176 3 2MB
English Pages 274 [279] Year 2012
The English It-Cleft
Topics in English Linguistics 79
Editors
Elizabeth Closs Traugott Bernd Kortmann
De Gruyter Mouton
The English It-Cleft A Constructional Account and a Diachronic Investigation
by
Amanda L. Patten
De Gruyter Mouton
ISBN 978-3-11-027780-7 e-ISBN 978-3-11-027952-8 ISSN 1434-3452 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. ” 2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 10785 Berlin/Boston Cover image: Brian Stablyk/Photographer’s Choice RF/Getty Images Printing: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen 앝 Printed on acid-free paper 앪 Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com
Acknowledgements
This book is a revised version of my 2010 University of Edinburgh dissertation Cleft Sentences, Construction Grammar and Grammaticalization. I would first like to thank my PhD supervisor, Nikolas Gisborne, and the examiners of my thesis, Geoff Pullum and Kersti Börjars. I am immensely grateful to the AHRC for funding my postgraduate studies. Without this financial support, I could not have continued in education. Among those who have discussed my work with me, I would especially like to thank Graeme Trousdale and Regina Weinert. I am also grateful to Roger Higgins for taking the time to correspond with me early on in my studies and for encouraging me in my work on clefts. I must also thank Catherine Ball, Nancy Hedberg, Bettelou Los and Javier Pérez-Guerra for helping me to access unpublished or not widely distributed works, as well as Susan Pintzuk, Ann Taylor and Anthony Warner for introducing me to the English historical parsed corpora series and for their guidance in its use. Thanks also to Linda van Bergen and Meg Liang for help with translating some of the historical data. Above all, I thank Elizabeth Traugott for showing interest in my work and for her guidance throughout the writing of this book. I am very grateful for her encouragement and for her valuable comments on my written work at various stages in the process. Many thanks also to Kirsten Börgen, Julie Miess and Angelika Hermann at De Gruyter Mouton for help in producing the finished piece. ALP Newcastle, 2012
Contents
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vii
Chapter 1 Introduction and background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. An outline of the project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. An overview of the literature on cleft sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. The expletive approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. The extraposition approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. A constructional approach to it-clefts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. A diachronic approach to it-clefts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 5 5 7 9 12 14
Chapter 2 A model of language structure and language change. . . . 1. Some basic assumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. A constructional model of language structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. A constructional model of language change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. The application to it-clefts and copular constructions . . . . . . . . . .
16 16 17 21 25
Chapter 3 Specificational copular constructions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Different and competing analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. The equative approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. The inverse approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. A less formal approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Specification as (the inverse of) nominal predication . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Specification and definite NP predicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Specification and inversion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Capturing this account in cognitive and constructional frameworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Accounting for the behaviour of indefinite NPs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. Specification and indefinite NP predicates. . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. An account based on discourse requirements. . . . . . . . . . 3.3. An account based on definiteness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Summarizing and extending the account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. An overview of specificational NP be NP sentences . . . . 4.2. Positioning this account in relation to the literature . . . . .
27 27 28 30 32 34 34 38 42 47 48 49 51 56 56 58
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Contents
4.3. Other specificational copular constructions . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1. Th-clefts as specificational copular sentences. . . 4.3.2. Wh-clefts as specificational copular sentences . . 4.3.3. All-clefts as specificational copular sentences. . . 4.3.4. A family of specificational copular sentences. . .
62 63 64 68 69
Chapter 4 It-clefts as specificational copular sentences. . . . . . . . . . 1. The English it-cleft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. A “discontinuous constituent” account of it-clefts . . . . . . 1.2. Explaining the it-cleft‟s pragmatic properties. . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1. Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2. Presupposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3. Exhaustiveness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4. Contrast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. Explaining the it-cleft‟s structural properties . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1. The behaviour of the cleft clause. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2. The evidence for VP constituency. . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3. The evidence from agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. Interim summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. A comparison with expletive accounts of it-clefts. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. A comparison with other extraposition accounts of it-clefts . . . . . 3.1. The early extraposition accounts of the 1970s . . . . . . . . . 3.2. The more recent discontinuous constituent accounts . . . . 3.3. A different extraposition account? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. A comparison with other constructional accounts of it-clefts . . . .
71 71 72 78 79 80 82 85 87 88 93 96 101 102 107 107 110 114 115
Chapter 5 Other varieties of it-cleft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Beyond the archetypal it-cleft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Predicational (and proverbial) it-clefts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. An expletive approach to predicational it-clefts. . . . . . . . 2.2. Predicational it-clefts and the inverse approach . . . . . . . . 2.3. Predicational it-clefts and the equative approach . . . . . . . 3. It-clefts with non-nominal foci. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Informative-presupposition (IP) it-clefts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
120 120 122 123 127 131 134 140 146
Chapter 6 The it-cleft and earlier periods of English . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Beyond the present-day language system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. The early history of the English it-cleft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. A restrictively modified pronoun? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
148 148 149 152
Contents
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4. An obligatorily extraposed relative clause?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. An unusual pattern of agreement? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. The evidence from Old English gender agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. The it-cleft as a relic from an earlier time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
157 162 170 177 183
Chapter 7 The it-cleft‟s development over time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. A diachronic investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. The corpora, the search and the selection process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. OE presentational/impersonal sentences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Existential sentences with it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. The pattern I it am. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4. Other constructions mistaken for clefts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. Interim summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Frequency information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Changes to the clefted constituent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Changes to the cleft clause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
184 184 184 186 190 191 192 193 194 196 204 211
Chapter 8 The it-cleft and constructional change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. The two kinds of constructional change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. A grammatical constructionalization account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Some alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. An impersonal account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. A Celtic account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. A word order account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Interim summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Why do it-clefts undergo a construction-specific development?. . 4.1. Why do it-clefts develop a construction-specific range of foci?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. Why do it-clefts develop construction-specific discourse functions? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
212 212 213 218 219 221 222 224 225
Chapter 9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
243
Corpora and data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
248
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
249
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
266
225 232 241
Chapter 1 Introduction and background
1.
An outline of the project
It-clefts are interesting for a number of reasons. For one thing, they have a non-standard structure which appears not to conform to the general rules of the language. If we take a look at the example in (1), we can see that itclefts have four main components: the introductory pronominal it, a form of the copular verb be, a postcopular phrasal element and a sentence-final clause. (1)
[It] [was] [Frank] [that complained]
From this example, we can see that (for the linguist) the it-cleft‟s syntactic configuration is difficult to make sense of. The that-clause is structured internally like a restrictive relative: it contains a gap (in subject position) which corresponds to the constituent that precedes the clause. However, proper names, such as Frank, are full noun phrases. As such, they cannot normally be modified by restrictive relative clauses. So how does this clause relate to the postcopular element, if at all? Can we really call this a restrictive relative clause? If so, what does it modify? If not, are we dealing with a clausal structure that is unique to the it-cleft? Equally problematic is the role of initial it. Is this an expletive dummy subject and if so, why is it there? Does it operate as a syntactic placemarker and if so, for which element? Or is the constituent it related in a different way to other elements in the sentence? In addition, it-clefts have a number of unusual semantic, pragmatic and discourse-functional properties. These are particularly interesting since it is not immediately clear which elements in the cleft structure contribute to the meaning of the construction. For example, the it-cleft is a focusing construction. The primary informational content is placed in the syntactically marked postcopular focal position and is often given primary stress, see
2
Introduction and background
(2).1 However, it is not at all obvious why this particular syntactic configuration should be chosen as a focusing device. Is this its primary function? (2)
It was FRANK that complained
A further property of the it-cleft is that it exhibits exhaustiveness effects. For example, in (2) we assume that Frank was the only person who complained on this occasion. They are also presuppositional; the information in the sentence-final clause is not asserted and is preserved under negation. For instance, in example (3), we are told that Frank didn‟t complain but we are left with the presupposition that somebody (else) did complain. This begs the question, where do these pragmatic meanings come from? Which elements contribute to them? (3)
It wasn‟t Frank that complained
Cleft sentences also have a specificational (or identifying) meaning. For some authors, specificational meaning involves a value-variable relationship (see Higgins 1979; Declerck 1988). For example, (2) identifies Frank as the value for the variable described by the sentence-final clause, x complained. However, for others, specificational meaning is attributed to a special use of the copular verb. So does be have a specificational meaning in the it-cleft? If not, where does the specificational meaning of it-clefts come from? To a large extent, how these questions are answered (and perhaps whether they are even asked at all) depends on how we think it-clefts relate to other constructions, or configurations, in the language. Most approaches to it-clefts fall into two broad categories: those that understand it-clefts in relation to simple subject-predicate sentences, such as (4), and those that relate it-clefts to other specificational copular sentences, such as (5). (4)
Frank complained
(5)
The one that complained was Frank
1. I use the term focus to refer to a unit of information structure where the assertion differs from the presupposition (see Chapter 4, Section 1.2.1). Although focus is often marked by intonation, Lambrecht (1994: 208) observes that “accent placement and focus marking are not to be equated”. Where focus marking is unclear or ambiguous in my examples, I make use of small capitals to indicate the marking of focus by intonation.
An outline of the project
3
I discuss these two approaches and the analyses that result from them in Section 2. Essentially, justification for the first approach comes from the truth-conditional equivalence between it-clefts and simple subject-predicate sentences. From this perspective, it-clefts are viewed primarily as a means of marking focus syntactically. The second approach, on the other hand, builds on the fact that the it-cleft is a copular construction with a specificational meaning. So which is the better approach? The answer to this question depends upon what we think is the primary function of it-clefts and asking which perspective can best explain the range of properties that itclefts display. There are also different varieties of it-cleft which are sometimes regarded as separate structures. One domain of variability involves the category of elements that can occur in the postcopular (focal) position. Although, most frequently, the focal element is a noun phrase, it-clefts allow a range of other constituents to occur as the complement of be, such as the prepositional phrase in (6). So should these examples be analysed in the same way as those with nominal foci or do they require a separate analysis? Can the sentence-final clause still be analysed as a restrictive relative if the immediate antecedent is not nominal? (6)
It‟s in October that he‟s leaving
Another domain of variation relates to the information status of the sentence-final clause. In it-clefts, the clausal component is typically associated with expressing discourse-old information, as in (7). In this example, we know from the prior discourse that a letter has been written and so the open proposition x wrote it is given information. However, in other cases, such as (8), the information expressed by the sentence-final clause is not given by the previous discourse and the proposition, that someone once said “Laws are silent at times of war”, does not even have to be known (or familiar) to the intended audience. Do these examples represent two different types of it-cleft? And if so, how are they related? Is one more basic, or prototypical, than the other? (7)
A: Did Max write the letter? B: No. It was Walter who wrote it.
(8)
(Start of lecture) It was Cicero who once said, “Laws are silent at times of war”
4
Introduction and background
A further domain of variation concerns the relationship between specificational and predicational tokens. It-clefts are usually identified as having a specificational meaning (see above). However, superficially similar proverbial sentences, such as (9), have a predicational meaning. For instance, (9) is most closely paraphrased by the predicational copular sentence in (10). In both sentences, the postcopular element describes, rather than identifies, the referent (the road that has no turning) as long. (9)
It is a long road that has no turning
(10)
The road that has no turning is a long one
How does this structure relate to the specificational it-cleft, if at all? Can proverbial sentences, such as (9), really be called clefts? It-clefts also seem to resemble extraposed sentences, such as (12). For instance, on the surface, the it-cleft in (11) differs only in that it contains a gap in the sentence-final clause. Do it-clefts share more than just an apparent likeness with this extraposed structure? (11)
It was the Colonel [that __ survived]
(12)
It is a miracle [that he survived]
In this book, I provide answers to these questions by examining it-clefts within the framework of construction grammar (cf. Croft 2001; Goldberg 1995, 2006; Lakoff 1987). Construction grammar was developed with a view to providing full and explanatory accounts of specialized linguistic patterns as well as broad generalizations. On this model, constructions are not considered the epiphenomenal byproducts of a combination of componential meaning and highly general rules. Instead, aspects of form and meaning can be encoded by the construction itself. Since much of the itcleft‟s structure and use cannot be predicted from general patterns of correspondence, it is well-suited to treatment within a constructional approach. I come back to this issue in Section 3. In addition to providing a synchronic account of the English it-cleft, I also examine the construction‟s diachronic development. Relevant questions here include: What is the origin of the it-cleft construction? How has the it-cleft (and its relationship to other constructions) changed over time? How did the different varieties of it-cleft emerge? This study contributes to the recent literature on diachronic construction grammar. As a complex and specialized linguistic pattern, the English it-cleft provides an example of
An overview of the literature on cleft sentences
5
how larger (multi-word) constructions undergo change. I discuss this aspect of my investigation in Section 4. In this section, I have provided a very brief outline of the different types of phenomena discussed and the kinds of questions addressed throughout this book. In the next section, I provide an introductory background into the literature on cleft sentences. Section 3 asks why construction grammar is helpful in the treatment of it-clefts. Here, I present an overview of the particular kind of cleft analysis argued for in this book and I compare it to other constructional accounts proposed in the literature. The historical facts of the English it-cleft, along with my diachronic construction grammar account, are sketched in brief in Section 4. I explain how I use this diachronic evidence to both support and inform my synchronic analysis. The methodology employed in this study is discussed in Section 5.
2.
An overview of the literature on cleft sentences
As I noted in Section 1, authors tend to view it-clefts either from the perspective of their relationship to truth-conditionally equivalent subjectpredicate sentences or from the perspective of their relationship to other specificational copular constructions. In this section, I outline these two approaches and the analyses that result from them. Although the individual proposals differ, these opposing viewpoints lead to two different kinds of analysis: those that treat the postcopular phrase as the preposed argument of the proposition expressed in the sentence-final clause and those that consider the sentence-final clause to be associated in some way with the initial element it. The purpose of this section is not to provide an exhaustive and comprehensive review of the literature, but simply to highlight intellectual trends in the history of the analysis of the construction.
2.1.
The expletive approach
For many authors, it-clefts are considered primarily as information structure variants of syntactically more basic sentences. From this perspective, it-clefts do not differ dramatically in their semantic content from canonical subject-predicate sentences, but are marked by the way that this informational content is presented (Ward, Birner, and Huddleston 2002). Unlike their canonical counterparts, it-clefts have a fixed information structure: the information that is to be foregrounded is placed in the postcopular position
6
Introduction and background
while the remaining semantic content is backgrounded into a sentence-final clause, as shown in (13). (13)
It was [[Frank]i [that ____i complained]]
(14)
Frank complained
[it-cleft] [canonical]
The analyses resulting from this approach assume that the focal element in it-clefts enters into a predication relationship with the information in the sentence-final clause; this accounts for their truth-conditional equivalence with simple subject-predicate sentences. From this, it follows that the initial element it and (in most accounts) the copular verb be are semantically empty, serving only to introduce, or foreground the postcopular element. As a result, in the cleft literature, these analyses are referred to cumulatively as the expletive approach; common to all such accounts is the assumption that the initial pronoun it does not play an essential role in the interpretation of the sentence. An early example of an expletive account is detailed by Jespersen (1937: 83–89). He suggests that it-clefts are syntactically identical to their noncopular counterparts except for the addition of a “lesser subject and verb” and a “connective word”. So, for instance, the elements it, be and that in (15) are semantically empty, with Frank and complained entering into a predication relationship. The example is formalized using Jespersen‟s notation.2 (15)
[It was] Frank [that] complained [sv] S [3c] V
According to Jespersen, this analysis explains why it-clefts are used as a means of marking focus syntactically. He notes, “A cleaving of a sentence by means of it is…serves to single out one particular element of the sentence and very often, by directing attention to it and bringing it, as it were, into focus, to mark a contrast” (Jespersen 1949: 147). A number of similar analyses were developed within the generative tradition of the 1980s. The details of these analyses differ. For example, Rochemont (1986) suggests that the postcopular element is situated within 2. The use of square brackets in Jespersen‟s (1937: 86) formalism indicates that this information is “extraposed” relative to the sentence proper. Lower case s and v indicate the “lesser” (i.e. expletive) subject and verb and 3 c represents a “tertiary connective”.
An overview of the literature on cleft sentences
7
the sentence-final clause at deep structure, while for Williams (1980) and Heggie (1988) these components are coindexed at the level of surface structure by a predication rule. Chomsky (1977) claims that the it-cleft is a type of topicalization construction involving wh-movement. The relationship between the postcopular element and the sentence-final clause is therefore akin to that between topic and comment. For Delahunty (1982, 1984) on the other hand, these components enter into a predication relation at the level of logical form. Delahunty converts the sentence-final clause into a function (via lambda abstraction) which takes the postcopular element as its argument; after a reduction operation, the Logical Structure of cleft sentences is equivalent to that of their noncopular counterparts. Although they use different mechanisms to achieve it, these authors assume that it-clefts and truth-conditionally synonymous sentences share a level of representation. Common to all of these accounts then is the treatment of the initial pronoun it as an expletive element, the analysis of the sentence-final clause as being in some way related to the postcopular element, and the understanding that the primary function of it-clefts is as a focusing device.
2.2.
The extraposition approach
For others, it-clefts are considered foremost as specificational copular sentences. From this perspective, it-clefts are analysed in relation to corresponding pseudocleft sentences and sometimes to noncleft copular constructions with an identifying function. The term pseudocleft is commonly used to encompass both wh-clefts, which are introduced by wh-words, and th-clefts, which are introduced by the definite article and one of a small number of semantically general head nouns such as the one or the thing.3 (16)
It‟s grape soda that I like best
[it-cleft]
(17)
What I like best is grape soda
[wh-cleft]
(18)
The thing that I like best is grape soda
(19)
My favourite drink is grape soda
[th-cleft] [noncleft NP be NP]
3. My use of the term th-cleft is from Collins (1991a, 1991b). This term is used in a different sense in Ball (1977) and Hedberg (1990, 2000) to refer to cleft sentences introduced by demonstratives, such as this or that.
8
Introduction and background
Each of these examples has the function of identifying (or specifying) the postcopular element grape soda as matching a certain description. Like the it-cleft in (16), pseudoclefts also contain clausal elements. However, in (17) and (18) these clauses are in subject position. This suggests that the it-cleft is an extraposition construction: the sentence-final clause is not connected to the focal element; instead, it is related in some way to the initial it. Again, an early example of such an approach is provided by Jespersen (1927). Prior to his (1937) account, outlined above, he proposed a “transposition analysis” of it-clefts. In the following passage, Jespersen suggests that it-clefts are paraphrased most closely by other specificational copular constructions. Here the sentence-final clause is analysed as a restrictive relative, modifying the constituent it. He notes, …it is not really the antecedent (or what looks like the antecedent) that is restricted by a relative clause. When we say „it is the wife that decides‟ or „it was the Colonel I was looking for‟ what we mean is really „the wife is the deciding person‟ and „the Colonel was the man I was looking for‟: the relative clause thus might be said to belong rather to „it‟ than to the predicative following after „it is‟ (Jespersen 1927: 88)
Other accounts that view it-clefts in relation to specificational copular sentences can be found in the transformational analyses of the 1970s, which derive it-clefts from pseudoclefts (see Akmajian 1970; Gundel 1977), or from the same source as pseudoclefts (see Wirth 1978). For these authors, the clausal element in subject position is extraposed, leading to the manifestation of it as either a placemarker or a pronominal copy. Again, the details of these analyses differ. For example, Akmajian and Wirth derive itclefts via extraposition rules that are particular to cleft sentences, whereas Gundel suggests that this process is an instance of ordinary right-dislocation. For Gundel, the initial it is a pronominal copy of the right-dislocated clause, whereas for Akmajian, it seems to be an expletive element. Bolinger (1972) takes an approach that is more in line with Jespersen‟s (1927) original proposal, in which the relative clause restrictively modifies the constituent it. He suggests that analytic compound relatives, as in (20), “provide an ideal source” for it-clefts (Bolinger 1972: 110). Such sentences can undergo what he labels “inversion” (extraposition-from-NP), whereby the restrictive clause is extraposed but the nominal head remains in situ, as in (21). For it-clefts however, this “inversion” is obligatory rather than optional. On this analysis then, the constituent it is neither a placemarker, nor a pronominal copy, but a restrictively modified pronoun.
A constructional approach to it-clefts
9
(20)
That which he stole was money
[analytic compound]
(21)
That was money which (that) he stole
[inverted compound]
(22)
It was money which (that) he stole [it-cleft] (examples from Bolinger 1972: 109)
Consequently, for these authors, there is little consistency as to the exact role of it or how the relationship between it-clefts and other specificational sentences works. Nevertheless, what these extraposition analyses share is a concern for recognizing it-clefts primarily as specificational copular sentences.
3.
A constructional approach to it-clefts
So which of these approaches is the better one? From the perspective of construction grammar, the choice is straightforward. In this section, I explain why construction grammar is a useful framework for representing and accounting for the unusual properties of it-clefts and why an approach that examines clefts in relation to specificational sentences is more compatible with the principles of construction grammar. I go on to provide an overview of my account of it-clefts before showing how this improves on the previous constructional analyses proposed in the literature. In construction grammar, larger linguistic patterns are represented as symbolic pairings of form and meaning, much like individual lexical items. These complex constructions are made up of smaller units, which are also form-meaning pairs. However, since these correspondences are internal to the larger construction, such compositional meanings may nevertheless be construction-specific. Furthermore, on this model, constructions can sometimes encode meanings which are not compositional; that is, which cannot be attributed to its individual components. In recognizing the construction as a theoretical symbolic object, construction grammar therefore anticipates the existence of (and can represent) idiosyncratic grammatical information which cannot be predicted on the basis of highly general grammatical rules. Within this framework, all aspects of form and meaning (including aspects of use) are listed inside the construction and so form part of the speaker‟s grammatical knowledge. The theory of construction grammar is therefore ideally suited to the task of providing full and comprehensive accounts of the properties of more specialized linguistic patterns, such as the English itcleft construction.
10
Introduction and background
As Goldberg (2003: 120–121) notes, the explanatory power of constructional accounts comes from the requirement that each construction must be motivated; that is, there must be some reason as to why this particular construction should exist in the language. For the most part, the motivation for a construction comes from within the grammar. On a usage-based constructional theory, a speaker‟s grammatical knowledge is represented as a network of constructions (form-meaning pairs). Specialized linguistic patterns inherit properties from more general patterns. The more properties a construction inherits, the more it can be said to be motivated by the language system. Constructions that are related to one another are shown to inherit properties from the same general pattern, forming a family of constructions. A more detailed introduction to construction grammar is provided in Chapter 2. The way that grammatical knowledge is organized in construction grammar suggests that analyses of it-clefts which are based on their relationship to structurally simple noncopular sentences will result in a less satisfactory account than an approach which views it-clefts in relation to other specificational copular sentences. On this model, inheritance links are posited between constructions that are both formally and functionally related, with an emphasis placed on similarities of surface form (Goldberg 2006: 23) and aspects of meaning that go beyond truth-conditional synonymy (Goldberg 1995: 103). Goldberg (1995: 108) says, “The intuition is that the existence of a given form with a particular meaning in no way motivates the existence of a different form with a closely related meaning”. Therefore, while noncopular subject-predicate sentences can often be used to paraphrase itclefts, their truth-conditional synonymy is not necessarily expressed (as closely) in the grammatical system. As we might expect, accounts which view it-clefts in relation to structurally less complex sentences leave a number of questions unresolved: Why should focus be marked using this particular structure? Why do it-clefts have so many semantically empty elements? Where do the existential presuppositions and the property of exhaustiveness come from? I view the it-cleft foremost as a member of the family of specificational copular constructions. It-clefts, wh-clefts, th-clefts, all-clefts and certain noncleft copular sentences all inherit properties from a more general, schematic, specificational copular construction. But what is a specificational copular construction? And where does specificational meaning come from? The answers to these questions are not obvious and a number of different analyses have been proposed in the literature. In order to understand the larger schema, or category, of copular constructions, I examine the nature
A constructional approach to it-clefts
11
of these sentences in Chapter 3. I argue that in specificational copular sentences, specificational meaning results from a class-membership predication relation associated with the concept of definiteness. I show that this type of analysis is able to account for data which has eluded alternative approaches to specificational sentences. On this account, many of the it-cleft‟s properties are shown to be motivated; that is, they are simply inherited from the more basic specificational copular construction. Following the extraposition accounts of Jespersen (1927) and Bolinger (1972), I analyse the sentence-final clause as a restrictive relative, modifying the initial it. In particular, I argue in Chapter 4 that it and the relative clause together operate like a discontinuous definite description (see also Hedberg 1990, 2000; Percus 1997; Han and Hedberg 2008). Since definite descriptions exhibit existential presuppositions and are associated with exhaustiveness (or inclusiveness), this analysis explains why these properties are found in it-clefts too. It also reduces the number of semantically “dummy” elements. For instance, on this account, the initial it is not expletive and is instead shown to perform an important function. Where my account advances the current literature is in providing a reason as to why definite descriptions are a fundamental component of it-clefts (and other specificational constructions). Furthermore, as I explain in Chapter 5, this particular analysis allows for a more straightforward account of the relationship between specificational and predicational/proverbial itclefts. Alternative constructional accounts of it-clefts have been put forward by Lambrecht (2001) and Davidse (2000). However, while both authors extend their accounts to other types of cleft sentence, neither makes use of a system of inheritance. Consequently, they treat the it-cleft as a highly idiosyncratic construction. For example, Lambrecht (2001) views it-clefts in relation to simple noncopular sentences, and so presents an expletive analysis. Thus, while his account is able to accommodate the it-cleft‟s unusual properties (through invoking the concept of the construction), it cannot identify how they come about. Davidse (2000), on the other hand, analyses the it-cleft as a highly complex structure involving two clauses (one of which is unique to cleft constructions) which enter into different semantic relationships with the postcopular element. Again, it is not clear how this structure is motivated by the language system. The constructional approach outlined here is therefore, in some ways, an improvement on those of Lambrecht (2001) and Davidse (2000) since it makes full use of the tools employed in construction grammar for making generalizations. By examining it-clefts in relation to the taxonomy of
12
Introduction and background
specificational sentences and exploiting an appropriate inheritance hierarchy, the motivation for this construction is maximized. Only after examining it-clefts in relation to the rest of the grammar are the exceptional or truly construction-specific characteristics isolated. As Goldberg (2003: 118) observes, “a given construction often shares a great deal with other constructions that exist in a language; only certain aspects of its form and function are unaccounted for by other constructions”.
4.
A diachronic approach to it-clefts
We have seen then that construction grammar tolerates (although nevertheless seeks to limit) idiosyncrasies in the language system. However, ideally, even exceptional properties should be provided with an explanation of some sort. According to Goldberg (2003: 121), in such cases, motivation can be provided by factors external to the grammar. In this section, I ask whether historical evidence can provide motivation for, and so account for, some of the construction-specific properties of the it-cleft. From my synchronic analysis of the it-cleft as a type of specificational copular construction, certain structural aspects remain a puzzle, such as the modification of it by a restrictive relative clause and the extraposition of the relative clause. By examining the it-cleft‟s structural idiosyncrasies in relation to the language system of earlier periods of English, I show in Chapter 6 that although these properties are no longer motivated by the language system, they are likely to have been inherited from formally related constructions existing at earlier periods of the language. In this way, the it-cleft shows how the retention or entrenchment of once-motivated form-function pairings can lead to construction-specific properties which are no longer productive in other areas of the grammar. For most types of it-cleft then, their seemingly idiosyncratic properties become much less mysterious when examined in relation to the grammar of earlier periods of English. However, there are subtypes of it-cleft which exhibit properties that cannot be attributed to inheritance at any period of the language. In Section 1, I introduced two varieties of it-cleft which are sometimes treated as separate constructions from the it-cleft proper: those with non-nominal foci and those with new information in the sentence-final clause. The particular range of elements found to occur in the postcopular position of the it-cleft is not shared by other specificational copular constructions. Likewise, the it-cleft seems to be the only kind of specificational sentence to express brand-new information in the presuppositional clause
A diachronic approach to it-clefts
13
(see Prince 1978; Collins 1991a). As a result, the range of non-nominal foci and the ability to express hearer-new information are properties which are not inherited from the wider specificational construction (see Chapter 5). This begs the question, where did these more idiosyncratic properties come from? In Chapter 7, I conduct a diachronic investigation, using data (from four historical English parsed corpora) which spans from Old English to Modern English. I find that the it-cleft occurs with an increasingly wide range of foci and appears in a greater variety of discourse contexts over time. These idiosyncratic properties of the it-cleft are therefore shown to be an outcome of the construction‟s historical development. In Chapter 8, I ask how and why the it-cleft construction has developed in this particular way. I interpret the changes to the function and use of the specificational it-cleft as an example of schematization. On this account, novel instances are formed by extension from the prototype, overriding inheritance from more basic patterns. As these new types of instance become more conventional, the itcleft, in turn, becomes a more abstract and schematic construction. The itcleft‟s construction-specific development is therefore shaped by its prototype, which differs in subtle ways from that of other specificational copular constructions. I exemplify this with a short comparison of it-clefts and whclefts. The historical evidence therefore demonstrates that the it-cleft was once fully motivated by inheritance from the language system. Over time, the construction has acquired a range of idiosyncratic properties via conventional pathways of change – both fossilization and schematization. Therefore, while these construction-specific characteristics are not inherited from more general patterns of correspondence, they are nevertheless shown to be motivated by general principles of language change. A more comprehensive overview of usage-based approaches to constructional change is provided in Chapter 2. With the inclusion of a substantial diachronic component, the present study is able to contribute to the somewhat limited literature on the history of the English it-cleft. Until very recently, Ball‟s (1991, 1994a) work has dominated the literature on this topic (see Filppula 2009; C. Johansson 2008; Los 2009; Los and Komen forthcoming; Patten 2010; Pérez-Guerra 1999, forthcoming for more recent contributions). However, in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, I present a very different account of the specificational it-cleft‟s origin and subsequent diachronic development. The approach outlined here is unique in that it reviews the historical data in light of an extraposition (from-NP) account of it-clefts. As I explain, the historical evidence actually
14
Introduction and background
provides considerable support for this particular synchronic approach. Finally, the present study contributes to the recent literature on diachronic construction grammar, in that it provides an example of how more complex (multi-word and partially schematic) constructions undergo change.
5.
Methodology
This book examines the English it-cleft from both a synchronic and diachronic perspective. In the synchronic part, I rely largely on examples that are either invented or taken from the literature. I have chosen to exemplify my discussion in this way for several reasons. First, I am engaging with a literature where the use of invented examples is common practice. Second, since the issues surrounding the data are often complex, I have made an effort to keep examples brief and to choose examples that highlight the relevant features without requiring unnecessary explication. Furthermore, in these chapters, the focus of my discussion is on the prototypical it-cleft subtype. As a result, I am not always interested in detailing qualitative differences between individual instances. However, where my concern is to highlight variation in the it-cleft‟s structure or to demonstrate aspects of use, I provide attested examples from the British component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB), extracted using the corpus utility program ICECUP 3.1. A search on the CLEFTIT annotation produces an output of 430 hits within 422 text units. From this data, I discounted incomplete tokens, tag questions and truncated clefts (see Chapter 4, Section 1.1 for an analysis of such structures), as well as a handful of instances which appear to have been mistakenly tagged as it-clefts.4 This amounts to a data-set of 404 tokens, from which frequency counts and proportions are measured. For more comprehensive quantitative studies of present-day it-clefts in the ICE-GB see Gómez-González (2004, 2007), Hasselgård (2004), and Nelson (1997). 4. For example, in the utterance below, work is not specified as the thing she most enjoys; instead, working full-time as a nursing auxiliary (referred to by it) is described as enjoyable work. This is not an it-cleft, despite its mark-up in the ICE-GB. (i)
At the time of the accident she was thirty-nine years old, married, with children, and working full-time as a nursing auxiliary at the Pembury Hospital near Tunbridge Wells. It was work which she much enjoyed a and to which she was fully committed. (S2A-062 008, Legal Presentation)
Methodology
15
The diachronic investigation makes use of data from four independent, yet related, historical English corpora: the York-Toronto-Helsinki Corpus of Old English Prose (YCOE), the Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Middle English, second edition (PPCME2), the Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Early Modern English (PPCEME) and the Penn Parsed Corpus of Modern British English (PPCMBE). These four corpora form part of the same series of syntactically annotated historical English corpora from the University of Pennsylvania and the University of York. As a result, they all use the same system of syntactic annotation and are accessed by the same search engine: CorpusSearch2. Together, the corpora comprise over 5 million words of running text and span the entire history of British English up until 1914. This amounts to over 500 clear it-cleft tokens, dating from the mid-tenth to the early-twentieth century. I discuss the method of extraction and selection in detail in Chapter 7, Section 2. The study undertaken here is corpus-based rather than corpus-driven; that is, my cleft analysis informs my corpus investigation and, in turn, the empirical evidence serves to support my constructional account of it-clefts. Unlike in corpus-driven studies then, I approach the data with already established hypotheses. One reason for adopting this approach is that it-clefts are notoriously difficult to identify and separate from superficially similar but structurally distinct sentence-types, such as those containing extraposed subject clauses (see Calude 2008a; Haugland 1993). Furthermore, since there are different ways of analysing it-clefts, linguists may differ over which examples count as clefts. It therefore seems preferable to have a clear understanding of the criteria used to extract the relevant data, so that at least the approach is consistent. It also means that I can address the issue of how well my theory accounts for the data.5
5. See Tognini-Bonelli (2001) for an outline of the differences between corpusbased and corpus-driven approaches to corpus study. While I argue for a corpus-based approach in this instance, Tognini-Bonelli (2001: Chapter 5) discusses the merits of a corpus-driven approach.
Chapter 2 A model of language structure and language change
1.
Some basic assumptions
This book examines the synchronic structure and diachronic development of the English it-cleft within the framework of construction grammar. In particular, I adopt the fundamental principles of usage-based theories of construction grammar, and make use of concepts from Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991), Cognitive Construction Grammar (Lakoff 1987; Goldberg 1995, 2006) and Radical Construction Grammar (Croft 2001). In this chapter, I outline some of the basic claims underlying the present study and introduce some of the machinery that I make use of in my analysis of cleft and copular sentences. In Section 2, I explain how grammatical knowledge is organized on a usage-based, constructional theory and discuss the rationale behind this model of language structure. In Section 3, I show how, together with usage-based assumptions, the conceptualization of language as a hierarchical network makes a number of predictions regarding the diachronic development of constructions which are compatible with wellattested pathways of change, such as grammaticalization. In Section 4, I go on to provide a (very brief) indication of how I make use of these various concepts in my analysis of the English it-cleft construction. It should be noted that not all versions of construction grammar adopt this same set of principles. The Construction Grammar of Kay and Fillmore (1999), for example, is not usage-based. As a result, it differs from other construction grammars in that it adopts a complete (rather than a default) mode of inheritance, which licenses a non-redundant system of grammar. As Goldberg (2006: 214, 216) notes, this version of construction grammar has developed somewhat separately, in that it more closely resembles the formalist theory Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG). In what follows, I indicate where this version of construction grammar differs from the other relevant theories and, as a result, from the fundamental assumptions of the present study.
A constructional model of language structure
2.
17
A constructional model of language structure
Construction grammar was developed with a view to providing full and explanatory accounts of specialized linguistic patterns. Such configurations are problematic for the componential model of grammatical knowledge that underlies generative theories of grammar (see Croft 2007). On a componential model, each type of linguistic knowledge (syntax, semantics and so on) makes up a separate component, with aspects of meaning and form being mapped on to one another through general linking rules. The only idiosyncratic and item-specific mappings between these components are found in lexical items, which are both arbitrary and conventional. On this model then, complex structures are built out of discrete, atomic elements in accordance with the combinatorial rules specific to each component. This reductionist perspective lends itself to the stronger hypothesis that constructions (more complex grammatical structures) are purely epiphenomenal. As Chomsky (2000: 8) says, “grammatical constructions are taken to be taxonomic artifacts, useful for informal description perhaps but with no theoretical standing”. The componential model works well for regular syntactic expressions, since, once we know the meanings typically associated with each of the lexical items, we can determine the meaning of the construction as a whole. However, the meaning and function of more specialized linguistic patterns cannot be determined from the general rules of semantic interpretation for their constituents as they exist outside of the particular construction; that is, the meaning of specialized linguistic patterns is conventional in the sense that it must be learned. Such structures are also sometimes noncompositional; that is, they express meanings which cannot be entirely broken down into components and attributed to their individual formal elements.1 These, less regular expressions are therefore problematic for a strictly componential model of language structure, since aspects of their meaning and/or use cannot be generated from the application of highly general linking rules. Such phenomena represent strong evidence for the need to recognize the construction as having an independent theoretical status. On this model of grammar, constructions are symbolic pairings of form and meaning, much like lexical items. The syntactic elements and semantic components that are particular to each complex construction are related via symbolic links that 1. See Nunberg, Wasow, and Sag (1994) for a detailed discussion of the differences between the concepts of conventionality and noncompositionality.
18
A model of language structure and language change
are internal to that construction. This allows the representation of meanings that are at once compositional (attributable to individual elements of form) and conventional (construction-specific or irregular). In addition to housing these smaller pairings of form and meaning, complex constructions contain a further symbolic link which relates the entirety of the construction‟s form to the construction‟s conventional meaning. This allows the representation of noncompositional meanings, which are associated with the construction as a whole, but cannot be attributed to any of its individual parts. A model of grammar which recognizes the construction as a theoretical object is therefore able to handle the existence of idiosyncratic grammatical information. However, construction grammar takes this a step further, proposing that, in fact, all grammatical knowledge, including the predictable or regular patterns of the language, should be represented as constructions. As Fillmore, Kay, and O‟Connor (1988: 534) suggest, the machinery needed to describe more peripheral constructions can be “generalized to more familiar structures”. Indeed, this follows directly from the usage-based assumptions of most construction grammars. On a usage-based model, humans are not innately programmed with linguistic knowledge; instead, all of language (and not just the periphery) is learned inductively from the input, or rather, from the speaker‟s linguistic experiences. It follows from this that all grammatical knowledge (both specialized linguistic patterns and broad generalizations) should be given a uniform representation. Therefore, in usage-based constructional theories, the entire language system is made up of constructions (form-meaning pairs). As long as a linguistic pattern is sufficiently frequent that the speaker is likely to induce an abstract mental schema, then it may be stored as a symbolic unit. Thus, on a usage-based framework, constructions are simply conventionalized chunks of linguistic knowledge (Goldberg 2006: 05). These constructions form a structured inventory which makes up the speaker‟s knowledge of the language. This inventory is represented as a taxonomic network of constructions with each construction constituting a separate node (Croft and Cruse 2004: 262). The network is hierarchical, showing that some constructions are more basic or general than others. Lower-level constructions inherit attributes from higher-level constructions. That is to say, more specialized and substantive (lexically filled) constructs are instances of more general and schematic (lexically open) constructions. Usage-based construction grammars adopt the default mode of inheritance. On the complete inheritance model, an inheriting construction inherits all of the information which is specific to a dominating construction. This means
A constructional model of language structure
19
that information only has to be represented once in the hierarchy: inherited information is stored only in the dominating construction, at the highest level possible. This amounts to a non-redundant system of linguistic knowledge. It follows from the complete inheritance model that while a lower-level construction may contain information which is not present in a dominating construction, it may not contain information that conflicts with information presented at a higher level, without resulting in ill-formedness (Goldberg 1995: 73–74). Categories formed on the basis of these inheritance hierarchies are therefore classical; that is, a construction is a member of a larger constructional category if and only if it inherits all of the grammatical structure of the parent construction. It is this mode of inheritance that is adopted in Kay and Fillmore‟s (1999) Construction Grammar. On the default inheritance model, however, conflict between the information specified in the inheriting construction and that specified in the dominating construction is permitted. This means that all of the attributes of a dominating higher-level construction will be inherited by the lower-level construction unless there is conflict. In this case, the more specific construction wins and inheritance is limited to only non-conflicting information.2 Mismatch phenomena can therefore be accounted for easily, assuming a default inheritance model. Mismatch describes mappings between form and meaning which do not conform to more general patterns of correspondence. Francis and Michaelis (2003) identify two different kinds of mismatch. Complexity mismatch occurs when there is not a one-to-one relationship between semantic components and formal elements. For instance, they note that extraposition constructions, such as (1), involve an expletive it which is “present in syntax but semantically unspecified” (Francis and Michaelis 2003: 4). Content mismatch, on the other hand, involves incongruous formmeaning mappings. Francis and Michaelis provide the example of predicate nominals. They note that since noun phrases typically function as referring expressions, their use in sentences like (2) involves a category mismatch, in 2. Hudson‟s Word Grammar (1990, 2007) also adopts a default inheritance model of grammatical knowledge. Word Grammar shares much with constructional theories in that it assumes that the syntax of language is comprised “of a very large number of constructions, each with its own peculiar interactions with other constructions and with lexical items” (Hudson 2007: 153). The difference is that Word Grammar focuses on the (more or less specific types of) dependency relations between the words which make up these constructions (Hudson 2007: 156).
20
A model of language structure and language change
which “the typical formal properties of one lexical category...are associated with the typical semantic properties of another category” (Francis and Michaelis 2003: 5). (1)
It is a miracle that he survived
(2)
John is a doctor
Since mapping between form and meaning is internal to the construction, mismatch constructions are simply presented as containing information that overrides inheritance from more general patterns. As Francis and Michaelis (2003: 24) note, mismatch effects therefore “provide evidence for symbolic constructions and for inheritance hierarchies”. In the default mode of inheritance, information is stored redundantly. A redundant system represents information not only on the highest possible node, but at all levels in the hierarchy. Goldberg (1995: 98) argues in favour of a redundant, or “full entry”, model since without it there is no way of resolving conflict that may arise in cases of multiple inheritance. For example, if a lower-level construction inherits information from two different dominating constructions, but the information specified for these constructions conflicts, how do we know which of the parent constructions wins? In a case such as this, we can only know which information will be inherited from which parent construction if this is specified redundantly in the daughter construction. A redundant system can also be argued for on psychological grounds. While a non-redundant system is more economical, it requires maximum on-line processing; that is, for a speaker to classify an utterance as an instance of a lower-level construction, they must search all the way up the inheritance tree in order to determine what the specifications of this construction are and whether the utterance matches them. In contrast, Goldberg (1995: 74) says that “the inheritance mechanism of our system is not an online process, but rather a static relation defined by shared information”. The evidence from cognitive psychology supports the latter system; it suggests that “Concepts and properties in human knowledge are organized with little concern for elegance and parsimony” (Barsalou 1992: 180). By highlighting shared information, a redundant system also shows how the constructional taxonomy supports itself. As Lakoff (1987: 538) notes, the more redundancy a construction exhibits, the better it fits into the language network. In other words, the more properties that are inherited from other constructions, the more we can say that the construction is motivated,
A constructional model of language change
21
or supported, by the language system. This means that we have an explanation as to why this particular construction with these particular formmeaning correspondences should be likely to exist in the language. Goldberg (2003: 120) notes that the requirement that every construction must be motivated is “What imbues a constructional approach with explanatory adequacy”. Therefore, while the symbolic nature of the construction is designed to capture idiosyncratic information, the organization of grammatical knowledge in construction grammar nevertheless encourages and facilitates the identification of generalizations (whether at more local or more general levels in the taxonomy). In construction grammar then, “Exceptions are allowed to exist, but only at a cost to the overall system” (Goldberg 1995: 119). Thus, a default inheritance model allows for partial generalizations to be recognized. Some constructions (or instances of constructions) are “better” (or more motivated) members of the constructional category than others. As a consequence of this, the categories defined by the inheritance hierarchies of this model are non-classical, with each category containing prototypical members and non-prototypical members.3
3.
A constructional model of language change
On a usage-based model, language change originates in language use, at the level of the instance (or construct), and is dependent upon general cognitive processes, such as categorization (Bybee 1985, 1995, 2006). As a result, change is not confined to the acquisition process on this model; a speaker‟s grammar can change throughout their lifetime. Assuming a usage-based approach, both language learning and language change involve the speaker inductively generalizing over actually occurring instances to form mental schemas (or constructions) which are represented in the language system. The storage and organization of the speaker‟s grammatical knowledge is dependent upon, and can change according to, patterns of activation. Token frequency (the number of times a given instance is activated) results in the entrenchment of the instance as a unit in the language system. Furthermore, the repeated use of an instance which is already stored as a conventional unit in the speaker‟s grammar activates (and so strengthens) that construct, making it more entrenched. In contrast, type frequency (the frequency or 3. For a recent critique discussing the limits of constructional inheritance, see Sag, Boas, and Kay (2012).
22
A model of language structure and language change
activation of different types of instance) results in the entrenchment of a more basic schema. That is, the speaker abstracts over the different types of instance to form a schema which stipulates only those characteristics shared by all instances. The more types of instance a schema sanctions, the more productive and schematic (or general) that construction will become (see Barðdal 2008). Along with the non-classical categories of the default inheritance model, these usage-based assumptions make some testable hypotheses regarding the diachronic development of constructions. In particular, they suggest that there are two different type of constructional change: one which is brought about by token frequency and one which is dependent upon type frequency. Although these changes have consequences for constructions at different levels in the hierarchical network, they nevertheless involve the same process of conventionalization (or the entrenchment of schemas). As shown above, type frequency results in the entrenchment of more schematic and higher-level constructions. However, token frequency results in the entrenchment only of a single, substantive, lower-level construct. As Bybee (1985: 132–134) suggests, the repeated use and activation of a construction which represents only one type of instance will only strengthen the status of that particular schema; it will not serve to reinforce any superordinate constructions. Consequently, the entrenchment of individual instances is often found occurring alongside a concomitant loss (or weakening) of the overarching schema, which is no longer type productive. This kind of constructional change can therefore lead to the fossilization of entrenched patterns which are no longer properly integrated into the constructional taxonomy. For instance, Fillmore, Kay, and O‟Connor (1988) note that in the comparative conditional “the X-er the Y-er” construction (such as the more you practice, the easier it will get), the is not an instance of the definite article, and is instead a relic of the Old English instrumental demonstrative þy. In many ways, fossilization depends upon a redundant system of grammar, in which information inherited from the parent construction is also specified (or stored) in the daughter construction. While token frequency accounts for historical retention, type frequency accounts for novelty in the language system. On a usage-based model, new types of instance are formed by extension from the prototype. Langacker (1991: 295) argues that such “extensions” occur because of the “pressure of adapting a limited inventory of conventional units to the unending, evervarying parade of situations requiring linguistic expression”. The new instances therefore represent non-prototypical members of the constructional category, overriding inheritance from the overarching construction. As the
A constructional model of language change
23
new and existing types of instance coexist, the speaker generalizes over them to create a new level of abstraction, which resolves the former conflict between the category and its new membership. This can, in turn, have repercussions for yet higher-order constructions (or categories) in the taxonomy, as existing schemas become more abstract in order to accommodate (or sanction) the new lower-level constructions. This type of constructional change therefore proceeds upwards throughout the hierarchy, leading to the creation of new constructions and the reconfiguration of existing ones. As Goldberg (2006: 62) observes, “…we constantly parcel out meaning, form abstractions, and generalize over the instances we hear”. This kind of constructional change is thus both gradual (proceeding in incremental steps) and directional. For historical linguists who accept a constructional model of language structure, this type of constructional change constitutes a reimagining of the well-attested directional change of grammaticalization. Although this label traditionally applies to simple, atomic elements as they become more grammatical over time, such items are also regarded as constructions on this model, since they are also symbolic units of form and meaning. From this, it follows that changes which apply to substantive, simple constructions should also affect more schematic and complex constructions. In other words, if lexical items can grammaticalize, larger, less substantive constructions should also be subject to grammaticalization (Trousdale 2008a: 33–34). Assuming a constructional model of language structure, the lexicon and the inventory of grammatical constructions are not separate components; instead, they exist along a syntax-lexicon continuum, which ranges from the most schematic and general constructions to fully substantive, unproductive patterns. Thus, on this model, the cline from lexical to grammatical status is re-envisaged as a hierarchy from more substantive to more schematic constructions. Within the framework of construction grammar, grammaticalization is therefore a process of schematization, in which the construction becomes a more abstract, higher-level category and its internal composition becomes less fixed. As Trousdale (2008b: 170–171) comments, “The more schematic the construction, the more productive it will be (thus such constructions become aligned with what is usually called „syntax‟ and „productive morphology‟)”. In many ways, usage-based construction grammars are ideally suited for providing a theory from which to study grammaticalization phenomena. As we have seen, the hierarchical network is able to both represent and account for these directional changes (see also Traugott 2007; Trousdale 2008a;
24
A model of language structure and language change
Fried 2008). Furthermore, the notion of a gradient continuum from lexicon to syntax accords with the gradual nature of grammaticalization, in which lexical items develop more grammatical functions through a series of small, incremental stages (see Diewald 2006). As Langacker (1990: 16) observes, a grammaticalizing element “moves along this continuum rather than jumping from one discrete component to another”. Finally, a focus on constructional change fits in with more recent approaches to the grammaticalization of atomic elements as being context-dependent. For example, Himmelmann (2004: 31) considers the grammaticalization of the individual element to be dependent upon the schematicity of the surrounding construction; he argues that “the unit to which grammaticization properly applies are constructions, not isolated lexical items” (emphasis original); see also Bybee (2003). This description of the grammaticalization of constructions (or rather, grammatical constructionalization) also offers a way of accounting for the existence of mismatch phenomena. On this model, grammaticalization is akin to schematization or expansion. As such, the construction is extended to accommodate items with which they are not prototypically associated. Michaelis (2003: 263) uses the terms coercion and coercion effect “for the enriched interpretations which result from this procedure”. In construction grammar, coercion is accounted for by a combination of default inheritance and the symbolic nature of the construction; that is, if the construction‟s conventional meaning conflicts with the meaning typically associated with a superimposed lexical item, the constructional requirements “win out” and the lexical item conforms to them. Michaelis (2003: 268) refers to this as the Override Principle. An example of such template-based coercion is provided by Goldberg (1995: 158), who identifies mismatch in instances of the English causedmotion construction between the semantics of the verb and the semantics designated by the construction. She notes that in examples like Joe kicked the dog into the bathroom, motion is coded by the verb and the preposition into. However, in examples such as Sam squeezed the rubber ball inside the jar and Sam urged Bill outside of the house “neither the verbs squeeze or urge nor the prepositions inside or outside independently code motion” (Goldberg 1995: 158; italics original). In such instances, the construction coerces the “locative term into a directional reading” (Goldberg 1995: 159). According to Michaelis (2003: 266), construction grammar is ideally suited to representing these coercion effects, since it “uses a single combinatory mechanism, the construction, to account for both coerced and syntactically transparent interpretations”.
The application to it-clefts and copular constructions
25
An understanding of coercion also helps to explain the gradual nature of constructional change. As Goldberg (1995: 159) comments, coercion is governed by the extent to which there is a relationship between the inherent meaning of the coerced item and the interpretation which it is given by the construction. This explains why some items can be successfully coerced into the construction, while others result in ungrammatically. For example, in the case of the caused-motion construction above, the relationship between the prepositional meaning and the constructional meaning is straightforward: the location given by the preposition is interpreted as the “endpoint of a path to that location” (Goldberg 1995: 159). On this account, then, the grammaticalization of constructions is governed by the degree of similarity between the new instances and the prototype; that is, between the coerced item and the coerced interpretation.4
4.
The application to it-clefts and copular constructions
In this section, I briefly summarize how I make use of the various concepts of usage-based construction grammar (introduced above) in my analysis of the English it-cleft construction. I go on to highlight two important ways in which my approach to cleft and copular constructions differs from much of the relevant literature on this topic. As we saw in Chapter 1, the it-cleft is a specialized linguistic pattern, in that much of its structure and use cannot be predicted from highly general rules. It is therefore well-suited to treatment within a constructional framework. Nevertheless, in the following pages, I show that the it-cleft is also a motivated construction. By placing the it-cleft in a hierarchy of copular constructions, I show that many of the it-cleft‟s properties are inherited from a larger specificational copular construction, which is itself a mismatch structure. In this way, the constructional framework helps us to identify generalizations, albeit often at a much more local level in the hierarchy. I then go on to explain the it-cleft‟s remaining idiosyncratic properties by appealing to historical evidence. I show that the diachronic development of the it-cleft construction involves both fossilization and schematization; that is, the it-cleft preserves properties which were originally inherited from 4. However, this is not to say that coercion is predictive or deterministic in any strict sense. Traugott (2007: 524) makes the point that “coercion construed as a strictly formal device is problematic for a theory of constructions as dynamic, partially-productive, and „contingent, not deterministic‟ (Goldberg 2006: 217)”.
26
A model of language structure and language change
once productive patterns and has acquired new types of instance over time. As the coerced interpretations found in these new mismatch constructs are conventionalized, the it-cleft gradually develops a range of new functions and ultimately becomes a more schematic and productive construction. At a more fundamental level, my analysis is shaped by the assumptions of construction grammar in two further ways. First, since the form-function mapping is internal to the construction on this model, construction grammar differs from most other theories in that it encourages accounts which discuss form and meaning together (rather than structure alone). As a result, my analysis often focuses on symbolic and semantic descriptions of constructs typically viewed from a syntactic perspective (see Croft 2007: 490). This is especially true of my analysis of specificational copular sentences in the following chapter. Second, construction grammar is a monostratal model of language; that is, it does not recognize separate levels (or components) of syntactic structure. Therefore, while I often make use of linguistic terms which imply a derivational process, such as clefted, extraposed, reverse and inverse, I do not assume that these constructions are derived from more basic, underlying structures. Instead, my use of this terminology is intended only as a way of engaging with a larger literature developed from within alternative theories of grammar.
Chapter 3 Specificational copular constructions
1.
Different and competing analyses
In Chapter 1, I argued for an account of it-clefts which treats them foremost as specificational sentences. In this chapter, I outline a particular analysis of specificational copular constructions which focuses on defining the concept of specificational meaning. The account is developed in relation to noncleft NP be NP sentences before it is extended to other kinds of copular sentence, including th-clefts, wh-clefts and all-clefts. The purpose of this chapter is to establish a unified account of the family of specificational copular constructions which can be usefully employed in the analysis of itclefts developed in Chapter 4. My analysis of specificational copular sentences begins with an examination of sentences of the type NP be NP, as in (1). (1)
The thoracic surgeon is John McIntyre
How we analyse specificational sentences like (1) is dependent on whether we choose to relate them to superficially similar sentences such as (2), and, at a more fundamental level, on how we interpret the relationship between sentences containing postcopular definite and indefinite noun phrases, as in (2) and (3). (2)
John McIntyre is the thoracic surgeon
(3)
John McIntyre is a surgeon
Most authors would agree that in example (3), which contains a postcopular indefinite NP, John McIntyre is classified as a member of the set (or category) of surgeons and is therefore ascribed the property of being a surgeon. The sentence therefore expresses a relation of set-membership (or class inclusion). However, the analysis of sentences containing postcopular definite NPs, as in (2), is more controversial and corresponds, in part, to two different and competing accounts of specificational NP be NP sentences, such as (1). These are commonly referred to as the equative approach and the inverse approach.
28
Specificational copular constructions
In what follows, I outline the main tenets of each type of analysis before going on, in the remaining sections of this chapter, to advance a particular account of specificational copular sentences which draws mainly from the inverse tradition. I approach the literature and outline my analysis with the assumptions of a set-theoretic account of nominal predication, defined as a semantic relation between members and sets. Later in the chapter, I situate my analysis within constructional and cognitive frameworks that take a different approach to the concept of nominal predication.
1.1.
The equative approach
For some authors, sentences with postcopular definite noun phrases, such as (2) above, are semantically equative. On this analysis, the thoracic surgeon functions as a referring expression, picking out a particular individual that is equivalent to John McIntyre. The sentence in (2) therefore tells us that the individuals John McIntyre and the thoracic surgeon are one and the same. Since the specificational sentence in (1) contains the same two noun phrases, albeit in the reverse order, it can be accounted for in the exact same way (see for example, Evans and Green 2006: 599). On this account then, specificational copular sentences are provided with the same analysis as identity statements, such as (4). This makes sense because such sentences are also reversible, as shown in (5). It also helps to explain why specificational sentences like (1) are felt to have an identifying meaning.1 (4)
Trapper John is John McIntyre
(5)
John McIntyre is Trapper John
The account is further supported by the behaviour of sentences containing postcopular indefinite NPs, as in (3). Such sentences, which have an ascriptive rather than identifying function, do not seem to share this characteristic reversibility, as shown in (6). (6)
#A surgeon is John McIntyre
1. However, as Declerck (1988: 3) observes, the meaning relation involved in specificational sentences is not quite the same as that in identity statements; he says, “They are identifying in the sense that they reveal the identity of some entity not in the sense that they state a relation of identity between two entities”.
Different and competing analyses
29
Other proponents of the equative approach to specificational sentences assume that sentences containing postcopular definite NPs, such as (2), are instances of predication rather than equation. Here then, as in (3), the postcopular NP is a set-denoting predicate, of type , which combines with a referring expression, of type e.2 However, on the basis of evidence such as (6), these authors argue “that it is not possible to treat any constituent appearing in [subject] position as predicated of a postcopular argument” (Heycock and Kroch 1991: 380; see also Rothstein 2001). As a result, specificational sentences like (1) must instead equate two phrases of the same semantic type: in this case, two (type e) referring expressions. The apparent inversion relationship between pairs of copular sentences such as (1) and (2) is therefore illusory. Since two referring expressions cannot combine directly (in that one is not the argument of the other), most proponents of this approach claim that in specificational sentences (and identity statements), the copula is a special be of identity. An exception to this is Heycock and Kroch (1999), who suggest that the identity relation originates instead from the null functional head of an “equative small clause”. Either way, common to all such accounts is the claim that the two NPs of a specificational NP be NP sentence are of the same semantic type, which can therefore be equated or identified (and which can also be reversed). However, a problem with the equative approach is that the NPs in specificational sentences are not as “equal” as those of identity statements. For instance, while it seems reasonable to analyse the two proper names in (4) as type e expressions referring to individuals, it is not at all obvious that the definite NP the thoracic surgeon in (1) is being used in this way, at least not to the same extent as the postcopular NP John McIntyre. Heycock and Kroch (1999: 381) concede that the “assimilation of specificational sentences to equatives runs afoul of the intuition that the former are asymmetric in interpretation in a way that „true equatives‟ are not”; they go on to attribute this to a difference in information structure, rather than semantic type. 2. In type-theoretic semantics, e defines an individual constant; that is, an argument expression which has constant reference to an individual. One-place predicates have the complex type . This indicates that the expression combines with an individual expression (of type e), which results in a formula (an expression of type t) (see Cann 1993: 83–84). I make use of types throughout this chapter as a way of engaging with the formal semantics literature on copular sentences and NPs (see especially Partee [1986] 2004a, [1987] 2004b).
30
Specificational copular constructions
Despite this problem, the equative approach to specificational sentences is very popular, especially among those offering a semantic explanation for syntactic connectedness (discussed in Section 4.3.2). More interestingly for our purposes, this approach is also common among authors who, like me, analyse it-clefts in relation to specificational copular sentences (see, Han and Hedberg 2008; Percus 1997; Reeve 2012). I return to this issue in Section 3 of Chapter 4.
1.2.
The inverse approach
The inverse approach to specificational sentences depends upon the initial claim that sentences with postcopular indefinite and definite noun phrases are both predicational (rather than equative). Sentence (2), repeated here as (7), therefore contains a precopular referring expression (John McIntyre) and a postcopular set-denoting NP (the thoracic surgeon), which ascribes a property to the referent. On an inverse account, the specificational sentence in (1), repeated here as (8), has the reverse (or inverse) configuration, with the type predicative NP appearing in initial position. (7)
John McIntyre is the thoracic surgeon
[predicational]
(8)
The thoracic surgeon is John McIntyre
[specificational]
On some versions of this account, specificational and predicational copular sentences are actually derived from the same small clause structure, in which the referential noun phrase always precedes the predicative noun phrase. The argument goes that if the referential noun phrase is raised into the subject position, a predicational copular sentence is obtained. In contrast, specificational copular sentences result from a movement operation which raises the predicative noun phrase (see Moro 1997; Mikkelsen 2005). An advantage to the inverse approach is that it captures the intuition that specificational sentences are semantically asymmetrical. Indeed, there is good evidence for the claim that the initial NP in specificational examples like (8) is non-referring. By experimenting with environments involving left-dislocation structures, question-answer pairs and tag questions, Mikkelsen (2002, 2005) shows that while in predicational and equative constructions, anaphoric pronouns agree with the subject in terms of gender, number and animacy, specificational copular sentences allow the pronoun it to be anaphoric to gender-specific subjects, as shown in (10).
Different and competing analyses
31
(9)
The tallest girl in the class is Swedish, isn‟t she?
(10)
The tallest girl in the class is Molly, isn‟t it?
(11)
[Pointing to a player on the field] SHE is Molly Jacobson, isn‟t she? [equative] (examples from Mikkelsen 2005: 72)
[predicational] [specificational]
These results indicate that there is a clear semantic difference between the subjects of specificational and equative copular sentences. As Heycock and Kroch (2002: 106) concede, “This behaviour is quite unexpected under an equative analysis”. On an inverse account, however, the pronominalization data gains a simple explanation; as Mikkelsen (2005: 66) observes, it is often anaphoric to predicative elements, as shown in (12) (see also Chapter 4, Section 1.1). (12)
LBJ is the President of the United States. He has been {it/*him} since 1963. (examples from Mikkelsen 2005: 65)
Proponents of the inverse approach include (to name a few) den Dikken (2006), Heggie (1988), Mikkelsen (2005), Moro (1997), Partee (2004a) and Williams (1983). However, despite a large literature developing and supporting inverse accounts, the approach leaves a number of questions unresolved. For instance, a potential problem with this type of analysis is that some predicational copular sentences resist inversion. We have already seen, in (6) above, that indefinite NP predicates cannot typically occur in precopular position. In fact, as I go on to explain in Section 3, some indefinite NPs, in certain contexts, can function as the initial NP of a specificational copular sentence. However, the exact criteria on which this distinction is based remain elusive. Authors supporting an equative account argue that indefinite NP subjects will only be permissible if they allow a specific reading, on which they refer to a particular individual (see Heycock and Kroch 2002: 112). In contrast, those arguing for an inverse approach have sometimes appealed to information structure conditions as an explanation for why indefinite NP predicates are often barred from moving into precopular position (for example, see Mikkelsen 2005). In Section 3.2, I show that information structure alone cannot satisfactorily account for the data. It therefore remains a challenge for the inverse approach to provide an adequate description of, as well as an explanation for, the restrictions on indefinite NP predicates.
32
Specificational copular constructions
A further difficulty with the inverse approach is that it does not address the question of where specificational meaning comes from. These works stipulate that when inversion occurs, the result is a specificational copular sentence. Mikkelsen (2005: 1) suggests that predicational copular clauses tell us “something about the referent of the subject”, while a specificational clause “says who or what the referent is” (emphasis original). However, specificational meaning does not follow as a direct result of movement and is not tied to a particular word order. For instance, noninverted NP be NP sentences with focal subjects, such as (13), can perform the same specificational function of identifying rather than describing the referent as their inverse counterparts (see Declerck 1988: 93). Such examples are sometimes labelled reverse specificational copular sentences. (13)
A. Who is the winner? B. JOHN is the winner, isn‟t he?
(14)
A. Who is the winner? B. The winner is John, isn‟t it? (examples from Mikkelsen 2005: 177)
This poses the following, as yet unanswered, questions: what is the relationship between specificational and predicational meaning and how does specificational meaning come about?
1.3.
A less formal approach
Higgins (1979) presents a less formal account of specificational copular sentences which focuses on characterizing the nature of specificational meaning as distinct from both identity and predication. For Higgins, specificational sentences function like lists; that is, the initial NP acts as the heading of the list and the postcopular elements serve as items on that list. On this interpretation, the specificational NP be NP sentence in (15) can be paraphrased as the list given in (16) (see Higgins 1979: 154). (15)
The runners up were Max and Henry
(16)
Runners up: Max, Henry
Higgins suggests that specificational sentences involve a value-variable relation. He notes that “the heading of a list provides a „variable‟, thereby
Different and competing analyses
33
delimiting a certain domain, to which the items on the list conform as „values‟ of that variable” (Higgins 1979: 155).3 Higgins (1979: 214) maintains that this relation “is not the expression of some kind of identity” and goes on to argue against the equative approach to specificational sentences. However, Higgins does not align his analysis with those involving predication either. He notes that “The whole notion of being „about‟ something is alien to a list”; “a list is neither „about‟ the heading of the list nor „about‟ the items on the list” (Higgins 1979: 214). To cement this distinction, Higgins chooses to discuss specificational sentences, not in terms of reference or predication, but using his own terminology. For Higgins, the precopular NP is superscriptional and the postcopular element is specificational. Unfortunately, when it comes to characterizing the superscriptional and specificational components, it is not very clear how Higgins‟ terminology relates to more well-defined concepts. Nevertheless, in what follows, I suggest that Higgins‟ characterization of specificational meaning is not actually at odds with analyses involving predication. Certainly, Higgins recognizes a semantic asymmetry between the two components of a specificational sentence and highlights the importance of the parallelism between pairs of predicational and specificational sentences, such as (17) and (18). (17)
That he hasn‟t come is a problem
(18)
The problem is that he hasn‟t come (examples from Higgins 1979: 274)
Higgins (1979: 275) suggests that while these examples are presumably “not directly related,…the existence of the parallelism clearly means something”. While Higgins seems doubtful of the validity of movement-based 3. Declerck (1988) also engages with the concept of specificational meaning and formulates an account based upon the same value-variable relation as Higgins. However, by expanding on this idea, Declerck provides an extremely broad definition of specificational meaning as pertaining to any sentence that gives the answer to a wh-question, including ones with a predicational focus, as in (i). This effectively reduces the concept of specificational meaning to contrastive focus. Since such examples have a predicational or ascriptive meaning, they are not considered specificational copular sentences here. (i)
Q. What is John like? A. John is SILLY. (adapted from Declerck 1988: 39)
34
Specificational copular constructions
accounts here, I show that his observations square neatly with the particular type of non-derivational inverse analysis that I propose.
2.
Specification as (the inverse of) nominal predication
In this section, I build up an account of specificational copular sentences which adopts many of the same assumptions as the inverse approach. That is, I assume that such sentences involve predication (rather than equation) and that the subject NP can function as the semantic predicate. However, since I assume a monostratal model of language, it does not follow on my account that specificational sentences are derived via movement operations (see Chapter 2, Section 4).4 Instead, I develop constructional schemas for such sentences, which highlight their symbolic and semantic properties. In particular, my focus is on explaining the relationship between specificational and predicational meaning. That is, I examine how and why specificational meaning arises in some sentences containing predicative NPs and not others. Making use of Hawkins‟ (1991) characterization of definiteness, I explain why definite NP predicates are especially well-suited to the specifying function and go on to suggest some reasons why specification is so often expressed via an inversion construction. Finally, I show that while the account of nominal predication that I adopt here is not customary in constructional theories, it is not incompatible with these frameworks.
2.1.
Specification and definite NP predicates
To begin then, let us assume that the sentences in (19) and (20) are both predicational, containing a precopular referring expression (John) and a postcopular predicative NP which denotes the set of individuals that have the relevant property (of surgeon or best surgeon). (19)
John is a surgeon
[predicational]
(20)
John is the best surgeon
[predicational]
4. I follow Birner (1994, 1996), in using the terms inverse and inversion without supporting “a multistratal, movement-based analysis, but rather to conform to traditional terminology for clarity” (Birner 1994: 235).
Specification as (the inverse of) nominal predication
35
This establishes the familiar view of nominal predication as an expression of class or set membership. In (19) then, the referent John is categorized as a member of the set of surgeons. In other words, John is ascribed the property of being a surgeon. Similarly, for (20), we can say that the best surgeon describes, or ascribes a property to, John. However, the sentence in (20) allows an additional interpretation. If the referent John is focused, the sentence acquires a specificational reading on which John is identified as matching the description the best surgeon. In contrast, the sentence in (19) does not invite this interpretation; even when the referent John is focused, as in (21), there is still the sense that we are ascribing a property to John. (21)
JOHN is a surgeon
(22)
JOHN is the best surgeon
[predicational] [specificational]
We can account for this difference by examining the nature of the classmembership relation in each sentence. In (20), the postcopular NP denotes a set with only one member; there can only be one best surgeon. Therefore, by classifying John as a member of this set, we are saying something about John (describing him as being the best surgeon) and we are listing the complete membership of the set best surgeon. The latter, specificational reading is brought about if the referent (or membership) is focused, shown in (22). In contrast, the predicate nominal in (19) denotes a set with many members. By classifying John as a single member of the set of surgeons, we are ascribing a property to John. However, since John does not come close to making up the membership of this unrestricted set, a specificational reading for (21) is not forthcoming. This simple observation goes a long way to explaining why definite noun phrases are so common in specificational NP be NP sentences. We saw that in (20) above, the superlative best indicates a single member set. However, in most specificational sentences, the set is restricted simply as a result of it being marked as definite. For example, the sentence in (23) allows a specificational interpretation despite the fact that there are other thoracic surgeons in existence. (23)
JOHN is the thoracic surgeon
[specificational]
Here, it is the presence of the definite article that marks this set as restricted, such that John represents an exhaustive list of its members.
36
Specificational copular constructions
According to Hawkins (1991), the definite article has three main properties. First, it carries with it the conventional implicature that the noun phrase will be understood in relation to a shared set or pragmatic (P-) set which is manifest in the speech participants‟ mutual cognitive environment (a notion borrowed from Sperber and Wilson (1986)). For example, in (23), the thoracic surgeon can be understood in relation to the surrounding context (or larger situation set) expressed overtly in (24).5 (24)
JOHN is the thoracic surgeon (in this outfit)
Secondly, the definite article is associated with existence entailments. Accompanied by the implication of P-membership, it follows from (23) that there is a thoracic surgeon in this outfit. Finally, the definite article is associated with uniqueness. This means that the descriptive content contained within the NP applies uniquely within the P-set. For example, since the definite noun phrase in (23) contains a singular noun, it can only be used to describe one entity (and no more). Thus, it follows from (23) that there is only one thoracic surgeon in this outfit. Hawkins extends the uniqueness generalization to definite NPs containing plural nouns by suggesting that in all cases, the definite NP applies to the total or maximal set of entities that satisfy the description within the P-set. Hawkins refers to this regularity as inclusiveness (see also Hawkins 1978). Assuming this account of definiteness, we can now explain why definite NP predicates allow a specificational interpretation. From the conventional implicature of P-membership, it follows that a definite description denotes a set of entities that exists within a shared environment. In other words, the predicate denotes a set that is always understood to be restricted in some way. For instance, the set of thoracic surgeons in this outfit is more specific (has fewer members) than the set of all thoracic surgeons. If specificational meaning involves listing all of the members of a described set, it follows that this set is likely to have only a small membership. The predicative NPs that allow a specificational interpretation will therefore denote restricted sets. In addition, it follows from the property of inclusiveness that when a definite NP is predicated of a referring expression, the description will 5. This is not to say that the “incomplete” description in (23) contains additional restrictive material at some underlying level of syntactic representation. Such an analysis is dubbed the syntactic ellipsis approach by Stanley and Szabó (2000), and is strongly criticized therein.
Specification as (the inverse of) nominal predication
37
characterize the individual(s) referred to uniquely (see Declerck 1986: 30). Consequently, the subject NP will be understood to comprise a complete list of entities that make up the restricted set. For example, the sentence in (23) suggests that John is the only thoracic surgeon in this outfit. The same is true of examples containing plural definite NPs, such as (25). (25)
MAX and HENRY were the runners up
In this sentence, the definite NP predicate applies inclusively to all entities that satisfy this description. Max and Henry are therefore taken to constitute an exhaustive list of the members that make up the pragmatically restricted set of runners up (in a particular race or competition). In other words, we assume that there were no other individuals, besides Max and Henry, who were runners up on that occasion. In the account sketched here, specificational meaning is conceived of in much the same way as by Higgins (1979). As Higgins suggests, specification involves the listing of entities. He elaborates by saying that the heading of a list “delimits a domain” and each item on that list “identifies a particular member of that domain” (Higgins 1979: 213). Here, Higgins gets very close to the concept of specification as a class-membership relation, despite his choice to discuss such sentences in terms not involving predication (see Section 1.3). In this section, I have viewed specificational meaning as a reimagining of nominal predication. On this interpretation, a class inclusion relation is used to identify the membership of a set, rather than to say something about an individual (as having the property of being a member of some set). I have explained that definite NP predicates are especially well-suited to the specifying function as a result of their unique semantic and pragmatic properties. In particular, I have claimed that a specificational interpretation is facilitated if the predicative NP denotes a restricted set (for which it is possible to list all of its members) and if the individuals referred to can be taken as an exhaustive list of members within the described set (on the principle that a well-formed list should ideally be complete). As I go on to explain in Section 3.1, indefinite NP predicates do not necessarily share these properties. For instance, as we saw in (19) above, indefinite NPs can denote very general sets, which are not understood in relation to a given Pset (see Hawkins 1991). Finally, I have suggested that in predicational NP be NP sentences, specificational meaning is accompanied by an information structure re-
38
Specificational copular constructions
quirement; in order to interpret a class-membership relation as identifying the membership of some set, the members (or referents) should be in focus.
2.2.
Specification and inversion
In Section 2.1, I outlined an account of how specificational meaning arises in certain cases of nominal predication. As a result, our focus so far has been on so-called reverse specificational sentences, i.e. non-inverted NP be NP sentences with a specificational meaning.6 However, while sentences with postcopular predicative NPs can allow a specificational interpretation, inverse NP be NP sentences consistently have a specificational, rather than a predicational (or ascriptive), meaning. In this section, I examine why specification is associated with inversion and why a specificational inversion construction should exist alongside its non-inverted counterpart. On the account sketched so far, sentences with postcopular definite NPs, such as (26), contain precopular referring expressions and postcopular predicative NPs. Following the inverse approach to specificational sentences (outlined in Section 1.2), I assume that (27) involves the inverse alignment, with the semantic predicate occurring in precopular position. (26)
John McIntyre is the thoracic surgeon
(27)
The thoracic surgeon is John McIntyre
However, unlike most inverse accounts, I do not assume that the latter is derived from the former, or that these sentences stem from the same underlying structure. Rather, I suggest that NP be NP sentences with precopular predicative NPs make up a distinct construction that shares properties with other kinds of inversion construction, including VP inversion, PP inversion and AP inversion, as shown in (28), (29), (30) and (31). (28)
The winning couple was Pierce and Able
[NP inversion]
(29)
Sponsoring the event was Jonathan Tuttle
[VP inversion]
6. As den Dikken (2005) notes, there is confusion in the literature over the terms reverse and inverse, since they have come to refer to opposing sentences. Their use depends on which configuration is considered the more basic or canonical. While I do not assume a derivational account, in what follows, I continue to use terminology associated with the inverse approach.
Specification as (the inverse of) nominal predication
39
(30)
Behind the scenes was Sidney Freedman
[PP inversion]
(31)
Particularly impressive were Leslie‟s legwarmers
[AP inversion]
Although these sentences may not comprise a syntactically uniform category,7 Birner (1994: 235) observes that in all the different kinds of inversion, “the logical subject [of which something is being predicated] appears in postverbal position while some other, canonically postverbal, constituent appears in clause-initial position”. Furthermore, sentences (28) to (31) all involve inversion “around be” and the clause-initial constituent is semantically predicative. Thus, specificational sentences like (28) might be said to belong to the family of be inversion (or predicative inversion) constructions (see Dorgeloh 1997: 84).8 The question then is why is specificational meaning often expressed via an inversion construction? I suggest that there are two main reasons. The first relates to information structure. In her corpus study of English inversion constructions, Birner (1994, 1996) finds that such sentences are subject to a robust pragmatic constraint. She notes that “the preposed element in an inversion must not be newer in the discourse than the postposed element” (Birner 1996: 90). For Birner (1994: 234), the function of inversion sentences is to “allow the presentation of relatively familiar information before a comparatively unfamiliar logical subject”. As we saw in Section 2.1, specificational meaning is also tied to a particular information structure, arising in examples where the referring expression is in focus. Specification is therefore well-suited to the information structure requirements of inversion, since the relatively informative membership information will be situated in postverbal position, after the set description.
7. While the precopular NP in specificational sentences is clearly the grammatical subject, the clause-initial elements of other types of inversion sentence display mixed evidence for subject status (see Bresnan 1994; Mikkelsen 2005). For example, in the specificational (28), the verb agrees with the precopular NP; however, in the AP inversion in (31), it is the postverbal NP that determines agreement. As Mikkelsen (2005: 138) suggests, there may be a historical explanation for this morphosyntactic distinction (see also Chapter 6, Section 5). 8. PP inversion commonly occurs with verbs other than be, with the clause-initial constituent providing locative information. As a result, most authors recognize two types of inversion: locative inversion, which occurs with verbs that take locative complements, and the inversion of non-locative predicatives, which is generally restricted to the verb be. Although the distinction is not clear-cut, it is the latter that is most relevant to inverse accounts of specificational sentences.
40
Specificational copular constructions
Secondly, inversion provides an unambiguous way of distinguishing between specificational and predicational meaning. We have seen that, for sentences with postcopular definite NPs, the class-membership relation allows both a predicational (ascriptive) and a specificational interpretation. However, since inversion constructions have a fixed information structure, the examples which allow a specificational interpretation will always be interpreted as specificational. Conceivably, this situation results in specificational meaning becoming associated with NP inversion. As a result, this particular type of inversion construction is constrained not only by discourse considerations, but also by the criteria which sanction specificational meaning. I come back to this issue in Section 3.3. This accounts for the association between specificational meaning and inversion. However, it also goes a long way to explaining why this rather idiosyncratic construction should exist alongside the non-inverted predicate nominal construction. I suggest that the specificational NP inversion construction is motivated (or supported) in three different ways. First, this sentence type is part of a family of be inversion constructions in which a predicative constituent appears in clause-initial position and the argument of which it is predicated occurs postverbally. This mismatch construction, which overrides more general patterns of correspondence between form (syntax) and function (semantics), is therefore reinforced at a local level in the inheritance hierarchy (see Chapter 2, Section 2). Second, as we saw above, the NP inversion construction provides a syntactic way of marking specification as distinct from predication. Finally, since all inversion constructions have the same fixed information structure, specificational inversion sentences conform to the generalization that given information should be presented prior to new information (see Ward, Birner, and Huddleston 2002: 1372). In other words, this sentence type is motivated by inheritance from a highly general information structure construction. As a final question, we might ask, how is predication (or class inclusion) actually achieved in the specificational inversion construction? In construction grammar, predication is interpreted as valency or relationality. Verbs are understood to be inherently relational. For instance, the act of sleeping requires a sleeper. In the sentence Henry sleeps then, the semantic structure of the predicate sleeps contains a schematic substructure which is elaborated by the non-relational argument Henry (Croft and Cruse 2004: 281). However, prototypical nouns (which denote objects), are not inherently relational, that is, they do not imply the existence of any other entity (having a valency of zero). As a result, when nouns occur in a predicative position, some semantic relation between the subject and the noun must be
Specification as (the inverse of) nominal predication
41
coerced or construed. Thus, the noun is “forced to behave” as if it takes a single semantic argument, having a valency of one (Croft 1991: 69). This explains how indefinite NPs, which typically denote individuals, come to denote sets (or categories) in the predicate nominal construction: they are incorporated into a class inclusion relation (see Chapter 2, Section 2). From this, NPs are not expected to have a relational meaning when they occur outside of the predicative position; that is, we would not expect a class inclusion relation to be forthcoming independently of the predicate nominal construction. However, there is reason to suggest that definite descriptions may be, in some sense, relational. Hawkins‟ (1991) characterization of definiteness is consistent with the treatment of the as a form of universal quantifier, akin to all (see Hawkins 1978). However, while sentences with all make a claim about all of the individual members of some set, sentences with the seem to make a claim about a set as a whole. For instance, it is not necessary for all of the individual paving stones to be cracked in order for There are cracks in the paving stones to be true (see Hawkins 1991: 409; Burton-Roberts 1981). Thus, definite noun phrases appear to denote sets, even though their use is often synonymous with reference to the members of this set.9 On this account, the definite article serves to delimit and isolate sets of entities rather than individuals. Hawkins (1991: 410) says “that there is some unique maximal set of entities within a P-set to which expressions such as the bridesmaids refer. For a singular definite NP, this set comprises just a single member”. In some sense then, definite NPs are relational, in that the existence of a set implies the existence of its members. Declerck (1987: 20) suggests that, “Reference to a set implicates reference to all its members” (emphasis added). In construction grammar, predication (or valence) is relative; as Croft and Cruse (2004: 281) note, “predicate and argument status depend on what two semantic structures are being compared”. Thus, we might suggest that when a set-denoting definite description is compared with an individual expression, a relation of class-membership can ensue. Here, the definite NP 9. Examples in which reference to a set as whole does not correspond to reference to all of the members of a set therefore represent an argument against the claim that the is a universal quantifier (contra Hawkins 1978; Neale 1990). See also Graff (2001), who shows that quantifier phrases ranging over individuals differ from definite NPs in that they cannot occur in predicative position (if they are to be treated as semantic units), and Mikkelsen (2005: 159), who finds that NPs introduced by all and every do not form acceptable specificational subjects.
42
Specificational copular constructions
is not used to refer, but to describe. On this account, specificational inversion sentences could be said to have the same syntactic structure as equative sentences, but a different semantic relation – of class inclusion rather than identity. In other words, the postcopular referring expression is understood to comprise the complete membership of a (pragmatically) restricted set. This may account for some of the similarities which have been observed in the syntactic behaviour of specificational inversion sentences and equatives.10 In addition, this scenario would further account for the relation between specification and inversion. While definite NPs (which consistently allow a specificational interpretation) invite a class-membership relation, indefinite NPs must be coerced into it. I examine instances in which indefinite NPs are coerced into the specificational inversion construction in Section 3.3.
2.3.
Capturing this account in cognitive and constructional frameworks
So far, I have proposed an analysis of specificational copular sentences which explains how specificational meaning comes about in certain cases of nominal predication and why it is often expressed via an inversion construction. However, at this point, it is important to note that the account of nominal predication upon which this analysis is based (as involving a semantic relation between members and sets) is not standard in constructional frameworks. In what follows, I argue in favour of a class-membership account of both definite and indefinite nominal predication and show how this can be expressed using the machinery of cognitive semantics. On many constructional accounts, sentences with postcopular definite noun phrases are understood in terms of an identity relation. Croft (1991: 69) suggests that class inclusion and identity are two of several possible 10. For instance, while the subject-predicate strings of predicate nominal sentences (including non-inverted specificational sentences) can occur as the complement of consider, shown in (ii) and (iii), specificational inversion and equative structures cannot, shown in (iv) and (v) (see also Heycock and Kroch 1999). (ii) I consider [John the best doctor]
[predicate nominal]
(iii) I consider [JOHN the best doctor]
[non-inverted specificational]
(iv) *I consider [the best doctor John] (v)
*I consider [John McIntyre Trapper John]
[specificational inversion] [equative]
Specification as (the inverse of) nominal predication
43
semantic relations involving predicate nominals. While most sentences containing postcopular indefinite NPs are analysed as involving “the relation of token to its subsuming type”, postcopular definite NPs are said to be coerced into a relation of “token-token identity”. In both cases, the copular verb plays an important role in establishing the appropriate semantic relation. While the former involves a “classifying be”, the latter requires an “equational be” or a “be of identity”. However, Langacker (1991) outlines two objections to this type of analysis (which he refers to as a “standard approach”). First, he takes issue with the claim that be necessarily expresses a semantic relation in such sentences, since comparable relationships are found in a variety of constructions without be (Langacker 1991: 65). For instance, (32) and (33) involve the same nominal predication relation as their copular counterparts. (32)
I considered John a good surgeon
(33)
That would make John the best surgeon
Langacker (1991: 65) concludes that “the identity or inclusion relation is independent of be”, arguing that instead “be is a meaningful element whose primary function is temporal and aspectual”.11 Secondly, Langacker claims that sentences with definite and indefinite predicate nominals require parallel analyses. For Langacker (1991: 67), such sentences “are equivalent in all essential respects” and differ only to the extent that definiteness differs from indefiniteness. Langacker‟s analysis of nominal predication therefore develops from the same basic assumptions as my account of specificational sentences. He notes that copular sentences containing definite and indefinite descriptions are instances of the same predicate nominative construction and exhibit the same semantic relation. However, while I have assumed that such sentences involve class inclusion, Langacker claims that they all predicate identity between two instances (or individuals). 11. While specificational inversion structures cannot be embedded under consider (see footnote 10), they can occur as the complement of make, as in (vi). This suggests that the meaning relation involved in specificational sentences is also independent of be. See also Higgins (1979: 161), who finds that certain other verbs “permit a meaning relation similar to specification” (emphasis added). (vi) But if what you say is true, that would make the real murderer John! (Heycock and Kroch 1999: 381)
44
Specificational copular constructions
Langacker‟s argument runs as follows. Since the copula be serves only to “temporalize” stative predication, it must be the predicate nominatives themselves that are relational. As such, they express a relation between a trajector and a landmark, in which a more prominent entity (tr) is understood in relation to a less prominent one (lm). Langacker (1991: 66) posits a derivational pattern, in which a nominal (profiling a thing X) is construed as predicative (see Figure 1). The entity (X) becomes the landmark to which the, as yet schematic, trajector is related via a profiled identity relation (represented by a dotted line).
Figure 1. The semantic derivation of predicate nominatives (Langacker 1991: 66)
In predicational NP be NP sentences then, the subject NP provides the semantic characterization of the trajector. On this account, (34) specifies the identity of two individuals: Auschlander (the trajector) and the Chief of Services (the landmark). (34)
Auschlander is the Chief of Services
Langacker (1991: 68) extends this analysis to sentences with indefinite NP predicates, such as (35). Here, the landmark is an arbitrary (or imaginary) member of the doctor category which is “conjured up” in the minds of the speaker and hearer solely for the purpose of enabling an identity relation. (35)
Auschlander is a doctor
Langacker posits the following semantic structure for the predicate nominative construction (see Figure 2). Here, the landmark is an instance (ti) of a type specification (T), such as the category doctor or Chief of Services. A relation of identity holds between this instance and the trajector (Auschlander) within the domain of instantiation.
Specification as (the inverse of) nominal predication
45
Figure 2. The predicate nominative construction (Langacker 1991: 68)
On this account then, even sentences with indefinite NP predicates involve a relation of identity, rather than class-membership. According to Langacker (1991: 68), a class inclusion relation is only implied in such sentences. For instance, in (35), the inclusion of Auschlander in the doctor class is specified indirectly as a result of the identification of Auschlander with an arbitrary, non-specific instance of the class doctor. Langacker (1991: 67) justifies this account by claiming that, if the predicative NP simply denoted a class, the presence of the indefinite article would be unexpected; he says, “It is not just a noun but a full nominal, so presumably it does not represent a type specification but rather an instance of that type”. However, J. Taylor (2002: 362) is not entirely satisfied with this analysis; he notes that, “despite the presence of the indefinite article”, which seems to be “an idiosyncratic feature of English”, predicative nouns are like adjectives, predicating a property of the subject referent. This is consistent with findings from within formal theories of semantics. According to Graff (2001), Partee (2004a) and Williams (1983), predicative NPs can conjoin with other properties of type , such as adjective phrases, and can occupy (predicative) positions in which individuals (type e) and phrases which quantify over individuals () are restricted from occurring. As a result, most authors analyse indefinite predicative NPs as having an () interpretation equivalent to a bare common noun interpretation.12
12. In formal semantics, common nouns are interpreted as because they denote sets of (or properties of) entities, rather than referring to individuals.
46
Specificational copular constructions
Langacker (1991: 69) provides this type of analysis for predicate nominatives containing simple, articleless nouns, as in the French example (36). (36)
Auschlander est médecin
„Auschlander is (a) doctor‟
For such sentences, the predicate noun describes a type specification (T), rather than an instance of a type specification (ti). The semantic characterization of the instance is instead provided by the subject nominal. For (36) then, the landmark is the category doctor and the trajector is the instance Auschlander. As shown in Figure 3, the profiled relationship (represented by a dotted line) is thus a correspondence between a type and an instance. This structure represents a genuine, or direct, instantiation relation between the trajector instance and the type specification. Here, there is only one instance, provided by the subject nominal. Consequently, the class inclusion relation is not mediated by an intervening identity relation between two instances (cf. Figure 2).
Figure 3. Bare noun predicate nominatives (Langacker 1991: 69)
I suggest that this, much simpler, structure can be usefully extended to English sentences with indefinite and definite NP predicates. On this account, predicate nominals designate types (i.e. classes or categories). They are also relational, characterizing an instantiation relation between the landmark, which is semantically specified, and the trajector, which is specified only schematically (to be elaborated by the subject nominal). From this, it follows that the copula be is not necessary to establish a classifying relation (contra Croft 1991). Instead, be functions only to express the continuation of this instantiation relation over time. Quantified NPs are therefore given a type interpretation because they quantify over and in relation to sets of entities. See also footnote 2.
Accounting for the behaviour of indefinite NPs
47
The nature of this instantiation relation is dependent upon the semantics of definiteness and indefiniteness. For sentences involving definite NP predicates, instantiation relates a type specification with all possible instances of this type. This follows from the property of inclusiveness associated with the definite article (see Section 2.1). In contrast, sentences containing indefinite predicative NPs relate a type specification to just one of its instances (see Section 3.1). The distinction between definiteness and indefiniteness also impacts on the elaboration of the type (T). We saw in Section 2.1 that while indefinite NP predicates can sometimes denote very general sets, definite NP predicates are understood to denote restricted sets. In Cognitive Grammar, the process of restricting or narrowing a type is referred to, fittingly, as specification. In other words, definite noun phrases typically designate highly specified types, with fewer instances. Although this account of nominal predication is not consistent either with Croft‟s (1991) constructional take on the “standard approach” or with Langacker‟s (1991) Cognitive Grammar analysis, it nevertheless makes use of existing constructs in cognitive semantics, with one important proviso. On most cognitive accounts, definite NPs invariably designate instances of types (rather than types). The definite article indicates that this instance is grounded; that is, it can be located within the speech event. As J. Taylor (2002: 346) notes, the grounding of an instance is therefore tantamount to referring to that instance. However, on an account that recognizes a predicative or non-referring use of definite NPs, the distinction between grounding and specification becomes blurred. By interpreting a type in relation to the speech event (or mutual cognitive environment), we are necessarily restricting that type, narrowing the number of its instances (see Section 2.1). This is therefore akin to the process of specification, which J. Taylor (2002: 344) refers to as “the distinctive function of modifiers and complements”.
3.
Accounting for the behaviour of indefinite NPs
The account outlined in Section 2 treats specificational NP be NP sentences as predicate nominal constructs involving a class-membership (or class inclusion) relation. Specificational meaning is understood to be an interpretation of this predication relation, on which the referring expression lists the membership of some set (characterized by the predicate nominal). Definite NP predicates are shown to be well-suited to the specifying function: the property of inclusiveness means that the entities referred to by the
48
Specificational copular constructions
argument expression will be taken to represent a complete list of members, and the implication that definite NPs are understood in relation to a shared environment means that the set is restricted (or the type is specified) so that the number of possible members (or instances) is small enough to be usefully listed. In this section, I examine whether this characterization of specificational meaning can help to explain why indefinite NPs are often restricted from occurring as the subjects of specificational inversion sentences and whether it can account for particular examples in which indefinite NP predicates do allow a specificational interpretation.
3.1.
Specification and indefinite NP predicates
Following Hawkins‟ (1991) account, indefiniteness can be defined in the following way. While definite NPs are associated with existence and uniqueness entailments, the use of the indefinite article entails only existence and conversationally implicates (but does not entail) exclusiveness, or nonuniqueness. For instance, (37) entails that there is a surgeon and implies that there is more than one surgeon (or that John is not the only surgeon). (37)
John is a surgeon
Furthermore, membership of a P-set does not always hold with indefinites. For instance, as shown in Section 2.1, we can interpret (37) as including John in the very general set of surgeons. Hawkins (1991: 419) notes that indefinite NPs can be interpreted in relation to a shared set (or mutual cognitive environment) on the condition that exclusiveness is satisfied. For example, if (37) were uttered inside a hospital, the likely interpretation would be that John is a surgeon in this hospital. However, since this implication is easily cancelled, Hawkins suggests that P-membership is conversationally implicated in indefinites (and conventionally implicated in definite NPs). Hawkins‟ account provides an explanation for why sentences with indefinite NP predicates rarely allow a specificational interpretation. As we have seen, indefinite NPs sometimes denote very general sets (such as surgeons). Furthermore, even when the set is understood in relation to a shared environment (as in surgeons in this hospital), the entity referred to by the argument expression will normally be taken to form an incomplete list of the entities within this set (see also Declerck 1986: 30). This follows from the exclusiveness (or non-uniqueness) implicature of indefinites. Sentences
Accounting for the behaviour of indefinite NPs
49
with indefinite NP predicates are therefore unlikely to provide meaningful information about a set‟s membership and so cannot enable a specificational interpretation. On this account, the fact that indefinite NPs rarely occur as the subjects of specificational inversion sentences is somewhat predictable. First, as we saw in Section 2.2, indefinite NPs typically denote individuals (or a single member of a set), and so are not inherently relational. Second, even when they are construed as predicates, indefinite descriptions are unlikely to be interpreted as uniquely characterizing the referent (see Declerck 1986: 30) such that the entity referred to is taken to represent the complete membership of the described set. Since the NP inversion construction is associated with specificational meaning, this explains the unacceptability of inversion sentences, such as (38). (38)
#A surgeon is John
However, as mentioned in Section 1.2, some indefinite descriptions can, in certain contexts, function as the initial NP of a specificational inversion sentence. Mikkelsen (2005) provides the following example. (39)
A philosopher who seems to share the Kiparskys’ intuitions on some factive predicates is Unger (1972), who argues… (Mikkelsen 2005: 155)
So what is it about these particular indefinite NPs that allows them to meet the requirements of this inversion construction and enables a specificational meaning to occur? From the analysis sketched so far, we might expect that the kinds of indefinite NP predicate to occur in the specificational inversion construction would be those that share most in common with definite NPs. In what follows, I show that while these indefinite descriptions certainly do display characteristics associated with definiteness, they also perform a useful, additional function which is not found in inversion sentences with definite NP subjects. I begin by discussing a previous attempt at characterizing this subset of indefinite NPs from within the inverse tradition.
3.2.
An account based on discourse requirements
As I explained in Section 1.2, the question of why only a selection of indefinite NP predicates can occur as the subjects of specificational inver-
50
Specificational copular constructions
sion sentences presents an important obstacle for inverse analyses based on movement. Mikkelsen (2005) attempts to overcome this by putting together an account based upon discourse requirements. Mikkelsen claims that a predicative NP will only be raised to subject position if it contains discourse-old information. She notes that, in such cases, the predicative NP is interpreted as the topic of the sentence; “the preference for the topic to be in subject position” overrides the canonical word order, resulting in inversion (Mikkelsen 2005: 163). On this basis, Mikkelsen explains the lack of indefinite NP predicates that qualify for inversion as a consequence of the association between indefinite NPs and new information. For instance, while the definite article is often said to have an anaphoric function, indicating that the entity can be located within the previous discourse, the indefinite article is instead used a means of introducing new entities into the discourse, shown in (40). (40)
Mary saw a movie last week. The movie was not very interesting. (Abbott 2010: 133)
As a result, indefinite NP predicates rarely meet the criterion for a verified topic, and so do not qualify for the role of subject. Mikkelsen‟s account predicts that all indefinite NPs which are found in the initial position of a specificational inversion sentence will contain discourse-old information. This prediction is borne out. For instance, Mikkelsen notes that (39) is an extract from a text discussing the judgments of Kiparsky and Kiparsky. The discourse-old element, the Kiparskys‟ intuitions, therefore links the indefinite NP to the preceding discourse, allowing it to function as topic. Mikkelsen (2005: 158) suggest that unmodified indefinites, shown in (38) above, cannot meet this criterion because they do not contain any material that could provide this kind of link. She notes that the only way for unmodified NPs to function as topic is for the entire NP to be discourse-old; in such cases, the indefinite article would be infelicitous and the NP would have to be marked as definite. On Mikkelsen‟s account then, indefinite subjects of specificational inversion sentences have to meet two competing requirements: they must contain enough discourse-old material to qualify for the role of topic while still satisfying the “Novelty Condition” associated with indefinites (cf. Heim 1982). For instance, while the indefinite subject in (39) contains discourse-old information, “no philosopher who shares the Kiparsky‟s intuitions on some factive predicates has been mentioned before” and so it can be marked as indefinite (Mikkelsen 2005: 155).
Accounting for the behaviour of indefinite NPs
51
Mikkelsen‟s (2005) account makes a lot of sense, since it reflects Birner‟s (1994, 1996) finding that inversion is sensitive to discourse status (see Section 2.2). However, discourse factors alone cannot fully explain the restrictions on indefinite specificational subjects. For instance, Mikkelsen provides examples, such as (41), where the predicative NP is discourse-old and yet is felicitously marked as indefinite. Since these sentences meet Mikkelsen‟s criteria, they should qualify for inversion. However, as shown in (42), this is not the case. Mikkelsen (2005: 159) therefore concludes that her account, as it stands, “cannot be the whole story”. (41)
Bill is a doctor. John is a doctor (too).
(42)
Bill is a doctor. #A doctor is John (too). (examples from Mikkelsen 2005: 159)
While I agree with Mikkelsen (2005) that discourse considerations are certainly important for inversion constructions, I suggest that the particular discourse status of indefinite specificational subjects follows from their peculiar function in specificational sentences. I argue that these indefinite NPs assert the existence of a non-exclusive, restricted set of entities as relevant to the shared discourse environment. In specificational inversion sentences then, indefinite NPs share many of the same properties of definite NPs while still providing a unique discourse function. In what follows, I advance this account, making use of Hawkins‟ (1978, 1991) analysis of definiteness and indefiniteness as well as Prince‟s (1981, 1992) taxonomy of discourse familiarity (also adopted by Birner 1994, 1996).
3.3.
An account based on definiteness
When appearing in the specificational inversion construction, definite NP subjects are typically discourse-old. For instance, the use of the definite article in (43) suggests that both the speaker and the hearer already know that some entity (or singleton set of entities) exists which satisfies the description psychologist. This information may be explicitly evoked, involving the previous mention of a psychologist among the pragmatic set of people talked about, or it may be inferable from the discourse context. (43)
The psychologist is Dr. Hugh Beale.
52
Specificational copular constructions
For instance, if (43) were part of a discourse about a particular hospital, the existence of a psychologist within this environment could be inferred from our shared script or frame of hospitals i.e. from what we know about hospitals. As Birner (1996: 95) notes, inferable information patterns with evoked information in inversion sentences and can therefore be “collapsed into a single category (i.e. discourse-old information)”. In contrast, indefinite specificational subjects will not be felicitous if they are discourse-old; that is, if the information they express is already present in the context of a particular speech event. To illustrate this point, consider the example in (44). Given the right context, this could be an acceptable specificational sentence. However, if the indefinite NP is explicitly evoked in the previous discourse, (44) becomes unacceptable, shown in (45) and (46). (44)
A psychologist who works at St. Eligius is Dr. Hugh Beale.
(45)
There is a psychologist at St. Eligius. #A psychologist who works at St. Eligius is Dr. Hugh Beale.
(46)
There are several psychologists at St. Eligius. #A psychologist who works at St. Eligius is Dr. Hugh Beale.
In the discourse context of (45), where there is no implication that there is more than one psychologist at St. Eligius, the definite article would be preferred, shown in (47).13 Similarly, while the exclusiveness condition of indefinites is satisfied in (46), the numeral one is preferred, shown in (48). (47)
There is a psychologist at St. Eligius. The psychologist is Dr. Hugh Beale.
(48)
There are several psychologists at St. Eligius. One (of the) psychologist(s) working at St. Eligius is Dr. Hugh Beale.
In (48), one performs a partitive function in relation to the evoked set of psychologists at St. Eligius. Since the existence of several psychologists entails the existence of one psychologist, this NP denotes a smaller subset of a previously evoked set, the existence of which is entirely inferable from the 13. Although the first sentence of (45) and (47) contains an indefinite NP, it does not imply exclusiveness (more than one). As Hawkins (1978: 222–223) comments, the exclusiveness condition of indefinite noun phrases disappears when they occur in there be sentences.
Accounting for the behaviour of indefinite NPs
53
discourse context (see Prince 1981: 236). As shown in (46), the indefinite article a does not have this function in specificational sentences; it is not used to provide an already familiar or presupposed description or to classify an entity as a single member of some previously evoked set of entities. In the specificational inversion construction, descriptions introduced by a therefore perform a different function from those introduced by the or even one. Rather than indicating that the existence of a set of entities that satisfy the description is already known or knowable from the discourse context, the indefinite article is used to establish the existence of this set and to position this information in relation to the discourse context. For instance, as was shown above, the initial NP in (39), repeated here as (49), provides a description which is brand-new to the discourse, but which is also explicitly related to some element within the discourse context (in this case, the Kiparskys). Assuming Prince‟s (1981) taxonomy then, these indefinite specificational subjects are brand-new anchored. (49)
A philosopher who seems to share the Kiparskys’ intuitions on some factive predicates is Unger (1972), who argues… (Mikkelsen 2005: 155)
In (49), the relative clause provides the anchor, or link, to the preceding discourse. For Hawkins (1978, 1991), this is an establishing relative clause. It adds to, or extends, the mutual cognitive environment in a way that is relevant to and compatible with the interlocutors‟ existing knowledge (Hawkins 1991: 411). Fox and Thompson (1990) discuss this as a form of grounding; the NP is grounded in the conversational space via its relationship to a referent which is clearly given in the immediate context. From the account outlined in Section 2 above, we might expect that indefinite NP predicates which contain establishing relative clauses would be better suited to the specificational function, since they exhibit many of the same properties as definite NPs. As we have seen, these indefinites are explicitly anchored to the speech event. This is what enables the indefinite NP in (49) to meet the discourse requirement of inversion, such that the postcopular NP is newer to the discourse than the precopular NP (see Birner 1994, 1996). Furthermore, since anchoring takes place via restrictive modification, these indefinite NPs denote highly restricted sets; in other words, the type is specified to a greater degree, limiting the number of possible instances of that type (see Section 2.3). Finally, as Hawkins (1978: 225) points out, “the exclusiveness condition is no longer operative” in indefinite NPs with establishing relative clauses.
54
Specificational copular constructions
The indefinite NP in (49) is therefore noncommittal with respect to inclusiveness and exclusiveness (which are associated with definiteness and indefiniteness, respectively (see Section 2.1)). In (49) then, type specification and non-exclusiveness result in the suggestion that the number of philosophers who share the Kiparskys‟ intuitions on factive predicates is limited and there is no implication that there is in fact more than one such philosopher. It is therefore possible that the description philosopher who seems to share the Kiparskys‟ intuitions on factive predicates characterizes Unger uniquely. This indefinite noun phrase therefore enables a specificational reading for (49), such that the postcopular Unger can be taken as representing the set‟s (potentially complete) membership. Indefinite NPs with establishing relatives are therefore able to occur as the subjects of specificational inversion sentences because they bridge the gap between definiteness and indefiniteness. The account of specificational meaning outlined in Section 2.1 is therefore able to explain what lies behind Declerck‟s (1988: 19) observation that indefinite specificational subjects invariably express new information, but “involve modifiers expressing old information”. In particular, it suggests that the fundamental property of these particular indefinite NPs is that they do not rule out an inclusiveness interpretation. While I have argued that, in this construction, indefinite NPs introduced by the indefinite article often function differently from those introduced by one, Declerck (1988: 20) does not make this distinction; he claims that all types of indefinite specificational subject indicate exclusiveness and that their use “is motivated by the semantic difference between these NPs and the corresponding definites” (emphasis added). Of course, it is not just indefinite NPs with establishing relative clauses that can occur in the specificational inversion construction, and in fact it is not always the modifying information that contains discourse-old material. For instance, the specificational sentence in (50) has an indefinite NP subject displaying adjectival modification. Here, the head noun psychologist provides the link to the previous discourse and the adjective phrase especially talented expresses new information. (50)
There are several psychologists at St. Eligius. An especially talented psychologist is Dr. Hugh Beale.
As in (49) then, the indefinite NP an especially talented psychologist has the information status brand-new anchored. We have seen above, in (48), that the existence of several psychologists entails the existence of a (or
Accounting for the behaviour of indefinite NPs
55
one) psychologist. However, the existence of an especially talented psychologist cannot be inferred from the preceding discourse. The indefinite article therefore functions not to indicate that the existence of some described set of entities is already known or knowable from the discourse context, but to actually assert the existence of this set and to position this information in relation to the discourse context. While in (49), the establishing relative also serves to extend the discourse environment, the indefinite NP in (50) carries with it the implicature of P-membership, such that the set psychologist is understood in relation to the discourse-old set of psychologists at St. Eligius (see above and Hawkins 1991). This set is further restricted, or specified, by adjectival modification to the extent that it does not rule out a uniqueness (or inclusiveness) interpretation such that Dr. Hugh Beale is the most talented psychologist at St. Eligius. This account of indefinite specificational subjects seems to be on the right lines, especially when we consider some less felicitous examples. For instance, the indefinite NP in (51) involves adjectival modification and has the same discourse status as that in (50). Nevertheless, there is the sense that the specificational sentence in (51) is not as good as that in (50). (51)
There are several psychologists at St. Eligius. ?A talented psychologist is Dr. Hugh Beale.
This is to be expected from the account sketched here. As we saw above, the adverb especially, meaning „above all‟, creates a uniqueness interpretation for (50). Without this adverb, it is more difficult to obtain a nonexclusive reading. Since talented is a gradable adjective, an individual can be talented to a greater or lesser degree and the dividing line between what counts as talented and what does not is difficult to determine. Therefore, we might expect there to be more than one talented psychologist at St. Eligius (even if some are considered to be less talented than others). On this account then, we anticipate that indefinite NPs will be better suited to the specifying function if they contain lots of modifying information (providing a more restricted type specification) and if they contain modifiers which lexically imply uniqueness. Gradient acceptability judgments are therefore built into this account, since felicitousness is dependent upon the degree to which the indefinite NP can be considered as having properties associated more with definiteness than indefiniteness. As Mikkelsen (2005: 159) notes, a purely discourse-based account cannot explain
56
Specificational copular constructions
why the content and form of modification should be a factor in “determining the felicity of indefinite specificational subjects”.14
4.
Summarizing and extending the account
In this section, I summarize the account of specificational NP be NP sentences developed so far and consider how this draws from, and advances on, the existing literature. I then go on to examine the implications for other types of specificational copular construction, building up a family of related constructions. In particular, I outline the analyses of th-clefts, wh-clefts and all-clefts that are most consistent with the account of specificational meaning developed here, before going on to advance an analysis of the it-cleft as a specificational copular construction in Chapter 4.
4.1.
An overview of specificational NP be NP sentences
On the account developed so far, specificational meaning in NP be NP sentences is quite literally the inverse of predication; that is, it derives from 14. Since additional material is often said to facilitate a specific reading for indefinite noun phrases (see Fodor and Sag 1982), one could argue that the felicitousness of indefinite specificational subjects is dependent on a specificity condition similar to that found in sentences containing individual-level predicates (see Heycock and Kroch 2002: 112). However, the kinds of indefinite NPs that make acceptable specificational subjects do not readily occur with predicates expressing permanent properties without inducing a generic reading, as shown in (viii) compared with (ix). (vii) A doctor who finds cures for rare diseases is Jonathan Tuttle. (viii) A doctor who finds cures for rare diseases is intelligent. (generic reading) (ix) A certain doctor we both know is intelligent.
(specific reading)
Furthermore, indefinite specificational subjects do not pronominalize with gender-specific tag questions, as we would expect on a referential reading, shown in (x) and (xi). (x)
A certain doctor we both know is intelligent, isn‟t he?
(xi) *A doctor who finds cures for rare diseases is Jonathan Tuttle, isn‟t he?
Summarizing and extending the account
57
the same nominal predication relation of class inclusion but involves interpreting this relation from the opposite perspective, as listing the membership of a set rather than attributing a property to a referent. In Section 2.1, definite NP predicates were shown to be especially well-suited to enabling a specificational interpretation because they are always understood in relation to the speech event (and so denote restricted sets) and because they are associated with inclusiveness. For sentences with definite NP predicates then, the referring expression is understood to provide a complete, exhaustive list of the members which constitute the restricted set. The specificational interpretation also relies on a particular information structure, in which the referring expression is in focus. From this, it follows that specificational sentences will invariably meet the discourse requirements of inversion, such that the precopular element is not newer to the discourse than the postcopular element (which itself conforms to highly general information structural tendencies). This, along with the fact that the NP inversion construction provides an unambiguous, structural way of distinguishing between specificational and predicational meaning, helps to explain the association between specification and inversion (see Section 2.2). In Section 2.3, this account of specificational NP be NP sentences was situated within cognitive and constructional frameworks. Here, it was argued that the class inclusion relation of nominal predication does not arise via a special use of “classifying be” (contra Croft 1991), nor is it implied indirectly as a result of an identity relation between an instance and an arbitrary, nonspecific instance of a type (contra Langacker 1991). Instead, predicate nominals (definite and indefinite) were analysed as designating a type and as profiling a relation between that type and the schematic instance of that type, which is then elaborated by an argument expression. On this account, predicate nominals are properly relational, expressing an instantiation (or class inclusion) relation between an instance and a type. In Section 3, we saw that by focusing on the question of what constitutes specificational meaning, rather than on the conditions affecting syntactic movement operations, we can provide something of an explanation for the behaviour of, and restrictions on, indefinite specificational subjects. As was shown in Section 3.2, these issues have not been satisfactorily addressed in movement-based inverse accounts. It was argued, in Section 3.3, that the indefinite article performs a useful function in specificational inversion sentences and so provides a contrast with the use of the definite article. First, it allows the speaker to introduce a brand-new set description into the communication space, with the proviso that it is anchored to the discourse in some way. Second, it means that the speaker can be noncom-
58
Specificational copular constructions
mittal or evasive with respect to inclusiveness. In other words, the referring expression can plausibly be taken as representing a set‟s membership even though it may not in actuality constitute an exhaustive list of members. Despite providing this unique and useful function, we saw that the felicitousness of indefinite specificational subjects is nevertheless governed by their similarity to definite NPs, which we have said contain properties well-suited to specificational meaning. In particular, the indefinite NP predicate must exhibit, or at least not be at odds with, some characteristics associated more with definiteness than indefiniteness. For instance, indefinite NPs will be deemed more acceptable as the subjects of specificational inversion sentences if they are understood in relation to the communication space and if they contain modifying information which specifies the type to such a degree that exclusiveness is not implied.
4.2.
Positioning this account in relation to the literature
The account of specificational NP be NP sentences built up throughout this chapter is based on the premise that such sentences involve nominal predication (or class inclusion) rather than equation and so captures the same intuitions as the inverse analyses of specificational sentences outlined in Section 1.2. However, while the inverse approach focuses on the derivational relationship between specificational inversion sentences and their predicational (or “non-inverted”) counterparts, the account developed here assumes a non-derivational, monostratal model of language. Thus, pairs of inverse and non-inverted NP be NP sentences are not derived from a common underlying structure, but are instances of two separate constructions which are related by their position within the hierarchical taxonomy of grammatical knowledge. As we saw in Section 2.1, certain instances of the predicate nominal construction allow a specificational interpretation. All such sentences share the same semantic relation (of class inclusion) and exhibit the same syntactic structure (see also footnote 10). I suggest that specificational sentences with postcopular predicative NPs (commonly referred to as “reverse” specificational copular sentences) form a subtype of the predicate nominal construction, labelled the specificational non-inversion construction in Figure 4. The psychological reality of this sub-construction can be argued for on the grounds that such sentences have a fixed information structure which is not found in the more general predicate nominal construction; that is, the subject must be in focus. Furthermore, these sentences have a distinct,
Summarizing and extending the account
59
specifying function which requires that the predicate denotes a restricted set or designates a highly specified type – a characteristic which falls out from the semantics and pragmatics of definite NP predicates (see Section 2.1). Specificational inversion sentences, on the other hand, involve the same class inclusion relation as sentences with postcopular predicate nominals, but have different structural properties (see Section 2.2).15 We could argue that speakers recognize the parallelism between the specificational inversion construction and the predicate nominal construction, and so form an abstraction, shown as predicate nominal semantics in Figure 4. Although this construction mostly comprises semantic information (outlined in Section 2.3) and does not specify a particular linear order, predicate nominal semantics still constitutes a form-meaning pairing because the type specification must be provided by a nominal element. As I explain in Chapter 5, the same is not true for the element characterizing the instance of this type, as a variety of phrasal categories can be used to perform a referring function. The construction therefore has a highly abstract form, specifying for two phrasal elements (XP and NP) mediated by the copular verb be. The specificational inversion construction further stipulates that the type must be specified (or the set restricted) to the extent that a specificational interpretation can be achieved. The construction involves mismatch, in that the grammatical subject is the semantic predicate and the semantic argument (a referring expression) is in the complement position. In addition, the specificational inversion construction has a fixed information structure, with focus placed invariably on the postcopular XP, which characterizes the instantiation of the type (or the membership of the set). As we saw in Section 2.2, the specificational inversion construction shares some of these properties with other kinds of be inversion construction. Despite differences in their syntactic behaviour, these inversion sentences exhibit a similar mismatch between form and function (with the logical subject occurring in postverbal position and a predicative element appearing in clause-initial position) in addition to sharing the same discourse requirements. The family of be inversion constructions may therefore provide local support (and motivation) for the symbolic and information structural properties of the specificational inversion construction, as shown in Figure 4. 15. As noted in Section 2.2, it is conceivable that the specificational inversion construction shares the same syntactic (subject be complement) structure as that found in equative sentences – one which is underspecified for syntactic predication (see footnote 10). However, since I have not explored the syntax of these constructions in any detail, this is not represented in Figure 4.
60
Specificational copular constructions
Predicate nominal semantics
be inversion construction
Specificational inversion construction
Predicate nominal construction Specificational noninversion construction
Figure 4. A constructional taxonomy of predicate nominal inheritance relations
As a result of its theoretical differences from other inverse analyses, the account developed over this chapter focuses not on identifying a system of rules for governing movement operations but on characterizing the relationship between specificational and predicational meaning. By recognizing the role of definiteness in enabling the specificational interpretation of NP be NP sentences, this account advances the semantic (as opposed to the structural) side of the inverse approach. In doing so, it owes much to Higgins‟ (1979) characterization of specificational sentences as functioning like lists (see Section 1.3). As I explained in Section 2.1, Higgins sometimes gets very close to depicting specificational meaning as a class inclusion relation. For instance, he notes that in specificational (inversion) sentences, the postcopular NP “says what constitutes or makes up the object referred to by the subject noun phrase” (Higgins 1979: 150). In other words, a specificational interpretation involves listing the membership of a set or class, rather than using class inclusion to attribute a property to a referent. The analysis of specificational meaning developed here also has a number of points in common with the account of Blom and Daalder (1977). These authors suggest (as I do) that specificational sentences involve a class inclusion relation. However, for Blom and Daalder, this is tantamount to a hyponymy relation. Their argument runs as follows. Predicational NP be NP sentences involve a class-membership relation in which the subject referent is a hyponym of the superordinate category described by the predicate nominal. Specificational (inversion) sentences have the reverse alignment, with the subject denoting a more general concept than the postcopular NP. Declerck (1988: 92) criticizes this account, claiming that although predicational NP be NP sentences often do express a class-membership relation,
Summarizing and extending the account
61
“there are subtypes of predicational sentences where no idea of classinclusion (or class-membership) appears to be present”. In evidence of this, he cites examples with definite NP predicates, such as (52). (52)
John is the best musician in town
(Declerck 1988: 92)
Declerck (1988: 93) also argues against Blom and Daalder‟s claim that specificational copular sentences involve a hyponymy relation; he observes that “There is no difference in generality between the variable NP and the value NP”. Declerck suggests that this is the reason why the two NPs are reversible – because they exhibit no difference in specificity.16 The account of specificational meaning developed here provides a solution to the discrepancy between these two arguments. On the one hand, I assume (with Blom and Daalder 1977) that specificational inversion sentences involve class inclusion relations and are therefore, in some sense, the “reverse” of predicational NP be NP sentences. However, I also agree with Declerck (1988: 93) that specificational sentences are not characterized by a “difference in generality”. For sentences with definite NP predicates, such as (52) above, there is, as Declerck comments, no difference in the generality of the two NPs, since both are inherently singular. However, what Declerck does not acknowledge is that the postcopular NP can nevertheless be interpreted as denoting a (highly restricted, all-inclusive) set or class. As we have seen, this property of definite NPs is what enables these sentences to 16. For Declerck (1988: 47), the asymmetry of specificational sentences instead stems from the fact that whereas the value NP is “strongly referring”, the variable NP is “weakly referring” or attributive. In other words, the variable NP is used to refer to an unknown individual – “whoever or whatever is the so-andso” (Donnellan 1966: 285). However, Mikkelsen (2005: 89) shows that in tag questions, subjects with unknown reference differ from the subjects of specificational inversion sentences in that they “do not pronominalize as it, but with the gendered pronouns she/he”, as shown in (xii) (see also Declerck 1988: 56). (xii) The murderer (whoever he is) must be insane, mustn‟t he/*it? (xiii) The murderer is Andy Schroeder, isn‟t it?
[specificational inversion]
Furthermore, as Higgins (1979: 269) observes, the concept attributive does not accurately characterize the function of specificational sentences. On an attributive use, the speaker does not know the identity of the referent; however, specificational sentences are instead used when the speaker does know (and intends to inform the hearer of) the referent to which the description applies.
62
Specificational copular constructions
acquire both predicational (x is a member of the set Y) and specificational (x makes up the complete membership of the set Y) interpretations.
4.3.
Other specificational copular constructions
This account of specificational meaning can be extended to other kinds of copular sentence. In this section, I outline comparable analyses of various different types of pseudocleft construction before going on to examine the implications for it-clefts in Chapter 4. Pseudocleft constructions include thclefts, wh-clefts, and all-clefts, shown in (53), (54) and (55). (53)
The thing that I like best is grape soda
[th-cleft]
(54)
What I like best is grape soda
[wh-cleft]
(55)
All he drinks is grape soda
[all-cleft]
The term pseudocleft stands alongside the term cleft (used as a synonym for it-cleft) to indicate that while it-clefts can almost always be paraphrased by noncopular sentences, pseudoclefts usually, but do not always, have simple sentence counterparts (see Ward, Birner and Huddleston 2002: 1423). For instance, (53) and (54) correspond in meaning to I like grape soda best and (55) can be paraphrased as he only drinks grape soda. However, there is no corresponding noncleft for (56) because *I like about it that it‟s so sweet is ungrammatical. (56)
What I like about it is that it‟s so sweet
[wh-cleft]
The relationship between pseudoclefts and simple noncopular sentences is therefore “less systematic” than that existing between it-clefts and their more basic counterparts. As a result, pseudoclefts are not as well-suited to a derivational (movement-based) account. Nevertheless, Ward, Birner, and Huddleston (2002: 1423) maintain that clefts and pseudoclefts share the same information packaging function of dividing “the message into two parts”. Consequently, pseudoclefts are often discussed in relation to more basic sentences. For example, Lambrecht (2001: 469) analyses their introductory elements (the thing that, what) and the copula as semantically inert, suggesting that while pseudoclefts are not derived, they nevertheless have the same semantic structure as simple noncopular sentences. In what follows, I present analyses which examine pseudoclefts not in relation to
Summarizing and extending the account
63
their noncopular counterparts but as fully-fledged copular constructions. The aim is that by the end of this chapter we will have established a unified analysis of the family of specificational copular sentences which can be usefully employed in the analysis of it-clefts in Chapter 4.
4.3.1.
Th-clefts as specificational copular sentences
Collins (1991b: 483) defines th-clefts as pseudoclefts “introduced by the in conjunction with the proform equivalents of the English interrogatives (thing, one, place, time, reason, way)”. However, despite this formal distinction, th-clefts are essentially just specificational NP be NP sentences introduced by definite NPs. As a result, this sentence type can be accounted for using the same analysis as that proposed in Section 2 above. On this account, the th-cleft in (57) is an instance of the specificational inversion construction, containing a definite NP predicate in subject position. Therefore, the only thing that separates this th-cleft from the NP be NP sentence in (58) is the form of the initial NP. (57)
The one who wants to be a concert pianist is Charles
(58)
The aspiring pianist is Charles
The main difference between (57) and (58) is that the th-cleft in (57) contains an obligatory restrictive relative clause. As shown in (59), the sentence becomes unacceptable when this restrictive information is removed (see Lambrecht 2001: 469). Of course, the initial NP in (58) can also be restrictively modified, shown in (60). However, here, the reduced relative provides the P-set (this outfit), within which the existence and uniqueness of the singleton set aspiring pianist holds (see Hawkins 1991). Since this Pset is already accessible from the immediate context (as indicated by the use of the definite article) it does not have to be expressed overtly, shown in (58). (59)
#The one is Charles
(60)
The aspiring pianist in this outfit is Charles
In contrast, the relative clause in (57) provides the singleton set information (wannabe concert pianist) that distinguishes Charles from the other entities that make up the larger P-set. Here, the head noun one performs a partitive
64
Specificational copular constructions
function in relation to the contextual P-set, such that Charles is specified as the one (out of the people in this outfit) who wants to be a concert pianist. In (59) then, the initial NP does not contain any information that uniquely describes Charles as distinct from the other members of the P-set and so does not constitute an acceptable specificational sentence. The obligatory presence of the restrictive relative explains why these particular NP be NP sentences are characterized as clefts (or pseudoclefts). For many authors, the concept cleft is tied to the correspondence of such sentences to noncopular paraphrases. In (57) above, the relative clause information x wants to be a concert pianist forms the basis of a noncopular counterpart, for which the postcopular Charles functions as the missing subject. However, in (60), it is the head noun, rather than the relative clause, that provides the distinguishing information. As a result, Charles is in this outfit does not adequately capture the meaning of (60) and so this NP be NP sentence cannot be characterized as cleft. What distinguishes th-clefts from other NP be NP sentences then, is how the informational content of the initial predicative NP is distributed; the correspondence of th-clefts to noncopular sentences is secondary to this and is dependent upon it. However, it is not clear to me whether this small formal distinction is recognized by speakers; that is, whether th-clefts make up a separate construction from noncleft NP be NP sentences. The answer depends on the psychological reality of the concept (or rather, the construction) cleft. For Collins (1991b: 484) th-clefts include only those examples that can be analysed “as in any sense a cleaving of a simple sentence”. Since I view cleft sentences as fully-fledged copular constructions, the term cleft has no theoretical significance on my account. Therefore, it may be the case that the th-cleft examples are simply instances of the specificational inversion construction and can be accounted for in the exact same way as other specificational NP be NP sentences.
4.3.2.
Wh-clefts as specificational copular sentences
The analysis of specificational NP be NP sentences outlined in Section 2 can also be extended to incorporate wh-clefts. On this account, the precopular constituent of a wh-cleft is a fused relative. Fused relatives function as noun phrases in which the head is incorporated into the relative lexeme. Therefore, what I like best in (61) corresponds to a definite NP with an integrated relative clause, such as the x [I like x best] or the x such that I like x best (see Ward, Birner, and Huddleston 2002: 1420).
Summarizing and extending the account
(61)
65
What I like best is grape soda
Much of the literature on wh-clefts involves the discussion of connectivity (for a comprehensive overview, see den Dikken 2005). In what follows, I show that while some of the connectivity evidence seems to support the treatment of wh-clefts as specificational NP be NP sentences, other connectivity data is problematic for this type of analysis. Most connectivity effects are found not only in wh-clefts, but in all types of specificational sentence, and so support a unified analysis of such constructions. For example, both the wh-cleft in (62) and the NP be NP sentence in (63) exhibit reflexive connectivity. Here, the postcopular reflexive yourself is governed by the pronoun you embedded inside the restrictive relative clause. (62)
What you should try instead is shaving yourself in the evenings
(63)
The approach you should try instead is shaving yourself in the evenings (examples from Higgins 1979: 57)
In generative and transformational theories of grammar, binding effects such as this represent clause-internal structural relations between syntactic elements. Consequently, connectivity evidence has sometimes been used to support analyses of wh-clefts in which the postcopular constituent is either extracted from within, or coindexed with a gap inside, the embedded relative clause. On such accounts, binding in wh-clefts works in much the same way as it does in simple noncopular sentences, such as (64) (see Hankamer 1974). (64)
You should try shaving yourself in the evenings
However, since noncleft NP be NP sentences like (63) cannot be derived from simple noncopular sentences, Higgins (1979) suggests that connectivity in specificational sentences requires an explanation which is independent from syntactic c-command. Higgins (1979) argues instead for an interpretive account, suggesting that connectivity effects are related to, and in fact result from, the meaning of specification. More developed analyses taking a semantic approach to connectivity are found in Jacobson (1994), Sharvit (1999, 2003) and Heller (2002, 2005). For these authors, binding is
66
Specificational copular constructions
a consequence of semantic composition and depends upon the semantic properties of what/the and be.17 It is beyond the scope of this book to develop an account of connectivity in specificational sentences. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the shared behaviour of wh-clefts and other specificational sentences with respect to connectivity supports a unified analysis of these constructions. However, there are some types of connectivity that are specific to the whcleft, such as NPI connectivity, shown in (65). Since the licensing of the negative polarity item any breaks down in the “reverse” wh-cleft of (66), such examples can be analysed as specificational NP be NP sentences with postcopular fused relatives. However, den Dikken, Meinunger and Wilder (2000) argue that canonical wh-clefts like (65) require a separate analysis. (65)
What John didn’t buy was any wine
(66)
* Any wine was what John didn’t buy
These authors argue for an ellipsis approach where the licensing negation ccommands the NPI at S-structure within an elliptical IP, shown in (67). They go on to suggest that this type of wh-cleft patterns with questionanswer pairs, and analyse the wh-clause as an interrogative rather than a fused relative. (67)
What John didn’t buy was [he didn‟t buy any wine] (den Dikken, Meinunger and Wilder 2000: 50)
For den Dikken, Meinunger and Wilder (2000) then, not all types of whcleft can be reduced to specificational NP be NP sentences. However, the “question-in-disguise” theory of wh-clefts is not without its problems. For one thing, it stipulates enormous amounts of elided material that are not always supported by agreement factors. In addition, NPI connectivity can sometimes feature in th-clefts, which contain “what are undisputably DPs containing headed relative clauses in their pre-copular position” (den Dikken, Meinunger and Wilder 2000: 81). (68)
?The only thing John didn’t buy was any wine
17. However, since many of these accounts depend upon a “be-of-identity”, they are somewhat at odds both with analyses that view specificational sentences as instances of nominal predication and with evidence that specificational meaning (whether class inclusion or identity) is actually independent of be.
Summarizing and extending the account
67
The only way for these authors to account for examples like (68) is to suggest that the precopular DP is a “concealed question”, whether this is realized syntactically at an underlying level (requiring further ellipsis) or purely in terms of semantic function (see also Schlenker 2003). Exactly how NPI connectivity works in specificational sentences is not clear to me. However, I am skeptical of an approach that provides superficially similar and functionally analogous sentence types with such different and unrelated underlying structures. As Schlenker (2003: 212) observes, it is not entirely impossible for a negative polarity item to be licensed in a “reverse” wh-cleft. (69)
To buy any wine was what he refused to do (Schlenker 2003: 212)
As a result, I maintain a fused relative analysis for all types of wh-cleft and will assume that the gradient acceptability of foci containing NPIs is evidence that wh-clefts and “reverse” wh-clefts form distinct constructions that have developed their own idiosyncratic properties (see also Chapter 8).18 As shown in Figure 5, the wh-cleft construction is an instance of, and inherits from, the specificational inversion construction. The“reverse” whcleft construction is a subtype of the specificational non-inversion construction. Like other “reverse” specificational sentences, “reverse” wh-clefts are instances of the predicate nominal construction. The wh-cleft and the “reverse” wh-cleft are positioned at a lower level in the constructional hierarchy, which reflects the fact that they are less schematic (or general) than the higher level constructions. For instance, in addition to their construction-specific behaviour, wh-clefts and “reverse” wh-clefts also have a more substantive (fixed) form. While the specificational inversion and noninversion schemas involve nominal predication, the wh-cleft constructions further specify for a fused relative (selecting from a limited range of whrelatives) in the semantic predicative position.
18. I suspect that the restrictions on any and (to a lesser extent) some may be related to their extreme non-specificity. For instance, unlike in (66), the NPI of (69) is embedded inside a specific action to buy any wine. Likewise, (68) becomes less acceptable without the adverb only, which establishes a contrast between wine (as a specific foodstuff) and the other produce that John did buy. Therefore, the wh-cleft may differ from other specificational sentences only in that it is unusually well-suited to occurring with non-specific, abstract foci. I provide more evidence to this effect in Chapter 8, where I compare it-clefts to wh-clefts.
68
Specificational copular constructions
Predicate nominal semantics
be inversion construction
Predicate nominal construction
Specificational inversion construction
Specificational noninversion construction
Wh-cleft
“Reverse” wh-cleft
Figure 5. Incorporating wh-clefts into a family of specificational constructions
4.3.3.
All-clefts as specificational copular sentences
Like th-clefts and wh-clefts, all-clefts, such as (70), are a variety of pseudocleft (see Collins 1991b: 483). As with th-clefts, the precopular constituent here is clearly nominal and so can be easily incorporated into the analysis of specificational NP be NP sentences outlined in Section 2. (70)
All that he asked for was a grape soda
However, as Traugott (2008) notes, all-clefts have an additional function, producing a “below expectation” reading which is also found in th-clefts containing the adverb only, as in (71). (71)
The only thing he asked for was a grape soda
The all of all-clefts therefore differs from the ordinary use of this word. In (72), all has the opposite effect: that of emphasizing the number of things he‟d asked for. While all in (72) corresponds in meaning to the quantifier everything, we cannot replace the all of (70) with this word, shown in (73). (72)
And after all that he‟d asked for…
(73)
*Everything that he asked for was a grape soda
Summarizing and extending the account
69
Therefore, rather than quantifying over individuals (all things), the all of all-clefts seems to be used to emphasize the totality of the set, as inclusive of all and only those entities to which the description applies. Since all-clefts contain this unvarying substantive element, which furthermore fulfils a somewhat idiosyncratic function in these sentences, they can be treated as instances of a distinct all-cleft construction, which is itself a subtype of the specificational inversion construction (see Figure 6). Like other kinds of specificational copular sentence, the all-cleft has a counterpart which does not involve inversion, shown in (74). These “reverse” allclefts form a subcategory of specificational non-inversion sentence. For a more detailed analysis of all-clefts, see Tognini-Bonelli (1992). (74)
And that is all I‟m going to say about the matter Predicate nominal semantics
Predicate nominal construction
be inversion construction
Specificational inversion construction Wh-cleft
All-cleft
Specificational noninversion construction “Reverse” wh-cleft
“Reverse” all-cleft
Figure 6. Incorporating pseudoclefts into a family of specificational constructions
4.3.4.
A family of specificational copular sentences
Throughout Section 4.3, I have outlined accounts of th-clefts, wh-clefts and all-clefts which are consistent with their treatment as specificational copular sentences involving nominal predication. In the case of th-clefts, these examples can be properly integrated as instances of the specificational (non-)inversion construction (see Section 4.3.1). In contrast, wh-clefts and all-clefts have been shown to form less abstract generalizations at an intermediary position in the inheritance hierarchy, shown in Figure 6. Regardless, it is noticeable that although these sentence types are referred
70
Specificational copular constructions
to cumulatively as pseudoclefts, no overarching pseudocleft construction is posited in our taxonomy of specificational copular sentences. As I explained above, this transformational terminology refers to the relationship between such sentences and their noncopular paraphrases and so has no theoretical significance on an account which treats them as fully-fledged copular constructions. From this perspective, the only commonality unique to these sentence-types is a predicative noun phrase containing a semantically general head noun and (therefore) an obligatory relative clause. It is not clear to me that this is a sufficient basis for the claim that the pseudocleft category has any psychological reality.
Chapter 4 It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
1.
The English it-cleft
In the introductory chapter, it was noted that English it-clefts are comprised of four main elements: an introductory it, a form of the copular verb be, a postcopular phrasal element and a sentence-final clause. However, our understanding of how these components function and relate to one another differs from one analysis to the other. Consequently, it is common in the cleft literature for these structural subparts to be labelled using construction-specific, theory neutral terminology. Following Hedberg (1990), I make use of the terms shown in (1) throughout my discussion. (1)
Cleft pronoun + copula + clefted constituent + cleft clause
Also in Chapter 1, we saw that there are two main types of analysis that have been proposed to account for the it-cleft‟s unusual structure. One of these hinges on the correspondence between it-clefts and simple noncopular sentences. On this account, the cleft clause is predicated of, or is in some other way related to, the clefted constituent, while the cleft pronoun is semantically expletive. The other type of analysis stems from the treatment of it-clefts as specificational copular sentences. From this perspective, the cleft clause is in an extraposed position and is related in some way to the cleft pronoun, which may play an important role in the interpretation of the sentence. In what follows, I outline my own version of the latter type of analysis, based upon the account of specificational copular sentences developed in Chapter 3. I then go on, in the remaining sections of this chapter, to discuss my analysis in relation to the cleft literature. In Section 2, I pit my analysis against an expletive account, before comparing it to other versions of the extraposition analysis in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, I show how my analysis of it-clefts differs considerably from the alternative constructional accounts proposed in the literature.
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1.1.
It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
A “discontinuous constituent” account of it-clefts
In Chapter 3, I advanced an analysis of specificational copular sentences as involving nominal predication and showed that definiteness is an important concept in the creation of specificational meaning. Since it-clefts are specificational copular constructions, it follows that they too should contain a nominal, predicative element which will likely exhibit some of the characteristics associated with definiteness.1 This suggests a “discontinuous constituent” analysis of the it-cleft, on which the cleft pronoun and the cleft clause function together as a definite NP predicate. On this type of account, the it-cleft in (2) is effectively reduced to a specificational NP be NP sentence, corresponding to the th-cleft in (3). (2)
It was Frank that complained
(3)
The one that complained was Frank
From these examples, we can see that the highlighted cleft clause in (2) corresponds to the relative clause in (3). As a result, I suggest that the cleft clause is in fact a restrictive relative, albeit in an extraposed position. From this, it follows that the cleft clause must be relative to the initial it, providing us with a semantic NP be NP structure. Like other personal pronouns, it is definite. Functioning as a pronominal form of the definite article, it therefore imbues the discontinuous NP with characteristics associated with definiteness. The cleft pronoun also acts as the head noun of the description, performing a role equivalent to the one or the thing in th-cleft sentences (cf. Postal‟s 1970 transformational analysis of personal pronouns). However, as is the case for th-clefts, it is the relative clause that provides the distinguishing classifying information. For instance, in (2) and (3), the act of complaining uniquely characterizes Frank as distinct from the other members of the relevant background set (such as, the people in this outfit). On this account then, it-clefts are specificational inversion sentences in which the semantic predicate is a discontinuous definite NP. It-clefts therefore involve an additional mismatch between the syntax and the semantics: while a noun‟s modifiers typically appear inside the NP, in it-clefts and 1. However, this does not follow on all accounts that treat it-clefts as specificational copular sentences. Declerck and Seki (1990: 31) say, “As is well-known, it-clefts are the only type of specificational copular structure in which the variable need not be a nominal”.
The English it-cleft
73
other sentences containing extraposed relative clauses, the semantic modifier is situated at the end of the clause (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005: 163). However, unlike other sentences containing extraposed relatives, the it-cleft has a relatively fixed structure: the cleft clause must be extraposed and cannot occur in a position adjacent to the cleft pronoun, as shown in (4). This also accounts for the unacceptability of sentence (5), in which the complete definite description is in postcopular position. Unlike NP be NP or pseudocleft sentences then, the it-cleft does not have a corresponding non-inversion construction. (4)
*It that complained was Frank
(5)
*Frank was it that complained
The ungrammaticality of sentences like (4) and (5) has been used as an argument against analyses which claim that the cleft clause forms a semantic constituent with the initial it (see Jespersen 1937: 84–85). Left unexplained, this data is certainly problematic for the account sketched here and I return to the issue of why these structures represent unacceptable alternatives in Chapter 6. For now, however, it is sufficient to note that the itcleft‟s extraposed structure conforms to, and is supported by, a variety of information structure generalizations (or constructions). Like other specificational inversion constructions, it-clefts have a fixed information structure, in which the focus is located in clause-final position. Thus, all such constructions conform to the principle that the relatively new information should not occur in subject position. However, it-clefts also conform to the information structure tendency for heavier constituents to occur near the end of the clause (see Hawkins 1994, 2004; Wasow 1997, 2002). As Prince (1978: 886) notes, the cleft clause in it-clefts is on average nearly twice as long as the clefted constituent (see also Collins 1991a). The it-cleft configuration is therefore motivated by some highly general, and often competing, information structure principles. As Lambrecht (2001: 488) comments, “cleft formation is a way for a language „to have its cake and eat it too‟”. In part, this explains why the it-cleft configuration exists as a useful and motivated construction in our taxonomy of copular sentences. As shown in Figure 7, the it-cleft is a less schematic subtype of specificational inversion construction. It is more specific, in that it contains the substantive element it and it specifies for an extraposed restrictive relative clause. Together, the cleft pronoun and the cleft clause function as the definite NP predicate,
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
which describes the entities referred to by the clefted constituent. It-clefts therefore exhibit the same semantic structure of class inclusion as other specificational copular sentences. Of course, it is not typical for personal pronouns to be restrictively modified in this way and so the it-cleft configuration is relatively idiosyncratic. This represents a good argument for its treatment as a symbolic construction with internal form-meaning mappings, rather than as a product of componential meaning and general combinatorial rules (see Chapter 2, Section 2). However, while construction grammar tolerates and anticipates idiosyncratic information, it still requires that such properties are motivated. In Chapter 6, I look to the language system of earlier periods of English to explain why the cleft pronoun differs from other, more typical, uses of it.
be inversion construction
Predicate nominal semantics
Specificational inversion construction
It-cleft
Wh-cleft
All-cleft
Figure 7. Incorporating the it-cleft into a family of specificational constructions
There are also other types of specificational sentence which share the itcleft‟s irregular configuration. Aside from an initial it, cleft structure can be introduced by other elements, such as the demonstrative pronouns this and that (see Hedberg 2000). These demonstrative clefts are used to indicate temporal or spatial deixis within the immediate discourse context.2
2. I use the term demonstrative cleft to refer to sentences which have the extraposed structure of it-clefts, but which are introduced by demonstrative pronouns. The term is used in a different sense in Calude (2007, 2008b) to refer to a subset of reverse pseudoclefts with demonstrative subjects, such as that‟s what I thought.
The English it-cleft
(6)
This is Oliver London we‟re talking about, isn‟t it?
(7)
That was Oliver London who just phoned
75
For instance, this in (6) indicates that the description person we‟re talking about is dependent upon the current discourse situation. On the other hand, (7) is tied to an event in the recent past. Here, that indicates that the description person who just phoned is only slightly removed from the immediate context and still depends upon this context for its interpretation. There-clefts, such as (9), are also related structurally to the it-cleft. They differ from it-clefts in that they do not carry an exhaustiveness effect. For instance, we assume from the it-cleft in (8) that Mark is the only person (in this department, for instance) who is working Saturday. However, the there-cleft in (9) is used to indicate that Mark and Oliver may or may not comprise a complete list of people available to work Saturday. (8)
It‟s Mark that‟s working Saturday
(9)
Well, there‟s Mark and Oliver that are available to work Saturday
Therefore, while the same structural configuration is shared by it-clefts, demonstrative clefts and there-clefts, we have seen that the choice of using it, this, that or there to introduce this structure has implications for sentence meaning. This supports the claim that the cleft pronoun is a meaningful element which provides an important semantic contribution. For example, the non-exhaustive reading of there-clefts suggests that the property of exhaustiveness in it-clefts can be attributed to the initial it (see Section 1.2.3). The demonstrative cleft and the there-cleft can be incorporated into our taxonomy of specificational copular sentences, part of which is shown in Figure 8. Since, as we have seen, it-clefts, demonstrative clefts and thereclefts share the same structural configuration, we might wonder whether they form a distinct category, shown here as the overarching cleft schema. It is difficult to say whether speakers actually recognize this overarching category and whether this abstraction is realized in the language system. Consequently, the cleft schema is depicted in Figure 8 using a series of dashed lines, with the arrows pointing upwards to demonstrate that this abstraction may not be independently motivated. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the it-cleft, the demonstrative cleft and the there-cleft are structurally related in some way. I build up a historical account to this effect in Chapter 6.
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
be inversion construction
Predicate nominal semantics
Specificational inversion construction Cleft schema
Wh-cleft
There-cleft
Demonstrative cleft
All-cleft
It-cleft
Figure 8. Incorporating cleft varieties into a family of specificational constructions
The treatment of it-clefts as specificational inversion sentences also has implications for the analysis of so-called truncated clefts, as in (10). As the name suggests, many authors have viewed such sentences as reduced or elliptical it-clefts, including Büring (1998), Declerck (1983a, 1988), and Declerck and Seki (1990). On this type of account, the cleft clause is missing from the second sentence in (10) because it is immediately recoverable from the discourse, as shown in (11). (10)
Was it Oliver who came to work Saturday? No, it was Mark.
(11)
Was it Oliver who came to work Saturday? No, it was Mark who came to work Saturday.
However, this account is not consistent with the extraposition-from-NP analysis of it-clefts argued for here. For instance, I suggested above that the cleft pronoun it performs a role equivalent to the one in th-clefts. From this, it follows that the truncated it-cleft in (11) patterns with the truncated thcleft in (12). However, as I explained in Chapter 3, Section 4.3.1, examples such as (12) do not constitute acceptable specificational sentences. Here, it is the relative clause information that uniquely characterizes Mark as distinct from his workmates and so this constituent cannot be felicitously removed.
The English it-cleft
(12)
77
Was it Oliver who came to work Saturday? #No, the one who came to work Saturday was Mark.
This suggests that it was Mark in (10) cannot be analysed as a truncated it-cleft. Rather than forming part of a discontinuous description (along with an elided cleft clause), I suggest that the initial it in such sentences is a full, non-restricted pronoun which is anaphoric to a complete predicative NP. On this account then, the pronoun it in (10) is anaphoric to the discontinuous definite description it (the one)...who came to work Saturday. Examples of “truncated clefts” are therefore really specificational inversion sentences with pronominal subjects. The same can be said for instances with that, shown in (13). Here, the pronoun is in bold and its antecedent is underlined. (13)
Was it Oliver who said he‟d work Saturday? No, that was Mark.
A similar analysis is put forward by Mikkelsen (2007), who builds up a case for analysing the initial it and that of such sentences as property denoting anaphoric pronouns. She notes that, when used referentially, it and that can only denote non-human, type e individuals. However, in contexts involving specificational inversion sentences, it and that can nevertheless be anaphoric to subjects that describe human individuals, shown in (14) and (15). Mikkelsen (2007: 54) concludes that, in such cases, it and that “are in fact property denoting anaphors (extensionally, type )”. (14)
The best baker is Beverly, isn‟t it?
(15)
The best baker, that/it is Beverly. [left-dislocation structure] (examples from Mikkelsen 2007: 54)
[tag question]
This analysis is supported by the use of it and that as property anaphors in other (non-specificational) contexts. For instance, in (16) and (17), the antecedents to it and that are non-referring, predicative expressions. (16)
Beverly is employee of the month. It/That is a prestigious position.
(17)
They said that Beverly was accomplished and she certainly is that.
Mikkelsen goes on to extend this analysis to truncated clefts, which she analyses as specificational clauses containing pronominal subjects. Using the example in (18), Mikkelsen notes that the truncated cleft in A1 corresponds to the specificational NP be NP sentence in A2. The only difference
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
is that in A1, the initial NP depends upon the context for its interpretation. In this sentence then, Beverly is specified as the individual “who bears a certain contextually salient property” of being the best baker (Mikkelsen 2007: 49). (18)
Q: Who do you think the best baker is? A1: It/That‟s Beverly. A2: The best baker is Beverly.
(Mikkelsen 2007: 54)
Therefore, in terms of our constructional taxonomy, truncated clefts are instances of the specificational inversion construction. Since such examples are effectively NP be NP sentences and the use of it and that as property denoting anaphors is independently attested, it is not clear whether these sentences form a distinct “truncated cleft” construction. Either way, the important thing to note is that, since such sentences do not contain (elided) extraposed relative clauses, they do not inherit the same cleft schema as itclefts, demonstrative clefts or there-clefts (see Figure 8).
1.2.
Explaining the it-cleft‟s pragmatic properties
In Section 1.1, we saw that the account of specificational copular sentences developed in Chapter 3 calls for a discontinuous constituent analysis of it-clefts, in which the cleft pronoun and the cleft clause (analysed here an extraposed restrictive relative) function together as a definite NP predicate. On this account, it-clefts are understood to involve the same nominal predication relation and exhibit the same characteristics of definiteness as other copular sentences with a specificational meaning. In what follows, I show that many of the it-cleft‟s functional and structural properties simply fall out from this analysis. In particular, what are often considered to be idiosyncratic characteristics of the it-cleft are shown to be inherited either from the wider specificational inversion construction or from other more general form-meaning correspondences. In this section, I discuss the it-cleft‟s semantic-pragmatic features before going on to examine how the construction‟s structural characteristics relate to an extraposition-from-NP account in Section 1.3. Here, I show that the pragmatic properties of focus, presupposition, exhaustiveness, and contrast can be explained either as characteristics of definiteness more generally or as products of specificational meaning. While other authors have certainly recognized such correspondences between it-clefts and definite NPs (see
The English it-cleft
79
Section 3), I provide an explanation for them in relation to my own account of specificational sentences, which makes use of Hawkins‟ (1978, 1991) conceptualization of definiteness.
1.2.1.
Focus
The it-cleft is widely regarded as a device for marking focus syntactically. Indeed, on accounts that treat it-clefts as structural variants of noncopular sentences, this is understood to be the construction‟s primary function. For instance, Lambrecht (1994, 2001) suggests that it-clefts provide a way of avoiding the ambiguities associated with prosodic focus marking. For example, in the noncopular (19), nuclear stress is placed on the final element. (19)
John kissed MARGARET
This utterance can be interpreted in two ways, shown in (20) and (21). The context in (20) results in an argument-focus reading, where the object Margaret constitutes the focus phrase, while in (21) the entire predicate is in focus. (20)
Who did John kiss? John kissed [MARGARET]
(21)
What did John do? John [kissed MARGARET]
In contrast, the corresponding it-cleft, shown in (22), does not allow both of these readings. Here, the focused element (Margaret) is placed in a syntactically marked postcopular position while the remaining content of (19) is located in the cleft clause. This provides an unambiguous argument-focus reading; as Lambrecht (2001: 489) notes, it-clefts are “used to prevent unintended predicate-focus construal of a proposition”. (22)
It was [Margaret] that John kissed
However, on the assumption that it-clefts are specificational copular sentences, the construction‟s primary function is not to provide a structural alternative to prosodic focus marking in noncopular sentences, but to express a specifying class inclusion relation. On this account, the rigid argument-focus structure that Lambrecht (2001) observes falls out directly from the it-cleft‟s specifying function. As I explained in Chapter 3, specifi-
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
cational meaning in copular constructions involves a reinterpretation of a nominal predication relation. Rather than ascribing a property to a referent, specificational sentences specify the membership of a set (i.e. the instances of a type specification). The difference between predicational (or ascriptive) and specificational meaning is therefore partly information structural. In non-inverted predicate nominal sentences, a specificational interpretation relies on the prosodic focus marking of the subject argument, shown in (23). On the other hand, the inversion construction shown in (24) has a fixed information structure, containing a postcopular focal element. This provides an unambiguous specificational reading, since the membership (rather than the set) information, is always in focus. (23)
JOHN is the thoracic surgeon
[specificational non-inversion]
(24)
The thoracic surgeon is John
[specificational inversion]
As a subtype of the specificational inversion construction, the it-cleft inherits this fixed focus structure. Therefore, in (22), the focal element Margaret is not the argument of the predicate kissed, as in (19), but of the predicate nominal it (the one)…who John kissed. On this analysis, it-clefts are not information structural variants of simple noncopular sentences. Instead, they are specificational copular sentences, and so exhibit the focus structure associated with specifying the membership of a set.
1.2.2.
Presupposition
Focus is a relational concept, often defined as the unit of information structure where the assertion differs from the presupposition (see Lambrecht 1994; Vallduví and Engdahl 1996; Erteschik-Shir 2007). For instance, in (20) above, the information John kissed x is already known. As the only unpredictable element, Margaret is the focus of the sentence, providing the value for the variable x in the open proposition. For authors that view the itcleft primarily as an information packaging construction, the cleft configuration performs two roles: it foregrounds the focal element while at the same time backgrounding the remainder of the sentence into a separate, subordinate clause. On this account, the it-cleft functions not only as a focusing device, but as a way of marking presupposed information (see Ward, Birner, and
The English it-cleft
81
Huddleston 2002: 1415). For instance, in (22), the proposition John kissed somebody is taken as a precondition to the assertion that John kissed Margaret. Information that is presupposed is characteristically preserved under negation. For instance, (25) asserts that John didn‟t kiss Margaret but the presupposition that John kissed somebody (else) remains in force (see Halvorsen 1978). (25)
It wasn‟t Margaret [that John kissed]
The presuppositional nature of it-clefts follows naturally from an extraposition-from-NP account. In Section 1.1, I claimed that the cleft clause restrictively modifies the cleft pronoun, forming a discontinuous definite description. As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 2.1, the definite article is associated with existence entailments. For instance, (24) above entails that the singleton set thoracic surgeon exists (or is not empty). More specifically, this sentence entails a presupposition which remains constant under negation, shown in (26). This sentence presupposes, but does not assert, that there is a thoracic surgeon.3 (26)
The thoracic surgeon isn‟t John
On the account of it-clefts argued for here, it follows that the discontinuous constituent should also carry existential presuppositions. For instance, both (22) and (25) presuppose that that the individual(s) that John kissed exist(s), while (22) also entails that the individual that John kissed exists. As in it-clefts then, the negation of the copular verb in specificational sentences like (26) does not affect the existential presuppositions of definite descriptions; here, neither the existence of the set of thoracic surgeons nor that of the individual John is denied. Instead, what is negated is the existence of an instantiation or class inclusion relation between these elements. Tellingly, however, both (25) and (26) carry the assumption that some other
3. The presuppositional nature of definite descriptions in it-clefts and other specificational copular sentences is reinforced by their fixed information structure, since topics have a tendency to be presupposed (see Horn 1986). As Abbott (2006: 13) notes, “When definition descriptions are functioning as predicate nominals, and thus as focus, they lose their presuppositional character to a great extent”. However, since in specificational (non-)inversion sentences, the referring expression is always in focus, these existential presuppositions remain in force (see Chapter 3, Section 2).
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
individual matches the description (or instantiates the type). This supports the suggestion, made in Chapter 3, Sections 2.2 and 2.3, that the definite NP subject of specificational inversion sentences is a relational element. In other words, the existence of the set requires the existence of its membership or instantiation. The purpose of a specificational sentence then is to elaborate the (as yet) schematic trajector role of instance. Since (25) and (26) only identify an individual that does not perform this function, the act of specification has not yet been achieved. Such sentences therefore suggest that some other entity exists that can complete this instantiation relation. On the account proposed here, the presuppositional nature of it-clefts does not follow from the backgrounded position of the cleft clause and does not warrant independent explanation in relation to the cleft configuration. Instead, it follows from the semantic contribution of the cleft it. As we have seen, the it-cleft shares this perfectly regular pragmatic property with other definite descriptions and (with respect to negation, for instance) exhibits the same behaviour as other specificational copular sentences.
1.2.3.
Exhaustiveness
In addition to its fixed focus structure and existential presuppositions, the use of the it-cleft also signals exhaustiveness. For instance, the simple noncopular sentence in (27) does not preclude the possibility that John kissed additional people besides Margaret on the occasion in question. However, from the corresponding it-cleft in (28), we assume that Margaret was the only person that John kissed. (27)
John kissed Margaret
(28)
It was Margaret that John kissed
Again this pragmatic property falls out neatly once we treat the it-cleft as a specificational copular sentence containing a (discontinuous) definite NP predicate. On Hawkins‟ (1978, 1991) account, the definite article is associated with inclusiveness, such that the NP applies to the complete set of entities that satisfies this description (within a pragmatically restricted context). As I explained in Chapter 3, this characteristic of inclusiveness brings about an exhaustiveness interpretation for specificational sentences containing definite NP predicates. In such cases, the entities predicated of by
The English it-cleft
83
the definite NP will be understood as comprising a complete list (or the totality) of individuals that constitute the described set (or category). Therefore, in (28), the description it...that John kissed necessarily applies to all of the individuals that John kissed on a particular occasion, simply by virtue of being marked as definite (by the cleft pronoun it). From this, it follows that the individual Margaret is understood to uniquely satisfy this description, representing an exhaustive list of people John kissed. In Chapter 3, I suggested that this pragmatic property is extremely compatible with the specifying function, since in such sentences the referential NP must be taken to represent (or at least give a satisfactory indication of) the membership of a set. Ideally then, specificational sentences offer a complete or exhaustive list of members, inclusive of all individuals that comprise the described set. A somewhat similar suggestion is made by Declerck (1988: 30), who views specification as a value-variable relation. He claims that it-clefts such as (28) carry an exhaustiveness implicature stemming from the Maxim of Quantity („make your contribution as informative as required‟). Declerck notes that, if the speaker adheres to the Maxim of Quantity when formulating this specificational it-cleft, they will necessarily provide an exhaustive list of the values that satisfy the variable described by the cleft clause that John kissed. Declerck (1988: 30) concludes, “It is clear, then, that exhaustiveness follows directly from the act of specification itself. Exhaustiveness is nothing else than „exhaustive listing‟”. See also Horn (1981) for a (generalized) conversational implicature analysis of exhaustiveness in it-clefts. I agree with Declerck that exhaustiveness is a concept strongly related to that of specificational meaning, in that it conforms to our intuitions of what constitutes a well-formed list. Nevertheless, specificational meaning does not create and cannot explain exhaustiveness in it-clefts. Rather, this pragmatic characteristic stems ultimately from the concept of definiteness (specifically the property of inclusiveness). This, among other things, offers a reason as to why definite NPs are well-suited to occurring in specificational copular constructions and provides support for the analysis of itclefts as containing discontinuous definite NPs.4 4. Declerck (1988) does go on to relate the property of exhaustiveness to the concept of definiteness. However, it is not clear how this relationship transpires in Declerck‟s analysis of it-clefts. For Declerck (1988: 31), the cleft clause is not a restrictive relative (modifying it) and instead represents an incomplete variable expression which “functions like a definite nominal”. However, since the cleft clause does not contain a definite element, it is difficult to see where
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
This account also explains why certain types of specificational sentence consistently indicate exhaustiveness while others do not. As was shown in Section 1.1, there-clefts do not (and cannot) rule out a non-exhaustive interpretation; it is entirely possible, given (29), repeated from (9), that there are other colleagues, besides Mark and Oliver, available to work Saturday. (29)
Well, there‟s Mark and Oliver that are available to work Saturday
Since it-clefts and there-clefts share the same cleft structure, the differences between them must rest on the nature of the cleft pronoun (see Section 1.1). On the account developed here, the cleft it performs the same function as the definite article. Since definiteness entails uniqueness, it follows that the act of specification in it-clefts will necessarily be interpreted as exhaustive. However, there-clefts seem to pattern more closely with specificational sentences introduced by indefinite NPs in this regard. Indefinite NPs are not associated with inclusiveness but, as shown in Chapter 3, they can still occur as the subjects of specificational inversion sentences as long as they do not implicate exclusiveness/non-uniqueness (therefore explaining the preference for restrictively modified indefinites). In specificational sentences then, indefinite NPs are noncommittal with respect to inclusiveness and exclusiveness. From this, it follows that the entities predicated of by the indefinite NP could conceivably, (but may in reality not) comprise a complete list of entities that satisfy the description. There-clefts also allow the speaker to be evasive about whether the act of specification is exhaustive or not. For instance, it is possible, following (29), that Mark and Oliver are the only colleagues available to work Saturday. Indeed, this state of affairs most likely represents the speaker‟s (perhaps limited) knowledge on this matter. However, by choosing a therecleft (rather than an it-cleft), the speaker indicates that they are unwilling to commit to the stronger proposition. Assuming a discontinuous constituent account then, the property of exhaustiveness in it-clefts can be explained as a direct consequence of the property of inclusiveness (or uniqueness) associated with definiteness. While exhaustiveness is a concept which is well-suited to the specifying function, the act of specification does not, in and of itself, bring about an definiteness comes from on this account. Furthermore, as I explain below, the non-exhaustive there-cleft data suggests that definiteness (and, from this, exhaustiveness) must be attributed to the pronoun it, rather than to the cleft clause.
The English it-cleft
85
exhaustive interpretation.5 Non-exhaustiveness is tolerated in specificational sentences as long as the list of entities can be taken as representative (or at least indicative) of the membership of the described set.
1.2.4.
Contrast
It-clefts are also said to have a contrastive function. For instance, (30) contrasts Charles with other people who do not share his ambition. More specifically, it invites a contrast between Charles and the other people who make up some contextually relevant set of individuals. For example, if used to specify the only aspiring pianist in this outfit, (30) will necessarily invite a contrast between Charles and the other people in this outfit. This sense of contrast is even more pronounced in negative it-clefts. For instance, in (31) Charles is contrasted with the individual who satisfies this contextually relevant description. As Declerck (1992: 214) observes, contrastiveness is “a relative characteristic”: the sense of contrast becomes greater if the set of potential values is limited and clearly defined. (30)
It‟s Charles that wants to be a concert pianist
(31)
It‟s not Charles that wants to be a concert pianist
5. Nevertheless, for some authors, exhaustiveness cannot occur without an act of specification. From this perspective, negative it-clefts (which do not specify a set‟s instantiation) are not really exhaustive. For example, although only one entity is listed in (i), it does not follow that John kissed only one person. As shown in (ii), we can qualify this negative statement by listing two (or more) entities which satisfy the description given. (i)
It wasn‟t Margaret that John kissed
(ii) It wasn‟t Margaret that John kissed – it was Kellye and Ginger Such examples have led Atlas and Levinson (1981) and Declerck (1988) to treat positive and negative it-clefts differently, with only the former containing exhaustiveness entailments/implicatures. However, once we relate exhaustiveness to inclusiveness, both types acquire a uniform interpretation. On this account, what is at issue in (i) is the totality of the set of people John kissed. The sentence in (ii) is therefore unproblematic; it simply asserts that the complete set of people John kissed is not made up of Margaret, but of Kellye and Ginger. Therefore, exhaustiveness, or the fact that we are talking about the totality of the set, is a prominent feature of both positive and negative it-clefts.
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
Yet again, the contrastive nature of it-clefts can be explained as a consequence of the characteristics of definiteness. As we have seen, definite descriptions are always understood in relation to some mutual cognitive environment, or pragmatic set. They are also associated with inclusiveness, such that they denote a set of entities which exists uniquely within the relevant context (see Hawkins 1991). Therefore, assuming that it-clefts contain definite NP predicates, it follows that Charles is the only aspiring concert pianist within some mutually understood context. It is because of this property of exhaustiveness that (30) invites a contrast between Charles and the other entities within the relevant pragmatic set that do not match this description (or which fall outside of this more restricted set). For the negative it-cleft in (31), contrast follows both from the existential presuppositions of definite NPs and from the (conventional) implicature of P-membership. As we saw in Section 1.2.2, presuppositions remain constant under negation. The it-cleft in (31) therefore presupposes the existence of some individual that wants to be a concert pianist and further implicates that this entity exists within some relevant pragmatic set. Like other negative specificational sentences, negative it-clefts do not elaborate an instantiation relation because they do not provide the membership of a set. However, since the existence of a set implies the existence of its members, the negative it-cleft in (31) invites a contrast between Charles and the as yet unidentified individual within the P-set that satisfies this description. It-clefts therefore share the same contrastive function as other specificational copular sentences containing definite, predicative NPs. However, as with other sentence-types characterized as cleft, it-clefts exhibit less variation in how this contrastive information is presented. For example, the noncleft NP be NP sentence in (32) has two possible readings. Depending on the context, (32) can be used to contrast Dr. Hugh Beale with other nonpsychologists working at the hospital or with some other group of psychologists who don‟t work at St. Eligius hospital. (32)
The psychologist who works at St. Eligius is Dr. Hugh Beale.
In the former, the restrictive relative clause provides the shared environment (or P-set information) of hospital workers from which the sole psychologist is identified. In the latter, the relative clause tells us what distinguishes Dr. Hugh Beale from some shared set of psychologists. As shown in (33), this latter reading is not possible if the relative clause is omitted. Here, the head noun must be interpreted as containing the distinguishing information and the relevant P-set information is determined by the context.
The English it-cleft
(33)
87
The psychologist is Dr. Hugh Beale.
In it-clefts, however, it is always the relative (or cleft) clause that provides the distinguishing classifying information. For instance, in a discourse about a group of psychologists, (34) specifies Dr. Hugh Beale as the only one working at St. Eligius. In order to capture the second reading of (32) above, we must alter the information in the cleft clause, shown in (35). Uttered in a discourse about St. Eligius, (35) contrasts Dr. Hugh Beale with the non-psychologists working at the hospital. (34)
It‟s Dr. Hugh Beale who works at St. Eligius.
(35)
It‟s Dr. Hugh Beale that‟s the psychologist.
It-clefts differ from noncleft NP be NP sentences in that the head noun of the definite description is semantically underspecified and invariably relates to the contextual P-set information (see also the discussion of th-clefts in Chapter 3, Section 4.3.1). For instance, in (34) and (35) respectively, the cleft pronoun isolates a singleton set from the relevant P-set of psychologists and hospital workers, to which the descriptive content of the restrictive relative clause applies uniquely. The contrastive function of it-clefts therefore follows from the analysis of the cleft pronoun and cleft clause as a discontinuous constituent carrying the existential and uniqueness entailments associated with definiteness. Since definite descriptions are always understood in relation to a mutual cognitive environment (or shared, pragmatic set), they inevitably bring about a contrast with the other entities within that environment. Furthermore, the particular way that contrast works in it-clefts (and other sentence types characterized as cleft) follows from the fixed, substantive structure of the (discontinuous) description as containing a semantically underspecified head noun and a contentful relative clause.
1.3.
Explaining the it-cleft‟s structural properties
We have seen then that the construction‟s pragmatic properties acquire a straightforward analysis once we assume a discontinuous constituent account. In this section, I examine the it-cleft‟s structural characteristics, including the behaviour of the cleft clause, some difficult constituency evidence, and the complicated facts surrounding agreement. At first glance,
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
these outwardly complex and irregular properties seem to highlight various problems with the extraposition-from-NP account argued for here. However, in what follows, I show that the cleft clause and the constituency data are not incompatible with, and actually exhibit behaviour which is to be expected from, an account which analyses the clausal component as an extraposed relative, restrictively modifying the cleft pronoun. I go on to show that while the agreement evidence presents more of a challenge for my account, and warrants a supplementary explanation, the analysis of specification as a type of class inclusion relation provides a useful perspective from which to examine this data. I conclude that the agreement facts gain at least a plausible explanation on the account of it-clefts presented here.
1.3.1.
The behaviour of the cleft clause
The cleft clause exhibits a variety of different and seemingly contradictory properties, making it very difficult to conclusively classify this construct as an instance of one or another recognized clause type. As Lambrecht (2001: 468) notes, “its category membership is sometimes debatable or unclear”. In some ways, the cleft clause is undeniably analogous to restrictive relative clauses. For instance, the cleft clause occurs with the same range of introductory elements as restrictive relatives. Most tellingly, the cleft clause is often introduced by that and sometimes occurs without an overt relative pronoun, as in (36). While both of these options are possible for restrictive relatives, shown in (37), they are not found in other, nonrestrictive clause types. For instance, nonrestrictive relatives require an overt wh-relative pronoun, shown by the ungrammaticality of (38). (36)
It was Oliver London that/ I used to work with
(37)
The guy that/ I used to work with lives there
(38)
*Oliver London, that/ I used to work with, lives there
While nonrestrictive relatives are separated from the rest of the sentence by commas or pauses, as in (38), the cleft clause does not share this property. This suggests that, like the restrictive relative clause in (37), the cleft clause is interpreted as forming a constituent with some other element in the sentence. However, additional evidence suggests that, unlike restrictive relatives, the cleft clause does not form a constituent with its immediate antecedent.
The English it-cleft
89
As shown in (36), the clefted constituent in it-clefts can be a proper name. Nonrestrictive relatives, which provide additional or ancillary information, can also attach to these phrasal elements, as in (39). In contrast, proper names cannot normally be modified by restrictive relatives, shown in (40). (39)
Oliver London, who I used to work with, lives there
(40)
*Oliver that I used to work with lives there
As Langacker (1991: 432) notes, restrictive relatives function to modify or restrict the type specification of the antecedent noun. In (37), the relative clause aids identification by providing a more detailed specification, since guy I used to work with is more specific than the type designated by guy. However, in (40), the proper name Oliver is a complete noun phrase used to refer to a specific, uniquely identifiable, individual. As such, it cannot be further modified by a restrictive relative.6 Restrictive relative clauses and their antecedent nouns form a constituent, and therefore an intonation unit, within the noun phrase, with nuclear stress falling on the tone-final element, shown in (41). However, since itclefts are typically spoken with a fall-rise tone, shown in (42), the cleft clause does not form an intonation unit with the clefted constituent (see Halliday 1967: 237; Davidse 2000: 1103). This suggests that, like nonrestrictive relatives, the cleft clause functions as a separate constituent from its phrasal antecedent. (41)
[The doctor who phòned me] lives there
(42)
[It was the dòctor] [who phóned me]
An additional problem with a restrictive relative analysis of the cleft clause is that, while both configurations can occur without an overt relative pronoun, this phenomenon is far less constrained in it-clefts (see Sornicola 1988: 346). For instance, the zero realization of the relative pronoun is not found in restrictive relatives where the antecedent acts as the subject of the 6. As Langacker (1991: 59) points out, a restrictive relative clause can modify a proper noun only if it is preceded by a determiner, as in (iii). Here, Oliver is used not to refer to a specific entity, but as a common noun denoting a more general type person with the name Oliver. (iii) I just bumped into the Oliver you used to work with
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
proposition in the relative clause. This is evidenced by the ungrammaticality of (43) in comparison to the grammatical (37), where the guy functions as the complement of a preposition. In contrast, the cleft clause can occur without an overt relative marker even when the relative element functions as the subject, shown in (44). (43)
*The man paid for that is over there
(44)
It was your husband paid for that
(Lambrecht 2001: 470)
This evidence has led many authors suggest that the cleft clause is a structurally unique type of clause, specific to the cleft configuration. While the cleft clause exhibits the same internal structure as a restrictive relative, it does not restrictively modify its immediate antecedent. Consequently, some have labelled the cleft clause as a type of “nonrestrictive” relative clause, despite a lack of correspondence between the cleft clause and other nonrestrictive relatives (see for instance, Lambrecht 2001). As Huddleston (1984: 462) comments, this type of analysis “is very largely ad hoc – the relative clause is of a kind that is sui generis, unique to this construction”. However, once we assume an extraposition-from-NP analysis of itclefts, the seemingly contradictory behaviour of the cleft clause becomes straightforward and is shown to be consistent with a restrictive relative analysis. As Jespersen (1937: 83) notes, when talking about his earlier transposition theory, the cleft clause “is felt to be, and is treated like, a relative clause, though it does not logically restrict the word with which it is connected”. This observation is unproblematic for an extraposition-fromNP account, since here the cleft clause restrictively modifies the initial it. Therefore, the antecedent of the cleft clause is not the immediately preceding clefted constituent, but the cleft pronoun. As shown in (45), the prosodic structure of it-clefts supports the claim that the cleft clause forms a discontinuous constituent, and an intonation unit, with the initial (unstressed) it. As Huddleston (1984: 461) comments, this type of analysis also allows us to explain the difference in meaning between superficially similar sentences such as (45) and (46). On this account, the sentence in (46) is not an it-cleft, but a specificational NP be NP sentence containing a restrictively modified referring expression. Here, the NP the doctor who phòned me comprises a single intonation unit, with the noun doctor functioning as the antecedent of the restrictive relative. What characterizes (45) as an it-cleft then, is the restrictive modification of the pronoun it.
The English it-cleft
(45)
Q: Who phoned? A: [It] was the dòctor [who phóned me]
(46)
Q: Who was at the door? A: It was [the doctor who phòned me]
91
Once we treat the cleft pronoun as the antecedent of the cleft clause, we can also speculate as to why it-clefts permit zero realization of the relative marker in more contexts than “ordinary” restrictive relatives. As was noted above, restrictive relatives cannot normally occur without an overt relative marker when the relative element functions as the subject of the embedded clause. For instance, in (47), the relative proposition contains a gap in subject position which corresponds to the antecedent noun (__phoned me). (47)
*The doctor phoned me is at the door
Presumably, the problem with such sentences is that they create an unintended “garden-path” reading in which the modified NP is taken to be a complete sentence. For instance, in (47) the doctor phoned me is a wellformed proposition. Here, the VP may not be interpreted as a restrictive relative ( phoned me) but as predicated of the NP the doctor. In contrast, for relative clauses with object gaps, as in (48), zero realization of the relative marker is unproblematic. Since the doctor I phoned is not a wellformed sentence, it must, in all contexts, be interpreted as a restrictively modified NP. (48)
The doctor I phoned is at the door
In (47) then, miscommunication occurs because the doctor is incorrectly analysed as an unmodified NP. However, on an extraposition-from-NP account of it-clefts, phoned me does not modify the doctor in (49) and is instead relative to it. Consequently, the zero realization of the relative marker does not create the same parsing ambiguity as in (47). (49)
It was the doctor phoned me
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that while it-clefts can certainly tolerate zero markers in clauses with subject gaps, this is by no means the preferred option. Out of 31 it-clefts without overt relative markers in the ICE-GB corpus, only 12 contain subject gaps in the cleft clause and 10 of these are reduced cleft clauses. Considering that 67% of all it-clefts in the ICE-GB exhibit subject gaps (270 out of 404), we would expect there to be
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
twice as many zero relativizers functioning as subjects compared with nonsubjects. Instead, zero markers functioning as objects and adjuncts are 1.6 times more frequent (9.5 times more if we factor out the reduced relatives). Tellingly, the zero relatives with subject gaps are restricted to spoken communication. For instance, example (50), along with 8 out of the 10 it-clefts containing reduced relative clauses, occurs in spoken sports commentaries. (50)
And it‟s the grey Altaya still still has it from Young Pretender in the yellow (S2A-006 176, Channel 4 Racing)
The spontaneous commentary sub-genre of the ICE-GB has been noted for its high concentration of it-clefts and shows a strong preference for it-clefts that deviate from the conventional pattern (see Nelson 1997). For instance, the majority of it-clefts with initial focus, such as (51), are also found in spoken sports commentaries. (51)
Simeone it is who chips the ball in (S2A-010 174, BBC Radio 5 International Soccer Extra)
This suggests that the occurrence of it-clefts with zero relatives containing subject gaps is exceptional and that, in general, it-clefts exhibit the same preference as other restrictive relative clauses for zero realization in clauses with non-subject gaps.7 This is exemplified by (52), which contains two cleft clauses performing different functions. While the first of these (you‟d spoken to__) has an object gap and a zero relativizer, the second clause (who__ spoke to you) has a gap in subject position and seems to require the occurrence of an overt relative marker.8 (52)
Was there some doubt in your mind as to whether it was a lady or gentleman you‟d spoken to or who spoke to you (S1B-006 108, legal cross-examination)
7. As Curme (1931: 186) notes, “the that should not be omitted if it is needed to keep the thought clear, i.e., to indicate the oneness of the words in the subject [cleft] clause and to maintain the integrity of the group as a distinct grammatical element in contradistinction to other elements in the sentence”. 8. The it-cleft in (52) is perhaps predicational rather than specificational, with the focal element ascribing a property to an individual (see Chapter 5). However, since I will claim that both varieties of it-cleft exhibit the same discontinuous, extraposition-from-NP structure, they are equally relevant to the discussion surrounding the realization of the relative marker.
The English it-cleft
93
In sum, then, the extraposition-from-NP analysis of it-clefts allows for the cleft clause to be unequivocally classified as a restrictive relative. With this analysis in place, much of the seemingly incongruous behaviour of the cleft clause becomes predictable from what we know about how restrictive relative clauses operate in the rest of the grammar. Of course, on this account, the cleft clause cannot be said to be a typical restrictive relative, since it is extraposed relative to a pronominal element. Outside of the itcleft construction, the pronoun it functions as a full NP, and so would not normally qualify as the antecedent of a restrictive relative (see the discussion of proper names above). Importantly, however, the restrictive modification of pronouns is not unprecedented. I return to this issue in Chapter 6, where I show that an extraposition-from-NP account of it-clefts is supported by empirical, historical evidence.
1.3.2.
The evidence for VP constituency
A potential problem for the extraposition-from-NP account of it-clefts is the apparent evidence that the postcopular element and the cleft clause form a constituent. Delahunty (1982) invokes five tests for VP constituency, including VP-deletion, VP-conjunction, right-node-raising, parenthetical formation, and VP-fronting. With respect to each of these environments, shown in examples (53) to (57), Delahunty claims that the clefted constituent and the cleft clause operate as a syntactic unit (in bold). This is unexpected on the account proposed here, which treats the cleft clause as any other extraposed relative. (53)
I said that it should have been Bill who negotiated the new contract, and it should have been [VP-deletion]
(54)
It must have been Fred that kissed Mary but Bill that left with her [VP-conjunction]
(55)
It could have been – and it should have been – Bill who negotiated the new contract [right-node-raising]
(56)
It must have been, in my opinion, the cyanide that did it [parenthetical formation]
(57)
?I said that it was Bill that argued the case, and Bill who argued the case it was [VP-preposing] (examples from Hedberg 1990: 98, her judgments)
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
However, in what follows, I show that not all of this data is problematic for a straightforward extraposition-from-NP analysis of the cleft clause and that not all of these configurations are reliable tests for constituency. First, it can be argued that examples of VP-deletion, such as (53), relate to a type of specificational construction different from the it-cleft. In Section 1.1, I argued that specificational sentences of the type it be NP are not truncated it-clefts, in which the cleft clause has been elided or deleted. Instead, they are simply NP be NP sentences with pronominal subjects. Assuming an inverse analysis of specificational sentences, the subject it is therefore a property denoting anaphor which refers back to a predicative expression (see also Mikkelsen 2007). From this, it follows that the second instance of it should have been in (53) is not an incomplete it-cleft but an incomplete it be NP sentence, corresponding to it should have been Bill. Here, the pronoun it is anaphoric to the description given in the preceding it-cleft, it…who negotiated the new contract. On this account, (53) involves the “deletion” only of the NP Bill rather than the string Bill who negotiated the new contract. Consequently, (53) cannot be used as evidence for analysing the clefted constituent and the cleft clause of it-clefts as forming a syntactic constituent. Secondly, we can set aside Delahunty‟s constituency evidence on the basis that such tests are notoriously unreliable. For instance, Croft (2001) comments that coordination cannot be depended upon to uncover constituency. He provides the following examples of English coordinate constructions which “support „constituents‟ that are not supported by other criteria” (Croft 2001: 189). (58)
[Jenny makes]?? and [Randy sells]?? the prints
(59)
Jenny gave [the books to Randy] ?? and [the magazines to Bill]?? (examples from Croft 2001: 189)
As these examples show, it is not only constituents that can conjoin. Croft suggests that coordinate constructions combine structures which are perceived to have sufficient points of commonality. Coordination therefore demonstrates evidence of conceptual grouping rather than constituency (see also Wierzbicka 1980, Ch.7). Consequently, the conjoining of Fred that kissed Mary with Bill that left with her in (54) is not necessarily indicative of VP-internal constituency. Likewise, right-node-raising and parenthetical formation tests can give false results for constituency. For instance, Hedberg (1990: 98) observes
The English it-cleft
95
that these constructions “do not entirely exclude extraposed relative clauses …from appearing in the position filled by the cleft clause in clefts”. She provides the following examples. (60)
Nobody would – and nobody could – drink instant coffee who knew anything about espresso [right-node-raising]
(61)
Nobody would ever, in my opinion, drink instant coffee, who knew anything about espresso [parenthetical formation] (examples from Hedberg 1990: 99)
In each case, the extraposed relative clause who knew anything about espresso clearly restricts, and is dependent upon, nobody. Nevertheless, on the assumption that these constructions are reliable tests for constituency, (60) and (61) indicate that the relative clause is internal to the VP (in bold). These “ordinary” extraposed relatives therefore exhibit the same pattern of behaviour as the it-clefts in (55) and (56) above. Consequently, right-noderaising and parenthetical formation cannot be used as evidence against an analysis of it-clefts involving extraposition-from-NP. This leaves us with VP-fronting (or VP-preposing). As Hedberg (1990) observes, extraposed relative clauses cannot occur in the VP-fronting construction. On the basis of (62), Hedberg (1990: 99) concludes that “the relation which holds between the cleft pronoun and the cleft clause is not identical to the relation which holds between an extraposed relative clause and its NP head”. (62)
*I said a candidate would win who had charisma, and win who had charisma, a candidate did (Hedberg 1990: 99)
However, VP-fronting in it-clefts is also unacceptable to many speakers, leading Delahunty (1982) to disqualify this evidence, treating examples like (57) as ungrammatical. Nevertheless, in a later paper, Delahunty (1984: 71) claims that the low acceptability of such sentences “appears to be a matter of stylistic awkwardness rather than ungrammaticality”. Hedberg (1990, 2000) agrees, arguing that while some examples are certainly more unacceptable than others, including (63), preposing can be used as evidence for VP-internal constituency in it-clefts. She presents the it-cleft in (64) as an example with an “equally acceptable status” as the straightforward case of VP-preposing in (65) (see also Reeve 2010: 50).
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
(63)
*I said it is John that‟s an interesting guy, and John that’s an interesting guy it is (Hedberg 2000: 916)
(64)
I said it would be a conservative who‟d win and a conservative who won it certainly was (Hedberg 1990: 98, her judgment)
(65)
I said that I would finish by September, and finish by September I did (Hedberg 1990: 98)
However, I disagree with Hedberg‟s (1990) judgments. The it-cleft in (64) is clearly less acceptable and is certainly less natural than the noncleft example in (65). In conclusion then, examples of VP-preposing are at best unnatural and at worst ungrammatical. Consequently, I do not view this data as strong evidence for VP-internal constituency (see also Delin 1989). In sum, Delahunty‟s (1982) constituency evidence does not undermine the extraposition-from-NP analysis of it-clefts argued for here. As shown above, we can account for this data fairly neatly (where grammatical) by comparing it-clefts to other sentences containing extraposed relatives. In addition, it is worth noting that we can invoke similar constituency tests as evidence that the cleft clause does not form a constituent with the postcopular element. For instance, Han and Hedberg (2008: 359) provide the example in (66), in which a parenthetical adverbial phrase comes between these two components. (66)
It was Kim, in my opinion, who won the race (Han and Hedberg 2008: 359)
1.3.3.
The evidence from agreement
Agreement evidence is often called upon to argue against extraposition accounts of it-clefts. On the extraposition-from-NP account argued for here, we anticipate that, when the cleft clause contains a gap in subject position, the verb inside the cleft clause will agree with the antecedent pronoun it. Data which demonstrate the existence of a subject-verb agreement relation between the verb in the cleft clause and the clefted constituent are therefore extremely problematic for this analysis. For instance, Jespersen (1937: 84) suggests that agreement in it-clefts represents overwhelming evidence against an extraposition account, claiming that there is “almost universal agreement with regard to person and number of the verb in the relative clause with the immediate antecedent”.
The English it-cleft
97
However, in what follows, I show that that the agreement patterns of itclefts present a far muddier picture than Jespersen portrays here. In truth, the facts surrounding agreement are very complicated and are difficult to account for on any one analysis of it-clefts. While the person agreement evidence is suggestive of an extraposition account (contra Jespersen 1937), number agreement is more problematic, requiring an ancillary explanation. According to Jespersen (1937: 84), the pattern shown in (67) represents the ordinary system of person agreement in it-clefts. Here, the verb in the cleft clause agrees with the postcopular first person pronoun and the clefted constituent is in the nominative case. This pattern would suggest that the clefted element acts as the preposed argument of the proposition expressed in the cleft clause, I am responsible. (67)
It is I who am responsible
(Akmajian 1970: 153)
However, Akmajian (1970: 150) finds that the most common agreement pattern is actually that which is represented by (68). Here, the postcopular pronoun is in the objective case and the verb in the cleft clause is systematically third person, regardless of the clefted constituent. (68)
It is me who is responsible
(Akmajian 1970: 150)
Akmajian (1970) finds that the majority of speakers consistently adopt the pattern in (68). Furthermore, all speakers who display the pattern in (67) nevertheless allow (68) as an acceptable alternative. The remaining speakers in Akmajian‟s data set display the pattern in (69). As in (68), verbal agreement is consistently third person, but these speakers mark the clefted element as nominative when no surface subject intervenes between it and the verb of the clause. As Akmajian (1970: 152) notes, this strategy often gives the misleading impression of case agreement between the clefted constituent and the relative element. (69)
It is I who is responsible
So, in all of the different “dialects” that Akmajian (1970) observes, third person marking of the embedded verb is customary (and for many speakers is routine). In only one of the less common dialects is it possible for person marking to be influenced by agreement with the clefted constituent (contra Jespersen 1937). Indeed, among it-clefts in the ICE-GB corpus, there are no examples in which the person marking of the cleft clause has clearly been
98
It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
influenced by that of the clefted constituent; the verb embedded in the cleft clause allows a third person interpretation in all 404 it-clefts. In contrast, there are 4 instances in which there is an observable discrepancy between the person marking of the clefted constituent and that of the cleft clause. For instance, in (70), the postcopular me is a first person pronoun while the embedded verb has is an unambiguously third person singular form. Case aside, this lack of agreement produces the ungrammatical “unclefted” string *I has ended up as the criminal. (70)
The irony is, as Linda pointed out, it‟s me that’s ended up as the criminal. (W1B-007 099, social letter)
The evidence from person agreement therefore seems to support our discontinuous constituent account, on which the cleft clause is extraposed relative to the third person pronoun it. As Akmajian (1970: 151) notes, itclefts show the same pattern of agreement as pseudocleft sentences, such as the th-cleft in (71). In these sentences, the embedded verb is systematically marked as third person following agreement with a third person head noun (in this case, one). (71)
The one who is responsible is me
(Akmajian 1970: 151)
On this type of analysis, we anticipate that, as in other specificational inversion constructions, the postcopular pronoun in it-clefts will be assigned objective case as a result of its postverbal position. However, in the ICEGB, we find only 5 instances where the focal pronoun is clearly objective despite there being a subject gap in the cleft clause, as in (70). In contrast, there are 9 tokens containing postcopular pronouns in nominative case, including (72). (72)
…it was he who recommended that CPRE should be contacted. (W1B-020 117, business letter)
Akmajian (1970) suggests that such deviations from the expected pattern may result from the use of nominative case as a prestige form. This is certainly supported by the ICE-GB data. While all 5 tokens with objective pronouns occur in relatively informal, unplanned modes of communication, including direct conversation and social letters, nominative case marking is found in more formal and planned discourses, such as scripted broadcasts, published works and business letters (see Gómez-González and Gonzálvez-
The English it-cleft
99
García 2005: 165). However we choose to explain them, the case agreement facts do not represent a strong argument against an extraposition account of it-clefts; the fact remains that the person agreement data supports a discontinuous constituent account, such as the one argued for here. In contrast, number agreement is certainly problematic for this account. As shown in (73), the embedded verb does not agree in number with the singular pronoun it, but with the clefted constituent. In the corresponding th-cleft, on the other hand, the embedded verb also allows plural marking, but this is in agreement with both the clefted constituent and the plural head noun ones, shown in (74). (73)
It‟s John and Margaret who are responsible
(74)
The ones who are responsible are John and Margaret
It-clefts and pseudoclefts therefore have different patterns of number agreement (see also Huddleston 1984: 461). Of course, this is unexpected on a discontinuous constituent account, which views it-clefts in relation to other specificational inversion sentences. Nevertheless, in what follows, I show that we can provide something of an explanation for number agreement in it-clefts once we treat this discontinuous description as the semantic predicate. In Chapter 3, I argued for a class inclusion analysis of specificational inversion sentences, in which the precopular NP denotes a set (or type) and the postcopular NP specifies the individuals (or instances) that make it up. In (74) then, the precopular NP the ones who are responsible denotes a single set but, with regard to number, is conceived of in terms of its multiple entities or instances. The predicative NP of a specificational sentence is therefore interpreted in the same way as any other type of collective entity. As Croft (2001: 128) notes “a collective entity is conceptually both singular and plural; it is singular because it functions as a singular unit, but it is also plural in that it is made up of a multiplicity of individuals”. Alternative conceptualizations sometimes lead to variation and change. Croft (2001: 127) discusses the following example of a phenomenon which has now become a convention of the language. Here, a noun which refers to a collective entity is marked as singular, but is followed by a plural verb. (75)
Section 278 of the Highways Act 1980, therefore, provides that if a highway authority are satisfied that it would be of benefit to the public… (Croft 2001: 127)
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
It is possible then that the mixed pattern of agreement in it-clefts with plural foci is somehow related to the different ways of conceptualizing the discontinuous definite description. As shown in (73), while the verb in the relative clause is marked as plural (are), the copular verb of the matrix clause is consistently singular („s). We might argue then that while the matrix copula shows agreement with the singular set (marked as singular by it), the embedded verb agrees in number with the members of this set. This might sound opportunistic, but it is worth noting that a similar state of affairs is found in NP of NP constructions. For instance, in (76), the matrix verb has agrees with the singular noun group, while the verb are in the relative clause shows agreement with antecedent noun physicians. On this analysis then, (73) informs us that the set (of individuals who are responsible) is comprised of John and Margaret. (76)
The group of physicians who are responsible for this mix up has been ordered to disband.
In essence then, the cleft pronoun is underspecified for number, characterizing sets with singular and plural membership in the exact same way. The extraposed position of the cleft clause therefore provides the it-cleft with a useful function: it allows the speaker to withhold information about number until the act of specification is complete. For instance, in (77), the speaker contrasts plural referents (the tadpoles) with a singular entity (the frog), suggesting that both could potentially comprise the membership of the underspecified set. This becomes much more difficult when the speaker is forced to choose between a singular and plural head noun, show in (78). (77)
It‟s not the frog but the tadpoles which tell us the truth about our class system (S2B-036 044, BBC Radio 4 debate)
(78)
??The things which tell us the truth about our class system aren‟t the frog but the tadpoles
In addition, it is worth noting that there is variation in the it-cleft‟s number agreement pattern. Although not attested in the ICE-GB, some speakers allow the verb in the relative clause to be marked as singular (agreeing with it and the matrix copula) even when the clefted constituent is plural. For
The English it-cleft
101
instance, in my dialect, (79) is an equally acceptable alternative to (73) above.9 (79)
It’s John and Margaret that’s responsible for this
In conclusion then, number agreement is not an insurmountable obstacle to analysing the cleft clause as extraposed, relative to it. Once we treat the cleft it as a morphosyntactically singular, but conceptually underspecified pronoun, number agreement is understood to be a semantic phenomenon, with the verb in the cleft clause showing agreement with the membership of the described set. As I go on to show in Chapters 5 and 6, the analysis sketched here successfully accounts for the different agreement patterns of specificational and predicational it-clefts and is furthermore supported by historical evidence.
1.4.
Interim summary
Throughout Section 1, I have advanced and supported a discontinuous constituent (extraposition-from-NP) analysis of it-clefts on which the cleft pronoun and the cleft clause function together as a definite NP predicate. After demonstrating how this particular analysis follows neatly from the account of specificational copular sentences as involving a nominal predication relation in which the semantics and pragmatics of definiteness play an important part (outlined in Chapter 3), I went on to show that many of the
9. This is the pattern most often found in wh-clefts. Like the cleft it, what is inherently singular, but can be used to denote a set with plural membership. Typically, the verb in the cleft clause and the matrix copula agree with the singular what, as in (iv). However, other times the matrix copula shows agreement with the postcopular NP, as in (v). This suggests that, for both wh-clefts and it-clefts, the verb adjacent to what or it will be consistently marked as singular, while the verb which appears later in the sentence is subject to influence from the set‟s plural membership (which is made explicit by the postcopular NP). (iv) What has made this especially upsetting has been their constant reassurances and their lack of contrition (v)
What makes something a pencil are superficial characteristics such as a certain form and function (Partee 1998, citing Higgins p.c.)
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
it-cleft‟s functional and structural properties fall out from this analysis straightforwardly. In Section 1.2, I showed that a discontinuous constituent analysis of itclefts is very successful at both accounting for and explaining the construction‟s pragmatic properties. From this perspective, many of the it-cleft‟s pragmatic characteristics are inherited from the wider specificational inversion construction and conform to the general patterns of correspondence found in definite NPs. For instance, the fixed focus-structure of it-clefts was shown to follow from the analysis of specificational meaning as a reinterpretation (or information structural variant) of a class-inclusion predication relation. Likewise, once we invoke Hawkins‟ (1978, 1991) account of definiteness, the properties of presupposition, exhaustiveness and contrast are explained as products of the existential, inclusiveness and familiarity conditions associated with definite NPs. Section 1.3 examined the it-cleft‟s structural characteristics in relation to an extraposition-from-NP analysis. It was shown that the behaviour of the cleft clause and the it-cleft‟s person agreement patterns are consistent with, and acquire an explanation on, this type of account. Furthermore, the examination of so-called “constituency tests” revealed that it-clefts can be manipulated in many of the same ways as other sentences involving extraposed relatives. Finally, the number agreement data was identified as problematic for a discontinuous constituent account. Nevertheless, as shown in Section 1.3.3, we can account for inconsistencies in the way that number is marked in it-clefts once we adopt a predicational analysis of specificational sentences. On this type of analysis, the discontinuous description is semantically predicative, denoting a set of entities which can be conceptualized as both singular (in relation to the set) and plural (in relation to its members). As I explain in Chapter 5, this approach provides an illuminating way of accounting for differences between specificational and predicational it-clefts. First, however, in the remaining sections of this chapter, I situate my account in relation to the current cleft literature.
2.
A comparison with expletive accounts of it-clefts
As I explained in Chapter 1, expletive is the name given to it-cleft analyses which assume that the cleft clause is directly predicated of (or is in some other way related to) the clefted constituent. This accounts for the truthconditional equivalence between it-clefts, such as (80), and simple subjectpredicate sentences, such as (81).
A comparison with expletive accounts of it-clefts
(80)
It was Frank that complained
(81)
Frank complained
103
From this, it follows that the cleft pronoun and (in most accounts) the copular verb do not play an important role in the interpretation of the sentence. On expletive accounts then, the cleft it is invariably a semantically expletive element. It is this characteristic that gives this type of analysis its name. While all expletive accounts adopt this same set of basic assumptions, authors differ as to how they perceive the relationship between the cleft clause and the postcopular element and how they think this relationship comes about. Nevertheless, whether it is achieved underlyingly at deep structure (Rochemont 1986), via indexing at surface structure (Chomsky 1977; Heggie 1988; Williams 1980), as a result of lambda conversion at the level of logical form (Delahunty 1982, 1984), or through some combination of the above (É. Kiss 1998), these authors all assume that it-clefts share a level of representation with simple subject-predicate sentences. There is of course some evidence for the claim that the clefted element and the cleft clause form a constituent, including number agreement (see Section 1.3.3), VP-constituency tests (see Section 1.3.2) and possibly also syntactic connectedness (see Chapter 3, Section 4.3.2). However, in many ways, expletive accounts are not as successful as discontinuous constituent analyses at accounting for the it-cleft‟s characteristics, leaving a number of questions unresolved. Expletive accounts tend to take a syntax-centred approach to it-clefts. As a result, they rarely tackle the issue of how this construction acquires its pragmatic properties. In Section 1.2, I showed that the characteristics of existential presupposition, exhaustiveness and contrast result from the semantic contribution of the cleft it, which performs the same function as the definite article. However, the cleft pronoun is semantically empty on expletive accounts. Since the only contentful elements are those found in the corresponding noncopular sentence, no elements remain that could be said to generate these pragmatic properties. As a result, it is difficult, on an expletive account, to explain exactly how the it-cleft‟s meaning differs from that of its simple sentence paraphrase. For example, É. Kiss (1998) attempts to account for exhaustiveness in the syntax, as resulting from cleft structure. She claims that “exhaustive identification is a function of structural focus” (É. Kiss 1998: 251). Identificational focus (which expresses exhaustive identification) has a designated syntactic position, occupying the specifier slot of the focus phrase. In É.
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
Kiss‟ analysis, the clefted constituent occupies this scope position, thereby performing two important roles. Syntactically, the clefted constituent functions as an operator which “marks the sentence part following it and ccommanded by it as the scope of exhaustive identification” (É. Kiss 1998: 253). Semantically, the clefted element expresses the complete set of entities for which the predicate in the cleft clause holds. In this way, É. Kiss provides a syntactic explanation for the fact that it-clefts are associated with exhaustiveness. However, there are several problems with this account. For one thing, it is highly idiosyncratic. É. Kiss (1998: 258) assumes that exhaustiveness is dependent upon a syntactic structure which in English is particular to the itcleft configuration. However, we have seen, in Section 1.2.3 above, that exhaustiveness is found in other specificational copular constructions (which do not exhibit the cleft structure). Consequently, the account is unable to capture existing generalizations in the language. Secondly, not all types of cleft sentence are exhaustive (see Section 1.2.3). Non-exhaustive thereclefts represent an important exception to the claim that exhaustive identification is tied to cleft structure. Instead, they provide support for theories in which exhaustiveness is signalled by the cleft it. As shown in Section 1.1, the existence of non-exhaustive there-clefts as well as deictic demonstrative clefts represents strong evidence against the claim that the cleft it is semantically expletive, since a change in the cleft pronoun results in a concomitant change in meaning (see Hedberg 2000). Without recognizing the semantic contribution of the initial it (and its relation to the definite article), expletive analyses are unable to account for the it-cleft‟s pragmatic properties. The expletive analyses also struggle to account for some of the it-cleft‟s structural properties. As I explained in Section 1.3.1, the behaviour of the cleft clause is largely consistent with a restrictive relative analysis, if we assume that the cleft clause is relative to it. However, if we take the clefted constituent to be the antecedent, the cleft clause seems to exhibit a range of contradictory properties which make classification difficult. For some authors, the cleft clause shares only a superficial similarity to relative clauses; Delahunty (1982), Rochemont (1986) and Heggie (1988) argue that relative pronouns, like who, only occur in the cleft clause as a result of analogy with relative clauses. Others, including Chomsky (1977) and Williams (1980), suggest that the cleft clause has the same internal structure as a restrictive relative but, since the cleft clause does not restrictively modify its immediate antecedent, it is said to perform a different function from other restrictive relatives.
A comparison with expletive accounts of it-clefts
105
On expletive accounts then, the cleft clause cannot be classed with any known clause type. Although the cleft clause looks and behaves in many ways like a restrictive relative, it is really a non-modifying sentential predicate. From this, it follows that the cleft clause is a structurally unique type of clause, specific to the cleft configuration. However, the expletive accounts seem to be missing an important generalization here. If the cleft clause is structured internally like a restrictive relative, then the chances are it also has a modifying function. If this clause does not modify the clefted constituent then we have to ask, what does it modify? The discontinuous constituent account provides us with a suitable answer: the cleft clause restrictively modifies the cleft pronoun it. Person agreement data is also problematic for expletive accounts. As I explained in Section 1.3.3, the verb in the cleft clause typically shows agreement with the third person pronoun it, rather than with the clefted constituent, shown in (82), repeated from (68). Such data is especially awkward for expletive accounts which invoke movement to extract the clefted constituent out of the cleft clause, including Rochemont (1986), since these examples do not have corresponding noncopular paraphrases, demonstrated in (83). (82)
It is me who is responsible
(83)
*Me is responsible
(Akmajian 1970: 150)
In order to accommodate this data, É. Kiss (1998: 259), whose main argument requires movement, suggests that the clefted constituent can also be base-generated in the postcopular position and coindexed with the whpronoun in the cleft clause. Nevertheless, while expletive analyses invoking the base-generation strategy can cope with the person agreement data, this is still suggestive of an alternative account. In sum, it seems that expletive accounts have less explanatory potential than the extraposition-from-NP account argued for in Section 1.1. Once we treat the cleft clause and the cleft pronoun as forming a discontinuous definite description, the it-cleft‟s pragmatic and structural characteristics become less mysterious and are found to be consistent with what we know about other types of specificational construction as well as definite noun phrases and restrictive relative clauses, more generally. By maximizing correspondence between it-clefts and their noncopular paraphrases, expletive accounts cannot capitalize on these generalizations. From this perspective,
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
it-clefts cannot be easily incorporated into a unified analysis of specificational copular constructions. Heggie‟s (1988) work is exceptional in that it does attempt to integrate an expletive account of it-clefts into a general theory of copular sentences. Assuming an inverse analysis of specificational sentences, Heggie claims that all copular constructions involve predication of some sort. Since most expletive accounts assume that the cleft clause is predicated of the clefted element, Heggie maintains that it-clefts are like other copular sentences. For Heggie, the copula is a raising verb which takes a small clause complement. It functions as a “verbal operator”, creating a predicate out of any phrasal category via coindexing. This index then “spreads” to the subject of the small clause via predication (following Williams 1980). In the case of the it-cleft then, the cleft clause becomes the predicate and the clefted constituent functions as the subject of the small clause. However, there is an important difficulty with Heggie‟s analysis. On the inverse account, specificational copular sentences always involve nominal predication. If it-clefts are a subtype of specificational copular sentence, it follows that these too should involve nominal predication (see Section 1.1). Assuming an expletive account, however, it-clefts involve a unique form of predication. Consequently, Heggie (1988: 183) makes the verbal operator function so unrestricted that it “allows be to create small clause structures which do not exist in any other context”, such as the CP-small clause found in it-clefts. For Heggie then, it-clefts are like other specificational copular sentences in that they involve predication. However, since they do not share the same type of predication, it is difficult to see what is gained from this unified analysis. Without the assumption that nominal predication generates specificational meaning in all such constructions, Heggie‟s account does not benefit from the key generalization that it-clefts contain definite descriptions. Thus, despite Heggie‟s (1988) attempt, expletive analyses are not well-suited to being incorporated into a general theory of specificational copular sentences. As I see it then, the main problem with the expletive approach is that it does not prioritize the relation between it-clefts and other specificational constructions. While these authors may recognize that it-clefts are a subtype of specificational copular sentence, this fact does not form the basis of their analyses.10 By examining it-clefts in relation to structurally 10. Den Dikken‟s recent work may represent an exception to this claim. He treats it-clefts as specificational inversion sentences (as do I). On his account, the initial it is a (meaningless) pro-predicate (which has undergone inversion) and
A comparison with extraposition accounts of it-clefts
107
less complex sentences, expletive accounts overlook the useful generalizations that exist at a local level in the hierarchy. As Hedberg (1990: 35) observes, “nothing is what it seems” on an expletive approach.
3.
A comparison with other extraposition accounts of it-clefts
The discontinuous constituent account argued for in Section 1.1 is therefore in many ways more successful than expletive accounts at providing explanations for the it-cleft‟s characteristics. But how does this particular analysis measure up to more similar accounts? In what follows, I show how this analysis compares to other accounts which assume that the cleft clause is related to the cleft pronoun in some way. I begin by outlining some of the early extraposition accounts of the 1970s before focusing on more recent discontinuous constituent accounts. I show that while my analysis draws heavily from this literature, capturing many of the same insights, it provides a novel perspective from which to explore the crucial role that definite descriptions play in it-clefts.
3.1.
The early extraposition accounts of the 1970s
The extraposition approach to it-clefts became especially popular during the transformational tradition of the 1970s. Within this decade, a number of analyses were developed which derived it-clefts from pseudocleft sources via extraposition. For example, Akmajian (1970) derives it-clefts from their corresponding wh-clefts, shown in (84) and (85). For Akmajian, wh-clefts differ from th-clefts like (86), in that the wh-clause is a “headless” relative, and so does not function as a full NP (see the discussion in Bolinger 1972). (84)
It was a car that John bought
the clefted constituent is the underlying subject. The clefted constituent is structurally related to the cleft clause via asyndetic specification (not predication). On this analysis, the cleft clause is a base-generated, right-dislocated, free relative containing a radically empty null head which enters into a concord relationship with the clefted element. Den Dikken (2009: 22) concludes that “all specificational copular sentences have a predicational source”. Nevertheless, since on this account, the it-cleft‟s specificational meaning does not arise via nominal predication, den Dikken does not consider the role of definiteness in such sentences.
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
(85)
What John bought was a car
(86)
The thing that John bought was a car (examples from Akmajian 1970)
Akmajian claims that these wh-clauses are generated in the structure given as (87) below (where what is associated with something). He then invokes a construction-specific Cleft-Extraposition Rule which extraposes the initial clause of the wh-cleft to the end of the sentence, “leaving the it in subject position” (Akmajian 1970: 161). In some cases, such as (84) above, the whrelative must also be replaced by that (Akmajian 1970: 164). (87)
[it [John bought something]] ( → what John bought) (Akmajian 1970: 161)
As I see it, Akmajian‟s account misses a crucial generalization: the cleft it, what and the thing all function as the article and head noun of definite descriptions. On this analysis, the extraposition of the wh-clause of a whcleft results in a right-dislocated wh-cleft rather than an it-cleft. Gundel (1977) agrees, and provides an analysis in which it-clefts are derived from right-dislocated structures. In right-dislocated wh-clefts, it acts as a pronominal reference to the right-dislocated fused relative, shown in (89). For Gundel, it-clefts are derived by an optional, construction-specific Variable Head Deletion rule.11 This rule deletes the head element of the compound pronoun what as well as the intervening sentence boundary between the dislocated clause and the postcopular element. The result, Gundel claims, is an it-cleft containing a sentence-final restrictive relative and a referential subject (it) that acts as a pronominal copy for the dislocated constituent, shown in (90). (88)
What you heard was an explosion
(89)
It was an explosion, what you heard
(90)
It was an explosion that you heard (examples from Gundel 1977: 543)
11. Gundel (1977: 557) acknowledges that her Variable Head Deletion rule “has no independent motivation in English, and the fact that it can apply only in ID [specificational] structures is admittedly suspicious”.
A comparison with extraposition accounts of it-clefts
109
For both Akmajian (1970) and Gundel (1977) then, the cleft clause is a headless relative clause and the cleft pronoun is a semantically redundant placemarker or pronominal copy for the extraposed (or dislocated) clause. However, there are two other transformational analyses which argue (as I do) that the cleft clause forms a definite description with the cleft it. For example, Wirth (1978) derives it-clefts (and wh-clefts) from copular sentences whose subjects contain relative clauses with the head nouns one or thing, as in (91). These (th-cleft) structures undergo extraposition, shown in (92), before restricted nominal reduction applies, which deletes the head noun. Since the cannot occur without a following noun, shown in (93), it must be inserted instead. Wirth (1978: 60) claims that it is a “syntactic variant” of the, appearing when there is no head noun in the NP. (91)
The thing which (that) struck the house was lightening
(92)
The thing was lightening which (that) struck the house
(93)
It(*The) was lightening which (that) struck the house (examples adapted from Wirth 1978)
Wirth (1978) therefore recognizes the relationship between the cleft it and the definite article and invokes a rule of extraposition-from-NP (rather than extraposition of the NP). From this, it follows that the cleft clause forms a discontinuous description with the subject element. However, Wirth also makes use of a similar head deletion rule to Gundel (1977). On Wirth‟s account then, the cleft it does not really function as the antecedent noun of the cleft clause. In contrast, Bolinger (1972) suggests (as do I) that the cleft pronoun restrictively modifies the pronoun it. For Bolinger, itclefts are derived from the same rule of “inversion” (essentially extraposition-from-NP) that creates the structure in (94). This rule “inverts” the restrictive relative clause of the analytic compound relative in (95), leaving the nominal head in initial position. (94)
That was money which (that) he stole
(95)
That which he stole was money
From this, it follows that the it-cleft in (96) is derived from the structure in (97). Here, it functions as the nominal head of the restrictive relative that he stole. While inversion is optional for (95), it applies obligatorily “when the nominal of the main clause is it”, as in (97) (Bolinger 1972: 110).
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
(96)
It was money that he stole
(97)
*It that he stole was money
3.2.
The more recent discontinuous constituent accounts
(examples from Bolinger 1972: 109)
Bolinger‟s (1972) and Wirth‟s (1978) transformational analyses therefore represent forerunners of the discontinuous constituent account of it-clefts.12 This type of analysis has gained renewed interest in recent years, resulting in a number of different versions of this approach. For example, Percus (1997) derives it-clefts from an underlying structure containing a definite determiner and a null head, shown in (98b). The relative clause of this structure is then extraposed, before the DP (containing the definite article and CP trace) is realized as it at morphological spell-out, shown in (98d). On this account then, it is not restrictively modified by the cleft clause; instead it substitutes for a complete DP. (98)
a. It is [JOHN] F that Mary saw. b. [IP [DP the 0 [CP OPi that Mary saw ti]]j [VP tj is John]] c. Extraposition [[IP [DP the 0 tk]j [VP tj is John]] [CP OPi that Mary saw ti]k] d. It is John that Mary saw Spell-Out: [DP the 0 tk] It (Percus 1997: 338)
Percus provides support for his analysis by identifying several properties which it-clefts share with specificational sentences containing definite NPs, including existential presuppositions and exhaustiveness (see Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3). He claims that all such sentences are semantically equative, containing a different copula from that occurring in predicational sentences. Percus (1997: 376) notes that while the latter relates an individual and a predicate and does not allow inversion, the former allows inversion, selecting “two arguments of the type of individuals” with the restriction 12. Other early analyses which foreshadow later discontinuous constituent accounts include Jespersen‟s (1927) “transposition theory” (see Chapter 1, Section 2.2) and also Fowler and Fowler‟s (1908) discussion of it…that. For instance, Fowler and Fowler analyse the it-cleft It is money that I want in relation to the sentence It (the thing) that I want is money, where the “antecedent „it‟ followed by a defining relative clause with „that‟...gives us the subject of a predication”.
A comparison with extraposition accounts of it-clefts
111
that “one of its syntactic arguments be a Du [unknown individual]” (cf. Declerck 1988; Chapter 3, footnote 16). Hedberg‟s (2000: 894) analysis is based on the claim that definite NPs are comprised of two parts: “an INDEXICAL component, which is expressed by the determiner head and determines the relation of the referent to the context, and a DESCRIPTIVE component, which is expressed by its nominal complement and describes the referent” (emphasis original). For Hedberg (2000: 898), “it is analyzed as an allomorph of the”. In it-clefts then, the cleft pronoun functions as the definite article head (the indexical component) of the DP, while the cleft clause comprises the descriptive component. This is shown in (99) and (100), where the descriptive component is highlighted in bold. (99)
[DP [D the] [NP [NP dog] [PP next door]]]
(100)
[DP [D it]…[CP who won]]
(examples from Hedberg 2000: 898)
Hedberg (2000: 898) claims that the definite article is realized as it as a consequence of the extraposed position of the cleft clause; that is, “when no descriptive content (NP or CP) immediately follows”.13 On Hedberg‟s account, the “complement clause” of the subject DP is extraposed into a position internal to another DP inside the VP, shown in (101). The cleft clause is therefore syntactically adjoined to the clefted constituent “in the position of a nonrestrictive relative clause” (Hedberg 2000: 915).14 (101)
[IP [DP [D it]]i [I' [I wask] [VP [DP [DP Max] [CPi [whoj] [C' tj won]]]]]]
For Hedberg (2000) then, the cleft clause is semantically related to the cleft pronoun, but forms a syntactic constituent with the clefted element, inside the VP. This allows Hedberg to capture (most of) the generalizations afforded by a discontinuous constituent account, without coming up against Delahunty‟s (1982) VP constituency evidence. However, as was shown in Section 1.3.2, it-clefts behave like other sentences containing extraposed 13. This aspect of Hedberg‟s analysis is not supported by the historical evidence. In earlier periods of the language, the pronoun it sometimes occurs as the immediate antecedent of a restrictive relative (see Chapter 6). 14. Hedberg (1990) offers a different syntactic analysis, in which the cleft clause (analysed as a restrictive relative) adjoins to an embedded VP rather than a DP. Nevertheless, on both accounts, the cleft clause forms a constituent with the clefted element within VP, following Delahunty (1982).
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
relatives in relation to most of these constituency tests (see also Hedberg 1990). Consequently, they do not seem to function as a pressing reason for positing a construction-specific and very complex type of extraposition (see Hedberg 2000: 913). As a result of her syntactic analysis, Hedberg analyses the cleft clause as nonrestrictive, relative to the clefted constituent. I argued against this position in Section 1.3.1. Hedberg offers a similarly manifold analysis of the it-cleft‟s semantics. She suggests (as I do) that while the clefted constituent is a type e referring expression denoting individuals, the discontinuous constituent is of a higher type, which is consistent with its analysis as either a predicate (type ) or as a generalized quantifier (type ,t>) (Hedberg 2000: 917). However, elsewhere in her paper, Hedberg (2000: 898) describes the combination of cleft pronoun and cleft clause as “a discontinuous referring expression” (emphasis added) and she makes use of a separate “identificational copula” to obtain a specificational, rather than a predicational, interpretation (Hedberg 2000: 916). As I explained in Chapter 3, Section 1.1, the “two be” approach is typical of equative rather than inverse accounts of specificational sentences. In subsequent work, Han and Hedberg (2008) propose an analysis of itclefts within the framework of Tree Adjoining Grammar. Like Hedberg (2000), their aim is to “capture the best of both” the extraposition and expletive accounts (Han and Hedberg 2008: 345). In order to do this, these authors exploit the machinery of Tree Adjoining Grammar, which provides structures with both a derived tree, which represents surface constituency, and a derivation tree, which represents semantic composition and syntactic dependencies (Han and Hedberg 2008: 355). Han and Hedberg suggest that the cleft clause is syntactically adjoined to the clefted constituent in the derived tree, while the cleft clause and the cleft pronoun form a syntactic and semantic unit in the derivation tree (represented by placing elementary trees for them in a multi-component set). Han and Hedberg suggest that this analysis reflects the parallelism between it-clefts and copular sentences with definite descriptions, while accounting for evidence that favours an expletive account, such as VP constituency and number agreement. However, although their grammatical model allows it, the fact remains that the syntactic and the semantic structure of it-clefts are very much at odds with one another on this account. Han and Hedberg (2008) also adopt an equative account of specificational it-clefts, in which an “equative copula” takes two DP arguments, shown in (102). I return to Han and Hedberg‟s analysis in Chapter 5, where I show
A comparison with extraposition accounts of it-clefts
113
that an equative account is not actually capable of explaining the it-cleft‟s number agreement properties. (102)
THEz [won(z)] [z = Ohno] (It was Ohno who won) (Han and Hedberg 2008: 349)
Reeve (2010, 2012) has also proposed a two-tiered analysis of it-clefts. He suggests that the cleft clause is a restrictive relative which semantically modifies the cleft pronoun but syntactically modifies the clefted element. Reeve presents a syntactic analysis which is essentially parallel to Hedberg (2000); that is, the cleft clause is adjoined to the clefted element within DP. For Reeve, however, there is no relation of extraposition between the cleft clause and it. In support of this analysis, Reeve claims that the cleft clause behaves more like other relatives modifying VP-internal DPs than relatives modifying subject DPs.15 This begs the question, how can the cleft clause ever “be interpreted as restricting the reference of it” (Reeve 2011: 170).
15. For instance, Reeve (2010: 56–57) suggests that it-clefts with reduced relatives, such as (vi) pattern with object relatives rather than subject relatives. While many authors have observed that extraposed relatives cannot normally be reduced, shown in (vii), Reeve claims that this is only true for subject relatives, providing the grammatical example (of a reduced extraposed object relative) in (viii) (see also Reeve 2012: 39). (vi)
It was John [sitting outside]
(vii) *A man came in to the room [now sitting outside] (viii) I saw a man yesterday [now sitting outside] (examples from Reeve 2010: 57) However, this data is not straightforward, since the intervening element in (viii) is not comparable to that in (vii). Once we put a concrete NP between the extraposed clause and its antecedent, as in (ix), the reduced object relative becomes less grammatical. Furthermore, extraposed subject relatives become more acceptable in contexts without this intervening NP, as in (x). This suggests that the restrictions on extraposed reduced relatives are based on gardenpath ambiguities, which the it-cleft is not subject to (see also Section 1.3.1). (ix)
??I saw a man in the room [now sitting outside]
(x)
?A man came in (yesterday) [now sitting outside]
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
As a solution to this problem, Reeve claims that relative clauses have two licensing conditions, one thematic and one syntactic, which in it-clefts are licensed by different DPs (the cleft it and the clefted constituent, respectively). In order to satisfy both conditions, the cleft clause undergoes obligatory extraposition to VP and the two licensers are related through semantic equation. Reeve (2012: 4) suggests that specificational sentences “contain a functional head,...Eq(uative), in the extended verbal projection” which semantically “equates the denotations of the two DPs”. On this account, the cleft pronoun and the clefted element are of the same semantic type (e.g. type e). It therefore follows that while the cleft clause is said to semantically modify the initial it, the pronoun alone comprises a complete, referring DP. For Reeve then, the it-cleft is a noncompositional configuration; there exists a mismatch between the semantics and the syntax which is difficult to reconcile.
3.3.
A different extraposition account?
In this section, we have seen that the account of it-clefts developed in this chapter follows a long tradition of treating the cleft clause as being in some way related to the cleft pronoun. However, not all of these accounts assume (as I do) that the cleft clause and the cleft pronoun form a discontinuous definite description, including Akmajian (1970) and Gundel (1977). Of the ones that do, not all claim (as I do) that the initial it is restrictively modified by the cleft clause, including Hedberg (2000), Percus (1997) and Wirth (1978). Furthermore, many of the more recent accounts, such as Han and Hedberg (2008) Hedberg (2000) and Reeve (2010), claim that the cleft clause also forms a syntactic constituent with the clefted element. For these authors then, the it-cleft configuration is not a straightforward case of extraposition-from-NP (as I have argued). Consequently, the analysis presented here is perhaps most similar to Bolinger‟s (1972) transformational account (see Section 3.1). As I explained in Section 3.2, the most recent discontinuous constituent accounts combine elements of both extraposition and expletive analyses in order to account for the it-cleft‟s contradictory properties. However, it is often difficult to see how the two disparate aspects of these analyses come together under a cohesive account. As we have seen, the “best of both” approach results in some very complicated analyses, which invoke a host of construction-specific devices to sanction the it-cleft‟s distinctive behaviour. Consequently, it might be better to account for some of these phenomena in
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different ways. In this book, I maintain a fairly uncomplicated analysis of the it-cleft as an extraposition-from-NP construction. I provide new evidence in support of this analysis from a variety of sources and show that much of the more challenging data is not actually inconsistent with this account, once viewed from a different perspective (see especially Chapter 6). It is also interesting to observe that most of the discontinuous constituent accounts have assumed that it-clefts are semantically equative (Bolinger 1972; Han and Hedberg 2008; Percus 1997; Reeve 2010, 2012). Instead, I have incorporated it-clefts into an inverse analysis of specificational sentences which suggests that the concept of definiteness plays a fundamental role in the creation of specificational meaning. This account of specificational copular sentences provides strong support for analysing it-clefts as containing discontinuous definite NP predicates. Thus, while many authors have identified points of similarity between it-clefts and specificational sentences containing definite NPs, the analysis of specificational meaning as a class inclusion relation (along with Hawkins‟ 1978, 1991 conceptualization of definiteness), gives an account of how these shared properties come about (see Section 1 and also Chapter 3).
4.
A comparison with other constructional accounts of it-clefts
The analysis developed throughout this chapter is presented within the framework of construction grammar. As I explained in Chapter 1, the itcleft is especially well-suited to this treatment, since construction grammar was designed to account for specialized linguistic patterns which do not conform to highly general grammatical “rules”. A constructional approach encourages us to find generalizations at a more local level. For instance, when examined in relation to a small family of related constructions, the itcleft is shown to inherit properties from more basic schemas (specifically, the specificational inversion construction) and to conform to the behaviour of definite NPs and restrictive relatives, more generally. A constructional approach is also useful in that it anticipates that the grammar contains some measure of idiosyncratic information (see Chapter 2). As shown in Section 1.1, once we (momentarily) factor out the non-standard use of it and the restrictive modification of a detached, pronominal element as constructionspecific properties, our analysis of English it-clefts becomes far more straightforward, allowing the relevant generalizations to be made. However, there are other constructional accounts of it-clefts in the literature which are very different from that argued for here. In what follows,
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
I show that while each of these accounts makes reference to some of the basic claims and concepts that underlie the constructional framework, they overlook some of the explanatory objectives which the theory was designed to meet. For example, Lambrecht (2001) puts forward an expletive account of itclefts, which is largely based on Jespersen‟s (1937) analysis. Specifically, Lambrecht (2001: 472) agrees with Jespersen that “the sequence it is…and the connective pronoun or marker (when present) do not enter fully into the semantic composition of the sentence”. For Lambrecht (2001: 470) then, the it-cleft‟s main function is as a syntactic focusing device, with it and be providing the pragmatic role of “focus marker” (see also Section 1.2.1). On his account, the gap in the cleft clause is coindexed with the clefted constituent and the cleft clause is a kind of nonrestrictive relative, in that it has the internal structure of a restrictive relative clause but does not modify its antecedent (see also Section 1.3.1). In this way, Lambrecht (2001: 473) simply extends the taxonomy of relative clauses to encompass the specific type of clause found in it-clefts. Lambrecht (2001: 466) claims that his approach is constructional, in that the it-cleft is treated as a noncompositional configuration, with properties that “require independent explanation”. For instance, on his account, the itcleft involves a complexity mismatch, expressing “a simple proposition via biclausal syntax” (Lambrecht 2001: 466), it contains a construction-specific type of relative clause, and it has pragmatic properties which are associated with the construction as a whole (rather than attributed to any individual component). Lambrecht‟s analysis is therefore constructional in the sense that he believes, as I do, that the concept and architecture of the construction is extremely useful for the study of specialized linguistic patterns, such as the it-cleft. However, while Lambrecht extends his analysis to pseudoclefts (arguing that initial what and the one are also semantically inert dummy elements, see Chapter 3, Section 4.3), he does not situate the it-cleft within a hierarchical network of constructions and does not exploit a system of inheritance. As Goldberg notes, constructional taxonomies are organized in a way that prioritizes similarities of surface form (Goldberg 2006: 23) and aspects of meaning that go beyond truth-conditional synonymy (Goldberg 1995: 103). By examining it-clefts in relation to truth-conditional paraphrases which are both formally and functionally less complex, Lambrecht‟s account does not identify (what I believe are) the key generalizations shared among the family of copular constructions, and instead emphasizes the itcleft‟s idiosyncratic and irregular properties.
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117
Unlike Lambrecht, Davidse (2000) does not assume that it-clefts are semantically equivalent to their noncopular counterparts and instead claims that both the matrix clause and cleft clause contribute to the construction‟s representational semantics. For Davidse, the matrix clause is an identifying clause; in other words, it functions as a specificational copular sentence. Using Halliday‟s (1967) terminology, Davidse labels the pronoun it as the identified and the clefted constituent as the identifier. In many ways, this is akin to a value-variable relation. As Davidse (2000: 1121) comments, “The identified can be likened to the unknown „x‟ in a mathematical equation and the identifier to its actual value in that equation”. Davidse (2000: 1125) suggests that the definite pronoun it also performs a quantifying role, imposing “an exhaustively specifying value onto the complement of be” via equation. The relative clause then takes this complement (which has been exhaustively quantified) as its antecedent, incorporating it into a value-variable relation, as defined by Declerck (1988). In other words, the clefted element constitutes the specific value, or total set of instances, for the variable or “entity involved in the situation designated by the relative clause” (Davidse 2000: 1125). Davidse (2000: 1128) provides evidence that the cleft clause is neither a restrictive nor a nonrestrictive relative and concludes that the relationship between the cleft clause and its antecedent has a “special status”. Davidse‟s constructional account is therefore much more compositional than Lambrecht‟s (2001), but is in many ways just as idiosyncratic. Like Lambrecht, she argues that it-clefts “can and should be analyzed as constructions in their own right” (Davidse 2000: 1124). This leads Davidse to claim that it-clefts contain a construction-specific type of relative clause and that they are properly biclausal, with each clause entering into a different semantic relationship with the clefted constituent. Davidse (2000: 1127) concludes that it-clefts “do not simply express specification - …they SPECIFY…INSTANCES AS VALUES CORRESPONDING TO A VARIABLE” (emphasis original). On Davidse‟s account then, specificational meaning is marked twice: once by the identifying matrix clause and once by the valuevariable relationship expressed by the relative clause. However, aside from being uneconomical, this is also unnecessary: it increases the complexity of the it-cleft structure in a way that is not supported by inheritance from the language system. Pavey‟s (2004) Role and Reference Grammar analysis also makes use of the construction as a unit of grammatical knowledge. Following Declerck (1988), Pavey suggests that it-clefts involve a value-variable relationship, in which the postcopular element provides the value for the variable
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It-clefts as specificational copular sentences
described by the cleft clause. She notes that “the relationship between the cleft clause and the rest of the it-cleft construction results in a „sens global particulier‟ that will be characterized differently from both restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses” (Pavey 2004: 201). For the matrix clause, Pavey adopts a simple predicational structure, in which the postcopular referring expression acts as a kind of pragmatic predicate (a concept borrowed from Lambrecht (1994: 231)). She claims that that the “clefted constituent value „modifies‟ the variable expressed by the cleft clause [and]…assists the hearer in making a full identification of the underspecified argument in the cleft clause” (Pavey 2004: 200). The syntactic argument of this postcopular predicate is the non-referring cleft pronoun, which, for Pavey, serves only to reflect the main specificational function of the sentence. On Pavey‟s (2004) account then, the it-cleft is a highly idiosyncratic construction. Not only is the syntactic predicate a referring expression and the syntactic argument a non-referring pronoun, but, the clefted constituent is also a pragmatic predicate, involved in a relation of identification (rather than predication) with the presupposed cleft clause. For Pavey (2003: 12) then, “the structure, meaning and function of it-clefts is particularly complex since there is no straightforwardly isomorphic link between the various elements at the syntactic, semantic and the pragmatic level”. On top of this, the cleft clause is related to the rest of the sentence in a way that is both syntactically and semantically idiosyncratic and the cleft it has a construction-specific meaning. Pavey (2004: 254) makes use of the concept of the construction primarily as a way of housing these idiosyncratic properties; she notes that “These idiosyncrasies of the construction require special conditions and these are stated in the constructional template”. Pavey‟s reliance on construction-specific phenomena is to some extent unexpected, since she views the it-cleft, as I do, “as one of a „family‟ of copular constructions, and as a specificational construction in particular” (Pavey 2004: 189). Nevertheless, Pavey (2004: 187) notes that her it-cleft analysis is not consistent with either equative or inverse accounts of specificational sentences. Furthermore, the it-cleft is syntactically distinct, since “it does not contain two noun phrases connected by the copula” (Pavey 2004: 185).16 For Pavey then, the only thing that it-clefts share with other 16. This syntactic difference is also present in Declerck‟s (1988) original analysis. He notes that while the subject NP of a specificational NP be NP sentence contains a variable x, shown as the head noun in (xi), the x variable is not represented in the it-cleft‟s syntactic form. In such sentences, the clefted ele-
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specificational sentences is a pragmatic (rather than semantic) predicational (or rather identifying) function (see above). The accounts of Lambrecht (2001), Davidse (2000) and Pavey (2004) are therefore constructional in the sense that the it-cleft is recognized as having the status of a construction; that is, it is treated as a conventional unit of linguistic knowledge containing construction-internal mappings between form and meaning (see Chapter 2). However, since these authors do not invoke inheritance, or look for significant pattern resemblances with more basic constructions, the it-cleft is not properly situated in the language network. This leads Lambrecht, Davidse and Pavey to stipulate a lot of idiosyncratic information, without showing how the it-cleft construction is motivated. As Goldberg (2003: 118) comments, “a given construction often shares a great deal with other constructions that exist in a language; only certain aspects of its form and function are unaccounted for by other constructions”. Therefore, despite popular misconceptions, the constructional framework neither supports nor encourages highly idiosyncratic analyses of extremely noncompositional structures. In accordance with the principles of construction grammar, the approach undertaken in this work seeks to maximize inheritance from the language system, emphasizing both formal and functional correspondences between it-clefts and other, more basic constructions. The more properties a construction inherits, the more we can say that the construction is motivated (see Chapter 2, Section 2). In other words, the it-cleft is properly integrated into, and is therefore supported by, a network of related constructions. Only after examining it-clefts in relation to the rest of the grammar should the exceptional or truly construction-specific characteristics be isolated – and even these should ideally be provided with an explanation of some sort (see Goldberg 2003: 121). Following this model trajectory, we begin, in the remaining chapters, to examine some aspects of the it-cleft construction that require explanation (or rather motivation) from outside of the family of specificational copular sentences.
ment provides the value for the variable described by the cleft clause, shown in (xii) (Declerck 1988: 185). (xi) The one(x) that complained was Frank (xii) It was Frank that complained
Chapter 5 Other varieties of it-cleft
1.
Beyond the archetypal it-cleft
In Chapter 4, the it-cleft construction was integrated into an inverse account of specificational copular sentences, outlined in Chapter 3. On this analysis, the cleft clause is an extraposed restrictive relative which modifies the definite pronoun it to form a definite description; this discontinuous constituent is predicated of the postcopular referring expression, which (due to a fixed information structure) is interpreted as constituting the membership of the described set. With this analysis in place, many of the it-cleft‟s properties were shown to be inherited from the specificational inversion construction and to conform to the behaviour of definite NPs more generally. However, there are some varieties of it-cleft that have fewer properties in common with the family of specificational copular constructions. In what follows, I show how the analysis developed so far can be extended to accommodate these different varieties of it-cleft, before going on to ask how they are motivated, if not by inheritance from the larger specificational schema. As I explained in Chapter 1, not all of the tokens which appear to be itclefts have a specificational meaning – some have a predicational meaning instead. In these tokens, known as predicational and/or proverbial it-clefts, the clefted constituent provides descriptive rather than specifying information. For instance, (1) describes the image presented in the poem as a beautiful image. Likewise, the proverbial token in (2) advises that roads which have no turnings are long roads. As a proverb, it provides reassurance that a life without some surprises (good or bad) is very monotonous; in other words, we can expect to experience difficult times if we want to live a full life. (1)
He asks God to “disperse these mists, which blot and fill My perspective still as they pass; Or else remove me hence unto that hill Where I shall need no glass”. It is a beautiful image which is presented here, it is one of longing. (W1A-018 061, student examination script)
(2)
It is a long road that has no turning
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Such examples have often been regarded as forming a structurally distinct sentence type, which is only superficially related to the specificational itcleft. However, in Section 2, we will see that accounts which examine itclefts in relation to other copular constructions anticipate the existence of predicational it-clefts and that a discontinuous constituent account lends itself well to both the specificational and predicational varieties of the construction. Another domain of variation concerns the range of elements that can occur in the postcopular position of specificational it-clefts. So far, our focus has been exclusively on sentences of the type NP be NP. However, while the predicative expression of a specificational copular sentence is always nominal, the referring expression does not have to be. All specificational constructions, including it-clefts, allow a variety of phrasal categories to occur in this position, as demonstrated by the PP-focus it-cleft in (3). (3)
It was to the Corkscrew that I directed my steps (W2F-011 009, fiction)
However, since the same range of potential focal elements is not shared by the different specificational constructions, this property cannot be attributed to inheritance. Nevertheless, in Section 3, I show that an inverse account is very good at explaining why some elements make better it-cleft foci than others and I suggest that historical evidence may be useful in showing how a construction-specific category of it-cleft foci has emerged. There is further variation in the discourse-status of the cleft clause. Typically, this component expresses discourse-old information. A very clear example is given in (4). Here, the fact that someone communicates about the threat of war is given in the immediate discourse. (4)
Who communicates about the threat and for what purposes? The answer is extremely simple. It is domestic politicians who communicate about the threat in order to mobilise public support for their own policy and power base. (W2A-017 030, academic writing)
However, in some cases, the cleft clause contains brand-new information. For instance, the it-cleft in (5), from Birner, Kaplan, and Ward (2007: 323), occurs as “the first sentence of a newspaper article and…could also felicitously begin a history lecture”. Here, the information in the relative clause is not given in the previous discourse and the proposition, that Lewis and Clark reached the Pacific Ocean, may not even be known to the intended
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Other varieties of it-cleft
audience. Instead, such sentences often function to inform the header/reader of a brand-new, yet presupposed, proposition. (5)
It was 200 years ago this month that Lewis and Clark reached the Pacific Ocean (Chicago Tribune, 23/11/05 [Birner, Kaplan, and Ward 2007: 323])
I discuss these examples, labelled informative-presupposition it-clefts by Prince (1978), in Section 4. Here, I suggest that other specificational constructions do not occur with brand-new information in the predicative NP and conclude that this construction-specific property cannot be inherited from the specificational inversion construction – a claim which is somewhat at odds with the views of Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001). Instead, I suggest that, to explain how IP it-clefts are motivated, we need to conduct a diachronic investigation.
2.
Predicational (and proverbial) it-clefts1
Perhaps because they are less common than their specificational counterparts, predicational (and proverbial) it-clefts are rarely discussed in the cleft literature and many authors do not recognize them. For example, Gundel (1977: 547) claims that the specificational-predicational distinction is not applicable to it-clefts, which “can only have an ID [identifying] interpretation”. Furthermore, authors who do discuss these predicational tokens often treat them as forming a distinct and unrelated sentence-type. For example, Ball (1977: 68) claims that predicational (including proverbial) it-clefts are “superficially similar but syntactically unrelated” to specificational it-clefts. Likewise, Lambrecht (2001: 502–503), who discusses only the proverbial examples, suggests that they cannot be analysed as true cleft sentences. Declerck (1983b, 1988) provides a more complicated analysis, in that he treats proverbial and predicational it-clefts as separate constructions. While the proverbial examples are said to “represent a type of their own, different from genuine clefts” (Declerck 1983b: 16), Declerck integrates the nonproverbial predicational tokens into his analysis of specificational it-clefts, all the time maintaining that the it-cleft is “essentially specificational in nature” (Declerck 1983b: 18). 1. The analysis and arguments put forward in this section were originally presented as a conference paper at the Cleft08 workshop, Berlin (see Patten 2008).
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123
In what follows, I claim that this treatment of the predicational examples as distinct from the it-cleft proper (or as somehow “partly specificational”), stems from the fact that these authors (Ball 1977; Declerck 1983b, 1988; Lambrecht 2001) adopt an expletive approach, which struggles to account for the predicational it-cleft data. I explain that a discontinuous constituent analysis is, in contrast, well-suited to the treatment of predicational it-clefts and show that the existence of a predicational variety is expected on (and so supports) an account which views the it-cleft foremost as a copular construction.
2.1.
An expletive approach to predicational it-clefts
As was shown in Chapter 4, Section 2, expletive accounts typically examine it-clefts in relation to their noncopular counterparts, and so assume that the cleft clause is predicated of (or is in some other way related to) the clefted constituent. From this perspective, the cleft clause exhibits a peculiar mix of properties which makes classification difficult (see also Chapter 4, Section 1.3.1). For instance, Declerck (1983b: 12) claims that the cleft clause is not a genuine restrictive relative, Lambrecht (2001: 473) suggests that it is a type of nonrestrictive relative which is unique to cleft sentences and Ball (1977: 58) maintains that while its internal structure is like a restrictive relative, it has “no apparent head”. Regardless of the particulars, these authors all agree that the cleft clause is not an ordinary restrictive relative clause. However, proverbial it-clefts do not show this same correspondence to noncopular sentences. Instead, authors agree that they are paraphrased most closely by predicational NP be NP sentences containing restrictive relative clauses. For example, the meaning of (2) above, repeated here as (6), is not that, in general, long roads do not have turnings, as in (7), but that roads without turnings are long roads, as in (8). (6)
It is a long road that has no turning
[proverbial it-cleft]
(7)
A long road has no turning
(8)
A/The road that has no turning is a long road [predicational paraphrase]
[noncopular paraphrase]
On this basis, Lambrecht (2001: 503) suggests that the construction has a “noncleft status”, since, for him, the concept cleft is inextricably tied to the
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Other varieties of it-cleft
semantic equivalence of such examples to noncopular sentences.2 Likewise, Declerck (1983b: 14) concludes that they “are not really cleft sentences but represent a type of sentence that is homophonous with clefts. They differ from clefts in that they involve a true restrictive relative clause”. Instead, these authors analyse proverbial it-clefts as derived from, or as instances of, either extraposition-from-NP (see Ball 1977; Declerck 1983b: 15) or rightdislocation, shown in (9) (see Lambrecht 2001; Declerck 1983b: 16). (9)
It is a long road, a road that has no turning
[right-dislocation]
We have seen then that the expletive approach cannot be applied to the proverbial it-cleft. As Lambrecht (2001: 502) observes, it is a “construction whose subsumption under our cleft definition poses serious problems”. The proponents of this approach are therefore forced to examine specificational and proverbial tokens in relation to two different sentence-types, only one of which has an NP be NP structure. Unsurprisingly, this results in two different analyses, involving differences in the status of the cleft clause. In a circular line of argumentation, this is then used as evidence that the proverbial examples should be treated as forming a structurally distinct sentence type from the specificational it-cleft. The situation becomes even less clear when we consider non-proverbial predicational tokens, such as (1) above, reproduced in part here as (10). As Ball (1977: 61) notes, these examples pattern with proverbial it-clefts in that they also correspond to predicational copular sentences, shown in (11). Ball therefore analyses all it-clefts with a predicational meaning in the same way, as forming a sentence-type distinct from the it-cleft proper. (10)
It is a beautiful image which is presented here (W1A-018 061, student examination script)
(11)
The image which is presented here is a beautiful image
However, while the separate treatment of proverbial it-clefts can perhaps be justified on the basis that they speak of hypothetical circumstances and, as proverbial expressions, are possibly instances of an older linguistic pattern (see Declerck 1983b: 15–16), there is less reason to assume that the nonproverbial predicational tokens are distinct from the specificational it-cleft. 2. Ball (1991: 149) employs similar criteria; she notes that “the predicational cleft is a construction distinct from the specificational cleft, which can be „uncleft‟”.
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As a result, Declerck tries to incorporate these examples into his expletive account. For Declerck (1988), specificational sentences involve a value-variable relation: in it-clefts, the clefted element specifies the value for the variable described by the cleft clause. On this analysis, the it-cleft is an inherently “specificational structure”. Therefore, while Declerck (1983b, 1988) acknowledges that predicational it-clefts have an ascriptive meaning and identifies several characteristics that they share with other predicational sentences, his objective is to account for and explain how predicational meaning ensues from what is an essentially specificational configuration. As a result, Declerck (1983b: 18) suggests that tokens like (10) “are really borderline cases: although the information they convey is predicational, they are formally cleft sentences, and cleft sentences are essentially specificational in nature”. Declerck claims that in such sentences, the modifying adjective (in this case beautiful) is the only predicational element; the head noun (image) is specificational, in that it constitutes the value for a variable. He notes that “If we leave out the predicational modifier, what remains must be a good specificational cleft”, shown in (12) (Declerck 1983b: 31). (12)
It is an image which is presented here
Declerck suggests that the reason why examples like (10) are felt to be predicational is that the adjective constitutes the only new information: the rest of the NP is presupposed, representing information that is given or known. On this account, the predicational meaning of these specificational it-clefts comes about “more or less accidentally” (Declerck 1983b: 38). Thus, from Declerck‟s analysis of these predicational tokens, the claim that it-clefts are fundamentally specificational in nature can be maintained. However, Declerck concedes that there are some examples which must be analysed as purely, rather than partly, predicational it-clefts. For example, in (13), the head noun issue represents old information: what is new is that this issue has now become important. However, “the fact that become is used instead of be makes it impossible to maintain that the focal NP as a whole is specificational” (Declerck 1983b: 38). Likewise, the presence of no in (14) indicates that the entire NP, including the head noun idiot, is “exclusively predicational”. Declerck (1983b: 18) notes that “the substitution of no for not a in a postcopular NP is possible only if the NP in question is predicational (more specifically, if it expresses a property)”.
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Other varieties of it-cleft
(13)
After the recent troubles it has become an extremely important issue that the ministers must discuss next week
(14)
It certainly was no idiot who planned this (examples from Declerck 1983b: 38–39)
Declerck treats such examples as exceptional cases. He notes, “Purely predicational clefts…are possible only because a specificational interpretation is explicitly excluded by the lexical material of the head clause”, such as by the use of become or the presence of no (Declerck 1983b: 41). There is also the suggestion that these examples may be the product of language change. Declerck (1983b: 38, 39) says that this type of cleft “can hardly be recognized as specificational any more”; in fact, it “is no longer specificational at all” (emphasis added). For Declerck then, it-clefts are only recognized as non-specificational, or as “exclusively predicational”, as a last resort. However, there are some it-clefts which express a predicational meaning but which do not contain adjectival modifiers or other lexical material said to suppress a specificational interpretation. For instance, in (15), the it-cleft is used not to identify the entity who made the suggestion originally (a specific woman), but to inform us that the individual who made the suggestion originally was female. In this context then, the unmodified clefted constituent a woman denotes a class or property, rather than referring to an individual: it is clearly a predicational NP (see also Hedberg 1990: 57). This is at odds with Declerck‟s (1983b: 31) claim that such structures are necessarily “good specificational cleft[s]”. (15)
So don‟t debar women from being able to contribute to cricket because after all women did invent overarm bowling in eighteen hundred and five and then it was adopted officially sixty years later by which time everybody had forgotten that it was a woman who made the suggestion originally (S1B-021 084, BBC Radio 4 Sport on Four)
Therefore, while Declerck attempts to integrate predicational clefts into his account, they are ultimately treated as aberrations of the specificational it-cleft to a greater or lesser degree. However, as shown in (15), this cannot account for all such examples. Instead, the predicational tokens seem to form a distinct, and yet structurally-related class of it-cleft. Furthermore, by recognizing that true predicational (i.e. non-specificational) it-clefts exist,
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127
the status of the proverbial it-cleft is called into question. If predicational itclefts are possible, why should the proverbial examples, which also have a predicational meaning, require a separate analysis? In conclusion then, the expletive approach is not well-suited to the treatment of predicational varieties of it-cleft, including the proverbial tokens. It encourages authors either to overstate the structural differences between predicational and specificational it-clefts, or to overlook their differences in meaning.
2.2.
Predicational it-clefts and the inverse approach
However, as Hedberg (1990, 2000) and Han and Hedberg (2008) observe, the existence of predicational it-clefts becomes predictable on an account which views it-clefts as copular constructions, since, as we saw in Chapter 3, noncleft NP be NP sentences also come in both specificational and predicational varieties, shown in (16) and (17) below. (16)
The thoracic surgeon is John McIntyre
(17)
The thoracic surgeon is a heavy drinker
[specificational] [predicational]
In Chapter 3, I analysed specificational meaning as a reinterpretation of the nominal predication relation associated with definite NP predicates. On this account, specificational copular sentences, such as (16), are the inverse of predicate nominal sentences; that is, the postcopular element John McIntyre is a referring expression and the precopular element the thoracic surgeon is a predicative NP. However, this definite NP can also function as a referring expression when predicated of by a postcopular indefinite NP, as shown in (17). In (16) then, John McIntyre is classified as the thoracic surgeon; in (17), the thoracic surgeon is classified as a heavy drinker. Since other types of specificational copular sentence have also been shown to contain definite NP predicates (see Chapter 3, Section 4.3), it follows that they too should correspond to predicational NP be NP sentences in which the definite element functions as a referring expression. For instance, in the wh-cleft in (18), the postcopular clause that he could use a drink is predicated of by the fused relative what (the thing that) John said. However, in (19), this same phrase functions as a referring expression, where what John said is described, or classified, as a secret. (18)
What John said was that he could use a drink
[specificational]
128
(19)
Other varieties of it-cleft
What John said was a secret
[predicational]
As Williams (1983: 430) comments, on an inverse account, the distinction between predicative and referential NPs “corresponds with two types of pseudoclefts: predicative free relatives occur in the specificational pseudocleft, and referential free relatives occur in the predicational pseudocleft”. Likewise, on the assumption that it-clefts contain discontinuous definite noun phrases (see Chapter 4), we would expect this element to allow both predicative and referential readings. For instance, in the specificational itcleft in (20), the discontinuous constituent (it + relative clause) functions as a predicative NP, denoting a set of which the referent Margaret is the sole member, an interpretation which follows from the uniqueness entailments of definite NPs (see Chapter 3, Section 2). However, in the predicational itcleft in (21), repeated from (15) above, this same NP us used to refer to an individual, while the postcopular element functions as the predicative NP. Here, it (the one) who made the suggestion originally is classified as a member of the set of women. Since the predicate is indefinite in this instance, it carries an exclusiveness interpretation, such that the individual in question is not the only woman in existence (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1). (20)
It was Margaret who made the suggestion originally
(21)
It was a woman who made the suggestion originally (S1B-021 084, BBC Radio 4 Sport on Four)
The existence of a predicational it-cleft variety therefore follows neatly from an account which assumes both an inverse analysis of specificational copular sentences and a discontinuous constituent analysis of it-clefts. As a result, they can be accounted for easily. While specificational it-clefts are instances of the specificational inversion construction, in which a (discontinuous) predicative NP precedes a referring expression, predicational itclefts inherit from the predicate nominal construction. As we might expect, the roles are reversed or “inverted” in such sentences, with a (discontinuous) referring expression preceding a postcopular predicative NP. On this account then, the predicational examples form a separate construction from the specificational it-cleft, but they are nevertheless structurally related, sharing the same discontinuous (extraposition-from-NP) structure. From this, it follows that they are sub-constructions of the same it-cleft schema, shown in Figure 9. While the it-cleft schema is not fully motivated in present-day English (despite support from a variety of basic
Predicational (and proverbial) it-clefts
129
information structure generalizations), we can assume that speakers recognize this fixed and irregular structure and so form the more abstract mental representation (see also Chapter 4, Section 1.1). In Chapter 6, we will see that the it-cleft schema obtains its formal and functional properties from configurations existing outside of the present-day language system. Predicate nominal semantics be inversion construction
Specificational inversion construction It-cleft schema
Specificational it-cleft schema
Predicate nominal construction Specificational noninversion construction
Predicational it-cleft schema Proverbial it-cleft schema
Figure 9.
Incorporating predicational and proverbial it-clefts into a taxonomy of constructions involving nominal predication
In addition to their formal resemblance (which brings with it a semantically underspecified definite NP), the two types of it-cleft exhibit the same predicate nominal semantics (also shown in Figure 9). However, since specificational it-clefts inherit from the specificational inversion construction and predicational it-clefts inherit from the predicate nominal construction, they differ primarily in how their formal elements and meaning components correspond to one another. While in the specificational examples, the initial discontinuous definite NP functions as the semantic predicate, in predicational it-clefts, this is treated as an act of reference.3 3. Further evidence that there are two different types of it-cleft (predicational and specificational) becomes apparent when embedding under consider. Specificational it-clefts, like other specificational inversion sentences, require the overt presence of to be when occurring in this environment, shown in (ii) (see also Chapter 3, footnote 10). However, predicational it-clefts pattern with other pre-
130
Other varieties of it-cleft
On this account, the clefted constituent is either a referring expression, resulting in a specificational it-cleft, or it is a predicative expression, resulting in a predicational it-cleft. From this perspective, it does not make sense to speak of the specificational and predicational elements within the focal NP, contra Declerck (1983b, 1988). Declerck‟s “borderline” cases are therefore properly predicational; in (10), repeated here as (22), it is not only the adjective beautiful, but the entire NP a beautiful image that is semantically predicative. In such tokens, the postcopular head noun (in this case, image) provides a value for the underspecified head noun contained within the cleft pronoun it, as shown in the NP be NP paraphrase in (23). As a result, the postcopular noun is interpreted as given information, while the attributive adjective bears the main (focal) stress. (22)
It is a beautiful image which is presented here (W1A-018 061, student examination script)
(23)
The image which is presented here is a beautiful image
The proverbial examples can also be accounted for straightforwardly on this approach. As shown in Figure 9, proverbial it-clefts are also instances of the predicational it-cleft construction. In such tokens, the discontinuous definite NP has generic reference; that is, it refers to an abstract individual – a hypothetical entity which exhibits properties shared by all entities that satisfy this description. For example, in the proverbial it-cleft in (24) and its predicational NP be NP paraphrase in (25), it (the mother) that has such children (that is, the hypothetical mother that has children which behave as well as these ones do) is described, or classed, as being necessarily a happy mother.
dicational NP be NP sentences in that the subject-predicate string can occur as the complement of consider without to be, shown in (iv). Declerck (1983b: 30) notes this parallel, but nevertheless insists on the “essentially specificational nature of clefts”. (i)
I consider his best friend *(to be) John
[specificational inversion]
(ii) I considered it *(to be) John who is his best friend (iii) I consider John (to be) his best friend
[predicational NP be NP]
(iv) I consider it (to be) an interesting subject that they are discussing tonight (examples from Declerck 1983b: 30)
Predicational (and proverbial) it-clefts
(24)
It is a happy mother that has such children
(25)
The mother that has such children is a happy mother
131
Because such sentences involve a particular type of reference and because they have specialized stylistic and metaphorical functions, we can recognize a distinct proverbial it-cleft construction, shown in Figure 9. Furthermore, since each proverb is a learned and invariable saying, the instances of the proverbial it-cleft construction should also occur within our taxonomy as highly entrenched and substantive constructs (see Chapter 2, Section 3). For reasons of space, this is not represented in Figure 9. Therefore, the discontinuous constituent account of it-clefts argued for here allows us to provide proverbial and non-proverbial predicational itclefts with a unified analysis, while at the same time acknowledging their familial relationship with specificational it-clefts, contra Ball (1977) and Declerck (1983b, 1988). In turn, the proverbial examples could provide us with a clue to finding out more about the it-cleft‟s structural configuration. As Declerck (1983b: 15) observes, “the type of sentence under consideration is essentially proverbial and, like most proverbs, reminiscent of an older stage in the English language”. As we have seen, for Declerck, this counts as an argument for analysing the proverbial examples as forming a distinct sentence type from the modern-day specificational it-cleft. However, on the assumption that all types of it-cleft (including the proverbial tokens) share the same structural configuration, it follows that the it-cleft schema might well be a relic from an earlier period of the language. I explore this hypothesis in Chapter 6, where I research the history of the itcleft construction.
2.3.
Predicational it-clefts and the equative approach
So far, then, we have seen that predicational (and proverbial) it-clefts can be successfully accounted for assuming the analysis of it-clefts and copular constructions developed over Chapters 3 and 4. This represents an improvement on the expletive approach of Ball (1977), Declerck (1983b, 1988) and Lambrecht (2001), where the specificational-predicational distinction in itclefts is eliminated rather than explained. However, as we saw in Chapter 4, Section 3.2, there are alternative discontinuous constituent accounts in the cleft literature, of which some have been argued to be able to accommodate predicational it-clefts (see especially Han and Hedberg 2008). Where they
132
Other varieties of it-cleft
differ from the current account is in assuming that specificational it-clefts are semantically equative. In what follows, I show that the inverse approach adopted here is in a better position to explain the predicational it-cleft data. On Han and Hedberg‟s (2008) account, specificational it-clefts involve a two-place equative predicate taking two referential arguments: the discontinuous constituent and the clefted constituent. This is represented using the formula in (26). In contrast, we have seen that predicational it-clefts contain a postcopular predicate with a single argument: the discontinuous constituent. This is shown in (27). (26)
THEz [won(z)] [z = Ohno] (It was Ohno who won)
(27)
THEz [beat(z, John)] [kid(z)] (It was a kid who beat John) (examples from Han and Hedberg 2008: 349)
The specificational-predicational distinction here is not quite as tidy as on the account outlined in Section 2.2 above. There, it was suggested that specificational and predicational it-clefts exhibit the same predicate nominal semantics; they differ mainly in terms of which elements perform which function. For Han and Hedberg, on the other hand, these two varieties of itcleft have very different semantic structures, each involving a distinct copular verb and argument structure. More problematically, however, their analysis is unable to account for an observable discrepancy between specificational and predicational it-clefts. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3, specificational it-clefts referring to plural entities are nevertheless introduced by a singular cleft pronoun. For instance, while the postcopular NP in (28) refers to two individuals, the discontinuous NP cannot be introduced by the plural pronoun they. However, as Ball (1977) observes, predicational it-clefts with postcopular plural NPs are introduced by plural pronouns, rather than the singular it, as in (29). (28)
It is (*They are) John and Margaret who are responsible
(29)
They are (*It is) nice boots you’re wearing
This data is indicative of a semantic difference between the discontinuous constituents of specificational and predicational it-clefts. On my inverse account, the discontinuous description of a predicational it-cleft refers to individuals. As such, it is expected that this constituent will be marked for
Predicational (and proverbial) it-clefts
133
number.4 However, the discontinuous description of specificational it-clefts is a predicative, set-denoting NP. In Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3, I suggested that in examples such as (28), this NP is conceptually both singular and plural, in that it denotes a singular set made up of plural members. While the matrix copula is shows agreement with the singular set (marked as singular by it), the embedded verb are agrees with the membership of this set. However, for Han and Hedberg (2008), the discontinuous constituents of both specificational and predicational it-clefts are semantically referring expressions. Consequently, these authors do not anticipate any differences in the behaviour of these NPs. While, on their account, the plural marking of the predicational it-cleft in (29) is to be expected, they cannot begin to explain why specificational it-clefts like (28) do not share this property. They note, “Why equative clefts require singular cleft pronouns when they contain a plural clefted constituent does not follow from our theory and remains a puzzle” (Han and Hedberg 2008: 372). In contrast, it is the plural marking of predicational it-clefts that is problematic for Reeve‟s (2010) equative account (see Chapter 4, Section 3.2). Based upon the specificational data, Reeve concludes that clefts only allow neuter singular pronominal subjects, regardless of the gender and number of the clefted constituent, and builds a syntactic explanation for this into his analysis. Consequently, predicational it-clefts with plural subjects are unaccounted for. Reeve (2010: 113) suggests that such examples do not “involve a true cleft structure” and provides these “false predicational clefts” with an analysis similar to that argued for here for all cleft types. It therefore seems that a discontinuous constituent approach is more successful at accounting for the predicational it-cleft data if we assume an inverse analysis, on which the precopular NPs of specificational and predicational sentences are semantically distinct. In turn, the data provides further evidence against an equative analysis of specificational copular sentences (see also Chapter 3, Section 1).5 4. Den Dikken (2009) also uses this evidence to show that while the cleft pronoun of specificational it-clefts is (for him) a pro-predicate, the initial it of predicational it-clefts is a referential pronoun. 5. However, Birner, Kaplan and Ward (2007) propose a particular type of equative analysis which they argue can account for such data. Focusing on demonstrative clefts (in our terminology), they analyse the cleft pronoun that and the clefted constituent as semantically referring expressions. The authors suggest that clefts with plural foci can only occur with singular subject pronouns if there is an open proposition (OP) in the discourse. They claim that in such sentences, that refers to the instantiation of the variable in the OP, rather than to
134
Other varieties of it-cleft
In sum, the account of specificational meaning and specificational itclefts developed throughout Chapters 3 and 4 lends itself well to the treatment of predicational and proverbial it-clefts, and is better at accounting for this data than either expletive or equative analyses. In particular, I have suggested that while predicational it-clefts are structurally and semantically related to specificational it-clefts, they inherit from (and are thus motivated by) the predicate nominal construction, rather than the specificational inversion construction (see Figure 9 above). It follows from this that while the discontinuous definite NP in specificational it-clefts denotes a set of entities, this same constituent in predicational it-clefts is used to refer to a member, or to some of the members, of a set.
3.
It-clefts with non-nominal foci
So far, the account developed here has focused on the level of correspondence between it-clefts (of both specificational and predicational varieties) and sentences of the type NP be NP. As a result, the discussion has centred on it-clefts with noun phrases in the postcopular position. However, while such examples are known to represent the most common variety, specificational it-clefts can occur with a range of clefted elements, such as prepositional phrases, clauses and adverb phrases, shown in (30), (31) and (32), respectively. (30)
It was to the Corkscrew that I directed my steps (W2F-011 009, fiction)
(31)
It‟s only if you have one of them and your parents have a licence that you‟re covered under that (S1A-078 085, direct conversation)
(32)
And it was only then that it i it uh the wound opened (S1B-066 025, legal cross-examination)
the plural entities in the discourse or situational context; this variable is singular “regardless of the cardinality of its instantiation” (Birner, Kaplan and Ward 2007: 330). However, the existence of a salient OP is not as reliable as the specificational-predicational distinction in predicting the form of the subject pronoun in clefts with plural foci: specificational tokens with plural foci occur with singular subject pronouns even in discourse initial position (despite the absence of a salient OP). Nevertheless, some aspects of this analysis come close to the account of number agreement argued for here; on both accounts, the cleft pronoun relates to a singular concept rather than referring to plural individuals.
It-clefts with non-nominal foci
135
Predicational it-clefts, on the other hand, do not share this property; in these sentences, the clefted constituent is always nominal. This state of affairs provides strong support for the analysis argued for here, in which itclefts are situated within a family of constructions that share the same predicate nominal semantics. Since, as we have seen, the clefted constituent in predicational it-clefts is semantically predicative, we would not expect anything other than an NP to occur in this position. Given that the precopular referring expression is also nominal (since the discontinuous definite NP structure represents a substantive feature of the it-cleft schema), the predicational it-cleft is a true NP be NP construction.6 In specificational itclefts, on the other hand, the discontinuous predicative expression is inherently nominal, but the clefted referring expression does not have to be. It-clefts7 with non-nominal foci are therefore anticipated on this account since predicative NPs can sometimes be predicated of non-nominal items, such as the PP subject under the bed in (33). Like other kinds of it-cleft then, those with non-NP foci contain a discontinuous definite description which is made up of the pronominal head it and a restrictive relative clause. For instance, the PP-focus it-cleft in (34) corresponds to the th-cleft in (35) and the wh-cleft in (36). (33)
Under the bed is a great place to hide
6. For Reeve (2010: 54), the impossibility of predicational it-clefts with adjectival predicates supports his claim that the cleft clause syntactically modifies the clefted constituent; he suggests that (v) is ruled out because “the clefted AP feline does not „correspond‟ to the gap in the cleft clause”, shown in (vi). He notes that for other discontinuous constituent accounts, on which (v) corresponds to the predicational copular sentence in (vii), the judgment of ungrammaticality is “mysterious” (see also Reeve 2012: 35–37). However, on the account argued for here, in which it-clefts always involve nominal predication, the impossibility of (v) is explained easily. (v)
*It is feline that I am pointing at
(vi) *I am pointing at feline (vii) The thing that I am pointing at is feline (examples from Reeve 2010: 52, 54) 7. In keeping with the cleft literature, I continue to use the term it-cleft as a convenient shorthand for specificational it-cleft. In the remainder of this work, I explicitly indicate where the discussion turns to predicational it-clefts or relates to the it-cleft schema which encompasses both of these subtypes.
136
Other varieties of it-cleft
(34)
It was with a knife that I cut it
(35)
The way that I cut it was with a knife
(36)
How I cut it was with a knife
(Fowler and Fowler 1908)
That such examples can be so easily integrated into a discontinuous constituent account represents a further advantage of this type of analysis. In contrast, on some expletive accounts, it-clefts with non-nominal foci represent a structurally distinct sentence type from those containing postcopular NPs. As we have seen, on this type of account, the cleft clause is related in some way to the clefted constituent. For Delin (1989), when the clefted constituent is nominal, the cleft clause can be analysed as a restrictive relative.8 However, since relative clauses cannot modify non-nominal antecedents, she argues that it-clefts with non-NP foci instead contain a sentential complement (see also Ball 1994a and the discussion in Chapter 8, Section 3.1). Nevertheless, while the discontinuous constituent analysis argued for here can straightforwardly accommodate examples with non-nominal foci, it is difficult to properly explain, or even describe, which elements can and cannot occur as the clefted constituent. For one thing, the range of possible it-cleft foci differs from that of other specificational copular sentences. For example, it-clefts can occur with certain prepositional phrase foci that are not found in other constructions, shown in (37) and (38). (37)
It is with great pride that I accept this award
[it-cleft]
(38)
*How I accept this award is with great pride [wh-cleft] (examples from Gundel 1977: 548)
Since they cannot be derived from equally acceptable pseudocleft sources, such examples present a particular problem for transformational analyses (see Chapter 4, Section 3.1). On this basis, Pinkham and Hankamer (1975) conclude that it-clefts with non-NP foci are derivationally distinct from those with NPs in postcopular position. They suggest that only the latter can be derived by extraposition (forming “deep-clefts”); all other it-clefts 8. As Delin notes (1989: 60), a restrictive relative analysis for it-clefts with nominal foci is not uncontroversial on the expletive approach, since relative clauses cannot ordinarily modify full NPs (see also Chapter 4, Section 1.3.1). Likewise, on the account argued for here, the restrictive modification of pronominal it awaits further justification (see Chapter 6).
It-clefts with non-nominal foci
137
must be derived from their corresponding noncopular sentences via the extraction of the clefted element (forming “shallow clefts”).9 On a non-derivational extraposition account, such as the one argued for here, it-clefts like (37) do not present this same problem. However, what they do show is that the acceptable it-cleft foci comprise a constructionspecific category, governed by factors peculiar to this construction. Since the range of it-cleft foci is not shared among the family of specificational copular constructions, it cannot be accounted for by inheritance and instead requires an independent explanation. However, it is difficult even to identify the boundaries of this category, since some XPs make for acceptable foci only in certain circumstances. For this reason, we cannot rely on a rule-based, syntactic account to explain which items can and cannot occur in postcopular position. For instance, Delahunty (1982, 1984) devises a syntactic account to sanction the full range of it-cleft foci (including NPs, PPs, AdvPs, particles, APs and quantifier phrases), while excluding all other constituents. For Delahunty, the clefted constituent and the cleft clause are syntactic sisters within VP (see Chapter 4, Section 1.3.2). As a result, he makes use of Jackendoff‟s (1977) rules for the projection of V to explain why only certain syntactic categories occur in postcopular position. For example, the nonexistence of a phrase structure rule like VP → V VP S′ accounts for the absence of it-clefts with VP foci, such as (39). (39)
*It was complain that Frank did
However, because these phrase structure rules apply wholesale to each phrasal category, they do not predict that some members of a category can make for better (or more acceptable) it-cleft foci than others, or that their relative acceptability can depend on a variety of factors. For instance, while adverbial foci are sanctioned by Delahunty‟s rules, the AdvP-focus it-cleft in (40) is questionable. As shown in (41), the focal adverb slowly becomes more acceptable when placed in a contrast set with other manner adverbs. To account for this data, Delahunty (1984: 80) appeals to the it-cleft‟s pragmatic properties; he suggests that the unacceptability of (40) “perhaps has to do with the uniqueness and exhaustiveness implicatures associated with the form”. For Delahunty, (41) is more acceptable than (40) because the itcleft‟s implicatures are negated. 9. For other attempts to account for it-clefts without pseudocleft sources from within a transformational analysis, see Emonds (1976) and Gundel (1977).
138
Other varieties of it-cleft
(40)
?It was slowly that Mary dressed to go out
(41)
It wasn‟t only slowly that Mary dressed, but carefully too (examples from Delahunty 1984: 80)
Since Delahunty ultimately relies on a pragmatic explanation to account for the differing acceptability of permissible it-cleft foci, the rationale for positing rule-based, syntactic restrictions is called into question. As we have seen, this construction-specific category cannot be satisfactorily defined in terms of general syntactic rules or major syntactic categories. Perhaps then, the range of it-cleft foci is governed purely by function rather than form. Assuming the inverse analysis of specificational sentences developed over Chapter 3, the specificational it-cleft contains a discontinuous predicative NP and a postcopular referring expression. We might expect then that only those elements that can be given a referential interpretation will be able to occur in the postcopular, focal position. While this approach cannot explain why it-clefts have a different range of foci from other specificational copular constructions, it nevertheless helps us to understand why some items are more likely than others to occur in this position. Since NPs denote objects, they are well-suited to the referring function (see Croft 1990). Therefore, we anticipate that NPs will make up the most common class of it-cleft foci (by my calculation, accounting for 311 (77%) of the 404 it-clefts in the ICE-GB). Indeed, some authors, including Davidse (2000: 1116), claim that the postcopular position is a “strictly „nominal slot‟”: all non-NP elements occurring in this position are “rankshifted” into the category of NPs via nominalization. Similarly, for Partee (2004a), non-nominal focal elements are nominalized via the typeshifting operation nom. However, it isn‟t really true to say that non-nominal it-cleft foci are “reclassified” as noun phrases. For instance, as Partee observes, the non-NP foci of cleft sentences do not display the same morphological markings as other nominalized forms. In discussing the specificational adjective phrase focus wh-cleft in (42), Partee (2004a: 198) asks “why is the form here unusual rather than unusualness?” (42)
What John is is unusual
(Partee 2004a: 190)
Partee (2004a: 199) chooses to leave “the question of what licenses the proposed zero-morphology of unusual on the specificational reading” of (42) unanswered. However, the evidence suggests that nominalization is
It-clefts with non-nominal foci
139
not necessarily involved in sanctioning the non-NP foci of specificational inversion sentences. Instead, these non-NP items appear to be unchanged with regard to both meaning and form. Only their function is altered, with characteristically modifying or predicative elements being employed as referring expressions. A similar account is provided by É. Kiss (1998). She suggests that the focal element in identificational (our specificational) sentences must denote a type e individual. Since VPs and other predicative elements do not denote individuals, they do not ordinarily make for acceptable clefted constituents, shown in (43). Nevertheless, É. Kiss (1998: 262) follows Szabolcsi (1983) in assuming that non-individuals can sometimes “be individualized, that is presented as discrete entities”. For example, (44) involves the listing of predicative APs, in which “a two-member set of properties (including tired and sick) is established” (É. Kiss 1998: 262, italic original). (43)
*It‟s sick that he was
(44)
It‟s not sick that he was but tired (examples from É. Kiss 1998: 262)
On the account presented here, we might say that by contrasting sick with tired, the latter is conceived of as a distinct property (situated among a restricted background set of related properties), which uniquely matches the description it (the thing) that he was, and so comprises the membership of this set. Likewise, focusing adverbs often serve to make characteristically nonreferring foci more acceptable. For instance, the adverb only improves the acceptability of the AdvP-focus it-cleft in (45) by placing the manner adverb gradually in relation to some excluded alternatives (see also (41)). (45)
And it‟s only gradually that people with the qualities required for success in a command economy can develop the qualities that are required to survive in a free market economy (S2B-047 068, non-broadcast, scripted speech)
As Borkin (1984: 127) notes, other adverbs “without a contrastive concern for alternatives”, including just, precisely and exactly, can also function “to underscore the correctness of identification”. These various coercion strategies produce the same effect: the clefted element is presented as a discrete entity with clear-cut boundaries.
140
Other varieties of it-cleft
By providing a functional (rather than formal) explanation for the range of it-cleft foci, we can account for the fact that this construction-specific category is not comprised of complete classes of phrasal items. We are also able to explain why some property-denoting elements have to be coerced into the postcopular slot in order to qualify as acceptable foci. However, our account cannot yet explain why the it-cleft seems to have different criteria for measuring what constitutes acceptable foci from other specificational copular constructions. For instance, as I go on to show in Chapter 8, the wh-cleft construction is in many ways more relaxed than the it-cleft about what can enter into the referential slot, allowing a greater variety of property-denoting items (including APs and VPs) to occur in postcopular position, shown also in (42). I suggest that a possible way to account for these differences is to examine how these constructions have developed over time (see also Chapter 7).
4.
Informative-presupposition (IP) it-clefts
As I explained in Chapter 4, the it-cleft has a fixed information structure. Like other specificational inversion sentences, the construction contains a postcopular focal element. On this focus structure, which is associated with specificational meaning, the membership (rather than the set) information is at issue (see Chapter 4, Section 1.2.1). Like other sentences containing definite NPs, the it-cleft is also presuppositional. The discontinuous definite NP carries an existential presupposition such that the entities which satisfy the description are assumed to exist (see Chapter 4, Section 1.2.2). This information is treated as a precondition to the main assertion. From this, it follows that it-clefts, like other specificational inversion sentences with definite predicative NPs, are associated with expressing new information in the postcopular XP and old information in the precopular (or discontinuous) NP. In terms of information structure then, the archetypal itcleft behaves in ways that are consistent with its treatment as a specificational inversion construction. However, it is well known that the relationship between focal and new information, and between presupposed and old information, is imperfect. Entities which are already known to us, and which have been mentioned in the discourse, can nevertheless be in focus. For instance, (46) could occur towards the end of a discussion about John and the other members of the surgical team. What is new or unpredictable in (46) is not John, but the fact that John (as opposed to any other entity) instantiates the type best surgeon.
Informative-presupposition (IP) it-clefts
(46)
141
The best surgeon‟s got to be JOHN
Likewise, information which is presupposed is not always manifestly old. Presupposed information need not be present in the prior discourse or even part of shared knowledge. Instead, it could be inferable from, or simply consistent with, the speech participants‟ mutual cognitive environment. For example, (47) could form part of a discourse about an impending operation. In this instance, the presence of an anaesthesiologist may not be already known to the hearer and may not have been mentioned in the preceding discourse. Nevertheless, this information is inferable from the shared script or frame of operations i.e. from experiential or cultural knowledge about operations in general (see also Chapter 3, Section 3.3). (47)
The anaesthesiologist is Dr. Vijay Kochar
To some extent then, we expect that it-clefts, like other specificational inversion sentences, will deviate from the archetypal “old-NP be new-XP” configuration. However, what is less clear is how our analysis can account for instances such as (48), which contain brand-new information in the cleft clause. Here, the existence of an individual who once said “Laws are silent at times of war” does not form part of a previous assertion and is not necessarily shared or inferable knowledge. (48)
(Start of lecture) It was Cicero who once said, “Laws are silent at times of war” (Patten 2010: 222)
Are these examples, labelled informative-presupposition it-clefts by Prince (1978), also predictable from the behaviour of specificational inversion sentences and definite NPs more generally? For Hedberg (2000) and Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001), such examples fall out straightforwardly assuming an analysis on which it-clefts contain discontinuous definite descriptions. Using Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski‟s (1993) Givenness Hierarchy, these authors note that the entities referred to by definite NPs are very often unfamiliar to the addressee. For instance, Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001) find that for roughly 44% of the tokens in their corpus, the addressee could not be expected to have an existing representation of the entity in memory. On this basis, the authors conclude that the definite article in English is actually unspecified for familiarity and that it “only requires the addressee to be able to assign a
142
Other varieties of it-cleft
unique representation” to the phrase by the time it has been processed (Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 2001: 288). They go on to claim that this account can be “naturally extended” to itclefts, on the assumption that the cleft it and the cleft clause form a discontinuous definite description. Citing the corpus studies of both Delin (1989) and Hedberg (1990), Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001: 292) find that the proportion of it-clefts containing nonfamiliar cleft clauses is relatively high, ranging between 49% and 72%, respectively. They conclude that such examples should not be treated as exceptional cases requiring independent explanation. As Hedberg (2000: 903) states, “informative presupposition itclefts are analogous to definite descriptions whose referent is uniquely identifiable but not yet familiar”. Thus, a notable advantage to this approach is that it allows for a unified account of all types of specificational it-cleft. In other words, the informative-presupposition examples are shown to behave in ways that are consistent with the behaviour of definite NPs more generally. However, there are several reasons to suspect that the facts are not quite as simple as Hedberg (2000) and Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001) suggest. For one thing, these authors group inferable and new information together as forming a single nonfamiliar category. They reason that new and inferable entities are not already “in memory (at least not necessarily so) at the point when the phrase that refers to them is encountered” (Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 2001: 280). However, it is not always clear where the boundary lies between old and new information and the correct classification of inferables is both problematic and debatable (see Prince 1981: 252). For many authors, including Hedberg and Fadden (2007) and Prince (1992), inferables share the same information status as the entities from which they are inferable. On this approach, most inferables are classified with old, rather than with new, information. The evidence for this association comes from Birner (1994, 1996). In her study of English inversion sentences, she finds that “inferrables are treated exactly as though they had been explicitly evoked. That is, inferrables are treated as no less „given‟ in this sense than explicitly evoked elements” (Birner 1996: 102, emphasis original). Therefore, it seems that Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski‟s (2001) claims regarding the proportion of unfamiliar entities referred to by definite NPs may be somewhat overblown. Of course, this does not undermine the observation that definite NPs do not always refer to familiar entities. For instance, Hawkins (1978) mentions several unfamiliar uses of the definite article in noun phrases containing explanatory modifiers. In all such cases,
Informative-presupposition (IP) it-clefts
143
the “modifier itself takes over the role of previous discourse, and enables the hearer to identify some set of objects within which he is to locate the referent” (Hawkins 1978: 149).10 For instance, while (49) does not require that the hearer has prior knowledge of the woman in question, (50), without the relative clause, does presuppose familiarity on the hearer‟s part. (49)
What‟s wrong with Bill? Oh, the woman he went out with last night was nasty to him.
(50)
The woman was nasty to him. (examples from Hawkins 1978: 131)
For Hawkins (1991: 411), the reason for this difference is that (49) contains an establishing relative clause which extends the relevant P-set information (the facts and entities contingently associated with Bill) in a way that is compatible with the hearer‟s knowledge. In order to accomplish this, the hearer-new entity (the woman) must be “explicitly related or „anchored‟ to an individual who IS mutually known” – in this case to Bill (Hawkins 1991: 411, emphasis original). However (and here we come to the second complication), definite NPs in specificational sentences do not appear to share this same range of unfamiliar uses. For instance, it would undoubtedly seem strange to utter (51) if the referent that satisfies the description woman he went out with last night were not at issue; that is, if the information that Bill went out with a woman last night were not already known. (51)
The woman he went out with last night was Cathy Martin
In specificational sentences then, definite descriptions are associated with familiar information. As we saw in Chapter 3, Section 3, brand-new, anchored information can be incorporated into the precopular predicate if the indefinite article is used. For instance, in (52), the indefinite article indicates that the description woman he went out with last night is hearer-new information and informs us that there is a woman who Bill went out with last night. Here, it is still possible that this description characterizes Cathy
10. For Abbott (2004: 137), this represents a further difficulty with Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski‟s (1993, 2001) model. On their hierarchy of cognitive statuses, it is the article which encodes degree of accessibility. However, Abbott notes that this approach does not satisfactorily explain why more accessible referents require less descriptive information in the NP and vice versa.
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Other varieties of it-cleft
Martin uniquely; in other words, that Cathy Martin represents the membership of the (potentially singleton) set of women he went out with last night. (52)
A woman he went out with last night was Cathy Martin
These indefinite NP subjects therefore seem to fill a gap in the function of definite NPs. Like their definite counterparts, indefinite specificational subjects are anchored to the conversation space, they denote restricted (rather than general) sets, and exclusiveness is not implied (see Chapter 3, Section 3). This observation ties in well with Hawkins‟ (1991: 417) claim that the and a “provide a grammatically, and psycholinguistically real contrast set, in which the is the logically stronger member of the pair”. He notes that the interpretation of a depends on “whether the could not have been used instead, and from the precise interpretation of the when it could have been used” (Hawkins 1991: 417). In other words, indefinite NPs will display characteristics associated with definite NPs, only when “there is no longer any competition between the and a” (Hawkins 1991: 422). Moreover, the association between definite NPs and old (or salient) information in specificational copular sentences does not seem to be reliant on their preverbal position. For instance, it is difficult to imagine a context for the specificational non-inversion sentence in (53) in which the identity of the referent matching the description woman he went out with last night is not at issue; in other words, where the existence of such a woman is not already known. (53)
CATHY MARTIN was the woman he went out with last night
This is not to say that sentences with postcopular definite NP predicates cannot occur with unfamiliar information in the postcopular position. However, such examples are perhaps better classified as predicational, rather than specificational copular sentences. For instance, (54) does not require that the hearer already knows that Bill went out with a woman last night. However, since the referent Cathy is discourse-old information, (54) seems to be about this individual, describing, or ascribing a property to, Cathy. (54)
This is Cathy. Cathy‟s the woman he went out with last night.
The third and final complication is that informative-presupposition itclefts seem to perform a pragmatic function which is different from many other unfamiliar uses of definite noun phrases. Given the it-cleft‟s structural
Informative-presupposition (IP) it-clefts
145
configuration, we might expect the cleft clause to sometimes function as an establishing relative clause. However, the cleft clause of informativepresupposition it-clefts does not have to be anchored to the prior discourse and is not necessarily built on (forming an extension of) an aspect of the hearer‟s existing knowledge. For example, (48) above, repeated for convenience as (55), provides brand-new, unanchored and non-inferable information. (55)
(Start of lecture) It was Cicero who once said, “Laws are silent at times of war” (Patten 2010: 222)
Such instances therefore seem to be rooted not in the hearer‟s existing knowledge but in the area of general knowledge, or established fact. As Prince (1978: 899–900) notes, the informative-presupposition it-cleft serves “TO MARK A PIECE OF INFORMATION AS FACT, known to some people although not yet known to the intended hearer” (emphasis original). In truth then, the it-cleft is very much associated with known information, so much so that it goes beyond consideration of what the hearer knows. The situation, then, is more complicated than Hedberg (2000) and Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001) suggest. As we have seen, informativepresupposition it-clefts exhibit a discourse-pragmatic function which is not shared by other specificational copular sentences, with or without inversion. For instance the pseudoclefts which correspond to (55) are not so suited to discourse-initial position, shown in (56) and (57). (56)
(Start of lecture) #The one who once said, “Laws are silent at times of war” was Cicero [specificational inversion sentence]
(57)
(Start of lecture) #CICERO was the one who once said, “Laws are silent at times of war” [specificational non-inversion sentence]
The suggestion here is that the audience should already know that someone once said, “Laws are silent at times of war”. From this, it follows that the informative-presupposition it-cleft cannot be explained as a straightforward product of inheritance, nor does it seem to be governed purely by the word order considerations which result from the extraposed position of the relative clause (contra Abbott 2000: 1429).
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Other varieties of it-cleft
Furthermore, we have seen that the specialized function of the informative presupposition it-cleft differs from many of the recognized unfamiliar uses of definite NPs in other contexts and represents a very extreme form of unfamiliar use. In definite NPs, new information is typically presented as an extension of the hearer‟s existing knowledge; it is anchored to, or built upon, what the hearer already knows. In this way, definite NPs in general seem to be associated with hearer-old information. However, in IP it-clefts, the presupposed information does not necessarily have to be (assumed to be) consistent with, or in any way expected from, the hearer‟s knowledge. As Prince (1978: 898) comments, “the whole point of these sentences is to INFORM the hearer of that very information”. Nevertheless, the new information is presented as non-debatable because it is marked as established fact. It-clefts are therefore associated with factual information. To formalize this distinction, Prince (1978: 903) reserves the term given for information assumed to be “in the hearer‟s consciousness” and known to refer to “information that the speaker represents as being factual”. For Prince, it is the latter notion which is pertinent to it-clefts. In sum, the characteristics of these informative-presupposition examples are not entirely predictable from analyses in which it-clefts contain discontinuous definite descriptions, particularly if they are analysed in the context of a family of specificational copular constructions. Therefore, contra Hedberg (2000) and Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (2001), the itcleft‟s discourse-pragmatic properties do seem to require an independent explanation. In Chapter 7, I provide evidence to suggest that the it-cleft has acquired construction-specific properties over time. This accounts for some much discussed differences in the discourse functions of it-clefts and whclefts (see Chapter 8).
5.
Summary
Throughout Chapter 4, I built up an analysis in which it-clefts are treated foremost as specificational copular sentences. In particular, my aim was to provide a constructional account which maximizes motivation for the itcleft by situating it in relation to a family of constructions as both an instance and inheritor of an overarching specificational inversion construction. Throughout Chapter 5, I have considered three varieties of it-cleft which cannot be accounted for in this way: predicational (and proverbial) it-clefts, it-clefts with non-NP foci and informative-presupposition it-clefts. I have shown that while my analysis extends naturally to incorporate predi-
Summary
147
cational and proverbial it-clefts (owing to inheritance from the predicate nominal construction), there are some aspects of the specificational itcleft‟s behaviour that remain a mystery. As a result, it seems that we must look outside of the present-day language system to explain the range of it-cleft foci and the informationstatus of the cleft clause. This is the focus of the diachronic investigation in Chapter 7, which demonstrates how the specificational it-cleft has acquired these construction-specific properties over time. First, however, we must address the idiosyncratic structural properties shared by all types of it-cleft, such as the restrictive modification of the pronoun it, the obligatory extraposition of the cleft clause, and the construction‟s unusual agreement patterns. In Chapter 6, I show that these properties are historical remnants of an earlier period of English. The historical evidence provides both an explanation for these idiosyncratic properties and demonstrable support for a discontinuous constituent account of it-clefts.
Chapter 6 The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
1.
Beyond the present-day language system
At this point, we begin our investigation into the history and diachrony of the English it-cleft. In the remaining chapters, I show how, once we look beyond inheritance from the present-day language system, we can find an explanation for some of the residual construction-specific properties which remain unaccounted for on our analysis. Before investigating the development of, and changes to, the construction in Chapter 7, I begin, in this chapter, with a consideration of the properties that have stayed the same over time. Here, I examine the it-cleft‟s structural idiosyncrasies in relation to the language system of earlier periods of English. As I explained in Chapter 4, there are some aspects of the discontinuous constituent account of it-clefts that remain a puzzle. On this analysis, the cleft clause is a restrictive relative clause, which modifies the cleft pronoun it. However, we have already seen (in Chapter 4, Section 1.3.1) that proper names and pronouns cannot normally be modified by restrictive relatives. How then do we explain this fundamental structural property, which has played an instrumental role in our analysis so far? A further difficulty is the extraposed position of the cleft clause. While extraposed relative clauses are not uncommon, extraposition-from-NP is not normally obligatory. In itclefts, however, the cleft clause cannot appear in a position adjacent to its pronominal antecedent. The success of a discontinuous constituent account therefore depends on an answer to the question, why is the relative clause always extraposed? The final puzzle of interest to us here relates to agreement. As we have seen in Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3, the person agreement data largely supports a discontinuous constituent account, in that the verb in the cleft clause typically agrees with the third person pronoun it. Number agreement, on the other hand, seems to follow the opposite pattern, with the embedded verb agreeing with plural foci, rather than with the inherently singular pronoun it. In order to account for these agreement facts, I suggested that in it-clefts with plural foci, the discontinuous description is interpreted as a kind of collective entity – that is, as having both singular and plural conceptualizations. In Chapter 5, Section 2, I showed that this analysis neatly accounts
The early history of the English it-cleft
149
for the fact that number agreement works differently in specificational and predicational it-clefts. Nevertheless, we have yet to provide any real evidence for it. The question remains, why is number agreement in it-clefts not straightforward? In this chapter, I provide an answer for each of the above questions by outlining the relevant historical evidence. In many ways, my approach here follows from Declerck‟s (1983b: 15) suggestion that the proverbial it-cleft configuration is “reminiscent of an older stage in the English language”. On the assumption that proverbial, predicational and specificational it-clefts share the same discontinuous constituent structure (see Chapter 5, Section 2), it follows that the it-cleft schema may itself be characterized as a historical remnant, which better reflects the language system of earlier periods of English. The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, I outline the early history of the it-cleft construction, discussing the various debates over its first attestation. I then go on, in Sections 3, 4 and 5, to address each of the three problem cases in turn: the restrictive modification of the pronoun it, the obligatory extraposition of the cleft clause and the unusual pattern of number agreement. In Section 6, I examine some new evidence which is specific to the historical data – that of gender agreement. We will see that the it-cleft‟s early gender agreement patterns represent very clear evidence in support of a discontinuous constituent account. Finally, in Section 7, I provide an account of the construction‟s origin and diachronic development which is consistent with the historical evidence. I conclude that the it-cleft structure has become increasingly idiosyncratic over time, not as a result of any internal changes, but in relation to the surrounding language system.
2.
The early history of the English it-cleft
For many authors, the it-cleft is an Early Middle English development. For example, Ball (1991), whose work constitutes the most comprehensive diachronic treatment of the cleft construction to date, suggests that the first specificational it-cleft does not arise in her data until the late thirteenth century; she provides the following example of an early focus-first it-cleft from The South English Legendary. (1)
„A-bidez,‟ quath þis holie man: „ore louerd is guod and freo. þe deuel it is þat bringuth þis wedur…‟
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The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
„Stay, said this holy man, our Lord is good and free. The devil it is that brings this weather…‟ (1280-90 South English Legendary [Ball 1991: 158]) Ball‟s findings are supported by the observations of both Visser (1963) and Mitchell (1985a). For instance, Visser (1963: 49) does not identify any Old English cleft tokens with it (or hit); he notes that “hit is omitted” in Old English, “or its place is taken by þæt”. Likewise, Mitchell (1985a: 622) does not find any Old English examples “corresponding to the modern use of „it‟ to give emphasis, as in „It‟s food that I want‟”. He elaborates, “This is not surprising, since OE achieves the same emphasis by giving the noun initial position”, providing the example given as (2) below (Mitchell 1985a: 622). Visser (1963: 49) cites this same example as an OE cleft, without hit. (2)
…min fæder is þe me wuldrað …my father is that me glorifies „It is my father that glorifies me‟ (Ælfric, Catholic Homilies [Ball 1991: 27])
In proposing her origin story for the Early Middle English it-cleft, it seems that Ball is influenced by the accounts of Visser and Mitchell. She suggests that the specificational it-cleft developed out of this Old English NP beon relative clause configuration due to the rise of expletive subjects in Middle English. She notes, “the focused subject [of (2), min fæder] becomes the predicate complement and dummy hit appears in its place” (Ball 1991: 68). Recently, however, Filppula (2009) has reconsidered the Old English evidence, extracting tokens from the York-Toronto-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Old English Prose (YCOE). He concludes that “YCOE contains several clear examples of clefts with hit that can be considered specificational in meaning and hence genuine instances of it-clefts” (Filppula 2009: 277). Although I adopt a very different methodology from Filppula (see Chapter 7, Section 2), I agree with him on this point. I have identified seven tokens in the YCOE that clearly warrant a specificational it-cleft analysis, including (3) below. (3)
& cyðde hit þam Iudean. þæt hit wære se hælend þe hyne hælde. (cowsgosp,Jn_[WSCp]:5.15.6088) „[The man went away] and told the Jews that it was Jesus who had healed him.‟ (Ball 1991: 40)
The early history of the English it-cleft
151
Interestingly, this token also appears in Ball‟s data. However, she analyses it (and other similar examples) as having a subtly different function as well as a different structure from the it-cleft proper (see Ball 1991: 63–67). I discuss this aspect of Ball‟s analysis, and identify several problems with it, in Section 6 of this chapter. The YCOE data also includes six examples of the predicational it-cleft construction, including (4). In this token, Zosimus incorrectly classifies the individual praying as a spirit rather than as a living being. A predicational interpretation for (4) is confirmed when, later in the text, the individual in question (who turns out to be St. Mary of Egypt) says ic nan gast ne eom ac æmerge and axe and eall flæsc („I am no spirit, but embers and ashes, and all flesh‟ (Skeat 1881a: 21)). Here, the NP spirit is clearly used to express a property rather than to refer to an individual. (4)
Đa þa he on þære eorðan læg astreht þa hwon hit gast wære þæt ðær mid hwylcere hiwunga gebæde hi. (comary,LS_23_[MaryofEgypt]:278.187) „Whilst then he lay prostrate on the earth he [was troubled in his mind, considering whether] at all it might be a spirit that, by some strange appearance, was praying there‟ (Skeat 1881a: 19)
Ball (1991) agrees that such tokens represent early examples of the presentday predicational it-cleft. On Ball‟s analysis then, the specificational it-cleft is a more recent construction than the predicational it-cleft; for her, the two types of it-cleft are therefore both structurally and historically distinct (see Chapter 5, Section 2.1). The present-day demonstrative cleft is also attested in Old English. For example, Ball (1991) identifies several Old English tokens with the structure þæt/þis NP beon relative clause, including (5) and (6) below. The data is comprised of both specificational and predicational tokens. For instance, (5) seems to me to be a clear occurrence of a specificational that-cleft. Likewise, (6) is analysed by Ball (1991: 38) as an OE predicational thiscleft containing an indefinite NP predicate. Here, the vision revealed to the young man is described as being a wonderful vision. (5)
…he þa wolde ȝyt cunnian, hwæt þæt wære, þæt he ær ȝehyrde. „…he still wanted to verify what that/it was that he had heard.‟ (Gregory‟s Dialogues [Ball 1991: 36])
152
(6)
The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
Đis is to soþan sum wundorlic gesihð þe god ælmihtig þysan geongan men onwreogan hæfð. „This is truly a wonderful vision that God Almighty has revealed to this young man‟ (The Seven Sleepers, ÆLS 23 [Ball 1991: 38])
In conclusion then, it seems that the present-day it-cleft construction dates back to the Old English period. Despite some disagreement regarding the earliest attestation of the specificational it-cleft variety, the YCOE data includes tokens which clearly have a specifying function and which can be accounted for straightforwardly by assuming a discontinuous constituent analysis of specificational it-clefts (see further, Section 6). What is more, the Old English data exhibits the same family of constructions that we find in present-day English, with specificational and predicational varieties of itand demonstrative clefts occurring side by side. This means that the structural configuration shared by all of these constructions (referred to as the cleft schema in Chapter 4, Section 1.1) is not a recent development, but a relic from earliest English. This provides support for the historical approach adopted in this chapter, in which the (now) idiosyncratic properties of the cleft configuration are reconsidered in relation to the language system of earlier periods of English.
3.
A restrictively modified pronoun?
As noted above, in Section 1, the cleft structure is unusual in that the cleft clause restrictively modifies the cleft pronoun. However, though atypical, it should be noted that restrictively modified pronouns do occur in presentday English, albeit in restricted environments. For example, relative clauses can restrict the very general type specification of indefinite pronouns, shown in (7). Furthermore, for some speakers, definite object pronouns can be followed by reduced relatives in expressions such as (8) and (9) below. (7)
[someone [who lives here]]
(8)
[them [round the corner]]
(9)
[him [next door]]
In addition, restrictively modified pronouns occur in formulaic expressions, such as (10). Here, the pronoun he and the following relative clause form a
A restrictively modified pronoun?
153
definite description (akin to the one who laughs last), which is used to refer to a hypothetical entity. (10)
[He [who laughs last]] laughs longest
Although no longer a productive pattern, the example in (10) is an instance of a historically much more regular construction involving determinative pronouns; that is, pronouns modified by restrictive relatives.1 Perhaps then, the present-day cleft structure is also an instance of the once productive determinative pronoun construction. There is considerable historical evidence in support of such a claim. For instance, the early demonstrative clefts clearly warrant a determinative pronoun analysis. As Ball (1991: 58–59) comments, þæt and þis could both occur with restrictive relative clauses in Old English, shown in (11) and (12). Note that in (12), the relative clause is adjacent to the demonstrative þis, in a position that is unacceptable in present-day English, shown in (13). On the basis of such evidence, Ball analyses Old English þæt- and þis-clefts, including (5) and (6) above, as determinative pronoun constructions involving extraposition-from-NP. (11)
Hi forbærndon ða ða burh 7 ðæt ðe binnan hyre wæs „They burnt then the city and that which was in it.‟ (The Heptateuch, Josh [Ball 1991: 59])
(12)
la, Petrus, þis þæt ic þe sæde, mæȝ beon hrædlice ȝecyðed. lo Peter this that I you said may be quickly proved „What I have said, Peter, can be quickly proved.‟ (Gregory‟s Dialogues [Ball 1991: 58])
(13)
*This that I said to you can be quickly proved
(Ball 1991: 58)
There is also evidence for analysing the it-cleft as a (now conventionalized) instance of the determinative pronoun construction. Like that and this 1. I follow Ball (1991) and Declerck (1988) among others in describing pronouns modified in this way as determinative. However, Curme (1931) uses the term in a slightly different sense from other authors. He suggests that the clausal component in it-clefts and other determinative pronoun constructions is a “subject clause” rather than a restrictive relative. On this account, the cleft it and other determinatives serve as “anticipatory subject[s], pointing to the following subject clause” (Curme 1931: 188).
154
The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
(or þæt and þis), it could also, at one time, function as a determinative pronoun. In the Middle English examples below, (h)it occurs as the immediate antecedent of a restrictive relative clause. (14)
…forhohe forte don hit þæt te þuncheð uuel of & eil forte heren. (c1220-25 CMHALI,142.261) „...unless they scorn to do what they think wrong and ill to hear of‟ (Cockayne 1866: 24)
(15)
þis is it þat settiþ þee in silence… „This is what sets you in silence…‟ (e15th The Book of Privy Counselling [Ball 1991: 59])
According to Ball (1991: 59), the determinative use of it does not appear until Early Middle English; she states that “Hit, to my knowledge, does not occur in construction with a relative clause in OE”. However, the YCOE contains 16 tokens in which a relative clause is analysed as having the antecedent hit, all of which involve extraposed relatives, as in (16) and (17). While these extraposed clauses could be independent from, yet coreferential with, hit, we cannot rule out a determinative interpretation, on which hit is restrictively modified. At the very least, these tokens are relevant to an extraposition analysis of it-clefts and suggest that a determinative use of it may have originated in such extraposition structures (see also Section 4). (16)
Ne þæt to nahte nyt ne biþ þæt man godne mete ete oþþe þæt betste win on gebeorscipe drince, gif þæt gelimpeþ þæt he hit eft spiwende anforlæteþ, þæt he ær to blisse nam & to lichoman nyttnesse. (coblick,HomS_17_[BlHom_5]:57.35.701) „It is all to no purpose for a man to eat good meat, or at a feast to drink the best wine, if it happeneth that he afterwards spews up and loses that which he previously received for enjoyment, and for the advantage of his body‟ (Morris 1880: 56)
(17)
Ne wiðcweþe we be þære eadigan Marian þa ecan æriste þeah for wærscipe gehealdenum geleafan us gedafenað þæt we hit wenon swiþor þonne we unrædlice hit geseþan. þæt ðe is uncuð buton ælcere fræcednysse. (cocathom1,ÆCHom_I,_30:431.80.5925) „Nor do we deny the eternal resurrection of the blessed Mary, though for caution, preserving our belief, it befits us that we rather hope it, than rather rashly assert what is unknown without any danger‟ (Thorpe 1844: 441)
A restrictively modified pronoun?
155
In addition to providing us with the relevant determinative structure, the language system of earlier periods of English also helps to account for the semantic interpretation of the early cleft tokens. As shown in (3), the OE hit-clefts, like their present-day counterparts, can occur with human foci; in this instance, the discontinuous NP characterizes a human referent. In present-day English, this is difficult to account for, since it is associated with reference to non-human entities. In Old English, however, the pronoun it could also be used to refer to human individuals. For instance, in the OE example given in (18), hit is used as the subject of a predicational sentence to refer back to the old man. In present-day English, we would instead have he as the subject.2 (18)
Hwæt is þes ealda man? Se engel him to cwæþ, Hit is an biscop se dyde mare yfel þonne god… „“Who is this old man?” The angel said to him: “He is a bishop who did more evil than good…”‟ (The Blickling Homilies [Ball 1991: 25])
The history of the pronoun it therefore offers a plausible explanation as to how and why the discontinuous constituent of it-clefts can describe or refer to human entities, in specificational and predicational varieties respectively. This hypothesis is supported by the correspondence that exists between the cleft it and the determinative uses of he and she in present-day English. As shown in (19) below, he and she had a determinative function in Middle English (see Ball 1991: 147). However, unlike determinative it and this, he and she can still sometimes occur with adjacent relative clauses, as shown in (10) above. (19)
Bridgume iss he þatt hafeþ þ brid „The bridegroom is the one that has the bride‟ (c1175 The Ormulum [Ball 1991: 147])
2. Indeed, he replaces it in an Early Middle English version: (i)
þa escade paul to mihhal hwet þe alde mon were. þa cweð mihhal heh angel he wes an biscop on eoðre liue… „Then Paul asked Michael who the old man was. Then said Michael the Archangel: He was a bishop in the other life…‟ (1185-1225 Lambeth Homilies [Ball 1991: 25])
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The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
In support of a determinative pronoun analysis of proverbial it-clefts, Declerck (1988: 155) notes that when the discontinuous NP refers to a human entity, “the pronoun it can be replaced with the more regular determinative pronouns he/she” (emphasis added). Making this same point, Curme (1931: 189) discusses the following examples, in which the hypothetical human who follows his own instructions can be introduced either with determinative it or he. (20)
It is a good divine that follows his own instructions (Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice [Curme 1931: 189])
(21)
He is a good divine who follows his own instructions (Curme 1931: 189)
In conclusion then, the evidence from Old and Middle English provides a suitable historical context for the discontinuous constituent analysis of itand demonstrative clefts argued for here. We have seen that the restrictive modification of pronouns was once a much more productive pattern, with it, that and this occurring in positions adjacent to modifying relatives. Furthermore, we have found that the pronoun it could at one time be used with human reference. This explains just how it is possible for discontinuous descriptions headed by neuter it to describe or refer to human entities in specificational and predicational it-clefts respectively, as shown in (3) and (20) above. Finally, we have found that it, like that and this, may have been used determinatively since Old English, occurring in sentences with extraposed relatives, and that the “more regular” determinative pronouns he and she can, like the cleft it, occur with extraposed relative clauses, as in (21). This historical evidence provides support for a discontinuous constituent (or extraposition-from-NP) analysis of both the earliest OE cleft tokens and their present-day counterparts. Most authors agree that at least some types of it-cleft require an analysis on which the pronoun it has a determinative function. While Declerck (1983b, 1988) limits this analysis to proverbial itclefts and Ball (1977, 1991) applies it to her predicational tokens as well as to all types of Old English demonstrative cleft, the historical facts provide equal evidence in support of a determinative analysis for the specificational it-cleft subtype. They show without doubt that the proposed cleft structure, on which an extraposed relative clause restrictively modifies the cleft pronoun, was motivated by the language system of earlier periods of English, inheriting properties from the then productive determinative pronoun construction and conforming to historical uses of the pronoun it.
An obligatorily extraposed relative clause?
4.
157
An obligatorily extraposed relative clause?
Nevertheless, a question remains with this historical account of the presentday it-cleft. If the cleft it is truly a determinative pronoun, then how do we account for the fact that the extraposition of the cleft clause is obligatory? In other words, why can the cleft clause never occur in a position adjacent to the pronoun it? While the fixed position of the cleft clause has been regarded by many as a strong argument against an extraposition-from-NP analysis (see Jespersen 1937: 84–85, for example), I present evidence that demonstrates that the present-day it-cleft configuration is better attuned to the language system of Old English, when the extraposition of relative clauses was very much the preferred option. I suggest that while the language system has changed, the it-cleft has retained the earlier pattern as an entrenched (fixed) form. Although extraposed relatives are not especially uncommon in presentday English (see Francis 2010: 65), they are clearly atypical, and on some models of language are said to derive from their “more basic”, non-extraposed counterparts. In Old English, however, relative clauses are routinely found sentence-finally. For instance, O‟Neil (1977: 199) goes so far as to say that “the most striking characteristic of the relative clause [in OE is] the fact that such clauses are (almost) always at the margins of the main clause, (almost) never flanked by material from the main clause”, as in (22) below. (22)
[þa men common on East Engle [þe onþæm anum scipe wære]] „the men came to East Anglia who on the one ship were‟ (O‟Neil 1977: 200)
On this basis, O‟Neil argues against a derivational account of such tokens, on which the relative clause is underlyingly embedded under NP. He notes that it is only by the Middle English period that relative clauses are regularly found in a position adjacent to their nominal antecedents. More recently, Suárez-Gómez (2006) has provided empirical support for O‟Neil‟s claim. She examines a database of 518 Late Old English and Early Middle English relative clauses, which excludes clause-final tokens that do not have the potential to show variation in their position with respect to the main clause. Suárez-Gómez (2006: 80) finds that “In LOE extraposed relative clauses are almost twice as frequent as clause-internal relative clauses. However in EME the frequency of integrated clauses increases importantly and even slightly outnumbers extraposed relative clauses”. She takes this as evidence of “a clear development” whereby relative clauses, which initially
158
The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
“appear adjoined to the margins of the main clause” in positions extraposed from their antecedents, have become more integrated (or intraposed) within the main clause (Suárez-Gómez 2006: 127). This evidence suggests that the extraposed structure of the early it-clefts was consistent with the behaviour of OE relative clauses, more generally. It could also account for the fact that determinative it does not appear with adjacent relative clauses until Early Middle English (see Section 3). The overall picture then, is of an originally well-motivated it-cleft construction which conforms to wider generalizations involving relative clauses and determinative pronouns. It seems then that while relative clauses “gradually became more integrated with the sentences to which they were attached” (Ball 1991: 60), the it-cleft construction simply retained the older pattern.3 This raises the following question: why didn‟t this change also affect the relative clause in it-clefts? In other words, why has the it-cleft construction been safeguarded against changes to the wider language system? The reason must be that the OE it-cleft configuration is still motivated in some way. In other words, while the obligatorily extraposed cleft clause is no longer consistent with the behaviour of relative clauses more generally, the cleft structure (as a whole) has come to be aligned with, and supported by, other basic patterns and principles in the language system. As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 1.1, the cleft configuration conforms to some highly general information structure principles, such as the tendency for heavier constituents to occur near the end of the clause (see Hawkins 1994, 2004; Wasow 1997, 2002). This, accompanied by the fact that focal information is placed within a cognitively-preferred clause-final position, makes the cleft structure particularly well suited to linguistic generalizations brought about by processing demands.
3. In addition to its extraposed position, the present-day cleft clause may also have retained another trait of the early English relative clause. Fischer et al. (2000: 93) note that in Old and Middle English, zero relatives were most common where the antecedent acts as the subject of the proposition in the relative clause, as in (ii). While zero-subject restrictive relatives are no longer found in presentday English, Fischer et al. (2000: 94) note that the early tokens “closely resemble the zero-type still acceptable” in it-clefts and there be sentences (see Chapter 4, Section 1.3.1). (ii) I know no knight in this contrey [Ø] is able to macche hym „…I know no knight in this country [who] is able to match him (Malory, Works [Fischer et al. 2000: 93])
An obligatorily extraposed relative clause?
159
Indeed, Suárez-Gómez (2006) finds evidence which suggests that the principle of end-weight is a contributing factor in the position of relative clauses in Early Middle English. While in Old English, extraposition is preferred irrespective of length, as integrated clauses start to become more frequent, it is only the longer relative clauses that are still associated with extraposition (Suárez-Gómez 2006: 103). Suárez-Gómez does not measure the influence of length relative to that of the main clause, which may have more relevance for the preservation of cleft structure than absolute length.4 Nevertheless, the data supports a scenario in which the it-cleft was shielded from the initial move towards embedded relative clauses in EME as a consequence of its information structure. In addition, prosodic factors could help to explain why the extraposed position of the cleft clause is obligatory. As we saw in Section 3 above, the pronoun it begins to appear with adjacent relative clauses in Early Middle English. However, in most of these examples, the determinative description occurs in a postverbal position. Ball (1991: 263) claims that “for whatever reason, it + relative clause is not attested in first position”. Although this statement may be too strong for the Middle English corpus employed here,5 intraposed relatives adjacent to clause-initial it do seem to be dispreferred. From this, we might conclude that the historical non-occurrence of it-clefts with non-extraposed (or intraposed) relatives is part of a more general phenomenon affecting the determinative it. Bolinger (1977: 76) offers a possible explanation, attributing it to the prosody of English; he notes that “It is normally stressless, but in initial position followed by an obligatory stressless that it would have to be stressed”.6 4. See also Francis (2010), who finds that relative weight is a significant factor in the extraposition of relative clauses in present-day English. 5. There is one example in the PPCME2 in which it + relative clause functions as a left-dislocated subject, introducing a conjoined proposition, shown in (iii). (iii) And hit þat Saynt Nycholas hadde by hys holy prayer, hit was of such fuson and plente, þat hit fond all þe pepull to ete and to sowe þe ȝerthe aftyr (a1415-1500 CMMIRK,13.363) „And that which Saint Nicholas received by his holy prayer, [it] was of such abundance and plenty, that it provided [for] all the people to eat and to sow the garden [there]after‟ 6. Although it-clefts with intraposed relatives are not attested, we do find examples with determinative it that can be interpreted as reverse specificational sentences; that is as specificational inversion constructs. For example, in this token
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The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
Ball (1991: 60) suggests that there may also be interpretive reasons why the cleft clause “never came together with its antecedent, but remained in fixed clause-final position”. Discussing a determinative pronoun analysis of the OE predicational tokens, she notes that, as in present-day English, the focal noun is often interpreted as given information, forming part of the discontinuous referring expression (see Chapter 5, Section 2). For instance, (6) above, repeated here as (23), describes the vision revealed to the young man. In contrast, in the non-extraposed version, translated in (24), this that (or þis þe) is interpreted more generally as what. Ball (1991: 61) concludes that the correct interpretation of the predicational cleft “depends crucially on the relative clause coming after the predicate nominal, so that there were sound interpretive reasons for its staying put”. (23)
Đis is to soþan sum wundorlic gesihð þe god ælmihtig þysan geongan men onwreogan hæfð. „This is truly a wonderful vision that God Almighty has revealed to this young man‟ (The Seven Sleepers, LS 34 [Ball 1991: 38, 58])
(24)
*This that God Almighty has revealed…is truly a wonderful vision (Ball 1991: 38, 58)
As a final possibility, we might speculate that, over time, it-clefts have come to align less with (the now integrated) relative clauses, and more with other kinds of extraposition construction. While we are used to thinking of extraposed sentences as less basic structures, studies have repeatedly shown that, for clausal subjects (such as that-clauses and to-infinitives), extraposition is more common than non-extraposition (see Erdmann 1987; Kaltenböck 2004); Calude (2008a: 13) concludes, “extraposition appears to be the norm rather than the exception”. Thus, while it-clefts have a distinct structure, in that they do not involve the extraposition of a complete subject expression, the superficial similarity that exists between it-clefts and cases of it-extraposition could well provide support for the it-cleft‟s outward appearfrom Early Modern English, that (the act of unconditional friendship) is specified as the thing that allows us to „benefit mankind‟, „better ourselves‟ and so make ourselves „dearer to God‟. Such examples show that, at earlier periods of English, it-clefts (like other subtypes of specificational inversion sentence) had corresponding “non-inverted” forms (cf. example (5) in Chapter 4, Section 1.1). (iv) …and indeed that is it that can make the difference; we must be friends to all… (1662 JETAYLORMEAS-E3-P1,14.63)
An obligatorily extraposed relative clause?
161
ance, as shown in (25) and (26). Indeed, Pérez-Guerra (1998) explores the historical relationship between it-clefts and it-extraposition and finds that they undergo a parallel increase in frequency from the Early Modern period onwards.7 (25)
It was the Colonel that survived
(26)
It is a miracle that he survived
[it-cleft] [extraposed that-clause]
We can conclude then that while the cleft clause‟s extraposed position is no longer consistent with the behaviour of restrictive relative clauses more generally, this was not always the case. At earlier stages of English, relative clauses frequently occurred at the margins of the main clause. As the external structure of relative clauses has undergone change, leading to more integration between the relative and its antecedent, the it-cleft has remained the same. Now, the it-cleft‟s extraposed structure is supported largely by a combination of interpretive, information structural and prosodic factors as well as via analogy with other extraposition constructions. Therefore, while the motivation for cleft structure is less direct in the system of present-day English, the it-cleft can still be shown to conform to larger generalizations. Furthermore, even though the fixed, discontinuous relationship between the cleft clause and its pronominal antecedent is now specific to the cleft schema, the internal structure of the cleft clause is nevertheless inherited from the restrictive relative clause construction. Again, this is supported by historical evidence. Undertaking a comparative study of the relative markers in NP-focus it-clefts and restrictive relative clauses, Ball (1994b) finds that the cleft clause and other restrictive relatives have undergone parallel diachronic developments. Focusing on clauses in which the gap functions as the subject of the embedded verb, Ball shows that in both it-clefts and restrictive relatives, that is the preferred complementizer up until the eighteenth century, when there is a sharp increase in the use of wh-pronouns. However, Ball notes that while the pronoun which undergoes a rise in the eighteenth century, it never achieves the same high frequency as who. Ball interprets this data as 7. Pérez-Guerra suggests that this increase may be tied to a corresponding decrease in right-dislocation structures. While in right-dislocation, the dislocated constituent is “syntactically loose”, in it-clefts and it-extraposition, the extraposed clause is “integrated at sentence level” (Pérez-Guerra 1998: 15). From this perspective, the cleft construction actually conforms to the tendency for languages to move towards more integrated structures.
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The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
evidence of a paradigmatic shift in the system of relative markers (see also Ball 1996). She notes that during the seventeenth century, who replaces personal which, leading to a distinction in the restrictive relative paradigm between personal and non-personal antecedents. This is followed by the assignment of that to the non-personal category. As a result of the decline in that with personal antecedents, who has become the dominant form for cleft clauses and restrictive relatives with personal subject antecedents, at least in standard written British English. On the other hand, non-personal which remains in competition with that and so is not subject to the same rate of increase. Ball argues that it-clefts and restrictive relative clauses undergo these same changes at roughly the same time and at the same rate. She notes that “the rate of decrease in that with personal antecedents is not significantly different in clefts and restrictive relatives, a finding which supports the hypothesis that cleft complements and restrictive relative clauses share a syntactic structure” (Ball 1994b: 196). Therefore, the historical evidence suggests that while its extraposed position is reminiscent of an earlier stage of the language, the cleft clause is nevertheless a fully-fledged restrictive relative which inherits its internal structure from the more productive construction.
5.
An unusual pattern of agreement?
Assuming a discontinuous constituent analysis of cleft structure, the specificational it-cleft displays an unusual pattern of number agreement, in that the verb embedded inside the cleft clause does not formally agree with its antecedent – the singular pronoun it. For instance, in (27), the embedded verb (are) is plural, in agreement with the focal NP (John and Margaret). In contrast, the subject pronoun and the matrix copula are both marked as singular (it is). So, we might ask, what is the history of this curious system of number agreement? (27)
It‟s John and Margaret who are responsible
On first appearances, the diachronic data does not seem overly helpful. For instance, it is well known that throughout the it-cleft‟s entire history, the verb in the cleft clause shows agreement with the focal NP, rather than with the initial it (see Ball 1991). Consequently, we cannot claim that this pattern of number agreement has undergone change. However, what has
An unusual pattern of agreement?
163
changed over time is the behaviour of the matrix copula. In what follows, I show that the history of agreement in the matrix clause in fact provides us with a way of understanding how present-day agreement works in the cleft clause. Throughout Old English and well into Middle English, the matrix verb agrees in number with the clefted constituent (see Visser 1963: 49 and Ball 1991: 283–288). For example, the text in (28) contains two it-clefts. In the first, the form of the copula is agrees with the singular referent your own spirit. However, in the second instance, the matrix verb and the postcopular NP are both marked as plural. (28)
…when it is þin owe spirite þat spekiþ þees iueles, or it ben þees oþer iuel spirites þat speken hem in þee. „…when it is your own spirit that speaks these evils, or it {are/is} these other evil spirits that speak them in you‟ (e15th A Tretis of Discrescyon of Spirites [Ball 1991: 286])
It is not until the early fifteenth century that we begin to see the situation that we have today, with the matrix copula being marked as singular, even in cases where the clefted constituent refers to plural entities. Example (29), which is from a slightly later manuscript of the same text as (28), shows the more modern pattern. Here, the postcopular NP is plural but the matrix verb is in the singular form. (29)
…or it is þees oþer iuel spirites… „…or it is these other evil spirits… (mid-15th A Tretis of Discrescyon of Spirites [Ball 1991: 286])
So how should we account for the it-cleft‟s early agreement pattern and what can it tell us about the present-day it-cleft? Once again, the answer lies in the history of the cleft pronoun it. Throughout Old and Early Middle English, the pronoun it could sometimes be used with plural reference (see Mitchell 1985a: 622). For example, in (30), OE hit is used to refer back to three different events, classed here as signs. (30)
And eac his æriste of daeðe, and his upstige to heofenum, and ealle ða wundra þe he worhte, ealle hit wæron tacna… „And, likewise, his resurrection from death, and his ascension to heaven, and all the wonders which he wrought – all these were signs…‟ (Ælfric, Catholic Homilies [Thorpe 1844: 146, 147])
164
The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
Similarly, in the EME token in (31), hit is used alongside ha (they) to refer to a plural referent, the clever and wise words. (31)
…witti ant wise w[o]rdes hit weren ȝef ha neren false… „…clever and wise words they would be if they weren‟t false…‟ (1200-25 Seinte Katerine [Ball 1991: 154])
From this, it follows that, in (28) above, the plural copula (ben) shows agreement, not only with the plural postcopular constituent, but also with the pronoun it. So, in the earlier it-cleft agreement pattern then, number marking is actually consistent across the whole of the construction. The historical facts therefore demonstrate that while the verb embedded in the cleft clause has always been subject to plural marking (in agreement with the clefted constituent), this was originally in agreement both with the matrix copula and, most importantly, with its nominal antecedent – the determinative it. For example, in the Old English it-cleft in (32), taken from the YCOE, the verb in the cleft clause (feallan) carries the plural present ending -að, and so shows agreement with the plural marking (-an) of the postcopular masculine noun steorra. However, since the matrix copula sind is also formally plural, we may assume that the initial hit is also plural, being used to describe a plural entity. (32)
Ac hit ne sind na steorran þæt ðær feallað „But it is not stars that fall there‟ (cotempo,ÆTemp:9.1.286)
For the early it-cleft tokens then, number agreement is accounted for easily on a discontinuous constituent analysis: the cleft clause shows agreement with its pronominal antecedent, which can be used to refer to or describe both singular and plural entities. Therefore, the historical it-cleft tokens are not problematic for this account in the same way as their present-day counterparts. Thus, we have seen that the earlier number agreement pattern is consistent with a discontinuous constituent analysis (and in fact with any analysis) of it-clefts and that the more unusual, present-day pattern is a development. So how can we account for this change? As we have already seen, the pronoun it was once maximally underspecified; that is, it could describe or refer to plural as well as singular individuals and to human as well as non-human referents (see example (18) above). To an extent, the specificational it-cleft has retained this historical flexibility, in that the present-day it-cleft permits both human and plural foci. In these sentences,
An unusual pattern of agreement?
165
a discontinuous NP headed by it can describe (or be predicated of) singular or plural, human or non-human referents. However, since in most contexts the pronoun it has come to be restricted to denoting non-human, singular individuals, the cleft it is also perceived of as a morphologically singular pronoun (by analogy). This is demonstrated by the changes to subject-verb agreement in the matrix clause, as the matrix copula now consistently takes the singular form. The development of it as an invariably singular pronoun has therefore created a complicated pattern of number agreement. Although the discontinuous NP still describes plural entities and the verb in the cleft clause still takes plural marking, the cleft pronoun and the matrix verb are formally singular. The historical evidence therefore supports an analysis of the present-day it-cleft in which the cleft it is semantically underspecified and, although formally marked as such, is not limited to describing singular, non-human referents. On such an account, number agreement in the cleft clause is semantic, rather than morphosyntactic (see Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3). This is supported by those occasional examples in which the cleft clause does not show agreement with a plural postcopular NP. For instance, out of a handful of Late Middle English tokens with plural foci, Ball (1991: 307) points to the following example, also found in the PPCME2, in which the postcopular pronoun ye is plural but the embedded verb hath is marked as singular. She notes that while ye is formally plural, in this example, it has singular reference. Ball (1991: 307) concludes that “the embedded verb agrees in number with the referent of ye” (emphasis added). (33)
„Truly, sir‟, she seyde, „I trowe hit be nat ye that hath slayne my husbonde, for he that dud that dede is sore wounded, and is never lykly to be hole, that shall I ensure hym‟. (a1470 CMMALORY, 202.3233) „…it is not you that has slain my husband…‟ (Ball 1991: 307)
Visser (1963: 49) discusses a similar example from Early Modern English; he notes that “The form makes in the following passage from Shakespeare‟s All‟s Well (IV, ii, 21) is remarkable”. Here, the embedded verb does not agree with the postcopular plural NP the many oaths. Instead, makes shows agreement with the referent for which this negative it-cleft holds true (the plain single vow), even though this is not specified until later in the sentence. Similar examples occur in present-day English, where agreement in the cleft clause seems to be governed by semantic factors, such as the act of specification (see Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3).
166
(34)
The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
„Tis not the many oaths that makes the truth, But the plain single vow that is vow‟d true (Shakespeare, All‟s Well That Ends Well [Visser 1963: 49])
However, while number agreement in specificational it-clefts therefore seems to be semantic, the cleft clause in predicational tokens shows formal agreement with the cleft pronoun. As we saw in Chapter 5, Section 2.3, present-day predicational clefts with plural foci are introduced by plural pronouns, such as they. Yet again, this agreement pattern seems to result from changes to the pronoun it. According to Visser (1963: 50), they-clefts date back to the sixteenth century. The development of this construction therefore follows the reanalysis of it, occurring only after its matrix copula is consistently marked as singular. Before this time, plural predicational clefts are also introduced by the underspecified pronoun it, as shown in this Early Middle English token from the PPCME2 (see also Ball 1991: 154). (35)
Ah ȝet me teoneð mare þt ha tuket ure godes to balewe & to bismere & seid hit beoð deoflen þt in ham dearieð. (c1200-25 CMKATHE,27.136) „But it grieves me yet more, that she brings our gods into contempt and derision; and says that they are devils that lurk within them.‟ (Ball 1991: 154)
Interestingly, the changes to the pronoun it in Middle English are followed by a period of variation, in which specificational clefts with plural foci can also be introduced by plural pronouns. For example, in this Early Modern English they-cleft from Locke, the collective entity our offspring is contrasted with other species as the things we neglect to discipline when young. In present-day English, this token would be introduced by it, which (along with the adverb only) suggests that the example prefers a specificational reading. (36)
We are generally wise enough to begin with them when they are very young and discipline betimes those other creatures we would make usefull to us. They are only our ofspring that we neglect in this point and haveing made them ill children we foolishly expect they should be good men. (1685 LOCKE-E3-H,51.125)
While both the specificational and predicational varieties of it-cleft have therefore been affected by the changing function of the pronoun it, this has
An unusual pattern of agreement?
167
nevertheless resulted in the development of different patterns of agreement for the two constructions. The fact that the specificational it-cleft did not fully develop (or, at least, did not retain) a variant with they, suggests that there is a semantic difference between the discontinuous constituents of specificational and predicational it-clefts. This, in turn, supports an inverse (rather than an equative) analysis of specificational meaning (see Chapter 5, Section 2.3). In particular, I have suggested that the discontinuous NP of the predicational tokens is marked for number because it refers to individuals. In contrast, the discontinuous NP of specificational it-clefts denotes a set. In examples with plural foci then, the description is conceptually both singular and plural, denoting a singular set with plural members. By not marking number until the act of specification is complete, the construction allows the speaker to contrast singular and plural entities as possible instantiations of the same set (see Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3). There is therefore a practical advantage for retaining the original, underspecified use of it in the specificational variety. However, on the account sketched here, we might also expect to see a difference in the introductory pronouns of specificational and predicational clefts with human foci; that is, for he or she to replace it in the predicational examples and for underspecified it to be found in the specificational tokens. The existence of predicational it-clefts like (37) disproves this rule. As den Dikken (2009: 6) notes, such examples “have postcopular predicates that should be predicated of humans”; he continues, “The use of referential it as the subject here raises some questions”. (37)
It‟s no RELIABLE man that you hired, but a crook (Declerck 1988: 160)
On the current analysis, such examples gain a historical explanation: the use of it with human reference is a relic from an earlier time. Nevertheless, there is variation in the introductory pronouns of predicational clefts which is not found in the specificational variety. This conforms to the predictions of the current account and provides additional evidence in support of it. As Curme (1931: 189) notes, We thus often use it even where we point to persons, provided the desire is to identify…; but when the desire is to describe, we may say with Shakespeare „It is a good divine that follows his own instructions‟ (Merchant of Venice, I, II, 15); or more commonly we replace it here by a personal pro-
168
The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
noun that indicates gender and number: „He is a good divine who follows his own instructions.‟8
In conclusion, the historical evidence has shown that number agreement in specificational it-clefts hasn‟t always been a problem for a discontinuous constituent analysis. In Old and Early Middle English, when it had variable reference, it-clefts with plural foci were marked as plural throughout. It is only with changes in the usage of it that the construction has developed its unusual pattern of number agreement, with the formally singular cleft it retaining its original semantic flexibility. The historical evidence therefore supports the account of number agreement sketched in Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3, and provides a reason for its idiosyncratic nature. In addition, the fact that the predicational it-cleft was more thoroughly affected by the changes to the pronoun it supports the claim, outlined in Chapter 3, Section 2, that specification is the inverse of predication, rather than an instance of equation. On this account, the discontinuous NP in specificational it-clefts is semantically predicative, rather than referring. However, it should be noted that while the history of number agreement strengthens the particular analysis of it-clefts argued for here, the history of person agreement seems to argue against such an account. We have already observed that in present-day English, the verb embedded in the cleft clause is typically in the third person and the postcopular NP is often found in the objective case. This pattern is consistent with an extraposition-from-NP analysis, on which the cleft clause modifies the third person pronoun it (see Chapter 4, Section 1.3.3). However, when personal pronouns first appear in postcopular position (in the Late Middle English period), they are always in the nominative case and the verb embedded in the cleft clause sometimes shows person agreement with the postcopular pronoun (see Ball 1991: 308– 309). Ball (1991: 309) provides the example in (38). Here, the embedded verb have agrees with the clefted constituent – the first person, nominative pronoun I. (38)
Wherefore it is onely I that haue offenced. (1531 Elyot Gouernour II [Ball 1991: 309])
8. Such variation does not seem to be limited to proverbial predicational tokens, as shown in (v). (v)
He‟s a good man (that) you‟ve got there
An unusual pattern of agreement?
169
This earlier agreement pattern would seem instead to provide evidence in favour of an expletive analysis of it-clefts, in which the postcopular NP functions as the underlying subject to the verb embedded in the cleft clause. However, there is additional evidence which argues against this conclusion. For one thing, postcopular personal pronouns are found in the nominative case even when they cannot function as the subject of the verb in the cleft clause. For example, in (39), hee is nominative, despite its correspondence to the object of the embedded proposition you love __ best. (39)
Why, is it hee you love best, quoth the Parson? (1597 DELONEY-E2-P1,16.235)
Furthermore, throughout the Middle English period, postcopular pronouns in simple copular sentences were also in the nominative case. Smith (1906: 78–81) cites several examples, including (40). Here, it is not possible to analyse the nominative pronoun he as subject of some additional clause. Instead, this pattern can be used in support of an inverse analysis of these specificational sentences. Smith (1906: 81) suggests that such examples are evidence of a “transition period”, during which time the postcopular pronoun changes from having subject to object status. (40)
…but by cause he knewe not his sheld he demed it was not he. (1485 Malory, Le Morte d‟Arthur (Cx) [Smith 1906: 80])
Discord between the person marking of the verb in the relative clause and that of its pronominal head, shown in (38), also extends beyond the itcleft construction. For example, the verb have in the reverse pseudocleft of (41) shows agreement with the subject of the matrix clause rather than with the third person determinative he. As Ball (1999) notes, this agreement pattern “can sometimes penetrate even a relative clause with a noun head”, such as that given in (42). (41)
Y am he that haue synned, and Y dide wickidli… „I am the one that have sinned, and I acted wickedly…‟ (a1440 Wycliffite Later Version [Ball 1991: 311; Ball 1999])
(42)
I am, said she, a gentylwoman that am disheryted, whiche was somtyme the rychest woman of the world. (1485 Malory, Le Morte d‟Arthur (Cx) [Ball 1999])
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The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
The earlier pattern of person agreement in it-clefts is therefore indicative of larger generalizations involving Late Middle English copular constructions and relative clauses. In truth then, the historical data does not necessarily support an expletive analysis of it-clefts and cannot be used as evidence against a discontinuous constituent account.
6.
The evidence from Old English gender agreement
In addition to the evidence involving earlier patterns of number and person agreement (which has helped to explain the agreement facts in present-day it-clefts), a historical perspective brings with it some new agreement data, concerning gender. In Old English, pronominal relatives inflect for gender, number and case; that is, they are in agreement with the gender and number of their antecedent nouns, while case is inflected according to the relative clause. The Old English cleft data is therefore extremely instructive, since we have an additional means with which to identify the structure of these early cleft sentences. In what follows, I show that gender agreement in OE it-clefts favours a discontinuous constituent analysis and is problematic for expletive accounts (on which the antecedent of the cleft clause is the clefted constituent, rather than the cleft pronoun). Indeed, the Old English tokens have often been discounted from earlier historical accounts because they do not conform to an expletive analysis, and so (on this thinking) cannot be considered true clefts. Old English has three different relativization strategies: relative clauses can be introduced by the indeclinable particle þe, by pronominal relatives inflected for gender (se, sēo, þæt), or by some combination of the two, such as the seþe relative (Mitchell and Robinson 2007: 76–77). For examining cleft structure, the relevant tokens are those in which the relative clause is not introduced by the indeclinable þe and where there is disagreement between the neuter cleft pronoun and the gender marking of the clefted constituent. In such cases, the form of the relative pronoun makes it possible for us to identify whether the antecedent is the neuter hit or the postcopular noun. There are 6 relevant tokens in the YCOE, out of a total of 13 it-clefts. In 5 of these 6 tokens, the relative pronoun is þæt. While relative that is now invariable (which was already standard by the thirteenth century), it is for the most part agreed that in Old English, neuter singular “þæt was still part of a well-preserved demonstrative/relative declension” (Mitchell 1985b: 108). Although we can identify precursors to the modern use of that in OE, lack of agreement involving neuter singular
The evidence from Old English gender agreement
171
þæt was very rare. Indeed, Mitchell (1985b: 101) finds that “most of the apparent examples of relative þæt showing lack of concord…can be otherwise explained”. Furthermore, OE þæt could function as the complement of a pied-piped preposition (as in þurh þt „by which‟), a characteristic unique to pronominal relatives (Suárez-Gómez 2006: 85). Therefore, the use of þæt in the YCOE cleft tokens suggests that the antecedent of the relative clause is the neuter pronoun hit. Among them, these 5 YCOE tokens represent both specificational and predicational varieties of it-cleft and contain both masculine and feminine postcopular nouns. (43), for instance, is clearly a predicational it-cleft (see the discussion of example (4) in Section 2). Here, the postcopular noun gast is masculine and so is at odds with the relative þæt. As Ball (1991: 39) notes, Bourcier (1977: 326) discusses this same example and takes hit to be the antecedent of the relative clause. (43)
Đa þa he on þære eorðan læg astreht þa hwon hit[n.] gast[m.] wære þæt[n.] ðær mid hwylcere hiwunga gebæde hi. (comary,LS_23_[MaryofEgypt]:278.187) „Whilst then he lay prostrate on the earth he [was troubled in his mind, considering whether] at all it might be a spirit that, by some strange appearance, was praying there‟ (Skeat 1881a: 19)
Example (44) is also predicational. Here, Philosophy describes the grace granted to the wicked as temporary rather than everlasting. The predicative noun gifu is feminine, but the relative clause is introduced by the neuter þæt rather than the feminine sēo. (44)
Đa cwæð ic: Nu ic (on)gite þæt hit[n.] (n)is ecu gifu[f.] þæt[n.] he gifð þæm yflum, ac is hwilchwugu eldcung & andbid þæs hehstan deman. (coboeth,Bo:38.119.33.2388) „Now I understand that it is not an everlasting grace that He granteth to the wicked, but a manner of delay and waiting for the Highest Judge.‟ (Sedgefield 1900: XXXVIII)
Example (45), however, is clearly specificational. Here, the neuter þæt does not agree with either Petrus or ængel, both of which are masculine. This leads Mitchell (1985b: 102) and Ball (1991: 67) to conclude that the initial pronoun hit is the antecedent of the relative clause. Mitchell (1985b: 102) says, “þæt refers back to hit”.
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þa cwædon þa geleafullan, Nis hit na Petrus þæt ðær not-is it-n. not Peter-m. REL-n. there cnucað, ac is his ængel.‟ knocks but is his angel-m. (cocathom1,ÆCHom_I,_ 34:474.247.6867) „Then the faithful said: It isn‟t Peter who is knocking there, but his angel.‟ (Ball 1991: 39, translation and gloss)
Similar examples are shown in (46) and (47). Here again, the postcopular nouns steorra and lichoma are both masculine, while the cleft clause is introduced by the neuter pronoun þæt. (46)
Ac hit[n.] ne sind na steorran[m.] þæt[n.] ðær feallað „But it is not stars that fall there‟ (cotempo,ÆTemp:9.1.286)
(47)
ond him ætywde ða wunda on his handum ond on his fotum ond þa gewundedan sidan, þæt hi þy soðlicor ongeaton þæt hit[n.] wæs soðlice his agen lichoma[m.] ðæt[n.] þær of deaðe aras. (comart3,Mart_5_[Kotzor]:Ma27,A.2.493) „and showed them the wounds on his hands and on his feet and his wounded side, that they might understand with greater certainty that it was truly his own body that had there arisen from death.‟ (Herzfeld 1900: 51–53)
In only one example does the relative pronoun agree in gender with the clefted constituent but not with the cleft pronoun. In (48), we have two seþe relatives. In the first, the relative pronoun is in the nominative case (se þe), while in the second, it is in the accusative case (þone þe). The masculine forms se and þone are consistent with the postcopular Swithhun, rather than with the neuter cleft hit. (48)
Đa cwæð þæt wif him to. þæt hit[n.] wære Swyðun[m.] se[m.] ðe hine lærde mid þære halgan lare. and þone[m.] ðe he geseah on ðære cyrcan swa fægerne. (coaelive,ÆLS_[Swithun]:388.4463) „Then said the woman to him, „that it was Swithhun who had instructed him in this holy lore, and whom he had seen so glorious in the church.‟‟ (Skeat 1881b: 465)
Unlike the other examples, this token seems to favour an expletive account, on which the antecedent to the relative clause is the postcopular constituent.
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However, there is an alternative explanation for this agreement pattern. Rather than forming a conjoined relative with þe, the masculine pronoun se could be functioning as the demonstrative head of the relative clause (see Allen 1980: 108–109). Ball (1991: 40) states that the pronoun in the second conjunct (þone) cannot be accounted for on this analysis because the accusative form clearly takes its case from the relative clause (he had seen x in the church). Nevertheless, the first conjunct is properly ambiguous and can be interpreted either as a restrictive relative clause, or as a right-dislocated demonstrative-headed relative. On the latter reading, (48) is made up of a simple copular sentence (it was Swithhun) followed by a complete definite description containing two relative clauses (he who had instructed him in this holy lore and whom he had seen so glorious in the church). However, while it is certainly possible that the token in (48) is not a true it-cleft, there is no solid reason to disqualify it other than that it supports an expletive account. I therefore continue to count this token as a cleft, while noting that, in general, gender agreement in the Old English data can only be accounted for by a discontinuous constituent (or extraposition-from-NP) analysis. While my data includes only it-clefts, Ball (1991) finds this same agreement pattern in the Old English demonstrative clefts. For example, in the predicational þæt-cleft in (49), the neuter relative (þæt) shows agreement with the initial pronoun rather than with the masculine postcopular noun journey. As Ball (1991: 59) notes, “The gender of the relative pronoun suggests that [the initial] þæt is the head of the relative clause”. (49)
þæt wæs geocor sið, þæt se DEM-n.n.s was grievous journey-m. REL-n.s. DEM-m.n.s hearmscaþa to Heorute ateah! despoiler to Heorot took „That was a painful journey that the loathsome despoiler had made to Heorot.‟ (Beowulf [Ball 1991: 35])
On the basis of gender then, OE hit-, þæt- and þis-clefts clearly warrant an analysis involving extraposition-from-NP. Indeed, none of the relevant authors have argued otherwise. For instance, Ball (1991: 63) follows Culicover and Rochemont‟s (1990) account of present-day English extraposed relative clauses and claims that, in these Old English tokens, the relative clause is base-generated in an extraposed position adjoined to IP and is coindexed with the neuter subject pronoun (hit, þæt or þis). What has been called into question, however, is the status of these Old English tokens as genuine clefts. In other words, because such examples do not conform to an
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expletive analysis of cleft sentences, they have often been discounted as representing early instances of the present-day it-cleft construction. This is especially true of Ball‟s (1991) work. From the outset, Ball (1991) assumes an expletive analysis of presentday it-clefts, on which the cleft pronoun is a dummy element. From this perspective, the OE gender agreement pattern “is a surprising fact: if these are true clefts, in which the focus is the logical antecedent of the relative pronoun, we should expect gender agreement with the focus” (Ball 1991: 39–40). By way of a solution to this problem, Ball builds a case for analysing the OE tokens as instances of a separate construction. For the predicational examples, this is relatively straightforward. We have already seen (in Chapter 5, Section 2) that predicational it-clefts are incompatible with expletive accounts and so are treated by many as forming a structurally distinct sentence type from the it-cleft proper (see Ball 1977). For Ball then, as here, the predicational it-cleft has an extraposition-from-NP structure that has remained relatively unchanged since Old English. The only substantial difference between our accounts is that, for Ball, this does not represent the “true” cleft structure. However, it is much more difficult to argue that the OE specificational tokens form a separate construction from the present-day specificational itcleft. To do so, Ball claims that they are functionally (as well as formally) distinct, invoking Higgins‟ (1979) distinction between specificational and identificational copular sentences. According to Higgins (1979: 265), the sentence in (50) has two possible readings. The specificational reading tells us that the individual Mary Gray matches the description the girl who helps us on Fridays. However, on the identificational reading, we are told the name (Mary Gray) of the individual referred to by the definite NP the girl who helps us on Fridays. (50)
The girl who helps us on Fridays is Mary GRAY (Higgins 1979: 265)
Higgins‟ class of identificational copular sentences and his use of the term identificational are not widely accepted.9 Nevertheless, Ball uses this definition to argue that the Old English non-predicational tokens are actually 9. Indeed, Mikkelsen (2004, 2005) argues that Higgins‟ (1979) identificational class is not a semantically uniform category and goes on to show that many of his examples can be accommodated into a tripartite taxonomy of predicational, equative and specificational copular sentences.
The evidence from Old English gender agreement
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identificational rather than specificational it-clefts. That is, she claims that they do not identify a specific referent; instead, they identify only the name of an already established individual. For instance, after examining the context for (45) above, shown in (51), Ball (1991: 64) explains that “there is an otherwise established entity in the context [the one knocking at the door] which lacks only a name”. (51)
Micel wurðscipe is cristenra manna, þæt gewhilc hæbbe fram his acennednysse him betæhtne engel to hyrdrædene, swa swa be ðam apostle Petre awriten is, þaða se engel hine of ðam cwearterne gelædde, and he to his geferum becom, and cnucigende inganges bæd. þa cwædon þa geleaffullan, „Nis hit na Petrus þæt ðær cnucað, ac is his ængel.‟ „It is a great honour for Christian men, that each has from his birth an angel assigned to him in fellowship, just as of the apostle Peter it is written, when the angel led him from the prison, and he came to his companions, and knocking prayed for admission, the faithful said, “It isn‟t Peter who is knocking there, it‟s his angel.”‟ (Ælfric, Catholic Homilies [Ball 1991: 65])
However, this cannot be right. Here, the faithful mistake St. Peter, who they believe to be in prison, for his angel; that is, they (wrongly) identify his angel as the one who is knocking there. In (51) then, what is at issue is not the name of the referent (as Peter or his angel) but the referent itself. This example clearly conforms to our understanding of specificational meaning as involving the specification (or identification) of the individuals that are uniquely characterized by the definite description (i.e. the members that make up the described set). Likewise, Ball (1991: 64) claims that token (3), repeated here as (52), “occurs in the same kind of identificational context”. In this example, Jesus has healed a lame man. However, the man does not know the identity of the one who healed him until he encounters Jesus again. Realizing who he is, the man tells the Jews. (52)
& cyðde hit þam Iudean. þæt hit wære se hælend þe hyne hælde. (cowsgosp,Jn_[WSCp]:5.15.6088) …and told the Jews that it was Jesus who had healed him.‟ (Ball 1991: 40)
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The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
For Ball (1991: 66), “the central issue is the name of an entity which has already been at least partially described, and which is salient”. However, the man provides much more information than a simple name or label here (the Saviour, or literally, the healer). Instead, he refers to an individual, pointing out Jesus for the benefit of the Jews. Indeed, Ball (1991: 66) acknowledges that these Old English hit-clefts also allow a specificational interpretation; she concludes, “There is a fine line between identification and specification”. In conclusion then, there is little justification for characterizing the Old English cleft data as performing a naming or labelling function, rather than a specificational one. There is therefore little evidence for suggesting that the Old English hit-clefts are instances of a structurally distinct construction. Tellingly, Ball only distinguishes between specification and identification when discussing the Old and Early Middle English data. For subsequent periods, Ball finds it difficult to implement this distinction and consequently abandons it. She notes, “Specificational and identificational it-clefts are classed together here because of the difficulty of reliably distinguishing them…While the distinct semantics of the predicational cleft continue to set it apart, the other two types are close both in interpretation and function” (Ball 1991: 220). This suggests that Ball‟s main purpose in employing this distinction for Old English is to allow her to reconcile the existence of early tokens involving extraposition-from-NP with an expletive account of specificational it-clefts. In sum, the Old English gender agreement data provides strong support for extraposition-from-NP accounts, so much so that it forces proponents of expletive analyses to discount and explain away this data as evidence of a different kind of copular construction.10
10. Filppula (2009) is exceptional in that he assumes that it-clefts have an expletive structure while maintaining that the YCOE contains genuine it-cleft tokens with a specificational meaning. Tellingly, however, Filppula does not discuss the gender agreement evidence in any detail, except to note that, for the example given as (45) and (51) above, “Mitchell [1985b: 102] takes hit and not the focused noun, as in clefts, to be the antecedent of the relative pronoun here and therefore rejects this as an example of a cleft sentence” (Filppula 2009: 277).
The it-cleft as a relic from an earlier time
7.
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The it-cleft as a relic from an earlier time
Examining the it-cleft‟s early history therefore provides us both with a new dataset for analysing cleft structure and with an alternative language system in which to look for generalizations that help to explain the construction‟s (now) idiosyncratic properties. This allows us to address questions which were left unresolved by a discontinuous constituent analysis of the presentday facts. For instance, we saw in Section 3 that the it-cleft‟s discontinuous (it + relative clause) NP is an instance of a once productive pattern in which determinative pronouns are modified by restrictive relative clauses. In Section 4, we saw that the sentence-final position of the relative clause was the norm in Old English, which suggests that the it-cleft represents a reflex of the older pattern. Finally, in Section 5, we saw that the cleft pronoun it has more in common semantically with the Old and Early Middle English lexeme it than with the present-day pronoun. With this observation made, we can better understand the it-cleft‟s unusual pattern of number agreement. In this way, the it-cleft‟s construction-specific formal properties have been shown to have their sources in configurations which no longer exist (or are no longer productive) in present-day English. In other words, these now idiosyncratic properties were at one time inherited from more general linguistic patterns, including the determinative pronoun construction, the paratactic relative clause construction, which displays “a loose degree of integration” (Suárez-Gómez 2006: 52), and the OE/EME lexeme it. These early inheritance relations are given in Figure 10 as dashed lines, indicating that they are representative of an older system of English. OE/EME lexeme it
OE paratactic relative clause
Determinative pronoun
It-cleft schema
Specificational it-cleft
Predicational it-cleft
Figure 10. Incorporating historical motivation for the it-cleft configuration
The it-cleft‟s syntactic configuration, as it is conceived on a discontinuous constituent account, was therefore originally motivated by the language
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The it-cleft and earlier periods of English
system of earlier periods of English; that is, it was supported by a family of constructions. On this account, the it-cleft schema is a relic from an earlier time. While the structured inventory of the language has changed since Old English, the it-cleft construction has been largely unaffected. From this, it follows that the it-cleft‟s historical development involves the entrenchment (or fossilization) of once productive patterns. In Chapter 2, Section 3, we saw that, on a usage-based model of change, fossilization is a product of token frequency (that is, the number of times a given instance is activated). While the it-cleft is a relatively low frequency construction, it undergoes a gradual, yet substantial, increase over time (see Chapter 7). This serves to cement the status of the it-cleft schema as a conventional unit in the speaker‟s grammar. However, the strengthening of this individual, lower-level construction does not result in the activation, or the reinforcement, of its superordinate schemas (see Bybee 1985: 132–134). Instead, it occurs alongside the weakening (or loss) of their productivity; that is, the overarching constructions no longer sanction different types of instance. This usage-based account assumes a redundant system of grammar, where information inherited from the dominating construction is also specified the inheriting construction. This analysis explains how, as the dominating constructions have either fallen out of use (such as the determinative pronoun construction) or undergone significant changes (such as the external syntax of restrictive relatives and the restriction of it to non-human, singular individuals), their influence has become entrenched within the it-cleft schema. The it-cleft has therefore become increasingly idiosyncratic over time, not through any internal changes, but in relation to the surrounding language system. This idea, that irregularity is sometimes the relic of historical regularity, is well understood (see Chapter 2, Section 3). For example, irregular past tense forms such as stand/stood are the entrenched relics of a once productive pattern of strong verbs. Likewise, idioms such as kith and kin (meaning „friends and family‟) and with might and main (meaning „with a lot of strength‟) contain words which are no longer found outside of these formulaic expressions (see Fillmore, Kay, and O‟Connor 1988). However, an important, and as yet unresolved, question for such usagebased hypotheses is posed by Croft (2007: 504); he asks, “How many tokens is enough to entrench a linguistic unit?” Certainly, in the case of the it-cleft, it is unlikely that frequency alone can account for its entrenched form. In Section 4, I suggested that the it-cleft has become less associated with the constructions which inform the behaviour of its component parts and instead aligns with other constructions which support the it-cleft‟s
The it-cleft as a relic from an earlier time
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structure as a whole, such as information structure generalizations and extraposition constructions. Thus, while the it-cleft has become more entrenched over time, resulting in a fixed form which is resistant to the changes affecting its component parts, it is not entirely unsupported. In this instance then, fossilization is accompanied by pattern-alignment with more general structures. Since the configuration is now motivated less directly, its structural details are difficult to make sense of without considering the historical evidence. Contra Declerck (1983b: 15) then, it is not only the proverbial cleft that is “reminiscent of an older stage in the English language”, but all varieties of it-cleft and demonstrative cleft. The basic structure of present-day clefts is therefore older than the individual proverbial cleft tokens, which have emerged through a similar process of entrenchment (or fossilization). Ball (1991: 148) records the first proverbial cleft as occurring in Early Middle English, in The Owl and the Nightingale, shown in (53). (53)
Nis no man for is bare songe Lof ne wrþ noȝt suþe longe; Vor þat is a furworþe man þat bute singe noȝt ne can. Not-is no man for his mere song / Esteemed not is not very long For that is a worthless man / That but sing nought not can „No man for his mere song is esteemed for very long; for that is a worthless man who can do nothing but sing‟ (1250-1300, The Owl and the Nightingale [Ball 1991: 148])
In such examples, the discontinuous definite NP has generic reference (see Chapter 5, Section 2.2). That is, it evokes an abstract, hypothetical entity “whose type is given by the predicate NP (man) and whose basic attributes are specified by the þat-clause (here, the man who can do nothing but sing)” (Ball 1991: 149). Since such tokens are often used metaphorically, and so can be applied in a number of similar situations, their frequency may be relatively high. This leads to the entrenchment of the instance as a substantive construct, stored low in the constructional taxonomy as a fixed and invariable saying. However, while it is clear that the storage and retention of cleft structure involves entrenchment at various levels in the constructional hierarchy, we have yet to explain how this discontinuous structure first came into being. Nevertheless, the taxonomic network of related constructions provides us with a plausible hypothesis. As instances of either the specificational inver-
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sion construction or the predicate nominal construction, we would expect the Old English cleft tokens to have developed from simple NP be NP sentences introduced by the neuter pronominal subjects, þis, þæt and hit. As Ball (1991: 24) notes, “it is plausible that a language could have the simple copular sentence without having the cleft”. For instance, (54) is a simple OE specificational inversion sentence, in which the initial hit is a full anaphoric NP with the meaning the one that was standing there. (54)
…sæde þæt Petrus þær stode. þa geleaffullan cwædon þæt hit …said that Peter there stood the faithful said that it nære Petrus, ac wære his engel. not-were Peter but were his angel „[Rhoda] said that Peter was standing there. The faithful said that it wasn‟t Peter, but was his angel.‟ (Ælfric, Catholic Homilies [Ball 1991: 24])
Once we add a paratactic relative clause (in accordance with the Old English determinative pronoun construction), we obtain a specificational it-cleft as in the example in (45), repeated below as (55). Here, the initial hit is restrictively modified by the extraposed clause and functions as the determinative head of the definite description it (the one) that is knocking there. (55)
þa cwædon þa geleafullan, „Nis hit na Petrus þæt ðær cnucað, ac is his ængel.‟ (cocathom1,ÆCHom_I_, 34:474.247.6867) „Then the faithful said: It isn‟t Peter who is knocking there, but his angel.‟ (Ball 1991: 39)
Ball (1991: 67) provides a similar account of these OE tokens; she suggests that the predicational and identificational hit-clefts are “simple sentence[s] expanded by the adjunction of a relative clause”. However, Ball provides a different origin story for the specificational itcleft (see Section 2). She suggests that this construction originated in Early Middle English, with examples such as (56), repeated from (1). (56)
„A-bidez,‟ quath þis holie man: „ore louerd is guod and freo. þe deuel it is þat bringuth þis wedur…‟ [As St. Edmund was preaching, it became overcast, a terrible wind began to blow, and it grew dark. People began to leave.] „Stay, said
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this holy man, our Lord is good and free. The devil it is that brings this weather…‟ (1280-90 South English Legendary [Ball 1991: 158]) Ball (1991: 158) claims that this example has a different function from the OE hit-clefts, since “It is not the case that there is a storm-bringing entity in the context whose identity is at issue. Rather, the devil is contrasted with God as the value of X in the OP [open proposition] X brings this weather”. More importantly, however, this EME token differs from the OE examples in that it is actually amenable to an expletive account of the specificational it-cleft, occurring as it does only after the system of gender agreement has already broken down (see Section 6). Searching for a viable source construction, Ball comes across an Old English NP beon relative clause configuration, exemplified by (57), also (2). She suggests that such examples acquired expletive subjects in Middle English; “The resulting structure is superficially similar to” but structurally distinct from the OE identificational hit-cleft (Ball 1991: 68). (57)
…min fæder is þe me wuldrað …my father is that me glorifies „It is my father that glorifies me‟ (Ælfric, Catholic Homilies [Ball 1991: 27])
However, while Ball (1991: 51) translates these examples as it-clefts, she notes that they are closer in form to reverse pseudoclefts, since the initial, focal NP is the grammatical subject. Furthermore, Ball acknowledges that this source construction is very rare in Old English; it occurs in her data only in translations of Latin headless relatives and is sometimes avoided even then. For example, (57) is an English translation of the Latin original …est Pater meus, qui glorificat me. She concludes that “in Late West Saxon, at least, NP/PRO BEON REL-CLAUSE was not the preferred construction for marking focus and open proposition” (Ball 1991: 52). Ball‟s (1991) account of the specificational it-cleft‟s origin is therefore shaped by her adherence to an expletive analysis. Instead, I suggest that the historical data calls for a much simpler account, on which the specificational it-cleft develops in OE, alongside the predicational variety. In proposing two different origin stories for present-day it-clefts, Ball‟s account is in many ways parallel to Matsunami‟s (1961: 6) earlier claim that the identifying and disjunctive functions of it-clefts “originally belonged to different constructions,…they were combined in one and the same formula in the
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course of the syntactical development of English”. Indeed, Ball makes use of Matsunami‟s distinction between the identifying and emphasizing (or contrastive) functions of it-clefts as a way of differentiating between identificational and specificational it-clefts. For example, in support of a non-specificational analysis for the OE hitclefts in (51) and (52) above, Ball (1991: 66) notes that Matsunami finds (52) “to be „identifying‟ rather than „emphasizing‟”. She also cites Mitchell (1985a: 622), who discards (51) as an example of “the modern use of „it‟ to give emphasis”. Ball goes on to employ this distinction in her assessment of (57) as properly specificational. Again she cites Mitchell (1985a: 622), who says that “OE achieves emphasis…by giving the noun initial position”. However, for Matsunami (1961: 14), example (57) has an “identifying nature” and so “is also of the identifying pattern”. This suggests that the functions of identifying and emphasizing are simply not appropriate for distinguishing between different kinds of copular sentence. As we saw in Chapter 3, the purpose of a specificational sentence is to correctly identify the entity which uniquely matches the description given by the predicative NP. The identifying function then, neither characterizes, nor properly corresponds to, Higgins‟ (1979) definition of the identificational copular sentence as a naming or labelling device. That Ball conflates Matsunami‟s identifying-emphasizing distinction with Higgins‟ characterization of identificational and specificational copular sentences therefore results in a misunderstanding of the nature of specificational meaning and further undermines the basis on which the OE hit-clefts are separated from (and discounted from) the later specificational it-cleft data.11
11. An example of this is Ball‟s (1991: 156) treatment of the following token. Here, St. Mary converses with someone who she thinks is the gardener. However, it is really Jesus, who has risen from his tomb. Ball analyses (vi) as an Early Middle English identificational it-cleft. She notes that “On the specificational reading, which is brought about by „unclefting‟ [shown in (vii)], Mary would be strangely mistaken about the event taking place…Whereas on the identificational reading, she is only mistaken about the identity of her interlocutor, not about what is actually happening” (Ball 1991: 156–157). (vi) Heo wende hit were þe leyhtunnward. þat to hire spek. „She thought it was the gardener that was speaking to her‟ (1250-1300 Passion of Our Lord [Ball 1991: 156]) (vii) Heo wende þe leyhtunnward spek to hire. „She thought the gardener was speaking to her‟
(Ball 1991: 157)
Summary
8.
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Summary
In this chapter, I have examined it-clefts from earlier periods of English in relation to the synchronic language system of the time. In doing so, I have identified some illuminating generalizations which are not at all transparent in present-day English and have posited inheritance relations which are no longer productive in the constructional taxonomy. The historical evidence therefore provides motivation (via default inheritance) for properties which are specific to a discontinuous constituent (extraposition-from-NP) analysis of it-clefts. We now have a plausible explanation as to what sanctions the restrictive modification of the pronoun it, why the cleft clause is obligatorily placed in an extraposed position and which events have led to the itcleft‟s unusual pattern of number agreement. In addition, while the evidence suggests that the it-cleft configuration has changed very little over time, a historical perspective nevertheless provides us with the opportunity to examine those structural properties which have undergone change, and which are no longer observable in present-day English. In particular, I have shown that Old English gender agreement patterns offer strong support for a discontinuous constituent account. The historical cleft data is therefore extremely instructive. It not only supports the analysis of cleft structure argued for here, but also provides us with a number of plausible explanations as to why the present-day it-cleft is structured in this way. As Matsunami (1961: 1) observes, not one of the various synchronic accounts of it-clefts has “succeeded in explaining its grammatical irregularity, for which only the historical consideration seems to be equal to answer, but to which, to my mind, enough notice has never been given”.
However, this reasoning is problematic. While (vii) prefers a predicate-focus reading, on which Mary could be mistaken about what is happening i.e. that he spoke to her, this information is presupposed in the corresponding it-cleft and is therefore not at issue. Even if we interpret specificational it-clefts as information-structure variants of noncopular sentences, they nevertheless provide an unambiguous argument-focus reading (Lambrecht 2001: 485), on which only the identity of St. Mary‟s interlocutor is at issue (see Chapter 4, Section 1.2.1).
Chapter 7 The it-cleft’s development over time
1.
A diachronic investigation
In Chapter 6, we saw that a historical perspective provides motivation for some of the it-cleft‟s more idiosyncratic properties by revealing inheritance relations that are internal to the structured inventory of an obsolete system of grammar. In particular, the cleft structure has been shown to be a relic from an earlier time, shaped by generalizations which are no longer true of the present-day language system. In this sense then, the story of the it-cleft is one involving an absence of change, or rather, a resistance to change. It is this process of conventionalization that, above all else, creates the illusion of idiosyncrasy. Nevertheless, the it-cleft construction has not been entirely impervious to change, as we will see in this chapter. Most noticeably, the frequency of the it-cleft has increased and its function has expanded over time. In what follows, I chart the it-cleft‟s diachronic progress all the way from Old English to Modern English. I conclude that the construction has gradually acquired some of its more idiosyncratic properties as a result of language change. In this way, the diachronic evidence provides additional motivation for the present-day it-cleft construction, via factors which are external to the language system (see Goldberg 2003: 121). The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, I discuss aspects of the methodology, including the corpora used and the method of data extraction. Here, I detail and defend a much more rigorous selection process than that employed in Filppula‟s (2009) recent study of Old and Middle English it-clefts. I then go on to provide some basic frequency information in Section 3, before focusing in more detail on the it-cleft‟s gradual acceptance of a wider range of focal elements in Section 4 and its appearance in a greater variety of discourse contexts in Section 5.
2.
The corpora, the search and the selection process
For this diachronic investigation, I make use of data from four independent, yet related, historical English corpora: the York-Toronto-Helsinki Corpus of Old English Prose (YCOE), the Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Middle
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English, second edition (PPCME2), the Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Early Modern English (PPCEME) and the Penn Parsed Corpus of Modern British English (PPCMBE). These four corpora form part of the same series of syntactically annotated historical English corpora from the University of Pennsylvania and the University of York. As such, they are broadly (and as much as possible) comparable in terms of the size of the corpus, the number and size of the text files and genre composition. All employ roughly the same system of syntactic annotation, which permits the searching of syntactic structure using the specially-designed CorpusSearch2 program. Together, the YCOE, the PPCME2, the PPCEME and the PPCMBE comprise over 5 million words (totalling 5350956), spanning the entire history of British English up until 1914. The relevant tokens were retrieved by searching for the structure of the cleft clause, labelled as CP-CLF. The annotation provides cleft clauses with the same internal structure as that of relative clauses, but analyses them as daughters of IP. This mark-up is not inconsistent with either an expletive or an extraposition-from-NP account: it is intended only as an aid to searching, not as a linguistic statement. Nevertheless, there is some indication that the annotation process has been influenced by the standard assumptions of an expletive analysis. Given an extraposition-from-NP account, we would assume that a search of cleft clauses would isolate not only it-clefts, but also demonstrative clefts, introduced by this and that (see Chapter 4, Section 1). However, the PPCME2 and PPCEME annotation manual (Santorini 2010) associates the label CP-CLF exclusively with it-clefts, suggesting that this is a structurally unique, construction-specific type of clause. Since the focus here is on it-clefts, this assumption is not so problematic for the purposes of data collection. However, in the YCOE specifically, the adoption of an expletive account is much more overt and has an unwelcome effect on the search output. The YCOE reference manual states that the CPCLF structure “is not contained within its antecedent or coindexed to the expletive subject, which may be empty or overt” (A. Taylor 2003, emphasis added). This statement includes the fundamental assumption of an expletive analysis and is at odds with a discontinuous constituent account. It assumes further that, since the cleft pronoun is a meaningless dummy element, it can be realized as an empty subject. The search for CP-CLF in the YCOE therefore locates not only all it-clefts, but also tokens with the surface structure be XP relative clause, which are given an empty expletive subject in the syntactic annotation. The YCOE reference manual confirms that, “When the HIT subject of a cleft is missing an empty expletive subject is added” (A. Taylor 2003).
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The it-cleft‟s development over time
If, however, we acknowledge the evidence that the cleft pronoun is not in fact expletive, and instead functions as a definite determinative pronoun, the inclusion of sentences without determinative pronouns as instances of cleft structure makes little sense. True to form, once we examine the discourse contexts of these hit-less tokens, they appear to be instances of an OE presentational construction rather than a subtype of it-cleft.
2.1.
OE presentational/impersonal sentences
A search of the CP-CLF structure in the YCOE yields 94 cleft tokens. The majority of these examples occur without the pronoun hit. This includes 50 tokens from a single text file, cobede.o2, taken from Bede‟s Ecclesiastical History of the English People, such as (1) and (2) below. (1)
Đa wæs æfter hire deaðe, þæt þa broðor oðerra weorca swiður gemdon & þisse cirican timbro forlæton soefon gear. (cobede,Bede_3:6.176.8.1722) „Then after her death, the brethren were more occupied with other works, and for seven years neglected the erection of the church‟ (Miller 1898: 177)
(2)
Đa wæs æfter Æðelberhtes forðfore, Eadbald his sunu feng to ðam rice, ond he sona micle wonunge & æwerdlan wæs þære mærwan cyrican weaxnisse. (cobede,Bede_2:5.110.22.1042) „Then after Æthelberht‟s death his son Eadbald succeeded to the throne and soon he was cause of great loss and injury to the growth of the tender church‟ (Miller 1898: 111)
In these examples, the postcopular PP provides a temporal setting for the event described in the following clause. Although parsed as clefts in the YCOE, and labelled time-clefts in the reference manual (A. Taylor 2003), these tokens have a very different function from the specificational it-cleft. For one thing, the examples do not contain presupposed þæt-clauses. As we have seen, in Chapter 4, Section 1.2.2, presupposition characterizes all different kinds of specificational copular sentence, by simple virtue of the fact that they contain definite descriptions. Even in informative-presupposition it-clefts, brand-new information in the cleft clause is marked as expected in some sense or not at issue (see Chapter 5, Section 4).
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Once we examine the discourse context of these hit-less OE tokens, it is difficult to interpret them as cleft sentences. For example, (1) occurs as part of a discourse which follows the story of the abbess, who starts to build a church in her monastery but dies before she can finish it. Surprisingly, it is a full seven years before the brethren recommence the building work and carry out the abbess‟ plans. That the brethren are so diverted from this task is not only new to the reader, it is presented as the main informational content of the sentence; that is, as an unexpected turn of events. Similarly, in (2), Eadbald‟s ascension to the throne is presented as a highly significant event. In the prior context, Bede writes of Æthelberht‟s life and death, with no mention of Eadbald. As a result, we cannot interpret (2) as simply providing us with the timing of Eadbald‟s ascension to the throne. Instead, the event signals the beginning of a cruel and chaotic reign, which contrasts starkly with the good deeds of Æthelberht. The non-presuppositional YCOE tokens therefore lend themselves to a presentational interpretation, in which actions or events are presented in a neutral manner. Here, I follow Ball (1991) in referring to such sentences as impersonals. On this account, the verb wesan is not the copula that we find in clefts, but has a full meaning, similar to „happen‟ or „come to pass‟ (see Visser 1963: 50). This is followed by a sentential complement (rather than a relative clause), which provides the primary informational content. Such sentences often occur with scene-setting adjuncts, such as the PPs after her death and after Æthelberht‟s death in (1) and (2) above, which leads to a superficial similarity with it-clefts containing prepositional foci. However, in impersonals, this postcopular adjunct is optional; it is not an obligatory part of the sentence. As Ball (1991: 95) observes, Old English has a number of presentational verbs of this type, including (ge)weorðan, gelimpan, gesælan, getimian, getidian, and cuman. These happen-class verbs commonly occur with the expletive subjects hit and þæt, shown in (3). However, when some other element occupies the first position, hit and þæt are optional (Ball 1991: 93). This explains why (1) and (2), which are introduced by the adverb þa, contain empty expletive subjects. (3)
Đæt gelamp on sumre niht, þæt þær com sum man to þæs halgan weres spræce. „It happened one night that there came a certain man to speak to the holy man‟ (Saint Guthlac [Ball 1991: 99])
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The it-cleft‟s development over time
Ball (1991) explicitly discusses Bede‟s Ecclesiastical History in relation to this OE impersonal construction. She notes that “the historical works, with their focus on events, favour the occurrence of HAPPEN-impersonals” (Ball 1991: 98) and goes on to find a significant association between their occurrence and the start of major segments in the narrative. An impersonal analysis for the examples from Bede is further supported by Miller‟s (1898) translations, shown in (1) and (2) above. Miller chooses to translate these passages, not as present-day it-clefts, but as simple sentences with initial thematic temporal expressions. As Ball (1991: 95) observes, these tokens cannot be rendered in any other way, because “present-day English has no verb which introduces an event into the discourse, in a neutral manner, via a that-clause”. I have taken care to exclude those tokens which are plainly impersonals (both with and without it) from my historical dataset and include only those tokens which clearly prefer an it-cleft analysis. This has had an enormous impact on my calculation of the frequency of YCOE it-clefts, leaving me with only 13 relevant tokens. In contrast, Filppula (2009) is not as selective in his recent approach to the YCOE data. He claims that the YCOE “timeclefts”, such as the tokens from cobede.o2, “clearly belong to the class of „informative-presupposition‟ clefts” (Filppula 2009: 272). As a result, Filppula translates the OE hit-less impersonals, including (1) and (2) above, as present-day it-clefts, shown in (4) and (5) below. In all other respects, Filppula accepts Miller‟s (1898) translations. He notes, “I have followed here Miller‟s…translation but added clefting to the beginning of the sentence as indicated by the parsing in YCOE” (Filppula 2009: 274). (4)
„Then [it] was after her death that the brethren were more occupied with other works, and for seven years neglected the erection of the church‟ (Filppula 2009: 272)
(5)
„Then it was after Æthelberht‟s death that his son Eadbald succeeded to the throne,…‟ (Filppula 2009: 272)
Filppula does not discuss the discourse context or the function of these examples in any detail. However, he does comment that they do not contain presupposed that-clauses, despite going on to classify them as informativepresupposition clefts (see Filppula 2009: 273). This suggests that Filppula‟s figure of 89 YCOE clefts is, at least to some extent, overblown. Indeed, Filppula (2009: 276) acknowledges that, “some of the structures parsed as
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clefts in YCOE, and especially the type of time-clefts found in Bede‟s texts, may be open to differing interpretations”. While the hit-less impersonals are mostly confined to Old English, the variant with expletive it continues to appear. For example, the sixteenth century token in (6) does not allow a cleft analysis because we cannot establish a plausible focus. Instead, the example prefers an impersonal interpretation, akin to „just as it happens that‟ or „just as it is the case that‟. It is telling that in later versions of this text, such as (7) and (8), the passage is rendered as a simple sentence with an initial adverbial expression, rather than as an it-sequence. (6)
And I do not speke nowe of the voluntarye mouynges of the soule, that hath knowledge, but of the natural intencion of thynges, euen as it is that we do digest meates, that we haue eten without thynkyng thereon howe it is digested and as we do take wynde and breathe in slepe, not knowyng thereof. (1556 BOETHCO-E1-H,80.509)
(7)
As our meate we take without great study… (1593 BOETHEL-E2-H,68.223)
(8)
Thus we swallow our Meat without thinking of it, (1695 BOETHPR-E3-H,145.236)
Likewise, examples containing the question word how, such as (9), often favour an impersonal reading. These tokens seem to question how it is even possible that the situation denoted by the that-clause has come about, rather than asking in what manner it took place (see also Ball 1991: 104). (9)
Then saith the woman of Samaria vnto him, How is it that thou, being a Iewe, askest drinke of me, which am a woman of Samaria? For the Iewes haue no dealings with the Samaritanes. (1611 AUTHNEW-E2-H,IV,1J.361)
Even in the Late Modern English period, we find similar examples containing the fixed phrases hence it is and therefore it is. As shown in (10) and (11), the adverbs hence and therefore make unlikely cleft foci; there is certainly no element of contrast here. Instead, these introductory phrases serve a presentational function, which can be paraphrased as „and so it happens‟ or „and so it is the case‟.
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The it-cleft‟s development over time
(10)
Hence it is, that the will, induced by powerful reasons, sometimes chuses and embraces death, altho' nature dreads and abhors it; (BOETHRI-1785,123.244)
(11)
and therefore it is that we have inserted some passages verbatim from his work, „Neuralgia and its Counterfeits‟ (POORE-1876,163.56)
2.2.
Existential sentences with it
In addition to the impersonal/presentational tokens, the CP-CLF output also includes some existential sentences. Formerly, existential sentences could occur with it as well as there. For instance, the rhetorical question below asks „what is there (or what exists) that a man can do to another man which cannot be done, in turn, to him‟. The expected answer to this question is of course „nothing‟. The follow-up sentence offers an example of this truism by reminding us that Busiris, who frequently killed his guests, was in turn killed by one of his guests – Hercules. (12)
To go further, what is it that any man may do to another, which another may not do again to him? We are told, that it was the Custom of Busiris to kill his Guests, and himself at last was killed by Hercules his Guest. (1695 BOETHPR-E3-P1,76.509)
While these tokens are superficially similar to clefts, they are pragmatically distinct. Existential sentences question rather than presuppose the existence of the entity described in the that-clause (Ball 1991: 269). For this reason, I have excluded these tokens from my data-set. I have also eliminated 11 tokens of the type whase itt iss þatt…from the PPCME2 data. This construction, found in The Ormulum (cmorm.po.m1), also seems to prefer an existential reading. For example, the first sentence of (13) serves to establish a generic, indefinite entity „whoever there is that loves peace‟, which is then predicated of in the following sentence, „shall find Jesus‟. (13)
& whase itt iss þatt lufeþþ griþþ & follȝheþþ wiþþ hiss herrte, Đatt mann shall findenn Jesu Crist To beon wiþþ himm i blisse. (c1200 CMORM,I,227.1888)
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„And whoever it is that loves peace And follows with his heart That man shall find Jesus Christ To be with him in bliss.‟ (= „Whoever loves peace...shall find Jesus Christ...‟) (Ball 1991: 185) As a result, there is very little difference in meaning between these tokens and corresponding simple sentences introduced by indefinite wh-subjects, as shown above. Ball (1991: 188) concludes that their appearance in The Ormulum, which is written in verses of 15 syllables, may be due to the fact that “itt is þatt is metrically useful”. Whatever governs its appearance, it is clear that Orm‟s construction is more existential than cleft. As Ball (1991: 186) notes, if they are it-clefts then they “are of a type not yet seen and no longer extant”.
2.3.
The pattern I it am
11 tokens introduced by the pattern I it am have also been omitted from the PPCME2 search results. Ten of these, shown below, are from a single passage of the same text: Julian of Norwich‟s Revelations of Divine Love. (14)
…ofte tymes oure lorde Ihesu sayde to me, “I it am that is hiaste. I it am that þou luffes. I it am that thowe lykes. I it am that þowe serves. I it am þat þou langes. I it am that þowe desyres. I it am that thowe menes. I it am þat is alle. I it am that haly kyrke preches the and teches the. I it am that schewed me are to the”. „…often times our lord Jesus said to me, “I am the one that is the highest. I am the one that you love. I am the one that you like. I am the one that you serve. I am the one that you long [for]. I am the one that you desire. I am the one to whom your intention is directed. I am the one that is all. I am the one that holy church preaches to you and teaches you. I am the one that showed myself to you before.”‟ (c1400-50 CMJULNOR,59.256-265)
Although these tokens look like focus-first specificational it-clefts, they are actually predicational. The function of these sentences is to tell us more information about the subject (Jesus), rather than to identify the referent described by the discontinuous definite NP. Here, the pronoun I is the thematic subject, which shows agreement with the copular verb am. The postcopular relative modifies the determinative it to form a predicative NP.
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The it-cleft‟s development over time
The configuration I it am is therefore equivalent to I am he (see Ball 1991: 71). Watson and Jenkins (2006: 206) note that the use of I it am rather than I am he may be a way of deemphasizing the maleness of Jesus at a time when the gender-neutral construction I am the one had not yet developed.
2.4.
Other constructions mistaken for clefts
The search for CP-CLF in the historical English parsed corpora produces several other structures which are easily mistaken for it-clefts. For example, although (15) below is annotated as a cleft by the YCOE (and is treated as such by Filppula (2009: 274)), it is most likely a simple NP be NP specificational copular sentence followed by a nonrestrictive relative. (15)
...and þæt hus afylde mid ormætum stence, þæt man eaðe mihte witan þæt hit se deofol wæs þe hine dwelian wolde; (coaelive,ÆLS_[Martin]:770.6456) „...and that house filled with intense odour so that one could easily know that it was the devil who wanted to mislead him;...‟ (Filppula 2009: 274)
In this example, the devil pretends to be Christ. What is at issue here, then, is the identity of this vision, as either Christ or the devil. If the vision is truly Christ, then no deception can be said to have occurred. Therefore, the information in the relative clause x wanted to mislead him cannot be presupposed. Instead, it provides additional information about the devil, explaining his purpose for appearing as Christ. Likewise, I do not consider (16) to be an it-cleft, despite its mark-up in the YCOE. Here, the relative clause is properly restrictive, but it modifies the postcopular noun Veronica rather than the initial it. In this example, Veronica is treated as a common noun, representing the type „people named Veronica‟. The initial hit is used with human reference. (16)
...and eac hyt wæs seo ylce Veronix, þe þæs hælendes reafes æthran and wearð þurh þæt fram þæs blodes fleusan gehæled. (covinsal,VSal_1_[Cross]:18.1.129) „because [and also] she was the same Veronica who had touched the Saviour‟s garment, and was healed from the flow of blood.‟ (Cross 1996: 114)
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A similar example is found in the output for the PPCMBE. In (17), the zero relative modifies the noun time to form a postcopular NP (the first time I have been quoted as an authority by an eminent outsider). The initial it is a full anaphoric pronoun referring to the situation depicted in the previous sentence. (17)
I believe to-day there was in the Times what I may call the first personal thorough recognition of my working life from an educational quarter…It is the first time I have been quoted as an authority by an eminent outsider, (THRING-187X,216.28)
Finally, it is well-known that sentences with extraposed that-clauses are difficult to distinguish from it-clefts (see Calude 2008a; Haugland 1993). In the following example from the PPCMBE output, the that-clause (that she did) is an extraposed subject, which is predicated of by the VP is in the family. The intended meaning here is something like „that she did say it and think it is known in the family‟. (18)
That poor child Carinthia Jane, when first she beheld Old England's shores, tossing in the packet-boat on a wild Channel sea, did say it and think it, for it is in the family that she did; and no wonder that she should… (MEREDITH-1895,19,132.8-9)
2.5.
Interim summary
The CP-CLF annotation in the English historical parsed corpora is therefore applied to several constructions which are not it-clefts. This is unsurprising, since it is notoriously difficult to identify and isolate it-clefts from other, superficially similar but structurally distinct, sentence types. In most cases, however, a manual check of the discourse context of each token provides enough evidence for a reliable classification. Other times, the judgements are much more subtle and I discuss some of the difficult cases in Section 4. After eliminating examples which prefer an impersonal reading, sentences with existential it, and tokens where the clausal component has some other relationship to the rest of the sentence, what remains is a dataset of specificational and predicational it-clefts spanning over 1000 years and comprising over 500 tokens (with 514 it-clefts in total).
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3.
The it-cleft‟s development over time
Frequency information
Frequency information, charting the development of the English it-cleft, is provided in Table 1. These figures represent data from all four corpora: the YCOE (1.5 million words), the PPCME2 (1.2 million words), the PPCEME (1.7 million words) and the PPCMBE (1 million words). The data is mostly separated into 70–100 year intervals, using time periods recognized by the English historical parsed corpora series.1 However, the Old English data has not been divided up in this way, since it is difficult to separate the YCOE text-files into discrete time periods. Table 1 indicates both raw numbers and frequencies which are normalized to a corpus of 500,000 words (shown in parentheses). The numbers given here are quite conservative; I have only included what I believe are clear cases of specificational and predicational it-clefts.2 Table 1. The frequency of it-clefts throughout Old, Middle and Modern English OE (–1150) ME 1 (1150–1250) ME II (1250–1350) ME III (1350–1420) ME IV (1420–1500) E I (1500–1569) E II (1570–1639) E III (1640–1710) MBE I (1700–1769) MBE II (1770–1839) MBE III (1840–1914)
Specificational 7 (2.4) 3 (5.8) 3 (10.2) 12 (12.3) 17 (32.0) 26 (22.6) 40 (30.6) 103 (91.1) 82 (137.2) 105 (142.4) 95 (168.8)
Predicational 6 (2.1) 2 (3.9) 1 (3.4) 3 (3.1) 1 (1.9) 1 (0.9) 1 (0.8) 1 (0.9) 1 (1.7) 1 (1.4) 3 (5.3)
Total 13 (4.5) 5 (9.7) 4 (13.6) 15 (15.4) 18 (34.0) 27 (23.4) 41 (31.4) 104 (92.0) 83 (138.9) 106 (143.7) 98 (174.2)
These figures show a general increase in the occurrence of it-clefts over time. The normalized frequencies, in particular, increase steadily at almost every interval. The only exception relates to the period MEIV (1420–1500), which contains a higher proportion of it-clefts than the following two subperiods of Early Modern English. The reason for this aberration seems to 1. The PPCME2 is divided into subcorpora indicating both composition date and manuscript date. Here, I conflate these subcorpora to indicate only the time of composition (where known). 2. Nevertheless, as a consequence of reexamining the data, the frequencies given here are slightly higher than those given in Patten (2010) for Late Middle and Early Modern English.
Frequency information
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lie in the high frequency of it-clefts in two Late Middle English texts: The Book of Margery Kempe and Malory‟s Morte Darthur. 11 of the 18 it-clefts in MEIV appear in these two text-files (cmkempe.m4 and cmmalory.m4), which contain several instances of hidden or mistaken identity. In (19), for example, a woman is berated for not believing that the one who spoke to her was truly God. Likewise, in (20), King Arthur fails to identify Merlin (who is in disguise) as the man currently speaking to him. (19)
& þis chastisyng schal enduryn xij days tyl þu wyl beleuyn þat it is God whech spekyth to þe & no deuyl. (c1450 CMKEMPE,146.3375) „and this chastising shall endure twelve days until you will believe that it is God who speaks to you and no devil.‟
(20)
And Merlion was so disgysed that kynge Arthure knewe hym nat… „Sir,‟ seyde thes two knyghtes, 'hit ys Merlion that so spekith unto you.‟ (a1470 CMMALORY,30.952)
In any case, Table 1 suggests that the it-cleft has steadily become a more established construction over time, occurring just under 40 times more frequently in the late nineteenth century data than in Old English. What is more, the figures clearly show that this increase is limited to the specificational variant of this construction. While the predicational it-cleft is present throughout all periods of English, it maintains a relatively low frequency. In Old English, the specificational it-cleft and the predicational it-cleft have roughly the same rate of occurrence. In MEI, the frequency of the predicational it-cleft is 2/3 the size of that of the specificational it-cleft, which drops to 1/3 at MEII and again to 1/4 MEIII. However, from the end of the Late Middle English period onwards, the two constructions take different paths and their frequencies are no longer comparable. Interestingly, the predicational it-cleft is attested slightly earlier than the specificational it-cleft. While all 7 of the OE specificational examples occur in the first half of the eleventh century, 3 of the predicational tokens are dated from around the middle of the tenth century. Ball‟s (1991: 53) observation about predicational it-clefts therefore applies equally to this data; she notes that “they now appear as exceptions to generalizations about the cleft, but they represent the earliest attested English cleft construction with neuter pronoun subject”. The question therefore presents itself: why is this variety now exceptional in relation to the specificational it-cleft? In other words,
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The it-cleft‟s development over time
what accounts for the divergence in the development of these two related constructions? The predicational it-cleft seems to have changed little since Old English. For instance, the OE predicational it-cleft in (21) has the same structure and function as the nineteenth century token in (22). (21)
Forþam hit is swiðe ryht spell þæt Plato se uðwita sæde; (coboeth,Bo:35.95.19.1836) „It is a very true saying that Philosopher Plato spake‟ (Sedgefield 1900: XXXV)
(22)
…and the attention of the pupil must be engrossed in the first instance with overcoming these difficulties…Still, it is but a divided attention that we can give to the exercise. (BAIN-1878,383.350)
In contrast, the general increase in the specificational it-cleft‟s frequency is known to be accompanied by two main changes: it occurs with a greater range of non-nominal foci over time and it acquires a new discourse function, in which the cleft clause changes from expressing only given information to also expressing new information presented as fact (see Ball 1994a; Patten 2010). I outline each of these developments in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, before discussing different ways of accounting for them in Chapter 8.
4.
Changes to the clefted constituent
Table 2 shows the syntactic categories of specificational it-cleft foci in the diachronic corpora. As anticipated, the data indicates that this construction occurs with a wider and more diverse range of focal elements over time. For instance, clear examples of it-clefts with clausal and adverb phrase foci do not appear in the corpus until Early Modern English. Furthermore, while it-clefts with prepositional foci are present in Middle English, these also become much more frequent at the end of the Early Modern period, when there is a substantial increase in the overall number of specificational itclefts, and AdvP-focus it-clefts start to appear. As shown in Table 2, itclefts with NP foci, which are (ordinarily) the most common type of it-cleft at each stage of English, are also the oldest, dating back to Old English.
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Table 2. The changing frequencies of it-clefts with a range of focal categories OE ME I ME II ME III ME IV EI E II E III MBE I MBE II MBE III
NP 7 (2.4) 2 (3.9) 3 (10.2) 11 (11.3) 17 (32.0) 24 (20.8) 38 (29.1) 74 (65.5) 52 (87.0) 42 (56.9) 57 (101.3)
PP
AdvP
CL
1 (1.9) 1 (1.0) 1 (0.9) 2 (1.5) 19 (16.8) 26 (43.5) 54 (73.2) 28 (49.8)
1 (0.9) 9 (8.0) 2 (3.3) 7 (9.5) 6 (10.7)
1 (0.9) 2 (3.3) 2 (2.7) 4 (7.1)
Total 7 (2.4) 3 (5.8) 3 (10.2) 12 (12.3) 17 (32.0) 26 (22.6) 40 (30.6) 103 (91.1) 82 (137.2) 105 (142.4) 95 (168.8)
This change, involving the development of it-clefts with different categories of foci, is often taken to indicate the relaxation of a syntactic constraint: the focal position loses its NP specification and allows other kinds of phrasal elements to enter into it (see Patten 2010). The data-set in Table 2 suggests that this expansion begins relatively early on, with the appearance of PP-focus it-clefts in Early Middle English. This it at odds with Ball‟s (1994a) suggestion that it-clefts with non-NP foci are the product of a Late Middle English development, involving a partial merger between the existing NP-focus it-cleft and the it-impersonals (see Chapter 8, Section 3.1). She cites LME examples of the PP-focus it-cleft dating from the early fifteenth century. On reexamining the LME data in Patten (2010), I came across a slightly earlier token from the late fourteenth century (in period MEIII of the PPCME2). (23)
Me troweþ þat by þe prayers of þis holy mayde it is þat þat Me believes that by the prayers of this holy maid it is that that place was nevere ȝit destroyed (a1387 CMPOLYCH,IV,125.869) place was never yet destroyed „I think that it was by the prayers of this holy maiden that that place was never destroyed‟ (Patten 2010: 230)
I argued that (23) requires an it-cleft analysis rather than an impersonal interpretation because if we remove the prepositional phrase (in bold), the meaning of the sentence is compromised. For instance, in (23), the writer expresses his belief that Ethelberga‟s prayers prevented the destruction of
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the abbey. However, on the impersonal interpretation, shown in (24), the writer “expresses a doubt about whether it is a fact that the abbey was never destroyed. This is a far less intuitive gloss of [(23)], which seems instead to presuppose the fact that the abbey was never destroyed” (Patten 2010: 230). This suggests that the postcopular PP is a focal element rather than a purely optional adjunct; that is, it identifies the cause of the abbey‟s preservation, rather than providing scene-setting temporal or spatial information. (24)
I think it happened that that place was never destroyed.
A similar example occurs in the Early Middle English component of the PPCME2. The following early thirteenth century token seems to be an itcleft rather than an it-impersonal because the information in the cleft clause is presupposed. In the prior discourse, the devil provides a list of ways for people to resist him and to protect themselves from the „base desires‟ which lead them into „filthy sin‟. One such „weapon‟ is given in (25): recognizing the role of the devil in leading them to act on their shameful desires. This interpretation is supported when we examine the following sentence, which describes the devil‟s evil nature. (25)
þenchen hit is þurh me þt hare lust leadeð ham to wurche to wundre. Þenchen ȝef ha beieð me? to hu bitter beast ha buheð. (c1200-25 CMMARGA,78.379) „thinking that it is through me that their desire leads them to shameful actions; thinking what a vicious creature they are paying homage to if they submit to me‟ (Millet and Wogan-Browne 1990: 63)
If, on the other hand, we treat the postcopular prepositional phrase through him as an optional adjunct, as in (26), the resulting reading is less plausible. Here, as in (24), the relevant relation – of agency – is left unexpressed. This fundamentally alters the meaning of the sentence. (26)
thinking that it happens that their desire leads them to shameful actions
The evidence from the early English corpora therefore suggests that itclefts could occur with prepositional foci as early as Early Middle English. Indeed, it could be argued that the PP-focus it-cleft was actually available in Old English. The YCOE data does not contain any clear-cut examples of
Changes to the clefted constituent
199
PP-focus it-clefts and consists of plenty of tokens which are unambiguously it-impersonals, such as (27). (27)
And hyt wæs þa on þam ehtoðan geare, þe se mycla hungor heom on becom, þæt hig for þære hlafleaste þa eorðan æton. (covinsal,VSal_1_[Cross]:14.2.105) „And it happened in the eighth year, when famine came upon them, so that for want of bread they ate earth‟ (Cross 1996: 267)
Nevertheless, there are two genuinely borderline tokens in the YCOE, both of which contain temporal adverbial phrases in postverbal position, expressing the duration of an event. On the one hand, these look like other impersonals with „measure of time‟ adjuncts. On this basis, Ball (1991: 101) groups (28) with the OE impersonal from Bede in (29). On an impersonal reading then, (28) translates as „Now, for 38 years, my daughter has been lost to me‟. However, the example is also amenable to an it-cleft analysis, on which the speaker Paphnutius specifies (and emphasizes) the exact number of years that his daughter has been missing. This interpretation is not at odds with the discourse context and is the one opted for by Filppula (2009: 273). (28)
Nu hit is for eahta and þryttiðan gearan þæt min dohtor me losode (coeuphr,LS_7_[Euphr]:270.283) „Now it is for eight and thirty years that my daughter hath been lost to me‟ (Skeat 1881a: 351)
(29)
Đa wæs twa gear ðæt he ðæt bsicopsetl swa sæt 7 heold. (cobede,Bede_4:30.370.13.3702) „Then for two years he thus occupied and held the bishop‟s seat‟ (Miller 1898: 371)
Here, I have chosen to exclude these tokens from the diachronic data-set of it-clefts. As shown below, tokens with postcopular temporal expressions, and which are clearly it-clefts rather than impersonals, do not appear in the corpus until much later in the history of English. Therefore, a cleft analysis for these borderline YCOE tokens is perhaps unmotivated (see also Ball 1991: 111). Nevertheless, the relatively early attestation of PP-focus itclefts in Early Middle English still raises the question of whether the it-cleft construction ever actually had a syntactic constraint specifying for NP foci. Although the diachronic data shows that the it-cleft occurs with a wider
200
The it-cleft‟s development over time
range, and a greater number, of non-NP focal elements over time (see Table 2), the evidence suggests that this structural change is actually governed by semantic conditions (see also Patten 2010). Data from the YCOE and the PPCME2 suggests that, originally, the itcleft showed a preference for focusing NPs referring to the most discrete of entities. In Old and Early Middle English, 10 out of 12 NP-focus it-clefts (over 80%) contain proper name and pronominal foci which denote animate individuals. Likewise, in Late Middle English, 22 out of 28 it-clefts with NP foci refer to animate entities (almost 80%).3 This figure drops to under 50% in the PPCEME, with 64 animate NP foci in 136 relevant tokens (of which 3 are indefinite NPs). In the PPCMBE, less than 40% of the 151 NPfocus it-clefts contain animate foci and only 52 of these 58 tokens have definite, specific reference (under 35% of it-clefts with NP foci). Abstract nouns, which do not denote discrete physical objects, occur as it-cleft foci only from the Late Middle English period onwards. In LME, they make up less than 15% of the NP-focus it-clefts (4 tokens out of 28). This figure increases to over 20% in Early Modern English, with 29 out of 136 instances having abstract nouns in the focus position, and again to over 30% in Late Modern English, involving 48 out of the 151 it-clefts with NP foci. As abstract nouns come to be used more frequently as it-cleft foci, we find a strong tendency for them to occur in lists or accompanied by focusing adverbs. As we saw in Chapter 5, Section 3, such strategies are employed in present-day English as a way of individualizing characteristically non-referring it-cleft foci, such as adjective phrases and manner adverbs, in order to make them more acceptable (see also É. Kiss 1998; Borkin 1984). In Early Modern English, 27 out of the 29 examples containing postcopular abstract nouns (93%) occur with listed alternatives (19 tokens) and/or with focusing adverbs (10 tokens). For example, in (30), the abstract noun shame is presented as a discrete and distinct emotion, which stands in contrast to pain as the most valuable basis for a child‟s punishment. Similarly, proud knowledge is defined and delimited through a contrast with pure knowledge in (31). This example is especially interesting because here contrastive listing also leads to a subtle reformulation of the cleft clause. Although both clauses provide the same discourse-old information, the former presents it in a much more neutral manner. I discuss this issue further in Section 5.
3. Ball (1991: 272) finds this same preference in her Late Middle English data. She notes that 89 out of 111 NP-focus it-clefts (80%) contain animate foci.
Changes to the clefted constituent
201
(30)
for „tis shame of the fault and the disgrace that attends it that they should stand in feare of, rather then paine, if you would have them a temper truely ingenuous. (1685 LOCKE-E3-H,57.206)
(31)
…that it was not the pure knowledg of nature and vniuersality… which gave the occasion to the fall; but it was the proude knowledge of good and euill…which was the fourme of the temptation; (1605 BACON-E2-P1,1,4R.26)
Contrastive focusing adverbs also serve to position the focus in relation to excluded alternatives. In (32), the adverb alone emphasizes the uniqueness of the abstract noun use. Likewise, in (33), the adverb only contrasts the abstract opportunity (or alone time) with other, more concrete gifts. (32)
„Tis use alone hardens it and makes it more able to endure the cold (1685 LOCKE-E3-P1,34.34)
(33)
„Tis opportunity, „tis a lone-hour only, that can make me happy. (1688 BEHN-E3-P1,167.206)
However, after the Early Modern period, it-clefts containing postcopular abstract nouns are less associated with listing and focusing adverbs. In the PPCMBE, 27 out of 48 NP-focus it-clefts with abstract foci (56%) involve listing (21 tokens) and/or focusing adverbs (7 tokens). What is more, this association grows progressively weaker over time. At MBEI, 71% of itclefts with abstract nouns involve listing or focusing adverbs (10 out of 14 tokens); this drops to 54% at MBEII (7 out of 13 tokens) and to just under 48% at MBEIII (10 out of 21 tokens). This suggests that abstract nouns, which do not denote discrete physical objects, have gradually become more acceptable it-cleft foci and do not need to be quite so often coerced into the referential focus position via individualizing techniques, as shown in (34). (34)
but it was love for you that made me guilty
(COLLIER-1835,27.1002) In addition to focusing more abstract entities over time, the it-cleft also occurs with a greater number of relational foci. Table 3 shows an increase in the number and variety of it-cleft foci expressing the relations of time, place, means, reason and manner.
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The it-cleft‟s development over time
Table 3. The changing frequencies of it-clefts with a range of adverbial foci Time OE ME I ME II ME III ME IV EI E II E III MBE I MBE II MBE III
1 (0.8) 14 (12.4) 8 (13.4) 10 (13.6) 8 (14.2)
Place
12 (10.6) 3 (5.0) 12 (16.3) 10 (17.8)
Means
Reason
Manner
Total
1 (1.9)
1 (1.9)
1 (1.0)
1 (1.0)
4 (3.5) 5 (8.4) 17 (23.0) 7 (12.4)
2 (1.7) 1 (0.8) 6 (5.3) 6 (10.0) 10 (13.6) 5 (8.9)
4 (3.5) 4 (6.7) 13 (17.6) 5 (8.9)
2 (1.7) 2 (1.5) 40 (35.4) 26 (43.5) 62 (84.1) 35 (62.2)
As we can see, it-clefts with relational foci become much more frequent in the second half of the Early Modern period. This corresponds to a general increase in both the number of specificational it-clefts and the number of itclefts with non-NP foci at this time (see Table 2). Before this point, the few it-clefts with adverbial foci are limited to expressing means or reason. For example, the Middle English PP-focus it-cleft in (35), repeated from (23) above, expresses a causal relationship. As noted in Patten (2010: 230), this same relation can also be expressed by it-clefts with NP foci in Middle English, such as (36). Here, the focal NP corresponds to the subject of the cleft clause, rather than to an adjunct. (35)
Me troweþ þat by þe prayers of þis holy mayde it is þat þat place was nevere ȝit destroyed (a1387 CMPOLYCH,IV,125.869) „I think that it was by the prayers of this holy maiden that that place was never destroyed‟ (Patten 2010: 230)
(36)
It es pride in þaim þat hyes þaim „It is pride that elevates them‟
(a1425 CMBENRUL,11.370) (Patten 2010: 230)
Clear examples of it-clefts containing temporal and spatial foci do not occur until the latter half of the Early Modern period (see also Patten 2010). This development sees the appearance of it-clefts with AdvP foci; at EIII, all 9 AdvP-focus it-clefts involve reference to time and place (see Table 2). In addition to examples with AdvP and PP foci, such as (37), we also find NP-focus it-clefts expressing temporal and spatial relationships in this period, as shown in (38). Indeed, at EIII, 11 out of the 26 tokens referring to time and place involve NP foci.
Changes to the clefted constituent
203
(37)
It was in 78; but I am not certain of the Day of the Month: It was on a Saturday he came (1685 OATES-E3-P2,4.87.257)
(38)
It was, as near as I can remember, the 3d of August, that he went out of Town (1685 OATES-E3-H,4,73.C1.42)
Manner adverbials first appear as it-cleft foci during the late seventeenth century. These tokens are especially interesting, since, unlike references to time and place, manner expressions do not have conventional boundaries. It is perhaps unsurprising then that over 60% of the 21 tokens from EIII to MBEII occur either with focusing adverbs, shown in (39), or intensifying modification – used to turn a gradable expression into a well-defined superlative, as in (40). (39)
In a Word, „twas in this flattering Light only, though not perhaps so thoroughly consider‟d, I look‟d upon the Life of an Actor when but eighteen Years of Age (CIBBER-1740,53.226)
(40)
They were so strict with us, as to landing any Goods, that it was with extream Difficulty that I got on Shore three Bales of English Goods… (DEFOE-1719,197.88)
Throughout this period, all manner adverbials occur in PP-focus it-clefts. At MBEIII, however, there is a further development, with 3 out of the 5 tokens involving adverb phrase foci. As we saw in Chapter 5, Section 3, manner adverbs often need to be placed in a contrast set with other members of this category before they are deemed acceptable it-cleft foci. This is also true of the historical data. In the early twentieth century example in (41), the focus is defined by what it isn‟t, rather than what it is, and the description is shaped and reinforced by listing (wantonly nor altogether willfully). (41)
It is not wantonly, nor altogether willfully, that man has so often lost his God. (TALBOT-1901,95.93)
In addition to occuring increasingly with non-NP adverbial foci, it-clefts also appear with PP foci which correspond to arguments of the verb embedded inside the cleft clause. For example, in (42) to this exercise is specified as matching the description given in the gapped relative clause the supposed training more especially applies ___. Such tokens appear in the diachronic corpus at the end of the Early Modern period (with 1 instance)
204
The it-cleft‟s development over time
and become more frequent in Late Modern English (with 10 instances, averaging just over 5 tokens every 500,000 words).4 In some of these tokens, the focal PP expresses a meaning which is (at least) reminiscent of the relational concept „location‟. For example, (42) can be paraphrased as where the supposed training more especially applies is to this exercise. (42)
Accordingly, it is to this exercise that the supposed training more especially applies. (BAIN-1878,368.152)
However, in other cases, it is difficult to detect any kind of relational meaning whatsoever. For example, in (45), the postcopular PP is used to refer to an animate individual. This token seems to function as an alternative to the NP-focus it-cleft it is you to whom I am indebted, in which the focus corresponds to the object of the preposition in the embedded clause. Once again, this suggests an increasing overlap in the functions of nominal and prepositional it-cleft foci. (43)
Lady C. So sir, it is to you that I am indebted for all the confusion that has taken place in my house this afternoon. To Frank. (COLLIER-1835,20.700)
5.
Changes to the cleft clause
In addition to the changes to the clefted constituent, the it-cleft construction undergoes a parallel development which has consequences for the information status of the cleft clause. This change sees the rise of the informativepresupposition (IP) it-cleft, which provides brand-new information in a presupposed clause (see Chapter 5, Section 4). Originally, the cleft clause was associated with expressing discourse-old information. For instance, all 7 of the specificational it-clefts in the YCOE contain information which is given in the immediate discourse context. In (44), God has told Adam that he must prove his obedience by forgoing that thing which God forbids. The fact that Adam will have to forgo something is therefore old information; what is at issue is the identity of this thing (as „the fruit of one tree‟).
4. However, Ball (1991: 107) suggests that this may actually be a Late Middle English development.
Changes to the cleft clause
(44)
205
Swylce God cwæde to him, “Nast þu na þæt ic eom þin Hlaford and þæt þu eart min þeowa, buton þu do þæt ic þe hate, and forgang þæt ic þe forebode. Hwæt mæy hit þonne beon þæt þu forgan sceole. (cocathom1,ÆCHom_I,_1:181.78.73) „As if God had said to him, “Thou knowest not that I am thy Lord, and that thou art my servant, unless thou dost that which I command, and forgoest that which I forbid thee. But what may it be that thou shalt forgo? (Thorpe 1844: 15)
In the Middle English corpus, however, we find two examples where the information in the cleft clause is not given by the previous discourse, but is nonetheless shared knowledge, including (45). (45)
Abid a while, I prey þe, and taak good kep ho it is þat Abide.IMP a while, I pray thee, and take good keep who it is that leneþ hym so boldely to Cristes brest and slepþ so sauerly leans him so boldly to Christ.GEN breast and sleeps so surely in his lappe. (c1400 CMAELR3,45.586) in his lap. „Stay a while, I pray you, and take good note of who it is that leans so boldly against Christ‟s chest and sleeps so confidently in his lap.‟ (Patten 2010: 236–237)
In this example, the proposition that „someone leant against Christ‟s chest‟ has not been mentioned previously. Nevertheless, the immediate discourse context is about the part of the Bible that this event is from. “The purpose of this extract is to remind us of this scene (and so assumes that we know it), even though this particular event is not present in the previous discourse” (Patten 2010: 236). In this MEII token, then, the information in the cleft clause is shared, but non-salient. It is not until Late Middle English that we begin to find examples which can properly be called informative-presupposition it-clefts. There are three such tokens in the PPCME2, one at MEIII and two at MEIV. For instance, the relative clause in (46) contains discourse-new information which is not necessarily shared knowledge. However, the token is still presuppositional, and so gives the impression of expressing a fact known to a third party. It is therefore unsurprising that this example, along with the two other instances from LME, belongs to the genre „history‟.
206
(46)
The it-cleft‟s development over time
It was he þat graunted Kyng Herri þe Secunde to go into Yrlond and turne hem to þe feith, (a1464 CMCAPCHR,108.2367) „It was he that granted King Henry the Second to go into Ireland and turn them to the faith.‟
The IP it-cleft continues into the Early Modern period, with three instances at both EI and EII. For example, (47) provides a discourse-new description of Christ in the cleft clause. Here, the author presents this information as a previously established fact by referring to the third-party source, St. Paul. (47)
he is truthe and lyfe, he is alone our onlye medyator and advocate, sytynge at the ryghte hande of hys Father. Yt ys he, as S. Powle saythe, that ys our onlye redempsion, salvasyon, justyffycasyon, and reconsylyation. (c1555 MOWNTAYNE-E1-P1,190.273)
Towards the end of the Early Modern period, at EIII, the frequency of IP it-clefts increases to 8 instances. In addition to the usual tokens, where the cleft clause expresses information which we take to be certifiable fact, as in (48), we also find example (49), which has a performative function. (48)
I now see it was not without cause, that our good Queen Elizabeth did so often wish her self a Milkmaid all the month of May, because they are not troubled with fears and cares, but sing sweetly all the day, and sleep securely all the night (1676 WALTON-E3-P1, 234.278)
(49)
Aman. Pray be so just then to me, to believe, „tis with a World of Innocency I wou„d enquire, Whether you think those Women we call Women of Reputation, do really „scape all other Men, as they do those Shadows of „em, the Beaux. (1696 VANBR-E3-P1,43.108)
In this token, Amanda asks a question (and so performs a speech act) in the cleft clause. However, by choosing a cleft formulation, she backgrounds the question and its delicate subject matter while emphasizing her own position of innocence. This concern to distance herself from the speech act is further evidenced by the use of the modal wou‟d. The example represents the first performative it-cleft in the diachronic corpus, a subtype which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. The development of the performative itcleft results from changes both to the cleft clause and the clefted constituent, since such sentences focus on the manner in which the discourse-
Changes to the cleft clause
207
new/hearer-new act is performed. By the end of the Early Modern period, the IP it-cleft is already an established construction and manner expressions have begun to appear in the focal position (see Section 4). In addition to the IP it-cleft tokens, the end of the Early Modern era also sees some creative uses where a discourse-old presupposition is altered or in some way manipulated. For example, in (50), the information in the cleft clause is partly old and partly new. “Here, it is given that Dunne is baulked and confused, and therefore that something baulks thy Understanding, but the rest of the proposition, that something baulks thy Honesty, is new to the discourse” (Patten 2010: 237). (50)
Dunne. My Lord, I am so baulked, I do not know what I say myself; tell me what you would have me say, for I am cluttered out of my Senses. L.C.J. Why, prithee Man, there‟s no body baulks thee but thy own self; thou art asked Questions that are as plain as any thing in World can be: it is only thy own depraved naughty Heart that baulks both thy Honesty and Understanding, if thou hast any; (1685 LISLE-E3-P2,4.118.362)
In this example, the Lord Chief Justice (L.C.J) manipulates a discourse-old presupposition to include his individual opinion that Dunne is deliberately being dishonest. The use of cleft structure here, therefore allows the speaker‟s opinion to be presented as uncontroversial fact. A slightly earlier and much more subtle example was given as (31) above. In this early seventeenth century token, the cleft clause information is made more subjective as it is reformulated in a way that captures the author‟s negative attitude towards the event discussed (see Section 4). In the PPCMBE, the frequency of IP it-clefts doubles, accounting for nearly 19% of all specificational it-clefts, compared with just over 8% in the PPCEME. Counting only clear cases where the information in the cleft clause is entirely discourse-new (and not merely non-salient) and where the information is not inferable either from the situational or discourse context, 16 tokens occur at MBEI, 18 at MBEII and 19 at MBEIII.5 Some of the 5. There are a number of tokens in the PPCMBE which have the appearance of IP it-clefts, but which actually contain highly non-salient, discourse-old information. For example, we can see that in (i), the narrator‟s separation from his father as he heads to university represents discourse-old information. However, prior mention occurs on a previous page, before a long interval in which the narrator recounts his early relationship with his father. By the time we get to the
208
The it-cleft‟s development over time
more interesting cases include (51), which contains inaccurate information in the presupposed clause. Here Maxwell makes the assumption (based upon the experts‟ accepted opinion) that the female worker bees must be, in some way, impregnated. However, we now know that the queen bee is the only fertile female in the hive. Indeed, the example contains a further incorrect presupposition by referring to an entity that does not exist (the King bee). Nevertheless, (51) behaves in every other way like an ordinary IP itcleft; that is, the cleft clause information is presented as new, yet uncontroversial fact. (51)
7. The greatest Part of the Writers on this Subject, having been of the Opinion, That the Sovereign was a Male, and that it is by Virtue of this King, that the Working-Bees, who are Females, are impregnate;… (MAXWELL-1747,11.32)
The following example from Dickens is also an IP it-cleft. Here, the cleft clause expresses information which is both new and unexpected, given Mr. Pickwick‟s implicit belief. However, the it-cleft backgrounds the main point before Dickens goes on to reinforce it (touched they were) and further explain it. Dickens chooses to instead focus on Mr. Pickwick‟s foolish and ungainly attempts to defend himself. This narrative technique allows the reader to be touched by the same events that his adversaries are, so that, by the time we read the information in the cleft clause, it no longer depicts a controversial reaction but almost a shared experience. (52)
It might have been Mr Pickwick's very unexpected gallantry, or it might have been the complicated manner in which he had got himself out of bed, and fallen all in a mass upon the hornpipe man, that touched his adversaries. Touched they were; for, instead of then and there making an attempt to commit manslaughter, as Mr
it-cleft, this episode in the narrator‟s life is non-salient. However, the token functions very much like an IP it-cleft, in that it (re)introduces a new chapter in the narrator‟s life and signals the start of a new segment in the narrative. Delin (1992: 292) is therefore correct that, in many cases at least, “the information within an it-cleft presupposition appears to remind rather than inform”. (i)
In setting out for the university, I was to part with my father and preceptor…and it was not without many tears shed on both sides that we parted, when I mounted the chaise in which I set out for Oxford. (GODWIN-1805,66.208)
Changes to the cleft clause
209
Pickwick implicitly believed they would have done, they paused, stared at each other a short time, and finally laughed outright. (DICKENS-1837,553.219) The early twentieth century token in (53) is especially interesting because it occurs right at the very end of the diachronic corpus. Out of all of the other instances, this token best illustrates the distinct characteristics we attribute to the present-day IP it-cleft. The example contains a postcopular temporal expression, it expresses new information in the cleft clause and it occurs in discourse-initial position (introducing a section on Japanese Gardening). While all of these properties are shared with the happen-class impersonal construction (see Section 2.1), example (53) clearly has a different information structure. Although the fact that commercial cultivators gave serious attention to the Japanese flora may be new to the reader, it is presented as a commonplace occurrence. What is marked as surprising is how long it took for this event to take place, not until some fifty years ago. (53)
Although the introduction of the beautiful Japanese plants that now contribute to the charm of British gardens belongs to the distant past, it was not until some fifty years ago that commercial cultivators gave serious attention to the Japanese flora, with a view to obtain some other of its members for the further enrichment of our gardens. (WEATHERS-1913,1,13.288)
There are also three further tokens of the early performative it-cleft in the PPCMBE, including (54). In this example, Wetherell uses an it-cleft to mitigate the face-threatening act of questioning the accuracy of the Lord‟s note. The construction highlights Wetherell‟s deference to this high-status individual and downplays the accusation that information is being withheld. Performative it-clefts therefore function as a politeness strategy, enabling the speaker to distance themselves from their act (marked as presupposed or „not at issue‟) by focusing on their emotional response, either to the act itself or to the addressee. (54)
Mr. Wetherell. It is with great deference I should question the accuracy of your Lordship‟s note, but I apprehend it will be found to be admitted there, that you may enquire through what Officer of Government the communication was made. (WATSON-1817,1,160.2033)
210
The it-cleft‟s development over time
In addition, the PPCMBE contains several more examples in which an otherwise discourse-old presupposition contains elements of the speaker‟s opinion. Not all of these tokens are quite as playful or creative as the Early Modern example in (50). Oftentimes, they involve the author placing their own value judgements about the proposition inside the presupposed clause. This encourages the reader to accept these opinions unchallenged. In (55), for example, the author expresses his culturally-motivated opinion that for women to work as manual labourers is a revolting proposition. (55)
The fair sex are the farmers of the island; they condescend, or submit, to dig the land, sow, harrow, and reap, and even patiently thresh, and with handmills grind what their industry has obtained: but it seems not to be brutality of disposition, but the imperious necessities of situation, which impose such revolting toil upon the weaker sex. (TURNER1-1799,32.83)
However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, we come across yet another new development. At this point, we find IP it-clefts which present a statement of opinion in the cleft clause, rather than a statement of fact. For example, in this it-cleft from Oscar Wilde‟s An Ideal Husband, the information in the cleft clause is discourse-new. It is therefore not an example involving the adaptation or manipulation of a discourse-old presupposition. Nevertheless, this IP it-cleft is not based on factual information; the claim that marriage is a hopeless, one-sided institution is the opinion of the speaker. (56)
Well, I will make her stand by her husband. That is the only thing for her to do. That is the only thing for any woman to do. It is the growth of the moral sense in women that makes marriage such a hopeless, one-sided institution. (WILDE-1895,75.992)
By placing this statement in a presupposed clause, it is expressed as a truism. This creates the sense that the speaker (and the writer, for that matter) is an authority on the subject. The example is humorous, mainly because it presents what is obviously a controversial claim as an incontestable fact. The rhetorical device employed here is therefore “assertion by presupposition”.
Summary
6.
211
Summary
From this diachronic corpus investigation, we have seen that while the itcleft‟s basic structure may have remained unaltered since Old English, the construction has nevertheless undergone substantial changes in its function and usage. In particular, the specificational it-cleft (unlike the predicational it-cleft) undergoes a gradual and continual increase in frequency over time. This is accompanied by changes to both the clefted constituent and the cleft clause. As shown in Section 4, the it-cleft occurs with an increasingly wide range of foci, which denote a more diverse array of semantic concepts. The it-cleft originally showed a preference for focusing the most discrete of entities, such as proper names and pronouns denoting animate individuals. Over time, however, the construction begins to co-occur with less discrete entities, such as abstract nouns (from Late Middle English onwards), before taking a greater number and variety of relational and situational foci, which express concepts such as time, place and manner (towards the end of Early Modern English). This development has had consequences for the category of it-cleft foci, initiating an increase in the number and variety of phrasal categories that can enter into the focal slot. Likewise, we saw in Section 5 that the it-cleft changes from expressing only given information, to expressing shared but non-salient information, before the inclusion of information which is factual or assumed to be factual in some sense. This development marks the introduction of the IP itcleft in Late Middle English. However, the data suggests that the change continues further, as nonfactual opinion is slowly accommodated into the cleft clause. For instance, towards the end of Early Modern English, creative uses appear in which elements of speaker opinion are integrated into an otherwise discourse-old presupposition. This is followed, at the end of the Modern English period, by examples where the entire cleft clause is comprised of opinion presented as fact. This diachronic perspective therefore shows that the it-cleft has acquired some of its more idiosyncratic properties over time, as a result of language change. As was shown in Chapter 5, the present-day it-cleft can occur with certain foci not found in related constructions and has a greater capacity for expressing new information in the relative clause. These properties can now be explained as the outcome of the it-cleft‟s construction-specific historical development. Nevertheless, two questions remain: how do we account for these changes and why has only the it-cleft construction developed in this particular way?
Chapter 8 The it-cleft and constructional change
1.
The two kinds of constructional change
In Chapter 6, we saw that the historical development of the English it-cleft involves a process of fossilization; that is, the it-cleft schema is a relic from an earlier time, retaining residual patterns which are no longer productive outside of the cleft construction. On a usage-based account, fossilization is the product of token frequency (that is, the number of times an individual instance is activated). As the it-cleft becomes more frequent over time, the schema is strengthened and reinforced. In other words, the cleft structure is entrenched in the speaker‟s grammar to such a degree that it is indifferent to, and unaffected by, changes to the higher-order constructions from which the it-cleft inherits its structural properties.1 Therefore, while the structured inventory of the language has changed, such that the it-cleft‟s superordinate schemas have fallen out of use, their influence lives on in the lower-level construction, which exhibits fossilized properties that no longer require the support of an overarching taxonomy of constructions. However, this is not the only way in which frequency affects the storage and organization of grammatical knowledge. While token frequency results in the entrenchment of the instance, type frequency (which involves the activation of different types of instance) leads to the entrenchment of more abstract schemas (see Chapter 2, Section 3). On this account, novel types of instance are formed by extension from existing constructs. As these different types of instance coexist, speakers generalize over them to form a more abstract (or schematic) and productive construction. This, in turn, may result in the reconfiguration of constructions higher up in the taxonomy, as the system is reorganized in such a way that these novel instances are properly integrated into the hierarchical network. While fossilization results in the entrenchment of lower-level constructs, this process of schematization therefore results in the entrenchment of (a series of) higher-order constructions. As I explained in Chapter 2, this type 1. This is not to say that frequency is the only reason for the entrenchment of the it-cleft construction. In Chapter 6, Section 7, I suggested that analogy and pattern-alignment may also have played an important part.
A grammatical constructionalization account
213
of change has been found to correspond to the traditionally item-based change, grammaticalization. Assuming a constructional model of language, in which atomic items and grammatical structures are treated as the same fundamental object (as constructions), the cline from more lexical to more grammatical is re-envisaged as a hierarchy from more substantive to more schematic constructions. Consequently, the notion of “becoming more grammatical” is understood as movement up the hierarchy, that is, as schematization, or grammatical constructionalization (see Trousdale 2008a). In what follows, I show that the ongoing changes to the function and use of the specificational it-cleft, outlined in Chapter 7, can be interpreted as an example of grammatical constructionalization. The diachronic development of the English it-cleft therefore involves both fossilization and schematization.
2.
A grammatical constructionalization account
On a grammatical constructionalization account, the changes to the range of it-cleft foci and to the information status of the cleft clause originate in language use, with speakers forming novel instances by extension from the existing it-cleft schema. These changes proceed gradually, in incremental stages, since they are governed by the degree to which the new instances override the more general patterns of correspondence found in the original construction; that is, by their degree of similarity to the it-cleft prototype (see Chapter 2, Section 3). As I explained in Chapter 4, the it-cleft is a type of specificational inversion construction. As such, it contains a focal referring expression and a discontinuous definite description (with an existential presupposition). I suggest that the gradual trajectory of the changes to the clefted constituent and the cleft clause is governed by the referential semantics of the postcopular slot and the presuppositional nature of the definite description. For instance, we have seen that while the it-cleft originally focuses only concrete objects (showing a preference for animate individuals), it occurs with more abstract and relational foci over time, which denote less discrete concepts. This is accompanied by an increase in the range of non-nominal categories that can occur in postcopular position. As Croft (1991: 67) notes, the semantic class of „objects‟ is the typological prototype of referring constructions. Furthermore, since NPs typically denote objects, they are the phrasal category most suited to performing a referring function. The change to the range of it-cleft foci therefore involves extension from the prototype:
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The it-cleft and constructional change
over time, semantic classes and syntactic categories which are less suited to the referring function are accommodated into the referential slot. This account is supported by the presence of coercion effects. Michaelis (2003) observes that when there is a mismatch between the construction‟s conventional meaning and that associated with any superimposed item, we find an enriched interpretation, as the item conforms to the requirements of the construction; she refers to this as coercion (see Chapter 2). For instance, the it-cleft imposes referential characteristics onto non-nominal elements as they are accommodated into the focal slot. As Bolinger (1972) observes, prepositional phrases lose their relational properties when they occur as itcleft foci. Therefore, the meaning of (1) is not that the time is located in the winter, but that the time is/equals „in the winter‟. Such examples therefore have little difference in meaning from those with NP-foci denoting discrete periods of time, as in (2). (1)
If it bee in the winter that your Hawke batheth, when no sunne shineth, you may then drie her as well by the gentle aire of the fire as otherwise. (1615 MARKHAM-E2-P1,1,90.37) „If it is in the winter that your hawk bathes, when no sun shines, you may then dry her as well by the gentle air of the fire as otherwise‟
(2)
and if this be done in November, it will preserve the Trees for that whole year, with that once doing, it being the winter time only that they will feed upon the bark. (1696 LANGF-E3-H,116.193)
In this way, non-nominal elements come to denote more discrete entities by simple virtue of entering into the referential slot. As Davidse (2000: 1116) notes, non-NP foci become like proper names; that is, they are “„cited‟ in their entirety” and are given definite identification without being formally marked as such. Other times, less discrete concepts are individualized and made into more acceptable it-cleft foci through listing or the use of focusing adverbs. For example, we have seen that over 90% of abstract nouns functioning as it-cleft foci in Early Modern English exhibit these overt coercion strategies (see Chapter 7, Section 4). Towards the end of the Modern English period, however, the figure drops to below 50%. This is indicative of a change to the overarching it-cleft schema, as the occurrence of abstract nouns in focal position becomes more conventionalized. These same coercion strategies are required in present-day English as a way of enabling characteristically
A grammatical constructionalization account
215
predicative items, such as adjective phrases, to function as it-cleft foci, as in (3) (see also Chapter 5, Section 3). This suggests that the it-cleft undergoes not only gradual, but also continual, grammaticalization (or grammatical constructionalization). (3)
It‟s not just intransitive that the verb has to be (Ball 1991: 479, citing Horn 1978)
The change to the information status of the cleft clause, meanwhile, is governed by the presuppositional nature of the construction‟s discontinuous definite NP. Over time, speakers are able to further manipulate what sorts of information can be marked as presupposed, overriding a general pattern of correspondence between presupposed and old (or familiar) information (see Chapter 5, Section 4). The change therefore proceeds in incremental stages in a direction outwards from the prototype (with instances deviating increasingly from it). Once again, this development involves coercion. As Lambrecht (1994: 71) explains, by using an expression which requires a presupposition, such as an it-cleft, to present information that is not shared knowledge, the expression itself forces that presupposition and the hearer accommodates it as such. In this way, new information and speaker opinion are marked as known, despite the fact that they are not known to the hearer. This creates a coerced interpretation, on which they acquire the status of general knowledge or established fact (see Prince 1978). The change leads to the creation of a new construction: the informativepresupposition (IP) it-cleft. The instances of this sub-construction override both general patterns of correspondence (between presupposed and familiar information) as well as inheritance from the existing it-cleft schema. Since these instances have a distinct property – a unique discourse function which is in addition to the specifying function of other it-clefts – speakers abstract over the novel instances to form a new IP it-cleft sub-construction. At this point, the accommodation of new information into the presuppositional clause becomes conventionalized. As Lambrecht (1994: 71) notes, the IP itcleft therefore represents “an extension” of the existing it-cleft schema “via conventionalized pragmatic accommodation”. The discrepancy between the it-cleft schema and the less prototypical IP it-cleft is subsequently resolved as the overarching category changes to suit its new membership. In other words, the speaker inductively generalizes over both the instances sanctioned by the existing specificational it-cleft and the instances which make up the new IP it-cleft. This is illustrated in Figure 11, where dashed arrows show the direction of the extension and the
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The it-cleft and constructional change
subsequent abstraction. As a consequence of this, the specificational it-cleft becomes a more schematic, productive, and higher-order construction. The dashed lines surrounding the lower-level specificational it-cleft in Figure 11 show that it is supplanted by the more basic schema. Specificational it-cleft
Specificational it-cleft
Informative-presupposition it-cleft
Figure 11. The emergence of the IP it-cleft and the subsequent schematization of the specificational it-cleft construction
The more abstract it-cleft schema stipulates only those characteristics that are shared by all of its members. The upshot is that particular requirements regarding the discourse status, saliency, or familiarity of the information that is accepted into the cleft clause are now almost non-existent. As Borkin (1984: 125) notes for present-day it-clefts, “„Presupposed‟, when used with respect to cleft sentences, then, means „non-asserted‟ or „assumed to be true‟, and no more than that”.2 Nevertheless, the changes to the cleft clause are best characterized as a process of pragmatic enrichment; over time, the it-cleft has developed new uses, which are in addition to its original specifying function. For instance, the it-cleft can be used to remind the hearer or reader of relevant but nonsalient information, to inform them of facts they may not already know and, most recently, as an indirect way of communicating the speaker‟s opinion. In this way, the historical development of the it-cleft involves a change in 2. Lehmann (2008: §3.1.2) observes that, “To the extent that pragmatic accommodation of the proposition presupposed by the extrafocal clause is conventionalized in the cleft sentence, the construction becomes more grammaticalized”. For Lehmann, the outcome of grammaticalization here is the “levelling out” of the contrast between the presupposition (in the cleft clause) and the assertion (in the postcopular, focal position). However, it should be noted that it-clefts are inherently presuppositional, since they contain discontinuous definite NPs. While this property may be manipulated, with the result that new information is marked as presupposed, it is not in any way reduced or lessened over time.
A grammatical constructionalization account
217
perspective from what the hearer or reader knows to how the speaker feels. As Traugott (1982, 1989) observes, grammaticalization often involves a shift towards increasingly subjective meanings; that is, the grammaticalized word or string of words comes to express the speaker‟s beliefs or attitudes. The change to the range of it-cleft foci might also be viewed as a move towards subjectification, as it involves a gradual progression from focusing discrete concrete entities to more abstract and interpretative qualities. These parallel developments are instrumental in the emergence of the performative it-cleft at the very end of the Early Modern period (shown in Chapter 7, Section 5). In these tokens, the speaker performs a speech act in the cleft clause and specifies the manner in which this act is performed in the postcopular, focal position. In doing so, the speech act is backgrounded, or taken for granted, while the speaker‟s emotional response to it, or to the hearer, is highlighted. In the early examples, the performance of the speech act threatens to characterize the speaker in a negative way (as improper, impolite or self-important). In contrast, the focused phrase shows what the speaker wants to convey about themselves, their attitudes and their beliefs. The performative it-cleft is therefore a highly subjective, speaker-oriented construction. As shown in Figure 12, the performative tokens form a subtype of IP it-cleft. It-cleft schema
Specificational it-cleft
IP it-cleft
Predicational it-cleft
Performative it-cleft
Proverbial it-cleft
Figure 12. Incorporating IP it-clefts and performative it-clefts into a taxonomy of it-cleft constructions
In addition, speakers may recognize yet more substantive constructions. For example, the multiword string it is with great pleasure that is common in ceremonial contexts. As shown in (4), this now formulaic device acts as an anticipatory signal to the audience that the ritual has begun.
218
(4)
The it-cleft and constructional change
It is with great pleasure that I present to you this award.
In sum, it seems that while the it-cleft‟s basic structure has remained the same since Old English, the specificational it-cleft has undergone a process of gradual expansion. In accordance with Himmelmann‟s (2004) definition of grammaticalization, the diachronic development of the it-cleft involves both host-class expansion, whereby the construction allows a wider range of components to enter into it, and semantic-pragmatic context expansion, through which the construction develops new pragmatic functions (see also Patten 2010).3 The history of the it-cleft construction is therefore in some ways contradictory, in that it is both resistant to change and susceptible to grammaticalization (i.e. grammatical constructionalization). Nevertheless, on a usage-based model, both aspects of the it-cleft‟s development are understood in the same way, as involving a process of conventionalization; that is, the entrenchment of schemas. Both fossilization and schematization conspire together to make the it-cleft a more idiosyncratic construction: the specificational it-cleft resists the wider changes affecting the grammatical system while pursuing its own construction-specific development.
3.
Some alternative explanations
Nevertheless, a variety of alternative explanations have been put forward to account for the it-cleft‟s rising frequency, the development of it-clefts with non-NP foci and the origin of the informative-presupposition it-cleft. In what follows, I discuss three such accounts, which depend on mergers, borrowings and word order changes, respectively. For each, I show that they are not as successful at accounting for the diachronic facts (outlined in Chapter 7) as an explanation involving grammatical constructionalization.
3. On Himmelmann‟s (2004) account, grammaticalization applies to constructions rather than to isolated lexical items. However, here, construction is interpreted as the surrounding context which influences an atomic, grammaticalizing element. In this work, and in Patten (2010), I adapt Himmelmann‟s definition to examples of constructional change which do not result in the grammaticalization of lexical items.
Some alternative explanations
3.1.
219
An impersonal account
In her (1994a) paper, Ball claims that the Old English impersonal construction, introduced in Chapter 7, Section 2.1, plays a central role in the development of it-clefts with non-NP foci and it-clefts with new information in the cleft clause. On her account, the it-impersonals underwent a partial merger with the specificational it-cleft in Late Middle English, resulting in a new and separate construction: the AdvP/PP-focus IP it-cleft. According to Ball (1994a), these tokens differ from the original NP-focus it-clefts in that they contain sentential complements, rather than relative clauses, which express propositions that are new to the discourse. The AdvP/PPfocus IP it-cleft construction then merges with the existing NP-focus it-cleft to form another new sentence type: the NP-focus IP it-cleft. Ball‟s explanation of how the it-cleft acquired prepositional and adverb phrase foci is not unreasonable, since we have seen that the impersonal construction shows a strong superficial similarity to the it-cleft (see Chapter 7, Section 2.1). However, there are several aspects of the diachronic corpus data that cannot be accounted for on this analysis. For one thing, there is no evidence to suggest that it-clefts with PP and AdvP foci form a sentencetype distinct from the NP-focus it-cleft. As we saw in Chapter 7, Section 4, the first PP-focus it-cleft in the PPCME2 appears some time before the Late Middle English period (and even before what Ball (1991: 158) claims is the “first specificational NP-focus hit-cleft” in her corpus). In contrast, it-clefts with AdvP foci appear much later in the construction‟s development; clear examples are only found towards the end of the Early Modern era (see also Patten 2010: 231). Instead, what seems to unite these two varieties for Ball (1994a: 605) is that, as it-clefts with non-nominal focal elements, they are less amenable to a relative clause analysis; in these tokens, the cleft clause typically expresses a complete sentence (without a perceptible gap) and is rarely introduced by elements other than that. Ball concludes that they therefore have a different syntactic structure from NP-focus it-clefts, and contain a “sentential complement” rather than a restrictive relative clause. However, in Chapter 5, Section 3, I showed that it-clefts with non-nominal foci do not warrant a separate analysis from those containing postcopular NPs; once we assume an extraposition-from-NP analysis of it-clefts, on which the antecedent of the relative clause is the initial it rather than the clefted constituent, the syntactic category of the postcopular XP is immaterial. On this account, we do not need to look to the impersonals to provide an independent source for a distinct AdvP/PP-focus it-cleft, which explains how it has
220
The it-cleft and constructional change
acquired a sentential complement. Once we take this step, there is no longer any motivation to look for a historical derivation which goes beyond the extension of a single it-cleft construction. A further limitation of Ball‟s account is that it predicts that any changes to the clefted constituent and to the information status of the cleft clause are originally limited to the new AdvP/PP-focus IP it-cleft. However, instead, the diachronic data shows evidence of parallel developments affecting NPand non-NP-focus it-clefts simultaneously. For instance, we saw in Chapter 7, Section 4, that when time and place adverbials are attested as it-cleft foci in the second half of the Early Modern period, some 40% of the relevant tokens contain focal NPs. Similarly, there is little evidence of an early, and obligatory, connection between IP it-clefts and it-clefts with AdvP/PP foci, or of the proposed time-delay before IP it-clefts begin to occur with NP foci. For instance, the earliest PP-focus it-cleft in the PPCME2 contains a discourse-old cleft clause (see Chapter 7, Section 4). Likewise, while the first IP it-cleft in the corpus contains a focal PP, it is soon followed by two further NP-focus it-clefts, also in the LME period (see Chapter 7, Section 5). Furthermore, it is telling that the majority of IP it-clefts identified in the PPCEME contain nominal foci. Finally, there are several characteristics of the diachronic data that are not anticipated on this account. For example, the appearance of a new kind of it-cleft with AdvP/PP foci does not explain why NP-focus it-clefts occur with more abstract foci over time or why such examples show evidence of coercion; nor does it predict that the it-cleft will go on to permit a greater range of non-nominal foci. Thus, in order to speculate about the it-cleft‟s development beyond the Late Middle English period, Ball (1994a: 614) has to invoke a number of additional pressures; she notes, “From the LME period onwards, the it-cleft construction has taken in a greater variety of non-NP foci, possibly in response to the decline of some alternatives and functional change in others (e.g. preposing)”. Likewise, the influence of the impersonals on the origin of the IP it-cleft does not explain why aspects of speaker opinion are eventually accommodated into the cleft clause; nor can it account for the development of a performative function for the it-cleft in Modern English. These later developments can only be explained once we recognize the fundamental role of presupposition in governing the changes to the cleft clause. Tellingly, this is one property that is not shared with the impersonal construction. In conclusion, an account which relies solely on characteristics acquired from the impersonal construction to license changes to the clefted element
Some alternative explanations
221
and the cleft clause is unable to account for the full extent of the it-cleft‟s gradual and continual development.4
3.2.
A Celtic account
More recently, Filppula (2009) has appealed to Celtic influence in order to explain the overall rise in English it-clefting and the expanding range of itcleft foci over time.5 He begins with an examination of the specificational copular constructions of Celtic languages. These constructions differ from the English it-cleft in that they do not occur with an introductory pronoun, the copula be is optional, and it is unclear whether the subordinate clause is a relative construction (see Filppula 2009: 271). Even so, Filppula (2009: 281) claims that they “are both structurally and functionally close enough to their English counterparts to be transferable in a contact situation.” For example, there is some evidence to suggest that the Celtic copular constructions have impacted on it-clefting in Celtic-influenced varieties of English. Filppula (2009: 270) notes that the Celtic constructions exhibit a greater syntactic freedom than English it-clefts, since “even the verb can be put into focus position”, as shown in the Irish example in (5). Similarly, it is well known that the it-clefts of Irish English occur with a wider range of property-denoting foci than those of other varieties of English, as shown in the early twentieth century token in (6). In addition, the prominent role of clefting in Irish is also found in Irish English (Filppula 2009: 282). (5)
(Is) ag leigheamh atá sé „Reading he is‟ (lit. (it is) reading that he is) (Gregor 1980: 148, cited in Filppula 2009: 270)
(6)
Is it dead he is or living? – It‟s little you care if it‟s dead or living I am. (1903 Synge, Shadow of the Glen [Visser 1963: 50])
4. See Patten (forthcoming) for a discussion of how Ball‟s (1994a) approach to the diachronic data reflects, and is influenced by, a different set of theoretical assumptions from those adopted in the current work. 5. Filppula does not discuss whether Celtic influence could also account for the changes to the information status of the cleft clause. As I explained in Chapter 7, Section 2.1, Filppula (2009: 272) analyses tokens which I take to be OE impersonals as belonging “to the class of „informative-presupposition‟ clefts”. For Filppula then, the IP it-cleft is present in Old English; it is not the outcome of a subsequent development in the history of the it-cleft construction.
222
The it-cleft and constructional change
According to Filppula (2009: 288), the frequent use of cleft constructions in Celtic-influenced varieties of English “underlines the susceptibility of this area of grammar to contact influences” and offers an additional piece of indirect evidence to suggest that influences from Celtic may have affected the rise of it-clefting in English, more generally. Filppula‟s theories are not incompatible with the constructionalization account of it-clefts outlined in Section 2. For instance, Filppula (2009: 277) considers the relaxation of syntactic constraints on the clefted constituent, along with the overall rise in the frequency of it-clefts, “to be a clear indication of the gradual grammaticalisation of clefting”. Filppula‟s concern then is not to explain how the changes to the it-cleft progress, but to ask why grammaticalization has occurred; in particular, to ask whether influence from Celtic languages could have possibly motivated this change. However, while it is plausible that Celtic influence could have had an impact on English it-clefting more generally (i.e. beyond the Celtic-influenced varieties), Filppula (2009: 288) admits that this scenario is “hardly conclusive because of the indirect nature of much of the evidence”. Furthermore, the influence of Celtic languages is not really required to motivate the changes to the it-cleft construction, since, as we have seen, they conform to general principles and conventional pathways of language change (see Section 2).
3.3.
A word order account
Other authors have suggested that the it-cleft has developed in response to a loss of alternative word order arrangements in English. As Jespersen (1937: 86) notes, “this construction may be considered one of the means by which the disadvantages of having a comparatively rigid grammatical word-order (SVO) can be obviated”. In support of this, the typological evidence shows that cleft constructions seem to be favoured in languages with a rigid word order, such as French, English and the Celtic languages (see Filppula 2009: 281–282). An example of this approach is the recent work of Los (2009) and Los and Komen (forthcoming), which examines the hypothesis that the development of the English it-cleft was shaped by the loss of verb-second (V2). The V2 construction allowed a variety of constituents (not only subjects) to occur before a finite verb in second position. This meant the loss of a multifunctional first position which was associated with unmarked topics but could also contain focused material. Los (2009) and Los and Komen (forthcoming) explore the rise of English it-clefting as a resolution strategy – as
Some alternative explanations
223
performing these same functions while conforming to the rigid SV word order. Los‟ (2009) approach is to explore the association between first position in V2 and unmarked topics. She suggests that the loss of V2 has meant that the pre-subject position (involved in preposing) has become pragmatically marked as expressing more prominent information and that the it-cleft provides us with a useful strategy to avoid positioning adverbials in a position that is too prominent. She considers the following examples which differ in acceptability. (7)
#With great pleasure, we can inform you that your application was successful
(8)
It is with great pleasure that we can inform you that your application was successful (examples from Los 2009: 114)
Los (2009: 114) claims that the it-cleft in (8) functions to “place with great pleasure in end-focus position to make it less marked” (italic original). Of course, this argument is to some extent paradoxical, since the it-cleft is a focusing construction and is not by any means a neutral way of presenting information. While Los (2009: 114) recognizes this, she finds that “nothing else appears to explain the awkwardness of the more literal translation”. Los and Komen (forthcoming) take a different approach, which explores the secondary role of the first position in V2 as a host to focused material. They suggest that the loss of V2 has meant that focus-marking of first position adverbials is restricted in present-day English; the it-cleft develops as a resolution strategy, placing focused material in a position that conforms to the rigid SV word order while maintaining the relative ordering of constituents. They consider the following examples which differ in acceptability. (9)
(*Precisely) to avoid such a conflict of interest I am resigning
(10)
It‟s (precisely) to avoid such a conflict of interest that I am resigning (examples adapted from Los and Komen, forthcoming)
As shown in (9), the focus-marking of the first position clausal adverbial to avoid such a conflict of interest is infelicitous. The it-cleft in (10) allows us to place this focused adverbial in complement position while maintaining the linear order of (9), in which the clausal adverbial comes before the verb resigning. As a focusing construction, the it-cleft in (10) differs from (9) in
224
The it-cleft and constructional change
that it does not require the presence of the focus marker precisely to mark the adverbial clause as focal. In support of this hypothesis, Los and Komen (forthcoming) find that the relative frequency of it-clefts with focusing adverbs increases between Old English and Early Modern English, before undergoing a decrease in Late Modern English. They account for this trend by noting that Old English has the alternative strategy of placing focus markers in first position; the recent decline in it-clefts with focusing adverbs is attributed to the survival of V2 reflexes in present-day English. However, the diachronic development of it-clefts with focusing adverbs acquires a different explanation on my account. In Chapter 7, Section 4, I suggested that focusing adverbs are used to coerce abstract nouns and relational items into the referential position as these foci begin to occur more frequently in Early Modern English. During the Modern English period, the relative frequency of it-clefts containing abstract nouns and relative elements in the focal position increases, but these are less associated with focusing adverbs. This suggests that their use has become conventionalized. This exploratory research into the impact of the loss of V2 on English itclefting is very interesting and I am sympathetic to the view that word order considerations are a significant factor influencing the early development of the it-cleft construction. However, a potential difficulty with this approach is that it prioritizes the role of it-clefts as an information-packaging device. On the assumption that the it-cleft is a fully-fledged specificational copular construction, containing a discontinuous definite noun phrase with existential presuppositions and a postcopular focal referring expression, there are more factors than word order considerations involved in the differing acceptability and use of (7) and (8), and (9) and (10). Certainly, word order changes are unlikely to be the only factor influencing the it-cleft‟s development. Ball (1991: 518) suggests that rigidity of word order cannot account for the continual increase in it-clefting after LME, since at this time, “alternatives involving movement have long since disappeared”. Likewise, Los and Komen‟s (forthcoming) analysis does not explain why it-clefts become more frequent in Late Modern English, despite the decrease in itclefts with focusing adverbs.
3.4.
Interim summary
In conclusion, while it is possible that word order changes, influences from Celtic languages and the loss of the it-impersonals could have contributed
A construction-specific development
225
to an increase in the frequency of English it-clefts at certain points in time, none of these factors can satisfactorily account for the it-cleft‟s gradual and continual development, explaining both the changes to the range of it-cleft foci and the information status of the cleft clause. As we saw in Section 2, this is only possible with a grammatical constructionalization account, on which the it-cleft‟s construction-specific development is shown to follow a conventional pathway of change.
4.
Why do it-clefts undergo a construction-specific development?
In Section 2, we saw that the historical development of the it-cleft involves extension from the prototype. Over time, less discrete entities and relational or situational information (often expressed by non-nominal items) are accommodated into the referential slot. Likewise, nonfamiliar information gains a coerced interpretation in the cleft clause, as a result of being marked as presupposed. However, as I explained in Chapter 3, most specificational copular constructions contain a referring expression and a definite description (with an existential presupposition). From this, we might expect that the different kinds of specificational sentence would likely undergo this same diachronic development. Nevertheless, in Chapter 5, we saw that the exact range of it-cleft foci is construction-specific and other specificational copular constructions are unable to occur with brand-new information in the relative clause. In this section, I identify some subtle semantic and pragmatic properties which may have enabled and shaped the it-cleft‟s construction-specific historical development. I frame this discussion in a comparison of it-clefts and wh-clefts (a topic which has received considerable interest in the cleft literature).
4.1.
Why do it-clefts develop a construction-specific range of foci?
Despite their close familial relationship, it-clefts and wh-clefts occur with a different range of foci. For example, we saw in Chapter 5, Section 3, that certain prepositional phrases can occur as the focus of an it-cleft which are not permitted in the wh-cleft configuration, see examples (11) and (12). (11)
It was as a Guardsman that he came to the Second Battalion (S2A-011 124, BBC Radio 4 Trooping the Colour)
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(12)
The it-cleft and constructional change
*How he came to the Second Battalion was as a Guardsman
However, in many other respects the wh-cleft construction is more relaxed than the it-cleft about what can enter into the referential slot. For instance, while wh-clefts commonly occur with VP foci and permit a full range of clausal foci, shown in (13) and (15), it-clefts do not occur with verb phrases and non-factive clauses in the focal position, shown in (14) and (16). (13)
What he‟s done is spoil the whole thing
(14)
*It‟s spoil the whole thing that he‟s done (examples from Leech and Svartvik 2002: 218)
(15)
What I‟m saying is that he’s stupid
(16)
*It‟s that he’s stupid that I‟m saying
Furthermore, adjective phrases also make for more acceptable wh-cleft foci, as demonstrated by the differing acceptability of (17) and (18). As we have seen, APs can only be accommodated into the focal position of an it-cleft under specific circumstances, such as listing, shown in (19). (17)
What he is is obsessive
(18)
*It‟s obsessive that he is
(19)
It isn‟t obsessive that Bill is, just manic-depressive (Delahunty 1984: 76)
In what follows, I suggest that these distributional differences ultimately result from a subtle semantic difference in the constructions‟ introductory elements; that is, the initial it of it-clefts and the wh-words of wh-clefts. As we saw in Chapter 6, Section 5, the cleft it is a semantically underspecified pronoun. This means that the determinative head of the it-cleft‟s discontinuous NP can be given all manner of different interpretations. In contrast, while the what of wh-clefts (or what-clefts) has a very general meaning, it is nevertheless specified as near synonymous with the thing. This distinction is made particularly apparent in predicational clefts. As Ball (1991: 60) notes, predicational it-clefts often have a “more restrictive interpretation” than predicational wh-clefts. For example, while the it-cleft in (20) is understood to mean the dress that she wore was wonderful, the what-cleft in (21) tells us that the thing she wore was a wonderful dress. In
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this example then, the cleft it is interpreted as having a much more specific meaning than the thing, gaining its semantic interpretation from the postcopular noun (see Chapter 5, Section 2). This shows that the cleft pronoun is therefore underspecified, rather than truly general, preferring a specific (or restrictive) interpretation. (20)
It was a wonderful dress that she wore
(21)
What she wore was a wonderful dress
The semantic flexibility of the determinative it explains why the it-cleft is such a useful (and relatively productive) construction. Not only can the discontinuous NP be predicated of human and plural referents (see Chapter 6, Section 5), but it can also characterize entities which cannot be classified by other nouns. For example, the it-cleft in (22) is more acceptable than the corresponding wh-cleft and th-cleft given in (23) and (24). Here, the prepositional phrase with great determination does not quite fall within the semantic scope of how or the adverbial noun way, which typically denote „instrument‟ or „means‟. As a result, in these examples, the referring expression does not match up with the head noun of the definite description. (22)
It was with great determination that he climbed to the top
(23)
*How he climbed to the top was with great determination
(24)
*The way that he climbed to the top was with great determination
As Declerck (1994: 215) notes, “the range of wh-words or noun phrases that can function as pronouns (the place/thing/one/way…) is too narrow for every cleft to be matched by a pseudo-cleft.” For Declerck, the it-cleft is compatible with a greater variety of foci because the that-clause is headless (see Declerck 1984a: 281). Here, I suggest that it is the semantically underspecified meaning of the cleft it which means that it can cover “the same ground as the adverbial nouns and much more” (Bolinger 1972: 122). A similar explanation could perhaps help to account for the acceptability of it-clefts like (25), which contain PP foci referring to animate individuals. Although these foci are in some sense directional, they cannot be captured by the nominal relative where, as shown by the unacceptable wh-cleft in (26) (see also Chapter 7, Section 4). Thus, the semantically underspecified nature of it could provide an answer as to how the it-cleft has developed this alternative to NP-focus it-clefts where the NP functions as the object of
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The it-cleft and constructional change
a preposition, as in (27), and why these examples do not have corresponding th-clefts, shown in (28). On this account, it in (25) is not really comparable to the head noun person. Instead, such examples involve the extension of a more relational concept. This would explain why (25) does not require a preposition in the precopular (discontinuous) NP, much like (29). (25)
It was to Ed that she was referring
(Huddleston 1984: 460)
(26)
*Where she was referring was to Ed
(27)
It was Ed that she was referring to
(28)
*The person that she was referring was to Ed
(29)
Where she left it was with Ed
(Huddleston 1984: 460)
However, we saw above that while the cleft pronoun it is semantically underspecified, the interpretation it is given is usually specific. This means that the discontinuous NP in it-clefts characterizes the postcopular XP uniquely. In other words, the description is not general enough to potentially classify any other referent. This accounts for some of the restrictions on the range of it-cleft foci and explains why listing is an effective coercion strategy for accommodating items which denote properties into the referential slot. As Declerck (1984b: 144) notes, “properties are not mutually exclusive: if X has property A, there is no reason why it should not have other properties as well”. For example, in (30) and (32) the descriptions the thing that he was and the thing that he is do not exclusively apply to the adjective phrase sick and the predicative noun secretary. However, by contrasting sick with tired in (31), the property sick is established as a member of a limited set of potential ailments. Likewise, in (33), a secretary is contrasted with the profession that uniquely matches the more restrictive (or specific) description the thing that I‟d wanted to be. (30)
*It‟s sick that he was
(É. Kiss 1998: 262)
(31)
It‟s not sick that he was but tired
(É. Kiss 1998: 262)
(32)
*It‟s a secretary that I am
(33)
They made me a secretary, but it wasn‟t a secretary I‟d wanted to be (Ward, Birner, and Huddleston 2002: 1418)
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Nevertheless, not all characteristically predicative elements can be individualized in this way. For example, providing a more specific description and establishing a limited set of alternatives in (35) does not make the verb phrase eat much more acceptable than in (34). This suggests that in order for the semantic class of „actions‟ to fill the referential slot of the it-cleft, they must become more noun-like, as with the gerund eating in (36). This example is closer to the prototypical it-cleft instances, which contain nominal foci denoting discrete entities (see Section 2). (34)
*It‟s eat that she does
(35)
??It‟s eat that she likes to do best, not shop
(36)
It‟s eating that she likes best, not shopping
In addition to the restrictions on verb phrase foci, it-clefts cannot occur with non-factive clauses in the postcopular position (see Delahunty 1984; Delin 1989). For example, (37) contains the non-factive verb say. Here, the proposition that he never replied to her letters is not assumed to be true because it is attributed to the thoughts and beliefs of the person who said it and could therefore involve conjecture or falsehood. The example in (38), on the other hand, contains the factive verb regret. Here, the clausal complement is understood to express a true proposition. In other words, he regretted the fact that he never replied to her letters. (37)
*It was that he had never replied to her letters that he said
(38)
It was that he had never replied to her letters that he (most) regretted
Again, the reason for this difference in acceptability seems to lie in the fact that sentences such as (38) are closer to the it-cleft prototype. Here, the factive clause refers to an actually occurring event. In such sentence, the that-clause can be replaced by other noun-like elements, such as gerunds (his insistence that he was in the right) and adjectival nominalizations (his carelessness) (see Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). However, these nominal constructions cannot replace that-clause complements of non-factive verbs. It makes sense then, that when presented with that-clause foci, the hearer interprets them as referring to existentially presupposed events, rather than to some abstract concept such as „the words somebody said‟. In example
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The it-cleft and constructional change
(37) then, the non-factive verb say conflicts with our prior assumption that the proposition expressed in the postcopular clause is true. However, while it-clefts were originally restricted to NP foci denoting the most discrete of entities, the early wh-clefts do not share this same characteristic. According to Traugott (2008), the specificational wh-cleft did not emerge until the late seventeenth century, at a time when other specificational copular constructions were already well established. From her data, it appears that the early what-cleft never had a particular association with NP foci, occurring frequently with a range of clausal foci (including both factive and non-factive clauses) and verb phrase foci (such as to-infinitives).6 From the very beginning then, the wh-cleft could occur with categories of foci which are not acceptable in the it-cleft. For example, the wh-cleft in (39), containing a focal non-factive clause, is perfectly grammatical. (39)
What he said was that he had never replied to her letters
There are two possible reasons for this. First, since wh-clefts were never really associated with nominal foci, the that-clause will not necessarily be interpreted as a noun-like concept, such as an actually occurring event. Secondly, wh-clefts have a different linear order to it-clefts, which contain extraposed relative clauses. In example (39) then, the non-factive verb say is given prior to its clausal complement, marking it as non-presupposed. As a result, the hearer cannot misinterpret the focal clause as factive. However, the linear order of the description and the referent which matches this description cannot be the only reason for the grammaticality of wh-clefts with non-factive foci. Otherwise, we could not explain why reverse wh-clefts,
6. Traugott (2008) suggests that wh-clefts with infinitival foci may have developed from non-specificational tokens. Originally, examples such as (i) had only a purposive meaning (the thing I do is in order to please you). With the emergence of the specificational wh-cleft, such examples could be reanalyzed. On this new reading, the to-infinitive is identified as the thing that I do rather than my purpose in doing it. The independence of this new meaning from the original purposive construction is accomplished by the fact that to finally becomes an optional element, allowing bare infinitive foci, shown in (ii). See Mair and Winkle (2012) on the change from to-infinitive to bare infinitive in specificational pseudoclefts. (i)
What I do is to please you
(ii) What I do is please you
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such as (40), are deemed more acceptable than their corresponding it-clefts (see also Delin 1989: 97). (40)
?That he had never replied to her letters was what he said
The reason why wh-clefts are open to a greater variety of non-nominal categories than it-clefts seems to lie in the construction‟s introductory element. As noted above, while the cleft it is semantically underspecified, the what of what-clefts is specified as near synonymous with the thing. In the wh-cleft construction, this very general concept covers not just objects, but also actions and properties. As shown above, these sorts of entities are not mutually exclusive and, as a result, NPs headed by the semantically general what do not always provide a description which is truly unique to the postcopular referent. For example, in (41), (42) and (43) below, there is not only one possible thing that John is or Sarah was or that she can do. Nevertheless, these action/property-denoting foci can enter into the wh-cleft construction without requiring the use of coercion strategies. (41)
What John is is stupid
(42)
What Sarah was was an idiot
(43)
What she can do is eat
We have seen then that differences in the range of foci found in it-clefts and wh-clefts can be traced to a subtle difference in the semantics of their introductory elements. That the cleft it is semantically underspecified helps to explain why it-clefts can occur with prepositional phrases that cannot be classified by other nouns; that the cleft it prefers a specific interpretation means that prototypically predicative elements (which are not mutually exclusive) will not make for acceptable it-cleft foci without the use of coercion strategies. In contrast, the what of wh-clefts is semantically general but is nevertheless specified as near synonymous with the thing. This provides a reason as to why the wh-cleft is open to a wider range of syntactic categories, which denote all manner of things, including objects, properties and actions. In turn, this shows why wh-clefts are historically less associated with NP foci and why only it-clefts exhibit a clear preference for focusing noun-like elements.
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4.2.
The it-cleft and constructional change
Why do it-clefts develop construction-specific discourse functions?
It-clefts and wh-clefts also display different discourse functions. As we saw in Chapter 7, the it-cleft has developed an informative-presupposition subtype, in which brand-new information is expressed in the presuppositional cleft clause. This discourse-function is specific to the it-cleft construction; it is not shared by any other kind of specificational copular sentence (see Chapter 5, Section 4). For instance, corpus studies of wh-clefts have not found any evidence to suggest that the construction can occur with brandnew information in the relative clause (see for example Prince 1978; Delin 1989; Collins 1991a). Based upon such evidence, Delin (1989: 180) concludes that “wh-clefts cannot carry presuppositions that appear at the NEW end of the range” (emphasis original).7 Ward and Birner (2004: 157) demonstrate this with the following examples. In (44), the description what he does is salient because of the earlier mention of Triggs‟ profession. However, when the wh-clause is non-salient, this same wh-cleft becomes infelicitous. For instance, in (45), the mere sighting of a friend does not give rise to the issue of what he does. (44)
Hey look! That‟s my friend Jeremy Triggs over there. He‟s a lexicographer. What he does is find alert readers who recognize new words or new usages for ordinary ones.
(45)
Hey look! That‟s my friend Jeremy Triggs over there. #What he does is find alert readers who recognize new words or new usages for ordinary ones. (examples from Ward and Birner 2004: 157)
Thus, the IP it-cleft is the result of a construction-specific development; there is no corresponding variety of wh-cleft. Furthermore, while the it-cleft has subsequently developed a specialized performative function, the whcleft has acquired a construction-specific use as a presentational device (see 7. Reverse wh-clefts exhibit a similar restriction. For instance, Oberlander and Delin (1996: 200) find that “reverse wh-clefts are frequently used for re-evoking information, rather than communicating entire new propositions” (see also M. Johansson 2001). Likewise, Hedberg and Fadden (2007) find that reverse wh-clefts are unlike IP it-clefts in that the focal slot and the relative clause cannot both contain hearer-new information. It is only when the subject is discourse-old that new information can occur in a postcopular fused relative. As shown in Chapter 3, such sentences are analysed here as predicational rather than specificational constructs.
A construction-specific development
233
below). In what follows, I suggest that these discourse-functional differences stem from a subtle distinction in the constructions‟ prototypical information structures. In particular, while the relative clause of the it-cleft was originally associated with expressing discourse-old information (see Chapter 7, Section 5), wh-clefts have always been associated with inferable information (see Traugott 2008). The corpus studies of Prince (1978) and Collins (1991a) suggest that wh-clefts are commonly found with inferable information in the relative clause. As Prince (1978) notes, information is inferable if it is appropriate to the speech situation and can therefore be assumed to be already in the hearer‟s consciousness (see also Prince 1981). Wh-clefts therefore differ from it-clefts in that they express information that is not necessarily already known, but which is understood to be relevant to the discourse context and which is therefore assumed to be salient for the hearer. Prince (1978: 894) concludes that while it-clefts are associated with known, old, or factual information (and so are less relevant to speaker-hearer interaction), “It is Chafe‟s [1974, 1976] notion of givenness – THAT WHICH THE SPEAKER ASSUMES TO BE IN THE HEARER‟S CONSCIOUSNESS – that is pertinent to whclefts” (emphasis original).8 Prince (1978: 896) demonstrates this distinction by considering the following examples, which differ in acceptability; she notes that in the attested token given in (46), “it is known or knowable 8. In contrast, Gundel (1985: 98) suggests that “it is the it-cleft and not the whcleft whose relative clause must contain material that is already „in the addressee‟s consciousness‟ at the time of utterance”. Gundel claims that the it-cleft‟s sentence-final topic clause refers an entity which is not only familiar but activated. In other words, it is the focus of attention. On this account, we would expect that “the wh-cleft can occur at the very beginning of a discourse when the addressee‟s attention can generally not be expected to be focused on the topic, but that the corresponding it-cleft will not be appropriate in such a context” (Gundel 1985: 97). However, as Collins (1991a: 105) notes, it is only IP it-clefts that can occur in initial position in such contexts; wh-clefts are only found discourse-initially when the information in the relative clause is inferable from the speech situation. For instance, in Gundel‟s (1985: 98) example below, the fact that the lecture is on some topic is inferable from our existing knowledge of how lectures work and is therefore present in the hearer‟s consciousness. (iii) (At the beginning of a lecture) What I would like to talk about today is conversational implicature. (Gundel 1985: 98)
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The it-cleft and constructional change
from the fact that the speaker sews books, that something is „rotten‟ or amiss with them. However, the theme of this discourse, i.e. what it is about, is „books‟, not „what is rotten‟; thus the it-cleft is ideally suited to the task”. (46)
„…So I learned to sew books. They‟re really good books It’s just the covers that are rotten.‟ (Bookbinder in Terkel 1974 [Prince 1978: 896])
(47)
…So I learned to sew books. They‟re really good books. What’s rotten is just the covers.‟ (Prince 1978: 896)
The early association between it-clefts and discourse-old (rather than inferable) information provides an explanation as to why this construction has developed an informative-presupposition subtype. As we have seen, the it-cleft differs from the wh-cleft in that the relative clause expresses old or known information, which is not so dependent upon speaker-hearer interaction. Prince (1978: 898) notes, “The fact that it-clefts may present information as known without making any claims that the hearer is thinking about it (or, in fact, even knows it) presents the speaker with a strong rhetorical temptation: what is to prevent him/her from putting new information into the that-clause?”. In IP it-clefts then, hearer-new information is marked as known – albeit known to a third party. Such sentences therefore have the function of expressing this information as uncontroversial fact, signalling for the hearer to accept it unchallenged (see Delin 1992). Thus, the development of the IP it-cleft depends upon, and ultimately reinforces, the association between it-clefts and known/factual information. Since IP it-clefts are associated with expressing previously established facts, they enable the speaker to distance themselves from the information expressed in the cleft clause. As Prince (1978: 900) comments, IP it-clefts are used when the speaker “does not wish to take personal responsibility for the truth or originality of the statement being made.” This explains how the it-cleft configuration came to be used to express elements of speaker opinion in the cleft clause and why the it-cleft developed a performative function, which is unique among the family of specificational copular constructions (shown in Chapter 7, Section 5). As we have seen, performative it-clefts mitigate the force of a speech act by marking it as presupposed. Instead, the speaker‟s emotional response to the act becomes the focus of the sentence. Thus, performative it-clefts function much like announcements embedded under factive verbs of emotion, such as regret in (48). As Abbott (2000: 1432) notes, here “the speaker removes herself from respon-
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235
sibility for the content of the announcement, and goes on record instead as expressing an appropriate emotion”. (48)
We regret to inform you that your insurance policy is hereby cancelled. (Abbot 2000: 1430)
The it-cleft‟s construction-specific development is therefore shaped by its early association with known, or factual, information. Interestingly, this association seems to permeate the entire it-cleft configuration – not just the information status of the cleft clause. For instance, Bolinger (1970: 69, 1977: 71) finds that, in it-clefts, the specificational relationship between the clefted constituent and the cleft clause must have a prior basis. He discusses the following discourses, which differ in acceptability. (49) (50)
A: When will we know? B: It‟s tomorrow that we‟ll know
(Bolinger 1970: 69)
A: When will you tell me? B: #It‟s tomorrow that I‟ll tell you
(Bolinger 1970: 69)
The discourse in (49) would be entirely appropriate if speakers A and B are waiting for exam results which are to be made available on tomorrow‟s date. As a result, in this example, the time of knowing has been previously established. In (50), on the other hand, the time of telling has no prior basis and is decided by the speaker there and then. Consequently, an it-cleft is not the best choice for expressing this information. Additional evidence for Bolinger‟s claim can be found in the corpus data from the ICE-GB, which suggests that it-clefts collocate with words and phrases which demonstrate that the specificational relationship is grounded in fact. More than 5% of all it-clefts (24/404) occur with the words fact, therefore and thus in the same text unit, as in (51). Many of these examples play a summative role, occurring at the end of a discourse segment, including (52) and (53). (51)
It was in fact the physiotherapist who confirmed the suspicion of the doctor that it was a cartilage problem. (W1B-020 050, business letter to insurance company)
(52)
It is thus the slacks that have soils most resembling those of true terrestrial situations, and the richest plant and animal communities. 5.2.3 The relationships of dune sands to terrestrial soils. (W2A-022 079, academic writing)
236
(53)
The it-cleft and constructional change
I began this thesis with images of the positive, generous sexuality of the ancient Turkish deities and I conclude, with the inescapable fact that, bar the Tantric tradition, it is the sexuality of the Goddess, and consequently real women, that has suffered most in the process of transition that the Aryan heroes brought into the world‟s symbolic art forms so variously enshrined in each religious tradition. (W1A-008 011, student essay, MA dissertation)
In contrast, wh-clefts are not so associated with the expression of factual information. As we saw in Section 4.1, wh-clefts commonly occur with foci denoting actions and properties – entities which are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, rather than providing a factually correct referent which uniquely matches a previously established description, the wh-cleft exhibits a certain flexibility, allowing the speaker to choose between different, but equally correct alternatives. For Herriman (2003: 3), “The wh-cleft takes up a position which acknowledges the existence of alternatives. At the same time, however, it closes down the discussion by expressing the authorial position in preference to all other alternative positions” (emphasis added). Consequently, the wh-cleft construction actually serves to emphasize the speaker‟s role in the specificational process. For example in (41) and (42) above, repeated here as (54) and (55), the speaker selects the characteristic which they believe appropriately sums up the individual in question. In doing this, the speaker expresses their own opinions about that individual. Likewise, in (43), repeated here as (56), the speaker selects an activity which she does well. By highlighting one particular activity over many possible others, the speaker is able to make a comment about the individual in question, for example that she is greedy. (54)
What John is is stupid
(55)
What Sarah was was an idiot
(56)
What she can do is eat
The often-noted association between wh-clefts and inferable information also provides opportunities for the speaker to actively construct, rather than simply report, a specificational relationship. For instance, we have seen that while some wh-clefts have antecedents in the prior discourse, oftentimes the information in the relative clause is inferable from the metalinguistic context. This relies upon the hearer‟s understanding of the norms of the speech situation, including the role of the speaker. For instance, we can
A construction-specific development
237
cooperatively assume that the fact that the speaker intends to express their meaning and that they have relevant thoughts and opinions will be in the hearer‟s consciousness (see Prince 1978: 890–891). Thus we find wh-clefts introduced by expressions such as what I mean is, what I mean to say is, what worries me is and what I‟ve noticed is, to name but a few. Sentences like these, including (57), provide the speaker with a forum to express their views through the construction of a specificational relationship which has neither a prior basis nor a grounding in fact. As Prince (1978: 891) comments, “such WH-clefts are often used not simply for clarifying previous assertions, but also for remaking them”. (57)
„What I mean is we need something to answer somebody‟. (The Presidential Transcripts 1974 [Prince 1978: 890])
Thus, in many ways, the wh-cleft is a more subjective, speaker-oriented construction than the it-cleft. While wh-clefts highlight the speaker‟s role in the specificational process, it-clefts reduce the speaker‟s responsibility for the information expressed by treating it as a pre-established fact (although this is also what allows the speaker to manipulate this construction as a way of expressing their opinions). This explains why the wh-cleft construction has never developed informative-presupposition or performative subtypes. Instead, the wh-cleft has undergone a construction-specific development, acquiring a presentational function. As shown in (57) above, wh-clefts with antecedents in the metalinguistic context often express very general information in the precopular clause. In presentational wh-clefts, the initial clause is so uninformative that it simply functions as a presentational device which introduces a postcopular proposition. For example, in (58), the postcopular constituent expresses the main informational content of the sentence; the fused relative and the copular verb function as a unit, separated from the rest of the sentence by a comma. (58)
What I‟m saying is, you shouldn‟t let her boss you about
The clausal focus is presented here as a complete sentence; in other words, it does not have to be introduced by that, unlike the clausal foci of it-clefts.9 9. Such examples provide support for the claim made by den Dikken, Meinunger, and Wilder (2000) and Schlenker (2003) that NPI connectivity in wh-clefts can be accounted for by invoking ellipsis. The wh-cleft differs from other specificational constructions in that it licenses negative polarity items in the focal posi-
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The it-cleft and constructional change
Bolinger (1977: 11) suggests that the word that is inherently anaphoric. The lack of that in (58) therefore indicates that the postcopular clause expresses a brand-new assertion. In these presentational wh-clefts, the proposition expressed in the focal clause is thus more informative than both the information in the precopular clause and also the relationship of specification that exists between them. The development of this discourse function seems to be related to a gradual change in the information status of the precopular fused relative. According to Koops and Hilpert‟s (2009) diachronic study, the wh-cleft has come to be introduced by increasingly general descriptions over time. For example, while the highly general verb do was often found in the precopular phrase of early wh-clefts (see also Traugott 2008), the construction now commonly occurs with the even less specific verbs happen and be, see (59). The verb happen is first attested in the wh-cleft in the late nineteenth century, and is used frequently by the middle of the twentieth century. Most recently, the verb be has become especially common in wh-clefts in present-day spoken English. (59)
I think what happened was, I just launched in. (Nick Hornby, How to be Good, p.5)
Koops and Hilpert (2009: 235–236) note that while the verb do requires that the agent of the dynamic event is specified (what he did was…), the verb happen does not (what happened was…); in turn, the verb be is “maximally general” since it can encompass both dynamic and stative events (what it was was…). As Prince (1978: 893) notes, such expressions are also highly inferable, since “there seems to be a pragmatic principle that says that events keep occurring – and that in our culture, at least, they are our proper and constant concern”.
tion, shown in (iv). If we assume that these sentences are in some way related to wh-clefts with sentential foci, such as (v), then NPI connectivity in wh-clefts can be explained. However, since tokens like (v) form a separate presentational subtype of wh-cleft, an ellipsis approach is unlikely to be valid analysis for all instances of the construction, contra Schlenker (2003). See Chapter 3, Section 4.3.2, for other accounts. (iv) What he didn‟t buy was any wine (v)
What he didn‟t buy was, he didn‟t buy any wine
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239
This usage is said to be most especially common in spoken language. Weinert and Miller‟s (1996) study examines the use cleft constructions in spontaneous, informal discourse, using dialogue data from the Map Task experiments (see Anderson et al. 1991). They find that all 20 of the wh-cleft tokens contain the low content verbs do or happen.10 Weinert and Miller pay close attention to the suprasegmental features of these tokens, which lead them to question whether any of their examples are “classic clefts”; that is, clefts which do not have a pause separating the cleft clause + copula from the clefted constituent. Instead, they suggest that the clefted constituent has a “potentially independent status” in all of the wh-cleft tokens, including (60).11 They note, “Even without the cleft clause, the clause or verb phrase carries all the necessary information and can be interpreted…This, we suggest, is what allows the fast tempo and phonetic reductions on the cleft clause” (Weinert and Miller 1996: 197). (60)
Cause what you‟re doing is you‟re going up the side of the allotments (Weinert and Miller 1996: 194)
Weinert and Miller (1996: 197) suggest that these wh-clefts have a macrodiscourse function: they all serve as the climax to a period of negotiation between the instruction-giver and the instruction-follower, through which the instruction-giver expresses their conclusions. However, wh-clefts are also “forwards pointing” in that they function as a bridge to the next section of discourse, in this case, leading into the next subset of instructions. Hopper (2001) also finds that presentational wh-clefts play a significant role in conversational turn-taking. He suggests that the precopular clause delays the delivery of the main assertion, “by adumbrating (foreshadowing) the continuation in general terms without giving away the main point” (Hopper 2001: 114). This has the dual purpose of informing the reader that 10. Similarly, Hopper (2004: 156) finds that “the pattern what (NP) {do, happen, say} {is was} accounts for almost 90% of all occurrences” in his corpus; he concludes that “the pseudocleft could almost be called formulaic”. 11. This conclusion is supported by the use of punctuation in this striking token taken from a college student‟s written work. Here, a full stop separates the cleft clause + copula from the clefted constituent; the latter is presented as a completely independent sentence. (vi) The navy box like object he had placed in front of me caught my eye. I was baffled by it. What I didn‟t realise was. I would later learn this would be the most important item to save someone‟s life.
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what follows is worthy of attention as well as buying time for the speaker to formulate the postcopular assertion, therefore enabling them to “hold the floor”. In wh-clefts then, the specificational relationship between the precopular description and the postcopular referent is often completed “online”, decided by the speaker during the course of the utterance. This often gives the wh-cleft a “fragmentary appearance” (Hopper 2004: 156), shown in (61).12 (61)
Okay, Right, Oh. Right what we need to do right is like eh... (Weinert and Miller 1996: 194)
Indeed, Hopper and Thompson (2008) suggest that many apparent cases of “incomplete” wh-clefts are instead instances of a distinct construction, in which a wh-clause is used to project the upcoming stretch of discourse. In other words, it tells us that there is “more to come”. They discuss example (62), in which the wh-phrase is not followed by the copular verb, but by an independent sentence functioning as a directive, cook all the fish. Although there is still a specificational meaning here, in that the initial phrase classifies the next sentence as the thing she should do, Hopper and Thomson (2008: 108) suggest that the introductory expression serves mainly to “frame the following talk”. (62)
what you oughta do though Mar,…cook all the fish. cause – we won‟t use it,…if you don‟t cook it. (Hopper and Thompson 2008: 108)
Over time then, it seems that the wh-cleft has developed a new discourse function in which the act of specification is so general that it functions only as a simple presentational device. Indeed, for some speakers it may be that this subtype of wh-cleft no longer has a specificational meaning at all. This would explain the existence of the “double is” construction, exemplified by (63), which contains two instances of the matrix copula. (63)
What it is is, is that I just can‟t see the point of doing it
12. See also Schmid (2001: 1536) on the use of definite NPs containing abstract head nouns, such as the thing is, as “a useful hesitation device”. As Tuggy (1996: 725) comments, “The thing is is such a strongly entrenched automatic unit, that it is easy for speakers to bring it out from their minds as a unit, even before they have figured out what they want to say next”.
A construction-specific development
241
In such sentences, the initial description (in this case, what it is) functions as a unit with the first matrix copula be (see Brenier and Michaelis 2005). Since this unit of information functions only as a formulaic presentational device, a further copula is provided after the intonation break to reinforce the specifying relationship between the postcopular clause and the initial description. This construction has a further turn-taking function, providing even more “down time” for the speaker to formulate their main assertion.13 We have seen then that the development of different discourse functions for the it-cleft and wh-cleft constructions is related to their association with known (or factual) information and with Chafe-given (or hearer-activated) information, respectively. This, in turn, can be traced back to an early link between it-clefts and discourse-old information and wh-clefts and inferable information. These subtle differences in information-structure explain why only the it-cleft has developed an informative-presupposition subtype and why the wh-cleft has instead acquired a use as a presentational device. Both of these developments involve subjectification. We have seen that while the it-cleft can be employed as an indirect way of communicating the speaker‟s opinion in the cleft clause (under the guise of uncontroversial fact), the whcleft configuration can be used as a way of introducing the speaker‟s views in the focal phrase (which is also dependent on the fact that wh-clefts allow a full complement of clausal and verb phrase foci).
4.3.
Summary
The construction-specific development of the it-cleft therefore seems to be influenced and shaped by two, relatively minor, semantic and pragmatic properties: the underspecified semantics of the cleft pronoun it and an early 13. Tuggy (1996) provides a cognitive account of what he calls the 2-B construction, outlining a family of constructs which are more or less entrenched, including the thing is is that CLAUSE and the problem is is that CLAUSE. However, Tuggy does not discuss wh-clefts with double be. Pavey (2009) attempts to fill this gap and notes a relationship with the amalgam construction shown in (vii). Here, the focal NP hand sanitizer functions as the referent for both a specificational inversion sentence (it‟s hand sanitizer) and a reverse wh-cleft (hand sanitizer is what it is). Such constructs could also be said to perform a reinforcing role. See Massam (1999) for a generative account of the “double is” construction. (vii) It‟s hand sanitizer is what it is
(interview transcript [Pavey 2009: 27])
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association with discourse-old information. For instance, we have seen how the cleft it could have influenced the changes to the range of it-cleft foci. Because this pronoun is maximally underspecified, it can describe elements which cannot be classified by other nouns, and which are therefore unacceptable in other copular constructions. However, while it is underspecified, the interpretation it is given is usually specific. This gives a reason as to why it-clefts show a preference for focusing discrete, mutually-exclusive entities. The early association with discourse-old information, on the other hand, has helped shape the development of new discourse functions for the it-cleft construction. In particular, it results in an association between itclefts and the presentation of pre-established facts. This explains why the it-cleft alone has developed informative-presupposition and performative subtypes – constructions which function to downplay the speaker‟s responsibility for the information expressed. As a point of comparison, wh-clefts differ from it-clefts in that the pronoun what is both specified (as near synonymous with the thing) and general. This explains why wh-clefts are able to focus syntactic categories denoting properties, actions and events (entities which are not mutually exclusive). Furthermore, wh-clefts show an early association with inferable, as opposed to discourse-old, information, including that which can be inferred from the metalinguistic context. As shown above, wh-clefts with metalinguistic antecedents often express highly general information in the precopular clause. This explains why the wh-cleft has developed a presentational function, in which the act of specification is merely used as a device for introducing a focal proposition. This, rather cursory, comparison of it-clefts and wh-clefts outlines some possible reasons why, despite there being a familial relationship among all specificational copular constructions, the it-cleft has undergone a separate development, acquiring a greater range of idiosyncratic properties. We have seen that small semantic and pragmatic differences in the make-up of these constructions mean that the it-cleft and the wh-cleft have subtly different prototypes, which govern and shape their construction-specific pathways of change (see Chapter 2, Section 3).
Chapter 9 Conclusions
This book has provided a synchronic and diachronic constructional account of the English it-cleft construction. In Chapter 1, we saw that the it-cleft is an unusual configuration, with a non-standard structure that does not conform to highly general grammatical rules. In addition, it-clefts exhibit various pragmatic and discourse-functional characteristics which, at first sight, are difficult to make sense of given their structural properties. In Chapter 2, we saw that the framework of construction grammar is ideally suited to the treatment of this specialized linguistic pattern, since it not only offers a way of capturing and representing idiosyncratic information (through the makeup of the symbolic construction), but it also encourages us to explain how less regular properties are motivated by identifying generalizations, albeit at a local level, in the constructional taxonomy of grammatical knowledge. As a result, I claimed that a constructional perspective is most consistent with an approach which examines it-clefts in relation to a family of copular constructions (rather than as information structure variants of syntactically more basic sentences). In Chapter 3, I built up an analysis of specificational copular sentences which draws heavily from the inverse tradition. On this account, specificational meaning is quite literally the inverse of predication; that is, it derives from the same nominal predication relation of class inclusion but involves interpreting this relation from the opposite perspective, as listing the membership of a set rather than attributing a property to a referent. I showed further that the inherent meaning of definite NP predicates makes them especially well-suited to enabling a specificational interpretation, since they describe the totality of a restricted set. This interpretation also relies on a particular information structure, in which the referring expression (the membership of the set) is in focus. The account of specificational copular sentences sketched here captures the same intuitions as other inverse analyses, but focuses on the question of what constitutes specificational meaning, rather than on the conditions affecting syntactic movement operations. It has the advantage of treating specification as a phenomenon separate from (but associated with) inversion. From this, it follows that so-called “reverse” specificational copular sentences are accounted for straightforwardly and the relation between specification and inversion is explained, rather than assumed. Furthermore,
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Conclusions
in recognizing the central role of definiteness in the creation of specificational meaning, the current account is more successful at explaining the restrictions on indefinite specificational subjects. In particular, it shows that while indefinite NPs provide a unique and useful function, their felicitousness is nevertheless governed by their similarity to definite NPs; that is, they must exhibit, or at least not be at odds with, some characteristics associated more with definiteness than indefiniteness. On the assumption that it-clefts are instances of the specificational inversion construction, it follows that they too will involve nominal predication, containing a definite NP predicate and a postcopular referring expression. This led me to argue for a discontinuous constituent analysis of it-clefts in Chapter 4. On this account, the cleft clause is an extraposed restrictive relative, which modifies the cleft pronoun it to form a discontinuous definite description. While this meant that we had to accept and (momentarily) overlook certain idiosyncrasies in cleft structure, including the obligatory extraposition of the relative clause and the restrictive modification of the pronoun it, it also allowed us to make several pertinent generalizations. For instance, on this account, the behaviour of the cleft clause is consistent with a restrictive relative clause analysis. Likewise, the properties of focus, presupposition, exhaustiveness and contrast fall out from this analysis, and are explained either as characteristics of definiteness more generally or as products of specificational meaning. While other authors have recognized such correspondences between itclefts and definite NPs, my account advances the current literature by offering support for the hypothesis that definiteness is fundamental to the it-cleft and to specificational copular sentences in general. In this way, the analysis of specificational meaning outlined in Chapter 3 provides further justification for a discontinuous constituent account of it-clefts. I concluded Chapter 4 by situating my account in relation to the cleft literature. I claimed that the analysis argued for here is able to capture more generalizations than both expletive analyses (which view the pronoun it as a dummy element) and other constructional accounts (which make little use of inheritance – the explanatory mechanism of construction grammar). It also differs from other recent discontinuous constituent accounts in that it defends a more straightforward extraposition-from-NP analysis of it-clefts. While the more complicated analyses claim to be able to account for some of the it-cleft‟s contradictory properties, I have explored the extent to which we can account for them in other ways, without adding to the structural complexity of the it-cleft.
Conclusions
245
In Chapter 5, I showed that this analysis extends naturally to incorporate predicational (including proverbial) it-clefts, owing to inheritance from the predicate nominal construction. I claimed that such sentences present a particular problem for expletive analyses of it-clefts and demonstrate further support for a discontinuous constituent account. Furthermore, I showed that this data can be accounted for more successfully if we assume an inverse analysis of specificational copular sentences. From this perspective, specificational and predicational it-clefts have similar structures and the same predicate nominal semantics. They differ primarily in how their elements of form and components of meaning correspond to one another. While in the specificational examples, the discontinuous definite NP functions as the semantic predicate, in predicational it-clefts, this is treated as an act of reference. However, most discontinuous constituent accounts assume that it-clefts (and other specificational copular sentences) are semantically equative. From this, it follows that specificational and predicational it-clefts have very different semantic structures, often involving different kinds of copula. Furthermore, since on an equative approach, the discontinuous definite NP functions as a referring expression in both varieties of it-cleft, it is unable to account for the different realization of the cleft pronoun in specificational and predicational it-clefts with plural clefted constituents. Finally, in Chapter 5, we saw that there are examples of the specificational it-cleft which exhibit additional, construction-specific properties that cannot be accounted for by inheritance. In particular, the it-cleft allows some constituents to be clefted that are not found in other specificational copular constructions and is able to occur with brand-new information in the cleft clause, a characteristic which seems to be unique to this particular type of specificational construction. I showed that while these tokens can be accommodated into the it-cleft analysis argued for here, and do not require a separate analysis, they nevertheless require explanations from outside the present-day language system. The historical component of the book began in Chapter 6. Here, we saw that that the cleft structure is actually an Old English construction, which has remained largely unchanged over time. When examined in relation to the language system of earlier periods of English, the it-cleft‟s idiosyncratic structural properties, including the restrictive modification of the pronoun it, the obligatory extraposition of the cleft clause, and the unusual pattern of agreement, quickly lose their mystique. These properties were shown to be originally inherited from once productive patterns, including the determinative pronoun construction, the paratactic relative clause construction and
246
Conclusions
the (semantically underspecified) OE/EME lexeme it. While these patterns have since changed or fallen out of use, their influence remains entrenched (or fossilized) within the it-cleft schema. The early historical evidence therefore provides an explanation for these idiosyncratic structural properties as well as demonstrable support for a discontinuous constituent account of it-clefts. The OE hit-clefts were shown to be especially instructive in this regard, since the gender agreement system provides an additional means with which to identify the structure of these early tokens. With only one possible exception, all of the relevant instances in the YCOE demonstrate agreement between the neuter cleft pronoun and the relative pronoun (þæt), exactly as we would expect on an extrapositionfrom-NP account. This data has, to my knowledge, never been used in support of an extraposed/discontinuous structure for all types of it-cleft, despite its clear preference for this type of analysis. Indeed, an expletive analysis is unable to account for these early hit-clefts. We saw in Chapter 6 that this has often resulted in the discounting of the OE specificational tokens from the recorded history of the English it-cleft. In Chapter 7, I conducted a diachronic investigation, which follows the it-cleft from Old to Modern English. Making use of data extracted from the YCOE, the PPCME2, the PPCEME and the PPCMBE, I showed that the frequency of the specificational it-cleft has increased, and its function has expanded, over time. In particular, we saw that the it-cleft occurs with an increasingly wide range of foci. Originally focusing only concrete objects (showing a preference for animate individuals), the it-cleft gradually occurs with more abstract and relational foci, which denote less discrete concepts. This is accompanied by an increase in the range of non-nominal categories that can occur in postcopular position. In addition, the it-cleft acquires new discourse functions as it changes from expressing old information in the cleft clause, to also expressing non-salient information, before the inclusion of information which is new to the hearer but assumed to be factual in some sense, before allowing even speaker opinion to occur in this position. As a result, the it-cleft‟s idiosyncratic range of foci and its ability to occur with brand-new information in the cleft clause were shown to be the outcome of the it-cleft‟s construction-specific historical development. In Chapter 8, I argued that these changes to the function and use of the specificational it-cleft are best interpreted as an example of schematization. On this account, new instances are formed by extension from the prototype, overriding the more general patterns of correspondence found in the original construction. In particular, the changes to the clefted constituent and the cleft clause are governed by the referential semantics of the postcopular slot
Conclusions
247
and the presuppositional nature of the definite description. Over time, semantic classes and syntactic categories which are less suited to the referring function are accommodated into the referential slot, and speakers are able to further manipulate what sorts of information can be marked as presupposed. The upshot is that the it-cleft gradually becomes a more schematic (or open) and productive construction, sanctioning a wider range of instances. I concluded Chapter 8 by identifying two subtle semantic and pragmatic properties which may have enabled and shaped the it-cleft‟s construction-specific historical development: the underspecified semantics of the cleft pronoun it and an early association with old (or known) information. In sum, this book has argued for a straightforward extraposition-fromNP analysis of the English it-cleft, drawing on evidence from three main areas: (a) the central role of definiteness in the creation of specificational meaning, (b) the existence and make-up of predicational (and proverbial) itclefts, and (c) the early, historical it-cleft data. The approach is constructional in that it aims to maximize motivation for the it-cleft construction, by identifying generalizations at a local level in the constructional taxonomy. We have seen that the it-cleft inherits properties from specificational copular and predicate nominal constructions, from definite NPs and restrictive relative clauses. On this account, many of the it-cleft‟s properties are shown to conform to more general patterns of correspondence. However, idiosyncrasies are also tolerated on this constructional account. Rather than incorporating them into a complex (and counterintuitive) synchronic analysis, this book has made use of historical evidence to explain how and why the it-cleft has developed construction-specific properties over time. In this way, the diachronic investigation informs and supports an otherwise simple and intuitive analysis of the English it-cleft. There are several areas of research which could follow from this study. For instance, the proposed relationship between specification and the characteristics of definiteness should really be tested on a larger set, and a wider range, of naturally occurring indefinite specificational subjects. Furthermore, if, as has been suggested here, it-clefts are instances of NP inversion, it would be useful to situate the it-cleft within a history of specificational inversion sentences, more generally. On a much smaller scale, while this book has highlighted the common structure and shared history between itclefts and demonstrative clefts, our focus here has been on the it-cleft construction. A data-led study comparing the frequency, use and behaviour of these cleft types over time would be most revealing.
Corpora and data sources
Hornby, Nick 2001 How to be Good. London: Penguin. Kroch, Antony, and Ann Taylor 2000 The Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Middle English (PPCME2). Department of Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania. CD-ROM, second edition, http://www.ling.upenn.edu/hist-corpora/. Kroch, Antony, Beatrice Santorini, and Lauren Delfs 2004 The Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Early Modern English (PPCEME). Department of Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania. CD-ROM, first edition, http://www.ling.upenn.edu/hist-corpora/. Kroch, Antony, Beatrice Santorini, and Ariel Diertani 2010 The Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Modern British English (PPCMBE). Department of Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania. CD-ROM, first edition, http://www.ling.upenn.edu/hist-corpora/. Nelson, Gerald, Sean Wallis, and Bas Aarts 1998 International Corpus of English – Great Britain (ICE-GB) Release 2. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/english-usage/projects/ice-gb/. Taylor, Ann, Anthony Warner, Susan Pintzuk, and Frank Beths 2003 The York-Toronto-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Old English Prose (YCOE). Department of Linguistics, University of York. Oxford Text Archive, first edition, http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~lang22/YcoeHome1.htm.
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Index
agreement case, 97–99, 168–170, 172–173 gender, 30, 133, 149, 170–176, 181, 183, 246 number, 30 39n, 96–97, 99–102, 112–113, 132–133, 148–149, 162–168 person, 96–99, 105, 168–170, 191 all-clefts, 10, 62, 68–69 analogy and pattern alignment, 104, 158, 160–161, 165, 178–179, 212n Celtic influence, 221–222, 224 cleft clause changes to information status of, 13, 204–211, 213, 215–218, 225, 232–235, 242 obligatory extraposition of, 12, 73, 109, 148–149, 157–162, 183, 245–246 structure of, 1, 3, 88–93, 104–105, 116–118, 123–124, 136, 161– 162 cleft it expletive, see expletive accounts definite, see discontinuous constituent accounts semantically underspecified, see underspecified it cleft schema, 75–76, 78, 152, 161 clefted constituent categories of foci, 3, 121, 134–140, 221, 225–229, 231 changes to, 12–13, 196–204, 211, 213–215, 217–221 , 224–225, 227–228, 242, 246–247 coercion, 24–26, 41–43, 139–140, 201, 214–215, 220, 224, 228, 231 see also individualizing techniques
Cognitive Grammar, 16, 43–47 compositionality, degree of, 9, 17–18, 23, 114, 116–117, 119 connectivity effects, 65–67, 237n constituency, VP, 87–88, 93–96, 102– 103, 111–112 construction grammar, 4–5, 9–12, 14, 16–26, 40–42, 47, 74, 115–119, 146–147, 212–213, 243–244 constructionalization, 24, 213–218, 222, 225 contrast, 6, 63, 85–87, 103, 137, 139, 181–182, 200–201, 203, 228 conventionality, degree of, 13, 17–18, 21–22, 26, 119, 153, 185, 214–215, 216n, 218, 224 copula be of identity, 2, 29, 43, 66n, 110– 112, 117, 132 classifying be, 43, 46, 57 non-relational be, 43–44, 46 corpora, search and selection process, 14–15, 184–194 see also ICE-GB; PPCEME; PPCMBE; PPCME2; YCOE definiteness and inclusiveness, 11, 36– 37, 41, 47, 54–55, 57–58, 63–64, 69, 72, 82–87, 244 demonstrative (this-, that-) clefts, 74– 76, 104 history of, 151–153, 156, 160, 173, 179, 185, 247 determinative pronouns, 153–160, 169, 177–178, 180, 186 discontinuous constituent accounts, 11, 72–78, 109–115 “double is” construction, 240–241
Index Early Modern English, 159n, 161–162, 165–166, 189–190, 194, 196–197, 200–203, 206–207, 211, 214, 217, 219–220, 224, 230 end weight, see information structure generalizations entrenchment, 12, 21–22, 131, 157, 178–179, 212, 218, 246 equative approach, 28–31, 33, 61n, 110–115, 117, 131–134, 167, 245 equative sentences, 28, 30–31, 42, 59n exclusiveness, see indefiniteness exhaustiveness, 2, 11, 35–37, 57–58, 75, 82–86, 103–104, 110, 117, 137 existential there be/it be sentences, 52n, 158n, 190–191, 193 expansion, see schematization expletive accounts, 5–7, 11, 71, 102– 107, 112, 114, 116, 123–127, 136, 244–245 influence on historical accounts, 169–170, 172–174, 176, 181, 185, 246 extraposed relative clauses, 73, 93, 95– 96, 102, 113n, 148, 154, 156–159, 161, 173 see also cleft clause, obligatory extraposition of extraposed subject clauses, 4, 15, 19– 20, 160–161, 193 extraposition accounts, 7–9, 11, 71–73, 107–115, 136 – 137 factive clauses, 226, 229–230, 234–235 familiarity conditions, 3, 36, 39, 50–55, 80–81, 86–87, 121–122, 140–146, 215–216, 232–237, 241 – 242 see also information structure generalizations; presupposition focus-first it-clefts, 92, 149, 191 focusing in it-clefts,1–2, 5–7, 73, 79–80, 116, 140, 223–224
267
in specificational sentences, 35, 37– 38, 57–59, 79–80, 102 in V2 construction, 222–224 see also clefted constituent fossilization, 13, 22, 25, 177–179, 212– 213, 218, 246 garden-path readings, 91, 113n givenness hierarchy, 141 grammaticalization, 16, 23–25, 213, 215, 216n, 217–218, 222 see also constructionalization ICE-GB, 14, 91–92, 97–98, 100, 120– 121, 124, 126, 128, 130, 134, 138– 139, 225, 235–236 “identificational” copular sentences, 174–176, 180–182 identity statements, see equative sentences impersonal/presentational sentences, 186–190, 193, 197–199, 209, 219– 220, 224 inclusiveness, see definiteness indefiniteness and exclusiveness, 37, 47–58, 84, 128, 143–144 individualizing techniques focusing adverbs, 66n, 139, 200– 201, 203, 214, 223–224 listing, 139, 200–201, 203, 214, 226, 228–229 nominalization, 138, 229 information structure generalizations, 40, 73, 129, 158–159, 161, 179 see also familiarity conditions informative-presupposition it-clefts, 3, 121–122, 140–146, 186, 232n, 233n, 234 development of, 188, 204–211, 215–220, 221n, 232, 234, 237, 241–242 inheritance, 10–13, 16, 18–21, 25, 78, 102, 115–119, 177–178, 244–245, 247
268
Index
inverse approach, 30–32, 34, 38, 50– 51, 77–78, 106, 112, 115, 127–128, 132–133, 167, 169, 243 inversion sentences, 38–40, 57, 59 Irish and Irish English, 221 it-cleft schema, 128–129, 131, 135, 149, 178, 212–216, 246 Late Modern English, 161–162, 189– 190, 193–197, 200–204, 207–211, 214, 220–221, 224, 238 Middle English, 149–150, 154–159, 163–166, 168–170, 176–177, 179– 181, 182n, 190–191, 194–200, 202, 204n, 205–206, 211, 219–220 mismatch, 19–20, 24, 26, 40, 59, 72, 114, 116, 213–214 motivation, 10–13, 20–21, 25, 40, 59, 73, 119–120, 156, 158, 161, 177– 179, 183–184, 243, 247 Old English, 22, 150–160, 163–164, 170–178, 180–183, 186–189, 192, 194–200, 204–205, 218–219, 221n, 224, 245 pattern alignment, see analogy performative it-clefts, 206–207, 209, 217–218, 220, 232, 234–235, 237, 242 PPCEME, 15, 159n, 166, 169, 185, 189–190, 194, 197, 200–203, 206– 207, 214, 220, 246 PPCMBE, 15, 185, 190, 193–194, 196– 197, 200–204, 207–210, 246 PPCME2, 15, 154, 159n, 165–166, 185, 190–191, 194–195, 197–198, 200, 202, 205–206, 219–220, 246 predication, nominal, 19–20, 28–30, 34–37, 40–49, 57 predicational clefts, 4, 92n, 120–135, 226–227, 245, 247
history of, 151–152, 155– 156, 160, 166–168, 171, 173–174, 176, 180–181, 194–196 presupposition, 2, 11, 80–82, 86, 103, 110, 140, 186, 244 governing change, 210, 213, 215– 217, 220, 225, 247 see also informative-presupposition it-clefts proverbial it-clefts, 4, 120, 122–124, 127, 129–131, 245 history of, 149, 156, 179 pseudoclefts, 7–8, 62–63, 69–70, 98– 99, 145 as a source for it-clefts, 8, 107–109, 136–137 see also all-clefts; th-clefts; whclefts quantification, universal, 41, 45, 68–69, 112, 117 relationality, see valence relative clauses establishing relatives, 53–55, 143– 145 history of relative markers, 158n, 161–162, 170–171 nonrestrictive relatives, 88–90, 111–112, 116–118, 123, 192 reduced relatives, 63, 91–92, 113n, 152 restrictive relatives, see cleft clause, structure of; extraposed relative clauses zero realization of relative marker, 89–92, 193, 158n “reverse” specificational sentences, 32, 35–38, 58–59, 66–69, 73, 74n, 80, 144–145, 160n, 169, 181, 231–232, 233n, 241n, 243 right-dislocation, 8, 107n, 108, 124, 161n, 173
Index schematization and expansion, 13, 23– 26, 197, 212–213, 215–216, 218, 246 specificational meaning, 2, 32–38, 40, 47–49, 53–58, 60–62, 80, 182, 243– 244 value-variable relationship, 2, 32– 33, 61, 80, 83, 117–118, 125, 181 see also copula, be of identity subjectification, 207, 217, 237, 241 th-clefts, 7, 10, 62–64, 66, 68–69, 72, 76, 98–99, 107–109, 135–136, 145, 227–228, 240n there-clefts, 75–76, 84, 104 token and type frequency, see usagebased approach truncated clefts, 14, 76–78, 94 underspecified it, 87, 129–130, 226– 228, 231, 242, 247 human and non-human, 155–156, 164–165, 167–168, 177–178, plural and singular, 99–101, 132– 133, 163–168, 177–178, 246 uniqueness, see definiteness usage-based approach, 10, 13, 16, 18, 21–25, 178–179, 212–218 valency and relationality, 40–41, 44, 46, 49, 57, 82 value-variable relationship, see specificational meaning verb-second, 222–224 wh-clefts, 7, 10, 62, 64–69, 101n, 107– 108 categories of foci, 136, 138, 140, 225–228, 230–231 development of, 230, 232, 237–238, 240–242 discourse functions, 232–233, 236– 242
269
predicational, 127–128, 226–227 presentational, 232, 237–242 Word Grammar, 19n YCOE, 15, 150–152, 154, 164, 170– 172, 175, 176n, 180, 184–189, 192, 194–200, 204–205, 246