The Democratic-Republicans of Massachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674281905, 9780674281899

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THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS OF

MASSACHUSETTS

A Publication of the Center for the Study of the History of Liberty in America • HARVARD UNIVERSITY

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS OF

POLITICS

MASSACHUSETTS

IN

A

BY

YOUNG

PAUL

REPUBLIC

GOODMAN

1964 HARVARD

UNIVERSITY

CAMBRIDGE,

PRESS

MASSACHUSETTS

© Copyright 1964 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 6 4 - 2 2 7 2 1 Printed in the United States of America

The Center fot the Study of the History of Liberty in America is aided by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

TO

MY

MOTHER

AND

FATHER

FOREWORD

Political parties play an important role in American democracy. They are part of the mechanism of selection and consent, which links the people to their government. By presenting the voter with the possibihty of choice they give meaning and depth to the whole electoral process. Furthermore they are significant factors in the estabhshment of decisions and the formulation of policy. It is therefore almost unthinkable that they should not ahvays have existed in their present two-party form, and not always have embodied the same configuration of social forces. Indeed, some historians have attempted to trace direct lines of continuity back from the Democratic party of Lyndon B. Johnson to that of Andrew Jackson and Tliomas Jcfferson and thence to the anticonstitutionalists of 1788 and the radical Whigs of 1776. By the same token they have found a connection between the Republican party of Dwight Eisenhower and Abraham Lincoln, the Whigs of Webster and Clay, the Hamiltonian Federalists, and the Revolutionary moderates. Yet, whatever their validity for later periods, these interpretations run counter to the evidence at the point of origin. Political parties, in their nineteenth and twentieth ccntury forms, did not älways exist; they came into being. T h e framers of the federal and State constitutions did not anticipate that such agencies would appear and made no Provision for them. T h e successive parties sprang up, developed, and changed not as elaborations of tendencies always present, but in response to specific historical circmiistanccs. vii

FOREWORD

Hence the importance of the forty critical years after independence, when the first political Organization of the Repubhc took form. The developments of the period have not yet been explained; yet they contain important clues to an understanding of the history of American pohtics. The interpretation of that period must begin with an examination of local sources. The United States was an aggregation of states as well as a nation; and parties were as much, or more, State or local in character as federal. Therein lies the value of such intensive studies as Dr. Goodman has here given us. Massachusetts was an important State, not only in size, wealth, and population, but in its Position in the Union. Within it were waged significant contests for political supremacy, some of which took a meaningful party form and established a pattern for later action. Its experience, while not identical with that of other states, illuminates the whole process of party development. Oscar Handlin

viu

PREFACE

A l t h o u g h political parties have c o m e to play a vital role in the conduct of American democracy, providing an orderly means of managing public affairs and offering the citizenry alternative programs and leadership sensitive to t h e varied interests of a diverse electorate, they are not as c i d as the Republic. T h e revolutionary generation did not inherit these formalized institutions for decision-making, nor did they create t h e m overnight upon gaining independence. R a t h e r they evolved slowly and hesitatingly from experiences in t h e y o u n g R e p u b l i c w h i c h led Americans to seek new modes of governance better suited to the needs of postrevolutionary society than those with w h i c h they were familiar. Historians have n o t always thought so. O v e r half a Century ago, Charles A . Beard propounded an influential interpretation of American history which located the origins of political parties in continuing conflicts between the poor and the rieh, farmers and merchants, debtors and creditors, owners of real wealth and paper wealth. T h e sources of these rivalries, he argued, w e n t back into the colonial past, accounted for divisions in the revolutionary era, persisted into t h e national period, and formed the binding thread that ran all through the fabric of A m e r i c a n experience. T h e Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties that emerged in the 1790's were thus n o t new formations b u t essentially the "conservative" and "radical" elements in American society that had split over independence and then continued to struggle for control of the new State and ix

PREFACE

national authorities. The conservatives, comprising the wealthy, aristocratic Clements, united to resist the humbler citizenry, who saw the Revolution as an opportunity to realize ambitions long thwarted during generations of British rule. Not always able to resist democratic pressures during the Revolution that weakened their grip on local government, conservatives favored creation of a pow^erful central government to protect the interests of birth and wealth. Whilc the Confcderation disappointed their expectations, it did not dampen their nationalism. For over a decade they labored tirelessly to strengthen national authority and curb State power. Success finally came in 1789. The adoption of the Constitution, Bcard argued, was a triumph for conservative personalty interests over the radical, agrarian groups that had opposed ratification as a threat to democratic rule. The victory of the proconstitutionalists made control of the new national government a central political issue during the next decade as those who had fought ratification became Republicans and their opponents Federalists. For a decade Federalists prevailed, governing in the interests of merchants and security holders, bankers and manufacturers, and those hostile to the claims of the democratic yeomanry. After a decade of Federalist rule, an aggrieved husbandry, organized within the Republican party and skillfully marshaled by Jefferson and Madison, recaptured the Republic from the "paper aristocracy." The "Revolution of 1800" transferred power from one social group to another, for the triumph of Jeffersonian Democracy, Beard explained in Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, "meant the possession of the federal government by the agrarian masses led by an aristocracy of slaveowning planters, and the theoretical repudiation of the right to use the Government for the benefit of any capitalistic groups, fiscal, banking, or manufacturing."

PREFACE

T h e present study challenges the validity of Beard's thesis for Massachusetts and questions the assumptions upon which it rests. T h e social sources of party were far more complex and less homogeneous than Beard suggested. Bay State Repubhcans did not seek to oust capitalist classes in favor of agrarian masses but rather united a diverse coalition of urban and rural folk, merchants and farmers, artisans and professional, speculators and squatters, deists and Calvinists. These groups made common cause against entrenched interests, usually Federahsts, who thwarted the desires of newcomers and Outsiders, rising merchants and ambitious office seekers, rehgious dissenters and landless yeomen eager to share access to authority and to broaden social opportunities. Moreover, the evolution of Massachusetts Republicanism was neither the outgrowth of earlier conflicts in colony and Commonwealth, nor part of a fixed partisan alignment that Beard thought punctuated the entire course of American history. Y e t while the parties were genuine innovations of the 1790's, responsive to the pressures and tensions of that decade, they were not full-scale models of the modern party system. Although they did look forward to the political institutions of a later age, they still retained links with experiences in the colonial past. By focusing primarily on national politics and on the great events and personalities at the center of the Union, and by assuming fixed continuities in political history, historians have often read the present into the past. T h e first parties were loose and unstable collections of local forces. Innovative and unique, they lacked deep roots in tradition and experienced great difEculty overcoming the parochialism and fluidity of American Society, which retarded the permanent polarization of the electorate into stable, competitive groupings. Differing from earlier and later political xi

PREFACE

formations, the precise nature of the first parties was shaped by the postrevolutionary society in which they evoked. I am deeply grateful to Oscar Handlin, whose tireless patience, continuing encouragement, and extraordinary example are a constant source of Inspiration; and to Bernard Bailyn, whose penetrating and original studies of early American history freshly illuminate the colonial antecedents of the national period. I also wish to thank Mr. Leo Flaherty of the Massachusetts Archives for services beyond the call of duty. Finally, I am grateful for the assistance of Houghton Library of Harvard University, the Library of Congress, the Essex Institute, the Peabody Museum of Salem, the American Antiquarian Society, the Maine Historical Society, and the Massachusetts Historical Society. Manuscript collections in the Boston Public Library have been used by courtesy of the trustees of the Boston Public Library. P. G.

XU

CONTENTS

I

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

II

THE

POLITICS

OF

ADJUSTMENT

III

THE

BEGINNINGS

IV

THE

REPUBLICAN

V

THE

URBAN

VI

THE

PROCESSES

VII VIII

47

INTEREST

70

POLITICS

ASCENDANCY

MASSACHUSETTS THE

OF

31

PARTY

INTEREST

REPUBLICAN

AND

OF

1

97 128 154

REPUBLICANS

UNION

182

NOTES

209

BIBLIOGRAPHY

255

INDEX

275

xni

THE POLITICS OF

INDEPENDENCE

The revolutionary generation confronted new and difficult challenges as it left an empire and founded a republic. For a decade and a half Americans grappled with a series of threats to the success of the experiment. The end of roval rule together with the necessity for unitmg a dozen provincial sovereignties forced patriots to devise new modes of governance at the same time that the dislocations of war and the return of peace disturbed the social order. Although they faced fresh and unprecedented difficulties, Americans responded to them in familiar ways. The style and mode of politics inherited from colonial times lingered on after independence, even though they often proved inadequate in the face of altered circumstances and novel experiences. Like Citizens elsewhere, the people of Massachusetts underwent demanding tests of their capacity for self-government. It was necessary to devise new frameworks of government as well as to select leaders and adopt policies that reconciled competing claims and assimilated particular interests to the common welfare. After several years of modest success, the Bay State experiment faltered, threatened by civil war and national weakness. Yet despite serious differences among themselves, Americans found paths of accommodation that left the young Commonwealth unscarred by permanent marks of conflict or by fixed, competitive, organized political rivalries. A Commonwealth in Transition. The Massachusetts social order evolved in an area which embraced a variety of

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

regions and economies. The rolling uplands of the interior and the coastal lowlands fronting the ocean shaped the Bay State's productive systems. Exploiting the great natural resources of the oceans, the inhabitants of the port towns of Essex, Plymouth, Suffolk and Bristol counties, Cape Cod, and the Islands of Dukes and Nantucket counties imported and exported, fished and went whaling, built vessels and serviced them. Nearby numerous farmers fed the sailors, artisans, laborers, merchants, and shopkeepers who lived at the sea's edge. Westward lay Middlesex and Worcester counties, settled largely by yeomen raising wheat, rye, and hogs. The upland continues westward into Hampshire county until it reaches the fertile Connecticut River Valley, which gives way all too soon to the hüls of Berkshire County at the western end of the State. Though this region developed late, it rapidly outpaced the rest of the State in the latter half of the eighteenth Century. By 1790 the period of basic settlement was over and in the next two decades the fastest growth rate occurred neither in the inland nor in the old coastal towns but in New England's eastern frontier, the District of Maine. Linked to Massachusetts until 1820, Maine had a larger area and was blessed with an enormous coastline, many harbors, rieh timber resources, and hundreds of mill sites. Despite differences of environment, length of settlement, and productive systems, men shared a belief in a harmony of interests. Farmers, merchants, and artisans needed each other, for what benefited one group ultimately benefited all; and the Commonwealth was expected actively to promote and protect the aspirations of all. These ideals received their greatest test in the years of revolution and postwar adjustment. Unity amid diversity, change despite stability, colored life in revolutionary Massachusetts, The State included a

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

variety of groups that were experiencing differing degrees of dislocation which undermined older sources of authority and created new problems born of independence. Though change required adaptation and the reintegration of so ciety, many traditional forms survived, providing both stability and links with the past. This counterpoint of the new and the old necessitated modifications of traditional arrangements without sharply breaking with the past. Both political and economic developments illustrated the duality of revolutionary experience. While the war seriously strained the commitment to a concord of interests, its dynamics rapidly altered people's fortunes and shifted and blurred men's positions, easing and softening tensions.^ Independence disordered eastern Society, not only disrupting older trade patterns and forcing many well-placed Tory merchants to migrate, but also creating new profits for those able to adjust to altered circumstance. Shrewd, lucky, far-seeing, and flexible men with political connections gained riches while older houses often abandoned commerce. Those who before the war had been the "meaner people" became "by a stränge revolution . . . almost the only men of power, riches, and influence."^ Changes were complex even among the successful. Rising prices and rapid fluctuations created substantial creditor interests among traders and security holders, who came to favor the stabilization of values. But inflation also benefited ordinary yeomen, whose debts were reduced, and even more the prosperous market farmers, who reaped the rewards of high prices. But town artisans, fisherfolk, professional, and creditors were hurt, as suggested by their demands for price fixing.® Though strains developed among rival interests, Americans, united by common ideals and a shared predicament, managed to adjust or suspend conflict without permanently disrupting the Community. So great was its inner stability

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DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

that Massachusetts delayed a constitutional settlement until the war was almost over. T h e State Constitution of 1780 was neither a conservative, hberal, nor class document but rather represented a Community consensus, estabhshing a reasonable framework within which groups might advance their welfare. T h e product of trial, error, and compromise, it embodied past experience and future fears, expressing deep-seated notions about the needs of society and the rights of man. Framed by a specially chosen Convention, the Constitution built on colonial custom and revolutionary theory. Though "the consent of the people" was "the only moral foundation of government," a property quahfication was designed primarily to exclude dependent poor, through whom a wealthy few might dominate and corrupt the state.^ T h e requirement that voters have an annual income of three pounds or an estate worth sixty pounds did not radically alter the colonial franchise. Because "the inequality between estates . . . is so inconsiderable, and the tax necessary to qualify . . . is so moderate," public policy was expected to enjoy the sanction of a majority.® In practice the franchise was cheaply valued; dozens of towns repeatedly failed to send repräsentatives and many qualified voters rarely exercised their rights, so attentive were they "to their private interest."® T h e system of representation also owed much to earlier custom. T h e towns remained the basic unit, but a formula apportioned legislators in the General Court according to population, hoping thereby to prevent domination of the small towns by the large ones and still ensure that representation followed population.^ While the franchise and composition of the General Court gave public authority a broad base, human nature made it essential to erect safeguards against the abuse of

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

power. A strong executive with a veto served all the people and checked the legislature; otherwise, the factious scheming of "men of wealth, of ambitious spirits, of intrigue, of luxury and corruption" would deprive govemment of "any stability, dignity, decision, or liberty."® T o prevent either legislators or the executive from transforming the appointive power into a patronage machine, plural ofEceholding was carefully limited and the source of jobs was divided between the two branches.® Finally, an elaborate declaration of rights denied the govemment power to deprive men of cherished personal liberties. From March to June 1780 the towns debated ratification. Though the results were often confused and conflicting, the new fundamental law seemed the best men could contrive and there was little serious objection to the juggling of the returns.'" John Adams, the constitution's principal architect, had tried to frame a system comprehending "all Orders of men," hoping they would "put confidence in it, and struggle for its support."" The next few years tested the durability of his handiwork. The PoUtics of Faction. Neither the winning of independence nor the adoption of the new Constitution radically altered the procedures by which Massachusetts managed public affairs. Yet the transition from colony to State did pose fresh problems. While the towns continued to send representatives to the General Court, as they had done for generations, it was necessary to fill the many offices left vacant by fleeing or retiring Tories and the new ones created by the exigencies of the war. And in 1780 for the first time the State had to choose a chief executive. In addition to the task of selecting officials, the Commonwealth had to formulate policies to govem the conduct of the war and to facilitate a difficult transition to a peacetime society.

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

Colonial experience strongly influenced politics during the first decade of independence. The rivalry of factions provided a familiar model. Factions were groups of individuals who temporarily joined forces to pursue immediate, personal advantage. Lacking permanent Organization, their membership constantly shifting, and without an ideology er broad base of support within the electorate, factions did not seek power to shape the major contours of public policy or to represent the community's varied interests. Narrow, self-serving formations, they flourished where the participating electorate was small and apathetic, where social groups were not cohesive, organized, and active political forces, and where the sources of authority were confused and insecure. Such circumstances offered rieh opportunities for political manipulation by loose alliances of ambitious persons, their families, friends, and "connections." Royal governors had found that alliances with important local men were indispensable for successful tenure of office. Yet they also discovered that factions were inherently unstable. Their members regularly quarreled with one another Over division of the spoils, and the success of one usually generated the emergence of r i v a l groups able to stir up trouble if their claims went unrecognized." The politics of faction was further complicated when economic, social, occupational, and religious groups became politically active. Like factions, these groups lacked permanent Organization, but they formed a more stable interest, enjoying extensive support among persons confronting similar problems and sharing common aspirations. For them politics was a means of influencing govemment to promote group welfare. Usually content to remain passive observers of factious rivalries, interest groups became politically alive only when stirred by special circumstances which threatened their well-being or when they perceived

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

new modes of furthering their ambitions. Tlius dissenters from the religious establishment, newly settled communities exposed to frontier dangers, and persons anxious to increase the supply of currency and credit attempted from time to time to make authority sensitive to their specific needs. These efforts tended to be temporary and specific rather than a continuing involvement in pohtical affairs because interest groups were also unstable. Their membership constantly shifted and their goals often changed or were reahzed without recourse to politics. W h e n interest pohtics flared up, entrenched factions found it difficult to contain demands for pohcy changes. Some capitahzed on populär discontent, providing it with needed professional leadership and at the same time using it to advance their own fortunes. But usually pressures on authority subsided, the voters' customary apathy returned, and politics once more became primarily a contest between small groups of competing individuals and their "connections." Though the struggle with England during the decade preceding the Revolution led to the most extensive and important Organization of interest groups in American experience, the patriot forces, once in control of the new State govemments, became highly factious. After the collapse of royal authority in Massachusetts and the departure of the royal govemor, power devolved upon the legislature and ultimately upon the local worthies in the towns. Slowness in replacing the old charter left the formal structure of politics unsettled for six years, while the shakeup in ofEcialdom opened opportunities for newcomers and was another source of instability. Once in sole control of appointments, the General Court quickly descended to the "mean business of auctioneering" by dividing "among themselves almost every post either in the civil or military

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

way that has any profit or honour annex'd to i t . " " Persons obtained office, according to Elbridge Gerry, "who might have lived tili the millenium in silent obscurity, had they depended on their mental qualifications to bring them into public view."" When the war was over James Bowdoin noted that one could "scarcely see any other than new faces," a change almost "as remarkable as the revolution itself.'"® Dynamic economic conditions added further uncertainty to the political scene as belief in the harmony of interests, rapid fluctuations in fortunes, and the newness of many problems forestalled an early and rigid conflict of interests. When the Commonwealth chose its first governor in 1780, John Adams was satisfied that the competition for ofEce posed no threat, although he was aware that rival factions would contest the prize. " W e cannot have a bad Governor at present," Adams wrote. " W e may not possibly have the best that might be found, but we shall have a good one."'® In 1776 John Hancock was one of a düster of prominent revolutionary leaders. In 1780 he became the first governor of the Bay State, garnering overwhelming majorities at the polls, and winning repeated re-election later on. A master of factional politics, he achieved pre-eminence by isolating rivals, cultivating allies, carefully nurturing personal popularity, and avoiding difficult decisions. Early in the war Hancock had quarreled with his fellow delegates in the Continental Congress, notably with Samuel Adams, who thwarted his national ambitions. Shifting his attention back home, Hancock sought to discredit Adams and replaced Adams' friend in the General Court, James Warren, as Speaker of the house.^'^ Hancock also busily cultivated loyal associates, among them Thomas

8

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

Cushing, an influential Boston merchant and former member of Congress, who became justice of the common pleas, probate judge of Suffolk County, and lieutenant governor. Cushing's son-in-law, John Avery, replaced Sam Adams as secretary of State.'® William Cooper, Boston town clerk and Suffolk probate register, and bis brother Samuel Cooper, the patriot minister, ended their ties with Adams and joined Robert T . Paine, attorney general, and James Sullivan, an inveterate newspaper polemicist, who were among the governor's dose allies.'® In a Community where the franchise was liberally bestowed Hancock was a master of the art of popularity. A punctilious provincial aristocrat glorying in pomp, pageantry, and high-born manners, he shrewdly added the common touch, providing firewood for the poor in winter and music on the Common in summer. As a legislator he made sure that Congress had two warships built at Boston, using as many men as possible, and as an employer he gave jobs to the North End artisans who built Hancock's Row.^° Once in ofEce, the governor had considerable patronage. In his first year, he tripled the number of justices of the peace in Suffolk County, almost quadrupled those in Essex, and doubled those in Worcester.'" Yet Hancock's influence had limits. Sam Adams remained in the State Senate and most of the leading county ofEcials were carry-overs from the previous decade. Because political rivalry was weak and Organization rudimentary, patronage was used less to erect a great machine than to keep entrenched groups contented. Hancock's strengest competition came from James Bowdoin, who annually challenged him at the polls. But Bowdoin failed to attract much support, even in the eastcrn coastal communities. Attacked for alleged Tory connections, Bowdoin, like Warren and Sam Adams, feit the Sharp lash of the Hancock faction. T o many of the

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

the governor's rise signified the emergence of "a new crew" that had won power by "forming a Coalition of Parties and confounding the Distinction between Whigs and Tories, Virtue & Vice."''^ The Hancock circle prospered so long as the electorate was apathetic, group interest was fluid, and the Commonwealth failed to grapple with difEcult and mounting issues. Toward the middle of the 1780's, however, serious disturbances in the economy plus an oppressive bürden of debt sharply defined and polarized interest groups. Unable to postpone any longer and unwilling to make necessary and unpopulär choices, Hancock resigned early in 1785. The politics of faction gave way to the politics of interest. older Patriot leaders,

The Politics of Interest. The peace of 1783 confirmed independence, but it also confronted Americans with serious Problems of readjustment. As wartime markets shrank and new ones opened slowly, prices feil, debts increased, and merchants, farmers, and artisans experienced increasing difficulties. The war had left Massachusetts with a large public debt. Unwilling to levy sufücient taxes, the State had borrowed and issued paper money, which it made legal tender. Though the currency depreciated and the debt rose, the State contributed its share to the war effort. But in the early 1780's the Commonwealth sought to reform its finances by abolishing legal tender, scaling down the public debt, and adopting a schedule to pay interest and principal in specie taxes. Fearful of pressing Citizens too hard, the legislature postponed the new fiscal policies, suspending taxes pledged to the debt in 1782 and 1784 and delaying payment of the principal until after 1785.^ Private debts also mounted steeply. WTiile farmers lost wartime markets, merchants were deprived of the profits 10

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

of privateering and government contracting, and artisans languished for want of employment. People rushed to import large quantities of British "baubles" and "gewgaws." B u t Americans found that old markets did not return and that pre-revolutionary Channels did not always reopen. Britain had dominated the colonial trade and was a major market for tobacco, timber, provisions, rum, fish, whale oil, and vessels as well as a source of sugar, tea, and manufactures. C u t loose from the Empire, traders found themselves subject to a mercantile system which barred their ships from the W e s t Indies and placed heavy duties on exports to Britain. Mechanics and artisans had even less margin with which to endure hard times. Restrictions on American shipping meant unemployment for those who built new vessels and serviced old ones, while the flood of British imports robbed many craftsmen of customers who preferred well-styled and cheap British products.^^ T h e crisis deepened late in 1785, causing many failures and penetrating deeply into the economy, and affecting "a great party of those who are engaged in Trade."^® Urban groups began to seek political solutions and demanded restrictive legislation that would shelter them from competition and force the reopening of English markets.^® Critical of navigation legislation were yeomen, who liked cheap British goods and cared little whose vessels carried native exports.^^ Merchants themselves were divided, for some whose main profits came from exports were unwilling to take risks in defense of the carrying trade by excluding British vessels. Some of those best able to weather the storm believed that hard times would eliminate the weaker houses, curb excessive expansion, and eventually restore trade to a more solid footing. " M a n y who retail tape & pins," Christopher Gore wrote, "must, as they ought to have done years ago, retire to labor."^® Moreover, the artisans'

11

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

desire to limit consumption of British goods antagonized importers, who argued that the seaports "never were designed as the nurseries of arts and mechanics."^® But the demand for heavy imposts also appealed to pubhc creditors, who regarded the duties as an obvious source of funds to Support the State debt. Again merchants were in a dilemma, for while "their commercial interest would suffer by the proposed taxes . . . their creditor interests demanded" new revenues.®" Though the attitudes of urban groups were complex, a consensus favored positive State action. Their aspirations found expression in the election of 1785, which sent James Bowdoin to the State House. The campaign was the first closely contested race for the governorship under the Constitution. Hancock failed to transfer his popularity to his personal choice, Lieutenant Governor Cushing, and Bowdoin won a plurality. The populär vote was small and indecisive and apathy was great, for interest groups were not generally aligned into state-wide parties. Bowdoin ran as well or better than Cushing in the rural towns but won decisively in the eastern maritime communities, notably Boston, where voters responded to appeals to abandon "that spirit of party, which has too long convulsed this metropolis."®^ Once in office, the new chief executive enjoyed wide Support. A few months after the campaign, young John Quincy Adams reported that "everything has subsided, and the present Governor is very populär."®^ Hancock joined the Boston delegation in the legislature and with the other solid merchants supported the measures of the new administration.®® Bowdoin did not significantly alter ofEcialdom, and in 1786 won re-election without Opposition. From the outset the new governor exerted vigorous leadership and steered the State along a new course. Heavy 12

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

duties were placed on foreign imports, some of which were banned outright.®'' And a navigation act barred the export of American goods in British vessels and required foreign shipping to pay impost duties double those placed on Americans.^® A mission to France explored the possibilities of expanding economic ties, perhaps eventually to effect "a great revolution in trade" that would cxclude Britain entirely.®® W h i l e none of these measures was a magic Solution, they gave urban groups hope of relief. But the governor's most difHcult problem was still how to finance the Consolidated State debt. Increased revenues from new taxes covered interest payments but were insufficient to fund the fast-maturing principal, which feil due in 1785.^' Land taxes were already heavy, for the legislature had voted £ 1 4 0 , 0 0 0 in 1784 to redeem the army notes, while even larger amounts of back taxes were uncollected.^® Anxious not to place additional burdens on the land, the State omitted direct levies in 1785. Meanwhile Bowdoin prepared new recommendations. Intent on paying the debt, he believed that the Commonwealth could either follow the original plan of the early 1780's, to tax heavily and extinguish the debt in four years, or it could amortize its obligations over fifteen years with an annual assessment of £ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , an alternative he thought less onerous.®® Few politicians, however, appreciated the practical limits of taxation. Imposts and excises were continued for three years, delinquent towns were pressed to pay back taxes, and in March 1786 a new direct levy of £ 1 0 0 , 4 3 9 was voted, almost half going for the congressional requisition, a third for redeeming the balance of the army notes, and the rest for running the government.^" Though the new funds were insufEcient to finance the debt's principal, they overburdened the state's resources, forcing the General Court to suspend levies pledged to the debt until April 1787 and to 15

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

postpone plans for amortization. But it was too late, for less than a month after the legislature adjourned in the Summer of 1786 bands of farmers closed the courts at Northampton. Rebellion in a Commonwealth. Agrarian discontent had been building over the years.^^ Like urban groups, husbandmen experienced difficulty in adjusting to a peacetime Society where they no longer enjoyed wartime markets, inflation, legal tender, and closed courts. At the same time that farmers' ability to weather troubled times declined, the pressure of public and private debt steadily mounted. Husbandmen joined in the consumption of foreign Imports, while their lands and polls, as always, were expected to bear the major share of taxation. As long as towns evaded taxes, yeomen lived off British credit, the State postponed funding the debt, and the crisis was delayed. But as public and private creditors pressed their claims in the middle 1780's, the weaker yeomen faced ruin, imprisonment, and the loss of their property. With no relief in sight, unwilling to remain passive, some took arms, closed the courts, and defied government. Shays' Rebellion meant the dissolution of the social compact, the breakdown of constitutional processes, and the appearance of extralegal bodies only six years after adoption of a new fundamental law raised doubts about the practicality of republicanism. Men wondered why a State in which most folk were farmers and most farmers could vote was torn by civil war."*^ The alienation of substantial elements, convinced that the polity was unresponsive to their welfare, occurred partly because farmers had failed to participate directly in government. For generations they were content to delegate authority to others whose wealth, family connections, and professional posi14

THE

POLITICS

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INDEPENDENCE

tions made them the dominant leaders in their communities. Relatively few Citizens bothered to vote, and towns often neglected to send representatives as husbandmen left the business of governing to others. When agriculturalists had demanded relief in the middle 1780's, only 19 of 1 1 8 legislators had voted for paper money and only 35 of 124 had favored making real and personal property tender for debts.^® By closing the courts, setting up county Conventions, and attacking the bar, the Shaysites ended passive acquiescence in indirect governance. The challenge to republican Order fused ruling elements, causing factions to dose ranks. Rival leaders in Berkshire County, who had been bitterly divided in the late 1770's, now united against the rebels.^ Hancock opposed paper money, Sullivan defended the legal system, and Sam Adams demanded harsh repression of the insurgents.'*® Despite real hardships and the silent sympathy of many who stayed at home, the yeomen melted before armed authority. Suppression did not exorcise the sources of conflict, but it did give men a second chance to restore a harmony of interest and faith in the ideals of Commonwealth. The test came in the spring elections of 1787. Despite disenfranchisement of the rebels, the number of voters more than doubled, a hundred additional representatives went to the General Court from towns usually negligent, and other towns turned out incumbents.^® The main contest was between Bowdoin and Hancock. Teaming up again with Thomas Cushing, Hancock emerged as one unidentified with unpopulär measures and the man best able to obliterate the distinctions "too long inculcated between the yeomanry and the inhabitants of the sea-ports."^^ The former governor won in a landslide, polling three quarters of the vote and carrying every county. While he swept the

15

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inland towns, the vote was closer in the ports, but here, too, Urban elements opted for "the flexible safe and accommodating temper of an Atticus" rather than "the firm steady undeviating mind of a Cato."^® Governor Hancock promptly set about to restore "the government to its needed tranquihty."^® Carrying further the rehef measure begun under Bowdoin, the State restored habeas corpus, pardoned rebels, continued legal tender laws, and granted relief to imprisoned debtors.®" Payment of the public debt was postponed, direct taxes were deferred one year, and excises were lowered.®^ But the legislature also decisively refused to issue paper money or scale down the public debt. Commonwealth and Confederation. However special its Problems, Massachusetts was one of thirteen states which had formed the Confederation to pursue common objectives.®^ From the very beginning the nature of this new Union had troubled Americans and for over a decade they sought to mold a system responsive to rival interests, yet capable of acting effectively and justly. As the problems of peacetime mounted, men found the Confederation compromise unsatisfactory and they sought to redefine both the form and meaning of "union." In its response to the issues of centralization, the Bay State was flexible and openminded, interest groups were complex and their views shifted. Ultimately conflict was adjusted within a new framework of national authority. T h e defects of the Confederation appeared early and evoked various remedies. Massachusetts sympathized with Congress' desire for reliable revenues and understood the advantages of Continental commercial regulations, but concrete efforts to amend and improve the Articles lacked a consensus. Apathy and divisions among groups together 16

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with widespread fear of redistributing power doomed tlie possibility of solutions within the existing structure. Several times in the early 1780's the Commonwealth considered congressional requests for a Continental impost. At first the State thought that the levies would fall unequally, bearing heavily on the large importing communities, but it later approved a 5 per cent duty to run for twenty-five years.^^ T h e vote was dose and groups were sharply split; some rural elements, hoping to shift tax burdens, realized that a Continental impost would pre-empt revenues from trade. Easterners also were disunited. Pubhc creditors favored the imposts because receipts were allocated to the Continental debt, but Elbridge Gerry and the congressional delegation opposed voting funds until Congress redressed the claims of particular Bay State creditors who had suffered from inflation.®^ Despite these differences, the impost won the Support of a legislative majority.®® Even before the economic crisis in the middle of the decade, Massachusetts granted Congress power to regulate trade for fifteen years.®® But other states demurred and the Commonwealth enacted its own navigation act, suspending it after a year as ineffective " f o r want of Cooperation of our sister states."" Y e t many realized that as long as the Confederation was weak and divided. European powers would not grant favorable commercial concessions and American trade would languish.®® In the Summer of 1785, the General Court called for a Convention to revise the Articles, but again the State was split.®® Its delegation in Congress argued that general amendments would be premature until "the States . . , have a more clear & comprehensive view of their commercial interests."®" W h e n a commercial parley did convene at Annapolis in September 1786, Massachusetts was unrepresented. T h e legislature had appointed delegates but

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merchants were reluctant to serve, some doubtful of success, others convinced that relief measures must come from Congress.®^ Though there was widespread recognition of the need to strengthen the Confederation, concrete efforts repeatedly foundered because men feared increasing power at the center of the Union. Gerry warned in 1785 that a wholesale, hasty revision of the Articles might invest Congress with "too füll & unguarded a delegation of powers," thereby aiding "the friends of an Aristocracy."®^ Stephen Higginson was suspicious of the Annapolis gathering, characterizing Hamilton, Madison, and Morris as "great Aristocrats" who neither knew nor cared much about trade.®® T h e example of Robert Morris, Superintendent of finance, who was engaged in a complex web of economic and political activities, aroused suspicion that a powerful individual could amass influence, fleece the government, advance the interests of his own faction, and become "the King or Grand Monarch of America."®^ Mounting economic difficulties and internal rebellion, however, increased the pressure to infuse new energy into the Union, but it became apparent that the Articles could not simply be patched up. Congress was never intended to become a strong center of authority. Neither economic groups nor the separate commonwealths feit it was responsive to their interests and all were fearful of faction and the misuse of additional powers. M e n opposed to piecemeal amendments would grant far greater influence to a government they trusted, but this required scrapping the Articles and devising new constitutional forms. The Commonwealth and Constitutional Innovation. In the fall and winter of 1787, Massachusetts considered a new framework of government designed "to form a more 18

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perfect Union." T h e ratifying Convention, which met in Boston, was one of the largest assemblages in the state's history, for the Constitution stirred intense populär interest, sphtting the Commonwealth into two opposing camps.®® T h e lines of division were complex. T h e coastal towns strongly favored the Constitution, and so did the inland villages of Suffolk and Essex counties. Opposition was strongest in the central and western counties, but the majorities against ratification were modest in Middlesex and Bristol counties and there was even strong pro-Constitution sentiment along the lower portions of the Connecticut River and in southern Berkshire County. And in the District of Maine the issue became linked with the unique, local question of Separation from Massachusetts. T h e checkered sectional distribution thus indicated that the cleavage was not simply between east and west or town and country.®® T h e strongest proponents of the Constitution were merchants, public security holders, artisans, and professional leadership groups, who were convinced that centralization was essential to promote their welfare.®^ Y e t the sources of Support for change do not define the character of the Opposition, for interests and attitudes were complex. Many personalty groups expected to benefit from ratification. But of 246 personaltyless towns, 142 opposed and 104 favored the Constitution.®® Similarly, most of those rejecting change were farmers, but some yeomen favored it. T h e less insular and more commercially minded husbandmen stood to benefit from a revival of prosperity in the ports, whereas subsistence farmers had less stake in urban revival.®® T h e anticonstitutionalists often conceded the defects of the Confederation and recognized the need for more vigor-

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ous government, but they were optimistic about the future and extremely fearful of change. Having just experienced civil war and having only recently restored an equilibrium, many men were loath to ordain a new and untried authority. Persons who had never sympathized with rural insurgency, such as Gerry and Sam Adams, preferred the famihar to the unknown. The Constitution was a radical document which broke with conventional notions and with estabhshed political custom. To men who dreaded arbitrary power and feared "even Hmited authority" it was a mysterious system füll of Strange innovations and hidden d a n g e r s D e p a r t i n g from experience, the framers had deliberately created a new govemment which appeared unfamiliar and questionable to many Americans. The ensuing controversy evoked a clash between two different sets of assumptions, one rooted in the familiar, the other in a fresh experiment in Continental self-government7' Men agreed that the polity must be responsive both to special interests and the general good but they disagreed Over the constitutional means to achieve republican ends. The conventional view was that "only by protecting local concerns [is] . . . the interest of the whole . . . preserved."'^ Fragmentation and decentralization of power was the cornerstone of liberty since only small governmental units, dose to the people would guard their interests. "The idea of an uncompounded republick, on an average one thousand miles in length, and eight-hundred in breadth, and containing six millions of white inhabitants . . . is . . . an absurdity," wrote James Winthrop, "and contrary to the whole experience of mankind."^® The new system presupposed that the polity suitable to a small Commonwealth would not adequately serve "the great affairs of thirteen states," for localism bred factional20

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ism, which destroyed republicanism. An enduring union would have to be founded on broader principles than the continuing clash of parochial rivalries. T h e heart of the new scheme was a modified system of representation and an inventive distribution of power among competing authorities. A legislature was generally expected to mirror closely the many disparate interests within the Community. For this reason the unit of representation in Massachusetts was small and homogeneous and hundreds of men elected annually sat in the General Court. In contrast, the populär branch of Congress would contain only sixty-five delegates chosen for two years. Such modifications reflected the view that the rulers of an extensive republic must divest themsclves of "local concerns" and become servants of the nation. They must represent a fairly large geographic area with complex and varied interests and serve at least two years. Otherwise they would "dwindle to a servile agent, attempting to secure local and partial benefits by cabal and intrigue."^^ But critics wondered whether an assembly few in numbers, far from its constituents, and elected for long terms would either understand or serve the voters' interests.'^® T h e other far-reaching constitutional innovation was the creation of a federal system which divided sovereignty bctween local and central authority. Where the nation had Jurisdiction, it could act conclusively and effectively, but the states retained responsibility for large areas of governance. T h e novelty of federalism, however, was the source of much confusion and apprehension. T h e Constitution let the states establish franchise qualifications, but critics charged that the vote was thrown open to men without property.'® Similarly the absence of a bill of rights alarmed those not satisfied with assurances that Congress lacked 2 1

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jurisdiction to invade personal liberties. Fears of consolidation reflected the difEculty many had in understanding the subtleties of federalism. As a result the new system seemed füll of unimaginable dangers: Congress would control elections, deprive states of local levies, control State courts, abolish jury trial, and ultimately destroy the separate commonwealths. While supporters of the Constitution thought that federalism and indirect representation might overcome the defects of the Confederation, others viewed a departure from traditional modes as a dangerous innovation that would concentrate power in hands insensitive to the Claims of competing interests and the ideas of Commonwealth. Differences of interest and ideology thus split men sharply. Fear of change was so widespread that ratification carried only after months of an extraordinarily educational debate and astute political management. Skillful preconvention maneuvering sought to fill the assembly with as many sympathetic delegates as possibleJ^ Seeking to win backing from dissenters, pro-Constitution forces included a Baptist minister among the Boston delegation, which also had representatives of the leading factions. An effective massing of the mechanics and tradesmen assured unanimity within the Boston group despite the skepticism of Sam Adams and Dr. Charles Jarvis.'® In the Convention proponents of change resisted an early decision, hoping that a prolonged discussion might turn the tide. Though they expounded the new System carefully and treated objections respectfully, only a few delegates were swayed. T h e final recourse was to win over Governor Hancock and to offer amendments that might appease the suspicious. W i t h the State evenly split, Hancock was reluctant to antagonize either major bloc. Yet his neutrality jeopardized his position among important 22

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eastern groups aggressively pushing for ratification. In the end he traded his support for concessions from the Bowdoin faction. Breaking his silence, the governor offered amendments, and a week later Massachusetts became the seventh State to ratify/® Though the Constitution had sharply divided the Commonwealth, the debate did not leave a residue of bitterness. Before the Convention adjourned, leading critics promised to Support the new experiment. They had lost in a fair and honest contest and would urge their constituents to submit to the decision of "a majority of wise and understanding men."®° In the weeks after adjournment, many towns reversed themselves and the Constitution seemed to enjoy a measure of popularity throughout the state.'^ Doubts and fears did not vanish, but people turned to the more important task of living under the new fundamental law. T h e real test would come when men translated the written document into actual policies and institutions. T h e restoration did not satisfy any group completely, but it did not leave any permanently alienated. T h e merchants, officials, and country gentry who had soundly beaten the Shaysites did not press their advantage unduly. A n d the yeomen, somewhat dismayed and perhaps shocked by what hard times had driven them to, looked to politics rather than to rebellion to promote their well-being. For generations group rivalries had been a source of social tension. Yet an abundance of opportunities had taught men that they could advance their interests without depressing those of their neighbors. T h e economy had made Citizens truly dependent on one another. T h e farmer relied on traders to find markets for his surplus, while the merchant completed his cargoes with country produce and relied upon rural folk to purchase foreign imports. In the past, though town and country had often quarreled, they 23

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managed to settle their conflicts peacefully. Out of this experience had emerged a belief in an ultimate harmony of interests. A severe economic recession following a decade of social dislocation temporarily undermined the old faith. Unable to attribute their troubles to a foreign oppressor, seemingly helpless to alter circumstances through public action, Americans blamed hard times on each other. Farmers were condemned for consuming vast quantities of foreign luxuries even though the rural market was a pillar of urban prosperity. Public creditors insisted that the State meet its obligations, forgetting that unless yeomen prospered the Commonwealth could not pay its debts no matter how diligently the General Court levied new taxes. For a moment, men lost sight of these truths, frustrated by the disappointments of independence, the ineptitude of State and nation, and the inefEcacy of politics. Shays' Rebellion had a therapeutic effect. It taught Citizens that no group could prosper long at the expense of another. The only Solution to common difüculties was common efforts to restore that abundance of opportunity by which all had traditionally prospered. Despite years of rapid change and rising tensions, the Commonwealth did not emerge from the rebellion permanently divided. By the end of the decade men sought to restore a consensus and dissolve the hostile alignments which had briefly led to armed conflict. Though the price of peace was stalemate, it was far better than civil war. Yet just as Massachusetts reached an impasse, exhausting its ability to solve problems alone, fresh hope appeared in efforts to recast the union of independent commonwealths. Politics in Transition. In the years immediately after rebellion and ratification, Massachusetts moved further along 24

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toward a restoration of a harmony of interests. As men found peaceful ways of resolving conflict, rivalries softened, apathy returned, and the State enjoyed several years of political calm. Governor Hancock had emerged as the great pacifier, binding the wounds of civil war and overcoming resistance to constitutional innovation. He retained office until his death in 1793, though discontented elements twice sought to upset the equihbrium his hegemony symboHzed. In the spring of 1788 some opponents of ratification ralhed behind Elbridge Gerry for governor. As the state's leading critic of the Constitution, Gerry realized the futility of competing with Hancock, whose re-election he did not consider an "unfortunate circumstance."®^ Hancock won handily, receiving support from the Bowdoin faction. A year after routing an attack from the left, he faced a new challenge from the right. Elements deeply disturbed by the disorders of the decade sought to reinstall Bowdoin. Suspicious of the governor's compromise politics, his unwillingness to antagonize interest, and his penchant for avoiding unpopulär decision, advocates of strong government— their enemies called them "fiery federalists"—doubted Hancock's loyalty to the federal system and feared he might become an obstructionist.®® Despite bitter personal attacks in the press and the legislature, the former governor won re-election easily, running well ahead of Bowdoin even in the eastern mercantile towns. Once again voters preferred someone who would stand between "the lawless Shaysites" and "the intriguing design of a combined aristocracy," preventing the State from being "convulsed by the violence of parties."®^ Hancock's latest triumph marked another shift in alignments. While he sufEered defections from the Bowdoin camp, he gained new support from two previously hostile elements. Opponents of ratification who had backed Gerry

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the previous year now feared that Hancock's enemies were "the seif created nobility" who sought to "pitch him Down in the M u d " and to establish supremacy over all men of "revolution principles."®® The governor also found new strength in the metropolis. For a decade Sam Adams' influence had waned. Pushed aside by Hancock, alienating yeomen by advocating harsh treatment for the rebels and mechanics and tradesmen by giving only lukewarm support to the Constitution, the aged patriot became increasingly isolated. In 1787 he ran a poor third for lieutenant governor and the following year was defeated in a bid for Congress.®® The spring of 1789 was propitious for a reconciliation with his old rival. Suffering defections in the east, seeking additional support in the west, Hancock joined forces with Adams and helped elect him lieutenant governor. By 1790 the governor had Consolidated his power, and as long as he lived competition for the first chair virtually ceased. Voters became apathetic and people lost interest in politics. "If they will give me my Land at the Duck pond," one Citizen observed, "they may do as they please about the Matter. I will not run my shins against the stump that does not stand in my way."®^ Important unresolved Problems of debt and finance, trade and commerce remained, but these were now largely beyond the scope of local authority. While State responsibilities narrowed, Citizens retained power to shape the policies of an invigorated national government. The election of the Bay State's first federal representatives was another sign of declining group tensions and the blurring of older divisions. The choice of two senators was compromised, one seat going to the seaboard, the other to the interior. The legislature readily agreed on Caleb Strong, a Northampton lawyer, to represent the in26

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land towns, but the selection of bis colleague proved more difEcult. Bowdoin, Sam Adams, and Rufus King were among the many eastern possibilities, but Dr. Charles Jarvis of Boston made the strengest bid. A leading member of the Hancock circle, Jarvis might advance the governor's national ambitions. Though favored by the lower house, Jarvis was rejected in the State Senate, and after a temporary impasse the two houses agreed on Tristram Dalton, a Newburyport merchant of moderate views who was uninvolved in factional rivalries.®® T h e voters played a more direct role in choosing congressmen but populär interest was well below that in the State canvass of 1787. In the Plymouth and Maine districts George Partridge and George Thacher swept into office, meeting little concerted Opposition.®® Elsewhere, in the absence of political Organization and an aroused citizenry, contests were highly factious. In half the congressional districts multiple candidacies badly fractionalized the vote, depriving anyone of the chance for a majority and necessitating runoffs. While the antagonisms of the 1780's did not disappear entirely, elections revealed the disorganization of politics and the softening of older tensions. Though the eastern maritime communities overwhelmingly favored the Constitution, the first federal elections found them disunited. Proponents of centralization in Suffolk county feared the area would "be much divided" since "Adams, Otis, Arnes & Heath & James Bowdoin jr will probably be voted for."®" T h e contest eventually narrowed to Adams and Fisher Ames, a young Dedham lawyer who had only recently won fame by bis eloquent advocacy of the Constitution. Ames defeated Adams, whose lack of enthusiasm for ratification alienated many merchants, mechanics, and tradesmen in Boston as well as nearby market farmers.®^ Competition in Essex County was more complex. 27

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Four major candidates shared the vote and none won a majority. Nathan Dane, a county worthy of moderate views, and Samuel Holten split the Support of towns which had rejected ratification. T h e pro-Constitution forces divided their strength between Benjamin Goodhue and Jonathan Jackson.®^ By attracting backing from Dane and Holten Clements, Goodhue triumphed on the second ballot. Elections in inland communities, where Opposition to ratification was strongest, also illustrated the fluidity of politics. T e n of twenty-two Bristol towns had opposed the Constitution, but all except two endorsed congressional candidates favorable to centralization. While a little over half the towns in Middlesex County had rejected the Constitution, congressional voting patterns showed little continuity with earlier divisions. Middlesex was the home of Elbridge Gerry, who first declined to run for Congress, where his friends hoped he might restrain those seeking to "involve the country in Civil wars and bloody controversies."®' T h e pressure to stand mounted and Gerry consented, noting that "some of the high federalists have been urging me to go."^ Though his supporters denounced "the proud, aristocratical gentry, who think the yeomanry . . . unfit to have any part in the government," Gerry staked a Claim for moderation, deprecating excessive democracy, favoring effective centralization, and promising to Support the Constitution with amendments.®® At the first poll antiConstitution towns split their votes between Gerry and Nathaniel Gorham, while William Hull, John Brooks, and Joseph Varnum garnered sufficient ballots to prevent a choice. Gerry won easily the second time, and his election was welcomed by both John Bacon, a Stockbridge critic of the Constitution, and Henry Jackson, an ardent proconstitutionalist.®®

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Thirty out of thirty-seven towns in Worcester County had opposed ratification; their unity did not endure. T h e Chief rivals for the congressional seat were Jonathan Grout and Timothy Paine. An old revolutionary leader, lawyer, and justice of the peace, Grout sympathized with the yeomen and won considerable popularity, which sent him to the State Senate in 1788. Paine was an ex-Tory who had held numerous ofHces before the Revolution, re-entering pubhc hfe in the 1780's. While Grout clearly attracted the Support of husbandmen suspicious of centrahzation, most of Paine's votes also caine from anti-Constitution towns, and both men favored amendments. T h e first federal elections in the Hampshire-Berlcshire district were models of dynamic politics. Multiple candidacies, general apathy, and a fractionalized vote forced numerous canvasses. Both Hampshire and Berkshire claimed the seat, adding a further sectional complication. T h e strengest contender was Tlieodore Sedgwick, who had connections in both counties.®'' T h e able Stockbridge lawyer, however, lost a majority of Berkshire towns to John Bacon and William Whiting, critics of the Constitution, and to Thompson Skinner, a pro-Constitution politician from Williamstown. Unlike his Berkshire competitors, Sedgwick attracted considerable Support in neighboring Hampshire County, yet repeatedly failed to muster a district majority as long as Berkshire split its vote and Samuel Lyman took the lion's share in Hampshire. Though Sedgwick feared a Union between Lyman and Whiting, anti-Constitution towns split their vote several ways.®® By the fifth ballot the factional Situation clarified and Sedgwick won. Though he swept Berkshire County, his margin of victory in the district was narrow and success owed much to clever management.'«

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The unpatterned confusion of the first congressional elections revealed a decline in the polarization of group interests and a return to the more factious politics of an earlier period. Neither the distress of the postwar years, which had disrupted the harmony of interests on which factions thrived, nor the rebeUion and ratification controversies left the State permanently divided into organized pohtical groups. T h e hard-pressed yeomanry rebelled when government appeared insufEciently sensitive to their troubles. Had institutions existed which regularized and formahzed participation in pohtics, the Commonwealth might have avoided a direct challenge to authority. But the Community lacked a tradition of active involvement of Citizens. For generations men had been accustomed to delegating pohtical responsibilities to others. Those who could vote often had not bothered until the folly of civil war taught them that the ballot was a surer and better means of redress. T h e outpouring of voters in 1787 and the triumph of a policy of accommodation were the first steps toward restoring the harmony of interests. Even the deep split over the wisdom of increasing the authority of central government did not significantly arrest the restoration. Though the revolutionary generation lacked formal institutions through which later Americans settled conflict by compromise and reason and adjustment and experimentation, it managed to avert disunion and social chaos. By 1789 it had hopefully embarked on an adventure in Continental self-government whose success rested heavily on the ability of an invigorated Union to accommodate many different interests in a diverse Republic.

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The new Union immediately confronted a series of unsolved and serious problems which had challenged both the states and the Confederation for over a decade. Moreover, populär sentiment called for a more precise definition of the federal system. The central authority's response to these issues altered the alignments of the past, successfully accommodated rival interests, and dissipated fears of centralization. Adjusting to a Federal Polity. The promise of amendments delimiting national power contributed to ratification in Massachusetts and elsewhere. One of the most alarming omissions in the Constitution as drafted had been a bill of rights. A Portland publisher wrote to his future congressman: "You laugh at a Bill of Rights; but should one ever be annexed to the Constitution, I will fall down, and worship it."^ Congress was Willing to guarantee personal liberties, but some critics of the Constitution insisted on more fundamental modifications, such as enlarging the national legislature, preventing interference in local elections, reserving internal taxation to the states, and generally limiting federal authority to expressly delegated power. But it was doubtful that these or other structural changes would receive Support from enough states; nor was the pressure for such alterations sufüciently strong or persistent.^ Another early problem was plural officeholding. The Massachusetts Constitution explicitly banned multiple officeholding, but did this prevent a State legislator, a sheriff, 31

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or a probate judge from serving in Congress or a federal judge from sitting in the General Court? The consensus was that the spirit and principle of the State Constitution should extend to federal appointees, who should be barred from holding plural ofEces in a manner similar to that set forth in the Massachusetts Constitution. Thus federal judges could not sit in the State legislature because judges of the Supreme Judicial Court were excluded.® Hostility to pluralism reflected fear that favored individuals might accumulate dangerous influence. As a result, two State legislators were forced to give up their posts, others did not seek or win re-election, a federal judge was not seated, and two congressmen resigned, one to remain a sheriflF, the other a justice of the common pleas.^ Despite these efforts to ensure a proper balance between local and national authority, few doubted that the Union alone could successfully tackle the great problems of debt, taxation, trade, and finance. Of all the questions plaguing the Commonwealth in the 1780's, none had proved so insoluble as the large public debt. The Politics of Finance. In the years after the rebellion, the size of the Massachusetts debt had changed little. Because merchants opposed high imposts and excises, and farmers direct levies on lands and polls, revenues were sufficient only to cover government Operations and interest payments. Earlier efforts to fund public obligations had violently disrupted the harmony of interests; the price of peace was fiscal stalemate. The new government, however, found ways of satisfying creditors without disturbing the Community. Anticipating federal action, the General Court offered to repeal imposts and excises and to resign the funding of the debt to a national Solution.® Since Congress controlled the riebest 32

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sources of revenue, it would have to meet its responsibilities or "those who are now highly federal . . . will become Antifederal."« T h e Union's extensive taxing power was attractive to yeomen, who thought that land would not have to bear the bürden because imposts and excises would be ample. Merchants also preferred a federal Solution. Nationwide duties would fall more uniformly and be collected more efficiently than local levies and would relieve merchants of the troublesome State impost. Furthermore, since Massachusetts had one of the largest debts, it would have to tax commerce heavily if each Commonwealth were to fund its obligations separately/ Massachusetts therefore strongly supported Alexander Hamilton's program to fund the national debt and assume State debts. N o one argued more ardently against discriminating between original and subsequent holders of securities than Elbridge Gerry. If suffering soldiers sold their paper cheaply, he favored compensating them, but not at the expense of creditors. Though speculators bought securities at low prices, they gave "currency to property that would lie dormant."® Discrimination, Gerry concluded, was plainly fraudulent and violated a sacred contract. Even if some creditors were the very "dregs of creation and the scum of iniquity," discrimination was both impractical and unjust.® More important than discrimination was the rate of interest. Hamilton offered 6 per cent on part of the debt and 3 per cent on the remainder. T h e Senate considered a proposal for 4 per cent. T h e lower rates meant partial repudiation, but Congressman Fisher Arnes and others argued that the uncertainty of revenues warranted compromise, especially since security owners would still benefit substantially/" 33

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Gerry, however, demanded 6 per cent; anything less was repudiation. Disputing Hamilton, he argued that the nation could easily Support higher interest." His views found Support at home. A Portland creditor, John Hobby, predicted that 4 per cent would "be extreemely fatal" to honest investors and 3 per cent would deprive them of "one half the nominal amount of our demands." According to Benjamin Goodhue, Salem's greatest merchant preferred the defeat of assumption of the State debts rather than "have the debt of the U S funded upon so open a violation of contract as the Secy proposed."'^ In Boston friends of the government were dismayed by the Senate's offer of a bare 4 per cent: "That a proposal so undisguised & unjust shou'd come from that brauch of the Legislature was not within our expectations."'^ Disappointed creditors. Christopher Gore reported, "may endeavor to make terms with the State." Security holders were numerous, important, and attached to property, and "would change sides rather than lose any share of the blessing."" Moreover, the delay and uncertainty of funding may have caused some to despair of a national settlement. In that event, George Gabot predicted, "the general government would be ruined."'® The proposal to assume State debts also revealed other divisions among security holders. Some of those whose investments were primarily in Continental paper feared that assumption might jeopardize funding and reduce interest rates." Others thought that unless it was linked to the general funding scheme, assumption was doomed. Thus splits among creditors threatened "the whole assumption, and probably the funding system with i t . " " When the Massachusetts legislature met in the winter of 1790, for the first time since the rebellion a combination of Clements fearful of consolidation together with "some 34

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of the most strenuous advocates for the Constitution" renewed efforts to fund the State debt.'® Alarmed by assumption, some viewed it as the opening wedge to complete centrahzation. The debt now became "the barrier of our hberties," which must be paid if "we may pretend to hold up the importance of the State Government." Otherwise Citizens "will naturally become less attached to the welfare of the Commonwealth, and place their dependence altogether on the Federal Government." Thus it became necessary to pay the interest by doubling the land and poll taxes, a small price to retain State sovereignty. Nor must the Commonwealth discriminate, since it must strictly adhere to its public obligations.^® But for obvious political reasons, antiassumptionists sought first to increase the yield from the State excise, offering to mortgage it to the debt. In March 1790 the General Court adopted an elaborate new set of laws, tightening administration, taxing wines, rum, coffee, sugar, cheese, coaches, licensing inns and retailers, and appropriating the receipts to the debt.^° If some creditors hoped for a deal with the State, they were soon disillusioned. Failing to increase levies on lands, Massachusetts was unable to fund its debt. Moreover, security owners realized that if assumption failed, the states would perpetually compete with Congress for revenues.^' Most important, merchants anxious to abolish local duties believed that unless the Union assumed both local and national obligations, Massachusetts would continue to need extensive revenues and would probably bürden trade.^^ Finally, farmers would be only slightly affected by the necessary federal imposts.^® Thus there seemed "no other way under heaven by which our Citizens can be relieved from heavy and Oppressive Land Taxes, but by such an assumption."" Because Citizens were reluctant to pay federal levies 35

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and still support a large local debt, the antiassumptionists were doomed. Husbandmen would not submit to burdens on the land for the sake of abstract fears of consolidation. Nor did assumption necessarily mean further centralization. On the contrary, Gerry argued, should the commonwealths fund separately, taxes "will be so heavy as to make the State Government unpopulär, and the destruction of their constitutions may thereby be produced."^'' Delays would create new demands for consolidation and the defeat of assumption would cause the states and the nation to compete for revenues. T h e scheme was thus vital to preserve the harmony of the Union.^® Ultimately trapped by the prospect of direct levies, antiassumptionists could not mass farmers behind their program nor find much support elsewhere. Governor Hancock equivocated but eventually favored assumption, and in June 1790 the legislature recommended its adoption to "equalize the burthens of the several States, & to prevent the too frequent Operation of large direct taxation."^^ Massachusetts promised to repeal the new excises when and if Congress acted.^® Continued delay in New York made some of the "best and most substantial friends" of the new government "damn mad and alniost ripe for anything."^® T h e Massachusetts delegation in Congress worked hard for Hamilton's program, Ames and Gerry were tireless debaters, and Theodore Sedgwick eloquently appealed to "the compassion of the Representatives of the people of America, to relieve us from the pressure of intolerable burdens."®® Congress finally reached agreement in July 1790, and in September a special session of the General Court repealed the local excise.®' Assumption proved so populär that in 1792 the Commonwealth petitioned Congress to fund the remainder of the debt not covered by the original measure.®^ W h e n the

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Treasury finally settled accounts in 1794, it did not take Over the entire bürden but credited Massachusetts with $1,248,000 in United States paper.'^ In that year the legislature adopted a comprehensive measure funding its remaining obhgations with the interest from federal securities, investments, land sales, and a small tax on polls and estates.'^ Comparison of the State budgets of 1786 and 1794 clearly reveals the impaet of assumption. In the year of rebeUion, 78 per Cent of expenditures went for interest payments. Six years later, interest charges had fallen about 60 per cent and represented only 53 per cent of outlays.®® In the next twenty-five years expenses remained low, and by 1801 Governor Caleb Strong foresaw the cxtinction of the Massachusetts debt. For two decades the total taxes on land and polls were light because the debt was small and the State drcw on interest from investments. Nor did the Commonwealth bürden trade, for by 1795 it abolished the last of its indirect taxes.®® The national Solution of the financial problem removed it as a divisive force in State politics and yet satisfied most groups. For a decade yeomen had fought taxation of the land. T h e new central government relieved agriculture without oppressing commerce, and in the face of such real benefits, fears of consolidation seemed abstract. Meanwhile Urban elements, who had struggled vigorously for centralization, were often divided, disappointed, and impatient. Ultimately both groups were accommodated as funding and assumption eliminated a central cause of conflict. Tlie new framework of government thus offered fresh opportunities to advance the harmony of interests. The Politics of Banking. That was also the experience in the field of public banking. After the war the art of banking gave Americans new modes of advancing their material 37

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welfare. Independence ended royal restrictions on corporate grants and the commonwealths were expected to distribute favors liberally and fairly. As the pressure for charters mounted, the states and the nation had difEculty in satisfying the demands of competing interests. Massachusetts incorporated its first bank in 1784. Though the Massachusetts Bank was extremely successful, underwriting trade, issuing notes, and providing exchange, there were early demands for a new institution more sensitive to "the various interests of the metropohs."®^ By 1789 the Massachusetts Bank had become prosperous; its dividends rose to about 20 per cent, arousing jealousy among Outsiders anxious to share in the profits. Critics charged that the Community had unwisely granted a monopoly "to a few men, in exclusion of all others, to make as much paper money as they shall please to issue."®® Though the General Court amended the charter to define the Bank's Privileges more precisely, some groups remained unsatisfied. Only expansion could mollify them.®® The Secretary of the Treasury's proposal to found a large national Bank of the United States opened fresh possibilities, and all but one of the Bay State's congressmen voted in favor of it.^" But the new venture, chartered in Congress in 1791, created conflicts among competing interests. Alexander Hamilton was against opening branches in the major seaports "lest they disrupt management and divide the Bank's strength."^^ Boston businessmen, however, wished to share in the bank's management. They suspected that Philadelphians would engross most of the stock and that Robert Morris' clique would gain control.'*^ Fearing competition, the Bank of New York purchased stock in the federal bank, ofEering three hundred of its own shares to bar a branch there. The prospect that the Massachusetts Bank might follow suit disturbed Clements who hoped that branches would weaken and destroy the State institutions.'**

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These strong nationalists argued that the Bank of the United States must have cash deposits in Boston; otherwise its notes would lack public confidence, enjoy only limited circulation, and pass at a discount.^^ If the branches, however, did business at 5 per cent, they could "overpower the State banks by giving borrowers better t e r m s . F o r as fiscal agent of the Union and depository of customs, the Bank had advantages that would bring it "eventually . . . all the good custom."^® Opponents of local financial organizations believed that "all the influence of the moneyed men ought to be wrapped up in the Union, and in one bank"; otherwise, local ones might "become dangerous Instruments in the hands of State partisans" who would flaunt the "badge of Sovereignty."^^ T h e Bank of the United States and its branches did not threaten diversity but forced a clearer definition of local banking policy. T w o groups pressed the Commonwealth to purchase shares in the national institution. Boston and several other eastern towns argued that the investments would be profitable and would link the state to the Union more firmly. Others, fearing that the Bank might become the tool of aristocrats, favored public investment to check undemocratic influence.^^ But the District of Maine, Salem, Newburyport, and most inland towns demurred, unconvinced that purchase of four hundred shares would give them any significant voice in the Bank's affairs.^® More important than the state's reluctance to invest was the disappointment of many who had hoped to buy stock privately. Anticipating heavy demands for shares, Hamilton advised Investors to deposit funds in advance, but the demand greatly exceeded supply, and within one hour after the books opened the stock was oversubscribed. By manipulation, the Secretary was able to influence the distribution of shares among favored groups, including thirty congressmen.®® Angry Boston critics charged that a few insiders 39

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had engrossed the stock even though Congress had ordered a fair distribution. Complaining merchants and Investors feit doubly abused, since their payments of imposts and excises filled the Bank's coffers." A danger arose that those "shut out from the national bank will be very solicitous of reaping the profits heretofore experienc'd from the State Bank."®2 In 1791 a group of Boston merchants, generally without ties to the Massachusetts Bank, together with spokesmen for the artisans, sponsored "an asylum for all ages and classes." The Boston Tontine proposed to seil shares, with subscribers to receive annuities that increased in value as participants died until the entire fund was distributed among the remaining survivors in 1850.®^ Requesting a charter, the Tontine promised to loan funds to farmers and to expand the circulating medium. But a spokesman from the Berkshires argued that the scheme would encourage speculation, tempting the less sagacious yeomen to bonow, engulfing them in debt, and causing the loss of their lands. Moreover, the right to charge 9 per cent interest seemed "too much like granting exclusive privileges."®^ Denied incorporation, the Tontine dissolved and the Promoters sought some more successful approach. Modifying James Sullivan's suggestion that the Commonwealth replace privately chartered banks by a public monopK)ly, they requested a charter for a new institution which would directly involve the State.®® The boldness of the new design and the extent of the privileges sought jeopardized the venture, especially among the inland representatives. Nor did the Massachusetts Bank relish competition from a publicly supported rival.®® By compromising, the promoters obtained the incorporation of the Union Bank in June 1792 with the Support in the legislature of towns throughout the Commonwealth.®^ Ten years had passed since the 40

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State had incorporated its first bank; it had since learned to distribute favors more prudently, fixing the life of the charter, requiring the bank to loan 20 per cent of its fund to agriculture, and granting the State rights to a third of the stock and representation on the board of directors.'^® Though the new Institution spread the benefits of banking and checked the influence of the Bank of the United States, financial institutions remained the object of criticism.®' The Union Bank's loan and discount poHcy was attacked as arbitrary. The branch bank was allegedly run not to serve merchants but as "a stock jobbing shop, just to answer the purposes of speculators." Its fluctuating discounts were "a clog to other banks in this town and will ever prevent their pursuing a regulär, uniform system of negotiation."®« The main source of discontent was pressure for expansion. For a while Massachusetts did not freely distribute charters, preferring to expand the capital of the Union Bank, but eventually the floodgates opened as it became impossible to limit grants of incorporation.®^ Within this unstable and shifting Situation, group attitudes were complex and fluid. While many urban groups had favored centralization and supported a national Solution of the financial problem, investors and merchants interested in banking frequently found the Commonwealth more sensitive to their interests. The Union Bank enjoyed support from both the Hancock faction and its arch critic, Stephen Higginson. On the other hand, John Bacon, Berkshire County's staunch foe of consolidation, joined with the Massachusetts Bank interest to oppose the Union charter, but he mustered scant support among the husbandmen. ITie dynamics of bank politics indicate that continuous factional or group conflict was of little importance. Rather, divisions occurred between entrenched groups and others

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seeking access to opportunity. While both banking and public finance were major issues confronting Citizens in the postwar years, the foundations of prosperity rested primarily on the condition of commerce. Formulation of a national trade policy was one of the major responsibilities of the strengthened Union. National Commercial Policy. Merchants, tradesmen, artisans, and fisherfolk expected the new government to promote their welfare. Traders desired restrictions on foreign shipping to end the "almost total Stagnation of American ship-building" and artisans wanted protection for native enterprise.®^ Congress promptly enacted a Continental impost. Ideally the tax had to raise sufficient revenue, afford protection to domestic interests, and fall equally on all. While an impost was considered the fairest and most practica! tax, each group fought duties which affected it adversely. No State had more faithful watchdogs than Massachusetts. Senator Dalton promised, "Everything that can affect shipbuilding I shall watch with a jealous Eye."®^ Bay State congressmen favored heavy protection against foreign cordage and cable, but they opposed aid to domestic producers of hemp.®* While doubting the ability of hemp growers to supply shipping needs, they assured southerners that a duty on nails would enable Massachusetts and Pennsylvania manufacturers to fill all domestic requirements.®® W h e n news of the imposts reached the Commonwealth, it made "many belch out like Mad Men," strengthening critics of the Constitution and arousing Opposition "by some who have been very high feds."®® While most people supported moderate levies to raise necessary funds, the taxes on molasses and salt were considered unfair and especially harmful to the fisheries. Moreover, the duties 42

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would have broad political repercussions, carrying "devastation throughout all the N e w England States/' where a third of the fishermen were reported already unemployed, and destroying "the fond hopes entertained by our constituents . . . that this Government would insure their rights, extend their commerce, and protect their manufactures."" Vigorous Opposition eventually reduced the tax on molasses.®® Similarly, after complaints that salt drawbacks went to exporters rather than to fisherman and merchants, Congress agreed to make refunds directly to those engaged in fishing.«« Even more important than the imposts was a long-sought Continental navigation act. Congress was Willing to discriminate in favor of native shipping but it was not inclined to go as far as Massachusetts wanted. Some people had envisioned a Virtual American monopoly of the carrying trade, but southerners argued that insufEcient domestic tonnage and indebtedness to English merchants would force planters to employ British carriers, who would only pass on high duties to American customers/® Even though the final duties were lower than Congressmen Ames and Goodhue had sought, the Tonnage Act of July 20, 1789, strongly favored domestic shipping. Vessels built and owned in the United States paid six cents per ton, while foreign bottoms paid fifty cents. By exempting American coasting vessels altogether, the act fostered a native monopoly. Congress also encouraged the new Far Eastern trade by discriminating against foreign importers. Finally American shipping was granted a 10 per cent discount on imposts.''^ Another early problem was whether to discriminate against nations which did not have commercial treaties with the United States. James Madison argued that an aggressive stand would force Britain to lift restrictions on 43

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trade, notably with the W e s t Indies. Advocates of discrimination insisted that England was vulnerable to pressure since Americans consumed a quarter of its exports, shipped large amounts in its bottoms, and supplied the W e s t Indies with necessities. In contrast, the United States would not suffer seriously from commercial warfare because it depended on England chiefly for manufactured luxuries. Finally, Madison urged that unless the British stranglehold was broken, the nation would never develop new trading ties with Holland, France, and other countries.'^ Massachusetts' reaction to discrimination was ambiguous. Its representatives supported it but its senators demurred. W h e n the Senate rejected discrimination, all the state's congressional delegation but one agreed to drop the scheme." While urban interests desired the elimination of barriers to trade, they disagreed on methods. Merchants favored an end to restrictions but were reluctant to embark on commercial warfare. Nearly two thirds of the nation's foreign trade was with Britain and her colonies, and Yankees feared the loss of markets, the carrying trade, and credit which financed British imports. T h e prospect of developing new ties elsewhere was uncertain. Already Americans enjoyed access to French colonies, though this business was always subject to restrictive pressures. There seemed little choice among the various commercial empires, for all had identical aims: to monopolize trade for their own subjects. Having just recovered from the difüculties of the 1780's, merchants were in no mood to experiment, preferring to wait until the Union was stronger before taking on British mercantilism. In the meantime, "open and calm negotiation" rather than retaliation might influence the English/^ Federal navigation policy received a mixed reception from Massachusetts urban groups. James Sullivan reported that traders and manufacturers were discouraged, while 44

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"Shipbuilders & their dependents who were in Expectations of great Riehes and who expected the Exclusive right of carrying Ameriean produee in their own bottoms are wounded in the Tonnage Act." "Zealots for the Constitution," he wrote later to Elbridge Gerry, had promised "more benefits than any Government ean produce."^^ T h e imposts also aroused criticism. Portland merchants denounced them, John Gardiner terming those on Salt and molasses "partial, injurious and allmost ruinous . . . upon the Trade and Fisheries of the N e w England States."'® Sullivan reported that merchants were threatening to haul up their vessels. T h e distillers particularly were bitter, and he feared that there would "not be a punctual Collection" of duties." Fisher Arnes later alerted Secretary Hamilton: " W h e n money is in the case merchants need watching."'® Similarly John Quincy Adams noted the decline of the government's popularity "in the seaports and among the merchants who find their interests affected by the Operation of the revenne laws." Both he and Sullivan worried about the disillusionment among those "who have been the firmest friends to the Constitution."''® T h e new duties, some merchants thought, would retard and hinder business and drain the already short supply of specie. However, Hamilton ordered customs collectors to accept bills of the Massachusetts Bank and to deposit specie and notes in that institution.®" T h e initial criticism of national commercial policy soon subsided. Even before ratification, the seaports had begun to revive. Registered Massachusetts tonnage engaged in foreign trade more than tripled between 1789 and 1790 as Americans dominated the carrying business. Similarly the coasting trafEc advanced, though not quite so rapidly. By the late 1780's the cod fisheries had also shown signs of recovery. T h e profits were small, expansion was slow and 45

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unsteady, but the industry was beginning to flourish again.®^ Relative prosperity made it easier to pay the Continental imposts, while assumption of the State debt permitted the eventual abohtion of local excises. By the end of 1791 Christopher Gore exuberantly observed that in a few years "we can dictate the terms of communication with any European power."®^ Despite such optimism, the future of American commerce remained unstable. T h e new government had no immediate success in piercing the restrictions of the mercantile empires and whatever privileges France or Britain granted were uncertain. Though many Citizens had viewed the strengthening of national authority with great misgivings, their initial experience was very promising. As they moved toward the third decade of independence, they found that constitutional innovations helped them to solve vcxing problems of long Standing and thus harmonized competing interests by removing sources of tension. Funding and assumption, the Bank, and tariff and navigation legislation did not command universal Support. But though men differed on details and dissented from individual measures, they did not divide into competitive political parties. For a few years Americans basked in the warm sun of national prosperity and domestic peace. Y e t there were danger signs ahead. As war and revolution spread beyond the boundaries of France and engulfed Europe, the independence and prosperity of the young Republic faced a critical test which profoundly altered the character of American politics.

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The founding fathers did not expect that the new government would entirely escape conflicts of interest or factional rivalries. But they did hope that the new constitutional structure, enhanced by such innovations as federahsm and indirect representation, would make it easier to reconcile the general welfare with particular interests and would prevent the polarization of the citizenry into hostile groups struggling for power. Experience in the years immediately following ratification justified the optimism of the constitutionalists and exploded the frightened pessimism of their critics. While disagreements broke out at the national capital over the best ways to lay the foundations of a strong and permanent Union, these differences did not generate nationwide, continuous divisions. In Massachusetts fluidity and dynamism and an absence of persistent group tensions made politics placid as Citizens enjoyed the first fruits of the successful Union. But toward the middle of the decade, consensus began to dissolve under the acid influence of a diplomatic and commercial crisis which gradually split the country into two hostile camps, each convinced that the other threatened the stability of the social order and that the future of the Republic depended largely upon its own ability to control and shape the nation's destiny. Years of Political Calm, 1789-1793. The Inauguration of the central government, with its enlarged powers and re47

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sponsibilities, attracted to the capital many of those who had endeavored earlier to strengthen the Union. As the members of the first Congress assembled, national politics assumed an importance that Confederation affairs had not had. Düring the 1780's many of the most talented had shunned membership in the Confederation Congress and states often neglected to assure constant and faithful representation. In contrast, after 1789, New York, Philadelphia, and then Washington became the scenes of a vital political lifo, where men such as Madison, Washington, Jefferson, John Adams, and Hamilton gathered to guide the young nation through infancy. W h i l e all worked for the success of the new experiment, they did not always agree on the most appropriate means to promote the national welfare. An important early conflict arose between supporters and opponents of Secretary Hamilton's financial program. Congressman Madison and Secretary of State Jefferson, together with like-minded associates, particularly in the Virginia delegation, believed that Hamilton's proposals favored special interests and were insufficiently sensitive to other elements that comprised the Union. Madison insisted that the funding program should discriminate against speculative creditors, but few supported him, and Hamilton's proposal did not seriously divide "either the people or their delegates in Congress."^ A sharper split arose over the Secretary's plan to assume the State debts. Commonwealths with small debts that had taxed their Citizens during the preceding decade to fund their obligations regarded it as unfair to bürden them with hcavy financial responsibilities incurred by others. Eventually competing claims were adjusted as a final settlement of accounts overcame long-standing differences between the states and the nation, thereby satisfying "the material interests of all the states . . . in some degree."^ Following 48

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adoption of the financial program, Jefferson, who shared Madison's misgivings, doubted that "anything so generative of dissensions can arise again."® But Hamilton's subseqiient plan to charter a national bank and his management of the funding Operations, together with his extensive influenae throughout the government, continued to arouse deep suspicion in and out of Congress. An unsuccessful attack on the Secretary in Congress, repeated clashes with Jefferson in the cabinet, and the publication of polemical assaults on the leading protagonists marred the harmony of the early years. But they did not signify widespread Opposition to the new ordcr. In the early Congresses voting did not occur along clear-cut party lines; while some members often voted with or against Madison, a great many remained unattached^ Though a leader of a capital group critical of some national policies, Jefferson feit free to retire in 1793, satisfied that the ship of State had been well launched. As Secretary of State his primary concern had been the conduct of foreign afFairs, and despite his belief that Hamilton was pro-British, both he and his rival as well as the President and most Americans agreed that the nation should preserve its independence and neutrality in the face of the great struggle emerging in the Atlantic world that was being generated by revolution in France. T h e voicing of disagreements at the national capital was paralleled by some grumbling and discontent in the states, but Opposition was neither widespread nor organized, and it did not penetrate deeply within the electorate. In Massachusetts competition for public office declined and increasing numbers of Citizens neglected to vote.^ Not only did federal policies win general Support, but the stafhng of the new government further strengthened the ties of union. An extensive customs and excise sen-ice absorbed incum49

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bent State revenue officials and also found places for new men.® Competition for the more important positions was keener, and while deserving petitioners were necessarily disappointed, selection was not based on narrow political considerations. The President could not reward all the faithful supporters of centralization but he did find jobs for connections of Elbridge Gerry and Charles Jarvis7 Stability and continuity were also characteristic of the State, where the membership of the Senate and judiciary changed little, and even Governor Hancock's harshest critics approved his choice for the Supreme Judicial Court. Public acquiescence in the new order was evident in the election of the second and third Congresses, when Massachusetts incumbents won by large margins, often without serious Opposition.® Repeated canvasses were necessary in the two Southern districts of the State because of complicated factionalism, multiple candidacies, and sectional preferences. In the far west, Opposition to Theodore Sedgwick was apparently vanishing, for he polled three quarters of the vote on the first trial in 1790. Similarly, in the east, Essex County gave Benjamin Goodhue over 85 per cent of its vote and Fisher Ames carried 75 per cent of Suffolk's vote. The new congressional apportionment law of 1792 grouped the counties into districts, each county voting for all the representatives assigned to the district, though each was entitled to a congressman of its own. The two largest districts contained three counties, which chose not only a county congressman but also a fourth district repräsentative. TTiere was little pattern to district voting returns other than a strong streak of localism as the larger counties sought the district seat for native sons. While the level of voters' interest was generally low, counties showed even less concern over the contests elsewhere in the district, re-

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flecting a provincialism and absence of such common interests as might have cut across geographic boundaries and forged political unities. Though Massachusetts accepted the new dispensation happily, mild factionalism and a residue of earher differences persisted. Berkshire County's John Bacon remained a faithful spokesman of rural elements, who were suspicious of centrahzation, while the Hancock circle, though lacking distinct and consistent views on major pubhc pohcies, emphasized the importance of maintaining a careful balance in the federal system.® In the metropolis, Benjamin Austin and Thomas Dawes, Jr., charged that the artisans had not been sufficiently protected, but neither could arouse mechanics and tradesmen to oust Congressman Ames. T h e competition between Dawes and Austin for artisan Support was symptomatic of the looseness of faction.'" W h e n Boston debated repeal of its ban on theaters, Governor Hancock and Sam Adams spht with their alhes Gerry, Jarvis, and Sullivan." Similarly, when the city sought to modernize municipal government, SulHvan and Jarvis broke with Sam Adams and Austin.'^ Factionahsm was also characteristic of politics in the District of Maine, where ambitious politicians found Support among friends and connections in their own localities but had difEculty penetrating successfully outside their counties. W h e n Maine was divided into three congressional districts in 1792, factional regrouping occurred, with competition centering between rivals within a county. But numerous canvasses and light voting were indicative of the disorder of political life, Toward the middle of the decade, however, the nature of politics in the Commonwealth dramatically altered. Continuous parties emerged based on competing interests and ideologies. Their origins cannot be traced simply to an earlier factionalism or to an earlier conflict of interests, for

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parties were new institutions which stemmed less from old rivalries and issues than from fresh problems confronting the nation. As long as interest groups remained content, politics remained highly local, factious, and dull. B u t by the end of the Century, cataclysmic events abroad disrupted the entire Atlantic world, threatened the nation's placid prosperity, polarized groups, and plunged the young Republic into a decade of party warfare. The Dilemma of Neutrality, 1793-1796. From the founding of the first Settlements, American attitudes toward Europe had been ambivalent. W h i l e colonials had fled their native lands to build new lives in the wilderness, they could not shed all the memories and associations of the past. Moreover, the struggle for survival at the beginning and the continuing desire to prosper materially had prevented settlers from isolating themselves from the outside world. A s members of a great empire, Americans found many advantages in the ties that bound them to Britain. A n d even when that attachment no longer proved desirable, the young Republic could not turn its back on the Atlantic world. T h e winning of independence depended on foreign help, and the search for a viable postwar economy led to the development of external ties that were at least as extensive as those maintained in the past. Actually, independence imposed fresh responsibilities on Americans to manage their relations with other nations since they no longer could leave that task to others. T h e realities of national existence within a system of competing nation-states quickly disappointed those who expected that withdrawal from the British Empire would bring an end to mercantilist restraints and to involvement in foreign conflicts. In some ways Americans became more deeply involved in events 52

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abroad than ever before as their own revolutionary example became a model and Inspiration for those alienated from Europe's old regimes. T h e Bay State, no less than the Union, was caught up in this web of dependency, as events in the 1790's made indelibly clear.'® Massachusetts' prosperity rested on a diversified economy oriented to foreign trade. After two decades of frustration, and after ratification, American commerce entered a golden age and in the next ten years the exports of the Bay State almost quadrupled.^^ Yet the Situation was fundamentally unstable because it was extremely sensitive to unpredictable conditions abroad over which Americans had little control. Yankees had learned to penetrate the interstices of European mercantilism, gaining access to new orbits of exchange and opening new avenues of profit, but their enterprises rarely enjoyed legal footing. In the middle 1790's they saw the foundations of their brief prosperity seriously threatened when the wars of the French Revolution intensified the competition of rival nation-states and exclusivist economic systems. Initially, turmoil among the great powers created a golden opportunity to serve as impartial traders in a world at war. But realistically, complete neutrality was impossible unless Yankees retired from the seas. France and England both learned that American shipping was an important factor in the balance of power. Tlie logic of geography and economics thus ultimately involved the United States in the world struggle. English naval hegemony forced France to rely on neutral shipping to carry on much of the trade of empire, whereas the British were better able to supply their dependencies themselves. Trade with the French West Indies even in clearly noncontraband items thus aided France and undercut British naval supremacy. In effect, foreign vessels were sup53

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plying the deficiencies of Gallic sea power. Yet if Americans embargoed trade with the French empire, the fighting French Republic would have suffered severely, since its colonies regularly relied on American goods and services even in peacetime. Yet to continue trading with Britain behind the protection of the royal navy would contribute to the total English effort. Americans were thus enmeshed in an almost insoluble dilemma. The problem of defining neutrality fairly and acceptably to the belligerents was further complicated by factors transcending the logic of commercial interest. The diplomatic crisis forced the United States to choose between two Systems of government fighting for survival. Most Americans had welcomed the French Revolution, viewing the spread of republicanism in the Old World as confirming the wisdom of the experiment in the New World.^® But when the Revolution took a radical turn, executed the king, suppressed dissidents, bloodied its name, and went to war, many people had second thoughts. Some drew back in horror, fearing that the spread of Jacobinism would undermine stability everywhere, while others were just as convinced that for all their mistakes and excesses, the French carried the torch of liberty against monarchic despotism. A bitter and discordant dialogue between the friends and enemies of the Revolution carried the problems of diplomacy into the arena of domestic politics, gave ideological content to controversy, poisoned the political atmosphere, and polarized groups into parties. For two decades the future of French republicanism remained a live issue. But in 1794 the most immediate and pressing problem was the preservation of neutrality. While Americans differed sharply in their sympathies, few favored direct involvement in the contest. It proved far easier to Support impartiality in principle, however, than to define it in prac54

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tice, because prosperity required continuing Business ties with both belligerents. Although England was the best market for exports and also the leading source of imports, trade with France was only second in importance.'® Moreover, in certain areas French markets were more advantageous. W h i l e the British shackled Yankee business with the W e s t Indies, the French islands were the best markets for New England fish; nor did the French monopolize the carriage in their own bottoms or prevent foreigners from obtaining profitable returns.'^ Beyond Europe and the Caribbean, traders had tentatively begun to penetrate the Far East, voyaging to China, India, Sumatra, and other exotic places. Since most of these ventures were conducted without formal treaty rights, they rested on an insecure footing. Shipowners and captains exploited temporary situations and favorable circumstances stemming from the unsettled policies and special needs of the Controlling powers. Lacking the means to overthrow mercantile systems built over generations, entrepreneurs preferred to cultivate influence slowly and patiently, operating informally and seizing shortrun opportunities. Such economic pragmatism succeeded until the outbreak of war between France and England, when Americans discovered that the belligerents would not accept a definition of neutrality which offered goods and services impartially to whoever wanted them. This became clear in 1793, when France dispatched a new minister to her sister republic. Citizen Edmond Genet's mission was to ensure America's benevolent neutrality; the United States need not directly enter the conflict nor formally honor her revolutionary alliance, for America could render invaluable economic aid simply by supplying food and shipping to feed the Republic and keep open the lifelines of empire. But the French were not content to capitalize on business ties, 55

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for when they attempted to fit out privateers in American ports they seriously compromised the nation's impartiality. Anxious to avoid entanglement, Washington demanded Genet's recall and formally prodaimed American neutrality. Massachusetts merchants warmly supported the President and were alarmed by Governor Hancock's and Sam Adams' reluctance to deny the French use of local ports. T h e Boston town meeting condemned the fitting out of privateers in local harbors, and throughout the Commonwealth towns drew up resolutions in favor of remaining neutral." British attacks on American shipping in 1793 added a new dimension to the problem. Seeking to subject France to severe economic pressure and to dismember her colonies, the royal navy began to seize hundreds of American vessels, particularly in the W e s t Indies. That triggered a major crisis in foreign relations.'® T h e British assaults on American neutrality, no less than the French, alarmed the Bay State. Salem merchants, "heated and angry," denounced detentions and speculated on the advantages of privateering.^° E . H. Derby, the town's leading trader, castigated the view "that the powers combined against France were amicably disposed towards the United States." He wrote to his congressman: " I trust my government will never submit to such treatment, while we have it in our power to make them due us Justice . . . I hope you will not suffer US to be further insulted by those Pirats."^' In Boston, Christopher Gore predicted that many of the most respectable merchants would decline "from the most elevated State of affluence . . . into poverty and bankruptcy."-^ English outrages inspired advocates of a pro-French neutrality to mobilize support for Madison's policy of commercial warfare against Britain. But a series of town meetings in Boston ended with victory for the counsels of caution.^® Wliile strong retaliatory action attracted initial backing,

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sober second judgments dictated patience and delay in the hope of salvaging establislied and profitable relationships. Patient neutrality became the central objective. George Cabot, no admirer of Jacobinism, feared the consequences of either a French or British victory.^'' One would threaten domestic order, the other would malce England intolerably insolent and grasping. Similarly, John Quincy Adams, an early critic of the Revolution, observed that "the general disposition of the French ruling powers has been constantly favorable to us, and that [of] the British government . . . deeply malignant."^^ Impatience and restlessness persisted. William Eustis, a Boston legislator, had opposed Madisonian policy in town meeting, but he warned Congressman David Cobb: " I n six months . . . the commerce of this State is comparatively done & some decided measures in support of it are due & expccted froni the Government."''® Sober Bostonians opposed rash moves, hoping to give the administration freedom of action, but if necessary, Eustis counseled, " D - n ye pimping restrictions, confiscate their property & declare war."^'' Because of the dangers in delay and the necessity of reaching a peaceful settlement, the President dispatched John Jay to London to negotiate a treaty. Years after ratification of the Jay Treaty in 1795, Republicans and Federalists regarded it as a decisive issue which had split the nation into hostile camps and shaped the course of foreign and domestic politics. T h e treaty became symbolic: either it was the fountain of peace and prosperity or the manifestation of antirepublican, pro-British sympathies. Many of those who later became the treaty's staunchest backers forgot that their initial reaction had been one of confusion, division, and rejection. In perspective, Jay's main accomplishment was to avoid or postpone war, but at the time the terms of the agreement seemed far less favorable than people had expected. Massa57

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chusetts found the commercial articles, with which the State was most directly concerned, disappointing. Article X failed to open access to the British West Indies on an acceptable basis and was never ratified. Article X I I I recognized American rights in British East India, but Yankees could not carry goods directly to Europe or engage in the Indian coastal traffic. Containing no acceptable definition of contraband and recognizing England's right to search and detain neutrals, the treaty seemed to surrender "all or most of the benefits of a Commercial nature which we had a right to expect from our Neutrality in the present European War."^® Finally, the complicated nature of the document made it subject to various and often alarming interpretations. Düring July 1795 the Boston town meeting discussed and condemned the treaty with hardly any dissent, but a month later men prudently reconsidered.^® While the agreement did not open the West Indies or guarantee neutral rights, it did offer a chance of preserving trading ties with Britain. The English promised compensation for seized vessels and agreed to relax the ban on neutral commerce with France. Moreover, the actual effects of the treaty were greatly altered by the informal structure of Anglo-American commerce, which significantly influenced the Operation of British mercantilism. Though vessels were normally barred from the British West Indies, wartime shortages required open ports throughout the decade, and as a result trade with the islands was more prosperous than it had been in peacetime.®" Nor were new enterprises in the Far East seriously threatened. Although merchants no longer could legally carry goods directly from India to Europe, a ban not easily enforced, they could bring shiploads home and re-export them abroad. Like the West Indies trade, business in the Orient prospered, alarming the East India

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Company, which resented the intrusion of Yankees into its prized monopoly.®' The words of Jay's Treaty were thus less unfavorable than they appeared on the surface. Though some Americans insisted that the agreement sacrificed commercial interests and betrayed France, pubhc sentiment in Massachusetts strongly shihed in favor of ratification. The treaty did not resolve the dilemma of neutrahty, but it had far-reaching consequences for the structure of pohtics in the young Repubhc.®^ The Emergence of Parties, 1794-1800. The diplomatic crisis divided the nation into two hostile camps that became formahzed through new institutional Channels, pohtical parties.^® Those sympathetic to France, critical of England, and concerned over threats to republican order at home became the core of the Republican party. Others, fearful that a pro-French attitude would compromise neutrality, lead to war, and spread Jacobinism to American soil, became the core of the Federalist party. Each group considered the other disloyal to the settlement of 1789 and anxious to recast the social order upon some foreign model. Each claimed for itself a monopoly of patriotism and virtue and held its opponents to be subversive and unscrupulous. As Republican and Federalist, "Jacobin" and "Monocrat," confronted one another, it seemed as if the fate of the Republic were in the balance. TTie Problems of neutrality generated a heated ideological controversy as earlier differences over domestic policy had not. In State and nation fixed political alignments began to emerge. In Congress few members remained unattached and votes broke according to clear partisan divisions. In New York and Philadelphia leading politicians such as Madison and Hamilton planned strategy and tactics, managed their supporters, and forged interstate alliances. Un59

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like the two previous presidential canvasses, the election of 1796 was a closely fought duel between two wellmatched rivals, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. But the locus of power remained in the states, where congressmen and presidential electors were chosen. Tlie tensions growing out of the neutrality crisis provoked the formation of numerous political organizations in various parts of the Union. Among these were the DemocraticRepublican societies, which were dedicated to sustaining friendly relations with the embattled republicans of revolutionary France. In Massachusetts, pro-French Bostonians in 1793 held a great Civic Feast to honor the new sister republic, and in the following year these elements, centering around Governor Hancock, organized the Constitutional Society to express sympathy for the French cause abroad, to defend republicanism at home, and to fight government policies such as Jay's Treaty, which jeopardizcd Franco-American friendship.^'* While these societies did not engage directly in the political process, they were initial efforts to give organizational form to the highly charged sentiments of those aroused by the dilemma of neutrality. More important for the future was the evolution of political parties that competed directly for power. In Massachusetts, politics became increasingly competitive. Many voters awoke from their customary apathy as electioneering became intense and rivals hotly competed for public officc. Beginning in 1794, Governor Samuel Adams, who had succeeded on Hancock's death and shared his predecessor's Gallic sympathies, was marked for political destruction by anti-French elements. They charged that his party spirit and undue partiality for France, his failure to quell rioters against the }ay Treaty, and his age and feebleness rendered him unfit to guide the Commonwealth any further.®® Though many voters accepted the indictment, they were 60

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reluctant to turn out the aged patriot. Adams finally retired in 1797, after two campaigns to oust him had failed. His ability to stave off defeat indicated how slowly and hesitatingly voters responded to the demands of partisan regularity.'® Adams' retirement furthered the development of parties because now the State had a chance to make a clear-cut choice of a chief executive. Federahsts and Repubhcans each had to select a Standard bearer who could carry the State. Repubhcans spht and divided their votes between James Sulhvan and Moses Gill, while Federalists swept to victory with Increase Sumner and established a finn grip on the State House for almost a decade. Throughout the Commonwealth a political revolution was in progress. Düring the 1790's the same six or seven men represented Boston in the legislature, giving a variety of groups a place on the town's delegation. Some became Repubhcans and others Federalists, but until 1794 they managed to harnionize diverse Clements. In the spring of 1794, however, the conflict over foreign policy upset traditional arrangements. Boston Repubhcans replaced two incumbents with "Jacobins," one of whom was closely identified with the Constitutional Society.®' Thereafter the two parties competed for local ofHce and voting mounted sharply. Despite their initial success, the power of Boston Repubhcans quickly waned as fear of war with England, acceptance of the Jay Treaty, and growing differences with France enabled Federalists to purge the State S e n a t e and house. Half of the Boston delegation elected in 1796 were new men and all were reliable. T h e metropolis was fast becoming a Federalist bastion.®® As the Commonwealth became sharply polarized, rival groups also focused on elections to national office. In 1794 congressional elections became increasingly competitive 61

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and in 1796 rivalries further intensified.^® Federalists purged Hampshire County's William Lyman and Maine's Henry Dearborn, both of whom had worked with Madison in Congress but lost the Middlesex seat, while in Suffolk and Berkshire counties Republicans strenuously challenged Federalist incumbents, though with less success. In the presidential election of 1796, some Republicans attempted to deprive John Adams of the electoral votes of his native state.^" T h e persistent and growing competitiveness of State and national canvasses signified a transformation in the conduct of public affairs, as older procedures gave way to the new politics of party. Political parties were new groupings that differed from the factions and interests of the past, though they often incorporated such elements.'*' Parties were more permanent and more heterogeneous, had broader objectives and far more elaborate Organization, than earlier formations. Unlike factions, which were temporary alliances constantly in motion, seeking limited, often personal advantages, parties held together large groups with common objectives which sought political power to influence public policy. In contrast, factions had been loose aggregations of ambitious and skillful manipulators who thrived where the electorate was small or apathetic, where social groups were contented or at least disorganized and leaderless, and where the deference of the many for the few left the business of government to the management of an elite. Thus Governor Hancock had led a faction which successfully obtained ofHce even though it represented no particular group in Massachusetts and favorcd no particular program other than the enjoyment of the privileges and honors of ofEce. T h e politics of faction had proved unable to withstand the tensions generated by the economic difficulties of the 1780's, when Citizens in distress demanded new leadership 62

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and fresh policies to weather hard times. In such periods of stress major interests such as farmers, artisans, and merchants became more actively engaged in poHtics to secure rehef from their difficulties or to thwart those who threatened their well-being. N o longer content to let rival factions quarrel over the spoils of offices, such groups turned pohtics into an arena where rival interests and programs competed for influence. A party united a broad spectrum of interests, but it was more than simply a collection of these Clements. In the past, interests had entered politics to influence government on behalf of a particular sector of Society whose aims were specific and hmited and whose political involvement was temporary. Parties, however, formed coalitions of diverse groups seeking to shape public policy through continuous political activity. Parties included factions and interests, but were more than the sum of their parts and had an institutional life of their own, including an organizational apparatus which nominated candidates, planned strategy and tactics, raised funds, and influenced public opinion. And Partisans shared a common ideology which knit together far-flung interests, generated an emotional attachment to a cause (including its leaders and Organization), and sustained continuous, intensive, and patterned modes of political rivalry. W h i l e parties became an essential mechanism in the process of democratic decision-making, they were slow and late in developing. T h e obstacles were both institutional and ideological. Colonial politics had been provincial partly because the locus of power was confined to a single colony or to London. Because of the factious, nonparty nature of eighteenth Century English politics, ambitious Americans advanced their fortunes by imitating English practice and working within the framework of British procedure. More63

THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS Over, a high degree of social mobihty in the colonies retarded the development of rigid class distinctions and persistent conflict, and thereby assured a favorable climate for nonparty politics. An abundance of opportunity and belief in the harmony of interests, a tradition by which differences were resolved through accommodation, were further barriers to the polarization of the citizenry into formal, fixed, competitive groupings. T h e Revolution eliminated the British tie, but the states remained the centers of authority and politics remained parochial and disorganized. B u t the adoption of the new federal system and the ensuing problems confronting the Union altered the conditions in which the politics of faction and interest had thrived. T h e federal system, with its division of sovereignties between state and nation and its delegation to the central authority of responsibility for the general welfare, altered the focus of political rivalry. Great national questions, such as foreign affairs, were no longer settled by decisions made in the State houses. T o have their way, voters and leaders had to capture control of the Congress and presidency. Though congressmen came from all four corners of the Republic and jealously advanced local interests, they were forced to forge alliances on broader grounds at the national Capital. As they did so they formed voting blocs which sought to influence the direction of national policy. And as Congress bcgan to polarize, groups at the center of the Union became vitally concerned with politics within the states, where elections determined a party's national influence. Even more than Congress, the presidency cut across geographic lines, since the chief executive was chosen by the country rather than by political -subdivisions. Those who made common cause in Congress were anxious to assure Support back home for their party's presidential can64

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didates. T h u s each State became a battleground for electoral votes. In these ways the federal structure rendered the more traditional modes of competition obsolete. Federalism forced groups seeking power to forge broad coalitions within the states as well as in the nation, to coordmate widely scattered and diverse Clements, and to transcend regional differenees and parochial preferences. It also forced them to develop organizational techniques that artieulated the various efforts and forces that comprised the party formation. O n c e pattemed modes of competition began to develop, they in turn generated further sophistication in Organization. Control of the federal patronage enabled those in power to reward supporters throughout the Union and especially to succor and nurture the faithful in communities where they were a weak minority denied local ofEce. B u t those excluded from federal favor found refuge and sustenance for their parties in control of State governments. Y e t the far-reaching structural changes effected in 178g did not automatically produce political parties. I l i e y only provided a framework conducive to the evolution of such organizations when conflicts of interests sought new modes of expression. Most earlier divisions had occurred within the confines of a colony or State. B u t during the 1780's many farmers, artisans, merchants, and public creditors began to perceive that they shared common problems with similarly situated groups elsewhere in the Union. T h e y also discovered that local authority was often incapable of promoting their well-being. W h i l e the movement for centralization reflected a growing perception of nationwide interests, the success of the new government in relieving tensions and solving difücult problems retarded the emergence of interstate ties. T l i e crisis in foreign affairs, however, disturbed voters' apathy, altered the traditionally paro65

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chial focus of interest, and promoted the crystallization of nationwide formations. T h e dangers of war, the bitter divisions between pro- and anti-French elements, the growing belief on all sides that the Republic was threatened by subversive elements, polarized the citizenry and created a common sense of danger that welded voters into more inclusive groups which sought to overcome the diversity and provincialism that had thwarted Organization in the past. In this process the elaboration of rival ideologies played a vital role, providing a common set of beliefs that cemented the loyalties of heterogeneous elements scattered throughout the states. Though ideological conflict in the 1790's helped to sharpen political differences, certain deeply held beliefs were obstacles to party development. Those among the revolutionary generation who thought most deeply about the Problems of republican government shared the apprehension that factions and interests—terms they used interchangeably with "parties"—might seek unlimited power and use it to deprive others of liberty. T h e dilemma was that in a republic there seemed no other way of resolving differences and formulating public policy except through the clash of competing groups. Resigned to a belief that men were self-serving, the founding fathers thought that Citizens would always contest for advantage. T o contain the corrosive effects of conflict, great faith was placed in the efficacy of constitutional mechanisms. T h e State constitutions employed practices such as annual elections, division of power, and direct representation, while the national authority looked to indirect representation and federalism to assure that government would promote the general good rather than particular claims. Yet the framers did not entirely trust formal constitutional arrangements. Ideally, the Republic must be guided

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by disinterested statesmen above faction and interest, dedicated solely to promoting the common good. W h e n differences erupted in the 1790's, the leading protagonists, such as Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson, shared similar images of their own purposes and roles. They saw themselves not as leaders of a party but as disinterested guardians of the national interest. From this angle of vision, one's opponents appeared as factious, scheming, ambitious, and nnscrupulous promoters of discord and special interest.^^ As parties took shape they seemed to undermine the efforts of the framers who had built into the Constitution structural features designed to prevent factions and interests from commanding sufficient influence to control government. But by combining many diverse elements, parties mustered coalitions that overcame the weaknesses of isolation and parochialism and enabled groups to link up with others and mold a powerful formation. Alarmed by party growth, Federalists sought to hinder the Organization of the Republican Opposition by making public criticism dangerous. And both groups often cloaked their activities in secrecy because at the beginning formalized political Opposition lacked legitimacy. Condemned at their birth on every side, the first parties eventually made organized competition for influence a legitimate, orderly, and desirable way to conduct public affairs. For without a philosopher-king to resolve differences, a huge and heterogeneous republic needed institutions which would offer Citizens choices between competing policies and leaders and would periodically enable a widely dispersed and diverse electorate to register a clear expression of the national will. Y e t none of the centralizing forces such as the diplomatic crisis, the ideological conflict, and the federal system could entirely overcome the provincialism, apathy, and 67

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diversities which rcsisted Organization and polarization. T h e first parties were not full-scale models of later prototypes. In many communities parties emerged late and hesitatingly, remained anemic, and failed to penetrate deeply into the fabric of society, their strength and composition unstable, their local sources more important than their national leadership. While the federal structure promoted party development, the states remained pre-eminent. Local govemment affected men's affairs more pervasively and more frequently than did the nation. Moreover, the sheer newness of parties deprived them of those ancestral loyalties and deep roots in the past which might have counterbalanced their internal heterogeneity, parochial origins, and factious tendencies. Even the fierce ideological quarrel between the friends and enemies of France rapidly subsided as the sister republic degenerated into a dictatorship and Jefferson's election in 1800 failed to install Jacobinism on American shores. W h i l e more stable in composition and more complex in function than the factions and interests of the past, neither the Republican nor the Federalist party survived very long. T h e first political parties were loose collections of provincial interests rather than autonomous centers of organized initiative and leadership managed by professional politicians. As interests shifted and conflicts were accommodated, the foundations upon which the early parties had rested crumbled. T h e precise character of these institutions is most clearly revealed by an examination of their social sources and the process by which they evolved. In Massachusetts, as throughout the Union, the crisis in foreign affairs had polarized the nation and stimulated the rise of parties. Jay's Treaty did not resolve the problem of neutrality, for by reaching a settlement with England 68

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tlie nation only shifted from one liorn of the dilemma to the other. Regarding the treaty as a hostile act, France unleashed her navy against American trade and the two republics drifted toward war. Republicans were appalled by the prospect, but French outrages against Yankee shipping undermined the Opposition. Düring the undeclared naval war with France, Federahst influence rcached its zenith. Y e t by 1799 the dominant party was fatally Splitting apart. A pro-war group led by Hamilton refused to Support the President's flexible policy of toughness combined with negotiation. John Adams belatedly but effectively routed the extremists and adventurers in his own party, rejecting the easy road to national unity through war and repression. But while the President was saving the peace, Jefferson and his followers were preparing to recapture the nation from their enemies. Though defeated in 1800, Federalism remained important, notably in Massachusetts. But even in that New England bastion, the Opposition rapidly revived from the depths of the late 1790's and transformed the Commonwealth into a genuine two-party State.

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Party growth was painfully slow. The emergence of two rival groups at the national capital did not suddenly divide the rest of the country. Gradually, competitive parties evolved and by 1800 were spreading across the Commonwealth, penetrating sparsely settled areas in Maine, bustling commercial towns along the coast, and quiet rural hamlets in the interior. The Democratic-Republican formation was a heterogeneous coalition of interests which cut across regional, economic, occupational, and religious lines. The party attracted persons alienated from established authority, convinced that those long entrenched in positions of influenae blocked the advancement of worthy and ambitious though less favored Citizens.^ The party builders were not primarily national statesmen directing affairs from Philadelphia or professional politicians operating from Boston. Unlike later professional party leaders, they were generally ambitious merchants, tradesmen, capitalists, speculators, ministers, and office seekers who formed an interest and mobilized relatives, friends, acquaintances, and dependents to oppose those in power. As they fought for influenae, they tried to swell the party showing at the polls by mustering wide Support in the Community. By linking together a varied collection of leaders and championing a broad spectrum of dissatisfied Clements, the Republican party in Massachusetts formed a powerful alliance whose importance steadily mounted after 1800. 70

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The common bond that united Republican Berkshire farmers with Salem merchants and rural Calvinists with Urban rationahsts was an Interpretation of postrevolutionary experience. More than any other event, the French Revolution defined the content and style of politics. More than any other act, the Jay Treaty influenced the development of party. A stränge and unreal debate developed in the 1790's which pictured two hostile groups, each dedicated to undermining the established Order. Both linked their vision of the future and their understanding of the present with events abroad. The general sympathy for France did not last much past 1793. As the Revolution turned radical and as war in Europe clouded the prospects of American neutrality, disillusionment spread. But many Americans did not lose faith. Those who became Republicans identified the cause of France with the cause of populär government everywhere. Britain's assault on Franco-American trade and her attempts to suppress enlightenment in Europe roused latent but highly nationalistic, anti-English emotions. If the French were defeated, Republicans believed, England would tyrannize the oceans and undermine American independence.* The Jay Treaty confirmed fears that some groups at home, hostile to republican institutions, were anxious to tie the United States to the Tory kingdom. The treaty was "pregnant with Evil," Governor Adams Said, not simply because it sacrificed commercial interests, but because "it may restore to Great Britain such an influence Over the Government and People of this Country, as may not be consistent with the general welfare."® T o Republicans the treaty meant abandoning neutrality, jeopardizing friendly relations with France, and becoming utterly dependent on Britain. Rejecting economic imperatives which

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drove many to accept the treaty, Republicans depicted their opponents as aristocrats bent on subverting the Republic. T o defend the cause of repubhcanism at home and abroad, Citizens formed societies in Boston, Portland, and throughout the nation. The appearance of these organizations aroused deep suspicion because they resembled the feared Jacobin chibs of France, which had seized control and engulfed the nation in a blood bath. The RepubHcan societies might be the vanguard of a movement to subvert estabhshed authority and remake America in the image of France, where the mob mied and distinctions of rank and wealth vanished. A harsh and divisive dialogue pervaded the political atmosphere. Men argued not over means but over ultimate ends. Republicans pictured their antagonists as aristocrats. British agents, former Tories, and refugees; Federalists characterized their adversaries as levelers, Jacobins, and anarchists dedicated to upsetting the settlement of 1789. Each condemned the other for placing enthusiasm for a foreign power Over loyalty to the Union. Both images were unreal, bearing but a faint connection with the inclinations of either group. Yet they rested on a semblance of truth, because extremists on both sides lent substance at times to the parties' images of the other. More important, however, the dominant elements in both parties were loyal to the arrangement of 1789. Republicans praised the French Revolution but would never accept political theory or practice that violated traditional notions of constitutionalism. JefFersonians did not relish the violence of revolutionary change abroad and had no plans to alter the distribution of wealth or to remodel the social structure at home. Most Federalists were similarly devoted to preserving the settled order. They became hos72

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tile to the Revolution because they believed the French had rejected the politics of Balance and overturned established authority without stabilizing a new one. Except for some highly placed extremists, however, few Federalists had serious intentions of recasting America in the image of Britain. Tlie party had its share of old patriots who regarded England primarily as the major bulwark against the spread of Gallic influence and the key to the nation's economic health." Paradoxically, while both parties were committed to the existing polity, disagreement appeared more fundamental, the political dialogue more intemperate, and the possibilities of compromise seemingly fewer than in almost any other period of American history. T h e roots of this conflict are to be found in the unstable and dynamic character of postrevolutionary American society. The Republican Leadership. Eighteenth Century Massachusetts was neither a pure democracy where the people ruled directly nor a closed preser\ e dominated by a hereditary elite. From the earliest days, political power dispersed and feil into the hands of Clusters of local groups. Ambitious and rising newcomers were able to gain access to Office and enter the local gentry, becoming the judges, justices of the peace, tax assessors, sheriffs, ministers, lawyers, doctors, and traders who constituted the ruling elite. ITiough farmers and artisans were usually content to let men of substance guide the Community, many could vote, demand justice, turn out an old representative, and attach themselves to factions eager to challenge long-entrenched intercsts. But generally ofEcials expected and enjoyed populär acquiescence. T h e Revolution did not tear apart the social fabric. In many towns the county leaders were patriots, and little dis73

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placement occurred, while in other communities Tones fled or retired from public life and old-line families made way for the new. The war opened numerous opportunities for men in the lower ranks of the gentry to gain prominence and improve their positions through mihtary Service, politics, and trade. Thus continuity and change were both part of the revolutionary experience. While the war did not cause the wholesale displacement of one group by another, it did alter the social structure, creating opportunities for many who lacked the wealth, family, or experience that characterized the older elites. As untrained and inexperienced men appeared on the scene competing for recognition, it was no longer as clear as it once had been who was entitled to lead. Moreover, even as the governing groups settled down and became better defined, they faced unprecedented problems: wartime economic dislocation, constitutional changes, and the formation of a viable union in place of the Confederation. Two great crises followed the Revolution—Shays' Rebellion and the debate over ratification. Twice Citizens challenged traditional leadership, but the threats to the social Order proved brief and not entirely successful. By 1790 Massachusetts and the nation had moved fast and far toward mastering discontent and pacifying the unruly. Confronting armed hostility, the judges and militia leaders, doctors and lawyers, merchants and capitalists, newcomers and oldtimers, stood united against disorder. The conflict Over the Constitution, however, was less clear-cut, though most of the gentry finally favored ratification. But the unity of the 1780's did not last, because the social Order was unstable. While the Revolution created new opportunities, it also weakened the traditional lines of authority. Groups who themselves had but recently arrived lacked the force of tradition and custom to buttress their 74

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Position. Moreover social mobility—the openness of professions, the varied chances in trade, the creation of new communities requiring leadership, and the rise in older communities of newcomers aspiring to prominence—^left persistent sources of tension. In this social context, two rival groups in the 1790's competed to guide the Commonwealth's future. Men's positions in the social structure shaped their responses to the events of the decade. Those most securely established in local office, trade, and finance, those Controlling the seats of authority in church and State, came to view the French Revolution with horror. Fearing that involvement would undermine prosperity, they also believed that the spread of French doctrine threatened the social Order. They recoiled from Jacobinism, clung to the protection of a British alliance, and attempted to uproot Subversion at home. Well-placed individuals such as the judges, justices, probate ofEcers, county trcasurers, sheriffs, the complex array of entrenched officials together with the older county families and their professional and mercantile allies, led the Federalist party. T h e sources of Republican leadership were different. T h e party attracted persons either outside the elite or enjoying a recently acquired and insecure position in local Society. They were often new men who came from rising families that had been excluded from the highest levels of influence and Standing. Frequently men of substance in their own communities, they desired but lacked countywide influence, and unlike some of the newly arrived had not gained a firm position in the social order. Rising from obscurity or modest circumstances, they identified revolution and republicanism at home and abroad with opportunity. T h e French had uprooted privilege, destroyed ecclesiastical and monarchic establishments, and had given power 75

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to those who had been excluded for centuries. Americans who condemned change and feared and distrusted populär rule cast doubt on the validity of republicanism. Federalism, according to Republicans, threatened the future of the newcomer, the ambitious man, the outsider. T o a few, the Hamiltonian financial system spelled the creation of a monied aristocracy that would rule the land and widen the distinctions between various levels of society. Federalist partiality for Britain appeared to mark that corrupt kingdom as a model for American Imitation. Federalist foreign policy moved the nation closer to war with France, bringing with it heavy taxes and the persecution of dissent. Federalist commercial policy doomed newly developed and profitable ties with France and the Continent. Within Massachusetts itself, Federalists hoarded power and privilege, narrowing rather than widening opportunity. T h e party stood for monopoly of local office, charter privileges, the natural resources of Maine, and the religious, institutional, and professional life of the Community. T h e nation was misruled, Republicans announced, because government did not truly reflect the interests of the people. Voters were often deceived and lacked direct representation. For generations they had submitted to a system of indirect rule whereby the lawyer, not the merchant, the local judge, not the farmer, sat in the General Court. But indirect government did not always work. It suffered anarchic breakdown in the 1780's and now a decade later once again was under heavy attack. Republicans repeatedly demanded direct representation. Communities should select men whose interests closely reflected those of the voters. Merchants, not lawyers, should sit for the trading towns; farmers, not judges, should represent the inland communities. Only then would an identity exist between voters and officials. 76

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T h e Republican appeal was essentially an attack on traditional sources of leadership, not a call for social upheaval but a demand for enlarged opportunities for the excluded. Finding difficulty in meeting the argument, Federalists rehearsed the notion of a harmony of interest and denounced their critics as "ignorant rieh men" eager for power. T h e Republican polemic proved to be more than shrewd propaganda: it worked. Merchants such as Orchard Cook and Jacob Crowninshield, farmers such as Joseph B. Varnum, and mechanics such as Thompson Skinner replaced many of the Federalist attorneys who sat in Congress. By questioning the assumption by which Federalists ruled, Republicans hoped to gain influence. T h e obstacles to opportunity must be weakened and above all the nation must avoid war with France and entanglement with Britain. T h e Channels of trade with the Continent and the Far East must remain open; expansive measures must replace repressive political and economic ones; access to corporate privilege must become available to everyone; and the professional and communal life of the State must comprehend groups that had been excluded previously. These were the general objectives of the Republican interest; their precise formulation varied. Eastern merchants were concerned with foreign trade and sharing in grants of corporate charters, while their inland allies were moved by other Problems. But everywhere Jeffersonians joined to remove the barriers to advancement. After two decades of struggle, the party enjoyed considerable success. In many communities Republicans became the dominant group, replacing the older leadership or at least sharing influence. In time they merged into the social Order and eventually distinctions blurred and became almost imperceptible. Party labels lost their meaning as the older differences narrowed and eventually disappeared, 77

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yet the experience of rivalry in the early Republic left a discernible trace. Amid the bitterness of political warfare, fine distinctions of position were maintained. Striving to achieve a coherent and secure place in New England life, Republicans constituted a social group united by ties of kinship and marriage. The Austins, Townsends, and Gerrys intermarried, as did the Harrises and Devenses of Charlestown; out in the Connecticut Valley marriage cemented ties between the families of William Lyman and Samuel Fowler. Eastern Republicans such as William Eustis and James Swan formed connections with the Langdons, New Hampshire's leading Jeffersonian family. The formation of Republican social connections was only one aspect of the processes by which aspiring elements united to further their interests. The party's development did not follow precisely the same course everywhere, but an examination of the sources of the Republican interest will indicate the character of the movement. The Republicanism of Inland Massachusetts. Throughout the rural communities of Massachusetts, from Middlesex to Hampshire County, from the eastern District of Maine to the western Berkshires, Republican groups challenged the reigning authorities. They did not enjoy equal success everywhere; in some areas outstanding leadership failed to compete with entrenched elements and circumstances were unfavorable to dissent. Out in the Berkshires, however, one of the earliest successful Republican organizations developed in the 1790's. Berkshire County was settled later than all other parts of the Commonwealth except Maine. As a consequence, its social structure was looser. Many of the towns were recently founded, others were not yet incorporated at the time of the Revolution, and local Centers of power were 78

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often ill-defined. Life seemed freer, less trammeled by settled ways and institutions than in the older parts of the State. Here religious dissent flourished and some of the purest heirs of Jonathan Edwards' Calvinism maintained the faith against the hberahsm of the commercial east. Here men moved to start afresh, to found their churches, and to win for themselves and their famihes greater control over their destinies. Despite its frontier quahties, Berkshire had a ruhng gentry drawn from wealthy early settlers who carried family authority from the Connecticut Valley into the hills further west. T h e names most commonly identified with Berkshire leadership at the time of the Revolution included the Dwights, the Ashleys, the Williamses, and their brilliant professional ornament, Theodore Sedgwick. But offzcialdom here was less secure, less well entrenched than elsewhere, and it was not surprising that the Revolution evoked demands from newcomers that power be shared. T h e northern towns had been growing more rapidly, demanded change, and provided leadership for the Berkshire constitutionalists in the late 1770's. T h e constitutionalists closed the courts and favored reforms broadening the base of participation in government.® In the end they forced the Dwights and Williamses to compromise, and as a result county leaders were united when the Shaysites challenged authority. But after the suppression of the rebels, tensions persisted in the upper levels of society, and by 1794 an Opposition to the Sedgwick connection had become active and powerful. Several figures typified Berkshire Republicanism. Thompson J. Skinner, Jr., was the most influential Jeffersonian in the far west.® A brigadier general of the militia, State S e n a t o r and treasurer, twice elected t o Congress, federal marshall, and commissioner of loans, he was the center of 79

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an important interest. He was the son of a Connecticut minister, became a mechanic, and migrated to Williamstown in 1775, where, with a brother, he was a carpenter and builder. Skinner emerged as one of the new leaders of the growing northern part of the county. He resisted the Shaysites and voted for the Constitution in the ratifying Convention, but after 1790 he split with the old county leadership. He opposed Sedgwick's bid for re-election to Congress in 1792 and 1794 and ran against Ephraim Wilhams in 1796, each time increasing his vote. Skinner's Position on the important public questions of the day was often unclear, for his campaigns reflected political shrewdness rather than a clear-cut programmatic commitment. Thus Skinner tried to outmaneuver Sedgwick in 1792 by favoring his own election as the Berkshire congressman and backing Sedgwick for the district seat, though Berkshire was the smallest of the three counties in the district and could not expect to choose two of the four representatives/ In 1796 the Skinnerites assiduously reassured people that while their man might have criticized the Jay Treaty, he preferred it to war.® The Skinner forces Struck their most consistent note when they professed faith in populär government and attacked rule by "the high ton'd Aristocrats, Monocrats, Demagogues, Pedagogues, Gogmagogs, Conspirators, and Federal Hopgoblins," who were usually pettifogging lawyers anxious to destroy liberty.® Throughout the county men of talent and ambition joined Skinner. In Williamstown, William Young, major in the militia and large landowner, was a warm Republican.^" In Stockbridge, Barnabas Bidwell, another son of a minister, studied for the bar under Sedgwick but, failing to secure a postmastership, found it more profitable to link his fortunes with the Skinnerites. Bidwell became a State Senator, county treasurer, congressman, and attorney gen80

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eral of the Commonwealth." Both Skinner and Bidwell later in their careers were defalcators of public funds, fled the State, and disgraced the party. A somewhat different brand of Berkshire Republicanism was represented by John Bacon and Reverend Thomas Allen, both Calvinists/^ Bacon graduated from Princeton in 1765 and preached at the Old South Church in Boston, where his Calvinism resulted in dismissal and retreat to a more hospitable environment. He opposed the constitutionalists and the Shaysites but changed his mind at least twice on the federal Constitution. A firm democrat, fearful of aristocratic designs, he was the only State Senator to condemn the Alien and Sedition Laws.^^ Becoming judge of the common pleas and later a congressman, he supported the Republican attack on the federal judiciary.'^ A consistent and outspoken critic of Hamiltonian finance, he was suspicious of banking and speculation, identifying lawyers and financial interests with antirepublicanism and •deism.'® Republicans insisted that since professional men had long enjoyed public office, the time had come for "the Farmers to be represented by one of their brethren." As "a practical husbandman," Bacon's interests were at one •with the people who sent him to Washington in 1800. Winning favor and ofEce, Bacon educated his son as a lawyer and young Ezekiel joined the Skinnerites and moved into his father's seat in Congress.^® Sharing Bacon's Calvinism and hostility to the entrenched judiciary were two of the most prominent religious figures in the Berkshires. Reverend Thomas Allen, the Congregational minister of Pittsield, was born in Northampton, where the family supported Jonathan Edwards, and he grew up a New Light Calvinist. Educated a t Han'ard, he settled in Pittsfield in 1764, preaching there f o r forty-six years. A prominent constitutionalist and anti81

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Shaysite, Allen did not seek political office but became a conspicuous example of Jeffersonian Calvinism." Eider John Leland shared with Allen the religious leadership of Berkshire Republicanism. An outstanding itinerant Baptist preacher, he spent his early career in the South, later migrating north to reclaim his native New England from sin. Settling in the town of Cheshire amid a large group of Rhode Island Baptists, Leland shared Allen's hostility to the judiciary, which stood between the people and government and enforced oppressive laws requiring men to Support established churches.'^ Düring the 1790's Skinner, Bidwell, Allen, Leland, the Bacons, and others began building a Republican Organization and bidding for political ofiice. A series of vacancies in county ofEces enabled Governors Hancock and Adams to appoint Skinnerites. By 1800 Repubhcans held a majority of the important positions, including most of the places on the Court of Common Pleas and those of the probate judge and sheriff.^® Success increased the power and prestige of the leadership, and after 1800 Berkshire became a Jeffersonian stronghold. The pattern of Republican growth in other inland areas was similar, although the party was not everywhere as successful. Hampshire and Worcester counties remained Federalist, while Middlesex and Norfolk became strongly Jeffersonian. In the first two counties, the Republicans never developed a leadership able to challenge local authority effectively. Except for Levi Lincoln of Worcester, the Republicans in the region lacked forceful, well-known personalities and the yeomen were content to follow the old county families. The Situation in Hampshire County was even worse, for the party there lacked anyone of Lincoln's stature and the old families continued to dominate the Connecticut Valley.^" These areas were settled somewhat 82

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earlier than the Berkshires, the leadership was more firmly entrenched, and the religious Situation was less favorable to dissent. Hampshire and Worcester were among the largest counties in the State; it was difficult for rival groups to organize and incipient Repubhcan Opposition never gained a foothold in local office. But in the counties to the east, a strong Jeffersonian group emerged, ably led and eminently prosperous. Middlesex County had an abundance of Repubhcan leadership. Cambridge alone boasted Elbridge Gerry, James Winthrop, and Dr. Aaron Hill. Though a merchant, a prominent revolutionary figure, and a heavy investor in public securities, Gerry seemed unable to follow the usual road to success. Instead of remaining in his native Marblehead, where he was a local power, he moved in the 1780's to Cambridge; he favored the objectives of centralization but opposed the Constitution. In Congress he supported the principles of Hamiltonian finance, only to retire from public life after two terms. Gerry re-emerged in public lifc at the end of the decadc, when he went to negotiate peace with France and later headed the Republican state ticket at home.^' Allied with Gerry were James Winthrop and Aaron Hill. Winthrop, the son of a Harvard mathematics professor, became university librarian and probate register of Middlesex County. Like Gerry he never really fitted into local Society. Often at odds with the College administration, he was denied succession to his father's chair and left Harvard in 1787.^^ Aaron Hill was the son of a local Cambridge worthy, graduated from Harvard, and entered militar)' scrvice during the Revolution. He studied medicine in Portsmouth and later switched to trade, but failed, returning to Cambridge in the 1790's. As a Republican leader, he became a state Senator, a mcmber of the Council, post-

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master of Boston, and a member of the party's central committee.^^ Another important Middlesex Republican was Newton's General William Hull. A prominent revolutionary soldier, Hull married into one of the county's leading families but never settled down within the gentry. He engaged in a variety of ventures, speculated in Yazoo lands in Georgia, and became financially hard-pressed. In the 1780's he practiced law, opposed the Shaysites, and was critical of the federal Constitution's centralizing tendencies. Journeying abroad in the 1790's, he spent some time in France, where he was favorably impressed by the Revolution. Back home he became brigadier general of the militia, judge of the common pleas, and Jefferson's governor of Michigan Territory.^^ From northern Middlesex came Joseph B. Varnum of Dracut, one of the area's most important national figures. Lacking formal education, Varnum did have the advantage of some inherited property, which he improved and farmed. He served in the Revolution and emerged as the Republican congressional candidate in the 1790's. In 1793 he defeated Samuel Dexter, a Charlestown lawyer well connected within the county elite, and won repeated re-election to Congress, becoming Speaker of the House in 1807 and later a United States Senator in 1810. Throughout his life he displayed a deep concern for personal religious experience.^® Not far from Dracut lived Samuel Dana. The son of a Tory minister driven from the county, Dana became a lawyer and competed for favor with Timothy Bigelow, another Groton attorney, who had the advantage of a marriage alliance with one of the county's most influential families, the Prescotts.^® Men such as Gerry, Varnum, Hull, Winthrop and Dana came into prominence in the revolutionary period, but did 84

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not achieve a secure position in Middlesex County. Ambitious, able, and impatient, not content to let all tlie local honors pass them by, they identified their interests with the cause of Republicanism. Like their brethren in the Berkshires, they bid for power by attacking the indirect rule of the old-line leadership. Thus Varnum insisted that Congressman Dexter represented neither merchants nor farmers because he was a lawyer. Looking over the state's congressional delegation, Jeffersonians complained: "But to have nine Lawyers, and not a Single Farmer, is really too much." Varnum was obviously preferable because "in one word, he is a real Farmer," an honest man who "has not courted the rieh, or attempted to advance his interests by stockjobbing."^^ Indeed, he was a prosperous husbandman who expanded his original homestead from one hundred and sixty to five hundred acres, largely improved, cultivated, and protected by ten miles of fencing. With strong leadership, Middlesex Republicans were effective, obtained local office, and built a good Organization. Governor Hancock appointed Winthrop to the Court of Common Pleas when the first vacancy appeared, while Hull's command of the militia was another source of influence. The county became a party bastion and did not waver until the War of 1812. The origin of Republican leadership throughout the inland areas was much the same as in Berkshire and Middlesex counties. Everywhere ambitious men competed with established authority, some with greater, others with less, success. Yet the Republican challenge had another dimension, which reached deeply into the hearts of the people and gave Bay State Jeffersonianism an emotional appeal that the contest for preferment hardly suggested. At the same time that men sought to enlarge opportunities in one sphere, they 85

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were questioning the legitimacy of power in another; just as they resisted secular authority they also opposed ecclesiastical establishment.

Republicanism and the Churches. Religious problems aroused men because they were local and personal, and because they stimulated disputation by many of the most articulate members of the Community. T h e growing controversy over the establishment was important not only because of the substantive issues involved, but also because it gave parties a cause which cut across sectional, economic, and class lines. Advocacy of the Separation of church and State gave Republicans a populär issue which appealed to large groups dissatisfied with the Standing order and opened fresh possibilities of forging new links between the party and the people. T h e Spiritual life of the Commonwealth underwent important changes after independence. Congregationalism became weaker, dissent grew stronger, and problems of church and State were persistently troublesome. Each year after 1780 the establishment lost ground, and by the 1790's the instability in religious life propelled rival denominations into politics. T h e defenders of the standing order took refuge behind the Federalist banner while the forces of dissent rallied to the Republican Standard. T h e debate between the two groups echoed the secular dialogue of the party politicians. Before Americans had much time to enjoy the fruits of independence, many were lamenting the weakening of traditional bonds between the churches and Society. T h e forces of disruption were not new; but the Revolution was disillusioning, for instead of fostering unity it only gave further inipetus to change. 86

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T h e conflicts over the Great Awakening in the early decades of the Century had shattered the homogeneity and stability of the estaMishment. A deep theological and moral gulf developed between the New Light Calvinist Champions of the Edwardsian vision and the hberal Congregationahst advocates of a rational and benevolent deity.^® Besides undermining the internal unity of the establishment, the Awakening also stimulated dissent. Calvinists who could not capture their local societies for the Edwardsian view became Separates, forming new churches founded on the true gospel. Moreover the Awakening inspired theological speculation and personal inquiry, further Splintering the faith. Thus Baptists emerged as a growing sect, accepting much of the Edwardsian doctrine but rejecting infant baptism and the mingling of secular with ecclesiastical authority.^® Before the Revolution, Baptists, Quakers, and Anglicans had secured temporary and uncertain relief from the bürden of supporting the established churches. Wlien the Commonwealth moved toward a constitutional settlement in the late 1770's, these groups sought a more satisfactory arrangement. T h e Baptists especially had perennially fought for complete freedom from religious taxation. They were greatly disappointed by the new State Constitution of 1780.'° Article I I I of the Declaration of Rights guaranteed freedom of worship but continued public Support of the ministry. W h i l e confirming the old establishment, it also proclaimed the equality of all denominations. Dissenters could request that their ministerial taxes be applied to their own societies, but a clear-cut Solution was evaded. In practice, Congregationalists received public funds and the sects could obtain their share only by great effort, after excessive harassment, and sometimes not at all. In the next three

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decades, dissenters engaged in suits and controversies to force recalcitrant towns to conform to the Constitution. Persistent and repeated disputes divided communities and left many men deeply dissatisfied with the relation of church to state.®^ In time the tensions mounted because dissent flourished, making deep inroads into a hitherto sohdly Congregationalist Community. The Methodists launched their first organized assault on New England; by 1820 their membership rose to 25,000 served by 125 ministers.®^ T h e Universahsts also became a consequential group; and the Baptists, the largest group, made enormous strides.®® They were traditionally strong in the southern towns bordering on Rhode Island, but they now advanced into the southern portions of Worcester and Hampshire counties and into Maine, attracting individuals who found the spiritual life of the Congregational churches dead, their doctrines uninspired, and the necessity to pay the parish tax both burdensome and contrary to the dictates of conscience.®^ T h e nature of the dissenters' appeal was most clearly suggested by the regions in which they made impressive gains, notably, Maine, where the number of Baptists societies doubled between 1800 and 1810, and together with the Methodists they outnumbered Congregationalists by 1820.®® Here on New England's frontier, much of it unpeopled and in the early stages of settlement, the personal and emotional experience characteristic of dissent was more attractive than the institutionalized faith of the establishment. Moreover, the very form of their Organization gave Baptists and Methodists advantages Over Congregationalism. They dispensed with a learned ministry, cared little for the orderly processes of church-building, and instead relied on itinerant circuit riders to preach and convert. Thus the sects were making important strides, and the 88

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Reverend William Bentley reported that an unprecedented number of Congregational pulpits were empty, with many parishes deeply split over doctrine and the settlement of new candidates.^® Upholders of the Standing order were shocked and bewildered as they watched "a set of wandering and vagabond itinerants, assuming various appelations, and pretending to different degrees of orthodoxy" stream "through the land with their magpye voices," spreading "discord and fanaticism in every section of New England." The sects clearly came "to undermine the settled and ordained Pastor . . . and break up and destroy all regulär Societies."" As dissent grew, Opposition to the establishment intensified. But the Problems facing Congregationalism—Calvinist and liberal—were not limited to threats from without; the Standing order itself was deeply troubled and profoundly split internally. The postrevolutionary years disappointed the Congregational ministry. It complained of a declension in morals, of a reluctance to support the pulpit adequately, and worst of all, of the spread of deism and atheism.''® Tliough none had contributed more to the revolution than the ministry, wrote Peter Thacher, "the clergy of NewEngland are, of all men the most miserable.Bad enough that heterodoxy spread among the ill-educated and poor farmers of the backcountry, but the sophisticated and wealthy merchants of the seaboard seemed inclined to cast off their Calvinist heritage in favor of a liberal faith that eventually became Unitarianism.^" Thacher complained that men believed "that, as the clergy are the creatures of the people, they ought to be kept in the dosest dependence upon them: That they may, at any time, dismiss them from their Service."^' Sensing a loss of status, feeling clerical tenure insecure, and apprehensive Over declining morals and a fragmenting of faith, upholders of the religious order 89

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were profoundly disturbed. T h e disorganization of church life went much deeper than institutional difficulties and a lessening of piety; there was also a crisis over the future of Congregationalist belief. Because the outstanding and articulate figures among the clergy were Federalists, historians have generally viewed the ministry as monolithically committed to one party. Actually its loyalties were divided. T h e outspoken group whose sermons survived were not altogether typical of the great mass of pastors. Many Calvinists became Republicans because of their democratic social theory and their hostility to the liberal ideas of the Federalist elite on the seaboard. William Bentley, whose knowledge of religious life was extraordinary, noted that outside N e w England, Calvinists were generally Jeffersonians.^^ He also believed that the Federal Calvinists in Massachusetts were not representative of Congregationalism. There were influential and articulate Jeffersonian Calvinists in the Bay State.^® T h e extent and origins of the political conflict within the Calvinist ministry were obscure, but the clergy did become hotly involved in partisan politics.^ T h e temper of Federal Calvinism was dramatically revealed by its response to the French Revolution. A t first Calvinists sympathized with the French, as did most Americans, viewing the downfall of Catholicism as a belated fulfillment of the Reformation. But some soon had second thoughts. Insecure themselves, beset with internal problems, they began to condemn the Revolution as "better information, and the further development of the character of the French rulers" revealed their original error.^® T h e revolution undermined not only false religion, but all religion. Moreover, the spread of French influence to America threatened the secular authorities on whom Federal Calvinists had come to rely. Toward the end of the 1790's, the Reverend Jedidiah 90

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Morse of Charlestown spread word that a secret conspiracy, a branch of the European Order of the Illuminati, was seeking to overthrow State and church.^® Though Morse's charges were fantastic and undocumented, he sounded a note calculated to rally Calvinists against the spread of irreligion. His alarm tapped an important well of eighteenth Century Calvinist feeling, its strain of millennialism.^' Federalist ministers saw the French Revolution as a catadysm presaging the millennium. T h e "immense waste and depopulation of the human race" perpetrated by the blood baths of France and the wars in Europe were all part of God's plan "for the universal reign of the Messiah." For "after the destruction of the present guilty and incorrigible inhabitants, a surviving remnant may be so disciplined as to become the loyal subjects of the Prince of Peace, and enjoy the glorious privileges of his universal kingdom."« W i t h visions of a millennial holocaust and a conspiracy of Illuminati, Calvinists looked to Federalism to block the spread of Jacobinism, atheism, and their American exponents, the Democratic-Republicans. Through their "self-created" societies, their sympathy for French social changes, and their Opposition to a religious establishment, Republicans marked themselves as enemies of order and the instruments of Illuminisni. Confronting such an enemy, thcse Calvinists overlooked the Arminianism and deism of the eastern Federalist leadership. T h e immediate danger required religious and secular authority to unite against the common foe. Morse devoted much of his energy to forging organizational unity among Congregationalists, preferably through some sort of Presbyterian polity. He hoped to bury or obscure the doctrinal differences among Hopkinsians, moderate Calvinists, and Anninians by emphasizing the necessity to resist the 91

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spread of indifference. But he underestimated the seriousness of theological disagreement and his efforts were unsuccessful.^® Indeed at the very time Morse was working for ecclesiastical union, the first rumblings of the Unitarian schism threatened to destroy the practical alliance of Federalist clergy and ultimately to undermine the estabhshment. The Standing order was further weakened because Calvinism itself did not speak with one voice; some rejected the social analysis of Morse and his colleagues, finding Repubhcanism, not Federahsm, the hope of the true faith. The Jeffersonian Calvinists preached that the real sowers of illuminism and deism were the Federalists and their clerical allies. Indeed deism was "the Cornerstone of Federahsm," "and the Deistical Idea among Federalists, that there is no Religion among the people but what springs from the Coercion of Civil Government, and that all Religion is a mere Engine of State, is demonstrably false. There is a State Religion and there is a Gospel Religion. They are essentially different."®" The true church of Christ did not require public sanction but desired only independence and tolerance, for when pulpit combined with sword it was reduced "to a level with civil things." This union was "the Corner on which Satan was to build his fabric of infidelity," since a church which seeks "earthly greatness" also "thrives in the midst of wealth and honors, delights in war, and pursues with zeal whatever christianity forbids."®^ Republican Calvinists not only rejected an alliance with government but also reafHrmed faith in the people. Observing that the principles of the Revolution had lately come under attack, they recalled that Americans had once "believed, that the supreme power is in the people . . . For, at that day, the word democracy, had no frightful sound; nor were our greatest and best men ashamed to call 92

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themselves Democrats."®^ "In the common people of this Country," the Reverend Thomas Allen wrote to Jefferson, "is to be found the chief Virtue and Piety of the Land."®® Just as Christianity fulfilled Spiritual needs, Republicanism was "perfectly suited to the political interests of the common people" because it demanded "such a sacrifice of the passions, such a devotion to the public good, such undeviating regard to justice and peace, that even the common people cannot long preserve it in its purity."®^ Men had succumbed to the sins of Federalism but they still could do their Christian duty and enlist in a movement to overthrovi' the religious establishment and secure the rights of conscience. While Federal Calvinists interpreted Jefferson's election in 1800 as evidence for cataclysmic millennialism, Republican Calvinists greeted the new dispensation as "the rising of 'the morning Star.' " The itinerant Republican minister David Austin proclaimed, "A new day opens upon the gospel fields and upon the American nation, and through them to all nations."^^ Everywhere were signs and portents of a new birth, of revival, and Spiritual regeneration. The death of Hamilton and the disgrace of Burr, twin enemies of Republicanism, were a warning to Federalists that they were "fighting against God . . . and God in his holy providence is thwarting their schemes."®® But the best evidence of reawakening was changes in the Spiritual life of the nation. "Never did this land see such a body of sound Calvinists as at the present day," wrote Pittsfield's leading Calvinist to the nation's foremost deist." Calvinists proudly pointed to the Second Great Awakening, which began around 1800, as proof that "God is taking care of his own cause, for never since the settlement of this Country has there been such glorious revivals of Religion as since President Jefferson presided."®® 93

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Jeffersonians might rejoice at the Coming of the New Jerusalem, but revival alone could not destroy the union of church and State legally imbedded in the institutions of the Commonwealth. Because it was essential to enter politics to reshape the secular order, John Bacon of Stockbridge and the Reverend Joseph Barker of Middleboro went to Congress, John Leland led others who sat in the General Court, while the ministers Solomon Aiken of Dracut, Samuel Niles of Abington, Thomas Allen of Pittsfield, and others less articulate and more obscure advocated the cause of Republicanism. These Jeffersonian Calvinists were not an isolated group lost in a sea of Congregational orthodoxy, for the advance of dissent added strength to the enemies of establishment. Republicans called on all groups, regardless of doctrinal differences, to unite against "the Aristocratical Faction" which "would rejoice to see the day when a rigorous act of uniformity should take place in the State, which would deprive Baptists, Methodists, Quakers and all sects but their own of religious rights and immunities."^® Continuous controversy over church taxes and a series of unfavorable judicial decisions intensified dissatisfaction with the Standing order and pushed the sects further into politics. Wherever dissent flourished, Republicans generally found political support. Though Hampshire and Worcester counties were heavily Federalist, the party showed strength in towns with Baptist concentrations. In Cheshire, the home of Eider John Leland, the highest vote the Federalists ever polled between 1800 and 1 8 1 2 was seven out of a total of 241. Similarly, towns in Bristol and Plymouth counties and in the District of Maine, where Baptists and Methodists were numerous, generally voted Republican.®" At the same time that a common antagonism to the establishment forged a political union of Calvinists and dissenters within the Republican party, these groups also 94

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found Support from JefFersonians, who shared neither their doctrines nor their grievances. T h e Spiritual indinations of much of the Repubhcan leadership differed httle from that of their Federahst counterparts. James Sullivan, Levi Lincoln, and the Crowninshields of Salem were liberal Congregationalists with Unitarian tendencies similar to those of the mercantile and professional elites in the larger eastern communities. Finding themselves under continued attack from Federalist clergy, they lashed back by accusing their critics of prostituting religion for partisan ends, of misrepresenting Jefferson's views, and of Converting pulpits into sources of "party rant, and defamation."®' They also perceived the possibilities of exploiting the religious Situation for political advantage. Jeffersonian Calvinists, all sorts of dissenters, and the Republican leadership found common interests in Opposition to Federalist authority in church and State. Since clerical influence and secular power supported each other, an attack on one would weaken both. The Republican leadership thus sought to become the champion of dissent and disestablishment. Early in his first term, Jefferson issued an address to propagate the principles of Separation.®' In Massachusetts, Levi Lincoln, William Eustis, and Charles Jarvis had long sympathized with those opposed to ministerial taxes.®^ James Sullivan was the legal defender of the sects, which in Maine found a friend in William King." Jeffersonians repeatedly called on dissenters to "cement the basis of civil and religious Liberty, by confounding the artifices of those AngZo-federalists, who would establish an hierarchy in Massachusetts, and suppress the freedom of Divine worship."®® Bay State Jeffersonians planned carefully. W h e n they learned that T o m Paine intended to publish a third volume 95

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of the Age of Reason, they asked the ancient Sam Adams to induce Paine not to embarrass the party any further in New England. For Massachusetts Repubhcans hoped to nurture the growth of theistic faith.®® "It deserves a thought," the Reverend WiUiam Bentley wrote, "how much the common interest of mankind will be served by weakening the Congregational Churches, by strengthening the Baptists, by deposing the more enlightened sect & not putting any check to superstition."®'^ Bentley and his Republican congregation in Salem were moving toward Unitarianism and had no personal sympathy for "illiterate enthusiasts," but they contemplated religious variety "as favorable to religious liberty" and to the cause of the party. Consequently, they shrewdly gave financial support to local dissenters. "The Baptists have finished & dedicated their new Brick Meeting House," Bentley wrote. "They boast much of it & not one of them has yet discovered that the Republicans built it. It is not amiss they should think it their own."®' Thus eastern Republicans attempted to forge a link with populär religion. Viewing the establishment as a bulwark of Federalism, they hoped to undermine both by fostering multiplicity. On this basis, Bay State Republicanism could unite lural Calvinists and urban rationalists, inland dissenters from the religious Order and urban critics of the social order. It was through such processes that a diverse coalition pf farflung interests became a political party. Political change in the eastern maritime communities and the District of Maine further enlarged, broadened, and strengthened the Republican formation.

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In Urban communities up and down the Massachusetts coastline a strong Republican party challenged Federalism's right to speak for the maritime interest. Traders, capitahsts, and mechanics whose welfare Federahst rule threatened forged a new poHtical instrument seeking to reshape the young Republic. Republicanism in the Metropolis. The Hancock faction formed the core of the Repubhcan party in Boston. Repeatedly controUing the governorship and influential in town affairs for many years, it enjoyed broad support until the neutrahty crisis disrupted the Boston consensus and spht the city into hostile camps. As long as the Hancock connection had bowed to the sentiments of the town's major interests, it retained power. But when sympathy for France led it to oppose Jay's Treaty and thereby to incur the risk of war, it ahenated the majority of merchants and artisans and defeat became inevitable. The sources of Boston Repubhcanism were complex, for parties did not form along occupational hnes but appealed to a broad spectrum of men in various walks of Hfe. James Bowdoin, son of the deceased former governor, was a successful merchant who invested funds in land and pubhc securities and later became Jefferson's minister to France.' Russell Sturgis was a respectable businessman and für trader also involved in banking.^ Samuel Brown had prospered sufficiently during the Revolution to buy Thomas Hutchinson's estate. With others in New York and Boston 97

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he explored trade in the Orient in the early lygo's and later served as a naval agent under JefFerson.® Gustavus and Nathaniel Fellows were sons of a Cape Ann sea captain. They entered commerce before the Revolution, became staunch patriots, and flourished. Nathaniel bought a loyalist estate in Boston, was a shipowner, and controlled a Cuban coffee plantation worth $350,000 at his death. He traded with France and both he and Sam Brown were involved in the Union Bank. They also owned an armed vessel in the late 1790's.^ John Brazer started as a ship carpenter, operated a störe, and in the 1790's entered overseas trade along with Ezra Davis, whom he made a partner. Davis sailed to Europe and the West Indies, was in Paris during the reign of terror, and later came home to assumc control of the firm after Brazer retired. He spent the latter part of his life in the Boston customs house.® A leading Methodist, Arnos Binney, was an enterprising and shrewd retail grocer who also invested in soap, candle, and glass manufacturing. As a naval agent during the War of 1812, he made a large fortune contracting for supplies.® Among the artisans and manufacturers no Republican was better known or more articulate than Benjamin Austin. He and his brother Jonathan were active revolutionary patriots and after the war operated a ropewalk. Jonathan served as secretary of State from 1806 to 1808 and as State treasurer from 1 8 1 1 to 1812. Politically more important and a tireless polemicist, Benjamin sat several years in the State Senate until the Federalists purged him. In 1803 Jefferson appointed him commissioner of loans.^ Bela Clap, another artisan leader, was a contractor and builder of many of Boston's fine structures. He commanded a Company of troops sent to suppress the Shaysites and later organized the Republican faithful on a ward level.' Republican supporters among the town's physicians included David Townsend and William Eustis. They both 98

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practiced medicine in the army, Townsend later becoming active in the Society of the Cincinnati and inspector of pot and pearl ashes under Hancock.® Eustis also held the office of surgeon of Castle Island. After the war he entered politics, serving against the Shaysites and representing Boston in the General Court. A man of considerable ambition, he failed to obtain a satisfactory military appointment under the federal government and preferred to continue his private practice. Even after party differences became bitter, he maintained good relations with Federalists, who considered him socially respectable and a moderate force among Republicans. In 1800 and 1802 Boston elected him to Congress; he later became Madison's Secretary of W a r and governor of the Commonwealth.'" Dr. Charles Jarvis was the best Republican orator in the Bay State. He and his brother, Leonard, had been dose to Hancock. Leonard was federal collector of excises and served in the General Court, where he was active on the Committee for the Sale of Eastern Lands, acquiring holdings in Maine and subsequently moving there. Charles was the head of a large family of prominent Republicans. Graduating from Harvard in 1766, Charles Jarvis received medical training in Europe and then returned to build a successful practice in Boston. A populär figure, he served many years in the legislature and was a delegate to the ratifying Convention in 1788, where he voted for the Constitution. Jarvis was a leading Republican Speaker in town meeting and the General Court; Jefferson appointed him surgeon of the Marine Hospital in Charlestown." T h e outstanding Republican lawyer in Massachusetts was James Sullivan. Possessing little formal education, Sullivan nevertheless built up a populär legal business. As an ambitious and active publicist, one of Hancock's dosest advisers, he preferred the freedom and financial rewards of the bar to high judicial office, though he served as State 99

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attorney general from 1790 to 1806. Deeply attached to populär government, Sullivan was critical of speculators, including those in his own party. He was also more quickly disillusioned with the French Revolution than many of his colleagues. Socially respectable, he was considered a restraining influence by Federalists, who did not discharge him when they assumed power. In 1804 Sullivan became the Republican Standard bearer for governor and led the party to victory in 1807 and 1808.^'^ Two of Sullivan's leading professional colleagues were George Blake, who became United States District Attorney under Jefferson, and Perez Morton. The son of a tavernkeeper, Morton went to Harvard, later studied law, and was an active patriot. He accumulated wealth during the war, built a mansion in Dorchester, acquired extensive property throughout New England, and was a prominent investor in Georgia's Yazoo lands. Morton became Speaker of the Republican-controlled legislature and State attorney general in 1811.'® This diverse group of Boston Republicans was bound together by a common response to the challenges of the 1790's. While many of the town's elite became disillusioned with the French experiment, fearing that the spread of Jacobinism threatened the social order and might entangle the nation in foreign adventures, Republican Citizens remained committed to the Revolution. The Hancock faction had won power less through connections with influential families than by cultivating the favor of farmers and artisans in the metropolis and elsewhere. In addition, James Sullivan and William Eustis were ambitious climbers who were respectable but never feit wholly accepted by the local gentry. Sullivan had attached himself to Hancock early, battled the governor's rivals, attacked the monopoly of the Massachusetts Bank, and was legal champion of the 100

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dissenters. Eustis never possessed the wealth he wanted or thought he needed to reahze his aspirations. Though he owned some pubhc securities and dabbled in trade, he complained that he lacked the fortune to obtain high office. " I t was once objected to me when a candidate," he wrote, "that I did not hve in a splendid house hke the other gentlemen." Disillusioned with his pubhc prospects, he found that pohties forced him to mix "with men who are not so good or well-meaning as m y s e l f . " " Benjamin Austin preached a different and more radical Version of Boston Repubhcanism, directed to the lower ranks of the urban populace, and he occasionally disturbed the Repubhcan gentry. Appeahng to independent tradesmen and mechanics, who shared less fully than others in the prosperity of the 1790's, Austin argued that centrahzation had been disappointing. T h e urban groups had welcomed the Constitution as the salvation of native enterprise but not all had shared equally in the fruits. While public finances had been reformed, new national and state banks founded, and domestic shipping protected, the interests of artisans and tradesmen were inadequately promoted. T h e encouragement of imports yielding large customs revenues needed to fund the public debt seemed more important than the adoption of a program of vigorous economic nationalism. TTie old coalition of merchants and artisans who had effected ratification and erected the Union Bank to "save the Commerce of this town from bankruptcy" was foundering because local aristocrats combined with Tory factors to overpower the middling interest of young businessmen just entering trade and honest mechanics in need of custom.'® M e n who had linked their fortunes to the populär Hancock faction, who feit alienated from the reigning gentry and were anxious to ensure wider opportunities for new101

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comers, together with independent artisans and tradesmen demanding protection against British competition identified the French cause with their own interests. Sympathy for the French and Opposition to Jay's Treaty enjoyed populär Support until sober second thoughts combined with fear of war to turn Boston against the Repubhcan leadership. The party lost influenae and became increasingly isolated from the town's dominant interests until the end of the decade, when the dangers of war with France split the Federalists. Seizing the opportunity, Bay State Jeffersonians challenged the hegemony of Federalism in the metropolis and throughout the Massachusetts mercantile Community. Federalist Disunity in the Maritime Towns. Though Federalists had enjoyed massive support along the seaboard, their dominant position was seriously threatened toward the end of the decade. In Salem, Marblehead, Lynn, Saco, Wiscasset, and Barnstable, Republicans became the majority party. In other communities, such as Boston, Federalists retained supremacy, but everywhere the drift toward war with France deeply troubled urban groups.^' The extreme Federalists—the Essex Junto, the followers of Hamilton and Timothy Pickering—openly broke with President Adams because he sought a peaceful settlement with France. Discovering that his policies were genuinely populär, especially in New England, where the trading towns favored peace, the Hamiltonian faction concluded that the merchants were unreliable. Stephen Higginson reported that even the "best men may indeed differ" on whether to negotiate with France.^'' George Cabot and Timothy Pickering both noted that traders were greedily anxious to do business with the French.^® In August 1798, lOS

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Boston's Congressman Harrison G . Otis, who had worked closely with the Hamiltonians, received word from Richard Codman, an old Harvard classmate and Boston merchant residing in Paris, that haste was essential to avoid war. By 1799 Otis, undoubtedly mirroring the dominant sentiment in the city, had broken with the extremists and gone over to the President." After 1798, Hamilton and his alHes could no longer speak for the merchant Community, which predominantly followed the President.^® John Adams was less an able politician than a statesman of stubborn integrity and sturdy nerves. An eaily critic of the French Revolution and a supporter of Jay's Treaty, he would not tolerate Gallic attacks on American shipping or insults to American nationality. He strengthened the country's military arm and adopted a firm diplomatic posture to convince the French that Yankees could not be intimidated. Ready to fight if necessary, Adams much preferred negotiations. Exposure of the X Y Z Affair, in which the French demanded a bribe before they would negotiate with the American commissioners sent to avert war, aroused patriotic passions and temporarily undermined the Opposition. Hamiltonians pressed harder for war, hoping to wed the nation firmly to Britain and permanently to brand the Republicans as traitors, and thus to ensure Federalist power for years to come. By dispatching another embassy instead of declaring war, the President outraged the war faction and upset their fondest dreams. His Cambridge friend and negotiator, Elbridge Gerry, became the center of attack because he had remained in Paris after his fellow commissioners had left, thereby keeping alive the hope for peace. Hamiltonians denounced him as a tool and dupe of the French, subjecting him to abuse which only political nec103

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essity restrained them from unleashing against the Chief Executive. The President stuck by his old friend, reahzing that Gerry's aims and enemies were his own.^^ The election of 1800 found the prowar Federalists in a predicament. Opposed to the President's peace policy, depressed by the prospect of a Convention with France, they could not desert Adams without handing the election to Jefferson. Publicly Hamiltonians supported Adams, but privately they v^^orked for his running mate, Charles C. Pinckney, creating a split which opened the way for Cooperation between Adams Federalists and Massachusetts Republicans. The desire for peace brought many partisans closer together. After coming home, Gerry staunchly defended the President and favored his re-election. Some Republicans wanted to coalesce with moderate Federalists and Support both Adams and Jefferson. This scheme never materialized and the party divided, some favoring Jefferson, others Adams. The Adams Republicans believed that the best way to crush the war faction of the party was to re-elect the President. Since Jefferson had no chance of carrying the Bay State, they thought it best to throw their weight behind Adams by supporting his peace policy to render him independent of the war faction in his own party. If successful, Adams could more effectively destroy the Hamiltonians than could Jefferson, who was unpopulär in New England.^^ Cooperation between Adams Republicans and Federalists became apparent in the State canvass eight months before the presidential poll. Gerry was the Republican candidate for governor, pledged to Adams and campaigning against the "war hawks."^® He ran extraordinarily well, greatly increasing the Republican vote over previous years, and almost won. Hundreds of Adams Federalists deserted 104

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their party to Support him, and some observers thought the President had intervened on Gerry's behalt.^'* In Bristol County, for instance, the Federal senatorial ticket polled twice as many votes as the Repubhcans, but Gerry carried the county. Throughout the eastern communities, Republicans ran strongly and duphcated their showing in the fall congressional elections, notably in the Federahst bastion of Boston. The RepubHcan candidate, Dr. Wilham Eustis, was shrewdly chosen to unite moderates in both parties.'^ He won by garnering 48 per cent of the city vote along with big majorities in the surrounding towns and became the only Jeffersonian Boston sent to Washington. The spht in the metropolis revealed serious divisions within urban Society and marked the development of a powerful RepubHcan commercial interest in Massachusetts. The RepubHcan Merchants. Urban interests had never been monohthic; fissures had always existed, for the varied and complex groups who populated the port towns had numerous and conflicting ideas of how best to advance their welfare. The prospect of war with France, however, heightened differences and polarized groups. Rising entrepreneurs, whose fortunes rested directly on commercial ties with France, together with others whose advancement required both peace and access to privilege long enjoyed by the well-established, challenged Federalist control of the maritime towns. Though Britain enjoyed a primary place in American trade, substantial opportunities in the French empire attracted particular merchants and communities. Tlie Revolution was expected to enhance Gallic hospitality to Yankee enterprise by freeing the land from the ancient shackles of a feudal order and transforming it into the leading commercial power. Once able to compete successfully with 105

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Britain, France would eventually engross "a great propoition of ye American Commerce."^® T h e possibilities of developing new business ties fired the Imagination of a group of ambitious Republican traders led by the resourceful James Swan. A commercial operator of considerable scope and daring, Swan was a Scottish immigrant who had served an apprenticeship in a Boston counting house before the Revolution." He was active in patriot poHtics, served on the Massachusetts Board of W a r , and acquired wealth which he invested in Maine lands, Tory real estate, and pubhc securities. Burdened with nonliquid assets, he feil into financial difEculties in the 1780's and moved to France to recoup his fortune. There he explored the opportunities for expanding Franco-American trade, cultivated leading merchants, and circulated only among men of the first rank, a practice which he found "much more agreeable, & cheaper."^® Swan's success hinged on political connections in France. As a government contractor, fresh opportunities opened in 1793 when the outbreak of war in Europe caused food shortages, which forced the French Republic to establish the Commission des Subsistences to solve the supply problem. Being dose to many officials, Swan suggested that the French export to America wines, brandies, silks, laces, satins, and similar domestic produce in exchange for foodstuffs. Tlie entire Operation would be conducted by his firm at a 2 per cent commission, using American merchants and shipping to escape capture. T h e French were eager to cxploit American neutrality and also to finance purchases abroad with domestic products and foreign credit. Between 1794 and 1796, as ofEcial purchasing agent for the French in America, Swan dispatched over a hundred shiploads, until the French eventually exhausted their 106

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credit and were unable to obtain additional funds. Swan complained bitterly that American traders and bankers were unsympathetic and refused to make additional loans. Tlie Jay Treaty was another serious blow to bis enterprise and he publicly condemned Boston mercbants for supporting tbe agreement. Indeed bis entire business faced imminent disaster. Antagonized by the treaty, the French began to seize American vessels, while agreements with Holland, Spain, and Prussia ended their dependence on Yankee supplies. Swan feil into disrepute, bis firm dissolved, and it became unsafe to return to Paris, even thougb the Republic owed bim 1,000,000 livres tournois, or about $191,000.^^ Before the entire enterprise collapsed Swan had involved a group of Americans, including several Bostonians, in France. Benjamin Hichborn, Boston born and Harvard educated, had served in the American Revolution and later became a leading Republican lawyer. In 1794 he was in L e Havre, where he successfully negotiated a sale to the Commission des Subsistences.®" Similarly, Benjamin Jarvis, the son of Dr. Charles Jarvis, also supplied the Commission. Another American in France, John Higginson, was the son of Stephen Higginson, who became an extreme anti-Adams Federalist. But the father was probably unaware that bis son was a Swan agent receiving American goods for the French government.^' In the United States Swan also found mercbants eager to do business. Because of the danger of British seizures, the French insisted that subagents be politically reliable so that the enemy would not receive clues to ship movements. Swan relied on trusted firms in various ports along the coast. William Jarvis, another son of Dr. Jarvis, was a young trader trained in Virginia, from where he retumed to establish a Boston house with a southern partner. Jarvis 107

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prospered until he got involved with Swan's subagents, the Murrays of N e w York, who were speculators in assignats, breadstuffs, and rice. Jarvis endorsed $38,000 for the Murrays, and when they failed he feil with them. Subsequently, he went to sea, became a successful merchant captain, and repaid his debts. Jefferson appointed him consul at Lisbon, where he also conducted a trading Operation.®^ In Salem, Swan's man was Elias Hasket Derby, who in 1794 was neutral toward France and critical of Britain.®® Charlestown became a Republican stronghold despite its proximity to Federalist Boston. Several of the town's prominent businessmen led the party, among them Matthew Bridge, a shipowner, who together with Swan exported lumber from Maine to France.®^ T h e Swan connection constituted a group having direct economic ties with France, but it was neither as successful nor as important as the Crowninshields of Salem. In the first few decades after independence, Salem was one of the nation's great commercial marts. Here men founded new fortunes and planned ambitious adventures to exotic parts of the world, penetrating the tea trade of China and the pepper, sugar, coffee, and textile markets of southeastern Asia. Most successful was Elias Hasket Derby, whose daring, organizational skill, and business acumen brought him a fortune of about a million dollars. But his was only one of a number of families which acquired wealth and with it social and political position. Among the Salem traders, the most prominent were the Crowninshields.®® T h e founder of the family fortune, George Crowninshield, Sr., rose from the deck of a ship to a counting house.®® T h e family was not important either before or during the Revolution, when it began to acquire capital and experience. T h e eider Crowninshield supplied the gov108

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ernment with clothing during the war and in l y g i owned $12,000 in public securities.®^ But his most important asset was his five sons. These able young men—Jacob, John, Richard, Benjamin, and George, Jr.—went to sea very young, traveling around the world and gaining the knowledge and skills necessary for success. They quickly wen commands of vessels for other Salem houses, earning handsome shares which increased the clan's resources. Thus Jacob netted some $4,000 on one voyage for E . H. Derby. W h e n the brothers sailed for George Crowninshield & Co., as they often did, the captain's share was kept in the family. T h e Crowninshields were an extraordinary well-knit group. Serving in different capacities and often scattered around the world, the sons kept the firm abreast of changing market conditions. Their ambitions were similar to those of other rising Salem families, but they had drive, unity, independence, and intensity that set them apart. Like Derby and William Gray they operated on a big scale and their rewards were considerable. Over the years they acquired a fleet of vessels, built the town's largest wharf, and in 1809 their wealth was estimated at dose to $750,000.®® Their fortune stemmed from the development of an extensive trade orbit in Europe and Asia. T h e Far East offered New England merchants staples they badly needed. Loading vessels with European and domestic produce, but mostly with specie, they purchased tea, textiles, coffee, sugar, pepper, and spices and reexported them to Europe. Until Americans entered this trade, it had been dominated by restrictive European monopolies operating under government sanction.®® T h e Crowninshields were deeply involved in the newer trading areas, linking their Operations closely to the French empire. Although they sailed to British India, they concentrated on Sumatran pepper and the coffee and sugar 109

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of Isle de France and Reunion. They were among the early successful adventurers who undercut British and Dutch control of the pepper supply by deahng directly with native leaders. The business was very profitable at first, inducing merchants to import hundreds of thousands of pounds, most of which they sold abroad. The primary pepper markets were Italy and France, with Bordeaux playing a central role in the affairs of George Crowninshield & In Bordeaux the Crowninshields sold eastern staples, especially the coffee and sugar purchased at Isle de France and Reunion. These two French islands, about halfway between the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian subcontinent, had good harbors and excellent markets for foodstuffs and European manufactured goods. In wartime, Jacob Crowninshield estimated that Americans bought three quarters of the islands' entire produce and almost all of their coffee. But the islands were more than sources of supply. Homeward-bound vessels from China, Batavia, Sumatra, and the Coromandel Coast often stopped there to correct their reckoning, exchange gold for dollars, or make unexpected quick sales, returning eastward for another shipload.^^ The most successful were those who could parlay their original outbound cargo into a complex series of profitable transactions before sailing home. Such was the experience of John Crowninshield, whose voyages from 1796 to 1798 illustrate the nature of the family enterprise. John, along with his brother George, Jr., commanded the Belisarius and left Salem in November 1795 with a cargo of brandy, Madeira, rum, lead, bar iron, soap, porter, and specie. Their father owned a 75 per Cent interest and the two brothers shared the rest. Liberal instructions allowed them to visit any promising markets in the Far East, but they were not to stay abroad too long.^^ By March 1796 the Belisarius had reached Isle de France and Reunion, where John was unable to seil his cargo for the specie he 110

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would need in India/® Instead, he took on coffee and after several months' delay arrived at Bordeaux in November.'*^ By marketing directly in France, he avoided the customary delay of returning to Salem and re-exporting. John's sales were favorable and he bought wines and gold, arriving back at the Isle in May 1797. He stopped there for provisions before proceeding on to Tranquebar, a Danish colony in southeastern India. Favorable markets at the Isle had induced him to exchange wine for specie, cofFee, sugar, and indigo, and then continuing to India, he bought blue cloth at Tranquebar and Pondicherry in the summer of 1797.''® Instead of going on to Calcutta with his remaining specie, as he had originally planned, he decided that the season was unfavorable. Taking advantage of an advantageous exchange rate, he converted his remaining specie into East India Company bills, depositing them with Messrs. Fairlie, Gilmore & Co., the family's Calcutta correspondent.'*® On the way home, John made such good time to the Isle that he stopped there and changed his plans. He sold his blue cloths for cotton, coffee, and indigo, and set out for Calcutta, leaving the remainder of his cargo behind to be invested in coffee which he planned to pick up on his return.'*' By December 1797 the Belisarius had reached Calcutta, where John sold some cotton and iron, investing his funds in bandannas, calicoes, colored goods, and sugar. Amid rumors of war between France and the United States, he prepared to sail for home.'^® TTie voyage of John Crowninshield on the Belisarius carried the firm's business into distant markets but centered about the French empire. In the Far East, the Isle de France and Reunion provided staples which along with Sumatran pepper and Indian textiles were the basis of a complex series of exchanges in which Bordeaux, Amsterdam, and Copenhagen were the entrepots for European distribution. The Crowninshield's market was Continental 111

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and the key to it was France, which controlled much of western Europe through French-sponsored republics in Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. Bordeaux in particular figured heavily in the firm's Operations, and there the family purchased a French privateer in the late 1790's for use in their Business. Extensive commercial correspondence was maintained with the local house of Stroble & Martini, and between 1803 and 1805 John Crowninshield resided in France, where he directed his family's European affairs.^® Economic ties with France were so important that war would have been disastrous. " A war we must not have," wrote Jacob Crowninshield, preferring to agree to "almost anything that France may demand" except national humiliation.®" W a r was both dangerous and senseless. It might cause an internal revolution, jeopardizing "the very existence of our government."" Property of all kind would depreciate, the value of federal securities would decline, vessels would become almost worthless, while the nation would groan under the weight of taxes to Support an army and navy. "If we have a war with France," Jacob predicted, " 7 / 8 of all the merchants in Massachusetts would undoubtedly stop payment."®^ Furthermore, war was folly since France was not vulnerable to American attack. " I n Bordeaux," John observed, "there are upwards of 100 [American vessels]—the property belonging to Salem alone is valued at nearly 3,000,000 dollars. Where can America shew that number in any of her ports, the property of French Citizens?" T o fight under such disadvantages would "be madness."®® Y e t even the Crowninshields could not entirely resist the war fever, for while they hoped for peace, they offered the services of two of their vessels to the United States Navy. T h e Crowninshields blamed their own government for getting the country into "a dam-d scrape." TTie cause of the crisis was "Jays treaty & of course our duplicity." By attack-

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ing American shipping, the French were simply applying the principles of the treaty "without the expence of an Embassy."®^ T h e only hope for peace was to negotiate. " I think they are open to conviction," John wrote honie from Calcutta, and "if they say that the man who made the Treaty with England was in his heart an Enghshman let the man that goes to France be in his heart a French-

man.'"'

Despite their deep Opposition to war, the Crowninshields feit isolated in Salem. They believed that few families shared their political views because Gallic attacks on American commerce and the influence of a pro-British junto had made most Salemites "completely English in all their principals & even wishes."^® By the late 1790's a sense of alienation and the desire to preserve profitable business ties pushed the family into Salem politics, where their leadership, respectability, and wealth built a strong Republican party. For years Essex County politics had had an almost monolithic nnity. Elections often went uncontested and a single political loyalty dominated this Federalist stronghold." Though a few dissented from the prevailing orthodoxy, they generally kept their opinions to themselves.®® Toward the end of the decade, however, an Opposition party emerged and by 1802 it captured Salem as well as other parts of the county.®® W h e n Essex County's southern district sent Jacob Crowninshield to Congress, a new political dynasty had triumphed in one of the great maritime communities of America. Federalism remained strong along the North Shore, Controlling many towns and offices, but Essex became a two-party county with a powerful Republican connection. Success in Salem did not come overnight. At first a small minority, the Crowninshield interest slowly organized, gathered strength, and between 1800 and 1802 undermined 113

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the Federalist hold on the merchant Community. The crucial issues were peace and Support of President Adams. The Repubhcans ran as pro-Adams men, backing the Chief Executive against enemies in his own party who preferred hostihties to negotiations. Appealing to mechanics, farmers, and merchants to send a trader to Congress, not another lawyer, Republicans argued that "surely as the seaports depend on Commerce, it is the height of folly for freemen to let party demagogues influence them against their true interests."®" Federalist policy harmed the greater part of the Community, and benefited only a select few "overgrown" merchants, capitalists, lawyers, and ministers—"an aspiring nobility." In contrast, the Republicans claimed "the confirmed Support of some of the best members of the Community, independent good livers, and well infornied mechanics, as well as of the opulent and wealthy." Jacob Crowninshield, never a tool of faction, promised to oppose war, Support Adams, and further the interests of the middling and wealthy elements.®^ Each election saw the Republicans gain strength. They elected a congressman, took over local ofEces, and by 1804 carried Salem in the State canvasses. Federalists lamented: "Place no dependence upon the populous seaports."®^ Soon they were protesting "that a Single Family should rule this populous, wealthy & respectable town."®® While Federalists complained, the Reverend William Bentley noted happily that "the Greatest Aristocracy in New England" had been replaced by the rule of the many. Yet he was not describing a social revolution; in Salem one powerful commercial connection had displaced another.®^ The rise of the Crowninshields challenged the dominant Clements in Salem. In the 1790's the Derbys were the leading family, but toward the end of the decade the Crowninshields contested for pre-eminence. When Elias Hasket 114

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Derby died in 1799, the Derbys lost their ablest member. As some of the family drifted away along with other Federalists who preferred Boston to Salem, the Crowninshields replaced them as the town's social and political leaders. They purchased the Derby country seat and cemented ties with many of the community's most respectable folk, forming a new elite which assumed the attributes and responsibilities of its role. Excluded from the dancing assembly, Republicans established one of their own. In the Reverend Bentley of the East Church they enjoyed the ministrations of perhaps the most learned clergyman of the day. From Marblehead came a brilliant young lawyer, Joseph Story, to represent Republicans in the courts and legislatures. To compete with the Federalist Salem Gazette, a party newspaper was founded, the Salem Independent Register, dependent on the financial and literary contributions of local merchants and professional men. As Republicans prospered in trade and politics, they began to look to the State House for grants of corporate privilege, especially in banking. Unwilling to confine their interests to local affairs, Salem Republicans had a voice in national councils. Jacob Crowninshield declined to become Jefferson's Secretary of the Navy but his brother Benjamin later served as President Monroe's Secretary. In 1 8 1 1 Joseph Story, little more than a decade out of Harvard, became a member of the United States Supreme Court, after serving in Congress and the General Court. Through their power in Washington, the Crowninshields influenced the distribution of patronage, and from his position as chairman of the congressional committee on commerce and manufacturing, Jacob Crowninshield became one of the most articulate Republican spokesmen on maritime affairs. Tlie political evolution of Salem was not unique; Republicans also found substantial support in other communities 11 5

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where men lived by the sea. T h e fishing and whaling towns of Marblehead, Gloucester, Cape Cod, and the islands of Dukes and Nantucket counties were centers of Jeffersonian strength. These areas had special problems stemming from their wartime experience and the nature of their economies. They had suffered greatly during the Revolution and had difEculty recovering. Marblehead and Sherburne, on Nantucket, were largely single-economy towns, depending heavily on fishing and whaling. T h e war not only disrupted these industries but independence upset long-established trade patterns and deprived fisherfolk and whaling men of their niche in the mercantilist system. Britain barred American fish from the West Indies, which had been one of the major prewar markets, and placed almost prohibitive duties on whale oil. After the war these towns had either to develop new markets or diversify.®® Gloucester pursued the latter course, entering overseas trade while retaining her old interest in the fisheries.®® Other areas were less flexible and less enterprising. Marblehead particularly paid a high price. W i t h fishing a perilous undertaking, Marbleheaders turned their skills to military efforts. Large numbers followed John Glover to serve with Washington, allowing boats and fishing equipment to decay. Men such as Elbridge Gerry, one of the town's important merchants and leading politicians, left and never really returned. Almost twenty years after the war's end, 1 5 per cent of the population consisted of widows and fatherless children,®^ and as late as 1790 the cod fisheries had not yet returned to the prewar levels of activity.®® Similarly the whaling industry suffered so badly from the loss of British markets that Dukes and Nantucket considered secession from the Commonwealth, hoping thereby to regain British favor. Despite their depressed con116

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ditions, Marblehead and the Islands failed to participate in the postwar boom in overseas shipping. T h e new trading Orbits in the Far East required large vessels, deep harbors— which Marblehead lacked—and considerable capital. Of the fishing and whaling towns only Gloucester had the resources to recast its economy on broader foundations. Y e t the old industries revived slowly and eventually found new markets outside the British Empire. T h e fisheries expanded and prospered in the 1790's, owing in part to government bounties but mostly to the discovery of outlets in the French W e s t Indies. After the war, these islands became the principal purchasers of dried and pickled fish, two thirds of all such exports going to France or the French W e s t Indies.®® These markets became so important, George Cabot noted, that should they "be lost the fishery wou'd be almost if not quite ruined."''° A few communities dominated and depended on fishing, notably Marblehead, Gloucester, Cape Cod and Dukes and Nantucket, which together accounted for over 70 per cent of codfish exports between 1786 and 1790. Despite temporary shifts, France and Spain were for two decades the principal markets for the American staple. T h e whale fisheries centered in Nantucket and Dartmouth (New Bedford) and to a lesser extent on the Cape. Like Marblehead, Nantucket had suffered badly during the war, only to find British markets closed in the 1780's. William Rotch, a successful and wealthy merchant, removed his family, friends, and Operations to England, but finding an unsympathetic ministry there he proceeded to France, where he received a warmer welcome. Rotch and several Americans settled in Dunkirk, flourishing until the danger of war in Europe induced them to go home. Fearing that the British were anxious to destroy the American whaling 117

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industry and dependent on it for Imports, the French abated their duties and placed American oil on a favorable footing/^ T h e economies of both the fishing communities and the whahng towns, with their largest markets in the French empire, required peaceful ties with the new French Republic. T h e threat of war seriously jeopardized their prosperity/^ and Marblehead, Barnstable County, and Nantucket all became Republican strongholds. William R . Lee was the leading Jeffersonian in Marblehead. Entering trade before the Revolution, he purchased Nantucket and N e w Bedford whale oil for European markets. He served in the army until 1778 and then returned to trade and privateering. After the war he fitted out a dozen fishing vessels and served in a variety of public posts. In the late 1790's he invested in 25,000 acres of Yazoo lands, retired from business, and in 1802 Jefferson appointed him collector of the ports of Salem and Beverly.^® Neither the fishing nor the whaling towns developed any leaders comparable to the Crowninshields of Salem, but they were tenaciously loyal to Republicanism even in trying days of embargo and war. T h e party valued their support and championed their interests. W h e n Nantucket men complained because they had to pay duties on small quantities of tea, coffee, and similar items acquired during a voyage, they sought aid from Jacob Crowninshield and Richard Cutts.^^ Joseph Story urged Crowninshield to press for legislation exempting employed fisherfolk from militia duty after the courts had declared them liable to Service." In such ways Republicans tried to strengthen their ties with these communities. T h e rise of eastern Republicanism revealed that urban groups had complex and differing views of self-interest. 118

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Allied with dissenters and Calvinists in the rural towns, together with newcomers who were challenging Federalist authority, Republicans also found powerful Support in the District of Maine, where the emergence of a Jeffersonian connection mirrored the processes of party evolution throughout the Bay State. Linked to Massachusetts until 1820, Maine was both N e w England's frontier and the fastest growing part of the Commonwealth. Extensive, unoccupied land, untapped natural resources, and numerous harbors invited men to settle afresh. Between 1790 and 1 8 1 0 the population of the District of Maine advanced twice as fast as that of Massachusetts as a whole, and Maine's voters became a valuable prize for the party which captured them. Safely Federalist until 1800, Maine was rapidly transformed into a Republican bastion, indispensable to the party's success. T h e pace and pervasiveness of social change defined the contours of Maine politics. Sparsely settled before the Revolution, the District boomed in the postwar years as pioneers poured into its virgin lands. Rapid settlement undermined the older social order, for newcomers challenged the established leadership. Within this dynamic contcxt, politics was highly factious, parties emerged slowly and complexly, and most of the Republicans prominent aftcr 1800 had taken little part in public life during the preceding decade. As the population doubled between 1790 and 1800, new men gained wealth and influence, some becoming leaders in the new communities, others competing for Position in the older towns. Maine Republicanism thus represented the thrust of enterprising and ambitious Clements struggling for recognition and power. T h e party was extremely weak during the 1790's, most of its strength being concentrated among the farmers and lumbermen of the Kennebeck Valley, who rallied behind 119

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Henry Dearborn. A revolutionary veteran who settled in the Valley after the war, Dearborn advanced rapidly, buying and selling land and running lumbering Operations, as well as a wharf, störe, and ferry. In 1790 he became federal marshall and two years later was elected congressman from the huge district comprising Lincoln, Hancock, and Washington countiesJ® By supporting Madison in 1794 in Opposition to Federalist foreign policy, he alienated influential groups back home. Dearborn lost his seat in 1796 and returned to his home to battle for local supremacy." Both Lincoln and Kennebeck counties were dominated by old families, allied with some fortunate recent arrivals who enjoyed access to authority. The Lithgows of Hallowell and the Bowmans of Pownalborough had a firm grip on local Office even before the Revolution. Members of their families held multiple offices and passed them on from one generation to the next. Together with the Norths, the Conys, the Dummers, and others they were the judges and justices, the sheriffs and leading attorneys, of the local elite/® Though often divided by personal rivalries, the threat of Jacobinism welded them into a cohesive group anxious to preserve their power. Opposition to Federalist foreign policy isolated Henry Dearborn from these most prominent men in the Lincoln-Kennebeck country. Republican influence grew, however, as able and ambitious individuals throughout the region enlisted in the cause. Some were fairly well established, such as Nathan Weston of Augusta. Weston had been a merchant, ran a general störe, purchased fürs and lumber, and manufactured pot and pearl ashes, regularly running a vessel to and from Boston. In the 1790's he contested Daniel Cony's leadership in Augusta, and though unsuccessful at first eventually was elected to the General Court and served on the Council.^^ Another prominent Kennebeck Repubhcan, John Chandler, was born in New Hampshire and served in 120

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the Revolution. His friend Dearborn induced him to remove with a party of neighbors to Monmouth, Maine. Poor and illiterate, Chandler went to school with the children, worked as a blacksmith, and dug potatoes for General Dearborn. W i t h patronage, he rose fast, becoming a census taker, postmaster, ensign in the militia, and tavemkeeper. He later was a representative, a State Senator, and a congressman.®" Together with Chandler, Weston, Barzillai Gannett, Francis Carr, Martin Kinsley, Eleazar Ripley, and other Republican hopefuls in Kennebeck and Penobscot country, Dearborn constructed an influential connection. Jefferson appointed him Secretary of W a r in 1802 and collector of the Port of Boston later. T h e rise of the Dearborn group, however, only partially defines the sources of Maine Republicanism. Without the Support of important mercantile elements along the coast, the party would have remained a minority. T w o powerful groups of Republican merchants made York and Lincoln counties JeflFersonian strongholds. Although the party emerged late along the seaboard, it grew on Opposition to Federalist foreign policy, which many feared would lead to war with France. T h e Cutts connection of Saco (Biddeford) was the Center of the Republican interest in York County. T h e founder of the family fortune, Thomas Cutts, started as a clerk for Sir William Pepperell, borrowed £ , 1 0 0 capital from his father, and entered business in Saco. Here he prospered a n d b e c a m e t h e riebest m a n in t h e Community,

owning

many vessels, engaging in overseas trade, acquiring extensive landholdings, and assuming the attributes of the local gentry. He built a great mansion, educated his children, and was generous to the poor. Although the eider Cutts was justice of the peace and a notary public, he never achieved rank as a county official.®^ Until 1798 York was a one-party county, repeatedly send121

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ing Federalist George Thacher to Congress by overwhelining majorities. But toward the end of the decade Opposition appeared in Saco.'^ Like many traders elsewhere, the Cuttses had commercial ties with France and feared that war would disrupt profitable relations with the Continent. In the middle of the 1790's the family was trading with Hamburg, Amsterdam, and particularly Bordeaux, carrying freight to France for Josiah Bacon, a Repubhcan merchant in Boston. In 1796 Cutts was trying to collect payment from the French firm of Dallarde, Swan & Co.®^ Allied with other respectable men in York such as Stephen Thatcher and Joseph Storer, who were Kennebunk merchants, John Woodman, a prominent Buxton farmer and local worthy, Benjamin Green, a Berwick teacher and lawyer, and Dr. Thomas G . Thornton, physician and merchant in Saco, the Cuttses won control of York County and became one of the great Republican commercial forces in Maine.®'^ In 1802 they sent Thomas' Harvard-educated son Richard to Congress®' and for years the family dominated the county, resisting attacks by factious Clements who considered them high-toned aristocrats.®® Even more influential was the mercantile group led by William King of Bath. King was a great merchant-politician, powerful not merely in Lincoln County but throughout Maine and Massachusetts. From all over the statc and from Washington, Jeffersonians sought his advice on policy, patronage, strategy, and tactics.®^ King was born in 1772, the son of a Scarborough merchant and brother of two other prominent public men, Rufus King, a Federalist Senator and diplomat from N e w York, and Cyrus King, a Federalist lawyer in Saco. Unlike his two brothers, William did not go to College and had few advantages. He went to work in a Saco sawmill and later formed a partnership with Dr. Benjamin 1. Porter, acquiring a mill at Topsham, a center of the lumber indus-

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tty. Here Porter and King opened a störe, purchased timber for export, and operated several vessels. Moving to Bath in 1800, King retained his connections with Porter and Topsham but was now more favorably situated to expand his activities. He opened a störe with Peter H. Green, obtained wharves, warehouses, and additional shipping, and helped to estabhsh Maine's first textile mill.®' He loaded his vessels with lumber, flour, oars, and staves for England, Ireland, and the West Indies and reccived in return rum, sogar, molasses, coal, salt, and earthenware. Sometimes his vessels carried freight and occasionally they were sold in foreign ports.®® From the beginning, King cooperated in business with others, first with Porter, then with Green. As he prospered and entered the ranks of the mercantile gentry, he linked his fortunes with several traders in the region, among theni Peleg Tallman, a retired wealthy Bath sea captain and shipbuilder, and Moses Carleton, Jr., and Abiel W o o d , }r., two of Wiscasset's rising merchants. Together the quartet was active in founding the Lincoln and Kennebeck Bank in Wiscasset and the Hallowell and Augusta Bank.®" T o facilitate and expand their Operation they organized a coniniission house in Boston headed by John B. Frazier and Charles Savage, who were related by marriage to King and W o o d respectively.®' As King prospered, he also entered local politics, reprcsenting first Topsham and then Bath in the General Court. In the 1790's he was a Federalist, thus belonging to the predominant party in the maritime communities of his region. But around 1800 Lincoln County split, paralleling divisions elsewhere in eastern Massachusetts. While the Dearborn Republicans of the upper Valley of the Kenncbeck and Penobscot ran their own candidate for Congress, the old-line Federalist leadership met resistance from a younger group led by King. For several years the two fac-

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tions fought for power, at first within the party; by 1804 the King interest had moved into the Republican camp, had routed the Federahsts, and had become the dominant power in Lincoln County.®^ The King forces charged their Federalist opponents with being violent Hamiltonians, enemies of President Adams, and supporters of war. They appealed to farmers and merchants to vote for Orchard Cook, a Wiscasset trader who would Support the Repubhcan administration because it was "the firm advocate for peace which is favorable to trade."®® Peace, they insisted, would advance the prices farmers received by 50 per cent, ensure merchants the advantages of neutral trade, and provide mechanics with employment in an expanding shipbuilding industry. Claiming the backing of the wealthiest shipowners in the district, the Cook people announced that merchants had "at length become sensible that their interest is to be promoted only by delegating some of their own profession to assist in legislating on their important commercial concerns."®^ With more than forty lawyers in Congress, the time had come for Lincoln County to elect a Republican trader to join Cutts of York County and Crowninshield of Salem. The anti-Cook Federalists described their rivals as "ignorant rieh men" who sought to prejudice "the people against men in power that they may be removed to make way for others of aspiring dispositions."®® King's group won in 1804 and became extremely powerful in Maine politics. Jeffersonians appreciated the importance of this development and welcomed the new converts. "Gentlemen of talents & property," wrote Joseph Bartlett to King in 1805, "are ever an acquisition to any party."®® "Your district has effected an unexpected change," Congressman Richard Cutts had noted earlier, adding, "Merchantile Genl. are much wanted here."" The rise of the King connection illustrates the dynamic 124

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quality of party evolution in the early Republic. King and his circle were successful, newly risen traders dissatisfied with established leadership. Desiring access to power to obtain patronage, land, bank, and insurance charters and other perquisites of influence, they found difficulty advancing their interests as Federalists. Apprehensive that extreme Federalism threatened peace and prosperity, they sought to control the party and later deserted it for Repubhcanism. They also pereeived that rising populär discontent within Maine offered fresh opportunities for ambitious, clever, and aggressive newcomers. By championing the cause of landless farmers and religious dissenters, Maine Republicans broadened their appeal and forged a powerfui coalition which soon dominated the District. Dissent grew and flourished in Maine more vigorously than anywhere eise in the Commonwealth. Here, as elsewhere, the sects complained that they paid ministerial taxes to Support the Congregational establishment. By advocating reform and attacking Federalism as the bulwark of the Standing order, Jeffersonians captured much of the sectarian vote.®® In Maine, as in Massachusetts proper, Republicans and dissenters found a harmony of interests, each group advancing its own cause by uniting against Federalist authority. Republicans also were spokesmen for another underprivileged group, the landless squatters. Burdened by a heavy postwar debt, Massachusetts used its public domain as a source of revenue. It granted some land to war veterans and might have offered yeomen small free farms, but instead it sold large tracts to realize immediate gains, notably by the Bingham Purchase, which transferred some two million acres to private interests. At the same time, the Commonwealth sought to promote settlement and improvement by requiring grantees to plant a given number of families on each township within a stipulated time. T h e program 12 5

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proved unsuccessful, for it raised relatively little money and failed to stimulate migration. The Bingham interest, for instance, was unable to meet its obligations and repeatedly won postponements, and settling duties were neither performed nor enforced. In addition to the postwar grants, numerous large ones made during the colonial period became a recurrent source of controversy because of disputes Over their vahdity and precise boundaries. Control of extensive and disputed holdings by absentee proprietors was thus a Potential cause of tension.®® Since the Commonwealth offered neither cheap nor free tracts, husbandmen were just as likely to locate on private as on State lands. Nor did owners develop orderly processes for the creation of towns. Improvements required capital and tracts were very large and difficult to supervise, all of which invited squatting and timber stealing. "Every inhabitant here is now a depredator—a trespassor,—a plunderer," observed David Cobb.'"" But not all settlers simply cut timber; some cultivated the land, made improvements, and began to carve out farms. As long as no one bothered them, they were content. B u t when large proprietors sent out surveyors and demanded that yeomen purchase their lands, conflicts arose over prices, the values of improvements, and titles. T h e squatters argued that speculators had violated their contracts by defaulting on the settlement duties, and therefore had forfeited their titles. Moreover, farmers who had bought, expecting that development would be actively pushed, had been cruelly dcceived. Husbandmen charged that the Pejepscot proprietors refused to seil on reasonable terms as directed by resolutions of the General Court. They argued that they had been forced to pay twice for their farms, and some owners were even accused of selling public lands.'" For years unrest festered. There were occasional 126

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acts of violence against surveyors, but not until after 1800 did the problem assume serious dimensions. W h e n absentees began to bring suits of ejection, discontent mounted, violence flared, and law and order were flonted. T h e time was overripe for the State to formulate a just and equitable Solution to Maine's land problems. Republicans such as William King realized that the party might contribute to a peaceful settlement while gaining popularity. Proprietors played into their hands because their ties were usually Federalist, enabling Republicans to Claim that they were the yeomen's only true friends. By 1805 and 1806 alarmed Federalists warned that the squatters of Maine would impose a Republican governor on the Commonwealth.^®^ Jeffersonians replied: " T l i e squatters must come forward with their usual strength."^"^ T h e squatters, dissenters, merchants, and office seekers of Maine who formed the Republican party were highly successful. In a few years they transformed the eastern counties from a Federalist bastion into a Republican stronghold, which gave the party 60 per cent of its vote. Rapid change and social instability along N e w England's eastern frontier fostered the growth of a strong Republican connection, but the pattern of party evolution in Maine only duplicated the pattem throughout the Commonwealth wherever ambitious and aggressive newcomers and climbers challenged the dominance of established authority. Successful merchants and rising local worthies, fearful of war with France and anxious for the preferments of power, joined with religious dissenters and landless squatters to reorder public life and broaden opportunities in the germinal years of the young Republic. Ideals and ambitions and programs and leadership, however, were insufficient to win influence and reshape the polity. It was essential also to master the arts of persuasion and the mysteries of power. 127

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The growing strength of the Democratic-Republican interest after 1800 made Federalist control tenuous and Republican victory an ever closer prospect. As the Commonwealth became evenly divided, both parties systematized and refined pohtical practices, beheving that efEcient Organization, skillfully directed changes in voting, and shrewd use of the patronage held the key to power. The Road to Victory. The Jeffersonian tide had not penetrated New England in 1800. Bay State FederaHsts successfully resisted until 1804, when the President carried Massachusetts; and in 1806 and 1807 the Repubhcans captured first the State legislature and then the executive. Building a Republican majority was a slow and difEcult task beset with internal factionalism and tactical disagreements. Hoping to exploit divisions within the Opposition, the Repubhcans ran Elbridge Gerry for governor from 1800 to 1803. As a former merchant familiar with the problems of the seaports, a friend of John Adams, and an architect of peace with France, Gerry was ideally suited for the role. His near victory in 1800 as well as the party's extraordinary triumph in Boston inspired belief that moderation would shortly wean away enough Federalist voters to yield a Republican majority. Tliis strategy worked fairly well for a time. Gerry made surprising gains in 1801 and carried Boston, which sent a füll slate of Repubhcans to the General Court.' Congressman William Eustis also treaded cautiously, anxious not 128

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to alienate moderate Boston Federalists. "He has a great deal more prudence than I had heretofore given him credit for as a politician," Henry Dearborn observed.^ In 1802 Eustis was re-elected, and in the spring of the year John Quincy Adams suggested that the Federalists include four Republicans on the Council.® But the politics of appeasement ultimately produced intraparty conflict, for while the Boston wing made some gains, Gerry's share of the State vote declined sharply by 1803, forcing a critical reappraisal of the tactics of accommodation. In 1802 some Republicans were demanding new leadership, convinced that they had "been too timid and accommodating to their enemies." Earlier hopes of compromise had died, Levi Lincoln argued, for it had become clear that there could "be no reconciliation, consistent with the present m e a s u r e s . . . I once thought otherwise."^ In the future, Lincoln concluded, the party must "look to its friends, & not to its enemies for support."® Meeting in Washington, a group of Republicans proposed to drop Gerry in favor of Lincoln and won Support in the western counties.® But when Massachusetts Republicans caucused in February 1803, easterners strongly opposed a change and questioned the wisdom of seriously challenging Governor Caleb Strong. Believing that Strong was unbeatable, they argued that it was foolish to contest his re-election, especially because it would "play the devil with the cause in Boston."'' Unable to agree, the two factions renominated Gerry but pursued different tactics at home. Berkshire and Essex County Republicans ran a füll ticket led by Gerry, but in Boston the party planted Strong at the top of its list. Despite internal divisions, Republicans made gains in the legislature, but generally outside of Suffolk County. They were unable to retain control of the Boston delegation, and in 1804 Eustis lost his congressional seat. Failure undermined the influ129

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ence of the eastern faction, which could no longer rcsist demands for new leadership to rally the faithful. In 1804 the party shrewdly nominated James SulHvan. He was an ideal candidate, appealing to a broad spectrum of Republican interests and possibly even to moderate Federalists. An old patriot, closely identified with Hancock, Sullivan was a self-made man who became one of the state's most eminent attorneys, rising to a comfortable Position in Boston society. He remained attorney general even imder Federalist governors, for his enormous ability and moderation won him respect from political opponents. Hailing from the District of Maine, Sullivan was particularly attractive to a region of growing Republican power, and though an outstanding Congregationalist layman, he had long championed the interests of dissenters. Sullivan's first campaign produced immediate results. T h e party gained in every county but one, increasing its share of the vote by a third, and Jefferson concluded that within a year "the N e w England states will all be with us."® Sullivan did poorly only in Boston, where his Opposition to speculative banking and support of municipal reform divided his party.^ T h e anti-Sullivan faction wished to drop him and requested that Jefferson give them "some extraneous & justifying circumstance," such as appointing Sullivan Attorney General of the United States.'" But the bulk of the party thought success depended "on a steady & faithful adherance to their old men, principles & measures."'' T h e gap between Republicans and Federalists quickly narrowed. By 1806 the Republicans captured the General Court and barely lost the governorship. T h e balloting was dose and the outcome remained in doubt for weeks because the votes necessary for victory were disputed. Their fingers hardened by hard labor, the yeomen, according to 130

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Harrison G . Otis, were unable to spell correctly and thus had cast hundreds of bailots for "Caleb Stoon" and "James Sulvan." W h e n the new Republican General Court met in June 1806 it had to elect a governor by deciding whieh contested votes to eount. At first the legislature followed a purcly partisan tack, adopting and applying rules favorable to Sullivan. But fearing that steamroller tactics would disrupt party harmony and lead to charges of stealing the election, the Republicans finally juggled the returns in favor of a Federalist governor and a Republican lieutenant governor/^ Even though he had narrowly lost, Sullivan claimed a moral victory.^® Controlling the legislature and packing the Council, the party could checkmate Governor Strong while waiting another year for a clear-cut, indisputable, and honestly won majority. " A little more time," Jefferson assured Sullivan, "will place you where you ought to be, and givc your enemies leisure to rcpent of their useless wickedness."" Republicans did not have long to wait. In 1807 they captured the State House. Until the outbreak of war in 1 8 1 2 , the Commonwealth remained evenly divided, the winning party never polling more than 51 per cent of the gubernatorial vote. Republican victories between 1806 and 1 8 1 2 rested on the growing strength of the ambitious ofHce seekers, discontented yeomen and dissenters, and the rising merchants, capitalists, and professional Clements who comprised the Republican interest. As the populär vote mounted, the party made exceptionally heavy gains in certain regions, notably western Massachusetts, where its vote more than quadrupled, owing largely to the turnout of dissenters. Great advances were also registered in Maine, which was transformed from a Federalist into a Republican stronghold that gave the party 60 per cent of the region's vote. Moreover, the relative importance of the Dis-

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trict of Maine grew as its share of the gubernatorial vote rose from l o to 25 per cent between 1800 and 1807. Major advances in Maine and western Massachusetts, as well as in Essex and Plymouth counties, significantly contributed to victory.^' Behind these changes in voting patterns were important innovations in the processes of politics. The Organization of Politics. While political Organization was not strictly new in Massachusetts, the older town caucus and county Convention had been loosely administered parochial affairs, lacking institutional continuity and centralized direction. Neither the Revolution nor the crisis of the 1780's evoked fresh political techniques. Not until the sharp, persistent polarization of political interest in the 1790's brought regularly contested elections and men perceived the need and advantages in coordinating a far-flung heterogenous party coalition were widespread efforts made to mobilize and articulate efforts and influence systematically. By 1800 neither party could afford the older informal devices; as the State became very evenly balanced, Organization became an important source of strength, adding a new dimension to the politics of the young Republic/® T h e needs were many and varied: to select Candidates, avoid splits, and weld unity, to mold public opinion, bring out the vote, and marshal the faithful in the General Court. In the absence of adequate nominating procedures a multiplicity of candidates often confused the electorate, fractionalized the vote, prevented anyone from getting a majority, and necessitated repeated runoffs. Moreover, once Hancock and Adams no longer dominated the governorship, the parties had to select candidates to head their statewide tickets. The result was the use of nominating caucuses. Following the winter session of the General Court in February 1800, Federalist legislators met in the Senate 132

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Chamber and chose Caleb Streng as their Standard bearer. Republicans questioned the legitimacy of such poHtical Organization, arguing that the Federahst caucus created "an undue influence" seeking to dictate how Citizens should vote. Moreover, the legislators violated the spirit of constitutional Separation of powers, since the nominee would presumably be obHgated to those who selected h i m . " T h e Federahsts countered that it was entirely proper for seventytwo men to gather, consult the sentiments of the State, and agree on a candidate suitable to all. Surely, they argued, an open meeting was preferable to the secret Republican caucuses.'® Jeffersonians pleaded self-defense. Deploring a "State of affairs" which compelled them "to have recourse to measures which though pure and honourable, will be attended with some trouble,"'® they asked, " W h i l e the Tories are thus in motion, why should the Whigs be idle?"^" From time to time each party published accounts of the activities of the rival's Organization hinting that they were sinister and unrepublican.^' But necessity drove both groups to adopt similar devices, and prejudice receded as caucuses and other organizational techniques became rooted in the practices of politics. T h e hierarchy of the Republican party consisted of town, ward, and county committees and a State committee. In October 1800 Salem's Reverend William Bentley observed that "for the first time the zeal of caucusing has been introduced into Salem." Instead of a few men meeting together to select candidates, "large associations are forming . . . as reputation, interest, & all men hold dear are involved in the controversies."^^ In the larger towns such as Boston and Salem cumbersome general committees were supplemented by ward committees.^® Before each election the wards met and declared for candidates, adopted an address to the voters, chose a group to confcr with other wards,

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and, most important, designated persons to bring out the vote, pass out lists on election day, and watch the polls for trickery. By 1810 delegates from Boston's wards were also meeting in Convention to select senatorial candidates for Suffolk County.-^ The development of Organization received an impetus from the complicated method of choosing presidential electors in 1804, which put a premium on planning. Throughout the Commonwealth county committees rallied the faithful, chose candidates, adopted addresses and circular letters. Hampshire County Republicans resolved to halt work on election day and to divide the county into four districts in which groups would supervise electioneering.^® The Worcester Convention concentrated on electing Republican selectmen so that none of the faithful would be barred from the voting lists.^' In Boston the central committee sat as the party's executive arm. Most active before and during a campaign, it coordinated and unified activities, helped to set up local organizations, raised funds, distributed propaganda, advised local leaders, emphasized key issues, and directed over-all tactics.^' In 1807, for instance, anticipating a Federalist scheme to challenge votes certified by unsworn selectmen, the central committee instructed local groups to "ascertain whether the selectmen of Federalist towns in their districts were sworn or not."^® Control of the General Court was highly fluid because towns often neglected to send legislators, causing the size of the legislature to fluctuate considerably. The committee concentrated on maximizing the representation of faithful towns.^® In 1 8 1 0 county chairmen were told that when rival groups were "nearly equal in numbers, it is generally good policy to be the attacking party and push for a Representative. This conduct generally intimidates the opponents and ends in complete success or at least prevents them from sending."®" 134

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After the clection, the committee tried to assure füll attendance by Republican legislators at the organizational meeting of the General Court.'^ The personnel of party Organization consisted largely of federal and State officials. In Portland this included a commissioner of bankruptcy, a customs collector, a postmaster, and a local lawyer. The chairman of the central committee for several years was Aaron Hill, a Senator from Middlesex County and the postmaster of Boston. Supplementing the work of the regulär Organization was a variety of related efforts. Building a Republican press was an important but difücult task. Most of the older newspapers became Federalist, so that Republicans had to build largely from Scratch. Except for Boston's Independent Chwnicle and Universal Advertiser the party had no continuously published organs until after 1800, when it broke the grip of the one-party press. The Pittsfield Sun challenged the Western Star in the Berkshires, the National Aegis competed with the venerable Massachusetts Spy in Worcester, the Salem Independent Register opposed the Salem Gazette, and the Eastern Argus defended the Republican cause against the Portland Gazette in Maine. Financial support came from prominent Republicans and whatever patronage could be channeled to the Journals. In 1807 and 1808, for instance, for the first time in years the proceedings of the House of Representatives were printed, by the Independent Chronicle. The Crowninshields backed the Salem Register, while Elbridge Gerry, James Bowdoin, William Eustis, Benjamin Austin, James Sullivan, and Samuel Brown bought subscriptions to establish the National Aegis.^^ Individual congressmen, such as Joseph B. Varnum, who sent propaganda to every town in his district, also flooded the State with partisan literature.®® Special runners were

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dispatched from the larger towns to ride political circuit and help local groups.®^ Before the spring elections of 1804 a Maine senatorial candidate counted on the "industry and influence" of one Denny McCobb, whom he promised in return to make a representative. Traveling by horse where possible, by canoe where necessary, M c C o b b was instructed to Visit every creek and cove, meet every "man, woman and child that can anyways help you." He was to praise his candidate's charity and disinterestedness, impress women by talking "soft and pritty," bowing, cringing, and smihng, and emphasize the candidate's good looks and piety. Educated and professional men were impressed by tales of the candidate's talents, while military men loved talk of "firebrands, guns, wars, and death." In short, M c C o b b learned, dissimulation was the key to success: " W i t h the Federalists it's well to be rather lavish, and with the Anti's you can give a mixture of a sly and wise grin and observe that you do not wish to say much of his politics as it possibly might leak out, but bid them recollect that his friends are mostly Anti's and that they, the Anti's, will soon be the strongest side."^5 Within a decade, caucuses, committees, Conventions, circulars, runners, and party newspapers had become common and accepted practices. Growing out of intensive rivalry and closely fought elections, Organization was a new tool in the struggle for power. Its most significant accomplishment was the mobilization of the electorate. The Politics of Voting. Party growth was accompanied by an explosion of voting. Between 1800 and 1812 the populär vote for governor and the percentage of adult males voting more than doubled, although the property qualification remained unaltered and it was no easier to acquire the necessary wealth.®® T h e vast increase stemmed from greater 136

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participation by eligible nonvoters and from a liberal interpretation of the property requirement which broadened the base of the electorate. Both developments derived from, and in turn influenced, political Organization. Anxious to maximize their strength at the polls, the parties radically altered their attitude toward the traditional apathy of a large portion of the electorate.®^ Düring the years of overwhelming Federalist supremacy, neither side had much incentive to make maximum efforts, but once the gap began to dose the parties realized that elections might be won by the Organization which most efficiently brought out the vote. The decline of voting apathy was one of the main fruits of new political energies. County Conventions, town parleys, pre-election rallies, and ward committees involved many more people in politics than ever before. On election day, local bodies distributed printed tickets, transported the infirm and aged, campaigned through the streets and on the approaches to the polling places, making sure that the faithful attended and rounding up the unreliable. Both parties watched the polls closely and estimated the outcome, scouring the streets for stray votes that would ensure victory or upset the opposition's lead.®® Competition magnified the importance of elections and each contest assumed enlarged dimensions. The town's choice of selectmen was important since they controlled the voting lists; the selection of representatives not only decided control of the legislature but also might seal the fate of the Senate and executive in a dose election; and those who dominated the State House could influence the destiny of the nation. Thus every race was important, every vote vital. Yet there were limits to mobilizing the inactive, exciting the apathetic, and arousing the passive. It was also possible to qualify new voters. As both parties enrolled new voters, 137

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each accused the other of corrupting elections, and rounding up the aged and the infirm, the Negro and the ahen, the pauper and the propertyless to vote. B u t neither consistently denianded purification of the voting hsts nor d o s e scrutiny of new voters, for both Repubhcans and Federalists hoped to benefit most from the expansion of the election rolls. N o r was it difEcult to maintain a semblance of constitutional propriety. T h e selectmen compiled the hsts, and whoever controlled the town could influence the admission of new voters. T h e State Constitution was sufficiently vague to permit selectmen to find ingenious interpretations which quahfied favored townsmen. W h e r e the minorit}' was well-organized and strong, it could protest and demand the application of liberal principles to everj'one. T h e result was an easing of the property requirement without any formal constitutional change.^® T h e qualification was less an obstacle in rural areas, where most men owned freeholds, though even among the land poor the barriers were not insurmountable. T h e ballots of farm laborers were challenged not because they lacked sufficient property but because they allegedly did not satisfy residence Standards/® T o evade the £ 3 freehold requirement, persons were enfranchised w h o did not own b u t leased real estate.^' T h e barriers came down also in the larger urban towns, where College students, Negroes, apprentices, sailors, and most important, artisans, commonly voted. T h o u g h these folk often had no estates, officials counted cash on hand, debts, working tools, clothes, and household and other personal possessions. " A n d . . . what free Citizen," Boston Federalists observed, "has not this property? N o t one, perhaps in thirty; for he must be poor indeed." Meanwhile Salem Federalists lamented that Republicans enfranchised men who could barely pay a poll tax: "If a man exists, and his nakedness is covered, and h e 138

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lias a bed to lay bis bead upon, tbough be bas scarcely tbe value of a cent wbicb is to a sberiff's execution, it is said tbat he must be wortb 200 dollars, and is tberefore qualified to vote."'Tlie weakening of tbe property quabfication was a contiiiuing source of complaint, as was tbe loosening of tbe residence requirement/'^ W b e n disputes reacbed tbe General Court, tbe coniniittee on elections tended to Interpret residence loosely, observing tbat tbe selectmen "bave not tbe opportunity or power of tborougbly investigating nice questions of residence."" Various attempts by tbe legislature to bar unquaHfied persons failed to balt tbe expansion of tbe electorate.''' T b e increase was so great tbat people bad difEculty Casting tbeir bailots witbin tbe prescribed bours of 1 1 : 0 0 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., and 50 towns witb more tban five hundred qualified voters won permission to open tbe polls earlier. Similarly, to accommodate tbe large number seeking admission to tbe voting rolls, selectmen were required to receive evidence of qualifications on tbe day before elections.^® Following Republican victories in 1806, 1807, and 1808, Federalists must bave suspected tbat they were losing tbe battle of tbe bailots, for wben tbey regained control of tbe State House in 1809 tbey restricted voting in town elections. In i 8 n Republicans retaliated by permitting everv male Citizen over twenty-one wbo paid any taxes to select local ofEcials.^'' T o safeguard freedom of cboice and to prevent intimidation by local ofEcials, selectmen were forbidden to discover wbom a voter favored. Federalists insisted tbat tbe town francbise was liberalized only to permit Republicans to manipulate tbe voting lists and tbereby to increase tbeir representation in tbe General Court.^® T h e tide could not be reversed either by disenfranchising new voters or refusing others with just claims. In 1807 139

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Abijah Bigelow, a Federalist lawyer, compiled The Voters' Guide, hoping to preserve "elections from corruption," but he confessed that "the zeal of party spirit, warped by predjudice, influenced by passion, and contending for interest or triumph, rather than the public good, will endeavor, right or wrong, so to construe the Constitution as will best promote its own schemes of ambition and interest."^® In 1812—the high point in many decades—68 per cent of the adult males voted. Since some of the remaining 32 per cent were probably eligible but failed to vote, the actual percentage not enfranchised was a small minority of the adult male population. The great increase in the electorate, stemming from the competition of party, was accompanied by a variety of devices serving partisan advantage. Selectmen used a number of tricks to fool the Opposition. They might not adequately publicize the time of the vote, and in one town they simply refused to accept certain voters' ballots; in another they delayed opening the polls until most of the voters had gone home except for the party faithful, who had no trouble carrying the day in an empty meeting house.®" But these devices were petty and local, and politicians developed more refined methods of massing the voters throughout the State. Each State determined its own manner of choosing presidential electors, with practices varying from State to State and from one poll to the next. In the first three elections no real contests occurred in Massachusetts, where the people and the legislature jointly selected electors.®^ The Federalists took no chances in 1800 and the legislature assumed the sole right to pick the sixteen electors.®^ Attacking this Innovation as an illegal infringement on populär rights, Republicans insisted that the voters were the best judges.^® The odium cast upon legislative selection probably induced Federalists to adopt a different approach in 1804. Before, 140

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each congressional district had chosen an elector, but now voters were required to select nineteen electors in a general state-wide ticket which contained at least one from each congressional district.^^ T h e purpose of this system was to enable a Federalist majority throughout the State to name all the electors, whereas the older district system would have split them between the parties. Prior to the election both parties printed and circulated lists, until an unforeseen difEculty arose. It had been customary for the parties to print lists which were used as bailots, ensuring correct spelling and dispensing with the trouble of writing the names. T h e general ticket made printed ballots virtually indispensable, since the average voter would have difficulty filling his ballot with the names of his party's nineteen electors. About a month before the canvass, however, the legality of printed ballots was questioned, and when the attorney general ruled that votes must be handwritten, both parties frantically prepared hundreds of written lists to prevent the invalidation of votes lacking the proper district distribution of electors.®® Republicans vigorously fought the general ticket as they had legislative selection, insisting that the older district system was sanctioned by "the general and immemorial custom of the people of this Commonwealth." Furthermore, the new scheme was incompatible with the notion of direct representation because the State was so vast that Citizens could not possibly be familiar with most of the electors, many of whom were purely local men.®® Y e t Republicans were primarily afraid that the general ticket would deprive them of a single elector. Ironically, both parties miscalculated, for Jefferson carried Massachusetts and received all its electoral votes. W h e n they recaptured the legislature in 1808, Federalists took no chances and authorized the General Court to 141

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choose electors. Republicans also learned how to play the game, and so when they controlled the State House in 1 8 1 2 , suspecting they would not poll a statewide majority in the fall presidential election, they apportioned electors among six districts, hoping thereby to assure themselves a share of the electoral vote." Keen partisan infighting also marked gubernatorial campaigns. TTie closeness of the race in 1806 and the dispute Over the ballots left the outcome in doubt for some time and led Federalists to try to disenfranchise unincorporated plantations, though they had voted for governor in the past. Republicans afürmed the voting rights of plantations, which were largely Jeffersonian areas in Maine still in the pre-town phase of development, but Governor Strong vetoed the bill, requesting an advisory opinion from the Supreme Judicial Court. As the judges interpreted the State Constitution, plantations had few political rights, but since they paid taxes, the framers in 1780 had granted them a voice in the choice of State senators. But the Constitution otherwise limited voting for governor and representatives to residents of towns.®® T h e legislature, like the executive, also feit the effects of partisan maneuvering. Tlie size of the General Court was extremely fluid, its membership having more than doubled between 1800 and 1 8 1 0 . T h e lower house became enormous; by 1 8 1 2 it had 745 members, compared to 258 in 1 8 0 1 . Like the explosion in voting, expansion stemmed from organized competition. As the strength of the parties became evenly matched in the General Court, politicians realized that power would go to those most suceessful in inducing loyal towns to be fully represented. Because of the expense, many communities often neglected to send anyone to Boston and the larger towns rarely chose füll delegations, making it possi142

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ble for the parties to increase substantially their ranks in the legislature. As each party feared the other would attempt to overwhelm the lower house with new members, both made strenuous efforts to do just that.®® Controlling the House had an importance far beyond a Single campaign, for as one Maine Republican noted, "If we Succeed this year it will be of Little Consequence another as we shall be sure of Success next year."®" W h e n the towns assembled for the annual spring elections, they first decided how many representatives to send. T h e majority party naturally tried for the maximum number, but economy-minded folk were reluctant to bear the expense. W h e n wealthy Gloucester Federalists offered to subsidize the cost of a large delegation, the Republican legislature rejected the members chosen under circumstances deemed subversive of free elections.®^ But Jeffersonians were just as eager to increase their own numbers, and though they lost the governorship in April 1809 they still hoped to carry the House in May by increasing their quota of representatives in Berkshire County by nine, Worcester and Hampshire from six to eight, Middlesex from eight to ten, and similarly elsewhere.®^ Competition led to election disputes as a losing minority questioned its town's right to an enlarged delegation. The Constitution tied representation to the number of ratable polls, but selectmen had freedom to decide whom to include. It was uncertain whether to count Citizens from other states, resident aliens, or persons exempted from taxation; but because of constitutional ambiguities, selectmen could simply count males over sixteen, and perhaps a few under age, as well as paupers, strangers, and transients.®® T h e most important controversy centered in Boston. Tlic metropolis customarily sent six or seven men during the

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1790's until Federalists vastly increased the delegation to 42 by 1 8 1 0 . Republicans charged that assessors had included on the voting list inhabitants of other towns, persons counted twice, Harvard students, and prisoners, as well as some seven hundred aliens who were not ratable polls. Republicans warned against corrupting elections with aliens, but the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that aliens were ratable polls for purposes of representation.®^ In another attempt to increase their representation, Republicans demanded that the State pay the füll costs of attending sessions of the legislature. While the Commonwealth financed transportation, the towns bore the expense of attendance, with the bürden falling most heavily on the less afHuent and distant communities in Maine. T h e party argued that nine Federalist towns with fewer ratable polls had almost twice as many representatives as ten Republican towns. Republicans also claimed that they would have had an additional 45 votes in the General Court if 18 towns, mostly in Maine, had chosen representatives.®® T h e Solution was simple. In 1 8 1 2 the Commonwealth paid for the attendance of representatives, but when the Federalists returned to office they repealed the law and threatened to fine communities sending excessively large delegations.®® Between 1 8 1 0 and 1 8 1 2 Republicans developed other means of entrenching themselves in ofEce, notably by redistricting. Traditionally, each county constituted a Single senatorial district, with the number of senators apportioned on the basis of wealth. T h e Republicans increased Maine's seats in the State Senate from seven to ten, and by cutting across county lines and carefully selecting towns formed senatorial districts calculated to yield Republican majorities. Tlie peculiar shape of the district in Essex County became the prototype of the gerrymander.®^ T h e census of 1 8 1 0 enabled Jelfersonians also to alter the composition 144

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of the congressional delegation. The state obtained two more congressional seats, both in Maine, and in Massachusetts proper, two new districts, Essex South and Worcester South, were designed to be virtually identical with the new senatorial districts.®® A product of intense partisan competition and Republican insecurity, gerrymandering was an innovation which aroused great controversy. While Jeffersonians blandly insisted on the right of minorities within a county to enjoy some representation, critics noted that no similar sohcitude was shown for Federahst minorities. When Federahsts denounced gerrymandering as a crude device for political advantage, Republicans righteously labeled such talk "indecorous and inadmissable" and constituting "a breach of Order."®® Once Federahsts regained power, they restored the old senatorial districts.'"' Between 1800 and 1 8 1 2 heated party competition and intensive Organization enlarged populär participation, expanded the electorate, increased representation, and encouraged keen partisan scheming. The Uses of Patronage. Another device to advance the Republican cause was manipulation of patronage. Dominating the ranks of both State and federal ofEcials, Federahsts enjoyed almost a monopoly of public ofEce in 1800. Though Bay State Republicans held a few jobs which rewarded the faithful, tempted the wavering, and swayed some voters, newcomers and Outsiders excluded by established authority expected to rise high and fast once control changed hands. Realizing the value of political favors in building a permanent majority, the party experimented until, by 1812, it had articulated and refined a theory and policy of patronage. Faced early with the problem of rewarding the faithful, President Jefferson took a dose and personal interest in

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the problem, elaborating bis views after less than a month in ofEce/' Massachusetts Republicans were especially interested in administration policy because until 1806 Washington was practically their only source of jobs. Joseph Story suggested that State notaries be replaced by federal officials who would constitute a small, learned, able body of men giving uniformity and technical precision to the authentication of documents. Moreover, "in this way in Mass. a Republican would at least hold an ofßce. Y o u know that we are now systematieally excluded."'^^ Combining moderation with shrewd calculations of politieal advantage, Jefferson rejeeted wholesale removals in favor of a slow and patient regeneration of the ofEcialdom. Ostensibly reluctant to make political removals, he promised to eliminate ineompetents and fill all normal vaeancies with Republicans, predicting that eventually both parties would share federal office equally. Sullivan and other Bay State leaders endorsed administration policy primarily for tactieal reasons, hoping to continue to exploit Federalist divisions and permanently split the Opposition. By distinguishing between Hamiltonian and Adams Federalists, "monocrats" and "the federal seet of republicans," Republicans eventually hoped to win over a good portion of the Opposition by displacing the former and retaining the ktter." There was no radical overhaul of offieialdom during the initial years of Republican rule. George Blake replaccd Harrison G . Otis as Federalist distriet attorney, but Jefferson named Silas Lee, a Federalist lawycr, distriet attorney for Maine, hoping to neutralize Lee's influence and gain his Support. Though some Republicans demanded Lee's ouster in 1808, Levi Lincoln and others insisted on keeping him, elaiming that Lee had served the party without formally renouncing his old allegiance. "This masked 146

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course of procedure," Lincoln observed, "is sometimes useful."'^ Similarly, Henry Dearborn helped to engineer the appointment of Federalist Thomas Dawes, Jr., as commissioner of bankmptcy, because Dawes's father was a builder influential among Boston mechanics and anxious to advance bis son." Gradual removals bad still anotber advantage. Tbere were so many bungry Republican job seekers tbat even if the administration bad made wbolesale replacements many of the deserving would have been disappointed, leading to dismiity and factionalism/® Some Republicans, however, were unwilling to give up the fruits of office for the sake of long-range policy, while others believed that gradualism was poor politics." Gerry adviscd the President "to clean the augean stable, of its obnoxious occupants" and Jacob Crowninshield was "convinced that all the federalists holding office under the U States should be replaced with republicans."'® Hampshire County Republicans wondered why "the fostering band of patronage" bad never "been extended to tbis County?" Instead, "the heads of departments have, from fear, or froni affection distributed the 'loaves & fishes' among our enemies, and thereby enabled them to prolong the war against the present Administration."'® Demanding removals bccause previous administrations had uniformly excluded them, bungry Republicans thought that wooing the Opposition was starry-eyed.®" On the eve of William Eustis' bid for re-election in 1802, bis brother in Boston confided that defeat might prove a Hessing in disguise if only it convinced "all half ass'd politicians that it is the power only which is contended for, and tbere must be a radical change in the ofEces and in the presses . . . Mr. Jefferson must turn every man out Over whom he holds a constitutional right, and take care that those he puts in will help him."" 147

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Realizing that moderation would not satisfy everyone, Jefferson promptly reassured the faithful that tolerance did not mean he would make no removals. The long Federalist monopoly of offices justified demands for "a proportionate share in the direction of public affairs." Preferring to leave it "to time and accident" to give the deserving a fair share of places, the President conceded that the total exclusion of Republicans called "for prompter correctives."®^ Consequently, he promised to eliminate those who worked actively against the administration. " W e would betray the cause committed to our care," he informed Lincoln, "were we to permit the influence of official patronage to be used to overthrow" us.'^ This new wrinkle was open to broad interpretation and permitted selective application. In Essex County, where there was a strong possibility of building an independent Republican majority around the Crowninshield interest, the administration moved fast to oust Federalist customs collectors. In contrast, Jefferson did not summarily replace Federalist holdovers in Boston, where the party was relatively weak and was seeking Federalist Support. Patronage policy was thus beset by a number of competing pressures. The President realized that he must reward his friends, but he did not want to alienate moderate Federalists, especially in New England. The local party was of two minds, some favoring gradualism, others expecting removals. In addition to these crosscurrents, the administration faced the inevitable intraparty competition for available positions. The President sought advice from the two Massachusetts members of his cabinet, Lincoln and Dearborn, as well as from the Republican congressional delegation in Washington, who kept in touch with regional leaders back home. The Crowninshields for instance, were influential in making customs appointments in Essex County, while William King played a key role 148

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in Maine nominations. But local politicians frequently squabbled, confusing the administration and breeding factionalism at home.®^ By 1 8 1 2 the political character of federal officials in Massachusetts was considerably altered. T h e Post Office Department offered the greatest opportunities because so many new postmasterships were created. These jobs were not necessarily lucrative but yielded supplementary incomes. Jacob Crowninshield boasted that of the twelve hundred post offices in the nation, "it is so conducted that the Repubhcans have 850 of them. D o not mention the number for the Federahsts will think we have our proportion & the change is going on."®^ T h e customs Service was a smaller but more valuable prize and by 1 8 1 0 only three of 38 revenue officials were holdovers from 1800.®® These posts frequently went to party leaders such as Henry Dearborn, who retired from the cabinet to become Boston's collector of customs. Jefferson's patronage policy enjoyed moderate success. Republicans neutralized part of the Opposition and piecemeal removals weakened Federalist charges of political persecution. Gradual replacements in various parts of the State obscured the extent of change and left the general public unaware of what was happening.®^ In contrast to the subtle handling of the federal patronage were the policies of Massachusetts Republicans once they won power in the Commonwealth. Until 1806 they had no State patronage. Long exclusion from office coupled with Jefferson's gradualism created a large, pent-up demand for rewards. Governors Gerry and Sullivan counseled caution, keeping alive hope of further reconciling opponents, but the bitterness of partisan warfare in the years after the embargo made moderation increasingly difficult.®® T h e clamor for removals became irresistible, especially since tenuous majorities led Republicans to try to strengthen 149

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their position by redistributing favors. For the first time, Massachusetts experienced rotation in ofEce, upsetting the tradition of long-tenured public servants, as Republicans aboHshed jobs filled by Federalists and staffed new ones with their own followers. But as soon as Federalists regained power, they restored the old jobs and jobholders. T h e process began in 1806, when a Republican legislature won its first opportunity to divide the spoils.®® T h e General Court constitutionally named the State treasurer and public notaries, and these posts now began to change hands regularly as the parties alternated in control of the State House.®" W h e n Jeffersonians captured the governorship, they liberally commissioncd new justices of the peace, whose numbers increased successively with each switch in the executive.®' Republicans also wanted some of the more important judicial posts, but Federalist holdovers were not easily removed. T h e Solution was to alter the structure of the courts, creating new tribunals and new positions. T h e State had abolished the old courts of general sessions in 1804, consolidating their functions in the common pleas. Republicans resurrected courts of sessions in every county and also added county attorneys to conduct the state's local litigation.®^ Other innovations were projected in 1807 and 1808 including the replacement of the common pleas with a new system of circuit courts."® By claiming that these changes were a species of reform, the party insisted it was not dividing the spoils. Y e t Republican schemes made places for the faithful. T h e courts of sessions, for instance, had jobs for seventy-eight justices, who received three dollars for each day in attendance plus travcl expenses. Unfortunately, the Federalists abolished the sessions courts and county attorneys in 1809.®^ T h e tempo of removals gained momentum in 1 8 1 1 during Governor Gerry's second term. Claimmg that he had 1 50

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entered office in a temperate and conciliatory mood, hoping to "exterminate if possible a party spirit," Gerry boasted that he had "confirmed in bis place or reappointed . . . every State officer" under bis control. But moderation had met with contempt and Gerry warned that he would no longer tolerate officials who sanctioned resistance to law and encouraged civil war.®® His message reflected the bitterncss of postembargo politics and the determination of Republicans to secure their power. For the party had won control of both houses in 1 8 1 1 and was now able to act decisively to entrench itself in office. In the Summer of 1 8 1 0 , the central committee began to compile a list of all jobholders, distinguishing between friends and enemies.®® T h e following summer, Republican legislators, working diligently to replace Federalists with Republicans, revived the courts of session and county attorneys, established a new circuit court of common pleas to replace the old county courts, and gave the governor authority to appoint new sheriffs and court clerks in every county.®^ Gerry also named dozens of new justices of the peace and inspectors.®® As always there were more office seekers than positions, and the leadership had difficulty accommodating all the deserving applicants. "Office or no office you know is now the question," an obscrver wrote, "every man wants, each man is best, and all must be accommodated."®® From the inferior of Maine came a complaint that a few influential men controlled most of the appointments in Boston, excluding "the common people," who had hoped their new sheriff might be "a poor man . . . wäre he a farmer or a soldier or a mecannick or a millman."""' Federalists resisted the assault on the entrenched officials, charging that new positions were created solely for political reasons. A law abolishing the common pleas

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removed fifty-four justices and opened the door for eighteen Republican judges in the new circuit courts of common pleas. A handful of men, it was claimed, engrossed the new posts: two Council members sat on the Courts of Session, while nine State senators and 29 representatives obtained judicial posts. Pubhc office was no longer an opportunity to serve the Community, having become a source of profit. The Massachusetts Spy lamented: "With a violence hitherto unknown amidst all the contentions of party in this Commonwealth, the Democratick Faction in the legislature . . . have, with a Single sweep of general merciless extermination, ejected from their stations nearly all the old, long tried servants of the publick"^"^ Bay State Republicans skillfully defended rotation, reconciling removals with public well-being.'"^ Arguing that when the voters rejected Federalism they also desired a thorough change of men as well as measures, Jeffersonians insisted on their responsibility to reshape the character of officialdom and to make it reflect the new order. The successful party was entitled to a loyal and sympathetic civil Service to advance its program. Moreover, the Commonwealth should be ruled by a strong majority, for where the division between parties was equal, "the dangers and evils are numerous."^"® But a powerful party could not be formed if its friends were neglected and its enemies rewarded. Jeffersonians admitted that removals would cause bitterness, but they insisted that failure to satisfy the faithful would produce as many complaints and would "chill the ardours of action at their source, extinguish the vital principle of confidence, and soon change the character of Our government,""'^ for the influence of officials was immense. Sheriffs, for instance, occupied "an office of the first emolument and the greatest influence in a county." They granted favors, set bail, packed juries, wantonly called 152

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out the posse, and appointed "scores of Deputies, Appraisers, Keepers of goods, and jailors of Citizens." Republicans insisted, "Surely if there is an ofEcer in the Commonwealth who ought to possess the confidence of the people, and harmonize in feehng and in pohtical principle with the government and administration, it is the one possessing such an extent of patronage, such a variety of duties, such tremendous powers.""® Jeffersonians capped their argument for rotation with an appeal to antimonopoly ideology. Equahty of privileges meant that pubhc ofEce must regularly change hands. Long-entrenched civil servants had obtained posts at no expense and with no preparation and discharged their duties at no sacrifice, in fact frequently receiving handsome emoluments. Exclusive control of ofEce no less than "monopolies of all kinds, are unfriendly to the body politic; and it is an insult to the human understanding to say that an ofEcer ought not to be removed, merely because he has been in ofEce seven or eight years, and made from it some twenty or thirty thousand dollars."'"® Thus Republicans insisted that public Service be opened to all on an equal basis even if those who enjoyed long tenure had to make room for newcomers. Twenty years before Andrew Jackson went to Washington, Massachusetts Jeffersonians practiced rotation in ofEce and radically transformed the political character of State officeholding. Because the principle of rotation was new, it was necessary to articulate a theory of removals reconciling party needs with the common good. T h e uses of patronage, however, like innovations in party Organization and voting, were primarily means of winning influence. More important was the way Republicans used power to promote the aspirations of the Republican interest.

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Jefferson's election in i8oo did not automatically alter the structure of power within the states, though it did create a more favorable climate in which provincial Republicanism could thrive. T h e party's national victory routed Föderalist extremists and secured the peace President Adams had negotiated. Taxes were lowered, the hated Alien and Sedition laws lapsed, a couple of partisan Federalist judges were disciplined, and last-minute Federalist appointments were annulled. T h e new President brought more economy and simplicity to the conduct of public business, but his greatest achievement, the purchase of the Louisiana Territory, was a shrewdly managed windfall, not a long-standing Republican ambition. Strengthened by their party's control of the national government, Massachusetts Republicans made their principal target the displacement of entrenched Federalist authority in the Commonwealth. T h e key to change was control of the State House, through which Republicans could reorder the polity, break the Federalist grip on ofEces and institutions, and open the doors to ambitious newcomers, landless farmers, and religious dissenters. By forging a powerful coalition and developing an effective political instrument, Bay State JeflFersonians came to control one or both branches of the legislature in all the years between 1806 and 1 8 1 2 except 1809, and they captured the governorship four times between 1807 and 1 8 1 2 . Victory made them anxious to taste the fruits of power. 154

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The Politics of Land Tenure. The support of Maine yeomen was a crucial element in Republican success. Denied free State lands, those who migrated to New England's eastern frontier often settled indiscriminately on the public and private domain as well as on tracts whose title was unclear. They carved out farms, cut timber, and founded new communities until challenged by private interests either to buy the land or move and lose their improvements. Settiers complained that the priccs asked were excessive and beyond their means, but if they refused to buy they would be abandoning the fruits of their labor. The Courts offered little protection, since the law did not recognize squatter rights. Furthermore, conflicting private Claims were so thorny that the courts might become hopelessly bogged down in indeterminate questions of ownership. Only a political Solution could reconcile competing interests and spare the region the scars of bitter conflict. As proprietors pressed their demands, sent out surveyors, and brought suits for ejection, the necessity for such a settlement grew urgent. Republicans had won influence by proclaiming themselves the husbandinan's friend while picturing Federalists as servants of absentee speculators.' In 1805 William King, together with other Maine Republicans, proposed a legislati\'e investigation of grantees who failed to fulfill the terms of their contracts.When the Commonwealth alienated large tracts, it had generally required the settlement of a stipulated number of people to ensure reasonably rapid development. Charging neglect of these duties, Republicans demanded forfeiture. By blocking the inquiry, Federalists only confirmed their image as tools of the landholders. None of the large proprietors was more vulnerable than the Ringham interest, which had acquired over two mil-

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lion acres in the 1790's on the promise to settle 2,500 farmers by 1803, with half the deeds held in escrow to ensure Performance.^ T h e sheer size of the undertaking and the extent of the assumed responsibihties, together with inadequate financing and Bingham's death, delayed development of the purchase. Though the Bingham group failed to fulfill the requirements, the speculation had enjoyed pohtical favor from the beginning, and David Cobb, one of Bingham's agents and Federahst president of the State Senate, managed to thwart demands for forfeiture temporarily. Repubhcan pohtical pressure, however, was mounting. In June 1805 Harrison G . Otis informed Charles W . Hare, Bingham's Philadelphia trustee, that "designing men" were encouraging a "spirit of insubordination and enmity to the legitimate rights of property."^ Hare realized that even his Federalist friends would have trouble preventing forfeiture, for the Bingham interest had not lived up to the original agreement and Republican influence was growing. T h e best hope was to make a deal. Informing Hare that King had expressed interest in Kennebeck lands, C o b b noted, " H e has proposed no price but he wishes to be concern'd whenever they are sold."^ Hare proceeded to Boston, and by January 1807 had silenced Opposition by trading Maine lands for political support.® King and several of his Lincoln County associates, including Peleg Tallman, Moses Carleton, Abiel W o o d , Jr., and Benjamin Porter, received three townships along the Kennebeck and agreed to assume certain settlement obligations. Under bipartisan pressure, the State relinquished the undelivered portion of the original purchase and extended the time for performing settling duties, provided the proprietors posted an $80,000 bond against nonperformance.® Having avoided forfeiture and entangled his erstwhile enemies, Hare claimed a substantial 156

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victory: " W e have created a common bond of interest with some of the populär leaders in Massachusetts who have promised to Support us against all future injustice, and we have placed them in a Situation which will compel them to turn the tide of emigration as much in our direction as the course of events will allow."^ News of the deal leaked out and King was charged with publicly attacking the Bingham interest but privately lining his own pockets.^ Republicans flatly denied that King owned "a single acre of wild lands without the bounds of an unincorporated town" and defended the new agreement because it assured forfeiture for nonperformance. Far from befriending the large proprietors, they righteously insisted, King had protected the settlers "from the cruelty of federalist oppression."^ This was more than propaganda, for while King was shaking down the Bingham group he was also earning a reputation as champion of the landless. By the middle of the decade tensions between squatters and landowners reached dangerous proportions. Petitions poured into the legislature demanding relief against ejection. Having "fled to the wilderness, as a refuge from poverty & oppression," having cleared the land by hard toil until "that wilderness now buds & blossoms like the rose," Peter Chalmers and other yeomen claimed they were threatened with the loss of their life's labors. Willing to buy their homesteads at a fair price, Jonathan Trask and other petitioners refused to pay exorbitant prices or purchase title as long as "claim succeeds claim; proprietor follows proprietor & the purchase of one deed must be followed by that of another."'® In March 1808 the Commonwealth adopted the Betterment Act, which is usually credited to William K i n g . " Over the bitter Opposition of owners who claimed that the measure would cause "a total prostration of all the Baniers

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which the Constitution has provided for the Protection of the Property and Rights of the People," the legislature barred the ejection of settlers without compensation for the value of improvements assessed by a local jury.^^ If landlords chose to seil to occupants, a jury would determine a fair price for the lands without improvements. In 1809 yeomen received an extension of the time for making final payment/® Though the squatters welcomed the new law and idolized King, betterment did not solve the more complex problem of disputed title. Even those ready to pay a fair price for their farms refused to buy defective deeds. Meanwhile, owners of disputed land could still try to oust settlers who found themselves defenseless. Some resisted surveyors and, dressed as Indians, skirmished with sheriff's deputies, forcing Governor Sullivan to remove the unpopulär Kennebeck Sheriff Arthur Lithgow and replace hiin with John Chandler." Chandler toured the disaffected regions, urging obedience to the law and promising to cnforce it fairly. But he failed to pacify everyone; and in 1809 a surveyor was killed and the alleged murderers tried and acquitted. Düring these commotions, Sullivan resisted demands to call out the militia to suppress disorder, but the Supreme Judicial Court ordered five hundred men to protect surveyors running lines. Squatters denounced judicial Intervention as unconstitutional, but in March 1 8 1 0 a Federalist legislature sanctioned the court's use of the militia. W h e n Republicans returned to power three months later, in June, they repealed the new militia authorization and sought more positive solutions to Maine's troubles.^® Several of the most important title disputes involved large grants which antedated the Revolution, such as the Pejepscot claim, which had been confirmed after the war 158

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011 condition that farms be sold to settlers at prices judged fair by three public commissioners. Complaining that the proprietors refused to observe the agreement, squatters demanded forfeiture. In March 1807 King requested an investigation and the legislature directed the attorney general to recover the lands unless the grantees complied with the agrcement.^® T h e State brought suit in i8o8, but the judges delayed a verdict while the grantees moved to oust occupants. Betterment offered inadequate protection, for landowners had learned how to evade the law by bringing several actions against a squatter—one for pasture and woodlands, another for mowing and tillage, electing to seil part of the farm and pay for the value of improvements on the remainder, thereby leaving the farmer with a useless fragment of his homestead.'^ In 1 8 1 1 , a committee of the General Court headed by King investigated the Pejepscot Situation and reported back to the legislature, which directed the courts to continue without costs all pending actions against settlers until the judges ruled on the Commonwealth's suit against the proprietors." T h e legal problems proved tangled, counsel became enmeshed in fine points of procedure, and the judges wrote three opinions. A majority rejected the technical objections of the defendants and held the Pejepscot grant conditional on equitable sales to settlers.'® T h e State also argued that the grantees had intruded on lands outside the original grant. Examining the resolution of 1 7 8 7 which confirmed the claim, the court upheld the defendants and the State agreed to compensate them for the disputed tracts at a sum fixed by three referees.^' Concurrent with the Pejepscot difEculties were complaints from several towns in Lincoln County against another group with ancient title to lands on which settlers had located for decades, unable to determine ownership. 1 59

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Having neglected their grant until settlement gave it value, the owners now brought forward "from the dark shades of time the relicks of old, colusive and decrepit claims . . . which half a Century has suffered to sleep in darkness.""' Though the grantees had never located or settled the tracts, occupants who made improvements for the last fifteen or thirty years had no legal rights under common law to lands they considered public domain. Yeomen demanded protection against English land law, which might "dispense right and justice to another clime" but brought "wrong and injustice to this."^^ Arguing that the law retarded Maine's development, husbandmen insisted that real actions should not be entertained on claims antedating the Revolution. The legislature dispatched a committee to Lincoln County, and in June 1 8 1 1 Governor Gerry submitted a report with recommendations.^ Praising the settlers' industry and desire to obtain good title, the committee favored compromise, noting that even the proprietors wished to end the conflict. Owners agreed to release their claims under the original grant in exchange for an equivalent amount of unlocated and unsettled lands, while the State offered to confirm squatters on their farms for a small Charge.^* While resolving conflicts rooted in past grants, some Republicans also thought of the future. Many problems had arisen because the Commonwealth had used the public domain as a source of revenue, alienating over three million acres between 1791 and 1800.^® Nathan Weston and other Republicans demanded a halt to the rapid transfer of public domain to private ownership, favoring the disposal of small tracts to actual settlers located in compact communities furnished with roads and schools.^® After a final orgy which alienated almost half a million acres be160

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tween 1802 and 1805, the State called a halt and in the next few years considered alternative ways of disposing of its landed treasure.^'' T h e leading proposal was to create a general land office to regulate sales, survey unsold lands, lay them out in twenty-four-thousand-acre townships, and hold public auctions. Weston, however, demanded a minimum purchase price and limitations on the amount any one individual could acquire. A revised measure, reflecting his views, proposed to lay out initially only twenty townships near the more settled communities, to establish a minimum purchase price of seventy-five cents an acre, and to encourage development by granting the first twenty yeomen in each township one hundred acres at a very low price. Only half the land might be sold in amounts as large as a half or whole township and those acquiring large tracts would have to settle each six hundred acres within five years or forfeit title.^® Speculative interests in both parties, however, were probably responsible for postponing the creation of the General Land OfBce until 1 8 1 5 . In the meantime the State made few large grants. As a rapidly developing region beset with difEcult problems and competing ambitions, the District of Maine was a hotbed of unrest and personal rivalry. Capitalizing on the dynamics of social change, aggressive and ambitious newcomers challenged the entrenched Federalist authority by forging a populär alliance with squatters, whose loyalty was cemented to the party when Republicans employed State power in the yeomen's interest. As land reformers, Republicans such as William King found not only political profit but also private advantage. Though he had personally gained from attacking the Bingham group, King became celebrated for his "goodness to the Settiers," their "greatest friend and whom the people put unbounded confidence in."^® Repubhcans neither sought nor effected fundamen-

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tal change in the pattern of tenure, but their sensitivity to the farmer's claims enabled them to ease the problems of settlement and adjust conflicting interests. Elsewhere in the Commonwealth, including the eastern counties, other members of the Repubhcan interest demanded that the State become more attuned to the welfare of the disadvantaged. The Religious Settlement. Heavily indebted to dissenters as well as to Maine yeomen, Republicans assumed power during a decade of heightening tensions between dissent and the religious establishment. Article III of the State Constitution had not become a charter of freedom but only produced "noxious weeds of hypocrisy and cruelty." Legally entitled to Support ministers of their own choice, in practice many dissenters found towns unwilling to share church funds unless forced to do so by the courts. Judicial redress, however, was expensive and time-consuming, the bench was unsympathetic, and ingenious lawyers and stubborn town fathers were quick to invent new obstacles to recovery: Was the itinerant Methodist circuit rider actually a "settled" preacher entitled to public funds? Did Universalists preach "Christian" religion? Could unincorporated societies claim tax support? By raising repeated and new objections, by refusing dissenters their share of the tithe, Congregationalists fought a rear-guard action against sectarian inroads and the threat of disestablishment.®" T h e Standing order was doomed, for dissent was growing fast and was the most dynamic Spiritual force in the State. Increasingly restless and unwilling to engage in endless squabbles and suits, many Baptists, in particular, objected to the principle of taxation for religious purposes, some preferring to lose their money rather than submit certificates acknowledging secular authority in spiritual affairs.

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A series of unfavorable legal decisions after 1800 galvanized dissent and inspired a vigorous assault against Congregationalist power. In 1804 W e s t Springfield Methodists sued to recover taxes they wished applied to a minister of their own choice. T h e Supreme Judicial Court ruled tliat itinerant circuit riders who did not regularly preach in a town were ineligible since only "settled" and ordained pastors were entitled to public funds.®' Grounding their opinion not only on constitutional interpretation but also on considerations of policy, the judges warned that Support of itinerant dissenters "would have the most direct tendency to subvert all the regulär religious societies."^^ T h e decision was a serious blow to Baptists and Methodists because they were widely dispersed and relied on a traveling, unsettled clergy. Five years later dissenters suflered another defeat when the Courts ruled that only ministers who served an entire 3'ear in one place could claim public funds. A Baptist who preached half the year in Kingston and the other half in Middleboro could not receive taxes paid by his parishioners in the two towns, for he was not regularly "settled." Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons reasoned that since people paid church taxes for an entire year's ministry, the plaintiff was demanding a füll year's pay for half a year's services. By contracting with a dozen societies, the itinerant clergy might grow rieh.®' Both these decisions imposed burdens on dissenters, requiring them to employ a minister for the entire year or forfeit public Support. Even more serious was a decision by the high court in 1 8 1 0 holding that only incorporated societies were entitled to recover taxes. Reversing pre\'iously settled doctrine, Parsons ruled that article III did not Cover private but only public societies known by law. By denying unincorporated groups tax support, the State 163

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would not be infringing on religious freedom, he argued, since men were still able to worship as they pleased. The Courts would not encourage Citizens to withdraw from the regulär corporate bodies, form sects claiming public Support, and thereby spread division and disaffection within the established churches and deprive them of membership and funds.^^ Dissenters were aroused as never before, since many of them had never incorporated, either out of neglect or Opposition to all links with the State. Unwilling to accept passively judicial efforts to bolster the establishment, they worked diligently for legislative relief. In 1807 John Bacon, Republican Calvinist from the Berkshires and president of the State Senate, introduced a bill to grant dissenters tax exemption, thus eliminating the need to sue for recovery. The dose partisan division of the House together with a handful of Republican defections defeated the measure, which Federalists condemned as "the Infidel Bill."®® Despite this setback, the Reverend William Bentley predicted that "the increase of the sects must eventually make this law necessary."®® Throughout the Commonwealth Jeffersonian Calvinists and dissenters campaigned hard. They gathered petitions containing thirty thousand names appealing for relief and new men were sent to the legislature pledged to alter the law.®'' One of these was the Berkshire Baptist John Leland, who traveled east to promote one of the great causes of his career. The State Constitution, he told his fellow representatives, guaranteed equality among the sects, yet in practice the State violated the consciences of those who believed it sinful to "pay a legal tax for religious services."®® Moreover, union of church and State was evil because it secularized religion, "disrobing Christianity of her virgin beauty—turning the Churches of Christ into creatures of 164

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State—and metamorphosing gospel ambassadors to State pensioners."'® Demanding an end to religious monopoly, Republicans predicted that the Commonwealth would flourish without a privileged clergy, as had Boston, New York, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, N e w Jersey, and Delaware, which had not been "sunk with earthquakes or destroyed with fire and brimstone."'"' Uniformity was unnecessary to ensure order and morality, for even the established churches were divided among themselves on both doctrine and polity, while Federalists ran a Socinian for governor and a Calvinist for lieutenant governor.^' T h e Republican victories in 1 8 1 0 and 1 8 1 1 made reform possible. Governor Gerry favored relief, and in June 1 8 1 1 the legislature passed the Religious Freedom Act. Tlie final count in the House was close, with the crucial votes Coming from Maine, whose representatives were four to one for change.^^ Though Congregationalism was not disestablished, the rights of dissenters were explicitly guaranteed. Citizens filing certificates of membership in a sect were "forever afterwards" exempted from supporting the established societies, while recent court decisions were reversed. A n unincorporated group was entitled to funds as was an itinerant minister serving several parishes as long as he was "ordained and established according to the forms and usages of his own religious sect."^® Federalists resisted change as dangerous, attacked Republicans for catering to "the restless sectarians," and predicted that the act would undermine "the regulär parochial establishment" and "encourage and multiply . . . fomenters of religious discord."^^ Such protests were of no use, for by 1 8 1 2 forces within and without Congregationalism were growing so powerful that no religious group could maintain a privileged position. Elsewhere and earlier throughout the young Republic the variety of faiths made a monopoly of 165

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one untenable. While the establishment endured longer in New England than elsewhere, here too it was doomed as dissenters allied with other groups and challenged entrenched authority. The Religious Freedom Act, however, was only one of several efforts to undermine the power of Bay State Federalism. The Quest for Participation. Though victory at the polls assured the Republican elite public office, they also desired access to certain prestigious and important communal institutions, participation in which was a mark of social eminence and personal worth. Jeffersonians complained that an exclusive "family compact" had engrossed all social honors and privileges, creating an aristocratic influence: "Many institutions of this Commonwealth, which have promised great benefit to the public, would have met with much more success, had similar corporations been established. W h e n only one of any kind is permitted, it too frequently happens, that a majority of the individuals composing it, indulge their private views and interest, to the exclusion of men of the most enlarged, liberal and informed minds."^' T h e Solution was to liberalize and multiply institutions, broaden their composition, and promote competition. Harvard University was a Federalist bulwark. Despite divisions within the Congregationalist ministry, the clergy still played a leading role in the College, where dozens of ministers were trained for the pulpits of established societies. Also at Harvard the younger sons of leading families spent four years before entering the worlds of law and medicine, trade and politics. Attuned to the interests of the established elite, Harvard was overwhelmingly Federalist in tone. In 1805 another of the university's many Student rebel166

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lions erupted, causing an investigation by the Board o£ Overseers. Under the College charter, the Overseers included the governor, lieutenant governor, the Council, the Senate, and a group of ministers. At the time of the inquiry Republicans controlled both the Senate and Council. Dividing along party lines, Federalist Overseers backed the College administration and Republicans supported the students and only barely missed dominating the board. Frightened by the prospect of "Jacobinical" capture, Harvard obtained an amendment to the College charter at the ver)' next Federalist legislature, replacing the senators with ministers and laymen chosen by the Overseers.^® Republicans attacked the efforts "of a few persons" to "perpetuate themselves and their family connection"^^ in control of the university and denounced the award of an honorary degree to Senator Timothy Pickering.^^ W h e n Harvard students pounded the floor of the Cambridge meetinghouse during the reading of Governor Gerry's Thanksgiving Day Proclamation in 1 8 1 1 , they only further inflamed Republican critics.^® Determined to reassert public authority, Republicans repealed the new amendment to the charter, ignoring President Kirkland's earnest reminder that Harvard never indulged in politics.®" Though Kirkland denied that the General Court had authoritv to amend the charter without the college's consent, the legislature restored the old Board of Overseers. But the victory was temporary; when Federalits returned to power, they again secured the university against Republican control.^' T h e Massachusetts Medical Society also became enmeshed in partisan conflict. Founded in 1 7 8 1 , it had rapidly become a leading professional association, licensing physicians, upholding Standards, publishing works of scientific research, and fostering medical education. In 1 8 1 1 a 167

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group of well known Republican doctors, including Marshall Spring, Nathaniel Arnes, and William Aspinwall, sought a charter for a rival College of Physicians.®^ The most eminent among them was Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse, Professor of the theory and practice of medicine at the Harvard Medical School, who had been associated with the school from its early days and had won a reputation by championing vaccination against smallpox. However, he feil out with Dr. John Warren, who was president of the Medical Society and professor of anatomy and surgery. Waterhouse complained that Harvard had not adequately recognized his talents and he resisted Warren's effort to move the school from Cambridge to Boston. As a result, Waterhouse was forced to resign and took a federal job as medical superintendant of New England's military posts.®^ Critics of the Medical Society charged that a small clique stifled creativity, excluded worthy men, monopolized "all the honoTs and profits of the profession/' and used "every means of maintaining their petty despotism."®^ The Federalist monopoly of the Medical Society had broad significance because "it is by keeping possession of every avenue to learning, that the junto are still established with impunity." It was imperative to charter a rival Institution, the first of its kind "patronized and strenuously supported by every influential republican in the State."®® The Medical Society denied any favoritism or partisanship and warned that the establishment of more than one Society, as in New York and Philadelphia, would lower Standards and deprive medical research and education of the community's united support.®® By clever lobbying the Society won over a few Republicans, including Speaker Joseph Story, and defeated incorporation of the rival group by a few votes.®^ 168

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While direct attacks on Harvard and the Massachusetts Medical Society failed, Republicans enjoyed more success when they sought to participate in one of the great philanthropic achievements of the age, the founding of the Massachusetts General Hospital. In 1 8 1 0 a group of the state's wealthy elite, considering themselves " 'treasurers of God's b o u n t y ' " became aware that Boston lacked adequate hospital facilities. Many people endured illness in wretched garrets and cells without proper Ventilation, food, or nursing. T h e problem was not confined to the very poor or dependent; many diligent servants, artisans, and journeymen were unable to "defray the expense of medicine and medical assistance," particularly "in cases of long protracted disease." In a well-regulated hospital, "the poor man's chance for relief would be equal perhaps to the most afiluent, when affected by the same disease." T h e hospital's proponents asked for some State aid but planned to rely mainly on private contributions.^® W h i l e the petition for the hospital charter did not evoke partisan conflict, the original sponsorship was almost exclusively Federalist. Prominent Republicans must have sought association with the enterprise, for the list of incorporators in the final charter was virtually an honor roll of leading Bay State Jeffersonians. Joining such Federalist stalwarts as TTieophilus Parsons, George Cabot, and Harrison G . Otis were James Bowdoin, Elbridge Gerry, William Eustis, Henry Dearborn, Perez Morton, Joseph B. Varnum, Thomas Cutts, Samuel Brown, and Benjamin Crowninshield, among others.®® T h e quest for participation in communal enterprises such as Harvard University, the Medical Society, and the Massachusetts General Hospital was an effort by those outside established centers of status and authority to gain access to associations of prestige and influence. This desire 169

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to share more fully in the institutional life of the Commonwealth also drove Republicans to seek a share in one of the state's most valuable gifts, the privilege of incorporated banking. The Politics of Banking, 1800-1812. Massachusetts chartered only a handful of banks in the eighteenth Century. By 1800 irresistible pressures forced the multiplication of charters. The demand came primarily from trading towns dotting the seaboard from the Penobscot Valley down to New Bedford, where commercial prosperity rested on the country's position as the world's largest neutral trader.®® The early banks were primarily supposed to supply the short-term credit needs of commerce, but some men also perceived the speculative advantages of exploiting the power to issue notes. Numerous petitions for incorporation forced the Commonwealth in 1803 to debate the wisdom of expansion. Arguing that the self-regulating forces of the market would control excessive note issues, a State Senate committee recommended multiplying the number of banks. Wherever a relatively small group dominated the banks, as in Boston, or where only one institution existed, excluded interests claimed equal privileges which it was politically impossible to deny. Though sixteen new banks were authorized between 1802 and 1806, the demand was barely satisfied. The quest for charters became a highly competitive race, with victory going to those best organized and most influential. Republicans sought to participate, finding the older institutions narrowly based and dominated by the wealthiest Federalist merchants, who opposed expansion because of the competitive threats to their business as well as to the stability of the currency. Though Republicans were a political minority until 1806, they often held the balance of 170

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power in the struggle in the legislature. Success often went to banking coalitions such as those in Worcester, Portland, and Northampton, where a few Republican stockholders were admitted by the dominant Federalist group. Where Repubhcans were powerful, as in Salem, they cnjoyed greater leverage. Before 1803 the town had only one bank and one insurance Company. In that year a bipartisan group in the Salem Insurance Company, including the Crowninshields, sought a second bank in which to invest Company funds. T h e exclusively Federalist Essex Bank retaliated by petitioning for a second insurance Company, restricting the shares to their own clique. T h e Crowninshields toyed with the idea of establishing a third insurance Company to comprehend those barred from the new one. Eventually both groups got their bank and insurance Company.®' Shares in the new Salem Bank were engrossed by a small group, causing the disappointed to seek a charter for the Mechanicks' Bank.®^ T h e legislature was unreceptive, Richard Crowninshield reported, "because it was not of the Federalist sort," but his brother Jacob thought the rebuff was "a good thing & will finally help the republican cause."®® Boston was also a lively center of financial politics. There were three institutions until 1803, when some of the town's leading Federalist merchants, many with ties to the older institutions, founded the Boston Bank. Complaining of the high price of stock and the drain of local funds to Philadelphia and N e w York, they argued that another bank would neither injure the established ones nor lessen the value of the state's Investment in them.®^ Opposition arose from Federalist and Republican businessmen, usually of the second rank, as well as from shopkeepers, who complained that a handful of rieh traders had monopolized most of the shares through a secret subscription. Incorpo-

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rating them would not diffuse the charter privilege but only concentrate it further at the expense of "men of less property." Unable to block the Boston Bank, critics sought one of their own. A bipartisan coahtion of several hundred merchants and tradesmen from the "middhng interest" petitioned for a "Town and Country Bank." Instead of benefiting the few, this new hberal Institution promised to diffuse subscriptions widely, particularly among "men of modest or middhng capital." It also undertook to make loans on urban real estate, thereby providing credit for the small borrowers in the towns. The middling interest had other, more serious criticisms of the Boston banks. Expansion had flooded the metropolis with depreciating foreign notes, which were not promptly redeemed by the country banks and which threatened to drive Boston bills out of circulation. When the Boston institutions decided to refuse foreign bills, hoping to force payment of debts in local paper, they alarmed those who had anticipated covering their obligations with foreign paper. Since many merchants had to accept out of town currency at face value or lose country trade, they welcomed a new Institution, such as the Town and Country Bank, which would accept foreign bills at or near par.®® The legislature refused to grant a charter, and though Republicans supported it, the vote was neither clearly partisan nor sectional.®® But the party tried to blame defeat on the Federalists, picturing them as the Champions of bank monopoly, opposed to "every measure calculated to promote the interest of the middling class of citizens."®'^ "Will a director of the Boston Bank," the Boston Democrat asked, "or a man, whose 'projects' gripe every monied Institution within the town, be advocates for such salutary measures as our Situation calls for?" Republicans pro172

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claimed, " L e t the charters be free for all, if they are granted to any."®® By uniting politically, the middling interest might elect representatives who would "counteract the overbearing influenae operating with the banks."®® Republicans added a few Federalists to their Boston ticket, and in 1803 and 1804 representatives of the middling interest won election with bipartisan support, but the remainder of the Republican list suffered defeatJ" Meanwhile, ambitious promoters discovered another more successful way to enter the banking business. T h e Boston Exchange Office, chartered in 1804, was a bipartisan enterprise headed by a Republican and composed of a group of lesser merchants and shopkeepers. W i t h $150,000 in local bills and $50,000 in specie, the Exchange made loans but could not issue notes. Ostensibly designed to Support the value of country issue, the Exchange was expected to benefit those forced to resort to private brokers who took foreign bills but at a large discount/^ T h e scheme failed, for the flood of out of town notes and the country banks' refusal to redeem them promptly caused continued depreciation. W h i l e the Exchange did not succeed in regulating the currency, it did become a Center of speculation. By acquiring control of some distant banks—the further away from Boston the better—a group of directors planned to print vast quantities of paper, unload it at whatever price it would bring, and thereby clear large profits, since the bills could never be redeemed. For this purpose an ideal location for a note-issuing factory was the wilderness of the Old Northwest. T h e opportunity came in 1805 when Jefferson appointed as governor of Michigan Territory William Hull, an old Revolutionary W a r veteran and leading Middlesex County Republican. Hull was probably in financial distress and needed public office; while his new job did not pay much,

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it opened other opportunities for gain. Hull's unsuccessful investment in Yazoo lands no doubt made him familiar with other speculators who appreciated the possibilities of the Michigan frontier/^ These capitalists included a number of men involved both in the für trade and the Exchange Office. T h e most prominent was Russell Sturgis, a successful and wealthy merchant. A friend of John Jacob Astor, another Republican für trader, Sturgis was active in the Pacific northwest but also may have tapped the peltry sources of the Old Northwest. He and his associates petitioned the territorial legislature of Michigan to charter a bank at Detroit, ostensibly to finance für trading against intensive English competition.'^® T h e legislature, composed of Governor Hull and three judges, including Augustus B. Woodward, a Virginia fortune seeker, was receptive.''^ Considering the plan too modest, Judge Woodward increased the capitalization from $400,000 to $1,000,000 and lengthened the life of the bank from thirty to one hundred and one years. Since Michigan was mostly a wilderness inhabited by three thousand souls, this bold vision was not entirely inspired by the economic needs of the frontier. Without waiting for congressional approval, the Detroit Bank opened for business. T h e Boston capitalists, who owned some 85 per cent of the stock, paid $19,000 in specie, on which the bank issued $400,000 in notes for circulation eastward. Sturgis quickly unloaded his stock before the scheme collapsed. This did not occur until after Andrew Dexter and his associates in the Exchange—the group with the largest investment in the bank—^had issued over $1,000,000 in additional notes. Although few easterners knew that the Bank had refused to redeem the first five dollars presented, Detroit bills inundated Massachusetts, alarming merchants and bankers. T h e public was warned against accepting the handsome-

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looking paper and banks refused Bostonians asked Coiigress to disallow the charter, while settlers denounced thc Hull-Woodward administration, charging that its sole aim was to amass power and emoluments, subordinating the welfare of the territory to "speculating views." TTie bank was one of many schemes of "egregious rapacity and selfishness."-® Meanwhile Judge Woodward, the bank's president, sought congressional sanction for the enterprise and wrote a deceptive letter to Madison masking the true nature of the speculation. " I f any abuse exists," he purred, "whieh is not believed here, like all others it will necessarily correct i t s e l f . " " B u t the attacks were successful and in 1807 Congress annulled the charter and the enterprise collapsed.™ T h e Detroit Bank was only one of several devices by which speculators exploited opportunities in banking. Their activities were symptomatic of a more general problem, the unregulated, unstable, and chaotic State of the currency. Charter grants in Massachusetts came to an abrupt end in 1806 when Governor Strong pointed out that existing institutions could meet all legitimate needs." Tlie embargo a little later unsettled economic conditions on which speculation had thrived, shook the financial system, and forced a number of banks to stop payment. Blaming the ills of the currency on the country banks' excessive note issues and lax redemption practices, the great Boston banks favored retrenchment, denying new charters and placing the out of town banks under pressure to redeem their bills.®" T h u s just as Republicans were assuming State power, some Federalists and others demanded restraint, placing the party in a neat dilemma. For years Jeffersonians had denounced the banking system as a conspiracy of rieh Federalists against the smaller tradesmen. T h e banks were

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"engines of oppression," enabling favored groups to exploit enterprising merchants and shopkeepers, while the competition for charters corrupted government. Federalists monopolized "all the exclusive privileges . . . until the voice of private Citizens is lost in the overbearing influence of privileged companies."®^ As long as "combined court parties grant banks and other privileged corporations to favored companies, equal rights cannot exist."®^ The logic of this indictment led to the possibility either of abolishing all corporate banking or of establishing new institutions to equalize privilege. The first alternative was impractical and the second meant opening the floodgates to expansion. The dilemma was compounded by enormous pressure for new charters both inside and outside Republican circles. Located in the smaller coastal towns, the ßo-called country banks were generally run by rising entrepreneurs and speculators, who saw in them an important means of advancement. Blaming the ills of the currency on the metropolis, expansionists :argued that their notes would not have depreciated if "the great monied institutions of Boston" had not combined and made runs on the smaller banks to depress their paper.®® Among the expansionists were Republicans long hungry for charters of their own. The Crowninshield connection in Salem, for instance, demanded the defeat of Essex County's two Federalist Senators because both were bank presidents and hostile to new grants.®^ Nowhere was the demand for additional charters louder than in Maine, where requests poured in from Bath, Bangor, Brunswick, Augusta, East Portland, Warren, Camden, and Machias. Some of these groups were largely Republican, others were bipartisan with Republican leadership, but all needed the Support of Wilham King, whom Federalists denounced as "the greatest Bank Stockholder 176

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in Maine," Sponsoring numerous charters only to engross hundreds of shares for himself.®® Confronted by a banking system already overexpanded and extremely vulnerable to economic fluctuation, yet pressed also by interests opposed to restraint, the Republicans moved cautiously at first, breaching exclusive Federalist control of two Boston banks in which the State held stock. W h e n the Commonwealth chartered the Union and Boston banks, it reserved the right to appoint directors, but it never exercised its right until 1807, when the General Court named six Republican directors for each bank, to make sure that "another political sect . . . participate[d] in their management."®® W h e n he assumed office in 1807, Governor Sullivan was confronted by "the great & increasing evils attending the present system of Banking . . . the frequent & distressing inconveniences & losses . . . and also the immense quantities of bank paper in circulation . . . the losses on which are borne by the Citizens of this Commonwealth."®^ Fifteen years before, Sullivan had recommended concentrating banking in a State monopoly. In the intervening time political pressure resulted in diffusion, but the idea of concentration did not die.®® It re-emerged again in 1807 in altered form, attracting support at first from groups in both parties. T h e plan was to combine all existing banks in a great public monopoly capitalized at $20,000,000. Established banks would have eighteen months to subscribe to 60 per cent of the stock and would thereafter become branches of the State bank. T h e Commonwealth would play a leading role, investing in the remaining shares, depositing its funds, and choosing a third of the directors. A monopoly would be created by refusing to grant new charters or to renew old ones and all notes would be redeemed promptly. Note issue 177

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would not increase unduly, bills would have the same value everywhere, and depreciation would be checked, restoring Order and stability to the currency.®® For these reasons the idea appealed to restrictionist bank interests in Boston and to antispeculative Repubhcans such as John Bacon of Berkshire County. But the bill did not suit urban Repubhcans such as the Crowninshields and the King connection, who werc unwilhng to rehnquish their quest for charters. T h e State monopoly would not accommodate them because it would simply comprehend existing institutions. Since most "of the present bank stockholders . . . are federalists . . . that party must invariably be the principal proprietors and sole managers of the institution."®" For almost a year debate, delay, and maneuvering prevented any final action. Düring that time the bill was rewritten to suit the interests of Republican expansionists.®^ T h e bill called for the creation of new branches that would not incorporate the old banks, for direct transference of stock from the established to the new institutions was ruled out. Shares would be distributed "at the discretion and under the direction of this Commonwealth" and the bank could double its capital and found additional branches from time to time. But most important, the restraining features of central banking were eliminated when the requirement for prompt and universal note redemption was dropped. These changes mutilated the original conception; the bill no longer rationalized the banking system but it did threaten Federalist interests. Passed in the house, it was killed in the closely divided Senate.®^ W h e n Repubhcans regained power in May 1 8 1 0 they enjoyed a unique opportunity because the charters of all the Massachusetts banks and of the Bank of the United States were due to expire by 1 8 1 2 . T h e first Step was to destroy the great national financial power. This Institution 178

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had incurred tlie enmity of Republican banking interests in Massachusetts and elsewhere, who were critical of its restraining influence and jealous of its monopoly of government deposits. In 1803 Congressman Jacob Crowninshield considered securing a branch for Salem, bnt he dropped the idea as impractical since the Philadelphia directors were Federalists and would exclude Republicans. "Thank G o d , " he wrote, ". . . their charter will be wanted to be renewed before many years & we shall see if any class of nien arc to enjoy exclusive privileges in this Country.""'' Jefferson also nurtured a deep dislike for the bank. As a shrewd politician, he appreciated the uses of patronage and hoped that by distributing federal funds among State institutions he might further wed urban interests to the Republican party. Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, however, valued the bank's services as well as the stabilizing influence it exerted on the economy. He opposed altering relations and strongly favored rcchartering.®^ But renewal faced powerful Opposition in Congress, whcre state banking interests were influential."' T h e House defeated recharter, with every Bay State Republican voting against the bank and their Federalist colleagues favoring it. Behind Republican unanimity were visions of erecting new institutions on the ruins of the old one.®® Controlling the State in 1 8 1 0 and 1 8 1 1 , Republicans refused to renew any of the expiring State charters. T h e dcmise of the old banks required creation of new ones "to make loans to those persons who are indebted to existing Institutions and thereby enablc them to wind up their affairs with the least possible embarasment."®' T w o large Republican banks would prove sufficient. A charter was granted to the Crowninshields for the Merchants Bank of Salem, while the rest of the faithful formed the huge new State bank, capitalized at $4,500,000, the largest ever in179

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corporated in Massachusetts.®® Neither a monopoly nor a central bank, the Institution was simply a politically inspired effort to give Republicans control of a powerful financial agency. Though Federalists obtained a few shares, county committees headed by prominent local Republicans frankly distributed stock "as extensively as possible among the Friends of the Government" hoping to break "the bank monopoly," Federalism's "principal support."®® While serving party interests, the Republicans sought to cloak their efforts under the mantle of r e f o r m . T l i e y insisted that the new institutions safeguarded the public interest more clearly than had previous ones because the State could appoint a third of the directors, invest in a third of the stock, and received an annual tax of i per cent on the paid in capital. Federalists were outraged. Now it was their turn to denounce a monopoly."' The established banks denied that they were politically biased, and the Worcester Bank even added a prominent Republican to its board of directors.'®^ The Republican monopoly did not endure, for when the Federalists returned to power in 1 8 1 2 they liberally renewed old charters, though on terms similar to those granted to the two Republican institutions. After a decade of political infighting, the parties reached a stalemate. While the long-term economic deficiencies of the banking system remained unsolved, Republicans won more nearly equal access to the corporate privilege. The State bank became a depository for federal revenues and played an important role in financing the War of 1812, when most New England capital went on strike against "Mr. Madison's War."'"® In the first flush of victory in i 8 n , Republicans briefly fought among themselves for control of the State bank, but the great merchants and their allies resisted the "middling interest" and presided over its 1 80

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future."^ T h e aggressive capitalists and traders who played such an important role in building a powerful urban Repubhcan interest had at last received their most valuable reward. T h e years of Republican ascendancy in Massachusetts brought moderate changes which widened opportunities for the excluded, the disadvantaged, and the newcomers, whose aspirations Governor James Sulhvan articulated in his first message: " T h e power of government must be exerted to give equal advantages to all its subjects; not to create wealth, er exclusive privileges to any.""® By 1 8 1 2 Republicans had made significant strides toward realizing this ideal. Y e t at the very moment of victory the future was clouded. Events beyond the boundaries of State and nation were sweeping the country toward war. Local politics were not isolated from the broader currents of national life, and the fate of Bay State Republicanism was ultimately linked to the way Jefferson and Madison wielded power at the center of the Union.

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While Republicans were charting the course of political victory and consolidating power, the Atlantic world was preoccupied with a deadly struggle between rival empires which had been locked in mortal combat ever sinee war and revolution had spread beyond France and engulfed niuch of western Europe. Americans succeeded in jealously giiarding their neutrahty with its economic advantages until Britain and France, frustrated by stalemate, sought fresh avenues to victory which endangered both the prosperity and independence of the young Repubhc. ^The crisis became the great test of Repubhcan Icadership in Washington and throughout the Union. The President and the Bay State. In 1801 the European powers arranged a temporary trnce, and though war resumed in 1803 Americans stayed aloof. Jefferson enjoyed a few more years of tranquiUity with which to solidify Republican power by expanding the party's influence and Converting fair-minded Federahsts. In his first inaugural, the President had appealed beyond party hnes in an effort to unite all Americans behind his moderate leadership. The great task was the conversion of New England, Jefferson believed. Otherwise "the government will be a very uneasy one." Realizing that the region had "drunk deeper of the delusion," he still believed it would shortly "awake like Sampson from his sleep, & carry away the gates & posts of the city."^

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T h e President went to New England for three members of his cabinet. He named Levi Lincoln Attorney General, Henry Dearborn Secretary of W a r , and Gideon Granger Postmaster General, and wliile they did not hold top posts, tlie concentration of New Englanders in the administration indicated the importance of cultivating an area of Republican weakness. Moreover, the negative character of the administration's domestic program—repealing old policies, cutting taxes and defense spending, and reducing the civil Service—left New England Federalists without compelling issues. All the dire predictions of ruin melted in the sun of national prosperity. Though Republicans had been branded enemies of commerce, trade reached new heights bctween 1800 and 1807. Exports increased by some 45 per cent, the re-export business quadrupled, registered tonnage in foreign trade advanced by 25 per cent, and Imports grew by some 10 per cent.^ T h e increased customs revenne produced by an expanding commerce enabled Republicans to repeal the land and whiskey taxes but still to have a surplus to reduce and Service the national debt. T h e administration also showed particular solicitude for Boston investors who had sunk two million dollars into the Yazoo lands of Georgia.® In 1795 Georgia sold a million acres to speculators who unloaded part of their purchasc on Yankees. T h e following year the Georgia legislature rescinded the grant, alleging that it had been obtained fraudulently. Prominent among the Bay State Republican investors were George Blake (250,000 acres), James Sullivan (80,000), Leonard Jarvis (160,000), Samuel Brown (125,000), Samuel Fowler (500,000), William Hull, John Brazer, David Townsend, and William R . Lee.^ Along with other Massachusetts speculators they insisted they had bought on good faith, were ignorant of any briber)% and dcnied Georgia's right to impair a solemn contract. Appeal183

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ing for justice in Washington, the N e w England investors entrusted their claims to Gideon Granger, Perez Morton, and Joseph Story, who lobbied for federal intervention.® T h e administration and Congress were sympathetic, and a commission composed of Lincoln, Gallatin, and Madison recommended that Georgia cede her western lands in return for a liberal boundary, federal Indian removal, and a share of land sales. They also favored setting aside 5,000,000 acres to compensate the Yazoo claimants, thereby evading complex legal questions and avoiding litigation. T h e Yazoo settlement, however, became hopelessly involved in bitter factional politics in Congress. Smarting after the failure to impeach Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, in which he had been a prime mover, John Randolph, the House Republican leader, blamed his defeat on a combination of Madisonian and New England Republicans. Henceforth he directed his great powers of oratory and invective against the administration and his fury particularly against the Yazoo compromise, blocking action until 1814.® Jefferson reaped the first fruits of success in 1804, when he carried all New England except Connecticut and came very dose to uniting the entire Union behind his leadership. Their future bleaker than ever, Bay State Federalists were searching their souls even before the President's sweep. Timothy Pickering saw his party "crumbling away in New England/' and he believed it was still weaker than appeared. Apostasy, lassitude, and indifference overcame the ranks as the goals of Federalism became entirely negative and unpersuasive. Their strength ebbing, some such as Pickering refused to watch passively the consummation of " M r . Jefferson's plan of destruction." Defeated and frustrated, they bruited about the possibilities of severing N e w England and maybe N e w York from the rest of the Union 184

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and forming a new federation pure in morals and sound in politics. Though Pickering thought speed was essential, he found only pessimism and despair among his friendsJ George Cabot rejected disunion because false doctrine had infected every section; nor was the time ripe, since Federalists were very weak and revolution was only feasible after "great suffering or the immediate effects of violence."® These mutterings of separatism only heightened the enormous gulf between Adams Federalists and the diehards. Defeat in 1800 did not bring the warring elements closer together and talk of disunion only widened the breach. Stephen Higginson reminded Pickering that the Adams people were tainted with democracy and would "seize every occasion to keep up a division in the Federal party here."® When John Quincy Adams returned from abroad in 1801, the two factions quarreled over the choice of a new United States Senator. The Federalist caucus finally compromised and agreed to Support Pickering for two ballots in the lower house and then to switch to Quincy Adams. Pickering failed and Adams went to Washington, where he voted with Federalists on many measures but supported the Louisiana Purchase. When Adams learned of Pickering's Separatist schemes, his party ties were further strained.^" As long as the nation enjoyed peace and prosperity, however, the Pickering group became more hopelessly isolated and the moderates gradually moved closer to the Republicans. This process was well in motion until decisions made in the Old World threatened both the commercial boom and the Jeffersonian dream of union. The Testing of Republicanism. Neutrality had been profitable, yet it was also fraught with danger and uncertainty." The nation had come dose to war several times in the 1790's, and while Washington and Adams had avoided 185

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conflict, neither could secure permanent recognition of neutral rights. Only the pressure of necessity had foreed the belligerents to open cracks in their mercantile systems and grant Americans opportunities ordinarily denied them. After ten years of exhausting war, neither protagonist could subdue the other. In 1805 the contest entered a new phase as both Pitt and Napoleon hoped to achieve through economic warfare what they could not gain on the battlefield. By closing the Continent both to British exports and neutral trade with England, Napoleon hoped to undermine the economic foundations of the enemy effort. But two could play the game, and Britain's mastery of the seas had already enabled it to disrupt neutral shipping, which kept open the lifelines of the French Empire; now England might tighten her grip and completely ban neutral trade with the Continent or tax it heavily. This would not only increase pressure against France but would please British merchants, shipowners, and navy men jealous of growing Yankee commercial power. T h e heart of the problem was the great increase of American re-exports, which quadrupled between 1800 and 1807. Governed by the Rule of W a r of 1756 England permitted such trade as was legal in peacetime. Since French mercantilism normally monopolized most foreign commerce for native subjects, neutrals were denied the right to exploit wartime exceptions. However, the Admiralty courts opened a loophole by allowing indirect trade with the enemy. By importing French colonial produce into the United States, paying the duties and receiving drawbacks, and then re-exporting, Americans developed an extensive legal trade with the Continent. In 1805 in the Essex case a British judge closed the loophole on the grounds that merchants receiving drawbacks neither paid duties nor broke voyage, but rather engaged in a continuous journey. 186

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T h e Essex decision tlius subjected to seizure American vessels involved in the re-export trade and was the first in an important series of English and Freneli moves to implenient their new policies. Caught in a crossfire, Americans could not obey France's deerees without violating Britain's Orders. Jefferson might have led an outraged people into war after the British attack on the American warship Chesapeake, but he had other ideas, He favored an experiment in peaceful coercion which rehed on economic pressure to sccurc diplomatic objectives. By denying beUigerents acccss to valuable markets and American shipping, he hoped to estabhsh respeet for freedom of the seas. Such was his theory of embargo and nonintercourse.'^ Henry Adams' classic account in his History of the United States describes Jefferson's experience as a critical tcst of presidential leadership and democratic pohtics. Committed to a philosophy of negative government, fearful of mihtary force, hostile to debts and taxes, Republicans shunned the use of power, the only thing aggressors rcspccted. While economic coercion was a futile instrument, Jefferson had no other choice, because he was the prisoner of the principles through which his party came to power. T o resort to the customary ways in which nations dcalt with one another would doom repubhcanism and transform the United States into just another Old World dcspotism. Thus Jefferson emerges in Adams' account as a tragic hero, füll of noble but impractical ideals, unable to summon the will to vindicate national rights. Jefferson failed miserably, for while France and Britain endured American economic pressure the embargo proved terribly costly at home. It trampled constitutional libertv, spread economic ruin, bankrupted the treasury, reduced the poor to want, and worst of all sapped the national character bv

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opening "the sluice-gates of social corruption." Republicans also paid a heavy political price, dooming their dream of Union as regional jealousies and populär disafFection became widespread and the Opposition gained a new lease on life. Jefferson left office in 1809 frustrated and beaten, happy to lay down the burdens of power and retire to the relative anonymity of private life. Tired and weary, writes Adams, the President finally reached home, momentarily cheered by the friendly welcome of his neighbors, and asked pitifully: " 'Whose ox have I taken, or whom have I defrauded? W h o m have I oppressed, or of whose hands have I received a bribe to blind mine eyes therewith?' " " On this sad note, Adams ends the dramatic fourth volume of his monumental history. By dwelling on great personalities, inexorable forces of change, and the dramatic ironies of history, he constructs a brilliant and imaginative account. Y e t the response of Massachusetts Republicans to the crisis in foreign affairs suggests a tale more complex than the story of a well-meaning leader, befuddled by an impractical ideology, directing a supine nation to ruin. Though the experiment with nonintercourse and embargo damaged the economy and gave Federalists new hope, Bay State Republicans strongly supported the administration. Economic interest fused with powerful sentiments of nationalism and girded the party and the country during a critical period of their history. Despite enormous political risks, internal disagreement, and temporary setbacks, the Massachusetts Democracy demonstrated a toughness and durability which kept them a potent force until the outbreak of war in 1 8 1 2 . Jacob Crowninshield ably articulated the views of Jeffersonian merchants. After the resumption of war in Europe the Crowninshield family was determined to defend neutral trade. If the flag was not respected, " w e [must] make 188

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it so/' Jacob wrote, by "assuming [a] decided tone upon the first attack on our neutral r i g h t s . " I have no idea we should put up with British or any other aggressions & attempt no remedy," Jacob thundered/^ T h e eider George Crowninshield agreed and was certain the president "never will Let these Robers abuse our rights."^® Toward the end of 1803, Congressman Crowninshield warned Jefferson against British designs, urged resistance, and predicted that, if trade were free, American commerce would "increase to a boundless extent" and " w e shall be a great commercial nation."'^ " Y o u may be assured," he told a Salem friend, "not a man in the Administration is an enemy to commerce."'® T h e Essex decision in 1805 confirmed Crowninshield's worst fears. Jealous of American competition, the British had barred Yankee vessels from the W e s t Indies, limited ties with India, and now sought to cut off vital Continental markets and ultimately "reduce the United States to colonial subjection.'"® From London came the corroboration of James Bowdoin, who reported that the British were planning to unleash "a predatory system upon our commerce as far as the government & people of the U. S. were disposed to suffer As the royal navy enforced the new policy, American ships were seized, seamen impressed, and six million dollars in property sequestered. "Our commerce is bleeding, we are suffering more than we ought," Crowninshield wrote to Madison, "our patience, I speak now as a merchant, is almost worn out."^' Convinced that the country's very "existence as a commercial nation depends on a firm resistance," he scorned Submission as "degradation" and "slavery."^^ On the eve of debate on the commercial crisis in Congress, Joseph Story stated that if diplomacy failed, the country would have "to resort boldly and decisively to the appeal to arms," and though he deplored war, 1 89

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lie preferred it to a peace "bought by the surrender of our rights or our commerce."^® In March 1806 Congress debated Pennsylvania Representative Andrew Gregg's proposal to ban British imports until impressment and restrietions were abandoned. As early as December 1805 Jacob Crowninshield favored retahation and three months later he strongly supported Gregg's resolution. Beheving that decisive action was essential and hesitancy a dangerous invitation to further aggression, the Salem congressman warned that if the country gave up the re-export trade, "we shall be pushed to give up others, one demand will be made after another, and we shall lose all our commerce. N o t all Americans agreed, however, and some members in both parties preferred to sacrifice Continental trade for British markets and manufactures. Crowninshield scored such a narrow view, arguing that national prosperity was intimately linked to re-exports, which were just as important as domestic exports of tobacco, beef, cotton, and pork. Unless merchants could exchange agricultural surpluses in the East and West Indies for sugar, coffee, and other tropical staples and then resell them in Europe, American farmers would find their markets severely contracted. Moreover, re-exports financed British imports. T h e country bought eleven to twelve million dollars more from the British than it sold to them but remittances from France, Spain, Italy, and Holland and elsewhere offset the unfavorable balance. T h e entire economy was thus interrelated. Agriculture and commerce were "twin sisters—children of one birth . . . they must live or die together—you cannot separate them—by sacrificing the one you sacrifice the other."^® Crowninshield thought nonimportation might work because the British W e s t Indies relied on American provisions and English manufacturers depended on Yankee 190

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markets. Should economic coercion lead to war, however, the militia of Vermont and Massachusetts would quickly seize Canada and Nova Scotia, the West Indies would fall, and the British would lose forty million dollars in American dcbts and investments.^® Whilc the Salem merchant discounted the danger of war and predieted the success of nonimportation, Joseph Story was skeptical. " W e must depend for ultimate effect," he wrote, "upon measures more decisive & which teem with hostile energy."" Both Crowninshield and Story were well in advance of the administration and public opinion. Few were anxious to fight, and Congress rejected Gregg's resolution and substituted a milder measure, which barred only a limited list of imports. T h e aim of nonintercourse was to bolster the bargaining power of American negotiators in London. Even Boston's Federalist merchants had denounced the Essex decision, claiming that it would destroy "the most lucrative commerce in our country," and they advocated a special mission to England.^" T h e treaty secured by James Monroe, however, neither recognized freedom of the seas nor settled the impressment question and was not submitted to the Senate for ratification. Anglo-American relations deteriorated further in June 1807 when the British attacked the Chesapeake, and later in December reafRrmed their right to impress. While relations with Britain were worsening, Napoleon issucd his Berlin and Milan decrees, authorizing the confiscation of vessels entering British ports voluntarily or those visited by enemy cruisers and sent into their harbors. Tightly trapped between the two systems, American merchants were liable to seizure by the British if they sailcd for the Continent without stopping in England to pay duties, or confiscation by the French if they obe)'ed British law. By December 1807 nonintercourse appeared utterly 191

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ineffective; Jefferson's answer was a total embargo on foreign trade.^® T h e President's immediate aim was to preserve shipping from capture, but bis long-range goal was to intensify economic pressure against France and England and induce tbem to revoke their Orders and decrees. This experiment, like the earlier one, ultimately failed, but Jefferson believed that embargo would bave worked if only N e w England bad observed tbe law and patiently waited for tbe belligerents to succumb. Initially the embargo received impressive Support from Bay State Republicans, and two important new converts further bolstered the experiment.®" Senator John Quincy Adams jeopardized bis political future to back the embargo, while one of the great Federalist foreign traders, William Gray, reputedly the riebest merchant in America, joined the Crowninshields in Salem, cast aside bis old allegiance, and later became lieutenant governor under Gerry." Gray's Switch was only additional evidence that the embargo enjoyed considerable support among urban groups. By apologizing for English outrages, Federalists convinced many that they subordinated American interests to the welfare of Britain. Without the embargo millions of dollars in vessels and property would have been seized. Nor were merchants Willing to relinquish trade with the Continent in Order to preserve ties with England. Many agreed with Jacob Crowninshield that Continental markets formed a cornerstone of national prosperity, for while Britain furnished most American Imports, Europe was by far a more important export market. Between 1800 and 1807 France, Spain, and Holland took 46 per cent of America's exports, while England received 32 per cent; and between 1805 and 1807 exports to France, Spain, Italy, and Holland were double those to Britain. Without remittances accumulated on the Continent, Americans could not finance the purchase 192

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of English goods; nor would tobacco and lumber and other domestic products bring good prices if barred from Europe and left to glut English warehouses. By eschewing a deal with England at the expense of France, Jeffersonian diplomacy recognized the vital importance of both trading orbits and sought to remove restrictions in both.®^ Whatever impact the embargo had on France and Britain, it developed slowly and imperceptibly. At home, however, the cessation of foreign trade brought depression to the fisherfolk and shipbuilders, merchants and seamen, planters and farmers. Politically it created deep strains within the Republican party and opened new prospects for Federalist revival. Bay State Republicans had been Willing to Support an embargo, but the longer the experiment continued without producing the desired results, the greater were the economic hardships and political risks. After a year Republicans divided on future policy. Some merchants, such as William Gray and Joseph White, Jr., seeing war or the abandonment of American rights as the only alternative, favored retaining the embargo. Party loyalty restrained others from voicing their misgivings. But gradually Opposition mounted as Republicans feared that prolonging the experiment lent credibility to charges that they were enemies of commerce and tools of France.®® Having barely won re-election in 1808, while his party lost both houses of the legislature, Governor Sullivan was acutely sensitive to the embargo's political dangers. Partial success at the polls emboldened Federalists. They marched unemployed sailors through the streets and whipped up protests culminating in a legislative memorial condemning the destruction of commerce. Warning the President that continuing the embargo would seriously weaken Republicanism and stimulate new plots of disunion, Sullivan admonished, " Y o u will not believe this until it shall be too

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late."^^ Hoping to reduce pressure, the governor licensed flour imports from other American ports, and once clear of Boston or Salem Harber, vessels might indulge in illegal adventures. Jefferson and Gallatin detected the main loophole in their system and pressed Sullivan to explain why he permitted flour imports far in exeess of domestic requirements. T h e governor stood his ground, insisting that the Commonwealth's ninety thousand urban residents consumed all the breadstuffs imported.®® Republieans sought to minimize hard times in other ways too. They sought federal jobs for the unemployed seamen, favored State aid to the distressed, and generously contributed to soup kitchens and other rehef efforts."® While Sullivan and others tried to mitigate hardship, revolt was brewing among powerful Republican interests in Maine. Orchard Cook, congressman from the Lincoln district, had been sent to Washington by the King connection. Having voted for the embargo, he later found himself caught between pressure from the administration to remain loyal and insistent demands from constituents for repeal. T h e economic interests of Maine traders such as King and his associates differed considerably from those who traded with the Continent. Operating on a much smaller Scale, Maine merchants concentratcd on exporting lumber to England and her colonies. Able to prosper despite a British blockade of the Continent, they saw little reason to sacrifice profitable English ties for Continental markets.®^ Life in Washington made Cook's views less parochial and for many months he defended the embargo and tried to convince the King group that it was essential to avoid a war whose danger they gravely underestimated. Echoing Jacob Crowninshield, he argued that national prosperity dependcd on non-English markets because two thirds of the country's cxports went to markets controlled by Napoleon. " T h e 194

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trade of Wiscasset," he pleaded, "may bc wholly to Great Britain & its dependencies biit \ve must look to the whole."^^ Assuring bis friends of the administration's deep sympatby for tbe "honest & wealthy merchants," he begged them to enlarge their views: "You liave not been embargoed so much for the South as the South has for you. How would the South suffer if the Embargo were raised tomorrow? And I am led to admirc the firmness Liberahty & extensive views of Southern Gentlemen; they are zealous to encourage the northern merchants."''® The King interest remained adamant and unconvinced. Estimating that at least half the Repubhcan members of the legislature thought the "mercantile interest has been neglected," King made overtures to the Opposition.'"' "I learn with pleasure," wrote Arthur Lithgow, "that you are now eonvinced of an anti-commereial spirit that exist in a Majority of our national couneils and that you are about taking measures with others to have a füll meeting of all parties to signify a disapprobation of the policy."^' Cook was unable to resist any longer, but he warned his friends: "Beware how you suffer your ardent desire for the increase of your wealth."''Unable to produce diplomatic results, confronting rebellion within his own party and a resurgence of the Opposition, Jefferson could not prevent repeal. Congressmen Ezekiel Baeon, Orchard Cook, and Joseph Story (who succeedcd Jacob Crowninshield in the House when he died in 1808) pushed for relief, though some Massachusetts Republicans continued to Support embargo, while, according to Bacon, "Open & immediate War with Great Britain would undoubtedly be populär with many, perhaps a majority of OUT leading partizans even in New England."^'' Unwilling to take up arms or to admit defeat, both the administration and Congress grasped for some way to savc face. Cook suggested arming American merchant vessels

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and letting them protect themselves against French or British attack.^^ But John Quincy Adams predicted that hundreds of vessels and millions of dollars in property might be sequestered and that the injured owners would demand war.^® Congress finally renewed nonimportation, but hmited it to cargoes from France and England. Even weaker than embargo, the new measure could not hope to budge the belhgerents, especially since it enabled merchants to trade with them through intermediate ports. All Massachusetts Republican congressmen supported the compromise except Orchard Cook, whose friends stubbomly insisted on complete freedom of trade.^® A year later Congress dropped even partial nonintercourse while authorizing a resumption of embargo against France and Britain if either did not revoke their Orders and decrees. Since peaceful coercion had failed, war was the only alternative to Submission, but there was no strong sentiment for a resort to arms. Instead, the nation drifted along unable to reverse the consequences of the Essex decision of 1805. In 1810 Congress authorized the President to permit the resumption of trade with Britain and France and to reimpose nonintercourse with the one if the other ceased to violate American neutral rights. When Napoleon appeared to revoke the French blockade, Madison swallowed the bait and invoked an embargo against the recalcitrant British, thus paving the way for war. Until the outbreak of war, the economy revived and with it resilient Bay State Republicans bounced back and returned to power. Federalist successes in 1808 and 1809 were superficial, for though they recaptured the lower house in 1808 and the governorship the next year, they won the latter by only 2 per cent of the vote. Seizing the opportunity to exploit Republican difEculties, Federalists were quickly disappointed. George Cabot informed Timothy 196

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Pickering that while most people detested embargo, party lines were streng enough to keep many loyal to the administration: " W e are more tranquil here than it was expected w e should be under the embargo," he wrote predicting mounting discontent once the füll impact of the trade stoppage penetrated the economy.^^ Christopher G o r e similarly expressed dismay that men who "generally voted & acted with the federalists, being extremely rieh & fearful of losing any portion of their property, are weak enough to believe the Measure of the Executive will prevent a war, & therefore speak favourably of the Embargo."^' A year after experience under the embargo, G o r e still doubted whether " t h e people of our State will be disposed to c o n f i r m " Federalist resistance. W i t h a majority probably " n o t exceeding 4,000," he cautioned, "a small Error may even lose that."^® Unable to exploit embargo for more than brief and temporary advantage, Federalists made relatively little headway because Republicanism was sustained by two powerful forces. O n e was the complex attitudes of the mercantile Community, much of which preferred embargo to Sequestration or war and was unwilling to sacrifice Continental markets for Anglo-American trade. Moreover, both the husbandmen of the inland towns and the urban populace of the ports were imbued with a youthful nationalism and dedication to the ideals of union, which inspired men in every class and section to endure sacrifice in defense of national dignity. Proud and defiant, Citizens of the young R e p u b l i c rallied to the flag. Throwing aside the rational calculations of the counting house, Jacob Crowninshield had earlier proclaimed his passionate devotion to American rights: " B u t I would rather submit to be clothed in a bear skin—rather than submit to this degradation I would agree not to wear 197

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a Single article of British manufacture during my life. Sir, I would rather go naked. I ask pardon of the Committee but I speak the honest sentiments of my heart."'" John Ouincy Adams was neither a merehant nor so emotional, but he completed his conversion to Republieanism by supporting embargo at the eost of losing his seat in the United States Senate. Beheving that the crisis transcended questions of economic advantage, Adams thought the independence of the country was at stake, for if the nation submitted it might as well rejoin the British Empire." Breaking his last ties with Federalism, he could no longer stomach "their degeneracy from just and honourable principles .. . their professed veneration for the policy of Washington, while they were aiming a fatal blow at the Union . . . their blind & stupid servility to a British Ministry which was heaping insult upon outrage on their CountTy."°^ Father, like son, was unable to remain silent. As the aging former President sat in Ouincy and watched his successor strive as he himself had a decade before to steer clear of war without surrendering American interests, he observed his old enemies, the Pickering sort of Federalists, endanger both peace and union. In 1809 John Adams published a series of letters recounting how years past members of his own party had tried to lead the country to war against France when peace was still possible. Denouncing the proBritish sympathies of some, he warned his fellow Citizens: "Our form of government, estimable as it is, exposes us more than any other to the insidious intrigues and pestilented influence of foreign nations. Nothing but our inflexible neutrality can preserve us."'^® John Quincy Adams, together with many leading Republicans, realizing that the embargo severely strained the loyalty of men and scctions, believed that the integrity of 198

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the Union was on trial. By condoning British aggression, encouraging violation of law, and appealing to sectional jealousies, Jeffersonians thought their opponents were flirting with treason and separatism at a time of great national peril. Appealing to Americans of all parties to unite before a common danger, Republicans did not resort to instruments of repression, but instead tapped a deep well of nationalism. As President Lincoln was to do fifty years later, they exploited the ideals of union by identifying their party and policies with the larger sense of national purpose, with pride in the past and hopes for the future. T h e Old World, they argued, was testing the mettle of a free pcople. Americans must demonstrate that while thc^• cherished peace and prosperity, "there is a point beyond which forbearance becomes pusillanimity and destruction." A free independent republic could not bc bought cheaply and without sacrifice; nor were the alternatives to war or Submission simple and clear-cut. "It is a choice of evils," Republicans confessed, "which the wisest cannot avert, and the bravest cannot vanquish." Yct cven though embargoed, Americans enjoyed "privileges and public advantages, that render us the envy of othcrs."®* T h e only successful defense was union. "Union is ever\thing," Lcvi Lincoln insisted, "it is our strength, our numbers, our resources. If we must have conflicts, let them be with forcign enemies."®® National strength lay in harmony for a united people could do anything, while "a division of the States, would instantly dissolve the nation; and destroy evcr)' limitation to civil and social dutv." Dcnianding that Citizens awake to the great dangers and their true interest, James Sullivan pleaded, "It is time that we had become one people."®® W h i l e men often quarreled, their common needs far outweighed their parochial differenccs: 199

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To preserve a union of interest and sentiment, so absolutely necessary to our existence as a nation, jealousies are to be laid aside, charity cherished, and a reciprocity of affection and civility to be exhibited. All the States must be the country of the Citizens of each, and each State the country of all. Our national union, glowing on the public opinion, is the best defense of our sovereignty.®^ Developing the theme of union to comprehend the heritage of the past and the promise of the future, Republicans wondered aloud what had happened to the sons of revolution who had once endured hanget and cold on "the plains of Lexington, the bridge at Concord . . . the heights of Charlestown." Had devotion to the ideas of self-government which inspired a people in '76 exhausted itself in thirty years?®® If a scheming minority loyal to foreign interests could reduce government to impotence and force the Republic to submit to the dictates of Old W o r l d despotisms, then democratic government was a failure, and "as a nation we should perish, as freemen be lost."®® T h e whole World was watching the way Americans met the great challenge to their national sovereignty. Governor Lincoln asked: Are we ripe, are we prepared to proclaim to a suffering and enslaved world, that unhappy man has made his last disposing effort for the Support of a free government; that the most Dromising experiment has so soon failed—that liberty, the egitimate offspring of law, the favorite child of government, has been expelled its hoped for resting place, driven from its last retreat, and banished the world?®" T h e crisis thus inspired Bay State Republicans to f r a m e a patriotic defense of the Union, and when the ultimate test came in 1 8 1 2 the party supported war. T h e state's entire Republican congressional delegation voted for the declaration, Governor Gerry left home to serve as Madi200

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son's Vice President, while King, Dearborn, Hull, Eustis, and others contributed their services to the national effort. As hostilities neared, many Jeffersonians must have breathed a sigh of relief: " W e have been long enough at peace," Gerry said, "we are losing our spirit, our character, and our independence. W e are degenerating into a mere nation of traders, and are forgetting the honour of our ancestors and the interest of posterity. W e must be roused by some great event that may stir up the ancient patriotism of the people."®' Appeals to nationalism were successful as long as the country remained at peace. The victory of 1 8 1 1 enabled Massachusetts Republicans to reward their supporters and entrench themselves firmly in power, and it seemed to herald control of the Commonwealth for years to come. But the approach of hostilities quickly ate away the small Republican plurality. Less than two months before Congress declared war, Republicans narrowly lost the governorship; in the fall of 1 8 1 2 the Federalists added a sweeping congressional triumph, and during the rest of the decade dominated the Bay State. Epilogue: The Decline of Party. The war generated a shortlived Federalist revival but it did not sustain permanent party growth. In the years beyond the focus of this study, the differences between the parties grew increasingly blurred, the electorate became less polarized than it formerly had been, and neither party retained a cohesive Organization or a distinctive program. Federalism had begun to disintegrate rapidly after Jefferson's election in 1800. Though many continued to march wearily under the old banner, others converted to Republicanism or lost interest in politics. When Republican rule disappointed predictions of national catastrophe and social turmoil, the transfer of 201

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

power appeared rather as an orderly change by which new groups of Americans won an opportimity to hold ofEce and exercise authority. Success at the polls made the Democratic-Republican party the dominant pohtical force nationally and in most of the states, but it did not assure institutional longevity. By 1 8 1 5 , the Repubhcans, no less than the Federahsts, had lost the vitality which had once made them a distinetive and dynamic politieal force. Internally rent by factionalism, often unopposed at the polls, its program and policies attractive to many former detractors, the party was fast becoming a vast, inclusive umbrella sheltering almost all who sought refuge within a politieal Organization. T h e early parties had been efforts to devise institutions better suited to governing an extensive and diverse republic than the more parochial formations like the factions and interests of colonial times. T h e danger of American involvement in the wars of the French Revolution in the 1790's threatened the prosperity and independence of the young Republic and generated nationwide divisions. As Americans quarreled Over how to preserve neutrality, some sympathetic to France and others to Britain, they came to view domestic difEerences in the context of the revolutionary struggle abroad. A bitter ideological debate ensued which depicted the nation as divided between Jacobins and Monocrats, though few Americans seriously wished to change the social order. In Massachusetts conflict over foreign affairs mirrored tensions between well-entrenched groups in church, State, and the economy, and ambitious newcomers and Outsiders seeking equal access to power. As the diplomatic crises of the lygo's polarized the nation, Citizens found it necessary to create politieal forms through which widely scattered and heterogeneous collections of like-minded voters could become effective politi202

MASSACHUSETTS

REPUBLICANS

cally. T h e federal structiire had divided sovereignty between the states and the nation and had required groups within the states to join forces with others elsewhere to capture the organs of national authority. T h e first pohtical parties were thus efforts to overcome the parochiahsm and diversities of American Society which resisted Organization. Federalists and Repubhcans each combined a powcrful array of interests, articulated a party program for the nation, and offered the electorate attractive leadership. Yet neither party endured much beyond its years of greatest success. T h e instabihty and rapid demise of the first pohtical parties indicate how fragile these nevv institutions were. As the conditions which had nourished their growth disappeared, the parties withered. They had evolved during a period of grave externa] danger and deep internal tensions. For over two decades the Old World had bcen at war. Though Americans enjoyed the advantages of neutrality, they constantly hovered on the brink of involvement. Both parties had gained victories as Champions of peace. Federalists had claimed credit for preventing war with England in the middle 1790's while Republicans rose to power toward the end of the decade resisting the drift toward war with France. Even the Federalist revival between 1807 and 1 8 1 5 stemmed largcly from populär aversion to forcign entanglements. T h e Pcace of Ghent drastically altered the international context of American politics. For the first time since the Revolution, the fate of the young Republic no longcr hinged on the changing balance of power in Europe. Frecd from externa! distractions and threats and the foundations of national security firmly laid, Americans could turn inward and shift their attentions from the Atlantic world to the Mississippi Valley and beyond. At the sanic time that external threats subsided, depriv203

THE

DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS

ing politicians of the issues and emotions evoked by fear of war and love of peace, the domestic sources of party conflict were losing their force. By 1 8 1 5 those who had formerly been alienated from established authority were no longer Outsiders. In State and nation aspiring newcomers enjoyed public ofEce and civic esteem, presided over prosperous banks and bustling counting houses, worshiped in greater equality, and farmed lands of their own. As the party of opportunity, the Democratic-Republicans had been the instrument by which restless and ambitious men on the make formed a powerful coalition among those anxious to share more fully in the fruits of self-government. Success thus deprived the Republican party of its reason for being. T h e decay of party was only temporary. A new generation was Coming of age for whom the Revolution was history and the durability of the Republic no longer in doubt. T h e revolutionary generation left still another legacy. After winning independence, it had fashioned a pohty able to govern forcefully yet responsive to the diverse interests inhabiting the Republic. Though none had foreseen them and the wisest had deplored them, political parties became the vehicles of change and accommodation. Despite their importance, the early parties were peculiarly unstable. Their origins went back no further than the 1790's and they failed to survive much beyond 1 8 1 5 . A new and seemingly transitory development, the first parties did not have deep institutional roots. Even in their heyday they had been loose collections of provincial interests. Moreover, they lacked well-established forms of political Organization and procedures which might have promoted survival. Highly local, evolving from rivalries within the towns and citics, counties, and states, they appealed to an electorate without firmly anchored, hereditary loyalties. 204

MASSACHUSETTS

REPUBLICANS

After 1820 parties revived. Far-reaching social and economic developments produced fresh tensions which divided Americans and required resolution. For forty years new political organizations arose and old ones disappeared, mirroring the rapid pace of social change. By 1860, howcver, the foundations had been laid for a modern two-party system as nrbanization and industrialization gradually etched enduring lines of conflict and defined long-term problems which the polity must solve. Finally, the Civil W a r made control of national authority the paramount objective of political action and fixed voters' party affiliations firmly for generations to come. Though the modern parties evolved in response to different forces and have only a shadowy continuity with their predecessors, they built on the precedent of the revolutionary generation, which had devised new instruments of peaceful change during the trying years of the young Republic.

205

NOTES

• BIBLIOGRAPHY

•

INDEX

ABBREVIATIONS BPL EI LC MA MHS MHSC MSL

Boston Public Library Essex Institute Library of Congress Massachusetts Archives Massachusetts Historical Society Massachusetts Historical Society Collections Massachusetts State Library

MeHS NYHS NYPL PCSM PMHS

Maine Historical Society New York Historical Society New York Pubhc Library Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society

NOTES

CHAPTER

I. T H E

P O L I T I C S OF

INDEPENDENCE

1. Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, "Radicals and Conservatives in Massachusetts," New England Quarterly, X V I I (September 1944), 343-355; see also the same authors' Commonwealth (New York, 1 9 4 7 ) , chs. 1, 2, and Robert A. East, Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionär)/ Era (New York, 1938). 2. Quoted in William V . Wells, The Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams (Boston, 1888), III, 75; see also Robert T . Paine to Elbridge Gerry, April 12, 1777, in James Austin, The Life of Elbridge Gerry (Boston, 1828-1829), I, 220-222; Samuel Adams to Francis L. Lee, [?] 1778, Samuel Adams, Writings of Samuel Adams, ed. Harry A. Cushing (New York, 1904-1908), I V , 19-20. 3. Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, "Revolutionary Economic Policy in Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly, ser. 3, I V (Januaiy 1 9 4 7 ) . 3-26. 4. John Adams to James Sullivan, M a y 26, 1776, John Adams, Works of John Adams, ed. Charles F. Adams (Boston, 1 8 5 0 - 1 8 5 6 ) , IX, 375. 5. Theophilus Parsons, Memoir of Theophilus Parsons (Boston, 1859), p. 392; see also Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution of Government for the State of Massachusetts Bay (Boston, 1832), p. 218; J. R. Pole, "Suffrage and Representation in Massachusetts: A Statistical Note," William and Mary Quarterly, ser. 3, X I V (October 1 9 5 7 ) , 567-569. 6. Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Held in the Year 1788 . . . (Boston, 1856), p. 122, hereafter cited as Mass. Convention Debates, 1788. 7. Parsons, pp. 360, 376, 384-385; Pole, pp. 565-567; J. Adams to Joseph Hawley, Aug. 25, 1776, J. Adams, Works, IX, 435; Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution, p. 219. 8. John Adams to Gerry, Nov. 4, 1779, J. Adams, Works, IX, 506. 9. Ellen E. Brennan, Plural Ofßceholding in Massachusetts, 1760-1780, (Chapel Hill, 1945). 10. Samuel E. Morison, "Struggle over the Adoption of the Constitution in Massachusetts, 1780," PMHS, ser. 3, L (May 1 9 1 7 ) , 354fr. 209

NOTES

TO CHAPTER

I

1 1 . O. and M. F. Handlin, Commonwealth, pp. 28-32; see also Parsons, p. 394. 12. The indispensable authority on eighteenth Century English politics is Sir Lewis Namier. See especially his Crossroads of Power (London, 1962), chs. 7, 20, and England in the Age of the American Revolution, 2nd ed. (London, 1 9 6 1 ) , especially ch. 5; see also Richard Pares, King George III and the Politicians (Oxford, 1 9 5 3 ) . For an illuminating study of the way Amcrican politics fitted into the English system see John A. Schutz, William Shirley, King's Governor of Massachusetts (Chapel Hill, 1 9 6 1 ) . 13. David Cobb to Robert T . Paine, Feb. 24, 1776, Frederick S. Allis, Jr., ed., William Bingham's Maine Lands, 1 7 9 0 - 1 8 2 0 (Boston, 1954), I, 408; see also S. Adams to Gerry, Oct. 29, 1775, J. Austin, Gerry, I, 1 2 1 ; Robert J. Taylor, Western Massachusetts in the Revolution (Providence, 1954), 80-83. 14. Gerry to S. Adams, Dec. 1 3 , 1775, J. Austin, Gerry, I, 1 2 3 15. James Bowdoin to Thomas Pownall, Nov. 20, 1783, Bowdoin and Temple Papers (Boston, 1907), p. 22. 16. John Adams to Jonathan Jackson, Oct. 2, 1780, J. Adams, Works, IX, 5 1 1 ; cf. Henry C. Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot (Boston, 1 8 7 7 ) , pp. 23-24. 17. Herbert S. Allan, John Hancock, Patriot in Purple (New York, 1948), pp. 1 1 7 , i95ff; J. Adams, Works, III, 34-35; John C . Miller, Sam Adams, Pioneer in Propaganda (Boston, 1936), p. 336; Wells, Samuel Adams, II, 380-387; J. Austin, Gerry, I, 279. 18. Allan, p. 2 1 3 ; James Warren to S. Adams, Nov. 20, 1780, Warren-Adams Letters, ed. W . C. Ford (Boston, 1 9 1 7 , 1 9 2 5 ) , II, 149. 19. Samuel Adams to Elizabeth Adams, Feb. 1, 1 7 8 1 , S. Adams, Writing, IV, 244; S. Adams to Warren, Nov. 20, 1780, WarrenAdams Letters, II, 149; Samuel Dexter to John Temple, Dec. 1 3 , 1783, Bowdoin and Temple Papers, p. 29; Thomas C. Amory, Life of James Sullivan (Boston, 1859), I, 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 . 20. H. E. Scudder, ed., Recollections of Samuel Break (Philadelphia, 1 8 7 7 ) , p. 109; Samuel A. Drake, Old Landmarks and Historie Personages of Boston (Boston, 1900), pp. 144, 341, 359; Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, New Travels in the United States of America (London, 1794), I, 94. 21. Massachusetts Register, 1 7 8 1 , 1782; Anson E. Morse, The Federalist Party in Massachusetts to the Year 1800 (Princeton, 1909), p. 21. 22. For the Bowdoin-Hancock rivalry see Samuel Dexter to John Temple, Dec. 13, 1783, Bowdoin and Temple Papers, p. 29;

210

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

for thc Warren-Hancock rivalry see Warren to J. Adams, Nov. 22, 1780, Warren to S. Adams, May 3 1 , June 7, 26, 1778, WarrenAdams Letters, II, 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 0 - 2 1 , 24-25. 23. Charles J. Bullock, Historical Sketch of the Finances and Financial Policy of Massachusetts from lySo to igo; (New York, 1 9 0 7 ) , pp. 6-9; Robert A. East, " T h e Massachusetts Conservatives in the Critical Period," in Era of the American Revolution, cd. Richard B. Morris (New York, 1 9 3 9 ) , pp. 355-356; Acts, 1780, chs. 1 2 , 39; 1 7 8 1 , ch. 30; 1782, ch. 67. 24. Independent Chronicle, July 29, 1784, April 8, 28, May 1 2 , June 16, Aug. 20, Oct. 6, 20, 1785; Mass. Centinel, April 16, 19, 1785. 25. Stephen Higginson to J. Adams, Dec. 30, 1785, J. F. Jamcson, ed., "Letters of Stephen Higginson, 1 7 8 3 - 1 8 0 4 , " Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1896, I (Washington, 1896), 7 3 2 - 7 3 3 . 26. Higginson to J. Adams, Aug. 8, 1785, ibid., p. 723; Independent Chronicle, April 14, 2 1 , 1785. 27. Independent Chronicle, April 2 1 , 1785; Thomas W . Higginson, Life and Times of Stephen Higginson (Boston, 1 9 0 7 ) , p. 70. 28. Christopher Gore to Rufus King, April 19, 1786, Charles R. King, ed., Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (New York, 1 8 9 4 - 1 9 0 0 ) , I, 168; see also Higginson to J. Adams, Dec. 30, 1785, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," pp. 7 3 2 - 7 3 3 . 29. Independent Chronicle, Oct. 1 3 , 1785. 30. O. and M . F . Handlin, Commonwealth, p. 39. 3 1 . Mass. Centinel, April 25, 1785, and see April 2, 20, 27, 1785, and Independent Chronicle, March 3 1 , April 14, 1785. 32. John Q. Adams to J. Adams, Aug. 3, 1785, John Quincy Adams, Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington C . Ford (New York, 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 8 ) , I, 19. 33. East, "Massachusetts Conservativcs," p. 352. 34. Acts, 1785, ch. 17; 1786, ch. 48; see also 1783, ch. 12. 35. Acts, 1785, ch. 8. 36. Bowdoin to J. Adams, Jan. 12, 1786, and see J. Adams to Bowdoin, March 24, May 9, 1786, Bowdoin and Temple Papers, pp. 87, 92ff. 37. Governor's Message, Oct. 20, 1785, Acts and Laws, 1 7 8 3 86, pp. 729-732. 38. Acts, 1784, ch. 25; East, "Massachusetts Conser\atives," pp. 355-356; O. and M . F. Handlin, Commonwealth, pp. 37-44: C . J. Bullock, "Finances and Financial Policy of Massachusetts," pp. 8-9. 39. Governor's Message, Oct. 20, 1785, Acts and Laws, 1 7 8 5 2 11

NOTES

TO

CHAPTER

I

86, pp. 730-732; Govemor's Message, June 2, 1786, ibid., 178687, pp. 9 1 1 - 9 1 2 . 40. Acts, 1785, chs. 46, 74; 1786, ch. 28. 41. The best detailed account of Shays' Rebellion is the contemporary one of George R. Minot, History of the Insurrection in Massachusetts, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1 8 1 0 ) . See also O. and M. F. Handlin, Commonwealth, ch. 2; Marion Starkey, A Little Rebellion (New York, 1955); R. Taylor, Western Massachusetts, pp. 1045. 42. Govemor's Message, Sept. 28, 1786, Acts and Laws, 178687, p. 929; Independent Chronicle, March 1, 1787; J. Q. Adams to Abigail Adams, Dec. 30, 1786, J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 28-29; J. Adams to Benjamin Hichborn, Jan. 27, 1787, J. Adams, Works, IX, 551. 43. Minot, Insurrection, p. 31. 44. R. Taylor, pp. 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 , 147-148; J. E. A. Smith, History of Pittsfield (Boston, 1869), pp. 408-409; Minot, pp. 128-129. 45. James Sullivan to S. Adams, Oct. 12, 1786, Samuel Adams Papers, NYPL; Amory, Sullivan, I, 189, 193. 46. Pole, "Suffrage and Representation in Massachusetts," pp. 5 7 ^ 5 7 8 ; East, "Massachusetts Conservatives," p. 363. 47. Independent Chronicle, April 19, 1787; see also Mass. Centinel, March 31, 1787. 48. Independent Chronicle, March 29, 1787; see also Mass. Centinel, March 24, 31, 1787. 49. Govemor's Message, June 2, 1787, Acts and Laws, 1786-87, pp. 985-987. 50. Acts, 1787, chs. 6, 20, 29, 53. 51. Acts, 1787, ch. 63. 52. The best account of this period is in East, "Massachusetts Conservatives," pp. 347-391. 53. Resolves, 1780, January Session, ch. 249; Acts, 1783, ch. 18, and see 1 7 8 1 , ch. 37, which granted the 5 per cent impost without a specific time limit. 54. Higginson to Arthur Lee, Jan. 27, 1784, Higginson, Stephen Higginson, pp. 237-239. Rufus King also opposed the impost for a time because he feared strengthening Congress. (see King, Rufus King, I, 1 4 - 1 5 ; J. Austin, Gerry, I, 4 1 2 - 4 1 5 ) . 55. Amory, Sullivan, I, 143-146, says that Sullivan opposed the impost, but Sullivan is reported as supporting it in King, I, 1 4 - 1 5 . 56. Acts, 1784, ch. 15. 57. Acts, 1786, ch. 16. 58. John Adams to R. King, June 14, 1786, Gerry to R. King, May 19, 1785, Nathan Dane to R. King, Oct. 8, 1785, King, I,

212

THE

POLITICS

OF

INDEPENDENCE

183, 67-70, 98-99; Higginson to J. Adams, July 1786, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 740. 59. Resolves, 1785, May Session, chs. 76-78. 60. Gerry and others to Bowdoin, Sept. 3, 1785, and see Dane to R. King, Oct. 8, 1785, King, I, 6off. 6 1 . Resolves, 1785, February Session, ch. 199; 1786, May Session, chs. 7 1 , 86, 99; Higginson to J. Adams, July 1786, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 734; Higginson to Samuel Osgood, June 14, 1786, Samuel Osgood Papers, N Y H S ; King, I, 200. 62. Gerry and others to Bowdoin, Sept. 3, 1785, King, I, 60-66; see also Theodore Sedgwick to Calelj Davis, Jan. 3 1 , 1786, in East, "Massachusetts Conservatives," p. 371. 63. Higginson to J. Adams, July 1786, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 735. 64. James Warren to J. Adams, Jan. 28, 1785, Warren-Adams Letters, p. 248; see also Higginson to Arthur Lee, [?] 1 7 8 3 , Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," pp. 7 1 1 - 7 1 3 ; Resolves, 1784, January Session, ch. 109; King, I, 5 1 - 5 2 . 65. The Standard analysis for Massachusetts is Samuel B. Harding, Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts (New York, 1 8 9 6 ) . See also Orin G . Libby, "Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States on the Federal Constitution, 1 7 8 7 - 1 7 8 8 , " Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, I (Madison, 1894), 1 2 , 75-78; Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York, 1 9 1 3 ) , pp. 2570. See the attack on Beard by Forrest McDonald, We the People: the Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago, 1 9 5 8 ) , pp. 1 8 2 - 2 0 2 . 66. The vote on ratification appears in Mass. Convention Debates, iy88, pp. 87-92. 67. McDonald, pp. 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 . 68. O. and M . F . Handlin, "Radicals and Conservatives in Massachusetts," pp. 3430?. 69. Mass. Centinel, Jan. 9, 1788; McDonald, pp. 359-363. 70. Edward Bangs to George Thacher, Jan. 1 , 1788, Harding, Contest over Ratification, p. 74. 7 1 . Cecilia Kenyon, " M e n of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government," William and Mary Quarterly, ser. 3, X I I (January 1 9 5 5 ) , 3-43. 72. [James Winthrop], "Letters of Agrippa," in Paul L. Ford, ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States . . . ij8j1788 (Brooklyn, 1 8 9 2 ) , p. 73. 73. Ibid., pp. 64-66.

213

NOTES

TO C H A P T E R

I

74. Mass. Convention Debates, ijSS, pp. 1 9 1 - 1 9 2 ; see also 'Western Star, Dec. 2 1 , 1790. 75. Mass. Convention Debates, 1788, pp. l o i f f , 1 3 4 ; Harding, Contest Over Ratification, pp. 1 1 9 - 1 2 1 . 76. Mass. Convention Debates, 1788, p. 1 3 3 . 77. Theodore Sedgwick to Henry V a n Schaack, Oct. 28, Dec. 5, 1 3 , 1 7 8 7 , Theodore Sedgwick Papers, M H S ; Jeremiah Wadsworth to R . King, Dec. 16, 1 7 8 7 , King, Rufus King, I, 264; Mass. Convention Debates, 1 7 8 8 , pp. 48, 5on8, 5 1 0 9 , 5 2 n i i , 5 3 n i 2 . 78. Christopher Gore to R . King, Dec. 9, 1 7 8 7 , Jan. 6, 1 7 8 8 , King, I, 2 6 2 - 2 6 3 , 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 ; S. Adams to Richard H. Lee, Dec. 3, 1 7 8 7 , S. Adams Papers, N Y P L ; Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox, Jan. 6, 1788, Henry Knox Papers, M H S ; Mass. Centinel, Jan. 9, 1787. 79. R . King to Knox, Feb. 1 , 1788, King, I, 319; Mass. Convention Debates, ij88, p. 268; see also pp. 7 9 - 8 1 , 2245. 80. Mass. Convention Debates, 1788, p. 2 8 1 ; see also pp. 2 7 4 275, 277, 280, 282. 8 1 . Henry V a n Schaack to Peter V a n Schaack, June 2 1 , 1 7 8 8 , Henry C . V a n Schaack, Memoirs of the Life of Henry Van Schaack (Chicago, 1 8 9 2 ) , p. 1 5 8 ; Henry Jackson to Knox, Feb. 24, 1 7 8 8 , Knox Papers, M H S ; Salem Mercury, M a y 27, 1788; Harding, Contest over Ratification, pp. 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 . 82. Elbridge Gerry to Samuel R . Gerry, April 6, 1789, Elbridge Gerry Papers, M H S . 83. [Stephen Higginson], The Writings of Laco . . . (Boston, 1 7 8 9 ) ; Herald of Freedom, Feb. 24, 1789; Mass. Centinel, March 1 8 , 1789. 84. Independent Chronicle, Feb. a6, 1 7 8 9 , and see April 2, 1789; Mass. Centinel, Feb. 2 1 , 1 7 8 9 . 85. Warren to Gerry, Feb. 1 , 1789, Gerry Papers, L C . Of 43 towns going for Gerry in 1788, 4 1 gave majorities to Hancock. Note also the ties between Sullivan and Gerry in Sullivan to Gerry, Feb. 2 1 , April 22, 1 7 8 9 , Gerry Papers, M H S . 86. [?] to S. Adams, December 1 7 8 9 [?], S. Adams Papers, N Y P L ; Higginson to Nathan Dane, M a y 22, 1788, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 7 6 1 ; Jackson to Knox, March 1 0 , 30, April 6, 1788, Knox Papers, M H S ; Mass. Centinel, March 1 5 , 1788. 87. Jeremiah Hill to George Thacher, Feb. 4, 1789, George Thacher Papers, B P L ; see also Gore to R . King, March 2, 1 7 8 9 , Rufus King Papers, N Y H S ; Jackson to Knox, June 7, 1789, Knox Papers, M H S . 88. Gore to R . King, Aug. 1 0 , 30, Nov. 23, 26, 1788, King, 214

THE

POLITICS

OF

ADJUSTMENT

Rufiis King, I, 34iff; Massachusetts House Journal, May 22, 1788, MA; Eben F. Stone, "Sketch of Tristram Dalton," Essex Institute Historical Collections, X X V (January-March 1888), 1 - 2 9 . 89. Abstract of Votes for Congress, 1788-89, M A . 90. Gore to R. King, Dec. 14, 1788, King, I, 347. 9 1 . Gore to R. King, Dec. 2 1 , 1788, Jan. 29, 1789, ibid., I, 348ff. 92. Ibid. 93. Samuel Osgood to Gerry, Feb. 19, 1789, Sullivan to Gerrj', Jan. 2, 1788, Elbridge Gerry Papers, L C . 94. Elbridge Gerry to S. R . Gerry, Feb. 14, 1789, Gerry Papers, M H S ; E . Gerry to [?], March 22, 1789, Gerry Papers, L C . 95. Independent Chwnicle, Jan. 1 , 1789, and see Jan. 22, 1789; Herald of Freedom, Jan. 16, 23, 1789. 96. John Bacon to Gerry, Feb. 26, 1789, Gerry Papers, LG; Jackson to Knox, Feb. 1 5 , 1789, Knox Papers, MHS. 97. Samuel Henshaw to H. Van Schaack, Dec. 4, 1788, Van Schaack, Memoirs, p. 160; Richard E . Welch, Jr., "Theodore Sedgwick, 1 7 4 6 - 1 8 1 3 : Federalist," unpub. diss., Harvard University, 1952, l, 1 7 4 - 1 7 7 . 98. Col. Smith to [?], Feb. 26, 1789, Sedgwick Papers, M H S . 99. Sedgwick to Henshaw, May 1 5 , 1789, ibid.; Sullivan to Gerry, May 28, 1789, Gerry Papers, L C . G H A P T E R n . T H E P O L I T I C S OF A D J U S T M E N T

1. Thomas B. Waite to George Thacher, Aug. 15, 1788, Thacher Papers, B P L . 2. Independent Chronicle, March 4, 1790; Henry Jackson to Henry Knox, March 7, 1790, Knox Papers, M H S ; Higginson to S. Adams, March 24, 1790, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 776; Christopher Gore to R. King, June 7, 1789, K n g , Rufus King, p. 362. 3. Independent Chronicle, Jan. 28, Feb. 18, June 28, 1790, Feb. 5, 1 7 9 1 ; Western Star, Feb. 8, 1 7 9 1 ; Mass. Spy, April 22, 1790; Massachusetts House Journal, Jan. 22, 1790, M A . 4. Governor's Message, Feb. 1 3 , 1789, Acts and Laws, 1788-89, p. 744; Resolves, 1788, December Session, ch. 1 1 4 a . 5. Acts, 1789, ch. 18. 6. John Avery to George Thacher, April 22, 1789, Thacher Papers. B P L . 7. Higginson to Alexander Hamilton, November 1789, James O. Wettereau, "Letters from Two Business Men to Alexander Hamilton on Federal Fiscal Policy, November 1789," Journal of Eco-

215

NOTES

TO CHAPTER

II

nomic and Business History, III (August 1 9 3 1 ) , 684; Jackson to Knox, Jan. 24, 1790, Knox Papers, MHS; Nathaniel Wells to Thacher, June 4, 1790, Thacher Papers, BPL; Independent Chronicle, Dec. 1, 7, 1789, Feb. 18, 1790. 8. Annais of Congress, ist Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1280-1284. 9. Nathaniel Barrell to Thacher, March 11, 1790, and see Joseph Storer to Thacher, Feb. 17, 1790, Thacher Papers, BPL; Independent Chronicle, Jan. 27, 1791; Mass. Centinel, Aug. 4, 1790. 10. Higginson to Hamilton, November 1789, Wettereau, "Letters to Alexander Hamilton," p. 685; AnnaLs of Congress, ist Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1427-1434; Theodore Sedgwick to P. Van Schaack, July 31, 1790, Sedgwick Papers, MHS. 1 1 . Annais of Congress, ist Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1443-1448; Gerry to [?], May 16, 1790, Gerry Papers, LC. 12. John Hobby to Thacher, Feb. 3, 1790, Barrell to Thacher, Feb. 21, 1790, Thacher Papers, BPL; Benjamin Goodhue to Stephen Goodhue, April 25, [1790], Benjamin Goodhue Papers, EI; Columbian Centinel, July 23, 1790. 13. Gore to R. King, July 11, 1790, and see Jan. 24, July 22, 25, 1790, King, Rufus King, I, 3851!; Higginson to J. Adams, March 24, 1790, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," pp. 776-777; Herald of Freedom, Aug. 6, 1790; Columbian Centinel, July 23, 1790. 14. Gore to R. King, Jan. 24, 1790, King, I, 385-386. 15. George Cabot to B. Goodhue, May 5, 1790, Lodge, Cabot, P- 3716. Barrell to Thacher, Feb. 21, 1790, Thacher Papers, BPL; B. Goodhue to S. Goodhue, April 25, [1790], Goodhue Papers, EI. 17. Fisher Arnes to George R. Minot, May 20, 1790, Fisher Arnes, Works of Fisher Arnes, ed. Seth Ames (Boston, 1854), I, 78; see also John Hobby to Thacher, Feb. 3, 1790, Thacher Papers, BPL. 18. J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, March 19, 1790, J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 48. 19. Herald of Freedom, Feb. 23, 1790. See also Independent Chronicle, Dec. 3, 1789; Western Star, Jan. 19, March 9, 1790; Samuel Nasson to Thacher, March 2, 1790, Thacher Papers, BPL; Gore to R. King, Jan. 24, 1790, King, I, 385. 20. Acts, 1789, ch. 48; see also ch. 47. 21. Wells to Thacher, June 4, 1790, Thacher Papers, BPL. 22. Ibid.; Mass. Centinel, June 5, 19, 1790; Independent Chronicle, May 27, 1790; Annais of Congress, ist Gong., 2nd Sess., p. 1320. 23. Western Star, Feb. 2, 23, March 23, April 6, 1790. 216

THE

POLITICS

OF

ADJUSTMENT

24. Western Star, Feb. 2, 1790. 25. Annais of Congress, ist Cong., znd Sess., p. 1709. 26. Ibid., pp. 1 3 2 5 - 1 3 2 6 . 27. Resolves, 1790, May Session, ch. 1 3 . The vote in the Senate was 1 7 - 7 and in the House 83-40 (see Wells to Thacher, June 4, 1790, Thacher Papers, B P L ) ; see also James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry, June 20, 1790, Gerry Papers, M H S . 28. Acts, 1790, ch. 14; Independent Chronicle, June 19, 1790; Mass. Spy, June 24, 1790. 29. Jackson to Knox, April 25 and June 27, 1790, and see July 4, 1790, Knox Papers, M H S ; Gore to R. King, April 25, 1790, King, Rufus King, I, 386; Sullivan to Gerry [?] 18, 1790, Gerry Papers, LG. 30. Annais of Congress, ist Gong., 2nd Sess., p. 1 5 2 5 . 3 1 . Acts, 1790, ch. 1 5 . 32. Resolves, 1 7 9 1 , January Session, ch. 148; Independent Chronicle, Feb. 16, 1792. 33. G. J. Bullock, "Finances and Financial Policy of Massachusetts," p. 2 1 . 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid., p. 20. 36. Ibid., pp. 19, 23-26. 37. Independent Chronicle, Nov. 26, 1790, and see Aug. 4, 1785; Mass. Centinel, July 27, 1785, Dec. 29, 1787; N. S. B. Gras, The Massachusetts First National Bank of Boston, 1 7 8 4 - 1 9 3 4 (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 3 7 ) , pp. jSff. 38. James Sullivan, The Path to Riehes ( 1 7 9 2 ) , reprinted in Magazine of History, L X V I , Extra Number ( 1 9 3 3 ) , p. 202 and passim. On the prosperity of the Massachusetts Bank see Gras, Massachusetts First National Bank, pp. 58, 62-63, 581; Columbian Centinel, Feb. 23, 1793. 39. Acts, 1 7 9 1 , ch. 65. 40. Thomas H. Benton, Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (New York, 1 8 5 7 - 1 8 6 3 ) , I, 273-274, 2 7 8 284, 308; John Wendell to Gerry, March 24, [?], Gerry Papers, L G . Gompare John Adams' views on banking in Joseph Gharles, Origins of the American Party System (Williamsburg, 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 34n70. 4 1 . Quoted in Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 126; see also Hamilton's message to Gongress in Alexander Hamilton, Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Henry G. Lodge (New York, 1 9 0 4 ) , III, 425. 42. Fisher Arnes to Hamilton, July 3 1 , 1 7 9 1 , Alexander Hamil-

217

NOTES

TO

CHAPTER

II

ton, Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. John C . Hamilton (New York, 1 8 5 0 - 5 1 ) , V , 473; Gore to R. King, June 1 3 , 1 7 9 1 , King, Rufus King, I, 399; Hammond, Banks and Politics, p. 126. 43. Gore to R. King, Aug. 7, 1 7 9 1 , King, I, 400-401. For investment by the Massachusetts Bank see Gras, Massachusetts First National Bank, p. 346. 44. Higginson to Hami ton, Feb. 23, 1 7 9 1 , Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 784. 45. Arnes to Hamilton, Jul)' 3 1 , 1 7 9 1 , Hamilton, Works, ed. Hamilton, V , 474. 46. Gore to R. King, Aug. 7, 1 7 9 1 , April 1 , 1792, King, I, 400-401, 406-407. 47. Ames to Hamilton, July 3 1 , 1 7 9 1 , Hamilton, Works, ed. Hamilton, V , 475. 48. Herald of Freedom, June 1 7 , 1 7 9 1 ; Western Star, June 2 1 , 1791. 49. Massachusetts House Journal, June 14, 1 7 9 1 , MA; Herald of Freedom, June 1 7 , 2 1 , 1 7 9 1 ; Gore to R. King, June 1 3 , 1 7 9 1 , King, I, 399. 50. Hamilton to the President and Directors of the Massachusetts Bank, May 30, 1 7 9 1 , Letters from the Treasurer, vol. V I , Department of the Treasury, National Archives; James O. Wettereau, " N e w Light on the First Bank of the United States," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, L X I (July 1 9 3 7 ) ' 273-274. 51. Independent Chronicle, Sept. 29, 1 7 9 1 , Oct. 1 1 , 1792; Sullivan, Path to Riehes, pp. 1 9 5 - 1 9 6 . 52. Gore to R. King, Aug. 7, 1 7 9 1 , King, I, 401. 53. Constitution of the Boston Tontine Association ( 1 7 9 1 ) in Dwight Foster Papers, B P L ; Independent Chronicle, Jan. 26, 1792. For Hamilton's suggestion of a tontine see Hamilton, Works, ed. Lodge, II, 267-268. 54. Western Star, March 6, 1792; see also Columbian Centinel, Nov. 19, 1 7 9 1 , Jan. 28, Feb. 18, 1792; Independent Chronicle, Feb. 9, 23, 1792. 55. Massachusetts House Journal, June 4, 1792, MA; Independent Chronicle, July 5, 1792; Sullivan, Path to Riehes, pp. 207!!. Fisher Ames reported suspicions that Sullivan's advocacy of a State monopoly was actually an attempt to open a new "field of speculation" (see Ames to Hamilton, June 10, 1792, Hamilton, Works, ed. Hamilton, V , 5 1 0 ) . 56. Massachusetts House Journal, June 1 3 , 1792, M A . 57. Ibid., June 1 5 , 1792; Massachusetts Senate Journal, March 8, 1792, M A . 218

THE

POLITICS

OF

ADJUSTMENT

58. Acts, 1792, ch. 6. 59. Independent Chronicle, Nov. 25, 1792. 60. Ibid., April 29, 1795, and see Oct. 25, Nov. 25, 1792, April 3, 1 3 , 16, 1795; Columbian Centinel, April 1 1 , 1795. 6 1 . Independent Chronicle, April 3, 1 3 , May 4, 7, 1 7 9 ; ; Rcsolves, 1795, May Session, ch. 25. 62. Petition of Boston Tradesmen and Manufacturers, June 5, 1789, American State Papers: Finance (Washington, 1 8 3 2 - 1 8 3 4 ) , I, 1 0 - 1 1 ; Independent Chronicle, Jan. 1 , 1789; Resolves, 1790, September Session, ch. 2; Gore to R. King, April 29, 1789, King, Rufus King, I, 361. 63. Dalton to Michael Hodge, June 2, 1789, Stone, "Sketch of Tristram Dalton," p. 23. 64. Annais of Congress, ist Gong., ist Sess., pp. 1 5 0 - 1 5 3 , 208. 65. Ibid., pp. 1 5 6 - 1 5 7 . 66. John Games to Thacher, May 2, 1789, Thacher Papers, B P L ; Sullivan to Gerry, May 28, 1789, Gerry Papers, L G . 67. Annais of Congress, ist Gong., ist Sess., pp. 1 3 1 - 1 3 5 , 1 3 6 138, 2 1 1 - 2 2 6 , 228-229, 296-300, 3 0 9 - 3 1 1 , 3 1 4 - 3 1 7 , 3 3 2 - 3 3 5 ; see also Higginson to J. Adams, July 4, 1789, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," pp. 765-767. 68. U.S. Statutes at Large, 1789, ch. 2. 69. Ibid., 1789, ch. 2, and 1792, ch. 108; Annais of Congress, 2nd Gong., ist Sess., pp. 362fi; Emory R. Johnson and others, History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States (Washington, 1 9 2 2 ) , H, i 6 i f f . 70. Annais of Congress, ist Gong., ist Sess., pp. 1 7 6 - 1 7 8 , 2 5 3 261, 282-283. 7 1 . U.S. Statutes at Large, 1789, ch. 3. For the Far Eastern trade see 1789, ch. 2; Annais of Congress, ist Gong., ist Sess., pp. 1 6 8 - 1 7 0 . 72. Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 30, 1789, James Madison. Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia, 1 8 6 5 ) , I, 480fr. 73. Annais of Congress, ist Gong., ist Sess., pp. 1 7 6 - 1 7 8 , 2 5 3 256, 6 1 6 - 6 1 8 ; William Maclay, Journal of William Maclay (New York, 1 9 2 7 ) , p. 50. 74. Higginson to J. Adams, Dec. 20, 1789, and see March 24, 1790, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," pp. 7 7 1 - 7 7 2 , 780; Arnes to George R. Minot, July 2, 1789, Fisher Arnes, Works, I, 58-59; Alexander Hamilton, Industrial and Commercial Correspondence of Alexander Hamilton, Anticipating His Report on Manufactures, ed. Arthur H. Gole (Ghicago, 1 9 2 8 ) , pp. i 7 i f f ; Higginson to Gabot, [1792], Lodge, Cabot, pp. 52!!. 219

NOTES

TO

CHAPTER

III

75. Sullivan to Gerry, July 25, 1789, Gerry Papers, LG; Sullivan to Gerry, July 31, Gerry Papers, MHS. 76. John Gardiner to S. Adams, Nov. 1, 1789, S. Adams Papers, NYPL; see also Thomas Waite to Thacher, Dec. 30, 1789, Stephen Hall to Thacher, April 30, 1789, Thacher Papers, BPL. 77. Sullivan to Gerry, July 25, 178g, Gerry Papers, LG. 78. Arnes to Hamilton, June 10, 1792, Hamilton, Works, ed. Hamilton, V, 511; Higginson to J. Adams, March 1, 1790, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 775. 79. J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, April 5, 1790, J. Q. Adams, Works, I, 53; Sullivan to Gerry, Feb. 3, 1790, Gerry Papers, MHS; cf. Higginson to J. Adams, March 24, 1790, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 777. 80. Higginson to J. Adams, March 1, 1790, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," pp. 775ff; Annais of Congress, ist Gong., ist Sess., p. 229; Gircular to Gollectors of Massachusetts, Nov. 20, 1789, Letters from the Treasurer, vol. VI, Treasury Department, National Archives. 81. Adam Seybert, Statistical Annais (Philadelphia, 1818), pp. 32off, 334, 341; Raymond McFarland, History of the New England Fisheries (New York, 1 9 1 1 ) , pp. i3iff. 82. Gore to R. King, Dec. 25, 1791, King, Rufus King, I, 404. GHAPTER I I L

THE

BEGINNINGS OF

PARTY

1. E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse (Ghapel Hill, 1 9 6 1 ) , p. 304.

2. Ibid.,

pp. 3 2 5 - 3 2 6 .

3. Quoted ibid., p. 343. 4. Noble E. Gunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1801 (Ghapel Hill, 1 9 5 7 ) . PP- 7 - 8 ' 67, 7 1 - 7 2 , 77-

,

.

.

,

5. There was a notable dechne of electioneenng in the newspapers. See J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, March 19, 1790, J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 48-49; Higginson to J. Adams, April 7, 1790, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 781. 6. This Observation is based on a comparison of State and federal officials in the Massachusetts Register, 1788-1790.

7. Elbridge Gerry to S. R. Gerry, April 18, 1790; James Lovell to Gerry, Aug. 8, 1789, Gerry Papers, MHS; Gerry to J. Adams, July 26, 1790, Gerry Papers, LG; Henry Jackson to Henry Knox, April 24, 1791, Knox Papers, MHS. 8. The analysis of voting is based on a study of congressional returns in the Massachusetts Archives. 9. See Governor's Messages, Jan. 26, 1791, Acts and Laws, 220

THE

BEGINNINGS

OF

PARTY

1 7 9 0 - 9 1 , p. 558, and Sept. 1 8 , 1 7 9 3 , ibid., 1 7 9 2 - 9 3 , p. 699; Resolves, 1 7 9 3 , September Session, ch. 45; James Sullivan, Observations upon the Government of the United States of America (Boston, [ 1 7 9 1 ] ) ; James Sullivan to William Eustis, Jan. 1 3 , 1802, Amory, Sullivan, II, 9 2 - 9 3 . 1 0 . Christopher Gore to R . King, Oct. 23, 1790, King, Rufus King, I, 393; Herald of Freedom, Sept. 3, 24, 28, Oct. 1 , 1790; Independent Chronicle, Aug. 5, 26, Sept. 2, 6, 9, 1 6 , 23, 30, Oct. 25, Nov. 22, 1790. 1 1 . Gerry to S. Adams, July 1 7 , 1789, S. Adams Papers, N Y P L ; J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, Feb. 4, Dec. 8, 1 7 9 2 , J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 1 1 6 , 1 2 1 . 1 2 . Boston Town Records, 1 7 S 4 - 1 7 9 6 (Boston, 1 9 0 3 ) , pp. 2 7 5 276; J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, Feb. 1 , 4, 1 7 9 2 , J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 1 1 0 - 1 1 3 , 1 3 . Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1 9 6 1 ) , ch. 1 . 1 4 . Timothy Pitkin, Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America (Hartford, 1 8 1 6 ) , pp. 51 ff. 1 5 . See, for example, Charles D. Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution (Baltimore, 1 8 9 7 ) ; Eugene P. Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, ijgo-1800 (New York, 1942). 1 6 . Compare American Imports from and exports to Britain and France in Pitkin, pp. 2 1 2 - 2 1 4 , and Seybert, Statistical Annais, pp. 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 . 1 7 . For a comparison of the British and French W e s t Indies see Pitkin, pp. 1 7 9 - 1 8 9 ; Samuel F . Bemis, fay's Treaty: A Study in Commercial Diplomacy (New York, 1 9 2 3 ) , pp. 21 ff; George Cabot to Alexander Hamilton, Dec. 1 8 , 1 7 9 1 , Hamilton, Industrial and Commercial Correspondence, pp. 1 7 1 - 1 7 3 ; Higginson to Cabot, ?] 1 7 9 2 , Lodge, Cabot, pp. 52ff. 1 8 . Higginson to Hamilton, Aug. 24, 1 7 9 3 , Hamilton, Works, ed. Hamilton, V , 579; Mass. Spy, Aug. 1 , 1 7 9 3 . 19. Anna C . Ciauder, American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, iyg3-i8i2 (Philadelphia, 1 9 3 2 ) , pp. 2 7 5 . 20. Gore to R . King, March 1 5 , 1794, King, Rufus King, I, 553. 2 1 . Robert E . Peabody, Merchant Venturers of Old Salem (Boston, 1 9 1 2 ) , pp. 1 7 2 - 1 2 8 ; see also Columbian Centinel, Dec. 28, 1 7 9 3 , Jan. 1 , 1794; Nicholas Pike and Thomas W . Hooper to David Cobb, March 25, David Cobb Papers, M H S ; Daniel Kilham to George Thacher, Jan. 1 4 , 1 7 9 4 , Thacher Papers, M e H S ; Salem Gazette, March 1 8 , April 20, 1 7 9 4 . 22. Gore to R . King, March 1 5 , 1794, King, I, 553.

221

NOTES

TO

CHAPTER

III

23. Eustis to Cobb, Feb. 20, 26, March 2, 1794, Cobb Papers, M H S ; Gore to R. King, March 3, 1 5 , 1794, King, I, 547, 553; Columbian Centinel, Feb. 1 2 , 1 5 , 22, 26, March 8, 1794; Boston Town Records, 1 7 8 4 - 1 7 9 6 , pp. 347-348. 24. Cabot to Samuel Phillips, March 10, 1794, Lodge, Cabot, p. 78. 25. J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, April 12, 1794, J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 183. 26. Eustis to Cobb, Feb. 26, 1794, Cobb Papers, M H S . 27. Eustis to Cobb, Feb. 26, 1794, and see letters of Feb. 9, 1 7 , March 2, 29, 30, April 27, May 27, 1794, ibid. 28. Boston Town Records, ijS^^-ijgö, p. 409. 29. For the progress of reactions see Independent Chronicle, July 1 3 , Oct. 1 2 , 1795, Aug. 3, 1797; Russell Sturgis to Thomas H. Perkins, July 1 2 , 1795, Samuel Cabot Papers, M H S ; Cabot to King, July 25, 27, Aug. 4, 14, 1795, Lodge, Cabot, pp. 80-81, 83, 85. Stephen Higginson contended that practically no Boston mcrchants were critical of the treaty, but he admitted that at least a third of the members of the Boston Chamber of Commerce "were at first mislead" (see Higginson to Timothy Pickering, July 14, Aug. 1 3 , 16, 1795, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," pp. 787ff). 30. Alice B. Keith, "Relaxations in the British Restrictions on American Trade with the British West Indies, 1 7 8 3 - 1 8 0 2 , " Journal of Modern History, X X (March 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 - 1 8 ; F . Lee Benns, The American Struggle for the British West India Carrying-Trade, 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 3 0 (Bloomington, Ind., 1 9 2 3 ) , pp. i9ff. 3 1 . Holden Furber, " T h e Beginnings of American Trade with India, 1 7 8 4 - 1 8 1 2 , " New England Quarterly, X I (June 1 9 3 8 ) , 235-265. 32. For the importance of Jay's treaty in national politics see Charles, Origins of the American Party System, pp. 1 0 3 5 . 33. The Standard accounts of the growth of parties in Massachusetts are A. E . Morse, The Federalist Party in Massachusetts to the Year 1800, chs. 5 - 1 1 , and William A. Robinson, Jeffersonian Democracy in New England (New Häven, 1 9 1 6 ) , chs. 1 - 2 . 34. See John Hancock to S. Adams, Aug. 3 1 , 1793, S. Adams Papers, N Y P L ; J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, Jan. 5, 1794, J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 179; Amory, Sullivan, I, 291 ff; J. C . Miller, Sam Adams, Pioneer in Propaganda, pp. 393ff; Link, DemocraticRepublican Societies, pp. 83£F. 35. J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, April 1 2 , 1794, J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 1 8 4 - 1 8 5 ; William Cushing to Increase Sumner, Feb. 24, 1794, William H. Sumner, Memoir of Increase Sumner, Governor of Massachusetts (Boston, 1 8 5 4 ) , p. 19; Columbian Centi2

22

THE

REPUBLICAN

INTEREST

nel, March i , 8, April 2, 1794; Independent Chronicle, April 3, 7, 1794; Salem Gazette, March 18, April 1 , 1794; Westem Star, April 1 , 179A. 36. J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, March 24, 1794, J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 183; J. Adams to Abigail Adams, April 7, 16, 19, 1794, John Adams, Letters of John Adams Addressed to His Wife, ed. Charles F. Adams (Boston, 1 8 4 1 ) , II, 154, 1 5 7 , 221; Eustis to Cobb, March 30, 1794, Cobb Papers, M H S . 37. J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, May 26, 1794, J. Q. Adams, Writings, I, 1 9 1 ; J. Adams to A. Adams, May 1 7 , 1794, J. Adams, Letters to His Wife, II, 1 6 1 ; Eustis to Cobb, Feb. 2, 1794, Cobb Papers, M H S . 38. Peleg Coffin, Jr., to Dwight Fostcr, Jan. 25, 1796, Foster Papers, B P L . 39. See Madison to Jefferson, Nov. 16, Dec. 4, 2 1 , 1794, Feb. 14, 1795, Madison, Letters, II, 19, 25, 28-29, 35; Fisher Ames to Gore, Nov. 18, 1794, Fisher Ames, Works, I, 1 5 3 - 1 5 8 . 40. Stephen G . Kurtz, The Presidency of John Adams (Philadelphia, 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. i48ff; Columbian Centinel, Oct. 2, 5, 3 1 , Nov. 7, 1796; Independent Chronicle, Oct. 10, Nov. 2, 5, 1796. 4 1 . A fresh and original analysis of party growth and the nature of parties, as distinguished from other formations, is William N. Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, ijy6-i8og (New York, 1 9 6 2 ) , especially ch. 5. 42. See the informative article by Cecilia M . Kenyon, "Alexander Hamilton: Rousseau of the Right," Political Science Quarterly, L X X I I I (June 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 6 1 - 1 7 8 . CHAPTER

IV.

THE

REPUBLICAN

INTEREST

1 . For the historiographical controversy over party origins see Orin G . Libby, " A Sketch of the Early Political Parties in the United States," Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota, II (April 1 9 1 2 ) , 205-242; Orin G . Libby, "PoHtical Factions in Washington's Administrations," ibid., III (July 1 9 1 3 ) , 2 9 2 - 3 1 8 . Compare Charles A. Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York, 1 9 1 5 ) , ch. 1 . Recently Libby's Position received some Support in Cunningham, Jeffersonian Republicans, ch. 1 , while Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore, 1 9 5 3 ) , generally supports Beard. A fresh approach will be found in Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation. 2. For Republican attitudes toward the French Revolution see Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, pp. i66ff, i8o, 2 0 1 - 2 0 3 , 209ff, 253ff, and Link, DemocraticRepublican Societies, passim. For the views of Boston Republicans 223

NOTES

TO C H A P T E R

IV

See [James Sullivan], The Altar of Baal Thrown Down: Or, the French Nation Defended . . . (Boston, 1 7 9 5 ) ; Independent Chronicle, Dec. 5, 1 7 9 3 , Jan. 5, 1794, Jan. 5, March 5, 1 7 9 5 . 3. Governor's Message, Jan. 19, ijg6, Acts and Laws, 1 7 9 4 - 9 5 , pp. 6 1 8 - 6 1 9 . 4. Historians have often accepted the partisan polemic at face value as evidence that one or both of the parties favored far-reaching social changes that would have significantly altered the character of the Republic and tied it firmly to a foreign power. T h e writings of the two great protagonists, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, often lend weight to such a view; yet the relationship of these two rivals was more complex. As Jefferson's most recent biographer notes, " I t must have been exceedingly difEcult for him to think of John Adams as an 'Angloman.' " Even at the time he competed with Adams for the presidency, "his respect for Adams was genuine, and his friendliness toward him sincere." Jefferson thonght Adams "insufficiently democratic," but " h e was not much disturbed about Adams's attitude in foreign aSairs, and he knew that on financial questions he did not see eye-to-eye with Hamilton." Events proved how much closer Adams and the bulk of his party were to Jefferson and the Republicans when the President opposed Hamilton and those who favored a British alliance and war with France in the late 1790's. As for Jefferson's loyalties, the French minister to the United States, Pierre Adet, was not taken in by Federalist propaganda and wrote home that the Republican leader was pro-French "because he fears us less than Great Britain; but he might change his opinion tomorrow, if tomorrow Great Britain should cease to inspire his fears. Jefferson, although a friend of liberty and learning, although an admirer of the efforts we have made to break our bonds and dispel clouds of ignorance which weighs down the human race, Jefferson, I say is American, and, as such, he cannot be sincerely our friend. A n American is the born enemy of all the European peoples" (Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, Boston, 1962, pp. 276, 293, 2 8 9 - 2 9 0 ) . 5. T h e best modern history of Berkshire County is by Richard D. Birdsall, Berkshire County: A Cultural History (New Häven, 1 9 5 9 ) , especially pp. 1-2, 2 7 - 2 8 , 2 7 6 - 2 8 5 , 2 9 2 - 2 9 5 . See also David D . Field, ed., History of the County of Berkshire (Pittsfield, Mass., 1 8 2 9 ) , and J. E . A. Smith, History of Pittsfield, pp. 334ff, for an account of the Berkshire constitutionalists. 6. Arthur L . Perry, Williamstown and Williams College: A History (n.p., 1 9 0 4 ) , pp. 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 ; Field, p. 4 1 6 . 7. Welch, "Theodore Sedgwick," I, 222, 252, 273, 275; Western Star, Jan. 8, 1 7 9 3 .

224

THE

REPUBLICAN

INTEREST

8. Western Star, Aug. 23, 30, Oct. 1 7 , 24, 1796. 9. Ibid., Oct. 10, 1796, and see Oct. 1 7 . 10. Perry, pp. 6 9 - 7 1 . 1 1 . Dictionary oj American Biography, II, 246-247; Welch, I, 256. 1 2 . For Berkshire rehgious life see Birdsall, Berkshire County, chs. 3-4. 1 3 . Independent Chronicle, Feb. 1 1 , 1799. 14. Birdsall, pp. 22, 26, 4 1 , 88, 236, 247-248. 1 5 . Pittsfield Sun, Jan. 6, Feb. 17, 1 8 0 1 . 16. Undated manuscripts by Thompson Skinner, Jr., Galling for Bacon's election, probably in 1800 and 1 8 0 1 , in the Berkshire Atheneum in Pittsfield. 1 7 . William B. Sprague, Annais of the American Pulpit (New York, 1 8 5 7 - 1 8 6 9 ) , I, 6o7ff; Birdsall, Berkshire County, pp. 26, 43, 49, 57, 222-225. 18. Lyman Butterfield, "Eider John Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, N.S., L X I I (October 1 9 5 2 ) , 1 5 5 - 2 4 2 ; Birdsall, Berkshire County, pp. i i 6 f f ; John Leland, The Writings of the Late Eider Leland (New York, 1 8 4 5 ) , pp. 29off. 19. Birdsall, Berkshire County, pp. 2 3 5 - 2 3 7 . 20. For information on Levi Lincoln see Dictionary of American Biography, X I , 262-264, and William Lincoln, History of Worcester (Worcester, Mass., 1 8 6 2 ) , pp. i93ff. Among Lincoln's allies were Samuel Brazer, Jr., and Edward Bangs (Worcester), Gen. Timothy Newell (Sturbridge), Gen. John Whiting and Moses White (Rutland), Samuel Jones (Milford), Jonathan Grout (Petersham), and David Henshaw (Leicester). In Hampshire County leading Republicans were William Lyman and Levi Shepherd (Northampton), Solomon Smead (Greenfield), Benjamin Smith (Hatfield), Jonathan Smith (West Springfield), and Samuel Fowler (Westfield). 2 1 . For an interesting biographical Interpretation of Gerry see Samuel E . Morison, By Land and By Sea (New York, 1 9 5 3 ) , pp. 181-199. 22. Dictionary of American Biography, X X , 407-408. 23. Lucius R. Paige, History of Cambridge (Boston, 1 8 7 7 ) , pp. 583-584. 24. Dictionary of American Biography, IX, 363-364; William Bentley, Diary of William Bentley, D.D., Pastor of the East Church Salem, Massachusetts (Salem, 1 9 0 5 - 1 9 1 4 ) , II, 280; Samuel Clarke, Memoir of General William Hüll (Boston, 1 8 9 3 ) , especially pp. 1 2 - 1 4 ; Maria Campbell, Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull (New York, 1 8 4 8 ) . 225

NOTES

TO

CHAPTER

IV

25. Joseph B. Varnum, "Autobiography of General Joseph B . Varnum," Magazine of American History, X X (November 1 8 8 8 ) , 405-414; Dictionary of American Biography, X I X , 228-229; Silas R. Coburn, History of Dracut (Lowell, Mass., 1 9 2 2 ) , pp. 3 1 7 , 418-419. 26. Samuel A. Green, Historical Sketch of Groton (Groton, Mass., 1894), pp. 1 1 8 , 129, 1 7 5 , 2 1 3 ; Caleb Butler, History of the Town of Groton (Boston, 1 8 4 8 ) , p. 266. 27. Independent Chronicle, Jan. 8, March 19, 1795; Columbian Centinel, May 23, 1795. 28. Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (New York, 1949); Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America (n.p., 1 9 5 5 ) ; Alan E. Heimert, "American Oratory: From the Great Awakening to the Election of Jefferson," 2 vols., unpub. diss., Harvard University, i960. 29. For the spread of dissent see Isaac Backus, History of New England with Particular Reference to the Denomination of Christians Called Baptists, 2nd ed. (Newton, Mass. 1 8 7 1 ) , II, 2640 and passim; Jacob C . Meyer, Church and State in Massachusetts from ij^o to 1 8 3 3 (Cleveland, 1 9 3 0 ) , pp. 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 ; Birdsall, Berkshire County, pp. 87ff. 30. Meyer, pp. 94!!; Wells, Samuel Adams, III, goff; Backus, II, 200ff, 22off; Alvah Hovey, Memoir of the Life and Times of the Rev. Issac Backus, A.M. (Boston, 1 8 5 8 ) . 3 1 . Meyer, pp. i i i f f , 1 4 5 - 1 4 6 ; Amory, Sullivan, I, 1 8 1 - 1 8 5 ; Backus, II, 3 2 M ; Birdsall, pp. 97^; Western Star, Dec. 27, 1 7 9 1 , Dec. 1 7 , 24, 1793. 32. Wade C . Barclay, Early American Methodism, 17691844 (New York, 1949), I, 140. 33. Bentley, Diary, III, 1 9 1 , 195, 2 7 1 , 345-346. 34. For the growth of the Baptists after the Revolution sce Backus, II, chs. 28, 30, 34, 36-40; Henry S. Burrage, History of the Baptists in New England (Philadelphia, 1 8 9 4 ) , pp. 84-85; Bentley, III, 134, 2 1 4 , 485. 35. Henry S. Burrage, One Hundredth Anniversary of the Maine Baptist Missionary Convention (Portland, 1 9 0 4 ) , pp. 4ff; William D. Williamson, History of the State of Maine (Hallowell, Me., 1 9 3 2 ) , II, 2 2 i f f , 695-697; Jonathan Greenleaf, Sketches of the Ecclesiastical History of the State of Maine, from the Earliest Settlement to the Present Time (Portsmouth, 1 8 2 1 ) . 36. Bentley, III, 36. 37. Kennebeck Gazette, Aug. 20, 1802; Bentley, III, 9 1 . 38. Vernon Stauffer, New England and the Bavarian llluminati (New York, 1 9 1 8 ) , ch. 1 .

226

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39. Peter Thacher, Observatiom upon the Present State of the Clergy of New-England . . . (Boston, 1 7 8 3 ) , p. 9; Meyer, Church and State, pp. 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 . 40. W r i g h t , Beginnings of Unitarianism, passim; Herbert M . Morais, Deism in Eighteenth Century America ( N e w York, 1 9 3 4 ) , pp. 32ff; Jane M . Johnson, " 'Through C h a n g e and Through Storni': A Study of Federalist Unitarian T h o u g h t , 1 8 0 0 - 1 8 6 0 , " unpub. diss., RadclifiFe College, 1958. 4 1 . Thacher, Observations, p. 4. For the controversy aroused by T h a c h e r see James Sullivan, Strictures on the R c v . M r . Thatcher's Pamphlet, Entitled, Observations upon the State of the Clergy of New England . . . (Boston, 1 7 8 4 ) , and Thacher's answer, A Reply to the Strictures of M r . /. S. a Layman . . . (Boston, n . d . ) . 42. Bentley, Diary, III, 364-365. 43. W i t h o u t attempting a systematic investigation to identify the party loyalty of the clergy, we found, often by chance, the following Republican ministers. A m o n g Congregationalists: T h o m a s Allen (Pittsfield), Joseph Barker ( M i d d l e b o r o ) , Ephraim Judson (Sheffield), Samuel Niles ( A b i n g t o n ) , David Sanford, Solomon Aiken ( D r a c u t ) . A m o n g Baptists and Methodists: T i m o t h y Merrit, Samuel Hillman, Joshua Prentiss ( M a r b l e h e a d ) , Joshua Taylor, James Hooper (Paris, M a i n e ) . 44. See Helmert, "American Oratory," for an explanation locating the split in Calvinism in doctrinal differences stemming from the G r e a t Awakening which later fed into the politics of the late eighteenth Century. 45. David Osgood, Some Facts Evincive of the Atheistical, Anarchical, and in Other Respects, Immoral Principles of the French Republicans . . . (Boston, 1 7 9 8 ) , p. 12. For the change in the attitude of the clergy see John Adams to Abigail Adams, Feb. 9, 1794, J. Adams, Letters to His Wife, II, 142. See also David Osgood, The Wonderful Works of God Are to Be Remembered . . . ([Boston], 1 7 9 5 ) , especially p. 23, and Osgood, A Discourse Delivered February 19, 1 7 9 5 . . . (Boston, 1 7 9 5 ) , especially p. 17. Osgood's sermons evoked a reply from James Sullivan, The A tar of Baal Thrown Down. 46. Stauffer, Bavarian Illuminati, especially ch. 4; James K . Morse, Jedidiah Morse, A Champion of New England Orthodoxy ( N e w York, 1 9 3 9 ) , pp. 5511. See also Bentley's remark some years later in the Diary, III, 357. 47. Helmert, "American Oratory," vol. I, ch. 2. 48. David Osgood, The Devil Let Loose . . . (Boston, 1 7 9 9 ) , p. 14. 49. J. K. Morse, pp. 6 i f f ; Bentley, Diary, III, 345-346, I V , 33. 227

NOTES

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CHAPTER

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50. Thomas Allen to Thomas JefiFerson, March 4, 1805, Jefferson Papers, L C . See also National Aegis, Nov. 1 7 , 1802, Oct. 3 1 , 1804; Eastern Argus, Oct. 25, 1804; Pittsfield Sun, Oct. 21, 28, 1800, Feb. 3, 1 8 0 1 , Feb. 21, May 23, 1803. 51. Abraham Bishop, Proofs of a Conspiracy . . . (Hartford, 1 8 0 2 ) , pp. 1 5 , 39ff. 52. Joseph Barker, An Address to a Respectable Number of Citizens . . . (Boston, n.d.), p. 6. 53. Allen to Jefferson, March 4, 1805, Jefferson Papers, L C . See John Leland's democratic theory in his Writings, p. 267. 54. Bishop, Proofs of a Conspiracy, p. 134, and see p. 87; Leland, Writings, p. 267. 55. [David Austin], Republican Festival . . . (n.p., n.d.), pp. 3fiF. For a direct attack on Federal Calvinists' cataclysmic millenialism see John Bacon's answer to Jedidiah Morse, Extracts from Professor Robinson's 'Proofs of a Conspiracy' . . . (Boston, 1 7 9 9 ) . 56. Thomas Allen, "Reflections on the Death of General Hamilton," broadside from the Berkshire Reporter, M H S . 57. Thomas Allen to Thomas Jefferson, March 4, 1805, Thomas Jefferson Papers, L C ; G . Adolph Koch, Republican Religion (New York, 1 9 3 3 ) , p. 275. 58. Eastern Argus, Oct. 25, 1804. See also the Observation of Bentley, Diary, III, 66. 59. Eastern Argus, March 29, 1805; Independent Chronicle, April 1 , 1805; for the Federalist reply see Portland Gazette, March 25, 1805, Oct. 27, 1806. 60. It is possible to get a rough idea of the location of dissent by examining the Massachusetts Register, which lists the ministers and sects for the towns throughout the State. Town histories are also rieh in materials on local church history. 6 1 . Independent Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1800; for other Republican attacks on Federal clergy see Jan. 10, 1799, Sept. 8, 1 5 , 22, 1800, April 2, 1807. See also Eastern Argus, March 29, 1805; National Aegis, March 1 7 , 1802, Aug. 29, Nov. 14, 1804; Pittsfield Sun, Oct. 1 1 , 1802; Levi Lincoln to Jefferson, July 5, 1 8 0 1 , Jefferson Papers, L C . 62. Jefferson to Lincoln, 1 8 0 1 , Jefferson Papers, L C . 63. For Lincoln see the Mass. Spy, March 10, 1802; for Eustis and Jarvis see William Eustis to Henry Van Schaack, Jan. 1 5 , Feb. 1 , 1792, Van Schaack, Memoirs of Henry Van Schaack, pp. i82n, 183. For Wilham Bentley's numerous comments on the alliance of Republicans and dissenters see the Diary, II, 409, III, 66, 170. 64. For Sullivan's connection with dissent see Samuel Stillman 228

THE

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INTEREST

to Henry V a n Schaack, Jan. 2, 1 7 9 2 , V a n Schaack, Memoirs of Henry Van Schaack, p. 1 8 1 ; Amory, Sullivan, I, 1 8 1 - 1 8 5 ; Bentley, Diary, III, 226; Parsons Cooke, A Century of Puritanism (Boston, 1 8 5 5 ) , p. 247. 65. Independent Chronicle, April 1 , 1 8 0 5 . 66. Gideon Granger to Eustis, Nov. 1 8 , 1802, William Eustis Papers, L G ; Levi Lincoln to Jefferson, Dec. 6, 1 8 0 2 , Jefferson Papers, L G ; National Aegis, Feb. 9, 1 8 0 3 . 67. Bentley, Diary, III, 5 4 1 - 5 4 2 . 68. Bentley to Jacob Growninshield, Jan. 14, 1806, Feb. 1 1 , 1806, Miscellaneous Papers, Growninshield Papers, Peabody Museum. See also Bentley, Diary, III, 82, 1 1 9 , 235, 297. GHAPTER V .

THE

URBAN

INTEREST

1. Dictionary of American Biography, II, 5 0 1 - 5 0 2 . 2. Roger Faxton Sturgis, ed., Edward Sturgis of Yarmouth, Mass., 1 6 1 3 - 1 6 9 5 , and His Descendants (Boston, 1 9 1 4 ) , pp. 3 5 - 3 6 ; Oliver A. Roberts, History of the Military Company of the Massachusetts . . . (Boston, 1 8 9 5 - 1 9 0 1 ) , II, 2 1 5 ; [Julian] Sturgis, From Books Ö- Papers of Russell Sturgis ([Oxford, 1 8 9 3 ] ) . 3. PMHS, ser. 1 , X I I I (December 1 8 7 3 ) , 2o6ff; ibid., ser. 2, V I I (May 1 8 9 2 ) , 4 i 6 f f ; ibid., ser. 3, L I I I (June 1 9 2 0 ) , 2 i 8 f f . 4. Franklin B. Sanborn, "St. John de Gr^vecoeur, the American Farmer ( 1 7 5 3 - 1 8 1 3 ) , " ibid., ser. 2, X X (February 1 9 0 6 ) , 46flf; Timothy Pickering to Nathaniel Fellows, Aug. 9, 1 7 9 8 , Timothy Pickering Papers, M H S . 5. Roberts, II, 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 , 3 1 3 - 3 1 4 ; John Brazer and Ezra Davis Letter Book, 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 1 0 , Baker Library, Harvard Business School 6. [Thomas L . V . Wilson], The Aristocracy of Boston . . (Boston, 1 8 4 8 ) , p. 6; 'Our First Men . . . (Boston, 1 8 4 6 ) , p. 1 3 7. Dictionary of American Biography, I, 4 3 1 - 4 3 2 ; James T Austin, Autobiographical Fragment,- Austin Family Manuscripts M H S . For Benjamin Austin's views see Constitutional Republican ism, in Opposition to Fallacious Federalism . . . (Boston, 1 8 0 3 ) As evidence of his lifelong devotion to the artisan interest see his letter to Thomas Jefferson of Dec. 1 1 , 1 8 1 5 , Jefferson Papers, L G 8. Roberts, II, 247. 9. See the biographical and genealogical account of David Townsend in the Gerry Papers, N Y P L . 1 0 . Dictionary of American Biography, I V , 1 9 3 - 1 9 5 . 1 1 . On Leonard Jarvis see Allis, William Bingham's Maine Lands, I, 27n8, II, 686-687, 686n6, 854, 867; Brissot de Warville, New Travels in the United States, I, 94. On Gharles Jarvis

229

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CHAPTER

V

See James S. Loring, The Hundred Boston Orators (Boston, 1854), pp. 309®; Mary P. S. Cutts, The Life and Times of the Hon. William Jarvis, of Weather^eld, Vermont (New York, 1869), pp. 6ff; William Sullivan, Familiar Letters on Public Characters and Public Events, 1 7 8 3 - 1 8 1 5 (Boston, 1834), p. 26. 12. Amory, Sullivan, passim. On Sullivan's legal practice see J. Q. Adams to J. Adams, Sept. 21, 1790, J. Q. Adams, Writings, 1, 58. 13. Loring, p. 172. For Morton's landholdings see an advertisement in the Independent Chronicle, April 16, 1798. 14. William Eustis to William North, postmarked Feb. 16, [1798 or 1799 ?], William Eustis Papers, NYHS; for other revealing glimpses of the man see his letters to North of July 14, 1791, Oct. 13, 1799, Sept. 25, 1801, ibid., and to David Cobb, Feb. 9, 1794, Cobb Papers, MHS. For his holdings of public securities see Eustis to Henry Knox, Feb. 13, 1786, in Fast, "Massachusetts Conservatives," p. 38in69. The William Eustis Papers, in the Library of Congress, contain Information on the family's economic activities. For Eustis' interest in trade see Columbian Centinel, Nov. 2, 6, 1799; and for his attempt to obtain military ofEce see Henry Jackson to Knox, March 31, 1790, Benjamin Lincoln to Knox, April 27, 1791, Knox Papers, MHS. 15. Independent Chronicle, Sept. 6, Nov. 22, Dec. 6, 1792, May 4, 1795, Sept. 20, Nov. 10, 1796, Aug. 10, Nov. 2, 16, 1797, May 23, 1799; Columbian Centinel, Nov. 3, 1796; B. Austin, Constitutional Republicanism, pp. i7iff and passim. 16. The best account of Federalist disunity is in Kurtz, Presidency of John Adams, and for a different analysis see Dauer, The Adams Federalists, ch. 5. 17. Higginson to Timothy Pickering, May 1 1 , 1797, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," pp. 798-799. 18. Pickering to Alexander Hamilton, June 9, 1798, Hamilton, "Works, ed. J. Hamilton, V L 304; George Cabot to Pickering, Feb. 21, 1799, Lodge, Cabot, p. 220. 19. Samuel E. Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1J65-1848 (Boston, 1 9 1 3 ) , I, 164!!., 183. 20. Kurtz, p. 353; cf. Dauer, pp. 196-197. 21. Higginson to Pickering, Jan. 12, i8oo, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 835; Morison, Otis, I, 189; Lodge, Cabot, pp. i83ff, 281-282; Kurtz, pp. 282, 331, 39iff. 22. Amory, Sullivan, II, 770. See Jefferson's appeal to Gerry, Jan. 26, 1799, Thomas Jefferson, Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford (New York, 1904-05), IX, 15-26; Elbridge Gerry to Jefferson, Jan. 15, 20, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC; Joseph B. 230

THE

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INTEREST

Varnum to William Eustis, Nov. 21, 1800, Eustis Papers, LC. For Republican support of Jefferson see Independent Chronicle, Aug. 1 1 , 18, Sept. 8, 1 1 , 22, Oct. 2, 1800. 23. Independent Chronicle, March 6, 10, 13, 17, 20, 31, April 17, May 4, 8, June 19, 23, 1800; Columbian Centinel, Aug. 6, 13, 1800; Higginson to Pickering, April 16, 1800, Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," p. 836; Abigail to J. Q. Adams, May 15, 1800, Adams Papers, Part IV: Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, January-May 1800, microfilm, Widener Library, Harvard University; Kurtz, p. 391. 24. John Wendell to Gerry, May 12, 1800, Gerry Papers, NYPL; Cabot to Gore, March 27, 1800, Lüdge, Cabot, p. 271. 25. Columbian Centinel, April 16, Oct. 29, 1800; Independent Chronicle, Oct. 27, 30, Nov. 13, 1800. On Eustis' ability to attract Federalist support see Jackson to Cobb, Nov. 5, 1800, Allis, William Bingham's Maine Lands, H, 1085; Ames to Christopher Gore, Dec. 29, 1800, Fisher Ames, Works, I, 289. 26. James Bowdoin to Lady Temple, Oct. 31, 1793, Bowdoin and Temple Papers, p. 205. See also Amory, Sullivan, II, 68-70; Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, p. 74; Bowdoin to Jesse Putnam, June 30, 1802, Historical Manuscripts in the Public Library of the City of Boston, no. 3 (Boston, 1902); Independent Chronicle, Dec. 5, 1793, Jan. 23, Feb. 16, March 25, 1797, Feb. 26, Aug. 27, 1798, Jan. 12, 1801. 27. Howard C. Rice, "James Swan: Agent of the French Republic, 1794-1796," New England Quarterly, X (September 1 9 3 7 ) ' 464-48628. James Swan to Henry Knox, March 29, 1788, and see letters of February 17, 1788, and Oct. 3, 1790, Knox Papers, MHS. 29. Swan realized how precarious his position was and began planning new ventures, this time to Spain, Italy, and Turkey (see Swan to Knox, April 2, 1795, Knox Papers, M H S ) . 30. Loring, Hundred Boston Orators, 1 3 1 - 1 3 3 ; Pierre Caron, ed., La Commission des Subsistences de l'An II (Paris, 1924-25), I, 270, 542, 629. Hichborn had sought a contract for supplying the Gonfederation in the 1780's with army rations. See his letter to Knox, Dec. 26, 1786, Knox Papers, MHS; see also Ames to Gore, Oct. 4, 1796, Fisher Ames, Works, I, 202. 31. Caron, I, 393, 537. 32. Cutts, William Jarvis, passim, especially pp. 43ff, 53-54; Dictionary of American Biography, IX, 624-625. 33. Bentley, Diary, II, i i o ; Peabody, Merchant Venturers of Old Salem, pp. 127-128; Columbian Centinel, Dec. 28, 1793. 34. Fannie S. Chase, Wiscasset in Pownalborough (Wiscasset, 231

NOTES

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CHAPTER

V

Me., 1 9 4 1 ) , pp. 464, 454; Josiah Bartlett, An Historical Sketch of Charlestown (Boston, 1 8 1 3 ) , p. 2 1 ; Thomas B. Wyman, The Genealogies and Estates of Charlestown (Boston, 1 8 7 9 ) , p. 126; Timothy T . Sawyer, Old Charlestown (Boston, 1 9 0 2 ) , p. 230. 35. For general accounts of Salem see James D. Phillips, Salem and the Indies (Boston, 1 9 4 7 ) ; Charles Osgood and Henry M . Batchelder, Historical Sketch of Salem, i626-i8j