The Development of Arabic Logic (1200-1800) 3796539092, 9783796539091

Citation preview

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARABIC LOGIC (1200–1800 )

Recent years have seen a dramatic change in scholarly views of the later career of Arabic and Islamic philosophy. For much of the twentieth century, researchers tended to dismiss the value of Arabic writings on philosophy and logic after the twelfth century, often on the basis of the prejudice that handbooks, commentaries and glosses are of necessity pedantic and unoriginal. This assumption has now been abandoned. As a consequence, a vast amount of later Arabic writings on philosophy and logic, hitherto neglected, are now being studied and edited. The present work is an attempt at giving an overview of the development of Arabic logic from 1200 to 1800, identifying major themes, figures and works in this period, while taking into account regional differences within the Islamic world. It offers a corrective to Nicholas Rescher’s seminal but now outdated The Development of Arabic Logic, published in 1964. Author Khaled El-Rouayheb is James Richard Jewett Professor of Arabic and of Islamic Intellectual History at Harvard University. His publications are including the monographs Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900 –1900 ( 2005 ) and Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century ( 2015 ). He is co-editor ( with Sabine Schmidtke ) of The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy ( 2016 ).

ARABIC LOGIC (1200–1800)

Julia Jorati /Dominik Perler /Stephan Schmid (eds.)

Khaled El-Rouayheb

Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy

Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy 2

Khaled El-Rouayheb

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARABIC LOGIC (1200–1800)

2 MEMP

www.schwabeverlag.ch

I S B N 978-3-7965-3909-1

9

783796 539091

RZ Schwabe_MEMP_2_Druck_20190305.indd 1

05.03.19 15:03



Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy 2 Julia Jorati / Dominik Perler / Stephan Schmid (eds.)

Khaled El-Rouayheb

The Development of Arabic Logic (1200–1800)

Schwabe Verlag

®

MIX Papier aus verantwortungsvollen Quellen

www.fsc.org

FSC® C083411

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Schwabe Verlag, Schwabe Verlagsgruppe AG, Basel, Schweiz This work is protected by copyright. No part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or translated, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Cover design: icona basel gmbh, Basel Graphic design: icona basel gmbh, Basel Typesetting: Schwabe Verlag, Basel Print: CPI books GmbH, Leck Printed in Germany ISBN Print 978-3-7965-3909-1 ISBN eBook (PDF) 978-3-7965-3937-4 The ebook has identical page numbers to the print edition (first printing) and supports full-text search. Furthermore, the table of contents is linked to the headings. [email protected] www.schwabeverlag.ch

Contents

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................... 11 Note on Transliteration, Dates, and Translations ................................... 13 I. Introduction ................................................................................................... 15 II. Prologue: Arabic Logic up to 1200 ........................................................ 21 III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350 ......................................................................... 29

(i) Introduction .................................................................................... 29 (ii) Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) ...................................................... 37 (iii) Zayn al-Dīn al-Kashshī (d. 1221) .................................................

41

(iv) Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 1233) .................................................... 43 (v) Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 1248) ................................................. 44 (vi) Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1265) ................................................... 47 (vii) Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) .....................................................

54

(viii) Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 1276) .................................................

56

(ix) Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 1283) .................................................

59

(x) Ibn Kammūna (d. 1284) ................................................................

63

(xi) Ibn Wāṣil al-Ḥamawī (d. 1298) ....................................................

64

(xii) Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1322) ......................................

65

6

Contents

(xiii) Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) .............................................

68

(xiv) Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Maḥbūbī (d. 1347) .........................................

70

(xv) Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1349) ............................................

71

(xvi) Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 1365) ................................... 72 IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition .......................................

75

(i) Introduction ....................................................................................

75

(ii) Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390) .................................................

80

(iii) al-Sayyid al-Sharīf Jurjānī (d. 1413) ............................................

84

(iv) Ḥācī Pāşā Ḫızır Aydīnī (fl. 1370–1421) .......................................

90

(v) Meḥmed Fenārī (d. 1431) ..............................................................

90

(vi) Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka (d. 1432) ..................................................

91

(vii) Ḳaraca Aḥmed (d. 1450) ............................................................. 94 (viii) al-Sayyid ʿAlī al-ʿAjamī (d. 1456) .............................................

95

(ix) ʿImād al-Fārisī (fl. 1446–1464) .................................................. 96 (x) Mullā Dāʾūd al-Khwāfī (fl. 1465) ................................................. 97 (xi) S.adr al-Dı¯n al-Dashtakı¯ (d.1498) ................................................. 99 (xii) Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 1502) ................................................. 101 (xiii) Qāḍī Mīr Ḥusayn al-Maybudī (d. 1504) .................................... 104 (xiv) Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Dashtakī (d. 1542) ................................ 105 (xv) Ḥājjī Maḥmūd Nayrīzī (fl. 1498–1526) ....................................... 107 (xvi) ʿIṣām al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Isfarāyinī (d. 1536) .................................. 108 (xvii) Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Amlashī (fl. 1548) ................. 110 (xviii) Aḥmed Ṭāşköprüzāde (d. 1561) ............................................... 112 (xix) Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ b. Makhdūm Ḥusaynī ʿArabshāhī (d. 1568) ...... 114

Contents

(xx) Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī (d. 1573) .................................................. 115 (xxi) Mīr Fakhr al-Dīn Sammākī Astarābādī (d. 1577) ....................... 117 (xxii) Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī (d. 1587) .................................................. 119 V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition ....................................... 121

(i) Introduction .......................................................................................... 121 (ii) Muḥammad al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī (d. 1370) ................................. 125 (iii) Ibn ʿArafa al-Warghamī al-Tūnisī (d. 1401) .................................. 126 (iv) Saʿīd al-ʿUqbānī (d. 1408) ............................................................... 127 (v) Ibn Marzūq al-Ḥafīd (d. 1439) ........................................................ 128 (vi) Ibrāhīm b. Fāʾid al-Zawāwī (d. 1453) ............................................... 129

(vii) Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 1490) ...................................... 130 (viii) Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Maghīlī (d. 1503) .................... 135 (ix) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Akhḍarī (d. 1546) ............................................ 137 (x) Aḥmad b. Aḥmad Aqīt al-Timbuktī (d. 1583) ................................. 140 VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition ......................................................... 143

(i) Introduction ........................................................................................... 143 (ii) Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631) .......................................................................... 148 (iii) Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1635) ........................................................................ 151 (iv) Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī (d. 1687) .................................................... 155 (v) Mullā Mīrzā Shirwānī (d. 1687) ........................................................ 158 (vi) Muḥammad Yūsuf Tihrānī (fl. 1692) ................................................ 160 (vii) ʿAlī b. Ḥusayn Jāmiʿī ʿĀmilī (fl. 1674–1712) ............................... 163 (viii) Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad Iṣfahānī (d. 1725) ................................ 165

7

8

Contents

(ix) Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad Mukhtārī Nāʾīnī (d. 1722) .................... 167 (x) Muḥammad b. Yūnus al-Shuwayhī al-Najafī (fl. 1806) .................. 169 VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition ............................................. 173

(i) Introduction ........................................................................................... 173 (ii) ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkūtī (d. 1657) ................................................... 176 (iii) Muḥammad Rashīd Jawnpūrī (d. 1672) .......................................... 178 (iv) Mīr Zāhid Harawī (d. 1689) .............................................................. 180 (v) Muḥibbullāh Bihārī (d. 1707) ............................................................ 182 (vi) Jārullāh Ilāhābādī (fl. 1718) .............................................................. 186 (vii) Qāżī Mubārak Gūpāmawī (d. 1747) ............................................... 188 (viii) Mullā Ḥasan Lakhnawī (d. 1784) .................................................. 191 (ix) Baḥr al-‘Ulūm Lakhnawī (d. 1810) .................................................. 193 (x) Fażl-i Imām Khayrābādī (d. 1828) .................................................... 195 XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition ..................................... 199

(i) Introduction ........................................................................................... 199 (ii) Meḥmed Emīn Ṣadrüddīnzāde (d. 1627) .......................................... 205 (iii) Ḳara Ḫalīl Tīrevī (d. 1711) ............................................................... 207 (iv) Muṣṭafā Mōstārī (d. 1707) ................................................................ 209 (v) Meḥmed Sāçaḳlızāde (d. 1732) ......................................................... 211 (vi) Esʿad Yānyavī (d. 1731) .................................................................... 216 (vii) Meḥmed Emīn Üsküdārī (d. 1736) ................................................. 221 (viii) Ebū Sa‘īd Ḫādimī (d. 1762) ............................................................ 224 (ix) Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (d. 1791) .............................................................. 227

Contents

(x) Müftīzāde Meḥmed Ṣādıḳ Erzincānī (d. 1808) ................................ 233 (xi) ʿAbdullāh Kānḳirī (d. 1823) ............................................................. 234 IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition ............................................. 237

(i) Introduction ........................................................................................... 237 (ii) al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī (d. 1691) ................................................................. 240 (iii) Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī (d. 1716) ........................................................ 242 (iv) Aḥmad al-Mallawī (d. 1767) ............................................................. 244 (v) Muḥammad al-Fullānī al-Kashnāwī (d. 1741) ................................. 247 (vi) Aḥmad al-Hilālī (d. 1761) ................................................................. 248 (vii) ʿUmar al-Fāsī (d. 1774) .................................................................... 250 (viii) Ibn Saʿīd al-Ḥajarī al-Tūnisī (d. 1784) ............................................ 252 (ix) Ibn Kīrān (d. 1812) ............................................................................ 253 (x) Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār (d. 1835) ....................................................................... 256 X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition ......................................... 259

(i) Introduction ........................................................................................... 259 (ii) Buṭrus al-Tūlāwī (d. 1745) ................................................................. 260 (iii) Yūsuf Shamʿūn al-Simʿānī (d. 1768) ............................................... 267 (iv) Yuwākīm al-Muṭrān (d. 1766) .......................................................... 275 (v) Simʿān al-Ṣabbāgh (fl. 1780) ............................................................. 284 XI. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 287 XII. References ................................................................................................. 295

(i) Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu ..................................................... 295 (ii) Western Languages ............................................................................. 309

9

10

Contents

Index of Terms ................................................................................................. 321 Index of Personal Names .............................................................................. 324 Index of Titles ................................................................................................... 330

Acknowledgments

The present work was originally conceived as a contribution to the projected third volume of Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt, edited by Ulrich Rudolph. My first thanks are due to Professor Rudolph for inviting me to write the piece. His initial guidance and the workshops that he arranged in Zurich for contributors to the third volume were crucial for developing an outline for my chapter. When I ended up with a draft that was much longer than a contribution to an edited volume, he generously helped me explore various publishing options. (I should add that I still intend to publish a contribution on the development of Arabic logic to volume 3 that should be published in the coming years.) Dr. Christian Barth of Schwabe Verlag gave crucial backing to the idea of publishing my study in expanded, self-standing form and was an invaluable support in the process of turning the draft into a monograph. I am grateful to him, and also to Professor Dominik Perler, Professor Stephan Schmid and Professor Julia Jorati for accepting my book in their monograph series Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Peter Adamson kindly agreed to read the book manuscript that I submitted, and his suggestions were most helpful in the final round of revisions. In the process of drafting and revising various chapters, I also received important comments and corrections from Asad Q. Ahmed, E.J. Ashworth, Giovanni Carrera, Cristiano Casalini, Emma Gannage, Frank Griffel, Lukas Muehlethaler, Sait Özervarlı, Reza Pourjavady, Riccardo Strobino, Jack Tannous, Sajjad Rizvi, Rob Wisnovsky, and Sara Nur Yıldız. Hacı Osman Gündüz and Shahrad Shahvand helped me track down sources and prepare the manuscript for publication. Nariman Aavani, Didar Akbulut, Mehmet Fatih Arslan, Abdurrahman Mihirig, Caitlyn Olsen, Rob Wisnovsky and Sara Nur Yıldız kindly helped me obtain digital copies of manuscripts and printed books. The early stages of research and writing were done while I was a Leverhulme Visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge in the academic year 2015–16.

12

Acknowledgments

I thank the Leverhulme Trust for support, and Tony Street and Clare Hall College, as well as the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (CRASSH), for graciously hosting me that year. For the duration of my stay in Cambridge, I had numerous stimulating conversations on relevant topics with Tony Street, John Marenbon, Saleh Zarepour and Tianyi Zhang. I am also grateful to the British Library, Cambridge University Library, Princeton University Library, and the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul for kindly allowing me access to their rich collections of Arabic manuscripts. Online resources are becoming increasingly important for research. The following have been particularly helpful in my case, and I list them here because it is not always possible to acknowledge in the text itself each and every time I have used them: – BrillOnline (http://www.brillonline.com/) – Google Play (https://play.google.com/books) – Hathi Trust Digital Library (https://www.hathitrust.org/) – Scholasticon (http://scholasticon.ish-lyon.cnrs.fr/index_fr.php) – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/) – The digitized manuscripts and rare books on https://al-mostafa.info/ books/ – The digitized manuscripts on http://www.alukah.net/library/ – The online catalog of manuscripts in Iran (www.aghabozorg.ir) – The online catalogs of İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi in Istanbul (http://ktp.isam.org.tr/) I thank Cambridge University Press for permission to use, in reworked form, some passages from my contribution to The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic (eds. Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Stephen Read, Cambridge University Press 2016), and American University of Beirut Press for permission to use, in reworked form, some passages from my contribution to In the House of Understanding: Histories in Memory of Kamal S. Salibi (eds. A. Abu-Husayn, T. Khalidi & S. Mourad, American University of Beirut Press, 2017). Manja Klemenčič has been a constant source of encouragement and judicious advice throughout my career. Everyone else mentioned in these acknowledgments has helped make this book better than it would otherwise have been. Without Manja’s unfailing support, I hate to think what would have become of its author.

Note on Transliteration, Dates, and Translations

In transliterating names, I have followed the transliteration system of the Journal of Islamic Studies for Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Ottoman Turkish, with two exceptions: For Ottoman Turkish I use ḫ (Ḫ in upper case) instead of h/H to render the letter ‫خ‬, and for Urdu names I have not underlined the aspirated sounds (thus “Lakhnawī”, not “Lakhnawī”). I have retained the Arabic transliteration system for all scholars active before the establishment of the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires. I then use the Ottoman Turkish transliteration system for Ottoman scholars from Anatolia and Rumelia, the Persian transliteration system for Persian, Central Asian and Kurdish scholars active after 1500, the Urdu transliteration system for Indo-­ Muslim scholars, and the Arabic transliteration system for scholars from the Arabic-speaking Near East and North Africa. I have retained the Latinate forms “Avicenna” and “Averroes” for the scholars who are already known by these names in English. In giving dates, I usually give both the Islamic calendar (Hijri) year and the CE year, thus: Hijri year/CE year. A Hijri year will usually begin in one CE year and continue into another. Unless the sources also give the month, I have given the Hijri year followed by the two CE years that it spans, for example 1078/1667–8. I have not given Hijri years when referring to twentieth-­century scholars or European and early modern Christian Arab scholars. All translations from the Arabic are my own unless otherwise indicated.

I. Introduction

On the eve of modernity, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, logic was a staple part of madrasa education in all major centers of Islamic learning, from Fes and Tunis in the Maghreb to Qom and Lucknow in the East. Practically all students were expected to study at least the basics of the discipline, and the more ambitious would have studied intermediate and advanced texts as well. Works on logic were routinely written; these were often commentaries and glosses on standard madrasa handbooks but sometimes also treatises on particular topics or even new handbooks. Some of these treatises, handbooks, commentaries and glosses were among the earliest books published in the nineteenth century by the newly established printing and lithography presses of Morocco, Cairo, Istanbul, Kazan, Iran and India. The status of logic as a core instrumental discipline, whose essentials should be mastered by any serious student, goes back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As the institution of the madrasa spread from its origins in the Seljuk lands of Central Asia and Iran, logic usually found its place in the curriculum, though not without some initial resistance from traditionalist scholars. Influential figures such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/ 1210) deemed logic a legitimate science that could help Islamic jurists and theologians assess arguments and avoid errors of reasoning (Marmura 1975; Shihadeh 2005). This came to be the mainstream verdict in the period from 1200 to 1800, though opposition did not disappear entirely, especially in the Arabic-Islamic (as opposed to the Turco-Persianate) world, and has been strengthened in the modern period by the rise of fundamentalist Salafism (El-Rouayheb 2004). As logic became “naturalized” into the milieu of the madrasas, it largely shed its originally intimate connection to Aristotelian/Neo-Platonic philosophy. Many of those who taught and studied the discipline in later centuries had little or no interest in physics or metaphysics. In step with this transformation in the

16

I. Introduction

use of logic, the focus of the discipline itself changed. In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, logicians ceased to engage directly with Arabic translations of the works of Aristotle, relying instead on condensed handbooks written by Muslim scholars. Such handbooks devoted little or no attention to Aristotle’s Categories or Posterior Analytics. Logic came to be seen as a metaphysically uncontentious discipline that investigated, in a purely formal or topic-neutral way, the rules for the acquisition of non-evident concepts from evident concepts by means of definition and description, and for the acquisition of non-evident assents from evident assents by means of syllogism. Aristotle’s categories, or his theory of demonstrative science, had little or no place in this new scheme of things. (As will be seen below, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were some efforts in both Safavid Iran and among Uniate Christian Arabs in the Levant to reverse this development and reforge the link between logic and Aristotelian philosophy.) Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric, which the early Arab Aristotelians had considered part of the logical Organon (Black 1990), also came to be seen as largely extrinsic to logic. Dialectics and rhetoric were cultivated in the madrasas as separate disciplines called ādāb al-baḥth (the rules of debate) and maʿānī wa bayān (semantics and rhetoric) respectively. As its ties to Neo-Platonized Aristotelian physics and metaphysics were weakened or sundered, logic forged new links with other disciplines, especially law, theology, grammar and rhetoric. Later handbooks on jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) and theology (kalām) were suffused with technical terms and argument forms taken over from logic. Some of these handbooks include opening chapters on logic, for example Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā (The Epitome of The Utmost), an influential handbook on jurisprudence by the Egyptian scholar Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249), and Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār (The Rising of Lights), a handbook on philos­ ophical theology by the Persian scholar and judge al-Bayḍāwī (d. 719/1317) (Ibn al-Ḥājib 2006; Bayḍāwī 1991). In the influential works of the Cairo-based grammarian Ibn Hishām (d. 761/1360), logical terminology is adduced when discussing the definitions of key concepts in Arabic syntax, the assumption clearly being that readers were familiar with basic logic (Ibn Hishām 2007). The same assumption is evident in later Arabic works on rhetoric, such as the immensely influential handbook Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ (The Summary of the Key) by al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338) and its many later commentaries (Qazwīnī 2004). Whatever opposition there had been in early Islamic centuries

I. Introduction

between Arabic grammar and the Greek-inspired discipline of logic was no longer in evidence after the twelfth century. The plethora of extant Arabic logical handbooks, commentaries and glosses attest to the widespread study of logic during what historians of Europe would call the “late medieval” and “early modern” periods. In Turkey alone, more than four thousand extant manuscripts on logic copied between 1300 and 1800 are listed on the website of the Turkish Cultural Ministry (www.yazmalar.gov.tr) as being extant in various Turkish libraries. Despite this wealth of extant material, the study of the history of logic in Islamic civilization is still in its early stages. Ibrahim Madkour’s L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe (1934, 2nd edition 1969) was the first major study (Madkour 1934, 1969). It was marred, however, by the – largely armchair – assumption that the tradition declined after Avicenna (d. 428/1037), and it accordingly devoted a mere eight (dismissive) pages to developments after the eleventh century. The work of Nicholas Rescher in the 1960s and early 1970s offered a partial corrective. Rescher pushed his investigations into the thirteenth century and managed to reconstruct a sophisticated system of temporal and modal logic in one influential handbook from that century, al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya (The Epistle for Shams al-Dīn) by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276) (Rescher 1974). He also published a bio-bibliographic survey, entitled The Development of Arabic Logic (1964), covering the period from the eighth to the sixteenth century (Rescher 1964). These works provided an important stimulus to the study of Arabic logic after Avicenna. As is to be expected, some of Rescher’s assumptions and assertions have been modified or abandoned by later scholarship. He assumed, for example, that the Arabic tradition of logic declined steeply after the thirteenth century and had descended by the sixteenth century into sheer “commentary-mongering”. This view, largely based on the presumption that commentaries and glosses are of necessity pedantic and unoriginal, is no longer accepted among scholars in the field. But even those who now correct or revise Rescher’s claims are themselves indebted to his pioneering efforts. Rudolf Mach, who overlapped with Nicholas Rescher at Princeton University in the 1950s, likewise played a role in the modern rediscovery of later Arabic logic. Mach, who for many years was curator of Islamic manuscripts at Princeton University Library, was partly responsible for collecting a large number of Arabic manuscripts on logic and dialectics, especially from later centuries. He painstakingly described many of these in his monumental Catalogue of Arabic Manu-

17

18

I. Introduction

scripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection (1977) (Mach 1977). He was working on a catalog of the New Series of Arabic manuscripts at Princeton when he passed away in 1981, his work being continued by Eric Ormsby and published in 1987 as Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University Library (Mach & Ormsby 1987). Both catalogs are important sources for the history of later Arabic logic, along with other catalogs published since Rescher’s The Development of Arabic Logic, for example of the rich collections of manuscripts on logic in the Topkapi Palace Library in Istanbul, the Khuda Bakhsh Public Library in Bankipore, the Raza Library in Rampur, and the Royal Library in Rabat (Karatay 1966, Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, ʿArshī 1971, Khaṭṭāb 1985). One of Mach’s students at Princeton, Larry Miller, completed in 1984 a groundbreaking and widely cited PhD dissertation on the development of dialectics in the Islamic world (Miller 1984). Rescher’s dismissal of the period after the thirteenth century held sway among Western specialists until the 1990s (see, for example, Maroth 1989, 216ff; Arnaldez [1991] EI2; and Inati 1996). Since then, however, it has increasingly been seen as unsatisfactory. In a number of articles from the first decade of the 2000s, John Walbridge suggested that even if Rescher’s sweeping negative assessment were accurate, there would still be historical and cultural questions to be addressed about the role of logic in later Islamic scholastic culture (Walbridge 2000, 2002, 2003). In the same decade, Tony Street published the first of a number of seminal articles on various aspects of the history of Arabic logic (Street 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2008). Street offered a carefully argued and documented corrective to Rescher’s sometimes speculative remarks about Arabic logic in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and as a result we now have a much better sense of developments in this period, especially in modal logic. Street also dissented from the view that the decline of the later Arabic tradition could simply be inferred from the prevalence of commentaries and glosses, without actually bothering to read later works. At the same time, Rob Wisnovsky forcefully pressed for a more general reevaluation of the later Islamic tradition of philosophy and philosophical theology, and also called for a more nuanced assessment of the literary formats of commentary and gloss (Wisnovsky 2004, 2013, 2014). A number of students, advisees or associates of Street and Wisnovsky have gone on to produce monographs, articles, editions or translations relevant to the history of the later Arabic logical tradition (see the works of Ahmed, El-Rouayheb, Strobino and Young cited in the bibliography).

I. Introduction

In the Islamic world, there has in recent years been a burgeoning interest in editing premodern works on philosophy and logic. Though this interest has lately taken off in Turkey and the Arab lands, it is Iranian scholars who have stood for the greater part of this editorial activity so far. In Iran, the tradition of Islamic philosophy and logic has continued uninterrupted until the present, and local scholars were too well informed to be taken in by the prejudice that this tradition ended in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries. Specifically in the field of logic, noticeable recent contributions include: Āḥād Farāmarz Qaramalekī’s editions of the logic section of the philosophical summa entitled al-Mulakhkhaṣ (The Summary) by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), of the handbook of logic entitled al-Tanqīḥ (The Scrutiny) by Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1045/1635), of a work on logic entitled Naqḍ al-uṣūl (The Criticism of Principles) by Muḥammad Yūsuf Tihrānī (fl. 1104/1692), and of a number of treatises from the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on the liar paradox; Mahdī Sharīʿatī’s richly annotated edition of the works on “conception and assent” (taṣawwur wa-taṣdīq) by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/1365), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1045/1635) and Mīr Zāhid Harawī (d. 1101/1689–90); Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī’s editions of the summa of philosophy entitled al-Kāshif (The Uncoverer) by Ibn Kammūna (d. 684/1284) and of al-Ufuq al-mubīn (The Clear Horizon) by Mīr Dāmād (d. 1041/1631); and Mahdī ʿAẓīmī’s editions of some of the logical works of Athīr al-Dīn al-­ Abharī (d. 663/1265). This more recent scholarship has made it possible to offer the present overview of the history of Arabic logic from 1200 to 1800, an overview that is intended to be at once a corrective and a homage to Rescher’s The Development of Arabic Logic. Like Rescher’s work, it is in part bio-bibliographic. Each section of what follows has an introductory essay on general developments within a certain period and region, followed by discussions of the lives and works of some major figures. Deciding who was and who was not a “major” figure is of course not always straightforward. This is especially the case for the later centuries, both because more material survives from those centuries and because it is easier, with the benefit of hindsight, to determine who the influential logicians of earlier times were – it is more difficult to do so when dealing with scholars who were writing just before the dramatic disruptions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that in many regions brought the Arabic tradition of logic to an end. In general, an attempt has been made to include logicians who appear to have been original, or whose works were widely copied or discussed, or who

19

20

I. Introduction

were noticeably prolific, or illustrate certain significant historical trends. At the present stage of research, our sense of which logicians meet these criteria is of course provisional, and there may be readers who are disappointed that some figure or other has been left out. But in an overview such as this, some difficult choices have to be made. It is simply impossible to include every single scholar who wrote on logic in Arabic in the six hundred years spanned by the present volume.

II. Prologue: Arabic Logic up to 1200

The Arabic tradition of logic grew out of the Greco-Arabic translation movement of the ninth century. The effort to translate the works of Aristotle, and to revise and annotate these translations, often on the basis of the Greek and Syriac commentators, developed seamlessly into the writing of full-fledged commentaries and expositions in Arabic. By the early tenth century, a circle of scholars had emerged in Baghdad who saw themselves as continuators of the late antique, Alexandrian tradition of Aristotelian philosophy. The most well-known figure in the circle was undoubtedly al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), who wrote numerous treatises, epitomes, paraphrases, and long commentaries on Aristotelian logic, many of which are extant. Later eminent represen­ tatives of this tradition were Fārābī’s Christian student Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (d. 363/974), as well as Ibn Zurʿa (d. 398/1008) and Abū l-Faraj Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 434/1043). In the eleventh century, Baghdad Aristotelianism was challenged by the influence of Avicenna (d. 428/1037), who was active in the eastern regions of the Islamic world – in Central Asia and Persia. Avicenna himself stood in the late antique tradition of Neo-Platonized Aristotelianism, but his approach was not that of an exegete or expositor but of a brilliant and audacious autodidact unwilling to be anyone’s follower. He dismissed the practice of doing philosophy through painstaking textual exegesis of the Aristotelian corpus, and emphasized the value of “verification” (taḥqīq), i.e., the critical assessment of received views (Gutas 2014, 214–217). His influence on the later Arabic tradition of logic was decisive. By the end of the twelfth century, almost all logicians in the Islamic world took their point of departure in his writings. The last region that held out was Islamic Spain, where Averroes (d. 595/1198) and his student Ibn Ṭumlūs (d. 620/1223) continued to expound a more conservatively Aristotelian logic. By the fourteenth century, however, Avicenna’s logic (modified by a number of  later scholars) was dominant even in the westernmost parts of the Islamic world, a fact

22

II. Prologue: Arabic Logic up to 1200

attested – with some regret – by the great North African historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) (Rosenthal 1958, III, 143). The different developments of Arabic and Latin logic in the later middle ages is to a large extent a result of the dramatic difference in the reception of Avicenna’s logical writings. Though some of Avicenna’s metaphysical and natural-philosophical writings came to be known in the medieval Latin world, most of his logical writings did not. Of the logical books of his philosophical summa al-Shifāʾ (The Healing) only the first, corresponding to Porphyry’s Eisagōgē in the Peripatetic Organon, was translated in its entirety into Latin (Bertolacci 2013, 245–248). Many of Avicenna’s most distinctive contributions to logic remained unknown to later Latin scholastics. It may be helpful here to briefly summarize some of these contributions (for a more detailed account, see Strobino 2018). The early Baghdad Aristotelians had focused on what is today called “term logic”, i.e., the logic of categorical propositions (Every J is B; Some J is B; No J is B; Some J is not B) as opposed to conditionals and disjunctions. To be sure, they followed the Greek commentators in incorporating some basic elements of Stoic propositional logic, namely the recognition of modus ponens, modus tollens, and disjunctive syllogism. But Avicenna developed the logic of conditionals and disjunctions far beyond this. A substantial portion of the book on Syllogism (Qiyās) from his abovementioned summa al-Shifāʾ was devoted to discussing wholly hypothetical syllogisms, i.e., syllogisms in which both premises are conditionals or disjunctions (Shehaby 1973). Avicenna also took the apparently unprecedented step of “quantifying” conditionals and disjunctions, analogous to the standard quantification of categorical propositions. He thus distinguished between the universal-affirmative conditional “Always: If P then Q”, the particular-affirmative “Sometimes: If P then Q”, the universal-negative “Never: If P then Q”, and the particular-negative “Sometimes not: If P then Q”. Exactly how to interpret this move from the perspective of modern logic is not clear (see Hasnawi & Hodges 2016, 63–65), but it is a distinctive feature of the Avicennan and post-Avicennan tradition of logic. Instead of Fārābī’s division of the syllogism into categorical (the three syllogistic figures of Aristotle) and hypothetical (modus ponens, modus tollens, and disjunctive syllogism), Avicenna divided syllogisms into “combinatorial” and “reiterative”. In a “reiterative” (istithnāʾī) syllogism, one premise reiterates

II. Prologue: Arabic Logic up to 1200

or negates a proposition that occurs in the other premise. An example is modus ponens: If P then Q P Q The second premise P reiterates the antecedent of the first premise. Another example is modus tollens: If P then Q Not-Q Not-P Here, the second premise negates the consequent of the first premise. By contrast, in the “combinatorial” (iqtirānī) syllogism each premise contains a term or a proposition that is not contained in the other premise. This includes the standard Aristotelian syllogisms: Every J is B Every B is A Every J is A It also includes the wholly hypothetical syllogism: If P then Q If Q then R If P then R This way of dividing syllogisms is also one of the most distinctive features of the Avicennan and post-Avicennan tradition of Arabic logic. Yet another influential innovation of Avicenna is his “temporalization” of the “absolute” proposition. The earlier Peripatetic tradition had recognized the necessity proposition (Every J is necessarily B) and the possibility proposition (Every J is possibly B), as well as the “absolute” proposition not explicitly marked as necessary or possible (Every J is B). This last type of proposition was under-

23

24

II. Prologue: Arabic Logic up to 1200

stood by Avicenna to assert that everything that is at least once J is at least once B. On this reading, the contradictory ceases to be “Some J is not B”. For example, “Every human is a sleeper” is true, but “Some human is not a sleeper” is also true, for some human does not sleep at least once. Instead, the contradictory of the “absolute” proposition is a perpetuity proposition: “Some human is never a sleeper” (Strobino & Thom 2016, 344). A further important distinction in the Avicennan and post-Avicennan system of modal logic is that between “essential” (dhātī) and “descriptive” (waṣfī) modalities. This distinction captures the sense in which, for example, “Every bachelor is necessarily unmarried” is true and the sense in which it is false. Being unmarried is necessarily true of a bachelor insofar as he is described as a bachelor. But it is not necessarily true of the entity or essence that is described as a bachelor, for it is not essential to the person described as a bachelor that he be a bachelor. By contrast, “Every human is an animal” expresses a necessity that depends only on the existence of the subject, not on a non-essential description of that subject. Arabic logicians working in the wake of Avicenna systematized his distinction between dhātī and waṣfī modalities, and his introduction of the perpetuity proposition as the contradictory of the “absolute” proposition, to develop a modal logic far more complex than that found in Aristotle or the early Arabic Aristotelians (Strobino & Thom 2016, 343–359). One further point on which Avicenna departed from received tradition will be mentioned here. He expressed the view that Aristotle’s Categories is not properly a part of logic (Sabra 1980, 764). The later Arabic tradition overwhelmingly accepted this position. The ten Aristotelian categories were henceforth discussed as part of general metaphysics (usually under the heading “Substances and Accidents”), not in works of logic. An indication of Avicenna’s powerful impact on the later Arabic logical tradition can be seen in the part on logic in the influential philosophical compendium al-Mulakhkhas (The Summary) by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), who was active in Persia and Central Asia and who will be the first major figure discussed in the chapters that follow. References to Avicenna are by far the most common (twenty-five in all), and there is no real engagement with the works of pre-Avicennan logicians (see the index of works and authors cited in Rāzī 2003, 453). Rāzī did mention Aristotle (twice), the fourth-century Greek commentator Themistius (once), and Fārābī (twice), but he did not cite any of their works, and his passing mentions seem to be based on Avicenna’s own references.

II. Prologue: Arabic Logic up to 1200

The other works on logic cited by Rāzī all postdate Avicenna. These include a handbook entitled al-Baṣāʾir al-Naṣīriyya (Insights for Naṣīr al-Dīn) by ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī, who had dedicated the work to the Seljuk Vizier Naṣīr al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Abī Tawba (who was vizier from 521/1127 to 526/1131). Sāwī was perhaps the most eminent Avicennan philosopher and logician of the twelfth century. Besides the mentioned work on logic, he also wrote a number of treatises defending some of the more controversial philosophical positions of Avicenna, for example the view that the knowledge of the Necessary Existent does not extend to sublunar particulars qua changing particulars (Sāwī 2013). Rāzī also cited the summa of philosophy al-Muʿtabar (The Considered View) by Sāwī’s contemporary and rival, the Jewish-born philosopher and physician Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 547/1152). Abū l-Barakāt has sometimes been presented as simply an opponent of Avicenna, but this is too simplistic. He presented himself as committed, in general, to carefully considering and assessing received views, as opposed to uncritically reiterating them (Griffel 2011, 64–71). Abū l-Barakāt in effect adopted Avicenna’s refusal to be reverential toward his predecessors, and turned this against Avicenna himself. This is very different from, for example, Averroes’ criticisms of Avicenna for his departures from Aristotle. The rhetoric of rejecting “imitation” (taqlīd) – even of Avicenna himself – is likewise in evidence in the introduction to Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), the well-known work attacking Neo-Platonized Aristotelianism by the Islamic theologian, jurist and mystic al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). This, too, may have contributed to the widespread readiness among twelfth-century philosophers to engage dialectically with received views (Griffel 2011, 55–64). In logic, for example, the rejection of the fourth figure of the syllogism by Avicenna and the earlier Arabic Aristotelians was reconsidered. The first scholar in the Arabic tradition to defend the fourth figure was Najm al-Dīn Ibn al-Sarī (d. 548/1153–4). He did so well knowing that all previous logicians familiar to him had rejected the figure, including Galen who was sometimes said to have recognized it but whose works, Ibn al-Sarī correctly pointed out, do not bear out the attribution (Sabra 1965). A generation later, Majd al-Dīn al-Jīlī penned the first extant treatise that dealt with the modal and wholly hypothetical syllogisms in the fourth figure (Pourjavady 2001, 345–364; Falāḥī 2015–6). Jīlī, too, struck an independent-minded note in the introduction to his treatise, writing:

25

26

II. Prologue: Arabic Logic up to 1200

I have seen that the notable among philosophers and the great among scholars have omitted the fourth figure from their books, and have considered it among the futile and insignificant matters, claiming that it is too intricate for natural disposition and too remote from satisfactory investigation. In my soul came an urge to look into extracting it, and an inclination to contemplate it with a view to presenting its proofs. I found it not to be so remote as they described, and have discovered things the like of which they have not seen. I will therefore make clear its conditions of productivity, and give the details of its moods and their conclusions (Pourjavady 2001, 346; Falāḥī 2015–6, 220).

Significantly, Jīlī was Rāzī’s most important teacher of the philosophical sciences and had, in turn, studied with one of Ghazālī’s most eminent students Muḥammad b. Yahyā al-Nayshābūrī (d. 548/1153) (Shihadeh 2005, 157). As will be seen in the following chapter, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī took over his teacher’s acceptance of the fourth figure. He would become perhaps the most eminent representative of the tendency in the twelfth century to engage with Avicenna’s philosophical works but in a probing, critical manner. Again, to see in this nothing but “opposition” to Avicenna, as has often been done in modern scholarship, is to ignore that Rāzī took his point of departure in Avicenna’s writings, was an influential teacher of these works, accepted many aspects of Avicenna’s thought, and on occasion rejected earlier criticisms of Avicenna that he believed were a result of misunderstanding (Shihadeh 2016). It is rather that he was animated by an ethos of rejecting “imitation” and extoling “verification”, which militated against simply accepting Avicenna’s views or identifying the task of the philosopher or logician with the faithful exposition of Avicenna’s writings (Wisnovsky 2013). It may also be helpful to note two figures not mentioned by Rāzī. One is his older contemporary Averroes, active in Islamic Spain. The conservative, non-­ Avicennan Aristotelianism represented by Averroes does not seem to have been a strong presence in Rāzī’s Eastern milieu. Even in Baghdad, the center of Arabic Aristotelianism in earlier centuries, the influence of Avicenna was paramount by the second half of the twelfth century, as is clear from the careers of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) and ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (d. 629/­ 1231), both of whom studied in Baghdad in this period and attest to the dominance of Avicenna’s philosophy there. The latter figure would, incidentally, later rebel against this dominance and seek to return to a more pristine Aristotelianism, apparently after going to Cairo and meeting, among others, the great

II. Prologue: Arabic Logic up to 1200

Jewish philosopher Maimonides (d. 601/1204). But the ineffectiveness of ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī’s resistance, at least in logic, is revealed by the fact that none of his logical works are extant (Bonadeo 2013, 198–208). Another figure not cited by Rāzī is his slightly younger contemporary Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), a fellow student of Majd al-Dīn al-Jīlī. Suhrawardī developed an anti-Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic “Illuminationist” (ishrāqī) philosophy that in subsequent centuries was seen as an alternative to Avicenna’s. He purported to return to the wisdom of Plato, the pre-Socratics, and the sages of pre-Islamic Persia, but he had little or no access to the views of these distant or mythical figures, and his tightly argued version of Neo-Platonist philosophy is itself testimony to the independent-minded tendencies of his age. In logic, however, Suhrawardī was, like Rāzī, deeply influenced by Avicenna, and can be seen as belonging to the Avicennan tradition, though with individual views on a number of specifics (Street 2008). He was skeptical of the possibility of acquiring new conceptions through definition, but this was not exceptional – Rāzī expressed a very similar view, and already Avicenna had suggested that finding the real definitions of things is practically impossible (Rāzī 2003, 118; Goichon 1963, 2ff). He also claimed that all modality propositions can be reduced to universal-affirmative “essential” (dhātī) necessity propositions (Street 2008, 166–171). Such distinctive logical ideas do not appear to have had a strong influence on the Arabic logical tradition, at least not in the centuries immediately following his death. Both Averroes’ conservative Aristotelianism and Suhrawardī’s anti-Peripatetic Illuminationism remained largely submerged currents until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when, as will be discussed in Chapter Five below, a number of Shiite Iranian scholars sought to return to what they deemed the wisdom of the “older scholars”.

27

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

(i) Introduction (Street 2015 and El-Rouayheb 2016) The thirteenth century and the early decades of the fourteenth century was an exceptionally dynamic period in the history of Arabic logic. The Islamic tradition itself marked this fact by distinguishing between the “older logicians” (al-­ mutaqaddimūn) and the “later logicians” (al-mutaʾakhkhirūn), with the divide falling in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. This division is understandable: With figures such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 646/1248), the Arabic logical tradition reoriented itself in a decisive manner. It ceased to take the books of the Peripatetic Organon as an organizing principle, instead presenting the discipline of logic as being concerned with general rules for the acquisition of new concepts (taṣawwurāt) from already known concepts through descriptions and definitions, and for the acquisition of new assents (taṣdīqāt) from already known assents through syllogism. Works on logic henceforth typically began by dividing knowledge into conception and assent, then proceeded to deal with concepts and their acquisition, discussing singular and universal terms, the five universals (species, genus, differentia, proprium, general accident) and the various types of descriptions (rusūm) and definitions (ḥudūd). They then turned to assents and their acquisitions, discussing propositions, including hypothetical and modality propositions, their immediate implications (such as conversion and contraposition), and then presenting the categorical, modal and hypothetical syllogisms. In this scheme of things, there was no place for Aristotle’s Categories and very little for his Posterior Analytics, Topics, Sophistici Elenchi, Rhetoric and Poetics. The distinction between demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical, rhetorical, and poetic syllogisms was usually mentioned briefly toward the end of thirteenth-century works, but received mostly perfunctory attention compared to the modal and hypothetical logic.

30

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

Rāzī and Khūnajī also firmly rejected the practice of doing logic through reverential exegesis, boldly writing their own presentations of the field, with Rāzī’s Mulakhkhaṣ and Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār being particularly influential. In their wake followed a number of other lengthy independent presentations of logic, by Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1265), Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/ 1274), Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276), Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 682/ 1283), Ibn Wāṣil al-Ḥamawī (d. 697/1298), and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322) (for further information about these scholars and their works, see the bio-bibliographic entries below). The number of independent summas from the thirteenth century is striking, and probably unrivalled by any other century in Islamic history. Lengthy, independent presentations of logic continued to be written in the first half of the fourteenth century, by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311), Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), and Ṣadr ­al-Sharīʿa al-Maḥbūbī (d. 747/1346–7), but they become much rarer after the middle of the fourteenth century, giving way to the dominance of the literary formats of condensed handbook (matn), commentary (sharḥ) and gloss (ḥāshiya). It is also revealing that it was in the thirteenth century that most madrasa handbooks that came to be studied in the Islamic world until the modern period were written. Though Avicenna’s logical writings continued to be read in later centuries, especially in Iran and India, they did not form the basis for the teaching of logic after the thirteenth century. Even the logic section of Avicenna’s Ishārāt apparently ceased to be studied, as shown by the fact that glossators after the fourteenth century focused exclusively on the sections on physics and metaphysics, and that the first modern printings of the work in Istanbul (1290/1873) and Cairo (1325/1907) simply omitted the section on logic. Too much had happened in the thirteenth century for Avicenna’s works, or indeed the works of any pre-thirteenth-century logician, to form the basis for logical instruction in later centuries. As with any periodization, the division between “older” and “later” logicians captures certain features but inevitably elides others. It categorizes Avicenna simply as an “older” logician, and this is in some respects misleading. The point of departure for logicians such as Rāzī and Khūnajī was almost invariably Avicenna’s writings. They also adopted many of Avicenna’s departures from the received Aristotelian tradition, for example his recognition of wholly hypothetical syllogisms. Avicenna, in the context of criticizing his predecessors and

(i) Introduction

rivals among the Aristotelians of Baghdad, had already rejected the practice of doing logic by reverential exegesis of Aristotle. Even the tradition of organizing presentations of logic around the acquisition of concepts and assents had been prefigured in Avicenna’s condensed al-Ishārāt. Nevertheless, the valid point about the influence of Avicenna can easily be pushed too far, and was indeed pushed too far in the pioneering explorations of Arabic logic by Nicholas Rescher who overestimated the extent to which the modal logic presented in thirteenth-century Arabic handbooks was indebted to Avicenna (Rescher 1974). There were in fact important differences between Avicenna’s modal logic and the modal logic expounded in the classic thirteenth-century handbooks, as will be seen shortly. Furthermore, the adoption of the organizing principle of alIshārāt was emphatically a choice made by later logicians; Avicenna himself adopted a more traditional organizing principle inspired by the Organon in al-Shifāʾ, and so did his student Bahmanyār (d. 457/1065) in his summa of logic, physics and metaphysics al-Taḥṣīl (Bahmanyār 1970). There was also nothing inevitable about Avicenna’s self-confident and iconoclastic attitude being adopted by later logicians influenced by him. Indeed, some thirteenthand fourteenth-century scholars thought that there was too little reverential exegesis of Avicenna’s works, and accused Rāzī, Khūnajī and their followers of systematic and uncharitable misunderstandings of the works of “the Master” (al-Shaykh). Most importantly, a number of logicians in the thirteenth century departed from Avicenna’s positions on a number of central issues. The following are some of the main departures: 1) For Avicenna, the subject matter of logic is “second intentions” (al-maʿqūlāt al-thāniya). These are, roughly, second-order concepts such as “universal”, “genus” or “proposition” whose per se accidents (ʿawāriḍ dhātiyya) are investigated in logic (Sabra 1980). Khūnajī and logicians influenced by him departed from this view, on the grounds that logic also investigates second intentions themselves, not just accidents that are true of second intentions. For example, a logician is concerned with what a “universal” or a “genus” or a “proposition” is, i.e., their definitions, and not just accidents that are true of them. Instead, Khūnajī proposed that the subject matter of logic is more generally “known concepts and assents” (maʿlūmāt taṣawwuriyya wa taṣdīqiyya) insofar as these lead to new concepts and assents. Logic, on this account, is not distinctive by having as its subject matter a unique realm of second-order

31

32

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

lating from known concepts and assents to unknown concepts and assents (El-Rouayheb 2012). 2) Beginning with Rāzī, Arabic logicians tended to systematize a number of distinctions that Avicenna had introduced in an ad hoc manner in various passages. For example, they systematically distinguished between necessity and perpetuity propositions, between one-sided and two-sided modalities (for example between possibility and contingency), and between dhātī and waṣfī readings of modality propositions (reminiscent of, if not exactly corresponding to, the medieval Latin distinction between de re and de dicto modality). This led them to distinguish between more than a dozen modality propositions, whereas the earlier Arabic tradition had tended to operate simply with necessity, possibility and absolute propositions (Street 2015, Strobino 2016, 350–354). 3) The sheer number of new modality propositions made it impractical to discuss them one by one when treating the modal syllogistic. Thirteenth-century Arabic logicians devoted considerable attention to working out the relative strengths of the numerous modality propositions, and then invoked general principles of implication, for example that what does not follow from the stronger proposition does not follow from the weaker, or that what follows from the weaker also follows from the stronger. This provided them with a feasible shortcut when treating modal syllogisms (El-Rouayheb 2016, 73; Strobino 2016, 350–359). 4) The mutual implications of conditionals and disjunctions were discussed at considerable length. Khūnajī, for example, may have been the first logician (in any language) to explicitly recognize De Morgan’s laws: a disjunction (Either P or Q) is equipollent to a negative conjunction (Not both not-P and not-Q), and a negative disjunction (Not either P or Q) is equipollent to a conjunction (not-P and not-Q). Khūnajī also rejected Avicenna’s principle that the following consequence holds: Always: If P then Q ⇒ Never: If P then not-Q An impossible antecedent, Khūnajī argued, could imply both a proposition and its contradictory. If “P” is impossible (for example “It is raining & it is not rain-

(i) Introduction

ing”) then it may entail both Q (“It is wet”) and not-Q (“it is not wet”) (El-Rouayheb 2009). 5) Khūnajī also denied that the contraposition of categorical propositions is valid. A standard proof of traditional contraposition ran as follows: (1) Every J is B To prove: Every non-B is non-J (2) Some non-B is J (3) Some non-B is B

Assumption Assumption for Indirect Proof 2, 1 (DARII)

But Khūnajī and like-minded logicians denied that “Some non-B is J” is the contradictory of “Every non-B is non-J”. They insisted that the following two propositions are not equivalent: Not: Every non-B is non-J Some non-B is J It was generally agreed that affirmative propositions have existential import, whereas negative propositions do not. But this means that if there are no nonBs then the second, affirmative proposition is false whereas the first, negative proposition is true. Instead, a number of thirteenth-century logicians redefined “contraposition” (ʿaks al-naqīḍ) to mean the following immediate inference (Khūnajī 2010, 147–148; Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī 1948, 133–134): Every J is B No non-B is J 6) Rāzī and Khūnajī recognized the fourth figure of the syllogism, by contrast to earlier Arabic logicians such as Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes (Rāzī 2003, 265–271; Khūnajī 2010, 247–248). The fourth figure was thereafter presented on a par with the other three figures in the standard handbooks on logic from the thirteenth century. As will be seen in later sections, it was only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the fourth figure was again subjected to criticism as “unnatural”, both by Safavid Iranian logicians who sought to return to the ways of the “old logicians”, and by Maronite and Greek Catholic

33

34

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

logicians from Lebanon and Syria who had been trained in the Latin tradition of logic. 7) Khūnajī and most thirteenth-century logicians following in his wake held that first-figure syllogisms with possibility minors are not productive (Street 2015; Strobino 2016, 349–359). This in turn was closely related to the position that the extension of the subject term of a categorical proposition only includes entities of which it is actually true. Fārābī was understood to have had the position that the subject term includes anything of which it is possibly true – to adopt a term from mediaeval Latin logic, the subject term is “ampliated” to the possible. On that account, a first-figure syllogism with a possibility minor seems evidently productive: Every J [i.e., every possible J] is possibly B Every B [i.e., every possible B] is necessarily A Every J [i.e. every possible J] is necessarily A Avicenna was understood to have rejected ampliation to the possible and to have upheld the view that the subject term should be understood to include only that of which it is true in actuality (past, present or future). On this account, a first-figure syllogism with a possibility minor arguably ceases to be evidently productive and needs a proof. Every J [i.e., every actual J] is possibly B Every B [i.e., every actual B] is necessarily A Every J [i.e., every actual J] is necessarily A Avicenna was usually understood by later logicians to have shown the validity of such syllogisms by supposing the possibility expressed in the minor premise to be actualized (i.e., we suppose it is true that “Every J is actually B”), then pointing out that a necessity conclusion uncontroversially follows, and then arguing that therefore the conclusion must remain true with a possibility minor since supposing a possibility actualized cannot lead to an impossibility, such as a necessity proposition changing its truth-value from false to true. Starting with Khūnajī, revisionist post-Avicennan logicians rejected this proof. They invoked a distinction apparently first explicitly made by Rāzī

(i) Introduction

(Street 2015; Strobino 2016 348–349). A proposition of the form “Every J is B” can be understood in two ways: (1) Every actual J in extra-mental existence is B; and (2) Every actual J (if it exists) is B (if it exists). According to the first, “externalist” (khārijī) reading, the proposition “Every phoenix is a bird” is false. According to the second, “essentialist” (ḥaqīqī) reading, the proposition is true: A phoenix, if it were to exist, would be a bird. On the first reading, a syllogism with a possibility minor is clearly not productive. A counterexample would be: Every horse is possibly a featherless biped Every featherless biped is necessarily a human The premises are true on an “externalist” reading, but even the weakest modality proposition does not follow, viz. “Some horse is possibly a human”. The case of “essentialist” propositions is less clear. The major premise of the just-mentioned counterexample (“Every featherless biped is necessarily a human”) is false on an “essentialist” reading, since non-human featherless bipeds are possible and, were they to exist, would not be human. Khūnajī and his followers admitted that no counterexample was forthcoming when the premises are interpreted as “essentialist” propositions. They nevertheless insisted that even in that case (i) a first-figure syllogism with a possibility minor is not evidently productive and needs a proof, and (ii) that the proof they attributed to Avicenna is faulty. By supposing the possibility minor to be true as an absolute proposition (“Every J is actually B”), the extension of things that are actually B has been expanded, and there is no guarantee that in such a case the major premise remains true as a necessity proposition. Their position was therefore that a first-figure syllogism with a possibility minor is sterile if the premises are taken in the khārijī sense, and not known to be sterile or productive if the premises are taken in the ḥaqīqī sense. Recent studies have shown that Avicenna’s proof can be shown to be valid in modern modal system S5 (Thom 2008), and that Khūnajī’s objection to Avicenna’s proof singles out precisely the move that is legitimate in S5 but illegitimate in weaker modern modal systems such as T (El-Rouayheb 2016, 78–79). The perspective of what Tony Street has called “revisionist Avicennian” logicians such as Rāzī and Khūnajī was enshrined in the standard madrasa handbooks of logic that were studied in most parts of the Islamic world until the modern period, such as Kātibī’s al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ

35

36

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

al-anwār. Nevertheless, the victory of the revisionists was not complete. A number of thirteenth-century logicians upheld Avicenna’s original positions on many of the points mentioned above. Particularly influential were the defenses of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Kammūna (d. 684/1284) and the former’s students Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī and Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī. Ṭūsī defended the view that the subject matter of logic is second intentions; that “Always: If P then Q” implies “Never: If P then not-Q”; that contraposition as traditionally understood is perfectly valid and that the new-fangled “contraposition” of Khūnajī and his followers is of no use; and that first-figure syllogisms with possibility minors are productive (Street 2015; El-Rouayheb 2016). More orthodox Avicennians even sometimes complained of the resolutely formal orientation of logic after Rāzī and the resultant neglect of topics treated in the later books of the Organon. For example, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī condemned “the later logicians” for wallowing in topics that are of no use in this world or the next, such as the immediate implications of hypotheticals and the hypothetical syllogism, while neglecting demonstration, dialectics, fallacies, rhetoric and poetics (Shīrāzī 2002, 61). Fourteenth-century commentators and glossators on the mentioned madrasa handbooks often discussed the main points of contention between the revisionists and the more orthodox Avicennians. The former were often described as “the later logicians” or “the author of al-Kashf [i.e. Khūnajī] and those who follow him”, whereas the latter were sometimes referred to – by opponents of course – as “those who are fanatically partisan to the Shaykh [i.e. Avicenna]” (al-mutaʿaṣṣibūn li-l-Shaykh) (El-Rouayheb 2009, 221). The question of the subject matter of logic, for example, continued to be debated intensively in later centuries, with some commentators coming down on the side of Khūnajī and others coming down on the side of Avicenna (El-Rouayheb 2012). The fourth figure of the syllogism and the modal logic of the revisionists were broadly accepted. But Avicenna’s position that “Always: If P then Q” implies “Never: If P then not-Q” was also widely accepted in later centuries, and Khūnajī’s questioning of this principle was mostly abandoned (El-Rouayheb 2009). Some later logicians eire­ nically presented both contraposition as traditionally understood and as understood by Khūnajī and his followers as simply two distinct forms of immediate implication (see for example the entry on al-Sanūsī in Chapter Three below). In the following sections, some of the major logicians from the period and their works will be briefly presented. Inevitably, the survey is selective and focuses on scholars whose works were particularly influential or original.

(ii) Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra ¯zı¯

(ii) Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra ¯zı¯ (Griffel 2007) Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn al-Khaṭīb al-Rāzī was born in the town of Rayy (near present-day Tehran) in 544/1149. He began his studies with his father Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb (d. 559/1163–4), an eminent Ashʿarī theologian, and later studied philosophy with Majd al-Dīn al-Jīlī, a somewhat obscure figure who also taught the “Illuminationist” philosopher Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191). He attained prominence in his later years as a polymath who wrote esteemed contributions to Islamic theology, jurisprudence, Quran exegesis, rhetoric and philosophy, and he enjoyed the patronage of a succession of rulers in Khorasan (in northeastern Iran) and Transoxania. He died in Herat (in present-day western Afghanistan) in 606/1210. Rāzī earned a reputation in some circles, especially in Safavid and Qajar Iran, as an opponent of Avicenna and of philosophy in general – someone who raised theologically motivated, sophistical “doubts” (tashkīkāt) that threatened the future of philosophy in Islam, had it not been for their refutation by the Shiite scholar Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. This image influenced Nicholas Rescher’s The Development of Arabic Logic (1964), in which the following is presented as a tentative assessment of Rāzī’s role in the history of Arabic logic: It is possible … that no genuinely original developments of significant importance can be credited to him, and that the principal originality of his contribution lies in the organization of materials and in the anti-Avicennist impetus of his discussions (Rescher 1964, 185).

Recent scholarship (especially by Ayman Shihadeh, Tony Street and Rob Wisnovsky) has effectively undermined this older assumption. Certainly in logic, Rāzī cannot plausibly be presented as simply an unconstructive foe of Avicenna. On the contrary, he was broadly an “Avicennian” logician, in the sense that he took his point of departure in Avicenna’s writings and accepted some of the main distinctive contributions of Avicenna to the Arabic logical tradition, for example a distinction between waṣfī and dhātī readings of modality propositions and the wholly hypothetical syllogism. In this respect, he differed radically from someone like Averroes who was systematically opposed to Avicenna’s departures from the Aristotelian tradition (Street 2004; Street 2005). In fact, Rāzī was an important contributor to the westward spread of Avicennian logic at the expense of the more Aristotelian traditions of Baghdad and Islamic Spain, and both he and his students were influen-

37

38

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

tial teachers of Avicenna’s works, especially the Ishārāt. (See, for example, Shihadeh 2005, 153–154; Endress 2006, 410–415) As indicated above, Rāzī was an independent-minded thinker who did not hesitate to criticize or question Avicenna’s assertions when he thought it justified to do so. Nevertheless, his commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt was emphatically not systematically hostile, and Ṭūsī’s famous quip that it was a “calumny” (jarḥ) and not a “commentary” (sharḥ) is really only understandable from the perspective of a much more reverential attitude toward Avicenna (Wisnovsky 2014; Shihadeh 2016). Though research on Rāzī’s logical writings is still in its early stages, it is already abundantly clear that Rescher’s tentative assessment of his role is woefully inaccurate. As indicated in the introduction, Rāzī played an important role in reorienting the Arabic logical tradition away from the Aristotelian Organon and toward the study of the formal rules for the acquisition of conceptions and assents. On the level of content, too, a number of Rāzī’s innovations proved influential: The logic part of his tripartite presentation of philosophy al-Mulakhkhaṣ is the first major Arabic work on logic to present the fourth figure of the syllogism on a par with the traditional three. Incidentally, Rescher had surmised (1964, 197) that a rejection of the fourth figure was one of the hallmarks of the anti-Avicennian “Western” tradition that Rāzī had founded – a clear indication of how inaccurate his assessment of Rāzī was. Rāzī was also one of the first major logicians to operate with more than a dozen modality propositions, rather than the necessity, absolute and possibility propositions of the older Aristotelian tradition (Street 2015). These modality propositions resulted from the systematic application of various distinctions introduced in an ad hoc manner by Avicenna in various passages, between necessity and perpetuity, between dhātī and waṣfī readings, and between one-­ sided and two-sided modalities, for example between possibility (J is possibly B) and contingency (J is possibly B and possibly not B). Rāzī also appears to have been the first to suggest a distinction between a khārijī and a ḥaqīqī reading of categorical propositions (Street 2015). On the first reading, a proposition with the form “Every J is B” asserts that every J in the extra-mental world is B. On the second reading, it asserts that every J, were it to exist, would be B, thus allowing for the truth of statements such as “Every phoenix is a bird”. The impetus for this distinction appears to have been Avicenna’s view on the extension of the subject term of a proposition. Avicenna had

(ii) Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra ¯zı¯

rejected Fārābī’s view that the extension of the subject term is everything of which it is possibly true and insisted that it should only include entities of which it is actually (bi-l-fiʿl) true at some point in time (Ibn Sīnā 1964, 20–21). At the same time, he had rejected the idea that the extension of the subject term only includes entities in the extra-mental world (fī l-khārij) of which it is true (Ṭūsī 1377–1379/1958–59, I, 115–116). This understandably led to some uncertainty among his readers and to the kind of distinction introduced by Rāzī. One further example of an original contribution by Rāzī was his discussion of relational syllogisms (El-Rouayheb 2010, 39–48). He rejected the mainstream Avicennian attempt to regiment such arguments into standard syllogisms with three terms, and in his Mulakhkhaṣ he introduced a short section on syllogisms “in which the middle term is not repeated in its entirety” such as: A is equal to B B is equal to C A is equal to C Some of Rāzī’s more influential works on logic were: 1) A commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt (Pointers), completed after 579/ 1183–4 and before 582/1186. This was one of the most widely discussed philosophical works in Arabic from the twelfth century, and elicited intense discussion throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. A two volume edition edited by ʿAlī Riżā Najafzāde was published in Tehran in 1384/2005–6 by Anjumān-i Āthār-i va Mafākhir-i Farhangī. The first volume covers the section on logic. 2) A critical epitome of Avicenna’s Ishārāt, entitled Lubāb al-Ishārāt (Kernels of Pointers), first printed in Cairo in 1326/1908. A more recent edition was prepared by Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā in 1986 (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Nefertiti). 3) A commentary on Avicenna’s ʿUyūn al-ḥikma (The Sources of Wisdom), written late in his life. This has been edited by Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā (Tehran: Muʾassasat al-Ṣādiq, 1373/1994) in three volumes, of which the first covers logic. The logic section follows the organization of the Peripatetic Organon rather than the more influential organization of

39

40

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

the Ishārāt into two main sections dealing with the acquisition of conceptions and of assents. 4) A short handbook on logic entitled al-Āyāt al-bayyināt (The Evident Signs), which elicited commentaries by Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258) and Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283). The former commentary has been edited, on the basis of a single manuscript, by M. Djebli (Beirut: Dar Sader, 1996). 5) A lengthy summa of logic known as al-Manṭiq al-kabīr (The Long Logic). Rāzī referred the reader to this work in his al-Mulakhkhaṣ. Curiously, his commentator Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276) wrote that he had not seen or heard of a copy of this work (Rāzī 2003, 415). The catalogue of the Arabic manuscripts in the Topkapi Palace Library in Istanbul lists an extant manuscript of this work (Karatay 1966, nr. 6782). However, the attribution is questionable. The manuscript (MS Ahmed III, copied in 667/1268) does not indicate the author of the work, and internal evidence suggests that it was written in the middle decades of the thirteenth century, after the revisionist suggestions of Khūnajī and Abharī. 6) al-Mulakhkhaṣ (The Summary), a presentation of philosophy in four parts: logic, general metaphysics, physics and theology, completed in 579/1183–4. Along with his commentary on the Ishārāt, this appears to have been Rāzī’s most widely studied and quoted work dealing with logic. It elicited a lengthy commentary by Kātibī. Apart from Avicenna’s Ishārāt, it is the first major work in the Arabic tradition that organizes the presentation of logic into two major parts dealing with the acquisition of conceptions and assents respectively. The contents of the logic part of the work are as follows, with the relevant page numbers from the edition prepared by A. Qarāmalekī and A. Aṣgharīne­ zhād and published in 1381/2002–3 (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Imām Ṣādiq): a. Introduction (pp. 7–13): On the need for logic. On the subject matter of logic b. First part: On the acquisition of concepts i. On preliminaries (pp. 13–98): On types of conventional reference. On singular and universal terms. On the five universals ii. On the aims (pp. 99–118): On definitions and descriptions

(iii) Zayn al-Dı¯n al-Kashshı¯

c. Second part: On the acquisition of assents i. On propositions and their immediate implications (pp. 119– 238): On categorical and hypothetical propositions. On A, I, E, and O propositions. On modality propositions. On conversions and contrapositions. On various kinds of hypothetical propositions ii. On syllogism (pp. 239–329). On proof in general: syllogism, induction and analogy. On categorical syllogisms. On modal syllogisms. On combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms. On syllogisms in which the middle term is not repeated in its entirety. On reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms. On complex syllogisms and indirect proof iii. On demonstration (pp. 331–355)

(iii) Zayn al-Dı¯n al-Kashshı¯ Very little is known of this scholar. The historians Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (d. 668/ 1270) and Bar Hebraeus (d. 685/1286) both mentioned him in passing as one of the most eminent students of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa 1884, II, 23; Bar Hebraeus 1663, 485; Bar Hebraeus 1890, 445). Even his name – ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad – is only known from his own extant writings. The attributive “al-Kashshī” indicates that he originally hailed from the town of Kashi (present-day Kashgar) in what is now western China. Bar Hebraeus mentioned that he was later active in the historic region of Khorasan, presumably in one of its two major towns, Nishapur or Herat. His date of death is not known, though it is likely that he did not survive the wholesale massacres of the populations of Nishapur and Herat by the Mongols in 618–619/1221–2. (Quṭb alDīn al-Miṣrī, another eminent student of Rāzī’s, was killed during the Mongol sacking of Nishapur, see Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa 1884, II, 30.) Kashshī wrote influential works on logic, and post-Avicennan logicians writing in the middle decades of the thirteenth century, such as Khūnajī, Abharī and Kātibī, regularly cited him and discussed his ideas, obviously considering him to have been a major figure. (By comparison, the logical writings of Kashshī’s contemporary – and now much better known – Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī [d. 631/1233] appear to have been largely ignored by later logicians.) For example, Kashshī was credited by the later tradition with being the first to recognize

41

42

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

a principle governing the contradictory of the particular complex modality proposition (Khūnajī 2010, xvii–xviii). It was generally recognized that the contradictory of a universal complex modality proposition is the disjunction of the contradictory of the two parts. For example, the universal complex modality proposition “Every human is at some point a laugher but not always” consists of the two simple modality propositions “Every human is at some point a laugher” and “Some human is at some point not a laugher”. The contradictory is a disjunction of the contradictories of the two parts: “Either Some human is always not a laugher or Every human is always a laugher”. However, the case of the particular complex modality proposition is somewhat different. The proposition “Some body is at some point an animal but not always” cannot have as its contradictory the disjunction of the contradictories of its parts, for the original proposition is false and yet the disjunction of the contradictories of its parts is also false: “Either no body is always an animal or every body is always an animal”. Rather, the contradictory of a particular complex modality proposition is to predicate the disjunction of every individual falling under the subject term: “Every body is either always an animal or always not an animal”. Kashshī’s two extant works on logic are: 1) Ḥadāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq (The Garden of Verities). This is a lengthy summa of logic, general metaphysics (umūr ʿāmma) and physics (ṭabīʿī), in the preface to which he mentioned and praised the reigning Khwārazm-­ Shāhid ruler ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad II (r. 596/1200–617/1220) and his son Jalāl al-Dīn Manguberdī (d. 628/1231). An early and possibly unique extant manuscript of the work is in the Köprülü Library in Istanbul (Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 864). Copied in 625/1228, it comprises 218 folios, with variable lines per page. The section on logic proper takes up folios 25a to 124a, though the general introduction also includes discussions that were often included in books on logic, such as the types of linguistic reference, the five universals, and the ten categories (fols. 13a–24b). 2) An introduction to logic, subsequently known as al-Muqadimma al-­ Kashshiyya (The Kashshian Introduction). A commentary on this work was written by a certain Fakhr al-Dīn Ibn al-Badīʿ al-Bandahī (d. 657/ 1258). There are early extant manuscripts of the commentary in the Chester Beatty library in Dublin (Arberry 1955–, VI, 4931) and in the Vatican library (Levi Della Vida 1935, I, 20).

¯ midı¯ (iv) Sayf al-Dı¯n al-A

¯ midı¯ (Weiss EI3) (iv) Sayf al-Dı¯n al-A Sayf al-Dīn ʿAli al-Āmidī was born in Āmid – present-day Diyarbakir – in 551/ 1156. He pursued his studies in Baghdad, where he studied theology and law with the Shāfiʿī scholar Ibn Faḍlān (d. 595/1199) and the philosophical sciences at the hands of unnamed Christian and Jewish teachers. After completing his education, he settled in Cairo where he taught for approximately two decades, though his philosophical inclinations reportedly led to criticism from colleagues and eventually to his leaving the city. He then settled in Damascus toward the end of his life. He there had disputations with some of the students of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, such as Shams al-Dīn al-Khusrawshāhī (d. 652/1254). He died in 631/1233. Āmidī left behind a number of esteemed works in rational theology and jurisprudence – works that influenced authors of classic madrasa handbooks in these two disciplines such as Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249) and ʿAḍud al-Dīn alĪjī (d. 756/1355). He also wrote a number of philosophical works covering logic, physics and metaphysics. However, these appear to have been much less influential. Manuscript copies are few and very early, showing that they were not widely copied in later times. There are also very few, if any, references to them in the works of later logicians. These philosophical works are:

1) Al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (The Dazzling Light of Shining Wisdoms). This is an extensive summa of logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics. The sole extant manuscript of the work, copied in Āmidī’s lifetime, has been published in facsimile by Fuat Sezgin (Frankfurt: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 2001). The section on logic covers the first two volumes out of four. It is broadly organized according to the books of the Organon. 2) Daqāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq (Subtle Verities), another lengthy tripartite summa of logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics. Apparently the sole extant manuscript of this work, covering most of the first volume on logic, is in the Princeton University Library (Islamic Manuscripts: Garrett 42B). It comprises 240 folios, with 23 lines per page. It was copied in Āmidī’s own lifetime. 3) Kashf al-tamwīhāt fī Sharḥ al-Ishārāt (Revealing the Distortions in the Commentary on The Pointers). This is a systematic criticism of Fakhr

43

44

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt. It has recently been published in two editions: (i) edited by Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2013); and (ii) edited by ʿĪsā Jawāʾira (Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2015).

(v) Afd· al al-Dı¯n al-Khu ¯najı¯ (El-Rouayheb EI3; Khu ¯najı¯ 2010, iii–lix) Khūnajī was born in 590/1194 in the town of Khūnaj in the province of Azerbaijan. No reliable information has come down to us regarding his teachers. Bar Hebraeus (d. 685/1286) listed him as one of the eminent students of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, but this is doubtful: Khūnajī was barely sixteen years old when Rāzī died, and though he often cited Rāzī’s works, he never referred to him in a way suggesting a personal relationship. Indeed, he was quite critical of Rāzī; more so than he was critical of Avicenna. Khūnajī was in Mecca in 624/1226–27, where he wrote his short handbook on logic al-Jumal. He was in Cairo in 632/1234–35, where he taught the biographer of philosophers and physicians Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (d. 668/1270) and enjoyed the patronage of the Ayyubid ruler of Egypt al-Malik al-Kāmil (r. 615/1218–635/1238). After al-Kāmil’s death, he went to Seljuk Anatolia and served as a judge, but returned to Egypt in the wake of the Mongol defeat of the Seljuks in 641/1243. He was appointed Chief Judge of Cairo by al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ (r. 637/1240–647/1249) a year later, and died in Cairo in 646/1248. In terms of innovativeness and influence, Khūnajī was arguably second only to Avicenna in the history of Arabic logic. All the departures from Avicenna mentioned above seem first to have been proposed by Khūnajī. His work deeply influenced Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, two classic handbooks on logic that continued to be studied in the Islamic world until the twentieth century. Khūnajī’s logical works are: 1) al-Jumal (The Sentences), a very short and dense handbook of logic that elicited numerous commentaries in later centuries, particularly in North Africa. An unsatisfactory edition of the work has been published; see Risālatān fī l-manṭiq, edited by Saʿīd Ghurāb (Tunis: alMaṭbaʿa al-ʿAṣriyya, 1980), pp. 29–39. Though not formally subdi-

(v) Afdal al-Dı¯n al-Khu ¯najı¯ ·

vided into sections, the contents of the handbook are as follows, with the corresponding lemmas of Ghurāb’s edition (the correspondence is not perfect for Ghurāb’s punctuation and paragraphing is sometimes arbitrary): a. Preamble (§1) b. Reference by correspondence, inclusion and implication. Complex and singular utterances (§2) c. Universal and particular terms (§3) d. The five universals: species, genus, differentia, proprium, general accident (§4) e. Absolute and relative species and genii (§5) f. Definition and description (§6) g. Propositions (§7) h. The copula. Negation. Metathetic predicates (§8) i. Quantifiers (§9) j. Quantification of the predicate (§10) k. Modality propositions (§11–§12) l. Contradiction (§13) m. Conversion (§14) n. Syllogism. The four figures (§15) o. Modal syllogisms: Conditions for productivity (§16) p. Modal syllogisms: The modality of conclusions (§17) q. Proofs: by reduction to the first figure, indirect proof, or ecthesis (§18) r. Hypothetical propositions: conditionals and disjunctions (§19) s. Affirmative and negative hypothetical propositions (§20) t. Strict, exhaustive and exclusive disjunctions (§21) u. Quantification of conditionals. The immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions (§22) v. Combinatorial-Hypothetical syllogisms (§23–§24) w. Reiterative-Hypothetical syllogisms (§25) 2) al-Mūjaz (The Concise), a handbook of intermediate length that elicited commentaries by Fakhr al-Dīn Ibn Badīʿ al-Bandahī (d. 657/1258), Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283) and Sayf al-Dīn Dāʾūd b. ʿĪsā al-­ Baghdādī (d. 705/1305). Two relatively early manuscripts of the work are: (i) Cambridge University Library: Ll. 6.24, fols. 3b–43b (copied in

45

46

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

750/1349), and (ii) Majlis Library, Tehran, nr. 1984, pp. 4–92 (copied in 687/1288). 3) Kashf al-asrār ʿan ghawāmiḍ al-afkār (Disclosing the Secrets of the Abstruse Thoughts), a lengthy, sprawling and unfinished summa that contains most of his innovative ideas. Kātibī, who wrote a monumental commentary on the book, described it as containing noble investigations, subtle rules and general principles that are absent from the works of people of the discipline, especially in modality propositions, their contradictories, converses and contrapositions, the modal syllogisms and the hypothetical syllogisms. He uniquely presented outstanding innovations and truthful discoveries that were not indicated by people before him.



Similar attestations to the originality of the work were penned by the aforementioned Ibn al-Badīʿ and by Khūnajī’s student Ibn Wāṣil alḤamawī. It was edited by the present author and published in 2010 (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy & Berlin: Institute for Islamic Studies, 428 pp.). The following is an outline of the contents of the work: a. Preliminaries (pp. 6–60) i. On the need for logic ii. On utterances iii. On universal and particular iv. On the genus v. On the species vi. On the differentia vii. On the proprium viii. On the general accident ix. On what is common and peculiar to the five universals x. On the interrelations of the five universals b. Definitions (pp. 61–70) c. Propositions (pp. 71–119) i. The division of propositions ii. On copulas iii. On singular, unquantified and quantified propositions iv. On metathetic terms v. On modalities vi. On the unity and plurality of propositions

(vi) Athı¯r al-Dı¯n al-Abharı¯

d. e. f. g.

Contradiction (pp. 121–128) Conversion (pp. 129–145) Contraposition (pp. 147–194) Hypothetical propositions (pp. 195–229) i. On the division of hypothetical propositions ii. On the disjunction iii. On singular, unquantified and quantified hypotheticals iv. On the divisions of conditionals and disjunctions v. On immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions vi. On non-standard expressions of hypotheticals h. Syllogism (pp. 231–267) i. Modal syllogisms (pp. 269–315) i. On the modal syllogisms of the first figure ii. On the modal syllogisms of the second figure iii. On the modal syllogisms of the third figure iv. On the modal syllogisms of the fourth figure j. Combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms (pp. 317–423) i. On what consists of two conditional premises ii. On what consists of two disjunctive premises iii. On the syllogism consisting of a categorical and a conditional iv. On the syllogism consisting of a categorical and a disjunction v. On the syllogism consisting of a conditional and a disjunction vi. On common issues involving hypothetical syllogisms

(vi) Athı¯r al-Dı¯n al-Abharı¯ (Eichner EI3; S ¸es ¸en 1997; S ¸es¸en 2008) The attributive “Abharī” suggests that he hailed from the town of Abhar near Qazvin. He is known to have studied with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s student Quṭb al-Dīn al-Miṣrī (d. 618/1221) in Nishapur (Shihadeh 2005, 153–154; Endress 2006, 410–415), with the dialectician Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī (d. 615/1218) in Samarqand (von Hees 2002, 58), and with the mathematician and astronomer Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn Yūnus (d. 639/1242) in Mosul (Ibn Khallikān 1977, V, 313). In 626/1229, he was in Irbil where he taught, among others, the biographer Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282). His later career is obscure. A passing comment in the chronicle of Bar Hebraeus states that Abharī was active in Seljuk Anatolia

47

48

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

(al-rūm) at some point (Bar Hebraeus 1663, 485; Bar Hebraeus 1890, 445). According to the colophon of a manuscript written by one of his students (described in Şeşen 1997, 270–271 and Şeşen 2008, 141–147), he returned from Seljuk Anatolia to Mosul in 643/1245, and later went to “Persia” (al-ʿajam) and died in either Shushtar or, more likely, Shabistar (in Arabic script the two names are very close) near Maragha. The date of death 19 Rabīʿ II, 663/8 February 1265 is based on anonymous marginalia in an extant manuscript of a biographical dictionary of philosophers and physicians by al-Qiftī (d. 646/1248) (Seybold 1919, 114). However, this date contradicts other manuscript evidence that Abharī was not alive in 656/1258 when Ṭūsī wrote his Taʿdīl al-miʿyār, a refutation of Abharī’s Tanzīl al-afkār. Abharī’s relationship with Khūnajī was until recently something of a puzzle (Khūnajī 2010, xxiv–xxv). They were contemporaries and present many of the same innovative ideas at roughly the same time. It is likely that they met – Abharī was almost certainly in Seljuk Anatolia when Khūnajī was a judge there from 635/1238 to 641/1243. The fact that Abharī’s student Kātibī wrote that Khūnajī had presented ideas in Kashf al-asrār that no previous logician had proposed strongly suggests that Abharī had indeed been influenced by Khūnajī. Ibn al-Badīʿ (d. 657/1258) and Ibn Wāṣil (d. 697/1298), both of whom were aware of at least some of Abharī’s works, made similar remarks about the originality of Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār. It is also suggestive that all the major innovations of Khūnajī are to be found in Abharī but not vice versa: Abharī proposed some novel and influential ideas that are not to be found in Khūnajī, for example, doubting the productivity of first-figure wholly hypothetical syllogisms; restricting the extension of the subject terms of ḥaqīqī propositions to entities that the subject term can possibly be true of (thus excluding impossible subjects); and proposing eight valid moods of the fourth syllogistic figure (see Thom 2010; Ṭūsī 1974, 213–216; Ḥillī 1363/1985, 135). Curiously, however, Abharī never seems to have mentioned Khūnajī, instead using language that suggests that he was presenting his own innovative ideas. The issue might have been clearer if it were known when the relevant works of Khūnajī and Abharī were written. Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār was almost certainly written before 634/1237, and Abharī’s revisionist work Kashf al-ḥaqāʾiq was written before 642/1244. But it is difficult to be much more confident about precise dates, at least given the present state of research. It is also unlikely that Khūnajī and Abharī were both influenced by a common teacher, for their early works on logic are more conven-

(vi) Athı¯r al-Dı¯n al-Abharı¯

tionally Avicennian and show few signs of the novel ideas that they would espouse in later works, for example Khūnajī’s Jumal which was written in 624/ 1226–27 and four works by Abharī that were copied and studied by his student Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī in 627/1230 (Istanbul, Köprülü Library: MS Fazıl Ahmet Paşa 1618, including a certificate of study to Kātibī in Abharī’s hand). New light on this issue has been shed by the recent edition of the section on logic from Abharī’s Muntahā l-afkār fī ibānat al-asrār (Abharī 2016). This work survives in two recensions. The first rejects some of the major innovative suggestions that Khūnajī had made in Kashf al-asrār, such as the view that a necessity E-proposition (Necessarily no J is B) does not convert to a necessity E-proposition (Necessarily no B is J), that a possibility A proposition (Every J is possibly B) does not convert to a possibility I proposition (Some B is possibly J), and that first-figure syllogisms with possibility minors are sterile (pp. 124–126, 129–130, 146–148). Though Abharī did not mention Khūnajī by name, the wordings of the suggestions are clearly derived from the latter’s work, as noted by the editors. The second recension, by contrast, endorses Khūnajī’s claims. This shows conclusively that Abharī had read Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār, that he initially rejected a number of its innovative suggestions, and that he later changed his mind and endorsed most of them. Abharī was a prolific writer and authored more than a dozen presentations of philosophy in its three parts: logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics. A number of these were explicitly written for the benefit of his students. He also wrote a number of works on dialectics (jadal), but these still await study. Judging from the number of extant manuscripts, the following were Abharī’s most influential works that dealt with logic or dialectics: 1) Kashf al-ḥaqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-daqāʾiq (Disclosing Verities in Redacting Subtleties), an exposition of logic, physics and metaphysics. Abharī began the work by stating that many generally accepted principles in natural philosophy and logic were based on weak arguments (ḥujaj wāhiya), and that he wished to write a work that made clear the mistakes of older scholars, adding subtle points (daqāʾiq) that he had extracted from the realm of potentiality to actuality (akhrajtuhu min al-quwwa ilā l-fiʿl). Along with Tanzīl al-afkār, this is Abharī’s most influential “revisionist” work, expounding views that, notwithstanding Abharī’s claims to originality, were often derived from Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār. The

49

50

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

work has been edited by Hüseyın Sarıoğlu (Istanbul, 1998; 476 pp. of which pp. 3–234 cover logic). 2) Tanzīl afkār fī taʿdīl al-asrār (The Revelation of Thoughts in Recalibrating Secrets), another presentation of the three parts of philosophy, purporting to present the results of Abharī’s own thinking (mā addā ilayhi afkārunā), leading to the “recalibration” (taʿdīl) of the discipline (Şeşen 1997, 267). The logic of the work is broadly “revisionist”, indicat­ing that it was composed after works such as Muntahā l-afkār and Hidāyat al-ḥikma. The work elicited a detailed refutation in 656/ 1258 by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Lemmas from Abharī’s work are reproduced in the edition of Ṭūsī’s refutation printed in Tehran in 1974 in the miscellany Manṭiq va-mabāḥith-i alfāẓ edited by M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (pp. 139–248). There are three extant manuscripts of Abharī’s work in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul: Laleli 2562, Reisülkuttab 569, Nurosmaniye 2662. 3) Muntahā l-afkār fī ibānat al-asrār (The Ultimate Thoughts in Explicating Secrets). This is the work mentioned above, also consisting of a section on logic followed by parts on metaphysics and natural philosophy. The logic section survives in two recensions, the first rejecting and the second endorsing the most characteristic views of Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār. Both recensions have been edited by Mahdī ʿAẓīmī & Hāshim Qurbānī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Ḥikmat, 1395/2016). 4) Khulāṣat al-afkār wa-naqāwat al-asrār (The Synopsis of Thoughts and the Choice of Secrets). Written after Kashf al-ḥaqāʾiq, this is, unusually, a summa of logic rather than a tripartite presentation of philosophy. It is extant in a single manuscript and has been edited by M. ʿAẓīmī & H. Qurbānī. (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2018, pp. 93–385). 5) Talkhīṣ al-ḥaqāʾiq (The Summary of Verities). This is one of Abharī’s numerous shorter surveys of logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics. It is an early work, and is extant in a copy made by his student Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī in 627/1230. The logic part has been edited by Mahdī ʿAẓīmī in the journal Jāvīdān-i khirad 30(1395/2016), pp. 101– 132. The presentation conspicuously lacks the distinctive revisionist ideas that Abharī would expound in later works.

(vi) Athı¯r al-Dı¯n al-Abharı¯

6) Hidāyat al-ḥikma (The Guidance of Wisdom). This is Abharī’s most well-known presentation of philosophy in its three parts. Again, the logic of this work lacks the most distinctive revisionist departures from Avicenna, suggesting that it was written relatively early in Abharī’s career. Though the sections on physics and metaphysics were widely studied and commented upon in later centuries, the logic section apparently fell into disuse and most commentators ignored it. One extant commentary that covers the logic part (only) was written by Qāḍīzāde al-Rūmī, a scholar active at the observatory of Ulugh Beg (d. 853/1449) in Samarqand (see Mach 1977, nr. 3158). The logic part of Abharī’s work has been edited by Muḥammad Taqī Dānishpazhūh in Majalla-yi Dānishkāda-yi adabiyyāt va-ʿulūm-i insānī 17 (1340/1961), 484–94. At the end of the work, Abharī referred the reader to the longer treatment of logic in his Zubdat al-asrār. 7) Zubdat al-asrār (The Cream of Secrets). This is yet another tripartite presentation of philosophy, longer than Hidāyat al-ḥikma. It must have been a relatively early work, for there are references to it in Hidāyat al-ḥikma, and the logic of that latter work lacks some of the more distinctively revisionist ideas that Abharī would expound in his later work. Three extant manuscripts of this work are: (1) Ayatollah Marʿashī Najafī Library, Qom 4060, fols. 2–38; (2) Millet Library, Istanbul: Feyzullah 1210, fols. 100–168, and (3) Burdur İl Halk Library, Burdur, Turkey: 1180, fols. 1–51. (Some of these manuscripts may not include all three parts.) The work is presumably not identical to Zubdat al-ḥaqāʾiq (The Cream of Verities), one of the four works by Abharī that were copied and studied by his student Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī in 627/1230 (Istanbul, Köprülü Library: MS Fazıl Ahmet Paşa 1618, fols. 107–149). 8) Al-Qawādiḥ al-jadaliyya (Dialectical Confutations), a treatise on dialectics (jadal), edited by Sharīfa al-Ḥawshānī (Beirut, Riyadh, Damascus: Dār al-Warrāq, 2004, 205 pp.). As with his later works on logic, Abharī adopted an iconoclastic stance in this work, undertaking to criticize many principles accepted by earlier dialecticians, including his teacher Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī. The work appears to have been written after Abharī adopted a number of “revisionist” views in logic.

51

52

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

Many of his arguments are based on denying, for example, that if an antecedent entails a proposition then it cannot entail the negation of that proposition as well (i.e., denying that p → q entails ¬[p → ¬q]), and denying the contraposition of conditionals (i.e., denying that p → q entails ¬q → ¬p). 9) Tahdhīb al-Nukat (The Emendation of the Impressions), a revision of a work on dialectics (jadal) by Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083), see Nemoy 1956, nr. 1412. (On the original work by Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, see Mach & Ormsby 1987, nr. 849) 10) Īsāghūjī (Introduction), a short, introductory exposition of logic that came to be widely used as a primer on logic in subsequent centuries and as such elicited numerous commentaries and glosses. Some of the most influential commentaries were the following: a. By Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Kātī (d. 760/1359), widely studied throughout the Turco-Persianate world (Kātī 1270/1862). b. A commentary widely studied in the Indian subcontinent in later centuries and attributed there to al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) (Jurjānī 1309/1891–2). c. By Meḥmed Fenārī (d. 834/1431), a somewhat more demanding commentary that was widely studied in the Turkish-speaking parts of the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Shirwān (present-day Azerbaijan) before its incorporation into the Safavid Empire, and in the Tatar areas north of the Black and Caspian Seas (Fenārī 1289/1872). d. By Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1519), entitled al-Maṭlaʿ (The Starting Point). It was widely studied in Egypt, and elicited numerous glosses by later Egyptian scholars (Anṣārī 1302/1885; Anṣārī 2017). The influence of Abharī’s work is such as to merit a closer description, and its shortness allows for not just an outline of sections but an actual summary of contents (for an English translation, see Calverley 1933): In the preamble, it is stated that the work contains what ought to be known by any budding student of the sciences. It then introduces various types of conventional reference: by correspondence (muṭābaqa), by inclusion (taḍammun), and by implication (iltizām). It then divides utterances into

(vi) Athı¯r al-Dı¯n al-Abharı¯

singular (mufrad) or composite (muʾallaf), and then subdivides the former into particular (juzʾī) and universal (kullī). It then gives the five types of universal: genus (jins), species (nawʿ), differentia (faṣl), proprium (khāṣṣa), and general accident (ʿaraḍ ʿāmm). It then divides the explicatory phrase (qawl shāriḥ) into complete description (rasm tāmm) and incomplete description (rasm nāqiṣ) and complete definition (ḥadd tāmm) and incomplete definition (ḥadd nāqiṣ). A proposition (qaḍiyya) is then defined and divided into categorical (ḥamlī) and hypothetical (sharṭī), the latter being subdivided into conditional (muttaṣil) and disjunctive (munfaṣil). A proposition is then stated to be either affirmative (mūjiba) or negative (sāliba), and either unquantified (muhmala) or quantified (maḥṣūra), and the latter is either universal (kulliyya) or particular (juzʾiyya). Conditional-hypotheticals are divided into “implicative” (luzūmī) and “coincidental” (ittifāqī), and disjunctive-hypotheticals are divided into “exhaustive” (māniʿat khuluww), “exclusive” (māniʿat jamʿ) and “strict” (ḥaqīqī). The contradiction (tanāquḍ) and converse (ʿaks) of the quantified propositions are then given. This is followed by a brief discussion of the syllogism (qiyās), which is divided into four figures (ashkāl), though only the four productive moods (ḍurūb) of the first figure are given. Hypothetical syllogisms are then introduced, both the “combinatorial-hypothetical” (sharṭī iqtirānī) syllogisms of the Avicennian tradition, such as the wholly hypothetical syllogism, and the “reiterative-hypothetical” (sharṭī istithnāʾī) syllogisms recognized in pre-Avicennian Arabic logic, such as modus ponens, modus tollens, and disjunctive syllogism. Demonstration (burhān) is briefly described as a syllogism consisting of certain premises, and the sources of certainty (yaqīn) are then enumerated: self-evident axioms (awwaliyyāt), sense perception (ḥissiyyāt), experience (mujarrabāt), intuitive apprehension of middle terms (ḥadsiyyāt), reports that are attested in numerous, independent ways (mutawātirāt), and propositions in which the requisite middle term between subject and predicate is implicitly understood by the mind (qaḍāyā qiyāsātuhā maʿahā). Dialectical (jadal), rhetorical (khiṭāba), poetic (shiʿr) and sophistical (safasaṭa) syllogisms are then briefly described, and the work ends with the stipulation that one should rely on demonstrative syllogism only.

53

54

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

(vii) Nas.¯r ı al-Dı¯n al-T. u ¯sı¯ (Mudarris Raz˙avı¯ 1354/1975–6) As his attributive indicates, Ṭūsī was born in the town of Ṭūs in Khorasan, in 597/1201. He began his studies with his father, a Twelver-Shiite jurist, and later studied the philosophical sciences in nearby Nishapur with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s students Quṭb al-Dīn al-Miṣrī and Farīd al-Dīn Dāmād (Rahim 2003, 223). He went westward, presumably just before the Mongol sacking of Nishapur in 618/1221, and continued his studies in Baghdad and Mosul, in the latter town attending the classes of the mathematician and astronomer Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn Yūnus. He was early drawn to esoteric Ismaʿili Shiism, and spent many years of his prime in the Ismaʿili fortress of Alamut. After the Mongol capture of Alamut in 654/1256, he enjoyed the patronage of the Mongol commander Hülegü and apparently reverted to Twelver Shiism. In 657/1259, he obtained the backing of Hülegü for building an observatory in Maragha and preparing a new astronomical table (zīj). He worked in Maragha for a decade, seeking and obtaining the cooperation of a number of other philosophers, astronomers and mathematicians. He died in Baghdad in 672/1274. Though Ṭūsī initially studied Avicenna’s works with some of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s students, he came to be critical of Rāzī’s work in general, including what he thought were Rāzī’s wrongheaded criticisms of Avicenna. Sectarian divisions may have been at play to some extent, Rāzī being the prominent Sunni theologian of the age and hence a natural target for criticism from Shiites. Ṭūsī was also an influential critic of the logical ideas of Abharī, though he did accept a number of revisionist modifications to Avicenna’s system (such as the fourth figure of the syllogism). His logic works include: 1) Asās al-iqtibās (The Basis of Acquisition), a Persian summa of logic that, to judge from the large number of extant manuscripts, appears to have been widely read in the Persianate world in later centuries. Completed in 642/1244–45, this appears to have been Ṭūsī’s earliest work on logic. Unlike most summas of the thirteenth century, it maintains the books of the Organon as the overarching organizing principle. The following are the main divisions of the work, along with the page numbers of the edition edited by Mudarris Rażawī and published in Tehran in 1326/1947: Eisagoge (pp. 6–33); Categories (pp. 34–59); De Interpretatione (pp. 60–185); Prior Analytics (pp. 186–339); Posterior

(vii) Nas.¯ır al-Dı¯n al-T.u ¯sı¯

Analytics (pp. 340–443); Topics (pp. 444–514); Sophistici Elenchi (pp. 515–528); Rhetoric (pp. 529–585); Poetics (pp. 586–599). The work was translated into Arabic by the Ottoman scholar Mullā Ḫüsrev (d. 885/1480), who dedicated the translation to the Ottoman Sultan Meḥmed II (r. 855/1451–886/1481). An unsatisfactory and incomplete edition of the Arabic translation was published in Cairo in 1999. It was edited by Ḥasan al-Shāfiʿī and Muḥammad al-Saʿīd Jamāl al-Dīn on the basis of a single manuscript extant in Egypt, ignoring the numerous early manuscripts that are extant in Istanbul. 2) Sharḥ al-Ishārāt (Commentary on the Pointers), an esteemed commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt, in which he systematically attempted to refute the criticisms raised in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the same work. It was completed in 644/1246–47. The logic sections of the commentary may, as indicated above, have been less widely studied than the other sections, for glossators from the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tended to omit it and focus on the sections on physics and metaphysics. But there is nevertheless abundant evidence that the entirety of Ṭūsī’s commentary continued to be copied, read and cited in subsequent centuries. It was published in three volumes by Maṭbaʿat al-Ḥaydarī in Iran in 1377–1379/1958–59. The first volume covers the section on logic. 3) Taʿdīl al-miʿyār (Recalibrating the Measure), a systematic criticism of Abharī’s Tanzīl al-afkār and therefore an important work in the more orthodox Avicennian response to revisionist logicians. It was printed in Tehran in 1974 in the miscellany Manṭiq va-mabāḥith-i alfāẓ edited by M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (pp. 139–248). According to the text of this edition, the work was completed in mid-Shaʿbān 656/mid-August 1258. It refers to Abharī as deceased, suggesting that Abharī died earlier than the conventionally accepted date of 663/1265. 4) Tajrīd al-manṭiq (Extracted Points of Logic), a short, condensed handbook of logic in Arabic, organized along the lines of his Persian summa Asās al-iqtibās. This was reportedly written shortly after Ṭūsī left Alamut and joined the court of Hülegü in 656/1258. Though it did not elicit as many commentaries and glosses as other thirteenth-century handbooks, it appears to have been familiar in Shiite circles in later times. Ṭūsī’s student Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī wrote a commentary on

55

56

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

it that has been published (Ḥillī 1363/1985). A later commentary, extant but unpublished, was written by Maḥmūd Nayrīzī (fl. 913/1508) (Pourjavady 2011, 156–157).

(viii) Najm al-Dı¯n al-Ka¯tibı¯ (El-Rouayheb EI3) Kātibī hailed from the town of Qazvin and was, as he himself stated on a number of occasions in his works, a student of Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī. He later worked at the Maragha observatory under Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. In this period, he enjoyed the patronage of the Il-Khanid vizier Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī (v. 661/1263–683/1284) and his son Sharaf al-Dīn Hārūn (d. 685/1286), to whom he dedicated a number of works. He died in 675/1276. His grave was still identifiable in Qazvin in the sixteenth century. Kātibī is one of the most prolific and influential writers on logic in the Arabic tradition, authoring an independent summa, three extensive commentaries, and an extremely popular handbook. He was influenced by Khūnajī and Abharī, but was no mere follower or expositor. His massive commentary on Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār, for example, was mainly sympathetic, but did not hesitate to depart from Khūnajī on occasion, especially when dealing with modal contrapositions and the fourth figure of the modal syllogism. Kātibī was also aware of some of Ṭūsī’s counter-arguments to the revisionists, and attempted to take these into account. Kātibī’s works on logic include: 1) Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq fī kashf al-ḥaqāʾiq (Collected Subtleties in Disclosing Verities), a summa of logic dedicated to Sharaf al-Dīn al-Juwaynī. A relatively late manuscript of this work (Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale: MS Arabe 2370, dated 863/1458) also contains sections on physics and metaphysics, but it appears to be the only extant manuscript with this addition. The present author is working on an edition of this work, and it would appear that all other manuscripts, including nine that are considerably earlier than the Paris manuscript, do not contain these later sections, for example London, British Library, Or. 11201 (fols. 9–148) and Cairo, Dār al-Kutub, Majāmīʿ Muṣṭafā Pāshā 162 (fols. 267–389), both dated 677/1278, and Dublin, Chester Beatty 3577 (fols. 1–84), dated 680/1282. Incidentally, the section on logic in al-Shajara

(viii) Najm al-Dı¯n al-Kı¯tibı¯

al-ilāhiyya (The Divine Tree), a widely copied philosophical summa by the “Illuminationist” philosopher Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (fl. 685/1288), appears in large part to have been simply lifted (without acknowledgment) from Kātibī’s Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq. 2) ʿAyn al-qawāʿid (The Quintessence of Rules), a manual of logic of intermediate length, significantly shorter than Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq but approximately twice the length of his more famous al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya discussed below (nr. 6). Two early manuscript copies are: Princeton, Princeton University Library, Islamic Manuscripts, Garrett Y1878 (fols. 3–34, copied in 680/1282), and Leiden, Leiden University Library, Or. 210/1 (fols. 1–72, copied in 673/1275). 3) Baḥr al-fawāʾid (The Sea of Useful Points), a commentary on his own ʿAyn al-qawāʿid, of comparable length to Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq. Two early manuscripts are: London, British Library, Or. 11576 (105 folios, copied in 680/1282), and Leiden, Leiden University Library, Or. 210/2, fols. 72–159, copied in 673/1275). 4) al-Munaṣṣaṣ fī sharḥ al-Mulakhkhaṣ (The Precise Commentary on the Summary), a lengthy commentary on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s influential al-Mulakhkhaṣ on logic, general metaphysics, physics and theology. In his introduction, Kātibī wrote that he had first commented upon the section on logic, and some years later commented upon the later, philosophical and theological sections, after which he revised the commentary on the first section and dedicated the final work, completed in 671/1272–3, to Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī. Two early, extant manuscripts are in Leiden University Library (Or. 36, 299 folios with 37 lines to a page, copied in 692/1293. Folios 1b–90b cover the section on logic) and in the Āstān-i Quds-i Rażavī Library in Mashhad (Ḥikma 1041, 444 folios with 33 lines to a page, copied in 693/1294. Folios 1b–144b cover the section on logic.) 5) A commentary on Khūnajī’s seminal summa of logic Kashf al-asrār. This is one of the lengthiest works on formal logic to have been written in Arabic. An early manuscript of the work is in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul (Carullah 1418, 226 folios, 31 lines per page, copied in 678/1280). Apart from commenting on the work, Kātibī also added sections on induction, analogy and the matter of the syllogism (demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric, sophistry, and poetics) that

57

58

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

Khūnajī had expressly planned to include in his work but had never completed. 6) al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya (The Epistle for Shams al-Dīn), a condensed handbook of logic, dedicated to Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī. Along with Abharī’s much more elementary Īsāghūjī, it was a staple of madrasa education throughout most of the Islamic world until the twentieth century. As such, it merits a closer look. The following gives the sections and subsections of the work, with the page numbers of the Istanbul edition of 1287/1870: a. Preamble (p. 2) b. Introduction (pp. 2–3) i. On the quiddity of logic and the need for it ii. On the subject matter of logic c. On singular terms (pp. 3–10) i. On utterances ii. On singular concepts iii. On universal and particular iv. On definitions d. On propositions (pp. 10–22) i. On the definition of proposition and its primary division ii. On categorical propositions 1. On the parts of the proposition 2. On the four quantified propositions 3. On privatives 4. On modality propositions iii. On the divisions of hypothetical propositions iv. On the immediate implications of propositions 1. Contradiction 2. Conversion 3. Contraposition 4. The immediate implications of hypotheticals e. On syllogism (pp. 22–29) i. On the definition of syllogism and its divisions ii. On modal syllogisms iii. On combinatorial-hypothetical syllogism iv. On reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms

(ix) Sira¯j al-Dı¯n al-Urmawı¯

v. On further types of inference f. Conclusion (pp. 29–32) i. On the matter of the syllogism ii. On the divisions of sciences

(ix) Sira¯j al-Dı¯n al-Urmawı¯ (Marlow 2010) As is the case with most thirteenth-century logicians, little is known of the early years of Sirāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Abī Bakr al-Urmawī. His attributive suggests that he hailed from Urmia, in what is today the Iranian province of western Azerbaijan. Bar Hebraeus listed him as one of the many students of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (Bar Hebraeus 1663, 485; Bar Hebraeus 1890, 445), but this is plainly incorrect. Urmawī was born in 594/1198 and was therefore barely twelve when Rāzī died; he could at most have studied, like Abharī, with some of Rāzī’s students. There is less reason to suspect other reports that he, like Abharī and Ṭūsī, studied with the astronomer and mathematician Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn Yūnus in Mosul, though astronomy and mathematics seem to have been incidental to Urmawī’s interests in later years. Like Khūnajī, Urmawī came to enjoy the patronage of the Egyptian rulers al-Malik al-Kāmil and al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ. He was sent by the latter to Frederick II in Sicily, and there wrote an unidentified book on logic for the Emperor. Urmawī later became a judge in Konya in Seljuk Anatolia, and died there in 682/1283. Urmawī’s relation to Khūnajī is not entirely clear. Both hailed from the same historic region of Azerbaijan, and both were active at the courts of al-Malik al-Kāmil and al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ in Cairo. In terms of doctrine, Urmawī’s logical works are very close to those of Khūnajī, but without any explicit acknowledgment of influence or indebtedness. Urmawī was only four years younger than Khūnajī, so it is unlikely that he was a straightforward student of the latter. So who influenced whom? There is little hard and fast evidence either way, but a number of factors suggest that Urmawī was mainly following Khūnajī, rather than vice versa. First, a number of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century authors attest to the originality of Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār and speak of “the author of al-Kashf and those who follow him” (Khūnajī 2010, iv–vii). There are no comparable testimonies singling out Urmawī’s originality. Second, Urmawī wrote a commentary on Khūnajī’s Mūjaz, and this would be highly unusual if Khūnajī had been a follower of Urmawī. Third, Urmawī appears to have gone with

59

60

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

Khūnajī to Seljuk Anatolia when the latter was sent as an emissary from al-Malik al-Kāmil to the Seljuk court, and he also appears to have returned to Cairo with Khūnajī after the Mongol defeat of the Seljuks in 641/1243 (Marlow 2010, 289– 290). Upon their return, it was Khūnajī who was appointed Chief Judge of Cairo by al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ after being recommended by the representative of the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad (Rahim 2010, 23). Again, all of this would be baffling if Khūnajī had been a follower of Urmawī. Fourth, Khūnajī’s incomplete and unpolished summa of logic was almost certainly written by 634/1237. By comparison, those of Urmawī’s writings on logic that can be dated are substantially later: Sharḥ al-Ishārāt (659/1261), al-Mabāhij (671/1273), Bayān alḥaqq (675/1276), and the present evidence does not suggest that the works that cannot be securely dated were written before 634/1237: his commentary on Khūnajī’s Mūjaz must have been written after Kashf al-asrār, for the Mūjaz itself refers to that longer work, and his most famous work Maṭāliʿ al-anwār survives in numerous manuscripts none of which are dated earlier than 670/1271. Fifth, Urmawī wrote abridgements of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s al-Maḥṣūl (The Yield), on the principles of jurisprudence, and al-Arbaʿīn (The Forty), on rational theology. It has also been observed that the section on philosophy in his Maṭāliʿ al-anwār is a paraphrase of the corresponding section of Rāzī’s Mulakhkhaṣ (Eichner 2009, 102–4). It is therefore not far-fetched to see the logic part of Maṭāliʿ al-anwār as yet another abridgement – of Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār. This was precisely the view of the Ottoman scholar and bibliophile Veliyüddīn Cārullāh (d. 1151/1738) (Khūnajī 2010, vi, n10), though it is admittedly not clear if he had any direct evidence for this or was merely guessing on the basis of content. All of this is circumstantial, of course, and it is certainly possible that further research should lead to a revision of this picture of the direction of influence. (For the view that it was Khūnajī who was influenced by Urmawī, see Lameer 2014, 415–416. Lameer does not, in my opinion, offer even circumstantial evidence for his view.) In any case, it is important to emphasize that Urmawī, like Kātibī, was not a mere follower but rather someone who sought to remedy some of the loose ends and tensions in Khūnajī’s unpolished and incomplete work. Urmawī’s main works on logic are: 1) Sharḥ al-Mūjaz (Commentary on The Concise), the aforementioned commentary on Khūnajī’s Mūjaz. An extant manuscript is in the Qara­ wiyyīn library in Fes (Fāsī 1979–89, III, 334, nr. 1278). It is possible

(ix) Sira¯j al-Dı¯n al-Urmawı¯

that the acephalous commentary on the Mūjaz that is extant in the British Library in London (MS Or. 5953, 177 folios, 11 lines per page) is another copy. 2) Sharḥ al-Ishārāt (Commentary on The Pointers), a commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt, completed in 659/1261 (Karatay 1966, nr. 6661); 3) Ghāyāt al-Āyāt (The Aims of The Signs), a commentary on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s handbook on logic al-Āyāt al-bayyināt. It is extant in a manuscript in the Alexandria Municipal Library in Egypt (MS 1957D, folios 1–77, copied in 679/1280). 4) al-Manāhij (The Trails), an intermediate length handbook on logic to which Urmawī wrote his own commentary, entitled al-Mabāhij (The Joys). An autograph copy of the commentary is extant in Konya in Turkey (Konya Karatay Yusufağa Kütüphanesi, MS 5482, fols. 75–229, dated 671/1273). 5) Bayān al-ḥaqq (The Explication of Truth) a summa of logic and metaphysics (ḥikma ilāhiyya) completed in 675/1276 (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Library, Atıf Efendi 1567, 143 folios, copied in 676/1278) 6) Maṭāliʿ al-anwār (The Dawning of Lights), a handbook of logic and metaphysics, less than half the length of the previous work. The later section on metaphysics seems to have fallen out of use within a few decades of Urmawī’s death, and the most widely copied and studied commentaries on the work, by Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1349) and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365), only cover the first part on logic (Mach 1977, nrs. 3221–3222). That part is substantially longer than Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, and gives a much fuller account of the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions (conditionals and disjunctions) and the hypothetical syllogism. Urmawī’s work with the lengthy commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī seems to have served for centuries as a standard handbook for students in the Eastern Islamic world who wished to pursue the study of logic beyond Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and its commentaries. It was still in use in Iran and Turkey in the nineteenth century, as shown by an Iranian lithograph from 1273/1857 and a printed edition in Istanbul from 1277/1861. The contents of the work are as follows, along with the folio numbers of an early manuscript copied in 670/1271 (Tehran: Tehran University Library, MS 6850).

61

62

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

i) Preamble (fol. 1b) ii) On the acquisition of conceptions a. On preliminaries (fol. 1b–4a) i. On the need for logic ii. On the subject matter of logic iii. On utterances b. On the universal and particular (fol. 4a–10a) i. On the divisions of the universal ii. On the genus iii. On the species iv. On the differentia v. On the proprium and general accident vi. On definitions and descriptions iii) On the acquisition of assents a. On the divisions, parts and immediate implications of propositions (fol. 10a–27a) i. On the divisions of propositions ii. On the parts of the proposition iii. On singular, quantified and unquantified propositions iv. On privatives v. On modalities vi. On the unity and multiplicity of the proposition vii. On contradiction viii. On contraposition ix. On the hypothetical proposition x. On the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions b. On syllogism (fol. 27a–34b) i. On its description ii. On the divisions of syllogism iii. On the conditions of productivity of the four figures iv. On modal syllogisms c. On hypothetical syllogisms (fol. 34b–48a) i. On what consist of two conditional premises ii. On what consists of two disjunctive premises iii. On what consists of a categorical and a conditional

(x) Ibn Kammu ¯na

iv. On what consists of a categorical and a disjunction v. On what consists of a conditional and a disjunction vi. On how to derive categorical propositions from combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms vii. On the reiterative-hypothetical syllogism viii. On the additional issues relating to syllogisms: complex syllogisms; indirect proof; the regimentation of arguments into syllogistic form; the five arts; the sources of demonstrative premises.

(x) Ibn Kammu ¯na (Pourjavady & Schmidtke 2006) Little is known of the early life of ʿIzz al-Dawla Saʿd b. Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna. He was born to a Jewish family in Baghdad and was writing works on philosophy by 657/1259. He corresponded with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Najm al-Dīn al-­ Kātibī, and – like Kātibī – dedicated a number of works to the Il-Khanid vizier Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī and his son Sharaf al-Dīn Hārūn. In 679/1280–1, he wrote Tanqīḥ al-abḥāth fī l-milal al-thalāth (The Scrutiny of Investigations into the Three Religions), a work adjudicating between the three monotheist religions and clearly written from the perspective of a non-Muslim. In 683/1284, his patron al-Juwaynī was executed, and he had to be smuggled out of Baghdad due to riots caused by the last-mentioned work. He reportedly died in the town of Hillah shortly thereafter. Though he first came to the attention of modern scholars due to his treatise on the three religions, he was primarily remembered in the later Islamic tradition for his commentary on Suhrawardī’s Talwīḥāt (Intimations) on logic, physics and metaphysics. Along with the works of Ṭūsī and Ḥillī, this was one of the most influential thirteenth-century works that was explicitly critical of the revisionist post-Avicennian logicians. Ibn Kammūna’s works also exerted considerable influence via the mediation of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī’s widely read works. As shown by Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke (Pourjavady & Schmidtke 2004), Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination) frequently follows Ibn Kammūna’s commentary on the Talwīḥāt, and the logical and philosophical sections of Quṭb al-Dīn’s encyclopedic Durrat al-tāj (The Pearl of the Crown) are in large part a Persian translation or paraphrase of Ibn Kammūna’s Arabic summa of philosophy al-Kāshif.

63

64

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

Ibn Kammūna’s works on logic include: 1) A commentary on Suhrawardī’s Talwīḥāt (Intimations), completed in 667/1268. (Pourjavady & Schmidtke 2006, 63–77). This has been edited in three volumes by Najafqolī Ḥabībī (Ṭehran: Markaz al-Buḥūth wa-l-­ Dirāsāt li-l-Turāth al-Makhṭūṭ, 2009), of which the first volume is dedicated to logic. 2) A commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt (Pointers), completed in 671/1273 and dedicated to Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī’s son Sharaf al-Dīn Hārūn. (Pourjavady & Schmidtke 2006, 59–63) 3) al-Kāshif (The Uncoverer), also called al-Jadīd fī l-ḥikma (The New in Wisdom), a three-part compendium of philosophy completed in 676/ 1278 and dedicated to Dawlatshāh b. Sanjar, apparently a high government official in Baghdad associated with Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī (Pourjavady & Schmidtke 2006, 87–92). It has been edited by Ḥāmid Nājī Isfahānī in 561 pages (Tehran & Berlin: Iranian Institute of Philosophy & Institute of Islamic Studies, 2008), of which pp. 9–76 are devoted to logic.

(xi) Ibn Wa ¯s. il al-H. amawı¯ (G. El-Shayyal EI2; Hirschler EI3) Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Ḥamawī, often known simply as Ibn Wāṣil, was born in Hamah in Syria in 604/1208, and studied the rational sciences in Damascus with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s student Shams al-Dīn al-Khusrawshāhī (d. 652/1254). He later settled in Cairo and, like Khūnajī and Urmawī, enjoyed the patronage of al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ. In 659/1261, he was sent by the Mamluk ruler Baybars (r. 658/1260–676/1277) on an embassy to the court of Frederick II’s son Manfred (r. 1258–1266) in southern Italy. Like Urmawī before him, Ibn Wāṣil composed a work on logic for his Latin hosts before returning to Egypt. He returned to his birth town of Hamah a few years later, and died there in 697/1298. Ibn Wāṣil was influenced by Khūnajī, with whom he studied in Cairo and whose Kashf al-asrār he admired. But like Urmawī and Kātibī, Ibn Wāṣil was also an independent-minded logician who was keenly aware that there were problems and tensions in his teacher’s unfinished work, and strove to address these. His comments in the introduction to his commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal are indicative:

(xii) Shams al-Dı¯n al-Samarqandı¯

When the Imam Afḍal al-Dīn wrote the Kashf he did not have a chance to edit and review it, and he became preoccupied with his position as judge and teacher, and did not live long after that. So there remained in the Kashf some inconsistent passages and some incorrect views whose incorrectness has become clear to me by arguments and demonstrations similar to those with which he refuted the views of those before him. I will indicate some of these in this short work (MS, Beinecke Library, Yale, Landberg 104, fol. 2a).

Ibn Wāṣil’s logical works include: 1) Nukhbat al-fikar (The Select Thoughts). This is the summa of logic that Ibn Wasil wrote for Emperor Manfred. Initially thought to have been lost, it is in fact extant in a Yale University Library manuscript copied in 680/1282 by a Samaritan scribe (see Nemoy 1956, nr. 1406). 2) Sharḥ al-Jumal (Commentary on the Sentences), a commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal. This was especially esteemed in North Africa, and started a tradition there of writing commentaries on the Jumal that lasted until the end of the seventeenth century. The earliest extant copy appears to be in Yale University Library (see Nemoy 1956, nr. 1407, missing the last folio but clearly written by the same scribe as copied Nukhbat al-fikar). Another early extant manuscript is in the National Library of Algiers (Fagnan 1893, nr. 1387). 3) A short treatise, entitled Hidāyat al-albāb (Guidance of Hearts), outlining the basics of logic that, according to Ibn Wāṣil, should be known by all scholars. A manuscript of this work is extant in Cambridge University Library (MS Ll.6.24, fols. 72b–87b).

(xii) Shams al-Dı¯n al-Samarqandı¯ (Miller EI2) Despite writing a number of influential and much studied works, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī is a somewhat obscure character who escaped the attention of the numerous biographical sources from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. His attributive indicates that he hailed from Samarqand or its environs. He appears to have studied with Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 687/1289), a Central Asian-born scholar who taught in Baghdad toward the end of his life. A number of Samarqandī’s works were written in the 680s/1280s and 690s/1290s. He was active outside of Central Asia in this period, and dedicated his most extensive treatment of logic to a certain ʿImād al-Dīn Khiḍr b. Ibrāhīm al-Muʾminī

65

66

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

who is mentioned by the historian Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (d. 723/1323) as an Il-Khanid grandee in Tabriz (Ibn al-Fuwaṭī 1416/1995–6, IV, part II, 719). A careful study of early manuscripts by Ramazan Şeşen and Heidrun Eichner reveals that he later moved to Khojand in Central Asia (Şeşen 2008, 147–151; Eichner 2009 389–391). According to marginalia in an early manuscript, Samarqandī died in 702/1303, though a later hand has corrected this to 722/1322. The latter date seems preferable, for there is manuscript evidence that Samarqandī was still alive in 719/1319 (the date of an extant copy of his commentary on his own al-Ṣaḥāʾif, a summa of philosophy and theology; see British Library, London: MS Delhi Arabic 954). Samarqandī’s major work on logic was esteemed and much copied in later centuries, especially in the Turco-Persianate world. He seems to have been neither a “revisionist” nor an “orthodox” Avicennian, but represented a critical synthesis of these two orientations. On the subject matter of logic, for example, he defended the Avicennian view, but his modal logic is broadly revisionist. He also took original departures, for example recognizing relational syllogisms and offering a brief but subtle analysis of them (El-Rouayheb 2010, 58–62), as well as presenting an original discussion of the liar paradox (Miller 1985). Samarqandī was also extremely influential as a dialectician, and his works formed the point of departure for the later literature in this field (Miller 1984). With him, dialectic became decisively dissociated from both Islamic jurisprudence and Aristotle’s Topics, and became an entirely formal discipline suffused with the principles of propositional logic. In step with this transformation, the earlier term jadal came increasingly to be supplanted by the terms ādāb al-baḥth or munāẓara. Samarqandī’s logical works include: 1) A handbook of logic entitled Qistās al-afkār (The Balance of Thoughts). This has been edited by Necmettin Pehlivan with a facing-page Turkish translation (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014. 573 pp.). 2) An extensive commentary on Qistās al-afkār. Though it did not elicit many glosses and super-glosses, suggesting that it was not formally studied in madrasas, there are nevertheless abundant manuscript copies of this lengthy work, and numerous references to it by later Eastern logicians, indicating that it was widely read or consulted in later cen-

(xii) Shams al-Dı¯n al-Samarqandı¯

turies, especially in the Turco-Persianate world. For early extant manuscripts, see Nemoy 1956, nr. 1410 and Karatay 1966, nr. 6776. 3) al-Anwār al-ilāhiyya (The Divine Lights), a condensed handbook on rational theology (kalām) prefaced with an exposition of logic and dialectic. An early extant manuscript is in the Süleymaniye Kütüphanesı, Istanbul: Laleli 2432, fols. 143–159, 35 lines per page, copied in 706/ 1307). 4) A commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt (for extant manuscripts, see Wisnovsky 2014, 347). 5) A commentary on the Fuṣūl (The Chapters) – also known as al-Mu­ qaddima al-Burhāniyya (The Burhānian Introduction) – on dialectic by his teacher Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī. (For extant manuscript copies, see Samarqandī 2014, 46–47.) 6) ʿAyn al-naẓar (The Quintessence of Ratiocination), a short treatise on co-implication (talāzum), incompatibility (munāfāt) and concomitance (dawarān). Two extant manuscripts are in the British Library in London: Or. 3730, fols. 72a–76a and Or. 3908, fols. 1a–5b. 7) A treatise on ādāb al-baḥth that came to be widely studied and commented upon in later centuries. A recent edition of the treatise, followed by the commentary of Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1519), has been edited by ʿArafa ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Nādī (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2014), pp. 73–94. The following is an overview of the contents of the work: a. Introduction (pp. 73–74) b. First section: On explication (pp. 75–76). This includes a series of definitions of core terms in the discipline, such as munāẓara (disputation), dalīl (proof), ʿilla (reason or ground of a judgment), munāqaḍa (objection to a premise), muʿāraḍa (counterproof), naqḍ (counterexample showing that a proffered proof is flawed). c. Second section: On the order of enquiry (pp. 77–87). This includes a discussion of the proper way for the questioner (sāʾil) to raise objections to the claimant (muʿallil), and the proper way for the claimant to respond to these objections. The questioner may (i) object to a premise of the claimant’s proof (munāqaḍa), or (ii) object to the proof as such, adducing counterexamples that show that the proof is flawed and does not establish the desired conclusion

67

68

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

(naqḍ), or (iii) give an equally compelling proof for the opposing conclusion (muʿāraḍa). Samarqandī then gave an illustration of the stated rules in the case of the debate between Islamic theologians and Aristotelian/Neo-Platonic philosophers concerning the pre-eternity of the world. d. Third section: On questions that I have invented (pp. 88–94). This includes a self-consciously original application of the mentioned dialectical techniques to three issues: the first in Islamic theology (the thesis that there is only one necessary existent), the second in Aristotelian/Neo-Platonic philosophy (the thesis that the Necessary Existent acts from necessity and not choice), and the third in law (the thesis that a father may force his mature daughter to marry). Samarqandī’s handbook elicited numerous commentaries, attesting to its popularity as a madrasa handbook. Some of the commentators were (Mach 1977, nrs. 3336–3339): – ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Bihishtī al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 749/1348). – Quṭb al-Dīn al-Gīlānī (fl. 830/1427). A critical edition and translation of this commentary (and of Samarqandī’s handbook) is being prepared by Walter Young. – Masʿūd al-Shirwānī (d. 905/1499), who authored the perhaps most widely studied commentary on Samarqandī’s handbook in the Turco-­ Persianate world, eliciting numerous glosses and super-glosses between the fifteenth century and the seventeenth. – Qāḍī Mīr Ḥusayn al-Maybudī (d. 909/1504). – Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520), whose commentary was widely studied in Egypt, eliciting numerous glosses down to the nineteenth century.

(xiii) Ibn al-Mut. ahhar al-H. illı¯ (Schmidtke, “H. ellı¯”, EIr) Ḥillī was one of the most influential Shiite scholars of the medieval period, authoring numerous works on theology and law that continued to be esteemed in Shiite circles until modern times. He was born in Hillah in Iraq in 648/1250. He studied logic with both Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī, but

(xiii) Ibn al-Mut. ahhar al-H.illı¯

was much closer in orientation to the former than the latter. His commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, for example, is quite critical and much closer in spirit to the more orthodox Avicennism of Ṭūsī (Street 2016). Ḥillī enjoyed the favor of the Il-Khanid ruler of Persia Öljaitu (r. 704/1304–716/1316) and seems to have been instrumental in that ruler’s conversion to Shiism. He died in Hillah in 726/1325. His logical works include: 1) A commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, entitled al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyya fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-Shamsiyya (The Clear Principles in Commenting upon the Epistle for Shams al-Dīn). It was completed in 679/1280. It has been edited by Fāris Ḥassūn Tabrīziyān and published in Qom in 1412/1992, in 426 pages. 2) A summa of logic, physics and metaphysics, entitled al-Asrār al-­ khafiyya fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya (The Hidden Secrets in the Rational Sciences) and dedicated to Sharaf al-Dīn al-Juwaynī (d. 685/1286), the dedicatee of Kātibī’s Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq. This has been published in 640 pages (Qom: Markaz al-Abḥāth wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah, 1421/2000– 01), of which pp. 7–223 cover the section on logic. It appears to have been written shortly after the commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya. 3) Marāṣid al-tadqīq wa-maqāṣid al-taḥqīq (The Observatory of Precision and the Ends of Verification). This is another presentation of the three philosophical sciences, presented as an abridgment of a longer summa entitled Taḥrīr al-abḥāth fī maʿrifat al-ʿulūm al-thalāth (The Redaction of Investigations for Knowing the Three Sciences). It is not clear whether this longer summa was ever completed, and what relation it bears to the previously mentioned summa al-Asrār al-khafiyya, which is not mentioned in the Marāṣid. The sole extant manuscript of the Marāṣid is incomplete and breaks off toward the end of the first part on logic. It has been edited by Muḥammad Ghafūrī-Nazhād (Karbala: al-ʿAtaba al-ʿAbbāsiyya al-Muqaddasa, 2017. Pp. 63–381). 4) A commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-manṭiq, entitled al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ manṭiq al-Tajrīd (The Tiered Jewel in Commenting upon the Logic of the Extracted Points). This was written later than the commentary on the Shamsiyya and al-Asrār al-khafiyya. Judging from the number of extant manuscripts, as well as citations by later scholars, this appears to have been his most widely read work on logic. It was litho-

69

70

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

graphed in Iran in 1311/1894 and has since been printed in movable type on a number of occasions. 5) A commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt that is entitled al-Muḥākamāt (Adjudications), as it purports to “adjudicate” between the earlier commentaries of Rāzī, Ṭūsī and Najm al-Dīn al-Nakhjuwānī. Extant copies of the work are: Istanbul, Topkapi Palace Library: Ahmed III 3400 and Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library: Damat Ibrahim Paşa 817. 6) An incomplete and only partially extant commentary on Avicenna’s Shifāʾ, entitled Kashf al-khifāʾ min kitāb al-Shifāʾ (Disclosing the Hidden in the Book of The Healing). Approximately two-thirds of the commentary on the Categories survives in a unique manuscript (Chester Beatty Library, Dublin: MS Arabic 5151, 102 folios). As this manuscript lack a preface or an introduction, it is likely that Ḥillī had also covered the first book of the logic, i.e., the Eisagoge. However, there is no evidence that he completed his commentary on the Categories, let alone the later books of the logic.

(xiv) S. adr al-Sharı¯ ̔ a al-Mah. bu ¯bı¯ (Dallal 1995, 7–11) Despite being a prominent and influential Ḥanafī jurist, Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa’s life seems to share the obscurity that afflicts so many Central Asian scholars of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Only the bare outlines of his life are discernable: He was born in Bukhara, and reportedly studied with his grandfather, an eminent Ḥanafī jurist. An early extant manuscript of Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ (Chester Beatty Library, Dublin: MS Arabic 3583) appears to have been owned by Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa, and has a certificate that suggests he read the work with one of Urmawī’s students. Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa went on to teach in Herat and Bukhara, and died in the latter city in 747/1346–7. Apart from his extremely influential works on Ḥanafī law and jurisprudence, he authored a work entitled Taʿdīl al-ʿulūm (Recalibrating the Sciences) that is a tripartite summa of logic, rational theology and astronomy. Formally, the work includes both a highly condensed base text and an expansive commentary by the author. The logic section of the work is of a broadly revisionist-Avicennian orientation, but with a number of original departures. It is both influenced by, and often critical of, the Qistās by the abovementioned Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī. (For two early extant manuscripts, see Ahlwardt 1877–99, nr. 5096 and Karatay 1966, nr. 6759.)

(xv) Shams al-Dı¯n al-Is.faha¯nı¯

Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa’s work was esteemed in later Ottoman circles, and the logic section elicited the following comment in a widely read encyclopedia of the sciences by the sixteenth-century scholar Aḥmed Ṭāşköprüzāde (d. 968/1561): If you wish to reach the ultimate station in logic then look to “The Recalibration of Logic” which is one of the parts of Taʿdīl al-ʿulūm by the great Imam … Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa, may God grant him the highest stations. In that work, he – may he rest in peace – uncovered subtleties that had long perplexed the minds of the ancients, and imparted principles that had eluded all of the luminaries (Ṭāşköprüzāde 1968, I, 303).

(xv) Shams al-Dı¯n al-Is. faha¯nı¯ (Is. faha¯nı¯ 2012, I, 71–107) Shams al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Iṣfahānī was born in Isfahan in 674/1276. He studied primarily with his father, who in turn had studied with the eminent Ashʿarī theologian, Shāfiʿī jurist and Quran exegete Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 719/1317). He later went to Tabriz, where he reportedly met and studied with the polymath Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311), a student of both Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī. After going on pilgrimage to Mecca in 724/1324, he settled in Damascus where he taught for a number of years, meeting and impressing both the controversial Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) and his critic, the Shāfiʿī jurist Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355). He moved to Cairo in 732/1331–2, and continued to teach there until he succumbed to the Black Death in 749/1349. Iṣfahānī’s most influential works were his commentaries on two handbooks of philosophical theology: Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād (Distillation of the Creed) and Bayḍāwī’s Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār (The Rising of Lights). He also wrote works on Quran exegesis, jurisprudence, logic and dialectics. In the latter two fields, his output is to a conspicuous extent dominated by commentaries on earlier handbooks. Furthermore, his commentaries deal with the preambles of the base text, discussing their rhetorical, theological and philosophical features. By contrast, thirteenth-century scholars who wrote commentaries (such as Kātibī, Ibn Wāṣil and Ḥillī) tended to skip the preamble of the base text and confine their remarks to strictly logical issues. Both features of Iṣfahānī’s writings foreshadow the development of Arabic logic in the fourteenth century, as can be seen in the writings of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365) and Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390). Iṣfahānī’s contributions to logic and dialectics are:

71

72

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

1) A commentary, entitled Tanwīr al-Maṭāliʿ (Casting Light on The Dawning), on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ al-anwār. This covers the logic part of Urmawī’s handbook only. An early extant manuscript is dated 719/1319 (Tehran University Library, Iran: MS 6422), implying that it was written relatively early in Iṣfahānī’s career, before moving to Damascus. For two other manuscripts copies, see Mach 1977, 3221. 2) A commentary on al-Fuṣūl, a handbook on dialectics (jadal) by Bur­ hān al-Dīn al-Nasafī. For an early extant manuscript, see Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul: Laleli 740 (96 folios, dated 737/1336–7). For another manuscript, see Fihris al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya 1924, I, 238. 3) A commentary, entitled Bayān al-Mukhtaṣar (An Explanation of the Epitome), on Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā, a handbook of jurisprudence by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249) that includes a section on logic. It has been published on a number of occasions in recent decades: edited by Muḥammad Baqā (Mecca: Dār al-Madanī, 1986); by ʿAlī Jumʿa (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2004); and by Yaḥyā Murād (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006). 4) A commentary on Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār, a handbook on philosophical theology by al-Bayḍāwī that also includes a section on logic. A recent edition has been published in Qom in 1393/2014 (Intishārāt-i Rāʾid). The discussion of logic is in volume I, pp. 171–238. 5) An intermediate length handbook on logic entitled Nāẓir al-ʿayn (The View of the Quintessence), composed in Tabriz. Later, in Cairo, Iṣfahānī wrote his own commentary on the work. (For extant copies, see Karatay 1966, nr. 6880 and Fihris al-kutub al-mawjūda bi-l-maktaba al-Azhariyya 1947, III, 446.)

(xvi) Qut. b al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯ al-Tah. ta¯nı¯ (Sharı¯ ̔ atı¯ 2004, 49–60) Quṭb al-Dīn was born in a village near Rayy around the year 692/1293, and studied with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s students Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī. There is some reason to think that he was a Shiite, for he copied and annotated at least one work on Shiite law by Ḥillī, and in that work claimed descent from the eminent Shiite religious scholar Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381/991) – hence the attributive “al-Buwayhī” by which he appears in some sources. But when he came to Damascus toward the end of his life he was described by a number of local scholars as a Sunni of the Shāfiʿī school who had

(xvi) Qut. b al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯ al-Tah. ta¯nı¯

authored a commentary on a well-known Shāfiʿī manual of law. In Damascus he earned the attributive “al-Taḥtānī” since he was residing in a madrasa that had another Quṭb al-Dīn living above him in one of the upper stories. He died in Damascus in 766/1365. Quṭb al-Dīn was arguably the most influential logician writing in Arabic in the fourteenth century. He authored the two standard commentaries on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, both widely studied until modern times. The latter commentary is approximately twice as long as the former, and reveals him to have been an ardent admirer of Avicenna who believed that almost all the departures from “the Master” proposed by “the author of al-Kashf and those who follow him” were ill-considered and based on misunderstandings. Nevertheless, he obviously did not believe that logic was simply identical to the exegesis of Avicenna’s logical works, for he was willing to make his own suggestions on a number of points. For example, he seems to have been the first to suggest that a proposition consists of four parts: subject, predicate, copula and judgment – earlier Arabic logicians had not explicitly distinguished the copula and the judgment (El-Rouayheb 2016). He also defended a nominalist position regarding universals (see Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī 2013); rejected the need to regiment relational inferences into standard syllogisms with three terms (El-Rouayheb 2010, 66–69); and rejected the productivity of first-figure wholly hypothetical syllogisms (Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī 1861, 214–215). His commentary on the Shamsiyya is less ambitious and idiosyncratic, and more concerned with explication than criticism. It was obviously aimed at less advanced readers, though not complete beginners. Quṭb al-Dīn’s works on logic include: 1) A commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, entitled Lawāmiʿ al-asrār bi-sharḥ Maṭāliʿ al-anwār (The Blazing Secrets in Commenting upon the Dawning Lights). It covers the logic section of Urmawī’s handbook only. It was written in 728/1328 and is dedicated to the Il-Khanid vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 736/1336). It was lithographed in Tehran in 1274/1857 (no publisher indicated) and printed in Istanbul in 1277/ 1861 (Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 251 pp.) and 1303/1885 (Ḥāc Muḥarrem Bōsnavī, 352 pp.). Two more recent editions have recently been published in Iran: (i) edited by ʿAlī Aṣghar Jaʿfarī Valanī (Tehran: Dānishgāh-i Tihrān, 2014) and (ii) edited by Abū l-Qāsim Raḥmānī (Tehran:

73

74

III. Arabic Logic, 1200–1350

Muʾassasa-yi Pizhūhishī-yi Ḥikmat va Falsafa-yi Īrān, 2014). A third recent edition, which claims to be based on a single manuscript, and which lacks any critical apparatus, has been published in Egypt (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2015, edited by Maḥfūẓ Abī Bakr Ibn Maʿtūma). 2) A commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, entitled Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid almanṭiqiyya bi-sharh al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya (Redacting the Rules of Logic in Commenting upon the Epistle for Shams al-Dīn). It was written in 729/1329 and likewise dedicated to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad. Around half the length of his commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, it has been lithographed or printed on numerous occasions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in Cairo, Istanbul, Iran and India. 3) Glosses, entitled al-Muḥākamāt (Adjudications), on Avicenna’s Ishārāt and Ṭūsī’s commentary. These glosses, completed in 756/1355, elicited numerous super-glosses in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Though Quṭb al-Dīn’s glosses cover the entirety of the Ishārāt and Ṭūsī’s commentary, later super-glossators tended to ignore the logic section and focus on the physics and metaphysics. The glosses are printed along with Ṭūsī’s commentary on the Ishārāt in the three volume edition published in Tehran by Maṭbaʿat al-Ḥaydarī in 1377– 1379/1958–59. The first volume covers the section on logic. 4) A treatise on conception and assent (taṣawwur wa taṣdīq). This came to be intensively studied in Mughal India. It was edited by Mahdī Sharīʿatī in his Risālatān fī l-taṣawwur wa l-taṣdīq (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2004), pp. 93–135. 5) A treatise on universals (kulliyyāt). It was edited along with two later commentaries, with facing-page Turkish translations, by Ömer Türker (Risâle fî tahkîki ʿl-külliyyât [İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2013]). 6) A treatise on quantified propositions (maḥṣūrāt), both categorical and hypothetical (Mach & Ormsby 1987, nr. 1154).

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

(i) Introduction (El-Rouayheb 2016; El-Rouayheb 2017) In the course of the fourteenth century, the Arabic tradition of logic underwent two important transformations. First, the tradition of writing independent summas waned noticeably compared to the preceding century, giving way to the predominance of the literary forms of condensed handbook (matn), commentary (sharḥ) and gloss (ḥāshiya), as well as treatises (risāla) on particular topics. The rare summas of later centuries were mostly written by scholars such as Ibn Turka al-Iṣfahānī (d. 835/1432), Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī (d. 949/1542) and Muḥammad Yūsuf Ṭihrānī (fl. 1104/1692) who wished to return to the logic of “the ancients”, therefore writing works that harked back, in terms of emphasis or organization, to the Peripatetic Organon or Avicenna’s Shifāʾ. In the twentieth century, the literary forms of commentary and gloss came to be denigrated by most historians, Muslim as well as Western, as inherently pedantic and unoriginal. The prevalence of these literary forms was seen in studies such as Ibrahim Madkour’s L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe (1934, 2nd edition 1969) and Nicholas Rescher’s The Development of Arabic Logic (1964) as evidence of the degeneration of the Arabic logical tradition into sheer “comment-mongering”. This is clearly too sweeping. The Arabic logical tradition had from the beginning been linked to commenting on the books of the Organon. What was true of someone like Fārābī in the early tenth century remained true of Arabic logicians after the thirteenth century: commentators and glossators were expected to be charitable to the work they were commenting on, but often felt free to critically discuss or expand on received ideas and to disagree with the author of the base text or with other commentators. A number of examples of this will be given below, in the discussion of some of the major logicians from the period.

76

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

Having said this, the prevalence of the literary forms of commentary and gloss after the thirteenth century indicates that doing logic again came to be associated with the respectful (though not necessarily uncritical) exegesis of logical texts, after an interlude from the eleventh to the thirteenth century in which the connection between logic and textual exegesis had been weakened due, at least in part, to the self-confidence and iconoclasm of Avicenna, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Khūnajī. Symptomatic of the more text-oriented approach of later centuries was the tendency to comment on and gloss the preambles of logical handbooks. It is striking that thirteenth-century commentators such as Ibn al-Badīʿ al-Bandahī (d. 657/1258) in his commentary on Khūnajī’s Mūjaz, Ibn Wāṣil (d. 697/1298) in his commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal, and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276) in his commentaries on Rāzī’s Mulakhkhaṣ and Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār, did not discuss the preambles of the base text, mainly confining their discussions to strictly logical issues. This is the case even as late as the commentaries of Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd, written toward the end of the thirteenth century (Ḥillī 1412/1991; Ḥillī 1423/2002–3). Fourteenth-century commentators, by contrast, discussed the wording of the preamble and introduction on a par with other passages of the base text. This is true, for example, of the commentary of Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1349) on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, the commentaries of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/1365) on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, and the commentary of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya. Later glossators accentuate this trend, many of them discussing at great length semantic, rhetorical and theological issues raised by the wording of the preamble of the commentaries they were glossing, as well as the commentators’ discussion of the preambles of the base texts. An example of this is the widely studied gloss of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) on the commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/1365) on Urmawī’s handbook Maṭāliʿ al-anwār. Around one-tenth of Jurjānī’s gloss is devoted to Quṭb al-Dīn’s own preamble and the commentary on Urmawī’s preamble (Jurjānī 1861, 2–14). These early parts of Jurjānī’s gloss were in turn glossed intensively by a host of later scholars (Mach 1977, nrs. 3225–3231; Mach & Ormsby 1987, nrs. 696–701), sometimes leading to lengthy works (as long as some of the thirteenth-century summas of logic) devoted almost entirely to semantic, rhetorical, theological and metaphysical issues raised by the first few pages of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary.

(i) Introduction

Though this practice might seem perplexing and pedantic to modern readers, it should be kept in mind that most commentators and glossators did eventually get to the strictly logical passages of the base text and often discussed these with subtlety. Furthermore, even the earlier treatment of preambles sometimes elicited discussions of relevant logical points. For example, the issue of relational syllogisms was discussed by a number of sixteenth-century glossators of a fifteenth-century commentary on a fourteenth-century handbook, and they did so in their discussion of the preamble in connection with the commentator’s statement that to laud (ḥamd) God is to attribute munificence to Him, and in particular voluntary munificence, “for it [munificence] is an attribute of an action, and this is by volition.” Some glossators regimented the argument into the following relational syllogism, arguing that the conclusion follows formally from the premises without the need for regimenting it into a standard syllogism with three terms (El-Rouayheb 2010, 158–163): This munificence is an attribute of action Action is voluntary This munificence is an attribute of the voluntary A second major development in the fourteenth century was a shift of emphasis, especially marked in the Eastern Islamic world. Thirteenth-century logicians such as Khūnajī, Kātibī, Urmawī and Ibn Wāṣil were keenly interested in the conversion and contraposition of modality propositions, the immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions, as well as the modal and hypothetical syllogisms. In Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār, for example, approximately 70% of the whole work is devoted to these topics (Khūnajī 2010). By the second half of the fourteenth century, this interest clearly began receding among Eastern Islamic logicians. Instead, the most intensely discussed parts of the thirteenth-century handbooks came to be the earlier parts dealing with issues such as the division of knowledge into conception and assent, the subject matter of logic, the problem of circularity or regress if there are no evident conceptions and assents, types of conventional reference, and the five universals (genus, species, differentia, proprium and general accident). There was still some interest in propositions, especially in the question of the parts of the propositions, for example whether they are three (subject, predicate, copula) or four (subject, predicate, copula and judgment) and in the liar paradox. But there is little evidence of strong interest

77

78

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

in issues such as the conversion and contraposition of modality propositions, the immediate implications of hypotheticals, and the modal and hypothetical syllogisms. This shift in focus becomes clear from the commentary traditions on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ. For example, approximately three-quarters of the widely studied gloss by al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya discusses passages in the commentary dealing with preliminary matters and conceptions, and less than 10% is devoted to the sections on the immediate implications of propositions and the syllogism (Jurjānī 1318/1900, pp. 146–159). Jurjānī’s gloss in turn became the subject of numerous super-glosses by fifteenth-century Persian scholars that discussed points raised in Jurjānī’s glosses (Mach 1977, nr. 3198–3202), thus sharing and reinforcing the emphasis on the earlier parts of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary. Jurjānī’s abovementioned gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on the Maṭāliʿ exhibits the same trend even more markedly. It only covers the early sections dealing with rhetorical and semantic aspects of the preamble of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary, preliminary matters (the nature of knowledge and its division into conception and assent; the subject matter of logic; conventional reference), the five universals, and definitions and descriptions, ignoring entirely the later sections dealing with the acquisition of assents, i.e., propositions and syllogisms (which account for more than two-thirds of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary). Again, Jurjānī’s gloss elicited numerous super-glosses in the course of the fifteenth century by Persian scholars (Mach 1977, nrs. 3225–3231; Mach & Ormsby 1987, nrs. 696–701). By contrast, the later parts of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary dealing with conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of hypotheticals, and the syllogism appear not to have elicited a single gloss after the fourteenth century. A slightly later handbook of logic that came to be widely studied in later centuries is Tahdhīb al-manṭiq by Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390). An esteemed commentary on this handbook by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/ 1502) illustrates the same trend. The commentary only covers the part of the handbook that dealt with preliminary matters, the five universals, the acquisition of concepts, and propositions; it does not cover the later parts of Taftāzānī’s handbook dealing with conversion, contraposition and syllogism. The incomplete commentary elicited a large number of glosses and super-glosses

(i) Introduction

in later centuries throughout the Turco-Persianate world (Mach 1977, nrs. 3237–3246). Interest in, for example, modal conversions and syllogisms may not have ceased entirely in later centuries in Eastern Islamic lands. Nevertheless, the overall shift in emphasis away from formal-technical discussions of conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of hypotheticals, and the modal and hypothetical syllogism is unmistakable. An obvious question is why this shift occurred. It is difficult to answer such questions with confidence, though it seems likely that it was connected to two broader intellectual developments. One was the spectacular rise of interest in the discipline of semantics and rhetoric (ʿilm al-maʿānī wa l-bayān). Especially the relevant sections of Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm by Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229) and its sometimes critical epitome (Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ) by al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338) came to be widely studied and elicited a large number of commentaries, glosses and super-­ glosses in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Smyth 1992; Mach 1977, nrs. 3868–3914). A conspicuous number of Eastern logicians after the mid-fourteenth century were also eminent contributors to this burgeoning literature. It is highly unlikely that this was unrelated to the shifting emphasis in logic works toward, among other things, linguistic and semantic issues. Another relevant intellectual development that coincided with the shifting emphasis of Eastern logicians in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was the noticeable philosophical turn in Islamic rational theology (kalām). The process can be seen in earnest in the writings of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233), and gained strength in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In widely studied theological works such as Tajrīd alʿaqāʾid by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār by Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 719/1317) and al-Mawāqif by ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), discussions of the metaphysics and physics of the Aristotelian/Neo-Platonic philosophers take up almost two-thirds of the total. It is only approximately the last third of these works that is devoted to traditional issues discussed in kalām, such as the proofs for the existence of God, God’s attributes, the creation of human acts, and the nature of the Quran. Again, it is unlikely that this was unrelated to the shifting emphasis of logicians. There is considerable overlap between the issues discussed in the early philosophical sections of the new kalām handbooks and those discussed in the early sections of logic handbooks, for example: the subject matter of a science; the definition of knowledge, its division

79

80

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

into conception and assent, and the division of both into evident and acquired; the question of the extra-mental existence of universals; and the nature of predication (ḥaml) (See, for example, Jurjānī 1286/1869, 12–14, 16–21, 21–28, 114, 121–124, 128–131). Again, there is also a conspicuous overlap between a list of eminent Eastern Islamic logicians from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century and a list of eminent Eastern Islamic philosophical theologians in the same period. In support of this explanation, it may be pointed out that the shift in emphasis away from modal and hypothetical logic was much less marked in North Africa where the interest in semantics-rhetoric and philosophical theology was much less strong than in the Eastern Islamic lands, at least until the seventeenth century. North African theologians such as al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490) eschewed lengthy philosophical preliminaries and still retained a focus on the traditional theological topics covered in, for example, the works of Juwaynī (d. 478/1085). The North African tradition of logic in this period exhibits a number of distinctive features and will be discussed in a separate section below. In the remainder of this chapter, a number of major Eastern Islamic logicians from 1350 to 1600 will be discussed in greater detail.

(ii) Sa ̔ d al-Dı¯n al-Tafta¯za¯nı¯ (Madelung EI2) Taftāzānī was born in a village in Khorasan in 722/1322. Reports that he studied with the illustrious ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) and Quṭb al-Din alRāzī (d. 766/1365) are late and not supported by Taftāzānī’s references to these scholars in his works, which are frequently critical and do not indicate a personal relationship. A report that he studied with one of Ījī’s students, a certain Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn al-Qirimī (d. 781/1379), seems more worthy of acceptance. Taftāzānī was active in Herat in the late 740s/1340s, when he composed the esteemed Long Commentary (al-Muṭawwal) on Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ, the previously mentioned handbook on semantics and rhetoric. He later travelled to Central Asia, obtaining the patronage of Muḥammad Jānī Beg of the Golden Horde (r. 742/1342–758/1357), Ḥusayn Ṣūfī in Khwārezm (r. 762/1361–773/1372), and Tamerlane (r. 771/1370–807/1405). He died in Tamerlane’s capital Samarqand in 792/1390. Taftāzānī’s works were enormously influential until the modern period. In the twentieth century, his reputation suffered from the rising prejudices against

(ii) Sa ’ d al-Dı¯n al-Tafta¯za ¯nı¯

both post-Mongol intellectual life and the literary formats of commentary and gloss. It is now sometimes assumed that he was a “sterile commentator” (Rescher 1964, 218), but such an assessment is grossly inaccurate. Though not an iconoclastic thinker, Taftāzānī would have thought of himself as a “verifier” (muḥaqqiq) who not only explicated the views of his predecessors but also critically evaluated them. His logical works bear out this self-conception. For example, in his commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya (Taftāzānī 1317/1899) he defended Kātibī’s view that the subject matter of logic is “known concepts and assents” from the criticisms of Ṭūsī (p. 8), and defended nominalism concerning universals against the more standard Aristotelian view of Kātibī (p. 21). He was also surprisingly well read, citing for example Fārābī’s Kitāb al-ḥurūf (pp. 30–31) and the Arabic translation of Porphyry’s Eisagōgē (p. 3, l. 21). He also penned an influential though aporetic discussion of the liar paradox (Alwishah & Sanson 2016). Most strikingly perhaps, his handbook of logic Tahdhīb al-manṭiq contains a passage that was considered by commentators, with good reason, to have been original. It attempts to give conditions of productivity across the various figures and moods of the syllogism, invoking the concept of ʿumūm al-mawḍūʿiyya, roughly translatable as “subject generality”: this is true of a term in a premise if it is actually or by implication the subject of a universal proposition. This is akin to, even if not identical to, medieval Latin notions of “distribution”. The passage, which came to be known in later centuries as ḍābitat al-Tahdhīb, runs as follows: The general rule for the four [syllogisms] is that there must be: either a subject generality of the middle term and that it is actually and affirmatively connected to the minor or predicated of the major term, or a subject generality of the major term together with a difference in quality [i.e., one premise is affirmative and the other negative] and an incompatibility between the relation of the description of the middle term to the description of the major term and its relation to the substance of the minor (Taftāzānī 1887, p. 7, ll. 1–5).

Taftāzānī’s logical works are: 1) A commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya (Epistle for Shams al-Dīn). This was lithographed in Lucknow in 1317/1899 in 78 pages and in Istanbul in 1312/1894–95 in 192 pages. A more recent edition, based on a single manuscript but collated with the Indian lithograph, was prepared by

81

82

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

Jādullāh Bassām Ṣāliḥ (Jordan: Dār al-Nūr, 2011). In the introduction to the work, Taftāzānī stated that he had been asked to write a commentary that reviews and, where necessary, corrects or supplements Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the same work. 2) A gloss on the commentary of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī on Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā (The Epitome of the Culmination), a handbook on jurisprudence by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249). Both Ījī’s commentary and Taftāzānī’s gloss cover – inter alia – the first part of the work that includes a general introduction as well as the outlines of logic. This section occupies the first 115 pages of the first volume of the Cairo edition of 1316/1898–1317/1900. 3) A commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī has erroneously been attributed to Taftāzānī in Carl Brockelmann’s Geschichte der arabischen Literatur. The source of the error appears to be an Indian lithograph from 1288/1871 (Delhi: Maṭbaʿ-i Muḥammadī) of the gloss of Ḳūl Aḥmed on the Ottoman scholar Fenārī’s commentary on Īsāghūjī. In this lithograph, the glossator’s mention of al-Fawāʾid al-Fanāriyya in the introduction was corrupted to al-Fawāʾid al-Taftāzāniyya. (Ḳūl Aḥmed’s gloss was printed on a number of occasions in Istanbul in the nineteenth century, along with Fenārī’s commentary, so the correct reading can easily be verified.) 4) Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (The Emendation of Logic), a condensed handbook, around half as long as the Shamsiyya but managing to cover almost as much. This was originally the first part of a work covering both logic and rational theology, entitled Ghāyat tahdhīb al-kalām fī taḥrīr al-manṭiq wa-l-kalām (The Ultimate Emendation of Discourse in Redacting Logic and Theology). The later commentary tradition, however, tended to treat the two parts as separate handbooks. The part on logic, known simply as Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, was widely studied in later centuries, and as such elicited numerous commentaries and glosses. Particularly influential were the following commentaries by: a. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502), which was widely studied in Ottoman Turkey and Mughal India (Dawānī 1887). As mentioned above, it is incomplete and only covers the parts up to the simple modality propositions;

(ii) Sa ’ d al-Dı¯n al-Tafta¯za ¯nı¯

b. ʿUbaydullāh Khabīṣī, dedicated to the Uzbek ruler ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Khān (r. 947/1540–959/1552). This became a standard commentary at the Azhar College in Cairo. Interestingly, it left out the aforementioned passage on the ḍābita (Khabīṣī 1965; ʿAṭṭār 1318/ 1900–01; ʿAṭṭār 1936); c. Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī (d. 981/1573), which was widely studied in Safavid and Qajar Iran (Yazdī 1314/1896; Yazdī 1988). The following is an overview of the contents of the handbook: i.

Introduction. On knowledge and its division into conception and assent. The need for and subject matter of logic ii. Linguistic preliminaries. Types of reference. Distinction between singular and complex utterances. Univocal, modular and homonymous expressions iii. Particular and universal iv. The five universals v. Definition and description vi. The proposition. Its definition and parts. Singular, quantified and unquantified propositions. The ḥaqīqī and khārijī proposition vii. Modality propositions viii. Hypothetical propositions: Conditionals and disjunctions ix. Contradiction x. Conversion xi. Contraposition xii. Syllogism. The four figures xiii. Combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms xiv. The reiterative-hypothetical syllogism xv. Induction and analogy xvi. The five arts: demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric, poetics, sophism xvii. Conclusion. On the subject matter, principles and issues of science. The “eight headings” of a science: aim, benefit, title, division, founder, discipline, manner of instruction, and rank Compared to the Shamsiyya, the Tahdhīb does not give the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions. When presenting the four figures

83

84

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

of the syllogism it gives the conditions of productivity for the modal syllogisms of the first three figures, but not the conclusions of various productive modal syllogisms. For the fourth figure, it merely gives the conditions of productivity for the non-modal syllogisms. On the other hand, both the aforementioned paragraph on the “general conditions” (ḍābiṭa) for productivity across the figures and the concluding discussion of the “eight head­ ings” are not to be found in the Shamsiyya.

(iii) al-Sayyid al-Sharı¯f al-Jurja¯nı¯ (Sakha¯wı¯ 1935–7, V, 328–330; Pourjavady 2011, 1–4; Van Ess, “Jorja¯nı¯, Zayn alDı¯n”, Enc. Iranica; Van Ess 2013) ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī was born in 740/1339–40 in a village near Gorgan, southeast of the Caspian Sea. His family claimed descent from the Prophet, and hence he came to be widely known as “al-Sayyid al-Sharīf ” (“Mīr Sharīf ” in the Persianate world). He pursued his education in Herat, where he met an ageing Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and later went to Anatolia and Cairo, in the latter city reportedly studying with a certain “Mubārakshāh”, an elusive figure who was apparently a student of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī and ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī and who is mentioned in biographical entries on a number of Anatolian scholars from this period who studied in Cairo (Ṭāşköprüzāde 2010, 49, 51, 138–9). He may be identical to Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Mubārakshāh al-Bukhārī who wrote a commentary on Kātibī’s handbook of philosophy Ḥikmat al-ʿayn that Jurjānī would later gloss. Alternatively, he may be identical to the Mubārakshāh who wrote a commentary on a treatise on music by Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 693/ 1294), completed in 777/1375 and dedicated to Shāh Shujāʿ (r. 759/1358–786/ 1384), the very same Muẓaffarid ruler of Persia who just a couple of years later granted Jurjānī a teaching post in Shiraz (Van Ess 2013, 29). (If this Mubārakshāh left Cairo and returned to Persia then this might help explain why he eluded the numerous Egyptian biographical dictionaries from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.) Jurjānī taught in Shiraz from around 779/1377, helping to consolidate that town as a major center for the study of the rational sciences in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. After the conquest of the town by Tamerlane in 789/ 1387, he was taken to the Timurid court in Samarqand, and reportedly upstaged

(iii) al-Sayyid al-Sharı¯f al-Jurja¯nı¯

the ageing Taftāzānī in a debate in front of the ruler. He returned to Shiraz after Tamerlane’s death, and died there in 816/1413. Jurjānī’s works clearly exhibit the changing emphasis of logicians away from the formal technicalities of modal and hypothetical logic toward in-depth discussion of philosophical and semantic issues raised in the earlier parts of standard handbooks on logic. On the level of literary form, Jurjānī’s works are also indicative of the development of Arabic logic in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Apart from a few short treatises, two introductory manuals in Persian, and possibly a short commentary on Abharī’s introductory Īsāghūjī, his works on logic took the form of glosses on commentaries by earlier scholars. None of this should be taken to mean that he was not a subtle contributor to the logical tradition. The extent to which his glosses were glossed in turn by later scholars suggests that he was, though a detailed study of his writings has yet to be made. Jurjānī’s works on logic are: 1) A gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya. These glosses were widely esteemed in later centuries and elicited numerous super-glosses. They have often been printed or lithographed along with the commentary, for example Tehran 1300/1883, Cairo 1311/1894 and Cairo 1323/1905. It has also been printed separately, for example in Istanbul 1318/1900 (160 pp., 23 lines per page). Approximately three-quarters of these glosses (pp. 2–119) are devoted to the section on “conceptions” (taṣawwurāt), dealing with preliminary matters, the five universals and definition, and approximately a fourth (pp. 120–160) to “assents” (taṣdīqāt), i.e. propositions and syllogisms. By comparison, in a comparable Istanbul printing of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary (1325/ 1907, 178 pp., 27 lines per page), around a third (pp. 2–58) is devoted to “conceptions” and two-thirds (pp. 59–178) to “assents”. Jurānī’s glosses were often known as “the minor gloss” (al-ḥāshiya al-ṣughrā), to distinguish them from his longer – and hence “major” (kubrā) – gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ al-anwār. 2) A gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ al-anwār. Again, these glosses were widely studied and glossed in later centuries, especially in the Persianate world. It was printed as an appen-

85

86

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

dix (of 150 pp., 38 lines per page) to the commentary in the Istanbul edition of 1277/1860–1. As mentioned above, the gloss only covered the early parts of the commentary dealing with the preamble, introduction, and conceptions (corresponding to the first 74 pages out of the total 251 pages of the mentioned printing of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary). 3) A gloss on ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī’s commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā on jurisprudence, covering inter alia the early section on logic. This was printed along with Ījī’s commentary and Taftāzānī’s gloss in Cairo in a two volume edition in 1898–1900. Jurjānī’s gloss on the introduction and first chapter on logic (vol. I, pp. 1–115) elicited numerous super-glosses in later centuries, especially in the Ottoman Empire (Mach 1977, nrs. 872–877). 4) A commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal was sometimes misattributed to Jur­ jānī in later times. The two extant manuscripts that are listed in catalogs as containing Jurjānī’s commentary actually contain the commentary by the fourteenth-century North African scholar al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī (on whom there is an entry in the following chapter), the two Sharīfs obviously having been confused by later scribes and catalogers (Bodleian, Oxford: MS Arab.e.215 and Maktabat-i Fāẓil-i Khwānsārī, Khwansar, nr. 126 [Markaz-i Iḥyā-yi Mīrāth-i Islāmī, Tehran: Microfilm nr. 17]). 5) Some works on logic by the much earlier physician Zayn al-Dīn Ismāʿīl al-Jurjānī (d. 531/1136) have also been misattributed to al-Sayyid alSharīf al-Jurjānī, for example the treatises Taʿlīq al-qiyās (Annotating the Syllogism) and Fī iktisāb al-muqaddimāt (On the Acquisition of Premisses), both erroneously included in a list of works on logic by the later Jurjānī (in Van Ess 2013, 71). On the earlier Jurjānī, see J. Schacht, “al-Djurdjānī, Ismāʿīl b. Ḥusayn”, EI2; Rescher 1964, 168–9). 6) Later Indo-Muslim scholars attributed a short commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī to Jurjānī, and this was lithographed on a number of occasions in India in the nineteenth century with the title Mīr-i Īsāghūjī (see Jurjānī 1309/1891–2). There are, however, no early references to Jurjānī having written such a commentary. It is not included in the list of Jurjānī’s works reproduced by the historian al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1497) on the authority of Jurjānī’s great-grandson whom he met in Medina (Sakhāwī 1935–7, V, 329), nor is it included in the list of commentaries on the Īsāghūjī given by the Ottoman bibliographer Kātib Çelebī (d.

(iii) al-Sayyid al-Sharı¯f al-Jurja¯nı¯

1067/1657) (Kātib Çelebī 1941–3, I, 206–208). Given Jurjānī’s reputation throughout the Turco-Persianate Islamic world, it is surprising that Ottoman and Persian scholars should have been unaware of the work. This might lead one to suspect that another commentator on the Īsāghūjī who was a “Sharīf ” (a descendant of the Prophet) came to be confused with Jurjānī in the later Indo-Muslim tradition. On the other hand, internal evidence supports the attribution to Jurjānī. The commentator at one point (Jurjānī 1309/1891–2, 9) referred the reader to his gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya. The dedicatee of the work is given in the Indian lithograph editions as “Ghiyāth al-Islām wa Mughīth al-Muslimīn Amīr Muḥammad”, and this may well be a slightly corrupt reference to Ghiyath al-Din Pīr Muḥammad (d. 812/ 1409), a grandson of Tamerlane who governed Fars and to whom Jurjānī dedicated his widely studied commentary on Ījī’s compendium of philosophical theology al-Mawāqif (The Stations). 7) A handbook on dialectics that was widely studied in India, and known there as al-Risāla al-Sharīfiyya, has also been attributed to al-Jurjānī. Again, the treatise appears to have been unknown outside the Indian subcontinent and is not mentioned by the historian al-Sakhāwī or the Ottoman bibliographer Kātib Çelebī. It would be good to know when and where the attribution to Jurjānī was first made, and to locate and study early extant manuscripts. Given the uncertainty, I have included a closer description of the work, along with a standard commentary, in a later chapter on Indo-Muslim logic. 8) A treatise on fallacies (mughālaṭāt) that is extant in a number of copies has also been attributed to Jurjānī (Mach & Ormsby 1987, nr. 1236). But many of these extant copies are anonymous, so further research is needed before the attribution can be confirmed. 9) A short treatise on disjunctions (al-tardīd al-infiṣālī), extant in a number of manuscripts (Mach 1977, nr. 3260). 10) A short introductory handbook on logic in Persian, known by the title Ṣughrā (Minor) to distinguish it from his somewhat longer introduction entitled Kubrā (see the following item). There are two purported printings of this work, one in a miscellany of logic handbooks lithographed in Lucknow in 1872 (Majmūʿa-yi manṭiq, pp. 1–9), the other edited (on the basis of a single late manuscript) by Murtażā Mudarrisī

87

88

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

Chahārdahī and published along with the longer Kubrā in Tehran in 1334/1956 (Jurjānī 1334/1956, pp. 23–28). Intriguingly, the texts of the two editions do not agree at all – they are simply two different works. The Indian lithograph is the one that contains Jurjānī’s Ṣughrā, as shown by the Arabic translation of the work prepared by Jurjānī’s son Muḥammad b. al-Sharīf (d. 838/1434–5) and printed in a miscellany in Cairo in 1328/1910 (Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil, pp. 279–291). In the introduction, the son wrote that he was translating a Persian work that his father had written for him, but with a few additions of his own (most notably a concluding section outlining the principles of dialectics). The Arabic translation in general follows the Persian text of the Indian lithograph, with the exception of the mentioned additions. It bears no relation to the treatise published by Chahārdahī. The latter treatise may not be by Jurjānī at all, and may therefore be yet another work falsely attributed to him in later centuries. 11) Another, longer introductory handbook on logic in Persian, known by the title Kubrā (Major) to distinguish it from the previously mentioned Ṣughrā. This appears to have been a popular introduction in the Persian-speaking world, eliciting a number of commentaries and versifications in later centuries. It too was translated into Arabic. Jurjānī’s aforementioned son Muḥammad b. al-Sharīf prepared a somewhat expanded Arabic version that circulated under the title al-Ghurra (The Most Excellent) (Jabalrūdī 1983, 21). However, the text of the Ghurra does not correspond to the text of another, more literal Arabic translation that is extant in a number of manuscripts (Mach 1977, nr. 3258) and was printed in Istanbul in 1288/1871 (Jurjānī 1288/1871, 16 pp.). And that translation is obviously not by Muḥammad b. al-Sharīf, for the translator wrote that Jurjānī had composed the original Persian treatise for “his noble son”, and that he – the translator – was translating it into Arabic for the benefit of his own son. Probably due to this statement, the translation circulated under the title al-Risāla al-Waladiyya (“The Son Treatise”). The Kubrā is comparable in scope to Abharī’s Īsāghūjī but is more expansive concerning the division of science into conception and assent, types of reference, and singular and complex utterances. It introduces some of the basic modality propositions, though without exploring their conversion, contraposition or the modal

(iii) al-Sayyid al-Sharı¯f al-Jurja¯nı¯

syllogism. It gives the conditions of productivity of the first three syllogistic figures (Abharī had only discussed the first) but does not include a discussion of the matter of the syllogism, simply ending with the reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms: modus ponens, modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism. The work was lithographed in Lucknow in 1872 in a miscellany of logic handbooks (Majmūʿa-yi manṭiq, pp. 10–50), and printed in Tehran in 1334/1956 in an uncritical edition prepared by Murtażā Mudarrisī Chahārdahī on the basis of a single, seventeenth-­ century manuscript (Jurjānī 1334/1956, pp. 5–23). In this case, the Tehran printing and the Indian lithograph are of the same work, though with the expected minor variants. The following is an overview of the contents of the work: a. Introduction b. Conception and assent c. Evident and non-evident conceptions and assents d. The derivation of non-evident from evident conceptions and assents e. Logic as the rules for the derivation of non-evident conceptions and assents f. Reference g. Types of reference h. Types of conventional reference i. Singular and complex utterances j. Singular utterances: Verbs, nouns and particles k. Complex utterances: Complete and incomplete l. Universals and particulars m. The five universals n. Descriptions and definitions o. Propositions. Categorical and hypothetical p. Quantified and unquantified propositions q. Metathetic predicates r. Modalities s. Conversion t. Contradiction u. Argument (ḥujja): Inductive, analogical, and deductive

89

90

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

v. Syllogism. The four figures w. Conditions of productivity of the first three figures x. Reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms

(iv) H. a¯cı¯ Pa¯sa¯ Hızır Aydı¯nı¯ (Yildiz 2014)

˘ A contemporary and possibly an acquaintance of Jurjānī, Ḥācī Pāşā appears to have been born in Konya in central Anatolia. He went to Cairo to pursue his studies, traveling via Damascus where he attended the lessons of the ageing Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī. In Cairo, he studied with the illustrious Ḥanafī jurist Akmal al-Dīn al-Bābartī (d. 786/1384) and with Jurjānī’s elusive teacher “Mubārakshāh”. He returned to Anatolia in 771/1370, settling in the Aydinid principality (beylik) in southwestern Anatolia. He there enjoyed the patronage of the local ruler, and wrote a number of works on logic, philosophical theology, and medicine. He was still alive as late as 824/1421 when he dedicated a work – an exegesis of the Quran – to the Ottoman Sultan Murad II (r. 824/1421–855/1451) who incorporated the Aydinid principality into the Ottoman Empire. In 784/1382, Ḥācī Pāşā authored an extant gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ (see Princeton University Library, Islamic MSS, Garrett Y4385, 188 folios, 19 lines per page, copied in 811/1409). Unlike Jurjānī, Ḥācī Pāşā covered the entirety of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary, not only the section on “conceptions”. His gloss nevertheless appears to have been largely supplanted by Jurjānī’s gloss, even in Anatolia, presumably in part because of prestigious incoming Eastern scholars who had studied with Jurjānī such as ʿAlī al-ʿAjamī (d. 860/1456) and Fatḥullāh al-Shirwānī (d. 857/1453). Extant manuscripts of Ḥācī Pāşā’s gloss appear to confirm this trajectory. Around a dozen extant copies are known, but almost all of these are dated before the middle of the fifteenth century, suggesting that the work was rarely copied after that time.

(v) Meh. med Fena¯rı¯ (M. Zilfi, “Fena¯rı¯za¯de” EI3) Fenārī was born in 751/1350 in western Anatolia. He went to Cairo to complete his studies, as was common among Anatolian scholars before Sultan Meḥmed II (r. 855/1451–886/1481) established his famous “Eight Schools” in Istanbul. Upon his return, he became a teacher, judge and later Mufti in Bursa (the intel-

(vi) S.a¯ ’ in al-Dı¯n Ibn Turka

lectual center of the Ottoman Empire before the conquest of Constantinople), where he died in 834/1431. His works on logic are: 1) A commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī. This was lithographed and printed on a number of occasions in Istanbul in the nineteenth century, for example in 1294/1877 in 27 pages, followed (on pp. 28–80) by a gloss by a certain Ḳūl Aḥmed b. Ḫizir, apparently a sixteenth-century Azeri scholar. In his introduction, Fenārī boasted of having written the commentary in a single day, and a short winter’s day at that. Though the Īsāghūjī is an introductory work, Fenārī’s commentary provides a demanding discussion of the issues raised, and a later Ottoman work on education advised the student to read it after studying Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya (Sāçaḳlızāde 1988, 140–1). It elicited numerous glosses and super-glosses by later Ottoman, Tatar and Azeri scholars. A passage from Fenārī’s introduction in which he discusses what makes the numerous inquiries of logic one discipline (jihat al-waḥda) was sometimes commented upon in independent treatises. The passage was in part lifted from the commentary of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) on Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā, the abovementioned handbook on jurisprudence with an opening section on logic by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249) and from Taftāzānī’s gloss on Ījī’s commentary (see Ījī 1898–1900, I, 14–16). 2) An introductory section on logic in his esteemed summa of Ḥanafī jurisprudence Fuṣūl al-badāʾiʿ (Chapters of Wonders). This takes up pp. 18–­69 of the first volume of the work printed in Istanbul in 1289/1872. Though Fenārī did not cover modal logic or the more technical aspects of hypothetical logic in this work, his presentation is demanding and includes critical discussions of earlier views on, for example, the division of knowledge into conception and assent, the conditions for syllogistic productivity, the reduction of the other syllogistic figures to the first, and indirect proof.

(vi) S. a¯ ̕ in al-Dı¯n Ibn Turka (Melvin-Koushki 2012, 38–57) Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka was born in Isfahan in 770/1369 and began his studies there. He and his family were taken to Samarqand after Tamerlane’s conquest

91

92

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

of Isfahan in 789/1387. From Samarqand, he went on the Hajj and continued his studies in Cairo. In his late thirties, he returned to Isfahan and began teaching there. He became close to the courts of Pīr Muḥammad (d. 812/1409) and his brother Iskandar (d. 818/1415), Timurid rulers in Fars who are also the dedicatees of some of Jurjānī’s works. After Tamerlane’s son Shāhrukh (r. 812/ 1409–851/1447) established control over Persia, Ibn Turka’s position became precarious and he had to travel to the new court in Herat on more than one occasion to clear his name and curry the favor of the new ruler. He died in Herat in 835/1432. Ibn Turka’s reputation in later centuries was primarily linked to his mystical-theosophical works, such as his Tamhīd al-qawāʿid (Preparation for the Rules) and his commentary on Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (Bezels of Wisdom) by the Andalusian mystic Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). His work on logic al-Manāhij (The Trails), completed in 833/1430 (Melvin-Koushki 2012, 100), is also of some importance, as it shows that there were scholars in the period who were dissatisfied with mainstream post-Avicennian logic and harked back to the way of the “older logicians”. Ibn Turka’s introduction to the work states that he wished to write for his son a work that presents the pristine, unadulterated truths of logic as taught by “olden” teachers, cleansed of adventitious “eristic doubts” (tashkīkāt jadaliyya) (Ibn Turka 1997, 1). This kind of rhetoric, which associated “later scholars” with “eristic” and “sophistical doubt”, and “the ancients” with “certainty” (yaqīn) and “demonstration” (burhān), would later reappear in the writings of some Safavid philosophers. Stylistically too, Ibn Turka prefigured later scholars such as Mīr Dāmād, with his frequent sententious exhortations to the reader to heed the wisdoms being imparted, and overblown portrayals of the “later scholars” as not simply mistaken about this or that point of logic (as Ṭūsī and Ḥillī had argued) but as willful enemies of true “wisdom” (ḥikma). The following passage from Ibn Turka’s work is illustrative: As for the two possibility propositions [e.g. “Every J is possibly B” or “Every J is contingently B”], they convert to an absolute possibility proposition [“Some B is possibly J”], since its contradictory [“Every B is necessarily not J”] converts to a proposition [“Every J is necessarily not B”] that is incompatible with the original proposition or contradicts it. This suffices as an exposition of this section [on conversion]. But the later logicians, as is their wont, have delved at length into this, and made distinctions among quantified propositions, all of no use except to waste ink and make books longer. The one who is clever and alert should not rely on these and waste his precious

(vi) S.a¯ ’ in al-Dı¯n Ibn Turka

time, and instead spend his life on what benefits him, and heed the saying of the Prophet, “Part of being a good Muslim is not prying into issues that are not of one’s concern” (Ibn Turka 1997, 55).

There is no new argument here, despite the bombast. The proof offered by Ibn Turka had been thoroughly criticized by the revisionist-Avicennian logicians of the thirteenth century. Rhetorical antiquarianism aside, Ibn Turka’s relatively short summa is organized around the acquisition of conceptions and assents, like most post-Avicennian works. It includes a discussion of the thirteen modality propositions canonized by Rāzī and Khūnajī, takes into account the wholly hypothetical syllogism, and even divides the syllogism into four figures. However, it devotes noticeably more attention to demonstration and related issues (traditionally treated in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics) than was usual in mainstream post-­ Avicennian logic. The following is an overview of the contents, with the corresponding page numbers in the edition of Ibrahim al-Dībājī published in Tehran in 1376/1997. 1) Preamble and Introduction (pp. 1–5) 2) First manhaj: On the explicative statement (pp. 35–64) a. On its preliminaries. On types of conventional reference. On singular and complex utterances. On the universal and its kinds b. On verifying the means to acquire conceptions. On the general conditions of explicative statements. On description and definition 3) Second manhaj: On verifying the means of acquiring assents, which is called “argument” (ḥujja) (pp. 65–94) a. On the preliminaries of the argument. On premises; on the divisions of propositions. On quantified propositions. On metathetic predicates. On modality propositions. On contradiction. On conversion. On contraposition. On hypothetical propositions b. On verifying the means to acquiring assents, i.e., argument. On its quiddity. On its divisions. On the conditions of productivity. On modal syllogisms. On combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms. On how to derive categorical propositions from combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms. On the reiterative-hypothetical syllogism. On complex and indirect syllogisms

93

94

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

4) Third manhaj: On the way of acquisition and the varieties of its matter (pp. 95–102) a. On how to construct definitions and syllogisms with a desired concept or conclusion already in mind b. On the epistemological status of premises c. On the five arts d. On induction and analogy 5) Fourth manhaj: On scientific acquisition (al-kawāsib al-taʿlīmiyya) (pp. 103–113) a. On the four questions: what, which, whether, and why b. On the order of questions c. On a problem pertaining to questions involving impossible concepts d. On that-demonstration and why-demonstration e. On science and its parts f. On the order of sciences

(vii) K. araca Ah. med (T. a¯sköprüza¯de 2010, 193–4) Ḳaraca Aḥmed b. Abī Yazīd hailed from the region of Ṣarūḫān around the town of Manisa in western Anatolia. He taught in Ottoman Bursa and died there in 854/1450. Biographical entries supply no information about his teachers, though it is likely that he met Meḥmed Fenārī, the most eminent Ottoman scholar of the previous generation who was also active in Bursa. He appears to have been a well-known teacher of logic, judging from the number of commentaries and glosses he wrote on standard handbooks in the field. Writing a century later, the Ottoman scholar Ṭāşköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) related that Ḳaraca Aḥmed was slow-witted and therefore struggled as a student, but nevertheless succeeded in becoming an accomplished scholar through sheer diligence. His writings on logic are:

1) A super-gloss on the gloss of Jurjānī on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya (Mach 1977, nr. 3198). 2) A relatively short gloss on Taftāzānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya (Mach 1977, nr. 3216).

(viii) al-Sayyid ’Alı¯ al- ’ Ajamı¯

3) A gloss on Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Kātī’s commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī. This appears to have been his most widely copied work, and there are numerous extant copies of it in Turkish libraries, for example Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul: Laleli 2597 (20 fols.); Laleli 2601 (fols. 28–46); Reisülkuttab 1177 (fols. 163–173); Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa 331 (fols. 1–35). (For further copies, see also Mach 1977, nr. 3161.) 4) A commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī (Mach 1977, nr. 3180).

(viii) al-Sayyid ̔ Alı¯ al- ̔ Ajamı¯ (T. a¯sköprüza¯de 2010, 93–94) This scholar was reportedly a student of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī. He settled in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Murād II (r. 824/1421–855/ 1451) and was granted a teaching position at a college in Bursa. He died in 860/1456. ʿAlī al-ʿAjamī wrote two widely copied works on logic: 1) A gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya and on Jurjānī’s glosses (Mach 1977, nr. 3199). As indicated in Mach’s catalog, the gloss was divided into three parts of roughly equal length, each with its own preamble, covering (i) preliminaries, (ii) the five universals, and (iii) assents. Not all extant manuscripts include all three parts. 2) A gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Maṭāliʿ, completed in 849/1445 (Mach 1977, nr. 3226; Karatay 1966, nr. 6871). Intriguingly, the Egyptian historian al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1497) included a biographical notice (Sakhāwī 1935–7, V, 158–159) on a student of Jurjānī with a very similar name and the same date of death: al-Sayyid ʿAlī alShīrāzī (d. 860/1456). This scholar settled in Medina in 840/1437 and lived there until he died. He wrote a commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī that is described as being four quires long. Despite the similarity in dates of death and names (Shiraz is in Persia and “al-ʿAjamī” means “the Persian”) and the link to Jurjānī, Sakhāwī’s obituary mentions nothing about an earlier spell in the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman biographical notices of ʿAlī al-ʿAjamī do not mention that he retired to Medina to-

95

96

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

ward the end of his life, so it is likely that these were simply different students of Jurjānī.

(ix) ̔ Ima¯d al-Fa¯risı¯ This scholar appears to have escaped the notice of pre-modern biographical works. In some of his writings, he gave his name as ʿImād b. Yaḥyā al-Fārisī. The colophons of some extant manuscript copies of his works indicate that he was active in Herat in the third quarter of the fifteenth century. His writings on logic include: 1) A gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and on Jurjānī’s gloss. It only covers “conceptions”, i.e., the part of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary and Jurjānī’s gloss dealing with the preamble, the division of knowledge into conception and assent, the subject matter of logic, kinds of linguistic reference, the five universals, and definitions. It was completed in Herat in 850/1446 (see Tehran: Kitābkhāne-yi Madras-i ʿĀlī-yi Shahīd-i Muṭahharī: MS Sipahsalar 3024). The introduction suggests that it was written while Fārisī was still a student. The gloss was printed in Istanbul in 1287/1870 (128 pp.). 2) A commentary on Abharī’s introductory Īsāghūjī, completed in 869/ 1464 (ʿArshi 1971–, IV, 252–253). 3) The same scholar may have written a gloss on the commentary of Masʿūd al-Shirwānī (d. 905/1499) on Samarqandī’s handbook on ādāb al-baḥth (Mach 1977, nr. 3342). The Ottoman bibliographer Kātib Çelebī (d. 1067/1657) referred to the author of the gloss as ʿImād al-Dīn Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad al-Kāshī, whom he surmised was “a scholar of the tenth [i.e. sixteenth] century” (Kātib Çelebī 1941–43, I, 39). Though the glossator may have died in the early sixteenth century, the gloss must have been written in the fifteenth, for one extant manuscript dates from 898/1492–3 (Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul: Kadızade Mehmed 462, folios 1–29) and the gloss was already being glossed in turn by Ottoman scholars active in the early decades of the sixteenth century, such as Şücaʿüddīn İlyās (d. 929/1522–3) and his son Lüṭfullāh (d. 940/ 1533) (Kātib Çelebī 1941–43, I, 40). The name given by Kātib Çelebī is – suspiciously – that of the author of a short biography of Avicenna, writ-

(x) Mulla¯ Da¯ ’ u ¯d Khwa¯fı¯

ten in 754/1353 (see Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad al-Kāshī, Nukat fī aḥwāl alShaykh al-raʾīs Ibn Sīnā, edited by Aḥmad Fuʾād al-Ahwānī [Cairo: Manshūrāt al-Maʿhad al-Faransī, 1952]). It is of course impossible for a fourteenth-century scholar to have written a gloss on Shirwānī’s commentary. ʿImād al-Dīn Yaḥyā may be a corruption of ʿImād ibn Yaḥyā (easily made in Arabic script). The attributive “al-Kāshī” may have been falsely supplied by Kātib Çelebī (or by his source) due to confusion with the earlier scholar. But even if accurate, it need not be incompatible with the attributive “al-Fārisī”. “Kāshī” probably derives from the town of Kāshān near Isfahan, though there are other possibilities, such as Kāsh near Hamadan or Gāsh near Mashhad. The geographic term “Fars” usually denotes the highland region of southwestern Persia, south of Hamadan and Isfahan, but it is sometimes used in a wider sense, and in any case someone who was born in Kāshān, for example, but of a family that originated from Fars might have been known by both attributives, depending on context. Identifying the glossator with ʿImād b. Yaḥyā al-Fārisī, though tentative, would fit both the time in which the gloss must have been written, i.e., the third quarter of the fifteenth century, and the place – the commentator Masʿūd al-Shirwānī died in Herat in 905/1499, probably at an advanced age, for he was a student of Jurjānī’s student Fatḥullāh al-Shirwānī (d. 857/ 1453) and his commentary was written before 852/1448 (the date of a manuscript copy extant in the British Library, London: Or. 3124). In any case, the gloss was widely studied in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Ottoman madrasas and elicited a number of super-glosses from Ottoman scholars in this period (see, for example, Mach 1977, nrs. 3343–3344). On account of its difficulty, it was dubbed ḳara ḥāşiye (“The Opaque Gloss”) (Kātib Çelebī 1941–43, I, 39).

(x) Mulla¯ Da¯ ̕ u ¯d al-Khwa¯fı¯ (Nava¯ ’ ı¯ 2000, 171–172) ʿIṣām al-Dīn Dāʾūd al-Khwāfī was active in Herat in the middle decades of the fifteenth century. The Timurid ruler of Central Asia and northeastern Iran Abū Saʿīd Mīrzā (r. 855/1451–873/1469) appointed him tutor to his son Maḥmūd Mīrzā (b. 857/1453–d. 900/1495). When Abū Saʿīd Mīrzā was defeated and killed and the forces of Ḥusayn Bayqara took control of Herat in 873/1469,

97

98

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

Mullā Dāʾūd accompanied Maḥmūd Mīrzā to Ḥiṣār-i Shadmān (in present-day Tajikistan) where he was appointed Ṣadr (head of religious foundations). He died there at some point before 899/1494. The seventeenth-century Ottoman bibliographer Kātib Çelebī mentioned him as a student of Taftāzānī (Kātib Çelebī 1941–3, 1063), probably because Mullā Dāʾūd referred to Taftāzānī as “the teacher” (al-ustādh) in his most widely known work (nr. 1 below). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a student of Taftāzānī (who died in 792/1390) was still teaching a Timurid prince around the year 870/1465. Mullā Dāʾūd could at most have studied with some of Taftāzānī’s students. Mullā Dāʾūd’s writings on logic include:

1) A lengthy and much-studied gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and on Jurjānī’s gloss thereon. The numerous manuscripts of this work attest to its widespread use in colleges throughout the Turco-Persianate world. The main part covering “conceptions” (taṣawwurāt) was printed in Istanbul in 1285/1868 (204 pp.) There are a few manuscripts of the work that purport to include Mullā Dāʾūd’s glosses on the later part on “assents” (taṣdīqāt), for example Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul: Fatih 3270 (46 folios, copied in 946/ 1539–40). Most manuscripts do not include this later part. In many catalogs, the gloss is attributed to the Ottoman scholar Ḳara Dāvūd Ḳūçevī (d. 948/1542), but this is a misattribution noted and corrected already by Kātib Çelebī (Kātib Çelebī 1941–3, 1063). Mullā Dāʾūd al-Khwāfī’s gloss is mentioned as being “well-known among students” in a near-contemporary Persian source (Navāʾī 2000, 171–172), whereas the Ottoman scholar and biographer Ṭaşköprüzade (d. 968/1561) explicitly noted that his contemporary Ḳara Dāvūd Ḳūçevī did not compose any works (lam yashtaghil bi-l-taṣnīf) (Ṭāşköprüzāde 1389/2010, 348). 2) Also attributed to “Mullā Dāʾūd” is a gloss on the gloss of Jurjānī on the early parts of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ. There are numerous extant manuscripts of this work, for example: Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul: Ragıp Paşa 890 (120 fols.); Köprülü Library, Istanbul: Mehmed Asım Bey 289 (196 fols.); Ayatollah Marʿashī Library, Qom: MS 6359 (95 fols.); Raza Library, Rampur: 3294 al-Manṭiq/ 2741M (147 fols.); Princeton University Library: Islamic Manuscripts,

(xi) S.adr al-Dı¯n al-Dashtakı¯

New Series 69 (fols. 3–139). It is, however, not entirely certain that this work is by the same scholar who wrote the former gloss. Mach and Ormsby (Mach & Ormsby 1987, nr. 696) attribute the work to a certain Dāʾūd al-Shirwānī and note that a number of manuscripts attribute it to yet other scholars. On the other hand, there is internal evidence that the two glosses are by the same person, and that they were thought to be by the same person by Muslim logicians in the seventeenth century (see Sharīʿatī 2004, (3) 257n1).

(xi) S. adr al-Dı¯n al-Dashtakı¯ (Pourjavady 2011, 16–24) Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Dashtakī was born in Shiraz in 828/ 1425, to a family that claimed descent from the Prophet. He is known to have studied in his hometown with some of Jurjānī’s students, and in turn became a renowned teacher of the philosophical sciences and established his own madrasa in Shiraz, the Manṣūriyya, in 883/1478. A number of his works bear dedications to the Āq Qoyunlū ruler Sultan Yaʿqūb (r. 883/1478–896/1490) and the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (r. 886/1481–918/1512). He was killed in 903/ 1498 in connection with an uprising against a rebellious governor of Shiraz. Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī became involved in wide-ranging and acrimonious debates with his contemporary and fellow-townsman Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502). The controversies unfolded mainly in various glosses and counter-glosses on the commentary by ʿAlī al-Qūshjī (d. 879/1474) on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-ʿaqāʾid, and more precisely on the first section of that commentary, dealing with general metaphysics (umūr ʿāmma) (for an overview of some of the disputes between the two scholars, see Pourjavady 2011, 86–105; Pourjavady 2016; El-­ Rouayheb 2010, 92–104). Though primarily concerned with metaphysics, these controversies touched on numerous issues in logic. For example, the two scholars debated whether a copula is necessary in propositions such as “J exists” or such propositions – unusually – have no copula and only a subject and a predicate (Dashtakī held that a copula was not necessary in such propositions, and Dawānī denied this), and whether relational inferences are valid as they are or must be rephrased as standard syllogisms with three terms (Dawānī thought they were valid as they are, and Dashtakī denied this). They also discussed the liar paradox in these glosses, and both scholars went on to write independent treatises on the topic. Their treatises, and those of their immediate students,

99

100

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

constitute the most intensive scrutiny of this paradox in the Arabic tradition. (On the liar paradox in the Arabic tradition, see Alwishah & Sanson 2009; Alwishah & Sanson 2016; Miller 1985.) Dashtakī was deeply influenced by Avicenna and inclined to value him over “the later scholars”. He esteemed Avicenna’s Shifāʾ, often preferring its more expansive discussions to those in the Ishārāt and its commentaries. He also regularly cited the works of early Avicennian logicians such as Bahmanyār (d. 457/1065) and ʿUmar b. Sahlān al-Sāwī (fl. 520s/1130s). But it is important to note that this was not simply a debate between partisans and opponents of Avicenna, for Dawānī esteemed Avicenna as well. Rather, the two rivals often disagreed over what Avicenna’s position had been. They also engaged with a range of issues not explicitly addressed by Avicenna, and with thinkers who postdated him. Apart from the profound and scattered discussions of logical issues in his glosses on Qūshjī’s commentary, Dashtakī’s logical works include: 1) A gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya and Jurjānī’s glosses thereon. This survives in a number of manuscripts and appears to have been the most widely read and copied of Dashtakī’s strictly logical works. Two early manuscripts, copied in the lifetime of the author, are in the Ayatollah Marʿashī Najafī Library in Qom, nr. 8459 (82 fols., 15 lines per page) and in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul, Carullah 1371 (40 fols., 19 lines per page). As with most glosses on this work, Dashtakī’s focuses on the earlier parts dealing with preliminary topics, the acquisition of concepts, and propositions. 2) At least one gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Maṭāliʿ al-anwār and Jurjānī’s glosses thereon, written in response to glosses by Dawānī on the same work (Millī Library, Tehran: 2717ʿayn, 117 fols. & Marʿashī Najafī library, Qom 7312, fols. 61–138). (He may have written more than one gloss; see Pourjavady 2011, 81.) It appears that these glosses and counter-glosses dealt with semantic, philosophical and theological issues raised by the preamble of Quṭb al-Dīn alRāzī’s commentary, and hardly dealt with logical topics at all. 3) A treatise on the liar paradox, edited by Āḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalekī in the collection Davāzda risāla dar pārādūks-i durūghgū (Tehran, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2007), pp. 27–62. Dashtakī’s treatment of the

(xii) Jala¯l al-Dı¯n al-Dawa¯nı¯ 101

liar paradox, which seems original, is as follows: Truth and falsity are only applicable to statements. Only if Zayd makes a statement (khabar) can we say that his statement is true or false. A reiteration of the truth or falsity predicate requires a further statement, viz. “Zayd’s statement is true (or false)”. Otherwise, we would have one statement and two applications of the truth or falsity predicate, resulting in badly formed sentences such as:

Zayd’s statement is true (or false) is true (or false)



as opposed to the well-formed:



“Zayd’s statement is true (or false)” is true (or false).



In the case of “My statement now is false”, we have one statement (the one picked out by the subject term “My statement now”) and one application of the predicate “false”. There are, ex hypothesi, no further assertions and therefore no grounds for reiterating the truth or falsity predicate and describing “My statement now is false” as either true or false.

(xii) Jala¯l al-Dı¯n al-Dawa¯nı¯ (Pourjavady 2011, 4–16, Pourjavady 2016) Dawānī was born around the year 830/1426 in the village of Davān near Kāzerūn in Fars, and began his studies with his father and another local scholar, both students of Jurjānī. He moved to nearby Shiraz to continue his education. He later enjoyed the patronage of the Qara Qoyunlū ruler Jahān Shāh (r. 839/ 1436–872/1467) and spent time at the court in Tabriz. He returned to Shiraz after the defeat of the Qara Qoyunlū by the rival Āq Qoyunlū, but continued to enjoy the patronage of the new rulers Ūzūn Ḥasan (r. 872/1467–882/1477) and his sons Khalīl (r. 882/1477–883/1478) and Yaʿqūb (r. 883/1478–896/ 1490), being appointed Chief Judge of Fars by the latter. Many of his works are dedicated to rulers beyond Persia, among them the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II. Dawānī died in 908/1502, less than two years before the Shiite Safavids conquered Shiraz.

102

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

Dawānī was arguably the most influential and original logician in the Eastern Islamic lands in the fifteenth century. As mentioned above, his three sets of glosses on Qūshjī’s Sharḥ al-Tajrīd contain numerous profound discussions with his rival Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī on points of logic. These discussions have yet to be studied thoroughly, but an example of such a discussion relates to the relational syllogism (El-Rouayheb 2010, 92–104). Dawānī argued, against Dashtakī, that a middle term could recur in the second premise with “addition” or “subtraction” without this impugning syllogistic productivity. For example, the following syllogism is, he argued, valid: The world is composite To every composite there is a composer To the world there is a composer In this example, the middle term is “composite” and recurs in the second premise with the addition of the preposition “to” (li-). As an example of a middle term that recurs “with subtraction”, Dawānī mentioned the following: Zayd is the brother of ʿAmr ʿAmr is the leader of the town Zayd is the brother of the leader of the town Here, “brother of ʿAmr” is the predicate of the minor premise, and “ʿAmr” alone is the subject of the major. Dawānī also authored a number of works specifically on logic, and these continued to be intensively studied in later centuries, especially in Mughal India and Ottoman Turkey. These include: 1) A commentary on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Though incomplete, not covering the later sections on contradiction, conversion and syllogism, this work was the most influential work in the Eastern Islamic tradition from the fifteenth century, and it elicited numerous glosses and super-glosses in later centuries in Safavid Iran, Mughal India and Ottoman Turkey. It was printed in Istanbul in 1305/1887 in 52 pages, along with the gloss of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ (d. 976/1568–69) (152 pp.), and Taftāzānī’s handbook (8 pp.). The early part of the commentary has

(xii) Jala¯l al-Dı¯n al-Dawa¯nı¯ 103

also been lithographed on a number of occasions in India in the nineteenth century, with the gloss of Mīr Zāhid Harawī (d. 1101/1689–90). The tone of the work is set in the introduction, in which he wrote: I have not heeded what is commonly accepted, for truth is more worthy of being followed, and I have not stood still at the station of what has already been said, for the pathway of reasoning is open. Instead, I have shown the unsullied way and churned the cream of plain truth. I have presented verified points that are absent from commonly circulating books, and indicated subtle intricacies not contained in lengthy tomes (Dawānī 1887, 2).



The work includes – inter alia – a defense of Avicenna’s realist position regarding universals (pp. 30–31) and an influential criticism of Quṭb alDīn al-Rāzī’s view that a proposition has four parts: subject, predicate, copula and judgment (pp. 36–37). 2) A gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya. This focuses mainly on the early parts of Jurjānī’s gloss, dealing with introductory matters and the acquisition of concepts. It has been lithographed in India (Delhi: al-Maṭbaʿ al-Mujtabāʾī, no date, 40 pages) and printed in Cairo as an appendix to the monumental edition of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary with the glosses of Jurjānī, Siyālkūtī and Dasūqī (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1323/1905, vol. II, 256–286). 3) A gloss on the commentary of Masʿūd al-Shirwānī (d. 905/1499) on Samarqandī’s treatise on ādāb al-baḥth (see Mach 1977, nr. 3341). 4) Two glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Maṭāliʿ al-anwār and Jurjānī’s glosses thereon (Pourjavady 2011, 81). The second of these was in response to a counter-gloss by Dashtakī. As noted earlier, these glosses dealt with semantic, philosophical and theological issues raised by the preamble of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary, and hardly dealt with logical topics at all. For an early manuscript of his first gloss, see Mach & Ormsby 1987, nr. 694. For an extant manuscript copy of his second gloss, entitled Tanwīr al-Maṭāliʿ (Casting Light on The Dawning), see Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2261 (153 folios, 19 lines per page, copied in Shiraz in 1049/1639). 5) A treatise on the liar paradox, entitled Nihāyat al-kalām fī ḥall shubhat kullu kalāmī kādhib (The Ultimate Discourse on Solving the Soph-

104

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

ism of ‘All My Discourse is False’), edited by Āḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalekī in the collection Davāzda risāla dar pārādūks-i durūghgū (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2007), pp. 101–155. Dawānī’s solution to the paradox is that the offending sentence “My statement now is false” is not a proposition. This is because a proposition must relate an independent state of affairs and in this way be a candidate for truth or falsity. The offending sentence “My statement now is false” does not relate that there is a nexus between subject and predicate that is prior to, and independent of, the sentence itself; rather the very uttering of the sentence brings about the nexus. In such a case, there is no distinction between the nexus in the sentence itself and the nexus that obtains apart from the sentence. Since such a distinction is essential to being a proposition, the offending sentence is not a proposition, even though it may superficially have propositional form. The case is analogous to a performative utterance (inshāʾ) such as “I hereby sell you X” – here too the sentence superficially resembles a proposition but does not relate that an independent nexus obtains.

(xiii) Qa¯d. ¯ı Mı¯r H. usayn al-Maybudı¯ (Pourjavady 2011, 32–37) He was born around the year 853/1449 to Mīr Muʿīn al-Dīn al-Maybudī, a governor of the town of Yazd in Fars. He studied in Shiraz with Dawānī, and was later appointed Chief Judge of Yazd by the Āq-Qoyunlū ruler Sultan Yaʿqūb (r. 883/1478–896/1490). He was executed in 909/1504, shortly after the Shiite Safavid conquest of that city. His most widely studied and glossed work was a commentary on Abharī’s handbook of philosophy Hidāyat al-ḥikma. Like most commentators on Abharī’s handbook, Maybudī skipped the opening section on logic and only covered the sections on physics and metaphysics. However, he also wrote works on logic and dialectics: 1) A commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, printed in Istanbul in 1289/1872 (182 pp.). An autograph copy, dated 886/1481–2, is extant in the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin (nr. 3759, fols. 1–99). The commentary draws on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentaries on the Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, with the “major” and “minor” glosses of Jurjānī, Taftāzānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya, and Kātibī’s own summa

(xiv) Ghiya¯th al-Dı¯n Mans.u ¯r Dashtakı¯ 105

Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq, with occasional quotations from Avicenna’s Shifāʾ. Maybudī devoted approximately 45% of his commentary to preliminary matters and conceptions (compared to 33% in Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary), and approximately 33% to immediate implications and formal syllogisms (compared to Quṭb al-Dīn’s 36%). Interestingly, the commentary does not engage with Dawānī’s contributions to logic, for example his criticism of the quadripartite analysis of the proposition, or his discussions of universals, the liar paradox and the relational syllogism. An explanation for this might be that the commentary, like Quṭb al-Dīn’s earlier commentary, was intended as an intermediate-level, rather than advanced, work. 2) A commentary on Samarqandī’s treatise on ādāb al-baḥth. An autograph manuscript is extant in the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin (nr. 3759, fols. 100–127).

(xiv) Ghiya¯th al-Dı¯n Mans. u ¯r Dashtakı¯ (Pourjavady 2011, 24–32) A son of the aforementioned Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr was born in 866/1461–2 in Shiraz. He studied with his father, and started teaching at the latter’s college in his late twenties. After the Safavid conquest of Shiraz in 909/1504, he joined the entourage of Shah Ismāʿīl I (r. 907/1501–930/1524), suggesting that he embraced Shiism. He fell out of favor shortly after the accession of Shah Ṭāhmāsp I (r. 930/1524–984/1576) and returned to Shiraz where he taught until his death in 949/1542. Ghiyāth al-Dīn was a fervent opponent of Dawānī, regularly denouncing him in insulting terms. Like his father, he was an admirer of Avicenna and the “older logicians”. His most extensive work on logic, entitled Taʿdīl al-mīzān, begins by expressing a preference for the logic of Avicenna and his early followers over the “dialectical” and “rhetorical” procedure of “the later logicians” (Dashtakī 2007, I, 134–136). Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s works on logic include: 1) Taʿdīl al-mīzān (Recalibrating the Scale), a lengthy summa of logic. The work has unfortunately not been edited, and it seems that the few extant manuscripts are fragmentary. Three incomplete manuscripts are: (i)

106

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

Ayatollah Marʿashī Najafī Library, Qom, nr. 9698; (ii) Astān-i Quds-i Rażavī Library, Mashhad, nr. 23954; and (iii) Majlis Library, Tehran, nr. 15636. It was organized along the lines of the Organon and the logic books of Avicenna’s Shifāʾ. In other words, it breaks with the dominant post-Avicennian tradition of organizing books on logic around the acquisition of concepts and assents. Some portions of the work are lifted from al-Taḥṣīl of Avicenna’s student Bahmanyār (El-Rouayheb 2010, 104 n. 67). 2) Miʿyār al-ʿirfān (The Measure of Gnosis), a shortened version of Taʿdīl al-mīzān, printed in the modern edition of his collected works (Dashtakī 2007, II, 991–1071). Like its longer original, it is organized according to the books of the Organon. Interestingly, in the sections on Prior Analytics, he presented both a standard post-Avicennian account with four figures and more than a dozen modality propositions, and the modal logic of the older logicians with three figures and necessity and possibility as the only modalities. In the section on Topics, he presented the basics of both Aristotelian dialectic and the more recent science of ādāb al-baḥth. As noted by the modern editor, numerous passages were lifted from Ḥillī’s commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-manṭiq. Though to some extent an eclectic “cut-and-paste” job, Dashtakī did sometimes present his personal opinion on various issues. For example, he claimed to have found a novel way of showing the productivity of non-evident syllogisms, apart from the received methods of conversion (ʿaks), indirect proof (khalf), and ecthesis (iftirāḍ). The method is a combination of the latter two proofs: it assumes the contradictory of the desired conclusion; if that contradictory is a particular-affirmative proposition, it uses ecthesis and adds the resulting proposition to the premises and derives a contradiction. 3) Miqyās al-naẓar (The Standard of Ratiocination), a somewhat shorter handbook on logic that is not organized according to the books of the Organon. It has been printed in his collected works (Dashtakī 2007, II, 1071–1097), though on the basis of a single, defective manuscript. 4) A lengthy treatise on the liar paradox, in which he attempted to vindicate his father’s solution against that of Dawānī, edited by Ahad Faramarz Qaramaleki in the collection Davāzda risāla dar pārādūks-i durūghgū (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2007), pp. 159–261.

(xv) H.a¯jjı¯ Mah. mu ¯d Nayrı¯zı¯ 107

5) A gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya, with critical comments on Dawānī’s gloss on the same work. (See Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2256: 144 fols., 21 lines per page.) 6) A gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Sharḥ al-Maṭāliʿ, with critical comments on Dawānī’s gloss on the same work. (See ʿArshī 1971, IV, nr. 3298: 221 folios, 17 lines per page.) 7) Critical annotations to Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. A fragment of the work is extant in the Majlis Library in Tehran, nr. 3423(2).

(xv) H. a¯jjı¯ Mah. mu ¯d Nayrı¯zı¯ (Pourjavady 2011, 53–61) The attributive “Nayrīzī” derives from the town of Nayrīz in Fars. He studied in nearby Shiraz with Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī, from whom he obtained a certificate in 903/1498. He also studied with Ṣadr al-Dīn’s son Ghiyāth al-Dīn, indicating that he was younger than the latter. After completing his studies, he spent some years in Isfahan, Qazvin, and Gilan, enjoying the patronage of a number of Safavid grandees. From around 919/1513, he settled in Yazd. He was still alive in 933/1526, but was outlived by his teacher Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī who refers to him as deceased in one of his later writings. Nayrīzī was a prolific writer in the philosophical sciences. Not surprisingly, he was critical of Dawānī and inclined to defend the views of his teachers the Dashtakīs. The controversies between Dawānī and the Dashtakīs may have taken on sectarian overtones in the early decades of Safavid rule, for a conspicuous number of Dawani’s students were Sunnis who were executed or had to leave Safavid Persia, whereas Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī’s most eminent students – Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī, Shams al-Dīn Khafrī (d. 942/1535–6) and Nayrīzī – were or became Shiites who enjoyed the patronage of the new Safavid order. (However, the alignment of philosophical positions and sectarian identity was not perfect, for a few of Dawānī’s students were or became Shiites.) Nayrizi’s works on logic include: 1) An extensive commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrid al-manṭiq, completed in Qazvin in 913/1508 (Pourjavady 2011, 120–121, 156–157). 2) An extensive commentary on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. An autograph manuscript, incomplete at the end, is extant in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul: Şehid Ali Paşa 1780, fols. 1–51. This was written

108

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

earlier than the commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrid al-manṭiq, for one fragment from the work is dated 904/1499. (For extant manuscripts, see Pourjavady 2011, 163–167). Nayrīzī’s student Shāh Mīr Hibatullāh Ḥusaynī (fl. 936/1529) also wrote a – much shorter – commentary on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq that is extant in a number of manuscripts (for example, British Library: MS Delhi Arabic 1531, fols. 20b–87b; Princeton University Library: Islamic MSS: Garrett 124L, 42 fols.). 3) A short super-gloss on Jurjani’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ. (For an extant manuscript, see Pourjavady 2011, 178–179.) 4) Annotations to Dawani’s treatise on the liar paradox. These are extant on the margins of one manuscript copy of Dawānī’s treatise (Pourjavady 2011, 129, 187–188).

(xvi) ̔ Is. a¯m al-Dı¯n Ibra¯hı¯m Isfara¯yinı¯ (El-Rouayheb EI3) ʿIṣām al-Dīn was born in 871/1466–7 in the town of Esfarāyen in northern Khorasan. He pursued his studies in Herat, which in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was a major cultural and intellectual center, rivaling Shiraz. Among his teachers were Taftāzānī’s great-grandson Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Ḥafīd al-Harawī (d. 916/1511) (Ḥaydar Mīrzā 2004, 306–7; Lārī 1393/2014, II, 887). He later taught in the town and enjoyed the patronage of its famed Timurid ruler Ḥusayn Bayqara (r. 874/1469–912/1506). In 926/1520, ten years after the conquest of Herat by the Shiite Safavids, he left for Bukhara in Central Asia, then under the rule of the Sunni Uzbeks, and enjoyed the patronage of ʿUbaydullāh Khān (r. 918/1512–946/1539) there. He died in 943/1536–7 while on a visit to Samarqand and was buried in that town near the shrine of the Naqshbandī Sufi Khwāja ʿUbaydullāh Aḥrār (d. 895/1490). ʿIṣām al-Dīn was one of the most eminent scholars of grammar and semantics-rhetoric of later centuries. His extensive commentary, entitled al-Aṭwal (The Lengthiest), on Qazwīnī’s Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ (The Epitome of the Key) and his gloss on the commentary by Jāmī (d. 898/1492) on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s handbook on syntax al-Kāfiya (The Sufficient) were particularly esteemed. He also wrote extensively on logic. His works have not yet been investigated systematically, and the nature of his contributions to the logical tradition is an open question. Unlike some of his Shirazi contemporaries, it seems he was comfortable with the

(xvi) ’Is.a¯m al-Dı¯n Ibra¯hı¯m Isfara¯yinı¯ 109

mainstream post-Avicennian tradition, as opposed to harking back to the ancients. In his most extensive work on logic (nr. 1 below), he regularly cited Kātibī’s Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, rather than Avicenna’s Shifāʾ. His works on logic include: 1) An extensive gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya. This was printed in Istanbul in the nineteenth century, the volume on “assents” (taṣdīqāt) in 1259/1843 in 209 pages, and the volume on “conceptions” (taṣawwurāt) in 1289/1872 in 307 pages. The volume on “conceptions” incorporates two shorter treatises by ʿIṣām al-Dīn, on whether a science is reducible to its issues (pp. 90–96), and on why the discussion of conceptions should precede the discussion of assents (pp. 115–124). ʿIṣām al-Dīn’s gloss, though much longer than Jurjānī’s, exhibits the same focus on the earlier parts of the commentary, dealing with preliminary matters, the five universals, definition, and propositions. Only a little over a tenth (13–14%) deals with contradiction, conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of hypotheticals, and the syllogism, even though these sections cover more than a third of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary. 2) A commentary on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Like Dawānī’s commentary, to which it occasionally responds, the commentary is incomplete and does not cover the sections on conversion, contraposition and syllogism (Mach 1977, nr. 3248; Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2301). 3) A Persian commentary on Jurjānī’s Kubrā, the aforementioned Persian introduction to logic (Tihrānī 1936–, XIV, 31). There are a number of extant manuscripts of this work in Iranian libraries, for example MS Marʿashī Najafī nr. 2520, 73 folios, 17 lines per page. 4) A commentary on a short treatise on ādāb al-baḥth by ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) (Mach 1977, nr. 3366). 5) A short treatise on the logical relations that obtain between contradictories (Princeton University Library, Islamic MS, Garrett Y3122, fols. 54a–55b). 6) A short treatise on the three types of conventional reference: by correspondence (muṭābaqa), by inclusion (taḍammun) and by implication (iltizām) (Princeton University Library, Islamic MS, Garrett Y3122, fols. 56a–57a and, in a different hand, on fols. 58b–59b).

110

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

7) A treatise discussing a passage from Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya in which Quṭb al-Dīn criticized the way in which Khūnajī and “those who follow him” understood the so-called ḥaqīqī proposition, i.e., a proposition in which the predicate is said to be true of the subject if it were to exist (law wujida). For an extant manuscript, see Princeton University Library, Islamic MS: Garrett 132L, fols. 78a–81b. 8) A short treatise on the contradictory (naqīḍ) of both concepts and propositions (Mach 1977, nr. 3274). Some extant manuscripts attri­ bute the treatise to ʿIṣām al-Dīn’s contemporary Mullā Muḥammad Ḥanafī (fl. 922/1516), a scholar who, like ʿIṣām al-Dīn, was active in Herat and later fled to Central Asia after the Safavid takeover of that city. This Mullā Ḥanafī also wrote a widely studied commentary on ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī’s treatise on ādāb al-baḥth.

(xvii) H. asan b. H. usayn b. Muh. ammad Amlashı¯ (El-Rouayheb 2018) This scholar was active in the year 955/1548, the date of an autograph manuscript of his summa of Ḥanafī jurisprudence entitled Ḥall al-uṣūl (Solving the Principles) (Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: MS Kadizade Mehmed 104). The attributive “Amlashī” indicates that he hailed from the town of Amlash in the province of Gilan near the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea. It is clear that he later settled in the Ottoman Empire, for a number of his autograph manuscripts are extant in Istanbul, and he dedicated works to Ayās Meḥmed Pāşā, Ottoman Grand Vizier from 942/1536 to 946/1539, and to a certain Aḥmad Çelebī b. Abī l-Suʿūd, almost certainly Aḥmed Çelebī (d. 970/1563), the son of the famed Ottoman Grand Mufti Ebū l-Suʿūd (d. 982/1574). It is likely that he is identical to Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn al-Tālishī, a scholar who hailed from the Talish-speaking area in the northern Gilan region. He studied in Tabriz, left for the Ottoman Empire after the Safavid conquest of that city in 906/1501, continued his studies in Istanbul, and then settled in the Hejaz and Cairo for approximately forty years, before returning around the year 957/1550 to Istanbul where he died in 964/1556–7. Amlashī’s handbook of logic, entitled Takmīl al-manṭiq (The Completion of Logic), though not especially original or influential, occupies a special place

(xvii) H.asan b. H.usayn b. Muh. ammad Amlashı¯ 111

in the Western study of Arabic logic. A manuscript of the work in the British Library (MS Or. 12405, fols. 72a–104b) was examined by Nicholas Rescher, and its detailed presentation of modal propositions and syllogisms allowed him to flesh out the condensed remarks in the classic, thirteenth handbook al-­ Risāla al-Shamsiyya by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī and thus develop his path-breaking presentation and interpretation of post-Avicennan modal logic in The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Rescher 1974). The British Library manuscript did not name the author, and Rescher mistakenly attributed it to the copyist, Meḥmed Sādıḳ b. Feyżullāh b. Meḥmed Emīn Şirvānī, whom he assumed was a Persian scholar of the fifteenth century but was actually an eminent Ottoman scholar who died in 1120/1708. This Ottoman scholar made at least two copies of Takmīl al-manṭiq, in which he integrated Amlashī’s own marginal annotations to the work as a running commentary, thus producing what he called a “commentary” (sharḥ) on Takmīl al-manṭiq. Amlashī’s works on logic are: 1) Takmīl al-manṭiq (The Completion of Logic), a manual on logic that was dedicated to Aḥmed Çelebī b. Abī l-Suʿūd, almost certainly the son of the famed Ottoman Grand Mufti Ebū l-Suʿūd. An undated autograph manuscript of the work is extant in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul (MS Laleli 2561, fols. 1a–39a). The work covers much the same ground as Kātibī’s al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya, though the treatment of modal propositions and modal syllogisms is somewhat more expansive. Amlashī listed twenty-two modal propositions, instead of the thirteen listed in Kātibī’s handbook and the fifteen in Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, though the two earlier handbooks and their standard commentaries had presented the additional modal propositions when discussing modal contradiction, conversion and contraposition. As mentioned, Takmīl al-manṭiq is not a conspicuously original handbook, but it nevertheless contains interesting departures from the positions expounded in Kātibī’s Shamsiyya on a number of points. For example, it presents a nominalist position regarding universals (fol. 10b), analyses propositions into four rather than three parts: subject, predicate, nexus, and judgment (fol. 11b–12a), and rejects the view that truth consists in correspondence to extra-mental fact, proposing instead that truth is accordance with what is self-evident or provable (fol. 13a, margin).

112

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

2) Ḥall al-Tahdhīb (Solving the Emendation), a commentary on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. It is extant in a water-damaged manuscript in the Süleymaniye Library (MS Laleli 2644, fols. 50a–100a), copied from the autograph in 1065/1654–5. 3) A short super-gloss on the gloss of Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Bardaʿī (d. 927/ 1520–1) on the commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī by Ḥusām al-Dīn alKātī (d. 760/1359). This is extant in autograph folios bound together with the previously mentioned autograph copy of Takmīl al-manṭiq (MS Laleli 2561, fols. 40a–47a).

(xviii) Ah. med T. a¯sköprüza¯de (B. Fleming “T. a¯sköprüza¯de” EI2) He was born in 901/1495 in Bursa and studied there with a number of scholars, including his father Muṣṭafā (d. 935/1529), a former tutor to the Ottoman Sultan Selīm I (r. 918/1512–926/1520). He then began teaching in Edirne and Istanbul, followed by spells as a judge in Bursa and Istanbul. He retired from the judgeship of Istanbul in 961/1554 and died in the Ottoman capital in 968/1561. Ṭāşköprüzāde is now perhaps most known for his biographical dictionary of Ottoman scholars al-Shaqāʾiq al-nuʿmāniyya fī ʿulamāʾ al-dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya (Red Anemones concerning the Scholars of the Ottoman State) and his encyclopedia of the sciences Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda (The Key to Felicity and the Lamp of Eminence), both written in Arabic. In his time, he was also considered an eminent scholar of the rational sciences who taught philosophical theology, semantics-rhetoric and jurisprudence. His perhaps most widely studied (and copied) work was a short introduction to the discipline of ādāb al-baḥth. He also wrote a number of treatises on topics that overlap the fields of philosophical theology and logic. His works include: 1) al-Liwāʾ al-marfūʿ fī ḥall mabāḥith al-mawḍūʿ (The Raised Flag in Solving the Problems of the Subject Matter), on the subject matter of a science. This was a much discussed topic in the standard handbooks on philosophical theology and logic in Ṭāşköprüzāde’s time. (For a detailed description of an extant manuscript copy, see Ahlwardt 1887–99, nr. 5205.) 2) Fatḥ al-amr al-mughlaq fī masʾalat al-majhūl al-muṭlaq (Opening the Thwarted Injunction concerning the Issue of the Completely Unknown).

(xviii) Ah. med T.a¯sköprüza¯de

On the paradox of what is not conceived in any way. The “paradox” arises from the generally agreed principle that conception is a precondition for judgment, i.e., that what is not conceived in any way cannot be the subject of a judgment. The problem is that the principle “What is not conceived in any way cannot be judged” seems precisely to be a judgment about what is not conceived in any way, and hence seems to be self-refuting (on this problem, see Lameer 2014). Two extant manuscripts of this treatise are: Bayezıt Devlet Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: MS Veliyüddin 3238, fols. 96–100, and Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: MS Bağdatlı Vehbi 2196, fols. 119–127. 3) Ghāyat al-taḥqīq wa-nihāyat al-tadqīq fī taqsīm al-ʿilm ilā l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq (The Ultimate Verification and the Utmost Exactitude in Dividing Knowledge into Conception and Assent). On the division of knowledge into conception and assent, a topic intensively discussed by Eastern Islamic theologians and logicians after the fourteenth century. An extant manuscript is in the Bayezıt Devlet Kütüphanesi in Istanbul (Veliyüddin 3238, fols. 163–167). 4) al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyyāt fī mabāḥith al-kulliyyāt (The Clear Principles concerning the Discussions of Universals) or, according to some manuscripts, Qawāʿid al-ḥamliyyāt fī mabāḥith al-kulliyyāt (The Principles of Categorical Propositions concerning the Discussions of Universals). The problem of universals was regularly discussed by Eastern Islamic philosophical theologians and logicians. Ṭāşköprüzāde’s treatise is a defense of realism against the attack of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī. The treatise has been edited with a facing-page Turkish translation in the fourth volume of his collected works (Taşköprüzade Külliyatı 4: Felsefe Risaleleri, edited by K. Şenel, C. Şenel & M. Z. Tiryaki [Istanbul: Istanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi Yayınları 2016], pp. 117–163). 5) A treatise on ādāb al-baḥth, plus a commentary. This is a short handbook on ādāb al-baḥth, to which Ṭāşköprüzāde wrote his own relatively short commentary. It was based on Samarqandī’s treatise but left out Sa­marqandī’s intricate examples of dialectical exchanges in theology and jurisprudence. The handbook was widely used as an introduction to ādāb al-baḥth in Ottoman Turkish colleges until the nineteenth century, and it elicited numerous glosses by later Ottoman scholars (Mach 1977, 3375– 3383. It was lithographed in Istanbul in 1313/1895 in thirteen pages.

113

114

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

(xix) Mı¯r Abu ¯ l-Fath. b. Makhdu ¯m H. usaynı¯  ̔ Arabsha¯hı¯ (Afandı¯ 1403/1982–3, V, 486–487, 492; Qummı¯ 1980, 562, 993; Ru ¯mlu ¯ 1384/2005, III, 1465; Da¯nisha¯muz 1988, VI, 100) Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ reportedly studied with ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī in Transoxania. Whereas his teacher had abandoned the realm of the Shiite Safavids for that of the Sunni Uzbeks, Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ followed the opposite path. He appears to have been in Mashhad when the Safavids reconquered it from the Uzbeks in 934/1528. Despite some early suspicion of his sectarian allegiance, he became attached for a number of years to the court of Shah Ṭāhmāsp I in Qazwin, and dedicated to the Shah an influential commentary on a Shiite creedal work by Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī. Some of his later works on logic are dedicated to the vassal ruler of Gilan, Khān Aḥmad II (r. 944/1538–1000/1592). He died in Ardabil in 976/1568–69. Though little remembered today, Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ was one of the most influential Eastern Islamic logicians of the sixteenth century. Many of his works continued to be studied in later centuries; curiously they appear to have been more popular in the Ottoman Empire and Mughal India than in Iran. This may have been due to the fact that the handbooks he glossed came to be more widely used in the two former regions. Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, for example, was a standard handbook in Ottoman Turkey and Mughal India but seems to have dropped out of the curriculum of Safavid colleges in the seventeenth century, being replaced by the complete but less probing and demanding commentary of Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī. Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ’s works on logic include:

1) A gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, dedicated to Khān Aḥmad II of Gilan. Though not hostile, Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ on several occasions expressed reservations about Dawānī’s positions. His gloss was regularly studied in Ottoman madrasas and elicited numerous super-glosses by later Ottoman scholars (Mach 1977, nrs. 3237–3243). It was printed in Istanbul in 1305/1887 in 152 pages, followed by Da­ wānī’s commentary (52 pp.) and Taftāzānī’s handbook (8 pp.). In Mug­ hal India, it was eventually supplanted by the gloss of Mīr Zāhīd Harawī (d. 1101/1689–90), but it retained a measure of influence insofar as Mīr Zāhid discussed the views of earlier glossators.

(xx) Mulla¯ ’Abdulla¯h Yazdı¯ 115

2) A continuation (Takmila) of Dawānī’s incomplete commentary, comp­ leted in 972/1564 (Mach 1977, nr. 3236; ʿArshī 1971–, IV, 332–33; Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2283). Of particular influence was his discussion of ḍābitat al-Tahdhīb in which he criticized Taftāzānī’s claim to have captured the conditions of productivity across all four syllogistic figures. The discussion was lithographed in India in a mis­ cellany entitled Majmūʿa-yi bīst-i rasāʾil-i manṭiq (Cawnpore, 1329/ 1912), pp. 3–5. 3) A gloss on a commentary by Mullā Muḥammad Ḥanafī (fl. 922/1516) – another scholar from Herat who had fled to Uzbek Bukhara – on a short treatise on ādāb al-baḥth by ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī. This gloss was apparently completed in Mashhad in 935/1528–29 (Mach 1977, nr. 3349). It came to be widely studied in Ottoman circles from the seventeenth century, and elicited numerous super-glosses (Mach 1977, nrs. 3350–3362). 4) An extensive gloss, in Persian, on ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī’s commentary on Jurjānī’s Kubrā. It was completed in 960/1553. An early, extant manuscript consists of 81 folios, with 21 lines per page (MS Marʿashī Najafī 4088). 5) A short gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya, completed in 953/1546, specifically discussing the question of whether it is possible to acquire new concepts from previously known concepts (MS Marʿashī Najafī 957, fols. 126–130). 6) A gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, completed in 955/1548, specifically discussing the paradox of “what is not conceived in any way” (al-majhūl al-muṭlaq) (MS Marʿashī Najafī 957, fols. 88b–113a). 7) A short treatise on the ten categories, completed in 956/1549. (For an extant manuscript copy, see MS Marʿashi Najafī 957, fols. 115b–119b.)

(xx) Mulla ¯  ̔ Abdulla ¯h Yazdı¯ (Tihra ¯nı¯ 1971–, VII, 135; Khwa ¯nsa ¯rı¯ 1391/1971–2, IV, 228–230; Afandı¯ 1403/1982–3, III, 191–194) Mullā ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥusayn Yazdī was a student of Dawānī’s student Jamāl alDīn Maḥmūd Shīrāzī (d. 962/1554–5). He may also have studied with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī, for in 962/1555 he was teaching at the Manṣūriyya madrasa

116

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

in Shiraz that had been founded by Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s father Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī. He was an esteemed teacher and counted among his students the eminent Safavid polymath Bahāʾ al-Dīn ʿĀmilī (d. 1030/1621). According to a contemporary source (Rūmlū 1384/2005, 1487), he died in 981/1573–4 in the province of ʿArabistān (modern-day Khuzistan), possibly while on pilgrimage to the Shiite shrine cities of Iraq. A later source states that he died in Isfahan in 1015/1606–7 (Muḥibbī 1284/1868–9, IV, 40), but this appears to be due to a confusion of Yazdī with the prominent religious scholar Mullā ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥusayn Tustarī who died in Isfahan in 1021/1612 (Tihrānī 1971–, VIII, 343–346). Yazdī’s extant logical works are:

1) A gloss on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, completed in 967/1560. Formally, it was a “gloss” (ḥāshiya) rather than a “commentary” (sharḥ), for it did not quote the entirety of Taftāzānī’s handbook, but rather cited the first few words of a statement and then expounded and discussed it. Often referred to simply as “the Gloss of Mullā ʿAbdullāh” (ḥāshiyat Mullā ʿAbdullāh), it came to be a standard intermediate handbook in Iranian scholarly circles in Safavid and Qajar times. As such, it elicited dozens of glosses by later scholars, and was lithographed or printed on numerous occasions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A Teh­ ran lithograph from 1314/1896 that includes extensive marginal annotations by later scholars comprises 102 pages. Of these, around a third (pp. 1–35) is devoted to preliminary matters and conceptions, and around a third to immediate implications and the formal syllogism (pp. 50–83). A relatively large proportion (18%) is taken up with induction, analogy, the matter of the syllogism, and the concluding discussion of the subject matter, principles and issues of a science (pp. 83–102). 2) A Persian commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (Tihrānī 1936–, XIII, 161–­162, nr. 546). Two extant manuscripts of the work are: Ayatollah Marʿashī Najafī Library, Qom: MS nr. 10609 (69 folios, various lines per page, copied in 985/1577) and Hażrat-i Maʿṣūma Library, Qom, MS nr. 477 (133 folios, 19 lines per page, copied in 1053/1643). 3) A gloss, entitled al-Kharrāra (The Ripple), on the commentary of Da­wānī on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. An extant manuscript, copied during the lifetime of the author, is in the Ayatollah Marʿashī Najafī library in Qom (nr. 11262/5, fols. 96–165, 21 lines per page, copied in 975/1567–8).

(xxi) Mı¯r Fakhr al-Dı¯n Muh. ammad b. H.usayn Samma¯kı¯ Astara¯ba¯dı¯ 117

4) A gloss on the discussion of the subject matter (mawḍūʿ) of a science in the early parts of Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. An early extant manuscript is in the Ayatollah Marʿashī Najafī library in Qom (nr. 11262/6, fols. 168–180, 21 lines per page, copied in 975/ 1567–8). 5) An extensive commentary on the passage in Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb almanṭiq presenting the ḍābiṭa, i.e., the general conditions of produc­ tivity in terms of “subject generality”. This appears to have been written during the lifetime of his teacher Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shīrāzī, i.e., before his commentary on the entire Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. It has been printed in the appendix to a recent edition of Yazdī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Turkmānī (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2018), pp. 401–424. 6) Some sources also attribute to Yazdī a gloss on the “older” gloss by Dawānī on Jurjānī’s gloss on Sharḥ Maṭāliʿ al-anwār, as well as a gloss on Dawānī’s gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya. It is not clear whether these glosses are extant.

(xxi) Mı¯r Fakhr al-Dı¯n Muh. ammad b. H. usayn Samma¯kı¯ Astara¯ba¯dı¯ (Tihra¯nı¯ 1971–, VII, 179–180; Ru ¯mlu ¯ 1384/2005, III, 1533–4) He studied in Shiraz, primarily with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī, and later became attached to the court of Shah Ṭāhmāsp I, to whom he dedicated a number of works. Apart from the logical works listed below, he also wrote an esteemed gloss on the commentary by Qāḍī Mīr Ḥusayn al-Maybudī (d. 909/1504) on Abharī’s Hidāyat al-ḥikma, covering the section of the commentary dealing with natural philosophy. He died in 984/1577. His works on logic are: 1) A gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (Tehran, Kitābkhāneh-i Markazī Dānishgāh-i Tihrān: MS Mishkāt 1224, fols. 3a–87b). This was one of several esteemed glosses written on Dawānī’s commentary in sixteenth-century Persia – the glosses of his contemporaries Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ and Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī have already been mentio­n­ ed. Judging from the tone of this work, the hatred that Ghiyāth al-Dīn

118

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

Dashtakī harbored toward Dawānī was not necessarily transferred to his students. Fakhr al-Dīn was not uncritical, but not consistently hos­ tile either, and in his introduction he praised Dawānī’s work. One prob­ lem that he raised in this gloss (fol. 59b–60a) came to be intensely discuss­ ­­ed in later centuries: Dawānī had defended the view that conception can attach itself to anything that assent attaches to, but not vice versa. He had also defended the view that knowledge (ʿilm) and the known (maʿlūm) are identical in essence (muttaḥidān dhātan). On this account, what is known is the form of an entity, and knowledge is that very form in the mind – Dawānī explicitly rejected the view that what is in the mind is merely the image or likeness (shabaḥ or mithāl) of the thing rather than the form or essence itself. Fakhr al-Dīn pointed out that if knowledge and the known are identical in essence, then conception (a subtype of knowledge) is identical to what is known by conception, and assent (another subtype of knowledge) is identical to what is known by assent. But if what is known by conception can be the same as what is known by assent then the implication would be that conception can be identical to assent. (Schematically put: Conception = object of conception = object of assent = assent.) Such a view undermines the standard division of knowledge into conception and assent. After all, if conception can attach itself to anything that assent attaches to, but not vice versa, and if knowledge and the known are identical, then this implies that assent is simply a subtype of conception, and it seems ridiculous to divide knowledge into conception and its subtype. 2) A treatise on dialectic (munāẓara), completed in 958/1551 (MS: Āstāne-­ yi Quds-i Riżawī 1131). This presents the basics of ādāb al-baḥth, but unusually goes on to present more than a dozen sophisms (mughālaṭāt), including the liar paradox, and their solutions. Fakhr al-Dīn’s solution to the liar paradox is simply to deny bivalence, i.e., the principle that every proposition is either true or false. The definition of a proposition (qaḍiyya) is a complete statement that may be true or false. However, this does not imply that every proposition is actually true or false, merely that a proposition considered in abstraction from its specific matter (khuṣūṣiyyat al-mādda) is true or false. This solution appears to be derived from the thirteenth-century Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammūna whose view on the liar paradox, expressed in correspondence

(xxii) Mı¯rza¯ Ja¯n Ba¯ghnawı¯ 119

with his contemporary Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī, had been presented and discussed in the abovementioned treatises of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī and Dawānī (Qaramalekī 2007, 35–37, 119–124).

(xxii) Mı¯rza ¯ Ja¯n Ba¯ghnawı¯ (R. Pourjavady EI3) Mīrzā Jān Ḥabībullāh Bāghnawī was born around the year 930/1524 and studied in Shiraz with Dawānī’s student Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shīrāzī (d. 962/ 1554–5). He went on to teach in Shiraz for some twenty years after his teacher’s death. During the short reign of the Safavid Shah Ismāʿīl II (r. 984/1576–985/ 1578), who stopped the persecution of Sunnis in Persia, Mīrzā Jān became associated with the court and openly declared his Sunnism. When the Shah was assassinated, Mīrzā Jān’s position in Safavid Persia became untenable, and he left for Uzbek Central Asia. He died in Bukhara in 995/1587. Though little remembered today, Mīrzā Jān’s writings were very influential in Ottoman Turkey, Persia, Central Asia and India down to the nineteenth century. His gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s gloss on Ṭūsī’s commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt (covering the physics and metaphysics only) was printed in Istanbul in 1290/1873. His gloss on Ibn Mubārakshāh’s commentary on Kātibī’s Ḥikmat al-ʿayn was printed in Kazan in 1321–2/1902–3. He also wrote a super-gloss on the section on general metaphysics from Qūshjī’s commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd and Dawānī’s first set of glosses thereon. This super-gloss survives in numerous manuscript copies in Iran and Turkey, attesting to its widespread use. Mīrzā Jān’s works were referenced and discussed by later Ottoman scholars such as Ḳara Ḫalīl Tīrevī (d. 1123/1711), Safavid scholars such as Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī (d. 1098/1687) and Mullā Mīrzā Shirwānī (d. 1098/1687), and Mughal scholars such as Mīr Zāhid Harawī (d. 1101/1689–90) and Qāżī Mubārak Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749). The super-gloss on Qūshjī’s commentary gave a summation of some of the main points discussed by Dawānī and Dashtakī in their glosses and counter-glosses on Qūshjī’s commentary, including the disputed points of logic. For example, he gave a summary account of Dawānī’s views on relational syllogisms (El-Rouayheb 2010, 104–107). Mīrzā Jān’s straightforwardly logical works were:

1) A super-gloss on the gloss of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī on the early parts of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ al-an-

120

IV. 1350–1600: The Eastern Islamic Tradition

wār, covering the preamble, the division of knowledge into conception and assent, the subject matter of logic, and the paradox of “what is not conceived in any way” (al-majhūl al-muṭlaq). This appears to have been an influential work and was still cited and discussed by Safavid, Mughal and Ottoman logicians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (For extant manuscripts, see Mach 1977, nr. 3228; Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2262, fols. 1–127.) 2) A gloss on the part of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ al-anwār dealing with “assents” (taṣdīqāt). Almost all glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary confined themselves to the early parts of the work that had been glossed by Jurjānī. Unusually, Mīrzā Jān supplemented his gloss on that much discussed early part with a gloss – albeit a relatively short one – on the parts dealing with categorical, modal and hypothetical propositions. However, his gloss does not cover the commentary’s discussion of conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of hypotheticals, or the categorical, modal and hypothetical syllogisms (Mach 1977, nr. 3232; Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2262, fols. 128–203). 3) A treatise on sophisms (mughālaṭāt), dedicated to the vassal ruler of Gilan, Khān Aḥmad II, the abovementioned dedicatee of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ’s gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (Mashhad: Āstāne-yi Quds-i Rażawī, MS 1126 and Qom: Marʿashī Najafī, MS 10201/4). 4) A commentary on the passage in Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq presenting the ḍābiṭa, i.e., the general conditions of productivity in terms of “subject generality”. This has been printed in the appendix to a recent edition of Yazdī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Turkmānī (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2018), pp. 395–400. 5) An extant manuscript of a handbook of logic entitled Baḥr al-manṭiq (The Sea of Logic), copied in India but later making its way into a Turkish library (Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi, MS 2203/6, fols. 38b–46b), has been misattributed to Mīrzā Jān. The work is actually by a much later namesake, the Indo-Muslim scholar Ḥabībullāh Qannawjī (d. 1140/ 1727). (For two other copies of Baḥr al-manṭiq, with the correct attribution, see ʿArshī 1971, IV, pp. 406–407.)

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

(i) Introduction A North African tradition of Arabic logic emerged in the fourteenth century. This tradition was broadly post-Avicennian, having been brought to the Maghreb from Egypt where Khūnajī, Urmawī and Ibn Wāṣil had been active in the middle decades of the thirteenth century. However, it retained a distinct regional character. Most obviously, the handbooks that came to be used in the Maghreb were distinct from those in common use in the Eastern Islamic lands. Rather than Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, Khūnajī’s Jumal became the standard handbook on advanced logic in the Maghreb, and elicited numerous commentaries by fourteenth- and fifteenth-century North African scholars. It is indicative of this difference in handbooks that not a single commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya or Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ was written by a scholar from the Maghreb, whereas not a single commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal was written by a scholar from the Turco-Persianate world. Later, the Mukhtaṣar al-manṭiq (The Epitome of Logic) of Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490) came to be widely studied in North Africa down to the modern period, but it was not studied in the Turco-Persianate world. The Ottoman bibliographer Kātib Çelebī (d. 1067/1657), for example, seems not to have been aware of it at all. This distinct tradition of handbooks went hand in hand with a somewhat distinct emphasis. North African logicians until the mid-eighteenth century retained a focus on the immediate implications of propositions (conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions) and the formal syllogism, even when their Eastern Islamic counterparts were losing interest in these topics and instead exploring in great depth metaphysical, epistemological and semantic issues raised in the earlier parts of their hand­ books. The distinct emphasis may be brought out by comparing two widely studied commentaries from the fourteenth century, roughly of equal length.

122

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

The first is the commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/ 1365); the second is the commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal by Muḥammad alSharīf al-Tilimsānī (d. 771/1370) (Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī 1325/1907; Tilimsānī, Sharḥ al-Jumal, MS: British Library, Add. 9617). The former work devotes approximately 32% of the total number of pages to discussing preliminary issues and the acquisition of concepts; the latter devotes around 16%. The former devotes around 36% to the formal implications of propositions and the formal syllogism; the latter devotes around 64%. If anything, this difference between Eastern and Western post-Avicennian logicians became even more pronounced after the mid-fourteenth century, for – as mentioned in the previous section – the shift in focus of Eastern logicians toward philosophical and semantic issues became even stronger after Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī. To some extent, this regionally distinct emphasis may have been a function of the different handbooks used. Khūnajī’s Jumal, for example, launches straight into a discussion of different types of conventional reference, omitting any discussion of the division of knowledge into conception and assent or of the subject matter of logic. Later commentators on the handbook therefore had less opportunity to dwell on such preliminary topics. The Jumal also devoted considerable space to conditionals, disjunctions and the hypothetical syllogism, forcing commentators to follow suit. (28% of al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī’s commentary is devoted to hypothetical logic, compared to 13% of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on the Shamsiyya.) The Jumal also has no discussion at all of the sources of premises and the “matter” of the syllogism, in other words demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, poetical and sophistical syllogisms. It is unlikely, however, that the different emphasis was merely a result of coincidental features of standard handbooks. As suggested in the previous section, Eastern Islamic logicians after the thirteenth century typically doubled as contributors to philosophical theology, semantics-rhetoric or even straightforward Avicennian philosophy. As will be seen in more detail below, North African logicians typically doubled as jurists or as theologians who mostly (though not invariably) eschewed the lengthy philosophical preliminaries that had become common in Eastern theological works after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. North African theological handbooks that were widely studied in this period, such as al-ʿAqīda al-Burhāniyya (The Burhānian Creed) of ʿUthmān al-­ Salālujī (d. 573/1178) and the creeds of Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490), are conspicuously different from Eastern Ashʿarī handbooks in

(i) Introduction

avoiding lengthy philosophical preliminaries, instead retaining a focus on the traditional topics of kalām covered in, for example, the works of al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) (Muqtaraḥ 2010; ʿUqbānī 2008; Sanūsī 1316/1898; Sanūsī 2009). This arguably goes some way toward explaining the differing emphases of Eastern and North African logicians. Eastern logicians after the thirteenth century tended to focus on the aspects of their discipline that spoke most immediately to the issues and concerns of semantics-rhetoric and post-Avicennian metaphysics. North African logicians from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were much less likely to be keenly interested in semantics-rhetoric and philosophy, and it is therefore hardly surprising that they evinced less interest in those aspects of logic that overlapped in an especially marked way with those disciplines. A logician who was unwilling to delve deeply into, for example, philosophical theories about form and matter, second intentions, the mental existence (wujūd dhihnī) of quiddities, or the extra-mental existence of universals was unlikely to thrust himself with relish upon topics such as the nature of knowledge (is it the occurrence of a form to the mind?) and its division into conception and assent; the subject matter of logic (is it second intentions?); do universals exist in the extra-mental world and if so in what manner? One need not read many pages of Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, for example, to realize that the discussion of such issues occurred wholly within the conceptual framework of the falsafa tradition (Dawānī 1887). By contrast, the aspect of logic that North African scholars would have thought most immediately relevant to their other concerns would have been the syllogistic. As shown by Wael Hallaq, Islamic jurisprudence had increasingly adopted a syllogistic ideal of reasoning since al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) (Hallaq 1990). The same is true of rational theology – the adoption of explicitly syllogistic reasoning is one of the most distinctive differences between Ghazālī’s theological work al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād (The Golden Means in Belief) and his teacher al-Juwaynī’s al-Irshād (The Guide) (Ghazālī 2013; Juwaynī 2000). And this trend intensified in the centuries after Ghazālī. The aforementioned fifteenth-century scholar Sanūsī wrote a number of theological works that were widely studied throughout Islamic Africa until the end of the nineteenth century, and these stand out by their extensive and explicit use of syllogistic argument forms. To be sure, Eastern theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries such as Taftāzānī, Jurjānī and Dawānī also sometimes used basic logical terminology in their theological writings, and they clearly assumed that their readers were

123

124

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

familiar with such terminology (El-Rouayheb 2016, 424–425). But Sanūsī’s use of syllogisms in his theological works is noticeably more systematic than his Eastern contemporaries. This in turn was related to his radical view that accepting the Islamic creed by imitation (taqlīd) of elders and peers is unacceptable, and that it is incumbent on all believers to know the basic tenets of the creed and their rational proofs (El-Rouayheb 2015, 175–188). An “imitator” (muqallid) who is unaware of such rational proofs is, in his view, either a sinner (fāsiq) or an unbeliever (kāfir). This was a position that had been upheld by some early Ashʿarī theologians but had been largely abandoned by Eastern Ashʿarīs since the time of Juwaynī and Ghazālī in favor of the less radical view that knowledge of rational proofs is a farḍ kifāya, i.e., a communal duty but not incumbent on each and every adult and sane Muslim. Among North African Ashʿarīs such as Sanūsī the more radical view remained influential (though not uncontested either). Accordingly, the creeds written by Sanūsī stand out in comparison to most Eastern Ashʿarī or Māturīdī creeds by not simply giving the articles of faith (ʿaqāʾid) but also including at least one rational proof for each article. And, as mentioned, such proofs were regularly cast in syllogistic form. Three further distinctive features of the North African logical tradition deserve to be noted. First, there does not appear to have been a more conservative current that sought to undo the post-Avicennian tradition in the name of a more orthodox Avicennism or ancient wisdom. Ṭūsī’s commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt was known to at least some North African logicians from the fourteenth century; some of its arguments on this or that issue were adopted; others were rejected and described as “fanatic partisanship” (taʿaṣṣub) to Avicenna. Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works were also known to some North African logicians in the fourteenth century, but again they seem to have drawn on them in a piecemeal way, to enrich the discussion of particular points. The historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) made nostalgic observations about how “the books of the ancients” on logic (i.e., the books of the Organon) had been abandoned by later logicians, “as if they had never been” (Rosenthal 1958, III, 143), but Ibn Khaldūn did not write works on logic in the tradition of the “older logicians” nor, it appears, did any other scholar from the Islamic West after Averroes’ student Ibn Ṭumlūs (d. 620/1223) (Ibn Ṭumlūs 1916; Ibn Ṭumlūs 2006; Ibn Ṭumlūs 2016). Second, the literary form of the “gloss” (ḥāshiya) did not become common in North Africa until the seventeenth century, and the tradition of writing

(ii) Muh. ammad al-Sharı¯f al-Tilimsa¯nı¯ 125

super-glosses, i.e., glosses on glosses, remained virtually unknown until the eighteenth century. This presumably reflects the fact that the practice of writing sets of glosses on earlier works appears first to have taken off in the Eastern Islamic lands in the fourteenth century. For whatever reasons, it took centuries for the practice to be adopted in the Western Islamic lands. Third, the discipline of ādāb al-baḥth as it crystallized in the works of Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322) does not seem to have been much studied west of Egypt. Strikingly, there appears to be no substantial contribution to the literature on ādāb al-baḥth by a scholar from the Maghreb up to the nineteenth century. It is also indicative that the Moroccan scholar al-Ḥasan alYūsī (d. 1102/1691), a logician and apologist for the rational sciences in general, did not mention ādāb al-baḥth or ʿilm al-munāẓara in his encyclopedia of the sciences al-Qānūn (The Canon) (Yūsī 1998). Why the Maghreb did not adopt the discipline for so long is not clear. The following are some of the major North African logicians from the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

(ii) Muh. ammad al-Sharı¯f al-Tilimsa¯nı¯ (Timbuktı¯ 1351/1932, 255–264) He was born in Tlemcen in 710/1310–11, and studied logic and the rational sciences primarily with Muḥammad al-Ābilī (d. 757/1356), an important figure in the rise of the North African logical tradition (Timbuktī 1351/1932, 245–248; Nassar 1964). The attributive “Ābilī” derives from Avila in Spain, whence his family hailed. He appears to have been born and raised in Tlemcen, and studied in Marrakesh with the prominent mathematician and astronomer Ibn al-Bannāʾ al-Marrākushī (d. 721/1321). He also reportedly went to Cairo and the Levant, though when he did so and whom he met there is not entirely clear. Ābilī went on to teach not only al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī but also two other scholars who wrote influential works on logic: Ibn ʿArafa al-Tūnisī (d. 803/1401) and Saʿīd al-ʿUqbānī (d. 811/1408). Further details about the life and writings of the latter two scholars will be given below. Incidentally, Ābilī also taught the aforementioned historian Ibn Khaldūn. Muḥammad al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī later enjoyed the patronage of the Marinid ruler Abū ʿInān Fāris al-Mutawakkil (r. 749/1348–759/1358), to whose Chamberlain he dedicated a commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal. An early, aceph-

126

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

alous copy of the commentary in the El Escorial library (Derenbourg 1903, nr. 617) comprises 88 folios, with 27 lines per page. The colophon indicates that the work was completed in 754/1353 and copied in 801/1399. In Derenbourg’s catalog, the author of the commentary is not identified, but the date of completion and the dedication to Muḥammad Ibn Abī ʿAmr al-Tamīmī, the Chamberlain (ḥājib) of Abū ʿInān (see Ibn Khaldūn 1956–61, VII, 606–609, 751–752), leave little doubt as to the author. Another extant manuscript is in the British Library in London (Add. 9617, folios 7b–140b, copied in 862/1458). Al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī returned to teaching in Tlemcen after Abū ʿInān’s death, and died there in 771/1370. Ibn Khaldūn, who attended al-Sharīf ’s classes, reported that he used to teach Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works (Ibn Khaldūn 1951, 62–64). This is borne out by his commentary on the Jumal, which occasionally cites the views of Averroes. He also used to teach Khūnajī’s Jumal and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ. His other major works include an esteemed work on jurisprudence, entitled Miftāḥ al-wuṣūl fī bināʾ al-furūʿ ʿalā l-uṣūl (The Key toward Building Legal Rules on Principles) (Tilimsānī 1998), and a treatise on fallacies, entitled Mathārāt al-ghalaṭ fī l-adilla (The Sources of Mistakes in Proofs) (Tilimsānī 1998, 761–792). Some modern sources also attribute to al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī a commentary on Khūnajī’s Mūjaz (Rescher 1964, 217). No early sources mention such a commentary, and it is almost certain that the attribution is based on a later confusion with his commentary on the Jumal. Another persistent mistake in later sources is the attribution of a commentary on the Jumal to the Timurid scholar al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī. This is clearly based on confusing the two Sharīfs. The two extant manuscripts that are listed in catalogs as containing Jurjānī’s commentary actually contain Tilimsānī’s commentary (Bodleian, Oxford: MS Arab.e.215 and Maktabat-i Fāẓil-i Khwānsārī, Khwansar, nr. 126 [Markaz-i Iḥyā-yi Mīrāth-i Islami, Tehran: Microfilm nr. 17]).

(iii) Ibn  ̔ Arafa al-Warghamı¯ al-Tu ¯nisı¯ (Timbuktı¯ 1351/1932, 274–279) He was born in Tunis in 716/1316, and studied logic and the rational sciences with the aforementioned Muḥammad al-Ābilī, as well as with the local scholars Ibn al-Ḥabbāb (d. 749/1348) and Ibn Hārūn al-Kinānī (d. 750/1349–50), the latter of whom wrote a widely studied (in North Africa) commentary on

(iv) Sa ’ ı¯d al- ’ Uqba¯nı¯ 127

Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249), a handbook on jurisprudence with an introductory section on logic. (In the Islamic East, the standard commentary on this work was by ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), mentioned in the previous chapter in the entries on Taftāzānī and Jurjānī.) Ibn ʿArafa became one of the leading Mālikī jurists and Ashʿarī theologians of his time, writing a number of influential works in those fields. He became Imam of the prestigious al-Zaytuna Mosque in Tunis and died in his hometown in 803/1401. He authored an advanced but highly compressed Mukhtaṣar (Epitome) of logic that was esteemed in later centuries. The West African scholar Aḥmad Bābā al-Timbuktī (d. 1036/1627) described it thus: “His work on logic includes rules and insights that are beyond the ken of even the virtuosi, despite its brevity” (Timbuktī 1351/1932, 274). Sanūsī, who wrote a commentary on the work, told a student: “His discourse is difficult, especially in this Mukhtaṣar. I had great difficulty disentangling it and could only do so when I was alone” (Timbuktī 1351/ 1932, 329). The following discussion of the problem of the productivity of first-figure syllogisms with possibility minors gives a sense of its highly cryptic style: And the modal syllogisms of the first [figure] are likewise [productive], absolutely on the view of al-Fārābī concerning the subject term, and on the view of the Shaykh [Avicenna] concerning it likewise, or with the added condition that the minor premise be at least actually true, or the third like the second with respect to the khārijī major while suspending judgment with respect to the ḥaqīqī proposition – the Imam [Fakhr al-Dīn] with the Shaykh [Avicenna], Urmawī and Ibn Wāṣil with the Kashf (Ghurāb 1980, 83).

An unsatisfactory edition of Ibn ʿArafa’s Mukhtaṣar was published in Tunis in 1980, along with Khūnajī’s Jumal; see Risālatān fī l-manṭiq, edited by Saʿīd Ghurāb (Tunis: al-Maṭbaʿa al-ʿaṣriyya, 1980), pp. 59–123.

(iv) Sa ̔ ¯ı d al- ̔ Uqba¯nı¯ (Timbuktı¯ 1351/1932, 125–126) He was born in Tlemcen in 720/1320–21 and studied with Ābilī. He became an eminent Mālikī jurist and Ashʿarī theologian, authoring commentaries on the aforementioned Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā on jurisprudence by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249) and on al-Burhāniyya, the aforementioned Ashʿarī creedal work by al-Salālujī (d. 573/1178). Like al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī, he enjoyed the patronage

128

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

of Abū ʿInān Fāris who appointed him judge of the town of Béjaïa. He later enjoyed spells as judge of Salé, Marrakesh and Tlemcen. He died in his town of birth in 811/1408. ʿUqbānī wrote a commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal that is longer than, and often critical of, al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī’s commentary on the same work. An extant manuscript comprises 176 folios with 29 lines per page (Derenbourg 1903, nr. 616). In his catalog of Arabic manuscripts at the El Escorial library, Derenbourg was unable to identify the author of the manuscript, which lacks the first folio. However, the fact that the author states that he completed the commentary in Salé in 773/1371, and later made some revisions to it in Marrakesh and Tlemcen, strongly suggest that it is ʿUqbānī’s commentary. Even more decisively, its discussion (on fol. 87a) of the syllogism of equality (A equals B & B equals J, so A equals J) corresponds to the account of ʿUqbānī’s position in the later commentary of Ibn Marzūq al-Ḥafīd (El-Rouayheb 2010, 75). The catalog of the manuscript library of al-Khizāna al-Ḥamziyya al-ʿAyyāshiyya in Rachidiya in Morocco lists and describes what purports to be a lengthy commentary on the Īsāghūjī by ʿUqbānī (see Laḥmar 2009, III, 894–895; the undated manuscript comprises 119 folios, with 30 lines to a page). A number of factors suggest that this is in fact another copy of his commentary on the Jumal. The incipit quoted by the catalogers is the first lemma that is commented upon, and this corresponds to the beginning of the Jumal, not Abharī’s Īsāghūjī. The explicit is also reminiscent of the explicit of the El Escorial manuscript, though with what appear to be additional pious formulations that may easily have been added by the scribe. No medieval source attributes a commentary on Īsāghūjī to ʿUqbānī, and the catalogers do not indicate what led them to identify the work as such. The manuscript obviously lacks a proper preamble and introduction, simply beginning by citing a lemma from the base text and commenting upon it, and the cited explicit also does not indicate that the term Īsāghūjī appears in the text. It may be that the erroneous title Sharḥ ʿalā Īsāghūjī was supplied by a later hand, and that this misled the catalogers.

(v) Ibn Marzu ¯q al-H. afı¯d (Timbuktı¯ 1351/1932, 293–299) Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-ʿUjaymī, known as Ibn Marzūq al-Ḥafīd, was born in Tlemcen in 766/1364, and studied with both Saʿīd al-ʿUqbānī and al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī’s son ʿAbdullāh (d. 792/1390). He also went to Tunis and studied

(vi) Ibra ¯hı¯m b. Fa ¯ ’ id al-Zawa ¯wı¯ 129

with Ibn ʿArafa, with whom he went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 790/1388. He became one of the leading scholars of his hometown, and wrote numerous influential works, including a widely read and copied commentary on al-Burda, a popular poem in praise of the Prophet. While still a student, he composed a versification of Khūnajī’s Jumal that is extant (Nemoy 1956, nr. 1405). He later wrote a lengthy commentary on the Jumal, completed in 804/1401 and entitled Nihāyat al-amal fī sharḥ al-Jumal (The Fulfillment of Hope in Commenting upon The Sentences), in which he attempted to adjudicate between the commentaries of ʿUqbānī and al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī. Two extant copies of this work are: El Escorial 614 (100 folios, 37 lines per page, copied in 859/1455) and Tunis National Library 517 (184 folios, 26 lines per page, copied in 891/1486). Ibn Marzūq al-Ḥafīd died in Tlemcen in 843/1439. Incidentally, the seventeenth-century Ottoman bibliographer Kātib Çelebī mistakenly listed Khūnajī’s Jumal as an epitome of Ibn Marzūq’s Nihāyat al-amal (Kātib Çelebī 1941–43, I, 602). He was obviously not very familiar with the works of the North African logical tradition. His mistake is sometimes repeated in secondary sources.

(vi) Ibra ¯hı¯m b. Fa ¯ ̕ id al-Zawa ¯wı¯ (Timbuktı¯ 1351/1932, 52–53) This scholar hailed from a Berber tribe in the Kabyle highlands west of Algiers. He was born in 796/1393–4 and pursued his education in Béjaïa and Tunis, in the latter city studying with Muḥammad al-Ubbī (d. 827/1423–4 or 828/1424–5), one of the star pupils of Ibn ʿArafa. He then settled in the town of Constantine in what is today northeastern Algeria, and studied with Ibn Marzūq al-Ḥafīd when the latter passed through that town – this was presumably when Ibn Marzūq was on his way to or from his second Hajj pilgrimage in 819/1416–17. He died in Constantine in 857/1453. Zawāwī wrote a commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal, completed in 828/1424– 25 and entitled Nasj al-ḥulal li-alfāẓ al-Jumal (Weaving Garbs for the Expressions of The Sentences). This appears to be the last commentary on the Jumal of which multiple, complete manuscript copies are extant. In length, it is comparable to the commentary of al-Sharīf al-Tilimsānī, rather than the mammoth commentaries of ʿUqbānī and Ibn Marzūq. Three extant manuscripts are: (i) Tamagroute, Dār al-Kutub al-Nāṣiriyya 1859 (the library’s catalog states that this is an “old” manuscript copied from and collated with an autograph, but does

130

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

not give further details; see Manūnī 1985, 41); (ii) Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣ­ riyya 3278w (75 folios, variable lines to a page, undated); and (iii) Tunis National Library 9902 (213 folios, 16 lines to a page, copied in 1144/1731).

(vii) Muh. ammad b. Yu ¯suf al-Sanu ¯sı¯ (Timbuktı¯ 1351/1932, 325–329) He was born in Tlemcen around the year 832/1428, and studied with a number of local scholars. His main teacher of logic was Muḥammad b. al-ʿAbbās al-Tilimsānī (d. 871/1467) who in turn had studied with Ibn Marzūq al-Ḥafīd and with Saʿīd al-ʿUqbānī’s son Qāsim (d. 854/1450). He went on to author a number of works on logic and Ashʿarī theology that were immensely influential down to the early twentieth century throughout Islamic Africa. He died in Tlemcen in 895/1490. As in the case of Taftāzānī, Sanūsī’s reputation suffered in the course of the twentieth century, and it has often been assumed that he was nothing but a “vulgarizer”. Such an assessment does not survive even a cursory investigation of his works. His most widely studied logical work, Mukhtaṣar al-manṭiq (The Epitome of Logic), is not a basic introduction but rather an intermediate handbook comparable in scope and length to Kātibī’s Shamsiyya or Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. His commentary on Ibn ʿArafa’s Mukhtaṣar is an advanced work that is comparable in scope and length to major Eastern works such as Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ or Samarqandī’s auto-­ commentary on al-Qisṭās. Having said this, Sanūsī does appear to have viewed logic strictly as a handmaiden to theology, and hence had little patience with those areas of logic that he considered to be of no use outside the field of logic itself. For example, his commentary on Ibn ʿArafa’s Mukhtaṣar is incomplete, and does not cover the last part dealing with the notoriously difficult topic of hypothetical syllogisms that only share a term, not an entire antecedent or consequent (juzʾ ghayr tāmm). An example of these kinds of syllogisms, explored at great length by Khūnajī, is: Always: If Every A is B then Every J is D Every D is H Always: If Every A is B then Every J is H

(vii) Muh. ammad b. Yu ¯suf al-Sanu ¯sı¯ 131

Shortly after beginning his exposition of this section, Sanūsī abruptly brought his commentary to an end, according to some manuscripts with the remark that the topic is “of little benefit” (Ghurāb 1980, 48). In the introduction to his commentary on his own Mukhtaṣar, he wrote that he would confine his work to the “important” parts of the discipline, rather than the superfluous parts that “divert attention from the religious sciences, perplex the mind, and adulterate the necessary aspects of reasoning”. In this respect, Sanūsī represents a certain retrenchment of the North African tradition compared to the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that what he considered “important” included a good deal of modal and hypothetical logic. His treatment of hypothetical logic in his Mukhtaṣar, for example, is fuller than that in either Kātibī’s Shamsiyya or Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb, as will be shown below. Of particular interest is the relatively lengthy section of the Mukhtaṣar devoted to the immediate implications of hypotheticals, in which Sanūsī gathered principles that earlier works had tended to disperse throughout the sections on hypotheticals, on conversion and contraposition, and on the hypothetical syllogism. This is all the more remarkable given that Eastern logicians had largely lost interest in this topic by Sanūsī’s time. The immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions presented and proved in Sanūsī’s handbook are given in the following table (Sanūsī 1292/1875, 82–88): : The immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions

Table 1

1.1

If P then (Q & R) ⇒ If P then Q; If P then R

1.2

If (P & Q) then R ⇒ / If P then R; If Q then R

1.3.1 1.3.2

P & (Q & R) ⇒ P & Q; P & R (P & Q) & R ⇒ P & R; Q & R

1.4.1 1.4.2

P or (Q & R) ⇒ P or Q; P or R (P & Q) or R ⇒ P or R; Q or R

1.5.1 1.5.2

Not both P and (Q & R) ⇒ / Not both P and Q; Not both P and R Not both (P & Q) and R ⇒ / Not both P and R; Not both Q and R

1.6.1

Not: if P then (Q & R) ⇒ / Not: if P then Q; Not: If P then R

1.6.2

Not: if (P & Q) then R ⇒ Not: If P then R; Not: if Q then R

1.6.3.1 1.6.3.2

Not: P and (Q & R) ⇒ / Not: P and Q; Not: P and R Not: (P & Q) and R ⇒ / Not: P and R; Not: Q and R

132

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

1.6.4.1 1.6.4.2

Not: P or (Q & R) ⇒ / Not: P or Q; Not: P or R Not: (P & Q) or R ⇒ / Not: P or R; Not: Q or R

1.6.5.1 1.6.5.2

Both P and (Q & R) ⇒ Both P and Q; Both P and R Both (P & Q) and R ⇒ Both P and R; Both Q and R

2.1 2.2

If P then Q ⇒ Not: If P then not-Q Not: If P then Q ⇒ If P then not-Q

3.1

If P then Q ⇒ Not both P and not-Q

3.2

If P then Q ⇒ Either not-P or Q

3.3.1 3.3.2

Not both P and Q ⇒ If P then not-Q; If Q then not-P Either P or Q ⇒ If not-P then Q; If not-Q then P

4

(Either P or Q) & (Not both P and Q) ⇒ If not-P then Q; If not-Q then P; If P then not-Q; If Q then not-P

5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4

If P then Q ⇒ Not: not both P and Q If P then Q ⇒ Not: Either P or Q (Not both P and Q) & (Not: Either P or Q) ⇒ Not: If P then Q; Not: If Q then P (Either P or Q) & (Not: not both P and Q) ⇒ Not: If P then Q; Not: If Q then P

5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4 5.2.5 5.2.6

Not: If P then Q ⇒ / Not both P and Q Not: If P then Q ⇒ / Either P or Q Not: not both P and Q ⇒ / If P then Q Not: not both P and Q ⇒ / Either P or Q Not: either P or Q ⇒ / If P then Q Not: either P or Q ⇒ / Not both P or Q

6.1.1 6.1.2

Not both P and Q ⇒ Either not-P or not-Q Either P or Q ⇒ Not both not-P and not-Q

7.1

Always: If Some A is B then Q ⇒ Always: If Every A is B then Q

7.2

Always: If P then Every A is B ⇒ Always: If P then Some A is B

7.3.1 7.3.2

Sometimes not: If Every A is B then Q ⇒ Sometimes not: If Some A is B then Q Sometimes not: If P then Some A is B ⇒ Sometimes not: If P then Every A is B

7.4.1 7.4.2

Sometimes: If Every A is B then Q ⇒ Sometimes: If Some A is B then Q Sometimes: If P then Every A is B ⇒ Sometimes: If P then Some A is B

7.5.1 7.5.2

Never: If Some A is B then Q ⇒ Never: If Every A is B then Q Never: If P then Some A is B ⇒ Never: If P then Every A is B

(vii) Muh. ammad b. Yu ¯suf al-Sanu ¯sı¯ 133

Sanūsī’s works on logic include: 1) A commentary on an expanded version of Abharī’s Īsāghūjī by the Syrian-born, Egyptian-based scholar Burhān al-Dīn al-Biqāʿī (d. 885/ 1480). An extant manuscript is in the Princeton University Library (Mach 1977, nr. 3266). 2) A commentary on Ibn ʿArafa’s Mukhtaṣar. As noted above, his commentary is incomplete, but it still constitutes Sanūsī’s lengthiest and most detailed work on logic. Two extant manuscripts are: Süleymaniye Kütüphanesı, Istanbul, MS Ragıp Paşa 904, 207 folios, 23 lines per page; Tunis National Library, MS 15811, 180 folios, 21 lines per page. Though mostly concerned with explicating the highly compressed prose of the base text, Sanūsī on occasion disagreed with Ibn ʿArafa. 3) Sanūsī also wrote his own Mukhtaṣar (Epitome) of logic, to which he wrote an intermediate length commentary. This was his most widely studied work on logic, and elicited numerous commentaries, glosses and versifications in later centuries by North African scholars (on some of these, see Chapter Seven). As such, it merits a closer look. It is reminiscent in scope and organization to Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, but with some noticeable differences. For example, it includes a discussion of propositions in which the predicate is quantified (al-munḥarifāt), for example, “Every J is every B” or “Every J is some B”. It also includes both contraposition as traditionally understood (ʿaks al-naqīḍ al-muwāfiq) and as understood by Khūnajī and his followers (ʿaks al-naqīḍ al-mukhālif) as two distinct immediate implications. Though it introduces the standard post-Avicennian modality propositions and discusses their contradictories, converses and contrapositives, it does not include a discussion of modal syllogisms, on the grounds that this topic is too demanding for the novice and of little use, while adding that someone who has mastered the preceding sections on the conversion and contraposition of modality propositions would be able to proceed without much difficulty to the discussions of modal syllogisms in lengthier works. (Sanūsī’s commentary on Ibn ʿArafa includes such a detailed discussion of modal syllogisms.) Sanūsī’s handbook also has no discussion at all of the matter of the syllogism (i.e., demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, poetics, sophistry) or of induction and analogy. On the other hand,

134

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

as mentioned above, it includes a relatively lengthy section on the immediate implications of conditionals and hypotheticals (lawāzim al-­ sharṭiyyāt). By comparison, Kātibī’s Shamsiyya devoted very little attention to this topic, and later Eastern handbooks such as Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq devoted none at all. Indeed, the retaining of interest in the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions in the Western Islamic world, and the loss of interest in the same topic in the Eastern Islamic world, is one of the more striking differences between the two traditions of Arabic logic in later centuries. Almost a fifth (19%) of Sanūsī’s commentary on his handbook is devoted to hypothetical propositions and their logic, significantly more than in comparable, intermediate level handbooks in the Eastern Islamic world, such as Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya (13%) or ʿUbaydullāh al-Khabīṣī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (9%). Even though Sanūsī’s work has no discussion of the modal syllogism, it still devotes more than half of the total (51%) to contradiction, conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions, and the formal syllogism, compared to around 36% in Quṭb al-Dīn’s work and 39% in Khabīṣī’s work. The following is an overview of the contents of the Cairo printing of 1292/1875: a. Introduction (pp. 2–5) b. Conception and its principles i. Types of reference (pp. 6–11) ii. Singular and complex utterances (pp. 11–13) iii. Multivocal and univocal utterances (pp. 13–14) iv. Universal and particular (pp. 14–18) v. The five universals (pp. 18–25) vi. Definition and description (pp. 26–28) c. Assent and its principles i. Propositions. Conditionals. Disjunctions (pp. 28–34) ii. Categorical propositions (pp. 34–35) iii. Modality propositions (pp. 36–42) iv. Quantified, unquantified and singular propositions. Quantification of the predicate (pp. 42–45) v. Ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions (pp. 46–50) vi. The A, I, E, and O propositions (pp. 50–53)

(viii) Muh. ammad b. ’Abd al-Karı¯m al-Maghı¯lı¯ 135

vii. Metathetic propositions (pp. 53–55) viii. Quantified hypothetical propositions (pp. 56–58) ix. Contradiction (p. 58–69) x. Conversion and contraposition (pp. 69–82) xi. Immediate implications of hypotheticals (pp. 82–88) xii. Combinatorial syllogisms (pp. 88–111) xiii. Reiterative syllogisms (pp. 111–114) 4) Some biographical sources also attribute to Sanūsī a commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal. It is doubtful whether he ever completed such a commentary. Not only are there apparently no extant copies of the work, there also do not seem to be any citations from it in later works.

(viii) Muh. ammad b.  ̔ Abd al-Karı¯m al-Maghı¯lı¯ (Timbuktı¯ 1351/1932, 330–332; Hunwick, “al-Maghı¯lı¯”, EI2; Hunwick & O’Fahey 1994, II, 20–25) He was born around the year 843/1440, and studied in his hometown of Tlemcen. He later settled in the Saharan oasis region of Touat (in present-day southern Algeria), an important station along the trans-Saharan trade routes. He there gained notoriety by inciting violence against the local Jewish community for not living in an appropriately “subservient” manner and hence forfeiting their status as a tolerated minority. From Touat, he also visited some of the nascent sub-Saharan Muslim states in Goa, Kano and Katsina. His letters to the Songhai ruler Askia Muḥammad (r. 898/1493–935/1528) have attracted scholarly attention in recent years. He died in Touat in 909/1503–04. Maghīlī wrote a number of works that might be described as “popularizing” in nature (with much more justice than in the case of Sanūsī), perhaps reflecting his residence in areas that had little established tradition of scholarship. In logic, he wrote: 1) An introductory handbook entitled Lubb al-albāb fī radd al-fikr ilā l-ṣawāb (The Kernel of Hearts in Inducing Thought to Correctness). This has been published (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, 2006, 78 pp.), though the edition is uncritical and unreliable. For example, the rendering of Maghīlī’s explanation of mubāyana on p. 26, line 4 is nonsensical (compare with Riyadh University Library, MS nr. 4260, fol. 2a, lines 16–17),

136

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

and there is an obvious lacuna on p. 35, line 6. A more reliable edition is a desideratum, for though the work is introductory and does not deal with modal logic or the more intricate aspects of hypothetical logic, its introduction is remarkable. After defining ratiocination (naẓar) and knowledge (ʿilm) and briefly discussing the hoary question whether logic is a science or not, Maghīlī introduced the four “relations” (nisab): two things can have (i) non-overlapping extensions (mubāyana); (ii) equivalent extensions (musāwāt); (iii) one can have wider extension than the other (ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ muṭlaq); (iv) and partially overlapping extensions (ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ min wajh). This is not original, but Maghīlī unusually gave a diagrammatic representation of these relations, thus: (i) (ii) (iii)   (iv)    



 

He then presented the implications of these four relations (pp. 26–30). For example, if J has a wider extension than B, then the truth of two propositions follows: a universal-affirmative (Every B is J) and a particular-affirmative (Some J is B). Conversely, a universal-affirmative proposition implies that its two terms are either equivalent or that the predicate is of wider extension than the subject. The diagrammatic representations of the four relations may well be original. It was also very unusual, if not unprecedented, for a handbook on logic to begin by laying out these four relations and connecting them in this manner to the quantity and quality of categorical propositions. The remainder of the handbook is less atypical. The four major ensuing sections discuss (i) the principles of conceptions, i.e., the five universals (pp. 33–37); (ii) the aims of conceptions, i.e., definitions and descriptions (pp. 41–45); (iii) the principles of assents, i.e., propositions and their contradictories and conversions (pp. 49–57); and (iv) the aims of assents, i.e., the categorical and hypothetical syllogisms (pp. 61–67).

(ix) ’Abd al-Rah. ma¯n al-Akhd. arı¯ 137

2) An introductory didactic poem entitled Manḥ al-wahhāb fī radd al-fikr ilā l-ṣawāb (The Grant of the Bestower in Inducing Thought to Correct­ ness). This appears to have been a versification of the previous work. Maghīlī reportedly wrote three commentaries on the poem. At least one of these is partially extant (Riyadh University Library, MS nr. 4260, 15 folios, missing at the end, available at https://al-mostafa.info/books). The introduction to the commentary reproduces the introduction to the aforementioned prose handbook Lubb al-albāb (and can be used to correct the readings of the unsatisfactory edition of the latter). The most widely used commentary on the poem, however, was written by the Saharan scholar Aḥmad b. Aḥmad Aqīt al-Ṣanhājī (d. 991/1583) from Timbuktu, of whom more will be said below. 3) Maghīlī reportedly also wrote a commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal. This does not appear to be extant.

(ix)   ̔ Abd al-Rah. ma¯n al-Akhd. arı¯ (El-Rouayheb EI3) Abū Zayd ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad al-Ṣughayyir al-Akhḍarī wrote a series of didactic poems on a range of scholarly disciplines, some of which became extremely popular in later centuries. There are surprisingly few references to him in contemporary and near-contemporary sources, and biographical information must be reconstructed on the basis of his writings, extant manuscripts, and much later sources whose reliability is not always clear. One of his didactic poems states that he was 20 years old toward the end of 939/1533, another poem that he was 21 at the beginning of 941/1534, thus revealing that he was born in 919/1513. He hailed from the village of Benṭiyūs (Ben Thious) near Biskra, a Saharan oasis town in what is now eastern Algeria, and began his studies with his father who was reportedly a disciple of the eminent scholar and Sufi Aḥmad Zarrūq (d. 899/1493). He also studied with ʿUmar al-Wazzān (d. 965/1557–8) in Constantine, and scholars from that town played an important role in the early dissemination of his works. Some sources report that he died in 953/ 1546–7. According to other sources, he died in 983/1575–6. His major didactic poems were all composed by 950/1544 and some of his own commentaries on these remained unfinished, which supports the earlier date. However, a didactic poem on grammar that has been attributed to al-Akhḍarī and is extant in a unique (and privately owned) manuscript was reportedly completed in 981/

138

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

1573, which – if the attribution is reliable – favors the later date. He was buried in his family’s lodge (zāwiya) in Benṭiyūs, where his grave survives to this day. Akhḍarī’s didactic poem on logic entitled al-Sullam al-murawnaq (or al-­ munawraq in some manuscripts) (The Adorned Ladder), completed in 941/1534, became a standard introduction to logic throughout North Africa until the modern period, eliciting numerous commentaries and glosses in later centuries. Particularly influential were the commentaries by: a) Akhḍarī himself, often studied in later times with the extensive gloss of Saʿīd Qaddūra (d. 1066/1656) who was active in Algiers (printed on the margins of Bannānī 1318/1901) b) The Moroccan scholar Aḥmad Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī (d. 1128/1716) (Wallālī 2017) c) The Egyptian scholar Aḥmad al-Mallawī (d. 1181/1767), who wrote both a Long and a Short commentary on the poem d) The Egyptian scholar Aḥmad al-Damanhūrī (d. 1192/1778) (Damanhūrī 1948) e) The Moroccan scholar Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Bannānī (d. 1194/1780) (Bannānī 1318/1901) f) The Egyptian scholar Ḥasan al-Quwaysinī (d. 1254/1838) (Quwaysinī 2006) g) The Egyptian scholar Ibrāhīm al-Bājūrī (d. 1276/1860) (Bājūrī 1347/ 1928) The contents of the work are as follows, with the corresponding page numbers of the Cairo edition from 1293/1876 that includes the poem itself with Akhḍarī’s own commentary: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.

Preamble and Introduction (pp. 28–32) On the permissibility of logic (p.32) Conception and assent (pp. 33–34) Types of conventional reference (p.34) Singular and universal terms. The five universals (pp. 34–36) Univocal, homonymous, modular & synonymous expressions (p.36) The various meanings of “all” and “some” (pp. 36–37) Definitions and descriptions (pp. 37–39) Propositions (pp. 39–42) Contradiction and conversion (pp. 42–43)

(ix) ’Abd al-Rah. ma¯n al-Akhd. arı¯ 139

k. Syllogism (pp. 43–44) l. The four figures (pp. 44–47) m. The hypothetical syllogism (pp. 47–49) n. Complex syllogism, induction, analogy (pp. 49–50) o. Demonstration (pp. 50–51) p. Errors of reasoning (pp. 51–52) q. Conclusion (pp. 52–55) The seventeenth-century Ottoman bibliographer Kātib Çelebī described the Sullam as a versification of Abharī’s Īsāghūjī. Though this is often repeated in secondary sources, it is not accurate. The poem itself does not indicate this, and though it covers much of the same ground as Abharī’s introduction, it also differs from it on occasion. For example, the introductory part on the use and permissibility of logic has no parallel in Abharī’s work. It also discusses the conditions of productivity of all four figures, not just the first, and devotes much more space to fallacies. Curiously, it does not recognize “combinatorial-­ hypothetical syllogisms” (roughly equivalent to wholly hypothetical syllogisms), instead dividing the syllogism into the categorical (ḥamlī) and the hypothetical (sharṭī), including under the latter category modus ponens, modus tollens, and disjunctive syllogism. This archaic, pre-Avicennan view may derive from the section on logic in the widely studied handbook on jurisprudence Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā by the Egyptian scholar Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249) (Ījī 1898–1900, I, 91). Ibn al-Ḥājib, however, had simply ignored the “combinatorial-hypothetical syllogism”, rather than explicitly rejecting it. (The same is true of Maghīlī’s abovementioned handbook.) Ibn Hārūn, the abovementioned North African commentator on Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā, had written that Ibn al-Ḥājib had excluded the wholly hypothetical syllogisms because their productivity is not evident (see the quotation in Bannānī 1318/1901, 168 margin). It is possible that Akhḍarī had been influenced by this comment. Both Ibn al-Ḥājib and Akhḍarī recognized the fourth figure of the syllogism, so their non-recognition of wholly hypothetical syllogisms cannot be due to a predilection for “the ancients”. Another introductory work on logic that has often been supposed to belong to the North African tradition of logic is al-Waẓāʾif (The Installments), attributed by the seventeenth-century Ottoman bibliographer Kātib Çelebī to a certain Shams al-Dīn al-Maghribī (Kātib Çelebī 1941–43, 2015). The attributive given by Kātib Çelebī is almost certainly mistaken, however. The earliest extant man-

140

V. 1350–1600: The Western Islamic Tradition

uscript of the work, from the fifteenth century, gives the name of the author as Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī l-Qāsim al-Maʿarrī or al-Muʿizzī, as is clear from the reproductions of the beginning of the manuscript in Rāʾid Amīr ʿAbdullāh al-Rāshid, al-Turāth al-manṭiqī fī l-Maghrib wa l-Andalus: Dirāsa wa taḥqīq makhṭūt Waẓāʾif fī ʿilm al-manṭiq (Amman: Dār al-Muʿtazz, 2016), pp. 82, 84. It is difficult to tell from the reproductions if the attributive is “Maʿarrī” or “Muʿizzī” – in Arabic script the two words are only distinguished by a single diacritic – but it is clearly not “Maghribī,” though the editor does not note this. In another undated manuscript of the work, not noted by the editor but extant in the Princeton University Library (see Mach 1977, nr. 3233), the author is given as Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī l-Qāsim al-Muʿizzī. The later misreading “al-Maghribī”, either by Kātib Çelebī himself or by the scribe of the manuscript that he was relying upon, could easily arise in Arabic script. It is worth noting that none of the five known extant manuscripts of the work are of North African provenance (see the four manuscripts described by Rāshid 2016, pp. 73–75 and the Princeton manuscript described in Mach 1977, nr. 3233).

(x) Ah. mad b. Ah. mad Aqı¯t al-Timbuktı¯ (Hunwick & O’Fahey 1994, IV, 15–17) This scholar hailed from the Aqīt family of Ṣanhāja Berbers from the Sahel region. He was born in Timbuktu in 929/1522 and studied with his uncle Maḥmūd Aqīt (d. 955/1548), who may have been Maghīlī’s student, and later with his uncle’s son Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd Aqīt (d. 973/1565). He went on pilgrimage in 955/1548, meeting some of the eminent scholars and Sufis of Egypt and the Hejaz. He returned to Timbuktu and became renowned as a scholar and teacher until his death in 991/1583. His son was the famous scholar and historian Aḥmad Bābā al-Timbuktī (d. 1036/1627). Aḥmad b. Aḥmad Aqīt wrote a widely studied commentary on Maghīlī’s didactic poem on logic Manḥ al-wahhāb. This survives in a number of manuscript copies. (See, for example, King Saud University Library, Riyadh: MS 7110, fols. 41a–81a, 28 lines per page, end missing. For two more extant manuscripts, see Ould Ely 1995, I, nr.1009; II, nr.1945.) Though Maghīlī’s poem is, like Akhḍarī’s Sullam, an introductory work, the commentary of Aḥmad b. Aḥmad Aqīt is considerably longer than Akhḍarī’s own commentary on the Sullam and appears to be the most substantial work on logic written in the African-Arabic

(x) Ah. mad b. Ah. mad Aqı¯t al-Timbuktı¯ 141

tradition in the sixteenth century. Aḥmad b. Aḥmad Aqīt regularly cited passages from Maghīlī’s own commentaries on the poem, from the commentaries on Khūnajī’s Jumal by Maghīlī and Ibn Marzūq al-Ḥafīd, from Ibn ʿArafa’s Mukhtaṣar, and from another didactic poem on logic by the North African scholar ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Lamaṭī al-Miknāsī (d. 964/1556–7), whom the commentator had met in Medina while on pilgrimage. Less regularly, he cited the shorter commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal by Ibn Qunfudh al-Khaṭīb al-Qusanṭīnī (d. 810/1407), as well as the commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (who is confused with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī), and a number of works on jurisprudence by the Damascene Shāfiʿī jurist Tāj al-Dīn Ibn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370). The work came to be known north of the Sahara too, presumably due the commentator’s son, Aḥmad Bābā, who lived in Morocco for a number of years after the Moroccan conquest of Timbuktu in 1000/1591. It was still cited by Moroccan scholars in the eighteenth century. Aḥmad b. Aḥmad Aqīt also reportedly wrote a commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal, though this does not appear to be extant.

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

(i) Introduction After the sixteenth century, the Eastern Islamic logical tradition fragmented along the lines of the three major Empires: the Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mughal. Henceforth, there was little contact between scholars of these three polities, and each tended to develop its distinct logical curriculum. Many of the basic handbooks were shared (Abharī’s Īsāghūjī, Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb), but each tradition tended to supplement these in different ways. For example, in India a new handbook by Muḥibbullāh Bihārī (d. 1119/1707) entitled Sullam al-ʿulūm came to be intensively studied, but it appears to have been unfamiliar to scholars in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, at least until the nineteenth century. Similarly, the works of Ottoman Turkish logicians such as Ḳara Ḫalīl Tīrevī (d. 1123/1711) and Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (d. 1205/1791) appear to have been unknown in Iran and India. Some of the works of Iranian philosophers such as Mīr Dāmād (d. 1041/1631) and Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1045/1635) became known relatively quickly in Mughal India. But there was little if any influence in the other direction, and by the eighteenth century Indo-Muslim scholars had developed their own distinct curriculum in logic. It is therefore most appropriate to treat the three logical traditions separately in what follows. In Safavid Iran, the standard introduction to logic appears to have been Jurjānī’s Persian handbook Kubrā, which survives in numerous manuscript copies in Iranian libraries (Tunkābunī 1353/1975, 44). A standard, non-introductory handbook in this period was the commentary by Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī (d. 981/1573) on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. (Formally, this was known as a “gloss” (ḥāshiya) because it did not cite the entire text of Taftāzānī’s handbook, only the beginning of a passage, followed by explication and discussion.) The sheer number of Iranian glosses on this work attests to its widespread use.

144

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

The twentieth-century Iranian bibliographer Āghā Buzurg Tehrānī listed more than twenty glosses (Tihrānī 1936–, VI, 60–63; XIII, 162–163). Judging from the number of extant copies in Iranian libraries, the more influential ones were written by: a) Isḥāq al-Ḥuwayzī (d. before 1111/1699) b) ʿAlī Riżā Shīrāzī (d. 1085/1674), in Persian c) Bahāʾ al-Dīn Mukhtārī Nāʾīnī (d. 1135/1722), entitled Taʿdīl al-mīzān d) Muḥammad Muḥsin Ṭāliqānī Qazwīnī (fl. 1132/1720) e) ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Marāghī (d. ca. 1260/1844) f) Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ardistānī (d. 1271/1855), entitled al-Qisṭās almustaqīm The tradition of studying and glossing Yazdī’s commentary continued into modern times, and it has repeatedly been lithographed or printed since the nineteenth century. Safavid Iranian students who wished to pursue their logical studies further standardly moved on to Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ al-anwār with the commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī and the gloss of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī. This was lithographed in Iran in 1274/1857, a clear sign that it was still studied then. The Iranian scholars Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī (d. 995/1587) and Mullā Mīrzā Shirwānī (d. 1098/1687) wrote extensive glosses on this work, though these do not cover the later sections on immediate implications and syllogisms, suggesting that only the earlier sections of the commentary were still the subject of formal instruction. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya was known as well. It was often cited by Safavid-era logicians, and was lithographed in Iran in 1276/ 1860 and 1280/1864–5. It is unclear, however, to what extent it continued to be formally studied in Shiite madrasas, and it elicited very few glosses in the Safavid period. Ṭūsī’s commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt was also familiar to Safavid scholars. Later glossators on Ṭūsī’s commentary, such as Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī, Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī and Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī, focused on the sections on physics and metaphysics (Dashtakī 2007, II, 519–590; Mīrzā Jān 1290/1873; Khwānsārī 1378/1999), and this suggests that the logic section was not formally studied. Nevertheless, later Iranian scholars regularly cited or quoted from the logic section, so it was clearly still read. Ḥillī’s commentary on Ṭūsī’s

(i) Introduction

Tajrīd al-manṭiq also seems to have been known, and there are a number of manuscripts of the work that date from the Safavid period. But it was not, as is sometimes assumed, the standard handbook on logic in this period. It did not elicit nearly as many glosses as Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī’s commentary on the Tahdhīb, and an Iranian lithograph edition from 1311/1893–94 of Ḥillī’s commentary is prefaced with the statement that this was a work that had been almost completely forgotten. Besides this broadly post-Avicennian tradition, the seventeenth century witnessed the strengthening of the current – mentioned previously in connection with Ibn Turka and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī – that wished to recover the logic of the “older logicians”. This was part of a larger intellectual movement in Safavid Iran that attempted to return to ancient philosophical wisdom, represented by, for example, the apocryphal Theology of Aristotle or the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma misattributed to al-Fārābī (Pourjavady 2015). There was also renewed interest in the Shifāʾ of Avicenna in Safavid and post-Safavid Iran, with a number of glosses being written on the work (Tunkābunī 1353/1975, 48; Wisnovsky 2013, 193–199, 208–210). It was especially the book of Metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt) that was the focus of attention, but the books on logic were also read. An epitome of the logic, physics and metaphysics of the Shifāʾ was written by Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad Iṣfahānī (d. 1137/1725), of whom more will be said below (Iṣfahānī 1394/2015). By contrast to this resurgent interest in older logicians, the Sunni scholar Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī – who in logic was usually considered the first of “the later scholars” (al-mutaʾakhkhirūn) – came to be regularly derided as a “sophist” (mushakkik) who had raised wrongheaded criticisms of the ancients. The prominent Safavid philosopher Mīr Dāmād, for example, could hardly mention Rāzī without adding some derogatory epithet. Later Sunni logicians did not fare much better in Mīr Dāmād’s estimation. Khūnajī and Kātibī were at one point described as “those who disguise themselves as people of knowledge” (Mīr Dāmād 2013, 210); Jurjānī was dismissed as “one of the imitators” (Mīr Dāmād 2013, 87). Another stark example of this trend toward returning to the “older logicians” is the work of Muḥammad Yūsuf Tehrānī (fl. 1104/1692), discussed below. There are also unmistakable traces of it, though in somewhat less radical form, in the logical writings of Mullā Ṣadrā, also discussed below. A further indication are a number of Iranian manuscript copies of Averroes’ Middle Commentaries

145

146

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

on Aristotle’s Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics (usually bound together) dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One such manuscript, copied by a certain ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Abharī in 1084/1673–1674, is extant in the Quds-i Rażawī Library in Mashhad. (See Gholam Moghaddem 1383/1963, XXIV, nr. 524.) Another manuscript, copied in 1072/1661 by an unnamed scribe (but in the nastaʿliq script characteristic of the Eastern Islamic lands) is extant in the Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī Library in Tehran. (See the description of this manuscript in the editors’ introduction to Averroes 1980, 45.) Averroes’ Middle Commentaries may well have been the model for a Persian work on logic by ʿAlī Qulī b. Qarachagāy Khān (fl. 1076/ 1665) that is divided into four parts, covering Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, and Posterior Analytics. There is reason to believe that the work may have been intended as an introduction to a Persian survey of philosophy that, revealingly, is entitled Iḥyāʾ-i Ḥikmat (The Revival of Wisdom) (Tihrānī 1936–, I, 308, XXIII, 53). This philosophical antiquarianism may be related to a surprising dearth of Iranian works on ādāb al-baḥth after the sixteenth century. The major online resource for manuscripts extant in Iran (www.aghabozorg.ir) includes a number of works on ādāb al-baḥth, but it is conspicuous that almost all those that postdate the sixteenth century are actually by Ottoman authors – manuscripts of these works somehow having made their way into Iranian libraries. Judging from this source, the Iranian tradition would seem to have largely petered out after Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ ʿArabshāhī (d. 976/1568–69) and Fakhr al-Dīn Sammākī Astarābādī (d. 984/1577). The most prominent philosophers in Iran in the period from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth appear not to have written on the field at all: Mīr Dāmād (d. 1041/1631), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1045/1635), Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī (d. 1080/1669), Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī (d. 1098/1687), Mahdī Narāqī (d. 1209/1795) and Mullā Ḥādī Sabzawārī (d. 1289/1873). It is certainly striking that none of the Iranian logicians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries listed in this section wrote works on ādāb al-baḥth, whereas the majority of prominent Ottoman Turkish logicians in the same period did. Two modern studies of the curricula of Shiite seminaries in Najaf and Iran in the early twentieth century do not list any handbooks on ādāb al-baḥth (Kirmili 1913; Tunkābunī 1353/1975; Nasr 1975). The apparent decline of interest in ādāb al-baḥth in Iran after the sixteenth century seems so dramatic and unexpected as to invite a more thorough inves-

(i) Introduction

tigation. If it did occur, then it may have been related to the tendency to reject the post-Avicennan tradition of logic and to reengage with the works of Avicenna himself and even with the more orthodox Aristotelian tradition of Fārābī and Averroes. Several Safavid and Qajar scholars also adopted the self-image of older philosophers who had presented themselves as engaged in indubitable “demonstration” (burhān) as opposed to what they claimed was the hollow and disputatious “eristic” (jadal) of the Islamic theologians (mutakallimūn). This wish to return to the philosophy of “the ancients” and the closely related revival of interest in Aristotelian demonstration may well have translated into a decreased interest in the relatively recent and dialectical discipline of ādāb albaḥth. Mīr Dāmād, for example, was full of scorn for what he called “the we-do-not-concede-ists” (al-lānusallimiyyīn) and “the why-could-it-not-beists” (al-limālāyakūniyyīn) (Mīr Dāmād 1376/1988, 283). The phrases “we do not concede” (lā nusallimu) and “why could it not be” (limā lā yajūzu) are mentioned in Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī’s classic handbook on ādāb al-baḥth as standard ways of formulating dialectical objections (Anṣārī 2014, 81–87), and it is therefore hardly surprising that Mīr Dāmād did not contribute to that discipline. The fall of the Safavid dynasty and the sack of the capital Isfahan by Afghans in 1135/1722 marked the beginning of a period of political instability and urban and economic decline in Iran that lasted until the establishment of the Qajar dynasty in 1193/1779 (Amanat 2017, 126–246). Political turmoil and socioeconomic crisis need not necessarily imply intellectual retrenchment – there are examples of sophisticated philosophical activity in Iran in the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, it does appear that no influential work on logic was written in Iran in the five or six decades between the fall of the Safavids and the consolidation of Qajar rule. By contrast, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the emergence of Najaf in Iraq as a major center of Shiite scholarship, fuelled in part by the influx of scholars fleeing the turmoil in Iran after the fall of the Safavids (Litvak 1998, 16–18). Though located in an Arabic-speaking part of the Ottoman Empire, Najaf retained strong intellectual ties to Iran, and scholars there who wrote on logic in this period can be seen as part of the same tradition as their Iranian colleagues. A prolific logician who was active in Najaf at the very end of the period covered in this survey was Muḥammad b. Yūnus al-Shuwayhī, discussed below. The perhaps most influential work on logic from Iran proper in the Qajar period was a didac-

147

148

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

tic poem, entitled al-Laʾālī al-muntaẓama (The Ordered Pearls), with an auto-­ commentary by Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1289/1873) (see Fena 2016). This work, deeply influenced by Mullā Ṣadrā’s works on logic, has remained a wellknown handbook in Iran to the present day. However, it belongs squarely to the nineteenth century and hence falls outside the scope of the present survey. The following are some of the major logicians active in Iran or the Shiite shrine cities of Iraq in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:

(ii) Mı¯r Da¯ma¯d (Afandı¯ 1403/1982, IV, 40–44; Khwa¯nsa¯rı¯ 1391/1971, II, 62–68; Tihra¯nı¯ 1971–, VIII, 67–70; Rizvı¯ 2016) Muḥammad Bāqir Astarābādī, better known as Mīr Dāmād, was born some time between 958/1551 and 969/1561. He went on to become one of the most prominent scholars in Isfahan during the reign of Shah ʿAbbās I (r. 996/1587–1039/ 1629). In 1030/1621, he was appointed chief jurisconsult of the capital. He died in 1040/1631. Mīr Dāmād’s philosophy has attracted some attention in modern scholarship, especially his theory of ḥūdūth dahrī, i.e., the view that the world is created outside time. (It was much debated in later times whether this was indeed a coherent alternative to the rival theses of the eternity of the world and of creation in time.) I will here focus on his role, often overlooked, in the development of the Arabic logical tradition. There are some indications that he may have written a work on logic entitled Tashrīq al-ḥaqq (The Radiance of Truth), though it is unlikely to be extant. The later Safavid scholar and biographer ʿAbdullāh Afandī (d. 1130/1717) had not seen a copy of the work but noted that Mīr Dāmād referred to it in one of his other writings. Even the well-informed Shiite bio-bibliographer Āghā Buzurg Ṭihrānī (d. 1970) only repeated ʿAbdullāh Afandī’s observation, and had obviously not seen or heard of an extant copy (Tihrānī 1936–, IV, 190). It is possible that Mīr Dāmād started writing the work but did not complete it. ʿAbdullāh Afandī also ascribed to Mīr Dāmād a treatise on syllogisms and how they are productive (kayfiyyat intājihā) but added that this treatise, too, was apparently not completed. The same scholar also ascribed to Mīr Dāmād a gloss on the logic part of the commentary of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s handbook on jurisprudence Mukh­ taṣar al-Muntahā. A single, short gloss from this work – on various kinds of linguistic reference – was printed in Tehran in 1974 in the miscellany Manṭiq

(ii) Mı¯r Da ¯ma¯d

va-mabāḥith-i alfāẓ edited by M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (pp. 297–8). The editors used an autograph manuscript in Tehran University Library that includes a number of short annotations by Mīr Dāmād on various passages from various works. It is not clear whether there is an extant collection of his entire set of glosses on Ījī’s commentary. Whatever the case may be, Mīr Dāmād’s influence on later logicians was primarily imparted through his work al-Ufuq al-mubīn (The Clear Horizon) (Mīr Dāmād 2013). Though primarily devoted to discussions of quiddity, being and time, the work on numerous occasions discusses points of logic. The work is clearly incomplete; Mīr Dāmād explicitly planned for it to consist of two main parts, each consisting of a number of sections entitled musāqa, but all that we have is the first, fifth and sixth musāqa of the first part. In the early parts of the first musāqa, Mīr Dāmād launched into a lengthy discussion of “predication” (ḥaml). This in turn led him to discuss propositions, their divisions and parts, the nature of assent, and – briefly – the liar paradox. The fifth [i.e., the second extant] musāqa is in large part devoted to modal notions, including attempts to show that modalities strictly speaking only modify affirmative propositions, as well as discussions of the issue of what, if anything, follows from an impossibility. The latter issue led Mīr Dāmād to briefly consider some of the paradoxes of hypothetical logic that had been found problematic since Avicenna, such as the following hypothetical syllogism (Mīr Dāmād 2013, 437):

If something is black all over and white all over then it is black all over If something is black all over then it is not white all over If something is black all over and white all over then it is not white all over Mīr Dāmād’s style is distinctively grandiloquent, sententious and oracular. His contemporaries, even accomplished philosophers, found his style unusually obscure. Furthermore, many discussions in al-Ufuq al-mubīn are only fully understandable in light of the earlier controversies between Dawānī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī, briefly discussed in Chapter IV above. An example is the following passage discussing the liar paradox: How shall I describe how people from among the ancient verifiers, the verifying ancients, the thoughtless pseudo-philosophers, and the pseudo-philosophizing later scholars have slipped concerning this matter [i.e., the liar paradox]! … I have unraveled the knot with some of what my Lord has granted to me of Wisdom, and His Munif-

149

150

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

icence has guarded me from stumbling. Have I not prepared you in the [section] on the Measure of Individuality, should cleverness take you by the hand, to apprehend that the predication itself falls under the subject term insofar as it is the nature of the current discourse with some qualification of that nature, and not insofar as it is a predication in which this predicate in its specificity is predicated of this subject? … So the [subject-predicate] combination itself, abstracting from the specificity of the predicate, is part of the root (sinkh) of what is an individual falling under the subject term, and the judgment only extends to it from that perspective (iʿtibār). From that perspective, it is detached from the specific predicate in its specificity. For the specificity of the predicate is by considering its specific individuality, and the extending [of the judgment] is not from that perspective. The entailment of falsity by truth, and vice versa, is only from the perspective of the specificity of the predicate, not from the perspective relevant to the extending [of the judgment]. In this way are rooted out those who have done an injustice to their own selves and have defamed Wisdom and instigated darkness, praise be to God, the Lord of the two worlds (Mīr Dāmād 2013, 99–100).

The passage becomes slightly less baffling in light of the discussions of the liar paradox in fifteenth-century Shiraz. It may be recalled that Ṣadr al-Dīn al-­ Dashtakī had proposed that the sentence “This statement of mine is false” is neither true nor false, because there is one statement (picked out by the subject term “This statement of mine”) and one use of the falsity predicate (“is false”). Since there is no further statement, a reiteration of the truth or falsity predicate is illegitimate, and hence the proposition “This statement of mine is false” cannot itself be described as true or false. One of Dawānī’s criticisms of this proposed solution went as follows (Qarāmalekī 2007, pp. 59–61, 129–130): The subject term “This statement of mine” picks out the entire sentence “This statement of mine is false”, not just the subject of that sentence. Someone who says, “This statement of mine is false” is in effect saying, ““This statement of mine is false” is false”. Dashtakī cannot maintain that falsity applies to the subject “This statement of mine” but not to the entire sentence “This statement of mine is false”, for “This statement of mine” is precisely “This statement of mine is false”. Mīr Dāmād’s discussion seems to amount to an attempt to disarm Dawānī’s objection. His argument seems to be that the subject term “This statement of mine” does indeed pick out the entire statement “This statement of mine is false”, but it picks it out in a nonspecific sense. Presumably the idea here is that the specific identity of the predicate “is false” has nothing to do with it falling under the subject term “This statement of mine” – the predicate would equally have fallen under that subject term if it had been, for example, “is true” instead of “is

(iii) Mulla¯ S.adra¯ 151

false”. This purportedly blocks Dawānī’s counter-argument. Falsity is predicated of “This statement of mine” without this implying that the entire proposition “This statement of mine is false” is also false. As will be seen in a later section, Mīr Dāmād’s solution to the liar paradox would be taken up and discussed intensively by later Indo-Muslim logicians. Equally influential was Mīr Dāmād’s employment of a range of concepts and distinctions that had hitherto been somewhat marginal to the post-Avicennian tradition. One such distinction is between the “simple whether” (hal basīṭa) and the “composite whether” (hal murakkaba) (Mīr Dāmād 2013, 181–186). The first refers to the mere being or existence of something; the latter to its being this or that. A closely related distinction is between “copulative being” (wujūd rābiṭī) and “predicative being” (wujūd maḥmūl), the former referring to “being” as a copula between subject and predicate; the latter to “being” as a predicate (Mīr Dāmād 2013, 191–194). Yet another influential distinction is between “primary predication” (ḥaml awwalī) and “familiar, logical predication” (ḥaml mutaʿāraf ṣināʿī or ḥaml shāʾiʿ) (Mīr Dāmād 2013, 61–67). The former indicates that the subject and the predicate are two ways of describing the same entity, for example, “The human is the rational animal”. The latter merely indicates that an entity picked out by the subject term is identical to an entity picked out by the predicate term, for example, “Every human is an animal”. Most of these distinctions were adopted from previous works, for example, Qūshjī’s Sharh al-Tajrīd with the glosses of Dawānī and Dashtakī or the book on Demonstration from Avicenna’s Shifāʾ. But it was apparently through the influence of Mīr Dāmād’s work that these terms and distinctions came to the forefront in the writings of some later logicians, especially in the Indian subcontinent. As noted by the modern editor Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī, al-Ufuq al-mubīn appears to have been more influential in India than in Iran, and almost all later annotations to the work were written by Indo-Muslim scholars (Mīr Dāmād 2013, iliii–iliv). There are also clear echoes of it in the aforementioned Indo-Muslim handbook of logic Sullam al-ʿulūm by Bihārī and its numerous commentaries, to be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.

(iii) Mulla¯ S. adra¯ (Rizvi 2007; Sharı¯ ̔ atı¯ 2004, 5–20) Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī was born in Shiraz around the year 979/1571. He pursued his studies in Qazvin and Isfahan, studying the philo-

152

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

sophical sciences primarily with Mīr Dāmād. As is well known, he eventually departed from his teacher’s views on a number of metaphysical issues. Though sometimes presented in modern literature as a luminary of the “school of Isfahan”, most of his mature years were spent outside the capital, more specifically in Qom and Shiraz. He died during a pilgrimage to the shrine cities of Iraq in 1045/1635–6. In his own lifetime and for the rest of the Safavid period, he was a controversial figure who elicited much opposition, both from anti-mystical, anti-philosophical exoteric scholars and from rival philosophers such as Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī (d. 1080/1669) and Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī (d. 1098/1687). Since the nineteenth century, however, his writings have come to dominate the teaching of philosophy in Iran, two influential advocates being Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1289/1873) and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabaṭabāʾī (d. 1981). He wrote the following works that deal with logic: 1) Extensive annotations to the commentary by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311) on Ḥikmat al-ishrāq by the “Illuminationist” philosopher Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191). These annotations cover – inter alia – the early parts of the work that deal with logic. They were reproduced on the margins of the 1315/1896 Iranian lithograph edition of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary. A more recent edition was published by Hossein Ziai in 2010, based on the lithograph and three nineteenth-century manuscripts. Curiously, several marginal annotations that are included in the lithograph edition are missing from Ziai’s edition. As is the case with Mīr Dāmād’s al-Ufuq al-mubin, many of the annotations of Mullā Ṣadrā flow directly from the debates between Dawānī and Dashtakī in the fifteenth century. For instance, he agreed with Dashtakī, against Dawānī, that in propositions that predicate existence there is no need for a copula; it is only in the case of other predicates that the copula is a third part of the proposition. Thus, the proposition “Humans exist” has two parts only, whereas “Humans are mortal” has three parts. (Incidentally, this is one of the annotations that are on the margins of the old Iranian lithograph [Mullā Ṣadrā 1315/1896, 73] but not in Ziai’s edition.) On the other hand, Mullā Ṣadrā agreed with Dawānī, against Dashtakī, that relational syllogisms are productive as they are, without the need to recast them as conventional syllogisms with three terms (Mullā Ṣadrā 1315/1896, 98).

(iii) Mulla¯ S.adra¯ 153

2) A treatise on conception and assent. The treatise relies heavily on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī’s treatise on the same topic, as well as the relevant parts of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentaries on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ. But Mullā Ṣadrā attempted to rectify what he saw as tensions and inconsistencies in Quṭb al-Dīn’s various discussions. The treatise was lithographed in 1311/1894 as an appendix to Ḥillī’s commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-manṭiq. It has since been edited along with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s treatise by Mahdī Sharīʿatī and published under the title Risālatān fī l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq (Qum: Muʾassasat Ismāʿīliyān, 1416/1996; 2nd edition: Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya 1425/2004). It has also been translated and studied by Joep Lameer in his Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2006). 3) A handbook on logic entitled al-Tanqīḥ (The Scrutiny). Though it did not displace Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq as a standard handbook in Iranian madrasas, the work was sufficiently esteemed to elicit a commentary entitled al-Kifāya al-manṭiqiyya bisharḥ al-ishrāqāt al-Ṣadriyya (The Sufficiency in Logic in Commenting upon the Ṣadrian Illuminations) a century later by a certain ʿAlī ʿAskar Ḥusaynī (fl. 1134/1722). (For two extant manuscripts of the commentary, see Kitābkhāne-i Buzurg-i Āyatollāh Marʿashī Najafī, Qom: MS 743 and MS 5702.) The following gives the main chapters, along with the page numbers in the 1999 edition of Ghulam-Reza Yasipour and Ahad Faramarz Qaramaleki: a. On Īsāghūjī (pp. 5–14). On the division of knowledge into conception and assent, the use and subject matter of logic, types of reference, the division of terms into singular and composite, the division of singular terms into particulars and universals, and the five universals. b. On explicative statements (pp. 15–18). On description and definition. c. On Bārī Armīnās (pp. 19–23). On propositions and their division into categorical and hypothetical. d. On the modality of propositions (pp. 24–31). This introduces the conventional post-Avicennian modality propositions, though with

154

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition



the addition that the basic modal notions are three: necessity, impossibility and possibility. It then gives the contradictories, converses, and contrapositives of both non-modal and modality propositions. e. On the second combination (pp. 34–41). This gives a condensed discussion of the three figures of the syllogism, omitting the fourth. It also gives the “combinatorial-hypothetical” syllogism recognized by Avicenna and the post-Avicennian tradition, as well as the “reiterative-hypothetical” syllogisms: modus ponens, modus tollens, and disjunctive syllogism. f. On indirect syllogism (pp. 42–43). On complex syllogism and indirect proof. g On other kinds of argument (pp. 44–45). On induction, analogy and physiognomy (firāsa). h. On Demonstration (pp. 46–52). This gives a relatively lengthy discussion of demonstration, the causal relation between the three terms of the demonstrative syllogism, and a discussion of whether definition can be gained through demonstration. i. On Sūfisṭīqī, i.e., Fallacy (pp. 53–56). On fallacies due to both form and matter. The organization is clearly influenced by the older tradition of Arabic logic, rather than the standard post-Avicennian organization into a part dealing with the acquisition of conceptions and a part dealing with the acquisition of assents. Other elements of the work also reflect a more conservatively Avicennian outlook, especially the disregarding of the fourth figure of the syllogism and the relatively detailed discussion of demonstration. Yet other elements are inspired by the “Illuminationist” (i.e., anti-Peripatetic Neo-Platonist) philosopher Suhrawardī (d. 587/ 1191), in particular the claim that all propositions can be reduced to categorical universal-affirmative necessity propositions. For example, “J is not B” can be transformed into “J is a non-B”; “J is possibly B” into “J is necessarily a possible B”; and “J is B or J is A” into “J is either B or A” (pp. 27–28). There is also evidence of the influence of Mīr Dāmād. For example, a distinction is introduced between “primary predication” and “familiar accidental predication” (p. 10), and the discussion of some problematic hypothetical syllogisms echoes Mīr Dāmād’s discussion

¯ qa¯ Husayn Khwa¯nsa¯rı¯ 155 (iv) A .

in al-Ufuq al-mubīn (p. 40). There is also some influence from Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq: Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of modal conversion and modal syllogism follows that handbook closely (pp. 30–31, 34–38). He even accepts the “revisionist” post-Avicennian view that possibility propositions do not convert and that first-figure syllogisms with possibility minors are sterile. 4) The edition of the collected philosophical treatises of Mullā Ṣadrā prepared by Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī in 1996 (Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-mutaʾallihīn [Tehran: Intishārāt-i Hikmat]) includes a treatise on the liar paradox. As noted by Sajjad Rizvi (Rizvi 2007, 113), the trea­ tise is actually by the fifteenth-century scholar Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī al-Dashtakī. This is far from being the only time that the two scholars have been confused by modern historians and catalogers of manuscripts.

¯ qa¯ H. usayn Khwa¯nsa¯rı¯ (Tihra¯nı¯ 1971–, VIII, 166–167; (iv) A Afandı¯ 1403/1982, II, 57–60; Khwa¯nsa¯rı¯ 1391/1971, II, 349– 358; Gharawı¯ 1403/1982, I, 235) Though perhaps little remembered now, Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī was one of the leading scholars in Isfahan in his time. He was born in 1016/1608 and studied with a number of Safavid scholars, including Mīr Abū l-Qāsim Findiriskī (d. 1050/1640–1), Ṣulṭān al-ʿUlamāʾ Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Rafīʿ (d. 1064/1654), and Muḥammad Taqī Majlisī (d. 1070/1659). He went on to teach in Isfahan, and came to enjoy the esteem and patronage of Shah Sulaymān (r. 1076/1666–1105/ 1694). He died in Isfahan in 1098/1687. Though an eminent teacher and author of philosophical works, Khwānsārī opposed the most distinctive ideas of Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā, and his references to them are usually critical (Khwānsārī 1378/1999, ix–xiv). In many of his works, he presented himself as rejecting “imitation” (taqlīd) of any previous thinker, and in wide-ranging controversies with his contemporary Muḥammad Bāqir Sabzawārī (d. 1090/1679), he accused his rival of “fanatical partisanship” (taʿaṣṣub) to Avicenna and of mistaking the task of a commentator and glossator on Avicenna’s works with simply establishing Avicenna’s intended meaning (Khwānsārī 1378/1999, xxiii–xxiv). Khwānsārī’s major philosophical works are: a gloss on the Metaphysics of Avicenna’s Shifāʾ; a gloss on the sections on natural philosophy and metaphysics from the Muḥākamāt of Quṭb al-Dīn

156

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

al-Rāzī on Ṭūsī’s commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt; and a gloss on Dawānī’s “old” (i.e., first) gloss on the section on general metaphysics from Qūshjī’s commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-kalām. The last-mentioned work includes a number of discussions of points of logic, for example whether the middle term in a syllogism can recur with addition or subtraction or whether relational syllogisms must be reduced to standard syllogisms with only three terms (El-Rouayheb 2010, 139–145), and the liar paradox. Khwānsārī’s discussion of the liar paradox has been edited by Āḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalekī in the journal Khiradnāme-yi Ṣadrā 10(1376/1997), pp. 77–89. He rejected Dawānī’s suggestion that the sentence “This statement of mine is false” is not a statement or assertion (khabar), but his own solution to the paradox is, by his own admission, not radically different. It runs as follows: An assertion is true or false only if it is a report (ḥikāya) about something that is the case (wāqiʿ). In this particular instance, the assertion is a report about a report. This is not problematic when the object report is about something that is the case, as when I say, “What Zayd reports is true” and Zayd has actually asserted something about reality that is either true or false. However, if the object report is not about reality but itself about another report, and that report in turn is about yet a further report, and so on ad infinitum, then truth or falsity are inapplicable, as when I say that what Zayd reports is true, and what Zayd reports is that what Bakr reports is true, and what Bakr reports is that what Khalid reports is true, and so on, without reaching a report that is not about a report but about something that is the case. The paradoxical statement “This statement of mine is false” is of this latter kind. It is a report about a report, with no discernable report about something that is the case. Hence, it is neither true nor false. Khwānsārī also wrote a treatise on another logical problem much discussed by Safavid logicians in the seventeenth century and by Indo-Muslim logicians influenced by them, the so-called “problem of entailment” (shubhat al-istilzām). The problem may briefly be presented as follows: It seems true to say that if something’s existence does not entail the cessation of its nonexistence then it always exists. Consider a contingent entity J. It seems that it is true that “If J exists then J’s existence entails the cessation of J’s nonexistence”. The problem is that this conditional appears to imply, by contraposition, the following:

If J’s existence does not entail the cessation of J’s nonexistence then J does not exist

¯ qa¯ Husayn Khwa¯nsa¯rı¯ 157 (iv) A .

In this way, the following two conditionals seem both to be true, though they apparently contradict each other: (1) If J’s existence does not entail the cessation of J’s nonexistence then J always exists (2) If J’s existence does not entail the cessation of J’s nonexistence then J does not exist Moreover, we seem to be able to prove the existence of self-contradictory entities in this manner, for example: The round square is such that its existence does not entail the cessation of its nonexistence Everything whose existence does not entail the cessation of its nonexistence exists always The round square exists always The first premise of the syllogism seems doubtful at first glance, but can be proven by indirect proof. We start with the assumption that we wish to show is false: If the round square exists then its existence entails the cessation of its nonexistence By contraposition, we infer the following: If the existence of the round square does not entail the cessation of its nonexistence then the round square does not exist But this appears to contradict the second premise of the syllogism, namely: Everything whose existence does not entail the cessation of its nonexistence exists always Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī’s treatise presented various formulations of this problem, and offered solutions to each. In the course of his discussion, he made critical comments about the solutions offered by Mīr Dāmād and by Muḥam-

158

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

mad Bāqir Sabzawārī, the latter of whom had devoted a short treatise to the problem. Sabzawārī responded with critical annotations to Khwānsārī’s treatise. Khwānsārī, in turn, wrote detailed replies to these annotations, resulting in what circulated as a second treatise on the topic. (For extant copies of Khwānsārī’s treatises, see Mach & Ormsby 1987, nrs. 1135–1136.) Āqā Ḥusayn also wrote a short super-gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ. Extant manuscript copies of this work suggest that it was only one or two folios long, and specifically discussed the distinction between immediate (bi-ghayr wasaṭ) and mediate (bi-wasaṭ) implication (Kitābkhāne-yi Dānishgāh-i Markazī, Tehran: MS 6710, fol. 351; Kitābkhāne-yi Āstān-i Quds-i Riżavī, Mashhad: MS 5794, fols. 335–337).

(v) Mulla ¯ Mı¯rza ¯ Shirwa ¯nı¯ (Khwa ¯nsa ¯rı¯ 1391/1971, VII, 93–96; Tihra ¯nı¯ 1971–, VIII, 524–525; Gharawı¯ 1403/1982, II, 92) Mīrzā Muḥammad b. Ḥasan Shirwānī, known as Mullā Mīrzā, was born in 1033/ 1623–24. He presumably hailed from the province of Shirwān, roughly corresponding to the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan, then under Safavid rule. Little is known of his intellectual formation. He reportedly studied with Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī, though the extent of these studies is not clear and the two seem to have become scholarly rivals in later years (Tihrānī 1936–, II, 58–59). Mullā Mīrzā also obtained a certificate from the prominent scholar of the religious sciences Muḥammad Taqī Majlisī (d. 1070/1659) (Tihrānī 1971–, XII, 470–471). He went on to become one of the most eminent scholars of Isfahan in his time, and enjoyed the patronage of the Safavid rulers Shah ʿAbbās II (r. 1052/1642–1076/1666) and Shah Sulaymān (r. 1076/1666–1105/1694). He died in Isfahan in 1098/1687. Mullā Mīrzā wrote a number of esteemed works, including a gloss on Maʿālim al-dīn, a handbook on Shiite jurisprudence by Ḥasan Ibn al-Shahīd al-Thānī (d. 1011/1602–3); a gloss on the gloss of Shams al-Dīn al-Khafrī (d. 942/1535) on the later, theological portions of Qūshjī’s commentary on Tajrīd al-ʿaqāʾid; and a gloss on Ibn Mubārakshāh’s commentary on Kātibī’s handbook on metaphysics and physics Ḥikmat al-ʿayn. His major work on logic is an extensive gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ and

(v) Mulla ¯ Mı¯rza ¯ Shirwa ¯nı¯ 159

on Jurjānī’s glosses thereon. This is probably the longest of the numerous glosses written on this advanced handbook since the fourteenth century. One extant manuscript (Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ: MS New Series 904) comprises 278 folios with 20 lines to a page. Like the great majority of glosses on this work, Shirwānī’s only covered the introduction of Urmawī’s handbook and Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary thereon, corresponding to the first 19 pages out of the 251 pages in the Istanbul edition of 1277/1861. The topics dealt with are: theological, rhetorical and semantic issues raised by the preamble; the division of knowledge into conception and assent; the principle that if all conceptions and assents are non-evident then circularity or infinite regress would result and knowledge would be impossible; the subject matter of logic; and the paradox of “what is not conceived in any way” (al-majhūl al-muṭlaq). Mullā Mīrzā wrote in the introduction to his gloss that Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on the Maṭāliʿ is an outstanding work that outweighs all other books in the discipline of logic. As such, it had elicited a number of previous glosses, of which Mullā Mīrzā singled out those by Jurjānī and Dawānī as particularly esteemed. Mullā Mīrzā made it clear that his own glosses had first arisen in the context of teaching the work, though he then added a dedication of the polished and collected set – completed in 1076/1666 – to Shah ʿAbbās II. Mullā Mīrzā’s glosses are far from being merely explicative; they are often critical of the commentator or of earlier glossators. Apart from the glosses of Jurjānī and Dawānī, he was clearly aware of (and usually critical of) the glosses written a century earlier by Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī. Perhaps surprisingly, there are no explicit references to Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā and no obvious indications of any sustained engagement with their writings, even though especially the latter had written on some of the topics discussed at length by Mullā Mīrzā, such as the division of knowledge into conception and assent and the paradox of what is not conceived in any way. Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā are sometimes presented in modern studies as leading figures in a so-called “school of Isfahan”. There are nevertheless indications that their influence was resisted by a number of prominent scholars in Isfahan, even specialists in philosophy or logic such as Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī and his son Jamāl al-Dīn Khwānsārī (d. 1125/ 1713), as well as Mullā Mīrzā Shirwānī, Bahāʾ al-Dīn Iṣfahānī (whose epitome of Avicenna’s Shifāʾ was mentioned above) and the latter’s student Bahāʾ al-Dīn Mukhtārī Nāʾīnī. The predominance of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in Iran only

160

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

seems to have become established in the period following the sack of Isfahan by the Afghans in 1135/1722. Mullā Mīrzā also wrote a gloss on Ījī’s commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s handbook on jurisprudence Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā. It is not clear whether this gloss covered the first section of the handbook dealing with logic. Some glosses on this work written in the Safavid period do cover the logic part, such as the aforementioned gloss by Mīr Dāmād (that may not be fully extant), but others only cover the later sections on jurisprudence, for example the glosses by Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī, Ṣulṭān al-ʿUlamāʾ Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Rafīʿ, and Jamāl al-Dīn b. Ḥusayn Khwānsārī (see Tihrānī 1936–, VI, 129–132). Mullā Mīrzā reportedly also wrote a treatise on propositions with metathetic predicates, and a treatise on what is evident and non-evident and how these may differ from person to person. Neither of these treatises appears to be extant, though.

(vi) Muh. ammad Yu ¯suf T. ihra ¯nı¯ Very little is known of this scholar. He wrote an unusual work on logic entitled Naqd al-uṣūl wa talkhīṣ al-fuṣūl (The Criticism of Principles and the Summary of Chapters) that is extant in a number of manuscripts. Even the usually well-­ informed twentieth-century Shiite bio-bibliographer Āghā Buzurg Ṭihrānī knew nothing of the author except what can be learned from the work itself: that his name was “Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn, known as Yūsuf al-Ṭihrānī”, and that he finished the work in 1104/1692 (Tihrānī 1936–, XXIV, nr. 1408; Tihrānī 1971–, IX, 833). The colophon of one extant manuscript (Tehran, Kitābkhāneh-i Markaz-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, MS Ilāhiyyāt 712, dated 1130/1718) refers to the work as manṭiq-i Awliyā, suggesting that the author may have been identical to the “Mullā Awliyā” who wrote an extant gloss, completed in 1108/1696, on the book on Metaphysics from Avicenna’s Shifāʾ. This suggestion appears to be confirmed by an extant, early manuscript of the gloss (Qom, Kitābkhāneh-i Buzurg-i Āyatollāh Marʿashī Najafī: MS 4673) that gives the author’s name as “Muḥammad Yūsuf Rāzī, known as Awliyā”. (The attributive “Rāzī” derives from the historic town of Rayy that is now a district of Tehran.) Unfortunately, little is known of this Mullā Awliyā apart from his reportedly having been a student of Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī (Tihrānī 1971–, IX, 83). It is tempting to speculate whether he is identical to Qiwām al-Dīn Muḥammad Ṭihrānī, who was a student of the philosopher Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī (d. 1080/1669) and authored a short hand-

(vi) Muh. ammad Yu ¯suf T.ihra ¯nı¯ 161

book on philosophy entitled ʿAyn al-ḥikma (The Quintessence of Wisdom) (Tihrānī 1971–, VIII, 460). Alternatively, he may be identical to Muḥammad Yūsuf Ṭāliqānī (Ṭāleqān is a small town not far from Tehran) who is mentioned alongside Qiwām al-Dīn Ṭihrānī as one of the eminent students of Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī (Tihrānī 1971–, VIII, 215–216, 644). Certainly, the contents of Naqd al-uṣūl suggest that it was written by someone influenced by Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī, who was strongly inclined toward the “older philosophers” (Tabrīzī 1386/2007). Ṭihrānī’s work is a radical attempt to undo the post-Avicennian tradition of logic and return to the doctrines of the older logicians (al-qudamāʾ). It purports to be a revised version of an earlier work by the same author, entitled al-Fuṣūl, but this earlier version does not seem to be extant. The following is an overview of the main sections of Naqd al-uṣūl, with the page numbers of the edition prepared by Ahad Faramarz Qaramaleki, Sahar Kavandi, and Muhsin Jahed (Zanjan, Iran: Dānishgāh-i Zanjān, 1389/2010): 1. On the proposition and what it consists of (pp. 3–35) a. Eisagoge (Madkhal) b. De Interpretatione (ʿIbāra) c. Declarative statement 2. On the Prior Analytics, i.e., Syllogism (pp. 37–102) a. [On the definition of the syllogism, its figures and moods, the conditions of productivity, and the modal syllogistic] b. On extracting syllogisms and their premises, and regimentation (taḥlīl) into figures and moods c. On further types of inference 3. On the Posterior Analytics, i.e., Demonstration (pp. 103–203) a. The purpose of this section in accordance with the way of the First Teacher b. On the conditions of demonstration c. On the commonalities of the sciences d. On the things that are the principles of demonstration and science e. On what is common to the “why-demonstration” and the “that-­ demonstration”, and their different definitions f. On sense perception being the principle of the sciences, and that the principles of demonstration end in principles that have no principles

162

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

g. That definition is not established through demonstration or division or induction h. On the way to establish definitions As shown by the foregoing outline, half of Naqd al-uṣūl is devoted to demonstration and related discussions that had been treated by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics and by Avicenna in the book on Demonstration (Burhān) from the Shifāʾ. This is in itself a radical departure from mainstream post-Avicennian logic since the thirteenth century, which had given scant attention to such topics. Even in earlier sections, Ṭihrānī departed from the post-Avicennian tradition in numerous ways. He disregarded the fourth figure of the syllogism, for instance, and when discussing the modal syllogistic he confined his attention to necessity, possibility and absolute propositions, rather than the numerous modality propositions discussed in post-Avicennian handbooks. He even on a number of occasions criticized Avicenna for his departures from older logicians. For example, he defended Fārābī’s view that the subject matter of logic is utterances (alfāẓ) insofar as they refer to meanings (maʿānī) that can be used to derive further meanings, and rejected Avicenna’s criticism of this view (pp. 7–8). He also rejected Avicenna’s criticism of Fārābī’s view concerning the extension of the subject term in a proposition (pp. 42–45). He also rejected the wholly hypothetical syllogism that had been developed by Avicenna (p. 73). A preliminary study of the work and its sources was made by the Iranian editors of the work. Ṭihrānī explicitly cited Avicenna’s Shifāʾ and Ishārāt, as well as Ṭūsī’s commentary on the later work. The editors also suggest that he used Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s gloss on Ṭūsī’s commentary on the Ishārāt, Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-manṭiq with the commentary of Ḥillī, and Ibn Turka’s Manāhij. To this list, one can add two further sources, not noted by the editors: Given his antiquarian predilections, Ṭihrānī would almost certainly have read Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī’s commentary on Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, possibly with the annotations of Mullā Ṣadrā. He defended, for example, the view that in predications of existence there is no need for a copula, and that it is only in the case of other predicates that a copula is needed to link subject and predicate (pp. 14–15). As mentioned above, this is a view that may have been expressed in Mullā Ṣadrā’s annotations to Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (depending on whether the relevant gloss in the lithograph edition is authentic), though it could have been adopted from Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī or Mīr Dāmād as well. More unex-

¯ milı¯ 163 (vii) ’Alı¯ b. H.usayn Ja ¯mi’ı¯ ’A

pectedly, it can be shown that Ṭihrānī also used Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works, which – as mentioned above – are known to have circulated in Iran in the seventeenth century. His critical discussion of Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s views on the extension of the subject term of the proposition echoes Averroes’ discussion in the Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics, and reaches the same conclusion: that in necessity and absolute propositions the subject term extends to what it is actually true of, whereas in possibility propositions it extends to what it is possibly true of (pp. 43–45. Cp. Averroes 1983, 123–125). Another passage that shows an engagement with Averroes’ Middle Commentary is one in which Ṭihrānī discussed the suggestion of some early Peripatetics that in first-figure modal syllogisms consisting of a necessity premise and an absolute premise the conclusion follows the weaker of the two premises (pp. 57–59). Ṭihrānī even quoted verbatim from Averroes, calling him “one of the commentators on the discourse of Aristotle” (baʿḍ shāriḥī kalām Arisṭū) (cp. Averroes 1983, 122). The account of the modal syllogistic in Naqd al-uṣūl mainly follows Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics, rather than Avicenna’s works.

¯ milı¯ (Tihra (vii)  A ̔ lı¯ b. H. usayn Ja ¯mi  ̔ ¯ı  ̔ A ¯nı¯ 1971–, IX, 511–512; ¯ milı¯ 1413/1992, 32–39)  ̔ A Again, very little is known of this scholar. He wrote a number of works on a range of subjects, the earliest being completed in 1085/1674 and the latest in 1124/1712. The one work of his that has been published – a Quran commentary entitled al-Wajīz (The Brief) – was completed in 1120/1708 (ʿĀmilī 1413/1992). His attributive indicates a family origin in Mt ʿĀmila in what is now southern Lebanon, but his family had been active in Persia for generations – both his great-grandfather and his grandfather had been chief jurisconsults in Shushtar, then the capital of the province of ʿArabistān (present-day Khuzistan) in southwestern Persia. He himself appears to have been active in the town of Khalafābād east of Shushtar. ʿĀmilī wrote extensively on logic. His works belong squarely to the mainstream post-Avicennan tradition, and show no inclination to reject this tradition in favor of a return to older traditions of logic. Though he occasionally cited Avicenna’s al-Shifāʾ, as well as Ṭūsī’s commentary on the Ishārāt, most of his explicit references are to the works of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Saʿd al-Dīn al-­

164

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

Taftāzānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī. There are no obvious traces of influence from the works of Mīr Dāmād or Mullā Ṣadrā. His works on logic are:

1) A handbook on logic entitled Irshād al-mutaʿallim ilā l-ṭarīq (Guiding the Learner to the Path), along with a commentary that was completed in 1085/1674. An autograph copy, dated 1086/1675, is extant in the Ayatollah Gulpāygānī Library in Qom (nr. 2403), comprising 82 folios with 20 lines per page. The work is divided into an introduction on the definition, use and subject matter of logic, and two main sections dealing respectively with the acquisition of conceptions and the acquisition of assents. The handbook is reminiscent of Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq in length. In coverage, the two handbooks are also comparable, though ʿĀmilī left out the opening discussion of various kinds of reference (dalāla), the ḍābiṭa (the section in which Taftāzānī gave gene­ ral conditions for productivity across all the figures) and the concluding section on the principles and issues of science. 2) An introductory didactic poem on logic entitled Tuḥfat al-mubtadiʾ (The Gift to the Beginner), reportedly composed in 1090/1679. He later wrote a commentary on the work that must have been written after 1096/1685, for in it he refers to his super-commentary on Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq that was completed on that date. The work covers much of the same ground as his Irshād, but leaves out modality propositions, their conversions and contra­ positions, and the modal syllogistic. An extant copy in the Ayatollah Gulpāygānī Library (nr. 2678), dated 1119/1707, comprises 65 folios with 18 lines per page. 3) A super-commentary, completed in 1096/1685, on the second part of Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, covering “assents” (taṣdīqāt), i.e., propositions and syllogisms. The modern Iranian bibliographer Āghā Bozorg Tihrānī (d. 1970) described it as a “commentary” (sharḥ) rather than the more usual “gloss” (ḥāshiya), the difference being that ʿĀmilī integrated the full text of Yazdī’s work into his own running commentary (Tihrānī 1936–, XIII, 162). An extant manuscript, copied in 1280/1863, comprises 126 folios, with variable

(viii) Baha ¯’ al-Dı¯n Muh. ammad Is.faha ¯nı¯ 165

lines to a page (available at the Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ Foundation [www. kashifalgetaa.com], nr. 263). 4) A super-commentary on the first part of Yazdī’s commentary, covering “conceptions”. An extant, undated manuscript is in the Ayatollah Marʿashī Library in Qom (MS nr. 12841, folios 112–201, 19 lines per page). 5) A treatise on the parts of the proposition. An autograph that is extant in the British Library in London (Or. 7826, folios 162b–171b) is dated 1098/1687. The treatise is an extended and critical discussion of the thesis of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī that a proposition has four parts: subject, predicate, the nexus between them indicated by a copula, and the affirmation or negation of the nexus.

(viii) Baha ¯ ̕ al-Dı¯n Muh. ammad Is. faha ¯nı¯ (Khwansa ¯rı¯, 1391/ 1971–2, VII, 111–118; Ja ̔ fariya ¯n 1374/1996; Abisaab EI3) He was born in 1062/1651–2, the son of the scholar Tāj al-Dīn Ḥasan Iṣfahānī (d. 1098/1687). At a young age, he travelled with his family to India, and apparently studied there with his father. Astonishingly precocious, he began writing scholarly works at the age of eleven, and considered his education complete by the time he was thirteen. By his early twenties, he was back in Isfahan, and came to be known there as “al-Fāḍil al-Hindī” (The Eminent Indian), even though he disliked the epithet (Jaʿfariyān 1374/1996, 26) and made disparaging comments about India and its inhabitants in some later works (Iṣfahānī 2015, 5). There is no evidence of him being influenced by Indo-Muslim scholarship in logic and philosophy. He became one of the preeminent scholars in Isfahan in his time and a polymath who taught and wrote on law, jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, logic, grammar and rhetoric. His writings on logic and philosophy bear little, if any, trace of influence by Mīr Dāmād or Mullā Ṣadrā. Like the venerable Shiite scholar Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), he appears rather to have combined esteem for Avicenna’s philosophical writings with a staunch commitment to mainstream Shiite theological positions (for example, to the creation of the world in time). In a treatise discussing the well-known tradition according to which every century would have its “renewer” of religion, he mentioned more than a dozen Safavid scholarly luminaries of the seventeenth century, but left out Mullā Ṣadrā and instead emphasized the role of Āqā Ḥusayn

166

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

Khwānsārī in refuting “a group of heretics and infidel Sufis” who propagated belief in the pre-eternity of the world (Jaʿfariyān 1374/1996, 98). Bahāʾ al-Dīn Iṣfahānī died in 1137/1725. It is possible that he was executed, along with a number of other Safavid grandees, by the new Afghan rulers of Persia. His works on logic, all written in his earlier years, are:

1) Khulāṣat al-manṭiq (The Synopsis of Logic), a brief introduction to logic completed in 1074/1663, when the author was twelve years old. He also wrote a short commentary on the work (ʿArshī 1971, IV, nr. 3448). 2) Ḥikmat-i Khāqāniyya (The Wisdom of the Sovereign). This is a Persian introduction to the three parts of philosophy – logic, physics and metaphysics. It was dedicated to the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1068/ 1658–1118/1707), and therefore presumably written, like the previous work, before the authors’ return to Isfahan. It has been edited by Ghulām-Ḥusayn Dīnānī (Tehran: Mīrāth-i Maktūb, 1377/1998). Pages 43–98 of the edition cover the part on logic. It has a standard post-­ Avicennan orientation, with an introduction (pp. 43–49) and five main sections (maqṣad): on universals (pp. 43–60), definitions (pp. 60–62), propositions (pp. 62–77), syllogisms (pp. 78–98), and reduction, induction and analogy (p. 98). It presents the subject matter of logic as “known conceptions and assents”, rather than second intentions. It recognizes four figures of the syllogism, thirteen modality propositions, and its brief account of modal syllogistic is in accord with the “revisionist” Avicennan view that it is a condition for the productivity of first-figure syllogisms that the minor premise be actual, i.e., not merely a possibility proposition. Its coverage of syllogisms is distinctly formally oriented, and less than two pages out of twenty are devoted to the “matter” of the syllogism, i.e., demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric, poetics and sophistry. 3) ʿAwn ikhwān al-ṣafāʾ ʿalā fahm kitāb al-Shifāʾ (The Aid to the Brethren of Purity for Understanding the Book of the Healing). This is the abovementioned epitome, completed in 1084/1673, of the parts on logic, physics and metaphysics from Avicenna’s monumental philosophical summa al-Shifāʾ. The logic part has been edited by ʿAlī Owjabī (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2015, 635 pp.). The introduction includes fulsome praise of Avicenna’s work, a dedication to the Safavid ruler Shah Sulaymān (r. 1077/1666–1105/1694), and laments about an

(ix) Baha¯’ al-Dı¯n Muh. ammad Mukhta¯rı¯ Na¯’ı¯nı¯ 167

unhappy stay in India. The work covers Eisagoge (pp. 25–62), Categories (pp. 65–155), De Interpretatione (pp. 159–198), Prior Analytics (pp. 201–­345), Posterior Analytics (pp. 349–441), Topics (pp. 445–536), Sophistical Refutations (pp. 539–555), Rhetoric (pp. 559–621), and Poetics (pp. 625–635). In general, Bahāʾ al-Dīn stayed close to Avicenna’s positions, for example presenting the view that the subject matter of logic is second intentions (pp. 31–32), giving only three figures of the syllogism (pp. 226–262), and presenting first-figure syllogisms with possibility minor premises as productive (pp. 247–253), all in contrast to the views expressed in Bahāʾ al-Dīn’s own Hikmat-i Khāqāniyya which must have been written just a few years earlier. Interestingly, in the highly technical section on wholly hypothetical syllogisms – one of the most original sections of Avicenna’s logical work – Bahāʾ al-Dīn noted that he occasionally had to depart from the received text of the Shifāʾ, for the manuscript copies that he had seen were corrupt and unreliable at the relevant points (see the footnotes on pp. 286 and 293).

(ix) Baha¯ ̕ al-Dı¯n Muh. ammad Mukhta¯rı¯ Na¯  ̔  ¯ı nı¯ (Tihra¯nı¯ 1971–, IX, 107–109; Khwa¯nsa¯rı¯ 1391/1971, VII, 121–122; Tihra ¯nı¯ 1936–, IV, 153–154; VI, 61; VI, 134; XVIII, 311) He was born in Isfahan around the year 1080/1669–70, and studied there with the eminent scholars Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī (d. 1111/1700), Muḥammad al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī (d. 1104/1693), and the abovementioned Bahā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad Iṣfahānī, known as “al-Fāḍil al-Hindī” (d. 1137/1725). Mukhtārī went on to write numerous works in a variety of disciplines, such as homiletics, Shiite law, Arabic grammar and logic. His date of death is not recorded; it is likely that he was one of the many thousands who died of famine or disease during the Afghan siege of Isfahan in 1134–35/1722. Like Mullā Mīrzā Shirwānī and ʿAlī Jāmiʿī ʿĀmilī, Mukhtārī is a salutary reminder that not all Safavid logicians were preoccupied with returning to “the ancients”, and that there were still those who continued to work within the paradigm of logic established by “later”, post-Avicennian scholars. Mukhtārī did on occasion cite Avicenna’s Shifāʾ but there is little indication that he was especially beholden to it. He at one point even referred to Avicenna as an Ismāʿīlī, and conspicuously refrained from adding the standard phrase “may

168

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

God have mercy on him” (raḥimahu llāh or ʿalayhi raḥmatu llāh) used of deceased people of the right faith, instead using the phrase “may he receive what he deserves” (ʿalayhi mā ʿalayhi) commonly used of Muslims who were not Twelver Shiite (see MS: Kitābkhāne-yi Astān-i Quds-i Rażavī, Mashhad: 13185, fol. 115b). Mukhtārī engaged extensively with the works of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Taftāzānī, Jurjānī, Dawānī and Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī. By contrast, there does not seem to be any explicit reference to Mīr Dāmād, Mullā Ṣadrā or Muḥammad Yūsuf Ṭihrānī in his logical writings. Mukhtārī’s works on logic are: 1) Lisān al-mīzān (The Mouthpiece of the Scale) a handbook on logic, on which he wrote his own extensive commentary. The work has a standard post-Avicennian organization into two main parts dealing, respectively, with the acquisition of conceptions and the acquisition of assents. The three extant manuscripts of Mukhtārī’s own commentary that have been uncovered so far, including an autograph (Kitābkhāne-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, Tehran: MS 14721) are incomplete and only cover the first part on conceptions. (See also: Kitābkhāne-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, Tehran: MS 6528 & Ayatollah Marʿashī Library, Qom: MS 2659). Curiously, however, Mukhtārī mentioned in the introduction to his gloss on Yazdī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq that he had earlier completed his extensive (kabīr) commentary on Lisān al-mīzān “by the grace of God” (see Taʿdīl al-mīzān fī taʿlīq ʿilm al-mīzān, Kitābkhāneh-i Astān-i Quds-i Rażavī, Mashhad: MS 13185, fol. 1a). Also, in his gloss on Yazdī’s commentary he referred the reader to his longer work for a fuller discussion of modality propositions and combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms (ibid, fol. 98b, 151b–152a), and as there are no such discussions in the first part of his commentary on Lisān al-mīzān, this too suggests that Mukhtārī actually finished his commentary on the second part. The extant first part of the commentary, completed in 1114/1702, is detailed and often critical, and it is regrettable that the second part was either not completed or appears to be lost. For example, he defended at some length a version of realism regarding universals, against the criticisms of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Taftāzānī and Jurjānī (pp. 58–69). He also engaged in a lengthy discussion of whether particulars can properly occupy the predicate position in a proposition.

(x) Muh. ammad b. Yu ¯nus al-Shuwayhı¯ al-Najafı¯ 169

He criticized both Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī and Dawānī for believing that they could, defending instead the opposing view of Taftāzānī and Jurjānī (pp. 71–77). 2) Taʿdīl al-mīzān fī taʿlīq ʿilm al-mīzān (Rectifying the Scale in Annotating the Science of the Scale). This is Mukhtārī’s extensive gloss on Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. It is one of the longest and most esteemed of the many glosses written on this commentary, and was reproduced on the margins of Iranian lithographs of Yazdī’s commentary from 1314/1896 and 1323/1905. It was written after the commentary on Lisān al-mīzān, which is mentioned in the introduction, and to which Mukhtārī on a few occasions referred the reader for fuller discussions. Despite the title, Mukhtārī’s glosses are mainly expli­ cative, though on a few occasions he did express reservations about Taftāzānī’s or Yazdī’s positions. One striking feature of the work is that it devotes a relatively large portion (more than a third of the whole) to the discussion of the immediate implications of propositions (conversion and contraposition) and the syllogistic, including the modal syllogistic. As mentioned earlier, most glosses on standard logical handbooks in the Eastern Islamic world after the fourteenth century tended to focus on the parts dealing with introductory matters and conceptions. 3) Mukhtārī also reportedly wrote a super-gloss on the gloss of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ al-anwār (Tihrānī 1936–, VI, 134, nr. 725). This does not appear to be extant and it is not possible to say how extensive it was.

(x) Muh. ammad b. Yu ¯nus al-Shuwayhı¯ al-Najafı¯ (see Tihra¯nı¯ 1936–, III, 45–46; III, 81–82; XXIII, 316; Tihra¯nı¯ 1971–, XII, 469–471) Not much is known about this scholar, apart from what can be gleaned from his own writings. He studied in the Shiite Iraqi cities of Hillah, Karbala and Najaf, and was a student (and brother-in-law) of the eminent jurist Jaʿfar Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ (d. 1227/1812), one of the major figures in the dramatic reassertion of the Uṣūlī trend in Shiite jurisprudence in the second half of the eighteenth century, at the expense of Akhbārī traditionalism that had enjoyed its heyday

170

VI. 1600–1800: The Iranian Tradition

in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries (on him, see Khwānsārī 1391/ 1971, II, 200–206; Madelung, “Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ”, EI2). Shuwayhī wrote an extensive commentary, completed in 1221/1806, on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, with the somewhat verbose title Mīzān al-ʿuqūl fī kashf asrār ghawāmiḍ ḥaqāʾiq masāʾil al-maʿqūl (The Scale of Intellects in Uncovering the Secrets of the Obscure Truths of the Issues of Cognition). One extant manuscript of this work (British Library, London: MS Or. 7999) comprises 254 folios with 22 lines to a page, approximately half of which covers “conceptions” and the other half “assents”. It is noteworthy that Shuwayhī showed little interest in recovering the logic of “the ancients”. Throughout the commentary, he cited and engaged with the standard post-Avicennian handbooks: the widely studied commentaries and glosses on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī, Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ and Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb. He also cited some of the major summas from the thirteenth century, such as Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār, Kātibī’s Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq, and Samarqandī’s Qisṭās al-afkār, as well as Ṭūsī’s commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt and, more unusually, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Avicenna’s ʿUyūn al-masāʾil. Though a close study of the work has yet to be made, there are conspicuously few, if any, explicit references to the works of Mīr Dāmād or Mullā Ṣadrā. For example, in his brief discussion of the liar paradox (fol. 128a–128b), he presented Dawānī’s solution, followed by the criticism offered by Nūrullah Shūshtarī (d. 1019/1610) in his gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. (The criticism is that self-reference is not the root of the problem, for “My statement now is true” does not seem paradoxical, nor does “My statement now is a complex utterance”; the problem is instead due to the specificity of the predicate of the proposition.) Shuwayhī did not discuss Mīr Dāmād’s solution to the liar paradox at all. Shuwayhī regularly referred the reader for further discussion to three other works on logic that he had written: Mirʾāt al-ʿuqūl (The Mirror of Intellects), al-Manār (The Lighthouse), and Ḍiyāʾ al-adhhān (The Light of Minds). It is not clear if any of these are extant, though the twentieth-century bibliographer Āghā Buzurg Tihrānī wrote that he had seen the first part of an autograph copy of Ḍiyāʾ al-adhhān fī ʿilm al-mīzān (The Light of Minds in the Science of the Scale) in a library in Najaf (Tihrānī 1936–, XV, 122). Even if these works have been lost, they testify to a keen interest in logic in the Iraqi shrine cities at the time. There is reason to believe that philosophy, and especially the “transcendent theosophy” of Mullā Ṣadrā, did not become as influential in the

(x) Muh. ammad b. Yu ¯nus al-Shuwayhı¯ al-Najafı¯ 171

Shiite shrine cities of Iraq as it did in Iran (Litvak 1998, 41). But logic clearly thrived there, along with rational theology and jurisprudence. This strong tradition of logical studies continued well into the twentieth century, as attested by the writings of Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar (d. 1964), Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (d. 1979) and ʿAlī Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ (d. 1990) (see Muẓaffar 1968; Ṣadr 1972, Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ 2006).

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

(i) Introduction (Ahmed 2012) The seventeenth century witnessed the emergence of a sophisticated tradition of Arabic logic in the Indian subcontinent. To be sure, Arabic logic had been studied in the region before that time. The Indo-Muslim scholar ʿAbdullāh Tulanbī (d. 932/1525–26) had written a commentary on a handbook on logic entitled al-Mīzān (The Scale) – an abridged version of Kātibī’s Shamsiyya whose authorship is not clear but which was widely studied in India (Tulanbī 1311/ 1893–4). It was only from the first half of the seventeenth century, however, that a steady stream of more advanced Arabic works on logic were written in the region. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Indo-Muslim tradition of logic was impressing scholars in Egypt such as Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār (d. 1250/1835) (ʿAṭṭār 1936, 436; ʿAṭṭār 1316/1898, II, 484). By the late nineteenth century, Indo-­ Muslim works on logic were being printed in Cairo and Kazan, suggesting that, by then, they were studied in those cities as well. The rise of the Indo-Muslim tradition of logic and philosophy is closely connected with the influx of Iranian scholars in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many attracted by the plethora of Persian-speaking courts in the Indian subcontinent. One such scholar was Fatḥullāh Shīrāzī (d. 997/1589) who had studied with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī and Dawānī’s student Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shīrāzī, and later made a successful career in India. He first gained the patronage of the Shiite ruler of Bijapur ʿAlī ʿĀdil Shah I (r. 965/1558–987/1579) and then of the Mughal ruler Akbar (r. 963/1556–1014/1605). A later source states that Fatḥullāh was the one who first introduced the works of Dashtakī, Dawānī and their students to India (Ḥasanī 1955, IV, 254–255). Another avenue through which such works were introduced was Central Asia, whence the Mughal dynasty had originated and with which the Indian subcontinent continued to enjoy close cultural and economic ties. The eminent Persian specialist

174

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

in the rational sciences Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī (d. 995/1587) settled in Central Asia toward the end of his life, along with his student Yūsuf Kawsaj Qarabāghī (d. 1033/1625). Both are known to have taught students who went on to become influential teachers of the philosophical sciences in India (Ḥasanī 1955, V, 384). In the middle decades of the seventeenth century, some of the works of Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā were introduced as well. Especially the former’s al-Ufuq al-mubīn and the latter’s commentary on Abharī’s Hidāyat al-ḥikma came to be studied and annotated from the second half of the seventeenth century. The introduction of these works seems to have been due to Persian philosophers active in the Indian subcontinent in the early to mid-seventeenth century, such as Mīr Findiriskī (d. 1050/1640–1), Mīr Muḥammad Hāshim Gīlānī (d. 1061/1651), and Mīr Dāmād’s student Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad Gīlānī (d. 1071/ 1660) (Rizvi 2011). Perhaps the earliest Indo-Muslim scholar to engage with Mīr Dāmād’s work was Maḥmūd Jawnpūrī (d. 1062/1652) who was close to the court of Shah Jahān (r. 1037/1628–1068/1658) and tutor to the Emperor’s son Shah Shujāʿ (d. 1071/1661) (Ḥasanī 1955, V, 397–399; Ahmed EI3 “Maḥmūd Jawnpūrī”). The study of logic came to occupy a prominent role in madrasas in the Indian subcontinent in the eighteenth century. (On the influential, so-called Ders-i Niżāmī curriculum in Indo-Muslim colleges, see Ḥasanī 1958, 16). Widely studied introductory handbooks were Jurjānī’s Persian introductions Ṣughrā and Kubrā, Abharī’s Arabic introduction Īsāghūjī, and the aforementioned alMīzān. Students would then usually move on to the study of Kātibī’s Shamsiyya with the commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī and the gloss of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī. This was commonly supplemented with the following more demanding works: (1) Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq with the commentary of Dawānī and the gloss of Mīr Zāhid Harawī (d. 1101/1689–90); (2) Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s treatise on conception and assent, also with the gloss of Mīr Zāhid; and (3) the new handbook on logic by Muḥibbullāh Bihārī (d. 1119/1707), entitled Sullam al-ʿulūm (The Ladder of the Sciences), along with some standard commentaries. These three works, which will be discussed in more detail below, elicited a plethora of glosses by Indo-Muslim scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The nature of the advanced works studied in India reveals that “logic” had come to be strongly associated with a sophisticated and in-depth discussion of metaphysical and epistemological issues presented in the early parts of the

(i) Introduction

handbooks on logic from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, for example: the nature of knowledge (ʿilm); the division of knowledge into conception and assent; the mental existence of quiddities; the unity of knowledge and known; the subject matter of a science; the nature of second intentions; whether conception and assent can have the same intentional object; whether substance terms can be applied with modulation (tashkīk); and whether and in what sense universals exist extra-mentally. Also intensively discussed were a number of logical paradoxes, for example the liar paradox, or the paradox of “what is not conceived in any way” (al-majhūl al-muṭlaq), or “the sophism that can occur generally” (al-mughālaṭa al-ʿāmmat al-wurūd) about which more will be said below. By comparison, there was little interest in systematically pursuing purely formal implications such as modal conversion and contraposition, the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions, and the modal and hypothetical syllogisms. A scholar such as Mīr Zāhid Harawī was able to gain a reputation as a consummate “logician” without engaging with such issues in his writings. In effect, the field of logic had ceased to be particularly associated with working out formal implications and assessing formal proofs, a substantial departure from the conception of the field by thirteenth-century logicians such as Khūnajī, Kātibī, Urmawī and Samarqandī. This was a culmination of a process that was already in evidence in the second half of the fourteenth century, as is clear from the previous chapter on the Eastern Islamic logical tradition from 1350 to 1600. The discipline of dialectics (ādāb al-baḥth or ʿilm al-munāẓara) was also a staple part of the madrasa curriculum on the Indian subcontinent, though perhaps not as intensively cultivated as logic. The standard handbook was the so-called al-Risāla al-Sharīfiyya (The Sharīfian Treatise) that has been attributed to al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413). The attribution deserves closer scrutiny. The treatise appears to have been unknown outside the Indian subcontinent, and it is not clear when it was first claimed there that Jurjānī was the author of the handbook, nor has a close study of extant manuscripts been done. As was seen in Chapter Two above, other works were mistakenly or questionably attributed to Jurjānī in later centuries. This suggests the possibility, at least pending further research, that the work might actually be by another “Sharīf ”, such as Jurjānī’s great-grandson Mīr Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, who studied with Dawānī in Persia and later enjoyed the patronage of Niẓām al-Dīn II, ruler of Sind (r. 866/1461–914/1508) (Pourjavady 2011, 13), or Mīr Sharīf Āmulī (fl.

175

176

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

993/1585), a specialist in the philosophical sciences who hailed from the same general region as Jurjānī and enjoyed the patronage of the Mughal Emperor Akbar (Ḥasanī 1955, V, 166). Be that as it may, the standard commentaries on al-Risāla al-Sharīfiyya were written by Muḥammad Rashīd Jawnpūrī (d. 1083/ 1672) and ʿAbd al-Bāqī Jawnpūrī (d. 1082/1671–2). Their commentaries were repeatedly lithographed in India in the nineteenth century, with copious annotations by later Indo-Muslim scholars. The following are some of the major Indo-Muslim logicians from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:

(ii)   ̔Abd al-H. akı¯m Siya¯lku ¯tı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, V, 210–211) He was born in Sialkot, in the Punjab, and studied with Kamāl al-Dīn Kashmīrī (d. 1017/1608), about whom little is known. He apparently also studied in Lahore with ʿAbd al-Salām Lāhūrī (d. 1037/1627–8), one of Fatḥullāh Shīrāzī’s most influential students (Ḥasanī 1955, V, 223–224). He went on to gain a reputation as a scholar in the rational sciences, writing works on philosophical theology (kalām), semantics-rhetoric, jurisprudence and logic that continued to be studied for centuries. Siyālkūtī dedicated a number of works to the Mughal ruler Shah Jahān, who reportedly twice rewarded him with his weight in silver. He died in 1067/1657. His major work on logic was an extensive gloss, completed in 1053/1643 and dedicated to Shah Jahān, on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya. It was lithographed in Delhi in 1870 and in Lucknow in 1878 (the editions do not give the Hijri dates). It was printed in movable type in Istanbul in two volumes in 1259/1843 and then reprinted there in 1291/1874 and 1320/1902. It was also printed in Cairo in 1323/1905 along with Quṭb alDīn’s commentary and Jurjānī’s gloss. As was so often the case with later glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on the Shamsiyya, Siyālkūtī’s gloss focused mainly on the discussion of introductory matters and issues relating to the acquisition of conceptions (types of linguistic reference, the five universals, definitions and descriptions). Just a little over 10% of the gloss discusses the later passages in the commentary dealing with contradiction, conversion, contraposition, and syllogism. Siyālkūtī’s glosses were clearly informed by the work of Dawānī, whom he often followed, and ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī, of whom he was frequently critical. He often cited Quṭb al-Dīn alRāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, which typically expanded on points

(ii) ’Abd al-H.akı¯m Siya¯lku ¯tı¯ 177

made in the considerably shorter commentary on the Shamsiyya. He on occasion also quoted from Avicenna’s Shifāʾ. The later Indo-Muslim scholar ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Ḥasanī (d. 1341/1923) noted that Siyālkūtī’s works were particularly esteemed among Ottoman Turkish scholars (ʿulamāʾ al-Rūm) (Ḥasanī 1955, V, 210). Indeed, Siyālkūtī’s major works travelled extraordinarily well, and within a century of his death were known and esteemed in Istanbul and Cairo, as well as India. By the nineteenth century, Ottoman Turkish scholars such as Ḫōcā Kerīm Amāsī (d. 1303/1886) and ʿAbdülḥamīd Ḫarpūtī (d. 1320/1911) were writing extensive super-glosses on the first part – covering “conceptions” (taṣawwurāt) – of Siyālkūtī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on the Shamsiyya (Amāsī 1303/1885; Ḫarpūtī 1289/1872). The impact of Siyālkūtī’s writings therefore appears to have been as strong, if not actually stronger, in Istanbul than on the Indian subcontinent. One possible reason for this was that Siyālkūtī was writing before the influence of Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā was felt in Mughal India – he seems largely unaware of their works. By contrast, Indo-Muslim logicians writing in the second half of the seventeenth century began to engage with the works of the two Iranian philosophers, and this might explain why some of Siyālkūtī’s works tended to be superseded by later work. For example, his gloss on Jurjānī’s commentary on the Mawāqif, on philosophical theology, was largely supplanted by the gloss of Mīr Zāhid Harawī in the curriculum of Indo-Muslim madrasas (Ḥasanī 1958, 16). By contrast, among Ottoman Turkish scholars the influence of Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā appears to have been minimal, as will be shown in a subsequent section. The fact that Siyālkūtī did not engage with their work was therefore hardly seen as a problem. His gloss on Jurjānī’s commentary on the Mawāqif was printed on a number of occasions in Istanbul in the nineteenth century, for example in 1292/1875 and 1311/1893–4. Having said this, the fact that Siyālkūtī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on the Shamsiyya was lithographed twice in India in the 1870s shows that it continued to be read in later centuries. Furthermore, both Bihārī, the author of the aforementioned Sullam al-ʿulūm, and his eighteenth-century Indo-Muslim commentators were clearly familiar with Siyālkūtī’s work. For example, a passage in Bihārī’s handbook that discusses Avicenna’s views on the extension of the subject term of a proposition is clearly a summary of the corresponding discussion in Siyālkūtī’s gloss. Avicenna had criticized Fārābī for believing that the extension of the subject term includes anything of which it is possibly (bi-l-im-

178

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

kān) true, proposing instead that it should include only those entities of which the subject term is actually (bi-l-fiʿl) true. But Avicenna had also stated that the extension is not limited to things that fall under the subject term in extra-­ mental fact, but includes things that fall under it in mental supposition. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī had suggested that this meant that the extension of the subject term is the same according to both Fārābī and Avicenna, the difference being purely notional. Both would, for example, include a white person under the term “black human”: Fārābī because the white person can possibly be black, Avicenna because the mind can suppose the white person to be actually black. Siyālkūtī quoted Avicenna’s Shifāʾ at some length in defense of the view that the difference between the positions of Avicenna and Fārābī is real. A white person would not, for Siyālkūtī, fall under the extension of the term “black human” according to Avicenna. Avicenna’s point about not limiting the extension of the subject term to extra-mental things simply meant that, for example, non-existent black people were also included in the extension of the term “black human” (Siyālkūtī 1323/1905, II, 40–41). Bihārī briefly made the same point in his handbook, using the same example (Gūpāmawī 1887, 188–189). Commentators on Bihārī were aware of the influence of Siyālkūtī, referring to the latter as “alFāḍil al-Lāhūrī” (for example Gūpāmawī 1887, 185, 254). Siyālkūtī also wrote a super-gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn alRāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ. This clearly did not circulate nearly as widely as his gloss on the commentary on the Shamsiyya. One of the few extant manuscripts, in the Khuda Bakhsh Library in Bankipore in India (Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2263, 131 folios, 19 lines per page), is dated 1016/1607, suggesting it was an early work written decades before his more famous gloss. A very short, extant treatise on sophisms (mughālaṭāt) is also attributed to Siyālkūtī (ʿArshī 1971, IV, 370).

(iii) Muh. ammad Rashı¯d Jawnpu ¯rı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, V, 367–370; Fozail Ahmed Qadri, “  ̔ Abd al-Rashı¯d Jawnpu ¯rı¯”, EI3) Muḥammad Rashīd Jawnpūrī was born in a village near Cawnpore (present-day Kanpur) in 1000/1592. He pursued the rational sciences at an advanced level at the hands of Muḥammad Afżal Jawnpūrī (d. 1062/1652), who had studied with students of Fatḥullāh Shīrāzī and who also taught Maḥmūd Jawnpūrī, mentioned above as one of the first Indian scholars to engage (critically) with the

(iii) Muh. ammad Rashı¯d Jawnpu ¯rı¯ 179

works of Mīr Dāmād. Muḥammad Rashīd Jawnpūrī was also initiated into a number of Sufi orders by Ṭayyib Banārisī (d. 1042/1633) and became an initiating Sufi master himself, writing a number of mystical works and having his Sufi aphorisms collected by disciples. He taught for a number of years in Cawnpore, where he died in 1083/1672. As mentioned above, Muḥammad Rashīd Jawnpūrī wrote one of the standard commentaries on al-Risāla al-Sharīfiyya, a handbook on dialectics attributed to al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) that was widely studied in India. It has already been mentioned that the attribution is questionable and deserves further scrutiny. A closer look at the handbook is therefore included in the present section, rather than in the entry on al-Jurjānī in Chapter Two on Eastern Islamic logic from 1350 to 1600. The following is an overview of the contents, along with the page numbers of the Cairo edition of Jawnpūrī’s commentary, with extensive glosses by later scholars reproduced in the footnotes (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Muḥammad ʿAlī Ṣubayḥ, 1929): – Preamble (pp. 3–14) – Introduction (pp. 14–65). Definitions of key terms in the science of dialectics – Section I (pp. 65–71): On the natural ordering of dialectical exchanges – Section II (pp. 71–81): On whether one can object to definitions – Section III (pp. 81–88): On objecting to claims that are advanced without proof – Section IV (pp. 88–98): On objecting to specific premises (munāqaḍa) – Section V (pp. 98–105): On the corroboration (sanad) of one’s objection – Section VI (pp. 105–114): On objecting to the proffered proof (naqḍ) – Section VII (pp. 114–122): On objecting to the conclusion of the proof by presenting an equally compelling proof for the opposing conclusion (muʿāraḍa) – Section VIII (pp. 122–125): On objecting to a premise after a proof has been given for it, either by objecting to the proof or by presenting an equally compelling proof for the opposing premise – Section IX (pp. 125–130): If a disputant aims to sow doubt, rather than establish a claim, the opponent should confine himself to objecting to specific premises rather than objecting to the proof or giving a counterproof for the opposing conclusion

180

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

– Epilogue (pp. 130–136): The subject of disputation is always a claim, implicit or explicit. On avoiding haste in disputation. On adjusting the standards of proof to the subject matter The handbook attributed to Jurjānī shows that the schema presented by Samarqandī in his classic handbook (described in Chapter One) was coming under pressure in later centuries. It was unclear, for example, whether a straightforward claim without a proof could be objected to in one of the three standard ways: a proof not having been given, one could hardly object to a premise (munāqaḍa), or object that the proof is flawed (naqḍ), or present a counterproof for the opposing claim (muʿāraḍa). It was also unclear in what sense definitions could be subject to dialectical objections, for the objective of a definition is arguably to bring to mind a concept (taṣawwur), not an assent (taṣḍīq), in which case it is not really a claim at all. Muḥammad Rashīd’s commentary, which came to be known as al-Rashīdiyya (The Rashīdian), included critical remarks on a commentary on the same handbook by his younger contemporary and townsman ʿAbd al-Bāqī Jawnpūrī (d. 1082/1672). This prompted ʿAbd al-Bāqī to write a second commentary responding to the Rashīdiyya. The disputes between the two commentators were pursued by later Indo-Muslim glossators on these commentaries.

(iv) Mı¯r Za¯hid Harawı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, VI, 306–308; Sharı¯ ̔ atı¯ 2004, (3), 7–36) The birthdate of Mīr Muḥammad Zāhid b. Muḥammad Aslam al-Harawī is not known. His father was born in Herat, left for Central Asia and then India, and was appointed judge of Kabul by the Mughal ruler Jahangir (r. 1014/1605– 1037/1627), retaining this post until his death in 1061/1650. Mīr Zāhid studied the philosophical sciences in Lahore with Muḥammad Afżal Badakhshī (d. 1050/ 1640), who in turn had studied in Central Asia with Yūsuf Kawsaj Qarabāghī, the aforementioned student of the prominent Persian philosopher Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī. Mīr Zāhid later became attached to the court of Aurangzeb (r. 1069/ 1659–1118/1707), whose overseer (muḥtasib) of military accounts he became. He was later appointed head (ṣadr) of religious endowments in Kabul, where he died in 1101/1689–90. Mīr Zāhid authored two widely studied glosses on logical works:

(iv) Mı¯r Za¯hid Harawı¯ 181

1) A gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s treatise on conception and assent (Sharīʿatī 2004). The extensive gloss engages critically with Quṭb al-Dīn’s treatise, drawing on the works of Avicenna, Ṭūsī and Quṭb al-Dīn alShīrāzī, as well as fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Persian scholars such as Dawānī, Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī, Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī and Mīr Dāmād. (It does not appear to take note of Mullā Ṣadrā’s treatise on conception and assent.) The gloss brings home in a particularly striking way the fact that glossators did not just explicate the base text. Quṭb al-Dīn’s treatise, though far from simple, is much less demanding than Mīr Zāhid’s probing gloss. The gloss in turn elicited a great many super-­ glosses by later Indo-Muslim scholars, of which those by Ghulām Yaḥyā Bihārī (d. 1180/1767) and Baḥr al-ʿUlūm Lakhnawī (d. 1225/1810) appear to have been particularly esteemed and elicited a number of super-­ super-glosses (Sharīʿatī 2004, (3), 40–50). 2) A gloss on Dawānī’s incomplete commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (Mīr Zāhid 1293/1876). Again, this gloss engages extensively and critically with Dawānī’s commentary, drawing on some of the same authorities as in his gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s treatise, as well as earlier glossators on Dawānī’s commentary, such as Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ and Fakhr al-Dīn Sammākī Astarābādī. It may perhaps be recalled from the earlier chapter on Eastern Islamic logic from 1350 to 1600 that the last-mentioned glossator had raised the following problem: Dawānī had defended both the view that conception and assent can have the same intentional object, and that knowledge and what is known is essentially identical. Together, these two views should imply that assent is a subtype of conception, undermining the standard division of knowledge into conception and assent. Mīr Zāhid’s response may give a flavor of the subtle discussions in his glosses: though knowledge was usually defined as “the form of a thing in the mind”, Mīr Zāhid argued that closer scrutiny should lead us to distinguish between knowledge as a cognitive state (ḥāla idrākiyya) and the occurrence of the form to the mind. The cognitive state occurs when the form is present, in which case knowledge can truthfully be predicated of the occurring form, but this is accidental predication. The reality of knowledge is not the form itself, but the consequent cognitive state. This allows us to solve the problem, for the division of knowledge into conception and assent is a division of the reality of knowledge, i.e.,

182

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

the cognitive state, whereas what is identical to the known object is the form that occurs to the mind (pp. 46–49). Mīr Zāhid’s gloss on “Mullā Jalāl”, as it was widely known, again elicited countless super-glosses by later Indo-Muslim scholars (some of which will be mentioned below).

(v) Muh. ibbulla¯h Biha¯rı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, VI, 250–252; Ahmed 2016) He was born in a village near present-day Aurangabad in the province of Bihar, and studied with Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1103/1691). The Emperor Aurangzeb appointed him a judge in Lucknow and later a tutor to the son of Aurangzeb’s son Shah ʿĀlam. When Shah ʿĀlam I succeeded his father in 1118/1707, Bihārī was appointed head (ṣadr) of religious endowments in the Empire, though he died a few months later, in 1119/1707. Bihārī wrote the following works on logic: 1) A short treatise on the “sophism that can occur generally” (al-mughālaṭa al-ʿāmmat al-wurūd). The sophism goes as follows: Take any proposition p. It must be the case that p. This can be proven by indirect proof: If it is not the case that p, then the contradictory of p must be the case, and if the contradictory of p is the case then something is the case, so the following conditional must be true, “Whenever it is not the case that p then something is the case”. This conditional implies, by contra­position, “Whenever it is false that something is the case then p is the case”. But this last conditional seems clearly false, for if nothing is the case then it is surely not the case that p. This sophism appears to have been formulated already in the thirteenth century, for it appears in Qisṭās al-afkār by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī who was discussed in Chapter One (Samarqandī 2014, 559). Bihārī’s solution is to deny that the conclusion is false: It is impossible that it should be false that some­thing is the case, and an impossible antecedent may imply an impossible consequent. His treatise was lithographed in Lucknow in 1298/1881 (al-Maṭbaʿ alʿAlawī) on p. 64 of a miscellany consisting of ʿAbd al-Rashīd Jawnpūrī’s commentary on the Sharīfiyya on dialectics (pp. 2–­62), Ījī’s short treatise on dialectics (pp. 62–63), and a commentary on Bihārī’s treatise by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Lakhnawī (d. 1285/1868) (on pp. 65–79).

(v) Muh. ibbulla¯h Biha¯rı¯ 183

2) The handbook Sullam al-ʿulūm (The Ladder of the Sciences). This is one of the most successful of the later handbooks of Arabic logic, and by the nineteenth century was taught not only in India but also – as noted above – in Central Asia, Russian Tatarstan and Egypt. It elicited numerous commentaries, of which the following were influential enough to be lithographed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: a. By Ḥamdullāh Sandīlī (d. 1160/1747). Particularly the section of the commentary covering the second half of Bihārī’s handbook, on assents, came to be widely studied and glossed. b. By Qāżī Mubārak Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749). Particularly the section covering the first half, on conceptions, came to be widely studied and glossed. Indian lithographs of this commentary usually only include that first part. It was printed in its entirety along with Bihārī’s Sullam in Kazan in 1887 in 316 pages. c. By Mullā Ḥasan Lakhnawī (d. 1199/1784). Particularly the section covering the first half, on conceptions, came to be widely studied and glossed. d. By Baḥr al-ʿUlūm Lakhnawī (d. 1225/1810). e. By Mullā Mubīn Lakhnawī (d. 1225/1810). Entitled Mirʾāt alshurūḥ (The Mirror of Commentaries), this was a lengthy commentary, lithographed in two volumes in Lucknow in 1882 and printed in two volumes in Cairo in 1327/1909–1328/1910.

Bihārī’s handbook does not have clear divisions into sections and subsections. The following is a rough table of contents, along with the page numbers of the undated lithograph published in Karachi by Qadīm-i Kutubkhāne under the title Sullam al-ʿulūm maʿa ḥāshiyatihi Iṣʿād al-fuhūm, which presents Bihārī’s work in the main rubric, with extensive glosses on the margins:

I. Preamble. Introduction: Conception and assent; the subject matter of logic; Meno’s paradox; the four main questions of scientific inquiry: that, which, whether (simple and compound), and why (pp. 2–13)

184

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

II. Conceptions a. A discussion of the principle that what is not conceived in any way (al-majhūl al-muṭlaq) cannot be judged (the problem being that the statement seems precisely to be a statement about what is not conceived in any way); linguistic and semantic preliminaries; the compound utterance; the liar paradox (pp. 13–23) b. Particular and universal terms; whether particulars can occupy a predicate position in a proposition; the relations between the extensions of terms; the five universals; the extra-mental existence of universals (pp. 23–58) c. Definitions and descriptions (pp. 58–68) III. Assents a. Propositions and their parts; the differing views of conditionals among grammarians and logicians; whether a proposition might imply its own negation; “The sophism that can occur generally” (pp. 69–81) b. Quantified propositions: The different senses of “Every”; whether the subject term refers to the universal reality or the particulars falling under it; the difference between “primary predication” and “common, logical predication”; the existential import of subject terms (pp. 81–100) c. The standard post-Avicennian modality propositions (pp. 100–114) d. Conditionals and disjunctions; some problematic conditionals with impossible antecedents (pp. 114–129) e. Contradiction, conversion and contraposition (pp. 129–148) f. The definition of the syllogism; the four figures; the modal syllogism; hypothetical syllogisms, including some problematic cases (pp. 148–165) g. Induction and analogy (pp. 165–169) h. The five arts: demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, poetical, and sophistical syllogisms (pp. 169–179) The page numbers may give a misleading impression of the length of Bihārī’s handbook; each page only has on average seven lines of the Sullam, and the margins are generous to allow for extensive glosses. The page numbers will nevertheless give a sense of the focus of the work. Only approxi-

(v) Muh. ibbulla¯h Biha¯rı¯ 185

mately 20% of the work is devoted to discussing the immediate implications of propositions and the formal syllogism, compared to approximately 38% dealing with preliminary matters and conceptions. A striking feature of Bihārī’s handbook is the focus on puzzles and paradoxes, usually introduced with terms such as “doubt” (shakk) or “sophism” (mughālaṭa), followed by their “solution” (ḥall). These include Meno’s paradox, the paradox of “what is not conceived in any way” (al-­ majhūl al-muṭlaq), the liar paradox, and “the sophism that occurs generally”. When Bihārī discussed modal and hypothetical logic, he clearly presumed the reader was familiar with the treatment in works such as Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and its commentaries. He gave a summary account of such formal matters, referring the reader to other works for fuller accounts of, for example, the relative strength of the numerous modality propositions, the immediate implication of conditionals and disjunctions, and the fourth figure of the modal syllogism. Instead, he pursued puzzles that had been raised by previous logicians. One such, for example, is the statement “Every human necessarily exists”. This seems at first sight to meet the standard definition of an absolute necessity proposition: the predicate is necessarily true of the subject as long as the subject exists. Yet, the opposing contingency proposition seems clearly true: Some human contingently exists (pp. 104–106). Another puzzle relates to wholly hypothetical syllogisms such as the following, in which the premises seem true but the conclusion seems false (pp. 161–163): Always: If 4 is odd then it is a number Always: If 4 is a number then it is even Always: If 4 is odd then it is even

For Bihārī’s North African contemporaries, advanced handbooks on logic (such as Khūnajī’s Jumal) differed from introductory handbooks on logic (such as Akhḍarī’s Sullam) by discussing modality propositions, systematically working out their relative strengths, their conversions and contra­ positions and the modal syllogism, as well as the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions and the hypothetical syllogism, including

186

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

the notoriously difficult topic of hypothetical syllogisms in which the premises only share a term (juzʾ ghayr tāmm), rather than an entire antecedent or consequent. In the Indo-Muslim context, what made Bihārī’s text an advanced handbook was not that it dealt with such topics – it did so rather cursorily and less systematically than works that were studied at an earlier stage of the logical curriculum, such as the commentaries on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya. Rather, it was considered part of the pinnacle of logical studies because it raised and discussed doubts and puzzles at almost every step through its exposition of the standard topics of post-Avicennian logic.

(vi) Ja¯rulla¯h Ila¯ha¯ba¯dı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, VI, 54) Almost nothing is now known of this scholar apart from his being Mufti of Allahabad (in present-day Uttar Pradesh) and a contemporary of Amānullāh Banārisī (d. 1133/1720–1), with whom he engaged in a number of scholarly polemics (on the latter scholar, see Ḥasanī 1955, VI, 39). He authored a conspicuous number of works on logic: 1) A treatise on the liar paradox (al-jadhr al-aṣamm). This is extant in the British Library in London (MS Delhi Arabic 1568, fols. 35a–43b). Ilāhābādī’s solution, which is explicitly presented as original, is as follows: The proposition “My statement now is false” is both true and false. Because the proposition says of itself that it is false, its truth implies its falsity and its falsity implies its truth. It expresses the judgment that the predicate “false” is true of the subject, and the subject is the proposition itself. In this way, the proposition includes two opposing judgments, and entails opposing consequences: truth and falsity. An analogue would be if one were to inquire whether the human who is not a human is a human or not. The straightforward answer is that the human who is not a human is both a human and not a human. Similarly, a proposition whose truth implies its falsity and whose falsity implies its truth is both true and not true. 2) A treatise on the abovementioned problem of “the sophisms that occur generally” (al-mughālaṭāt al-ʿāmmat al-wurūd). This is extant in the Raza Library in Rampur (MS 5138D: fols. 56a–57a) (ʿArshī 1971–, IV, 408–9).

(vi) Ja¯rulla¯h Ila¯ha¯ba¯dı¯ 187

3) A treatise on the “problem of entailment” (shubhat al-istilzām), presented in the entry on Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī in the previous chapter on Iranian logicians from 1600 to 1800. This is extant in the Raza Library in Rampur (MS 5138D: fols. 52a–55a) (ʿArshī 1971–, IV, 408–9). 4) A treatise on the following principle: if one concept J is narrower in extension than another concept B, then the negation of J is wider in extension than the negation of B. Apparent counterexamples to this principle, discussed since the thirteenth century, were known as “the problem of the contradictory of the narrower being wider” (shubhat naqīḍ al-akhaṣṣ aʿamm). The treatise is extant in the Raza Library in Rampur (MS 5138D: fols. 57b–58a) (ʿArshī 1971–, IV, 408–9). 5) Tadhkirat al-mīzān (The Memento of the Scale), a condensed manual on logic. There are at least two extant manuscript copies of this work: (1) Raza Library, Rampur: MS 2083M: 101 folios with 11 lines per page, copied in 1157/1744; (2) Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesı, Manisa (Turkey): MS 2203, folios 1b–10b, 27 lines per page, copied in 1191/1777. (Judging from the handwriting, the latter copy was made in India, not Turkey.) In length, style, scope and focus, Ilāhābādī’s Tadhkirat al-mīzān is reminiscent of Bihārī’s Sullam al-ʿulūm. The focus is noticeably on introducing various principles and then using these to solve problems or paradoxes. Ilāhābādī was familiar with Bihārī’s work and explicitly cited it, so the parallels are not fortuitous. Other logicians regularly cited by Ilāhābādī are Mīr Zāhid Harawī, Mīr Dāmād, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, Quṭb al-Dīn alRāzī, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (especially his commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt), and Avicenna. Another comparable Indo-Muslim handbook on logic that dates from approximately the same period is Baḥr al-manṭiq (The Sea of Logic) by Ḥabībullāh Qannawjī (d. 1140/1727–8) (ʿArshī 1971, IV, 406). Unlike the case of Ilāhābādī’s Tadhkirat al-mīzān, the relation between Qannawjī’s work and Bihārī’s is not clear. There do not seem to be any obvious signs that either author was engaging with the other. Qannawjī’s work was completed in 1105/1693–4; Bihārī’s Sullam was written before 1109/1698, for he refers to it in his manual on jurisprudence Musallam al-thubūt composed on that date. Whichever was written first, the examples of Baḥr al-manṭiq

188

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

and Tadhkirat al-mīzān show that Bihārī’s Sullam was not the only independent and advanced handbook of logic written in the Indian subcontinent in this period, but rather the most successful of a number of such works that all testify to the intensive and sophisticated study of the discipline at the time.

(vii) Qa¯˙z¯ı Muba¯rak Gu ¯pa¯mawı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, VI, 247–248) As indicated by his attributive, Qāżī Muḥammad Mubārak b. Muḥammad Dāʾim hailed from the town of Gopamau in what is today the state of Uttar Pradesh in northcentral India. His date of birth is not known, but he was already writing scholarly works before the end of Aurangzeb’s reign in 1118/1707. He referred to Mīr Zāhid Harawī as his teacher (see, for example, the marginal annotations to Gūpāmawī 1887, 25, 34, 62, 63, 127, 128, 152). He went on to teach in Delhi for many years, and died there in 1162/1749. Gūpāmawī’s major work on logic was a commentary on Bihārī’s Sullam alʿulūm. According to one of his own glosses on the introduction to the commentary, he wrote the major part of it during the reign of Aurangzeb, i.e., in Bihari’s own lifetime, but only had a chance to complete it many years later, in 1143/1730. It is thus one of the earliest commentaries on Bihari’s handbook, and certainly the earliest of the more famous and widely studied commentaries. Especially the first part dealing with “conceptions” (taṣawwurāt) was glossed intensively in Indo-Muslim colleges, and was lithographed on a number of occasions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The entire commentary was printed in movable type in Kazan in 1887, indicating that the commentary was also studied among the Muslim Tatars at the time. An autograph manuscript copy is extant in the Raza Library in Rampur (5357M: 122 fols., 19 lines per page). Gūpāmawī’s commentary follows Bihārī’s handbook in delving deeply into introductory matters and the logic of conceptions. The boundary between logic and metaphysics is difficult to observe in the work. Gūpāmawī pursued in detail and with considerable sophistication questions such as: whether quiddities are “made” (majʿūlā) or whether it is strictly their existence that is “made” (pp. 11–14); the definition of knowledge, which category it belongs to, and the relation between knowledge by presence and knowledge by forms (pp. 16–31); whether substance terms can be applied analogically (i.e., with variation of intensity or priority) as claimed by the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) phi-

(vii) Qa¯˙z¯ı Muba¯rak Gu ¯pa¯mawı¯ 189

losophers (pp. 60–66); in what sense God can be said to know changing, sublunary particulars (pp. 86–87); whether natural universals and Platonic Forms have extra-­mental existence (pp. 134–144); and whether the world is eternal as claimed by most philosophers, or created in time as claimed by theologians, or created outside of time (ḥudūth dahrī), as claimed by Mīr Dāmād (pp. 171–177). By contrast, only around 12% of the total is devoted to the immediate implications of propositions (such as conversion and contraposition) and the formal syllogism. It may be recalled that approximately two-thirds of the major summas of logic from the thirteenth century were devoted to such formal topics. The authors most frequently cited by Gūpāmawī are his teacher Mīr Zāhid, Mīr Dāmād, Dawānī, and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī. Less regularly, he referred to Mīr Dāmād’s student Mullā Ṣadrā (his al-Asfār al-arbaʿa); Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī (his gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Sharḥ al-Maṭāliʿ), ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkūtī (his gloss on Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya), and Avicenna (revealingly, the references are not to his logical works but to the Metaphysics of al-Shifāʾ). Interestingly, he referred consistently and reverentially to Mīr Dāmād as “The First Teacher of the Yemenite Philosophy (al-muʿallim al-awwal li-l-ḥikmati l-yamāniyya)” (see, for example, pp. 46, 121, 143). Most later Sunni, Indo-Muslim logicians would adopt a much more negative stance toward the Iranian philosopher. Though respectful, Gūpāmawī’s attitude toward Mīr Dāmād was certainly not uncritical. This comes across, for example, in his discussion of the liar paradox. In the Sullam, Bihārī had presented Dawānī’s solution to the paradox which, to recapitulate, went as follows: The sentence “This statement of mine is false” is not a proposition, and therefore cannot be said to be true or false. This is because there is no nexus between subject and predicate that obtains independently of the sentence itself, and a proposition only obtains if there is such an independent nexus to which the nexus in the sentence can be said to correspond or not to correspond. Bihārī replied that, contrary to Dawānī’s claim, there is a difference between the report (al-ḥikāya) and what it is about (al-maḥkī ʿanhā), and it therefore makes sense to consider “This statement of mine is false” as a proposition that may or may not correspond to the nexus that actually obtains apart from the proposition. The report itself is the specific proposition “This statement of mine is false”. What the report is about is the predication of falsity to that statement considered in a nonspecific sense, i.e., without taking into account its specific content. Paradox is avoided because falsity is attributed to “This statement of mine” considered in a nonspecific (mujmal) sense, while

190

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

truth is attributed to “This statement of mine is false” considered as a specific (mufaṣṣal) proposition. In other words, the problematic statement is not really self-referential: the proposition “This statement of mine is false” truthfully ascribes falsity to “This statement of mine”, and there is no paradox in saying truthfully that some other statement is false. Like almost all commentators on Bihārī’s Sullam, Gūpāmawī rejected Bihārī’s solution and claimed that Dawānī’s is preferable (Gūpāmawī 1887, 76– 78). He argued as follows: If the subject “This statement of mine” is considered nonspecifically, i.e., simply as a subject (of a proposition) that can be indicated by a subject term, then it makes no sense to say that it is true or false. Terms are not true or false; only propositions are. If, on the other hand, it is considered as a proposition consisting of a subject (“This statement of mine”) and a predicate (“is false”), then the report and what it is about are the same, and it cannot be that the report is true and what it is about is false. Bihārī’s own glosses (minhuyāt) make it clear that he was inspired by Mīr Dāmād’s solution to the liar paradox. As was stated in the preceding chapter on the Iranian tradition of logic, Mir Damad had argued that the predicate “is false” only “transmits” to the subject “This statement of mine” when that subject is understood nonspecifically. In this way, he attempted to block Dawānī’s point that the predicate “is false” applies not only to the subject “This statement of mine” but also to the entire sentence “This statement of mine is false”, thus making that sentence predicate falsity of itself and generating the paradox that if that entire sentence is false then it is true and if it is true then it is false. Gūpāmawī replied, first, that Mīr Dāmād’s point is implausible when we are dealing with a proposition with a particular (as opposed to a universal) subject, such as “This statement of mine”. How can the subject of the proposition be understood “nonspecifically” even though it is particularized by a demonstrative? Furthermore, Mīr Dāmād’s point has absurd consequences. In a universal affirmative proposition (“Every B is A”) the predicate applies not only to the explicitly stated subject (“B”) but also to everything of which that subject is true, even if those things are conceived in a general way. If it did not transmit in this manner, then a first-figure syllogism such as the following would not be productive: Every J is B Every B is A Every J is A

(viii) Mulla¯ H.asan Lakhnawı¯ 191

The truth of the conclusion of the syllogism is based on the predicate “A” transmitting to “J” which falls under “B”. Gūpāmawī’s other major work on logic is a gloss on Mīr Zāhid’s gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. This was completed in 1145/1732, two years after the completion of his commentary on Bihārī’s Sullam. An autograph manuscript copy is extant in Raza Library in Rampur (nr. 5355M, 67 fols., 19 lines per page).

(viii) Mulla¯ H. asan Lakhnawı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, VI, 296–298) Muḥammad Ḥasan b. Ghulām Muṣṭafā, often known as “Mullā Ḥasan”, was a great-grandson of Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī, the aforementioned teacher of Bihārī. He was born in Lucknow and studied with his father’s uncle Niẓām al-Dīn b. Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī (d. 1161/1748), the influential teacher and scholar at the Farang-i Maḥall madrasa in Lucknow who established the curriculum, the socalled Ders-i Niẓāmī, that came to be influential in Indo-Muslim colleges down to the modern period. Mullā Ḥasan went on to teach in Lucknow for around twenty years. He later had to leave the city due to his family’s involvement in local sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiites, and spent time in Faizabad, Shahjahanpur and Delhi before settling in the newly founded city of Rampur in Uttar Pradesh where he continued teaching until he died in 1199/1784. His main works on logic are:

1) A gloss on the gloss of Mīr Zāhid Harawī on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (ʿArshī 1971, IV, pp. 342–344; Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2292). 2) A gloss on the gloss of Mīr Zāhid on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s treatise on conception and assent (ʿArshī 1971, IV, pp. 308–309; Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2269). 3) A commentary on Bihārī’s Sullam al-ʿulūm, completed in 1177/1763. The first part of this commentary, covering the introductory parts and the acquisition of conceptions, was widely studied in later generations and was lithographed repeatedly in India in the nineteenth century along with the gloss of ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Lakhnawī (d. 1285/1868). It appears to have been a particularly independent-minded work, for

192

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

example including a protest against the dominant tendency to equate knowledge (ʿilm) with conception (taṣawwur) (Mullā Ḥasan 2001, pp. 39–40); a defense of the “revisionist” view of Khūnajī and Kātibī that the subject matter of logic is broader than just second intentions (pp. 58–60); and a defense of Dawānī’s proposed solution to the liar paradox against Bihārī’s criticism (which, as indicated above, was inspired by Mīr Dāmād’s criticism) (pp. 99–102). 4) A handbook on logic titled Maʿārij al-ʿulūm (The Stairs of the Sciences). This is modeled on, but somewhat longer than, Bihārī’s Sullam. In the introduction to the work, he wrote: I was asked by a person with blazing intelligence and engagement … to compose a treatise on logic that would critically verify, reexamine and correct the treatise written in this [field] by the learned Muḥibbullāh al-Bihārī. The request corresponded to my own thoughts, for I saw in it [Bihārī’s treatise] an imitation of some of the more obscure positions of the philosophers, an inclination away from the right path, additions that are not suitable for such a book, and words not acceptable to pure hearts. I also saw that it was devoid of a number of important issues. So I met his request, relying upon God the Most High, and wrote down in a short span of time a treatise that I titled The Stairs of the Sciences, in which there are verified points that dispel imitation, emphatic points that dispel waywardness, reexaminations of additions, and corrections of positions that are devoid of assent and truth (fol. 54a).



The work covers much of the same ground as the Sullam, but in somewhat less condensed prose. There are at least two extant copies of Mullā Ḥasan’s handbook: British Library, London: MS Delhi Arabic 1519 (60 folios, 15 lines to a page, copied in 1228/1813) and Raza Library, Rampur: MS 8182M (fols. 54b–76b, 23 lines to a page, copied in 1198/ 1783–4). The main divisions of the handbook are as follows, with the folio number of the Rampur manuscript: I.

Introduction on the definition, purpose and subject matter of logic (fol. 54b) II. Linguistic preliminaries (fol. 56a) III. The five universals (fol. 59a) IV. Definition and description (fol. 62b) V. Propositions (fol. 63b)

(ix) Bah. r al- ’ Ulu ¯m Lakhnawı¯ 193

VI. Contradiction (fol. 70b) VII. Conversion (fol. 72a) VIII. Argument: Syllogism (fol. 73a) IX. Argument: Induction and analogy (fol. 75a) X. The five arts (fol. 75b–76b) In terms of overall organization and coverage, the handbook is very much in the post-Avicennan tradition: the organizing principle is to have two main parts on conceptions and their acquisition and on assents and their acquisition; four figures of the syllogism are recognized, though the reader is referred to longer works for a discussion of the modal syllogisms of the fourth figure; the modal logic is broadly “revisionist” rather than orthodox Avicennan; and little attention is given to the matter of the syllogism. On points of detail, however, Mullā Ḥasan frequently departed from received views, as indeed he had announced in his introduction. Apart from the points mentioned above in the discussion of Mullā Ḥasan’s commentary on the Sullam, there is also a subtle discussion of the problem of relational syllogisms. Mullā Ḥasan incisively noted a tension in Bihārī’s (and most of his commentators’) treatment of inferences such as “A is equal to B, B is equal to J, so A is equal to J”. They at the same time (i) denied that such an inference is a syllogism, (ii) asserted that the two premises “A is equal to B” and “B is equal to J” formally entail the conclusion “A is equal to what is equal to J”, and (iii) defined a syllogism as a pair of premises that formally entails another proposition. Mullā Ḥasan noted that these positions are inconsistent. If it is conceded that the premises “A is equal to B” and “B is equal to J” entail “A is equal to what is equal to J”, then the premises meet the definition of a syllogism (fol. 73b).

(ix) Bah. r al- ̔ Ulu ¯m Lakhnawı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, VII, 282–287; Ahmed, “Bah. r al- ̔ Ulu ¯m,  ̔ Abd al- ̔ Alı¯”, EI3) Baḥr al-ʿUlūm ʿAbd al-ʿAliyy Lakhnawī was born in Lucknow in 1144/1731–32. He was the son of the previously mentioned Niẓām al-Dīn b. Quṭb al-Dīn Sihālawī, the founder of the so-called Ders-i Niżāmī curriculum. ʿAbd al-ʿAliyy

194

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

studied with his father and, later, with his father’s student Kamāl al-Dīn Fatiḥpūrī (d. 1175/1761), before becoming an eminent teacher and scholar in his own right. He had to leave Lucknow after being accused of fomenting violence against Shiites there. (The rulers of the region of Oudh in which Lucknow was located were Shiites.) He continued teaching to considerable acclaim in Shahjahanpur, Rampur, Bengal, and Madras (the latter two then under the control of the British East India company), and died in the latter city in 1225/1810. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm was recognized as an eminent polymath who wrote esteemed works on Ḥanafī jurisprudence, logic, natural philosophy and mystical theosophy (he was an admirer of the Andalusian mystic Ibn ʿArabī). In his philoso­ phical and logical works, he regularly criticized Mīr Dāmād in harsh, even vituperative terms. The substance of his criticisms has yet to be studied (at least by a modern scholar outside of the Indian subcontinent) but their tenor can be gathered from the following words with which Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s concludes one discussion: And thus is has become clear to you that this person, with his incompetence and megalomania, when he attempts to explicate subtleties and uncover truths does not manage to bring forth anything but affected drivel and ornamented words. The only position he assumes is far-fetched imagining, and the only thing he drinks is what his fantasy mistakes as water when it is really a mirage (Baḥr al-ʿUlūm 1891, 128).

There may well have been a sectarian undertone to Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s harshness, just as there may have been a sectarian undertone to Mīr Dāmād’s dismissive attitude toward scholars such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Khūnajī, Kātibī, Taftāzānī and Jurjānī. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm’s works on logic include: 1) A commentary on Bihārī’s Sullam al-ʿulūm. It was lithographed in Delhi in 1891 in 276 pages. A more recent edition, based on the lithograph (but not including the numerous auto-glosses), was prepared by ʿAbd al-Naṣīr Aḥmad al-Malībārī (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2012). 2) A gloss on the gloss of Mīr Zāhid on Dawānī’s Sharḥ al-Tahdhīb. It was lithographed as an appendix (of 76 pages) to Dawānī’s commentary and Mīr Zāhid’s gloss in Delhi in 1913.

(x) Faz˙l-i Ima¯m Khayra¯ba¯dı¯ 195

3) A gloss on the gloss of Mīr Zāhid on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Risāla fī l-­taṣawwur wa l-taṣdīq. It was lithographed in Delhi in 1292/1875 in 66 pages with super-glosses by later scholars. 4) A gloss on the section of Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq dealing with the ḍābita, the passage in which Taftāzānī attempted to give the conditions of productivity across the figures of the syllogism in terms of “subject generality”. This has been printed in the appendix to a recent edition of Yazdī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Turkmānī (Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2018), pp. 425–439. 5) Annotations, presumably critical, to Mīr Dāmād’s al-Ufuq al-mubīn. An extant manuscript in Raza Library in Rampur comprises 26 folios with 18 to 24 lines per page (ʿArshī 1971–, IV, p. 594). The library classifies it as a work on logic (3639 Manṭiq/8121M).

(x) Faz˙l-i Ima¯m Khayra¯ba¯dı¯ (H. asanı¯ 1955, VII, 374; Ahmed, “Fad. l-i Ima¯m Khayra¯ba¯dı¯”, EI3) Fażl-i Imām b. Muḥammad Arshad Khayrābādī was born and raised in Khairabad, near Lucknow. He studied primarily with the local scholar ʿAbd al-Wājid Khayrābādī (d. 1216/1802), who in turn had studied with students of Kamāl al-Dīn Fatiḥpūrī, the aforementioned teacher of Baḥr al-ʿUlūm al-Laknawī. Fażl-i Imām later came under the employment of the British East India Company, whom he served as Mufti and Ṣadr (head of religious endowments) in Delhi. He gained a reputation as a specialist in logic and philosophy. His son Fażl-i Ḥaqq (d. 1278/1861) and grandson ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq (d. 1316/1899) were also leading scholars in these fields. Fażl-i Imām died in his hometown in 1243/1828. His works on logic include:

1) A commentary on al-Mīzān, the aforementioned introductory handbook of uncertain authorship that was widely studied in India. This was lithographed in 1286/1869 in 82 pages (Khayrābādī 1286/1869). 2) A gloss on Mīr Zāhid’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s treatise on conception and assent (ʿArshī 1971–, IV, pp. 320–321; Khuda Bakhsh 1963–, XXI, nr. 2273). 3) An introductory handbook on logic entitled al-Mirqāt (The Staircase), lithographed in Delhi in 1886/1303 in 32 pages, and frequently litho-

196

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

graphed thereafter along with various commentaries and glosses, both in the original Arabic and in Urdu translation. This was Fażl-i Imām’s most widely studied work. It remains a staple handbook in many madrasas on the Indian subcontinent, and has elicited numerous commentaries in Arabic, Persian and Urdu. Two early commentaries were by the author’s aforementioned grandson ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī (in Arabic, lithographed in Kanpur: Maṭbaʿ-i Niżāmī 1333/1915, 222 pp.) and by Ilāh-bakhsh Fayżābādī (d. 1306/1889) (in Persian, lithographed in Kanpur: Maṭbaʿ-i Niżāmī 1296/1879, 160 pp.). The Mirqāt has retained its popularity better than the Sullam, presumably because interest in the latter, more advanced handbook has suffered due to the noticeable decrease in the role of the rational sciences in madrasas in the Indian subcontinent in modern times. Fażl-i Imām’s handbook was explicitly aimed at the “beginner” (al-mubtadiʾ) and included what ought to be known by all students. In this respect, it is similar to Abharī’s Īsāghūjī, but it is significantly longer and more wide-ranging than that earlier handbook. It would seem that by Fażl-i Imām’s time, the sense of what all students should know about logic had expanded considerably. Indeed, Fażl-i Imām’s handbook probably afforded better preparation for the study of more advanced works than Abharī’s. To some extent, it can be seen as an abridged version of Bihārī’s Sullam, covering many of the same topics but in a more expansive manner and with much fewer doubts and puzzles. It introduces the standard modality propositions of post-Avicennian logic but does not discuss their conversion and contraposition or the modal syllogism. Towards the end of the work, it does expand on questions relating to the matter of the syllogism even beyond Bihārī’s treatment, after complaining that “later logicians” had neglected this topic even while delving into abstruse formal topics that are of little use, such as the hypothetical syllogism. The following is an outline of the contents of the handbook, with the page numbers of the edition published in Karachi in 2009: A) Introduction (pp. 4–15): 1. On knowledge and its division into conception and assent 2. The purpose of logic 3. The subject matter of logic

(x) Faz˙l-i Ima¯m Khayra¯ba¯dı¯ 197

B) Conceptions (pp. 15–43) 1. Utterances and types of reference 2. Subtypes of conventional reference 3. Singular and composite utterances 4. The logical predicate and the grammatical verb 5. Univocal. Equivocal. Analogical 6. Homonymy. Literal and metaphorical meaning 7. Synonymy 8. The complete compound expression 9. The incomplete compound expression 10. Particular and Universal 11. Different senses of universal 12. The relations between the extensions of two universals 13. Relative and absolute particulars 14. The species 15. The genus 16. The differentia 17. The proprium 18. The general accident 19. Definition and description 20. Real and lexical definition C) Assents (pp. 44–110) 1. On propositions 2. Affirmative and negative categorical propositions 3. The parts of the categorical proposition 4. Singular and quantified propositions 5. The A, I, E, and O propositions 6. The use of symbols such as “J” and “B” to stand for terms 7. Predication 8. The ḥaqīqī and khārijī proposition 9. Privative propositions 10. Modality propositions 11. Conditionals 12. Disjunctions 13. Quantified hypotheticals

198

VII. 1600–1800: The Indo-Muslim Tradition

14. The antecedent and consequent of a conditional are not asserted 15. Contradiction 16. Conversion 17. Contraposition 18. Three types of argument: syllogism, induction and analogy 19. Syllogism 20. The four figures of the categorical syllogism 21. The first figure 22. The second figure 23. The third figure 24. The fourth figure 25. Combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms 26. Reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms 27. Induction 28. Analogy 29. Indirect proof 30. The matter of the syllogism 31. Demonstration 32. Dialectics 33. Rhetoric 34. Poetics 35. Sophistry 36. The reasons for fallacies 37. On fallacies D) Conclusion (pp. 110–114) 1. The subject, principles and issues of science 2. The types of inquiry

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

(i) Introduction Until recently, historians tended to believe that the intellectual and cultural heyday of the Ottoman Empire was in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At least in the case of logic and the closely related field of dialectics, this belief has recently been shown to be mistaken (El-Rouayheb 2008). Of the works on logic written in the central parts of the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a conspicuous proportion were by scholars born and educated in Persia: ʿAlī al-ʿAjamī (d. 860/1456), who wrote a gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and a super-gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ; ʿAlī al-Shāhrūdī al-Harawī, known as Muṣannifak (d. 875/1470), who wrote a Persian commentary on the Shamsiyya (Ṭāşköprüzāde 1389/2010, 149–152); and Ḥasan b. Ḥu­ sayn Amlashī (fl. 940s/1530s and 950s/1540s) who wrote a handbook on logic entitled Takmīl al-manṭiq. Advanced works on logic by “homegrown” Ottoman scholars are, by comparison, relatively infrequent before the seventeenth century. Examples include Meḥmed Fenārī (d. 834/1431) and Ḳaraca Aḥmed (d. 854/1450), mentioned in Chapter Two, and Mullā Luṭfī Tōḳādī (d. 899/1494) who wrote a super-gloss on Jurjānī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ (Ṭāşköprüzāde 1389/2010, 248–251). Even allowing for a few more exceptions, this output pales by comparison to the number of Ottoman works on logic after the sixteenth century. There were, to be sure, a number of prominent Ottoman scholars from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries who wrote broadly on topics in the rational sciences, such as Aḥmed Ḫayālī (d. 870/1465), Ḥasan Çelebī Fenārī (d. 886/1481), Ḫōcazāde Būrsevī (d. 893/1488), Kemālpāşāzāde (d. 940/1534), and Aḥmed Ṭāşköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) (Ṭāşköprüzāde 1389/2010, 129–131, 168–170, 118– 129, 331–334). It is conspicuous, however, that none of these scholars wrote

200

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

straightforward works on logic – at most introductory handbooks on dialectics or treatises on specific topics that overlap the fields of philosophical theology and logic, such as the liar paradox, the division of knowledge into conception and assent, and the problem of universals. The establishment of Shiite Safavid rule in Persia in 908/1502 contributed toward the formation of a distinctive Ottoman tradition of logic. In the short term, the coming to power of the Safavids led even more Eastern scholars – Sunnis fleeing persecution – to come to the Ottoman lands. The works of fif­ teenth- and sixteenth-century Persian specialists in the rational sciences such as Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī (d. 908/1502), Qāḍī Mīr Ḥusayn Maybudī (d. 909/1504), ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī (d. 943/1536–7), Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ Ardabīlī (d. 976/1568–9) and Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī (d. 995/1587) came to be intensively studied in Ottoman Turkish madrasas, often introduced by Sunni Persian, Azeri and Kurdish scholars who moved westward in the wake of the conquest of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus by the Safavids under Shāh ʿAbbās I (r. 996/1587–1039/1629) (El-Rouayheb 2015, 26–56). In the longer term, the conversion of Iran to Shiism resulted in the severance of scholarly ties and an end to the stream of Eastern immigrant scholars, allowing a distinct tradition of logic to emerge in the central Ottoman lands in the course of the seventeenth century. Two early examples were ʿAllāmek Meḥmed Bōsnavī (d. 1046/1636), who wrote a commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya (Karatay 1966, nr. 6845), and Meḥmed Emīn Ṣadrüddīnzāde (d. 1036/1627), on whom more will be said below. Scholarly ties with Persia were negligible thereafter. The works of later Iranian scholars such as Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā, for example, were not nearly as influential in the Ottoman Empire as they were in Iran and the Indian subcontinent. Though there was interest in some of their works in the circle of the learned Grand Vizier Rāġıp Meḥmed Pāşā (d. 1176/1763), this appears to have been an exception – the Grand Vizier explicitly wrote that these works were not familiar in the Turkish Ottoman lands (see ʿAjam & Daḥrūj 2000, 857). The works of the eminent Ottoman logician and philosopher Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (d. 1205/1791), for example, bear no indication of his being familiar with Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā. Logic was intensely studied in Ottoman Turkish madrasas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In terms of handbooks and emphasis, the curriculum in the madrasas of Anatolia, Thrace and Istanbul was closer to that of the Persianate world than to that of North Africa – even the parts of North Africa under Ottoman rule (on the standard handbooks, see Özyılmaz 2002, 35, 40,

(i) Introduction

57, 123–129). This means that one cannot without qualification speak of an “Ottoman” tradition of logic, but rather of an “Ottoman Turkish” tradition – though such works were normally written in Arabic until the nineteenth century. The standard introductory handbook in the Turkish-speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire in this period was Abharī’s Īsāghūjī, studied with the commentary of Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Kātī and the more demanding commentary of Meḥmed Fenārī. Also widely studied was Kātibī’s Shamsiyya with the commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī and the glosses of later Persian scholars such as al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Mullā Dāʾūd al-Khwāfī, ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī, and – from the eighteenth century – the Indo-Muslim scholar ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkūtī. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ was also studied, usually with the glosses of Jurjānī on the early parts. In the course of the seventeenth century, this was supplemented by two more advanced works: a treatise by the aforementioned Meḥmed Emīn Ṣadrüddīnzāde on what makes the numerous inquiries of logic one discipline (jihat al-waḥda), and Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq with the glosses of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ. In the eighteenth century, a number of Ottoman scholars wrote their own independent handbooks of logic. Of these, Gelenbevī’s al-Burhān fī ʿilm al-mīzān, to be discussed below, came to be widely studied and elicited a number of commentaries. As in the case of Mughal India, the most advanced stages of the study of logic in Ottoman Turkish madrasas consisted of the in-depth exploration of metaphysical, epistemological and semantic issues raised in the early parts of standard handbooks in the field: Fenārī’s commentary on Īsāghūjī, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya, and Dawānī’s commentary on the Tahdhīb. Interestingly, a nineteenth-century Ottoman scholar noted that it was customary to study the second part of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya, dealing with “assents” (taṣdīqāt), i.e., propositions and syllogisms, before studying the first part dealing with “conceptions” (taṣawwurāt), i.e., the nature of knowledge, the subject matter of logic, the five universals and definitions (Kilisī 1275/1859, p. 8, ll. 17–18), clearly indicating that the latter was considered the more advanced part. A number of Ottoman scholars, such as Ḳara Ḫalīl Tīrevī (d. 1123/1711), gained a reputation as eminent “logicians” without engaging in any sustained manner with the formal consequences of modality and hypothetical propositions or with modal and hypothetical syllogisms. To be sure, there were still Ottoman scholars, such as the aforementioned Gelenbevī, who in their writings showed that they had studied carefully the

201

202

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

modal and hypothetical logic of the classic, thirteenth-century handbooks, but even in their case this was an area of logic that was apparently considered to have been worked out in detail by previous authorities, with little room for original departures or controversy. Compared to Mughal India, there appears to have been less interest in paradoxes such as the liar or the “sophism that can occur generally” among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman Turkish logicians. A number of further characteristics of the Ottoman Turkish tradition of logic in this period are worth noting. Compared to Safavid Iran, there is much less evidence among Ottoman Turkish logicians of a wish to undo the post-­ Avicennian tradition of logic and return to “the ancients”. Even the works of Avicenna were rarely quoted, and one does not get the impression that Avicenna’s Shifāʾ held any special authority for most Ottoman logicians. As shown by Asad Ahmed, some eighteenth-century Ottoman logicians even seem to have had the mistaken impression that Avicenna believed that possibility propositions do not convert and that first-figure syllogisms with possibility minors are not productive, a clear indication that Avicenna’s own writings on logic were not widely read (Ahmed 2011). This is of course not to deny that some people in the Ottoman Empire might have read and admired the “older logicians”. At least one Ottoman scholar who was involved in translating Latin works on logic and philosophy in the early decades of the eighteenth century, Esʿad Yānyavī (d. 1143/1731), adopted the rhetoric of philosophy having degenerated from the demonstrative certainties of the ancients to the “rhetoric” and “dialectic” of later times. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Yānyavī’s translations had much of an impact on the later Ottoman tradition of logic. There are no references to Yānyavī and his translations in the works of the eminent Ottoman logicians Ebū Saʿīd Ḫādimī (d. 1176/1762), Ismāʿīl Gelenbevī (d. 1205/1791), ʿAbdullāh Necīb ʿAyntābī (d. 1218/1804), Meḥmed Ṣādıḳ Erzincānī (d. 1223/ 1808), Muṣṭafā Rīzevī (d. 1227/1812) and ʿAbdullāh Kānḳırī (d. 1239/1823). Mainstream Ottoman logicians seem to have been comfortable working within the post-Avicennian tradition represented by the thirteenth- and fourteenth-­ century handbooks and their commentaries and glosses. One undercurrent that is discernable among some Ottoman logicians is an antipathy toward the in-depth exploration of metaphysical topics by Dawānī and his Persian glossators. Such a stance comes across, for example, in the introduction to a commentary by Dāvūd Ḳārsī (fl. 1150s/1740s and 1160s/1750s)

(i) Introduction

on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (Köprülü Library, Istanbul: MS Mehmed Asım Bey 325). Ḳārsī noted in his introduction that there were already numerous commentaries on Taftāzānī’s handbook, including Dawānī’s commentary. But that commentary, he noted, was full of “philosophical subtleties” (tadqīqāt falsafiyya) that were extraneous to the discipline of logic. Such sentiments appear to have been widespread among scholars whose overall outlook has sometimes loosely been called “Ḳāḍīzādelı” and characterized by staunch commitment to Ḥanafī law and Māturīdī theology as well as vehement hostility to popular syncretic religious practices, mystical theosophy (though not necessarily to all forms of Sufism) and the Aristotelian/Neo-Platonist philosophers (though not to logic or rational theology). But recent research (El-Rouayheb 2008) has shown that this current did not become sufficiently strong to prevent the widespread study in Ottoman Turkish madrasas of, for example, Maybudī’s commentary on Abharī’s philosophical handbook Hidāyat al-ḥikma or Dawānī’s commentary on the Tahdhīb. Another feature of the Ottoman Turkish tradition is the intense interest in ādāb al-baḥth, the kind of dialectic represented by the works of Shams alDīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322). The sheer volume of Ottoman Turkish contributions to this field is conspicuous and unrivalled anywhere else in the Islamic world (El-Rouayheb 2015, 61–70). A standard introduction to the field was a short handbook by the abovementioned sixteenth-century scholar Ṭāşköprüzāde. This would standardly be followed by a study of Samarqandī’s handbook with the commentary of Masʿūd al-Shirwānī (d. 905/1499) and various glosses thereon. From around the middle of the seventeenth century, students would typically also study the commentary by Mullā Muḥammad Ḥanafī (fl. in Herat and Bukhara in the early sixteenth century) on a short treatise by ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), usually with the gloss of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ. This came to be supplemented with new works in the field written by Ottoman scholars, such as Ḥüseyn Adanavī (fl. 1092/1681) and Meḥmed Sāçaḳlızāde (d. 1145/1732), on whom more will be said below. One consequence of this intense cultivation of ādāb al-baḥth was a renewed interest in casting scholarly arguments into explicit syllogistic form, to make clear which premises might be contested in a disputation. This renewed interest in syllogistic regimentation (taḥlīl), after centuries of neglect in the post-Avicennan logical tradition, led to an interest in so-called “unfamiliar syllogisms”, i.e., formally valid relational inferences that had not been recognized in classi-

203

204

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

cal Aristotelian logic (El-Rouayheb 2015, 85–96). For example, in a short handbook on dialectics by the abovementioned Sāçaḳlızāde a dialectical objection to a definition is cast in the form of the following syllogism: This definition leads to circularity Circularity is absurd This definition leads to the absurd This so-called “unfamiliar syllogism” (qiyās ghayr mutaʿāraf) is in effect a relational syllogism (what medieval Latin logicians called an “oblique” syllogism). Though intuitively valid, such arguments were not recognized in classical Aristotelian logic. Beginning with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in the twelfth century, some Arabic logicians had proposed that such inferences are productive without the need for analyzing them into standard Aristotelian syllogisms with three terms. As mentioned in a previous section, the topic had elicited controversy in the wide-ranging debates between the fifteenth-century Persian philosophers Dawānī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī. Dawānī had argued, against Dashtakī, that an inference such as the following is productive as it stands, without the need for rewriting it into the form of a standard Aristotelian syllogism:. Zayd is the brother of ʿAmr ʿAmr is the leader of the town Zayd is the brother of the leader of the town Dawānī’s point was repeated by some of his later followers and glossators. But until the early eighteenth century, the point had simply been reiterated in certain ad hoc contexts, leaving little influence on overall presentations of syllogisms in handbooks of logic. The fact that “unfamiliar syllogisms” came to be employed by Ottoman dialecticians in their attempts to regiment arguments into syllogistic form brought the concept to the forefront and led to further developments of the basic idea formulated by Dawānī. Most importantly perhaps, the idea emerged in the early decades of the eighteenth century that “unfamiliar syllogisms” can occur in all four syllogistic figures and that these have conditions of productivity that may or may not be similar to those of standard syllogisms. An influential and early expression of this insight is to be found in a short treatise on enthymemes and “unfamiliar syllogisms” by Mūsā

(ii) Meh. med Emı¯n S.adrüddı¯nza¯de

Pehlivānī (d. ca. 1161/1748) who was active in Tokat in northcentral Anatolia (El-Rouayheb 2010, 163–174; El-Rouayheb 2015, 90–96). Though some Safavid and Mughal logicians were aware of Dawānī’s point, the Iranian and Indo-­ Muslim traditions did not develop a fixed concept of “unfamiliar syllogisms” or divide them into figures and moods. Given the geographic proximity to Western Europe, the Ottomans were among the earliest in the Islamic world to encounter the early modern Latin tradition of logic. A number of Maronite and Greek Catholic scholars from Lebanon and Syria were trained in Rome in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and went on to write works in Arabic on philosophy and logic that were anchored in the Latin tradition. Their writings will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter. During the reigns of Mehmed IV (r. 1058/1648–1099/ 1687) and Ahmed III (r. 1115/1703–1143/1730), there was also some interest in European learning at the Ottoman court, and a number of scholars in Istanbul made translations of, for example, the Atlas Minor of Hondius (d. 1612), the Atlas Maior of Blaeu (d. 1673), and the works of the Paracelsian physicians and alchemists Crollius (d. 1609) and Sennert (d. 1637) (Pinaralioğlu 2014; Bachour 2012). The aforementioned Ottoman scholar Esʿad Yānyavī also translated a work on logic by the Greek-born, Padua-based Aristotelian Joannes Cottunios (d. 1658). A closer description of this work will be given below. Some of the major Ottoman logicians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are:

(ii) Meh. med Emı¯n S. adrüddı¯nza¯de (Muh. ibbı¯ 1284/1867, III, 475–6; ̔ At. a¯ ̕ ¯ı 1268/1851, 712) This scholar hailed from the region of Shirwān, roughly corresponding to the area of present-day Azerbaijan. He studied with his father, Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirwānī, who in turn had studied with Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ ʿArabshāhī (d. 975/1567–8). Meḥmed Emīn also studied with Ḥusayn Khalkhālī (d. 1014/1604–5 or 1030/ 1620–1), one of the most eminent students of Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī (d. 995/ 1587). When the Safavids conquered Shirwān in 1015/1606, he went west, first settling in the town of Diyarbakir and eventually coming to Istanbul in the entourage of the Grand Vizier Naṣūḥ Pāşā (v. 1020/1611–1023/1614) when the latter returned from his Eastern campaigns. He dedicated an encyclopedia of the sciences to Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1012/1603–1026/1617) and was granted a

205

206

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

teaching position in Istanbul. He died in the Ottoman capital in 1036/1627. His grandson Meḥmed Ṣādıḳ Ṣadrüddīnzāde (d. 1120/1708), who became Grand Mufti of the Ottoman Empire, retained his grandfather’s interest in logic. As mentioned in Chapter Four, he wrote the copy of Amlashī’s Takmīl al-manṭiq that is extant in the British Library and that Rescher used in his pioneering investigations of Arabic modal logic after Avicenna. Meḥmed Emīn Ṣadrüddīnzāde’s works on logic are: 1) A treatise commenting on a passage in Fenārī’s commentary on Īsāghūjī on “the aspect of unity” (jihat al-waḥda), i.e., on what makes the numerous inquiries of logic one discipline. The treatise came to be widely studied in Ottoman Turkish lands in subsequent centuries. It was printed in Istanbul in 1288/1871(Ṣadrüddīnzāde 1288/1871, 28 pp.). According to a glossator of the treatise writing two generations later, there were significant variations in extant copies, indicating that Meḥmed Emīn revised his work after it had begun to circulate. 2) A gloss on the gloss of his teacher Khalkhālī on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Khalkhālī’s gloss covered the entirety of Dawānī’s commentary, i.e., up to the discussion of the simple modal propositions (Mach 1977, nr. 3243). Meḥmed Emīn’s super-gloss only covered the earlier part of Khalkhālī’s gloss dealing with preliminary matters, the five universals, and definition/description. One extant manuscript copy of the gloss (Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi, Akhisar Zeynelzade 676) includes numerous marginal annotations derived from “a new copy” or “an old copy”, again making it clear that Meḥmed Emīn revised his glosses after first penning them. (For another copy, misattributed to Meḥmed Emīn’s father, see Mach 1977, 3244.) 3) An encyclopedic compendium dedicated to Sultan Ahmed I and entitled al-Fawāʾid al-khāqāniyya (Instructive Points for the Sovereign). An extant manuscript consists of 152 folios with 23 lines to a page (Kütahya Vahit Paşa İl Halk Kütüphanesi 2371). It gives a short introductory description of each science, followed by a series of “issues” (masʾala) belonging to it. The section on logic (fols. 75b–80a) discusses the following issues: (i) on the need for logic; (ii) on the knowledge of logic being obligatory; (iii) on the division of knowledge into conception and assent; (iv) on whether it is possible to acquire assents from concep-

(iii) K. ara Halı¯l Tı¯revı¯ 207 ˘

tions or conceptions from assents; (v) on conceiving something by its quintessence (kunh) or by some accidental description (wajh); (vi) on predication; (vii) on whether extra-mental composition (tarkīb khārijī) is a condition for composition in the mind (tarkīb dhihnī). 4) Some sources attribute to Meḥmed Emīn Shirwānī a gloss on the commentary of Kātī on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī. But a number of extant copies of these glosses are dated to the early sixteenth century (for example Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul: Laleli 2595, copied in 939/1532–3 and Şehid Ali Paşa 1770, copied in 944/1537–8), clearly showing that they are by a different “Shirwānī”.

(iii) K. ara Halı¯l Tı¯revı¯ (Bu ¯rsalı 1333/1914–5, I, 299; Seyh¯ı 1989, ˘ ˘ IV, 329–330) Ḳara Ḫalīl b. Ḥasan hailed from Tire near the town of Aydin in western Anatolia. He went to Istanbul to complete his education, studying with some of the major scholars of the Ottoman capital and gaining his official certificate (mülāzemet) from the Chief Mufti (Şeyḫülislām) Yaḥyā Minḳārīzāde (d. 1088/ 1677). He then rose in the ranks of the Ottoman judicial hierarchy, culminating in the position of Chief Judge (Ḳāżīʿasker) of Anatolia in 1119/1707. He died in 1123/1711. Ḳara Ḫalīl wrote numerous esteemed works in philosophy, rational theology, logic and dialectics, usually in the form of extensive glosses on commonly studied handbooks. For example, he wrote a super-gloss on the gloss of Ḫayālī on Taftāzānī’s commentary on the creed of Nasafī (d. 537/1142); a super-gloss on the glosses of Jurjānī and Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī on the commentary by Ibn Mubārakshāh al-Bukhārī (fl. 755/1354) on Kātibī’s handbook of philosophy Ḥikmat al-ʿayn; and a super-gloss on the gloss of Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Lārī (d. 979/ 1571) on Qāḍī Mīr Maybudī’s commentary on Abharī’s handbook of philosophy Hidāyat al-ḥikma. His works on logic are:

1) A gloss on Fenārī’s commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī and on the earlier gloss on this work by the little-known sixteenth-century Azeri scholar Ḳūl Aḥmed b. Ḫizir. This extensive gloss, completed in 1111/1699–1700 and entitled Jalāʾ al-anẓār fī ḥall ʿawīṣāt al-afkār (The Clarification

208

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

of Views in Unraveling the Abstruse Thoughts), was printed on a number of occasions in Istanbul in the nineteenth century. One such printing by Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿOthmāniye in 1310/1892–1893 consists of 232 pages. The pages allocated to various topics are as follows: a. The preamble and introduction (pp. 2–19) b. The aspect of unity (pp. 19–48) c. Types of linguistic reference (pp. 48–81) d. Particular and universal terms. The five universals (pp. 82–124) e. Definitions and descriptions (pp. 124–153) f. Propositions (pp. 153–184) g. Contradiction and Conversion (pp. 184–204) h. Syllogism (pp. 204–221) i. Induction, analogy and the matter of the syllogism (pp. 221–232) Thus, around two-thirds (65–66%) of Ḳara Ḫalīl’s gloss is devoted to discussions of introductory matters and the acquisition of conceptions, and around 16% to contradiction, conversion and the formal syllogism. In Fenārī’s commentary, by comparison, around 38% of the total is devoted to introductory matters and the acquisition of conceptions, and around 30% to contradiction, conversion and the formal syllogism. As indicated by its title, Ḳara Ḫalīl’s gloss was hardly intended to be an introductory work. But as in the case of Mughal India, what made it an “advanced” work was that it delved deeply into questions such as the subject matter of logic, the nature of second intentions, the five universals, the difference between essential and accidental attributes, kinds of linguistic reference, and definitions and descriptions. The transformation of Abharī’s rudimentary Īsāghūjī into a vehicle for demanding discussions of such philosophical and semantic issues is revealing of the development of Arabic logic in the Eastern Islamic world after the fourteenth century. 2) al-Risāla al-ʿawniyya fī īḍāḥ al-ḥāshiya al-Ṣadriyya (The Helpful Treatise in Elucidating the Gloss of Ṣadrüddīnzāde). This is an extensive gloss, completed in 1105/1694, on the aforementioned treatise by Meḥmed Emīn Ṣadrüddīnzāde explicating the passage on “the aspect of unity” (jihat al-waḥda) from Fenārī’s commentary on Īsāghūjī. Again, the trajectory of this discussion is revealing: Fenārī’s discussion takes up 26 lines in a nineteenth-century printing of his commentary. Meḥmed

(iv) Mus.t. afa¯ Mo ¯sta¯rı¯ 209

Emīn Ṣadrüddīnzāde’s treatise on the passage was printed in 28 pages in Istanbul in 1288/1871. Ḳara Ḫalīl’s gloss was printed in Istanbul in 1288/1871 in 151 pages. 3) A super-gloss on Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ’s gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Completed in 1094/1683, this appears to be the first major gloss on this work by an Ottoman Turkish scholar. The three manuscripts of the work that are in Princeton University Library (Mach, nr. 3238) comprise 91, 92 and 113 folios respectively. 4) An extensive super-gloss on the gloss of Mullā Dāʾūd al-Khwāfī on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya. Two extant manuscripts (Süleymaniye Kütüphanesı, Istanbul: Nurosmaniye 2726 and 2727) consist of 225 folios and 186 folios respectively. Mullā Dāʾūd’s gloss only covered the first half of the commentary, dealing with introductory matters and conceptions, so the super-glosses by Ḳara Ḫalīl must have dealt with the same topics. 5) An extensive gloss on Tāşköprüzāde’s commentary on his own short handbook on ādāb al-baḥth. This gloss, entitled Hadiyyat al-nabiyy al-­ mustaṭāb fī ʿilm al-naẓar wa-l-ādāb (The Gift of the Sweet Prophet in the Science of Reasoning and Rules), is one of the early indications of a burgeoning interest in dialectics among Ottoman scholars in the second half of the seventeenth century. It was completed in 1088/1677. (For extant manuscripts, see Mach 1977, nr 3375.)

(iv) Mus. t. afa¯ Mo ¯sta¯rı¯ (Bu ¯rsalı 1333/1914–5, II, 30–32; Ljubovic 2008, 36–48) Muṣṭafā b. Yūsuf Mōstārī was born in Mostar in Bosnia in 1061/1651. He left for Istanbul in 1088/1677 to pursue his studies, and stayed in the Ottoman capital for fifteen years. In 1103/1692, he returned to his hometown and assumed the position of Mufti there. He died in 1119/1707. Mōstārī seems to have represented a somewhat different strand of Ottoman logical writing than his contemporary Ḳara Ḫalīl. He chose to write his own commentaries on the handbooks in common use in Ottoman Turkish madrasas: Abharī’s Īsāghūjī, Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb. As such, he had to deal in some detail with the formal implications of propositions and with the modal and hypothetical syllogisms as presented in the base texts.

210

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

(Around a third of his commentary on the Shamsiyya is devoted to such formal implications and syllogisms.) By comparison, Ḳara Ḫalīl, by writing super-­ glosses, could follow earlier glossators in focusing on certain sections of the handbooks and eliding others. Mōstārī also engaged much less with Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq and its Persianate glossators, and he appears to have steered clear of the handbooks of philosophy that were commonly studied in Ottoman madrasas, such as Abharī’s Hidāyat al-ḥikma and Kātibī’s Ḥikmat al-ʿayn. Apart from logic, his main scholarly interest appears to have been law and jurisprudence rather than philosophy, and his perhaps most widely copied non-logical work was an extensive gloss on Mirʾāt al-wuṣūl (The Mirror of Attainment), a handbook on Ḥanafī jurisprudence by Mollā Ḫüsrev (d. 885/1480). Mōstārī’s works on logic are: 1) A commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī, completed in 1093/1682. This was printed in Istanbul in 1316/1898–99 in 78 pages. 2) A gloss on Fenārī’s commentary on Īsāghūjī, completed in 1103/1692. This appears to have been considerably shorter than Ḳara Ḫalīl’s gloss. The sole extant manuscript of the work (an autograph in the Oriental Collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts & Sciences, nr. 198) consists of 40 folios (Ljubovic 2008, 39–40). 3) A commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, completed in 1101/1690. This was Mōstārī’s most extensive work on logic. Two autograph copies (Princeton University Library, Mach nr. 3219 and Ghazi Husrev Bey Library, Sarajevo, nr. 733) consist of 133 and 143 folios respectively. It was advertised as a “new” (jadīd) commentary, perhaps analogously to the “new” commentary by Qūshjī (d. 879/1474) on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-ʿaqā’id, which managed to supplant the “old” commentary written by Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1349). However, though Mōstārī’s commentary survives in around half a dozen manuscript copies, it did not displace Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s older commentary, which continued to be glossed by later Ottoman scholars such as Meḥmed Emīn Üsküdārī (d. 1149/1736) and Meḥmed Ṣādiḳ Erzincānī (d. 1223/1808). Mōstārī’s work drew on the previous commentaries on the Shamsiyya by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Taftāzānī, Qāḍī Mīr al-Maybudī, and ʿAllāmek Meḥmed Bōsnavī, as well as Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī’s Sharḥ al-Qisṭās, and Ṣadr al-

(v) Meh. med Sa¯çak. lıza¯de

Sharīʿa’s Taʿdīl al-ʿulūm. Surprisingly, there is little sustained engagement with Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq and the gloss thereon by Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ that were beginning to elicit considerable interest in Ottoman circles in Mōstārī’s lifetime. For example, Mōstārī simply expounded the view of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Taftāzānī and Jurjānī that a proposition has four parts: (i) subject, (ii) predicate, (iii) the conceived nexus between them, and (iv) the affirmation or negation of the nexus (fol. 57a–57b), without taking into account Dawānī’s criticism of this idea – criticism that was accepted by Mōstārī’s contemporary Ḳara Ḫalīl and most later Ottoman logicians. 4) A commentary on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, completed in 1118/ 1706. Unusually, Mōstārī wrote a single commentary covering both Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq and Tahdhīb al-kalām. Though Taftāzānī’s had originally conceived of these as two sections of a single work, the later commentary tradition tended to treat them separately. An extant autograph manuscript (Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, nr. 4668) comprises 242 folios, of which folios 5a to 42a cover the section on logic (Ljubovic 2008, 45–48).

(v) Meh. med Sa¯çak. lıza¯de (T. Özcan, “Saçaklızade Mehmed Efendi”, TDV-˙I A XXXV, 368–370) Sāçaḳlızāde was born in Marʿaş (present-day Kahramanmaraş) in southeastern Anatolia. Though his date of birth is not reported, his later career suggests that it was in the 1060s/1650s. He reportedly studied with the prominent scholar Tefsīrī Meḥmed (d. 1111/1699) who was active in the eastern Anatolian town of Sivas (on him, see Şeyḫī 1989, IV, 158), and with Ḥamza Dārendevī who was Mufti in the town of Darende near Sivas. By 1100/1688, Sāçaḳlızāde was himself teaching in Aleppo, then the third largest city of the Ottoman Empire (Sāçaḳlızāde 1329/1911, II(1), 2). He later returned to his town of birth where he continued to teach in his later years. Different sources give different dates for his death, but the correct year appears to be 1145/1732–3, this being supported by a chronogram composed on the occasion. Sāçaḳlızāde wrote on a wide variety of topics, including rational theology (kalām), inheritance law, Quran recitation, and the controversial questions of whether smoking tobacco is permissible and whether the parents of the Proph-

211

212

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

et Muhammad (who died before his prophecy) would be saved in the here­ after. In a late work, entitled Tartīb al-ʿulūm, he expressed disapproval of the study of “philosophy” in the Ottoman Empire (Sāçaḳlızāde 1988, 223–230). At the same time, he deemed rational theology, logic, dialectics, mathematics, medicine and astronomy to be useful disciplines. He himself wrote a number of works on dialectics that came to be widely studied in the Ottoman Empire until the early twentieth century. These are: 1) Annotations to the introductory handbook on ādāb al-baḥth by the Ottoman scholar Ṭāşköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) (Mach 1977, nr. 3379). 2) A summa of dialectics entitled Taqrīr al-qawānīn al-mutadāwala fī ʿilm al-munāẓara (Setting Forth the Rules Current in the Science of Disputation). Completed in 1117/1705, this appears to be the longest work on ādāb al-baḥth that is not a commentary or gloss written in the Islamic tradition. (For a discussion of the work, see Karabela 2010, 169–184.) It was printed in Istanbul in 1289/1873 in 93 pages, with an additional 35 pages of auto-glosses printed as an appendix. The follow­ ing is an outline of the contents: a. Preamble (pp. 2–3) b. Introduction: On explicating some terms in the discipline (pp. 3–12) c. First Part: On issues relating to conception i. On Definitions (pp. 12–20) 1. On the division of definitions into nominal and real 2. On the conditions of real definition 3. On what may and may not be objected to in a definition a. On demanding a proof for a nominal definition b. On the objection that a definition is not equal to the definiendum c. On the objection that a definition is circular d. On the objection that a definition leads to an infinite regress e. On the objection that a definition includes linguistic deficiencies [for example ambiguous or figurative terms]

(v) Meh. med Sa¯çak. lıza¯de

f. On offering a counter-definition ii. On Divisions (pp. 20–31) 1. On explaining division 2. On the exhaustiveness aimed for in a division 3. On the relation between what is divided and each part 4. On whether division is among the things that lead to conception or that lead to assent 5. On the fact that division can include a definition of the parts 6. On the conditions of division 7. On the conditions of exhaustiveness 8. On the tasks of claimant and questioner with regards to division a. Objecting to the division itself b. Objecting to the exhaustiveness c. Objecting to the definition implied in the division d. Second part: On issues relating to assent i. On objecting to a premise (pp. 35–76) 1. On the support (sanad) of the objection 2. On objecting to a part of the proof 3. On objecting that the formal conditions of productivity have not been met 4. On objecting that what follows from the proof is not the desired conclusion 5. On pointing out the source of the opponent’s error (ḥall) and usurpation of the opponent’s role (ghaṣb) 6. On the tasks of the claimant when the questioner objects to a premise a. On refuting the objection b. On refuting the support of the objection c. On giving a new proof d. On giving a new claim ii. On objecting to the proof (naqḍ) (pp. 76–82) 1. On explicating what is meant by naqḍ 2. On naqḍ maksūr [i.e., applying the core of the proffered proof shorn of certain particularities to other instances, to

213

214

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

show that the proof is too strong and can be used to derive absurd consequences in other instances] 3. On the tasks of the claimant when the questioner objects to the proof iii. On counterproof (muʿāraḍa) (pp. 82–88) 1. On the divisions of counterproof 2. On the tasks of the claimant when the questioner gives a counterproof e. Conclusion i. Some further principles of disputation (pp. 88–89) ii. On some aspects of syllogisms (pp. 89–93) Compared to earlier handbooks, such as Samarqandī’s classic treatise, the treatise of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), the Sharīfiyya attributed to al-Jurjānī (d. 813/1413), and the handbook of Ṭāşköprüzāde (d. 968/ 1561), Sāçaḳlızāde’s stands out in a number of ways: As already mentioned, it is significantly longer and more detailed. The overall organization into two sections dealing respectively with disputations relating to the acquisition of conceptions and the acquisition of assents is also very different from classic handbooks, though it had been prefigured in a much shorter treatise on ādāb al-baḥth written a generation earlier by the eastern Anatolian scholar Ḥüseyn Adanavī (fl. 1092/1681) (Adanavī 1267/1850). It is noteworthy that whereas Sāçaḳlızāde regularly cited classic handbooks on dialectics in his discussion of assents, he apparently found little guidance in these works for his discussion of definitions and division, engaging instead with works on logic and jurisprudence, such as the commentaries of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya and Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, and the commentary of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s Mukhtaṣar, all three with the glosses of Jurjānī. Sāçaḳlızāde also conspicuously tended to present dialectical exchanges as explicit syllogisms. This led him to devote considerable attention to the regimentation of arguments into syllogistic form, to enthymemes (arguments with missing premises), and to cases in which it might be debated whether or not a middle term recurs, for example an argument such as the following (p. 43):

(v) Meh. med Sa¯çak. lıza¯de

This is a rational animal Every animal breathes This breathes

This focus on definition, division, regimentation into syllogistic form, enthymemes and middle terms clearly influenced later Ottoman handbooks on logic, as will be seen below. 3) A shorter handbook, entitled al-Risāla al-Waladiyya (The Son Epistle). This is a later abridgement of Taqrīr al-qawānīn, written for the benefit of Sāçaḳlızāde’s son. It became a popular handbook on dialectics in the Ottoman Empire and was printed on a number of occasions in Istanbul and Cairo in the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth (for example, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Khānjī, 1329/1911, 13 pp.). It elicited numerous commentaries by later scholars, for example (Mach 1977, nrs. 3403–06): a. b. c. d. e.

Ḥüseyn b. Ḥaydar Bertizī (a student of Sāçaḳlızāde) Meḥmed b. Ḥüseyn Behisnī (a student of Sāçaḳlızāde) ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Āmidī (fl. 1181/1767) Ḥasan Nāzikzāde İslimyevī (fl. 1199/1784) Ḫalīl Āḳvirānī (d. 1223/1808)

4) Two standard sources (Baghdadi 1951–55, II, 322–323; Būrsalı 1333/ 1914–5, I, 325–328) attribute other works on dialectics and logic to Sāçaḳlızāde, but these seem to be cases of misattribution. The follow­ ing short treatises are, in fact, by another eighteenth-century scholar with a misleadingly similar name, Meḥmed b. Vāʿiż Velīcānī Marʿaşī (fl. 1146/1759), who may have been a student of Sāçaḳlızāde: (i) ʿIṣmat al-adhhān fī ʿilm al-mīzān (The Infallibility of Minds in the Science of Logic), a short handbook of logic, (ii) Salāmat al-qulūb fī bayān ithbāt al-maṭlūb (The Soundness of Hearts in Proving the Desired Conclusion), a short treatise on syllogism, (iii) ʿAndalīb al-munāẓara (The Nightingale of Disputation) a short handbook on dialectics, and (iv) Zubdat al-munāẓara (The Cream of Disputation) another short handbook on dialectics. (For extant manuscripts of these works, with the

215

216

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

correct attribution, see Mach & Ormsby 1987, nrs. 32, 375, 1301–1302, 1612.)

(vi) Es ̔ ad Ya¯nyavı¯ (K. Sarıkavak, “Yanyalı Es‘ad Efendi”, TDV-˙I A, XLIII, pp. 322–323; Bu ¯rsalı 1333/1914–5, I, 234–235; Özervarlı 2011) Esʿad Yānyavī hailed from the town of Ioannina in what is now northeastern Greece. His date of birth is not known, but he went to Istanbul to pursue his studies in 1098/1687. His main teacher in the philosophical sciences appears to have been Ibrāhīm Şehirlīzāde, a student of the eminent Tefsīrī Meḥmed (d. 1111/1699) and one of numerous Ottoman scholars who wrote super-glosses on Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Lārī’s gloss on Qāḍī Mīr Maybudī’s commentary on Abharī’s handbook of philosophy Hidāyat al-ḥikma (Mach 1977, nr. 3057). After receiving his formal certificate in 1111/1699, Yānyavī rose in the graded Ottoman teaching and judicial hierarchy, culminating in his appointment as chief judge of the Galata district of Istanbul in 1138/1726. In his later years, he was one of the scholars charged with the correction of books printed in the pioneering but short-lived printing press established by Ibrāhīm Müteferriḳa (d. 1158/1745). He died in 1143/1731. In the present context, the focus will be on his translation of a work on logic by Joannes Cottunios (Ioannis Kottounios), a Greek-born teacher of philosophy at Padua who died in 1658 (see Legrand 1895, II, 50, III, 389–395; Fyrigos 2001). Yānyavī completed the work in 1132/1720 while he was teaching at the madrasa of the Eyüp Sultan Mosque in Istanbul, and dedicated it to Sultan Ahmed III (r. 1115/1703–1143/1730), the Grand Vizier Dāmād Ibrāhīm Pāşā, and the Grand Mufti Yenişehirlı ʿAbdullāh Efendī. In the introduction to the work, he wrote that after extensive studies of philosophy, he had concluded that the discipline as practiced and taught in his time was full of supposition (ẓann) and guesswork (takhmīn) falling short of certainty (yaqīn). He traced this back to what he considered the unsatisfactory nature of the Arabic translations of Greek philosophical works made in the Abbasid period. (Incidentally, the idea of the unsatisfactory nature of the early Arabic translations of Greek philosophical works is present in earlier authors who were widely read in Ottoman scholarly circles, for example Dawānī’s student Qāḍī Mīr Ḥusayn al-Maybudī [d. 909/1504]; see Pourjavady 2011, 37.) Yānyavī then stated that he had made

(vi) Es ’ ad Ya¯nyavı¯ 217

an effort to study the Greek works of Aristotle with one of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire; presumably this was a Greek scholar from his hometown of Ioannina, which was a center of cultural and intellectual life among the Ottoman Greeks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Kitromilides 2013, 36–39, 137). He wished to translate Aristotle’s metaphysics and physics anew, but since the understanding of these works presupposes a familiarity with Aristotle’s logic, he also wanted to translate the books of the Organon, including Porphyry’s Eisagoge. As these works in turn could be challenging to understand, he decided to translate the commentary on them by Cottunius. He referred to this commentary as “the most luminous commentary” (al-sharḥ al-anwar), an expression that seems to have confused some later catalogers and bibliographers who have sometimes attributed to Yānyavī a commentary on a work called “alAnwar” or “al-Anwār”, and even in some cases a commentary on Maṭāliʿ al-anwār by Urmawī (Baghdadi 1951–55, I, 205–6). It is clear, however, that al-anwar in Arabic is a superlative adjective (“most luminous”) modifying the definite noun al-sharḥ (“the commentary”). The Arabic al-sharḥ al-anwar is a translation of the Latin Expositio Lucidissima, from the title of Cottunios’ work on logic Expositio Lucidissima Universae Logices printed in Padua in 1651 (Cottunios 1651). Significantly, Yānyavī’s translation may not have been directly from the Latin but from a Greek version. He wrote in the introduction: I wished to explain some of what is difficult to understand from these books [of the Organon] and leave the books that are easy to understand, and to summarize some of what the author [i.e. Aristotle] expanded upon in detail … within the translation of (fī ḍimni tarjamat) the most luminous commentary (al-sharḥ al-anwar) of the consummate wise thinker (al-ḥakīm al-kāmil) Yuwānis Qūtunniyūs al-Qarafiryawī [i.e., from Karafe­­rye, the Ottoman name for modern Veria in Greece], the first philosopher (al-faylasūf al-awwal) of his time in the Academy of Padua, with the use of clear explications (bayānāt wāḍiḥa) taken from the commentaries of his students who heard these from his own mouth (maʾkhūdhatan min shurūḥi talāmīdhihi l-ākhidhati lahā min fīhi).

Yānyavī’s remarks do not indicate that Cottunios’ work was in a different language from the Greek that he – Yānyavī – had learned in order to read and translate Aristotle, and his appeals to the lecture notes of Cottunios’ students would be odd if he were simply translating the printed edition of Expositio Lucidissima. It may be that Cottunios’ work circulated among his Greek students

218

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

in an annotated Greek translation, and that it is this that Yānyavī translated into Arabic. Cottunios founded a college in Padua for Greek students, and may well have allowed or authorized Greek versions of his Latin works for their benefit. In any case, Yānyavī’s work is a loose rather than exact translation of Cottunios’ Expositio Lucidissima. Most conspicuously, Cottunios’ work begins with treatises on terms (pp. 3–32), propositions (pp. 32–50) and syllogisms (pp. 50– 68), followed by an introduction on the nature and subject matter of logic (pp. 69–81), and commentaries on Porphyry’s Eisagoge (pp. 81–169), Aristotle’s Categories (pp. 169–351), and Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (pp. 352–442). As will be seen below, Yānyavī changed the order of chapters. Even within each chapter, he did not follow Cottunios’ Latin text strictly, sometimes omitting passages, amending or replacing examples, and even, in rare instances, expressing disagreement with Cottunios. The main sections of Yānyavī’s work are given in what follows, with the corresponding folio numbers from one extant manuscript (Süleymaniye Kütüphanesı, Istanbul: MS Ayasofya 2568): 1) Preamble (fols. 1b–6b) 2) First Introduction (fols. 6b–16b): On the divisions of logic and its definition. On whether logic is a science or not. On the subject matter of logic. On whether logic is necessary for the acquisition of the sciences 3) Second Introduction (fols. 16b–47b): On Explaining Īsāghūwī [sic] of Porphyry 4) Third Introduction (fols. 47b–123b): On Explaining the Categories of Aristotle 5) The first teaching (fols. 123b–134b): On the three mental operations. On explicating definition. On the divisions of definition. On the noun. On the verb. On the sentence 6) The second teaching (fols. 134b–142a): On propositions 7) The third teaching (fols. 142a–148a): On proof 8) On the Posterior Analytics, i.e., Demonstration (fols. 148a–186a) A number of features of Cottunios’ work would have been unusual to his Muslim readers. The two longest chapters are devoted to Aristotle’s Categories and Posterior Analytics, covering topics that tended to be ignored in post-Avicennan Arabic works on logic. Cottunios regularly cited the opinions of medieval and

(vi) Es ’ ad Ya¯nyavı¯ 219

renaissance Latin scholastics and commentators on Aristotle, and these would of course have been unfamiliar to most, if not all, of Yānyavī’s readers. For example, there are references to Thomas Aquinas (Thūmā Aqūnātus), Duns Scotus (Sqūtūs), Ockham (Ūkhāmūs), Domingo de Soto (Dūminqūs), Zabarella (Zābarillūs), Francisco Toletus (Tūlitūs) and Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (Hurtādus). There are also references to Averroes (Ibn Rushd al-Qurṭubī), whose commentaries on Aristotle were still studied in the Latin West and whose name at least may have been familiar to some Ottoman scholars. At the level of content, a number of features of Yānyavī’s translation also distinguish it from mainstream Ottoman logical works. For example, it gives a short account of the properties of terms as developed in medieval Latin logic (fol. 126b–128b), for example distinguishing between “the categorematic term” (al-ḥadd al-ḥamlī) with self-standing meaning, for example “man” and “horse”, and “the syncategorematic term” (al-ḥadd maʿ al-ḥamlī) that only has meaning when used along with a categorematic term, for example “all” and “or”. It rejects the fourth figure of the syllogism (fol. 144a) and does not recognize the wholly hypothetical syllogisms of Avicenna and the post-Avicennian tradition (fol. 145b). It confines the modalities to three: necessity, impossibility and possibility (fol. 139a–140a). It also operates with four kinds of “hypothetical” proposition (fol. 142–142b): conditionals, disjunctions, conjunctions (ʿaṭfiyya) and “causal” (sababiyya) – for example “Zayd laughs because he is rational”; the latter two were not usually recognized in the Arabic tradition as distinct types of proposition. It also recognizes so-called “exponible” propositions (al-qaḍāyā al-mashrūḥa) (fol. 140b–141a) that are divided into “exclusive” (ḥaṣriyya), “exceptive” (istithnāʾiyya) and “reduplicative” (muʾakkida), all concepts that were foreign to the Arabic-Islamic tradition of logic. Examples of such propositions would be, respectively: “Humans alone are rational animals”, “All bodies but the heavenly are corruptible” and “The writer insofar as he is a writer moves his fingers”. Interestingly, Cottunios’ work recognizes “oblique” (māʾil) syllogisms (Cottunios 1651, 60–61). For example, the following is presented as a valid syllogistic inference: In every place, God is (In omni loco est Deus) This hall is a place (Hec aula est locos) In this hall, God is (In hec aula est Deus)

220

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

Cottunios’ presentation of oblique syllogisms is brief, and there is no discussion of why such inferences are valid. (On oblique syllogisms in medieval Latin logic, see Thom 1977.) In Yānyavī’s translation, the order of the premises is quietly changed (in Arabic logic, the minor premise is standardly mentioned first), and the example is slightly amended (fol. 145a): This desert is a place (hādhihi l-ṣaḥrāʾu makānun) In every place, God is present (fī kulli makānin Allāhu ḥāḍirun) In this desert, God is present (fī hādhihi l-ṣaḥrāʾi Allāhu ḥāḍirun) It is worth considering whether the recognition of relational syllogisms in later Ottoman works on logic might have been influenced by Yānyavī’s translation. The answer is almost certainly no. The roots of the Ottoman recognition go back to Dawānī in the fifteenth century, and it is possible to follow the emergence of the concept of “unfamiliar syllogisms” (qiyās ghayr mutaʿāraf) in a series of seventeenth-century glosses on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq by Ḥusayn Khalkhālī (d. 1014/1605 or 1030/1620), Meḥmed Emīn Ṣadrüddīnzāde (d. 1036/1627), Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn Gūrānī (fl. 1066/1656) and Ḳara Ḫalīl Tīrevī (d. 1123/1711) (El-Rouayheb 2010, 158–163). As mentioned above, the division of such “unfamiliar syllogisms” into figures and moods in the course of the eighteenth century was motivated by an interest in regimenting recognized dialectical objections into explicit syllogistic form. Crucially, none of the examples of oblique syllogisms given in Yānyavī’s translation correspond to standard examples of “unfamiliar syllogisms” in which the “semantic dependent” (mutaʿalliq) of the predicate of the minor premise is the subject of the major premise. It also cannot be assumed without any textual evidence that Yānyavī’s translation was known to later Ottoman logicians. As mentioned previously, there does not appear to have been any explicit reference to this translation in the works of the later Ottoman scholars who will be mentioned below. Though Yānyavī referred to his work as a “translation” (tarjama), he on a number of occasions intervened in the text. Most obviously, some of the examples are clearly his, not Cottunios’, such as the following “exclusive proposition”: “The seal of the prophets is Muhammad alone peace and blessings upon him” (fol. 140b). Also, the translation mentions that the copula is often expressed by means of kāna or yakūnu in Arabic, dir in Turkish, and ast in Persian (fol. 124a);

(vii) Meh. med Emı¯n Üsküda¯rı¯ 221

this is of course not in Cottunios’ work (Cottunios 1651, p. 3). Yānyavī even expressed disagreement with Cottunios’ rejection of the fourth figure (fol. 144a), though such outright disagreements are not common. Cottunios’ presentation (Cottunios 1651, 56–60) of the traditional mnemonic renderings of syllogistic figures and moods (BARBARA, CELARENT, etc.) does not appear in Yānyavī’s translation, obviously having been dropped as untranslatable – perhaps already from the Greek version that Yānyavī may have been translating. Another manuscript of Yānyavī’s work (Süleymaniye Kütüphanesı, Istanbul: MS Ragıp Paşa 881) suggests that he revised his first translation two years later, in 1134/1722. This other manuscript lacks the lengthy preamble containing Yānyavī’s motives for translating Cottunios’ work, as well as the dedications to the Sultan, Grand Vizier and Grand Mufti. Though the ensuing text seems mainly to be the same as in the first version, there are some differences. For example, in the first discussion (mabḥath) of the first introduction (al-muqaddima al-ūlā), Yānyavī inserted a quotation from Avicenna’s Shifāʾ in the later version (fol. 2b). Yānyavī also wrote a super-gloss on the gloss of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ ʿArabshāhī (d. 976/1568–9) on Mullā Ḥanafī’s commentary on a treatise on ādāb al-baḥth by ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī. This super-gloss displays a very different side of Yānyavī – a side that has received much less attention by modern historians. It shows that he was well versed in the post-classical Islamic intellectual tradition. He explicitly cited the works of earlier Ottoman glossators on the same work, as well as the works of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Taftāzānī, Jurjānī, Dawānī, ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī, Mīrzā Jān Bāghnawī and ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkūtī. Two extant manuscripts of the work are: (i) Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesı, MS 2039, fols. 39–72, and (ii) Çorum İl Halk Kütüphanesı, MS 2313, 65 folios.

(vii) Meh. med Emı¯n Üsküda¯rı¯ (Gökdag ˘ & Deniz 2014, 25–50) Meḥmed Emīn Üsküdārī was a contemporary of Esʿad Yānyavī and Meḥmed Sāçaḳlızāde. Little is known of his education and subsequent career. In an incidental reference in one of his writings, he mentioned that he was a student of Fāżil Süleymān (d. 1134/1721), a preacher at the Ayasofya Mosque in Istanbul who gained some renown as a critic of the panentheist mystical ideas of Ibn ʿArabī and his followers. Üsküdārī may also have been a disciple of Murād Bukhārī (d. 1132/1720), a Sufi master who brought to Istanbul the Mujaddidī

222

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

branch of the Naqshbandī order – a branch that went back to the Indian Sufi Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624) and eschewed both panentheism and the ecstatic rites of some other Sufi orders. He wrote a number of extant works on theology, logic, mathematics and grammar. His abridgement of Taḥafut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) by the earlier Ottoman scholar Ḫōcazāde (d. 893/1488) has been edited with a facing-page Turkish translation (Gökdağ & Deniz 2014). He died in 1149/1736. Logic was of particular interest to Üsküdārī, judging from the number of works he wrote in the field. His focus appears to have been primarily with issues relating to “assents”, i.e., propositions and syllogisms, rather than with preliminary issues and “conceptions”. Unusually, he wrote a gloss on the second half of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya, covering “assents”, ignoring the first half covering “conceptions”. In this respect, he is more reminiscent of Mōstārī than Ḳara Ḫalīl. Unlike Mōstārī, however, he engaged regularly with the works of later Persian logicians such as Dawānī, ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī and Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ. His main works on logic are: 1) A gloss on the second part of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, covering “assents” (taṣdīqāt), i.e., propositions and syllogisms. It regularly takes into account the earlier gloss of ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī. Completed in 1127/1715, this was Üsküdārī’s most extensive work on logic. Two extant manuscripts are: (i) Princeton University Library, Islamic Manuscripts, Garrett Y5281, 128 folios, with 23 lines per page, copied in 1202/1787–8; and (ii) Çorum İl Halk Kütü­phanesı, Çorum, nr. 5042, 218 folios, 17 lines per page, copied in 1198/1783–4. Approximately two-thirds of the work is devoted to propositions, and one-third to immediate implications (for example, conversion and contraposition) and the formal syllogistic, the same proportion as in ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī’s gloss on the “assents”. In Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary, by contrast, the discussion of propositions takes up approximately 38% of the section on “assents”, whereas the discussion of immediate implications and the formal syllogism takes up approximately 52%. So even within the topic of “assents” there was a clear tendency for later glossators to dwell on propositions, for example on whether they have three or four parts, or whether the antecedent and consequent of a condi­

(vii) Meh. med Emı¯n Üsküda¯rı¯ 223

tional are properly speaking propositions (as they lack the element of judgment). 2) A commentary on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. This was completed in the year of his death, 1149/1736. An autograph manuscript is extant in Haci Selim Ağa Library, Istanbul: Kemankeş 339. It comprises 70 folios, with 19 lines per page. In the colophon, Üsküdārī wrote that he thought of the work as complementing the commentary that his teacher Fāżıl Süleymān had written on the second part of Taftāzānī’s handbook, on theology (kalām). As mentioned above, Taftāzānī had originally conceived the parts on logic and on theology as a single work, entitled Ghāyat tahdhīb al-kalām fī taḥrīr al-manṭiq wa-l-kalām, though the later commentary tradition tended to treat the two parts as separate handbooks. 3) A short treatise on the parts of the proposition, explaining the competing views that the parts of a proposition are three (subject, predicate and the nexus between them) or four (subject, predicate, nexus and judgment). This appears to have been Üsküdārī’s most widely copied work on logic, surviving in numerous manuscript copies in Istanbul. A holograph is extant in Haci Selim Ağa Library, Istanbul: Kemankeş 326, fols. 3a–5b. 4) A relatively short commentary on an introductory treatise on ādāb al-baḥth by the Ottoman scholar Meḥmed Birgevī (d. 980/1573). An autograph manuscript is extant in Haci Selim Ağa Library, Istanbul: Kemankeş 292 (10 folios). 5) A gloss on the gloss of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ on Mullā Ḥanafī’s commentary on Ījī’s treatise on ādāb al-baḥth. A holograph, completed in 1140/1727– 8, is extant in Haci Selim Ağa Library, Istanbul: Kemankeş 281, 49 folios. 6) A gloss on the discussion of the subject matter (mawḍūʿ) of a science in Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. An autograph fragment, incomplete at the end, is in Haci Selim Ağa Library, Istanbul: Kemankeş 326, fols. 1b–3a. 7) A short treatise on modality propositions and their relations (nisab). By “relations” is meant relative strength or weakness. Any two modality propositions (from the more than a dozen recognized in post-Avicennan logic) can be such that they have (i) equivalent truth conditions, (ii) non-overlapping truth conditions, (iii) partially overlapping truth

224

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

conditions, or (iv) one is “more specific” (in the sense that its truth implies the truth of the other but not vice versa) and the other “more general”. An autograph is extant in Haci Selim Ağa Library, Istanbul: Kemankeş 326, fols. 40a–43b. 8) A treatise on the distinction between universal and particular terms (Mach 1977, nr. 3283). 9) A gloss on the passage in Fenārī’s commentary on Īsāghūjī dealing with the “aspect of unity” (jihat al-waḥda) has also been attributed to Üsküdārī (in Gökdağ & Deniz 2014, 38). However, the manuscript indicated is actually a copy of Meḥmed Emīn Ṣadrüddīnzāde’s treatise on “the aspect of unity”, mentioned above. A reason for the misattribution, apart from the similarity of given names, may be that the relevant manuscript, made in 1121/1709, is by the hand of Meḥmed Emīn Üsküdārī himself (see Haci Selim Ağa Library, Istanbul: Kemankeş 326, fols. 3b–39b).

(viii) Ebu ¯ Sa ̔ ¯d ı Ha¯dimı¯ (Bu ¯rsalı 1333/1914–5, I, 296–298; Sarıkaya 2005) ˘ Ebū Saʿīd Meḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Ḫādimī was born in the village of Hadim near Konya in 1113/1701. He began his studies with his father, and then went to Istanbul to continue his studies with Aḥmed Ḳāzābādī (d. 1163/1750), an influential teacher of the rational sciences. After completing his education, he returned to his hometown and taught at a madrasa founded by his father. He authored a number of esteemed works that were printed in the nineteenth century, including an influential handbook on Ḥanafī jurisprudence, a voluminous commentary on the influential pietistic work al-Ṭarīqa al-muḥammadiyya by Meḥmed Birgevī (d. 981/1573), and a commentary on Ghazālī’s ethical treatise Ayyuhā l-­ walad. He died in Hadim in 1176/1762. His works on logic include:

1) ʿArāʾis anẓār al-abkār wa-nafāʾis maʿdin al-asrār (Bride-Worthy Virginal Views and Precious Trove of Secrets). This is a handbook on logic, written during the lifetime of his teacher Ḳāzābādī. In the introduction, Ḫādimī wrote that he did not wish to confine himself to the well-known aspects of logic but to collect less familiar points from various margina-

(viii) Ebu ¯ Sa ’ ı¯d Ha¯dimı¯ 225 ˘

lia and from the lectures of his teacher, thus bringing together “what has not hitherto been collected in a treatise nor a book” (mā lam yajtamiʿ ilā l-ān fī risāla wa-lā fī kitāb). Indeed, the work is quite unusual in its organization (the folio numbers are from an extant manuscript in Princeton University Library, copied in 1159/1746: Islamic MS, Garrett Y5310, folios 117b–154b): a. Preamble and Introduction (117b–118b) b. On definitions i. On real and nominal definition. On the distinction between universal and particular, and between essential and accidental. The five universals (118b–123a) ii. On lexical definition (123a–124a) iii. On division (124a–126a) c. On assents i. On the principles [of assent]: Propositions. Contradiction. Conversion. Contraposition (126a–130a) ii. On Proof: Syllogism, Induction and Analogy (130a–131b) iii. On the matter of the syllogism: Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Poetics, Sophistry (131b–134b) iv. On the form of the syllogism. The four figures of the categorical syllogism. The different kinds of combinatorial-hypothetical syllogism. The reiterative-hypothetical syllogism (134b–147b) v. On the complex syllogism and reductio ad absurdum (147b–148b) vi. On the middle term (148b–149b) vii. On regimentation and enthymemes (149b–151a) viii. On how to reduce some syllogisms to others (151a–153a) ix. On fallacies due to matter and form (153a–154b)

Atypical features include the fact that Ḫādimī did not begin with a discussion of the division of knowledge into conception and assent and the subject matter of logic. Also, he introduced the basic modality propositions but did not discuss their conversions, contrapositions and the modal syllogism, while giving a surprisingly full account of the vari-

226

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

ous types of combinatorial-hypothetical syllogism, closely following Urmawī’s discussion in the Maṭāliʿ. In effect, Ḫādimī inverted the emphasis of Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, which gave a detailed account of modal logic but a truncated account of hypothetical syllogisms. Particularly the early sections on nominal and lexical definitions and on division, and the later sections on the middle term, regimentation, enthymemes, and the reduction of syllogisms are unusual for post-­­Avicennian handbooks on logic and are clearly influenced by the Ottoman tradition on ādāb al-baḥth. The section on the middle term, for example, includes a discussion of whether the middle term must recur in the second premise in its entirety. Ḫādimī allowed for syllogisms in which the middle term is qualified in one premise but unqualified in the other (fol. 148b–149a), for example:

This is a rational animal Every animal breathes This breathes This type of inference had been discussed by Sāçaḳlızāde in his aforementioned summa of dialectics Taqrīr al-qawānīn al-mutadāwala fī ʿilm al-munāẓara, a work with which Ḫādimī was familiar (and which he cited in his juvenile work Risāla fī l-qiyās, described below). Other sources that Ḫādimī drew on include the works widely stud­ ied in Ottoman Turkish madrasas: Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentaries on the Shamsiyya and the Maṭāliʿ; Ījī’s commentary on the logic section of Ibn al-Ḥājib’s handbook on jurisprudence Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā; al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s glosses on the three works just mentioned; Taftāzānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya; Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī’s commentary on the logic section of Bayḍāwī’s handbook on philosophical theology Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār; ʿIṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāyinī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary on the Shamsiyya; and Dawānī’s commentary on the Tahdhīb with the gloss of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ. Ḫādimī’s handbook survives in numerous manuscript copies (Mach 1977, nr. 3293). It also elicited a lengthy commentary by Necīb ʿAbdullāh ʿAyntābī (d. 1218/1804) which is extant in at least two manuscripts: Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: Hacı Mahmud Efendi, 5733

(ix) Isma¯ ’ ı¯l Gelenbevı¯ 227

and Topkapı Palace Library, Istanbul, EH 1973. There is some reason, though, to think that it eventually came to be overshadowed by the slightly later handbook of Gelenbevī (discussed below), which was printed on a number of occasions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and elicited around half a dozen commentaries in this period. 2) Tajrīd fawāʾid ʿArāʾis al-anẓār (Extracting the Lessons of the Bride-­ Worthy Views). This is an abridgement of the previous handbook, around half the length of the original and completed in 1169/1755–56 (Mach 1977, nr. 3294; Mach & Ormsby 1987, nr. 1468). Confusingly, this work has been printed with the title ʿArāʾis al-nafāʾis fī l-manṭiq (Istanbul: Dār al-Irshād & Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2012). The editors do not seem to be aware that the work they edited is not the original ʿArāʾis but an abridgement. 3) An untitled treatise on syllogism and proof. This is extant in a manuscript with the possibly apocryphal title Risāla fī l-qiyās (Treatise on Syllogism) (Milli Kütüphane, Ankara, MS A9694, fols. 91b–111b). It is an early work, completed in 1134/1721–22, and was later incorporated by Ḫādimī into the second part of his ʿArāʾis. 4) A short treatise on the proposition (qaḍiyya) and its parts. It elicited a commentary by his student Ḫalīl Āḳvirānī (d. 1223/1808) (see Mach 1977, nrs. 3295 and 3296).

(ix) Isma¯ ̔ ¯l ı Gelenbevı¯ (Bingöl 1988; Kawtharı¯ 1994, 553– 561; S. Gölcük & M. Yurdagür, “Gelenbevi Ismail”, TDV-––i A, XIII, 552–555) Ismāʿīl b. Muṣṭafā Gelenbevī was born in the town of Gelenbe near Aydin in western Anatolia in 1143/1730–31. He studied in Istanbul with ʿOṡmān Ālāşehrī (d. 1190/1776) and Meḥmed Emīn Anṭālī (d. 1211/1797), the former a student of a student of Sāçaḳlızāde, and the latter, like Ḫādimī, a student of Aḥmed Ḳāzābādī. Gelenbevī received a formal certificate (mülāzemet) from Anṭālī in 1177/1763–64. Most of his Arabic scholarly works on logic, dialectics, astronomy, philosophy and theology appear to date from the 1170s/1760s and 1180s/ 1770s. Though he had received a madrasa education, he became involved in teaching mathematics and geometry at the newly established Imperial Naval College in Istanbul in the 1190s/1780s. In this period, he wrote Turkish trea-

228

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

tises that introduced the new mathematics of logarithms. Toward the end of his life, he seems to have assumed a juridical career more typical of a madrasa-­ trained scholar. He died in 1205/1790 while occupying the post of Chief Judge of Yenişehir-i Fenār (modern Larissa) in Thessaly. Gelenbevī was probably the most eminent and influential Ottoman philosopher, theologian and logician of the eighteenth century. In philosophy, he wrote an extensive gloss on the gloss of Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Lārī (d. 979/1571) on Qāḍī Mīr Maybudī’s commentary on Abharī’s Hidāyat al-ḥikma, printed in Istanbul in 1270/1854–55 in 435 pages. In theology, he wrote an even longer gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on the Creed of Ījī that was printed on a number of occasions in Istanbul in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His works on logic include: 1) A commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī. This was printed in Istanbul in 1306/1888–89 in 72 pages. It appears to have been an early work. The introduction suggests as much, Gelenbevī stating that he was asked to write the commentary by his fellow students during their joint study sessions (mudhākara) (p. 2). It also propounds views that Gelenbevī would later abandon, for example that a proposition has four parts: subject, predicate, copula and judgment (p. 34). This view, taken over from Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Taftāzānī, is explicitly rejected in his other logical works. 2) An extensive super-gloss on Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ’s gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. This was printed twice in Istanbul, in 1234/1819 in 514 pages, and in 1313/1895 in 352 pages. Despite its length, it covers only the earlier parts of Dawānī’s commentary and Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ’s gloss, dealing with the preamble and introduction of Taftāzānī’s handbook. 3) An extensive super-gloss on Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ’s gloss on Mullā Ḥanafī’s commentary on Ījī’s treatise on ādāb al-baḥth. It was printed in Istanbul in 1234/1819 in 604 pages. 4) A handbook on ādāb al-baḥth. It was printed in Istanbul in 1284/1867 with the commentary of Gelenbevī’s student Meḥmed Ḥasanpāşāzāde (d. 1194/1780) and in Cairo in 1353/1934 with the glosses of the Kurdish scholars ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Panjiyūnī (d. 1901) and ʿUmar Qaradāghī (d. 1936).

(ix) Isma¯ ’ ı¯l Gelenbevı¯ 229

5) A treatise on modalities, entitled Miftāḥ bāb al-muwajjahāt (The Key to the Door of Modalities). It is not particularly concerned with the relative strengths of modality propositions, or their conversions or contrapositions. Rather, it is a philosophical discussion of necessity, perpetuity, actuality, potentiality, possibility and impossibility. It deals, inter alia, with propositions and their parts, the extension of subject terms, and the difference between ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions. It was lithographed in Istanbul in 1301/1886 in 56 pages and then printed with movable type in 1309/1891 in 71 pages, in both cases with the title Risālat al-imkān (The Possibility Treatise). 6) A treatise on syllogisms lithographed in Istanbul in 1297/1879–1880 with the title Ḳıyās Risālesı (Treatise on Syllogism) has also been attributed to Gelenbevī. However, the attribution is almost certainly mistaken. Two extant manuscripts of the treatise in the Raza Library in Rampur in India are attributed to Ḳıyās Meḥmed Āmidī (fl. 1175/ 1761) (ʿArshī 1971–, IV, p. 420). A third extant copy is included in a collection of treatises by Ḳıyās Meḥmed Āmidī (Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul: Haci Mahmud Efendi 1703, fols. 88–109). A fourth extant copy gives the author’s name as ʿAbbās Efendī (Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: Laleli 3713, fols. 76–82), the scribe apparently having mistakenly copied the phrase li-Qiyās Efendī as li-ʿAbbās Efendī (which is easily done in Arabic script). 7) A handbook on logic entitled al-Burhān fī ʿilm al-mīzān (Demonstration in the Science of the Scale). It was printed twice in Istanbul, in 1253/1837 and in 1310/1892, along with glosses by Gelenbevī himself. As mentioned above, this work came to be widely studied in Ottoman Turkish and Kurdish scholarly circles from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth. It elicited numerous commentaries, of which the following have been printed: a. Muṣṭafā Rīzevī (d. 1227/1812), dedicated to Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1223/1808–1255/1839) and printed in two volumes in Istanbul but without indication of publisher or date. This is arguably the most substantial commentary, delving deeply and critically into the topics covered by Gelenbevī. The first volume, on the first part of Gelenbevī’s handbook on “conceptions” (taṣawwurāt), consists of 154 pages. The second volume, on the part on “assents” (taṣdīqāt)

230

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

consists of 170 pages. The discussion of formal implications (contradiction, conversion, contraposition, and formal syllogism) takes up around a quarter of the whole (II, 72–155). (On the commentator, see Ṡüreyya 1996, IV, 1163.) b. Yūsuf Şükrü Ḫarpūtī (d. 1292/1875), entitled Nāmūs al-īqān bisharḥ al-Burhān (The Law of Certainty in Commenting upon The Demonstration). It was lithographed in Istanbul in 1274/1857–58 in 243 pages. It is short and mainly explicative, and relies heavily on Gelenbevī’s own marginal glosses on the handbook. c. ʿAbd ül-Nāfiʿ ʿİffet Ramażānzāde (d. 1307/1890), entitled Fenn-i Manṭik (The Art of Logic) and printed in Istanbul in 1295/1878 in two volumes of 159 and 284 pages respectively. The commentary is in Ottoman Turkish. d. Ḥasan Ḥüsnü Mōṣüllü (d. 1315/1898), entitled Tanwīr al-Burhān (Lighting The Demonstration). It was printed in Istanbul in 1307/ 1889–90 in 278 pages. e. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Panjiyūnī (d. 1901), formally an extensive gloss rather than a commentary. It was printed along with Gelenbevī’s handbook in Cairo by a Kurdish printing press in 1347/ 1933. f. ʿUmar Qaradāghī (d. 1936), another extensive gloss, printed together with Panjiyūnī’s gloss in Cairo in 1347/1933.

The contents of Gelenbevī’s handbook are as follows, along with the corresponding page numbers of the Istanbul edition of 1310/1892: 1) Introduction (pp. 2–5) a. Knowledge, Conception and Assent b. Types of Reference 2) On singular concepts (pp. 5–12) a. Universal and particular b. Essential and accidental c. The five universals d. Divisions of essences e. Divisions of accidents 3) On the explicative phrase (pp. 12–14)

(ix) Isma¯ ’ ı¯l Gelenbevı¯ 231

a. On definitions and descriptions b. General conditions of explicative phrases 4) On propositions and their immediate implications (pp. 14–30) a. On propositions and their division into categorical and hypothetical b. On quantified and unquantified propositions c. On khārijī and ḥaqīqī propositions d. On privative propositions e. On modality propositions f. On hypothetical propositions g. On contradiction h. On conversion i. On contraposition 5) On the form of proofs and arguments (pp. 30–50) a. On argument and proof in general. Induction and analogy b. On syllogism c. On reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms d. On categorical, combinatorial-hypothetical and unfamiliar syllogisms e. On the familiar syllogism and the four figures f. On modal syllogisms g. On the combinatorial-hypothetical syllogism and its various subdivisions h. On complex and indirect syllogisms 6) On the matter of proofs (pp. 50–55) a. The sources of certainty. The epistemic status of premises b. The premises of demonstrative proof c. On the “why-demonstration” and the “that-demonstration” d. On the subject matter of science The organization and coverage of Gelenbevī’s handbook is somewhat more conventional than Ḫādimī’s earlier handbook discussed above. In terms of content, one of the striking features is the recognition of the four figures of the “unfamiliar syllogism” and a brief discussion of their conditions of productivity. The following are Gelenbevī’s examples of the four figures, depending on whether the recurrent part (boldfaced in the examples) is

232

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

part of the subject or predicate of the first, minor premise and the subject or predicate of the second, major premise: FIGURE 1) This is the slave of a man Every man is human This is the slave of a human

[“man” is part of the predicate] [“man” is the subject]

FIGURE 2) This is the slave of a man No woman is a man This is not the slave of a woman

[“man” is part of the predicate] [“man” is the predicate]

FIGURE 3) The slave of a man is a human [“man” is part of the subject] Every man is an animal [“man” is the subject] The slave of some animal is a human FIGURE 4) The slave of a human is an animal [“human” is part of the subject] Every Rūmī is a human [“human” is the predicate] The slave of some Rūmī is an animal Unlike Ḫādimī, Gelenbevī included a discussion (pp. 28–30 and 37–39) of modal conversion, contraposition and modal syllogisms, following Kātibī’s Shamsiyya closely. Like Ḫādimī, he included a lengthy account (pp. 39–49) of the combinatorial-hypothetical syllogism that appears to follow Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, though not word for word. Although these sections may not have been original, it is still significant that they were included, indicating that Gelenbevī held that modal and hypothetical syllogisms, though perhaps not particularly open to novelty or controversy, should still be mastered by a serious student of logic. His more profound

(x) Müftı¯za¯de Meh. med S.a¯dık. Erzinca¯nı¯ 233

and conscientious commentators, such as Rīzevī, were thus provoked into a serious engagement with these topics. 8) A number of other short treatises by Gelenbevī on logical topics are extant in manuscript form, for example a treatise on division (taqsīm), on implication (luzūm), on the parts of the proposition (ajzāʾ al-qaḍiyya), and on knowledge (ʿilm) (see Mach 1977, nrs. 3307–3310). The fact that many of these treatises do not have proper preambles and introductions suggest that some of them – at least – may have been extracted from his longer works.

(x) Müftı¯za¯de Meh. med S. a¯dık. Erzinca¯nı¯ (Bu ¯rsalı¯ 1333/1914– ˙ üreyya 1996, V, 1419) 15, II, 32–33; S There is little biographical information on this scholar. He was reportedly a student of Meḥmed Emīn Anṭālī (d. 1211/1797), the aforementioned teacher of Gelenbevī (Kawtharī 1993, 39, 44–45). He went on to teach in Istanbul and died there in 1223/1808. He left behind glosses on standard handbooks on logic and dialectics that were printed, sometimes repeatedly, in Istanbul in the nineteenth century, attesting to their popularity in colleges there: 1) A gloss on the commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī on al-Shamsiyya and on al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s gloss. This seems to have been the longest of the many glosses written on this handbook since the fourteenth century, dwarfing even the lengthy glosses of ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī (d. 943/1536–7) and ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkūtī (d. 1067/1657). The section on “conceptions” (taṣawwurāt), i.e., preliminary matters, the five universals and definitions, was printed in Istanbul in 1307/1890 in 470 pages and in 1310/1892–3 in 360 pages. The section on “assents” (taṣdīqāt), i.e., propositions and syllogisms, was printed in Istanbul in 1254/1838 in 295 pages, and in 1279/1862 in 242 pages. Like the glosses of Isfarāyinī and Siyālkūtī, only approximately 13% of Erzincānī’s gloss is devoted to formal implications, i.e., contradiction, conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of hypotheticals, and the formal syllogism, even though around 36% of Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary is devoted to such topics.

234

XIII. 1600–1800: The Ottoman Turkish Tradition

2) A gloss on al-Risāla al-Ḥusayniyya, the treatise on ādāb al-baḥth by Ḥusayn Adanavī (fl. 1092/1681) that was mentioned above as one of the precursors to Sāçaḳlızāde’s summa of dialectics Taqrīr al-qawānīn. It was printed in Istanbul in 1308/1890, in 216 pages.

(xi) ̔ Abdulla¯h Ka¯nk. ırı¯ (Bu ¯rsalı 1333/1914–5, I, 377–378; see also the scholar’s own account of his studies, extant in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesı, Istanbul: Autograph MS: Yazma Bag ˘islar 2444) ʿAbdullāh Kānḳırī Ḳayyimzāde was born in 1186/1770 in the town of Çankırı in northcentral Anatolia. He pursued his studies in nearby Amasya with Aḥmed Ürgūpī (d. 1213/1799) and Kayseri with ʿOṡmān Āḳşehrī (d. 1226/1811), both former students of Ebū Saʿīd Ḫādimī. He also studied in Hadim near Konya with Ebū Saʿīd’s son Meḥmed Emīn Ḫādimī (d. 1223/1808). He later moved to Istanbul and taught at a Sufi lodge (tekke) in the district of Üsküdar. He died in 1239/1823. Kānḳırī was a prolific writer, and authored a number of glosses on widely studied handbooks on rational theology, philosophy and logic, most of these of remarkable length. His works on logic are:

1) An extensive super-gloss on Fenārī’s commentary on Īsāghūjī, along with the glosses of Ḳūl Aḥmed, completed in 1224/1809. The super-­ gloss is considerably longer than, and regularly critical of, the super-­ gloss of Ḳara Ḫalīl on the same work. It appears to have been Kānḳırī’s most widely read work and was printed three times in Istanbul in the nineteenth century: in 1242/1825 in 271 pages and in 1279/1862 and 1313/1896 in 307 pages. As in the case of Ḳara Ḫalīl’s gloss, the emphasis is clearly on introductory matters and conceptions (pp. 1–221 of the 1313/1896 edition, amounting to 72% of the total) rather than propositions and syllogisms. 2) An extensive super-gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb almanṭiq and the gloss of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ, dedicated to Sultan Selīm III (r. 1203/1789–1222/1807). An extant manuscript (Çorum İl Halk Kütüphanesı, nr. 2506) consists of 145 folios, with varying but usually 41 lines per page. It is even longer than, and often critical of, Gelenbevī’s

(xi) ’Abdulla¯h Ka¯nk. ırı¯ 235

super-gloss on the same work. Like Gelenbevī, Kānḳırī only covered the early parts of Dawānī’s commentary and Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ’s gloss, dealing with the preamble and introduction of Taftāzānī’s handbook. Topics discussed are: rhetorical, theological, and philosophical issues related to the preamble; the definition of knowledge; the division of knowledge into conception and assent; the division of conception and assent into evident and acquired; and the subject matter of a science in general and of logic in particular. 3) A super-gloss on Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ’s gloss on Mullā Ḥanafī’s commentary on Ījī’s treatise on ādāb al-baḥth. An extant manuscript is in the Bayezit Devlet Kütüphanesı in Istanbul (MS Veliyüddīn 2866, 110 folios). 4) A super-gloss on the early parts of the gloss of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-­ Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) on the commentary of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/ 1355) on the Mukhtaṣar of Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249), a handbook on jurisprudence. Ottoman scholars had since the fifteenth century regularly glossed the early parts of Ibn al-Ḥājib’s handbook, Ījī’s commentary and Jurjānī’s gloss, covering the work’s introduction and opening section on logic. Influential earlier glosses were written by Ḥasan Sāmsūnī (d. 891/1486), Ḥusayn Khalkhālī (d. 1014/1605 or 1030/1620) and Meḥmed Kefevī (d. 1168/1754) (Mach 1977, nrs. 873, 875–876). An autograph of Kānḳırī’s super-gloss is extant in Bayezit Devlet Kütüpha­ nesı in Istanbul (MS Veliyüddīn 946, 127 folios).

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

(i) Introduction As shown in a previous chapter, a number of advanced works on logic had been written in the Maghreb in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. There seem to have been no such advanced works for more than a century after Sanūsī’s death in 895/1490. This lull may be related to the turmoil undergone by the Maghreb in the intervening period. The Marinid, Ziyyanid and Hafsid dynasties that had presided over the cultural and intellectual florescence of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries weakened and ultimately collapsed in the period from the mid-fifteenth century to the mid-sixteenth century, and the Spaniards, Portuguese and Ottomans vied for control of the region (Ḥajjī 1977, I, 54; Abun Nasr 1987, 144–147). This time of trouble only came to an end in the second half of the sixteenth century, with the Ottomans consolidating control over most of what are now Tunisia and Algeria, and the establishment of the Saʿdid and later ʿAlawid dynasties in Morocco. Whatever the reason, it was only in the seventeenth century that advanced works on logic again began to be written in North Africa. By then, the cities of Tlemcen, Constantine and Tunis were no longer the only, or even main, venues for such work. Rather, most of the eminent logicians of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were from Morocco. Especially the Moroccan scholars al-Ḥasan al-Yūsi (d. 1102/1691), Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī (d. 1128/1716) and Aḥmad al-Hilālī (d. 1175/1761) produced advan­ ced works that continued to be studied in North Africa until the modern period. The Moroccan tradition in this period retained its distinct character. The handbooks used – Akhḍarī’s introductory Sullam, Sanūsī’s intermediate Mukhtaṣar, and Khūnajī’s advanced Jumal – were not commonly studied in the Turco-Persianate world. Conversely, there appears to have been little awareness in Morocco of the post-fourteenth-century Eastern logical tradition. The last Eastern logician with whom Yūsī, Ibn Yaʿqūb and Hilālī systematically en-

238

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

gaged was the Timurid scholar Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390). They appear, for example, to have been unfamiliar with the works of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502) that were so influential throughout the Turco-Persianate world. The turn toward intense discussion of introductory matters and conceptions that is so characteristic of Eastern Islamic logic after the mid-fourteenth century is also much less marked among North African logicians, at least until the mid-eighteenth century. This can be brought out by comparing the emphasis of Yūsī’s extensive gloss on Sanūsī’s commentary on the Mukhtaṣar with that of two Eastern glosses of comparable length: the glosses of ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī (d. 943/1536–7) and ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkūtī (d. 1067/1657) on Quṭb alDīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya. Around a third of Yūsī’s gloss is devoted to introductory matters and conceptions; the two Eastern scholars devote around 60% of their glosses to such matters. Yūsī devoted around 40% of his gloss to the formal implications of propositions (contradiction, conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions) and the formal syllogism; the two Eastern scholars devoted a mere 13–14% to such discussions (El-Rouayheb 2016, 515–516; El-Rouayheb 2017, 398–403). One might also compare the commentary of Hilālī on a later versification of Sanūsī’s handbook with the commentary of the Indo-Muslim scholar Qāżī Mubārak Gūpāmawī (d. 1162/1749) on Bihārī’s Sullam (Hilālī 1313/1895; Gūpāmawī 1887). Hilālī devoted around 36% of his commentary to discussions of the immediate implications of propositions and the formal syllogism; Gūpāmawī devoted around 12%. Hilālī devoted around 26% to discussions of introductory matters and conceptions; Gūpāmawī devoted around 50% to such discussions. Even these figures do not tell the whole story, for a large proportion of Hilālī’s discussion of modality propositions and of ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions is devoted to systematically working out the formal relations (nisab) between them, i.e., their relative strengths, a topic barely touched upon in Gūpāmawī’s commentary. The upshot is that in the Maghreb, the discipline of “logic” was still closely associated with the study of formal implications and with constructing and evaluating formal proofs. North African logicians still showed an interest in the topic of the immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions until the middle of the eighteenth century. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Sanūsī had devoted a section of his handbook to this topic, and some of his later commen-

(i) Introduction

tators and glossators expanded his treatment. None of the major Eastern handbooks on logic from the fourteenth century to the eighteenth devote much attention to this topic. The influence of Moroccan logicians also spread to Egypt, where the students of Yūsī and Ibn Yaʿqūb gained a reputation as teachers of logic and trained a number of Egyptian students who would go on to become eminent contributors to the field, especially Aḥmad al-Mallawī (d. 1181/1767) whose life and œuvre will be discussed below. From around the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the tradition weakened. Morocco underwent a renewed period of political turmoil and economic retrenchment after the death of the powerful Moulāy Ismāʿīl (r. 1082/1672–1139/1727). The political unrest ended with the accession of Sīdī Muḥammad III (r. 1171/1757–1204/1790), but that long-­ reigning Sultan was hostile to rational theology and logic and inclined toward traditionalist-fideist creedal beliefs (Harrak 1989, 298ff). The study of logic survived, to be sure, but the Moroccan works in this field that were written in the nineteenth century consisted of commentaries and glosses on relatively introductory handbooks such as Akhḍarī’s Sullam and another didactic poem entitled al-Kharīda (The Virginal Pearl) by Ḥamdūn Ibn al-Ḥājj (d. 1232/1817). The tradition of writing commentaries and glosses on Sanūsī’s Mukhtaṣar appears to have come to an end in the mid-eighteenth century – the last known Moroccan glosses being by ʿUmar al-Fāsī (d. 1188/1773) and Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Bannānī (d. 1194/1780) (El-Rouayheb 2016, 530). In the course of the eighteenth century, Tunis and especially Cairo rose to prominence as centers for the study of logic, arguably eclipsing Morocco by the end of the period covered in this survey. From the middle of the eighteenth century there is evidence of an increased influence of the Eastern Islamic logical tradition in North Africa. By then, Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq with the commentary of the Persian-born Central Asian scholar ʿUbaydullāh Khabīṣī (fl. 952/1545) was being taught in Tunis. The Tunisian scholar Ibn Saʿīd al-Ḥajarī (d. 1199/1784–5), of whom more will be said below, wrote a gloss on this commentary that explicitly aimed to rebut the criticisms raised against Dawānī by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī, thus situating the gloss in an entirely Eastern context (Ibn Saʿīd al-Ḥajarī 1318/1900–1). At the same time, the works of the Indo-Muslim scholar ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm Siyālkūtī became familiar to Egyptian scholars. Aḥmad al-Mallawī had not engaged with Siyālkūtī’s work when writing in the early decades of the eighteenth century,

239

240

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

but his student ʿAlī al-ʿAdawī al-Ṣaʿīdī (d. 1189/1775) plagiarized extensively from Siyālkūtī’s work in his own gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya (El-Rouayheb 2016, 531). A generation later, the Egyptian scholar Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār (d. 1250/1835) became familiar with some of the later Indo-­Muslim works on logic, such as Mīr Zāhid Harawī’s gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq and Bihārī’s Sullam al-ʿulūm with some of its commentaries. Appealing to such works, he urged his Egyptian colleagues to revise what he deemed their complacent belief in the superiority of their own scholarship (ʿAṭṭār 1936, 436; ʿAṭṭār 1316/1898, II, 484). As will be seen below, his own logical writings quote profusely from later Persian and Indo-­ Muslim works. The impression that Persian and Indo-Muslim works made on North African scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is perhaps understandable. Works such as Siyālkūtī’s gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya or Mīr Zāhid’s gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on the Tahdhīb, with their almost total neglect of questions of formal consequences and formal proofs, and their intense scrutiny of metaphysical and epistemological questions, might hardly look like “logical” works at all from a modern perspective. By comparison, the focus of North African logicians might appear much more continuous with the modern understanding of logic. But it should be kept in mind that the formal emphasis of the North African logical tradition gave it a markedly conservative character. The formal implications of modal and hypothetical propositions had been worked out in considerable detail by the great logicians of the thirteenth century: Khūnajī, Urmawī, Kātibī and Ibn Wāṣil. In those areas, the scope for later scholars to do more than what the historian of astronomy George Saliba – in a different context – has called “nibbling along the edges” (Saliba 2007, 279) of the received system may have seemed slight. By contrast, Eastern Islamic logicians were delving into less well-charted territory, exploring issues that appeared foundational, profound and open-ended. Some of the major North African logicians of this period are:

(ii) al-H. asan al-Yu ¯sı¯ (Qa¯dirı¯ 1977–86, III, 25–49; Honerkamp 2009) al-Ḥasan b. Masʿūd al-Yūsī was a central figure in the rekindling of the North African logical tradition in the seventeenth century. His extensive gloss on

(ii) al-H.asan al-Yu ¯sı¯ 241

Sanūsī’s commentary on the Mukhtaṣar was the first influential and nonintro­ductory work on logic written in the Maghreb since Sanūsī’s writings two centuries earlier. It is extant in numerous manuscripts throughout the region, attesting to its popularity. He also trained a number of students who in turn became important writers and teachers of logic. Some of these students moved to Egypt, where they gained a reputation as teachers of the rational sciences. Yūsī was born around the year 1040/1630 in a Berber village near the upper reaches of the Moulouya river basin in the Middle Atlas. He studied in Marrakesh with scholars such as ʿĪsā al-Sugtānī (d. 1062/1652), author of an esteemed gloss on one of Sanūsī’s theological works. He also studied in the zāwiya (a combination of Sufi lodge and madrasa) of the prominent Shādhilī Sufi and scholar Muḥammad Ibn Nāṣir al-Darʿī (d. 1085/1674) in Tamagroute in the Draa valley in southeast Morocco. He went on to teach to considerable acclaim in the zāwiya founded near Kasba Tadla in the Middle Atlas by Abū Bakr al-Dilāʾī (d. 1021/1612). After the destruction of the Dilāʾī zāwiya in 1079/1668 by the forces of Moulāy Rashīd (r. 1077/1667–1082/1672), Yūsī continued teaching in Fes and then Marrakesh. He died on his return from the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1102/1691. Yūsī’s two main works on logic are: 1) An extensive gloss, entitled Nafāʾis al-durar fī ḥawāshī al-Mukhtaṣar (Precious Pearls on the Margins of The Epitome), on Sanūsī’s commentary on the Mukhtaṣar (Khaṭṭāb 1985, IV, nrs. 74–79). Though charitable, Yūsī expanded, supplemented and occasionally modified Sanūsī’s views. He drew extensively on especially Taftāzānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya and Ibn Marzūq al-Ḥafīd’s lengthy commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal, but occasionally defended his own individual views. 2) A lengthy treatise on the difference between the differentia and the proprium, entitled al-Qawl al-faṣl fī l-farq bayna l-khāṣṣa wa l-faṣl (The Decisive Discourse on the Difference between the Proprium and the Differentia) (Khaṭṭāb 1985, IV, nrs. 83–84). This treatise has not been edited or studied, but the length of extant manuscripts suggests it may have been the most extensive treatment of this topic in the Arabic tradition. The introduction of the work strikes a confident and critical note:

242

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

O reader! There may occur in our work things with which you are not familiar and that you will find nowhere else. Do not hurry to condemn this, whimsically heeding the call of the one who merely relays what others have said and stitches it together, and for whom the ultimate in knowledge and the aim of all effort is to say, ‘So and so has said’. No by God! … We seek refuge in God from blackening folios and stuffing quires with what people have said and meant, following the well-trodden path of imitation (taqlīd) as the dull-witted do … So know, o reader, that we have not included in this or other compositions anything besides what we believe to be correct, viz. concepts and propositions that are evident or correctly argued for (Quoted in Samlālī 1975, III, 162).

(iii) Ibn Ya ̔ qu ¯b al-Walla¯lı¯ (Qa¯dirı¯ 1977–86, III, 229–233) Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī, often referred to as Ibn Yaʿqūb, hailed from the same region as Yūsī, with whom he studied in the Dilāʾī zāwiya in the mid-1070s/1660s. After his teacher’s death, he became perhaps the leading scholar in the rational sciences in North Africa, writing a number of commentaries on standard handbooks of philosophical theology, semantics-rhetoric and logic that were widely copied and studied in later centuries. In later years, he appears to have been a tutor at the palace of Moulāy Ismāʿīl in Meknes. He died in Meknes in 1128/1716. Ibn Yaʿqūb wrote extensively on logic, and he commented upon the full range of handbooks in common use in Morocco in his time: the introductory Sullam of Akhḍarī, the intermediate Mukhtaṣar of Sanūsī, and the advanced Jumal of Khūnajī. His style is marked by clarity and the almost complete absence of references to or quotations from previous authors. The focus of his logical works is unmistakably with formal consequences and formal syllogisms, perhaps more so than any other Arabic logician of this late period. For example, around 60% of his commentary on Sanūsī’s Mukhtaṣar is devoted to the immediate implications of propositions and the formal syllogism, and only 12% to introductory matters and conceptions. He is one of the last Arabic logicians whose work shows a mastery of the formally demanding topic of hypothetical syllogisms with only a part (juzʾ ghayr tāmm) of the antecedent or consequent shared by the two premises. His works on logic include:

1) Lawāmiʿ al-naẓar bi-sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar (Sparkling Thoughts in Commenting upon The Epitome), a commentary on Sanūsī’s Mukhtaṣar.

(iii) Ibn Ya ’ qu ¯b al-Walla¯lı¯ 243

Though the commentary is mainly explicative, Ibn Yaʿqūb on occasion disagreed with Sanūsī. An extant manuscript is in the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, MS nr. 1427 (98 folios, 27 lines per page, copied in 1141/1729). 2) al-Qawl al-musallam bi-sharḥ al-Sullam (The Conceded Discourse in Commenting upon The Ladder), a commentary on Akhḍarī’s Sullam. This has been edited by Nizār Ḥammādī (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2016, 324 pp.). 3) Tafṣīl al-mujmal bi-sharḥ al-Jumal (Detailing What is Summarized in Commenting upon The Sentences), a commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal. This may have been the first commentary on this advanced handbook since the fifteenth century. It also appears to have been the last such commentary. Unfortunately, it may not be fully extant. The one manuscript that has come to light so far (Rabat, al-Khizāna al-Ḥasaniyya, MS 2306) is a fragment of 87 folios (with 24 lines per page), erroneously bound together with the end of another work. The complete commentary must have been approximately twice as long. 4) His own didactic poem, al-Lāmiyya (i.e., rhyming with the letter lām), on logic, along with a prose commentary. The following is an outline of the work, with the folio numbers of what appears to be an autograph manuscript of 65 folios (with 24 lines per page), extant in the Azhar library in Cairo (Cairo, Azhar Library: MS 2576/96175): a. Preamble (fol. 1b) b. The definition and purpose of logic (fol. 2b) c. Kinds of reference; singular and complex terms (fol. 4a) d. The five universals (fol. 6b) e. Definition (fol. 10a) f. Propositions, including modal and hypothetical (fol. 12a) g. Contradiction (fol. 23a) h. Conversion, contraposition, immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions (fol. 26a) i. Syllogism, including modal and combinatorial-hypothetical (fol. 32b) j. Reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms (fol. 58b) k. Induction, analogy and the matter of the syllogism (fol. 60b–65a)

244

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

(iv) Ah. mad al-Mallawı¯ (El-Rouayheb 2016) Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Mujīrī al-Mallawī was born in 1088/1677 and died at an advanced age in 1181/1767. The attributive “Mallawī” derives from the Middle Egyptian town of Mallawī. It is not clear whether he was born in the town or one of his ancestors had hailed from it. In any case, he studied in Cairo, and there fell under the influence of a number of teachers of Moroccan origin, in particular ʿAbdullāh al-Kinaksī and Aḥmad al-Hashtūkī (d. 1127/1715), both students of the abovementioned Moroccan theologian and logician al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī. Mallawī in turn became one of the most eminent Egyptian scholars of his age, writing a number of works on logic, rational theology, syntax and rhetoric that were studied down to the twentieth century. Particularly influential were his two commentaries, one long and one short, on Akhḍarī’s introductory didactic poem al-Sullam al-murawnaq. Especially in his student days, Mallawī also wrote a number of more advanced works on modality propositions and their conversions and contrapositions, modal syllogisms, and the immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions. These often took the form of short didactic poems along with commentaries. Though didactic poems and commentaries were long derided by modern historians as exemplifying the unoriginal and “vulgarizing” nature of works written in the “post-classical” age of Islamic civilization, Mallawī’s works are in fact advanced and critical contributions, and have a good claim to being the most extensive treatments of topics such as modal syllogisms and the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions since the fourteenth century. Mallawī engaged extensively with especially the works of Ibn ʿArafa, Sanūsī and Yūsī, though he was also aware of some Eastern Islamic work such as the commentaries on the Shamsiyya by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Taftāzānī, the commentary on Īsāghūjī by Fenārī, and the commentaries on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq by ʿUbaydullāh Khabīṣī (fl. 952/1545) and Taftāzānī’s great-grandson Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Harawī, often known simply as al-Ḥafīd (d. 916/1510). Conspicuously, he seems largely to have ignored the logical works of Dawānī and ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī, even though he could hardly have been unaware of them – they were regularly quoted by Egyptian scholars active a century earlier, such as Aḥmad al-Ghunaymī (d. 1044/1634) and his student Yāsīn al-ʿUlaymī (d. 1061/1651). It may be that Mallawī found the emphases of the two later Persian scholars to be too much at odds with his own.

(iv) Ah. mad al-Mallawı¯ 245

The following logical works by Mallawī are extant: 1) A long commentary on al-Sullam al-murawnaq by Akhḍarī. There are six extant manuscripts of the work in the Azhar Library, Cairo (Fihris al-kutub al-mawjūda bi-l-Maktaba al-Azhariyya ilā sanat 1366/1947, III, 428). 2) A short commentary on al-Sullam. This appears to have been his most widely studied work in later times, and elicited glosses by his students ʿAṭiyya al-Ujhūrī (d. 1190/1776), Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ṣabbān (d. 1206/ 1792) and Aḥmad b. Yūnus al-Khulayfī (d. 1209/1795). Ṣabbān’s gloss was printed in Cairo in 1285/1868, with Mallawī’s commentary on the margin. It was reprinted in Cairo in 1319/1901 and in 1357/1938. 3) A didactic poem on modality propositions (al-muwajjahāt) and their relative strengths, conversions and contrapositions, with a commentary entitled al-Laʾālī al-manthūrāt ʿalā naẓm al-muwajjahāt (Scattered Pearls upon the Versification of the Modal Propositions). (For extant copies, see Fihris al-Kutub al-Mawjūda bi-l-Maktaba al-Azhariyya, III, 435 & Ahlwardt 1887–99, nr. 5211.) 4) A didactic poem on modal syllogisms (mukhtaliṭāt), with a commentary entitled Asrār al-maʿqūlāt fī sharḥ naẓm al-mukhtaliṭāt (The Secrets of Cognition in Commenting upon the Versification of the Modal Syllogisms). This may well have been the most extensive treatment of this topic since the fifteenth century. An extant manuscript is in the Rampur Library in Uttar Pradesh (MS 8385M, 20 folios, 31 or 32 lines per page, copied, to judge from the handwriting, in the Middle East rather than in India. For another extant manuscript, see Fihris al-Kutub al-­ Mawjūda bi-l-Maktaba al-Azhariyya, III, 428). 5) A didactic poem, with commentary, on the immediate implications (lawā­zim) of hypothetical propositions (al-sharṭiyyāt). Again, this is probably the most extensive treatment of this issue since the fourteenth century. It is also the work in which Mallawī most often took original positions. An extant copy is in the Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul (Laleli 2679, 36 folios, 25 lines per page). 6) A didactic poem on the khārijī and ḥaqīqī propositions, i.e., propositions in which the subject term is assumed to actually exist in the extra-­ mental world (fī l-khārij) or to have merely supposed existence (bi-l-

246

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

farḍ), with a commentary entitled al-Asrār al-ḥaqīqiyya fī-mā yataʿallaq bi-l-khārijiyya wa l-ḥaqīqiyya (The True Secrets concerning the Extra-­ mental and the Essential Propositions). An extant manuscript is in Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Cairo (MS 2929w, fols. 1a–12b, 21 lines per page). 7) A treatise, entitled Tuḥfat al-mushtāq bi-bayān inḥiṣār al-kayfiyya immā fī l-ḍarūra wa-mā yuqābiluhā wa immā fī l-dawām wa l-iṭlāq (The Gift to the Longing in Explaining that Modality is Encompassed by Necessity and its Opposite or Perpetuity and its Opposite), showing that all modality propositions are encompassed by necessity and its negation, and perpetuity and its negation. An extant manuscript is in Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Cairo (MS 2929w, fols. 13a–17b, 21 lines per page). 8) A didactic poem, with a prose commentary, on the logical relations in terms of strength and weakness that can obtain between two propositions, and between one proposition and the negation of the other. It is entitled Laṭāʾif al-maʿānī fī l-nisab bayna ʿayn aḥad al-muntasibayn wa naqīd al-thānī (The Subtle Meanings Concerning the Relations between One of Two Related Propositions and the Contradictory of the Other). An extant manuscript is in Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Cairo (MS 2929w, fols. 18a–20b, 21 lines per page). 9) A treatise on the logical relations (nisab) between modality propositions, entitled al-Munaḥ al-wāfiyyāt fī nisab al-muwajjahāt (The Sufficient Presents Concerning the Relations of Modality Propositions). An extant manuscript is in the Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Cairo (MS 2930w, 10 folios, 21 lines per page). See also Fihris al-Kutub al-Mawjūda bi-l-Maktaba al-Azhariyya, III, 444. 10) A gloss on a commentary by the Egyptian scholar Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 925/1519) on the Īsāghūjī of Abharī. This has been edited along with the commentary (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2016). The editor suggests (on pp. 39 and 56) that Mallawī plagiarized from a gloss on the same commentary by a certain Muḥammad al-Daljī, on the ground that a later glossator attributes to al-Daljī a number of passages that are identical to passages in Mallawī’s gloss. But an inspection of an extant manuscript of Daljī’s gloss (available on www.alukah.net/ library/11551/105279) shows that Daljī attributed these passages to his teacher (shaykhunā), and when Mallawī quoted a named scholar Daljī reproduced the passage and added “as reported by our teacher from an earlier Imam” (cp.

(v) Muh. ammad al-Fulla ¯nı¯ al-Kashna ¯wı¯ 247

Mallawī pp. 147–148 with Dalajī MS fol. 119b). In other words, it is clear that Daljī was Mallawī’s student and quoted a number of passages from his teacher’s gloss. 11) A versification of Sanūsī’s al-Mukhtaṣar on logic. There are four extant copies of the poem in the Azhar Library in Cairo (Fihris al-Kutub al-Mawjūda bi-l-Maktaba al-Azhariyya III, 446–447). 12) A gloss on the preamble of the commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī on Kātibī’s al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya (Ahlwardt 1887–99, nr. 5265).

(v) Muh. ammad al-Fulla ¯nı¯ al-Kashna ¯wı¯ (Hunwick & O’Fahey 1994, II, 37–39) This Fulani scholar hailed from Katsina in what is today northern Nigeria, and pursued his studies in the Bornu region around Lake Chad and in the Baguirmi region south of Bornu. He went on pilgrimage in 1140/1728, stayed in the Hejaz for five years, and then settled in Cairo where he died in 1154/1741–2. He was particularly reputed for his mastery of the occult sciences, and his extensive work on talismans and astral magic al-Durr al-manẓūm wa-khulāṣat al-sirr al-­ maktūm fī ʿilm al-ṭalāsim wa l-nujūm (The Ordered Pearls and the Synopsis of the Hidden Secret on the Science of Talismans and Stars), completed in Cairo in 1146/1733, was lithographed in Bombay in 1303/1885–6 and printed in Cairo in 1961. He also wrote an extensive work on logic, entitled Izālat al-ʿabūs ʿan wajh Manḥ al-Quddūs (Removing the Severity from the Face of the Grant of the All-Holy). This is a commentary on his own didactic poem on logic. An undated holograph is extant in Yale University Library (MS Landberg 233, 297 folios, with variable lines per page). As explained in the conclusion of the commentary, the original version of the didactic poem was composed in his home region in 1137/1724–5 and was conceived as a versification of Sanūsī’s Mukhtaṣar. While in the Hejaz, however, Kashnāwī expanded the poem from 571 to 832 lines, incorporating new material relating to the “five arts” (demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, poetics and sophisms) from Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ al-­ anwār and its commentary by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī. The expansion of the poem surely reflects the encounter with Eastern Islamic works on logic. Apart from the commentary on the Maṭāliʿ, he also referred to Bihārī’s Sullam al-ʿulūm and Mīr Zāhid Harawī’s gloss on Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq, works

248

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

with which he presumably became familiar while sojourning in the cosmopolitan scholarly milieu of the Hejaz. Kashnāwī appears to have written his extensive commentary while in Cairo, i.e., some time between 1145/1732–3 and his death in 1154/1741–2. In his introduction, he noted that he would rely primarily on Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentaries on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ and Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, as well as on Sanūsī’s auto-­ commentary on the Mukhtaṣar, the gloss on that commentary by al-Ḥasan al-­ Yūsī, and the later commentary on the Mukhtaṣar by Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī. (An extant manuscript of Ibn Yaʿqūb’s commentary is by the hand of Kashnāwī; it was copied in 1141/1729, while he was in the Hejaz; see King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh: MS nr. 1427.) Kashnāwī also on occasion drew on the aforementioned Indo-Islamic works by Mīr Zāhid and Bihārī, as well as Taftāzānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya, the commentaries on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq by Dawānī and Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī, and Mallawī’s commentary on Akhḍarī’s Sullam. Kashnāwī’s work may not have been particularly original or influential – there appears to be only one manuscript copy that is extant apart from the holograph (see Fihris al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya, I, 222), and I have not found any references to it in later works on logic. Nevertheless, it represents a remarkable confluence of the North African and Eastern Islamic traditions of Arabic logic, prefiguring the increased influence of the Eastern tradition on African logicians in the second half of the eighteenth century.

(vi) Ah. mad al-Hila ¯lı¯ (Qa ¯dirı¯ 1977–86, IV, 143–151) Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Hilālī was born in 1113/1701–02, and studied mainly in the oasis town of Sijilmasa in southeastern Morocco with the scholar Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb al-Sijilmāsī (d. 1165/1751) who, in turn, had studied with some of Yūsī’s students, including Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī. He also met prominent Egyptian scholars, including Mallawī, on his way to and from the Hajj, though their actual influence on him is not clear – he seems to have been unaware of Mallawī’s works on logic, for example. Hilālī went on to teach in M’daghra near Sijilmasa, in Sijilmasa itself, and in Fes. He died in the former town in 1175/1761. His main work on logic, written in the lifetime of his teacher, is an extensive commentary on a versification of Sanūsī’s Mukhtaṣar by Yūsī’s student ʿAbd al-Salām b. al-Ṭayyib al-Qādirī (d. 1110/1698). Numerous manuscripts of this commentary are extant (Khaṭṭāb 1985, IV, nrs. 60–66). It was lithographed in

(vi) Ah. mad al-Hila ¯lı¯ 249

Fes in 1313/1895 in 344 (not continuously paginated) pages. A table of contents is as follows: i) ii)

Preamble and Introduction (pp. 1–12) Knowledge, conception and assent. The “headings” of logic (pp. 13– 22) iii) Types of reference (pp. 22–37) iv) The principles of definition: Singular and complex utterances, particular and universals terms (pp. 37–56) v) The five universals (pp. 56–71) vi) The relations between universals (pp. 71–75) vii) General conditions of explicative phrases (pp. 75–86) viii) Definition and description (pp. 87–90) ix) Propositions (pp. 90–103) x) Modality propositions (pp. 109–142) xi) Quantified and unquantified propositions. Quantification of the predicate (pp. 142–148) xii) The ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions (pp. 148–159) xiii) Metathetic predicates (pp. 159–166) xiv) Hypothetical propositions (pp. 166–185) xv) Quantifiers (pp. 185–190) xvi) Contradiction (pp. 190–205) xvii) Conversion and contraposition (pp. 205–230) xviii) Immediate implications of hypotheticals (pp. 230–255) xix) Syllogism (pp. 255–287) xx) Modal syllogisms (pp. 287–291) xxi) Combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms (pp. 291–307) xxii) Reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms (pp. 307–314) xxiii) Complex and indirect syllogisms. Induction and analogy (pp. 314– 321) xxiv) The matter of the syllogism (pp. 321–339) xxv) Conclusion (pp. 339–344) Hilālī’s commentary is more than twice as long as Sanūsī’s own commentary on the Mukhtaṣar. To some extent, this is due to its inclusion of topics that Sanūsī had not discussed. Most conspicuously, Hilālī introduced his commentary with

250

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

a relatively lengthy discussion of knowledge, its division into conception and assent, the need for logic, its subject matter, aim, name, founder, legitimacy, and its relation to other sciences (pp. 1–22). Whereas Sanūsī ended his handbook with the hypothetical syllogism, Hilālī added a relatively lengthy discussion of induction, analogy and the five arts (pp. 314–339). But even in cases where Hilālī covered topics treated in Sanūsī’s handbook, he usually did so at considerably greater length. For example, his discussion of the immediate implications of hypothetical propositions takes up 25 pages, compared to eight pages in the 1892/1875 Cairo edition of Sanūsī’s commentary, mostly because Hilālī raised and discussed problems and also discussed problems that had been raised by Yūsī and Ibn Yaʿqūb. Hilālī’s discussion of modality propositions takes up 34 pages of the lithograph, compared to six pages in Sanūsī’s commentary, mainly because Hilālī supplemented Sanūsī’s presentation with a detailed account of the relative strengths of the numerous modality propositions. Hilālī’s treatment was informed by the works of Ibn ʿArafa, Sanūsī, Yūsī and Ibn Yaʿqūb, as well as the commentaries on the Shamsiyya by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (whom he confused with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī) and Taftāzānī. He also regularly cited other relevant works by Taftāzānī, especially his Sharḥ al-­Maqāṣid on philosophical theology and his long and short commentaries on Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ on semantics-rhetoric. On a few occasions, he also cited Akhḍarī’s Sullam, the commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq by Khabīṣī, the commentaries on Īsāghūjī by the Cairene scholars Aḥmad al-Ubbadī (d. 860/1456) and Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 925/1519), and the commentary by Aḥmad b. Aḥmad Aqīt al-Timbuktī (d. 991/1583) on Maghīlī’s didactic poem Manḥ al-wahhāb. Hilālī was not familiar with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ, a work that would be cited regularly by later Moroccan scholars such as ʿUmar al-Fāsī (d. 1188/1773) and Ibn Kīrān (d. 1227/1812). This is clear from the fact that he quoted from it indirectly, via a quotation in another source (p. 11). Nor are there any indications that he was familiar with the writings of Dawānī and ʿIṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāyinī that by the second half of the eighteenth century would be cited regularly by Tunisian scholars.

(vii)  ̔ Umar al-Fa ¯sı¯ (Makhlu ¯f 1349/1931, I, 356–7) ʿUmar b. ʿAbdullāh al-Fāsī was born in Fes around the year 1125/1713. He studied with a number of scholars, but appears to have been closest to Aḥmad b.

(vii) ’ Umar al-Fa ¯sı¯ 251

Mubārak al-Lamaṭī al-Sijilmāsī (d. 1156/1743), who is now known primarily for his Sufi works but was also a teacher of the standard exoteric sciences, including logic – he wrote super-glosses on the gloss of Saʿīd Qaddūra on Akhḍarī’s commentary on the Sullam (printed on the margins of Bannānī 1318/1900–1). Fāsī went on to become one of the leading scholars of Fes in his time, writing a number of esteemed works on law, grammar and logic. He died in Fes in 1188/1774. His works on logic are:

1) A gloss on Sanūsī’s commentary on the Mukhtaṣar, entitled Taḥrīr alnaẓar fī baʿḍ masāʾil al-Mukhtaṣar (Redacted Thoughts Concerning some Issues in The Epitome), of which there are four manuscript copies in the Royal Ḥasaniyya Library in Rabat, Morocco (Khaṭṭābī 1985, IV, nrs. 10–14). The gloss is substantially shorter than Yūsī’s gloss. Manuscript nr. 5619 in the Royal Ḥasaniyya Library in Rabat, for example, comprises 82 folios, with 24 lines per page, compared to the Princeton University Library copy of Yūsī’s gloss (Islamic Manuscripts Garrett 485H), which comprises 182 folios, with 23–25 lines per page. It also indicates a shift in emphasis among Moroccan logicians in the second half of the eighteenth century. The discussion of formal implications (contradiction, conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of hypotheticals, and the formal syllogism) takes up around 27% of Fāsī’s gloss, compared to around 40% in Yūsī’s gloss. Four pages of Fāsī’s gloss (fols. 70a–71b) are devoted to the immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions, compared to eleven pages in the Princeton University Library manuscript copy of Yūsī’s gloss (fols. 206b–211b). This shift in emphasis was probably due, at least in part, to increased exposure to later Eastern Islamic logical writings. Fāsī was familiar with, and sometimes cited, earlier North African commentators on Khūnajī’s Jumal. But he also cited extensively and regularly from Quṭb al-Dīn al-­ Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ with the gloss of al-Sayyid al-­Sharīf al-Jurjānī, a work that appears to have been unavailable to Yūsī in the seventeenth century, and even to Hilālī writing a generation earlier than Fāsī. 2) A gloss on Yūsī’s treatise on the difference between the differentia and the proprium. (For an extant manuscript, see Khaṭṭābī 1985, IV, nr. 1.)

252

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

(viii) Ibn Sa ̔ ¯d  ı al-H. ajarı¯ al-Tu ¯nisı¯ (Makhlu ¯ f 1349/1931, I, 350) Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Saʿīd, known simply as Ibn Saʿīd, hailed from the village of Bouḥjar (Bū Ḥajar) near the town of Monastir, south of Tunis. He studied in Tunis with scholars such as Qāsim al-Maḥjūb (d. 1190/1776–7), his son Muḥammad b. Qāsim (d. 1243/1827–8), and Ṣāliḥ al-Kawwāsh (d. 1218/1804). He went on to write a number of glosses on widely studied handbooks on grammar, rational theology and logic. He died young, a victim of the deadly plague that hit Tunis in 1199/1784–5. Ibn Saʿīd is perhaps the most influential logician in Tunis since Ibn ʿArafa in the fourteenth century. Tunis had reemerged in the eighteenth century as an important center of scholarship, after what seems to have been a period of intellectual and cultural retrenchment in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The town enjoyed close economic and cultural relations with Egypt, and many Tunisian scholars interacted with Egyptian scholars in Alexandria or Cairo, often while on their Hajj pilgrimage. Ibn Saʿīd was aware of some of the works on logic by Egyptian scholars, in particular Yāsīn al-ʿUlaymī (d. 1061/ 1651) who had written a gloss on Khabīṣī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq and whom Ibn Saʿīd accused of plagiarizing extensively from the commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī (d. 943/1536–7), mentioned in Chapter Four. In turn, Ibn Saʿīd’s major work (nr. 1 below) came to be known to later Egyptian scholars and was printed in Cairo in the nineteenth century. Ibn Saʿīd’s works on logic are:

1) A gloss on the commentary of Khabīṣī on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Khabīṣī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq had been in widespread use in Cairo since the early seventeenth century, and by the time of Ibn Saʿīd was obviously being studied in Tunis as well. Ibn Saʿīd’s gloss was printed in Cairo in 1296/1879 and 1318/1900–01, along with another gloss on Khabīṣī’s commentary by the later Egyptian scholar Ḥasan alʿAṭṭār (d. 1250/1835). He drew extensively on a number of Eastern Islamic works: Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentaries on the Shamsiyya and the Maṭāliʿ, with the glosses of Jurjānī; Tāftāzānī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya as well as Taftāzānī’s other relevant works on philosophical theology and semantics-rhetoric; and the commentaries on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502), by Taftāzānī’s great-­

(ix) Ibn Kı¯ra ¯n

grandson Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Harawī al-Ḥafīd (d. 916/1510), and by the latter’s student ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī. By comparison, there are only a few passing references to works by previous logicians from the Maghreb, in particular Sanūsī and his commentators and glossators, though it is possible that Ibn Saʿīd was less forthcoming when he relied on such sources – one later glossator accused him of sometimes passing off other scholars’ observations as his own (ʿAṭṭār 1318/1900–1, 2–3). There appears to have been much less reluctance in citing Eastern logicians. In his introduction, he mentioned that he was concerned with replying to the criticisms that had been raised by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī against Dawānī, thus situating his own gloss in the context of a debate between two Eastern Islamic logicians, and – moreover – two logicians who were still largely unknown to contemporary logicians in the more western parts of the Maghreb. The focus of Ibn Saʿīd’s gloss likewise reflects this increased Eastern influence. Only around 20% of the gloss is concerned with the sections of Khabīṣī’s commentary dealing with the immediate implications of propositions and the formal syllogism, whereas around 50% discusses the earlier parts of the commentary dealing with the preamble, introduction and “conceptions”. 2) A treatise entitled Lawāmiʿ al-tadqīq (The Blazing Scrutiny), commenting upon the statement in Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq that, “knowl­ edge, if it is acceptance of the nexus [between subject and predicate], is assent” (al-ʿilm in kāna idhʿānan li-l-nisba fa-taṣdīq). An early man­uscript of the work is extant in the Tunis National Library, MS 9133, fols. 79–90, 23 lines per page.

(ix) Ibn Kı¯ra ¯n (Makhlu ¯ f 1349/1931, I, 376–377) Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib Ibn Kīrān was born in Fes in 1172/1758–59. He studied there with, among others, the abovementioned ʿUmar al-Fāsī (d. 1188/1773) and Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Bannānī (d. 1194/1780), the latter of whom had written a widely-glossed commentary on Akhḍarī’s Sullam (Bannānī 1318/1900– 01). Ibn Kīrān went on to become one of the leading scholars of Morocco in his day, and enjoyed a close relationship with Sultan Moulāy Sulaymān (r. 1206/ 1792–1238/1822). He wrote an esteemed commentary on a didactic poem on Ashʿarī theology by Ibn ʿĀshir (d. 1040/1631) (see Wazzānī 1348–52/1930–33).

253

254

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

In logic, he wrote a commentary on al-Kharīda (The Virginal Pearl), a didactic poem by his contemporary Ḥamdūn Ibn al-Ḥājj (d. 1232/1817). Completed in 1196/1782 (Khaṭṭāb 1985, III, nr. 90), it was lithographed in Fes in 1329/1911 in 278 (not continuously paginated) pages, with generous margins –on these margins the edition includes another commentary on the same didactic poem by Ibn al-Ḥājj’s son Muḥammad (d. 1274/1858). Ibn Kīrān also wrote a treatise on the difference between the nexus (nisba) that connects subject and predicate and the judgment (ḥukm) (Khaṭṭāb 1985, III, nr. 37). He died in Fes in 1227/1812. The commentary on al-Kharīda confirms that the North African tradition of logic was losing its distinctive character by the late eighteenth century. Ibn Kīrān drew extensively on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s Maṭāliʿ and Jurjānī’s gloss, a work that had not been available to Hilālī two generations earlier. He also drew extensively on the commentaries of Quṭb al-­ Dīn and Taftāzānī on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, along with the gloss on the former commentary by Jurjānī. An outline of the work is given below: i) ii) iii) iv) v)

Preamble. Introduction. The permissibility of logic (pp. 2–24) Knowledge, conception and assent (pp. 24–31) Kinds of linguistic reference (pp. 31–44) Singular and composite expressions. Homonymy (pp. 45–67) The distinction between essential and accidental. The five universals (pp. 67–81) vi) The difference between “universal” and “universal quantification”, and between “particular” and “particular quantification” (pp. 81–84) vii) Definition and description (pp. 84–104) viii) Propositions: Categorical and hypothetical. Metathetic predication. Quantification of the predicate. Existential import (pp. 104–135) ix) Modality propositions (pp. 135–142) x) Hypothetical propositions: Conditionals and disjunctions (pp. 142– 166) xi) Contradiction (pp. 166–178) xii) Conversion (pp. 178–191) xiii) Contraposition (pp. 191–196) xiv) The Immediate Implications of hypothetical propositions (pp. 196– 197) xv) The syllogism (pp. 197–207)

(ix) Ibn Kı¯ra ¯n

xvi) The four figures (pp. 208–233) xvii) Modal syllogisms (pp. 233–235) xviii) Combinatorial-hypothetical syllogisms (pp. 235–240) xix) Reiterative-hypothetical syllogisms (pp. 240–248) xx) Induction, analogy, complex syllogisms, indirect syllogisms (pp. 248–­ 256) xxi) The five arts (pp. 256–270) xxii) The relation of premises to conclusion: is it causal, rational or customary? (pp. 270–272) xxiii) Fallacies (pp. 273–278) Ibn Kīrān’s work was hardly meant to be a basic introduction, and it is significantly longer and more demanding than, for example, Akhḍarī’s commentary on his own Sullam. Yet, it is more demanding primarily because it at some length discussed preliminary matters (conception and assent, various types of reference) and the logic of conceptions (the five universals, definition and description). Around 37% of Ibn Kīrān’s work is devoted to such topics, compared to around 30% devoted to formal implications and syllogisms. Ibn Kīrān introduced the modality propositions and discussed their contradictories and their conversion, but not their contraposition, and he gave a very summary account of the modal syllogism. He devoted exactly nine lines to the immediate implications of hypotheticals, explicitly copied from Kātibī’s Shamsiyya, as well as a summary account of the hypothetical syllogism. It is clear that by Ibn Kīrān’s time, the focus of Moroccan logicians had become more aligned with that of Eastern Islamic logicians. One could now write a non-introductory work on logic and yet give little attention to modal and hypothetical logic, instead delving critically into preliminary matters and conceptions. This stands in marked contrast to the North African tradition up to the mid-eighteenth century, in which the primary difference between introductory and more advanced handbooks had been the extent to which they dealt with modal and hypothetical logic. This is not to deny the persistence of regionally specific traits. A discussion of propositions with quantified predicates (munḥarifāt), for example, is present in Ibn Kīrān’s work, following Sanūsī’s Mukhtaṣar. Ibn Kīrān still occasionally cited Sanūsī’s work and Yūsī’s glosses thereon. On at least one occasion, he cited Ibn Wāṣil’s commentary on Khūnajī’s Jumal. Like Akhḍarī’s Sullam, Ibn Ḥājj’s Kharīda included a discussion of the religious permissibility of logic, leading

255

256

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

Ibn Kīrān to devote five pages of his commentary (pp. 25–30) to this issue. Hilālī, too, had discussed this in his aforementioned commentary on al-Qādirī’s versification of Sanūsī’s Mukhtaṣar. Though all these logicians affirmed the permissibility – and indeed the commendableness – of the study of logic, the very fact that they bothered to do so might suggest that this was an issue that simply refused to go away in North Africa, by contrast to the Turco-Persian parts of the Islamic world where the matter appears to have been settled. Indeed, as was mentioned above, the long-reigning Moroccan Sultan Sīdī Muḥammad III (r. 1171/1757–1204/1790) had been opposed to the study of logic and rational theology in madrasas.

(x) H. asan al-̔ At.t.a ¯r (Bı¯t.a ¯r 1961–63, I, 490–492; De Jong 1983) Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-ʿAṭṭār was born in Egypt around the year 1180/1766 and pursued his education in Cairo. He studied logic with Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ṣabbān (d. 1206/1792) and Muḥammad ʿArafa al-Dasūqī (d. 1230/1815), both second-generation students of the abovementioned logician Aḥmad al-Mallawī. ʿAṭṭār left for Istanbul in 1218/1803, amidst the turmoil that followed the departure of Napoleon from Egypt. He only returned to Egypt ten years later, having spent the intervening years in Istanbul, Shkoder (in Albania), Izmir, Damascus, Jerusalem and the Hejaz. After his return, he taught at the Azhar for a number of years. One of his students was Rifāʿat al-Ṭahṭāwī (d. 1290/1873), whose description of Paris is a landmark work in the Muslim encounter with Europe in the nineteenth century. In Cairo, ʿAṭṭār also had contacts with the English orientalist Edward W. Lane who mentioned him in his Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (Lane 1895, 218). In 1244/1828, he was appointed editor of the official journal al-Waqāʾiʿ al-Miṣriyya by the ruler of Egypt, Muḥammad ʿAlī Pāshā (r. 1220/1805–1264/1848). He was appointed Rector of the Azhar College in 1245/1830 and died in 1250/1835. ʿAṭṭār did not, as has been suggested in some modern studies (Gran 1998, 145–146), introduce the sustained study of logic at the Azhar College in Cairo, for there had already been considerable interest in the field in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He should rather be seen as having introduced a range of Eastern Islamic works on logic and dialectic that had been unknown or little-studied at the Azhar before his time, thus challenging the dominant influence that had been exerted by the Maghrebi tradition since the seventeenth

(x) H.asan al-’ At.t.a ¯r

century. He had become acquainted with such Eastern works during his stay in Istanbul and Albania, as well as through his personal contacts with eminent Turcophone scholars such as ʿĀrif Ḥikmet (d. 1275/1859) who, in turn, had become familiar with a number of Indo-Muslim works on logic and philosophy during his spell as Ottoman judge in Medina. Some of these Eastern works were: Meḥmed Sāçaḳlızāde’s Taqrīr al-qawānīn and al-Risāla al-Waladiyya on ādāb al-baḥth; Dawānī’s commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq with the glosses of Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ and Mīr Zāhid Harawī; and Bihārī’s Sullam al-ʿulūm with the commentary of Baḥr al-ʿUlūm. ʿAṭṭār was also familiar with North African works on logic such as Sanūsī’s Mukhtaṣar and its gloss by al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī, and he occasionally cited these in his own writings. Nevertheless, such references are few compared to the profuse quotations from Eastern logical works. In contrast to the clear emphasis on modal logic and the immediate implications of conditionals and disjunctions in the work of Aḥmad al-Mallawī a century earlier, ʿAṭṭār’s own interests were much more in line with those of the Eastern Islamic works that he admired. His major work on logic is a gloss on the commentary by Khabīṣī on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. The discussion of introductory matters and conceptions takes up approximately 52% of that gloss but only approximately 29% of Khabīṣī’s commentary. The discussion of the immediate implications of propositions and formal syllogisms takes up only around 20% of ʿAṭṭār’s gloss, compared to around 39% of Khabīṣī’s commentary. ʿAṭṭār’s works on logic include: 1) A gloss, completed in 1236/1820, on the commentary by Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 1519) on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī. It was printed in Cairo in 1347/ 1928 in 107 pages. More recently, it was published along with the gloss on the same work by al-Mallawī (Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2016). 2) A gloss, completed in 1238/1822, on the commentary by Khabīṣī on Taftāzānī’s Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. It has been printed on a number of occasions in Cairo, for example in 1296/1879 and 1318/1900–01 along with the gloss on the same work by the aforementioned Tunisian scholar Ibn Saʿīd al-Ḥajarī, and in 1355/1936 along with the gloss of ʿAṭṭār’s teacher Dasūqī. 3) A gloss, completed in 1226/1812 in Damascus, on the commentary by Meḥmed Behisnī (fl. 1140s/1730s) on Sāçaḳlızāde’s al-Risāla al-Waladiyya on dialectics (De Jong 1983, 112, nr. 17).

257

258

IX. 1600–1800: The North African Tradition

4) A gloss, completed in 1234/1819, on a treatise on the ten Aristotelian categories (maqūlāt) by the North African-born, Egyptian-based scholar Muḥammad al-Bulaydī (d. 1176/1763). In ʿAṭṭār’s time, this was considered a work on “philosophy” (ḥikma) rather than “logic” (manṭiq), though it is included here due to the position of the categories in the Peripatetic Organon. The gloss was printed in Cairo in 1328/1910. 5) Two sets of glosses, completed in 1242/1827 and 1250/1834, on a didactic poem plus commentary on the ten categories by the Egyptian scholar Aḥmad al-Sijāʿī (d. 1197/1783). They were printed along with ʿAṭṭār’s gloss on Bulaydī’s treatise.

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

(i) Introduction The seventeenth century witnessed the beginning of a literary and cultural efflorescence among Arabic-speaking Christians in the Levant (Patel 2013, 36–74). Though it would with time gain a momentum of its own, and affect Levantine Christians of all denominations, as well as Arab Muslims, the movement was originally linked to the proselytizing and educational efforts of Counter-Reformation Catholicism. A Maronite College was founded in Rome in 1584. Its students were trained in a range of disciplines, including Latin, Arabic, Syriac, logic, philosophy and theology, and many returned to assume influential clerical and educational positions at home. Another Maronite College was founded in Aleppo in 1666, and its cultural and intellectual role was hardly less significant. Another important educational institution in Rome that attracted Levantine Christians was the Pontifical Urban College for the Propagation of the Faith, founded in 1622. Some aspects of this cultural and literary movement are familiar to modern historians. Especially the spread of printing in the eighteenth century in Levantine Christian circles and the emergence of accomplished Christian Arab belle­ trists and grammarians have often been seen as precursors of the so-called Nahḍa – the self-styled “renaissance” of Arabic letters in the nineteenth century. Less attention has been given to the emergence of an Arabic tradition of philosophy and logic among Maronite and Greek Catholic scholars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Though written in Arabic, Christian Arabic works on logic from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are noticeably distinct from the post-Avicennan tradition prevalent among their Muslim contemporaries and much closer to the early modern Latin tradition of logic in Catholic Europe – a tradition encountered in Chapter Six in the discussion of Esʿad Yānyavī’s translation of

260

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

Expositio Lucidissima by Joannes Cottunios (d. 1658). (For early modern Latin traditions of logic, see Ashworth 1974 and John of St Thomas 1955.) However, there are indications that Arabic-speaking Christian logicians in this period were familiar with some Islamic-Arabic works on logic and on occasion integrated some points from these into their own writings. A description of the major figures and works of this tradition of Arabic logic is included below.

(ii) But.rus al-Tu ¯la ¯wı¯ (d. 1745) (Graf 1944–52, III, 394–400) Buṭrus al-Tūlāwī or al-Tūlānī was born in 1659 in the village of Tūlā near the coastal town of Batroun in what is today northern Lebanon. In 1669, he was sent to the Maronite College in Rome. It is likely that he attended the classes of, among others, Ottavio Cattaneo (d. 1679) and André Semery (d. 1717), eminent Jesuit philosophers and logicians who taught at the Collegio Romano in the 1670s (Villoslada 1954, 235, 332). The former’s four-volume Cursus philosophicus, the first devoted to logic, was published in Rome in 1677. The latter’s three-volume Triennium philosophicum, the first covering logic, went through numerous editions between 1674 and 1723. Tūlāwī may also have met Sylvestro Maurus (d. 1687) who taught at the Collegio Romano in the 1650s and 60s and has been described by a modern historian of logic as “the most significant scholastic Aristotelian of his age” (Risse 1964–70, II, 323–324). Maurus’ four-volume Quaestionum philosophicarum, the first dealing with logic, was published in Rome in 1658 and reissued there in 1670, and his six-volume paraphrase of the works of Aristotle was published in Rome in 1668. Tūlāwī returned to the Levant in 1682, and taught for many years at the Maronite College in Aleppo. His numerous works range over logic, philosophy and theology, as well as a Syriac grammar and an abridged Arabic translation of The Imitation of Christ by Thomas à Kempis (d. 1471). He died in Aleppo in 1745. Tūlāwī wrote two works on logic: An introductory al-Madkhal or Īsāghūjī (Introduction), completed in 1688, and a longer Kitāb al-Manṭiq (Book of Logic), completed in 1693. These were conceived as the first two parts of a four-part survey of philosophy, and were followed by a volume on natural philosophy and a volume on metaphysics (completed in 1698 and 1703 respectively). The works were written while Tūlāwī was teaching in Aleppo, and were presumably taught to his students. The numerous extant manuscripts from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries attest to their popularity. His Īsāghūjī was published

(ii) But.rus al-Tu ¯la ¯wı¯ 261

in 2001 by Ameen Albert Rihani on the basis of a single (and sometimes unreliable) manuscript prepared in 1818 by a young Fāris b. Yūsuf al-Shidyāq, later to become famous as the belletrist Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq (1805–1887). The following is an overview of the contents of the work: Introduction (pp. 51–55) First part: On Conception (pp. 55–109) 1) On the terms of the proposition 2) On the division of terms 3) On signifier and signified 4) On the division of the signification of utterances 5) On the signifying utterance and its divisions 6) On the universal, the collective noun, and the particular 7) On transcendental and non-transcendental terms 8) On univocal, equivocal and analogical terms 9) On absolute and connotative terms 10) On abstract and concrete terms 11) On beings of reason and real beings 12) On material supposition and its divisions 13) On formal supposition and its divisions 14) On personal and simple supposition 14) (sic) On collective and distributive supposition 15) On determinate and indeterminate supposition 16) On ampliation (fasāḥa) 17) On restriction (ḥaṣr) 18) On transference (iḥāla) 19) On appellation (munāsaba) 20) On definition 21) On the divisions of definition 22) On division Second Part: On Assent (pp. 110–179) 1) On the noun 2) On the verb 3) On the particle 4) On the enunciation 5) On the proposition

262

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

6) On the compound proposition 7) On the matter of the proposition 8) On the form of the proposition 9) On the quality of the proposition 10) On the quantity of the proposition 11) On the property of the proposition 12) On the matter of each type of proposition 13) On the opposition of propositions 14) On contradictories 15) On contraries 16) On sub-contraries 17) On subalterns 18) On equipollence 19) On conversion and its conditions 20) On modal propositions 21) On exponible propositions Third Part: On Ratiocination (pp. 180–297) 1) On ratiocination 2) On syllogism 3) On the matter, form and figure of the syllogism 4) On the moods of the syllogism 5) On the general rules of the syllogism 6) On the specific rules for each figure 7) On the reduction of the imperfect syllogism to the perfect 8) On reduction per impossibile 9) On expository, hypothetical and relational syllogisms 10) On demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistical syllogisms 11) On fallacious syllogisms 12) On syllogisms whose fallaciousness is due to meaning 13) On the syllogisms of the Arabs 14) On the rules and principles of consequence Tūlāwī’s Īsāghūjī is very much in the seventeenth-century Latin scholastic tradition of logic. It is reminiscent of the introductory parts of the logical works of Paolo Valla (d. 1622), John of St Thomas (d. 1644), Joannes Cottunios (d. 1658), Rodrigo Arriaga (d. 1667), Gabriel of St Vincent (d. 1671), Ottavio Cattaneo

(ii) But.rus al-Tu ¯la ¯wı¯ 263

(d. 1679), Sylvestro Maurus (d. 1687), Antoine Goudin (d. 1695), and André Semery (d. 1717) (Valla 1622, 1–43; John of St Thomas 1955; Cottunios 1651, 3–68; Arriaga 1644, 1–32; Gabriel of St Vincent 1669, 1–64; Maurus 1670, 1–166; Cattaneo 1677, 1–150; Goudin 1729, 51–136; Semery 1686, 1–94). As in these Latin introductions, his basic organizing principle was to devote three main parts of the work to each of the three operations of the mind (afʿāl al-quwwa al-ʿaqliyya): simple conception, judgment and ratiocination (pp. 53–55). His discussion of terms includes elements that were standard in the Latin tradition but unknown to the Arabic-Islamic. For example, he distinguished between categorematic (muḥaṣṣal) and syncategorematic (ghayr muḥaṣṣal) terms (pp. 67– 69). He also outlined the Latin theory of supposition (farḍ or niyāba) (pp. 85– 93), and discussed the ampliation (fasāḥa) and restriction (ḥasr) of terms (pp. 93–95). (On these topics, see Ashworth 1974, 37–76.) In the part on assent, some of the conspicuously Latin elements are: the recognition of four kinds of compound (muʾallafa) proposition (pp. 123–125): the conditional (sharṭiyya), the disjunction (munfaṣila), the conjunction (ʿaṭfiyya) and the causal proposition (sababiyya) – the last two types were not explicitly recognized in the post-Avicennan Arabic-Islamic tradition. Tūlāwī also recognized three types of “exponible” proposition (al-qaḍiyya al-wajib tafsīruhā) (pp. 169–179): exclusive (ḥājiza) such as “The Apostles are only twelve”; reduplicative (ḥaythiyya) such as “The human, insofar as he is rational, possesses understanding”, and exceptive (istithnāʾiyya), such as “All humans have sinned with Adam except the Virgin Mary”. He only recognized three modalities: necessity, impossibility and contingency. He reproduced the standard square of opposition of medieval Latin logic, with contradictories (al-mutanāqiḍatān), contraries (al-mutaḍādatān), sub-contraries (al-maḥṣūratān), and subalterns (al-musaw­waratān) (pp. 143–155). In the part on ratiocination, some of the more distinctive features are the following: Like medieval and early modern Latin logicians, Tūlāwī gave the major premise in a syllogism (i.e., the premise that contains the predicate of the conclusion) first, whereas the Arabic-Islamic tradition from its inception tended to give the minor premise first – Tūlāwī referred to syllogisms in which the minor premise is given first as “the syllogisms of the Arabs” (qiyāsāt al-ʿarab) (p. 283). He recognized three figures of the syllogism, rather than the four that were standard among Muslim logicians after the thirteenth century. The five valid moods of the fourth figure were instead given as indirect moods (ḍurūb ghayr

264

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

mustaqīma) of the first figure. (The manuscript on which Rihani based his edition gives garbled examples of these indirect moods. Compare pp. 195–197 of Rihani’s edition with the more reliable text of another manuscript of the same work: British Library, London: Or. 3710, fols. 70b–71a). Tūlāwī did not quantify conditionals and disjunctions as post-Avicennan logicians did, nor did he discuss the wholly hypothetical syllogism. Like most Latin logicians of the medieval and early modern periods, he included a discussion of “expository syllogisms” (al-qiyās al-wājib tafsīruhu), i.e., syllogisms in which the middle term is a particular, not a universal, such as (p. 247):

This man is walking Zayd is this man Zayd is walking Tūlāwī also recognized what he called “syllogisms with relations” (al-qiyās dhū l-iḍāfa) (p. 251), but his discussion is very brief, and his example suggests that he did not have mind what is usually understood by “relational syllogisms” (for example, the oblique syllogisms of the Latin tradition or the unfamiliar syllogisms of the Ottomans), but simply syllogisms in which the middle term mentions a relation but in which there are still three terms that recur in their entirety, such as: Every book revealed by God is worthy of teaching The Gospels is a book revealed by God The Gospels is worthy of teaching As was standard in the early modern Latin tradition, Tūlāwī included a general discussion of the rules of syllogistic productivity across all figures and moods (pp. 217–223). For this purpose, he invoked the principle that what is said of a distributed subject (mawḍūʿ kullī) is also said of whatever is subsumed under that subject (the dictum de omni) and that what is denied of a distributed subject is also denied of whatever is subsumed under that subject (the dictum de nullo). This was followed by general rules of syllogistic productivity, for example that there must be three and only three terms, that there is no productivity from two negative premises, nor from two particular premises, and that the conclusion will follow the weaker premise. Toward the end of his work (pp. 293–297),

(ii) But.rus al-Tu ¯la ¯wı¯ 265

Tūlāwī briefly expounded some of the basic rules of consequence (qawāʿid almalzūm wa-mabādiʾuhu) sometimes found in early modern Latin introductions to logic (compare John of St Thomas 1955, 124–127). These principles are: 1) A true antecedent only produces a true consequent 2) A false consequent only follows from a false antecedent 3) False antecedents may produce false or true consequents 4) If the antecedent is necessary then the consequent is necessary 5) If the antecedent is possible then the consequent is possible 6) If the consequent is impossible then the antecedent is impossible 7) If the consequent is false then the antecedent is false 8) The contradictory of the consequent produces the contradictory of the antecedent 9) Everything that follows from the consequent also follows from the antecedent Tūlāwī appears to have been familiar with some works belonging to the Arabic-­ Islamic tradition. The Īsāghūjī of al-Abharī – a standard introduction to logic in Muslim colleges in the Ottoman Empire – had been printed in Rome in 1625, along with a Latin translation by the Italian Franciscan Tommaso Obizzino da Novara (Thomas Obicini Novariensis, d. 1632). Even though Tūlāwī may have had to coin Arabic terms to render concepts such as “supposition”, “ampliation” and “reduplicative”, his work displays a conspicuous terminological continuity with Muslim works on logic when dealing with concepts shared between the two traditions, such as “proposition”, “syllogism”, “mood”, “figure”, and “modality”. On a few occasions, Tūlāwī appears to have introduced elements from the Arabic-Islamic tradition into his work. For example, he distinguished between signification by correspondence (muṭābaqa), inclusion (taḍammun) and implication (iltizām) (pp. 63–67), a standard feature in Islamic works on logic such as Abharī’s Īsāghūjī but not of Latin introductions to the field. When discussing disjunctions, Tūlāwī first stated – like early modern Latin logicians such as John of St Thomas (John of St Thomas 1955, 97–98) – that a disjunction is true when one of its disjuncts is true, and that it is false when both disjuncts are false. He then followed Muslim logicians in distinguishing between the exclusive disjunction (māniʿat jamʿ), in which the disjuncts cannot both be true, the exhaustive disjunction (māniʿat khuluw), in which the disjuncts cannot both be

266

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

false, and the disjunction that is both exclusive and exhaustive (pp. 131–135). The terms for the first two types of disjunction correspond to those used in Arabic-Islamic works, but the very idea of making this tripartite distinction may be adopted as well, for it contradicts the preceding point about truth conditions. The so-called “exclusive” disjunction can be true even if both disjuncts are false, and is false if both disjuncts are true. Tūlāwī’s longer work on logic remains unpublished but is extant in more than half a dozen manuscripts. It is significantly longer than his Īsāghūjī, and comparable in length and scope to the non-introductory parts of the logical works of the seventeenth-century Latin scholastics mentioned above. It comprises eighteen main sections, given below with the folio numbers of a manuscript in the British Library (Or. 4246, fols. 113a–248a, 21 lines to a page, copied in 1842): I. On the subject matter of logic (fol. 116a) II. On the quiddity of logic (fol. 120b) III. On the categories (fol. 128b) IV. On universals (fol. 140a) V. On the genus (fol. 144b) VI. On the species (fol. 150a) VII. On the differentia (fol. 154a) VIII. On the proprium and the general accident (fol. 156b) IX. On the whole and the part (fol. 160b) X. On cause and effect (fol. 162b) XI. On the subject (fol. 170a) XII. On composite conceptions (fol. 171b) XIII. On reference and utterance (fol. 178a) XIV. On the proposition (fol. 187b) XV. On definition and division (fol. 192a) XVI. On syllogism (fol. 202a) XVII. On the matter of the syllogism (fol. 215a) XVIII. On demonstration (fol. 228a–248a) The outline gives a sense of the focus of the work. Only five folios are devoted to propositions. The formal syllogism is covered in 13 folios, amounting to less than 10% of the work, of which a mere 12 lines (fol. 214a–214b) are de-

(iii) Yu ¯suf Sham ’ u ¯n al-Sim ’ a ¯nı¯ 267

voted to the modal syllogism. Tūlāwī’s longer work was explicitly conceived as a more advanced work than his Īsāghūjī. Yet, it is not notably more detailed than the shorter propaedeutic work in its coverage of propositions, the formal syllogism and the general rules of consequence. It is clear that what made the longer work more advanced, for Tūlāwī, was primarily that it offered a much more detailed coverage of topics that had been treated in Porphyry’s Eisagoge and Aristotle’s Categories and Posterior Analytics. It appears to have been typical of the seventeenth-century Latin scholastic tradition to assume that a focus on formal logic (i.e., the study of terms, propositions and the formal syllogism) belonged to a more introductory stage of logical studies, and that advanced students would then move on to an in-depth discussion of topics covered in the books of the Organon, usually with an emphasis on the five universals, the ten categories, and the theory of demonstration (John of St Thomas 1955, 5–6).

(iii) Yu ¯suf Sham ̔ u ¯n al-Sim ̔ a ¯nı¯ (Graf 1944–52, III, 444–455) Yūsuf Shamʿūn al-Simʿānī (Giuseppe Simone Assemani) was born in 1687 in the village of Hasroun near Bsharri in northern Mount Lebanon. He was a student at the Maronite College in Rome from 1696 to 1709. If, as is likely, he attended classes at the Collegio Romano in this period, he would have studied logic and philosophy with, among others, the Jesuits Dominico Antonio Briccialdi (d. 1733) and Tommaso Silotti (d. 1747) (Villoslada 1954, 330, 333). Briccialdi wrote Triennium philosophicum (the first volume covering logic) and Silotti Brevis logica, both extant at the library of the Pontifical Gregorian University but unpublished (see https://manus.iccu.sbn.it). Assemani would very likely also have attended the lectures of the perhaps most eminent philosopher and theologian teaching at the Collegio Romano in the first decade of the eighteenth century, the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Ulloa (d. 1723) whose Logica Minor and Logica Major were printed in Rome in 1711 and 1712, respectively (Villoslada 1954, 214, 324). Assemani completed his education in 1709 and was ordained the following year. He started working at the Vatican Library and led a number of manuscript gathering expeditions to the Middle East. In the years 1719–28, he published the first volumes of Bibliotheca Orientalis, a monumental though unfinished digest of Oriental manuscripts in the Vatican library relating to the history and

268

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

doctrines of the Eastern Churches. In 1739, he was appointed First Librarian of the Vatican Library. He died in Rome in 1768. In 1710, a year after formally completing his studies, Assemani completed a lengthy work on logic entitled Kitāb al-Manṭiq (The Book of Logic). An auto­ graph, written in Karshūnī, i.e. Arabic using Syriac script, survives in the Monastery of Saint Anthony Abbot in Rome. A recent edition (Louaize, Lebanon: Notre Dame University Press 2014) reproduces the autograph in facsimile with facing-page printing in Arabic script (pp. 26–316). The manuscript also contains Assemani’s Madkhal ilā l-ʿulūm (Introduction to the Sciences, pp. 1–16), Madkhal fī ʿilm al-manṭiq (Introduction to Logic, pp. 17–24), and Kitāb al-Jadal (The Book of Dialectics, pp. 318–324). Unlike the other figures mentioned in this chapter, Assemani stayed in Rome after completing his education. Though he made a number of visits to Egypt and the Levant, most of his later life was spent working at the Vatican Library. He came to be known first and foremost for his Latin works relating to Eastern Church history, many of which were printed in his lifetime. His early Arabic writings on logic and philosophy, by contrast, remained in manuscript form until very recently, and it is not clear how widely they circulated. Nevertheless, given his renown, it would perhaps be strange for the present chapter not to include a discussion of his lengthy work on logic, which exhibits a number of unusual features. The work is divided into three main “parts” (qism), dealing with conception (taṣawwur), judgment (ḥukm) and syllogism (qiyās). Each part comprises a number of “chapters” (maqāla) that in turn are subdivided into “sections” (faṣl). The following are the main parts and chapters: Introduction (pp. 39–40) Part One: On Conception I. On the utterance (pp. 40–54) II. On what is attached to the utterance (pp. 54–63) III. On universals (pp. 63–70) IV. On the five universals (pp. 70–82) V. On the categories (pp. 83–87) VI. On the seven categories (pp. 87–107) VII. On definition (pp. 108–113) VIII. On division (pp. 113–117)

(iii) Yu ¯suf Sham ’ u ¯n al-Sim ’ a ¯nı¯ 269

Part Two: On Judgment I. On the noun (pp. 118–122) II. On the verb (pp. 122–126) III. On the particle (pp. 126–128) IV. On enunciation (qawl) (pp. 128–129) V. On the proposition (pp. 130–143) VI. On the categorical proposition (pp. 143–154) VII. On the transposition (inqilāb) of categorical propositions (pp. 155–161) VIII. On the conversion of categorical propositions (pp. 162–168) IX. On the quadripartite [i.e. modal] proposition (pp. 168–180) X. On the connective proposition (pp. 180–186) XI. On the disjunction (pp. 187–190) XII. On the hypothetical proposition (pp. 190–196) XIII. On the causal proposition (pp. 196–199) XIV. On the exceptive proposition (pp. 199–202) XV. On the reduplicative proposition (pp. 202–206) XVI. On the truth and falsity of propositions (pp. 206–218) Part Three: On Syllogism I. On the perfect syllogism (pp. 220–224) II. On moods and figures (pp. 224–239) III. On the rules of productive syllogism (pp. 240–254) IV. On the rules of consequence (pp. 255–259) V. On the productive syllogism and its kinds (pp. 260–274) VI. On the reduction of productive moods (pp. 274–292) VII. On the imperfect syllogism (pp. 292–294) VIII. On connective and disjunctive syllogisms (pp. 294–298) IX. On hypothetical, causal and reduplicative syllogisms (pp. 298– 301) X. On the reiterative (istithnāʾī) syllogism (pp. 302–305) XI. On induction and analogy (pp. 306–307) XII. On demonstration and uncertain syllogisms (pp. 307–311) XIII. On fallacies (pp. 311–316) As with the case of Buṭrus al-Tūlāwī, a number of features of Assemani’s work show the influence of the early modern Latin tradition of logic. The overall

270

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

organization is into three main parts corresponding to the three “acts of the mind” (afʿāl al-ʿaql): conception, judgment and inference. In the first part, there is a discussion of the “ampliation” (tawsīʿ) and “restriction” (qayd) of terms (pp. 54–63). Interestingly, Tūlāwī had rendered these Latin concepts differently in Arabic (he used fasāḥa for “ampliation” and ḥaṣr for “restriction”), leading one to think that there were as yet no standard translations for peculiarly Latin logical concepts and that these Christian Arab authors were still trying individually to coin the appropriate Arabic terms. This supposition is further supported by a number of other cases. For example, Tūlāwī termed the Latin “exponible” proposition al-qaḍiyya al-wājib tafsīruhā and divided it into (i) exclusive (ḥājiza), (ii) reduplicative (ḥaythiyya), and (iii) exceptive (istithnāʾiyya). Assemani termed the exponible proposition al-qaḍiyya al-mashrūḥa and termed the second of its subtypes ʿāṭifa – a term that Tūlāwī had used for conjunctive propositions such as “Moses is a prophet and Caleb is a prophet”. Also, Tūlāwī termed sub-contraries (i.e., two propositions whose form is such that they can both be true but not both be false) maḥṣūratān, whereas Assemani used the phrase mutaḍāddatān juzʾiyyan. Like Tūlāwī, Assemani adduced only three modalities: necessity, contingency, and impossibility. Though he discussed the opposition and conversion of modality propositions, he ignored the modal syllogisms. Assemani also placed the minor premise in a syllogism first, so that an example of the first figure is: Every human is an animal Every laugher is a human Every laugher is an animal As mentioned above, Muslim logicians standardly reversed the order of the premises, putting the premise with the subject of the conclusion first. Again like Tūlāwī, Assemani discussed the general rules of syllogistic productivity across all figures (pp. 240–253), for example that there are three and only three terms, and that the middle term is distributed (yuʾkhadhu l-ḥaddu l-awsaṭu kulliyyan) in at least one premise. He also gave general rules of valid consequence (qawānīn al-natīja), listing the following ten (pp. 255–259):

(iii) Yu ¯suf Sham ’ u ¯n al-Sim ’ a ¯nı¯ 271

1) True premises produce a true conclusion 2) False premises produce either a true or a false conclusion 3) Necessary premises produce a necessary conclusion 4) Contingent premises produce a contingent conclusion 5) Impossible premises produce either an impossible, a contingent or a necessary conclusion 6) Universal premises produce either a universal or a particular conclusion 7) Particular premises produce a particular conclusion 8) Singular premises produce a singular or a universal or a particular conclusion 9) Affirmative premises produce an affirmative conclusion, and negative premises produce a negative conclusion 10) In affirmative propositions, the affirmation of actuality implies the affirmation of potentiality, but not vice versa, and the denial of potentiality implies the denial of actuality, but not vice versa Three of the more idiosyncratic features of Assemani’s work are: First, he confined the categories to seven, as opposed to the traditional ten. He argued that action and passion are one category, that position is reducible to quality and place, and that possession is reducible to quality (pp. 85–86). More research is needed to trace the antecedents of this view. The claim that the categories are seven had been defended by French Cartesians in the seventeenth century (Arnauld & Nicole 1965, 51), but their list of categories is conspicuously different from Assemani’s. Second, Assemani recognized the fourth figure of the syllogism (p. 239). This was still a minority opinion in the Latin tradition when he was writing. Only three syllogistic figures are presented in the most widely studied Latin manuals of logic from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: by Francisco de Toledo (d. 1596), Pedro da Fonseca (d. 1599), Eustache de Saint Paul (d. 1640), Philippe Du Trieu (d. 1645) and Francisco de Oviedo (d. 1651). This remained the position of popular Latin handbooks from the late seventeenth century by the French Dominican Antoine Goudin (d. 1695), the French Oratorian Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel (d. 1706), the Italian Jesuit Giovanni Battista de Benedetti (d. 1706), and Tūlāwī’s aforementioned teacher André Semery (d. 1717). The view that there are four figures had, however, gained some ground

272

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

over the course of the seventeenth century. It had been advocated by, among others, the unconventional philosophers Tomasso Campanella (d. 1639) and Sebastian Izquierdo (d. 1681), the latter a teacher of the abovementioned Juan de Ulloa (who in turn may have taught Assemani) (Campanella 1637, 383–392; Izquierdo 1659, II, 177–203). The perhaps most influential European work from the seventeenth century that divided syllogisms into four figures was La logique ou l’art de penser, perhaps better known as the Port-Royal Logic, by Antoine Arnauld (d. 1694) and Pierre Nicole (d. 1695), published in French in 1662, in Latin in 1674, and reprinted on numerous occasions in both languages (Arnauld & Nicole 1965, 200–203). In Philosophia ad usum Scholae accommodata by Guillaume Dagoumer (d. 1745), first published in 1701–2 and often reprinted in later decades, the view that there are four figures is presented as the “most recent opinion” (opinio recentiorum) (Dagoumer 1757, II, 435). The recognition of the fourth figure had been standard in the Islamic-Arabic tradition after the twelfth century, and it cannot be precluded that Assemani may have been influenced on this point by, for example, Abharī’s Īsāghūjī that – as mentioned above – had been published with a Latin translation in Rome in 1625. But the fact that Assemani gave the direct and indirect moods of the four figures (pp. 260–274) strongly suggests that he was following the Latin tradition. An indirect mood is one in which the two extremes are converted in the conclusion. For example, the following is a direct mood of the first figure: Every human is an animal Every laugher is a human Every laugher is an animal An indirect mood of the first figure would be: Every human is an animal Every laugher is a human Some animal is a laugher The Islamic-Arabic tradition did not give indirect moods, and would have considered the second example not to be in the first figure at all but in the fourth, for the middle term “human” is a subject in the minor premise (the prem-

(iii) Yu ¯suf Sham ’ u ¯n al-Sim ’ a ¯nı¯ 273

ise with the subject of the conclusion) and a predicate in the major premise (the premise with the predicate of the conclusion). A third unusual feature of Assemani’s work is that he recognized four types of composite proposition (apart from the exponible propositions mentioned above): (i) “connective”, (ii) disjunctive, (iii) conditional, and (iv) causal. The first type, the “connective”, he termed muttaṣila, a term that he almost certainly adopted from the Islamic tradition (pp. 180–183). Assemani quantified the muttaṣila proposition, using examples that are strikingly reminiscent of standard examples of the muttaṣila in Avicennan and post-Avicennan logic: his example of the universal muttaṣila is “Whenever the human is an animal then he is sensitive” (kullamā kāna l-insānu ḥayawānan fa-huwa ḥassāsun), and his example of the particular muttaṣila is “It may be if the human is an animal then he is sensitive” (qad yakūnu in kāna l-insānu ḥayawānun fa-huwa ḥassās). So far, it would appear that Assemani simply incorporated Avicenna’s notion of quantifying conditionals. But closer reading reveals that the matter is more complicated. One problem is that Assemani gave as an example of an “unquantified” muttaṣila “Zayd is a human and John is sitting” (Zayd huwa insānun wa-Yūḥannā jālisun) – this is not a conditional at all. Furthermore, and crucially, he wrote that the quantified muttaṣila proposition is only true if both its parts are true (p. 180), clearly revealing that he understood the muttaṣila proposition very differently from Avicenna and post-Avicennan Muslim logicians. In the post-Avicennan Islamic tradition, it was usual to divide the “hypothetical” (sharṭiyya) proposition into conditionals (muttaṣila) and disjunctions (munfaṣila). Assemani, however, treated the muttaṣila as a different kind of composite proposition from the sharṭiyya. He reserved the term sharṭī for the third kind of composite proposition which is clearly the conditional, for example “If the sun is up then it is day” (in kānat al-shamsu ṭāliʿatan fa-l-nahāru mawjūd), stating explicitly that such a sharṭī proposition can be true even if both its antecedent and its consequent are false (pp. 192–3). The evidence thus suggests that Assemani did not think of the muttaṣila as a conditional; he appears instead to have taken it as equivalent to the conjunction (thus translating the Latin copulativa) or to the “temporal” proposition recognized in some Latin works and usually considered a kind of conjunction – propositions that state that one proposition is true at the same time as another proposition is true, for example “The sun shines while it is day” (see Ashworth 1974, 147; Øhrstrøm 1982; Broadie 1993, 27).

274

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

Assemani devoted most of the third part of Kitāb al-manṭiq to the categorical syllogism (pp. 220–294), but also briefly discussed the various kinds of hypothetical syllogism (pp. 295–305). Again, he made the curious distinction between the muttaṣila and the sharṭī syllogism. In his discussion of the former (pp. 295–296), he was clearly influenced by Avicenna’s discussion of the “combinatorial muttaṣila syllogism” in al-Shifāʾ, especially his quantification of muttaṣila premises. In the ensuing discussion of the sharṭī syllogism (pp. 298–300), Assemani did not quantify the sharṭī premises, though he did acknowledge the wholly hypothetical syllogism, for example: If Zayd is a human then he is an animal If he is an animal then he has sensation If Zayd is a human then he has sensation Though the influence of Avicenna is undeniable, Assemani thus still operated with the medieval and early modern Latin distinction between the copulative syllogism and the conditional syllogism. In the Logica Minor of the aforementioned Juan de Ulloa, who taught at the Collegio Romano when Assemani was a student, copulative syllogisms include inferences such as the following (De Ulloa 1711, pp. 143): A and B [in the sense that they co-exist] A and C [in the sense that they co-exist] B and C [in the sense that they co-exist] A conditional syllogism includes what de Ulloa termed syllogismus pure conditionalis, for example (De Ulloa 1711, p. 149): If A then B If C then A If C then B Assemani appears to have used his reading of Avicenna to expand on the treatment of these two forms of syllogism among some of his Latin teachers and sources. However, the assimilation of Avicenna’s muttaṣila into the Latin tradi-

(iv) Yuwa ¯kı¯m al-Mut.ra ¯n

tion’s “copulative” proposition (or into the “temporal” proposition usually seen as falling under the “copulative”) was very different from the post-Avicennan Islamic tradition’s understanding of the muttaṣila as a conditional.

(iv) Yuwa ¯kı¯m al-Mut.ra ¯n (d. 1766) (Graf 1944–52, III, 210– 214; Nasrallah 1989, IV/2, 138–142, 252–254) Yuwākīm al-Muṭrān was born in 1696 in the town of Baalbek in Lebanon. Very little – if anything – is known of his early education. As a Greek Catholic destined for holy orders, it is likely that he studied at one of the numerous Catholic schools established in the Levant by Capuchins, Jesuits and Carmelites. A reference in one of his later writings to the Spanish Jesuit Luis de la Puente (d. 1624) may indicate a Jesuit education. He later joined the Basilian Order based in the Monastery of St John in Choueir in Mount Lebanon, and studied with ʿAbdullāh al-Zākhir (d. 1748), who is now chiefly remembered for the printing press he established there in 1733. Zākhir, who came from Aleppo, is in some sources mentioned as a student of Tūlāwī, though other sources do not mention this, possibly reflecting a later falling out between the Greek Catholic Zākhir and Jesuits and Maronites in Aleppo (on this point, see Aouad & Fadlallah 2009, 454–461). Muṭrān went on to occupy various clerical and pedagogic positions in Baalbek, Aleppo and Acre. He died in the last-mentioned town. His date of death has conventionally been given as 1772, but there is evidence that he actually died six years earlier, in 1766 (Nasrallah 1989, IV/2, 138). The most widely disseminated work on logic by Muṭrān is his al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya fī l-uṣūl al-manṭiqiyya (The Ingenuous Tome on the Principles of Logic). It was completed in Aleppo in 1754, and was intended as an introduction (īṣāghūjī) to the discipline. A number of sources indicate that it was in widespread use in Greek Catholic circles in the Levant throughout the nineteenth century (Aouad & Fadlallah 2009, 466–467). The following is a table of contents, with the folio numbers of an undated manuscript extant in the Princeton University Library (Islamic Manuscripts: Garrett 488H, 74 folios, 17–20 lines per page).

Introduction to philosophy (fols. 4a–7a) – Preamble on the purpose of philosophy – Explaining the name “philosophy”

275

276

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

– On the quiddity of philosophy – On the [final, formal and material] causes of philosophy – On the divisions of philosophy Introduction to logic and the three operations of the mind (fols. 7a–9a) – On the definition of logic, explaining its name, and its divisions – On the three operations of the mind First Part: On issues relating to conception (fols. 9a–32b) I. On universals a. On genus and the Porphyrian tree b. On the species c. On the differentia d. On the proprium e. On the general accident II. On the categories a. On substance b. On quantity c. On quality d. On relation e. On action and passion f. On when g. On where h. On position and possession III. On definition, description and division a. On referring expressions and kinds of reference b. On definition and its division c. On utterance and its divisions d. On enunciation and its division e. On the explicative discourse i. On essential definition ii. On description f. On division Second part: On assent, i.e., judgment (fols. 32b–43a) I. On assent in general a. On the quiddity of the proposition b. On the matter and form of the proposition [i.e. terms and copula]

(iv) Yuwa ¯kı¯m al-Mut.ra ¯n

c. On the properties of propositions i. On the quantity of the proposition ii. On the quality of the proposition iii. On the opposition of propositions iv. On the equipollence of propositions v. On conversion d. On the divisions of the propositions e. On composite propositions i. On the conjunctive proposition ii. On the hypothetical proposition iii. On the conditional iv. On the disjunction v. On the causative proposition vi. On exponible propositions f. On order (rutba wa niẓām) i. On ascent and descent (inḥiṭāt wa irtiqāʾ) Third Part: On ratiocination (fols. 43a–72a) I. On syllogism in general a. On proof and its divisions b. On the quiddity of the syllogism c. On the matter of the syllogism [the extremes and premises] d. On the form of the syllogism i. On the first figure and its moods ii. On the second figure and its moods iii. On the third figure and its moods e. On the rules (qawāʿid) of the syllogism i. On the principles (uṣūl) of the syllogism [the dictum de omni & dictum de nullo] ii. On the general syllogistic rules and reduction of non-­ perfect figures f. On the species of syllogism II. On syllogism specifically a. On the complex and hypothetical syllogism b. On demonstrative syllogism c. On dialectical, rhetorical and poetic syllogism d. On sophistical syllogisms

277

278

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

Conclusion: On logical dialectics (fols. 72a–74a) Muṭrān’s introduction, too, is much closer to the Latin tradition of logic in ways that are by now familiar. Muṭrān presented logic as an introduction to philosophy, and not – as was standard in Islamic circles by this time – to all sciences. He covered the Aristotelian categories, the Porphyrian tree, and the square of opposition. He recognized exponible, conjunctive and “causal” propositions. He only acknowledged three figures of the syllogism, and included five “indirect” moods alongside the standard four moods of the first figure. He gave the major premise of a syllogism first. When discussing the conditions of syllogistic productivity, he invoked the dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo. He only recognized modus ponens, modus tollens, and disjunctive syllogism as “hypothetical syllogisms”, and ignored the wholly hypothetical syllogisms of the post-Avicennan tradition. Muṭrān’s concluding section on “logical dialectics” (mujādala manṭiqiyya) is also conspicuously different from the Arabic-Islamic discipline of ādāb albaḥth. He presented six rules of disputation: (i) to understand clearly the claim; (ii) to produce a claim syllogistically from the very outset; (iii) to be careful to anticipate which premise might be challenged; (iv) if the objector concedes a premise in one sense but not in another, then the claimant should either use another premise or use the premise as conceded by the objector; (v) to stick to the middle term of the original syllogism and not adduce another in the midst of the disputation; and (vi) to dispute syllogistically if time permits. He then gave three rules to be observed by the disputants: (i) to listen carefully and make sure one understands the claims made; (ii) not to respond before the opponent has finished presenting his case; and (iii) to repeat the syllogism of the opponent and then proceed to scrutinize it premise by premise, objecting or clarifying when appropriate. The focus and terminology are very different from that of the discipline of ādāb al-baḥth cultivated so intensively among Muslim Ottoman scholars. Having said this, a few elements from the Arabic-Islamic tradition are present as well. Like Tūlāwī, he distinguished between reference by correspondence (muṭābaqa), by inclusion (taḍammun) and by implication (iltizām) (fols. 22b–24a). Also like Tūlāwī, he distinguished between three kinds of disjunction and used the standard Arabic-Islamic terms for these (fols. 41–41b): the māniʿat jamʿ in which the disjuncts cannot both be true, the māniʿat khuluw

(iv) Yuwa ¯kı¯m al-Mut.ra ¯n

in which the disjuncts cannot both be false, and the ḥaqīqiyya in which the disjuncts cannot both be false and cannot both be true. Another work on logic by Muṭrān was his completion of an unfinished commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī by his teacher ʿAbdullāh al-Zākhir. A description of an extant manuscript that contains this work is included in Aouad, Roisse, Gannagé & Fadlallah 2008, 267–273. According to Graf ’s monumental Geschich­ te der christlichen arabischen Literatur, the work was completed in 1766. However, there are already references to it in al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya completed in 1754 (see Aouad, Roisse, Gannagé & Fadlallah 2008, 277). It is clear from this work that Zākhir and Muṭrān were familiar not only with Abharī’s Īsāghūjī, but also with the standard commentaries on it by Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Kātī (d. 760/1359) and Meḥmed Fenārī (d. 834/1431) that were studied in Muslim colleges. Zākhir was one of the local Christians in Aleppo who reportedly attended the classes of Sulaymān al-Naḥwī (d. 1141/1728), a Muslim scholar who was primarily renowned for his teaching of grammar (naḥw) but also taught logic. It is possible that Zākhir studied these works with him. Muṭrān also authored a longer work on logic entitled al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya fī sharḥ al-uṣūl al-manṭiqiyya (Explanatory Dictions in Commenting upon the Principles of Logic). In the preamble, he wrote that he had earlier written a shorter introduction (madkhal) that contained “the principles of logic” (al-uṣūl al-manṭiqiyya). This is almost certainly a reference to al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya fī l-uṣūl al-manṭiqiyya that, as mentioned above, is explicitly presented as an introduction (īṣāghūjī) to the discipline. One problem is that, according to both Graf and Nasrallah, al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya was completed in 1751, three years before al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya, but this dating is again problematic. The dating of al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya to 1754 is secure, for Muṭrān mentioned the place and year of composition in the introduction to that work. Yet, on a few occasions in al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya, Muṭrān urged the reader to consult the discussion of an issue in “Īṣāghūjī known as al-Risāla al-ʿabqariyya” or “al-Īṣāghūjī al-ʿabqariyya” (see, for example, Qism III, Maqāla I, Bāb III: fī māddat al-qiyās or Qism I, Fann II, Bāb II, Faṣl II: fī l-maḥmūlāt ayy al-maqūlāt al-ʿashr). At the same time, there are references to al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya in the Princeton manuscript of al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya (see fols. 42b, 66b, 71b–72a), though at least one reference (fol. 42b) tells the reader that he will encounter a more expansive discussion in al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya “God willing” (sa-taqifu ʿalayhi in shāʾa Allāhu fī kitābinā al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya), suggesting that the longer work was

279

280

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

not yet complete. If Graf and Nasrallah are right in dating al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya to 1751, then either Muṭrān revised it at a later date and incorporated references to al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya into the revised version, or the references in al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya are to an earlier version of al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya that was written prior to 1751. It is also possible that the date given by Graf and Nasrallah is wrong, that Muṭrān was writing both works at the same time, and that he completed al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya first. Al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya is almost twice the length of al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya. An extant, unpaginated manuscript copy in Princeton University Library comprises 118 folios, with 21 lines to a page (Islamic Manuscripts, Third Series 138, pp. 110b–346a, copied in 1833). In terms of organization, it is quite similar to the more introductory work, having three main parts dealing with the three operations of the mind: conception, judgment and ratiocination. But the longer work discusses each of the topics at greater length. Especially the treatment of demonstration and Aristotelian topics is considerably more detailed than in al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya. In addition, al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya includes discussions to which there are no parallels in the earlier work. Most conspicuously, in the first section on conceptions Muṭrān gave a relatively lengthy discussion of terms and supposition (Qism I, Fann III, Bāb I: fī l-ḥudūd and Bāb II: fī mulḥaqāt al-ḥudūd). The third part on ratiocination includes a discussion of consequences (Qism III, Maqāla II, Bāb V, Faṣl IV: fī qawāʿid al-natīja ay qawānīnihā). It is reminiscent of Tūlāwī’s discussion in Īsāghūjī but is terminologically distinct. Tūlāwī had called the consequent al-malzūm, apparently due to a misunderstanding of that Arabic term. Arabic-Islamic logicians used malzūm for the antecedent of a true conditional, and lāzim for the consequent, in other words in the exact opposite sense as Tūlāwī. Muṭrān’s usage of lāzim and malzūm is continuous with the Arabic-Islamic tradition, and he tended to use either lāzim or natīja for “consequent”. He gave the following rules of consequence: 1a) From truth only truth follows 1b) The false only follows from the false 1c) From the false the false or true may follow 2) If the antecedent is possible then the consequent is possible 3) If what follows from the antecedent is impossible then the antecedent is impossible

(iv) Yuwa ¯kı¯m al-Mut.ra ¯n

4) Anything incompatible with the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent 5) From the contradictory of the consequent the contradictory of the antecedent follows 6) Anything that follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent 7) In an affirmative statement, actuality entails possibility (for example, if Zayd moves actually then Zayd possibly moves) 8a) A universal premise entails both a universal and a particular conclusion 8b) A particular premise only entails a particular conclusion 8c) A singular premise may entail a singular, a universal and a particular conclusion Like Tūlāwī, Muṭrān had little interest in modal logic and devoted only a few lines of his summa to modal conversion and modal syllogisms. An additional element in Muṭrān’s longer work on logic that may derive from the Arabic-Islamic tradition is that he quantified conditionals. In other words, he distinguished – as Avicenna and post-Avicennian logicians did – between the universal-affirmative “Always: If P then Q”, the particular-affirmative “Sometimes: If P then Q”, the universal-negative “Never: If P then Q”, and the particular-negative “Sometimes not: If P then Q” (Qism II, Maqāla I, Bāb IX, Faṣl IV: fī bayān kammiyyat al-qaḍiyyatayn al-muttaṣila wa l-munfaṣila). This allowed him to include a brief discussion of the opposition and conversion of conditionals, though he did not recognize wholly hypothetical syllogisms. It should be noted, however, that some Latin logicians who were contemporaries of Muṭrān also quantified conditionals, though in a slightly different way. For example, the Swiss Jesuit Jakob Dedelley (d. 1757), whose Summulae logicae went through six editions between 1728 and 1762, presented a square of opposition for conditionals (Dedelley 1728, 86). In his scheme, the universal-affirma­ tive conditional is exemplified by “Every human, if he studies becomes learned” (Omnis homo, si studet, fit doctus); the particular-affirmative conditional by “Some human, if he studies becomes learned (Aliquis homo, si studet, fit doctus)”; the universal-negative conditional by “No human, if he studies becomes learned” (Nullus homo, si studet, fit doctus), and the particular-negative by “Some human, if he studies does not become learned” (Aliquis homo, si studet, non fit doctus).

281

282

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

It is possible that Muṭrān assimilated this kind of quantification of conditionals into the somewhat different one he came across in Avicenna and post-Avicennan Islamic works such as Fenārī’s commentary on Abharī’s Īsāghūjī. Interestingly, Muṭrān may have been familiar with Assemani’s work on logic, for he noted that some scholars considered the “connective” (muttaṣila) and the “hypothetical” (sharṭiyya) two distinct types of composite proposition. Muṭrān confessed that he could see no difference between the two. He held, in line with “the Arab philosophers” (falāsifat al-ʿarab), that the “hypothetical” (sharṭiyya) divides into the “conditional” (muttaṣila) and the “disjunction” (munfaṣila), and suggested – not entirely accurately – that those who wished to distinguish the “connective” from the “conditional” simply thought of the former as quantified and the latter as not quantified (see Qism II, Bāb IX, Maqāla I, Faṣl II: fī l-qaḍiyya al-muttaṣila). In the case of Tūlāwī and Assemani, it is possible to identify some of the Latin logicians and works on logic that they would have encountered when they were students in Rome in the 1670s and 1700s respectively. This is much more difficult in the case of Muṭrān, about whose early education so little is known. He was not influenced by European logicians inclined toward the new, non-scholastic philosophies of the early modern period, such as Antoine Arnauld (d. 1694), Christian Wolff (d. 1754) and César Chesneau Dumarsais (d. 1756), and apparently not even by Catholic scholastics who selectively absorbed elements from these new philosophies, such as Sebastian Izquierdo (d. 1681), Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel (d. 1706), Edmond Pourchot (d. 1734) and Guillaume Dagoumer (d. 1745). (On these figures, see http://scholasticon. ish-lyon.cnrs.fr/index_fr.php or the name index to Risse 1964–70, II, 743–749.) Indeed, Muṭrān’s rejection of the fourth syllogistic figure and his disregard of the wholly hypothetical syllogism mark his work as more old-fashioned than Assemani’s which was written more than forty years earlier. His work is instead reminiscent of conservative scholastic Jesuit logicians active in the first half of the eighteenth century, such as Luis de Lossada (d. 1748) and the aforementioned Jakob Dedelley (d. 1757). It is noteworthy that Muṭrān retained the three “mental operations” (conception, judgment and ratiocination) as an organizing principle for a lengthy, non-introductory work on logic. As mentioned above, it appears to have been more usual in the seventeenth-century Latin tradition to adopt this organizing principle for shorter introductions, while

(iv) Yuwa ¯kı¯m al-Mut.ra ¯n

organizing lengthier, more advanced works according to some or all of the books of the Aristotelian Organon. Nevertheless, there are examples of Latin works from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that adopt the tripartite organization even for lengthy surveys of logic, for example Lossada’s Institutiones dialecticae and Dedelley’s Summulae logicae, as well as the revised and expanded version prepared by Matthias Heimbach (d. 1747) of the very popular handbook Manuductio ad logicam by the French Jesuit Philippe Du Trieu (d. 1645). Another striking feature of al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya is the formal organization, with ever-finer divisions and subdivisions. The work is divided into three major “divisions” (qism) that are then subdivided into “fields” (fann), which are then subdivided into “articles” (maqāla), which are subdivided into “headings” (bāb), which in turn are subdivided into “chapters” (faṣl), which are then subdivided into “parts” (juzʾ). The terms used for the divisions are reminiscent of Avicenna’s philosophical summa al-Shifāʾ, with which some early modern Christian Arab scholars were familiar (Aouad & Fadallah 2009, 462–463; Pourjavady 2017, 322; Nasrallah 1979, IV/1, 249). Avicenna’s work is divided into “books” (jumla), for example on logic or natural philosophy or metaphysics, each of which are then subdivided into “fields” (fann), then “articles” (maqāla), then “chapters” (faṣl). The predilection for ever-finer divisions may betray the influence of the popular and often highly systematic handbooks of logic and philosophy produced by the Jesuit College in Coimbra (Portugal) in the years 1592–1606 and then reissued in revised editions until the early eighteenth century (Casalini 2017). For example, the volume on logic from Cursus Philosophicus Conimbricensis by Antonio Cordeiro (d. 1722) is divided into “treatises”, which are subdivided into “disputations”, which are then subdivided into “questions”, which are then subdivided into “articles”, which are then subdivided into “queries” (Cordeyro 1714). Muṭrān wrote an even longer work on logic. According to Joseph Nasrallah’s Histoire de mouvement littéraire dans l’église Melchite du Ve au XXe siècle (Nasrallah 1989, IV/2, 254), Muṭrān completed that work in 1763 and gave it two titles: al-Kamāl al-murtaqī fī l-ʿilm al-manṭiqī (The Ultimate Ascent in the Science of Logic) and al-Takmīl fī ʿilm al-manṭiq al-jalīl (The Completion in the Noble Science of Logic). Nasrallah referred to an autograph manuscript extant in the Monastery of St Georges El Chir in Bmekkine in Lebanon, but did not give a closer description of the work.

283

284

X. 1600–1800: The Christian Arabic Tradition

(v) Sim ̔ a ¯n al-S. abba ¯gh (Graf 1944–52, III, 248–249; Nasrallah 1989, IV/2, 255–256) Simʿān al-Ṣabbāgh was born in Shafā-ʿAmr near Acre in 1726, and studied in Rome at the Pontifical Urban College for the Propagation of the Faith between 1745 and 1753. He returned to the Levant and was initially active in the entourage of Ibrāhīm al-Ṣabbāgh, a Greek Catholic physician and vizier of Ẓāhir al-­ ʿUmar (r. 1159/1746–1189/1775), the virtually autonomous ruler of Acre and its hinterland in northern Palestine and southern Lebanon. He later taught at the ʿAyn Warqa seminary, founded in 1789 in the Keserwan region of Mt Lebanon. His date of death is not known, though he was still alive in the year 1802. Ṣabbāgh wrote a work on logic entitled Manārat al-qiwā l-ʿaqliyya fī l-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiya (The Lighthouse of Mental Faculties: On the Rules of Logic). (For extant manuscripts, see Nasrallah 1989, IV/2, 256.) The work is slightly shorter in length, but broadly comparable in organization and coverage to Yuwākīm al-Muṭrān’s al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya, with which Ṣabbāgh was presumably familiar given that Muṭrān was also active in Acre in the 1760s. (Muṭrān’s work is bound together with Ṣabbāgh’s in a manuscript extant in the British Library – MS Or. 4242 – copied in 1814. Unfortunately, this manuscript is often illegible due to corrosive ink.) Ṣabbāgh’s Manārat al-qiwā l-ʿaqliyya, too, is presented as an “introduction” (īṣāghūjī) and is organized into three main parts, corresponding to each of the three mental operations: conception, judgment and ratiocination, followed by a conclusion on dialectics (al-mujādala al-­ manṭiqiyya). There are, however, a number of revealing differences to Muṭrān’s work, for example a discussion of “ideas” and their origins (uṣūl ṣuwar al-ash­ yāʾ) and the recognition of the fourth figure of the syllogism. On both points, Ṣabbāgh’s work reflects a number of Latin manuals on logic published in the mid- to late eighteenth century, for example Institutiones logicae by Pieter Van Musschenbroek (d. 1761), Institutiones logicae by Antonio Genovesi (d. 1769), and the first volume of Institutiones philosophicae by François Jacquier (d. 1788). (Jacquier 1785, 38–53, 176–177; Musschenbroek 1748, 5–38, 118–121; Genovesi 1745, 30–39, 148–149). The Latin tradition of logic that Ṣabbāgh was exposed to in Rome in the mid-eighteenth century was in some ways different from that to which Tūlāwī had been exposed a century earlier, reflecting the noticeable weakening of Baroque scholasticism in Catholic Europe in the intervening period and the

(v) Sim ’ a ¯n al-S.abba ¯gh

increased dominance of non-scholastic philosophical and scientific currents. Ṣabbāgh likely studied with the abovementioned François Jacquier, a Frenchborn Minim friar, philosopher and mathematician who taught at the Pontifical Urban College for the Propagation of the Faith while Ṣabbāgh was a student there. (On Jacquier, see Risse 1964–70, II, 367–368; Pierre 2017, Pepe 2017 and Guicciardini 2015.) Jacquier adopted a much more accommodating stance toward the non-Aristotelian scientific and philosophical currents of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than the more conservative scholastic teachers of Tūlāwī. He edited and commented upon Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, and in his philosophical writings he explicitly acknowledged the influence of the German (Protestant) rationalist philosopher Christian Wolff (d. 1754). His widely studied Institutiones philosophicae, first published in 1757, was translated into Arabic as early as 1766 by the Greek Catholic monk Anṭūn al-Ṣabbāgh (d. 1804), another graduate of the Pontifical Urban College (Nasrallah 1989, IV/2, 180–3, 254).

285

XI. Conclusion

Six centuries, and a vast geographic area, have been surveyed in the foregoing chapters. It may be helpful at this point to give a brief summary of some major developments. The period from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/1365) was a particularly dynamic period, especially in the Eastern Islamic world. Logicians usually took their point of departure in the works of Avicenna, but approached his writings with the same independence of mind with which Avicenna himself had approached the works of Aristotle. Logic came to be decisively dissociated from the exegesis of the Aristotelian Organon, and came to be seen instead as a discipline that studied the formal or topic-neutral rules for the acquisition of concepts via definitions and descriptions, and for the acquisition of assents via syllogisms. The Aristotelian Categories came to be considered extra-logical; four figures of the syllogism were recognized; modal and hypothetical logic was explored extensively, far beyond what was usual in the earlier Arabic (or the later Greek) Peripatetic tradition; and Aristotelian Topics and Demonstration were, if not ignored altogether, given cursory treatment. The writings of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390) and – even more markedly – al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) mark the beginning of a new era. Lengthy, independent summas of logic henceforth became rare, giving way to the predominance of the genres of condensed handbook, commentary and gloss. Longer Arabic writings of logic tended to become more oriented toward textual exegesis in which standard madrasa handbooks, including the non-logical preambles, were explicated and scrutinized. Perhaps because of the dramatic rise in interest in general metaphysics (umūr ʿāmma) and semantics-­ rhetoric (ʿilm al-maʿānī wa l-bayān) in madrasa culture in the Islamic East, there was a marked tendency to focus on the earlier parts of logical handbooks, dealing with the definition of knowledge, its divisions into conception and assent and into evident and non-evident; the subject matter of a science; various kinds

288

XI. Conclusion

of linguistic reference; and the five universals. By contrast, logicians from the thirteenth century had clearly been most interested in modal and hypothetical logic. In the pioneering historical surveys of Madkour and Rescher, this shift in genre and emphasis was seen as indicative of the atrophy of the Arabic logical tradition. One might understand their bafflement when looking at later glosses and commentaries that might spend many pages or folios on rhetorical and theological points raised by the preamble of a work on logic. Nevertheless, sophisticated reflection on various points of logic continued. Jalāl al-Dīn alDawānī (d. 908/1502), arguably the most important logician of the fifteenth century, wrote critical and influential contributions to the debates on whether a proposition has three parts (subject, nexus, predicate) or four (the mentioned three plus judgment); on the liar paradox; and on whether relational syllogisms are valid as they stand or must be reduced to standard syllogisms with three terms. The shift in emphasis toward philosophical preliminaries and semantic paradoxes was particular strong in the Turco-Persianate East, and much less noticeable in the Maghreb. North African logicians retained the focus on modal and hypothetical logic well into the seventeenth century. This may be due to the fact that the disciplines of general metaphysics and semantics-rhetoric, as they crystallized in the East in the fourteenth century, took centuries to make substantial inroads in North Africa. In that region of the Islamic world, logic appears to have been most intimately connected to the discipline of creedal theology (ʿaqīda) in which systematic proofs were given for articles of the faith. The syllogistic and its preliminaries (conversion and contraposition) were therefore the areas of logic whose use was most evident to North African scholars. With the influential logician and theologian al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490), there was a tendency, on the one hand, to adopt explicit syllogistic argument forms in creedal works to an unprecedented degree and, on the other hand, to abandon some of the more abstruse areas of hypothetical and modal logic that were considered of no use for creedal theology. Until the end of the sixteenth century, the works on logic of the Turco-­ Persianate world can be seen as belonging to a single tradition. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, scholars moved regularly from Central Asia and Persia to Anatolia, and sometimes back again. This changed with the establishment of the Safavid Shiite dynasty in Iran. In the short term, this led to

XI. Conclusion

even more scholars – Sunnis facing persecution – to move to the Ottoman realm. But after the reign of Shah ʿAbbās I (r. 996/1587–1039/1629), scholarly connections were to a large extent severed. Ottoman scholars and Safavid scholars developed somewhat different logical curricula, and were no longer in contact with developments on the other side of the border. In the Indian subcontinent, Iranian influence was a bit more long-lived, but even there a distinct tradition of Arabic logic developed over the course of the seventeenth century and came to be solidified in the well-known Ders-i Niżāmī curriculum first developed in the Farang-i Maḥall college in Lucknow in the early eighteenth century – a curriculum that was markedly different from that which prevailed in Iran. In terms of works studied, emphasis and major figures, the traditions of Ottoman Turkey, Safavid Iran and late Mughal India were, by the end of the seventeenth century, distinct. Among Safavid scholars, there was a powerful current that wished to return to the logic of the “older logicians”, i.e., to the works of Avicenna and even non-Avicennan Aristotelians such as Averroes. The idea of organizing works on logic according to the books of the Organon reappeared; the fourth figure again came to be dismissed as “unnatural”; the discipline of ādāb al-baḥth developed by later scholars such as Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322) was neglected; and renewed attention was given to the theory of Aristotelian demonstration. In the Indian subcontinent, the tradition tended to focus on the discussion of knowledge and its division into conception and assent, as well as on puzzles and paradoxes: the paradox of what is not conceived in any way; the “sophism that occurs generally”; the “paradox of entailment”; and the liar paradox. In the Ottoman Turkish tradition, the discipline of ādāb al-baḥth was cultivated more intensively than elsewhere, leading to an interest in casting dialectical exchanges into explicit syllogistic form. This in turn led to scrutiny of cases in which it might be debatable whether a middle term recurs in the two premises, for example, when “animal” is a term in one premise and “rational animal” is a term in the other. Relational syllogisms were recognized and divided into figures and moods. In addition to the three post-Timurid traditions, the North African tradition of logic experienced a revival in the seventeenth century, after a conspicuously barren (from the perspective of logic) sixteenth century. Even in this late period, the North African logical tradition remained largely untouched by Eastern Islamic logical developments after the fourteenth century and still re-

289

290

XI. Conclusion

tained a focus on the formalities of modal and hypothetical logic: the relative strengths of modality propositions, conversion, contraposition, the immediate implications of hypotheticals, and the syllogistic. In the course of the eighteenth century, however, the tradition weakened again, largely due to a combination of political turmoil, economic decline, and the strengthening of fideist hostility toward logic and rational theology. By the end of the period covered in this survey, later Eastern Islamic works were making an impression in Egypt and the Maghreb, and the North African tradition was losing its distinctive character. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a number of Maronite and Greek Catholic Christians from the Levant, such as Buṭrus al-Tūlāwī (d. 1745) and Yuwākīm al-Muṭrān (d. 1766) wrote lengthy works on logic in Arabic that in general were much closer to the Latin tradition of the period than to that of their Muslim contemporaries. Such logicians had to coin Arabic terms for concepts peculiar to the Latin tradition of logic, such as “supposition”, “distribution”, “categorematic” and “exponible”. At the same time, they were aware of some works in the Arabic-Islamic tradition, and on occasion incorporated some ideas gathered from these into their own works. Around the year 1800, therefore, at least five distinct subtraditions of Ara­ bic logic existed. There may well have been more. Central Asia, the Yemen, and Islamic West Africa also had distinctive scholarly traditions that may be worth further investigation as more manuscripts come to light. There is neither enough space, nor sufficient available research, to give more than the barest outline of developments in the nineteenth century and beyond. The five subtraditions certainly did not disappear overnight but continued at least into the early decades of the twentieth century. In Ottoman Turkey, for example, scholars such as Ḫōca Kerīm Amāsī (d. 1303/1886) and Ḥüseyn Prizrenlı (d. 1933) continued to write works on logic in the pre-modern tradition. The same is true of the Kurdish scholars ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Panjiyūnī (d. 1318/ 1901) and ʿUmar Qaradāghī (d. 1936); the Moroccan scholars Muḥammad b. Ḥamdūn Ibn al-Ḥājj (d. 1274/1858) and Muḥammad Mahdī Ibn Sūdā (d. 1294/ 1877); the Egyptian scholars Ibrāhīm al-Bājūrī (d. 1276/1860) and Muḥammad ʿIllaysh (d. 1299/1882); the Iranian scholars Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1289/ 1873) and Mullā Hādī Hamadānī (d. 1331/1912–3); and the Indo-Muslim scholars ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Lakhnawī (d. 1304/1886) and ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī (d. 1316/1899).

XI. Conclusion

Certain trends already in evidence in the pre-modern period were reinforced. The works of the aforementioned Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī contributed toward making the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā a powerful and perhaps predominant current in philosophical circles in modern Iran (Fena 2016). The “back-to-the-ancients” current that was so marked in Safavid Iran eventually began to have a more widespread effect, largely through the influence of the Iranian-­born Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1314/1897) on the eminent Egyptian scholar Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905). While in Beirut, ʿAbduh came across a manuscript of al-Baṣāʾir al-Naṣīriyya, a work on logic by the early Avicennan logician al-Sāwī (fl. 526/1127). He made a copy, brought it back to Cairo, and attempted to introduce it into the curriculum of the Azhar, arguing that it was superior to the post-Avicennan handbooks already in use there (Sāwī 1316/1898). In Ottoman Turkey, the tendency to cast dialectical exchanges into explicit syllogisms developed into a self-conscious program for the syllogistic regimentation of the claims and arguments of logical handbooks. The most eminent representative of this trend was Ḫōcazāde ʿAbdullāh Kilisī (d. 1303/1886) who taught in Aleppo. He wrote two acclaimed volumes in which he recast the prose of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on Kātibī’s Shamsiyya into a series of interlocking syllogisms, in the process making extensive use of “unfamiliar” (i.e., relational) syllogisms (Kilisī 1275/1858; Kilisī 1289/1872). He and his followers would call this approach to logic “the new principles” (al-uṣūl al-jadīda). The renowned Greek Catholic scholar and belletrist Naṣīf al-Yāzijī (d. 1871) wrote a short, introductory handbook of logic entitled Quṭb al-ṣināʿa fī uṣūl al-manṭiq (The Pivot of the Art: On the Principles of Logic) (Yāzijī 1857) – until recently the only work in the later Christian Arabic tradition of logic to have been printed. Judging solely from that work, the Christian Arabic tradition grew closer to the Muslim Arabic in the course of the nineteenth century. Yāzijī quantified conditionals and disjunctions, gave the minor premise in a syllogism first, and recognized four figures of the syllogism. Nevertheless, too much should not be inferred from a single work. Already in the early eighteenth century, Christian Arabs used Abharī’s Īsāghūjī, which has the mentioned features, as an introductory handbook. Furthermore, as stated in the previous chapter, the works of Tūlāwī and Muṭrān continued to be copied and studied in the nineteenth century.

291

292

XI. Conclusion

Western influence also increasingly made itself felt. The Logique of César Chesneau Dumarsais (d. 1756) was translated from French into Arabic and published in Cairo in 1254/1838 with the title Tanwīr al-mashriq fī ʿilm al-manṭiq (Enlightening the East in the Science of Logic). The volume on logic from Elementi di filosofia by the Italian philosopher Pasquale Galuppi (d. 1846) was translated into Turkish and published in Istanbul in 1861 with the title Miftāḥ ül-fünūn (The Key to the Sciences). The Turkish scholar ʿAlī Sedād (d. 1900) wrote a seminal work, Mīzān ül-ʿuḳūl fī l-mantıḳ ve l-uṣūl (The Scale of Minds on Logic and Method), which introduced readers to the novel ideas of the nineteenth-century English logicians Hamilton, De Morgan, Boole and Jevons (Sedād 1303/1885–6). An even more enthusiastic endorsement of the new “algebra of logic” was made a generation later by Ṣāliḥ Zekī (d. 1921) in his Mīzān-i tefekkür (The Balance of Thought) (Zekī 1332/1913). At the same time, a tendency toward “vernacularization” further accentuated the fragmentation of the Eastern Islamic tradition. By the end of the nineteenth century, Ottoman Turkish scholars (such as ʿAlī Sedād and Ṣāliḥ Zekī) were increasingly writing works on logic in Turkish rather than Arabic. At the same time, Indo-Muslim logicians began increasingly to write in Urdu (Ahmed 2013, 236; Walbridge 2002). This trend was enhanced by the spread of modern educational institutions that chose various vernacular languages, rather than Arabic, as the language of instruction. Especially in the Sunni world, traditional madrasas suffered from the centralizing tendencies of modernizing states that often nationalized pious endowments (awqāf) – the economic backbone of the madrasas. In Kemalist Turkey, the Arabic scholastic tradition was brought to an end almost entirely as part of an aggressive program of secularization and Turkification that included, among other things, nationalizing pious endowments, closing madrasas, and adopting the Latin script for Turkish. The spread of Salafism in the twentieth century, especially in the Arab world and the Indian subcontinent, led to a downgrading of the so-called “rational sciences” in madrasas and an increased emphasis on the study of hadith, i.e., reports about the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad. New educated classes, trained in modern educational institutions, have often contested the authority of madrasa-trained scholars from the perspective of various forms of Western-inspired ideologies (positivism, liberalism, Marxism, socialism, nationalism) or anti-scholastic fundamentalism (Abū l-Aʿlā Maudūdī, Sayyid Quṭb).

XI. Conclusion

The indigenous tradition of logic has survived best in Shiite circles, where clerics are immune to (virulently anti-Shiite) Salafism and have had much more success maintaining their religious authority and independent economic base. The Manṭiq (Logic) of the Najaf-based scholar Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar (d. 1964) has enjoyed much popularity in recent decades and is well on its way to supplanting Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī’s sixteenth-century commentary on Tahdhīb al-manṭiq as a standard, non-introductory handbook in Shiite seminaries (Muẓaffar 1968). In the Indian subcontinent, there are still some circles in which Yazdī’s commentary on the Tahdhīb or Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the Shamsiyya are studied and annotated, usually in Urdu (see, for example, Pūrnavī 1416/1996). Even Bihārī’s advanced Sullam continues to be issued in lithograph editions, but it is not clear just how widely it is still studied. The Indian subcontinent is a vast region, and includes a number of rival scholarly and curricular traditions, so it is difficult to make any generalizations. However, critical and probing (as opposed to expository) commentaries or glosses on advanced works appear to be a thing of the past. In most other parts of the Islamic world, traditional logic survives, if it survives at all, in an attenuated form, with only introductory works such as Abharī’s Īsāghūjī and Akhḍarī’s Sullam being studied and printed with any regularity. Nevertheless, this may not be the end of the story. As mentioned in the introduction, there is presently a strong interest in the Islamic world in editing pre-modern works, and it is by no means certain that this will remain an antiquarian enterprise that does not somehow reinvigorate the millennium-old tradition of Arabic logic.

293

References

(i) Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu ʿAbd ül-Nāfiʿ ʿIffet Efendi. Fenn-i manṭiḳ: Mīzān-i Şerḥ-i Mütercem-i Burhān. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1295/1878. Abharī, Athīr al-Dīn. Kashf al-ḥaqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-daqāʾiq. Edited by Hüseyın Sarıoğlu. Istanbul: n.p. 1998. Abharī, Athīr al-Dīn. Khulāṣat al-afkār wa-naqāwat al-asrār. Edited by M. ʿAẓīmī & H. Qurbānī. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2018. Abharī, Athīr al-Dīn. Muntahā l-afkār fī ibānat al-asrār: taḥrīr-hā-yi yakum va duvvum-i manṭiq. Edited by M. ʿAẓīmī & H. Qurbānī. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Ḥikmat, 1395/2016. Abharī, Athīr al-Dīn. Talkhīṣ al-ḥaqāʾiq. Logic section edited by Mahdī ʿAẓīmī, “Manṭiq-i Abharī dar Talkhīṣ al-ḥaqāʾiq,” Jāvidān-i khirad 30(1395/2016–17): 101–132. ʿĀbid al-Fāsī, Muḥammad. Fihris Makhṭūṭāt Khizānat al-Qarawiyyīn. Casablanca: Dār al-Kitāb, 1979–1989. “Ādāb al-Baḥth.” In: Kāẓim Mūsawī Bujnūrdī (ed.): Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī, vol. I: pp. 159–160. Tehran, 1991. ʿAdawī al-Ṣaʿīdī, ʿAlī. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya. Printed with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Tahrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya bi-sharḥ al-risāla al-Shamsiyya, and the glosses of Jurjānī and Siyālkūtī. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1323/1905. Afandī, ʿAbdullāh. Riyāḍ al-ʿulamāʾ wa-ḥiyāḍ al-fuḍalāʾ. Edited by Aḥmad Ḥusaynī. Qom: Maktabat Āyatollāh al-Marʿashī al-Najafī, 1403/1982–3. Aḥmadnagārī, ʿAbd al-Nabī. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Tahdhīb li-l-Yazdī. Lithograph. Lucknow: Sulṭān al-Maṭābiʿ, 1268/1852. ʿAjam, R. & R. Daḥrūj (eds.). Mawsūʿat al-muṣṭalaḥāt al-mawḍūʿāt fī Safīnat al-Rāghib wa dafīnat al-maṭālib [Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān 2000]. Akhḍarī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Sharḥ al-Sullam al-murawnaq. Printed as an appendix to Aḥmad al-Damanhῡrī, Īḍāḥ al-mubham min maʿānī l-Sullam. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1948. Amāsī, Ḫōcā Kerīm. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Ḥāshiyat al-Siyālkūtī ʿalā l-taṣawwurāt. Istanbul 1303/ 1885.

296

References

Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn. Kashf al-Tamwīhāt fī Sharḥ al-Ishārāt. Edited by Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2013. Edited by ʿĪsā Jawāʾira. Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2015. Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn. Al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir. Facsimile reproduction, prepared by Fuat Sezgin. Frankfurt: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 2001. ʿĀmilī Jāmiʿī, ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn. al-Wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿazīz. Edited by Mālik alMaḥmūdī. Qum: Dār al-Qurʾān al-Karīm, 1413/1992. Amīn, Muḥsin. Aʿyān al-Shīʿa. Beirut: Dār al-Inṣāf, 1960ff. Anṣārī, Zakariyyā, Fatḥ al-wahhāb bi-sharḥ al-Ādāb. Edited by ʿArafa ʿAbd al-Raḥmān alNādī. Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2014. Anṣārī, Zakariyyā (d. 1519). al-Maṭlaʿ Sharḥ Īsāghūjī. Printed in the margins of Yūsuf al-Hafnī’s Ḥāshiya ʿala Sharḥ Zakariyyā l-Ansārī ʿala Īsāghūjī. Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Taqaddum al-‘Ilmiyya, 1326/1908–9. Edited by ʿArafa ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Nādī. Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2017. Assemani, Guiseppe Simone. Madkhal al-ʿulūm; Madkhal al-manṭiq; al-Manṭiq; al-Jadal: Makhṭūt min al-ʿāmm 1710. Louaize, Lebanon: Notre Dame University Press, 2014. ʿAṭṭār, Ḥasan. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Khabīṣī. Printed with Khabīṣī, al-Tadhhīb bi-sharḥ al-­ Tahdhīb, and the gloss of Ibn Saʿīd al-Ḥajarī. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Azhariyyah al­ Miṣriyyah, 1318/1900–01. Printed with Khabīṣī, al-Tadhhīb bi-sharḥ al-Tahdhīb, and the gloss of Muḥammad b. ʿArafa al-Dasūqī. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1936. ʿAṭṭār, Ḥasan. Ḥāshiya ʿala al-Maṭlaʿ. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1348/1929. Edited by ʿArafah ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Nādī. Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2016. ʿAṭṭār, Ḥasan. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ Jamʿ al-Jawāmiʿ. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-ʿilmiyya, 1316/ 1898. ʿAṭṭār, Ḥasan. al-Ḥāshiya al-Kubrā ʿalā Maqūlāt al-Bulaydī wa-ḥāshiyatāh al-kubrā wa l-ṣughrā ʿalā Sharḥ Maqūlāt al-Sijāʿī. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Khayriyya, 1328/1910. Baghdādī, Ismāʿīl. Hadiyyat al-ʿārifīn: Asmāʾ al-muʾallifīn wa āthār al-muṣannifīn. Istanbul: Milli Eğetim Basimevi, 1951–55. Bahmanyār b. Marzubān. al-Taḥṣīl. Ed. Murtaḍa Muṭahharī. Tehran: Dānishkādah-i Ilāhīyāt va Maʻārif-i Islāmī, 1349/1970–1. Baḥr al-ʿUlūm al-Lakhnawī. Sharḥ Sullam al-ʿulūm. Lithograph: Delhi: Maṭbaʻ Mujtabāʼī, 1891. Edited by ʿAbd al-Naṣīr al-Malībārī. Kuweit: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ 2012. Bājūrī, Ibrāhīm. Ḥāshiya ʿalā l-Sullām al-murawnaq. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1347/ 1928. Bājūrī, Ibrāhīm. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Sanūsī. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Taqqadum al-­ ʿIlmiyya, 1321/1904. Bannānī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan. Sharḥ al-Sullam. Lithographed with the gloss of Qaṣṣāra. Fez: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥajariyya, 1307/1890. Printed with the gloss of Qaṣṣāra. Būlāq: al-­ Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1318/1901.

(i) Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu

Bar Hebraeus. Tārīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal. Edited by E. Pococke with the title Historia compendiosa dynastiarum. Oxford, 1663. Edited by Anṭūn Ṣāliḥānī. Beirut, 1890. Bayḍāwī, Qāḍī ʿAbd-Allāh. Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār min maṭāliʿ al-anẓār. Edited by ʿAbbās Sulaymān. Cairo & Beirut: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyyah li-l-Turāth & Dār al-Jīl, 1991. Bihārī, Muḥibbullāh. Sullam al-ʿulūm. Lithographed with the gloss of Muḥammad Barakatullāh Lakhnawī, Sullam al-ʿulūm maʿa ḥāshiyatihi Iṣʿād al-fuhūm (Karachi: Qadīmī Kutubkhāne, n.d.). Printed with Qāżī Mubārak Gūpāmawī, Sharḥ Sullam al-ʿulūm. Kazan: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Malakiyya, 1887. Printed with Baḥr al-ʿUlūm Lakhnawī, Sharḥ Sullam al-ʿulūm. Edited by ʿAbd al-Naṣīr al-Malībārī. Kuweit: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ 2012. Bingöl, A. Gelenbevi’nin Mantık Anlayışı. Istanbul: Milli Eğetim Basımevi, 1993. Bingöl, A. Gelenbevi İsmail. Ankara: Kültūr ve Turizm Bakanliği, 1988. Bīṭār, ʿAbd al-Razzāq. Ḥilyat al-bashar fī taʾrīkh al-qarn al-thālith ʿashar. Edited by Muḥammad Bahjat al-Bīṭār. Damasucs 1961–63. Būrṣalī, Meḥmed Ṭāhir. ʿOthmanlı Müelliflerı. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿAmire, 1333/1914–5. Damanhūrī, Aḥmad. Īḍāḥ al-mubham min maʿānī l-Sullam. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1948. Dashtakī , Ghiyāth al-Dīn. Miʿyār al-ʿirfān. In: A. Nourani (ed.): Muṣannafāt Giyāth Manṣūr Dashtakī. Tehran: University of Tehran, 2007. Vol. II: 989–1068. Dashtakī, Ghiyāth al-Dīn. Miqyās al-naẓar. In: A. Nourani (ed.): Muṣannafāt Giyāth Manṣūr Dashtakī. Tehran: University of Tehran, 2007. Vol. II: 1071–1097. Dawānī, Jalāl al-Dīn. Sharh Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Printed with the gloss of Mir Abu l-Fath and the Tahdhīb al-manṭiq of Taftāzānī. Istanbul, Haci Muharrem Efendi Matbaʿası, 1305/1887. Printed with the commentary of Yazdī. Edited by ʿAbd al-Nāṣir al-Malībārī. Kuweit: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2014. Dawānī, Jalāl al-Dīn. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Ḥāshiyat Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya. Lithograph. Delhi: alMaṭbaʿ al-Mujtabāʾī, n.d. Printed as an appendix to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-­ Shamsiyya. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 1323/1905. Dānishāmūz, Ḥabībah. “Abū al-Fatḥ al-Ḥusaynī”, in: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī, V. 6. Tihrān: Markaz-i Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī, 1988–, p. 100. Falāḥī, Asadollāh. “Taṣḥīḥ va-taḥqīq risāle-yi al-Lāmiʿ fī l-shakl al-rābiʿ neveshte-yi Majd al-Dīn Jīlī”. Falsafe va Kalam-e Eslami 48 (2015–16): 201–244. Fayżābādī, Ilāh-bakhsh. Hadiyya-yi Shāhjahāniyya Ḥall-i Mirqāt-i mīzāniyya. [Redacted by the commentator’s student Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān Bhūpālī] Lithographed: Kanpur: Maṭbaʿ-i Niżāmī 1296/1879). Fenārī, Meḥmed. Fuṣūl al-badāʾiʿ fī uṣūl al-sharāʾiʿ. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿat al-Shaykh Yaḥyā, 1289/1872. Fenārī, Meḥmed. Sharḥ Īsāghūjī. Printed with the Gloss of Ḳūl Aḥmed. Istanbul: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥarbiyya, 1278/1861. Fihris al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya al-mahfūẓa bi-l-Kutubkhāne al-Khedīviyya al-Miṣriyya. Cairo: Maṭbaʻat ʻUthmān ʻAbd al-Razzāq, 1305/1888–1311/1893.

297

298

References

Fihris al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya al-mawjūda bi-l-dār li-ghāyat sanat 1921. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1924. Fihris al-Kutub al-Mawjūda bi-l-Maktaba al-Azhariyya ilā Sanat 1366/1947. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Azhariyya, 1947. Gelenbevī, Ismāʿīl. al-Burhān fi ʿilm al-mīzān. Printed with the glosses of Panjiyūnī and Qaradāghī. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿādah, 1347/1928–9. Istanbul: 1253/1837. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿOthmāniye, 1310/1892. Gelenbevī, Ismāʿīl. Ādāb al-baḥth. Printed with the commentary of Meḥmed Ḥasanpāşāzāde, Istanbul: n.p., 1284/1867. Printed with the glosses of Abd al-Raḥmān Panjiyūnī and Ibn al-Qaradāghī, Cairo: n.p., 1353/1934. Gelenbevī, Ismāʿīl. Miftāḥ bāb al-muwajjahāt. Lithographed with the title Risālat al-imkān. Istanbul: n.p., 1301/1886. Printed with the title Risālat al-imkān. Istanbul: n.p., 1309/1891. Gelenbevī, Ismāʿīl. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Ḥashiyat al-Lārī ‘alā Sharḥ Hidāyat al-ḥikma. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1270/1853–4. Gelenbevī, Ismāʿīl. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Mīr al-Ādāb. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire,1234/1818–9. Istanbul: n.p., 1288/1871. Gelenbevī, Ismāʿīl. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Dawānī ʿalā l-ʿAqāʾid al-ʿAḍuḍiyya. Istanbul: Şirket-i Hayriye-yi Ṣaḥāfiye-ye 1307/1890. Gelenbevī, Ismāʿīl. Sharḥ Īsāghūjī. Istanbul: Şirket-i Sahafiye-ı Othmāniye Maṭbaası, 1307/ 1889. Gharawī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī. Jāmiʿ al-ruwāt. Qom: Maktabat Āyatollāh al-Marʿashī al-Najafī 1403/1982. Ghurāb, Saʿd (ed.). Risālatān fī l-manṭiq. Tunis: al-Jāmiʿa al-Tūnisiyya, 1980. Gökdağ, K. & Deniz, G. (eds.). Meḥmed Emin Üsküdari (ö. 1736): Telhisu Tehafüti’l-hukema. Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014. Gölcük, Ş. & Yurdagür, M. “Gelenbevi”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988–2013. Vol. XIII, 552–555. Gūpāmawī, Qādī Mubārak. Sharḥ Sullam al-ʿulūm. Kazan: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Malakiyya, 1887. Ḫādimī, Ebū Saʿīd. ʿArāʾis al-nafāʾis fī l-manṭiq. Istanbul: Dār al- Irshād & Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2012. Ḥajjī, Muḥammad. Al-Ḥaraka al-Fikriyya bi-l-Maghrib fī ʿAhd al-Saʿdiyyīn. Rabat, Maṭbaʿat Faḍāla, 1977. Ḫarpūtī, Yūsuf Şukrī. Nāmūs al-īqān Sharḥ al-Burhān. Istanbul: Litografya Matbaasι, 1274/ 1857–8. Ḫarpūtī, ʿAbdülḥamīd. Ḥāshiya jadīda ʿalā Ḥāshiyat al-Siyālkūtī. Istanbul: Yahya Efendi Matbaası, 1289/1872. Ḥasan, ʿA. Fihris Makhṭūṭāt Dār al-Kutub al-Ẓāhiriyyah: al-Falsafa, al-Manṭiq, Ādāb al-Baḥth. Damascus: Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya, 1970.

(i) Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu

Ḥasanī, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy. Al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya fī al-Hind. Damascus: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-­ ʿArabī, 1958. Ḥasanī, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy. Nuzhat al-khawāṭir wa-bahjat al-masāmiʿ wa-l-nawāẓir. Hyderabad, Deccan: Majlis Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1955–. Ḥaydar Mīrzā. Tārīkh-i Rāshidī. Edited by ʿAbbāsqulī Ghaffārīfard. Tehran: Mīrāth-i Maktūb, 2004. Hilālī, Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. al-Zawāhir al-ufuqiyya bi-sharḥ al-Jawāhir al-manṭiqiyya. Lithograph. Fez: n.p., 1313/1895. Ḥillī, Ibn Muṭahhar. al-Asrār al-khafiyya fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya. Qom: Markaz al-Abḥāth wa l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah. 1421/2000–2001. Ḥillī, Ibn Muṭahhar. al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ manṭiq al-Tajrīd. Lithograph. Iran: n.p., 1311/1893–4. Edited by Muhsin Bidarfar. Qum: Intisharat Bidar, 1363/1985. Ḥillī, Ibn Muṭahhar. al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyya fī sharḥ al-Risāla al-shamsiyya. Edited by F. Ḥ. Tabrīziān. Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr, 1412/1991. Ḥillī, Ibn Muṭahhar. Marāṣid al-tadqīq wa-maqāṣid al-taḥqīq. Edited by Muḥammad GhafūrīNazhād. Karbala: al-ʿAtaba al-ʿAbbāsiyya al-Muqaddasa, 2017. Ḥurayshī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Al-Fihris al-Mūjaz li-Makhṭūṭāt Muʾassasat ʿAllāl al-Fāsī. Rabat: Muʾassasat ʿAllāl al-Fāsī, n. D. [Ḥusayn Adanavī]. Sharḥ al-Ḥusayniyya. Lithograph. Istanbul: n.p., 1267/1850–1. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd. Sharḥ al-Āyāt al-bayyināt. Edted by M. Djebli. Beirut: Dar Sader, 1996. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa. ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ. Edited by August Müller. Königsberg, 1884. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī. Majmaʿ al-ādāb fī muʿjam al-alqāb. Edited by Muḥammad al-Kāẓim. Tehran, 1416/1995 or 1996. Ibn al-Ḥājib. Mukhtaṣar Muntahā l-sūʾl wa-al-amal fī ʻilmay al-uṣūl wa-l-jadal . Edited by Nadhīr Ḥamādū. Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2006. Ibn Hishām. Sharḥ Qaṭr al-nadā. Edited by Emil Yaʿqūb. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2007. Ibn Kammūna. Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt. Ed. Najafqoli Habibi. Tehran: Miras-i Maktub, 2009. Ibn Kammūna. Al-Kāshif: al-Jadīd fī l-ḥikma. Edited by Ḥ. N. Isfahānī. Berlin & Tehran: Institute for Islamic Studies & Iranian Institute of Islamic Philosophy, 2008. Ibn Khaldūn. Kitāb al-ʿibar wa-dīwān al-mubtadaʾ wa-l-khabar. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī 1956–61. Ibn Khaldūn. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Trans. F. Rosenthal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Ibn Khaldūn. al-Taʿrīf bi Ibn Khaldun wa riḥlatihi gharban wa sharqan. Edited by M. al-Ṭanjī. Cairo: n.p., 1951. Ibn Khallikān. Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān. Edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977. Ibn Kīrān, al-Ṭayyib. Sharḥ al-Kharīda fī l-manṭiq. Lithograph. Fez: n.p. 1329/1911.

299

300

References

Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd [Averroes]. Talkhīṣ kitāb al-qiyās. Edited by Maḥmūd Qāsim, Charles E. Butterworth, and Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Majid Harīdī. Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 1983. Ibn Mubārakshāh, Shams al-Dīn. Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ʿayn. Kazan: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1321/1903 – 1322/1904. Ibn Saʿīd al-Ḥajarī. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Khabīṣī. Printed on the margins of Khabīṣī, al-Tadhhīb bi-sharḥ al-Tahdhīb. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Azhariyya, 1318/1900–01. Ibn al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Muḥammad. al-Durra. Printed [with the title Risāla fī l-uṣūl al-­ manṭiqiyya] in Majmūʿat al-rasāʾil. Cairo 1328/1901, pp. 279–291. Ibn al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Muḥammad. al-Ghurra. Printed with the commentaries of Jabalrūdī and Ṣafawī. Edited by Albert N. Nader. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1983. Ibn Sīnā. al-Shifāʾ: al-Qiyās. Edited by S. Zāyid & I. Madkour. Cairo, 1964. Ibn Ṭumlūs. Le livre de la rhétorique du philosophe et médecin Ibn Ṭumlūs. Edited by M. Aouad. Paris: Vrin 2006 Ibn Ṭumlūs. Kitāb al-amkina al-mughlaṭa & kitāb al-jadal. Edited by Fouad Ben Ahmed. Beirut: Difaf Publishing, 2016 Ibn Ṭumlūs. Kitāb al-Madkhal li-ṣināʿat al-manṭiq. Edited by A. Palacios. Madrid 1916. Ibn Turka al-Iṣfahānī. al-Manāhij fī l-manṭiq. Ed. I. Dībājī. Tehran: Institute of Islamic Studies, 1997. Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Wallālī, Aḥmad. al-Qawl al-musallam fī taḥqīq maʿānī l-Sullam. Edited by Nizār Ḥammādī. Kuwait: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2016. Ījī, ʿAḍud al-Dīn. Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥājib. Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1316–1317/ 1898–1900. Iṣfahānī, Bahāʾ al-Dīn Fāżil-i Hindī. Ḥikmat-i Khāqāniyya. Edited by G. I. Dinānī. Tehran: Ayene-ye Miras, 1998. Iṣfahānī, Bahāʾ al-Dīn Fāżil-i Hindī. ʿAwn Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ ʿalā fahm Kitāb al-Shifāʾ. Edited by ʿAlī Owjabī. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 1394/2015. Iṣfahānī, Shams al-Dīn Maḥmūd. Bayān al-Mukhtaṣar. Edited by Muḥammad Baqā. Mecca: Dār al-Madanī, 1986. Edited by ʿAlī Jumʿa. Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2004. Edited by Yaḥyā Murād. Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006. Iṣfahānī, Shams al-Dīn Maḥmūd. Maṭāliʿ al-anẓār fī sharḥ Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār. Qom: Manshūrāt-i Rāʾid, 1393/2014. Iṣfahānī, Shams al-Dīn Maḥmūd. Tanwīr al-Maṭāliʿ. MS: Tehran University Library, Iran, nr. 6422. Iṣfahānī, Shams al-Dīn Maḥmūd. Tasdīd al-qawāʿid fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-ʿaqāʾid. Edited by Khālid al-ʿAdwānī. Kuweit: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2012. Isfarāyinī, ʿIṣām al-Dīn. Ḥāshiya ʿalā l-taṣawwurāt. Istanbul: Şeyḫ Yaḥyā Maṭbaʿası, 1289/1872. Isfarāyinī, ʿIṣām al-Dīn. Ḥāshiya ʿalā l-taṣdīqāt. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1259/1843–4. Jabalrūdī, Khiḍir. Sharḥ al-Ghurra fī l-manṭiq. Edited by Albert N. Nader. Beirut: Dār alMashriq, 1983.

(i) Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu

Jaʿfariyān, Rasūl. Aḥvāl va āthār-i Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad Iṣfahānī, mashhūr bih Fāżil Hindī (1062–1137). Qom: Anṣāriyān, 1374 /1996. Jawnpūrī, Muḥammad Rashīd. al-Rashīdiyya ʿalā l-Sharīfiyya. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Muḥammad ʿAlī Ṣubayḥ, 1929. Lithographed: Lucknow: al-Maṭbaʿ al-ʿAlawī, 1298/1881. Jazāʾirī, Saʿīd Qaddūra. Taʿlīqa ʿalā Sharḥ al-Sullam al-murawnaq. Printed on the margins of Bannānī, Sharḥ al-Sullam. Cairo: Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1318/1901. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. Ḥāshiyah ‘alā Sharḥ Maṭāli‘ al-anwār. Printed as an appendix to Rāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn. Lawāmiʿ al-asrār bi-Sharḥ Matāliʿ al-anwār. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1277/1860–1. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. Sharḥ al-Mawāqif. Istanbul: Maṭbaʻat al-Ḥājj Muḥarram Afandī al-Būsnawī, 1286/1869. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharh Mukhtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥājib. Printed with Ījī’s Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥājib. Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1316–1317/1898–1900. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. Ḥāshiya ʿala Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya. Printed with Quṭb al-Dīn alRāzī’s Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya bi-sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya. Cairo: Musṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1948. Printed with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya bi-sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya. 1323/1905. Printed independently with title Ḥāshiya al-Ṣughrā li l-Sayyid al-Sharīf ʿalā al-Quṭb. Istanbul: Cemal Efendi Maṭbaası, 1318/1900. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf [?]. Mīr-i Īsāghūjī. Lithographed with Fażl-i Ḥaqq Rāmpūrī, alKāfī li-ḥall Īsāghūjī. Delhi: al-Maṭbaʿ al-Mujtabāʾī 1309/1891–92. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. Kubrā. Lithographed in Majmūʿa-yi manṭiq. Lucknow 1872, pp. 10–50. Printed in Dū manṭiqi-i Fārsī: Kubrā, Ṣughrā. Edited by Murtaza Mudarrisī Chahārdahī. Tehran: Kitābkhāneh-i Ṭāhῡrī, 1334/1956, pp. 5–23. al-Risāla al-Waladiyya [= Anonymous Arabic translation of Jurjānī’s Kubrā], printed with the title Tercüme-yi Risāle-yi Velediye. Istanbul: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kütüphanesi [reprint of 1288/ 1871 edition]. Jurjānī, al-Sayyid al-Sharīf. Ṣughrā. Lithographed in Majmūʿa-yi manṭiq. Lucknow 1872, pp. 1–9. Kānḳirī, ʿAbd-Allāh. Nafāʾis ʿarāʾis al-anẓār wa laṭāʿif fawāʾid al-afkār [=Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fanārī]. Istanbul: Maṭbaʾa-yi ʿAmire, 1313/1896. Ḳara Ḫalīl Tīrevī. Jalāʾ al-anẓār fī ḥall ʿawīṣāt al-afkār. Istanbul: Yaḥyā Efendī, 1289/1873–74. Ḳara Ḫalīl Tīrevī, al-Risāla al-ʿawniyya fī īḍāḥ al-ḥāshiya al-Ṣadriyya. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1288/1871. Karatay, F. E. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi Arapc̦ a yazmalar kataloğu. Istanbul: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, 1966. Kāshī, Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad. Nukat fī aḥwāl al-Shaykh al-raʾīs Ibn Sīnā, edited by Aḥmad Fuʾād al-Ahwānī. Cairo: Manshūrāt al-Maʿhad al-Faransī, 1952 Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ, ʿAlī, Naqd al-ārāʾ al-manṭiqiyya wa ḥall mushkilātihā. Qom: Āfrand, 1427/ 2006 [reprint of 1954 edition].

301

302

References

Kātī, Ḥusām al-Dīn. Qāla Aqūlu [=Sharḥ Īsāghūjī]. Lithograph. Cawnpore: Maṭbaʿ-i Niẓāmī, 1279/1862. Kātib Çelebī. Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa l-funūn. Istanbul: Maarif Maṭbaasi, 1941–43. Kātibī, Najm al-Dīn. al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya. Istanbul 1287/1870. Kawtharī, Muḥammad Zāhid. “Tarjamat al-ʿallāma Ismāʿīl al-Kalanbawī wa-lumʿa min anbāʾ baʿḍ shuyūkhihi.” In: Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī. Maqālāt. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 1994, pp. 553–561. Kawtharī, Muḥammad Zāhid. Al-Taḥrīr al-wajīz fī-mā yabtaghīhi al-mustajīz. Edited by ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda. Aleppo: Maktab al-Maṭbūʿāt al-Islāmiyya, 1993. Khabīṣī, ʿUbayd-Allāh. al-Tadhhīb Sharḥ al-Tahdhīb. Printed with the glosses of Ibn Saʿīd and ʿAṭṭār. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿah al-Azhariyyah al-Miṣriyyah, 1318/1900–01. Printed with the glosses of Dasūqī and ʿAṭṭār. Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1936. Printed independently. Cairo: Muḥammad ʻAlī Ṣubayḥ, 1965. Khaṭṭāb, Muḥammad. Fahāris al-Khizāna al-Ḥasaniyya bi-l-Qaṣr al-Malakī bi-l-Rabāṭ. Rabat: n.p., 1985. Khayrabādī, Fażl-i Imām. Mirqāt.Lithograph. Lahore: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya, 1978. Lithograph. Delhi: n.p. 1886. Printed Karachi 2009. Khayrabādī, Fażl-i Imām. Tashḥīdh al-adhhān bi-sharḥ al-Mīzān. Lithograph. Tamsaganj: n.p., 1286/1869. Khayrabādī, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq. Sharḥ-i Mirqāt. Lithograph. Cawnpore: Maṭbaa-i Intizami, 1333/1914–5. Lithograph. Rampur: n.p., 1866. Khūnajī, Afḍal al-Dīn. Kashf al-asrār ʿan ghawāmiḍ al-afkār. Edited by K. El-Rouayheb. Berlin & Tehran: Institute for Islamic Studies & Iranian Institute of Islamic Philosophy, 2010. Khwānsārī, Āqā Ḥusayn. Ḥāshiya ʿalā shurūḥ al-Ishārāt. Edited by A. ʿĀbedī. Qum: Markaz Intishārāt Daftar Tablīghāt Islāmī, 1378/1999. Khwānsārī, Āqā Ḥusayn. al-Ḥāshīya ʿalá al-Shifāʾ (al-Ilāhīyāt). Edited by Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī. Qom: Kungrih-i Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī, 1378/1999. Khwānsārī, Mīrzā Muḥammad Bāqir. Rawḍāt al-jannāt fī aḥwāl al-ʿulamāʾ wa l-sādāt. Qom: n.p., 1391/1971–2. Kilisī, Ḫōcāzāde. al-Ḥāshiya al-jadīda ʿalā l-Taṣawwurat. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿAmire, 1289/ 1872. Kilisī, Ḫōcāzāde. al-Ḥāshiya al-jadīda ʿalā l-Taṣdīqāt. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1275/ 1858. Ḳūl Aḥmed. Ḥāshiya ʿalā l-Fanārī. Printed as an appendix to Fenārī, Sharḥ Īsāghῡjī. Istanbul: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥarbiyya, 1278/1861. Laḥmar, Ḥamīd. Al-Fihris al-waṣfī li-Makhṭūṭāt Khizānat al-Zāwiya al-Ḥamziyya al-­ ʿAyyāshiyya. Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 2009.

(i) Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu

Lārī, Muṣliḥ al-Dīn. Mirʾāt al-advār va-mirqāt al-akhbār. Edited by Sayyid Jalīl Ṣaghravāniyān. Tehran: Mīrāthi Maktūb, 1393/2014. Maghīlī, Muḥammad b. ʻAbd al-Karīm. Lubb al-lubāb fī radd al-fikr ilā l-ṣawāb. Edited by Abū Bakr al-Jazāʾirī. Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2006. Makhlūf, M. Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya fī ṭabaqāt al-Mālikiyya. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Salafiyya, 1930–1. Mallawī, Aḥmad. Sharḥ al-Sullam al-murawnaq. Printed on the margins of Muḥammad al-­ Sabbān’s Ḥāshiya ʿala Sharḥ al-Mallawī ʿala al-Sullam. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1938. Manūnī, M. Dalīl makhṭūṭāt Dār al-Kutub al-Nāṣiriyya bi-Tamagrūt. Rabat: Wizārat alAwqāf, 1985. Maybudī, Qāḍī Mīr Ḥusayn. Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya. Istanbul: n.p. 1289/1872. Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ Ḥusaynī. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Printed with Dawānī’s Sharḥ Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Istanbul: al-Ḥājj Muḥarram al-Bōsnavī, 1305/1887. Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ Ḥusaynī. Sharḥ ḍābiṭat al-Tahdhīb [= extract from his Takmilat Sharḥ al-Tahdhīb], lithographed in Majmūʿa-yi bīst-i rasāʾil-i manṭiq (Cawnpore, 1329/1912), pp. 3–5. Mīr Abū l-Fatḥ Ḥusaynī. Miftāḥ al-Bāb. Printed in al-Bāb al-ḥādī ʿashar li-l-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī maʿa sharḥayhi. Edited by M. Mohaghegh. McGill & Tehran: Institute of Islamic Studies & Tehran University, 1986. Mīr Dāmād. al-Ufuq al-mubīn, edited by Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī. Tehran: Mirāth-i Maktūb, 2013. Mīr Dāmād. Al-Qabasāt. Edited by M. Mohaghegh. Tehran: Tehran University Publications 1376/1988. Mīrzā Jān Bāghnavī, Ḥabīb-Allāh. al-Muḥākamāt maʿa Ḥāshiyat Mīrzā Jān. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿayi ʿĀmire, 1290/1873–4. Mīrzā Jān Bāghnavī, Ḥabīb-Allāh. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ʿayn. Printed with Ibn Mubārakshāh. Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ʿayn. Kazan: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1321/1903–1322/ 1904. Mīr Zāhid Harawī. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ Mullā Jalāl [ʿalā Tahdhīb al-manṭiq]. Lucknow: alMaṭbaʿ al-ʿAlawī, 1293/1876. Delhi: al-Maṭbaʿ al-Mujtabāʾī, 1331/1913. Mīr Zāhid Harawī. Ḥāshiya ʿalā l-Risāla al-Quṭbiyya. Edited by Mahdī Sharīʿatī in Risālatān fī l-taṣawwur wa l-taṣdīq. Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2004. Moghaddam, Barat Ali Gholam. Fihrist-i Kitābkhāna-yi Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍawī. XXIV: Manṭiq. Mashhad: Sazmān Kitābkhāne-hā, 1383/1963ff. Mōstārī, Muṣṭafā. Sharḥ Īsāghūjī. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1316/1898. Mōṣülī, Ḥasan Ḥüsnī. Tanwīr al-Burhān. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿat al-Sharika al-Murattabiyya liĀrtīn Āṣādūryān, 1307/1889–90. Mudarris Raz̤avī. Aḥvāl va ās̲ ār-i qudvah-ʹi muḥaqqiqīn va sulṭān-i ḥukamā va mutakallimīn, ustād-i bashar va ʻaql-i ḥādī-i ʻashr, Abū Jaʻfar Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī, mulaqqab bi Naṣīr al-Dīn. Tehran: Bunyād-i Farhang-i Īrān, 1354/1975–6.

303

304

References

Müftīzāde Erzincānī, Meḥmed Ṣādiḳ. Ḥāshiya ʿalā l-Ḥusayniyya. Istanbul: Şirket-i Ṣaḥāfiye-yi ʿOṡmāniye, 1307/1889–90. Müftīzāde Erzincānī, Meḥmed Ṣādiḳ. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya: al-Taṣdīqāt. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1254/1838. Müftīzāde Erzincānī, Meḥmed Ṣādiḳ. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya: al-Taṣawwurāt. Istanbul: Şirket-i Ṣaḥāfiye-yi ʿOṡmāniye, 1308/1890–1 Muḥibbī, Muḥammad Amīn. Khulāṣat al-athar fī aʿyān al-qarn al-ḥādī ʿashar. Cairo: alMaṭbaʿa al-Wahbiyya, 1284/1868–69. Mullā Ḥasan Lakhnawī. Sharḥ al-Sullam al-maʿrūf bi-Mullā Ḥasan maʿa ḥāshiyatihi al-Qawl al-aslam li-ḥall Sharḥ al-Sullam. Lahore & Karachi: Żiyāʾ al-Qurʾān, 2001 [reprint of undated lithograph]. Mullā Mubīn Lakhnawī. Mirʾāt al-shurūḥ. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿādah, 1327–1328/1909–1910. Lithograph. Lucknow: Nuval-i Kishūr, 1299/1882. Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī. Risālat al-taṣawwur wa l-tasdīq. Printed with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Risāla fī l-taṣawwur wa l-taṣdīq and the gloss of Mīr Zāhid Harawī. Edited by Mahdī Sharīʿatī, Risālatān fī l-taṣawwur wa l-taṣdīq. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004. Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī. Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil-i falsafī-yi Ṣadr al-mutaʾallihīn. Edited by Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī. Tehran, 1996. Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī. Taʿlīqāt ʿala Sharḥ Hikmat al-ishrāq. Lithograph. 1315/1897–8. Reprint. Qom: Intishārāt-i Baydar, n.d. Addenda on the Commentary on the Philosophy of Illumination, Pt. 1. On the Rules of Thought. Edited by Hossein Ziai. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2010. Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī. al-Tanqīḥ fī l-manṭiq. Edited by Āḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalekī & Gholāmrezā Yāsīpūr. Tehran: Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, 1378/1999. Muqtaraḥ, Muẓaffar. Sharh al-ʿAqīda al-burhāniyya. Edited by Nizār Ḥammādī. Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 2010. Muẓaffar, Muḥammad Riḍā. al-Manṭiq. Najaf: Maṭbaʿat al-Nuʿmān, 1968. Navāyī, ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn. Rijāl-i kitāb-i Ḥabīb al-siyar. Tehran: Anjuman-i Ās̲ ār va Mafākhir-i Farhangī, 2000. Ould Ely, A. Fihris makhṭūṭāt Markaz Aḥmad Bābā li-l-tawthīq wa-l-buḥūth al-tārīkhīyah bi-­ Tinbuktū. London: Muʾassasat al-Furqān lil-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1995. Özcan, T. “Saçaklızade Mehmed Efendi”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988–2013. Vol. XXXV, 368–370. Özyılmaz, Ömer. Osmanlı Medreselerinin Eğitim Programları. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2002. Pourjavady, Nasrallah (ed.). Majmūʿa-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha. Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāhī, 1380/2001. Pūrnavī, Muftī Muḥammad Shabbīr. al-Tashrīḥ al-munīb bi-ḥall Sharḥ al-Tahdhīb. New Delhi: al-Huda Publications, 1416/1996. Qādirī, Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib. Nashr al-mathānī li-ahl al-qarn al-ḥādī ʿashar wa l-thānī. Edited by Ḥajjī and Tawfīq. Rabat: Maktabat al-Ṭālib, 1977–86.

(i) Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu

Qaramaleki, Ahad Faramarz, “Āqā Ḥusayn Khwānsārī va muʿammā-yi jadhr-i aṣamm”. ­Khirādnāme-yi Ṣadrā 10 (1376/1997), 77–89. Qaramaleki, Ahad Faramarz (ed.). Davāzdah risālah dar pārāduks-i durūghgū. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2007. Qazwīnī, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb. al-Īḍāḥ fī ʿulūm al-balāgha. Edited by Gharīd al-Shaykh Muḥammad & Īmān al-Shaykh Muḥammad. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 2004. Qummī, Aḥmad Ibrāhīmī Ḥusaynī. Khulaṣat al-tavārīkh. Tihrān: Dānishgāh-i Tihrān, 1980. Quwaysinī, Ḥasan. Sharḥ naẓm al-Sullam fī l-manṭiq. Edited by Abū Ṭalḥa al-Marḥῡmī. Casablanca: Dār al-Rashād al-Ḥadītha, 2006. Rahim, Mohamed. Die Chronik des Ibn Wāṣil. Kritische Edition des letzten Teils (646/1248– 659/1261) mit Kommentar. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010. Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn. Manṭiq al-Mulakhkhaṣ. Edited by A. F. Karamaleki & A. Asgharinezhad. Tehran: ISU Press, 2003. Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn. Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa l-tanbīhāt. Edited by A. Najafzade. Tehran: Anjuman-i Ās̲ ār va Mafākhir-i Farhangī, 2005. Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn. Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma. Edited by A. al-Saqā. Reprint. Tehran: Muʾassasat al-Ṣādiq, 1415/1994. Rāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn. Lawāmiʿ al-asrār bi-Sharḥ Matāliʿ al-anwār. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-yi ʿĀmire, 1277/1860–1. Edited by ʿAlī Aṣghar Jaʿfarī Valanī. Tehran: Dānishgāh-i Tihrān, 2014. Edited by Abū l-Qāsim Raḥmānī. Tehran: Muʾassasah-i Pizhūhishī-yi Ḥikmat va Falsafah-i Īrān, 2014. Edited by Maḥfūẓ Abī Bakr Ibn Maʿtūma. Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2015. Rāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn. al-Muḥākamāt. [Printed with Ṭūsī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt.] Rāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn. Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya bi-sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya. Cairo: Musṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1948. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1323/1905. Istanbul: Ahmed Efendi Matbaası, 1325/1907. Rīzevī, Muṣṭafā. Sharḥ al-Burhān. Istanbul: n.p., n.d. Rūmlū, Ḥasan. Aḥsan al-tavārīkh. Edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Navāʾī. Tihrān: Asāṭīr, 2005. Ṣabbān, Muḥammad. Ḥāshiya ʿala Sharḥ al-Mallawī ʿala al-Sullam. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1938. Sabzavārī, Mullā Hādī. Sharḥ al-Manẓūma. Edited by M. Ṭālibī and annotated by Ḥasanzāde Āmulī. Qom: Nashr-i Nāb, 1416/1995. Sāçaḳlīzāde, Meḥmed. Taqrīr al-qawānīn al-mutadāwala fī ʿilm al-munāẓara. Istanbul: n.p., 1289/1872–3. Sāçaḳlīzāde, Meḥmed. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Qūl Aḥmad wa-l-Khayālī, printed in Majmūʿat al-ḥawāshī l-bahiyya ʿalā Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Kurdistān al-ʿIlmiyya, 1329/1911, vol. II(i), pp. 2–134. Sāçaḳlīzāde, Meḥmed. Tartīb al-ʿulūm. Edited by Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Sayyid Aḥmad. Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya, 1988.

305

306

References

Sāçaḳlīzāde, Meḥmed. al-Risāla al-Waladiyya. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Khānjī, 1329/1911. Printed with the commentaries of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Āmidi and Meḥmed Behisnī. Cairo: alMaṭbaʿa al-Azhariyya, 1331/1912–3. Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir. al-Usus al-manṭiqiyya li l-istiqrāʾ. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1972. Ṣadrüddīnzāde, Meḥmed Emīn. Risālat Jihat al-waḥda. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿa-i Ḥāci Muḥarrem Bōsnavī, 1288/1871. Ṣafawī, ʿĪsā. Sharḥ al-Ghurra fī l-manṭiq. Edited by Albert N. Nader. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1983. Sakhāwī, Shams al-Dīn. al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ. Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1935–37. Samarqandī, Shams al-Dīn. Qistās al-afkār fī taḥqīq al-asrār. Edited and translated into Turkish by Necmettin Pehlivan. Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014. Sandīlī, Ḥamd-Allāh. Sharḥ Sullam al-ʿulūm. Dehli: Maṭbaʿat al-Mujtabā’ī, 1328/1910–11. Sanūsī, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf. Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-manṭiq. Cairo: 1292/1875. Sanūsī, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf. ʿUmdat ahl al-tawfīq wa-l-tasdīd fī sharḥ ʿAqīdat ahl altawḥīd [=Sharḥ al-Kubrā]. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Jarīdat al-Islām, 1316/1898. Sanūsī, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf. Sharḥ Umm al-Barāhīn [=Sharḥ al-Ṣughrā]. Edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Darwīsh. Damascus: Dār al-Bayrūtī, 2009. Sarıkavak, K. “Yanyalı Es‘ad Efendi”, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988–2013. Vol. XLIII, pp. 322–323. Samlālī, ʿAbbās. al-Iʿlām bi-man ḥalla Marrakush wa-Aghmāt min al-aʿlām. Rabat: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Malakiyya, 1975. Sāwī, ʿUmar b. Sahlān. al-Baṣāʾir al-Naṣīriyya fī l-manṭiq. Annotated by Muḥammad ʿAbduh. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1316/1898. Sāwī, ʿUmar b. Sahlān. Three logical and philosophical treatises. Edited by Gholamreza Dadkhah and Mohammad Karimi Zanjani Asl. Bonn: Goethe & Hafis, 2013. Sayyid, Fuʾād. Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah: Fihris al-Makhṭūṭāt al-latī iqtanathā al-Dār min Sanat 1936 ilā 1955. Cairo: n.p., 1961. Sedād, ʿAlī. Mīzān ül-ʿuḳūl fī l-manṭıḳ ve l-üṣūl. Istanbul 1303/1885–6. Şeşen, R. Mukhtārāt min al-makhṭūṭāt al-ʻArabiyyah al-nādira fī maktabāt Turkiya. Istānbūl: Waqf al-Abḥāth lil-Tārīkh wa-al-Funūn wa-al-Thaqāfah al-Islāmīyah, 1997. Şeşen, R. “Tawqīʿāt Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī wa Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī”. In: Y. Ziedan (ed.): al-Makhṭūṭāt al-muwaqqaʿa. Alexandria: 2008, 141–147. Sharīʿatī, Mahdī (ed.). Risālatān fī l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004. Shahrazūrī, Shams al-Dīn. al-Shajara al-ilāhiyya fī ʿulūm al-ḥaqāʾiq al-rabbāniyya. Edited by N. Görgün. Beirut and Istanbul: Dār Ṣādir & Dār al-Irshād, 2007. Shīrāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn. Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq. Edited by A. Nourani & M. Mohaghegh. Tehran: Institute of Islamic Studies, 2002.

(i) Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu

Shīrāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn. Durrat al-tāj li-ghurrat al-dībāj. Edited by M. Mishkāt. Tehran: Majlis, 1938–45. Siyālkūtī, ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya. Printed with Quṭb al-Dīn alRāzī, Tahrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya bi-sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya, and the glosses of Jurjānī and ʿAdawī. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1905. Ḥāshiya ʿalā l-taṣawwurāt; Ḥāshiya ʿalā l-taṣdīqāt. Istanbul: Şirket-i Sahafiye-yi Othmāniye Maṭbaası, 1320/1902–3. Lithographed. Delhi 1870. Lithographed. Lucknow 1878. Şeyḫī Meḥmed. Veḳāʾiʿ ül-Fużalāʾ. In Şaḳaiḳ-i Nuʿmaniye ve Zeyilleri. Istanbul: Çağrı Yayinları, 1989. Ṡüreyya, M. Sicill-i Oṡmani. Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ile Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı’nın ortak yayınıdır, 1996. Tabrīzī, Rajab ʿAlī. al-Aṣl al-aṣīl. Edited by ʿAzīz Javānpūr Hiravī & Ḥasan Akbar Bayraq. Tehran: Anjuman-i Asār va Mafākhir-i Farhangī, 1386/2007. Tādilī, Ṣāliḥ and Saʿīd al-Murābiṭ (eds.), revised by E. Levi-Provencal: Fihris al-Makhṭūṭāt al-ʿArabiyya al-Maḥfūẓa fī l-Khizāna al-ʿĀmma bi-l-Rabāṭ, al-juzʾ 1. Rabat: al-Khizāna al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kutub wa l-Wathāʾiq, 1997–8. Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharh Mukhtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥājib. Printed with Ījī’s Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥājib. Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1316–1317/1898–1900. Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn. Sharḥ al-Shamsiyya. Lithograph. Lucknow: al-Maṭbaʿ al-Yūsufī, 1317/1899. Lithograph: Istanbul: 1312/1894–5. Edited by Jādullāh Bassām Ṣāliḥ. Jordan: Dār al-Nūr, 2011. Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn. Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Printed with Sharh Tahdhīb al-manṭiq of Dawānī and the Gloss of Mir Abu l-Fath. Istanbul, Haci Muharrem Efendi Matbaʿası, 1305/1887. Printed with the commentaries of Dawānī and Yazdī. Edited by ʿAbd al-Nāṣir al-Malībārī. Kuweit: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2014. Printed with the commentary of Yazdī and an appendix consisting of numerous commentaries on the section on the ḍābiṭa. Edited by ʿAbd alḤamīd al-Turkmānī. Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2018. Ṭāşköprüzāde, Aḥmed. Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa miṣbāḥ al-siyāda. Edited by Bakrī & Abū l-Nῡr. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, 1968. Ṭāşköprüzāde, Aḥmed. al-Shaqāʾiq al-nuʿmāniyya fī ʿulamāʾ al-dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya. Edited by Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabaṭabāʾī Behbehānī. Tehran: Kitābkhāne-yi Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, 1389/2010. Ṭāşköprüzāde, Aḥmed. Sharḥ al-Risāla fī Ādāb al-baḥth. Lithograph. Istanbul: n.p. 1313/ 1895. Ṭāşköprüzāde, Aḥmed. al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyyāt fī mabāḥith al-kulliyyāt. Printed in Taşköprüzade Külliyatı 4: Felsefe Risaleleri. Edited by K. Şenel, C. Şenel & M. Z. Tiryaki. Istanbul: Istanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi Yayınları, pp. 117–163. Ṭāvūskārī, Meḥmed. Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Qiyāsiyya. Istanbul: Maṭbaa-i Amire, 1281/1864–5. Tihrānī, Āghā Buzurg. al-Dharīʿa ilā taṣānīf al-Shīʿa. Najaf: Maṭbaʿat al-Gharrāʾ, 1936ff.

307

308

References

Tihrānī, Āghā Buzurg. Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-Shīʿa. Edited by ʿAlī Naqī Munzawī. Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī, 1971– Tihrānī, Muḥammad Yūsuf. Naqḍ al-uṣūl wa talkhīṣ al-fuṣūl. Edited by A. F. Qaramaleki, Sahar Kavandi & Muhsin Jahed. Zanjan, Iran: Dānishgāh-i Zanjān, 1389/2010. Tilimsānī, Muḥammad al-Sharīf. Miftāḥ al-wuṣūl ilā bināʾ al-furūʿ ʿalā l-uṣūl, wa-yalīhi kitāb Mathārāt al-ghalaṭ fī l-adilla. Edited by Muḥammad ʻAlī Farkūs. Mecca: al-Maktabah al-Makkiyya & Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Rayyān, 1998. Timbuktī, Aḥmad Bābā. Nayl al-ibtihāj bi-taṭrīz al-Dībāj. Cairo: ʿAbbās b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Shaqrῡn, 1351/1932. Tulanbī, ʿAbd-Allāh. Badīʿ al-mīzān. Lucknow: al-Maṭbaʿ al-Yūsufī, 1311/1893–1894. Ṭūlāwī, Buṭrus. al-Īsāghūjī. Edited by A. Rīḥānī, et al. Beirut: Notre Dame University Press, 2001. Tunkābunī, Mīrzā Ṭāhir. “Kutub-i dars-i qadīm”. Farhang-i Īrān-zamīn 20 (1353/1975): 39–82. Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn. Asās al-iqtibās. Edited by M. Razavī. Tehran: Chapkhāneh Dānishgāh, 1326/1947. Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn. Sharḥ al-Ishārāt. Printed with Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ishārāt wa l-tanbīhāt. Tehran: Maṭbaʿat al-Ḥaydari, 1377/1957–8. Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn. Taʿdīl al-miʿyār fī naqd tanzīl al-afkār. In: M. Mohaghegh & T. Izutsu (eds.): Collected Papers on Logic and Language.Tehran: Institute of Islamic Studies, 1974, 139–248. Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn. Tajrīd al-manṭiq, printed with Ḥillī’s commentary al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ manṭiq al-Tajrīd. Edited by Muhsin Bidarfar. Qum: Intisharat Bidar, 1423/2002–3. ʿUqbānī, Saʿīd. Sharḥ al-ʿAqīda al-burhāniyya. Edited by Nizār Ḥammādī. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Maʿārif, 2008. Wazzānī, Idrīs. Al-Nashr al-ṭayyib ʿalā Sharḥ al-Shaykh al-Ṭayyib. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Miṣriyya, 1348/1930– 352/1933. Yazdī, Mullā Abd-Allāh. Ḥāshiya ʿalā Tahdhīb al-manṭiq. Lithograph: Tehran 1314/1896. Printed with the commentary of Dawānī. Edited by ʿAbd al-Nāṣir al-Malībārī. Kuweit: Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, 2014. Printed with an appendix consisting of numerous commentaries on the section on the ḍābiṭa. Edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Turkmānī. Amman: Dār al-Nūr, 2018. Yāzijī, Naṣīf. Quṭb al-ṣināʿa fī uṣūl al-manṭiq. Beirut: n.p., 1857. Yūsī, al-Ḥasan. Al-Qānūn fī Aḥkām al-ʿIlm wa Aḥkām al-ʿĀlim wa Aḥkām al-Mutaʿallim. Edited by Ḥ. Ḥammānī. Rabat: Maṭbaʿat Shāla, 1998. Zaydān, Y. and M. Zahrān. Fihris Makhṭūṭāt Baladiyyat al-Iskandariyya: al-Manṭiq. Alexandria: n. p., 2001. Zekī, Ṣāliḥ. Mīzān-i tefekkür. Istanbul, 1332/1913. Ziriklī, Khayr al-Dīn. Al-Aʿlām. Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1995.

(ii) Western Languages

(ii) Western Languages Abisaab, Rula J. “al-Fāḍil al-Hindī, Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Iṣfahānī”. In: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas & Everett Rowson (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Leiden: Brill, 2014. Abun-Nasr, J. M. A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Ahlwardt, W. Verzeichnis der Arabischen Handschriften der königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin. Berlin: Georg Olms Verlag, 1887–1899. Ahmed, S. and N. Filipovic. “The Sultan’s Syllabus: A Curriculum for the Ottoman Imperial Medreses Prescribed in a Fermān of Qānūnī I Süleymān, Dated 973/1565”. Studia Islamica 98/99 (2004): 183–218. Ahmed, Asad Q. “Logic in the Khayrâbâdî School in India: a preliminary exploration”. In: M. Cook, N. Haider, I. Rabb, and A. Sayeed (eds.): Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought: Studies in Honor of Professor Hossein Modarressi. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 227–244. Ahmed, Asad Q. “Systematic Growth in Sustained Error: A Case Study of the Dynamism of Post-Classical Islamic Scholasticism”. In: A. Ahmed, B. Sadeghi & M. Bonner (eds.): The Islamic Scholarly Tradition: Studies in History, Law and Thought in Honor of Michael Cook. Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp. 343–378. Ahmed, Asad Q. “al-Jawnpūrī”. In: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas & Everett Rowson (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Leiden: Brill, 2014. Ahmed, Asad Q. “The Sullam al-ʿulūm of Muḥibb Allāh Bihārī (d. 1707)”. In: K. El-Rouayheb & S. Schmidtke (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 488–508. Alwishah, A. & Sanson, D. “The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World from the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Century CE”. Vivarium 47 (2009): 97–127. Alwishah, A. & D. Sanson. “al-Taftāzānī on the Liar Paradox”. In: R. Pasnau (ed.): Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 4, 2016, pp. 100–124. Amanat, Abbas. Iran: A Modern History. New Haven: Yale University Press 2017. Aouad, M., Ph. Roisse, E. Gannagé & H. Fadlallah. “Les manuscrits de philosophie dans la bibliothèques du Liban”. Melanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 61, 2008, pp. 189–341 Aouad, M. & H. Fadlallah. “Philosophes chretiens de langue arabes aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siecle en Syrie et au Liban”. Parole d’Orient 34 (2009): 443–468. Arberry, A.J. A Handlist of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Chester Beatty Library. Dublin: E. Walker, 1955–66. Arnaldez, R. “Manṭiḳ”. In: Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2002. Arnauld, Antoine & P. Nicole. La logique, ou l’art de pense. Edited by Pierre Clair & Francois Girbal. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965. Arriaga, Rodrigo. Cursus philosophicus. Lyon: Prost, 1644.

309

310

References

Arshi, I. A. Catalogue of the Arabic manuscripts in Raza Library: Sufism, Holy Scriptures, logic and philosophy. Rampur, 1971. Ashworth, E.J. Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period. Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel, 1974. Ashworth, E. J. “Joachim Jungius (1587–1657) and the Logic of Relations”. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967): 72–85. Bachour, N. Oswaldus Crollius und Daniel Sennert in neuzeitlichen Istanbul: Studien zur Rezeption des Paracelsismus im Werk des osmanischen Arztes Ṣāliḥ b. Naṣrullāh Ibn Sallūm al-Ḥalabī. Freiburg: Centaurus, 2012. Bencheneb, H. “al-Sanūsī, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf.” In: Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition. Leiden: EJ Brill, 1960–2002. IX, 21a. Bertolacci, A. “The reception of Avicenna in Latin medieval culture”. In: P. Adamson (ed.): Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013. Black, D. L. Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic philosophy. Leiden: Brill, 1990. Bonadeo, C. M. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Philosophical Journey. Leiden: Brill, 2013. Broadie, A. Introduction to Medieval Logic. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Brockelmann, C. Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur. Leiden: Brill, 1937–49. Brustad, K. “Jirmānus Jibrīl Farḥāt.” In: J.E. Lowry and D. Stewart (eds.): Essays in Arabic Literary Biography, 1350–1850. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2009, pp. 242–51. Campanella, Tomasso. Philosophia rationalis: Logicorum libri tres. Paris: Doubray, 1637. Casalini, Cristiano. Aristotle in Coimbra. The Cursus Conimbricensis and the education at the College of Arts. London & New York: Routledge, 2017. Cattaneo, Ottavio. Cursus philosophicus. Rome: Tignesi, 1677. Cottunios, Ioannes. Expositio lucidissima universae logices. Padua: Cribollianis, 1651. Cordeiro, Antonio. Cursus philosophicus conimbricensis. Lisbon: n.p. 1714. Dagoumer, Guillaume. Philosophia ad usum Scholae accommodata. Lyon: Fratrum Duplain, 1757. Dallal, A. An Islamic Response to Greek Astronomy: Kitāb Taʿdīl hayʾat al-aflāk of Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa. Leiden: Brill, 1995. De Benedetti, Giovanni Battista. Philosophia peripateteci. Venice: Typographia Balleoniana, 1749. Dedelley, Jakob. Summulae logicae. Porrentruy: Cuchot, 1728. De Jong, F. “The Itinerary of Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār: A Reconsideration and its Implications”. Journal of Semitic Studies 28(1983): 99–128. De Oviedo, Francisco. Cursus philosophicus. Lyon: Phillipe Borde, 1663. Derenbourg, H. Les manuscrits arabes de l’Escurial. Paris: E. Leroux, 1903. De Ulloa, Juan. Dialectica, seu Logica Minor. Rome: Paul Komeneck, 1711 De Ulloa, Juan. Logica Major. Rome: Cajetan Zenobi, 1712. Du Hamel, Jean-Baptiste. Philosophia nova et vetus. Paris: Stephanum Michellat, 1708.

(ii) Western Languages

Dumarsais, Cesar Chesneau. Logique, ou reflexions sur les principales opérations de l’ésprit. Paris: Dufart, 1798. [= Tanwīr al-mashriq fī ʿilm al-manṭiq. Bulaq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kubrā, 1254/1838.] Du Trieu, Philippe. Manuductio ad logicam. Ingolstadt: Wilhelm Eder, 1631. Du Trieu, Philippe (ed. & rev. by Matthias Heimbach). Manuductio ad logicam. Antwerp: Thieullier, 1722. Eichner, H. “Al-Abharī, Athīr al-Dīn”. In: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas & Everett Rowson (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Leiden: Brill, 2014. Eichner, H. The Post-Avicennian Philosophical Tradition and Islamic Orthodoxy: Philosophical and Theological Summae in Context. Unpublished Habilitation dissertation, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, 2009. El-Rouayheb, K. “Sunni Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500–1800”. Islamic Law and Society 11 (2004): 213–232. El-Rouayheb, K. “Theology and Logic.” In: S. Schmidtke (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 408–431. El-Rouayheb, Khaled. “Impossible antecedents and their consequences: some thirteenth-­ century Arabic discussions”. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2009): 209–225. El-Rouayheb, Khaled. Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900–1900. Leiden: 2010 Brill. El-Rouayheb, K. “al-Khūnajī, Afḍal al-Dīn”. In: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas & Everett Rowson (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. 2010 El-Rouayheb, Khaled, “Post-Avicennan logicians on the subject-matter of logic: some thirteenth- and fourteenth-century discussions”. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 22(1) (2012): 69–90. El-Rouayheb, Khaled. Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015. El-Rouayheb, Khaled, “Arabic Logic after Avicenna”. In: C. Dutilh-Novaes & S. Read (eds.): The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016, pp. 67–93. El-Rouayheb, K. “Aḥmad al-Mallawī (d. 1767): Commentary on the Versification of the Immediate Implications of Hypothetical Propositions”. In: K. El-Rouayheb & S. Schmidtke (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press 2016, pp. 509–534. El-Rouayheb, K. “The Transformation of Eastern Arabic Logic in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries”. In: A. Abu-Husayn, T. Khalidi & S. Mourad (eds.): In the House of Understanding: Histories in Memory of Kamal S. Salibi. Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 2017, pp. 389–404.

311

312

References

El-Rouayheb, K. “Takmīl al-manṭiq: A Sixteenth-Century Arabic Manual on Logic”. In: A. Gheissari, J. Walbridge & A. Alwishah (eds.): Illuminationist Texts and Textual Studies: Essays in Memory of Hossein Ziai. Brill: Leiden, 2018, pp. 199–256. El-Rouayheb, K. “al-Akhḍarī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān”. In: Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, (forthcoming). El-Rouayheb, K. “al-Kātibī, Najm al-Dīn”. In: Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, (forth­ coming). El-Rouayheb, K. “The Myth of the ‘Triumph of Fanaticism’ in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire”. Die Welt des Islams 48 (2008): 196–221. El-Rouayheb, K. “Was there a revival of logical studies in eighteenth-century Egypt?” Die Welt des Islams 45 (2005): 1–19. Emiralioglu, Pinar. Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. Abingdon & New York, 2016. Endress, G. “Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa: Intellectual Genealogies and Chains of Transmission of Philosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East”. In: J. Montgomery (ed.): Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy: From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank. Leuven & Paris: Peeters, 2006, pp. 371–422. Eustache de Saint Paul. Summa philosophiae quadripartite. Geneve: Jacob Stoer, 1647. Fagnan, E. Catalogue Generale des Manuscrits des Bibliotheque Publiques d’Alger. Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1893. Fena, F. “Haji Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1873), Ghurar al-farāʾid.” In: K. El-Rouayheb & S. Schmidtke (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 560–85. Fleming, Barbara, Babinger, F. and Woodhead, Christine. “Ṭas̲ h̲ köprüzāde”. In: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, 2012. Fonseca, Pedro. Institutionum dialecticarum. Cologne: Petrum Cholinum, 1623. Fyrigos, A. “Joannes Cottunios di Verria e il neoaristotelismo padovano”. In: M. Pade (ed.): Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2001, pp. 225–240. Gabriel à Sancto Vincento. Logica. Rome: Mancini, 1669. Galluppi, Pasquale. Elementi di filosofia: Volume primo: La logica e la psicologia. Milan: Giovanni Silvestri, 1832. [= Miftāḥ ül-fünūn (Istanbul: n. p. 1277/1861)] Genovesi, Antonio. Institutiones logicae. Napoli, n.p. 1745. Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid. Moderation in Belief: Al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād. Translated by Aladdin M. Yaqub. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. Goichon, A-M. Avicenne: Livre de definition. Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1963. Goudin, A. Philosophia juxta inconcussa, tutissimaque D. Thomae dogmata. Venice: Dominico Lovisa, 1729.

(ii) Western Languages

Graf, G. Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur. Vatican: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1944–52. Gran, P. The Islamic Roots of Capitalism, Egypt 1760–1840. Syracus, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998. Griffel, F. “Between al-Ghazālī and Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī: The Dialectical Turn in the Philosophy of Iraq and Iran during the 6th/12th Century”. In: P. Adamson (ed.): In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Twelfth Century. London: Warburg In­ stitute, 2011, pp. 45–75. Griffel, F. “On Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Life and the Patronage He Received”. Journal of Islamic Studies 18 (2007): 313–344. Gutas, D. “Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic logical works”. In: C. Burnett (ed.): Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts. London: Warburg Institute, 1993, pp. 29–52. Gutas, D. Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Leiden: Brill, 2014. Gutas, D. “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–ca.1350”. In: J. Janssens & D. De Smet (eds.): Avicenna and His Heritage. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002, 81–97. Guicciardini, Niccolo. “Editing Newton in Geneva and Rome: The Annotated Edition of the Principia by Calandrini, Le Seur and Jacquier”. Annals of Science 72 (2015): 337–380. Hallaq, W. “Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in Sunni Jurisprudence”. Arabica 87 (1990): 315–358. Hallaq, W. Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Harrak, F. “State and Religion in Eighteenth Century Morocco: The Religious Policy of Sidi Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh, 1757–1790.” PhD diss., University of London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1989. Hasnawi, A. & W. Hodges. “Arabic Logic up to Avicenna”. In: C. Dutilh-Novaes & S. Read (eds.): The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016. Hirschler, Konrad. “Ibn Wāṣil, Abū ʿAbdallāh”. In: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas & Everett Rowson (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Hitti, P., Faris, N. & ʿAbd al-Malik, B. Descriptive Catalog of the Garrett Collection of Arabic Manuscripts in the Princeton University Library. Princeton: Princeton University Library, 1938. Honerkamp, K. L. “Al-Yūsī, al-Ḥasan b. Masʿūd”. In: J.E. Lowry and D. Stewart (eds.): Essays in Arabic Literary Biography, 1350–1850. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2009, pp. 410–419. Hunwick, J.O & R. O’Fahey (eds.). Arabic Literature of Africa. Leiden & New York: Brill, 1994– Hunwick, J. O. “al-Maghīlī, Maḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm”. In: Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1960–2002. V, 1165–1166.

313

314

References

İnalcik, H. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973. Inati, Sham. “Logic”. In: S. H. Nasr & O. Leaman (eds.): A History of Islamic Philosophy. London: Routledge, 1996. Izquierdo, Sebastian. Pharus scientiarum. Lyon: Claude Bourgeat, 1659. Jacquier, Francois. Institutiones philosophicae. Venice: Simon Occhi, 1785. John of St Thomas. Outlines of Formal Logic. Translated by Francis C. Wade. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press 1955. Juwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn. A Guide to the Conclusive Proofs to the Principles of Belief. Translated by Paul E. Walker. Reading, UK, 2000. Kafadar, C. “The Question of Ottoman Decline”. Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 4 (1997–98): 30–75. Karabela, Mehmet. “The Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-Classical Islamic Intellectual History.” Unpublished PhD diss., McGill University, 2010. Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library. Catalogue of the Arabic and Persian Manuscripts in the Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Library. Volume 21: Encyclopaedias, Philosophy, Logic and Dialectics. Patna: The Library, 1970ff. Kirmili, A. M. “Le Programme des etudes chez les chiites et principalement ceux de Nedjef.” Revue du Monde Musulman XXIII (1913): 268–279. Kitromilides, Paschalis M. Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2013. Lameer, J. Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dῑn Shῑrāzī. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Phi­ losophy, 2006. Lameer, J. “Ghayr al-malʿūm yamtaniʿ al-ḥukm ʿalayhi: An exploratory anthology of a false paradox in medieval Islamic philosophy”. Oriens 42 (2014): 397–453. Lane, Edward William. An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians. London: A. Gardner, 1895. Legrand, Émile. Bibliographie hellénique, ou description raissonée des ouvrages publiés par des grecs au dix-septieme siècle. Paris 1894–6. Levi Della Vida, G. Elencho dei Manoscritti Arabi Islamici Della Bibliotheca Vatican. Vatican. 1935. Litvak, M. Shiʻi scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq: the ʻulama of Najaf and Karbala. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. Lossada, Luis de. Institutiones dialecticae. Salamanca: Francisco Garcia, 1721. Lossada, Luis de. Cursus philosophicus. Salamanca: Francisco Garcia, 1724. Ljubovic, A. The Works in Logic by Bosniac Authors in Arabic. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Luciani, J. D., ed. & trans. Les Prolégomènes Théologiques de Senoussi. Algiers: Fontana, 1908. Mach, R. Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection. ­Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

(ii) Western Languages

Mach, R., and E. L. Ormsby. Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University Library. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. MacEoin, D. “Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Ḳawāmī Shīrāzī”. In: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2002. VII, 547. Madelung, W. “al-Taftāzānī”. In: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. 2012. Madelung, W. “Kās̲ h̲ if al-G̲ h̲ iṭāʾ”. In: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2002. Madkour, Ibrahim. L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe. Paris, Vrin, 1969. Marlow, L. “A Thirteenth-Century Scholar in the Eastern Mediterranean: Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī. Jurist, Logician, Diplomat”. al-Masaq 22 (2010): 279–313. Marmura, M. E. “Ghazali’s attitude to the secular sciences and logic”. In: George F. Hourani (ed.): Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science. Albany: State University of New York Press. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975, pp. 100–111. Maroth, M. Ibn Sīnā und die peripatetische Aussagenlogik. Leiden: Brill, 1989. Maurus, Sylvestro. Quaestionem philosophicarum. Rome: Michaelis Herculis, 1670. Melvin-Koushki, M. “The Quest for a Universal Science: The Occult Philosophy of Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Ibn Turka (1369–1432) and Intellectual Millenarianism in Early Timurid Iran”. PhD dissertation. Yale University. 2012. Miller, L. B. “al-Samarqandi, Shams al-Dīn.” In: In: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960–2002. VIII, 1038. Miller, L. “A Brief History of the Liar Paradox”. In: R. Link-Salinger (ed.): Of Scholars, Savants, and Their Texts. New York & Berlin: Peter Lang, 1985, pp. 173–182. Miller, L. “Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through the Fourteenth Centuries.” Unpublished PhD Diss., Princeton University, 1984. Musschenbroek, Pieter Van. Institutiones logicae. Leiden: Samuel Luchtmans, 1748. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. “The Traditional Texts Used in the Persian Madrasahs.” Islamic Quarterly 19 (1975): 172–186 Nasrallah, Joseph. Histoire de mouvement littéraire dans l’église Melchite du Ve au XXe siècle. Vol. IV: Periode Ottomane, 1516–1900. Louvain & Paris: Peeters, 1979–89. Nassar, Nassif. “Le maitre d’Ibn Khaldun: Al-Abili”. Studia Islamica 20 (1964): 103–114. Nemoy, Leon. Arabic manuscripts in the Yale University Library. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956. Obizzino da Novara, Tomasso (Thomas Obicini Novariensis). Isagoge, id est breve introductorium Arabicum in scientiam logices. Rome: Stephanus Paulus, 1625. Øhrstrøm, Peter. “Temporalis in Medieval Logic”. Franciscan Studies 42 (1982): 166–179.

315

316

References

Özervarli, M. Sait, “Yanyali Esad Efendi’s Works on Philosophical Texts as Part of the Ottoman Translation Movement in the Early Eighteenth Century”. In: B. Schmidt-Haberkamp (ed.): Europe and Turkey in the 18th Century (Bonn University Press, 2011), 457–472. Patel, Abdulrazzak. The Arab Nahdah: The Making of the Intellectual and Humanist Movement. Edinburgh University Press 2013. Pepe, Luigi. “Entre physique et mathématiques: François Jacquier en Italie”. In: G. Montègre & P. Crépel (eds): François Jacquier: Un savant des Lumières entre le cloître et le monde. Nancy, 2017, pp. 131–146. Pierre, Benoist. “Religion, science et mondanité au XVIIIe siècle à travers l’itinéraire du père François Jacquier. In: G. Montègre & P. Crépel (eds): François Jacquier: Un savant des Lumières entre le cloître et le monde. Nancy, 2017, pp. 85–112. Pourchot, Edmond. Institutiones philosophicae. Lyon: Freres Bruyset, 1733. Pourjavady, Reza, & Schmidtke, Sabine. “Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī’s (634/1236 – 710/1311) Durrat al-Taj and Its Sources” (Studies on Quṭb al-Dīn Al-Shīrāzī I). Journal Asiatique 292(1–2), (2004): 311–330. Pourjavady, R., & Schmidtke, S. A Jewish philosopher of Baghdad: ‘Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammuna (d. 683/1284) and his writings. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Pourjavady, R. “An Eastern Renaissance? Greek Philosophy under the Safavids”. Intellectual History of the Islamicate World 3 (2015): 248–290 Pourjavady, Reza. “The World-Revealing Cup by Mīr Ḥusayn al-Maybudī and its Latin Translations”. Oriens 45 (2017): 306–329. Pourjavady, Reza. “Bāghnawī, Ḥabīballāh”. In: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas & Everett Rowson (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. 2012. Pourjavady, R. “Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502), Glosses on ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Qūshjī’s Commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād”. In: K. El-Rouayheb & S. Schmidtke (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press 2016, 415–437. Pourjavady, R. Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Rahim, A. “The Twelver-Shiite Reception of Avicenna in the Mongol Period”. In: D. Reisman (ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Leiden: Brill, 2003, pp. 219–232. Reichmuth, S. “Bildungskanon und Bildungreform aus der Sicht eines Islamischen Gelehrten der Anatolischen Provinz: Muḥammad al-Sajaqlī (Saçaqlızāde, gest. um 1145/1733) und sein Tartīb al-ʿUlūm”. In: R. Arnzen and J. Thielmann (eds.): Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea. Leuven: Peeters, 2004, pp. 493–522. Rescher, N. The Development of Arabic Logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. Rescher, N. “The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy”. In: N. Rescher. Studies in Modality. Oxford: American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, nr. 8, 1974, pp. 17–56.

(ii) Western Languages

Risse, Wilhelm. Die Logik der Neuzeit. Stuttgart: Frommann, 1964–70. Rizvi, S. Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of Manchester, 2007. Rizvi, S. “Mir Damad in India: Islamic Philosophical Traditions and the Problem of Creation”. Journal of the American Oriental Society 131 (2011): 9–24. Rizvi, S. “Mīr Dāmād’s (d. 1631) al-Qabasāt: The Problem of the Eternity of the Cosmos”. In: K. El-Rouayheb & S. Scmidtke (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Rosenthal, Franz (trans.). The Muqaddima of Ibn Khaldun. New York, Pantheon Books, 1958. Sabra, A. I. “Avicenna on the Subject-Matter of Logic”. Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 746–764. Sabra, A. I. “A twelfth-century defence of the fourth-figure of the syllogism”. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 28 (1965): 14–28. Saliba, G. Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2007. Sarıkaya, Yaşar. Abū Saʿīd Muḥammad al-Ḫādimī (1701–1762): Netwerke, Karriere und Einfluss eines Osmanischen Provinzgelehrten. Hamburg: Verlag Kovač, 2005. Schmidtke, S. “Ḥellī, Ḥasan b. Yusof”. In: E. Yarshater (ed.): Encyclopaedia Iranica. New York: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 2001– (2003), XII, 164–169. Semery, Andre. Triennium philosophicum. Bologna: Guiseppe Longhi, 1686. Seybold, C.F. “Al-Abharī’s (d. 663/1265) Isāġūǧī und al-Fanārī’s (d. 834/1431) Kommentar dazu”. Der Islam 9 (1919): 112–115 Shayyal, Gamal el-Din el-. “Ibn Wāṣil”. In: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Shehaby, N. The Propositional Logic of Avicenna. Dordrecht, Reidel, 1973. Shihadeh, A. “From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī: 6th/12th century developments in Muslim phi­ losophical theology”. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005): 141–179. Shihadeh, A. “Al-Rāzī’s (d. 1210) Commentary on Avicenna’s Pointers: The Confluence of Exegesis and Aporetics”. In: K. El-Rouayheb & S. Schmidtke (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 296– 325. Slane, M. Le Baron de. Catalogue des manuscrits Arabes. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1883–95. Smyth, W. “Controversy in a Tradition of Commentary: The Academic Legacy of al-Sakkākī’s Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm”. Journal of the American Oriental Society 112 (1992): 589–597. Spevack, A. “Apples and Oranges: The Logic of the Early and Later Arabic Logicians”. Islamic Law and Society 17 (2010): 159–184. Stocks, P. & Baker, C.F. Subject-Guide to the Arabic Manuscripts in the British Library. London: The British Library, 2001.

317

318

References

Street, Tony. “Toward a History of Syllogistic after Avicenna: Notes on Rescher’s Studies on Arabic Modal Logic”. Journal of Islamic Studies 11 (2000): 209–228. Street, Tony. “An Outline of Avicenna’s Syllogistic”. Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie 84 (2002): 129–160. Street, Tony. “Arabic Logic.” In: D. M. Gabbay and J. Woods (eds.): Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic. Vol. 1 of Handbook of the History of Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004, pp. 523–596. Street, T. “Logic”. In: P. Adamson & R. Taylor (eds.): The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 247–265. Street, T. “Faḫraddin ar-Rāzīs Critique of Avicennan Logic”. In: D. Perler & U. Rudolph (eds.): Logik und Theologie: Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter. Leiden: Brill, 2005, 99–116. Street, T. “Suhrawardī on Modal Syllogisms”. In: A. Akasoy & W. Raven (eds.): Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 163–178. Street, Tony. “Medieval and Modern Interpretations of Avicenna’s Modal Syllogistic”. In: F. Opwis & D. Reisman (eds.). Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Essays in Honor of Dimitri Gutas. Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp. 232–256. Street, Tony. “Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic”. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition). Street, T. “Kātibī (d. 1277), Taḥtānī (d. 1365), and the Shamsiyya”. In: K. El-Rouayheb & S. Schmidtke (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 348–374. Street, T. “Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) and the Early Reception of Kātibī‘s Shamsīya: Notes towards a Study of the Dynamics of Post-Avicennan Logical Commentary”. Oriens 44 (2016): 267–300. Strobino, R. “Ibn Sina’s Logic”. In: E.N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018. Strobino, R. & P. Thom, “The Logic of Modality”. In: C. Dutilh-Novaes & S. Read (eds.): The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 342–369. Thom, Paul. “Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Modal Syllogistic”. In: S. Rahman, T. Street, & H. Tahiri (eds.): The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008, pp. 361–376. Thom, P. “Abharī on the Logic of Conjunctive Terms”. Arabic Sciences & Philosophy 20 (2010): 105–117. Thom, Paul. “Termini Obliqui and the Logic of Relations”. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 59 (1977): 143–155. Toletus, Francisco. Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis. Venice: Iuntas, 1596. Valla, Paolo. Logica. Lyon: Prost, 1622.

(ii) Western Languages

Van Ess, Josef. Die Träume der Schulweisheit: Leben und Werk des ʿAlī b. Muḥammad alǦurǧānī (gest. 816/1413). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2013. Van Ess, Josef. “Jorjānī, Zayn al-Dīn”. In: E. Yarshater (ed.): Encyclopaedia Iranica. New York: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 2001–, vol. XV, 21–29. Von Hees, Syrinx. Enzyklopädie als Spiegel des Weltbildes: Qazwīnīs Wunder der Schöpfung: eine Naturkunde des 13. Jahrhunderts. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2002. Walbridge, J. The Science of Mystic Lights: Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī and the Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. Walbridge, J. “A Nineteenth-Century Indo-Islamic Textbook”. Islamic Studies 42 (2003): 687–693. Walbridge, J. “Logic in the Islamic Intellectual Tradition: The Recent Centuries”. Islamic Studies 39 (2000): 55–75. Walbridge, J. “Review of Harold Spencer, Avicenna to Ghazipuri: Studies in Eastern Islamic Logic”. Islamic Studies 41 (2002): 534–537. Wisnovsky, R. “The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary in Post-Classical (ca.1100–1900) Islamic Intellectual History: Some Preliminary Observations”. In: P. Adamson, H. Balthussen, and M. W. F. Stone (eds.): Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, II. London: Institute of Advanced Studies, 2004, pp. 149–191. Wisnovsky, R. “Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the Ishārāt”. Oriens 41 (2013): 349–378. Wisnovsky, R. “Toward a Genealogy of Avicennism”. Oriens 42 (2014): 323–363. Wisnovsky, R. “Avicenna’s Islamic Reception”. In: P. Adamson (ed.): Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013, pp. 190–213. Yildiz, Sara Nur. “From Cairo to Ayasuluk: Haci Paşa and the Transmission of Islamic Learn­ ing to Western Anatolia in the Late Fourteenth Century”. Journal of Islamic Studies 25 (2014): 263–297. Young, W. “Mulāzama in Action in the early Ādāb al-baḥth”. Oriens 44 (2016): 332–385. Ziai, H. “Mullā Ṣadrā: Life and Works”. In: S. H. Nasr and O. Leamann (eds.): A History of Islamic Philosophy I. London: Routledge, 1996. pp. 635–642. Ziai, H., and J. Walbridge, eds. & trans. Suhrawardī: The Philosophy of Illumination. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young Press, 1999. Zilfi, M. “The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul”. Journal of Near Eastern Studies 45 (1986): 251–269. Zilfi, Madeline C. “Fenarizade”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas & Everett Rowson. Leiden: Brill, 2014.

319

Index of Terms

ādāb al-baḥth  16, 66, 67, 96, 103, 105, 106, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 118, 125, 146–147, 175, 203, 209, 212–214, 221, 223, 226, 228, 233–234, 257, 278, 289 Ampliation  34, 261, 263, 265, 270

Categorematic and Syncategorematic  219, 263, 290 Categories  16, 24, 29, 42, 54, 70, 115, 146, 167, 218, 258, 266, 267, 268, 271, 276, 278, 287 Commentaries and glosses, literary form of   18, 30, 75–76, 81, 85, 124–125 Conception and assent (taṣawwur wa taṣdīq)  19, 29, 74, 77, 78, 80, 83, 88, 89, 91, 96, 113, 118, 120, 122, 123, 138, 153, 159, 174, 175, 181, 183, 191, 195, 196, 200, 206, 225, 230, 235, 249, 250, 254, 255, 287, 289 Conditionals  22, 32, 45, 47, 52, 53, 61, 62–63, 77, 83, 121, 122, 131, 134, 156–157, 182, 184, 185, 197, 219, 222, 238, 243, 244, 251, 254, 257, 263, 264, 273–275, 277, 280, 281, 282, 291 see also: Disjunction; Hypothetical Syllogism; Immediate implications; Quantification, conditionals Conjunctions  32, 219, 263, 273 Consequences  201, 240, 242, 280 see also: Immediate implications; Impossible antecedents

Contraposition  29, 33, 36, 41, 46, 47, 52, 56, 58, 62, 77, 78, 79, 82, 88, 93, 109, 111, 120, 121, 131, 133, 134, 135, 154, 156, 157, 164, 169, 175, 176, 182, 184, 185, 189, 196, 198, 222, 225, 229, 231, 232, 233, 238, 243, 244, 245, 249, 251, 254, 255, 258, 290 Conversion  29, 41, 45, 46, 47, 53, 58, 77, 78, 79, 83, 88, 89, 92, 93, 102, 106, 109, 111, 120, 121, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 154, 155, 164, 169, 175, 176, 184, 189, 193, 196, 197, 208, 222, 225, 229, 231, 232, 233, 238, 243, 244, 245, 249, 251, 254, 255, 262, 269, 270, 277, 281, 288, 290 Copula  45, 46, 73, 77, 99, 103, 151, 152, 162, 165, 220, 228, 276, see also: Nexus; Propositions, parts of Definition  16, 27, 29, 31, 40, 45, 46, 53, 58, 62, 67, 78, 83, 85, 89, 93, 94, 96, 109, 134, 136, 138, 153, 154, 161–162, 164, 166, 176, 179, 180, 184, 192, 197, 201, 204, 206, 208, 212–213, 214, 215, 218, 225, 226, 230, 231, 233, 243, 249, 254, 255, 261, 262, 266, 268, 276, 277, 287 Demonstration  16, 36, 41, 53, 57, 63, 83, 92, 93, 94, 122, 133, 139, 147, 151, 154, 161–162, 166, 184, 198, 202, 218, 225, 231, 247, 266, 269, 280, 287, 289 see also: Posterior Analytics

322

Index of Terms

Dialectics  16, 17, 18, 28, 29, 36, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 57, 66–68, 71, 72, 83, 87, 88, 104, 105, 106, 113, 118, 122, 133, 147, 166, 175, 179–180, 182, 184, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203–204, 209, 212–215, 220, 225, 226, 228, 233, 234, 247, 256, 257, 262, 268, 277, 278, 284, 289, 291 see also: ādāb al-baḥth Disjunction  22, 32, 42, 45, 47, 61, 63, 77, 83, 87, 121, 122, 131–132, 134, 184, 185, 197, 219, 238, 243, 244, 251, 254, 257, 263, 264, 265–266, 269, 273, 277, 278, 282, 291 Distribution  81, 261, 264, 270, 290 Exponible proposition  219, 262, 263, 270, 273, 277, 278, 290 Fourth Figure of the Syllogism  25–26, 33, 36, 38, 47, 48, 54, 56, 84, 139, 154, 162, 185, 193, 195, 219, 221, 263, 271–272, 282, 284, 289 Grammar  16, 17, 108, 137, 165, 167, 184, 222, 251, 252, 259, 260, 279 see also: Syntax Hypothetical syllogisms –  Disjunctive syllogism  22, 47, 53, 62, 89, 139, 154, 269, 278, – Modus ponens/Modus tollens  22–23, 53, 89, 139, 154, 278, – Wholly hypothetical syllogism  22, 23, 25, 30, 37, 41, 45, 47, 48, 53, 58, 62–63, 73, 83, 93, 139, 149, 154, 162, 167 [purely], 168, 185, 198, 219, 225, 231, 232, 249, 255, 264, 274, 278, 281, 282

Immediate implications  29, 32–33, 36, 41, 45, 47, 58, 61, 62, 77, 78, 79, 105, 109, 116, 120, 121, 131–132, 133–134, 135, 144, 167, 175, 185, 189, 222, 231, 238, 242, 243, 244, 245 [immediate inferences], 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 257, 290 see also: De Morgan; Consequences; Conversion; Contraposition Impossible antecedents  32–33, 182, 184, 280 Khārijī/ḥaqīqī  35, 38, 83, 127, 134, 197, 229, 231, 238, 245–246, 249 see also: Subject-term

Liar paradox, see Paradox, Liar Logic, opposition to  15, 196, 239, 256, 290, 292 Metaphysics  15, 16, 24, 30, 31, 40, 42, 43, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 61, 63, 69, 74, 79, 99, 104, 119, 123, 144, 145, 155, 156, 158, 160, 166, 188, 189, 217, 260, 283, 287, 288 Middle-term  39, 41, 53, 81, 102, 156, 214, 215, 225–226, 264, 270, 272, 278, 289 Minor premise, placement of  220, 263, 270, 291 Modality propositions  27, 29, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 58, 77, 78, 82, 83, 88, 93, 106, 133, 134, 153–154, 162, 164, 166, 168, 184, 185, 196, 197, 201, 223, 225, 228–229, 231, 238, 244, 245, 246, 249, 250, 254, 255, 270, 290 Nexus, between subject and predicate  104, 111, 165, 189, 211, 223, 253, 254, 288 see also: Copula

Index of Terms

Organon  16, 17, 22, 29, 31, 36, 38, 39, 43, 54, 75, 106, 124, 217, 258, 267, 283, 287, 289 Paradox – Liar  19, 66, 77, 88, 91, 100–101, 103–104, 105, 106, 108, 118, 149– 151, 155, 156, 170, 175, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 200, 288, 289 – Of entailment (shubhat alistilzām)  156–157, 187, 289 – Of what is not conceived in any way (al-majhūl al-muṭlaq) 112– 113, 115, 120, 159, 175, 184, 185, 289 [known] – Meno’s 183, 185 – That occurs generally (al-ʿāmmat al-wurūd)  175, 182, 184, 186, 202 Posterior Analytics  16, 29, 54–55, 93, 146, 161, 162, 167, 218, 229, 267, Propositions, parts of  58, 62, 73, 77, 83, 103, 111, 149, 152, 165, 184, 197, 211, 222, 223, 227, 228, 229, 233, 288 Quantification – Of conditionals  22, 45, 47, 74, 135, 197, 273–274, 281–282, 291 – Of the predicate  45, 133, 134, 249, 254, 255 Reduplicative propositions  219, 263, 265, 269, 270 Reference, types of  45, 52, 109, 265, 278 Semantics-rhetoric (maʿānī wa-bayān)  16, 79, 80, 108, 112, 122, 123, 176, 242, 250, 252, 287, 288 Subject matter of logic  31, 36, 40, 58, 62, 66, 77, 78, 81, 83, 96, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 123, 153, 159, 162, 164, 166,

167, 175, 183, 192, 196, 201, 208, 218, 223, 225, 235, 250, 266, 287 Subject-term, extension of  34, 35, 38–39, 48, 162, 163, 177–178, 229 Supposition of terms  261, 263, 265, 280, 290 Syllogisms – Division into combinatorial and reiterative  22–23, 41, 45, 47, 53, 58, 63, 83, 93, 135, 154, 198, 225, 231, 243, 249, 255 –  Expository 262, 264 – Modal  32, 41, 45, 46, 47, 58, 62, 84, 93, 111, 127, 133, 163, 193, 231, 232, 244, 245, 245, 249, 255, 270, 281 – Oblique  204, 219–220, 264 – Relational  39, 66, 73, 77, 99, 102, 105, 119, 152, 156, 193, 203, 204–205, 220, 231–232, 262, 264, 288, 289, 291 see also: Fourth Figure; Hypothetical syllogisms; Middle term; Minor premise Theology, syllogistic reasoning in  123– 124, 288 Topics, Aristotelian  16, 29, 55, 66, 106, 167, 280, 287 see also: ādāb al-baḥth; Dialectics Universals – Five Universals  29, 40, 42, 45, 46, 53, 62, 77, 78, 83, 85, 89, 95, 96, 109, 134, 136, 138, 153, 176, 184, 192, 197, 201, 206, 208, 225, 230, 233, 241, 243, 249, 251, 254, 255, 266, 267, 268, 276, 288 – Realism and nominalism regarding  73, 74, 80, 81, 113, 123, 168, 184

323

Index of Personal Names

The index of personal names does not include names of scholars who are mentioned in the table of contents. ʿAbbās I (Safavid ruler)  148, 200, 289 ʿAbbās II (Safavid ruler)  158, 159 ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Khān (Uzbek ruler)   83 ʿAbduh, Muḥammad  291 ʿAbd ül-Nāfiʿ ʿİffet Ramażānzāde  230 Ābilī, Muḥammad  125, 126, 127 Abū Saʿīd Mīrzā (Timurid ruler)  97 Afandī, ʿAbdullāh  148 Afghānī, Jamāl al-Dīn  291 Aḥmed I (Ottoman Sultan)  205, 206 Aḥmed III (Ottoman Sultan)  205, 216 ʿAjamī, Sayyid ʿAlī  90, 95–96, 199 Āḳşehrī, ʿOṡmān  234 Akbar (Mughal ruler)  173, 176 Āḳvirānī, Ḫalīl  215, 227 ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad II (ruler of Khwārezm)  42 Ālāşehrī, ʿOṡmān  227 ʿAlī ʿĀdil Shāh I (Sultan of Bijapur)  173 ʿAlī ʿAskar Ḥusaynī  153 ʿAlī Qulī b. Qarachagāy Khān  146 ʿAlī Sedād Cevdetpāşāzāde  292 ʿAllāmek, Meḥmed Bōsnavī  200, 210 Amāsī, Ḫōcā Kerīm  177, 290 Āmidī, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb  215 ʿAmīdī, Rukn al-Dīn  47, 51 ʿĀmilī, Bahāʾ al-Dīn  116 ʿĀmilī, Muḥammad al-Ḥurr  167

Āmulī, Mīr Sharīf  175–176 Anṣārī, Zakariyyā  52, 67, 68, 246, 250, 257 Anṭālī, Meḥmed Emīn  227, 233 Aqīt, Maḥmūd  140 Aqīt, Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd  140 Aquinas, Thomas  219 Ardistānī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn  144 ʿĀrif Ḥikmet  257 Aristotle  16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 31, 66, 93, 124, 126, 145, 146, 162, 163, 217–219, 260, 267, 287 Arnauld, Antoine  271, 272, 282 Askia Muḥammad I (Songhai ruler)  135 see al-Simʿānī, Yūsuf Aurangzeb (Mughal ruler)  166, 180, 182, 188 Avicenna –  Attitudes to  25, 31, 36, 37–38, 73, 124, 155, 165, 167–168, 202 –  Commentaries, Epitomes, and Glosses on  39, 43–44, 55, 61, 64, 67, 70, 74, 119, 145, 155–156, 160, 166–167 –  Innovations of  21–24 – Ishārāt  30, 31, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 55, 60, 61, 64, 67, 70, 74, 100, 119, 124, 144, 156, 162, 163, 170, 180

Index of Personal Names

–  Shifāʾ  22, 31, 70, 75, 100, 105, 106, 109, 145, 151, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166–167, 167, 177, 178, 189, 202, 221, 274, 283 –  ʿUyūn al-ḥikma  39, 170 Averroes  21, 25, 26, 27, 33, 37, 124, 126, 145, 146, 147, 163, 219, 289 Ayās Meḥmed Pāşā (Ottoman Vizier)  110 ʿAyntābī, ʿAbdullāh Necīb  202, 226 Bābartī, Akmal al-Dīn  90 Badakhshī, Muḥammad Afżal  180 Baghdādī, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf  26–27 Baghdādī, Abū l-Barakāt  25 Baghdādī, Dāʾūd b. ʿĪsā  45 Bahmanyār  31, 100, 106 Bājūrī, Ibrāhīm  138, 290 Banārisī, Amānullāh  186 Banārisī, Ṭayyib  179 Bannānī, Muḥammad b. Ḥasan  138, 239, 253 Bardaʿī, Muḥyī al-Dīn  112 Bar Hebraeus  41, 44, 47–48, 59 Bayḍāwī, al-Qāḍī Nāṣir al-Dīn  16, 71, 72, 79, 226 Bāyezīd II (Ottoman Sultan)  99, 101 Behisnī, Meḥmed  215 Bertizī, Ḥüseyn  215 Bihārī, Ghulām Yaḥyā  181 Bihishtī, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn  68 Biqāʿī, Burhān al-Dīn  133 Birgevī, Meḥmed  223, 224 Blaeu, Joan  205 Boole, George  292 Briccialdi, Dominico Antonio  267 Bulaydī, Muḥammad  258 Campanella, Tommaso  272 Cattaneo, Ottavio  260, 262 Cordeiro, Antonio  283

Cottunios, Joannes  205, 216–221, 260, 262 Crollius, Oswald  205 Dagoumer, Guillaume  272, 283 Daljī, Muḥammad  246–247 Dāmād Ibrāhīm Pāşā  216 Damanhūrī, Aḥmad  138 Dārendevī, Ḥamza  211 Dasūqī, Muḥammad ʿArafa  103, 256, 257 Dedelley, Jakob  281, 282, 283 De Morgan, Augustus  32, 292 De Soto, Domingo  219 De Ulloa, Juan  267, 272, 274 Dilāʾī, Abū Bakr  241 Dumarsais, César Chesneau  282, 292 Du Trieu, Phillipe  271, 283 Ebū l-Suʿūd  110, 111 Farīd al-Dīn Dāmād  54 Fārābī  21, 22, 24, 33, 34, 39, 75, 81, 127, 145, 147, 162, 163, 177, 178 Fatiḥpūrī, Kamāl al-Dīn  193–194 Fāżil Süleymān  221, 223 Fayżābādī, Ilāh-bakhsh  196 Fenārī, Ḥasan Çelebī  199 Findiriskī, Mīr Abū l-Qāsim  155, 174 Frederik II (Holy Roman Emperor)  59, 64 Galen  25 Galuppi, Pasquale  292 Ghazālī  15, 25, 26, 123, 124, 224 Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad (Il-Khanid vizier)  73, 74 Ghunaymī, Aḥmad  244 Gīlānī, Hāshim  174 Gīlānī, Niżām al-Dīn Aḥmad  174 Gīlānī, Quṭb al-Dīn  68 Gūrānī, Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn  220

325

326

Index of Personal Names

Ḫādimī, Meḥmed Emīn  234 Ḥafīd al-Taftāzānī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā  108, 244, 253 Hamadānī, Mullā Hādī  290 Hamilton, Sir William  292 Ḥanafī, see Mullā Ḥanafī Ḫarpūtī, ʿAbd ül-Ḥamīd  177 Ḫarpūtī, Yūsuf Şükrü  230 Ḥasanī, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy  177 Hashtūkī, Aḥmad  244 Ḫayālī, Aḥmed  199, 207 Ḫōcāzāde Būrsevī  199 Hondius, Jodocus  205 Hülegu (Mongol Khan)  54, 55 Hurtado de Mendoza  219 Ḥusayn Bayqara (Timurid ruler)  97, 108 Ḥusayn Sūfī (ruler of Khwārezm)  80 Ḥüseyn Adanavī  203, 214, 233 Ḥuwayzī, Isḥāq  144 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa   41, 44 Ibn ʿArabī, Muḥyī al-Dīn  92, 194, 221 Ibn Bābawayh  72 Ibn al-Badīʿ al-Bandahī  42, 45, 46, 48, 76 Ibn Faḍlān  43 Ibn al-Fuwaṭī  66 Ibn al-Ḥabbāb  126 Ibn al-Ḥājib  16, 43, 72, 82, 86, 91, 108, 127, 139, 148, 160, 214, 226, 235 Ibn al-Ḥājj, Ḥamdūn  239, 254 Ibn al-Ḥājj, Muḥammad b. Ḥamdūn  254, 290 Ibn Hārūn  126, 139 Ibn Hishām  16 Ibn Kamāl Pāshā, see Kemālpāşāzāde  Ibn Khaldūn  22, 124, 125, 126 Ibn Khallikān  47 Ibn Mubārakshāh  84, 119, 158, 207 Ibn Nāṣir, Muḥammad  241 Ibn Qunfudh al-Khaṭib  141

Ibn al-Sarī  25 Ibn al-Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn  141 Ibn Sūdā, Muḥammad Mahdī  290 Ibn Taymiyya  71 Ibn al-Ṭayyib, Abū l-Faraj  21 Ibn Ṭumlūs  21, 124 Ibn Yūnus, Kamāl al-Dīn  47, 54, 59 Ibn Zurʿa  21 Ījī, ʿAḍud al-Dīn  43, 79, 80, 82, 84, 86, 87, 91, 109, 110, 115, 127, 148, 149, 160, 182, 203, 214, 221, 223, 226, 228, 235 ʿIllaysh, Muḥammad  290 Iṣfahānī, Tāj al-Dīn  165 Ismāʿīl I (Safavid Shah)  105 Ismāʿīl II (Safavid Shah)  119 Izquierdo, Sebastian  272, 282 Jacquier, François  284, 285 Jahān Shāh (Qara Qoyunlu ruler)  101 Jahangīr (Mughal ruler)  180 Jāmī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān  108 Jawnpūrī, ʿAbd al-Bāqī  176, 180 Jawnpūrī, Maḥmūd  174 Jawnpūrī, Muḥammad Afżal  178 Jevons, William Stanley  292 Jīlī, Majd al-Dīn  25, 26, 27, 37 John of St Thomas  262, 265 Jurjānī, Muḥammad b. al-Sharīf  88 Jurjānī, Mīr Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad  86, 175 Jurjānī, Zayn al-Dīn Ismāʿīl  86 Juwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn  80, 123, 124 Juwaynī, Shams al-Dīn (Il-Khanid Vizier)  56, 57, 58, 63, 64 Juwaynī, Sharaf al-Dīn Hārūn (son of Shams al-Dīn)  56, 63, 64, 69 al-Kāmil (Ayyubid Sultan)  44, 59, 60 Ḳārsī, Dāvūd  202–203 Kāshī, Yaḥyā  96–97

Index of Personal Names

Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ, Jaʿfar  169 Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ, ʿAlī  171 Kashmīrī, Kamāl al-Dīn  176 Kātī, Ḥusām al-Dīn  52, 95, 112, 201, 279, Kātib Çelebī  86–87, 96–97, 98, 121, 129, 139, 140 Kawwāsh, Ṣāliḥ  252 Kāzābādī, Aḥmed  224, 227 Kefevī, Meḥmed  235 Kemālpāşāzāde  199 Khabīṣī, ʿUbaydullāh  83, 134, 239, 244, 250, 252, 253, 257 Khafrī, Shams al-Dīn  107, 158 Khalīl b. Ūzūn Ḥasan (Aq Qoyunlu ruler)  101 Khalkhālī, Ḥusayn  205, 206, 220, 235 Khān Aḥmad II (vassal ruler of Gilan)  114, 120 Khaṭīb, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn  37 Khayrābādī, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq  195, 196, 290 Khayrābādī, ʿAbd al-Wājid  195 Khayrābādī, Fażl-i Ḥaqq  195 Khulayfī, Aḥmad  245 Khusrawshāhī, Shams al-Dīn  43, 64 Khwānsārī, Jamāl al-Dīn  159, 160 Kilisī, ʿAbdullāh Ḫōcāzāde  291 Kinaksī, ʿAbdullāh  244 Ḳıyās Meḥmed   229 Ḳūçevī, Ḳara Dāvūd  98 Ḳūl Aḥmed  82, 91, 207, 234 Lāhūrī, ʿAbd al-Salām  176 Lakhnawī, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm  182, 191 Lakhnawī, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥayy  290 Lakhnawī, Mullā Mubīn  183 Lamaṭī Miknāsī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz  141 Lamaṭī Sijilmāsī, Aḥmad b. Mubārak  251 Lane, Edward  256

Lārī, Muṣliḥ al-Dīn  207, 216, 228 Lossada, Luis de  282, 283 Luṭfullāh b. Şücāʿuddīn  96 Maghribī, Shams al-Dīn, see Muʿizzī, Shams al-Dīn Maḥjūb, Qāsim  252 Maḥjūb, Muḥammad b. Qāsim  252 Maḥmūd II (Ottoman Sultan)  229 Maḥmūd Mīrzā (Timurid ruler)  97, 98 Maimonides  27 Manfred (King of Sicily)  64, 65 Manguberdī (son of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad II, ruler of Khwārezm)  42 Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir  167 Majlisī, Muḥammad Taqī  155, 158 Marāghī, ʿAbd al-Raḥīm  144 Marʿaşī Velīcānī, Meḥmed b. Vāʿiż  215–216 Maudūdī, Abū l-Aʿlā  292 Maurus, Sylvestro  260, 263 Meḥmed II “Fātiḥ” (Ottoman Sultan)  55, 90 Miṣrī, Quṭb al-Dīn  41, 47, 54 Mōsüllü, Ḥasan Ḥüsnü  230 Moulāy Ismāʿīl (Moroccan Sultan)  239, 242 Moulāy Rashīd (Moroccan Sultan)  241 Moulāy Sulaymān (Moroccoan Sultan)  253 Mubārakshāh  84, 90 Muḥammad ʿAlī Pāşā (ruler of Egypt)  256 Muḥammad Jānī Beg (Khan of the Golden Horde)  80 Muʿizzī, Shams al-Dīn  139–140 Mullā ʿAbdullāh Tustarī  116 Mullā Ḥanafī  110, 115, 203, 221, 223, 228, 235 Mullā Ḫüsrev   55, 210

327

328

Index of Personal Names

Mullā Luṭfī Tōkādī  199 Muʾminī, ʿImād al-Dīn (Il-Khanid grandee)  65–66 Murād II (Ottoman Sultan)  90, 95 Murād Bukhārī  221 Muṣannifak, ʿAlī Shāhrūdī  199 Mutawakkil, Abū ʿInān Fāris (Marinid ruler)  125, 128 Müteferriḳa, Ibrāhīm  216 Muẓaffar, Muḥammad Riḍā  171, 293 Naḥwī, Sulaymān  279 Narāqī, Mahdī  146 Nasafī, Burhān al-Dīn  65, 67, 72 Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd (Seljuk vizier)  25 Naṣūḥ Pāşā (Ottoman Vizier)  205 Nayshābūrī, Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā  26 Nāzikzāde, Ḥasan  215 Newton, Isaac  285 Niżām al-Dīn II (ruler of Sind)  175 Obizzino da Navarra, Tomasso  265 Ockham, William  219 Öljaitü (Il-Khanid ruler)  69 Panjiyūnī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān  228, 230, 290 Pehlivānī, Mūsā  204–205 Pīr Muḥammad (Timurid ruler)  87, 92 Porphyry  22, 81, 217, 218, 267 Prizrenlı, Ḥüseyn  290 Puente, Luis de la  275 Qaddūra, Saʿīd  138, 251 Qādirī, ʿAbd al-Salām b. al-Ṭayyib  248 Qāḍīzāde al-Rūmī  51 Qannawjī, Ḥabībullāh  120, 187 Qarabāghī, Yūsuf Kawsaj  174 Qaradāghī, ʿUmar  228, 230, 290 Qazwīnī, al-Khaṭīb  16, 79, 108 Qirimī, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn  80

Quṭb, Sayyid  292 Qūshjī, ʿAlī  99, 100, 102, 119, 151, 156, 158, 210 Quwaysinī, Ḥasan  138 Rāġıb Meḥmed Pāşā (Ottoman Vizier)  200 Rīzevī, Muṣṭafā  202, 229–230, 232 Ṣabbāgh, Anṭūn  285 Ṣabbāgh, Ibrāhīm (vizier to Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar)  284 Ṣabbān, Muḥammad  245, 256 Sabzawārī, Hādī  146, 148, 152, 290, 291 Sabzawārī, Muḥammad Bāqir  155, 157–158 Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir  171 Ṣaʿīdī, ʿAlī al-ʿAdawī  240 Sakhāwī, Shams al-Dīn  86, 87, 95 Sakkākī, Abū Yaʿqūb  79 Salālujī, ʿUthmān  122 al-Ṣāliḥ (Ayyubid Sultan)  44, 59, 60, 64 Ṣāliḥ Zekī  292 Samsūnī, Ḥasan  235 Sāwī, ʿUmar  25, 100, 291 Scotus, John Duns  219 Şehirlızāde, Ibrāhīm  216 Selīm I (Ottoman Sultan)  112 Selīm III (Ottoman Sultan)  234 Semery, André  260, 263, 271 Sennert, Daniel  205 Shāh ʿĀlam I (Mughal ruler)  182 Shāh Jahān (Mughal ruler)  174, 176 Shāh Mīr Ḥusaynī  108 Shāh Shujāʿ (Mughal prince)  174 Shāh Shujāʿ (Muzaffarid ruler)  84 Shahrazūrī, Shams al-Dīn  57 Shāhrūkh (Timurid ruler)  92 Shidyāq, Aḥmad Fāris  261

Index of Personal Names

Shīrāzī, Abū Isḥāq  52 Shīrāzī, ʿAli Riżā  144 Shīrāzī, Fatḥullāh  173, 174, 178 Shīrāzī, Jamāl al-Dīn Maḥmūd  115, 117, 119, 173 Shīrāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn  30, 36, 63, 71, 72, 141, 152, 162, 181, 250 Shirwānī, Fatḥullāh  90, 97 Shirwānī, Masʿūd  68, 96, 97, 103, 203 Shirwānī, Muḥammad Ṣādiq, see Şirvānī, Meḥmed Ṣādıḳ Shushtarī, Nūrullāh  170 Shuwayhī, Muḥammad b. Yūnus Sīdī Muḥammad III (Moroccan Sultan)  239, 256 Sihālawī, Quṭb al-Dīn  182, 191 Sihālawī, Niżām al-Dīn b. Quṭb al-Dīn  191, 193 Sijāʿī, Aḥmad  258 Sijilmāsī, see Lamaṭī, Aḥmad b. Mubārak Sijilmāsī, Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb  248 Silotti, Tommaso  267 Simʿānī, Yūsuf, see Assemani, Guiseppe Sirhindī, Aḥmad  222 Şirvānī, Meḥmed Ṣādıḳ  111, 206 Subkī, Taqī al-Dīn  71 Şücāʿuddīn İlyās  96 Sugtānī, ʿĪsā  241 Suhrawardī, Yaḥyā  27, 37, 63, 64, 152, 154, 162 Sulaymān I (Safavid Shah)  155, 158, 166 Sulṭān al-ʿUlamāʾ, Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Rafīʿ  155, 160 Ṭabaṭabāʾī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn  152 Tabrīzī, Rajab ʿAlī  146, 152, 160, 161 Ṭāhmāsp I (Safavid Shah)  105, 114, 117 Ṭahṭāwī, Rifāʿat  256 Ṭāliqānī, Muḥammad Yūsuf  161 Ṭāliqānī, Muḥsin  144

Tālishī, Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn  110 Tamerlane  80, 84, 85, 87, 91, 92 Tamīmī, Muḥammad b. Abī ʿAmr (Marinid Chamberlain)  126 Tefsīrī Meḥmed Sīvāsī  211, 216 Themistius  24 Thomas à Kempis  260 Ṭihrānī, Āghā Buzurg  144, 148, 160, 170 Ṭihrānī, Qiwām al-Dīn  160–161 Tilimsānī, ʿAbdullāh b. al-Sharīf  128 Tilimsānī, Muḥammad b. al-ʿAbbās  130 Timbuktī, Aḥmad Bābā  127, 140, 141 Toletus, Francisco  219 Tulanbī, ʿAbdullāh   173 ʿUbaydullāh Khān (Uzbek ruler)  108 Ubbadī, Aḥmad  250 Ubbī, Muḥammad  129 Ujhūrī, ʿAṭiyya  245 ʿUlaymī, Yāsīn  244, 252 Ulugh Beg (Timurid ruler)  51 ʿUqbānī, Qāsim  130 Ürgüpī, Aḥmed  234 Urmawī, Ṣafī al-Dīn  84 Ūzūn Ḥasan (Aq Qoyunlu ruler)  101 Veliyüddīn Cārullāh  60 Wazzān, ʿUmar  137 Wolff, Christian  282, 285 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī  21 Yaʿqūb b. Ūzūn Ḥasan (Aq Qoyunlu ruler)  99, 101, 104 Yāzijī, Naṣīf  291 Yenişehirlı ʿAbdullāh   216 Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar (ruler of Acre)  284 Zākhir, ʿAbdullāh  275 Zarrūq, Aḥmad  137

329

Index of Titles

ʿAndalīb al-munāẓara (Velīcānī)  215 al-Anwār al-ilāhiyya (Samarqandī)  67 al-ʿAqīda al-burhāniyya (Salālujī)  122, 127 ʿArāʾis anẓār al-abkār (Ḫādimī)  224–227 al-Asrār al-ḥaqīqiyya (Mallawī)  245–246 al-Asrār al-khafiyya (Ḥillī)  69 Asrār al-maʿqūlāt (Mallawī)  245 al-Aṭwal (Isfarāyinī)  108 al-Āyāt al-bayyināt (Rāzī)  40, 61 Asās al-iqtibās (Ṭūsī)  54–55 Atlas maior (Blaeu)  205 Atlas minor (Hondius)  205 ʿAwn ikhwān al-ṣafā (Bahāʾ al-Dīn Iṣfahānī)  166–167 ʿAyn al-ḥikma (Ṭihrānī)  161 ʿAyn al-naẓar (Samarqandī)  67 ʿAyn al-qawāʿid (Kātibī)  57 Ayyuhā l-walad (Ghazālī)  224 Baḥr al-fawāʾid (Kātibī)  57 Baḥr al-manṭiq (Qannawjī)  120, 187–188 al-Baṣāʾir al-Naṣīriyya (Sāwī)  25, 291 Bayān al-ḥaqq (Urmawī)  60, 61 Bayān al-Mukhtaṣar (Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī)  72 Burhān (Gelenbevī)  201, 229–232 Categories (Aristotle)  16, 24, 29, 146, 218, 267 Cursus philosophicus (Cattaneo)  260

Cursus philosophicus conimbricensis (Cordeiro)  283 Daqāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq (Āmidī)  43 De Interpretatione (Aristotle)  146 Ḍiyāʾ al-adhhān (Shuwayhī)  170 al-Durr al-manẓūm (Kashnāwī)  247 Durrat al-tāj (Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī)  63 Eisagōgē (Porphyry)  22, 81, 217, 218, 267 Elementi di filosofia (Galluppi)  292 Expositio lucidissima (Cottunios)  217–221 Fatḥ al-amr al-mughlaq (Ṭāşköprüzāde)  112–113 al-Fawāʾid al-khāqāniyya (Ṣadrüddīnzāde)  206–207 Fī iktisāb al-muqaddimāt (Zayn al-Dīn al-Jurjānī)  86 al-Fuṣūl (Nasafī)  67, 72 al-Fuṣūl (Ṭihrānī)  161 Fuṣūl al-badāʾiʿ (Fenārī)  91 Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (Ibn ʿArabī)  92 Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma (pseudo-Fārābī)  145 Ghāyāt al-Āyāt (Urmawī)  61 Ghāyat al-taḥqīq (Ṭāşköprüzāde)  113 al-Ghurra (Ibn al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī)  88 Ḥadāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq (Kashshī)  42

Index of Titles

Hadiyyat al-nabiyy al-mustaṭāb (Ḳara Ḫalīl)  209 Ḥall al-Tahdhīb (Amlashī)  112 Ḥall al-uṣūl (Amlashī)  110 Hidāyat al-albāb (Ibn Wāṣil)  65 Hidāyat al-ḥikma (Abharī)  50, 51, 104, 117, 174, 203, 207, 210, 216, 228 Ḥikmat al-ʿayn (Kātibī)  84, 119, 158, 207, 210 Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Suhrawardī)  63, 152, 162 Ḥikmat-i khāqāniyya (Bahāʾ al-Dīn Iṣfahānī)  166, 167 al-Īḍāḥāt al-nuṭqiyya (Muṭrān)  279–283

–  Kātī’s commentary on 52, 95, 112, 201, 279 –  Mīr Sharīf (Jurjānī?)’s commentary on 52, 86–87 –  Mōstārī’s commentary on 210 –  Ubbadī’s commentary on 250 Īsāghūjī (Biqāʿī)  133 Īsāghūjī (Tūlāwī)  260–266 Ishārāt (Avicenna)  30, 31, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 55, 60, 61, 64, 67, 70, 74, 100, 119, 124, 144, 156, 162, 163, 170, 180 ʿIsmat al-adhhān (Velīcānī)  215 Izālat al-ʿabūs (Kashnāwī)  247–248

Iḥyāʾ-i ḥikmat (ʿAlī Qulī)  146 Imitation of Christ (Thomas à Kempis)  260 Institutiones dialecticae (Lossada)  283 Institutiones logicae (Genovesi)  284 Institutiones logicae (Van Musschenbroek)  284 Institutiones philosophicae (Jacquier)  284, 285 al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād (Ghazālī)  123 al-Irshād (Juwaynī)  123 Irshād al-mutaʿallim (Jāmiʿī)  163, 164 Īsāghūjī (Abharī)  52–53, 58, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 95, 96, 112, 128, 139, 143, 170, 174, 196, 201, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 224, 228, 234, 244, 246, 250, 257, 265, 272, 279, 282, 291, 293 –  Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī’s commentary on 52, 246, 250, 257 –  Fenārī’s commentary on 52, 82, 91, 201, 206, 207, 208, 210, 224, 234, 244, 282 –  Ḳaraca Aḥmed’s commentary on 95

Jalāʾ al-anẓār (Ḳara Ḫalīl)  207–208 Jāmiʿ al-daqāʾiq (Kātibī)  56–57, 69, 105, 109, 170 al-Jawhar al-naḍīd (Ḥillī)  69–70, 106, 144–145, 153 al-Jumal (Khūnajī)  44, 44–45, 49, 64, 65, 76, 86, 121, 122, 125–126, 127, 128, 129, 135, 137, 141, 185, 237, 241, 242, 243, 251, 255



al-Kāfiya (Ibn al-Ḥājib)  108 al-Kamāl al-murtaqī (Muṭrān)  283 Kashf al-asrār (Khūnajī)  30, 36, 46–47, 48, 49, 50, 56, 57–58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 73, 76, 77, 127, 170 Kashf al-ḥaqāʾiq (Abharī)  48, 49, 50 Kashf al-khifāʾ (Ḥillī)  70 Kashf al-tamwīhāt (Āmidī)  43–44 al-Kāshif (Ibn Kammūna)  19, 63–64 al-Kharīda (Ibn al-Ḥājj)  239, 254–255 al-Kharrāra (Mullā ʿAbdullāh)  116 Khulāṣat al-afkār (Abharī)  50 Khulāṣat al-manṭiq (Bahāʾ al-Dīn Iṣfahānī)  166

331

332

Index of Titles

al-Kifāya al-manṭiqiyya (ʿAlī ʿAskar)  153 Kitāb al-ḥurūf (Fārābī)  81 Kitāb al-jadal (Assemani)  268 Kitāb al-manṭiq (Assemani)  268–275 Kitāb al-manṭiq (Tūlāwī)  266–267 Kubrā (al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī)  87, 88–90, 109, 115, 143, 174 al-Laʾālī al-manthūrāt (Mallawī)  245 al-Laʾālī al-muntaẓama (Sabzawārī)  147–148 al-Lāmiyya (Ibn Yaʿqūb)  243 Laṭāʾif al-maʿānī (Mallawī)  246 Lawāmiʿ al-asrār (Quṭb al-Dīn alRāzī)   73–74, 76, 78, 85, 90, 95, 98, 100, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 130, 143, 144, 153, 158, 158–159, 169, 170, 176, 178, 189, 199, 201, 210, 214, 226, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254 Lawāmiʿ al-naẓar (Ibn Yaʿqūb)  242–243, 248 Lawāmiʿ al-tadqīq (Ibn Saʿīd)  253 Līsān al-mīzān (Nāʾīnī)  168–169 al-Liwāʾ al-marfūʿ (Ṭāşköprüzāde)  112 Logique (Dumarsais)  292 Logique ou l’art du penser (Arnauld & Nicole)  272 Lubāb al-Ishārāt (Rāzī)  39 Lubb al-albāb (Maghīlī)  135–136 Maʿālim al-dīn (Ibn al-Shahīd al-Thānī)  158 Maʿārij al-ʿulūm (Mullā Ḥasan)  192–193 al-Mabāhij (Urmawī)  60, 61 al-Madkhal (Tūlāwī), see Īsāghūjī (Tūlāwī) Madkhal fī ʿilm al-manṭiq (Assemani)  268 Madkhal ilā l-ʿulūm (Assemani)  268 al-Manāhij (Ibn Turka)  92–94, 162 al-Manāhij (Urmawī)  61

al-Manār (Shuwayhī)  170 Manārat al-qiwā l-ʿaqliyya (Ṣabbāgh)  284 Manḥ al-wahhāb (Maghīlī)  137, 140–141, 250 Manṭiq (al-Muẓaffar)  293 al-Manṭiq al-kabīr (Rāzī)  40 Manuductio ad logicam (Du Trieu)  283 al-Maqāṣid (Taftāzānī)  250 Marāṣid al-tadqīq (Ḥillī)  69 Maṭāliʿ al-anwār (Urmawī)  35–36, 44, 60, 61–63, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 85, 90, 95, 98, 100, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 130, 143, 144, 153, 158, 158–159, 169, 170, 176, 178, 189, 199, 201, 210, 214, 217, 225, 226, 232, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254 –  Iṣfahānī’s commentary on, see Tanwīr al-Maṭāliʿ –  Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on, see Lawāmiʿ al-asrār Mathārāt al-ghalaṭ (Tilimsānī)  126 Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Newton)  285 al-Mawāqif (Ījī)  79, 87, 177 Miftāḥ bāb al-muwajjahāt (Gelenbevī)  228–229 Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm (Sakkākī)  79 Miftāḥ al-wuṣūl (Tilimsānī)  126 Miqyās al-naẓar (Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī)  106 Mirʾāt al-ʿuqūl (Shuwayhī)  170 Mirʾāt al-wuṣūl (Mollā Ḫüsrev)  210 Mīr-i Īsāghūjī (al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī?)  52, 86–87 al-Mirqāt (Khayrābādī)  195–198 Miʿyār al-ʿirfān (Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī)  106 al-Mīzān (?)  173, 174, 195 Mīzān-i tefekkür (Ṣāliḥ Zekī)  292

Index of Titles

Mīzān al-ʿuqūl (Shuwayhī)  170 Mīzān ül-ʿuḳūl (ʿAlī Sedād)  292 Muḥākamāt (Ḥillī)  70 Muḥākamāt (Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī)  74, 155–156 al-Mūjaz (Khūnajī)  45–46, 59, 60–61, 76, 126 Mukhtaṣar (Ibn ʿArafa)  127, 130, 133, 141 Mukhtaṣar (Ibn al-Ḥājib)  16, 72, 82, 86, 91, 127, 139, 148, 160, 214, 226, 235 Mukhtaṣar (Sanūsī)  121, 130, 131, 133–135, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 247, 248, 249, 251, 255, 256, 257 al-Mulakhkhaṣ (Rāzī)  19, 24, 30, 38, 39, 40, 40–41, 57, 60, 76 al-Munaḥ al-wāfiyyāt (Mallawī)  246 al-Munaṣṣaṣ (Kātibī)  57 Muntahā al-afkār (Abharī)  49, 50 al-Muʿtabar (Abū l-Barakāt)  25 al-Muṭawwal (Taftāzānī)  80 Naqḍ al-uṣūl (Ṭihrānī)  160–163 Nafāʾis al-durar (Yūsī)  238, 241, 251, 255 Nasj al-ḥulal (Zawāwī)  129–130 Nāẓir al-ʿayn (Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī)  72 Nihāyat al-amal (Ibn Marzūq)  128, 129, 141, 241 Nihāyat al-kalām (Dawānī)  103–104 Nukhbat al-fikar (Ibn Wāṣil)  65 al-Nūr al-bāhir (Āmidī)  43 Philosophia ad usum scholae accommodata (Dagoumer)  272 Poetics (Aristotle)  29 Posterior Analytics (Aristotle)  16, 29, 93, 146, 162, 218, 267 Prior Analytics (Aristotle)  146, 163

al-Qānūn (al-Yūsī)  125 al-Qawādiḥ al-jadaliyya (Abharī)  51–52 al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyya (Ḥillī)  69 al-Qawāʿid al-jaliyyāt (Ṭāşköprüzāde)  113 al-Qawl al-faṣl (Yūsī)  241–242, 251 al-Qawl al-musallam (Ibn Yaʿqūb)  243 Qistās al-afkār (Samarqandī)  66, 70, 130, 170, 182, 210 al-Qistās al-mustaqīm (Ardistānī)  144 Quaestionum philosophicarum (Maurus)  260 Quṭb al-ṣināʿa (Yāzijī)  291 Rhetoric (Aristotle)  16, 29 al-Risāla al-ʿawniyya (Ḳara Ḫalīl)  208–209 al-Risāla al-Ḥusayniyya (Adanavī)  203, 214, 233 Risālat al-imkān (Gelenbevī), see Miftāḥ bāb al-muwajjahāt  al-Ṣaḥīfa al-ʿabqariyya (Muṭrān)  275–279, 279–280, 284 Salāmat al-qulūb (Velīcānī)  215 al-Shamsiyya (Kātibī)  17, 35, 44, 57, 58–59, 61, 69, 73, 74, 76, 78, 81–82, 83–84, 85, 87, 91, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 103, 104–105, 107, 109, 110, 111, 115, 117, 121, 122, 130, 131, 133, 134, 141, 143, 144, 153, 170, 173, 174, 176–178, 185, 186, 189, 199, 200, 201, 209, 210–211, 214, 222, 226, 232, 233, 238, 240, 241, 244, 247, 248, 250, 252, 254, 255, 291, 293 –  ʿAllāmek’s commentary on 200, 210 –  Ḥillī’s commentary on 69 –  Maybudī’s commentary on 210, 104–105

333

334

Index of Titles



–  Mōstārī’s commentary on 210–211 –  Muṣannifak’s commentary on 199 –  Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on, see Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya –  Taftāzānī’s commentary on 81–82, 94, 104, 226, 241, 248, 252 al-Shaqāʾiq al-nuʿmāniyya (Ṭāşköprüzāde)  112 al-Sharīfiyya (Jurjānī?)  87, 175–176, 179–180, 182, 214 Shifāʾ (Avicenna)  22, 31, 70, 75, 100, 105, 106, 109, 145, 151, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166–167, 167, 177, 178, 189, 202, 221, 274, 283 Sophistic Elenchi (Aristotle)  29 Ṣughrā (al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī)  87–88, 174 al-Sullam al-murawnaq (Akhḍarī)  138–139, 140, 237, 239, 242, 243, 244, 245, 248, 250, 251, 253, 255, 293 Sullam al-ʿulūm (Bihārī)  143, 151, 174, 177, 183–186, 187–188, 188–191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 238, 240, 247, 257, 293 Summulae logicae (Dedelley)  281–283 Tahdkirat al-mīzān (Ilāhābādī)  187–188 Taʿdīl al-miʿyār (Ṭūsī)  48, 55 Taʿdīl al-mīzān (Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī)  105–106 Taʿdīl al-mīzān (Nāʾīnī)  144, 169 Taʿdīl al-ʿulūm (Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa)  70–71 Tafṣīl al-mujmal (Ibn Yaʿqūb)  138, 243 Tahāfut al-falāsifa (Ghazālī)  25 Tahāfut al-falāsifa (Ḫōcāzāde Būrsevī)  222 Tahdhīb al-kalām (Taftāzānī)  82, 211, 223 Tahdhīb al-manṭiq (Taftāzānī)  78, 81, 82–84, 102–103, 107–108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 123,

130, 131, 134, 143, 145, 153, 155, 164, 168, 169, 170, 174, 181, 191, 194, 195, 201, 203, 206, 209, 210, 211, 220, 223, 226, 228, 234, 239, 240, 244, 247, 248, 250, 252, 253, 257, 293 –  Dawānī’s commentary on 107, 109, 114, 115, 117, 117–118, 120, 123, 170, 181, 191, 194, 201, 203, 206, 209, 210, 211, 220, 223, 226, 228, 234, 240, 247, 248, 257 –  Ḥafīd’s commentary on 244, 253 –  ʿIṣām al-Dīn Isfarāyinī’s commentary on 109, 252, 253 –  Ḳārsī’s commentary on 202–203 –  Mullā ʿAbdullāh Yazdī’s commentary on 116, 117, 120, 143–144, 153, 164, 165, 168, 169, 195, 293 –  Khabīṣī’s commentary on 83, 134, 239, 244, 250, 252–253, 257 –  Shuwayhī’s commentary on 170 Tahdhīb al-Nukat (Abharī)  52 Taḥrīr al-naẓar (Fāsī)  251 Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya (Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī)  73, 74, 76, 78, 82, 85, 87, 91, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 103, 104–105, 107, 109, 110, 115, 117, 121, 122, 134, 141, 144, 153, 174, 176–178, 186, 189, 199, 201, 209, 210–211, 214, 222, 226, 233, 238, 240, 244, 247, 248, 250, 252, 254, 291, 293 Taḥṣīl (Bahmanyār)  31, 106 Tajrīd fawāʾid Arāʾis al-anẓār (Ḫādimī)  227 Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād (Ṭūsī)  71, 79, 99, 102, 119, 151, 156, 158, 210 Tajrīd al-manṭiq (Ṭūsī)  55, 69, 76, 106, 107, 108, 145, 153, 162 al-Takmīl (Muṭrān)  283

Index of Titles

Takmīl al-manṭiq (Amlashī)  110–111, 112, 199, 206 Taʿlīq al-qiyās (Zayn al-Dīn al-Jurjānī)  86 Talkhīṣ al-ḥaqāʾiq (Abharī)  50 Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ (Qazwīnī)  16, 79, 80, 108, 250 al-Talwīḥāt (Suhrawardī)  63, 64 Tamhīd al-qawāʿid (Ibn Turka)  92 al-Tanqīḥ (Mullā Ṣadrā)  19, 153–155 Tanqīḥ al-abḥāth (Ibn Kammūna)  63 Tanwīr al-mashriq (Dumarsais)  292 Tanwīr al-Maṭāliʿ (Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī)  72 Tanwīr al-Maṭāliʿ (Dawānī)  103 Tanzīl al-afkār (Abharī)  48, 49, 50, 55 Taqrīr al-qawānīn (Sāçaḳlızāde)  212–215, 226, 234, 257 al-Tarīqa al-muḥammadiyya (Birgevī)  224 Tashrīq al-ḥaqq (Mīr Dāmād)  148 Tawāliʿ al-anwār (Bayḍāwī)  16, 71, 72, 79, 226

Topics (Aristotle)  16, 29, 66 Theology of Aristotle  145 Triennium philosophicum (Briccialdi)  267 Triennium philosophicum (Semery)  260 Tuḥfat al-mubtadiʾ (Jāmiʿī)  164 Tuḥfat al-mushtāq (Mallawī)  246 al-Ufuq al-mubīn (Mīr Damād)  19, 149–151, 152, 155, 174, 195 ʿUyūn al-ḥikma (Avicenna)  39, 170 al-Wajīz (Jāmiʿī)  163 al-Waladiyya (al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī), see Kubrā al-Waladiyya (Sāçaḳlızāde)  215, 257 al-Waẓāʾif (Muʿizzī?)  139–140 Zubdat al-asrār (Abharī)  51 Zubdat al-munāẓara (Velīcānī)  215

335

Das Signet des Schwabe Verlags ist die Druckermarke der 1488 in Basel gegründeten Offizin Petri, des Ursprungs des heutigen Verlagshauses. Das Signet verweist auf die Anfänge des Buchdrucks und stammt aus dem Umkreis von Hans Holbein. Es illustriert die Bibelstelle Jeremia 23,29: «Ist mein Wort nicht wie Feuer, spricht der Herr, und wie ein Hammer, der Felsen zerschmeisst?»

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARABIC LOGIC (1200–1800 )

Recent years have seen a dramatic change in scholarly views of the later career of Arabic and Islamic philosophy. For much of the twentieth century, researchers tended to dismiss the value of Arabic writings on philosophy and logic after the twelfth century, often on the basis of the prejudice that handbooks, commentaries and glosses are of necessity pedantic and unoriginal. This assumption has now been abandoned. As a consequence, a vast amount of later Arabic writings on philosophy and logic, hitherto neglected, are now being studied and edited. The present work is an attempt at giving an overview of the development of Arabic logic from 1200 to 1800, identifying major themes, figures and works in this period, while taking into account regional differences within the Islamic world. It offers a corrective to Nicholas Rescher’s seminal but now outdated The Development of Arabic Logic, published in 1964. Author Khaled El-Rouayheb is James Richard Jewett Professor of Arabic and of Islamic Intellectual History at Harvard University. His publications are including the monographs Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900 –1900 ( 2005 ) and Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century ( 2015 ). He is co-editor ( with Sabine Schmidtke ) of The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy ( 2016 ).

ARABIC LOGIC (1200–1800)

Julia Jorati /Dominik Perler /Stephan Schmid (eds.)

Khaled El-Rouayheb

Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy

Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy 2

Khaled El-Rouayheb

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARABIC LOGIC (1200–1800)

2 MEMP

www.schwabeverlag.ch

I S B N 978-3-7965-3909-1

9

783796 539091

RZ Schwabe_MEMP_2_Druck_20190305.indd 1

05.03.19 15:03