The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy) (Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture) 9819926165, 9789819926169

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KEY CONCEPTS IN CHINESE THOUGHT AND CULTURE

The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy) Tianyu Feng Translated by Yanan Shao

Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture

Editor-in-Chief Wang Fang, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing, China

Associate Editors Siying Zhang, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing, China Lin Wang, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing, China Wen Zhang, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing, China

Editorial Board Florence Chia-ying Yeh, Nankai University, Tinajin, China Qizhi Zhang, Institute of Chinese Thoughts and Culture, Northwest University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China Yulie Lou, Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing, China Ning Wang, School of Chinese Language and Literature, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China Zhen Han, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China Xuejun Yan, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing, China Jixi Yuan, School of Chinese Classics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China Tingyang Zhao, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China Keping Wang, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China Weigui Fang, School of Chinese Language and Literature, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China Chunqing Li, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China Jing Zhang, School of Humanities, Communication University of China, Beijing, China Jinglin Li, School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China

Published in partnership between FLTRP and Palgrave Macmillan, the Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture offer a unique insight into Chinese culture, defining and contextualizing some of China’s most fundamental and at times complex philosophical concepts. In a concise and reader-friendly manner, these works define a variety of quintessentially Chinese terms such as harmony (hé/和) or association (x¯ıng/兴) – and examine how they first appeared and developed in Chinese culture, the impact they had on Chinese thought and why they continue to have significant meaning in China today. At a time when the understanding of different histories, languages and cultures globally is at a premium, this series provides a valuable roadmap to the concepts which underpin 21st century Chinese society.

Tianyu Feng

The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy)

Tianyu Feng Wuhan University Wuhan, China Translated by Yanan Shao Foreign Languages School of Tianjin Chengjian University Tianjin, China

ISSN 2524-8464 ISSN 2524-8472 (electronic) Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture ISBN 978-981-99-2616-9 ISBN 978-981-99-2617-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6 Jointly published with Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd. ISBN of the China (Mainland) edition: 978-7-5213-3999-4 Translation from the Chinese language edition: “概念的文化史:以“封建”与“经济”为例” by Tianyu Feng, © Liu Tongping (The author’s wife) 2022. Published by Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd. All Rights Reserved. © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Publisher’s Note to “Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture Series” (English Edition)

In the course of human history, Chinese civilization has always been known for its long history and remarkable breadth and depth. In a unique geographical environment and thanks to a fascinating historical development, the Chinese nation has nurtured academic traditions, humanistic spirits, values, a way of thinking, ethics and customs unfound elsewhere in the world. All of this was expounded and sublimated by Confucius, Mozi, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Mencius, Xunzi and other ancient sages and philosophers, and encapsulated into thousands of highly concise and profound key concepts underpinning the brilliant and rich Chinese culture. Reflective of the supreme wisdom and rational thinking of the Chinese nation, the concepts have come to be known as “key concepts in Chinese thought and culture.” They are the brainchild fostered by the Chinese nation engaged for thousands of years in independently exploring and rationally thinking about the universe, the world, social norms and ethics, ways of thinking and values. They represent the unique and most significant hallmark of Chinese thought and civilization produced by the Chinese nation. They are the greatest intellectual legacy left by ancient Chinese philosophers to the contemporary Chinese and the most valuable intellectual wealth contributed by the Chinese nation to world civilization. The past four decades of reform and opening up have witnessed continued growth of the Chinese economy and its comprehensive strength. As an active participant and contributor to globalization, China v

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PUBLISHER’S NOTE TO “KEY CONCEPTS IN CHINESE …

has been increasingly admired in the international community for its national conditions, history, thoughts and culture. On the other hand, its basic research has fallen behind with the development of the times. So far there exists no comprehensive and systematic collation and interpretation of the concepts that reflect its thought and culture, for introduction to overseas readers. There is no unified comprehension and interpretation of many terms, especially those reflective of the unique Chinese philosophy, humanism, values, and ways of thinking. It is even more regrettable that the lack of unified norms for the translation of such terms into foreign languages has frequently led to deviations from their actual meaning, and consequently confusion and even misunderstanding on the part of overseas readers may result. To ameliorate the above circumstances, we officially launched in 2014 the “Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture Project.” Drawing on the excellent history of traditional Chinese thought and culture, the Project has focused on key concepts encapsulating Chinese philosophy, humanistic spirits, values, ways of thinking, and cultural characteristics, especially those with implications for the development of contemporary world civilization and in line with the common values of the human race. Those concepts were then interpreted in objective and concise Chinese and translated into English and other languages, for overseas readers to better understand the connotations and essence of Chinese thought and culture, and consequently to promote equal dialogue and exchanges between Chinese civilization and other civilizations of the world, so as to jointly build a community and shared future of mankind. So far, over 600 terms have been collated, interpreted and translated by Project experts and published by the Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press (FLTRP) in six volumes in Chinese and English under the serial title of “Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture.” However, due to style and volume restrictions, the historical context, semantic context, origin and evolution, academic influence and the underlying humanistic spirit, values, and modern implications haven’t been fully elaborated for some of them. To give overseas audiences a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of them, FLTRP and Springer Nature have jointly planned the new “Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture Series” (English Edition). Each volume of this series will be centered on one concept only or a couple of closely related concepts. The authors are required to examine in detail the historical context, semantic context, origin and evolution, and

PUBLISHER’S NOTE TO “KEY CONCEPTS IN CHINESE …

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academic influence, based on the research findings on ancient Chinese literature. They are expected to unfold their elaboration around important figures in the development of Chinese thought and culture, as well as their works, theories and academic viewpoints. The series thus features comprehensive and original academic contributions offering relevant theoretical approaches and insights based on independent research by the respective authors. Integrating professional studies with popular interest, it emphasizes integration of corroboration and exposition and equal emphasis on Oriental and Occidental scholarship. All authors selected are young and middle-aged scholars accomplished in the study of Chinese thought and culture. It is believed that the publication of this series will make it possible for overseas readers to have a more systematic understanding of the philosophy, humanistic values, academic perspectives and theoretical viewpoints underlying the key concepts of Chinese thought and culture, and a clearer understanding of the ways of thinking, the values and cultural characteristics of the intellectual world of the Chinese nation and overseas Chinese. We are grateful to Harmen van Paradijs, Vice President of Springer Nature Group, and Myriam Poort, Editorial Director, Humanities and Social Sciences, Springer Nature for their generous support in planning and publishing this series. August 2018

Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press

Contents

1

Introduction

1

Part I Fengjian (Feudal) 7

2

Composition of the Classical Chinese Term “Fengjian”

3

The Zhou Fengjian System of Decentralization and the Qin System of Monarchical Centralization

11

4

The Concept of H¯ oken (封 封建) in Early Modern Japan

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5

A Discovery of the Similarities Between Fengjian and Feudalism

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Establishment of the Concept of Feudalism in Western Europe and Its Encounter with Feudalism in East Asia

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6 7

The New Term “Fengjian” in the Late Qing Dynasty and Early Republican Era 7.1 The Abolition of the Han System and Its Replacement by a System of Prefectures in Japan’s Meiji Restoration Changed the Feudal System into the System of Prefectures 7.2 The Zhou Dynasty State System Was the Same as the Feudal Systems of Europe and Japan in the Middle Ages

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CONTENTS

The Alienation of the New Term “Fengjian” 8.1 Chen Duxiu’s Theory that Feudalism Equals Backwardness 8.2 Ignoring the Differences Between China and Japan in the Early Modern Societies 8.3 An Investigation into “Anti-feudalism” During the May 4th Movement and the New Culture Movement

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Generalization of the Concept of “Feudalism” 9.1 The Communist International’s Generalized View of Feudalism 9.2 Social History Debate Promoted the Generalization of Feudalism

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The Truth About Marx’s Theory of Feudalism 10.1 The Superficial Understanding of the Doctrine of Social Forms by the Participants in the Social History Debate in China 10.2 The Non-feudal Early Modern Societies of China, India, and Other Eastern Countries

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Criticism of Generalized Feudalism by Chinese Scholars

71

12

Patriarchal Landowners’ Authoritarian Society and the Age of Imperial Power 12.1 The Patriarchal System 12.2 The Landlord System 12.3 The Autocratic Monarchy

81 83 87 93

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9

10

47 49

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57 60

65 67

Part II Jingji (Economy) 13 14

The Classical Meaning of “Jingji”: Governance for the People Jingji as Envisaged in the Studies for Practical Solutions in China and Japan in the Near-Ancient Period: The National Economy and the People’s Livelihood 14.1 Jingji Which Means Governance for the People 14.2 The Use of the Term “経済” (Keizai, Jingji) in Early Modern Japan

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111 111 113

CONTENTS

14.3 15 16

17 18

19 20

The Presentation of Jingjixue (经济学)

The Evolution of Ancient and Modern Meaning of Economy in the West Until It Was Finally Settled Translation of Economy into Keizai in the Late Edo Period and During the Meiji Period 16.1 The Change of the Meaning of the European and American Term “Economy” and the Following by the Japanese 16.2 Staatshuishoudkunde Was Translated as Seisan-Gaku (製産学) and Keizai-Gaku Got Closer to Waseisan-Gaku 16.3 The Japanese Misuse of the Term “经纪” ( Jingji) Led to the Change of the Meaning of “经济” ( Jingji) 16.4 Establishment of the New Name “Keizai” in Japan 16.5 Fukuzawa Yukichi and Nakae Ch¯ omin Divided Keizai into Four Parts 16.6 Economy Means Being Frugal Modern Japan Doubted About the Translation of Economy as Keizai and Tried Other Alternatives The Rejection of Japan’s Translation of Economy as Keizai by Chinese Scholars in the Late Qing Dynasty and Their New Alternatives 18.1 Various Translations by Protestant Missionaries to China 18.2 Transliterations by the Chinese 18.3 Identifying with and Questioning Keizai, the Japanese Translation of Economy and Replacing It with Zisheng and Jixue

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115 117 121

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123 124 126 129 130 135

139 139 141

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The Early Republican Period: Establishment of “Jingji” as the Translation of Economy in China

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Examination of Jingji in Its Present Sense 20.1 Semantics 20.2 History

153 153 155

About the Author

Tianyu Feng, an expert in Chinese culture and history, senior professor at Wuhan University. In recent decade, Prof. Feng has focused on the study of the modern transformation of Chinese culture under the circumstance of the interaction between Chinese and Western cultures. His works achieved the first prize of China Book Award, the second prize of Outstanding Achievements in Humanities and Social Sciences Research from Ministry of Education and other prizes. Some of his papers have been published abroad in foreign languages, such as in Japanese, English and Spanish.

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List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4

Chinese bronze inscription Small seal scrip Chinese bronze inscription Small seal script

102 102 103 103

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Language is a tool for thinking and a direct reality of thought. It is also a cultural creation. Language and thought are interdependent, and as a tool of communication, language is a necessary part of human society and a product of social life. The language formed during the cultural process includes three elements: phonology, grammar, and vocabulary. The meaning of vocabulary is particularly historically malleable and dynamic. Without the help of words, a concept is just an indefinite, vague, and confusing thing. The lexicalization of concepts is a prerequisite for thinking and a necessary condition for human beings to enter the world of conscious meaning. The formation and evolution of meaning is realized through the lexicalization of concepts. By examining and analyzing vocabulary in a historical and cultural context, a cultural-historical perception can be obtained. The evolution of concepts is a symptom of the evolution of human thought, reflecting the expansion of the total amount of knowledge and the migration and deepening of thought. Since the modern era, Western learning has been gradually introduced to China, leading to an unprecedented process of change in knowledge and thought, language and concepts in China. Due to the polysemy of Chinese characters, Chinese words can often derive multiple meanings without the form being changed in the least. As a result, the translation of Western concepts with

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_1

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classical Chinese phrases often leads to derivation and variation of meanings, which makes it possible and necessary to create new expressions. However, the two major processes of cultural progress and national transformation, which are involved in the translation of concepts from ancient to modern times and from a foreign language to Chinese, are not always mutually compatible, and the situation is so complicated that concepts and denotations are mismatched from time to time. If a Chinese word is used to translate a foreign concept, it is not only completely unconnected with its classical meaning, or even contrary to its original meaning, but also far from the meaning of the foreign word, and it is impossible to derive a new meaning from the original word form by changing the word formation. The “new meaning” of the Chinese word is thus all externally imposed. This kind of mistranslation will lead to conceptual mismatches. The Chinese translations of “economy” and “feudalism” are typical examples. Consistent understanding of the same concept is a prerequisite for interpersonal exchange of ideas. The negative consequences of conceptual mismatches often reach the wider ideological and cultural levels. The long-established culture of Chinese characters does not cling to its national identity of the language by rejecting foreign concepts; nor does it cut off its cultural origins and allow foreign countries to exercise symbolic hegemony; still less should it lose its holding force and allow some concepts to be mismatched. There are historical, social, and cultural reasons for the mistranslations. Examining the reasons and consequences of the mistranslations may help find a remedy; it may also help to find the right way to create new expressions in the future and prevent the reappearance and abuse of inaccurate new expressions. If mismatched concepts are promoted by academic or non-academic factors, they will be passed on by word of mouth and spread far and wide, and over time, they will become agreed expressions which are difficult to change. If the mismatched concepts are of limited harm (e.g., jingji for economy), they can be left unchanged for the time being; if they are of great harm (e.g., fengjian for feudalism), they must be corrected and replaced with other expressions. Ensuring the standardization, precision, and purity of words and concepts to keep them from being polluted, falling into disorder, and degrading is integral to promoting cultural traditions, embracing the best of foreign culture, and ensuing the healthy development of Chinese culture. The importance of this endeavor is twofold: first, to both trace

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INTRODUCTION

3

the classical meanings of words and sort out their modern meanings, and to search for the evolutionary trajectory of Chinese culture, so as to know the origin of new expressions and the basis of their variations; second, to be open-minded in observing the connection and difference between foreign concepts and original Chinese concepts, and investigate the mechanism whereby new expressions are produced in the process of international exchange and Chinese and Western acculturation.

PART I

Fengjian (Feudal)

At present, many often refer to China as “a feudal society,” but I wonder what they mean. In terms of political system, there has been a unified central government in China since the Qin Dynasty (221–206 B.C.), with prefectures and counties under its jurisdiction without hereditary feudal rulers, which is insufficient evidence to call China “feudal.” In terms of academics, since the beginning of Confucianism and Mohism in the preQin period before 221 B.C., academics has spread among the general public, being neither monopolized by the nobles nor dominated by religious temples. Academics has been easily and extensively accessible to the general public and provided the basis for selecting candidates from among ordinary scholars for the state bureaucracy. All this has been true since the Qin Dynasty. Since there is not a special noble class in China, it is baseless to refer to China as “feudal.” —Qian Mu: An Outline of National History In the Chinese system, fengjian (feudal) is a classical term with very old and stable meaning, but at the same time it is also a new term that has been given quite complicated and even contradictory content in Chinese modern history (1840–1949). This new term is in a key position in the humanities and social sciences, and even in the discourse of the whole population. Therefore, it is necessary to examine and properly define the term.

CHAPTER 2

Composition of the Classical Chinese Term “Fengjian”

Fengjian is a joint noun composed of the words “feng ” and “jian.” (1) Written as oracle bone inscriptions, feng resembles a tree planted in Chinese bronze inscriptions, the left in the earth; written as part of feng symbolizes a spreading tree and the right part represents a human hand (the same is true with the right part of feng in regular script written as cun [寸]), which means to gather soil in small seal script, feng means the same for the tree; written as thing as it is written in Chinese bronze inscriptions and is extended to mean to plant trees in the soil to show the boundaries of the field and the border. Originally, feng means to draw the demarcation lines of fields and regions, and it is extended to mean to grant fiefs to someone to make him a vassal. Explanation of Script and Elucidation of Characters defines feng as “to grant fiefs to a vassal.” Feng is a verb which means for the king to grant fiefs to a vassal based on his rank. in oracle bone inscriptions, jian resembles a person (2) Written as planting a tree in a certain area and the dots represent grains in Chinese bronze of earth, meaning construction; written as inscriptions, jian drops the grains of earth and represents a person in small seal script, jian is an ideoin construction; written as logical compound which is derived from yu (聿, meaning law). Explanation of Script and Elucidation of Characters defines jian © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_2

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as “to enact laws.” According to the Guangya dictionary, “jian means to establish.” Jian is extended to mean to create. According to “The Great Plan” in The Book of History, “The sovereign has established in himself the highest degree and pattern of excellence.” And according to “The Supreme Official Position of Zhongzai” in The Rites of Zhou, “When a king establishes a country….” It is in “The 24th Year of Duke Xi” about the early Zhou’s policy in Zuo’s Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals that the term “fengjian” was first used to mean “grant fiefs to establish a vassal”: In the past, in response to the revolt against the Zhou Dynasty (1046– 256 B.C.) by Shu of Guan (unknown–1039 B.C.) and Shu of Cai (dates unknown) in collaboration with that Wugeng (dates unknown), a son of the Shang Dynasty’s King Zhou (trad. r. 1154–1123 B.C.) of Shang, the Duke of Zhou (dates unknown) granted fiefs to many of his relatives to make them vassals in defense of his dynasty.

Kong Yingda (574–648), a Confucian scholar of the early Tang Dynasty, paraphrased the latter part of the statement as follows: “Relatives were granted fiefs and made vassals as barriers for the Zhou Dynasty.” This is a clear expression of the meaning of fengjian. Although the Zhou Dynasty practiced the fengjian system of granting fiefs to people to making them vassals, it often used the words “feng ” and “jian” separately without making fengjian a single concept, and the above quote from Zuo’s Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals is a rare example. During the Qin and Han dynasties (221 B.C. to AD 220), because of the correspondence between the fengjian system and the system of prefectures and counties, the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems were often compared and commented on by rulers and scholars, so fengjian became a major topic of discussion at all levels of society. A decisive debate took place at a court meeting presided over by Emperor Qin Shi Huang (259–210 B.C.), where the important ministers Wang Wan and Li Si expressed their opposing views about the two systems (see “Records of Emperor Qin Shi Huang,” Records of the Historian). Commandant of Justice Li Si (280–208 B.C.) rejected the argument of

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COMPOSITION OF THE CLASSICAL CHINESE TERM …

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Prime Minister Wang Wan (dates unknown) in favor of fengjian’ s superiority and argued that the establishment of prefectures and counties would help develop the emperor’s unified autocracy. Those who were made vassals by King Wen (1152–1056 B.C.) and King Wu(1076–1043 B.C.) of the Zhou Dynasty shared the same surname. Later on, as the kinship gradually became distant, the people of this same kinship attacked each other as enemies and the vassals fought wars with one another. At present, the country has been unified thanks to the divine power of your majesty. If prefectures and counties are established, all the princes and meritorious officials can be rewarded decently with public tax revenues and be easily brought under control. Keeping the country free from dissent is the right way to make it peaceful. Making people vassals will not make this happen.1

Emperor Qin Shi Huang categorically stated that, “The Commandant of Justice made a good point.” He adopted Li Si’s suggestion to set up 36 prefectures whose military and government officials were appointed by the court, abolishing the vassals ( fengjian) that had been in place since the Shang and Zhou dynasties. This marks a major institutional turn in Chinese history.

1 “Records of Qin Shi Huang,” Records of the Historian.

CHAPTER 3

The Zhou Fengjian System of Decentralization and the Qin System of Monarchical Centralization

With the aforementioned Qin court debate as a starting point, from the Han dynasties, Wei and Jin dynasties, Tang and Song dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties, comparative theories of vassal and prefecture-county systems emerged one after another in history, praising or denigrating the vassal system.1 One of the most notorious historical theories is probably found in On Investiture by Liu Zongyuan (773–819) of the Tang Dynasty, which says: The Zhou Dynasty divided its land like a melon, established five titles of Duke, Marquis, Count, Viscount, and Baron, and made many people vassals. Spread all over the country like stars, the vassal states were assembled around the king of Zhou. They were like wheels that move around the center or spokes that are rallied by the axle. The vassals gathered together to meet with the Son of Heaven; scattered, they guarded the territory and defended the court.

Liu had a concise summary of the investiture in early Zhou: Zhou overthrew the Shang Dynasty. It grew from a small state in the Western part of the country to seize control of all of the country. As it was unable to govern its vast territory and large population, its king granted fiefs and the 1 Zhang Shizhao, Essentials of the Works of Liu Zongyuan, Shanghai: Wenhui Press, 2000, pp. 61–93.

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_3

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people attached to them to the nobles with the same surnames as his and with different surnames at five levels. These nobles governed their separate states, met with the king at regular intervals, and defended the capital (the Son of Heaven). Liang Qichao (1873–1929) of China’s modern times called this system the “Zhou Dynasty State System of China,”2 which can be abbreviated as “the governance of Zhou” or “the system of Zhou.” The two main elements of the Zhou system are hereditary aristocratic politics and a lordly economy in which land could not be bought or sold. The Zhou system is similar to the systems of Europe during the Middle Ages and of Japan during the Middle Ages and in the early modern period. “They were in the feudal period and practiced aristocratic politics. They were both divided into states.”3 Liu went on to point out: “I have been wondering why the Zhou Dynasty collapsed for a long time. It was dangerously supported by vassals. Weren’t the vassals too strong to be safe for the dynasty?…. This is the cause of the failure of Zhou.” The Zhou Dynasty both thrived and collapsed due to fengjian (the vassals of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period fought each other to cause the collapse of the Zhou Dynasty). In order not to follow the beaten track of the Zhou system, after unifying China, the Qin Dynasty prevented the vassals from becoming too strong to be safe in the country. To this end, it replaced the fengjian system with the system of prefectures and counties whereby the officials selected and appointed by the imperial court replaced hereditary nobles in local governance, and centralized power and even the monarch’s personal centralization of power were strengthened. This gave rise to the Qin system of centralized power of the autocratic monarchy. Although the Qin Dynasty was short-lived, its system survived for two millennia until the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368–1911), which is a distinctive feature of Chinese history. Liu made the following comments on the system of prefectures and counties implemented from the Qin to the Tang Dynasty.

2 Liang Qichao, “On the Differences and Similarities between the Chinese and European State Systems,” The China Discussion, Yokohama: The China Discussion Journal, vol. 26, September 5, 1899, p. 1. 3 Ibid.

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The Tang Dynasty did the right thing by setting up prefectures and counties and appointing their heads. However, there were still violent and cunning people who rebelled from time to time to seize prefectures and counties. The fault did not lie in the establishment of prefectures and counties but in the fact that the military governors had great military strength. Back then there were rebellious military governors but not rebellious heads of prefectures and counties. It is true that the system of prefectures and counties could not be changed.

Liu fully affirmed the role of the Qin system of prefectures and counties in consolidating national unity, calling it “the right thing” to do and believing that, “It is true that the system of prefectures and counties could not be changed.” However, from the Han, and especially the Tang Dynasty, onward, the Zhou fengjian system did not die out, and emperors of different dynasties were still granting fiefs to their relatives and other nobles and making them vassals, but the main body of their political systems had been changed to the Qin system of prefectures and counties. However, there were not a few people who admired the Zhou fengjian system. During the Wei and Jin dynasties (220–420), there were many articles praising fengjian, and in the Song Dynasty (960–1276), neo-Confucians often praised the fengjian system and the patriarchal system. In the Northern Song Dynasty, Zhang Zai (1020–1077) said, “For the Son of Heaven to found a country and for a vassal to establish a state is the principle of heaven.”4 In the Southern Song Dynasty, Hu Hong (1105–1161) said, “Granting fiefs to people to create states is a symbol of benevolence to the people.”5 This is the theory of fengjian based on moral idealism. Powerful emperors claimed to be benevolent, but most of them took the Confucian principles of benevolence and morality as a pretext while enforcing the strict laws advocated by the Legalists. They used a mixture of the Zhou and Qin systems. The private words of Emperor Xuan of Han, Liu Xun, admonishing the prince are a classic expression of the autocratic monarch’s rule:

4 Collected Works of Zhang Zai, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1978, p. 259. 5 Collected Works of Hu Hong, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1978, p. 266.

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Our Han Dynasty has its own system integrating rule by virtue and rule by force. How can we follow the example of the Zhou Dynasty relying solely moral education?6

The governance of Qin was characterized by rule of force, and the governance of Zhou was characterized by rule of virtue. Integrating these methods of governance and using both the Confucian principles of benevolence and morality and the strict laws advocated by the Legalists were the essentials of imperial rule. Some of the scholar-bureaucrats with a vision for the proper governance of the country often tried to supplement the Qin system of prefectures and counties with the Zhou fengjian system. At the time when the Ming Dynasty was just replaced by the Qing Dynasty, the scholar-bureaucrats discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the fengjian system and the system of prefectures and counties with a view to learning a lesson from the fall of the Ming Dynasty, affirming the fengjian system. Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), said in “Fengjian,” an article he failed to include in his Waiting for the Dawn, “After three generations, the Ming Dynasty was free from nomadic invasion.” But why had China been suffering from frequent Nomadic seizure and occupation of its land since the Qin Dynasty? Huang attributed it to the failure to implement the fengjian system: In the fengjian system, the people were soldiers themselves and emperors viewed their people as their own children while the latter viewed their emperors as their parents. The people worked on their farms during peacetime and fought battles during wartime…. Now, without the fengjian system, the people are no longer soldiers themselves and have to pay to have armies.

Huang also knew that in the ancient fengjian system, people were the soldiers themselves and that it was difficult to make this happen now. This led him to have the second best plan for establishing border towns under a system similar to fengjian in order to strengthen border defense against the nomads. In “Frontier Towns” of his Waiting for the Dawn, he said:

6 “Records of Emperor Yuan,” A History of the Han Dynasty.

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THE ZHOU FENGJIAN SYSTEM OF DECENTRALIZATION …

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Fengjian was something of the past, but as we stand now, we need to restore frontier towns.

He went on to review the advantages and disadvantages of the fengjian system and the systems of prefectures and counties in order to pave the way for introducing his theory of frontier towns: The disadvantage of the system fengjian is that strong vassals swallowed weak ones in defiance of the edicts of the Son of Heaven; that of the system of prefectures and counties is that the country suffered untold wars. To avoid the disadvantages of the two systems and make both of them work, it is necessary to establish frontier towns.

Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) had a similar view, believing that the system of fengjian and the system of prefectures and counties had their own weaknesses and strengths and that the former should be used to supplement the latter. He wrote nine essays entitled “On Prefectures and Counties,” arguing that under the fengjian system, “power was centralized at the bottom” while “power was centralized at the top” under the monarchical system of prefectures and counties, so it was improper to praise the latter system. His “On Prefectures and Counties (I)” said: The system of prefectures and counties is now found to be extremely weak, but nobody can do anything about it and it is still left as it was. This is why people are getting poorer, and why China is getting weaker and more chaotic.

In view of this, the same article stated that: The fengjian system should be integrated with the system of prefectures and counties to correct the error of the past two millennia. If a future monarch wants to enrich the people and strengthen the country, my advice may be useful.

By advocating fengjian in their political theories, Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu did not mean they wanted to grant fiefs to people to make them vassals; their purpose was to achieve decentralization. To address the shortcomings of the autocratic monarchy having centralized power in the Ming and Qing dynasties, they tried to use some characteristics of fengjian, such as making the people soldiers themselves and practicing

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local decentralization, as a way to adjust and improve the practice of the monarch having absolute centralized power. Yuan Mei (1716–1797), a Qing Dynasty scholar, argued from a cultural point of view that the decentralized fengjian system enabled talents to have room for survival and academic thinking to expand. In his “Notes about On Investiture,” he exemplified that Confucius, a sage, could not survive and develop under the system of prefectures and counties, and that his doctrine grew and flourished thanks to the political and cultural pluralism under the Zhou fengjian system. Yuan had this sketch of Confucius’ life: He benefited from fengjian. He was busy moving around to the states of Wei, Chen, Cai, Liang, Qi, and Teng. He was welcome there and revered by vassals. With the support of his disciples, he built up a fame around himself. Thousands of years later, he is crowned as the teacher of all ages. If he were born under the system of prefectures and counties and had failed the imperial examinations many times, he would have been confined to a state and stayed unfamed there. How could he have become accomplished in the country under that circumstance? Confucius and Mencius were able to prepare the Six Classics, demand the respect of vassals. They owed their success to fengjian.7

This is a discussion of the positive significance of fengjian from the perspective of intellectual and cultural history, and a criticism of centralized power for leading to cultural tyranny. This theory is also insightful. In modern times, those who advocated local autonomy often cited the philosophers of the Ming and Qing dynasties who worked to restore fengjian. The fengjian prefectures and counties debate of Huang, Gu, Yuan, etc., which exerts the positive value of fengjian, is different from the praise of the system of prefectures and counties by Li Si, Jia Yi, Chao Cuo, Liu Zongyuan, Su Dongpo, Wei Moshen, etc. The two opposing theories of fengjian are both splendid and enlightening, helping people better understand the original meaning of fengjian. From the pre-Qin period to the Han and Tang dynasties and to the Ming and Qing dynasties, the famous thinkers of the past discussed

7 Yuan Mu, “Selected Works of the Xiaocangshan Studio (23),” Collected Works from the Xiaocangshan Study.

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THE ZHOU FENGJIAN SYSTEM OF DECENTRALIZATION …

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fengjian from different points of view and for different purposes, but all of them understood fengjian to mean to “invest people with titles to make them vassals” or to be extended to mean to “decentralize” without misinterpreting or distorting its meaning. Thus, the arguments of fengjian in ancient times can be diverse, but the concept of fengjian is consistent with the present.

CHAPTER 4

The Concept of H¯ oken (封建) in Early Modern Japan

Not only were the various theories of fengjian in ancient China consistent with the concept of fengjian, but the theories of h¯ oken in early modern Japan can also be used as a proof of the classical meaning of fengjian. For more than two millennia, Japan has been using Chinese characters in its culture and has accepted the term “fengjian” from Chinese books and texts such as Zuo’s Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals, Records of the Historian, and Liu Zongyuan’s On Investiture. According to “Barbarians” of The Book of Song, the Japanese ruler’s letter of credence to Song begins with the phrase “My remote invested vassal,” claiming that Japan was a vassal with fiefs granted by China. This document was analyzed by the historian Kuni Kunitake in the Meiji era, and modified by Shen Yue, editor-in-chief of the Book of Song, but it is true that Japan often called itself a vassal of China in the Heij¯o and Heian periods, which is evidenced by the term “h¯oken.” During the Toyotomi Hideyoshi period, Japan no longer considered itself a vassal of China. When the Ming ambassador submitted a letter of state with the phrase “I hereby name you the king of Japan,” the ruler Toyotomi was furious and tore the Ming letter of state on the spot. The late Edo historian Yori Sanyo described the scene in a poem entitled “Destroying the Letter of Investiture”: Hearing he was named the king of Japan, Toyotomi flared up and tore the letter up. © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_4

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I can make myself king if I want to; That is absolutely not the business of China.

Following the example of Toyotomi, the Edo Shogunate did not consider itself a vassal of the Ming and Qing dynasties, but in its internal affairs, Japan followed the fengjian system of ancient China. Like the Chinese dynasties that repeatedly discussed the pros and cons of fengjian and prefectures and counties, Japan also attached importance to this topic. When Tokugawa Ieyasu first established the Edo Shogunate, he took the fengjian system of the Western Zhou Dynasty as the ideal system of government, and he drew on some of the methods of the system of prefectures and counties to implement a moderate degree of centralization. This type of thinking became the “long-lasting imperial strategy” of the Tokugawa regime. In the mid-Edo period, Muro Ky¯us¯o, a Confucian official of the Shogunate and a neo-Confucian scholar, was consulted by Tokugawa Yoshimune, the eighth sh¯ ogun of the Tokugawa shogunate of Japan, and wrote repeatedly to him on the system and policies of the Shogunate, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of h¯oken and prefectures and counties. In contrast to Jia Yi of the Han Dynasty and Liu Zongyuan of the Tang Dynasty, who advocated the system of prefectures and counties, Muro idealized the h¯oken system and argued that the Zhou Dynasty had survived for 900 years because it had been guarded by the vassals. It is clear that this theory was created in response to the Shogunate system of the Edo period. Of course, Muro was not a stubborn Confucian scholar. He also reviewed the shortcomings of the fengjian system of the Zhou Dynasty and contributed to the sh¯ogun Tokugawa policy of strengthening the system of meeting with and reporting to the monarch. This made the daimyos spend half of the year in Edo and the other half in their states in order to exercise effective control over the h¯oken domains. This was something that comes between the centralized system and the h¯oken system of domains.1 The ancient thinker Ogy¯u Sorai, a contemporary of Muro’s, more strongly respected h¯ oken and rejected prefectures and counties, believing that h¯oken and rites and music were the two aspects of national policy and both were the ways of the sages. He argued that they were practiced for many generations in the Zhou Dynasty and made the dynasty 1 Takimoto Seiichi (ed.), The Japanese Economic Series, Tokyo: Japan Economic Series Press, 1914, vol. 3.

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peaceful. When they were abolished in the Qin Dynasty, the dynasty was thrown into chaos. In his Kogakuha Writings VII , Ogy¯u said, “The Qin Dynasty brought the country under the system of prefectures and counties, which led rebels to undermine the country. As a result, the dynasty even failed to make it to its third generation.” He thought that in order to overcome the crisis of the Shogunate, it was necessary to follow the way of the previous kings and restore the well-field system and vassals. In his “On Governance,” Ogy¯u praised the initial period of the Shogunate in Edo for achieving h¯oken in the country and severely criticized the later introduction of urban settlements and the system of meeting with and reporting to the monarch for being nothing short of the system of prefectures and counties. Therefore, Ogy¯u was a more thoroughgoing supporter of h¯oken than Muro.2 It can be seen that in the early modern era of Japan (Edo period), h¯oken was discussed based on the system of vassals, a concrete expression of the system of granting titles to people to make them vassals. Unlike the Chinese officials from the Han Dynasty and especially the Tang Dynasty onwards who praised the system of prefectures and counties, the Japanese officials praised the fengjian system. This is, of course, related to the national and political systems of ancient and medieval Japan. In the Edo period, the open-minded scholars who engaged in studies for practical solutions, such as Honda Toshiaki and Sat¯ o Nobuhiro, favored the system of prefectures and counties and criticized the h¯oken system. In the Meiji Restoration, Japan carried out modernization reforms following Western examples, and one of its three national policies was abolish the han system and replace it with the system of prefectures (the other two were to enrich the country and strengthen the military and to civilize and enlighten the masses). This was modeled, of course, on the unified nation-states established by the Western European powers. However, in arguing for the rationality of abolishing the han system and replacing it with the system of prefectures, the terminology and logic followed the classical form of Chinese character culture: In upholding the banner of the spirit of Emperor Jinmu’s state creation and restoration of

2 The Great Series of Japanese Thought, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973, vol. 36.

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imperial rule, the advantages and disadvantages of h¯oken and prefectures were discussed anew.3 Contrary to the Edo period when many commentators sang the praises of h¯oken, the early Meiji period saw the emergence of public opinion that promoted the prefectures and discouraged h¯oken, as shown first in It¯o Hirobumi’s Plan to Return Land and People to the Emperor in the first year of Meiji (1868) and Kido Takayoshi’s Memorial to Return Land and People to the Emperor in the second year of Meiji (1869). In addition, Saig¯o Takamori and others also had similar theories. It¯o sailed to Western Europe on a British ship in the third year of Bunky¯u (1863) and saw modern European society for himself, and decided that it was urgent to abolish the han system and replace it with the system of prefectures. In the 11th moon of the first year of Meiji, It¯o, who was then governor of Hy¯ogo Prefecture, submitted a memorial to the court, saying that he was “pleased” that Himeji Domain lord Sakai Tadakuni had returned his domain and that it was “a blessing for the imperial family.” He believed that this would unify the government and military power and expand the “might of the imperial state.”4 As one of the Three Great Nobles of the Restoration, Kido Takayoshi ¯ (the other two were Saig¯o Takamori and Okubo Toshimichi) put forward a proposal in the second year of Meiji (1869), according to which in the previous year when Tokugawa Yoshinobu was told to implement the policy of restoration of imperial rule by returning the land and people to the imperial family, he led an armed rebellion against the imperial government. Kido proposed that therefore, in order to implement the new policy to “domestically, put the best talent to use in the interest of the people while internationally, to ensure Japan becomes an equal with other countries,” Japan must “put an end to its 700-year-old faulty system and ensure the 300 vassals return their land and people; otherwise, there will be no new policy to speak of.”5 The 700-year-old faulty system refers to the h¯oken system of military power and vassal states that was practiced

3 Sakamoto Takao, Modern Japan (2): The Construction of the Meiji State, Tokyo: Ch¯uo ¯ k¯oron-sha, 1998, p. 79. 4 It¯ o Hirobumi, “Iwakura Tomomi Relational Document 17–7-28,” Memorials, Tokyo: Hokusen-sha. 5 “Memorial to Return Land and People to the Emperor,” Kido Takayoshi’s Documents, VIII, Japan Historical Society, pp. 25–26.

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from the Kamakura shogunate, Muromachi Shogunate to Edo Shogunate spanning more than 700 years. In the second year of Meiji, the lords of the four domains of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen submitted a memorial for the return of their domains, advocating the theory of “the king’s land and people” (based on the lines from “Beishan, the Minor Odes of the Kingdom” in the Chinese Book of Songs: Under the wide heaven, All is the king’s land. Within the sea-boundaries of the land, All are the king’s servants.

This paved the way for the restoration of imperial rule by abolishing the han system and replacing it with the prefecture system. In the seventh moon of the fourth year of Meiji (1871), the appendix of Shimbun No. 6, which was supported by Kido Takayoon, published Cho Sanshu’s “A New Article onh¯oken,” which discussed the advantages and disadvantages of theh¯oken system and the prefecture system, and criticized the former system for “having hereditary domain officials who had their private servants, goods and wealth, troops, policies, and institutions.” Therefore, the abolition of the domains and their replacement with prefectures was “the most urgent task of the court.” The article also cited examples from Chinese history to illustrate the shortcomings of theh¯oken system, and stated that the conversion to a prefecture system was an urgent task against the backdrop of the nations confronting each other. This marked the official debut of the theory of affirming prefectures. On the 14th day of the seventh moon of the same year, the Meiji government promulgated the Edict on the Abolishing Domains and Replacing Them with Prefectures, declaring that “in order to benefit the people domestically and ensure that Japan stands as an equal with other nations internationally, it is advisable to make the name and reality match by unifying government orders,”6 and making the 300 domains become three urban prefectures (fu) and 302 prefectures (ken). Four months later, they were merged into three urban prefectures (fu) and 72 prefectures (ken). This transformed Japan from a h¯ oken state to a modern state of 6 The Ministry of Justice (ed.), Constitution and the Law (I), Kyoto: Kanbei Murakami, 1873, p. 6.

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prefectures in one fell swoop. On the 27th day of the ninth moon of the fourth year of Meiji (October 14, 1871), “The Abolition of the Feudal System in Japan,” an English translation of “A New Article onh¯oken” was published in a Yokohama-based English magazine.7 This is also an early English translation of the Chinese phrase “fengjian system.” In short, during the Meiji period, when Japan was carrying out Westoriented political reforms and establishing a modern state system, the abolition of the h¯oken domain system and the implementation of a centralized prefecture system were the main priorities. Abolishing the h¯oken system became the priority of the Meiji Restoration. The term “h¯oken” used by the Japanese during this period maintained its connection with the classical meaning of the Chinese term “fengjian,” but at the same time opened the door to the Western meaning of feudalism. In the early Meiji period, the ancient meaning of h¯ oken and its Western meaning were already in the process of convergence.

7 Masato Matsuo, A Study of the Abolition of the Domains and Their Replacement with Prefectures, Tokyo: Yoshikawa Hirobunkan, 2000, pp. 252–254.

CHAPTER 5

A Discovery of the Similarities Between Fengjian and Feudalism

The Chinese Middle Ages and Modern Ages from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties were, in mainstream terms, a non-fengjian era and China’s political systems were very different from those of Western Europe in the Middle Ages. However, the state and political systems of Japan, which is located across the sea from China, in its Middle Ages (the Kamakura and Muromachi periods) and Modern Ages (Edo period), were quite similar to the feudal system of Western Europe on the other side of Eurasia. The Edo Shogunate closed Japan to the outside world for 200 years, during which the Japanese people, who were considered guilty of a capital offense if they left the country privately, could only sit back and be confined to their borders and certainly did not realize that the political system of their country was similar to that of the West in the Middle Ages. The first to notice the similarities were the Westerners who entered Japan at the end of the Shogunate. In 1853, the US Commodore Matthew Perry’s squadron of ships arrived in Japan, and the country had to open up and foreign ambassadors were stationed there as a matter of course. In the sixth year of the Ansei era (1859), Sir Rutherford Alcock, an English diplomat, came to Japan as consul general and diplomatic representative, and in the following year he was promoted to be the first minister of Japan, and returned to England in the second year of the Bunky¯u era (1862). Later on, he served as English minister to China until he retired in 1871. He was a Western © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_5

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diplomat who lived in China and Japan for a long time and had extensive knowledge of East Asian societies (for a biography of Alcock, see the “Foreword” written by Yamaguchi K¯osaku for the Japanese translation of Alcock’s The capital of the Tycoon: a Narrative of a Three Years’ Residence in Japan). A noteworthy phenomenon is that Alcock, who spent more than 20 years in China (1843–1859, 1865–1871) and had a detailed knowledge of Chinese society, did not consider Qing China to be similar to medieval Europe, while he concluded from his observation of Japan that Japan was “very similar” to the medieval feudal system of Europe. In 1863, based on his own three-year (1859–1862) experience in Japan, Alcock wrote an account of his stay in the country entitled The Capital of the Tycoon: a Narrative of a Three Years Residence in Japan in two volumes. (In 1949, Yamazawa Shokuju translated most of the book into Japanese, titled Three Years of Residence in Japan. The book was later translated in its entirety by Yamaguchi K¯osaku under the title The Capital of the Tycoon. His translation was published in 1962 by Iwanami Shoten in three volumes. I bought a copy of the translation from a used book company in Nagoya in 1999.) Alcock’s account of Japan is a product of his comparison of Western European, Chinese, and Japanese societies, focusing on his observations of Edo-era Japan. The historically minded diplomat found that Japanese society at the time (at the end of the shogunate) was largely similar in character to the English feudal system centuries earlier, which led him to call Japan “an Eastern version of the feudal system.”1 Alcock said he was interested in studying this system.2 Chapter 11 of the book discusses Japanese politics in detail, calling the Tokugawa shogun, the supreme ruler of the Edo shogunate, a “tycoon,” and arguing that Japanese tycoon politics was similar to that of medieval Europe: below the sovereign were feudal lords, with fiefs and titles granted by the sovereign. The lords and daimyos had some rights independent of the tycoon in their domains and had the power of life and death over their subjects and followers. During his stay in Nagasaki, Alcock saw that the samurais under the Hizen Marquis were extremely

1 Rutherford Alcock, The Capital of the Tycoon, Japanese version by Yamaguchi K¯ osaku, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1962, p. 40. 2 Ibid.

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A DISCOVERY OF THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN FENGJIAN …

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loyal to their lord, and that the Hizen Marquis were beyond the jurisdiction of the tycoon and were entitled to behead their samurais. This is similar to the situation in Western Europe during the reign of the King of the Franks (938–996) of the Capetian dynasty. The book also repeatedly compares the Taik¯osama (General Tokugawa) to feudal rulers of the late medieval period in Europe. For example, Chapter 3 compares him to feudal emperors or powerful officials of late medieval France, such as Louis XI (reigned 1461–1483), Chancellor Richelieu, and Louis XIV (reigned 1643–1715).3 Chapter 6 again refers to Japan as the “Eastern version of the feudal system,” saying that Japan in the Edo period was similar to the English Plantagenet Period (1154–1399). The book also repeatedly refers to the rulers of Japan as “feudal vassals” and “feudal lords.” Alcock added that many essentials of “present-day Japan” were comparable to those of “the Western countries of centuries ago” and hoped that historians would make “a thoughtful and systematic study” of them.4 In discussing Japan’s social ills, Alcock also labeled the country as a “feudal and arbitrary system” and argued that: The present state of Japanese society is very similar to the period of lawlessness and violence in England.5

This is the conclusion of a Western European diplomat with a good sense of history who witnessed Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, and it is of great comparative historical value. Alcock can be said to be one of the first to describe the social system in modern Japan as feudal. Observers and scholars in modern Western Europe shared the observation that early modern Japan resembled Western Europe in the Middle Ages. Japanese scholars who went abroad after the Meiji Restoration also realized that the Bakuhan system in Japan was similar to the European medieval system not only in terms of political system but also in terms of economic structure. The Japanese historian Sakamoto Tar¯o’s Japanese History and Historiography gives a typical example: Japanese economic historian Fukuda Tokuz¯ o studied in Germany during the Meiji period, and in 1900 he wrote a book in German entitled The Economic History

3 Ibid., pp. 341–343. 4 Ibid., p. 155. 5 Ibid., p. 188.

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of Japan (translated into Japanese in 1907, and Chinese in 1929), in which he divided Japanese history into four periods based on European economic historiography—the primitive era (ancient times–644), the era of the expansion of imperial power (645–930), the feudal era (931–1602), and the era of the authoritarian police state (1603–1867), specifically discussing the consistency of the social and economic development of Japan with the process of European development. Fukuda’s teacher, Franz Clemens Brentano, a professor of economic history in Germany, wrote a foreword to the book, describing the state of Fukuda as he listened to his lectures. I often saw his smile in the lecture hall of economic history. One day, when I asked him the reason for his smile, he replied that all the European economic history treatises he had heard from me was the same as the history of Japan. So I asked him to introduce the economic history of Japan to European readers.6

This vivid account reflects the similarity between Japanese and European feudal systems from the eyes of Japanese scholars who traveled to Europe, which echoes the observations of the Japanese eyewitnesses of Europe who had traveled to Japan before. After comparing the feudal systems of Germany, France, England, and Japan, Maki Kenji, a Japanese doctor of law known for his research on feudal systems, made the concluding remark that, “Our feudal system is very similar to the systems of the aforementioned European countries.”7 According to Japanese scholars, the feudal society in Japan, which resembled the medieval system in Europe, was generally described as follows: from the 12th to the nineteenth century, the Shogunate of the Shogun shared power with the local hereditary military nobles (samurais) who were granted power by the Shogun, and established a feudal system characterized by political decentralization and lordly economy. This feudal system was similar to the feudal system of the Zhou Dynasty in China 2,000–3,000 years ago and the feudalism of Western Europe from the 9th to fifteenth century, but was distinct from the centralized prefecture and 6 Franz Clemens Brentano, “Foreword by by the Original Compiler,” in Fukuda Tokuz¯o, The Economic History of Japan, Tokyo: Hobunkan Shobo, 1907, pp. 11–12. 7 Maki Kenji, “History of the Founding of the Feudal System in Japan,” Tokyo: Kobundo Shuppan, 1935, p. 17.

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county system and the community characterized by the landlord-landholding peasant economy of China from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties. The Japanese feudal system is closely related to the ancient clan surname system. In the era of surname system, the official positions of the court were hereditary, so “K¯o, Shin, Ren, Z¯o, Jika, and Kubi” were not only the surnames of nobles but also the names of officials, and the hereditary nobles were in charge of land and people (called “bemin”). In the seventh and eighth centuries, Japan studied the legal system of the Tang Dynasty on a large scale. The Taika era reforms of 646 A.D. took the centralized Tang system as a model, abolished the clan land and bemin system of the clan system, and established a unified state system with the emperor as the center. The Taibo Decree of 701 made this system legal. The imperial court controlled by the emperor monopolized the ownership of land, divided it into small pieces, and granted them to tenant peasants, who provided rent for the court. Administratively, tenant peasants were divided, from the smallest to the largest in the capital, into households, rows, blocks, hos, bos, and j¯ os; and locally, into households, villages, prefectures, and states. All levels of this administration were subject to the control of the court. However, this centralized system, which was imitated from the Tang Dynasty, was not easy to implement and difficult to maintain in Japan, which had a strong tradition of the clan system. For example, the imperial examination system did not work in Japan, where officials were hereditary, and the onceimplemented Handen system and conscription system did not work for a long time. In the early ninth century, the centralization of the imperial court controlled by the emperor, the regents, and the kanbaku gradually collapsed, and the Handen system was discontinued and replaced by the occupation of territories and the establishment of estates by the nobles of each prefecture, Buddhist temples, and shrines. The imperial conscription system was also discontinued, and along with it, the private armies of the noble lords emerged. From the eleventh century onward, the samurai class, whose loyalty to the lord was the “way,” became a political force, and Japan entered the era of the Shogunate, in which the samurai class and its chief “Shogun” (commander in chief of the expeditionary force to expel barbarians) were in charge of the real power. The Kamakura Shogunate, the Muromachi Shogunate, and the Edo Shogunate emerged successively, and the military remained in power for seven centuries from the late twelfth century to the mid-nineteenth century. The Kamakura

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Shogunate gave land to its generals, called “shugos” (governors), and the manors they belonged to have jit¯os (territory stewards), forming a network in which the Shogunate was in charge of the governors and jit¯os, and society was initially feudalized. In the Muromachi period, the governors held local power, and the middle and high-ranking samurais had fiefs all over the country, and the feudal system became mature. In the Edo period, based on the bakuhan system during the reigns of Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the local lords were further feudalized, and the shogunate and local feudal states jointly governed the country, while the shogunate controlled the independent feudal states through the sankin-k¯otai system and other systems, thus forming the complete bakuhan system.

CHAPTER 6

Establishment of the Concept of Feudalism in Western Europe and Its Encounter with Feudalism in East Asia

Human history is always ongoing, and it is always quite late to name its sections. In the case of Europe, the millennium after the collapse of the Roman Empire and before the birth of industrial civilization did not have a specific name until the early modern period, when the term feudalism, derived from the Latin feodum, was gradually used in Western Europe to refer to medieval society. The term “feudal society” was finalized more than 200 years after it was first coined by Marc Bloch, the French historian and founder of the Annales School, in his famous book La société féodale (the Chinese version was prepared by Zhang Xushan and published by the Beijing-based The Commercial Press in 2004). Broadly speaking, French jurists in the sixteenth century came into contact with this topic when they studied the feudal laws of the Po Valley in northern Italy in the Middle Ages; English jurists in the seventeenth century used feudalism to refer to the surviving land covenants, legal customs, and political institutions of the Middle Ages. The dictionaries published in 1680 had terms like “féudalité” and “gouvernement féodal.” The eighteenth-century French Enlightenment thinker Montesquieu, in his The Spirit of Law, devoted a section to lois féodales, discussing the feudal ruler-feudal vassal relationship, the fief system, and serfdom, outlining the basic attributes of feudalism in Western Europe. Adam Smith, an English economist, also discussed the causes of feudal hierarchy. In the nineteenth century, feudalism became a formal term for the medieval system © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_6

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in Western Europe through the research of historians from many countries, especially the German school of history, and a system of concepts and categories of the feudal system was formed with feudalism as the backbone. There are many similarities between the medieval societies of Western Europe and the Middle Ages (the Kamakura Shogunate and Muromachi Shogunate periods from the late twelfth century to the mid-sixteenth century) and the Early Modern Ages (the Edo Shogunate period, from the early seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century) in Japan. These similar social and cultural features, such as the combination of feudal lords and vassals with the feudal lands, the decentralization of royal power, the division of sovereignty, the hereditary nature of the office, the hierarchy, the manorial economy, the tradition of the samurais (called chivalry in Europe) resulting from the separation of the military and agriculture and the subordination to the lord, as well as the concept of personal attachment and revenge, were coincidentally present in Western Europe and the Japanese islands in the Far East, all in the few centuries between ancient and modern times. In China, the Yin and Zhou dynasties had a system of granting fiefs to people and making them vassals, which also had similar characteristics to the above. However, the Qin and Han dynasties and the Ming and Qing dynasties had a system of prefectures and counties, which was characterized by the supremacy of the monarchy, centralization of power, the system of appointing officials and ensuring that officials are not hereditary and have a rank and a term of office, the election of officials by examination, the free sale of land, and the relative relaxation of personal control. All this was very different from the medieval period in Western Europe and the Medieval and Early Modern Ages in Japan. Modern Western scholars have continued their comparative studies of European and Japanese history and have gained new insights. British scholar George Bailey Sansom’s The Western World and Japan, a Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures focuses on the differences between Japanese society before and after the Meiji Restoration and European society. He argued that the Meiji Restoration was not an overthrow of the feudal system and a Western European-style democratic revolution, because feudal society had already disintegrated in Japan as early as the Genroku period (1688–1703), and centralization had become much more centralized in the mid- and late Edo period. This statement is similar to Fukuda’s claim that the Edo period was an “authoritarian police

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state.” This statement moves the dissolution of feudalism in Japan forward by more than 100 years, but in general, it still recognizes the similarities between Japan and the medieval social forms of Western Europe. It is precisely because social systems were established based on a lordship economy of granting fiefs to people to make them vassals in both the medieval Europe and the Middle Ages and Early Modern Ages in Japan and the Japanese had embraced the term “fengjian,” which means “granting fiefs to the people to establish vassal states,” from the imported Chinese texts since ancient times, in the Meiji period, when translating Western historical treatises, the Japanese naturally translated the European medieval social form of feudalism as “fengjian society.” From the winter of 1870 to 1873, the Japanese Enlightenment thinker Nishi Amane (1829–1897) stated in his school handouts Hyakugaku Renkan that: The feudal system is also the h¯ oken system. This Western term is the same as the Chinese fengjian system.1

With a reference to Western scholars, Nishi also divided human history into three successive sections: In the ancient times, theocracy was the first section; in the Middle Ages, feudalism was the second section; and in the present day, monarchical politics is the third section.2

Nishi also adjusted this statement, stating that: As I see it today, the divine rule and h¯oken (feudal) politics were the first section; monarchical politics was the second section; and world republic & eternal peace were the third section, which is maximum state of world governance.3

The term “h¯oken politics” used by Nishi was not connected with “monarchical politics” (i.e., monarchy), so it is obvious that feudal meant 1 Nishi Amane, “Hyakugaku Renkan,” Collected Works, Tokyo: Munetaka Shob¯ o, vol. 4, 1981, p. 231. 2 Ibid., p. 213. 3 Ibid., pp. 213–214.

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“granting fiefs to establish vassal states,” a system that comes between divine politics in the clan era and monarchical politics. The term “h¯ oken” follows the classical Chinese meaning of granting fiefs to establish vassal states, but it was significantly extended in the translation of English term “feudalism” from an old name referring to a political system to a historiographical term indicating a universal historical stage. In 1875, Japanese Enlightenment thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi published An Introduction to Civilization, introducing the views of French historian François Guizot and referring to the era of feudal division as “h¯ oken seido” (feudal system). In addition, he discussed the three stages of the development of the independent societies of Japan and Western Europe, namely, Savagery, Feudalism, and Rich Nation, Strong Army. The term “savagery” here refers to the pre-civilization period; Rich Nation, Strong Army is another term for “civilization” (modern capitalism); and “Feudalism,” which comes between them, refers more or less to the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Ages in Japan and the Middle Ages in Western Europe. This “h¯oken” evolved from the old name for political system to a new name for historical stage. In Chapter VIII of An Introduction to Civilization, Fukuzawa discussed the history of Europe and described the centuries following the invasion of the Germanic barbarians as follows: Europe transitioned to a situation of feudal division. This situation began in the 10th century and collapsed only in the 16th–17th centuries. This era is called the era of the feudal system. In the feudal era, France, Spain and other countries had their own names and monarchs, but the monarchs existed only in name. Their warriors were divided into tribes, built cities based on mountains to hold their own troops and remain independent, enslaved people and called themselves nobles. In fact, they had formed many independent kingdoms…. The right to freedom belonged entirely to the nobles who owned land and people.4

The connotation of feudal here is also a general agreement between the Western meaning and the Chinese original meaning, and the connotation of feudal includes the content of the cession, the ceremonial establishment of monarchs, and aristocratic politics. This was the typical view of feudalism in Japan during the Meiji period. In 1875, Hideki Nagamine 4 Fukuzawa Yukichi, An Introduction to Civilization, Chinese version prepared by the Beijing Compilation and Translation Society, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1992, p. 123.

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translated “The Feudal System” from Francois Guizot’s General History of Civilization in Europe, Volume 4, with the following note: The term “h¯ oken seido” is used because the feudal system is used in the original text. Back then, Europe did not have emperors, with only the powerful coercing the people. They dominated parts of the countries at every turn and established independent states. Although the form was similar to the Spring and Autumn Warring States at the end of the feudal period of China’s Zhou Dynasty, it was not quite the same. If in the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, the Zhou imperial family did not exist, and if the vassals were weak and ignorant, did not know how to collaborate with each other to defeat others, and did not interact with the world, and never left their own states, then the form of their period is similar to the one in Europe mentioned above, so I just named this form h¯ oken.5

In Volume IX, “The Monarchical System,” and Volume XII, “The Reform of the Church,” from General History of Civilization in Europe, terms such as “feudal system” and “feudal governance” also appear many times. In Japanese history books, the term “h¯ oken” was used early to express the political system of Europe in the Middle Ages, and this term has maintained its similarity to the ancient Chinese term “fengjian.” Japanese dictionaries of the Meiji period also reflect the process of translating “feudalism” as “h¯okenュニス.” The word “h¯oken” was included in the second edition of A Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary (1872) compiled by J. C. Hepburn, an American Christian missionary in Japan, and was translated into English as the feudal system of government. The word “h¯oken” was included under the word “feudal” in Fuon-Sozu-Eiwa-Jii (An English and Japanese Dictionary) by Shibata Masayoshi and Koyasu Takashi, published by Nissh¯usha Printing Office in 1873. In the mid- and late Meiji period, the word “h¯ oken”was commonly used in Japan to mean feudal, and new names such as “feudal system” were derived from this word. In Zoho-Teisei Eiwa-Jii (An English and Japanese Dictionary), published by Nissh¯usha Printing Office in 1882, “feudalism” was translated as “h¯oken seido.” In short, the term “h¯oken seido” was commonly used in Japan in the early and mid-Meiji period as the translation of feudalism, and h¯oken, an 5 Francois Guizot, General History of Civilization in Europe, Japanese version by Hideki Nagamine, Tokyo: Gyujanggak, vol. 4, 1875, pp. 1–2.

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old name of the fief system of China’s Western Zhou Dynasty, became a new name which was extended to express a universal historical era. The meaning of this new name is a blend of ancient Chinese and Western meanings, and it contains the meanings of “making people nobles and establishing vassal states,” “granting fiefs to people to make them vassals,” and “fief.”

CHAPTER 7

The New Term “Fengjian” in the Late Qing Dynasty and Early Republican Era

In the cultural circle of Chinese characters, Japan was the first to use h¯oken seido to translate the Western historical term “feudalism” in the 1870s, and by the 1880s and 1890s, h¯oken seido had become a common kanji historical term in Japan. By the 1880s and 1890s, fengjian had become a common Chinese historiographical term in Japan, and it was the product of the interchange between the ancient meaning of the Chinese term and the Western meaning of feudalism. At this time, the Chinese began to pay attention to the Meiji Restoration in Japan and borrowed new terms, including h¯oken seido, from the Japanese translation.

7.1

The Abolition of the Han System and Its Replacement by a System of Prefectures in Japan’s Meiji Restoration Changed the Feudal System into the System of Prefectures Huang Zunxian was the first person in China to introduce the Meiji Restoration in Japan systematically based on his experience and study. From 1877 to 1882, he spent more than four years in Japan as the counselor of the Qing court, and wrote Miscellaneous Poems on Japan and A National History of Japan.

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_7

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Miscellaneous Poems on Japan was first published in 1879, discussing the history, political situation, and folk customs of Japan and the development and change of the Japanese system of government when it shifted from “the feudal system” to “the system of prefectures.” Huang wrote a poem, which reads: Kokuz¯ os were appointed in accordance with the old rules, These officials were named on their merits. At present only one commands the central departments, And this is Daij¯ okan (the Great Council of State).

What is important is his note to this poem: “This indicated that Japan changed from the feudal system to the system of prefectures.” In 1890, Huang revised his Miscellaneous Poems on Japan in London, and the above lines became: Kokuz¯ os were appointed in accordance with the old rules, All these officials were removed from office. There were many kinds of officials seals, Only Daij¯ okan (the Great Council of State) had the final say.

This revised poem meant more or less the same as the old one, but it makes it clearer that the feudal system had been changed to the centralized system. Huang had a note to this poem, which reads as follows: In ancient feudal Japan, its officials were called kokuz¯ os. It had 144 of them. Later on, kokuz¯ os were removed and kokushis were appointed to change from the feudal system to the system of prefectures, which is like changing the feudal establishment into counties. In the 10th year of the Tenji period, the positions of the Daij¯ o-daijin (the highest of all official positions and equivalent to the position of the Prime Minister), Minister of the Left, and Minister of the Right, a system which remains in force today. However, after the military took control of state power, the feudal system was restored and the position of the Daij¯ o-daijin existed in name only. After the Meiji Restoration, all ancient systems were restored based on the Chinese and European systems. With the help of ministers, the

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Daij¯ o-daijin assisted the emperor with his governance so that his policies were implemented by the ministries.1

Huang’s historical concept is quite advanced, and he clearly specified the changes of Japan’s political system from ancient times to modern times: Japan in ancient times shifted from “the feudal system” to “the system of prefectures”; in the Middle Ages it was restored to “the feudal system” from “the system of prefectures”; in the Meiji Restoration, Japan took into account the system of prefectures and counties in China since the Qin Dynasty and the modern political systems in Europe, and abolished the “feudal system” in favor of the Daij¯ okan system. Huang’s A National History of Japan was written in 1887 and officially published after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. It also discusses the feudal history of Japan: in ancient times, each state had kokushis and kunshis appointed by the imperial court until the system of prefectures was implemented. In the Kamakura Shogunate period, “the land was divided and granted to vassals,” and “the jit¯ os were often inherited and kokushis were not appointed. As a result, the feudal system was gradually established.” The feudal system became mature in the Ashikaga period and the Tokugawa period. During the Meiji Restoration, in the name of restoring ancient systems, the feudal system was changed to the system of prefectures. Huang’s concept of “fengjian” was an unhindered combination of the term’s ancient and modern, Chinese and Western meanings. He was one of the pioneers among the scholars who used new concepts when they opened their eyes to the world in the late Qing Dynasty and early Republic of China.

7.2 The Zhou Dynasty State System Was the Same as the Feudal Systems of Europe and Japan in the Middle Ages Liang Qichao, who began his exile in Japan in 1898, was the Chinese pioneer in the use of the Japanese translation of h¯ oken seido. In his article “On the Differences and Similarities between the Chinese and

1 Huang Zunxian, Notes to Miscellaneous Poems on Japan with annotation by Zhong Shuhe, Changsha: Hunan People’s Publishing House, 1981, p. 67.

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European State Systems”2 published in 1899, he discussed the similarities between the state systems of China and Europe: they both went through the family era, the chieftainship era, and the feudal era in turn. Liang compared the Chinese Zhou Dynasty state system with the ancient Greek state system, and used “feudal era” and “aristocratic politics” in parallel as close phrases: The Chinese Zhou Dynasty state system and the European Greek state system share the most similarities, that is, both were in the feudal era and had aristocratic politics. Both had states existing side by side.

Liang clearly classified the two millennia after the Qin Dynasty as another era after the “feudal era,” and called it the “unification era,” and considered “this as one of the major differences between the Chinese state system and the European one.” This shows that Liang not only adopted the terminology from the West, but also distinguished the differences between Chinese and Western history, and did not apply the Western historical sequence to Chinese history. In 1901, Liang published “A Narrative of Chinese History,”3 in Section 8 of which he divided Chinese history into the following sections, with reference to the Western division of world history into the Ancient Period, Middle Ages, and Modern History: 1) The Ancient Period. From the Yellow Emperor to the unification of Qin, it was the China of China…. 2) The Middle Ages. From the unification of Qin to the end of the Qianlong period of the Qing Dynasty, it was the China of Asia…. 3) Modern History. From the end of the Qianlong period to the present day, it was the China of the world….

In the discussion of the Ancient Period, Liang pointed out the characteristics of this period:

2 Liang Qichao, “On the Differences and Similarities between the Chinese and European State Systems,” The China Discussion, Yokohama, The China Discussion Journal, vol. 26, September 5, 1899, p. 5. 3 Liang Qichao, “A Narrative of Chinese History,” The China Discussion, Yokohama, The China Discussion Journal, vol. 90, September 3, 1901, pp. 1–5; vol. 91, September 13, 1901, pp. 1–4.

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It was the China of China, that is, the era of self-development, selfcompetition, and self-unity of the Chinese nation. The most important thing was the victory over the indigenous barbarians, the powerful persons and their loyalists and sons were given important territories, and China shifted from chieftainship to feudalism.

He took the eastern advance of the Zhou people and the implementation of feudalism as the most important landmark of the history of the Ancient Period in China. As for the Middle Ages, Liang called it “the era of the heyday of the monarchical system of government.” In short, Liang regarded the “feudal era” as a stage of China’s ancient history. He believed that between the “feudal” and “modern” periods, there was a long journey called the “Age of Unification” or “the era of the heyday of the monarchical system of government.” He also devoted himself to exploring the characteristics of China’s feudal system and thus investigating the reasons for the direction of Chinese history. In 1902, Liang published “A Treatise on the Evolution of Chinese Autocracy,” the second chapter of which is entitled “The Gradual Reform of the Feudal System” (from local decentralization to centralization).4 Liang said, “Where did feudalism in China begin? It began in Zhou. Feudalism is the term used to describe the division of land people acquired to others…. Since the Qin Dynasty, the country had become one family. With land boundaries of more than 20,000 kilometers, China has been ruled by an emperor for two millennia. This is the most obvious example of the development of autocracy. Liang pointed out the beginning of autocracy: “After Emperor Qin Shi Huang defeated the six states, he set up prefectures and counties, eradicating the trace of feudalism.” It is obvious that Liang discussed the “feudal system” in the sense of “granting fiefs to people to establish vassal states,” and explicitly called the Zhou system the “feudal system,” while after Qin, “the traces of feudalism were eradicated.” Later on, after this article, Liang also wrote “More on the Feudal Systems of China, Europe and Japan,”5 knowledgeably distinguishing

4 Liang Qichao, “A Treatise on the Evolution of Chinese Autocracy,” The New People’s Gazette, Yokohama: New People’s Gazette Office, June 6, 1902, no. 9, pp. 19–30. 5 Liang Qichao, “More on the Feudal Systems of China, Europe and Japan,” Selected Works from the New People’s Gazette, Yokohama: New People’s Gazette Office, 1902, pp. 36–38.

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the differences between these feudal systems. He recognized that China, Europe, and Japan all had the era of granting fiefs and people, but the difference between China, Europe, and Japan lies in the fact that Europe had civil society and civil power, but China did not; Japan had the landowning class, but China did not. This led to the rise of civil power in Europe and Japan following the fall of their feudalism and to the rise of monarchical power in China following the fall of its feudalism. This is an insightful, yet slightly simplistic, argument. However, the term “fengjian” he used is a good way to achieve the common understanding of the Chinese, Western, and Japanese historical term; his thinking about the historical evolution of feudalism in China, Europe, and Japan shows the frontier of a political concept. Liang Qichao was known for his changeable views, but in the use of the new term “feudalism,” he achieved consistency in the use of the concept throughout the process, and insisted on the unity of the original and Western meanings. This is the result of his policy of “discussing old learning with new knowledge.” In his case, phrases such as “feudal era,” “feudal system,” and “feudal society” were also used earlier, which initially realized Chinese and Western acculturation and the reasonable transformation of ancient and modern meanings. Chinese scholars who engaged in Chinese-English translations also coordinated feudalism with fengjian in the sense of “granting fiefs to create vassal states.” Although this happened after h¯oken seido was used to translate feudalism, it can still be regarded as an independent production of Chinese translators who were rich in general knowledge. Yan Fu, for example, was aware of the meanings of both Chinese and Western terms for feudalism, and he took a cautious approach to their translation. In the three years after 1897, Yan translated Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations into Chinese. His Chinese version for the title was The Original Wealth (Yuanfu). He transliterated feudal as “fute” or combined transliteration and free translation to make “fute system” and “fute custom.” In 1903, Yan translated John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, still transliterating feudal as “fute.” Later on, Yan translated the English scholar Eward Jenks’ A History of Politics (which can be directly translated as Political Science) into The General Commentary on Society, and published the translation in 1904. This translation translated feudalism as “fengjian system” (sometimes also transliterated as “fute” or “fute fengjian” in a combination of

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transliteration and free translation). The book defines the “feudal era” in the following way. To sum up, in the feudal era, the social systems had become fute by and large. The people were ruled by their level of social status; this was no different from a patriarchal society, but what was different was that the people who lived in a patriarchal society were determined to belong to a group and become its members by birth. In the fute period, people lived in a society and acquired rights, which were followed by corresponding obligations.6

The book answers the question of “what stage is feudalism in the history of social evolution” like this: Feudalism a transition period between the patriarchal and military societies.7

This means that fengjian was a transitional period between the patriarchal society and the modern state society and existed between the end of the clan system and the beginning of modern society. A History of Politics divides social evolution into three stages, namely, barbarian society (also called totemic society), patriarchal society, and state society (also called military society), and the transition from the second stage to the third stage was made via the “feudal era.” In his preface to his translation of A History of Politics, Yan Fu introduced Jencks’s view of historical staging: “It began with totem, followed by patriarchy, and became a state.” “From patriarchy to the state,” there was a transitional form: Between the two comes feudalism. In the case of feudalism, the people generally cultivated crops.8

This passage is noteworthy for two reasons: First, it refers to the intermediate stage of the transition from ancient patriarchal society to state society (a unified centralized state) as feudalism. Second, feudal society is 6 Edward Jenks, A History of Politics, Chinese version by Yan Fu, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1904, p. 92. 7 Ibid., p. 92. 8 Yan Fu, “Preface to the Translation of A History of Politics,” Collected Works, Beijing:

Zhonghua Book Company, China Bookstore, 1986, p. 135.

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a product of settled agrarian civilization. This is a very general insight of world history. The term “fengjian” used by Yan Fu encompasses the concept of both the classical meaning of the term in Chinese (establishing states and vassals) and the meaning of feudalism (the lord and fief system), and expresses a similar system shown at different times in the history of China and Western Europe, thus indicating the healthy use of the historiographical term “fengjian.” As a statesman who was well versed in both the East and West, Sun Yat-sen also accurately grasped the historiographical term “fengjian.” His understanding of fengjian had two major characteristics: first, it was a combination of the East and the West; second, his understanding remained consistent throughout the process. In his later years, he still used the term “fengjian” in the sense of “granting fiefs” and “noble hereditary system,” and compared and evaluated Chinese and Western history in this sense. According to Sun, the Qin Dynasty had ended the feudal system in China, which was two millennia earlier than the “breaking of feudalism” in Europe until the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modern times. He gave a series of 16 lectures on the Three People’s Principles in Guangzhou from January to August 1924, of which the third of the Six Lectures on Democracy said: Europe was still in the feudal era more than 200 years ago, the same era as China was more than two millennia ago. Because China’s political evolution was earlier than Europe’s, the feudal system was broken down in China more than two millennia ago. In Europe, the feudal system has not been completely broken down until now…. The situation in Europe before the revolution, compared with China, was much more authoritarian. What is the reason for this? It is the hereditary system. At that time, the nobles of Europe such as emperors and princes were hereditary from generation to generation, and they did not conduct other businesses; the people were also hereditary in one business from generation to generation, and they could not conduct other businesses…. Since the destruction of the ancient feudal system in China, such restrictions have been completely broken.9

9 Sun Wen, Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles, Shanghai: Fuqiang Press, 1924, pp. 43–44.

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Here, Sun prominently discussed the hereditary nobility and hereditary professions under the “feudal system” and treated the “feudal system” of China more than two millennia ago (referring to the feudal system of Yin and Zhou) and the “feudal system” of medieval Europe as comparable systems. In his lecture, Sun revealed his pride that China ended its feudal history earlier than Europe, but did not answer why China, which ended feudalism first, lagged behind Europe in modern times. Compared with Liang Qichao’s article “On the History of the Evolution of Chinese Autocracy,” Liang’s “feudal view” is similar to Sun’s, but Liang had a deeper understanding of the East and the West, both ancient and modern. From the remarks of Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yat-sen, the term “fengjian” referred to by the mainstream of Chinese academia and political circles in the late Qing Dynasty and early Republican era drew from Western meanings while maintaining an inner tension with its classical Chinese meanings. They regarded the Chinese feudal system of the Western Zhou Dynasty and the European medieval system (feudalism), as well as the Japanese medieval and early modern military rule as similar systems of government. The content of fengjian was granting fiefs to establish vassal states, the division of power among hereditary nobles, the operation of fiefdoms and the control of vassals by lords, and the decentralization of state sovereignty. All this is a far cry from the economic system of free trade in land that had been in place since the Qin and Han dynasties, and is in contrast to the centralized system of autocratic monarchy ensured by the bureaucratic examination and election systems, the system of appointing officials, and the system of prefectures and counties. This was the state of the use of the historiographical term “feudalism” in the first stage of modern China.

CHAPTER 8

The Alienation of the New Term “Fengjian”

As mentioned above, the understanding of the historiographical term “h¯oken seido” in Japanese historiography has been consistent without any major ups and downs. In China, the homeland of the term “fengjian,” the term remained consistent in the late Qing and early Republican periods, but during the New Culture Movement, the meaning of fengjian changed for some important commentators: it evolved from an ancient historical concept to a synonym for “early modern,” becoming a synonym for antiquated, backward, and reactionary institutions and ideas that were opposed to modern civilization. This was the state of the use of the historiographical term “feudalism” in the second stage of modern China. This was the beginning of the dramatic change of the concept of fengjian and should be singled out for research.

8.1 Chen Duxiu’s Theory that Feudalism Equals Backwardness Chen Duxiu was the first to generalize the concept of feudalism by referring feudalism as the source of the backwardness of China. In his article “To the Youth”1 published in the Youth Magazine on September 1 Chen Duxiu, “To the Youth,” Youth Magazine, vol. 1, no. 1, Shanghai: Qunyi Book Company, September 15, 1915, pp. 1–6.

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_8

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15, 1915, Chen called on the youth with the new spirit of “autonomy, progress, enterprise, worldliness, practicality, and science” and attacked the old spirit that was contrary to it—the spirit of slavery, conservatism, reclusiveness, closed-doorism, impracticality, and imaginariness. Under the heading of “progressive, not conservative,” Chen said: There are all kinds of evil words that harm the people and the principle. All the ancient rules that prove effective must not be framed. Misconceptions abound not only today. The inherent ethics, laws, academics, and rituals are all the remnants of the feudal system without exception.2

All kinds of antiquated and backward phenomena were attributed to the “remnants of the feudal system,” and “feudalism” was said to be the source of stereotypes and backwardness. On October 15, 1915, Chen wrote “Today’s Education Policy” (Youth Magazine, vol. 1, no. 2), in which he discussed in the second part of the educational policy, “Putting the People at the Center,” Chen pointed out that: The feudal era was the era of monarchical autocracy, when the people only obeyed the orders of the ruler and had no opportunity to interact with each other, making them weak in thinking as a collective.3

The terms “feudal era” and “era of monarchical autocracy” were mixed together, and the Zhou system and the Qin system were confused. This was an unprecedented usage, which was not only different from the usage of all canonical texts since Zhou and Qin, but also contrary to the usage of modern authors. As mentioned earlier, Liang Qichao in 1901 also clearly distinguished between the “feudal era” (referring to Yin and Zhou) and the “era of the heyday of the monarchy” (referring to Qin and Han), calling them two historical stages with the latter following the former, while Chen merged these two stages with different meanings into one.

2 Ibid., p. 3. 3 Chen Duxiu, “Today’s Education Policy,” Youth Magazine, vol. 1, no. 2, Shanghai:

Qunyi Book Company, October 15, 1915, p. 4.

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THE ALIENATION OF THE NEW TERM “FENGJIAN ”

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Ignoring the Differences Between China and Japan in the Early Modern Societies

Why did Chen Duxiu uniquely make such a huge expansion of the extension of fengjian? He himself did not explain this, which requires us to examine Chen’s life in order to explore the source of his new theory. Chen was one of those who went to Japan for further studies in the late years of the Qing Dynasty and the early Republican period. From 1901 onwards, he traveled to Japan several times. After he returned from Japan in the summer of 1915, he founded Youth Magazine (renamed New Youth from its second volume) in Shanghai, which became the most important public opinion position of the New Culture Movement. The term “fengjian” which Chen used in his articles published in the magazine seemed to be a classical term familiar to the Chinese, but in fact it was a new term learned from Japan. During Chen’s trip to Japan, the country was at the end of the Meiji period and the beginning of the Taisho period and had emerged from the feudal stage (the seven hundred years of the Kamakura Shogunate, Muromachi Shogunate, and Edo Shogunate were Japan’s feudal era) and entered modern times. Japanese commentators often referred to the past, backward systems, concepts, and customs as “h¯oken,” which could be found everywhere in the books and newspapers of the Meiji and Taisho periods. Fukuzawa Yukichi’s autobiography, for example, was full of criticism of the feudal system. Fukuzawa’s ancestors were “humble people,” and his father, who was a lower-class clan member in Nakatsu, earned only 13 koku, so he was depressed and miserable all his life and suffered from the feudal hierarchy. In his autobiography, Fukuzawa repeatedly denounced the “aristocratic system” and expressed his deep resentment against the “feudal aristocratic system.” his sorrowful statement said, “The aristocratic system was the enemy of my father.”4 In his “An Encouragement of Learning” and “A Brief Introduction to Civilization,” he referred to European scholars’ views and divided the world into three stages: “primitive,” “semicivilized,” and “civilized” while believing feudalism was a “semicivilized” social form that must be opposed. Another Enlightenment thinker, Nakae Ch¯omin (1847–1901), was also a fighter against feudalism. In Chapter III of the famous work A 4 Dictated by Fukuzawa Yukichi and shorthanded by Yano Yujiro, Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi, Tokyo: Jijishinp¯o, 1899, p. 10.

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Year and a Half he completed shortly before his death, he compared the rigidity of the hierarchy, family system, and its way of life, which were the prominent manifestations of feudalism in Japan, to “the fossilization of the people all over the country.”5 In short, to scholars of the Meiji Enlightenment such as Fukuzawa and Nakae, feudalism was a collection and synonym of obsolescence, backwardness, and inhumanity. This understanding and usage of feudalism was the main trend of the Meiji-Taisho period. Chen, who studied in Japan at the end of the Meiji period and the beginning of the Taisho period, was deeply influenced by this trend. After his return to China, Chen used the term “fengjian” which he obviously borrowed from Japan to refer to the various decadent systems and ideas in China. However, when Chen transplanted the proposition of “anti-feudalism” from the Meiji-Taisho period, he overlooked a major difference between Chinese and Japanese history: early modern Japan was “feudal” and anti-feudalism was a must of the modernization movement in Japan, while early modern China was “non-feudal” and the modernization movement in China had different purposes. Ignoring this difference in the history of China and Japan, the simple transplantation of the “anti-feudalism” task of Japan’s modernization to modern China is the crux of the problem. Of course, Chen was well aware of the revolutionary targets of the modernization movement in China (including, for example, ritualism, autocracy, patriarchy, and superstition), and fengjian was just a basket he used, which contained all the targets that the New Culture Movement actually wanted to liquidate. The meaning of feudalism, which Chen discussed on the eve of May 4th Movement, mainly refers to “patriarchal, authoritarian, and class (referring to hierarchical),” and they were all included in Chen’s call for the new youth to rise up and sweep away. The term “fengjian” used here was symbolic and was not identified as an academic social form. The term “fengjian” was seriously given the meaning of historical stage in a passage from Chen’s “The Difference between the Fundamental Ideas of the Eastern and Western Peoples” published on December 15, 1915.

5 Nakae Ch¯ omin, A Year and a Half , Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1901, p. 142.

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There has been nothing different in Japan from nomadic society to patriarchal society; there has been nothing different in Japan from chieftainship to feudalism either.6

This is to consider “feudal politics” as a long historical era following “chieftainship” (i.e. the clan system) and largely coinciding with “patriarchal society,” which is a preliminary indication of Chen’s view of China’s ancient history: China did not have a slave era, but went directly from a clan communal system to a feudal system, which, together with the patriarchal system, has continued from the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasty to the present. The same text also states that: Loyalty and filial piety are the morals of the feudal era of patriarchal society, and the spirit of the semicivilized Japanese people.7

Once again, the terms “patriarchal” and “feudal” were used alternatively and included in the term “semicivilized,” which refers to the entire historical period between the age of the uncivilized clan system and civilized modern society. Chen’s theory of “semicivilized” Japanese people was influenced by Fukuzawa’s An Introduction to Civilization, which was based on the “primitive, semicivilized, and civilized” theory. This theory was derived from the popular European view of the history of civilization in the nineteenth century. Chen applied the framework of the Western EuropeanJapanese view of the history of civilization to the history of Chinese civilization, and equated the feudal era with “semicivilized period” as the period after “barbarism” (i.e. primitive society) and before “civilization” (i.e. modern society). All of Chen’s various statements during the May 4th Movement were largely within this framework. Because Chen’s fengjian refers to the whole of ancient China after the end of the clan system, he regarded Confucius as a thinker of the feudal era (meaning all of ancient China). Chen’s “The Way of Confucius and Modern Life,” published on October 30, 1916, criticized Kang Youwei 6 Chen Duxiu, “The Difference between the Fundamental Ideas of the Eastern and Western Peoples,” Youth Magazine, vol. 1, no. 4, Shanghai: Qunyi Book Company, December 15, 1915, p. 2. 7 Ibid.

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for advocating Confucianism and argued that the way of Confucius was not applicable to modern life: Confucius grew up in the feudal era, and the morality he advocated was the morality of the feudal era. The rituals that he expounded about the state of life were the rituals about the state of life of the feudal era. The policies he advocated was feudal policies. The morality, rituals, life, and politics of the feudal era he stressed were nothing more than the rights and reputation of a few monarchs and nobles, but not the happiness of the majority of the people.8

He also cited the saying of “Qu Li” in The Book Rites that “the rules of ceremony do not go down to the common people and the penal statutes do not go up to great officers” as “the ironclad evidence of the way of Confucius and the spirit of the feudal era.” This equated the “feudal era” with the “old era” that produced various authoritarian and inhumane systems, ideas, and ways of life. The anti-Confucius and antiConfucianism of the May 4th Movement were based on the logic that feudalism = backwardness and reaction, and Confucius = feudalism, so Confucius = backwardness and reaction, and should be defeated.

8.3

An Investigation into “Anti-feudalism” During the May 4th Movement and the New Culture Movement

The May 4th Movement was a period of cultural pluralism, and supporters of the movement, let alone the vast number of supporters of the New Culture Movement, did not agree with the generalization of feudalism. This means that the active participants of the New Culture Movement either did not use the term “feudalism” or used it in a way that was incompatible with its traditional and Western meanings. Throughout Lu Xun’s novels and essays, the targets of his condemnation included the cannibalism in “benevolence, righteousness,

8 Chen Duxiu, “The Way of Confucius and Modern Life,” New Youth, vol. 2, no. 4, Shanghai: Qunyi Book Company, December 1, 1916, p. 5.

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and morality,”9 the hierarchy of “10 classes of human beings,”10 the “old-fashioned erroneous thinking of putting the elder at the center,”11 and the urge to “read less—or not at all—Chinese books,”12 but did not include feudalism. Some writers for Youth Magazine (later called New Youth) also used the term “feudalism,” but the meaning varied. For example, Gao Yihan’s “An Introduction to the Difference between the Modern and Ancient Concepts of the State” is a translation of a section of J. K. Bluntschli’s The Theory of the State, comparing medieval independent states with modern unification: In the Middle Ages, when feudalism emerged, state power was divided, evolved and decentralized, from gods to kings, from kings to princes, to warriors. Fiefdoms were granted. They was a variety of sources of law. In modern times, the state was conditioned by nationalities and its power was used to maintain unity.13

The term “feudalism” here refers to the system of divided states, independent vassals, and multiple sources of law in medieval Europe, which is very different from what Chen called “feudalism.” Another example is Wu Yu’s “The Family System as a Basis of Authoritarianism,” which begins with the following statement: When Shang Yang and Li Si destroyed fengjian, our country had the opportunity to change from a patriarchal society to a military society.14

9 Lu Xun, “Diary of a Madman,” New Youth, vol. 4, no. 5, Shanghai: Qunyi Book Company, May 15, 1918, p. 417. 10 Lu Xun, “Jottings under Lamplight (II),” Wilderness, no. 5, Beijing: Weiming Printing Office, May 22, 1925, p. 4. 11 Lu Xun, “How to Be a Good Father?” New Youth, vol. 6, no. 6, Shanghai: Qunyi Book Company, November 1, 1919, p. 557. 12 Lu Xun, “Youth Must Read (X),” Jing Pao Supplement, no. 67, Beijing: Jing Pao

Newspaper, February 21, 1925, p. 8. 13 Gao Yihan, “An Introduction to the Difference between the Modern and Ancient Concepts of the State,” Youth Magazine, vol. 1, no. 2, Shanghai: Qunyi Book Company, October 15, 1915, p. 8. 14 Wu Yu, “The Family System as the Basis of Authoritarianism,” New Youth, vol. 2, no. 6, Shanghai Qunyi Book Company, February 1, 1917, p. 1.

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The fengjian here obviously refers to the feudal system of the Western Zhou, which is not related to the fengjian that Chen opposed. Wu Yu clearly distinguished feudal patriarchal society and military society (i.e. monarchical society) into two historical stages, and what he criticized was the “class system” that strictly distinguished between superiority and inferiority. He echoed Lu Xun, saying that “those who preached ritualism were cannibals,”15 but before “ritualism,” he either used the word “old” or “patriarchal,” but not “feudal.” Still another example is “My Marxist View” by Li Dazhao (1889– 1927). In the article, Li said: The society of the feudal lords was produced by the hand mortar, and the society of the capitalists of the industry was produced by the steam powder machine.16

This is the theory of “feudalism” developed based on the level of productivity. It is a concise expression of historical materialism, and Li’s use of “feudal” and “vassal” in parallel shows his respect for the classical and Western meanings of “feudalism.” In addition, in his “Material Change and Moral Change” published in December 1919, Li said: Medieval society was a feudal and lordly system with land, and the social classes were like ladder sections, subordinated to each other layer by layer, with the emperor at the top, the princes under the emperor, the lords under the princes, the small lords under the lords, and the people and serfs being trampled on the ground.17

This is an overview of the feudal system based on the characteristics of European medieval society, which is also similar to the ancient meaning of fengjian (granting titles to establish vassals).

15 Wu Yu, “Cannibalism and Ritualism,” New Youth, vol. 6, no. 6, Shanghai: Qunyi Book Company, November 1, 1919, p. 580. 16 Li Dazhao, “My Marxist View (I),” New Youth, vol. 6, no. 5, Shanghai: Qunyi Book Company, May 1919, p. 530. 17 Li Dazhao, “Material Change and Moral Change,” New Thought, vol. 2, no. 2, Beijing: National Peking University Press, December 1919, p. 214.

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In short, the fengjian referred to by the commentators during the May 4th Movement was intrinsically related to the classical and Western meanings of the term, and was not generalized. It was after the 1930s that the May 4th Movement and the New Culture Movement were considered “anti-feudalist.”

CHAPTER 9

Generalization of the Concept of “Feudalism”

In the 1920s, when China’s democratic revolution was on the rise, the influence of Soviet Russia increased, and the literature of the Communist International was translated into Chinese and spread in China, so that the generalized concept of feudalism was accepted by the theoretical circles of the Communist Party of China and the left-wingers of the Kuomintang. This was the state of the use of the historiographical term “feudalism” in the third stage of modern China.

9.1 The Communist International’s Generalized View of Feudalism The neo-feudal view was first translated into China from the documents of the Communist International, and the view was created by Lenin. Lenin’s definition of feudal society was different from that of Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels, based on the historical reality of Western Europe, followed the historiographical tradition of studying feudalism in Western Europe and regarded it as a special case, and did not agree to use it as a universal model to apply to the medieval societies of other regions. Lenin, on the other hand, based on Russian history, modified the theory of feudalism in Western Europe. For example, in his books What the “Friends of the People Are” and How They Fight the Social-Democrats written in 1894 and The Development of Capitalism in Russia written © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_9

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after 1895, Lenin formed a broader concept of feudal society based on his investigation of Russia’s serfdom and corvée economy. He believed that feudalism was characterized by an agrarian way of life; the dominance of the natural economy; the occupation of land among large landholders, i.e., landlords; and the practice of serfdom. Lenin elevated the pan-feudal view to a universal paradigm for analyzing Asian societies. The key statement that modern China was a “feudal system” and a “semi-feudal state” is first found in Lenin’s “Democracy and Populism in China.” In the article, Lenin stated that: But the objective conditions of China, a backward, agricultural, semi-feudal country numbering nearly 500 million people, place on the order of the day only one specific, historically distinctive form of this oppression and exploitation, namely, feudalism. Feudalism was based on the predominance of agriculture and natural economy. The source of the feudal exploitation of the Chinese peasant was his attachment to the land in some form. The political exponents of this exploitation were the feudal lords, all together and individually, with the emperor as the head of the whole system.1

In his “Draft Theses on National and Colonial Questions for the Second Congress of the Communist International” written in June 1920, Lenin again elaborated the ideas of his 1912 article, referring to the Eastern countries, including China, as “more backward states and nations, in which feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-peasant relations predominate.” The task of the peasant movement in the Eastern countries was to oppose “all manifestations or survivals of feudalism.”2 The document of the Second Congress of the Communist International, which was formed by Lenin’s ideas, characterized modern China as “semicolonial” and “semi-feudal.” The document “Theses on the Eastern Question,” imbued with the same spirit and adopted by the Fourth World Congress of the Communist International, was translated into Chinese in 1923. The first issue of New Youth Quarterly, the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, published Yi Hong’s Chinese version of the document entitled “Theses

1 The article was published on July 15, 1912. See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1990, vol. 21, p. 429. 2 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986, vol. 39, p. 164.

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on the Eastern Question: Adopted at the Fourth World Congress of the Communist International.” The theses called the elites of the Eastern countries “feudal or semi-feudal and semi-bourgeois,”3 and said that the Eastern countries practiced a “feudal patriarchal system” and that the revolutionary target of the proletariat was “the bourgeoisie and feudal landowners or ‘feudal landowner class’ in the colonies.” The document classified the existing social state of the Eastern countries, including China, as a “feudal system” or a “colonial, semi-colonial” or “semifeudal” society.4 This important assertion, made by Lenin in 1912, was introduced to China in the early 1920s through the documents of the Communist International and directly initiated the “anti-feudal” communication in the Great Revolution. Lenin and the Communist International’s reference to modern China as a “semi-colony” was quickly accepted by the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang during their cooperation. In January 1924, the First National Congress of the Kuomintang issued a manifesto confirming China as a “semi-colony,” while Sun Yat-sen used the term “sub-colony.” The term “semi-colony” was more commonly used in the Communist Party of China’s communication materials. As for the term “semi-feudal,” the Kuomintang basically did not adopt it. The foregoing quote from Sun Yat-sen’s Six Lectures on Democracy in 1924, which stated that China’s feudal system was “broken” more than two millennia ago during the Qin Dynasty, shows that Sun adhered to classical meaning of feudalism and rejected the generalization of feudalism. As mentioned earlier, due to the significant differences between the Eastern and Western medieval social forms, the term “feudal” referring to the European medieval system cannot necessarily be applied to the medieval systems of the Eastern countries. Marx, who followed the tradition of Western European historiography, was cautious about this, while Russian thinkers such as Lenin and the Russian scholar Kovalevsky, who came between the East and the West, ignored this difference between the East and the West during the Middle Ages.

3 Yi Hong, “Theses on the Eastern Question: Adopted at the Fourth World Congress of the Communist International,” New Youth Quarterly, no. 1, Guangzhou New Youth Magazine Society, June 15, 1923, p. 77. 4 Ibid., pp. 78–79.

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9.2 Social History Debate Promoted the Generalization of Feudalism In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Chinese Social History Debate among Chinese social scientists took this communitarian view of history to the extreme, making the term “feudalism” formally generalized and giving it an academic form. The interpretation of the concept of feudalism by rival debaters was discussed in my article “An Examination of the Mistranslation of the Historical Term ‘Feudalism’.” Here, I will only discuss one common feature of the rival debaters, namely, the European model of Chinese history. The commonality of the debaters in the Chinese Social History Debate who advocated the generalization of feudalism is very obvious. For example, the “Preface” Guo Moruo wrote to his Studies on Ancient Chinese Society on the night of September 20, 1929 can be regarded as a manifesto of historical commonality. There is a passage in prose poetry: As long as it is a human body, its development, whether it is red, yellow, black or white, is generally the same. The society formed by people is exactly the same. The Chinese have a catchphrase that says, “Our national conditions are different.” This national prejudice is shared by almost every nation. Yet the Chinese are not gods, nor are they monkeys, and the societies they form should not be different.5

Guided by regarding the notion that “national conditions are different” as a “national prejudice,” Guo used European history as a model to delineate “the stages of development of Chinese society’s history”: China implemented the primitive communal system before the Western Zhou; slavery in the Western Zhou era; feudalism in and after the Spring and Autumn period; and capitalism in the last hundred years.6

Guo also divided the “social revolution in China” into three stages. The first revolution of slavery took place during the Yin and Zhou dynasties. The second revolution of feudalism occurred in the Zhou and Qin 5 Guo Moruo, “Preface,” Studies on Ancient Chinese Society, Shanghai: Xinxin Book Company, 1930, p. 1 of the preface. 6 Guo Moruo, Studies on Ancient Chinese Society, Shanghai: Xinxin Book Company, 1930, p. 23.

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dynasties. The third revolution of capitalism took place in the late Qing Dynasty.7 The time period of feudalism is completely deviated from tradition, saying that, “Emperor Qin Shi Huang is worthy of being the patriarch who completed feudalism in Chinese social history and unified the country.”8 This change is obviously the result of using European history as a model for Chinese history: medieval Europe was “feudal” and medieval China (Qin and Han to Ming and Qing) was also considered “feudal.” This is because “the society formed by the Chinese is not supposed to be different.” The opposing debaters in the social history debate denied that China was in a feudal society at that time, arguing that it had already disintegrated more than two millennia ago during the Qin Dynasty. Tao Xisheng (1899–1988) is the most important exponent of this theory. However, his argument was rather inconsistent. In his book An Analysis of the History of Chinese Society, he said that, “The Spring and Autumn and Warring States period was a key point in the social history of China, when Chinese society ended its feudal system,” but he also said that, “The destroyed feudal system was still built on another foundation; it is not exactly a feudal system.”9 He said that, “China after the Qin and Han dynasties was still in the pre-capitalist period,”10 but later he argued that, “Chinese society, from the Warring States period until recently, was a degenerate feudal society.”11 As for the Chinese society at that time, he said that it was “an early capitalist society dominated by feudal ideas,”12 but later he changed his mind, saying that it was “a patriarchal feudal social structure…. Chinese society can be called a feudal society.”13 He wrote in his Chinese Society and the Chinese Revolution, “This 2,500 years of China, by

7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., p. 20. 9 Tao Xisheng, An Analysis of the History of Chinese Society, Shanghai: New Life Book

Company, 1929, p. 4. 10 Ibid., p. 7. 11 Ibid., p. 8. 12 Ibid., p. 32. 13 Ibid., p. 191.

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the feudal system, was the period of the post-feudal system; by capitalism, was a pre-capitalist society.”14 How did Tao come up with such contradictory statements? The reason lies in the fact that he could not escape from the European model. He was not confident in his assertion that the post-Qin period was a “non-feudal society” because it did not correspond to the “historical commonality,” so he changed his formulations in order to put the narrative of Chinese history into a universal historical framework close to the Western European model. It can be seen that the rival debaters in the debate on Chinese social history, despite their opposing views and incompatible political opinions, had one thing in common: both sides, to varying degrees, were guided by the historical staging framework from the West, i.e., they tried to measure Chinese history according to the model of “primitive society—slave society—feudal society—capitalist society.” Of course, the rival debaters made different clothes: some called the present China feudal or semi-feudal, whereas some called it pre-capitalist and some call it capitalist. Both sides of the social history debate faced the problem of the contradiction between concepts and historical facts when articulating their commonsensical view of China’s history. For those who wanted to generalize feudalism, an insurmountable obstacle to proving that China after the Qin and Han dynasties was a feudal society was the classical word “feudal” which was what the Zhou Dynasty system was. Guo Moruo, who was well versed in ancient Chinese culture, was of course well aware that the original meaning of fengjian is to “grant titles and establish vassals,” which refers to the Yin and Zhou system, especially the enfeoffment system of the Western Zhou Dynasty. And now to apply the term to the despotic empires from Qin and Han onward when the system of prefectures and counties was implemented, the ancient meaning of fengjian must be interpreted differently. Guo tried hard to make this happen. In his Studies on Ancient Chinese Society, he reinterpreted the words “feng and jian” in the ancient sense: the former means “boundary forest,” and the latter means “genital worship,” from which he concluded:

14 Tao Xisheng, Chinese Society and the Chinese Revolution, Shanghai: New Life Book Company, 1935, p. 195.

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“Therefore, what the ancients called “fengjian” was quite different from the term ‘fengjian’ we use now.”15 Although Guo Moruo tried to redefine fengjian, he could not disassociate himself from its classical meaning. In the introduction to his Studies on Ancient Chinese Society he discusses the transformation of slavery into feudalism (which he called “the second social change”), he made this statement: The second social change was the collapse of the aristocracy and the rise of the wily among the slave class, which would naturally become a form of the analysis of independent local regimes. In agriculture, the manor system emerged; in industry and commerce, the guild system developed. In the political reflection, this was represented by feudal vassals, so the slave society was changed into a feudal society.16

The term “feudal” used here is largely similar to the classical meaning of feudal, but is very different from the generalized feudalism in Guo’s same book. There are two other interesting passages in the same book: “It was only after the eastern move of the Zhou Dynasty that Chinese society shifted from slavery to true feudalism.”17 Guo classified the Western Zhou Dynasty, which established vassals, into slavery, while the “feudal system” which he believed the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period) had been transformed into was discussed in the sense of independent vassals, so the meaning of his feudal system still did not break away from the ancient meaning of “feudal.” Guo went on to say that: Although dynasties after the Qin Dynasty were said to be implementing the system of prefectures and counties, there were kings in the Han Dynasty, border towns in the Tang Dynasty, three feudatories in the late Ming Dynasty [sic] (the three feudatories were in the early Qing Dynasty—Ed.).

15 Guo Moruo, Studies on Ancient Chinese Society, Shanghai: Xinxin Book Company, 1930, pp. 309–310. 16 Ibid., p. 6. 17 Ibid., p. 19.

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Nian Gengyao in the early Qing Dynasty, who was an ordinary provincial governor called “the feudal son of heaven,” was not implementing the feudal system.18

The “feudal system” referred to here means more explicitly the “system of granting titles to establish vassals.” Guo used examples of post-Qin feudal remnants to prove that the post-Qin system was still a feudal system, which is also conceptually in conflict with its generalization of feudalism. This shows that, like Tao Xisheng, Guo also failed to define the meaning of the concept implied by feudalism; he sometimes generalized it and sometimes used its classical meaning. Therefore, from the point of view of the definition and application of core terms, Guo and Tao, the two main debaters in the social history debate, were in a state of conceptual instability. The connotation of term “feudalism” Guo and Tao used in the debate, which grew suddenly large and small, its extension was even more unpredictable, and the expansion of the period of time was often a thousand years, a point criticized by commentators. In 1932, Li Ji, who advocated the “Asian mode of production,” wrote an article entitled “Introduction and Critique of the Various Claims of the Chinese Economic Periods,”19 in which he pointed out the contradictions of Guo and Tao’s theses, revealing the situation in which their subsequent statements negated their previous ones. Li Ji’s criticism of Guo and Tao was more than harsh, but there was one key point he seemed to fail to insufficiently reveal: the multiplicity of concepts and inconsistencies in the use of the term “fengjian” used by Guo and Tao are inevitable reflections of the incompatibility between the foreign models they applied and the historical reality of China. From the 1920s to the early 1930s, the third period of the fengjian discourse, during which generalized feudalism acquired a theoretical form. In the mid-and late twentieth century, especially through the authoritative decision made by Stalin on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course, the generalized feudal view was regarded as the fruit of Marxist historiography and entered the mainstream of Chinese terminology. This is the fourth phase of the use of the word “feudalism,” which extends to the present day.

18 Ibid., p. 20. 19 Li Ji, “A Critique of the Chinese Social History Debate,” Shanghai: Shenzhou

Guoguang Press, 1934 first edition, and 1936, second edition, pp. 100–448.

CHAPTER 10

The Truth About Marx’s Theory of Feudalism

10.1 The Superficial Understanding of the Doctrine of Social Forms by the Participants in the Social History Debate in China The participants in the social history debate that began after the defeat of the Great Revolution were mostly young social scientists in their 20s who had studied in Japan or the West (according to statistics, their average age was 26), their political affiliations were complex (there were the mainstream of the Communist Party of China, the Trotsky-Chen Duxiu Party that had left the Communist Party of China, the left-wingers of the Kuomintang, those in power in the Kuomintang, and personages without party affiliations), and their academic approaches differed from each other. However, they had one thing in common: most of them had been influenced by Marxism to varying degrees, and they were competing with each other to claim a materialistic view of history, trying to grasp Chinese history by Marx’s doctrine of social forms, and to explain Chinese society by applying the logic that the economic base determines the superstructure. Therefore, unlike the debate between science and metaphysics, the Chinese Social History Debate was largely conducted within the Marxist discourse system, with both sides using the Marxist vocabulary imported from Japan, and some directly translating the relevant Marxist discourses from English and German and using them as the theoretical basis. Even © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_10

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Tao Xisheng, a Kuomintang theorist, liked to “talk a lot about Marxism” and often “copied passages from Capital (most of them indirectly) and used them as a weapon” (Li Ji).1 As for the New Thought School, which represented the views of the Communist Party of China, it raised the banner of Marxism. Guo Moruo explicitly declared that he would take Marx’s Capital as guidance, and said that his Studies on Ancient Chinese Society was intended to be a sequel to Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. The fact that the two sides of the debate on Chinese social history scrambled to quote Marx and Engels demonstrates the efficacy of Marxism in the Chinese intellectual community during the decade from the May 4th Movement to the Great Revolution, which in turn popularized Marxism, especially historical materialism, and advanced the study of Chinese history. However, the learning and application of historical materialism by both parties to the debate was still in its infancy, and naivete was inevitable, and the influence of dogmatism from Soviet Russia, especially the tendency to politicize academic issues, constrained the debate. At that time, the Soviet Communist Party was engaged in a fierce struggle between the majority headed by Stalin and the minority headed by Trotsky, and both factions had their own arguments about Chinese society and history (the Stalinists called Chinese society “feudal” and “semi-feudal,” while the Trotskyists called it “capitalist”). The theories of the two sides were cited as the basis for the parties to the debate on Chinese social history. One of the results of the debate—the generalized feudal view—was basically a reinterpretation of the thesis of the majority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, led by Stalin and Bukharin, on Chinese society. Therefore, although the “generalized feudal view” was called Marxist, it actually reflected the views of the Soviet Communist Party led by Stalin and did not conform to Marx’s original thesis.

1 Ibid., p. 258.

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10.2 The Non-feudal Early Modern Societies of China, India, and Other Eastern Countries Marx devoted himself to the exploration of the universal laws of human history, and his statement in 1859 in his Preface of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy that “In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society”2 was regarded as a division of universal stages of human history. However, Marx did not specify the stages of social forms, much less give a widely applied formula, as Stalin did later. On many occasions, Marx emphasized the diversity of the historical development of regions and peoples, was critical of the generalization of the logic of European history into universal laws, and repeatedly and sharply denounced those who arbitrarily extrapolated the individual to the general. In his “Letter to Editor of the Otecestvenniye Zapisky” dated November 1877,3 in response to the Russian liberal populist Nikolay Konstantinovich Mikhaylovsky’s misinterpretation of Capital, Marx wrote: He feels himself obliged to metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the marche generale [general path] imposed by fate upon every people, whatever the historic circumstances in which it finds itself, in order that it may ultimately arrive at the form of economy which will ensure, together with the greatest expansion of the productive powers of social labor, the most complete development of man. But I beg his pardon. (He is both honoring and shaming me too much.)

Here the principled difference from the theorists of the general path for historical development is clearly indicated. Attention to the specific examination of the historical individuality of different regions and peoples was already shown by Marx’s formulation of the “Asiatic mode of production” in the 1850s. Although this formulation is rather vague and has led to a lot of controversy among later commentators, the intention is clear: the historical process of the Eastern 2 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1965, vol. 13, p. 9. 3 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1963, first edition, vol. 19, pp. 126–131.

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states is different from that of Western Europe and should be defined differently. From the 1870s onward, he devoted a great deal of effort to the study of the ancient history of the peoples of the East, for which he made a large number of reading notes, accompanied by several commentaries. From these notes, one can see a reflection on the progress of the medieval world on many fronts. In 1867, Marx pointed out in Capital that: In all countries of Europe, feudal production is characterized by division of the soil amongst the greatest possible number of subfeudatories. The might of the feudal lord, like that of the sovereign, depended not on the length of his rent roll, but on the number of his subjects.4

The emphasis here is on the control of the subjects by the feudal lords in the “countries of Europe,” where personal dependence was the basis of the feudal system. Marx outlined the basic features of feudalism as follows: personal dependence, inalienability of land, super-economic deprivation, division of power, and hierarchy. These characteristics were generalized from the social existence of Western Europe in the Middle Ages. However, when he studied the materials of Japanese social history, he found that in Japan there was a deep personal dependence in the Middle Ages, and land was a political privilege of the feudal lords, which could not be transferred or bought or sold, forming a manorial economy similar to that of Western Europe in Middle Ages. The lord’s estate was a self-sufficient and secluded whole, the land was “non-mobile,” and the lords practiced super-economic deprivation on the servile people, thus using feudalism to describe Japanese society. Unlike Japan, the situation in other Eastern countries such as India and China was different. Marx explicitly opposed the attachment of feudalist concepts (such as feudal lordly functions and the fief system) to Eastern countries such as India and China, where land could be transferred. In his “Anthropological Notebooks,” Marx outlined the essential features of feudalism: first, serfdom, without which feudalism did not exist; second, land is owned by the feudal lords, and fiefs do not have the nature of commodities that can be freely bought and sold; third, 4 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001, second edition, vol. 44, p. 824.

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the feudal lords have hereditary judicial power, or the right of lordship to judge; fourth, power is decentralized, and the monarchical centralization is not compatible with feudalism. Accordingly, he argued that the basic form of most early modern societies such as China, India, and other Eastern countries (with the exception of Japan) was an absolutist, centralized monarchical system of government based on a highly decentralized and economic ground of small agriculture combined with cottage industry, and on scattered patriarchal village communities. Although Marx did not comment directly on the social form of China, it is clear from his logic that China was not a feudal society from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties. First, from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties, the main agricultural producers were largely free peasants, not serfs with legal personal attachments, and there was no predominant serfdom in China. Second, since the Warring States period, land in China could be bought, sold, and transferred, and the hereditary system of noble land did not prevail. Third, China had a more complete and stronger centralized monarchy than India, preventing the development of a social form like the decentralized lordly feudal system of Western European countries. Fourth, the judicial power was in the hands of the imperial court controlled by the emperor (the so-called “royal law”), and the hereditary judicial power of the feudal lords was gradually eliminated as early as the end of the Zhou Dynasty. The exercise of judicial power by private individuals (including nobles) was regarded as violating “royal law.” To sum up, from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties, it is clear that China was not a feudal society, because the main agricultural producers from the Qin and Han dynasties were free peasants, not serfs with deep personal attachments, and there was no dominant serfdom. Since the Warring States period, land could be bought and sold freely, and the hereditary land system of the nobility did not prevail; China also had a more complete and powerful centralized monarchy than India, preventing the development of a social form like the feudal system in Western Europe. Therefore, to call the period from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties a “feudal society” is obviously in direct contradiction to Marx’s view.

CHAPTER 11

Criticism of Generalized Feudalism by Chinese Scholars

As mentioned earlier, most of the participants in the debate on Chinese social history were communalists who, to varying degrees, judged Chinese history on the European model, leading to the proliferation of a generalized feudal view. However, during and after the debate, there was no shortage of historians who resisted this generalized feudal view and focused on the reality of Chinese history itself, giving a precise interpretation of the feudal system. These historians, in order of publication, include: Zhou Gucheng (The Structure of Chinese Society, 1930). Qu Tongzu (Chinese Feudal Society, 1937). Qian Mu (An Outline of National History, 1940). Zhang Yinlin (An Outline of Chinese History (I), 1941). Li Jiannong (Lectures on the Economic History of China, 1943). Tong Shuye (A History of the Spring and Autumn Period, written in 1935–1937, published in 1941). Wu Yuqin (Scholar-Officials and the Disintegration of Ancient Feudal Society, written in 1941, Royal Power and Law in Feudal China, written in 1946; both were published in 2012). Zhou Gucheng participated in the debate on Chinese social history as a personage without party affiliations, and published three books, The © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_11

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Structure of Chinese Society (1930), The Changes of Chinese Society (1931), and The Present Situation of Chinese Society (1933) in New Life Book Company in Shanghai. The first of these books divided the history of the Chinese political system into five periods. “First is the period of no political system… including a long period from time immemorial to the time of the Yellow Emperor.” “Second is the period of complete aristocratic politics…, spanning the period from the Yellow Emperor to the time of the destruction of the Shang Dynasty in the 13th year of King Wu of Zhou…. The feudal system was still in the making.” “Third is the feudal period,”1 which was defined as follows: This period refers to a long period of time (1122–246 B.C.) from the destruction of King of Zhou of the Shang Dynasty by King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty until the time when Emperor Qin Shi Huang became a complete autocrat. During this period, the political system was a feudal system. From King Wu of Zhou to King Ping of Zhou, the feudal system was the most complete. From King Ping of Zhou to the time of Emperor Qin Shi Huang, the feudal system gradually declined.2

“Fourth is the period of alternating feudalism and autocracy… refers to the short period of time from Emperor Qin Shi Huang to Emperor Gaozu of the Han Dynasty…. the so-called feudal system changed to the sole ruling system of prefectures and counties.” “Fifth is the political period from the Qin Dynasty to the present.”3 This statement of Zhou, from the perspective of the history of political systems, very clearly discussed the process of the Chinese feudal system from its conception, its heyday to its abolition, which is very different from the generalized view of feudalism. Most of the participants in the social history debate were pan-social scientists, and not many of them specialized in the study of ancient Chinese history in the strict sense. Qu Tongzu was one of the historians who participated in this debate and thus stepped up his systematic study of Chinese feudal society. In 1937, he wrote a book entitled The Feudal Society in China, and his preface said: 1 Zhou Gucheng, The Structure of Chinese Society, Shanghai: New Life Book Company, 1930, pp. 30–31. 2 Ibid., p. 31. 3 Ibid.

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Since there were different views on the meaning and content of feudal society, the issue of the era of feudal society in China became the center of the debate. From the time I started to write the book to the time it went to press, I always held the attitude of not forcing myself to be the same as others and not forcing others to be the same as me. I believe that the most important thing for a social scientist to understand in the study of a social system is the system itself, and the second most important thing is the problem of the era. If the system itself can be thoroughly understood, it is easier to solve the problem of when it started and when it ended.4

Unlike others who carried out emotional and heated debate, Qu devoted himself to the examination and interpretation of the feudal system itself in a calm manner. In the introduction to the book, he asked and answered the following question: What is the meaning of feudal society?.... We know that the term “fengjian” is extremely ambiguous. The English for fengjian is feudalism derived from fief. It is similar to the meaning of the practice of granting people and fiefs to those in feudal China. However, it is extremely difficult to say what the content of fengjian is.5

Following this, he quoted the definitions of feudal society from European and American historians, and then summarized them as follows: Feudal society is just a class society that determined rights and obligations with the organization of land as the center.6

Both Qu and Zhou believed that the Zhou Dynasty was a feudal society, but their arguments differed in scope. Zhou confirmed the Zhou Dynasty as a feudal society by political system, while Qu discussed Chinese feudal society comprehensively from the fief system and patriarchal system to economic life, the land system, and social classes. According to Qu:

4 Qu Tongzu, “Preface,” The Feudal Society in China, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1937, p. 1 of the preface. 5 Qu Tongzu, “Introduction,” The Feudal Society in China, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1937, pp. 1–2. 6 Ibid., p. 4.

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In terms of economic system, the Zhou Dynasty had fully become an agricultural economy, and land relations became the center of all organization. In terms of political system, a large-scale feudal system was implemented only at the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty… Below the vassals, there were also ministers and senior officials, who were feuded by the vassals and had fiefs. This kind of hierarchical feudal relationship was the characteristic of feudal politics. In terms of social system, class and patriarchy were the two most important organizations.7

It should be said that Qu’s concept of feudal society is largely a generalization of the classical and Western meanings, which is plain and credible, and his conclusion is in general agreement with that of Zhou. Before the Zhou Dynasty, feudalism is said to exist, but this is not reliable at all. The feudal period should start from the Zhou Dynasty… Before the Zhou Dynasty, there were already feudalism in China, but it was only after King Wu of the Zhou Dynasty made a systematic, concrete and strict feudal organization prevail in the whole dynasty by political power that China had a feudal society in its entirety.8

Qu’s book The Feudal Society in China was not geared for debate and made positive statements throughout. A little later than this book, the master of Chinese culture Qian Mu wrote An Outline of National History in 1939, and made a rather sharp attack on the generalized view of feudalism. Qian eloquently argued that Chinese society from the Zhou and Qin dynasties onward was “not enough to be called ‘feudal’” from the perspectives of political system, academia, economy, state law, and land system. At present, many often refer to China as “a feudal society,” but I wonder what they mean. In terms of political system, there has been a unified central government in China since the Qin Dynasty (221–206 B.C.), with prefectures and counties under its jurisdiction without hereditary feudal rulers, which is insufficient to call China “feudal.” In terms of academics, since the beginning of Confucianism and Mohism in the pre-Qin period 7 Qu Tongzu, The Feudal Society in China, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1937, pp. 355–356. 8 Qu Tongzu, “Introduction,” The Feudal Society in China, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1937, p. 5; Qu Tongzu, The Feudal Society in China, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1937, p. 7.

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before 221 B.C., academics has spread among the general public, being neither monopolized by the nobles nor dominated by religious temples. Academics has been easily and extensively accessible to the general public and provided the basis for selecting candidates from among ordinary scholars for the state bureaucracy. All this has been true since the Qin Dynasty. Since there is not a special noble class in China, it is baseless to refer to China as “feudal.”9

Qian also discusses the non-feudal nature of Chinese society since the Qin and Han dynasties in terms of economic life and the land system. Since the abolition of the well-field system, private land could be freely bought and sold, and thus there were annexations.... As land was a fief, so the country could not be feudal.10

Qian also disagreed with calling China a capitalist society in the post-Han period. However, if China is called a capitalist society, it is not. The traditional Chinese political concept did not allow the growth of capitalist forces.11

After refuting the generalized feudal view, Qian also rose to the methodological level, revealing the crux of the generalized feudal view: the application of the European model to Chinese history. Western historians have said that their history evolved from a society of “feudal aristocracy” to a society of “industrial and commercial capital.” Those who deal with Chinese history think that Chinese society must be one of these two. Since it is not a society of “industrial and commercial capital,” it must be a society of “aristocratic feudalism.”

Qian questioned the universality of Western historical staging. Western historians said that history evolved from “feudal aristocratic” society to “industrial and commercial capital” society. Both sides of the Chinese

9 Qian Mu, “Introduction,” An Outline of National History, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1940, first edition, and 1947, second edition, p. 18. 10 Ibid., p. 19. 11 Ibid.

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social history debate accepted this theory, trying to describe Chinese history in this mode, but Qian did not agree. In the past, Chinese society was neither a feudal society nor an industrial and commercial society; it was self-contained.12

This is what he listed in his An Outline of National History: China evolved from “patriarchal feudalism” in the Western Zhou Dynasty to the “new military state” in the Warring States period, then to the “great unified government” in the Qin and Han dynasties, and to “feudalism in disguise” in the Wei and Jin Dynasties and Southern and Northern Dynasties… In short, Chinese history must be staged in accordance with Chinese reality, not based on the Western European model. Qian especially stated that: Why do we have to cut the feet to fit the shoes and say that the evolution of human history cannot escape from the staging methods of Western scholars?13

Qian’s An Outline of National History leaves room for improvement in its historical staging, but his thinking based on the reality of Chinese history shines with academic brilliance. His criticism of the advocates of the generalized feudal view “being too lazy to seek the truth of national history and brave to use others’ theory”14 deserves careful consideration. Following Qu and Qian, Zhang Yinlin’s An Outline of Chinese History was also a positive statement, and its second chapter defined feudal society and prefecture and county society as follows: The feudal empire created by King Wu of Zhou and developed by the Duke of Zhou lasted for about seven hundred years.... China shifted to decentralized feudal empires to the empires of prefectures and counties from the Han Dynasty onwards, and from this society of divided classes

12 Qian Mu, “Introduction,” An Outline of National History, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1940, first edition, and 1947, second edition, p. 19. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.

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and fixed privileges to a more politically and legally equal society. This process is central issue of China’s social history.15

In this sense, Zhang commented slightly on the generalized view of feudalism: “The term ‘feudalism’ mentioned above is often misused.”16 This young historian talent positively argued that: Strictly speaking, the elements of feudal society were as follows: under a royal family, there were several levels of feudal lords in the form of pagodas, each of which, though called a vassal to his superior, was in fact the hereditary governor and landlord of a region. According to this definition, the society of the Zhou Dynasty was undoubtedly a feudal society.17

This definition of Zhang is in line with the ancient meaning of fengjian and with the political form of feudalism in the medieval countries of Western Europe, and pays attention to explaining the economic and social structures of this political form, which can be regarded as a definition covering the feudal societies of the East and West. Li Jiannong, who was famous for his research in Chinese economic history and modern history, published Lectures on the Economic History of China (also called Chinese Economic History) in 1943 in New China Book Company. In the book he made a precise interpretation of “feudal society” from the actual situation of Chinese history. Instead of applying the formula of “five social forms,” he said in the third chapter of the book that, “Feudalism is a system that comes between clan communism and individual land freedom.”18 “Clan communism” is the communal system of primitive society, and “individual land freedom” is the system of free sale of land from the Qin and Han dynasties onwards. Li pointed out that the feudal system existed in between and was a “transition period” between the two.19

15 Zhang Yinlin, An Outline of Chinese History (I), Chongqing: Youth Book Company, 1941, p. 37. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., pp. 37–38. 18 Li Jiannong, Lectures on the Economic History of China (I), Changsha: Hunan Lantian

New China Book Company, 1943, p. 25. 19 Ibid., 27.

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Li argued that the Western Zhou Dynasty was a typical feudal society and that the feudal system “had reached a mature stage of development by the Spring and Autumn period, but its collapse was clearly visible.” He stated that the forces corrupting the feudal system were both economic and political, that “economic” forces refer to the progress of productivity, changes in agriculture with serfdom as the means of production, and the destruction of the feudal foundation, and that “political” forces refer to the formation of a centralized state and the destruction of the feudal superstructure. Li’s conclusion is that: The feudal system began to shake in China in the early Spring and Autumn period, and still existed in form only at the end of the Warring States period, but was no longer there substantially. Emperor Qin Shi Huang merely announced the official death of the feudal system.20

This theory is in line with the historical reality of the Zhou and Qin dynasties. Tong Shuye, a representative of the Doubting Antiquity School, wrote A History of the Spring and Autumn Period between 1935 and 1937, which was completed in 1941 and published by Kaiming Book Company in 1946. The book made well-founded judgments. Parts of it read: The true feudal society in China was limited in time to the Zhou Dynasty.21 From the Western Zhou to the early Spring and Autumn period, the general economic situation was that the country was roughly selfsufficient....22 What kind of social organization was produced under the conditions of self-sufficient and infantile agricultural economy? This is the famous “feudal society” in history. The term “feudal society” is properly defined as a society nominally under the rule of a royal family, but in reality with unlimited division of land and political power: each plot of land has its hereditary owners, large and small, who dominated all economic and political rights, 20 Ibid., 47. 21 Tong Shuye, A History of the Spring and Autumn Period, Shanghai: Kaiming Book

Company, 1946, p. 8. 22 Ibid., p. 56.

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creating an opposition between the landowners and the serfs attached to the land. From this definition, China was at the heyday of feudal society from the Western Zhou Dynasty to the early Spring and Autumn period.23

Tong Shuye used historical materialism to analyze Chinese history, defined feudal society accurately, and criticized, without naming names, the generalized view of feudalism that was spreading at that time. Wu Yuqin was famous for his research in world history, but he had explored Chinese feudal society in depth. His master’s thesis ScholarOfficials and the Disintegration of Ancient Feudal Society (1941) and his Ph.D. thesis Royal Power and Law in Feudal China (1946) looked at China’s national history from a global perspective, identifying the feudal era in China as the Shang and Zhou periods and the rise of the scholarofficials as the driving force behind the disintegration of the feudal system; comparing the feudal system of medieval Europe with that of the Shang and Zhou periods in China, and explaining the similarities and differences between the two. Wu’s two books remained long unknown, and even until his death in 1949, he did not make his views known. The two works were published in a book by Wuhan University Press in 2012 and included in the series of “Wuhan University’s Centennial Classics.” The Wuhan University Research Center of Traditional Chinese Culture held a seminar in December of that year in honor of Wu. The theories and methods presented in the two works were hailed by the academic community as “extraordinary historical materials and extraordinary discoveries.” To sum up, although the generalized feudal view dominated in the mid- and late twentieth century, there are many theories opposing it, only some of which were listed above. These treatises attempted to connect the ancient meaning of fengjian with its Western meaning, and observe the ancient history of China from the perspective of the pluralistic progress of the world’s medieval history. Although their correctness and accuracy are all open to discussion, they are a heritage that deserves to be restudied and discussed. Comparing them with the generalized view of feudalism will help clarify the long confused concepts of fengjian.

23 Ibid.

CHAPTER 12

Patriarchal Landowners’ Authoritarian Society and the Age of Imperial Power

It is normal for the connotation and extension of a concept to change from ancient to modern times. Giving the old concept a new meaning is both permissible and necessary, but this new meaning should be derived from the ancient meaning of the concept and coordinated with its international meaning as far as possible, at least taking into account either the ancient meaning or the international meaning. If the new meaning is not compatible with the ancient meaning and the international meaning and is irrelevant to the space provided by the Chinese word form, this “new meaning” is water without a source and wood without a foundation; a new word with such a “new meaning” is a mismatched word. Unfortunately, the terms fengjian, fengjian system, fengjian society, and fengjian period that are commonly used in China’s mainland today to express the social forms that have been there for more than two millennia since the Qin Dynasty are mismatched words. The most basic rule of naming things is to make the name correspond to the reality and match the name with the truth. The sections of Chinese history must be named in accordance with the historical reality of each section. Before Western historiography (including its terminology) was introduced to China, Chinese historiography was mainly based on dynasties, focusing on naming sections of history by those in power. According to the works written by those in favor of new texts the Western Han Dynasty on The Spring and Autumn Annals, the Spring and Autumn © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_12

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period of more than two centuries was divided into three stages. The first stage is marked by political chaos and social anomy, the second stage is characterized by the reestablishment of legitimate political order, and the third stage is when the world as a whole experiences great harmony and every individual is able to fully realize their potential. Designed to bring the country out of chaos, this method of staging history is different from the prevailing method during the period when history was staged by dynasty and was popular among those in favor of new text. In modern China when Western historiography was introduced to the country, with reference to the Western linear view of evolutionary history, Chinese history was also staged as “ancient, medieval, modern, contemporary” (a method adopted by Liang Qichao and Xia Zengyou) in China. This staging was of course true to the reality, but it only indicated the chronological order without specifying the socio-historical traits of each stage. Later, Liang created the method of staging Chinese history as “China’s China, Asia’s China, and the world’s China,” which was in line with the actual development of China’s cultural relations with foreign countries, but still did not specify the inherent social and cultural attributes of the three stages of Chinese history. In the 1920s, the historical materialist doctrine of social forms was introduced into China and gave a theoretical backbone to historical staging. However, under the influence of Western centrism, Chinese history was divided into five social forms—primitive society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society and socialist society, and the Chinese history was sequenced as follows: primitive society, slave society, feudal society, and semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. This staging method has been popular in China’s mainland since 1949. However, as mentioned above, some aspects of this staging method are the product of the generalized feudal view, which has the disadvantage of not being true to the reality. In contrast to those with a generalized feudal view who call China in the period from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing dynasties “a feudal society,” some Chinese scholars have called it “an authoritarian society,” “a solely authoritarian society,” “a centralized society,” and “a society of individual land freedom.” Western scholars have called China “an Asian society,” “an Oriental autocratic society,” “an authoritarian political society” “a bureaucratic society” or “a traditional society.” In the late 1980s, I described China in the more than two millennia from the Qin and Han dynasties to the Ming and Qing

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dynasties as “a patriarchal authoritarian society.”1 This is closer to the historical reality following the Qin and Han dynasties than naming China as “a feudal society,” but it is not complete, because the name I gave only points out the characteristics of the socio-political structure of China from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty, but did not yet reveal the economic system of this historical period and the economic form is the cornerstone of the social form. For more than two millennia in China, following the Qin and Han dynasties, the landlord-land-holding peasant system of private ownership of land (the landlord system) was an increasingly powerful presence as opposed to the feudal lord system. It was intertwined with the centralized autocratic imperial system (as opposed to the system of granting fiefs to establish vassals) and closely integrated with the patriarchal system. For more than two millennia from the Qin to the Qing dynasties, the fundamentals of Chinese society had become a social form not based on the feudal system that had become nonmainstream, but on a combination of the patriarchal system, the landlord system, and the autocratic imperial system.

12.1

The Patriarchal System

Patriarchy is a hereditary system of society or government in which the father or eldest male is head of the family and descent is reckoned through the male line. Patriarch is the eldest male of the clan, who is recognized as the direct heir of the clan’s chief. Patriarchy is about the identification, succession, and the exercise of power of the patriarch. In Zhang Zai’s view, this system not only maintained the family and clan (especially the great families), but also had a great bearing on the continuity of court politics and the security of the country. As the organizational law of clans, the patriarchal system evolved from the patrilineal clan system. “The Interpretation of Relatives” of Erya says that, “The group that is centered on one’s father and tied to one’s paternal line is the clan.” This system was first established in the Yin and Shang dynasties, and then took shape in the Western Zhou Dynasty. It was intertwined with the feudal system and the hierarchy and they combined to form the hereditary system of the royal family and nobility of that era. The patriarchy so constructed was not only the rule of kingship (the rule 1 See Feng Tianyu, “An Analysis of the ‘Feudal’ System in China,” Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1990.

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of succession between the emperor and the vassals of the Zhou Dynasty), but also the rule of clanship (the rule of blood relations between the nobles and even the commoners at all levels). The patriarchal system was extended from the rule of kindship and the rule of clanship to the whole of society. Patriarchy and feudalism were originally two systems that were mutually inclusive. The feudal system was maintained based on the patriarchal system which was expanded by the feudal system in turn. In the Western Zhou Dynasty, patriarchy and fengjian were united, but after the Eastern Zhou Dynasty, they gradually underwent complicated changes, and the general trend was that fengjian was in decline while patriarchy shifted from political system to social organization, and changed from being combined with fengjian to being combined with monarchy. During the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, the system of prefectures and counties gradually replaced the feudal system, and the system of appointed and regular officials replaced the hereditary system for nobles’ officials positions and benefits, which, together with the disruption of the first and second sons (many officials made their concubine their wife, so that their second son could inherit their title) led to the destruction of the core of the legal system of first-born son succession. All this led to the disintegration of the patriarchal system. This was called “the abolition of feudalism and the collapse of patriarchy.”2 This is a situation in which the collapse of one led to the decline of the other. During the Warring States period, the Legalists tried to replace the practice of staying close to those who should be close with the practice of respecting those who should be respected and replace the rule of law with the rule of rites, which reflected this trend. The Confucianists, whose priority was to revive states that had been extinguished and restore families whose line of succession had been broken, upheld the patriarchal system rites, advocating return to propriety and ascribing perfect virtue. The Guan Zhong school combined Confucianism and Legalism, advocating both rites and law in an attempt to unify the patriarchal system with the monarchy. The new Confucianists of the Han Dynasty significantly developed this theory. From the Western and Eastern Han dynasties onwards, fengjian was on decline, Chinese society was generally a combination of patriarchal and autocratic systems at the

2 “Memorials,” vol. 6, The History of the Song Dynasty.

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state level, and of the patriarchal system and village organizations in the countryside. The social realities from the Qin and Han dynasties onward were that the feudal system was replaced by the system of prefectures and counties, and the basic unit of social structure changed from “clan” to “family,” but the patriarchal system did not pass away with the wind, and grassroots society was mostly organized in a semi-patriarchal and semi-regional manner. This is not the result of some schools of thought, but is the result of the social and economic pattern: under the natural economic conditions, the way of life in clans was maintained for a long time, and the rules of succession and the corresponding rituals, which distinguished between close and distant blood, were inherited, and in particular, the spirit of clan (i.e., the concept of patriarchy) was passed on for a long time. The ethical and political views of Han and Song Confucianists, which were based on the practice of staying close to those who should be close and extended to the practice of respecting those who should be respected, matched the long-continued patriarchal system and patriarchal thinking, and constituted the mainstream of social consciousness. The patriarchal system from the Qin and Han dynasties onward was not the strict, standardized patriarchal system of the Western Zhou Dynasty, but a patriarchal system in a broader sense, or a transformed patriarchal system. One of the major manifestations of this transformation is that “loyalty to the emperor” overrides “filial piety,” thus differing greatly from the pre-Qin patriarchal consciousness that puts filial piety first. In the era of imperial power, although filial piety continued to be emphasized (the Han Dynasty claimed that “the country should be ruled with filial piety”), loyalty and filial piety were regarded as an interactive relationship (it was emphasized that “loyal officials should come from filial sons”); however, when one of the two had to be dispensed with, “loyalty to the emperor” overrode “filial piety,” and this is called “loyalty and filial piety cannot be pursued all at the same time.” This is why the imperial power era of imperial power supremacy was different from the patriarchal feudal era. In the imperial power era, although the concept of patriarchy was transformed, the transformed spirit of patriarchy that enveloped Chinese society in the more than two millennia following the Qin Dynasty was manifested as follows: first, the paternal monophyly principle was widely practiced; second, the family system, which largely followed the patriarchal structure, flourished; third, the family and the state shared the same

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structure, the patriarchal system was united with the autocratic monarchy, and patriarchal and imperial power supported each other. The patriarchal ritual system was the mandatory system of succession for the imperial dynasties and nobles from the Qin to the Qing dynasties. For example, for the succession of emperors and princes, the principle of closely related clan branches should be observed. Violation of this principle was considered as “disrupting the ancestral system” and “violating rites.” This led to fierce political disputes in many dynasties. The Ming Dynasty’s great debate on rituals during the reign of Emperor Jiajing and the debate on whether the family lines of Emperors Xianfeng and Tongzhi should be followed in the early years of the reign of Emperor Guangxu are notable examples. Both sides of the debate were based on patriarchal rituals. Another example is that the novel Dream of the Red Chamber depicts the noble family of the Rong Mansion. After the death of the Duke of Rongguo, the eldest son Jia Daishan inherits the title. Daishan has two sons: the eldest son is Jia She and the second son is Jia Zheng. After the death of Daishan, the mediocre Jia She inherits his title, and the more talented Jia Zheng can only obtain the title through the imperial examination. This is an example of strict adherence to the patriarchal principle of “first-born son succession.” What the novel shows is the reality of life in the noble society of the Ming and Qing dynasties. The patriarchal ritual system also retained its physical form and normative approach among the Chinese people (such as ancestral temples, ancestral halls, genealogies, clan fields, clan schools, and clan rules) and tended to become autonomous. The patriarchal system continued to play an important role in Chinese society until modern times (e.g., Zeng Guofan created the Hunan Army based on the patriarchal organization and with the intellectual support of the concept of patriarchy). The concept of patriarchy (manifested as reverence for ancestors, filial piety and fraternity, changing filial obedience into allegiance, preserving chastity, and clan unity) was not only popular among the people, but was also made a national concept. For example, in the Song Dynasty, the emperor’s edict said, “Filial piety and kindness are the most important part of human morality, and harmony is the best way to put the house in order,” which is a typical manifestation of the national concept of patriarchy. Patriarchal ethnics served as a guiding principle both in the imperial court and among the general public. In his “Preface to the Translation of A History of Politics,” Yan Fu, a modern author, discussed the situation of the Chinese patriarchal

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system, which had been passed down for thousands of years, and divided the process of human society into three stages: “It began with totem, followed by patriarchy, and became a state.” He considered patriarchy to be a transitional form from clan society (characterized by totem worship) to society after the emergence of the state. In the case of China, the early establishment and long continuity of the natural economy of farming made the patriarchal system particularly long-lasting. In the preface, Yan said that the Chinese people until modern times “were just a patriarchal people.”

12.2

The Landlord System

From the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period onward, the feudal lordship system began to transform into the landlord system, and the mainstream of the land system from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty gradually moved away from the feudal lordship system. The landlord system can be fully expressed as the landlord-landholding peasant system of private ownership of land. This is the land system that had been gradually formed since the Warring States period, especially between the Qin and Qing dynasties. During these more than two millennia, state land ownership (king’s land ownership) and private ownership coexisted, and the general trend was to gradually separate land ownership from political power, with the feudal lordship system gradually fading out. The Yin, Shang, and Western Zhou dynasties practiced a system of fiefdoms where land could not be bought or sold. The following statements, “Land cannot be bought or sold” (“Wangzhi, The Book of Rites ), “Peasants are not allowed to shift to other industry”3 (Guanzi), “Peasants must stay as such throughout their life” (“The 26th Year of the Reign of the Duke of Zhao,” Zuo’s Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals ), and “Peasants must not move out of their hometowns until they die” (“Teng Wen Gong Part I,” Mencius ), are all expressions of the land system and the status of peasant identity in the feudal period. This situation began to change at the end of the Western Zhou Dynasty. Western Zhou inscriptions, such as those on the Weihe Wine Vessel and Weiding I, show that land could already be traded at a price during the time of King 3 “Guanzi Urges the Duke Huan of Qi to Practice the Rule of Force,” “Qi,” Discourses on Governance of the States.

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Gong of Zhou, but only subject to legal formalities, contracts, and official recognition. In the late Western Zhou Dynasty, King Xuan changed the system by dispossessing him of his land in the capital area4 and abolished the public land system by dividing it to the tiller. The public farming system under which “In thousands of pairs they remove the roots”5 and “With your ten thousand men all in pairs”6 was gradually changed into the system of small collective farming and even individual farming. By the Eastern Zhou Dynasty, public and private fields existed side by side, and the lords (such as Zeng Sun and Zhu who often appear in The Book of Songs ) maintained the authority and warmth of a patriarchal parent over the peasants. This is shown in the poems on farming such as “Futian,” “Datian,” “Chuzi,” “Xinnanshan,” “Zaishan,” and “Liangsi” in “Minor Ode to the Kingdom” and “Sacrificial Ode to Zhou” of The Book of Songs. Land transfer began in the mid-Western Zhou Dynasty and was recorded in Western Zhou bronze inscriptions. According to the inscriptions on the Gebai Vessel Geber Gui, in the time of King Xiao of Zhou, the nobleman Ge Bai exchanged 30 pieces of field for four horses of the rich man Peng Sheng. This is the account of bartering for fields. Earlier, the inscriptions in the Weihe Wine Vessel stated that in the third year of King Gong of Zhou, the nobleman Ji Bai exchanged fields for money and bought jade jangles and tiger skins with the money. This shows that money was already used in this early trade of fields and goods as an intermediary for valuation. Land trading during the Spring and Autumn period was only found once in “The Fourth Year of the Duke of Xiang of Qin,” Zuo’s Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals: “When the Rongdi tribe lives in the prairie, they stress goods to the neglect of land, so we can buy their land.” By land, the book means the ranch of Rongdi; it does not mean that its arable is tradable. “Urging Good Governance (I),” Han Feizi says, “The people of Zhongmou who gave up farmland and sold their houses and the vegetable gardens around them….” This is often cited as an example of the sale of fields, but it does not necessarily seem to be reliable, because the text only refers to the sale of houses

4 “Duke Wen of Guo Urges the Duke Huan of Qi to Dispossess Himself of His Land,” “Zhou,” Discourses on Governance of the States. 5 “Zaishan,” “Sacrificial Ode to Zhou,” The Book of Songs. 6 “Yixi,” “Sacrificial Ode to Zhou,” The Book of Songs.

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and the vegetable gardens around them and the abandonment of farmland, but not to the sale of farmland. In short, the original materials of farmland sales in the Spring and Autumn period are still lacking. “Financial and Economic Affairs,” A History of the Han Dynasty, states that the State of Qin in the mid-Warring States period “used the law of Shang Yang to introduce the system of the emperor, abolished the system of well-fields, and the people were able to sell and buy land. As a result, the rich had vast fields, while the poor had no little land.” This is an additional comment made by the Eastern Han historian Ban Gu on Dong Zhongshu’s comment on the Shang Yang’s reform hundreds of years before, emphasizing that the sale of land by the people would inevitably lead to land annexation. In contrast, Dong Zhongshu’s statement that “the people were able to sell and buy land” was based on the Han Dynasty land system compared to the situation in the Qin Dynasty during the Warring States period, and could not necessarily be regarded as the original state of the Warring States. In fact, during the era of the seven Warring States, all states still had state ownership of land and practiced the state land grant system, in which vassal states owned land and granted it to their people according to the system. In the case of Qin, for example, there was no explicit provision for the people to sell and buy land in Shang Yang’s reform, but only the recognition of granted land and houses which could be possessed in one’s name and passed on to one’s descendants. Therefore, the system in which “the people could sell and buy land” was the practical consequence of the system of granting land. According to “Biographies of Lian Po and Lin Xiangru,” Records of the Historian, Zhao Kuo’s mother submitted a memorial to the king of Zhao, saying that Zhao Kuo was not qualified as a general. One of the reasons was that Zhao Kuo “hid the gold and silk rewarded by the king of Zhao in his home, looked for cheap and suitable fields and properties every day, and bought them whenever possible.” This is about the actual sale of land, but it was already in the late Warring States period. In short, it is generally justifiable to claim that land could be bought and sold during the Warring States period land, but the evidence is not sufficient. In the Warring States, there were already a lot of registered peasant households that owned small pieces of land, and they were subject to the “supereconomic” plunder of the state and had a certain degree of personal dependence. In the Qin Dynasty, the state land grant system was still in place, and free trade in land was rare. During the Han and Tang dynasties, the court distributed land to cultivators, and this happened again

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and again mainly at the beginning of the two dynasties. The state land grant system from the Qin Dynasty onward was a system of granting fiefs to direct cultivators by a centralized state, which was very different from the feudal system of granting fiefs and people to lower lords by higher lords. From the Northern Wei Dynasty to the Sui and Tang dynasties, the state allocated land to the tillers by their number. Because land could be freely bought and sold and super-economic deprivation was pursued by the powerful, land annexation became more and more intense. As a result, the “annexation” and “suppression of annexation” became a major policy dispute in the dynasties. Allocating land by population and suppressing land annexation were both aimed at maintaining the imperial power’s direct control of the peasants, which was in line with the bureaucratic politics of the imperial power directly reaching the common people. There may be few records of the system that “the people could buy and sell land” in the pre-Qin Dynasty period, but there is much evidence that private ownership of land was practiced in the Spring and Autumn period. A famous textual account is found in the poem “Minor Odes to the Kingdom, “Datian” from The Book of Songs, which reads: “May it rain first on our public fields/And then come to our private!” Back then, there appeared “private land” which the cultivators could cultivate for their own benefit after paying taxes to the state; in the late Spring and Autumn period, there was “primary tax land” for which rent was collected in kind in the State of Lu; the State of Qi was the first to shift to the land tax system from the public land system; Zi Chan of the State of Zheng introduced the system of imposing military service and collecting military supplies. All these are all examples of taxation of private fields. This shows that “private land” had been opened up in addition to the “public land” of the feudal lordship system at that time. In the Spring and Autumn period, the State of Jin introduced the system of land exchange, which signified the privatization and transferability of fields. During the Warring States period, encouraging the cultivation of private land was one of the main themes of the reform of the states. For example, Li Kui’s reform, which took place in the fourth century B.C. during the reign of Marquis Wen in the State of Wei and advocated that “a variety of business methods should be adopted in agricultural cultivation”; Wu Qi’s reform during the reign of King Dao of Chu; Zou Ji’s reform during the reign of King Wei of Qi; and Shen Buhai’s reform during the reign of Marquis Zhao of Han all had such themes. The reform by Shang Yang in the reign of Duke Xiaoyu of Qin made the private ownership of land

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popular. Shang Yang recruited people from the states of Wei, Jin, and Han to exploit the wasteland of Qin, which led to a great increase in private land as these people “were allowed to cultivate as much or as little as they wanted.”7 The landlord-land-holding peasant economy grew so much that Qin became “a rich country with a strong army that was invincible.” In the Qin Dynasty, “the people were made to declare the actual amount of land they possessed,” and the court collected taxes accordingly. This meant that private ownership of land was affirmed nationwide, and private ownership of land was officially embodied in law. Starting from the Qin Dynasty’s practice of “making the people declare the actual amount of land they possessed,” the state system of granting fields during the Warring States period gradually receded from the mainstream. From the beginning of the Han Dynasty to the mid-Western Han Dynasty, the state land grant system survived in the form of the practice of granting land and houses, but the sale of land gradually became popular. In “The Life of Prime Minister Xiao He,” Records of the Grand Historian, it is stated that Xiao He, an important minister in the early Han Dynasty, “bought thousands of mu of people’s land by force and at low cost.” After that, land sales were repeatedly recorded in the history books, and private ownership of land developed. After Emperor Ai of the Han Dynasty, the system of granting land and houses was abolished, and the landlord system of private ownership of land gradually became dominant. It should be noted that although private ownership of land gradually became popular from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty, land ownership by the king and the people always coexisted. For example, “Financial and Economic Affairs (I),” A History of the Ming Dynasty, says: “The land system of the Ming Dynasty divided land into two types: state land and private land.” Moreover, land ownership by the king (government ownership of land) was always the highest nominal institutional concept of land; therefore, the private ownership of land from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty was incomplete and not completely free, and its accurate expression should be: private ownership of land under the constraint of the king’s ownership of land (state ownership). The land system in China changed from the Qin and Han dynasties onwards, and during the Eastern Han, Wei, Jin, and Southern and Northern dynasties, the lordly manor system, which was accompanied

7 “Assets,” vol. 1, The Imperial Reader of the Taiping Era.

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by the aristocratic system rose, making it possible for free peasants to transform into dependent people, and the feudal nature of society was revived. Therefore, some Chinese and foreign historians call the Wei, Jin, and Northern and Southern dynasties “quasi-feudal societies” and “feudal societies in disguise,” which is not unreasonable. After the midTang Dynasty, the landlord system was restored and developed, and the landlord-owner economy with private ownership of land prevailed. Landholding peasants, namely peasants registered with the central government, were the main agricultural laborers and the basic source of imperial servitude. Unlike the serfs in medieval Europe, these peasants had no strict personal attachment, but their land rights were very unstable, and those who went bankrupt either became tenants of the landlords or the nobles. At the beginning of each dynasty, the court took control of the land after the war and recruited peasants to cultivate it by granting and dividing the land among peasants. As a result, the proportion of land-holding peasants increased. Later, land annexations became more intense, and there were also “super-economic” land annexations by nobles and even emperors. In the Ming Dynasty, for example, Emperor Taizu granted each courtier, marquis, and minister 10,000 mu of land and each prince 100,000 mu. Many ministers opposed this and the area was reduced by half. Emperors Xiaozong and Xizong granted meritorious royal relatives millions of mu, and Emperor Shenzong even extensively occupied the people’s land for royal estate and wanted to grant his son the King of Happiness 4 million mu of land. But on the whole, the above situation did not reverse the basic pattern of the landowner-self-owner system of private ownership of land. The natural economy of small agriculture and cottage industry, which was the basis of the landlord-land-holding peasant system, was highly dispersed and enclosed, and an integrated mechanism was needed to coordinate social resources to achieve certain broad goals (such as building water conservancy and roads, defending against foreign invasions, and maintaining law and order). As a result, a strong, authoritarian state was established on the broad foundations of a dispersed small-peasant economy. The autocratic monarchy regarded landlords as a reliable class to depend on, and some dynasties even explicitly prohibited merchants from becoming officials, and kept those without assets from being selected as officials. So, who had assets and were not businessmen in the city? Only landlords, of course. The landlords became the basic group from which officials were selected by the autocratic emperor.

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The Autocratic Monarchy

Compared with Western Europe and Japan, Chinese history has two major features. One is that feudalism was established early. In terms of the “Western Zhou feudal system,” it was formed more than a thousand years earlier than the feudal systems of Western Europe and Japan. The other is that the bureaucratic politics under the unified autocratic monarchy was established early and lasted for a long time. In terms of “the Qin Dynasty’s reunification of China,” it was more than a millennium earlier than the establishment of autocratic kingship in Western Europe and Japan. From the Zhou and Qin dynasties onward, authoritarian monarchies became the norm, and strong autocratic kingship lasted for more than two millennia in China, while in Western Europe and Japan autocratic kingship was only a relatively short transitional stage at the end of the Middle Ages. In China’s Western Zhou patriarchal feudal society, which retained some vestiges of primitive democracy, the monarchy was a limited monarchy (a hierarchical monarchy), with a patriarchal hierarchy of dependence between the Son of Heaven of Zhou and the vassals, and between the vassals and the vassals and the high-level officials. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period, with the decline and disintegration of the patriarchal feudal system, the legacy of primitive democracy gradually disappeared, with the loss of the Son of Heaven of Zhou’s power, and the growth of the lords’ autocracy. The centralized and autocratic kingship had already emerged in the Warring States in the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. The seven states of Qi, Wei, Zhao, Han, Qin, Chu, and Yan established the system of prefectures and counties in which the monarchs were in charge of the administration one after another. The Qin Dynasty swept away the six other states and made the unlimited monarchy (autocratic monarchy), which was “autocratic” and “dictatorial,” a reality nationwide. According to “Biography of Emperor Qin Shi Huang,” Records of the Historian, in the 26th year of the reign of King Yingzheng of Qin in 221 B.C., Prime Minister Wang Wan and Commandant of Justice Li Si gave him the supreme title of emperor. With this title, he stood at the peak of power. “In the country of prefectures and counties, the law was unified.” The autocratic monarchy in which the emperor was in charge of key issues now deserved its name. From 221 B.C., when Yingzheng became China’s first emperor, to 1912, when the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Puyi, abdicated, the

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autocratic monarchy lasted for 2,132 years, with nearly 500 emperors. During this period, the political system had its ups and downs, but the general trend was that centralized power became stronger and stronger. Take the systems of election of officials for example. The Han Dynasty implemented the recommendation system in which the prime minister, marquises, and prefectural governors recommended officials who were appointed to official positions after examination by subjects such as filial piety, virtuous literature, and talent, thus laying the foundation for a centralized bureaucratic system. The Wei and Jin dynasties implemented the nine-grade talent selection system in which the privileged clans held political power, and the political pattern in which “on one from a humble family would be appointed a top official and no one from from a noble family would be reduced an official at the bottom” emerged. The Sui Dynasty abolished the system of grassroots officials, deprived the nobility of political power in their birthplace, and replaced the nine-rank system of officials with the imperial examination system, which enabled the scholars of the common families to enter the government, and revived the centralized system of officials. The Tang Dynasty continued the Sui system, and the system of imperial examination by subject became complete, and the Ministry of Personnel became the body for selecting officials, and the selection requirements covered physical appearance, manner of speech, highlighting the aristocratic criteria for selecting officials and making it convenient for nobles to enter government. By the Song Dynasty, the imperial examination system was free from the old traces of aristocracy, and the scholars were selected as officials by closed examination, so that the emperor could directly select the scholars from the common families as officials, thus putting the centralized system of officials into practice. The imperial examination system completed the two processes of “officialization of Confucianism” and “Confucianization of officials,” which together enhanced the control of the autocratic imperial power over society and ideology and culture, showing a different trend from the pluralism of feudal aristocratic politics. Therefore, although there were changes in the political system from the Qin Dynasty onward, the general trend was the completion of bureaucratic politics under the monarchy and the evolution of “the proposal for a unified national system” into a living reality. The traditional Chinese political system never lacked enlightened and rational elements and was always called “benevolent government,” but it

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is not enough to prove that the Chinese imperial government was autocratic. This autocracy is directly related to the long and deep tradition of “a unified national system” in Chinese culture. Due to the constraints of rituals, customs, laws, and bureaucracy, as well as the nobility and local gentry power, the power of the Chinese autocratic emperor (imperial power) could not be said to be unlimited, but these limitations lacked legal regulation, and the privileges of the nobility were often restricted or even denied, so that they were usually weak in constraining imperial power. In addition, the rituals and bureaucracy and local gentry power were subservient to the authority of the emperor. With the power to issue all kinds of orders, the emperor could change institutions and remove officials from their positions whenever he wanted. As a result, the Chinese imperial power, which covered the power to spare one’s life, execute him, enrich him, make him impoverished, promote him to a high position, and reduce him to a low position, was undoubtedly authoritarian. It is a basic fact that in Chinese history from the Qin Dynasty onward, the imperial power had been supreme. From the Qin and Han dynasties onward, Chinese dynasties were frequently overthrown and replaced with new ones, but the monarchy remained intact. This absolute monarchical power evolved in an up-anddown manner for more than two millennia. While the Qin and Han dynasties still had a prime minister who was “under one person and above all others,” the Western Han court and other dynasties sought ways to control the power of the prime minister. In the Eastern Han, Wei, Jin, Sui, and Tang dynasties, the big prestigious clans enjoyed political privileges, and prefectural governors and border town mayors were in charge of the fiefdoms and held real power, constituting the center of power outside the central imperial power. In the Song Dynasty, the aristocratic system was eliminated, and at the beginning of the dynasty, military personnel handed over power (known as “dissolving military power over a cup of wine”), and local power was divided and administered by the imperial court, and power was concentrated in the hands of the imperial court. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, the power was all in the hands of the emperor. After the Taizu Emperor of the Ming Dynasty abolished the prime ministerial system, and the prime minister’s power was seized by the emperor and the six ministries were brought under the direct control of the emperor. Even the grand secretary who was believed to have the power of a prime minister without being called a prime minister only had the power to make recommendations and did not enjoy decision-making

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power and, in most cases, he was merely the emperor’s secretary. The decision-making power was in the hands of the emperor or the eunuch Director of Brush-Writing of the Directorate of Ceremonial. The Ming and Qing monarchs had an extreme centralization of power. Some scholars have questioned the authoritarian nature of ancient Chinese politics by citing examples of the various supervisory bodies that existed during the Chinese monarchy. However, an examination of the practical utility of such oversight bodies reveals that their function was merely to supervise bureaucrats at all levels, but did not constitute a check on imperial power and, in most cases, was a reinforcement of authoritarian imperial power. To address this issue, Sun Yat-sen in modern times proposed the separation of the five powers—legislative power, judicial power, administrative power, examination and election power, and supervision power—as a solution to change the centralized power of the monarchy. For various reasons, the modern transformation of China’s political system was realized in a revolutionary form. The significance of the Revolution of 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen was not only the overthrowal of the Qing Dynasty, but also the end of the autocratic monarchy that had been in place in China for more than millennia, which became an epoch-making landmark in Chinese history. The Warring States put an end to the patriarchal feudal system and replaced it with the unified patriarchal autocratic monarchy (Wang Fuzhi’s Comments about History as a Mirror refers to this period as “a great period of change in ancient and modern times”). The Revolution of 1911 put an end to the patriarchal autocratic monarchy and replaced it with a democratic republican system, so it can be called another “great period of change in ancient and modern times.” Of course, the inertia of the autocratic monarchy could not be swept away by a revolution, so Sun Yat-sen had the last words: “The revolution has not yet succeeded. Comrades, you must carry on.” In conclusion, what persisted in China for more than two millennia from the Qin and Han dynasties onward was not a “feudal system” that took a secondary role, but a social form that was a combination of the patriarchal and landlord systems and the autocratic monarchy. The three features of feudalization typical of Western Europe and Japan— serfized peasants, manorialized land, and diversified political power—were reversed in China during the more than two millennia between the Qin and Qing dynasties, with lordship being gradually replaced by landlordism, aristocratic politics being replaced by bureaucratic politics, the

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division of power evolving into centralized power, and peasants gradually gaining basic personal freedom. It is obvious that calling China from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty a feudal society does not correspond to the reality, and referring to it a “patriarchal landowners’ authoritarian society” is in line with the basic characteristics of the social organization, economic structure, and political system of China during these two millennia. However, the abovementioned term is not concise enough, and a general term comprising of the elements (the patriarchal and landlord systems and the autocratic monarchy) would be a complete solution. If we look at the three elements of society from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty—patriarchy, landlordism, and monarchy, we will see that there is a big banner that governed everything, with the term “imperial power” written on it. This “imperial power,” with patriarchal relations (which had changed from the original patriarchal system of the Western Zhou Dynasty) as the social structure, the landlord-land-holding peasant land system as the economic base, and bureaucratic politics as the operating machine, is a sign of a specific historical stage in China, which had not yet emerged in the patriarchal and feudal Shang and Zhou dynasties and had basically come to an end in the Republican era following the Qing Dynasty, though its remains were still there. For more than two millennia from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty, imperial power prevailed and grew stronger, so calling this historical period “the era of imperial power” could not only be relevant but also be more convincing. During the more than two millennia from the Qin to the Qing Dynasty, there were many changes in various systems, customs, and ideas in different stages. To put it briefly, with the Middle Tang Dynasty as the boundary, the period was divided into two parts: The Qin to the midTang Dynasty constitute the “early period of imperial power,” during which the landlord economy and bureaucratic politics began to take shape, but some remnants of the lord economy and aristocratic politics were retained, and in some periods such as the two Jin dynasties and the Northern and Southern Dynasties, these vestiges had a tendency to expand. From the mid-Tang Dynasty to the end of the Qing Dynasty, the “late period of imperial power” saw the lordly economy and aristocratic politics fade from the social stage, the landlord economy and bureaucratic politics mature, and the autocratic monarchy’s centralization of power reach its peak. Beginning with the Revolution of 1911s overthrowal of the autocratic monarchy, China entered the Republican age.

PART II

Jingji (Economy)

In classical Chinese, the term “jingji”(经济) means governance for the people. In China, those who are good at management are called “jingji” (经纪). When the Japanese imported the Chinese language, they mistook 经纪for经济, because both are pronounced jingji. Such examples abound. Now the Japanese term “経済” (keizai) has been imported back to China with the meaning of “economy,” which is totally different its original meaning in Chinese. Although it is difficult to abandon the habit of using jingji for economy, it is advisable to know how this practice originally came into being. —Huang Moxi, A New and Comprehensive Encyclopedic Dictionary for General Use 1 “Jingji” (经济, economy) is a common term in China nowadays: Guomin jingji (national economy), jingji gaige (economic reform), and jingji xiaochi (economic street food) are always heard and written about. The term “jingji” in these examples is a Chinese translation of the English term “economy,” which is a system of inter-related national production, distribution, exchange and consumption activities, and also means being frugal and giving good value or return in relation to the money. However, an investigation shows that the term “jingji” with the abovementioned new meaning we use today for “economy” is not only far from its classical Chinese meaning, but also cannot be deduced from its morphology 1 Huang Moxi, A New and Comprehensive Encyclopedic Dictionary for General Use, Shanghai: Rotary Club of Shanghai, 1911, vol. 11, p. 35.

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to its present meaning. It is a term mistranslated from English to Japanese and Chinese. The change of the concept of “jingji” (keizai) reveals the orientation for the modern Japanese and then the Chinese people to free themselves from pan-political and pan-moral concepts in terms of their understanding of social livelihood issues.

CHAPTER 13

The Classical Meaning of “Jingji”: Governance for the People

As a classical Chinese term Jingji is a combination of the characters jing (经) and ji (济). The character “经” ( jing) is not found in oracle bone inscriptions, but it is written as Fig. 13.1 in Chinese bronze inscriptions. The lower part represents the stand of the loom, the upper and lower horizontal strokes represent the frames of the reed on a loom, and the three curves represent the longitudinal lines of the loom when weaving. Written as in small seal script (Fig. 13.2), the left part of jing —糸—emphasizes the character’s meaning of silk thread while 巠 is used as a phonetic symbol and an indication of the meaning of the character, making it both a pictophonetic character and an associative compound. According to “糸,” Explanation of Script and Elucidation of Characters, “Meaning weaving, jing is derived from 糸and is pronounced as 巠.” Duan Yucai (1735–1815) said, “Jing is the vertical line of a woven fabric as opposed to the horizontal line.” (Figs. 13.1 and 13.2). 巠means the flow of water, and 径means path, so 经 is also used as 径. First found in The Book of Change, 经means field path. Liu Xi in the Eastern Han Dynasty said in “Classics,” Explanation of Terms: “经is the same as 径 (roads)…just as in ‘The roads extend in all directions’.” As a verb, jing (经) means “to govern.” According to “Prime Minister,” The Rites of Zhou (Officers of Zhou), “…to 经 (govern) the state.” “The Dao,” Huainanzi, says, “…have the courage to 经 (govern) the state.” © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_13

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Fig. 13.1 Chinese bronze inscription

Fig. 13.2 Small seal scrip

Jing (经) is used in conjunction with lun (纶, which refers to the rope made of threads and is extended to mean well-organized). For example, “Zhun,” “Xiangzhuan,” The Book of Changes, says, “The trigram representing clouds and that representing thunder form zhun. The man of virtue, in accordance with this, adjusts his measures of governance as in sorting the threads of the warp and woof.” The Doctrine of the Mean also says, “It is only the individual possessed of the most entire sincerity that can govern the state.” In addition, jing also forms jinglüe (经略) with lüe (略) and forms jingzhi (经制) with zhi (制) to mean jurisdiction and governance. Jing was first found to be used together with shi (世) in “The Adjustment of Controversies,” Zhuangzi: Outside the limits of the world of men, the sage occupies his thoughts, but does not discuss about anything; inside those limits he occupies his thoughts, but does not pass any judgments. In the jingshi (经世) of Spring and Autumn, which embraces the history of the former kings, the sage indicates his judgments, but does not argue in vindication of them.

According to Wang Xianqian and Zhang Taiyan, Zhuangzi’s original meaning of jingshi (经世) here was to chronicle the state and prepare a chronology. Later, the term was interpreted as “to govern and save

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Fig. 13.3 Chinese bronze inscription

Fig. 13.4 Small seal script

the state” by Confucianists who tried to enrich and improve Zhuangzi’s ideas with Confucianism, which is relevant to the Confucian concept of engaging with society, but it does not fit into the Daoist concept of disengaging from society. In the era when Confucianism was dominant, the term “jingshi” was passed down and widely used for the Confucian ideals of governing and saving the state. Written as in Chinese bronze inscriptions and in small seal script, ji ( 济) is a morphological character with shui (水) as a morphological symbol and qi (齐) as a vocal symbol. The original meaning of ji is the name of a river, referring to the Ji River, but it also has a general meaning related to water. It is used as a noun for ferry and as a verb for crossing the flowing water. In The Book of History, there is a phrase like “in order to ji (help) the people.” Ji (济) also has the same meaning as qi (齐), which means to harmonize (Figs. 13.3 and 13.4). Jingshi (经世) and jimin (济民) are combined to form the phrases such as jingshi jimin and jingshi jisu (经世济俗). For example, Ge Hong of the Eastern Jin Dynasty said in his “Mingben,” Baopuzi: “Confucianists are devoted to promoting governance for the people.” The book also contains the phrase “use wisdom and intelligence to promote governance for the people.” From the Sui and Tang dynasties, the phrase “governance for the people” became popular. For example, the phrase “save

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and govern the state”1 appeared in a text issued by Li Yuan, the Tang Emperor Gaozong. This phrase also became a source of naming people, such as the name of Li Shimin (李世民), the Tang Emperor Taizong, who was named after jingshi anmin (济世安民),2 and the name of the modern revolutionary Cai Jimin (蔡济民), an important participant in the Wuchang Uprising of the Revolution of 1911 who was named after jingshi jimin (经世济民). As an abbreviation of the phrases “经世济俗” ( jingshi jisu) and “经 世济民”( jingshi jimin), meaning governance for the people, the term “jingji” (经济) is believed to first appear in the Western Jin Dynasty. According to “The Governance by the King of Changsha,” The Book of Jin, during the War of the Eight Princes (291–306), Changsha King Sima Yi wrote to his brother Chengdu King Sima Ying, said that as brothers, they “are both from the same royal family, but we have been named to serve outside of the capital and cannot expound and propagate the king’s concept of governance.” According to “Biography of Ji Zhan,” The Book of Jin, Emperor Yuan of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (reigned from 317 to 322) praised Ji Zhan in an edict: “Ji Zhan is faithful and aboveboard and good at governance for the people.” “Biography of Yin Hao,” The Book of Jin, says that in his letter to Yin Hao, Emperor Jianwen of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (reigned 371–372) that, “You have sunken your knowledge and talent into the bottom of the sea, and after a long period of reflection and practice, you will be able to show your talent one day for promoting governance for the people.” In his “Ritual and Music,” Zhongshuo, philosopher Wang Tong of the Sui dynasty praised a Confucian family of the time as follows: It has been a Confucian family for seven generations, and all of them have been good at governance for the people.

This passage of Wang Tong is often used by dictionaries as the first example of the term “jingji,” but in fact, Wang’s use of the term is about three centuries later than the abovementioned historical texts.

1 Imperial Diary of the Foundation of the Great Tang, vol. I. 2 “Imperial Biographies,” The Old Book of Tang, vol. II.

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From the Tang Dynasty onward, the use of jingji became more frequent. For example, Li Bai’s “Mock a Confucianist of Lu” says: When an old man of Lu talked about the Five Classics, White-haired, he stuck to the texts. When asked about how to govern the state for the people, He was at an utter loss for words.

Du Fu “Reflections While Going Upstream” says: Ever since ancient times, Few have been adept at governance for the people.

The legendary fiction Ganze Yao: Tao Xian by Yuan Jiao in the late Tang Dynasty says of Wang Xian: Wang Xian is well learned that he is good at governance for the people.

“Biography of the Tang Emperor Xuanzong,” The Old Book of Tang, says of the emperor: At the imperial court, he was indeed good at governance for the people.

“Biography of Wang Anshi,” A History of the Song Dynasty, quotes Zhu Xi as saying: He was superior to the rest of the country by virtue of his literary talent and conduct, and he took it as his responsibility to promote morality and governance and benefit the people. He served as the Prime Minister under the Song Emperor Shenzong.

There is a famous ancient couplet praising the literary talent of Sima Qian and Sima Xiangru, and praising Zhuge Liang’s ability to govern and bring peace to the country: The two Simas of Western Han had the highest literary talent, Wolong of Nanyang could best govern for the people.

In its comments on members of the Practical Merit School, A History of the Song Dynasty would often praise them for their ability to govern for

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the people. For example, its “Biography of Ye Shi” says that he “aimed high and was good at governance for the people” and its “Biography of Chen Liang” says that he “was devoted to governance for the people and valued the keeping of his promises.” In Dream of the Red Chamber, Jia Zheng praises Jia Yucun for his attention to governance for the people and scolds his son Jia Baoyu for his indifference to this and for his excessive love for women.” The concept of “governance for the people” ( jingji) in the above text is the abbreviation of jingshi jimin or jingshi jiguo, which means those in government govern the state for the benefit of the people and is similar to politics in meaning. Of course, the ancient meaning of jingji also includes national finance, national economy, and people’s lives. For example, the seventh volume of Zhuozhong Zhi, an autobiographical memoir written by the Ming Dynasty eunuch Liu Ruyu, says of Chen Ju, Eunuch Director of Brush-Writing of the Directorate of Ceremonial during the reign of the Ming Emperor Wanli, “He was devoted to jingji, paying every attention to the country’s annual revenue and expenditure.” The “jingji” here is not detached from the traditional meaning of governance for the people. The terms “jinglüe” (经略) and “jingzhi” (经制), which are similar to jingji in meaning, became names of official positions. For example, the Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties set up jinglüeshi (经略使, Major) in important border garrison towns as border defense officers. According to Water Margin, framed and persecuted by Grand Marshal Gao Qiu, Wang Jin, a martial arts instructor of the Imperial Guards in Dongjing (present-day Kaifeng), flees to Yan’an Prefecture at night to join his Major friend. The Song Dynasty also had the official position of jingzhishi”(经制史) who took charge of financial and taxation affairs in the southeast. Jingji also became a name of an official position. For example, the Jin Dynasty had jingjishis (经济使, relief officers).3 In the late Qing Dynasty, the term “jingji” was still used by its classical meaning of governance for the people, but it increasingly included salt, river work, river transport, and other aspects of the national economy and people’s livelihood. In 1861, Lin Zexu’s disciple Feng Guifen discussed “how to promote governance for the people” in his “Using Western Learning,” A Discussion at Xiaobinlu Residence, advocating “using the

3 “Records of the Historian Biography,” vol. 66, A History of the Jin Dynasty.

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techniques all other countries used to become rich and strong as a supplement,” thus becoming the first to introduce Western policy governance. Subsequently, Xue Fucheng, Wang Tao, and others also discussed how to make China rich and strong, making the concept of governance for the people more practical. Of course, it was Zeng Guofan who led this academic direction in the late Qing Dynasty. In 1869, in his “On Learning: To Zhili Students,” Zeng Guofan divided Confucianism into four subjects, namely, argumentation, textual criticism, rhetoric, and governance for the people. He further deliberated on them in the first volume of his Qiuque Study Diary: There are sciences of argumentation, rhetoric, governance for the people, and textual criticism. The science of argumentation is the study of principle in A History of the Song Dynasty and the study of virtue in Confucianism. The science of rhetoric is the study of speech in Confucianism. The study of economics is the subject of political affairs in Confucius. The science of governance for the people is the study of politics in Confucianism. The science of textual criticism, which is now known as the study of Sinology, is also language in Confucianism. None of these four is dispensable.4

Including the science of governance for the people in the study of politics in Confucianism in order to highlight Neo-Confucianism’s function as a study of governance for the people shows that Zeng Guofan still used the term “jingji” in the political sense, i.e., in the sense of governance for the people while the actual study of the national economy and the people’s livelihood (military science, agriculture, financial management, etc.) is an important part of the study of jingji (economy). Because of Zeng’s great influence in the years of emperors Xianfeng, Tongzhi, and Guangxu and the needs of the times, the study of jingji (economy) gradually became a subject of study for students in the late Qing Dynasty, and this phrase became widespread and widely used. In May of 1898, the eve of the Reform Movement, Zhang Zhidong, the governor of Huguang, and Chen Baojian, the governor of Hunan, presented the New Memorial on the Imperial Examinations, which advocated the dropping of the requirement for the eight-legged essays in the examinations and the replacement of essays on “Chinese jingji,”

4 Zeng Guofan, Qiuque Study Diary, Shanghai, Huifengtang Book Company, 1925, p. 11.

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which consisted of Chinese history and politics of the dynasty, and on “Western jingji,” which consisted of geography, schools, finance, the military system, commerce, and criminal law (see Collected Works of Zhang Zhidong, vol. 48). Guizhou education officer Yan Xiu asked for the imperial examinations to add the examination of jingji subjects to select officials well-versed in current Chinese and foreign affairs. The proposal was shelved due to the Reform Movement of 1898, but was immediately reactivated by the New Policies in the late Qing Dynasty, when the Qing court issued an imperial edict in August 1901, abolishing the eight-legged essays and establishing the Special Jingji Section and the Main Jingji Section in the imperial examinations for current affairs examinations. In 1903, the Special Jingji Section was introduced and administered the imperial examination of the Special Jingji Section in the Hall of Preserving Harmony. Zhang Zhidong, an advocate of the New Policies in the late Qing Dynasty, was a marker of the imperial examination of the Special Jingji Section. The examination of the Special Jingji Section covered Chinese and Western jingji, which still meant governance for the people, though the examination already covered the new contents of Chinese and Western academic on the governance of the state (primarily finance, trade, transportation, etc.). This was a major development in the reform of the imperial examination system in the late Qing Dynasty, which made the eight-legged essays withdraw from the imperial examination and was actually a prelude to the abolition of the imperial examinations in 1905. Protestant missionaries who were China in the late Qing Dynasty also used the term “jingji” in its traditional sense. For example, Young John Allen began to publish “A Brief Discourse on the Relations between China and the West” in volume 358 of Church News in October 1875, and his first article, “On the Method of Creating Wealth,” included the phrase “stress the jingji of Yao, Shun, Yu the Great, and Tang of Shang”; “Care for China, The Third Book” published by Anonymous in volume 497 of Church News (the sixth moon of the fourth year of Qing Emperor Guangxu) says, “Among the nations, China has many jingji personnel, so it is rich and strong country.” This is followed by the repeated use of jingji, including, for example, “this is jingji that is needed for making the country rich and strong,” “to become a rich and strong country, China must promote its jingji first,” “real results must be

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made in improving China’s jingji,” and “with jingji comes no benefit.”5 Volume 533 of the same newspaper contains the article “Urge Students to Study Things Useful for Today” by Shaozhi Shiwuzhe (meaning knowing a little about current affairs). The article suggests that “we should have greater learning, greater jingji.”6 The term “jingji” that appears in many places in Church News sponsored by Western missionaries means governance for the people, but its emphasis is already on the need to make China rich and strong and blaze a path to prosperity. The word “economy” is used in many places in Church News, showing the transformation of the classical political term “jingji” to mean national economy and the people’s livelihood.

5 “Care for China, The Third Book” Church News, Shanghai: Linhua Academy, July 13, 1878, vol. 497, pp. 645–646. 6 Shaozhi Shiwuzhe, “Urge Students to Study Things Useful for Today” Church News, Shanghai: Linhua Academy, April 5, 1879, vol. 533, p. 431.

CHAPTER 14

Jingji as Envisaged in the Studies for Practical Solutions in China and Japan in the Near-Ancient Period: The National Economy and the People’s Livelihood

14.1 Jingji Which Means Governance for the People From the pre-Qin Dynasty period onward, jingji was understood to mean governance for the people with the help of the term “jingshi” (经世). Gong Zizhen of the Qing Dynasty said: Before the Zhou Dynasty, each period of politics had its own period of scholarship which was created by a king.... But this Way, this scholarship, and this politics are all just the same.1

With the consistent spirit of Confucianism for governance for the people, this way, this scholarship, and this politics inwardly form the sage just as it was believed by the Zi Si-Mencius School, and externally form the king just as it was advocated by Xunzi. “Refute the Assertions of 12 People,” Xunzi, says that, “They governed the country and used all things to nourish all the people.” This demonstrates the content of the study of

1 Collected Works of Gong Zizhen, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1975, p. 4.

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“jingji” in research on the national economy and the people’s livelihood. This kind of research direction was encouraged by Chen Liang, Ye Shi, and other members of the Practical Merit School. They stressed both morality and utilitarianism, and finance, military management, and deployment other practical studies became an extension of jingji. By the time of the Ming and Qing dynasties, studies for practical solutions reached a new peak, the use of all things to improve the people’s lives was held as a standard by scholars, agriculture, salt, transport, merchants, financial management enriched the connotation of jingji, and studies for practical solutions gradually became an independent discipline. According to Zhao Jing’s “Jingji,” A General History of Chinese Culture and Ye Tan’s The Roots of Chinese Jingji, jingji was commonly included in the titles of books from the Song and Yuan dynasties onward, such as Liu Yan’s An Explanation of Jingji and Ma Cun’s Selected Works on Jingji and Teng Gong’s On Jingji in the Song Dynasty, and Li Shizhan’s Selected Works of Jingji in the Ming Dynasty. There were more books with jingji included in their titles such as Essays on Jingji, Works on Jingji by Famous Ministers of the Ming Dynasty, A Reference Book on Jingji, On Jingji, Works on Jingji, Biographies of Famous Jingji Ministers of the Ming Dynasty, A General Survey of Jingji, and A General Introduction to Jingji. The Qing Dynasty also had Essays on Jingji in the Qing Dynasty and New Essays on Jingji in the Qing Dynasty. The different kinds of essays on jingji in the Ming and Qing dynasties were close to their essays on governance for the people in both content and editing style, were mostly collections of proposals for governance for the people and were devoted more and more to specific content of finance and industry and commerce, such as money management, taxation, tuntian, salt law, tea law, rivers and canals, canal transport, industry, management of mountains, lakes, birds and beasts, and financial and economic affairs.2 It can be seen that jingji became increasingly significant in the national economy and people’s livelihood from the Song and Yuan dynasties onward. Of course, all this was included in the general theme of “governance for the people,” that is to say, it was part of the political topic of national governance.

2 See Feng Tianyu, “The Compilation of Essays on Governance for the people in the Late Qing Dynasty,” Studies for Practical Solutions in the Late Qing Dynasty, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, Chapter 11, 2002.

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14.2 The Use of the Term “経済” (Keizai, Jingji) in Early Modern Japan The term “経済” in the sense of “governance for the people” was introduced to Japan from China at an early stage, along with Chinese classics, and was sometimes found in ancient Japanese classics. In the early modern era (Edo period), there were many Japanese books named after keizai, such as Dazai Shundai’s Keizairoku (経済錄) which starts by explaining keizai: All governance of the country is called keizai.3

The keizai referred to in Rangaku scholar Aoki Kony¯o’s Keizai Sany¯ o, Kaiho Seiry¯o’s On Keizai, Sat¯o Nobuhiko’s Keizai Y¯ oryaku which confused Shinto with foreign studies, Chikuzan Nakai’s Keizai Y¯ ogo, Koga Seiri’s Selected Works on Keizai, and Sh¯oji K¯oki’s Keizai Mond¯ o Hiroku all means governance for the people. To extend this meaning of keizai’s, the first volume of Sat¯o Nobuhiko’s Keizai Y¯ oryaku says: So-called “keizai” means to manage the territory of the country to save the people.4

Of course, keizai still meant a political theory of governance for the people, but it focused on the creation and distribution of material wealth. This kind of theory of keizai, which focused on the national economy and the people’s livelihood, was a manifestation of the spirit of seeking practical solutions and rejecting empty talk that flourished in the Edo period in Japan, foreshadowing the trend of lexical transformation of the term “keizai “ in modern times. In the foreign studies in the late Edo period, the keizai theory was more inclined to the exploration of the national economy and the people’s livelihood and included the study of Western science and the introduction of Western production technology. Keisei Hisaku (A Secret Plan of Government) written by Honda Toshiaki who engaged in foreign

3 Dazai Shundai’s Keizairoku, Tokyo: Keizai Zasshisha, 1894, p. 1. 4 Sat¯ o Nobuhiko, Keizai Y¯ oryaku, Tokyo: National Institute of Japanese Literature,

1876, vol. 1, p. 1.

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studies, proposes four major national priorities: first, the extraction of saltpeter (mining saltpeter, breaking up rocky reefs, and opening up water and land transportation); second, minerals development (mining gold, silver, copper, iron, lead and other minerals for national use); third, shipping development (shipbuilding and development of shipping, so that the world’s products can be circulated); and fourth, island development (development of the surrounding islands, especially expanding the northern frontier). Although the term “keisei” still retained its ancient Chinese meaning of governance for the people, its content had been extended to material production, circulation, exchange and distribution, and advocated the study of Western technology. Honda Toshiaki also wrote an essay entitled “Keizai H¯ogon.” In its “Introduction,” the essay discusses how to use Western technology in the construction of houses, roads, and bridges, and the use of stone and iron materials, and its “A general discussion of keizai,” it discusses how to increase material production to meet the needs of the people for food, clothing, and shelter and proposes that the solution to this problem for Japan as a maritime country is to expand foreign trade. It can be seen that although the keizai theory of the Japanese in the Edo period was still a political theory of governance for the people, it already focused on material production, circulation, exchange, and distribution, which were related to the national economy and the people’s livelihood, and it stressed opening up. This laid the groundwork for the modern Japanese to translate the word “economy” to keizai. In the Edo period, the term “enriching the country” was often used in Japan, in addition to the discussion of governance for the people under the name of “keizai.” Shihei Hayashi, who predated Honda Toshiaki, wrote an essay entitled “Proposal to Enrich the Country” to discuss the issue of rich and poor. The title of Shihei’s essay is modeled on the Chinese monograph Fuguoce (Strategy of Enriching the Country) written by Li Gou in the Song Dynasty. Of course, the term “enrich the country” has a more distant origin, as Sima Qian said that when Guan Zhong ruled Qi in the Spring and Autumn period, he encouraged his people to “accumulate wealth, enrich the country and strengthen the military.”5 Xunzi also wrote the article entitled “Enriching the Country” during the Warring States period. In the late 1860s, the School

5 “Biographies of Guan Zhong and Yan Ying,” Records of the Historian.

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of Combined Learning of the Qing Dynasty in Beijing set up a course on “Enriching the Country,” which was taught by American missionary William Alexander Parsons Martin. Joseph Edkins, a British missionary to China, wrote Strategy of Enriching the Country (serially published in Church News, vol. 43–88, 1892–1896). In Japan, there were also many translations and works with “enrich the country” included in their titles, such as Nagamine Hideki’s translation of Francis A. Walker’s The Making of a Nation as On Enriching the Country in 1874 and Fukuzumi Masae’s book Shortcut to Enrich the Country in 1875. It can be seen that the Japanese and Western missionaries to China coincidentally borrowed the classical Chinese term “strategy to enrich the country” to name their treatises on the national economy and the people’s livelihood and at one time used it as a translation of the Western term “economics.”

14.3

The Presentation of Jingjixue (经济学)

The term “jingjixue” has also been used in China since ancient times. The poem of Yan Wei in Volume 263 of Complete Tang Poems says: Governance for the people should be valued, To seek the development of the country.

This is an early example. In his comments on Works of Lu Zhi, Zhu Xi said that “this is jingji zhixue” (the study of governance for the people). This term was also used in “Biography of Zhao Mengfu,” A History of the Yuan Dynasty. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, the phrases “dangwu jingji zhixue” (must carry out studies of governance for the people) and “haojiang jingji zhixue” (enjoy discussing governance for the people) often appeared in history books on people. In these books, jingji zhixue is often juxtaposed with the study of life, the study of neoConfucianism, and the study of history as a category of learning. As I mentioned earlier, in the late Qing Dynasty, Zeng Guofan believed that in addition to argumentation, textual criticism, and rhetoric, students must study jingji zhixue (the study of governance for the people). These examples of jingjixue and jingji zhixue all refer to the study of governance for the people, but they already include more and more contents of the national economy and the people’s livelihood. But after all, they cannot break through the limit of general politics and general ethics. The term

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“keizai-gaku” used by the pre-mid Edo period in Japan was generally similar to the meaning of jingjixue in the Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties in China: Under the general theme of the study of governance for the people, there is an increasing amount of content on the national economy and the people’s livelihood, but it has not yet broken through the political framework of keizai. By the end of the Edo period, this changed, which was directly related to the Eastern spread of Western terminology.

CHAPTER 15

The Evolution of Ancient and Modern Meaning of Economy in the West Until It Was Finally Settled

The term “jingji” in the cultural circle of Chinese characters was transformed from the classical meaning of governance for the people to mean a system of inter-related national production, distribution, and consumption activities, and also mean being frugal and giving good value or return in relation to the money, beginning with the use of keizai by modern Japanese as the translation of English term “economy.” In the West, the term “economy” has a rather complicated development process. The English word “economy” evolved from the Greek word “o„κoνoμ´ια.” In O„κ oν oμικ o´ ς written by the Greek thinker Xenophon in the fourth century B.C., the Greek word “o κoς” (oîkos) is interpreted as family (clan), and νšμω (ném¯o) originally means domination and is extended to mean management. The two form a composite word, meaning “household,” “household management,” “clan management,” so Xenophon’s O„κ oν oμικ o´ ς what can be translated into Chinese as as Household Management or On Household Management. This is the origin of the term “economy” in Western culture. Aristotle, who was half a century behind Xenophon, defined economics as the study of the art of getting money and getting rich, including the distribution of slaves. He wrote two books—Economics (meaning household management) and Politics. The former argues that “economics arose before politics” and

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that “economics is as different from politics as the family is from the citystate.”1 In short, in the West, the meaning of economy as household management is longstanding, but gradually evolved. By the Middle Ages, the classical city-state society no longer existed, but the political governance of the country and the states remained separate from the economy (household management), which was diametrically different as the ancient Chinese concept of integration of oneself and his family, state, and country and of the unified process of cultivating oneself, regulating one’s family well, governing the state properly, and bringing peace to all under heaven. Therefore, the ancient Chinese term “jingji” (governance for the people) has a larger conceptual domain than the term “economy” (household management) used in the Classical Era and the Medieval Age in Europe. In the sixteenth century, economy (household management) was combined with agronomy, which was studied by rural nobles. It was also combined with Christian theology, containing the meaning of Divine regimen, and gradually took on a legal meaning. In the seventeenth century, economy was gradually extended from the meaning of household management to the meaning of state governance, and its conceptual domain expanded so that it became close to the concept contained in the classical Chinese term “jingji” (governance for the people). For example, the title of Antoine de Montchrétie’s book Traicté de l’économie politique, published in 1615, means The Order and Rule of the State. It was claimed the book was “a political economy for the king and queen.” Montchrétie said that what he discussed in the book had gone beyond the scope of family life and family management to cover social governance, the national economy, and the people’s livelihood and include the political content of governing the state and bringing peace to all under heaven, so it was a kind of reading material for the sovereign and was therefore called political economy. In the eighteenth century, there were more and more treatises on economy in Western Europe, and the thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau during the Enlightenment wrote in 1755 an entry on “political economy” for the French Encyclopédie (compiled between 1751 and 1772). His political economy was distinguished from the ancient Greek household management and focused on governing the state and bringing peace 1 Aristotle, “Economics,” Collected Works, Renmin University of China Press, 1994, vol. 9, p. 289.

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to all under heaven. Classical economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus and John Stuart Mill all adopted political economy. For example, in 1817 Ricardo published a representative work On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Marx wrote Critique of Political Economy; his magnum opus Capital is also subtitled A Critique of Political Economy. Of course, the economic thought of these important European philosophers from the eighteenth century onward also contains the search for the laws of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, which makes the term “economy” no longer a subordinate to politics, but makes it refer to the national economic and people’s livelihood activities that are connected with politics and self-contained. In the modern West, economy had a double meaning of economy and economics, and in the nineteenth century, some people in Englishspeaking countries suggested that the suffix “ics” should be added to economy to make it a standardized disciplinary name, thus giving rise to the word “economics.” The Economist, a famous weekly magazine founded in 1843 in England, promoted the popularity of the term “economics.” By the late nineteenth century, the distinction between economics and politics in the West became clearer, and economics was devoted to the study of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. For example, William S. Jevons proposed to replace political economics with economics in the late 1870s. British economist Alfred Marshall published Principles of Economics in 1890, including economics in its title. Since then, the division between economics and political economics has become more and more obvious. From the early nineteenth century onward, with the progress of economic activities, the connotation of economy became more and more refined, James Mill, a British economist, advocated the aspects of the meaning of economy in his book Elements of Political Economy: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. Later, in his A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Commerce and Commercial Navigation, John R. McCulloch made a similar statement. The present-day meaning of economy (the sum of the acts and processes of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, and the social relations of human beings formed on this basis) was thus basically settled. In summary, the concept of Western economics has undergone a process of “negation of negation”: in ancient times and the Middle Ages, economy was separated from the state and city-state politics; in the early and mid-modern period, the two tended to be combined and developed

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in the name of political economy; and from the mid-nineteenth century, with the maturity of industrial civilization and commodity economy, economics and politics developed separately at a new level, and economics was separated from political economy and became a special science to discuss the national economy and the people’s livelihood, devoted to the study production, distribution, consumption and exchange. As early as 1631, Western economica had already entered the Chinese language in Mingli Tan (An Exploration of Principles), the Chinese translation of the Latin version of Introduction to Aristotle’s Dialectics prepared by Francois Furtado and Li Zhizao. They translated economica as management literally and egenuomijia transliterally,2 but the translation has almost no influence. In general, the Eastern spread of Western economic concepts took place after the mid-nineteenth century (it happened in the mid-nineteenth century in Japan, and in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in China). The evolution of the concept of economy from political economy to economics was taking place in the West in the mid- and late nineteenth century, so Chinese and Japanese scholars countries had different understandings of economy, which led to differences in the choice of Chinese characters for the translation of economy.

2 See Mingli Tan, a Chinese version of Introduction to Aristotle’s Dialectics prepared by Francois Furtado and Li Zhizao, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1959.

CHAPTER 16

Translation of Economy into Keizai in the Late Edo Period and During the Meiji Period

In the early modern Japan, the translation of the Western word “economy” went through a complicated process. The Japanese were firstly influenced by the evolution of the semantics of the European and American term “economy,” and then they chose their versions through leaps and bounds.

16.1 The Change of the Meaning of the European and American Term “Economy” and the Following by the Japanese For a long period of time, the Western term “economy” was used in conjunction with “political” and was compatible with the meaning of political governance, but in the mid-nineteenth century, Europe and America adopted economy as the abbreviation of political economy, and the meaning of economy shifted to production, exchange, and distribution. At this time (the late Edo Period and early Meiji period, i.e., the mid-nineteenth century), when the Japanese were looking for kanji (Chinese characters) for economy during their translation of Western works, it was inevitable that they chose 経済(keizai), meaning governance for the people. In addition, as mentioned above, since the mid-Edo period, due to the development of the study for practical solutions, the term “keizai” had come to increasingly mean the national economy and © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_16

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the people’s livelihood. The combination of these two led to the mutual convergence of keizai and economy, which led the modern Japanese to translate economy as keizai. At the end of the Japanese Edo period, foreign studies were emerging, and the English-Japanese dictionaries came into being. In 1862, Hori Tatsunosuke (1823–1894) at the Institute for the Study of Barbarian Books published A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language, which was the first in Japan to translate economist as 経済 家and political economy as 経済学.1 In 1869, the government-authorized reprint of A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language translated economy as 家事ヲスルコト,倹約スルコトand 法and political economy as経済学.2 The difference between the two was clearly noted. According to An English-Japanese Dictionary, edited by Takahashi Shinkichi et al. and published in the same year and An English and Japanese Dictionary, edited by Arai Ikenosuke and published in 1872: economical adj. 家事ノ。 倹約ナル economically adv. 家事ヲ為シテ。倹約シテ economist s. 家事スル人。 経済家 economize-ed-ing. v. a. et. 倹約スル economy s. 家事ヲスルコト、倹約スルコト、法 political economy 経済学 Also in 1872, on the eve of his study in the Netherlands, the Enlightenment scholar Nishi Amane used the term “keizai-gaku” (経済学) in a letter to Rijiro Matsuoka, saying that: I have just come to see Western philosophy and keizai-gaku are really amazingly fair and overboard arguments, and thus feel they are quite different from the Chinese concepts we have always been learning.3

1 Hori Tatsunosuke, A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language, Edo:

The Institute of Foreign Languages, 1862, p. 245. 2 Hori Tatsunosuke, A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language supplemented by Horikoshi Kamenosuke, Tokyo: T¯ oky¯o-fu Aritaya Seiemon, 1869, p. 123. 3 Nishi Amane, “A Letter to Rijiro Matsuoka on the Interest in Western Philosophy,” Collected Works, Tokyo: Munetaka Shob¯ o, 1981, vol. 1, p. 8.

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From the context of the letter, the “keizai-gaku” in question is no longer the traditional study of governance for the people in ancient Chinese, but refers to a Western discipline that is just as important as philosophy, but the letter does not go further to discuss them. Later the letter mentions the foundation of keizai4 that corresponds with Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, and Zhu Xi’s principle of life. The keizai here obviously means governance for the people. It can be seen that the meaning of the term “keizai” used by Nishi was still in a state of flux and had not fully developed to mean economy in its modern sense.

16.2 Staatshuishoudkunde Was Translated as Seisan-Gaku (製産学) and Keizai-Gaku Got Closer to Waseisan-Gaku In 1863, Nishi Amane and Tsuda Mamichi studied in the Netherlands under Simon Vissering, a doctor of law. Vissering wrote a bamboo document to show his method of teaching, in which law was divided into five subjects: “(1) natural law, (2) international public law, (3) national law, (4) seisan-gaku (economics) and (5) statistics.”5 The present translation of these five subjects are: natural law, international public law, national jurisprudence, economics, and statistics. At this time, Amane translated staatshuishoudkunde as seisan-gaku. He explained seisan-gaku as follows: Seisan-gaku is the art of enriching the country and the people and teaching them how to do so.6

And in “The Summary of the Five Subjects,” a revised version of “Learning the Five Subjects,” Amane translated Vissering’s five subjects as follows: (1) natural law, (2) international public law, (3) national law, (4) economics, and (5) statistics.7

4 Ibid. 5 Nishi Amane, “Learning the Five Subjects,” Collected Works, Tokyo, Munetaka Shob¯ o,

1981, vol. 1, p. 134. 6 Ibid. 137. 7 Ibid, p. 138.

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Both the keizai-gaku and seisan-gaku used by Nishi mean the same thing—the art of enriching the country and securing the people. At this time, the Nishi hovered between keizai-gaku and seisan-gaku, the two translations for economics. The term “keizai-gaku” used by Nishi corresponded to the terms “seihy¯ o-gaku” (政表学) and “keikoku-gaku” (経国学, while both seihy¯ o-gaku and keikoku-gaku mean politics. Therefore, the so-called “keizai-gaku” of Nishi no longer meant governance for the people, which is political, and that is, the study of politics, and referred exclusively the study of the national economy and the people’s livelihood.

16.3 The Japanese Misuse of the Term “经纪” (Jingji) Led to the Change of the Meaning of “经济” (Jingji) The reason for this change in the meaning of “jingji” is not only that the meaning of “economy” used by Europeans shifted from politics to the national economy and the people’s livelihood, but also the Japanese misused the term “经纪” introduced from China. The Chinese term “经 纪” refers to the production, use, management, and distribution of goods and materials and means good management. This is what is meant by “Banfajie,” Guanzi, when it says, “The sages followed its example and established 经纪” and by “Biography of Sima Qian,” A History of the Han Dynasty, when it says, “For the government, it clarifies the principles of the kings, and for the public, it distinguishes the经纪 guidelines for various matters in the human world. 经纪 is pronounced the same as 经济in Chinese and the two look similar to each other, so they were often used alternatively after they were introduced to Japan so that 经 济assumed the meaning of 经纪(good management). This is one of the semantic reasons why the original meaning of 经济in modern Japan was changed to management and livelihood. In 1911, in the entry of “jingji” in his A New and Comprehensive Encyclopedic Dictionary for General Use, Huang Moxi briefly explained the metamorphosis of the meaning of jingji and the errors caused by its introduction to Japan from China: The term “jingji” (经济) means governance for the people. In China, those who are good at planning are called”经纪.” When the Japanese imported Chinese, they mistook 经纪for经济, because both are pronounced jingji. Such examples abound. Now the Japanese term “経済” (keizai) has been

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imported back to China with the meaning of “economy,” which is totally different from its original meaning in Chinese. Although it is difficult to abandon the habit of using jingji for economy, it is advisable to know how this practice originally came into being.

Huang’s suggestion is very important and worth noting. Kanda Takahira, who served as a professor at the Institute of Foreign Languages and the Institute of Foreign Education successively, published a book entitled Governance for the People. Under this traditional subject, he discusses issues such as increasing property and trade. Doi K¯oka called him “a second Adam Smith, whose study was devoted to governance.”8 In 1867, Kanda made Introduction to Keizai the title of his translation of British scholar William Ellis’s Outlines of Social Economy (first published in 1846 and reprinted in 1850), which can be directly translated as Introduction to Social Economy. So Kanda translated economy as keizai. Vissering translated Outlines of Social Economy into Dutch and Kanda translated the Dutch version into Japanese. Kanda’s preface to his translation reads: Although each country has its own rules, the teaching practices in schools in the Western countries are very similar. Five important disciplines are offered: (1) canons, (2) law, (3) philosophy, (4) medicine, and (5) literature. Each discipline offers different subjects.... Law has seven subjects: (1) civil law, (2) commercial law, (3) criminal law, (4) national law, (5) international public law, (6) accounting, and (7) keizai-gaku. All these are what the country needs and students cannot ignore.9

Keizai-gaku here is economics in its modern sense. In 1868, the book was renamed Introduction to Western Keizai and reprinted. The book also created a number of kanji to translate Western terms, such as 求取 (now 需求), 金馆 (now 银行), 工工 or 雇作 (now 劳动者), 财主 (now 资本家), 财本 (now 资本), 作 业 now 劳动), 相迫 (now 竞争), 品位 (now价格), and 利分 (now利润). The most important of all, of course, was “经济” (economy). Introduction to Keizai is one of the first books in the cultural

8 Doi K¯ oka, “Preface to Commentary on On Governance for the People,” in Kanda Takahira, Commentary on On Governance for the People, Tokyo: Shoeido, 1879, p. 3 of the preface. 9 Willian Ellis, Outlines of Social Economy, Japanese version by Kanda Takahira, Yirishi, Tokyo: Kinokuniya Genbee, 1867, p. 1 of the preface.

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circle of Chinese characters to use keizai in its new meaning as the title, and it is a pioneering work in translating economy as keizai.

16.4

Establishment of the New Name “Keizai” in Japan

As early as the end of Edo period, Ga Noriyuki (1840–1923) translated The Elements of Political Economy by Francis Wayland (1796–1865), an American, “as a stepping stone for beginning students to read economic books.” Later, at the request of and with the help of his disciple Fujii Senzan, he further refined his translation and made it a book titled Enlightening Readings on Economy. At the beginning of the Meiji period, Fujii added “A Helper in Life” to the title of the book and had it republished in four volumes from 1872 to 1874 by Eishasai in Tokyo. The book begins with an explanation of keizai-gaku, stating that, “Keizai covers a wide range of issues that should be studied one by one. It covers production, exchange, profit, and consumption.”10 From 1869 to 1870, the Kaisei School (later the Southern University) in Tokyo published The Original Theory of Political Economy in seven volumes, Ogata Sei and Mitsukuri Rinsh¯ o’s Japanese version of Elements of Political Economy published by the American scholar of history and economics Arthur Latham Perry in 1867. According to “The Elements of Political Economy,” Part II of Chapter 3: Political Economy is originally “a branch of moral philosophy.” The moral philosophy Adam Smith first taught was divided into four parts: the first comprises natural theology; the second is about ethnics, or what Paley terms the science of duty and the reasons of it; the third discusses jurisprudence, or that part of morality which relates to justice; while the fourth part examines those political and social regulations which are founded on expediency, and which tend to increase the prosperity and power of a State.” Ogata note says: “The last 10 A Helper in Life: Enlightening Readings on Economy, Kanda Takahira’s Japanese version of Francis Wayland’s The Elements of Political Economy, Tokyo: Eishasai, 1872, vol. I, pp. 1–2 of the introductory remarks by Fujii Senzai. Francis Wieland’s The Elements of Political Economy was also translated by Obata Tokujir¯ o and published in nine volumes under the title On Political Economy by Shokodo from 1871 to 1877 in Tokyo, with the permission of the government. On the first page, Its “Introduction to the Original Text” begins with this statement: “Political economy means financial science or science of enriching the country…. The way of managing and increasing financial resources means exactly the same for both individuals and the country.”.

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one is what is called political economy by the later generations. At that time, its name was already established in Japanese, but it was not yet commonly used.”11 In 1871, Nagae Ken wrote “On Keizai: Ways to Make a Living,” which was published by Aoyodo in Osaka in February of the following year. The contents of the book were not only about economic issues in the present-day sense, but also about education administration, filial piety, and fraternity, the Four Cardinal Principles are propriety, righteousness, integrity, and shame, the five principles of how, between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity, and other policies for governing the country and bringing peace to all under heaven. Obviously, the “keizai” mentioned by Nagae does not go beyond the classical sense.12 It is noteworthy that the title of the book is at the front of the table of contents, and “On Keizai” is followed by “Ways to Make a Living.” It is evident that Nagae used the concepts of “keizai” and “making a living” as synonyms. At the beginning of 1873, Goshuzai in Kyoto published Nishimura Shigeki’s Japanese translation of the American scholar Henry Hartshorne’s (1823–1897) Household Cyclopedia: A Complete Practical Library of Household Information (published in 1871) under the title Household Keizai. In his Notes on the Use of the Book, Nishimura said, “Beginning with agriculture, this book deals with almost all the skills of various craftsmen and handicraft trades. It is indeed a treasure of human life and a method for enriching the country.”13 Nishimura’s view of Keizai is thus vaguely visible. In June 1873, with the permission of the government, Kinokuniya Genbee in Tokyo published Murota Jyuubi’s Japanese translation entitled A New Discussion of Keizai in two volumes. The first page of the

11 Arthur Latham Perry, Elements of Political Economy, Japanese version by Ogata Sei

and Mitsukuri Rinsh¯o, Tokyo: Kaisei School, 1869, p. 1. 12 Nagae Ken, On Keizai: Ways to Make a Living, Osaka: Aoyodo, 1872, pp. 1–7 of contents. 13 Henry Hartshorne, Household Cyclopedia: A Complete Practical Library of Household Information, Nishimura Shigeki’s Japanese version, Kyoto, Muraji Goemon, etc., 1873, p. 2 of the Notes.

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preface to the translation calls keizai-gaku “the art of financial management” and “the art of asset management”14 ; the first page of the first volume says: “Keizai deals with nothing but the art of governing the country and bringing peace to all under heaven. Political means relating to the government or the public affairs of a country. All is regarded as keizai. However, the keizai this books discusses is only about the art of production management.”15 In the winter of 1873, Ky¯uchido in Tokyo published Hayashi Masaaki’s Japanese translation entitled Introduction to Keizai in three volumes. Its “Introduction” reads, “Keizai-gaku investigates goods and materials and their production, exchange, and distribution…. Goods and materials are the main subject of keizai.”16 In January 1874, Bunseido in Tokyo published Fuso Kan’s A Guide to Foreign Theories, which says, “Keizai-gaku deals with everything from the issues of individuals and families to the affairs of countries and governments.” Here keizai-gaku is economy in English and German, but political economy in French.17 In June 1874, Yurikosai in Tokyo published the two-volume Principles of Keizai, Okada Yoshiki’s translation of Henry Charles Carey’s Principles of Political Economy. In the preface to the translation, the translator explained his view of keizai: “Since the Kenmu Restoration, the study for practical solutions has been on the increase, giving rise to Keizai-gaku. This science has produced ever-clearer explanations of issues ranging from the mechanism of the creation of heaven and earth and the reasoning of human wisdom and ingenuity to the art making the country rich and strong and the policy of maintaining law and order.18

14 Murota Jyuubi’s Japanese translation entitled A New Discussion of Keizai, Tokyo: Kinokuniya Genbee, 1873, p. 1 of the Preface. 15 Ibid., p. 1. 16 Hayashi Masaaki’s Japanese translation entitled Introduction to Keizai, Tokyo:

Ky¯uchido, 1873, vol. 1, p. 1 of the Introduction. 17 Fuso Kan, A Guide to Foreign Theories, Tokyo: Bunseido, 1874, p. 4, p. 20. 18 Okada Yoshiki, Principles of Keizai, Tokyo: Yurikosai, 1874, p. 1 of the Introduction.

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16.5 Fukuzawa Yukichi and Nakae ¯ Chomin Divided Keizai into Four Parts The widespread circulation of keizai and keizai-gaku in their present sense of economy and economics in Japan is related to the translation of Fukuzawa. When he visited Europe in 1862, he acquired the book Political Economy: For Use in Schools, and for Private Instruction published in Scotland by William and Robert Chambers in 1852. It can be translated as “Economics for School and Home Use.” Fukuzawa stated: Chambers’ book on keizai is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the way of human intercourse, the reason for the establishment of independent nations, the intercourse of nations, the reason for the establishment of government, the structure of government, national law, customs, and the education of the people, etc., which is called social economy; the second part deals with national governance, which is called political economy.19

In 1867, Fukuzawa translated this economic book and other books, and made them into a three-volume book entitled Western Affairs, which was published in the winter of the same year. In Volume 3, “General Theory of Economics” says: The purpose of keizai-gaku is mean to provide people with food, clothing, and shelter, to increase their wealth, and to see they are happy. This led great scholars of the past to write books on keizai issues and called them the treatises on the wealth of nations.20

The same volume traces the evolution of keizai from the ancient Greek household management to the study of the national economy and the people’s livelihood. Based on quotations of the economist John Ramsay MacCulloch, the volume argues that as a science, keizai covers the production, manufacturing, accumulation, distribution, and consumption of products.21 Fukuzawa’s Western Affairs was widely circulated, and the new terms “keizai” and “keizai-gaku” became popular. 19 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Western Affairs, Edo: Shokudo, 1867, vol. 1, pp. 1–2 of the Preface. 20 Ibid., p. 10. 21 Ibid., p. 11.

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16.6

Economy Means Being Frugal

It is worth mentioning that economy came to mean being frugal. A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language, published by Hori Tatsunosuke in 1862, explains economy as the method of being frugal to keep ends meet. This is an early example of giving the meaning of “being frugal” to economy. The Greek word “o„κoνoμ´ια” means household management, and being frugal is a must in household management. Following A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language, Fukuzawa elaborated on economy’s meaning of being frugal in his discussion of household economy and popularized the practice of being frugal. Fukuzawa’s book Economic Affairs of the People deals with “the household economy.”22 The first part of the book was published in 1877, trying to increase the awareness of young people aged 15 or 16 of the need to “save money,” “be honest” and “work hard,”23 emphasizing that “not a single bowl of cold rice or wick” should be treated as trivial or wasted, and advocating “quality and frugality” and careful accumulation of assets.24 Of course, Fukuzawa was not a frugalist. He embraced the Western idea of free economy and did not indiscriminately urge people not to be extravagant. He had a theory of hierarchical frugality: producers of material wealth should consume more and should not be frugal, while consumers such as bureaucrats and scholars should be frugal. “The Theory of Taxation” in the second edition of Western Affairs he published in 1870 advocated that the necessities of the poor should be taxed at a low rate or as untaxed goods, while the “extravagant” goods should be taxed heavily to increase the national revenue.25 In the second edition of his book

22 According to Fukuzawa Yukichi, “There are two kinds of economy. One is the home

economy in which the family business is developed by working for the basic needs, on the basis of which one should continue to work in order to keep his family independent. The other is the national economy in which on the basis of developing the family business to meet the basic needs and having wisdom and morality to spare, one should care about affairs beyond his family, work to benefit society, accumulate assets for the public and spend them on the independence of the country.” (Fukuzawa Yukichi, Economic Affairs of the People, Tokyo: Fukuzawa Yukichi, 1880, 2nd edition, preface, p. 1 of the preface). 23 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Economic Affairs of the People, Tokyo: Fukuzawa Yukichi, 1877,

p. 2. 24 Ibid, pp. 6–7. 25 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Western Affairs, Tokyo: Keio Press Inc., 1870, 2nd edition,

pp. 35–36.

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Economic Affairs of the People written in 1880, he reiterated his theory of hierarchical frugality, advocating “the national economy” and discussing the collection and distribution of assets. In addition to criticizing extravagance and waste of assets and money, dismissing extravagance as vicious, he advocated that producers should consume more and that the consumption and creation of wealth should be balanced, so should consumption and production, in order to develop the economy and protect the interests of humanity. This is consistent with the capitalist spirit of frugality and hard work to increase wealth in the modern Western “Protestant ethic,” and also has the implication of encouraging free economy. There were also scholars who were the contemporaries of Fukuzawa and interpreted “economy” in terms of “thrift and diligence.” For example, Chapter 1 on “Putting Enriching the Country First” from Okada Ry¯oichir¯o’s book On the Living Economy (published in 1879) begins with the following words: “Those who seek to enrich the country must make it a point to cut consumption and increase production”26 ; Chapter 8 on “Economy” begins with the following words: “People work diligently for profit and practice frugality due to poverty. Making the people practice economy is the art of the ruler.”27 Moreover, “Section 27: The Difference between Economy and Extravagance” of the first edition of the second volume of Sata Kaisek’s Saibai Keizairon (The Theory of Cultivating the Economies) stated that, “So-called economy is meant to curtail extravagance. So-called extravagance is to exceed the limits of consumption.” The essence of economy is to keep within the limits of consumption and wealth, and to keep the two in line with each other and remain moderate. Excessive consumption means extravagance, and to have less than enough consumption means stinginess. Extravagance and stinginess both fail to keep frugality and extravagance in line with each other.28 One of the earliest books that discusses the Japanese economy under the topic of “economy” is Sekkenron: Hakurai Zeihin (Imported Goods: On Economy) published by Murai Ichiei in 1880. According to the book, “Economy is what people call thrift,” that is, “to cut back extravagance by saving useless expenses, and to do everything

26 Okada Ry¯ oichir¯o, On the Living Economy, Shizuoka Prefecture: Kakegawa-cho, Yamauchi Hikoju, 1879, vol. 1, p. 1. 27 Ibid., p. 24. 28 Sata Kaisek, Saibai Keizairon, Tokyo: Sata Kaisek, 1878, p. 38.

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without spending money.” The book focuses on “economy in terms of imported goods” and advocates the enactment of an economy law for foreign goods.29 Nakae Ch¯omin also explained the meaning of economy as “hard work and frugality.” In short, the kanji for economy (keizai) in the Japanese that is commonly used today as an equal of frugality does not mean the same as the ancient Chinese meaning of the term “jingji.” Its origin traces back to A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Language which translates economy as frugality. The explanation of economy as frugality by the first and second editions of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s book Economic Affairs of the People made this meaning spread far and wide. Later, the term “economic principle” was developed, meaning “maximum effect with minimum cost,” and this meaning was also derived from the meaning of economy of frugality. To sum up, from the end of the Edo period to the beginning of the Meiji period, Japanese people gradually used the term “keizai” in the sense of material production, consumption, financial management, frugality, and giving good value or return in relation to the money, abandoning its classical meaning of political governance. Moreover, during the Meiji period, Japan had already translated the major economic schools in Europe and the United States, and both trade protectionism and economic liberalism spread in Japan. From the 1880s onward, there were many translations or paraphrases of Western treatises called “economics” in Japan. In 1902, Liang Qichao wrote A Short History of Economy with the intention of promoting Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. Because Yan Fu’s translation of Smith’s book was too profound to understand by common readers, Liang drew on various books on economics written and translated by the Japanese to explain it. These books include Abe Toranosuke’s Japanese version of J. K. Ingram’s A History of Philosophical Economy (published by the Economy Magazine in 1896), Sakatani Yoshiro’s Japanese version (published in 1887 by the Philosophical Academy in 1887) of the English translation of Luigi Cossa’s Italian book Guide to the Study of Political Economy, and Inoue Tatsukur¯ o’s History of Economy (published by the Tokyo College

29 Murai Ichiei, Sekkenron: Hakurai Zeihin, Fukuoka:Tamura Senji, 1880, pp. 1, 3.

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of Technology Publishing Department in 1898). These are only a few of the books published under the title of “economy” in the mid- and late Meiji period.

CHAPTER 17

Modern Japan Doubted About the Translation of Economy as Keizai and Tried Other Alternatives

In summary, the word “economy” was gradually translated as Keizai in Japan during the late Edo period and the Meiji period, depriving keizai of its classical Chinese meaning of governance for the people and giving it a meaning its form cannot suggest. For keizai, the Japanese translation for economy, to abandon its classical meaning is not only its aberration as a term but also means that keizai-gaku moved away from its general concern of governing the country and bringing peace to all under heaven to the pursuit of material wealth and the justification of its rationality. Of course, the translation of economics was not immediately unified as keizai-gaku in modern Japan, and there were many people who doubted the translation of economy as keizai during the late Edo period and the Meiji period. For example, although Nishi Amane used the term “keizai-gaku” in his correspondence in 1862 and used seisan-gaku (製 産学) and keizai-gaku alternatively during his stay in the Netherlands in 1863, but he never forgot seisan-gaku. In his lectures in 1870, which were compiled by his students and published as Hyakugaku Renkan, he followed this phase of the Chinese classic Mencius: “regulate the livelihood of the people” (製民之産) and again elaborated on the subject “seisan-gaku.” He also did not believe that keizai-gaku was not a good translation of economy while arguing that seisan-gaku was a better way to communicate between the ancient Chinese and Western meanings. In his Hyakugaku Renkan, Nishi stated that: © Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_17

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Recently, Tsuda translated it as keizai-gaku based on the phase “governance for the people” (経世済民), which does not seem quite right in terms of terminology. Therefore, I have translated it as seisan-gaku based on Mencius’ “regulate the livelihood of the people.”1

Later, in his Three Treasures of the Human World, written in 1874, Nishi considered health, knowledge, and wealth to be the three treasures of the human world and believed that the difference between money and wealth was what keizai-gaku must study.2 It can be seen that until the 1870s, the Nishi was torn between the words “economics” and “production science.” Translating economy as keizai-gaku was obviously not what Nishi wanted. Fukuzawa Yukichi was one of the translators who translated economy as keizai-gaku. As mentioned earlier, he did so in his 1867 book Western Affairs. In 1868 he translated the American Francis Wieland’s book The Elements of Political Economy as Elements of Keizai-Gaku at Kei¯o Gijuku (now Keio University) and made it its textbook. At the same time, however, Fukuzawa repeatedly used the term “finance” to refer to livelihood activities and related doctrines. The Kei¯o Gijuku he created offered the finance subject. In 1890, the three subjects of literature, finance, and law were combined to establish a university department, which was the foundation of Keio University. The Department of Economics at Keio University was called the “Department of Rizai” until the 1930s. Similarly, the University of Tokyo initially established the Department of Political Science and Rizai-Gaku in the Faculty of Letters, which offered the subject of rizai-gaku.3 In 1886, in accordance with the Imperial Universities Ordinance, finance was included as one of the subjects taught in the Political Science Department of the University of Law.4

1 Nishi Amane, “Hyakugaku Renkan,” Collected Works, Tokyo: Munetaka Shob¯ o, vol. 4, 1981, p. 235. 2 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 515. 3 The University of Tokyo (ed.), “The First Annual Report of the University of Tokyo

from September of the 13th Year of the Meiji Period to December of the 14th Year of the Same Period,” University of Tokyo, 1882, p. 21. 4 Imperial Universities Ordinance, JACAR (Asian History Resource Center) Ref. A15111217200, Official Documents, Part X, 1886, vol. 28, Academic Administration I, General Academic System, School Building I (National Public Library).

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Later, it was renamed “economics.”5 In 1919, in accordance with the new Imperial Universities Ordinance (Imperial Decree No. 13), Tokyo Imperial Universities established the Faculty of Law, Faculty of Medicine, Faculty of Engineering, Faculty of Literature, Faculty of Science, Faculty of Agriculture, and Faculty of Economics.6 At this point, rizai was finally replaced by economics. In his book Economics for Beginners, the British scholar Henry Dunning Macleod made a theoretical distinction between political economy and economy (economics), pointing out that economy, or economics, came from a Greek word that combines the meanings of “all kinds of property” and “law.” According to Aristotle, economy means “the law of revenue collection,” including “the royal, executive, political and domestic” economies; Economy, or Economics, means in Greek the means of raising a revenue: and the author says that there are four kinds of Economics—the Regal, the Satrapical, the Political, and the Domestic. Polis in Greek means a free state; hence the term Political Economy means “the method by which a free state raises a revenue.” Macleod defined economics as “the science of the interrelationship of exchangeable goods, or the science of value, sometimes called the science of creating wealth.”7 Based on the second edition of Macleod’s Economics for Beginners (1879) and by referring to its fourth edition (1884), Akasaka Kamejir¯o translated the book into Japanese under the title of Macleod’s Economics, which was published by Sh¯useisha in Tokyo in December 1889. Influenced by the original work, Akasaka Kamejir¯o also distinguished between political economy and economics, translating the former as “keizai-gaku” and the latter as “zairi-gaku” (財理学). He explained in his Notes on the Use of the Book that “political economy is a term for the political discussion of wealth; economics is for the discussion of wealth without politics.” “The translation of political economy as keizai-gaku is a common practice in Japan, but no one has distinguished between political economy and economics. I don’t know if it is appropriate to translate it as zairi-gaku. 5 Tokyo Imperial Universities, (ed.), Tokyo Imperial University: Introduction from the

30th Year of the Meiji Period to the 31st Year of the Same Period, Tokyo Imperial Universities, 1897, p. 87. 6 The Official Gazette, Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Office, February 7, 1919, no. 1953, p. 91. 7 Henry Dunning Macleod, Economics for Beginners, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1894, p. 4.

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The so-called “zairi-gaku” means the philosophy of wealth, because the author of this original book also regards economics as “the science of seeking wealth” and “the metaphysical science.”8 Akasaka Kamejir¯o translated political economy as keizai-gaku, which is equivalent to the present-day translation of seiji keizai-gaku, based on keizai’s classical meaning—governance for the people. Akasaka also translated economics as zairi-gaku, which refers to economics in a narrow sense. Akasaka’s translation shows his respect for the classical meaning of keizai and his reservation about translating economics as keizai-gaku. Until now, Japanese dictionaries are also discussing various kanji translations of economy. For example, the entry of “keizai” in the fifth edition of K¯ ojien, edited by Shinmura Izuru and published by Iwanami Shoten in November 1998, states that keizai-gaku is the Japanese translation of political economy and economics and is defined as “the study of economic phenomena, formerly known as zairi-gaku.” This shows that zairi-gaku has been popular in Japan for a long time as a transitional translation, and the dictionaries of recent years also state that keizai-gaku was once called “zairi-gaku.” It can be seen that in modern Japan, there were many people who had doubts about translating economy as keizai-gaku, and they also created alternatives, such as seisan-gaku, fukoku-gaku, rizai-gaku, and zairi-gaku. These terms were used in Japan for a long time along with keizai-kagu. It took a long time for keizai and keizai-gaku to become common and standardized terms in Japan until they were gradually finalized from the early 1860s to the end of the 1990s.

8 Akasaka Kamejir¯ o, Macleod’s Economics, Tokyo: Sh¯useisha, 1889, p. 4 of the Notes on the Use of the Book.

CHAPTER 18

The Rejection of Japan’s Translation of Economy as Keizai by Chinese Scholars in the Late Qing Dynasty and Their New Alternatives

The term “keizai,” which is defined as a system of inter-related national production, distribution, exchange and consumption activities, and being frugal and giving good value or return in relation to the money was criticized as soon it was introduced into China at the end of the Qing Dynasty.

18.1 Various Translations by Protestant Missionaries to China Like the various translations of economy in Japan at the end of the Edo period and during the Meiji period, China also made various attempts to translate the English word at the end of the Qing Dynasty, and the translations were more controversial than those in Japan. The controversy was first of all due to the variety of Chinese translations of economy by Western missionaries. (1) Fuguoce (strategy of enriching the country)

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_18

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The earliest Chinese translation of economy in the late Qing Dynasty was done by William Alexander Parsons Martin, an American Protestant missionary in the late 1860s when he established an economics course at the School of Combined Learning in Beijing. He named the course “fuguoce” after the book Fuguoce written by the Song Dynasty’s Li Gou, whose title was derived from the Chapter “Fuguo” from Xunzi. Martin’s lecture was based on the 1863 edition of Manual of Political Economy by Henry Fawcett. The book was translated into Chinese by Wang Fengzao, deputy instructor of the School of Combined Learning, and checked by Martin, and titled Fuguoce, the translation was published by School of Combined Learning in 1880. (2) Cailixue (financial management) On June 17 and 24, and July 1, 1876, Church News serialized Essays on Political Economy. When it discusses “how to strengthen the country for the benefit of the people,” the article says, “‘The Great Learning’ also discusses wealth; and to manage wealth, one must study things to acquire knowledge first.”1 Later, this should mark the beginning of the missionaries’ use of the term “licaixue” to translate economy. (3) Fuguoce (strategy of enriching the country), cailixue (financial management) “assisting governance,” “the science of wealth management,” and “yigenuomi” Interpreted by John Fryer, an English Protestant missionary, and translated by Ying Zuxi in 1885, the Chinese version of the brothers W. and R. Chambers’s as Political Economy, for Use in Schools, and for Private was entitled A Discussion on Assisting Governance. Assisting governance means the same thing as governance for the people. In the book, economy is translated as the science of assisting governance and the science of wealth management, and is also transliterated as yigenuomi. A Discussion on Assisting Governance also contains a number of translations of economic

1 “Essays on Political Economy: Second Discussion on How to Strengthen the Country for the Benefit of the People,” Church News, Shanghai: Linhua Academy, June 24, 1876, vol. 393 of year 8, p. 596.

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terms, such as ziben (capital), hetong (contract), gongsi (company), yihang (bank), and gufen (shares) which are still in use today. (4) The science for enriching the country English Protestant missionary Joseph Edkins’s Chinese translation of the second edition of The Theory of Political Economy by the Englishman William Jevons was serialized in Church News (vol. 43–88, August 1892–May 1896). The translation was published in a single volume in mid-summer 1897. The book translates economy as the study of enriching the country and calls economists “those studying how to enrich the country,” both of which are derived from the “strategy of enriching the country.” The book also uses the terms “fengong ” (division of labor), “ziben” (capital), “liudong buxi ziben” (working capital), “dingerbuyi ziben” (fixed capital), “liyin” (profit), and other economic terms in Chinese characters.

18.2

Transliterations by the Chinese

Influenced by the translations of missionaries, there were many translations of economy by the Chinese, among which “strategy of enriching the country” was the most popular. In 1896, Chen Zhi wrote More on Enriching the Country, claiming to have been based on British Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. Since Chinese people at that time mistook Enriching the Country for The Wealth of Nations, Chen named his book More on the Strategy of Enriching the Country, claiming that his book was to “rise after England” and make China rich. From the first to the second moon in 1899, Ma Lin and Li Yushu serialized in Church News their book How Different Countries Try to Get Rich, in which they reviewed various economic theories in Europe and America. In December of the same year, Church News published the National Public Examination Program created by the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese and the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China (1834– 1839), listing the courses in Western studies in Chinese translation which included “enriching the nation.” In short, before and after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Westerners and their Chinese imitators in China used the terms such as

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fuguoce, fuguoxue, zuozhizhixue, licaizhilüxue, licaixue, and yigenuomi to translate economy and economics. The Ministry of Education of the Qing Dynasty approved the translation of economics as fuguozue (the science of enriching the country). Until the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese scholars still used jingji in the sense of governance for the people, including Kang Youwei, who was happy to use new terms. In “Politics,” volume 5 of his Books in Japan, he said that “all the six classics—The Book of Poetry, The Book of History, The Book of Rites, The Book of Music, and The Spring and Autumn Annals—are books on jingji.” During the Reform Movement of 1898, Kang established the Jingji Society in Beijing. The term “jingji” in these two places was still used in the ancient sense of governance for the people. An example of the modern meaning of economy or economics in the Chinese context can be found in the article “Famous Japanese Scholars Discuss Economy” in the 11th moon 1896 issue of the newspaper Shiwu Bao. The article was translated from the Japanese magazine Tokyo Journal of Economics by the Japanese scholar Kozyo Satakichi at the request of Shiwu Bao. It begins with the following words: A famous Japanese scholar, Taguchi, discusses keizai-gaku, known as the strategy of enriching the country in China saying: People have two differing views on keizai-gaku: one is the trading theory; the other is the social theory.2

The first Chinese scholars who used the term “jingjixue” and discussed its accuracy as the Chinese translation for economy were Liang Qichao and Yan Fu. In 1897, Liang Qichao wrote Reform: Translation of Books, advocating the translation of the Western science of seeking wealth. He called such books “books on the study of wealth,” adding a note that “they are called books on keizai.” He also listed such books that had been translated into Chinese, such as Enriching the Country, Strategy of Enriching the Country, and Elements of Jingji. He said that A Discussion on Assisting Governance was also such a book on this study. In 1899, Liang Qichao published an article “On the Benefits of Learning Japanese” in The China Discussion saying: 2 “Famous Japanese Scholars Discuss Economy,” Kozyo Satakichi’s translation, Shiwu Bao, Shanghai Shiwu Bao Office, December 15, 1896, vol. 14, p. 27.

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Japan has been seeking wisdom and knowledge from all over the world for 30 years since the Meiji Restoration. It has translated and written no less than one thousand useful books, especially on political science and zishengxue (licaixue or keizai-gaku in Japanese), wisdom (philosophy in Japanese), and group science (sociology in Japanese), which are all urgently needed to increase people’s wisdom and strengthen the foundation of the country.3

It can be seen that Liang initially used the terms fuguoxue, zishengxue, licaixue, and jingjixue to translate economy, with the first three as the main translations and the last one as supporting comparative translation.

18.3 Identifying with and Questioning Keizai, the Japanese Translation of Economy and Replacing It with Zisheng and Jixue During exile in Japan, Liang Qichao began to positively use keizai, the Japanese translation of economy. In 1899, he wrote “On the Trend of National Competition and the Future of China in Modern Times” in Japan, which stated that: Therefore, the dispute is...not a political matter, but a keizai (the Japanese translation of economy which is now translated as the Chinese term “zisheng ”) matter.4

When jingji was used alongside with politics, it no longer meant governance for the people. Liang’s explanation for this was: Keizai “is the Japanese translation of economy which is now translated as the Chinese term ‘zisheng.’” At this time, Liang had already adopted keizai, the Japanese translation of economy, though he did not fully agree; he still liked the term “zishengxue” better. In July 1902, Liang said in “New People: On Progress” that Adam Smith had created a new economic theory in modern times, saying,

3 Liang Qichao, “On the Benefits of Learning Japanese,” The China Discussion, Yokohama: The China Discussion Journal, vol. 10, April 1, 1899, p. 3 of the Editorial. 4 Liang Qichao, “On the Trend of National Competition and the Future of China in Modern Times,” The China Discussion, Yokohama: The China Discussion Journal, vol. 30, October 15, 1899, p. 3 of the Editorial.

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“Smith destroyed the old shengjixue, and a new shengjixue emerged.”5 Here the term “shengjixue” was used and the term “jingjixue” was avoided. It seems that after Liang Qichao’s exile in Japan, he was still not satisfied with keizai-gaku, the Japanese translation of economy, and the translation of the term used by him hovered between keizai-gaku and the shengjixue he created. In February 1904, Liang quoted from the Japanese translation of Marx in “Socialism in China”: Marx said, “The present jingji society is really the one in which a few people plunder the land of the majority.”6 This is the use of the term “jingji” in a new sense. Yan Fu had reservations about the Japanese translation of the word “economy.” In 1898, he translated English classical economic Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. Yan’s first translation of the title was Jixue. In February of that year, he completed a volume and sent it to Wu Rulun for review. Wu’s reply was: I have reviewed your translation of the first volume of Smith’s Jixue. I hope that you will complete the translation soon. Jixue is an elegant term faithful to the original, to which I have no objection.7

Wu Rulun, a Tongcheng master of classical Chinese, appreciated the translation of jixue. When Yan completed his translation of Smith’s book in 1901, he settled on the title Yuanfu based on the original title. He considered it the “best” of Adam Smith’s more than 10 books. In his biography of Smith, he said, “Smith returned to his hometown and stayed there for 10 years, during which he wrote Yuanfu (The Wealth of Nations). As soon as it came out, it was translated by various countries and won the praise of all yanji zhijia.” Here, the term “yanji zhijia” is equivalent to the modern word “economist,” so it is clear that Yan insisted on the translation of economy as jixue.

5 Liang Qichao, “New People: On Progress,” The China Discussion, Yokohama: The China Discussion Journal, vol. 46–47-48, February 14, 1904, p. 302. 6 Liang Qichao, “Socialism in China,” The China Discussion, Yokohama: The China Discussion Journal, vol. 11, July 5, 1902, p. 4. 7 Wang Quchang, The Chronology of Yan Fu, Republican Series, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1936, third edition, vol. 77, p. 41.

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After translating Yuafu, Yan wrote “Notes on the Use of the Book,” criticizing the Japanese translation of economy as keizai for being too general, and advocating translating it as jixue on the grounds that: Jixue is a translation of the Western term “economy” derived from the Greek term “o„κoνoμ´ια.” O κoς (oikos) means family, and νšμω (ném¯ o) means governance. “Ji” is derived from regulating the family, which can be extended to include weighing, measurement, planning, regulation, and receiving and handing over payment. This can also be expanded to livelihood in the country and under heaven. As the term “economy” covers too many things, and it is translated as keizai in Japan and licai in China. In terms of accuracy, keizai is too broad while licai is to narrow. I translated economy as jixue. Although ji is more than what Yao and Shun controlled and the pingzhun method is about. I studied Chinese classics to find that kuaiji, jixiang and jixie are often used alongside guoji and jiaji and seem to be more in line with the Greek term νšμω (ném¯ o). So I believe that Yuanfu is a book about jiexue.

Yan Fu also explained why the title of the book became Yuanfu: “The reason why I used Yuanfu is that the book is an inquiry into the nature of wealth, the causes of poverty and prosperity, and the origin of the wealth of nations.”8 When Yan’s translation Yuanfu was published, it was recommended in “Books” of The New People’s Gazette edited by Liang Qichao. While highly praising it, the gazette objected to its translation of terms saying: Political Economy is a term that does not exist in China. The Japanese translated it as keizai-gaku, which is really disturbing. Yan Fu translated it as jixue, which is also not comprehensive. I would like to propose translating it as zhengshu cailixue as a reference based on the two meanings of the original: politics and management.9

In response to this, Yan published Discussing the Translation of the Book Yuanfu with The New People’s Gazette in no. 7 of the gazette saying:

8 Ibid. 9 Liang Qichao, “Books: Yuanfu,” The New People’s Gazette, Yokohama: New People’s

Gazette Office, February 8, 1902, no. 1, p. 113.

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I translated Economy as jixue based on its traditional meaning.... The latest use of this term is often without its modifier “Political.” In ancient China, we had the terms “jixiang ” and “jixie” and now we have the terms “guoji,” “jiaji,” and “shengji” in common use. I believe that ji best expresses the traditional meaning of Economy.10

It is evident that Yan was quite thoughtful of his translation of economy as ji, believing that it not only contains the meaning of guoji, jiaji, and shengji but also fits the traditional meaning of the English term “economy.” He was therefore confident in his choice of jixue. Here Yan put forward the principles of Chinese-English translation: taking into account the traditional meanings of both Chinese and English terms and choosing the Chinese term with the same connotation of the original term for translation so as to achieve a common agreement between the two languages. Although Yan’s term “jixue” has not been passed down, the principle of translation he proposed is correct. When I read it a hundred years after the Yan’s translation appeared, I find it still convincing, and this is the best theory of our forefather, which should not be forgotten by future generations. In the same period, Chen Changxu also adopted the term “jixue” and named his translation Comment on Jixue, which can be regarded as a response to Yan’s creation of the term “jixue.” Liang Qichao basically agreed with Yan’s translation “jixue,” and Liang’s 1902 book, “A Short History of the Evolution of the Science of Shengji,” translated economy as “jixue” based on Yan’s translation “jixue.” In the “Seven Examples” of this short history, he said: The Chinese translation of this science is not yet determined. I often use the translation “pingzhun,” which too has not been settled. Yan Fu uses jixue, but I think it is inconvenient to use it as a compound noun. Some say shengji may serve the purpose, I now use it while waiting for future improvement, but this is used to wait for future generations. It is most difficult to determine the translation of new terms. Comments are most welcome.11 10 Liang Qichao, “Discussing the Translation of the Book Yuan Fu with The New People’s Gazette,” Yokohama: New People’s Gazette Office, May 8, 1902, no. 7, p. 112. 11 Liang Qichao, “A Short History of the Evolution of the Science of Shengji or Pingzhun,” The New People’s Gazette, Yokohama: New People’s Gazette Office, May 8, 1902, no. 7, pp. 9–10.

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These words of Liang reveal that he had translated economy as “pingjunxue,” but was not satisfied with it. He chose shengjixue and had to make do with it. He hoped that people would improve it in the future. This not only shows that it is not easy to translate the terms of a new discipline, but also demonstrates Liang’s open-minded attitude in terminology creation. The reason why Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, and other Chinese scholars did not agree with the Japanese translation of economy as keizai was not discussed in depth, but I speculate as follows: The Japanese translation of economy as keizai occurred at the end of the Edo period and the beginning of the Meiji period, that is, in the 1860s and 1870s when Europe was still in the era of the prevalence of political economy. The Japanese naturally translated economy in the sense of governance for the people. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Yan Fu formally started his translation career, and at that time, Europe had already undergone the transformation of separating economics from political economy, and economics was limited to the discussion of the national economy and the people’s livelihood. Yan, therefore, thought that the translation of economics as keizai was too broad, and chose the translation “jixue.” In short, Yan, Liang, and other Chinese scholars of the Qing Dynasty did not agree with the translation of economics as jingjixue, but tried to find a term with a similar meaning to economics from classical Chinese. In addition to jixue and shengjixue, pingjunxue was also used at one time, in which the term “pingzhun” was taken from the pingzhun method, an economic measure used in the Han Dynasty. “Pingzhun” of Records of the Historian has a detailed account of this. The pingzhun method was intended to protect small peasants from the monopoly of giant merchants, and the court bought household goods when market prices were low and sold them at preferential prices when market prices rose, in order to protect the livelihood of the common people. The term “pingzhun” was later extended from the meaning of price suppression to fiscal policy, which is close to the modern meaning of economy. The above efforts of the Chinese were also shown in dictionaries. In 1903, Wang Rongbao and Ye Lan compiled the dictionary Xin’erya, which set up the entry “General explanation of jixue,” retaining the item of “jixue” and defining it as follows:

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Jixue is the science about the generation, distribution, transaction, and use of wealth; it is also called jingjixue; it is commonly called licaixue.12

The term “jixue” is used here as the main term of the entry, while jingjixue and licaixue are used as supplementary explanatory terms, and jingjixue is not used as an entry. Hu Yilu (unknown–1915), who studied at Tokyo Imperial Universities, published “On the Translation of Names” in no. 25–26 of the Tianjinbased journal Yongyan (edited by Liang Qichao) in 1914, which affirmed the entry of new Japanese terms into China in general, but also pointed out that some of the Japanese translations did not make sense, and warned that “it is not advisable to use them to prevent confusion.” Among the Japanese translations that “should be improved urgently,” Hu cited jingji for economy, changhe, and zhiwaifaquan (for extraterritoriality) as examples. It can be seen that it was a common view of Chinese scholars in the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republican period that the Japanese translation of the word “economy” was “ungrammatical to Chinese” and “not suitable to be used.”13

12 Wang Rongbao and Ye Lan, Xin’erya, Shanghai: Mingquan Press, 1903, p. 37. 13 Hu Yilu, “On the Translation of Names,” Yongyan, Tianjin: Yongyan Newspaper

Office, no. 25–26, February 15, 1914, pp. 14, 9 of this article.

CHAPTER 19

The Early Republican Period: Establishment of “Jingji” as the Translation of Economy in China

In the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republican period, there were both free translations and transliterations of economics in China. Its transliterations included yekenuomi in Yan Fu’s translation Yuanfu as well as aikongnuomi and aikanglaomi. Its free translations include the Protestant missionaries’ translations “fuguoce,” “fuguo yangmingce,” and “licaizhilüxue” and the Chinese scholars’ translations “pingzhunxue,” “jixue,” “shengjixue,” “qingzhongxue,” “licaixue” “caixue,” and “zishengxue.” Many translations were in use all at the same time without no consensus. These translations were mostly chosen from the classics. We have discussed the sources of pingzhun and fuguo above. Another example is licai (wealth administration), which is taken from Xici (II) of The Book of Changes: “The right administration of that wealth, correct instructions to the people, and prohibitions against wrong-doing; these constitute his righteousness.” From the Song Dynasty onward, licai became a buzzword, and Wang Anshi blamed poverty at the time to “ineffective wealth administration”1 ; Ye Shi of the Southern Song Dynasty had the theory that “no one in ancient times was a sage ruler and a virtuous minister without good wealth administration.”2 It can be seen that licai is a common word for financial management in classical Chinese, 1 “A Memorial to Emperor Renzong,” Selected Collected Writings of Wang Anshi, 2 “Economy” (I), Selected Works of Ye Shi, Zhonghua Book Company, 1961, p. 658.

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_19

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so it is a close translation of economy. Liang Qichao, in his article “The Modern Meaning of ‘Economic and Financial Affairs’ from Records of the Historian,” interpreted economics as “the wealth administration in ‘The Great Learning’” and called economists “scholars studying wealth administration.” At the beginning of the twentieth century, despite multiple translations, jingji was finally made the authorized translation of economy due to the strong influence of Chinese translations of Japanese books (especially Japanese economics textbooks). In December 1900, “A List of Translations to Come off the Press” from the first issue of Translated Books, founded by Chinese students studying in Japan in Tokyo, included The National System of Political Economy; “A List of Translations to Come off the Press” from the sixth issue in July 1901 included A History of Economy by the Japanese scholar Inoue Tatsujiro. Beginning in its ninth issue in December 1902, a section entitled “Economy” was created in Translated Books to publish economic translations. In 1903, the Japanese scholar Sugi Eisabur¯o was hired as a lecturer in economics at the Imperial University of Peking, where he wrote “Lectures on Economics” and lectured on “economics” in the Chinese university. All this made jingji popular in its present-day meaning of economy and economics. Also in 1903, the Shanghai-based Commercial Press translated and published the Japanese scholar Mochiji Rokusabur¯ o’s A General Theory of Economics. After that, in 1905, Wang Jingfang translated the Japanese scholar Yamazaki Kakujir¯o’s Economics; and in 1906, Wang Shaozeng edited Lectures on Economics by Yamazaki. In the late Qing Dynasty, Chinese translations of Western economic works also borrowed the Japanese translation of economy for their titles. For example, in 1908, Zhu Baoshou’s translation of S. M. Macvane’s The Working Principles of Political Economy was entitled Jingji Yuanlun, and in 1910, Xiong Songxi and others’ translation of R. T. Ely’s Outlines of Economics was titled Jingjixue Gailun. Unlike other new terms of Japanese origin that were quickly adopted in China, the term “jingji” was not widely accepted by the Chinese until around the time of the Revolution of 1911. The reason is that the new meaning of this term in Chinese is far from its classical meaning, and it is impossible to derive the new meaning from its form. Many Chinese scholars, including Liang Qichao, Yan Fu and other great scholars, tried again and again to find a more meaningful Chinese term for economics. Therefore, the term “jingjixue” was used for a long time together

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with licaixue, fuguoce, jixue, and shengjixue. As mentioned above, the modern Japanese Enlightenment thinkers such as Fukuzawa Sokichi and Nishi Amane also used the term “keizai-kagu” ( jingjixue) to translate economics, but they were not satisfied with it. Fukuzawa liked rizai-gaku better while Nishizou preferred to seisan-gaku. This is a reflection of the fact that the term “economics” was used to describe the economic science. This shows that the translation of economy as keizai was not ideal, and the top scholars of China and Japan in the cultural circle of Chinese characters tried to find an alternative. In addition to the influence of the popularity of Japanese books (especially Japanese textbooks) in the late Qing and early Republican period, the reason why the term “jingjixue” became a common term in China is also related to the cultural communication practice of the revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen. The Chinese revolutionary newspaper People News, which was edited and published in Japan, mostly used the Japanese term “keizai” for the translation of economy. Sun Yat-sen, Zhu Zhixin (1885– 1920), and others often used the term “jingji” in its present sense in their articles. In the early years of the Republic of China, Sun also advocated the term “jingji” should replace fuguoce and licaixue. In 1912, Sun gave a lecture on “Socialism’s Factions and Methods,” discussing the Chinese translation of economy as follows: Jingjixue was actually originated in China. Guanzi, the economist, developed the salt and fishery industries, making the State of Qi rich and strong. However, at that time there was no term “economics” in Chinese and related practices were not well organized, so China failed to make this a science. Later, the principles of economics became a unified system of doctrine; they are named fuguoxue or licaixue, but are not enough to cover the meaning of economics, but only the term “jingji” seems to be a little closer. Jingjixue covers an array of detailed issues of different categories, but it has two priorities: production and distribution. Production is the production of goods and artifacts, and distribution is the use of the goods produced to provide for the needs of people.3

In his speeches, he repeatedly used the terms such as “jingjixue,” “jingjixuejia,” and “jingjixue zhi yuanli.”

3 Sun Yat-sen, “Socialism’s Factions and Methods,” in Hu Hanmin (ed.), Collected Works of the Prime Minister, Shanghai: Minzhi Book Company, 1930, vol. 2, p. 106.

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After the early Republican era, jingji and jingjixue gradually became the common translations of economy and economics, respectively, which included production, exchange, distribution, and consumption, and parted ways with the classical meaning of governance for the people. However, jingjixu continued to be used alongside fuguoce, jixue, and licaixue during the Republic of China. For example, Ma Yinchu (1882– 1982), the first Chinese doctoral candidate in economics, wrote his doctoral thesis at Yale University in 1914, using the terms “fuguoce” and “jixue” instead of “jingjixue,” showing his reservation about the translation of economics as jingji. It was only after the 1920s that jingji and jingjixue became unified terms and were generally accepted and used by the Chinese academic community and society. Ma’s later works were also named The Jingji Transformation of China, Introduction to Jingji, Selected Wartime Jingji Essays of Ma Yinchu, and Select Jingji Essays of Ma Yinchu. Li Dazhao, an early Chinese Marxist, quoted from “Preface to the Critique of Jingji,” Ma’s Chinese translation of the Japanese version of Karl Marx’s “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” he actually used the Japanese term “keizai” for economy.

CHAPTER 20

Examination of Jingji in Its Present Sense

20.1

Semantics

The present meaning of “jingji” (a system of inter-related national production, distribution, exchange, and consumption activities, and also means being frugal and giving good value or return in relation to the money) has been agreed upon, not only in academic circles, but also in popular usage, so it is probably difficult to be replaced. However, the present-day meaning of the term “jingji” has obvious drawbacks in terms of semantics and lexical construction, which should be revealed. Because of their polysemy, Chinese characters can often contain a variety of meanings under the same form, so the translation of Western concepts with ancient Chinese terms often results in the expansion, reduction, derivation, or even total change of meaning, which is the condition for classical Chinese terms to evolve into new terms. However, such expansion, reduction, derivation, and full change should follow the logic of Chinese character evolution so that people can understand them in order to use them or use them in order to understand them. A common way to create new meanings for classical Chinese characters is to take the ancient meaning of the original character as the starting point, so that its extension is expanded and its connotation is transformed. For example, 教授 was originally a verb, meaning to impart knowledge. From the Song Dynasty onward, it became a noun with an attributive

© Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd 2023 T. Feng, The Cultural History of the Chinese Concepts Fengjian (Feudalism) and Jingji (Economy), Key Concepts in Chinese Thought and Culture, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2617-6_20

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structure, referring to the school official in charge of school examinations. The present meaning of 教授 was obtained in the translation of professor, which refers to the highest title among university teachers, but this new meaning is a reasonable derivation of the original meaning. Another example is 物理, which in the ancient sense refers to the theory of things in general. The present meaning of 物理 was obtained when translating physics, which is a category of natural science that studies the laws of change of matters above the molecular level (the change of molecules is the subject of chemical research), and the evolution of this connotation is also logical. Another example is 历史, the ancient meaning of which is history book, referring to the account of past facts, but its modern meaning is obtained when translating history and 历史was transformed to mean the development process of nature and human society, or refer to the discipline of history. Such derivation is easy to understand. The ancient meaning of 组织 is textile, but its modern meaning was obtained from the translation of the Japanese term “組織” (soshiki), and 组织 was transformed to mean the unit of organs in the organism, and then extended to mean the collective formed based on certain tasks and systems (organization). The ancient and modern meanings vary considerably, but the modern meaning can be found in the space of meaning provided by the form of the term. In short, although there are differences between the ancient and modern meanings of these Chinese characters in terms of generality and specificity, breadth and narrowness, or changes in meaning, there is an inherent tension between their old and new meanings due to inheritance and mutation. With a little thought, the user can discover the evolutionary trajectory between these meanings and gain an understanding of their evolution and the matching of Chinese and Western terms. On the contrary, the present meaning of the term “jingji” is not only disconnected from the classical meaning, but also cannot be derived from the morphology of the Chinese term, and even if the construction method is changed, the present meaning cannot be derived. The present meaning of jingji (the system of inter-related national production, distribution, exchange, and consumption activities, being frugal and giving good value or return in relation to the money) was added to the classical Chinese term “jingji,” so the new term “jingji” has lost its foundation for the formation of a Chinese term. This is the reason why Chinese scholars such as Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, Hu Yilu, and Ma Yinchu were reluctant to agree with this translation of economy as jingji and tried to replace it with the

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term “jixue.” For the same reason, Japanese scholars such as Nishi Amane created the term “seisan-gaku” to be used alongside keizai-gaku; although Fukuzawa Yukichi was one of the first to translate economy as keizai-gaku, he was not satisfied with the translation and liked rizai-gaku better as an alternative. Akasaka Kamejir¯ o translated economics as zairi-gaku.

20.2

History

However, China and Japan, which belong to the same cultural circle of Chinese characters keizai-gaku ( jingjixue) as the translation of economics, the reason for which must be observed from the perspective of history. In addition to jingjixue or keizai-gaku, the various translations of economics created by China and Japan in modern times, such as jixue, shengjixue, pingzhunxue, zishengxue, qingzhongxue, licaizxue (rizai-gaku), fuguoxue, seisan-gaku, and zairi-gaku, have similar traits: they all use classical Chinese characters such as 计 ( ji), 平准 (pingzhun), 资生 (zisheng ), 轻重 (qingzhong ), 理财 (licai or rizai), 富国 ( fuguo), and 制产 (seisan) as their base and employ their classical meaning as the starting point to derive new meanings. Therefore, their character form and meaning are unified, and it is possible to look at the form and find the meaning. This gives these translations a firm foundation to form Chinese terms. Therefore, the word form and the word meaning are unified, and it is possible to look at the form and find the meaning. However, why did they fail to occupy the authentic position as the translations of economics? The author believes that although these terms are reasonable as Chinese terms, they all have a similar weakness: they only express a certain aspect of human material life, but are not enough to reflect the whole picture. Yan Fu said in his Notes on the Use of the Book for his translation Yuanfu that licai is too narrow to translate economics. In all fairness, Yan’s criticism is not only applicable to the term “licaixue,” but also addresses the main reasons why the other abovementioned translations, including Yan’s creation of jixue, did not work well for economy: the meaning they manifest is either production, consumption, distribution, or management which cannot encompass the whole of human material life as economy does. Only jingji and jingjixue, although criticized by Yan for being “too broad,” are richer in unifying power and were finally chosen by history as the Chinese translation of economics.

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As already mentioned, the term “jingjixue” has the defects of misalignment between ancient and modern concepts and disconnection between form and meaning, so it is not a reasonable Chinese term. It brings some inconvenience to the development of the discipline. For example, when tracing the academic history of this discipline, there is a divide between classical and modern concepts, and between Eastern and Western concepts, which requires a great deal of effort for interpretation. If we change the perspective to examine the semantic changes in the context of history, especially the history of ideas, we can find that the modern translation of economy as jingji has removed jingji from the political and ethical meaning of governing the state properly, bringing peace to all under heaven, and pursuing governance for the people ruling the country and given it the meaning of creation, exchange, and distribution of material wealth (frugality included). As a result, the focus of the discussion of important practical issues such as material production and social activity has shifted from morality to utilitarianism. This shows a transformation of the spirit of the times: the value orientation of society evolved from the classical emphasis of morality at the expense of utilitarianism to the modern realism of profit. Modern industrial civilization has multiple intellectual pillars, and pragmatism is one of its important pillars. The “invisible hand” of the profit-driven, value-based law is the powerful driving force of modern industrial civilization. It is the historical reality in which modern industrial civilization made pragmatism flourish that led to the creation of economics as a science about the national economy and the people’s livelihood and the gradual removal of its subordinate status to politics in the modern West. Economics, as such a modern discipline, grew in Europe and America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then spread around the world. In East Asia, Japan was the first to establish this discipline in the mid-nineteenth century, roughly in parallel with its adoption of an open policy and its progress toward industrial civilization. Modern Western economics began to be introduced to China around the end of the nineteenth century through the intermediary of Japan, and Yan Fu translated it directly from Europe during the same period, but as mentioned earlier, no Chinese uniform terminology had been developed by the end of the Qing Dynasty. At the beginning of the twentieth century (in the early years of the Republic of China and around the time of the First World War, when China’s modern national industry was developing), modern economics was formally spread to China, and

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the meaning of “economics” was transformed from ancient to modern, and “economics” became the common name of the study of the national economy and the people’s livelihood. It was in this historical process that the ancient meaning of jingji was transformed to its modern meaning, and jingjixue became a common name for the study of the national economy and the people’s livelihood. Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, and other modern Chinese scholars were dissatisfied with jingji as the translation of economy from the perspective of semantic purity, and tried to come up with alternatives, but the Chinese finally started to accept jingji as the translation of economy in the early years of the Republic of China. On the surface, this was the result of the strong influence of the new Japanese terminology and Sun Yat-sen’s advocacy of it, but in its essence, there was a trend of the times at work: the medieval Chinese meaning of jingji as pan-political and pan-ethical governance for the people was no longer sufficient, and the English term “economy,” which means a system of inter-related national production, distribution, exchange, and consumption activities can better reflect overall real social and material activities, so people had no term to name it, but to find jingji from the classical Chinese for this purpose. Of course, this was done at the price of giving up the purity of Chinese terms. Reflecting on the unification of semantics and history, if China and Japan, both of which belong to the same cultural circle of Chinese characters, had created a more precise and corresponding Chinese term to translate the new concept of economy, it might have helped people to understand the meaning of the term based on its form, thus facilitating the understanding of the public and promoting the growth of related disciplines. However, language development is a historical process without “if.” Its actual operation shows that as new concepts came in large numbers, it seemed to be impossible to deliberate them with ease. Sometimes they had to compromise the base for forming terms in order to simply move forward with popular language practice. However, this in no way means that reflection is useless, because what was done in the past cannot be undone, but can serve as a lesson for the future. What we should do and can do is to reveal the evolutionary process of the terminology that has been developed, and to analyze the successes and failures, so as to become more rational and more aware of what we should not do as we embrace and create new terms in the future. This should enable the construction of terminology (especially core terminology) to enter a healthier track and provide a solid and reliable link for the developing knowledge network.