The Dynamics Of Russia’s Geopolitics: Remaking The Global Order [1 ed.] 303058254X, 9783030582548, 9783030582555

Citation preview

Frontiers in International Relations

David Oualaalou

The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics Remaking the Global Order

Frontiers in International Relations Series Editors Benjamin Tallis, Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic Maren Hofius, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany Elke Schwarz, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK Kristin Haugevik, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway

This book series pushes the boundaries of International Relations (IR) and breaks new ground by thinking and writing from the limits of the discipline and beyond. Frontiers in International Relations (FIR) welcomes original scholarship that expands and challenges our understanding of IR by exploring new subfields, offering innovative perspectives on pressing problems, or enquiring into IR’s analytical and normative premises. To that end, it explicitly seeks works that engage in cross-disciplinary dialogue with related disciplines and develop innovative ways to analyse and approach the subject matter. The series welcomes standard monographs and edited volumes, as well as handbooks. It particularly encourages early-career scholars and innovative projects to submit manuscripts, and provides rapid and constructive feedback. All titles in the series are peer-reviewed.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16555

David Oualaalou

The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics Remaking the Global Order

123

David Oualaalou Global Perspective Consulting Dallas, TX, USA

ISSN 2662-9429 ISSN 2662-9437 (electronic) Frontiers in International Relations ISBN 978-3-030-58254-8 ISBN 978-3-030-58255-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Praise for The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics

“For anyone wishing to understand Russia’s long-term strategy and trajectory, the book you hold in your hand is an essential guide. David Oualaalou, an international geopolitical consultant and intellectual who has written numerous analyses on geopolitics, global affairs, international business, and energy issues; and whose books constitute a bedrock of penetrating exposition and analysis on the current global state of affairs… strips away much of the cant that pervades public discourse these days on global order and gets to a fundamental reality: Where Russia is headed as US leadership falters.” —The Honorable, Lyndon L. Olson, Jr., Former US Ambassador to Sweden “This book is a comprehensive, thought provoking understanding of how and why a once collapsed USSR returned as the Russian Federation and today is a major challenger for global and regional dominance, especially over the USA and Western Europe. You may not agree with all the assessments and predictions, but you will find that Dr. Oualaalou’s frank and bold writing style comes with personal integrity, first-hand military experience, and solid geopolitical knowledge.” —William A. Mitchell, Colonel USAF, Ret. and Professor Emeritus, Baylor University. Author of Baylor in Northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2016 “Dr. Oualaalou provides a compelling look at a frequently underestimated player on the world stage, from the unique perspective of an insider who is both a scholar and has served as the ‘boots on the ground’ in many conflict zones.” —David Schleicher, Attorney for U.S. government employees around the world in job-related disputes

v

In memory of those who were unjustly executed during the Katyn forest massacre

Preface

Writing The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics: Remaking the Global Order became imperative to me after completing Volatile State: Iran in the Nuclear Age and observing the ever-changing American political landscape after the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA. Similarly, Russia’s increased military and diplomatic footprints in the Middle East and other regions convinced me of the need to place Russia’s engagements within the context of the greater geopolitical chess game Moscow is now playing. For instance, one should not be surprised by the outcome of the Syrian civil war, where Russia emerged as the deciding force, openly exposing the decline of American leadership in the region. Russia’s position regarding the ongoing dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran is unpredictable. Will it act as a broker, or will it let the tiff play out to see what might shake out? Analysis points to Russia being one of two key global players—the second is China—in the emerging new global order. My qualifications and preparation for assessing Russia’s global strategy in a dynamic world with contemporary geopolitical shifts are founded on over 15 years of experience as an international security analyst and consultant in Washington D.C. My theoretical and real-world knowledge of how geopolitics, global security, energy issues, and domestic and international business intersect is founded on my doctoral focus in international security, and as a military veteran abroad in the field with elite military forces in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bolivia, and the Ivory Coast, to name but a few while carrying out operations at the behest of the US policymakers. I also understand and appreciate the depth of Russia’s social, geopolitical, and cultural interactions, from both abstract and practical perspectives, and understand how Russia’s domestic and foreign policies work. In my opinion, this first-hand interactive experience is necessary to offer the most salient analysis of how Russia interacts, responds, and manages its role within the current regional and global geopolitical system.1 1

Regarding my personal experience, please bear in mind that, though this work discusses unclassified and declassified information, it does not and cannot offer factual evidence from classified sources.

ix

x

Preface

That said, I draw on my experiences to help the reader understand the larger picture of Russia’s political realities and to share insights on how to understand and solve the problems affecting Russian–US relations and the world. Some of my writings have contributed to an understanding of these important concerns. For examples, see my op-ed pieces on global affairs for the Slovak Atlantic Council, an affiliate of the European Atlantic Council; the Huffpost; the Waco Tribune-Herald; the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong); and the World Affairs Council. Some of my publications have been translated into Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, German, Russian, Turkish, and Spanish, among other languages. Those articles address a wide range of topics, including global energy markets, international security, global affairs, American foreign policy, international business, and more. Occasionally, I assess how the geopolitical landscape, with Russia at its center, might look in the next decade or so and how certain countries, including the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, and Middle East, might act or react given the seismic shifts shaping the political landscape, regionally and globally. Further understanding of my work is expressed in Beneath the Veil: Fall of the House of Saud (2018); Volatile State: Iran in the Nuclear Age (2018); and The Ambiguous Foreign Policy of the United States (2016). Russia’s aggressive foreign policy poses serious challenges to subsequent American administrations as pundits, scholars, and foreign-affairs experts wonder what will become of the Russian–US relations. The lack of debate about Russia within the Washington establishment alarms me. Similarly, since the end of the Cold War, the US government has suffered from a precipitous decline in expertise, prestige, and talent. Gone are the Yeltsin era reforms that transformed Russia into an authoritarian system under Putin. The vision of building a brave new democratic order in Russia after 1991 has proved illusory. Those who were thinking that post-Cold War era Russia would turn into a functioning democracy thought neither long enough nor understood well the history of Russia. I remain convinced that if the West—and Washington, for that matter— wants to build a cooperative partnership with Russia, the first step is to diagnose the cause of the ailing relationship, then prescribe a cure. My recent conversations in Europe with eastern European citizens underscore serious concerns about Russia’s aggressive foreign policy. Similarly, Scandinavian countries have responded anxiously to Russia’s allocation of its naval assets to the Arctic. Russia has long sought economic and military dominance in its northern shores, a region that holds as much as $35 trillion worth of untapped oil and natural gas (Reid 2018). Even China —a nation with no territorial claim to the Arctic—has begun funding Arctic development projects. It underscores the region‘s growing global importance and influence. And with the climate change impacting the area and the world over, we should expect fierce competition in the near future. In this book, I address three primary questions relevant to the current global context:

Preface

xi

Will current geopolitical shifts greatly benefit Russia’s long-term global objectives? What foreign policy will Russia pursue in the Middle East and the Baltic regions to guarantee the security of its strategic interests? And will major powers confront one another over resources that could trigger military conflict, or will they choose appeasement to maintain peace and stability in this new era? This book pays special attention to how Russia’s aggressive foreign policy is playing out in different regions of the world, particularly the Middle East, Latin America, Europe, and the Baltics. Estonia, for instance, is closely watching Russia’s foreign-policy initiatives. Similarly, the possibility of a Russia–China alliance could provide both countries the right platform on which to further their cooperation on all fronts, including the military. There is no certainty about what the global geopolitical landscape might look like in the next decade or so. With certainty, however, one can conclude that the Russia–China alliance will further contribute to a precipitous shift in the global order and further decline of the US share of global power. Alas, the shift in the global balance of power is already underway. My text is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the economic and political scholarship on the domestic challenges that Russia continues to face since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. On the domestic political front, Russia encountered major challenges in 1993 as opposition emerged from the legislative and executive branches to Russia’s political direction. Those challenges prompted then President Boris Yeltsin to deploy the military to dissolve the parliament and call for new legislative elections. A decade or so later, Russia embarked on a new strategy under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. This strategy, global in scope, well-resourced and coordinated, aimed to expand Russia’s global outreach and influence and promote Russia’s commercial, military, and energy interests. It came on the heels of America’s and the West’s political discord and waning leadership. Chapter 2 addresses the history of the Soviet Union and its emergence on the global stage. I provide a snapshot about Russia under Mikhail Romanov, who, in 1613, became the first Romanov czar of Russia. The chapter transitions to the demise of the Romanov dynasty and subsequent takeover by the Bolsheviks. I argue that Russia’s aggressive foreign policy reflects its desperate need to reclaim the glorious days of the Russian empire or even the Soviet Union era. In this context, even if only briefly, one must consider the historical events that shaped Russia in to what it is today. Today, under Putin, Russia deploys tactics backed by military force to achieve its global strategy. Russia’s presence is practically all over the map, be it in the ongoing conflicts in the Baltics region and the Middle East, or the thus-far-limited military intervention in Venezuela and possible cooperation with China. Although its foreign actions are often opportunistic, Russia increasingly aims to create a multipolar world in which it plays a more prominent role. Similarly, with its new status in the Middle East, Russia is already redrawing the region’s geopolitical map militarily, politically, and economically.

xii

Preface

I move from addressing the historical setting under which the Soviet Union was established to the political events that facilitated the emergence of modern-day Russia. I focus on a timeline that begins with the end of World War II in 1945 and the beginning of the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union that dragged on nearly a half century. I conclude this chapter with a discussion over the emergence of the Russian Federation and the economic, social, and political challenges through the reign of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, Demetri Medvedev, and the current president, Vladimir Putin. Chapter 3 examines Russia’s military and energy sources of power. Both sources contribute to the foundation on which Russia has built its power. If it were not for its nuclear capabilities, we would not be discussing Russia much. However, Russia’s abundant oil and natural gas allow Moscow to use its economic resources as a political tool to further its agenda. Throughout world history, the geopolitics of energy has been about not only supply and demand, but also who controls access to energy sources. Controlling energy access has been one of Russia’s driving forces in the global energy market. That fact explains how the discovery of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Egypt and Cypress is already exacerbating geopolitical tensions among interested countries, including Russia. Russia’s short- and long-term strategy has been to use its military apparatus to advance its agenda. In the aftermath of both Russia and the USA suspending the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty), Moscow will develop the new generation of medium-range nuclear missiles. It is a matter of time before Russia deploys those missiles near the Baltic region and the borders of eastern European countries. This chapter concludes with observations on whether Russia will reshape the world order as it increases its presence in the Middle East and threatens peace and stability in the Baltic region. Given this reality, one concludes that Putin’s understanding of security issues is fundamental to his ability to navigate through volatile storms as Russia sails through geopolitical waters. Chapter 4 examines the US foreign policy toward Russia before and after the 1991 fall of the USSR that saw the demise of communism. Historically, Russian– US relations go back some 200 years when the two countries shared multifaceted diplomatic relations. As global dynamics changed, Russia and the USA started competing for political, economic, and ideological influence, along with dominance. They also cooperated when facing challenges that represented a threat to their national interests. Fast-forward to the early twentieth century: the USA provided humanitarian assistance to Russia during the 1921–1923 famine. Russia and USA interests converged when they joined forces against a common enemy during WWII. However, when the USA decided to provide allies with supplies, this decision marked the start of the Cold War, which saw both countries [Russia and the USA] propping up their worldwide military alliances. This standoff was prevalent through two military alliances centered in Europe: NATO (the USA and its allies) and the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet Union and its allies).

Preface

xiii

I devote a section in this chapter to address the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, seen as the end of the Cold War—or so we thought! While many in the Washington establishment think the Cold War ended and the USA won, current reality suggests otherwise. Russian–US relations embarked on new dimensions, both bilaterally and multilaterally. I conclude that, without a direct dialogue between Moscow and Washington, there would be no cooperation. It will be interesting to learn to what degree Russia will meddle in the upcoming 2020 US presidential election to maintain the current status quo. Chapter 5 focuses on how the Russian–US rivalry did not stop even after the fall of the USSR in 1991. Currently, the world witnesses an aggressive Russia backed by military support and economic incentives. For several underlying reasons, this rivalry will only intensify in the coming years. Russia’s launch of its campaign to impact elections in the USA and Europe not only testifies to its long-term strategy of undermining democratic institutions in the West, but also highlights its commitment to defend what Russia claims as its “sphere of privileged interests” around its borders and beyond. Chapter 6 begins with an introduction of my core argument about how Russia stands to benefit from impacting global order using different means: cyber, economic, intelligence, and military instruments. Then, I investigate in Chap. 6 how the US “leading from behind” approach contributes to a chaotic global order, creates a vacuum that Russia and China are filling, and paves the way for the reemergence of a multipolar world in which Russia plays a prominent role. I also elaborate on how Russia capitalizes on the US political gaffes and missteps, including its 2003 Iraq invasion and the ongoing Afghanistan war. In doing so, Russia furthers its political aspirations to reinstate itself as a global power that wields influence and expands its global footprint to recapture its lost glory. In Chap. 7, the theme is to integrate my perspective on how Russia and China intend to play their political cards at the international gaming table. I assess the new geopolitical landscape moving forward with Russia at the heart of this analysis. Further, I specifically detail how Russia’s relations with other major powers may develop given a shift in the global balance of power. The chapter also addresses whether the USA has a new strategy in place for dealing with Russia as the latter has found a way to further undermine credibility and trust in the American’s democratic system—and the global order, for that matter. It is shortsighted, in my opinion, to limit the dialogue about what plagues the current Russian–US relations to differences about key strategic interests. What lies ahead concerns me greatly because Russian–US relations are sitting on the edge of outright conflict, especially in the aftermath of the death of the INF Treaty. I see no reason why Russia will change course regarding what lies ahead. The West, including the USA, needs to stop pretending that it knows what Russia was— or is—up to. Lack of debates about Russia prevent analysts and foreign-policy establishments from fully understanding that the strategy, scale, and scope of activities Russia embarks on, especially after 2014, go beyond its periphery both geographically and operationally.

xiv

Preface

My concern is that, absent USA international wisdom, the Western world may be on the last leg of its hegemonic journey. In that case, look for China to fill the vacuum and for Russia to start rebuilding its lost empire. Pretending otherwise at this late stage of the game is unrealistic. More specific, the book addresses whether Russia will reshape the global order. It also addresses Russia’s economic struggle as it faces an ongoing decrease in oil prices on the global market and renewed US economic sanctions following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Will Russia refrain from joining, or taking part in, China’s “One Road One Belt” initiative? I do not see any logical reason why it would. Time will tell. This work also tries to address Russia’s overall strategy in the Middle East by engaging three important topics: (1) As the geopolitical storm in the Middle East intensifies, Russia is taking advantage of the ongoing chaos, compelling regional countries to reassess the impact of the new geopolitical order on their future political and economic outlooks; (2) How might the discovery of new LNG on the coastlines of Egypt and Cypress impact Russia’s energy policy toward Europe? Since Russia is the main LNG supplier to Europe, the recent energy discoveries in Egypt and Cypress will eventually change the economic prospects for many countries in the region; and (3) Is Russia’s annexation of Crimea a prelude for more aggression toward the Baltic States? A debate is growing among international security analysts and academia that Moscow knows exactly which political buttons to push. When it comes to global affairs, Russia still wants to have a say and not have its input and propositions overlooked. Yet, Russia is pressing forward with its global strategies, be they located in the Middle East (intervention in a Syrian civil war that goes even beyond the border of Syria) or Latin America (the building of a spy base in Nicaragua in a startling Cold War-like military and intelligence presence). And so, the stage is set. The meteoric rise of China, the decline in the US share of global power, the dissolution of a global order, and the possibility of joint military ties between Russia and China suggest that the shift in the global balance of power is already underway. We should not dismiss the warning signs of the return of Russia as a player that is, after all, a nuclear superpower, or certainly second to none with respect to destructive capabilities. If Russia’s engagements in Syria and Ukraine are any indication, its military is willing and ready to fight at the behest of Putin and the Kremlin. I write this book with the absolute conviction that Russia is embarking on a strategy that will foment chaos in the Baltic States, further create divisions between the USA and its allies, and seize the opportunity granted to it through a geopolitical shift, to join forces with China to counter a common enemy:

Preface

xv

the USA. Will Russia succeed in these endeavors given the shifting geopolitical balance of power? The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics: Remaking the Global Order addresses these and other relevant questions. Dallas, USA

David Oualaalou

Reference Standish Reid, “Finland’s race for Arctic riches,” Politico, March 28, 2018, https://www.politico. eu/article/finlands-race-for-arctic-riches-resources-shipping-lanes-high-north/

About This Book

Russia faces monumental uncertainties from increased military and diplomatic challenges as its footprints in the Middle East region and other countries expand into a complicated and unpredictable geopolitical chess game with high stakes and losses. Western adversaries who thought that post-Cold War era Russia would become a functioning democracy have profoundly misjudged. My recent conversations with eastern European citizens underscore serious concerns about Russia’s aggressive foreign policy. At the same time, Scandinavian countries have responded anxiously to Russia’s assignment and deployment of naval assets to the Arctic region. Moscow is very adaptive and her objectives change quickly to match evolving circumstances. The West seldom knows why or understands Moscow’s geopolitical and strategic maneuvering. Lack of vigorous and honest political debates, with incorrect assumptions about Russia, prevent fully understanding their strategy, scale, and scope of activities and intentions. This is particularly true for current Russian objectives and activities that extend far beyond its borders, both geographically and operationally. Russia finds itself grappling in many directions as the global order transforms. This book offers a vision of Russia’s future, as Moscow tries to influence the outcome in its favor.

xvii

Contents

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Current State of Global Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Russia’s Relations with Its Breakaway States . . . . . . . . 1.4 Russia’s Internal Dynamics (Social/Economic/Political) 1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

1 1 2 4 9 16 17

2 History of Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Early History of the Russian Empire . . . . . . . 2.3 Emergence of Modern-Day Russia . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Geography of Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Structure of the Present Russian Government . 2.7 Era of Stagnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

19 19 20 23 27 28 29 30 34 34

3 Russia’s Sources of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Military: A Source of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Russia’s Tensions with Its Breakaway States . 3.4 Energy (Oil/Natural Gas): A Source of Power 3.5 Russia: An Energy Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

37 37 39 45 45 49 50 51

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53 53

xix

xx

Contents

4.2

Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) (1933–1945): 32nd President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Harry S. Truman (1945–1952): 33rd President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961): 34th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 John F. Kennedy (1961–1963): 35th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) (1963–1968): 36th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974): 37th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 Gerald R. Ford Jr. (1974–1977): 38th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 James (Jimmy) E. Carter, Jr. (1977–1981): 39th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10 Ronald W. Reagan (1981–1989): 40th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11 George H. W. Bush (1989–1993): 41st President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.12 William J. Clinton (1993–2001): 42nd President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.13 George W. Bush (2001–2009): 43rd President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.14 Barack H. Obama (2009–2017): 44th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.15 Donald J. Trump, Jr. (2017–Present): 45th President of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.15.1 Trump’s Approach to Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.15.2 What Is the Core Argument? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.15.3 Are We Moving Forward? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.16 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Geopolitical Rivalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Military Rivalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Russia’s Perspective . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 The United States’ Perspective 5.4 Intelligence Rivalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

....

54

....

55

....

57

....

57

....

59

....

60

....

61

....

62

....

63

....

64

....

65

....

65

....

67

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

68 69 71 73 74 74

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

77 77 79 84 86 88 90 92 93 94

Contents

xxi

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

97 97 98 100 102 104 109 113 115

7 Russia’s Road to the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Russia’s Growing Presence in the Arctic 7.2 Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policy . . . . 7.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

117 118 123 125 126

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Political Dimensions . . . . . . . . 6.3 Social Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Economic Dimensions . . . . . . . 6.5 The Neighborhood . . . . . . . . . 6.6 Moving Forward . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

About the Author

Dr. David Oualaalou is an international geopolitical consultant, professional speaker, award-winning educator, and former international security analyst in Washington D.C. He worked with elite US military forces carrying out operations directed by US policymakers. While representing the US government, David worked in former Russian enclaves including Uzbekistan and other nearby locations. He grasps the depth of Russian society, culture, and religious trends. David knows how Russia’s internal politics work both theoretically and practically. David combines his real-world experiences with a doctorate in Public Policy and Administration, with concentration in homeland and international security. He has written many published articles and appeared often on television and radio shows. Dr. Oualaalou is the author of Volatile State: Iran in the Nuclear Age; Beneath the Veil: Fall of the House of Saud; and The Ambiguous Foreign Policy of the United States toward the Muslim World.

xxiii

Chapter 1

An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

1.1 Introduction After the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the USSR), many in the United States and Europe claimed that the Cold War ended and that the capitalist system had triumphed. For much of the post–Cold War era, the assumption among Washington elite circles and Europe was that the Russian Federation (Russia) no longer had the power it once did. That thinking among Washington elites persists even today. However, the thinking in the West that Russia will be unable to reemerge has proved illconceived. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its intervention in the Syrian civil war, and the Iran nuclear agreement with the West all point to Russia’s rising. However, since 2012, and under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia embarked on an expansionist policy. Putin is currently serving his fourth term as Russian president (2000–2004, 2004–2008, 2012–2018, and May 2018 to the present). The purpose of his well-resourced, successful campaign aims at one objective: Russia’s desire to reclaim its lost global power, influence, and status. A consensus of American foreign policy experts has opined that Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012, after serving a four-year term as prime minister, marks the full launch of Russia’s global engagements in many dimensions. Putin concluded that to reclaim its global influence, Russia did not need to engage in a large conventional war against the United States. Rather, Russia’s return as a global superpower greatly depended on launching a well-crafted strategy, one that involved an array of military, cyber, intelligence, energy, and diplomatic tools. Let us think about what that strategy looks like. Russia’s strategic objective is to: (a) undermine the United States—led international order that is already faltering in the wake of Trump’s “America First” rhetoric; (b) influence political systems, wherever they may be; (c) sow division within Western societies by helping nationalism to reemerge and cultivating disinformation, which Russia succeeded in provoking; and (d) foment distrust and negative public opinion of democratic institutions, elections, and economies. While Russia targets mainly © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 D. Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5_1

1

2

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

the West, it has added the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia to its list. The world is already witnessing Russia’s promotion of its commercial joint capital venture with India, military sell of S-400 missiles to Turkey and, possibly, Iraq, and energy contracts with Iran and Saudi Arabia interests.

1.2 Current State of Global Affairs This chapter offers a brief account of the political climate in both the Balkans and the Baltic region, with Russia as its focus. It includes a consideration of Russia– Europe relations and consequences for the political and economic futures of Eastern European countries, including the Baltic States. The chapter also discusses the impact that Russian–Chinese cooperation may have on the global balance of power and Asia’s geopolitical order. It addresses Russian–United States relations, given the chaotic, ambiguous American foreign policy, ongoing Middle East upheavals, Latin America’s turmoil, and overall global geopolitical shifts. Will Russia’s struggling economy revamp itself? Will social tensions heighten in Russia given the recent decision by the Kremlin to fine and jail those who show disrespect for state symbols, state authorities, or Putin himself, on social media or otherwise? In my opinion, these outcomes further shatter the hopes of those in the West who claim that post-USSR Russia will embrace democracy. Current reality suggests otherwise. I go further to state that policymakers, whether in Washington, D.C., Berlin, London, or Brussels, conveniently or ignorantly, are denying reality: Despite the fall of the USSR, Russia was never going to embrace democracy. It was wishful thinking sold to the masses in the West to promote preset agendas. We should ask the following questions: What will Russia look like after the Putin era? Will Europe finally embark on a steady plan to address Russia’s aggressive foreign policy? Will the Baltic States be the source of another major global war? Could China and Russia’s partnership go beyond the borders of Asia? I address these questions—that demand much-needed answers, now more than ever—with new insights and expanded knowledge. Putin’s rise to power made evident his strong desire to return Russia to its glory days. His main foreign—policy objective is to restore the multipolar system in which the USSR played a more prominent role on the global stage. Moscow argues that the West has ignored Russia’s interests in the new geopolitical order, which has left no option for Russia but to pursue its global outreach by whatever means. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 supports my argument. However, this aggressive foreign policy that not only sets Russia on a belligerent trajectory, but also has become the hallmark of its approach to global affairs. Look no further than at how Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war has evolved over the years, becoming the deciding force that dictates the political outcome in Syria—and the Middle East, for that matter. A decade or so ago, no one predicted Russia would embark on such a venture, knowing how worried Moscow had been about the possibilities of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as NATO) expanding eastward. Chaos in the Middle East, the annexation of Crimea, and the deployment of Russian mercenaries

1.2 Current State of Global Affairs

3

and military hardware to Latin America, among other ventures, have allowed Russia to play a far more prominent role on the global stage. As I argued in a January 2017 article, “Russia’s military has become a pivotal tool in Putin’s foreign policy. You don’t have to look far to see what Russia is doing in Syria. So when Trump lifts sanctions on Russia, supports Moscow’s unlawful annexation of Crimea, limits NATO’s expansion eastward and allows Russia to test new firepower in the Syrian theater, the West should expect Russia to be more aggressive. Russia’s impulsive behavior and thirst for conquest (and without challenge) could well play out in the Balkans. Then we can see if Trump is a puppet or power to be reckoned with (Oualaalou 2017).” Sadly, the United States, the only major power that can challenge Russia on many fronts, is lost in the global political wilderness because of its perceived thinking that the fall of the USSR signifies an end to its ideology. Clearly wishful thinking, to say the least! While strategic at times, Russia’s foreign engagements and actions are often opportunistic, with one specific objective: the creation of a multipolar system in which Russia is on equal footing with the United States. Unfortunately, global geopolitical shifts have changed political calculations for everyone. The economic, diplomatic, and military emergence of China supports my argument. Russia is aware of the global shifts on many fronts; however, it prioritizes its agenda based on what it wants to achieve domestically and to project globally. Russia has three key strategic initiatives. First, Russia has the ability to deploy, and rely on, relatively inexpensive diplomatic, military, intelligence, cyber, and energy tools to exert influence and expand its global presence. Second, Russia’s strategy is assisted by the tumultuous gaffes and entanglements of the West—including the United States—be they in Afghanistan and Iraq or Libya and Venezuela. Further, Russia’s cyberwarfare appears to have paid off as anti-establishment sentiments in Europe and North America grow by the day. Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russia’s meddling in the 2016 United States’ presidential election and the potential collusion of President Trump with Russia is a working example. Thus far, Russia has succeeded by sowing division among Americans, including elected officials. Look no further than how, for instance, the Republican Party lost its moral standing as it stays silent while supporting a president who bends the law and shreds the Constitution. Third, Mr. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy and impulsive decisions, mired in murky logic, reveal his need for a much deeper understanding of global affairs. This lack of understanding by a sitting United States president and the absence of American leadership on the global stage create a vacuum that Russia—and China, for that matter—see this as an opportunity to their advantage. America’s foreign policy has regressed, especially in the last fifteen years or so. The failure intensified under Trump, who withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement. Russia now has a weak United States president doing its bidding while Russia foments division in a chaotic American administration at odds with political norms. The July 2018 NATO Summit in Helsinki serves as evidence of my claim. In my opinion, Trump, who lacks a deep understanding of foreign policy and is unpredictable, could cost the United States dearly by making reckless decisions and dangerous concessions to Russia. Alina Polyakova, a Russian analyst at the Brookings Institution, writes, “We still have no

4

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

agenda for the Trump-Putin meeting. It’s unclear what the U.S. thinks it can get from Russia, or what it even hopes it can get. For Putin, that ambiguity is an asset. For Trump, it’s a liability (Gregory 2018).” Recall my reference to America’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement. I am convinced that North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, has factored in, prior to his two meetings with Trump in Singapore and Vietnam respectively, that he [Kim] does not and will not trust Trump no matter what the latter says or promises. Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran agreement testifies to Kim’s thinking. United States’ withdrawal from agreements and treaties—bilateral or otherwise—shows Trump’s inconsistencies. Countries around the world, including North Korea, are convinced that trusting the United States is a liability moving forward. They must be asking: How can we trust the United States, which says one thing, then does another? Let us put all this within the context of Russia’s global strategy. To do so, it behooves us to seriously consider the implications of the United States’ long-term strategic interests following its withdrawal from the INF Treaty with Russia. While the United States of America claims that Russia has violated the treaty for years, I remain skeptical about Trump’s vague explanation. I argue that the Kremlin hatched the plan for the United States to withdraw from the treaty, knowing that a sitting United States president, Trump, is quietly pushing Russia’s global agenda on its behalf. Was it a pretext for Russia wanting to develop a new type of nuclear missile? Most likely! We should not be naïve to think that Russia—or China, for that matter— will adhere to international law requirements when developing new types of mediumrange nuclear-tipped missiles. In a February 2019 article in The New York Times, Andrew E. Kramer writes, “But adding to a sense that the broader architecture of nuclear disarmament has started to unravel, Mr. Putin also said that Russia would build weapons previously banned under the treaty and would no longer initiate talks with the United States on any matters related to nuclear arms control (Kramer 2019).” Alas, the decision to withdraw from the treaty has indeed initiated a new arms race that now includes China, which was never a signatory to the 1987 treaty. Using history as my guide, the last time the United States withdrew from a major international agreement—the Treaty of Versailles after the so-called “War to End All Wars”— dynamics were set into play that resulted in a second, even more devastating world war. Notably, the United States did not make the same mistake twice after World War II, and the world, for a half century, was a far more peaceful place.

1.3 Russia’s Relations with Its Breakaway States The current global state of affairs suggests that Russia will disallow all changes to the security and geopolitical architecture near its borders. This was evident during Russian president Vladimir Putin’s argument on March 8, 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, about Russia’s historical claims to the peninsula and its

1.3 Russia’s Relations with Its Breakaway States

5

Russian-speaking population. When describing Russia’s reaction to Western-backed protests that saw the removal of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, Putin states, “If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard (Cooley 2017).” To Russia, the annexation of Crimea falls within the broader context of what is to come next when dealing with, and confronting, the West. By annexing the Crimea, Putin sent a strong message to the West, letting them know that he will forbid Western actors from dictating the orientation and direction of the post-Soviet states, known in Russia as its “near abroad.” In my opinion, in his 2014 speech, Putin laid the groundwork for seeking new security and political arrangements with the West, a “New Yalta,” if you will. Doing so allows Russia to redefine its sphere of influence, which, in the Kremlin’s eyes, should extend in Europe and Eurasia, once within the boundaries of the Russian Empire and later the USSR. It became evident to Putin that, after the fall of the USSR, the West deliberately ignored Russia’s interests. Then, when NATO started to expand eastward, it sent a strong message to Moscow that time is of the essence for Russia to plot its global strategy in the hope of achieving its goals, no matter what. To Russia, the annexation of Crimea is justified because Putin articulated the security threats the West constitutes when it [West] encroaches on Russia’s regional interests and “privileged sphere of influence.” Maintaining such regional influence provides Putin legitimacy and firms up his domestic agenda. Thus, Russians perceive their country as a great power in an emerging multipolar system. Putin’s actions raise a question: What exactly does Russia want in Ukraine and its other neighbors? Some in the West argue that Putin wants to rebuild the Soviet Union to what it was at the height of its power. The reality is much more complicated given the current global geopolitical shifts. Yes, Putin deploys various tactics that allow Russia to exert regional influence. However, the overall objective, reconstituting the glory days of the USSR, is only part of the long-term strategy. Alexander Cooley, the Claire Tow professor of political science at Barnard College and director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute for the Study of Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe, writes: To simply assert, as many Western observers find convenient, that the Russian president seeks to reconstitute the Soviet Union with Russia at its center obscures the wide variety of instruments, actors, and norms through which Moscow actually exerts its influence in the region and potentially beyond. Russia is unlikely to reconstitute the USSR anytime soon; leaders of all former Soviet states, including some of Russia’s closest allies, push back and hedge against Moscow’s overt attempts to advance broad-based political reintegration. But, Moscow has many tools at its disposal to influence the political, economic, social, and foreign-policy trajectories of its neighbors, even if it will not be able to rebuild an imperial state. (Cooley 2017)

Where from here is anyone’s guess. One can be certain, however, that the emerging post-USSR states represent a competing battleground where other major powers’ political, economic, and strategic interests tend to overlap, and possibly collide, with those of Russia. That in turn compels countries like Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Kazakhstan to choose between either aligning themselves with the West or face a Russian invasion. I remain optimistic that Russia will go that far only if the West

6

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

corners Russia by deploying missiles in Poland, Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine, for example. Should that happen, which I do not foresee at the time of this writing, Russia will undermine these countries by using various tools at its disposal, including military actions. Given the ever-changing geopolitical dynamics, Washington and Brussels should not be too confident of their ability to coexist with Russia in Eurasia, assuming that Russia will cooperate and together sing “Kumbaya.” That is wishful thinking in a global order that Russia seems to be, deliberately, turning upside down. I will do readers an injustice if I limit my argument about Russia’s global strategy only to its neighborhood, the Baltic States and the Caucasus region. Rather, I must present the argument in its greater global context by asking the following questions: What is the long-term objective of Russia’s intervention in the Middle East? Why is Russia rebuilding a spy base in Nicaragua through a startling Cold War-like military and intelligence presence? What is Moscow’s strategy for the Baltic States? What trajectory might a Chinese–Russian military and diplomatic cooperation take? What are the foundations and implications of this cooperation? These are five questions I strongly believe readers need answers to place Russia’s global strategy in the correct context. U.S. policymakers, global affairs, security and intelligence analysts, and academia are pressed to categorize the shifting winds of geopolitics as the United States’ credibility and leadership have been waning for years. Similarly, American foreign policy is lost in a maelstrom of conflicts as it reacts to one problem after another. It does not help matters when the sitting United States president fights mounting legal troubles that cast grave doubts about his ability not only to lead, but also to think strategically about protecting long-term United States interests. And how could Trump think of the long-term well-being of the United States when he evaluates almost everything in terms of monetary gains? That said, who would have thought that the time had come for the world to witness Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in the Middle East? Who would have thought that Russia would have become the deciding factor on which the Middle East’s political outcome depends? Look at the Syrian conflict to see the magnitude of Russia’s influence. If my argument does not convince the reader to grasp the impact of Russia’s expansion in the Middle East, consider, for instance, the recent cooperation between Russia and Iran or Saudi Arabia. In my opinion, that cooperation demonstrates how the geopolitical balance of power in the Middle East favors Russia. I find it ironic that Saudi Arabia is cooperating with Russia. How could we forget the images of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, supported and financed by Saudi Arabia and trained by the United States, fighting the USSR after its invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979? However, in the ever-changing, unpredictable Middle East, Riyadh resumed its diplomatic ties with Moscow and went beyond political niceties to include defense and energy discussions. Talk about change! I refer to the meeting that took place in the Kremlin when then-prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, solicited the support of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev against Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait in the 1990s. Fast-forward to today: Russia and Saudi Arabia find themselves far apart on issues like Iran, Syria, and Yemen. Yet, both countries—Russia and Saudi Arabia— cooperate despite these basic differences. Like China before it, Russia perceives its

1.3 Russia’s Relations with Its Breakaway States

7

cooperative relationship with Saudi Arabia as one of suitability and convenience, with no strategic aspirations on the horizon—only a real demonstration of American leadership decline in the region. However, I am not convinced when the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) claims that Russian—Saudi relations are strategic in nature; that claim is for political consumption and subject to further discussions. This outcome leads me to address whether policymakers in Washington D.C.— and the West, for that matter—are formulating an effective policy to deal with Russia’s global expansion and aggressive foreign policy. It may be too late since Russia has no reason to retreat from its newly found role in the Middle East, Ukraine/Crimea, Libya, and Venezuela, or even to reassess its policy toward the Baltic States as shown in Fig. 1.1. Limited debates happen in the halls of a dysfunctional United States Congress and in policy think tanks regarding what to do about Russia’s global activism and aggressive foreign policy. But most of the debates and analyzes amount to rhetoric and the mere consumption of ink. American foreign policy leadership stands on a broken, fragmented foundation, on life support before its death. Look no further than what the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are doing in Yemen—the atrocities they are committing against defenseless civilian Yemenis using American and British weapons. Yet, the United States’ new principle of total self-interest in foreign policy is convincing allies that the old “one-for-all, allfor-one” approach of the past seventy years is over. As one who worked extensively in the Middle East to support American foreign-policy initiatives, I find current secretary of state Mike Pompeo’s lack of leadership disturbing. He can’t stand up to his boss, President Trump, or challenge the KSA and UAE’s atrocities in Yemen. Pompeo’s failures lay bare the decay into which the United States, once cherished, respected, and admired by many around the world, has fallen. Sadly, what the United States now amounts to is greed. Pompeo’s moral cowardice is the subject of another discussion, for another time. Where does the United States Congress stand? Well, I leave it up to my readers to ponder the consequences for the USA given an executive branch of the United States government that fails to live up to its responsibilities to uphold the Constitution of the United States of America. Perhaps the time has come to reconsider term limits, for instance, so members of Congress do not get too conformable in a chamber, spending three to four decades fattening their wallets by promoting their own interests. As argued in my previous writing: Congress daily reflects heights of hypocrisy given how politicians (not all but clearly a majority) are more concerned about their political careers and what’s in it for them personally than serving constituents and upholding once-sacred, founding principles. While we might hear, from time to time, that certain members of Congress are angry on points of principle and ethics, it’s inevitably nothing but cheap political theatrics. Meanwhile, most Americans have no clue that the legislative branch is now largely controlled by a Saudi lobbyist group. Former congressman Pompeo’s decision pretty much confirms this. So much for draining D.C. swamps. (Oualaalou 2018)

8

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

Fig. 1.1 Baltic States political map. Source “Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com”

Within this framework, those in charge of American foreign policy cannot convince an apprentice sitting United States president to develop a strong American foreign policy. Four key points need immediate attention. First, the Trump administration has no grasp of how Russia’s activities in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America have damaged United States’ interests. Second, the Trump administration lacks a benchmark to evaluate the cost to America’s interests and benefits to Russia’s expansion. I am convinced that Russia’s investment in the Middle East, including diplomatic support for Iran, military intervention in support of Syria’s

1.3 Russia’s Relations with Its Breakaway States

9

Bashar al-Assad, energy ventures with Saudi Arabia, and economic/military contracts with Turkey, have paid off substantially. However, the picture differs in Europe, where there is a push back against Russia given the ongoing economic sanctions and persistent tensions with NATO. Third, Russia’s gambling with its security, its expansion and global activism have become a threat to a United States—led international order, its security, and its allies. My concern about Trump’s ignorance and unpredictability is that he will not know when and how far to push back against Russia, though I am convinced that he will not push back against Moscow. Why would he when Russia managed, facilitated, and supported his election to the White House? Yet, if Trump orders the placement of United States Patriot missiles in Poland, which is unlikely, I am convinced that Russia will perceive such an act as a provocation that could pave the way for Moscow to justify the use of military force in Eastern Europe. This scenario is worrisome because both the United States and Russia have recently quit the INF Treaty, allowing both countries to place medium-range nuclear missiles anywhere they wish. It is a forgone conclusion that the Trump administration will have a realistic, sustainable means to thwart Moscow’s ambitions without exacerbating the situation. Lastly, the United States could enter into a partnership with other countries to counter Russia. Nevertheless, I have one main reservation about such a hypothesis: many countries—allies and others—doubt America’s ability to lead. The 2018 G-20 and NATO summits are a working example. Even if allies agree to support America’s effort to counter Russia’s expansion, who will bear the cost? Pursuant to Trump’s “America First” slogan, I do not see how other countries will be convinced to join efforts with the United States. Considering all these possibilities, there is no telling how Russia may react when it joins forces with China, another stakeholder in this global political fray.

1.4 Russia’s Internal Dynamics (Social/Economic/Political) Politically, socially, and economically, Russia has been on a roller coaster since the fall of the USSR. This section analyzes statistics to show how the economic sanctions the West imposed on Russia after its annexation of Crimea contributed to crippling Russia’s economy and hindered its progress. However, Western sanctions are not the only factor in this equation; one must add the functionality of a central Russian government and bureaucracy. Said differently, reforms in Russia have been subordinated to the imperatives of political stability and government functionality. The economic challenges Russia faces are not limited to the government sector, but also have spilled into the private sector, one that is marginalized due to the central government’s institutional constraints caused by ever-growing government encroachment into the marketplace. When assessing the Russian economy, one concludes that large state-owned institutions such as Gazprom (oil and gas), Aeroflot (aviation), and Bazalt (defense) combined with an incompetent public sector, dominate the Russian economy. Moreover, corruption hinders any efforts to move the economy forward.

10

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

Politically, Russians have grown accustomed to having Putin at the helm of power. Most of us in the West recall that when Putin took the reins of power from Boris Yeltsin, Russia was in bad shape following years of economic recession. Yet, Russians have not forgotten that it was Putin who decisively and brutally ended the war in Chechnya. His doing so set the tone for decades to come—Putin now enters his third decade at Russia’s helm of power. Given his intelligence background as a former KGB agent, Putin masterfully managed geopolitical and military affairs. As Andrew Weiss, a Russia scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues “Putin is a very nimble adversary who’s been at this for 20 years now. The Hamburg meeting sounds like it was one of Putin’s wildest dreams: a freewheeling backroom-style conversation with a U.S. president (Hudson and Dawsey 2019).” Russians have grown confident in Putin’s ability to turn Russia around, which he did during his first year as he shepherded the Russian economy to about ten percent growth. Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, writes: Putin simultaneously embarked upon a campaign to upgrade Russia’s aging and, in some cases, rusting arsenal. He played his diplomatic and military hands masterfully: seldom has a power which remained so weak on paper achieved so much in reality. Under Putin’s stewardship, Russia was like a poker player which repeatedly managed to force opponents with a full house if not a royal flush to fold in the face of his own pair of twos.

It is this string of successes which burnish Putin’s image abroad. Even as many disdain him, much of the U.S. media spectrum today portrays Putin as a master strategist eerily successful in almost all he sets out to do (Rubin 2019). What might Russia look like after Putin? No one in the Russian political establishment today could carry on Putin’s strategic vision and cagy approach to dealing with global conflicts. One certainty: Russia in the post-Putin era will hesitate, leading to the possibility of major conflicts. Demographically, the Russian population has undoubtedly been impacted by recent economic sanctions. But the sanctions are not the only factors. Russia’s demographic declines combine a host of factors that include decreasing fertility, rising mortality rates, alcoholism, divorce, and a failing healthcare system. Russia’s demographic problems raise alarms among Russian politicians. For instance, mortality is not limited to death from alcohol, which Russians consume heavily, but includes death from violence, injuries, and suicide. Nonnatural causes of death have also contributed to the decline of Russia’s population. How will Russia manage its global engagement, especially militarily, given its massively declining population? This demographic snapshot suggests that, in addition to the current economic crisis, the Russian government’s options are limited, especially concerning its elderly population. Every government needs to have a sound policy for financing retirement. As Russia’s retired population grows, its financial resources devoted to this segment of society have dwindled. Once again, this puts forth the question how Russia intends to address this issue moving forward. Julie DaVanzo and David Adamson, researchers at Rand Corporation, write:

1.4 Russia’s Internal Dynamics (Social/Economic/Political)

11

Knowledge about Russia’s demographics should help dispel the popular notion of a demographic crisis. The continuation of several long-term patterns, such as declining fertility and historically high mortality, accounts for many of the current trends. While it is undoubtedly true that economic conditions have aggravated current problems, there is no strong evidence linking these problems with recent economic and political reforms. (DaVanzo and Adamson 1997)

Consider the demographic aspect when assessing Russia’s global strategy and to what degree its internal challenges may hinder its ability to realize its objectives, domestically and globally. The subsequent pages address in detail the potential risks Moscow faces given that its population continues to decline at an alarming rate. Today, global-affairs and security analysts, business leaders, academia, and experts are asking serious questions. Particularly, what role does Russia contemplate for itself in the new global order? Russia understands that serving its strategic and economic interests requires major resources as it not only deals with its main foe, the United States, but also approaches Baltic States, Latin America, the Middle East, and central Africa, where Russia now pursues various ventures. As for China, it remains to be seen how far Russia and China are willing to go to put their differences aside and team up to counter the United States of America. Will Russia maintain its policy of fomenting division within American society and other European countries including Hungary? In the last decade or so, Russia has engaged globally, increasingly nefariously, including election interference, disinformation, and military support of regimes like Al-Assad’s Syria and Maduro’s Venezuela. That said, given the multitude of conflicts around the world, in addition to the United States’ moral bankruptcy displayed through its declining leadership, Russia has taken advantage of an ill-informed and unfit sitting United States President, Trump, to advance its global agenda. Now that tensions between Iran and the Trump administration have escalated, Russia is closely monitoring the development and will intervene if its interests are jeopardized. That is a glimpse into Russia’s strategic thinking. The present work devotes chapter six to addressing what lies ahead for Russia as it manages and rearranges the global order through means other than conventional military encounters. That said, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea makes clear Moscow’s willingness to use military force when it deems necessary. The question centers on how far Russia is willing to go to influence that change, to ensure the outcome is to the Kremlin’s liking strategically, and to inject life support into a bipolar system that many in the West thought ceased to exist after the USSR disintegrated. More than ever, Russia keeps a close eye on world events, so it can plan according to Moscow’s dictates. Look no further than the ongoing regional conflicts, be they in Southeast Asia and the Middle East or Latin America and North Africa, to realize how Russia plans to intervene, under any pretext, to influence the outcome and dominate the course of action. Syria and Venezuela are examples. But it will not do the reader justice if this analysis neglects the current global chaos in Southeast Asia between the two nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan, or in Yemen between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Russia supporting Tehran more so than Riyadh. The scenario is no different in North Africa, where the failed state of Libya has opened the door

12

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

for Russia’s support of self-appointed militias. And, in Latin America, how could we forget the images broadcast on CNN, BBC, and Al-Jazeera of the failed coup orchestrated by Juan Guaidó, whom the Trump administration vehemently supports. It is mind boggling to think about the United States’ support of Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela without the latter winning a legitimate election, let alone a presidential one. Talk about contradictions! While addressing the United States involvement in Venezuela—and Latin America, for that matter—is a fascinating topic, let history be our guide as to what took place in the 1950s through the 1980s when the United States engaged in a policy of regime change that resulted in the rise of dictators of all sorts. The United States did many good things in Latin America. At the same time, it has a bloodstained record of supporting coups and dictators across the Latin American region—Somoza in Nicaragua, Pinochet in Chile, Stroessner in Paraguay, Batista in Cuba, Death Squad in Honduras (an armed group that conducts extrajudicial killings or forced disappearances of persons for the purposes of political repression, assassinations, torture, genocide, ethnic cleansing, or revolutionary terror), and genocidal military dictators in Guatemala. For now, suffice it to state that the turmoil in Venezuela has two specific objectives. One is geopolitical, suggesting how Russia can intervene anywhere in the world, including in the Western hemisphere. Two is that Russians perceive Putin’s intervention in Venezuela as a sign of strength, thus sending signals about his promise to restore the USSR to its glory days. As of this writing, Maduro’s government announced that China and Cuba would send 933 tons of “health products” to Venezuela (Krygier and O’Grady 2019). As a matter of fact, China recently sent seventy-one tons of medical aid to Venezuela, a clear sign of Beijing’s support of Maduro and a rebuke to Washington. Interestingly, not only Russia and China but also Turkey, Cuba, and Bolivia are throwing their weight behind Maduro. It indicates the shifting balance of power. However, Russia’s involvement is of great interest to us in this work. Moscow’s support for Caracas is not limited to speeches delivered by Putin but is also manifested through actions such as sending troops and military hardware. Josh K. Elliott, a journalist with International Global Media, writes: Approximately 400 suspected mercenaries were dispatched to Venezuela that same week to protect Maduro from harm, Reuters reported. The mercenaries are associated with a group called Wagner, a private military contractor that employs more than a thousand former Russian soldiers. The shadowy group has reportedly fought for Russian interests in Syria and Ukraine, although the Kremlin describes them as unaffiliated volunteers. (Elliott 2019)

Against this backdrop, the question is whether Russia will approach the Venezuela situation as it did the Ukraine’s. Possibly, considering that Russia sent two of its “White Swans,” a reference to Russian nuclear-capable bomber aircrafts, for a visit to Caracas in December 2018. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Russia has placed nuclear weapons in Venezuela just in case. The move is part of Russia’s geopolitical chess game with the United States—except now, we must add China to the mix. Looking at this scenario objectively, the irony is that Russia’s intervention in Venezuela is no different from the U.S. intervention in Ukraine. Alas, to the chagrin of Washington, Moscow decided to annex Crimea, then did so, ending United States’

1.4 Russia’s Internal Dynamics (Social/Economic/Political)

13

support inside Ukraine once and for all. Now we know what it feels like having Russia in our backyard, changing the geopolitical equation. Time is of the essence, and the West does not have the luxury to think it is premature, as some scholars and foreign-policy experts argue, to talk about the reemergence of a bipolar system. I must disagree that the changes on the global stage incited by Russia suggest we are moving in that direction: bipolarity. If I may add, the Trump administration’s maximum sanctions pressure on Iran combined with the threat of war will see Russia and China siding with Iran, thus contributing to an already shifting global balance of power. To those in the West who argue that Putin’s strategy to reinstate the USSR’s glory days is a dream, I say they are mistaken. Putin is marching steadily toward achieving that objective. Eventually, the West will come to terms with that reality. Do you recall a decade ago when the West stated that China’s economy would take many decades to catch up to that of the United States? No more! The trade war between the United States and China indicates the falsity of the U.S.’s preceding assessment. Welcome to the reality of geopolitics. I am convinced Russians believe that Putin is destined to achieve that objective: Russia’s place on the global stage as a major power that wields influence, supported by a strong military apparatus. Behind the scenes, business leaders, global-affairs, intelligence, and security analysts have been debating how realistic it is for Putin to achieve his objective of returning Russia to its leading role on the global stage. Acting, presumably, in Russia’s interest, Putin undertakes a calculated strategy that includes military, cyber, disinformation, and diplomatic tools to ride the unpredictable geopolitical tides. His decision to get involved in Syria’s conflict by sending Russia’s heavy upscale weapons demonstrates how far Putin is willing to go to forcefully rearrange seats at the global geopolitical table. This approach is not limited to Middle East, but also extends to Latin America (Venezuela and Honduras) and Africa. Speaking of Africa, we should not be surprised to learn how eager Russia is to establish a foothold in Africa, following in the footsteps of China. Russia plans to establish a logistical base in Eritrea, which would give Russia access to the Red Sea. This engagement, along with others, should be viewed in the context of Russia’s global strategy, one supported by all Russian government echelons. Putin’s decision to dispatch Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s prime minister, to visit Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe supports my argument. The high-profile visit of the Russian diplomat marked the signing of economic, military, and technical cooperation agreements (Beaumont 2018). A common theme in debates and discussions in the West centers on the perception of Russia as a global agitator primarily due to its military strength. Russia’s political influence backed by military support is impacting the Middle East, an outcome that could not be overlooked anymore. Unlike the state of affairs prior to the fall of the USSR, current worldwide geopolitical dynamics with emphasis on the Middle East and the Baltic region have changed the conversation regarding Russia’s ability to manage and influence the trajectory. With ongoing upheavals in the Middle East, Latin America, central Asia, and Africa, and with more on the horizon, the geopolitical order of which the United States has been the principal architect and guardian,

14

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

is faltering. Gone is the era that most historians dubbed “The American Century,” in which the United States of America managed the global order and was accustomed to its place at the top of every pecking order. While American global leadership has been declining for some time, there is no telling how its discombobulated approach under Trump may affect the global order, as we know it. It is too late to point fingers, knowing how ambiguous American foreign policy has become. American foreign policy: heavy on rhetoric and empty on substance; dependent on a dysfunctional United States Congress; poisoned by the venom of tribal politics, injuring American democracy. Look no further than at how the Trump administration turned a blind eye on human rights atrocities in favor of economic incentives, then praised itself as the champion of the principles of democracy—nothing but a consumption of ink. Sadly, we are today barely a shadow of the true America that once represented the world. While President Trump and Republicans—and Democrats, for that matter— have spoken as if America is all-knowing in its moral authority, the United States has failed to preserve and defend basic human decency and dignity. This new reality is pushing Russia forward with its plans to interfere, redirect, divide, and conquer wherever the opportunity presents itself. Look no further than at what is taking place on the global stage: Iran’s increasing influence, China and Russia’s growing presence in the Middle East, Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy, the Baltic States’ ongoing fear of a surprise Russian invasion or annexation like that of Crimea, and the ongoing chaos in Latin America. If that is not enough, consider the recently dismissed far-right United States national security advisor, John Bolton, and the unqualified secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, both of whom are advocating for a war against Iran. These two U.S. officials are disastrous and leading the United States on a dangerous path through their reckless policies and manipulated intelligence reports. There have been reports suggesting that Bolton pressured intelligence analysts while at the State Department when he oversaw the intelligence division there. Do you recall when Pompeo was asked whether the United States would stop supporting Saudi Arabia’s slaughter of defenseless Yemenis? Pompeo dodged the questions by talking about something that had nothing to do with the human catastrophe in Yemen. I argue that when Secretary Pompeo or the American president speaks on foreign policy, the world hears only chest-beating bravado, meaningless rhetoric about human rights, and hollow claims of global greatness. No wonder our president’s remarks at the United Nations inspired contemptuous laughter. Our only enduring value these days is greed, power amid endless, self-righteous hectoring that orders all peoples around the globe to abandon their heathen ways and improve themselves according to Washington’s specifically ordained, self-serving, coffer-padding dictates (Oualaalou 2018). Russia’s global outreach and expansion are not limited to a political course, diplomatic negotiations, or global treaties. Rather, Moscow’s efforts extend to economic ventures in the hope of acquiring international markets. Russia plans to use energy to further its objectives. For instance, in 2014, Russia decided to cut off supplies of gas to Ukraine after the two countries failed to agree on a price during talks mediated by the European Union. Russia is willing to use economic pressure to prevent Europe or the United States from supplying Ukraine with natural gas. Thus, Russia

1.4 Russia’s Internal Dynamics (Social/Economic/Political)

15

uses economic tools as political weapons to pressure other countries, the Ukraine, in this example. The move also has geopolitical and security inclinations: to prevent the presence of either Europe or the United States near Russia borders. I argue that this is no different from what is currently taking place in the eastern Mediterranean region following the recent discovery of massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) fields in both Egypt and Cyprus. I strongly believe this discovery of LNG has already created tensions between Egypt, Cyprus, Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon. I am not surprised to learn that Moscow has already drafted a strategy in case Europe decides to replace Russia with Egypt as its main supplier of LNG. It is my understanding that Russia will not allow such a venture to take place. Moscow will undermine any efforts that will challenge its status as the main supplier. Equally important, Russia now finds itself at a crossroads, so to speak, when it comes to its economic ventures with Iran. Since the United States decided to withdraw unilaterally from the Iran nuclear deal reached with the major powers plus Germany (known as P5 + 1), Russia will have to decide whether to challenge United States sanctions by continuing to trade with Iran or support the United States sanctions on a limited basis. I believe Russia will want to demonstrate its global role by ensuring that its interests are recognized and mediated, as tensions rise between Iran and the U.S. If the United States ends up warring with Iran, I am convinced that Russia and China will support Iran behind the scenes. The United States of America is on a dangerous path, to say the least, as a war with Iran will take on wider dimensions, involving countries that seek to defend their strategic and economic interests. The other alternative announced by Trump is regime change in Iran. It demonstrates not only the president’s ignorance about historical events (particularly the 1953 CIA and MI6 orchestrated-coup in support of the shah) but also the effect regime change will have on the region’s political landscape. A policy of regime change in Iran advocated by the hawkish United States’ national security advisor, John Bolton, will fail now because the regional dynamics have changed from those of the 1950s when Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in favor of the shah. As we know, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran later changed the course of history.1 There is no telling what the political map of the Middle East may look in the aftermath of a war between Iran and the United States of America. A war with Iran will certainly disrupt the global oil market as Iran will try to shut down the Strait of Hurmuz, through which 17.8 million barrels of oil cross daily. Russia, a major oil producer, may benefit from such a war as demand for Russia’s oil 1 As

I wrote in June 2017, “One of the president’s worst foreign policy blunders may be born of political convenience or ignorance. Whatever its cause, it is alarming that the president fixes his sights on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Is the president ready to combat Iran on Saudi Arabia’s behalf? Most analysis points in that direction, a dangerous path to say the least! Are the statements issued by the Trump camp about cancelling the 2015 nuclear deal the prelude to a much greater plan such as Iranian regime change? Possibly. Trump’s limited knowledge of global affairs, Middle Eastern political dynamics, and the shifting regional balance of power suggest that his pursuing regime change will inevitably unleash unrelenting battles between the Shia (Iran) and Sunni (Saudi Arabia) variants of Islam.” Oualaalou David, “The Dangerous Possibility of War with Iran,” The Huffington Post, June 28, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-dangerous-possibilityof-war-with-iran_us_5953ca34e4b0c85b96c65e49.

16

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

and natural gas will increase. Do you recall how falling oil prices in 2014 impacted the coffers of main producers like Saudi Arabia, leading the latter to enter into an agreement to cut oil production with a non-OPEC member, Russia? Moscow understands the link between geopolitics and energy and will want to ensure that its intervention in any geopolitical conflict guarantees the security of its economic and geostrategic interests. I believe Russia envisions itself having a far greater role in the Middle East. As the Middle East continues to swim in a sea of challenges, a key question arises: Can Russia affect the current political landscape in the Middle East? The answer is yes. For instance, the rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran illustrates the need for Russia to position itself—it already has—by supporting Iran (claiming the United States made a mistake by withdrawing unilaterally from the nuclear deal), and Syria (by setting the terms of a cease–fire with the opposition on behalf of the Syrian government), and Turkey (by selling the advanced missile system S-400 and planning a joint production of the next generation S-500), thus allowing Russia’s reentry into the region through much wider doors.2

1.5 Conclusion This chapter’s objective has been to show the framework for my arguments, arguments established on facts, rationality, and truth. It will not do the reader justice if I cherry pick information or promote one side of the argument over another. Rather, I present the argument as it is and let readers reach their own conclusions. The following sections address in great depth the historical events that have made Russia what it is today. I also address its sources of power, which come mainly from the sale of military hardware and energy (oil and gas). These sources of power seem to assist Russia moving forward in its global strategy. More and more, Russia is becoming relevant given (a) its growing influence on the global stage, (b) the United States declining leadership, and (c) global geopolitical shifts unfavorable to the United States and its allies. In the case of Russia, I believe it is time to ask the hard questions, to scrutinize how far Russia will go to realize its global aspirations. However, when I read and hear some experts arguing that Russia has no global power, except for its military 2I

argued in 2018’s Volatile State, “To Russia’s benefit, the ongoing spat between Iran and Saudi Arabia reflects the wider regional conflict between Sunnis and Shi’ites. The cutoff of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia (Sunni dominant) and Iran (Shi’a dominant) is not new given how proxy wars across the region expose the issue underlying this religious schism between the two Muslim sects. Given this tumultuous environment, Russia may take revenge for Saudi Arabia supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion, in 1989. It is not the case. The reason is that Russia will want to see how the schism between the two religious rivals plays out. Moscow wants to see if the US will interfere to support its staunch ally, the Saudis, to tilt the cold war to the Saudi’s favor. Assuming for a moment that is the case, Moscow already has prepositioned its heavy armaments in Syria and will be in a better position to shift its priorities and support Iran should the need arise. Alas, the outcome could not be more dangerous.” Oualaalou David, “Volatile State: Iran in the Nuclear Age,” (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 2018).

1.5 Conclusion

17

strength, and is not a threat to regional and global security, I must rebuke those critics for having chosen to be dishonest to themselves and to their audience. Their dishonesty requires a response! The United States government needs to start thinking about building the next generation of American foreign-policy leaders who will not only debate vigorously and honestly the issues pertaining to Russia’s global strategy, but also steer our great nation in the right direction. In the meantime, we need to accept that while we remain a global force in the twenty-first century, the absolute supremacy of the United States and the West is fast waning. And let us be realistic: Europe is similarly weak and more divided than ever. I do not conceive how it could replace the United States’ leadership. My fear is that, in the absence of United States’ international wisdom, the Western world may be on the last stretch of its hegemonic journey. In that case, look for China to fill the vacuum and for Russia to start rebuilding its lost empire. Pretending otherwise at this late stage of the game is just shortsightedness.

References Beaumont, P. (2018). Russia’s scramble for influence in Africa catches western officials off-guard. The USA Today. September 11, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/ sep/11/russias-scramble-for-influence-in-africa-catches-western-officials-off-guard Cooley, A. (2017). Whose rules, whose sphere? Russian governance and influence in post-soviet states. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. June 30, 2017. https://carnegieendowment. org/2017/06/30/whose-rules-whose-sphere-russian-governance-and-influence-in-post-sovietstates-pub-71403 DaVanzo, J., & Adamson, D. (1997). Russia’s demographic “crisis”: How real is it? Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP162/index2.html Elliott, J. K. (2019). Why Russia wants Nicolas Maduro to stay in charge of Venezuela. International Global News. February 9, 2019. https://globalnews.ca/news/4930480/maduro-venezuela-putinrussia/ Hudson, J., & Dawsey, J. (2019). Putin out-prepared Trump in key meeting, Rex Tillerson told House panel. The Washington Post. May 22, 2019. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-outprepared-trump-in-key-meeting-rex-tillerson-told-house-panel/ar-AABMeww?li=BBnb7Kz Korte, G. (2018). Trump’s chaotic NATO summit raises stakes for Putin talks in Helsinki. The USA Today. July 12, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/07/12/trumpnato-summit-putin-talks-helsinki/779598002/ Kramer A. E. (2019). Russia pulls out of I.N.F. Treaty in ‘symmetrical’ response to U.S. Move. The New York Times. February 2, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/world/europe/rus sia-inf-treaty.html Krygier, R., & O’Grady, S. (2019). In Venezuela, humanitarian aid has become a political weapon. The Washington Post. February 14, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/ in-venezuela-humanitarian-aid-has-become-a-political-weapon/2019/02/14/5eab781a-308911e9-8781-763619f12cb4_story.html?utm_term=.976999d213cb Oualaalou, D. (2017). Russia will test Trump’s loyalties very soon. The Waco Tribune—Herald. January 15, 2017. https://www.wacotrib.com/opinion/columns/board_of_contributors/david-oua laalou-board-of-contributors-russia-will-test-trump-s/article_21b81d1f-ec76-5153-9a5c-1d4 9313a1b8b.html

18

1 An Overview of Russia’s Geopolitics

Oualaalou, D. (2018). Padding US coffers on the faraway miseries of others. The Waco Tribune— Herald. September 28, 2018. https://www.wacotrib.com/opinion/columns/board_of_contribut ors/david-oualaalou-board-of-contributors-padding-us-coffers-on-the/article_241fa279-cc255493-912a-73f0d05e071b.html Rubin, M. (2019). Why Russia’s economy is headed for trouble. The National Interest. January 17, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-russias-economy-headed-trouble-41872

Chapter 2

History of Russia

2.1 Introduction It would be impossible to address the extensive history of the Russian empire in a few pages. However, a writer should briefly explain, put in perspective, and illuminate the decisive elements that have shaped modern–day Russia from the far-reaching events of millennia past. It would be an injustice to the reader for me to minimize the importance of historical events, particularly for Russia, an extraordinary empire, which happens to be the world’s largest country. That said, emphasizing the historical events, from the Mongol invasion to Tsarist rule, from ages of enlightenment and industrialization to revolutions and wars, helps us acquire a better understanding of Russia at its core. Although Russia is known for its political institutions, military power, energy abundance, massive land area, and domestic upheavals, it is also recognized for its cultural contributions in art, ballet, and classical music. It is known specifically for masterful accomplishments by its citizens such as Tolstoy, the greatest author of all time; Tchaikovsky, the world-renowned composer; and Rasputin, a mystic and selfproclaimed holy man who befriended the family of the last monarch of Russia, Tsar Nicholas II, while gaining considerable influence in the late imperial Russia. Many foreigners are familiar with Russian caviar and vodka, but the cultural significance of, and contributions by, Russian society and its economy are more remarkable. The above snippet of Russian history encapsulates the former Russian empire that influenced, shaped, and elucidated the political, social, and cultural plateau on which many of Russia’s domestic and foreign agendas competed. Before interpreting today’s Russia, one should define the former Soviet Union’s geographical territory and place its territory within the context of modern-day Russia [as Fig. 2.1 shows]. Doing so allows for a better understanding of Russia’s foreign-policy pursuits. My explanation and examination also address the challenges faced by the USSR that led to the demise of Communism. Nevertheless, without first becoming acquainted © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 D. Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5_2

19

20

2 History of Russia

Fig. 2.1 Russian Federation political map. Source “Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com”

with the historical background in which Russia acquired its territory and expanded its influence, readers may find it challenging to understand why today’s Russia behaves as it does. A brief selective description of Russia’s history, geography, demographics, and foreign relations follows. All of these factors have combined to transform the Russian Federation from a new union of Scandinavian immigrants into a global power armed with massive nuclear stockpiles. Over many centuries, those characteristics shaped Russia into what it is today. We begin with a narrative of the USSR’s historical identity.

2.2 Early History of the Russian Empire Knowing the history of the Russian empire, especially the history of its beginning era, helps one to understand modern-day Russia better. However, I forgo detailing the earliest history of Russia. Rather, I begin with Russia’s history starting with the East Slavs, Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples. Interestingly, many historians agree that the Russian empire started with the Viking rulers who established the northern state of Rus’, in 862 (Unattributed 2019). The two cities of Staraya Ladoga and Novgorod, the latter is Russian for Newtown, played a pivotal role in establishing the state of Rus’. During the eighth and ninth centuries, Staraya Ladoga played a crucial role as a prosperous trading outpost. The

2.2 Early History of the Russian Empire

21

city became a multiethnic settlement dominated mainly by Scandinavians. Interestingly, the inhabitants of the Staraya Ladoga were called by the name of Rus’. Novgorod, on the other hand, is considered one of the oldest, most important historic cities in Russia, with its more than 1000 years of history. Around 882 B.P., Prince Oleg of Novgorod seized power in Kiev, laying the foundation for the powerful state of Kievan Rus’. The prince’s ambition did not stop there. He launched an attack on the city of Constantinople (today’s Istanbul), which was the capital of the Byzantine Empire. Oleg was able to unite the northern and southern lands of the Eastern Slavs under one authority. This unity allowed him to rule the state and adopt Christianity as the official state religion. Interestingly, the conversion of Vladimir the Great (c. 958– 1015) and the people of Rus’ to Christianity was orchestrated by the prince himself (Unattributed 2014). The adoption of Christianity began the synthesis of Byzantine and Slavic cultures that defined Orthodox Slavic culture for the next millennium. However, the Mongol invasion in 1237–1240 expedited the disintegration of Kievan Rus’ due to huge numbers of casualties, including many deaths and injuries among its population. It is worth noting, though, that before its disintegration, Kievan Rus’ played a pivotal role in medieval international relations (Mackenzie and Curran 2002, p. 32). After the thirteenth century, Moscow became a cultural center. That made it possible for the territories of the Grand Duchy of Moscow to become the Tsardom of Russia, in 1547. In 1721, Peter the Great founded his state and named it the “Russian Empire.” During this era, the Russian Empire extended from the eastern borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Pacific Ocean. Though, for hundreds of years, Russians were ruled by the elite and the astonishingly wealthy Czarists. The elites ruled over a Russian society that largely consisted of peasants. The social, economic, and political challenges over the years led to the February Revolution of 1917, ending the reign of the last tsar, Nicholas II. His family, the Romanov dynasty, ruled Russia for three centuries. One cannot address the Russian Empire and its history without knowing the Romanov dynasty’s role in shaping Russia’s history and future. A brief look at how the Romanov dynasty rose to power and its accomplishments, rightly or wrongly, is important in understanding how the dynasty forever changed Russia’s social, economic, and political trajectory. My historical reference point starts after events in 1613 following years of unrest, famine, and upheavals that included invasions. Subsequently, at the age of sixteen, Mikhail Romanov was crowned the first Russian tsar, ending the instability that had ravaged Russian society. The Romanov dynasty ruled Russia for three hundred years; fighting officially ended in 1618 because of a treaty agreed to by Poland and Sweden (Mackenzie and Curran 2002, p. 143). Historians agree that during Mikhail’s rule, the Russian Empire witnessed massive territorial expansions that included the conquest of Siberia, a venture supported mainly by the Cossacks— they were originally Tatar warriors, whose name was derived from the Turkish and Arabic word Kazak, meaning “adventurer” or “freebooter.” By the sixteenth century, mainly Slavic communities had settled within the borders of Muscovy, Tatary, and Poland (Montefiore 2017, p. 19). These communities were financed by the Stroganov,

22

2 History of Russia

a family of highly successful Russian merchants, industrialists, and landowners. Mikhail’s sons died almost simultaneously, one aged five and the other at birth; the tragedy strongly impacted the tsar, whom illness—which included scurvy, dropsy, and dispersion—struck down on July 12, 1645, after he fainted in church (Montefiore 2017, pp. 37–38). The period of rule by Peter the Great (1689–1725) succeeded that of the tsar. Peter the Great’s tenure in power marked three major accomplishments: (a) building a new capital in Saint Petersburg; (b) establishing the Russian Navy; and (c) reorganizing the government. The implementation of these structural changes, besides permitting the acculturation of Western European culture, made it possible for the Russian Empire to emerge as a global power. The next historical era of the Russian Empire was one of enlightenment. During this era (1762–1796), a woman, Catherine II, ruled Russia. Historians agree that Catherine the Great, who took power in a bloodless coup and reigned for over thirty years, was Russia’s longest-ruling woman leader. As the Russian Empire was expanding, so too was the desire to conquer other areas. This outcome compelled the then Ottoman Empire, along with British and French forces, to challenge Russia and its leader, Czar Nicholas I, during the Crimean War. This war was a devastating military conflict for Russia, in which troops were decimated, and the shortcomings of the Russian military were clearly exposed. The disastrous results compelled Alexander, in late 1856, to sign the Treaty of Paris, bringing the ill-fated war to a swift conclusion (Simkin 1997). The next era was ruled by Tsar Alexander II. His issuance, in 1861, of an Emancipation Reform consisted of abolishing serfdom, which allowed peasants to purchase land. Among his other reforms were universal military service, strengthening Russia’s borders, and promotion of self-government. During his tenure, he sold Alaska to the United States, in 1867. His reign ended by assassination, in 1881. The czar era of 1855–1904 saw remarkable political and social reforms that shaped the Russian society for future decades. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Russia entered a new phase of domestic change influenced by economic, social, and political upheavals. Yet, the main event that sent Russia on a path to global exposure was its involvement in defending Serbia against the Austria-Hungary alliance during WWI. During this era of 1906–1917, many domestic social and political reforms were introduced, including the constitution. The Duma’s attempt to open the economy and the political system failed; the Stolypin reforms, changes to imperial Russia’s agricultural sector, also failed. These efforts were rejected as the ruling elites refused to relinquish or share power. While none of those reforms yielded desirable results, Russian citizens continued enduring hardship. Unfortunately, Tsar Nicholas II, who ruled Russia from 1894 to 1917, ignored the demands of his citizens and used his troops to end growing demonstrations. By 1915, amid those popular revolts, his popularity sank. Meanwhile, WWI raged on; the war was going badly for Russia, but the domestic front looked even bleaker. Nicholas II decided to personally oversee Russia’s unsatisfactory war efforts during WWI. Heading out to the war front meant that Nicholas II

2.2 Early History of the Russian Empire

23

had to leave someone else in charge of the government. He granted that responsibility to his ill-prepared, unqualified spouse, Alexandra Feodorovna. Alexandra was unable to handle the popular revolt as Russians had united for a common cause that could improve their living conditions. Among their demands was the establishment of a constitutional form of government. However, upon his return from the frontline, Nicholas II refused this proposal; the famous February Revolution of 1917 followed and eventually the collapse of the Romanov dynasty. Nicholas II and his family were executed just a year later. The international press officially reported his execution. For example, the New York Times broke the news on the front page of its July 21, 1917, Sunday edition, under the headline “Ex-Czar of Russia Killed by Order of the Ural Soviet” (Pipes 1990). This reporting left unclear whether the Ural regional Soviet or Bolshevik Central Committee in Moscow had ordered the execution of the czar and his family.

2.3 Emergence of Modern-Day Russia Historians agree that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 laid the foundation for the emergence of the Soviet Union, which evolved over many decades. The revolution resulted from a combination of factors that included economic policy failures, war fatigue, and displeasure with the autocratic system of government under the authority of the tsar, Nicolas II. The 1917 revolution that overthrew Nicholas II and ended the Romanov dynasty made possible the emergence of moderate socialists, which lead to the Communist takeover on October 25, 1917. The effect of the revolution that coincided with the ongoing WWI had a major impact on the Russian society on all fronts. Orlando Figes, a history professor at the University of London, writes: In the end, the Bolsheviks had no choice but to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. The terms were ruinous for Russia: Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Lithuania were all given nominal independence under German protection. The new Soviet Republic lost 34 percent of her population, 32 percent of her agricultural land, 54 percent of her industrial enterprises, and 89 percent of her coal mines. The sacrifices secured Lenin’s position as the victor of the 1917 revolutions. With the distraction of a foreign war behind him, Lenin could focus on solidifying his power at home, in the face of the civil war that lay ahead (Figes 2017).

With the demise of the Romanov dynasty, the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, took over and became known as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was Lenin’s Red Army that led the march toward victory following the civil war’s breakout. As a result, Lenin’s rule lasted until his death, in 1924. The stage was set: from 1922 to 1991, the history of Russia became essentially the history of the Soviet Union, one that defined relations between the West and the East. Note that the ideologically socialist system under which Russia was built reflected different eras of the Soviet Union’s history. In 1918, Bolsheviks perceived themselves as Communists, with the government of the Soviet Union based on the one-party system. In my opinion, Lenin’s followers had legitimate reasons for resenting the

24

2 History of Russia

czar’s government—it had plunged Russia into terrible wars for which the country was unprepared. However, there was little reason to expect that the regime they were creating would unleash far greater terrors (McMeekin 2017). Interestingly, by the 1930s, the Bolsheviks had managed to create an “illiberal Soviet subject” who lost his own identity and values in the public culture of the state. Consequently, it became challenging for any citizen within the system to think of himself or feel outside the terms defined by the public discourse of the Bolsheviks, and any dissenting thoughts or emotions were likely to be felt as a “crisis of the self,” demanding to be purged from the personality (Figes 2014). Social unrest made possible an emerging leader who shaped Russia’s history for decades to come. Born Iosif Visarrianovich Dzhugashvili, but known as Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), he rose to leadership as the general secretary of the Communist Party and premier of the Soviet Union. Stalin was born in the modern-day Republic of Georgia. By the accounts of many historians, his father was an alcoholic; thus, Joseph Stalin’s unstable family environment shaped his upbringing and influenced his thinking. His disillusionment with religion influenced his decision to join the Bolshevik revolution movement. Historical records indicate that, during his activism in the early years of the Bolshevik movement, he started using his new alias “Stalin,” Man of Steel. He moved through the ranks within the Communist Party as it acquired influence while expanding across the Soviet Union. The death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924 led to Stalin, who was positioned to lead the party, ultimately gaining control of the country. However, Stalin had an uphill battle that required him to defeat other party officials also struggling for the leadership position. Stalin quickly exiled his main rival, Leon Trotsky. By the 1930s, in a dictatorial style, Stalin had absolute control over the Soviet Union. Stalin’s ascendency to power as general secretary of the Communist Party saw fundamental changes in the Soviet society on many fronts. As the Soviet’s de facto head of state, Stalin embarked on oppressive policies throughout the 1930s that saw massive purges of political enemies and ethnic minorities. Purges were not only against party members, but also against all other members of society. Historians agree that in the early 1930s, Stalin was responsible for the mass starvation of the peasantry. He was also responsible for the death of more than 20,000 polish POWs in 1940 (Lovell 2009). This crime has always been attributed to Germany’s attempt to manipulate history. During the same era, Stalin wanted to develop the Soviet Union’s industrial sector to reverse the country’s dependency on agriculture. His efforts created major tumult because the Soviet Union was not ready for such rapid change. Stephen Kotkin, an American historian, writes: Stalin’s painstaking creation of a personal dictatorship within the Leninist dictatorship had combined chance (the unexpected early death of Lenin) and aptitude: He had been the fifth secretary of the party, after Yakov Sverdlov (who also died prematurely), Yelena Stasova, Nikolai Krestinsky, and Vyacheslav Molotov. His self-fashioning as savior of cause and country who was menaced from every direction dovetailed with fears for the socialist revolution and Russia’s revival as a great power menaced from every direction. Lenin’s party, with its seizure of power in the former Russian empire, had enacted upon itself a condition of

2.3 Emergence of Modern-Day Russia

25

“capitalist encirclement,” a structural paranoia that fed, and was fed by, Stalin’s personal paranoia. But those feelings on his part, whatever their now untraceable origins, had ballooned in his accumulation and enactment of the power of life and death over hundreds of millions. Such were the paradoxes of power: The closer the country got to achieving socialism, the sharper the class struggle became; the more power Stalin personally wielded, the more he still needed. Triumph shadowed by treachery became the dynamics of both the revolution and Stalin’s life (Kotkin 2017).

Regardless of how history judges Stalin, it remains true that, at the beginning of his tenure, Stalin had one specific objective in mind: to expand the Soviet Union’s ideals and principles around the world. Interestingly, Stalin recognized that global upheavals allow the Soviet Union to pursue a global mission while breaking out of its enclosed geopolitical space (Kotkin 2014). Stalin’s thinking went beyond an agrarian society to an industrial one with military capabilities to rival those of the United States. One of Stalin’s tactics was the deployment of espionage activities; the objective was to follow the development of the military activities of the Soviet Union’s rivals. The Soviet Union’s espionage program paid off. Stalin received intelligence from his spies that the United States and Great Britain were developing an atomic bomb program codenamed “the Manhattan Project.” Historians claim that Stalin first knew about the Manhattan Project in 1940 before future president Harry Truman. That knowledge concerned Stalin regarding the possible ramifications for the Soviet Union if it eschewed a similar path. It prompted Stalin to issue directives to redirect major investments into nuclear physics. The Soviet nuclear program during the Stalin era was small; however, once the United States dropped its first atomic bomb, on Hiroshima, it convinced Stalin that the Soviet Union must develop its own nuclear bomb. Further, Stalin recognized the potential opportunity for the Soviet Union when developing nuclear weapons, specifically, the weapons’ impact on international politics. With the fast pace of nuclear development, Stalin ensured resources would be devoted to this priority, though the Soviet Union experienced hardship from warrelated death and destruction. Stalin remarked to Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, a Soviet nuclear physicist who is widely known as the director of the Soviet atomic bomb project, saying, “If a child does not cry, the mother doesn’t understand what he needs. Ask for anything you’d like, you won’t be let down.” (Unattributed n.d.). The Soviet Union’s efforts produced results when it successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949, accelerating the nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union. This arms race defined international relations and relations between the East and West for decades to come. Stalin’s long-term objective was to deny the United States a nuclear monopoly. In 1953, only a few months after Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union detonated its first hydrogen bomb. Note that after the Nonaggression Pact between Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, in 1939, events on the ground took a different turn. Within days after signing the agreement, Hitler invaded Poland. Soon after, WWII erupted, and the Soviet Union invaded Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. The aftermath of WWII fomented tensions between the Soviet Union and the West, particularly with the United States. On the one hand, after Churchill’s famous declaration, “An Iron

26

2 History of Russia

Curtain has descended across the Continent,” the Soviet Union expanded its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the Soviet Union promoted its ideology and revolution in other parts of the world, including China and the Middle and Near East. The Soviet Union’s 1949 testing of a nuclear bomb further exacerbated tensions. This outcome pushed the United States and the Soviet Union into a nuclear arms race that shaped their relations, and those of global affairs, for decades to come. Acquiring nuclear capabilities convinced the Soviet Union to march forward by expanding its sphere of influence and spreading its ideology. Similarly, Moscow considered embarking on ventures that would have major impacts on global relations. For instance, in 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the Earth, which it did in about ninety-eight minutes. Sputnik’s surprise launch sent shockwaves throughout the American public, which felt a sense of technological superiority amid a postwar economic boom (Howell 2018). The Soviet Union’s space venture began a “space race” with the United States. Only a few years later, in 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space when the Soviet Union sent him into orbit around the Earth. The Soviet Union worked also to improve its military capabilities, honing its space technology while expanding its ideology worldwide. As a result, the world woke up in 1962 to the Cuban Missile Crisis, a nuclear standoff between the United States and the USSR over strategic missiles in Cuba. At issue was the Soviet Union’s deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the island some ninety miles from the state of Florida off the southern tip of the United States. This move created fear and panic among Americans, who thought they were on the brink of a nuclear exchange with the USSR. After thirteen days of tense negotiations between President John Kennedy’s administration and the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, the latter agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba and transport them back to the USSR. In return, the United States agreed not to invade Cuba and to remove its [USA] missiles from Turkey. Some argue that Khrushchev gambled by placing the missiles near the United States border since the USA’s missile capabilities, during that era, were robust. Further, the United States’ logistical capabilities surpassed those of the Soviet Union. It begs the question why, knowing this reality, Khrushchev would embark on such a risky venture. Many explanations emerged about the true motives behind Khrushchev’s challenge to the United States by his installing the missiles in Cuba. Some argue that Khrushchev’s decision countered the emerging lead of the United States in developing and deploying strategic missiles. Others argue that Khrushchev meant to send a strong message to the United States that the Soviet Union intended to protect Cuba after the United States’ failed coup attempt at the Bay of Pigs, in 1961. Peter Kenez, a historian specializing in Russian history and Eastern Europe, expresses yet another opinion: Since the Soviet Union was ringed by American bases, he assumed the Americans would be in no position to be indignant. We will never know his motives, but there are several possibilities. A prominent historian of Soviet Foreign Policy suggested that he intended to impress his Chinese comrades with his daring. He may have wanted to ensure Cuban security by making an attack on the island impossibly costly. He may have regarded this move as a

2.3 Emergence of Modern-Day Russia

27

first step in increasing Soviet influence in the western hemisphere. Of course, these options were not mutually exclusive (Kenez 2017).

As stated earlier, the complexities of Russian history are not limited to its domestic and foreign policies but are also impacted by its human and physical geography. A brief account follows of key characteristics of Russia that include its geography, demographics, and the structure of the modern-day Russian government. Those characteristics reflect many past centuries of history that continue to affect Russia today. The following briefly explains how Russia’s geography contributed to Russia’s dealings and behavior on the contemporary international stage.

2.4 Geography of Russia Since the end of the USSR in 1991, Russia is now officially the Russian Federation, located in northeastern Europe and northern Asia. It is still the largest country in the world—slightly less than 1.8 times the size of the United States. To the north, Russia shares boundaries with the Arctic Ocean; to the west with the northern Pacific Ocean; to the south with China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; and to the west with the Black Sea, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. Russia also shares maritime borders with Japan by the Sea of Okhotsk and the U.S. state of Alaska across the Bering Strait (Hellie et al. 2019). Since Russia’s victory over Georgia a few years ago, Moscow recognizes two more bordering countries, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which are internationally recognized as parts of Georgia. The city of Moscow, Russia’s capital, is one of the largest cities in the world, second largest in Europe. Geographical advantages make Russia a strategic location with access to many locations, allowing it to have tremendous geostrategic, economic, political, religious, and cultural influence. Given its massive land mass, Russia is the world’s largest country in total area. It stretches over a vast territory that covers nearly twice the size of Canada. Russia extends across the whole of northern Asia and the eastern third of Europe, with eleven time zones. Furthermore, Russia’s diverse landforms include deserts, semiarid steppes, deep forests, and the arctic. The world’s deepest lake, Baikal, is also located in Russia. Russia’s diverse population in 2019 was estimated at about 146.79 million people, including Crimea. While most of the population are ethnic Russians, about 120 other ethnic groups reside there, speaking various languages and embracing different religious and cultural traditions. Most of the Russian Federation’s population is concentrated in the European section of the Russian Federation, which includes Moscow, the capital. Moscow and Saint Petersburg, formerly Leningrad, are the two most important cultural and financial centers in Russia. Additionally, they are considered by many to be the most picturesque cities in the world. Many ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people have relocated eastward into Siberian cities

28

2 History of Russia

like Vladivostok and Irkutsk after the social and economic changes the former USSR experienced during the twentieth century. At times, Russia experiences extreme climates given its proximity to the Arctic Circle. Interestingly, Russia’s harsh, frigid winters have protected it from foreign invaders throughout the centuries. Although cold temperatures have made life challenging for the locals, Russia’s abundance of natural resources includes massive reserves of oil; Russia ranks third after the United States and Saudi Arabia in oil reserves. Russia also has reserves of gas and precious metals. However, this abundance of resources has not translated into improved living conditions for most Russians. Oligarchs have most of the wealth. Throughout Russia’s history, wealthy, powerful Russians who control the resources have ruled over a great mass of their poor, powerless compatriots. That dynamic has led to confrontations between the two groups, which explains the number of revolutions experienced by the USSR and both pre–Communist and post-Communist Russia. Rather than expand more on Russia’s geography, suffice it to say that Russia’s topography varies as much as its demographics, languages, political views, and religious diversity. Two elements concerning Russia’s geography are noteworthy. First, in the western part of the country, which occupies some two-fifths of Russia’s total area, lowland plains predominate over vast areas broken only by low hills and plateaus. Second, in the eastern part, the bulk of the terrain is mountainous, though there are some extensive lowlands. Given those geomorphological actions and topological factors, Russia may be subdivided into six main relief regions: the Kola-Karelian region, the Russian Plain, the Ural Mountains, the West Siberian Plain, the Central Siberian Plateau, and the mountains of the south and east (Hellie et al. 2019). Some of Russia’s most important cities are Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, and Kazan. Yekaterinburg, for instance, is at the center of the Eurasian continent on the Isle River. It is regarded as the third Russian capital city given the size of its tourism and transport sectors, culture, and economy. Moscow, however, is the most populous Russian city with over 11.5 million residents.

2.5 Demographics While Russia is the largest country in the world in terms of square miles, its population is far less impressive when compared to other countries like China, India, and the United States. In terms of world population, as of July 2018, Russia ranks eighth with about 142 million people (The World Fact Book 2019). To put this in perspective, consider the following: Bangladesh, which is 118 times smaller, has a population of 164 million, outnumbering Russia by 18 million people (Yegorov 2018). The reasons for Russia’s demographic challenges are well researched in sociology and regional studies. My objective in this narrative, however, is to address how Russia’s demographic challenges greatly affect its political, social, and economic trajectories, both domestically and globally. Russia’s observers argue that its location

2.5 Demographics

29

in an extremely cold climate and the chronic consequences of WWII are two elements that contribute to its demographic decline. Climatologically, temperatures in most of Russia’s regions are too cold to support human habitation. As a result, most of the Russian population concentrate in the European part of the country. Northern location and climate explain why the vast territories in northern Siberia remain uninhabited. Vladimir Kolosov, president of the International Geographical Union, states, “The population [in Russia’s Asian region] is just two people per square kilometer.” The outcome of WWII is another reason contributing to Russia’s demographic decline. According to various sources, when the Soviet Union engaged in WWII, it lost between twenty-five and thirty million people. The Washington Post estimates the number to be about twenty-six million (Tharoor 2015). The USSR’s drastic loss of population during WWII created a demographic “gap” that continues to echo its effects today. The thinking is that individuals who died during the 1940s lacked children, which explains Russia’s next demographic downfall during the 1960s and 1990s respectively. Julie DaVanzo and David Adamson of the Rand Corporation write: The trends of population growth and aging in Russia have been profoundly affected by catastrophic events, such as the two world wars, the civil war of 1917–1922, and famines in the early 1920s and ‘30s. These catastrophes have distorted the population pyramid– the typical age distribution and balance between male and female in the population. For example, huge losses during World War II have caused Russia to have the lowest overall male-to-female ratio in the world, especially among the elderly. The irregularities of this pyramid will continue to have an impact on the number of births and the rate of population growth and aging for several decades (DaVanzo and Adamson 1997).

Evidently, wars and climate are not the only elements contributing to the decline of Russia’s population. Alcohol consumption, death from violence, suicide, and nonnatural causes of death are also a significant factors. When taken into consideration, the combination of those elements contribute to the demographic decline within Russian society. Alas, these factors play a pivotal role in Russia’s future global endeavors as it works to improve its place on the global stage.

2.6 Structure of the Present Russian Government Following the brief review above of Russia’s history, I now turn to the structure of the modern-day Russian government. Most important are the changes introduced in the 1993 Russian constitution, which called for establishing three branches of government: the executive, legislative, and judicial. The structure is similar to that of the United States. The difference in Russia’s model, however, is that these three branches do not share equal powers. Unlike the United States, the Russian system of government allows the president to have formidable power as head of the armed forces and the security council. That power allows the president the sole authority to set the economic, security, and foreign-policy agenda for the country. That said, the Russian

30

2 History of Russia

system of government’s presidential powers appear to grant the president authority to issue decrees bypassing the legislative branch of government. Said differently, the president can decide on a particular agenda without due process or legislative review. Russian observers note that Russia’s strong presidential system is like the one executed by France’s Charles de Gaulle during his 1958–1969 reign. In Russia’s case, the president exhibits power through appointing key officials. Interestingly, with Russia’s current president, Vladimir Putin, it is estimated that the size of his presidential apparatus in Moscow and other localities numbers more than 75,000 people, mostly employees of state-owned enterprises, directly under his control (Darlington 2018). The Russian government is a bicameral system, with a Federation Council (178 members) and the State Duma (450 members). Both houses fall under the Federal Assembly. Lawmakers in both houses serve four-year terms. The Duma, it is widely reported, has the most powerful role of primary consideration for all legislation. In 2000, after being elected president, Putin exerted more control over the Federation Council by replacing exofficio membership with a process of presidential appointment. While the United States consists of fifty states, Russia is divided into eightynine jurisdictions. Each one has two representatives in the Federation Council. Each jurisdiction’s governor is considered its chief executive. The latest implemented changes indicate that instead of being directly elected in their jurisdictions through popular vote, governors are now nominated by the president, then appointed by the jurisdiction’s legislature. The jurisdiction’s legislature can reject a nomination; however, after three rejections, the president can dissolve the legislature if he so chooses. In 2005, as one example, all of President Putin’s thirty nominees were approved by the legislature. Political attention is already shifting in Russia to 2024 when the constitution forbids Putin from running for office. Should Putin not be permitted to serve as president again, a scenario that I question, it will end an era in Russian history in which Putin has been at the helm of power, as both prime minister and president, from 1999 to 2024. Nonetheless, Putin’s tenure will be extraordinary, longer than any previous Soviet Union’s supreme leader, except Joseph Stalin, whose administration exceeded twenty-five years. Although I remain cautious, and in spite of the West’s ongoing criticism, Putin may prevail domestically if he galvanizes the necessary support of the Russian people.

2.7 Era of Stagnation Is it fair to categorize Leonid Brezhnev, the leader of the USSR following the removal of Khrushchev, as primus inter pares? I say yes. Brezhnev ruled the USSR from 1964 until his death, in 1982. During his tenure, the USSR experienced major economic setbacks. The ever-present corruption, and eventually the disintegration of the Soviet Union, resulted from ill-conceived economic policies. That said, when Brezhnev took

2.7 Era of Stagnation

31

the reins of power, he began his tenure with the country experiencing both a good economic footing and soaring prosperity. The slow accumulation of major social, political, and economic problems followed. Yet Brezhnev did not change course with new policies or suggested alternatives. The result was a sluggish economy; hence, this period of USSR history is often referred to as the “Era of Stagnation.” Interestingly, those who immediately followed Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, were both senior politicians with little incentive for change. Andropov led the Soviet Union from 1982 until his death in 1984 and was replaced by Chernenko, who served until his death, in 1985. It appears these two senior politicians were more interested in maintaining the status quo rather than reorienting the Soviet economy and introducing new policies. Soon after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he introduced new reforms in the hope of reviving the Soviet Union’s economy; however, his economic policies failed, leading to the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Two major events marked the tenure of Gorbachev. One is the Chernobyl disaster. The other is the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Historians agree that during Gorbachev’s tenure, the Russian – United States relations observed détente mainly over nuclear issues. During Gorbachev’s tenure, the Cold War ended, leading to the disintegration of the USSR. Gorbachev was the last president of the USSR. Domestically, Gorbachev embarked on economic reforms known as perestroika, Russian for “restructuring,” which aimed to decentralize the decision-making process from the central government, to improve efficiency. Alas, his economic policies failed to achieve their intended objectives for improving the living conditions of Russian citizens. The cracks in the Soviet’s economic and political infrastructure became prevalent. When Eastern bloc countries in 1989–1990 started to abandon the Marxist-Leninist governance system, Gorbachev decided not to intervene militarily. His inaction emboldened a growing separatist sentiment that threatened to break up the Soviet Union. In 1991, hardliners, mainly those who embraced Marxist-Leninist ideology, launched a coup against Gorbachev. Although the coup failed, it gave a strong indication of what lay ahead socially and politically. In the wake of this failed coup against Gorbachev, he resigned, and the Soviet Union ceased to exit. To this day, Gorbachev remains a controversial figure among Russians. Some applaud his pivotal, multilevel efforts to improve the living conditions of Russians, curb human rights abuses, end the Cold War with the USA, and reunify Germany. Others blame him for the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which led to a downtrodden economy and a decline in Russia’s global influence. After leaving office, Gorbachev criticized Russian presidents who followed him, including the late Boris Yeltsin and the current president, Vladimir Putin. It behooves us, however, to set the historical record straight. The breakdown of Communism was not based solely on the West; rather, it came from within the Soviet Union’s system itself. “The widespread consensus among historians, is that Perestroika and breakdown were yet another ‘revolution from above.’ According to Mark Edele, it was not ‘civil society’ that broke the grip of Communism—it was the Communist establishment, ‘uncivil society,’ which was primarily responsible for the downfall of the Soviet Union (Edele 2019).”

32

2 History of Russia

December 26, 1991, marks the day the Soviet Union ceased to exist—many Russians regard it as the darkest day in the history of the USSR. After taking office following the fall of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin implemented new policies including, for instance, the removal of Communist-imposed price controls and reforms imposed on Soviet enclaves. Similarly, in 1993, Yeltsin signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II). The purpose of the treaty, which, according to the Arms Control Association, never went into force, was to conduct inspections while overseeing the elimination of ICBMs and their silo launchers. With all those changes, Yeltsin surprisingly won reelection, in 1996. However, he resigned in 1999, naming Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, as the acting president. Note, however, that during the early 1990s, the Russian Federation engaged in regional conflicts that changed its geopolitical trajectory in the following years. For instance, in 1994, Russian Federation troops entered the breakaway state of Chechnya. The purpose of the incursion was to stop Chechnya from seeking independence. The year-and-a-half conflict resulted in the death of approximately 100,000 people (Unattributed 2009). Scattered operations by Chechen rebels followed, including hostage taking at a hospital in Budennovsk, southern Russia. The Kremlin dispatched Russian commandos to free the hostages, though unfortunately the operation resulted in one hundred deaths. Events took a different turn, in 1996: a Russian missile attack killed the Chechen president, Dzhokhar Dudayev. However, when rebels launched a successful attack on Grozny, its leader, Aslan Maskhadov, signed a cease-fire with Moscow, and Russian troops began to withdraw. At this juncture, the Kremlin recognized Maskhadov’s government. Despite a peace treaty signed between Russia and the Chechen leader, the problem of Chechnya’s independence is still unresolved. Historians agree that 2000 was the year in which Vladimir Putin officially became the president of the Russian Federation. His landslide reelection in 2004 put forth the question what would happen when Putin’s term in office ended in 2008. Would he retire, or would he circumvent the democratic process by resorting to political tricks to keep himself in power? Apparently, the latter option prevailed. His protégé, Dmitry Medvedev, ran for office in 2008 and was elected president while Putin served as prime minister. We should not be blind to the reality of who was “the boss.” Medvedev was nothing but a figurehead; Putin made the decisions from behind the scenes. Because of his grip on the political process and its institutions, Putin was reelected president, in 2012. Following the fall of the USSR, Russia’s espousal of democracy was somehow uncertain, to say the least. The Russian Federation election of 2000 represented one step forward and two steps back. The election of 2000 begged the question whether Russia could and would embrace democracy without manipulating election results or intimidating opposition candidates. Everyone can agree regardless that the 2000 Russian elections changed the course of history. Russia went from a country where power was centralized in the hands of the Kremlin to a country in which the citizens chose their leaders—or so they thought. Michael McFaul, former United States’ ambassador to Russia, writes:

2.7 Era of Stagnation

33

More than two-thirds of the eligible voters participated, and they appeared to make informed choices between a range of candidates who offered alternative platforms, policies, and leadership styles. At the same time, this election did not occur on a level playing field. Vladimir Putin enjoyed tremendous resource advantages that tainted the process. Although weak in some arenas, the Russian state still enjoys too much power regarding the electoral process, while societal organizations–political parties, civic organizations, trade unions, and independent business groups–remain too weak to shape the outcomes of elections (McFaul 2000).

Moving forward, Russia dealt with a host of domestic and foreign issues. Russia experienced domestic terrorism attacks in 2010 when two suicide bomber attacks on the metro in Moscow killed 39 people (Bigg 2010). The Kremlin blamed the attacks on north Caucasus militants. The Kremlin’s accusation was confirmed when the then Chechen leader, Doku Umarov, claimed responsibility for the attacks. Domestic issues were not Russia’s only concerns. Moscow’s relations with Washington experienced turbulence in the wake of the FBI’s discovery, and subsequent arrest, of ten low-level Russian spies who were engaging in various activities in the US (McGreal 2010). The spies were part of a network using cold war tactics such as Morse code messages and invisible writing to communicate with the Russian government. In 2012, things came to a head when Putin won his third term as president. Demonstrations erupted over the election results, which many Russians believed were rigged. Fearing the negative impact on his image, Putin ordered the demonstrators arrested. Among those arrested were members of the music band Pussy Riot. The band became the face of the opposition to Putin’s rule. Unfortunately, each of the three members of the band was sentenced to two years of hard labor. However, their arrest was condemned by not only the United States but also the European Union and the Human Rights group. The following year, in 2013, Russia emerged center stage for none other than harboring a former CIA employee, Edward Snowden, who leaked highly sensitive information about the National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance program dubbed “Prism.” Moscow decided to grant Snowden temporary asylum, which strained relations between Moscow and Washington. Consequently, then president Obama cancelled his summit meeting with Putin. The complexities of Russian history are hard to decipher. Consider, for example, Moscow’s decision, in 2014, to annex Crimea. While the West, quite rightly and quickly, condemned Russia’s move, it failed to understand the historical ties Russia has to Ukraine. For instance, half of Crimea’s two million people are of Russian decent. Similarly, Russia still maintained a naval base there. Many in the West may be unaware that Crimea was part of Russia up until 1954 when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave it as a gift to Ukraine. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Crimea became part of an independent Ukraine (Calamur 2014). Following its latest annexation by Russia, Crimea held a referendum and ninetyseven percent of its voters choose to secede from the Ukraine and rejoin Russia. The United States and some European countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia. Similarly, Western countries including the United States viewed the elections in Crimea as a fake display of democracy. Ian Birrell, a former deputy editor of the

34

2 History of Russia

Independent and speechwriter for former United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron, wrote: Before anyone rushes to accept this vote, they might also like to note the most recent poll in Crimea – published last month – showed just 41% wanted unity with Russia. This was a rise of five points in a year, and was taken as the violence flared in Kiev, but it makes it impossible to assume a majority really wanted to join Russia – let alone 97% of the population. It is also worth recalling that when the Soviet Union collapsed, a majority in Crimea endorsed Ukrainian independence – although its economic performance has been disastrous and millions have moved away these past two decades (Birrell 2014).

As widely reported, Russia’s involvement in the 2016 United States presidential election led to an FBI investigation that in turn prompted the United States Department of Justice to appoint special counsel Robert Mueller to investigate. At issue was Russia’s alleged meddling in the 2016 United States’ presidential election. The findings demonstrate how technology is a double-edged sword.

2.8 Conclusion Subsequent pages offer a detailed narrative of the Russian Federation’s justification for deploying its military power and abundant energy to support its domestic and global agenda. The time could not be more challenging and puzzling for Russia as the Middle East spirals out of control, US global leadership wanes, oil prices drop, Iran’s influence grows, and an impeachment inquiry ensnares President Trump, which could see him removed from office for breaking US laws. Russia’s fears are also internal: a declining population, growing unemployment, a widening gap between the rich and the poor, and systemic inequalities. The list is long. Chapter three focuses on which power sources Russia draws from to support its domestic and global agenda. My subsequent analysis in chapter three also focuses on whether those sources enable Russia to reassert itself on the global stage while influencing the global agenda in a fast-changing world. Make no mistake: the tough choices now contemplated by Russia prove challenging, the consequences far reaching. As the sun sets on a world marked by the rise of nationalism, political divisiveness, rising conflicts, and uncertainty, I wonder how far Russia will go to secure its seat at the head of the global table. Interesting times lie ahead for Russia!

References Unattributed. (no date). Stalin and the atomic bomb. The Atomic Heritage Foundation. https://www. atomicheritage.org/profile/joseph-stalin. The World Fact Book. (2019). Central intelligence agency library, October 5, 2019, https://www. cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html.

References

35

Bigg, C. (2010). Moscow mourns 39 victims of metro blasts. Radio Free Europe, March 30, 2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Moscow_Mourns_39_Victims_Of_Metro_Blasts/1997511.html. Calamur, K. (2014). Why Ukraine is such a big deal For Russia. National Public Radio (NPR), Politics & Policy, February 21, 2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/02/21/280684 831/why-ukraine-is-such-a-big-deal-for-russia. Darlington, R. (2018). A short guide to the russian political system, March 21, 2018, https://www. rogerdarlington.me.uk/Russianpoliticalsystem.html. DaVanzo, J., & Adamson, D. (1997). Russia’s demographic “Crisis”: How real is it? Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP162/index2.html Edele, M. (2019). The Soviet Union: A short History (p. 194). Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley Inc. Figes, O. (2014). Revolutionary Russia, 1891–1991 (p. 145). New York: Henry Hold & Company. Figes, O. (2017). From Tsar to U.S.S.R.: Russia’s chaotic year of revolution. National Geography, October 25, 2017, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/archaeology-and-history/mag azine/2017/09-10/russian-revolution-history-lenin/ Hellie, R., Hosking, G. A., Keenan, E., Louis, Lieven, D., McCauley, M., & Medvedkov, Y. V. (2019). Russia. Encyclopedia Britannica, Sep 21, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Rus sia. Howell, E. (2018). Sputnik: the space race’s opening shot. Space, August 22, 2018, https://www. space.com/17563-sputnik.html. Kenz, P. (2017). A history of the Soviet Union from the beginning to its legacy (p. 209). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kotkin, S. (2014). Stalin: Paradoxes of power (p. 556). New York: Penguin Press. Kotkin, S. (2017). Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 (pp. 5–6). New York: Penguin Press. Mackenzie, D., & Curran, M. W. (2002). A history of Russia, the Soviet Union, and beyond (6th ed.). Boston: Wadsword, Cengage Learning. McFaul, M. (2000). Russia’s 2000 presidential elections: Implications for Russian democracy and U.S.-Russian relations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 01, 2000, https://carnegieendowment.org/2000/04/01/russia-s-2000-presidential-elections-implicati ons-for-russian-democracy-and-u.s.-russian-relations-pub-421 McGreal, C. (2010). FBI breaks up alleged Russian spy ring in deep cover,” The Guardian, June 28, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/29/fbi-breaks-up-alleged-russian-spy-ringdeep-cover. McMeekin, S. (2017). The Russian revolution: A new history (p. 352). New York: Basic Books. Montefiore, S. S. (2017). The Romanovs: 1613–1918. New York, Vintage Books. Pipes, R. (1990). The Russian revolution (p. 783). New York: Vintage Books, A division of Random House. Simkin, J. “Tsar Alexander II,” Spartacus Educational, September 1997 (updated July 2016), https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSalexander2.htm Tharoor, I. (2015). Don’t forget how the Soviet Union saved the world from Hitler. The Washington Post, May 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/08/dont-for get-how-the-soviet-union-saved-the-world-from-hitler/. Unattributed. (2009). Chechnya and Russia: Timeline. The Guardian, April 16, 2009, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/16/chechnya-russia-timeline. Unattributed. Russia: A Timeline. History, March 19, 2019, https://www.history.com/topics/russia/ russia-timeline Unattributed. Vladimir the Great’s Christianization of the Kievan Rus’. Word Press, August 11, 2014, https://fromthegardenintothecity.wordpress.com/2014/08/11/vladimir-the-greats-christian ization-of-the-kievan-rus/ Yegorov, O. (2018). Why is Russia’s population (relatively) small and declining? Russia Beyond, November 27, 2018, https://www.rbth.com/lifestyle/329586-russia-population-small.

Chapter 3

Russia’s Sources of Power

3.1 Introduction The debates that followed the fall of the USSR in 1991 focused mainly on feeding Western domestic audiences rhetoric about the new democracy that was sweeping Russia. As a result, it was said, democracy would manifest globally. Those spoon feedings became fewer as years went by, and the hard truth settled in: Russia becoming a democracy is an illusion, much like running after a mirage. With current major shifts in the global balance of power, business leaders and political observers— in addition to defense, intelligence, and energy analysts—seem to be perplexed about the nature of Russia’s long-term global strategy. Following the collapse of the USSR, in 1991, Russia’s withdrawal from areas of influence in Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America has had a major impact on the global balance of power— leaving the United States as the sole global power. However, now that Vladimir Putin is serving his fourth term as the Russian president, two important questions loom large: Why is Russia reemerging on the world stage, and what resources is Russia deploying to that end? To be sure, Russia’s current global engagement is leaving many in Washington scratching their heads. The United States, conveniently or ignorantly, is unclear by what it means, while Europe is divided on how to deal with Russia. This new reality suggests the urgent need for the West to rethink its strategy toward Russia as the latter moves forward with its plans. The question whether Russia can afford to sustain its global expansion presupposes an antecedent question: What are the sources of Russia’s power? If those sources of power are military and natural resources, mainly energy, are there others besides? Grant the previous chapters’ argument that Russia draws its power from its military apparatus, including its striking nuclear capabilities and abundant natural resources, primarily of oil and natural gas. My subsequent analysis then focuses on whether those sources adequately enabled Russia to embark on a global expansion strategy while playing an influential role in a fast-changing world. This chapter offers a detailed narrative that answers those basic questions. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 D. Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5_3

37

38

3 Russia’s Sources of Power

Much to the chagrin of the West, Putin is reasserting Russia’s presence on the global stage. His moves expose the tense relations that currently exist between the West and Russia. Putin’s actions come on the heels of Russia’s overtures to China. I devote a detailed narrative about this point in the upcoming pages. For now, suffice it to state that Russia–China relations must concern the West, including the United States. I wager that both Russia and China will likely reshape the geopolitical landscape, including that of the Middle East, while pushing the United States away from Asia as much and as far as possible. It is worth noting that Russia’s global strategy is supported not only by its military, mainly because of its nuclear capabilities, but also through its seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where Russia exercises its influence through advancing its objectives and vehemently objecting to United States interests. The latest UNSC vote regarding the deployment of an international force to Syria was vetoed by both Russia and China. You get my point! Opportunities for Putin to advance Russia’s global interests abound and cannot be dismissed. Angel Stent writes, Russia’s ability to thwart Western interests has also enabled it to advance its own interest internationally. Western attempts to isolate Russia after the seizure of Crimea have failed. Moreover, the increasing disarray in the transatlantic alliance since Donald Trump came to power, plus Brexit (Britain’s decision to leave the European Union) and a European beset by new challenges, all these have provided Putin with unanticipated opportunities to advance Russia’s interests, which he has skillfully utilized. (Stent 2019, p. 3)

The current global system is complex: the United States is on the last stretch of its global hegemony, while China is edging toward global supremacy and is near the cusp of its objective. Many Westerners cast doubt about Russia’s ability to manage a global system the same way the United States did and continues to do for the time being. But the concern is not about that, in my opinion. Rather, it is about what to expect from Russia as it tries to return to its pre-1991 status: a global superpower player. It comes on the heels of countries like those in the Middle East that see Russia in a positive light and are willing to work with Moscow on a host of issues. The current dynamics in Syria, where Russia currently decides the outcome, support my argument. It does not exactly help matters when President Trump lacks a systematic understanding of global affairs and cannot articulate and defend U.S. strategic interests. Furthermore, Russia played a major role in helping Donald Trump win the United States presidency in 2016. Russia’s role has led many to question Trump’s legitimacy. Russian meddling in the 2016 United States’ presidential election should give Americans pause to reflect on where our democracy is headed. Russia’s meddling should also provide an opportunity for domestic debates about whether it is time to abolish the Electoral College once and for all. After all, the United States Constitution’s principle “One Person, One Vote”1 should and must stand. Not embarking on these necessary

1 Spakovsky

Hans A. von & Slattery Elizabeth, “One Person, One Vote: Advancing Electoral Equality, Not Equality of Representation,” The Federalist Society, Volume 16, Issue 3, October 26, 2015, https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/one-person-one-vote-advancing-ele ctoral-equality-not-equality-of-representation.

3.1 Introduction

39

changes will further cast doubt about future United States local and national elections. It has been reported already that millennials distrust the system. As a result, elections, presidential or otherwise, are the last thing on their minds. Now let us consider the sources of Russia’s power more closely, especially military and energy. In my opinion, the military apparatus and energy abundance contribute substantially to how Russia formulates its foreign policy; both sources of power serve its interests domestically and globally. However, it perplexes me to read in some United States and European publications that Russia is weak and unable to mount a strong comeback on the global stage. To those I say, You are wrong! The annexation of Crimea should serve as both a prelude to and warning of what lies ahead in the Baltic States, the next target on Russia’s list. Much of Russia’s foreign policy structure post-1991 is attributed to the change in the role of its military apparatus, one that guarantees the security of the state. Robin Higham writes, “Fundamental change in the role of the Russian military today depends on Russia’s shifting from its long-standing expansionist foreign policy to one in support of the status quo (Kagan 2002).” The following pages detail the sources of Russia’s power, mainly military, and how it deploys these sources to support its foreign policy and the advancement of its global agenda.

3.2 Military: A Source of Power Most agree on this fact: we would not be talking much about Russia if it lacked military capabilities, especially nuclear strength. Our reticence would be in spite of the historical record, which shows that the former Russian empire’s contribution to civilization throughout human history played a pivotal role in shaping world history. Because of its military capabilities, Russia today greatly influences the trajectory of global affairs as it continues to develop sophisticated weapons to reshape the global order and recapture the USSR’s days of glory. But before detailing how Russia considers its military capabilities as a source of power, it behooves us to discuss the world order after World War II (WWII), one in which the USSR and the United States have competed aggressively and stealthily over ideological influence. Due to both the USA and the USSR’s military capabilities, the Cold War era was marked by peace and stability despite the outbreak of conflicts—small and large—that took place in different regions of the world. There are those who argue that this post-WWII era existed because of the strength, military and economic, the U.S. exhibited. While I agree with this assertion, we should not ignore the fact that Russia’s military capabilities acted as a counterbalance, contributing to peace and stability. No one denies that the United States of America emerged as the only superpower following the fall of the USSR, in 1991. America’s power was not limited to its military capabilities only, but also extended to economic and diplomatic dimensions. However, today Russia

40

3 Russia’s Sources of Power

is reemerging on the global stage, presenting an array of challenges that have not been witnessed since 1991. Russia’s reemergence is facilitated by the buildup of its military arsenal with nuclear weapon strike capabilities at its core, a source of power only the United States can match. While addressing Russia’s military capabilities from its naval assets and airpower to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and fighter jets would make a great topic, my focus in this section is to discuss how Russia deploys its military apparatus as both a tool and a source of power to navigate global geopolitical waters. I want readers to understand how Russia, because of its military strength, influences regional conflicts, reshaping them to support its global strategy. Understanding a resurgent Russia’s military as a source of power provides us with a deeper understanding of its global strategy in the twenty-first century. Look no further than what Russia is doing in the Middle East and Latin America and how it became the deciding factor on what’s taking place on the ground, politically and militarily. That said, I argue that in the Middle East, the most volatile region in the world, the Syrian civil war offered Russia an entry point for expansion of its objectives. Moscow decided not only back Syrian president, Bashaar al-Assad, but also reshape the region’s political landscape. Similarly, Russia’s regional political influence was evident when Moscow took an active role in the Iran nuclear negotiations that included, in addition to Russia, China, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (P5 + 1). Much has not been revealed about Russia’s efforts behind the scenes during the Iran negotiations, efforts that led to the historic 2015 Iran nuclear agreement. By the way, the Iran nuclear issue proved again that the Middle East continues to be the epicenter of military, sectarian, and social conflicts. The region also continues to be a competitive arena for global powers to exert their influence and profit from its bountiful economic resources. Whether or not the West wants to admit it, it was Russia that played a pivotal role behind the scenes, convincing Iran to come to the negotiation table and then to agree to the terms reached between the West and Iran. To the chagrin of involved parties who negotiated the agreement for years, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, hurtling the Middle East—and the world, for that matter—into chaos. Trump’s decision certainly changes the geopolitical calculus not only for Iran, but also for Russia and China, who are multiplying their footprints in the region. I argue that the decision to decertify the Iran nuclear agreement is already playing into the hands of Iran’s hardliners. By contrast, the decertification of the deal is music to the ears of the Saudis. In fact, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel—the only nuclear power in the region today—are the only countries to welcome this step by the American president. Most other countries, including Russia, viewed Trump’s decision as irresponsible, casting further doubts on America’s leadership role. It behooves us to highlight Israel’s nuclear capabilities to place the ongoing Iran conundrum in context. Today Israel (though without admitting it) has over 100 nuclear weapons, including a new generation of mininukes and neutron bombs. It also produces plutonium and tritium in quantities sufficient to build hundreds more. Former United States’ Secretary of State, Colin Powell wrote on March 3, 2015, in an email that has come to light:

3.2 Military: A Source of Power

41

“the boys in Tehran know Israel has 200 nuclear weapons, all targeted on Tehran, and we have thousands (Dinucci 2019).” My justification for emphasizing these dynamics in the Middle East is to highlight Russia’s role, mainly, the importance of its military. Russia seeks to ensure that the geopolitical shifts serve its long-term strategic interests. These dynamics lead me to address the ongoing Syrian civil war and how Russia has become involved from the outset of the war, acting as the global referee, backed by military capabilities to that end. Recall when Russia announced a sudden drawdown in forces, in 2016, in Syria. I argued that despite news bulletins to the contrary, Putin maintained a certain military presence in Syria, including the Russian Sukhoi Su-24 M bomber aircraft group.2 Interestingly, Russia’s resurgence on the world stage has been in the making for decades. It accelerated when Putin’s second term began. The West needs to know two things about Russia under President Putin: First, never bet too heavily on what the former KGB strongman will do next. Second, things are not always as they seem. Approaching Russia’s geopolitical calculations from this aspect, I argue that the Middle East has opened its doors to Russia, and now Russia influences outcomes for everyone. When evaluating to what degree Russia’s military, as a source of power, is contributing to that end, Moscow wagers that, as long as it uses its military strength as a tool to intimidate others and force a dialogue of sorts, it will have the upper hand. Repeatedly, Russia’s military was instrumental in shaping the outcome on many fronts, such as seizing the Crimean Peninsula, intervening on behalf of al-Assad’s Syria, supporting Maduro’s regime in Venezuela, and supplying Khalifa Haftar of Libya with mercenaries and weaponry. However, military tools alone would not be enough for Russia to achieve its goals. In addition to its powerful military apparatus, Moscow is deploying other assets, including threats of intervention, mainly toward the Baltic States. Doing so helps Russia be perceived as a force to be reckoned with regionally and globally. While Russia attests to its military strength, which includes nuclear capabilities, Moscow is moving forward to modernize those capabilities to include long-range precision-guided conventional weapons systems. Similarly, Russia’s air, land, and sea nuclear capabilities continue to improve. Russia is one of the oldest nuclear powers in the world. Its first experience with detonating a nuclear bomb was in 2I

argued, “First, the unexpected reduction in forces hardly suggests Russia’s involvement in Syria is done. To the contrary, Russian aircraft remain. These are not part of the drawdown. Their mission is to attack insurgents not included in the most recent ceasefire, principally Jabhat al-Nusra (another name for al-Qaida) and the Islamic State. To quote a Russian military journalist: ‘The fleet remains; antiaircraft systems remain; the tanks remain; all the marines remain; the helicopters remain; some of the aircraft will remain. Only some of the aircraft and their service personnel are being taken out. And they can come back, of course, in the space of three or four hours.’” Oualaalou David, “Putin proves ever-mercurial in Russia’s battlefield drawdown in war-torn Syria,” The Waco Tribune-Herald, March 27, 2016, https://www.wacotrib.com/opinion/columns/board_of_contri butors/david-oualaalou-board-of-contributors-putin-proves-ever-mercurial-in/article_48907b46eabb-5574-834d-0d8031f1dbb3.html.

42

3 Russia’s Sources of Power

1949. Since then, Russia has worked tirelessly to improve and modernize its capabilities. Further, Russia has one of the world’s two largest inventories of strategic nuclear weapons. Russia deploys all three platforms to maximize its nuclear strength. Each platform is controlled by a specific entity. For instance, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) manages Russia’s land-based ICBMs. Similarly, all Russian air and sea nuclear platforms are managed by Russia’s navy and aerospace force respectively (Stewart Vincent 2017). With the INF Treaty between the U.S. and Russia cancelled, I predict Moscow will increase its defense budget in order to develop new sophisticated weapon systems; thus increasing its defense budget. Since the fall of the USSR, Russia has managed to steadily increase its defense budget at the expense of its economic infrastructure. That increase was facilitated by a strong desire within the political establishment in Moscow to do so. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency analysis suggests that Russia’s 2016 budget, which initially decreased defense spending, was amended to increase defense spending to $61 billion, a 4.5% defense burden on GDP. By contrast, in 2006, defense spending was $27 billion, and the defense burden was 2.4% (Stewart Vincent 2017). Should Russia stay the course—and I believe it will—watch for a more confident, aggressive, and capable Russia in the next decade or so. Given Russia’s present and upcoming military advances, it behooves the United States—and the West, for that matter—to achieve a systematic understanding of Russia’s goals and aspirations while preventing any conflict with Moscow from erupting. Moreover, without a systematic understanding of where Russia’s military capabilities may be in a decade from now, the West will find it challenging to anticipate where the next conflict will emerge. The wrong decisions—or the right ones made too late—could have dire consequences. For instance, if the United States sets its sights on having a permanent military presence in Poland, I am certain Washington’s action will trigger a swift Russian response. We witnessed the annexation of Crimea as a result of the West’s—mainly the United States—insistence on pushing Ukraine toward democracy. The case in Poland will be more problematic. I am reminded of what former United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger predicted in his 1994 book Diplomacy. He wrote of the inevitability of a new multipolar era. Look no further than at the rise of China, on a steady march since the end of the 1990s. A quarter of a century ago, China’s prospects for becoming a serious rival to Washington were unclear; now the Beijing/Washington rivalry is a forgone conclusion. But I return to my point about the United States potential military buildup in Poland. I am not surprised to learn that Russia has already considered its options. One of those options is to establish a military presence in Belarus. The United States geopolitical think tank Stratfor writes: That said, regardless of specifics of Warsaw and Washington’s potential new defense agreement, any increase in the United States’ military position in Poland—no matter how small—is bound to prompt Russia to build up its own military position. One potential site for such a military buildup would be Belarus, which is already one of Russia’s key defense partners as a member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia has long eyed

3.2 Military: A Source of Power

43

its western neighbor as a spot for expanding its military foothold, particularly in the form of an airbase near Belarus’ border with Poland. Thus, permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Poland—no matter how small—could provide Moscow with just the motivation it needs to act on such efforts.3

Addressing Russia’s military structure will give the reader a snapshot of Russia’s overall military thinking regarding anticipated areas of conflict, potential challenges, and security threats to Russia. However, placing Russia’s military assets within the context of its global strategy is paramount. In this context, this section focuses on a Russian military doctrine: anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). At its core, this principle, which combines long-range anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-land missile systems, known in military jargon as “A2/AD capability,” denies an adversary the opportunity to operate in a specific region or area. In this context, Russia’s air superiority, an aspect of its military power, is deployed to further its global agenda. Similarly, embarking on the A2/AD principle, Russia sends a strong message to the West that it seeks not only to deter the West from using aerospace power against Russia, but also to convince the West that Moscow will not hesitate to use its nuclear deterrence, including all its platforms—conventional, nonstrategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces—to defend its interests. I argue that the implication of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities became the subject of many conversations in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The debate became even more urgent among NATO allies given that Russia’s military capabilities are felt acutely in the Baltic Sea region. One might ask, Why the Baltic Sea? It is because three of NATO’s members, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are within range of Russian missiles. Thus, NATO’s reinforcements to these NATO members could be halted, exposing weakness within the alliance to defend its members in time of need. Robert Dalsjo, deputy research director at the Department of Strategy and Policy at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, writes: The possible implications of Russian A2/AD capabilities were felt most acutely in the Baltic Sea region, where NATO reinforcements to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could be stopped by missiles from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad sandwiched between northern Poland and Lithuania. Similarly, Russia’s presence there could stymie the use of Western air power in the region. In Sweden, there are fears that Russia, in a crisis or war, might grab the island of Gotland—located about 120 miles from Stockholm and 220 miles north of Kaliningrad—and deploy missile systems there to seal off access to the Baltic States. (Dalsjo et al. 2019)

I, however, disagree with Dalsjo’s assertion that the threat from Russia over its long-range missiles has been overblown. If that is the case, why did not NATO act when Russia annexed Crimea? Why did not NATO react in Syria? At the time of this writing, countries in the Middle East are considering purchasing Russian missiles, S-300 and S-400, instead of the United States’ Patriot system. Turkey, a NATO member, has acquired the S-400 missile system despite a strong objection from the United States. However, some have argued that the S-400s are deadly accurate in comparison to the Patriot missiles. Consider, for instance, how Saudi Arabia’s Patriot 3 Unattributed. “In Poland, a Fixed U.S. Presence Will Warrant a Russian Response,” Stratfor, June

7, 2019, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/poland-fixed-us-presence-will-warrant-russian-res ponse.

44

3 Russia’s Sources of Power

missile defense system failed to stop the Houthis’ missiles and drones launched from Yemen, causing major damage to an oil pipeline and targeting the Najran regional airport. Saudis claimed they intercepted the drones, a claim that lacks an evidential basis. My point is that we should not treat Russia’s claims lightly—certainly not dismiss them. However, there is no doubt that Moscow is deploying Russia’s military capabilities, as a source of power, to influence the political trajectory in the hope of serving its global agenda. And it seems to be succeeding in the Middle East, I may add. These dynamics suggest that Russia’s air superiority, an aspect of its military power, is deployed to further its global agenda. Doing so allows Russia to limit and control the capability of an adversary to conduct aerospace strikes on any territory under Russia’s control. That ability could not be more evident than in Syria, where Russia strengthens its grip on the Syrian airspace. Russia’s intervention in Syria should be perceived within the broader context of both the Mideast geopolitical landscape and the global one. Observers notice that since Putin ascended to the Russian helm of power, in 2012, many Middle Eastern countries’ leaders have visited Moscow. I ask: Was the purpose of the visits to inquire into the nature of Russia’s sudden interest in the Middle East? Or were the visits to signal a shift in power as a result of United States leadership regressing in the region? Whatever the case, Russia’s return to the Middle East constitutes a real foreign-policy success for its strongman, Vladimir Putin. Angel Stent, a professor of government and foreign policy at Georgetown University, and an expert in United States and European relations with Russia, writes: Since Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, a steady stream of Middle Eastern heads of State have visited Russia. Leaders from Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have journeyed to Russia to confer with Putin. As has Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu—the latter several times a year. Indeed, Russia is the only great power that talks to the Shia states, the Sunni states—and the Israelis. It has replaced the United States as the go-to player in a fractured and violent area of key global strategic importance. (Stent 2019, p. 259)

Readers may ask why it is important to highlight specifically Russia’s reemergence in the Middle East. The answer lies in placing this reemergence within the context of the international geopolitical landscape Russia is currently shaping. Also, the answer requires that one understand that Moscow uses its military power to ensure that Russia achieves its global strategic objectives. To successfully reenter the Mideast, Russia’s military power plays a pivotal role to that end. I go further, stating that Russia’s success in becoming a key player in the Middle East is facilitated by chaotic and ambiguous United States policies and entanglement in unnecessary conflicts in the region, and a waning of United States leadership. The Mideast is not the only region in which Russia is using its military power as a source to shape outcome. Moscow has its own neighborhood in its sights. The next section discusses Russia’s strategy toward the Baltic States and neighboring countries.

3.3 Russia’s Tensions with Its Breakaway States

45

3.3 Russia’s Tensions with Its Breakaway States Aside from the Middle East, where Russia has made major political and strategic strides, Moscow intends to challenge Europe’s authority by acting aggressively. My interest in writing about this aspect is to emphasize Russia’s focus on both its political influence and its military threat, mainly toward the Baltic States and potentially the Nordic region. One must analyze Russia’s political conflicts with neighboring countries to understand the big picture. Clearly, Russia aims to influence the political outcome to further its strategic interests—no matter where they may be—to its favor. However, Russia must first protect its vast borderlands, from Donbas in Europe to Damascus in the Middle East/western Asia. Russia’s vast Eurasian borderlands have become the Kremlin’s buffer zones—a nearly uninterrupted expanse of armed conflict and outright war. As a result, countries like Ukraine and Georgia, if they are not with Russia, will always be a target of Russian missiles. For instance, in 2008, Moscow announced that it would keep about 7000 troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia indefinitely. Moscow wants to signal to other enclaves that Russia intends to assert its power in the region despite pulling out of Georgia (Gutterman 2019). Similar outcomes apply to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia also demonstrates its willingness to cajole and persuade countries like Kyrgyzstan, which is closer geographically to Beijing or New Delhi than it is to Moscow, to join Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a platform like that of the European Union (EU). Russia provides security by deploying its peacekeeping force, as in the example of Moldova and Georgia, which highlights its overall strategy and influence. Some of these regional countries were once under the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. The question regards the long-term objective for Russia in those conflicts. I intend to respond to that question in detail in the subsequent pages. For now, suffice it to state that Russia’s assets, mainly its nuclear weapons arsenal, serve as tools Moscow can pull from its foreign-policy toolbox. Russia’s military power should remind the West of the necessity to engage Moscow. We should learn the lessons of history, and Russia’s actions in the Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea serve as reminders. Besides its military, nuclear capabilities, and veto power in the UNSC, Russia’s vast energy and natural resources are another great source of power Russia relies on to further its economic and political agendas.

3.4 Energy (Oil/Natural Gas): A Source of Power Most agree on this fact: Russia is a major producer and exporter of oil and natural gas. We would not be talking much about Russia if it lacked an abundance of natural resources of energy. However, Russia’s production of oil rose to a post-Soviet record high of 11.16 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2018, surpassing the previous annual

46

3 Russia’s Sources of Power

record average of 10.98 million bpd set in 2017 (Soldatkin 2019). Russia, a nonOPEC member, plays a key role in influencing oil prices on the global market, especially when coordinating with OPEC members, mainly Saudi Arabia. Russia’s economic growth is driven by energy exports, given its high oil and natural gas production. Oil and natural gas revenues accounted for 36% of Russia’s federal budget revenues in 2016.4 While it is important to provide a snapshot of Russia’s natural resources production, my objective in this section is not to discuss in detail how many barrels of oil Russia produces. Rather, my purpose is to explain how Russia deploys its natural resources, including oil and natural gas, as another source of power in service of its foreign policy and to further its global agenda. Oil and natural gas production in Russia allows Moscow to influence global oil prices and tilts the global economy in either direction, according to its dictates. Russia has sometimes succeeded, while at other times it has not. Interestingly, in 1994, three years after the fall of the USSR, cooperation with Russia in the provision and transit of energy resources was suddenly initiated (Darden 2009). This change gave Russia more access to the global energy markets as Russian companies, including Russian global Gazprom, sought opportunities outside Russia’s borders. Although Russia is not a member of the OPEC cartel, its influence on the energy market has had a major impact on the economy of its clients. For instance, Europe relies heavily on Russia as a source of supply of both oil and natural gas. More than one-third of crude oil imports to European countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2016 came from Russia.5 Similarly, in the same year, more than 70% of natural gas imports to those countries also came from Russia, in 2016.6 To put it in perspective, nearly 60% of Russia’s crude oil exports and more than 75% of Russia’s natural gas exports went to OECD Europe in 2016. That said, highlighting Russia’s key energy infrastructure provides us with a great understanding of how far Russia deploys its energy sector as a tool in its foreign-policy toolbox. The energy sector includes nuclear reactors, oil, natural gas, and coal. As to generating power from nuclear reactors, for instance, in 2016, Russia was considered the fourth-largest generator of nuclear power in the world. Regarding the oil sector, Russia reported exporting, in 2016, more than 5 million b/d of crude oil and condensate.7 Seventy percent of Russia’s energy exports went to European countries, particularly the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, and Belarus. The reader should understand that, besides the sale of its military hardware on the global market, about 36% of Russia’s revenues come from the sale of oil and natural gas as of 2017. The primary reason for this is that Europe depends heavily on Russia for its energy needs. I argue that, economically speaking, Russia and Europe need each other. 4 Unattributed,

“Russia Oil Market Overview,” Energy Information Administration, April/11/2017, https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/eia-russia-oil-market-overview/. 5 Unattributed, “Russia Oil Market Overview,” Energy Information Administration, April/11/2017, https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/eia-russia-oil-market-overview/. 6 Unattributed. “Country Analysis Brief: Russia,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, October 31, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=RUS. 7 Unattributed, “Russia Oil Market Overview,” Energy Information Administration, April/11/2017, https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/eia-russia-oil-market-overview/.

3.4 Energy (Oil/Natural Gas): A Source of Power

47

Russia’s energy export percentage to Europe differs from Russia’s energy export percentage to Asia; however, recent analysis suggests that China has emerged as the largest importer of Russia’s crude oil as of 2016, according to Erica Downs, a senior research scientist in the China studies division of CNA Corporation and a nonresident fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. Russia also exports sizeable volumes of oil products. According to Eastern Bloc Research, Russia exported about 1.3 million b/d of fuel oil and an additional 990,000 b/d of diesel, in 2016. It exported smaller volumes of gasoline (120,000 b/d) and liquefied petroleum gas (75,000 b/d) during the same year. As for natural gas, Russia holds the largest natural gas reserves in the world and is the second-largest producer of dry natural gas. The state-run Gazprom dominates the country’s upstream natural gas sector, though production from other companies has been growing. According to Oil and Gas Journal, Russia holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves, with 1,688 trillion cubic feet (tcf), as of 2016.8 Russia’s reserves account for about one-quarter of the world’s total proved natural gas reserves. Most of these reserves are in large natural gas fields in west Siberia. My objective for disclosing these statistics is to illustrate how Russia’s energy resources have, somehow, contributed to the recovery of Russia’s economy, though most economists and energy analysts agree that Russia’s economic recovery has a long way to go. Yet, we cannot overlook the steps Moscow is taking to deploy its vast natural resources in pursuit of its foreign and security policies. Among the economic policies Russia is pursuing are discounts on its oil and gas exports, debt relief, and financial bailouts, among other tactics. For instance, Russia uses its growing economic clout to acquire key pieces of its former enclaves’ infrastructure—including railroads, electricity grids, and power stations—in order to gain further leverage over their economies and politics (Stronski and Sokolsky 2017). In 2013, for instance, Russia offered Ukraine a $15 billion bailout package to then president Viktor Yanukovych as a reward for not signing an association agreement with the EU. Consider some historical facts that have contributed to Russia’s role as the power broker in world energy markets. My historical reference goes back to 2002 when the Bush administration was considering the invasion of Iraq. With the geopolitical shifts that resulted from that disastrous, unnecessary invasion, Russia—and, to a lesser extent, Iran—emerged as the beneficiary of that conflict. Moscow capitalized on the global economic shifts, mainly in the energy fields, as a result of the invasion of Iraq. Doing so provided Moscow the opportunity to become the key energy broker for supplying the global market. Under those circumstances, Russia concludes that its natural resources should drive its global agenda. In 2002, David Ignatius of the Washington Post claimed that Moscow was “on its way to becoming the next Houston—the global capital of energy.” Similarly, a Canadian newspaper hailed Putin as “the world’s new oil Czar.” Mind you that this was 2002 when Russia briefly overtook Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest oil producer. 8 Energy

Information Administration, “Russia Energy Profile: Largest Producer Of Crude Oil,” Eurasia Review, October 27, 2016, https://www.eurasiareview.com/27102016-russia-energy-pro file-largest-producer-of-crude-oil-analysis/.

48

3 Russia’s Sources of Power

The potential for Russia to play a greater role on the global energy market is there. “We do have greater possibilities than almost any other country in the world. If put together Russia’s energy potential in all areas, oil, gas, and nuclear, our country is unquestionably the leaders (Yergin 2011),” Vladimir Putin once stated. Today one witnesses an assertive Russia, mainly in the economic front, as Moscow, a non-OPEC member, influences OPEC’s decision, especially when it comes to oil output.9 My analysis suggests that, given the ongoing upheavals in the Middle East, the United States–China trade war, and the possibility of a war between Iran and the United States, Russia sees an opportunity. Such events and portended events allow Russia to play a much greater role in the energy field, raising the possibility of Moscow challenging OPEC and helping shift oil supply from the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The attacks on oil tankers in May and June 2019 in the Gulf of Oman near the Strait of Hurmuz show how Russia can take advantage. Make no mistake that further interruption to global oil supply raises alarms about immediate security and potential military conflict in a vital passageway for a third of the world’s petroleum. Could these dynamics make it possible for Russia to become an energy superpower in the twenty-first century? The answer is no. It doesn’t mean, however, that Russia may not nevertheless become an energy superpower. That possibility lies more with its abundance in natural gas than it does with oil. Fiona Hill, special assistant to President Trump and senior director for European and Russian affairs, writes: Russia may well break into some global energy markets as an alternative supplier to unstable states in the Persian Gulf. But Russia’s energy future is in natural gas. As the next decade unfolds, continued crises in the Middle East and growing concern about pollution and global climate change will inevitably focus attention on Russia’s vast reserves of cheaper, cleaner natural gas. Russia’s success in international gas markets, however, is not a given. It will depend on major increases in production, serious investments—both foreign and domestic— in infrastructure, and the development of fully functioning gas markets in Asia. (Hill 2002)

But let us be realistic: Russia will never replace OPEC in the world oil market. Russia ranks third behind Saudi Arabia and the United States, at just over 7 mbd. However, I predict Russia will increase its oil supply to Asia in the next decade given the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimation that China’s oil consumption will be between 12–16 million mbd. In conclusion, Russia evaluates its natural resources, a source of power, as a tool to be prudently deployed and constructively used to pursue foreign-policy objectives. 9I

argued, “The announcement came on the heels of a recent decline in oil prices. Yet this drop is attributed to supply and demand; ongoing trade tensions between the United States and China; and Russia’s willingness to approve the price of oil at $60/barrel. Energy forecasters wonder whether consumers will continue to benefit from low oil prices in 2019. After all, Russia, a non-OPEC member, decided recently to join OPEC in collectively cutting production by about 1.2 million barrels, which would seem to automatically trigger a hike in prices.” Oualaalou David, “Shortsighted Saudis again outmaneuver themselves, this time with Qatar,” The Waco Tribune-Herald, December 22, 2018, https://www.wacotrib.com/opinion/columns/board_of_contributors/davidoualaalou-board-of-contributors-short-sighted-saudis-again-outmaneuver/article_0643d095-af715a34-ad15-92a13dc09936.html.

3.4 Energy (Oil/Natural Gas): A Source of Power

49

That strategy can lead to problems. Indeed, using history as my guide, I recall how, in the 1990s, discoveries of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Basin led to sharp differences between the United States and Russia as the former expressed interest in energy investments, while the latter perceived it as a threat to its economic and national security.

3.5 Russia: An Energy Power Let us not get ahead of ourselves. Reality suggests that when it comes to oil production, Russia will not replace the Middle East and other OPEC countries in the long term. Mind you that the United States’ oil production is considerable and could sway the market in either direction. While current global geopolitical shifts are undoubtedly working in Russia’s favor in the energy market, mainly regarding gas, Russia’s overall economy is in survival mode given ongoing sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe. Thus, it will take more than natural gas to move Russia’s economy forward. There is an urgent need in Russia for foreign investments, infrastructure upgrades, and venture capitalists. However, Russia has bet on its massive natural gas output, which allows it to influence the global market. Geopolitics affects energy prices. The oil price, for instance, is especially susceptible to political outcomes. Furthermore, global energy consumption is changing as countries work to find alternatives to both oil and coal; given those realities, Russia’s abundance of an untapped gas reserve demands attention. One must pay attention specifically to Russia’s strategic gas reserves straddling both Asia and Europe, with gas fields stretching from west to east Siberia including the island of Sakhalin. Those resources give Russia unique reach. Such good fortune allows Russia not only to play an influential role as a supplier to markets in Europe and Asia, but also to use this fortune as a political tool in support of its global agenda. In my opinion, in the coming years, Russia’s good fortune and shrewd strategy will cement its position not as an emerging power, but as an energy power. Russia’s economic outlook is not limited to its neighborhood only; rather, it extends beyond the Caucasus borders. For instance, Russia’s and Turkey’s relations have grown closer in the last two years. Both countries have removed most trade restrictions; only a few restrictions remain. My logic for highlighting Turkey as an example is to emphasize how Russia deploys economic incentives, energy, in this case, as tools to work on its agenda. In 2018, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) awarded Russia a construction license for Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. The Akkuyu NPP, which is being built in Mersin province in southern Turkey, is estimated at $20 billion.10 Interestingly, Russia’s energy minister, Alexander Novak, who announced the construction of the Akkuyu plant, also commented that Russia and 10 Unattributed, “Russia starts building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant,” World Nuclear News, April 3, 2018, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Russia-starts-building-Turkeys-first-nuc lear-power-plant-03041801.html.

50

3 Russia’s Sources of Power

Turkey have discussed another major energy project. That project is called the TurkStream, a dual-energy pipeline that will transport an estimated 15.75 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to Europe. At the time of this writing, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Tayyip Erdogan inaugurated the project at a ceremony in Istanbul. The leaders of Serbia and Bulgaria also attended the ceremony (Astakhova and Sezer 2020). Looking from the outside in, I argue that Russia plans to keep a firm grip on the European market and maintain its role as the sole energy supplier of natural gas, in this case, to Europe. I go further to state that Russia’s aim goes beyond economics. As stated earlier, Russia deploys its energy sector as a tool in its foreign-policy toolbox. By getting closer to Turkey economically, Russia convinced Ankara to purchase its S-400 air-defense system. The S-400 is a mobile surface-to-air missile system (SAM) designed by Russia. It is capable of engaging aircraft, UAVs, cruise missiles, and has a terminal ballistic missile defense capability (Missile Defense Project 2018) ). By selling the S-400 system to Turkey, a NATO member, Russia was able to stoke dissent within NATO and foment division between Ankara and Washington. Turkey’s decision to move forward with the purchase of its S-400 system prompted Washington to cancel training Turkey’s F-35 pilots and ordered them to leave the U.S. by July 31, 2019. Turkey’s case is just one example. I argue that Russia is embarking on similar tactics in Venezuela (presence of Russian nuclear weapons), Iran (the sale of S-300 system), Libya (provision of training to Haftar’s forces), Egypt (the construction of a $30 billion-dollar nuclear power plant), and Syria (highlighting ambitions that assert Russia as a global power), among others. The point is that the Russia-Turkey rapprochement is a prelude to continuing geopolitical shifts. Note that Russia is already courting Turkey to join the EEU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Make no mistake: Turkey’s engagement with the EEU and SCO sends a strong message to the West. And history tends to repeat itself: Russia’s use of Turkey is much like how it operated with Hungary—thus fomenting further divisions within the West.

3.6 Conclusion Undoubtedly, natural resources have contributed to rebuilding Russia’s economy as it sought to increase exports by promoting the sale of oil, natural gas, and arms. Indeed, oil and gas revenues provided Russia the ability to finance its global agenda. Many Russians argue that the economic reforms Putin implemented produced political stability and economic vitality not seen in the country during the 1990s, which gave Russia a sense of confidence as it entered the twenty-first century. Since ascending to power, Putin believed in pursing economic reforms despite major domestic opposition left over from the era of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Putin believed that the health of the Russian economy required a top-to-bottom review and deep structural reforms, reforms the Yeltsin administration had ignored.

3.6 Conclusion

51

Although Russia’s current saggy economy prevents it from playing a far greater role like that of the U.S., it does not diminish Moscow’s ability to influence political outcomes to its favor. Look at what is taking place in the Middle East or the Baltics. It is fair to state that, under Putin’s presidency, many Russians yearn for the Soviet past, for superpower status. Could this explain Putin’s popularity, that he is seen as a strong leader and one who could recapture Russia’s glory days? Possibly. Two things are clear: Russia experiences (a) nostalgia among some communists for the Soviet Union’s glory days and (b) uncertainty among many about the future. Further, given current geopolitical and global economic dynamics, Russia seems poised to set upon the long path of economic and political development in the twenty-first century. How these dynamics will shape U.S.–Russian relations in the twenty-first century is the subject of the next chapter. Let us investigate how Russia, under Putin, intends to proceed.

References Astakhova, O., Sezer, C. (2020). Turkey, Russia launch TurkStream pipeline carrying gas to Europe. Reuters. January 8, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-russia-pipeline/turkey-rus sia-launch-turkstream-pipeline-carrying-gas-to-europe-idUSKBN1Z71WP Dalsjo, R., Jonsson, M., & Berglund, C. (2019). Don’t believe the Russian hype. Foreign Policy. March 7, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/07/dont-believe-the-russian-hype-a2-ad-mis siles-sweden-kaliningrad-baltic-states-annexation-nato/ Darden K. A. (2009). Economic liberalism and its rivals: The formation of international institutions among the Post-Soviet States (p. 145). New York: Cambridge University Press Dinucci, M. (2019). 200 Israeli nuclear weapons targeted against Iran. Center for Global Research. June 19, 2019. https://www.globalresearch.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Screen-Shot-201805-19-at-08.32.04.png Gutterman, S. (2019). Russia tightens grip on enclaves.Toronto Star (Canada). Accessed March 24. https://ezproxy.mclennan.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir ect=true&db=n5h&AN=6FP3128421364&site=ehost-live Hill, F. (2002). Russia: The 21st Century’s Energy Superpower? The Brookings Institute. March 1, 2002. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russia-the-21st-centurys-energy-superpower/ Kagan, F. W. (2002). The military history of the Soviet Union (p. 306). New York: Palgrave Missile Defense Project (2018). S-400 Triumf. Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 4, 2017, last modified June 15, 2018. https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/s-400-tri umf/ Soldatkin, V. (2019). Russian oil output reaches record high in 2018. Reuters. January 2, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oil-output/russian-oil-output-reaches-recordhigh-in-2018-idUSKCN1OW0NJ Stent, A. (2019). Putin’s world: Russia against the west and with the rest. New York: Hachette Book Group Stewart Vincent, R. (2017). Russia military power: Building a military to support great power aspirations. Defense Intelligence Agency, 20. https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/ military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf Stewart Vincent, R. (2017). Russia military power: Building a military to support great power aspirations. Defense Intelligence Agency, 29. https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/ military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf

52

3 Russia’s Sources of Power

Stronski, P., & Sokolsky, R. (2017). The return of global Russia: An analytical framework. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 14, 2017. https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/ 12/14/return-of-global-russia-analytical-framework-pub-75003 Yergin, D. (2011). The Quest: Energy, security, and the remaking of the modern world (pp. 40–41). USA: The Penguin Press

Chapter 4

The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

4.1 Introduction One cannot cover the entire history of the United States—Russian relations in a few pages. However, one must briefly illuminate the historical evolution of this important, complex, and intriguing relationship. I believe even a brief narrative of the approximately eight decades of involvement by fourteen United States presidents helps one to understand the relations playing out today. However, my focus remains to explain the importance of the crucial, complex, volatile, and evolutionary United States— Russian relations given the global geopolitical shifts today. A consensus of historians think that the relationship between the United States and Russia is among the most critical bilateral relationships in the world, with implications that go beyond the two countries’ borders. While animosity and mistrust are key elements that have marked United States—Russian relations, both countries, at some point in their history, have shared common interests and worked together toward common goals. Those shared interests emerged in a host of areas, including furthering nuclear security and nonproliferation, ensuring regional security in Europe and Eurasia, countering terrorism and violent extremism, and managing the upheaval in the greater Middle East. Even in the realm of space, the United States and Russia have worked together through the International Space Station (ISS) to further their scientific cooperation and exploration of space. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States’ engagement with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was unlimited. Historical records indicate that the establishment of the USSR, in 1922, included Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Transcaucasia (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) with Uzbekistan, Turkestan, Tadzhik, Kazakhstan, and Kirghiz joining the union in later years. The United States officially recognized the USSR in 1933 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt realized that nonrecognition had not stopped communism from taking hold in the Soviet

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 D. Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5_4

53

54

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

Union. This was a time when the US faced international economic and diplomatic challenges that required the Soviet Union’s cooperation. On November 17, 1933, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an official agreement establishing formal diplomatic relations (Unattributed no date). The United States—Russian relations should be placed within the context of the global geopolitical balance of power. Doing so gives readers a clear understanding of why United States—Russian relations have influenced both countries’ political, ideological, and economic trajectories domestically, regionally, and globally. Chronologically, the United States—Russian relations started in 1933 when full diplomatic relations between the US and the USSR were established. My historical reference point starts with President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) in the early 1940s. More specifically, I consider that the decades’ long relations between the USSR and the United States officially started in 1941 when Germany invaded the USSR.

4.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) (1933–1945): 32nd President of the United States Before FDR became president, United States—Russian relations were, according to historians, hostile. The hostility resulted from the decision of Soviet leaders who, at that time, pulled Russia out of World War I (WWI). Although tensions existed between the two countries, the United States assisted the USSR during its famine and provided relief in the early 1920s. Historians agree that all this occurred while the United States and the USSR lacked official diplomatic relations. It was not until 1933 that the United States officially recognized the USSR. While detailing the horrendous events that led to WWII is important and is covered extensively in the literature, I will instead focus on the role FDR played in shaping United States—Russian relations. WWII brought both the United States and the USSR closer through a shared objective: defeating Nazi Germany. However, when the USSR showed aggressive tendencies and anti-democratic policies toward Eastern Europe, relations between the United States and the USSR experienced a downturn; thus tensions emerged even before the end of WWII. Germany’s Adolf Hitler had turned his attention toward Western Europe by invading and conquering Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and France; the United Kingdom was spared. During this period, FDR, along with British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, formed an effective team, crafting a joint statement of their nations’ war goals, dubbed the “Atlantic Charter,” in August 1941. Those steps placed the United States on a war footing, a dangerous path that FDR willfully refrained from acknowledging. William Leuchtenburg, a professor emeritus of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and a leading scholar of the life and career of FDR, writes: Still, FDR rarely staked out policy positions which committed the nation to a clear course of action. Roosevelt’s actions essentially placed the United States at war but FDR refused to

4.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) (1933–1945): 32nd …

55

acknowledge the danger, often responding with evasive answers to press queries about the difference between the nation being “short of war” and at war. Finally, FDR often proved a confusing, frustrating, and spotty administrator as he directed the nation’s military and industrial preparations for war. Prominent members of his cabinet and staff found all these failures exasperating (Leuchtenburg no date).

The challenge FDR faced during his dealings with the USSR became evident when the Soviet government violated its pledge not to interfere in American domestic affairs. We are witnessing something similar in the aftermath of Russian meddling in the 2016 United States’ presidential election. The main turning point was the killing of Sergey Kirov, the Leningrad Communist Party boss. This outcome precipitated the death or imprisonment of millions of Russians at the hands of Josef Stalin. The objective was to silence critics of the USSR’s government once and for all. With all the challenges he faced, agonies he endured, and victories he achieved, FDR did not have a chance to celebrate his accomplishments. He died on April 12, 1945, leaving Vice President Harry S. Truman in charge of a country still fighting WWII and in possession of a terrifying weapon of unprecedented destructive power.

4.3 Harry S. Truman (1945–1952): 33rd President of the United States Historians agree that President Truman’s White House confronted enormous challenges in both foreign and domestic affairs. At home, Truman worked diligently to protect and reinforce FDR’s New Deal reforms, ushered the American economy from a wartime to a peacetime footing, and advocated for the cause of AfricanAmerican civil rights. Abroad, Truman had to craft a foreign policy mainly toward the Soviet Union as the Cold War was emerging. America’s position on the Soviet Union became the core of American foreign policy for decades. Tensions between the United States and the USSR had existed before Truman became president. Those tensions, which started after the end of WWII, emerged as Moscow and Washington both wanted to shape the postwar global order according to their ideological orientations and strategic interests. For instance, Poland became one of the major flash points between the United States and the USSR. At the heart of those tensions was the USSR reversing its commitment to establish freely elected governments in Eastern Europe. To the Truman administration’s dismay, the Soviets’ move led to the establishment of the communist-dominated government in Poland in 1945 that would later become one of the USSR’s key Eastern European satellites. Having served as vice president witnessing the USSR’s negotiations with FDR, Truman lost hope of maintaining a workable relationship with the Soviets. However, he was also cognizant of, and realistic about, the possibility of raising tensions between the two superpowers at that time. The question became whether the United States could achieve a modus vivendi that accommodated its ideological and strategic interests. Even some of Truman’s advisers dissented from his exceedingly guarded approach. The Soviets’

56

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

move toward Poland provided a glimpse of what was to come: Moscow’s desire to dominate as much of Europe as possible. The Cold War fell upon the two powers immediately after the end of World War II, a war that gripped Europe and left a swath of destruction that crippled its infrastructure and led to massive food shortages. Yet, the Marshall Plan was not entirely a strategy to reconstruct Europe’s infrastructures and economies in the aftermath of World War II. The United States government had become concerned, even fearful, that failing to intervene in Europe could lead Europe to communism, the same path China took in 1949. A communist Europe was unacceptable to United States’ leadership. The possibility of such an outcome precipitated then United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall to propose a plan to assist Europe with a $13 billion economic package. The plan came to be known as “the Marshall Plan.” Much to Russia’s chagrin, the Marshall Plan succeeded, and a revived Europe allowed the United States to prosper economically. Was the Soviet Union really the monster that Washington leadership portrayed? Not physically, not if seen as a conventional fighting power. The Soviet Union posed its threat through the presence of its rival nuclear apparatus. Furthermore, that nuclear apparatus lay in the hands of Soviet leaders who espoused an ideology contrary to the capitalist principles on which America had built its democracy. Thus, the Soviet Union—an ideologue opposed to capitalism and armed with nuclear weapons—posed a threat to the global economic order of which the United States had served as primary architect and guardian. That order, of course, went beyond US borders, incorporating other nations and their major industries, financial institutions, and infrastructures. The American public responded negatively to providing large sums of money to rebuild Europe. Yet, the Truman administration played politics with the American people’s sentiments when it presented the need for the “Marshall Plan” not as a rehabilitation project, but as a response to an emerging, grave threat from the Soviet Union. Historians agree that Truman’s thinking differed in style and substance from FDR’s. Benn Stein writes: Importantly, the character of the new economic thinking was radically different from that under FDR. Rather than lending Europe reconstruction funds and wishing it well, a new integrated western European entity would be constructed using American blueprints, cash, and— ultimately, contrary to all early intentions- security guarantees. This effort—the Marshall plan, as it would come to be known—would entangle the United States in European affairs in precisely the manner George Washington has warned against (Steil 2018).

Truman’s subterfuge ushered in an era of political deception by subsequent United States administrations—dishonesty became the norm. Uninformed American citizens were fed lies, and a campaign of misinformation was shoved down their throats. Subsequent United States administrations like that of Kennedy continued with Truman-style fear mongering. As a result, in the early 1960s, containment became the favored political jargon to justify whatever policy or policies would benefit the Washington establishment and the elites.

4.4 Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961): 34th …

57

4.4 Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961): 34th President of the United States The Eisenhower administration faced three major events: in 1953, the ousting of the popular Iranian leader, Mohammed Mossadeq; in 1956, France, Britain, and Israel attacked Egypt after the latter decided to nationalize the Suez Canal; and, in 1958, President Eisenhower ordered US troops into Beirut to protect the Lebanese Christian-led government. What stands out about United States relations with the Soviets under the Eisenhower administration was the exchange of verbal threat between Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and President Eisenhower over the future of Cuba. Cuba became the central focus during the Cold War between the United States and the USSR. In an effort to undermine the Soviets’ ideology and expansion, President Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct clandestine operations against communism around the world, two of which toppled the governments of Iran in 1953, and Guatemala in 1954. One of Eisenhower’s top political goals was to improve relations with the Soviet Union following the death of Josef Stalin in 1953. For instance, in 1955, President Eisenhower met with the leaders of France, Britain, and the USSR in Geneva, Switzerland. The purpose of the meeting was to propose a new policy dubbed “open skies” to allow both countries [the USA and the USSR] to conduct air inspections of each other’s military programs. As expected, the USSR rejected the United States’ proposal. However, the USSR’s posture, in addition to the rise of Soviet nuclear capabilities, convinced President Eisenhower, in consultation with his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Further, President Eisenhower embarked on a strategy to counter the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia by creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). While many hoped that the United States—Russian relations during Eisenhower’s presidency would improve, the reality on the ground suggested otherwise. The dynamics at that time dictated the nature of the relationship. Consider, for example, a May 1960 incident in which the USSR shot down a United States’ U-2 reconnaissance plane. That incident shattered any hopes that President Eisenhower had before leaving office for a treaty with the Soviets. However, he warned in his farewell address of the danger of the “military-industrial complex.”

4.5 John F. Kennedy (1961–1963): 35th President of the United States President John F. Kennedy (JFK) assumed office with the hope of moving the United States forward to claim its place on the world stage and to address the challenges communism presented. In his inaugural address, Kennedy proclaimed, “Let every

58

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty” (Unattributed 1961). JFK’s foreign policy was dominated by American confrontations with the Soviet Union, which took form as proxy contests during the Cold War. Like his predecessors, JFK adopted the policy of containment, which sought to stop the spread of communism. President Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy had emphasized the use of nuclear weapons to deter the threat of Soviet aggression. Fearful of the possibility of a global nuclear war, Kennedy implemented a new strategy dubbed “flexible response.” The premise of that policy was to prepare the United States for a variety of military responses to international crises rather than focus on the use of nuclear weapons. This strategy relied on conventional arms to achieve limited goals. As part of this policy, Kennedy expanded the United States’ special operations forces and elite military units that could fight unconventionally in various conflicts. JFK hoped that the flexible response strategy would allow the United States to counter Soviet influence without resorting to war. Simultaneously, he ordered a massive buildup of the nuclear arsenal to establish superiority over the Soviet Union. Kennedy felt that his predecessor, Eisenhower, did an inadequate job of preventing communism from spreading. During this era, through economic incentives, the Soviets lured less-developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America into ideological and political alliances. Establishing communism as an ideology in Cuba, ninety miles away from the United States shores, exemplifies how the Soviet Union operated during this time. Historians agree that the Cold War dominated Kennedy’s presidency. Further, the United States’ failed attempt in 1961, to overthrow Fidel Castro’s government, known as the Bay of Pigs, worsened relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba’s patron. Tensions escalated in 1962 when Kennedy learned that the Soviets have had deployed ballistic missiles to Cuba, an event that became known as the Cuban missile crisis. Timothy Naftali, a Canadian-American historian, writes: Let’s take these questions together. In his dictated memoirs, Khrushchev credited himself with the idea of putting nuclear missiles on Cuba and ascribed two motives to the ploy: “The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would, I thought, restrain the United States from precipitous military action against Castro’s government. In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance of power.”’ (Naftali 2012).

As of 2019, the Cuban missile crisis is the closest the United States and the USSR have come to nuclear war—given what the public knows. Historical records indicate that it took thirteen days of tense negotiations between Moscow and Washington to defuse the situation with Moscow deciding to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. Cuba was not the only issue the Kennedy administration had to deal with. During Kennedy’s presidency, in 1961, the communist East German government built a wall that separated East Berlin from West Berlin. The purpose of the wall was to prevent East German citizens from fleeing to the West. Kennedy also faced a dilemma in Asia as communism was expanding there. To that end, JFK decided to increase the number

4.5 John F. Kennedy (1961–1963): 35th …

59

of United States military advisers in South Vietnam, a decision that got the United States into the thick of the Vietnam War, though largely after Kennedy’s death. To his credit, President Kennedy initiated bold proposals to deal with domestic issues. For instance, in June 1963, he submitted a civil rights bill to Congress; however, given strong opposition to the civil rights movement at that time, Kennedy’s bill did not pass. President Kennedy was assassinated, in 1963, while visiting Dallas, Texas. Then vice president Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as the next president of the United States.

4.6 Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) (1963–1968): 36th President of the United States A host of issues marked Johnson’s presidency, chief among them the Vietnam War. Historians agree that the war led to Johnson not winning a second term. He badly executed the Vietnam War—his stubborn personality led him, at all costs, to make decisions simply to keep from losing the war. Then he was dishonest with the American people about how the war was going. When the number of United States casualties started to climb despite the presence of about 500,000 American troops in South Vietnam, the conflict showed no sign of abating. As a result, LBJ was forced to disengage from Vietnam War only to see the negotiations take off after he left office. LBJ’s domestic accomplishments, which include the civil rights bill and the War on Poverty, were impressive. Ultimately, however, many historians agree that LBJ’s foreign policy was disastrous. LBJ was concerned about the spread of communism in Latin America. To that end, he nominated Thomas C. Mann, a former official in the Eisenhower administration, to be assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs. Mann, however, had a specific focus in mind: to judge countries in the Western hemisphere by their affirmed commitment to anti-communism rather than their commitment to democracy. Mann’s approach led to poor outcomes. As a result, LBJ undertook an interventionist policy toward Latin America that culminated with the deployment of United States soldiers to Santo Domingo to prevent another communist takeover in the Caribbean. One key international event profoundly impacted LBJ’s tenure: the USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20–21, 1968. The USSR’s invasion was dubbed Operation Danube, a joint invasion by Warsaw Pact members that included the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary. The invasion raised tensions between the United States and the USSR. However, LBJ’s calm attitude betrayed the United States’ limited options in dealing with the USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. Christopher Riehl of Western Kentucky University writes: … Johnson called on the Soviets and their allies to withdraw all forces from Czechoslovakia. The statement’s brevity indicates Johnson’s nonchalant attitude towards the invasion as well as American policymakers’ lack of options. President Johnson desired détente between the United States and the USSR; as a result, he wanted to leave the invasion behind and continue

60

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future furthering bilateral ties. It is no coincidence that a period of US-Soviet détente emerged immediately after Johnson’s presidency under the Nixon Administration once the backlash against the Soviet invasion had largely dissipated (Riehl 2019).

Undoubtedly, controversies marked LBJ’s tenure in office as he hoped to somehow resolve the raging war in Vietnam, but to no avail. The world, however, was shocked to learn about his withdrawal as a candidate for reelection. He wanted to devote time away from politics to the quest for peace. Alas, he did not live to witness the peace talks after he left office. Unexpectedly, LBJ died of a heart attack at his Texas ranch on January 22, 1973.

4.7 Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974): 37th President of the United States The Watergate scandal was the dark stain on the white page of Nixon’s presidential history. Yet, Nixon’s diplomatic efforts, supported by his top aid and eventual secretary of state Henry Kissinger, defined United States relations with major powers, including the USSR, during the 1970s. They focused their political energies on the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, the Middle East, Pakistan, and major arms limitation agreements. Nixon and Kissinger made a good team, partly because they had different personalities and therefore addressed issues from different perspectives. David Rothkopf, a professor of international relations and a political scientist, writes: They were a fascinating pair. In a way, they complemented each other perfectly. Kissinger was the charming and worldly Mr. Outside who provided the grace and intellectual-establishment respectability that Nixon lacked, disdained and aspired to. Kissinger was an international citizen. Nixon very much a classic American. Kissinger had a worldview and a facility for adjusting it to meet the times, Nixon had pragmatism and a strategic vision that provided the foundations for their policies. Kissinger would, of course, say that he was not political like Nixon—but in fact he was just as political as Nixon, just as calculating, just as relentlessly ambitious … these self-made men were driven as much by their need for approval and their neuroses as by their strengths (Rothkopf 2005).

Almost everyone assumed that Nixon’s rhetoric and anti-communist reputation would land him the title of assertive Cold War warrior. But almost everyone’s assumption was proved wrong by Nixon himself in his 1959 “Kitchen debate” with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. In that debate, Nixon hinted at moving away from containment policy. Harry Truman had advocated for containment against the USSR, but Nixon believed that Truman’s policy had failed. Thus, Nixon thought it was time to consider other options, which included emphasizing a foreign policy with economic goals at its core—a realist approach, I may add. But Nixon lost the election of 1960 to John F. Kennedy, so it would take another eight years for Nixon to have the chance to try his own strategy. In the 1960s, tensions between China and the USSR flared up as the two governments engaged in an angry ideological debate over the future of communism. At its core, the disagreement between China and the USSR resulted from China’s criticism

4.7 Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974): 37th …

61

of the Soviet Union’s policy of cooperation with the West. Amid that ideological war, Nixon took advantage politically of the rift between China and the USSR, playing the two communist giants against one another. Nixon’s historic trip to China, in 1972, opened the door for new relations between Beijing and Washington. Nixon’s trip was arranged by his top aide, Kissinger, who used Pakistan as an intermediary. The trip raised serious concerns in Moscow, which rushed to strike a deal with Nixon when the latter met Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The meeting produced major arms agreements—mainly a treaty banning anti-missile defenses in space. Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in establishing a major agreement with the Soviet Union, especially on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Missiles. However, despite his foreign-policy achievements, Nixon left the office of the presidency in disgrace following the Watergate scandal. On August 9, 1974, Nixon resigned the presidency to avoid assured impeachment and removal from office.

4.8 Gerald R. Ford Jr. (1974–1977): 38th President of the United States President Ford started his presidency with the United States—Russian relations on a shaky ground. However, the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East had nearly led to the massive military involvement of the superpowers. In order to maintain a consistent foreign policy in his administration, Ford asked officials from the Nixon administration, including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (who also served as national security adviser) and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, to serve on his administration. They agreed. However, in a surprise move, Ford later conducted a major shake-up in his foreign-policy team. Ford named Brent Scowcroft head of the National Security Council. He also fired Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Director of Central Intelligence (CIA) William Colby. He replaced them with his chief of staff, Donald Rumsfeld, and the American envoy to China, George H. W. Bush, respectively. Interestingly, Ford wanted to follow in Nixon’s footsteps regarding the United States relations with the USSR. Ford’s strategy suggests that he approved of Nixon’s approach to the USSR and other global issues including improved relations with China, and the United States support of South Vietnam (Greene no date). Historians agree that Ford wanted to forge much better relations with the USSR. To that end, the United States and the Soviet Union reached a deal in 1974, the Vladivostok Accords. Ford’s objective was to improve the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (SALT) agreement, a deal Nixon and Kissinger negotiated with the Soviets in 1972. Negotiations, however, between both parties failed to yield consensus due to key differences on both sides over limits on Soviet bombers and American cruise missiles respectively.

62

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

Ford was the only United States president to occupy the White House who was not elected as president or vice president. In November 2, 1976, Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, defeated Ford to become the first United States president from the Deep South since the Civil War.

4.9 James (Jimmy) E. Carter, Jr. (1977–1981): 39th President of the United States Historians have observed that Jimmy Carter lacked both national and international experience when he assumed the United States presidency in 1976. The election of Carter, a Democrat, brought a new emphasis to US foreign policy based on Carter’s own untested ideology. Carter believed that the rule of law should govern international affairs. Further, he wanted to be the first president to promote the United States as the leading supporter of universal human rights. Carter’s thinking and beliefs stem from his religious background and the conviction that American power should be used carefully. He also believed that the United States should forgo military conflicts. His thinking was geared toward improving relations with the Soviet Union in the hope that both nations would reach an agreement on many fronts, including economics and arms control; doing so would relax Cold War tensions (Strong no date). Similarly, historians credit Carter for initiating talks between Egypt and Israel, which led to the historic Camp David agreement. This agreement was Carter’s most significant achievement because it strengthened the United States’ position in the region relative to the Soviet Union. I argue, however, that Carter’s doctrine to protect the Persian Gulf to ensure access to cheap oil was mistaken. The reason is that Carter’s policies expanded the United States security umbrella over the Middle East, putting tremendous pressure on American resources; those pressures continue to be felt today. On the foreign-policy front, historians judge that Carter’s administration embarked on some successful foreign policies. For instance, in 1978, Carter’s administration completed the process of normalizing relations with China; those initiatives had begun during the Nixon administration. Equally important, in response to the Soviet missile deployment, NATO ministers of defense agreed in their 1979 meeting to counter the Soviets by deploying what became known as the “dualtrack” strategy—a simultaneous push for arms control negotiations and deployment of intermediate-range, nuclear-armed United States missiles in Europe, to offset the Russian SS-20 missiles. The United States and the Soviet Union tried, but failed, to negotiate an end to the escalation. During the same year, 1979, the meeting between Carter and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev resulted in the signing of a follow-up nuclear arms control agreement, dubbed SALT II. Two main events contributed, in my opinion, to Carter’s inability to win reelection. Those were (a) the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and (b) the Iran hostage crisis. Carter’s attempt to rescue the hostages failed. That failure dealt a serious

4.9 James (Jimmy) E. Carter, Jr. (1977–1981): 39th …

63

blow to Carter’s ability to save American lives, an outcome that his opponent in the election of 1980, Ronald Reagan, categorized as a failure of Carter’s overall foreign policy. Reagan claimed that Carter’s policies had left the United States in a weakened position in the Middle East. Because American hostages were held in Iran for 444 days, Americans voted Carter out of office.

4.10 Ronald W. Reagan (1981–1989): 40th President of the United States Major events happened during the Reagan presidency: Israel invaded Lebanon, in 1982. Bombings in Beirut killed 241 American soldiers, in 1983. The Iran-Contra scandal broke, in 1986. John Hinckley tried to assassinate Reagan himself, in 1988. However, Reagan’s administration realized one important objective: it ended the Cold War. Reagan’s victory led to the rollback of communism, an outcome manifested by the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, and, subsequently, the end of the Soviet Union, in 1991. To realize his administration’s objective, Reagan had to wait until Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet general-secretary, in March 1985. Afterward, Gorbachev initiated a plan to limit the number of Soviet missiles (SS-20) in exchange for limitation of missiles from NATO countries. Washington was receptive to Gorbachev’s proposal. As a result, negotiations extended to include all United States and Soviet intermediate-range missiles worldwide. The outcome of those talks led Reagan and Gorbachev to agree on a comprehensive intermediate-range missile elimination accord that officially concluded in the signing of the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987. The treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988 (Arms Control Association 2019). Historians agree that Reagan’s foreign policy aimed to assert American global power, denounce the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” and build up the United States’ military might. To that end, the Reagan administration came up with a strategy aimed at supporting and funding anti-communist “freedom fighters” in different parts of the globe, including in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, to name but three. The overall objective was to push back against communist influence that was spreading far and beyond. Like other United States presidents before him, Reagan had his share of scandals. The most relevant to this investigation is the “Iran-Contra affair,” a scandal that saw the Reagan administration secretly sell weapons to Iran and use money from the sale to covertly fund the Contras, a group opposed to the government of Nicaragua. However, the scandal was much more than a secret deal with an enemy, Iran. Malcolm Byrne writes, “In fact, the Iran-Contra affair was about much more than that single question. It encompassed highly dubious, and possibly illegal, acts with respect both to strands of policy and to broad-gauged attempts to cover up administration activities following their public disclosure (Byrne 2014).”

64

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

President Reagan will always be remembered for his famous speech at the Brandenburg Gate of the Berlin Wall. In that speech, he delivered a call for action by Gorbachev, stating, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” As fate would have it, two years after Reagan’s speech, the Berlin Wall came down, leading to the end of the Soviet Union.

4.11 George H. W. Bush (1989–1993): 41st President of the United States Historians agree that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 shaped the George H. W. Bush administration’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. Historians also credit the elder Bush for his steady approach to global affairs, especially toward the Soviet Union. During Bush’s term in office, communism took its last breath without either social upheavals or bloody revolutions. While Regan has been credited for the fall of the Soviet Union, the USSR’s disintegration occurred during Bush’s term. Surrounded by his trusted advisers, including Brent Scowcroft, Bush proceeded methodically in his dealings with the USSR. Some historians categorize Bush as a “moderate Cold Warrior.” That categorization stems from the startling difference between him and his predecessor, Reagan. Reagan adamantly, resolutely sought to destroy communism wherever it may have been; Bush lacked such zeal. Karl Qualls, Dickinson College Professor of History, writes, “He [Bush] was analytical, not impulsive. Although he certainly despised communism, he saw in Gorbachev a reformer who was willing to create change and who wanted peace.” (Kiger 2018) The historian Jeffrey A. Engel of Southern Methodist University assessed Bush’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union in his 2017 book When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War. Engel observed Bush’s political caution to resist, even challenge, those who wanted him to exert more influence and pressure on the other side of the Iron Curtain. To Bush’s credit, his not yielding to political pressure allowed the world to safely navigate through the seismic geopolitical changes that immediately followed the fall of the Soviet Union. Bush’s focus on assisting the Soviets during this tumultuous time did not sit well with the American people as the United States was going through a recession. Economic hard times brought to the fore a conservative named Patrick Buchanan, who challenged Bush for the Republican nomination. The primary challenge made Bush’s chances at reelection in 1992 slim. “I think that was part of the reason for his reelection loss, the sense that he was somehow less interested in us than in those foreigners (Kiger 2018),” writes Mark N. Katz, a professor of government and politics at the School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a former Soviet affairs analyst at the United States Department of State.

4.12 William J. Clinton (1993–2001): 42nd …

65

4.12 William J. Clinton (1993–2001): 42nd President of the United States Most historians agree that Bill Clinton was not well versed in foreign affairs. His political experience was limited to having served as governor of Arkansas. The collapse of the USSR and the uncertainties that resulted in the post-Cold War era created major global challenges and policy crises that Clinton was ill prepared for. President Clinton pursued the policy of his predecessor, ensuring that democracy spread throughout countries once under the Soviet Union’s influence. To that end, Clinton advocated, through his secretary of state Warren Christopher and later on Madelaine Albright, for the inclusion of eastern European countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. Clinton’s foreign-policy efforts yielded positive results when on March 12, 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic officially became NATO members. Clinton worked across the political aisle to come up with a bipartisan policy to assist former Soviet states. For instance, the Nunn-Lugar Act provided a mechanism by which the United States could provide technical assistance and funding to safeguard nuclear power plants and dismantle nuclear weapons. Interestingly, one of the states aided in the Clinton era is the Ukraine. Would Russia have annexed Crimea if Ukraine had maintained its nuclear capabilities? The answer is no. It was the United States that requested that the Ukraine dismantle its nuclear capabilities in return for guaranteed protection. Russia’s annexation of Crimea demonstrated how the United States failed to live up to its commitment. During the Clinton presidency, the United States became the only remaining superpower with military strength to overshadow the rest of the world. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Clinton refocused his energy on domestic affairs, mainly, the economy. A consensus among geopolitical and security analysts is that, as the Clinton presidency was coming to an end, the possibility of a nuclear exchange between the United States and Soviet Union was almost nonexistent.

4.13 George W. Bush (2001–2009): 43rd President of the United States The election of George W. Bush ushered in a new era for United States—Russian relations and introduced new challenges. The 9/11/2001 attacks on New York City and the Pentagon were wrathful and devastating. In a phone call to President Bush, Russia’s Putin expressed sympathy and support. He also suggested the need for cooperation in dealing with terrorism, including the establishment of bases in Afghanistan and central Asia. While Washington policymakers, including the president, welcomed Russia’s proposal, Putin had something else, of strategic nature, in mind.

66

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

Undoubtedly, the fall of the Soviet Union changed the geopolitical calculus for everyone. Gone were the days when the world had a multipolar system. In 2000, the United States stood alone as the world’s only superpower. Most analysts and historians agree that the 9/11 attacks came at a crucial time when Putin, who had come to power in 2000, was trying to improve Russia’s relations with Washington. The United States—Russian relations at the beginning of Bush’s presidency had a rocky start though: Bush and Putin’s dialogue came on the heels of spy scandals. For example, retired United States Army reserve colonel George Trofimoff was arrested on charges of selling military secrets to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and FBI agent Robert Hanssen was arrested on charges of selling secrets to Moscow over a fifteen-year period. The shaky start was also caused by the United States’ intentions to build a missile-defense shield and withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It was, however, the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terrorism that gave Russia and the United States a common objective on which to work together: defeating terrorism. In 2003, when the war on terror doctrine hastened the United States invasion of Iraq, Russia watched carefully how events unfolded in the Middle East. It was then that Russia began to perceive the United States as a renewed geopolitical threat. Yet, for many years, Russia refrained from criticizing the United States invasion. Russia wagered that, if it were to embark on a similar adventure somewhere in the world, Washington would not publicly criticize Moscow—one global hegemon would return the favor to another. Indeed, Russia didn’t need to say anything—that the United States invasion of Iraq is a disaster is a self-evident truth. Some might disagree with this assessment. Facts are hard to ignore. I ask, What did the United States gain from invading Iraq? Nothing! Did the United States defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan? The answer is no. The United States’ involvement in ongoing conflicts comes at an astronomical cost, in blood and treasure, leading to a widening wealth gap in American society. A reported 20 percent of households own more than 84% of the wealth. The “American Dream,” part of our very identity, is fading amid our recklessness, ignorance, and petty obsessions: political squabbling, corruption, a dysfunctional education system, income inequality, lack of meaningful investments, crumbling infrastructure, and a broken tax system (Oualaalou 2015). When a nation, the United States, in this case, spends more than it takes in, every American has a right to ask where the country is headed. And, when that same nation spends itself into more debt to fight a foreign war in the name of a confused ideology, it becomes the duty of every responsible, productive American citizen to say the country is headed the wrong way. For all its concern with events the world over, Americans are overlooking an even bigger problem: the American Dream. Bush’s legacy has been marked by his invasion of Iraq that forever changed the course of history in the Middle East. He returned to his native Texas, where he currently resides.

4.14 Barack H. Obama (2009–2017): 44th …

67

4.14 Barack H. Obama (2009–2017): 44th President of the United States Upon the election of President Obama, relations between the United States and Russia were at a low point in the aftermath of Russia’s conflict with Georgia, in 2008. Besides Georgia and Russia, the conflict involved the Russian-backed selfproclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The conflict started when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. As a result, Georgia sent its troops to South Ossetia. That decision prompted Russia to engage the Georgian military. Jim Nichol, a Russian-Eurasian affairs specialist, writes, “By the morning of August 10, Russian troops had occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border. Russian troops occupied several Georgian cities. Russian warships landed troops in Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region and took up positions off Georgia’s Black Sea coast (Nichol 2009).” Historians agree that the apparent warm personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and President Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush, did little to establish a good rapport between Putin and Obama. The latter hoped to reset relations with Moscow on a host of issues, especially nuclear arms cuts, Iran’s nuclear program, and Afghanistan. Policymakers within the Obama administration doubted that Russia would respond favorably to Obama’s reset strategy. The argument was that if President Obama saw an indifferent or unfavorable response from Moscow, he would have to turn his attention from Russia to other issues. Some progress was achieved, especially when Medvedev and Obama reached agreements on the Iran nuclear program and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). But things took a nosedive after 2011. The reason is that the return of Vladimir Putin to power, in 2012, seemed to augur a less cooperative relationship, given Putin’s view that Washington had not taken seriously Russia’s concerns over issues such as missile defense. Tensions worsened between Washington—the entire West, for that matter—and Moscow when Russia annexed Crimea. The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s involvement in the Syrian war shuttered any hopes for the cooperation President Obama was hoping for from Moscow. Tensions over Ukraine intensified relations between Obama and Putin. It is fair to state that United States—Russian relations during the Obama presidency were like a roller coaster. Steven Pifer, former ambassador to Ukraine, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe, and the director of Brookings’ Arms Control Initiative, writes: The Obama administration has found, to its frustration, that the up-and-down nature of its relations with Moscow has followed the pattern of US-Russia relations during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. If Washington and Moscow wish to avoid repeating this cycle, they need to consider how they approach some of the challenging questions on their bilateral agenda and how they might lock in—and sustain—positive developments in their relations (Pifer 2014).

68

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

Historians are now debating over Obama’s presidency. They debate its effectiveness on legislation like the Affordable Care Act (ACA). They deliberate the controversies surrounding some of Obama’s foreign-policy decisions, i.e., his drone policy, specifically, the deployment of drones targeting terrorists that killed innocent civilians in the process. Regardless, all historians agree that Obama will be remembered forever as the first African-American president. He left office with the Democratic Party in a weakened state.

4.15 Donald J. Trump, Jr. (2017–Present): 45th President of the United States At the time of this writing, many observers have concluded that President Trump cannot fathom global affairs dynamics. His lack of foreign-policy acumen and inept attitude have raised serious concerns domestically and globally. In a recent secret leaked cable, the United Kingdom ambassador to Washington, Sir Kim Darroch, states, “We don’t really believe this administration is going to become substantially more normal; less dysfunctional; less unpredictable; less faction riven; less diplomatically clumsy and inept (Agence France-Presse 2019).” The question that looms large is why Trump seems to act submissive when around dictators and oppressors like Egypt’s al-Sisi, North Korea’s Kim, Saudi Arabia’s Mohamed Bin Salman (MBS), and Russia’s Putin, while belligerent and pugnacious when addressing allies and Western leaders. Of especial relevance to the present investigation is Trump’s approach to, and relations with, Russia. The Trump administration has no Russia strategy in the first place, thus no implementation possibilities . The lack of strategy highlights Trump’s lack of a systematic understating of what is at the core of the United States—Russian relations. It also suggests that the Trump administration’s day-to-day policy toward Russia is mostly reactive, bordering on confusion and incoherence. Andrew Weiss, who worked on Russian affairs at the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Defense Department during the administrations of presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, writes: … Sure, there’s lots of attention on the appearance of countering the Kremlin’s malign activities, but little sustained focus on how best to manage an adversarial relationship with Moscow over the long haul. Tough talk on issues like Venezuela or U.S. election meddling has hardly changed the Kremlin’s risk calculus. With different parts of the president’s team marching off in different directions, the result is a mishmash of competing approaches that don’t add up to an effective policy (Weiss 2019).

This lack of a clear policy toward Russia, in addition to Trump’s hesitance to criticize Putin, has prompted many geopolitical observers and intelligence officials to wonder whether Russia has something on Trump. Trump’s past encounters with Putin in Helsinki, in 2018, and Osaka, in 2019, support my argument. Across many circles, diplomats, security analysts, and intelligence officers expressed concerns at how Putin managed to effortlessly outmaneuver Trump, a far less experienced politician.

4.15 Donald J. Trump, Jr. (2017–Present): 45th …

69

On the flip side, there are those who argue that the Trump administration has not deviated much from the Obama administration’s policy toward Russia or the Middle East. For instance, the former United States ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, who served under former president Obama, argues that a sense of continuity between the Obama administration and the Trump administration vis-à-vis Russia exists. McFaul argues that it was President Obama who imposed sanctions on Russia, and the Trump administration has continued, supported, and expanded those sanctions (Manchester 2018).

4.15.1 Trump’s Approach to Russia The preceding narrative discusses the nature of the United States—Russian relations in the context of different United States administrations. I must emphasize the urgency with which one needs to evaluate where this relationship is headed as geopolitical events on the global stage unfold. It makes sense therefore to assess what this relationship consists of. There is no telling what this relationship may look like pending the outcome of the upcoming 2020 United States presidential election. Against this backdrop, I must mention that United States—Russian relations for the past few decades have struggled to maintain some sort of an equilibrium. Whose fault is it? Is it the Russians’ fault? Is it the fault of American foreign policy? Those questions are hard to answer in a few pages; one needs to delve deeper to assess the foundations on which United States—Russian relations were developed in the last few decades. Most observers agree that United States—Russian relations are now at their lowest point since the Cold War. A deep mistrust between Moscow and Washington now runs through their relations on all fronts. That mistrust is not new—it is the old Cold War mistrust, and it threatens to thrust the relationship into an intensifying geopolitical competition in the Middle East, Latin America, Europe, and Africa. Neither the United States nor Russia is likely to waiver from its current policies on a range of issues. In my opinion, the disconnect lies in Washington refusing to reflect on its policies toward Russia and how those policies are perceived on the other end. Said differently, the political illusion in Washington is that Moscow will eventually get accustomed to the United States dictating its terms. Washington therefore expects Moscow to reluctantly accommodate NATO’s expansion to Russia’s doorstep, which is delusional. Similarly, Russia has to promote the idea that the United States is up to no good and has bad intentions when it supports, for example, the Ukraine and Georgia, Russia’s neighbors. With this political cat-and-mouse game, both Russia and the United States continue to outmaneuver each other with no end on sight. The management of the United States—Russian relations requires a strategy, a well-thought-out plan, tactful diplomacy, and a policy that goes beyond photo ops and exchanges of diplomatic niceties. William Burns, who previously served as United States Deputy Secretary of State, writes:

70

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future Navigating such a great-power rivalry requires tactful diplomacy—maneuvering in the gray area between peace and war; demonstrating a grasp of the limits of the possible; building leverage; exploring common ground where we can find it; and pushing back firmly and persistently where we can’t. The path ahead with Russia will get rockier before it gets easier. We ought to traverse it without illusions, mindful of Russia’s interests and sensibilities, unapologetic about our values, and confident in our own enduring strengths. We should not give into Putin—or give up on the Russia beyond him (Burns 2019).

Russia’s growing international activism in the Middle East, Latin America, and, more recently, Africa, is cause for concern. The United States and Russia need to realize that their differences, if not addressed, could have a major impact on global security. Consequently, the United States’ global agenda and interests would not be advanced accordingly. One must recognize that Russia wants to be treated equally with the United States as a major global player that wields power and influence. However, within the Washington political establishment, some argue that Russia is responsible for the breakdown in its bilateral relations with the United States precisely because Russia has acted too aggressively to gain that recognition. Russia’s recent aggression toward neighboring countries, Georgia and Ukraine, supports this claim. Eugene Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the United States National Intelligence Council, writes: At present, the broad bipartisan consensus in Washington is that Russia is entirely responsible for the breakdown in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Among its transgressions, it has invaded Georgia and Ukraine and annexed a portion of Ukrainian territory, interfered in the 2016 U.S. elections and in the elections of the United States’ democratic allies in Europe, violated the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, backed Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela, and assassinated or attempted to assassinate former Russian officials on foreign soil. These Russian activities are well documented and widely understood. What is less clear is the extent to which U.S. policy has been a contributing factor in the deterioration of the bilateral relationship. Without a careful and critical analysis of the United States’ own record, there is little chance of doing better in the future and stabilizing one of the United States’ most important foreign relationships (Rumer and Sokolsky 2019).

I have to agree that American foreign policy is not only ambiguous, but also contradictory. We say one thing and do another. We promise things, but we do not deliver. We sign treaties but do not observe the legality of those treaties. The Iran nuclear agreement, signed in 2015, which the Trump administration unilaterally decided to withdraw from, is an example. When the United States behaves this way, Russia grows more suspicious of America not wanting to commit to any treaty. Consider, for example, the INF Treaty, which the United States decided to withdraw from. The INF Treaty seemed to usher in nearly thirty years of warming relations between the two powers. And yet, in the year of this authorship, 2019, both countries have again declared their mistrust for each other, have shown that such mistrust is deep and abiding. Or consider the impact of the Trump administration’s recent announcement that the United States will be pulling out of the Open Skies Treaty (OST), a major arms control measure that provided transparency and built confidence among 34 participating states. As the relationship deteriorated, former Russian Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev stated, in 2016, “We [Russia and the United States] are rapidly rolling into a period of a

4.15 Donald J. Trump, Jr. (2017–Present): 45th …

71

new Cold War (Smale 2016).” What fomented such rapid deterioration? What caused Russia’s reticence at the Munich Security Conference of 2019, for example? Political and security leaders from governments, think tanks, and academia worldwide gather in Munich to discuss and debate pressing security issues. Russia had often figured prominently at the conference. Not so in 2019. Did Russia get the cold shoulder just then? No—problems had been brewing for years. United States policymakers refrain from admitting, conveniently or ignorantly, that what Russia does on the global stage could either assist the United States in advancing its objectives or hinder United States’ efforts and harm its strategic interests. Since this thinking persists, the logical question that follows, especially when considering the end of the Cold War, is “What has gone wrong since the fall of the USSR?” One must reflect on how Washington’s policies, or lack thereof, toward Russia should be placed within the context of the United States’ global strategy. As Russia pushes forward with its global strategy, I have my doubts that Washington can stop Russia’s quest to change the global balance of power, one that tilts in favor of Russia’s geopolitical aspirations. Will the two global powers cooperate with one another? The answer is that it is unlikely. The challenge lies in Washington and Moscow coming up with a framework guided by shared interests. In my opinion, before that materializes, Moscow will want to make sure the United States—and the West, for that matter—acknowledges Russia as a global power and treats it like one given its nuclear capabilities, abundance of natural resources, and veto power in the United Nations Security Council. Understanding where Russia is coming from could give the United States a starting point from which to build a dialogue in order to gain a cooperative attitude from Moscow. Ignoring this fact, on the other hand, will strengthen Russia’s resolve in moving forward with its global aspirations—despite limitations, undermining US global interests, and reshaping the global balance of power.

4.15.2 What Is the Core Argument? What is at the core of the United States—Russian relations tensions? The answer depends on whom one asks. Two different schools of thought provide different perspectives. I am referring to realists versus liberalists. I do not intend to turn this section into a philosophical argument about the core tenets of each school of thought. That said, I will briefly describe what each school stands for, especially regarding international politics, and where Russia fits in the debate. Realists believe that every state pursues its own interests. To do so, a state needs to build up its military forces so that it can dominate other states. Liberalists, on the other hand, believe that states can cooperate with each other using international treaties, agreements, and organizations to reach consensus on global issues. Unlike realists, liberalists oppose military buildup and do not see the role of the military as a way to solve conflicts. We can analyze United States—Russian relations from those competing perspectives. Favoring one school of thought over the other leads to different conclusions. In

72

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

the case of Russia, many realists issued warnings in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in 1991. Realists argued that post-Soviet Moscow would eventually react to any eastward expansion from the West and its military alliance, NATO. That is exactly what Russia is now doing. I believe Russia’s annexation of Crimea was a red line, a warning sign for the West to reconsider its expansion eastward. Moscow also sent a message to Washington that its days of trying to spread democracy in Russia’s orbit are over. Also, evidence suggests that realists correctly predicted that pushing Russia harder would lead to a new alliance of sorts, one in which China and Russia join forces. The famous Cold War diplomat George F. Kennan wrote in The New York Times in the 1990s about the danger of NATO expansion eastward, that it would be a “fateful error” that would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion” and “restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations (Glaser 2017).” And Russia reacted, indeed! I am not surprised at the rapprochement between China and Russia. It serves their interests to (a) keep the United States away from the Pacific realm and (b) further undermine United States’ global leadership. I am growing concerned, however, that if and when this rapprochement turns into a strategic alliance, with military dimensions, it will impact the global balance of power and therefore the international order as we know it. Yacqub Ismail, a political analyst, writes: Since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and the West imposed sanctions, China has not expressed any concerns publicly on the annexation of Crimea. Instead, it has improved its relations with Moscow on multiple fronts. Today, China is Russia’s largest trading partner, with a trade volume that exceeded $100 billion in 2018. Concerns over the two countries’ blossoming relationship has led some experts to raise the prospect that both countries will “join forces.” Both countries described their ties as a “Comprehensive Strategic Collaboration Partnership,” as military-to-military cooperation between the two countries is all time high, with new arms sales and joint military exercises (Ismail 2019).

I address the Sino—Russian rapprochement in detail in the following chapter. For now, suffice it to state that the Russia—China entente bodes ill for the United States, especially in times of an ambiguous American foreign policy, a dysfunctional United States Congress, political discord in Washington, and a president ill-informed about both global affairs and the presidency as an institution. President Trump has introduced an unacceptable behavior to American politics, which, if the American people allow it to continue, can and will harm democratic institutions that have already faced many challenges in the last 200-plus years. The world is waiting to see whether Trump will be reelected in 2020 or if a Democratic candidate wins the election; the result will certainly impact how the United States moves forward in its dealings with Russia. Whatever the case may be, the United States—Russian relations incline, in 2019, toward no cooperation since Russia has made visible strides to change the global balance of power. The recent delivery of Russia’s S-400 missile system to Turkey, a NATO ally, testifies to this shifting balance of power. Is the history of how the United States and Europe treated Russia after the fall of the USSR coming full circle? I say yes. The West paid little attention to Russia’s

4.15 Donald J. Trump, Jr. (2017–Present): 45th …

73

security and economic concerns. The assumption among Western policymakers— mainly those in the United States—was that Russia’s efforts to reassert itself politically, economically, and militarily following the disintegration of the USSR were nothing but remnants of the Cold War. They were wrong! Gone is the thinking that Russia is going to be confined to its “near abroad” neighborhood! The annexation of Crimea is the beginning of a series of geopolitical shifts reversing the global balance of power, alliances, and future strategies. If Russia’s success in selling Turkey and Iran its advanced air-to-surface missiles, S-300 and S-400 respectively, is any indication, it should remind us all of the shift in power currently taking place on the ground of the Middle East with Russia dictating its rules.

4.15.3 Are We Moving Forward? Where the United States goes from here concerning its relations with Russia is anyone’s guess. We can forever talk about strategies, theories, concepts, and so forth. In the end, these statements remain nothing but a consumption of ink. There is no will, only—quite frankly—a dysfunctional administration in Washington that assures that any policy emanating from its halls of power is doomed to fail. Despite the ongoing internal chaos in the Trump administration, there is still a responsibility to come up with a coherent, substantive approach to address Russia’s growing global engagement. The dilemma the United States faces with Russia is that it has been too late to the game of initiating a substantive strategy. The reason is that Russia will not and cannot trust the United States. We have not embarked on meaningful efforts following the fall of the USSR. We have not held to our end of the bargain when we promised not to expand NATO eastward. We wanted to shove democracy down the throats of newly independent Soviets enclaves, and we underestimated how Russia might react to those misadventures. Now the tables have turned. We are witnessing an assertive Russia. The handwriting is on the wall, and warning signs are all over, but we deliberately refrain from heeding those warnings. If we are talking about a strategy, how does one determine whether we are doing too much or too little? Either has risks. But first we need to ask the right questions. For instance, do Russia’s assertive foreign policy and global activism pose a threat to the United States global interests? Will Russia’s global strategies cost the United States geopolitically and ideologically in America’s sphere of influence (i.e., Middle East)? Which mechanism does the United States need to use to gauge the risk Russia is posing? Those are a few questions that need honest, rational, and immediate debate. I caution, however, against misleading a Western audience that has been asking and wondering, for some time, whether the West should fear Russia. Let us start by stating the obvious: the Cold War never ended. The West needs to reconsider its claim that it “won the Cold War.” There is much evidence to the contrary. The annexation of Crimea proved that the Cold War is back, and the West should not pretend otherwise. Like many geopolitical observers, I strongly believe that Russia’s annexation of Crimea represents the new “Iron Curtain.” This time

74

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

around, that line is drawn in Eastern Europe rather than its center. From a military perspective, this line is where political discourse and conversation with the West end, and military confrontation begins. Are we talking about a Russian comeback? Absolutely! We have not learned from the lessons of history: You do not humiliate your enemy, you do not underestimate your opponent, and you certainly do not rub your enemy’s nose in the dirt during a victory celebration. Robert Gates, former CIA director and secretary of defense, once said: [F]rom 1993 onward, the West, and particularly the United States, [had] badly underestimated the magnitude of Russian humiliation in losing the Cold War and then in dissolution of the Soviet Union, which amounted to the end of the centuries-old Russian Empire. The arrogance, after the collapse, of American government officials, academicians, businessmen, and politicians in telling the Russians how to conduct their domestic and international affairs (not to mention the internal psychological impact of their precipitous fall from superpower status) had led to deep and long-term resentment and bitterness (Trenin 2016).

That said, it behooves the United States—and the West, for that matter—to take a hard look at where Russia is headed. Examples of Russia’s global engagements abound and are easy to pinpoint. The challenge, in my opinion, is determining what is at the core of Russia’s motives.

4.16 Conclusion The United States should not expect Russia’s behavior to change. As the Trump administration’s term in office is ending, the West should expect Russia’s global challenges to persist. We need to consider, or, at least, formulate, two questions: How will we proceed with a stronger Russia emerging on the global stage? and What do we do if Russia fails to live up to the hype of it returning as a major global power? How might we deal with an underperforming Russia? Before engaging in this debate, let me make one thing clear: Russia will never associate itself with the West, its values, or its doctrines in the hope of following Western liberal ideals. Whoever thinks that way needs to reconsider his or her views. The next chapter addresses how, and to what degree, the rivalry between the United States and Russia will affect the global geopolitical landscape moving forward.

References Agence France-Presse. (2019). Donald trump ‘inept’ and ‘dysfunctional’, UK ambassador to US says. The Guardian, July 6, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/07/donaldtrump-inept-and-dysfunctional-uk-ambassador-to-us-says. Arms Control Association. (2019). The intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty at a glance. Arms Control Organization, February 2, 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ INFtreaty.

References

75

Burns, W. J. (2019). How the U.S.-Russian relationship went bad. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 8, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/08/how-u.s.-russian-rel ationship-went-bad-pub-78543. Byrne, M. (2014). Iran-Contra: Reagan’s scandal and the unchecked abuse of presidential power (p. 3). Lawrence, Kansas: University press of Kansas. Glaser, J. (2017). NATO expansion is unwise. Saying so isn’t treasonous. CATO Institute, March 17, 2017. https://www.cato.org/blog/nato-expansion-unwise-saying-so-isnt-treasonous. Greene J. R. (no date). Gerald ford: Foreign affairs. Miller Center, University of Virginia. Available https://millercenter.org/president/ford/foreign-affairs. Ismail, Y. (2019). The limits of the alliance between China and Russia. The National Interest, July 10, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/limits-alliance-between-china-and-russia-66406. Kiger, P. J. (2018). How George H.W. Bush finished what reagan started in ending the cold war. History Stories, December 5, 2018. https://www.history.com/news/george-bush-reagancold-war-end-gorbachev. Leuchtenburg, W. E. (no date). Franklin D. roosevelt: Foreign affairs. Miller Center, University of Virginia. Available https://millercenter.org/president/fdroosevelt/foreign-affairs. Manchester, J. (2018). Ex-ambassador finds ‘continuity’ in Obama and Trump’s Russia policies. The Hill, November 30, 2018. https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/419139-ex-ambassador-says-there-iscontinuity-in-obama-and-trumps-russia-policies. Naftali, T. (2012). The Malin notes: Glimpses inside the kremlin during the cuban missile crisis. Wilson Center, Fall(17/18), 299. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_Bul letin_17-18_Cuban_Missile_Crisis_50.pdf. Nichol, J. (2009). Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008: Context and implication for U.S. interests. Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf. Oualaalou, D. (2015). Upward mobility, income equality die while we fight over a broken system. The Waco Tribune Herald, May 3, 2015. https://www.wacotrib.com/opinion/columns/board_ of_contributors/david-oualaalou-board-of-contributors-upward-mobility-income-equality-die/ article_4be3eb9a-b331-59e2-8ef9-3f903e00b547.html. Pifer, S. (2014). US-Russia RELATIONS IN the Obama Era: From reset to refreeze? Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (p. 123). https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/ yearbook/english/14/Pifer-en_S.pdf. Riehl, C. (2019). Ideology in American cold war foreign policy. Vanderbilt Historical Review (p. 76). Accessed July 4, 2019, http://vanderbilthistoricalreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/ 04/IdeologyinColdWar.pdf. Rothkopf, D. (2005). Running the world: The inside story of the national security council and the architects of American foreign policy (pp. 111–112). New York: Public Affairs. Rumer, E., & Sokolsky, R. (2019). Thirty years of U.S. policy toward Russia: Can the vicious circle be broken? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 20, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-canvicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323. Smale, A. (2016). Russia and Germany cling to fragile business ties. The New York Times, February 23, 2016. https://www.wacotrib.com/opinion/columns/board_of_contributors/david-oualaalouboard-of-contributors-russia-will-test-trump-s/article_21b81d1f-ec76-5153-9a5c-1d49313a1 b8b.html. Strong, R. A. (no date). Jimmy carter: Foreign affairs. Miller Center, University of Virgin. Available https://millercenter.org/president/carter/foreign-affairs. Steil, B. (2018). The Marshall plan: Dawn of the Cold War (pp. 12–13). New York: Simon & Schuster. Trenin, D. (2016). Should we fear Russia? (p. 10). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Unattributed. (1961). Inaugural address of John F. Kennedy. Yale Law School, January 20, 1961. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kennedy.asp.

76

4 The United States—Russian Relations: Past, Present, and Future

Unattributed. (no date). United States relations with Russia: Establishment of relations to World War Two. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Available, https://2001-2009.state. gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm. Weiss, A. S. (2019). Trump’s confused Russia policy is a boon for putin. Politico Magazine, June 25, 2019. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/06/25/trump-putin-russia-weiss-227205.

Chapter 5

The United States–Russian Rivalry

5.1 Introduction Addressing the innumerable causes and interpretations that led to the United States– USSR (later Russia)1 rivalry would be a text in itself. Consequently, this chapter addresses the core of the United States–USSR hostility and factors that contributed to a lasting contentious relationship marked by mistrust, inconsistencies, and an enormous strain that nearly resulted in a nuclear war. I also clarify and respond to a fundamental question geopolitical observers are asking: could the contemporary rivalry between the US and Russia transform into a military conflict between the two nuclear superpowers? In other words, could the “Cold War” become a “Hot War”? A rivalry between the United States and the USSR emerged before WWII ended. This rivalry was about influence, especially ideological. The lack of trust at that time was between United States presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Truman and the Soviet premier Joseph Stalin, all of whom had contributed to this rivalry in many ways. Their rivalry explains why that mistrust has persisted all these decades up to the present time. Historical records indicate that mistrust between the United States and the USSR began in 1917 when the United States refused to recognize the new Bolshevik government after the Russian Revolution. Similarly, most historians agree that Stalin disliked the United States sharing nuclear technology research with Great Britain but excluding the USSR, the Allies’ unwillingness to engage the Germans on a second front to relieve pressure off the Soviets, and the United States’ decision to offer postwar financial assistance to Great Britain but not to the USSR.

1I

use the term “USSR” and “Russia” interchangeably depending on which era I am referring to.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 D. Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5_5

77

78

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry

These dynamics set both the political tone and the stage for several decades while the Cold War manifested. Cold War tensions started based on ideological differences held by the USSR, a communist country whose government and economic systems were at odds with the United States’ democracy and capitalist system. As a result, Western democracies, regardless of form and style, exhibited hostility toward the idea of a communist state. At its core, the rivalry between the United States and the USSR emerged mainly during the postwar era when the United States focused its foreign policy on one key aspect: the spread of democracy around the world. The decision of the United States to embark on spreading democracy did not sit well with the USSR’s ideology, which leaned toward overthrowing capitalism as a priority. Having already been invaded by Germany twice, the USSR feared what the future of Europe would become if it did not influence and shape the outcome. It was the threat of Germany that brought the United States and the USSR into a working relationship. However, both powers found themselves capitulating to the classic prisoners’ dilemma: working together would produce the best result, but, with everything to lose, neither side could risk trusting the other (Kuhn 2019). Moving forward, the United States and the Soviet Union understood what was at stake if they did not prevent the Cold War from escalating. As nuclear superpowers, Washington and Moscow realized the devastating consequences if there were ever a nuclear exchange between the two. This was evident in 1956 when President Eisenhower refrained from intervening in the Hungarian Revolution. His rationale for restraint was that action would certainly anger the USSR as the United States would be operating within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence (Eastern Europe). Similarly, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated how the USSR made sacrifices to avoid a nuclear exchange with the United States by withdrawing its missiles from Cuba. Interestingly, a year after the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow and Washington decided to establish a direct communication “hot line” to defuse any future crises. Two major outcomes of the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted—one positive, the other not so. On the positive side, the Cuban Missile Crisis allowed the United States and the USSR to come to an agreement regarding their nuclear weapons stockpiles. This agreement led to the signature of treaties, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1 and 2) among others. The downside of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that Moscow came to realize that it would be more productive to develop and invest in its long-range missile capabilities, known as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and capable of reaching the United States from USSR’s territory. The Cold War shaped US–Russian relations. The intensifying rivalry has had a major impact on both countries’ geopolitical calculations, intelligence strategies, and economic decisions. Yet, the fundamental question many historians raise is Who is to blame for the Cold War? Is it the Soviet Union (today’s Russia)? Is it the United States? Or is it both? The Western assertion has always been that the blame is squarely on the USSR for initiating the Cold War. Some argue that the United

5.1 Introduction

79

States’ intentions were to assist many around the world through the expansion of democracy, the rule of law, and guaranteed freedoms. What has been left out of the debate for decades, conveniently or unwittingly, is that United States president Truman, who, many historians agree, was responsible for starting the Cold War by using “acerbic” language in his false mischaracterization that the USSR represented a clear and present danger to the free world. These dynamics sat the stage for the Cold War to manifest through many large and small conflicts, disagreements, and alliances that, to this day, continue to shape the rivalry between the United States and Russia. Many in the West have claimed victory over an illusion that the Cold War is over, although Russia today is reemerging on the global stage at alarming speed, with a concerning approach. Russia’s global upsurge has been facilitated by many Putin policies implemented in the last decade or so. My detailed narrative about how Russia achieved this outcome is presented below. While many things have contributed to Russia’s comeback, my focus remains on the key dimensions that continue to shape this rivalry today: geopolitics, the military, and intelligence.

5.2 Geopolitical Rivalry Despite what one hears from either side of the rivalry between the United States and the USSR, it has evolved into fierce geopolitical competition based on ideological dominance. It is a cliché to state that each United States administration wants to start its tenure on a good footing when it comes to America’s relations with Russia. It is a false inclination to assume that the Trump administration will be able to achieve much in its relations with Russia. Trump’s predecessors, George W. Bush and Barak Obama, started their presidencies with high hopes that relations with Moscow would improve. However, each had their hopes shuttered in the face of reality that requires a new approach, demands a new strategy, and, quite frankly, necessitates a top-tobottom review of the United States’ policy toward Russia, though this pattern has been the norm since the early 1950s. Once it became evident that the United States–Russian rivalry was more than an ideological spat, leaders in both countries started working to outmaneuver each other at every corner. While all this was taking place, the world was innovating, nuclear research was progressing, and social conditions around the globe were changing. Be that as it may, the rivalry between the United States and Russia is not only shaped by the tensions the Cold War placed on the geopolitical and ideological table for both USSR and the United States but also included social and economic dimensions. Vladislav Zubok, a professor of international history at the London School of Economics, writes: The Cold War was not just another great-power confrontation. It was also a clash between opposite social and economic projects, a theater of cultural and ideological warfare. As such, David Caute concludes, it was shaped “by the shared and bitterly contested heritage of the European Enlightenment; and, not least, by the astonishing global ascendency of printing

80

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry presses, of film, radio, and television, not overlooking the proliferation of theaters and concert halls open to the broad public, particularly in the USSR.” (Zubok 2009)

The rivalry between the United States and Russia today differs markedly from what it was a few decades ago, though its tenets remain the same. Still, the desire to maintain an ideological influence drives both Russia and the US to highlight the intensity of their rivalry. I point out the recent Ukraine crisis. In my opinion, the crisis demonstrates that it “ended” the so-called post-Cold War era, though the Cold War itself never ended in the first place. Its ending was an illusion brought on by the West trying to justify its policies toward Russia by inflating the idea of its having been victorious. The Ukraine crisis put an end to that thinking. The crisis demonstrates two things. First is that Russia vehemently opposes Ukraine integration with the West, regardless of the cost. Secondly, the Ukraine crisis provided the perfect platform for Russia to cement its assertive foreign policy as a new era of intense geopolitical competition, strong rivalry, and even possible confrontation looming on the horizon between not only Moscow and Washington but also between Moscow and Brussels. One thing is clear: the United States’ support of Ukraine started in 1991 when the latter gained its independence. The United States’ assistance focused on supporting democratic institutions, promoting civic participation, and helping with good governance. The objective was for the Ukraine to develop a closer relationship with the European Union (EU), one that went beyond transforming its gradual economic integration and deepening of political cooperation. The United States indeed invested over $5 billion to assist Ukraine in these and other endeavors that would ensure a secure, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine (Sanders 2014). But claiming that the United States provided $5 billion in support of the riot is false. The Russian information machine—we came to realize its effectiveness, especially in the aftermath of the 2016 United States presidential election—succeeded in influencing public opinion about what the United States was doing in Ukraine. It is pivotal for us to understand in this discussion how Russia perceived the United States support for Ukraine. Moscow interpreted the intervention as a prelude to Ukraine’s eventual accession to NATO. This outcome prompted Putin to annex Crimea by drawing a line in the sand similar to the wall that divided Berlin at the height of the Cold War. Many historians, geopolitical analysts, and academics believe that the United States–USSR struggle over Ukraine, which Russia won, has become the first round of a new great-power clash, the first since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. While the United States–Russian rivalry, since its inception, was mainly focused on Europe and Russia’s neighborhood, it is now a bygone era compared to where this rivalry manifests itself today in the Middle East, Latin America, and North Africa. On the European front, Europeans are divided on how Russia is perceived. More division exists today than a few decades ago. Hungary, for instance, is cracking down on freedom of the press, is taking harsh measures against immigrants, and is rolling back on democratic institutions it established in the last few years. It all started when the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, embarked on policies that provoked and defied the EU. Undoubtedly, Mr. Orbán’s current tensions with the EU would lead him to lean toward Russia sooner rather than later.

5.2 Geopolitical Rivalry

81

Interestingly, doubts multiplied among Senators inside the halls of the United States Congress and on the foreign relations and intelligence committees. Senators knew that Russia would react to any expansion eastward that excluded Russia and that the United States could not contain Moscow’s retrograde, expansionist impulses (Steil 2018). The late Richard Holbrooke, then President Clinton’s special envoy to the Balkans, dismissed this warning when he wrote in World Policy Journal, in 1998, that the United States could “have [its] cake and eat it too… years from now… people will look back at the debate and wonder what all the fuss was about. They will notice that nothing has changed in Russia’s relationship with the West.” (Steil 2018) Holbrooke was dead wrong; may he rest in peace! Conventional wisdom suggests that European countries like Poland, which are geographically closer to Russia, are concerned about what Russia might do, especially after annexing Crimea; countries farther afield do not have to worry as much about Russian aggression. Similarly, political elites with little interest in Russia are more critical than the business circles, who have something to lose. And anti-European Union, anti-United States elements see Putin as their ally. The United States–Russian geopolitical rivalry is also on full display in the Middle East. Look at Russia’s action in Syria and the military and economic power Russia has there. Similarly, Turkey’s recent purchase of Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system—and soon possibly Russian Su-35 fighter jets in response to the US decision to expel Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program—supports my argument. It is just a matter of time before Russia will convince Turkey to leave NATO. The handwriting is on the wall. Should that happen, Russia—and China, for that matter— will establish a proxy military presence in a significant geostrategic location of the world. Note: China’s interest in Turkey stems from the latter serving as one of the main hubs in China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Gerald Toal, a professor of government and international affairs, writes: The United States has paid a high price over the last decade and a half for the thin geopolitics that drove its foreign policy after 9/11, a geopolitics that organized the world in moralized binaries without regard to the depth and complexities of geography and history. That complexity rebounded upon the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan but also in Georgia in 2008 (Toal 2017).

Indeed, changing political certainties in the Middle East affect economic realities. Russia fully understands that the region’s recent, sustained geopolitical shift brings with it a new geopolitical outlook, which compels regional countries to consider their options as the United States’ leadership in the region, and beyond—for that matter—has been waning. Russia’s strengthened Middle East alliances give it the ability to, indirectly, influence global oil prices, a possibility the international business community should consider. Conventional wisdom suggests that, given its energy (oil and natural gas) abundance, Russia will always be in a position to influence global politics and impact global oil market prices, though on a limited basis. Russia, a non-OPEC member, stands to lose substantial revenues if oil prices remain low. Yet, the Middle East’s ongoing upheavals, the failed state of Libya, unrest and economic hardship in Venezuela, ongoing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and renewed

82

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry

United States sanctions on Iran are more likely to impact Russia’s oil revenues. After publishing Beneath the Veil: Fall of the House of Saud, in which I discussed at length Russia’s economic ties to Saudi Arabia and Iran, I find it paramount to show why Russia stands to benefit from the chaos in the Middle East and reassert itself as a global player that wields political influence. In my opinion, Russia will benefit from reestablishing its presence in the Middle East—after all, some of those countries in the region were previously within the Soviet Union’s orbit. Russia seems to have figured out the weak links in Europe, identified flaws in the United States foreign policy toward the Middle East, and has stepped in to manage, on a limited basis, a regressive United States global leadership. I am not suggesting that Russia will replace the United States. No way, not ever! But what I am suggesting is that by having Russia rearrange the chairs at the global geopolitical table, and thereby reconfigure the global order, it is managing the process by which it can decide who sits where. In the case of Europe, Moscow is already working to influence countries that are not members of NATO and not covered under the United States’ security umbrella. Thus, it makes more sense, from Moscow’s perspective, to introduce changes and influence the political landscape sooner rather than later. There is a need in the United States and the West to come to grips with the reality that Russia will continue its aggressive foreign policy, stoke fear across its neighborhood, and introduce new security and military architecture to change the global balance of power. Of course, when a similar assertion is issued by one who might not be well-known to the Washington political elites (such as me), these statements and assertions are perceived as naïve and as made by someone who does not know what he is talking about. The reality is that when Washington dislikes the message, it tends to shoot the messenger—figuratively, of course. Time is of the essence for the United States and the West to act, as the global geopolitical landscape is changing by the hour, and ambiguity and chaos are the only constants when it comes to dealing with Russia. Things are changing but not to the liking of the United States. Take, for instance, America’s largest military facility in the Middle East, the Al-Udeid military base in Qatar. The base is situated in a country which is, unofficially, a partner and de facto ally of Iran. Further, Qatar has recently severed its relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. While retaining good bilateral relations with the US, Qatar remains aligned with Iran and Turkey (Chossudovsky 2019). Like other geopolitical observers, I wonder how effective the United States has been in trying to isolate Russia to prevent it from reemerging on the global stage. “There have been efforts at consolidating allies and partners, isolating and sanctioning Russia, helping Beijing keep a distance from Moscow, and countering the Kremlin propaganda,” (Trenin 2016) writes Dimitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Current evidence on the ground suggests that the United States failed to prevent Russia from forging its way through the global stage. That suggests that the hardline approach—to keep pressure on Russia until it succumbs—is not working. Should there be some pragmatism in having a dialogue with Russia to resolve differences and have a better chance of reaching shared objectives that both Moscow and Washington are satisfied with? I say yes. There are those in the West who vehemently oppose any compromise, while Russians are arguing that doing so comes at a heavy cost. However, I

5.2 Geopolitical Rivalry

83

argue that the cost is far greater if the West does not come to understand Russia’s grievances. For instance, does the West realize the impact when there is a genuine shift of power toward Asia supported by Russia and led by China? Does the West see the geopolitical shift in the emerging Eurasia, which will make Russia the West of the East? What about Russians themselves? How do they see these changes on the global landscape? Are they content with, and supportive of, what Putin is doing? Do they aspire for Russia to take its rightful place on the world stage in the twenty-first century? The answer is yes. While some Russians blame the West for their misfortune, others argue that the West did not win the Cold War. Rather it was the decision of the Russian leaders to end it. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings institute in Washington, DC, writes: Some Russians, including President Putin, have whipped themselves up into an unjustified anger over perceived slights by NATO nations. But it is not only Putin and the older Russian Cold Warriors who feel put out. Many Russians feel that NATO did not win the Cold War. Rather, a new generation of leaders of their own country had the wisdom to end it. They were then rewarded for their good sense, not only by a reaffirmation of the organization that had been their nation’s adversary, but by a major expansion of that very alliance (O’Hanlon 2017).

Today, the United States–Russian geopolitical rivalry is driven by a reality that the NATO alliance has gone too far, right up to Russia’s doorstep. What does the West expect? That Russia will cave in or that Moscow will welcome NATO advancement with open arms? In fact, when NATO extended the invitation to Montenegro, a country the size of Connecticut with little to contribute to NATO’s overall defense capabilities, I questioned the rationale for the decision. I believe the NATO alliance and the West—for that matter—knew how Russia would react. Moscow issued warning statements of a military nature. This should come as no surprise. The warning reflects Russia’s thinking of how any eastward expansion of NATO is perceived—as encircling Mother Russia (Oualaalou 2016). Could this explain why Putin decided to deploy advanced missile systems in Syria? My answer is yes, based on evidence on the ground and shifting geopolitical dynamics. Russia is sending a message to NATO that it will retaliate, one way or another. I have to disagree with Michael O’Hanlon’s assertion that any new security structure in Europe requires Russia to help uphold and guarantee the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. How could that be? Following the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union, former United States secretary of state James Baker spoke in the magnificent St. Catherine Hall at the Kremlin, saying that Western leaders contemplated “no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.” Interestingly, the now-declassified negotiation documents show that, for former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to agree to NATO membership for a newly unified Germany, he made it quite clear that “any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.” (Nimmo 2014) While I understand that the admission to the Alliance of a small country like Montenegro will not pose a threat to Russia, the United States and the Alliance need to be careful how far it is willing to push Russia given how impulsive and unpredictable

84

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry

Putin can be. In fact, the invitation only confirms the Kremlin’s paranoia that the West intends to encircle Russia. In my opinion, we are already witnessing Russia’s reaction in Europe and the Middle East. Consider the military hardware Russia has brought to Syria such as the Yakhont, a 6.7 m-long (22-foot) missile with a range of 290 km (180 miles) and carries a high explosive and warplanes (34 of them) that match or exceed the performance of our F22s and F18s. I ask “Why does Russia need all these sophisticated weapons in the Middle East?” The answer lies in Putin’s long-term strategic and geopolitical vision. Looking back at history, Russia embarked on a similar tactic at the dawn of World War II. You may recall the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, named after Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. The nonaggression treaty allowed Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Nazi Germany to divide Poland. I see Putin embarking on a similar strategy when the opportunity presents itself. The trajectory of the United States–Russian rivalry is taking an unknown destination. One thing is sure: the annexation of Crimea, the provision of military support to Syria, the sale of the S-400 and S-300 advanced missile systems to Turkey and Iran respectively, and the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing suggest what an unpredictable Russia can do in a world already marked by titanic geopolitical shifts, political upheavals, instability, and shifting alliances. It will not surprise me when President Putin’s next strategic move is to consider amendments to, or even the cancellation of, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with the United States. Should this scenario become a reality, it will be a game-changer.

5.3 Military Rivalry I am not going to dwell on the late 1940s when Russia and the United States started their arms race by developing nuclear weapons; rather, I focus my narrative on contemporary military issues that continue to affect the trajectory of the United States–Russian rivalry. Problems began when the United States’ military returned to the Middle East to establish a force in Afghanistan. Yes, the United States benefited from Russia voting for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1386. But Russia’s vote on resolution 1368, which condemned the attacks of September 11, 2001, was not in any way, shape, or form a declaration of support for the United States. Rather, Russia’s vote on the resolution should be viewed in terms of Russia’s strategic needs, domestically and globally. By Russia voting in support of the resolution, the United States would not later object to Russia targeting groups—no matter who they may be—as long as Moscow claims that its actions are in support of fighting terrorism.

5.3 Military Rivalry

85

Interestingly, the UNSC resolution authorized a British-led UN peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Russia voted for a resolution that put the British in charge. That move ensured that the US did not expand its influence in central Asia. A British-led force was Russia’s way of limiting the United States’ ability to test advanced military weapons in Afghanistan. And finally, showed Moscow’s strategy to draw Europe into a conflict, knowing that America’s involvement in Afghanistan would drag on for years. America is still entangled in Afghanistan, still has boots on the ground and cannot declare victory after 18 years—that proves my point! But the biggest problem is that the United States never abandoned its policy of containment. The “war on terror” became another battle against the “Communist menace.” To have a foothold in the Middle East was to have a presence the Russians did not! So went the thinking of American foreign policymakers even in 2001. Containment had become Washington’s strategic global framework within which it dictated, and the world order submitted. Everything was presented in terms of a conflict with the Soviet Union—now the Russian Federation—to justify the application of whatever policies benefited the Washington hawks and the elites. Those policies have nothing to do with the interests of the American people—not even the United States as a nation state, for that matter. It was rather a matter of political convenience! The “war on terror,” a throwback to old Washington narratives of containment, worked to the United States’ disadvantage just as the Russians reasoned! The “war on terror” has had a tremendous impact on the United States both in treasure and in blood. According to the Defense Department’s special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, after 18 years of US presence in Afghanistan and an expenditure of about $132 billion in projects to stabilize a country torn apart by four decades of war (Ziezulewicz 2019), the United States has not defeated the Taliban, the United States has not defeated the Taliban, but is in Qatar as of the time of this writing negotiating with Taliban officials. The United States cannot declare a victory or ensure that its war on terror strategy succeeds. In 2003, when the war on terror ideology hastened the United States invasion of Iraq, Russia watched carefully how events unfolded in the Middle East. It was then that Russia began to perceive the United States as a renewed geopolitical threat. Yet, for many years, Russia refrained from criticizing the United States invasion. Russia wagered that, if it were to embark on a similar adventure somewhere in the world, Washington would not publicly criticize Moscow—one global hegemon would return the favor to another. Indeed, Russia did not need to say anything—that the United States invasion of Iraq is a disaster is a self-evident truth. Militarily, Russia understands what is at stake if communication channels with the United States are closed. I wonder how the Kremlin currently perceives the escalating United States–Iran tensions. Will the United States declaration of sending troops to the Middle East raise tensions with Moscow? Does Russia perceive the stationing of United States troops in Saudi Arabia as a repeat of the disastrous 2003 invasion of Iraq? In light of the latest escalation between the United States and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, it is becoming clear in my opinion that any military conflict with Iran will draw in global players including Russia.

86

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry

5.3.1 Russia’s Perspective From a military perspective, Russia understands that the United States has overextended itself in the Middle East and central Asia (mainly in Afghanistan), and that the United States is paying for it at home. Moscow sees that Washington has undertaken another failed policy that underlines the historical and cultural ignorance of the United States’ decision makers. Similarly, Russia understands that United States policymakers depend heavily on intelligence gathered through technology rather than human assets and then dictate an extravagant armchair diplomacy. Note the failed United States policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Moscow has concluded that the longer foreign conflicts entangle America, the more advantageous it is for Russia. Recently, Russia has begun to pay careful attention to how technology feeds information to Americans too indolent to think for themselves. I will elaborate on this theme in the following pages. Let us set aside for now this discussion of the domestic consequences the United States faces from its ill-conceived foreign-policy ventures. The United States invasion of Iraq in 2003 seems to have heightened Russian president Vladimir Putin’s concern over the true motivations of the United States for invading. In my opinion, Putin perceived the invasion as a geopolitical threat. Global competition over spheres of influence dominated the Cold War, and Putin recognized the reemergence of that competition at the beginning of the twenty-first century. One has good reason to respect Moscow’s diplomatic restraint given the long history between the two powers. Indeed, Russia waited until 2007, in Munich, to criticize American foreign policy. Even then, Putin let things simmer before cautioning the United States about unilateral action in Syria. In September 2013, Putin wrote an editorial in The New York Times. He did not mince words while lecturing the United States about military intervention and how it undermines global security and stability. Putin observed: “It is alarming that military intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has become commonplace for the United States. Is it in America’s long-term interest? I doubt it. Millions around the world increasingly see America not as a model of democracy but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling coalitions together under the slogan ‘you’re either with us or against us.’” (Putin 2013) Then, in 2014, Putin made a forceful statement before international political experts. In a scathing criticism of the United States for its disregard of international law and unilateral use of force, Putin argued: “If the United States fails to abandon its ‘desire of eternal domination,’ then ‘hopes for peaceful and stable development will be illusory, and today’s upheavals will herald the collapse of global world order.’” (Isachenkov 2014). Two years after Putin’s statement, then the United States vice president Joe Biden offered Moscow a “reset.” Putin had other ideas. In fact, I think his editorial of 2013 and comments in 2014 may have foreshadowed future moves by Russia. Almost immediately thereafter two events occurred. In February 2014, Russia annexed Crimea. Why? Moscow realized that it was now or never to make its move. NATO had weakened to the point that Putin thought NATO had begun to destabilize the region. After annexing Crimea, Putin

5.3 Military Rivalry

87

claimed that Russia would not allow any threat to its western border; in doing so, he referred to the threat posed by NATO’s further expansion eastward. Interestingly, the annexation of Crimea overturned, in a single action, the assumptions on which the post-Cold War European order had rested. As an aside, let me observe that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a prelude to more aggression, mainly toward the Baltic States. A probable change to the geopolitical map of Europe, mainly its eastern region, is an inevitable conclusion. One thing is certain: Putin is also politically sensing that NATO is potentially in shambles. Turkey’s purchase and receipt of the S-400 missile system almost a year ahead of schedule will further contribute to the already destabilized and fragmented structure of NATO, to the detriment of Washington. The interesting aspect of this development is that Turkey, a crucial NATO member, is currently allied with two of Washington’s sworn enemies: Russia and Iran. Similarly, when one evaluates current dynamics in Southeast Asia, one realizes how Pakistan, a fictional US ally, is aligning itself with China and Iran. Talk about geopolitical shifts and alliances! The second event was Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015. After securing the Crimea uncontested, Moscow became emboldened. It flexed its military and diplomatic muscles as a show of assertiveness and defiance. Ostensibly, Putin intervened in Syria in 2015 to defend an ally, shift the geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, and take advantage of waning American leadership in the region to make Russia the dominant power in the Middle East. After all, the United States was mired and struggling in Iraq to the point of considering withdrawal without declaring a decisive victory. In my opinion, Putin had been preparing the West for what Russia might do in support of its own global strategy. The timing is not coincidental. Russia’s 2015 military involvement in the Syrian war came after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, which follows Putin’s NYT ’s September 11, 2013 editorial and subsequent bolder assertions about America’s failings. That is why, as I wrote earlier, Putin initially refrained from criticizing the United States after it invaded Iraq. Putin wanted to keep his options open in case Russia decided to invade another country. It seems that Putin put the blame squarely on the US when he intervened in Syria, asking the following: The United States did not play by the United Nations’ rules in Iraq, so why should Russia in Syria? A fair question! Putin’s military action in Syria also seems to ridicule former president Obama’s comment that America’s ability to act against injustice around the world is what makes America “exceptional.” Alas, Russia appears to have gotten the job done where America could not. As argued in previous writings, Russia’s military has become a useful tool in Putin’s foreign-policy toolbox. As a result, the West should expect Russia to be more aggressive in the future. I am under no illusion that Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict, for example, is for geopolitical and strategic reasons that go beyond the borders of the Middle East. Nor do I underestimate Russia’s strategic thinking for annexing Crimea.

88

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry

The net gain is to secure Russia’s borders, challenge NATO’s regional dominance, and replace the US as the major power broker in the Middle East. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East did not emerge in a vacuum, however. It has resulted from United States’ leadership decline in the region. Consider this brief historical snapshot of the United States involvement in the Middle East to place it within the context of the global system. The United States history and engagement in the Middle East goes back to the 1930s. But, for the sake of brevity and specificity, let us reflect on one historical reference point of United States involvement in the region: the overthrow of Iran’s Mohamed Mosaddeq in favor of the shah, Reza Pahlavi, in an orchestrated coup by the CIA in conjunction with British MI6, in 1953. The result of that coup, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, later turned out to be a disaster that has changed the course of history in the Middle East and US involvement in the region. With the current United States and Iran tensions on an escalatory trajectory, is history repeating itself?

5.3.2 The United States’ Perspective Most global affairs observers, intelligence professionals, and defense analysts, when asked about where the Trump administration’s policy stands when it comes to Russia, will respond: “It is anyone’s guess.” The United States is currently going through a leadership crisis, a dysfunctional Congress, and tribal politics that truly unveil how crippled some of America’s institutions have become. All the while, President Trump lacks the credibility and acumen to tackle global affairs in a manner that befits America’s leadership and smart diplomacy—whatever is left of it. Russia could not ask for a better outcome than present as it manages an incompetent sitting US president, sows division within American society, creates animosity among United States government agencies, and, above all, influencing the United States president to reduce America’s support for allies, including NATO. Russia fully understands the impact of having a weak United States on the international stage. Doing so allows Russia to pursue its strategy for reasserting its role in different geographical areas, including the Baltic States, which once were under the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Countries like Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia are uncertain what to make of President Trump’s inability to stand up to Russia. Sadly, at this time, that is just what the world expects from the United States. This could not be more evident than during the 2018 Helsinki summit between Trump and Putin. During a post summit press conference, the matter raised more concerns among allies in the wake of Trump’s statements such as “Russia was treated unfairly when it annexed Crimea”; “Russia should be allowed to rejoin G7”; and “Putin’s alleged assassinations of journalists and political enemies should be placed in their proper historical context.” (Crowley 2019). It is very concerning that, a sitting United States president refuses to believe his own intelligence agencies in favor of a foreign adversary. It is bizarre that Trump makes excuses for Russia. But what should make Americans fearful about Trump’s

5.3 Military Rivalry

89

leadership is that he seems to have no historical knowledge of the adversary for whom he apologies, whom he indulges. Consider Trump’s unmeasured, unconventional statements about Russia’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Trump’s ignorance of historical facts surrounding that event provides a glimpse into his inability to fathom global events and how to react and manage them given his position as president. For instance, Trump stated that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan because terrorists were going to Russia. Far from the truth. If only Trump had read the history of the invasion and what led to it. There is no doubt that the invasion cost the Soviet Union dearly and might have contributed to its collapse. But stating the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was solely based on Afghan terrorists attacking Russia is absurd. Most, if not all, historians, academicians, security analysts, and intelligence officers agree that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was mainly about spreading communism and maintaining a friendly and socialist government on USSR’s borders. In a Washington Post article posted by the Chicago Tribune, Sarah Cameron, at the University of Maryland, a historian of the Soviet Union and Russia, writes, “I think most scholars would agree that Afghanistan was a contributing factor in the Soviet collapse, but I don’t think anyone would go so far as to pin sole blame for the collapse on Afghanistan or to say that the Soviets went ‘bankrupt fighting in Afghanistan.’” (Horton et al. 2019). Trump also abandons important agreements between the US and Russia, which deepens mistrust. Consider, for example, in October 2018, when Trump stated his intention to terminate the INF Treaty in response to Russia’s alleged noncompliance with the agreement. The decision took NATO members by surprise, and more and more allies have become uncomfortable with Trump’s foreign-policy inexperience and dangerous policies. In February 2019, the United States officially withdrew from the INF Treaty. Putin reciprocated by taking similar steps and suspending all Russia’s INF Treaty obligations. Could the death of the INF Treaty pave the way for the cancellation of others? The answer is yes. Debate is already underway regarding the fate of the START treaty. This treaty too is set to expire in 2021, and there appears to be little political will to negotiate an extension (Unattributed 2019). Even Republicans who sat down with the Soviet Union in the 1980s and brokered the INF Treaty have objected to Trump’s foreign policy toward Russia. George Shultz, former secretary of state during the Reagan administration, wrote: “Nuclear weapons are a threat to the world. Any large-scale nuclear exchange would have global catastrophic consequences. Conscious of this reality, President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, worked in the 1980s to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of getting rid of them.” (Shultz 2018) Shultz argues that the US should continue to honor the INF Treaty. One should note the irony that Trump claims to be a Republican. I cannot stress enough the importance of the treaty and the potential catastrophic consequences of a nuclear exchange. Trump’s “America First” policy, in addition to the advocacy by some members of his administration like Secretary of State Pompeo and former national security advisor Bolton, well-known hawks, may have contributed to the United States abandoning the INF Treaty. There is a consensus that Russia has, over the years, violated

90

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry

the terms of the treaty. Many world leaders, including allies, argue that the “America First” rhetoric is marginalizing the United States even more so than at any other time in the twentieth century—the “American Century.” As a result, pundits, security analysts, business leaders, and academia are placing American foreign policy under the lenses of present-day reality, asking the following questions: How do we categorize the Trump administration’s foreign policy? Where do we place it on the global policy spectrum? Trump’s contradictory statements and disbelief in US intelligence community demonstrate, unequivocally, an ambiguous approach to formulating a sound American foreign policy in a chaotic international system. With a sitting United States president who does not believe in diplomacy, lacks foreign-affairs expertise and experience, rejects opinions and advice from his staff and cabinet, and demonstrates poor leadership to address global challenges with resolve befitting American leadership, bad things happen, such as the balance of power changes, and new alliances form. The Washington establishment needs to look at the writing on the wall. For instance, consider Russian rear admiral Eduard Mikhailov’s plan for war games with the Philippines, a former United States colony and once one of the United States’ most important and loyal allies in Asia. This rapprochement between the Philippines and Russia reflects a change of the region’s geopolitical landscape. Despite both countries’ claim that the sole purpose of these naval operations and maneuvers is to address piracy and terrorism, Washington should see and address Moscow’s long-term objective. But this is not happening. So, it is imperative to understand that Moscow’s engagement with the Philippines is a geostrategic challenge to the United States. Interestingly, Philippine president Duterte, a self-described socialist, has sought to dramatically shift his nation’s foreign and military alliances toward China and Russia (Mangosing 2017). Similarly, the Russian admiral has announced the possibility of Russia’s conducting joint military exercises with China and Malaysia in a disputed stretch of the South China Sea. Clearly, Russia is lining up its priorities since it expects no interference from a Russia-friendly Trump administration.

5.4 Intelligence Rivalry It does not follow that espionage between the two superpowers has subsided even if one argues that the course of the Cold War has eroded, that the multipolar system has collapsed, or that the Berlin Wall has come down. To the contrary, espionage was a major component of the Cold War and continues to be today. What has changed, however, is the approach that the United States and Russia employ to that end. The focus in this section is not on how FBI agent Robert Hanssen’s or former CIA counterintelligence officer Aldrich Ames’ cases have hindered United States’ efforts to maintain access in Russia. Rather, my narrative focuses on how the intelligence component has been determined as one of the key elements on which the United States–Russian rivalry exists. For instance, when the United States was working to

5.4 Intelligence Rivalry

91

develop its atomic weapons, the Manhattan Project, the USSR successfully infiltrated the project, thus highlighting the high stakes involved. Recall that the USSR’s infiltration during the Cold War was not limited to the United States, but included Europe as well. Richard Taylor, a journalist at The Guardian, writes: Mitrokhin’s files record in meticulous detail how the KGB in the 1970s spied on the sermons and meetings of the Polish cardinal Wojtyla, later Pope John Paul II. They include maps identifying the location of KGB booby traps and hidden arms caches in Western Europe. They claim that Philip Agee, the former CIA officer who publicly named a list of US agents, had used material offered to him by the KGB, and that Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB in the 1960s and 1970s, infiltrated Ramparts, the radical US magazine which consistently opposed the Vietnam War and also published Che Guevara’s diaries. Andropov played a key role in crushing the Prague spring uprising in 1968 (Taylor 2014).

However, the USSR’s recruitment of Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall, two key physicists, as well as technician David Greenglass as spies to reveal secrets about the Manhattan Project demonstrates how far USSR was willing to go. I am certain the United States reciprocated with similar tactics then and spies on Russia even now. The collapse of the USSR introduced new challenges for the United States in the intelligence realm. Said differently, the United States was concerned about the security of the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR, especially in the newly formed, politically unstable former Soviet republics. Russia, on the other hand, was concerned about how far NATO would expand eastward along its borders. With all the geopolitical changes on the global stage introduced after the fall of the USSR, one major event, the Gulf War, introduced new worries and threats through biological warfare. During this time, the invention and use of the internet brought about progress in technology and changed the rules of the game as both the United States and Russia deployed this medium to further their agendas. The internet became the platform on which cyberattacks, hacking, disinformation, and manipulation of social media settings happened. It fundamentally changed not only the rivalry between the United States and Russia, but also the nature of military confrontation, geopolitical tensions, diplomacy, and, of course, intelligence, mainly espionage. The United States’ and the USSR’s recruitment of spies and double agents during the Cold War era differs completely from how operations are conducted in today’s digital age. What makes the United States and Russia intelligence rivalry intense is that new hacking techniques, wireless communication systems, satellite imagery, and even simple email have all become tools both countries deploy. As a result, a new challenge emerged in Moscow and Washington with a need for their counterintelligence agents to constantly identify and obtain new devices and methods to track each other’s movements and activities. In my opinion, the intelligence rivalry between the United States and Russia in the twenty-first century will not only intensify, but also see further changes in the nature of recruitment and manipulation of public opinion. Russia’s recent success in influencing the 2016 US presidential election demonstrates my point. The challenges the United States faces in this realm should be placed within the context of its global engagement as the world’s leading military and economic power. Simultaneously, Russia, China, Iran, and others are capitalizing on the United

92

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry

States achievements in technology by using those achievements against United States interests. It demonstrates how global the threat has become. It is no longer limited to Russia; rather, it encompasses China (cyber espionage units, unit 61, 398), North Korea (units 121, 91, and 180), and Iran, among others.

5.4.1 Analysis The time in which the United States could operate with high probabilities for success rates with espionage in the Middle East, Europe, or Asia, has ended. To the contrary, Russia’s involvement in the Middle East is changing the international order. Scenarios thought unlikely a few years ago have become reality in the Middle East. Those scenarios include, for instance, China and Russia establishing a naval base in Iran and Turkey respectively. In my opinion, Russia’s military activities in the Middle East in support of Syria make possible more cooperation between Russia and Iran, a staunch ally of the Assad regime. Those new alliances could not be more evident than when Russia sent its long-range Russian Tupolev-22M3 bombers and Sukhoi34 fighter bombers to Syria using Iran’s Hamadan air base as a launching platform (Osborn 2016). Of course, Russia’s recent aggressive actions in the Middle East, in pursuit of new alliances, have come at a cost. It is fair to state that the US response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea was swift and strong: the US and its allies cancelled Russia’s membership with the Group of Eight (G8). The group consisted of the highly industrialized nations of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, Canada, and Russia. Further, the United States implemented new rounds of sanctions against Russia, which preceded the Novichok poisoning of the double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in the United Kingdom on March 4, 2018 (Faulconbridge and MacAskill 2018). Interestingly, the sanctions were imposed covertly and were not even listed in the White House daily briefings, as they should have been. Apparently, President Trump opposed imposing sanctions on Russia. The question, however, goes beyond Washington. The United Kingdom, where the alleged attack occurred, found Russia guilty of the poisoning crime, though there is no evidence suggesting that Russia committed the crime. There are more questions than there are answers. For instance, since the incident, the Skripals disappeared; no one knows where they are. They vanished without telling anyone what happened to them on that fateful day. The United Kingdom has dug a hole for itself and finds it hard to get out of. So, the idea that Russia sent someone to London to poison Sergei Skripal is farcical. And the idea a Russian agent will use a landmark chemical that could so easily be linked to Russian military is even more nonsensical. Few in Britain believes the narrative on Skripal. If Russia seeks to change the international political order, it can do so only by overcoming the economic constraints imposed by the West, including the United States. That has been the case since Russia’s early days as a communist country. However, following the fall of USSR, in 1991, the West thought that a wounded

5.4 Intelligence Rivalry

93

Russia would eventually embark on a peaceful globalization and join the West, including NATO countries, in their economic ventures, trade, foreign investments, and, possibly, responsive political institutions that would transform Russia from within. Indeed, to many observers, the seeds of democracy planted right after the fall of USSR started to grow in places like Ukraine that were once under the Soviet flag and influence. The prospects looked much different as some countries that were under Soviet influence embarked on meaningful economic and political changes and adopted Western values advocated mainly by Washington. Presently, for example, Poland is just as much part of the EU and NATO as Bulgaria or Iceland. The West assumed that the new Russian Federation would also embrace democratic ideals and values. That has not happened. Wishful Washington thinking turns out to be an illusion as mixed signals coming from Moscow indicate that Russia has other plans—plans not to the liking of the West. The annexation of Crimea clearly indicates that Russia has no interest in allying with the West or cooperating with the US in certain areas. Rather, Putin sees the need to move Russia in the opposite direction while developing strategies through alliances with Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, among others. Those new alliances suggest that Russia does not care about embracing global trade. Rather, Moscow’s sole objective is to regain its influence and have the upper hand in zero-sum games. It makes no difference, in my opinion, that Russia was banned from the G8. Russia’s expansion and its new alliances in the Middle East suggest its strategy—no matter how clumsy it may seem initially—is in fact working. The global trade or military cooperation the West had hoped for from Russia are not part of Russia’s plans. The deal Moscow signed with Syria for a permanent Russian naval base there, Moscow’s only naval foothold in the Mediterranean, speaks volumes.

5.5 Conclusion This chapter helps provide a clear picture of where the United States–Russian rivalry was and is headed. With xenophobic tendencies everywhere, the world, including the United States and Russia, faces serious global challenges ranging from nuclear proliferation and terrorism, to cybersecurity and global diseases. Mind you that these challenges will get more complicated as (a) water shortages become even more scare and lead to national security conflicts between nations and (b) the global population reaches about 10 billion inhabitants by 2056 and 11 billion by 2088 (Roser et al. 2013). Challenges will require the cooperation of all parties for extremely challenging conflict resolution efforts, though, with the United States and Russia being the global powers they are, they have the urgent responsibility to ensure the safety of the world. I am not naïve to think that Moscow and Washington will heed the warnings. Leaders in both capitals are going to pursue their plans, strategies, and rivalry, no matter what.

94

5 The United States–Russian Rivalry

One thing for certain, the Russian bear is back. Putin understands that it is now or never for Russia to reassert itself on the global stage. And it looks like that is exactly what Russia is doing. Given his calculating nature, Putin will not want to miss the opportunity to shape the landscape and influence the geopolitical trajectory of the twenty-first-century world. On the other hand, the United States cannot simply call the tune and expect Russia to dance. That is a bygone era as Russia will intensify its global activism in the face of an American foreign policy that has become dependent on politicians who prefer short-term gains over long-term strategies. Oh, and, by the way, we need to refrain from trying to remake Russia and other countries in our democratic image. It simply does not work. In the case of Russia, the United States must adjust accordingly and manage relations more competently with its rival because it is only becoming more challenging. Today, America is barely a shadow of its former self, of that convincing and powerful nation that emerged from WWII. Indeed, while Washington under both Republican and Democratic parties speak as if it is the world’s voice of wisdom, power, and all-knowing authority, America has really become the very picture of an overused, abused, and late-middle-age empress who eagerly displays her sagging wares but does not seem to realize that she has lost her appeal, attraction, and influence, and is much more laughed at than lusted over. When President Trump speaks on foreign policy, the world hears not only inconsistencies, but also meaningless bravado and absurd prating about freedom and other universal values. Yet, American foreign policy seems to have no vision, no clear objectives, and no sense of direction. I worry that these settings confirm the beginning of the end not only of the United States’ dominance but also of Western hegemony in its broader context. Time is of the essence! United States policymakers drawing on leadership from both political parties must put the future of America’s strategic interests before party loyalty and resolve to act. If the global geopolitical shift is not addressed immediately, accordingly, vigorously, and competently, the consequences will be dire, otherwise.

References Chossudovsky, M. (2019, June 21). Shift in military alliances: America declares war on Turkey? Center for Research on Globalization. https://www.globalresearch.ca/shift-in-military-alliancesamerica-declares-war-on-turkey-nato-in-disarray/5651137?utm_campaign=magnet&utm_sou rce=article_page&utm_medium=related_articles. Crowley, M. (2019). Trump says Russia should be readmitted to G7. The New York Times, August 20, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/us/politics/trump-russia-g7.html Faulconbridge, G., & MacAskill, A. (2018). Yulia Skripal, poisoned with her Russian double-agent father, is getting better. Reuters, March 28, 2018. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-russiapolice/yulia-skripal-poisoned-with-her-russian-double-agent-father-is-getting-better-idUKKB N1H432D?il=0. Horton, A., Salahuddin, S., & Blake, A. (2019). No, the Soviet Union did not invade Afghanistan because terrorists were crossing the border into Russia. The Chicago Tribune,

References

95

January 5, 2019. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-soviet-union-afghan istan-20190103-story.html. Isachenkov, V. (2014). Putin accuses US of undermining global stability. AP News, October 24, 2014. https://apnews.com/aa680c8f44b54dc2b212ecc679ca8003. Kuhn, S. (2019). Prisoner’s dilemma. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition). Accessed July 23, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/ entries/prisoner-dilemma/. Mangosing, F. (2017). Russia eyes war games with US ally Philippines. Inquirer Net, January 03, 2017. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/151158/russia-eyes-war-games-us-ally-philippines?utm_ expid=.XqNwTug2W6nwDVUSgFJXed. Nimmo, K. (2014). Gorbachev was told NATO would not move “one inch east,” a promise soon violated. InfoWars, March 24, 2014. https://www.infowars.com/nato-cant-be-trusted-to-tell-thetruth-about-russia-and-ukraine/. O’Hanlon, M. E. (2017, January 11). Addressing the real source of the U.S.–Russia rivalry. The Brookings Institute. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/01/11/addressingthe-real-source-of-the-u-s-russia-rivalry/. Osborn, A. (2016). Russia uses Iran as base to bomb Syrian militants for first time. Reuters, August 16, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-iran/russia-uses-iran-as-baseto-bomb-syrian-militants-for-first-time-idUSKCN10R0PA Oualaalou, D. (2016). NATO’s invitation of Montenegro Betrays Folly and Lack of Strategic Vision. The HuffPost, December 13, 2016. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/natos-invitation-of-monte_ b_8801886. Putin, V. V. (2013). A plea for caution from Russia. The New York Times, September 11, 2013. https:// www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html. Roser, M., Ritchie, H., & Ortiz-Ospina, E. (2013). World population growth. OurWorldInData (most recent substantial revision in May 2019). https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth. Sanders, K. (2014, March 19). The United States spent $5 billion on Ukraine anti-government riots. Pundit Fact. https://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/mar/19/facebook-posts/uni ted-states-spent-5-billion-ukraine-anti-governm/. Shultz, G. P. (2018). Preserve this treaty. The New York Times, October 26, 2018. https://ezproxy. mclennan.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN= 132629736&site=ehost-live. Steil, B. (2018, February 12). Russia’s clash with the west is about geography, not ideology. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/12/russias-clash-with-the-west-is-about-geo graphy-not-ideology/. Taylor, R. N. (2014). KGB defector’s cold war secrets revealed at last. The Guardian, July 7, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/07/kgb-defector-cold-war-vasil-mit rokhin-notes-public. Toal, G. (2017). Near abroad: Putin, the west and the contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus (p. 297). Oxford University Press, New York. Trenin, D. (2016). Should we fear Russia? (p. 19). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Unattributed. (2019). Moscow set to deploy new weapons as INF treaty ends. France 24 News, August 1, 2019. https://www.france24.com/en/20190801-moscow-set-deploy-new-weapons-inftreaty-ends. Ziezulewicz, G. (2019). As Trump mulls Afghanistan pullout, latest watchdog report paints grim picture of progress there. Military Times, February 1, 2019. https://www.navytimes.com/news/ your-navy/2019/02/01/as-trump-mulls-afghanistan-pullout-latest-watchdog-report-paints-grimpicture-of-progress-there/. Zubok, V. M. (2009). A failed empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (p. 164). The University of North Carolina Press.

Chapter 6

Outlook for the Russian Federation

6.1 Introduction Conventional wisdom suggests that to predict any country’s future is a precarious, formidable task. That goes double for the future of Russia, a country presently armed with massive nuclear stockpiles, ambitiously striving to wield global influence. It is a daring undertaking to accurately forecast what Russia may look like in the next few decades. However, most indications are that Russia is working toward reshaping, reorganizing, and influencing the global order one conflict, one-step, and one country at a time. While we may have thought that the fall of the USSR in 1991 had prevented Russia from ever reemerging, contemporary geopolitical conflicts and major power struggles have proved otherwise. Welcome to a multipolar world where a sole superpower no longer manages the earth. Given Russia’s vast, dynamic history, historical references guide my predictions about Russia. Yet, no one predicted Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nor that Russia would sell an advanced missile system—and soon fighter jets—to Turkey, one of NATO’s earliest members. Nor did anyone predict the possibility of a rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing that will inevitably change the global balance of power, mainly in the East. My suggestions about the future of Russia are based on historical events that I can reimagine, to envision a possible future scenario Russia could experience. When drawing insights from the Russian Empire’s history, I include in that vision the human tragedies, lost opportunities, crumbled empires, toppled czars, bloody revolutions, and collapsed regimes. Those may seem like events from a fardistant past, but they reflect the reality of the political, economic, and social conditions in Russia today. As I reflect on those historical events, in both the distant and the recent past, I ask myself, “Will my prediction materialize?” My cognitions have come from a conviction within the depth of my inner thoughts and vision. Is Russia’s renewed role on the global stage inevitable? Historically, Russia was home to world

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 D. Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5_6

97

98

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

history’s third-largest empire; it stretched over three continents—Europe, Asia, and North America. The rise of the Russian Empire coincided with the simultaneous decline of neighboring rival powers: the Swedish Empire, the Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire. For structural clarity, this chapter focuses on Russia’s outlook in key areas that have tremendous relevance to the security, stability, and global prestige of the Russian Federation. My interpretation of the outlook focuses on two main areas: domestic challenges and regional/global shifts. Domestically, the focus is on the political, social, and economic dimensions. Regionally, the focus is on the political shifts and emergent alliances in Russia’s “Near Abroad.” Globally, my focus centers on how Russia intends to progress through turbulent geopolitical waters in which countries have already set sail with Russia, overtly and covertly, guiding their collective course.

6.2 Political Dimensions To those who thought Russia’s March 2018 presidential election would bring more change, sorry to be the bearer of bad news. Analysts, myself included, expected little to change given the trajectory Vladimir Putin established for Russia a decade or so earlier. To understand better Russia’s domestic political landscape, one needs to fathom how the Russian system of governance was set up in the first place. Western audiences should understand that Putin at the helm means one thing: he intends to keep the ruling class—that is, individuals marked by the Putin brand—in power as long as possible. Mind you that President Putin is serving his final term (2018–2024), but I will not be surprised if the Kremlin introduces some administrative amendment to change the constitution, as Erdogan has recently accomplished in Turkey. At the time of this writing, “the State Duma, the lower chamber of the legislature, on the subject of resetting term limits—which would allow him to remain in power until 2036” (Galeotti 2020), writes Mark Galeotti, a lecturer and writer on Russian security affairs. For Putin to have the necessary legal justification, he needs an approval rating above 80% to amend the Russian constitution. This outcome will give him a mandate of legitimacy to claim that the Russian people support his policies and vision, wherever it takes mother Russia. Unfortunately, it is not the case following the recent global crises mainly in (1) energy with massive drop in oil prices, and (2) the spread of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. How Putin handles these crises cast doubt in the mind of Russians and the world—for that matter—about his ability to see this thru. Analysis suggests that Putin made two major errors of judgment vis-à-vis these two major global crises.

6.2 Political Dimensions

99

On the energy front, Russia miscalculated Saudi Arabia’s reaction when the latter rejected cutting oil production. As a result, Russia’s decision led to a massive surplus of oil on the global market plunging prices to a level not seen in the last 20 years or so. Why this matter to Putin? It is because oil prices are an existential matter to Russia, a petro-state, given the close ties between its budget and currency to global hydrocarbon markets (Carpenter 2020). As to COVID-19, Russia failed to adequately respond to the pandemic. I argue, since Russia shares a long 2600-miles border with China, it makes sense to close the border rather than appearing invincible as the pandemic was spreading faster and faster. Interestingly, Russia failed to contain the virus knowing that most of COVID19 testing during February and March of 2020 was handled by a single lab in Siberia. These failed strategies place Putin in an awkward position, politically speaking. And it may jeopardize his plan for amending the constitution to stay in office beyond 2024. But where is Russia headed? The answer depends on whom you ask. Certainly, Russian elites who embraced—or at least pretended to embrace—the new capitalist governance style are doing so indifferently. For the Russian elites, retaining power is more important than transforming the country. Few other intentions prevail in the internal Russian power transition regardless of the loud rhetoric the West has been hearing post-USSR. Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow and chair of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, writes: “As Putin prepares for his presumably final term from 2018 to 2024, the elites who embody Kremlin-style politics and state capitalism (in which power equals property) desire only to mimic change. They will employ minor tweaks needed to adapt the political system to changing internal and external conditions. The political class has no intention of actually transitioning from a hybrid autocracy to a more flexible, democratic, and market-oriented system. Doing so would be too risky, as it might result in a loss of power.” (Kolesnikov 2018). The current Russian political landscape reveals that the elites within the Russian political system failed to offer the country a clear vision to promote equity, economic opportunities, and a compelling long-term vision that goes beyond negative propaganda against the West. Russian propaganda blames the West for everything wrong with Russia today. Interestingly, the latest crisis in the Ukraine altered the Russian political path in an unanticipated way. Said differently, the crisis of Ukraine allows Russians to rally behind the Kremlin’s message, echoing Putin’s mantra of making Russia reemerge as a great power. The crisis also demonstrates a strong patriotism among Russians, a sentiment not seen since the 1991 disintegration of the USSR. Putin’s reelection saw new legislative measures introduced to limit both internal political freedom and interference by Western entities into Russia’s domestic affairs. The Kremlin also passed a law banning the United States from adopting Russian orphans and requiring all Russian governmental organizations that get foreign aid to register with the government. Other measures include, for instance, the expulsion of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

100

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

In my opinion, the Ukraine crisis led Russia to exercise more assertive domestic policies. The support from the Russian Orthodox Church was vital for Russia’s domestic political evolution.

6.3 Social Aspect As Russia plans for the future, it needs to be concerned about the demographic reality of an aging population. Like many Russian observers, I wonder whether Russia is ready for the inevitable demographic challenges and social changes. Russia must immediately address its growing death rate from alcohol consumption. In the 1990s, the death rate among Russians between the ages of fifteen to fifty-four was an astonishing 52 percent. This same demographic for all other countries combined was only 4 percent. These shocking statistics prompted the Russian Ministry of Health to issue a warning in 2017 “that up to 70 percent of deaths among men under 35 were due to alcohol-related causes in some Russian regions.” (Willingham 2018). But my focus here is not on Russian consumption of alcohol. Neither will I explore nor interpret the declining birth rate since the fall of the USSR in 1991. Rather, I focus on how a declining population presents a tremendous challenge for Russia moving forward. Of course, if Moscow wants to have a larger global presence, it urgently needs to address this social and economic issue. A United Nations report predicts that, by 2050, the population in Russia will shrink by about eleven million. Anatoly Vishnevsky, a Russian demographer, writes: “The current Russia’s lagging behind most Western countries may be explained primarily by an excessive, compared to the West, premature mortality due to external causes and circulatory diseases. In 1995, these two classes of causes of death were responsible for 85% of the excessive mortality in the age groups below 70 years. Of them, external causes were responsible for 46% of excessive deaths of men and for 25% of deaths of women.” (Vishnevsky 2000). Observers ask how Russia intends to deal with this major demographic shift. Will it open its doors to immigration? If so, where does Russia prefer to have most immigrants come from? I wonder how Russians feel about immigration given that most Russians trace their roots to East Slavic natives of Eastern Europe. Today, most Russians live in the Russian Federation with minorities scattered in other former Soviet states including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States. Taking that into consideration, I argue that the projected decline in Russia’s population will certainly have major geopolitical implications that range from fiscal issues to military power and the projection of influence not only around Russia’s “Near Abroad,” neighborhood, but also around the world. One must now briefly describe Russian society as it transitioned from a totalitarian structure to a proto-democracy. By proto-democracy, I mean an extensive, but not universally popular, participation in the official electoral process, undertaken with full debate to choose public representatives to serve in parliament or local government

6.3 Social Aspect

101

office for a specified term. The social setting of pre-1991 differed from what exists since that time. During the Soviet era, society was micromanaged in every aspect of its existence. Moscow’s central government controlled every facet of every citizen’s life: activities, institutions, and organizations. Doing so allowed the central government to exercise full control while monitoring every member and organization within society. The rigid governmental structure trickles down to every segment of society as the lines of control directed and managed by members of the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Russia today strives to create a civil society that consists of trust in the government, a well-structured family unit, functioning institutions that serve the need of every Russian citizen, and economic opportunities for everyone. All that sounded great as Russia untangled itself from the chains of the restricted communism in the previous decades—or so we thought. The current reality on the ground suggests otherwise. Social attitudes within Russia have not changed substantially from its past. However, as the author Glenn Curtis argues, the Russian social structure that was once built upon the social structure that depended on the ideology and principles of communism, is no longer the deciding factor of one’s social status. Curtis states, “Perhaps the most significant fact about Russia’s social structure is that ideology no longer determines social status. During the Soviet era, membership in the CPSU was the surest path to career advancement and wealth. Political decisions rather than market forces determined social status.” (Curtis 1996). In today’s Russia, the social gap between the haves and have-nots is apparent. Arguably, every society in the world has that gap. Even the United States, a wealthy nation by all standards, is experiencing a wide wealth gap and a sharp increase in poverty. Jeff Stein, with the Washington Post, states that “there are about 40 million Americans living in poverty and 18.5 million live in extreme poverty (Stein 2018). Russians expected the fall of communism to usher in a new era of prosperity, economic opportunities, and improved living conditions. Surprisingly, members of the old regime, CPSU, have enriched themselves at the expense of the rest of society. This new class uses its old industry and finance connections in the emerging capitalist system. According to a 1995 study conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences, more than 60% of Russia’s wealthiest millionaires, 75% of the new political elite, are former members of the communist nomenklatura, and 38% of Russia’s business people held economic positions in the CPSU (Curtis 1996). Today, the social setting in Russia invites more questions than answers. A sharp contrast exists between the working class and the so-called “new capitalist class.” The governance style of the USSR has changed as the system evolved from within. The political oppression of pre-1991 has eased, if not ended, but economic opportunities are still limited. The Russian government argues that there are more goods in the market but refrain from saying that buying those goods remains beyond the means of the average Russian worker. Thus, one cannot merely assume that Russia’s destiny is to play a far greater role on the global stage in the twenty-first century. The Russian government has

102

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

to come up with programs to provide financial assistance for Russian families and to open the doors for immigration. President Vladimir Putin has pledged to spend $8.6 billion over three years on programs including mortgage subsidies and payouts to families to encourage Russians to have more children (Avilov 2018). Administratively, new measures were introduced. Russia’s new citizenship rules allow citizens of former Soviet enclaves to obtain Russian citizenship if they meet certain criteria (e.g., language and ethnicity). This initiative has gained strong interest among Russian-speaking residents of those countries. Without meaningful social policy changes, Russia risks extending itself beyond what it can accommodate. Considering its history of social turmoil and revolutions, there is no telling what will happen when Russians start to demand changes from the government. At the time of this writing, there are demonstrations in Moscow following the Kremlin’s refusal to allow opposition parties to run in city council elections. City council elections are insignificant given that members hold limited power and do not even control their city budgets; however, demonstrators are demanding changes that go beyond local elections. Putin perceived the ten thousand demonstrators as a challenge to himself. They are channeling their anger about economic stagnation and lack of improvement in living conditions. All the while, Russia is investing heavily to upgrade its military apparatus with new weapons systems and establish military bases abroad, to include bases in the Arctic, Syria, and Africa. It behooves the Kremlin to address these social challenges as Russia plans for the future. Otherwise, history will repeat itself, and, sooner or later, the streets of Moscow will witness mass demonstrations demanding change, as the Bolshevik revolution once did. That was before a recent law was passed by the Kremlin, similar to the one put into effect by Erdogan in Turkey, the latter having held for nearly two decades. The new Russian law will land people in jail if they disrespect the government, criticize the state, or protest against it. It looks to me as though the Russian government is tightening the screws on democracy, once and for all.

6.4 Economic Dimensions Ask economists where the Russian economy stands today, and they will probably give radically different answers. Nonetheless, all answers converge on a single truth: lack of tangible economic reforms and heavy dependency on oil and gas exports have contributed to a weak economy—more reason that Russia needs to diversify its economy given its plans to play a more powerful role on the international stage. One must understand that the Russian economy has gone through cycles since the 1991 disintegration of the USSR. There are limited discussions over how Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reform program failed to yield the desired results; though some in the West say that Russia—and Eastern European citizens, for that matter— acquired freedom regardless of Gorbachev’s failed economic policies. Now say that to the struggling Russians who blame Gorbachev for the loss of their empire. It is not that bad. While Gorbachev’s reforms contributed to the economic decline and

6.4 Economic Dimensions

103

eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia embarked on risky adventures of full-scale economic reform after the election of Putin. Through the years, with Putin at the helm of power, Russia’s economy increased only about 1% or so a year. Many economic forecasters attributed the slow, low growth to the crippling sanctions imposed in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Sadly, economic realities in Russia have not settled following the annexation of Crimea, an aggressive action that resulted in Putin’s popularity soaring to over 80% (Nardelli et al. 2015). Five year later, Russians’ perception about “how their country is doing” is gloomy mainly because of Russia’s sluggish economy. Russians failed to grasp that while annexation of Crimea united Russians of all stripes, they paid a heavy price for it. That price came in the form of sanctions that further contributed to an already stagnant Russian economy. Chris Miller, director of the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writes: “At the time, Russia’s leaders could, with some justification, blame outside forces for the economic downturn. Russia has no control over oil prices, which are set in a global market. And sanctions were the result of confrontation with the West. If you approved of the annexation of Crimea—as most Russians did—then you could not blame Putin for sanctions. Western financial restrictions were the cost of reasserting Russia’s stature on the world stage.” (Miller 2019). Russia should also closely monitor the oil market. It does not serve Russia’s energy and economic interests if oil prices on the global market are low. This was evident in 2016 when oil prices dropped to $30 per barrel, substantially slashing Russia’s revenues. While no one argues that Putin tried to put the Russian economy on a good footing, his approach ends up serving Russia’s foreign policy rather than domestic economic satisfaction. Said differently, improving living conditions for Russians at home came second to asserting Moscow’s agenda abroad. Putin’s reality as he serves his last term, assuming the present term is his last, is that he will be remembered as the one who, with a great economic outlook, took over for Boris Yeltsin after the USSR’s disintegration and left Russia an empty shell. Russians admire Putin’s assertiveness, his shrewd, strategic approach to dealing with the world; but, at the end of the day, they wonder whether they have something to eat for dinner. With the Russian economy at a standstill, many are starting to question the wisdom of Putin’s adventures in distant lands while Russian people struggle day to day. Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, writes: “Putin, however, having centralized power and cut-off at the knees anyone capable of mounting a significant challenge, will leave behind a vacuum. He has made Russia into a country of first-world arms, but third-world infrastructure. No amount of saber-rattling or military deployments can hide the fact that corruption, mismanagement, and demographic decline during the Putin decades will condemn Russia to the developing world for decades, if not more.” (Rubin 2019). The big picture: Russia has no one to blame but itself for its economic performance. Russian elites need to ask the following questions: What is preventing foreign companies from investing in Russia? Why is there a lack of direct foreign investment in Russia? Russian elites do not ask those questions because the truth is difficult to hear. The West has had great concern not only for the falling ruble but also over the political

104

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

climate resulting from Putin’s absolute control over Russia. In my opinion, Putin’s dominance over all things related to Russia has made foreign investors nervous about investing in Russia. That reluctance bodes poorly for Russia as its economic growth projects to be anemic for years to come. As incomes continue dropping for a fifth consecutive year, 68% of Russians are discontent with the economy. According to a recent survey by the Russian State Statistical Agency, 80% of Russian families have a monthly income that leaves them unable to buy a “minimal assortment” of goods. Thirty-five percent cannot afford to buy two pairs of shoes for each family member (Aron 2019). Russia has recently announced a plan to overhaul its economy by 2024 at an estimated cost of $433 billion (Davlashyan and Tidey 2019). The irony is that Putin’s last term in office ends in 2024. Could the successful implementation of his suggested economic program extend his stay in power? Possibly. Given the hard realities of poverty and the aging Russian population, Putin pledged that the program will cut poverty in half and significantly boost life expectancy. I remain skeptical about those promises. If Russia fails to attract migrants to compensate for its labor shortages at home, it may face a future of even more dramatic population loss than previously expected (Drachev 2019). Whatever Putin’s plan, the hard truth is that the Russian economy is unlikely to improve anytime soon. We can debate all we want, but facts are hard to ignore. Two elements have resulted in today’s Russian economy. First, Russia has lost its past sources of growth. Second, the oligarch class in Moscow, which operates in the government that is, is unwilling to invest in developing new sources for growth. Vladislav Inozemtsev, founder and director of Moscow’s Centre for Post-Industrial Studies, said it best: “In a paternalistic society divided between masters and serfs, the lord would rather distribute less wealth among his subjects than allow them to generate more wealth themselves. Only then is his position safe.” (Inozemtsev 2019). The bottom-line: Russia’s economy will further deteriorate absent political reform.

6.5 The Neighborhood Questions loom large regarding Russia’s thoughts now that the annexation of Crimea is a fait accompli. Putin’s objectives lie far beyond the periphery of Russia’s “Near Abroad.” However, for Putin’s global activism to succeed, he must ensure that his neighbors are playing along and that no tensions could muddle his regional and global agenda. That is exactly what the annexation of Crimea means in the long term. Besides the issue of security and a red line in the sand for the West, the impact of the annexation has already vibrated in most states that were once under the Soviet flag. The question is “What is Russia’s true objective concerning its regional neighbors?” If the objective is to recreate Moscow’s Soviet-era influence, the annexation of Crimea certainly achieves that objective. It also supports the argument that Putin

6.5 The Neighborhood

105

intends to counter the West’s outreach in Russia’s neighborhood. Conflicts in both Georgia and the Ukraine should serve as a reminder that Russia will act militarily to prevent any further eastward encroachment by the West. It also allows Russia to preserve its buffer zone and prevent any country on Russia’s periphery from joining NATO. Russia’s desire to undermine countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, among others, prompts Moscow to come up with strategies, including disinformation, to influence, even manipulate, public opinion. Moscow also provides incentives to solidify its power, to prevent any integration of these countries with the West. Interestingly, Russia is willing to expand its sphere of influence to Central Asia, a region increasingly economically dominated by China. Speaking of China, Russia and China have drawn closer recently. Subsequent pages detail the content and significance of this rapprochement. For now, I turn to the elements facilitating Russia’s rise, both regionally and globally. In the 2010s, Putin deployed a host of elements to further his agenda, ranging from economic incentives, to political maneuvering, to military assistance. On the economic front, Russia established an entity known as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), in 2014. This single market integrates about 183 million people and generates about $4 trillion (Unattributed 2019a). Similarly, Putin actively reengaged with friendly neighbors like Belarus, for instance. He sought to cultivate that relationship through debt relief, financial bailouts, favorable trade terms, and discounts on oil and gas exports. Putin issued financial loans to Kyrgyzstan, a country in which 32% of the population lives below the poverty line. The loans totaled $1.5 billion. In return, Kyrgyzstan closed down the only regional U.S. military base. Interestingly, despite the $15 billion bailout package Russia offered Ukraine in 2013, Russia quickly reversed course when Ukraine stepped out of line by inviting the West. Russia then annexed the Crimea. The Ukraine had been sliding into apathy. In 2011, an International Republic Institute (IRI) research survey suggested that the Ukrainian public had little appetite for the kind of revolutionary activities that had happened in different parts of the country, in 2004. The poll also indicated that 55% of those polled disapproved of protests without government permits (Menon and Rumer 2015). Economic incentives are not the only tactics Russia uses primarily to intimidate, manage, and extend its regional sphere of influence. One should also address cyberwarfare. Even a few years ago, the story that has since emerged of Russia’s recent accomplishments would have seemed like fiction taken from the pages of a Cold War novel—too far-fetched to happen in real life. Yet today it is not fiction. Rather, the dark secret has become known. Russia’s cyber fingerprints are all over the globe, including in Europe and the U.S. Moscow has unleashed the power of the cyberattack. Russia ran paid advertisements on social media to sow dissension within the American public. Alana Abramson, a journalist at Time, writes, “The ads, which were posted on Facebook between 2015 and 2017 and were originally provided by Facebook to members of Congress, were created by the Internet research agency, an organization linked to the Kremlin. They show an operation designed to build

106

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

on existing domestic tensions, including issues like immigration, anti-Muslim sentiment, and clashes between African-Americans and law enforcement.” (Abramson 2018). The purpose of Russia’s deployment of digital and informational tools is to change public perception on a range of issues. To influence public opinion, Russia deploys Zebrocy, a hacking software toolkit composed of a set of downloaders, droppers, and backdoors. This malware—widely considered to be part of the infamous APT28/Fancy Bear Russian cyberespionage group’s toolset—continues its attacks on local and remote ex-USSR republic central Asian targets, argues Robert Lemos, technology journalist and former research engineer (Lemos 2019). Regional application of those cyberwarfare tools proved efficient for global use. Consider how Russia targeted the 2016 United States presidential election. The United States Senate intelligence committee issued a report disclosing that Russia purchased up to 3500 ads on Facebook (Wagner 2018). The Internet Research Agency, a Kremlin-backed online troll farm, purchased the ads. As a result, Trump won the 2016 election! Knowledge of those efforts extended to members of the Trump election campaign. Karen Yourish and Larry Buchanan write, “Stepping back to view the timeline from beginning to end reveals how these parallel threads—contacts, hacking and social media fraud—often crossed during the election. Campaign aides who denied knowledge of Russian contacts were later revealed to have either known about them or pursued them, though none ever told the F.B.I.” (Yourish and Buchanan 2020). As Russia steadily increases its regional influence and furthers its global activism, the use of cyberwarfare has become a vital—and inexpensive—tool through which Moscow exerts influence and changes outcomes behind the scenes. Look no further than in Hungary, Brexit in the UK, and, of course, the 2016 United States presidential election. Russia’s cyber influence reached other countries like the Netherlands (April 2016 referendum) and France (2017 election), in which Moscow favored the far-right National Front’s presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, who campaigned on an antiEU platform. At the time of this writing, many security experts in the U.S. have expressed serious concerns about Russia’s plans to influence the upcoming 2020 United States presidential election. The way I see it, 2016 was nothing but casing the targets. Once the targets are identified, the next phase is to execute the attack while tweaking and modifying regularly as technology improves. Besides undertaking cyberwarfare, Russia is also stepping up its diplomatic efforts. Consider, for example, Russia’s diplomatic, military, and economic partnerships with China, Iran, Turkey, and India, among others. Russia wants to have great visibility on the global stage. To achieve that, Moscow takes the role of mediator, sponsoring peace negotiations on the future of Syria, Serbia and Kosovo, and Afghanistan. All this happens while the United States is regressing from its global leadership role. As for its military and security, Russia is expanding its military presence not only in its region but also outside its periphery. After the USSR disintegrated in 1991, the newly founded Russian Federation established the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), in 1992. At that time, the purpose of the alliance was

6.5 The Neighborhood

107

Fig. 6.1 China’s political map. Source “Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com”

to allow Moscow to preserve its presence in the former Soviet states. As of today, Russia has acquired additional military bases: in Syria, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The next chapter details the strategic objective for Russia’s northern Clover military base in the Arctic. As promised previously, I now discuss in further detail the Sino–Russian rapprochement. Who benefits the most from that relationship? China? Russia? Both? Conventional wisdom suggests that both countries benefit from this partnership. However, as the partnership grows by the day, I believe China (as shown in Fig. 6.1) tends to benefit at the expense of Russia. Whatever the case, the creation of this potentially strategic alliance, created inadvertently by the United States through its ill-conceived foreign policies, will most likely change the global balance of power in the coming decades. The importance of analyzing the Sino–Russian partnership centers on how this relationship will develop into a strategic challenge for the United States. That in turn will have serious consequences for the United States in Central Asia and the Pacific realm. Some argue that bad blood between Russia and China prevents them from coming together. While this assertion is true given the history between the two powers, coming together as one force makes sense for both Beijing and Moscow. The outcome: a direct global military challenge to the United States will then come from the north, east and west. The Sino–Russian partnership did not happen in a vacuum. It was the outcome of exchanges between countries’ delegations, mainly military and economic. Militarily, for the first time, the two countries, in 2017, conducted joint military maneuvers near the Baltic Sea. Similarly, in 2018, China joined Russia during the latter’s annual

108

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

Vostok military exercises. These military exercises have raised concerns in the West given their visibility, scope, and scale. Russia’s and China’s military cooperation is not limited to joint military exercises. Rather, it extends to the sale of advanced weapon systems; for instance, Beijing purchased Russia’s advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM), the S-400, in addition to twenty-four SU-35 fighter jets (Chan 2019). Economically, Russia and China have increased their trade with one another tremendously. For instance, bilateral trade grew from $69.6 billion in 2016, to $84.2 billion in 2017, to $107.1 billion in 2018, marking the first time that figure surpassed $100 billion (Dobbins et al. 2019). But what is in it for Russia? The answer is both economic and geopolitical. Economically, trading with China helps Russia ride the wave of the ongoing Western economic sanctions. Geopolitically, the strides Russia made in the Middle East in addition to the annexation of Crimea make possible a much bigger role on the global stage. Obviously, the Trump administration’s chaotic foreign policy is adding to the mix. The cooperation between China and Russia is welcome news within their respective circles. That said, the latter knows it must ensure that China does not encroach on Russia’s sphere of influence in Central Asia and the Caucuses. For its part, Beijing made it clear to Moscow that the latter has nothing to worry about as China embarks on its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Russia worries that China’s growing economic clout could alienate Russia from its regional geopolitical calculations. Yacqub Ismail, an editor at the International Policy Digest, writes: “However, to avoid alienating Russia from its Central Asian calculations, China has expressed an interest to coordinate China’s Belt and Road Initiative to the Eurasian Economic Union, and has stated it will not play a security role in the region (at least for now). But these pledges are yet to be defined, and should raise concerns in Moscow.” (Ismail 2019). I believe the partnership between Russia and China will benefit both countries. Moving forward, they need to ask how they intend to defeat the United States geopolitically. If their partnership is to work, both China and Russia need to recognize each other’s limitations and what each party brings to the table. Otherwise, the relationship will be short lived. With these political changes on the ground, economic interventions, and partnership buildups, Russia stands to influence the political and economic landscape in its neighborhood. Certainly, Russia has realized that it makes no sense to engage militarily with NATO members in its vicinity. Rather, Moscow chooses to infiltrate the Baltic States’ political and intelligence institutions, as well as business networks, to influence the outcome. It looks like Russia has already succeeded. An example of this success: the arrest by the Main Intelligence Directorate (known as GRU) of a senior Estonian army officer from the Ministry of Defence and his father, who were detained for spying (Unattributed 2018b). It appears to me that Putin succeeded in making the region, especially the Baltic States, live in a state of uncertainty—not knowing whether Russia would conduct a surprise attack. After last year’s Vostok strategic exercises, the word on the street in the Baltics States is that the training was preparation for Russia’s near-future maneuvering over Baltic territory. Who knows? Such an outcome could materialize!

6.6 Moving Forward

109

6.6 Moving Forward History helps us to understand how societies and people behaved during past experiences and tragedies and provides us with a glimpse into future possibilities. Recent Russian history is no exception. What will we be expecting from Russia in the coming years and decades? I have been thinking about this question over the last couple of years as I observed from a distance and wrote about trends, behaviors, and strategies Moscow embarked on following Putin’s ascendency to power. As the famous Irish writer James Joyce once said, “If you want to know what a man really thinks, watch what he does.”1 If we want to understand Russia, we need to pay close attention to how Putin makes decisions, deals with crises, addresses concerns, ignores international norms, and above all punishes those who betray and defy him. But this section is not about Putin; rather, it is about where Russia is headed. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, once said, “Without Putin there will be no Russia.” Unquestionably, Putin is unavoidably at the center of almost everything Russia and is intermingled with all aspects of the society and its government. What is interesting about Russia moving forward is the strategy Putin has already implemented. It consists of reviving the Western Military District, which was abolished by Boris Yeltsin. Among five other major military districts, the Western Military District was initially established during the USSR era. Why is that important? The answer lies in having two of the Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia, across the borders from Russia. When considering the presence of between 350,000 and 400,000 Russian troops in addition to more than 100 fighter jets, four squadrons of long-range bombers, and Russia’s most modern surface-to-air missiles, one understands why these countries are very concerned (Aron 2019). I go further, arguing that the issue goes beyond the Baltic region and up to the Nordic states, particularly Finland and Sweden. These countries and Russia have a long history, though hostilities ceased after WWII. The last military conflicts between Russia and Sweden ended in 1809. Following the conflict, Sweden declared permanent neutrality. With Denmark and Norway, Russia has had friendly relations for centuries, except for the Cold War-era tensions (Trenin 2011). Speaking of Norway, it finds itself in a delicate position whether to accept the U.S. and NATO allies’ proposal to host sensors or anti-ballistic missiles systems on its territory. Surprisingly, the Norwegian government, according to a local newspaper titled Klassekampen, refused to accept the United States’ and NATO’s offer. Defense and security analysts assess the Norwegian decision as a big blow to the Western alliance. Interestingly, Klassekampen has also bitterly expressed its objection to the installation of the missile-defense system in both Romania and Poland (Allison 2019). The geopolitical landscape today differs much from that of the past. Russia today thinks in terms of security, economics, and, of course, a sphere of influence in its “Near Abroad” region. For instance, Moscow issued a warning on July 24, 2018, that Russia will take “response measures” if Finland and Sweden join NATO. Issuing a 1 https://archive.org/details/CNNW_20180523_060000_CNN_Tonight_With_Don_Lemon.

110

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

warning sends a message to the West—and the entire region for, that matter—that Russia will not tolerate any future advances by the West near its borders. On the economic front, I believe policymakers in Moscow decided that maintaining good relations with Nordic states serves Russia’s economic interests, especially in the energy field. Further, it provides Russia a good opportunity to access these countries’ advanced technology and investment resources. That in turn will further cement Russia as a major provider of energy, mainly gas, to Europe. Where do the Nordic states fit into this picture? The answer lies in Russia using the Baltic Sea to deliver its gas to its European customers, mainly Germany. Russia’s critics now speculate on what Moscow will do now that it has annexed Crimea and defeated the forces in Georgia after the latter’s former president, Mikheil Saakashvili, made the mistake of sending troops into the rebellious province of South Ossetia. Russia defended South Ossetia by deploying troops, and, within five days, Russia defeated the Georgian army. I highlight this incident because Saakashvili’s recent statement, “Russia’s most likely target in the near future is either Finland or Sweden,” raises serious concern about his [Saakashvili] judgment. I disagree with the former Georgian president because Russia will not want to risk inviting NATO troops to its northern borders. That said, targeting Sweden or Finland at this time makes no geopolitical sense from Moscow’s perspective. Saakashvili’s argument, in my opinion, reflects his resentment, anger, and bruised ego as he had to swallow a fast defeat he did not expect. He miscalculated, thinking the West was going to come to his rescue as soon as the first shot was fired. His analysis was flawed: it lacked a deep understanding of Russia’s strategic thinking. “Fortunately for Finland and Sweden, Saakashvili’s argument is based more on threat inflation, Russia hype, and bad analysis than it is on a realistic understanding of interstate relations in Northern Europe today” (Raitasalo 2019), writes Jyri Raitasalo, a military professor of war studies at Finnish National Defence University. However, I do not rule out the possibility that Russia will react militarily to Finland or Sweden if either allows the deployment of the United States’ offensive or defensive missile systems on its territory. Russia similarly threatened Poland, after which time the United States backed down from deploying its missile-defense shield there. Recently, Polish authorities have asked the United States for a permanent military presence in Poland. They argue that the military post will serve as a barrier against Russia. However, this they argue to no avail, as the United States maintained its position not to establish a permanent military base on Polish territory. Should that scenario change, expect Russia to move about 250,000–300,000 troops, along with 100 fighter jets and advanced S-400 missiles, to the borders near Poland. Imagine how Polish citizens may feel knowing that they are within range of massive, destructive Russian weapons. If I were to advise the Polish government, I should remind them that Russia is willing to engage militarily against NATO, exposing Poland first to the wave of destruction at Russia’s hands. I do not anticipate that scenario at this time; but for the sake of argument, if NATO uses its military might against Russia in defense of Poland, its victory will be short lived. Russia will subsequently use its tactical nuclear weapons

6.6 Moving Forward

111

to obliterate Poland and anything else in that theater of battle. That is a horrible but possible scenario, and I do not predict it to occur without adequate advance signals. I am certain policymakers in both Helsinki and Stockholm will be prudent when formulating their policies. I am not suggesting that they should be frightened by Putin. Rather, they must make pragmatic judgments when deciding (1) how low they are willing to bow to pressure from the West and (2) how far to push Russia. I take this position because we are already witnessing tensions within the streets of Helsinki, for instance, between supporters and opponents of Russia. In 2018, during NATO’s Helsinki Summit, division within Finnish society concerning Russia was on full display. While some Finn citizens have a legitimate fear of Russia in addition to anger toward the United States, many others have a soft spot for all things Russian. For example, signs displayed on the streets read, “We don’t want your bloody war” and “Lock up Putin for life.” Other demonstrators were chanting, referring to both Russian and the United States involvement in conflicts around the globe. However, “In the pro-Kremlin camp, there were calls to name a street after Putin and another one after Trump—this group seems to like Trump’s populism as much as it admires Putin’s authoritarianism (Nemtsova 2018), writes Anna Nemtsova, a Moscow-based correspondent for The Daily Beast and a researcher for the Washington Post. A lot of hype emanates from Western media and even from within Nordic states through organizations like the Nordic Journalist Centre (NJC), which provides negative coverage about Russia while highlighting the mistrust Nordic states have toward Putin’s motives and recent actions. The argument about Russia attacking Sweden, for instance, exemplifies the empty rhetoric and hyperbole one finds reported by various media. It will be interesting to see how Russia proceeds concerning its policy toward Nordic states (as displayed in Fig. 6.2). I remain convinced that Moscow will not attack or invade any of its northern neighbors unless the West—NATO—deploys its advanced weapon systems; but the West may already be late to the party. Moscow has already begun to develop and deploy a new missile system, the 9M729, as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (herein after referred to as INF) is officially dead. Could the Nordic states be the next target? Possibly but unlikely. If Russia finishes developing those new missile systems, will there be financial constraints given the ongoing Western sanctions on Russia? The answer is yes. Russia will not want to make the same mistake the USSR made when huge military spending at the height of the arms race with the United States contributed to the former’s collapse. The big concern now is the official death of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Will other treaties be terminated? Most likely! The START Treaty, for example, is due to expire in 2021. It will free both the United States and Russia to arm and deploy medium-range missiles worldwide. Europe immediately comes to mind. Are the European people ready to be used as pawns in a war game led by United States hawks like Secretary of State Pompeo, and the—now fired—national security adviser Bolton? Let’s be frank: Pompeo and Bolton are leading the United

112

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

Fig. 6.2 Nordic States political map. Source “Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com”

States off a dangerous cliff. The United States’ withdrawal from both the Iran nuclear agreement and the INF Treaty, driven by those hawks, raises serious concerns. When the INF Treaty was signed on December 8, 1987 (Kimball and Reif 2019), it relieved many in Europe. Now, without the treaty, Europe no longer feels that sense of security. I find the credibility of Secretary of State Pompeo questionable after he said that Russia caused the demise of the INF Treaty. Russia, on the other hand, states that it was the United States that walked away from it. With this tit for tat, I see no reason Moscow will want to negotiate the renewal of the START Treaty, which is due to expire in 2021. Similarly, NATO is arguing that Russia has breached the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty protocol. If so, I believe it is proper to address that—and the renewal of the START, for that matter—at the negotiating table rather than terminate the treaty altogether as the United States did. Concerning is that the United States announced the deployment of new ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in Asia (Unattributed 2019b). Even one of the United States’ closest allies, Australia, a member of the Five Eyes group, confirmed its intentions to disallow its territory to be used for any planned United States midrange missiles, which are capable of flying about 1000 km (620 miles). The cases of Norway and Australia demonstrate that even U.S. allies are considering whether to trust the United States. Given the United States’ recent foreign-policy blunders, it makes sense for countries, mainly allies, to evaluate their options according to their own interests (Marshallsea 2019). I am confident Russia will reciprocate by deploying missiles toward Europe. As a result, in a half century, we will have an ungoverned European space regarding nuclear

6.6 Moving Forward

113

weapons. I hope Europe is paying attention to these developments because if that does not frighten them, I do not know what will. On the western side of the Atlantic, most Americans have no clue about the status of the INF Treaty because they are either not interested, deliberately distracted, or simply don’t trust what is coming out of Washington. We should not get emotional, but rather remain calm and objective when presenting a pragmatic, realistic big picture about the current geopolitical reality on the ground: the fanning of hatred against Russia in Georgia, Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic States. NATO’s ever-increasing militarized perimeter around much of Russia has reached a dangerous level. After all, it was the United States that helped to overthrow the government in Ukraine, plunging the latter into a near war with Russia. Similarly, it was the United States that militarized Poland, thus rendering the Baltic region the new Cold War front. All this points to a dangerous war on the horizon. It reminds me of a soldier who goes to war, defends his country, and experiences trauma from the horror of death and destruction he witnesses. Then, when he comes back home, he tries to get help, and, suddenly, he snaps, killing his wife and children. We should not be surprised when Russia snaps! Will these dynamics provide Russia the perfect opportunity to reshape the geopolitical landscape regionally and globally? It remains to be seen. As to missiles, Russia has already deployed and tested them in Syria. I wonder where is next!

6.7 Conclusion It is a challenging proposition to predict where Russia may be headed; what its global agenda’s main focus is; and how the geopolitical landscape in the next decade or so may impact Russia. At the time of this writing, some questions remain that deserve answers. For example, will Putin’s term that ends in 2024 be his last? Will Putin instead follow in the footsteps of Chinese president Xi Jinping, who became president for life? I see the latter scenario playing out given that Putin has no replacement as of today—there is no one other than Putin in Russia with the intelligence, wit, shrewdness, intensity, and caginess needed for dealing with the world in such a way that Russia gets what it wants. I wonder where Russia will be after Putin is gone. Today, the key figures in Russian political circles are the prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev; the defense minister, Dmitry Sergey Shoigu; the foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov; and the foreign intelligence service chief, Sergey Naryshkin. Each of these officials has his own story. Whether Russians will accept any of them is subject to further debate. For instance, Defense Minister Dmitry Sergey Shoigu lacks the wit and shrewdness needed to deal with the world. Further, I question whether Russians will accept him as their leader given that he is a nonethnic Russian. In my opinion, Josef Stalin was the only exception. Stalin was born in Gori, which is today located in Georgia, and was considered a Georgian revolutionary. Stalin led the USSR from mid-1920 until 1953. Similarly, I do not see how the current foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, the diplomatic face

114

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

of Russia on the world stage, or the intelligence chief Sergey Naryshkin, can exert influence when facing challengers from within the Kremlin. Uncertainty will loom in the post-Putin era. Simultaneously, we should not rush to conclusions. Putin is sixty-six years old and seemingly in good health. He could easily dominate Russia in one position or another for another twenty years. Moreover, I will not be surprised if the Russian constitution is amended to grant him more power and authority to rule until his death, a reality the West needs to be prepared for. Moving forward, Russia wants to seize the opportunity now that an impulsive, ill-informed United States president with an incohesive foreign policy is in power. This may sound like I am taking a jab at President Trump. I am not. I am in no mood to waste my energy on nonsense as I see America chasing its tail—its days as global hegemon are numbered. For the last few decades, the United States has lacked an identifiable, let alone consistent, foreign policy, be it toward the Middle East and Africa or Russia and Asia. Look no further than at the rising tensions between the United States and China, a chaotic Middle East, and looming military conflict between Iran and the United States in the aftermath of General Qassem Suleimani’s assassination on January 3, 2020. Qassem Suleimani was an Iranian Major general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and commander of its Quds Force. All the while, Russia works behind the scenes to influence public opinion on its periphery and beyond. Time will tell how Russia’s efforts change various outcomes to its favor. A well-informed friend has told me that Russia may have undermined United States alliances and allies in an indirect attempt to impact Trump. Doing so gives Russia raison d’être to further its agenda. Russia concludes, and evidence supports its conclusion, that the current United States administration makes irrational, impulsive, and politically driven decisions, often delivered through a social media platform (Twitter) that has become the channel for American diplomacy regardless of the consequences or a much-needed strategy. Russia is undoubtedly convinced that the world is moving toward a multipolar system. Are the United States and China prepared for the Russian apex change? It doesn’t matter—it appears that Russia is leading this upcoming transition. Moscow realizes that America’s values are increasingly and rapidly changing, feeding Russia’s appetite for change. America governs through double standards: it is problematic for the United States to condemn a crackdown on free press abroad when President Trump labels the United States media the “enemy of the people.” It is perplexing for the United States to stand for human rights abroad when America turns a blind eye to the chilling murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, or the inhumane treatment and death by torture of political dissidents in Egypt. Yet the Trump administration continues its diplomatic, economic, and military support of these brutal regimes, as though those immoral, criminal acts never happened. Given the above background, Russia sees no reason to change course. Undoubtedly, the United States’ failure on the global stage of late presents an opportunity for Moscow to further its global activism.

References

115

References Abramson, A. (2018). Here’s what we learned from the ads bought by Russian trolls in 2016. Time, May 10, 2018. https://time.com/5272638/russia-facebook-instagram-ads-2016-election/. Allison, G. (2019). Norway refuses to join Ballistic Missile Defence System. United Kingdom Defense Journal, October 11, 2019. https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/norway-refuses-to-join-bal listic-missile-defence-system/. Aron, L. (2019). There’s a bigger Russian threat than meddling. Vladimir Putin is acting like he wants war. Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oearon-putin-russia-military-20190425-story.html. Avilov, A. (2018). Russia’s population decreases for first time in a decade. The Moscow Times, September 20, 2018. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/09/20/russias-population-decrea ses-first-time-decade-a62938. Carpenter, M. (2020). Putin has just made two huge mistakes—And his timing couldn’t be worse. The Washington Post, April 29, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/29/ putin-has-just-made-two-huge-mistakes-his-timing-couldnt-be-worse/. Chan, D. M. (2019). Russia offers China more Su-35 fighter jets. National Defense, June 28, 2019. https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/06/article/russia-offers-china-more-su-35-fighter-jets/. Curtis, G. E. (Ed.) (1996). Russia: A country study. Federal Research Division, the Library of Congress. https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/ru/russiacountrystu00curt/russiacountrystu00 curt_djvu.txt. Davlashyan, N., & Tidey, A. (2019). Russia unveils e390 billion plan to overhaul its economy. Euro News, February 11, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/02/11/russia-unveils-390-bil lion-plan-to-overhaul-its-economy. Dobbins, J., Shatz, H. J., & Wyne, A. (2019). A warming trend in China–Russia relations. Rand Corporation, April 18, 2019. https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/a-warming-trend-in-china-rus sia-relations.html. Drachev, V. (2019). Russia’s migrant shortage is bigger than anyone could have imagined. Stratfor, May 27, 2019. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russias-migrant-shortage-biggeranyone-could-have-imagined. Galeotti, M. (2020). Putin wants the world to keep guessing. Foreign Policy, March 12, 2020. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/12/putin-wants-the-world-to-keep-guessing/. Inozemtsev, V. (2019). Putin doesn’t care about economic growth. Project Syndicate, June 27, 2019. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-economic-stagnation-pro spects-by-vladislav-inozemtsev-2019-06. Ismail, Y. (2019). The limits of the alliance between China and Russia. The National Interest, July 10, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/limits-alliance-between-china-and-russia-66406. Kimball, D., & Reif, K. (2019). The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty at a glance. Arms Control Association, February 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty. Kolesnikov, A. (2018). Frozen landscape: The Russian political system ahead of the 2018 presidential election. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2018. https://carnegieendo wment.org/files/Kolesnikov_Consensus_Article_March2018_WEB.pdf. Lemos, R. (2019). Russian nation-state hacking unit’s tools get more fancy. Dark Reading, May 23, 2019. https://www.darkreading.com/application-security/russian-nation-state-hacking-unitstools-get-more-fancy/d/d-id/1334792. Marshallsea, T. (2019). Australia says it won’t be hosting US missile site. The Associated Press, August 5, 2019. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/08/05/australiasays-it-wont-be-hosting-us-missile-site/. Menon, R., & Rumer, E. (2015). Conflict in Ukraine: The unwinding of the post-Cold War Order (p. 54). Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. Miller, C. (2019). Can Putin fix Russia’s sputtering economy? Foreign Affairs, March 13, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2019-03-13/can-putin-fixrussias-sputtering-economy.

116

6 Outlook for the Russian Federation

Nardelli, A., Rankin, J., Arnett, G. (2015). Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at record levels. The Guardian, July 23, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2015/jul/23/vladimir-put ins-approval-rating-at-record-level. Nemtsova, A. (2018). Finland and the Bear: Russian meddling is a rising concern in Helsinki. Foreign Policy, July 31, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/31/finland-and-the-bear-russiaputin-trump-finns-helsinki/. Raitasalo, J. (2019). Scandinavia won’t be Russia’s next target. Foreign Policy, March 27, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/27/scandinavia-wont-be-russias-next-target-putinnato-finland-sweden-defense-saakashvili-georgia/. Rubin, M. (2019). Why Russia’s economy is headed for trouble. The National Interest, January 17, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-russias-economy-headed-trouble-41872. Stein, J. (2018). The U.N. says 18.5 million Americans are in ‘extreme poverty.’ Trump’s team says just 250,000 are. The Washington Post, June 25, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/wonk/wp/2018/06/25/trump-team-rebukes-u-n-saying-it-overestimates-extreme-povertyin-america-by-18-million-people/?utm_term=.4832d692e25b. Trenin, D. (2011). Russian policies toward the Nordic-Baltic region. Carnegie Moscow Center, September 07, 2011. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Nordic-Baltic_Security_Trenin.pdf. Unattributed. (2018b). Estonia arrests army officer, his father on suspicion of spying for Russia. Radio Free Europe, September 05, 2018. https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-arrests-army-officerhis-father-on-suspicion-of-spying-for-russia/29473872.html. Unattributed. (2019a). The Eurasia Center and The Eurasian Business coalition. The Eurasia Center, March 2019. https://eurasiacenter.org/events-and-news/programsevents.htm. Unattributed. (2019b). Pentagon chief: US eager to deploy new missiles in Asia. Aljazeera, August 3, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/pentagon-chief-keen-deploy-missiles-asia-190 803101753259.html. Vishnevsky, A. (2000). Replacement migration: Is it a solution for Russia? United Nations Secretariat (p. 2), August 15, 2000. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/ expert/2/vishnevsky.pdf. Wagner, K. (2018). Congress just published all the Russian Facebook ads used to try and influence the 2016 election. Vox, May 10, 2018. https://www.vox.com/2018/5/10/17339864/congress-rus sia-advertisements-facebook-donald-trump-president. Willingham, M. (2018). Deaths from alcohol fall by 25% in Russia in 2017. The Moscow Times, April 17, 2018. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/04/16/deaths-alcohol-fall-25-percent-russia2017-a61175. Yourish, K., & , L. (2020). A timeline showing the full scale of Russia’s unprecedented interference in the 2016 election—And its aftermath. New York Times, September 20, 2018. Retrieved January 14, 2020, from https://ezproxy.mclennan.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&db=bwh&AN=131859206&site=eds-live.

Chapter 7

Russia’s Road to the Future

Given the ever-changing global geopolitical landscape, my realist objective is to clearly interpret and honestly assess how Russia’s global activism has and will impact global affairs. The global order we see today has been managed for decades by the United States, but cracks in the structure of that order are increasing, expanding, and becoming more visible. Actually, American foreign policy is in shambles, even though some in the Washington establishment pretend otherwise. Similarly, NATO is confused, and Europe is more divided. For example, Germany’s recent refusal to take part in the United States-led maritime mission in the Strait of Hormuz speaks volumes about the rift between Europe and the United States. Russia fully understands that the United States’ move against Iran under the pretext of providing security for safe transit of ships amounts to controlling who ships what to whom. As a result, Russia is capitalizing on these dynamics by moving forward in its strategy of fomenting more division, creating more chaos, and arming enemies of the U.S. with sophisticated weapons. Germany’s refusal to support the U.S. highlights the strenuous relations between the United States and some of its other main European allies, especially France. Interestingly, Russia did not comment on the United States infraction of international law when it ordered the British navy to seize the Iranian-flagged Grace 1 oil tanker near Gibraltar, clearly in Spanish waters. That seizure, according to United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 3), is illegal. Similarly, Russia convinced Turkey—a key strategic NATO member—to ignore Washington’s warnings against Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 cutting-edge air defense systems. Soon, Turkey will be able to purchase and operate Russian fighter jets, the Sukhoi SU-35, a multirole fighter aircraft (Groll and Seligman 2019). Note that China, which is forging a partnership with Russia, has already purchased such fighter jets. Russia’s strategy is working as it sows more division within NATO. Could tensions between NATO and Turkey increase? Probably! I believe that it is only a matter of time © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 D. Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5_7

117

118

7 Russia’s Road to the Future

before Turkey leaves the NATO alliance. Turkey’s departure will be a tremendous blow to the alliance. One thing is certain: Turkey’s departure from NATO would cause other NATO members to reconsider their options as some are doing based on recent turmoil within the alliance. As argued in previous writings, a shift of wealth from the West to the East is already under way. Data suggest that the economic and security future is geared toward the East. In my opinion, Europe is in a bad spot if it chooses not to build better relations with Russia and eventually China. The United Kingdom already has a plan in place: a bilateral trade agreement with China is ready to be signed—if and when the UK exits the EU. “Will the UK, another staunch US ally, jump ship? Very unlikely. However, dancing at two weddings simultaneously is a customary Anglo-Saxon game plan. The Brits must have learned it from their masters in Washington, who in turn took the lessons from the Brits as colonial power for centuries, across the Atlantic (Koenig 2019),” writes Peter Koenig, an economist and geopolitical analyst. Similarly, addressing Russia’s strategy in the Middle East in the wake of rising tensions between Tehran and Washington is paramount, though Moscow understands that a war between Iran and the U.S. is unlikely. Other geopolitical analysts reached this same conclusion in the wake of Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement signed by his predecessor, Barack Obama, in 2015. Russia’s conclusion is also based on, and reflects, the shifting alliances within the Middle East. Alas, Trump is being played by his own cabinet members, including war hawks Secretary of State Pompeo and national security adviser Bolton, whom Trump dismissed recently. The threats Trump issues are not his own and are not even good propaganda. Like the previous conflicts, the United States starts them but is unable or unwilling to finish them and declare victory. Both Russia and Iran know this reality. It is only a matter of time before the cracks in the international order dangerously expand and contribute to the system’s crumbling. The rise of China, the increasing footprints of Russia in the Middle East and elsewhere, the annexation of Crimea, the rising tensions in the Persian Gulf, and the reemergence of the Taliban to power portend the inevitable collapse of that order. The narrative in this concluding chapter provides insight and analysis about Russia’s future aspirations, strategies, and vision. It focuses on two elements. First is Russia’s expansion into the Arctic. The second is Russia’s rapprochement with China. In my opinion these two elements hold the key to Russia’s future strategy as it works steadily and astutely to reshape the global balance of power and order to its favor.

7.1 Russia’s Growing Presence in the Arctic Following the devolution of the USSR, Moscow paid little attention to the Arctic. During the 1990s, the Russian Arctic was considered at best a burden fraught with socioeconomic challenges. However, following Putin’s arrival at the helm of power in the early 2000s, an “Arctic revival” began. The revival led Russia to start perceiving

7.1 Russia’s Growing Presence in the Arctic

119

the region as a strategic area that could experience both cooperation and competition, though Russia wants to make sure it asserts its influence as a great power over the Arctic, as can be concluded from Fig. 7.1. Given climate change and the security landscape, debates were launched in the West about the future of the Arctic. Regardless of different viewpoints, these debates converge on one specific question: what is Russia up to in the Arctic? Today’s reality has departed drastically from Mikhail Gorbachev’s definition of the Arctic in his 1987 “Murmansk speech” as a “zone of peace (Gorbachev 1987).” The thinking has

Fig. 7.1 Arctic political map. Source “Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com”

120

7 Russia’s Road to the Future

always been that the Arctic is an area of low political tensions between the East and the West. Today, that picture is different as dynamics in the Arctic are changing by the day. Russia has embarked on exploring the Arctic for two reasons: (1) military and (2) economic. From the military perspective, Russia’s approach to the Arctic, which has increased over the past few years, compels Moscow to expedite its presence in response to the changing geopolitical landscape. Knowing how the West will eventually react to Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic, Moscow wants to cement its presence as quickly as possible since it no longer considers the Arctic an isolated, valueless region. Similarly, gone is the era when the Arctic was off limits to military activities due to its harsh climate conditions. As temperatures warm across the globe and climate change is in full swing, Russia is giving the Arctic the same threat level it gives other regions (Baltic States, Balkans, etc.). Moscow wants to have full control over what happens and who operates near its northern borders. Recall when NATO, after the fall of the USSR in 1991, expanded eastward all the way to Russia’s doorstep? This time around, Moscow wants to preposition itself militarily to (1) counter any expansion of that nature and (2) allow Russia easy access to its northern fleet. I have to disagree with those who argue that Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic, for now, is defensive in nature. To the contrary, with the termination of the INF Treaty, Russia is now well-positioned to deploy its missiles in the best area for targeting Europe. I go further: it makes sense, if I were to advise Moscow, to place strategic nuclear assets, especially around the Kola Peninsula. The deployment will (1) serve as a second strike capability and (2) is a convincing deterrent. Russia gains another military advantage by establishing assets in the Arctic: it can strengthen its northern fleet and push any Arctic-based conflict toward sea lines of communication between the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea (Boulègue 2019). However, the risk remains that conflict will follow if Russia or another country misjudges the other’s intentions. I now present my readers with the bigger picture illustrating why Russia is pouring billions of dollars into building its Arctic military infrastructure, including the Northern Clover military base on Kotelny Island. Russia’s military buildup sends a message to the West that it intends to play a far greater role geopolitically. Russia is also making it clear to the West and the NATO alliance that the Arctic is fundamentally Russian—especially since the four other coastal nations are NATO members. In 2007, a debate followed Russia’s planting a titanium white, blue, and red tricolor flag on the seabed below the North Pole, claiming ownership (Parfitt 2007). Since then, Russia has actively projected its dominance of the Arctic and has prevented any challenge to that status. Due to melting ice in the Arctic, Russia’s dominance is displayed militarily and commercially. “The Americans think that only themselves can alter the music and make the rules,” Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, told the Saint Petersburg gathering. “In terms of the NSR, this is our national transport artery. That is obvious... It is like traffic rules. If you go to another country and drive, you abide by their rules (Astrasheuskaya and Foy 2019),” writes Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, a Financial Times correspondent in Moscow.

7.1 Russia’s Growing Presence in the Arctic

121

Contrary to its actions in the rest of Russia’s periphery, Moscow seeks to obtain dividends from projecting its military superiority and strength in the Arctic. Moscow’s thinking also stems from its belief in the inevitable change coming to the Arctic given that most, if not all, of Russia’s northern borders are unprotected. However, we cannot address geopolitical changes that await the Arctic region without addressing how climate change is contributing to that shift at an alarming speed. The fast-melting ice has already brought about debates in Moscow concerning its perception of security threats. Said differently, Russia wants to be ahead of “what if” scenarios so that Moscow can plan accordingly. The issue is not limited to security. Russia takes maritime traffic through the Arctic seriously. I predict Russia will exert some form of oversight, similar to Iran’s in the Strait of Hormuz. Failing to do so, Russia runs the risk of being unable to manage the inevitable competition over waterways and natural resources. Speaking of resources, Russia anticipates fierce competition over the massive untapped oil and natural gas. Sophie Hunter, a French law graduate with a background in international politics, writes, “Already, tensions are increasing worldwide. Trade wars are escalating, and so are conflicts. The melting Arctic adds to the explosive cocktail. Russia, China and the United States could well find themselves embroiled in another Cold War. These three superpowers have started a race to gain influence and control in the Arctic region. At stake are as much as $35 trillion worth of untapped oil and natural gas, valuable minerals, including gold, silver, diamond, copper, titanium, graphite, uranium and invaluable rare earth elements that could soon be within reach as the ice recedes (Sophie 2018).” Russia needs to factor in to its security equation how melting ice will allow the United States or NATO presence in the Arctic. If that presence is of a military nature, which I expect, calculations will change for everyone. Furthermore, if NATO or the United States deploys advanced military assets, including missiles and submarines, Russia will be forced to reciprocate by deploying its strategic nuclear weapons; but, if ice keeps melting at a faster rate, there will be little use for submarines since their ability to hide beneath the ice will decrease substantially, thus removing the element of surprise. This outcome will certainly undermine Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrence. Moving forward, Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic should be viewed primarily from a security perspective but it also intimidation of its Arctic neighbors. I disagree with those who argue that Russia’s deployment of weapons to the Arctic is nothing but chest thumping. Let us see what happens when NATO or the United States deploys offensive weapons there. I wonder how much the West can tolerate before it acts; then it may be too late since Russia has already cemented its presence there. As a result, Moscow will perceive any action by the West as maneuvering to change the dynamics. That said, Russia’s annexation of Crimea sent a message to the West that Russia will defend its military interests in the Arctic at any cost. With all the changes taking place, the West is better off to engage Russia on a security framework that includes military dimensions in the Arctic. The West should not exclude the Arctic from any military or security discussions with Russia because

122

7 Russia’s Road to the Future

Arctic security has already become part of Russia’s policy and will most likely continue to be in the future. This reality we cannot ignore. One thing is sure: the Arctic is to Russia what Berlin was to the West. The Great Powers’ competition during the Cold War in Europe will now be replicated in the Arctic in the twenty-first century, but with China added to the contest. Russia–China Rapprochement Debates are swirling in the West about how the China–Russia rapprochement may influence the global balance of power. Some are concerned about the seriousness of this rapprochement, while others suggest that it is provisional. Whatever the case may be, China–Russia rapprochement indicates a much bigger shift looming, one that will inevitably alter the global balance of power if Moscow and Beijing play their cards right. While this entente may benefit China more so than it does Russia, it remains true that China, not Russia, encouraged this alliance following Chinese president Jinping’s first trip to Russia, in 2019. Interestingly, the visit came at a tempestuous time, with problems between China and the United States on multiple fronts. Those problems include escalating tensions over trade, the banning of Huawei technology from the United States, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and more recently the ongoing Hong Kong demonstrations. It did not help matters when Washington labeled Russia and China as “revisionist powers” that seek to challenge the primacy of the United States. However, let us not pretend that the United States has not contributed, through its failed policies, to the emergence of the China–Russia alliance. In fact, the current United States posture toward both Moscow and Beijing, in my opinion, has contributed to their rapidly growing partnership. I was not surprised by this development and raised this concern, in 2015.1 While Russia and China expand their relations on many spheres, they have significantly focused in the past few years on (1) energy, (2) military, and (3) technology (Coats 2019). I take special interest in China’s energy focus to highlight how Beijing is financing projects in the Arctic. It stems from the fact that China will benefit from investing in the energy infrastructure (pipelines), since the region’s estimated untapped oil and natural gas reserves are about $35 trillion. One thing is certain: China should benefit from joining Russia’s Arctic efforts. The melting ice allows China to plan accordingly as it forges ahead with its “One Belt One Road (OBOR)” initiative. As a result, any shipping routes in the Arctic are 1 The

issue, however, goes beyond that. The reference is to the possibility of a military cooperation between the emerging China and the well-established Russia which, I’ll argue, will undermine America’s leadership in Asia. Both countries understand that the U.S. entanglement in the Middle East provides an opportunity to strengthen their political, economic, and military alliance as America’s credibility and global leadership is declining. What makes the matter even more challenging is that previous U.S. administrations have been warned not to antagonize emerging powers such as China and Russia. I could not agree more with former national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assertion in which he warned against such undertaking to avoid the outcome we are currently witnessing: A Chinese-Russian-Iranian alliance. Oualaalou David, “What’s Behind the New Chinese-Russian-Iranian Alliance?” Huffpost, November 24, 2014, https://www.huffpost. com/entry/whats-behind-the-new-chin_b_6189306.

7.1 Russia’s Growing Presence in the Arctic

123

considered part of China’s grand strategy. Dilip Hiro, a journalist and commentator who specializes on the politics of South Asia and the Middle East, writes, “Beijing’s Arctic policy, first laid out in January 2018, described China as a ‘near-Arctic’ state and visualized the future shipping routes there as part of a potential new ‘Polar Silk Road’ that would both be useful for resource exploitation and for enhancing Chinese security. Shipping goods to and from Europe by such a passage would shorten the distance to China by 30% compared to present sea routes through the Malacca Straits and the Suez Canal, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars per voyage (Hiro 2019).” Those dynamics suggest that Russia, with the support of China, financial and otherwise, aims to change the global order at its core. China and Russia share a common vision of a multipolar world order. I agree with the argument made by Alexander Lukin, head of the international relations department at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, in his recent China and Russia: The New Rapprochement. He argues that the China–Russia rapprochement is of strategic and geopolitical importance first and of economic importance second. However, Moscow and Beijing differ substantially on how they envision this multipolar system. From Russia’s perspective, Moscow wants a global system that consists of many poles with power balanced among the major powers. From China’s perspective, the global system should be correlated to a nation’s economic power. Beijing wants to ensure that economic prosperity is the main driving force unlike the path the USSR pursued, which contributed to its demise. As such, the world should expect Russia’s aggressive foreign policy to persist for the future. Thus, it makes sense to provide my insights into how and where that aggressive foreign policy is, and will be, structured.

7.2 Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policy This section focuses on Russia’s policy in the Middle East. Russia’s multiplying political and military footprints in the Middle East give pause, a reflection of sorts, to countries in the region, to reconsider their alliances. Turkey’s recent purchase of Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missiles instead of the United States Patriot systems shows how loyalties have begun to shift. The issue is much more complicated than previously taught about in classrooms or reported on by the international press. The issue is whether Turkey’s purchase of Russian’s missile system constitutes a threat to NATO. That concern was evident when the United States Senate voted to block transfers of the F-35 fighter jet to Ankara, a vote that reflected increasing tensions between the U.S. and Turkey, two NATO allies (Manson and Pitel 2018). Turkey’s recent purchases support my earlier point that the WWII alliance is indeed weakening and that Russia plans to take advantage of that weakness. To better understand these dynamics, one must look at history both to learn about and to assess events that influenced Russia in the last thirty to forty years, events that contributed to its current assertive foreign-policy trajectory. That said, Russia’s presence in the Middle East is neither a coincidence nor a reflection—at least not in its

124

7 Russia’s Road to the Future

entirety—of the United States leadership decline. Rather, it stems from Putin’s understanding of the existing danger and the threat the link poses between Arab jihadists in the Middle East and Salafist groups in the Caucasus region, the area located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and occupied by Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Ensuring the prevention of terrorists penetrating the Russian society is one of Putin’s priorities. An economic factor also enters the equation, emphasizing the link between geopolitics and energy. Russia’s interest in the Middle East contributes to stability in the Caucasus, which is vital to Moscow for the uninterrupted transport of Caspian oil and gas to the European and Asian markets. Will this outcome change as recent discoveries of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in Egypt (30 trillion cubic feet) and Cyprus (5–8 trillion cubic feet)? Possibly. The existing link between geopolitics and energy also demonstrates how far countries, including Russia, are willing to go to protect their access to energy sources and markets in a volatile world. In my opinion, Russia will not walk away from its newly found leadership role in the Middle East, regardless of its limit and impact, which will eventually go beyond the region’s borders. Further, Moscow can reinforce diplomatic and military ties with various Arab states in the region with a profound anti-United States and anti-West sentiment. In this context, one must think about how the Middle East may find Russia a preferable ally over the U.S. Look no further than what happened after the killing of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the backlash from some regional countries, including Turkey. However, the Trump administration demonstrates to the world how America lacks the moral courage and willingness to stand up to the Saudis for human atrocities. Mark Lander of The New York Times writes, “In a remarkable statement that appeared calculated to end the debate over the American response to the killing of Mr. Khashoggi, the president said, ‘It could very well be that the crown prince had knowledge of this tragic event—maybe he did and maybe he didn’t!’ (Landler et al. 2018)” The statement demonstrates not only Trump’s ignorance and naiveté of how the Saudis have played him out, but also provides a glimpse into how Trump assesses relationships, diplomatic or otherwise, in terms of monetary gain. Turmoil in the Middle East, the United States decision to pull out of Iran’s nuclear agreement, Venezuela’s domestic unrest, Libya’s internal chaos, and the death of the INF Treaty suggest that Russia will embark on a more aggressive foreign policy, adopting a belligerent military posture. The geographical areas Russia will focus on depend on Moscow’s strategic objectives. The United States withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement and the imposition of sanctions on Venezuela, for instance, have undoubtedly pushed Iran and Venezuela to work with Russia. Russia’s relations with Iran and Venezuela are both economic and strategic, serving Moscow’s interests to gain influence in the Middle East and the Western hemisphere. Krauss Clifford of The New York Times writes, “Simultaneous moves against the Iranian and Venezuelan governments would amount to a complicated geopolitical game, with energy-hungry countries likely to look for ways to dodge sanctions and adversaries likely to seek ways to take advantage (Krauss 2018).”

7.2 Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policy

125

Given all the conflicts and chaos emanating from Southeast Asia and the Middle East to Africa and Latin America, one concludes that Russia will become even bolder and more assertive. There is no telling what will happen now that Russia and China have decided to forge a partnership. That outcome, in my opinion, will define and influence the regional and global geopolitical and economic order. Where the world goes from here depends mainly on what Russia wants and how the West intends to engage Moscow, assuming there is a will. For all the challenges, economic and otherwise, that Russia continues to face, it remains a country that demands attention given its nuclear capabilities. Ernest Moniz, an American nuclear physicist and former United States secretary of energy, writes, “For all of Russia’s internal problems—an economic and political structure whose overreliance on one commodity (energy) and one person (Putin) is by definition fragile—the country will remain a force to be reckoned with for a long time to come. By virtue of its vast geography, permanent membership in the UN Security Council, rebuilt military, and immense nuclear forces, Russia can disrupt geopolitical currents in areas vital to the interests of the United States, including Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Arctic (Moniz and Nunn 2019).” That said, engaging Russia is in the best interest of the West, to decrease further tensions. Washington should enter into a meaningful discussion with Russia while building the framework within which both countries can work together. It involves acknowledging Russia’s security concerns and considering their interests. Simultaneously, Russia will have to engage the West in good faith, observe the nuclear arms treaties signed with the U.S., and assist in reducing conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere. I caution, however, that if Russia concludes that it will remain the target of U.S. sanctions forever, there will be no incentives for Moscow to dial down the rhetoric and change the course of its aggressive foreign policies.

7.3 Conclusion Russia’s aggressive foreign policy is contributing to a destabilized world from the Middle East and the Baltics to the Balkans and Latin America. This aggressive foreign policy is already having a ripple effect. The United States also shares the blame for the ongoing global shift through its reckless policies, unsound strategies, and inadequate global leadership of late. For now, we can at least agree that the United States should face its challenges head-on and encourage, rather than marginalize, those who bring up issues of détente with Russia rather than confrontation. It is no different than addressing issues like immigration, national debt, an ailing educational system, the economy, income inequality, corruption, and others. It is patriotism and love of country that should compel us to take on these challenges with the fortitude and concern for managing a safe, prosperous world. While Russia moves forward with its strategy, the United States struggles to maintain its global leadership. We see Europe more divided than ever, and the world

126

7 Russia’s Road to the Future

is not standing still. To seize new opportunities in the twenty-first century and navigate these dynamics vis-à-vis Russia, it behooves the United States to prepare the next generation of leaders to be fluent in foreign languages, acquainted with cultures, comfortable in the digital world, and deeply committed to America’s global vision. Dealing with these challenges is no easy task. Unfortunately, current trends across the United States government establishments do not reflect the full diversity needed in the twenty-first century.

References Astrasheuskaya, N., & Foy, H. (2019). Polar powers: Russia’s bid for supremacy in the Arctic Ocean. Financial Times. April 27, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/2fa82760-5c4a-11e9-939a341f5ada9d40 Boulègue, M. (2019). Russia’s military posture in the arctic. Chatham House, The Royal Institute for International Affairs. June 28, 2019. https://reader.chathamhouse.org/russia-s-military-pos ture-arctic-managing-hard-power-low-tension-environment#conclusionRussia’sMilitaryPostur eintheArctic Coats D. R. (2019). Worldwide threat assessment of the US intelligence community. Office of the Director or National Intelligence (p. 24). January 29, 2019. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/doc uments/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf Gorbachev, M. S. (1987). The speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the presentation of the order of lenin and the gold star medal to the city of Murmansk (pp. 23–31). Moscow: Novosti Press Agency. October 1, 1987. https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_ speech.pdf Groll, E., & Seligman, L. (2019). After rupture with U.S. Turkey looks to Russia for fighter jets. Foreign Policy. July 18, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/18/security-brief-plus-after-rup ture-with-u-s-turkey-looks-to-russia-for-fighter-jets/ Hiro, D. (2019). Under Trump, America’s global standing at record low two years later, trump has failed to reverse America’s decline. Common Dreams News. July 01, 2019. https://www.common dreams.org/views/2019/07/01/under-trump-americas-global-standing-record-low Hunter, S. (2018). Is a real cold war heating up in the arctic? Fair Observer. December 05, 2018. https://www.fairobserver.com/more/international_security/arctic-shipping-passageoil-exploitation-russia-china-us-global-warming-news-15241/ Koenig, P. (2019). The western alliance is falling apart. Global Research. August 02, 2019. https:// www.globalresearch.ca/western-alliance-falling-apart/5685408 Krauss, C. (2018). U.S. Sanctions could benefit Russia and China. New York Times. May 18, 2018. https://ezproxy.mclennan.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir ect=true&db=a9h&AN=129913139&site=ehost-live Landler, M., Haberman, M., Hulse, C., & Edmondson, C. (2018). Trump stands with Saudis over murder of Khashoggi. New York Times. November 21, 2018. https://ezproxy.mclennan. edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=133121540& site=ehost-live

References

127

Manson, K., & Pitel, L. (2018). Turkey rounds on US Senate move to block sale of F-35 jet. The Financial Times. June 19, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/d3c7492c-7346-11e8-b6ad-3823e4 384287 Moniz E. J., & Nunn, S. (2019). The new nuclear arms race—and how washington and moscow can stop it. Foreign Affairs. September/October 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ russian-federation/2019-08-06/return-doomsday Parfitt, T. (2007). Russia plants flag on North Pole seabed. The Guardian. August 2, 2007. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic

Index

The letter ’f’ following a number denotes an illustration. A Abkhazia, 27, 45, 67 Afghanistan mujahedeen, 6, 16n Russia, relations with, 6, 31, 62, 65, 84–85, 86, 89 Africa, 13, 58, 69, 70, 80 See also under names of countries Alexander II, 22 Andropov, Yuri, 31, 91 Angola, 13 anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), 43 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), 66 Arctic China, presence in, 122–123 climate change in, 120, 121 map, political, 119f resources, 121 Russia, security concerns, addressing, 118–122 arms race, historical, 25, 26, 58, 62 arms race, present-day, 4 Assad, Bashar al-, 9, 11, 40

B Balkans. See under names of countries Baltic States, 7, 8f, 14, 39, 43, 87 See also Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania Belarus, 6, 42–43, 105 Berlin Wall, 58, 63, 64 Bolivia, 12 Bolsheviks, 23–24, 77

Bolton, John, 14, 15, 89, 111–112, 118 Brexit, 38, 106 Brezhnev, Leonid, 30–31, 61, 62 Bulgaria, 59 Bush, George H. W., 47, 61, 64 Bush, George W., 65–66, 67, 79

C Carter, James (Jimmy) E., Jr., 62–63 Catherine II (Catherine the Great), 22 Caucasus. See under names of countries Chechnya, 10, 32 Chernenko, Konstantin, 31 Chile, 12 China Iran, relations with, 13, 92 map, political, 107f One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, 81, 108, 122 Turkey, relations with, 81, 92 United States, relations with, 61, 62 USSR, tensions with, 60–61 Venezuela, medical aid, 12 See also Russia-China relations climate change, 120, 121 Clinton, William (Bill) J., 65, 67 Cold War characteristics, 79–80 development, 55–56, 78–79 end, 1, 31, 63, 74, 83 end, as illusion, 73, 79, 80 era, 39

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 D. Oualaalou, The Dynamics of Russia’s Geopolitics, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58255-5

129

130 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 42–43, 106–107 Communism, 23, 24, 31, 58, 60–61, 63 Crimea annexation, by Russia, 4–5, 9, 11, 12–13, 42, 86–87 annexation, reasons for, 65, 72, 73–74, 80, 104–105 referendum on secession, 33–34 and Russian interests, 7, 103 United States response, 92 Cuba, 12, 26, 57, 58 Cuban Missile Crisis, 26–27, 58, 78 cyberwarfare, 3, 11, 91, 105–106 Cyprus, 15, 124 Czechoslovakia, 59–60 Czech Republic, 65

E East Germany, 59 Egypt, 15, 50, 124 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 57, 58, 78 Eritrea, 13 Estonia, 8f, 23, 25, 43, 45, 109, 112f Ethiopia, 13 Eurasia, 5, 6, 53, 83 See also under names of countries Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 45, 105, 108 Europe, 9, 14–15, 17, 69 See also under names of countries European Union (EU), 45, 80

F Finland, 25, 109–110, 111, 112f Ford, Gerald R., Jr., 61–62

G G8 (Group of Eight), 92, 93 Gazprom, 9, 46 Georgia, 5–6, 27, 45, 67, 70, 105 Germany, 15, 40, 78, 83, 84, 117 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 6, 31, 63, 64, 83, 102– 103, 119 Guatemala, 12, 57

H Honduras, 12, 13 Hungary, 59, 65, 78, 80, 106

Index I India, 11, 28, 106 INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, 4, 9, 42, 63, 89, 111–112, 120 Iran 1953 coup, repercussions of, 15, 88 China, relations with, 13, 92 nuclear agreement, 15, 40, 67, 70 Russia, relations with, 8–9, 15–16, 40– 41, 73, 124 Saudi Arabia, conflict with, 16, 16n Turkey, as ally, 87 United States, relations with, 11, 13, 15, 63, 85, 118 Yemen, 11 Iran-Contra affair, 63 Iraq, 6, 47, 64, 66, 85 Israel, 15, 40–41 J Johnson (LBJ), Lyndon B., 59–60 K Kazakhstan, 5–6 Kennedy, John F., 26, 57–59 Khrushchev, Nikita, 26, 33, 57, 58, 60 Kirov, Sergey, 55 Kissinger, Henry, 42, 60, 61 Kuwait, 6 Kyrgyzstan, 45 L Latin America, 12, 58, 69, 70, 80 See also under names of countries Latvia, 8f, 25, 43, 45, 109, 112f Lavrov, Sergey, 13, 113–114, 120 Lebanon, 15 Lenin, Vladimir, 23–24 Libya, 7, 11–12, 50 Lithuania, 8f, 23, 25, 43, 45, 112f M Malaysia, 90 Manhattan Project, 25, 90–91 Medvedev, Dmitry, 32, 67, 70–71, 113 Middle East Russia, geostrategic interests, 6, 8–9, 15–16, 40, 44, 81–82, 123–124 Taliban, 66, 85, 118 United States–Russia rivalry in, 69, 70, 80, 81

Index See also under names of countries Moldova, 5–6, 45, 83, 100, 105 Moscow, 21, 27, 28 Mozambique, 13 multipolar system, 3, 5, 42, 66, 114, 123

N Namibia, 13 Naryshkin, Sergey, 113–114 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance, 57 destabilization, 86–87 expansion of, 5, 65, 69, 72, 83–84, 109– 110 Helsinki Summit (July 2018), 3, 88, 111 missiles, Russian, threat to members, 43, 110–111 natural gas in the Arctic, 121 foreign policy, Russian, 14–15, 46, 48– 49 global markets, Russian access, 46–47, 48, 124 Turk-Stream, 49–50 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), 67, 84, 89, 111, 112 Nicaragua, 6, 12, 63 Nicholas II, 22–23 Nixon, Richard M., 60–61, 62 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Norway, 54, 109, 112, 112f nuclear program, Russian Federation, 4, 9, 32, 39–40, 41–42 nuclear program, USSR, 25, 26, 78

O Obama, Barack H., 33, 67–68, 69, 79, 118 oil in the Arctic, 121 and foreign policy, 15–16, 46 global markets, Russian access, 46–48, 124 prices, effects of, 16, 46, 81–82, 98–99, 103 production, Russian, 45–46 OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), 46, 48 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 46

131 P Pakistan, 11, 60, 61 Paraguay, 12 perestroika, 31, 102 Peter I (Peter the Great), 21, 22 Philippines, 90 Poland history, 25, 55–56, 59, 84 missile-defense shield, 6, 9, 84, 110–111, 113 NATO membership, 65, 93 Pompeo, Michael (Mike), 7, 14, 89, 111– 112, 118 Putin, Vladimir foreign policy objectives, 1, 2–3, 13, 65–66, 67 legacy, 103 presidency, 10, 30, 32, 33, 98 Trump, Donald J., relationship with, 3–4, 9, 11, 68 United States foreign policy, criticisms, 86–87 See also Russian Federation; United States–Russia relations

Q Qatar, 82, 85 R Reagan, Ronald W., 63–64, 89 RIAC (Russian International Affairs Council), 7 Romania, 25 Romanov dynasty, 21–23 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 53–55, 77 Russia-China relations Arctic, China presence in, 122–123 cooperation, strategic, 38, 72, 90, 107– 108, 107f partnership, United States role in promoting, 38, 72, 122, 122n Russian Empire, 19, 20–23, 97–98 Russian Federation COVID-19, 98, 99 democracy, 2, 32–33, 37, 93, 94 demographics, challenges, 10–11, 28– 29, 100 economic pressure, as tool, 14–15 economy, 9, 47, 49, 50–51, 102–104 energy sector, as toolbox, 46, 48–49, 50 expansionism, 1–2, 37–38, 39, 81, 120– 121

132 foreign policy, aggressive, 2–3, 39, 80, 123–125 foreign policy objectives, 1–2, 3, 11, 13, 37–38, 45 geography, 27–28 global strategy, 117–118 government structure, 29–30, 100–102 influence, global, expansion of, 105–106, 113–114 influence, regional, expansion of, 104– 105, 109–111 map, political, 20f mercenaries, use of, 3, 12, 41 military, as policy tool, 3, 11, 12, 39–40, 41, 43–44, 87 military capabilities, 39–44 military presence, expansion of, 102, 106–107, 111–113, 120–121 multipolar system, 3, 5, 42, 66, 114, 123 “near abroad”, 5, 73, 98, 100, 104, 109 nuclear arms program, 4, 9, 32, 39–40, 41–42 nuclear energy, 46 political system, 99–100 population, 27–28, 29, 100 reforms, 9, 11, 50, 102 sanctions, imposed on, 9, 10, 33, 69, 92, 103, 125 tensions, social, 2, 28, 100–102 terrorism, domestic, 33 See also Arctic; Crimea; Iran; natural gas; oil; Putin, Vladimir; RussiaChina relations; Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of (KSA); United States– Russia relations; USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics); Yeltsin, Boris

S Saint Petersburg, 27, 28 Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of (KSA) Iran, relations with, 16, 16n, 40 Russia, relations with, 6–7, 8–9 Yemen, relations with, 7, 11, 43–44 Shoigu, Dmitry Sergey, 113 Skripal, Sergei, 92 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 57 South Ossetia, 27, 45, 67, 110 Soviet Union. See USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) Stalin, Joseph, 24–25, 55, 113–114

Index Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (SALT I), 61, 66, 78 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II), 61, 62, 78, 84 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), 32 Sweden, 43, 109–110, 112f Syria conflict, Russian involvement in, 2, 8–9, 11, 16, 67, 84, 92 Russian forces, drawdown, 41, 41n Russian intervention, reasons for, 44, 50, 87

T Truman, Harry S., 25, 55–56, 60, 77, 79 Trump, Donald J. 2016 presidential election, 3, 34, 38, 80, 91, 105–106 “America First”, 1, 3, 9, 89–90 foreign policy, 14, 15, 15n, 88–90, 94, 114, 124 impeachment, 34 Kim Jong Un, relationship with, 4 Putin, relationship with, 3–4, 9, 11, 68 Russia, administration’s approach to, 69–71, 72, 73, 79, 88–89 See also Iran; United States of America (USA); United States–Russia relations Turkey China, relations with, 81, 92 energy partnership, with Russia, 49–50 missiles, removed from, 26 NATO membership, 81, 87, 117–118 United States–Russia rivalry in, 43–44, 81, 93, 117–118, 123 Venezuela, support for, 12

U Ukraine Crimea, referendum, 33–34 nuclear capabilities, dismantling, 65 Russia, relations with, 5–6, 7, 14–15, 70, 99, 105 United States–Russia rivalry in, 80 Yanukovych, Viktor, 5, 47 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). See USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) United Arab Emirates (UAE), 7, 40 United Kingdom, 38, 40, 68, 92, 106, 118

Index United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 38, 71, 83–85 United States of America (USA) foreign policy, in Latin America, 12, 59 foreign policy, under Trump, 3–4, 7–9, 14, 15n, 69–71, 117–118, 122 global leadership, problems, 13–14, 17, 38–39, 82, 114, 117, 125–126 Iran nuclear agreement, 15, 40, 67, 70 See also under names of presidents; United States–Russia relations United States–Russia relations 1933–1945 (Roosevelt administration), 53–55 1945–1952 (Truman administration), 55–56 1953–1961 (Eisenhower administration), 57 1961–1963 (Kennedy administration), 57–59 1963–1968 (Johnson administration), 59–60 1969–1974 (Nixon administration), 60– 61 1974–1977 (Ford administration), 61–62 1977–1981 (Carter administration), 62– 63 1981–1989 (Reagan administration), 63– 64 1989–1993 (Bush, George H. W. administration), 64 1993–2001 (Clinton administration), 65 2001–2009 (Bush, George W. administration), 65–66 2009–2017 (Obama administration), 66– 68 2017–present (Trump administration), 68–71 containment, as policy, 56, 58, 60, 85 espionage, 25, 33, 66, 90–92 future, path to mutually beneficial, 124– 126 future relations, challenges for, 73–74, 93–94

133 INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), 4, 9, 42, 63, 89, 111–112, 120 Nunn-Lugar Act, 65 rivalry, emergence, 77–79 rivalry, geopolitical, 79–84 rivalry, intelligence, 90–92 rivalry, military, contemporary issues, 84–85 rivalry, military, Russia’s perspective, 86–88 rivalry, military, United States’ perspective, 88–90 tensions, basis for, perspectives, 71–73 terrorism, war on, 66, 84–85 See also Cold War USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) Cuban Missile Crisis, 26–27, 58, 78 emergence, 23–24 Era of Stagnation, 30–31 fall, 9, 31, 32, 39, 63, 66, 89 fall, West’s views on, 3, 5, 97 iron curtain, 25–26 nuclear program, 25, 26, 78 perestroika, 31, 102 United States, rivalry with, 77–79 Warsaw Pact, 59 See also Cold War

V Venezuela, 7, 11, 12, 13, 50, 124 Vladivostok Accords, 61

W World War I, 22–23, 54 World War II, 25–26, 28–29, 39, 54–55, 77, 84, 123

Y Yeltsin, Boris, 10, 31, 32, 50, 103, 109 Yemen, 7, 11, 43–44