The End of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations [Reprint ed.] 0792334361, 9780792334361

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The End of the Cold War Evaluating Theories of International Relations Reprint with Postscript Eeghied by

PIERRE

ALLAN

Professor af Political Science and

KJELL

GOLDMANN

Professor of Political Science

rs CHUoU TR GET 4

KLEPWER LAW INTERNATIONAL The Plagee/ Boston f London

UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM

Hallward Library‘

ee ety

eeNOTTINGH OF A:

2 OM THe

UNIVERSITY hipaa 4é LIBRAR > 7

f

SEMHALL 12 —

This

book

may

be recalled

before

the above

date.

The

End

of the Cold

War

Evaluating Theories of International Relations

gut) f yh}\le DW

The End the Cold

of War

Evaluating Theories of International Relations Reprint with Postscript Edited by

PIERRE

ALLAN

Professor of Political Science and KJELL

GOLDMANN

Professor of Political Science

KLUWER

LAW

The Hague

INTERNATIONAL / Boston

/ London

A C.LP. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

|

37

«O02. GBasu4

ISBN0-7923-3436-1 lool250 b7x :

Published by Kluwer Law International, P.O. Box 85889, 2508 CN The Hague, The Netherlands.

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Reserved

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© 1995 Kluwer Law International Kluwer Law International incorporates the publishing programmes Graham & Trotman Ltd, Kiuwer Law and Taxation Publishers, and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

of

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Contents @

Introduction:

Three

Debates

about

the

Kjell Goldmann

Q)

End

of the

Cold

War

1

.

Intersystemic the

End

Rivalry and International

of the

Cold

War

Order: Understanding

12

@yvind Osterud Cold War Endgames 24 Vinod K. Aggarwal and Pierre Allan

@

The Events in Eastern Europe of International Relations Philip P. Everts

and the Crisis 55

in the Discipline

Bargaining, Power, Domestic Politics, and Security Soviet “New Thinking” as Evidence 82 Kjell Goldmann A Time and

of Reckoning?

the

End

Isabelle Peace

Theories

of the

Grunberg Research

Cold

War

and Thomas and

for a Reappraisal Hakan Wiberg

Eastern

of International

Dilemmas:

Relations

104

Risse-Kappen Europe:

How

Much

Need

147

What Is It That Changed with the End of the Cold War? An Analysis of the Problem of Identifying and Explaining Change 179 Heikki Patomaki The

End

of the

Theory? Pierre

5 10.

Cold

War:

The

Relations

Allan

Theory,

Prediction,

Kjell Goldmann Index

of International

226

Postscript: Notes

End

on Contributors 251

248

and the End of the Cold War

242

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4as ae oehis a poe =One “aoe ‘aaae erat oft%tds tw eee er Or. , aes: miteaS: -*a.eae Mave io t myaf iy Pry a “4 toll« e: A uy ote‘—— /: ' pas Pa pay apes _

iw

a

1. Introduction: Three the End of the Cold

KJELL

Debates War

about

GOLDMANN

In October 1989, just weeks before the Berlin Wall was broken through, a respected commentator wrote ironically in Stiddeutsche Zeitung about the expectation of some that this might occur. If the wall would in fact come down in spite of everything, he added, the West Germans would have to build a wall of their own to avoid having to deal with the problem of unification. As late as in the autumn of 1989, as a matter of fact, few in West German politics expected the DDR to collapse, and many did not want it to collapse. When realities — die normative Kraft des Faktischen — took command, there was surprise and consternation.!

The misjudgments of journalists, politicians, and diplomats were fully matched by those of us academics. An increasing number of specialists on the Soviet Union and East Europe maintain that they foresaw what was to come as early as 1985, 1982, the 1970s, or even earlier. Be that as it may, political scientists concerned with the discovery of general patterns and with the development of general theory seem to agree that what did in fact occur was different from what their theories had led them to expect. Scholars in comparative politics have felt compelled to ask “not simply why events unfolded as they did but why our predictive theories left us unprepared”.2 The present book reflects a similar concern among

1 The quotations are from Ingmar Karlsson, ropa (Stockholm: Timbro, 1991), 58, 65. 2 See a special issue of World from Nancy Bermoe’s introduction

Landet

Politics, Vol. 44, (p. 1).

No.

i mitten.

Tyskland

1 (October

1991).

och det nya EuThe

citation

is

2 students heritage

Kjell Goldmann of international in the

light

of the

relations. end’of

What the

Cold

do we

do

with

our

theoretical

War?

It is easy to show how unexpected the end of the Cold War was among | theorists of international relations. Take, for example, Kenneth Waltz’s | sophisticated analysis of bipolar stability. Or take Robert Gilpin’s theory of international change, by which international instability would likely re-_ sult from a Soviet challenge of US preponderance.* There is a whole lit-_ erature according to which arms races, once started, are apt to lead to war and certainly not to disarmament and withdrawal from confrontation.5 Not to mention the large literature in which irrational inhibitions to change are outlined, a literature ranging from John Steinbruner’s cybernetic theory to Robert Jervis’s cognitive propositions. The community of international relations researchers in effect joined forces in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to provide a comprehensive explanation of the fact that a confrontation threatening the existence of mankind continued in spite of its irrationality, with no end in sight. The sum of these efforts was an image of the Cold War as resulting from the operation of an anarchical international system reinforced by military-industrial interests as well as by a variety of bureaucratic, psychological, and domestic-political factors. This edifice more or less collapsed when the systemic constants turned out to be variable and actorlevel constraints vanished overnight. It became necessary for international relationists to re-examine their concepts and propositions in the light of this unexpected piece of empirical evidence. Discrepant evidence, of course, is not a reason for self-criticism and despair but forms an exciting challenge providing scholars with an oppor-

tunity to improve their understanding and insight. The end of the Cold War may be related in this spirit to several on-going debates in the community of international relations researchers. The object of this introduction is to outline three such debates and to suggest how they may be en-

Benes 176-83.

N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.; Addison Wesley),

4 Robert Gilpin, War and Change Press, 1981), 231-44.

in World Politics (Cambridge:

5 E.g., Michael Wallace, “Old Nails in New Coffins: visited”, Journal of Peace Research, 18 (1981, No.1).

The

Para

Cambridge Bellum

University

Hypothesis

Re-

6 John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions ofPolitical Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

|

|

Introduction

3

| riched by the end-of-the-Cold-War experience. In subsequent chapters, nine scholars reflect on these matters from the point of view of their re: search concerns and experiences. Some general conclusions are drawn in ‘the final chapter.

The

Nature

of the

Cold

War

The most obvious relation between the end of the Cold War and academic debate concerns the Cold War itself: its origin, continuation, and conclusion. After having witnessed the way in which the Cold War ended, it seems obvious to some scholars why it came about in the first place. “For all divergent approaches to the history of the Cold War there is general agreement on one point”, Dr. Vladimir Shustov of the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs told a recent Nobel Symposium, namely, that “the heavy and serious responsibility for the Cold War rests with Stalin and his lieutenants and their foreign policy”. John Lewis Gaddis maintained at the same symposium that “the Cold War really was about the imposition of autocracy and the denial of freedom”.’” In this view, the Cold War thus was an ideological struggle. It is an understatement to say that this was not the prevailing view

|

among Western academics before the 1990s. Few have been prepared to —\ argue that the Cold War resulted primarily from a threat by Soviet authoritarianism against Western liberty. Speaking very broadly, three other \\, views have been more common. Some thus have seen the Cold War essentially asanother round in an incessant power competition between Great Powers and hence as a result of the inevitable features of politics in an anarchical system of independent states. Others have emphasized misperceptions that have obtained, mistakes that have been made, false historical analogies that have been entertained, etc.; rather than being systemically determined the Cold War came about because of human error, in this view. Still others have

) thought the Cold War to have resulted primarily from capitalist expansionism and imperialism.

7 Vladimir V. Shustov, “A View on the Origins of the Cold War and Some Lessons Thereof”, and John Lewis Gaddis, “The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future”, papers presented at the 90th anniversary Nobel Jubilee Symposium, Oslo, 6-8 December 1991.

4

Kjell Goldmann

The way in which the Cold War came to be conducted — an unprecedented arms race and yet no war between Great Powers — has also been interpreted in various ways. One view basically has been that escalation was inevitable, given the security dilemmas in which the contenders were placed; the mutual deterrence that resulted proved capable of inhibiting war, however, and thus nuclear weapons prevented the Cold War from becoming a hot one. Another view has been that the_arms race, even if not inevitable, came about because of the short-sightedness and ignorance of the leaders ¢| spite

of this.

on both sides; we are lucky that war was avoided

In a third

view, the arms

race

resulted

in

from military-indus-_

trialinterestsintheWest;warwasavoided merelybecausetheotherside aoe sufficient precautions. ® |Systemic|accidental}, ‘or|imperialist |—thesethen havebeenthree common Riciiauvestoan\ideological| viewoftheColdWar.Thevarious UTDRE wouldseemtoimplydifferent views «ofitscone The ’ learning.experienceofthe arms race and the crises,and maybefie ina propagatedby peace researchand the peacemovementare crucial “in

the

second.

The

third view

presumably

is that

the

Cold

War

ended

be-

ause of Western machinations that prevented socialism from demon“strating its superiority. The now-fashionable interpretation of the Cold FiWar

as the defence

of freedom

is of course

inspired

by the view that the

“/Cold War ended because of the proven oppressiveness

and inefficiency of

WA Realsozialismus andthesuperiority ofWestern eeasia ocandmarket economy.

Different

views

of the future

also seem

to be implied.

In the first,

sys-

temic perspective, power-struggle is inevitable among Great Powers; what varies through history is the identity of the Powers but not the competition between them; we should have no illusion that we have reached the “end of history” and that the dissolution of the Soviet Union marks the end of Great Power conflict. In the second perspective, much can be learnt from the Cold War experience; new structures can be set up that are capable of providing for an unprecedented period of international peace and security. merely temporary; closing of the ranks

In the third perspective, the victory of imperialism is the struggle will continue, and now that there is a among the white peoples it may take the sinister form

Introduction

) '

5

of global apartheid.® In the fourth, ideological perspective, presumably, a critical issue is whether stable democracy will develop in the former socialist countries of East and Central Europe. _ Power-struggle, perception and learning, capitalist imperialism, freedom versus autocracy — what light have recent developments shed on the plausibility of each of these perspectives on the Cold War? That the answer is not self-evident is vividly illustrated in the paper by Vladimir Shustov cited above. After having emphasized Stalin’s responsibility Shustov goes on to argue that “it would be an unjustifiable simplification, even an anti-historical approach, to attribute the origins of the Cold War to the activities of one personality alone and to the foreign policy of his country”. In fact, the Cold War was a “geopolitical inevitability”; nobody could have prevented it, since it was “predetermined by numerous objective reasons stemming from the course of historical development”.9 Is this true? What were the “objective factors”? If such factors obtained but did not make the Cold War literally inevitable, what was the balance between the objective and the subjective? This War

ended

in this the of

in essence

one the

is the

needs

volume

to be

analyzing

the

War Cold

this

Aggarwal and War

debate

taken

address

by Vinod Cold

first

on

into issue,

in which account. but

and

Pierre

what

may

the Most

way

in which

of the

papers

the

paper

by

Allan

focus

especially

be

learnt

about

@yvind

the

Cold

published @sterud

on the

this

matter

and nature from

endgame.

rhe Disconfirmation ofInternational Relations Theory Embarrassment over the failure of international relations scholars to anticipate the end of the Cold War, presumes aview of scholarship by which prediction is a crucial test of theoretical success. The object of scholarship, in this view, is to identify, by the systematic study of history, invariances that obtain into the future. This is the object, not only because the search for a general theory is taken to be the best way of explaining the specific, but also because such knowledge can be put to use in efforts to solve social problems. There lurks here an analogy with the natural sci-

8 Ali A. Mazrui, “Global Apartheid? Race and presented at the 90th anniversary Nobel Jubilee

9 Shustov

(fn. 7).

Religion in the New World Order”, paper Symposium, Oslo, 6-8 December 1991.

6

Kjell Goldmann

ences: just as laws have been discovered in physics and chemistry that — can be used to improve man’s control of or adaptation to his natural environment, there are invariances to be discovered in. human relations that, if known, can be put in the service of improving man’s control of or adaptation to his social environment by making political decisions more wellinformed —a basically “positivistic” outlook. It is important to keep in mind how widespread this outlook has been among students of international relations. When so-called peace research emerged as a distinct field in the 1960s, its advocates argued that its distinguishing feature was its focus on the practical application of scientific knowledge. Johan Galtung compared peace research with medical research and maintained that the object was to do away with the quackdoctoring that he thought prevailed in international politics;!° a more positivistic statement cannot be imagined. Peace research was thus presented as an applied science, as distinct from the presumed ivory towerlike activities of students of international politics. This was very misleading insofar as the study of international politics, maybe more than any other branch of political science, has been concerned, if not obsessed, with a major social problem, that of war and peace. Galtung’s way of expressing his thought was drastic, but the thought was commonplace. Furthermore, in spite of the attacks of “post-positivists” and “postmodernists”, this would seem to have remained the basis of normal _

science

in the

field

of international

relations.

ie

Concern with improving political decisions arguably presumes the existence of a theory that is predictive at least in the sense that contingent { } forecasts about likely developments can be inferred from it. A theory, \]

within

this

research

program,

is constructed

on the

basis

of historical

ex-

“, perience or is tested against historical evidence and is then presumed to be valid also in the future — not necessarily regardless of time and space, but at least with regard to the time and space relevant from the point of view of its application to practical decision-making. Furthermore, predictive theory arguably needs to focus on structures rather than on the substantive content of ideas and beliefs. Structures may be changed by deliberate action or, if they cannot, may serve as a basis for predictions more effectively than the specific thoughts of transient individuals. Hence, if your object is to improve the basis for rational decision-making, 10 Johan

Galtung,

Fredsforskning

(Stockholm:

Prisma,

1967).

Introduction

he

: you have reason to focus on the improvement of structural theory rather than on obtaining a fuller and more insightful explanation or interpretation of events, processes, and outcomes. sats This would seem to have been the typical approach of international re| :| lations theory for a very long time. Theoretical propositions about inter| national relations characteristically have related structure to action. The —structure of the international system, or nations, or governmental bureaucracies, or processes of decision-making, or cognitions have been presumed to relate to foreign policy action in a law-like fashion. The aim _ of research has been taken to be to_develop data-based theory of this |, kind. Methods have varied from the mathematical to the interpretative » with regard to both theory formulation and empirical observation. The object has been the same regardless of method, however: good structural theory.

This undertaking has been challenged by the unexpected end of the Cold War. International relations scholars of a more or less positivistic persuasion nawoireason to reconsidertheir propositionsin the face of this

happenedin recentyears withwell-c -establishednotionsaboutpower-bal-| ancesand security dilemmas?Whatdo wedo in the presenceofseem- 6 ingly discrepant evidence with our several propositions about the inertia following from the power of domestic groups with a special interest in preserving things as they are? What do we do with the literature giving | good reasons to expect bureaucratic as well as cognitive inertia? Do we .have to reject it? To what extent can propositions challenged by the end of the Cold War be modified so as to be saved from rejection? More fundamentally, have they actually been challenged by the end of the Cold War, . or have they proven to be so weak that it is impossible to determine whether the end of the Cold War is compatible or incompatible with them? Questions such as these are pursued by Kjell Goldmann in his contribution to the present book.

Goldmann’s conclusion is that theeffortto relatetheendoftheCold Warto well-established propositions aboutinternational relationshelps topeas attentiononmajor. weaknesses. in.cxistingLeo. Ourchoicein such an extent that little will remain of their explanatory and predictive power. This observation inevitably leads on to the question what to do 7 with the positivistic research program. The issue is touched upon by sev-

8

Kjell Goldmann

eral authors in this volume and/may be said to form the main theme of — PhilipEverts’scontribution. We encounter here some of the main issues in the debate among social . scientists about the meaning oftheir profession. Isprediction necessarily _ 5)our object? Prediction in what sense? Or are explanation and under- © : / standing sufficientobjectives? But then, does non-predictive theory possess explanatory capability?And: ifpredictive theory is impossible, does this mean that the idea of improving the basis for rational decision-— makingby research has proven unrealistic? } ~ Behind questions such as these there lurk|two obj objections,that have increasinglybeen levelledaagaiinst internationalrelations theory of ttheposi_tivistickind.One line of criticism emphasizesthinking rather than struct)” ture.Thought is not determined by structure, it is argued. Autonomous thinking and rethinking is an important feature of foreignpolicy making; ideas, and hence action, may change even if structures are constant. ‘ ‘Learning thus is an important feature of politics, a feature allegedlydeg fined away in structural theory.!! The other line of criticism sets_context against generality: the specificcontext of political action allegedly is SO _importantthat the notionof general theory is illusory. pea scholar of-a-positivisticpersuasion may agree that the understanding \ | of politicalaction that can be obtained in terms of structural theory is ina Bu “ He pio es His or her Poe is aes however:—_ tivistic research

program iin Ticmiational

on the presumption

that

structures

polsagus

are capable

would seem to depend

of explaining

a significant

part of the variance in foreign policy action and hence are useful for predictive purposes. To what extent does the end of the Cold War challenge this presumption? What does the challenge imply for the profession-of international relations research?

f, iy

\ The Contention

between

Approaches

The field of international relations is often presented to students as an arena in which a number of contending approaches, paradigms, or theo-_ ries fight out theirrdifferences. Academic discourse, as a matter of fact, 11 This argument is pursued by Walter Carlsnaes in his paper “On Analyzing the Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change” presented at a meeting of the Stockholm Comparative Foreign Policy Group in Helsinki, 5-6 July 1991.

a Introduction

98

has-come to~presupposethe existence of what is variously known as the realist school”, the “realpolitik approach”, or “realist theory”. The proper ‘way of conducting a scholarly discussion about the fundamentals of in-

| (ordefendthis “school” 3 ternationalpoliticsis widelytakento be to attack’ _ and to set it against

other

“schools”

or “approaches”.

One can have mixed feelings about this way of conducting a scholarly discussion. For one thing, the_several critics of “realist theory” do not _agree among themselves about the tenets of the theory they are criticizing. There is confusion in the literature about what the “realist approach” really is, and the “realist theory” attacked by its critics sometimes differs from the theory propounded by the presumed realists themselves.!2 The same can probably be said about the approaches with which realism is presumed to contend. For another thing, it is not quite fair to picture the profession of international relations scholars as consisting of the faithful followers of a small number of presumed giants such as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Immanuel Wallerstein, or Johan Galtung. Still there is no getting away from the fact that scholars can be grouped on the basis of the quuestions they ask, the assumptions they make, the concepts they use, ‘the authorities | they cite, and the ideas from which they | dissociate themselves. “Schools” or “approaches” do exist in this taxonomic sense. They mainly do not contend in the strict sense of putting forward incompatible propositions about the same object. Rather ~

—

they are concerned with different aspects of international relations: stability orvchange, conflictor cooperation, system or actor, structure or thinking’ Their contention has less to do with validity than with fruitfulness— and relevance. The iissue is less who is right and who is wrong but whoaccounts for what we consider to be our most pressing problemsin a waythat weperceive to besatisfactory. “It isa very obvious idea to examine what the remarkable occurrence of _the end ofthe Cold War may tell us about the'\relative merits of various “schools” that contend in roughly this sense. Among the contributors to this book, Isabelle Grunberg and Thomas Risse-Kappen as well as Heikki \ ] Patomaki and Hakan Wiberg are concerned with evaluating whole ap- V proaches rather than specific propositions.

Anissue often raised about contending Eppa elative importa ternational _relations thusistherel

eethral

12 This is argued in more detail in Kjell Goldmann, “The Concept Source of Confusion”, Cooperation and Conflict 23 (1988), 1-14.

f_in-

and inter-

of ‘Realism’

as a

10

Kjell Goldmann

_nal determinantsofforeignpolicy. ‘issoften (butwrongly,if we are to believethe arch-realistHans J. Morgenthau!3)ascribedthe resumption that there is a sharp difference between international and domestic politics and that onlythe former matters so far as the making «of

) foreignpolic is concerned. Towhat extent dothe developments nts leading » up to the end ofthe Co ar suggestthis assumptioneee . Sy Anotherissuethat is oftenraisedconcernsthe roleofnon--state act actors. | It is commonto conceiveof “realis ” as state-= Since recent

d nts largelyhavetakenate in civi eae tare Pear a byvariousteg t

ofEastand ——ai

~for“realisttheory” : asiG Lew force olitics. ‘Fora MeAoes issueJs todowith power inevitable in international

politics.!5 Tere: is reason to consider what

end of the Cold War implies for this thought. Fourthly, the “realist approach” has had to contend _not just with

SS

ie

an

)\ecosaicomte®anate nd Weshould ak nee

ap-

with ap-

whether these

latterapproaches farebetterthan“realist theory” whensetagainst the way inwhich theCold W arended. There remains what may constitute the most important watershed in

I yQutonomousrrole of ideas. Isabelle Grunberg and Thomas Risse-Kappen _international

NC

The outcome “my demand to “we both make demands Column’s demand (CP).”!4

or

that

follows.

This gives us:

CP

is accepted by actor Column (RP)” is preferred and find no consensus (NC),” and to “I accept

This first postulate specifies an actor's basic goals: if Row has chosen to be demanding, he would prefer that Column be conciliatory — that is, choose the strategy “accept” leading to RP — rather than be demanding and thereby end up in the no consensus outcome (NC). The latter choice by Row would force Column to face the possibility of the costs of a conflict, in order to prevail by getting his opponent to eventually accept his demands. The leader of a coalition will always prefer prevailing (RP) over its opponent rather than accepting the opponent’s demand (CP). In a situation of “self-help”, any actor prefers its own goals to those of the other actor. We next specify the likely effects on actors’ preferences stemming from different values of the three situational variables — as envisaged independently from each other. The first of these three postulates specifies the constraints and prospects arising from overall power resources considerations. Postulate

2.1:

NC

> CP

when

overall

strong

Postulate

2.2:

CP

> NC

when

overall

weak

When Row is overall strong, it prefers the no consensus outcome (NC) to accepting Column’s demands (CP); actors who have overall strength are ready to risk a possible conflict escalation rather than accept the other actor’s demands. Conversely, actors who are overall weak will be very 13 The presented

postulates that follow are almost identical but in Aggarwal and Allan, “Obiettivi, Preferenzie,

somewhat e Giochi”

stricter (fn. 7).

than

the ones

14 For an example of the very wide applicability of this hypothesis, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977). In their twenty empirical cases of crisis and alliance bargaining, the games they use are all based on preference orders which are consistent with the postulate of RP > NC or CP.

32

Vinod Aggarwal

prudent

in avoiding

& Pierre Allan

the risk of a confrontation.

For them,

Column

prevail-

ing (CP) is better than no consensus (NC). The third postulate states that actors with a stable coalition will prefer mutual consensus (MC) to no consensus (NC). By contrast, leaders of unstable coalitions prefer no consensus (NC) to mutual consensus (MC). Postulate

3.1:

MC

> NC when

coalitionally

stable

Postulate

3.2:

NC

> MC

coalitionally

unstable

when

Why might this be the case? First, a stable coalition provides its leader with room to discover whether both actors can be better off through integrative bargaining. The stability of the coalition allows it to explore if a bargaining space exists.!5 Second, because the leader and its coalition have incumbency expectations, he or she is likely to have a long-term time horizon permitting the development of integrative bargaining solutions. Third, leaders of stable coalitions will be able to better prevent freeriders who would benefit from the mutual consensus without joining the coalition. The converse of these arguments apply to leaders of unstable coalitions, who prefer a no consensus conflictual outcome (NC) to a consensus one (MC). In addition, leaders of unstable coalitions may be tempted to escalate to shore up support against real or imaginary external foes. This would allow them to bolster their coalition and increase their power. The fourth postulate applies as follows: Postulate

4.1:

Postulate

4.2:

RP MC

> MC > RP

when only

an

actor

when

is issue an

actor

strong is

issue

weak

and

stable

An issue strong actor prefers prevailing (RP) to a mutual consensus (MC) outcome, whether stable or not and whether overall weak or strong. Such an actor expects to have its demands accepted, bolstering its preference of prevailing (RP) with respect to mutual consensus (MC). However, issue weak actors do not automatically have converse preferences of favouring a consensus over prevailing. Unstable actors will not prefer a mutual con15 This does not imply, of course, that actors with a stable coalition are more willing to acknowledge other actors’ demands than to make their own demands. It only indicates that stable coalitions permit rational and serious discussion of the other actor’s

demands, thereby geous solution.

increasing

the perceived

chances

of arriving ;

at a mutually

advanta-

Cold War Endgames

33

Table I: The Deduced Constrained Preference Orderings from Row’s Perspective

Coalitional

Issue and

Stable

Unstable

stability | postulate 3.1:MC>NC| Postulate 3.2:NC>MC

overall

resources

Issue

Postulate

strong:

4.1: RP

Overall Postulate

RP > MC > NC > CP

>MC

strong:

Issue

Deadlock

or Deadlock

type

(IS-5)

2.1: NC > CP

4.1: RP

RP > (MC or CP) >MC

Overall weak: Postulate

Dilemma

(IS-1)

Tssue strong: Postulate

Prisoners’

RP > NC > MC or CP

Chicken

> NC

RP > CP > NC > MC

or Leader

Hero

(IS-2)

(IS-6)

2.2: CP >NC weak:

Postulate 4.2: MC > RP applies only for stable ac-

MC > RP >NC>CP

RP > NC > MC or CP

tors

Overall Postulate Issue

strong: 2.1: NC > CP

Stag Hunt

Deadlock or Deadlock type

(IS-3)

(IS-7)

weak:

Postulate 4.2: MC > RP applies only for stable ac-

MC > RP > CP >NC

RP > CP

> NC > MC

tors

Overallweak: Postulate

Harmony

2.2: CP >NC For

Hero

(IS-4)

all cells — Postulate

(IS-8) 1: RP

> CP or NC

sensus because their instability does not provide them with the necessary flexibility to find a consensual solution. Only stable issue weak actors will prefer a consensus to prevailing because they don’t expect to win but can envisage a consensus solution. For them, a mutual consensus outcome (MC) appears more realistic and attractive than prevailing (RP). Only for such actors do we find the prevailing outcome (RP) not the best, but the second-best

solution.

34 3.3. Deducing

Vinod Aggarwal Full Constrained

& Pierre Allan

Preference

Orders

The next step is to combine these pair-wise preference comparisons to construct full constrained preference orderings for different individual situations. Table II presents the CPOs from actor Row’s perspective (for Column’s view, simply replace RP by CP everywhere). Table II shows that the four postulates generate unique preference orderings in five individual situations (IS # 1, 3, 4, 6, and 8).16 In the three other cases, our deductive model predicts two different but close preference orderings (IS# 2, 5, and 7).!7 It is important to keep in mind that we have developed full preference orderings by using our four simple postulates — not by specifying them directly from each individual situation.!8 In other words, our approach goes from simple pair-wise comparisons to more complex full preference orderings. 19 3.4. Deriving Games from Full Ordinal Preferences We now examine the specific games in normal form arising from various combinations of individual situations. The specific games are formed by combining the deduced single or double preference ordering resulting from an actor’s individual situation. Table III portrays the games that emerge from actors having a perfectly symmetrical ordinal preference.2° Owing to space constraints, we only illustrate the possible deduced symmetric games because there are many fewer symmetric than asymmetric games. Outcomes are ordered from best (4) to worst (1). In total for all the individual situations, there are eight different symmetric games: Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken, Leader, Stag Hunt, Harmony, Deadlock,

16 A unique preference sumer behaviour. 17 Note that

there

ordering

is also said to be “complete”,

are no logical contradictions

arising

from

as in the theory

of con-

our rules.

18 We also postulate that preferences are transitive, that is, consistent. The transitivity Tule is usually used for defining rationality. Note also that we do not consider ties in constructing the preference orderings for expository purposes. 19 The advantage of this deductive method is three-fold. First, it is much easier to justify pair-wise comparisons of outcomes than actors’ constrained preferences across the whole set of outcomes. Second, the logic of building up full preferences from simpler postulates is transparent, allowing for critical analysis of our assumptions. Third, this approach allows us to ensure consistency for preference orders across different individual situations since the logic used in constructing full preferences is identical. 20 In a symmetrica! each individual actor.

game,

the

situation

looks

exactly

alike

from

the

point

of view

of

Cold War Endgames

35

Table III: Deduced Symmetric Ordinal Games (Note: Nash Equilibria in bold type) Coalitional stability

Issue and overall

Stable

Unstable

resources

Prisoners’

Issue strong Overall

Dilemma

Deadlock

3,3| 1,4 4,1 2,2

strong

2,2| 1,4 4,1 [3,3

IS-1

strong

Overall

4,3

1,1| 2,4 4,2 |3,3 IS-5

Chicken Issue

Deadlock Type

Leader

|2,4

2,2

|3,4

weak IS-2

Issue weak Overall strong

Issue Overall

Stag Hunt i 1,3 pd Ly (6

Deadlock 2 Deadlock Type ya) | 1,4 13 | 2,4 4,1 |3,3 4,2 |3,3

IS-3

IS-7

weak weak

Deadlock Type, and Hero. In order to make predictions about the likely outcomes of a specific game, we use the standard Nash solution to find equilibria. This solution concept requires actors to evaluate each situation in which they may find themselves with respect to what they may achieve on their own by unilaterally changing their strategies to ameliorate their situation.?! Most individual situation cells contain only one preference ordering and therefore one game. In three cases we find two different orderings giving rise to two symmetric games (IS-2, IS-5, and IS-7). However, these games are fairly close to each other. Deadlock type is like Deadlock — 21 For a Dilemma,” Deadlock, Keohane, (Princeton:

discussion of Stag Hunt, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security World Politics, 30 (1978); for Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken, Leader, Hero, and see Snyder and Diesing (fn. 14). Harmony is discussed at length by Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy Princeton University Press, 1984).

36

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

where both actors’ dominant strategy of demanding leads to an outcome of no consensus.22 The game of Leader bears some similarities to Chicken. The likely outcome is asymmetric, where one of the actors prevails over the other. Leader is usually applied to model situations of coordination, whereas Chicken is used to represent cases where one party imposes its will on the other through reckless behaviour. In the latter case, the asymmetry between parties is much greater, and the relative gain greater for the victorious party in Chicken than in Leader. The variety presented here is only of the simplest kind — symmetrical games. In general, we would expect actors to be in different individual situations. Therefore our theory will often lead to asymmetrical games such as Called Bluff — resulting from a combination of one actor being in IS-1 (with Prisoners’ Dilemma preferences) while the other is in IS-2 (with a Chicken ordering).23 It is worth mutual

and

games

where

noting

that

conflicting actor’s

while

our

interests, interests

approach it can

are

generates also

completely

give

first

actor’s

second

one’s

preference

ordering

will be the exact

will be RP opposite:

CP

rise

opposed.

is relative and not absolute gains that count. For an actor in individual situation IS-1 pitted against

games to pure In such

example, another

with

both

conflict games,

it

we can have in IS-5. The

> MC > NC > CP, whereas

the

> NC > MC > RP.24

Turning to all the possible preference combinations, we have 64 possible games.25 We find that in each combination of individual situations, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, the game or games resulting from that combination have the same Nash equilibria. In other words, even where we predict several possible games (because there are sometimes two possible CPOs for a given individual situation), in all cases we have the same Nash solution(s). In six combinations of individual situations, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Because our general ap22 Several scholars use the term “type” to refer to games that are almost identical in structure and play, i.e.. analogous games. See George Downs, David Rocke, and Randolph Siverson, “Arms Races and Cooperation,” World Politics, 38 (1985), 121.

23 For a discussion 24 This

game

of Called Bluff, see Snyder

is the following:

and Diesing

(fn. 14).

Deadlock (IS 5 or 7)

Prisoners’ Dilemma (IS1)= S ' 25 rom

s 8 CPOs, i

since

we distinguish

between

actors

Row and

Column

(RP different

Cold War Endgames

37

proach does not allow for the greater precision of cardinal measurements for the preference orderings, Nash solutions in terms of mixed strategies cannot be computed. Instead, we suggest that actors proceed with moves and counter-moves, up to and until they end up in a Nash equilibrium where they will remain. They do so because only rarely are they individuals, and more often leaders of coalitions precluding a sophisticated strategy choice. Therefore, a series of moves and counter-moves, that is, cycling, is our predicted outcome of all the games obtained in those cases.26 Even in this case, we predict a specific sequence of moves and outcomes around the game matrix, and not simply that any outcome whatsoever is possible. We

never

vidual

cases,

outcomes, Nash

cycling,

and the

four no

Nash

possible

of either of the

outcomes,

in 24

in

10 cases.

in

15 cases,

outcome Row

in

consensus mutual

when cases,

we two

combine the

15 occurrences prevailing, outcome,

indi-

possible

Considering

15 instances,

or Column

mutual either

games

game

games

prevailing

consensus

outcomes

four

a unique

possible

Row

3 occurrences

of two

than

We find

we find

prevailing,

case

more

situations.

in 30

twin

have

games various

of Column

15 cases 6 where and

of the we have

finally,

one

or no consensus.27

This summary of our predicted games shows that our theory generates all possible Nash equilibria. On the other hand, we obtain not a single but two predicted outcomes in only 10 cases out of 64. Our theory is thus readily falsifiable. We have already used it to successfully analyze the Berlin crises of 1958-1961, the Cuban missile crisis, and, to demonstrate its wide domain of application, Hong Kong-US textile trade negotiations. We are currently analyzing Polish debt-rescheduling negotiations during the 1980s, European Community-American environmental negotiations around the Montreal Protocol, and the US-Swiss negotiations on their mutual legal assistance treaty of 1973 to help fight organized crime. In all these cases, we analyze strategic interaction over a few months to a few years at most. By applying it to US-Soviet relations over the past several decades, we show that our theory helps explain strategic interaction over a much longer time frame.

26 Individual

situations

IS 2&3,

3&2,

3&6,

6&3,

3&8,

and

8&3.

27 This occurs in Stag Hunt (both actors in IS 3). If we want to define a unique equilibrium solution, we can use the solution concept “in the strict sense” since one of those Nash solutions (MC = 4,4) is Pareto-superior to the other one (NC = 2,2). See Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957), 107.

38

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

Figure 2: The General US-Soviet Strategic Interaction Game USSR Accept (A)

Demand (D)

Accept (A)

Compromise / Détente

USSR Prevails

US

(MC)

(CP)

Demand (D)

US Prevails

Cold War / Risk of Conflict Escalation

(RP)

(NC)

4. US-Soviet

Relations

During

the

Cold War and Beyond

The two principal actors in the postwar period were the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the East-West conflict was crucial to many other nations, none could significantly influence the policy orientation of either of these two main players. The specific issue-area at hand is defined as the military rivalry between the US and the USSR. To analyze historical events, we dichotomize the range of strategic options available to both sides: a firm (Demand) and conciliatory (Accept) strategy for both actors. This classification yields the following outcomes, portrayed in Figure 2: (1) mutual consensus (MC) denotes a compromise in which both actors make some concessions, leading to détente; (2) no consensus (NC) implies disagreement and a risk of conflict escalation —a “cold” war which may escalate to a “hot” one; (3) actor “Row” prevails (RP) exemplifies an asymmetrical outcome with few American concessions in terms of the basic strategic relationship between the two superpowers, but with the Soviet Union making major ones; (4) actor “Column” prevails (CP), the reverse asymmetrical situation, where Soviet security demands are accepted by the US and the Soviets make clearly fewer and less important concessions. _ We make these drastic simplifications in order to model the basic characteristics of overall US-Soviet strategic interaction. Bargaining in other issue-areas need not take the particular structure of this game. For example, rules of diplomatic representation or trade questions could have a considerably different game structure: from our perspective, all bargain-

Cold War Endgames

ing is not tightly linked here.

to the basic military

4.1.

During

US-Soviet

Relations

the

Cold

War:

39

interaction

1950s

game represented

to mid-1980s

Having defined the initial conditions of the strategic interaction game (see Figure 2), we now code the individual situations of each actor. These situations set the situational constraints faced by actors. We code the US throughout the postwar period as strong within the issue area of military rivalry. As for the question of coalitional stability, there was some disagreement over how to manage US-Soviet rivalry in the Third World — particularly, in Vietnam. But American public and political elite opinion clearly favoured backing the coalition leader — the US President — in his dealings with the Soviet Union, considered generally to be the primary security threat to the United States. Finally, we code the US as overall strong, given its abundant resources of its domestic economy, international trade and finance, scientific and technological capabilities, and ideological resources as leader of “the free world”. In sum, we code the United States as issue strong, stable, and overall strong. These codings place it in individual situation IS-1. Based on Table II, we deduce that in light of the constraints on American actions given its individual situation, the US constrained preference ordering is as follows: US

Cold

War

CPO:

RP

> MC

> NC

> CP

The Americans prefer prevailing (RP) to mutual consensus (MC) to no consensus (NC), and the latter to an asymmetrical outcome favouring the Soviet Union (CP). This reflects a Prisoners’ Dilemma ordering. Repeating the same procedure for the Soviet Union, we also code it as issue strong. There is no doubt that the USSR had many military (including nuclear) resources throughout the postwar period.?§ As for its domestic or internal stability, we also code it as stable. Soviet elites supported the general policy of their government with respect to the main threat originating from America. Finally, Soviet overall power resources were also considerable, leading us to code it as overall strong. While its 28 Some have nuclear weaponry pointed out the Because we are 1980s, we need

argued that the U.S. had a decisive superiority with its monopoly in in the years immediately following World War II, whereas others have clear Soviet superiority in the conventional field in Europe at that time. mainly interested in what happened in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and not address this debate.

40

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

Figure 3: The US-Soviet Strategic Interaction Game: 1950s to mid-1980s USSR (IS-1, Prisoners’ Accept (A)

Dilemma) Demand (D)

Accept (A) US (IS-1, Prisoners’

Dilemma)

Demand (D)

economy was nowhere near as developed as that of the US, the Soviet Union clearly had large economic resources, and its wealth in oil and raw materials enabled it to be an important actor in international trade, particularly within Comecon; ideologically, it also had great power resources. These codings place the USSR in individual situation IS-1, with the following constrained preference ordering in its dealings with the United States: Soviet

Cold

War

CPO:

CP

> MC

> NC

> RP

Like the US, the Soviets (actor Column) prefer prevailing (CP) to mutual consensus (MC) to no consensus (NC), and the latter to an asymmetrical outcome favouring the United States (RP). They thus have a Prisoners’ Dilemma ordering. Both the Soviet Union and the United States possess the constrained preferences of a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation. Therefore, the deduced game which combines these two preference orderings is a symmetrical Prisoners’ Dilemma game, represented in Figure 3. The predicted outcome in this game, based on the Nash equilibrium, is no consensus (NC) — reflecting a “cold” war with a risk of conflict escalation. In other words, based on our general theory, we predict a US-Soviet strategic interaction characterized by a continued period of tension and conflict. Indeed, our deduction of United States and the Soviet ternational politics provided tral to realist thinkers, can

a Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situation for the Union neatly fits into the general view of inby the security dilemma. This dilemma, cenbe useful in analyzing our particular game

structure.

views

Other

important

of international

relations,

such

as the

Cold War Endgames

41

mirror image hypothesis and some analyses of deterrence theory, also benefit from such a formalization.29 Although a game of Prisoners’ Dilemma has a no consensus Nash equilibrium, repeated play of this game, however, can lead to an outcome of mutual consensus (MC).°° This means that periods of cooperation are possible in such a game, with the actors playing a strategy of conditional reciprocity —or “tit-for-tat” — over time. Thus, this solution to the game could account for periods of détente in a situation of mistrust.3! 4.2. Change in US-Soviet Relations: the End of the 1980s

The End of the Cold War, Mid-1980s

to

During the 1980s, the situation of both actors did not radically change in all dimensions: the United States continued to be militarily strong — especially with the arms build-up started in the two last years of the Carter administration and vigorously pursued during Reagan’s presidency. In terms of overall power, the United States — while plagued by an increasing budget deficit — remained overall strong economically, and became more self-confident ideologically. Likewise, the American public was united in supporting the President’s dealings with what he initially called the “evil empire.” In sum, America’s situation did not change, and our theoretical prediction is that its constrained preference ordering continued to resemble a Prisoner’s Dilemmaz-like one: US

Post-Cold

War

CPO:

RP

> MC

> NC

> CP

The Soviet Union experienced significant change in its situational constraints. Its military might remained formidable, and in terms of its issue specific resources it stayed strong. Domestically, its leadership enjoyed 29 On these in International

points, see Glenn H. Snyder, “Prisoner’s Politics,” International Studies Quarterly,

Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’ 15, no. 1 (1971).

Models

30 See in particular Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 31 Some analysts may wish to code the United States as being unstable in the midand late 1970s, given the domestic debate at that time — in particular the opposition to détente with the U.S.S.R. (e.g. Ronald Reagan the candidate in 1976 and 1980). This would imply that the U.S. is in IS 5, with Deadlock-like preferences. With the Soviet Union remaining in IS 1 (Prisoners’ Dilemma), the resulting game gives us a no consensus (NC) Nash outcome with no possibility to escape from it under a tit-for-tat strategy, since mutual consensus (MC) ceases being Pareto-optimal. These codings would explain the end of détente in the late 1970s.

42

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

continued support given the issue at hand, i.e.. strategic rivalry with the United States. Therefore, we continue to code it as stable. In overall power capabilities terms, however, a major development occurred. During the 1980s, the Soviet economy found it increasingly difficult to pursue a path of economic development. The productivity of its economic sector declined drastically as a result of the decreasing marginal productivity of investments. In addition, the increasing dissatisfaction among both military and civilian-minded elites, and rising discontent among the population at large, led to lower productivity of the labour force. Thus while its elites and the population at large remained overall supportive of the regime in its dealings with the United States, these other developments started eroding the internal power of the state.32 Soviet ideological prestige suffered at home as well as abroad. These developments eroded the Soviet power situation. Therefore, it could no longer be classified as overall strong. Indeed, our concept of overall power resources is somewhat analogous to the older Soviet view of power as envisioned in their concept of “correlation of forces.”33 It includes power dimensions that go beyond purely military considerations, such as ideological ones based on the nature of the socio-economic system — capitalism, socialism, etc. This broad definition encompasses the global relationship between countries to

32 See Urs Luterbacher and Pierre Allan, “Modeling Politico-Economic Interactions Within and Between Nations,” International Political Science Review, 3, no. 4 (1982), 404434; Pierre Allan and Urs Luterbacher, “The Future of East-West Relations: AComputer Simulation of Five Scenarios,” in Daniel Frei and Dieter Ruloff, East-West Relations, Vol. Il (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, & Hain, 1983), 285-318; and Allan and Luterbacher “Modeling East-West Strategic Relations in the 1980's,” in Istvan Dobozi and Harriet Matejka, eds., East-West Strategic Relations in the Mid-Eighties (Budapest: Trends in World Economy, No. 47, 1984), 35-67. These studies, based on simulations of an empirical global model of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China, showed that the USSR would encounter great problems throughout the 1980s. It would not only have great trouble in matching the Reagan defence build-up, but its economic development would slow down considerably. Rising but relatively unproductive investments would not permit an increase in consumption. Moreover, compounding the internal crisis, these studies pointed out that Soviet political elites as well as its population would become more and more discontented with the economic system. It was also clear that the Soviet Union could not win its war in Afghanistan — even if it chose to escalate considerably. Pierre Allan and Albert A. Stahel, “Tribal Guerrilla Warfare Against a

4Colonial (1983), Power: 590-617.Analyzing

the War in Afghanistan,”

33 Cf. Julian Lider, “The Correlation Research, 17, no. 2 (1980), 151-171.

of Forces:

Journal The

Soviet

of of Conflict Conf Resolution,n, 27 27, no. Concept,”

Journal

of Peace

Cold War Endgames

43

Figure 4: The US-Soviet Strategic Interaction Games: Mid- to Late 1980s USSR (IS-2, Leader)

Accept (A)

Demand (D)

Accept (A) US (IS-1, Prisoners’

Dilemma)

Demand (D)

USSR (IS-2, Chicken) Accept (A)

Demand (D)

Accept (A) US (IS-1, Prisoners’

Dilemma)

Demand (D)

include both the long-term economic potential, and the political will to resist which stems from ideologv. We conclude that the Soviet Union moved to individual situation IS-2, yielding the following constrained preferences (obtained from Table II): Soviet

Post-Cold

War

CPO:

CP

> MC

or RP

> NC

The Soviets’ most desired outcome is to prevail over the ter outcome is preferred to either a mutual consensus prevailing without any significant American concessions worst outcome is no consensus (NC). Thus our deduced erences are those of actors in a game of Chicken (if MC

US (CP). The lat(MC) or to the US (RP). Finally, the constrained pref> RP) or of Leader

(if RP > MC).

In this period, the Soviet leadership still prefers prevailing over the United States most. The major post-Cold War change in its preference ordering is that the worst outcome is now no consensus, whereas in the previous period it was the US prevailing. What are the implications as to the outcome of the two possible kinds of games? This is illustrated in Figure 4.

44

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

In both possible games, we observe the same unique Nash equilibrium outcome of RP: the United States prevails over the Soviet Union. The constraints faced by Soviet policymakers led them to accept such an outcome. The Cold War was over. Empirically, evidence that significant changes were forthcoming came even before Mikhail Gorbachev's appointment as First Secretary on March 11, 1985. In response to both the domestic and international evolution during the early 1980s, specific doctrinal changes occurred in Soviet foreign policy before 1985. The so-called “New Thinking” exemplifies these revised Soviet ideals. In fact, the term “perestrojka” appears to have been first used concerning international relations: “perestrojka mezdunarodnych otnosenij,” which translates as transformation of international relations.34 4.3.

The

Years

1990-1991

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union grew more unstable. This was certainly the case with respect to most domestic issues within the USSR. It should be recalled, however, that for our theory, we do not examine coalitional stability in a very general sense of domestic (dis)union, but rather more specifically with respect to the issue-area of military rivalry with the United States. Although the Soviet Union was stable in this respect in the 1980s, this was less so for 1990 and 1991. The widening split between hard-liners wishing to safeguard the military-industrial complex, and reformers more interested in economic development and willing to cut defence expenditures, made the Soviet Union less stable. Thus, we analyze the impact of Soviet coalitional instability on Soviet preferences. Does the US still prevail in such a situation? Does our model still predict the end of the Cold War? An unstable Soviet Union places it in individual situation IS-6, with a “Hero” constrained preference ordering (see Table II): Soviet

Possible

CPO

in

1990-1991:

CP

> RP

> NC

> MC

Combined with Prisoners’ Dilemma preferences for the US, we have an asymmetrical game. This game has the same Nash equilibrium of Row Prevailing (RP) — that is, the United States prevailing (see Figure 5.)

34 On these points, see Volker Rittberger, “Die Perestrojka und die Zivilisierung des Ost-West-Konflikts,” in Dietrich Geyer (Hrsg.), Europdische Perspektiven der Perestrojka (Tubingen: Franckle Verlag, 1991), 101-104.

|

Cold War Endgames

45

_ Figure 5: The US-Soviet Strategic Interaction Game with the Soviet Union Coded as Unstable USSR (IS-6, Hero) Accept (A)

Demand (D)

Accept (A) US (IS-1, Prisoners’

Dilemma)

Demand (D)

This is an interesting result because there is no change in the outcome whether the USSR is coalitionally stable (as we have coded it to this point), or unstable. In this case, then, our theory’s predictions do not depend on the question of stability. It is important to note that in general, a change in individual situation will usually result in a changed preference ordering. In turn, a change in preferences will often lead to a game change. Of course, different game structures may still produce the same Nash equilibrium. In fact, this is the result we obtain in this case: different preference orderings, but the same predicted outcome. As it turns out, this bolsters our model’s predictions. Because the coding of the coalitional stability of the Soviet Union is debatable in this case, disagreement on whether or not the Soviet Union is stable or unstable does not affect our predictions. In both cases, we find an end to the Cold War.

5.

The

Cold

War

and

Neorealist

Theory

To what extent does neorealism prove to be fruitful in explaining US-Soviet interaction? We have already seen that in explaining the evolution and end of the Cold War, changes in domestic coalitional stability do not directly influence bargaining outcomes. Domestic changes do, of course, influence the resources available to states, a point not properly addressed by static neorealist theory. But once a change in capabilities has taken place, from a comparative static perspective, domestic coalitional strength or weakness proves to be unimportant in explaining bargaining outcomes. We next examine if this finding about the role of coalitional stability holds for possible future US-Russian bargaining. To accomplish this task — as well as to speculate on the prospects for US-Russian relations —

46

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

section 5.1 uses our approach to generate conditional predictions about the future.35 Following this discussion, Section 5.2 theoretically examines the conditions under which domestic political changes (and not simply the capabilities of states) will influence bargaining outcomes. It also provides empirical evidence to demonstrate the crucial role played by domestic politics in international bargaining. Both the theoretical and empirical discussion in this section bolster our contention that a situational theory approach provides a more general theoretical model to account for bargaining outcomes than neorealism. 5.1.

Toward

Russian

a New

Cold

War

or Toward

Collaboration?

The

Future

of US-

Relations

We do not envision the United States or Russia (the main successor to the Soviet Union), as becoming weak within the military issue-area. Russia will remain a great military power, not only in the nuclear domain, but in the conventional area as well; so will the US. In sum, both will remain issue strong. As we shall see, in such cases, changes in domestic coalitional stability prove to have little explanatory value in predicting bargaining outcomes. Holding issue-strength constant and strong for both actors, let us look at the impact of changing the codings of the situational dimensions of overall capabilities and domestic stability. Russia could introduce economic and political reforms which might lead it develop overall strength in the medium to long run. It also might change in terms of coalitional stability with respect to the issue of great power military rivalry with the United States. Russia and its allied former Soviet states could, for example, be united in their dealings with the US, choosing to pursue either a path of confrontation or collaboration in this area. In other words, it could become coalitionally stable again, reverting to former Soviet or pre-World War I imperial Russian policies.

By contrast, for the United States, by and large, change in the codings on the dimensions of overall strength and coalitional stability appear unlikely. Many commentators now suggest that we have entered a unipolar — world, with the US as the only superpower. Yet if we assume that economic and military power are closely related, we might soon enter a mul-

35 A caveat is in order. Our theory about two-actor relationships significantly limits our ability to discuss a multipolar world. The reader should bear this in mind as we analyze the most likely scenarios.

Cold War Endgames

Table

IV: Scenarios

for Future

47

US-Russian

Note: both actors are issue strong

Relations

RUSSIA

Overallstrong| Overallstrong| Overallweak | Overallweak & Stable &Unstable & Stable &Unstable |

Overall strong

|

& Stable

|

Overall strong U | & Unstable

|S

36

sus

Overallweak | & Stable Overal!weak |] & Unstable

Russiaprevails Russiaprevails

Russiaprevails Russiaprevails

Eitherprevails| Eitherprevails Eitherprevails | Eitherprevails

tipolar world. From an economic perspective, the American economy shows signs of structural difficulties. It is conceivable that these problems, while certainly not commensurate with the Soviet ones leading to its dismemberment, could nevertheless become grave enough to deprive the US of sufficient resources outside of the issue-area of military rivalry to no longer justify coding it as overall strong. Likewise, it is far from clear that the broad consensus enjoyed by all American postwar Presidents in using US power when necessary to accomplish US goals will endure. Isolationism can come to the foreground again, and US policymakers might be sharply split on its proper role in the world. Consensual breakdown in domestic unity on this issue could prevent a future Administration from pursuing a consistent path in its interactions with Russia and the outside world. We

first

use

from

different

States

(see

game(s) both theses, The

our

feasible Table

as arising actors. with first

sensus

36 Détente

model

The United notable

equilibrium

is possible

to review individual

IV). Each out

logical

situations

for

cell in this

of a specific

ordinal

all the

of these

as actor

Row

feature

of this

table

in

game.

with

any

iteration

This

of the

and

Prisoners’

resulting

and the

the

Nash

equilibria

Russia

as actor

absence from

Dilemma

United

outcome

of individual

is the arises

Russia

describes

combination

evaluation

States

figure

combinations

of the

situations are

in paren-

Column.

of a mutual

the

fact

game;

of

that

see

both

footnote

conac-

29.

48

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

tors are issue strong and accordingly wish and expect to prevail — rather than having to compromise or search for a mutually satisfactory integrative solution. Second, all the remaining types of Nash equilibria are reached, in four instances for each: no consensus (NC), the US prevails (RP), Russia prevails (CP), and either the US or Russia prevails (RP or CP). We next

consider

consensus

these

outcome,

which

tween

these

two great

When

both

are

game;

when

repeated,

have

one

possibility

find

however,

in more

only

when

themselves

this

game

the

both in

permits In the

in a Deadlock-like

from

detail.

to a resumption

to develop.

players

of escaping

lead

occurs

they

— outcome

or both

outcomes

could

powers,

stable,

or Détente-like

various

are

a mutual

or Cold

War

overall

a Prisoners’

other

the

of a Cold

be-

Dilemma —

instances,

ordering War

no

strong.

consensus

three

preference

no consensus

First,

we

with

no

outcome.

The US prevails and obtains its highest payoff if it has many overall resources and Russia lacks overall strength. By contrast, Russia only gets its second or third best payoff. Ironically, when Russia is coalitionally unstable, it is assured of its second best payoff. When Russia is stable on the other hand, it may sometimes end up with its third best rather than second best payoff. With

the

reversed.

overall

In such

outcome

in most

Finally, determinate co-ordination, games

US

if both

cases,

weak

and

Russia

Russia

overall

prevails

and

strong, the

US

the gets

outcomes its

are

second-best

cases.

are overall

outcome. whereas

of co-ordination

weak,

When

both

in the but

also

three

either are

country

unstable,

other

cases,

may

prevail,

we have we may

with

a Hero witness

an ingame

not

of only

of exploitation.

Although the above are all the logical scenarios (with both players being issue strong), what are the most likely ones? We expect the US to remain not only issue strong but also overall strong. If this holds, the US will prevail over Russia unless the latter becomes overall strong again — an unlikely development in the short term. The interesting feature of these conditional predictions is that changing the coalitional stability coding of either the US or Russia does not change the outcome with respect to who prevails, although it does influence the payoffs that actors receive. In sum, the above analysis shows that as long as we maintain a coding of issue strong for both the US and Russia, bargaining outcomes do not change significantly when domestic coalitional strength varies. It is im-

Cold War Endgames

49

{ portant to emphasize, however, that changes in overall strength proved \ very significant in leading to different bargaining outcomes. Hence, ana| lysts who only focus on military capabilities in their examination of security affairs will encounter problems in making predictions unless they keep this fact in mind. _ 5.2. The Importance

of Domestic Politics for Predicting

_ We next show why _ tions of bargaining

neorealists outcomes

Bargaining

Outcomes

will be unable to make accurate predicfor all cases without including domestic

political variables in their model. To demonstrate this, we first theoretically discuss the impact of domestic coalitions and then present an empirical instance of its crucial role.

To theoretically determine under what conditions domestic coalitional stability will make a difference in predicting bargaining outcomes, we can refer to Table III. As we saw in analyzing the evolution of the Cold War, when both actors are issue-strong, domestic coalitional stability or instability did not change the basic outcome(s). This arises from comparing the games arising from actors being in individual situations 1 versus 5 (where in the first actors are stable and in the second unstable without changes in the other dimensions) and examining IS-2 versus IS-6. In both of these pair-wise comparisons, although the specific preference orderings are different, in both symmetric (represented in Table III) and asymmetric games, the resulting Nash outcomes are the same — although payoffs may sometimes vary somewhat. In contrast to the above cases, domestic coalitional stability proves significant when one or both actors are issue-weak. The most striking contrast occurs between IS-4 and IS-8, when an actor is issue and overall weak (illustrated by the two bottom games in Table III). When both are coalitionally stable but have few resources (that is, they are issue and overall weak), they end up in the mutual consensus cell and secure their highest payoff (game of Harmony). If one of them becomes unstable (Row, for instance), then Row prevails in the resulting asymmetrical game. Should both become unstable, then either player will prevail in the resulting Hero game that has two Nash equilibria. The role of domestic coalitions is also evident in comparing — in Table III — IS-3 with IS-7 (both actors are overall strong while issue weak). If both Nash

are stable, equilibria

they find themselves in a game of Stag Hunt with two (MC with payoffs of 4,4 and NC with payoffs of 2,2). As-

50

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

suming the Nash solution in the “strict sense”,37 the players will find themselves at the Pareto-superior outcome of MC. When either or both are unstable, however, they find it impossible to achieve the MC outcome and will end up in the no consensus cell (NC) with lower payoffs. Coalitional stability, representing domestic politics factors, can thus

play a major role in determining the final outcome of a strategic interaction situation — even in cases where actors have many resources they can link to the issue at hand. This runs counter to neorealism. Empirically, we can see the effect of such changes in stability by comparing Poland’s debt rescheduling negotiations with Western banks in 1981 with the 1982 negotiations. In early 1981, the Polish government realized that it would be unable to honour all its payments on its debt owed to Western banks; in response, it began negotiations with its creditors. In light of the high degree of domestic unrest caused by Solidarity-organized strikes and divisions within the Communist party, we code Poland as domestically unstable. Its international hard-currency reserves made it weak in debt-issue related resources, and it was also overall weak, placing it in individual situation IS8, with a Hero-like preference ordering. The 560 banks, represented by a 19-member task force, were also coalitionally unstable. They could not agree on a strategy toward Poland. American banks — who had outstanding loans of only $1.2 billion — preferred a “wait and see” policy. European banks (particularly West German ones) —whose exposure totalled $15.8 billion — wanted to solve the problem as soon as possible. Concerning issue-specific capabilities, about half of all the loans were government-guaranteed; in any case, their size was such that no bank was in danger because of its Polish loans. Hence, we code the banks as being issue strong. With respect to overall power, the banks were weak. They lacked sovereign power to enforce loan contracts, and had few resources outside the issue-area to make linkages. In sum, the banks were unstable, issue strong, and overall weak, placing them in individual situation IS-6. The combination of these preference orderings gives us a game of Hero (see Figure 6).

In theory, we expect two possibilities because the game has two Nash equilibria: either Poland gets its way, undertaking little adjustment of its economy, and receiving high rescheduling concessions from the banks, or

37 See

footnote

26.

Cold War Endgames

51

Figure 6: Polish-Western Banks Debt Rescheduling Game with Both Unstable Poland (IS-6, Hero) Accept (A)

Demand (D)

Accept (A) Western

Banks

(IS-6, Hero)

Demand (D)

the

converse

reschedule ted

occurs. before

to undertake

Empirically,

Poland two

reform

agreed

the to meet

banks most

prevailed. of their

They terms

refused and

to

commit-

initiatives.

At the end of 1981, the individual situation of Poland changed significantly. In December, General Jaruzelski imposed martial law and imprisoned thousands of regime opponents. By late 1982, a Solidarity-orchestrated strike had failed to materialize, its leader Lech Walesa was freed, and the government’s relations with the Roman Catholic Church were patched up. The Communist party was fully united again and Poland was thus coalitionally stable. In terms of issue or overall resources, Poland remained weak as little had changed in this respect. Only its coalitional stability improved drastically with the imposition of martial law and the rallying of the communist party behind the Jaruzelski government, putting it into individual situation IS-4, with Harmony-like preferences. As for the banks, their individual situation remained unchanged. They were still divided, especially since some governments — including the American one — were pressuring them to abandon their negotiations with Poland because it was under martial law. They also continued to be issue strong and overall weak, thus remaining in IS-6. These two sets of codings give rise to an asymmetrical game portrayed in Figure 7. This game has only one Nash equilibrium outcome with the Western Banks prevailing. Whereas in the pre-martial law negotiations, Poland had a chance to prevail, here it does not. In the previous case, even when the banks prevailed, Poland received its second-best outcome. Ironically then, by stabilizing the internal situation, General Jaruzelski’s Poland obtains a worse payoff than the Solidarity-striking Poland of 1981 — only its third-best. In both the January-April 1982 debt rescheduling negotiations and in the May-November 1982 ones, the banks prevailed, making very

52

Vinod Aggarwal

Figure 7: Polish-Western

& Pierre Allan

Banks Debt Rescheduling Game with the Banks Unstable But Poland Stable Poland (IS-4, Harmony) Accept (A)

Demand (D)

Accept (A) Western Banks

(IS-6, Hero)

Demand (D)

few concessions and not lending any additional money — contrary to what they were doing at the same time with Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. A change in coalitional stability, then, worsened the bargaining outcome for Poland, illustrating the importance of changes in domestic stability.

6.

Conclusion

Many analysts of the end of the Cold War have emphasized the role of domestic politics in explaining bargaining outcomes between the US and the Soviet Union. By contrast, neorealists, who focus on the international systemic level, emphasize changes in the distribution of capabilities. This paper examines the end of the Cold War and its aftermath in an effort to shed light on these theoretical debates as well as to examine the likely future of US-Russian interaction. Based on a situational theory of preferences, we argue that the seeming inconsistency of these two theoretical approaches can be partially reconciled. Although many have attempted to model US-Soviet interaction through the use of game theory, we have sought to go beyond the standard use of this approach. We have argued that payoffs should not simply be assumed; some theory of the origin of payoffs must be a first step in any analysis. The predictions we make of games are based on a deductive model. We do not look at the actual outcomes of negotiations to construct payoffs, a weakness in most other approaches using game theory. Our approach deduces constrained preferences from: (1) postulates about actors’ goals; and (2) three key “situational variables” that are likely to constrain and influence these goals: overall resources, issue-specific re-

Cold War Endgames sources, and domestic or internal coalitional stability. interaction result from a combination of these deduced

53 Games of strategic game preferences.

Based on our theoretical approach, we examined deductions about constrained preferences for specific historical events: the Cold War, its demise, and alternative futures. Our deductions are consistent with the historical record. First, they explained US-Soviet strategic rivalry from the 1950s to the 1980s characterized by a situation similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma. American-Soviet relations represent a prototypical case of the security dilemma. Our second analytical episode focused on the effect of changes of an economic nature in the Soviet Union. The resulting decline in Soviet overall power shifted the game to an asymmetrical one, leading to a predicted outcome of the US prevailing over the Soviet Union. The third episode examined the effects of changes in Soviet coalitional stability in the years 1990-1991 and found that the US continued to prevail. Finally, in examining the future of US-Russian relations, we argued that a renewal of a Cold War is possible. The Cold War endgame may not be at its end. Considering the most likely developments, however, the US is likely to continue prevailing in strategic interaction in the military realm. What light does this analysis shed on the debates of systemic versus domestic factors? First, it shows that neorealists have the better case in explaining the end of the Cold War, by focusing on structural changes. Although domestic politics may have undermined Soviet capabilities, relations with the United States in the security realm are best explained by systemic factors, and not by domestic coalitional factors. Our scenarios of future US-Russian interaction reinforce this point: as long as both actors remain issue-strong, domestic political changes will not directly affect bargaining outcomes. Second, the paper points to the deficiencies of neorealist analysis. Although domestic factors do not directly influence the bargaining between the US and the USSR/Russia, we must keep in mind that domestic policy choices undermined Soviet capabilities. The excessively narrow formulation of realist systemic theory omits important factors essential to an adequate explanation of bargaining outcomes. In particular, capabilities of states must be operationalized based on more than military resources and include economic, ideological resources, and so on. Power capabilities which can be linked to the bargaining are just as important as the ones specific to the issue at hand. In addition, although the omission of domestic capabilities does not prevent a neorealist formulation from ex-

54

Vinod Aggarwal

& Pierre Allan

plaining the end of the Cold War, this finding proves to be only a special case. In general, as we argue based on a situational theory of preferences, domestic coalitional changes can be crucial and must be included in our models of strategic interaction.

4.

The Events in Eastern Europe in the Discipline of International

PHILIP

and

the Crisis Relations

P. EVERTS!

Introduction

In 1990, we commemorated that 45 years had passed since the end of World War II. For the Netherlands it was 50 years ago that the German occupation of the country brought about a brutal end to its policy of neutrality which had kept the country out of war for 125 years. While I do not wish in the least to deprecate their importance, one may still ask how long these commemorations will continue. This is of course primarily determined by the intrinsic importance of the war itself and everything to which it is connected, and which people therefore will want to remember at least as long as the last eyewitnesses are alive. However, it may be possible, even likely, that a major role is also played by the fact that there has not been any event since then which could replace it in importance. As long as this is the case, “before” and “after the war” will remain among the unique historical yardsticks by which we measure the chronology of events. This perception was illustrated nicely in one of the placards carried in the big anti-nuclear demonstrations of the early eighties: “I was born after the war and want to keep it that way”. From 1945 we only had the Cold War. Of course, there were crises and periods of more and less intensity during this period: the events in Korea (1950), Suez and Hungary (1956), Cuba (1962) or Czechoslovakia (1968) come easily to mind. It is remarkable that while they were perceived as terribly important and real 1 An earlier and shorter version of this paper presented earlier at various occasions in the Netherlands and published in Dutch as “Omslag in Europa: Crisis in de leer der internationale betrekkingen”, Internationale Spectator, 44 (1990), 8, 442-448 55

56

Philip

P. Everts

break points at the time of their occurrence, they appear in hindsight as mere incidents which hardly disturbed the pattern of continuity. More importantly in this connection, they did not force us to reconsider our basic understanding of the world and the processes of international politics. The question is now whether, what I will call for short “the events of 1989-91” are so revolutionary and profound that, unlike earlier events, there is more reason that they will be seen in the future as the historical watershed between two qualitatively different periods in history, and whether in our perceptions they will come to play a role similar to that of World War II as mentioned above. Closely connected to this is the question of the implications of this for the scientific interpretation of the realm of international

The Events

politics.

of 1989

and Beyond

Although everything is of course debatable, it seems at present difficult, if not impossible to underestimate the extent, depth and importance of the recent changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, culminating in the events of 1989 and onward, up to the abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the ensuing disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is true even if one admits that the situation is still very much in flux and that the signs that point to retrogressive changes in what used to be the Soviet Union are still not entirely absent. What is essential to note here is that, for most observers, be they scientists or politicians, the changes, and particularly their extent and speed, seem to have come largely unexpected and totally unpredicted. This was true for those on “the left” just as much as for those on “the right”. There are many reasons why it is understandable that the initial reactions were careful and sceptical, but many observers kept clinging to this type of judgment with a remarkable degree of stubbornness, even after this was really no longer justifiable.2 To give some examples of this: The removal of Stalinist leaders and the first compromises with non-communist groups in specific Eastern European countries brought many to argue that this would not imply a reduction of the monopoly of power of the Party. “One can only speculate what 2 I want

to make

no exception

for myself

not to single them out for criticism or are held widely.

in this

respect.

If persons

but merely to offer illustrations

are cited

here

it is

of views which were

Eastern

Europe

and

the

Crisis

in International

Relations

57

exactly are the limits of this ‘own way’, but the retention of the supremacy of the communist party will certainly be one of these boundaries” (Dutch foreign minister Van den Broek in 1988).3 The reason for this was evident. It would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. One author (G. van Benthem van den Bergh) wrote in 19824: “The events in Poland have proven again, that any hope that the Soviet Union might ever give up the extension of its power in Eastern Europe is vain [... At issue is] enforced political integration, which implies that [...] the central monopolies of power (on the means of organization and information and thereby on the ideology) can just as much not be given up as in the Soviet Union itself. Any attack on this should be suppressed”. And if such a thing would happen this would certainly not apply to the Soviet Union itself.5

Reluctance

and

Impotence

When the reforms in Eastern Europe did nevertheless continue to take place with amazing speed, it was argued that this would not imply that the Soviet Union would give up its security interests in these countries. The announcement of unilateral Soviet troop withdrawals in December 1988 was accepted as a hopeful first step, but generally not interpreted as a first step towards total withdrawal in the near future. In fact, many saw it, suspiciously, as a move towards a “leaner, but meaner” force. The idea of a general withdrawal from Hungary and Czechoslovakia was seen as inconceivable and the same was true for the suggestion that the Warsaw Pact might stop to exist for all practical purposes. When revolutionary changes were yet announcing themselves in Poland and Hungary it was generally held that this would not apply to the GDR, the main Soviet fortress in its Eastern European glacis. The Soviet Union could never accept or tolerate similar developments in the GDR since this fortress repre-

3 Notitie over het beleid ten aanzien van de Oosteuropese landen alsmede Joegoslavié en Albanié, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, (1988), 14 (Ministerial letter to Parliament on the Netherlands policy towards Eastern Europe). 4 G. van Amsterdam:

Benthem van 1983, 8.

den

Bergh

in Volkskrant-edition

Met de koppen

tegen

elkaar,

5 This view is still defended in the report of the Adviesraad Vrede en Veiligheid (Government Advisory Council on Peace and Security), Verandering en Verankering. Perestrojka en Europese Veiligheid, (The Hague, October 1989). This report also envisaged, quite contrary to what would actually happen, that eventual German reunification should and would happen at the end of (East-West) European unification.

58 sented

Philip a prime

security

interest.

end of the whole Soviet Comecon. A superpower (so Van

Benthem

German

Minister

van

P. Everts “To give up the

GDR

would

empire in Eastern Europe, of Warsaw like the Soviet Union doesn’t do such

den Bergh

said

for Inter-German

in September

relations

(and

1989).° she was

mean

the

Pact and a thing”,

For the Westone who

could

be expected to know!) in early 1989 it was still evident that “ ... the conditions for a unification are simply not present, neither in the internal German relations, nor in those between the four victors of World War II”.7 And so the examples go on, and A similar series of misjudgments

on. could

be mentioned concerning the Soviet Union. The imminent fall of Gorbachev has been predicted since 1986, and among those who wrote in the press their necrologies of Gorbachev calling his political death self evident and unavoidable on the Monday of the coup in August 1991 there were also many who argued on Wednesday that the coup had been doomed to failure from the beginning. Likewise, one should note that it would also not be difficult to find similar examples of expectations with respect to the evolution of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait leading to the Gulf War, and of predictions made in this connection. In fact, the manifest inability to assess correctly the probability of certain developments in the East-West context since 1988 does not seem to have contributed notably to the modesty of many observers and commentators of this conflict, and to reluctance on their part to make strong claims and predict what would happen next. The impact of sanctions and diplomatic pressure, the expected duration of the war, the effectiveness of high-tech weapons and the intensity of Iraqi re-

sistance are obvious topics which come easily to mind in this connection. It is deplorable that the vast uncertainties concerning the probability of particular consequences of specific forms of action (or inaction,) and concerning the likely outcomes of the war were only very partly reflected in a degree of hesitation and reluctance with respect to the firmness of the political conclusions and moral judgments of many observers. This applies to all sides in the debates. In this connection Arthur Schlesinger has

6 G. van Benthem van den Bergh, Rivaliteit in Samenwerking. de betrekkingen tussen de grote mogendheden en de noodzaak gural lecture Erasmus University, Rotterdam, (29 September lenhoff, 1989), 46. 7 Dr Dorothée Wilms, Beitrage zur Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1989), 51.

(Bonn:

Over de ontwikkeling van van nieuw denken, inau1989, Amsterdam: MeuBundesministerium

fir

Eastern

Europe

and

the

noted the dangerous implications among (American) policy makers.

Crisis

in International

of the ignorance

Relations

about

59

the Middle East

When we got so much wrong about the Middle East yesterday, the day before yesterday and the day before that, why do we suppose we have suddenly got it right today. Right enough to send thousands of Americans to their deaths? ... Our ignorance about the future there is total. Yet the case for war is increasingly based on the conviction that we have divine foreknowledge and know the shape of things to come.

To claim foreknowledge is particularly presumptuous in 1990, he argues in view of our collective failure with respect to foreseeing the changes in Europe. “All the statesmen, sages, experts, all those bearded chaps on ‘Nightline’ were caught unaware.”§ Returning to the events in Europe, it is remarkable to note that there was a general consensus across the political spectrum, from left to right, that the division of Europe into two blocks was definite. Its permanence was questioned by few observers. I realize that this, of course, is a questionable statement. Not only is the concept of “general consensus” rather imprecise, its content and nature as alleged here is, it should be acknowledged, an object of empirical enquiry rather than an established fact.9 This is even more true with respect to notions which are presumed to be generally accepted within the discipline. Indeed, one may ask whether it is possible to sensibly represent and discuss the community of scholars as a homogeneous whole, particularly if one takes into account the variations between such diverse groups as, e.g. radical peace researchers and status quo-oriented strategic thinkers.!° I admit that I have not made such statements as below on the basis of an empirical investigation of, for instance, all or a relevant sample of statements on the issues concerned. I also readily admit that there were, as always, a few exceptions. What is presented here is my — admittedly intuitive — provisional personal assessment of the general thrust of the discipline for what it is worth. With

this

caveat

in mind

let us

8 arthur Schlesinger, “America doesn’t Herald Tribune, 17 December 1990.

proceed.

know

what

it is doing

in the Gulf”,

9 | am grateful to Kjell Goldmann for pointing this out to me. 10 This aspect was also brought to my attention by Rip Bulkeley, the author.

International

communication

to

60

Philip

The Reality Before

of the East-West

1989

it was

P. Everts

Conflict

generally

accepted

— though

often

grudgingly

and

with moral uneasiness — that the reality of the East-West division put severe limits on the possibilities of societal reforms and self-determination in Eastern Europe. What could be done was really restricted to making the borders more transparent and improving living conditions in Eastern Europe. The German President, Richard von Weizsacker, voiced a generally shared sentiment when he said “What is at issue is that the borders are stripped

from their

divisive

and inhumane

characteristics”.

While people disagreed over the possible extent and speed of such provements, more was not considered possible, if only because [...] any extreme

socio-political

or something like it. That ment or interventions on

change

... would

would increase the part of the

the allies

probably

cause

im-

a civil war

likelihood of massive involveof the threatened communist

or capitalist elites and ruling classes. If it would occur at all, socio-political change in Eastern or Western Europe should be gradual, reformist and nonviolent. 1!1! Since

these

were the

indeed

cautious

words

non-violent,

consequences

feared

were

but

written

certainly

by Jahn

we

neither

did not

know

more.

gradual

nor

The

changes

reformist.

Yet,

occur.

Finally, events culminated in the fall of the Wall and German reunification in Central Europe, and in the disintegration and dissolution of the Soviet Union in the East. Again, many stuck to cherished notions about the impossibility of change. Even after the Wall had crumbled most observers could not yet conceive of a speedy German unification, or even of unification at all. The Soviet Union would not permit that. We now know what happened since October 1989.!2 Today, nothing seems impossible any more. The certainties of the Cold War have been replaced by widespread uncertainty as to the future course of events. Yet,

to illustrate

once

of short

more term

how

perspective,

difficult

it sometimes

let me

quote

another

is to

overcome

the

limitations

article

from

11 son how less

FE.Jahn, “European security — which Europe should be more secure?”, in S. Karls- | (ed.) Europe and the world (Géteborg: Padrigu Papers, 1988), 19. It is remarkable carefully Jahn stuck to the “symmetrical” scheme treating East and West more or in similar terms.

12 This includes unconfirmed reports on the degree to which the Soviet Union was actively involved in promoting some of the regime changes (GDR, Czechoslovakia, Rumania). The fact that this involvement may have been based on the hope of “preventing worse” is immaterial here, where we are dealing with the consequences.

Eastern

Europe

and

the

Crisis

in International

Relations

61

the same author, written early in 1990.15 After stating carefully that it is not possible to predict how Europe will develop over, say, the next two decades!4, Jahn offers a number of conclusions, which have already been overtaken rapidly by events since then. He writes: “The predominant security problem will continue to be that of the prevention of war between East and West”.!5 This conflict “will remain a crucial factor in development. ... [NJeither the military nor the economic alliance of East and West are suddenly going to break up or fuse”.1© “The EC and the CMEA will no doubt for a long time retain their characters as organizations specific to the relevant system and deeply associated with NATO and the WTO”. However, the break-up of the CMEA “can no longer be excluded”. On the other hand “success in the restructuring of Eastern Europe could bring with it a restructuring of CMEA”.!7 Finally, unification of Germany was seen as quite unlikely until recently, but if, contrary to such expectations, the complex national and hence military unification of Germany should nevertheless be pushed through, this would result either in the dissolution of the residual NATO, or in the latter’s integration and armament. This

in

turn

would

lead

to

a renewed

and

sharpened

East-West

con-

frontation.}§

The Price

of Ignorance

Observations like these lead to a number of questions. Not the least important of those is the following: If we were so mistaken this time with respect to what was possible and impossible, likely or unlikely, what can we expect of such estimates and judgments the next time? This time it did not matter so much, since the events can generally be seen as positive, but the question remains whether we could allow ourselves to be equally complacent about our ignorance and impotence in case the developments 13 &. Jahn, “The Future of Europe, Eastern and J. Zielonka (eds), Restructuring Eastern (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), 203-218. 14 Jahn (fn. 13), 206. 15 Jahn

(fn. 13), 207.

16 Jahn

(fn. 13), 207.

17 Jahn

(fn. 13), 208.

18 Jahn

(fn. 13), 213.

Europe Europe:

and Central Europe”, in R.J. Hill Towards a New European Order,

62

Philip

P. Everts

were generally negative. }9 In particular, one can and should think here, of course, of the long maligned system of nuclear deterrence, the stability and blissful working of which seems no longer to be questioned presently by anyone. Indeed, the proposals of Messrs Bush and Gorbachev of September 1991 to continue the START process with drastic cuts, negotiated as well as unilateral, in nuclear armaments, will probably reduce considerably the dangers of unintended war if they are implemented. But we should not forget that none of these steps fundamentally alters the reliance on nuclear weapons for security. Indeed they tend to legitimize the policy of nuclear deterrence once more. Another area in which lack of foresight and imagination may lead to terrible disappointments is our present axiomatic acceptance, as revealed truth, that only a pluralist democracy, social and moral tolerance and respect for human rights can guarantee peaceful development and economic well being. But what about some Asian countries where impressive economic growth and stability have been combined with the maintenance of quite different civilised traditions and where societies are ruled by strongly paternalistic centralism?

Reactions

to the Changes

Now, we may argue that the momentous and fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, i.e. the crisis in the communist world and the international developments resulting in the end of the Cold War, in particular their unexpected nature, also point to the existence of a crisis in the discipline of international relations. Science, so the argument goes, has failed completely in foreseeing even the probability of the developments. By itself, this lack of prevision would not yet be a major catastrophe for the discipline. There have been other unexpected crises and important developments before. But this time there is more, and indeed worse. The thing is that we are not only dealing with unexpected developments, but also with developments which were actually the opposite of what was expected or predicted. Many of us were quite convinced of

19 This question was raised by one of the leaders of the Dutch peace movement, B. J. T. ter Veer, Het geluk van de vredesbeweging. 1989 een nabeschouwing, (Den Haag: IKVbrochure 44, 1990), 14. I am heavily indebted to his analysis, which focuses on the role of the Source.

peace

movement.

Some

of the

illustrative

citations

are

also

drawn

from

this

Eastern

Europe

and

the

Crisis

in International

Relations

63

what would certainly not happen.2° A number of such cherished views and of developments which ran counter to existing expectations (partly already referred to before) can be mentioned:?! 1)

“The Soviet Union will never accept a loss of strategic power. To maintain communist governments in Eastern Europe is essential to its strategic interests. Voluntary withdrawal ‘isn’t done’ by superpowers.” We all know what happened in reality.

2)

“Unless the strategic arms race is massively reversed, a nuclear war will be unavoidable. Increasing armaments also implies increasing the danger of war”. Often this prediction was accompanied by some kind of time scheme, like “before the end of the century”. While the number of weapons is still, in spite of the CFE and START treaties, higher than before, today the danger of nuclear war seems more remote than ever during the Cold War.

3)

“The armament dynamics tional and other interests Industrial

Complex).

are driven of groups

This

is also

by domestic economics, involved (the so-called true

for the

Soviet

instituMilitary-

Union.

This

leads to an arms race without end, and therefore disarmament is unlikely, if not impossible.” We know by now, that the economic burden of armaments has come to be seen as insupportable (and not only in the Soviet Union), and this has become a major factor behind the, highly promising, drive for drastic arms control and disarmament,

4)

which

so far the

capable

of preventing.

“There

is

a

difference

regimes. While Nomenklatura total

control

between

in neither

East

authoritarian

nor West

and

of power”.22

L. Reychler,

This

sounded

in the Kremlin that rather than assets23, “The Public

Perception

convincing,

the Eastern the peoples of NATO”, Nato

seem

totalitarian

the first can be overcome, the latter cannot, will never abandon its power and privileges

was concluded were liabilities 20 See also 1990), 16-23.

military

but

since the and has one

day

it

European of Eastern

regimes Europe

Review,

No. 2 (April

21 The quasi-citations given below are merely efforts on my part to synthesize particular theories into one sentence. 22 This theory is usually associated with the American writer and diplomat Jeane Kirkpatrick. See her “Dictatorships and Double Standards”, Commentary, 68 (November 1979), 34-45. 23 See

also

note

11.

Philip

64

refused classes 5)

P. Everts

to be intimidated any more, and the power of the evaporated and disappeared from one day to the next.

ruling

“In the world of today democracy is a threatened species. Everywhere it is on the retreat. It is undermined in particular from the inside by those who give in to the ‘totalitarian temptation’. However weak democratic structures and traditions still are in many countries, the “correlation of forces” today is indeed shifting, but in the opposite direction. This phenomenon is not restricted to Europe but seems to have a more general character, being also visible in countries of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. To the extent that there is a temptation it is, particularly in Eastern Europe, authoritarian rather than totalitarian. There are no more utopias.

6)

“If the the

West

Soviet

country gently that

after

there

put

up

it will

another

is indeed

will

it is the part

be,

EC and

such

be

West

NATO

in

force

the

to the

away Soviet but

themselves which

serve

rather main

poles

equalizes

that

of Finlandization. from

the

Union.”

in the

is responsible. as the

which

form

wooed

a process,

countries

of the

a military

suffer

to accommodate

on the the

not

Union,

forced

though

7)

does

than

One

West

and/or

Today

reverse

we

direction,

a concerted

Whatever

the

of

know aleffort

case

may

of attraction.

We also see examples of opposite developments. Theories which were largely rejected earlier seem to acquire new relevance: “The outcome of internal conflicts is determined to a large extent by what happens in other, surrounding, countries. If expansionist forces are not resisted everywhere, one country after another will fall”. This “domino theory”, developed at the time of the Vietnam War to serve as the rationale of opposing communist expansionism, was then usually rejected for its too mechanistic character and for neglecting the decisive role of indigenous factors. Since then little was heard of it, but the developments in Eastern Europe seem to plead for some rehabilitation, although the context has changed. Look at the series: Ten years in Poland, ten months in Hungary, ten weeks in the GDR, ten days in Czechoslovakia, and ten hours in Rumania. However, there is also the historical counter-example of 1848 to show that revolutionary waves do not always follow their full course.

24 See for a statement (Paris: Laffont, 1976).

of this

theory, ’ among

others, J.-F. J. F. Revel, : La tentatio

n totalitaire, aes

Eastern

Europe

and

the

Crisis

in International

Relations

65

More importantly perhaps and to be fair, one has to add that there were of course also those who correctly assessed and indeed predicted what would happen. Thus, Karl Deutsch, in an article from 1953, written even before Stalin’s death, argued that the communist societies in Eastern Europe would succumb in the course of the seventies and eighties because of their inherent tensions and contradictions.25 Other analyses of totalitarian

systems

have

pointed

to the

same

conclusion.

“Out-arming

the Soviet Union” was seen by some as a useful means to hasten this inevitable development. In line with this, the main concern and task of the West was sometimes described as the “management of the decline of the Soviet empire”. These views, however, never acquired a large following among scholars of international relations. What is important to note in this connection is that the critique of totalitarianism, which was popular in the fifties, gradually became marginalized among mainstream political science. When there was a rediscovery of these theories, as by the socalled “new philosophers” among the earlier French radicals, like André Glucksman, in the seventies, the theories were embraced to such an extent that the idea that change could yet be possible was rejected as irresponsible optimism. Thus, the general idea that for the foreseeable future there was no alternative to living with “the bear in the woods” was reinforced rather than fundamentally challenged. To conclude this section: we may of course ask, how long one should

take to conclude that an hypothesis should be rejected and whether the trends described are really irreversible,2© but it seems evident that what happened did not fit into trusted images, old truths are no longer valid — or, SO we must conclude with hindsight, have never been valid at all. In addition, there are many aspects in the new developments which are still mysterious and cry out for an explanation. Completely new analyses are therefore necessary. Formulated in more political terms: we are faced with the paradoxical situation that the future is now (at least in comparison with the past) cpen and fluid and offers many more opportunities for

25 | owe the reference to the article by K.W. Deutsch, Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems (1953) to Hans Daalder, Maatstaf (December 1990), cited by Koen Koch, De Volkskrant, 28 December 1990.

26 One example to Union, in particular against what is seen apparent stalling of Treaty have changed

keep in mind: since I first wrote this, recent events in the Soviet the apparently widespread resistance among the Soviet military as a “sell-out” of the country and its military power, as well as the the Soviet Union with respect to the implementation of the CFE our perceptions. This may force me to reconsider this issue.

66

Philip

P. Everts

change than was the case for.a very long time. At the threats are replaced by risks, we are at a loss with respect and desirable ways of making use of these opportunities.

“There

The

Is No

thesis

forms

that

logical still

to wait

and

events

we

from

Union

though

the

in the

events Union

such

many lead the

latter for

revival

a turn again.

seemed

“no alternative”

Rivalling

less

As noted

to the

likely.

also

less

East-West

past,

and

above,

there This 1991,

in both

policies

been

As the

are was

still

although empirical

in Europe.

Alof the of the

the

Soviet

one

might

phenomenon our

surprise

forces

which

during

in the and

the

in

lessen

stressed

between

In fact,

societal

discovered

to imagine

a common

the

course

normative

to

improbability

farfetched

should

“We

reversibility

confrontation. this

be

“restoration”

has

possible

too close

initially the

into

changes.

countries

a conservative

in August that

less

it was

can

in uncertainty,

however,

backlash.

obvious

landscape

various

be put

If we are

to distinguish

and

can

time,

reasonable. the

with

of the

communist

restoration

of the

coup

more

became

toward

had

some

irreversibility in

clouded

of the

to a conservative abortive

former

instance,

revolutions

happens

other

it became,

of,

and a

we

meets

arguments

for quite

seemed

Relief

discipline”

various

the

Here,

remained

increased

possibility

That

little.

the

future

and

see”,

too

and

The

of all, at least

extent

a distance.

Soviet situation

see

in the

rebuttal.

First the

only

is “a crisis

and

both

have

All”

there

order.

to question

add,

at

of resistance

some

the

Crisis

same time, as to the possible

first

in if it could days

of events terms

there

of it is

of reform.

Explanations

In the second place, one may argue that one should distinguish between the structure of the events themselves and the speed with which they took place. The first is much less problematic than the second. What happened was certainly surprising because of its extent, intensity and speed, but it was not unexpected in the sense of inexplicable. One can, for instance, point to those analyses of the inherent weaknesses of totalitarian systems already referred to above. Implicitly or explicitly, it is thus argued that existing theories are quite capable of explaining what happened, that they are therefore sufficient,

—

Eastern

Europe

and

the

Crisis

in International

and that consequently no major adaptations stance, the realist approach to international

Relations

are necessary. politics while

67

Thus, for inarguing that

power relations are decisive also does accept the notion that powerful states may decline in power and new powers emerge, with all the necesSary consequences. What happened, one could say, was therefore not at all contrary to the realist perspective. On this theoretical ground, it was to be expected that the bipolar East-West confrontation could some day come

to an end.

The

demise

of the

Soviet

Union

in that

sense

did not

come unexpectedly. It has to be admitted that many now offer explanations for the events which have taken place which have a certain prima facie plausibility. Some suggest in addition that it could all have been foreseen and the most self-assured even state that they have actually done so.27

With respect to the question of what explains the occurrence and nature of the recent revolutionary developments, a number of approaches offer themselves as potential candidates. Indeed, rivalling interpretations abound. I mention a few.

The Realist

Perspective

Realists

neo-realists,

flict

and

between

Soviet plicable

Union about

the

which

two

may

super

have

it as

come

such.

see

powers,

the can

unexpectedly The

notion

Cold now

War argue

but

that

of “imperial

as

a hegemonical

that there

the

demise

is nothing

over-stretch”

conof the inexmay

be

27 One example of someone who takes this position is H.W. Tromp, who explains the events as a consequence of global interdependence. “In the Netherlands I have pleaded for this perspective in my inaugural lecture when I became professor of peace research. (“Statenanarchie of interdependentie?”, 1980). At that time no one was interested. Now it has become reality. You can be right and also be put into the right”, Trouw, 23 March 1990. Tromp totally neglects that there was in fact very little interdependence between East and West, and that to the extent that it does exist interdependence is a sword that cuts both ways. Nor can it be maintained that interdependence was either unknown or unpopular at the time. It has been interpreted, however, in many different ways. Thus N. Chomsky argued in the early eighties that the Cold War was an institutional arrangement which obscured both the natural, presumably geopolitical, congruence of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union and the natural conflict between the United States and the major European nations. See on the history of the concept of interdependence J. de Wilde, Saved from Oblivion. Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century: A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex Interdependence, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991).

68

Philip

P. Everts

useful here.28 Applied to the Soviet Union it suggests how its downfall and the end of the bipolar world was brought about by a discrepancy between the military requirements to maintain the empire and the capacity to bear the economic burden involved. With respect to the chances of war and peace, adherents to this school of thought may argue in this connection that the new multipolarity spells little good for the chances of peace in the coming years. Many aspects of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, the war between Iraq and the international coalition which came to the aid of Kuwait may be seen as elements in the search for new configurations of power in a much less predictable world.

Domestic

Causes

“Liberals”

may

foresee

that

with

foundations the

of the

that outlines

political the

the

democratic

argue the

emphasize

the

breakthrough

elimination

of the

establishment have

processes

of détente

of a “civil of the

society”

in Eastern regimes

of the ideological

been

laid.

Europe

system

Neoliberal

of the

furthered

democratic bones

of a “war-free”

countries

opposition

downfall

the

the which

70s,

ideal.

They

of contention

the

at

least

among

institutionalists

and

emergence resulted

the

may

re-emergence of those

a few years

of

forces

of

later

in

in question.

Interdependence Supporters of the thesis of “interdependence” may and will argue that it was decisive that the notion perspired in the Soviet Union that “war doesn’t pay” in an age where security depends on the danger of mutual suicide, together with the recognition that new problems can no longer be analyzed in terms of old concepts, such as “class struggle” and that common dangers require a common approach: integration rather than confrontation.

28 This notion was popularized in Paul (New York: Random House, 1987).

Kennedy's

The Rise

and

Fall of the Great

Powers

! | ’

Eastern

Fundamental

Europe

and

or Accidental

the

Crisis

in International

Relations

69

Changes?

Others add that if there is the perception of “crisis in the discipline” (one might ask here: how do you decide that there is such a thing if it is not generally perceived as such? who is to be the judge in this respect?) this is not an unknown and new phenomenon. Unexpected developments, even of a structural nature, have occurred before. When the United Nations were founded in 1945 the colonial system was generally seen (at least by the drafters of the Charter, but on the other hand many in the colonies expected or hoped for an early independence) as semi-permanent. If the colonies would become independent this would not be for another 100 years or so. Hardly anyone in the metropolitan countries, expected decolonization to be almost completed within twenty years. Science has adapted to this and other revolutionary developments, and this can and should happen again. We should realize that we are dealing here with a classical debate. The other element in this debate is the interpretation of events and developments as “fundamental changes” in the international system, which should lead to “paradigmatic changes”.29 This has been argued earlier on many occasions. Some of these issues are still unresolved. Thus, it is still a point of debate whether and to what degree “the nuclear revolution” has brought about a fundamentally different “state of aggregation” in international politics. If so, this would make it impossible to generalize on for instance the relationship between armaments and the (non-) occurrence of war across these states of aggregation, i.e. before and after “Hiroshima”. Other issues have been settled, and many of the alleged changes either turned out afterwards to be less fundamental than it was thought earlier or could be accommodated within the prevailing models. Such experiences should caution us against the desire for fashionable adaptations and should make us sceptical toward the pretensions of “new approaches”. This is argued more specifically with respect to the presumed speed of the changes, which allegedly would make them unique, and which should therefore, it is said, make such adaptations a necessity.

29 See

for a critique

of this

conclusion

K. Koch,

“Beyond

the

‘New Paradigmatism’:

Some Traditional Thoughts about State-Formation, Integration, World Politics and War’, in: J.W. Nobel (ed.), The Coming of Age of Peace Research (Groningen: Styx, 1991), 151167.

70

Philip

Unwarranted

P. Everts

Expectations

Finally, one can hear the argument that those who speak of a “crisis in the discipline” have too high and unwarranted expectations and claims anyway about what the discipline of international relations is or should be capable of. To use the word prediction in this connection is, so one can argue, entirely inappropriate. Even meteorology, with all its exactly measurable quantities, can only predict in the proper sense within very wide limits, and still fails regularly. In international politics the dynamics are much more complex and the interaction of independent activities often leads to outcomes which those involved had neither expected nor intended. Moreover, there is always room for the personal, the accidental, the coincidence of events, the “deus ex machina”.°° No predictions therefore, at best tendencies, chances and probabilities, and even then only under the assumption of unchanged policies. It would therefore, so the argument goes, be unwarranted to speak of a “failure” of the discipline. At most, there are new themes which should be studied while others have become less relevant.

No Reason Each

for Unconcern

of the arguments

and Complacency presented

above

Yet, they can all be countered to some debate into one of degree, i.e. how much

has

undoubtedly

extent, failure,

validity.

which at least turns the predictive and otherwise,

one is prepared to accept without speaking of a major But, I would maintain, there is more. Let me deal with ments first.

Fundamental

some

intellectual the counter

crisis. argu-

Changes

In the first place there is the question of the nature, speed, extent and fundamentality of the changes which have occurred. Although it becomes more difficult everyday, as far as we can judge today, to imagine changes 30 The old discussion on the role of personal versus structural factors in history has been portrayed masterfully by L. Tolstoi in his War and Peace. In judging M. Gorbachev's alleged indecisiveness one is reminded of Tolstoi’s hero, Marshall Kutuzov and his anne refusal to act in preference to letting the forces of history do their inevitable work.

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71

more momentous than the ones we have witnessed in recent years, we can (or could for a long time) of course still argue about this aspect and its implications. E.g. are the changes really irreversible? Is the Russian Federation as the inheritor of the Soviet Union still a super power? Is there a qualitative difference between the recent and earlier changes?, etc. What is essential here, however, is that the difficulty which we experience in answering these questions indirectly testifies to the correctness of the thesis that the discipline has reasons to be very modest about its achievements. For, first and foremost, if it should have any value at all, it should be able to answer questions like these, or to provide criteria by which they can be answered. We should recall that we are not talking here about trivial details, but about central elements and characteristics of the international system. The very incapacity to distinguish between “fundamental” and “accidental” forms of change of the system strikes me as a reason for serious concern. In this connection I should add a remark about the question of speed. Of course speed is relative, but it is remarkable that we were all surprised and misled in varying degree by the apparent pace of the events, up to the abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the ensuing dissolution of the Soviet Union. For example: when Chancellor Kohl presented his ten-point plan for the German question at the end of 1989, he was met internationally with a general mixture of fear and irritation: “There the Germans go off (again) (and without consulting us)”. Half a year later, however, it appeared in retrospect as a modest deavour to put the brakes on a highly autonomous process.

Problematic

Aspects

and

en-

Inconsistencies

Some will be optimistic as to the explanatory potential of the various available theories. Others, myself included, will be more sceptical as to what these theories are capable of in this respect. Although it is not my intention here to explore the possible specific explanations in more detail, a few obvious problematic aspects can and should be mentioned here. Some examples of such failures have already been mentioned earlier. I now mention a few other. Some efforts at explanation from established theories seem indeed rather convincing at a first glance, but at second sight they are so only by the grace of using concepts which are really so vague, such as “power”, “balance of power”, “equilibrium”, “national interests”, that almost any

ie

Philip

P. Everts

policy and development can be explained in those terms. The requirement that hypotheses and propositions should be formulated in such a way as to allow refutation is often neglected. Other theses and predictions have been put forward with such a regularity and for so long that one should not be surprised if they turn out to be true once in a while. This seems to be the case, for example with respect to the Bloch-Angell thesis of interdependence defended by Tromp, which was already proposed 100 years ago,3! just as much as with the thesis that the communist system does not work and that the Soviet Union is a giant-of-clay. The latter theory has indeed come true but as an aside one can ask whether this implies that the proponents of this theory were much brighter at the time than those if us who did not support this claim. Such “sooner-or-later” theories are perhaps better than no theory at all, yet their explanatory, let alone their practical, value is at best limited. If we now move to the level of specific theories, we should note that the realist perspective which focuses on power relations and sees conflicts as determined by the dynamics of interstate relations should at least make room for the role played by internal/domestic political and economic developments in shaping international relations. Likewise, it is difficult to square this perspective, which stresses the permanency of rivalry and competition, with the emerging and current patterns of moderation and super power cooperation in addressing and dealing with regional conflicts, of which the crisis in the Middle East and the ensuing negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours plus the PLO are the most recent and striking examples. Again, these are not minor matters but fundamental issues, which our theories should incorporate. With respect to the presumed dynamics of armament and disarmament processes, the initial unilateral disarmament steps of the Soviet Union can not be squared with the notion that bureaucratic, military and other domestic interests are responsible for keeping the arms race going. In fact, the thesis of the “military-industrial-complex”, usually thought to be applicable, with some adaptations, to the Soviet Union too, predicted the exact opposite. Hence, this approach should be looked at again. Moreover, the acceptance of a strong degree of “reciprocal unilateralism” and the dropping of stringent verification requirements in the Bush-Gorbachev proposals on nuclear disarmament of 1991, are totally at odds 31 See note 26 and also H.W. Tromp, log”, Transaktie, 19 (1990), 1, 2-6.

“Commentaar.

Bij het

einde

van

de koude

oor-

~

Eastern

with

the traditional

Europe

and

the

understanding

Crisis

in International

Relations

of the logic of the disarmament

73

pro-

cess. The view that large bureaucratic organizations follow patterns of slow and incremental decision-making is at odds with the recent examples of dramatic shifts in the Soviet Union in orientation and policies in the area of both foreign and domestic policy. The thesis that totalitarian systems can only be reformed by outside pressure seems to be falsified, even if it is granted, as others argue, that Reagan’s SDI project and other steps in the arms race may have added considerably to the perceived armaments burden in the Soviet Union, and helped to bring about a reorientation. Cognitive theories, which emphasize the existence and permanency of enemy images in explaining popular attitudes and foreign policy seem not be resistant to the changes which have nevertheless occurred. That it is not possible to save much of the traditional Marxist or Marxist-inspired analysis seems evident. And there is more of the same kind.

Why the

Failure

to Foresee?

Finally, one may ask, if everything can be perfectly explained, how can it be that it was so difficult for those now offering these explanations to predict even the possibility or likelihood of such events? It is, of course true that the possibility to explain an occurrence post factum does not necessarily and always imply the possibility to predict its occurrence, but what is at stake here is the question of why it was that the probability of the events which did take place was generally estimated so low if not rejected out of hand? So far, the discipline of international relations and political science, despite laudable expectations which by their paucity suggest strong elements of chance, seems to excel largely only in predicting the past. There is no way to escape the conclusion that grosso modo we were all surprised. And it does not help greatly to try to exculpate the latter by making a distinction here between politicians and journalists on the one hand and scientists on the other, saying that the latter are less to blame, because there is no evidence which would warrant such a distinction.

74

Philip

Mitigating

P. Everts

Circumstances

Of course, there are also mitigating circumstances. Probably (one must be careful here!) the depressing secrecy and opaqueness of communist societies played an important role in explaining the failure to foresee the events. It is also possible that scientists were incapable of seeing real change when it did occur because they are also human beings and likely to become slaves of their own preferences or afraid of taking their wishes for reality. Statements on specific political problems often reflected primarily the political views of the person in question. Thus, left-liberals would favour détente, neo-liberals would be critically in favour, internationalist conservatives would favour détente, and neo- and paleo-conservatives would oppose it. Examples of failures are not difficult to find. The well-known economist Paul Samuelson wrote that it would be “a vulgar mistake to believe that most people in Eastern Europe live miserably”, and J. K. Galbraith maintained in 1984 that the Soviet economy had recently made enormous progress. The CIA agreed. The Harvard sovietologist Marshall Goldman repeatedly predicted since 1987 that M. Gorbachev would fall within six months, and his colleague, Seweryn Bialer concluded that the Soviet Union was not in a system crisis nor would it become so because of its “enormous reserves of political and social stability, sufficient to survive the greatest of difficulties” .32

A period of forty years of habituation to the idea that the behaviour of the Soviet Union while perhaps inscrutable was yet predictable (because it showed a good deal of continuity), also contributed to the incapacity of interpreting what happened. But even if one acknowledges these mitigating factors, troublesome questions remain conceming the relevance and reliability of our “scientific understanding”.

The Essential I find

the

Search

argument

for Regularities that

“one

can

never

predict”

too easy

and

not

con-

vincing. This is also true for the more precise argument that revolutions are unpredictable (“that is why they are revolutions’). It is almost pathetic 32 These examples and quotations Handelsblad, 7 September 1991.

are drawn from an article

by Maarten

Huygen,

NRC-

|

Eastern

Europe

and

the

Crisis

how people in international example of meteorology (which

relations is after

indeed

the

fails

regularly.

Indeed,

in International

Relations

75

in this connection grasp the all a “real”, “hard science”) which

weatherman

is an easy

and

welcome

target of our scorn, but he is also a “straw horse” which is easily disposed of without the critics of the thesis that there is a crisis in the discipline realizing ous

that

to stress

argument, physical

this

is no feat of arms

the

need

at all. It is, of course,

for researchers

also always certainties.33

useful Such

although anyone who has once ith the fact that he will always

to be modest.

never

superflu-

It is, to reverse

the

to stress that we are not dealing here with misunderstandings should be combated, used the word “prediction” should reckon be faced with such misunderstandings.

We should repeat here, however, that what is involved is not so much the precise moment of a future event or its speed and size, but far more fundamental aspects and characteristics of the international system, such as the permanency of power relations and of a bipolar system in particular, the characteristics of super power behaviour, the notion of “security”, the possibilities of non-violent structural changes, the importance of unilateral moves to disarmament and the reversibility or irreversibility of specific political processes such as armament dynamics} We know that we can not predict when a particular leaf of a particular tree will fall nor where it will land, but we can safely predict that due to periodic changes in the climate sometimes next autumn the trees will lose their foliage again. What we are looking for are comparable and equivalent patterns in international politics, nothing less and also nothing more. I realize

that

obvious

reasons

alized.

Nor can

this

is a controversial

to be sceptical I argue

or prove

heres to this view, but the goal of establishing essential politics. sought

in the

that

degree the

and

that

to which

majority

there this

of scholars

are goal

good can

and be re-

involved

ad-

I would still maintain that we should not give up such regularities. One may argue that this is not

or unavoidable If, however,

of the

issue

if our the

clarification

aim

raison-d’étre of our

is only

“to understand”

of political

understanding,

science but

also

the is in the

world not

of

only

produc-

33 The prototype of such a finding is the statement “if you turn the switch the light will go on”. It is remarkable that popular critics of the social sciences always use this and other examples as metaphors of the kind of trivialities which these sciences allegedly produce. I for one would, however, already be quite satisfied if, to begin with, such simple statements could be made in international relations with a certain reliability.

76

Philip

P. Everts

tion of knowledge which is policy relevant because it could be applied the solution of political problems, then things are clearly different.

The Requirements

of Applicable

This applies in particular entific endeavour called

in

Science

to those who pretend to be engaged in that scipeace research. It may be that the whole concep-

tion of peace research as an applied science is wrong or overly optimistic, and that therefore the analogies with disciplines like medicine and engineering do not hold. However, if they do, it is necessary, indeed essential to also hold on to the notion and assumption that there are regularities in the political processes which can be observed and discovered, even if this assumption can only serve as a guiding post and if reality falls far short of this. If that is the case, the norm or goal should also remain: to acquire such knowledge which permits us to make general statements about classes of phenomena, or in other words, knowledge which is generalizable: from cases which have been examined to unexamined similar cases, and from the present to the future. Such statements are of the form: “Under conditions p and q there is a relationship r between variables x and y”. “If this, then that”. In order to establish the existence or non-existence of such relationships it is necessary and unavoidable to proceed through the formulation of refutable propositions. This is not only necessary for the progress of science (if there is such a thing), but also it is only when this condition is fulfilled that political science, or peace research for that matter, can be politically relevant. This leaves open the possibility or even likelihood that the relationships which were found are either weak or have the character of correlations or a statistical probability. At least, however, we should be able to state whether they are positive or negative. As pointed out already before, in order to produce applicable knowledge it is not even necessary to “understand” in the sense of being able to explain (we may be dealing with a “black box”). There may be prediction without explanation just as there may be explanation without prediction. Not everything which we can “predict” in this way is policy relevant. Only to the extent that the variables concerned are fit for human manipulation can the insights also be policy relevant and can the researcher give advice of the kind “if you want this then you must do this and not do that”. The better

science

is able to “predict”

the more

applicable

its results

are.

|

Eastern

Problematic

Europe

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in International

Relations

77

Aspects

One can point out, however, that besides the development of a, though perhaps crude, predictive capability which one can call “descriptive prediction”, an equally important role of these applied disciplines is to develop the judgement of trained and experienced practitioners of the relevant skill. The judgements of those individuals certainly include expectations concerning the likelihood of the effects of certain actions or a commitment to bring about these effects, but these do not usually take the form of logical relationships between factual and descriptive propositions. This sort of “judgmental predictions” are based on an understanding of the situation which includes many other elements, such as reason and experience. The applied sciences usually deal with aspects of human experience and activity for which no complete or even “full” description of “the facts” is ever likely to be possible.34 Granted that we are often incapable to realize the goal of establishing generalizable relationships, “laws” if you want, there should be no reason to drop this as a norm once the going gets rough and we turn out be more empty-handed than we had thought previously, just as the unattainability of complete objectivity, to mention another canon of science, should never be an alibi to drop the search for it. It may be misleading, however, although the above seems to emphasize this, to equate theory formation with the establishment of static relationships. This leads easily to the disappointments mentioned above, to panic if circumstances change drastically, and to the cry for a “new paradigm”. Theories which aim at understanding how and why things change are probably more resistant to such reactions.

Further

Questions

on Theory

Formation

My initial conclusion is that we are indeed faced with serious problems, and that at least two intriguing (complexes of) questions which are very important for theory formation in international relations should urgently be placed on the agenda, to the extent that they are not already being looked into. The first developments

is whether

one can

in Eastern

34 } owe this comment

find a convincing

Europe

to Rip Bulkeley,

and

the

explanation

Soviet

communication

Union

and

to the author.

of the recent their

conse-

78

Philip

P. Everts

quences with the use of existing theories and approaches which is not — purely ad hoc. Some of the other chapters in this book try to test possible explanations. The accompanying question is: Which existing theories fail the test in the sense that they cannot fit in these developments, and should therefore be adapted or discarded altogether? To stand the test, such explanations should cover ideally the speed and extent of the changes as well as the nature (the direction). Although this may be a rather different question which has to do with psychological and sociological processes, we should yet also try to explain why, if such an explanation is possible, the events were so unexpected.

Implications

for a General

Theory

of International

Relations

It is only when these first questions are answered that we can move to the following item on the agenda, i.e. the more general problem of the implications of the recent developments and events for the development of a general theory of international relations. Which parts of theory appear now, with hindsight, to have been valid only within the parameters of the, bipolar, Cold War situation? Which parts should be discarded altogether, and which have even now retained their validity? Although these issues are not addressed here, it is, of course, entirely possible and legitimate, indeed necessary, to ask the same question with respect to other contemporary seemingly fundamental changes in the constellation of world politics, such as: the decline of the United States as a world power, the shift in financial and economic power from the Atlantic to the Pacific basin, the debt burden which suffocates the South, the sinking of Africa in a morass of poverty and social disintegration, and the proliferation of weapons of all kinds. Indeed, any general theory should take all of these into account.

The

Post-Cold

War

Situation

Of more specific interest and relevance is the urgent question of what the remaining theories tell us about the new post-Cold War situation which is now emerging. More particularly, I am thinking of the possibilities of establishing now a new and workable system of security under very different circumstances, which does not try to define the problems away by merely taking the road back to the (not very peaceful) inter-war past or postulates the fulfilment of conditions which would really make the

_ ' _ _

Eastern

Europe

and

the

Crisis

in International

Relations

79

Search for a security system superfluous. While the principles of collective security on the one hand and benign interdependence on the other are likely candidate guidelines for policies in this area, the historical experiences with both principles as well as theoretical considerations on their applicability strongly suggest the limitations of these models.

The Research

Agenda

Finally, the problem can also be formulated as the more general question of the consequences which the recent developments will or should have for the research agenda. That, however, is a much more trivial question. It has always been the case, that the urgency of particular topics had some influence on the agenda of the researchers. It is not necessary to give examples here. Thus, today it seems less urgent to write yet another book on nuclear deterrence than to study, as mentioned above, the requirements and feasibility of a new system of European collective security, or the implications of the new nationalisms for international peace and security.

It seems unmistakable that the post-1945 model of an equilibrium or pseudo-equilibrium between two blocs and of peace-through-deterrence is gradually giving way to a new “post containment” model, in which security is guaranteed more by economic, political, ecological and cultural ties and commonalties. The implications of the resulting changes on the research agenda for the theory of international relations seem, however, to be mostly indirect. In connection with theory formation, two tasks should be taken more seriously. Both were always recognized and acknowledged but in practice received little more than lip service, if only because they are difficult to fulfil. First of all, there is an urgent need for analyses which chart and bring about transparency of structural changes over longer time periods. In the second place, the unmistakable relations between domestic changes in and the international behaviour of the (late) Soviet Union underscore once more the undesirability of studying international processes in isolation from societal developments in individual countries. The current compartmentalization of sciences into “disciplines” and “specialisms” has fatal effects in this connection. Thus, for example, even within the discipline of international relations, problems like the arms race, the debt problem

80

Philip

P. Everts

and developments in the field of communication technology are studied usually as so many independent problems. These shortcomings, to wit the division into specialisms and disciplines and the resulting lack of communication, have been noted before as major stumbling blocks on the way to accumulation of knowledge and progress in theory formation, together with an extreme individualism and the tendency to look down upon any effort at theoretical improvement and reject it out of hand as “nothing new”.35 As an aside, I should point out that few will disagree with such a plea in principle. Indeed, the view that things are related to one another and should be studied in their complexity, is seen by many as profound. Of course, the need of a “synthetic approach” seems evident, but the “holistic” notion that everything is related to everything else also often borders on the trivial. Indeed, it is the task and essence of science to do the very opposite, i.e. to establish that some phenomena are related more or even strongly, and others less or even not at all. Science is about the reduction of potential variables. Obviously, this should, however, never be an alibi for parochialism.

The

Role

of Science

In all of this we should not forget that even when we plead for the production of applicable knowledge, the major function of science is still perhaps a negative one. At least until now, this is one of the strongest items on its record. What I mean is that the main social function of science is the rebuttal of “conventional wisdom”, assumed “facts” and regularities, as well as the critical analysis of ambiguous concepts and untested analogies, which permeate and dominate the usual political and societal discourse and debate, from left to right.

The counterpart to this is that it is to some extent unavoidable that theory formation in international relations and peace research should proceed in the proximity of political topicality, including the terms in which these topics are discussed. This moodiness and dependence on — 35 G.C.A. Junne, Theorievorming in de internationale betrekkingen. Opmerkingen over de stand van zaken in Nederland en de Bondsrepubliek, lecture for conference of Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek, 7 May 1987. Since then there has not been any improvement to speak of. See also Ph. P. Everts (ed.). International Studies in the

Netherlands. International

Report for the World Assembly Studies, 1989).

of International

Studies

(Leiden:

Institute

for

Eastern

Europe

and

the

Crisis

in International

Relations

81

_ fashions is not necessarily unhealthy and deplorable. In the present con| text, which in many ways is much more open than before, this may also represent an advantage in the sense that there is a societal sensitivity for | the need to “break open” existing theories and make them more dynamic. There is perhaps also a stronger public susceptibility of structural changes which could come about as the consequence of long term devel- opments which suddenly crystallize like salt in a supersaturated solution. One final remark on the possible contribution of science. My present emphasis on its shortcomings could raise the suspicion that I do not acknowledge one other vital role: the development of ideas and concepts for alternative policies. Thus, it is for instance difficult to understand the evolution of developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union without reference to such concepts as non-violent change, unilateral disarmament steps, non-offensive defence and non-intervention, all of which had been studied, developed and promoted by students of international politics and peace research in recent decades. It is, moreover, not too farfetched to assume a demonstrable relationship between this theoretical work and the political practice by and in the countries concerned. At the same time, however, these concepts were ridiculed and rejected out of hand by many of the self-appointed gurus of “hard-nosed realism” which thereby showed a singular lack of awareness.

Final

Remarks

It is tempting to include the other social sciences in an analysis like the one given here and to put the question how they deal with the same or similar problems and whether their record is “better” or perhaps even worse. Maybe such comparisons could, if only by analogy, help us to solve our problem or perhaps reduce or relativize our worries. I have deliberately chosen not to do this, however, partly in order to avoid the accusation that I am fouling other nests beside my own, but also because of a suspicion that analogies would not help us very much in solving the problems referred to. The main reason for this is that they have a specificity of their own. And it is for these specific problems that I feel primarily responsible.

5. Bargaining, Power, Domestic Politics, and Security Dilemmas: Soviet “New Thinking” as Evidence

KJELL

The

GOLDMANN

transformation

surprise

of Soviet

to many

people,

including

this paper is to consider tional politics. It seemed happened was

could

obvious

damentally, the thoughts had

been

War. proven

Does

the

about mobilized this

untenable?

fact,

Soviet

many

in the

why

the that

1980s

of us academics.

came

The

for the discipline fact that much terms.

was

not

easily

pressures years

and

to explain

central

tenets

Do we find ourselves

reconciled domestic

the

But

in a theoretical

if this

More

fun-

some

constraints

in established

of

of internaof what had

with

persistence

as a

object

did we fail to see it in advance?

turnabout

over

late

for in balance-of-power

international

suggest

policy

what this implies obvious after the

be accounted

after the

foreign

of the theory

of that

Cold have

crisis?

Now that the Soviet Union no longer exists it is easy to forget how amazed many of us were just a few years ago at what Soviet spokesmen called the “new thinking” about foreign policy: the acceptance of asymmetrical force reductions, the withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, the abandoning of the “international class struggle”, etc.! Theorists of international politics had not expected a Great Power to withdraw from the global power-struggle in this fashion. Furthermore, it had been common to presume the Cold War to have been so ingrained in Soviet thinking and so well-protected by domestic interest groups that fundamental change was out of the question. Thus very familiar thoughts about international politics were challenged by the “new thinking”. 1 On the last point see Bertil Nygren, “New and Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, 82

Old in Gorbachev's 6 (1989), 1-24.

‘New Thinking”,

Bargaining,

Power,

Domestic

Politics,

and Security

Dilemmas

83

_

Even the very project of international politics theory was put into question by the occurrence of the “new thinking”. Mikhail Gorbachev himself _ was the decisive factor, according to a common view. His personality — his values, his beliefs, and his determination — was idiosyncratic, and it could not have been predicted from structural factors that the Soviet Union would be led by such a person. He personally directed the political process, and not the larger organization in which he operated. His impact was due to him personally rather than to the situational context. He thus was in no significant way an instrument of larger forces. Nothing illustrates this view better than the idea of awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize. The applause with which the award was greeted — and the eagerness with which the Norwegian Nobel Committee was urged at a later stage to demand that it be returned — could only be seen as an indication of the widespread acceptance of the view that international politics is determined by individual leaders rather than by structural forces, complex organizations, and situational contexts. There is a long-standing tension between the inclination of politicians, journalists, and some historians to explain politics in terms of single individuals and the social scientists’ assumption that politics results from structure, organization, and context. The Gorbachev phenomenon would seem to add little to this controversy. Whether a particular leader has been indispensable to bring about a particular political outcome is as difficult to determine in the case of Mikhail Gorbachev as in other cases. To strive for a theory of international politics appears as meaningful or as meaningless as before, regardless of Mikhail Gorbachev. Thus assuming that it remains a professional task of to theorize about structure, organization, and context, question what the international politics theorist can events. In what follows, four theoretical perspectives on be taken

(i)

political scientists there remains the learn from recent foreign policy will

into consideration:

bargaining, i.e. the notion that foreign policy actions? previous interaction between adversaries,

(ii) | power, i.e. the notion that foreign policy actions of or changes in the actor’s power base,

result

result

from the

from features

2 The idea of defining the dependent variable of the argument as “foreign policy action” comes from Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualisation (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

84 (iii)

Kjell Goldmann domestic state

(iv)

constraints,

set limits

i.e..the

to its foreign

the international are determined

notion policy

that

the

domestic

features

of a

actions,

system, i.e. the notion that foreign by features of the system in which

policy actions states are the

main components.

(i) and (ii) represent balance-of-power type explanations of the “new thinking” that seemed obvious after the fact; the issue is why the “new thinking” did not seem equally obvious in advance. (iii) and (iv) represent two kinds of traditional foreign policy analysis that were challenged by the occurrence of the “new thinking”; here the issue is whether these thoughts are now discredited.

The “New Thinking”

as Bargaining

Outcome

It is easy to see how the “new thinking” might be accounted for in a bargaining perspective. Recall Snyder and Diesing’s division of bargaining into coercion and accommodation. In order for accommodation to be possible, the contenders must first agree on the distribution of bargaining power between them, Snyder and Diesing argue in effect. The final agreement, if there is one, will reflect this balance. For the purpose of making the agreed distribution of power as favourable to themselves as possible, therefore, both contenders first engage in coercive bargaining to impress the adversary with their superior resolve. Once the balance has been established, the contenders set out to do something else: to explore jointly what a final agreement reflecting this balance would be like. East-West bargaining over Europe in the 1980s can be seen as a prototype case. The immediate issue was the deployment of intermediate-range missiles, but more was at stake: the battle over the missiles came to be seen as a contest over the Soviet and US positions in Europe. There can be no better example of bargaining designed to impress an adversary with one’s own superior bargaining power than Soviet and US diplomacy in the first part of the 1980s. This bargaining was of particular complexity since a third party, there is reason

international public opinion, to believe that this increased

came to play a major the difficulty of arriving

role: at a

3 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), esp. p. 249.

Bargaining,

Power, Domestic

Politics,

and Security

Dilemmas

85

common assessment of the balance of bargaining power and, hence, of going over from coercive to accommodative bargaining.4 By 1984, however, it was evident that Soviet efforts to stop the deployment of NATO missiles had failed and that one of the presumed Soviet assets, the “peace movement”, had receded into the background. It is not farfetched to surmise that this fact was interpreted by both sides as a Western victory in a test of strength. What remained was to negotiate the terms of the Soviet capitulation — the INF Treaty in the first place.

This may suffice to suggest how the dynamics of bargaining may help \/ to explain the occurrence of the “new thinking”. There is little reason to suggest bargaining theory to be in a crisis because of the fact that the “new thinking” has occurred. This theory seems on the contrary to contribute to an explanation of the change in Soviet foreign policy.5 But then, why the surprise? Was it because of an underestimation of the importance of bargaining in international politics? Not necessarily. Rather, some inherent limitations of bargaining theory become obvious when an attempt is made to see the “new thinking” in a bargaining perspective. One is the difficulty of determining what is at stake in a process of bargaining. The Soviet Union had lost tests of strength before without withdrawing from “international

Central and East Europe and without class struggle”. Even if Soviet acceptance

option” may be explained over this issue, it is not can be accounted for on gain about, it is difficult

abandoning the of the US “zero

as the result of a US victory in a test of strength clear how much more of the “new thinking” that this basis. If it is unclear what bargainers barto predict the outcome from what happens dur-

ing the process.

More fundamentally, bargaining explains outcome within constraints set by structure. Some theories of international politics thus are concerned with the structural context — international or domestic — in which foreign policy is made and international-political processes occur, whereas other theories focus on the political processes that take place within this context, such as decision-making and bargaining. The per-

4 This is considered in Kjell Goldmann, “Bargaining and Opinion-Formation: The Case of the INF Treaty”, Political Studies (forthcoming). 5 For a criticism of such an interpretation of the INF case see Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Did ‘Peace Through Strength’ End the Cold War? Lessons from INF”, International Security, 16 (1991), 162-88.

86

Kjell Goldmann

spectives are complementary. Structural theory attempts to account for the stage on which decision-makers and bargainers perform their acts and that sets limits to what they can do; it seeks to explain the preferences from which decision-making and bargaining depart; it tries to explore the limits of the structural change that can be brought about by decision-making and bargaining. If we are wrong about structure we cannot predict outcomes, however profound our insight into process. Thus, even if the “new thinking” was logical in view of previous US-Soviet interaction, the Soviet Union could still be held to be structurally incapable of withdrawing from the Cold War. Given the assumptions about Soviet society and politics that prevailed until the late 1980s, it was a very reasonable view that a US bargaining victory with regard to arms control would be insufficient to produce a major revision of Soviet foreign policy. To assume this was our mistake, rather than a failure to take the dynamics of bargaining into account. The kind of theory challenged by the occurrence of the “new thinking” thus was structural rather than processual. This was important enough, however, since processual theory does not suffice to explain and predict much of what we want to explain and predict. The failure to anticipate the “new thinking” is a reminder of the fact that assumptions about structure are necessary in order to predict bargaining outcomes. A theory of international politics reduced to a theory of bargaining would be a poor one.

Power:

Legitimacy,

If references bargaining

Economy,

to Gorbachev do not

suffice

and Armaments

the person to explain

and the

to the dynamics

“new

thinking”,

of East-West a further

expla-

nation seems obvious in retrospect. By the mid-1980s or so, communist rule was suffering from an increasingly obvious legitimacy crisis in many countries. It became increasingly evident that not just the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe but even the continued existence of the Soviet Union itself were at stake. At the same time, the economic situation in the USSR was deteriorating to such an extent that a shift in priorities was becoming unavoidable. On top of this, the US-led arms race entered a new phase with the technologically advanced and fantastically expensive SDI program. The combination of a crisis in legitimacy and one in the economy with the continuing arms race implied a collapse of Soviet power that could only lead on to the “new thinking”, it now appears. The Cold War

~

Bargaining,

Power,

Domestic

Politics,

and Security

: could no longer be waged. If the Soviet position to be restored, indeed, if the Soviet Union were _ perative «

new

to end thinking”

evitable

result

thau’s

classical

the could

confrontation thus

of “interest

be

with seen

defined

in

the

in world affairs even to survive,

West.

The

a traditional

in terms

Dilemmas

87

were ever it was im-

occurrence fashion

of power”,

as

to quote

of the the

in-

Morgen-

formulation.®

Assuming that this is obvious ex post facto, why did some of us fail to see it in advance? Insufficient data about East Europe and the Soviet Union may have played a part, but a more interesting possibility is the role that politics may have played to prevent us in the West from making a realistic assessment of Soviet power. The analysis of communism and of the Soviet Union had long been politicized in Western countries. The view that communist rulers were incapable of gaining public support and even of managing an economy tended to be associated with hawkishness and conservatism, not to mention the view that the Soviet Union could be defeated by arms racing. If specific factual beliefs are generally assumed to go together with particular political views, those who do not want to be associated with these views may fail to accept those beliefs, however strong the evidence. The importance of the politics of foreign policy analysis as a topic for research is highlighted by the widespread feeling of surprise in the face of the “new thinking”. The main problem from the point of view of evaluating theory, however, does not concern the quality of the diagnosis of the situation that was made but the quality of the prognosis that could have been made on the basis of a correct diagnosis. There were undoubtedly those who were convinced that the lack of popular support was making the Soviet position in East Europe untenable and that the Soviet Union economy could no longer sustain the arms race. The question is whether they, in contrast to the rest of us, were in a position to anticipate the “new thinking”. Neither background variable is foreign to the theory of international politics, of course. On the contrary, economic capability and political cohesion are traditional components in writings about international power, together with military capability.7 Economic rise and decline, further6 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 5. 7 G. Tegenbos, kwantificering”,

“De macht der staten. Een Res Publica, 16 (1974), 133-59.

The Struggle for Power and Peace, inventarisatie

van

de

alternatieven

3rd tot

88

Kjell Goldmann

more,

is a prime

decline

explanatory

of Powers.®8

factor

Theories

about

in the

the

literature

power

about

effects

the

of public

rise

and

|

discontent

as well as of economic and military decline are crucially weak in one spect, however. They are what I propose to call sooner-or-later theories.

re-

A sooner-or-later theory is one that predicts that something will occur sooner or later, that it cannot be avoided indefinitely, that it will be realized at some unspecified future time. Sooner or later an enslaved people will

break

foreign will

its

policy

revise Such

its

bonds. retreat.

or later

Sooner have

so to speak,

or later

their

main

States,

seen not

this

convinced

empire

does

is that

causes

that

it will

collapse,

on theoretical have

decline

a state

limitations. they

can

if the Soviet empire fails to collapse lar discontent, and the impending United

economic

that

will

necessitate

is losing

an

a

arms

race

objectives.

assertions

theories,

Sooner

sufficed

no

for the

sooner

it be maintained

grounds?

If no,

to predict

an

event

finesse

of sooner-or-later

but

not

falsified.

Even

in the face of economic decline, populoss of strategic parity vis-a-vis the

problem

happen,

The

be confirmed

can

These are rhetorical weak, and the problem fact. This is important, ses of the implications

can

theorist;

or later. that

But

this

to explain

or she

then,

could

it be maintained

suffices

he

if the

have that

it after

can

Soviet

been what the

refore-

would fact?

questions. Sooner-or-later theory is inherently of accounting for the “new thinking” reflects this since sooner-or-later reasoning is typical of analyof shifts in international power. By definition, if a

state is losing some of its power base, it will fail to attain its current objectives, sooner or later. This is all we can say. It is something, but it is not much. We cannot say anything on this basis about the point where a particular state will give up a particular objective. One of the weaknesses of international politics as a field of study, it has been suggested elsewhere, is the primitiveness of our theories about power bases.9 The fact that many of us feel that the “new thinking” can be explained in retrospect in terms of the erosion of the Soviet power base and yet were surprised when it occurred is a reminder.

8 E.g., Robert Gilpin, versity Press, 1981).

9 Kjell ce

| | |

War and Change

in World Politics

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

Uni:

Goldmann and Gunnar Sjostedt, eds., Power, Capabilities, Interdependence in the Study of International Influence (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979),

|

Bargaining,

:

| Cognitions, It is

a common

Power,

Domestic

Special Interests, notion

that

Politics,

and Security

Dilemmas

89

and Bureaucracy

foreign

policies

may

be

so

embedded

in

the

: thinking of elites and publics, in special interests, and in bureaucratic routines that they are resistant even to strong pressure for change. Factors such as these may be thought to explain, for example, why it is difficult to come to an agreement in bargaining even when the distribution of bargaining power is obvious, and why states fail to adapt their foreign policy to new configurations of power. One reason why the “new thinking” came as a surprise to some of us probably was the fact that we had grown used to consider an extreme concern with national security, an urge to attain parity with the other superpower, and a militant anti-imperialism to be so ingrained in Soviet thinking, to have such a strong basis in domestic interests, and to be so strongly institutionalized in the Soviet bureaucracy that major change was not a serious possibility. I have sketched elsewhere a theory of foreign policy in which the focus , is on factors that may inhibit, delay, or reduce the scope of change in a foreign policy.!° These factors are called “stabilizers” in the theoretical sketch. The basic idea of the sketch is that the stronger the stabilizers of a policy, the more is required to make it change. The sketch is an attempt to place a variety of familiar thoughts about factors that inhibit foreign policy change in a common framework, including factors such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. How does this perspective on foreign policy go along with the occurrence of the “new thinking”? Is it true that Soviet foreign policy underwent major change in spite of having been strongly stabilized cognitively, domestic-politically, and administratively? If yes, what does this imply for the notion that the domestic “embedding” of a foreign policy justifies the expectation that it will continue to be pursued? Cognitions. Acommon argument about Soviet foreign policy has been the one about an exaggerated, indeed, paranoid fear of German attack. After having been attacked twice by Germany and after having lost 25 million people in World War II, Soviet foreign policy is dominated by an overriding fear of attack from the West and an overriding concern with maintaining a buffer between itself and Germany — this has appeared an archetypal 10 Kjell Goldmann, Change and Stability ties of Détente (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Wheatsheaf, 1988).

in Foreign Policy: The Problems and PossibiliUniversity Press, and London: Harvester,

SS

90

Kjell Goldmann

example of the way in which a nation may come to generalize and be | guided by traumatic experiences.! The effect has been reinforced, it has _ been suggested, by a tradition on the part of Russian and Soviet rulers to — exploit the fear of the West for their own purposes. This diagnosis of | Soviet thinking is not easily reconciled with the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and its acceptance of a united Germany as a member of | NATO. Here, it may seem, we have a stabilizer that failed to stabilize. Another argument about the persistence of Soviet foreign policy has been made in terms of communist ideology. Communists cannot give up the “international class struggle”, according to this line of thought. They can reconcile it with “peaceful coexistence”, but then they see the latter as a strategy for the former; peaceful coexistence, as Brezhnev put it, is “a kind of class struggle”.12 This is another thought about the fundamentals | of Soviet foreign policy that is difficult to reconcile with the “new — thinking”. What is put into question in the former case is the explanatory power of what may be called national beliefs — beliefs shared by so many people that they form part of a nation’s culture. The attempt to account for Soviet post-1945 foreign policy in terms of the traumatic experiences of the Soviet people is not the only example of such reasoning. Another is to explain Israeli policy in terms of the Holocaust. A third is the suggestion that the separate foreign policy courses of the Scandinavian countries since the late 1940s are due to their differing World War II experiences. 1!% The “new thinking” has reminded us of a weakness of such arguments, viz., the difficulty of saying anything about the persistence of a national lesson. Just as sooner-or-later reasoning fails to say anything about when an anticipated, indeed, inevitable change will occur, the notion of national beliefs as constraints on foreign policy change fails to say anything about when the effect of a traumatic event will wear off, as it certainly will — sooner or later.

11 For

the

way

in

which

ception and Misperception Press, 1976), 217-82.

decision-makers

in International

learn

from

history

Politics (Princeton,

see

Robert

N.J.: Princeton

Jervis,

Per-.

University

12 For a major study of the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence see Bertil Nygren, Fredlig samexistens: Klasskamp, fred och samarbete. Sovjetunionens détente-doktrin nioge ohn: Dept. of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1984). The quote is from p. 70. 13 Jervis

(fn. 11), 247.

_ _ | _ _

Bargaining,

Power,

Domestic

Politics,

and Security

Dilemmas

91

The other notion put into question by the “new thinking” is the one of ideology as a constraint on foreign policy. This issue, in contrast to the former, has been a perennial preoccupation of political scientists, with particular reference to the USSR Recent events support those who have suggested official ideology to be unimportant in foreign policy, either because official ideology does not affect the thinking of foreign policy decision-makers or because official ideologies are sufficiently generous to encompass anything decision-makers may come to think of. The occurrence of the “new thinking” may be taken to indicate that the existence of even

a highly institutionalized and very long-standing official ideology is a poor Va predictor of stability in foreign policy. This, I hasten to add, is not to suggest that cognitive theory has proven useless in foreign policy analysis. What I have suggested is that the weakness of two particular applications of cognitive reasoning is illustrated by the “new thinking”: the notions of national beliefs and official ideologies as stabilizers of foreign policies. However, these applications, even if marginal from the point of view of cognitive theory, are significant for analysts of world politics, because national beliefs and official ideologies may be the only kind of cognitions into which they may gain reliable insights. Special interests. The “new thinking” evidently went against the interests of important groups within Soviet society. The question is whether this made it surprising. The so-called theory of the military-industrial complex must be taken to imply that events of the “new thinking” type are implausible. The argument is in essence (a) that armaments, whether in response to external threats or otherwise, create and reinforce military and economic interests in the preservation of international tensions, and (b) that these interests are strong enough to prevail. Proposition (a) is not challenged by the “new . thinking”. The problem concerns proposition (b). The triumph of the “new ° thinking” shows that the existence of military-industrial interests does not suffice to prevent even a radical shift from confrontation to coopera-

tion. The point can be made general. We often explain and predict foreign policy by reference to specific interest groups: not just the military but the multinational corporations, the Catholic church, the farmers, the Israeli lobby, etc. The “new thinking” is a reminder, if one is needed, of the fact that the critical variable is the domestic balance of power and not the

92

Kjell Goldmann

existence of a particular interest group. This balance is rarely easy to specify. To identify relevant interest groups is easy; to determine their impact on foreign policy in given circumstances is difficult. Aconsensus is emerging in the discipline that existing theory is especially weak with regard to the domestic politics of foreign policy. This view gained further support from the failure of international relationists to anticipate the collapse of the support of the old order in the Soviet Union. Bureaucracy. So far as “bureaucratic inertia” in foreign policy is concerned, it has been suggested elsewhere that more work is needed before a satisfactory theory of the administrative stabilization of foreign policies may be said to exist.!14 The case can be made that no theory exists that could have been falsified by the “new thinking”. Be that as it may, even if it was argued in a scholarly study soon before this policy emerged that it would not be easy to bring about “major change in the political-military sphere”,!5 the research institutes in Moscow had long been regarded as a virtual lobby of détente.!© It is not true that there was no unorthodox thinking in Moscow’s foreign policy community before Mikhail Gorbachev came along. On the contrary, the “new thinking” drew upon a revisionist discussion that had been going on for years in the Soviet foreign policy system and should not have come as such a big surprise to us in the West who had known this to be the case. This boils down to the observation that some domestic factors expected to inhibit change in Soviet foreign policy failed to do it. This need not imply that the notion of such phenomena as stabilizers of foreign policies has been disconfirmed, even though the “new thinking” demonstrates the need for more research about the cognitions as well as the domestic politics of foreign policy. A more fundamental limitation of this kind of foreign policy analysis is involved, however. The occurrence of the “new thinking” is a reminder of the fact that a theory of stabilizers cannot indicate impossibilities. A change in policy results from a confrontation between disturbances and stabilizers, in which the former prove to be stronger than the latter. All a 14 Goldmann

(fn. 10), 186.

15 arthur J. Alexander, “Modeling Soviet Defense Decisionmaking”, in Jiri Valenta and William C. Potter, eds., Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984). 16 Morton Schwartz, University of California

Soviet Perception of the United States Press, 1978), 162.

(Berkeley

and Los Angeles:

theory needs

Power,

of stabilizers

can

to be

curs, did

Bargaining,

this not

overcome

does

work.

not

Domestic do

is to focus

if change prove

that

All it proves

Politics,

and Security

attention

is to result. the

is that

the

Therefore,

presumed

the

on

Dilemmas opposition when

stabilizers

disturbance

was

93

change

did more

that

not

oc-

exist

or

powerful.

A strong theory of foreign policy change would specify the amount of disturbance necessary to overcome given stabilizers. If there had been such a theory, we would have been able to determine whether it was disconfirmed by the occurrence of the “new thinking”. No such theory exists. We may be able to carry out a relatively systematic analysis of the factors likely to promote and to inhibit change in a particular case, but there is no theoretical basis for predicting the net result and hence no theory that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the outcome.

Risk Aversion

in Security

Dilemmas

When, during the Cold War, analysts became preoccupied with explaining the persistence of the superpower confrontation and its attendant nuclear arms race, one line of thought was to point at cognitive mechanisms, special interests, and bureaucracies — various factors at the actor level thought to inhibit a change from confrontation to cooperation in foreign policy. Another was to refer to the unavoidably conflictive nature of politics in an anarchical international system. The two could be combined: the conflictive features of the system of states could be presumed to reinforce as well as to be reinforced by features internal to each state. The argument at the actor level has been discussed above. The systemic argument is considered in the present section. An account of the Cold War in terms of international anarchy begins with the notion that in a system without central institutions, national security is at the top of the political agenda of every member, and each member must prepare for its own protection. Since the defence preparations of state A cannot but increase its offensive capability against state B, they are apt to cause B to increase its defence preparations against A, which is apt to increase B's threat to A, and so on. Anarchy thus compels states to engage in behaviour apt to lead to spiralling conflict — to arms races, crises, and maybe wars. Nobody each Model

and

has

suggested

this

every

inter-state

relation.

of international

politics

to be true Rather,

suggests

of each what that

and

every

is known because

state

and

as the Anarchy of the

anarchical

of

94

Kjell Goldmann

features of the international system, relations between adversaries tend to be overly conflictful. The Anarchy Model has little to say about why adversaries become adversaries and is better as a theory of the propensity for escalation and the difficulty of conflict resolution than it is as a theory of the sources of conflict. Analysts in this tradition generally take it for granted that Great Powers are either adversaries or allied against a common adversary. East-West relations since the late 1940s were taken by many to demonstrate how adversaries may become the prisoners of forces that can be traced back to the anarchical condition in which they are compelled to operate and that add significantly to the original opposition between them. This view of the tragedy of international politics comprises two assumptions, which together form what will here be called the Security Dilemma Proposition. There is first the assumption that because of the fact that the international system is anarchic, adversary states are placed in security dilemmas. Their governments thus are compelled to choose between abstaining from protecting their nations properly against an existing threat and taking measures likely to provoke an increased threat. There is, secondly, the assumption that in security dilemmas governments believe that it is better to be safe than sorry and put protection against immediate threats before avoiding the provocation of future ones; when compelled to choose, they prefer deterrence to détente.

The Security Dilemma Proposition is essential for the notion that the conflictfulness of international politics is due to the anarchic features of the international system.!7 Has this tenet of traditional international politics theory been discredited by the occurrence of the “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy? This is one of the more profound theoretical questions raised by recent events. The answer cannot be a determined “no” but need not be a straight “yes”. There are several intermediate possibilities with differing implications for the Security Dilemma Proposition. Even if we accept the “new thinking” as discrepant evidence, we may save the Security Dilemma Proposition by reducing its scope, explanatory power, or testability. It -

17 The concept of security dilemma is used in various paper would seem to be the conventional one in analyses international anarchy. For a similar if not identical usage

tion to Strategic Studies: Macmillan, 1987), 77-79.

Military

Technology

and

ways, but the usage of this departing from the notion of see Barry Buzan, An Introduc-

International

Relations

(London:

Is the evidence reliable?

Is the evidence relevant?

NO

The

scope

The theory is not challenged.

YES

of

Is the evidence compatible with the theory?

the theory is reduced.

Was another factor more important?

hhh speared P theo) Oea ae INVULNERABLE

The theory is a mere “perspective”.

Howvulnerable is thetheory to discrepant evidence? SOMEWHAT VULNERABLE The credibility of : the theory is diminished.

HIGHLY VULNERABLE The theory is : psieaee

Figure 1. The implications of seemingly discrepant evidence for a theory.

96

Kjell Goldmann

ee

would be unwise to reject the core of the notion of international politics as tragedy merely because of the occurrence of the “new thinking”. The “new thinking” is better seen as a reminder of its weaknesses than as proof that it is mistaken. A procedure for considering the implications of discrepant evidence for a theory is outlined in Figure 1. The procedure starts at the top and ends in one of the rectangles. Several successive defence lines, as it were, are indicated. If one must be abandoned there may be another, but the retreat implies a loss in territory, that is, in the strength of the theory one is defending. The first line of defence naturally is to deny that the evidence is reliable. If it is not, there is no theoretical problem to consider. It will be taken for granted in what follows that the “new thinking” did represent a profound change in Soviet foreign policy and thus that the Security Dilemma Proposition cannot be rescued in this simple way. Another defence line must be found. Relevance. was

Can

it be maintained

irrelevant

concerned

with

thinking” was

was

launched?

has

resulted

from

tainment.

to be

thus

to did

A / resulted sion.

give not

up

instead There

was

that

kind

Soviet

arms

race

in the

stable

Western

“new

thinking”

Proposition

in other

is

not

when

the

“new

words,

that

there

War,

many

have

Union?

view.

Western

The

and

Cold not

containment

far

for four

of the

obtained

expansionism

to a spiralling no

the

successful:

the

lead

Dilemma

a widespread

of fact,

peace

occurrence

it be maintained,

Soviet

singularly

it maintained

Union

been

the

Security

for the

As a matter

proved

of Can

dilemma

of course,

argued,

the

situations

no security

This,

war,

because

that

from

decades and

then

withdraw. that

deterrence to

the

which

used

of the

Soviet

could

convinced have

adversary

Soviet

conUnion

rearmament

Western

of an

threat

Western

provoking

and

conflict

from

and

the

defence been bent

Union

and

Soviet efforts

avoided. on

It

expan-

hence

no

dilemma.

This

view

of the

Cold

War,

to be

controversial,

seems

to

prevail now when we know how it ended.!8 It saves the Security Dilemma Proposition by reducing its scope. The implication of the Anarchy Model of international politics hardly is that some states are placed in difficult 18 See, for example, to the 90th Anniversary

the contributions Nobel Jubilee

of John Symposium,

Lewis Gaddis and Vladimir V. Shustov Oslo, 6-8 December, 1991.

Bargaining,

Power,

Domestic

Politics,

and Security

Dilemmas

97

Situations vis-a-vis their adversaries but that all states are, revisionist and non-revisionist alike. If the presumed expansionism of the Soviet Union is taken to show that the Security Dilemma Proposition was not invalidated by the “new thinking”, this comes close to reducing the proposition to one about the relations between non-revisionist states, that is, to a proposition about relations that are only mildly conflict-prone in the first place. Revisionist states, on this line of reasoning, have no security problem and hence no security dilemma; non-revisionist states have a security problem but no security dilemma vis-a-vis revisionist adversaries, since the source of their problem is the expansionism of the adversary and not the adversary’s perception of threat. We encounter here a familiar opposition between two perspectives on world politics. Conflict, in one view, is to a large extent rooted in mutual misperception and in the mutual exploitation of adversaries for domesticpolitical purposes; war is caused by the dynamics of conflict processes rather than by the incompatibility between underlying interests. Armaments and war, in another view, result from real conflicts of interest and can be traced back to the expansionism of particular states, nations, or economic or political systems. The former, of course, is a traditional leftliberal and social democratic approach to international politics; the latter is the criticism traditionally levelled against this centrist view from the right as well as from the left.

The Security Dilemma Proposition articulates a thought that is essential for the former approach and tends to be rejected by adherents of the latter, often on the ground that systemic theory is overly schematic when presuming actors to be basically similar. Adherents of the former perspective should be more reluctant than adherents of the latter to regard the “new thinking” as irrelevant to the question of the tenability of the proposition. They have good arguments for refusing to accept the assertion that there was no security dilemma for the Soviet Union. First of all, they may argue, security dilemma is a subjectivistic and not an objectivistic concept. Wester intentions are irrelevant; what matters are Soviet perceptions of Western intentions, and it has not been shown that Western containment was perceived in Moscow to imply no threat. Secondly, they may add, even if the original conflict of interest was profoundly asymmetrical, this does not exclude that Western deterrence, Soviet counter-deterrence, and Western counter-counter-deterrence created a more symmetri-

98 cal situation

Kjell Goldmann later

on that

was

perceived

as a security

dilemma

by both

sides. Those who thus reject the possibility of rescuing the Security Dilemma Proposition by dramatically reducing its scope have no choice but to accept the “new thinking” as relevant evidence and to go on to consider its

compatibility

with the proposition.

Compatibility with the proposition. Can it be argued that, contrary to appearances, the “new thinking” represented a response of the expected kind to a security dilemma? Maybe this was the best the Soviet Union could do to maintain deterrence. Maybe the proclamation of the “new thinking” is best seen as a regrouping of forces. In this interpretation, the “new thinking” was not a matter of setting the avoidance of a future threat before the meeting of an immediate one; it was a matter of meeting an immediate threat as well as possible in difficult circumstances. To accept this argument virtually is to commit oneself to the proposition that anything a government does to enhance its short-term security is compatible with the Security Dilemma Proposition and thus to deprive the proposition of much of its explanatory power. Unless taken to predict escalatory behaviour, the Anarchy Model is reduced to the truism that states do what they can to protect themselves with the means at their disposal. , This may be the place to recall a more intriguing argument that has ‘ been made in security dilemma terms about the “new thinking”. The leadership in Moscow accepted the Security Dilemma Proposition as an explanation of the persistence of the East-West confrontation, according to this line of thought, but they refused to accept the presumption that security dilemmas are inevitable. Instead — and maybe inspired by the notion of non-provocative defence — they thought it possible to liberate both themselves and the West from the dilemma, thus invalidating the proposition taken to explain its existence. Gorbachev and his people were invariance-breakers, in other words. The argument, just as the preceding one, deprives the Security Dilemma Proposition of much of its explanatory power. The strength of the proposition lies in the presumption of the necessity to choose between disagreeable alternatives; this is what dilemmas are about. If an agreeable alternative is taken to exist, all that is left of the proposition have a security problem that is sometimes mistakenly dilemma but that can be circumvented.

is that defined

states as a

Bargaining,

Power,

Domestic

Politics,

and Security

Dilemmas

99

The alternative to diluting the proposition in this fashion is to concede that the “new thinking” is indeed incompatible with it, thus continuing along the path outlined in Figure 1. Other factors. The argument at the next line of defence is that even if the “new thinking” is incompatible with the Security Dilemma Proposition, the proposition is not invalidated since special conditions obtained, viz., the deterioration of the Soviet power base. The Security Dilemma Proposition, on this argument, presumes that states believe that they can afford to escalate. This belief was lacking in the case of the “new thinking”. Arms races must stop if one contender cannot afford to go on. In anarchyrelated reasoning there has been an implicit assumption of a relatively stable distribution of power. Rapid decline may indeed be unlikely to occur in peacetime among Great Powers, but when it does occur, nonescalatory behaviour can be expected even in security dilemmas. A moment’s reflection makes clear why this is a costly defence of the proposition. The argument implies a significant decrease in explanatory power. In an anarchical system, states have reason to fear attack and therefore to prepare for their own defence — this much of the Security Dilemma Proposition is preserved. Governments, it is however added, weigh this consideration against others, such as the state of the economy, the welfare of the people, or the requirements of domestic politics. The Security Dilemma Proposition thus is reduced to a proposition about one influence on policy-making among several — a feature of the international system that is likely to be taken into account by governments, but only together with a variety of other concerns. This does not make the proposition meaningless. The weakness of this kind of theory is obvious, however: it is easy to draw up long lists of concerns that governments may have, and to argue that one particular concern is included among them thus is not to say much. A theory of this kind is useful, but only in the sense of contributing to a checklist of factors

analysts

have

reason

to take

into

account.

Now the Security Dilemma Proposition has arguably been thought to say more than this. When Waltz draws his analogy between a systemic theory of international politics and micro-economic theory about firms in the market,!9 he means to say that states in the international system, 19 Kenneth 1979).

N. Waltz, Theory of International

Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley,

100

Kjell Goldmann

like firms in the market, have to behave in certain ways in order to survive. But he means to say more. He clearly implies that the leaders of nations, like those of firms, want survival above everything else and that they therefore in fact behave in the way required for survival. His theory is not merely that certain considerations need to be made by rational actors but that they are in fact made and acted upon. Similarly, changing the Security Dilemma Proposition from a proposition about likely behaviour to one about one consideration among several may seem so unsatisfactory that it is tempting to consider defending it in some other way.

Vulnerability to discrepant evidence. Let us maintain, therefore, that according to the Security Dilemma Proposition, governments consider national security to be their dominating concern and not merely one concern among others, and that they therefore are prone to escalate in security dilemmas. Then we cannot avoid considering the “new thinking” to be a deviant case. To save the proposition we must retreat to the final line of defence. Here the argument is that a single counter-instance does not suffice to invalidate a theory, or at least not this particular theory. Granted that the “new thinking” was unexpected against the background of the anarchic features of the international system, the unlikely is not impossible — this is the argument. The Security Dilemma Proposition thus is capable of surviving a single counter-instance. Note that the argument is about the weakness of the proposition and not about the weakness of the evidence. As argued by Eckstein, singlecase analysis is a perfectly valid if not superior way of theory testing, unless it is a matter of probabilistic or weakly specified multivariate theory.2° If the Security Dilemma Proposition is defended by reference to the single-case argument, that is, to its limited testability, we imply that its utility for the explanation and prediction of single events is correspondingly limited. After such a strongly deviant case as the “new thinking” we may nevertheless feel more inclined than previously to question the proposition that _ states tend to escalate in security dilemmas. The argument that the proposition can be refuted only on the basis of statistical evidence may © not seem quite convincing after this experience. The “new thinking” may

20 Harry

Eckstein,

“Case

Study

and Theory

in Political

Science”,

in Fred E. Greenstein

and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science. Volume 7: Strategies (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 129-31.

of Inquiry

Bargaining,

be regarded

Power, Domestic

as a “plausibility

Politics, and Security

probe” in Eckstein’s

Dilemmas

sense

and thus

101

as an

_ indication, albeit inconclusive, that something is wrong with the proposition.2! The proposition remains, but its credibility is undermined.

The only remaining way of saving the Security Dilemma Proposition is to regard it as something else than a proposition about an empirical relationship. This would not be a break with established practice within the discipline. There is, on the contrary, a tradition of regarding the Anarchy Model as Weltanschauung rather than theory — as a “perspective” on or an “approach” to world affairs embracing a particular conception of man and providing structure and meaning to world politics rather than as a set of testable propositions about empirical relationships. A “perspective” or an “approach” may be taken to task on normative as well as on logical grounds, but it is essentially invulnerable to empirical evidence. The “new thinking” of the Soviet Union cannot invalidate a Weltanschauung in a definite way because no empirical observation can. The Anarchy Model is related to so-called realist theory.22 The debate over the merits of such theory would hardly have engaged so many scholars if the issue had merely been the validity of specific empirical propositions. Indeed, if empirical theory is what we are after, it is merely confusing to go into the issue of “realism” versus “idealism”.23 What makes realist theory engaging must be something else: its function as an interpretation of the essence and meaning of world politics that some find congenial and others unacceptable. This kind of debate is gaining additional academic respectability in a time when there is an increasing inclination to regard discourses rather than social reality as the legitimate objects of social research. 21 Eckstein

(fn. 20),

108-13.

22 They are not the same, however. There is confusion in the literature about the substantive contents of what authors call realist theory, but some agree with Keohane that “the three most fundamental Realist assumptions” are (1) “the most important actors in world politics are territorially organized entities”, (2) “state behavior can be explained rationally”, and (3) “states seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power” (Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond”, in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics [New York: Columbia University Press, 1986], 163). The Anarchy Model shares with realist theory, so defined, assumptions (1) and (2) but not assumption (3); it substitutes the assumption of international politics as a “security struggle” for that of international politics as a “power struggle” (this distinction is made by Barry Buzan in People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983], 157). 23 This is argued in Kjell Goldmann, “The Concept sion”, Cooperation and Conflict, 23 (1988), 1-14.

of ‘Realism’

as a Source

of Confu-

102

Kjell Goldmann

A Theoretical

Crisis?

The main thread of this paper is that much of international politics theory consists in the mere listing of factors presumed to affect foreign policy actions in a weakly specified way and in conjunction with other factors. Propositions abound about considerations that governments are apt to make; their lack of specificity is illustrated by the problem of drawing conclusions about foreign policy actions on the basis of power bases or special interests, and there is little theory that can be used to explain and predict the foreign policy actions resulting from the joint operation of this variety of factors. The most useful interpretation of the Security Dilemma Proposition in my judgment is to see it as such a partial — possibly very partial — theory; this interpretation is obvious as regards propositions about stabilizers; it is a plausible interpretation of sooner-or-later theory about power; even bargaining dynamics can be seen in this fashion. Our inability to anticipate the “new thinking” reflects both the weaknesses of the separate propositions and the lack of comprehensive theory. Does this mean that the discipline finds itself in a crisis? A feature of crisis, according to Hermann’s classical definition, is surprise.24 The occurrence of the “new thinking” has not revealed much about the theory of international politics that we did not know before. It has long been recognized that existing theory is too weak to permit the prediction of single events and hence that it cannot be disconfirmed by single counter-instances.25 It is not news that this objective has not been attained. Another feature of crisis, according to Hermann’s definition, is that there is a threat to important values. Among the values that are important for a research community are those that relate to the objectives of the profession. The occurrence of the “new thinking” arguably challenges the attainability and not just the attainment of strong theory. This is crucial, since many academics have embarked on the study of international politics because of a desire to make foreign policy more rational. It is difficult to retain this objective without presuming strong theory to be feasible. The discipline is indeed faced with a crisis in so far as there is

24

Charles

eure ed., ed., 1969).

“ a 334-35.

F.

Hermann,

International

“International

Politics

and

Crisis

Foreign

as

Policy

a Situational

(New York:

Variable”,

The

Free

in J.

Press,

N.

2nd

for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, “AResponse to My Critics”, in Keohane (fn. 22),

|

Bargaining,

Power,

Domestic

Politics,

and Security

Dilemmas

reason to question the validity of the predictive ambition, the objective of contributing to rational decision-making.

and hence

103

of

To maintain that the occurrence of the “new thinking” and the weaknesses in existing theory that it has highlighted prove this objective to be illusory may be to overstate the issue, however. The lesson to be learnt from the occurrence of the “new thinking” need not be that the objective of reasonably strong theory has proven to be unattainable. The main problem demonstrated by the occurrence of the “new thinking” lies elsewhere: in the tension between ambition and performance. The lesson to be learnt is that we should be modest about our achievements hitherto.

Thus, while there may be reason to continue the search for good theory about international systems and about the way in which such systems interact with domestic factors to produce foreign policy actions, our task in the present situation is not to tell people how to set up a new European security order. It is the more modest one of suggesting conceptual tools for an intelligent consideration of this matter; checklists of relevant factors that have a basis in theory and research are useful even if they amount to less than strong theory. By the same token, even if the longterm objective of strong theory is retained, the main methodological issue at the present time is not how to formulate and test such theory but how to design and evaluate the weak tests that are possible of the weak theory that is presently typical of the discipline. Both tasks are important enough.

6. A Time of Reckoning? Theories the End

ISABELLE

of International of the Cold War

GRUNBERG

and

THOMAS

Relations

and

RISSE-KAPPEN

1. Introduction!

There seems to be no end to the revolutionary transformation of world politics since 1985. It all began with “perestroika” and “glasnost” reflecting a fundamental re-orientation of Soviet foreign policy. When the West had just began to grasp the significance of these changes, the Soviets re_voked the Brezhnev doctrine thereby enabling the civil societies in Central Eastern Europe to overthrow the Communist regimes through peaceful revolutions. The Warsaw Pact collapsed together with the Berlin wall, and Germany rushed into unification. Just

when

tempt

we were

in

Moscow

“perestroika”

and

ago and

then

state

the

and

to adjust

occurred. “glasnost”

over which

republics

starting

he had

rushed Soviet

Its which long

lost

to secede Union

ceased

to the

failure

new

showed

Gorbachev control,

from

the

to exist.

situation, that

had had

central

the the

unleashed

become

at-

forces

of

six years

irreversible.

structure

So far,

coup

of the

however,

The Soviet

it has

col-

1 Farlier versions of this paper were presented at the workshop on the “End of the Cold War. Evaluating Theories of International Relations”, European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Colchester, England, March 22-28, 1991, and at the conference on the “End of the Cold War and International Relations Theories”, Cornell University, Ithaca NY, October 18-20, 1991. We thank the workshop participants, Ned Lebow, and Bruce Russett for comments on the drafts. We are also very grateful to Bobby Herman, Claudia Kappen, Paul Kennedy, John Mercer, Janice Stein, and Alex Wendt for advice regarding

specific theories paper, though.

discussed

in this paper.

We are solely responsible

104

for the flaws in this

A Time of Reckoning? lapsed almost as smoothly and peacefully Central Eastern Europe did in 1989. 1.1. A Crisis

in International

Not only did almost

most forecasts pened. I

nobody

pointed t false

Relations in

politi

105

as the Communist

regimes

in

Theory? -

ia-

ict t

S,

in the opposite direction of what actually happredictions followed logically from core assump-

tions of major international relations theories. However, many scholars spent precious little time re-evaluating their analytical tools but instead quickly proceeded to the more exciting task of predicting yet the next future.2 Thus, most articles describing possible future developments in a post-Cold War environment are based on assumptions which had just been seriously challenged by the events in the real world. Predicting future developments has always been a problem in the social sciences. Moreover, foreseeing single events cannot be expected from any theory. In other words, criticizing international relations theorists or area specialists for not predicting that Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in March 1985 misses the mark. However, there is a difference between the prediction of single events and of sea-changes in world politics which alter the structure of the international system. It is one thing to state that nobody could have foreseen that “perestroika” started in 1985. It is quite different to conclude that, therefore, international relations specialists could not have detected underlying trends and tendencies in East-West relations and in the former Soviet Union which suggested the potentiality of major changes. Moreover, the major theoretical traditions in international relations in fact claim to have something to say about large-scale changes in world politics. Realists point to changes in the distribution of power among the major states. Liberals tend to focus on the transformation of domestic | political structures. Institutionalists argue that international regimes might change the definition of state interests.

2 ject: 41: IS, the

See, for example, the three articles which International Security (IS) ran on the subJack Snyder, “Averting Anarchy in the New Europe”, IS, 14 (No. 4, Spring 1990), 5John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, 15 (No. 1, Summer 1990), 5-56; Steven Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After Cold War”, IS, 15 (No. 3, Winter 1990/91), 7-57.

106

Isabelle

As a result, ture clever

of the

Grunberg

international East-West

guesses

but

rather

& Thomas

relations conflict. resulted

Risse-Kappen

scholars

Most

of these

from

distinct

did,

in fact,

forecasts theoretical

predict

the

were

not

fujust

traditions.

Many realists who perceive world politics as inherently conflictual and war among nations as common rather than exceptional, directed their attention to what seemed to be extraordinary, namely the absence of major war among the great powers during the Cold War. They were puzzled by the “long peace”, tried to identify the reasons for it, but predicted its stability and ultimate resilience. John Lewis Gaddis for example published this analysis in 1987: For it is the case that the post-World War II system of international relations, which nobody designed or even thought could last for very long, which was based not upon the dictates of morality and justice but rather upon an arbitrary and strikingly artificial division of the world into spheres of influence, and which incorporated within it some of the most bitter and persistent antagonism short of war in modern history, has now survived twice as long as the far more carefully designed World War I settlement, has approximately equalled in longevity the great 19th-century international systems of Metternich and Bismarck, and unlike those earlier systems after four decades of existence shows no perceptible signs of disintegration.4

While Gaddis failed to perceive the warning signs of change, Jervis, for example, arguing from a “security dilemma” perspective out the possibility of a peaceful transition to another system:

Robert ruled

Nevertheless, on the central issues of the Cold War, the side practicing deterrence usually has significant bargaining advantages. Part of the result is that overt challenges are beaten back, but even more, that such challenges will be relatively rare. ... The theory of the nuclear revolution, then, predicts that the basic outlines of the status quo will be preserved. Major shifts in ay and spheres of influence usually occur through war or the threat of war.

Finally, many Cold War order 3 Philip

Everts

peace researchers who neither accepted the view of the as particularly peaceful nor agreed with the argument

has

listed

several

of these

predictions.

See

his

contribution

in this

vol-

ume.

4 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 216 (author's emphasis). Kenneth Waltz has recently argued that this prediction about the endurance of the bipolar order stemmed from a conflation of peace and stability. See his “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, Prepared for the APSA meeting, San Francisco, August 1990, 2.

; ee

Jervis,

The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University

Press,

A Time of Reckoning?

107

about the inherently stabilizing character of nuclear weapons, emphasized instead the dangers of the East-West arms race for crisis stability. They argued against deterrence strategists that an East-West war was not likely to break out because of one side’s premeditated attack out of opportunity-seeking motives, but because of processes of crisis escalation and the spill-over effects of internal instabilities on the international system. In the end, they predicted an escalation of the Cold War if the Soviet Union persistently weakened, while the opposite happened: Within the Soviet empire, Eastern Europeans will become more restive and difficult to control as may her own national minorities. Finally, a lower growth rate and possibly even economic stagnation will make it impossible for Soviet leaders to continue their current level of military spending and still hope to satisfy growing domestic demands for more consumer goods. A cutback in either area ... will have detrimental implications for Soviet security. At the very least, therefore, Soviet leaders are likely to see themselves as vulnerable and on the defensive. Historically, policymakers in such circumstances have tended to exaggerate, not to minimize the extent of their own weaknesses. They have also exhibited an exaggerated concern for their credibility convinced that any sign of weakness on their part will encourage more aggressive behavior by their adversaries.®

While these are extreme examples of scholars anticipating the exact opposite of what happened, most writers simply assigned a low probability to the end of the Cold War and its circumstances. There might be a number of reasons for this. For example, throughout the Cold War, there was a lack of valid empirical data on the internal situation in the Soviet Union and in Central Eastern Europe. If, as is increasingly clear, the former Communist governments did not know or did not want to know about what went wrong in their own countries, how should Western scholars have found out?7 6 Richard N. Lebow, “Dominant Powers and Subordinate Regions: 1914 and Today”, in Jan F. Triska , ed., Dominant Powers and Subordinate States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 400-422, 417. While Lebow was absolutely correct in his analysis of the Soviet problems, he predicted the opposite of what happened. The forecasts, however, followed logically from his assumptions about the domestic causes of war. See, for example, Lebow, Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Jack Levy, “Domestic Politics and War’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 43 (No. 4, 1988), 653-673.

7 Area specialists have to answer the question whether or not the available empirical evidence was used to the extent possible. It is clear, however, that studying the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe presented scholars with some peculiar problems. For a discussion see Jack Snyder, “Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy”, International Security, 9 (No. 3, 1984/85), 89-108; idem, “Science and Sovietology: Bridging the Methods Gap in Soviet Foreign Policy Studies”, World Politics, 40 (No.

108

Isabelle

However,

even

rioration

in

would

not

as the

pace

the

have

had

Grunberg they

Soviet

been

Union,

& Thomas

Risse-Kappen

aware

of the

many

international

been

able

to anticipate

its

of change

and

its peaceful

mode.

extent

of the

domestic

relations

systemic

consequences

dete-

specialists as well

This should alert us to methodological problems or choices involved in the whole exercise of assessing the validity of theories by reference to an empirical event. 1.2.

How

Do We Evaluate

Theories?

This paper attempts to evaluate various theoretical approaches to international relations and assess their capability to account for the “end of the Cold War” — at least its major aspects. We will employ various yardsticks to measure the comparative validity and usefulness of these theories. When designed

natural scientists want to test theories, they develop experiments to verify or falsify them. The theory is confirmed for the time being when the predictions made before the experiment materialize and, most important, when the scientific community has reached a consensus about the reliability of the data, the replicability of the experiment, and, ultimately, the validity of the theory. Of course, the experimental method can rarely be applied in social sciences, since control of potentially intervening variables is extremely difficult when historical processes, human communication, norms, values, and ideas are involved. Critics of the positivist slant in social sciences also point to the interaction between theories and the “real world” in the sense that there is no access to the “real world” outside the realm of human ideas about this world.

However valid these objections are, they run the risk of treating rival theories of a given phenomenon as equally valuable discourses on this phenomenon. In the “post-modern” or “post-structuralist” world, sometimes anything goes.8 While understanding the coherence of a theory and analyzing its logic is perfectly respectable, the risk is to stop here and to be content with a description of various approaches (or “perceptual 2, 1988), 169-193. See also Matthew Evangelista, rity Policy”, in Robert Jervis et al., eds., Behavior, York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

8 See Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, sidence in International Studies, special issue 3, September 1990).

“Sources Society,

of Moderation in Soviet Secuand Nuclear War, Vol. 2 (New

eds., Speaking of International

the Language of Exile. DisStudies Quarterly, 34 (No.

A Time of Reckoning?

109

lenses”). This is why we plead guilty of adopting a “modified positivist” ap| proach which recognizes the fundamental social construction of reality and of our theories about it, but nevertheless maintains that cumulative knowledge is possible through the competitive interaction among theories produced by the community of researchers.? One of the basic differences, of course, between our approach and a laboratory experiment is that we evaluate the theories post hoc. But this need not be a problem: meteorologists can revise their models even though they have no control over weather changes. They do, however, have a precise way of measuring the empirical phenomena they are using to improve those models: temperature, humidity, rainfall are all measured according to some unambiguous, universally acknowledged yardsticks. Likewise, no convincing evaluation of international relations theories can be done unless the nature of the empirical referent, the “end of the Cold War”, is clearly specified, in a way that is as consensual as possible. What abating abolition bloc,

and

republics burgeoning

is meant

by “the end of the Cold War”,

of East-West tensions of the bipolar security the transition of the market

Soviet

is more

than

the

or the advent of a new détente. It is the structure, the dissolution of the Eastern

of the Eastern Union

therefore,

toward

European democratic

states

and

political

the

successor

systems

and

economies.

However, there are three methodological hurdles to overcome. First, broad theoretical paradigms such as realism or liberalism may accommodate almost any event in world politics, if one only stretches their assumptions a little. Many theories can be twisted one way or another to fit the “end of the Cold War”. It is always possible to develop auxiliary hypotheses so that events which seem to disconfirm a theory at first glance, ultimately can be accounted for. However, it makes a big difference whether these auxiliary hypotheses lead to the discovery of new facts, thus leading to a “progressive research program” (to use Imre Lakatos’s

9 In other words, we accept the critique of positivism as put forward by critical theorists such as Jirgen Habermas and his discourse theory of truth. See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, 1988). But we remain committed to the modernist program because the epistemological baseline of “poststructuralism”, while interesting in a heuristic sense, seems shaky. Unfortunately, the adaptation of non-positivist arguments in international relations has often led to a confusion between critical theory in the sense of the Frankfurt school, which remains committed to the modernist program, and post-modernism/post-structuralism.

110

Isabelle

term),!°

or whether

Grunberg

they

are used

gaps in it in an ad hoc way. Second, theories may vary commodate which gard

large-scale

consider it as the

tions.

We will

But

it will

tent

to which

with

the

ex post still

find the

facto.

However,

that

the

the

the

various

extremes

in their

“end

impossible

various

has

not

as

defined

the

“end

theories

which

would

Those

which

of such

Cold

rerela-

extremes.

that

is, the

about

pass

event,

it and

it may is,

is at least

a first

|

at least

it seems

War”

ex-

is compatible

an

approximation, then

War”:

approaches,

to say

of the

to ac-

two

above

theoretical

much

a first

whether

of these

fill

ability

those

stages”,

is permissive

and

in international

either

as

theory

Cold

and

change

fits

War”

if a theory

of the

“intermediate

Cold

Nevertheless,

fit the

the

theory

of the

approach

anomalies

of drastic

single

of the

as utterly

way

to consider “end

to investigate with

no

assumptions

irrelevant.

useful

that

as

Risse-Kappen

two

such

event

common

be useful core

mean

fore, ible

most

an

to make

between

events

such

& Thomas

thereto

be

compat-

minimum

test

of validity.

Third, the main task in evaluating theories will, of course, be to examine their arguments concerning cause-effect relationships with regard to the “end of the Cold War”. In order to do so, however, we would have to specify our preferred version of the explanation: a “true” explanation would have to be posited or argued. At this stage, however, there is no consensus as to the ultimate causes, or the hierarchy and chronology of causes that brought the Cold War to an end. What one can do instead is to specify which preferred causes obtain for particular theories. But this is descriptive and hardly amounts to an assessment of the theory under review, unless one has a preconceived idea of the “true” model against which to make judgements. Therefore, we will be very carefully when trying to evaluate the causal explanations offered by the various approaches. These methodological problems aside, there are a couple of yardsticks which can be used to measure the comparative strength of theories, even if one does not pretend to have the ultimate explanation for the event to be discussed. These yardsticks are, to the greatest possible extent, “facts” around which a consensus has formed within the academic community. One

change.

of these

“facts”

Many theories

which

will

conceptualize

serve

as

yardsticks,

large-scale,

is

systemic

the

mode

of

changes

in

10 See Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

.

A Time of Reckoning?

111

world politics as a result of war, particularly among the great powers. They are incompatible with the fact that the Cold War ended not as a result of war, but as a result of predominantly peaceful changes. True, tension and fighting were occasionally seen, for example in Romania and when Soviet troops stormed the television building in Vilnius in January 1991. But the scale of these two events and their consequences cannot be compared with great power conflicts such as the two world wars or even the Tiananmen Square massacre for that matter. Therefore, we can safely characterize the end of the Cold War as an overall peaceful process. This mode of the change, then, will be our second test, the first being the large systemic change itself, represented by the end of the Cold War. A third yardstick that may be used is the pace of change. Again, few would deny the revolutionary nature of the changes which occurred in a little more than two years, between 1989 and 1991, with preliminary developments in the Soviet Union following the 1985 arrival of Gorbachev to power. As we shall see further, many theories would have predicted a slow, piecemeal accommodation between the two blocs, but very few envisaged a change that is both peaceful and revolutionary. Another yardstick is the timing of change which is slightly different from its pace. Theories, for example, that link the end of the Cold War to the economic collapse of the Soviet Union leave the question open as to why these changes did not occur in the 1970s when decline was firmly on its way. A prominent example is George F. Kennan’s prediction in his 1947 “X” article that the US “has in its power... to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”!! The problem with such “sooner-orlater theories” (to use Kjell Goldmann’s expression) is that they are often non-falsifiable. To be fair, however, it should be noted that most social science theories are unable to offer point-predictions and that most are well aware of time-lags in their forecasts. 1!

11 “x” “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, July 1947, quoted from Jeffrey Porro, ed., The Nuclear Age Reader (New York: A. Knopf, 1989), 44-47. This phrase is now frequently quoted as proof that the architect of containment actually predicted the end of the Cold War. 12 Thus, we are not arguing that theories should have been able to predict the exact timing of the events as measured in months. On the other hand, approaches which predict changes in the range of more than twenty years come dangerously close to such “sooner-or-later” theories.

2

Isabelle

Grunberg

& Thomas

Risse-Kappen

Finally, few would deny that the end of the Cold War was initiated by the Soviet leadership (whatever its motives for acting): Mikhail Gorbachev became First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party on March 10th, 1985. This started a continuous process of external détente and internal reform that eventually led to the emergence of radical reformists and nationalists within the Soviet bloc and ultimately the Soviet state itself. But these forces were unleashed at a later stage — they begun to make themselves felt in 1989, when the opening of the border between Hungary and Austria permitted thousands of Eastern Germans to rush out and eventually led to the opening of the Berlin wall. This is why it appears to be beyond doubt, that the prime mover of changes (what historians call “proximate cause”) has been the reformist policies of the new Soviet leadership which came to power in 1985. To summarize, the empirical events which will constitute the main yardstick for evaluating our theories are: 1) the systemic nature of the change; 2) its peaceful mode; 3) its abrupt pace; 3) its approximate timing; and 4) its origins in the leadership change in the former Soviet

Union. We will discuss the following theoretical traditions and their contribution to account for the end of the Cold War. We will start with classical and structural realism (2.). We will then discuss theories of international cooperation and institutions (3.). First, we concentrate on the “cooperation under anarchy” argument which accepts many of the core realist assumptions and found its major expression in the rational choice approach to international regimes (3.1). Second, we evaluate institutionalist approaches in the Grotian and Kantian traditions which come closer to classical liberal theories and emphasize the normand rule-governed character of international relations (3.2).15 While both realism and theories of international cooperation focus on developments that occur at the systemic level, other theories point to the importance of intra-state changes, that later spill over into the international realm. In a fourth part, we then move on to three unit-level approaches to world politics, republican

and

commercial

liberalism

(4.1),

domestic

structure

and

coalition-

13 International relations theorists who are concerned with conflict and cooperation range along a continuum from realism, on the one hand, and liberalism, on the other. See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences:

regimes as intervening variables” University Press, 1983), 1-22.

in idem,

ed., International

Regimes

(Ithaca

NY: Cornell

-

A Time of Reckoning?

building arguments chology (4.3).

2.

Classical

and

Classical relations

realism which

ism,

tried

has

(4.2), and explanations

Structural

basic

derived

from cognitive

psy-

Realism

is the traditional mainstream approach to international originated in Europe.!4 Structural realism, or neo-realto wean

classical

on history and its descriptive nious model of world politics.!5 share

1138

realism

away

from

its exclusive

reliance

slant and, thus, to offer a more parsimoThese two strands of realism nevertheless

assumptions.

An “ideal-type” realist perspective may be summarized by describing the units of analysis, the nature of the international system, the expected standard behaviour of states, and the consequences of this situation. Units of Analysis. For realists, states are the key units in international relations. This realist consensus dates back to Thucydides!® and forms the core of realist thinking. States are said to behave in a rational way, just like firms in the market (for neo-realism)!7 or in a way that reflects the greedy nature of humankind (for classical realism).!® In both cases, there is an underlying similarity between their modes of action and reasoning. In general, behaviour can be inferred and reconstructed with both an understanding of this universal logic and of the international system. 14 The standard textbook is Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf-Random House, 1972). See also Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). 15 Major structural realist works are Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979) and Robert O. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 16 See Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: 1986), 1-26.

study of world politics” in Columbia University Press,

17 “IStates] have consistent, ordered preferences and they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light of both those preferences and of their perception of the nature of reality” (Keohane, “Realism, neorealism”, 11). Note that perceptions, and therefore “their perception of the nature of reality” do not belong to the mainstream of realist analysis. 18 “Moreover, considering that men’s appetites carry them to one and the same end; which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common, nor divided, it follows that the stronger must enjoy it alone and that it must be decided by battle who is the stronger.” Hobbes quoted in J.C. King and J. A. McGilvray, eds., Political and Social Philosophy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973), 87.

114

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Risse-Kappen

States as the key units are differentiated within the system according to their power capabilities, defined in terms of territory, natural resources, population and, ultimately, economic and military might. The Nature of the System. Different international systems may succeed each other throughout history, because power capabilities will vary over time. But the realist world view is based on the idea that the system is regulated (or under-regulated) by power, and not by agreement or law. Anarchy characterizes the international system. Smaller states may therefore form alliances to balance against an upcoming threat, but ultimately a state can only rely on its own devices. Standard Behaviour of States. The basic insecurity characterizing the international system makes self-protection the foremost preoccupation of states. The improvement in welfare or the pursuit of other goals is subordinate to the maintenance of security. The absence of a superior law-enforcing mechanism makes even alliances fragile; “self-help” is the ultimate plight. Therefore, states have to at least maintain their relative power position in the system for pure deterrence purposes (neo-realism), or if they are status-maximizers for aggrandizement (as in some writings of classical realism).

Consequences. Since deterrence — either through internal means of power accumulation or through external alignments with other states -is the most rational way of ensuring some security, the replication of this behaviour among all participants in the system gives rise to a spiral of arms build-ups. This mechanism has been referred to as the “security dilemma” according to which a state is only secure when its military capability at least equals if not exceeds that of its neighbours. Both sides will balance against what they perceive as threatening to their national security.!9 The arms race literature is full of examples how inferences from military capabilities about aggressive intentions further exacerbated the security dilemma in the East-West conflict. Thus a country usually increases its security at the expense of another’s. An increase in territorial gains or alliance size, for example, has threatening consequences for other states. A “zero-sum game” logic is at — work.

Pushed

to its

limits,

it dictates

that

failure

to

act

may

amount

to

19 On the “balance of threat” theme see Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press, 1987). On the “security dilemma” see John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951); Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, 30 (No. 2, 1978), 167-214.

A Time of Reckoning?

115

objective loss. Thus, if a power finds a political vacuum at its doorstep, it is likely to fill it because it is assumed that other states will rush and do the same, as happened, for example, during the “scramble for Africa” at the end of the nineteenth Century.2° The tight logic of the international system and the priority given to security goals has other consequences for the realist paradigm: security stands “above politics”, and defence policies are formulated according to a conception of the national interest which is objectively definable. Given a choice, states tend to pursue security first, because, under conditions of threats to the very existence of the state, it is a logical precondition for the pursuit of any other goal. This “hierarchy of issues” has been challenged by Keohane and Nye.?! The alist

way thought,

the

Cold as will

War

ended

seems

be demonstrated

to challenge in the

the

basic

tenets

of re-

following.

Units of Analysis. Realism sees states as primarily concerned with their own preservation, just as living organisms would be. In this Darwinian metaphor, an animal will fight to survive to the very end. States are seen as independent “subjects” of history, as having interests that are not reducible to the sum of the interests of their citizens. This remnant of preliberal thinking2? is seriously challenged by the peaceful and negotiated disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and, although to a lesser extent, by thehaste with which the German Democratic Republic, a state in its own right, dissolved into the Federal Republic of Germany. Ethnic, linguistic identity and allegiance as well as welfare interests have superseded the states’ quasi-instinct of self-preservation assumed by realists. Pluralist critiques which stress the importance of these factors in world politics are here clearly relevant. Moreover, state legitimacy was uneven 20 See for example this remark by Christopher Coker: “Great powers have a horror of power vacuums being occupied by others, even if the space itself is worthless” in Christopher Coker, ed., The United States, Western Europe and Military Intervention Overseas (London: Macmillan, 1987), 14. This sentence is largely ironic, since later on the same author refers to “irrational obsessions over power vacuums and geo-political threats” (p. 24). 21 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 22 See, for example, Jean Barnes & Noble, 1967). Note form in some writings of the the indivisible “Sovereign” in trat Social (Oxford: Clarendon which was developed roughly

Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth [1576] (New York: that the organic model of the state survived in a different liberal age; Rousseau, for example, refers to the nation as The Social Contract. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du ConPress, 1972). The German romantic notion of “nation”, at the same time, also rests on the organic analogy.

116

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Risse-Kappen

across the system, and this qualifies the realist assumption that states differ from each other quantitatively, i.e., in terms of measurable, powerbased criteria, rather than qualitatively. Secessionist tendencies within the Soviet Union and various Eastern European states also suggest that people value self-government more than security per se under certain conditions. These groups should have preferred to remain under the protection of the Red Army if, indeed, security had been their predominant concern.

Nature of the System and Standard Behaviour of States. One of the most astonishing developments from a realist point of view is the complete turnaround in Soviet foreign policy behaviour, probably stemming from a major redefinition of national interest by the leadership. The bold unilateral disarmament initiatives beginning in 1985 seem to represent an anomaly for the realist approach, as they amount to wilful benefits for the enemy, according to the zero-sum game logic.?° The new definition of the “national interest was accompanied by a new official discourse stressing the salience of issues of common interest, the primacy of economic and human right objectives, and the out-dated character of the Cold War mentality.24 The deviation from the predicted state behaviour leads to the following contradiction: e

The Soviet Union, by disarming, restoring the sovereignty of satellite states, and, finally, disintegrating, was “objectively” losing out since the assumption is that national interest is largely dependent on national security (according to the primacy of security interests), which again leads to power maximization (because of the security dilemma).

¢

These steps were planned, initiated, and carried out by the state itself (or its leadership, since the actor is treated a unitary). Since realists assume that states — as rational actors — maximize their own interests, the Soviet leadership was either not acting in the country’s best interest or this interest did not consist in building up or retaining military power. The latter argument seems more appropriate, since it

23 The INF treaty in December cuts for the Soviet side.

1987 is widely regarded

as more demanding

in terms

of

24 For details see, for example, Raymond Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (Washington DC: Brookings, 1990); Bruce Parrott, “Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev”, Problems of Communism, November-December 1988, 1-36; Jack Snyder, “The Gorbachev Revolution. AWaning of Soviet Expansionism?’, International Security, 12 (No. 3, Winter 1987/88), 93-131.

A Time of Reckoning? is easier suspend

to relax the military definition of the national the assumption of self-interested behaviour.25

Piz interest

than

to

The problem lies in the realist tendency to take the interests of states as exogenously given and as ultimately determined by systemic imperatives and the struggle for survival. Realists have a hard time accounting for changes in preferences based on perceptions, values, ideas, and societal inputs.26 Some realists, however, might challenge the assumption that the strategic retreat of the former Soviet Union from its great power status was planned and initiated by the state leadership itself. While few could deny the ultimate origins of the changes — Gorbachev's reformist policies —, many observers argue that Gorbachev did not intend to bring about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In other words, the full scale of the changes constituted an unexpected outcome. While this is certainly true of the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself (Gorbachev was indeed reluctant to grant independence to the Baltic states, for example), it probably does not hold for the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Alliance. The revocation of the Brezhnev doctrine in the Summer of 1989 and Gorbachev’s message to the former East German communist leader Erich Honecker that “life punishes him who comes too late” on October 7,

25 Kenneth Waltz, however, would opt for the alternative solution — namely, that interpretation according to which the Soviet Union did not act in compliance with its own best interests. In his Theory of International Politics (fn. 15) Waltz does not claim that states always respond adequately to systemic imperatives. Only, states which refuse to adjust will probably be “punished” by the constraints of the international system and, ultimately, will not survive. In other words, his theory would not predict that states always behave according to the realist script but only that, if they don't, they will suffer. The fate of the Soviet Union would be a case in point. However, this line of defence leaves open many more questions: why do states sometimes behave in an “irrational” or “suicidal” way? How likely are they to behave in this way, and if the likelihood is high, how can any systemic theory stand in the face of such widespread “erratic” behaviour on the part of the units — which in effect fail to act according to systemic imperatives? If this is the ultimate line of retreat for structural realism, its explanatory power with regard to processes in the real world would seem to be rather limited.

26 See Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”, in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 229. For a thorough critique of the realist tendency to take state preferences for granted see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Anarchy and Power’, International Organization, Spring 1992.

118

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& Thomas

1989,27 are strong indications that, from Eastern Europe was premeditated. Thus, the behaviour of the Soviet

Risse-Kappen

indeed,

the

leadership

Soviet

strategic

retreat

seems

to pose

a major

|

anomaly for key realist concepts such as deterrence or balance of power. By unilaterally downgrading its deterrence capability the Soviet Union | signalled that it did not assume that the Western bloc would be willing to carry out its ability to take advantage of the situation and infringe on its territorial integrity. In other words, the Soviet leaders did not believe in | the realist argument that power vacuums are likely to be swiftly filled by the stronger party. ; One could, of course, argue that the presence of nuclear weapons suspended the realist logic of history with regard to power vacuums. According to this view, the Soviet leadership did not just trust the West but continued to deter it from exploiting Moscow’s weakness through the presence of stable second-strike nuclear capabilities.28 This argument constitutes an almost classical example of an auxiliary hypothesis designed to save a theory by presenting an ad hoc argument outside the realm of the core paradigm. Moreover, deterrence theory itself is inconclusive with regard to the reasoning. If the West was allegedly deterred from exploiting the Soviet weakness because of the presence of nuclear weapons, one could just as well argue that Moscow might have been deterred from using its nuclear arsenals had NATO and the US indeed filled the power vacuum which the Soviet retreat left. Assuming that NATO forces had moved into Poland and Czechoslovakia, how plausible is it that the Soviet leadership would have initiated nuclear war under these circumstances knowing that if would face its own destruction through US retaliation? Whatever one’s conclusions, the deterrence logic as such does not answer the question as to whether nuclear weapons necessarily alter the realist rules of the power game in world politics. One has to make additional assumptions.29 27 Quoted

in Elizabeth

in the

GDR’,

among

the

best

International narratives

Pond,

“A Wall Destroyed:

Security, of the

events

The Dynamics

15 (No. 2, Fall leading

1990),

to German

of German

35-66,

42.

Pond'’s

Unification article

is

unification.

28 For this argument see Kenneth Oye, “Explaining the End of the Cold War. Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace”, paper prepared for the Conference on “The Transformation of the International System and International Relations Theory”, Cornell University, Ithaca N.Y., October 18-19, 1991.

29 Fora thorough argument on the impact of nuclear weapons on world politics see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). On the argument that deterrence

A Time of Reckoning?

]

While

classical

and

structural

realism

seem

119 to encounter

difficulties

in

- accounting for the peaceful mode of change and for the fact that state ac_ tors actively initiated it, realist thinking seems to be at least permissive of large-scale transformations in world politics. Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, for example, argues that the transformation of the international system begins with changes in the relative distribution of power, which starts at the unit-level. He later insisted that “structural change begins in a system’s units, and then unit-level and structural causes interact” and, moreover, that “any theory of international politics requires also a theory of domestic politics”.2° However, while these refinements of Waltz’s structural realism at least permit the changes which we have identified as the “end of the Cold War”, they do not yet amount to a theory of change specific enough to be tested empirically. Another realist, Robert Gilpin, however, has developed a theory of large-scale change in world politics as a result of hegemonic decline. His argument is based on two principles, the “law of uneven growth” among states on the one hand, and the increasing costs of maintaining hegemony on the other hand: “Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of expansion is reached, the tendency is for the costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the capacity to finance the status quo.”3! Declining hegemons can either try to rejuvenate themselves by increasing the resources needed for the maintenance of their position in the international system or try to reduce their costs and commitments without jeopardizing their hegemonic position. If these attempts fail, however, “the primary means of resolving the disequilibrium between the structure of the international system and the redistribution of power has been ... hegemonic war.”32

theory is inconclusive with regard to whether or not nuclear weapons induce risk-adverse behaviour among states see also Richard N. Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A gerous Illusion (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

0 The first quote can be found in Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, paper prepared for the American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August 1990, 7; the second in idem, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: AResponse to My Critics”, in Keohane (fn. 16), 322-345, 331. See also ibid, 343.

31 Gilpin (fn. 15), 157. From a slightly different angle, Paul Kennedy has emphasized imperial over-extension as the major source of great power decline. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). 32 Gilpin (fn. 15), 197.

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Of course, this latter prediction has been disconfirmed by the mode of change under consideration here, the overall peaceful end_of the Cold War. However, it is unclear whether the theory of hegemonic decline can be applied at all to the Soviet Union, since it was primarily developed to account for systemic change in the international political economy.3% The former USSR was never in a position to play a hegemonic role in the world economy, since it lacked the ingredients of an economic superpower. Nevertheless, many scholars now use hegemonic decline somewhat loosely to explain the turnaround in Soviet domestic and foreign

|

|

| | . |

policies.Theyargue that the formerUSSRdeclinedeconomicallyandthat this decay threatened its great powerstatus when the SovietUnion faced

difficulties to maintain its empire in Central Eastern Europe, i.e., that systemic imperatives_placed major constraints.on policy. Moreover, the | decline was exacerbated through external factors, since the West engaged — ‘the Soviet Union

in a costly arms

race which

put further

strains

on a al-

ready struggling economy. The “Gorbachev revolution” would then have been originally motivated by an attempt to re-adjust the economic system in order to save the Soviet sphere of influence. The effort failed and the Soviet leadership had to cut its losses by withdrawing from Central Eastern Europe.34 There are at least three problems with this explanation. First, the variation in the independent variable, Soviet economic decline, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The available data about the state of the Soviet economy do not indicate for the 1970s or early 1980s that there was a drastic downward economic trend. There was stagnation, of course, and decreasing growth.°° But only in the late 1980s, i.e., after Gorbachev-had come into power and initiated the changes, did the Soviet Union face a serious economic crisis. Moreover, the argument that the Soviet Union could no longer afford to maintain its empire applies at least for the last two decades, if at all. During the 1970s and 1980s, i.e., under similar structural conditions, the two Soviet leaders Brezhnev and 33 On this (Princeton

point

N.J.:

see Robert

Princeton

Gilpin,

University

The Political

Press,

1987),

Economy

of International

Relations:

72-80.

34 An excellent representation of this view is Kenneth Oye (fn. 28). See also Waltz 7). For a discussion of this and other explanations see Evangelista (fn. 7). 35 According to CIA estimates, the growth of the Soviet GNP declined from 70 to 3.1% in 1971-75. The data for 1976-80 are 2.2% and for 1981-85 Matthew Evangelista, “Transnational Alliances and Soviet Demilitarization”, pared for the Council on Economic Priorities, October 1990, 16.

(fn.

5% in 19661.8%. See paper pre-

A Time of Reckoning?

121

Gorbachev pursued completely different domestic and foreign policies. If there were systemic imperatives for change, they were underdetermining. In other words, the explanation may demonstrate some underlying causes for the change, but only in a “sooner-or-later” sense. Second, a similar point can be made with regard to the fact that the Soviet Union was engaged in a costly arms competition with the West. The arms race certainly put further strains on an already declining Soviet economy. But this again sounds like a “sooner-or-later” explanation, since there seems to be no drastic variation in the independent variable to account for the timing of the change, unless one argues that the US military build-up under Ronald Reagan made a decisive difference. Indeed, many claim that the US “peace through strength” posture of the early 1980s finally drove the Soviet Union over the edge and induced the turnaround in its policies. There is some evidence that the Western ‘Teaction to Brezhnev’s foreign policy was perceived by the “new thinkers” as a further incentive to change Soviet foreign policy.37 Whether it induced the change, is an entirely different matter, though.38 Similar Western policies during earlier periods of the Cold War led to different Soviet reactions. For example, the US strategic missile build-up of the late 1950s and 1960s provoked balancing behaviour in Moscow rather than preparedness to compromise. Finally, it is widely argued that the strategic arms control treaties of the 1970s were only possible after the Soviet Union had reached strategic parity.39 If Soviet preparedness to

36 See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, “Hanging Tough Paid Off’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 45 (No. 1, January 1989), 11-14. This seems to be the dominant view of the conservative foreign policy establishment on both sides of the Atlantic.

37 With regard to INF, one of us has argued elsewhere that the Western arms build-up did play a role, but was underdetermining. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Did ‘Peace Through Strength’ End the Cold War? Lessons from INF”, International Security, 16 (No. 1, Summer 1991), 162-188. For a general discussion of Western influences on Soviet change see Jack Snyder, “International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change”, World Politics, 42 (No. 1, 1989), 1-30. 38 Empirical studies seem to indicate that the effect of the Western policy of confrontation during the early 1980s had a much lesser impact on Soviet behaviour than is frequently assumed. See, for example, Fred Chernoff, “Ending the Cold War: The Soviet Retreat and the U.S. Military Buildup”, International Affairs, 67 (No. 1, 1991), 111-126; Ted Hopf, “Peripheral Visions: Brezhnev and Gorbachev meet the ‘Reagan Doctrine’, in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., Learning in Soviet and American Foreign Policy (Boulder CO: Westview, 1991). 39 See Alexander George et al., eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

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compromise results from its own build-up in one case and from Western coercion in another, the explanation is obviously insufficient. Finally, hegemonic stability theory posits various state responses to hegemonic decline, among them retrenchment. One could argue then that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is roughly in line with the idea that states in decline try to maintain their international position by reducing some costly commitments. But the revocation of the Brezhnev doctrine, its replacement by the “Sinatra Doctrine”, and the strategic retreat from Central Eastern Europe are outside the realm of the theory, since this “retrenchment” reduced rather than preserved the Soviet great power status. In general, within

the

realist

same

time.

tion

thinking:

what

of the was

memory turies

said can

to heed

was

than and the

the

predation, dreams lessons

of the wishful

the

history

a-historical permanence

condition

was

thought

The in an

a more

in the

international

actors

anarchic as

up by cenadept

ultimate are

reasseras far

built

to be

the

of “iron

of humankind

hard-headedness believing

at

|

as a reaction

thinking.

and

Thus,

contradiction

formulated

state

of utopians law.

and

of the with

wisdom

a major

originally

idealist

precariousness

international sobering

was

considered

The

exposes

as a restatement

to be consistent

stretch.

War

to be historical

realism and

of international

for states of peace

ultimate

Cold

It seems

idealism?°

against

world

of the

Contemporary

to inter-war laws”

end

guide

triumph encouraged

of history.

At the same time, however, this attitude constitutes a denial of history itself, understood as process and change. “Despite his wide historical learning, Waltz’s work is fundamentally ahistorical... History becomes but a mine of data illustrating the permutations and combinations that are possible within a essentially unchanged human history.”41 While realism is an outstanding formalization of international relations in the classical age, or in the age of colonization, it is in danger of becoming obsolete as norms in the international system change. The reason why realism regards history as unchanged and unchangeable is that it fails to recognize the importance of inter-subjective norms, values and_ prescriptions in the very world it describes (Friedrich shown for example that threats, usually a “realist” type

Kratochwil of interaction,

has are

40SeeEdwardCarr,TheTwenty-Years’ Crisis,1919-1939 (London:Macmillan, 1951). “a raneee O. Keohane, n. 16), 243.

“Theory of World Politics:

Neorealism

and Beyond”

in Keohane

A Time of Reckoning?

123

' : based |

make

realm

on sense

certain in

of norms,

common physics

rules

normative — to

and

understandings).42

a certain

values.

Here

extent

—, but

again,

structural

“Iron not

in

laws” the

realism

may

human

is more

open to criticism than classical realism, with its theoretically fuzzy, but commonsensical description of individuals’ inputs in history. The insistence on “iron laws of states’s preferences” owes much to a key realist assumption, the allegedly strong separation between domestic and international spheres. This separation makes international politics immune to the processes of learning and adjustment seen in domestic politics throughout the course of history.43 Thus, international phenomena seem to be withdrawn from the realm of human affairs: they become something metaphysical which the human will cannot influence. Ironically, then, there is a sense in which the accusation of “idealism” can be returned.

3.

Theories

of International

Cooperation

and

Institutions

Theories of international cooperation are relevant to the end of the Cold War, since they seek to detect and explain the sources of cooperative behaviour among states, notably in the field of security. They range along a whole spectrum, encompassing realist-leaning and liberal-leaning regime theories. Many classical and most structural realists claim that, given the anarchic nature of the international system and the struggle of states for survival, cooperation should be rare and precarious in world politics. Stable cooperative arrangements may emerge among states, but realists see them as reflecting an articulation of interests and, therefore, as closely following the changing patterns of power distribution. At the other end of the spectrum, liberal institutionalists stress the norm-governed character of international relations and the pervasiveness of cooperative behaviour

42 See Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8. 43 Martin Wight argues that if Thomas More were to visit 20th century Britain, he would be impressed with positive domestic developments and with progress in political institutions. Looking at the international sphere, however, he would be “struck by resemblances to what [he] remembered... [T]he play would be the same old melodrama.” Martin Wight, “Why is There No International Theory?” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations (London: George Allan & Unwin, 1966), 26.

124

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that ensure a high degree of resilience where along that continuum, but “cooperation under anarchy” perspective

3.1. “Cooperation

Risse-Kappen

for international regimes. Somecloser to realism, stands the which will be examined first.

Under Anarchy”

While hard-core realists emphasize the obstacles to international cooperation in an anarchic world, other scholars accept the core assumptions of the realist paradigm, but relax the proposition that stable cooperation among states is virtually impossible in the absence of a hegemonic enforcer. The rational choice version of regime theory, for example, argues that state actors might embark on cooperative behaviour to solve “dilemmas of common interests and common aversion”.44 This “cooperation under anarchy”4> perspective does not pretend to offer a general theory of change in international relations. It focuses on the conditions under which cooperation can mitigate the “security dilemma”. Even though unrestricted confrontation leaves both sides worse off, states would often prefer unilateral defection over mutual cooperation (this is the prisoner’s dilemma). Three arguments are usually made to explain why the defection problem can be overcome despite the “security dilemma”.4® First, if the interaction is repeated within the framework of a long-term relationship, the “shadow of the future” is expected to restrain the conflict partners from seeking short-term gains through unilateral defection. Second, if the benefits to be achieved from cheating are relatively small as compared to the advantages of mutual cooperation, agreement should be facilitated. Finally, cooperation is also more likely, if specific agreements can be embedded in broader institutional arrangements. The “cooperation under anarchy” perspective fares very well in explaining the advent of the “first détente” and, more generally, throws light on the transformation of the East-West conflict from the confrontation of the 44 See Arthur

Stein,

“Coordination

and

Collaboration:

Regimes

in an Anarchic

World’,

in Krasner (fn. 13); Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). Very different versions of institutionalism are often lumped together in the literature as “neo-liberal institutionalism.” 45 See Oye (fn. 26). 46 See above all Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy” in Oye (fn. 26); and ae Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy”, in Oye (fn.

A Time of Reckoning?

125

1950s to détente and arms control during the 1960s and 1970s. Partial security regimes, particularly SALT and the CSCE, emerged because both sides became increasingly aware of the mutual benefits of security cooperation.*” The evolution of US-Soviet strategic arms control is roughly in line with the argument that cooperation becomes more likely, if the gains derived from defection are small as compared to the benefits of cooperation. SALT was only possible after the USSR had achieved strategic parity and the US-Soviet nuclear relationship had evolved toward a situation in which small additions to the arsenals were of marginal significance. The history of East-West arms control also seems to confirm the proposition that specific arrangements are facilitated, if they are embedded in more comprehensive cooperative frameworks. Most agreements occurred during times of relative détente between the superpowers. The breakdown of the arms control process during the early 1980s as a result of the renewed confrontation in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan also confirms the proposition. Thus, the ups and downs of the US-Soviet security relationship during the Cold War apparently confirm the realist roots of the “cooperation under anarchy” argument, namely, that the underlying condition of the security dilemma places serious constraints on cooperation in this area. However, since this approach does not assume that the security dilemma can be overcome once and for all among states (it stops short of a liberal belief in an ever more secure world), it has difficulties describing, let alone explaining, the sea-changes under Gorbachev. From this “realism-cum-cooperation” perspective, one could have predicted renewed Soviet interest in détente and arms control, since Gorbachev’s economic and political reform program needed cooperative relations with the West, not the least self-interest would have dictated a eration of the 1970s. However, the not just return to the bargaining

to receive economic assistance. Soviet return to the East-West security coopSoviet leadership under Gorbachev did table (the Chernenko leadership did

that), but fundamentally re-defined Soviet security interests in terms of “common security”. Once again, the notion that states change their security interests and make them contingent upon the security of others, i.e., 47 See George (fn. 39); Volker Rittberger, ed., East-West Regimes: Conflict Management in International Relations (London: Frances Pinter, 1990); also Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation (Washington DC: Brookings, 1985).

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that national security can only be achieved cooperatively,4® seems to be hard to reconcile with realist arguments, even if one stretches them to the limits (for example, by including the possibility of limited cooperation). Given the ever-present security dilemma, it is highly unlikely in this perspective that states will no longer be concerned about relative gains and losses in the security area, that they would opt out of the arms competition and consistently try to pursue joint gains. In the end, realists who assume that “cooperation under anarchy” is possible or that states do not just balance against “objective” power capabilities, but against perceived threats*9 are almost as challenged in their core assumptions by the Gorbachev revolution and the re-definition of Soviet national security interests as are hard-core realists. 3.2.

Liberal

|

| |

|

Institutionalism

As noted earlier, regime theory encompasses a wide range of perspectives. While the “cooperation under anarchy” perspective rests more or less on realist assumptions, liberal institutionalist approaches maintain that international relations are regulated by conventions, regimes, and international organizations.5° Many theories within the liberal tradition insist on unit-level changes and therefore will be examined later, along with other basic tenets of liberal thought. What concerns us here is that liberal theories of international relations have strong propositions about international cooperation. For these theories, world politics is anarchic only insofar as there is no world government, but this does not entail the absence of governance through international institutions or conflict regula48 On “common security” see Independent Commission for Peace and Disarmament (“Palme Commission”), Common Security (London: Pan Books, 1982); Egon Bahr, ed., Gemeinsame Sicherheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986). On the revolution in Soviet foreign policy see, for example, Evangelista (fn. 7); Garthoff (fn. 24); Parrott (fn. 24), 1-36; Snyder (fn. 24). 49 See Walt

(fn. 19).

50 Following Robert Keohane, we will use the notion of “institutions” as the generic _term encompassing conventions, regimes, and organizations which are distinguishable according to the degree of explicitness of rules and role assignments. See Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder CO: Westview, 1989), 3-4. In the following, we will concentrate on what Keohane has called the “reflective approach” to international institutions (pp. 170-174). However, we prefer to label it “liberal institutionalism” because the approach shares fundamental assumptions about the role of norms and ideas in human life with the broader liberal tradition. At the same time, its intellectual traditions can be traced back to theories of international law. For a discussion see Kratochwil (fn. 42), particularly chap. 5-8.

A Time of Reckoning?

|

|

127

tion through regimes that make a difference.5! Generalized shared expectations of behaviour and understandings are constitutive for successful interactions.52 While some regime theorists and the “cooperation under anarchy” perspective distinguish between interest-driven and norm-governed behaviour, most instjtutionalists would argue that the process by which interests and preferences are formed is itself normguided. However, norms enabling interaction have to be distinguished from rules establishing social order, i.e., institutions. International institutions establish the rules of the game in international politics by setting common standards of appropriate behaviour. They facilitate communication thereby influencing expectations about the actors’ future behaviour. Moreover, institutions can affect the practices of state bureaucracies and the domestic discourses and coalition-building processes. It follows that change in international relations is analyzed as the transformation of the underlying conventions which establish the basic rules of international relations and as transformations on the levels of institutionalization of norms. International institutions change, because the practices of actors change.53 Practices may be transformed for a variety of reasons, be it changes in ideas and value systems, power resources, or technologies. Thus, liberal institutionalists do not have a preconceived notion about the underlying causes of change in international politics. To explain the transformation of actors’ practices, one has to make additional assumptions about domestic politics, ideas, learning, or strategies of cooperation. Liberal institutionalists analyze the East-West conflict as a complex set of conventions and shared understandings, i.e., heavily rule-governed despite its conflictual nature. They point to the fact that even the areas of

51 The Columbia

classic study on this University Press, 1977).

is Hedley

Bull,

The

Anarchical

Society

(New York:

52 See, for example, Kratochwil (fn. 42); Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State”, International Organization, 40 (No. 4, 1986), 753-775. For an excellent overview on institutionalist assumptions see Harald Miller, “Institutional Theory of International Relations and the End of the East-West Conflict”, paper prepared for the Third Joint PRIF-PSP Conference, Ithaca, September 1991. See also Wendt (fn. 26).

53 See Kratochwil (fn. 42), 61. See also Reynold Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Case of Rule-Governed Change”, manuscript (University of Pennsylvania, Fall 1990). A practice is a pattern of behaviour that is meaningful within an actor’s discourse.

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competition could not be adequately understood in the framework of a self-help system, but were embedded in conventions.*4* Both sides developed at least tacit understandings about where to compete and where to cooperate. Even the mutual deterrence system emerged as a complex set of — mostly informal — rules identifying domains of competition (most important, the arms build-up) and cooperation (for example, mutual restraint in crises; the norm of no-[first-]Juse of nuclear weapons). Additionally, the ideological rivalry and the conflict between antagonistic political and economic systems, for example, were commonly identified as areas of almost unrestricted competition. Moreover, liberal institutionalism stresses that conventions developed which excluded certain areas from the competition. The most important concerned the inviolability of the postwar borders and the preservation of

the territorial status quo. The Potsdam agreement, the regulations governing the division of Germany, the Austrian State Treaty, the various Berlin agreements, German Ostpolitik, and the Helsinki agreements gradually formed an international regime to settle the issue once and for all.55 Finally, the détente period of the 1970s enlarged the domain of EastWest cooperation including trade, arms control, and, albeit to a lesser degree, human contacts (particularly in the inter-German relationship, but also in “basket three” of the CSCE agreements). The CSCE process even established human rights, one of the most contentious issues in the EastWest conflict, as an international norm so that complaints about their violation could no longer be regarded as interference in internal affairs. The institutionalization of détente and arms control deeply affected the domestic discourses and coalition-building processes in Europe, the US, and the Soviet Union. Attempts by various governments to destroy particular regimes provoked strong domestic opposition and were mostly unsuccessful.56 54 See the overview 55 It is important the nuclear arms effort

to avoid

in Miller

(fn. 52); also George

to note that, historically, competition and can, thus,

nuclear

et al., (fn. 39).

the origins not simply

of these conventions pre-date be understood as part of the

war.

56 For evidence see David Meyer, A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (New York: Praeger, 1990); Harald Miller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes”, paper prepared for the conference on international regimes, Tibingen, July 14-18, 1991; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik. Neuorientierungen und Entscheidungsprozesse im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1977-84 (MainzMunchen: Griinewald-Kaiser, 1988).

:

A Time of Reckoning?

129

From a liberal institutionalist perspective, then, the end of the Cold War signifies continuity as well as change in world politics. As the above interpretation suggests, there is continuity insofar as the post-Cold War order can build on a variety of conventions and regimes which emerged during the détente of the 1970s. However, the end of the Cold War also reflected fundamental transformations of the conventions governing inter-state relations in the Northern hemisphere. First, the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy toward “common security” and the recognition of interdependence can be easily reconciled with a liberal institutionalist perspective which does not exclude that states change their practices to pursue absolute or even joint gains in security affairs. “Common security” still means the continuing existence of coordination problems, but cooperative arrangements are enormously facilitated. Second, the end of the Brezhnev doctrine restored the convention of sovereignty in the relationship between the former Soviet Union and Central Eastern Europe.57

Thus, while structural realism and even the “cooperation under anarchy” perspective can hardly account for the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy toward “common security”, liberal institutionalism is permissive of such fundamental change in actors’ preferences and practices. Moreover, liberal institutionalism emphasizes the interconnectedness of domestic and international changes. Practices of actors shape international institutions which in turn affect the way actors perceive and define their interests and preferences. The approach is, thus, open to all kinds of explanations including historical, cultural, and even power-based accounts, provided they are mediated by international norms. The emphasis on rule-governed change suggests, however, that ideas, belief systems, and perceptions are taken more seriously than material capabilities. To be more precise, material capabilities would affect the practices of actors through the reasoning process, i.e., their impact is mediated by belief systems and perceptions. However, as stated above, liberal institutionalism does not encompass specific propositions about the causes of change in the practices of actors. While the theory is more permissive than realism of the peaceful mode and societal origin of the end of the Cold War, it simply does not address some of the major aspects of this momentous event. As a result, 57 Koslowski “Ottomanization”

and Kratochwil to “Finlandization”

(fn.

53) describe and ultimately

this process as to “Austrianization”.

a transition

from

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liberal institutionalism should be complemented particularly those focusing on the unit level.

4. Unit-Level

4.1. Republican

Theories

of International

and Commercial

by other

approaches,

Change

Liberalism

There are many liberal approaches to international politics, but several features and assumptions seem to be shared by most of them.5§ The first one is methodological individualism: the analysis begins at the level of the individual and tries to understand how collectives of individuals interact. Second, while many liberal approaches accept the view that states dominate world politics, states are not treated as unitary actors but as political entities which are influenced by domestic as well as transnational groups. Third, ideas and values matter in world politics, and not just material power capabilities. There is a remarkable consistency that links together these core liberal beliefs. The fundamental philosophical assumption that characterizes liberal thinking is that states (and people in general) share an immanent, implicit, long-term community of interests. One state’s long term interest is not to be achieved at the expense of another’s. In other words, international relations are not a zero-sum game. The corollary is that world politics does not move in cycles, as most realists assume, but that cumulative progress is possible. Progress comes about as states gradually realize that there is indeed a potential for joint gains, and act upon this realization. “Realization” is important here: it shows that mental representations do affect the way world politics is run. The ideal-type liberal model would describe a history where states and their leaders become more and more aware of where their true interest lies — in other words , they “learn”. Liberal theories of international relations assume that the domestic organization of political and economic life fundamentally affects the external behaviour of states. Republican liberalism from Montesquieu and 58 For overviews see Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Friedensstrategien (Paderborn: Schéningh, 1986), 110-167; Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12, No.4 (1983), 323-353; idem, “Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review, 80 (No. 4, 1986), 1151-1169; Robert Keohane, “International Liberalism Reconsidered”, in John Dunn, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 165-194; Joseph Nye, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism’, World Politics, 40 (No. 2, 1988), 235-251.

A Time of Reckoning?

: ]

131

Rousseau to Immanuel Kant argues that democratic republics which are - based on the recognition of individual human rights, the consent of the governed, and the rule of law behave more cooperatively in their relations _ with each other than authoritarian states do. Democracies rarely go to war against each other.5° Commercial liberalism in the tradition of, again, Kant, but also Adam Smith and David Ricardo holds that capitalist market economies are likely to develop a free trade orientation which would then insure peace among trading states.©° This liberal orientation is also more conducive to economic success. Modern versions of commercial liberalism argue that complex interdependence, which is characterized by multiple channels of transnational interactions and the absence of inter-state violence, while increasing the potential for conflicts, also provides multiple incentives to resolve those conflicts peacefully through cooperation.®! It follows that this liberal approach views change in international politics mainly as a result of the transformation of domestic political and economic structures. Liberals argue that the superior ability of pluralist democracies to preserve freedom, human rights, and participatory chances for all citizens together with the capacity of market economies to solve the problem of scarce resources and human needs induce change in international relations. The sheer presence of liberal democracies in the international system would put pressure on non-democratic states through the aspirations of their citizens.®2

59 The evidence for this proposition is greater than for any other assertion in the comparative study of wars. Note, however, that it only applies for democratic dyads. For the latest and most sophisticated study see Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Alliances, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artefact?” International Interactions, 17 (1991). See also Russett, Controlling the Sword (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 5. For excellent overviews of the history of this idea in liberal thinking from Machiavelli to Kant see Czempiel (fn. 58), 116-124; Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics” (fn. 58). 60 For a modern and modified version of this line of argument The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

61 See Keohane eds., Transnational Press, 1971).

see Richard

and Nye (fn. 21). See also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Relations and World Politics (Cambridge MA: Harvard

Rosecrance,

S. Nye Jr, University

62 See Emst-Otto Czempiel, Schwerpunkte und Ziele der Friedensforschung (MainzManchen: Griinewald-Kaiser, 1972), 95-101; Harvey Starr, “Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35 (No. 2, June 1991), 356-381. For a similar argument see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The International Sources of Soviet Change”, International Security, 16 (No. 3, Winter 1991/92), 74-118.

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& Thomas

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Thus, from a liberal perspective, the East-West conflict has not just been about world hegemony, but about fundamental values such as human rights and the political and economic organization of social life. It was a competition between liberal democracies and authoritarian, Marxist-Leninist regimes, between free market economies and centrally planned command systems.®? A liberal explanation sees the imposition of Soviet-type regimes in Central Eastern Europe as the crucial event leading to the formation of the Western Alliance. Republican liberalism also has a straightforward description of the changes in Europe since 1985. While realism concentrates on the transformation of the systemic structure, liberalism defines the change on the level of domestic political and economic structures. First, the democratization of the Soviet system and the transition of most Central Eastern European countries toward liberal democratic systems and free market economies marks the victory of liberal values in the East-West conflict. Economic and political liberalism has won the Cold War, since most Central Eastern European countries and the successor states of the Soviet Union are joining the community of democratic nations. As a matter of fact, the Communist systems in Central Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were constantly exposed to Western values, political freedom, and economic prosperity. The sheer presence of the European Community confronted the people in the Warsaw Pact with political and economic systems which guaranteed freedom, human rights, and basic welfare to their citizens. The Communist command systems failed to meet these political and economic standards. As a result, the legitimacy of the regimes in the Soviet Union and Central Eastern Europe eroded throughout the Cold War. In other words, it was not the Western military power which induced the changes in the USSR and Central Eastern Europe, but Western political values combined with superior economic performance.® In the in Central

liberal Eastern

view

then, Europe

the have

domestic altered

changes the

nature

in the of the

Soviet

Union

East-West

and con-

63 See Ernst-Otto Czempiel, “Friedenspolitik im europdischen Ost-West-Konflikt”, in Franz Béckle and Gert Krell, eds., Politik und Ethik der Abschreckung (Mainz-Minchen: Granewald-Kaiser, 1984), 84-97; Werner Link, Der Ost-West Konflikt, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1988); Arthur Schlesinger, “Origins of the Cold War”, Foreign Affairs, October 1967.

64 See Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 62) for a similar account. The process is entirely consistent with Czempiel’s description (fn. 62) of a liberal strategy for peaceful change in the international system twenty years ago.

| | _

| |

|

A Time of Reckoning?

133

flict fundamentally and enabled new levels of international cooperation in Europe. The Cold War can be gradually replaced by complex interdependence between East and West. However, this description faces some problems. First, the peaceful competition with Western values and economic prosperity took place throughout the Cold War. Why did the change come about in the mid1980s and not, say, twenty years earlier? Why did Khrushchev fail in revising the Stalinist course, while Gorbachev succeeded? Liberal theory cannot answer these questions. To refer to the diffusion effects of liberal democratic values and the virtues of market economies is as much of a “sooner-or-later” explanation as the allusion to the Western strategy of containment, put forward by realists.

Moreover, from a Kantian perspective, states overcome the security dilemma in favour of stable cooperation as a consequence of democratization. But the turnaround of Soviet foreign policy actually preceded democratization or at least-occurred in parallel to “perestroika” and “glasnost”. The new foreign policy was well established in 1987/88, but the Soviet Union did not yet qualify as a liberal democracy (as defined by free elections, the rule of law etc.). Even today, in 1992, none of the successor republics of the USSR can be regarded as market economies, yet.®© The timing of the systemic change is again a problem, here, especially when compared to the advent of domestic change. Second, the transformation processes in Central Eastern Europe seem to have followed the liberal script about popular uprisings against dictators. However, the triggering event was the revocation of the Brezhnev doctrine and the strategic retrenchment of the Soviet Union. Except for Poland where the changes indeed occurred as a result of the victories, defeats, and ultimate triumphs of “Solidarnosc”, “people’s power” toppled the regimes only after citizens were reassured that Soviet tanks would not intervene.®© Moreover, the democratization of the former Soviet Union was

65 Liberals might respond, however, that the theory does not contain claims about the inability of autocracies to adopt cooperative policies. Republican liberals only hold that, on balance, stable democracies are more inclined to cooperate among themselves than other political systems. 66 Still, the demonstrators faced considerable risks, particularly the East Germans. The crucial event was the demonstration in Leipzig on October 9, 1989. Had the East German state used force against the protesters at this point (which Honecker in fact had ordered), history might have turned out very differently. The best account is Pond (fn. 27):

134 initiated

Isabelle at the

very

Grunberg top

of the

& Thomas system,

Risse-Kappen by the

Communist

leadership

under Mikhail Gorbachev. In sum, liberal theory in the Kantian tradition has a strong explanation for the breakdown of the Communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe after the Soviet strategic withdrawal, given the continuous erosion of their

legitimacy. It also seems to pinpoint the reasons why the Communist political and economic structures failed. However, it is weak on the problems of timing and of the “prime mover” for all these changes. As a result, liberal theory has to be complemented by other explanations which focus on domestic structures and coalition-building processes and, thus, are able to explain the “top-down” nature of change and

perhaps

its timing.

4.2. Domestic

~/

Structures

and Coalition-Building

Processes

/The study of domestic structures shares the “liberal” interest in domestic politics while bringing international systemic factors into consideration, thus permitting the “dialectics of endogenous and exogenous factors” that Pierre Hassner called for in understanding the end of communism.§®7 This approach combines the analysis of domestic political and societal structures with the study of elite coalition-building processes.6* Domestic structures regulate whether and how societal demands are channelled into the political systems as well as the consensus requirements for decisions. Elite coalition-building processes explain specific policy out-

67 Pierre Hassner, “Un Cadavre Encombrant”, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, July 1990, 79. 68 See, e.g., Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Nils Peter Gleditsch and Olav Njolstad, eds., Arms Races. Technological and Political Dynamics (Newbury Park CA: Sage, 1990); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Richard N. Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Jack Levy, “Domestic Politics and War”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 43 (No. 4, 1988), 653-673; Erwin Miller, Riistungspolitik und Ristungsdynamik: Fall — USA (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985); Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structures, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies”, World Politics, 43 (No. 4, July 1991); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). For a review of domestic politics approaches see Erwin Miller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “From the Outside In and the Inside Out: Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Politics”, in Valerie Hudson and David Skidmore, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder CO: Westview, 1992).

A Time of Reckoning?

135

comes within given domestic structures. Domestic structure and coali| tion-building analysis has been particularly successful in accounting for / variance in domestic responses to similar external influences and, thus, _ permits a better understanding of the interaction of systemic- and domestic-level factors.®9 Domestic structure and coalition-building approaches help explain the “fine-print” of the conflict dynamics by looking at the way domestic coalitions were formed on both sides to sustain the Cold War. In addition to that, “second image reversed” accounts show how Western policies affected coalition-building processes in the Soviet Politburo, particularly the internal power balance between “hawks” and “doves” (and vice versa, how Soviet policies influenced consensus-building in the West).7° Moreover, the approach seems to fill the gaps in the realist and republican liberal accounts for both the stagnation period under Brezhnev and the change under Gorbachev. As argued above, structural realism cannot explain why it took the USSR so long to realize the failure of its command economy (this is the “timing problem”). A domestic structure account would argue that the Soviet Union's extremely centralized and authoritarian state structure wasincapable of adjusting to the internal and external ‘pressures for change. The “top-down” nature of the Soviet Union's decision-making apparatus meant that initiatives “from below” were frequently doomed to ooze away in the hierarchy. As Matthew Evangelista has shown with regard to arms decisions, such a domestic structure is unlikely to generate timely innovation.7! 69 See Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics”, International Organization, 32 (Autumn 1978), 881-911; Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organization, 42 (No. 3, 1988), 427-460; Snyder (fn. 37).

70 The results, however, are mixed. On the one hand, confrontational Western policies seem to have undermined whoever was in power in Moscow (whether “hawks” or “doves”). On the other hand, it is less clear how conciliatory policies affected the coalition-building processes on both sides (except for the Gorbachev effect in Western European and — to a lesser extent — US public opinion). See Snyder (fn. 37). See also Matthew Evangelista, “Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s”, World Politics, 42 (No. 4, July 1990), 502-528. 71 Evangelista (fn. 68). For an extremely interesting argument about how similarities in state structures between 19th century Russia and the Soviet Union account for resemblances in the reforms by Tsar Alexander II and Gorbachev see Valerie Bunce, “Sounds Familiar? Domestic Reform and International Change During the Reigns of Mikhail Gorbachev and Tsar Alexander II”, paper prepared for the Conference on “Political Economy of the 1990s: The Past as Prelude”, Northwestern University, April 20-21, 1991. Richard Anderson adds that the nature of coalition-building processes in the Politburo further hinders adaptation and learning responsive to internal and external

136

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While the Gorbachev “elite-driven” revolution poses an anomaly for a republican liberal account, a domestic structure explanation can show that large-scale changes in the Soviet Union could only be initiated at the top, given state strength and the repressive apparatus to contain or even eliminate societal dissent. Moreover, major reforms in such a domestic structure also require a leadership change. In fact, any change in the direction of Soviet domestic and foreign policies resulted from leadership successions, from Stalin to Khrushchev, from Khrushchev to Brezhnev, and from the Brezhnev successors to Gorbachev. Thus, the pre-Gorbachev Soviet domestic structure seems to explain the way in which change started. A leadership change resulting from a re-coalitioning process in the Politbureau had to come first, before “new thinking” could be implemented. But why then did changes in Central Eastern Europe come about very differently despite the similarities in domestic political structures? The Central Eastern European societies were somehow able to escape the grip of the political command system and to initiate regime change from below, beginning with “Solidarnosc” in Poland in 1980. Why was it that “civil societies” were able to emerge underneath the authoritarian political structures in Central Eastern Europe, while this was obviously not the case in the Soviet Union? First, as has already been noted, a “top down” component in the Eastern European transformation processes has to be acknowledged. Except for Poland, the revolutions “from below” only started after the revocation of the Brezhnev doctrine. Second, reforms in Russia have always been initiated “from above” since the 18th century. Russia’s economic backwardness and the “late, late industrialization”’2 resulted in a strong and centralized state which maintained firm control over society. Russia and the Soviet Union never enjoyed a democratic culture. In contrast, the Communist regimes were imposed on civil societies and — with the exception of East Germany — mostly democratic states. Poland and Czechoslovakia

pressures. See his “Why Competitive Politics Inhibits Learning in Soviet Foreign Policy”, in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder Co: Westview, 1991), 100-131. 72 See Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962). Also Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World (Boston: above all, Snyder (fn. 68).

Beacon,

1966).

For an application

on the

Soviet

Union

see,

—

A Time of Reckoning?

137

_ had been democracies for quite some time during the first half of this century. From the Hungarian uprising in 1956 to the Prague Spring of 1968, there were repeated attempts to democratize the political systems indicating that civil society was not completely uprooted by Communism. In sum, while the political structures in the Central Eastern European Communist states resembled the Soviet Union, the societies did not.73 However, pointing to the differences between the former Soviet and the Central Eastern European political and societal structures leaves a major puzzle for domestic structure and coalition-building explanations. The approach seems to be better suited than both realism and liberalism to account for the origin of change — elite or masses. But it cannot explain, either, why a domestic structure which seems so entirely inconducive to change produced a Gorbachev coalition which not only completely turned around Soviet foreign policy, but — through “perestroika” and “glasnost” — also started a process of gradually dismantling its own power basis. Reforms to preserve the system, yes, but a revolution “from above” which transformed the entire domestic structure? As argued above, an immediate and pressing economic or international crisis cannot easily account for the Gorbachev revolution, either. One has to take into consideration the major redefinition of interests achieved within the Soviet leadership. In sum, domestic structure and coalition-building approaches offer an explanation of the processes of change and of the lag between economic deterioration and policy responses. But they are unable on their own to account for the scope of the transformations and the ultimate origin of these sweeping changes. Thus, one has to look at the origins of ideas, values, and belief systems in the Gorbachev coalition for further insights which brings us, finally, to theories of cognitive psychology and learning.

4.3. Cognitive Psychology

and Learning’

Theories using cognitive psychology to explain making start from the observation that political

foreign leaders

policy decisionas well as other

73 See Valerie Bunce, “Rising Above the Past: The Struggle for Liberal Democracy in Eastern Europe”, World Policy Journal, 7 (1990), 395-430; Bunce and Dennis Chong, “Rationality and Democracy: Protest Movements in Eastern Europe”, paper presented to the APSA Annual Convention, San Francisco, Fall 1990. 74 This part of the paper cannot do justice field of cognitive psychology. We will focus proaches by international relations scholars.

to the enormous instead on the

body of literature in the use of psychological ap-

138

Isabelle

Grunberg

& Thomas

Risse-Kappen

human beings are exposed to enormous amounts of information and to environments characterized by fundamental uncertainties about the future. As result, they need tools to reduce complexity.” Theories of cognitive consistency focus on systems of internally consistent and hierarchically organized beliefs.76 Foreign policy belief systems are conceptualized as containing fundamental assumptions about the nature of international politics at the core, foreign policy goals and objectives in the middle, and preferences concerning tactics and means at the periphery. Attribution theories challenge the assumption that belief systems are internally consistent, interconnected, and hierarchically organized. They concentrate instead on “schemata” as concepts about some aspects of the environment which may be only loosely attached to each other. Learning theories deal with changes in people’s beliefs as well as behaviour.’7 Cognitive theories of learning, however, have often set out to explain continuity rather than change in belief systems. Ironically, this research agenda owed much to the resilience of the Cold War and the problem such a situation seemed to pose. Cognitive consistency theories argue that people not only have limited capabilities to process information, but also that they mainly hear what they want to hear. Information inconsistent with one’s beliefs is likely to be discarded, particularly if it contradicts one’s core beliefs. Thus, changes in belief systems are supposed to occur mainly incrementally and are more likely to affect peripheral beliefs about tactics and means than fundamental assumptions about the world. Basic beliefs are likely to change only if the discrepant information is so overwhelming that it cannot be handled any longer or if tactical behavioural adjustments failed repeatedly.’® Attribution theories agree that gradual changes in schemata 75 For the following see the excellent overview on the literature in Richard N. Lebow and Janice Stein, “The Limits of Cognitive Models: Carter, Afghanistan, and Foreign Policy Change”, manuscript (April 1989). 76 See, for example, Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Alexander George, “The ‘Operational _Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making”, International

Studies

Quarterly,

13 (No. 2, June

1969).

77 For the following see Philip Tetlock, “Learning in U.S. and Soviet Search of an Elusive Concept”, in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 71).

Foreign

Policy: In

78 There seems to be a problem with this argument. Cognitive approaches focus on perceptions rather than an “objective” outside reality. Thus what counts as contradictory information or as policy failure depends on the individual's belief system. If so, how do we know in advance when the amount of discrepant information becomes overwhelming? At least, there is the danger of post hoc ergo propter hoc arguments. If a change in funda-

—

A Time of Reckoning?

139

are more probable than dramatic transformations of one’s concepts. They _ add that drastic changes in schemata are more likely when they result from the “fundamental error of attribution”, i.e., the tendency to ascribe the behaviour of others to dispositional rather than situational factors. Learning as a change in people’s belief systems or schemata can occur along four structural dimensions.’ First, it can increase the cognitive complexity of arguments supporting one’s beliefs. Second, it might expand the evaluative complexity, i.e., the tension and dissonance among cognitions. Third, cognitive integration, i.e., the set of rules for coping with evaluative tensions, might be enhanced. Finally and least likely, the level of self-reflection about one’s own mental processes can be increased. Cognitive theories assume that learning occurs more frequently on the first dimension of cognitive complexity than on the others. However, there is no consensus in the literature as to what “learning” implies. Joseph Nye distinguishes between simple learning as tactical adjustments and complex learning as changes in policy goals.8° According to Ernst Haas, only such complex learning qualifies which is based on consensual knowledge, i.e., generally accepted understandings about cause-and-effect relationships, brought about by epistemic communities of experts. Everything else is adaptation.®! There is also no agreement in the literature on who actually learns. If one assumes that only individuals or groups of individuals learn, one has to identify changes in the beliefs and behaviors of those individuals or collectives. If learning is defined at the level of organizations, it is important to know whether specific individuals changed their minds or whether the transformation occurred because of personnel changes in the organization.®2 In the latter case, cognitive theories do not apply, of course. mental beliefs occurs, it seems easy to infer that there was information. See Lebow and Stein (fn. 75), 8, on this point. 79 See Tetlock

overwhelming

contradictory

(fn. 77), 32-33.

80 Joseph S. Nye, “Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes”, International Organization, 41 (No. 3, 1988), 371-402. 81 See Emst Haas, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Ernst Haas, “Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations”, in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 71), 62-99. If one follows this definition, learning should be extremely rare in world politics. On “epistemic communities” see Peter Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, Special Issue of International Organization, 46 (No. 1, Winter 1992). 82 For the use of the term at the organizational level see Nye (fn. 80). See also Lloyd Etheridge, Can Governments Learn? (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985).

140

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& Thomas

Risse-Kappen

The Gorbachev revolution appears to be one of those few instances in world history in which learning at the most fundamental levels of belief systems and involving all dimensions of cognitive structures occurred.83 Basic assumptions about the nature of world politics as an international class struggle changed leading to a re-definition of Soviet foreign policy goals. The turnaround of the Soviet foreign policy outlook not only increased drastically the cognitive and evaluative complexity of the belief systems, it also led to a change in values and priorities, which on a dayto-day level changed the terms of any cost-benefit analysis, and eventually transformed the decision-making process itself. And, of course, the change did not just involve belief systems, it manifested itself in Soviet behaviour. The cognitive sources of the change in the case of the Soviet leadership are becoming increasingly apparent.84 Ever since the 1970s, scholars in Moscow's USA and Canada Institute and the Institute for World Eco- nomics and International Relations built up a reformist consensus and pressed for a reassessment of foreign policy priorities. Their ideas gained prominence partly as a result of the appointments of former international relations theorists such as Yevgenii Primakov to the Politburo and the Presidential Council. Private initiatives such as joint Soviet-American research projects on arms control issues influenced foreign policy concepts in ruling circles and this has been reflected in a change of training for diplomats, and indeed pervasive changes of personnel.85 Soviet academics are said to have been particularly influenced by Western Peace research, notably psychological approaches dealing with enemy images and misperceptions, while Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy was slowly but surely discarded. Western research and ideas had an implicit or explicit influ-

83 For such an interpretation see Robert Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 71), 684-732.

84 See for example Martin Kimberly Conflict and Negotiation: A Research December

1990),

Legvold,

“Soviet

Learning

in the

1980s”,

in

Zisk, “Soviet Academic Theories on International Note” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34 (No. 4,

678-693.

85 See Agner Heller and Ferenc Feher, “The Gorbachev Phenomenon”, in Ferenc Feher and Andrew Arato, eds., Gorbachev: The Debate (London: Polity Press, 1989); Margot Light, “Restructuring Soviet Foreign Policy”, in Ronald J. Hill and Jan Ake Dellenbrant, eds., Gorbachev and Perestroika (London: Edwar Elgar, 1990).

-

A Time of Reckoning?

141

i ence on ideas of alternative defence.86 Foreign policy specialists ! fluenced the decision-making process.87 | " / ) i

also in-

Paul Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers was read with great interest at the USA and Canada Institute, and its leader, Georgi Arbatov used it to buttress his case for redirecting resources away from the military. The theme of military overspending eventually edged its way into Gorbachev's speeches.

In a similar way, Franklyn Griffiths has shown that elements of “new thinking” had been circulated in Soviet foreign policy for quite some time.8® He describes the Brezhnev era essentially as a struggle between _ “expansionist internationalists” and “reformative internationalists” who | later became the “new thinkers” of the Gorbachev era. The foreign policy ideas of the reformers can be traced back to the Khrushchev era when some foreign policy advisors argued for the first time that stable cooperation with the West might be possible because of internal changes in the nature of capitalism. “Reformative internationalists” were able to influence Brezhnev’s policy to some extent during the early 1970s, particularly during the honeymoon of US-Soviet détente. However, the reformers lost to the “expansionist internationalists” during the latter half of the 1970s as a result of the coalition dynamics in the Politburo. The struggle between the two tendencies can be explained by coalition analysis in the framework of the Soviet domestic political structure (see above). But the process by which the “reformative internationalists” and later “new thinkers” adopted their foreign policy attitudes seems to be consistent with how cognitive psychology would describe change in belief systems. Complex learning did apparently take place among the later “new thinkers”, from modest support for détente in a Soviet version of “cooperation under anarchy” to the full adoption of “common security” as an alternative view of foreign policy.89 But the change seems to have occurred gradually and incrementally through adjustments of beliefs to new information. For example, the failure of Brezhnev’s foreign policy appar-

86 See Gerard Holden, “Soviet ‘New Thinking’ in Security Policy”, in Mary Kaldor et al., eds., The New Détente: Rethinking East-West Relations (London: Verso, 1989), 235-250. 87 See Robert T. Huber, Soviet Perceptions of the US Congress (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1987). 88 See Franklyn Griffiths, “Attempted Learning: Soviet Policy Toward the United States in the Brezhnev Era”, in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 71), 630-683.

89 The following

owes a lot to discussions

with Bobby Herman

and Janice

Stein.

142

Isabelle

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& Thomas

Risse-Kappen

ently reinforced and radicalized the conviction of some “reformative internationalists” that a cooperative East-West relationship required fundamental changes in Soviet foreign policy.%° , In other words, cognitive psychology can account for the process of C, learning among the members of the Gorbachev coalition, which gradually increased the complexity and consistency of their foreign policy beliefs. However, the interpretation works ex post facto. Also, it is not clear whether the lessons which the “new thinkers” learned over twenty years of US-Soviet relations were the only possible ones assuming cognitive consistency or attribution theory.9! For example, some “reformative internationalists” of the Brezhnev era did not radicalize their views toward “common security” as much as, for example, Eduard Shevardnadze or Alexandr Yakovlev.92 Overall, this approach scores well on at least two counts: it helps exlain the societal origin of the change and its peaceful mode: the end of the Cold War was brought about by a change of policy, originating in a change of perceptions and preferences. Combined with domestic structural and coalition-building explanations, it may offer ways of solving the “sooner or later” problem faced by realism and republican liberalism.

9° This argument was made by one of the authors with regard to the impact of the Western INF deployment on the “new thinkers”. See Thomas Risse-Kappen (fn. 37). The contribution of the above-mentioned transnational networks of experts might have been that they offered a consistent foreign policy concept which satisfied the needs of the Soviet “new thinkers” for coherence. 91 To give an example from attribution theory, the “egocentric bias” (exaggeration of the likelihood that the actions of others result from one’s own behaviour) could explain why many “new thinkers” argued that Reagan’s response to Soviet policies under Brezhnev had to be expected, thus reinforcing their belief that Soviet policy was co-responsible for the tensions in the world. However, according to the “fundamental attribution error’, they could also have discounted the Soviet contribution to the Reagan buildup and ascribed his early rhetoric about “evil empires” to his fundamental convictions, thus calling into question the possibility that détente was a possibility with such an Administration. Where do we know which attribution bias is at work under what circumstances?

92 An interesting case seems to be Georgi Kornienko who, as deputy foreign minister in the Brezhnev era, supported détente, but later critisized the views of the more radical “new thinkers” for going too far in their evaluation of Soviet foreign policy during the latter half of the 1970s. See, for example, Kornienko, “Pravda i domysly o raketakh SS-20”, SShA, No. 4 (1989), 46-48. Cynthia Roberts alerted us to this article.

A Time of Reckoning? 5.

Some

143

Conclusions

_ None of the theories reviewed here can fully account for the tremendous | changes we referred to as the end of the Cold War and especially for the specific processes by which these changes occurred. This is not particularly surprising, since the “end of the Cold War” encompasses an entire class of events which are almost impossible to capture by a single theory. Realism, for example, which predicts that large-scale, revolutionary change in world politics will occur mainly through hegemonic wars, faces major anomalies concerning the mode of the change and its pace. Moreover, the — again mostly non-violent — disintegration of the central Soviet state should pose a problem for structural realists who consider survival the ultimate goal of a state. Liberal approaches and theories which stress the importance of ideas, values, and perceptions score better in understanding the revolutionary character of the change (at least for republican liberalism), its societal origins (for theories stressing perceptions), its pace, and its peaceful mode. But they can hardly explain its timing. This gap might be filled by theories focusing on domestic structure and coalition-building processes which may account for both the “top-down” origins of the change in the former Soviet Union and the “bottom-up” character of the transformation processes in Eastern Europe. However, this approach as well as cognitive psychology do not indicate precisely which of their independent variables applies under what circumstances. In other words, they risk to becoming post hoc ergo propter hoc accounts. The same holds true for liberal institutionalism which emphasizes changes in the practices of actors. Since practices can change as the result of almost anything, the approach might provide an excellent narrative of the way the Cold War ended but no viable explanation with predictive power. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify change in the independent variables which some theories specify as crucial to explain transformation processes in international politics. Structural realism and, interestingly enough, one of its major competitors, republican and commercial liberalism, share this problem with regard to the end of the Cold War. It is hard to show that there was a major shift in the distribution of capabilities among the great powers which structural realists would identify as crucial for explaining change. The Soviet Union was never on a par with the United States in terms of economic power. And the military balance of

144

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Risse-Kappen

power has not drastically changed since the mid-1960s, either. It is equally difficult to claim a major transformation in the diffusion effects of Western political, economic, and cultural values which republican and commercial liberals would emphasize. In other words, both approaches could be charged with being “sooner-or-later” explanations. Part of the problem is that there seems to be a lack of empirically substantiated theories of change in international relations. In fact, many theories set out to explain why the Cold War did not end: Realism and the “long peace” school tried to explain the endurance of the Cold War order despite a high degree of inter-state conflict rather than looking for sources of change. The “cooperation under anarchy” school focuses on the conditions of stable cooperation among states in an anarchic world. Cognitive psychology emphasizes persisting attitude patterns and motivations of individual decision-makers, but had little to say on the conditions under which belief systems are altered. Despite

these

shortcomings,

seems to completely miss thing to our understanding approaches seem to score take

domestic

politics,

none

of the

#1) |

international

institutions,

traditions

the

role of ideas

se-

the end of the Cold War serves “liberalism”, or “institutionalism” an

to

eclectic

The Soviet Union suffered from internal economic problems (commercial liberalism) and long-term decline (structural realism), as well as competition from political systems in the West which were better able to fulfil the aspirations of their citizens for human rights and material well-being (republican liberalism). It also endured military pressure (realism).

At the same time, past decades of détente, arms control, and partial security regimes such as confidence-building measures had created precedents and made it conceivable to find accommodations with the

United States tutionalism). *3)

and

on the reader’s preferences). As a matter of fact, of the end of the Cold War could read like this:

from its rival superpower

oi

theoretical

the mark. Each approach contributes someof the transformation processes. While some better than others (particularly those which

riously), it is premature to argue that close the book over ... (fill in “realism”, depending narrative

major

(“cooperation

under

anarchy”

perspective,

liberal

insti-

All this created favourable conditions for ideas to emerge which offered a way out of this predicament by fundamentally influencing the

~

A Time of Reckoning? values,

goals,

and

perceptions

of a new

145 class

of Soviet

leaders

(cognitive psychology). i 4)

W]

This

new

class

of reformists

built

a winning

leadership structure and initiated fundamental mestic and foreign policies (domestic structure).

coalition

reforms

in the

Soviet

in Soviet do-

_ 5) The new foreign policy altered the conventions governing both EastWest and intra-Eastern bloc relations toward “common security” and the restoration of sovereignty for the former Warsaw Pact countries (liberal institutionalism), thereby creating favourable international conditions for peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe “from below” (republican liberalism and domestic structure).

6) A coup attempt by the old guard was diffused by both internal resistance (republican liberalism) and the threat of external sanctions, thus showing the strength of the democratic norm within the international system (liberal institutionalism). This eclectic script shows that, while many theories will be assigned a short stay in purgatory, none deserves the eternal flames of hell. However, the theories that will pass the test best are, of course, those that are most permissive of drastic foreign policy change. This is why realism, which often reads as “a theory of what cannot happen”, is hit so hard by the end of the Cold War.93 This paper has begun with the specification of our methodological stance — cautious positivism. What better way of emphasizing the “cautious” aspect of this stance, than to conclude by stressing the interaction between history and theory? Contrary to the assumption of mainstream positivists, the observer and the observed are more than ever intertwined. As we saw, the Soviet “new thinking” neatly reflected the liberal and pluralist critique of realism. In fact, “new thinking” is a discourse

93 Realism, especially structural realism, could actually be regarded as a “theory of the impossible”: a discourse analysis of the Realist corpus would probably show the frequency of terms that restrict the future, such as “never” or “always”. See for example this passage by Robert Gilpin (emphasis added) from “Peloponnesian War and Cold War” in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss, eds., Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1991), 48: The Soviet Union for its part undoubtedly will continue to seek the ejection of American influence from the Eurasian continent, will strive to increase its global political status, and will never abandon its commitment to the ultimate triumph of its ideology. Within these parameters, the two superpowers will and must continue to work out the rules of their coexistence.

146

Isabelle

Grunberg

& Thomas

that has come alive, a theory that has become in a way self-fulfilling. Thus, is the ing:

one fact

important

that

in a way,

lesson

systemic this

and

might

material

be the

If the end of the and ideas matter

tremendous

potential

post-Cold

This War,

lesson

has become

to be drawn

for centuries. ues, norms, politics.

end

new world

not

factors

order.

the

are

lost

with its object,

that

end

War

grossly

of “geopolitics”

about be

fused

from

Cold War tells in international

for bringing should

Risse-Kappen

us anything, relations, those

known

it

it is that valthat they have change

who

Cold

underdetermin-

as we have

fundamental on

of the

are

in world

shaping

the

7. _

Peace Research and Eastern Europe: How Much Need for a Reappraisal?

HAKAN WIBERG

1. The Question Do the events in Eastern Europe in the last least a confrontation, for the peace research

few years tradition;

provide a test, or at if they do, what is

its result? To get into ercises

to uncover

abstraction “test”?

the

Third,

does how

substance the

of this

question,

assumptions

“tradition”

implicit

belong?

are we to identify

Second, “the peace

we need

some

in it. First, what

are

research

semantic

to what

ex-

level

we to mean

of

by a

tradition”?

The choice indicated by the first question is surrounded by much terminological fuzz. The general idea is to look for something on a higher level of abstraction than a “theory” in the narrow sense of that term: a coherent set of propositions about how a few variables are related to each other. Going beyond that level we find a plethora of terms: “paradigm”, “school”, “tradition”, “discourse”, “theory” (in a wider sense), etc. Some appear synonymous, others merely overlap or refer to different characteristics of intellectual bodies. I look for a body of propositions stating what aspects of social reality are important and giving indications of how to identify relations between them. This is a part of what the term “paradigm” (in the early Kuhn) tries to cover. I avoid it because of its polysemy and since it is questionable whether we can find any paradigm in International Relations — or any branch of social science, except perhaps econometrics. If International Relations were not pre-paradigmatic, we would hardly carry out the exercises in this book, looking at how some specified facts (ought to) affect different lines of thinking. 147

148 The kind

Hakan term

to be very

“tradition”. ferent

“discourse” For

traditions

useful

is also here;

whatever

too

hence

technical

Wiberg loaded the terms

with

choice we

assumptions of the

use,

there

less

of another theorized

certainly

term are

dif-

of analysis.

The second question also calls for some terminological groundwork. The most general idea covered by “test” is to arrive at some kind of decision on a body of propositions by means of empirical studies. If it consists of precise empirical hypotheses, the decision is called verification/falsification (should we accept the hypothesis as “true” or rejected it as “false”?), or more cautiously confirmation/disconfirmation (has the test given us grounds to regard it as more or less probable than a priori?). At the “theories” level of abstraction, “test” is also often used. From a logical point of view, the test is now indirect — by means of testing entailed hypotheses — and the decision is different: to uphold the theory or revise it? Higher up on the ladder of abstraction the question arises whether we can in any sense test such an entity as a tradition. This depends on what epistemology we adopt.! To a methodological anarchist like Feyerabend,” we cannot even test anything in the stronger senses of “test”, there being no generally valid methodology for it: “anything goes”. Whatever arguments there may be for this, it would make our question meaningless; I therefore look in another direction. More promising appears an idea in

1 The term “epistemology” is in itself highly ambiguous. In its traditional sense, it refers to the analysis of what we can lay legitimate claims to knowing with what degree of certainty on what premises, and is thus a branch of logic. In one modem sense, it includes the study of what propositions are actually believed by, e.g., what social strata under what circumstances, and thus belongs to the psychology of perception, to Wissenssoziologie, to cultural anthropology, etc. To complicate matters even more, some scholars see the distinction between these senses as a clear one, hence regarding the social etc. origins of a belief and its degree of validity as two non-related questions (e.g. Popper's distinction between “context of discovery” and “context of justification”). Others, like Feyerabend, refuse to make such a distinction, rejecting the possibility of a definite methodology for making discoveries as well as for testing validity claims (“Anything goes”). Still others, like Kuhn or Lakatos, take positions in between these. To outline the essence of these issues — or argue a position — would fill the chapter at the expense of the substantive discussion. I therefore summarize the epistemology provisionally — adopted for this chapter as “soft empiricism, accepting the possibility of incommensurability”, trusting that the argument will clarify what this implies. 2 Paul Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (London: New Left Books, 1978) and Philosophical Papers, Vol. I (New York: The Free Press, 1981). For a penetrating analysis of the positions of “rationalists” and “relativists”, see Thomas Brante, Vetenskapens sociala grunder — en studie av kon/flikter i forskarvarlden (Stockholm: Rabén & Sjogren, 1984; revised version in English forthcoming).

Peace

Research

and Eastern

Europe

149

Kuhn's early discussion of “paradigms”,? which also seems useful when discussing traditions. His point was, in essence, that paradigms cannot _ be tested

against

each

other,

for lack

of supra-paradigmatic

points

of

reference (no “pure facts” independent of paradigms) permitting such tests. The closest we get to a test — on this level of abstraction — is by - looking for anomalies inside a paradigm: phenomena that cannot be ac-

a counted

for, in spite

of having

lenses

of the paradigm

itself.

been That

observed,

measured

idea is also used

here,

etc. through looking

the

at tradi-

tions. To avoid an exaggerated impression of how much can be achieved by empirical studies in this respect, I prefer the weaker term “confrontation”* rather than “test”.

The third question is whether there is anything we can refer to as the peace research tradition? At first glance, this may be questionable. If we identify the peace research tradition in terms of the main journals, conference proceedings and publications series of institutes belonging to it,® we find a spectrum of explicit or implicit points of departure. By rough translation into labels common in political science, we can at least identify idealism, structuralism, neo-realism and interdependence theory — and, of course, bricolage. Let me therefore revise the query by looking for a tradition that is both widespread in peace research and relatively specific to this field. Eluding an encompassing empirical exercise in Wissenssoziologie, I make it a flat assertion that structuralism in Galtung’s version (more often referred to

3 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) 4 For an explication of the term and an excellent exemplification of the procedure, see Hans Mouritzen, Finlandization: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Politics (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988). 5 For a discussion of how to avoid circularity, see HAkan Wiberg, “The Peace Research Movement”, in Peter Wallensteen, ed., Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 30-53. Surveys of institutes have been published by Unesco since the 1960ies, most recently World Directory of Peace Research and Training Institutions. Sixth Edition (Paris: Unesco and Oxford: Berg, 1988). It may be too inclusive: several of the listed institutes would hardly define themselves as belonging to any peace research tradition. Largely overlapping overviews of peace research journals are given in Peter van den Dungen, Foundations of Peace Research (London: Housmans, 1981), 25ff, and in Charles Chatfield, “International Peace Research: The Field Defined by Dissemination”, Journal of Peace Research, 16 (No. 2, 1979), 161-178. Elizabeth Converse, “The War of All Against All”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 (No. 4, 1968), 471-532, and Hakan Wiberg, “What Have We Learnt About Peace?”, Journal of Peace Research, 18 (No. 2, 1981), 111-148 give overviews of the contents of these journals up to the respective volume (Wiberg limits his to “negative peace”).

150

Hakan

Wiberg

— by him and others — as Centre/Periphery search tradition; there is, at least, hardly more obvious.® 7 Let me add

the

reservations

immediately.

monopoly of peace research on the sense (in other senses, “structuralism” tions

in various

common

with

fields, each

other

theory) is such a peace reany candidate that is clearly

having

structuralist can refer

at most

or with

First,

this

tradition to several

extremely

Galtung’s

does

imply

a

in the narrow different tradi-

abstract

version).

not

Second,

features

in

structural-

ism has no monopoly on peace research; for example, some important works on the transformation of Europe, that are better described as “neorealist”® than as “structuralist”.? Third, this is no intellectual history of Johan

Galtung:!°

notwithstanding

we limit

the discussion

his also being

a culturalist

here

to the

— and

structuralist

much

aspect,

more.

6 For empirical backing, see Nils Petter Gleditsch, “The Structure of Galtungism”, in Nils Petter Gleditsch, Odvar Leine, Hans-Henrik Holm, Tord H@ivik, Arne Martin Klausen, Erik Rudeng and Hakan Wiberg, eds., Johan Galtung: A Bibliography of his Scholarly and Popular Writings, 1951-80 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1980), 64-81. Galtung appeared as the fourth most cited peace researcher, after three men much older than him: Kenneth Boulding, Karl Deutsch and Anatol Rapoport (Table 3). His most cited article (Table 8) was “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, published in Journal of Peace Research, 8 (no. 3, 1971), 81-117, and later in several other languages. An analysis — from a metatheoretical perspective — of Galtung’s position in Scandinavian peace research appears in Helena Rytévuori, Barefoot Research and Tribune of Reason: An Analysis of the Textual Corpus of Peace Research in Scandinavia, 1959-1986 (Tampere: The University of Tampere, Department of Political Science and International Relations, 1990).

7 If we identify traditions with leading representatives, fn. 6 gives three main alternatives to Galtung. The argument against Rapoport is than that his classical works are much occupied with Games Theory; this theory antedated peace research, and its use there is but one application of the general theory. The argument against Deutsch is that his theorizing has much wider scope, with its hard core in general political theory. The argument against Boulding (which could partly also be raised against the general Galtung) is that he has had several phases with different foci; it is difficult to find one single Boulding approach with as much following as Galtung’s Centre/Periphery theory. Their differences in approach are outlined in Kenneth Boulding, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung”, in Johan Galtung: A Bibliography (fn. 6) and in Johan Galtung, “Only one quarrel with Kenneth Boulding”, Journal of Peace Research, 24 (no. 2, 1985) 199-203.

_ 8 There is another source of terminological confusion: the term “structural(ist)” is also | used to connote a version of neorealist theory exemplified by Kenneth Waltz and, most recently, by Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, forthcoming). 9 E.g. Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer and Ole Weever, The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990). 10 That Galtung’s

would require a book of its own: from production has increased to about

the 676 titles in the 1980 bibliography, 1,000 titles in Johan Galtung: A Bibli-

Peace

Research

and Eastern

Europe

151

The ground cleared, let me restate the question: To what extent do re/cent developments in Eastern Europe constitute anomalies for this _Structuralist tradition, some important facts not being explicable by using it as an explanatory — or at least an interpretative — instrument? !

We then

first need a list of major

search tradition or any _ ments in the structuralist with these candidates.

2.

The

“anomaly

candidates”

(to the peace

re-

other tradition). We then present the core eletradition under review, and finally confront it

Anomalies

Let us now look for prima facie anomaly candidates to confront this peace research tradition. Screened in everyday terms, as the things that were surprising in the sense that most people would recently have regarded them as highly unlikely, they seem to be (in arbitrary order): 1. The change

in Soviet military

2. Emancipation

of a number

3. The

major

changes

cases, lesser units the transformations

4. The highly nia). 5. The ticular

between

in

from Soviet

a number

dominance.

of states

— and,

— ranging between the German in Bulgaria and Romania.

character

of the the

of states

of regime

non-violent

transformation

doctrine.

United

States

unification

of the revolutions

relations

between and

the

the

in some

blocs

(except and

and

Romain par-

USSR.

ography, 1951-1990 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1990). Carefully selflimited attempts are found in the article by Hans-Henrik Holm (building on a much longer Master's thesis) in the 1980 bibliography and in Rytévuori’s dissertation (fn. 6). An analysis of special relevance to the theoretical approach in the present chapter is found in Pekka Korhonen, The Geometry of Power: Johan Galtung’s Conception of Power (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Reports, No. 38, 1990) 11 With specified exceptions, Yugoslavia is not counted as part of “Eastern Europe”. It was not included in the external Soviet empire (except in 1945-48), and was nonaligned. In more than one sense of “East” and “West”, the boundary goes through Yugoslavia. While the transition to free elections in multiparty systems was a generally peaceful (that some ethnic groups boycotted elections and referenda in some republics is another matter), it also interacted with a wave of secessionism which, as they often do, led to war.

152

Hakan

Whether pends peace

either

of these

Wiberg

phenomena

does

constitute

of course on what tradition we confront research (both in terms of apologetics and

an

anomaly

it with. I will of self-criticism).

de-

focus

on

Three questions will be considered for each of these statements: How certain is it? How significant is it? How irreversible a phenomenon does it indicate? !2 Soviet doctrine. There is no doubt that the declaratory doctrine of the USSR changed strongly in the years after 1985.15 There was some initial controversy on how much other aspects of the doctrine (procurement, deployment, tactics etc.) had also changed; it was made increasingly irrelevant by the dissolution of the WTO, the military withdrawal from CSFR and Hungary in mid-1991, the agreed time tables for withdrawal from Germany and Poland before early 1994, etc. Remaining disagreements on the doctrine of the USSR itself were about how much rather than whether such changes have occurred!4 — also made increasingly irrelevant by the continuing military dissolution of the USSR itself into many states with own armed forces. The main dispute on significance has been about how much this change was a primus motor, the answers ranging between “Very much so” and “It was only an ideological legitimization for changes due to quite different reasons, primarily the catastrophic economy”. As for irreversibility, finally, it may still be early for any definite verdict, given the great inertia that tends to counteract changes of doctrine.!5 This inertia has to do with the long lead time for major arms from initial decision to finished product,!® as well as with the structure of the social carriers of

12 The first draft of the present chapter was written of facts and assessment of irreversibility are updated tween has generally supported the original assessments. 13 For

documentation

and

further

references,

Pact” in Bjorn Moller, Common Security tive (London: Brassey's, 1991), 64-70.

see

in March 1991. The presentation to March 1992; the year in bethe

and Nonoffensive

section

“NOD

Defense:

and

the

A Neorealist

Warsaw

perspec-

14 Military expenditures have gone down since 1988, according to SIPRI Yearbook 1991. World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, i991), p. 139 . The same source also states military research and development to be decreasing since 1989. On the other hand, Marek Thee, Whatever Happened to the Peace Dividend? The Post-Cold War Armaments Momentum (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1991) argues that is has not. doctrine.

In any

case,

15 For a systematic

there

analysis

is no

automatic

of inertia

relationship

factors,

between

see Mouritzen

this

and

a change

of

(fn.4), Part IV.

16 About ten years for, e.g., Carriers, battleships, fighters or missiles. For years after a change of doctrine, decisions have to be made whether to finish constructions of arms not called for by the new doctrine or write off huge investments.

Peace

Research

and Eastern

Europe

153

new ideas and the time it takes them to move into sufficiently senior | positions to get influential.!7 Minor doubt may hence remain as to | whether the changes of both types are yet sufficiently profound to constitute definite irreversibility. It can no longer be about the unrevivable War| saw Pact, or even about the Soviet forces, where central command cannot ) be regained, but at most concern Russia itself. The change in Soviet doc| trine |

is therefore

Emancipation The WTO, first

clearly sufficiently from Soviet transformed

great to define an anomaly

candidate.

dominance. Much speaks for its being certain. into a “consultative body” with no military

obligations, was completely dissolved in 1991. Soviet forces have been withdrawn or are under treaty-bound withdrawal. CMEA first ceased to coordinate the other economies with that of the USSR, then disappeared in 1991. Communist parties have little or no influence in most countries (the pattern of this will be one of our queries), and are no longer transmission belts for the — now dissolved — Soviet party. The significance is indisputable, whether or not the emancipation has gone all the way to “normal” relations with a superpower neighbour. Whatever the internal conditions in these states, the change is irreversible: any hypothetical scenario of the USSR engaging in a military crackdown at exorbitant (political and economic) expenses is dead now. Here, too, we have a clear anomaly

candidate.

Changes of regimes. This is more problematic, there being many cases of indisputable changes, whereas this is more doubtful in others. The former, especially the former GDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are beyond reasonable doubt, and indisputably significant. Irreversibility, where relevant here (the new democracies face other heavy problems and threats) can no longer be put into question by a possible Soviet intervention. We therefore have some clear anomaly candidates. We also have a “second anomaly”: why the variation? Non-violent fact.

In

most

tions;

the

main

exception

revolutions.

This

countries

Communist

there

was

regimes

is Romania;

is as close went,

but

here

no

as we come

element

not

with

we also

to a plain

of violence a bang, have

but the

in

matter the

revolu-

a whimper.

question

of

about

(The the

17 See Carl Axel Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning (Lund: Gleerup [Lund Studies in International History 4], 1973), and — on Swedish postwar doctrine — Wilhelm Agrell, Alliansfrihet och atombomber: Kontinuitet och forandring i den svenska férsvarsdoktrinen 1945-82 (Stockholm: Liber, 1985).

154

Hakan

Wiberg

relations and relative importance of a revolution by the civil society and a palace coup inside the regime.) The significance also generally appears to be beyond doubt. As for irreversibility, it is irrelevant that other conflicts inside some countries may take violent forms; a relevant reservation may be that some of the revolutions are not yet completed. We thus have some very clear anomaly candidates — plus some diversity between cases to account for. NATO-WTO NATO-WTO and

the

and relations

expressed

to members one further

have wish

of NATO

about

relations.

USA-USSR

twist

ceased

of most as

NATO-Soviet Yeltsin’s

relations.

of its

possible. relations

declaration

to This and

of Russia’s

We find exist

two

with

member

the states

transformed then

into wish

different dissolution

to join

issue,

about

here. of WTO

to become the

one

issues

as

close

first

into

NATO-Russia

NATO!8

has

given

a

to it.

The second issue is about relations between the USA and USSR (or CIS or Russia). This is where there was most disagreement for the longest time. On the one hand, we have seen a number of agreements, friendly declarations, instances of cooperative behaviour, etc. that would have appeared very unlikely in, say, 1984. Brezhnev certainly would not have declared that the USA is no longer an enemy, but an ally, nor asked for NATO membership. On the other hand, national consensus about the new line took a long time to emerge in both superpowers, there remaining on both sides “hawks” sticking to their guns, albeit increasingly isolated. The failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 is one indicator of this. Another can be found in the “leak” of scenarios from the Pentagon in February 1992; the only one concerning Russia was a completely absurd one, where Belarus was assumed to join Russia in invading Lithuania through Poland.!9 Hence, the significance can no longer be doubted: a profound change has taken place, making increasingly irrelevant the arguments about tactical ploys from a USSR/Russia set to become “leaner but mean-

18 So did

Stalin

in 1952,

but

the

motivations

in the

two

cases

appear

to be different.

19 The scenario appears absurd on several counts. First, whatever would be the point of invading Lithuania through Poland, thus adding a lot of opposition? Second, if the issue was one about Lithuania’s boundaries, it appears likely that Belarus and Poland would have common rather than opposed interests, Belarus having asked for negotiations about the territory it was made to cede to Lithuania in 1940 and Poland having stated in no uncertain terms its dissatisfaction with Lithuania’s treatment of its regions with a Polish majority. Third, in that case, both Belarus and Poland would probably see themselves as having more to lose than to gain by not involving Russia militarily.

Peace

Research

and Eastern

Europe

155

er” and a USA set to continue the Sisyphean mission of being Number One. There might be room for some hesitation concerning the irreversibility, given the political volatility (of different kinds, and for different reasons) of both states; but a new period of tension between Russia and USA would be a “normal” great power rivalry, not the postwar “East-West conflict”. We thus have another anomaly candidate.

3.

The

Model

The ideal type below builds on some of Galtung’s central articles in this respect.2° I have attempted to capture the logical essence of it by presenting it as an ideal type, making no claim to capture the full complexity in his own presentations. 1. The international 2.

AC/P

system

structure

units

linked

has a Centre/Periphery

structure.

of one

with

consists to each

or more

C units

one

or more

P

C unit.

3. Any P unit is a P unit to precisely

one C unit.

4. The that

by fragmentation. This means a) (cooperative or conflictual) are be-

structure(s) the major

is characterized interaction flows

tween

the

C units,

units;

and

b) that

5. The

interaction

tion.

This

of which

the

C unit

have

within

and

the system interests

ones

between

is no interaction a

as

between

C/P subsystem an

is to widen

in the common

the minor

there

is defined

fect terests

and

P unit.

— which in other

distribution

defines does

an not

P

by exploitathe

of values

element

exclude

their

P units.

interdependence,

unequal This

and

is characterized

asymmetric

the

C units

net between

of conflict that

the

ef-

units

of incan

respects.

6. Each unit has an internal centre/periphery structure turally analogous to the one described in 1-5. 7. The two-level C/P structure is characterized ternally linked through interaction between

(c/p),

struc-

by penetration: it is inthe centres in the units

20 A central article is mentioned in fn. 6. This approach being important in Galtung’s writings for decades, the list could be very long. It is systematically used in The European Community (fn. 68) and in several chapters of his Peace and Social Structure (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1978). Korhonen (fn. 10) analyses important parts of it.

Hdkan

156

Wiberg

\

(cC and interest

cP), who

have

is therefore

common

between

interests.

cC and

The

maximal

conflict

of

pP.

The model is thus, in its essence, relational. In its most abstract version, it aims at depicting a totality of relationships. More specified versions focus on individual dimensions and on values specifically related to them. In one of the classical texts,2! Galtung uses five main

types: Centre

Economic

nation

provides

Periphery

nation

provides

processing, means of produc-| raw materials, markets tion

Political

Military

protection, means of destruc-| discipline,traditionalhardware tion

Communications}

news, tion

Cultural

teaching, means of creation —| learning, autonom dence

means

of

communica-|

events,

passengers,

goods

validation,

depen-

It is explicitly pointed out22 that there is convertibility in all directions, no dimension being generally assumed to be the dominant one. The relations between dimensions can thus be formulated in an additional proposition: . The ation

existence

of a C/P

or reinforcement

structure of C/P

in any structures

Let us now look at the logical status

of these

dimension in other

favours

the

cre-

dimensions.

propositions.

Together with the others needed to define it, 1) implies some descriptive hypotheses. It can be meaningfully contradicted in several ways: For example, there may be isolates with (virtually) no relations to other nations; or an empirical analysis may point at more than two levels of nations, with a middle level “semiperiphery”. 2) is entirely

21 Galtung 22 Ibidem,

definitional,

(fn. 6), 92. 98ff.

hence

not testable.

Peace 3) can

be meaningfully

counter-instance tion to more than 4) is also test

it.

rather

In an

becomes of their one

sizes

of its

another related

the own C unit

testable,

absolute weak ratio

more

of the

is highest

lower

and

P units

two

absolute

testable

for two

of high

to the

lower

two

pairs:

same

further

for

relative

units

and

a C unit

C unit,

and

to

— it is

probability).

in a pair

rela-

criteria

of interaction a priori

two

A major

are in a C/P

for

size

between for

analysis.

if rephrased

C units,

still

157

that

it calls

(because

interaction

P units,

to different

— the

proposition and

P units

although

version

Europe

by empirical

would be “condominia”: one C unit.23

stronger that

and Eastern

contradicted

empirically

a rather

state

Research

It

terms, the

product

of a C unit and lowest

to and

a P unit

of

for P units

C units.

5) is testable by its implication that the gap between a C unit of its P units does in fact increase. There are some complications:

and any to get

non-tautologous, we have to limit the C/P characterization to the other testable propositions.24 While empirical data (e.g. on GNP/CAP) tend to support the proposition, there are also some a number of interesting exceptions that challenge its claims to universal validity: Denmark and New Zealand constitute classical challenges, some of the East Asian (and a few other) NICs more recent challenges. (It may be a common feature for most of the challenges that these nations have had a conscious ing up the processing ladder as quickly as possible.) 6) has a logical status similar to 1): to make it testable, the other

non-definitional

propositions

policy we have

of movto add

to it.

7) is testable, provided that we can operationalize the notions of common and opposite interests — and in Galtung’s conceptualization, the notion of interest is — conditionally — operationalizable.25

23 In this respect, the model fares quite well when confronted with world trade statistics. The 1964 statistics in Appendix I in Peter Wallensteen, Structure and War (Stockholm: Rabén & Sjégren, 1973) indicates that one nation in ten lies in what he defines as the economic sphere of interest of more than one Centre nation. My own calculations on the trade statistics for the same nations twenty years later (unpublished ms.) show that while there have been moves across spheres and other major changes in the pattern, this proportion has not increased.

24 The proposition to be tested would be: the more a unit is a periphery to a given C, being penetrated by C and having C monopolize its external relations, the more will the gap between the unit and C widen. 25 Since “conflict of interest” is tied to “exploitation”, which widening gap between Centre and Periphery, the operationalization to that of “structural violence”, outlined in Johan Galtung and

is defined in terms of a will have to be linked Tord H@ivik, “Structural

158

7 Hakan

Wiberg

8), finally, is also testable, since it implies a positive tween C/P relationships on different dimensions.?®

correlation

be-

Yet testability is not only — or even predominantly — a matter of confronting individual propositions with empirical data. From the above demonstration that some basic propositions are testable it follows that deductions

from various

combinations

of them

must

be so too.

Another controversy is on whether the model is deterministic in the sense of entailing that Centre/Periphery relationships are inexorably selfreinforcing? An argument for this assessment may be constructed as follows. By 5) exploitation increases the unevenness of resources of C and P nations, hence creating greater differences in resource power to be multiplied by the differences in structural power; by 4) P nations cannot pool resources to counteract this; by 7) they are not even in internal agreement to attempt it; and by 8) C/P relations will spread across dimensions. The simplest counter-argument is the same as Richardson added to his arms race model: “This is what is going to happen, unless somebody stops to think”.27 Another argument is that the model deals with structural power; but if the resource power of a C is weakened, e.g. by overpowering economic, military, etc. competition from another C, it may not have enough left to control its own P nations. This is plausible, but the variable exogenous to the model; yet if there is such a weakening, 8) may work backwards, the weakening of the C/P relationship on one dimension spilling over to others.

The model should following content:

therefore

be seen as having

— approximately

— the

Some mechanisms defined by the model have the total effect that C/P relations will tend to be self-reinforcing. Empirical exceptions therefore call for particular explanations. Such explanations may refer to variables exogenous to the model, e.g. C/Credistributions of and Direct Violence: 1971), 73-76.

A Note on Operationalization”,

Journal

of Peace

Research,

8 (no.

1,

26 For an ambitious attempt at an indirect test (largely confirmative), see Elisabeth L. Gidengil, “Centres and Peripheries: An Empirical Test of Galtung’s Theory of Imperialism”, Journal of Peace Research, 15 (No. 1, 1978), 51-66.

27 Galtung would formulate it in terms of “invariance-breaking”, rejecting determinism in social sciences — see especially his “Science as Invariance-seeking and Invariancebreaking Activity”, in his Methodology and Ideology (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1977), 72-97. One main point is that consciousness about the direction in which a mechanism tends to work may in itself counteract the very mechanism, because of its dependence on the participants’ not being aware of it.

Peace

Research

and Eastern

Europe

159

resource power.28 They may also refer to causal forces that are of “meta-model” rather than purely exogenous character. This refers to conscious efforts of actors to counteract the mechanisms: fragmentation by uniting, exploitation by economic policies, and penetration by domestic reforms and more self-reliance.29 These counteracting forces may be precisely counteracting, the net causal effect being determined by the balance of mechanisms and counteracting forces; they may also interact with the mechanisms, in the sense that their counteracting effect is strengthened by some of the mechanisms.

4.

Confrontations

Let us now confront the anomaly candidates with the main implications of our model, to see where auxiliary hypotheses can “save the phenomena” and where revisions are clearly called for, at least by incorporating previously exogenous variables. 4.1.

The

Soviet

Doctrine

This constitutes no strong confrontation, structuralism making no firm predictions about the content of military doctrines. To maximize the contrast, we may ascribe to the tradition the following position: “the military doctrine will be suitable to legitimize continued dominance over the periphery actors”. We would then have a clear case of disconfirmation: the revised Soviet doctrine clearly did not have that function.

The following are the main draft explanations, ble with each other:

at least partly compati-

28 Such redistributions may initially weaken some existing C/P relations, but result in new ones around the winning C units. 29 The theory implies that such efforts will be against formidable odds. Where unity succeeds in one sense (the Non-Aligned Movement, UNCTAD, raw material cartels etc.), it will tend to fail in the sense that the created bodies have much more limited influence than they aim at. It is easier to counteract exploitation by conscious development policies that work largely within than largely against the overall system (the export-driven East Asian NICs vs. isolationist import-substitution). Dogmatic self-reliance may make the result even worse than before: Kampuchea of the Khmer Rouge. Fighting penetration often leads to military intervention from C nations, like in Vietnam or Afghanistan. And so forth.

160

Hakan

Wiberg

1) The changed posture was forced by the economic demise; the change of doctrine was epiphenomenal, or served to legitimize to the military establishment changes made for other reasons. 2) Domestic changes: the belated rise to power of the Gorbachev cohort meant a great change in political orientation, a new program for the Soviet role in international politics being a centrepiece with its implications for the military doctrine. These included discarding some worst case analyses and proclaiming a posture of “reasonable sufficiency”, combining some withdrawal with abolishing some aspects of the earlier posture had been seen as the most threatening ones by the West.3° 3) Diffusion:

The

to continued Soviet gue

Out

search reliance

elite,

e.g.

for changes

of these,

in the

1) may

the

were

threat

ously, duced

no nuclear the defence

to be able,

images

in case

“reasonable

for an

was

network,

transmitted and

as desirable

dimensions

was

on other

to construct

alternative to the used

to ar-

grounds.

in structuralist

spilling

terms

over to the military);

of the change in doctrine, disregarding chain we should locate it. Its essential

(no war

with

China

and

NATO

simultane-

war, no major NATO aggression in Europe) renecessities. Before, it was geopolitically necessary of a major

lantic to have a chance age, this was no longer

b) With

seen

be possible

Let us try an immanent analysis for the moment where in a causal internal logic is as follows:

debate

deterrence

Pugwash

also

(weakened C/P relations in other 2) and 3) are entirely exogenous.

a) Reduced

German

on nuclear

through that

West

conventional

of not losing necessary.

sufficiency”

it. With

as a criterion,

war, the

to rush reduced

no major

trations close to the NATO boundary were called power projection far away from its own boundaries.

c) With no strong military reasons rope, other logic could prevail.

to the

At-

threat

im-

force for,

concen-

nor

for political control over Eastern By economic logic, that control

Soviet

Euwas

3° In his UN speech in December 1989, President Gorbachev announced a coming unilateral reduction of forces by 500,000 men and — more important — the disbanding of large units, including tank units, close to the West German border and the withdrawal of tank forces with bridge-building equipment — precisely what had been indicated as most offence-capable in the West German debate.

Peace

Research

and Eastern

Europe

161

more of a drain than a gain; by political logic, democratic changes in Eastern Europe were much less of a threat to a Soviet Union bent on glasnost and perestroika than in Brezhnev’s days. The Soviet message to national regimes was therefore that they would now have to make it on their own: there would be no military intervention in their behalf. As (a part of) an auxiliary hypothesis on how the imperial retreat came about, this logical reconstruction can supplement structuralism without contradiction, except in the strong version we constructed above. Structuralism giving less inherent priority to the military dimension than, e.g. classical Realism, it is also less challenged by the change of doctrine. When we go beyond that, however, the main anomaly remains for both: Why the imperial retreat?

4.2. The Emancipation

of States

What does this riddle look like from structuralist premises, especially those about power. They say that it is important to look at structural power (with fragmentation, penetration and exploitation as central mechanisms) as well as at resource power, and differ from classical Realism and Marxism-Leninism by not assuming the military or the economic dimension of power, respectively, to have the status of primus motor. Structuralism hence postdicts (and did in some cases, like Galtung, predict?!) that the power position of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe was weak, especially in terms of structural power, for the following rea-

sons. The military dimension was where the USSR stood strongest. The resource power aspect of this is that its percentage of the military expenditure of the WTO was considerably more disproportionate to its percentage of the total economic capability of the WTO than that of the USA inside NATO. The structural power side of it include fragmentation and penetration: a structure of the WTO with a very high degree of Soviet control over infrastructure (communications, storage, deployment, etc.) and over staff. Nomenklatura was to secure that the local military elites were politically reliable, and they had generally had a period of socialization at military 31 For an analysis of the conflict formations in the Soviet sphere of dominance, see Johan Galtung, Hitlerismus, Stalinismus, Reaganismus (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987). On structural rearrangements, see Johan Galtung, Europe in the Making (London & New York: Crane Russak, 1989)

162

Hakan

Wiberg

academies in the USSR. (This process was not yet complete in Hungary in 1956: Pal Maleter and much of the army sided with the Nagy government, not with the invading USSR. It was not really put to a test in CSSR in 1968, which kept its resistance strictly civilian. The most recent test case is Poland in 1981; the result is ambiguous. Squarely put: did Poland “occupy itself” at the behest of Brezhnev, or to avoid a Soviet intervention?) On all the other dimensions, the power position of (the Centre of) the USSR was much weaker. In the economic field, there was not a processing gap in Soviet favour; at least in relationship to the GDR and the CSSR, quite the opposite. Whereas a comparison with world market prices indicates that the USSR made a net gain in the first couple of decades,32 it was rather on the losing side since the mid-1970s (subsidized oil, etc.). With some swings up and down, the general tendency since the late 1950s was for the East European states to become less dependent on the USSR in terms of shares of foreign trade, and increasingly oriented to Western Europe. Their ailing economies were mainly due to the effects of their economies being structurally sovietized: heavy traditional industry, top-heavy central management with limited professional competence, local party bureaucrats opposing any economic reforms undermining their power positions, etc. In general, the problems were less due to direct or structural Soviet economic exploitation than to unintended (and usually denied%%) side effects of the system for political control. In the political dimension, the Soviet power position was also weak. The bridgeheads for penetration were the national Communist parties, or rather their leaderships; they had two major shortcomings. First, there were repeated indications that in a crisis situation, they might well be more Polish, Hungarian, etc. than Communist. Second, they normally had little penetration power beyond themselves: in most states, only tiny minorities of the population were Communists or would vote for them in free elections. There was even a linkage here: a condition for getting wider 32 Michael Kaser, COMECON (London: Oxford University Press, IX; S.J. Rosen and J. R. Kurth, Testing Theories of Economic Lexington Books, 1974), Ch. 12-13.

1967), especially Ch. Imperialism (London:

33 Some leaderships, e.g. in Poland were aware of them and did repeatedly attempt economic reforms. These were never sufficiently thorough, since the leaderships did not dare risk their most faithful support — the middle and lower level Communist party bureaucrats — in an uncertain gamble on wider popular backing.

Peace Research

national backing was precisely to the Soviet Union. The same was cal zealots, there tion.

Most

true was

peoples

and Eastern

Europe

163

that they were not seen as being too loyal

for the cultural dimension: apart from some politino looking to the Soviet Union for cultural inspira-

in Eastern

Europe

rather

saw themselves

as culturally

superior to Russia. Conclusion. The military dimension was much tionship between the (Centre of the) USSR than

more crucial in the relanormally found in Centre/Periphery relationships. This was also true for the position of the bridgeheads of the Centre in the Periphery, the local Centres. This made for a structurally weak pattern of domination, vulnerable because of its unidimensionality. With the dominance in the military dimension dismantled (see issue No. 1), the rest of the system was likely to disappear too. For

this

reason,

nance

constitutes

peace

research

ascribe

that

a heavier

thors

are

on record

tion

of the

Soviet

with

Galtung

the

emancipation

of several

less

of a confrontation

to traditions

weight

to the

as having Union,

there

— as predicting

4.3. The Major Changes

that

to the focus

military pointed are

nations

fewer

the imperial

structuralist

more

on resource

dimension. out

the that

from

Whereas

Soviet

domi-

tradition

in

power

and

several

au-

comparatively

weak

are

— together

on

record

posi-

breakdown.%4

in Regimes

The first two issues help to account for this issue too. Without bolshoi brat to bolster them up militarily, the national regimes were much weakened. Their remaining assets were: a) national armies and police forces, whose reliability might be in doubt if issues were defined as national (as, indeed, they often were, most notably in Poland and Hungary); b) control of the economies — but resting on political power, rather than on ownership (corruption and the early phase of Polish privatization notwithstanding); c) an ideology few others believed in, and that they were (often correctly) suspected of not even believing in themselves. This may explain why the revolutions were so relatively easy, but the explanation is far from complete. There are at least two remaining 34 One example is Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); but he anticipates a war with China as the catalyst of internal discontent and nationalist secessions. Héléne Carrére-d’Encausse has also repeatedly predicted the breakdown, but with the Moslems in Central Asia as prime movers.

164

Hakan

Wiberg

queries: a) Why do we find such a geographical variation? b) Why did the regimes back down peacefully, rather than attempting to cling to power by massive repression? Let us begin with WTO periphery states in Europe and the time order of — their regime changes (Yugoslavia and Albania, having made their own | revolutions in the 1940s and emancipated themselves from Soviet dominance much earlier than the others, constitute a separate category). That order was: 1. Poland, 2. Hungary, 3. GDR, and 4. Czechoslovakia. More questionable cases are Romania and Bulgaria, with later or less unambiguous changes in regime than in the others. In two states we can also look at the republic level: in the European parts of the USSR, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia came first, later followed by Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. In Yugoslavia, the changes in regimes came in the order: Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and BosniaHercegovina, followed by later and lesser changes in Serbia and Montenegro. A closer look at these time tables does indeed indicate a West-East pattern, but not what we would expect by pure geography or in terms of military blocs and political ideologies. It looks much more like the old and profound West-East pattern, dating back to the schisms of 864 (made definite in 1054), and fully established by the end of the mission race in 1240.35 For a short period in the summer of 1990, the correlation was actually perfect between being having a Catholic (or Protestant) culture and having a new regime; then Macedonia disturbed it, followed by several ex-USSR states, making the pattern more a time table than an immutable law. The point made here is not theological, nor on whether you cross yourself from right to left or vice versa. It is rather that the Catholic and Orthodox cultures conceive of the relationship between individual, nation, church and state in different ways, this also having effects for political culture. In any case, the explanation is cultural, rather than structural, so here we have an anomaly (or meta-anomaly) that clearly confronts the

35 That year is not quite arbitrary: in the battle at Neva, the Orthodox Russians prevented further advances by the (then) Catholic Swedes. The Lithuanian empire had pagan remnants taking sides between the two competing churches only a century later.

Peace

Research

and Eastern

Europe

165

i structuralist tradition in peace research, by calling for an auxiliary hy_ pothesis that cannot be derived from it (even if it does not contradict it).36 The second part of this question is why the regimes did not fight back much more vehemently than they did? We seem to have at least the following explanatory candidates to draw on: a) No Soviet intervention could be expected (Soviet troops in the GDR rather seem to have prevented its government from more repressive measures). b) Lack

of self-confidence:

it was obvious

that

the goods

had

not been

delivered and could not be; that the USSR would not help; and that a small minority of the people backed the government,37 while many saw it as stooges to a foreign power that belief by massive repression.

— and would

be strengthened

in

c) Doubtful reliability of the forces of repression: nightmare scenarios would involve, e.g., pitched battles between the army and the security police — as we actually saw in Romania later. d) The revolution was non-violent. This meant that the forces would be even more unreliable. It also meant that was — explicitly or implicitly — promised the possibility derly retreat.38

repression the regime of an or-

In explaining why the regimes did not use massive repression, these premises have to be put together to explanations in actors’ terms. We might then ascribe to the regimes some cost-benefit thinking based on the premises above and concluding that their structurally weak positions made attempts at repression more of a gamble than backing out, the punishment for failing being worse. Yet this would not test the validity of the structuralist approach, which is not primarily about subjective per-

36 As mentioned, Galtung is also a culturalist; for the importance he attaches to religious cultures, see, e.g., “Western Civilization: Anatomy and Pathology”, Alternatives, 7 (1981), 145-169. This is irrelevant to our present assessment of the structuralist tradition. 37 Illustrated in the slogan of East German anti-regime demonstrations: “Wir sind das Volk!” (We are the people!).

38 The opposition slogan in Prague: “We are not like Them!” — but in 1991 the new regime copied the old by making employment dependent on political beliefs.

166

Hakan

ceptions; nor it does not predict correctly perceived by actors.°? 4.4,

This

The Non-Violent

aspect

to what

the

structuralist power

and

has

Character

naturally

revolutions approach structural

that structural

of the

interested

Wiberg

will always

be

Revolutions

peace

tell — or do not and

conditions

its analysis

researchers; tell

— about

of the

relations

we limit the

ourselves

adequacy

between

of a

resource

power.

Let us start by stating some essential characteristics of the non-violent resistance in Eastern Europe.?° The approach to resource power based on physical force is not to match it (which would increase the loyalty of the repressive forces to the regime), but to render is useless by not fearing it. The (often implicit) threat of force then does not work; actually using it tends to undermine the regime. In some countries (most notably Poland) there were systematic attempts at reducing the economic power of the regime by withdrawing from the sectors of the economy that it controlled. Another method, also with Poland as a forerunner, was to limit that power by appearing in a trade union jacket and demand collective negotiations (making individuals less vulnerable). The normative power of the regime is weakened by confronting it, in particular on its own ground by stating that the regime did not even create or guard the values it proclaimed to.*! In terms of structural power, a predominant problem is how to combat fragmentation, e.g. by petition campaigns and big demonstrations. For normative power, the essential mechanisms have to do with reducing pluralistic ignorance;42 for economic power, the trade union formula served the purpose, combined in some cases with organizations for mutual self39 The Polish example seems to have made would eventually have to retreat.

other

regimes

40 For an analysis of the 1980-81 round in Poland, issue of Journal of Peace Research, 19 (No. 2, 1982).

underestimate

see several

articles

how far they in the

special

41 The social psychology of this is developed in Jadwiga Koralewicz, “Changes in Polish Social Consciousness during the 1970s and 1980s: Opportunism and Identity”, in Jadwiga Koralewicz, Ireneusz Bialecki and Margaret Watson, eds., Crisis and Transition: Polish Society in the 1980s (Oxford: Berg, 1987), 3-27. 42 In the jargon of sociology, pluralistic ignorance means that the dissenters froma norm generally believe that there is consensus about the norm, they being the only dissenters. This is strongly in the interest of the senders of the norm, whether an authoritarian regime or e.g. the “guardians of morality” in a democratic one; hence, any demonstration by many dissenters is a major threat to these senders.

:

Peace

Research

and Eastern

Europe

167

help; and for repressive power, such actions served both to reduce fragmentation inside the opposition by acting collectively and to reduce fragmentation between the opposition and the repressive forces by showing that the opposition did not constitute a threat to them, only to the regime. In the based

literature

on how

1) In the

the

most

the

use

the

powers

about

non-violent

opposition

deals

self-restrictive

of normative that

action*? with

versions

power:

actions

the

we can

power

of the

find

regime:

of non-violence, that

appeal

a trichotomy

it is limited

to

conscience

of

to the

be;

2) A wider range of non-violent measures involve the use of economic power, both against the opponent (strikes, boycotts etc.) and for oneself (withdrawal, mutual self-help, etc.), the abstract aim being to get a better negotiation position by changing the balance of power;

3) The most far-reaching measures involve depriving the regime entirely of power, by making it irrelevant (setting up parallel institutions in all important areas) or by making it inoperative (sit-ins etc.). The most important fact about non-violence in Eastern Europe is that it worked in a number of countries, with a progressive widening of ambitions over time, and with a rapidly accelerating last phase. The interesting problem is why it worked: what was the conjunction of circumstances that made it possible? Some points can be tentatively made already now. First, the non-violence we found was primarily what Gandhi called “the non-violence of the weak” — it was mostly not grounded in strong (religious or moral) pacifist convictions, but pragmatically chosen as the instrument of conflict that was most available and whose prospects for success were best.44 Second, learned authorities

in

it was

based

1956,

1968,

with

any

on a long 1970,

excuse

learning

1976 for the

process.

The

and

1980-81

how

use

of repressive

Poles not

successively to provide

power.

the

Czechoslo-

43 The main compendium on its strategy and social conditions remains the threevolume work by Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). For an analysis of relevance to our case, see also Alex Schmid, Social Defence and Soviet Military Power (Leiden: Centre for Conflict Study, 1985). 44 To avoid misunderstandings: this is a characterization of the entire processes, not of many individuals engaged in various kinds of non-violent action, consciously risking all kinds of harassment, including long prison terms. Only in Poland were these small groups of activists linked to a broad popular movement, whose choice of a non-violent strategy was indeed pragmatic, based on repeated learning experiences.

168

Hakan

vakia from

had the

1867.47 from

its

grand

rehearsal

two

decades

The

East

Germans

German

TV with

West

in

of struggle

Wiberg

1968-69.45 with

had

46 Hungary

Austria

had

resulting

years

its coverage

had a in the

of audio-visual

of demonstrations

Third, several earlier attempts having failed purposes), we must also look for environmental the conditions better this time.

tradition

Ausgleich

in

instruction in the

FRG.

(at least in their primary circumstances that made

a) By contrast to Czechoslovakia in 1968, there was small social distance between the parties: groups of the same people faced each other,

no Soviet

intervention

b) In previous cases, there ferent opposition groups the

opposition

being

in the cards.

was usually in the same

in different

countries.

little coordination country, and even This

had

between difless between

improved

in the

late

1980s. c) There

was

a snowball

as an inspiration

effect:

for the

the

next,

first

successful

case,

Poland,

served

etc.

d) Détente had deprived the authorities of a threat element to engender rallying around their) flag. It had also deflated the “rate of exchange” of military power to other forms of power. e) The

power

normative

a) and

resources

of the

or economic

b) are about

room

structural

deal with resource power; c) may fragmentation), or as exogenous.

regimes

had

been

for

a Gomulka

power

(less

worn

out:

was

no

or a Gierek.

fragmentation)

be interpreted

there

in structural

and

d) and

terms

e)

(less

45 See Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War without Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defense (New York: Schocken, 1975), especially Ch. 6. This interesting work differs from most of the literature in the field by having Clausewitz as a main source of strategic inspiration. 46 It ultimately failed in its proclaimed aims; but it took the USSR Slovak collaborators eight months to get the situation under control, originally counted with about a week.

and its Czech and whereas they had

47 See Sharp (fn. 43). The Hungarian struggle in the 19th century inspired the Finnish civilian resistance at the turn of the century — and several forms of non-violent resistance in Hungary in 1956, also described by Sharp.

Peace

4.5. The Transformation

Research

and Eastern

of Relations

between

Europe

169

USA and USSR

The anomaly candidate to be accounted for consists in a drastic change in interaction, including rhetoric, between the USA and the USSR/ Russia: from largely hostile to mainly friendly. These interactions have several important contexts and effects; the order of presentation chosen here is to begin with the global context, move to the particular relations between these two states and finally discuss their relationships to the development of bloc relations in Europe. At the global level, the issues of polarity and polarization are often seen as fundamental, for example for the understanding of US-USSR relations. Postwar history is then seen as a quick move to tight bipolarity followed by a slow process towards loose bipolarity. Many authors see the last few years as a transition to unipolarity; others argue that the change has rather been to multipolarity. Neither of these possible changes in polarity constitutes a direct challenging anomaly to the structuralist approach, which does not see bipolarity as theoretically privileged.4® In fact, the peace research tradition was early out in treating the postwar system of states as essentially multipolar (with bipolarity as an ephemeral limiting case). Galtung’s models have been multipolar for decades, as are those of many of his followers,*9 the military dimension not being privileged among the dimensions of power. How the world and Europe have been polarized (number of poles and degree of polarization®°) thus depends on the dimension considered. Through a politico-military lens, a high degree of bipolarity>! with indisputable Centres has long depicted itself; the dissolution of WTO is therefore a clear structural rupture. Seen through an economic lens, however, the processes of depolarization and multipolarization are old ones; the former is seen in Eastern European economies being increasingly oriented to the West, even if the USSR remained the single biggest trading partner for all of them. We have also had global economic multipolarity for a long time. The dependence on dimensions is graphically illustrated by the USA’s position as primus 48 Other parts of the tradition than the hard core presented dency for conflicts to bipolarize under a set of circumstances. 49 See, e.g. Peter

Wallensteen

here

deal with the ten-

(fn. 23).

50 The degree of polarization can be conceptualized in terms of the absence of neutrals, or in terms of how close the system lies to the ideal type where all positive relations are inside the subsystems around the respective poles, or a combination. 51 It has

also

been

higher

in Europe

than

in the

rest

of the

world.

170

Hakan

Wiberg

inter pares in the G-7 context differing clearly from its Big Brother position in NATO and in other parts of its alliance system. From a structuralist perspective, the primary challenge of change lies in accounting for the emancipation of Peripheries from a Centre unit, and in accounting for the emergence of one or more new Centres. I have already discussed the first problem: the dissolution of the C/P system with the USSR in the C role. The second problem is linked to the “rate of exchange” problem: how to weigh different power dimensions together into an aggregated one. There are two radical solutions: to give infinite weight to a single dimension, or to avoid the problem. Traditional Realism has tended in the first direction, the peace research tradition in the second, being more interested in Centre/Periphery relations than in Centre/ Centre relations, focusing more on structural power than on resource power — and having had no simple solution to the weighting problem. In Centre/Periphery resource

power

Periphery vious

we consider,

units.52

solution

relations,

the Centre

In Centre/Centre

is where

it rarely

C1 exceeds

matters

having relations,

C2 on every

much the

much

what

more only

than

case

aspect any

with

of of its

an

ob-

dimension.53

For a few decades this was true for the USA in relation to any other Centre. In the US-USSR relationship, the weights given to the power dimensions would not affect USA coming out as Number One (but more clearly so if the economic dimension got a high weight). After the Soviet retreat from the “struggle for parity” where the military dimension was its only chance, this is even more clear. To depict a clear recent change, we must combine a very heavy weight to the military dimension with a belief that the USSR was close to the USA in effective military power.54 The Japanese Centre was also largely one-dimensional and could not yet

52 Not necessarily more than the sum of what the Periphery units have, however — it is precisely this that calls for the notion of structural power as a central element of explanation. Since a grand Periphery alliance is a hypothetical actor only, its pooled resource power has no explanatory value in itself, but perceptions of it may have. ; 53 It will then normally also be more powerful in structural terms — having a bigger and more controlled Periphery system — but this empirical assertion is not derivable from the structuralist propositions in that direction. On the other hand, having more structural power means greater advantages by exploitation and may thereby contribute to account for the difference in resource power.

54 The first belief would be theoretical; the second empirical, but depending strongly on methodology. For a discussion of this, see Hakan Wiberg, “Measuring Military Exiene Purposes, Methods, Sources”, Cooperation and Conflict, 18 (No. 3, 1983), 161-178.

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match the USA even in terms of economic resource power; nor could Germany or (in the beginning) even the EC. By the same logic, the USSR could — for an even shorter period than the USA — have a claim to being Number Two by outranking all other contenders on each power dimension. In these respects, the last twenty years have meant much change -and the last couple of years not so much. What weights we give to different dimensions makes the same difference for the USSR/Russia and the USA: the higher the weight of the economic in relation to the military dimension, the more modest their status. . The relative weight of economic power seems to have increased indeed. A theoretical argument for this statement is derived from an additional assumption: that actors try to maximize the importance of the dimensions where they stand strongest. Since an increasing number of Centres are more able to compete for status on the economic than on the military dimension , the first dimension gets increased weight. Another argument is based on a common denominator in several developments: the emancipation of Eastern Europe, the détente between the USSR/Russia and China, the increasing economic relations between China and Japan, and the likelihood of improved relations between USSR/Russia and Japan if the islands issue is resolved. These developments all entail a reduced saliency of the military relative to the economic dimension in the bilateral relations. In spite of attempts to counteract this tendency,®> other actors thus have less reasons for economic concessions to the main possessors of military power.56 In direct US-USSR relations, this means that it is primarily the changing “rate of exchange”, rather than changes on single dimensions, that have increased the difference between the USA and the USSR/Russia — while decreasing the status differences between the USA and Germany and Japan. The two first states remain in a category of their own on the military dimension, whether in terms of nuclear weapons, conventional forces or arms exports, and this is only to a limited extent affected by

55 The main elements in the US “strategy against change” (not imply any conscious US grand strategy) seem to include widening the mandate of NATO (agenda, zone of operations) and attempts to demonstrate the importance of military power in the Gulf. Neither has been very successful.

56 An illustration was given at the G-7 meeting in May 1991, Germany and Japan “withdrawing” their contributions to the Gulf War by refusing to lower their interest rates. This refusal (which in itself would have been unlikely twenty years ago) probably cost the USA more than it gained by the contributions.

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what happens to their pact systems or in various negotiations and treaties.57 Nor have their relations changed dramatically on the economic dimension, the USA still being the biggest single economy among a group of big ones, its foreign trade slightly smaller than the German and its foreign aid slightly smaller than the Japanese;°® Russia was not a main challenger before — and is even less so now. The anomalous change in US-USSR relations was identified above as being primarily a change in interactive relations; changes in relative size and status are potential explanatory factors, rather than being the changes to be explained. Our central issue here is thus to what extent the changed interactive relations between the USA and USSR/Russia provide a challenge to the structuralist tradition. As stated above, the model says little about Centre/Centre relations, except in terms of interaction volume, where the Centre/Centre interaction is expected to be greater than between either Centre and any of its Periphery units. No proposition in the set tells whether any specific Centre/Centre relation will be primarily conflictual or cooperative. We will therefore have to make derivations to see whether they entail propositions challenged by this change. Although it is not a formal proposition in the presentation of the model above, we may regard it as an implicit postulate that Centres tend to preserve their Periphery systems; we have already dealt with the theoretical challenge thus defined by the Soviet imperial retreat. A further conclusion from the model is then that a Centre will tend to protect its Periphery sphere by A) acting in its behalf vis-a-vis other actors; B) protecting it against penetration from other Centres; C) protecting it against exploitation from other Centres. In the between cated able

military them

for

sphere — were

instance

to speak

for

by the

the the

WTO

and

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much

NATO

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much

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57 This certainly does not mean that they are even close to being equal: the virtual disappearance of Soviet power projection far beyond its boundaries has meant that the USA has achieved a much freer hand to put its imprint on regional conflicts — to the extent that external military power can be made relevant to them. In addition, the US mili-

tary budget is projected to decrease more slowly, which implies increasing differences in intervention capability. 58 The differences are so small that fluctuating rates of exchange between the three currencies cause changes of places from month to month.

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and

Eastern

Europe

173

than the USA could speak for NATO;59 but assumption A was challenged years before 1989 by Gorbachev proclaiming WTO states to be sovereign to look after their own security interests. We find a different pattern in the economic sphere. CMEA was the Soviet instrument; the economic multipolarity of the West was reflected in the absence of a corresponding institution there. USA is not even a member of the organization with greatest influence over its members, the EC; the OECD does not have much authority, and G-7 clearly is not a transmission belt for USA policies. US-USSR relations thus had less effects in Europe,®° precisely because the scene was more limited to this continent. (For a long time both CMEA and EC stuck to type A tactics by mutual non-recognition, countries on the 1989.)

insisting on dealing other side; but those

as collectivities with individual policies were eroded long before

Mutual type B tactics appeared on all dimensions: by mutual supervision of suspect contacts with the other side, (primarily Eastern) censorship and travel restrictions, different systems of ownership, etc. Type C tactics are more difficult to identify; most of the mutual economic restrictions appear to have been primarily dictated by fear of penetration, and in addition, there were different perceptions in the East and the West as to what constituted the problem.®! This aspect has therefore had limited immediate relevance for US-USSR relations, and in particular in Europe. Centres obviously have opposed interests; but it is also implicit in the model that they have a common interest in preserving the C/P structure. We thus have a mixed-motive game, where an assessment of the balance 59 The source situation makes comparisons difficult. The USSR appears always to have had its way in the WTO, even if individual countries, especially Romania and Hungary could make reservations. Whether any WTO decisions had a compromise character may be found out by new archives being available. The USA usually had its way in NATO, but often had to make compromises to get there. One of the first clear defeats was the Follow-On-To-Lance in 1989.

60 One European national clashes turbines

exception from this is defined by the US-dictated COCOM rules preventing the businessmen too from doing business their US colleagues were barred from by legislation. These were, however, eroded by increasing dissent and even open between USA and the major West European governments, e.g. concerning gas to Siberia.

61 Both the USSR and other CMEA states were primarily exporting raw materials and semi-processed goods to the West and importing (COCOM-permitted) processed goods and technology from it, the pattern being very similar to that between the West and the Third World. By the structuralist model, this is a central element in exploitation; but for a long time, Marxist textbook economics, defining exploitation according to its labour theory of value, prevented the Soviet decision-makers from seeing that.

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Wiberg

of interests calls for further elaboration and additional premises. There being much disagreement about how to postulate these additional premises and about the relations between these interests,®2 the model is only weakly challenged by the European development of US-USSR relations. The versions most strongly challenged are those that ascribe to superpowers an inherent interest in running a cold war to keep their respective clients faithful — they are clearly disconfirmed by the Gorbachev-Yeltsin effect, whereas analyses ascribing this tendency to particular cohorts of politicians in East and West must be judged by future historians with better access to evidence. Let us next focus on East-West relations in Europe by looking at the relations between the pact systems here. The changes became incontrovertible earlier than in the US-USSR case, WTO’s disappearance and the CFE I treaty having wide-ranging implications for West European security. The worst case conventional scenario used to be a massive Soviet + WTO attack from a flying start. Today a worst case scenario, to pass at least the test of logistical possibility, must be one of a considerably less massive Russian attack suffering the attrition of fighting itself through several hundred miles of hostile territory, thereby also providing very ample warning time. Western Europe can therefore make military reductions and view a reduction of US troops in Europe with equanimity.® For this reason, the Centre/Periphery patterns from the old system are thus weakened or vanishing in the military dimension. Since the Soviet empire was decidedly one-dimensional,®4 and the military dimension that where a C/P system around USA was most developed in Europe, this also means that the old C/P systems around the two superpowers are in rapid decline altogether.

62 There are several queries. Would the effect of Western détente policies be liberalization in the East — or would it legitimize continued or even stricter control? Was it in US national interests to informally recognize the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe (Sonnenfeld) or to oppose it (Reagan)? Was the superpower conflict in their common interest, by securing their own spheres of influence, as argued by Mary Kaldor in The Disintegrating West (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978)? 63 From that point of view, that is. There are other including Russia, to want a continued American symbolical level. 64 In addition, what has been an exception that clients tended to be a drain rather perspectives than the military.

grounds presence

for many European states, in Europe at least on a

for the USA has been a rule than a gain when regarded

for the USSR: from other

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:

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175

A structuralist will then expect new C/P patterns to emerge in Europe. They will depend on the development of “rates of exchange” treated above, and on 1) how much success former WTO states and former parts of the USSR have in building networks for collective action, and 2) whether the major

EC states

appear

as separate

Centre

actors

or as a joint

Centre.®

The obvious structuralist hypothesis is that 1) has slim chances, there being no previous structures to build on, all of them having been Centredominated. The Hexagonale project (Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, the CSFR and Poland) can be seen as a partial attempt in this direction, Italy being less likely to be overpowering than Germany;®6 but precisely that feature will set Germany against it.6”7 The very modest achievements of Europe East of the EC in creating instruments for joint bargaining with the West support this hypothesis. The structuralist prediction on 2) is a strong tendency for a joint West European Centre to develop.®® Possible regional sub-Centres have their competition regulated by rules internal to the EC, whose content or implementation the East European states are unable to affect. The results of the Maastricht conference in December 1991 support the prediction: even if a number of delays and national exceptions were agreed, the agreements in Maastricht clearly moved the creation of a joint Centre beyond the set of rules defining the Inner Market.

5.

Conclusion

Let me now try to summarize the implications for the structuralist tradition in peace research of the changes in Europe in the last few years.

65 We do not have to think of states as C units. They may also be national regions (a North German “Hansa”, or Bavaria setting up its own pattern in south-eastern and south-western directions) or transnational regions.

66 From the point of view of the Eastern governments, there is rather another problem: that the Hexagonale may mean a detour and a delay on the road to the EC membership they hope for. 67 Among several other perspectives on the conflicts in Yugoslavia, it can be seen as a battlefield between the state-based Hexagonale (with Italy as heavyweight), including all of (pre-1991) Yugoslavia, and the region-based Alp-Adriatic project (with Bavaria as heavyweight), which includes Slovenia and Croatia only. 68 See Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973). His Europe in the Making (New York and London: Crane Russak/Taylor & Francis, 1989) also indicates alternatives that might be attempted and some conditions for their succeeding.

Hakan

176 1.

Wiberg

The challenge posed by the change in Soviet military doctrine defines two options, the tradition not dealing directly with perceptions: one is to declare that there is no challenge, and the other to expand the model by the assumption that military doctrines of Centres have the function to legitimize a continued Centre position, in which case we get the same clear disconfirmation as suffered by other main traditions. The auxiliary hypotheses used in my reconstruction of the change largely used variables exogenous to the model, so the strongest claim that can be made is that they are compatible with it. . The emancipation from Soviet dominance is defines a prima facie disconfirmation of C/P theory. At closer inspection, it could be accounted for in terms of undermined power positions, in particular weak structural power positions, of the USSR and its traditional bridgeheads. It therefore defines a positive input to another tradition connected with ours, but only hinted at above: theory about emancipation from C/P relationships. In any case, the structuralist tradition may claim to have done better than traditions with their main emphasis on resource power (rather than structural power) and attaching great weight to the military dimension of power.

3.

The major changes of regime in several states was accounted for with reference to the change in Soviet doctrine and in terms of weak resource power and weakening structural power of the old regimes. The logic is thus similar to that for anomaly candidate 2: change was accounted for by adding the empirical observation that these sources of power were weak and therefore did not define the obstacles they normally do. The geographical variation was accounted for by a cultural variable entirely exogenous to the model. The question why the old regimes preferred withdrawing to fighting is primarily a matter of actor explanation, on which the structural tradition only bears indirectly; the variables used to account for it were partly taken from the model, partly exogenous. |

4.

The highly non-violent character of the revolutions must primarily be accounted for in actor terms, and the contributions to the analysis from the peace research tradition are of two kinds. One lies in structural analysis explaining the setting in which they occurred; if

|

Peace Research

and Eastern

Europe

we assume actors to have a correct perception also have an explanation of how the revolutions

177 of this setting,®©9 we systematically ex-

ploited the weaknesses in resource power and structural power of the old regimes by undermining them further and eventually defeating them. Some parts of the explanation, however, had to be fetched from another area in the peace research tradition: the theory of nonviolence, using concepts like “casting off fear” and “reducing pluralistic ignorance”. These are compatible with the structuralist tradition: the former can be reconstructed in terms of “rates of exchange” between dimensions of power, and the latter as a tactic of reducing fragmentation in the dimension of normative power. The appropriate verdict seems to be that the structuralist by the non-violent revolutions and analysing them, but that postdictions premises not inherent in the model.7°

model is not disconfirmed that it can contribute to of it require some added

5. The transformation of the relations between the United States and the USSR contained three queries: about their positions in the global system, about their direct relations and about their pact systems in Europe. The first did not define much of a challenge, falling largely outside the scope of the theory. Extending the theory with an argument on “rates of exchange of power”, I arrived at the conclusion that both states had lost international status, but the USSR more so. The change in their direct relations also defines a weak challenge, for the same reasons: the model implies a mixed-motive game, with competition about Peripheries and common interests in preserving the C/P system, but any prediction about the relative balance of these interests calls for premises external to the model. The recent developments in Europe question the model by the dissolution of the Soviet C/P system (treated under 2) and support it in

69 Sharing the analysis from the present perspective, that is. This is of course a questionable assumption, but no worse than what other theories have to do when moving from system assumptions to explaining the behaviour of actors.

70 after the defeat of Solidarity in 1981, I predicted in the preface of a Swedish edition of analyses by Polish sociologists that a new non-violent revolution would come within a few years. That prediction, however, was primarily based on the theory of non-violence and an analysis of Polish history, with the structuralist model in an ancillary role. See Hakan Wiberg, Margareta Bertilsson, Kristian Gerner and Andrzej Kutylowski (eds.), Konflikt och Solidaritet i Polen. Sociologiska analyser inifran (Stockholm: Prisma, 1982).

178

Hakan terms

of the

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Some

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is it good

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Wiberg

control,

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disso-

8

What Is It That Changed Cold War?

with the End of the

An Analysis of the Problem Explaining Change

HEIKKI

1. How the

of Identifying

and

PATOMAKI

Identification

of Change

is Theory-Dependent

Any theory of International Relations includes an ontology. By ontology I mean theory or a model of being, of the basic entities of which the world consists and of their relationship to one another. An ontology may be explicit or implicit, self-consciously understood as such or not.! There have been philosophies of science, particularly post-Humean ones, which have attempted to deny the role of ontologies in scientific theories, and which have thus reduced being to knowledge. However, in this context I simply assume that theories based on post-Humean philosophies of science do include implicit ontologies, although the authors of these theories have not understood this themselves, and although they may themselves prefer to speak of the “basic units of analysis”. Doctrines of being, i.e. ontologies, can be also distinguished by how they define the reality in terms of the notions of possibility, necessity and actuality.2 For instance, according to the post-Humean (positivist) world-view, the actual world is the only possible world, and science is a project of searching for universal

1 See Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986), 36-37. 2 Hayward R. Alker Jr., “Emancipatory Empiricism: Toward the Renewal of Empirical Peace Research”, in Wallensteen ed., Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), 219. 179

180

Heikki

Patomaki

(and thus necessary) invariances, which are typically interpreted in terms of “the determinism of large numbers”. The changes which occurred during “the end of the cold war” — is this choice of terms already a theory about what is important and relevant, and what is not? — can be analyzed only within a theoretical framework, which includes an ontology. To speak of change at all, is to do so within theoretical and philosophical categories that define the identity of and difference between temporal social entities and imply particular existential hypotheses or ontological claims. A change can be defined as a set of temporal transformations from world, to world2. At the epistemological level, at the level of theoretical categories, models and knowledge, it is appropriate to speak of identifying changes. Hence, every theory of international relations defines what the world, is, what it is like, and what its possible transformations are. Now, the task of theory-dependent identification can be analyzed with the help of the notion of iconic model. M is an iconic model of N, if T’ describes M and T describes N and T is a sentential model of T. T’ is a model of T (T and T are sets of sentences) if for every p in T there is a q (one and only one q perhaps) in T’, such that if q is acceptable, then p is judged to be true, and if p is judged to be false then q is unacceptable. The iconic model is a picture of a possible world, and correspondingly a theory can be thought of metaphorically as a statement-picture complex.* A taxonomy of iconic models is shown in Table 1. International Relations theories can be analyzed and classified as different kinds of iconic models. Models can be classified to different categories depending on their source and type. When the subject of the model is the same as the source (of the picture, by analogy or metaphor) on which the model is based, we talk about homoeomorphs; when the subject and the source differ, we talk about paramorphs. Homoeomorphs can be divided into three subcategories, of which only teleiomorphs are interesting from the point of view of social sciences. The term “teleiomorph” is intended to suggest that teleiomorphs are, in some respect or respects, improvements over their subjects. Two kinds of teleiomorphs can be distinguished, depending on just how they are related to their source-subject 3 Rapoport makes a distinction between necessity based on “the logic of history” and the “determinism of large numbers”, and he argues for the latter school of thought. Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), 85-99. 4 Ae oo 1970), 33-55.

The Principles

of Scientific Thinking

(London and Basingstoke:

MacMillan,

—

What Is It That Changed Table

1: A Taxonomy

|

of Iconic

Teleiomorphs Abstractions

181

Models

In relation e partial

Idealizations

with the End of the Cold War?

to subject

In relation

analogue

¢ complete

analogue

¢ complete

homolo

to source

e semi-connected e singly connected

ue

e multiply connected

(which may be a particular concrete entity, representing the type of all members of some class of entities, or it may be some kind of average). There are idealizations and there are abstractions. A pure idealization has all the relevant characteristics of its source subject, but at least some of them are, according to some scale of value, more “perfect” than the source-subjects properties. Abstraction, in turn, can be analyzed as follows. If the source subject has the relevant properties p)...p,, then an abstraction has the properties pj...p, (1 ) -_

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