effects of termination of employment in circumstances where it may be unexpected or unjustified, or both. Article 41(2) on the right of every person to be heard, the right to have access to his or her file, and the obligation of the EU to give reasons for its decisions, is important for EU civil servants seeking to rely directly on their right to a fair procedure in the event of their dismissal. Article 42 on the right of access to documents is also important in this respect. The CJEU, in Strack,68 upheld the right of EU civil servants to expect their institutional employer to observe both procedural and substantive employment rights contained in the Charter when applying the Staff Regulations. Finally, Article 47 on the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, is emerging as a significant dimension of the right of workers to protection against unjust dismissal in practice. First, the worker who succeeds in establishing unjustified termination within the scope of EU law is entitled to an effective remedy including the possibility of reinstatement in the job or re-engagement or, if this is not practicable or possible, to be awarded adequate compensation. Second, Article 24 RESC provides that a right to appeal to ‘an impartial body’ is an essential part of the protection of the claim of a worker who considers that their employment has been terminated without a ‘valid reason’.69 It follows that the right to be given a valid reason for dismissal is an

66 Art 5(b) of ILO Convention No 158. 67 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union [2019] OJ L186/105. 68 Case C-579/12 RX-II European Commission v Strack, EU:C:2013:570. 69 This is a reference to the distinction between valid and invalid reasons for dismissal contained in ILO Convention No 158, discussed in section C.III.



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important component of the worker’s entitlement to a fair hearing by a tribunal guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR, which is a primary source of Article 47.70

C.  Sources of Article 30 Rights I. ECHR 30.36 The ECHR is not a direct source of Article 30, but there are a number of connections between its provisions and the rights of workers on termination of employment. Article 6 ECHR has acquired particular significance. In a series of cases the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has extended the applicability of the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial to labour disputes concerning civil servants.71 For the ECtHR, judicial protection is not effective if there is a procedural or substantive obstacle to a genuine judicial examination of the merits of the parties’ claims.72 This approach applies in assessing the fairness of proceedings concerning removal of civil servants from office or the excessive length of dismissal proceedings.73 Rights on termination of employment have been enunciated in cases involving Article 8 ECHR on the right to respect for private and family life,74 and Article 9 ECHR on freedom of religion.75 Article 10 ECHR on freedom of expression has triggered case law upholding, firstly, the right to limited protection from dismissal for holding a political opinion or having an affiliation,76 and, secondly, the right of ‘whistleblowers’ to protection from dismissal without notice.77 In cases involving discriminatory dismissal, Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12, where connected to another provision of the ECHR, are also engaged. 30.37 In KMC v Hungary,78 the ECtHR held that the dismissal of a civil servant without giving reasons meant that the dismissal could not be practically and effectively challenged independently in a hearing before an impartial tribunal, contrary to Article 6 ECHR.79 The same conclusion had been reached by the Hungarian Constitutional Court,80 which annulled the offending domestic legislation after the application had been made to Strasbourg. Significantly, the ECtHR referred expressly to Hungary’s obligations under Article 30 in its judgment and noted that it draws on Article 24 RESC.81

70 See KMC v Hungary App no 19554/11 (10 July 2012). 71 Frydlender v France App no 30979/96 (27 June 2000); Vilho Eskelinen and Others v Finland App no 63235/00 (19 April 2007); and Iordanov and Others v Bulgaria App no 23530/02 (2 June 2009). 72 See the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, no 8/2011, cited affirmatively by the ECtHR in KMC (n 70) [16]. 73 Hrdalo v Croatia App no 23272/07 (27 June 2011); Mishgjoni v Albania App no 18381/05 (7 Dec 2010); and Golenja v Slovenia App no 76378/01 (30 March 2006). 74 Volkov v Ukraine App No 21722 (19 Jan 2013). In Volkov, it was held that a judge who had been unfairly dismissed for reasons connected with the right to private and family life was entitled to be reinstated. 75 Ivanova (n 50). 76 Redfearn v UK App No 47335/06 (6 Nov 2012). 77 Heinisch v Germany App no 28274/08 (21 July 2011). See also Resolution 1729 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on the protection of ‘whistleblowers’, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/ XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17851; and Recommendation 1916 (2010) on the protection of ‘whistleblowers’, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/17852. 78 KMC (n 70). 79 Ibid [33]–[36]. 80 Hungarian Constitutional Court, no 8/2011. 81 KMC (n 70) [18]–[19].

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II.  UN Treaties Article 6 of the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 30.38 recognises the ‘right to work’ including ‘the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts’.82 State Parties are required to ‘take appropriate steps to safeguard this right’ and to ensure its progressive realisation. In General Comment 18 on the Right to Work,83 the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESR) noted that the right to work implies the ‘right not to be unfairly deprived of employment’.84 The normative content of the right incorporates ILO Convention 158, discussed below.85 The UNCESR regards the failure to protect workers against unfair dismissal as a violation of the obligation on State Parties to protect the right to work.86

III. ILO Article 30 can ultimately be traced back to two ILO instruments on termination of employ- 30.39 ment at the initiative of the employer: Recommendation 119, 1963—now replaced by Recommendation 166, 1982—and Convention 158, 1982.87 The 1963 Recommendation provided the foundation of the principle that termination of the employment relationship by the employer should not take place without a valid reason and also the right of a worker to appeal against that termination to an independent body. It spurred legislation to protect job security in many EU Member States.88 However, it was the adoption of the Convention, as a stronger normative measure, that began the process of elevating protection against unjustified dismissal to the level of an international human right.89 The main provisions are briefly outlined below. They will be explained and analysed in more depth in sections D.III and D.IV. Article 4 of the Convention provides that: 30.40 The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service.

The Convention identifies specific reasons for termination that are not valid in Article 5, includ- 30.41 ing: union membership or participation in union activities; seeking office or acting as a workers’ representative; filing a complaint or taking proceedings against an employer; race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin; absence from work during maternity leave; and temporary absence from work because of illness or injury.90 Age is regarded as an invalid reason in paragraph 5 of the replacement Recommendation, but it is not referred to in the Convention.

82 Adopted on 16 Dec 1966: www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 83 E/C 12/GC/18, 6 Feb 2006: www.refworld.org/docid/4415453b4.html. 84 Ibid, para 6. 85 Ibid, para 11. 86 Ibid, para 35. 87 ILO instruments can be found on the NORMLEX database: www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en. See MT Carinci, ‘ILO Convention 158, Termination of Employment Convention (No 158)’ in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S ­Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 1149–65. 88 E Yemin, ‘Job Security: influence of ILO standards and recent trends’ (1976) 13 International Law Review 17. 89 See B Napier, ‘Dismissal—The New ILO Standards’ (1983) 12 Industrial Law Journal 17. 90 Arts 5–6.



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30.42

The substantive right to protection is backed up by procedural rights of the worker to a defence prior to, or at the time of, termination and a right of appeal against termination to an independent body, which can declare the dismissal invalid and remedy the situation by reinstatement, adequate compensation or other relief.91 The issue of remedies is considered further in section D.V. 30.43 Under Article 2 of the Convention, ratifying states have flexibility to exclude three categories of workers from some of the provisions. The excluded categories are: (a) workers engaged on contracts of employment for a specified period of time or a specified task; (b) workers serving a period of probation or a qualifying period of employment, ‘determined in advance and of a reasonable duration’; (c) workers engaged on a casual basis for a short period. 30.44 The impact of these limitations is discussed in section D.IV below, in particular the length of a ‘reasonable’ qualifying period, but there is no doubt that by excluding these categories of workers, who are among the most vulnerable, the personal scope of the right is severely limited.

IV.  Council of Europe Treaties 30.45 Article 1 ESC contains certain obligations on the contracting parties aimed at ensuring the ‘effective exercise of the right to work’ but these obligations have not been interpreted by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) as including protection for workers against unjust dismissal except in instances of discrimination.92 Article 4 ESC recognises the right of workers to a reasonable period of notice of termination of employment in the context of the right to a fair remuneration. 30.46 The main source of Article 30 is Article 24 RESC on the right to protection in cases of termination of employment at the initiative of the employer.93 This provision is based on ILO Convention 158 and is intended to bring the Council of Europe regime in line with ILO standards to avoid conflicting interpretations. Article 24 RESC is worded as follows: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of workers to protection in cases of termination of employment, the Parties undertake to recognise: a.

the right of all workers not to have their employment terminated without valid reasons for such termination connected with their capacity or conduct or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service; b. the right of workers whose employment is terminated without a valid reason to adequate ­compensation or other appropriate relief. To this end the Parties undertake to ensure that a worker who considers that his employment has been terminated without a valid reason shall have the right to appeal to an impartial body.

30.47 Point 2 of the Appendix to the RESC allows the exclusion of certain workers from the right in Article 24. These are the same three reasons contained in Article 2 of the ILO Convention and listed in paragraph 30.43 above. These will be discussed in section D.IV. 91 Arts 7–10. 92 Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee on Social Rights, December 2018, pp 203–06: https://rm.coe.int/ digest-2018-parts-i-ii-iii-iv-en/1680939f80. 93 Council of Europe, European Treaty Series No 163, 3 May 1996: www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/ Html/163.htm. See M Schmitt, ‘Article 24 RESC—The Right to Protection in Cases of Termination of Employment’ in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 336–39.

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Point 3 of the Appendix to the RESC contains a list of reasons for which it is prohibited to 30.48 terminate the employment relationship at the initiative of the employer under Article 24. This list is similar to the one contained in Article 5 of the ILO Convention. These reasons are, firstly, in relation to certain provisions in the RESC, namely, discrimination, trade union activities, participation in strikes, maternity, family responsibilities and worker representation, and, secondly, two reasons that are specific to Article 24. The first of these specifically prohibited reasons is ‘the filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative authorities’. This requires express safeguards by State Parties against retaliatory dismissal of workers who resort to the courts or otherwise seek to enforce their rights in situations in which workers allege a violation of the law.94 The second specifically prohibited reason is ‘temporary absence from work due to illness or injury’. In such situations a time limit can be placed on protection against dismissal.95

V.  National Constitutional Laws Article 30 is not sourced directly from national constitutional laws. Many provisions common to 30.49 national constitutions, such as dignity, equality, non-discrimination and the right to a fair trial and an effective remedy, are relevant to the Article 30 right. It is important to note, however, that legislation on unjust dismissal in some Member States, and related laws, have been interpreted by national constitutional courts purposively to guarantee effective protection. For example, legislation in Germany and Scandinavia has been interpreted and applied by the courts to protect employees’ representatives from dismissal by guaranteeing fair procedures.96 Article 18 of the Italian Statute di Lavoro (‘Workers’ Statute’)97 is of particular interest. It has 30.50 been associated with the concept of strong stability in the employment relationship to limit the power of dismissal. This concept was constructed in the post-1945 period and recognised by the Constitutional Court.98 In its original text, the Workers’ Statute provided that if a worker claimed unfair dismissal, there was a right to interim relief stopping the dismissal taking effect until the tribunal decided the case. Enterprises or organisations employing more than 15 persons were required to reinstate the unjustly dismissed worker in the job, and penalties could be imposed for failure to comply.99 Lord Wedderburn once described the Statute as a version of ‘habeas corpus for the worker’.100 Anderman regarded it as forcefully imposing responsibility on the employer not to dismiss without an independent assessment rather than necessarily creating a property right in the job.101 Until recently, attempts to modify the Statute had met with strong, sometimes violent, opposition. Significantly, however, a reform law was adopted in 2012, which made certain procedural changes but, most importantly, ended obligatory reinstatement as the only

94 ECSR Conclusions 2003, Statement of Interpretation on Article 24. See ESRC Digest (n 92). 95 Ibid. 96 See S Anderman, ‘Termination of Employment: Whose Property Rights?’ in C Barnard, S Deakin and GS Morris (eds), The Future of Labour Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 101–28, 123; and B Hepple, ‘European Rules on Dismissals Law?’ (1997) Comparative Labour Law Journal 204, 210–12. 97 Law no 300/1970. 98 S Bellomo, ‘Italian Report’. (Draft paper presented at the Seminar of Comparative Labour Law ‘Pontignano XXX’, Modena, July 2013). See Case no 174, 12 Dec 1972. 99 Anderman (n 96) 122–23. 100 Lord Wedderburn, ‘The Italian Workers Statute: British Reflections on a High Point of Legal Protection’ (1990) 19 Industrial Law Journal 154. 101 Anderman (n 96) 123.



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remedy for unjustified dismissal in most cases involving employers with more than 15 workers by providing for compensation in the range of one to two years’ pay as an alternative.102 More fundamental reform was to follow with Legislative Decree 23/2015 (known as the ‘Jobs Act’). The effect of the Jobs Act is to limit the right of reinstatement for workers employed on indefinite contracts from 7 March 2015. Workers falling under the Jobs Act only have a right to be fully reinstated with full compensation for lost wages in two situations regarded as the most severe cases of unlawful exercise of the power of dismissal. These are, firstly, when the dismissal has not been communicated in writing and, secondly, if it is a discriminatory dismissal independently of the number of workers employed by the enterprise or organisation.103 In other situations, the remedy for unjust dismissal is compensation based on seniority. However, the seniority rule was successfully challenged in a case before the Constitutional Court.104 In its judgment, the Court held that Article 30 was not applicable as the case did not concern the implementation of EU law. However, it found that the system of compensation based on seniority criteria was unconstitutional because it failed to take account of all the factors that needed to be considered for fair and balanced compensation for unfair dismissal and did not constitute an adequate deterrent.105 Notwithstanding this judgment, except in the aforementioned cases where there is a severe abuse of the power of dismissal, Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute will gradually cease to be applicable to employment relationships.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 30.51 Article 30 has connotations of a property right in the job for the worker, or at least a shift in that direction. Whilst there is much to support this conceptualisation of the right, it is more accurate to understand it as a mechanism for adjusting the employer-worker power relationship. Protection against unjustified dismissal places limits on the exercise of ownership rights by the employer but it does not create property rights for the worker in a particular job.106 The main challenge for legislators and judges, when evaluating Article 30, is to find the right balance between the employer’s managerial prerogative to make sound business decisions, including termination of the contract, which is inherent in Article 16 of the Charter on freedom to conduct a business, and the worker’s reasonable expectation of job security in the event of an unjustified

102 Law no 92/2012. See Bellomo (n 98). I am very grateful to Stefano Bellomo and Massimiliano Delfino for their advice on the labour law reforms in Italy. 103 At least five months of wages must have been lost for full compensation. It is also possible for there to be ‘weak’ reinstatement when it is shown that misconduct was not committed or when, according to a collective agreement, the misconduct should have been punished with a milder sanction. In such a case there can be reinstatement with a cap on compensation for damages equal to 12 months’ wages. This is fully explained in M Corti, M Delfino and C Spinelli, ‘The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the Evolution of Labour Law in Italy’ in M Stefko (ed), European National Welfare States’ Social Reforms as Responses to the Financial Crisis (Prague, Charles University, Faculty of Law, 2016) 155–61, 156. 104 Constitutional Court Decision No 194 of 2018 at www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do. See, ­Eurofound, Italy: Effects of Non-Compliance with Dismissal Regulations: www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/erm/legislation/ italy-effects-of-non-compliance-with-dismissal-regulations. 105 Ibid. See the summary on the EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s Charterperdia page at: https://fra.europa.eu/en/ caselaw-reference/italy-constitutional-court-decision-no-194-2018. 106 Anderman (n 96). Note Lord Denning, in Brindle v HW Smith (Cabinets) Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 230, who observed, at 231, that the concept of job security in English law is ‘akin to a right in property’.

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dismissal.107 The balance of interests was summarised by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) in its 1974 General Survey on ILO Recommendation 119:108 Although the Recommendation is essentially intended to provide protection of the worker’s security of employment, it also embodies an attempt to balance the several interests involved: that of the worker in job security, since the loss of his job may mean loss of his and his family’s livelihood; that of the employer in retaining authority over matters affecting the efficient operation of the undertaking, that of the community in maintaining peaceful labour relations and avoiding unnecessary dislocations due to either unemployment or unproductive economic units.

In seeking to find this balance, the need for a ‘valid reason’ for dismissal is paramount. As we have seen, the obligation on the employer to provide a valid reason for dismissal, and the listing of reasons that are automatically deemed not valid, is derived from Articles 4 and 5 of ILO Convention 158 and reinforced by Article 24 RESC. The CEACR regards the Convention’s provisions as establishing a ‘fundamental principle of justification’ for terminating employment relationships of indefinite duration109 and, more radically, it advises that the Convention removes the possibility for ‘unilateral’ termination by means of a period of notice or compensation in lieu.110 The judgment of the ECtHR in KMC v Hungary111 is significant in highlighting the incidental application of the ‘fundamental principle of justification’ for dismissal in the context of broader civil and political rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR and having the same meaning and scope in the Charter. The right to a fair hearing in Article 6 ECHR requires a reason— implicitly a valid reason—for dismissal to be communicated to the worker in order for that right to be practical and effective.112 Rights to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of association and non-discrimination, in Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14 ECHR, among others, will be violated if there is interference with the exercise of these civil rights. Such interference will be present in cases where the exercise of the right in question carries with it the sanction of unilateral termination of employment. Similarly, it must follow from this reasoning, that the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR requires reinstatement in the job or adequate compensation in lieu. Also, it can be argued that by referring to both Article 30 and Article 24 RESC, and noting that the latter is the source of the former in the explanations,113 the ECtHR has sent a message that the effect of incorporating Article 30 into the Charter, and granting the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties under Article 6(1) TEU, is to create an obligation on all EU Member States, as members of the Council of Europe, to guarantee the right to protection in cases of termination of employment regardless of whether or not those states have ratified the RESC. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque is more explicit in a separate concurring opinion issued with the judgment. According to the Judge, the effect of the adoption of Article 30 and the explanations has been to reinforce a European ‘consensus’ on protection in cases of termination of employment amounting to a ‘positive obligation for the Contracting Parties to the Convention to implement the principle of justification for termination of employment’.114 The ECtHR had previously





107 See

H Collins, ‘The Meaning of Job Security’ (1991) 20 Industrial Law Journal 227. GS 1974 on the reports related to Recommendation No 119, para 3. 109 CEACR Direct Request—Luxembourg (2007). 110 CEACR General Survey—Protection against unjustified dismissal (1995), para 76. 111 n 70. 112 Ibid [33]–[35]. 113 Ibid [18]–[19]. 114 Ibid, separate opinion, p 20. 108 ILO

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established that a social right can be legitimately derived from an ECHR provision ‘even when such a right is foreseen in the [ESC] and the Contracting Party is not bound by the relevant provision of the [ESC]’.115 Referring to Article 6 ICESCR and ILO Convention 158, the Judge concludes that it is ‘not acceptable’ for one state to advocate a ‘double standard’ in respect of termination of employment in respect of different international organisations.116 30.56 The Judge’s opinion amounts to a robust assertion of the ‘fundamental principle of justification’ in the European human rights context. It explains the basis upon which the ECtHR was able to make interconnections between Article 30 of the Charter, Article 24 RESC and Article 6 ECHR, so as to require Hungary to provide civil servants with valid reasons for termination of their employment that were capable of independent legal challenge. 30.57 KMC v Hungary demonstrates the potential of what Kahn-Freund once described as the ‘reflex effect’ of proclaiming fundamental social rights, as in the case of Article 30, as a basis for ‘the interpretation of positive legal norms and as direct sources of rights’.117 However, reflexive interpretation requires the existence of a positive legal norm. The legal vacuum in EU legislation and the limitations of Article 30 in the legal orders of the Member States has been starkly demonstrated in Nagy,118 a follow-up case to KMC v Hungary referred directly to the CJEU by a Hungarian court in October 2012, some three months after the ECtHR had given judgment. 30.58 Nagy concerned a group of civil servants who had been dismissed without cause under the same law adjudicated in KMC v Hungary, which permitted termination of employment in the civil service ‘without justification’. The civil servants were dismissed prior to the annulment of the law by the Constitutional Court in May 2011. The Hungarian court referred the case to the CJEU on the basis that Article 30 ‘has direct effect in terms of its applicability’ and it was therefore seeking guidance on the scope of the right, including the need to notify the workers of the reason for their dismissal and the existence of a remedy. Not surprisingly, the CJEU, in a brief order, ruled that it did not have jurisdiction. The national court was incorrect in assuming that Article 30 had direct effect and had misunderstood the scope of the Charter set out in Article 51(1). The invocation of provisions of the Charter could not, alone, establish competence on the CJEU to answer questions from a national court.119 The finding in Nagy is axiomatic, but it lays bare just how limited the CJEU is as a human rights court in the absence of a direct connection between EU law and a Charter right.

II.  Scope of Application 30.59 The right in Article 30 is an entitlement of ‘every worker’, without qualification. Use of the broader term ‘worker’ rather than ‘employee’ is indicative of an inclusive approach to fundamental social rights that encompasses not only employees with a regular employment contract or relationship, but also non-standard workers such as casual workers, ‘zero hours’ workers, home workers, temporary agency workers and others who may fall in a grey area between employment

115 Ibid, citing Demir and Baykara v Turkey App no 34503/97 (12 Nov 2008) [153]–[154]. 116 Ibid, p 21. 117 O Kahn-Freund, ‘The European Social Charter’ in FG Jacobs (ed), European Law and the Individual (Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishers, 1976) 181–211, 184. 118 Cases C-488–491/12 and 526/12 Nagy Sándor and Others v Hajdú-Bihar megyei Kormányhivatal and Others, EU:C:2013:703. See also, Cases C-614/12 and C-10/13 József Dutka and Csilla Sajtos v Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal and Budapest Főváros VI. Ker. Önkormányzata, EU:C:2014:30. 119 Applying Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105.

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and self-employment.120 Non-standard workers are in the most precarious position and are vulnerable to arbitrary dismissal. Appearances are deceptive. Article 30 applies only ‘in accordance with Union law and national 30.60 law and practices’. In the course of this chapter the term ‘worker’ has been used in preference to ‘employee’ consistent with the language of Article 30 and an inclusive interpretation of ILO Convention 158 and Article 24 RESC. The latter covers all workers who have signed an employment contract.121 However, although the ILO Convention ‘applies to all branches of economic activity and all employed persons’122 both it, and the appendix to the RESC, permit states to exclude ‘workers engaged on a casual basis for a short period’.123 Where the term ‘employee’ has been used in this chapter it has referred to EU or national 30.61 legislation that is limited to ‘employees’ as defined under national law. For example, Article 2(1)(d) of the Transfers of Undertakings Directive restricts its scope to ‘any person who, in the Member State concerned, is protected as an employee under national law’ (emphasis added). Where the term ‘worker’ is used in the Treaties or EU legislation without such a restriction, as is the case in the free movement of workers’ provisions, sex equality law, and directives on the protection of worker’s health and safety, the CJEU has developed a horizontal application of the concept of a ‘worker’.124 The CJEU’s definition of a ‘worker’ was proposed for codification in the Commission’s draft of the Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive as meaning ‘a natural person who, for a certain period of time performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for remuneration’.125 However, in the adopted text, vertical subsidiarity was preferred to this broad definition. Instead, the provisions of the Directive offer protection only to ‘every worker in the Union who has an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements or practice in force in in each Member State with consideration to the case-law of the Court of Justice’. Ultimately, what Bednarowicz aptly describes as ‘some sort of hybrid legal definition’126 does not impose the CJEU definition and results in legal incoherence. In the absence of harmonisation of the concepts of ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ at EU level, save in certain situations, protection against unjustified dismissal under national laws will continue to be reserved only for the standard employee and, therefore, the two-tier labour market will persist. With regard to the scope of application more generally, the Charter requires consistent 30.62 interpretation of the ECHR under Article 52(3), which is important bearing in mind the interconnections between ECHR rights and protection against termination. The Charter contains no information, however, on how to interpret the ESC, the RESC or ILO instruments. The ECSR has provided extensive guidance on the scope of the RESC. It is reasonable to

120 See M Freedland, ‘From the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus’ (2006) 35 Industrial Law Journal 1, 9. See further, J Kenner, I Florczak and M Otto (eds), Precarious Work: The Challenge for Labour Law in Europe (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2019), E Ales, O Deinert and J Kenner (eds), Core and Contingent Work in the European Union (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017). 121 ECSR Conclusions 2013, Statement of Interpretation on Art 24. 122 Art 2(1) of ILO Convention 158. 123 Ibid, Art 2(2)(c). 124 See Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121, paras 16–17, applied in Case C-256/01 Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College [2004] ECR I-873 and Case C-147/17 Sindicatul Familia Constanţa (SFC) v Direcţia Generală de Asistenţă Socială şi Protecţia Copilului Constanţa, EU:C:2018:926. 125 COM(2017) 797 final, Art 2. See further, B Bednarowicz, ‘Delivering on the European Pillar of Social Rights: The New Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions in the European Union’ (2019) 48 Industrial Law Journal 604, 612–15. 126 Ibid, 613.



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expect that this guidance will, at least, be persuasive bearing in mind the direct reference to Article 24 RESC in the Charter explanations.127 The fact that this linkage was emphasised by the ECtHR in KMC v Hungary,128 discussed in section D.I above, is important. It should point to a consistent interpretation of Article 24 RESC and Article 30 on the basis that all Member States are committed to upholding the Charter regardless of whether or not they have ratified the RESC. It is an approach that is necessary to ensure coherence in European human rights law and avoid a ‘double standard’.129

III.  Specific Provisions (a) Overview 30.63 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque’s opinion in KMC v Hungary130 offers a summary of the ‘minimum content in European human rights law’ of the right to protection of the worker in the event of termination of employment. It provides a useful template for the application of Article 30. The right to protection consists of four ‘core requirements’, according to the judge:131 [1] [2] [3] [4]

a formal written notice of termination of employment given to the employee, a pre-termination opportunity to respond given to the employee, a valid reason for termination, and an appeal to an independent body [with] powers to verify the factual and legal aspects of the appealed decision and to remedy it, if it is found illegal.

30.64 Termination of employment under ILO Convention 158 and Article 24 RESC means termination at the initiative of the employer.132 This excludes terminations by mutual consent and terminations on the initiative of the worker by reason of the employer’s conduct or what is known as ‘constructive dismissal’ under UK law.133 30.65 Starting with the requirement for written notice for dismissal, there has been some useful guidance from the CEACR. It has declared that the purpose of the notice is to enable the worker to prepare himself to adapt to the situation and look for a new job.134 Article 11 of the Convention provides that such a period of notice must be of a ‘reasonable’ duration. The specific length of notice is left to national legislation. Compensation in lieu is possible but it must correspond to the remuneration the worker would have received during the period of notice.135 The only exception to the obligation to give notice is in the case of serious misconduct by the worker.136 30.66 Next, procedural fairness prior to termination is founded on the right to a defence contained in Article 7 of the ILO Convention. This is essential to allow workers to be heard by the employer and to ensure that any decision to terminate is preceded by dialogue and reflection between

127 See B Hepple, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 225, 226. 128 n 70. 129 Ibid, separate concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque discussed in section D.I above. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 CEACR General Survey 1995, para 19: www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labourstandards/general-surveys/lang--en/index.htm. 133 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 95(1)(c). 134 CEACR Note on Convention No 158 and Recommendation No 166 concerning termination of employment, 2009, p 3: www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_171404.pdf. 135 CEACR GS 1995, para 247. 136 CEACR direct request—Serbia (2006).

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the parties.137 ILO Recommendation 166 is more specific in requiring consultation with workers’ representatives before a final decision is taken and making provision for the worker to be represented when defending himself.138 The requirement for a ‘valid reason’ for termination is regarded as a fundamental principle and the ‘cornerstone’139 of the substantive right in Article 4 of the Convention and Article 24 RESC. The first valid reason identified is ‘capacity’ of the worker either due to a lack of skills or qualities necessary to perform certain tasks or poor work performance not caused by intentional misconduct. In making decisions on the basis of the capacity of the worker, employers must ensure that they do not violate the principle of non-discrimination in Article 21 of the Charter. The CJEU, in Ring and Werge,140 has taken a very broad view of the concept of ‘disability’ consistent with the CRPD, discussed in section B above,141 and therefore protection in this respect is stronger than under the ILO Convention and the RESC.142 More problematic is age discrimination where a decision to terminate on grounds of age can be justified under Article 6 of Directive 2000/78 if ‘objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’.143 In a series of cases, the CJEU has upheld mandatory retirement ages permitted under national legislation on the basis of employment policies aimed at sharing employment opportunities among the generations,144 and has backed this up with a reference to the right to work in Article 15 of the Charter.145 In Prigge,146 a mandatory requirement for airline pilots to retire at the age of 60 was struck down as disproportionate because it took no account of the capability of the individuals concerned and the reasons given, including the safety of passengers, were not sufficiently connected to the labour market. Article 30 has not been considered by the CJEU in non-discrimination cases. Guidance from the ECSR suggests that Contracting Parties to the RESC have a wide discretion to impose a ‘valid retirement age’ justified by the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service. Age is not listed as an invalid reason for dismissal in Article 5 of the ILO Convention or the RESC. It is referred to in paragraph 5(a) of the ILO Recommendation, but with the caveat that it is ‘subject to national law and practice regarding retirement’. 137 CEACR GS 1995, para 148. See also the application of Art 7 of the Convention by the Brussels Labour Court in DD v SA Vanduc-Topfilm, 20 February 1992, Roll No 79–759/91: http://compendium.itcilo.org/en/text-full-search/#. 138 Recommendation 166, paras 9–11. 139 CEACR Note 2009 (n 134) p 1. 140 Joined Cases C-335 and 337/11 HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, EU:C:2013:222. 141 The CJEU found at point 1 of the operative part of the judgment that the concept must be interpreted as including ‘a condition caused by illness medically diagnosed as curable or incurable where that illness entails a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, and the limitation is a long-term one’. 142 Disability is not listed among the reasons not constituting a valid reason for dismissal in Arts 5–6 of the ILO Convention. 143 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 144 Case C-388/07 Age Concern England [2009] ECR I-1569; Case C-341/08 Petersen v Befungsausschuss für Zahnärtze für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe [2010] ECR I-47; Cases C-250/09 and C-268/09 Georgiev v Tehnicheski universitet—Sofia, filial Plovdiv [2010] ECR I-11869; Case C-45/09 Rosenbladt v Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsges mbH [2010] ECR I-9391; Cases C-159–160/10 Fuchs & Köhler v Land Hessen [2011] ECR I-6919. 145 Case C-141/11 Torsten Hörnfeldt v Posten Meddelande AB, EU:C:2012:421. 146 Case C-447/09 Prigge, Fromm and Lambach v Deutsche Lufthansa AG [2011] ECR I-8003.



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30.71

The next valid reason in Article 4 of the ILO Convention and Article 24 RESC is ‘conduct’. Two categories of misconduct have been identified by the CEACR:147 (a) inadequate performance of contractual duties, such as neglect, violation of work rules, disobedience of legitimate orders etc; or (b) improper behaviour, such as disorderly conduct, violence, assault, using insulting language, disrupting the peace of the workplace etc.

30.72 Misconduct outside of the workplace would not normally be a valid reason for dismissal. The ECSR has found that a prison sentence delivered in court for employment-related offences can be a valid reason for dismissal but not if the offence is not employment-related unless the length of the custodial sentence prevents the person carrying out their work.148 30.73 The issue of conduct deemed unacceptable by an employer for reasons of religion or belief arose in IR v JQ,149 a case involving a Catholic doctor, JQ, dismissed by a Catholic hospital, IR, because of a second marriage following divorce. The employer contended that JQ’s conduct was contrary to the religious ‘ethos’ of IR, an occupational requirement that is a permitted exception to the non-discrimination principle by virtue of Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78.150 The CJEU ruled that adherence to the notion of marriage did not appear to be necessary for the promotion of the organisation’s ethos bearing in mind the occupational activities carried out by IR. According to the CJEU, an employing organisation should not impose a stricter loyalty obligation on those who are employed because of their religion or belief than on those who are not employed for that reason. Therefore, while the matter ultimately would be for the national court to determine, the CJEU indicated that, on the facts, the notion of marriage as sacred and indissoluble did not appear to be a genuine, legitimate, and justified occupational requirement.151 The CJEU referenced Articles 10 and 21 of the Charter but not Article 30. Nevertheless, its ruling limited the scope for arbitrary dismissal under the exception. 30.74 The final valid reason for termination is one connected with the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service. In such a case the dismissal must be for economic reasons not connected with capacity or conduct. Classically this will be a redundancy involving either a reduction of the workforce or closure of a plant or factory.152 The ECSR has not specified whether economic reasons must be limited to situations where employers are in difficulty or whether they can include other business strategies.153 This will be explored further in discussion of the case law in part (b) of this section below. 30.75 Participation in trade union activities is listed among the reasons not constituting valid reasons for termination in Article 5 of the ILO Convention and the Appendix to Article 24 RESC. The other invalid reasons for dismissal are set in 30.48 above. Based on the case law of the ECtHR this must include participation in strikes as it is ultimately derived from freedom of association as guaranteed by Article 11 ECHR.154 More precise provisions are found in Articles 5 and 6(4) ESC. Potentially, Article 30 can be invoked. Under Article 7 of Directive 2002/14 on information

147 CEACR Note 2009 (n 134) p 2. 148 ECSR Conclusions 2005, Estonia, pp 205–10. 149 Case C-68/17 IR v JQ, EU:C:2018:696. 150 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 151 IR v JQ (n 149) [58]. 152 CEACR Note 2009 (n 134) p 2. 153 ECSR Conclusions 2003, France, p 191. 154 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey App no 68959/01 (21 April 2009).

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and consultation of workers,155 Member States must ensure that employees’ representatives, when carrying out their functions, ‘enjoy adequate protection and guarantees to enable them to perform properly the duties which have been assigned to them’. In Holst,156 the CJEU ruled that dismissal on grounds of status or carrying out the functions of an employees’ representative ‘could be regarded as constituting unfair dismissal under [national] law’. Similar arguments can be mounted for contending that dismissal of strikers facing collective redundancy, without carrying out the information and consultation requirements in the Collective Redundancies Directive, would amount to dismissals for ‘reasons not related to the individual workers concerned’ contrary to the Directive.157 In cases involving ‘temporary absence from work because of illness or injury’, which is not a valid 30.76 reason for termination,158 a time-limit can be placed on protection against dismissal according to the ECSR.159 Absence can constitute a valid reason for dismissal if it severely disrupts the smooth running of the undertaking and requires a permanent replacement for the absent worker. Additional protection must be offered, where necessary, for victims of employment injuries or occupational diseases.160 The right of a worker who considers that his employment has been terminated without a valid 30.77 reason to appeal to an impartial body is contained in the final paragraph of Article 24 RESC and Articles 8–9 of the ILO Convention. Article 8(3) of the Convention allows for a time-limit on claims. The burden of proof is not placed expressly on the employer but the worker does not have to bear it alone.161 The ILO Recommendation is stronger on the possibility of conciliation procedures before or during an appeal.162 If employment is terminated for economic reasons, the appeal body must be empowered to investigate the economic facts underlying the measures according to the ECSR.163 Additional provisions in the ILO Convention concern the entitlement of the worker to a sever- 30.78 ance allowance and other income protection164 and for consultation of workers’ representatives in the case of collective dismissals.165 Whilst the latter is similar in content to the Collective Redundancies Directive, the interpretation of the CEACR, discussed in section D.I above, indicates the need for protection against dismissal in cases where there are breaches of the information and consultation procedures. (b)  Application of Article 30 by the Court of Justice The scope of Article 30 has been interpreted narrowly by the General Court of the CJEU in staff 30.79 cases. It has been found not to lay down specific obligations to, for example, deduce that there might be an obligation to reassign a staff member rather than dismissing them.166 Nevertheless, it

155 Council Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ L80/29. 156 Case C-405/08 Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark, acting on behalf of Bertram Holst v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening [2010] ECR I-985 [63]. 157 See B Bercusson, European Labour Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 315–16. 158 Art 6(1) of ILO Convention 158 and the appendix to the RESC, point 3(f). 159 Conclusions 2005, Norway, pp 572–75. 160 Conclusions 2003, France, p 191. 161 CEACR GS 1995, para 199. 162 ILO Recommendation 166, para 14. 163 Conclusions 2003, Bulgaria, p 78. 164 ILO Convention No 158, Art 12. 165 Ibid, Arts 13–14. 166 See Case T-107/11P European Training Foundation v Gisela Schuerings, EU:T:2013: 624, para 100, and Case T-108/11 European Training Foundation v Gustave Michel, EU:T:2013:625, para 101.



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is useful, in this part, to explore the evolving case law concerning two labour law directives where EU law offers a degree of protection to workers in the event of termination of their employment contract or relationship and, hence, Article 30 could be of assistance. These are, firstly, the Transfers of Undertakings Directive, 2001/23167 and, secondly, the Collective Redundancies Directive, 98/59.168 Both directives are briefly outlined in Section A. 30.80 The Transfers of Undertakings Directive is largely bereft of the language of rights, but it does recognise, implicitly, important elements of the evolving right of protection in circumstances where dismissal can be deemed unjust. It upholds the right of an employee to job security in situations where an employer might otherwise be free to carry out dismissals at will in order to sell or subcontract the business subject only to following certain procedural obligations laid down under national laws or practices.169 More radically, by restricting the possibilities for dismissal, it allows for certain rights, such as pay and conditions that have been acquired over time, including by means of provisions in collective agreements, to be transferred with the employee to the new employer. The notion that such rights have been acquired and should not be forfeited, even in the event of termination of the original contract, is capable of being interpreted as a conceptualisation of the right to protection against unjust dismissal that transcends job security and recognises the job as a property right, or stake, owned by the employee. The CJEU has not been asked to rule in a case on Directive 2001/23 concerning a potential 30.81 violation of Article 30. In Alemo-Herron170 it gave precedence to an employer’s freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 in a fashion that weakens the protection of acquired rights. The case concerned the contracting out of leisure services by an English local authority to a private company which, two years later, sold its business to another company, Parkwood. Pay was determined by a collective agreement in the local government sector that was renewed periodically. The question arose as to whether Parkwood, as a private entity, was bound by the collective agreement, as they had not been a party to the negotiations. Advocate General Cruz Villalón supported a dynamic interpretation suggested by the UK Supreme Court under which the transferee is bound under the English law of contract by collective agreements not only in force at the time but also subsequent to that transfer. The Advocate General noted that the freedom to conduct a business in Article 16 is not an absolute right and is ‘very much open to being used as a counterweight’ to other fundamental rights.171 The logic would suggest that, at the very least, a balance should be struck between Article 16 and fundamental social rights in the Charter such as Article 30. By contrast, the CJEU, relying heavily on the principle of contractual freedom in Article 16, preferred a static interpretation of acquired rights on the basis that requiring the transferee to be bound by a contractual process to which he is not a party seriously reduces their contractual freedom ‘to the point that such a limitation is liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom to conduct a business’.172 The CJEU’s judgment is understandable if Article 16 is considered in isolation. As the 30.82 employees in question had not had their contracts terminated, the application of Article 30 did 167 Council Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the law of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16. 168 Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16 (as corrected by Corrigendum, [2007] OJ L59). 169 See Art 4 discussed in section A above. 170 Case C-426/11 Mark Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd (EU:C:2013:521) 521. 171 Ibid, opinion [52]. 172 Ibid, judgment [35]. The Court of Justice, unlike the Advocate General, was not prepared to distinguish Case C-499/04 Werhof [2006] ECR I-2397, where a static interpretation was preferred in the context of the contractual system in Germany.

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not arise directly. However, taking into account the objectives of the Directive, Article 30 might have been considered as a ‘counterweight’ to Article 16 as any diminution of acquired rights could lead ultimately to termination of employment. The employees had only been able to keep their jobs because the Directive is designed to guarantee ‘the protection of employees in the event of a change of employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights are safeguarded’.173 At the very least, the CJEU should have taken account of the balance between the commercial interests of the company inheriting the transferred employees and the protection afforded to those employees to retain their acquired rights under established collective bargaining processes. Flexible methods of contractual interpretation, which are the norm under English law, would have allowed for a dynamic approach without fundamentally restricting economic freedom. Now let us consider the Collective Redundancies Directive. As discussed in section A, it is 30.83 relevant to Article 30 because it relates to termination of employment based on the ‘operational requirements’ of the undertaking, establishment or service falling within Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 and Article 24 RESC. Whilst a dismissal for economic reasons would not normally involve disrespect or indignity for the worker, Article 30 is potentially engaged because it is essential, in the interests of justice in dismissal, for a fair procedure to be followed and objective criteria applied in the selection of workers to be made redundant.174 One immediate issue is the relationship between individual and collective dismissals. Under Article 1(a) of the Directive, the term ‘collective redundancies’ means ‘dismissals effected by the employer for one or more reasons not related to the individual workers’.175 Article 6 places a duty on Member States to ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures for the enforcement of ‘obligations’ under the Directive are available to the workers’ representatives and/or workers. The potential application of Article 30 in the context of the Collective Redundancies Directive 30.84 has arisen in four cases before the CJEU. In the first case, Mono Car Styling,176 Advocate General Mengozzi, in the first substantive evaluation of Article 30 in proceedings before the CJEU, briefly considered its possible relevance. In the Advocate General’s opinion, the underlying purpose of the EU’s legislature, by eschewing the language of ‘rights’ and referring instead to ‘obligations’, is ‘not to bestow a series of rights on those affected by collective redundancies, but to impose a series of obligations on employers who decide to make such redundancies’.177 It follows, according to the Advocate General, that Article 30 does not require an individual right of action to be provided in the event of an employer failing to observe the information and consultation procedure.178 In the Advocate General’s assessment, the reference to protection against ‘unjustified’ dismissal in Article 30 is an important ‘qualification’ which ‘makes clear’ that the protection of every worker is not provided, ‘as a fundamental individual right, with respect to every kind of irregularity that a dismissal might involve’.179 Instead, to invoke Article 30 within the scope of EU law, there must be a ‘serious irregularity’, as might arise, for example, in relation to the actual merits of the decision to dismiss. The Advocate General concluded that:180 Breaches of Directive 98/59, on the other hand, do not appear such as to justify reference to Article 30 of the Charter for, given the content of the directive, it is intended that the result of such breaches will be illegality of a formal/procedural kind.



173 Recital

4 of the preamble of Directive 2001/23. above (n 15) 153. 175 Emphasis added. 176 Case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling SA v Dervis Odemis and Others [2009] ECR I-6653. 177 Ibid, opinion [44]. 178 Ibid [96]. 179 Ibid [97]. 180 Ibid. 174 Collins

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30.85 Advocate General Mengozzi’s narrow interpretation of Article 30 would, effectively, exclude formal or procedural irregularities in the information and consultation process from the scope of unjust dismissal, an approach that is out of line with Articles 13–14 of ILO Convention 158. In an observation on the Convention, the CEACR commented that:181 Terminations of employment for economic, technological, structural or similar reasons must be consistent with the provisions of Article 13 and 14 of the Convention, particularly in respect of the consultation of worker’s representatives and notification to the competent authority.

30.86 In Mayor,182 the second case on the Directive, a group of employees had their contracts of employment terminated as a result of the death of their employer. The effect of Spanish law was to place the employees of a natural person in a weaker position than the employees of a company, as the former were regarded as not being dismissed in the event of the death of the employer. The national court asked if the Spanish legislation infringed Article 30. The case appeared to provide an ideal opportunity to interpret Article 30 in the context of the implementation of EU law within the field of application of the Charter under Article 51(1). However, the CJEU ruled that the dismissals could not be classified as a ‘collective redundancy’ because the provisions of Directive 98/59 presupposed the existence of an employer who contemplated redundancies and was capable of carrying out the required information and consultation process to put into effect such redundancies.183 It followed that the dispute was outside of the scope of the Directive and it was ‘not necessary’ to answer the question about the application of Article 30.184 30.87 The CJEU’s reasoning in Mayor is highly questionable. Post-Lisbon, the CJEU should have considered whether a literal interpretation of the wording of the Directive was compatible with the Charter as purposive Treaty-equivalent law, rather than treating Article 30 as an afterthought.185 The difference of treatment under Spanish legislation between workers who have their contracts terminated due to the death of their employer, and workers who face dismissal due to corporate restructuring or insolvency, is stark but deemed to be outside the scope of EU law. 30.88 In a third case, Porras Guisado,186 a reference to the CJEU from a Spanish court, the issue in question concerned the relationship between the procedural obligations on the employer under the Collective Redundancies Directive, 98/59, and the prohibition of the dismissal of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding under Article 10 of the Pregnancy and Maternity Directive, 92/85.187 The referring court asked whether Spanish legislation, which made no provision for workers falling within the scope of Directive 92/85 to be afforded priority for retention in employment in cases of collective redundancy, was compatible with Article 10?188 In its judgment, the CJEU strictly differentiated between the individual rights of workers within the scope of Directive 92/85 and the duties of the employer in the event of a collective redundancy within the scope of Directive 98/59. First, the CJEU determined that Article 10 of Directive 92/85 must not be interpreted as precluding national legislation that

181 CEACR observation—Cameroon (2007). 182 Case C-323/08 Ovidio Rodriguez Mayor and Others v Herencia yacente de Rafael de las Heras Dávila and Others [2009] ECR I-11621. 183 Ibid [42]. 184 Ibid [59]. 185 For an example of a purposive approach to interpretation, see the opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministers, EU:C:2010:564. 186 Case C-103/16 Jessica Porras Guisado v Bankia SA and Others, EU:C:2018:99. 187 Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (10th individual Directive within the meaning of Art 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) [1992] OJ L348/1. 188 Porras Guisado (n 186) [28].

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permits the dismissal of a pregnant worker because of a collective redundancy within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Directive 98/59.189 Second, provided that objective criteria are used to identify the workers to be made redundant, the CJEU concluded that a pregnant worker may be dismissed in the context of a collective redundancy.190 Third, national legislation that gives no priority in a collective redundancy situation to workers falling within the scope of Directive 92/85 is not precluded but, however, Member States may provide a higher level of protection for those workers.191 The CJEU’s approach in this case was mechanical. Once it was satisfied that the procedural elements of Directive 98/59 were satisfied, any conflict with the protection against dismissal in Article 10 of Directive 92/85 was deemed resolved without direct consideration of the justice of any consequential dismissals within the scope of the latter Directive.192 Finally, to complete this quartet of cases, we have the most significant case to date on Article 30, 30.89 AGET Iraklis.193 Indeed it is the only case where the CJEU has applied Article 30 in a judgment, issued on 21 December 2016. Moreover, this was a judgment of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU. It was a rare case in which a Member State—Greece—intervened, in 2013, to refuse to authorise collective redundancies. The facts can be summarised as follows. AGET Iraklis planned to close a cement plant in Greece with the loss of 236 jobs. The company failed to agree a plan with the workers’ representatives and, in accordance with a Greek statute, the Ministry of Labour drew up a report on the proposed redundancies based on three criteria: the conditions in the labour market; the situation of the undertaking; and the interests of the national economy. These criteria took account of the acute economic crisis and high unemployment in Greece at that time. Applying these criteria, the Ministry decided not to approve the redundancies on the ground that the need for the redundancies had not been substantiated. AGET Iraklis brought a case before the Greek courts challenging the validity of the statute. The case was referred to the CJEU for a ruling as to whether the criteria used by Greece were compatible with the Directive and Article 49 TFEU, on the right of establishment in the internal market. Article 49 TFEU was applicable because a French company, Lafarge, was the principal shareholder of AGET Iraklis. The referring court also asked the CJEU whether these types of serious social reasons could justify what otherwise might be an invalid exercise of state authority. Advocate General Wahl set out his stall from the outset by declaring that ‘The European Union 30.90 is a free market economy, which implies that undertakings must have the freedom to conduct their business as they see fit’.194 The question in the case was ‘What are the limits, then to Member State intervention in order to ensure the job security of workers?’195 In considering this question, the task of the CJEU, according to the Advocate General, is to carry out a balancing exercise between the protection of workers in the event of a collective redundancy situation and the freedom of establishment of the employer. This required consideration of the freedom to conduct a business enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter,196 but was Article 30 also part of the equation?

189 Ibid, point 1 of the operative part of the judgment. 190 Ibid, point 2. 191 Ibid, point 4. 192 Art 30 was not cited in the Advocate General’s opinion or the judgment of the Court but the case is listed by the Commission in its review of cases on Art 30 in 2018. See European Commission 2018 report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, p 114, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamentalrights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights/application-charter/annual-reports-application-charter_en. 193 Case C-201/15 Anonymi Geniki Etairia Tsimenton Iraklis (AGET Iraklis) v Ypourgos Ergasias, Koinonikis Asfalisis kai Koinonikis Allilengyis, (judgment) EU:C:2016:972, (opinion) EU:C:2016:429. 194 Ibid (opinion) [1]. 195 Ibid. 196 Ibid [57].



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The Advocate General was dismissive, noting the lack of specific obligations in Article 30.197 The caveat on ‘national laws on practices’ in Article 30 meant that the right is analogous to Article 27 of the Charter on workers’ rights to information and consultation within the undertaking,198 which has been found by the CJEU, in Association de médiation sociale,199 to require more specific expression by provisions of EU law or national law to be fully effective. Article 27 did not confer on individuals a right that they may invoke as such, even when considered in conjunction with the provisions of the Directive.200 Implicitly the lack of justiciability applied to Article 30 for similar reasons even though it is expressed as a specific right for ‘every worker’. The Advocate General continued:201 All that I can infer directly from the wording of Article 30 of the Charter is, on the one hand, that it does not guarantee a right to permanent employment and, on the other hand, that the essential question is to ascertain what amounts, for the purpose of a restructuring exercise, to a ‘justified dismissal’.

Noting the reference in the Article 30 explanation to Article 24 RESC as a source, the Advocate General observed that dismissal for purely economic reasons is not listed in the non-exhaustive number of unlawful grounds for dismissal in that provision.202 The Advocate General concluded that: Under those circumstances, it seems to me that the threshold for determining what constitutes a ‘justified dismissal’ cannot be set too high, as the consequence of doing so would be to force an undertaking to put its restructuring plans on hold indefinitely, with the risk of remaining economically inefficient.

By contrast, the Advocate General read Article 49 TFEU and Article 16 of the Charter broadly in this balancing exercise. According to the Advocate General, for freedom of establishment ‘to be truly effective’ it must give a cross-border economic group ‘the right to scale down and, ultimately, dissolve an establishment in a Member State’.203 In other words, the right to leave that Member State. Applying the judgment in Alemo-Herron, the criteria laid down by Greece, interpreted in the light of Article 49 TFEU, restricted the employer’s freedom to conduct a business.204 The Advocate General went so far as finding that ‘the rule at issue merely gives the impression of being protective of workers’.205 Resorting to market economics, the Advocate General opined that ‘the idea of artificially maintaining employment relationships, in spite of unsound general economic foundations, has been tested and utterly failed in certain political systems of yesteryear’.206 The Advocate General therefore concluded that Article 16 could not be balanced with Article 30. Such a balancing exercise was a ‘fallacy’ because protecting workers was not at odds with either freedom of establishment or the freedom to conduct a business.207 Moreover, to rub salt in the Greek Government’s wounds, the Advocate General rounded off the opinion by referencing the conditions imposed on Greece under the European Stability Mechanism and, moving well beyond the issue of the protection of the job security of the workers concerned, cited the Commission’s policy goal that ‘in times of crisis, it is just as important to reduce all the



197 Ibid

[59], referring specifically to the staff cases, see n 166.

198 Ibid.

199 Ibid, see

Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT, EU:C:2014:2. [42]–[49]. 201 Ibid [59]. 202 Ibid [60]. 203 Ibid [65]. 204 Ibid [64] and [81]. 205 Ibid [72]. 206 Ibid [73]. 207 Ibid [74]. 200 Ibid

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factors which deter new undertakings from investing, as economic efficiency may help stimulate job creation and economic growth’.208 By contrast, the CJEU, in its judgment, was prepared to complete a balancing exercise between 30.91 these rights although it did not give an equal weighting to Articles 16 and 30. Its starting point was the business freedom contained in Article 16. According to the CJEU, that freedom includes the ability of an undertaking to assert its interests effectively and to negotiate changes in its employees’ working conditions with a view to future economic activity.209 Because the Greek legislation allowed the public authorities to prevent an employer from putting plans for collective redundancies into effect it constituted an interference with the exercise of business freedom and the freedom of establishment.210 The CJEU recognised that the protection of workers, the encouragement of employment, and reduction of unemployment may be acceptable justifications for a restriction on those freedoms.211 In this regard, in language markedly different in tone to that of the Advocate General, the CJEU drew on the social policy objectives in Article 151 TFEU and the goal of a high level of employment in Article 147 TFEU, and directly referenced the requirements in the horizontal social clause, Article 9 TFEU, for the EU to take account of ‘requirements linked to the promotion of high employment and adequate social protection’.212 Therefore, in analysing the overriding reasons of public interest, the EU must pursue its objectives, which are not only the development of the internal market but also the sustainable development of Europe and working for a highly competitive social market economy aimed at full employment and social progress, aims that must be achieved through action by the Member States, as well as through implementation of the Union’s policies and activities.213 Next, the CJEU distinguished its earlier ruling in Alemo-Herron, discussed earlier in this part, 30.92 on the basis that the Greek law did not entirely exclude, by its nature, the ability of undertakings to effect collective redundancies.214 It did not automatically violate Article 16 and it was necessary to consider, in the light of Article 30, whether the rules adopted to protect workers against unjustified dismissal were compatible with the principle of proportionality because ‘they are necessary and genuinely meet recognised objectives of general interest or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.215 It followed that the national criteria:216 must seek, in this sensitive area, to reconcile and to strike a fair balance between the interests connected with the protection of workers and of employment, in particular protection against unjustified dismissal and against the consequences of collective dismissals for workers, and those relating to freedom of establishment and the freedom of economic operators to conduct a business enshrined in Articles 49 TFEU and Article 16 of the Charter.

Departing from the opinion of the Advocate General, the CJEU observed that, given the consequences of collective redundancy decisions on workers’ employment:217 a mechanism [such as that used by Greece] that can contribute to enhancing the actual level of protection of workers and of their employment, by laying down substantive rules governing the adoption of such





208 Ibid

[80]. (judgment) [67]–[68]. 210 Ibid [69]. 211 Ibid [73]–[75]. 212 Ibid [76]–[78]. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid [88]. 215 Ibid [89]. 216 Ibid [90]. 217 Ibid [92]. 209 Ibid

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economic and commercial decisions by undertakings … is thus appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objectives in the public interest thereby pursued.

Further, the CJEU noted that, allowing for the broad discretion of Member States in social policy matters, it was not apparent that measures of a less restrictive kind would ensure the attainment of those objectives as effectively, and therefore, a mechanism such as that used by Greece could be a valid way of satisfying the proportionality requirement.218 30.93 Nevertheless, there was a sting in the tail for Greece. The CJEU determined that the permissible criteria were formulated in very general and imprecise terms, meaning that the situations in which they could be applied were potentially numerous and indeterminable.219 This left employers without the ability to know in what specific objective circumstances the public authorities might refuse to authorise a collective redundancy.220 In addition, the legislation failed to provide national courts with sufficiently precise criteria to enable them to review the way in which the administrative authority exercised its discretion.221 Therefore, although the principles upon which the proportionality test could apply were satisfied, in the context of the objective justification for two of the criteria, those provisions were not precise or based on objective verifiable conditions, and for this reason, failed to comply with the principle of proportionality.222 30.94 The CJEU concluded its judgment by dismissing the second question referred, as to whether, exceptionally, the national legislation could be deemed compatible with the provisions of the Directive and Article 49 TFEU because of ‘serious social reasons, in a context where there is an acute economic crisis and a particularly high unemployment rate’.223 Without resorting to the economic dogma used by the Advocate General, the CJEU ruled that such an interpretation would deprive the provisions of the Directive of their practical effect as there is no safeguarding clause authorising such a derogation.224 30.95 The opinion of the Advocate General and the judgment of the CJEU in AGET Iraklis provide a fascinating contrast on the scope of Article 30.225 On the one hand, the Advocate General follows the trend in the neoliberal discourse of international financial institutions which regards labour law as an obstacle to growth and employment and, as Ebert observes, ‘implies that dismissal protection laws do not really protect the interests of workers’.226 This is an ethos that is far removed from the values that underlie the Solidarity provisions in the Charter which are drawn from sources rooted in the concept of social justice. It reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the notion of job security. For a worker, job security is important for self-esteem, dignity, autonomy and financial security. It cannot be reduced to a theory about transitioning from jobs deemed no longer economically viable into new jobs that are unlikely to be comparable in terms of pay, status or skills, or may not be available at all. The unemployment rate in Greece in 2013, when the dispute commenced, was 27.3 per cent.227 The Advocate General was asserting what

218 Ibid [93]–[94]. 219 Ibid [100]. 220 Ibid [99]–[100]. 221 Ibid [101]. 222 Ibid [102]–[104]. 223 Ibid [105]. 224 Ibid [106]. 225 For analysis, see KA Polomarkakis, ‘A tale of two approaches to Social Europe: The CJEU and the Advocate General drifting apart in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 424. 226 F Ebert, ‘International Financial Institutions’ Approaches to Labour Law’ in A Blackett and A Trebilcock, Research Handbook on Transnational Labour Law (Edward Elgar, 2016) 124, 128. 227 AGET Iraklis (opinion) (n 193), fn 25.

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Mark Freedland and Jeremias Prassl have described as the ‘supersession’ model on the relations between EU labour law and internal market law.228 Under this model:229 EU internal market law is so extensively superimposed upon the sphere of collective and individual relations between employers and workers in the Union and each of its Member States, that it has to be regarded as having over-ridden or superseded labour law’s regulation of those spheres (‘the supercession type’).

The ‘supercession’ of labour law to the internal market continues a trend set by the CJEU’s rulings in Viking and Laval.230 It is an approach that removes all the oxygen from provisions such as Article 30 once a connection is made in the case to the need to protect liberalisation in the internal market. On the other hand, the judgment moves away from the ‘supercession’ model and instead, as 30.96 Markarkis observes, is a ‘step towards’231 an alternative ‘reconciliation’ model constructed by Freedland and Prassl under which EU internal market law ‘functions in tandem, and in some state of reconciliation’ with EU and domestic labour law.232 It is an approach akin to what Schiek has described as a ‘constitutionally conditioned’ internal market under which the internal market ‘is not “intervened in” by protecting social and labour rights, but that it is rather conditioned by adequate respect for, and protection and promotion of, these rights’.233 By making repeated reference to social objectives and social rights in the Treaties and, unlike the Advocate General, conducting a balancing exercise, the CJEU seeks to reconcile Article 16 and Article 30 by applying the proportionality principle. Schiek is correct to point out that Article 30 is not given ‘sufficient weight’ in the judgment but equally Article 30 is ‘not devoid of content’ and must be interpreted consistently with Article 24 RESC.234 Economic difficulties alone do not necessarily justify dismissals. The ECSR has emphasised that courts should review the underlying facts rather than simply accept the economic reasons invoked by the employer.235 Had the case not involved the internal market, because of the role of Lafarge in AGET Iraklis, a more targeted set of criteria, focused on minimising the loss of jobs, could have been tested so as to avoid unjust dismissals. Schiek suggests that the CJEU could have gone further by not regarding employment protection legislation as a restriction on Article 49 TFEU and instead determined proportionality on the basis of whether there was a difference of treatment between a Greek-owned business and one owned by an international employer.236 In conclusion, there is scope within the Directive for Member States to have a margin of discretion, taking into account the level of unemployment, to ensure that ‘greater protection should be afforded to workers in the event of collective redundancies while taking into account the need for balanced economic and social development within the [Union]’.237 The judgment in AGET Iraklis demonstrates that Article 30 has utility in a situation 228 See M Freedland and J Prassl, ‘Viking, Laval and Beyond: An Introduction’ in M Freedland and J Prassl (eds), Viking, Laval and Beyond (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014) 1, 15. For comment, see M Markakis, ‘Can Governments Control Mass Layoffs by Employers? Economic Freedoms vs Labour Rights in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 724, 731. 229 Freedland and Prassl, ibid, 15. 230 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation v Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. See Markarkis (n 227) 731. 231 Markakis (n 228) 734. 232 Freedland and Prassl (n 228) 15. 233 D Schiek, ‘Towards More Resilience for a Social EU—the Constitutionally Conditioned Internal Market’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 611, 638. 234 Ibid, 637–38. 235 Ibid, and Schmitt (n 93) 338. See ECSR Conclusions 2003, Bulgaria. 236 Ibid, 637. 237 Recital 2 of the preamble of Dir 98/59.



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where the Collective Redundancies Directive is applicable at least as a defensive provision to protect against unjustified dismissal.238

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 30.97 ‘Every worker’ is within the personal scope of application of Article 30 but the right to protection against unjustified dismissal operates ‘in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’. Not only does this limit the scope of application in EU law, as discussed in section D.II, but also, the international norms allow for a significant degree of vertical subsidiarity and flexibility. As noted in sections C.III and C.IV above, the ILO Convention and Recommendation, and the Appendix to the RESC, permit states to exclude some of the most precarious workers from protection. 30.98 Let us consider the scope of these limitations and derogations by reference to the three exceptions in ILO Convention 158. The first excluded group are ‘workers engaged under a contract of employment for a specified period of time or a specified task’.239 An identical provision is found in the Appendix of the RESC, point 2(a). There is a caveat that ‘adequate safeguards’ must be provided ‘against recourse to contracts of employment for a specified period of time the aim of which is to avoid the protection resulting from this Convention’.240 Bearing in mind the tripartite nature of the ILO, it is hardly surprising that the social partners negotiated a clause in the Framework Agreement annexed to the EU Fixed-Term Work Directive, which requires Member States to introduce measures to ‘prevent abuse’ of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships.241 This may have some limiting effect on the exclusion, and it should be noted that fixed-term ‘employees’ are protected against unjust dismissal in some legal orders. Also, the Cour de Cassation in France has relied directly on the safeguarding clause in the ILO Convention when striking down a national law on successive fixed-term contracts that had permitted termination without justification.242 30.99 The second excluded group are ‘workers serving a period of probation or a qualifying period of employment, determined in advance and of reasonable duration’.243 The Appendix to the RESC contains an almost identical provision.244 This leaves open the question of how long is a ‘reasonable duration’ for a qualifying period? There is important guidance on this point from the ECSR and the ILO. The ECSR has found that the exclusion of employees from protection against dismissal for six months ‘is not considered reasonable if it is applied indiscriminately, regardless of the employee’s qualifications’.245 Principle 5 of the Social Pillar provides that any probation period should be ‘of reasonable duration’.246 This has been implemented consistently with the ECSR guidance by Article 8(1) of the Directive on Transparent and Predictable

238 See S Laulom, ‘Article 30 CFREU—Protection in the Event of Unjustified Dismissal’ in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 942, 947. 239 Ibid, Art 2(2)(a). 240 Ibid, Art 2(3). 241 Council Directive 1999/70/EC, [1999] OJ L175/43. The relevant provisions are contained in cl 5 of the annexed agreement between the social partners. Cl 2 leaves the definition of ‘fixed-term workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship’ to national law. 242 Samzun v de Wee App no F 07–44.124 (1 July 2008): http://compendium.itcilo.org/en/text-full-search/#. 243 ILO Convention 158, Art 2(2)(b). 244 Point 2(b). 245 ECSR Conclusions, 2003 Italy and 2012, Cyprus. See ECSR Digest (n 92). 246 n 7.

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Working Conditions.247 This provision introduces a maximum period of six months for any probation period. In the preamble, it is noted that several Member States have established a maximum duration for a probation period of between three and six months, ‘which should be considered to be reasonable’.248 Article 8(2) provides that in the case of fixed-term employment relationships, Member States ‘shall ensure’ that the length of such a probationary period is ‘proportionate to the expected duration of the contract and the nature of the work’ and, if the contract is renewed ‘for the same functions and tasks, the employment contract shall not be subject to a new probationary period’. The preamble states that this applies to fixed-term employment relationships of less than 12 months.249 The purpose of Article 8(2) appears to be to allow some leeway for flexibility in fixed-term contracts, but the inclusion of these provisions opens up the prospect of Article 30 being applicable in a case where a worker is denied a right to bring an unjust dismissal action during a probation period. The same applies to the very open-ended exception in Article 8(3), under which Member States may provide for a longer probationary period, whatever the type of contract, ‘where justified by the nature of the employment or the interest of the worker’.250 In the preamble it is suggested that the term the ‘the nature of the employment’ might apply to ‘managerial or executive positions or public service posts’ and the term ‘the interest of the worker’ could apply ‘in the context of specific measures promoting permanent employment, in particular for younger workers’.251 The personal scope of Article 8 is limited further by Article 1(6) of the Directive, which allows Member States ‘on objective grounds’ not to apply that provision, and related provisions,252 to ‘civil servants, public emergency services, the armed forces, police authorities, judges, prosecutors, investigators or other law enforcement services’. Prior to the adoption of the new Directive the issue of the length of a probation period in the 30.100 context of dismissal was referred to the CJEU in Nisstahuz Paclava.253 In this case, a Spanish court asked the CJEU to rule on the lawfulness of a 12-month probation period in the context of the Fixed-Term Work Directive. Under Spanish law, an atypical contract could be established with a fixed-term probation period of 12 months, which could then be converted into a contract of indefinite duration when that period had elapsed. In the probationary period the employee has no legal protection against dismissal. Was such a law compatible with Article 30? The CJEU declined jurisdiction because the contract was formally of indefinite duration with the sole exception of the probationary period and, as such, could not be categorised as a fixed-term contract. On the basis of this narrow interpretation, which ran counter to the facts found by the national court, the CJEU ruled that the Directive did not apply to this situation and, as EU law was not engaged, the law governing the contract was outside the scope of the Charter by virtue of Article 51(1). Notwithstanding this finding, the CJEU observed that the duration of a probationary period is not regulated by the Directive. Once again, as in Nagy,254 the CJEU declined an opportunity to rule on the scope of Article 30 by finding no direct link with EU law even though there could

247 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union [2019] OJ L186/105. 248 Ibid, Recital 28 of the preamble. 249 Ibid. 250 Art 8(3), ibid, also states that where the worker has been absent from work during the probationary period, ‘Member States may provide that the probationary period can be extended correspondingly, in relation to the duration of the absence’. 251 Ibid, Recital 28 of the preamble. 252 This exception applies to all provisions in Chap III of the Directive, Arts 8–14. 253 Case C-117/14 Grima Janet Nisttahuz Poclava v Jose María Ariza Toledano (Taberna del Marqués), EU:C:2015:60. 254 n 118.



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have been a connection based on the probation period being treated as a fixed-term contract. However, once Directive 2019/1152 has passed its transposition date, the CJEU would be required, in a similar case, to rule on the scope of that provision in the light of Article 30. An interesting test case on the length of any qualifying period for a right to protection against unjustified dismissal has been decided by an ILO Tripartite Committee. France has ratified Convention 158. In response to a French law introducing a two-year qualifying period relating to individual and collective dismissals for undertakings with no more than 20 employees, the Confederation Générale du Travail alleged non-observance by France of the Convention and, in response, the ILO established a Tripartite Committee to investigate. In 2008 the Tripartite Committee concluded that a period as long as two years was not reasonable for excluding all of the employees concerned.255 The Cour de Cassation subsequently found that the legislation did not fall into one of the categories that can be excluded from the Convention.256 ILO and ECSR guidance is of interest in the light of developments in the UK. In 2012 the UK introduced legislation to vary the qualifying period for unfair dismissal claims from one year to two years.257 The Trades Union Congress estimated that 2.7 million employees would be excluded from bringing claims as a result.258 The UK, by reducing the scope of protection, chose to disregard the views of the ILO Tripartite Committee and the ECSR. Indeed, the UK government may have considered that it could act with impunity by relying on the limitations in Article 30. Moreover, Nagy259 indicates that an employee affected by this change would have no recourse under EU law even if the facts of the case occurred before the end of the post-Brexit transition period.260 Nevertheless, the UK may have breached international law by weakening the protection of workers from unjust dismissal. As noted in C.II above, the duty of State Parties under Article 6 ICESCR, on the right to work, includes safeguarding the protection of workers against unfair dismissal. In its General Comment, the CESCR stressed the progressive realisation of the right and concluded that, if any ‘deliberately retrogressive steps are taken’, State Parties have the burden of proving that they have considered all alternatives in the context of the ICESCR as a whole and have used the maximum available resources.261 The third group excluded under the ILO Convention and the RESC are ‘workers engaged on a casual basis for a short period’.262 Guidance from the ECSR is somewhat ambiguous on this point. According to the ECSR, all workers who have signed an employment contract are entitled to protection in the event of dismissal.263 The language suggests that states have a margin of discretion to exclude many workers who do not have standard contracts of employment or formal ‘employee’ status. There is also scope for States to exclude workers whose terms of employment are governed by ‘special arrangements’ which provide protection at least equivalent to the protection afforded under the ILO Convention subject to consultation with the social partners.264 Finally, States may exclude workers where ‘special problems of a substantial nature’ arise in the light of the particular 255 ILO Governing Body document GB.300/20/6. 256 Case No 1210. 257 Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012, effective from 6 April 2012. 258 Based on the UK Labour Force Survey of 2011. See TUC press release, 2 April 2012: www.tuc.org.uk/equality-issues/ around-27-million-workers-increased-risk-losing-their-jobs-when-unfair-dismissal-law. 259 n 118, discussed in section D.I. 260 Before 1 January 2021. 261 n 83. 262 ILO Convention 158, Art 2(2)(c). Point 2(c) in the Appendix of the RESC. 263 Conclusions 2003, Statement of Interpretation on Art 24. See the ECSR Digest (n 92). 264 ILO Convention 158, Art 2(4).

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conditions of employment of the workers concerned ‘or the size and the nature’ of the employing undertaking’, subject to consultation with the social partners.265 As the Tripartite Committee decision concerning France demonstrates, the flexibility permitted by the latter does not allow for a general exclusion of small businesses from the Convention.266

V. Remedies Under Article 10 of ILO Convention 158 the remedies for unjust dismissal are reinstatement or the payment of adequate compensation, or such other relief as may be appropriate. According to the ECSR, commenting on the equivalent provision in Article 24(b) RESC, the worker who has been unjustly dismissed should be reimbursed for financial losses incurred between the date of dismissal and the decision of the appeal body.267 In addition, compensation should be of a ‘high enough level to dissuade the employer and make good the damage suffered by the employee’.268 Reinstatement reverses the dismissal by correcting the injustice. The worker returns to the same job, or a comparable job, with arrears of pay, as if there had been no dismissal.269 The option of reinstatement under the ILO Convention is heavily circumscribed. Only bodies that are empowered under national law to order or propose reinstatement are required to consider this option. Even if these bodies are empowered to order reinstatement, they may find that it is not ‘practicable’. These matters are left to ‘national law and practice’. Once again, the formulation of ‘national law and practice’ renders the reinstatement remedy nugatory except in those legal orders that have taken it seriously because they recognise the worker’s interest in job security.270 The recent reform of the law in Italy, limiting reinstatement, is indicative of a wider shift in Member States away from the concept of reversing the dismissal.271 Article 47 of the Charter reinforces the principle of effective remedies well known in EU labour law. The asymmetric power relationship between the employer and the worker requires strong and effective remedies for violations of fundamental social rights. In the context of EU non-discrimination law, the national court must impose a penalty such as to ‘guarantee real and effective judicial protection … it must also have a real deterrent effect on the employer’.272 In Egenberger,273 the CJEU observed that the ‘judicial protection’ derived for individuals from Article 21, on non-discrimination, and Article 47, required a national court, in a case within the scope of EU law, ‘to guarantee the full effectiveness of those articles by disapplying if need be any contrary provision of national law’.274 The principle of ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties is now standard in EU labour law directives.275 The worker who is deprived of their livelihood following a dismissal that they consider to be unjust is in the greatest need of procedural fairness and an effective remedy. Therefore, Principle 7 of the Social Pillar which links procedural fairness with a ‘right of redress’ in the case of unjustified dismissal, including ‘adequate compensation’, is a welcome





265 Ibid, Art

2(5). Governing Body document GB.300/20/6. 2003, Bulgaria, p 78. 268 ECSR Digest (n 92) p 154. 269 Collins (n 15) p 216. 270 Ibid, p 217. 271 Discussed in section C.V above. 272 Case 14/83 Von Colson [1984] ECR 1891 [23]. 273 Case C-414/16 Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV, EU:C:2018:257. 274 Ibid [83]. 275 For example, see Art 10(2) of Directive 2008/94/EC on temporary agency work [2008] OJ L327/9. 266 ILO

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development.276 However, as explained at 30.03 above, although Article 16 of the Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive is the first provision in an EU labour law directive to introduce a ‘right to redress’, it grants that right to workers ‘whose employment relationship has ended’ but does not refer specifically to those who have been found to be unjustly dismissed.277 There is also no requirement for ‘adequate compensation’ to be awarded. The Directive simply contains the standard formula, in Article 19, that penalties for infringements of the Directive ‘shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. It remains to be seen how the ‘right of redress’ will be interpreted in the context of the Directive in the light of the Social Pillar and Article 30. However, it appears that the ‘right to redress’ in the context of termination of employment is not intended to be a standard feature of EU labour law measures as it is not included in the Directive on Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers, issued on the same day.278

E. Evaluation 30.109 Article 30 on the right of workers to protection against unjustified dismissal has an enigmatic quality. The ‘fundamental principle of justification’ for dismissal is firmly established at the UN, the ILO and the Council of Europe. It is the most salient of fundamental social rights because, perhaps more directly than any comparable right in the Charter, it asserts the principle that labour is not a commodity or article of commerce.279 It has been invoked purposively by the ECtHR and yet there is a void at EU level. Neither the Commission, which has the imperative to act on a clear legal basis, nor the CJEU, which has a duty to interpret and apply Article 30 in the context of legislation where it is, at least incidentally, relevant, has been prepared to give it a broad meaning in EU law. By contrast, the freedom to conduct a business in Article 16 has been liberally applied by the CJEU to limit the scope of EU labour law. At best, as seen in AGET Iraklis, Article 30 requires the CJEU to carry out a balancing exercise between the managerial prerogative to run the business as they wish and the worker’s right to job security.280 It is a balance that has been skewed towards the commercial interests of the employer and, where internal market freedoms are engaged, measures to protect the interests of the worker have been regarded as a restriction that can only be justified if deemed proportionate to a legitimate aim. Until such time as the CJEU treats economic freedoms and social rights equally, Article 30 offers, at best, a defence against the most egregious exercise of managerial power. Perhaps the best explanation for the enigma of Article 30 is a dual identity crisis. The first 30.110 identity crisis is internal to Article 30 and the norms from which it is sourced. In seeking to balance such a multitude of interests—job security, the managerial prerogative, and the needs of society—it lacks a clear focus. Its limitations and derogations exclude millions of casual and short-term workers who are the most vulnerable to the risk of unjust dismissal. Member States have been unravelling decades of employment protection without giving Article 30 a second glance. The second identity crisis is within the EU. Is the EU serious about balancing the economic

276 n 7. 277 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union [2019] OJ L186/105. 278 Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU [2019] OJ L188/79. The Directive merely has an identical penalties provision in Art 13. 279 See P O’Higgins, ‘“Labour is not a Commodity”—an Irish Contribution to International Labour Law’ (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 225. 280 n 193, discussed at 30.89–30.96 above.

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and social dimensions of integration? There are some who regard job security as an anomaly and Article 30 as anachronistic and outmoded. An alternative view, given some venting in the Social Pillar, is that the economic crisis, and now COVID-19, has shone a light on the need for stronger international labour standards to be respected and promoted in EU law. Research has shown that dismantling the legal protection of workers facing termination of employment has been inefficient in terms of economic recovery and has undermined productivity.281 The ILO has identified the termination of employment instruments as among the most relevant of its norms at times of global economic crisis, when stability is needed to protect livelihoods, reconcile work and private life and maintain social peace.282 It is time for Article 30 to cease to be an enigma. What this chapter has shown is that there 30.111 is plenty of guidance in international law to give it greater clarity and meaning. There is now some policy impetus in the Social Pillar. Notwithstanding the absence of a core unjust dismissal measure at EU level, there are sufficient interconnections between Article 30 and existing norms across the breadth of EU social law to advance justice and fairness in the employment relationship.

281 S Cazes and A Nesperova, Flexicurity, a relevant approach in Central and Eastern Europe (Geneva, International Labour Office, 2007). 282 ILO Global Jobs Pact, 2009, para 14: www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_115076.pdf.



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Article 31 Article 31 Fair and Just Working Conditions 1. Every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity. 2. Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest ­periods and to an annual period of paid leave.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 31 1. Paragraph 1 of this Article is based on Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work. It also draws on Article 3 of the Social Charter and point 19 of the Community Charter on the rights of workers, and, as regards dignity at work, on Article 26 of the revised Social Charter. The expression ‘working conditions’ is to be understood in the sense of Article 156 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2. Paragraph 2 is based on Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, Article 2 of the European Social Charter and point 8 of the Community Charter on the rights of workers.

Select Bibliography A Bogg and M Freedland, ‘The Criminalization of Workplace Harassment and Abuse—An Overpersonalised Wrong?’ in A Bogg et al (eds), Criminality at Work (Oxford, OUP, 2020). A Flanders, ‘Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical Analysis’ (1968) 6 British Journal of Industrial Relations 1. A Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford, OUP, 2001). ——, ‘On the Job: Time for Agreement’ (1996) 12 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 195. ACL Davies, EU Labour Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012). AL Bogg, ‘Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v Buckland: Re-establishing Orthodoxy at the Expense of Coherence?’ (2010) 39 International Law Journal 408. ——, ‘Of holidays, work and humanisation: a missed opportunity?’ (2010) 5 European Current Law xi. ——, ‘Paid Annual Leave and the Long-Term Sick: Third Time Lucky for the United Kingdom?’ (2007) 36 International Law Journal 341. ——, ‘Taken for a Ride: Workers in the Gig Economy’ (2019) LQR 219. ——, ‘The right to paid annual leave in the Court of Justice: the eclipse of functionalism’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 892. ——, ‘The Regulation of Working Time in Europe’ in AL Bogg, C Costello and ACL Davies (eds), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016). B Bercusson, European Labour Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2009). B Hepple, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 30 International Law Journal 225. C Barnard, EU Employment Law, 4th edn (Oxford, OUP, 2012). C Kolloay-Lehosky, ‘Article 26: The Right to Dignity at Work’ in N Bruun et al (eds), The European Social Charter and the Employment Relation (Oxford, Hart, 2017). C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 655.

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D Ashiagbor, ‘Economic and Social Rights in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2004) European Human Rights Law Reports 62. D Chalmers, G Davies and G Monti, European Union Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2010). D Edward and R Lane, Edward and Lane on European Union Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013). D McCann, ‘Decent Working Hours as a Human Right: Intersections in the Regulation of Working Time’, in C Fenwick and T Novitz (eds), Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010). D Weil, The Fissured Workplace (Cambridge MA, Harvard Univeristy Press, 2017). E Anderson, ‘Recent Thinking about Sexual Harassment: A Review Essay’ (2006) 34 Philosophy and Public Affairs 284. EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2006). H Collins, KD Ewing and A McColgan, Labour Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2012). J Clarke, Redgrave’s Health and Safety, 9th edn (London, LexisNexis, 2016) 10–16. J Hunt, ‘Fair and Just Working Conditions’, in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003). J Kenner, EU Employment Law: From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003). ——, ‘Regulating Working Time—Beyond Subordination’ in S Weatherill (ed), Better Regulation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007). J Murray, Transnational Labour Regulation: The ILO and EC Compared (The Hague, Kluwer, 2001). J Waldron, Dignity, Rank and Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2012). K Lippel, ‘The Law of Workplace Bullying: An International Overview’ (2010) 32 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 1. KD Ewing and J Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 International Law Journal 2. Lord Goldsmith, ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ (2001) 38 Cambridge Modern Law Review 1201. M Barbera, ‘The Unsolved Conflict: Reshaping Family Work and Market Work in the EU Legal Order’, in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003). M Ford, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Working Time: Bauer, Kreuziger and Shimizu before the Grand Chamber’ (2019) 5 International Labor Rights Case Law 242. M Freedland and N Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (Oxford, OUP, 2011). N Kountouris, ‘The Concept of “Worker” in EU law: Fragmentation, Autonomy and Scope’ (2018) 47 Industrial Law Journal 192. P Craig, ‘The Charter, the ECJ and National Courts’, in D Ashiagbor, N Countouris and I Lianos (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge, CUP, 2012). S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford, OUP, 2008). T Khaitan, ‘Dignity as an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous Nor a Panacea’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. T Nowak, ‘The Turbulent Life of the Working Time Directive’ (2018) 25 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 118.

A.  Article 31 and the Scope of EU Law 31.01 As is evident from the Explanations—which must be taken into account for the interpretation of the Charter1—EU law is one of the most important sources for the rights in Article 31, and the



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effect of this is to mark out a very wide perimeter for the scope of the Article. The overarching concept of ‘working conditions’ has the same meaning as in Article 156 TFEU, under which the Commission shall encourage co-operation between Member States in a wide range of social policy areas related to work, unrestricted in their subject-matter. Article 31 specifies a right to working conditions that respect workers’ ‘safety’ and ‘health’. This draws its inspiration from Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (the ‘Framework Directive’), introduced under former Article  118a of the Treaty as a result of Single European Act 1986 (now Article  153 TFEU). In turn, this Framework Directive led to the enactment of a series of what Barnard has described as ‘daughter’ Directives, the first wave of which related to workplace health and safety, work equipment, ­personal protective equipment, manual handing, display screen equipment and carcinogens.2 The wording and objective of the Framework Directive, and its Treaty source, mean that the terms ‘health’ and ‘safety’ have a very broad scope in this context, in accordance with the judgment of the CJEU in United Kingdom v EU Council.3 In relation to ‘dignity’ under Article 31(1), ‘dignity’ has been used as a general interpretive value by the Court in different contexts.4 It is most readily engaged by provisions on harassment related to sex, race and other protected characteristics in the domain of EU anti-discrimination law as specified, for example, in Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive 2000/78/EC, Article 2(3) of the Race Directive 2000/43/EC and Article 2 of the Sex Directive 2006/52/EC. In relation to Article 31(2), these rights are based principally on the relevant provisions of, 31.02 originally, Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time. This was amended by Directive 2000/34/EC, which implemented extensions to encompass sectors that had been excluded from the original Directive, and that Directive as amended is now codified in Directive 2003/88/EC (the ‘Working Time Directive’).5 This has been complemented by various ‘sectoral’ Directives which mostly give legal effect to the results of social dialogue in the transport arena—for example, in respect of mobile workers in the air and rail transport sectors.6 From the outset, Article  31(2) played a prominent role as an interpretive guide to 31.03 Article 7 of the Working Time Directive, which posits a right to paid annual leave. In this respect, Article 31(2) was a pioneering Charter provision in that it had an early and bold impact on the interpretation of the right. It first appeared in Advocate General Tizzano’s Opinion in BECTU.7 Subsequently, it was frequently referred to in CJEU decisions in the sphere of annual leave, as reinforcing how important were the social rights engaged. The mantra was that the right to paid annual leave was a particularly important principle of EU social law which was also expressly laid down in Article 31(2) of the Charter.8 As Williams v British Airways demonstrates, Article 31(2)

2 C Barnard, EU Employment Law, 4th edn (Oxford, OUP, 2012) 523–32; J Clarke, Redgrave’s Health and Safety, 9th edn (London, LexisNexis, 2016) 10–16. 3 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v EU Council [1996] ECR I-5755. 4 See Case C-13/94 P v S [1996] ECR I-2143 [22]; Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v Oberburgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609 [34]. 5 See the first recital to Directive 2003/88/EC. 6 See ACL Davies, EU Labour Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012) 215 discussing Directive 2000/79/EC on mobile workers in civil aviation, and Directive 2005/47/EC on mobile workers in cross-border services in the railway sector. See too Directive 2014/112/EC on inland waterways transport; Directive 1999/63/EC and Directive 2009/13/EC on merchant shipping; Directive 2000/34/EC on sea-going fishing vessels. 7 Case C-173/99 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Ex p BECTU [2001] ECR I-488 [26]. 8 See, among many others, Case C-155/10 Williams and Others v British Airways plc [2011] ECR I-8409 [16] and the cases cited in n 102.



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is equally relevant as an interpretative guide to the ‘sectoral’ Directives, such as mobile workers in civil aviation.9 The initial signs were, however, that it would not generate significant rights in itself. When in Dominguez AG Trstenjak expressed, at considerable length, the view that the right to paid annual leave in Article 31(2) was a fundamental right but lacked horizontal effect, the CJEU declined the opportunity to address the question and simply ignored the Charter in its judgment.10 That all changed with the ruling of the Grand Chamber in Bauer.11 In his Opinion AG Bot cited from the previous edition of this chapter, and concluded that the right to paid annual leave in Article 31(2) was a fundamental right, the effective protection of which required giving it horizontal effect. For its part the CJEU held that Article 31(2) of the Charter reflected an ‘essential principle of EU social law’, which was mandatory and unconditional in its nature and sufficient in itself to confer rights on workers within the field of EU law.12 Consequently, that Article could be relied upon directly by workers against employers, both public and private. The CJEU confirmed that ruling in a separate judgment of the Grand Chamber issued on the same day and using almost the same language, Max-Planck v Shimizu.13 The logic of Bauer and Shimizu should extend to other rights in Article 31(2), but this matter has not yet been considered by the CJEU.14 There have been a number of failed attempts to secure a legislated revision of the Working Time 31.04 Directive.15 After the Council and Parliament failed to reach agreement in 2009 on a proposed revision, in 2010 the Commission consulted with the social partners about a comprehensive review of the Directive, identifying the 48-hour limit and on-call time in particular as potential subjects of revision.16 This process broke down without agreement in 2011. Since then the Commission has published reports on the implementation of the Working Time Directive and an ‘interpretative communication’ intended to clarify its concepts.17 In the event that there are further legislative proposals for a revised Directive, whether under Article 153 TFEU or by means of social dialogue between management and labour under Article  155, the Commission, the Council and Parliament (and, ultimately, the Court if judicial review is sought) may be expected to scrutinise the legislation for its compatibility with Article 31 of the Charter. The Commission guidelines on impact assessment require assessing whether a proposal is consistent with the Charter.18 Giving further support to such scrutiny is Article 151 TFEU, which makes clear that

9 Williams (n 8) [18]. 10 Case C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre Informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique EU:C:2012:33 per AG Trstenjak [75]–[175]; cf. the Court [22]–[44]. 11 Case C-569/16 Stadt Wuppertal v Bauer and Case C-570/16 Willmeroth v Broßon EU:C:2018:871. For discussions, see M Ford, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Working Time: Bauer, Kreuziger and Shimizu before the Grand Chamber’ (2019) 5 International Labor Rights Case Law 242. 12 ibid [79]–[92]. 13 Case C-648/16 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Fördering de Wissenschaften eV v Tetsuji Shimizu ECLI:EU:C:2018:874. 14 On this, see AG Pitruzella in Case C-55/18 Federacíon de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras v Deutsche Bank ECLI:EU:C:2019:87 [94]–[97]. Oddly, the CJEU Grand Chamber did not address AG Pitruzella’s comments on the horizontal effect of Article 31, resorting instead to the conventional tools of the duty to interpret national law consistently with a Directive: see Federacíon de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras v Deutsche Bank ECLI:EU:C:2019:402 [68]–[72]. 15 Barnard (n 2) 558. For a full account of the history, see T Nowak, ‘The Turbulent Life of the Working Time Directive’ (2018) 25 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 118. 16 European Commission, Reviewing the Working Time Directive (first-phase consultation of the social partners at the European Union level under Article 154 of the TFEU) COM(2010) 106 final. 17 European Commission, Report on the implementation by Member States of Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time COM(2017) 254 final; European Commission, Interpretative Communication on Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (2017/C 165/01). 18 European Commission, Better regulation guidelines—impact assessment https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-makingprocess/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation-why-and-how/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en.

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‘fundamental social rights’ such as those in the 1961 European Social Charter (ESC) and the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSRW), both of which are referred to in the Explanations to Article 31, form the bedrock of social policy initiatives under Title X TFEU. This will be of particular significance as regards the various derogations contained in the current Working Time Directive, some of which are arguably incompatible with Article 31. Article  31 may have an important role as a defence to employers’ use of free movement 31.05 provisions under the TFEU. The facts in ITWF v Viking Line hardly bear repetition, but it is surely arguable that the right to fair and just working conditions of every worker as specified in Article 31 can be used to augment the weight of Article 28 of the Charter as a counterbalance to the employer’s use of free movement provisions in that case.19 The reference to ‘every’ worker in Article 31 is attuned to the particular context of Viking, where the solidarity action was directed against the exploitation of cheaper labour in Estonia. Since ‘every’ worker has a right to fair and just working conditions, including Estonian workers, solidarity action of the kind on display in Viking can be rationalised as a legitimate support for the values underpinning Article 31. The inclusion of ‘dignity’ in Article 31, and the obvious connections with Article 1 of the Charter, suggest that Article 31 is an especially weighty fundamental right in comparison compared with other labour rights in the Solidarity chapter. If Article 31 were to be invoked alongside Article 28 on a similar set of facts, one should expect this extra normative weight to affect the application of the proportionality test.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 31 with Other Provisions of the Charter Article  31(1) guarantees to every worker a right to working conditions that respect health, 31.06 safety and dignity. The various ‘working time’ rights in Article 31(2) should be understood as a partial specification of working conditions that respect the worker’s health, safety and dignity, and thus without prejudice to the generality of Article 31(1). Article 31 shares a vital common normative foundation with both Article  1 and Article  3 of the Charter. Article  1 states that ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’ Given its inviolable status in the Charter, human dignity has been described as a ‘fundamental value’ animating all of the other fundamental rights and freedoms.20 This is also reflected in its inclusion as the first of the fundamental values listed in the Preamble to the EU Charter. The specific reference to ‘dignity’ in Article  31 therefore points to an important explicit connection with Article  1.21 It follows that Article  31 should be regarded as a provision with very significant normative weight and importance. Indeed, one may regard Article 31 as the most fundamental of the labour rights in the EU Charter. Citing the preceding two sentences from this work, AG Tanchev endorsed such an approach in King v Sash Window, saying that Article 31(2) was a ‘specific manifestation of human dignity’.22

19 Case C-438/05 ITWF v Viking Line [2007] ECR I-2005. 20 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2006) 28. 21 The only other article that makes specific textual reference to ‘dignity’ is Art 25 on the rights of the elderly, which states that ‘the Union recognises and respects the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence’. 22 Case C-214/16 King v Sash Window Workshop EU:CL2017:439 [36].



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31.07

Article 3 of the EU Charter states that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity.’23 The right to working conditions that respect the worker’s ‘health’ and ‘safety’ is accordingly instrumental to Article 3’s concern to ensure respect for everyone’s ‘physical and mental integrity’. This connection is further reinforced by Article 3 ESC, one of the sources of Article 31 listed in the Explanations. The European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) has observed that the normative basis to Article 3 ESC is respect for the worker’s fundamental right to personal integrity,24 which corresponds in turn to a more specific right to physical and mental integrity at work.25 This reference to an abstract right to personal integrity may even extend beyond the broad ‘ergonomic’ reading of ‘safety’ and ‘health’ elaborated by the CJEU in United Kingdom v Council.26 This should also be read in conjunction with Article 35 of the Charter, which states that ‘a high level of health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the Union’s policies and activities’. In this way, Article  31 rests upon two fundamental normative pillars: the right to human dignity (Article 1) and the right to physical and mental integrity (Article 3). This confirms the basic and fundamental character of the protections set out in Article 31. 31.08 There are four further points of intersection between Article  31 and other EU Charter provisions. First, Article 5(2) prohibits ‘forced or compulsory labour’, and this has implications for the legitimate scope of opt-outs and derogations from Article  31 rights, especially where those derogations occur through individual agreements between workers and employers. In situations where individually ‘agreed’ derogations appear tainted by coercion or other forms of serious economic exploitation, it may be that Article 5(2) is engaged.27 Secondly, the rights to maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave should be construed with reference to the need for reconciliation of work and life outside (whether family, civic, religious, cultural or simply idle leisure). These concerns are already encompassed by the broad concepts of ‘health’, ‘safety’ and ‘dignity’ used in Article 31(1). For this reason, Article 33 is relevant to the interpretation of Article 31, especially its recognition that ‘the family shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection’ and the need ‘to reconcile family and professional life’ through forms of parenting leave.28 Patterns of unpredictable or excessive working can be highly disruptive for the family, and the requirement of ‘social protection’ of the family under Article 33(1) provides an interpretive reference point for Article 31. Article 23 is also relevant in its requirement that ‘equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay’, otherwise there is a risk that reconciliation agendas will be discriminatory in their gender impact.29 Given the particular labour market difficulties faced by older workers and workers with disabilities, Article  31 should also be interpreted by

23 In turn, there are obvious connections between the ‘right to life’ in Art 2 and the ‘right to respect for his or her ­physical and mental integrity’ in Art 3. 24 Statement of Interpretation on Art 3, 31 May 1969. 25 Conclusions XIV-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3, p 36. 26 United Kingdom v Council (n 3). 27 For an interesting analysis of ILO working time norms deploying this intersection, see D McCann, ‘Decent Working Hours as a Human Right: Intersections in the Regulation of Working Time’ in C Fenwick and T Novitz (eds), Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 509, 517–21. 28 In turn, Art 31 should be read alongside Art 7 which guarantees that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications’. 29 See M Barbera, ‘The Unsolved Conflict: Reshaping Family Work and Market Work in the EU Legal Order’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 139.

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reference to Article 25 (on the rights of the elderly) and Article 26 (on the integration of persons with disabilities). The accommodation of religious commitments in the implementation of normative regimes for working time should be sensitive to Article 22’s injunction that ‘the Union shall respect’ cultural and religious diversity.30 This is bolstered by Article  10’s protection of everyone’s ‘right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’. Thirdly, Article  32 requires that ‘young people admitted to work must have working 31.09 conditions appropriate to their age and be protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development’. The terms ‘health’ and ‘safety’ under Articles 31 and 32 should, as far as possible, be interpreted consistently. Finally, there is a link between Article 31 and Article 21 of the Charter, prohibiting ‘any discrimination’. According to the Explanations, ‘dignity’ in Article 31 draws upon Article 26 of the revised European Social Charter of 1996 (RESC). This provision of the RESC refers to the wrong of harassment in relation to work, which expressly includes sexual harassment but also extends to any form of ‘recurrent reprehensible or distinctly negative and offensive actions directed against individual workers in the workplace or in relation to work’. The reference to ‘dignity’ in Article 31 must, therefore, be read against the background of the non-discrimination provision in Article 21 which prohibits discrimination on an extensive (non-exhaustive) list of prohibited grounds which includes ‘social origin’, ‘genetic features’ and ‘property’ in addition to more traditional grounds such as race and sex. Further, sexual harassment under Article 31 must be construed by reference to the requirement in Article 23 that ‘equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay’. This is without prejudice to the very expansive concept of harassment deployed in Article 26 RESC, which sets itself against all ‘recurrent reprehensible or distinctly negative and offensive actions’, even where that treatment is not connected to a suspect discriminatory ground. This would seem to extend to any form of bullying in the working environment; hence it is a provision with a very broad reach.

C.  Sources of Article 31 Rights Article  31 draws inspiration from a range of sources, not limited to those expressly referred 31.10 to in the Explanations. The preamble to the Charter itself explains how the Charter ‘reaffirms’ rights which result from the constitutional traditions of Member States, their international obligations, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Social Charters and the case law from Strasbourg and Luxembourg. The Charter is thus based on a process of synergy, in which different international instruments and constitutional traditions combine in exploring the meaning and effect of fundamental social rights. Early in the history of the Charter, in BECTU AG Tizzano signalled such an approach in drawing attention to the various international instruments which informed the fundamental social right to paid annual leave.31 At that stage the CJEU was more restrained in its references.32 Seventeen years later, in Bauer and Shimizu the Grand Chamber held that the right to paid annual leave affirmed by Article  31(2) of the Charter was an essential principle of EU law, derived from instruments such as the Community

30 See the recitals to the original working time Directive 93/104/EC, referring to the need to take due account of the diversity of cultural, ethnic, religious and other factors with respect to rest breaks. 31 BECTU (n 7) [22]–[28]. 32 The CJEU only referred to the CCFSRW: ibid [39].



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Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSRW), the ESC, the RESC and ILO Convention C-132.33 While the CJEU has not so far drawn as extensively on international materials and the decisions of the relevant bodies as has the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), exemplified by the ‘integrated’ method of the ECtHR Grand Chamber in Demir,34 that may be in the process of change. The judgments of the Grand Chamber in Bauer and Shimizu open the way for applying a similar ‘integrated’ approach in relation to Article 31.

I.  Council of Europe Treaties 31.11 The ESC and RESC is of central importance as a source for Article 31, as acknowledged in the Explanations. In that light, the CJEU Grand Chamber has held that the right to paid annual leave in Article 31 reflects an essential principle of EU law, derived from various international instruments including the ESC (which is referred to in Article  151 TFEU) and the RESC.35 According to the Explanations, Article 31(1) draws normative inspiration from both Article 3 ESC and Article  26 RESC. Though there is no mandatory requirement to have regard to the decisions of the ECSR (as compared, for example, with the ECtHR, in line with Article  52(3) of the Charter) and to date the CJEU has not examined those decisions in relation to the rights which fall within the ambit of Article  31,36 we consider the relevant decisions of the ECSR should in practice be treated as of significant persuasive weight in formulating interpretations of Article 31.37 31.12 Article  3 ESC requires states ‘to issue safety and health regulations’ (Article  3(1) ESC), ‘to provide for the enforcement of such regulations by measures of supervision’ (Article 3(2) ESC), and ‘to consult, as appropriate, employers’ and workers’ organisations on measures intended to improve industrial safety and health’ (Article  3(3) ESC). The reformulated Article  3 under the RESC elevates ‘consultation with employers’ and workers’ organisations’ to an overarching obligation. In addition to the measures on issuing and supervision and enforcement of regulations, it requires states ‘to formulate, implement and periodically review a coherent national policy on occupational safety, occupational health and the working environment’ (Article 3(1) RESC) and ‘to promote the progressive development of occupational health services for all workers with essentially preventive and advisory functions’ (Article  3(4) RESC). A number of general propositions can be derived from the pronouncements of the ECSR. First, the Committee takes an extremely broad view of Article 3’s scope, given its concern with the worker’s fundamental right to physical and mental integrity at work, itself based on the fundamental human right to personal integrity. It applies to all sectors of the economy.38 It applies to all workers, including the

33 Bauer (n 11) [80]–[86]; Shimizu (n 13) [69]–[74]. See, similarly, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in Cases C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, European Commission v Francisco Carreras Sequeros and Others and Council of the European Union v Francisco Carreras Sequeros and Others ECLI:EU:C:2020:676, which drew on the Directive, the CCFSRW and the ESC [114]–[117]. 34 Demir v Turkey [2009] IRLR 766. See K Ewing and J Hendy ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal 2. 35 See, for example, Bauer (n 11) [81]; Shimizu (n 13) [70]. 36 This may be due to advocates failing to draw attention to the decisions (cf. the judgment of the EFTA court in E-5/15 M’bye v Stiftelsen Fossumkollectivet [2016] IRLR 227, in which the appellants referred to decisions of the ECSR on weekly limits to working time [25]). 37 For an engagement with the question of the ECSR’s standing in respect of the EU Charter, see B Hepple, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 225, 226. See also D Ashiagbor, ‘Economic and Social Rights in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2004) European Human Rights Law Reports 62, 65. 38 Conclusions II, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3, p 12.

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self-employed, and with a particular emphasis on those workers engaged in vulnerable atypical work such as ‘casual’ workers or fixed-term contract workers.39 Provisions that limit the scope of health and safety regulations to employers employing a minimum specified number of workers are also a breach of Article 3 ESC.40 Secondly, a broad interpretation of safety and health has been adopted by the ECSR which extends to the individual’s ‘right to physical and mental integrity at work.’41 Thirdly, a particular emphasis is placed upon the implementation of meaningful consultation mechanisms at all appropriate levels, including the enterprise level.42 Fourthly, the provision for effective supervision and enforcement of health and safety regulations by a suitably resourced inspectorate is regarded as having a ‘particular importance’ by the ECSR.43 Finally, the ECSR adopts an ‘integrated’ approach to ascertaining compliance under Article  3 ESC by drawing upon relevant EU and ILO standards (including the determinations of relevant committees) to specify more detailed technical reference standards in respect of particular occupational risks.44 Article 26 RESC guarantees a right of ‘all workers to protection of their dignity at work’ by 31.13 requiring states to undertake, in consultation with employers’ and workers’ organisations, to ‘promote awareness, information and prevention of ’ and ‘to take all appropriate measures to protect’ workers from two distinct dignitarian wrongs: (i) sexual harassment in the workplace or in relation to work; and (ii) ‘recurrent reprehensible or distinctly negative and offensive actions directed against individual workers in the workplace or in relation to work’ thereby encompassing other forms of harassment such as racial or sexual orientation harassment, even extending to ‘mobbing’ or bullying at work.45 This requires states to provide effective legal protection through access to an independent body to adjudicate upon complaints, appropriate procedural safeguards for complainants such as a reverse burden of proof, adequate remedies, and protection from victimisation for enforcing legal rights.46 Article 31(2) states that every worker has ‘the right to limitation of maximum working hours, 31.14 to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave’. The Explanation indicates that this provision is based upon Article 2 ESC, which guarantees the ‘right to just conditions of work’. Under the original ESC formula this required: (i) the setting of ‘reasonable daily and weekly working hours’ with the working week ‘progressively reduced’ as permitted by increases in productivity and ‘other relevant factors’; (ii) public holidays with pay; (iii) a minimum two weeks’ paid annual holiday; (iv) additional paid holidays or reduced working hours for workers engaged in prescribed ‘dangerous’ or ‘unhealthy’ occupations’; (v) ensuring that the worker’s weekly rest period corresponded with the tempo of the wider community by coinciding with a rest day recognised as such through custom or tradition. Article  2 RESC supplements this by specifying a minimum of four weeks’ paid annual holiday, by requiring states to ‘eliminate risks’ in ‘dangerous’ or ‘unhealthy’ occupations before resorting to compensatory enhanced paid holidays or reduced working hours, by ensuring written notice of ‘essential aspects’ of the contract or employment relationship within two months of commencing employment, and

39 Conclusions XIV-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3(1), pp 36–43. 40 Conclusions XIII-1, Greece, p 78. 41 Conclusions XIV-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3, p 36. 42 Conclusions 2003, Bulgaria, p 31; Conclusions 2005, Lithuania, p 306. 43 Conclusions I, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3, p 22. 44 Conclusions XIV-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3(1), pp 36–43. 45 See, generally, K Lippel, ‘The Law of Workplace Bullying: An International Overview’ (2010) 32 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 1. 46 European Committee of Social Rights, ‘Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee of Social Rights’ (2008) Art 26.



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by ensuring that workers performing night work benefit from special protective measures. It would seem that Article 2 ESC shares a common normative basis with Article 3 ESC in that both measures are concerned with protecting the health and safety of workers. It would also seem to follow from this that Article 2 ESC is similarly predicated on the worker’s right to bodily and mental integrity at work. 31.15 A number of general propositions can be derived from the pronouncements of the ECSR in respect of Article 2 ESC. First, it is important to construe the concept of ‘reasonable’ limits to daily and weekly working hours against the relevant Committee decisions. While no specifically quantified limits are set out in the text of Article  2(1) ESC, the ECSR has specified that a daily working day of 16 hours is too long to be reasonable,47 and that a total working week (including overtime) of 60 hours is also too long to be considered a ‘reasonable’ limit.48 A limit of 78 hours in a working week was described as ‘manifestly excessive’ by the ECSR.49 In all cases, the determination of what is reasonable will be shaped by an assessment of ‘relevant factors’ such as the nature of the work. For example, it might be argued that especially dangerous or unhealthy occupational activities would justify lower limits on daily and weekly working hours as ‘reasonable’. For those engaged in the provision of essential emergency services, the nature of the activity might justify higher limits. This would seem to favour flexible sectoral solutions to regulatory problems. Secondly, working time flexibility does not necessarily infringe the ESC though any flexibility 31.16 must operate within strict limits set by a ‘precise normative framework’.50 This requires, amongst other things, that adjustment of working time is not left solely to the discretion of either employer or employee; where collective agreements are used to adjust working time, those agreements must provide for a maximum limit for daily and weekly working hours; and collective agreements at enterprise level must contain extra safeguards to ensure that workers’ health and safety is protected.51 It is notable that these principles were expressed in a decision concerning ‘managerial’ employees, thereby underlining the wide personal scope of the legal principles under Article 2 ESC. Thirdly, the ECSR has adopted a strict protective approach to the provision guaranteeing paid annual holiday. Measures permitting workers to waive their entitlement to leave for a compensatory payment are regarded as a violation of Article 2 ESC.52 Further, workers are entitled to a period of two weeks’ uninterrupted paid annual leave during a year in which the leave is due.53 The fundamental nature of paid annual leave also requires states to facilitate the deferral of a period of holiday that is interrupted by illness or injury where this is necessary to guarantee the uninterrupted two weeks’ holiday.54 Finally, the special nature of night work means that it must be ‘humanised’ in the sense that there must be ‘continuous consultation’ with workers’ representatives on measures to ‘reconcile the needs of workers’ with the special demands and difficulties of night work.55 This must operate alongside regular medical examinations and provision for transfer to daytime work where possible.

47 Conclusions XIV-2, Norway, p 578. 48 Conclusions XIV-2, Netherlands, pp 535–36. 49 Confederation Francaise de l’Encadrement CFE-CGC v France Complaint No 9/2000 (Decision on the merits of 16 November 2001) 29–38. 50 Conclusions XIV-2, Netherlands, pp 535–36. 51 Conclusions XIV-2, Vol 1. 52 Conclusions I, Ireland, p 171. 53 Conclusions 2007, Statement of Interpretation on Art 2(3), p 11. 54 Conclusions XII-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 2(3), p 62. 55 Conclusions 2003, Romania, p 368.

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II.  Other Sources (a)  National Constitutional Laws The concept of ‘dignity’, which is central to Article 31(1), is an important element in the consti- 31.17 tutional orders of some Member States, for example Germany and Greece. Beyond the dignitary dimension of Article 31, however, the existence of a set of common constitutional traditions in Member States in this field of regulation is likely to be elusive. For example, Murray has noted of national constitutional provisions in the field of working time regulation that ‘the coverage of issues was patchy and there was no coherent body of working time principles common to all States’.56 She notes that limits on daily and weekly working time were ‘weakly represented’ in national constitutional rules but that ‘periods of rest were given a higher priority’.57 There is a similarly fragmented pattern in respect of health and safety regulation. Thus, Barnard notes that health and safety is regulated through constitutional provisions in some Member States (such as Greece, Portugal, Italy and Luxembourg), whereas in other Member States (such as Germany, France and the UK), regulation occurs primarily through statute.58 That the method of statutory regulation should be so widespread is perhaps not surprising, given some of the detailed complexity of health and safety regulation in respect of workplace hazards. This variety makes it unlikely that interpretive difficulties under Article 31 will be susceptible to resolution by invoking common constitutional traditions as a principal guide, simply because it will often be difficult to identify what those common traditions might be. Sometimes, however, constitutional traditions have been deployed in tandem with other sources to resolve interpretive difficulties under the Working Time Directive.59 For example, in Bauer AG Bot considered that the tendency of national courts to give direct effect to the ESC was relevant to the horizontal effect of Article 31, exemplifying the synergy between the different sources.60 This suggests that constitutional traditions can play a subsidiary role in interpreting Article 31 in support of other normative arguments. (b)  EU Law As the Explanation makes clear, undoubtedly the most important normative source for Article 31 31.18 is EU law. Article 31(1) is based upon the Framework Directive and Article 31(2) is based upon the original Working Time Directive, 93/104/EC. Both Directives were adopted under (then) Article 118a of the Treaty, now replaced by Article 153 TFEU. According to the Explanations, the definition of ‘working conditions’ in Article 31(1) is the same as in Article 159 TFEU. The background to the Framework Directive was the Commission’s third action programme 31.19 of (1988–1992), reinforced by the introduction soon afterwards of the CCFSRW.61 The Directive established a framework of general principles and duties in respect of health and safety in the working environment, while envisaging more specific duties to be included in subsequent

56 J Murray, Transnational Labour Regulation: The ILO and EC Compared (The Hague, Kluwer, 2001) 106. 57 ibid 106–107. McCann (n 27) takes the view that the constitutionalisation of such rights is especially prominent in Central and Eastern Europe (p 511). For further evidence as to the different means by which Member States have implemented the Working Time Directive, see n 17. 58 Barnard (n 2) 502. 59 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Joined Cases C-350/06 Gerhard Schultz-Hoff v Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund and C-520/06 Stringer and Others v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2009] ECR I-00179 [40]. 60 Bauer (n 11) [94]. 61 See Clarke (n 2) 11–12 and the European Commission, Commission Communication on Its Programme Concerning Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work, Com (87) 520 final.



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‘daughter’ directives.62 Its overarching objective was to ‘encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work’ through the elaboration of general principles for the prevention of occupational risks, and guiding principles for the discharge of those duties.63 The employer’s general duty is specified in Article  5 as a ‘duty to ensure the safety and health of workers in every aspect related to the work’: the duty to ‘ensure’ highlights the strength of the obligation in this context, as does its locus of operation in the formula ‘every aspect’. This duty is elaborated with greater specificity in Article  6 which sets out more particular responsibilities,64 a hierarchy of general principles of risk avoidance or prevention,65 and specific actions necessary for the proper discharge of the duty to ‘ensure’ health and safety of workers, including risk assessment.66 Again emphasising the width and depth of the Directive, the CJEU has held that every employer, regardless of its size, owes a duty under Article  6(3)(a) to evaluate all risks to workers’ health and safety and to possess a risk assessment in documentary form.67 This is complemented by a range of more specific employer duties set out in Articles 7–9, alongside a more circumscribed list of workers’ obligations in Article 13 of the Directive. There is also a striking emphasis on worker consultation and participation in Articles 11–12 of the Directive, reflecting the participative approach under Article  3 ESC and point 18 of the CCFSRW. Dialogue and balanced participation between workers and employers is one of the aims of the Directive, as the CJEU has held.68 Article  16 of the Framework Directive authorised the adoption of supplementing ‘daughter’ Directives within the sphere of areas listed in an Annex to the Directive (workplaces, work equipment, personal protective equipment, visual display units, handling of heavy loads, temporary or mobile work sites, and fisheries and agriculture), and many such Directives have been adopted.69 31.20 The aim of Directive 93/104/EC was to set down ‘minimum safety and health requirements for the organisation of working time’.70 To that end, the consolidated Working Time Directive specifies minimum rest periods in the form of daily rest (11 consecutive hours in a 24-hour period),71 rest breaks during working days longer than six hours (duration to be determined by collective agreements or, failing that, by national legislation),72 and weekly rest periods (an uninterrupted period of 24 hours in a seven-day period).73 The Directive also posits a maximum weekly average working time of 48 hours,74 and it establishes a right to paid annual leave of at least four weeks that may not be replaced by an allowance in lieu except on termination.75 The Directive contains various specific provisions on night work and shift work in Chapter 3. It also contains an elaborate series of derogations and specific procedural mechanisms for modifying and even setting content of basic labour standards in the Directive, specified in Chapter 5.

62 For an analysis of its quality as a ‘framework’ directive, see J Kenner, EU Employment Law: From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 100–104. 63 Art 1(1) and 1(2). 64 Art 6(1). 65 Art 6(2). 66 Art 6(3). 67 Case C-49/00 European Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-8575 [12]–[14]; Case C-5/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR 1-1305 [35]–[37]. 68 Case C-441/01 European Commission v Netherlands [2003] ECR I-5463 [39], [54]. 69 See Clarke (n 2) 12–13; Barnard (n 2) 523–32. 70 Art 1(1). 71 Art 3. 72 Art 4. 73 Art 5. 74 Art 6. 75 Art 7.

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The Directive sets a floor of rights and does not prevent Member States applying laws which are more favourable to workers: see Article 15. The Directive has been a fertile source of litigation, most particularly in respect of the right to paid annual leave in Article 7. (c)  The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989 The CCFSRW is a source of both the Working Time Directive and Article 31.76 The Explanation 31.21 refers to point 19 and point 8 of the CCFSRW as sources for Articles 31(1) and 31(2) respectively. Point 19 specifies that ‘every worker must enjoy satisfactory health and safety conditions in his working environment’, with measures aiming at further harmonisation that take particular account of ‘the need for the training, information, consultation and balanced participation of workers as regards the risks incurred and the steps taken to eliminate or reduce them’. This reference to ‘working environment’ emphasises that it is a broad conception of ‘safety’ and ‘health’ that is envisaged in the Charter formulation, rather than a narrower conception focused on industrial accidents and diseases. It also emphasises the vital importance of worker participation in the constitution, implementation and enforcement of the right to safe and healthy working conditions. Point 8 specifies that ‘every worker of the European Community shall have a right to a weekly 31.22 rest period and to annual paid leave’. Interestingly, this is located within the section dealing with ‘improvement of living and working conditions’ rather than ‘health protection and safety’, which highlights the fluidity of these categories. Its protections are also less extensive in scale and scope than the rights set out in the Working Time Directive. Less extensive in scale in that no minimum period of weekly rest or annual leave is specified, and less extensive in scope in that it does not encompass a right to limitation of maximum working hours or to daily rest periods. Nevertheless, the stipulation that ‘every’ worker has the right to a weekly rest period and to annual paid leave implies that, for Community Charter purposes, these particular enumerated rights should be regarded as fundamental rights of particular importance. (d)  ILO Norms The Explanation does not refer to ILO instruments as a source for Article 31. Nevertheless, it is 31.23 submitted that ILO instruments are relevant to Article 31(2) in virtue of Recital 6 to Directive 93/104/EC (which is referred to in the Explanation), repeated in Recital 6 to the current Working Time Directive, which specifies that ‘account should be taken of the principles of the International Labour Organisation with regard to the organisation of working time’.77 This is further reinforced by the practice of referring to relevant ILO material in respect of the Working Time Directive in some AGs’ Opinions. For example, in SIMAP AG Saggio had regard to the definition on hours of work in ILO Convention No 30,78 on Hours of Work, to decide what constituted working time under the Directive. AG Trstenjak made extensive use of ILO Convention No 132 concerning Annual Holidays with Pay to justify her interpretation of the Directive’s provisions concerning the interaction between sick leave and annual leave in Schultz-Hoff and Stringer.79 According to AG Trstenjak, consistency of interpretation ‘would appear to me essential





76 See

point (7) to the preamble to the original Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people at work. is no reference to ILO principles in the Preamble to Directive 89/391/EEC, by contrast. 78 Case C-303/98 SIMAP v Conselleria de Sanidad y Consumo de la Generalidad Valeciana [2000] ECR I-7963. 79 Above n 59 [66]–[68]. 77 There

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in view of the fact that the ILO has set the relevant international standards in the field of employment law’,80 with the ILO standards constituting a ‘floor of rights’ to the more extensive standards elaborated in the Directive. She did the same in Williams in relation to the level of pay for annual leave.81 Since then other AGs have continued the trend.82 Moreover, the CJEU in Schultz-Hoff, Schulte and Dicu made explicit reference to ILO Convention No 132 concerning Annual Holidays with Pay in its reasoning concerned with the entitlement to annual leave of workers absent due to sickness or parental leave.83 In this respect, there is a good deal of truth in Murray’s claim that the Directive ‘can be seen as an extension of international labour law, taking such regulation a step beyond the stage achieved by the ILO’.84 31.24 The following ILO instruments are relevant to the three types of right posited in Article 31(2). First, in respect of the right to maximum working hours: Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No 1); Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1930 (No 30); Forty-Hour Week Convention 1935 (No 47). Secondly, in respect of the right to daily and weekly rest periods:85 Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention 1921 (No 14); Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1957 (No 106). Finally, in respect of the right to paid annual leave: Holidays with Pay Convention 1936 (No 52); Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised) 1970 (No 132). (e)  UN Norms 31.25

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that everyone has the right to ‘just and favourable conditions of work’ (Article 23) and the right to ‘rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay’ (Article 24). To like effect, Article 7 of the UN Charter of 1966 on economic, social and cultural rights refers to rights to safe and healthy working conditions, to ‘rest, leisure and reasonable limitations of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays’ as elements of the right to just and favourable conditions of work. Both instruments were referred to by AG Tizzano in BECTU as part of the fundamental social rights which informed the background to the Charter and the Working Time Directive.86

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 31.26 It is difficult to overstate the importance of Article 31 in the general scheme of labour rights in the EU Charter. The inclusion of ‘dignity’ in the formulation, and thus the corresponding connection with Article 1 of the Charter, could be viewed as an ennobling of the right, entrenching

80 ibid, fn 41 of AG Trstenjak’s Opinion. See also fn 8 of AG Kokott’s Opinion in Case C-124/05 Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging v Staat der Nederlanden [2006] ECR I-3423. 81 Williams (n 8) per AG Trstenjak [50]. 82 For example, AG Tanchev in his Opinion in Sash Window (n 22) [38]. 83 Schultz-Hoff (n 59) [37]–[38]; Case C-214/10 KHS AG v Winfried Schulte [2011] ECR I-1175; Case C-12/17 Tribunalul Botoşani v Dicu EU:C:2018:799 [32]. See similarly the CJEU in Case C-214/16 King v Sash Window EU:C:2017:914 [3]; Shimizu (n 13) [70]. 84 Murray (n 56) 175. 85 As Murray notes, there is no instrument specifying a daily rest period (ibid 185). This was regarded as having been addressed by the limit on daily working hours (a default standard of eight hours). 86 BECTU (n 7) [23]. See similarly AG Tanchev in Sash Window (n 22) [37].

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its status as the most fundamental of the labour rights set down in the EU Charter. According to Bercusson, Article 31 of the EU Charter transforms the general objective of labour law as a whole into a subjective right of all workers, and elevates this subjective right (and the general objective) to the status of a fundamental social right … EU Member States are obliged by Article 31 to provide effective regulation within their national legal systems to protect the human dignity of workers across the whole field of conditions at work.87

Its presence is likely to be felt very significantly within the field of application of EU law across 31.27 two dimensions of influence: width and weight. First, the width of Article  31 is very significant, touching upon the whole of ‘working conditions’ insofar as these engage workers’ safety, health and dignity. This extensive reach is signalled by the reference to Article 31 in Recital (1) to Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work, where it is stated that the Directive is designed to ‘ensure full compliance with Article  31’. The aim of the Directive is described in Article 2 as ensuring ‘the protection of temporary agency workers and to improve the quality of temporary agency work’ through the application of a principle of equal treatment between temporary agency workers and a comparable directly recruited worker occupying the same job in respect of ‘basic working and employment conditions’. These conditions are defined as relating to ‘the duration of working time, overtime, breaks, rest periods, night work, holidays and public holidays; pay’.88 This goes beyond the specified matters in Article 31(2), in particular in the references to overtime, night work and pay. The reference to Article 31 in the recital to Directive 2008/104/EC supports the view that ‘safety’, ‘health’, ‘dignity’ and ‘working conditions’ should be understood in a very broad sense. Secondly, and as regards weight, Article 31 should be considered as a fundamental right of 31.28 very significant normative weight in the scheme of labour rights in the Charter. As Bercusson argued in the opening quotation, Article  31 speaks to the very purpose of labour law itself, namely to ensure fair and just working conditions, and it transfigures this overarching protective purpose into a subjective fundamental social right. This transfiguration, based in the injunction to respect the human dignity of all workers, marks out Article 31 as the grundnorm of the other labour rights in the Solidarity chapter. This is further supported by the fact that, unlike many other of the labour rights in the Solidarity chapter, Article 31 does not specify that the rights are ‘under the conditions provided for’ or ‘in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’.89 In the past some commentators argued that the effect of the reference to ‘national laws and practices’ in other Articles of the Charter is a form of normative dilution of the relevant standards.90 This argument is certainly not sustainable in relation to the right to annual leave, affirmed by Article 31(2) of the Charter, following the judgments in Bauer and Shimizu. The Grand Chamber held that Article  31 was unconditional and sufficient in itself to confer an effective right on workers. The logic of Bauer and Shimizu should apply to other elements of Article 31 beyond annual leave, which also have their source in international norms such as the ESC. AG Pitruzella thought as much in Obreras in relation to maximum working hours and

87 B Bercusson, European Labour Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2009) 380–81. 88 Art 3. 89 Art 52(6) provides that ‘full account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter’. This provision does not apply to Article 31 since there is no specification of ‘national laws and practices’ in the constitution of the rights. 90 See eg Arts 27 and 30 and Ashiagbor (n 37), especially the discussion of Art 30, ibid 68.



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daily and weekly rest periods.91 While the issue of horizontal effect was not addressed by the CJEU, which simply referred to the more conventional duty owed by domestic courts to interpret national law in a manner consistent with EU law, in its judgment the Grand Chamber referred to the limitations on working hours as fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and which must be interpreted in that light, citing Bauer.92 The absence of these limiting formulae means that Article 31 should be understood as a genuinely autonomous fundamental right, a standard against which Union laws and national laws and practices are measured rather than a standard capable of being diluted and weakened by those laws and practices. The point is underscored by AG Bot’s Opinion in Bauer in which, on his way to deciding that Article 31 did not require supplementary expression in EU or national law to have horizontal effect, he cited the preceding sentence from the last edition of this work.93 In Sash Window, AG Tanchev similarly considered that the ‘substantial normative weight’ of Article  31 drove the interpretation of the Working Time Directive because of the Article’s foundation in human dignity and international human rights’ instruments.94 Article 31 had already left a very significant imprint on EU social law even before the rulings 31.29 in Bauer and Shimizu. Specifically, its presence has been felt very strongly within the context of the right to paid annual leave in Article 7 of the Working Time Directive. It reached prominence at a very early stage in the legal life of the Charter. Thus, in the important case of BECTU the UK had specified a precondition of 13 weeks’ continuous employment as a qualifying threshold before workers could enjoy the right to paid annual leave.95 The trade union BECTU challenged that precondition as a faulty implementation of the Directive and sought an annulment of the relevant provision of national law. In an influential Opinion for use of the EU Charter as an interpretive tool, AG Tizzano 31.30 commenced his legal analysis of Article 7 of the Working Time Directive by establishing the status of the right to paid annual leave as a fundamental social right. Thus, he referred to its inclusion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ESC, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the CCFSRW as indicative of the right’s fundamental status.96 Nevertheless, he went on to observe that even more significant, it seems to me, is the fact that the right is now solemnly upheld in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union … I think therefore that, in proceedings concerned with the nature and scope of a fundamental right, the relevant statements of the Charter cannot be ignored, in particular, we cannot ignore its clear purpose of serving, where its provisions so allow, as a substantive point of reference … Accordingly, I consider that the Charter provides us with the most reliable and definitive confirmation of the fact that the right to paid annual leave constitutes a fundamental right.97

This fortified the AG’s conclusion that the precondition of 13 weeks’ continuous employment was an unlawful derogation from an inderogable fundamental social right. The Court for its part did not refer to the Charter, instead referring to the CCFSRW alone as an interpretive source, and

91 Federacíon de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras (n 14) [94]–[97] (AG’s Opinion). 92 Federacíon de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras (n 14) [30]–[32]; [68]–[71]. 93 Bauer (n 11) [83]. 94 Sash Window (n 22) [35]–[41], [52]–[55]. Cf. the more restrained approach of AG Saugmandsgaard ØE in Case C-306/16 Maio Marques da Rosa v Varzim Sol-Turismo EU:C:2017:486 [43]–[44], and the Second Chamber in the same case (EU:C:2017:844) [50]. 95 BECTU (n 7). 96 ibid [23]. 97 ibid [26]–[28].

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to the fact that the Directive did not make provision for derogations from the right to paid annual leave, to justify its conclusion that it was ‘a particularly important principle of Community social law from which there can be no derogations’.98 Nevertheless, BECTU established a pattern of reasoning that would become familiar in the paid annual leave cases, commencing with the highly abstract affirmation of its status as a fundamental social right to generate specific legal conclusions. This is a mode of reasoning that lends itself especially well to the position of Article 31 as a natural starting point in a chain of legal argumentation.99 Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, when the Charter attained the same 31.31 value as the Articles of the Treaty, this mode of reasoning became well established, if not very expansive in the judgments of the CJEU. In Williams and Others v British Airways plc, for example, AG Trstenjak observed that the fact that the right of every worker to paid annual leave is included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides the most reliable and definitive confirmation that it constitutes a fundamental right … on the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, that provision acquired the ­definitive status of primary law within the legal order of the European Union … This means that … legislative acts adopted by the EU institutions in this sphere must now be assessed by reference to that provision. The Member States are henceforth also bound by that provision in so far as they implement EU law.100

The CJEU in Williams itself made reference to the EU Charter stating that ‘the right to such an annual period of paid leave is, moreover, expressly laid down in Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which Article  6(1) EU recognises as having the same legal value as the Treaties.’101 This became the mantra of the CJEU in cases on paid annual leave, as the Charter eclipsed other normative sources in international law, even if it did not always figure in the detailed substantive reasoning of the Court.102 It did, however, set an overall normative tone that supported worker-protective reasoning in the case law. In recent years both AGs and the CJEU have greatly reinvigorated the effect of Article 31. The 31.32 process probably began with Sash Window, in which one of the issues was whether a worker, denied paid holiday in his contract, was required to take annual leave as a precondition for bringing a claim for unpaid leave under the Article 7 of the Directive. In his Opinion AG Tanchev drew heavily on Article 31 and its underpinning instruments in deciding that Article 7 of the Directive had ‘substantial normative value’, meaning that an employer owed a positive duty to provide workers with adequate facilities to exercise the right to annual leave.103 The CJEU took a different route.104 Though it repeated the mantra on Article 31, it relied principally on Article 47 of the Charter, on effective remedies, to decide that the worker did not have to take leave first.105

98 ibid [43]. 99 In this respect, it is interesting to note that national courts in the UK context have tended to deploy an interpretive approach that is decidedly non-purposive and more formalistic, construing specific statutory provisions in the working time context without locating the interpretive exercise within a wider understanding of fundamental social rights. For discussion, see AL Bogg, ‘Paid Annual Leave and the Long-Term Sick: Third Time Lucky for the United Kingdom?’ (2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 341. 100 Williams (n 8) [31]. 101 ibid [18]. 102 See eg Schulte (n 83) [31]; Case C-337/10 Georg Neidel v Stadt Frankfurt am Main EU:C:2012:263 [40]; Case C-78/11 Associacion Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribucion v Federacion de Asociaciones Sindicales EU: C: 2012: 372 [17]; Case C-178/15, Sobczyszyn v Szkola Podstawowa EU:C:2016:502 [20]. 103 Sash Window (n 22) [51]–[55]. 104 Sash Window (n 83). 105 ibid [31], [33], [41]–[47].



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More recently, however, AGs and the Court have given great prominence to Article 31, both as informing the substantive content to the rights to annual leave and as driving horizontal remedies. In Bauer AG Bot considered that Article 31(2) was a fundamental social right, mandatory and sufficient in itself to give rise to rights directly enforceable in domestic courts.106 An explicit factor in his Opinion was the need ‘to ensure that the recognition of fundamental social rights is not a ‘simple incantation’ (‘mere entreaty’).107 The CJEU extensively relied on the Charter in two respects. First, as regards the substantive right to annual leave, it held it was not lost on the death of an employer because that would not be in conformity with its recognition as a fundamental social right in Article  31(2) and the strict conditions on limitations of rights in Article 52.108 Second, when it came to the means of enforcing the right in the teeth of contrary national law, the CJEU determined that the right to annual leave was an ‘essential principle of EU social law’, derived from various international instruments, which Article  31 ‘reflects’ and ‘affirmed’.109 The upshot was that the Article was sufficient in itself to give rights which could be enforced in national courts, a result which, echoing AG Bot, was necessary to ensure effectiveness of the right.110 The same reasoning was repeated in Shimizu.111 It illustrates a process in which the great normative weight of the right, its sources in international instruments, and the need for effective remedies, all combine in a powerful synergy. 31.33 To date reliance on Article 31 of the EU Charter has been most evident in the paid annual leave context. In part, this is probably a reflection of the sheer volume of litigation concerning the regulatory complexities of that provision of the Directive. The presence of Article 31 has been less evident in other areas of working time regulation. Within the context of the individual right to a limitation of maximum working hours, which finds concrete expression in the Working Time Directive’s specification of a right to a maximum working week of 48 hours in Article 6, the CJEU did not refer to the EU Charter in Pfeiffer,112 in Stadt Halle113 or in decisions concerned with rest periods114 and the definition of working time.115 In the interests of a coherent interpretive approach, there is a need for greater consistency of interpretive practice in relation to all the working time rights listed in Article  31 and referred to in Working Time Directive. The signs are of a shift in this direction. In Obreras, which concerned weekly working time, daily rest and weekly rest, AG Pitruzella considered that the similarity of these rights to annual leave, their source in dignity and health and safety, and their inclusion in the same Article of the Charter meant they were horizontally effective, just as the CJEU held in relation to annual leave in Bauer and Shimizu.116 The CJEU also referred to Article  31, in affirming the fundamental nature of 106 Bauer (n 11) [53]–[95]. 107 ibid [95]. 108 ibid [57]–[63]. 109 ibid [80]–[85]. 110 ibid [84]–[92]. 111 Shimizu (n 13). 112 Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV [2004] ECR I-8835, although the Court did make reference to the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, ibid [91]. 113 Case C-243/09 Günter Fuß v Stadt Halle [2010] ECR I-9849. Nevertheless, the Court observed that ‘it should be noted that Article  6(b) of Directive 2003/88 constitutes a rule of EU social law of particular importance from which every worker must benefit, since it is a minimum requirement necessary to ensure protection of his safety and health’ (ibid [33]). 114 Case C-484/04 Commission v UK [2006] ECR I-7471. 115 See, for example, Case C-151/02 Landeshauptstadt Kiel v Jaeger [2003] ECR I-8389, though the Court refers to the Community Charter [47]. For discussion of this aspect of the case, using fundamental rights discourse to justify expansive interpretations of core concepts such as working time, see D Chalmers, G Davies and G Monti, European Union Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge, CUP, 2010) 249–50. 116 Obreras (n 14) [94]–[97]; but, as noted above, this issue was not expressly addressed by the CJEU. Though cf. Maio Marques da Rosa n 94, above.

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the rights, though it did not address the issue of horizontal enforcement (perhaps because this was not necessary to the resolution of the case).117 In our view, the reasoning of AG Pitruzella is compelling on the horizontality point for all the specified rights in Art 31 (2). A final matter to be addressed is the vexed question of the distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ as applied to Article 31. Article 52(5) provides that

31.34

the provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality.

According to the Explanation, Article 52(5) ‘clarifies’ the distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ though there is little clarity to be seen on the face of Article 52(5). The Explanation assists in clarifying the juridical consequences of the characterisation of a provision as a ‘right’ or a ‘principle’. Specifically, rights (but not principles) can ‘give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions or Member States authorities’ and hence are directly effective, whereas principles may only be used to interpret or review the acts that implement those principles. Unfortunately, there is little clarification in either Article 52(5) or the accompanying Explanation as to how one characterises a specific provision as one or the other. The Explanation gives illustrative examples of those Charter provisions embodying a principle (Arts 25, 26 and 37), and those Charter provisions that are composite, consisting of elements of a right and of a principle (Arts 23, 33 and 34). Since Article 31 is not included in the illustrative list, the exercise of characterisation is necessarily speculative given the ambiguity of the distinction.118 According to some writers, a possible basis for the right/principle distinction is that ‘provisions 31.35 whose content is dependent upon their realisation by national or EU law would be considered to be principles’.119 For this reason, the inclusion of the formula ‘under the conditions provided for’ or ‘in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices’ could be viewed as highly indicative that the provision is a principle rather than a right. Significantly, Article 31 dispenses with that formula, which provides support for the argument that it is properly characterised as a right, not a principle. This would accord with the views of leading scholars such as Barnard and Craig, both of whom characterise Article 31 as a right.120 AG Trstenjak offered the view in Dominguez that Article 31 is to be regarded as a right in its entirety, and not a principle.121 She argued that this is incontrovertible in respect of Article 31(2), given its structure and constitution as a definitive fundamental right. However, she also rejected the suggestion that the abstractness of Article 31(1) could be indicative of its status as a principle, since constitutionalised fundamental rights are often framed in highly abstract terms.

117 Obreras (n 14) [30], [50], [56], [71]. 118 The suggestion that any socio-economic right is ipso facto a principle, once raised by Lord Goldsmith in ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ (2001) 38 Cambridge Modern Law Review 1201, 1212 is now untenable, since it is clear from the listed examples in the Explanation that some socio-economic rights are (at least partially) composed of rights, such as the provisions dealing with ‘family and professional life’ (Art 33) and ‘social security and social assistance’ (Art 34). Furthermore, nomenclature is not determinative since some of the principles listed in the Explanation are described as ‘rights’ in the relevant Charter provision, such as Articles 25 and 26 dealing with the ‘rights’ of the elderly and persons with disabilities. 119 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 115) 240; ibid 1213. 120 P Craig, ‘The Charter, the ECJ and National Courts’ in D Ashiagbor, N Countouris and I Lianos (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge, CUP, 2012) 78, 98; Barnard (n 2) 29. 121 Dominguez (n 10).



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31.36

The cases on Article 31(2) have now confirmed that the right to paid annual leave is a right. AG Tanchev emphasised in Sash Window that the Charter and other international instruments all use the language of ‘entitlement’.122 In Bauer, AG Bot distinguished Article 27 of the Charter, which the CJEU in Association de Médiation Sociale held could not be relied on directly by individuals, owing to the absence of a reference to ‘cases and … the conditions provided by Union law and national laws and practice’ in Article 31.123 For him it was ‘indisputable’ that Article 31 conferred a right which, based on its wording, was mandatory and sufficient to be directly enforceable.124 The judgment of the Grand Chamber repeatedly referred to Article 31(2) as enshrining a ‘right’ to annual leave.125 The same conclusion should apply to the other elements in Article 31(2), which are also referred to as ‘rights’ and are treated as such in the other international instruments. But the high degree of generality and open-texture in some of Article 31(1)’s core concepts—‘safety’, ‘health’ and ‘dignity’—may mean it is less amenable to ‘individual legal enforcement’ when compared with Article 31(2). 31.37 What is not clear is whether Article  31 embodies rights and reflects a general principle of EU social law which is independently directly enforceable by individuals in accordance with the line of authorities beginning with Mangold.126 AG Trstenjak thought not in Dominguez;127 AG Tanchev avoided the issue in Sash Window.128 Though the CJEU has never directly addressed the point, the language and logic of Bauer strongly suggests the entitlement to annual leave is such a general principle of EU law. For the CJEU repeatedly referred to the right to annual leave as an ‘essential principle of EU social law’, derived from other international instruments to which Member States were signatories.129 Article  31 thus mirrored a general principle of EU social law that was already in existence as a fundamental social right, recognised in a multiplicity of European and international sources. Moreover, in holding that the right was directly enforceable by individuals, the Grand Chamber in both Bauer and Shimizu referred to Engenberger ‘by analogy’, a case on discrimination relying on the Mangold line of authorities as well as Article 21.130 The same should apply to the other provisions in Article 31(2) even if the position is more doubtful in relation to Article 31(1). 31.38 The distinction between rights and principles is relevant to Article  1(2) of the Protocol No. 30 to the EU Charter, drawn up in order to cajole the UK and Poland into signing the Lisbon Treaty. This provides that ‘nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.’ It is doubtful that this ‘glutinous’ provision will have much, if any, effect.131 First, to the extent that Article  31 of the Charter reflects and affirms existing and horizontally effective general principles of EU law—which we consider it does in light of Bauer and Shimizu—Article 1(2) of the Protocol is side-stepped. Second, since Article 31(1) and Article 31(2) draw upon EU law very heavily—specifically Directive 89/391/EEC and Directive 93/104/EC respectively—such rights have been provided for by national law in the UK in the

122 Sash Window (n 22) [39]–[40]. 123 Association de Médiation Sociale v Union Locale des Syndicats CGT ECLI:EU:C:2014:2 [67]–[75]. 124 Bauer (n 11), AG Bot, [71], [80]–[95]. 125 Bauer (n 11) per CJEU at eg [54], [58], [85]. 126 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm EU:C:2005:709. 127 Dominguez (n 10). See too AG Mengozzi in Case C-316/13 Fenoll v Centre d’Aide par le Travail EU:C:20:2015:200 [59]. 128 Sash Window (n 22) 58. 129 Bauer (n 11) [80]–[85]. See similarly Shimizu (n 13) [69]–[79]. 130 Bauer (n 11) [85]; Shimizu (n 13) [74]; Case C-414/16 Engenberger v Evangelishes Werk für Diakonie EU:C:2018:257. 131 D Edward and R Lane, Edward and Lane on European Union Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013) [6.118].

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form of national implementing measures.132 Third, the CJEU could always use Article 47 of the Charter, which is not in Title IV, to achieve the same horizontal effect as Article 31, just as it did in Sash Window when UK law was in issue.133 In this respect, it is notable that other cases with an enforcement dimension, but not involving a UK reference, have relied on Article 31 directly in support of a principle of effective enforcement.134 Finally, since Article 31 does not refer to ‘national laws and practices’ in its formulation, Article 2 of the Protocol has no relevance to the interpretation or application of Article 31.135

II.  Scope of Application The fundamental issue of scope for Article 31, as for all labour rights, is the personal scope of 31.39 the right: is it a right for all economically active persons including the genuinely self-employed? Is it a right for the ‘dependent self-employed’ who exist in a state of economic dependence on a limited set of purchasers of their labour power?136 Alternatively, it may be confined to workers who are in a subordinate relationship with an employer, or an even narrower subset of personal work contracts such as, for example, the UK concept of ‘employee’. There are a number of different approaches to personal scope under the ‘Solidarity’ chapter. The broadest conception can be seen in Articles 29, 33 and 35 where the relevant right is guaranteed to ‘everyone’. This would include the genuinely self-employed because this formulation seems to envisage a right of universal scope. By contrast, the narrowest conception can be seen in Articles 27 and 28, where the rights are conferred simply on ‘workers’. This lacks the universality of ‘everyone’ in that the rightholder must be engaged in a subordinate relationship for the provision of work in exchange for remuneration, and would seem to push the genuinely self-employed beyond its scope. An intermediate formulation can be seen in Articles 31 and 32, which guarantee rights for ‘every worker’. This appears to be broader than the simple reference to ‘workers’ in Articles 27 and 28, in that the addition of ‘every’ places the accent on the widest coverage possible within the limits set by the concept of ‘worker’. Another permutation is whether the definition of worker is conditioned by a reference to ‘national laws and practices’, where the national legal system could have a limiting effect on the personal scope of the right.137 Four considerations indicate a wide personal scope to Article 31. First, the rights to which it 31.40 refers are fundamental rights, as we have argued above, linked to the concept of ‘dignity’. The second factor is the language of the provision. ‘Every worker’ is not defined in accordance with ‘national laws and practices’, meaning it should be defined autonomously as a matter of EU law, just as applies to the similar concept of ‘worker’ in the Working Time Directive, also not shackled to national law.138 This opens the way to a broader conception than the ‘worker’ in Article 27, which is qualified by the phrase ‘under the conditions provided for by … national laws

132 On this, see AG Tanchev in Sash Window (n 22) [60]. 133 Sash Window (n 83). 134 Obreras (n 14). 135 This provides that ‘To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it shall only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that it contains are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of the United Kingdom.’ Nor is Article 1(1) relevant: see Case C-411/10 and Case C-493/10 NS and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department EU:C:2011:865. 136 See Barnard (n 2) 147, discussing the Commission’s Modernising Labour Law Green Paper, COM (2006) 708 final, 11. 137 For discussion of this problem in relation to the effective implementation of social policy directives, see Davies (n 6) 176–77. 138 Case C-428/09 Union Syndicale Solidaires Isère v Premier Ministre and Others [2010] ECR I-9961 [27].



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and practices’. In addition, the term ‘every worker’ implies a strong purposive approach to contractual characterisation so that any doubts about the individual’s employment status are resolved in favour of a determination that he or she is a worker. This broad conception of the personal scope of Article  31 accords with the approach of AG Bot in Kreuziger139 and finds support in Freedland and Kountouris’ work.140 In that light, those work relations described by Barnard as ‘dependent self-employed’ should fall within the concept of ‘every worker’, so including individuals engaged in predominantly personal work who are dependent upon a sole or limited set of purchasers of their labour as their principal source of income. 31.41 Third, a broad conception to the personal scope of Article 31 is supported by the jurisprudence concerning the term ‘worker’ in the Working Time Directive which, the CJEU held in Fenoll, bears the same meaning as ‘every worker’ in Article 31(2) in order to ensure a uniform protection of working time rights.141 According to the Court, the definition of ‘worker’ in the Directive has an autonomous meaning specific to EU law and is defined in accordance with objective criteria. The ‘essential feature’ of an employment relationship, however, is that ‘for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration’; only small-scale activities which are ‘purely marginal and ancillary’ fall outside the term.142 The approach of the CJEU to specific application of the concept shows its breadth. In Fennoll, a disabled person did various work activities at a work rehabilitation centre to facilitate his personal development and social integration, for which he was paid a small guaranteed income (less than the French national minimum wage and substantially guaranteed by the state). Noting that neither the source of the funds nor the level of productivity was relevant and indicating that the activities of Mr Fennoll did not seem to be ‘purely marginal and ancillary’, the CJEU gave a strong steer to the national courts that he was a ‘worker’.143 In Isère the CJEU similarly articulated the view that individuals employed to carry out seasonal and casual activities under an ‘educational commitment contract’ which specified a ceiling of 80 working days per year were within the personal scope of the Directive.144 These cases reflect the early approach in BECTU, holding that ‘Directive 93/104 draws no distinction between workers employed under a contract of indefinite duration and those employed under a fixed-term contract’.145 In B v Yodel Delivery Network Limited, the limitations of the autonomous EU definition based on control and subordination were exposed in a ‘Gig work’ case.146 The parcel courier had a wide latitude

139 Case C-619/16 Kreuziger v Land Berlin EU:C:2018:339 [24]. 140 M Freedland and N Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (Oxford, OUP, 2011) 395. See too N Kountouris, ‘The Concept of “Worker” in EU law: Fragmentation, Autonomy and Scope’ (2018) 47 Industrial Law Journal 192. 141 Case C-316/13 Fennoll v Centre D’Aide par le Travail “La Jouvene” EU:C:2015:200 [26]. See also Case C-658/18 UX v Governo della Repubblica italiana [89]. 142 ibid [24]–[27]; Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121; Case C-256/01 Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College [2004] ECR I-873. 143 Fennoll (n 141) [32]–[43]. The CJEU distinguished Case C-344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Jusititie [1989] ECR 1621, holding that a person engaged in drug rehabilitation was not a ‘worker’ for the purpose of free movement (and see AG Mengozzi [35]–[44]). 144 Isère (n 138). 145 BECTU (n 7) [46]. 146 Case C-692/19 B v Yodel Delivery Network Limited. The CJEU issued a ‘reasoned order’ in this case, under Article 99 of its Rules of Procedure, on the basis that the legal answer ‘may be clearly deduced from existing case-law or where the answer to the question referred admits of no reasonable doubt’. This was a surprising step, not least because the intersections between personal service, mutuality of obligation, and subordination, seem to raise very challenging legal problems, particularly in Gig work contexts. The brevity of the reasoning might also explain why Article 31(2) was not examined in the judgment.

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to employ ‘substitutes’ to undertake deliveries (known as a ‘substitution clause’), he was free to undertake work for direct competitors of Yodel Delivery, and he was free to refuse offers of work and to specify limitations on the number of deliveries he was willing to undertake. According to the Court, these factors militated against an objective determination that the delivery driver was working under the direction of Yodel: ‘more leeway in terms of choice of the type of work and tasks to be executed, of the manner in which that work or those tasks are to be performed, and of the time and place of work, and more freedom in the recruitment of his own staff are the features which are typically associated with the functions of an independent service provider.’147 Since the courier’s independence was not ‘notional’ and there appeared to be no relationship of subordination with Yodel, the CJEU concluded that the work arrangement was outside the scope of the autonomous EU definition. The CJEU did not refer to Article  31(2) in its brief reasoning. Yodel exposes the difficulties of a ‘subordination’ test in situations of casual work where there is no contractual stability between the parties.148 Article 31(2) would support a more inclusionary approach where there are objective markers of precariousness (for example, an absence of guaranteed work or pay), such as were present in Yodel. Where a subordination test has dysfunctional exclusionary effects on precarious workers, a wider approach might consider whether the courier’s work was ‘integral’ to the business of Yodel as an employing entity.149 This would restore the spirit of BECTU in the application of personal scope criteria to precarious work arrangements in the Gig economy, ensuring that the legal tests are commensurate with the fundamental nature of the rights being claimed. The Working Time Directive does not adopt the definition of ‘worker’ in the ‘Framework’ 31.42 Directive 89/391//EC, on health and safety, as the CJEU has pointed out.150 But the definition in Article  2 of the Framework Directive is also not linked to domestic law, it refers to an ‘employment relationship’, and that Directive has a broad scope,151 all supporting a similarly wide meaning to ‘every worker’ in Article 31(1) of the Charter. The English High Court considered the personal scope of Article 3 of the Framework Directive following a Judicial Review brought by the Independent Workers’ Union of Great Britain (IWGB).152 According to the IWGB, the UK had failed to implement the Framework Directive properly because national legislation restricted certain rights to ‘employees’ working under a ‘contract of employment’. While Chamberlain J. accepted that the Framework Directive set down a specific definition of ‘worker’, it did not follow that this legislative definition was narrower than the autonomous EU meaning of worker applied under the Working Time Directive. On the contrary, Article 3 should be interpreted broadly and purposively given the fundamental nature of these health and safety protections. Consequently, ‘worker’ in the Framework Directive included all work relations within the EU autonomous meaning of worker (although in line with the Article 3 definition, this would exclude ‘domestic servants’ and it would require that the employing entity in the employment relationship has ‘responsibility for the undertaking and/or establishment’). According to Chamberlain J., this broad purposive interpretation was supported by Article  31(1) given its reference to ‘every

147 Yodel (n 146) [32]. 148 For an example of this problem in UK law, in an Equality Act 2010 claim, see Windle v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] ICR 721. 149 This has obvious affinities with the approach to ‘limb (b)’ worker under UK law. See Bates van Winkelhof v Clyde & Co LLP [2014] UKSC 32, [2014] 1 WLR 2047; Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5. 150 Isère (n 138) [27]; Fenoll (n 141) [24]. 151 See eg Fenoll (n 141) [20]; SIMAP (n 78) [22]. 152 R (on the application of the IWGB) v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and the Health and Safety Executive [2020] EWHC 3050 (Admin).



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worker’. This is also supported by the wider approach to health and safety rights in Article 3 of the European Social Charter, referenced in the Explanation to Article 31(1). Article 3 extends to all workers, including the self-employed, with a particular emphasis on those workers engaged in precarious atypical work such as ‘casual’ workers or fixed-term contract workers. It followed that the restriction of certain statutory rights to ‘employees’ failed properly to implement the Framework Directive, and that it was necessary to adopt the wider domestic category of ‘limb (b) worker’ used in domestic law.153 31.43 The fourth factor supporting a wide scope to Article  31 are other international rights’ instruments. The decisions of the ESRC in respect of Article 3 of the ESC have emphasised its very broad personal scope, given its concern with the worker’s fundamental right to physical and mental integrity in the working environment. Article 3 of the ESC applies to all sectors of the economy,154 and it applies to all workers including the self-employed, and with a particular emphasis on those workers engaged in vulnerable atypical work such as ‘casual’ workers or fixedterm contract workers.155 Similarly, the ILO Conventions which are a source of Article 31, such as ILO Convention No.31, have a wide scope of application. Relevant here is ILO Recommendation No. 198 of 2006, on the employment relationship, the various language versions of which refer to concepts wider than an employment contract, focus on the facts of the working relationship and adopt a pro-inclusionary presumption where indicative factors of employment relationship are present.156 It is notable that this definition is used for certain fundamental rights under the ECHR, in particular the trade union rights under Article 11. We can see no reason why a similar approach should not obtain in relation to the fundamental rights under Article 31. Treating substitution clauses as conclusively negating worker status is incompatible with the approach under the ILO Recommendation. Personal work should operate merely as an indicative factor, coupled with a ‘legal presumption that an employment relationship exists where one or more relevant indicators is present’.157 We anticipate that this issue of personal status will be increasingly relevant in situations of disguised or uncertain employment status, especially in gig economy contexts. In this respect, Yodel is a disappointing decision and ought to be reconsidered in light of Article 31 and the ILO guidance on ‘employment relationship’. While it is not tenable to suggest that ‘every worker’ within the context of Article  31 includes the genuinely self-employed (otherwise it collapses into the formula ‘everyone’ used in other provisions in the Solidarity chapter), the ILO instruments support a maximalist reading of the concept of ‘every worker’ used in Article 31. The CJEU has also ensured that a narrow definition of ‘worker’ is not used to address wider regulatory difficulties with certain occupational activities and the implementation of working time rights. In Sindicatul Familia Constanta, the CJEU departed from the view of AG Wahl that foster parents were not workers.158 The foster parents were in a ‘hierarchical relationship’ and on that basis they were workers under the Directive. The CJEU nevertheless concluded that foster

153 See, for example, regulation 2 of the Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1833. 154 Conclusions II, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3, p 12. 155 Conclusions XIV-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3(1), pp 36–43. 156 The English version refers to an ‘employment relationship’; the French to ‘une relation de travail’; the Spanish to ‘una relación de trabajo’. See, for relevant criteria, para. 13 of the Recommendation. It has been applied by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to Article 11 of the Convention: see Sindicatul ‘Pastorul Cel Bun’ v Romania (Application No. 2330/09, 9 July 2013). 157 ILO Rec 11 (b). See further A Bogg, ‘Taken for a Ride: Workers in the Gig Economy’ (2019) LQR 219. 158 C-147/17 Sindicatul Familia Constanta, Ustinia Cvas and Others v Directia Generala de Asistenta Sociali si Protectia Copilului Constanta ECLI:EU:C:2018:926 [42].

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parents were within the scope of the derogations provided for in the Directive and Article 52(1) of the Charter, on account of the specific activities of foster parents as a ‘task in the public interest that forms part of the essential functions of the State.’159 Restricting the scope of worker should never be regarded as the functional equivalent of achieving the same ends as a derogation. It is more appropriate to adopt a wide personal scope in accordance with the inclusionary reach of Article 31, and then to consider issues of derogation transparently and in accordance with the stringent requirements of Article 52(1).

III.  Specific Provisions Article 31(1) specifies every worker’s right ‘to working conditions which respect his or her health, 31.44 safety and dignity’. In order to determine the content of the right each of the following elements needs to be elucidated: ‘safety’; ‘health’; ‘dignity’; and ‘working conditions’. Each of these elements will be addressed in turn. The most important source for Article 31(1) in respect of its ‘safety’ and ‘health’ dimension is 31.45 the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC. This Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 118a EEC (now Art 153 TFEU), which provided that ‘Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers, and shall set as their objective the harmonisation of conditions in this area, while maintaining the improvements made.’ The meaning and scope of Article 118a EEC was considered by the Court in United Kingdom v Council, where the UK sought an annulment of the Working Time Directive on the basis that the legal base of the Directive was defective.160 In what has now become a canonical proposition of EU social law, the Court rejected the UK’s challenge in the following terms: There is nothing in the wording of Article 118a to indicate that the concepts of ‘working environment’, ‘safety’ and ‘health’ as used in that provision should, in the absence of other indications, be interpreted restrictively, and not as embracing all factors, physical or otherwise, capable of affecting the health and safety of the worker in his working environment, including in particular certain aspects of the organization of working time. On the contrary, the words ‘especially in the working environment’ militate in favour of a broad interpretation of the powers which Article 118a confers upon the Council for the protection of the health and safety of workers. Moreover, such an interpretation of the words ‘safety’ and ‘health’ derives support in particular from the preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization to which all the Member States belong. Health is there defined as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being that does not consist only in the absence of illness or infirmity.161

Two arguments were deployed by the Court to justify a broad, dynamic and purposive 31.46 ­interpretation of ‘safety’ and ‘health’. First, the words ‘especially in the working environment’ justify a broad interpretation of health and safety. As Kenner has argued, the phrase ­‘working environment’ was inspired by a Danish ergonomic conception of health and safety which encompassed ‘the impact of economic, social, cultural and political factor affecting the worker and heightens the importance of safety at work. At the core of the analysis is an emphasis on the “physiological and psychological capabilities of the individual”. ’162 Secondly, an emphasis





159 ibid

[59]. Kingdom v Council (n 3). 161 ibid [15]. 162 Kenner, EU Employment Law (n 62) 96. 160 United

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on the whole physiological, psychological and social well-being of the worker in her working environment is supported by the World Health Organisation’s broad definition of health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’, an interpretive move by the Court that heightens the normative legitimacy of its approach. This embraces the traditional preoccupations of health and safety law, such as the avoidance of accidents and industrial diseases at work, but also extends to matters such as workplace stress, tackling harassment and bullying, the organisation of working time, and even the organisation of working tasks to avoid monotonous patterns of work.163 31.47 According to Davies, the interpretive approach of the Court in United Kingdom v Council provides an example of ‘constitutionalisation’ in that it propounds ‘a broad, dignitarian understanding of health and safety’.164 In her view, with which we agree, Article  31 should be understood as encapsulating a similar conception of health and safety to that articulated by the Court in United Kingdom v Council.165 However, a possible objection to this broad reading of Article  31 must first be addressed. As we have seen, the phrase ‘especially in the working environment’ had a particular and distinctive normative resonance in United Kingdom v Council, yet that phrase does not appear in Article  31. Its absence from Article  31 might therefore suggest a narrower approach to ‘safety’ and ‘health’ than would be the case for the concepts used in Article 118a EEC. This argument should be rejected for three reasons. First, the phrase ‘especially in the working environment’ should be regarded as implicit in Article 31 because of the sources referenced in the Explanations to Article 31—for example, Directive 89/391/EEC, itself adopted on the base of former Article 118a EEC. Furthermore, point 19 of the CCFSRW uses the similar phrase ‘health and safety conditions in his working environment’ and this is also identified as a source in the accompanying Explanation. Secondly, this broad reading is supported by the decisions of the ECSR in respect of another source referred to in the Explanations, Article 3 of the ESC. As we have seen, the ECSR has defended a broad interpretation of safety and health which extends to the individual’s right to physical and mental integrity at work,166 which has strong and striking parallels with the ergonomic conception of health and safety elaborated by the Court in United Kingdom v Council. Finally, the inclusion of ‘dignity’ in Article 31 means that we should expect a dynamic interaction between these core elements of the Article  31 right, such that ‘dignity’ reinforces the expansive reach of ‘safety’ and ‘health’ in Article 31. This would also fit with Davies’ characterisation of United Kingdom v Council as embodying a ‘dignitarian’ conception of health and safety.167 Thus stated, the principles of ‘safety’ and ‘health’ in Article 31 are broad but highly abstract. 31.48 Given the vital importance of the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC to Article  31(1), these highly abstract principles should be understood as mediated by a series of less abstract midlevel principles that are embodied in that Directive. Specifically, the general obligation in Article  6 of that Directive provides the general content of those mid-level principles, stating: ‘Within the context of his responsibilities, the employer shall take the measures necessary for the safety and health protection of workers, including prevention of occupational risks and provision of information and training, as well as provision of the necessary organisation and means.’ As Barnard’s account of the Framework Directive demonstrates, this general principle



163 Which

is an express duty in Art 6(2)(d) of the Framework Directive. (n 6) 201. 165 ibid 202. 166 Conclusions XIV-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3, p 36. 167 Davies (n 6) 201. 164 Davies

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is more specifically elaborated through a range of particular duties: duties of awareness and evaluation of risks; duties of planning and implementation; duties to train workers; duties to inform, consult and facilitate balanced participation of workers and their representatives; and duties to report.168 This is accompanied by specific duties of responsibility placed upon workers themselves.169 These mid-level principles are then given more specific concrete expression in the numerous Directives adopted pursuant to Article 16 of the Framework Directive, beginning with the’ six pack’ of Directives dealing with workplace health and safety, work equipment, personal protective equipment, manual handling, display screen equipment and carcinogens.170 The Explanation relates the concept of ‘dignity’ in Article  31(1) to Article  26 RESC. As we 31.49 have seen, this provision guarantees a right of ‘all workers to protection of their dignity at work’ by requiring states to undertake, in consultation with employers’ and workers’ organisations, to ‘promote awareness, information and prevention of ’ and ‘to take all appropriate measures to protect’ workers from two distinct dignitarian wrongs: (i) sexual harassment in the workplace or in relation to work; and (ii) ‘recurrent reprehensible or distinctly negative and offensive actions directed against individual workers in the workplace or in relation to work’, thereby encompassing other forms of harassment such as racial or sexual orientation harassment, ‘mobbing’, and bullying at work.171 We can understand this particular conception of dignity as targeting forms of treatment at work that are demeaning, insulting or degrading. Perhaps the most compelling rationalisation of what is captured by ‘dignity’ in Article 26, and thus by implication Article 31(1) of the EU Charter, is the idea of treating workers in ways that are expressive of disrespect to their personhood. This would encompass actions that constitute a serious violation of norms of civility in the workplace through the infliction of ‘dignitarian injuries’.172 A similar conceptualisation of dignity is elucidated and defended by Khaitan, who describes dignity as an ‘expressive norm’.173 A more difficult question is the extent to which ‘dignity’ extends beyond this narrower meaning. The right to working conditions that respect dignity is potentially very wide-ranging indeed: as a legal value dignity seems very prone to malleability and as such its multiplicity of guises in legal discourse can be somewhat bewildering.174 For example, Allan Flanders once famously argued that respect for human dignity was the most compelling justification for the practice of collective bargaining.175 Does it then follow that working conditions must be such as to respect rights to bargain collectively and to strike as an element in Article 31(1)? Does it also entail a right to job security? A right not to be discriminated against because of protected characteristics? Or a right to fair remuneration that is sufficient to support a dignified existence?

168 These are set out and categorised as such by Barnard (n 2) 516–22. 169 Art 13. 170 See, respectively, Directive 89/654/EEC, Directive 89/655/EC (now replaced by Directive 2009/104/EC), Directive 89/656/EC, Directive 90/269/EC, Directive 90/270/EC and Directive 90/394/EC (now replaced by Directive 2004/37). 171 The Explanatory Report to the RESC refers to the protection against ‘victimisation’ but this should capture bullying: see C Kolloay-Lehosky, ‘Article 26: The Right to Dignity at Work’ in N Bruun et al (eds), The European Social Charter and the Employment Relation (Oxford, Hart, 2017). See further Lippel (n 45) and Commission Recommendation 92/131/EEC on the protection of the dignity of men and women at work. 172 For discussion in the context of the personal employment contract, see AL Bogg, ‘Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v Buckland: Re-establishing Orthodoxy at the Expense of Coherence?’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal 408, 414–15. The concept of ‘dignitarian injury’ is explicated and defended in E Anderson, ‘Recent Thinking about Sexual Harassment: A Review Essay’ (2006) 34 Philosophy and Public Affairs 284, 292. 173 T Khaitan, ‘Dignity as an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous Nor a Panacea’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 174 For a comprehensive review of dignity in its manifold forms, see C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 655. 175 A Flanders, ‘Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical Analysis’ (1968) 6 British Journal of Industrial Relations 1.



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31.50

There is of course a danger that Article 31(1) becomes discredited because it is caricatured as a vessel containing the whole of labour law if dignity is over-expansive in its reach. For this reason, we should expect the concept of ‘dignity’ under Article 31 to be developed cautiously and incrementally by the CJEU.176 In principle, a wide range of abusive practices at work can offend dignity. For example, the most abusive forms of ‘zero hours’ contracting could be challenged as incompatible with respect for dignity, given the inability of workers to plan their lives on the basis of reasonable expectations of working time or income. Serious, unexpected cuts to financial remuneration can also be said to violate human dignity because they are incompatible with the ‘Rule of Law’ in working life.177 Supporting this wide view is Article 23(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which protects the right of ‘everyone’ to ‘just and favourable conditions of work’. Dignity is referred to in Article 23(3) in that ‘the right to just and favourable remuneration’ must ensure ‘for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity’. To date, however, the CJEU has declined to address questions asking whether wage cuts or low remuneration engage dignity in Article 31 on the basis that matters of pay exceed the competence of the EU and thus are incompatible with Article 51 of the Charter.178 This reticence is disappointing. The exclusion of ‘pay’ under Article 153(5) TFEU should be interpreted narrowly in light of the fundamental social objectives of that Article and nor does it exclude matters which have any sort of link with pay.179 There is much to be said for the view that ‘dignity’ can provide an independent means of challenging abusive working conditions, even where this is the result of low pay. 31.51 Supporting such a wide scope of application is, lastly, the term ‘working conditions’ in Article 31(1). The Explanation refers to Article 156 TFEU which provides that ‘the Commission shall encourage cooperation between Member States and facilitate the coordination of their action in all social policy fields under this Chapter’ in matters including ‘labour law and working conditions’. This is not in itself especially illuminating. The formulation ‘employment and working conditions, including dismissals, as well as pay’ is used in Article 13 of Directive 2006/54, on the equal treatment of men and women in employment, and the interpretation of that Article 13 should cast valuable light on Article 156 TFEU. As Barnard has observed of the case law on Article 13’s reference to ‘working conditions’, the Court has adopted a broad interpretation of its material scope.180 As well as explicitly including ‘pay’ and ‘dismissals’, the phrase ‘working conditions’ has been viewed by the Court as extending beyond those conditions set out in the contract of employment,181 and it has been treated as covering all conditions governing dismissal even including a voluntary redundancy scheme.182 The CJEU has similarly taken a wide view of ‘working conditions’ in Article  151 TFEU, which lays down the fundamental social objectives which, among others, Article 156 aims to achieve and to which it expressly refers.183 Working conditions should, therefore, bear the same meaning in both Article 151 and Article 156 TFEU. In Impact, the Grand Chamber pointed out that Article 151 expressly refers to the ESC which includes, in Article 4, a right to ‘fair remuneration sufficient for a decent standard of living for

176 See P v S (n 4) [22]; Omega (n 4) [34], where a paternalistic conception of dignity in line with the German constitutional conception is elucidated by the Court. 177 For this ‘rule of law’ view of human dignity, see Flanders (n 176). 178 See C-128/12 Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte v BPN ECLI:EU:C:2013:149 and C-264/12 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036.]. 179 See eg Case C-307/05 Del Cerro Alonso v Osakidetza [2007] ECR I-7101; Case C-268/06, Impact v Minister Agriculture [2008] ECR I-2438 [121]–[126]. 180 Barnard (n 2) 350. 181 Case C-116/94 Meyers v Adjudication Officer [1995] ECR I-2131. 182 Case 19/81 Burton v British Rail [1982] ECR 555. 183 Given effect by Directive 999/70/EC.

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themselves and their families’.184 While it is true that ‘a right to fair remuneration’ is ‘notably absent’ from Article 31,185 it does not follow that ‘pay’ should be regarded as excluded from the catalogue of ‘working conditions’ that must respect the worker’s dignity. Article  31(2) specifies three distinct rights: (i) a right to limitation of maximum working 31.52 hours; (ii) a right to daily and weekly rest periods; (iii) a right to an annual period of paid leave. Each of these rights will be analysed in turn. The right to a limitation of maximum working hours is well established in international law, 31.53 and specifically in the sources referred to in the Explanation. Although Article 31(2) does not specify the relevant time frame for setting ‘maximum working hours’, the relevant sources would seem to envisage this as a weekly limit. Article 2 ESC refers to the setting of ‘reasonable daily and weekly working hours’ with the working week ‘progressively reduced’ as permitted by increases in productivity and ‘other relevant factors’. While there are no specifically quantified limits set out in the text of Article 2(1) ESC,186 the ECSR has specified that a daily working day of 16 hours was too long to be reasonable,187 and that a total working week (including overtime) of 60 hours was also too long to be considered a ‘reasonable’ limit.188 A limit of 78 hours in a working week was described as ‘manifestly excessive’ by the ECSR.189 In all cases, the determination of what is reasonable will be shaped by an assessment of ‘relevant factors’ such as the nature of the work. This should allow adjustment of the content of a ‘reasonable’ limit to reflect such matters as whether the work is particularly dangerous or physically demanding or whether there is a continuing need for service provision such as in essential public services. The limitation of maximum working hours in the Working Time Directive adopts a different approach in specifying a universal and expressly quantified maximum limit of 48 hours per week. In light of that fixed limit, the mutual exclusivity of working time and rest under the Directive, and the absence of any intermediate category, the CJEU has held that the intensity of work is not relevant to what counts as ‘working time’ under the Directive.190 So, for example, every hour of time ‘on call’ will count towards the limit if it constitutes ‘working time’, even if the worker is at home and not working during that period.191 It is submitted that such an approach, based on the codification of the 48-hour limit, should not be transposed into the right under Article 31(2). The requirement that the maximum be ‘reasonable’ under Article 31(2), in line with the ECSR’s approach to Article 2(1) ESC, would allow the flexible setting of maxima to be calibrated by relevant factors such as the intensity of work in a particular industry. This would permit specific sectoral solutions to emerge in the process of formulating the normative content of the right under Article 31(2), rather than the rigidities of a simple universal standard for all workers.

184 Impact (n 180) [113]. 185 J Hunt, ‘Fair and Just Working Conditions’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 54. 186 ibid 51. 187 Conclusions XIV-2, Norway, p 578. 188 Conclusions XIV-2, Netherlands, pp 535–36. 189 Confederation Francaise de l’Encadrement CFE-CGC v France, Complaint No 9/2000 (Decision on the merits of 16 November 2001) 29–38. 190 Case C-14/04 Dellas v Premier Ministre [2005] ECR I-10253 [42]–[45] (and, for a recent example, see Case C-258/10 Grigore v Regia Naţionalăla a Pădurilor Romsilva EU:C:2011:122). Note the unsuccessful attempts of the Commission to introduce a new category of ‘inactive’ on-call time, with flexibility as to how it counted for working time: see AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Dellas [71]–[72] and The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council Amending Directive 2003/88 Concerning Certain Aspects of the Organisation of Working Time COM(2004) 607 final. 191 See, for example, Case C-518/15 Villes de Nivelles v Matzak ECLI:EU:C:2018:82. But the constraints on the worker during stand-by must ‘objectively and very significantly’; constrain his or her opportunities for stand-by time to constitute working time: see Case C-344/19 DJ v Radiotelevizija Slovenia ECLI:EU:C:2021:182 [54]; Case C-580/19 RJ v Stadt Offenbach am Main ECLI:EU:C:2021 [38].



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It is also important to emphasise two further points. First, Article  31(2) envisages a ‘maximum’ limit. Under Article 2 ESC the ECSR has determined that working time flexibility does not necessarily infringe the ESC though any flexibility must operate within strict limits set by a ‘precise normative framework’.192 This requires, amongst other things, that adjustment of working time must not be left solely to the discretion of workers, employers, or trade unions. It follows from this that the maximum must be quantified and specified in particular contexts: it cannot be left open-ended by collective agreements or contractual arrangements. Secondly, there must be limits on the reference period over which weekly working hours are calculated. The Working Time Directive specifies a default reference period of four months, though this can be extended to a period of six months or, exceptionally, up to a period of 12 months where this is justified by objective or technical reasons.193 It is submitted that the reference period under Article 31(2) should satisfy a requirement of reasonableness, with reasonableness informed by the parameters set by the ECSR under the European Social Charter framework and the time periods envisaged in the Working Time Directive. The most vital issue in relation to the right to maximum working hours is whether this right 31.55 can be derogated from by a relevant agreement. For all its clarity and universality, the 48-hour limit in the Working Time Directive may be effectively ‘drained’ of normative content through the provision of a mechanism for waiver of the right through individual agreement.194 This will be addressed in section IV. The right to daily and weekly rest periods finds some support in Article 2 ESC. In this respect 31.56 Article 2(5) requires states ‘to ensure a weekly rest period which shall, as far as possible, coincide with the day recognised by tradition or custom in the country or region concerned as a day of rest.’ This envisages weekly rest of 24 hours. It is quite bold in specifying as an objective that the setting of the weekly rest period be coordinated with the wider tempos of community life ‘as far as possible’.195 This provides a corrective to the increasing individualisation of working time and rest time, severed from the wider rhythms of community and social life.196 There is no explicit right to a daily rest period set out in Article 2 ESC. Rather, this is subsumed within the commitment to set reasonable daily working hours in Article 2(1) ESC. The Working Time Directive contains precise commitments to daily and weekly rest periods in Articles 3 and 5 respectively. Under Article 3 a worker is entitled to a daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours, while under Article 5 a worker is entitled to an uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours each week. The Working Time Directive also makes provision for rest breaks during the working day under Article 4, though the right to a rest break does not appear to be protected under Article 31(2) with its reference to daily and weekly rest periods. It is submitted that the rest periods protected under Article 31(2) should be construed as ‘reasonable’ rest periods, with the parameters of reasonableness determined by the more precise specifications particularly as set out in Articles 3 and 5 of the Working Time Directive. This would again allow some scope for sectoral flexibilities under Article 31(2) in the determination of normative content. Finally, Article  31(2) posits a right to an annual period of paid leave. By far the most 31.57 important source for this right is the extensive jurisprudence of the CJEU on Article 7 of the 192 Conclusions XIV-2, Netherlands, pp 535–36. 193 Art 19. 194 A Supiot, ‘On the Job: Time for Agreement’ (1996) 12 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 195. 195 Cf. the Working Time Directive, where the CJEU held that specifying Sunday as the day of rest in the original version of Article  5 was not rationally connected with health and safety and so annulled that provision: see United Kingdom v Council (n 3) [37]. 196 For discussion, see A Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford, OUP, 2001) 90.

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Working Time Directive. There has been a dynamic and productive engagement between Article 7 and Article 31(2) of the EU Charter, with the Charter giving significant extra force to the proposition that the right to paid annual leave is a fundamental social right of special importance in EU law, culminating in the judgments in Bauer and Shimizu.197 The right’s fundamental status as a social right has shaped the entire jurisprudence on Article 7. In turn, it follows from this symbiosis that the reasoning and specific legal conclusions of the CJEU on Article 7 are also reflected in the parameters of the right to a period of annual paid leave under Article 31(2). This interpretive synergy between Article 7 of the Working Time Directive and Article 31(2) means that the rights are so entwined in the CJEU’s legal reasoning that it is now difficult to discern where one begins and the other ends. The flow of normative influence goes in both directions. Sometimes the fundamental right under Article  31 has propelled a broad and purposive interpretation of the more specific provisions in the Working Time Directive. At other times judicially determined limits on the specific rights in that Directive may flow back into the parameters of the fundamental right under Article 31(2), evident in some of the case law on the interaction between parental leave and annual leave. There are four essential matters to be distinguished in respect of the substance of the right under Article  31(2): its duration; the requirement that the annual leave is ‘paid’; issues surrounding the timing of leave, such as when it may (and may not) be taken, and the length of time it is possible to accumulate leave entitlement across successive ‘leave years’; and whether the right to annual paid leave also encompasses a right to payment in lieu of leave on termination of the employment relationship. Each of these matters will be addressed in turn. First, though the duration of annual paid leave is not specified in Article 31(2), this should 31.58 be understood as a minimum of four weeks leave per year in line with Article 7 of the Directive. Where Member States make provision for periods of annual leave extending beyond the minimum four week period provided for by Article 7, the CJEU in TSN considered that Article 31(2) would not be applicable because Member States would not be implementing the Directive.198 The extra leave would be regulated purely as a matter of domestic law and would therefore beyond the scope of the Charter. Nor is there any breach of the fundamental right in Article 31 of the Charter where annual leave is reduced but not below the four-weeks minimum required by Article 7 of the Directive and the ESC.199 The CJEU has held that the principle of pro rata temporis applies in respect of part-time and short-time working in this context. Thus, in Heimann the works council agreed to a social plan whereby the employment contracts of dismissed workers were extended for a year in order to enable them to receive a financial allowance for the duration of ‘zero hours short-time working’.200 The CJEU held that this was analogous to part-time working 197 Bauer (n 11) and Shimizu (n 13). See similarly European Commission v Francisco Carreras Sequeros and Others (n 33). 198 Case C-609/17 TSN v Hyvinvointialn liitto ry ECLI:EU:C:2019:981. This approach was supported by AG Kokott in Joined Cases C-119/19 P and C-126/19 P, European Commission v Francisco Carreras Sequeros and Others and Council of the European Union v Francisco Carreras Sequeros and Others ECLI:EU:C:2020:229 where the Directive’s specification of four weeks’ leave was regarded as a necessary concrete determination for the right to annual leave in Article 31(2) (while recognizing that not every legal element of the Working Time Directive is necessarily incorporated into the rights in ­Article 31(2)). The CJEU Grand Chamber judgment was to the same effect. It held that a reduction in leave which still resulted in employees still having more than four weeks’ paid annual leave was not inconsistent with the fundamental right in the Charter: see European Commission v Francisco Carreras Sequeros and Others (n 33). [109]–[128]. 199 European Commission v Francisco Carreras Sequeros and Others, ibid. 200 Cases C-229/11 and C-230/11 Alexander Heimann and Konstantin Toltschin v Kaiser GmbH EU:C:2012:693. The CJEU referred to Case C-486/08 Zentralbetriebsrat der Landeskrankenhauser Tirols [2010] ECR I-3527 in the course of its decision, which addresses the particular position of part-time workers. The CJEU has also made it clear that the principle of pro rata temporis cannot be used to effectuate a retrospective reduction of annual leave entitlement, where that entitlement had been accrued during a period of full-term service but the worker had been transferred subsequently to part-time work: Case C-415/12 Bianca Brandes v Land Niedersachsen EU:C:2013:398.



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and it followed that the principle of pro rata temporis applied under Article  31(2) of the EU Charter and Article 7(1) of the Working Time Directive. The principle means that workers accrue annual leave based on the days or hours they are required to work201 and that workers who only work some weeks of the year under their contracts receive a reduced entitlement to leave.202 31.59 Secondly, there is a requirement that annual leave be ‘paid’. The function of payment for leave is to ensure that workers will in fact take the leave to which they are entitled, since the actual taking of leave is essential for their rest and recuperation from work. Two propositions follow from this. The first proposition is that payment for leave should occur contemporaneously with the taking of leave in order to ensure that economic pressures on workers to forgo their leave entitlement are reduced or eliminated. This was established in Robinson-Steele where a system of ‘rolled up’ holiday pay was regarded as incompatible with Article 7.203 ‘Rolled up’ payment consisted of a continuous addition to the worker’s hourly or weekly pay across the leave year, with workers responsible for managing the extra component of holiday pay to enable them to take leave. This approach protects the most vulnerable workers on low incomes from the economic pressure to forgo leave and work continuously, for example in situations where they had dissipated their income due to economic necessity. ILO Convention C-132 is more generous, and requires payment in advance of the holiday unless provided otherwise in an agreement, but the CJEU has not yet gone so far in relation to Article 7.204 The second proposition is that payment for leave should reflect ‘normal’ remuneration that 31.60 is ordinarily enjoyed by the worker while working. In Williams the question arose as to which payments supplementary to the ‘basic’ salary should be included in payment for annual leave.205 In this case, the pilots received two supplements to their fixed salary: one linked to time spent flying and the other to time spent away from base. According to the CJEU, all payments linked intrinsically to the performance of the tasks which the worker is required to carry out under his contract of employment and in respect of which a monetary amount is provided which is included in the calculation of the worker’s total remuneration, such as, in the case of airline pilots, the time spent flying, must necessarily be taken into account for the purposes of the amount to which the worker is entitled during his annual leave.206

This would also include elements of the salary relating to the individual’s ‘professional status as an employee’, but it would not include ‘ancillary costs’ such as money to compensate for the expenditure accrued during time spent away from base.207 It was for the national court to apply these tests to the particular set of payment arrangements. Some fairly obvious conclusions follow axiomatically from this. Formerly under UK law, commission payments and overtime payments were often excluded from the calculation of payment for leave, meaning that leave payment does not reflect ‘normal’ remuneration.208 The CJEU in Lock v British Gas confirmed that this was incompatible with the Directive.209 According to the Court, any reduction in remuneration caused by taking annual leave was liable to deter the worker from exercising

201 Case C-219/14 Greenfield v The Care Bureau Ltd EU:C:2015:745. 202 Case C-385/17 Hein v Albert Holzkamm GmbH & Co EU:C:2018:1018. 203 Cases C-131/04 and C-257/04 Robinson-Steele v RD Retail Services Ltd [2006] ECR I-2531. 204 See ILO Convention C-132, Art 7. 205 Williams (n 8). 206 ibid [24]. 207 ibid [26]–[27]. 208 For discussion, see AL Bogg, ‘Of holidays, work and humanisation: a missed opportunity?’ (2010) 5 European Current Law xi, xx–xxi. 209 Case C-539/12 Lock v British Gas EU:C:2014:351.

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the right, contrary to the objectives of the Directive. The logic of this test is that all the elements which count to remuneration should be maintained in respect of annual leave and any reduction is incompatible with Article 7; only payments intended exclusively to cover expenses are excluded.210 This interpretation is consistent with ILO Convention No. 131, to which AG Trstenjak referred in Williams,211 and from which it appears the CJEU borrowed the ­terminology of ‘normal remuneration’. The reference by the CJEU in Williams to payments ‘intrinsically linked’ with tasks the worker 31.61 is required to perform under his contract raises the spectre of arguments that payments for some work, such as voluntary overtime, are not required under the contract. Such an approach would be contrary to the purpose of payment. It would mean, for example, that workers on zero-hours contracts were not entitled to any payment in respect of annual leave. Article 31(2) reminds us that this is a fundamental social right and that the maintenance of ‘normal’ remuneration is vital to ensure that this fundamental right is not undermined. For this reason, any doubts as to whether remuneration is ‘intrinsically linked’ to performance should be resolved in favour of inclusion, since this is most likely to achieve the purpose of requiring that leave is paid (namely, that the leave is in fact enjoyed by the worker because there are no economic incentives to forgo leave). The better interpretation, consistent with the approach of the CJEU in both Williams and Lock, is that all remuneration must be maintained. There are two interpretations which achieve this result. First, payment for work which is ‘intrinsically linked’ to the performance of tasks is merely an example of one type of payment which must be maintained rather than an exhaustive test. Alternatively, the link is retrospective not prospective. If a payment was made for performing work done under a contract, that is sufficient (regardless of whether the work was required prior to its being done, as in the case of voluntary overtime). This accords with the approach of the CJEU in treating the ‘intrinsic link’ as synonymous with payments for work done.212 Thirdly, several propositions can be derived from the Article 7 jurisprudence on the timing of 31.62 leave which should inform the normative content of the right under Article 31(2). Annual leave may not overlap with other periods of Community guaranteed leave, such as maternity leave or parental leave.213 In this respect, Article 31(2) should be read consistently with Article 33 of the EU Charter on the reconciliation of professional and family life. In Dicu, the CJEU observed that periods of parental leave during a reference period did not count towards the entitlement to paid annual leave.214 In this respect, maternity leave and sick leave constituted special cases of leave, because in each case the suspension of the work obligation did not negate the entitlement to annual leave. In other cases, such as parental leave or short-time working where no work is performed, the entitlement to annual leave does not arise. This reflects the health and safety function of paid leave which is to ensure actual rest and leisure following on from periods of actual work.215 It is also consistent with the ILO C132 Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), 1970,

210 On what counts as remuneration, see AG Trstenjak in Williams (n 8) [69]–[79]. 211 ibid [50]. 212 Lock (n 210) [32]. But cf. the comments of the CJEU in Hein (n 203) to the effect that the ‘exceptional and unforeseeable’ nature of overtime means it does not ‘in principle’ form part of normal remuneration, though it would do if a worker is required to work it on a ‘broadly regular and predictable basis’ [46]–[47]. It is hard to square this with the purpose of the payment, ILO Convention No. 132 or with the consequences for those on zero hours contracts, who are often not required to do any work on a ‘broadly regular or predictable’ basis and who, on this logic, would be entitled to nil payments for annual leave. We submit that this reasoning is incompatible with the fundamental nature of the right. 213 Case C-342/01 Merino Gomez v Continental Industrias del Caucho SA [2004] ECR I-2605; Case C-519/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR-I-3067. 214 Dicu (n 83). 215 Case C-12/17 Tribunalul Botoşani v Dicu ECLI:EU:C:2018:195 [17] per AG Mengozzi.



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where Article 5(4) recognises that ‘absence from work for such reasons beyond the control of the employed person concerned as illness, injury or maternity shall be counted as part of the period of service’. At the current time, the CJEU has not been prepared to move beyond these exceptional categories in the ILO Convention. 31.63 In both Hein and Dicu, the CJEU recognised the fundamental character of the right to be paid annual leave under Article 31. These limitations on entitlement, based in a requirement of active performance of work, must now be regarded as limits implicit in the Article  31(2) right. We anticipate that there may be future litigation on the reach of the Dicu principle. A difficult area is where precarious workers are engaged in casualised arrangements, with periods of active work interspersed with cessations of work. During these periods of cessation, workers may effectively be ‘on call’ and unable to work for other employers. In BECTU, it should be recalled, the Court was scrupulous in ensuring the effective implementation of the fundamental social right for casual workers in precarious arrangements. These casualised work arrangements present a hard case for the current Dicu approach to entitlement. 31.64 While it is legitimate for Member States to prevent annual leave from being exercised during a period of sick leave,216 the possibility of a carry-over of leave entitlement into a subsequent leave year must be permitted by the legal framework to prevent the extinction of the worker’s fundamental social right which is hers absolutely.217 An unresolved issue under Article 7 (and Article 31(2)) is whether the worker has a right to designate a period of time as annual leave, with this designation only being overridden where there are legitimate business reasons (for example, preventing school teachers from taking annual leave during term time) or social policy reasons such as a need to align periods of annual leave with the wider tempo of community life (for example, ensuring that the taking of leave is coordinated within a particular locale so that rest time may become time shared with other citizens in the local community). In a situation where a worker can achieve no practical benefit from the taking of leave—for example during a period when work obligations are suspended during the pandemic (known as ‘furlough’ in the UK) but wider public health lockdown measures preclude most leisure and recreational activities—it would be an abuse of Art 31 (2) to allow employers to ‘run down’ the leave entitlement by designating ‘furlough’ time as annual leave. At a basic level, since it is the worker’s fundamental social right to paid annual leave, it would seem appropriate for the timing of leave to be determined—at least absent countervailing considerations—by the worker herself. Article  10 of ILO Convention 132 Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), 1970 provides that the timing of leave ‘be determined by the employer after consultation with the employer person concerned or his representative’. In our view, the scheme of the Directive supports a more worker-centred approach. Specifically, this is based in the humanisation principle set out in Article 13 of the Working Time Directive (‘the general principle of adapting work to the worker’).218 Accordingly, it follows that a worker

216 Schultz-Hoff and Others (n 59). Equally, a worker can insist upon the rearrangement of her annual leave where this overlaps with a period of sick leave ‘where that worker does not wish to take annual leave during a period of sick leave’ (ibid [25]): see Case C-277/08 Pereda v Madrid Movilidad SA [2009] ECR I-8405. 217 It is permitted by Art 7, and it should therefore be permitted by Art 31(2), to specify a cut-off point beyond which it would not be reasonable to continue accruing leave entitlements. This principle was established in KHS (n 83), where the worker had been on sick leave between January 2002 and August 2008. The CJEU observed that a right to unlimited accumulation of annual leave entitlements ‘would no longer reflect the actual purpose of the right to paid annual leave’, which is to guarantee a minimum period of rest and recuperation from labour (ibid [30]). Beyond a certain point, paid leave becomes ‘merely a period of relaxation and leisure’ (ibid [33]), rather than a period of rest from work. In this case, a period of 15 months carry-over was regarded as sufficient to satisfy the purpose of Art 7. It is noteworthy that the CJEU cited Art 31(2) in arguing for this conclusion, ibid [31] and [37]. 218 Bogg, ‘Of holidays, work and humanisation’ (n 209) xviii–xix.

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has the right to designate the timing of her leave under Article 31(2), subject only to overriding legitimate business or social policy reasons justifying a requirement that the leave be taken at another time. This approach shifts the default of decision-making power, compared to the model in the ILO Convention. Finally, the worker’s right to a payment in lieu of untaken leave during a leave year on 31.65 termination of the employment relationship is a fundamental social right that is necessarily implicit in the right to paid annual leave under Article 31(2). This principle was established in Stringer in respect of Article 7 and it should apply with equal force to Article 31(2).219 A number of propositions follow from this. First, since the right to a payment in lieu is a fundamental social right of all workers, there can be no preconditions governing its acquisition or extinction. It is the worker’s right automatically and unconditionally. Secondly, the requirement of ‘normal’ remuneration should also govern the calculation of the payment in lieu, given its function to ensure that periods of leave equate financially with periods of work. Thirdly, the payment in lieu must be calculated on the basis of proportionate accrual (minus the proportion of accrued entitlement already exercised during employment) in order to ensure that the four weeks’ minimum entitlement is maintained.220 Two general points apply to the normative content of the rights specified in Article  31(2). 31.66 First, the delineation of ‘rest periods’ requires a distinction to be made between ‘rest time’ and ‘working time’. These two kinds of time are mutually exclusive. This is reflected in the Working Time Directive’s ‘bipolar’ structuring of working time—time is either working time or it is rest time: it cannot be both simultaneously, and it must be either one or the other.221 The judicial approach under the Working Time Directive has been purposive and expansive in respect of ‘working time’, so that it extends to encompass even on-call time (whether active or inactive) where the worker is required to be present at the place of work.222 As Chalmers et al have argued, Jaeger provides an example of a case where fundamental social rights discourse is deployed to justify ‘a wide interpretation of what constitutes work … It also recalibrated the balance between employer interests and employee needs in favour of the latter.’223 This broad approach is viewed by the Court as necessary to support the health and safety objective of the Working Time Directive. It is supported by the wide construction of working time in the relevant ILO Conventions.224 In Federacion de Servicios Privados del sindicato Comisiones obreras (CCOO) v Tyco Integrated Security Sl and another, the CJEU considered that the time spent travelling between a peripatetic worker’s home and the first and last customer appointments of the day must be treated as ‘working time’.225 During these travel periods, the three cumulative definitional criteria in Article 2 of the Directive (the worker is working; at the employer’s disposal; and carrying out his activity or duties) was satisfied. This approach treating travel time as working time was followed in the EFTA case of Thue v Norwegian Government, where a police officer was required to attend a location other than his fixed or habitual place of work.226

219 Stringer (n 59) [61]. 220 See Bogg, ‘Of holidays, work and humanisation’ (n 209) xiii. 221 This ‘bipolar’ characterisation is provided in J Kenner, ‘Regulating Working Time—Beyond Subordination’ in S Weatherill (ed), Better Regulation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 195, 201. 222 See, for example, Jaeger (n 115). 223 Chalmers, Davies and Monti (n 119). 224 See the ILO Conventions on Hours of Work, C1 and C30. See The General Survey on hours of work (2005), Report III at p 19. 225 C-266/14 Federacion de Servicios Privados del sindicato Comisiones obreras (CCOO) v Tyco Integrated Security Sl and another ECLI:EU:C:2015:578. 226 E-19/16 Thue v Norwegian Government [2018] IRLR 449.



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31.67

In both Tyco and Thue, the general interpretive approach has been to elaborate and apply the definitional criteria in the Working Time Directive, in light of the health and safety purpose, without reference to Article  31. However, in DJ v Radiotelevizija Slovenina and RJ v Stadt am Main the Grand Chamber explicitly linked the concept of working time to fundamental right in Article 31 of the Charter, probably reflecting the greater normative weight given to the Article in recent years.227 Sometimes, however, the CJEU’s broad approach to working time may have undermined ‘employee needs’ due to an increased reliance on derogations and opt-outs as a way of alleviating some of the rigidities created by the ‘on-call time’ decisions.228 One way of avoiding these difficulties in the constitution of the Article 31(2) rights is to accord a prominent role to collective agreements between representative organisations of workers and employers to specify the content of these concepts in ways that are tailored to the particular needs of industrial sectors. 31.68 Secondly, all of the rights specified in Article 31 should be interpreted with reference to the humanisation principle, variants of which are found in Directive 89/391/EEC Article 6(2) and Directive 93/104/EC Article  13. Article  13 posits a ‘general principle of adapting work to the worker’ in respect of organising patterns of work, alleviating monotonous work and work at a pre-determined rate, and health and safety requirements. The principle has been subject to criticism by some commentators on account of its vague regulatory implications.229 These criticisms may be wide of the mark, however, insofar as they misconstrue the role and function of the humanisation principle. It does not generate a detailed regulatory template, but rather should be understood as a highly abstract legal principle that sets a general interpretive tone. It reminds us that work is a human good of special significance and that good work is a source of identity, self-esteem and self-realisation for workers. It reminds us that labour law and the regulation of work should be directed at the satisfaction of human needs and that labour law is—ultimately and always—for the flourishing of human beings. The organisation of work and working time must be adapted to the worker’s needs as a human being with dignity and autonomy. The humanisation principle sets itself against the subjection of the worker’s human needs to the employer’s economic imperatives. The rights in Article 31 must be interpreted and developed in the light of this deep normative commitment to the humanisation of work, which is an aspect of respect for human dignity in the working environment.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 31.69 Limitations and derogations are governed by the general clause in Article 52(1) which specifies that limitations must: (i) be provided for by law; (ii) respect the essence of those rights and freedoms; (iii) be subject to the principle of proportionality; (iv) be necessary; and (v) genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. These general constraints must be kept in view when considering limitations and derogations as they relate to the specific rights enumerated in Article 31. It should also be recalled that Article 31 is neither ‘in accordance with’ nor ‘under the conditions provided for by Union law and national laws and practices’. Accordingly, the nature and scope of limitations and derogations under Article 31 should be determined autonomously. This does not mean that Union law will be irrelevant. As the Explanation makes clear, Directives 89/391/EEC and 93/104/EC are important sources for Article  31, and hence will shape the configuration 227 DJ v Radiotelevizija Slovenjia and R J v Stadt Offenbach ad Main (n 191). 228 See AL Bogg, ‘The right to paid annual leave in the Court of Justice: the eclipse of functionalism’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 892, 903. 229 Kenner, ‘Regulating Working Time—Beyond Subordination’ (n 222) 201.

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of limitations and derogations. Nevertheless, since Article  31 dispenses with the formula ‘under the conditions provided for by Union law’, it follows that Article 31 does not necessarily track the limitations and derogations specified in Union law. This is particularly pertinent in respect of the rights in Article 31(2), given that the Working Time Directive has been described as ‘a decidedly weak and rather complex piece of legislation severely circumscribed by limitations and derogations’.230 This raises the possibility that Article 31 could provide a mechanism for challenging the limitations and derogations that are currently permitted under Union law. This possibility is now very much a realistic prospect, given the decision in Test-Achats, where the EU Charter was used successfully to challenge a derogation from the principle of equal treatment in respect of actuarial calculations that were gender-based, under Directive 2004/113 on equal treatment in access to and supply of goods and services.231 Each right will be examined in turn. Article 31(1) posits a right to working conditions that respect the worker’s ‘safety’ and ‘health’. 31.70 On its face, this looks like a serious candidate for a right that does not admit of limitations and derogations, thus an inderogable fundamental right. Certainly, it is difficult to contemplate a scenario where it might be justifiable for a worker to work in dangerous conditions that present a serious risk of accident or industrial disease. In this respect, it is notable that Directive 89/391/EEC does not provide for extensive derogations or limitations.232 Nevertheless, it is likely that much broader ‘ergonomic’ conceptions of ‘safety’ and ‘health’ are referred to by Article  31(1), as articulated by the Court in United Kingdom v Council.233 The ergonomic conception provides the normative underpinning to the various rights in the Working Time Directive which does provide for very extensive limitations and derogations in respect of many of its rights. The breadth of the ergonomic conception suggests that some limitations and derogations might in principle be defensible, subject to very strict limits on availability. Two points should be noted. First, there are limits on the ‘objectives of general interest’ which might be used to justify a limitation of this right. Both recitals to Directives 89/391/EEC and 93/104/EC specify that ‘the improvement of workers’ safety, hygiene and health at work is an objective which should not be subordinated to purely economic considerations’. It follows from this that ‘purely economic considerations’ can never figure as legitimate objectives to justify a limitation or derogation from the right to working conditions that respect the worker’s safety and health. Secondly, the health and safety basis of the right means that the proportionality test should be applied particularly strictly in this context. Article 31(1) also posits a right to working conditions that respect the worker’s dignity. The 31.71 ‘inviolability’ of dignity in Article 1 of the EU Charter, which ‘must’ be respected and protected, would seem to preclude any possibility of limitation or derogation under Article  31(1), and indeed it seems very difficult to contemplate circumstances where a worker might be subject to undignified working conditions with any legitimate justification. This would also fit with the understanding of human dignity in Member States’ common constitutional traditions. Thus, McCrudden has noted that dignity in both the German and French constitutional traditions has been regarded as not being at the disposal of the individual, and this has been used to justify 230 Kenner, EU Employment Law (n 62) 173. 231 Case C-236/09 Test-Achats [2011] ECR I-773, discussed in Barnard (n 2) 271. 232 The only limitation is in Art 2 ‘where characteristics peculiar to certain specific public service activities, such as the armed forces or the police, or to certain specific activities in the civil protection services inevitably conflict with it’ though even here ‘the safety and health of workers must be ensured as far as possible in the light of the objectives of this Directive’. There is also provision to permit Member States to introduce an ‘exceptional circumstances’ defence for employers in respect of their obligations under the Directive under Art 5(4). 233 United Kingdom v EU Council (n 3).



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bans on dwarf-tossing in France and on the participation of women in commercial peep-shows in Germany, even despite the voluntary consent of participants.234 In this respect, Article 52(4) is relevant in specifying that fundamental rights should be interpreted ‘in harmony with’ those ‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’. This would further entrench the dignity right’s inderogability. 31.72 With regard to Article 31(2), it is the right to limitation of maximum working hours that is the most controversial of all in respect of derogation. In general terms, the CJEU has emphasised that derogations must be limited to what is strictly necessary, in accordance with Article 52(1).235 These pronouncements have concerned the right to paid annual leave, which has always been regarded as an inderogable social right. The issues are more difficult in relation to derogations that are expressly permitted under the Working Time Directive itself. The Directive currently permits an individual derogation from the 48-hour maximum working week (the ‘opt-out’) through the mechanism of a worker’s individual agreement. This is subject to a series of protective measures set out in Article 22 of the Directive. The need to ensure the quality of the worker’s valid consent to waiver is also given further emphasis and elaboration in Pfeiffer, where the Court observed that the consent ‘must be given not only individually but expressly and freely’.236 Additionally, a valid consent must satisfy the requirement that it reflect a decision taken ‘with full knowledge of all the facts’.237 In fact, there are palpable tensions between Article 22 and the Pfeiffer criteria. Article  22 does not seem to preclude an ‘opt-out’ being inserted into a written contract and presented to the applicant on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. A refusal to sign entails a withdrawal of a job opportunity, yet the worker has not been subjected to a detriment by ‘his employer’ contrary to Article  22(1)(b) since he is not employed by the employer. This does not look like a ‘free’ consent as required by Pfeiffer. It also seems difficult to reconcile with the right to an effective remedy under Article 47. 31.73 The problems of derogation are particularly acute in the social care and healthcare sectors. The EFTA decision in M’Bye and others v Stiftelsen Fossumkollektivet sets the bar too low in terms of judicial scrutiny of permitted derogations under the Working Time Directive.238 This involved the working arrangements of therapists who lived in a residential setting with young people with drug and alcohol addiction problems. The employer proposed a shift to a ‘7 days on, 7 days off ’ working arrangement. Those workers that refused had their contracts terminated with offers of re-engagement on the revised terms. The EFTA Court reaffirmed the position in Pfeiffer that individual consent must be given expressly and freely, and that any working time worked in excess of the 48-hour default must respect general principles of health and safety. In this case, the Court took the view that an average of 84 hours per week during the ‘on’ period was consistent with those general principles. It was also possible in these circumstances to derogate from the rest period requirements, and the provision of compensatory rest, where objective reasons related to the situation of cohabitant care necessitated this dispensation. The Court also observed that it was permissible for Member States to restrict the scope for revocation of a Pfeiffer waiver, provided that revocation is permitted in exceptional circumstances so that the general principles of the protection of the health and safety of workers are observed.239 Finally, the Court observed that

234 McCrudden (n 175) 705–706. This would be coherent with the paternalistic conception of dignity elaborated by the Court in Omega (n 4). 235 Shimizu (n 13) [54]. 236 Pfeiffer (n 112) [84]. 237 ibid [82]. 238 M’bye (n 36). 239 ibid [64].

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the dismissal due to a failure to agree to new working time arrangements was not a ‘detriment’ within the meaning of the Directive. This was because under Norwegian law ‘the new terms can be justified on the basis of the financial situation of the Solvold branch, the terms are based on urgent operational requirements and therefore independent of the worker’s refusal to agree to perform such additional work.’240 In our view, this decision is very problematic, and its approach is difficult to reconcile with the 31.74 relevant Charter principles and indeed with the Directive itself. First, while there is a reference to Pfeiffer in relation to the quality of valid consent, the Court does not identify the right to a limitation of working hours as a fundamental social right. Secondly, in discussing derogations, it states that ‘a fair balance needs to be struck between the interests of workers and employers’ in defining the scope for revocation of a Pfeiffer consent.241 Further, the Court observes that ‘the rights of the workers and the special needs of hospitals or similar establishments … need to be balanced.’242 This mischaracterises the relevant exercise. The starting point is the fundamental right, and any derogation from that right must be construed strictly and in accordance with a necessity test. Thirdly, in its discussion of waiver, the Court states that ‘the parties must be able to exercise their right to freedom of contract.’243 This is very difficult to reconcile with the entire purpose of EU social law, of which Article  31 is the prime manifestation, which is to restrict freedom of contract in order to protect the weaker party in the relationship. Finally, the Court’s deference to operational reasons in treating the dismissal as outside ‘detriment’ is incompatible with the preamble to the Directive, which states that the improvement of workers’ safety, hygiene and health at work ‘should not be subordinated to purely economic considerations.’ Given the strong possibility that the rights in Article 31(2) constitute general principles of EU social law, the EFTA case of M’Bye should be revisited at the earliest opportunity. It is a most regrettable decision.244 In our view, and even leaving the unduly permissive approach in M’Bye to one side, the current 31.75 position under Article  22 of the Working Time Directive on the individual ‘opt-out’ does not seem compatible with Article 31(2). On one view, no derogation from the 48-hour maximum should be permitted. Such an argument could be based upon the ILO principles on working time, which should be treated as a floor to the Directive. Addressing an inquiry from Malaysia, the International Labour Office of the ILO said that Article 2 of Convention C1 Hours of Work (Industry), 1919, setting out the maximum weekly hours, was intended to lay down mandatory limits which were not subject to contracting out.245 In this respect it emphasised the mandatory wording of the relevant provision (‘shall not exceed’), and the risks that the practical effects of a limitation may be nullified in practice by contracting-out practices in particular sectors. In any future revision of the Directive, the interrelationship between ILO norms and EU norms will have to be addressed. We also recognise that a judicial challenge to the individual opt-out, using Article 31(2) as a basis of challenge, raises difficult and delicate constitutional questions of political and legal legitimacy. On another view, there may be some scope for derogation under Article 31(2), but within much 31.76 stricter limits than are currently envisaged by Article 22 of the Directive. In this respect, there may

240 ibid [80]. 241 ibid [63]. 242 ibid [49]. 243 ibid [45]. 244 We are grateful to Catherine Barnard for this suggestion. We are also very grateful for helpful discussions with Jeff Kenner and Eirik Bjorge on the question of ‘general principles’ in EFTA jurisprudence. 245 See Official Bulletin, Vol XL111, 1960, pp 566–568.



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be scope for a fertile interaction between Article 31(2) and Article 5(2) of the EU Charter with its prohibition of ‘forced or compulsory labour’. In a fascinating analysis of working time regulation under the ILO conventions, Deirdre McCann has drawn attention to the creative ways in which the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has deployed a nuanced analysis of coercion to identify instances of mandatory overtime that breach the prohibition of ‘forced labour’ in ILO Conventions.246 This approach has been sensitive to the corrosive effects of economic vulnerability on workers’ voluntary choices, and this is concordant with the CJEU’s repeated emphasis on viewing enforcement within the real context of work arrangements and the imbalance of social and economic power. This certainly is suggestive of the potential promise of Article  5(2) of the EU Charter in challenging at least some exercises of individual ‘opt-out’ from the maximum hourly limits on the working week. Any individual consent must be substantively free, informed and expressly given. It might suggest restrictions on the timing of the ‘opt-out’, preventing a valid waiver where that is elicited at the inception of the contract or during a probationary period. Furthermore, and in line with the decisions of the ECSR under Article 2 ESC, it would not be sufficient to permit an individual waiver where the outer limit of the working week was not specifically quantified. The current Working Time Directive simply states that there must be respect for ‘the general principles of the protection of the safety and health of workers’. It should be recalled that Article 31(2) of the EU Charter refers to a ‘maximum’. This would necessitate a specified outer limit even where the 48-hour requirement had been waived validly by an individual worker. 31.77 The derogations are of particular importance in the context of medical and social care arrangements. In this respect, the ‘unmeasured work’ derogation in Article 17 of the Working Time Directive, which applies to maximum weekly hours but also to daily and weekly rest periods, has been of increasing importance. This derogation is triggered in a situation when, on account of the specific characteristics of the activity concerned, the duration of the working time is not measured and/or predetermined or can be determined by the workers themselves, and particularly in the case of: (a) managerial executives or other persons with autonomous decision-making powers; (b) family workers; or (c) workers officiating at religious ceremonies in churches and religious communities.

It is submitted that this derogation may not be compatible with Article 31(2) for two reasons. First, Article 31(2) refers to the rights of ‘every’ worker which should extend even to those workers in an ‘unmeasured work’ situation. Secondly, the decisions of the ECSR highlight the very broad personal scope of ‘health and safety’ rights under the ESC framework. The Committee has held that Article 2 ESC applies to all workers including the self-employed, and with a particular emphasis on those workers engaged in vulnerable atypical work such as ‘casual’ workers or fixedterm contract workers.247 Given the health and safety basis to the rights in Article 31(2), it is suggested that the ‘unmeasured work’ derogation is therefore inconsistent with this provision of the EU Charter. In favour of the view that a limited derogation may be permitted, ILO C1 Article 2(a) envisages that employees in a supervisory or managerial capacity could be excluded from the strict provisions on working time limits. 31.78 At the current time, the CJEU has interpreted the ‘unmeasured work’ derogation strictly in social care settings. In Halva v SOS-Lapsikyla ry, the CJEU observed that the derogation ‘must be



246 McCann

(n 27). XIV-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3(1), 36–43.

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interpreted in such a way as to limit its scope to what is strictly necessary to safeguard the interests whose protection the derogation permits’.248 On this basis, even though the occupational activity of relief parenting necessarily embodied a high degree of autonomy, the overarching structuring of working time was still determined by the employer, hence it could not be said that working time as a whole was not measured or predetermined. Interestingly, this strict approach was adopted without reference either to Article 31(2) or Article 52 of the Charter. The right to daily and weekly rest periods are also subject to limitations and derogations 31.79 under the Working Time Directive. These correspond broadly to two types of derogation. First, there are situations where the character of the work, or situation in which the work undertaken, justifies derogating from the daily and weekly rest periods. These are set out in Article 17(3)–(4) of the Directive, and encompass matters such as ‘security and surveillance activities requiring a permanent presence’, ‘activities involving the need for continuity of service or production’, or ‘where there is a foreseeable surge of activity’. This is subject to the condition that ‘equivalent compensating rest periods’ are granted to affected workers or, exceptionally where that is not possible, that workers ‘are afforded appropriate protection.’ Secondly, Article 18 provides that it is possibly to derogate from the daily and weekly rest periods (though not the weekly maximum of working hours) through collective agreements ‘or agreements concluded between the two sides of industry at national or regional level or, in conformity with the rules laid down by them, by means of collective agreements or agreements concluded between the two sides of industry at a lower level.’ Derogation through collective agreement is also subject to the condition that ‘equivalent compensating rest periods’ are granted or, exceptionally where that is not possible, that workers ‘are afforded appropriate protection’. It is submitted that both kinds of derogation would be permitted in respect of the right 31.80 to daily and weekly rest periods under Article 31(2). The derogations under Article 17(3)–(4) should be construed strictly when applied under Article  31(2), though those derogations currently enumerated under that provision meet the strict proportionality criteria under Article 52(1) of the EU Charter. The collective agreement derogation should also be permitted under Article  31(2). Collins, Ewing and McColgan have observed regretfully of the Working Time Directive that the recitals do not refer to ILO principles on freedom of association.249 By contrast, Article  31(2) is not constricted in the same way but it must be read within the context of other relevant Charter provisions. Article 28 recognises ‘the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels’. Further, Article  12 recognises the ‘right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests’. In accordance with Article 52(4) which provides that rights in the Charter corresponding to ECHR rights shall have the same scope and meaning as ‘laid down by the said Convention’, it follows that Article  12 will incorporate the recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR recognising rights to bargain collectively and to strike as inherent in Article  11 ECHR with these rights set at the level of the relevant ILO standards.250 This means that collective agreements will have a special regulatory significance under Article 31, especially collective agreements concluded at national, regional or sectoral levels. The decisions of the ECSR under Article 2 ESC similarly recognise that collective agreements at enterprise level must contain extra safeguards to ensure that workers’ health and safety is protected.251 Given the role of Article 31(2) as an interpretive tool





248 C-175/16

Halva v SOS-Lapsikyla ry ECLI:EU:C:2017:617 [31]. Collins, KD Ewing and A McColgan, Labour Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2012) 302, fn 203. 250 See Ewing and Hendy (n 34). 251 Conclusions XIV-2 Vol 1. 249 H

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for the Working Time Directive, it also follows that the ILO principles on freedom of association do become relevant to that Directive’s interpretation even though the ILO principles are not referred to specifically in the recitals. According to the CJEU in SIMAP, collective agreements could not be used as a procedural mechanism for derogation from the 48-hour limit on weekly working time. This principle was given further support in Pfeiffer. It may be that Article  31, especially in view of other related provisions in the EU Charter, prompts a reassessment of this jurisprudence. 31.81 The right to paid annual leave under Article 7 is a fundamental social right of special significance and this is confirmed by its inderogable status in the Working Time Directive. As BECTU makes clear, it follows that it cannot be subject to any preconditions in respect of the enjoyment of the right. Moreover, the restriction in Article 7(2) of the Directive that the right to paid annual leave may not be substituted for a payment in lieu (except on termination of the employment relationship) is simultaneously a restriction under Article 31(2). Article 53 of the Charter provides that ‘nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law’. It follows from Article 53 that since the right to paid annual leave is an inderogable right in Union law, it must also be an inderogable right under Article 31(2). 31.82 In Sindicatul Familia Constanta, Ustinia Cvas and Others v Directia Generala de Asistenta Sociali si Protectia Copilului Constanta, the CJEU treated foster parents, who were workers under the Working Time Directive, as falling outside the scope of the Directive on account of the specific nature of the public service activity in that case.252 The CJEU noted that Romanian law contained measures to ensure that certain rights were protected, insofar as these were consistent with the activity of parenting. It also noted the relevance of Article 24 of the EU Charter which is concerned with protection of the best interests of the child. Accordingly, this derogation was compatible with Article 52(1) of the Charter, in that the restrictions in Romanian law did not impair the very essence of the foster parents’ rights. Given the global nature of this derogation, the effect of which is to take foster parents outside the protective scope of the Working Time Directive, it should be construed with exceptional stringency. This is reinforced by the dignitarian basis of the rights in Article 31(2), fully applicable to ‘every worker’ including the foster parents in this case.

V. Remedies 31.83 Article 47 specifies a right to an effective remedy before an independent and impartial tribunal that provides the claimant with a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time. Additionally, provision is made for legal aid and representation of victims. 31.84 First, the effectiveness of enforcement in this context is highly dependent upon provision of an independent public body such as a labour inspectorate with enforcement functions to ensure that working conditions respect workers’ safety, health and dignity. Under Article 3 ESC the provision for effective supervision and enforcement of health and safety regulations by a suitably resourced inspectorate is regarded as having a ‘particular importance’ by the ECSR.253 This would mirror the imaginative approach to remedies under EU equality law, where Directive 2006/54 and Directive 2000/43 each make provision for organisations to play a prominent role in the enforcement of equality norms.254 Secondly, individual remedies for breach of health and safety rights must



252 See

n 158.

254 Art

I, Statement of Interpretation on Art 3, p 22. 17(2); Art 13.

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be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’,255 with effective protection from victimisation for individual claimants.256 Thirdly, the special connection between ‘dignity’ and harassment wrongs under Article 31(2) would support appropriate procedural adjustments, such as a reverse burden of proof, that can assist vulnerable victims of workplace harassment in asserting their legal rights. This would certainly be supported by ECSR decisions under RESC Article 26.257 The general issue of enforcement has been central to the most recent generation of Charter 31.85 cases arising in the field of working time. This strong approach to remedies and enforcement was displayed in the important decision of Sash Window.258 In this case, the question arose whether on termination of the contract the claimant could recover a payment in lieu of leave that corresponded to the entire period of his engagement between 1999 and 2012. Under his contract, the claimant had been characterised as ‘self-employed’, whereas in the tribunal it had been accepted that he was a ‘worker’ for the purposes of EU law. The employer had conducted itself on the basis that the claimant was not entitled to paid annual leave. During the period of his employment, some periods of leave had been taken but unpaid, and a significant proportion of leave had been untaken. The employer argued that under the UK Regulations the claimant was not entitled to carry over leave entitlement into a new holiday year, in calculating the level of payment in lieu on termination of employment. AG Tanchev’s Opinion focused on the dignitarian foundations of the Article 31 right, which 31.86 elevated its normative weight and importance in the scheme of solidarity rights.259 Its normative strength was also reflected in its characterisation as an ‘entitlement’ in European and international instruments, which provided a strong indication of its fundamental character.260 The specific regulatory effect of this dignitarian perspective was to impose a positive obligation on the employer to provide a facilitative arrangement for the exercise of the fundamental right. Since the UK system effectively required the worker to seek to exercise the right to leave, in circumstances where such leave would be unpaid until challenged in a court, this undermined the full and effective enforcement of the right. The imposition of this positive onus on the employer was necessary to counteract the power imbalance between employers and workers. The structure of the UK regulation, the effect of which was to place the enforcement onus on the worker, was incompatible with Article 31’s status as an ‘imperative’ norm.261 Consequently, there should be no regulatory limit on carry over into subsequent leave years in a case such as Mr King’s, where he had been deprived of his entitlement without having had an effective opportunity of exercising the right in the first place. The CJEU followed the Advocate General in its disposal of the case, although it based its 31.87 reasoning principally on Article  47 of the EU Charter, and the right to an effective remedy. The odd regulatory structure in the UK system, which delinked the taking of leave from its remuneration in the enforcement mechanism, meant that a worker was forced to take leave before bringing an action to claim payment. Coupled with the strict limitations on carry over, the overall effect was the extinction of a fundamental right. In the words of the CJEU, such a result ‘would amount to validating conduct by which an employer was unjustly enriched to the

255 Barnard (n 2) 522. 256 Case C-185/97 Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd [1998] ECR I-5199. 257 European Committee of Social Rights, ‘Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee of Social Rights’ (2008) Art 26. 258 Sash Window (n 83). 259 Sash Window (n 22) [36]. 260 ibid [40]. 261 ibid [64].



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detriment of the very purpose of that Directive, which is that there should be due regard for workers’ health.’262 This represents an important example of the dynamic normative interaction between different Charter provisions, in this specific case Articles 31 and 47. It establishes an important regulatory response to the problems with ambiguous employment status, which may be a particularly difficulty in new contexts of Gig work. In circumstances where an employer has taken advantage of the latent uncertainties in employment status in work arrangements, the Sash Window principle could have a powerful deterrent effect on these propagating forms of ‘status uncertainty’ exploitation. 31.88 We see this strong approach to enforcement as culminating in the recent troika of Grand Chamber judgments, delivered on the same day, on the meaning and effect of the fundamental social right to paid annual leave: Max-Planck v Shimizu,263 Kreuziger,264 and Bauer.265 In Shimizu and Kreuziger, the Court focused upon the need for workers to enjoy an effective opportunity to take leave, with effective opportunity informed by sensitivity to the specific vulnerabilities of workers in an unequal work relationship. As such, the onus was on the employer to demonstrate that the worker had been encouraged to take leave and, further, that the decision not to do so had been taken in full knowledge of the legal consequences of not doing so in the leave year.266 There is a thread running through all of these enforcement cases, which is the coupling of fundamental social rights with strong positive obligations on private actors to facilitate an effective opportunity to exercise the rights.267 In Bauer, which concerned applications for payments in lieu of untaken leave by widows of deceased workers, the CJEU held that the full effectiveness of the entitlement would be supported by the full horizontal application of Article 31 between private parties. In this case, the national court was required to disapply the national legislation in order to ensure effective enforcement of the fundamental social right between private parties. Most recently, in Federacion de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras v Deutsche Bank SAE, the CJEU 31.89 considered whether there was an obligation to implement the mandatory recording of actual working time to ensure the effective enforcement of rest periods and limitations on working time. The fundamental nature of the social right was pivotal in the CJEU’s judgment. According to the CJEU, the Working Time Directive must be understood as an instrument to ‘give specific form’ to the fundamental rights in Article 31(2), which entailed that the Directive ‘may not be interpreted restrictively at the expense of the rights that workers derive from it’.268 This necessitated a legal framework which required employers to maintain ‘an objective, reliable and accessible system’ for recording the duration of daily working time.269 In this way, Article  31 is propelling a strong approach to enforcement, even apart from its 31.90 dynamic interplay with Article  47. Several points warrant emphasis. First, the ‘constitutional’ social rights dimension in Obreras continues to be located within a ‘labour law’ paradigm. In particular, the CJEU notes that effective compliance must be interpreted by reference to the social and economic context of employment: ‘the worker must be regarded as the weaker party in the employment relationship and that it is therefore necessary to prevent the employer from being in



262 Sash Window

(n 83) [64]. (n 13). 264 Kreuziger (n 139). 265 Bauer (n 11). 266 Kreuziger (n 139) [52]–[54]; Shimizu (n 13) [41]–[42], [45], [48]. 267 See further S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford, OUP, 2008). 268 Obreras (n 116) [31]–[32]. 269 ibid [60]. 263 Shimizu

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a position to impose a restriction of his rights on him’.270 This leads the CJEU to consider the real world of enforcement, and the evidential and procedural difficulties faced by vulnerable workers enforcing their rights in court. Secondly, the CJEU did not follow AG Pitruzella and take the step of treating all the rights in Article 31(2) as horizontally effective. We regard that conclusion as following ineluctably from Bauer. We expect that it will be recognised by the CJEU in due course. Thirdly, and building on Sash Window and the Bauer troika, the judgment contemplates positive duties on Member States and private employers to facilitate and support the exercise of workers’ fundamental social rights.271 Negative duties to refrain from interfering with their exercise are not sufficient to activate social rights. Finally, we note that there are unacknowledged dangers latent in this judgment. In intensifying surveillance, subordination and control in workplace settings, the effect of the decision might be to ratchet up the worker’s subordination. We suggest that these risks can be mitigated by AG Pitruzella’s reference to Article 27 of the EU Charter and the right to information and consultation for workers or their representatives.272 Monitoring mechanisms should be implemented through negotiation and consultation with representative trade unions, to ensure that workers’ privacy and autonomy in the workplace is adequately protected. This would also encourage a coherent interpretation of the interrelationship between various rights in the Charter that are engaged by workplace monitoring, including Articles 7 and 8 in Title II on ‘Freedoms’.

E. Evaluation In many ways, Article 31 has been the most precocious of the labour rights elaborated in the EU 31.91 Charter. From its early appearance in AG Tizzano’s Opinion in BECTU, it is now a settled element in the jurisprudence on the right to paid annual leave under Article 7 of the Working Time Directive. As the right has matured in the Court’s jurisprudence, its early promise has been fully realised in the reasoning of the CJEU. The recent CJEU cases on horizontal direct effect and the right to paid annual leave as a ‘general principle’ of EU law has cemented the status of Article 31 as the keystone of the Solidarity Chapter. It codifies a set of fundamental social rights of great constitutional significance, culminating in Bauer’s protection of the entitlements of dead workers. Yet these social rights continue to be anchored securely in the domain of labour law, with the CJEU sensitive to the power imbalance between employers and workers as the contextual backdrop to most of the disputed questions under Article 31. Some commentators such as Bercusson have made very bold claims for the potential of 31.92 Article 31 to lead to a reconfiguration of European social law. Whether Article 31 will precipitate such a revolution remains something of an open question, though less open than in the first edition of this book. Much continues to depend upon the specific parameters of ‘dignity’ in Article  31(1) and the extent to which this receives a broad interpretation from the CJEU. Much will also depend upon the Court’s appetite for judicial activism within the context of wider political debates about the EU Charter’s constitutional significance. It is also important to recognise the potential of Article  31 as an inspiration for a radical European legislative agenda. It should not be viewed narrowly as a normative framework for the judges alone. Article  31 has generated a flourishing jurisprudence, with its architecture shaped by human





270 ibid 271 ibid

[44]. [62]. (n 14) [71].

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dignity. We recall Brian Bercusson’s observations that one could understand the entire field of labour law to be subsumed within Article 31 and recast as a subjective fundamental right.273 As that process continues to unfold, we offer the following tentative thoughts. First, it is vital that the definitional rigidities that have undermined the effectiveness of the Working Time Directive as a regulatory instrument are not replicated in the interpretation of Article 31. The rights will remain supple and reflexive if the CJEU attaches a special regulatory significance to collective agreements with representative social partners in the constitution of the Article 31 rights. Secondly, Directive (EU) 2019/1152 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union contains a broad suite of new rights, and the preamble makes explicit reference to Article 31. In particular, Article 10 of the Directive, on ‘minimum predictability’ of work’, is transformative in moving the debates beyond limits and entitlements to the core question of who controls the distribution of working time, and the corrosive effects on workers’ capabilities where working time is highly unpredictable.274 Indeed, we see this as the next stage in developing an agenda based upon humanisation of working time. Thirdly, the European Pillar of Social Rights puts decent wages on the European agenda. We think that it is vital to address this at the European level. Working time and wages are symbiotically linked in the wage-work bargain. In particular, unpaid working time, within the context of an employment relationship, represents a failure to respect the dignity of the worker as a human being. Fourthly, we regard enforcement as a vital component in the next phase of Article 31 cases, developing the strong principles established in Sash Window within the context of the ‘fissured economy’.275 There will need to be a blend of public and private enforcement, and that enforcement will need to be properly resourced. In designing enforcement mechanisms, the empowerment of human beings must be at the very centre of the strategy. This might involve measures to support their own standing as right-holders with human dignity, capable of vindicating their own rights with the support of the state. It is important that right-holders themselves are not displaced or their preferences disregarded through public enforcement regimes.276 Fifthly, we expect an increasing number of worker status cases to arise in Gig economy contexts. In these cases, the broad and inclusionary basis of Article 31 will be very important in securing the application of the Directive to a wide range of work relations. This inclusionary approach would be supported by the deterrent norms in Sash Window. The full effect of Article 31 is yet to be felt here, and we are sure that Yodel will not be the last word on employment status in Gig work under the Working Time Directive. 31.93 Finally, we envisage the next stage of Article 31’s Charter life in the CJEU as developing its dynamic interaction with other Charter provisions. Sometimes that interaction is fraught with worker-protective potential, as with Article 47 in Sash Window. Emerging case law on privacy and monitoring, precipitated by the duty to measure working time, will need to be developed in line with freedom of association norms, so that workers are not disempowered by notionally

273 Bercusson (n 87). 274 See further AL Bogg, ‘The Regulation of Working Time in Europe’ in AL Bogg, C Costello and ACL Davies (eds), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016). 275 D Weil, The Fissured Workplace (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2017). 276 On dignity and the standing to vindicate legal rights, see J Waldron, Dignity, Rank and Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2012). These ideas are explored within the context of harassment as a wrong in A Bogg and M Freedland, ‘The Criminalization of Workplace Harassment and Abuse—An Overpersonalised Wrong?’ in A Bogg et al (eds), Criminality at Work (Oxford, OUP, 2020).

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worker protective developments. We should be especially vigilant of destructive interactions, in the light of the CJEU’s troubling reference to a right of freedom of contract in M’Bye, and the potential role of Article 16 of the Charter. This vigilance will be critical if the new battleground under Article 31 becomes the scope and limits of derogations under the Working Time Directive. To date, the force of Article 31 is yet to be felt fully in this context, and it is here where Article 31 runs up against Article 16. The dignitarian foundation of Article 31 should give it decisive weight in the event of any conflict between them.



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Article 32* Article 32 Prohibition of Child Labour and Protection of Young People at Work The employment of children is prohibited. The minimum age of admission to employment may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age, without prejudice to such rules as may be more favourable to young people and except for limited derogations. Young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 32 This Article is based on Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people at work,1 Article 7 of the European Social Charter2 and points 20 to 23 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.3

Select Bibliography Commission Staff Working Document of 27 October 2010 on the application of Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work, SEC (2010) 1339 final. H Cullen, ‘Children’s Rights’ in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 323–46. European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on the application of Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people at work, COM (2004) 105 final. ——, Communication from the Commission to the Council, European Parliament and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—A Special Place for Children in EU External Action, COM (2008) 55 final. ——, EU Action Plan on Children’s Rights in External Action, COM (2008) 55 final. N Ferreira, ‘Child labour and EU law and policy: a regional solution for a global issue’, in I Iusmen and H Stalford (eds), The EU as a children’s rights actor: law, policy and structural dimensions (Opladen/Berlin/ Toronto, Barbara Budrich, 2015) 259–288. ——, ‘Working children in Europe: a socio-legal approach to the regulation of child work’ (2017) 4(1) European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 43–104. M Hartwig, ‘The Elimination of Child Labour and the EU’ in G Nesi, L Nogler, and M Pertile (eds), Child Labour in a Globalised World—A Legal Analysis of ILO Action (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008) 246–62. A Jacobs, ‘Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Art 32)’ in B Bercusson (ed), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Brussels, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), 2002) 73–77.

* This chapter was written by Helen Stalford in the first edition. It has been updated by Nuno Ferreira in the second edition. 1 [1994] OJ L216. 2 CETS No 035. 3 Luxembourg, Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990. Points 20–23 relate to the ‘Protection of children and adolescents’.

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M Leibel, ‘Do children have a right to work? Working children’s movements in the struggle for social justice’ in K Hanson and O Nieuwenhuys (eds), Reconceptualising Children’s Rights in International Development—Living Rights, Social Justice, Translations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) ch 11. C McGlynn, ‘Rights for Children: the potential impact of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2002) 8(3) European Public Law 387–400. R Rodriguez et al, Study on Child Labour and Protection of Young Workers in the European Union: Final Report (European Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2006). H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). L Swepston, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 32—Protection from Economic Exploitation (Leiden: Brill, 2012). W Vandenhole, ‘Children’s Rights in EU External Action: Beyond Charity and Protection, Beyond Instrumentalisation and Conditionality’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Children’s Rights 477–500.

A.  Field of Application of Article 32 32.01 The primary objective of Article 32 is to curb potentially exploitative labour laws and practices involving children, and to protect the health and safety of young people who are lawfully employed. In that sense, Article 32 comfortably reflects the EU’s competence in the field of health and social policy (Art 153 TFEU). This strand of activity, which emerged in the 1980s,4 enables the EU to implement complementary measures with a view to improving workers’ health and safety (Art 153(1)(a) TFEU). This, in turn, is linked to the broader objectives of promoting employment, improving living and working conditions and enhancing social protection (Art 151 TFEU). This regulatory area was no doubt formulated with adult workers in mind, but its extension to child workers is hardly contentious.5 Indeed, the EU had already demonstrated a commitment to supporting national action aimed at protecting young workers some 20 years previously—long before any generalised international standards on child labour came into force, in fact.6 For instance, in 1967, the Commission adopted a Recommendation (on the basis of the original Articles 117, 118 and 155 EEC Treaty) urging Member States to adopt comprehensive national legislation to protect all under-18s at work regardless of the type of employment.7 It is this instrument that provides the blueprint for the main EU legislation on which Article 32 is based, insofar as it recommended: that the minimum age for work should be no less than 15 years; that children engaged in a family enterprise should be no less than 12 years; that night work should be prohibited for children; that there be no expectation to work for more than four and a half hours maximum without a break; and that the maximum working time should be

4 Primarily as a result of the Single European Act 1986, which authorised the EU institutions to adopt measures to regulate labour safety in isolation from any internal market imperative. 5 M Hartwig, ‘The Elimination of Child Labour and the EU’ in G Nesi, L Nogler and M Pertile (eds), Child labour in a globalised world—A legal analysis of ILO action (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008) 246. 6 International intervention was formerly restricted to industry-specific instruments on minimum age, notably the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention 1919, the Minimum Age (Sea) Convention 1920, the Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention 1921, the Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention 1921, the Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention 1932, the Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised) 1936, the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (Revised) 1937, the Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (Revised) 1937, the Minimum Age (Fishermen) Convention 1959 and the Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention 1965. The content and scope of the later, more general minimum age and child labour ILO conventions are discussed in section C.III. 7 Commission Recommendation of 31 January 1967 to the Member States on the protection of young workers [1967] OJ 25/405–408.

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no more than eight hours per day and no more than 40 hours per week for all children under the age of 18. It took some 25 years before the Recommendation was transposed into more sturdy legislative 32.02 form by virtue of Directive 94/33 (hereafter the Young Workers Directive).8 The content of this Directive largely replicates that of the preceding Recommendation, but it is more reflective of the intervening international instruments aimed at prohibiting child labour.9 The second key area of EU competence to which Article 32 is explicitly linked is in the field 32.03 of education, vocational training and youth (Art 165 TFEU). While the activities identified in Article 165 TFEU are now confined largely to formal education and vocational training schemes, they were originally explicitly integrated into the EU’s broader mandate in the field of social policy and youth,10 with a view to addressing, in a more holistic sense, some of the perceived injurious consequences that differential employment regulatory practices and conditions would have, not only on competition in the internal market, but also on the health, well-being and opportunities of workers. Indeed, it was on the basis of the former Article 118a EC that the Young Workers Directive was enacted, thereby cementing the correlation between employment access and educational opportunity. The presumption underpinning both the Directive and Article 32 of the Charter—that the employment of children adversely affects their educational progression—is further reinforced by the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, which explicitly declares that ‘the minimum employment age must not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age and, in any case, not lower than 15 years’. The third area with which Article 32 resonates relates to EU measures in an external relations 32.04 context. The issue of child labour has featured prominently in the EU’s dealings with non-Member States as part of a more comprehensive strategy to mainstream children’s rights into its external activities.11 EU legislative intervention in the field of child labour is manifested in the EU’s broader Trade Policy and Good Governance Agreements, most notably in its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP+) Schemes. Established in the early 1970s and significantly developed in the 1990s, the GSP imposes reduced tariffs on developing countries’ goods entering the EU market with a view to facilitating international trade and, ultimately, supporting economic growth in economically deprived regions.12 Adherence to international child labour standards (specifically those of the ILO) is a key prerequisite for countries that wish to benefit from the tariff reductions, and is accompanied by an undertaking that they will engage in regular monitoring and review of domestic labour laws and processes affecting children.13

8 Council Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people at work [1994] OJ L216/12–20. 9 Discussed in section D. 10 Former Art 118a EC—Social Policy, Education, Vocational Training and Youth. 11 See, eg, the Commission Communication ‘A Special Place for Children in EU External Action’, its accompanying Staff Working Paper on ‘Children in Emergency and Crisis Situations’ (2008), and its ‘EU Action Plan on Children’s Rights in External Action’ (COM (2008) 55 final); the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflicts (2003, updated 2008) available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/170703_eidhr_guidelines_single_09_children_armed_conflicts. pdf; the Council Conclusions on Children in Development and Humanitarian Settings (Brussels, 26 and 27 May 2008) available at www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Council_Conclusions/May/0526_GAERC-pravice_otrok.pdf; and the Council Conclusions on Child Labour (Luxembourg, 14 June 2010) available at www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/115180.pdf. 12 First introduced by Council Regulation 3281/94 of 19 December 1994, no longer in force. See, further, S Velluti, ‘The promotion and integration of human rights in EU external trade relations’ (2016) 32 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 83, 41–68. 13 Regulation 978/2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation 732/2008. For further detail on the child-labour-related measures inherent in the EU’s external trade policies and in its bilateral cooperation agreements with individual states, see H Cullen, The Role of International Law in the Elimination of Child Labour (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007); and Hartwig (n 5); and for a more focused review of the children’s



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32.05

In the absence of any competence to introduce harmonising measures aimed explicitly at the elimination of child labour, the EU has deployed a range of other budgetary, political and soft law mechanisms to encourage compliance, both internally and externally, with the global campaign against child labour. To strengthen and legitimise its efforts in this regard, the EU has consolidated its alliance with the ILO by entering into a Strategic Partnership Agreement in the field of development, which adopts the prevention of child labour as a core priority.14 As a result, the EU has invested significant funding in supporting ILO-coordinated intervention, educational reintegration, capacity-building and awareness-raising programmes targeting children.15 The Parliament and Commission have issued guidelines for Member States and international commercial operators, urging them to adhere closely to international child labour conventions in the development of their internal labour laws and in their individual commercial dealings with ‘developing countries’.16 The EU has extended its efforts in this regard to more targeted, grass-roots educational and social inclusion initiatives, by supporting NGO-driven campaigns and sector-specific research and training,17 and by integrating minimum labour and educational standards into its accession negotiations with candidate states.18 32.06 More generally, Article 32 manifests the EU’s emergent preoccupation with upholding and promoting children’s rights, a preoccupation that has been constitutionally endorsed by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and galvanised by the Commission’s seminal Agenda for the Rights of the Child in 2011.19 The Treaty of Lisbon has provided the catalyst for a number of structural, procedural, institutional and legal amendments that have significantly enhanced the prominence and status of children’s rights at EU level. First, ‘Protection of the rights of the child’ was introduced within the list of general stated objectives of the EU (Art 3(3) TEU), a priority that is linked explicitly with the EU’s external relations agenda (Art 3(5) TEU). Perhaps more persuasive, however, are new legal bases incorporated into the TFEU which have supported more concrete EU legislative intervention in areas that fall within the scope of Article 32 of the Charter. Provisions relating to combating sexual exploitation (Art 79(2)(d) TFEU) and human trafficking (Art 83(1) TFEU), coupled with streamlining of the EU’s institutional and legislative structure,20 have stimulated a stream of secondary legislation that endorse a holistic,

rights conditionality implicit in the EU’s external relations, see W Vandenhole, ‘Children’s Rights in EU External Action: Beyond Charity and Protection, Beyond Instrumentalisation and Conditionality’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Children’s Rights 488–91. 14 Brussels, 16 July 2004, available at www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-brussels/ documents/genericdocument/wcms_169299.pdf. 15 See further, Hartwig (n 5), 254–56. 16 See, eg, Commission Recommendation of 15 September 2000 on the ratification of International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No 182 of 17 June 1999 concerning the prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour [2000] OJ L243/41; Resolution of the European Parliament of 5 July 2005 [2006] OJ C157 E/85 point 2; European Parliament Resolution of 13 June 2002 on child labour in the production of sports equipment; and European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2012 on child labour in cocoa sector, 2011/2957(RSP). The EU itself, however, has not ratified these instruments yet. 17 ‘Investing in People’ has been just one thematic programme that supports initiatives in ‘developing countries’ aimed at combating child labour and promoting children’s education. It explicitly corresponds with the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals. See, further, Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation [2006] OJ L378, which was valid until 31 December 2013. 18 All of these measures are detailed in Commission Staff Working Document Combating Child Labour, SEC (2010) 37 final. 19 COM (2011) 60 final. 20 Detailed further in H Stalford and M Schuurman, ‘Are we there yet?: The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU Children’s Rights Agenda’ [2011] 19(3) International Journal of Children’s Rights, Special Issue, 7–29; and in H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 7.

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comprehensive approach to identifying and assisting victims of crimes associated with child labour, and to holding their perpetrators to account.21 Notwithstanding its preoccupation with protecting children from abuse associated with 32.07 harmful labour practices, Article 32 could also be seen as intersecting with the EU’s equalitydriven approach to labour market regulation. EU employment equality law, like most EU equality measures, finds its origins in the EU internal market framework which was concerned primarily with lubricating mobility between the Member States by ensuring equality of access to and treatment within employment for migrant workers (Arts 5(2), 9 and 45–48 TFEU). These measures have, again, been targeted largely (although not explicitly) at adult workers, but there is nothing explicitly excluding children of working age from their protective scope. The two main legislative provisions in this regard are Directive 2004/3822 and Regulation 492/2011.23 Both grant all nationals of a Member State the right to move to other Member States for the purpose of work, and grant equality of treatment with regard to access to and conditions of employment (without any exceptions on the basis of age).24 Equality of treatment in employment in another Member State, however, must be ‘in accordance with the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action governing the employment of nationals of that State’.25 This, by implication, includes any limitations regarding minimum working age and health and safety measures aimed at protecting young workers. In turn, measures to protect the rights of workers in a migration context should be read in conjunction with the broader corpus of EU equality law, much of which is directed at ensuring equality of treatment in the context of labour. Notably, the Employment Equality Directive26 prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in the context of employment activities,27 unless a characteristic relating to one of these grounds constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, when the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.28 More specifically, for the purposes of Article 32 of the Charter, the Directive enables Member States to derogate from the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, if, within the context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. Such differences of treatment may include the setting of special conditions on access to employment

21 Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA [2011] OJ L101/1; Directive 2011/92/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/ JHA [2011] OJ L335/1; and Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA [2012] OJ L315/57. These measures complement those already introduced in the context of the EU’s competence to develop harmonised procedural and administrative measures in the field of immigration and asylum, notably Directive 2004/81/EC on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities [2004] OJ L261/19. 22 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77, specifically Art 23. 23 Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1. 24 See, in particular, para 31 of the preamble of Directive 2004/38, which requires that Member States implement the Directive without discrimination on grounds of inter alia age. 25 Regulation 492/2011 Art 1. 26 Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 27 Para 12, preamble. 28 Para 23, preamble.



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and vocational training, employment and occupation, including dismissal and remuneration conditions for young people in order to promote their vocational integration or ensure their protection.29

B.  Interrelationship of Article 32 with Other Provisions of the Charter 32.08 The prohibition of child labour and the minimum age of employment established by Article 32 are reinforced by a number of other Charter provisions and, most obviously, the ‘Dignity’ provisions of the Charter. The right to integrity of person (Art 3) correlates with the insistence in the second paragraph of Article 32 on minimum health and safety standards for young workers. Article 32’s focus on prohibiting child labour also chimes with the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in Article 4. The parallel provision in Article 3 ECHR has been strictly interpreted to capture only the most severe of abuses, in which the public authorities either actively contributed to the treatment (through the implementation of particular laws, policies or practices), or failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such treatment occurring (for example, as a result of ineffective or unresponsive child protection procedures). In that sense, although there is little ECHR case law to support this,30 Article 4 of the Charter could conceivably be used to sanction state violations of their commitment to eliminating child labour. Existing ECHR case law suggests that such instances would more likely fall within Article 4 of the ECHR, which prohibits slavery or forced labour. The corresponding Charter provision in this regard is Article 5(1) and (3).31 This differs from Article 32, however, insofar as Article 32 prohibits child employment even in the absence of coercion or exploitation, on the presumption that it is inherently damaging to children’s education and welfare. Article 5 corresponds much more directly with coercive arrangements, but captures many of the contexts in which child labour is perpetuated, notably human smuggling, foreign domestic work arrangements, trafficking and prostitution.32 32.09 A further, more age-sensitive Charter provision to which Article 32 relates is the right to education enshrined in Article 14, insofar as the minimum age of employment is calibrated by reference to the minimum school-leaving age. In that sense, the effective application of Article 32 and its associated legislation is instrumental to the enjoyment of the right to education enshrined in Article 14.33 32.10 Article 32 can also be regarded as an adaptation of Article 31 (relating to fair and just working conditions) to accommodate the specific interests and vulnerabilities of child workers. Interestingly, however, while Article 32 offers protection against economic

29 Art 6. See, below, section D.V for further discussion of the potential for this instrument to be interpreted to enhance child workers’ rights more constructively. 30 The case of M and Others v Italy and Bulgaria App no 40020/03 (31 July 2012) offers an isolated exception. The applicants, of Roma origin and Bulgarian nationality, complained that, having arrived in Italy to find work, their daughter was detained by private individuals at gunpoint, was forced to work and steal, and sexually abused at the hands of a Roma family. They successfully argued that the Italian authorities’ failure to investigate the events adequately constituted a breach of Art 3 ECHR. 31 Art 5 of the Charter also explicitly extends to a prohibition of trafficking. 32 For examples of successful claims under Art 4 ECHR involving the forced labour of children and young people, see Siliadin v France App no 73316/01 (26 July 2005); Elisabeth Kawogo v United Kingdom App no 56921/09 (3 September 2013); CN v United Kingdom App no 4239/08 (ECtHR 374, 2012); and Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (7 January 2010). 33 The implications of the synergy between these two areas are considered in section D.

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exploitation, it does not go as far as guaranteeing children a right to a minimum wage or other pay-related benefits now routinely available to adult workers and endorsed by Article 31. Thus, the presumption is that lawfully employed child workers could rely on Article 31, in conjunction with the general employment equality legislation referred to above, to enforce their entitlement in this regard. More generally, Article 32 is linked to but not explicitly underpinned by the normative principles 32.11 set out in Article 24, the ‘rights of the child’ provision. The protectionist stance of Article 32 provides a more specific context in which to articulate the broad child welfare statements set out in Article 24, specifically: that children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being (Art 24(1)); and that in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, children’s best interests must be a primary consideration (Art 24(2)). Conversely, certain provisions of the Charter may be construed as being in tension with 32.12 Article 32. First, the blanket prohibition of all ‘children’ from employment (subject to limited exceptions) presents a challenge to the notion of children’s autonomy which sits alongside the best interests principle in Article 24(1). This provides that children ‘may express their views freely and requires that such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity’. This reflects axiomatic international children’s rights norms (specifically Art 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC)) and, in turn, recognises that children should have the opportunity to influence any decisions affecting their lives. Moreover, it reinforces the view that children’s competence should be determined not by crude reference to their age, but in the light of a more nuanced, individualised appreciation of their capacity and understanding of the issues at stake.34 Article 24, when read in conjunction with Article 32 and its underpinning framework, therefore presents something of a dilemma in relation to children who actively pursue work, paid or otherwise, as a fundamental expression of their financial and social autonomy or cultural identity. Indeed, this dilemma is reinforced by other provisions of the Charter, notably, Article 15 (freedom to choose an occupation and to engage in work) and Article 21 (the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age). A further Charter provision that presents a challenge to Article 32 is Article 7 regarding 32.13 the right to protection of private and family life. This is particularly relevant to children’s engagement in paid work organised by family members (including family catering, farming or entertainment activities such as busking or itinerant circus activities); or, indeed, in unpaid domestic work (including care-related work, cleaning, gardening or other menial tasks). While certain exemptions are permitted by the Charter and its related legislation to accommodate such arrangements, closer scrutiny of the national legislative framework and reports on implementation suggest significant uncertainty as to how to negotiate the boundaries between preserving the privacy and autonomy of family relationships and protecting children from exploitative or harmful working conditions.35

34 See UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No 12, ‘The Right of the Child to be Heard’ [2009] CRC/C/GC/12; L Lundy, ‘“Voice is Not Enough”: Conceptualising Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2007) 33 British Education Research Journal 927, 934; and for a review of different approaches to child participation in a range of contexts, see B Percy-Smith and N Thomas (eds), A Handbook of Children and Young People’s Participation: Perspectives from Theory and Practice (London, Routledge, 2009). 35 The discussion will return to these issues in section D.



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C.  Sources of Article 32 Rights I.  UN Treaties 32.14 Although it is not referred to in the explanatory text, the most direct source of the rights and obligations contained in Article 32 is the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, which states that: 1.

States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. 2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to ensure the implementation of the present article. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of other international instruments, States Parties shall in particular: (a) Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to employment; (b) Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of employment; (c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of the present article.

32.15 Article 32 CRC essentially offers children protection from harmful work in the light of their vulnerability, as they may be more exposed to work injuries, exploitation and detrimental effects to their rights to health, education and development.36 The first part of Article 32 of the Charter adheres to the CRC’s requirement that a minimum age for admission to employment should be maintained. The second part of Article 32 largely replicates Article 32(1) CRC. The key differences are that the CRC refers to ‘work’ generally, as opposed to ‘employment’ specifically,37 and it requires that children be protected from ‘hazardous working conditions’ and that their ‘spiritual’ development should also be protected. The reason behind the exclusion of the latter two references from the Charter is unclear, but McGlynn has attributed it to the fact that the protection from ‘hazardous’ conditions is implicit in the Charter’s obligation to promote the ‘safety, health and physical development of the child’. Similarly, the CRC’s concern to uphold the ‘spiritual development’ may have been regarded as a religiously loaded notion that could be more sensitively integrated within the Charter’s rather more secularised commitment to promoting the child’s ‘moral or social development’.38

II.  Council of Europe Treaties 32.16 The explanatory text accompanying Article 32 refers to Article 7 of the European Social Charter (the right of children and young persons to protection), which was adopted in 1961 and revised in 1996.39 It acts as a natural complement to the ECHR insofar as it focuses on social and economic rights (as opposed to the civil and political rights that dominate the latter instrument). Most significantly, it is the main European treaty to acknowledge the

36 L Swepston, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 32—Protection from Economic Exploitation (Leiden, Brill, 2012). 37 Ibid. Both the ILO and the Committee on the Rights of the Child see the ILO instruments and the CRC as applicable to ‘work’ broadly defined, thus wider than the notion of ‘employment’. 38 C McGlynn, ‘Rights for Children: the potential impact of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2002) 8(3) European Public Law 387, 399. 39 All 27 Member States of the EU ratified the original version of the Charter but, as of March 2021, five Member States had yet to fully ratify the revised 1996 version (Czech Republic, Denmark, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain).

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content and scope of children’s rights, particularly in the context of education and employment. Article 7 echoes the provisions enshrined in Article 32 CRC and in the Young Workers Directive, in that it provides that, inter alia, the minimum age of admission to employment shall be 15 years, subject to exceptions relating to ‘light work’; that persons who are still engaged in compulsory education shall not be employed in such work as would deprive them of the full benefit of their education; that the working hours of persons under 16 years of age shall be limited in accordance with the needs of their development, and particularly with their need for vocational training; that persons under 18 years of age shall not be employed in night work with the exception of certain occupations provided for by national laws or regulations; and that special protection be put in place to guard against physical and moral dangers to which children and young persons may be exposed in the workplace. Importantly, however, Article 7 extends the provision available to children and young people beyond the merely protective provision set out in Article 32 of the Charter, to incorporate the right to a fair wage or other appropriate allowances and to a minimum of four weeks’ annual holiday with pay. Although the European Social Charter remains an important European instrument in the field of labour and social standards, it is important to acknowledge that the shortcomings of its supervision mechanism have in practice limited the impact of ESC action.40

III.  Other Sources Article 32 is most explicitly derived from Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people 32.17 at work,41 the main objectives of which are twofold: first and foremost, to prohibit the employment of children below the compulsory school age; and second, to impose conditions on the employment of children lawfully engaged with a view to protecting their health, welfare and educational progression.42 While the explanatory text accompanying Article 32 makes no direct reference to instruments 32.18 governing unlawful aspects of ‘child labour’ that fall within its scope, the other international treaties with which Article 32 is indirectly associated (not least due to their close association with the Young Workers Directive) emanate from the International Labour Organisation. First, the ILO Minimum Age Convention No 138 (1973)43 sets the general minimum age for admission to employment or work at 15 years (13 for light work) and the minimum age for hazardous work at 18 (16 under certain strict conditions). It provides for the possibility of initially setting the general minimum age at 14 (12 for light work) where the economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed. It is worth noting that this derogation is not available under the Young Workers Directive, presumably because of the relative stability and predictability of the economic and social regimes across the Member States.44 However, research highlighting the acute impact of the 2008 global economic crisis on children across the EU may call into question this presumption.45

40 See, further, N Ferreira, ‘Child Labour and EU Law and Policy: A Regional Solution for a Global Issue’ in I Iusmen and H Stalford (eds), The EU as a Children’s Rights Actor: Law, Policy and Structural Dimensions (Opladen/Berlin/Toronto, Barbara Budrich, 2015) 259, 279. 41 Above, n 1. 42 A more detailed, critical review of these provisions in the context of Art 32 is presented in section D. 43 Ratified by all 27 Member States of the EU. 44 Hartwig (n 5), 218. 45 Innocenti Research Centre, The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Children: Lessons from the Past Experiences and Future Policies (Florence, ChildONEurope, June 2011); S Ruxton, How the Economic and Financial Crisis is Affecting Children and Young People in Europe (Brussels, Eurochild, December 2012).



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32.19

The second ILO Convention of relevance is Convention No 182 (1999) on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.46 This requires ratifying states to eliminate the worst forms of child labour in all its guises, including: slavery, child trafficking, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, the recruitment of children into armed conflict, child prostitution, pornography and drug trafficking; and any other work which is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children. The Convention requires ratifying states to provide appropriate, direct assistance to facilitate the removal of children from such situations, and to support their rehabilitation and social integration. It also requires states to provide such children with access to free basic education and, if possible and appropriate, vocational training. 32.20 A final ILO instrument that informs interpretations of Article 32 of the Charter is the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998. This represents a collective commitment, on the part of governments and employers’ and workers’ organisations, to uphold basic human values in the workplace, regardless of whether or not they are parties to the other relevant ILO Conventions. The effective abolition of child labour is one of the four fundamental principles around which this Declaration is framed and it manifests the same core features that are shared by the other instruments underpinning Article 32: that the minimum age for employment should correspond with the minimum age for completion of compulsory schooling; that certain exceptions may be made to accommodate particular types of work or to respond to less developed economic and educational facilities within the state; and that the health and welfare of children should be a paramount consideration in determining employment conditions or in granting any exemptions to the general prohibition of child work.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks 32.21 Article 32 is, at first glance, a relatively uncontroversial provision insofar as it articulates the obligations already imposed by EU legislation and international law. Its relevance in domestic contexts has already been acknowledged by national courts, in the light of the binding effect of the Charter and the principles of supremacy and effectiveness of EU law.47 Whether it constitutes a right or a principle in the context of the Charter remains a moot issue.48 In any case, the Commission has noted that Member States are, for the most part, already deemed to be compliant with the requirements set out in Directive 94/33 with regard to the employment conditions of under-18s, with several Member States going above and beyond their EU obligations.49 Moreover, it reinforces the standards and prohibitions articulated by the ILO as 46 Ratified by all 27 Member States of the EU. 47 Audiencia Nacional (Sala de lo Social, Sección 1ª) (Spanish High Court, Social Division, section 1), Decision No 28/2014, 11 February 2014. 48 Case C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la région Centre [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:33; Opinion of Advocate-General Tanchev in Case C-214/16 Conley King v The Sash Window Workshop Ltd and Richard Dollar [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:439; K Lenaerts, ‘La solidarité ou le chapitre IV de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne’ (2010) 82 Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 217. 49 Some ‘minor deficiencies’ have been observed in relation to Belgium, Bulgaria and Italy, where undeclared, informal work (generally implying the absence of an employment contract) accounts for up to 60% of children’s working arrangements: ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on the application of Directive 94/33/EC on the protection of young people at work and Annexes’ COM (2004) 105. See, also, ‘Commission Staff Working Document on the Application of Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work’ SEC (2010) 1339, Brussels, 27 October 2010, 16–18 (which reflects the position in the Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007).

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far as the employment of younger children is involved, and re-emphasises the negative correlation between children’s employment and poor educational attainment. However, closer scrutiny of Article 32 raises more fundamental questions regarding, first of all, the way in which ‘employment’ on the one hand and ‘education’ on the other are conceptualised, and how the balance between these two social rights is defined by reference to age. Linked to this are questions regarding the particular approach to children’s ‘rights’ favoured by the provision and, indeed, by EU law more broadly. Additionally, further interrogation is required as to whether Article 32 goes far enough in imposing positive obligations on states to eliminate exploitative child labour practices. These key issues will be considered in the analysis below.

II.  Scope of Application The personal scope of Article 32 is, in one sense, straightforward: it refers to ‘children’ and ‘young 32.22 people’ under the age of 18. The distinction made between younger and older children deviates from the universal CRC definition of ‘child’ to cover all under-18s, but largely reflects Directive 94/33, which presents a more nuanced list of sub-sets to which differential employment rights/ conditions are ascribed according to their age and education. The Directive adopts ‘Young People’ as an alternative umbrella term for all under-18s (Art 3(a)). ‘Child’, for the purposes of the Directive, on the other hand, refers specifically to a young person ‘of less than 15 years of age who is still subject to compulsory full-time schooling under national law’ (Art 3(b)); while ‘adolescent’ denotes any young person between the age of 15 and 18 who is no longer subject to compulsory schooling (Art 3(c)). This represents a prime example of the shifting definition of ‘child’ and, indeed, of ‘young 32.23 person’ under EU law more generally. In other areas of EU provision, such as the Commission’s Youth Strategy, the term ‘young person’ covers teenagers and young adults who fall within the 13–30 age bracket.50 What constitutes a ‘child’ for the purposes of EU law shifts again in the context of free movement law, to include the direct descendants of EU citizens’ and/or their partners who are under the age of 21 or who are dependants (the latter implying a biological or functional definition, rather than an age-related definition).51 At the other extreme, in aspects of immigration and asylum law, the definition of ‘child’ is significantly narrower with a view to limiting optimum family reunification rights to under-12s.52 Such variable interpretations of ‘child’ and ‘young person’ under EU law, which are perpetuated by Article 32, invoke a mixed response. On the one hand, it should be credited with acknowledging the importance of attuning rights in accordance with the heterogeneous needs and capacities of different groups of children. On the other hand, however, it undermines efforts that have been made in more recent years to adopt a more coordinated response to children’s rights in the EU context in a manner that is firmly grounded in a global framework of children’s rights (the CRC) and which adopts, as its starting point, the CRC definition of ‘child’, with a view to endorsing a minimum level of protection to all

50 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic And Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘An EU Strategy for Youth—Investing and Empowering A renewed open method of coordination to address youth challenges and opportunities’ COM (2009) 200 final. 51 Art 2(2)(c) Directive 2004/38 (n 22). For a more in-depth discussion, see Stalford, Children and the European Union (n 20), ch 1; and C McGlynn, Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006) 72. 52 Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/12, Art 4(1). See, further, E Drywood, ‘Challenging Concepts of the “Child” in Asylum and Immigration Law: The Example of the EU’ (2010) 32 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 309.



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children, regardless of age.53 Article 32 supports the Young Workers Directive approach to tiering children’s rights on the basis of age. Whilst not refuting the importance of protecting children’s right to education, health and welfare over and above the right to work, this crude articulation of rights on grounds of age sits uncomfortably with an established body of children’s rights and sociology of childhood research, theory and, indeed, jurisprudence that advocates a more capacity-based approach to defining rights, in the light of a range of contextual and individual factors.54 When considered in the context of child labour, this body of knowledge challenges the wisdom of a blanket ban on work purely on grounds of age, and informs us that a capacitybased approach engenders a greater appreciation of children’s ability (even at a relatively tender age) to undertake work in a manner that does not unduly affect their education but positively enhances their sense of self-sufficiency and aids their social and personal development. Equally, it enables us to appreciate and accommodate more effectively the vulnerabilities of young people who may lawfully qualify for employment under EU law but whose mental, emotional or physical disabilities expose them to more acute hazards that warrant protective intervention. It remains, however, to be determined how an individual, capacity-based approach could realistically be operationalised,55 especially in the context of labour regulation and inspection systems that already struggle with insufficient resources.56 32.24 The title of Article 32, ‘Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work’, is indicative of its potentially far-reaching material scope. Whilst it is loyal to the original objectives of EU intervention in child employment—to set minimum standards for the working conditions of young people within an internal context—it also supports the EU’s increasingly persuasive role in the global struggle against child labour.57 This raises immediate questions, however, as to whether the generalised prohibitions and requirements contained in the provision can adequately address what is, in reality, a complex and broad spectrum of scenarios ranging from relatively innocuous babysitting arrangements, newspaper delivery and domestic chores undertaken within the confines of a supportive and enriching family and community environment, to the social, emotional and financial dereliction associated with organised trafficking, slavery and sweat-shop labour. 32.25 For instance, the opening statement of Article 32 introduces a negative obligation to prohibit the employment of children younger than the compulsory school-leaving age and is based on the underlying assumption that employment, by its very nature, adversely affects children’s educational attendance and progression. The evidence to support this is highly persuasive, not only in a development context, but across the EU Member States too. For example, the European Parliament, quoting ILO data, estimated in 2005 that 171 million children work in places which

53 See EU Agenda on the Rights of the Child, which is explicitly grounded in the ‘standards and principles of the UNCRC’ (n 19), p 3. 54 There is an extensive literature in this regard, but key reference work includes M Freeman, The Rights and Wrongs of Children (London, Frances Pinter, 1983); J Eekelaar ‘The Emergence of children’s rights’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 161; A James and A Prout (eds), Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (Basingstoke, Falmer Press, 1990); G Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child (Florence, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2005); and J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009). 55 See N Ferreira, ‘Working Children in Europe: A Socio-Legal Approach to the Regulation of Child Work’ (2017) 4(1) European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 43, 91–92. 56 N Ferreira, ‘Working Children in England and Wales: Waking Up from Inertia’ (2017) 28(3) King’s Law Journal, 381, 17–21. 57 A Jacobs, ‘Prohibition of Child Labour and Protection of Young People at Work (Article 32)’ in B Bercusson (ed), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Brussels, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), 2002) 76–77.

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are hazardous for their physical and mental health, 5.7 million have become slaves to pay family debts, 1.8 million are exploited by prostitution and pornography rackets, 1.2 million have fallen victim to trafficking or have been press-ganged into sexual exploitation, forced labour or work, 600,000 are involved in other illegal activities, while at least 300,000 children have been forcibly recruited into armed forces around the world.58 However, a blanket prohibition on child employment is open to more robust challenge in the context of informal, occasional working arrangements enjoyed, and often orchestrated, by many children and their families as an integral part of their personal and familial development. Can and should the protectionist veil of Article 32 be used to constrain the activities of a 14-year-old girl engaged as a baby-sitter at the weekends, of a 13-year-old boy who takes on a newspaper delivery round or sets up a neighbourhood carwashing enterprise, of a 10-year-old rural dweller who assists her father during the lambing season, albeit at unsociable hours, or of an eight-year-old girl who assists with glass-washing duties in the family’s catering business instead of attending the local after-school club? Such activities clearly sit at the hazy intersection between work and enriching family life, between work and leisure, between work and social integration, or between work and self-expression, and yet they are susceptible to heavy-handed regulatory intervention, supported by the full weight of Article 32. This may be partially justified by the range of potentially negative consequences of such forms of work to the physical and psycho-social (cognitive and emotional) development and well-being of children, as even work carried out in such family and social contexts may potentiate situations of exploitation, abuse, and health and safety risks.59 The tensions with family and individual rights and freedoms need, however, to be recognised. In addition to the negative obligation to prohibit child employment, Article 32 also imposes 32.26 positive obligations on Member States. These are largely confined to the implementation of health and safety measures for children who can lawfully be employed and include putting in place ‘working conditions appropriate to their age’ as well as any measures aimed at protecting young people against economic exploitation, at safeguarding their health or physical, mental, moral or social development, and at preventing any harmful interference with their education. This protectionist agenda has supported the exclusion of children from the workplace, rather than seeking to positively enhance work-based rights. Cullen refers to this tension in the specific context of the Young Workers Directive, pointing to the irony of an instrument that seeks to limit the possibility of children becoming workers, whilst simultaneously representing one of the few examples of EU legislation that grants children rights independently of their family situation. Indeed, she suggests that such a position potentially brings the Young Workers Directive in conflict with other aspects of EU law, stating ‘[i]t is difficult to be certain, in the absence of a specific fact situation, how the ECJ would resolve a claim which was based on the alleged conflict between the Young Workers Directive and … EU non-discrimination provisions that have now been extended to grounds of age’.60 More generally, the Young Workers Directive may fall short of the standards established in Article 32, to the extent that the exploitation prohibited by Article 32 may take place in contexts from which EU law may be derogated, such as domestic and family settings,

58 European Parliament Report on the exploitation of children in developing countries, with a special focus on child labour (2005/2004(INI)), 14. 59 Ferreira, ‘Working Children in Europe’ (n 55), sections 10 and 11. 60 H Cullen, ‘Children’s Rights’ in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 323, 329. One can, however, foresee that such a hypothetic conflict would be solved in favour of the Young Workers Directive, considering the scope for derogation allowed by the Employment Equality Directive: Ferreira, ‘Child Labour and EU Law and Policy’ (n 40), 280–81. Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to try to use the principle of equality and anti-discrimination statutory norms to challenge minimum employment age norms and other limitations on child work: Ferreira, ‘Working Children in Europe’ (n 55), 63–64.



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and cultural or similar activities (see Section IV). Yet, it is unlikely that Article 32 could be used to challenge aspects of the Young Workers Directive, as Article 32 itself is based on the Directive, thus setting in motion a circular legal mechanism that could perhaps only be interrupted by resorting to a tool such as the principle of evolutive interpretation.61 32.27 A broader, more empowering interpretation of Article 32, drawing more liberally on the European Social Charter, would significantly extend the scope of such positive obligations beyond health and safety measures, towards the development of more constructive and empowering standards relating to children’s wages, minimum holiday entitlement, child-sensitive complaints mechanisms, progression entitlement and rights of association. Such rights are theoretically available through the panoply of EU employment equality provision, but a prevailing protectionist agenda may render it difficult for children to exploit it to its full potential. The irony, therefore, is that in seeking to protect children, EU child labour laws are perhaps obstructing their access to the very mechanisms that would enhance their employment rights and experiences.62 32.28 A more generous interpretation of states’ positive obligations under Article 32, beyond the comfortable confines of the Young Workers Directive health and safety measures, could also support the development of more constructive programmes of assistance aimed at removing, rehabilitating and socially reintegrating child victims of forced labour (as required by ILO Convention No 182). Such an interpretation of Article 32 could also add significant weight to the more victim-centred, rehabilitative tone of the growing corpus of EU legislation in the field of trafficking and sexual exploitation.63

III.  Specific Provisions 32.29 Three specific notions underpin the application of Article 32: the interrelationship between education and employment; the notion of economic exploitation; and the protection of the child. Implicit in these notions is the importance of addressing child labour in the context of the wider web of economic and social factors that both contribute to and are symptomatic of this phenomenon. 32.30 There is now widespread acknowledgement of the negative correlation between working and early school leaving. Equally, it is universally accepted that failure to attain a minimum level of education has a detrimental effect on a child’s future opportunities and economic stability. As the European Parliament notes: ‘It is a fact that poverty, lack of education and child labour form a vicious circle. Where the levels of poverty are high, children are required to work from an early age, and thus stay away from school, while their lack of education makes them more susceptible to exploitation and deprives them of a better future.’64 The pervasive and long-term effects of this vicious cycle prompted the UN to place eradication of poverty and compulsory and free basic education for all at the top of its agenda when establishing the Millennium Development Goals. The same priorities pervade the EU’s broader social inclusion agenda,65 on the accepted wisdom that the upward development and sustainability of the EU market economy requires aggressive intervention to address poverty when it takes root in childhood. As part of this campaign, the

61 Ferreira, ‘Child Labour and EU Law and Policy’ (n 40), 280. 62 But see below, section D.V, which identifies how non-discrimination jurisprudence might be applied more constructively to young workers. 63 Above, n 21. 64 European Parliament Report (n 58), 16. 65 Communication from the European Commission, ‘Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth’ COM (2010) 2020, Brussels, 3 March 2010.

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EU has invested more than a decade of research, monitoring and evaluation into identifying the determinants of child poverty, testing out different policy interventions and supporting mutually agreed targets for and cooperation between the Member States.66 Whilst not undermining the importance of situating the campaign against child labour within 32.31 this wider economic context, we need to be cautious about drawing over-generalised conclusions from this typology, since an overly ‘fatalistic’67 approach in this regard can carry some negative consequences already alluded to earlier in this chapter. First, it may legitimise an excessively paternalistic response to child labour, thereby overlooking the more empowering potential of many forms of child employment; and second, it may overlook other means of addressing the disenfranchisement of children in employment. Indeed, an international ‘working children’s movement’ has been actively campaigning since the 1990s for a radical review of the international and European regulatory framework in this regard. This movement has drawn attention to the paradox inherent in a supposedly ‘rights-based’ approach to child labour without due regard to children’s views, choices and individual circumstances, even if in practical terms this campaign may not lead to such different results than the ILO-sponsored agenda.68 This movement goes on to argue that simply expelling children from the labour market (and in the process stripping them of any autonomous capacity to develop important practical skills or to make a tangible contribution to their family’s income), without adequate economic, social and educational provision in its place, may serve to significantly exacerbate the position of many working children, particularly in the ‘developing world’. Liebel is thus heavily critical of the paternalistic nature of this approach: These negative effects are on account of laws and measures intended to protect children from exploitation that regard child labour as harmful and fail to take the reasons motivating children to take up work into account. The belief is that, children being unfit to work, there is no need to try to understand children’s views and feelings. The children are seen as victims and objects in need of help, not as subjects with thoughts about their situation and ideas about how to solve their problems that they wish to articulate.69

This observation prompts some interrogation of the notion of ‘economic exploitation’ as a 32.32 primary reference point for regulating child employment (Art 32, para 2 Charter; and Art 1(3) Young Workers Directive). In reality, the nature of children’s employment contracts varies significantly across the Member States in terms of salary levels, permanency, levels of supervision and training. Some fall quite neatly into the vocational training category, but may be regarded as exploitative insofar as they are unpaid.70 In other words, the boundary between exploitative practices, on the one hand, and ‘reduced pay for unskilled work’ or an unpaid training scheme with a vocational purpose on the other, remains very vague indeed. Certainly the notion of equal pay for work of equal value has yet to reach beyond the adult gender equality debate to inform decisions around the equitable remuneration of children and young people. One could thus argue that the remuneration of under-18 workers should be more strongly protected by the law.71 66 See, eg, Commission Recommendation of 20 February 2013, ‘Investing in Children: Breaking the Cycle of Disadvantage’ COM (2013) 778 final. 67 J Seabrook, Children of Other Worlds—Exploitation in the Global Market (London, Pluto Press, 2001) v. 68 Ferreira, ‘Working Children in Europe’ (n 55), section 7. 69 M Liebel, ‘Do Children Have a Right to Work? Working Children’s Movements in the Struggle for Social Justice’ in K Hanson and O Nieuwenhuys (eds), Reconceptualising Children’s Rights in International Development—Living Rights, Social Justice, Translations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), ch 11. 70 R Rodriguez et al, Study on Child Labour and Protection of Young Workers in the European Union: Final Report (European Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2006), 66–70. 71 Ferreira, ‘Working Children in Europe’ (n 55), 62–63.



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A more holistic approach to children’s employment—which achieves not only minimum standards in the physical conditions of the work environment, but which promotes equitable pay and progression, and which is open to more innovative combinations of paid work and educational or vocational training—would go some way towards enhancing the value of young people’s work.72 Embracing children’s status as workers in their own right, whilst safeguarding their education, safety, health and development, would not only enable children to avail themselves more fully of the benefits and protection available under EU equality law, but would also reinforce rights-based perceptions of children as active, valuable contributors to society and, indeed, to the economy.73

IV.  Limitations and Derogations 32.34 Article 32 accepts that its prohibition is ‘without prejudice to such rules as may be more favourable to young people and except for limited derogations’. By ‘favourable’ the provision seems to be referring to rules that are more restrictive of child work (thus further ‘protecting’ children) or that link work with education or training,74 and by ‘derogations’ the provision seems to be referring to rules that allow certain types of child work that would otherwise be prohibited. Derogations to the minimum age of admission to employment are permissible in specific, limited contexts, which are set out primarily in Articles 4 and 5 of the Young Workers Directive. These derogations can be divided into three categories: children of at least 14 years of age working under a combined work/training scheme or an in-plant work-experience scheme; children of at least 13 years of age performing ‘light work’; and children employed for the performance of cultural, artistic, sports or advertising activities (subject to the authorisation of the competent authority). The latter two categories that extend employment access to under-15s are subject to the additional proviso that such activities are not harmful to their safety, health or development, to their attendance at school or to their participation in vocational training programmes. 32.35 Reliable, comparative data on the number of working children who are benefiting from these exemptions is notoriously difficult to come by, both because of the limited visibility of many of the activities they include, and because of significant variances in national approaches to the collation of such statistics. 2006 estimates suggest that there were approximately 3–3.5 million working children under the age of 15 across the EU, only marginally fewer than the estimated number of 15–17 year olds in employment (3.5–4 million).75 32.36 The precise nature of the exempted activities is defined by reference to national law, arguably allowing for a more context-specific appraisal of the value and appropriateness of the activity. However, the singling out, by the Young Workers Directive, of cultural, artistic, sports and advertising activities as beneficiaries of more liberal employment conditions is a little bewildering

72 Art 4(2)(b) of the Young Workers Directive does accommodate combined work/training schemes or ‘in-plant’ workexperience, but these are strictly limited to programmes that are recognised by the competent authority and are likely to be confined to the formal, vocational training routes developed by regulated industries for older children (15–16+). For an analysis in favour of using the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers to enhance working children’s right to equitable remuneration and entitlement to vocational training, see Ferreira, ‘Child Labour and EU Law and Policy’ (n 40), p 281. 73 For a discussion of children as active contributors to society in the context of citizenship, see M Hill and K Tisdall, Children and Society (New York, Longman, 1997); R Lister, ‘Why Citizenship? Where, When and How Children?’ (2007) 8(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 693–718; and A Invernizzi and J Williams (eds), Children and Citizenship (London, Sage, 2008). See also Liebel (n 69), 237–38. 74 Swepston (n 36). 75 Rodriguez et al (n 70), 19.

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and demands some scrutiny of the ideological and ethical norms underpinning this distinction; it is likely to be based on the presumption that children will obtain a greater sense of physical, intellectual and cultural fulfilment through engaging in work of this nature, which, in turn, will offset any potential disadvantages arising from their distraction from formal education. Such a presumption may say more about the image-based, consumer culture which has come to define the society in which we live. Indeed, it is these social prescriptions that shape (or rather distort) our appreciation of what is really in the best interests of our children. Why, for instance, should child modelling, artistic performance or professional football training (common contexts in which the recruitment of children as young as five or six is routinely authorised and encouraged) be valued as worthwhile, fulfilling, opportunity-generating activities over and above a child working in close collaboration with his or her parents to develop and maintain a family farm, restaurant or an itinerant family circus? Linked to this, ‘harmful conditions’ should be clearly defined by the Young Workers Directive not only in terms of the physical environment in which the employment takes place, but also the psychological, social and emotional harm that may result from protracted periods of separation from family members for the purposes of performance rehearsals or sports training, or from the acute sense of self-awareness and body image triggered by premature and intensive exposure to commercial notions of beauty and success in the modelling and entertainment business. Article 32 of the Charter captures all of these notions, but popular interpretations of child employment standards may imply something rather more selective to accommodate and perpetuate popular notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ work, and by reference to adults’ (or more specifically, national authorities’ and commercial operators’) appraisal of ‘harm’ as opposed to that of the children themselves. Notwithstanding the ideologically suspect basis on which the exempted activities are defined, 32.37 sectoral-specific data on national child-employment trends across the Member States suggests that, in reality, child workers are concentrated in areas that fall outside these areas: there appears to be a heavier concentration of under-15s in the agricultural (including family-run farms) and services industries (such as restaurants, supermarkets and petrol stations).76 Such data leads to two preliminary conclusions: that the areas of activity highlighted in the derogations do not reflect the lived experiences of the majority of working children; and that many children are, in effect, working outside the lawful parameters of the Charter. Such conclusions raise questions as to the capacity of the current European regulatory framework, as it is currently interpreted, to respond to the real-life employment experiences of many children across the ‘developed regions’ of the Member States and enforce standards retained as fundamental.77 Even the European Commission’s largely positive review of the alignment between national employment legislation and practice and the requirements of the Young Workers Directive comes with some caveats; assessments regarding compliance are drawn on the basis of notoriously patchy data, accompanied by widespread acknowledgement that many aspects of child work are located in the shadow economy and therefore invisible.78 This seems to have led to an almost weary resignation by the European Commission to the fact that no amount of regulatory intervention can effectively address those ‘grey’ areas of employment that spill over into the private family sphere or that may be linked to children’s social, cultural and financial contexts.

76 Ibid 21–22; and Jacobs (n 57), 74–75. 77 Ferreira, ‘Working Children in England and Wales (n 56), section V. 78 J Calvo and R Rodriguez, ‘Studies on the Implementation of Labour Law Directives in the Enlarged European Union: Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the Protection of Young People at Work’ (Sythensis Report) (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2006).



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V. Remedies 32.38 Official evidence suggests loyal transposition of the EU Young Workers Directive, at least regarding access to and conditions of work within the Member States. Certainly, the conspicuous lack of national case law involving alleged victims points to the rarity of improper employment practices across any of the Member States.79 Yet, the same evidence also acknowledges that the Member States are by no means impervious to some of the most extreme forms of labour exploitation. Immigrant children within the Member States are acknowledged as particularly vulnerable to such practices, both because of instances of undocumented entry or residence, and because of their greater susceptibility to social, cultural, educational and economic marginalisation.80 Indeed, despite the existence of a right to access compulsory education,81 there is now an abundance of data revealing widespread educational underperformance among children from a migrant background: they exhibit higher rates of early exclusion from school, relatively poor attendance and poor attainment rates in terms of formal qualifications. Furthermore, across all of the Member States, on average, migrant students are reported to be one-and-a-half years behind their native peers in their reading skills by the age of 15.82 This situation is compounded by EU immigration law which authorises lawful impediments to migrant children’s access to and progression in education. For instance, Member States can provide child asylum claimants with education in accommodation centres rather than schools, and national authorities can legitimately postpone their access to compulsory schooling for up to three months from the date of application for asylum.83 32.39 The knock-on effects of this, in terms of migrant children’s enhanced susceptibility to unlawful, exploitative labour, have not gone unnoticed by the EU. The Commission has sought to facilitate educational integration—and, by implication, to mitigate some of the risk factors associated with child labour—through the launch of a range of integration programmes, particularly through its wider immigration and social inclusion strategies.84 32.40 Remedies of a more judicial nature are, theoretically, available to address alleged breaches of the Young Workers Directive, and there is no doubt that Article 32 of the Charter would offer a useful backdrop to such a claim. Although Article 32 has already been referred to by the Court of Justice as a relevant legal provision in its jurisprudence,85 there are no reported cases before

79 Rodriguez et al (n 70). 80 Rodriguez et al (n 70), 53; P Stanat and G Christensen, Where Immigrant Students Succeed: A Comparative Review of Performance and Engagement in PISA 2003 (Paris, OECD, 2006). 81 UNCRC 1989, Art 28. 82 European Commission, ‘Migration and Mobility: Challenges and Opportunities for EU Education Systems’ (Green Paper) COM(2008) 423 final, 1; European Commission, ‘Joint Council/Commission Report on the Implementation of the Education and Training 2010 Work Programme “Delivering Lifelong Learning for Knowledge, Creativity and Innovation”’ (Brussels, European Commission, 2008). 83 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection OJ L180, 29 June 2013, 96–116, Art 14. See, further, Stalford, Children and the European Union (n 20), 155–56. 84 See, eg, Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Common Agenda for Integration: a framework for the integration of third-­country nationals in the European Union’ COM (2005) 389 final; and Communication from the Commission on Europe, ‘2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth’, Brussels, 03 March 2010, COM (2010) 2020 final, 5. 85 The General Court has referred to Art 32 in the Front Polisario case, namely to highlight that, when negotiating trade agreements, ‘the Council must examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the production of goods for export is not conducted to the detriment of the population of the territory concerned, or entails infringements of fundamental rights, including, in particular, … the right to fair and just working conditions and the prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights)’: Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v Council of the European Union [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, para 228.

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the Court concerning child labour specifically. Much more common (although still relatively rare) are actions by migrant adults to enforce their children’s access to education within the host state with a view to anchoring their own residence status there.86 Such cases could feasibly be supported by Article 32 if there was persuasive evidence that the denial of education to a migrant child, resulting from the family’s deportation, would expose them to a real risk of unlawful, exploitative labour in their country of origin, especially if a EU Member State. A further, arguably more empowering judicial site for the enforcement of young people’s 32.41 rights in the context of employment can be located in the developing case law on age discrimination. Two judgments, in particular, come to mind as offering some potential for enhancing the status of lawfully employed children. First, in Kücükdeveci,87 the Court ruled that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age (as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter and the Employment Equality Directive)88 must be interpreted as precluding national measures that fail to take into account periods of employment completed by an employee before reaching the age of 25 in calculating notice periods for dismissal. A more child-sensitive application of this ruling would require employers to take into account all periods of lawful work undertaken by employees, whether that be during their childhood or adulthood, when determining notice and redundancy arrangements. Similarly, following the decision in Hennigs and Mai,89 the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age precludes measures laid down by a collective agreement which allow for employees’ salaries to be determined on appointment by reference to their age. If applied in the context of child workers, this ruling could form the basis of a claim that minimum wages should be calibrated more directly according to skills, experience and responsibility, thereby prohibiting the current tendency to automatically afford young workers the lowest salaries.90 Until such interpretative possibilities are properly litigated before the Court of Justice, judicial 32.42 remedies relating to child workers are more evidently available within the general framework of the ECHR, although these focus on the more extreme forms of child labour. The discussion has already alluded to a smattering of jurisprudence highlighting the readiness of the ECtHR to adopt a wide interpretation of ‘slavery and forced labour’ under Article 4 ECHR to encompass the whole gamut of child employment experiences and to hold states to account for their failures to take appropriate action to address such abuses.91 Perhaps one of the most effective EU-level responses to child labour is in the context of its 32.43 development cooperation activities, through the withdrawal of financial aid and preferential tariffs to those who fail to comply with their child-labour-related obligations under the ILO Conventions. Incentive arrangements for sustainable development and good governance were

The Advocate-General’s Opinion in the appeal before the Court of Justice against this case has, however, stated that by asserting that Art 32 produced extraterritorial effects in this context, this paragraph was vitiated by an error in law, in the light of the lack of control by the EU or its Member States over the non-EU territory in question: Case C-104/16 P Council of the European Union v Front Polisario [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:677, para 270–73. The General Court’s judgment was eventually set aside and the Front Polisario’s action dismissed: Case C-104/16 P Council of the European Union v Front Polisario [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:973. See, further, C Danisi, ‘Self-determination as a Peremptory Norm of International General Law and Human Rights in Occupied Western Sahara: A Test for the European Union’ in M Balboni and C Danisi (eds), Human Rights as a Horizontal Issue in EU External Policy (Napoli, Ed. Scientifica, 2019), ch IX. 86 Eg, see Case C-34/09 Zambrano v ONEM [2011] ECR I-01177; Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241; Case C-310/08 LB Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-01065; and Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-01107. 87 Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECR I-365. 88 Directive 2000/78 (n 26). 89 Cases C-297/10 and C-298/10 Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt, Land Berlin v Mai [2011] OJ 311/12. 90 Ferreira, ‘Working Children in Europe’ (n 55), 61–62. 91 Above, n 32.



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withdrawn temporarily from Sri Lanka in 2010 in response to evidence of unlawful child recruitment practices.92 It seems that this represents a relatively rare example of such sanctions being imposed, however, and there is a high degree of scepticism regarding the capacity of the GSP+ system to provide a sufficiently robust response to the persistently high rates of child labour across the ‘developing world’.93

E. Evaluation 32.44 There is no doubting the importance of Article 32 in protecting children from harmful employment practices. However, the deference to the Young Workers Directive as its primary interpretative guide obscures the potential of Article 32, not only to support the EU’s critical role in the global campaign against more extreme forms of child labour, but to positively enhance the status of children who are lawfully employed. The social, economic and regulatory landscape relating to child labour has shifted since the implementation of the Young Workers Directive; the EU has expanded to incorporate a much greater, more diverse range of Member States, and the position of children within the EU legal and policy order has been significantly enhanced. These developments suggest that the Young Workers Directive may no longer be the most adequate reference point to guide the interpretation of Article 32 of the Charter. A more positive synergy between education, socio-economic conditions and employment might be achieved if a more integrated approach to regulation were embraced, as endorsed by the EU’s broader social inclusion strategy. Equally, more effective use of the EU’s existing equality framework might enhance children’s rights and experiences of education and work by facilitating their access to and enforcement of a broader range of employment-related entitlements. Article 32 will help to crystallise the EU’s important role in combating more extreme forms of child labour too, not only through the range of budgetary and political mechanisms already being deployed in its external activities, but through robust transposition and ongoing refinement of its emergent child protection legislation governing trafficking, immigration and sexual exploitation. 32.45 A closer regard for children’s agency in their own educational and work decisions is now recognised as an important part of all of these processes. This, in turn, is consistent with the growing prominence of and respect for children’s rights and needs across a diverse range of EU activities, a process which emphasises the importance of combining a protectionist approach to child employment with systems and processes that empower children to exercise genuine choices that are in their best interests.

92 Detailed in W Vandenhole, ‘Children’s Rights in EU External Action: Beyond Charity and Protection, Beyond Instrumentalisation and Conditionality’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Children’s Rights 477, 489. 93 Vandenhole, ibid, cites the independent study of M Gasiorek et al, Mid-term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (Sussex, Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration, 2010), which concluded that the GSP-related sanctions were largely ineffective in ensuring states’ compliance with their international human rights obligations.

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Article 33* Article 33 Family and Professional Life 1. The family shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection. 2. To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to protection from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 33 Article 33(1) is based on Article 16 of the European Social Charter. Paragraph 2 draws on Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding and Directive 96/34/EC on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC. It is also based on Article 8 (protection of maternity) of the European Social Charter and draws on Article 27 (right of workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities and equal treatment) of the revised Social Charter. ‘Maternity’ covers the period from conception to weaning.

Select Bibliography M Barbera, ‘The Unsolved Conflict: Reshaping Family Work and Market Work in the EU Legal Order’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 139–60. N Busby, A Right to Care? Unpaid Care Work in European Employment Law (Oxford, OUP, 2011). E Caracciolo di Torella, ‘Is there a fundamental right to reconciling work and family life in the EU?’ in N Busby and G James (eds), Families, Care-giving and Paid Work: Challenging Labour Law in the 21st Century (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011) 52–65. —— ‘Article 27 RESC’ in in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 346–48. —— ‘ILO Convention 156’ in in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 1142–49. —— ‘An emerging right to care in the EU: a “New Start to Support Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers’ (2017) 18 ERA Forum 187. —— and A Masselot, Reconciling Work and Family Life in EU Law and Policy (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). H Collins, ‘The Right to Flexibility’ in J Conaghan and K Rittich (eds), Labour Law, Work, and Family (Oxford, OUP, 2005) 99–124. J Conaghan, ‘Time to Dream? Flexibility, Families, and the Regulation of Working Time’ in J Fudge and R Owens (eds), Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 101–30. C Costello, ‘Gender Equalities and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 111–38. * This chapter was written by Cathryn Costello in the first edition. It has been updated by Jeff Kenner and Katrina Peake in the second edition.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

P Foubert, ‘Child Care Leave 2.0—Suggestions for the improvement of the EU Maternity and Parental Leave Directives from a rights perspective’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 245. S Fredman, ‘Reversing roles: bringing men into the frame’ (2014) 10 International Journal of Law in Context 442. G James, ‘Forgotten children: work–family reconciliation in the EU’ (2012) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 363. C Kilpatrick, ‘Gender and the Legal Regulation of Employment Breaks’ in J Fudge and R Owens (eds), Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 153. CK Lehoczky and B Kresal, ‘Article 33—Family and Professional Life’ in F Dorssemont, K Lörcher, S Clauwaert, M Schmitt, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Employment Relation (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2019) 583–605. C McGlynn, ‘Reclaiming a Feminist Vision: The Reconciliation of Paid Work and Family Life in European Union Law and Policy’ (2001) Columbia Journal of European Law 241. ——, ‘Work, Family and Parenthood: the European Union Agenda’ in J Conaghan and K Rittich (eds), Labour Law, Work and Family (Oxford, OUP, 2005) 217–36. ——, Families and the European Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge, CUP, 2006). F Raday, ‘Article 11’ in M Freeman, C Chinkin, and B Rudolf (eds), The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary (Oxford, OUP, 2012) 279–309.

A.  Field of Application of Article 33 33.01 There are two distinct elements to Article 33 on family and professional life. The first element is Article 33(1). It sets out a positive obligation to afford ‘the family’ the enjoyment of ‘legal, economic and social protection’. This far-reaching obligation could apply in virtually any aspect of EU activity. Indeed, it refers not only to ‘legal protection’ but also to ‘economic and social’ protection, which suggests it is a true cross-cutting obligation, to be mainstreamed into all areas. Its significance in migration law, family law, criminal law and across all of EU equality and labour law is readily apparent. Article 52(5), which introduces the rights/principles dichotomy, is pertinent, given the 33.02 features of Article 33(1). The Explanation to Article 52(5) provides that Article 33 contains ‘both elements of a right and of a principle’.1 While the Explanations are not binding,2 the breadth, generality, and formulation of Article 33(1) supports the contention that this element of Article 33 is a ‘principle’ rather than an individual right. The legal consequences of this designation are set out in Article 52(5), namely that principles ‘may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers’. The facultative nature of this clause means that principles do not in themselves create positive obligations to act. However, once there is EU law or policy in the field, the principle ‘shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality’. Accordingly, EU laws and policies across all fields must be interpreted in conformity with Article 33(1), and where they breach the principle, are liable to annulment. Evidently, given the breadth and generality of Article 33(1), everything turns

1 Explanations [2007] OJ L303/17, 35. 2 Art 52(7) states: ‘The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States’.

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on its interpretation. As is discussed further in section C.III(a), Article 16 of the European Social Charter (ESC), on which Article 33(1) is based, is clearer in that the various aspects of ‘legal, economic and social’ protection it entails are contained both in the text of Article 16 and the pronouncements of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR). If the ECSR commentary is used to flesh out Article 33(1), its impact across a range of EU policy domains could be significant. Admittedly, while the Charter requires the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law to be taken into account,3 there is no analogous obligation to have regard to the ECSR materials. Nonetheless, they are an important source that gives decisive meaning to the ESC provision. In contrast with Article 33(1), the second element of the provision, Article 33(2), on the 33.03 reconciliation of family and professional life, clearly entails individual rights. These rights overlap with pre-existing EU legislative entitlements and have now been expanded upon by new EU legislation. Article 33(2) expressly entails three distinct rights: the right to protection against dismissal for a reason connected with maternity; the right to paid maternity leave, which both figure in the Pregnant Workers Directive;4 and the right to parental leave contained in the Parental Leave Directive.5 However, with effect from 2 August 2022, the Parental Leave Directive is repealed and replaced by the Work-Life Balance Directive of 2019,6 which, in addition to strengthening parental leave rights, adds three new rights: to paternity leave; carers’ leave; and to request flexible working arrangements for parenting or other caring purposes. These new rights, although not mentioned in Article 33(2), are intrinsic to the reconciliation of family and professional live it entails and are therefore its offspring even though the Charter does not formally add new tasks for the EU.7 The new Directive has been inspired by the adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights (Social Pillar) in 2017,8 which, in turn, can be seen as the progeny of the Charter.9 Principle 9 of the Social Pillar on work-life balance proclaims that: Parents and people with caring responsibilities have the right to suitable leave, flexible working arrangements and access to care services. Women and men shall have equal access to special leaves of absence in order to fulfil their caring responsibilities and be encouraged to use them in a balanced way.

Accordingly, although it is correct to assert that Article 33(2) simply ‘restates existing entitlements’,10 it has acted as a catalyst for policy development under the Social Pillar. As anticipated in the introduction to this chapter in the first edition, the conversion of the idea of reconciliation of family and professional life into fundamental rights form may bolster and expand the scope of these entitlements, considerably transforming them into what we can now call ‘work-life balance rights’. Moreover, describing these rights as aiming to reconcile family and professional life has reorientated their ethos. In particular, as Article 33(1) aims to ensure protection for the family, a priority is established between family and professional life, which informs

3 The Preamble, para 5, refers to the ‘caselaw of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights’. 4 Directive 92/85/EC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding [1992] OJ L348/1. 5 Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC [2010] OJ L68/13. 6 Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU [2019] OJ L188/79. 7 Art 51(2) of the Charter. 8 Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights [2017] OJ C428/10. 9 Ibid, Recital 5 of the preamble. 10 C McGlynn ‘Work, Family and Parenthood: the European Union Agenda’ in J Conaghan and K Rittich (eds), Labour Law, Work and Family (Oxford, OUP, 2005) 217, 228.



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Article 33(2), and measures in the field generally with the need for action to achieve gender equality and increased participation of women in the labour market as drivers for change. EU law originally framed the issue of protection during maternity as a health and safety policy, so its fundamental rights reorientation is significant. 33.04 Even in areas where Article 33(2) and the directives are coextensive, the constitutionalisation of these rights has normative consequences, in particular for the interpretation and validity of limitations to the right in question, as is discussed in section D.IV. In addition, as the Charter binds EU institutions in all situations, and the Member States whenever they ‘implement’ EU law, Article 33(2) may be relied on in situations where these directives are not applicable, but where the Member States are nonetheless implementing other EU norms.11 33.05 The preceding discussion has focused on the hard legal impact of Article 33. However, much EU activity relating to work-life balance uses soft law and new governance methods. The Lisbon Strategy prompted Member States to draw up ‘[a] series of measures … to facilitate women’s access to the labour market, such as providing childcare facilities and encouraging flexible working arrangements to enable women to enter and remain in the labour market’.12 Its successor, Europe 2020,13 adopted a similar approach, and now the Social Pillar directly links gender equality, work-life balance, childcare and support to children.14 Overall, the attention to gender equality waned over the years,15 and the approach adopted was criticised for focusing exclusively on freeing up women to take paid work, rather than allocating care burdens more equally between men and women.16 Principle 9 of the Social Pillar is important, therefore, for shifting the focus back to burden sharing in caring responsibilities and away from narrow ‘ideologies of motherhood’.17 As is discussed in section D, below, until the adoption of the Work-Life Balance Directive, EU measures on childcare were non-binding.18 For instance, the EU has set targets for both the percentage of children who should be in formal childcare19 and those who should be in ‘early childhood education and care’.20 A key question accordingly is whether the Charter can have a bearing on soft policies. Clearly, 33.06 when the EU adopts any hard laws, it is bound to respect and protect EU fundamental rights, as they are a condition for the legality of EU acts. Ideally, when it adopts non-binding policies, it should also be regarded as constrained and empowered by fundamental rights. However, in those contexts, as its output is not legally binding, it would be difficult to enforce this commitment

11 For an illustration, see Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981. 12 European Parliament, Mid-Term Review of the Lisbon Strategy from the Gender Perspective. Ip/c/FEMM/NT/2005, 4. 13 COM(2010) 2020 final. 14 Respectively, Principles 2, 9 and 11 of the Social Pillar (n 8). 15 M Smith and P Villa, ‘The ever-declining role of gender equality in the European Employment Strategy’ (2010) 41 Industrial Relations Journal 526, 540. 16 M Stratigaki, ‘The Cooptation of Gender Concepts in EU policies: The Case of “Reconciliation of Work and Family”’ (2004) Social Politics 30, 32. 17 C McGlynn, ‘Ideologies of Motherhood in European Community Sex Equality Law’ (2000) 6 European Law Journal 29. 18 Council Resolution of 29 June 2000 on the balanced participation of women and men in family and working life [2000] OJ C218; Commission, A better work-life balance: stronger support for reconciling professional, private and family life (COM)2008, 635. 19 The Barcelona European Council (2002) set targets of providing childcare by 2010 of at least 90 per cent of children aged between three years old and the mandatory school age, and at least 33 per cent of children under three years of age. These targets were reiterated in the Commission Communication, Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion—including implementing the European Social Fund 2014–2020 COM(2013) 83 final. 20 Council Conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (ET 2020), Annex I to the conclusions (OJ C119/7). It provided that by 2020, at least 95 per cent of children between four years old and the age for starting compulsory primary education should participate in early childhood education.

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in the courts. Similarly, when the Member State acts to meet these targets, giving the soft EU mechanisms hard domestic consequences, the Member State is not ‘implementing EU law’ as currently understood. Accordingly, its actions are not constrained by the Charter. Nonetheless soft mechanisms need to be founded on fundamental rights commitments if they are not to erode existing protections, so ensuring that the Charter commitments are taken seriously and are integrated into new governance mechanisms.21

B.  Interrelationship of Article 33 with Other Provisions of the Charter Article 33 is linked with all Charter provisions dealing with family and working life, as well as 33.07 equality. In particular, Article 33(1) is substantively related to Article 7 on family and private life, the provision which corresponds to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Also, pertinent is Article 9 on the right to marry and to found a family. However, the entitlements under Article 33 are not confined to families based on marriage. Article 22 requires the EU to respect ‘cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’. This Article may have a bearing on the forms of family life the EU should be required to recognise although, as will be discussed later in this chapter, EU legislators and the Court of Justice (CJEU) have tended to leave the definition of the ‘family’ to Member States. Parental rights over their children figure in Article 14(3), which refers to ‘the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions’. Policies to reconcile work and family life are essential for the achievement of equality 33.08 between men and women, which of course has a prominent position in the Equality chapter of the Charter. Admittedly, Article 33 is not located in this chapter, but the Charter preamble characterises the key values in its provisions as ‘indivisible’, acknowledging that the Charter’s values are inextricably linked.22 Article 23 refers to equality between women and men ‘in all areas’, which includes in the private sphere. A rights-based approach to work-life balance requires gender equality in the allocation of care burdens, as well as in the workplace. However, special rights for mothers may undermine this objective and perpetuate unequal care burdens. On the other hand, insisting on gender neutrality may undermine special protections for women who mainly bear dual burdens. The Work-Life Balance Directive accentuates the positives of a more gender-neutral approach by asserting that work-life balance policies ‘should contribute to the achievement of gender equality’ by ‘promoting the participation of women in the labour market, equal sharing of caring responsibilities between men and women, and the closing of the gender gap in earnings and pay’.23 The Charter also has a general prohibition of discrimination, in Article 21, which is not 33.09 confined to the grounds explicitly mentioned in Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).24 The Charter guarantee is pertinent in cases of discrimination

21 For discussion on new governance and fundamental rights, see S Fredman, ‘Transformation or Dilution: Fundamental Rights in the EU Social Space’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 41; O De Schutter and S Deakin, Social Rights and Market Forces: is the open coordination of employment and social policies the future of social Europe? (Brussels, Bruylant, 2005). 22 Para 2 states: ‘Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity.’ 23 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Recital 6 of the preamble. 24 See Art 21(1): ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’



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between those of different family and marital status. The original Equal Treatment Directive encompassed discrimination on these grounds as ‘sex’ discrimination,25 although the Recast Directive of 2006 is silent on this matter.26 The pertinence of other grounds of discrimination to caring burdens is evident in the approach of the CJEU to discrimination by association In Coleman,27 the CJEU held that EU rules on disability discrimination applied to prevent discrimination against a woman caring for her disabled son. Whether other care-giving scenarios can be brought within the scope of the doctrine remains to be seen. Same-sex parents may rely on protection against sexual orientation discrimination to try to vindicate their parental rights, or challenge systems which privilege the ‘heterosexual dyad’ of mother and father.28 The CJEU has indicated a shift of thinking in this direction by recognising that the concept of marriage includes same-sex spouses in the context of rights to free movement,29 but, as is noted in the preamble of the Work-Life Balance Directive, ‘Member States have competence to define marital and family status, as well as to establish which persons are to be considered to be a parent, a mother and a father’.30 One criticism levelled at EU work-life balance policies is that they conceive of children 33.10 predominantly as barriers to paid work. In general, the EU stands accused of being insensitive to children’s rights in this context.31 Article 24 on the rights of the child might be invoked to bring children’s rights into the frame, in particular given that, in accordance with Article 24(2), ‘In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration’.32 Admittedly, an attempt to invoke Article 24 before the CJEU in Chatzi, to make parental leave entitlements more child-centric, had an ambivalent outcome.33 That ruling was understandable based on the limitations of the legislation before the CJEU, but now, with the Work-Life Balance Directive there is a discernable shift of approach not just in the development of rights, such as the introduction of carers’ leave, but in the language used. In particular, the Directive notes that the Member States have ratified the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which, in Article 18(1), provides that ‘both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child and that the best interests of the child should be the parents’ basic concern’.34 Until the adoption of the Work-Life Balance Directive in 2019, EU hard law provisions had 33.11 focused on parenting to the exclusion of other care-burdens such as eldercare. Article 25 on

25 Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L40, Art 2(1). 26 Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23. 27 Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law [2008] ECR I-5603. For a perceptive argument building thereon, see H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) 80. 28 The term is borrowed from D Rosenblum, ‘Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting’ (2012) Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 57. 29 Case C-673/16 Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, EU:C:2018:385. 30 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Recital 18 of the preamble. 31 G James, ‘Forgotten children: work—family reconciliation in the EU’ (2012) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 363–79, 366. 32 See C Costello, ‘Gender Equalities and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 111–38. 33 Case C-149/10 Chatzi [2010] ECR I-08489. See discussion below at section C.IV(a). 34 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Recital 5 of the preamble. The UN Convention is referenced in the Explanation to Art 24 although Art 18 of the Convention is not specified among the highlighted provisions of most relevance. For the text of the Convention, see: www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.

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the ‘rights of the elderly’ may have a bearing alongside the demographic realities of an ageing population. It may come to be an important corrective to the focus on the care of children as the singular impediment to participation in paid work. If an elderly person requires the care of family members in order ‘to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life’, then it could be argued that labour laws which impede the exercise of that care undermine Article 25. Similar arguments can be made about the need for work-life measures concerning the rights of persons with disabilities ‘to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community’, as is required by Article 26. Most of the rights in the Work-Life Balance Directive are concerned with parenting but the introduction of a very modest amount of carers’ leave to provide personal care or support to a relative or person in the household ‘who is in need of significant care or support for a serious medical reason’,35 and the right for a carer to request flexible working,36 are relevant for the realisation of the rights and principles in Articles 25 and 26. Reconciliation of professional and family life overlaps with other work-related provisions 33.12 of the Charter, including Article 15, on freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work, and Article 30, the general protection of workers against unjustified dismissal. While Article 33(2) protects against dismissal on grounds of maternity, reinforcing Article 10 of the Pregnant Workers Directive, and taking parental leave, by referencing the Parental Leave Directive in the Explanation,37 when the Work-Life Balance Directive enters into legal effect, there will also be protection against dismissal on the grounds of taking, or seeking to take, paternity leave, carers’ leave, or for requesting flexible working.38 In turn, the EU legislative prohibition on discrimination prevents dismissal on a range of discriminatory grounds, which further intersects with Article 33. Article 33’s reconciliation agenda is clearly linked to the general right to ‘fair and just working 33.13 conditions’ under Article 31. Article 31(1)’s guarantee of working conditions in keeping with the worker’s ‘health, safety and dignity’ may be invoked in a diverse range of scenarios. Article 1 grants dignity, as a value and individual right, prime position in the Charter. More specifically, Article 31(2) constitutionalises the key aspects of EU working time regulation, providing some protection against long working hours which are so corrosive to work-life balance. While the Working Time Directive’s provisions on the length of the working week in effect only apply to full-time workers, providing an average working week of no more than 48 hours, it enables working time to be separated from weekly and daily rest entitlements and rest breaks.39 The right to paid annual leave, which ensures a minimum four weeks of leave each year to balance workers’ family and professional life,40 does apply to part-time workers, albeit on a pro rata temporis basis, and, in this respect, Article 31(2) has been recognised as mandatory and unconditional in nature and enforceable directly against a private employer as well as the state.41 At present, maternity pay in some circumstances, and allowances for parental leave in most, 33.14 depend on the state social security and assistance schemes in the Member States. In this respect, there is an intersection between Article 33 and Article 34 on ‘Social security and social assistance’. Indeed Article 34(1) explicitly mentions protection ‘in cases such as maternity’. 35 See Arts 1(c) and 6 of Directive 2019/1158 (n 6). 36 Ibid, Art 9. 37 Directive 2010/18 (n 5), cl 5(4) of the annexed framework agreement. 38 From 2 Aug 2022. Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 12(1). 39 Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L299/9, Arts 3–6. 40 Ibid, Art 7. 41 Cases C-569 and 570/16 Stadt Wuppertal v Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker Willmeroth v Martina Broßonn, EU:C:2018:871.



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33.15

Finally, at least in respect of the hard rights contained in Article 33(2), the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by Article 47, are of vital importance for individuals seeking to realise, in practice, the protection of their maternity rights, or to parental leave, or the new rights flowing from the passage of the Work-Life Balance Directive.

C.  Sources of Article 33 Rights I. ECHR 33.16 While the Explanation to Article 33(1) cites only Article 16 ESC as a source, the notion of the right to ‘family life’ under Article 8 ECHR is pertinent. The ECSR has adopted the ECHR approach to family life.42 Article 8 is notoriously extensive in its protection, entailing protection against all sorts of interferences with individual autonomy, from noise at night43 to the right to nationality.44 Of particular relevance is the ECtHR case law on the evolving understanding of ‘family’, the framing of positive duties under Article 8, and on gender equality in measures aimed at reconciliation of family and working life.45 33.17 The meaning of ‘family’ evolves under Article 8. While EU measures, particularly on citizenship and migration, tend to define family as based on marriage with dependents, the ECtHR focuses on de facto rather than de jure ties.46 For instance, in light of an evolving European consensus, the ECtHR, applying Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR on non-discrimination, has brought its case law into line with the ‘international movement towards the legal recognition of same-sex unions’,47 if not, as yet, preventing states from excluding same-sex marriage.48 The CJEU’s approach is now consistent with the ECtHR in this respect.49 The notion of family life under Article 8 depends on the existence of close, continuing and practical ties.50 However, the legal status of marriage is also indicative of family life51 and a child born of wedlock is ipso jure part of the family from birth, even if the parents are not living together.52 It is long established that whether children are born within or without wedlock is irrelevant to the existence of family ties.53 Indeed the ECtHR assumes the existence of a family relationship between parent and child regardless of the family’s living arrangements,54 or apparent lack of commitment to the child,55 although events may break that family tie between a child and a non-resident parent. Relationships 42 Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee on Social Rights, 22 March 2018, 165: www.coe.int/en/web/ european-social-charter/-/new-version-of-the-digest-of-the-case-law-of-the-european-committee-of-social-rights. 43 Hatton and Others v United Kingdom App no 36022/97 (8 July 2003). 44 Genovese v Malta App no 53124/09 (11 Oct 2011). 45 Council of Europe, Guide to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2020): www.echr.coe.int/ documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf. 46 H Stalford, ‘Concepts of Family under EU Law: Lessons from the ECHR’ (2002) 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 410. 47 See Oliari and Others v Italy App Nos 18766/11, 36030/11 (21 July 2015). Council of Europe (n 45) 17. 48 See, for instance, Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (24 June 2010); L Hodson ‘A Marriage by Any Other Name? Schalk and Kopf v Austria’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 170. 49 See Coman (n 29). 50 The following account draws on the summary of the Strasbourg case law in Al-Nashif v Bulgaria App no 50963/99 (20 June 2002) [112]. 51 Abdulaziz Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom App nos 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81 (28 May 1985) [62]. 52 Berrehab v Netherlands App no 10730/84 (21 June 1988) [21]. 53 Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330; Johnston v Ireland (1986) 9 EHRR 203; Boughanemi v France (1996) 22 EHRR 228. 54 Berrehab (n 50). 55 Ahmut v Netherlands App no 21702/93 (28 Nov 1996).

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between siblings are also protected.56 However, as regards relationships between adult siblings, the ECtHR requires ‘further elements of dependency involving more than the normal emotional ties’ in order for family life to be recognised.57 Similarly, family life includes at least ties between near relatives and the extended family, such as between grandparents and grandchildren, or aunts/uncles and nieces/nephews, since such relatives may play a considerable part in family life.58 However, in Slivenko, the ECtHR held that the relationship between an adult child and a non-dependent parent is not family life, but rather covered as an aspect of the right to privacy unless there is evidence of further elements of dependency, involving more than the normal emotional ties.59 In X, Y and Z v UK60 the relationship between a female-to-male transsexual, his female partner and her child was recognised as constituting a family. Article 8 entails positive obligations, which in turn inform the approach of the ECSR to 33.18 Article 16 ESC. For instance, the ECSR has taken into account X and Y v The Netherlands,61 where the ECtHR clarified that the positive duties inherent in Article 8 reached into the ‘sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves’.62 A range of legal protections are required to ensure effective protection against domestic violence.63 An important Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruling on Articles 8 and 14 ECHR illustrates a 33.19 commitment to equality in the provision of parental leave. In Markin v Russia64 a male soldier, was not entitled to the generous parental leave the law afforded to female soldiers and civilians. The ECtHR held that this was in breach of Articles 8 and 14. While Article 8 does not entail a right to parental leave,65 once such leave and allowances are provided, they come within its scope. Accordingly, if a state does decide to create a parental leave scheme, it must do so in compliance with Article 14.66 In its discrimination analysis, the ECtHR drew a distinction between maternity leave, ‘which is intended to enable the woman to recover from the childbirth and to breastfeed her baby if she so wishes’, and parental leave and allowances which ‘relate to the subsequent period and are intended to enable a parent concerned to stay at home to look after an infant personally’.67 Setting itself against measures that would have the ‘effect of perpetuating gender stereotypes’, the ECtHR held the Russian law was ‘disadvantageous both to women’s careers and to men’s family life’.68 Noteworthy is the citation of two CJEU rulings, Griesmar69 and Roca Alvarez.70 As in many other fields, the ECtHR is drawing on EU standards for inspiration, so the EU system appears to

56 Moustaquim v Belgium App no 12313/86 (18 February 1991); Olssen v Sweden (1989) 11 EHRR 259; Boughanemi (n 51). 57 Javeed v The Netherlands App no 47390/99 (3 July 2001); Ezzoudhi v France App no 47160/99 (13 Feb 2001). 58 See, for example, Marckx (n 51), TS and JJ v Norway (dec) App no 15633/15 (11 Oct 2016), Boyle v UK (1994) 19 EHRR 179. 59 Slivenko v Latvia App no 48321/99 (9 Oct 2003). 60 X, Y and Z v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 143. 61 X and Y v The Netherlands App no 8978/80 (26 March 1985). 62 Ibid [23]. 63 The ECSR also draws on Recommendation Rec (2002) 5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the protection of women against violence and Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1681 (2004) on a campaign to combat domestic violence against women in Europe. Conclusions 2006, Statement of Interpretation on Art 16, p 14. 64 Markin v Russia App no 30078/06 (22 March 2012). See Weller v Hungary App no 44399/05 (31 March 2009), where the refusal to grant a maternity allowance to a married father and his two sons on account inter alia of the father’s parental status was found in breach of Arts 8 and 14 ECHR. See also, Di Trizio v Switzerland, App no 7186/09 (2 Feb 2016). 65 A point from which Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in Markin, ibid, dissented emphatically, stating that, ‘The right to parental leave is a Convention right’ (emphasis in original). Partly concurring, partly dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque. 66 Markin, ibid [130]. 67 Ibid [132]. 68 Ibid [141]. 69 Case C-366/99 Griesmar [2001] ECR I-9383. 70 Case C-104/09 Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA [2011] 1 CMLR 28.



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be influencing the wider Council of Europe system,71 a phenomenon well documented in other areas of ECHR equality law.72

II.  UN Treaties 33.20

The Explanation to Article 33 identifies only European human rights sources, although there are directly relevant UN and ILO standards. It would be regrettable if Article 33 was interpreted in a Eurocentric manner, without regard to international human rights standards. This could lead the EU to condone breaches of international human rights law, or less overtly, to undermine the importance of international standards. It would be a missed opportunity for the EU to engage constructively with the development of international human rights law. Regrettably, the CJEU’s citation of international human rights materials is ‘parsimonious’.73 As Costello observes, what is needed is ‘constructive human rights pluralism’, that is a mode of interaction between human rights regimes, whereby each cultivates a degree of openness to the others, while maintaining its own integrity.74 The EU has much to gain from robust engagement with international standards, as is illustrated in the account of relevant UN and ILO standards below. (a) UDHR

33.21 Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) deals with protection of the family, providing: (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

33.22

This reference to the right to marry and to found a family is reflected in turn in Article 12 ECHR and Article 9 of the Charter. The notion of the family’s entitlement to protection in Article 16(3) informs Article 10(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 16 ESC and Article 33 of the Charter. Article 25(1) UDHR sets out the entitlement to an adequate standard of living for everyone: (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and

71 See, for example, C Dautricourt, ‘A Strasbourg Perspective on the Autonomous Development of Fundamental Rights in EU Law: Trends and Implications’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper No 10/10, 2010), available at https:// jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/a-strasbourg-perspective-on-the-autonomous-development-of-fundamental-rights-ineu-law-trends-and-implications/. 72 S Besson, ‘Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain Meet?’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 647. FRA/Council of Europe, Handbook on European Non-discrimination Law (FRA/Council of Europe, 2010). The Handbook describes itself as ‘examin[ing] European non-discrimination law stemming from these two sources as complementary systems, drawing on them interchangeably to the extent that they overlap, while highlighting differences where these exist’. 73 I de Jesús Butler and O De Schutter, ‘Binding the EU to International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 27 Yearbook of European Law 277, 282. 74 C Costello, ‘Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration Detention under International Human Rights and EU Law’ (2012) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 257, 260, 261–72.

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the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

Article 25(2) singles out mothers and children, stating ‘Motherhood and childhood are entitled 33.23 to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.’ This approach, affording special rights to mothers, comes in for criticism nowadays, as the ECtHR ruling in Markin75 illustrates, for perpetuating gender stereotypes, and failing to allocate care burdens equally between men and women. (b) ICESCR The most pertinent ICESCR guarantee is Article 10, which, in Article 10(1), recognises the 33.24 family’s entitlement to ‘the widest possible protection and assistance’. Article 10(2) provides special protection to mothers in the form of paid maternity leave, but temporally limited for ‘a reasonable period before and after childbirth’. During such periods working mothers should be afforded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits. Article 10(3) deals with special protective measures for children. Notable for its absence is any mention of parental leave. Article 7 ICESCR on the right to just and favourable conditions of work is also relevant to 33.25 the Article 33 goal of a realisation of a more equitable balance between family and professional life. In a General Comment on Article 7, issued in 2016, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) noted that, in respect of equality in promotion, there should be ‘analysis of direct and indirect obstacles to promotion as well as introduction of measures including training and initiatives to reconcile work and family responsibilities, such as affordable day-care services for children and dependent adults’.76 Also important, in addition to maternity, parental and paternity leave,77 are limits on working hours, rest periods and paid holidays ‘to maintain an appropriate balance between professional, family and personal responsibilities and to avoid work-related stress, accidents and disease’.78 The CESCR has produced a relevant General Comment on equality for women.79 While it 33.26 endorses substantive gender equality, it has been criticised for failing ‘to modify the structure of work itself to fully engender the right to work’.80 For example, its comments on Article 6 ICESCR, the right to work, and Article 7, are stated to require that ‘in law and in practice, men and women have equal access to jobs at all levels and all occupations and that vocational training and guidance programmes, in both the public and private sectors, provide men and women with the skills, information and knowledge necessary for them to benefit equally from the right to work’. The Comment makes no mention of unequal caring burdens and their contribution to gender inequality in preventing women from participating in paid work on the same terms as men. Notwithstanding this criticism, it should also be noted that the CESCR has stipulated that the equal right to social security requires states to guarantee maternity, paternity and parental leaves.81

75 n 64. 76 CESCR General Comment 23, on the right to just and favourable conditions of work (Art 7 ICESCR), E/C.12/GC/23 (2016), para 32. 77 Ibid, para 44. 78 Ibid, para 34. 79 CESCR General Comment 16 on the Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social And Cultural Rights E/C.12/2005/3 (2005). 80 S Fredman, ‘Engendering Socio-Economic Rights’ (2009) 25 South African Journal of Human Rights 410, 432. 81 See n 76 [26].



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(c) CEDAW 33.27

For a more transformative approach to gender equality, scholars and activists unsurprisingly look to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Its Preamble highlights the socially transformative aims of the Convention: ‘Aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men and women’ and ‘[A]ware that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women and society as a whole’. Article 5 provides: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; (b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases.

33.28

33.29

While children are the ‘common responsibility’ of men and women, it does not explicitly posit equal parental responsibility. Notably, it does not refer to equality or non-discrimination, but only to power and disadvantage. By 1994 all current EU Members States were parties to CEDAW. Save for Estonia and Latvia, all are also state parties to the CEDAW Optional Protocol. Austria, France, Ireland, Italy and Malta have included reservations in their ratifications, some of which the CEDAW Committee view as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.82 Article 11(2) CEDAW deals with equality in employment, containing an impressive compendium of maternity rights: In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures: a.

to prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status; b. to introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances; c. to encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities; d. to provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.

33.30

Raday characterises Article 11(2) as instituting a ‘regime of transformative equality’.83 It protects against dismissal on grounds of pregnancy and enshrines paid maternity leave. However, unlike 82 See further, V Neubauer, How could the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) be implemented in the EU legal framework? (July 2011): www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/ 201109/20110909ATT26166/20110909ATT26166EN.pdf. 83 F Raday, ‘Article 11’ in M Freeman, C Chinkin, and B Rudolf (eds), The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary (Oxford, OUP, 2012) 279, 305.

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the EU and ILO instruments, it does not specify a required period of leave. It anticipates the need for policies to reconcile family and working life, but does not require states to establish social supports, but only, in Article 11(2)(c), to ‘encourage the provision of the necessary supporting services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life’ and ‘the establishment and development of a network of childcare facilities’. There is no express mention of parental or even paternal leave, but such leave is an aspect of Article 5(b)’s ‘recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children’. Under that provision, the CEDAW Committee encourages the introduction of parental leave, with incentives for men to take it up. It has expressly endorsed the ‘Scandinavian model’ of separate paid paternity leave for fathers as best practice.84 The 2019 Work-Life Balance Directive extends the existing EU-level right to parental leave and introduces, inter alia, a new right to paternity leave, which reflects this approach, with a payment or allowance subject to limits and definitions under national law as will be explored further below.85 (d) CRC As mentioned above, a children’s rights perspective is a useful corrective for EU policies which 33.31 focus on caring for children predominantly as an impediment to paid work, which ought to be alleviated by commodifying it as a service. Article 24 of the Charter integrates the ‘best interests’ principle into EU law, drawing on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), as the CJEU has acknowledged.86

III.  The European Social Charter and Revised European Social Charter (a)  Article 16, European Social Charter The Explanatory Note to Article 33(1) describes it as ‘based on’ Article 16 of the Council of Europe’s ESC, which provides:

33.32

With a view to ensuring the necessary conditions for the full development of the family, which is a fundamental unit of society, the Contracting Parties undertake to promote the economic, legal and social protection of family life by such means as social and family benefits, fiscal arrangements, provision of family housing, benefits for the newly married, and other appropriate means.

The text of Article 16 of the Revised European Social Charter (RESC) remains the same.87 The ECSR notes that family takes its meaning from national law and the ECtHR case law, 33.33 and ‘every constellation defined as “family” by domestic law is covered by Article 16. However

84 F Raday, ‘Gender and democratic citizenship: the impact of CEDAW’ (2012) International Journal of Constitutional Law 512, 526–27. 85 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Arts 4–5 and 8. 86 Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769; Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-505. 87 As of 28 December 2020, all EU Member States have ratified either the ESC or the RESC. 22 of the EU-27 had ratified the ESC and 20 had ratified the RESC. State Parties which ratify the ESC/RESC accept at least five of the seven core articles of the ESC. These are: the rights to work, organise, bargain collectively, social security, social and medical assistance, rights of the family to social, legal and medical protection and the protection of migrant workers—see: www.eurofound. europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/european-social-charter. In addition, states undertake to be bound by at least 10 of the 19 articles in Pt II or 45 of the 72 numbered paragraphs. For details of the articles and paragraphs accepted by each state, see: www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/country-profiles.



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33.34

33.35 33.36

domestic law must not provide for an unduly restrictive definition’.88 It is not restricted to family based on marriage and applies equally to lone parent families.89 A noteworthy element of Article 16 is its reference to ‘family housing’. This guarantee has been applied in several decisions on collective complaints concerning the right to housing of Roma families.90 It has been interpreted as providing a guarantee of a ‘right to decent housing for families’ interacting with Article 31 RESC on the right to housing.91 By contrast, the Charter does not contain a right to housing,92 although ‘housing assistance’ figures in Article 34(3) in order to combat social exclusion and poverty.93 Destruction of housing and forced evictions are contrary to Article 16, requiring effective remedies and restitution.94 The ECSR condemned the destruction of Roma settlements and expulsions of Roma by Italy and France in summer 2010 on this basis.95 It is unthinkable that such egregious conduct would not breach several Charter provisions, from the right to dignity, Article 1, to the general entitlement to equality before the law, Article 20, non-discrimination, Article 21, and Article 33(1), albeit that the latter is a soft principle. It is interesting to consider why recourse was had to the ESC rather than hard EU remedies, assuming that many of those expelled were EU citizens. Another important aspect of Article 16 relates to childcare facilities. States are required to ensure that childcare facilities are available, affordable and of good quality.96 ‘Legal Protection’ under Article 16 includes family law matters such as the rights and obligations of spouses, during marriage and in cases of family breakdown.97 Drawing on its reports, the ECSR has issued a Statement of Interpretation,98 which deals with the custodial rights of parents. It aims to ensure that any limitations on such rights ‘should be based on adequate and reasonable criteria laid down in legislation and should not go beyond what is necessary for the protection and best interest of the child and the rehabilitation of the family’. States’ family mediation services are examined under this provision.99 Article 16’s legal protections extend to protection against domestic violence. The ECSR takes into account the ECtHR case law, in particular, as mentioned

88 ECSR Digest (n 42) 163. 89 Ibid. 90 Complaint No 15/2003 European Roma Right Center (ERRC) v Greece; Complaint No 31/2005 European Roma Right Center (ERRC) v Bulgaria (violation of Art 16 taken together with Art E). Cf Complaint No 51/2008 European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v France, where it was deemed unnecessary to examine Art 16, as the decision was based on the express right to housing under Art 31 ESC. 91 Ibid, ERRC v Bulgaria, decision on admissibility of 10 Oct 2005, para 9. See ECSR Digest (n 42) 163. 92 For comparison of the Charter with other instruments, see L Lazarus, C Costello, N Ghanea and K Zeigler, The Evolution of Fundamental Rights Charters and Caselaw: A Comparison of the United Nations, Council of Europe and European Union systems of human rights protection (Brussels, European Parliament, 2011) 182. 93 Under Art 34(3), in order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the EU ‘recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by European Union law and national laws and practices’. In Case C-571/10 Kamberaj, EU:C:2012:233, the CJEU used it to interpret the scope of the equal treatment guarantee under Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of long-term resident third country nationals. It held that the Directive’s reference to ‘social security, social assistance and social protection’ could include housing benefit. 94 Conclusions XIII-1, Turkey, pp 258–59; Conclusions XIII-3, Turkey, pp 381–85. 95 Complaint No 58/2009 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy; Complaint No 63/2010 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v France 28 June 2011. See A Nolan ‘“Aggravated Violations”, Roma Housing Rights and Forced Expulsions in Italy: Recent Developments under the European Social Charter Collective Complaints System’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 343. 96 Conclusions XVII-1, Turkey, p 490. 97 Conclusions XVI-1, United Kingdom, p 699. 98 European Social Charter (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2011, Vol 1, p 10. 99 Conclusions 2006, General Introduction, Comments on Article 16, p 12.

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above, X and Y v The Netherlands.100 A range of legal protections are required to ensure effective protection against domestic violence.101 ‘Economic protection’ includes family and child benefit under social security systems. 33.37 The ECSR has developed a ‘sufficiency’ test, based on the ‘median equivalised income’.102 Finally, State Parties must ensure equal treatment of citizens of other State Parties who are lawfully resident or regularly working in their territory with respect to family benefits.103 (b)  Article 8, European Social Charter The Explanatory Note provides that Article 33(2) is based partly on Article 8 ESC, entitled ‘The right of employed women to protection of maternity’. Maternity is defined in the Explanation as ‘the period from conception to weaning’. Article 8 ESC provides:

33.38

With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of employed women to protection, the Contracting Parties undertake: 1. 2.

3. 4.

to provide either by paid leave, by adequate social security benefits or by benefits from public funds for women to take leave before and after childbirth up to a total of at least 12 weeks; to consider it as unlawful for an employer to give a woman notice of dismissal during her absence on maternity leave or to give her notice of dismissal at such a time that the notice would expire during such absence; to provide that mothers who are nursing their infants shall be entitled to sufficient time off for this purpose; a.  to regulate the employment of women workers on night work in industrial employment; b. to prohibit the employment of women workers in underground mining, and, as appropriate, on all other work which is unsuitable for them by reason of its dangerous, unhealthy, or arduous nature.

Maternity Leave and Benefits Article 8 RESC extends the minimum period of paid maternity leave laid down in the ESC to 33.39 14 weeks. While the ECSR accepts national laws allowing women to opt for shorter maternity leave, in all cases there must be a compulsory period of no less than six weeks.104 As Article 8 aims to protect both women and children, various means are acceptable to ensure that women genuinely choose how to take the period of leave, whilst still ensuring a period of compulsory post-natal leave. Maternity leave must be accompanied by the continued payment of the individual’s wage or 33.40 salary or by the payment of social security benefits or benefits from public funds. Regardless of the modality, the payment should be ‘adequate’ which means not less than 70 per cent of the previous wage.105 The minimum rate of compensation must not fall below the poverty threshold

100 n 61. 101 The ECSR draws on Recommendation Rec (2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on the protection of women against violence, and Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1681 (2004) on a campaign to combat domestic violence against women in Europe. Conclusions 2006. See (n 98) p 12. 102 Median equivalised income (Eurostat): ‘the income of a household is established by summing all monetary income received from any source by each member of the household. In order to reflect differences in household size and composition, this total is divided by the number of “equivalent adults” using a standard scale (the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale)’. See (n 98), pp 12–13. 103 ECSR Digest (n 42) p 168. 104 Conclusions X-I-X-4 2011, Statement of Interpretation on Art 8(1). 105 Conclusions 2015, Statement of Interpretation on Art 8(1). ECSR Digest (n 42) p 116.



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of 50 per cent of median equivalised income.106 The ECSR accepts qualifying periods, but these must be reasonable. It has deemed periods of unemployment as counting towards the calculation of those qualifying periods.107 Protection against Dismissal 33.41

Protection from dismissal must be from the time the employee notifies the employer of her pregnancy to the end of their maternity leave.108 While the protection against dismissal under Article 8(2) applies equally to women on fixed-term and open-ended contracts, it is not absolute. In contrast to the CJEU case law, it permits dismissal if the period prescribed in the employment contract expires.109 In addition, Article 8(2) allows limited exceptions in certain cases such as misconduct of such gravity as to justify terminating the employment relationship and if the undertaking ceases to operate. In the case of dismissal contrary to Article 8(2), reinstatement of the woman should be the rule but, if this is not possible, ‘adequate compensation must be ensured’.110 The ECSR in 2011 issued a Statement of Interpretation on Articles 8(2) and 27(3): ceiling on compensation for unlawful dismissal.111 Its terms are redolent of the CJEU case law on effective remedies,112 requiring that ‘compensation for unlawful dismissal must be both proportionate to the loss suffered by the victim and sufficiently dissuasive for employers’. Accordingly, ‘[a]ny ceiling on compensation that may preclude damages from being commensurate with the loss suffered and sufficiently dissuasive are proscribed’. Breastfeeding Leave

33.42 Article 8(3) requires women to be afforded ‘sufficient’ time off for breastfeeding. The ECSR has deemed diverse national practices to meet this requirement. It has accepted legislation providing for two daily breaks for a period of one year for breastfeeding, or two half-hour breaks where the employer provides a room for breastfeeding;113 a one-hour break each working day;114 and entitlement to begin or leave work earlier.115 The CJEU ruling in Roca Álvarez116 has placed these types of leave under stricter scrutiny. Where in practice they serve to allow time-off for childcare generally (rather than breastfeeding specifically), then reserving them exclusively to mothers rather than fathers will offend the EU equality guarantees. Night Work and Dangerous Work 33.43

The ECSR has issued detailed guidance on these provisions, to ensure that protective measures are not used to exclude women from employment.117

106 Ibid. See (n 102) on the definition of median equivalised income. 107 Conclusions XV-2, France, p 197. 108 ECSR Digest (n 40) p 117. 109 Conclusions 2005, Estonia, pp 144–45. 110 Conclusions 2005, Cyprus. See ECSR Digest (n 40) p 118. 111 Conclusions 2011, General Introduction, Statement of Interpretation on Arts 8(2) and 27(3): ceiling on compensation for unlawful dismissal, p 15. 112 Case C-14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR-1891. 113 Conclusions I 1969, Italy, p 51. 114 Conclusion I 1969, Germany, p 191. 115 Conclusions 2005, France, p 228. 116 n 70. 117 Conclusions X-2 1990, Statement of Interpretation on Art 8(4), p 97. Conclusions X-2, Statement of Interpretation on Art 8(5), p 97.

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(c)  Article 27, Revised European Social Charter The Explanation to Article 33(2) provides that it is partly based on Article 27 RESC on ‘The right 33.44 of workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities and equal treatment’. Article 27 has its roots in ILO Convention 156 and ILO Recommendation 165 discussed below.118 Article 27 is concerned with the rights of both men and women workers with family responsibilities. It provides as follows: With a view to ensuring the exercise of the right to equality of opportunity and treatment for men and women workers with family responsibilities and between such workers and other workers, the Parties undertake: 1.

to take appropriate measures: a. to enable workers with family responsibilities to enter and remain in employment, as well as to re-enter employment after an absence due to those responsibilities, including measures in the field of vocational guidance and training; b. to take account of their needs in terms of conditions of employment and social security; c. to develop or promote services, public or private, in particular child daycare services and other childcare arrangements; 2. to provide a possibility for either parent to obtain, during a period after maternity leave, parental leave to take care of a child, the duration and conditions of which should be determined by national legislation, collective agreements or practice; 3. to ensure that family responsibilities shall not, as such, constitute a valid reason for termination of employment.

The Appendix to the RESC provides that ‘[i]t is understood that this article applies to men and 33.45 women workers with family responsibilities in relation to their dependent children as well as in relation to other members of their immediate family who clearly need their care or support where such responsibilities restrict their possibilities of preparing for, entering, participating on or advancing in economic activity. The terms ‘dependent children’ and ‘other members of their immediate family who clearly need their care and support’ mean persons defined as such by the national legislation of the Party concerned’. The ECtHR has made reference to Article 27 on numerous occasions.119 In its pronouncements 33.46 on Article 27(1)(b), the ECSR seems to be developing a right to demand working time adaptation for workers with family responsibilities. For instance, it has held that workers with family responsibilities should be allowed to work part-time or to return to full-time employment.120 The ECSR insists that parental leave under Article 27(2) is distinct from maternity or paternity leave, which fall under Article 8(1).121 If the state is bound by Article 16, its provisions apply to childcare.122 The ECSR has shown an awareness of the importance of encouraging men to take up parental leave, and has stated that leave should be an ‘individual right’ and ‘[w]ith a view to promoting equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women, the leave should, in principle, be provided on a non-transferable basis to each parent’, and it ‘recalls in this respect that remuneration of parental leave (be it continuation of pay or via social assistance/social

118 Council of Europe, 1996, ‘Explanatory Report to the European Social Charter’ (Revised), para 103. See E Caracciolo di Torella, ‘Article 27 RESC’ in in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 346–48. 119 For example, Markin (n 64). 120 Conclusions 2005, Statement of Interpretation on Art 27(1)(b); see, for example, Estonia, p 213. 121 Conclusions 2011, Vol 2, France, p 478. 122 ECSR Digest (n 42) p 214.



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security benefits) plays a vital role in the take up of childcare leave, in particular for fathers or lone parents’.123 As with Article 8(2), the same provisions protection against dismissal for exercising rights under Article 27 are applicable at least equivalent to the protection against discriminatory dismissal.124 Article 27 has influenced the Work-Life Balance Directive, which, by guaranteeing parental leave for each parent, introducing paternity leave, carers’ leave, and the right to request flexible working, as outlined below, marks a significant stride forwards towards the provision of adequate leave for workers with family responsibilities and a more equal distribution of caring responsibilities between women and men.125 33.47 There have been several attempts to rely on Article 27 in collective complaints. In Complaint No 139/2016 Central Union for Child Welfare v Finland,126 the complainants alleged that new Finnish legislation which restricted the individual entitlement to early childhood education and care to 20 hours per week where one of the parents is unemployed or on maternity, paternity or parental leave for a sibling, was contrary to Article 27 as well as Articles 16 and 17 ESC. The ECSR observed that the concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning of Article 27 includes both persons who work and unemployed persons seeking work.127 All workers who have family responsibilities should be treated equally under the law.128 Applying the interpretation of the Appendix to the RESC on the scope of Article 27, the ECSR noted that ‘[Article 27] applies [to] female and male workers with family responsibilities in relation to their dependent children as well as to other members of their immediate family who are also dependent, where such responsibilities restrict their opportunities to prepare for, enter, participate or advance in economic activity’.129 The complainants argued that the application of the new legislation made it more difficult for the unemployed parent to return to work after an absence due to family responsibilities. The ECSR found that the Finnish law was contrary to Article 27. For the right in Article 27 to be exercised effectively, states must ‘undertake to take “appropriate measures” to develop or promote child day-care services. The care services to which reference is being made are therefore the tools at the service of the right to equal opportunities and treatment granted by Article 27 to parents who work or are seeking for a job. Therefore, the notion of equality is inherent in the very recognition of this right’.130 The ECSR concluded that Finland had failed to provide ‘an objective or reasonable justification for this difference in treatment between parents who are unemployed or on leave and working parents with regard to their access to childcare services, which penalises those who are in most need of support to be able to enter or re-enter employment’ and, therefore, Article 27 was violated.131 Significantly, the ECSR called in aid Article 24 of the Charter on the rights of the child and Article 33, Principle 11 of the EU Social Pillar on ‘Childcare and support to children’, and the Barcelona objectives of the EU and Member States setting targets for ‘high quality and affordable’ childcare.132 123 Conclusions 2011, Vol 2, Netherlands, p 870; Conclusions 2011, Turkey. 124 Art 27(3) RESC. See ECSR Digest (n 42) p 215. 125 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6). 126 ECSR decision on the merits of the complaint, 11 Sept 2019: www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/ processed-complaints/-/asset_publisher/5GEFkJmH2bYG/content/no-139-2016-central-union-for-child-welfare-cucw-vfinland. 127 Ibid, para 36. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid, para 93. 131 Ibid, paras 95–96. 132 Ibid, paras 25–27. Principle 11 of the Social Pillar provides that ‘a. Children have the right to affordable early childhood education and care of good quality’ and ‘b. Children have the right to protection from poverty. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds have the right to specific measures to enhance equal opportunities’. For the Barcelona objectives see (n 19) and Presidency Conclusions, Barcelona European Council 15–16 March 2002: www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/71025.pdf.

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This recognises the linear connection between work-life balance for workers as parents and carers, equal opportunities and treatment for workers with family responsibilities, and affordable, high quality childcare available to all. Two other complaints concerned France. In Complaint No 9/2000 Confédération Française 33.48 de l’Encadrement CFE-CGC v France,133 the complainant organisation, representing managers, argued that their exclusion from a law providing for the reduction of working hours was a breach of Article 27, as well as Articles 2(1) and 4(2) RESC.134 While the claim based on the latter provisions succeeded, the ECSR was unwilling to take an expansive reading of Article 27. The complainant argued that that the absence of a maximum weekly limit denied to managerial staff a reduction in working time that would allow them to reconcile family and professional life. It claimed that managers were thus excluded from what it construed as the main objective of the legislation, the better organisation of working life by permitting more free time for employees to spend with their families. Article 27 required states to take measures in favour of workers with family responsibilities. However, in its view, this was not the ‘direct purpose’ of the legislation.135 In addition, ‘the ground relied on by the complainant trade union is not that the Government failed to take positive measures. Accordingly, the argument advanced is irrelevant’. On this scanty basis, the ECSR concluded that the situation complained of was not contrary to Article 27.136 A similar attempt to rely on both Article 20 (non-discrimination) and Article 27 failed in Complaint No 56/2009 Confédération Française de l’Encadrement CFE-CGC v France,137 where the ECSR held that the legal issues were considered under the other heads of argument. These two rulings are disappointing, a failed opportunity to clarify the content of Article 27. They may be explicable by the ECSR’s choice to rely on more widely ratified provisions. The tentative approach is in contrast to the more robust statements in its 2011 Conclusions set out above.

IV.  Other Sources (a) ILO Conventions Several binding International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and non-binding 33.49 recommendations are pertinent to the issue of the reconciliation of family and working life. The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 111, of 1958 is highly relevant. All EU Member States have ratified this Convention, one of the eight ‘fundamental’ conventions.138 However, the most pertinent ILO norms to reconciliation of family and professional life are, firstly, Convention 183 on Maternity Protection (Revised) of 2000,139 which is influenced by the Pregnant Workers Directive, and the accompanying Recommendation 191, also of 2000. 133 ECSR decision on the merits of the complaint, 16 Nov 2001: www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/ processed-complaints/-/asset_publisher/5GEFkJmH2bYG/content/no-9-2000-confederation-francaise-de-l-encadrementcfe-cgc-v-france. 134 Art 2(1) RESC: ‘to provide for reasonable daily and weekly working hours, the working week to be progressively reduced to the extent that the increase of productivity and other relevant factors permit’. Art 4(2) RESC: ‘to recognise the right of workers to an increased rate of remuneration for overtime work, subject to exceptions in particular cases’. 135 Complaint No 56/2009 (n 129) [54]. 136 Ibid [55]. 137 ECSR decision on the merits of the complaint, 23 June 2010: www.coe.int/en/web/european-socialcharter/processed-complaints/-/asset_publisher/5GEFkJmH2bYG/content/no-56-2009-confederation-francaisede-l-encadrement-cfe-cgc-v-france. 138 For the list of fundamental conventions, see the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998): www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm. 139 Country ratification data can be found on Normlex at: www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en.



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33.50

Secondly, there is Convention 156 on Workers with Family Responsibilities, of 1981, and the separate Recommendation 165, also of 1981, which are sources of Article 27 RESC and therefore, can be interpreted in situations within the scope of Article 33. Notably, the ILO’s list of eight ‘fundamental’ conventions does not include these two indicating a lack of priority towards workers’ family rights. As of 28 December 2020, 14 EU Member States had ratified Convention 183,140 while 13 had ratified Convention 156.141 Only these Member States are bound by the conventions in international law. Turning firstly to the Maternity Protection Convention, 183, it is important to appreciate that the ILO pioneered maternity protection in the workplace, with its first Convention on this topic dating from 1919.142 Its current iteration applies to all workers. States are permitted to exclude categories of women workers from the scope of the Convention.143 The right to maternity leave in Article 4 is for 14 weeks, identical to the Pregnant Workers Directive, with the Recommendation referring to 18 weeks, the higher level sought by the Commission in its proposal to amend that Directive, as discussed below.144 The payment granted should normally be no less than two-thirds of previous earnings. Article 6(3) of the Convention provides: Where, under national law or practice, cash benefits paid with respect to leave referred to in Article 4 are based on previous earnings, the amount of such benefits shall not be less than two-thirds of the woman’s previous earnings or of such of those earnings as are taken into account for the purpose of computing benefits.

33.51

The Recommendation, in contrast, envisages full pay. The Convention protects against dismissal and enshrines the right to return to work. Article 8 provides: 1. It shall be unlawful for an employer to terminate the employment of a woman during her pregnancy or absence on leave referred to in Articles 4 or 5 or during a period following her return to work to be prescribed by national laws or regulations, except on grounds unrelated to the pregnancy or birth of the child and its consequences or nursing. The burden of proving that the reasons for dismissal are unrelated to pregnancy or childbirth and its consequences or nursing shall rest on the employer. 2. A woman is guaranteed the right to return to the same position or an equivalent position paid at the same rate at the end of her maternity leave.

33.52 Article 9 guarantees non-discrimination on grounds of maternity: 1. Each Member shall adopt appropriate measures to ensure that maternity does not constitute a source of discrimination in employment, including … access to employment. 2. Measures referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include a prohibition from requiring a test for pregnancy or a certificate of such a test when a woman is applying for employment, except where required by national laws or regulations in respect of work that is: (a) prohibited or restricted for pregnant or nursing women under national laws or regulations; or (b) where there is a recognised or significant risk to the health of the woman and child.

140 Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 141 Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Greece, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 142 Convention No 3 on Maternity Protection 1919. It provided for 12 weeks’ leave, with sufficient benefits. 143 Art 2(2): ‘[E]ach Member which ratifies this Convention may, after consulting the representative organisations of employers and workers concerned, exclude wholly or partly from the scope of the Convention limited categories of workers when its application to them would raise special problems of a substantial nature’. 144 See n 180.

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33.53

Article 10 provides for breastfeeding breaks: 1. 2.

A woman shall be provided with the right to one or more daily breaks or a daily reduction of hours of work to breastfeed her child. The period during which nursing breaks or the reduction of daily hours of work are allowed, their number, the duration of nursing breaks and the procedures for the reduction of daily hours of work shall be determined by national law and practice. These breaks or the reduction of daily hours of work shall be counted as working time and remunerated accordingly.

The second measure, Convention 156 on Workers with Family Responsibilities was adopted 33.54 in 1981 following what has been described as an international feminist campaign.145 The Convention supersedes the 1965 Recommendation on Women Workers with Family Responsibilities.146 It was in part inspired by CEDAW.147 The Convention and its accompanying Recommendation,165,148 have two aims: first, to allow workers with family responsibilities to engage in work without discrimination, and secondly to reconcile work and family responsibilities, in particular by ensuring childcare provision. Notably, it applies not only to workers with children, but also, under Article 1(2), where there is an ‘other member of the immediate family who clearly needs care or support’. The accompanying Recommendation goes further, envisaging parental leave and paternity leave as well as eldercare provision. This broader vision was undoubtedly influential on the decision of the Commission to propose new carers’ rights now contained in the Work-Life Balance Directive. The core right under Article 3(1) of the Convention is non-discrimination: 33.55 With a view to creating effective equality of opportunity and treatment for men and women workers, each Member shall make it an aim of national policy to enable persons with family responsibilities who are engaged or wish to engage in employment to exercise their right to do so without being subject to discrimination and, to the extent possible, without conflict between their employment and family responsibilities.

The Convention provides protection against dismissal.149 Most of its other provisions are 33.56 programmatic; for instance, Article 4 on free choice and conditions of employment, and Article 5 on community planning and community services, including childcare. Overall then, the Convention is a flexible instrument, which at best can help to support the formulation of appropriate domestic policies relating to equal treatment and work-life balance. Nevertheless, according to Caracciolo di Torella, ‘it has played an important role in triggering a debate on work/life conflict’ because it is based on the assumption that this conflict ‘is not restricted to women and can be the source of two types of discrimination: between workers with and without family responsibilities and between female and male workers’.150 (b)  The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers The non-binding Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989 served 33.57 as a programme for legislative action for EU labour law for a time and was a driver for the

145 L Savery, Engendering the State: The International Diffusion of Women’s Human Rights (Abingdon, Routledge, 2007) 74. For analysis, see E Caracciolo di Torella, ‘ILO Convention 156’ in in E Ales, M Bell, O Deinert and S Robin-Oliver (eds), International and European Labour Law (Baden-Baden, Nomos, Beck and Hart Publishing, 2018) 1142–49. 146 Employment (Women with Family Responsibilities) Recommendation 1965 (No 123). 147 Raday (n 83) 281. 148 Which supersedes the Employment (Women with Family Responsibilities) Recommendation 1965. 149 Art 8, under which family responsibilities shall not, as such, constitute a valid reason for termination of employment. 150 See n 145, p 1142.



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eventual adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000.151 Article 16, on equal treatment for men and women, states that ‘Measures should also be developed enabling men and women to reconcile their occupational and family obligations’. However, it did not specify which sorts of policies were appropriate, nor did it identify unequal caring burdens as a particularly intractable manifestation of gender inequality. Notably, the Charter contained no reference to pregnancy or maternity. The notion of fair remuneration in the Charter suggests the male, or at least the ‘main breadwinner’ model, in that it refers to an equitable wage in Article 5(3), as ‘enabling the worker … to continue to enjoy the necessary means of subsistence for himself and his family’. (c)  EU Legislative Sources 33.58 The Explanation to Article 33(2) notes that it draws on the Pregnant Workers Directive152 and the Parental Leave Directive.153 The Parental Leave Directive has been repealed and replaced by the Directive on Work-Life Balance.154 The provisions on maternity rights, protection against dismissal and parental leave are considered in this section, whereas the new rights contained in the Work-Life Balance Directive are analysed in section D. Pregnant workers 33.59 The Pregnant Workers Directive, 92/85155 was adopted to protect the health and safety at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding, based on the provision now contained in Article 153(1)(a) TFEU. The ‘health and safety’ ethos of the measure is complemented by the strong equality-based protections for women during maternity in the case law of the CJEU treating discrimination of pregnant workers and those on maternity leave as direct sex discrimination.156 Article 33(2), in contrast, frames the right to ‘protection from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave’ as aiming to ‘reconcile family and professional life’. In Kiiski,157 the CJEU referred to the ESC and RESC in coming to the conclusion that ‘the right to maternity leave granted to pregnant workers must be regarded as a particularly important mechanism of protection under employment law’. 33.60 The Directive applies to ‘workers’ which is construed broadly in light of the meaning given to that term in the internal market context and under the equal pay guarantee in Article 157 TFEU, so that it may include those not regarded as ‘employees’ under national law, such as a remunerated company director.158 This is explored further in section D.II below. Notably, the entitlement to maternity pay may be made conditional on previous employment of up to 12 months prior to

151 Adopted on 9 December 1989 by 11 of the then 12 Member States: www.aedh.eu/en/the-community-charterof-fundamental-social-rights-of-workers-december-9th-1989/. 152 Directive 92/85 (n 4). 153 Now Directive 2010/18 (n 5). 154 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6). 155 n 4. 156 Case C-177/88 Dekker [1990] ECR I-3941; Case C-179/88 Hertz [1990] ECR I-3979; Case C-32/93 Webb v EMO [1994] ECR I-3567. However, the equality guarantee in Art 157 TFEU does not extend to ensure equal pay between a man who remains at work and a woman who is on maternity leave as their situations cannot be compared. See Case C-342/93 Gillespie [1996] ECR I-475. 157 Case C-116/06 Kiiski [2007] ECR I-7643 [49]. 158 Case C-232/09 Dita Danosa [2010] ECR I-11405 [46].

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the presumed date of confinement.159 The Directive provides for a continuous period of at least 14 weeks’ maternity leave, of which the two weeks before or after confinement is compulsory leave.160 Workers on leave are entitled to an ‘adequate allowance’ during that leave which is equivalent to sick pay under the employment contract or sickness benefit under national law.161 The CJEU in Boyle held that the right to take the leave can be waived by the worker except for the compulsory leave.162 Extending this logic a stage further, in Montull, the CJEU ruled that a mother who is an employed person within the scope of the Directive can be permitted to voluntarily assign part of her maternity leave to the father after the two-week period of compulsory maternity leave has been taken.163 Other provisions include an obligation on an employer to conduct a risk assessment where a pregnant worker’s activities put them at ‘specific risk’,164 and a right to take time off for ante-natal examinations.165 The Directive includes a provision on defence of rights, analysed further in section D.V.166 Under Article 10, it is prohibited for an employer to dismiss a worker falling within the scope 33.61 of the Directive during the period from the beginning of pregnancy until the end of maternity leave.167 If such a worker is dismissed, the employer ‘must cite duly substantiated grounds for her dismissal in writing’ and Member States must ‘take the necessary measures to protect workers … from consequences of [unlawful] dismissal’.168 Protection against dismissal under Article 10 has subsumed the case law under the Equal Treatment Directive,169 but that jurisprudence remains pertinent given its broader personal scope and applicability to a wider range of scenarios such as refusals to hire or to renew fixed-term contracts on grounds of pregnancy. However, Article 10(1) has a caveat. It prohibits dismissal of workers within the scope of the Directive ‘save in exceptional cases, not connected with their condition which are permitted under national legislation and/or practice’. Problematically, in Porras Guisado,170 the CJEU, when considering this exception, gave precedence to the managerial prerogative of the employer to make redundancies within the scheme of the Collective Redundancies Directive, 98/59,171 over the prohibition of dismissal in Article 10. The referring court asked whether Spanish legislation, which made no provision for workers falling within the scope of the Pregnant Workers Directive to be afforded priority for retention in employment in cases of collective redundancy, was compatible with Article 10.172 In its judgment, the CJEU differentiated strictly between the individual rights of workers within the scope of the Pregnant Workers Directive and the duties of the employer in the event of a collective redundancy under Directive 98/59. It determined, firstly, that Article 10 must not be

159 Directive 92/85 (n 4), Art 11(1), 11(2)(b) and 11(4). 160 Ibid, Art 8. 161 Ibid, Art 11(1), (2) and (3). 162 See Case C-411/96 Boyle v Equal Opportunities Commission, 1998 ECR I-6401 [58]. 163 Case C-5/12 Betriu Montull v INSS, EU:C:2013:571 [58]. 164 Directive 92/85 (n 4), Art 4(1). This includes activities where the worker is at ‘specific risk of exposure to the agents, processes or working conditions of which a non-exhaustive list is given in Annex I, the employer shall assess the nature, degree and duration of the exposure, in the undertaking and/or establishment concerned’. 165 Ibid, Art 9. 166 Ibid, Art 12. See Case C-63/08 Pontin v T-Comalux SA [2009] ECR I-10467. 167 Ibid, Art 10(1). 168 Ibid, Arts 10(2) and (3). 169 Directive 2006/54 (n 26). 170 Case C-103/16 Jessica Porras Guisado v Bankia SA and Others, EU:C:2018:99. 171 Council Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies [1998] OJ L225/16 (as corrected by Corrigendum [2007] OJ L59). 172 Case C-103/16 (n 170) [28].



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interpreted as precluding national legislation that permits the dismissal of a pregnant worker because of a collective redundancy.173 Secondly, provided that objective criteria are used to identify the workers to be made redundant, a pregnant worker may be dismissed in the context of a collective redundancy.174 Thirdly, national legislation that gives no priority in a collective redundancy situation to pregnant workers is not precluded; however, Member States may provide a higher level of protection for those workers.175 The CJEU failed to consider the fundamental right to protection against dismissal in Article 33(2) and, as Lehoczky and Kresal observe, this ‘regrettable interpretation … sets the level of protection significantly lower than the ECSR jurisprudence’ which permits dismissal ‘only when maintaining employment is impossible for objective reasons, or when the employer is guilty of serious misconduct’.176 33.62 Notably, the proposal to amend the Pregnant Workers Directive in 2008,177 in a significant shift of emphasis, would, if it had been adopted, have based a revised version of the Directive not only on health and safety, Art 153(1)(a) TFEU, but also on equality, Art 157 TFEU. The most significant change envisaged was the extension of maternity leave from 14 to 18 weeks. The proposal would also have reflected the case law on pregnancy dismissal and clarified rights on return to work. It also included a right to request flexible working on return to work, akin to that now applicable under the 2010 Recast Parental Leave Directive and developed further in the 2019 Work-Life Balance Directive. Parental Leave 33.63 The Explanation states that Article 33(2) draws on Directive 96/34/EC on parental leave which gives effect to the first framework agreement to emerge from the EU’s social dialogue structures.178 Directive 96/34 was repealed and recast by Directive 2010/18 following a decision by the European social partners to revise the framework agreement.179 In turn, the recast Parental Leave Directive is repealed, with effect from 2 August 2022, by the Directive on Work-Life Balance, a broader and more far-reaching piece of legislation adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure.180 The Parental Leave Directive, as recast, aims to lay down minimum requirements to facilitate 33.64 the reconciliation of parental and professional responsibilities for working parents. It is narrower in personal scope than the Pregnant Workers Directive, being confined to workers with ‘an employment contract or employment relationship’ as defined in national law.181 It increased the minimum period of parental leave from three months in the original Directive to four months, with leave to be taken on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a child as an individual right for each worker to take care of that child until a given age up to eight years.182 In principle, the leave

173 Ibid, point 1 of the operative part of the judgment. 174 Ibid, point 2. 175 Ibid, point 4. 176 CK Lehoczky and B Kresal, ‘Article 33—Family and Professional Life’ in F Dorssemont, K Lörcher, S Clauwaert and M Schmitt, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Employment Relation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2019) 583, 596. 177 COM (2008) 600/4. 178 Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1996] OJ L 145/4. 179 Directive 2010/18/EU (n 5). 180 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6). 181 Directive 2010/18 (n 5), annexed framework agreement, cl 1(2) and (3). 182 Ibid, cl 2(1).

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should be ‘non-transferable’ between working parents to promote equal treatment between men and women, but in practice, only one month must be non-transferable, giving considerable scope for variation between national regimes.183 Clause 5(5) of the annexed framework agreement makes clear that whether parental leave is paid is a matter for the Member States ‘taking into account the role of income—among other factors—in the take up of parental leave’. The Directive allows for maximum flexibility of application. Member States are given wide discretion in applying both the conditions of access and the detailed rules ‘as long as the minimum requirements of this agreement are respected’.184 Clause 5(1) gives workers the right to return to the same job at the end of a period of parental 33.65 leave, but ‘if that is not possible, to an equivalent or similar job’ consistent with their employment contract.185 Clause 5(2) provides that rights ‘acquired or in the process of being acquired by the worker on the date on which parental leave starts shall be maintained as they stand until the end of parental leave’. At the end of the leave, these rights must apply including any changes arising from national law and collective agreements. Clause 5(4) prohibits less favourable treatment or dismissal on the grounds of an application for, or the taking of, parental leave. This amounts to a general non-discrimination clause. Clause 6 added a new right not included in Directive 96/34. It grants workers a limited right to request flexible working on returning to work from parental leave. Workers can request changes to their working hours and/or patterns for a set period of time. Employers ‘shall consider and respond to such requests, taking into account both employers’ and workers’ needs’ with the modalities left to national law. This right is broadened in Article 9 of the Work-Life Balance Directive which will provide the right to both parents and carers, as defined in that Directive and discussed in section D.186 In addition to parental leave, clause 7 provides workers, in general, with a right to take time off in an emergency situation for urgent family reasons (force majeure).187 Finally, under Article 2 of the Directive, Member States must determine what penalties are applicable for infringements. Such penalties ‘shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. As outlined in section A above, the Work-Life Balance Directive, 2019/1158,188 which replaces 33.66 the Parental Leave Directive when it passes its transposition date, introduces a discrete selection of new EU law rights for workers to paternity leave, carers’ leave, and a broader right to request flexible working. This expansion of rights is consistent with the work-life balance and gender equality principles flowing from the Social Pillar which are, in turn, inspired by Article 33(2), but they are not sources of the Charter right. Therefore, in this part of the chapter, on the sources of the Charter provisions, our focus is only on the parental leave dimension. The remaining

183 Ibid, cl 2(2). 184 Ibid, cll 3 and 4. Areas of discretion include: granting parental leave on a full-time or part-time basis; making the right to parental leave subject to a work or service qualification up to a period of one year but, in the case of successive fixed-term contracts, the overall duration of such contracts is to be taken into account for purposes of calculating the qualifying period; defining circumstances where, subject to consultation rights, parental leave can be postponed for ‘justifiable reasons related to the operation of the organisation’; making special arrangements to meet the operational and organisational requirements of small and medium-sized undertakings; establishing notice periods to be given by the employer to the worker when exercising the right to parental leave, specifying the beginning and the end of leave; assessing the need to adjust the modalities to meet the needs of parents of children with a disability or long-term illness; and assessing the need for additional measures to address the specific needs of adoptive parents. 185 See Case C-7/12 Riežniece v Zemkopības ministrija and Lauku atbalsta dienesis, EU:C:2013:410 [54]. The CJEU ruled that an employer ‘may not render nugatory the right of a worker who has taken parental leave to be transferred to another post by offering that worker a post which is due to be abolished’. 186 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6). 187 This provision is unchanged in Art 7 of Directive 2019/1158, ibid. 188 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6).



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features of the Work-Life Balance Directive will be analysed in section D. As with the Parental Leave Directive, the Work-Life Balance Directive has aims that include the ‘reconciliation of work and family life for workers who are parents’.189 As regards parental leave, the Directive does not define parents beyond those who are the parents or adopters of a child but Member States ‘are encouraged’ to grant the right ‘to all workers who exercise parental responsibilities within the national legal systems’.190 The minimum period of parental leave remains at four months and it must be taken before a child reaches a specified age up to the age of eight.191 The provision on workers on parental leave receiving a payment or an allowance is somewhat stronger than in the Parental Leave Directive. Member States must ensure a payment or an allowance for workers who exercise their right to take parental leave but ‘such payment or allowance shall be defined by the Member State or the social partners and shall be set up in such a way as to facilitate the take-up of parental leave by both parents’.192 This is very ambiguous and will be open to varying interpretations at national level. 33.67 The problems of unpaid leave are illustrated in Gomez-Limon.193 Gomez-Limon argued that calculating a pension on the basis of (reduced) contributions actually paid while on parental leave was in breach of the Parental Leave Directive. The CJEU rejected these claims, as the Directive does not provide such an entitlement expressly. As Advocate General Sharpston noted, an ‘attractive argument’ could be made for not reducing entitlement to benefits during parental leave so as to support substantive equality, but one could not read the existing state of EU law as imposing such a requirement.194 The Work-Life Balance Directive, once effective, would not alter this case law as the payment or allowance would not be the same as regular pay unless provided for under national law. 33.68 The main change concerning parental leave in the new Directive is to increase the period of non-transferable leave from one to two months.195 This is a small incentive to men, in particular, to take their parental leave as, according to Recital 26 of the preamble, studies demonstrate that countries where more parental leave is given to fathers ‘experience a higher take-up rate by fathers and a positive trend in the rate of employment of mothers’. The details of parental leave left to Member State discretion are mainly the same as in the Parental Leave Directive but there are some tweaks. Where the employer is permitted to postpone leave under domestic law, they ‘shall provide reasons for such a postponement of parental leave in writing’.196 In a strengthening of the modalities of application of parental leave, Member States must take measures ‘to ensure that workers have the right to request that they take parental leave in flexible ways’ and, in considering such requests, the employer must take into account the needs of both parties, and ‘shall provide reasons for any refusal to accede to such a request in writing within a reasonable period after the request’.197 In and of itself, the recasting of the Parental Leave Directive, and now the incorporation 33.69 of parental leave into the Work-Life Balance Directive, raises an important question for the

189 Ibid, Art 1. 190 Ibid, Recital 21. 191 Ibid, Art 5(1). 192 Ibid, Art 8(1) and 8(3). 193 Case C-537/07 Gomez-Limon [2009] ECR I-6525. 194 Ibid, opinion [54]–[55]. One might speculate whether a creative reading of Art 34(1) EUCFR might also have been invoked in support of the applicant’s argument. 195 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 5(2). 196 Ibid, Art 5(5). 197 Ibid, Art 5(6).

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evolutive interpretation of Article 33. If the Article draws on a Directive which has now been repealed and replaced twice, should the Charter provision be interpreted to reflect the enhanced protections in the new legislation? If the legislation enhances rights protection, a progressive approach to the realisation of social rights would suggest that it should. The changes introduced by the 2010 and 2019 directives extending the personal scope, the amount of leave and the length of its non-transferability, should be read into Article 33(2), particularly as the Charter right explicitly states that ‘everyone’ should enjoy these protections, as is discussed above. However, the right to parental leave is afforded to workers, not children, notwithstanding Article 24 of the Charter. As the CJEU stated in Chatzi: [Article 24] states that children are to have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. However, this right to protection and care does not mean that children have to be acknowledged as having an individual right to see their parents obtain parental leave. It is sufficient for such a right to be conferred on the parents themselves. It is they who have both the right and the duty to bring up their children and who, for that purpose, can decide on how best to perform their parental responsibilities, in choosing whether or not to have recourse to parental leave.198

The practical ramification in Chatzi was that the CJEU rejected the applicant’s argument that in the case of twin babies, the leave entitlement should be doubled. However, the CJEU did oblige the Member State to take the particular needs of parents of multiples into account, whilst being careful to preserve national discretion over the modalities of leave. Ultimately, it left it to the national court to assess whether the mode chosen would ‘meet, in a specific case, the particular needs of the parents of twins in their work and family life’.199 While shying away from the language of rights in this statement, the CJEU does seem to be moving towards an enforceable entitlement to have tailored leave arrangements. To be effective, the right to parental leave must be underpinned by protection against dismissal 33.70 on grounds of taking that leave and the right to work. Article 33(2) only refers to protection against dismissal ‘for a reason connected with maternity’. However, dismissal on grounds of taking parental leave ought to be regarded as unjustified under Article 30 of the Charter.200 Under clause 5(5) of the framework agreement annexed to the Parental Leave Directive, Member States are required to ‘take the necessary measures to protect workers against less favourable treatment or dismissal on the grounds of an application for, or the taking of, parental leave’. These provisions are strengthened in the Work-Life Balance Directive which, in Article 12, protects workers not only against dismissal for this reason but also against ‘all preparation’ for dismissal. Workers may also request the employer to provide ‘duly substantiated reasons for their dismissal’ in writing. Related protections, including penalties for violations, will be considered further in section D.

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks It would be easy to be underwhelmed by Article 33. At first look, Article 33(1) is of such breadth 33.71 and generality that it is liable to be categorised as a mere ‘principle’, while Article 33(2) restates existing protections of fundamental rights. However, it would be wrong to dismiss Article 33





198 Chatzi, above

Case C-149/10 (n 33) [39]. [74]. section B above.

199 Ibid 200 See

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as entirely inert, not least because it has acted as a catalyst for the Commission’s initiative to support work-life balance for parents and carers of 2017,201 launched alongside the Social Pillar,202 and the subsequent adoption of a limited but important new instrument, the Work-Life Balance Directive in 2019.203 33.72 Given that Article 33(1) draws from Article 16 ESC, there is a rich body of ECSR material fleshing out the distinct aspects of ‘economic, legal and social’ protection required. The ECSR reports provide useful considered guidance on matters of concern to the EU, where EU policy seems to be lacking. For instance, there is guidance on the quality of childcare, while EU policy focuses on the quantity thereof. 33.73 The critique of Article 33(2) is more compelling. It is worth recalling McGlynn’s early assessment: Unfortunately, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights simply reproduces the existing position, rather than attempts to map a more progressive approach to reconciliation and thereby to parenthood … [Article 33(2)] restates existing entitlements … This provision reinforces a hierarchical gendered division of preference for motherhood over fatherhood, via the provision of paid maternity leave, followed by (unpaid) parental leave, and no provision for paternity leave.204

33.74 A comprehensive approach to the reconciliation of family and working life would entail measures not only on specific leave related to care of children, but also on adaptation of working time generally, and for childcare, elder care and care for other adults in need of support.205 Nonetheless, framing reconciliation issues as fundamental rights may help to transform them and it is important to assess recent EU-level initiatives in this context. A transformative human rights approach to reconciling family and professional life would focus on the human rights of both carer and care-recipient, shaping a new vision more attuned to lived experience, the centrality and value of care, and equality between women and men. Drawing on Caracciolo di Torella, under a fundamental right to reconciliation: 1.

Reconciliation would be an issue not just for mothers, but also fathers and other care-givers, with an emphasis on equalising caring burdens between parents. 2. The recipients of care would be expanded beyond children, to all dependents in need of care. 3. Traditional notions of family based on biological links would be superceded by a conception of family based on care-giving and mutuality. 4. A lifecourse approach would be adopted, in which the reality that care needs vary in nature and intensity from infancy to old age would be acknowledged.206

33.75 While Article 33 does not in itself signal any of these four changes, by situating the issue in the Charter, modes of fundamental rights argumentation open up which may move in that direction, in particular when Article 33 is read with other Charter provisions identified in section B and other sources and post-Charter developments explored in section C. Each of these changes

201 COM(2017) 252 (26 April 2017). 202 See n 8. 203 See n 6. 204 See n 10, 217, 228. 205 These are the ‘three pillars’ which form the basis of the account in E Caracciolo di Torella and A Masselot, Reconciling Work and Family Life in EU Law and Policy (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 206 These requirements are adapted from E Caracciolo di Torella, ‘Is there a fundamental right to reconciling work and family life in the EU?’ in N Busby and G James (eds), Families, Care-giving and Paid Work: Challenging Labour Law in the 21st Century (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011) 52, 56.

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would involve an expansion in the scope of application of reconciliation or work-life balance policies, so is discussed further in the next part of this section. Treating reconciliation of family and working life as a fundamental right should not close 33.76 off other more progressive narratives and visions. Busby’s right to care,207 while it has many affinities with the approach set out above, goes further in that would entail an enforceable right to reasonable accommodation in the workplace for all carers. Collins’ right to flexibility208 is also radical, in that it would recalibrate the basic bargain between worker and employer on the control of working hours, not simply in order to facilitate family life, but to grant all workers greater autonomy. Collins identifies alternative methods to institutionalise this right, with a reasonable accommodation duty the most demanding of them.209 Such a duty may be developed from the right not to be discriminated against. Given the broad right to family life in the Charter, and its general non-discrimination guarantee, reading these together to prompt judicial recognition of a right to some sort of workplace accommodation seems a fruitful strategy. The ethos, if not the text of Article 33, could be deployed. However, invitations to such judicially creative moves will face considerable textual and institutional hurdles.

II.  Scope of Application In this part of our analysis our discussion concerns the personal scope of Article 33(1) and (2).

33.77

(a)  Personal Scope of Article 33(1) The notion of family under Article 33(1) should be interpreted broadly, given that it is based on 33.78 Article 16 ESC, which is understood to encompass family in the sense of Article 8 ECHR and all forms of relationship regarded as constituting family life under domestic law. As the provision acknowledges ‘family’ as prior to formal status, this should open the way for a broad conception based on de facto ties and care as seen in the evolution of the case law on Article 8 discussed in section C above. However, as noted in the preamble of the Work-Life Balance Directive, it is Member States who have competence to ‘define family status’.210 (b)  Personal Scope of Article 33(2) Article 33(2) applies to ‘everyone’, wider even than the ‘every worker’ formulation used in other 33.79 provisions. In contrast, the EU directives apply to a defined range of ‘workers’. The Pregnant Workers Directive211 has a broad personal scope based on the CJEU conception of a worker under which a ‘worker’ is a person who performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which she/he receives remuneration.212 By contrast, the Parental Leave Directive uses the term ‘worker’ but leaves the definition of the term to each Member State which

207 N Busby, A Right to Care? Unpaid Care Work in European Employment Law (Oxford, OUP, 2011). 208 H Collins, ‘The Right to Flexibility’ in Conaghan and Rittich (n 10), 99–124. 209 While the aim is radical, the three possible means of securing this right are readily available. Collins, ibid, examines a duty to bargain in good faith on flexible working; a right to ask for flexible working hours with rejection only on objective grounds; and a duty of reasonable accommodation. 210 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Recital 18. 211 Directive 92/85 (n 4). 212 See Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121 [16–17]. Applied in the equality context in Case C-256/01 Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College [2004] ECR I-873.



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may lead to a narrower approach.213 The Work-Life Balance Directive,214 replacing the Parental Leave Directive, hints at a more ambiguous approach. Article 2 states: This Directive applies to all workers, men and women, who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements or practice in force in each Member State, taking into account the case-law of the Court of Justice.

33.80 It is therefore for the Member States to determine the breadth of employment relationships included within the scope of the Directive, and, whilst courts may draw on the CJEU construct of a ‘worker’, domestic law will have precedence leading to a degree of legal incoherence. As discussed above, the EU concept of ‘worker’ is broader than the notion of ‘employee’ under the domestic employment laws of the Member States. Nonetheless, it is not all-embracing, so there will be those in the grey area between employed and self-employed who may not be covered by the directive in question. The broader question of enforceability of Article 33(2) horizontally in order to seek to enforce the rights it contains against private parties and ensure an effective remedy is explored further in section D.V below. 33.81 The issue of scope is highlighted by the individual nature of the right to parental leave. In Maïstrellis, the first judgment of the CJEU to refer to Article 33(2),215 a Greek rule granted female civil servants an automatic right to parental leave but deprived male civil servants of an equivalent right if their ‘wives’ did not work or exercise any profession. According to the CJEU, the right of every working parent to parental leave is an ‘individual right’ from which Member States cannot derogate in their legislation or in collective agreements.216 Relying expressly on Article 33(2), the CJEU held that the restriction was invalid because it went against the objectives of the Parental Leave Directive, which include promoting women’s participation in the labour force and encouraging men to assume an equal share of parental responsibilities.217

III.  Specific Provisions and Issues (a)  Equalising Care Burdens? 33.82 Whereas Article 33(1) lays down the core principle of the protection of the family, Article 33(2) provides a guarantee of specific fundamental rights to bring about the reconciliation of family and professional life. Yet, a ‘right’ to reconcile family and working life belies the existence of considerable caring burdens and responsibilities, which are distributed unequally between men and women. Despite the reconciliation of work and family life being a priority for the EU since 1974,218 as the Commission admitted in its 2017 Communication launching its ‘Initiative to Support Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers’ (‘Initiative’): ‘Existing policies have not brought equal opportunities that allow fathers and mothers to work and care together for the welfare of children and society at large’.219 One consequence is an economic loss due to the

213 Directive 2010/18 (n 5), cl 1(2) of the annexed framework agreement. 214 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6). 215 Case C-222/14 Konstantinos Maïstrellis v Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, Diafaneias kai Anthropinon Dikaiomaton, EU:C:2015:473. See also Case C-174/16 H v Land Berlin, EU:C:2017:637. 216 Ibid [41]. 217 Ibid [40]–[41]. The CJEU also held that the rule was contrary to the provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive, 2006/54 (n 26). 218 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 Concerning a Social Action Programme [1974] OJ C1/13. See E Caracciolo di Torella, ‘An emerging right to care in the EU: a “New Start to Support Work-Life Balance for Parents and Carers”’ (2017) 18 ERA Forum 187, 187. 219 See n 201.

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underrepresentation of women in the labour market that amounted to €370 billion per year when the Initiative was launched.220 Equal caring can mean equally poor rights for both parents, as exemplified by the US 33.83 approach, where an equality frame arguably acts as an impediment to the development of rights to reconciliation.221 However, a transformative equality approach would encourage men to take on more active caring roles, leading to a fairer distribution of parental and other caring obligations. The CEDAW Committee and the ECSR both advocate an approach to parental leave that requires, or at least encourages, men to take up their right to take leave. Paid, individual, non-transferable leave entitlements are the ECSR’s identified best practice.222 Admittedly, this vision is not expressly required by the texts of international norms, such as Article 27 RESC, but rather comes from concerns to ensure equality between men and women. It is, nonetheless, the basis for the Commission’s drive to implement its Initiative through a mix of hard and soft law. While Article 33(2) reinforces maternity rights, the constitutionalisation of the right to 33.84 parental leave is significant, particularly given the paucity of analogous guarantees in other systems. Moreover, it has led to two further legislative evolutions culminating in the Work-Life Balance Directive of 2019, as the main output from the Initiative, which is intended to directly address the need for equalisation of care burdens. The new Directive can be seen as a by-product of Article 33, which also provided the dynamic for the inclusion of Principle 9 on work-life balance in the 2017 Social Pillar with its emphasis on ‘equal access’ to family leave to enable those with caring responsibilities ‘to use them in a balanced way’.223 As we have seen in the analysis of the parental leave provisions in the new Directive, in section C, it increases the non-transferable element of parental leave from one month to two months.224 This is intended to address the issue that it is mostly those with the lower income in the household, who are mainly women, who take parental leave, with an insufficient incentive for men to take their leave and, indeed, a reverse incentive to transfer it to the mother where this is permitted under national law.225 This gender bias in the take-up of parental leave and its distribution reinforces the stereotype that women have the primary caring responsibility for children.226 The doubling of the non-transferable period of leave should help a little with flexibility in the take-up of leave, but the overall legislative package of parental leave disappoints. It falls far short of the Commission’s proposal for four months of non-transferable parental leave, extending the age of the child from eight to 12 years where a parent may take parental leave, and for payment during leave ‘at sick pay level’.227 The provision on payment or an allowance in the Directive is for the equivalent of sick pay subject to any national ceiling on the amount.228 This is an improvement on the Parental Leave Directive but it is not equivalent to a decent wage in many Member States. At best, the changes may lead to a marginal improvement in the take-up of parental leave by men, but not sufficiently to meet the Commission’s ambition of ‘a sizeable impact on the sharing of caring responsibilities between men and women’.229 220 Ibid. 221 J Suk, ‘Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict’ (2010) 110 Columbia Law Review 1. 222 Section C.II(c) above. 223 Directive 2010/18 (n 5). 224 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 5(2). 225 Initiative (n 201) 9. 226 See Caracciolo di Torella (n 218) 191. 227 Initiative (n 201) 9. 228 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 8(1) and (2). 229 Initiative (n 201) 9.



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33.85

It is important, however, to consider the other three new EU rights brought about by the Work-Life Balance Directive, because each of them can be seen as complementary in balancing family and professional commitments, as envisaged by Article 33, albeit they have been diluted somewhat during the legislative process. 33.86 The first new right in the Work-Life Balance Directive is for workers to take paternity leave. This is not exactly groundbreaking, because ‘the vast majority of the Member States already have paternity leave provisions’.230 As the Commission notes, an OECD study has shown that ‘[f]athers’ involvement in childcare gives higher life satisfaction, physical and mental health of caring fathers and higher cognitive and behavioural outcomes for children’.231 Paternity leave is integrally linked with parental leave, and the combination of the two should contribute to more equal burden sharing. It fits with the reasoning of CJEU in Maïstrellis,232 where the CJEU referenced the objective in Article 157 TFEU, which is to ensure full equality in practice between men and women in working life and rejected a national rule that denied parental leave to men who were the sole earners in the household. Such a rule perpetuated a traditional distribution of the roles of men and women by keeping men in a role subsidiary to women in relation to the exercise of parental duties.233 The Commission’s proposal was for 10 days of paternity leave to be taken around the time of 33.87 the birth of the child and paid at sick pay level.234 Article 4 of the Work-Life Balance Directive provides the proposed 10 working days of paternity leave irrespective of marital or family status as a new right with it being left to Member States to determine whether it is to be taken partly before, or only after, the birth, or more flexibly.235 Paternity leave should also apply in the event of a stillbirth.236 In two respects the protection is stronger than for parental leave. Firstly, as regards payment, it provides that ‘Member States shall ensure that workers who exercise their right [to take paternity leave] receive a payment or an allowance’,237 which ‘shall guarantee an income at least equivalent to that which the worker concerned would receive in the event of a break in the worker’s activities connected with the worker’s state of health, subject to any ceiling laid down in national law’.238 This is somewhat diluted from the Commission’s proposal as it allows for sick pay or sickness benefit set at national level. The difficulty is that the worker on paternity leave may still face a significant drop in income as levels of sick pay or sickness benefit vary considerably between Member States with some only paying sickness benefit at a subsistence rate.239 Secondly, paternity leave ‘shall not be made subject to a period of work qualification or to a length of service qualification’. Also, in a widening of scope, ‘where and insofar as recognised by national law’, paternity leave must be made available for ‘equivalent second parents’,240 which 230 Caracciolo di Torella (n 218) 191. 231 Initiative (n 201) 9. See M Huerta et al, Fathers’ Leave, Fathers’ Involvement and Child Development: Are they Related? Evidence from Four OECD Countries, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No 140 (OECD, 2013). 232 Case C-222/14 (n 215). 233 Ibid [50]. 234 Initiative (n 201) 9. At present there is only indirect protection against unequal treatment between men and women in Member States where paternity leave has been granted under Art 16 of the Equal Treatment Directive, 2006/54 (n 26). 235 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 4(1). 236 Ibid, Recital 19 of the preamble. 237 Ibid, Art 8(1). 238 Ibid, Art 8(2). 239 See S Spasova, D Bouget and B Vanhercke, Sick Pay and sickness benefit schemes in the European Union: Background Report for the Social Protection Committee’s In-Depth Review on sickness benefits (Brussels, European Commission, 2106): https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fc7a58b4-2599-11e7-ab65-01aa75ed71a1. The authors note, at p 4, that: ‘Sick pay is the continued, time limited, payment of (part of) the worker’s salary by the employer during a period of sickness. A sickness benefit is provided by the social protection system and is paid as a fixed rate of previous earnings, or a flat-rate amount’. 240 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 3(1)(a).

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puts family above biology (see section D.III(b) below). Overall, therefore, this is much closer to the Commission’s proposal reflecting the fact that paternity leave is not controversial. Carers’ leave of five working days per year is the second new right in the Work-Life Balance 33.88 Directive as set out in Article 6. As the Commission note, the unequal burden of caring responsibilities not only applies to the care of children, but also to the care of dependent relatives.241 Europe’s working age population is ‘ageing and shrinking’ from four working-age people for every person aged over 65 years in 2013 to only two working-age people projected for 2060.242 It is women who are more likely, at present, ‘to perform the primary role of informal carers to look after ill or elderly relatives’.243 Under the Parental Leave Directive the only limited right to leave for a worker to care for a dependent relative is in an emergency situation where the worker is permitted to be absent from work for urgent and unexpected family reasons.244 The Work-Life Balance Directive defines a carer as ‘a worker providing personal care or support 33.89 to a relative, or to a person who lives in the same household as the worker, and who is in need of significant care and support for a serious medical condition, as defined by each Member State’.245 Therefore it is general right of leave to care for a ‘relative’ but a much more limited right to care for another person in the household. The Directive defines a ‘relative’ as ‘a worker’s son, daughter, mother, father, spouse, or where such partnerships are recognised by national law, partner in civil partnership’.246 It follow that ‘carers’ leave’ is the leave a worker has the right to take to care for that ‘relative’ or other person.247 It allows for some details, including the reference period for taking leave and any medical certification required, to be left to the Member States.248 Unlike with parental leave and paternity leave, there is no requirement for a payment or an allowance for carers’ leave. This is regrettable, as the Commission had proposed payment at sick pay levels for all the forms of family leave in the Directive, but it perhaps reflects the fact that this is the most innovative form of leave in the measure and the most contentious for the Member States. It is, nonetheless, a ‘significant improvement’249 to have the introduction of carers’ leave at EU level because, as Caracciolo di Torella notes, it is ‘the only truly family—rather than just child—friendly provision’250 and is therefore more broadly protective of the family as envisaged in Article 33(1). It does, however, only offer a ‘safety net’ and is not enough leave to provide for regular care and support as part of a wider care strategy.251 The right to request flexible working arrangements for the purpose of providing care is the 33.90 third new right contained in the Work-Life Balance Directive. Flexible working arrangements means ‘the possibility for workers to adjust their working patterns, including through the use of remote working arrangements, flexible working schedules, or reduced working hours’.252 To a certain extent this is complementary to what was already possible on the return to work after taking parental leave,253 but it is now more far-reaching in scope. Under Article 9(1), workers

241 Initiative (n 201) 5. 242 See European Commission, The 2015 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 2018 EU Member States (2013–2060) (Brussels, 2015). 243 Initiative (n 201) 5. 244 Directive 2010/18, cl 7 of the framework agreement. Now in Directive 2019/1158, Art 7. 245 Directive 2019/1158, Art 3(1)(c). 246 Ibid, Art 3(1)(e). 247 Ibid, Art 3(1)(d). 248 Ibid, Art 6(1) and (2), and Recital 27 of the preamble. 249 Caracciolo di Torella (n 218) 193. 250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 252 Directive 2019/1158, Art 3(1)(f). 253 Directive 2010/18, cl 6 of the annexed framework agreement.



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with children up to a specified age ‘which shall be at least eight years, and carers, have the right to request flexible working arrangements for caring purposes’. It is not specified how long the period of flexible working might be, but it can be subject to ‘a reasonable limitation’. Procedurally, employers must, under Article 9(2), consider and respond to such requests ‘within a reasonable period of time’ taking into account the needs of both parties and ‘provide reasons for any refusal of such a request’ or postponement. Article 9(3) provides that where the flexible leave arrangement is time limited, the worker has the right to request to return to the original work pattern ‘where justified on the basis of a change of circumstances’ and subject to the same procedural guarantees as applied to the original request. Finally, under Article 9(4), Member States can make the right to request flexible working subject to a period of work or service qualification which shall not exceed six months. 33.91 The introduction of a broad right for parents and carers to request flexible working reflects the fact that despite new technologies, the majority of workers in Europe work to fixed schedules and one consequence is that workers are ‘taking on jobs below their full professional potential and skills level or dropping out of the labour market when taking on caring responsibilities’.254 As this affects mainly women, introducing a right to request flexible working for carers as well as parents could have a ‘positive impact on women’s participation in the labour market’.255 Nevertheless, as a right to request rather than ‘a right to obtain’ leave it is rather shallow and, as Caracciolo di Torella observes, ‘does not go far enough to create a strong and enforceable legal requirement’.256 33.92 As we have noted, Article 33 includes protection against dismissal during pregnancy, maternity leave and parental leave. This is closely linked to protection against unjust dismissal in Article 30. Under the Work-Life Balance Directive, there is protection from dismissal for workers who have applied for, or have taken, parental leave, paternity leave, or carers’ leave, or have requested flexible working arrangements.257 Workers who have been dismissed can request the employer ‘to provide duly substantiated reasons’ for their dismissal and, if the facts give rise to a presumption that they have been dismissed on one of the prohibited grounds, the burden of proof switches to the employer to prove that dismissal was based on other grounds.258 Short of dismissal, workers exercising rights within the scope of the Directive are protected against discrimination,259 have protection of their acquired rights and have a right to return to their jobs or to equivalent posts ‘on terms and conditions that are no less favourable to them, and to benefit from any improvement in working conditions to which they would have been entitled had they not taken the leave’.260 Member States have some discretion regarding the status of the employment contract or relationship, social security entitlements and pension rights on return to work.261 33.93 Overall, this is an important range of rights strengthened in respect of pay and protection against dismissal and wider in scope including rights associated with caring for relatives and dependents in addition to parenthood. Of course, it does not go far enough, but it is a direct legislative output flowing from the concept of a more equal and balanced distribution of work-life commitments which is at the heart of Article 33. It provides rights that can be built on through judicial interpretation and legislative development at EU and national levels.

254 Initiative 255 Ibid.

(n 201) 10.

256 See

(n 218) 193. 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 12(1). 258 Ibid, Art 12(2) and (3). 259 Ibid, Art 11. 260 Ibid, Art 10(1) and (2). 261 Ibid, Art 10(3). 257 Directive

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Some ideas for further development are found in the Commission’s non-legislative package which includes, inter alia, financial support for projects aimed at better enforcement of EU law on work-life balance, monitoring the design and gender balanced take-up of familyrelated leave and flexible working, and sharing of best practices.262 Provision of high-quality, affordable and accessible child care and long-term care remains an obligation of the Member States and, in this respect, there is a need for new impetus as the majority of Member States have not achieved the Barcelona targets.263 Strengthening the protection of workers during maternity is the main lacuna in the Work-Life 33.94 Balance Directive, leading to some legislative divergence as regards employment protection. The Commission’s initiative was, as Caracciolo di Torella notes, ‘a missed opportunity’ as a revised Pregnant Workers Directive could have included some changes that might have been achieved politically such as extending the period of dismissal protection,264 prohibiting steps leading to dismissals and a right to written reasons for dismissal. Case law on pregnancy has filled some gaps. The CJEU pioneered protections for pregnant 33.95 workers by treating pregnancy discrimination as direct sex discrimination. Initially, its equality case law was indulgent of Member States’ special protections for mothers. For instance, in Hofmann,265 a father’s attempt to claim a State benefit afforded to women failed. Hofmann had cared for his child from the age of eight weeks to six months, facilitating the child’s mother’s return to work. The CJEU refused his equal treatment claim, stating that the measure was ‘not designed to settle questions concerning the organisation of the family, or to alter the division of responsibility between parents’.266 Some special rights for mothers may be regarded, under limited circumstances, as permissible positive action, provided that similarly situated fathers may also access the benefits in question. In Lommers, for instance, allocating a limited number of subsidised childcare places to working mothers was deemed a proportionate form of positive action, provided that fathers could exceptionally access these places if they ‘took care of their children by themselves’. In this context then, only single fathers could demand equal treatment with mothers.267 However, the strongest trend in more recent jurisprudence is to regard special rights for mothers to care for children as in breach of EU equality law, as they are liable to perpetuate gender stereotypes and unequal caring burdens. This approach is evident in Griesmar268 and Roca Álvarez,269 both cited by the ECtHR in Markin,270 and later in Maïstrellis.271 In Roca Álvarez, the CJEU rejected a rule that disadvantaged fathers where the mother was not in an employment relationship on the basis that the effect of the law was that the mother would ‘bear the burden resulting from the birth of her child alone, without the child’s father being able to ease that burden’.272 This cross-fertilisation demonstrates that EU law exerts influence on the wider Council of Europe system and vice versa. Article 33(2) has been criticised as ‘weak and modest in defining the content and concrete 33.96 rights’.273 However, the CJEU case law is moving towards requiring equal treatment of mothers



262 Initiative

(n 201) 14–15. (n 19) and ibid, 12–13. 264 Caracciolo di Torella (n 218) 194–95. 265 Case 184/83 Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 3047. 266 Ibid [1]. 267 Case C-476/99 H Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] ECR I-2891. 268 Case C-366/99 (n 69). 269 Case C-104/09 (n 70). 270 See n 64. 271 Case C-222/14 (n 215). 272 Case C-104/09 (n 70) [37]. 273 Lehoczky and Kresal (n. 176) 586. 263 See

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and fathers in respect of their responsibilities to children and, logically, under the Work-Life Balance Directive, this will apply equally to caring for relatives and other dependents. Requiring equal treatment without a floor of substantive rights may risk levelling down, so Article 33 may be useful to ensure that existing entitlements are not whittled away in the name of equality. Rather, it would be open to the CJEU to treat national privileges for mothers as instantiations of the right to reconcile family and working life but insist on their equal distribution amongst parents and care-givers irrespective of gender. (b)  Family, Beyond Biology 33.97 The rights in Article 33(2) relate to maternity and parenthood. The Charter Explanation seems to endorse a biological conception of ‘maternity’, stating that ‘Maternity covers the period from conception to weaning’. The ‘health and safety’ ethos of the Pregnant Workers Directive274 explains its focus on the biological processes of pregnancy, confinement and breastfeeding. In contrast, the Parental Leave Directive encourages Member States to define additional measures for the taking of leave by adoptive parents.275 This is extended further in the Work-Life Balance Directive which includes ‘equivalent second parents’ within the scope of paternity leave,276 but, oddly, not within parental leave. This indicates a deference to leaving it to the Member States to determine who is the parent under national law. 33.98 With the exception of adoption, which is covered in the directives, the CJEU has not been prepared to adopt a ‘beyond biology’ approach to the concepts of pregnancy, maternity and parenthood. In Mayr,277 a woman undergoing in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment, but not yet pregnant, was found to be outside the scope of the Pregnant Workers Directive. In two cases decided in 2014, CD and Z,278 women had used surrogate mothers in order to have a child. In the first case, CD used her partner’s sperm and another woman’s egg. Under UK law, CD and her partner were awarded full and permanent responsibility for the child. In the second case, Z and her husband had a child under a surrogacy agreement with a woman in California. Ms Z and her husband were granted the status of parents of the child under Californian law. Both mothers were refused maternity or adoption leave on the basis that neither had been pregnant, and the children had not been adopted. The references to the CJEU from the national courts—CD from the UK and Z from Ireland—raised questions concerning, inter alia, whether, as commissioning mothers, the women were entitled to paid maternity or adoption leave under the Pregnant Workers Directive.279 In CD, the CJEU adopted a strictly biological approach, ruling that EU law, both the Directive and Article 33(2), does not entitle commissioning mothers in a surrogacy arrangement to paid leave equivalent to maternity leave or adoption leave. The CJEU’s rationale arose from the source of the Directive, which has the objective of encouraging improvements in the safety and health of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding. According to the CJEU, workers falling within this category are a specific risk group within the framework of EU law on the health and safety of workers.280 Moreover, the CJEU noted that the provisions in the Directive concerning maternity leave expressly refer to confinement. Thus, its purpose is to protect the mother in the especially vulnerable situation arising from



274 Directive

92/85 (n 4). 2010/18 (n 5), cl 2(1) of the framework agreement. 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 3(1)(a). 277 Case C-506/06 Mayr v Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG [2008] ECR I-1017. 278 Case C-167/12 CD v ST, EU:C:2014:169 and Case C-363/12 Z v A, EU:C:2014:159. 279 Directive 92/85 (n 4). 280 Case C-167/12 (n 278) [28]–[30]. 275 Directive 276 Directive

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her pregnancy.281 Although the CJEU acknowledged that the interest in protecting the special relationship between mother and child would also be the case for commissioning mothers, it concluded that that objective only concerns the period after pregnancy and childbirth. It followed that the grant of maternity leave is strictly limited to a situation where the worker concerned has been pregnant and has given birth to a child. That was not the case in a surrogacy scenario.282 The CJEU therefore concluded that a commissioning mother who has used a surrogate mother in order to have a child does not fall within the scope of the Directive, even in circumstances where she may or does breastfeed the baby.283 In Z, the CJEU reiterated this conclusion.284 Perhaps reflecting on the harshness of its ruling, the CJEU reminded Member States that the Directive sets minimum standards. Member States are free to apply more favourable rules for the benefit of commissioning mothers.285 It is notable that there is no ECtHR case law directly on the surrogacy issue. The ECtHR’s 33.99 general approach assumes the existence of family life between birth mother and child, and the mother’s spouse.286 An unmarried father establishes family life by demonstrating care, so on the same logic, the couple or woman who commission the surrogacy could demonstrate their family life by caring for the child and indeed supporting the surrogate mother.287 It is disappointing that the CJEU did not adopt this approach when Article 33 offers the opportunity for a family rights orientation of the law beyond mere biologically driven health and safety. It is equally disappointing that this was not rectified at the time of the Work-Life Balance Initiative when the Commission might have proposed legislative amendments to the Pregnant Workers Directive to include IVF treatment and surrogacy within the scope of maternity.288 The EU’s approach has been described as restrictive in the area of surrogacy,289 which has fallen through the gaps.290

IV.  Limitations and Derogations Limitations and derogations are governed by the general clause in Article 52(1) which specifies 33.100 that limitations must: (i) be provided for by law; (ii) respect the essence of those rights and freedoms; (iii) be subject to the principle of proportionality; (iv) be necessary; and (v) genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Once a right is deemed ‘fundamental’, limitations thereto must be interpreted strictly. This 33.101 is best illustrated in the case law on the right to paid annual leave, recognised in Article 31(2) of the Charter, where that right’s fundamental status led the CJEU to deem unacceptable both long qualifying periods,291 and mechanisms where pay was ‘rolled-up’ into general

281 Ibid [33]–[35]. 282 Ibid [35]–[37]. 283 Ibid [40]. 284 Case C-363/12 (n 278) [58]–[60]. 285 Case C-167/12 (n 278) [42]. 286 See section C.I above. 287 See further, S Choudhry and J Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 175–77. 288 Ibid. 289 See Lehoczky and Kresal (n 176) 599. 290 See P Foubert, ‘Child Care Leave 2.0—Suggestions for the improvement of the EU Maternity and Parental Leave Directives from a rights perspective’ (2017) 24(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 245, 262. 291 Case C-173/99 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex p Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) [2001] ECR I-4881.



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remuneration,292 in order to avoid situations where workers would be discouraged from taking leave. For present purposes, the significance of this case law is that it illustrates that once a right is ‘fundamental’, limitations thereto must be interpreted strictly and the CJEU will look closely at mechanisms whereby workers alienate their fundamental rights. Furthermore, under the normative hierarchy between the Charter and EU legislation, where that legislation entails unacceptable restrictions on the fundamental rights set out in Article 33(2), those restrictions may be annulled in order to vindicate the fundamental right in question. Test-Achats illustrates precisely this approach, with a limitation in a Directive being annulled for undermining the fundamental right to equality.293 33.102 Looking at the Work-Life Balance Directive, there was an opportunity to end the permitted qualifying period of up to one year of work or service for taking parental leave on the basis that it was incompatible with the right of ‘everyone’ to have that leave under Article 33(2), but instead there was no change.294 Applying the reasoning in BECTU295 by analogy would lead one to question this exception, particularly when many workers who are most in need of reconciling work and family life are fixed-term workers or casual workers, such as those in the gig economy, who may find it difficult to qualify. Of course, one might object to the analogy on the basis of a difference between the directives. The Working Time Directive at issue in BECTU merely contains a general licence to set conditions for the leave over an annual reference period,296 with no specified qualifying period, unlike in the Work-Life Balance Directive. However, in response, it could be argued that the key question is not whether the limitation is expressly provided for in EU legislation, but rather whether the limitation in question undermines the effectiveness of the fundamental right. 33.103 In this respect, it is anomalous that, under the Work-Life Balance Directive, a six-month rather than one-year qualifying period is permitted for the right to request flexible working arrangements,297 whereas qualifying periods for paternity leave are not permitted.298 Carers’ leave is not expressly subject to a qualifying period, but ‘details regarding the scope and conditions’ of leave are left to national law and practice,299 suggesting that a reasonable qualifying period is possible. Given that the qualifying period for these other forms of leave or entitlements is less limiting than that for parental leave, when only the latter is expressly referenced in Article 33(2), the justification for the limitation on parental leave under Article 52(1) as ‘proportionate’ is doubtful. Even if the BECTU approach were not to be applied, and some qualifying periods are acceptable, the approach of the ECSR may be drawn on, which allows ‘reasonable’ qualifying periods, and allows periods of unemployment to count towards the qualifying period.300

V. Remedies 33.104 Article 47 of the Charter encapsulates the extensive case law on effective judicial protection. The right to an effective remedy was shaped by the CJEU in its equality jurisprudence in 292 Cases C-131/04 and C-257/04 CD Robinson-Steele and Others v RD Retail Services Ltd and Others [2006] ECR I-2531. 293 Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres [2011] ECR I-00773. 294 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 5(4). 295 Case C-173/99 (n 291). 296 Directive 2003/88 (n 39), Art 7. 297 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6), Art 9(4). 298 Ibid, Art 4(2). 299 Ibid, Art 6(1). 300 See n 107.

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particular.301 In that regard, EU law has been at the vanguard. The ECSR has taken inspiration from CJEU case law in its Statement of Interpretation on Article 8(2) and 27(3): ceiling on compensation for unlawful dismissal.302 Pontin303 concerned dismissal on grounds of pregnancy under the Pregnant Workers Directive. 33.105 Under the law of Luxembourg, bringing an action against such dismissal was subject to a 15-day time-limit. The CJEU suggested that this was a breach of the general principles of equivalence and effectiveness, but ultimately left the matter for the national court to assess. The national law in question also did not afford an action in damages, which was available to other dismissed employees. The CJEU found this limitation to be incompatible with the Directive, as it constituted less favourable treatment on grounds of pregnancy. In this way, the CJEU maintained its orthodox position that remedies in damages against employers are not per se required to secure effective judicial protection, but if such remedies are available in analogous domestic situations, then the principle of equal treatment requires that they be extended to those who suffer similar breaches of EU law.304 Notwithstanding the development of doctrines facilitating the indirect and incidental 33.106 enforcement of directives, the orthodox EU law position remains that directives alone are not capable of ‘horizontal direct effect’, that is they do not, of themselves, produce obligations between private parties which national courts must enforce.305 Despite this restrictiveness, the CJEU has held, by contrast, that certain provisions in the Charter, as primary EU law, are capable of a horizontal application to individuals even if the right in question is sourced, in part, from a directive. This is because either the right in question is also sourced from a general principle of EU law which has horizontal application within the scope of the Treaties, as is the case with the principle of non-discrimination given expression in Article 21, as in Egenberger,306 or, as in Bauer and Willmeroth,307 if the right is sufficiently clearly and precisely expressed in the Charter and is mandatory and unconditional in nature. In Bauer and Willmeroth, the latter rule applied to the right of workers to paid annual leave in Article 31(2), a provision which directly references the rights of workers in the Working Time Directive in its Explanation.308 Because these cases concerned rights contained in directives that had passed their transposition date, the facts fell within the scope of EU law under Article 51(1) and therefore Charter rights were applicable. Applying this case law to Article 33(2), it can be asserted that the rights set out therein 33.107 to paid maternity leave and parental leave, and protection against dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and those rights to leave, concern the equality of women and men in family and professional life and are thus inextricably linked to the general principle of equality and non-discrimination recognised by the CJEU. Moreover, it is significant that the relevant directives are mentioned in the Explanation and unlike, for example, Article 30 on unjustified dismissal, the rights contained in Article 33(2) are not subject to ‘national laws and practices’.

301 C Kilpatrick, ‘Turning Remedies Around: A Sectoral Analysis of the European Court of Justice’ in G de Búrca, and JHH Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2001) 143. 302 n 111. 303 Case C-63/08 Pontin [2009] ECR I-10467. 304 Case C-271/91 Marshall II [1993] ECR I-4367. 305 Case C-152/84 MH Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching) [1986] ECR 00723. 306 Case C-414/16 Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV, EU:C:2018:257. 307 Cases C-569-570/16 Stadt Wuppertal v Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker Willmeroth v Martina Broßonn, EU:C:2018:871. 308 Directive 2003/88/EC (n 39).



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It follows that these rights are clear and precise, and mandatory and unconditional in nature, like the right to paid annual leave, which means that any national law that violates the exercise of these rights should be disapplied. It follows from this case law, by analogy, that a combination of Article 33(2) and Article 47 can be invoked to enable the individual who has been wronged to pursue an effective remedy against a private party. Article 21 can be invoked, depending on the facts, but it is not necessary if the test set out in Bauer and Willmeroth is invoked specific to Article 33(2). What is perhaps most significant is that it was the horizontality of the specific social right in combination with the horizontality of Article 47 that enabled the individuals to realise their rights in practice and secure an effective remedy. 33.108 Turning to the specific content of the relevant directives on remedies, the Pregnant Workers Directive309 has a formulation that is somewhat outmoded today. Under Article 12 on ‘Defence of rights’, Member States are required to introduce ‘such measures as are necessary to enable all workers who should themselves wronged by failure to comply with the obligations arising from this Directive to pursue their claims by judicial process (and/or, in accordance with national laws and/or practices) by recourse to other competent authorities’. Although there is no provision on the burden of proof in the Directive, in Ramos,310 a case involving a challenge to a risk assessment made concerning a breastfeeding mother, it was held that evidential arguments do not have to be confined to health and safety arguments. If there is prima facie evidence of either direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of sex, the burden of proof switches to the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the equal treatment under the rule in Article 19(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive.311 In practice, the CJEU has read the principles of access to justice and effective remedies into Article 12 in its case law, as shown in Pontin312 above, but leaves a degree of scope for national procedural autonomy in determining the scope of the defence of rights and the nature of the remedy. The next evolution of this type of provision is seen in the revised Parental Leave Directive313 33.109 which states in Article 2 that ‘Member States shall determine what penalties are applicable when national provisions enacted pursuant to this Directive are infringed. The penalties shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. This is immediately a more specific and clear obligation on Member States imbued with the ‘right to an effective remedy’ for violations of the rights in Article 47 of the Charter. The Work-Life Balance Directive314 contains a further evolution by including a provision on 33.110 dismissal protection followed by a provision on penalties in, respectively, Articles 12 and 13. The worker who is deprived of their livelihood following a dismissal for seeking to exercise, or exercising, their rights under a directive is in the greatest need of procedural fairness and an effective remedy. Principle 7 of the Social Pillar315 includes a right of workers, prior to any dismissal, to be informed in writing, granted a reasonable period of notice, have a right of access to effective and impartial dispute resolution, and have a ‘right of redress’ in the case of unjustified dismissal. This is given effect by Article 12 of the Directive, as discussed above, but unlike the recently adopted Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive, there is

309 Directive 92/85 (n 4). 310 Case C-531/15 Elda Otero Ramos v Servicio Galego de Saúde and Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, EU:C:2017:789. 311 Directive 2006/54 (n 26). 312 Case 63/08 (n 303). 313 Directive 2010/18 (n 5). 314 Directive 2019/1158 (n 6). 315 n 8.

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no express right of redress.316 Principle 7 also refers to the need for ‘adequate compensation’ in the event of unjustified dismissal. Article 13 on ‘Penalties’ does not go that far but does require Member States to introduce penalties for infringements of the rights contained in the Directive and ‘take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented’. It continues with the standard formulation that those penalties ‘shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. Taken together, these provisions put specific obligations on Member States to provide for effective penalties for infringements and to put them into effect at domestic level with, where necessary, scope for more resolute direction from the CJEU based on Article 47 when cases are referred to it in due course.

E. Evaluation As the Commission observes in the conclusion to its Work-Life Balance Initiative, ‘The 33.111 21st Century European way of life should allow for a good balance between family and p ­ rofessional commitments and provide equal opportunities for women and men in the workplace and at home’.317 Article 33, although modest and iterative of existing legal protections, has acted as a catalyst for development of policies and law at domestic and EU-levels which has also been inspired by commitments made under international and European human rights law. Like all Charter provisions, in spite of its textual limitations, it is replete with transformative potential, and may open up space for creative human rights argumentation. It is disappointing that the Work-Life Balance Directive has been weakened during its passage through the EU’s legislative process and, moreover, that there is a lack of political will to strengthen the Pregnant Workers Directive. It falls short of Busby’s right to care318 or Collins’ right to flexibility.319 As Caracciolo di Torella observes, whilst carers’ leave, and the right to request flexible work arrangements, extend beyond caring for children, the measures ‘continue to privilege parents of young (and healthy) children over carers of adults’.320 There is no integrated ‘life-cycle’ approach to care on a more practical level.321 Nevertheless, the Work-Life Balance Initiative and the new Directive can provide a springboard for further policy development more focused on fairness and gender equality in practice alongside effective enforcement and a reflexive shift in the orientation of judicial interpretation. Tentative steps to widen the scope of the family and legal protection beyond biology can be anticipated but more progress is needed to widen support for different conceptions of the family and a more equal distribution of caring responsibilities between men and women.

316 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union [2019] OJ L186/105, Art 16. 317 Initiative (n 201) p 16. 318 Busby (n 207). 319 Collins (n 208). 320 See n 218, 196. 321 Ibid.



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Article 34* Article 34 Social Security and Social Assistance The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services, providing protection in events such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices. Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices. In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 34 The principle set out in Article 34(1) is based on Articles 153 and 156 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 12 of the European Social Charter and point 10 of the Community Charter on the rights of workers. The Union must respect it when exercising the powers conferred on it by Articles 153 and 156 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The reference to social services relates to cases in which such services have been introduced to provide certain advantages but does not imply that such services must be created where they do not exist. ‘Maternity’ must be understood in the same sense as in the preceding Article. Paragraph 2 is based on Articles 12(4) and 13(4) of the European Social Charter and point 2 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and reflects the rules arising from Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68. Paragraph 3 draws on Article 13 of the European Social Charter and Articles 30 and 31 of the revised Social Charter and point 10 of the Community Charter. The Union must respect it in the context of policies based on Article 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Select Bibliography Council of Europe, Social Security and Related Issues: English French Glossary (Strasbourg, CoE Publishing, 1998). ——, Anti-crisis Measures. Safeguarding Jobs and Social Security in Europe (Strasbourg, CoE Publishing, 2011). G de Búrca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State. In Search of Solidarity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds), Social Welfare and EU law. Essays in European Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005). A Gomez, Social Security as a Human Right—The Protection Afforded by the European Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Files No 23) (Strasbourg, CoE Publishing, 2007). ——, Social Security—Protection at the International Level and Developments in Europe (Strasbourg, CoE Publishing, 2009). U Neergaard, R Nielsen and L Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU law—From Rome to Lisbon (Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing, 2009). J Nickless, European Code of Social Security: Short Guide (Strasbourg, CoE Publishing, 2002). * This chapter was written by Robin White in the first edition. It has been updated by Oxana Golynker in the second edition.

Part I – Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter

—— and H Seidl, Coordination of Social Security in the Council of Europe: Short Guide (Strasbourg, CoE Publishing, 2004). F Pennings, European Social Security Law, 5th edn (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2010). F Pennings, ‘The Approaches of the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights vis-á-vis Discrimination on the Ground of Nationality in Social Security’ in F Pennings and G Vonk (eds), Research Handbook on European Social Security Law (Cheltenham and Northampton ME, Edward Elgar, 2015) 121–45. D Pieters, The Social Security Systems of the Member States of the European Union (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2002). M Ross and Y Borgmann-Prebil (eds), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010). M Rowland and R White, Social Security Legislation 2013/14, Vol III: Administration Adjudication and the European Dimension (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013). L Slingenberg, ‘Social Security case law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in F Pennings and G Vonk (eds), Research Handbook on European Social Security Law (Cheltenham and Northampton ME, Edward Elgar, 2015) 53–82. W Van Ginneken, Sustaining European Social Security Systems in a Globalised Economy (Strasbourg, CoE Publishing, 2012). P Watson, Social Security Law of the European Communities (London, Mansell, 1980). R White, EC Social Security Law (Harlow, Longman, 1999).

A.  Field of Application of Article 34 34.01 There is significant Union legislation and case law which touches on entitlement to social security, though nothing which could properly be described as European social security law.1 There are three dimensions to European Union law in this area: (1) coordination of the social security systems of the Member States in order to avoid barriers to free movement; (2) harmonisation of social security entitlements so that discrimination in entitlements between men and women is avoided; and (3) an emerging set of entitlements linked to citizenship of the Union. Each of these areas is addressed below in section D. There is also a body of immigration and asylum law which to some extent regulates access to social security and social assistance for nationals of countries outside the Union. 34.02 European Union law touching on social security has always had a link to the free movement of persons provisions in what is now the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,2 and this has led to the extension of virtually all provisions on social security to the three countries of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), and to Switzerland.3 Historically, European Union law has drawn a distinction between social security and social 34.03 assistance, but there has never been an entirely satisfactory definition of either concept, so that the dividing line between social security and social assistance is far from clear.4 What is clear is that Article 34 of the Charter does not simply apply to social security, but extends to social and housing assistance. Some social security legislation covers health care, but entitlement to health care is governed by the separate Article 35 of the Charter.

1 Though for convenience of expression, the term is used at a number of points in this commentary. 2 Arts 18–21 and 45–66 TFEU. See also the secondary legislation referred to below. 3 Under the EEA Agreement, [1994] OJ L1/3, and a separate agreement with Switzerland on the free movement of persons of 21 June 1999, [2002] OJ L114/6. See also the secondary legislation referred to below. 4 An issue of definitions in which Art 34 was invoked arose in Case C-571/10 Kamberaj (24 April 2012); see further below in section D.II.

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However, even in the field of social security (as distinct from social and housing assistance), the 34.04 provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union indicate that this is a sensitive matter of legal regulation. The legal base for the big coordinating regulation and its sister implementing regulation5 is what is now Articles 48 and 352 TFEU. There are two significant consequences which flow from this legal base. Any amendments have to be made using the ordinary legislative procedure set out in Article 294 TFEU. In the normal situation the ordinary legislative procedure attracts qualified majority voting, but in the case of measures under Article 48 TFEU, there is a rider which provides: Where a member of the Council declares that a draft legislative act referred to in the first subparagraph would affect important aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system, it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council. In that case, the ordinary legislative procedure shall be suspended. After discussion, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, either: (a) refer the draft back to the Council which shall determine the suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure; or (b) take no action or request the Commission to submit a new proposal; in that case, the act originally proposed shall be deemed not to have been adopted.

Article 352 TFEU, which is the reserve power, requires unanimity, and requires the Commission to draw the attention of national parliaments to proposals based on this provision. Article 352 TFEU does not permit measures which ‘entail harmonization of Member States’ laws or regulations where the Treaties exclude such harmonization.’ Directive 79/7/EC6 had as its legal base Article 235 EEC, the predecessor to Article 352 TFEU. The legal base of the Citizenship Directive7 is somewhat more complex; it is what is now Articles 18, 21, 46, 50 and 59 TFEU. Specific mention is made in the Explanation on Article 34 of Articles 153 and 156 TFEU. Article 153(1)(c) TFEU requires the Union to ‘support and complement’ the activities of the Member States in the field of social security and social protection of workers. Article 153(2) gives the European Parliament and the Council competence to adopt certain measures in the fields governed by the provision. But once again there are special provisions on social security. Unanimity under a special legislative procedure is required in relation to any measures adopted in the field referred to in Article 153(1)(c), and Article 513(4) provides:

34.05

34.06 34.07 34.08

The provisions adopted pursuant to this Article: —— shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof, —— …

Article 156 TFEU requires the Commission to encourage cooperation between the Member 34.09 States and to facilitate coordination of their action in social policy fields including social security. There is no competence to enact legislative measures under Article 156 TFEU.

5 Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, (corrected version) [2004] OJ L200/1, as amended; and Regulation 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 883/2004, as amended [2009] OJ L284/1. 6 Council Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security [1979] OJ L6/24. 7 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their families to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L229/35 CORRIGENDUM [2005] OJ L197/34.



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34.10

There is accordingly a range of competences given in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which touch on matters of social security and social assistance, though all of them are hedged around with certain reservations essentially in favour of action only being taken when the Member States are unanimous in wishing to see the Union adopt measures in the field.

B.  Interrelationship of Article 34 with Other Provisions of the Charter 34.11 Article 34 of the Charter appears in the section of the Charter entitled ‘Solidarity’. Other provisions in the section on solidarity deal with protection of workers, the prohibition of child labour, health care, professional and family life, access to services of general economic interest, environmental protection and consumer protection. The placement of the article on social security comes after the articles dealing with labour market protection and before those dealing with health, and environmental and consumer protection. 34.12 Reference is made in the preamble to the Charter both to Union and Council of Europe instruments, and to the case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights.

C.  Sources of Article 34 Rights I. ECHR 34.13 Article 1 of Protocol 1 and Article 14 ECHR have frequently been used by applicants to ­challenge national provisions of social security as breaching the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14, while Article 6 now requires adjudication of disputes concerning social security and social assistance to meet its requirements for fair trial. Article 8 ECHR is also often pleaded with Article 14 as having an impact on social security disputes, but in most cases the Court examines the application on the basis of Article 1 of Protocol 1 and Article 14.8 According to national authority, attempts to establish that certain conditions of entitlement to 34.14 social security involve conduct which falls within Article 3 as degrading treatment have failed.9 However, Article 3 might be engaged where a person is left so destitute and without access to shelter that the threshold for Article 3 is reached.10 This would appear to be supported by the Court of Human Rights, which in an admissibility decision said that a complaint about a wholly inadequate amount of financial support could, in principle, raise an issue under Article 3 if the effect of the consequent deprivation is sufficient to meet the minimum level of severity falling within the ambit of Article 3.11 Article 4 ECHR prohibiting slavery and forced and compulsory labour can be triggered in 34.15 cases of national law restricting social security entitlements in certain contexts of work, but its scope of application is limited by derogations from the term of ‘forced and compulsory labour’ in paragraph 3 of Article 4 ECHR. The applicant in Stummer v Austria sought to argue that



8 As

in Gaygusuz v Austria App no 17371/90 (1997) 23 EHRR 364. (on the application of Joanne Reynolds) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2002] EWHC 426. 10 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Limbuela, Tesema and Adam [2005] UKHL 66. 11 Larioshina v Russia App no 56869/00 (23 April 2002) [3]. 9 R

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a requirement to work in prison without affiliation to the old-age pension system could no longer be regarded as falling within the derogation of paragraph 3 of Article 4 ECHR.12 Although the Grand Chamber disagreed, the judgment noted a lack of consensus among Member States on this issue. In his partly dissenting opinion, Judge Tulkens argued that this provision, incorporated in the Convention in 1950, must be interpreted in the light of the present-day situation, and the concepts used in the Convention must be understood in the sense given to them by democratic societies today. Traditionally regarded as an area outside the law, prisons have gradually opened up to fundamental rights, to the benefit not only of prisoners but also of the prison authorities and their staff. Nowadays, work without adequate social cover could no longer be regarded as normal work. On those grounds Judge Tulkens concluded that the exception provided for in Article 4 § 3(a) of the Convention was not applicable in Stummer’s case. Moreover, in the examination of the case under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No 1, the judgment noted that as a working prisoner, the applicant was in a relevantly similar situation to ordinary employees.13 There have been attempts to rely on Article 4 to challenge conditions attached to entitlement 34.16 to unemployment benefits as part of activation policies aimed at getting working-age people off benefits and into work, such as the obligation to take up employment deemed unsuitable for qualifications, or the obligation to work without pay for private companies to acquire new qualifications. Such claims are unlikely to succeed, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights14 and the national authority,15 because work in activation policies, albeit compulsory and involuntary, would not pass the additional Van der Mussele16 test of being ‘unjust’, ‘oppressive’, ‘somewhat harassing’ etc. The position of the Court of Human Rights is that a state which introduced a system of social security is fully entitled to lay down conditions of eligibility to benefits under that system.17 The adjudication of social security disputes involves the determination of civil rights and 34.17 obligations under Article 6 attracting the guarantees of fair trial in that provision.18 Where the state provides a system of appeals, that system too must comply with the guarantees to be found in Article 6(1).19 In CG v Austria, the applicant had complained that the refusal to award him the emergency 34.18 assistance requested violated respect for his family life (presumably on the grounds that refusal of the assistance threatened the break-up of, or hardship to, his family);20 the admissibility decision is not specific on the basis for declaring this part of his complaint admissible. The Commission did not find it necessary to consider this aspect of the complaint since they concluded that there was a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 1. Nor did the Court, when it considered the case.21 Nevertheless, it remains open

12 Stummer v Austria App 37452/06 (2012) 54 EHRR 369 13 Stummer v Austria App 37452/06 (2012) 54 EHRR 95. 14 Talmon v Netherlands [1997] EHRLR 448. 15 R (on the application of Reilly and Anor) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (2013) UKSC 68. 16 Van Der Mussele v Belgium [1983] 6 EHRR 163. 17 Schuitemarker v Netherlands App no 15906/08 (ECHR, 4 May 2010). 18 Feldbrugge v The Netherlands Series A No 99, (1986) 8 EHRR 425; Deumeland v Germany Series A No 120, (1986) 8 EHRR 448; and Salesi v Italy Series A No 257-E, (1998) 26 EHRR 187. 19 Fejde v Sweden Series A No 212-C (1994) 17 EHRR 14 [32]. 20 CG v Austria App no 17371/90 (1994) 18 EHRR CD51. See also Report of the Commission of 11 January 1995. 21 When this case reached the Court, it was renamed Gaygusuz v Austria App no 17371/90 (1997) 23 EHRR 364.



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for the limits of the protection under Article 8 to be explored in the context of entitlements to social security. But it would be fair to say that there are few indications that the Strasbourg organs regard the Convention right here as including an obligation on the state to make payments to families for their support. 34.19 Reliance on Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) to avoid the normal requirements, for example, to pay national insurance contributions, are most unlikely to succeed. The Commission has held that a Dutch system of old-age pension insurance, alleged to interfere with the religious duty of caring for old people, did not violate Article 9.22 34.20 Article 14 prohibits discrimination in relation to the rights protected by the Convention on the grounds of sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. It has proved to be a fruitful basis for attacking the conditions of entitlement for social security benefits when read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 1. The prohibition in Article 14 covers both direct and indirect discrimination.23 Cases where Article 14 is pleaded require consideration of the following questions: 1. 2. 3.

Does the complaint fall within the sphere of a right protected by the Convention? Is there different treatment of persons in relevantly similar or analogous situations? Is the difference of treatment capable of reasonable and objective justification?

34.21 Discrimination will be prohibited by Article 14 only if there is an affirmative response to all three questions. 34.22 Certain grounds of differentiation are regarded as inherently suspect, such as sex, race, nationality, religion and sexual orientation. Different treatment based on these grounds is very difficult to justify. On other grounds, a more generous view is taken of the policy choices made by states.24 Most significantly, the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union appear to use different types of reasoning which can lead to different outcomes in case law on indirect discrimination.25 Cooperation between the courts is essential for streamlining the case law on the breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights respectively. The admissibility decision of the Grand Chamber in Stec v United Kingdom established that 34.23 all social security benefits, including social assistance, whether founded on contributions or otherwise, fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol 1, and so any discrimination prohibited by Article 14 in their administration can be raised in an application to the Court of Human Rights.26 However, Article 1 of Protocol 1 alone gives no right to benefit in a particular amount.27 Although social security benefits fall within the scope of protection of the right to

22 Reformed Church of X v The Netherlands App no 1497/62 (1962) 5 Yearbook of the ECHR 286; and X v The Netherlands App no 2065/63 (1965) 8 Yearbook of the ECHR 266. 23 DH and others v Czech Republic App no 57325/00 (2008) 47 EHRR 59. 24 For an overview of the case law in this area relating to social security, see M Rowland and R White, Social Security Legislation 2013/14, Vol III: Administration Adjudication and the European Dimension (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) paras 4.120–4.147. 25 F Pennings, The Approaches of the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights vis-á-vis Discrimination on the Ground of Nationality in Social Security’ in F Pennings and G Vonk, Research Handbook on ­European Social Security Law (Cheltenham and Northampton ME, Edward Elgar, 2015), 121. 26 Stec v United Kingdom App nos 65731/01 and 65900/01 (2005) 41 EHRR SE295. 27 Ibid.

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property under Article 1 of Protocol 1, the case law shows that the Member States enjoy a broad margin of appreciation.28 In Carson and Others v the United Kingdom, the Court of Human Rights stated that if the contracting state had a system in place allowing for the payment of a welfare benefit as a right, that legislation generated a proprietary interest under Article 1 of Protocol 1.29 For example, the reduction or discontinuation of a pension may constitute an interference with possessions that needs to be justified.30 Nevertheless, in da Silva Carvalho Rico v Portugal the applicants, whose retirement pension had been reduced due to austerity measures, were unsuccessful.31 The Court found that the austerity measures in Portugal at the relevant time had been proportionate to the legitimate aim of achieving economic recovery, and struck the right balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the fundamental rights of the applicant. All this case law establishes that social security entitlements are surrounded by a number 34.24 of protections under the European Convention, much of it of a procedural nature. None of the European Convention authorities establishes a right to receive social security or social assistance.

II.  UN Treaties Although it is not a treaty, mention should be made of the Universal Declaration of Human 34.25 Rights, Articles 22 and 25 of which grant a right to social security, and to support in relation to unemployment, sickness, disability, bereavement, old age or other exigency of life, as well as maternity and child raising. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 34.26 provides simply: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.’ Subsequent articles make specific reference to protection of the family and children, as well as health care. There is a periodic reporting requirement in Article 17, and an individual complaints machinery under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. General Comment 1932 emphasised the inclusion of non-contributory schemes within the field of social security, and the link with the nine areas of protection referred to in ILO Convention 102.33 Special mention should be made of the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with 34.27 Disabilities,34 since this is the first international human rights instrument to be ratified by the European Union. It contains wide-ranging obligations, including, in Article 28, a right to an adequate standard of living and social protection.

28 L Slingenberg, ‘Social Security case law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in F Pennings and G Vonk, Research Handbook on European Social Security Law (Cheltenham and Northampton ME, Edward Elgar, 2015), 60. 29 Carson and Others v the United Kingdom App no 42184/05 [2010] ECHR [64]. 30 Valkov and Others v Bulgaria App nos. 2033/04 et al (ECHR, 25 October 2011) [84]. 31 Da Silva Carvalho Rico v Portugal App no 13341/14 (ECHR, 24 September 2015) [46]. 32 General Comment No 19, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 39th Session, 5–23 November 2007, Doc E/C.12/GC/19 of 4 February 2008. 33 These are: medical care and benefits in relation to sickness, unemployment, old age, employment injuries, family, maternity, and invalidity, and for survivors in cases of bereavement. 34 See generally G de Búrca, ‘The European Union in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 174.



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III.  Council of Europe Treaties 34.28 In addition to the European Convention on Human Rights, the following Council of Europe instruments bear directly on social security and social assistance:35 (a)  European Social Charter (ETS 35) and European Social Charter (Revised) (ETS 163) 34.29 The Explanation on Article 34 mentions Articles 12 and 13 of the European Social Charter,36 which provide: Article 12—The right to social security With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social security, the Parties undertake: (1) to establish or maintain a system of social security; (2) to maintain the social security system at a satisfactory level at least equal to that necessary for the ratification of the European Code of Social Security; (3) to endeavour to raise progressively the system of social security to a higher level; (4) to take steps, by the inclusion of appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements or by other means, and subject to the conditions laid down in such agreements, in order to ensure: (a) equal treatment with their own nationals of the nationals of other Parties in respect of social security rights, including the retention of benefits arising out of social security legislation, whatever movement the persons protected may undertake between the territories of the Parties; (b) the granting, maintenance and resumption of social security rights by such means as the accumulation of insurance or employment periods completed under the legislation of each of the Parties. Article 13—The right to social and medical assistance With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social and medical assistance, the Parties undertake: (1) to ensure that any person who is without adequate resources and who is unable to secure such resources either by his own efforts or from other sources, in particular by benefits under a social security scheme, be granted adequate assistance, and, in case of sickness, the care necessitated by his condition; (2) to ensure that persons receiving such assistance shall not, for that reason, suffer from a diminution of their political or social rights; (3) to provide that everyone may receive by appropriate public or private services such advice and personal help as may be required to prevent, to remove, or to alleviate personal or family want; (4) to apply the provisions referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this article on an equal footing with their nationals to nationals of other Parties lawfully within their territories, in accordance with their obligations under the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, signed at Paris on 11 December 1953.

34.30

Article 14 ESC, which concerns the right to benefit from social welfare services, is, perhaps surprisingly, not mentioned in the Explanation on Article 34.

35 For the current state of ratifications, see www.conventions.coe.int. 36 Though all Member States are parties to the original European Social Charter (ETS No 35), Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, and Spain are not parties to the European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No 163). The text of Arts 12, 13 and 14 is the same in the original and revised European Social Charters.

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The Explanation also makes reference to Articles 30 and 31 of the European Social Charter 34.31 (revised):37 Article 30—The right to protection against poverty and social exclusion With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion, the Parties undertake: (a) to take measures within the framework of an overall and co-ordinated approach to promote the effective access of persons who live or risk living in a situation of social exclusion or poverty, as well as their families, to, in particular, employment, housing, training, education, culture and social and medical assistance; (b) to review these measures with a view to their adaptation if necessary. Article 31—The right to housing With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the Parties undertake to take measures designed: (1) to promote access to housing of an adequate standard; (2) to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination; (3) to make the price of housing accessible to those without adequate resources.

It should, however, be remembered that Part I of both versions of the Charter contains an 34.32 obligation for Contracting Parties only to accept as the aim of their policies ‘the attainment of conditions in which the following rights may be effectively realised’. This is often considered to amount to a promotional aspiration rather than the granting of legally enforceable rights. (b)  Other Council of Europe Instruments which are in Force Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints (ETS 158). European Interim Agreement on Social Security Schemes Relating to Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors (ETS 012). Protocol to the European Interim Agreement on Social Security Schemes Relating to Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors (ETS 012A). European Interim Agreement on Social Security other than Schemes for Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors (ETS 013). Protocol to the European Interim Agreement on Social Security other than Schemes for Old Age, Invalidity and Survivors (ETS 013A). European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance (ETS 014). Protocol to the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance (ETS 014A). European Code of Social Security (ETS 048). Protocol to the European Code of Social Security (ETS 048A). European Convention on Social Security (ETS 78). Supplementary Agreement for the Application of the European Convention on Social Security (ETS 078A).

37 These provisions appear only in the European Social Charter (revised). A number of Member States, as set out in n 27 above, are not parties to the European Social Charter (revised).



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34.33 Mention should also be made of a recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on a right of persons to have their basic needs met.38 34.34 The Council of Europe perceives social security systems as expressions of social solidarity which contribute to the maintenance of adequate standards of living. Council of Europe treaties on social security relate either to standard-setting, or to coordination of differing social security systems. Standard-setting instruments, of which the European Code of Social Security is the most important, require states to meet certain standards in social security provision, but they set underlying principles rather than levels of support. Coordinating instruments are designed to reduce the disadvantages which can arise where a person is or has been affiliated to the social security systems of more than one state. Since January 2012, activities under the European Social Charter and the European Code 34.35 of Social Security have been joined. The result is that International Labour Organization conclusions on compliance with the European Code of Social Security are now monitored by the Governmental Committee of the European Social Charter and the European Code of Social Security.39

IV.  Other Sources 34.36

34.37

The Explanation makes express reference to provisions of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers adopted on 9 December 1989. The specific reference is to Point 10 on social protection of workers, and Point 2 on rights associated with free movement of workers. Neither provision brings much to the task of interpreting Article 34. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a United Nations agency with responsibility for the advancement of international labour standards. It is the only UN tripartite agency involving representatives of states, of employers and workers, sometimes described as the social partners. The ILO was founded in 1919 and so pre-dates the United Nations Organization, but it became the first specialised agency of the UN in 1946. There are very many ILO Conventions. The ILO itself divides these into categories: (a) fundamental; (b) governance; and (c) technical. By far the largest number of conventions fall into the third category. The following are examples of current general conventions which require those participating to provide specified social security provision: C102 Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952. C118 Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention 1962. C130 Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention 1969. C157 Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention 1982. C182 Maternity Protection Convention 2000.

34.38

34.39

These conventions require parties to them to make provision for benefits in the circumstances prescribed by the relevant Convention but do not set either the level of the benefit or the detailed conditions of entitlement for their award. The ILO operates two types of monitoring mechanisms. The first is the examination of periodic reports submitted by member states on the measures they have taken to implement the provisions 38 Recommendation No R (2000) 3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Right to the Satisfaction of Basic Material Needs of Persons in Situations of Extreme Hardship, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 January 2000 at the 694th meeting of Ministers’ Deputies. 39 See generally on the work of the Council of Europe in the field of social security: www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/ socialsecurity/default_en.asp.

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of the ratified Conventions. The second is a representations procedure and a complaints procedure of general application. Both types of procedure are governed by the ILO Constitution.40

D. Analysis I.  General Remarks As a free-standing provision, Article 34 offers little. The Explanation notably refers to the 34.40 ‘principle set out in Article 34(1)’. This indicates that the matters governed by the provision are not fully-fledged rights but depend upon implementation in European Union and national law.41 The same is undoubtedly true of the provisions in the third paragraph which refers to recognition and respect for the right to the social protection referred to there. The wording of the second paragraph is somewhat different using the language of entitlement. All this makes examination of various implementing measures in both European Union law, and national law flowing from this and other obligations taken on by States particularly significant. Both Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 1612/68, to which reference is made in the Explanation, have now been overtaken by later Union instruments.42 There are already many international legal provisions broadly similar in content to Article 34 34.41 to which the Member States are parties. Indeed a cynic might fairly remark that Article 34 hardly goes beyond the provisions of Articles 22 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in recognising the broad obligation of states to support those in need. All Member States have systems of social security and social assistance which vary in scope and in the value of benefit provision determined in accordance with national priorities and budgets. That said, the inclusion of a specific right to social security and social assistance in the Charter does underline the obligation of states to recognise and respect entitlement to support for those who fall on hard times. The Article’s references to rules of Union law mean that the substance of this provision can 34.42 only properly be understood when it is read within the framework of current Union law affecting social security entitlement. Here entitlements flowing from citizenship of the Union and under the coordinating provisions on social security are of particular importance.

II.  Scope of Application All three paragraphs of Article 34 are made subject to the rules laid down by ‘Community law 34.43 and national laws and practices’.43 The wording of the second paragraph is slightly different, referring simply to ‘Community law’ as distinct from ‘the rules laid down by Community law’. It is difficult to conceive of any significance flowing from the difference of wording. The wording in all three paragraphs must indicate that there is no intention to go beyond what is at any moment in time offered by European Union law and national laws and practices. In particular, the personal scope of the rights may by the use of these phrases be limited to nationals of the

40 For further information, see the ILO website at www.ilo.org/global/lang--en/index.htm. 41 See Art 52 of the Charter, especially Art 52(5). 42 Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems (corrected version) [2004] OJ L200/1, as amended; and Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (codification) [2011] OJ L141/1, repealing and replacing Regulation 1612/68/EEC. See further below in section D.III. 43 See also Art 52(6) of the Charter.



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34.44

34.45

34.46

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Member States (and of the three EEA countries and Switzerland where Union law has been extended to their nationals), and to third-country nationals only where the Union has legislated to provide such nationals with rights under European Union Law.44 The words used in paragraph 1 are that the Union ‘recognises and respects’ the entitlement to social security and social services; this reflects the promotional nature of the European Social Charter from which it takes its inspiration. The same formulation is also used in Article 25 on the rights of the elderly; in Article 26 on the integration of persons with disabilities; and in Article 36 on access to services of general economic interest. There is no express reference to family benefits, though this may be encompassed in the reference to benefits and services providing protection in cases of dependency. The reference to social security benefits should be read as social security benefits as defined in Union legal instruments, but it must be remembered that there is a reference to respect for entitlements arising under national laws and practices and these may well go beyond those benefits within the personal and material scope of the Union instruments. The Explanation on Article 33 indicates that maternity is intended to ‘cover the period from conception to weaning’. Social services are nowhere defined in the Charter, but the Explanation refers to cases where such services have been introduced, and emphasises that there is no obligation to create such services where none currently exist. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no reference in the Explanation to Article 14 of the European Social Charter, which refers to social welfare services, and helpfully indicates that it is referring to services using methods of social work. If social services as referred to in Article 34(1) of the Charter are defined in this way, this is an important expression of support for a particular form of social protection commonly available in the Member States. The second paragraph is little more than a restatement of the benefits flowing from what is now Regulation 883/2004 and Regulation 492/2011.45 The Explanation refers to the predecessor regulations to these two regulations, but makes no mention of Directive 2004/38.46 The second paragraph is couched in the language of entitlement. The use of the term ‘everyone’ could be read as more sweeping than a reference to nationals of the Member States. However, the qualification of the word by the following words, ‘residing and moving legally within the European Union’, as well as the reference to the benefits and advantages being enjoyed ‘in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices’, clearly does not extend the benefits to all those within the jurisdiction of a Member State. Nationals of the Member States are plainly included, as are nationals of EEA countries, and Switzerland where Union law has been extended to cover them. Third-country nationals will be covered where there is Union legislation which provides for their protection.47 44 As in Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2004] OJ L16/44. The interpretation of terms in this Directive was in issue in Case C-571/10 Kamberaj (24 April 2012), which is discussed below. It is, of course, open to the Member States to legislate for more generous provision than that required by Union law. See also Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers (the Reception Directive) [2003] OJ L31/18; and Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (the Qualification Directive) [2011] OJ L337/9, esp Arts 28–32. See also now Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L180/96. 45 See further below in section D.III. 46 Undoubtedly because it post-dates the original Charter which was proclaimed in December 2000, and because the full range of rights flowing from the Citizenship Directive remains deeply contested. 47 As, for example, through the operation of Regulation 859/2003 in relation to Regulation 1408/71 or Regulation 1231/2010 in relation to Regulation 883/2004 where Member States have so agreed. The United Kingdom has not done so and for third-country nationals the regime in Regulation 1408/71 as extended by Regulation 859/2003 continues to apply. Note also the Directives listed in n 35 above which give certain entitlements to third-country nationals.

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There remains considerable controversy surrounding entitlement to social assistance under the Citizenship Directive. This provides that there is no entitlement to social assistance in the first three months of residence, but absolute equality of treatment with nationals is required after citizens have attained permanent residence under the Directive. This leaves considerable uncertainty surrounding entitlement in the period after three months and before the attainment of permanent residence. Even determining when permanent residence has been attained is problematic, since there is authority from the Court of Justice that only residence strictly in accordance with the Directive counts towards the five-year qualification period.48 In relation to the second paragraph of Article 34, social security benefits should be given a meaning which encompasses at least those benefits which are within the material scope of Regulation 883/2004, and social advantages a meaning congruent with the broad interpretation of the term by the Court of Justice under Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, now Regulation 492/2011.49 The second paragraph uses the language of entitlement. In relation to the third paragraph, it should be noted that the Treaty only uses the term ‘social exclusion’ in Article 3(3) and 9 TEU in committing itself to combatting social exclusion, and at the end of Article 153(1)(j) TFEU, so the emphasis in the Charter on the notion is a welcome re-inforcement of the Union’s commitment. The right which is to be recognised and respected is that to social and housing assistance.50 The Explanation indicates that it is based on Articles 30 and 31 of the revised European Social Charter.51 Article 34(3) also clearly draws on Article 13 of the European Social Charter, with its reference to social assistance.52 Paragraph 3 is rather more widely drawn than the cautious terms of Articles 30 and 31 of the European Social Charter (revised), since it refers to a right to social and housing assistance. However, little probably turns on that, since a number of Member States are not parties to the European Social Charter (revised).53 In the Kamberaj case54 the Court of Justice drew on Article 34 of the Charter in determining the obligation of Member States to provide housing assistance to third-country nationals and in giving meaning to the term ‘core benefits’ in Directive 2003/109.55 The dispute arose when an Albanian national who was a lawful long-term resident in Italy was denied access to housing benefit. The Italian scheme had a different basis of calculation for determining the global amount available for housing benefit provision, on the one hand, for citizens of the Union, and, on the other hand, for third-country nationals. The claimant was refused housing benefit because the fund for third-country nationals was exhausted. He complained that this breached the obligation in Article 11 of Directive 2003/109 to treat long-term residents who are third-country nationals on an equal basis with nationals. There was also an issue concerning Article 11(4) which allowed Member States to ‘limit equal treatment in respect of social assistance and social protection to core

48 Joined Cases C-424/10 Ziolkowski and C-425/10 Szeja (21 December 2011). 49 See Case 249/83 Hoeckx [1985] ECR 973; and Case 59/85 Reed [1986] ECR 1873. 50 In relation to housing assistance, see Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065; and Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107. 51 Arts 30 and 31 appear only in the European Social Charter (revised). 52 Though the absence of any reference to medical assistance might suggest the contrary. However, medical assistance is encompassed within the notion of social security benefits providing protection against the risk of sickness under Regulation 883/2004. 53 See n 27 above. 54 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj (24 April 2012). 55 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2004] OJ L16/44.



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benefits’. The Court notes that the preamble to the Directive referred to respect for fundamental rights and the principles laid down in the Charter. As a consequence, the Court said: 80. … when determining the social security, social assistance and social protection measures defined by their national law and subject to the principle of equal treatment enshrined [in the Directive], the Member States must comply with the rights and observe the principles provided by the Charter, including those laid down by Article 34 thereof. Under Article 34(3) of the Charter, in order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union (and thus the Member States when they are implementing European Union law) ‘recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices’.

34.53

34.54

That left two matters for determination. First, was housing benefit a benefit within the wording of Article 11(1)(d) which refers to ‘social security, social assistance and social protection as defined by national law’? The Court of Justice said this was a matter for the referring court which had to take into account the objectives of the Directive in the light of the principles set out in the Charter. The second question was whether housing benefit fell within the concept of ‘core benefits’, since the principle of equal treatment could be limited in relation to benefits falling outside that concept. The Court of Justice noted that the preamble to the Directive indicated that the concept of core benefits covered at least minimum income support, assistance in case of illness, pregnancy, parental assistance and long-term care.56 But the absence of express reference to housing benefits did not mean that they could not be core benefits. Furthermore, as a derogation from a general principle, Article 11(4) should be interpreted strictly. The Court stresses the basic nature of housing assistance, since basic needs include food, accommodation and health. The Court then gives a very strong steer to the referring court: 92. … it should be recalled that, according to Article 34 of the Charter, the Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources. It follows that, in so far as the benefit in question in the main proceedings fulfils the purpose set out in that article of the Charter, it cannot be considered, under European Union law, as not being part of core benefits within the meaning of Article 11(4) of Directive 2003/109. It is for the referring court to reach the necessary findings, taking into consideration the objective of that benefit, its amount, the conditions subject to which it is awarded and the place of that benefit in the Italian system of social assistance.

34.55

Three key points emerge from consideration of this case. The first is that references to the Charter which were included in Union legislation prior to the grant of treaty status to the Charter will now be read as though the Charter had treaty status at the time of entry into force of the legislation. The second is that the Charter provides a compelling guide to interpretation of Union legislation even where the provision of the Charter in issue is a principle rather than a right.57 The third is that what the Court says might be directly relevant to other Union instruments which concern welfare provision, such as the Qualification Directive,58 which allows Member States to limit welfare provision to ‘core benefits’.



56 Case 57 See 58 See

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III.  Specific Provisions The regulation of social security and social assistance entitlements under Union law flows from 34.56 three sets of measures: coordinating rules, harmonising rules, and benefits flowing from citizenship of the Union. However, the European Union rules need to be set in the context of the Council of Europe framework in this field, which is in turn heavily influenced by the work of the ILO. Additionally, certain Union instruments regulating the position of third-country nationals can have a significant impact on access to social security and social assistance. (a)  The Council of Europe Framework The Nature of the Council of Europe The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organisation. It has no legislative competence in 34.57 relation to its members. Such legal obligations as flow from Council of Europe instruments do so by reason of states signing and ratifying treaties sponsored by the Council of Europe. Some have suggested that its importance in international social policy initiatives has decreased in recent decades.59 For an organisation of 47 states, some of the social security conventions have attracted very few ratifications. Coordination Measures Two interim agreements on social security coordination were signed in 1953; these were 34.58 replaced by the European Convention on Social Security, signed in Paris on 14 December 1972. This Convention was designed to secure multilateral coordination of social security systems. It entered into force on 1 March 1977, but has attracted only eight ratifications,60 and is consequently something of a dead letter. The European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, signed in Paris on 11 December 1953, is of rather more interest. This has attracted 18 ratifications,61 and entered into force on 1 July 1954. It is the only multilateral convention on forms of social assistance. Article 1 of the Convention provides: Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to ensure that national of the other Contracting Parties who are lawfully present in any part of its territory to which this Convention applies, and who are without sufficient resources, shall be entitled equally with its own nationals and on the same conditions to social and medical assistance (hereinafter referred to as ‘assistance’) provided by the legislation in force from time to time in that part of its territory.

34.59

Article 11(a) defines lawful residence in the following terms: Residence by an alien in the territory of any of the Contracting Parties shall be considered lawful within the meaning of this Convention so long as there is in force in his case a permit or such other permission as is required by the law and regulations of the country concerned to reside therein. Failure to renew any such permit, if due solely to the inadvertence of the person concerned, shall not cause him to cease to be entitled to assistance.

59 F Pennings, European Social Security Law, 5th edn (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2010) 276–78. 60 Austria, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. 61 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.



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Harmonisation Measures 34.60

The European Social Charter has, since its inception, contained provisions relating to social security.62 Articles 12 and 13 have already been quoted above. In addition Article 14 contains the following provisions: Article 14—The right to benefit from social welfare services With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to benefit from social welfare services, the Parties undertake: (1) to promote or provide services which, by using methods of social work, would contribute to the welfare and development of both individuals and groups in the community, and to their adjustment to the social environment; (2) to encourage the participation of individuals and voluntary or other organisations in the establishment and maintenance of such services.

34.61

34.62

Article 12(2) ESC makes reference to the European Code of Social Security. That Code entered into force on 17 March 1968, and has been ratified by 21 countries. A revised European Code of Social Security signed in Rome on 6 November 1990 has attracted only 13 signatures and a single ratification; it is not in force. It will be noted that the form of the obligation under taken under Articles 12 to 14 for the European Social Charter is an undertaking to promote or encourage the attainment of the specified level of social protection. (b)  Coordinating Rules of European Union Law

34.63

What might be described as European social security law has grown out of the rules relating to the free movement of workers.63 However, developments in the field of social security have now gone far beyond the area of employment. The two main Union legal instruments are Regulation 883/2004, as amended, and its accompanying implementing Regulation 987/2009, as amended.64 These regulations are the third generation of legal instruments in this field,65 and now cover employed persons, self-employed persons, those who have ceased work, civil servants, and students. They probably cover all those who are or have been insured under national schemes in any of the Member States. They also extend beyond the Member States under the EEA Agreement

62 Though all Member States are parties to the original European Social Charter (ETS No 35), Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Poland, Spain, and the United K ­ ingdom are not parties to the European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No 163). 63 See generally, F Pennings, European Social Security Law, 5th edn (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2010); P Watson, Social Security Law of the European Communities (London, Mansell, 1980); and R White, EC Social Security Law (Harlow, Longman, 1999). 64 Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems (corrected version) [2004] OJ L200/1, as amended; and Regulation 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 883/2004, [2009] OJ L284/1, as amended. 65 The first generation of instruments was Regulation 3 concerning the social security of migrant workers [1958] JO L30/561, and Regulation 4 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation 3 [1958] JO L30/597. The second generation was Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, selfemployed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L149/2, and Regulation 574/72 laying down the procedure for implementing regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to their families moving within the Community [1972] OJ L74/1. For more background, see R White, ‘The New European Social Security Regulations in Context’ [2010] Journal of Social Security Law 144–63.

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to cover nationals of Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein,66 and nationals of Switzerland under a separate agreement. To some extent they also extend to third-country nationals who have been affiliated to the social security systems of two or more Member States.67 But these instruments are not in any sense a social security code for those subject to its coverage. They are instruments of coordination in relation to benefits within its scope allowing differing national social security systems to work together in order to avoid obstacles to free movement of persons between the Member States. In the Pinna case, the Court said: Article 51 [now Article 48 TFEU] of the Treaty provides for the co-ordination, not the harmonization, of the legislation of the Member States. As a result, Article 51 leaves in being differences between the Member States’ social security systems, and, consequently, in the rights of persons working in the Member States. It follows that substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of individual Member States, and hence in the rights of persons working in the Member States, are unaffected by Article 51 of the Treaty.68

The requirement for the coordination of social security systems only operates within the mate- 34.64 rial scope of the Union rules; under Regulation 883/2004 this covers benefits offering protection within ten branches of social security: —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— ——

sickness benefits; maternity and equivalent paternity benefits; invalidity benefits; old-age benefits; survivors’ benefits; benefits for accidents at work and occupational diseases; death benefits; unemployment benefits; pre-retirement benefits; and family benefits.

A social security benefit will fall within the scope of one of these 10 branches when it is designed 34.65 to protect against the named risk. The Court of Justice has consistently stated that whether a benefit is within the material scope of the named risks is determined not by the system of national classification, but by the application of European Union law. In Case 9/78 Gillard the Court said that the classification of a benefit under the coordinating regulation ‘rests entirely on the factors relating to each benefit, in particular its purpose and the conditions for its grant’.69 As a result, the Court has been imaginative in bringing benefits within the branches of social security to which the coordinating regulation refers. For example, in the Molenaar case, care benefits were regarded as providing protection against the risks related to sickness.70 In Commission v

66 In addition, there is some special protection afforded to refugees within Regulation 883/2004. Social security provision can also reach nationals of non-Member States through Association Agreements and decisions made under them: see, for example, Decision 3/80 of the Association Council on the application of the social security schemes of the Member States to Turkish workers and members of their families, and Case C-262/96 Sürül [1999] ECR I-2685. 67 See Regulation 859/2003 extending the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 to third-country nationals, and Regulation 1231/2010 extending the provisions of Regulation 883/2004 to third-country nationals. 68 Case 41/84 Pinna v Caisse d’allocation familiales de la Savoie [1986] ECR 1, 24–25. 69 Case 9/78 Gillard [1978] ECR 1661 [12]. See also Case C-160/96 Molenaar [1998] ECR I-84; Joined Cases C-502/01 and C-31/02 Gaumain-Cerri and Barth [2004] ECR I-6483; and Case C-228/07 Jörn Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989. 70 Case C-160/96 Molenaar [1998] ECR I-84. See also Case C-286/03 Hosse [2006] ECR I-1771.



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34.66

European Parliament and Council, certain disability benefits were held to be benefits protecting against the risks of sickness within the material scope of the regulation, rather than special non-contributory benefits which were excluded from its material scope to the extent that they could be made payable only in the Member State of residence.71 A particularly problematic distinction arises between social security and social assistance. Benefits within the above schemes are social security, whereas social assistance looks to need and tends to be discretionary in its entitlement, requiring some authority to determine the suitability of the applicant for support. The distinction has become blurred by elements of social security providing social assistance,72 and by some countries basing social assistance on rules of entitlement rather than discretion. There is no bright line distinction between benefits which constitute social security and those which constitute social assistance. The most helpful current exposition of the distinction can be found in the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in the Skalka case:73 50. On the subject of the distinction between social assistance and social security benefits, I should first outline the Court’s definition of social security benefits in its consistent case-law: ‘[A] benefit may be regarded as a social security benefit in so far as it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position and relates to one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1408/71.’ 51. In the Hughes judgment the Court addressed the objection that the supplement for families (‘family credit’) at issue in that case was granted on the basis of an assessment of need and, consequently, that the benefit constituted social assistance. The Court held in that regard: ‘Whilst it is true that a benefit such as family credit is granted or refused solely on the basis of the claimant’s assets, income, and the number and age of his dependent children, it does not follow that the grant of the benefit is dependent on an individual assessment of the claimant’s personal needs, which is a characteristic feature of social assistance … The criteria applied are objective, legally defined criteria which, if met, confer entitlement to the benefit, the competent authority having no power to take account of other personal circumstances.’ 52. If the same approach were adopted in assessing the compensatory supplement, it would, in fact, also have to be regarded as a social security benefit. After all, it too is granted on the basis of legally defined, objective criteria. The recipient of the pension is entitled to the supplement if his income falls short of a specific standard value which is also determined, in each case, on the basis of objective criteria. For instance, the standard value may depend on whether the pensioner lives with his or her spouse and on the number of children he or she has. There is nothing to suggest that the Sozialversicherungsanstalt has any discretion to assess personal need on the basis of criteria other than those defined by law. 53. However, it should be examined whether the position adopted by the Court in Hughes can be generalised. The definition of a social security benefit, as it is construed in that judgment, might, conversely, support the argument that a benefit constitutes social assistance only if it is granted on the basis of an assessment of the needs of the person concerned, which falls within the discretion of the competent authority, rather than on the basis of objective, legally defined criteria. 54. However, in many national legal orders, social assistance is granted on the basis of objective, legally defined criteria for assessing personal need simply so as to observe the principle of equal treatment. Furthermore, guaranteeing the minimum level of subsistence is no longer considered to be a charitable measure on the part of the State. On the contrary, in many modern welfare States, individuals have such a right as an expression of their human dignity.



71 Case

C-299/05 Commission v European Parliament and Council [2007] ECR I-8695. benefits’. C-160/02 Skalka [2004] ECR I-1771, paras 50–56 of the Opinion.

72 So-called ‘mixed 73 Case

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55. It follows that a benefit can display social assistance features, which are the criteria necessary for its classification as a special benefit, even when it is granted according to personal need which can be determined on the basis of objective, legally defined criteria. 56. A further crucial factor, in addition to indicators of personal need, in establishing that the benefit concerned is akin to social assistance is that the grant of the compensatory supplement does not depend on the aggregation of given periods of employment or contribution. Classification as a special non-contributory benefit means that the benefit is paid only if the pension recipient is resident in the country providing the benefit. As the German Government correctly points out, that derogation from the principle of exportability is lawful only so long as the person concerned has not acquired any pension entitlements as a result of periods of employment or contribution.74

It is possible to discern a trend in the case law of the Court of Justice to reduce the scope of social 34.67 assistance by defining benefits which are claimed to be social assistance as social security. For example, in the Vatsouras and Koupatantze case, the Court considered that benefits of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to the labour market would, irrespective of the classification under national law, constitute social security rather than social assistance.75 The rules of coordination offer significant benefits to those within the personal scope76 and the 34.68 material scope of the Regulation. The general objectives of the coordinating rules are such that a national of an EEA country: 1. 2.

3.

is not to be disqualified from entitlement to qualifying social security benefits on grounds of nationality or on a change of country of residence within the European Economic Area; may become entitled to a qualifying benefit by having contributions or qualifying periods of work or residence in one EEA country aggregated with those arising in another EEA country; and should not be disadvantaged in relation to entitlement to qualifying benefits by reason of his or her exercise of rights to move between EEA countries.

These rules are secured by the application of six principles: aggregation, equality of treatment, 34.69 subjection at any given time to a single social security law, the maintenance of acquired rights, the assimilation of legal effects and facts, and inter-state cooperation. The provisions of Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/201177 contain rules of equal treatment 34.70 for workers78 and their families on grounds of nationality for a range of benefits, though they do not require harmonisation of the benefits affected. In many cases, workers who are seeking access to benefits may be spared the need to secure a particular classification of a benefit in order to rely on the rules in Regulation 883/2004 by relying on Article 7(2). The identically worded predecessor to this provision has been construed very broadly by the Court of Justice. Its impact can be illustrated by the facts of the Castelli case.79 Carmela Castelli, an Italian national born in 1890, had never worked in Belgium, but had moved there in 1957 following the death of her husband. She lived with her son, who was in receipt of a Belgian retirement pension. She claimed the guaranteed income for old persons, but was refused because she was not a Belgian national

74 Footnotes omitted. 75 Joined Cases C-22 and 23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-4585 [59]. 76 Now essentially insured nationals of the Member States, an EEA country, and Switzerland. 77 Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (codification) [2011] OJ L141/1, repealing and replacing Regulation 1612/68/EEC. 78 Joined Cases C-147 and 148/11 Czop and Punakova (6 September 2012) establish that Regulation 1612/68 (and, it would follow, Regulation 492/2011) does not apply to self-employed persons. 79 Case 261/83 Castelli v Office National des Pensions pours Travailleurs Salariés [1984] ECR 3199.



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and was not entitled to a retirement pension or a survivors’ pension in Belgium. The Court of Justice, on a reference from the Belgian court, concluded that she was a dependent relative in the ascending line of a worker in Belgium who had elected to remain there on his retirement. As such, she was able to claim equality of treatment with nationals by reason of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68. Since dependent relatives of a Belgian national would be entitled to have access to the guaranteed income for old people, it followed that Carmela Castelli could not be excluded by reason of her Italian nationality. (c)  Harmonising Rules of EU Law 34.71

In contrast to coordination, harmonisation implies the securing of some uniformity of provision. It might require changes to national systems in order to comply with the international standard. In European Union social security law, the requirement to remove discrimination as between men and women in the field of social security involves elements of harmonisation. The benefits need not be the same in different Member States, but national social security systems must be adjusted to ensure that there is no discrimination based on grounds of sex in relation to the benefits within the material scope of the legislation.80 To that extent the rules require harmonisation of entitlement as between men and women. (d)  Benefits Flowing from Citizenship of the European Union

34.72 34.73

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The development of Union law on social security has been an adjunct of the rights of the ‘market citizen’,81 that is, economically active persons moving from one Member State to another. The introduction of citizenship of the European Union and the benefits attaching to it82 present a tension between those rights which are citizenship rights (which might well include entitlement to social security and social assistance) and those rights which are necessary for the protection of the economically active (for example, workers moving between Member States). As already noted, the Citizenship Directive indicates in Article 24(2) that a Member State is under no obligation to grant social assistance within the first three months83 of residence in a Member State other than that of the person’s nationality. However, once permanent residence under Article 16 of the Directive is attained, there must be absolute equality of treatment between nationals of the host Member State and nationals of other Member States. It would seem that it is the level of social integration which will determine the entitlement of nationals of other Member States in the residence period beyond three months but prior to the attaining of permanent residence under the Directive. The Court of Justice has acknowledged that, in certain cases, a Member State may use a residence test as a test of social integration in determining access to social security and social assistance, provided that the residence requirement can be objectively justified and is proportionate.84 Residence requirements meeting these conditions will not breach the

80 See Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security [1979] OJ L6/24. For a commentary on this Directive, see M Rowland and R White, Social Security Legislation 2013/14, Vol III: Administration Adjudication and the European Dimension (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) paras 3.612–3.642. 81 See Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’ in J Shaw and G More (eds) New Legal Dynamics of European Union, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), at 73. 82 See now Arts 18–25 TFEU. 83 Or longer, where a process of seeking work under Art 14(4)(b) is continuing. 84 Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703; and Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947.

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prohibition of discrimination of grounds of nationality.85 The Court of Justice has consistently stressed that enjoyment of rights attached to the status of Union citizenship is conditional on meeting requirements explicitly laid down in European Union law. A person who does not meet such conditions cannot fulfil the requirement of being lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State.86 These judgments significantly limit claims to entitlement to social security based solely on holding the status of citizen of the Union. There remains considerably more protection for those who can show that they are economically active as workers or selfemployed persons.

IV.  Limitations and Derogations Since Article 34(1) and (3) contains a principle and not a right, at first sight Article 52(2) would 34.75 seem to have no relevance in relation to Article 34. However, Article 52(2) states that Charter provisions based on the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and limits laid down in the Treaties. The Explanation states that Article 52(2) applies notably to the provisions concerning Union citizenship. It should be observed that this is increasingly being recognised as have a constitutional status. Union citizens are increasingly claiming equality of treatment in matters of social welfare on the basis of their Union citizenship status. Thus, notwithstanding the apparent lack of relevance of Article 52(2) to Article 34, arguments based on Union citizenship may bring the provision in by the back door. The provisions of Articles 52(5) and (6) when read together and in the context of their 34.76 application to the principle set out in Article 34(1) and (3) reinforce the requirement already present in the article that recognition and respect for social security entitlements must operate in the context of the requirements of both Union law and national law.

V. Remedies The somewhat inchoate nature of the rights contained in Article 34 significantly limits the 34.77 remedies for its breach. However, in relation to disputes about social security entitlement, it is believed that all Member States have appellate and review procedures which would meet the requirements of Article 47 of the Charter in offering a mechanism to challenge adverse decisions. Whether sufficient legal assistance is available to pursue those claims is rather more contentious, but where such assistance is not available the Member States would argue that the procedures for making challenges within their national legal orders are such that legal assistance is not necessary to ensure effective access to justice.

E. Evaluation Such entitlement to social security as is contained in Article 34(1) and (3) is inchoate. Respect 34.78 for the principle set out in Article 34(1) and (3) is met by having a system of social security, and in this regard the provisions of the Charter add little to international commitments which the Member States have undertaken elsewhere. Those obligations are sensitive to the issues

85 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom EU:C:2016:436. 86 Case C-333/13 Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig EU:C:2014:2358 and Case C-67/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597.



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of national resource allocation, and do not purport to set any level of social security or social assistance, or even to specify the types of social security or social and housing assistance which must be provided beyond referring to protection against certain risks. Yet, as the Kamberaj case shows, Article 34 will provide a clear steer as to the interpretation of Union legislation in this field.87 The position under Article 34(2) is, however, couched in the language of rights. It is not a broad provision and refers directly to entitlements arising specifically either under European Union law or under national law. National social security systems are often said to reflect a concept of social solidarity under which those who have are willing, through taxation and social security contributions, to contribute to support those who have not. Whether a concept of social solidarity can operate as a legal principle at the European level remains a contested issue.88 At its current state of development, it would not be possible to sustain an argument that social solidarity is a legal principle which, of itself, gives rise to obligations on Member States to support nationals of other Member States who fall on hard times. But Article 34 might be a first step towards such a position. Despite this somewhat pessimistic view, there are powerful provisions of European Union secondary legislation on free movement of persons, as well as relating to citizenship of the Union, which strongly encourage social solidarity among the Member States and which assimilate some migrant citizens with citizens of the host Member State for all purposes. The limits of the case law developments of these rights have not yet been reached. Just as the Member States remain somewhat ambivalent about their obligations to support citizens of the Union who are not their own nationals, so too the case law of the Court of Justice is still sending out mixed signals on what the provisions of the Citizenship Directive require of the Member States. In that context, it is no surprise that Article 34 also reflects that ambivalence.

87 See above, text accompanying n 45. 88 See generally M Ross and Y Borgmann-Prebil (eds), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), but esp S Giubboni, A certain degree of solidarity? Free movement of persons and access to social protection in the case law of the European Court of Justice, URGE Working Paper 3/2008, www.urge.it/files/papers/3_ wpurge3_2008.pdf, pp 166–97.

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Article 35 Article 35 The Right to Health Care Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the Union’s policies and activities.

Text of Explanatory Note on Article 35 The principles set out in this Article are based on Article 152 of the EC Treaty, now replaced by Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and on Articles 11 and 13 of the European Social Charter. The second sentence of the Article takes over Article 168(1).

Select Bibliography A de Ruijter, EU Health Law & Policy: The Expansion of EU Power in Public Health and Health Care (Oxford, OUP, 2019). A Ely Yamin, ‘The right to health’ in J Dugard, B Porter, D Ikawa and L Chenwi, Research Handbook on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2020) L O Gostin and B M Meier (eds), Foundations of Global Health & Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2020) T Hervey, ‘The right to hea