The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria [1st ed.] 9783030491529, 9783030491536

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The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria Ambrose Ihekwoaba Egwim

The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria

Ambrose Ihekwoaba Egwim

The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria

Ambrose Ihekwoaba Egwim Political Science and Public Administration Redeemer’s University Ede, Nigeria

ISBN 978-3-030-49152-9 ISBN 978-3-030-49153-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To the memory of my beloved brother Mr. Patrick Sabet Jego (Egwim), who died in London April 29, 2019.

Preface

The call for specific changes and reforms that would allow the federating units to have full authority and autonomy, structure and design a system of local council administration, have more revenue, ensure equitable representation in the federal appointments, and establish a separate police force, which means re-allocation of powers and functions has brought into focus argument for the strengthening of Nigerian federalism by strengthening the states, what has been termed ‘true federalism.’ This book argues using the process/sociological view of federalism that conditions, factors or forces which are conducive to federal stability, or instead to the successful operation of federal polity is peculiar to a particular environment. Thus, there are no clearly definable dimensions of what makes ‘true federalism.’ Federalism is rather a process, undergoing continuous modifications to fit the peculiarities of the environment in which it is being practiced. In that regard, a radical redistribution of power and resources is required to stabilize the Nigerian federal system. In fashioning the acceptable form of power-sharing, the interest of the citizen must be of utmost concern. The theme of the book is wildly discussed by academia, politicians, and professionals in contemporary Nigerian politics. It will be useful to the students of theory and practice of federalism, Nigerian federalism, Nigerian government, and politics. The general public seeking to know more about contemporary issues in Nigeria federalism will find the study interesting.

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I am pleased to express my profound gratitude for the assistance rendered to me by several people in the course of writing this book. I am grateful to Prof. Elo Amucheazi of the Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria, for reading and making helpful suggestions that improved the quality of this work. I would also like to thank Ms. N. Obianyo, Prof. I. Okoye, Prof. G. Onu, Prof. M. Oddih, late P. N. Chikendu, Prof. E. A. Egbo, Prof. M. Nnabugwu, Dr. J. C. Okafor, and Prof. Franck-Collins Okafor, of the Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria. I would not forget my colleagues at the Redeemer’s University, Nigeria: the H.O.D, Prof. Mike Adeyeye, ‘leke Oluwalogbon, A. O. Adedeji, Dr. S. O. Obasa. I remain indebted to my brother, late Mr. Patrick Sabet Jego (Egwim), who made sure I never lacked in terms of finance in the course of my university studies, as well as the various scholars whose materials were employed in writing this book. Ede, Nigeria

Ambrose Ihekwoaba Egwim

Introduction

Nigerian federalism can, perhaps, be described as having become highly centralized during military rule. Having returned to democratic rule since May 29, 1999, political leaders, commentators, academics, writers, and analysts brought into focus the need for specific changes and reforms that are necessary for the post-military era. These divergent views are all subsumed in one concept, ‘true federalism.’ In as much as all agree on the need for ‘true federalism,’ the changes that are required to achieve this are as varied as the number of people that propose it. The argument on ‘true federalism’ can be narrowed down to factors centered on power-sharing (a reformulation of center/component units relations bordering on revenue allocation and resource control, the constitution— on the federating units, marginalization/representation, local government creation, the establishment of state police, etc.). For the academics, ‘true federalism’ is taken to be theoretical—the ‘rigid’ distribution of functions and powers between the center and the component units. Any breach or usurpation of another’s functions amounts to the disregard of the principle of federalism. Therefore, federalism is no longer ‘true.’ On the part of the politicians and commentators, restructuring Nigeria in line with their perceptions is the only ideal and genuine basis for future unity in a ‘true federal nation.’ Some believe it could be achieved through the instrumentality of the National Assembly by constitutional amendment, constitutional commission, or conference; others think it requires an entirely independent arrangement

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like Sovereign National Conference and plebiscite. ‘It is common to hear politicians and even ordinary citizens talk of ‘true federalism as if it is the magic wand that will lead to the sustenance of the state and the resolution of the crisis of governance in Nigeria’ (Aiyede 2011). The demand for ‘true federalism’ seems to be the sign that one is a Progressive. Civil society activists always ensure that every communiqué on governance contain the phrase ‘true federalism’ as an imperative for Nigeria to make it as a nation. The phrase has become so common that it is not unusual for some political scientists to recommend ‘true federalism’ as the panacea for Nigeria’s ills. That ordinary citizens and politicians find it convenient to use the adjective ‘true’ to quality the institution contrived by human beings as part of a larger set of institutions to regulate human behavior does not pose a serious challenge. What is curious is that academics, including political scientists, have appropriated this phrase without engaging its content and meaning. (Aiyede 2011)

There appears to be a general agreement across the land that the existing federal arrangement is not desirable, that so much power is concentrated in the center. Advocates of ‘true federalism’ argue for the stripping of the federal government many of its powers and devolving the same on the lower tiers of government. A rigorous and purposeful re-examination and re-allocation of the legislative list in favor of the lower tiers. Re-grouping the existing 36 states into six regions, which will be the federating units exercising the powers of the former four regions, a return to pre-1966 fiscal relations, the federal government handing off local government affairs in favor of the states and the creation of the state police among others. This raises the questions: • Are there definable dimensions of power-sharing in ‘true federalism’?/At what state of power-sharing do we say we have ‘true federalism’? • Have the 36 states structure of Nigerian federalism overshot of the equilibrium in the number of states? • What is the role of fiscal arrangement in the centralizing tendencies of Nigerian federalism? • Has federal character ensured fair distribution of appointments and equal representation?

INTRODUCTION

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• Given the problems of local government in Nigeria, who creates local government areas? • Are the party and elections not affecting the functioning of a ‘true federal’ system of government? Considering the current state of federal practice in Nigeria, this book provides a systematic analysis of the challenges of federalism. The issues outlined are at the center of the defining challenges of Nigerian federalism. The book seeks to look theoretically at the concept of ‘true federalism’ to see whether there are definable dimensions of power-sharing that make ‘true federalism.’ It took a critical look at aspects of political restructuring in Nigeria, which have been termed ‘true federalism.’ The work is motivated by the earnest desire to contribute more significantly to the existing literature on the theory and practice of federalism. This study is, therefore, timely. The findings and conclusion will be useful to the students of theory and practice of federalism, Nigerian federalism, and policymakers. The general public seeking to know more about contemporary issues in Nigerian federalism will find the study interesting. As the country is still in search of the right panacea to the problems of unity in diversity, the significance of the study lies in its practical relevance. The book is divided into two parts: Part I, Chapters 1 and 2, examines the historical background and the theoretical validity of the concept ‘true federalism.’ While Chapter 1 entitled ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Federalism’ critically interrogated the different theoretical postulations on federalism, Chapter 2, ‘Background to Nigerian Federalism,’ historically traced the origins and development of federalism in Nigeria. The current topical issues on the dimension of true federalism discourse in Nigeria, resource control, restructuring the federating units, representation/marginalization, revenue allocation and derivation, local government administration/creation, and the control of the Nigerian Police Force (on whether or not there should be state police or even local government police), draw our attention in Part II (Chapters 3–7). Chapter 8 examines the role of party politics and election activities on the nature or model of Nigerian federalism since the return to civil rule, 1999, on the assumption that party politics and election activities affect the practice of federalism, followed by the conclusion.

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Reference Aiyede, R. (2011). Why the Idea of “True Federalism” Is Nonsensical. http://sah arareporters.com/2011/11/02/why-idea-%E2%80%9Ctrue-federalism%E2% 80%9D-nonsensical.

Contents

Part I

Theoretical Issues

1

Theoretical Perspectives on Federalism Institutional Approach Federalism as a Process Sociological Approach Federalism as a Bargain Limitations to the Approaches Analytical Framework References

3 5 6 9 10 11 13 16

2

Background to Nigerian Federalism Development of Federalism in Nigeria 1960–1966 Development of Federalism in Nigeria 1966–2020 The ‘True Federalism’ Debate in Nigeria: Current Issues in Literature References

19 19 21 24 31

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Part II Dimensions of the Federal Discourse in Nigeria 3

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Structure and Power Redistribution Power Redistribution in the Nigerian Federation: Restructuring the Federating Units? References Local Government Administration, Creation, and Control The Rochas’ Fourth Tier in Imo State Southeast Nigeria Local Government Creation and the 1999 Constitution Implications on Intergovernmental Relations The Problems of the Existing Local Government in Nigeria References

35 35 43

45 50 53 56 59 61

Use and Operational Control of the Police Force Possible Reform of the Nigerian Police Force Under True Federalism Debate The Politics of State Police The Idea of Community Policing References

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Fiscal Relations and Revenue Allocation Resource Control and Niger Delta Crisis References

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Marginalization: The Problem of Representation Igbo Marginalization References

85 87 92

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Party Politics and Federalism in Nigeria Dominant Party and Federalism: The Example of PDP The Nomination Process in PDP Degree of Central and Local Control Party Politics in the First and Second Republics Party Politics and Election Activities in the Fourth Republic The Diminishing Performance of the Opposition References

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95 99 104 107 110 113 114 116

CONTENTS

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Conclusion

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Bibliography

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Index

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 6.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2

45 requests for new states received by the National Constitutional Conference 1994 Sources of revenue: Community Governing Council vs. the Existing Local Government Functions of Community Governing Council vs. the Exiting Local Government States that created additional local governments Federal state percentage share in petroleum proceeds (1960–1999) The top 15 federal positions under Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998–1999) Federal parastatal, agency, or organ’s chief executives before 1999

37 52 54 57 81 86 88

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PART I

Theoretical Issues

CHAPTER 1

Theoretical Perspectives on Federalism

In the contemporary discourse on ‘true federalism/restructuring,’ most Nigerian scholars and commentators attribute exclusionary the principle character of the institutional approach to the subject of federalism. Elaigwu (2002: 84 in Kalu 2016: 346) linked this tendency to the post-military rule situation that has led to the emergence of a powerful central government in Nigeria. To some extent, most analysts consider the United States to be the perfect model of federalism; Nigeria and others have to approximate the American model to be considered truly federal (Oyovbaire 1979). Undoubtedly, all theories of federalism are more or less based on the intellectual and political status of the federal models of the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, which played a vital role in the elaboration of concepts and theories. According to Elaigwu (2002: 84 in Kalu 2016: 347): The protagonists of a weak central government refer to a ‘confederation’ or what they claim to be the classical model of federalism delineated by K. C. Wheare. The callers insist true federalism should express clear demarcation of powers and functions among the levels of government, which should be autonomous in the exercise of those powers and functions assigned by the constitution.

The call for Wheare’s original conception of federalism is by no means limited to Nigeria. According to Kalu (2016: 346), the quest for ‘true federalism’ or Wheare’s institutional approach to federalism is equally © The Author(s) 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6_1

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popular in several other federal countries across all continents: India, Pakistan, Mexico, and Russia. Even in the established federations like the United States, Canada, and Germany, ‘occasions have arisen where scholars have needed to emphasize the term “true federalism” as against a mere mention of federalism alone’ (Kalu 2016: 347). ‘The argument is that the center’s omnipotence and interference over the affairs of the states should be replaced with true federalism.’ Heidler and Heidler (2006: 16 in Kalu 2016: 347) equate ‘true federalism’ with the conferment of significant autonomy to sub-national governments, which should be unencumbered to superintend their affairs, to cope with dynamic economic, social, and racial diversity of the country in question. Scholars like Verny (1998 in Kalu 2016: 347) argue that ‘a true federalism has both distributions of political power specified in the constitution and a direct relationship between political power and the individual citizen.’ This school of thought utilizes the sociological approach to the study of federalism. They believe that there is nothing like ‘true federalism,’ every federal system is designed to achieve some specific goals concerning the peculiar situation of each society; therefore, whatever realizes this mission becomes ‘true federalism’ for that particular society. William Livingstone, Carl Friedrich, and William Riker, among others, have examined the social and political forces that produce varieties of federalism. Birch (1966) identified four basic approaches to the study of federalism: the Institutional or Legal Approach, the Sociological Approach, the ‘Federalism as a Process’ Approach, and the ‘Federalism as a Bargain’ Approach. In a broad definitional category, Jinadu (1979) identified two approaches, namely: the Legalistic Institutional Approach and the Process View. The former epitomized by Wheare stresses a formal division of powers between levels of government and the later sensitizes the student of federalism to the phenomenon of intergovernmental cooperation that cuts across any legal, constitutional division of powers. The first is classical, the other sociological. The two are not mutually exclusive. What that means is that, apart from the legalistic institutional approach as expounded by Wheare, Jinadu regards other approaches as sociological. This chapter sets out to examine the connection between the theories of federalism as expounded in the literature and the practice of federalism as experienced in the Nigerian context; it critically interrogates the different theoretical postulations on federalism. What follows in this chapter is a detailed critique of Wheare’s thesis, limitations, and therefore

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need for a theory with higher explanatory power and in line with current demands of true federalism in Nigeria. Although even granted that Wheare places too much emphasis on the legal dimension of federalism, there can be little doubt that federalism involves a legal-constitutional arrangement which delimits the legal and political competence of the levels of government. It is within the legal framework provided by the federal arrangement that sociopolitical factors take on meaning and significance. What the process view adds is that it sensitizes the student of federalism to the changing and evolving nature of the federal balance of power and to the fact that intergovernmental cooperation cut across the formal constitutional division of powers, which may model a particular federation. The chapter utilized Birch’s (1966) four approaches to the subject of federalism since K. C. Wheare: (1) Institutional Approach, (2) Federalism as a Process, (3) Sociological Approach, and (4) Federalism as a Bargain.

Institutional Approach This approach, led by Wheare (1963), emphasizes constitutional and legal aspects and associated political relationships. K.C Wheare focused on the ‘federal government’ as the established system or institutional structure. Those who see federalism from the institutional point of view always quote K. C. Wheare that federal system of government involves the division of functions between a central government and the units, without any part encroaching into the domain of the other. The component units have unfettered control of their financial resources sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to it under the constitution. Therefore, financial subordination makes an end of federalism (Dike 2006: 107). From Wheare’s definition, it subsists that the distinguishing characteristic of a federal system is that neither the central nor the regional government are subordinate to each other, but rather, the two levels of government are coordinate and independent: By federal principle, I mean the method of dividing powers, so that general and regional governments are each within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent K.C Wheare. (in Jinadu 1979: 15)

Wheare categorically declared:

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I hereby put forward uncompromisingly a criterion of federal government – the delineated and coordinate divisions of governments functions, and I have implied that to the extent to which any system of government does not conform to this criterion, it has no claim to call itself federal. (in Dare 1979: 27)

Wheare’s definition has been criticized as being legalistic, inflexible, unrealistic, and unworkable as well as neglecting certain economic, sociopolitical, and cultural factors that affect the dynamics of the federal arrangement (Dare 1979; Jinadu 1979; Akindele 1996). ‘Legalistic in the sense that it emphasized the formal institutional and constitutional dimension of federal arrangement while giving relatively little attention to important sociological and political dynamics of federations’ (Jinadu 1979). An attempt to develop a flexible model of federalism has been made by some scholars who refer to federalism as a process rather than as a static pattern of government; one of the variances of this thought is federalism as a process view broadly classified into sociological approach by Janadu (1979).

Federalism as a Process This approach argues that ‘federalism implies a process of federalizing, as well as a pattern or structure.’ Friedrich (in Drummond 1999: 27) defines the process of federalizing as: Either the process by which a number of separate political units… enter into and develop arrangements for working out solutions together… or the reverse process through which a hitherto unitary political community, as it becomes differentiated into a number of separate and distinct political subcommunities, achieves a new order in which the differentiated communities become capable of working out separately and on their own decisions and policies on problems they no longer have in common. Federalism refers to this process, as it does to the structures and patterns this process creates; it also encompasses the belief (ideas and ideologies) which it presupposes and generates. Federal behavior and federalist beliefs are part and parcel of federalism.

According to Carl Friedrich (in Jinadu 1979), ‘federalism is a process rather than a design…any particular design or pattern of competence or jurisdiction is merely a phase, a short-run view of a continually evolving

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political reality.’ Jinadu (1979) observed that federalism need not be rigid and based only on legality and institutions as Wheare has maintained. He argued that federalism must be seen as a dynamic and progressive development constantly adjusting in line with the demands of the society. Thereby stresses the importance of constitutional and extra-constitutional factors in the making of any federal system. Riker (in Drummond 1999) argues that no matter the degree of centralization or decentralization a federation may have, it remains a federal system if ‘the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions.’ In some federations, the division of powers is weighted toward the federal government instead of the states/regional governments. The justification for such a strong federal government is that when the regions are more powerful than the federal government, divisive forces could take advantage of the situation. Another reason is there are broad economic particularities and disparities among the states; therefore, a stronger federal government has the means to support weak jurisdictions. Lastly, a stronger federal government is believed to be necessary to meet external and internal threats. This makes it possible to encompass a great variety of federal, quasi-federal, and decentralized systems. If thus understood as the process of federalizing, it will become apparent that federalism may be operating in both the direction of integration and differentiation. Thus, the values of society do affect the integrative or disintegrative process. What is worthy of note about Friedrich’s reformulation, according to Jinadu, is that it asserts that federalism is a general principle of social organization and that the degree of federalism in a particular system is a function of sociological and not legal criteria. Federalism is said to be the process of federalizing, that is, the process of achieving a union of groups that retain their identity. In that regards, Sawer in Osaghae (1990: 90) notes: As long as the amending procedure (of the constitution), the operation of the judicial review, and the pattern of politics or a combination of any of the two of them restrict the ability of the center to abolish a regional structure… the position of a region is sufficiently secured, and so, the polity in question should be called federal.

In that regard, Osaghae quoting Kings notes that the key to federation is its universal constitutional attribution of entrenched powers at

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the center to constitutive and non-sovereign territorial units, the form this takes differs from one federation to another but as long as basic requirement is met, the federation remains a true one (King in Osaghae 1990: 90). According to Jinadu (1979: 14), federalism, like democracy, is an ambiguous term with no explicit or universal acceptable meaning. This is derived from the fact that federalism comparatively defers in practice and, in fact, had been a process. In many practices and history, it has taken the form of quasi-federalism, cooperative federalism, dual federalism, meaning that federalism is instead a process. He noted that Wheare’s definition stresses formal institutional requirements, constitutional delimitation of powers, bicameral legislature, independent electoral systems for both levels of government, multi-party but preferably a twoparty system, a supreme court—as if they are defining characteristics of federalism. Existing federal systems of government do not all embody these criteria, and even where they incorporate some of these criteria, there is usually a variation among them. Some unitary government is known to possess some of the institutions and a bicameral legislature. Commenting on the ‘coordinate and independent powers’ of the general and regional governments as stipulated by Wheare, Asobie (1998: 17) notes that the units need not be independent or coordinate with the national political unit but must have constitutional guarantee sphere. In that regard, Elazar (1987: 6–7) notes that federalism ‘can be considered a genus of the political organization of which there are several species.’ Elazar believes the federal principle offers one possible resource for resolving the problems ‘whose sources lie in conflicting national, ethnic, linguistic, and racial claims arising out of historical experience.’ Hence, these problems vary in time and places; federalism is instead seen as a process of continued problem solving, which is peculiar to the environment in which federalism is adopted. Thus, as against the Wheare’s view of federalism being static, it is rather a process, an umbrella covering many types of federalism. Federalism is more fully understood if it is seen as a process, an evolving pattern of changing relationship rather than a static design regulated by form and unalterable rules. ‘It is important not to view constitution-making simply as a once and for all response to how ‘the pressure for unity and diversity are fairly closely balanced’ in any society but, perhaps more illuminating, as implying the continuous process of federally adjusting the written legal basis for the division of power and sharing of responsibilities between the levels of government in a society to adapt

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the initial federal bargain to the changing circumstances with or without express constitutional amendment’ (Akindele 1996: 7). Governance is a learning process of adaptation and adjustment to the problems of a particular society. Federalism is unique in the entire environment it is being practiced. Since social, economic, and political conditions are continually changing, it follows that any federal relationship requires practical and built-in arrangements through which the rules can be periodically altered upon the initiative and consent of the federated entities.

Sociological Approach If Jinadu (1979) classification is used, it means that other postulations apart from Wheare could be subsumed to the sociological approach. This approach was led by Livingston, who claims that ‘the essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself.’ Every society, every nation, if you will, is more or less closely integrated in accordance with its own peculiar historical, cultural, economic, political, and other determinants. Each is composed of elements that feel themselves to be different from the other elements in varying degrees…. Furthermore, these diversities may be distributed among the members of a society in such a fashion that certain attitudes are found in particular territorial areas, or they may be scattered widely throughout the whole of the society. If they are grouped territorially, that is geographically; then, the result may be a society that is federal. If they are not grouped territorially, then the society cannot be said to be federal. (Livingston 1952: 84–85 in Drummond 1999: 26)

Livingston argues that since all countries are characterized by one form of territorial diversity or the other, all countries should have some tendencies of federalism; however, such territorial diversities have to be politically reflected in federal instrumentalities before it could reasonably describe a political system as federal. ‘Livingston’s point, according to Birch (1966: 16), is that federalism is essentially a phenomenon of social diversity rather than one of constitutional mechanics.’ William Livingstone (in Akindele 1996: 4) defines the federal government as ‘a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected.’ It subsists from his opinion that the integrative and disintegrative forces in society affect the nature of constitutional arrangements, which implies that federalism is a

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function of those societal forces like ethnic diversities, historical reasons, enormous geographic size, producing different challenges to the political leaders. The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, but in the forces economic, social, political, cultural that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary… institutions mean different things to different people; the same set of institutions may produce widely different when adopted and operated in different communities…This is no less true of federalism than it is of any other form of political organization. Federalism is a function not of constitutions but societies. Viewed in this way, it will be seen that federalism is not an absolute but a relative term. (Livingstone 1952: 83–88)

The sociological approach and ‘process view’ of federalism are concerned with conditions, factors, or forces that are conducive to federal stability, or rather to the successful operation of federal polity, which is peculiar to a particular environment. For Jinadu (1979), the two categories can be merged into one.

Federalism as a Bargain Riker’s approach focuses directly on the political aspects of federalism. According to Watt (in Jinadu 1979): Federations do not simply ‘happen’ because there are desires for unity. The activating of these desires and the achievement of federal union has, in every case, depended upon the appearance of dynamic and able leadership of statesmanship at the right time. Where such leadership has lacked vigor or the willingness and ability to compromise, the process of constitutionmaking has proved more protracted and controversial.

The conceptualization of federalism as a bargain by Riker leads to an emphasis on political leaders or politicians and the vital role of party politics in shaping the form of a federal government that ultimately emerges. Riker defines federalism in a very simple and formal way: A constitution is federal if it provides for two levels of government, each of which has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and each of which has ‘some guarantee (even though merely a statement in

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the constitution)’ of its contained autonomy within its sphere. (in Birch 1966: 20)

For Riker, the question of whether or not a federal system survives depends on the nature of the party system that develops. It does not depend: on the division of governmental powers, on the extent of governmental activities, or on the survival of provincial loyalties and a belief in states’ rights: These factors influence the nature and working of the federal system, but it is the structure of the parties which determines how long the system itself is maintained. What a federal system needs to survive after the original military-diplomatic considerations that call it forth have ceased to be operative, according to Riker, is the presence of a decentralized political party system. The structure of the party system reinforces the federal structure. Students of federalism are bound to pay attention to political parties and party systems if they are to understand and come to grips with the dynamics of federalism and intergovernmental relations. It has been well said that the single important political factor that influences the pattern of IGR outside the constitutional text is the party system in each country and that the proximate cause of variation in the degree of centralization or peripheralization in the constitutional structure of federalism is the variation in the degree of party centralization (Akindele 1996). Both centralized and non-centralized party systems pose problems for federalism, although the latter is more congruent with the federal spirit (Akindele 1996). The existence of a non-centralized party system is perhaps the most important single element in the maintenance of federal non-centralization. For the most part, the centralized character of federalism is the direct result of the role of the centralized parties.

Limitations to the Approaches According to Harman (1992: 348 in Drummond 1999: 27), Friedrich’s work, like Livingston’s approach, is full of ambiguity and difficulties. It is difficult, for example, to recognize which processes are federal and which are not. They do not provide any real indication of the link between the process and structure. However, they lead us to expect that federal systems generally are not static but changing in response to various pressures’. Jinadu (1979: 13) has argued that ‘if federalism is viewed as a process leading toward the unification of political systems, then factors lacking are adequate differentia to enable us to distinguish

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the federal from other systems of government.’ Jinadu suggests that Kenneth Wheare’s formulation is perhaps the most convincing and clearly expressed as against the formulation of Livingston, Riker, Sawyer, and others. He sees their works as variations or modifications of Wheare’s thesis about the formal division of power between levels of government. Even granted that Wheare places too much emphasis on the legal dimension of federalism, there can be little doubt that federalism involves a legal-constitutional arrangement which delimits, albeit vaguely or ambiguously, the legal and political competence of the levels of government…it is within the legal framework provided by a federal arrangement that Livingstone’s sociological factors take on meaning and significance’. It is still not possible, except by using Wheare’s rigid definition, to determine what are the requisites of federalism and the basis on which to establish which countries are federal and which are not. (Jinadu 1979)

Birch (1966: 22) sees the value of each approach from the perspective of the individual writer: It is a little difficult to compare the value of these approaches to the study of federalism because although the aims of the authors overlap, they are nevertheless not the same. Wheare’s aim is to make possible a detailed comparative study of the small number of federal systems that conform to his model. The aim of writers like Friedrich and Deutsch is to elaborate on the forces and conditions, thought to be mainly social and economical, which facilitate and stimulate the federalizing process. Riker aims to establish the conditions claimed to be entirely political, which are necessary for the making and maintenance of the federal bargain.

From Birch’s argument, it can be observed that no fundamental disagreements exist among the writers in their divergent approaches to the topic. Each approach is a narrow perspective of the broad theme, and none by itself explains the totality of the federal concept or its dynamics. Wheare provides the legal framework of what constitutes a federal constitution, Livingston looked beyond the surface to the social diversity that the constitutional division of powers is supposed to mirror; Riker addressed himself to the actual bargain and the integrative or disintegrative role of political parties. All four approaches together provide a comprehensive view of federalism and complement each other; ‘both constitutional and

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extra-constitutional factors go into the making and working of any federal system’ (Dare 1979: 34).

Analytical Framework An important basic feature of this study is its method of analysis, which stresses the importance of constitutional and extra-constitutional factors in the making of any federal system. Thus, we utilized the ‘process view’ of federalism, which argues that conditions, factors, or forces which are conducive to federal stability, or rather to the successful operation of federal polity is peculiar to a particular environment. Livingston has alleged that Wheare’s definition of federalism neglects sociological factors, which are crucial to the understanding of the dynamics of federalism. An explicit attempt to avoid the pitfall in Wheare was made by Carl Friedrich (in Jinadu 1979) according to whom ‘federalism is a process rather than a design…any particular design or pattern of competence or jurisdiction is merely a phase, a short-run view of a continually evolving political reality.’ Friedrich further claims that ‘if thus understood as the process of federalizing it will become apparent that federalism may be operating in both the direction of integration and differentiation.’ Thus, the values of society do affect the integrative or disintegrative process. What is worthy of note about Friedrich’s reformulation, according to Jinadu, is that it asserts that federalism is a general principle of social organization and that the degree of federalism in a particular system is a function of sociological and not legal criteria. Defining federalism in sociological terms, Livingston (in Akindele 1996: 4) has argued that the essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional structure but in the society itself. ‘The federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected. Federalism is more fully understood if it is seen as a process an evolving pattern of changing relationship rather than a static design regulated by form and unalterable rules.’ It is important not to view constitution-making simply as a once and for all response to how ‘the pressure for unity and diversity are fairly closely balanced’ in any society but, perhaps more illuminating, as implying the continuous process of federally adjusting the written legal basis for the division of power and sharing of responsibilities between the levels of government in society to adapt the initial federal bargain to the changing circumstances with or without express constitutional amendment (Akindele 1996: 7).

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Governance is a learning process of adaptation and adjustment to the problem of a particular society. The operators of the Nigerian federal system have been rather slow in this process of adaptation. The problem with Nigerian intellectuals/politicians is that they have not attempted to see federalism as being unique in the entire environment it is practiced. Nigerian federalism must not be equated with that of America, Canada, or even India in the garb of ‘true federalism.’ Attention must be focused on the peculiarities of the Nigerian society in fashioning whatever that is acceptable as ‘true federalism.’ Those who see federalism as being static has always quoted Wheare, that federal system of government involves the division of functions between a central government and the units, without any part encroaching into the domain of the other, the component units having unfettered control of their financial resources sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to it under the constitution. Therefore, financial subordination makes an end of federalism (Dike 2006: 107). Given the definition of federalism by Wheare, Dike (2006: 106) argues that the government of Nigeria as constituted presently is not a true federal state. That the component units do not have state constitutions or police and they depend solely on the center for a monthly handout; that is, debate for political restructuring to true federalism and agitation for resource control and fiscal federalism were signs that the states are feeling the overbearing influence of the federal government. Wheare’s definition has been criticized as being legalistic, inflexible, unrealistic, and unworkable as well as neglecting certain economic, sociopolitical, and cultural factors that affect the dynamics of the federal arrangement (Dare 1979; Jinadu 1979; Akindele 1996). According to Jinadu (1979: 14), federalism, like democracy, is an ambiguous term with no explicit or universal acceptable meaning. This is derived from the fact that federalism comparatively defers in practice and, in fact, had been a process. In many practices and history, it has taken the form of quasi-federalism, cooperative federalism, dual federalism, meaning that federalism is instead a process. He noted that Wheare’s definition stresses formal institutional requirements: constitutional delimitation of powers, bicameral legislature, independent electoral systems for both levels of government, multi-party but preferably a two-party system, a supreme court—as if they are defining characteristics of federalism. Existing federal systems of government do not all embody these criteria, and even where they incorporate some of these criteria, there is usually a variation among

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them. Some unitary government is known to possess some of the institutions and a bicameral legislature. ‘There is no pure or true federalism … what exists is a federal spectrum, along which there are variations, characterized by some devolution of power (Jinadu 2003: xiii).’ Commenting on the ‘coordinate and independent powers’ of the general and regional governments as stipulated by Wheare, Asobie (1998: 17) notes that the units need not be independent or coordinate with the national political unit but must have constitutional guarantee sphere. Thus, as against the Wheare’s view of federalism being static, it is rather a process, in fact, an umbrella covering many types of federalism. In some, the constitution lists the power of the national government, and the power denied to the states, all other powers remain with the state, for example, the United States of America; while in other federalism like Nigeria, the concurrent list is established, there is a limit on the exercise of power by the national government and the state; moreover, the limits have proved changeable. In the words of Lord James Bryce (in Amuwo 1998: 1): The problem which all federalized nations have to solve is how to secure an efficient central government and preserve national unity while allowing free scope for the diversities and free play to the … members of the federation. It is … to keep the centrifugal and centripetal forces in equilibrium so that neither the planet states shall fly off into space, nor the sun of the central government draws them into its consuming fires.

There is no definable dimension of what makes ‘true federalism.’ The concept ‘true federalism’ in Nigerian political discourse can best be taken as a way of showing dissatisfaction with a regime that has not met people’s expectations, as there is no stage of power-sharing at which we may say that federalism is at its true form. Awa puts it like this: There is no pure federal model; a whole range of institutional variations implementing the principle of coordinate authority is possible. (Awa 1976: 7)

In that regards, Guy Verhofstadt, the Prime Minister of Belgium in Obiagwu (2005: 8) opines: One ‘fit all’ federal model does not exist; each situation requires a tailormade approach, adapted to the needs of a particular cultural, historical, and demographic environment. Changing a state’s system is a gradual and

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complex process, which implies giving and taking in a spirit of compromise and sometimes highly technical situations.

‘There is no one model of federalism, but each country should fashion a federal system that suits its peculiar circumstances. Even though a country can learn from the best practices in other federal states, the details of the relationship between the federating units will largely depend on the realities of the society’ (Third International Conference on Federalism in Brussels, Belgium in Obiagwu 2005: 8). Emphasis should be shifted to society as different from the state, the individual, and his need as distinct from the state and its apparatus. The argument is that if the individual’s needs are the priority in the minds of those constructing or reconstructing the federal system, ‘true federalism’ is likely to be achieved, which is a federal system that will make the individual have a sense of belonging, be fulfilled and be protected as a citizen.

References Akindele, R. A. (1996). Nigeria in the global market of experiments in federalism. In J. I. Elaigwu (Eds.), Foundation of Nigerian federalism 1960–1995 (pp. 1– 39). Nigeria: National Council on Intergovernmental Relations. Amuwo, K. (1998). Federal systems: A theoretical perspective. In T. Babawale & F. Adewunmi (Eds.), Re-inventing federalism in Nigeria issues and Perspectives (pp. 1–13). Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Asobie, A. (1998). Centralizing trends in Nigerian federalism. In T. Babawale & F. Adewunmi (Eds.), Re-inventing federalism in Nigeria issues and perspectives (pp. 14–56). Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Awa, E. O. (1976). Issues in federalism. Benin City: Ethiopia Publishing Corporation. Birch, A. H. (1966). Approaches to the study of federalism. Political Studies, 14(1), 15–33. Dare, L. O. (1979). Perspective on federalism. In A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole, & W. Ofonagoro (Eds.), Readings on federalism (pp. 26–35). Nigeria: Institute of International Affairs. Dike, V. E. (2006). Democracy and political life in Nigeria. Bloomington: iUniverse. Drummond, M. L. (1999). Examination of federalism’s suitability in Australia relative to the United States, Switzerland, Canada, India, Germany, and Belgium. A Minor Thesis submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Public Policy and Management.

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Elazar, D. J. (1987). Exploring federalism. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press. Jinadu, A. (1979). A note on the theory of federalism. In A. B. Akinyemi, P. D. Cole, & W. Ofonagoro (Eds.), Readings on federalism (pp. 13–25). Lagos: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs. Jinadu, A. (2003). Foreword. In A. T. Gana & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), Federalism in Africa framing the national question (pp. 115–145). Eritrea: Africa World Press. Kalu, J. O. (2016, March). True federalism? Illustrations with the venn diagram. European Scientific Journal, 12(8), 344–365.http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/ esj.2016.v12n8p344. Livingston, W. S. (1952, March). A note on the nature of federalism. Political Science Quarterly, 67 (1), 81–95. Obiagwu, K. (2005, March 14). Reconciling contending issues in Nigeria’s quest for true federalism. The Guardian, pp. 8 and 9. Osaghae, E. E. (1990). A reassessment of federalism as a degree of decentralization. Publius, 20(1) (Winter), 83–98. Oyovbaire, S. E. (1979). The theory of federalism: A critical appraisal. Nigerian Journal of Political Science, 1, 78–91. Wheare, K. C. (1963). Federal government. New York: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Background to Nigerian Federalism

Federalism is marked by a constant search for the most efficient balance between central and component state’s powers. Empirical evidence from different parts of the world points to the fact that the federal constitution reflects the pulls and pressure at a particular historical point. The framing of the constitution does not itself eliminate these contradictory pressures, which make federalism a political necessity (Dare 2003: 93). From this point of view, events and constitutional developments in Nigeria illustrate this movement between ‘more power to the center’ and ‘more power to the periphery.’ The major institutional design problem has been over the division of powers and functions at the various levels of government (federal, state, and local governments). It has been a case of how to strike a balance between opposing demands for centralization or decentralization of powers (Jinadu 1994: 57 in Agbu 2004). There is the problem of how to design the federation in such a way as to prevent an ethnic group or a combination of ethnic groups, or one state or combination of states, from perpetually dominating and imposing their will on other ethnic groups (Jinadu 1994, Awolowo–Dosumu 1994 in Agbu 2004).

Development of Federalism in Nigeria 1960--1966 Between 1960 and 1966, Nigerian federalism underwent a period of crisis as a result of power decentralization to the regions. These include the crisis in the leadership of the Action Group (AG) 1962, census crisis © The Author(s) 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6_2

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1963, and General Election crisis 1964/1965. This crisis necessitated the incursion of the military into politics in 1966. The military government assumed absolute power, to eliminate the danger of size (argued to be a great obstacle to the stability of the federalism then), monolithic Northern Nigeria, created by the British and remained as the Northern Nigeria which occupied about two-thirds of the size of Nigeria, was broken into six states (Okunnu 2000). An important aspect of the debate then revolved around the principle that no federal unit should be too large in population as to threaten or dominate the others. This consideration led Gen. Gowon (Head of State 1966–1975) to split the country into 12 states. By this action, the center became very powerful, and the states weakened. Discontent arose soon after, and the agitation shifted to curbing the power of the center to the advantage of the states. This is what is now popularly described as ‘True Federalism’ (the call for re-allocation of revenue and functions in favor of the sate). Advocates of ‘true federalism’ argue for the stripping of the federal government of many of its overbearing powers and devolving the same on the lower tiers of government through a rigorous and purposeful reexamination and re-allocation of the legislative list in terms of variety and content in favor of the lower tiers. Some have argued for the re-grouping of the existing 36 states into six regions, which will be the federating units exercising the powers of the pre-1967 four regions. Some want a return to pre-1966 fiscal relations in which the states controlled their resources and contributed to the central Distributive Pool, which is shared between the center and states in an agreed formula. It is also intended that the Federal Government should not meddle with local government set up and that there should be State Police or even local government police. The prevailing opinion in Nigeria is that to survive as a nation-state, the country must restructure its political relations vesting a substantial degree of autonomy in the component units (Nnaan, 1995: 75 in Ibrahim 2003: 134). In general, what is canvassed as above is what is termed ‘true federalism.’ When the British left in 1960, Nigeria was a federation of three regions—North, West, and East—and the federal territory of Lagos. It became a republic in 1963. The Midwestern region was created in 1964, bringing the number of regions to four. There was a separate constitution for each of the four regions. The regions exercised substantial powers and functions owing to their territorial size and the revenue accruable to the regions. The principle of derivation was adopted in the revenue allocation

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formula simply because the revenue base was relatively evenly distributed. As Asobie observed: The peasant-based agrarian economy of Nigeria had a natural geographical spread, which encouraged the development of a decentralized political economy. In the 1940s and 1950s, Nigeria’s agrarian economy was, in geographical terms, decentralized but balanced: the Northern parts of the country produced cotton and groundnuts; the Eastern, palm produce and the Western, cocoa and rubber. Much of the foreign exchange for Nigeria was derived from the sale of these products. (Asobie 1998: 45)

Since agriculture was on the residual list, the regional governments derived much revenue from the sale of the export of agricultural commodities based on the derivation principle. By Section 134 of the constitution 1960, the federation must pay to each region, 50% of ‘the proceeds of any royalty received by the federation in respect of any minerals extracted in that region’ and ‘any mining rents derived by the federation during that year from within that region’ (Okunnu 2000). In 1963, the distribution of funds in the Distributive Pool Account was adjusted to give the new Midwestern region created out of Western Nigeria sums equal to 18.95% of the account.

Development of Federalism in Nigeria 1966--2020 The military seized power in 1966, suspended the 1963 constitution, and ruled the country for about 13 years, during which the civil war broke out from July 6, 1967, until January 10, 1970. On the eve of the civil war May 27, 1967, Gowon created the twelve states structure: Northwestern, Northcentral, Kano, Northeastern, Benue-Plateau, Central West (later renamed Kwara) state, Western state, Midwestern state, East-Central, Rivers, Southeastern, and Lagos state. The idea then was that the size of the Northern region contradicts the principle of federalism that no one federal unit should be too large in population as to threaten or dominate the others. While some analysts see the application of this principle as a means to break the North others, see the introduction of the twelve states as a means to checkmate the secessionist tendency at the Eastern Region as at that time led by Lieutenant Colonel, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu– Ojukwu, who was about to declare the ‘Republic of Biafra.’ The idea itself brought up its contradictions. The creation of states continued under the

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military rule until the current 36 states were created out of the former four regions. Military rule, multiplication in the number of states, the experience of war itself, and the increasing inflow of mineral oil revenue from the early 1970s facilitated the emergence of a highly centralized federal system in Nigeria. As Abayode and Ayida observed: The Nigerian civil war broke out shortly after the military assumed control of the state. The prosecution of the war and the hierarchical structure of the military command facilitated the greater concentration of power in the federal state and the increased centralization of the administrative machinery. War economic policy measures added up to a substantial increase in the level of state intervention in external trade. (Abayode and Ayida in Ohiorhenuan 1989: 145)

The former argument and pushing for the strengthening of the country by weakening the region in 1967 has now shifted to strengthening the country by strengthening the states. The Military Heads of State created all the states except the Mid-West region. State agitators base their demands purely on political motives. They believe it will enhance their chances during federal or state elections as well as increase their representation in the Federal Executive Council, the National Assembly, and appointments into federal boards. The representation of states in the Senate is based on the equality of states, the House of Representatives by population, and other political appointments by federal character, a sort of principle of equity. Under the military, constitution-making became centralized. The seizure of power by the military in 1966 denied the civil polity the opportunity to evolve an equitable federation through dialogue, constitutional reforms, and institutional evolution through the works of political parties, democratic institutions, and civil societies. On the assumption of office after the coup d’etat of July 29, 1975, Gen. Murtala Muhammed in October 1975 appointed a constitution drafting committee of 49 Nigerians to review the 1963 constitution. The balance of power shifted in favor of the center. This was achieved in many ways: Some matters previously on the concurrent list were transferred to the exclusive list. It is also correct that matters in the concurrent list were treated for practical purposes exclusive to federal, for example, security. Thirdly, the federal government powers were extended too, to matters formerly under the

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exclusive competence of the regional government, for example, local government administration (Asobie 1998; Sagay 2001). According to Sagay (2001): The 1979 and 1999 constitutions maintained the trend towards centralization, even though they were made ‘by the people’ for the operations of a democratic and federal system of government. Thus instead of 45 items in the Exclusive legislative list as in the 1960/3 constitutions, there were 66 items in the 1979 constitution and 68 in 1999.

Basic state matters, like drug and poisons, the election of state governors and state Houses of Assembly, fingerprint identification and criminal records, labor and trade union matter, meteorology, police, prisons, professional occupations, stamp duties, taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains, the regulation of tourist, traffic, registration of the business name, incorporation of companies, traffic on federal truck roads passing through states, trade and commerce, and census, were transferred from the concurrent to the exclusive list (Sagay 2001; Asobie 1998). Under the military, the North gained superiority and established bureaucracy in which it has a majority. Fears of marginalization by other ethnic groups became real. According to Dare, (2003: 93), ‘since the north had traditionally dominated the military, which in turn had dominated Nigerian politics, northern domination of the rest of the country was enhanced by the military rule.’ By the 1970s, under the military, the financial position of the federal government vis-à-vis the state government was strengthened. While federal government revenue expanded tremendously, revenue attributed to the state fell drastically. Under Gowon, owing to the oil ‘boom’ the agricultural sector was neglected. With years, mining rent and royalties became, by far, more buoyant than any other source of income to the states. The persistent weakening of the revenue bases of the states led to the change of focus in the accumulation process from peasant-based and regionally controlled agriculture to federal controlled mining rents and royalties. The principle of vertical allocation of revenue, which favors the federal authorities, shifted the focus of Nigeria politics from the states to the center. Controlling the federal government became a guarantee for using the state as a means of capital accumulation.

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The ‘True Federalism’ Debate in Nigeria: Current Issues in Literature The contemporary discourse on true federalism in Nigeria borders on the issues of functions and power redistribution between the states and the federal government. A review of the revenue sharing formula, the police on whether or not there should be state police and even local government police, marginalization or ethnic representation, restructuring the federating units, the administration, control, and creation of the local council. Before 1967 first state creation that demarcated the country into twelve states, the argument and debate were on the lopsided nature of the Nigerian federation and the need to weaken the regions and strengthen the center. More specifically, there was a problem with the size of the Northern region and the basic principle of federalism, which stipulates that no parts shall be large in territory/population to be in a position to dominate others. The problem could not be addressed within the First Republic 1960–1966. It took the forces of civil war and military fiat to correct the perceived anomalies. Presently, the argument and debate have changed to weakening the center and strengthening the states; that is, the states numbering 36 are weak to play the roles of the component units of a federation. Nnamani, the former Governor of Enugu state, believes that the true federal structure was the four regional structures which existed from the colonial legislation through the democratic process, that the twelve states structure and subsequent 36 were the creations of the military, therefore, undemocratic and not ‘true.’ He sees ‘true federalism’ in terms of structure, which must emanate as a result of dialogue by the people through a constitutional framework: By using an instrument of democracy and instrument of the constitution, a structure should evolve a real federal structure, true federalism. (Nnamani, Newswatch, January 29, 2001: 18)

It is not clear whether Nnamani wishes to go back to the four regional structures or for the 36 states to possess the powers of the former four regions. On the return to the pre-1966 federal system, Onimode (2003: 169) notes: The pre-1966 federal system was based on a tricolor regional system that has atrophied, and that system predates the era of oil wealth. The creation

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of so many states since 1967 makes it difficult to imagine the abolition of these states and a return to the old regional system, though its distribution of powers and fiscal system may still have valid attributes…the country’s present level of oil wealth and development have also become too complex to be adequately captured by the pre-1966 federal system.

The second option dealing with power redistribution and decentralization is an updated version of the pre-1966 federal system in which the country renegotiates the distribution of legislative powers and resource allocation among the three tiers of government. This redistribution and decentralization are necessitated by the current unitary tendencies of the original federal system, the increasing number of states and local governments, and the post-1973 oil wealth in the country. Advocating the redistribution of powers and resources in favor of the states and local governments, Onimode noted that there could be no permanent solution to the problem of an appropriate choice of the best structure for a nationstate; the structures evolve in time according to the historical experience of the country. The main options for restructuring the federation include a return to the pre-1966 federal system, the redistribution and decentralization of powers under this system, politico-military restructuring, fiscal federalism, confederalism, and rotational presidency and the possible political approaches for choosing among these options are a constitutional amendment, constitutional commission/conference, a sovereign national conference, and plebiscite. The increase in the number of states arose not as a matter of choice but of necessity to sustain ‘one Nigeria.’ The twelve states were created to curtail the centrifugal forces arising from the civil war. Federalism entails the putting of centrifugal and centripetal forces at bay. Policies to ensure this emanate from a given environment, events, and time. Because the states were created under military regimes, it is wrong to say it did not get popular support. The civilian administration of Shagari wanted to create new states in 1984. The national assembly received requests for about 45 new states. The House of Representatives endorsed 29 of such requests. They were yet to be ratified by the Senate when Gen. Muhammadu Buhari ousted the administration. Commenting on the creation of 12 states by Gowon, Okunnu (2000) wrote: On the day the drums of war were heard, Decree No.14 was proclaimed. On that day, a great obstacle to the stability of the federation was removed.

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The monolithic Northern Nigeria, created by the British and renamed as the Northern Region, which occupied about two-thirds of the size of Nigeria, was broken into six states… it is a cardinal principle of federalism that no one federal unit should be too large in population as to threaten or dominate the others… It was significant, therefore, that Decree No. 14 of 1967 went a long way to restructure the federation in such a way as to eliminate the danger of size.

Further creation of states by the military was also met with jubilation. According to Dayo (in Nkwocha 1997): Each time a military head of state creates states, he is seen as a messiah of a sort, it helps him to either legitimize his regime or consolidate his power base. He rides on the crest of the popularity for a long time.

Each time a group wants recognition, they start by agitating for their reconstitution into a separate state. The government has responded to such pressure by creating new states to please group leaders. The people themselves are rarely consulted in state creation exercises, giving the impression that the creation of states is a political reward to the leaders who are now given their empire for economic exploitation. According to Dare (2003: 106), the increase in the number of political units in the more stable federations came about through the expansion into the frontier, rather than the subdivision of the existing units. Aminu (2001) opines that the principle of federalism, which advocates that no part of a federation should be large enough to threaten the rest, was used purposely to break the North. Having broken-up the North, ethnically based divisions continued regardless of size and regardless of the potential ability to ‘threaten the rest.’ He notes that former arguments and pushing for a strengthening of the country by weakening the region in 1967 and today of strengthening the country by strengthening states, supports the proposition that it is, indeed, true that the fertile debating ground of ‘true federalism’ is a convenient diversionary tactic in place of the daunting and demanding task of development. Majority of scholars and politicians alike in Northern Nigeria advocate for a powerful central government; Nasarawa State governor, Adamu Abdullahi’s condemnation of the demand by the Southsouth for resource control or increase in the 13% derivation is notable:

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The demand over resource control in the oil-producing states is, in truth, a protest against the right of the north to share from the earnings from crude oil. The people of the Niger Delta believe that northern leaders stole the oil wealth to turn every road in the north into dual carriageway. (in Dike 2006: 283)

The ethnic and tribal groups in Nigeria are always looking out for their interests, as they are always organized to press their case or oppose others whose interests impinge on their interests. The North (in particular, the Northwest) was the main opposition to the Southsouth’s demand of 50% derivation. The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) called on Nigerians to reject the increase noting that the 17% approved by NPRC was excessive generosity (Dike 2006: 283). This cannot be removed from the monosectoral economy of Nigeria, which is based on petroleum resources derived from states in the South. The bulk of the state’s income comes from the oil rent, but while most of the states in the South produce oil, none of the states in the North as at now produce oil. Thus, state control of these resources, which advocates of another form of ‘true federalism’ centered on resource control project, will put the North at a great disadvantage. To control the petroleum resources, the center must control the states, weakening the center, and revisiting the pre-1967 derivation principle means removing mining rents and royalties from the center. This also means removing the economic base on which the ruling class in both the center and state derives their resources. Hence, in a more profound sense, Julius Ihonvbere in Gana and Egwu (2003: xxv) take the issue to a much deeper level starting from the premise that the Nigerian state, as presently constituted, is designed to serve the ruling class in the society. Therefore, the class character of the ruling cabal must be considered in the debate on the political development of the country. Scholars and statesmen from the Niger Delta, the area that produces the bulk of the petroleum resources, see ‘true federalism’ as ‘resource control’—an arrangement, which will put the states in control of their resources (Sagay 2001; Ugo 2004). As far as they are concerned, the debate on the concept ‘true federalism’ centers on who appropriates the revenue accruable from oil (communities, local government, states, regions, or federal government) as oil accumulates more percentage in the economy of Nigeria. So long as oil remains the preponderant influence on the national economy, mining rents and royalties being a major pillar on which development planning is built ‘resource control’ as a

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form of ‘true federalism’ will go on for a long time. The change in the economic base from agriculture as the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy to petroleum, which is not evenly distributed, is at the center of the problems, which may prolong the dream of the Niger Delta for resource control. In that regard, Sagay (2001) argues that ‘true federalism’ lies in ‘resource control’: We have clearly seen that the future of this country lies in only one direction – true federalism, together with fiscal federation and resource control by the owners of the resources.

Resource control and fiscal federalism are all inbuilt in the ‘true federalism’ as seen by Sagay, a scholar from the Niger Delta. From 1960 and 1963, constitutions Sagay (2001) notes the following features, which in his opinion emphasized the existence of a ‘true federal system’: 1. It is composed of powerful and autonomous regions and a center with limited powers. 2. Each region had its separate constitution, in addition to the federal government constitution. 3. Each region had its separate coat of arms and motto, from the federal state or government. 4. Each region established its separate semi-independent mission in the UK headed by ‘Agent-General.’ 5. The regional governments had residual power, i.e., where any matter was not allocated to the regions or the federal government, it automatically became a matter for regional jurisdiction. 6. Separate regional judiciaries and the power of the regions to establish, not only High Courts but also regional Court of Appeal, 7. The regions had their separate electoral commissions for local government elections. However, the chairman of the federal electoral commission was the statutory chairman of the state commission. 8. The revenue allocation system under the 1963 constitution was strictly based on derivation. Within the context of ‘true federalism,’ Sagay, like most other people from the oil-producing states, sees the return of ownership, control, use, and management of land and its mineral resources to the ‘rightful owners’ (states)—the kind of

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federal structure that allows each federating unit to control and manage its resources and pay taxes to run the central government. But we can take the argument further. We could raise the issue of who should ultimately control the resources (the state, the local government, the community, or the individual who owns the land). Etikerentse (2001) submits that resource control cannot be a substitute for dedicated transparent, just, and prudent governance at all tiers of government. He asserts that even with resource control, without good governance, the Niger Delta will see more crises: There is no reason to believe that the degree of distrust between a state and the federal government on this subject does not exist between a state and the communities (particularly those minority populations) that are located far from state government presence.

If the federal government is stripped of its ownership and control rights in favor of the state, Etikerentse argued, it would be a matter of time before communities, families, and individuals in the areas within the state (from which petroleum is derived) demand ownership and control right too. Certain politicians already cite the situation in the United States, seeking private or individual property interest in petroleum in their campaign for resource control. Some analysts think that the imbalance in the distribution of military and administrative offices is an issue to be tackled in ‘True Federalism’ (Ibagere 1999; Ogummuyiwe 1998; Oloja 2000; Laide 1999). In the opinion of this group, ‘True Federalism’ means equal representation. They believe that the North takes all positions of power and organs that generate or spend much of the nation’s resources. The thinking is that the North takes all the positions of power and organs that generate or spend much of the nation’s resources while leaving the highly technical ones to the Yoruba, Igbo, and Southern minorities. According to Laide (1999: 19), the position of power and/or money is Head of State, Secretary to Government, Chief of Defense Staff, Inspector–General of Police, Chief of Army Staff, Ministers of Justice, Internal Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, Water Resources, Solid Mineral, FCT, Controller-General of the Customs and Excise, Managing Director of NEPA, NITEL, etc. Those traditionally left for the South are education, information, national planning, and aviation. Secondly, the North has more states in a manner that negates the

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principle of equity. The North also has more local governments, which, together with states, ensure that more revenue accrues to the North. The resource (crude oil) comes from Southsouth. Some believe that in a federal system like Nigeria, the center has no business controlling the lion share of the revenue (Akarogun 2000; Edemode 2001). They argue that the local governments, being closer to the people and the bastion of real development activities, should be favored with higher revenue from the federation account. At the same time, some think that revenue allocation formulae should be adjusted in favor of the states. Perhaps the most comprehensive and abstract, free from personal benefit view on restructuring comes from the Patriots, a pan Nigeria, a non-political group led by a legal luminary, late Chief Fredrick Rotimi Alade Williams (SAN). They proposed that the existing 36 states be regrouped into six regions: Northcentral, Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southsouth, and Southwest. The regions will become the federating units, although the various states within each region may continue as units exercising governmental functions under the constitution of the region over the territory of the state concerned. From the opinion expressed by the Patriots, their arguments for re-grouping the existing 36 states into six regions are based on the principle expressed in the view that the units of a federation should each have sufficient population and economic resources so that they can run their government effectively. Based on the belief that at 36 states, structure Nigeria has overshot the equilibrium in the state strength in terms of economic viability, thus must seek to restructure the states to ensure a ‘true federation.’ On this note, the view expressed by Awa (1976: 40) becomes relevant. Awa argued that so long as the units of a federation remain autonomous, the governmental system will remain federal even though it may be necessary for small or poor units to receive aids of all sorts to function effectively. There are some difficulties connected with the principle of economic viability. The main one is that it is based on the tacit assumption that there is such a thing as an optimum size of the units of a federation and that if the regions of any federal union were made smaller than the optimum size and as a consequent given fewer functions then: 1. They (the units) would cease to function effectively, and 2. The governmental system would cease to be truly federal.

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This position is false from both theoretical and empirical points of view. Theoretically and conceptually, there is nothing like ‘true federalism.’ Following the persistent problems of federalism in Nigeria and the desire of most Nigerians to have a federal system that meets their expectations, most Nigerians, including academics, have come to use the term ‘true federalism’ to explain their yearning for a workable and acceptable federal system. The concept ‘true federalism’ assumes that there is a single, universal standard for federalism. Federalism is a concept that follows significant variations over time and across countries. Although there are certain general constitutive features of federalism, every federal system evolves its character.

References Agbu, O. (2004). Re-inventing federation in post-transition Nigeria: Problems and prospects. Nigerian Development, xxix(2), 26–52. Akarogun, O. (2000, October 8). Revenue allocation unfair to states. Champion, p. 14. Aminu, J. (2001). “Who wants a true federation?” Being text of a lecture delivered at fourth Champion Better Society. April 30, Daily Champion, May 2, p. 7. Asobie, A. (1998). Centralizing trends in Nigerian federalism. In T. Babawale et al. (Ed.), Re-inventing federalism in Nigeria issues and perspectives (pp. 14– 56). Lagos: Malthouse Press. Awa, E. O. (1976). Issues in federalism. Benin City: Ethiopia Publishing Corporation. Dare, L. (2003). Federalist deconcentration and group rights in Canada: Some lesson for Nigeria. In A. T. Gana & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), Federalism in Africa framing the national question (pp. 89–114). Eritrea: Africa World Press. Dike, V. E. (2006). Democracy and political life in Nigeria. America: Inverse. Edemode, A. (2001, September 16). Revenue allocation: Endless search for equitable formula. The Guardian, p. 8. Etikerentse, C. (2001, July 2). Federalism, the constitution and resource control’ a reaction to Prof. Sagay lecture. Vanguard, p. 35. Gana, A. T., & Egwu, S. G. (2003). The crisis of the nation state in Africa and the challenge of federalism. In A. T. Gana & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), Federalism in Africa framing the national question (pp. xv–xxvii). Eritrea: Africa World Press. Ibagere, E. (1999, December 31).‘Our self marginalization. Vanguard, p. 11. Ibrahim, J. (2003). Ethno-religious limits to construction of federalism in Africa. Yugoslavia and Nigeria compared. In A. T. Gana & S. G. Egwu (Eds.),

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Federalism in Africa framing the national question. Eritrea: Africa World Press. Laide, S. (1999, April 6). To restructure the federation. The Guardian, p. 19. Nnamani, C. (2001, January 29). We need a true federal structure. Newswatch, pp. 17–21. Nkwocha, J. (1997, June 2). The solution as a problem: With 36 states now, has this process of political restructuring helped Nigeria? Newswatch, p. 25. Ogummuyiwe. (1998, August 3). The marginalization inquest: Who is marginalizing whom: The CBN experience. Vanguard, p. 7. Ohiorhenuan, J. F. E. (1989). The state and economic development in Nigeria under military rule, 1966–79. In T. N. Tamunu & J. A. Atanda (Eds.), Nigeria since independence: the first 25 years (Vol. iv, pp. 141–162). Ibadan: Hebook. Okunnu, F. (2000, May 26). ‘Nigeria: original covenants of federating units breached’ Being excerpts of a paper delivered at the year 2000 law week of the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA), Lagos. The Guardian, pp. 8–9. Oloja, M. (2000, January 30). The grouse of the north. The Guardian, p. 1. Onimode, B. (2003). Fiscal federalism in the 21st century-option for Nigeria. In A. T. Gana & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), Federalism in Africa framing the national question (pp. 161–178). Eritrea: Africa World Press. Sagay, E. A. (2001, May 28). Nigeria: Federalism, the constitution, and Resource control. Text of speech delivered at the fourth sensitization programme organized by the Ibori vanguard at the Lagoon Restaurant, Lagos. The Guardian, pp. 8–9. Sagay. online: waadoo.org/nigerdelta/essay/resourcecontrol/sagay. Ugo, S. C. (2004, December). Resource control and its challenges to Nigeria federalism. The Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development, 4(4), 25–56.

PART II

Dimensions of the Federal Discourse in Nigeria

CHAPTER 3

Structure and Power Redistribution

Globally, in a federation, the federal government (the center) ought to be exclusively concerned with defense, immigration, fiscal policy, foreign relations; matters that impinge directly on the individual are left with the structure which can best provide for that—local government, state government. This part examines the distribution of power in that context. What power: local government for rural development, police for security particularly personal, state creation/restructuring for citizen’s welfare. What is the situation presently, how are they going to be structured to create a Nigerian model federation? Any lesson from practices elsewhere, i.e., other federations? In other words, power has to be shared to the extent the interest of the citizen is assured.

Power Redistribution in the Nigerian Federation: Restructuring the Federating Units? When Gowon, on May 27, 1967, created 12 states, he claimed that the aim was to achieve stability for the country. He had argued that ‘the main obstacle to future stability is the present imbalance in the Nigeria federation’ (Nkwocha 1997). Gowon argued that no nation would ever survive if one section of the country is in a position to hold the others to ransom. He went on to say that the creation of the new states was the overwhelming desire of the majority of Nigerians. The new states were Northcentral, Eastcentral, Northeastern, Northwestern, © The Author(s) 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6_3

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Southeastern, Kano, Central-west (later renamed Kwara) Benue-plateau, Western state, Midwestern, Rivers and Lagos. The creation of states has not brought stability; neither has the minority stopped agitating for more states. Nigeria now has 36 states, but there are still clamoring for the creation of additional states in the Southeast and other zones in the country. The Southeast argues that the creation of one more state from the zone will ensure fairly even distribution of states in the geopolitical zones/regions, an aspect of agitation for ‘true federalism’ that suggests the equitable distribution of resources and representation in the country. The Southeastern area constitutes five states, whereas other regions are made up of at least six states (Northcentral 6, Northwest 7, Northeast 6, Southsouth 6, and Southwest 6). One of the dimensions of the current discourse to achieving true federalism in the twenty-first-century Nigeria is whether powers should be redistributed and decentralization under the existing 36 states federal structure, the creation of additional states, or restructuring of the federating units to a six regional structure. According to Oyeweso (in Nkwocha 1997), as new states were created to solve the problem of ethnic domination, new majorities and minorities were thrown up, leading to more crises about domination and marginalization and perpetual agitation for more and more states. For example, Benue-Plateau now comprised Benue, Plateau, Kogi, and Nasarawa and partly Taraba state. The people are still asking for four more states—Apa, Katsina-Ala, Okura, and Oku because of the renewed feelings of ethnic disadvantage (Table 3.1). Late Obafemi Awolowo had predicted that the rate states were being demanded and created almost every community in the country will, in the future, become a state. ‘At the rate we are going, we will stop demanding a state when Ikene (his hometown) becomes a state’ (in Nkwocha 1997). In terms of domination, the concept ‘the core north’ now replaces the Northern region. The feeling of domination by the North over the South or the South over the North did not assume the state level, neither did state creation solve the problem of political instability, which has recently mutated into agitation for ‘resource control.’ The Niger Delta problem is one of the plethoras of ethnic issues. Murtala Muhammed created seven new states in 1976, bringing the total to 19. The main objective was to bring government nearer to the people and ensure even development within a federal structure of government. The old western state was divided into Ogun, Ondo, and Oyo

3

Table 3.1 45 requests for new states received by the National Constitutional Conference 1994

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Present state

Proposed state

Proposed capital

Abia Adamawa/Taraba Akwa—Ibom

1. Aba 2. Sarduana 3. Itai 4. Atlantic 5. Ezu 6. Gombe 7. Katagum 8. Apa 9. Katsina-Ala 10. Ogoja 11. Anioma 12. Toru—Ebe 13. Afemesa 14. Ebonyi 15. Njaba 16. Hadejia 17. Lantai 18. Bayajida

Aba Mubi Ikot Ekpene Oron Awka Gombe Azare Otukpo Zaki—Ibiam Ikom/Ogoja Asaba Patani Auchi Abakaliki Okigwe Hadejia N/A Daura, Kazaure, or Gumel Zonkwa or Kanfanchan N/A N/A Gwahzo N/A Anyigba Kabba Kebba Ilorim Kontagora Bida

Anambra Bauchi Benue Cross—River Delta Edo Enugu/Abia Imo Jigawa

Kaduna

19. Gurara

Kano

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Ogun

Tiga Gari Tigari Karadua Okura Okun Oya Yoruba/Ekiti Kainji Ndaduma (Nupe) 30. Ijebu—Remo

Ondo Osun

31. Ekiti 32. Oduduwa

Oyo

33. New Oyo

Katsina Kogi Kwara Niger/Kebbi

Odogbolu or Ijebuode Ado—Ekiti Ile—Ife or Ilesha Ogbomogbo

(continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued)

Present state

Plateau Rivers

Proposed state

Proposed capital

34. Oke—Ogun

Shaki, Iseyim, or Igboho Ibadan Akwanga Yanagoa, Brass, or Sagbama Ahoada Bori

35. Ibadan 36. Nasarawa 37. Bayelsa/Niger Delta 38. Orashi 39. Ogoni/Rivers East 40. Port Harcourt 41. New Rivers 42.

Sokoto

43. 44.

Taraba

45.

P/Harcourt South P/Harcourt Oloibiri Ogbia or Nembe Zamfara Gusau New N/A Sokoto/Saklewato Mambila N/A

Source The Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Constitutional Conference Vol. 2 (Abuja: National Assembly Press, 1995) Appendix I (cited in Suberu 1998: 288). Note N/A = Not Available

states. Imo and Anambra were carved out from the East-central. The Northeastern state was split into Bauchi, Borno, and Gongola states. The old Benue-Plateau state gave way to Benue and Plateau states. General Ibrahim Babangida created two states, Katsina and Akwa Ibom in 1987; on August 27, 1991, he created nine more states bringing the number of states to 30. The new states were Abia created from Imo state, Enugu from old Anambra state, Kebbi from Sokoto, Kogi out of Benue, and Kwara states and Delta out of former Bendel State. Others were Osun created from Oyo state, Taraba from Gongola, Yobe from Borno, Kebbi from Sokoto, and Jigawa from Kano. Agitation for state creation continued. Abacha set up a state creation committee headed by Arthur Mbanefo. The committee received about 75 requests for new states. On October 1, 1996, Abacha created six new states, bringing the total to 36. The states were Bayelsa from Rivers state, Zamfara from Sokoto, Ekiti from Ondo, Ebonyi from Enugu and Abia,

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Gombe from Plateau state. A military head of state created all the states except the Midwestern region. Each time a military head of state creates states, he is seen as a messiah of a sort. It helps him to either legitimize his regime or consolidate his power base. He rides on the crest of the popularity for a long time. State agitators base their demands purely on political motives. They believe it will enhance their chances during federal or state elections as well as increase their representation in the Federal Executive Council, the National Assembly, and appointment into Federal Boards. The representation of states in the Senate and most of these bodies are based on the equality of states. Most of the states, except Lagos, Kano, and Rivers, do not generate substantial revenue on their own. They depend on federal allocations, which have continued to dwindle as a result of the proliferation of states. On the review of 1999 constitution, the Patriots proposed that existing 36 states could conveniently be re-grouped into six regions as follows: 1. Northcentral comprising Kwara, Kogi, Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue, and Niger with Jos as the regional capital, 2. Northeast comprising Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, and Adamawa with Mardugiri as the regional capital, 3. Northwest comprising Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi, Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, and Jigawa with Kaduna as the regional capital, 4. Southeast comprising Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Imo, and Abia with Enugu as the regional capital, 5. Southsouth comprising Edo, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Cross River, and Akwa Ibom with Port Harcourt as the regional capital, 6. Southwest comprising Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, and Ekiti with Ibadan as the regional capital. In their opinion, it is the regions that will become the federating units. However, the various states within each region will continue as units exercising governmental functions under the constitution of the region over the territory of the state concerned. The constitution will define the division of powers between the federation, the regions, and the states. The chief executive of a region will bear the title ‘Governor’ while the chief executive of a state will bear the title ‘Administrator.’ Each region should ultimately determine its constitution so long as its provisions are not capable of:

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a. Impeding or prejudicing the exercise by the federal government of powers and authority vested in it under the constitution of the federation; b. Endangering any asset or investment of the federal government in the region; or c. Endanger the continuance of a federal government in Nigeria. • The regional House of Assembly will make provision for the constitution of the region, particularly its relationship with the states comprising that region. • In the division of powers between the federal and the region, they suggested a return to the exclusive powers of the federal government independence period (i.e., under the 1963 constitution). • That the regions, not the states, may have residual powers while the powers of the state will be set out specifically. On the system of revenue allocation, they emphasized the principle of derivation • Revenue is to be paid to the federation account for distribution between the federation and the regions. • All revenue arising from onshore natural resources must be allocated to the regions from which it is derived, and that region is also expected to give effect to the principle of derivation in sharing public revenue between itself and the states comprising it. On Judiciary they suggested: • A regional court of appeal, which will be the highest court of appeal in each region save in respect of appeals relating to constitutional matters, disputes, or controversies between government and other matters of significance, which will continue to go to the supreme court. On the Police they:

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• They suggested that the recruitment command and control of the forces will be in line with the needs of the various governments comprising the Nigerian federation. On unconstitutional usurpations of government powers: Patriots advocate: • Expunging from the constitution any provision, which appears to accord legitimacy to those responsible for such practices (military); • Deletion of the pension rights granted to past military heads of state under the 1999 constitution; • Removal of the inclusion of previous military Heads of the state as members of the National Council of State; • Complete disqualification of former military heads of state from standing for election. The Patriots based their reason for advising restructuring of Nigeria federation on the fact that Nigeria is a multiethnic country. History has shown that only the ‘true federal system’ of government provides the appropriate framework for the co-existence, cooperation, and sustainable development of such a heterogeneous society. They observed that more than 85 years after amalgamation, Nigeria remains a mere country of fundamentally diverse ethnic groups and not a nation with a common purpose, ideals, and goals. That Nigeria’s overall economic, political, and social development was fastest and most beneficial to the people between 1952 and 1962 when Nigerian regions were largely autonomous, and there was the consequential greatest measure of internal peace in Nigeria. That the liberal economic policies, which Nigeria has been attempting since 1986, have failed mainly because of the absence of a liberal political system. Some of the proposals of the Patriots are far-reaching. Though there was pressure for the creation of more states by the minority in the First Republic, it took the intra-party problems within the Action Group (AG) for the then National Assembly to alter the Western region in other to create the Midwestern region. How possible is restructuring from 36 states to six regions under a democratic constitution? For example, it recommends a fundamental restructuring of the country’s 36 states into six regions, each with a capital city and that power be devolved to the

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regions. Under the arrangement, the states will remain in existence but shall be subsumed into the regional structure. The regional chief executive shall be called ‘Governor’ while that of the state shall be known as ‘Administrator.’ They hope that this, if applied, will see to the strengthening of the component units of the country, away from the powerful center as presently practiced. At the conference of Nationalities in Nigeria held on December 17–19, 1998, the meeting believed that the nationalities were the partners that constitute Nigerian federation, not the states or any bodies. Therefore, they resolved that in restructuring Nigeria federation, the ethnic nationalities shall be the building blocks of the federation with the right to self-determination. Among other resolutions, those concerning political reorganization are as follows: • The federating units shall have powers comparable to the regions in the 1963 constitution, and they shall have their constitutions. • On revenue allocation/sharing, they advocated the principle of derivation with the owner—communities paying tax to the union government. All revenue accruing to the union government or federal account shall be shared between the federating units and the union government based on the new responsibilities assigned to each of these levels. They added that the federating units should have a larger share. • That the military and other public institutions should be subjected to democratic civilian control. • All recruitment and appointment into federal institutions should reflect the units that make up the union. • A new national army should be put in place with regional commands. These commands should ensure that the membership of the troops under their control consists of a substantial number of indigenes. According to Ibrahim (2003: 169), ‘the ethnic nationalities being a building block of a federation with the right for self-determination may lead to the disintegration of the state as in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia federations.’ A brief look at the points shows the ethnocentric nature of the people present at the conference. The idea is uncoordinated. Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups. If these ethnic groups form the basis for the federation, there would be about

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250 component units (at least), ‘each performing the functions of former regions before 1966’ as if they will all have resources to do so. No consideration was taken about the size of ethnic nationality, the resources to run the system, and the ability for the big ones being a threat to the federal union. On September 18, 2007, the governor of Enugu state inaugurated a committee to achieve Adada state. There is also renewed pressure for the creation of Orlu state in Imo state, Apa/Kasina Ala state from Benue state, among other agitations for new states. It is difficult to imagine the abolition of states and reversion to a six regional structure. The 36 states structure has evolved in time according to the historical experience of the country and may continue to be the federating unit of Nigerian federalism. The proposition for the restructuring of the federating units to a six regional structure based on the argument that the multiplication of states from a federation of 3 regions in 1960 to that of 36 states today has helped to whittle down the powers hitherto allocated to the states may not be feasible in a democratic system. Given that such restructuring in the history of Nigeria has been possible only under military rule. General Aguiyi Ironsi promulgated Decrees No. 33 and 34 of May 24, 1966, abolishing federalism and replacing it with a unitary form of government. The creation of 12 states by General Gowon out of the former four regions and other state creations were also drastic and impossible under the First and the Second Republic. • The 36 states structure will continue to be the federating unit for a long time despite the constitutional amendment.

References Ibrahim, J. (2003). Ethno-religious limits to construction of federalism in Africa. Yugoslavia and Nigeria compared. In A. T. Gana & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), Federalism in Africa framing the national question (pp. 115–145). Eritrea: Africa World Press. Nkwocha, J. (1997, June). The solution as a problem: With 36 states now, has this process of political restructuring helped Nigeria? Newswatch, p. 25. Suberu, T. S. (1998). States’ creation and the political economy of Nigerian federalism. In K. Amuwo (Ed.), Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria (pp. 276–295). Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

CHAPTER 4

Local Government Administration, Creation, and Control

Local government is an example of a matter of local concern, which under many federations come under the exclusive control of the state governments. Between 1950 and 1975, the country’s systems of local government moved from the colonial inheritance of indirect rule through Native Authority to elected councils. A fundamental feature of this period was that each region or state carried out the organization of its local government system in the way it deemed fit since, under the Nigerian federal system, the local government is a state subject. Thus, several modes of local government existed. However, the 1976 local government reform broke with the observance of the general principle (Adedeji 1997). First, the federal government entered the field of local government directly and introduced the most pervasive and sweeping reforms. A uniform system of local government was promulgated; the local government recognized as the third tier of government and a fixed portion of federal revenue given to the local government. Thus, with the 1976 local government reforms, formal relations were established between the central and local government and state and local governments. Different local government areas were created that paid no attention to history, tradition, culture, and community solidarity (Adedeji 1997). Fundamentally, the local government’s primary role is to promote the spirit of local self-help, and self-reliance, community sense of unity and achievement, through a network of people’s grassroots and civil society organizations. A uniform local government (for the whole country © The Author(s) 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6_4

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Nigeria) makes the attainment of these objectives extremely difficult, if not impossible. The country’s saving grace has been the long-neglected traditional modes of social organization. It is they that have successfully saved the village from total collapse and have enabled the people to cope and survive. The traditional ways of social organization consist of institutions centered around Traditional Rulers, Age Grade Associations, Town/Village Unions, Community Development Associations, Women’s Group, and Associations, as well as Religious Groups and Social Organizations. The Nigerian communities, to a large extent, are currently governed by these indigenous institutions. As Awa in Amucheazi (1973) has discovered in the case of Igbo states, Southeast Nigeria, ‘the Town Unions are the real seat of the local authority and …some local councils have tried to avoid trouble by making informal arrangement to co-operate with these extra-legal bodies.’ Adedeji (1997) argues that the crisis which faces local government; indeed, the African state can be blamed on the transplanted foreign institution. Thus, he suggested ‘the necessity for paradigm shifts from institutional transplants to institutional restitution, renewal, and restructuring.’ In that regards, Amucheazi (1973) argues that ‘the concept of the political system, among other things, underlines a structural-functional relation within definite political cultures.’ It implies that structures require a specific medium of political culture to perform certain political functions. This is to say that the performance of the political system demands congruence between political structure and political culture. The uniform local government system in Nigeria did not seem to have fulfilled these conditions. The local government system in Nigeria does not suit the political culture of the people and therefore prove functionally unsatisfactory. The consequence of this is that in such circumstances, the communities rely on other institutions that align with their inherent political attitudes to participate in modern political activities. In Southeast Nigeria, for example, certain social groups characterize rural communities. Most prevalent of such social groups are the Age Grades, Traditional Religious Institutions, Traditional Rulers, and Villages Assemblies, which have in recent times mobilized themselves to form larger Town Unions. These traditional institutions have all through history played significant roles in bringing development nearer to the doorsteps of the rural communities. Each has contributed immensely to the educational, economic, and social development of the countryside.

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An Age Grade comprises persons who, according to the society concerned, are regarded as people of the same age. However, the age brackets of the Age Grades may vary from one community to the other. In some communities, persons born within a specified period of three, four, or five years usually form an Age Grade. But the most important thing is that men can only belong to one Age Grade at a time, and each is traditionally associated with specific roles. According to Akude (1992: 316): … each (Age Grade) is usually made up of an organized people who share an ideology and whose activities become centered around a set of common goals and a set of belief, which regulate their mutual conduct. Each group is usually characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy and informality of conduct. Above all, members are bound together by a common interest and a common problem.

Over the years, Age Grades in different communities have distinguished themselves in performing such roles that aim at enhancing the socioeconomic life of the people. They had in the pre-colonial and colonial times concerned themselves with such traditional functions as maintenance of law and order, settlement of disputes between warring members and construction and maintenance of roads and markets, maintaining the cleanliness of local streams, and above all, protecting their communities from external aggression. However, in recent times the Age Grades have diversified their roles to include newer activities that aid modernization. They have, therefore, in recent times, played significant roles in the educational, economic, political, and social development of their various communities. The Age Grade in some of the towns and villages excelled themselves in building schools where there were none and building of classroom blocks, science laboratories, dormitories, and libraries in already existing schools. Some of them award scholarships to brilliant but poor students to serve as an incentive for them to develop themselves further. The Age Grade, as a social group, has, over the years, played prominent roles in raising the standard of living of the rural dwellers. Many of them have sponsored the construction of markets, motor parks, and roads as a means of boosting trade in their localities. Many Age Grades in various communities have engaged themselves in providing necessary basic amenities such as electricity, pipe-borne water, hospitals, access roads, and schools. Their efforts are geared toward enhancing the social

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and economic life of the rural communities. The Age Grades have helped to maintain peace and orderliness. Economic and social development of communities will be jeopardized if they do not enjoy peace and safety; the Age Grades in some communities, therefore, maintain peace and even protect the public as well as private property. Traditional religion is one of the traditional institutions that had lived with the Nigerian communities. Its impact on rural development is enormous and worthy of note. Under the auspices of traditional religion, values and morals are acquired and passed on to the younger generations. It helps to set socially approved values and norms, and people had to comply with such. According to Mbiti (in Akude 1992): Values and morals cover topics like truth, justice, love, right, and wrong, good and evil, keeping of promises and agreements, praise, and blame, the rights, and responsibilities of both the individual and his community character, integrity, and so on.

To all intent and purposes, therefore, traditional religion helps people to develop a high moral standard, which is very vital in all forms of development. Traditional rulers: Traditionally, Igbo people lived in small independent communities based on the kinship system. The British wanted to centralize authority over a larger area for the sake of easy administration and penetration, so they created the Warrant Chief. The Warrant Chiefs were not rooted in the communities but were appointed by the British authority as agents of British interests in a designated territory. According to Afigbo (1972), ‘the Supreme handicap or demerit of the Warrant Chief system was its lack of any real root in the political tradition of the people.’ It is, therefore, difficult to classify traditional rulers as a traditional institution in many communities in Southeast Nigeria. During the anti-colonial struggle, the Nigerian freedom fighters regarded the Warrant Chiefs more as British colonial stooges than Nigerians who had the good of their people at heart. The Yoruba of the West and the Hausa and Fulani of the North have more sophisticated traditional structures and institutions. Okafor (2006) notes only five centers of traditional centralized authority in the Southeast zone: Aguleri, Agukwu Nri, Arochukwu, Oguta, and Onitsha. After colonialism, governments in the Southeast zone created the office of traditional rulers and their autonomous communities by law or by

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statute rather than by custom. The traditional rulers have no executive powers, but they act as agencies for creating a productive climate that would receive government development plans with a welcome heart. Traditional rulers are often the primary audience that receives development plans from the government, especially rural development plans that are designed to impact on the very communities that are the domain of traditional rulers. In consultation with their people, the traditional rulers help to prepare a fertile ground for the reception of the programs of the government; the people are converted to the ideas of making the necessary sacrifices in support of the program and protecting the project and utilities. Traditional rulers are even threatened with the withdrawal of government recognition, where utilities installed in their domains are vandalized or destroyed. On the other hand, they use the occasions of ad hoc meetings with government functionaries to make requests for development projects to be sited or extended to their territories. They are, therefore, a precious channel of two-way communication between the grassroots and the government. While today, traditional rulers may remain the customary guardian of conventional morality, norms, and values, the meddlesomeness of politicians has miserably weakened their influence in the rural communities. Accordingly, many of them are no longer in a position to influence how things are being done in their communities. In many other communities, struggles for ascension to the throne have destroyed the hitherto cohesive homogenous and fraternal communities into rivals to the detriment of development. Town Union: The Anambra State Rural Development Fund (management) Edict No. 22 1986 defines the Town Union as ‘an organization established by the indigenes of a community primarily for the purpose of promoting the welfare of such indigenes and for the development of that community.’ The role of Town Unions in community development is not in doubt. Town Unions provide facilities like schools, roads, potable water, electricity, maternity centers, etc. In the course of this self-assigned duty, the unions create awareness of development in their communities. People can seek to inform and to motivate others to act on development projects they had seen elsewhere or those that their intelligence told them the government would embark on. Also, the Unions have developed the executive capacity for project implementation in their communities. This becomes very useful when the communities are required by the government to provide a counterpart fund for projects. The capabilities and

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the resources of the population voluntarily offered are then converted to cash to meet their obligation (Okafor 2006). The Town Union is the Chief development agent or partner of any government in the Southeast zone. It initiates and co-operates in project planning, project implementation, project monitoring, and post-project management (Okafor 2006). ‘The importance of the Town Union as an organ for governance and the inception of community development projects is enhanced by the fact that branches of the union are established by the indigenes wherever they reside outside the town, such associations are affiliated to the ‘parent’ Union based in the home town’ (Nwosu 2000: 199). ‘Indeed, the level of development (social, economic and political) in many rural communities in the Southeast is as high or as low as the effectiveness of their town unions’ (Okafor 2006). It is right and logical that the Town Unions retain and have even increased relevance in rural development in the Southeast zone. Over the years, efforts had been made by the state government in Southeast Nigeria to develop the Town Unions as a body that will have direct contact with the government as it represents the real social, political organization of the people. The scrapping of the existing uniform local government system will allow states to determine how grassroots are governed. It is right and logical that the Town Unions retain and have even increased relevance in rural development in the Southeast zone. A system of local government by democratically elected local government council, bringing government nearer to the people (responsive, accountable and transparent and above all, effective in providing certain basic and essential services needed by their communities), experience has shown cannot be achieved under the present system. The focus is on how local government could be structured in the interest of the citizenry. Igbo states Southeast Nigeria, for example, may incorporate the Town Unions and other traditional institutions into a useful tool for rural governance and development.

The Rochas’ Fourth Tier in Imo State Southeast Nigeria The Rocha’s administration (2011–2019) made one of the attempts to incorporate the Town Union into the existing local government system in Imo state. Under Rochas, attempt was made by the government to create what was called ‘Community Government Council (CGC)’ (The Rochas’ Fourth Tier) in 2012. Under this arrangement, traditional rulers,

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town union executives of the autonomous community, other appointed and elected indigenes are to be empowered as the Community Government Council (CGC) to participate in governance. Some civil servants in both the state and local governments will be drafted to their various local communities to implement the policy. The civil servants would facilitate the establishment of the fourth-tier governance (on transfer to their communities of origin in line with the state civil service deployment policy) and eventually hand over the reins of administration to the permanent staff after few years of tutelage. The Community Government Council is composed of a Town Union President-General (called the Secretary), the Community Liaison Officer (CLO), Women Leader, and Youth Leader. The CGC was designed to be headed by the traditional ruler of the autonomous community. The Women leader, Youth leader, and President-General will play advisory roles. The actual implementation of government policy, disbursement of monetary allocations, and execution of government activities will be undertaken by civil servants drawn from both the state and local governments. The philosophy behind the Community Council Law is to provide government backing to the existing Autonomous Community’s Development Unions in other to enhance their efforts in conjunction with the government for effective community development. This will make sure that funds and projects by the government, the communities, and international donors are effectively utilized and projects protected and guided jealously by the community. Political commentators and writers assume that the money that comes from the federation account to the local government purse may go directly to the community governments to take care of their health, educational, infrastructural, agricultural, and social welfare needs. The argument is that the CGC would curb corruption by using the time tested method of integrity promoted by the Town Unions, local policing, and controls will bring down crimes to a minimal level. It would also be more comfortable for local communities to decide for themselves the means of raising internally generated revenue to out-compete rival communities in raising the standard of living of their people. The idea of CGC faced so many challenges that delayed or even marred its implementation before the end of Rocha’s regime in Imo state. Since the autonomous community is a subset of the existing local government, it cannot raise income, spend same, and perform some other functions allocated to it without conflict within the jurisdiction of the current local

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government system. In the area of functions and finance, the CGC clashed with the existing local government (Table 4.1). For the CGC to be funded, different types of deductions from the local government sources of revenue have to be made. That will render the existing local government irrelevant and redundant in functions and sources of revenue which may now rest with the CGC. The CGC and Table 4.1 Sources of revenue: Community Governing Council vs. the Existing Local Government CGC sources of revenue a. Grants from the state and local governments b. Monies derived from its properties and investments c. Levies and dues collected from the community as may be agreed in general town union meeting convened by the Community Council d. Other sources of revenue that may be delegated to them by both state and local governments e. Where the council assists the local government in collecting revenue due to the local government, the council shall retain 70% as cost and transfer 30% to the account of the local government f. Accept gifts, grants, bequest, and devices made to the community if the condition attached by the person making it is not inconsistent with the objects of the community, her interest, and functions of the council g. Charge fees for access to or use of its resources or service or facilities or chieftaincy title h. Borrow money with the written approval of the finance and General Purpose Committee of Local Government or the Governor

Existing L.G.A. sources of revenue • Statutory allocation from the federation account • Statutory allocation from the state government to local governments in its areas of jurisdiction • Federal grant-in-aid, state grant-in-aid • Borrowing from state government and other financial institutions • Rates which include property rates and street lights, etc. • Fees and charges which include court fines, motor park fees, forest trees • Legal gifts from private individuals and corporate bodies • Earning and profits, loans, and miscellaneous sources such as rents on investments and proceeds from commercial activities

Source Imo State Autonomous Community Council Administrative Law No. 1 of 2012 and Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (compiled by author, 2019)

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other such arrangements cannot co-habit with the existing local government, at least in its current form. Local government should, therefore, be the state function, which should modify it to meet the peculiar traditional modes of social organization in the states. The sources of revenue to the CGC which can be classified as internal sources: Monies derived from its properties and investments, levies and dues collected from the community as may be agreed in the general town union meeting convened by the Community Council by implication weakens the internal revenue base of the existing local government council. The stipulation that ‘were the council assists the local government in collecting revenue due to local government, the council shall retain 70% as cost and transfer 30% to the account of local government’ means that the internally generated revenue of the local government has been reduced to 30% of whatever it used to be. Ordinarily, the functions and projects the CGC wants to do in communities are what the local governments are expected to do as the government that is nearest to the people (Table 4.2).

Local Government Creation and the 1999 Constitution Since the introduction of the 1999 constitution, the issue of local government creation or modification has been contentious. Lagos, Ebonyi, Katsina, Niger, Nassarawa, and many other states have attempted to create additional Local Government Areas in their various states. This has, in many cases, led to a crisis of intergovernmental relations between the federal and state governments. The 1999 constitution keeps the responsibility of creating local governments in a state’s legislature at the same time conferring the power of ratification on the National Assembly, whose duty it is to appropriate money for such councils. Section 7(2) of the 1999 constitution reads ‘the person authorized by law to prescribe the area over which a local government may exercise authority…’ and in no section of the constitution was the person spelled out (could that person be a state government or federal government). Who is the person authorized by law to create more Local Government Areas or ‘prescribe the area over which a local government council may exercise authority.’ What the subsection only deals with is the conditions that should be taken into account when new local government areas are contemplated, requiring that ‘each House of Assembly shall, after the creation of more local government areas… make adequate returns to each Houses of National Assembly.’ According

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Table 4.2 Functions of Community Governing Council vs. the Exiting Local Government Functions of CGC a. Conducting the affairs of the Community Governing Council b. Supervising the various branches of the Town Union including the general abroadians branch c. Rendering quarterly accounts of its activities to the general meeting of the Town Union d. Debating, approving, and amending the annual budget of the Community Council e. Examining and debating the monthly statements of income and expenditure which shall be rendered to it by the chairman of the Council f. Vetting and monitoring the implementation of projects and programs in the annual budget of the Community Council to guide against abandonment of projects g. Stimulating and encouraging rural and urban development through an integrated approach to community development of the community h. Promoting closer cooperation between the community government and nongovernmental/Donor agencies concerned with grassroots development i. Creating effective capacity building opportunities at the community in order to upgrade the skills of the people and their quality of life j. Promoting cultural practices and heritage of the autonomous community k. Performing such other functions as may be assigned to it from time to time by the local government and the state

Functions of Existing L.G. 1. The main functions of a local government council are as follows: (a) The consideration and the making of recommendations to a State commission on economic planning or any similar body on i. the economic development of the State, particularly insofar as the areas of authority of the council and the State are affected, and ii. proposals made by the said commission or body (b) collection of rates, radio and television licenses (c) establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds, and homes for the destitute or infirm (d) licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), canoes, wheelbarrows, and carts (e) establishment, maintenance, and regulation of slaughterhouses, slaughter slabs, markets, motor parks, and public conveniences (f) construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lightings, drains, and other public highways, parks, gardens, open spaces, or such public facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the House of Assembly of a State (g) the naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses (h) provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal

(continued)

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Table 4.2 (continued) Functions of CGC l. Assisting the local government in the following areas with the supervision of the local government (i) Collection of rates, radio, and television licenses in their community (ii) Establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds and homes for destitute or infirm in their community (iii) Licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), canoes, wheelbarrows, and carts in their community (iv) Establishment, maintenance, and regulation of slaughterhouses, slaughter slabs, markets, motor parks, and public convenience in their community (v) Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lightings, drains, and other public highways, parks, gardens, open spaces, or such public facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the Local Government Council and the House of Assembly of the State (vi) Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses in their community (vii) Provision and maintenance of public convenience, sewage and refuse disposal in their community (viii) Assessment of privately owned houses or tenement in their community for the purpose of levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a State

Functions of Existing L.G. (i) registration of all births, deaths, and marriages (j) assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for the purpose of levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a State, and (k) control and regulation of i. out-door advertising and hoarding, ii. movement and keeping of pets of all description, iii. shops and kiosks, iv. restaurants, bakeries and other places for sale of food to the public, v. laundries, and vi. Licensing, regulation, and control of the sale of liquor 2. The functions of a local government council shall include the participation of such council in the government of a State as respects the following matters (a) the provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education (b) the development of agriculture and natural resources, other than the exploitation of materials (c) the provision and maintenance of health services, and (d) Such other functions as may be conferred on a local government council by the House of Assembly of the State

Source Imo State Autonomous Community Council Administrative Law No. 1 of 2012 and Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (compiled by author, 2019)

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to Soyombo (2004), the same document that puts the responsibility of creating local governments in the state legislature also confers the power of ratification on the National Assembly, whose duty it is to appropriate money for such councils. The problem is who creates a local government? Who funds local government when created? This stems from the fact that there are 774 local governments contained in Part I of the First Schedule of the 1999 constitution, and it is part of the constitutional provision to allocate funds from the federation account monthly to these local governments. Consequently, local governments become federal government affairs (in funding) rather than state affairs. The contradiction arises from the fact that the more the local government, the more the federal allocation to the state. Some commentators have argued that ratification is only to add to what is contained in Part 1 of the First Schedule of the 1999 constitution rather than amending the constitution. Others say that local government councils cannot function as a so-called constitutional third tier of government if the National Assembly, following section 8(5), does not ratify their creation and subsequently include them in the constitution by amending it (Balagun 2004). As it is now, Local Government Areas cannot be multiplied at the whims and caprices of a state government without interfering with the system of allocation of revenue that grows out of the imperative need for a third tier, and the principle of guaranteeing the local government councils funds, just like the state and federal government (Table 4.3).

Implications on Intergovernmental Relations There are currently 774 local governments in the country guaranteed by section 3(6) of the 1999 constitution. ‘There shall be seven hundred and sixty-eight local government areas in Nigerian… and six area councils of Abuja.’ The central principle in federal allocations to local governments throughout the country is the equality of such local governments. If a state with a previous number of local governments increases the number of its local government by a certain number, all other states may also decide to increase theirs. If all are recognized as such by the federal government, then, from a given pool of money available to local governments, the total local government allocation to that state, which creates

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Table 4.3 States that created additional local governments State

Old L.G.s

Additional L.G.s

Total L.G.s

Year new L.G.s created

Ebonyi

13

21

34

2001

Lagos

20

37

57

2003

Katsina

34

30

64

2003

Nasarawa

13

16

29

2002

Niger

25

17

42

2001

Yobe

17

23

40

2003

Total

122

144

266

Comment Reverted to development areas Reverted to development areas Reverted to development areas Reverted to development areas Reverted to development areas Reverted to development areas

Source Aluko (2004) From the table, 144 new local governments were created by six states, more than doubling their present number of 122

the largest number of local governments, will increase. This will lead to competition among states on local government creation, consequently, constitutional crisis (Obasanjo 2003; Aluko 2004). In a situation where only Lagos state is involved, for example, each of the other states assuming there is no increase in their local governments would then loose in their original local government funding based on the central plank of payment of federal allocations to local governments throughout the country, which is more on equality of such local governments (Aluko 2004). Driving from the above arguments, we can elaborate further. Local government councils have been complaining of a lack of finance as the major problem inhibiting their performance. An increase in the number of local government in the country will drastically reduce monies accruable to individual local government in Nigeria going by the argument of Governor Tinubu of Lagos state:

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After all, we are not asking for any additional revenue for them; we are content to spread the same revenue, which went to the former 20 local government councils among the 57 new ones. (in Aluko 2004)

In contrary to the opinion of the governor, Aluko argues that ‘if the National Assembly approved Lagos state’s (or other states) new local governments, then by law the new local governments would have to be considered for revenue allocation via RMAFC (Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission) formula just like any of the other local governments.’ The result will be a proliferation of local governments, a constitution crisis, and a worsening of federal-state relations. As a way out, Aluko (2004) proffered three possible amendments to the constitution, which will also have an impact on the revenue allocation formula of the RMAFC: 1. The local government-based allocation is constitutionally fixed for all time in proportion to the relative current numbers of local governments in each state in the 1999 constitution. Thus, no matter how many local governments that Lagos state may choose to have in the future, its allocation would be 20/774 (= 2.58%), Kano would be 44/774 = (5.686), and Ekiti state would be 16/774 (= 2.07%). 2. The allocation to local governments is completely removed from the constitution, and all monies are based on states which can then disburse to as many local governments as they wish within their jurisdiction. 3. A mixture of considerations that take of the institutionary memory of the fractions of local governments of each state and the population fractions of the state vis-à-vis the 1991 census or any revised ones in the future. If any of these Aluko’s suggestions are implemented, it will lead to the power of the state to create or modify the local governments without having to refer the exercise to the National Assembly. It is preferable that the sharing of revenue allocation should be between the federal government and the states. Local government ought not to be part of the federating units. In response to the Guardian Opinion Poll conducted between July 11 and 22, 2003, with the question ‘how do you assess the performance of local government councils in the country?’ About 61% of the usable

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response adjudged the performance of local councils as not satisfactory, while 29% saw their performance as satisfactory; 9% were not sure. About 0.4% of the responses were invalid cases (Guardian August 4, 2003: 14). Many had argued that the ineffectiveness of local government derived primarily from excessive state government control and interference in the affairs of local governments. Others think that inadequate finance, more than anything else, accounts for the ineffectiveness of local government, that increasing the resources available to the local government will lead to their performing better. Some blame the inefficiency on corruption which has eaten deep in the ‘third tier’ level of government.

The Problems of the Existing Local Government in Nigeria Most of the state governors use the council as a means of patronage to party loyalists, rather than conduct elections into the councils, the administration of local government has been left at the disposal of a few persons appointed by the state governments. They act under the aegis of caretaker committees, made up of members who belong to ruling parties in the states and who are mostly aspirants into council offices. A situation where elected council officers with constitutional responsibilities are at the whims and caprices of the state executive, where political differences inform the type of relationship that exists between a council chairman and a state governor, has contributed to the inefficiency of the existing local government. State government excessive control and interference by diverting statutory allocation grants for local government as well as infringing on their revenue—yielding functions like markets, motor parks, tenement rating, and liquor licensing have rendered the existing Local government redundant. Huge sums are regularly deducted illegally by state governments, which act as senior partners in accounts owned with the council. The constitution requires the state governments to set aside 10% of their internally generated revenue for local councils. Many states had not adhered to this provision. A substantial part of the funds used by the local government comes from the federal government. The problem of local government in mobilization and provision of social amenities is not that of the creation of more local government but funding and sources of revenue, being financially independent of both the state and the federal government. The self-help pattern of funding the Town Unions

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set them apart from the existing local government. That would assert their autonomy from the state and the central government. The import of our argument is that the local government should, therefore, reflect local culture, and the existing system should be abolished. Federal units are the states; there is no way the local government will form part of the federation units. In other words, there would be different structures of local government in the country, varying from zone to zone. They should be the responsibility of the state and not the federal government. This will not only bring the government closer to the people, especially in rural communities, but also the gradual development of administrative machinery that would fit local circumstances. It will also reduce enormous scale corruption among the ruling elite, generate trust, and reduce apathy among the rural populace. As Lual (in Onu 2006) has noted ‘the root cause of pervasive poverty is institutional failure manifested in the destruction of important traditional structures and values of social governance and their replacement with alien alternatives that have little ground to stand on. ‘The surviving remnants of traditional notions and strategies of social mobilization still evident in the rural communities need to be revived and used as a platform for governance at the grassroots level. ‘The institutions of traditional chiefs/leaders where they exist could be another conduit of community involvement in both decision-making and implementation if the legislative system is sufficiently inclusive to accommodate all the major stakeholders. The government can govern less by exploiting the cultural values of the people that deal with trust, honesty, integrity, and communal orientation to create an inclusive and participatory governance system’ (Onu 2006). Almost all societies in Nigeria have traditional communications and mobilization mechanisms. They also have their regulative and adjudicative systems that track abuses and cultural sanctions that more effectively punish deviant behaviors than the existing structures of modern government. Experience in most states has shown that resources meant for the development of local communities channeled through local governments hardly get to the people and, in most cases, intercepted and channeled to other purposes. ‘It behooves that fiscal relationship could be more direct to the people through local structural formations.’ Onu (2006) has argued that ‘the current local government system is structured on the foundation, which sees the rural people as the beneficiary of development instead of participants in the process.’ But the community-oriented structure would lunch the people

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at the center of the development process and makes them active participants in matters that affect their lives directly. This would bring out the best in the communal spirit, ownership, and protection of the commonwealth. Local government (if it must exist) should not be a complex structure of authority but a transparent medium of assistance to local people to carry out their development projects directly. In that regard, local government should be left in the hands of the state, which should modify it to meet the peculiar traditional modes of social organization in each state. Igbo states Southeast Nigeria, for example, may then incorporate the Town Unions and other traditional institutions into a useful tool for rural governance and development. A system of local government by democratically elected local government council, bringing government nearer to the people—responsive, accountable and transparent and above all, effective in providing certain basic and essential services needed by their communities; ability to improve taxes and to levy rates and to collect revenue in large enough amount to enable them to provide services without being excessively dependent on handouts from the other two tiers of government. A local government council, which has a certain degree of relative autonomy from the state, experience has shown, cannot be achieved with the current arrangement.

References Adedeji, A. (1997, August 25). Search for rural development in Nigeria dynamics and strategies alternative systems of governance at the grassroots. Inaugural lecture delivered at the endearment fundraising for the late Major General Hassan Usman Katsina Chair of Public Administration at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria (Vanguard). Afigbo, A. E. (1972). The warrant chiefs, indirect rule in Southern Eastern Nigeria 1891–1929. New York: Humanities Press. Akude, I. (1992). Traditional agencies and rural development in Nigeria. In M. S. O. Olisa & J. I. Obiukwu (Eds.), Rural development in Nigeria dynamics and strategies. Awka: Mekslink Publishers. Aluko, M. E. (2004). Confusion as political master piece—Supreme Court rules on inchoate L.G.s and their impounded funds. http://www.nigerianmuse.com. Amucheazi, E. (1973). Local government and traditional legitimacy: Divisional administration in the East Central State. Quarterly Journal of Administration, 8(4).

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Anambra State of Nigeria. (1986). Rural Development Fund (management) Edict No. 22 of 1986. Enugu: Government Press. Balagun, S. K. (2004, July 19). Between federalism, new local councils and revenue allocation. Guardian, p. 9. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Lagos: Federal Government Press. Guardian Opinion Poll. (2003, August 4). How do you assess the performance of local governemnt councils in the country? Guardian, p. 14. Imo State of Nigeria 2012, Law No. 1 a law to provide for the establishment, structure, composition, finance, functions, and administration of Autonomous Communities in the Local Government Areas of Imo State. Nwosu, A. C. (2000). Town union assembly as an alternative to the local government council. In A. Adedeji & A. Bemidele (Eds.), People-centered democracy in Nigeria? The search for alternative system of government of the grassroots. Ibadan: Heinemann. Obasanjo, O. (2003, June 19). “The need for council reform” being president Olusegun Obasanjo national broadcast on the issue of review of structure of Governance in Nigeria. Guardian, p. 19. Okafor, C. U. (2006). Traditional/cultural institutions of government in the South–East of Nigeria and their role in modern politics and governance. A paper presented during the zonal conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association South-East Chapter. Onu, G. (2006). Achieving productivity and service delivery in Nigeria local governments through gender participation in shared governance. A paper presented during the zonal conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association South-East Chapter. Soyombo, O. (2004, April 29). Local government and (1999) constitution. Guardian, p. 65.

CHAPTER 5

Use and Operational Control of the Police Force

The control of security apparatuses such as the police is yet another matter of controversy, heightened by the strong desire expressed by some sections to establish state police. Some governors have expressed their desire to control the Commissioner of Police in their domain within the debate or desire for the institution of federalism in its true form. The local police force is argued to be naturally in a better position to police their familiar environment. With the worsening security situation in the country, the dilemma is whether to campaign for greater authority over the police or to press for ‘true federalism’ defined here to mean the establishment of state and even local government police. The first argument of those agitating for state police is that since there is a high level of insecurity in the country, state police would be more effective than the present Nigerian Police Force. Even though the constitution recognizes the state governor as the Chief Security Officer of a state, he does not exercise control over the police forces. The constitution has a provision that does not allow state governors to exercise all the power. On the other hand, those who oppose the call for state police chiefly base their argument on the abuse of the system by the state governors. The issue of who controls the police and whether or not there should be state police and even local government police has been argued for a long time. At the moment, the Nigerian police is a federal establishment operating throughout the country in a chain of command that terminates at the desk of the Inspector General of Police. At the same time, © The Author(s) 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6_5

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the constitution has described the governors as the Chief Security Officers of their states. The tactical disposition and operational use of the police in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (sec. 214–216) are vested in the Inspector General of Police. State Commissioners of Police are in charge of the day-to-day disposition and operation of the force, and in discharging these functions are responsible to the Inspector General of Police. The president or another minister authorized by him may give directions to the Inspector General concerning the maintenance of public safety and public order, as he considers necessary, and the Inspector General must carry out such orders. Subject to this provision, the Commissioner of Police must comply with the directions of the governor of a state or a commissioner authorized by him concerning the maintenance of public safety and public order within a state. Provided that before carrying out any such directions, the Commissioner of Police may request that the matter be referred to the president or such minister of the government of the federation as may be authorized on that behalf by the president for his directions. Section 214(1) states clearly, ‘there shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigerian Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the federation or any part thereof.’ There has always been a difficult challenge of striking a balance between the conflicting aspects of the constitution which on the other hand recognize the governors as the Chief Security Officer of the states, and on the other hand, make the states Police Commissioners in each state directly answerable to the Inspector General of Police. The debate on whether the police should be centralized dates back to the pre-independent constitutional conference, according to Awa (1964: 267): The constitution designates the police force as the principal formal mechanism for maintaining internal order, but there was prolonged debate regarding how the police should be controlled. Both the NPC and the AG contended that each region should be in absolute control of its police force so that it could effectively maintain law and order within its area of competence. The NCNC, on the other hand, argued that the police should be controlled by federal authorities. Otherwise, given the prevalence of tribalism, the police might be used by political parties for their benefit, regardless of the injury that might be done to the general body politic.

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The constitutional conference of 1958 reached agreement on the provisions for one Police Force in the federation, headed by Inspector General of Police. The Police Force was administered by the Police Council formerly presided over by the Governor General or by a federal minister appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister (Awa 1964). This operational control of police continued to date; the only difference is changing ‘the Region’ to ‘the State,’ the ‘Prime Minister’ to ‘the President’ and the ‘Regional Premier’ to the ‘Governor of a state.’ Thus, the question of whether there should be state police in Nigeria is one of the most persistent issues in Nigeria federalism and has existed for as long as Nigeria has been an independent state. Some scholars and political leaders have found fought with this arrangement under the current debate on true federalism. According to Fashola, the former Governor of Lagos states: ‘the opposition to the establishment of state police structure in Nigeria has largely been driven by an exaggerated, misleading and unfounded precedent focusing on the abuse of state police through political interference and manipulation (Vanguard August 25, 2012: 11)’. Some political analysts, opinion leaders, and political leaders have argued based on K.C Wheare’s principle of federalism. According to Falana, Vanguard (August 25, 2012: 12), ‘the issue of establishing state police is not really about whether the country is ready for it or not. It is necessary in a federation.’ In that line Punch editorial (August 8, 2012: 18) argues that ‘Nigeria cannot re-invent the wheel; the reality is that a federation constitution compels state police.’ According to Sun editorial (July 1, 2012: 6), ‘the current domiciliation of police functions at the federal government level only, does not cohere with the federalism Nigeria practices.’ For this school of thought, regardless of the pros and cons of the debate on the creation of state police structure in Nigeria, their concern is on the nation’s match toward the much cherished true federalism define basically on principle enunciated by Wheare which according to them is a sine-qua-non to the genuine principle of true federalism. Contrary views also exist that emphasize the sociological factors, peculiarities of the Nigerian environment. Putting into consideration the political climate operating in the country, the Ex-IGs (Punch August 15, 2012: 17) argue that the ‘state police would only be a tool in the hands of political leaders at the state level.’ Two divergent opinions have been expressed for and against the establishment of state police. Despite the attraction for state police, Etannibi Alemika (in Gana and Egwu 2003:

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xxiii) draws attention to the dangers of abuse when control is localized, as was the experience with the Native Authority police in erstwhile Northern Nigeria. In his opinion, what needs to be done is strengthening the existing mechanisms of control, as provided in the 1999 constitution, as in those of 1960 and 1963, that assigned the responsibility to a Police Council on which state governors are represented. There is a strong warning that local police units in colonial Nigeria, particularly in the North, were used to harass citizens. Any retreat to the decentralization of police should, therefore, embody assurance that police will not be an instrument for wanton abuse of citizens (Eke 1997). Arguments against state police build around the fear of abuses to which state governors may subject their police. These fears included those of intimidation and harassment of political opponents and perpetuation of electoral frauds. References were made to the experiences in the country during the former regional governments when the authorities put the regional and local authority police to abuse. This development led to an occasional breakdown of law and order. This school of thought, therefore, fears that it is too soon in the life of Nigeria’s nascent democracy for the idea of state police. According to Tempo Editorial (2001), ‘Nigeria’s real problem is not with excessive centralization, but with corruption at all levels of government. Unless the increasing criminalization of Nigerian politics is reversed, neither state nor federal police will be immune from abuse of power. The argument that state police force can be used for partisan political purposes works both ways. If state police can be used for a partisan purpose, then federal police can be used for such purpose too.’ Other scholars citing the United States and Australia, for example, where there is federal, state, and local police opine that the existence of several layers of security, particularly of the local kind, is consistent with the devolution of power in a truly federal system. According to Governor Attah (2005), ‘Nigeria police controlled by the federal government is antithetical to the practice of true federalism.’ The former Governor called for the state governments to be responsible for law and order in their localities and state police command to be accountable to the state governors. Only when a matter affects more than one state or extends beyond the boundary of a state should it be referred to the national authorities. Experts suggest reforming and improving the performance of the existing police force. According to the former Inspector General of Police Mohammed Abubakar, ‘the Nigerian police should be well funded, trained and equipped to enable it effectively constitute the first line of

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defense in matters on internal security (Vanguard August 25, 2012: 6).’ Human Right Watch (HRW) and CLEEN (Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Ekeh 2002) suggest expanding and reinvigorating the Nigerian Police Force to enable it to carry out its duties effectively: The government should provide adequate and timely payment to police officers and improve their working conditions, welfare, and equipment, with a view to raising their morale. A mechanism should be set up to eradicate corruption in the police force and bring to justice officers responsible for human rights violations. The police should be provided with thorough training, which could be undertaken in conjunction with human rights organizations with expertise in this area, and should include practical application of human rights standards, including the U.N. code of conduct for law enforcement officials and the basic principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials.

In a broad constitutional reform of police formations in Nigeria, Ekeh (2002) proffered the slimming down of the NPF, allowing it to perform specialized policing functions of a federal nature. The regional, local, and petty problems of law and order should be left to the state and local police. The Nigerian Police Force he argued could not cope with the expansive and security needs of Abuja and all state capitals; deal with the severe domestic security circumstances of such major cities as Lagos, Ibadan, Warri, Jos, Port Harcourt, Kano, and Onitsha; and then still take care of the domestic needs of small towns bearing the brunt of armed robberies and other severe forms of crimes. Ake saw the major problem in the malfunctioning of the NPF establishment in Article 214(1) of the 1999 constitution. This article of the Nigerian constitution forbids any other police formation that is not under the control of the federal government of Nigeria, thereby depriving the state and local governments of the legitimate function of any government, namely protecting people in its domain. ‘In temperament and organization, the Nigerian Police Force is not intended for little towns and villages that may well need small police forces for which they can pay’ (Ekeh 2002). Ake’s suggestions could be surmised in four sentences: 1. There is a need to reform the Nigerian constitution by deleting Article 214(1) and by permitting multiple police formations.

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2. The Nigerian Police Force should become specialized in matters that are deemed federal, while state police should operate in its entire domain in ways that will address personal security problems in their territories of jurisdiction. That is, creating jurisdictions for each to handle. Such crimes like robbery, murder, kidnapping, but not an election, should be given to the state police. 3. Local governments that can raise revenues may also have their security permitted by state laws to meet their security needs. 4. The country is too vast to be left in the hands of the central police system.

Possible Reform of the Nigerian Police Force Under True Federalism Debate Many suggestions have been made on how to restructure the Nigeria Police for effective security in a reorganized federation. The Patriots, a pan-Nigerian group led by a legal luminary late Chief Frederick Rotimi Alade Williams (SAN), on the review of 1999 constitution proposed that the recruitment command and control of the police force should be in line with the needs of the various governments comprising the Nigeria federation. They projected that the existing 36 states could conveniently be re-grouped into six regions. It is the regions that will become the federating units. However, the various states within each region will continue as units exercising governmental functions under the constitution of the region over the territory of the state concerned. The constitution will define the division of powers between the federation, the regions, and the states. The group proposed federal, regional, and state police structure. The Nigeria Police will be under the command and control of Inspector General of Police to be appointed by the president who may give ‘such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order as he may consider necessary, and the Inspector General of Police shall comply with those directions or cause them to be complied with.’ The police in the regions and states are to be under the command and control of an Assistant Inspector General of Police and Commissioner of Police, respectively, to be appointed by their chief executive—the ‘Governor’ and ‘Administrator’ in consultation with the relevant commission. This group argues that under ‘true federalism,’

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the recruitment, command, and control of the police force is relatively decentralized. The Northern Governor Forum at its meeting in July 2012 kicked against the creation of state police. It, however, resolved to prevail on the federal government to embark on police reforms that will assist the states in the control and management of police affairs on a sound philosophy of modern policing by amending the provision of Section 215 of the 1999 constitution thus: Subject to the provision of this section the Governor or such Commissioner of the government of the state as he may authorize in that behalf may give the Commissioner of Police of that state such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order within the state as he may consider necessary, and the Commissioner of Police shall comply with those directions or cause them to be complied with.

This is an attempt to removing the referral to the office of the Inspector General of Police and that of the presidency as provided in the 1999 constitution. According to Akinkunmi (2020), ‘a more pragmatic and sensible way to go about curbing the security impasse plaguing the country is to press for a constitutional amendment that would allow for the creation of state police forces with legal and full authority to carry arms.’

The Politics of State Police Many states have continued to fashion ways to tackle the problem of insecurity. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the Northeast is helping the police and army to curb Boko Haram activities in Borno and Yobe states, the CJTF is armed with basic weapons and has attained successes in the arrest of many members of the Boko Haram. Other states in the North: Kano, Borno, Zamfara, Yobe, Adamawa, Sokoto, etc. have in existence a security organization called Hisbah for sharia law enforcement. Kano state Hisbah Corps—religious police, for example, was set up in 2003 to enforce the Sharia law. The primary function of Kano Hisbah Guards, a commission created by law, is chiefly to ensure compliance with Islamic injunctions. Some sections of media have described Hisbah as ‘Islamic police,’ ‘morality police,’ or even ‘state police,’ a reference to

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the contentious issue of policing powers, currently vested solely in the federal government. In the series of subtle attempts in the realization of state or regional police is the Southwest regional security outfit codenamed Amotekun. It is the first time the states are organizing at the regional level for security purposes, though security outfits at the state level are not new. Many governors, depending on the nature of their security challenges, have devised ways of co-opting citizens directly or indirectly to provide internal security within their jurisdiction, under different names. According to Thisday (2020), twenty-three states out of thirty-six in the country operate local security outfits to complement the efforts of the police: Kaduna, Sokoto, Kano, Zamfara, Borno, Yobe, Rivers, Osun, Benue, Katsina, Cross River, Enugu, Taraba, Adamawa, Anambra, Ondo, Ebonyi, Edo, Nasarawa, Plateau, Niger, Bauchi, and Abia. This cuts across all regional parts of the country. Like the Hisbah group and the CJTF in the Northern Nigeria, the organizers of Amotekun and other security outfits at the state or regional level claim that it will complement the police force and other state security outfits in the country. In most cases, these vigilantes are allowed to carry small arms such as single-barrel and pumpaction, which are registered by the police. The new dimension is the collaboration within a region comprising many states for security purposes as exemplified by the Southwest regional security outfit, Amotekun.

The Idea of Community Policing The federal government not comfortable with the notion of state police has floated the idea of community policing. As put forth by the Inspector General of Police, this entails establishing and utilization of Special Constables from members of the community to serve as voluntary police officers under the coordination of the Nigerian Police Force. ‘The Special Constables will be drawn from members of the community to serve as voluntary community police officers under the coordination of the Nigerian Police Force’ (Adamu in Idris et al. 2019). It is a form of ‘policing tailored to the peculiarity of communities’ (Mba in Idris et al. 2019). This makes policing function citizen-centered and community-driven. Variants of community policing or neighborhood policing, a form of decentralized policing exist in the United States, UK, India, France, etc. It will be adapted to suit the existing traditional security architecture in the country. Community policing puts new emphasis on tackling the underlying causes

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of crime by addressing problems at the grassroots level (Bureau of Justice and Assistance 1994). ‘State Police’ and ‘Community Policing’ are not the same. ‘State police require state governments to create, recruit, train and manage the policing system separate from the federal government, while community policing is engaging the community in every aspect of policing, taking policing initiatives’ (Adamu, Vanguard 2019). Terver Akase, the Chief Press Secretary to the Governor of Benue state, notes that community policing has been in existence in Nigeria. ‘What is yet to be in operation is state police which requires a constitutional amendment to become operational’ (in Idris et al. 2019). The basic argument in this book is that federalism is rather a process, undergoing continuous modifications to fit the peculiarities of the environment, emphasis is laid on the society as different from the state, on the individual and his needs as different from the states and its apparatus, therefore, reforms will require the decentralization of policing functions that will respect the needs of different levels of governments in a federal system, make the individual have a sense of security, be protected as a citizen. While the federal government should have its police establishment’s state and local governments should not be prevented from having their police units, provided they can pay for them. It is evident from the account that the centralized use and operational control of the police force have emanated from the environmental forces, fears, and concerns of the minorities, tribalism, etc. The state governments should be ready to manage the police force—the ability to pay and eliminate the fear of abuse from the minorities—in this case, the opposition must be taken into consideration. Perhaps the gradual movement toward granting the state police has begun.

References Akinkunmi. (2020). Amotekun: South-West go vs must join hands with other govs to press for state police. https://www.sunnewsonline.com/amotekun-south-westgovs-must-join-hands-with-other-govs-to-press-for-state-police-akinkunmi/. Awa, E. O. (1964). Federal government in Nigeria. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Bureau of Justice and Assistance. (1994). Understanding community policing: A framework for action [Monograph]. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp. pdf.

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Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Lagos: Federal Government Press. Eke, P. (1997, April 23–25). Minority rights under Nigeria Federal structure. Proceeding of conference on constitution and federalism, held at university of Lagos, Nigeria, pp. 111–169. Ekeh, P. (2002). A review of HRW’s and CLEEN’s report, the bakassi boys: The legitimization of murder and torture on state-sponsored Vigilante groups in Nigeria. http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/documents/ConstitutionalM atters/PoliceVigilante/ReviewBakassiBoys-Ekeh.html. Gana, A. T., & Egwu, S. G. (2003). The crisis of nation state in Africa and the challenges of federalism. In A. T. Gana & S. G. Egwu (Eds.), Federalism in Africa framing the national quest (pp. xv–xxvii). Eritrea: Africa world press. Idris, H., Mutum, R, Abbah, H, Alkassim, B, Abubakar, U. Sadiq, L., et al. (2019). Community policing: What it really means for states. https://www.dai lytrust.com.ng/community-policing-what-it-really-means-for-states.html. Thisday. (2020). 23 states run local security outfits as groups demand decentralised policing. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/01/13/23states-run-local-security-outfits-as-groups-demand-decentralised-policing/. Vanguard. (2019). I-G says community policing will complement efforts in combating crimes. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/09/i-g-says-com munity-policing-will-complement-efforts-in-combating-crimes/.

CHAPTER 6

Fiscal Relations and Revenue Allocation

The main tenet of the redistributive approach to federalism, as we put forward in this book, is that the focus of distribution of power and resources in a federation should be on the citizen. While revenue allocation should aim at serving the individual, his position in the state (concerning appointment) should also be guaranteed. As Wheare had aptly commended, ‘there is and can be no final solution to the allocation of financial resources in a federal system. There can only be adjustments and re-allocations in the light of changing conditions’ (in Aboyade 1997: 38). Gana quoting Dudley (2003: 18) has argued that the explanation of ‘nationalists’ choice of federal formula in 1954 can best be explained in the attraction of Nigerian leaders to ‘a particular kind of federal structure’—the Wheare Model—which they saw as fitting the sociological reality confronting them, in a way in which the Canadian, Australian, and Indian federation did not. Their choice was thus not based on the abstract model, but on what they frequently referred to in their debate on the issues as ‘real’ or ‘true’ federalism which had the prospect of judicial autonomy with a wide range of discretionary powers and functions for the regions and prospect for fiscal self-sufficiency for aspiring regional premiers. Dudley noted that the regions where the demand for the Wheare formula was strongest (East and West) were also the regions with the highest increase in the revenues between 1953 and 1960, recording increase of 214% and 247%, respectively, as against 94.4% for the North and 74.4% for the federal government. The change in the © The Author(s) 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6_6

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economic base from agriculture as the mainstay of Nigeria economy to petroleum, which is not evenly distributed, is at the center of the problem of revenue allocation. In the First Republic, the central government received 49.6% of the federation account while the regional government took 50.4%, the federal government share dropped by 0.9 to 48.7% in 1961 with the regions taking 51.3%. The military government of Gen. Gowon changed the formula because more money was needed to prosecute the civil war and reconstruct the post-civil war economy. Limits on the exercise of power and consequently, resources by the states have evolved as a result of practical politics and military regimes. According to Sands et al. (n.d.), although the powers and functions are constitutionally established, the actual balance of power between the center and the state has always been more of a matter of politics than formal theory. This is evident in virtually all federalism. The federal government has taken on more responsibilities since the civil war and has consequently been claiming the lion’s share of the federation account. The 1981 revenue Act gave the federal government 55% of the federation account, state governments, 30.5% and local government, 10%, 4.5% for the special funds. The revenue allocation formula before the National Assembly in 2003 gave the federal government 46.63%; 33% to the states and local government are to get 20.37%. This was intended to replace the one introduced in 1992, which put the federal government’s share at 48.5%, 24% for state, and 20% to the local government. The remaining 7.5% went into special funds (Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1998: 213). Allocation was denied to the special fund in the proposal. Direct deductions made to FCT were also withdrawn as FCT is treated as a state for revenue sharing. However, a 13% derivation principle was retained; the fund would no longer form part of the consolidated revenue of the beneficiary states. A new revenue formula was presented to the legislature by President Olusegun Obasanjo dated January 6, 2005, which proposed 53.69% for the federal government of disbursed funds from the federation account while states will get 31.10% and local councils 15.21%. Before April 2002 when the Supreme Court voided the old revenue sharing formula, the federal government received 48.5%, states 24%, local councils 20% and special funds, 7.5% based on 10 July 1992 promulgated allocation of revenue (federal accounts, etc. amendment degree 1992).

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A copy of the executive bill for an act to prescribe the formula released by the National Assembly stipulated that the 53.69% of the federation account should be allocated in such a manner that the federal government would exclusively retain 47.19%. The balance of 6.5% meant for the National Priority services fund would be held in trust by the federal government for the three tiers of government, including the federal capital territory, which is treated as a state. The fund will be distributed to general ecological fund (1.5%), solid minerals development fund (1.75%), National Agricultural Development Fund (1.75%), and National Reserve Fund (1.5%). Of the 31.10% allocated to the state government and the FCT, horizontal sharing equality of states (45.23%), population (25.60%), population density (1.45%), internal revenue generation effort (8.31%), landmass (5.35%), terrain (5.35%), potable water (1.5%), education (three percent), and health (three percent). Regarding the 15.31% set aside for the 774 councils, the bill also provided horizontal sharing formula. The president, however, dropped the equality status among the councils in the bill. He explained that the action was to discourage states from indiscriminate creating of councils. The formula gave population (30.23%), population density (6.45%), internal revenue generation efforts (13.31%), landmass (10.35%), terrain (10.35%), potable water (6.5%), education (eight percent), and health (eight percent). In section two, subsection six of the bill, the president states: ‘The allocation made to a council shall not form part of the allocation of a state government or the FCT and no state government nor the FCT shall distribute or redistribute the funds so allocated to the councils in any manner other than as specified in subsection (5), that is the horizontal formula for councils of this section. The bill retained a 13% derivation fund for states but created a state derivation fund board to handle the money from resources exploited in such states. The vertical sharing formula allows the state government to get 60%, councils 30%, and host communities 10%. The bill also stated that the 60% of the derivation fund specified in subsection (1) (a) shall be shared among states concerned based on the production quantum of the natural resources while the 30% for councils shall be shared on a horizontal basis, thus giving 50% based on production quantum equality (20%), population (20%), and self-help projects (10%). On the 10% meant for the host communities, the bill directed that it should be shared using a formula prescribed by the state Houses of Assembly and in the case of Abuja, as prescribed by the National

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Assembly. To ease the management of the derivation fund, the bill said: ‘each state or FCT to which derivation fund is payable from the federation account shall, by a law of the state House of Assembly or an Act of the National Assembly, establish a board to be known as the state derivation funds board or in the case of the FCT, the Federal Capital Territory Derivation Funds Boards, as the case may be’. The board has the power to monitor and ensure that all projects are properly executed: 1. Ensure that the derivation funds are expended only in the manner prescribed by the law of the House of Assembly in the case of FCT, by an Act of the National Assembly; and 2. Carry out such other functions or exercise such powers as may be conferred on it by the law of the House of Assembly of the state. It further stated, ‘there is hereby established for the federation, a fund to be known as the National Priority Services Fund into which shall be paid an amount equivalent to 6.5% from the share of the federation account’ (http://www.nigerianmuse.com). One major innovation in this bill is the inclusion of communities in the sharing of the derivation fund and establishment of a Board to that effect. The derivation fund will no longer go 100% to the state concerned but will be allocated 60:30:10 to the state, local government, and host communities, respectively. This, if we may recall, formed part of the suggestions of the advocate of ‘resource control’—that the host communities be given some share of revenue accruable from resources that pleased God to allocate in their land. Revenue allocation is the method of sharing centrally generated revenue among the different tiers of government and how the amount allocated to particular tiers is shared among its components (Oates in Dike 2006). The concept of fiscal federalism according to Brennan and Buchman (in Dike 2006) emphasis improving the performance of public sector and provision of services by ensuring proper alignment of responsibilities and fiscal instrument in the federal system. Different tiers of government provide services for the social welfare of the citizens in it domain, states and local governments are in a better position to deliver public services, as they are closer to the people and have better information. In a federal system like Nigeria, the center has no business

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controlling the lion share of the revenue. The states and local governments being closer to the people and the bastion of real developmental activities should be favored with higher revenue from the federation account. The ideal revenue allocation formula should be that advocated by the Southern governors (Thisday October 5, 2003: 180), which favored uniform 36% for the federal and state government, 25% for the local governments, one percent to the federal capital, and two percent to ecology. We contend that if funds are allocated the way it ‘ought’ in the spirit of true federalism, the situation in the Niger Delta would be different.

Resource Control and Niger Delta Crisis Oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Oloibiri, in the present-day Bayelsa state in 1956. Today, it is produced in nine states in coastal and Southern Nigeria and is responsible for about 80% of Nigeria’s total revenue and 95% of export earnings (Sagay 2005). In revenue projection for the 2007 Budget, N4.3 trillion expected to accrue to the federation account, oil revenue estimated at N3.2 trillion, non-oil revenue at N1.1 trillion. Oil revenue represented 84% of the total estimated revenue, while non-oil revenue represents 16% (Vanguard October 12, 2007). Oil, therefore, is vital in financing the country’s economic growth and development. Oil fuels state power and activity in Nigeria. Government activity will grind to a halt if oil money is not available to it. Resource control crisis has led to the emergence of powerful mafia in the Niger Delta and increased the rate of petroleum products pipeline vandalization in the region, the kidnapping of oil workers, vandalization of oil installations, and general insecurity. This had negatively impacted on the nation’s image and economy, increased source for concern locally and internationally. The crisis in the Niger Delta threatened the electricity supply. The NNPC confirmed that ethnic militia blowing up the pipelines supplying gas to the Egbin thermal station in Lagos led to severe outages. The same armed groups prevent the NNPC from repairing previously vandalized petroleum product pipelines. ‘NNPC Joint Partners spent N444.5bn in seven years on security of oil installations in the Niger Delta; this amounts to a yearly average of $500 million or N63.5 billion’ (Guardian October 3, 2006: 1). Such a huge amount spent on security with little or no result, if spent on infrastructure, would have greatly reduced the restiveness in the region. Several multinational companies

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threatened to pull out of the Niger Delta over the fear of the safety of the members in the wake of increased activities of the restive youths in the region, the oil companies accuse the federal government of reaping huge amounts from revenue accruing to it from royalties, penalty on gas flaring, rentals and licenses and permits from oil companies, yet the companies continued to spend heavily on security. The gunmen in Niger Delta were the members of the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), comprising the Niger Delta Peoples’ Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Martyrs Brigade, and many more. The root of the crisis in the Niger Delta is the unacceptable neglect of the oil-producing areas. First, in the series of programs since May 29, 1999, return to the democratic system aimed at tackling the myriad of problems was the 13% derivation in revenue allocation (which was at times not released). Other major initiatives were the setting up of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta. Although the Niger Delta Commission and the Ministry of Niger Delta have been put in place just like earlier set up like Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Council (OMPADEC) to address the problem, not much has been achieved in the areas of diluting the crisis, the threat by the militants persist. According to Oronto (Punch August 25, 2003: 53), the struggle for resource control had been on for decades, but it became pointedly articulated between 1993 and 1998 via the Kaiama Declaration. Between 1990 and 1994, the movement for the survival of the Ogoni people articulated the position, saying that about 50% of the resource in Ogoni should go to Ogoni people. They linked that to the environmental devastation of Ogoni land. Ken Saro Wiwa, a leader and motivator, spearheaded the agitation. The second phase is by the youths of Ijawland, who made clear that the people wanted resource control. ‘Resource control’ is a recent coinage of the Southern governors, particularly Governor James Ibori of Delta state (1999–2007). As related to the Niger Delta crisis, resource control means the right of a community to control the natural resources located at its domain to a certain degree. It is the demand by the littoral states and other oil-producing areas to be allowed to control and manage the revenue accruing from oil and other natural resources in their domain under the principle of ‘true federalism.’ They argue that in a true federal state, the federating units own and control their resources and pay appropriate taxes to the center (Adesopo and Asaju 2004, Oronto 2007, Dike

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2006). Resource control means the agitation from the Niger Delta for the transfer of the present ownership and control right over petroleum from the federal government to the states where oil is located. According to (Sagay 2001) ‘resource control includes ‘states exclusive right to the ownership and control of resources, both natural and created within its territory.’ He gave three components of resource control as: 1. The power and right of a community or state to raise funds by way of tax on personnel matters, services, and material within its territory. 2. The exclusive right to the ownership and control of resources both natural and created within its territory and, 3. Right to customs duties on goods destined for its territory and excise duties on goods manufactured in its territory. Resource control is different from derivation. The principle of derivation requires that all revenue, which can be identified as accruing from or attributed to a particular state, should be allocated in part or in full to such a state. The state of origin of any particular revenue stands to receive more than any other state from the revenue accruing from within its administrative boundaries. Concerning petroleum resources, 13% derivation is to be paid to the oil-producing states. According to (Obje 2001), ‘derivation is the recognition of a prior beneficial right that was subsequently expropriated. Thus the principle of derivation is a form of compensation and/or reparation for an expropriated interest. It is a mandatory constitutional directive, which cannot be waived and/or contracted out by either the state or the federal government.’ Section 162 (2) of the 1999 constitution directs that not less than 13% of the revenue accruing to the federation account directly from any natural resources located in a state should be paid to the state. Obje noted that resource control is more of a political agitation than a legal position. Taken legally that resource control is made irrelevant by Section 44 (3) of the 1999 constitution, which vested ownership and control of all minerals and/or mineral oil on land and/or upon water in the federal government. This seems to be understood by the Governors of oil-producing states. While commenting on the onshore/offshore suit No. Sc. 28/2001, Obong Victor Attah, Governor of Akwa-Ibom state 1999–2007, noted thus: Any attempt to reintroduce onshore/offshore is what will create war. That is what will create war and not resource control because resource control

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is not a political idea that can be accepted or rejected. There is nothing in the court today that talks about resource control; go and read the brief on this case. Nobody has asked whether l should control my resources or not, the question is, should I get the benefit of the derivation of what comes out of the submerged position of my state? (Vanguard May 21, 2001: 1&2)

The central basis of the agitation for resource control by the oil-producing communities of Niger Delta is that they own the land on which they live, that the resource is on their land, that oil exploration has placed some difficulties and problems in the lives of the people. The implication is that Nigerian state, through the exploration of oil, has created some problems in Niger Delta and has not worked to remove the perceived injustice done to the people: 1. The degradation of the ecological system. 2. Flaring of gas: This results in acid rain, which has devastated the land, making it unsuitable for farming and for wildlife to survive. 3. Frequent oil spills have also left the rivers and streams polluted, and marine life destroyed. 4. In many of the riverine areas, people have no safe water supply, and they are forced to drink contaminated water with serious health consequences There is also claiming of the rights of producing communities, as against the state, on derivation and ownership of petroleum resources. Some analysts believe that as soon as the states achieve their resource control objective, the actual area within the states which produce the resources would make their demands if not for controlling it but for having a greater say in the disbursement of the funds derived from their resources, thus, staking the embers of discontent and instability in the oil-producing area of the states. This is the view of (Etikerentse 2001); therefore, he suggested not only increase in the 13% derivation principle but that a proportion of the amount payable should go directly to the actual area within the state from which the resource is derived. Even with resource control, he argued, without good governance at all levels of government, the Niger Delta will see more crises. ‘Resource control cannot be a substitute for dedicated, transparent just, and prudent governance at all tiers of government (Etikerentse 2001).’

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Table 6.1 Federal state percentage share in petroleum proceeds (1960–1999)

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Years

Producing state

Federal government

Distributable pool

1960–1967 1967–1969 1969–1971 1971–1975

50 50 45 45 minus offshore proceeds 20 minus offshore – 1.5 half 3% 13

20 50 55 55 plus offshore proceeds 80 plus offshore 100 98 and half 97 87

30 – – –

1975–1979 1979–1981 1981–1992 1992–1999 1999 –

– – – – –

Source Sagay (2001) [Guardian May 24, 2001: 8]

According to Sagay (2001) the introduction, reduction as well as subsequent increment of the derivation percentage to not less than 13% in the 1999 constitution evolved from 39 years of agitation. The principle of fifty percent derivation as provided in the 1960 and 1963 constitution was reduced to 1.5% 1982–1992, slightly increased to 3.0% by Decree 23 of 1992 which also abolished the issue of onshore/offshore dichotomy in the formula for revenue allocation from the federation account to the states and local governments areas. The fluctuation of the principle of derivation over the years was recorded by Sagay (2001), a scholar from Niger Delta thus (Table 6.1). At the third meeting of the 17 executive governors of the South held in Benin on March 26th and 27th 2001, the outgoing Chairman, Dr. Chimaraoke Nnamani of Enugu state, had this to say to his colleagues: I say to you that if democracy survives in Nigeria, nothing can stop the inalienable right of the sons and daughters of Niger Delta to control their resources. I say to you that if democracy prevails in our land, Nigeria will be restructured to respect and reflect true physical and fiscal federalism. (Guardian July 2, 2001: 17)

Speaking on the same vein, Chief Lucky Igbinedion, former Governor of Edo state notes that:

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Every state in the federation should be entitled to keep all the wealth that accrues to it by a natural endowment or the industry of its people, anything less can only result from the myopia of seeing co-existence as a zero-sum game, that is, that the progress of one unit can only come at the expense of another’s retrogression. (Guardian July 2, 2001: 17)

Dr. Nnamani was a Governor of non-oil-producing state (Enugu), Igbinedion, a Governor from a marginal onshore oil-producing state (Edo). That gives the impression that resource control or at least an increase in the 13% derivation principle may, in the end, be inevitable.

References Aboyade. (1997). Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation. Federal Government Press. Adesopo, A. A., & Asaju, A. S. (2004). Natural resources distribution, agitation for resource control right and the practice of federalism in Nigeria. Journal of Human Ecology, 15(4), 227–289. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Lagos: Federal Government Press. Dike, V. E. (2006). Democracy and political life in Nigeria. America: Inverse. Etikerentse, C. (2001, July 2). ‘Federalism, the constitution and resource control’ a reaction to Prof. Sagay’s lecture. Vanguard, p. 35. Gana, A. T. (2003). Federalism and national question in Nigeria; a theoretical exploration. In A. T. Gana & S. Egwu (Eds.), Federalism in Africa framing the national question (pp. 17–46). Eritrea: Africa world press. Mbanefoh, G. A., & Egwaikhide, F. O (1998). Revenue allocation in Nigeria derivation principle Revisited. In K. S. Amuwo (Ed.), Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum books Ltd. Obje, A. M (2001, May 23). ‘Political and legal evolution of resource control’ Test of a speech delivered at the fourth sensitization programme organized by the Ibori Vanguard at the lagoon restaurant, Lagos. Guardian, pp. 8–9. Oronto, D. (2003, August 25). Resource control politicized. Punch, p. 53. Oronto, D. (2007). A community guide to understanding resource control (Urhobo history society). http://www.waado.org/nigerdelter/essay/resour cecontrol/guide_douglas.html. Accessed June 2007. Report of Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation in the military Era 1979. Lagos: Federal government press. Sagay, E. A. (2001, May 28). Nigeria: Federalism, the constitution, and Resource control. Text of speech delivered at the fourth sensitization programme organized by the Ibori vanguard at the Lagoon Restaurant, Lagos. Guardian,

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pp. 8–9. Sagay; online: www.waadoo.org/nigerdelta/essay/resourcecontrol/ sagay. Sagay, E. A. (2005). The Niger Delta and the case for resource control. Vanguard, June 13, p. 34, June 14, pp. 30–32, June 16, p. 32. Sands, Barry, & Goldman. (n.d.). The challenge of democracy: Government in America.

CHAPTER 7

Marginalization: The Problem of Representation

According to Ibagere (Vanguard December 31, 1999: 11), a marginalized entity is rendered somewhat irrelevant in terms of importance. ‘Marginalization can occur when there is an association of entities that are supposed to be of equal status. This becomes impossible if one or some members of the association harbor greedy and despotic dispositions. Such dispositions eventually culminate in the uncanny thirst for undue positions of importance where such a greedy member can determine that status quo, usually in his favor, and to the detriment of others’ (Ibagere, Vanguard December 31, 1999: 11). We can illustrate with the distribution of local government areas in Nigeria, which are created by the federal government under military rule. Whereas Lagos and Kano states are almost equal in terms of population, Lagos State, for instance, has 20 local council areas while Kano has 44. The whole of five Igbo states has 95, while Katsina has 37 councils. Oil-producing Bayelsa has 8. It means that out of the resources shared to the local government, Kano would take 44, Lagos 20, and Bayelsa 8. Certainly, some states will fill marginalized. The problem of marginalization first came up during the first phase of Nigerian federalism in the 1950s and 1960s. The North bitterly complained that it was marginalized in public service: Northernization and Nigerianization were simultaneous; the north did not contribute much to Nigerianization. Thus by 1959, the north which was the senior partner in the coalition federal government that received over 60 percent of the parliamentary support from adherents of the Northern © The Author(s) 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6_7

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Table 7.1 The top 15 federal positions under Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998–1999) Position

Occupier

Section

1. Head of state, commander-in-chief of the Armed forces

General Abdulsalami Abubakar also holds positions of minister of Defence and minister of petroleum resources Vice admiral Mike Akhigbe Air Marshall Amin Daggash Lt. Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi Alh. Gidado Idris Air Marshal Nsikak Eduok Vice Admiral Jubrilla Ayiola Alh. Ibrahim Coomassie Brig. Gen. Mohammed Abdullahi (rtd.) Alh. Ibrahim Abdullahi Prof. Musa Yakubu Mallam Ismaila Usman Maj. Gen. Mamman Kontagora Mr. Mohammed Uwais Mr. Aret Adams

North

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Chief of General Staff Chief of Defense Staff Chief of Army staff Secretary to the federal government Chief of Air Staff Chief of Naval Staff Inspector General of Police National Security Adviser

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Minister of Justice Minister of Internal Affairs Minister of Justice Minister of FCT Chief Justice National adviser on petroleum resources

South North North North South South North North North North North North North South

Source Laide (Guardian April 6, 1999: 19)

Peoples’ Congress had less than one percent of the higher post in the federal civil service. (Tilman and Cole in Ayoade 1998: 111)

The North opposed the ‘self-government in 1956’ motion by Anthony Enahoro for fear of Southern domination in the bureaucracies owing to the superiority of the South in Western education, but under different military rule 1966–1999, the North gained supremacy and established bureaucracy in which it has a majority. The Nigerian civil war and the exodus of the Igbos from the federal public service also enhanced a massive Northern entrance into the federal public service. Within the period of military rule, the top national positions went to the North as Dare (2003: 93) has argued: ‘since the north had traditionally dominated the military, which in turn had dominated Nigerian politics, northern domination of the rest of the country was enhanced by military rule’ (Table 7.1).

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Of all the 10 Heads of state before 1999, only three are from the South. These are the late J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi January 15, 1966–July 29, 1966, General Olusegun Obasanjo, and Chief Ernest Shonekan August 26, 1993–November 17, 1993. Given the circumstances of ascendancy to power, Ironsi and Shonekan could not rightly say to have tested power at the center. Their tenure was very brief. The military years favored the North a great deal; it stands to reason that they will be most hit by any restructuring of the public service and political appointments that favor all parts that make up Nigeria. Before Obasanjo’s administration in 1999, all the chief executives of the four media organs, namely NTA, FRCN, VON and NAN, were from the North. In the same vein, most of the government enterprises and parastatals ranging from NITEL to M-TEL, NICON, NPA, NMA, FHA, NEPA, NEPZ, etc. used to be in the hands of northerners. The paramilitary forces Prisons Service, the Customs Service, the Immigration Service, and the Federal Road Safety Commission were in the hands of the North (Table 7.2). Very sensitive or key ministries and parastatals have always been in the hands of the northerners until Obasanjo’s presidency 1999–2007. The 1999 constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria stipulates, in section 14, subsection 3 that: The composition of the Government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.

The return to democracy, more especially under the PDP (1999–2015), saw the cry of marginalization shift to the North as the election into the office of the president favored the South. With Buhari ascendancy to power in 2015, all the major ethnic groups have had their turn to the presidency except the Igbos.

Igbo Marginalization Various commentators on the marginalization of Igbo’s have adduced many reasons:

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Table 7.2 Federal parastatal, agency, or organ’s chief executives before 1999 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Nigerian Ports Authority Nigerian Airways NNPC NITEL NICON Nig. Security Printing & Mining Co. NTA Nigerian Football Association

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund Nigerian Ambassador to USA Nigerian Perm. Rep. To UN PPMC (NNPC Subsidiary) Chief Justice of the Federation NEPA Secretary to Federal Government Inspector General of Police Nigerian Mining Corporation Federal Housing Authority JAMB National Universities Commission Customs Service Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) Federal Mortgage Bank Immigration Federal Radio Corporation of Nigerian Accountant General of the Federation Nat. Primary Education Commission National Maritime Authority National Directorate of Employment Corporate Affairs Commission

Alh. Wali Ahmed Alh. Sanni Ibrahim Alh. Dalhatu Bayero Alh. (Prof.) Buba Bajoga Alh. Mohammed Kari Alh. Baffa Patrick Ityohen Alh. Abdulmumuni Aminu/ Alh. Sannin Toro Alh. (Dr.) Mohammed Ali Alh. (Dr.) Hassan Adamu Alh. (Prof.) Ibrahim Gambari Alh. Haruna Abubakar Alh. (Justice) Mohammed Uwais Alh. Hamzar Ibrahim Alh. Gidado Idris Alh. Ibrahim Coomassie Yohanna Kwa Alh. Ibrahim Ali Alh. (Prof.) Bello Salim Alh. (Prof.) Munzall Jubril brig.Gen. Samuel Augo General Muhammed Buhari Alh. Kassim Bichi Alh. Sahabi Dange Alh. Abdulrahman Michika Alh. M.A. Argungu Alh. Ali Adamu Alh. Buba Galadima Alh. Baba Gana Zanna Alh. U.F. Abdullahi

Minister of Defence Period

Name

Geographical area

1960 1960–1964 1965 1966 1968–1975 1976 1977–1979

Tafawa Balewa Inuwa Wada Muhammadu Ribadu Inuwa Wada Yakubu Gowon I.D. Bisala Olusegun Obasanjo

North North North North North North South

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) Minister of Defence Period

Name

Geographical area

1980–1981 1982–1983 1983 1984–1988 1989 1990–1993

Iya Abubakar Akanbi Oniyangi Shehu Shagari Donkat Bali Ibrahim Babangida Sani Abacha

North North North North North North

Mines and Power Period

Name

Geographical area

1955–1959 1959–1960 1966–1967 1968–1971 1972–1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1979 1980 1981–1983 1983 1983 1984–1985 1985–1986 1986–1989 1993–1997 1997–1998 1998

Muhammadu Ribadu Yusuf Muttama Sule R.O.B Dikko R.O.A Dikko Shettima Ali Mongonno Effiom Otu Ekong Kachala Barko Shehu Kangiwa Prof. Justin Tseayo M.I. Hassan Paul Unongo Ali Makele Audu Ogbe Idrisu Ibrahim Tam David West Rilwanu Lukman Engr. Bunu Sherif Musa Alh. Bashir Dalhatu Alh. Babagana Kingibe Bello Suleiman

North North North North North South North North South North North North North North South North North North North North

Period

Name

Geographical area

1964–1966 1966–1975 1975–1979 1979–1981 1981–1984

L.O. Edet Kam Salem M.D. Yusuf Adamu Suleiman S.A. Adewusi

South North North North South

Inspector General of Police

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) Inspector General of Police Period

Name

Geographical area

1984–1986 1986–1989 1989–1993 1993–1998

Etim Inyang M. Gambo A. Attah Alh. Ibrahim Coomassie

South North North North

Head of Immigration Period

Name

Geographical area

1962–1966 1966–1967 1967–1976 1976–1979 1979–1986 1986–1990 1990–1992 1992–1998

H.E. Hamson J.E. Onuboju E.I. Aleyideino Aliyu Mohammed Lawai Sambo M. Damuiak Garba Abbas Garba Abbas

North South North North North North North North

Ministers of Internal Affairs Period

Name

Geographical Area

1975 1976–1979 1980–1981 1982 1983 1983 1984–1985 1985–1989 1990 1991 1993 1993–1995 1995–1997 1997–1998 1998

A. Suleiman W. Shinkaft Bello Maitama Yusuff Alu Baba Ibrahim Tahir Iya Abubakar Muhammadu M. Magoro/Lanba Gwom John Shagaya Bagudu Mamman Tunji Olagunju A, Okene Alex Ibru Alh. Baba Gana Kingbe Alh. Bashir Dalhatu Alh. Musa Yakubu

North North North North North North North North North North North South North North North

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) Chief of Army Staff Period

Name

Geographical area

1964–1965 1965–1966 January 66–July 66 1966–1967 1967–1970 1971–1975 1975–1979 October 79–April 80 April 80–October 81 1981–1983 January 64–August 85 1985 1989–1993 1993–1994 1994–1996 1996–1999

Col. R.A. Adebayo Col. K. Muhammed Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon Lt. Col. J.B.I. Akahan Brig. H.U. Katsina Maj. Gen. D. Ejoor Lt. Gen. T.Y. Danjuma Maj. Gen I.A. Akinrinade Lt. Gen. G.S. Jallo Lt. Gen. M.I. Wushishi Maj. Gen. I.B. Babangida Lt. Gen Sani Abacha Maj. Gen. Salihu Ibrahim Maj. Gen. Chris Alli Maj. Brig. Gen. A.J. Kasir Lt. Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi

South North North North North South North South North North North North North North North North

Source (Tell Magazine April 26, 1999: 30–31)

1. The 1966 pogrom, the civil war that resulted from there and the post-civil war anti-Igbo policies of the federal government notwithstanding its ‘no victor; no vanquished’ proclamation, such policies, including the monetary pittance of twenty pounds irrespective of the size of a bank account. 2. The 1973 indigenization policy that effectively transferred the commanding heights of commerce and industry primarily to Westerners. The Igbo marginalization is more paramount in the military and paramilitary bodies. According to Vanguard (July 29, 1999: 2), the National Security Council had no member from the Southeast, as against four from the Southwest, three from Northcentral, two from the Northeast, and one from the Southsouth. In the case of the military (Army, Air force and Navy), it is alleged that there is no officer of the rank of MajorGeneral (or its equivalent in the Air Force or Navy) of Igbo origins. There was only one Assistant Inspector General among the 16 highest-ranking

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officers in the police. The situation is not different in other paramilitary security agencies like the Customs, Immigration, Prisons, and Civil Defense (Southeast Zonal Working Committee of PDP Vanguard July 29, 1999: 2). There is the need for fair distribution of appointments and key positions in the country to ensure stable federalism, without in any way neglecting merit. Appointments and key positions should be filled in such a way as to prevent an ethnic group or a combination of ethnic groups, or one state or combination of states, from dominating and imposing their will on other ethnic groups. Since the return to democratic rule, May 1999, argument of marginalization has trailed the appointments made by the president depending on where the president comes from in the North and South divide. A group of Concerned Elders of the North (CEN) regarded President Jonathan’s appointment as dominated by Southerners; this was in an attempt to defend President Buhari, who is from the North, over accusations of ‘nothernization’ by the Southerners. Buhari’s critics had characterized his appointments as unbalanced, lacking in gender balance and regional equity. The positions often in the contest include those of the Permanent Secretaries, Directors-General in extra-ministerial departments and parastatals, Directors in ministries and extra-ministerial departments, senior military officers, top diplomatic posts and managerial cadres in the Federal bodies, agencies, and institutions. This chapter looked critically at how appointments and critical positions were filled under the military rule that assured the marginalization of certain groups. Appointments and key positions should be filled in such a way as to prevent an ethnic group or combination of ethnic groups, or one state or combination of states, from dominating and imposing their will on other ethnic groups. Having argued on the need to have a role created for the traditional institutions in local governance and rural development, and that fiscal and resource distribution system must be targeted to citizen interest. This chapter went further to advocate that while revenue should aim at serving the individual, his position in the state should also be guaranteed.

References Ayoade, J. A. A. (1998). The federal character principle and the search for National Integration. In K. Amuwo, A. Agbaje, R. Suberu, & G. Herault

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(Eds.), Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria (pp. 101–120). Ibdan: Spectrum. Dare, L. (2003). Federalist deconcentration and group rights in Canada: Some lesson for Nigeria. In T. A. Gana & G. S. Egwu (Eds.), Federalism in Africa framing the national question (pp. 89–114). Eritrea: Africa world press. Ibagere, E. (1999, December 31). Our self marginalization. Vanguard, p. 112.

CHAPTER 8

Party Politics and Federalism in Nigeria

This chapter is concerned with the effect of party politics and election activities on the nature of federalism as practiced in Nigeria since the return to democratic rule, May 1999. This is to the understanding that the scope of federal practice can be constrained by several factors, which actually will work in the direction of strengthening the central government. Akindele (1996) had hypothesized that party and elections adversely affect the operation of federalism. It must then be appreciated that apart from the legal basis for governance and intergovernmental relations, the single important factor that influences the pattern of intergovernmental relations outside the constitution is the party system in each country (Akindele 1996; Riker in Birch 1966: 20). Federalism is only ‘true’ to a particular nation as long as it is accepted as a functional system of government that meets the social, economic, and political needs of the people. The emphasis in this book is on individual and his needs because it is the only means by which we can objectively judge the success or failure of a political system. Where certain anomalies or practices appear to hobble the full flowering of federalism, the state must take steps to either remove them or modify them to accommodate particular social and political exigencies. The political parties represent a democratic means of resolving problems in a country by its citizens. The nature, structure, and organization of the dominant party or parties may not allow for free modification needed to achieve true federation—which is defined here to mean a federal system that will make the individual has a sense of © The Author(s) 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6_8

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belonging. According to Amucheazi (2006: 10), ‘the party is the most critical institution of governance irrespective of the political system. Its recruitment of the personnel for government both for the executive and the legislature, therefore, the political decision-makers put the destiny of the Nation in the parties. The party also is expected to bring about the integration of the various nationalities that make up the modern nationstate and, thus the stability of the nation. The quality of the personnel in question logically affects the quality of government policies and the well being of the people; it also determines the survival or collapse of a nation.’ What has been in existence in Nigeria since 1999 is the emergence of dominant political parties, be it PDP (Peoples Democratic Party) or APC (All Progressive Congress), hijacked by a few elite. Party primaries become a selection process by the president, Governors, or Party Chairmen as the case may be. This means that with a dominant political party, who becomes elected is almost a party affair, not that of the people. According to Akindele (1996: 11), ‘in all federal systems, the legal basis for governance and intergovernmental relations must be provided by a supreme written constitution. But constitutional trends and developments are shaped not only merely by express amendments through the carefully laid-down procedures, but also by practice over time as well as by authority’s interpretation by the appropriate court in the federations.’ Students of federalism are bound to pay attention to political parties and party systems as well as court verdicts more especially from the Supreme Court if they are to understand and come to grips with the dynamics of federalism and intergovernmental relations. It has been well said that the most single important political factor that influences the pattern of IGR outside the constitutional text is the party system in each country and that the proximate cause of variation in the degree of centralization or peripheralization in the constitutional structure of a federalism is the variation in the degree of party centralization. (Akindele 1996)

According to Akindele (1996), both centralized and non-centralized party system poses problems for federalism, although the latter is more congruent with the federal spirit. The existence of a non-centralized party system is perhaps the most important single element in the maintenance of federal non-centralization. For the most part, the centralized character

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of federalism is the direct result of the role of the centralized parties. The ‘federal principle’ was more fully realized in Nigeria during the First Republic (1960–1966) than elsewhere not simply due to the constitutional distribution of powers between the two levels of government which was ‘generous’ to the regions but more crucially to the regionalization of the political party system, the dominant system of power up to January 1966. The increasing regional character of the political parties not only strengthened the regions and gave them weight in their dealings with the federal government but also slowed down the trends toward centralization under the impact of national development planning. During the Second Republic (1979–1983), the parties were non-centralized in a manner that they could not facilitate centralization and federal domination. The NPN (the party at the center) was in control of only seven (7) of the nineteen (19) states (Akindele 1996: 11). According to Duverger (1972: 18), the classification generally adopted in connection with a party system distinguishes a plural party system from a one-party system. Still, the notion of ‘a dominant party’ serves a kind of bridge between plural and one-party systems. In a pluralistic party system, at least two parties coexist with no single one enjoying an overwhelming or constant superiority over the other (or others); if one does predominate, it then becomes a ‘dominant party.’ Within pluralistic systems, a basic distinction is recognized between a two-party system and a multiparty system. The simplest and crudest way to convert the number of parties into types of party systems, according to Bogaards (2004: 188), ‘is to equate them. One effective party entails a dominant party system, two effective parties signal a two-party system and three or more indicate a multiparty system,’ usually, the interest is not so much in the number of parties as such, but in the patterned interaction between them. In Nigeria, a multi-party election from May 1999 to May 2015 gave rise to a dominant party system. Advocates of the dominant party system argue that it is a correct way to reduce the problem of ethnicity, religion, regionalism, and statism, which is the bane of politics in Nigeria: …multi-partyism in 1960-65 and 1979-83 only encouraged the three ethnic players with their respective political parties and made the small groups search for shelter under any of the three ethno-regional political parties founded by leaders of majority groups. (Omoruiyi 2001)

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The dominant party may play integrative function, but it is antithetical to the practice of decentralized federalism, which encourages diversity in a plural society. The exit of the military from government house did not terminate the centralizing and unitarizing tendencies, which they introduced in January 1966. The explanation for this continued centralization, having returned to democratic rule since May 1999, may be found in the structure and organization of political parties. The military dictatorship has not ended with the military rule; instead, it transformed into political parties led by former autocratic generals who forced themselves into a democratic model. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) dominated Nigeria politics and election between 1999 and 2015. They replaced the military in Nigerian politics after the handing over to a democratically elected government of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. The party emerged as an offshoot of the G-34, a quasi-political group, which came to the scene in March 1998 to stop the late Sani Abacha’s self-succession plot. The G-34 enjoyed a massive following across the country. Many people, who identified with their cause to stop Abacha, regarded them as men of high principles. According to Awoniyi (Guardian January 14, 2007: 51) from inception, the PDP was dreamed of looking like the African National Congress of South Africa. ‘It was to be a huge mass movement that is people-oriented.’ It can be inferred from the opinion of Awoniyi that PDP from the beginning was fashioned to be a dominant party but a people-oriented type. Ekwueme, another founding father of PDP, had the view that the intention for forming the PDP was that ‘it would be a party that would be all-inclusive. It would not be exclusionary. Nobody was going to be left out no matter the person’s antecedents,’ but this is not to be as the party ‘fall into the hands of the oligarchy who takes decision hardly with any consultation’ (Amucheazi 2006). Ekwueme tactically withdrew from playing an active role in the affairs of the party before his death. Some of the party’s most active members were rendered impotent or ultimately coerced into silence or compliance. When Audu Ogbe was replaced with a caretaker chairman, Dr. Ahmadu Ali, a former military colleague of Obasanjo, the perception of increasing presidential control began to gain substance. In a speech to the party convention held in Abuja in early December 2004, Obasanjo asked party members to trust him as the party leader, to interpret the issue of selection of the appropriate presidential candidate at the right time. Some of the aggrieved

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founders were unhappy with Obasanjo tagging himself as the ‘father of the party and the nation.’ PDP enjoyed near-hegemonic power, controlled 28 out of the 36 states, also controlled the national government with a large majority 1999–2015. The exemplary presidential control of the party through the party Chairman and the National Working Committee means Nigeria retained the military modeled federalism even under a seemingly new party, the APC. ‘It could easily be argued that what we have in the APC is simply a reconstruction of old alliances: old wine in old but re-labeled bottles if we want to be cynical’ (Lukman 2012 in Ogulensi 2013). Lukman had argued that the histories of current Nigerian political parties show that they originated from the same source, the PDP.

Dominant Party and Federalism: The Example of PDP The question is why has the practice of government not been consonant with the ‘true federalism’ preferred by Nigerians? The explanation for the continued centralizing tendency of Nigerian federalism despite having returned to democratic rule since May 29, 1999 may be seen in the structure and organization of the Peoples Democratic Party, a dominant party. The first political party in the Fourth Republic from its womb other political parties emerged and emulate. Modern political parties cannot do without organization. Those who study party organization have been most concerned with the locus of power—how much power is found at each level, and who exercises it. According to Ujo (2000: 59), while it is true that the formal structure depicts the graphic framework of the organization, excessive reliance on it may be deceptive, as it may not present an accurate picture of the structure of the party. There is every possibility that informal structure could exist side by side with the formal ones. There is, therefore, the need to watch out for such structures and if they are found to study how they influence the formal structure. The formal organizational structure could become outmoded and thereby fail to reflect the pattern of behavior in the organization. Such formal structure may become the shadow rather than the substance of the organizational structure. Most scholars have tended to agree with Robert Michel that there is indeed an Iron law of oligarchy. They have endeavored to distinguish between loose-knit cadre parties and more tightly articulated mass parties .

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The former is controlled by a small core of leaders (usually found at the head of the party’s legislative group) who are free to form policy with little interference but also only occasional support from the broader membership. The latter has a larger, more active, and more committed membership, who is supposedly better able to share in decisions made by the party’s elected leadership. Other scholars have remarked on the phenomenon of the stratarchy—a decentralized party where party policy is made differently and independently by every nuclear unit and has only a limited range of application and enforcement. Eldersveld (1964) had described the stratarchy as ‘a self-contained, autonomous party unit with influence and control in its own right, permanent over time, and stable.’ A decentralized party composed of a multitude of junior oligarchic units, where party policy is made differently and independently by units, and has only a limited range of application and enforcement. According to Katz and Mair (2002: 129 in Carty and Cross 2006: 95): Stratarchical organizations are based on the principle of a division of labor in which different and mutually autonomous levels coexist with one another, and in which there is a minimum of authoritative control, whether from the bottom-up or from the top-down … While the levels may be mutually autonomous, they are not merely an agglomeration of independent entities: they are interdependent elements of a wider organization.

Uncomfortable with the concept of stratarchy, Koole (1996: 518 in Carty 2004: 7) denies its existence and instead argues that ‘it is, perhaps, better to speak about a federalization of political parties’ in which ‘local party branches have a certain autonomy in local affairs, but when acting together they are still able to wield considerable power on the national professionals.’ In a ‘federal’ party structure, the national party elite cannot ignore the ties with lower strata concerning national politics. The local party elite is relatively free from the interference of the national party in local issues. Sargent (2004: 137) argues that ‘whereas a corporation is organized as a hierarchy, with a chain of command that makes each level directly accountable to the level above it, a political party more especially in a federation is organized as a stratarchy in which power is diffused among and within levels of the party organization corresponding to the federal structure.’ Each major party is loosely organized so that state

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and local party organizations are free to decide their positions on party issues. State and local-level organizations operate within their spheres of influence, separate from one another. According to Jinadu (2011), ‘the party structure and administration at each level must be autonomous within the spheres of competence assigned to it by the party’s constitution, with provisions made for checks and balances by the other levels on the exercise of the autonomy.’ The territorial organization is an influential factor in party organization; federalism is, according to Epstein (1980: 31–34) and Harmel (1981: 86 in Lundell 2004: 26), ‘related to decentralized candidate selection.’ General party decentralization, and consequently decentralized candidate selection, is quite strongly related to the decentralization of power within the polities where the parties operate. ‘In federal systems, the national party organization often plays an insignificant role in the selection process, compared to parties in unitary systems’ (Lundell 2004: 34). Drawing from the US example, Gardner (2013: 15–19) notes: American parties are by global standards decentralized, meaning that state and local party organizations have often enjoyed considerable autonomy from the national organizations…if they (states) are to play any independent role whatsoever in a recognizably federal system, they must maintain a significant degree of political autonomy. Sub-national autonomy is, after all, the characteristic that defines the distinction between federalism and a mere decentralized hierarchy…Even the most minimal theory of federalism must contemplate that states have the capacity, if not actually, to thwart national action, at least to dissent from the substance of national political decisions…There are grounds to wonder whether the extra-constitutional power of political parties has not, in the end, caused something that looks much like a collapse into political centralization.

The distinction between stratarchy, mass, and cadre is useful, but there is a fourth form of party organization characterized by centralized power, the vanguard party (the dictatorial party). In this type of party, policy decisions are made by narrow elite at the party headquarters. Still, members are nevertheless expected to be fully and continuously devoted to the execution of party policy. Dictatorial parties bring order out of the chaos of multiple voters and broker ideas, constantly classifying, systematizing, and expanding the party’s doctrines. Invariably dictatorial parties tend to think about a new society. The competitors in politics become more inflexible; the struggle assumes the quality of a religious

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war; the only possible outcome for any contestant seems to be an overwhelming victory or ultimate annihilation. Dictatorial parties endeavor to seize power and become a revolutionary vanguard of the future state. Dictatorial parties plan for monolithic control; integration of the individual to them means the enforcement of conformity through various state agencies of enlightenment and one-way propaganda from above. Dictators talk about public opinion; the only problem is that they try through their secret agents to make those opinions. Indeed, the PDP under Obasanjo turned into a dictatorial party against a ‘people-oriented mass movement’ as envisioned by its founders. Though the structure and organization of Nigerian political parties follow the pattern expected in a federation, the party is structurally aligned along the tiers of government: the center, the state, the local government, and the wards in the descending order. Each unit reports to the immediate higher unit. Correspondingly, power is supposed to be reasonably decentralized, and each unit enjoying a reasonable degree of autonomy. Thus, the decisions of a unit ought not to be overturned by the immediate or any higher unit without due investigation and consultation. According to Amucheazi (2006: 16), ‘in contrast to supposed reasonable decentralization with regard to the federal structure of the country, the practice, as exemplified by the PDP, showed centralism.’ The National Working Committee ignores the outcome of primaries at the lower constituencies and imposes its candidates for all the elections, national, state, and even local government. The party he noted had fallen into the hands of an oligarchy who took decisions hardly with any consultation. The so-called Iron law of oligarchy in organizations seems to have been exemplified though, for the wrong reasons, that is not because of the demands of discipline in and success of the organization and mastery of rules and expert knowledge by the leadership but because of corruption and brigandage. (Amucheazi 2006: 16)

The apparent consequences of this were: 1. The factionalization of the party as party members tries to outbid one another for party posts, ministerial and board appointments, etc.

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2. In the state, there is a constant struggle between the Governor, who is the leader of the party, and the young millionaires who bought the chairmanship from the center, 3. Another consequence is the election and appointment of unqualified persons to positions of responsibility to the detriment of the interest of the people. Often party leaders themselves confound the situation by inducing the selection committee to adopt a candidate who may be in good standing with the party hierarchy but does not have popular support in his constituency. When popular candidates are defeated, local party leaders react by appointing parallel candidates, and the party spends valuable time settling the candidate’s claims and counterclaims, which never got resolved. It is not enough for aspirants to be entrenched in the grassroots; they must also understand how to play the ‘Abuja game.’ The party constitution adds a lot more to the powers of its national leaders. Article 17.1 of the PDP codes, says the decision on who eventually flies the party flag in any election rest with the National Execute Council (NEC), and NEC means, effectively Ali, president Obasanjo and to some extent, Chief Tony Anenih, Chairman of the PDP Board of Trustees. (Guardian January 14, 2007: 51)

This removes the choice of policies and the governor of a state from the people in individual states and transfers it to the center; the military dictatorship did not end with the military rule; rather, it transformed into political parties led by ‘democratic’ dictators. The party primaries provided the best opportunity for the Chairman to operate as a ‘maximum ruler.’ Aspirants, who wished to remain in the reckoning, do most of their campaigns at the party headquarters in Abuja. Several weapons were employed to force those who pretended to have a mind of their own, to yield to the mainstream intrigues. The preprimary screening in the PDP, for instance, was specially woven to ensure that only those that got the clean bill of the screening committee would advance to the next stage of the contest. ‘Recalcitrant’ party members, who refused to deliver on major party assignments, including the failed tenure extension project at the National Assembly by President Obasanjo, were brought down. This included Aminu Bello Masari, House of Representatives Speaker, who lost the governorship for Katsina state. The primaries were also times to

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settle scores with state governors, who had been too difficult to manage. The heat became unbearable for Governor Orji Uzo Kalu of Abia State, and he had to seek refuge in a new platform—The Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA), where he was the presidential flag bearer. Vice president, Abubakar, was screened out through non-revalidation of membership, suspension and eventual expulsion from the party. Chairman Ali’s wife, who did not even contest the senate primaries, was declared candidate for Delta North. In Imo state, the former president of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), Chief Charles Ugwu, was picked by the leaders of the party in Abuja as the party gubernatorial candidate. At the same time, Senator Ifeanyi Araraume, who scored the highest votes at the primaries, was not named the party candidate. Araraume scored highest in the primary held at the Dan Anyiam Stadium, Owerri, by scoring 2061. The nearest candidate Chief Hope Uzodinma had 1649, and Chief Tonny Ezenna got 1388 to place third. Ugwu scored only 36 votes. Arararume had scored the highest votes among the 22 aspirants. He was, however, not declared a winner because he did not have 50% of the vote. INEC displayed Araraume’s name as the party’s candidate for the governorship at the INEC offices in Abuja and Owerri. At the primaries for the selection of candidates, PDP always comes up with a ‘family arrangement’ that sees epic contests dissolved into a simple selection process.

The Nomination Process in PDP This has to do with political relations between the units of the party in the federation—national, state, and local organs); ‘the nomination process is regarded as the dependent variable, which serves as a prism for understanding the distribution of intra-party power among different organs and factions’ (Norris 2004: 26). There are two categories of candidates selected and nominated by political parties. Candidates are selected for staffing party offices across all the branches and chapters of political parties, and candidates are also nominated to contest general elections. ‘The technique of a party’s candidate selection explains and provides adequate information on how the party functions internally and the location of political power in a particular country’ (Katz and Mair 1995). In other words, knowing who is involved in the steps of the recruitment process is indicative of the relative authority exercised by various territorial levels of the party organization. The critical question, according to Norris,

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(2004), is ‘who decides,’ and the key dimensions of internal democracy are: i. The degree of centralization, namely how far nominations are either determined mainly by the national party leadership or devolved downwards to the regional, district, or local bodies, ii. The breadth of participation, a related but distinct matter concerning whether just a few selectors pick candidates or whether there is the choice of one, few, or multiple contenders are vying for the nomination. In the real sense of it, selection procedures ought to be a reflection of the party’s values and interests as much as a reflection of its operating environment—the constitutional structure matter for party development, organization, and behavior. In a federal system, the nomination of candidates ought to be more decentralized than in a unitary system. A political party, more especially in a federation, ought to be organized in a way whereby power is diffused among and within levels of the party organization corresponding to the federal structure. Each major party ought to be loosely organized so that state and local party organizations are free to decide their positions on party issues; state and local-level organizations operate within their spheres of influence, separate from one another. The Nigerian Fourth Republic inherited highly centralized federalism as a consequence of many years of military rule, which influence the organization of political parties and their dynamics. The PDP national party organs centralize power, a consequence of centralized federalism, and make decisions that affect nomination at all levels of the federation; sidelined candidates had greater incentives to abandon the party and form opposition party that would not only be competitive at the center but protects their regional interest in political offices at the national level. Candidates had greater incentives to abandon local organs of the party and focused their campaigns at the center. Those who had no connection at the center had no option than to leave the party. Politicians decamped from their parties because they did not fit within the national party’s calculations, not that the electorate rejected them; consequently, after primaries, there is a lot of traffic out of the political party, either to form a new party or for a candidate to contest the election on a different platform. Candidates were forced on party members, and in some cases, party

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primaries are either not held or manipulated by national party officials. The conditions of intra-party competition in the selection of candidates to contest elections (the nominating system) were schemed to favor National level supported candidates. This can be seen in the degree of central and local control of the nomination process, solving problems arising from local primary elections, and the enforcement of party discipline. The concept of the president as the National leader from where derived; the Governor, as leaders in the state, was alien to PDP’s constitution but remained a common practice. The stability of the PDP had been hinged on the Governors since the PDP assumed power in 1999. Governors control the party structures in the state, local government, and ward levels and also play a major role in the nomination of the presidential candidates. At the State and Ward levels, the governors deliberately shut out unwanted candidates and imposed their candidates on the party. The national leadership of the party turned a blind eye. It refused to act on the impunity of the Governors as far as the governors do not interfere in the selection process at the national level, which is manned by the national party bodies. Politicians had to flee from the PDP because they did not fit within the governors’ calculations. According to Sen. Ndoma-Egba (in Tsan 2015): As long as ownership of the party was not with its members but with governors, they became overbearing; it was only their wishes that ruled. The party (at the national level) suborns its constitution, guidelines, and even court orders to please the whims and fancies of governors who appropriate the will of members and impose theirs in its stead. This bred sycophancy, impunity and arrogance and eroded internal party democracy,’ …’ within the parties, especially the PDP, the government is no longer of the people and for the people. It is now the government of governors, by governors, and for governors. This resulted in brazen injustice and restricted the political space for many.

Contesting election was seen by the PDP flag bearers as a routine event. Election outcomes were frequently pre-determined. Once nominated to represent the PDP, a candidate can rest assure that the party will fight (by hook or crook) to ensure victory at the election. When the PDP politicians lose at their party’s primaries, they become inconsolable because the party’s primary was usually the last obstacle before the main event. The impression driving this arrogance was to believe that with PDP badge, victory was guaranteed at any election. It was this philosophy that drives

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some state governors and legislators to flee from their parties to join the PDP ahead of federal elections. As a rational politician, it was better to wear the emblem of the party that guarantees you victory in the election rather than to hang around a political party that offers you uncertainty. This also explained the abnormally large number of candidates seeking to represent the PDP, the crisis-ridden primaries, and conventions that produce factions. The people from the constituent units of the federation hardly contribute to decision-making within the party, including nominating and electing their representatives. In that case, their interests cannot be protected.

Degree of Central and Local Control The degree of central control over the local units of the party can be seen in actions taken by the NEC (National Executive Council) and the NWC (National Working Committee) of the PDP that eventually contributed to the defeat of the party. With numerous aspirants and consequent chaotic primaries, the ability to reach a consensus did not exist. The National Executive Committee (NEC) of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), through the National Working Committee (NWC), settled on a candidate for elections at all levels in most cases. Defeated local party leaders reacted by appointing parallel candidates, forming or joining new parties with their supporters; such suppression and express confirmation of candidates by the NWC removed the choice of candidate for election from the people to the intrigue at the center. In River State, for example, Amaechi obtained a declaration that he was the rightful governorship candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the 2007 elections, having scored 6527 of the 6575 votes cast at the parties primaries, but was substituted in the last minute with Omehia. Amachi was accused of corrupt practices after the primaries, and, based on this, the PDP replaced him as the party’s candidate. The Supreme Court ordered Celestine Omehia to vacate the seat for Rotimi Amaechi as governor of Rivers State without Amachi participating in the gubernatorial election. One of the major crises within the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which strengthened the support for the opposition, originally stemmed from Adamawa state as a result of governors’ move to maintain a grip on politics in their states to ensure state branch autonomy endangered by the National Working Committee. Adamawa crisis followed the dissolution of the Alhaji Mijinyawa Kugama-led executive on October 17, 2012,

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by the PDP National Working Committee, headed by the party’s national chairman, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur. The Kugama executive was Governor Murtala Nyako’s strong support, and its dissolution by the PDP national leadership kicked off a crisis that the party found very difficult to manage. The NWC (National Working Committee) held that the reason for the move was that the state chairman, Alhaji Umaru Mijinyawa Kugama, had overstayed his tenure and was from the same senatorial district as Governor Nyako. The dissolution of the state executive was, however, opposed by the governors who alleged, among others, that it would inspire anarchy and lead to a situation where NWC members at the least provocation would dissolve state executives of the party. The state executives of the party were in almost all cases loyal to the governors, and the decision against the Adamawa state chapter was seen as something that, if not checked, could in future affect all of them. In a letter dated December 10, 2012, and titled, ‘Brief on Matters leading to the Dissolution of Adamawa state PDP Executive by the NWC on October 17, 2012,’ addressed to all PDP governors, Nyako had called on the governors to resist the dissolution of the Adamawa PDP executive: I submit that if this unjust dissolution of the Adamawa state executive is left unchecked, every other state executive would soon find itself facing similar unjust treatment with repercussions for all. Let us collectively save our party.

Although the dissolution of the party executive in Adamawa was rescinded by 10 out of 12 members of the National Working Committee of the party, the National Chairman refused to be pacified even after being prevailed upon to do so by relevant stakeholders including Mr. Obasanjo (the former president) and governors of the party. In Kano state, the Bamanga Tukur-led Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) inaugurated Alhaji Hassan Kafayos and Andrew Musa as chairman and secretary, respectively, of an 11 member interim state executive of Kano state PDP. The inauguration of the interim state executive was done without recourse to either the Leader of the party in Kano state, Gov. Rabiu Kwankwaso or other stakeholders of the party from Kano. In Plateau state, the NWC sacked the state leadership led by Dakum Shown, a Professor, and replaced it with a caretaker committee led by Abu Shuluwa. The NWC argued that the Shown-led executive was incapable of running the party in the state and had been incorporating in the efforts

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at resolving the crisis there. According to Akali (Tell no. 43 October 26, 2009: 24–33), ‘it is a well-known fact that the bitter division within the party in the state has led to the setting up of parallel structures at all levels which was unacceptable to the NWC of PDP.’ In Anambra, the NWC endorsed the Uchenna Emordi-led State Executive Committee, ignoring the suggestion of the Southeast stakeholders meeting, which suggested that Emordi-led executive should be dissolved to give way for a caretaker committee. The NWC, through Alkali, overruled the stakeholders according to him, ‘no regional body is competent to review the decision of NWC, particularly when such a body is not known to the constitution of the party.’ Behind the supposed plot to take away the structure of the party from the aggrieved governors was that the governors were relevant to the grassroots politics and served as the only avenue for federal resources and party’s domination. Governors hold enormous sway because they allocate federally disbursed revenue and shape policy on development and security in their states; when a governor becomes stubborn by having the mind of his own separate from the party at the center, the war for the soul of the party in the state begins. ‘In as much as votes are mobilized at the base by members who have to contend with a varying opinion, tradition, and social structure, the local activist claim greater autonomy, and initiative in the selection of candidates’ (Roy 1967: 897). However, the structure politically ought to belong to the people at the grassroots and not the other way round. One character that permeates all political parties in Nigeria is the authoritarian nature and a high degree of centrality of the party structure and processes. There is a need to dismantle the subsisting overcentralization in Abuja. The key decisions determining who is nominated should occur among officials, delegates, and activists at the state or local level. The control, the center exercise on the state chapters, must cease so that each state runs its activities and brings its delegates to the center after voting for candidates. This strike directly at the heart of state autonomy and the struggle for ‘true federalism.’ Inter-party and intra-party democracy; about party primary, the question of institutionalizing a credible electoral system, and the process that will guarantee a free, fair, and transparent electoral outcome is essential. This will create a situation where the people’s vote will count. The elected leaders will have no choice but

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to deliver on electoral promises, as this is the only way they can guarantee their return to the office for a second term, and maintain or build confidence in the people on the faithfulness of their political parties. Party politics hitherto have not been played in the interest of the people; the people from the constituent units of the federation hardly contribute to decision-making within the party, including nominating and electing their representatives. In that case, their interests cannot be protected. Through the machinery of a dominant political party, the president installs a personality cult both in the country and the party in which there is no room to tolerate dissent or alternative views of governance. Under ‘selective electioneering,’ the so-called representatives do not represent the interest they are supposed to protect for fear of losing out in the next election; consequently, the room the National Assembly, the National Economic Council (NEC), the National Council of State, the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) established to resolve the issues raised in the literature as constituting true federalism are in the manipulation of the president. The future of Nigerian federalism, therefore, lies in competitive, issue-based political parties that will seek the mandate of the people to tackle some given national problems raised while on the campaign. The election of the party at the National level will serve as approval of policies they wish to implement.

Party Politics in the First and Second Republics In pre-independence and the First Republic period (1951–1966), political parties like NPC (Northern People’s Congress), AG (Action Group), and NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon) were all regionalbased parties. They had a romance with the prevailing ideologies of their time—socialism and capitalism, which determined their policies. In concrete policy terms, the parties led by Awolowo in the First and Second Republics—the Action Group (AG) and Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), respectively, were committed to the provision of free education, free health care, full employment, rural integration, and development as well as massive development of infrastructure. Awolowo affirmed his commitment to the ideology of democratic socialism. The more conservative inclined parties such as the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) of the First and Second Republics were less prone to utilize state resources for the provision of social welfare

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services for the vast majority of the people. They instead preferred policies that would help cultivate a viable business class and thriving private sector capable of spurring economic growth, believing that the masses would ultimately benefit from the ‘trickle-down’ effects of such policies. The ‘federal principle’ was more fully realized in Nigeria during the First Republic (1960–1966) than elsewhere due not simply to the constitutional distribution of powers between the two levels of government but more crucially to the regionalization of the political party system (Akindele 1996: 11). The increasing regional character of the political parties not only strengthened the regions and gave them weight in their dealings with the federal government but also slowed down the trends toward centralization under the impact of national development planning. During the Second Republic (1979–1983), the parties were noncentralized in a manner that they could not facilitate centralization and federal domination. The NPN, the ruling party at the center, was in control of only seven (7) of the nineteen (19) states. There were cases of the ruling party trying to coalesce into a hegemonic party at the center both in the First and the Second Republics, but the opposition parties also united to challenge it, pushing toward a two-party system. By this period, the regions were autonomous units of Nigerian federation exercising substantial powers and functions compared to the center. Parties remained relevant to the region even when it loose out at the center. This was the case of Awolowo, and his Action Group controlled Western region, Aminu Kano’s NEPU, and Kano politics. The then existing political parties saw the 1959 independence general elections as a fight on who controls the center. This was not possible in the poll because the parties were ethnic base. This led to a coalition of political parties to form the government at the center. By definition, ethnic parties are unable to expand significantly beyond their ethnic electoral base; thus, they are unable to pursue hegemony. The force to aggregate at the center became tremendous as power consistently, through the prosecution of civil war, dominant oil economy, and military guided constitutional change, shifted to the federal government. This herald the birth of the era of national parties or what can be referred to as dominant parties. Nigeria came out of the civil war as a much centralized federal state due mainly to the growth of Federal power, enhanced by the creation of smaller states that could not challenge federal power and the significant increase in the revenues accruing to the federal government, particularly from petroleum. The Nigerian state was placed on the

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path of centralization by the multiplication of states from 4 Regions to 12 federated states in 1967, and then to 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991, and 36 in 1996. The miniaturization of the federating states enhanced the power of the central government and the appetite of political parties to control it. This has the history of pushing regional parties into a series of coalitions with wilder interest aggregation. As a means of capturing power at the center, what emerged recently is umbrella parties—‘catch all parties.’ In elections that were relatively free and fair, namely 1979 and 1999 elections, the ‘catch-all’ parties that had the highest votes, the National Party of Nigeria and the Peoples’ Democratic Party failed in their desire to be hegemonic or dominant at the center through the polls. In the subsequent elections of 1983 and 2003, they all used incumbency powers to transform themselves into dominant parties; opposition being too weak and having no formidable force and resources to capture the center, members try to decamp to the ruling party. The ruling parties used electoral fraud and alliance to boost their support and control of the political process and weaken opposition parties. In Nigeria, alliances and mergers of political parties are mainly motivated by political expediency and the desire on the part of individuals, ethnic and other social groups to widen their support to control the center, thereby, have unhindered access to what they regard as their share of the so-called national cake. Since the acquisition of political power is generally seen as the best form of insurance against domination by other ethnic groups, the various political parties turn a blind eye on ideologies and other forms of opposition to the party at the center so far as this makes it possible for them to partake in controlling the center. By the time of the 1964 general elections, the first to be conducted solely by Nigerians, the country’s politics had become polarized into a competition between two opposing alliances. A series of shifting alliances between parties culminated in grand alliances that prompt a two-party competition. One was the Nigerian National Alliance made up of the NPC and NNDC; the other was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the NCNC, the AG, and their allies. The alliances collapsed with the demise of the First Republic in January 1966. When the presidential system of government was introduced in 1979, the ruling Political party NPN (National Party of Nigeria) adopted a purely catch-all strategy for the first time in Nigerian politics to control the center. When they fail short of a comfortable majority, the NPN

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entered into a working agreement with the NPP. The NPN tried to establish control of the center through massively rigged elections. Self-styled progressive politicians attempted to forge an alternative political party via the Progressive Parties Alliance PPA (in 1983, the Nigeria Peoples Party and a faction of the Peoples Redemption Party and the Great Nigeria Peoples Party allied contesting the general election). The pattern of electoral politics that emerged before 1999 was one in which one party was trying to maintain dominance while the opposition, on the other hand, tried to coalesce to challenge it. This was more favorable to decentralized federalism.

Party Politics and Election Activities in the Fourth Republic In the current 4th Republic PDP with the Umbrella logo representing the catch-all strategy of the party consistently won in the presidential, National Assembly, and Governorship elections, more votes/seats than all the other parties combined till 2015. Unlike in the 1st and 2nd Republic, the mathematical possibility of having the leading opposition party defeat the ruling party was close to nil from 1999–2015. In 2013, the All Progressive Congress APC was formed and defeated the PDP in the 2015 presidential election. Their logo is a bounded broom, representing bounded groups of divergent interests and ideology whose primary interest is to control the center. PDP emerged in 1999 with a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives winning 54% of Seats as Percentage of Total Seats Declare in the Senate and 59.20% in the House of Assembly. In the presidential election, the PDP emerged as a winning party with 62.78% votes, the only contending party AD/APP joint ticket secured 37.22% (derivative percentage worked out from http://africanelections. tripod.com/ng.html). In the subsequent elections in 2003 and 2007, PDP sought to consolidate her position. The PDP simulating ‘landslide victory’ was achieved through a combination of massive electoral fraud, outright falsification of election results, intimidation, harassment, and violence. Through the use of violence, intimidation, harassment, and electoral perversion, the ruling party was able to secure a crushing defeat of opposition parties in the controversial and discredited elections. In 2003, the PDP increased its simple majority in 1999 to absolute majority in the Senate, with 69.73% of seats won as a percentage of total

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seats declared as against 54.63% in 1999. They came a little short of that in the House of Assembly with 62.11% as against 59.20% in 1999. The presidential election was won by Obasanjo (PDP), seeking a second term with a slight minus 61.94% as against 62.78% in 1999. By the 2007 general election, a dominant authoritarian party has been established. In a massively rigged-election as noted by the EU Report, PDP won an absolute majority in the Senate and House of Representatives with 79.82%, and 73.06% of seats won as a percentage of total seats declared, respectively. Umaru Musa Yar’Adua won the presidential election in an election considered the most controversial in terms of electoral malpractice in the Fourth Republic. PDP also controlled an absolute majority in terms of governors of states in 2003 (28), 2007 (26) out of 36 states, substantially gaining from defectors from other parties. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) remained the leading political party in Nigeria with a majority of the state governors and members of the National Assembly and State Assemblies up till 2015. The party’s majority diminished after the 2011 general elections. This was due mainly to dissatisfaction with the party’s nomination process. In the presidential election, PDP emerged as the winning party with 58.89% votes, followed by Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) with 31.98% votes, and Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) with 5.41%. President Goodluck Jonathan received 58.89% of votes in the 2011 elections, down from the 69.60% garnered by his predecessor, the late Umaru Yar’Adua in 2007. The PDP controlled 59% of the seats in the House of Representatives, compared to 73.06% in 2007. Its strength in the Senate over the same period decreased from 79.82 to 66%.

The Diminishing Performance of the Opposition When democracy returned in 1999, the opposition parties won 15 of the 36 states. The Alliance for Democracy (AD) won in Lagos, Ekiti, Ondo, Ogun, Osun, and Oyo and All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) formerly All Peoples Party (APP) triumphed in Kwara, Kogi, Bornu, Gombe, Jigawa, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. The PDP had the rest, Abia, Adamawa, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, Rivers, and Taraba. PDP lost all the six (6) Southwest states, including Ogun state (the home state of the PDP presidential candidate, Obasanjo) to Chief Olu Falae, who was the candidate of AD/APP alliance during the 1999 election. Obasanjo schemed and lured the Southwest

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AD (Alliance for Democracy) Governors then Adebayo Adefarati (Ondo), Lam Adeshina (Oyo), Olusegun Osoba (Ogun), Adebayo Adeniyi (Ekiti), Bola Tinubu (Lagos), and Akande (Osun) into playing ethnic card to return him to office in the 2003 presidential election against General Buhari of ANPP. Promising to support them to retain their seats as well, except for Bola Tinubu of Lagos state who made it back to governorship position, others were voted out of office, and consequently, the gradual death of AD. By 2003, the opposition parties lost seven states—Ekiti, Kwara, Kogi, Ondo, Ogun, Osun, and Oyo. PDP, however, lost Anambra state to All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) via a judicial decision. But the PDP also had Jigawa in its fold following the first cross-carpeting of the state governor, Alhaji Saminu Turaki from ANPP. The fortune of the opposition brightened somewhat in 2007 after the controversial general elections of that year. While Bauchi went to the fold of the ANPP, the opposition also snatched victory in Ondo, Abia, and Imo through the outright declaration of balloting or courtesy of judiciary pronouncements. This raised their profile to 10 states: Abia, Anambra, Bauchi, Borno, Edo, Imo, Lagos, Ondo, Yobe, and Zamfara. In the interim, PDP also took from the opposition Kebbi, Jigawa, and Sokoto, bringing 26 states under its control. When Ikedi Ohakim, governor of Imo state, defected, the PDP-controlled states had risen to 29 out of 36 states of the federation. Opposition parties had won gubernatorial elections or secured legislative seats in the regions where these parties were traditionally strong: the South East for All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA); the North for the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); the South West for the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) but in other to be competitive at the center and to control the federal government, which allocates much of the resources, the leading opposition parties or their elected politicians decide to change from regional parties to national parties and aggregated at the center by joining the ruling party. The structure/organization of PDP as a dominant party negatively shifted the focus of Nigerian politics away from the interests of the citizen.

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References Akindele, R. A. (1996). Nigeria in the global market of experiments in federalism. In J. I. Elaigwu (Ed.), Foundation of Nigeria federalism 1960–1995 (pp. 1– 39). Nigeria: National Council on Intergovernmental Relations. Amucheazi, E. (2006, September 7). Political parties and the future of Nigeria. In Valedictory Conference in Honor of Prof. Amancheazi; Organized by Faculty of Social Science, University of Nigeria. Amucheazi, E. (n.d). Postgraduate lecture monograph. Awka: Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University. Birch, A. H. (1966). Approaches to the study of federalism. Political Studies, 14(1), 15–33. Bogaards, M. (2004). Counting parties and identifying dominant parties in Africa. European Journal of Political Research 43, 173–197. Carty, R. K. (2004). “Parties as franchise systems”: The stratarchical organizational imperative. Party Politics, 10(1), 5–24. Carty, R. K., & Cross, W. (2006). Can stratarchically organized parties be democratic? The Canadian case. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 16(2), 93–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/13689880600715912. Duverger, M. (1972). Party politics and Pressure Groups. London: Nelson and Sons Ltd. Eldersveld, S. (1964). Political parties: A behavioral analysis. Chicago: Rand McNally. Gardner, J. A. (2013). The myth of state autonomy: Federalism, political parties, and the national colonization of state politics (BUFFALO Legal Studies Research Paper Series. Paper No. 2013 – 021 SSRN-id2191150). Guardian. (2007, January 14). pp. 51–52, 57 and 58. Jinadu, L. A. (2011). Inter-party dialogue in Nigeria: Examining the past, present & future. In Lead paper at the inaugural DGD Political Parties Dialogue Series, held on October 4, 2011, at Bolingo Hotel, Abuja. Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing model of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the Cartel party. Party Politics, 1(1), 5–28. Koole, R. (1996). Cadre, catch-all, or Cartel? A comment on the notion of the Cartel party. Party Politics, 2(4), 507–523. Lundell, K. (2004). Determinants of candidate selection the degree of centralization in comparative perspective. Party Politics, 10(1), 25–47. www.sagepu blications.com. Norris, P. (2004). Building political parties: Reforming legal regulations and internal rules (A Report Commissioned by International IDEA 2004). Ogulensi, T. (2013). APC, history and the burden of expectation. http://www. punchng.com/opinion/apc-history-and-the-burden-of-expectation/. Omoruiyi, O. (2001). Parties and politics in Nigeria. http://www.dowodu. com/omoruiyi4.htm.

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Roy, R. (1967). Factionalism and “stratarchy” the experience of the Congress Party. Asian Survey, 7 (12), 896–908. Sargent. (2004). Chapter 4 parties. Austin American Stateman, 3207 BrownChapter04. Tsan, A. (2015). 2015 elections: How PDP governors contributed to party’s defeat. http://leadership.ng/news/431748/2015-elections-how-pdp-govern ors-contributed-to-partys-defeat. Ujo, A. A. (2000). Understanding political parties in Nigeria. Katsina: Klamidas Books.

Conclusion

This book focused on the critical issues raised by Nigerians as bases for ‘true federalism’—perceptions on what the Nigeria federalism ought to be in the twenty-first century. From the overview of the issues raised, it is evident that the problem of Nigerian federalism is the outcome of military rule. The major argument in this book had been that there is no stage at which a federation could be said to be at its ‘true state.’ Federalism is rather a process, fashioned and refashioned according to the dictates of time and peculiarities of a given environment in which it is being practiced. The emphasis here is on the society as different from the state, the individual, and his need as different from the state and its apparatus; the argument is that if the individual’s needs are the priority in the minds of those reconstructing the federal system, ‘true federalism’ is likely to be achieved, which is a federal system that will make the individual have a sense of belonging, be fulfilled and be protected as a citizen. A close look at the dimensions of current thoughts on restructuring of Nigerian federalism, which in all is termed ‘true federalism,’ shows diversity in the views expressed. At the same time, some are impersonal in their opinions, and others coined their personal/sectarian expectations and benefits into their perceptions of what they expect in ‘true federalism.’ For some school of thought, true federalism is synonymous with restructuring the federating units, reversing to a new six geopolitical structure since the 36 states arrangement enhances the powers of the center vis-à-vis the state. Fiscal issues bordering on revenue allocations adjusted in favor © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6

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of the states that are not in any way subordinate to the federal. Others see true federalism as resource control—the return of ownership, control, use and management of land and its mineral resources to the states (the kind of federal structure that allows each federating unit to control and manage its resources and pay taxes to run the central government). Others have based their views on the fear of domination and marginalization; therefore, see ‘true federalism’ as encompassing equitable representation; while, on the other hand, some have advocated a total return of local government affairs to the states and the constitutional provision for the state police. These debates arose from the perceived centralizing trends in Nigeria federalism more, especially during the period of military rule evident in the following areas: a. Federal government altering the distribution of powers in her favor since pronouncedly 1967. b. Increasingly usurping of functions previously allocated to the regions. c. Increase of finance accruable to the center as against that of the state. d. The growing weakness of the state powers as more states were carved out of the old powerful regions. e. The perceived superiority of the North in terms of majority in the bureaucracy and top federal positions. Four major factors facilitated this tendency toward centralization in Nigerian federation: a. The military rule; b. Mono-economy (oil-based rentier economy that is not evenly distributed); c. The prosecution of civil war; d. The constant constitutional change. The discussion by scholars and politicians on true federalism in Nigeria focuses mainly around K. C. Wheare’s concept of federalism. From Wheare’s definition of federation, it can be inferred that the distinguishing characteristic of a federal system is that neither the center nor the regional government is subordinate to each other but rather the

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two levels of government are co-ordinated and independent. That federal system involves division of functions between the central government and the units without any part encroaching into the domain of the other. The component units have unfettered control of their financial resource sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to it under the constitution. Therefore, financial subordination makes an end of federalism. This book undertook a detailed critique of Wheare’s concept of federalism and its limitations. It came up with a theory with higher explanatory power in line with current developments and demands for true federalism, thus the use of ‘process view’ of federalism. This is concerned with conditions, factors, or forces that are conducive to federal stability, or instead to the successful operation of federal polity, which is peculiar to a particular environment. The emphasis here is on the society as different from the state, on the individual and his need as different from the state and its apparatus; the argument is that if the individual is put in mind in the construction of a federal system, ‘true federalism’ is likely to be achieved— which is a federal system that will make the individual have a sense of belonging, be fulfilled and be protected as a citizen. The argument is by no means a rejection of Wheare’s concept of federalism. Wheare may have placed too much emphasis on the legal dimension of federalism. Still, there can be little doubt that federalism involves a legal—constitutional arrangement that delimits the legal and political competence of the levels of government. It is within the legal framework provided by the federal arrangement that sociopolitical factors take on meaning and significance. What the process view adds is that it sensitized students of federalism to the changing and evolving nature of the federal balance of power. It was this process view that formed our theory from which the inferences were made. The argument is that each of the present tiers of government has something to offer to the citizen, security from external attack. The monetary system that ensures his earning is worth something, internal security from hoodlums and assassins, self-worth (psychological) and respect, etc. power has to be shared to the extent the interests of the citizen is assured. The redistribution of power was examined in that context: local government for rural development, police for security, mainly personal. While the federal government should be exclusively concerned with defense, fiscal policy, foreign relations, matters that impinge directly on the individual must be left with the structure which can best provide for

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that—local government, state government. A critical look at the propositions for the restructuring of the federating units, based on the argument that the multiplication of states from a federation of 3 regions in 1960 to that of 36 states today had helped to whittle down the powers hitherto allocated to the states showed that it is not practicable under a democratic system. It is evident that the 36 state structures evolved in time according to the historical experience of the country and may continue to be the federating units. The focus shifted to the extension of the federal government powers to local government administration creation and control and the issue of internal security, use, and operational control of the Nigerian police. The federating units are the states; there is no way the local government will form part of the federation units. In other words, there should be different structures of local government in the country, varying from zone to zone. They should be the responsibility of the state and not the federal government. The states could then restructure the local government to reflect the local culture; the existing system should, therefore, be abolished. The structure of policing in Nigeria can be traced to political settlement achieved at the time of independence, which is currently anachronistic due to expansive security needs. Police powers should be shared between federal and state. We can learn from older federation like Australia. State police are concerned with personal security problems in their territories of jurisdiction and offense outside their jurisdiction is usually dealt with by the federal police. Fiscal and resource distribution systems must be targeted to citizen interests. While revenue should aim at serving the individual, his position in the state (concerning appointments) should also be guaranteed. Attention should be focused on resource control as a form of fiscal federalism; the other aspect, vertical allocation favoring the states, is not a major issue as that can be resolved by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAF). The concept of fiscal federalism emphasizes improving the performance of the public sector and the provision of services by ensuring proper alignment of responsibilities and fiscal instruments in the federal system. Different tiers of government provide services for the social welfare of the citizens in its domain. States and local governments are in a better position to deliver public services as they are closer to the people. The ideal revenue formula should be that which favors the state and local government with higher revenue from the federation account. If funds were allocated, the way it ought to, the situation in the Niger Delta would be different. The constituent units

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or states of the federation ought to keep their resources and contribute to the federal distributive pool, as was the case before the civil war. The deterioration in the Niger Delta, the state of war, destruction, etc. would not have been the case if revenue allocation had been along with the old arrangement. The book examined the effect of party and politics on the nature of federalism as practiced in Nigeria since May 29, 1999. This is to the understanding that apart from the legal basis for governance and intergovernmental relations, the single important political factor that influences the pattern of intergovernmental relations outside the constitution is the party system. The structure of a dominant party negatively shifts the focus of Nigerian politics away from the interests of the citizen. The military dictatorship did not end with the military rule; instead, it transformed into political parties led mainly by ‘democratic’ dictators. Hence, the return to a democratic government has not assured good life as expected by the citizens. Political forces such as parties and elections that affect resource distribution must be organized with the interests of the citizen as the primary concern. • A radical redistribution of power and resources is required to stabilize Nigeria’s federal system. Redistribution of powers must guarantee the interests of the citizenry in other to achieve the desired ‘true federalism.’ • Police powers should be shared between Federal and state. • The 36 states structure will continue to be the federating unit for a long time despite the constitutional amendment. • Resource control or at least increase in the 13% derivation principle may be prolonged but, in the end, be inevitable. • The core North (North West) feeling of marginalization between May 1999 and May 2015 was derived from their being highly favored in the years of military rule. • We suggest that local government should be left in the hands of the state in the current constitutional amendment, which should modify it to meet the peculiar traditional modes of social organization in the states. • Though these changes proffered for true federalism are desirable, it will require a national consensus (willing president and a National Assembly which sees the need to take the necessary steps). This may not be possible in a dominant party system, which is by itself highly centralized.

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Index

A Amotekun, 70

C Cadre parties , 99 Caretaker committee, 59, 108, 109 Centralizing, x, 98, 99, 120 Classical, 4 Community policing, 70, 71 Confederalism, 25 Constitution, ix, 4, 5, 8, 12–15, 19–22, 28, 30, 39–42, 53, 56, 58, 59, 63–69, 79, 81, 95, 96, 101, 106, 109, 121, 123 Cooperative federalism, 8, 14

D Decentralization, 7, 19, 25, 36, 66, 71, 101, 102 Democracy, 8, 14, 66, 87, 109, 114 Derivation, xi, 20, 21, 26–28, 40, 42, 74–76, 78–82, 123 Devolution, 15, 66

Dictatorial party, 101, 102 Dominant party, 95, 97–99, 111, 112, 115, 123 Dual federalism, 8, 14

F Federalism, ix–xi, 3–16, 19–21, 24–26, 31, 43, 63, 65, 71, 73, 74, 85, 92, 95–99, 101, 105, 110, 113, 119–121, 123 Fiscal federalism, 14, 25, 28, 76, 122 Fourth Republic, 99, 105, 114

H Hegemonic power, 99 Hisbah, 69, 70

I Institutional approach, 3–6 Intergovernmental relations, 11, 95, 96, 123 Internal democracy, 105

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. I. Egwim, The Dynamics of Federalism in Nigeria, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49153-6

135

136

INDEX

Internal security, 67, 70, 121, 122

L Legalistic, 4, 6, 14

M Marginalization, ix, xi, 23, 24, 36, 85, 87, 91, 92, 120, 123 Mass parties , 99

N Niger Delta, 27–29, 36, 38, 77–80, 122, 123 Nomination process, 104, 106, 114

P Party structure, 100, 101, 106, 109 Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), 87, 92, 96, 98, 99, 102–109, 113–115 Political party, 11, 12, 22, 95–100, 102–105, 107, 109–114, 123 Power redistribution, 24, 25 Process, 4–9, 11, 13–15, 23, 24, 60, 71, 96, 101, 104, 106, 109, 112, 119, 121

Q Quasi-federalism, 8, 14 R Resource control, ix, xi, 14, 26–29, 36, 76–80, 82, 120, 122, 123 Restructuring, ix, xi, 3, 14, 24, 25, 30, 35, 36, 41–43, 46, 87, 119, 122 Rotational presidency, 25 S Sociological, 4–7, 9, 10, 13, 65, 73 Stratarchy, 100, 101 T True federalism, ix–xi, 3–5, 14–16, 20, 24, 26–29, 31, 36, 63, 65, 66, 68, 77, 78, 99, 109, 110, 119–121, 123 U Unitary government, 8, 15 V Vanguard party, 101