The Creation of Wittgenstein: Understanding the Roles of Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright 9781350121096, 9781350121126, 9781350121102

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THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

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Also available from Bloomsbury Portraits of Wittgenstein, edited by F.A. Flowers III and Ian Ground The Radial Method of the Middle Wittgenstein, Piotr Dehnel Wittgenstein and the Problem of Metaphysics, Michael Smith Wittgenstein on Internal and External Relations, Jakub Mácha Wittgenstein, Religion and Ethics, edited by Mikel Burley

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THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN UNDERSTANDING THE ROLES OF RUSH RHEES, ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE AND GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT

Edited by Thomas Wallgren

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BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2023 Copyright © Thomas Wallgren and Contributors, 2023 Thomas Wallgren has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Editor of this work. Cover design by Louise Dugdale Cover images, Left, Science History Images. Right, GRANGER – Historical Picture Archive, both via Alamy Stock Photo. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-3501-2109-6 ePDF: 978-1-3501-2110-2 eBook: 978-1-3501-2111-9 Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

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CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

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LIST OF TABLES

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 1 Introduction Thomas Wallgren

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PART ONE PORTRAITS OF WITTGENSTEIN’S LITERARY HEIRS

2 Rush Rhees: ‘Discussion is my only medicine’ Lars Hertzberg

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3 A Portrait of Elizabeth Anscombe Duncan Richter

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4 Georg Henrik von Wright – A Biographical Sketch Bernt Österman

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CONTENTS

PART TWO UNDERSTANDING HOW THE EDITORS SHAPED WITTGENSTEIN’S POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATIONS, AND APPRECIATING THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ACHIEVEMENT

5 The Letters which Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright Sent to Each Other Christian Erbacher

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6 The Revision of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Kim Solin

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7 Naked, Please! Elizabeth Anscombe as Translator and Editor of Wittgenstein Joel Backström

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8 From a Collection of Aphorisms to the Setting of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy: G.H. von Wright’s Work on Wittgenstein’s General Remarks Bernt Österman 9 ‘. . . finding and inventing intermediate links’: On Rhees and the Preparation and Publication of Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ Peter K. Westergaard 10 Editorial Approaches to Wittgenstein’s ‘Last Writings’ (1949–1951): Elizabeth Anscombe, G.H. von Wright and Rush Rhees in Dialogue Lassi Jakola

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11 Art’s Part in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy Hanne Appelqvist

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12 Unearthing the Socratic Wittgenstein Thomas Wallgren

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APPENDIX 1

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Wittgenstein’s will. Facsimile of G.H. von Wright’s exemplar, kept at WWA.

CONTENTS

APPENDIX 2

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339

Table of writings published posthumously with Ludwig Wittgenstein named as author and at least one of the following as editor: Rush Rhees. G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright. Created by Rickard Nylund in cooperation with Thomas Wallgren BIBLIOGRAPHY Compiled by Patrik Forss in cooperation with Thomas Wallgren

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NOTE ON ARCHIVAL RESOURCES Compiled by Anna Lindelöf in cooperation with Bernt Österman and Thomas Wallgren

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INDEX

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FIGURES

5.1

5.2 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 A1.1

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The ‘black box’ of editing Wittgenstein that mediates between the ‘input’ of Wittgenstein’s papers and the ‘output’ of printed volumes. © Christian Erbacher. Year-wise distribution of the correspondence between Wittgenstein’s literary heirs. © Christian Erbacher. Source-graph: On Certainty (1969). © Lassi Jakola. Source-graph: Remarks on Colour (1977) © Lassi Jakola. Source-graph: Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2 (1992). © Lassi Jakola. Source-graph: Vermischte Bemerkungen (1977). © Lassi Jakola. Source-graph: G.H. von Wright’s unpublished edition of Wittgenstein’s ‘Last writings’. © Lassi Jakola. Source-graph: Rush Rhees’s plan for a Suhrkamp edition of On Certainty (1970). © Lassi Jakola. Thematic classifications in MSS 169–177: a proposal. © Lassi Jakola. Facsimile of G.H. von Wright’s copy of Wittgenstein’s will kept at The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, University of Helsinki. The editor thanks the Master and Fellows of Trinity College for permission to reproduce the text of the will in the present volume.

76 79 240 241 242 244 249 255 258

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TABLES

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 5.24

An overview of the correspondence between Wittgenstein’s literary executors between 1951–1999. Letters 1951 Letters 1952 Letters 1953 Letters 1954 Letters 1955 Letters 1956 Letters 1957 Letters 1958 Letters 1959 Letters 1960 Letters 1961 Letters 1962 Letters 1963 Letters 1964 Letters 1965 Letters 1966 Letters 1967 Letters 1968 Letters 1969 Letters 1970 Letters 1971 Letters 1972 Letters 1973

78 80 81 81 82 82 83 83 83 84 84 85 85 86 86 86 87 87 88 88 89 90 90 90 ix

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5.25 5.26 5.27 5.28 5.29 5.30 5.31 5.32 5.33 5.34 5.35 5.36 5.37 5.38 5.39 5.40 5.41 5.42 5.43 5.44 5.45 5.46 5.47 5.48 5.49 10.1

Letters 1974 Letters 1975 Letters 1976 Letters 1977 Letters 1978 Letters 1979 Letters 1980 Letters 1981 Letters 1982 Letters 1983 Letters 1984 Letters 1985 Letters 1986 Letters 1987 Letters 1988 Letters 1989 Letters 1990 Letters 1991 Letters 1992 Letters 1994 Letters 1995 Letters 1996 Letters 1998 Letters 1999 List of abbreviations used in the calendar. The remarks from MS 169–177 published in Vermischte Bemerkungen. A2.1 Table of writings published posthumously with Ludwig Wittgenstein named as author and at least one of the following as editor: Rush Rhees. G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright.

TABLES

91 91 92 92 93 93 94 94 95 95 95 96 96 97 97 98 99 99 99 100 100 100 100 101 101 260

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CONTRIBUTORS

Hanne Appelqvist is Docent of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki and currently works as the Deputy Director of the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. She is the author of Wittgenstein and Aesthetics, forthcoming in the Elements in the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, editor of Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language and has published a number of articles on the affinities between Wittgenstein and Kant. She is Editor-in-Chief of Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics and President of the Nordic Wittgenstein Society. Joel Backström is Docent of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki. He is the author of The fear of openness: An essay on friendship and the roots of morality (2007), and co-editor of Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind (2019). He has published on ethics, on the philosophical dimensions of psychoanalysis, on Wittgenstein and on Anscombe, including chapters in the Oxford Handbooks on Wittgenstein (2011) and on Elizabeth Anscombe (2022). He is also the editor, with Thomas Wallgren, of a forthcoming collection of previously little known and/or hard-to-access essays in cultural critique by G.H. von Wright (in Swedish). Christian Erbacher received his doctorate from the University of Bergen (Norway) for his research at the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) between 2007–2010. Incited by the opening of The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki (WWA), he has conducted several international research projects on the history of editing Wittgenstein. On this topic, he has published many journal articles as well as the monograph Wittgenstein’s Heirs and Editors. The volume The xi

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CONTRIBUTORS

Happy Afterlife of Ludwig W. with his collected papers on the history of editing Wittgenstein is in press. Lars Hertzberg is Professor emeritus of Philosophy at Åbo Akademi University, Finland. He has written essays on ethics, the philosophy of language, philosophical psychology and Wittgenstein, some of which have been collected in The Limits of Experience and in Wittgenstein and the Life We Live with Language. He has also done a translation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophische Untersuchungen into Swedish together with Martin Gustafsson (2021). Lassi Jakola is a doctoral student in Philosophy and in Ancient Greek language and literature at the University of Helsinki. His research focuses on G.H. von Wright’s ethics and philosophy of values, the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and on ancient Greek Philosophy, with special focus on the sophistic movement (fifth century BCE ) and Aristotle. He is currently finishing his doctoral dissertation in social and moral philosophy on G.H. von Wright’s Varieties of Goodness. Bernt Österman is Curator of The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives and Docent of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki. He has written articles on the philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright and recently published the book Skriv så ofta du kan [Write as often as you can], Helsingfors and Stockholm 2020, containing the correspondence between von Wright and Eino Kaila. Another interest is the development of methods for philosophical discussions and philosophical practice. Duncan Richter is a Professor of Philosophy at the Virginia Military Institute. His research focuses on Wittgenstein, Anscombe, and ethics. He is the author of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Student’s Edition (2021) and Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy (2011), as well as other books and articles on related topics. Kim Solin is Docent of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, Finland, and currently works as a Senior Faculty Administrator at Uppsala University, Sweden. He is an Honorary Research Fellow in Philosophy at The University of Queensland, Australia. In 2015–2017, he led the project Rush Rhees and Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics at The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, funded by the Swedish Research Council. Thomas Wallgren is a Professor of Philosophy and the Director of The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki. He is the author of Transformative Philosophy: Socrates, Wittgenstein and the Democratic Spirit of Philosophy, co-editor of the translations of Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj into Finnish and Swedish, and co-editor of Moral Foundations

CONTRIBUTORS

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of Philosophy of Mind (2019) and of Challenging Authoritarian Capitalism – The Transformative Power of the World Social Forum (2023). Wallgren has coedited and published books and essays on various topics in Wittgenstein and von Wright scholarship, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, development studies, political theory and the philosophical discourse of modernity. Peter K. Westergaard is Associate Professor at the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, Faculty of the Humanities, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His areas of research are the history of ideas and the philosophy of religion. Westergaard’s interests centre on the philosophy of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. His most recent publications are Mennesket er et ceremonielt dyr. Ludwig Wittgensteins Bemærkninger om Frazers ‘Den gyldne gren’ [Man is a ceremonial Animal. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s ‘The Golden Bough’], Copenhagen 2013, Kritik og tro. Hume, Kant, Nietzsche og Wittgenstein [Critique and Belief. Hume, Kant, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein], Copenhagen 2015, Nietzsche. Hvis man altid går til grunden. En afslutning [Nietzsche. If one always goes to the Ground. A Conclusion], Aalborg 2018, and Georges Bataille. Hulen, offeret og maleriet [Georges Bataille. The Cave, the Sacrifice, and the Painting], Aalborg 2021.

ABBREVIATIONS

FOR PUBLICATIONS BY LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AL

Aufzeichnungen über Logik September 1913

BBB

Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’. Generally known as The Blue and Brown Books

BGM

Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik

CC

Cambridge Letters: Correspondence with Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and Sraffa

CLF

Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker

CV

Culture and Value

GB

Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’

LE

A Lecture on Ethics

LW1

Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1

LW2

Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2

NB

Notebooks 1914–1916

NL

Notes on Logic September 1913

OC

On Certainty

PB

Philosophische Bemerkungen

PG

Philosophical Grammar

PI

Philosophical Investigations

PR

Philosophical Remarks

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ABBREVIATIONS

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PT

Prototractatus: An early version of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus

PU

Philosophische Untersuchungen

RF

Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough

RFM

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

ROC

Remarks on Colour

RPP1

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1

RPP2

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2

TLP

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

ÜG

Über Gewissheit

VB

Vermischte Bemerkungen: Eine Auswahl aus dem Nachlaß

Z

Zettel

FOR ARCHIVES AA

Collegium Institute Archive of G.E.M. Anscombe, Philadelphia

ÅAL

Åbo Akademi University Library, Turku

FIBA

Brenner Archives, Innsbruck

NLF

National Library of Finland

RBA

The Richard Burton Archives, Swansea University

WAB

The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen

WL

Wren Library, Cambridge

WWA

The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki.

OTHER BEE

The so called Bergen electronic edition, which aims to present all of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, was published between 1998 and 2000 by Oxford University Press in cooperation with WAB. (See Bibliography, Electronic Resources.)

See also explanatory notes by the chapter authors.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction THOMAS WALLGREN

With two exceptions the books we read as books by Ludwig Wittgenstein have not been created by him alone. The exceptions are the Logischphilosophische Abhandlung (1921) and the Wörterbuch für Volks- und Bürgerschulen (1926). All other books ascribed to Wittgenstein are the result of the co-creative work by Wittgenstein and his posthumous editors. This fact has passed without much notice, motivating a perplexed scholar to raise the concern that ‘Wittgenstein’s readers have remained unaware of the extent to which the published ouvre is the product of his editors’ decisions.’ (Stern 1994: 443.) The fundamental proposition that informs this volume is that the said concern has not lost its currency. Three further proposals guide the investigations collected here. The first is that engagement with Wittgenstein matters for the future of Western civilization. We might call this the enlightenment proposal. This first proposal, in turn, has three aspects. One is that enlightenment matters, that practices of reason contribute to the shaping of civilizations. The second aspect is that the self-understanding of philosophy contributes to the understanding of reason in culture at large as well as to the formation of the practices of reason. The third aspect is that engagement with Wittgenstein remains important to the self-understanding of philosophy, at least in its modern Western form. For these reasons engagement with Wittgenstein matters, not only, and perhaps not primarily, for discussion of specific topics in academic philosophy, but more generally for all discourses of self-understanding and self-determination in our times.1 1

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The second proposal that motivates the studies presented here is that the necessity to engage, again and better, with Wittgenstein, can only be rightly appreciated if we take seriously the complexity of the conditions of our access to his accomplishment. The third proposal is that studies of how the conditions of access to Wittgenstein have been created may have the potential of fundamentally changing our perception of what he created and of our notion of his philosophical life and work. So, whereas the second proposition may alienate readers who are not already convinced of Wittgenstein’s importance, the first and third propositions uphold a promise of a rich reward for those who are willing to take on the challenges introduced by the second. The proposal that the conditions of access to what Wittgenstein created presents serious challenges is not new, but it remains an open question how to define and deal with these challenges.2 This lies in the nature of things. As illustrated below, and shown in detail throughout this volume, the question of what exactly Wittgenstein created, where we can find it, what form it has and what the premises are that affect our engagement with it, is probably more complex in terms of empirical facts and text-critical and philosophical considerations than is the case with any other influential modern philosopher.3 Wittgenstein published less than a hundred pages of philosophy during his lifetime.4 When he died he left behind some 20,000 pages of writings in manuscripts and typescripts.5 In his will Wittgenstein appointed ‘Mr. R. Rhees Miss G.E.M. Anscombe and Professor G.H. von Wright’ to ‘publish as many of my unpublished writings as they think fit.’6 Between 1951 and 2001 Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright edited or co-edited some twenty books out of the Nachlass.7 Of all interventions by others than Wittgenstein himself that have contributed to the shaping of the conditions for understanding Wittgenstein, or, to the creation of what he is for us, their editorial work stands out as the most remarkable one.8 The contributors to the present volume illuminate this editorial work from different viewpoints. The ambition is not to arrive at a conclusion but to open up perspectives and to suggest opportunities for learning and enrichment. The title of the present volume indicates an interest of two kinds. One interest is in Wittgenstein’s editors; in what they did, and why they did what they did, when from the Nachlass they created the publications which, together with the Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus, have become the most important source for an understanding of Wittgenstein. The second interest is in Wittgenstein’s readers. Inevitably, one part of our understanding of what we read when we read Wittgenstein’s posthumous publications will be our understanding, or lack of understanding, of the role played by Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright, and of other editors, in shaping them. This

INTRODUCTION

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volume provides its readers with resources for taking enhanced responsibility for how they understand and respond to the co-creation of the works posthumously published in Wittgenstein’s name.9 Some scholars, including most notably the first person mentioned by Wittgenstein in his will, his ‘friend Mr. R. Rhees’, have in their work as Wittgenstein editors and interpreters been guided by the ambition of presenting to others how he might have wanted to present his ideas.10 Other scholars would perhaps say, in the spirit of what was in the 1950s called New Criticism, or that of Roland Barthes, that all interest by posthumous editors in the intention of the author is a superfluous and perhaps harmful intervention, betraying a wrongheaded fascination with a spurious notion of authenticity, which can only stand in the way of the real task; engagement with the text itself. Arguably, among the three original literary executors of Wittgenstein, especially Anscombe, and to some extent also von Wright, were sympathetic to such views. Obviously, a great deal of important philosophical work has been done in which publications attributed to Wittgenstein have been studied with little or no attention to the distinction between an author-centred and a text-centred approach or any other aspect of the complexities of the creation of Wittgenstein as understood and studied in the present volume. Quite often the results have been presented as interpretations of Wittgenstein. Authors who interpret Wittgenstein also often claim Wittgenstein’s backing for views they advocate. That is of course commonplace in philosophy; a thing we do. One might also argue that for strictly philosophical purposes the conflation of interpretation of the text with interpretation of the author is a moot point. The argument would be that what matters in philosophy is in fact argument. Hence, the task of scholars is to use whatever resources they can find to develop their arguments. When this is the task, it is always legitimate to turn to texts by Wittgenstein, or by ‘Wittgenstein’, to use it as material for our own work. The question whether quotation marks are needed around the name is of no interest. If this idea is taken to its logical conclusion it would of course make all referencing superfluous in philosophy, allowing us to leave behind, as Wittgenstein may sometimes have wished to, as vain, any discussion of debt and ownership of ideas, or right or wrong in the interpretation of authors and texts.11 Just as the present volume is not interested in finding fault with what Wittgenstein’s editors have done, nor is it interested in blaming scholars whose only interest is to cherry-pick, or gold-mine, Wittgenstein’s work for their own purposes. Cherry-picking is of course acceptable, and similarly, it is admissible for philosophers not to take a critical interest in how Wittgenstein’s editors may have made it difficult to discern some aspects of

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what is most unique in his achievement. But then something vital may also get lost. One relevant theme that has caught the attention of most contributors to the present volume, is the tension between Wittgenstein’s philosophical self-understanding and that of some of his editors. To see Wittgenstein aright one must, arguably, not see him as someone who is arguing about problems that belong to particular fields of philosophy with the aim to solve or dissolve them. One must also not see him as inventing new problems or new methods or new ways of conceiving philosophical questions and ideas. One must perhaps rather see him as doing all of that while also always asking: What is reason? What is it to reason? What is life with reason? What is the place, role and function of reason in our relation to ourselves and to others and what could that role at best be? How are these questions part of the further questions of what it is to be someone who is striving for dignity, meaning and freedom; for a life we might recognize as our life and willingly share with others? These questions – or questions such as these – are not always a living part of the everyday of professional academic philosophy and we do not have to bring them into discussions of Wittgenstein. But if we do not introduce such questions we may be missing out on significant parts of what these conversations may quite naturally involve. Of course, it does not follow that there is one straightforward and clear-cut alternative to the gold-mining approach to Wittgenstein, which one arrives at after careful study of the complexities of the creation of the Wittgenstein problematique. In this regard it is instructive to ask: What is relevant to consider when we try to learn from Wittgenstein? Where and how can we find it? To illustrate the matter let us consider briefly the question of the relation between a philosopher’s life and work and how any view on it is intrinsically related to the seemingly easy and straightforward question of how to identify and describe Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Wittgenstein sometimes said that philosophy was his life.12 The significance of this notion guided Rhees as editor of Wittgenstein to a high degree. In contrast, von Wright operated much more than did Rhees with the idea that the philosophy/life distinction is fruitful in our engagement with Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, he too found it difficult to know where to draw the line between what material is, and what is not, relevant to the interpretation of the philosophy.13 In 1969 von Wright published an article that he called ‘The Wittgenstein Papers’ (von Wright 1969). He there uses a distinction between manuscripts, typescripts and dictations as his main device for categorizing and describing the then known Wittgenstein Nachlass. Von Wright lists all items known to him and provides information in particular about their physical appearance, length in pages and, when possible, the

INTRODUCTION

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dates of origin. He presents the information as a catalogue where he gives the various items numbers in presumed chronological order.14 In an appendix to his catalogue, von Wright also lists Wittgenstein letters that have been published. From the perspective of the life vs philosophy issues, the inclusion of letters as a separate uncatalogued category, invites question. So does the exclusion of other items. The question of the remarks in the manuscripts written in code has been much discussed. In the von Wright catalogue there is no mention of their existence. That seems problematic in view of von Wright’s aspiration, over many years, to make all of the writings in his catalogue publicly available to scholarly study, while still excluding the coded remarks.15 A large bulk of writings, which are not listed in the von Wright catalogue, are those that derive from oral transmission. Many pupils who attended Wittgenstein’s lectures took notes and there now exists a considerable number of publications based on them. In his description of the Nachlass von Wright mentions that such material exists (1982: 39) but he does not explain why he does not include them in the catalogue.16 A different category of writings, difficult to denote, which provides access to Wittgenstein but is not included in the von Wright catalogue, is manuscripts and typescripts written in the hand of another person, even though the writing has happened in Wittgenstein’s presence under his close guidance.17 Moreover, in the study of Wittgenstein, memoirs and recollections by people who knew him have played a significant role. A fair number of publications exists that have the aim of giving a good idea of what Wittgenstein said during longer conversations and there are in addition many fragments with reports and quotes in memoirs and letters.18 These testimonies also belong to the history of how what Wittgenstein created has been made available to the public, but, again, von Wright’s catalogue does not mention any of them. We may conclude that in the way von Wright in his catalogue defined the realm of the Nachlass we see the extent to which he was inclined to the view that we can keep an interest in Wittgenstein’s life apart from an interest in his work. But at other times von Wright expresses a rather different bias, such as when he writes: The insight that Wittgenstein is inimitable should discourage any temptation to try to imitate him and encourage each one of us to consider what is his or her own Aufgabe as philosopher. This is not an idle exhortation. It is an urge to reconsider one’s motives for philosophizing, what drives us along. Only if what drives us along is integral to our being, as it was with Wittgenstein, are we philosophers in the full sense of the word.19

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If von Wright is correct, the question to what extent we can say that we are engaging with what Wittgenstein created when we study his philosophy through the reading of what we take to be his philosophical writings, irrespective of a study of his life, of ‘what drove him along’, or, when we study his life and care less about his philosophical writings, is in his case a burning matter for all philosophers. But, then, who is a philosopher? Where in our culture and our lives does philosophy happen? There is already for institutional reasons a tendency to take easy answers to these questions for granted. But at least in the case of Wittgenstein these answers are up for grabs.20 Nevertheless, the massive interest in Wittgenstein in academic discourse often pays scant attention to the non-academic, but not necessarily non-philosophical, reception which unfolds, richly but rather intractably, in the world of the everyday, and more visibly in the arts, where Wittgenstein is often acknowledged as a source of inspiration. It would be a large part of any comprehensive engagement with the Wittgenstein legacy to study the non-academic reception and its interplay with the academic one.21 Even though the present volume is primarily directed at philosophers, it also aspires to present elements that are useful for further study of this interplay. * The scheme of the volume is as follows: we offer historically contextualizing essays (chapters 2–5) and then move gradually from studies with a close-up examination of the editorial work of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright in individual cases (chapters 6–8) to studies with an increasing emphasis on the exchange between the editors and the philosophical significance and consequences of their policies and choices (chapters 9–12). The attentive reader will find that the interests of the various authors sometimes converge, and that occasionally the very same quotes from letters and other archival sources are used in more than one chapter. There is indeed some overlap, as well as both tension and complementarity between the chapters. We hope this will serve as an invitation to continued dialogue with the issues at hand. Chapters 2–4 present personal philosophical portraits of Wittgenstein’s literary executors. The chapters are vital for the collection because of the intricacy, and intimacy, of the question how the executors understood and wanted to take on the task given to them in Wittgenstein’s will. Their task was to ‘publish as many of [Wittgenstein’s] unpublished writings as they think fit’.22 But who were ‘they’? The aim of this section of the volume is to provide a basic platform for understanding the work undertaken by Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright as editors of Wittgenstein as an integral part of their individually quite different journeys in philosophy and life.

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In his portrait of Rhees, Lars Hertzberg brings to life the impression Rhees made on many who knew him well, including Wittgenstein, as a person who combined to an exceptional degree philosophical talent, human kindness, humility and the courage to stand by one’s moral convictions (chapter 2). Hertzberg notes that Rhees has so far been noted and remembered primarily as a ‘student and expounder of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views’, a fate he attributes partly to Rhees’s lack of personal ambition. Hertzberg suggests that as an heir to and interpreter of Wittgenstein Rhees is remarkable not least because he, like his teacher, embodied to a high degree the notion that ethical or existential matters and philosophical work are deeply intertwined.23 Hertzberg also draws attention to Rhees as a critic of Wittgenstein and seeks to explain how, especially in Rhees’s work in the philosophy of language, the probing of the question ‘What does it mean for there to be language?’ constitutes an original contribution that takes us beyond what we can find in Wittgenstein’s work. As in the case of Rush Rhees, the forceful character of Elizabeth Anscombe rarely failed to impress the people she met. In his portrait of Anscombe, Duncan Richter notes that the picture of her as a ‘scary kook’, a champion of Roman Catholicism and a feminist has become well-known (chapter 3). While capturing Anscombe’s true features, the impression they make may also stand in the way of coming to appreciate both her personality as a whole as well as her philosophical achievement. Richter draws special attention to three aspects. One is the philosophical integrity of the dialogue with the Catholic tradition both in her life and in her published work. Another is the significance for Anscombe’s philosophical development of the critical engagement with Hare’s moral philosophy, which she shared with her close female student friends and colleagues at Oxford, Philippa Foot, Iris Murdoch and Mary Midgley. Richter notes, among other things, how this formative experience from the 1940s explains deep differences between Anscombe’s moral philosophical outlook, as expressed in her influential paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ and that of Wittgenstein. Richter also provides a portrait of Anscombe as interpreter of Wittgenstein, bringing out, for instance, her scepticism of ‘the tendency of Wittgensteinians to treat language-games as needing no justification.’ In Bernt Österman’s biographical sketch of Georg Henrik von Wright we meet a scholar with mild manners whose outward character did not present any of the friction with the academic world that we meet in the cases of Wittgenstein, Rhees and Anscombe (chapter 4). Österman succinctly presents key facts about von Wright’s career, including the invitation to the young von Wright to succeed Wittgenstein at Cambridge. Österman also takes us behind the scenes to present lesser-known aspects. He explains the deep

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commonality that existed in the cultural and educational formation of von Wright and Wittgenstein as ‘middle Europeans’ and how this shared background contributed to the forming of von Wright’s friendship with Wittgenstein. Another lesser-known dimension of von Wright’s intellectual personality highlighted by Österman is the engagement in current social and political concern which he shared with Norman Malcolm, his closest friend from Wittgenstein’s classes in Cambridge, but not with Wittgenstein. Österman concludes his portrait with an incisive commentary on ‘the gap between what von Wright saw as his professional work [in philosophy] and his existentially oriented writings’. In the Nordic area von Wright’s essays on Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Spengler and, later, also on the Vietnam War, the ecological crisis and the pathologies of modernity, written in his native Swedish, have for many decades served as key references in popular debates about our culture and times. The topic Österman addresses is therefore better known in the Nordic countries than in other areas. It, nevertheless, opens important perspectives on von Wright’s contributions to Wittgenstein scholarship.24 The history of the cooperation between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright as Wittgenstein editors is the topic of Christian Erbacher’s contribution (chapter 5). Drawing on his in-depth study of archival holdings over the past ten years Erbacher manages to give readers in one chapter a comprehensive overview of a history of the close cooperation between three strikingly different philosophical personalities over almost five decades. In his highly informative tables Erbacher summarizes facts about the most essential source material for the study of the creation of Wittgenstein; the letters which his literary executors sent to each other, providing year-by-year counts of the number of letters and their location.25 In the commentary to the tables, Erbacher gives overviews of themes discussed in the correspondence, also pointing out key tasks for future research in order to fill present gaps in our understanding of this history. The cavalcade of thematically focused studies of how Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright created Wittgenstein for us is opened with Kim Solin’s chapter on how Wittgenstein’s work on the philosophy of mathematics has been made available (chapter 6). There are three editions of what has been published as Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik / Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM). While the second edition, from 1967, is substantially the same as the original 1956 edition, the third edition, essentially completed in 1974, differs from the earlier ones in some respects. Solin argues that the revisions are triggered to a large extent by the editors’ disappointment in the mid-1960s with the reception of their editions by Kreisel and other influential scholars in mathematics and the philosophy of

INTRODUCTION

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mathematics. Solin’s close-up study of the correspondence between Rhees and von Wright, in particular from October 1972 to May 1973, lays bare how controversies about technical matters concerning layout and form of presentation are intertwined with philosophical issues, such as the question whether to use a thematic principle for joining texts from separate sources.26 Solin also shows how the views held by Rhees and von Wright on the relation between mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics develop through the exchange. Rhees emerges as more engaged than von Wright in the matter, focusing increasingly on the vital role he thinks Wittgenstein’s work on the philosophy of mathematics played in the development of key themes in all his later philosophy, including rule-following, intelligibility, the relevance of addressing the concerns of concrete persons and more. Solin concludes that von Wright, who maintained a ‘logician’s perspective’ on RFM, prevailed in the editorial controversies. As a consequence, what gets suppressed in the published editions is Rhees’s efforts to bring out how Wittgenstein was struggling to find ways of overcoming our attraction to intellectual mystifications, such as ‘mythological’ interpretations of forms of calculation used in mathematics. Anscombe contributed immensely to the creation of Wittgenstein both by providing to anglophone readers her highly praised English renderings of most of the posthumous editions and as an editor. In chapter 7 Backström examines Anscombe’s reflections on how the translator can deal with differences in linguistic resources which are linked to differences in cultural heritage and also with the riddle of the ineliminable personal element in understanding the text and its author. Backström discusses the philosophical implications of the differences between how Anscombe and, fifty years later, Hacker and Schulte, handle the translation of the German word ‘Seele’ as ‘soul’ or ‘mind’. His discussion brings him to questions about the tensions between Wittgenstein’s self-understanding and the understanding of philosophy that Wittgenstein thought was characteristic of professional academic milieus. Backstöm’s interrogation of Anscombe as editor takes off from the observation that Anscombe’s preferred, explicit policy was what she called ‘minimum editing’. He then discusses three kinds of intervention between the text and the reader that Anscombe, nevertheless, could not avoid. One is her and Rhees’s decision to publish the Philosophical Investigations as a work with two parts; the second her effort to present Wittgenstein as a philosopher who worked on separable topics; the third is the suppression for a long time of remarks written in code. Backström argues that even though there are reasons to question the inclusion of part II in the PI, its status is in fact not radically different from that of part I, primarily because neither part was finalized for publication by

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Wittgenstein. On the separability issue, or, the ‘compartmentalization issue’, Backström suggests that Anscombe’s idea that the discussion of certainty, colour and the philosophy of psychology in Wittgenstein’s late manuscripts are separable is problematic on both philological and philosophical grounds.27 Finally, Backström argues that the coded remarks from 1914–1916, which have often been read as being merely of personal interest, are in fact highly relevant for interpretations of Wittgenstein’s views of the will, and of the existential and moral difficulties in relations between people. In the 1960s von Wright made a collection of remarks ‘of a general nature’ which he extracted both from Wittgenstein’s published books and from unpublished manuscripts and typescripts. In the 1970s he returned to the material and in 1977 a different collection was published as Vermischte Bemerkungen by Wittgenstein, edited by von Wright and his assistant, Heikki Nyman. In chapter 8 Österman argues that von Wright’s editing was informed by two different interests and proceeded in two stages. In the first stage von Wright wanted to provide access to Wittgenstein as a writer of aphorisms in whose work philosophical and artistic genius combined. Österman shows that this interest has roots in von Wright’s conversations with Wittgenstein before the war and in von Wright’s early conviction that in order to illuminate the deepest issues in life, the resources of art are more apt than those of philosophy. However, as Österman shows, it is only when this first interest is complemented with von Wright’s own growing concern with the social and political maldevelopments of his time that von Wright decides that the general remarks can and need to be published separately from Wittgenstein’s strictly philosophical work. Hence, in the published book two qualities stand out: many remarks have an aphoristic quality and many are remarks on the crisis of our times, or of modernity. The selection thus reflects a conception of philosophy typical of von Wright, but not necessarily of Wittgenstein, in which properly philosophical work stands in an uneasy relation to writings on the deepest and most acute existential, cultural and contemporary social and political matters. Österman shows how von Wright’s work was inspired by like-minded work on Wittgenstein by Toulmin and Janik (1973) and Kristóf Nyíri (1976), and by his discussions with members of the Praxis and Frankfurt Schools. Through close study of archival sources, Österman also makes clear that von Wright at the time took greater interest in affinities and differences between Marx and Wittgenstein than is apparent from his published writings. In the later 1960s and early 1970s it became clear to Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright that there were deep differences in their views about how to edit Wittgenstein for publication. The views of Anscombe and von Wright

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often prevailed, making it difficult, at the time, and even up to today, to appreciate and assess the work of Rhees and the philosophical energy he brought to the discussion between the literary executors in meetings, manuscripts and letters. In chapter 9 Peter Westergaard illuminates crucial moments in Rhees’s work at the time by presenting in detail the work he did on what we know as Wittgenstein’s Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ (GB), or, ‘Remarks on Frazer’ (RF). It is essential to Rhees’s handling of these remarks that he sees them as standing in close philosophical continuity with his philosophy of language, ethics and other key motives of his later work. Rhees suggests various ways of publishing the Remarks on Frazer together with other materials, such as the Lecture on Ethics, but Anscombe and von Wright in the end brushed most of Rhees’s suggestions aside and went on to publish on the basis of the topical, ‘compartmentalizing’ approach. In his reflections, Westergaard shows how acquaintance with Rhees’s failed suggestions provides us with an opportunity to try to see Wittgenstein’s philosophy through his eyes. He also provides a memorable portrait of the ethos of Rhees’s editorial effort and cooperative engagement.28 As evidenced vividly in Westergaard’s contribution, anyone who studies closely the correspondence between the literary executors is likely to be struck by the differences in outlook between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright that come to the fore around 1970. In Jakola’s chapter (chapter 10) the differences are highlighted through a penetrating study of the editorial work and discussion of one particular case; the work on the items identified as MS 169-177 in the von Wright catalogue. As Jakola points out, the bulk of this material has been published in OC, ROC and LW2 (On Certainty 1969, Remarks on Colour 1977 and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2: The Inner and the Outer 1992). One philosophical consequence has been that these publications, and in particular OC, have paved the way for the idea that we see in these writings the emergence of a final, third Wittgenstein, different from the first Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the second Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. Jakola’s careful reconstructions of the views of each of the three, Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright, indicates that this notion of ‘three Wittgensteins’ is to a high degree the result of Anscombe pushing through her view on how to publish the material in MS 169-177. Using instructive tables and diagrams Jakola shows that the realized history is certainly not the result of any obvious, almost mechanical editorship, but has involved choices that could not have been philosophically innocent. Jakola also presents the suppressed positions of von Wright and Rhees on the case. Jakola, moreover, presents his new discovery that before the publication of OC in 1969 von Wright in fact developed a detailed proposal for an edition to be published from the

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manuscript materials in question. This proposal was essentially completed in 1967–1968. It differed substantially both from the plan that was realized, based on Anscombe’s compartmentalizing scheme, and from the suggestions made by Rhees.29 Taking her point of departure from the study of the remarks von Wright collected and published as Vermischte Bemerkungen (VB), Appelqvist in her contribution (chapter 11) invites readers to a critical reappraisal of three themes in Wittgenstein scholarship in view of von Wright’s formative intervention. The first is the idea of Wittgenstein as a writer of aphorisms. Appelqvist does not question Österman’s views on von Wright’s motives for presenting Wittgenstein in this light nor the worth of such presentation. Nevertheless, she argues through concrete case studies that what to von Wright ‘looked like isolated aphorisms’ do in fact make more sense when we see how they belong and contribute to sustained philosophical reflection. Appelqvist’s further topics are Wittgenstein’s relation to philosophical tradition and the question of the role of aesthetics in his philosophy. Wittgenstein’s suggestion in his early work, especially in the Tractatus, that ethics, aesthetics and logic stand on a par has been much studied. In his later work a similar perspective has not always been seen. Von Wright’s collection, VB, may have reinforced the view that in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy attention to art and aesthetics is not an integral part of his philosophy. Appelqvist argues that such views fail to recognize the extent to which Wittgenstein in his later work is also steeped in a German tradition. In this tradition, which goes back to Kant and Baumgarten, aesthetics is understood as the investigation of the domain of sensibility and as a necessary part of a comprehensive philosophy of the forms of judgement, reason and understanding. Appelqvist proceeds to a study of the role played in Wittgenstein’s later philosophical investigations by his remarks on art, in particular on music. In her perceptive analysis she shows how the analogy between understanding music and understanding language is key both to the argument in the Tractatus and to what she calls the ‘hard core’ of Wittgenstein’s later work, his discussion of rule-following. These elements – the close rapport between aesthetics and the philosophy of logic and language, and also the continuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy with a German idealist tradition – are, Appelqvist argues, there in Wittgenstein, but are not easy to see for contemporary analytic philosophers who are not always versed in the history of German philosophy and whose understanding of Wittgenstein’s interest in aesthetics has often been shaped by their reading of von Wright’s editing of VB. In his contribution in chapter 12, Wallgren suggests that it is illuminating to think of the history of the editorial effort of Rhees, Anscombe and von

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Wright as a story with two parts. The first part is characterized by effortless agreement between the literary executors and by their enthusiastic common resolve ‘to give Wittgenstein to the world’. This part of the story was crowned with what seemed at least at first to be, simply, a resounding success. The second part of the story is that of emerging and deepening self-criticism and of growing intellectual divergence and moral distance between the three. Looking back at their cooperation, von Wright writes to his colleagues in 1988 that it is ‘much to be regretted that we never had a clear understanding . . . about the nature of the work we wanted to do with the Nachlass’.30 Wallgren highlights five elements in the second part of his narrative. The first is the suggestion that the depth of the philosophical challenges involved in the task of moving from Wittgenstein’s manuscripts to publications first became obvious to the literary executors when they started considering the publication of a complete edition. They then gradually recognized the controversial nature of their first editorial achievement, the PI with two parts, and therewith also the problems involved in the very idea of Wittgenstein as the author of works. Wallgren moves on to investigate in two separate but interrelated steps how Rhees’s and von Wright’s later work as editors, from the mid-1960s onwards, can be seen as complementary corrections to the earlier publications’ record. Rhees’s ambition was to show that there is close contact between Wittgenstein’s work over the years on seemingly different topics, and how this unity ‘of logic and ethics’ in his work was rooted in Wittgenstein’s notion that philosophy is always also a morally transformative work on oneself. In von Wright’s later editorial and interpretative work we can discern a similar, even if more convoluted, engagement with the comparable notion that in philosophy we try to overcome confusions in our language and lives which are occasioned by pathologies in habits of thinking that are typical of one’s times. Hence, any philosophical effort to come to terms with challenges to one’s own understanding caused by malfunctionings of our language-games will inevitably involve, as one of its dimensions, a critical engagement with the contemporary social and political constellation. Wallgren moves from these observations on Rhees and von Wright to discussion of two further issues. One is the question whether, and if so, how, Wittgenstein’s qualms about publishing are related to his conception of philosophy and of its value. The other is what to do with the fact that in his later years, at least after the autumn of 1936, a large part of Wittgenstein’s work consisted not in writing new materials but in arranging it, or ‘composing’ out of it, a ‘criss-cross’ form of philosophical dialogue between multiple voices. The literary executors did not reflect on these issues in their publications or correspondence. These omissions in the attention of the literary executors

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have, Wallgren suggests, made it unnecessarily difficult to see reason to attend to two aspects of Wittgenstein’s contribution. The first is the depth of Wittgenstein’s affinity with the Socratic and Pyrrhonian sceptical notion that philosophy is concerned with the unending search for deeper understanding more than with the search for solutions to problems, or even, their dissolution. The other is his contribution to the ‘Left-Hegelian’ discourse of the dialectics of enlightenment and, more generally, the questioning of enlightenment optimism. The volume has been compiled with the ambition of keeping Wittgenstein alive. It aspires to show that by paying attention to neglected detail pertaining to the complex history of the creation of Wittgenstein we may still discover much needed and sorely overlooked resources for intellectual enrichment and moral orientation in our times and perhaps in all times. * The research for this volume has been funded by the Academy of Finland research project ‘The Creation of Wittgenstein’ (2016–2021). The materials used here have been presented at the conference ‘Von Wright and Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Von Wright Centenary Symposium’, Strathaird, Cambridge, 20–23 September 2016 and at the workshop ‘The Creation of Wittgenstein’, at Kilpisjärvi biological research station, University of Helsinki 16–20 April 2018. The von Wright and Wittgenstein research seminar, co-hosted by the philosophy unit and the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives of the University of Helsinki, has served as a venue where many of the ideas developed in the various chapters have first been tested. The editor is grateful to all participants at these gatherings for inspiring discussions and for their generosity in sharing their knowledge and insights. He has also been much helped by further discussion and correspondence with Anat Biletzki, James Conant, Mladen Dolar, Peter Hacker, Leszek Kosczanowicz, Stefan Majetschak, Anat Matar, André Maury, Volker Munz, Yrsa Neuman, Alois Pichler, Lotar Rasinski, Rupert Read, Viggo Rossvaer, Josef Rothhaupt, Arvi Särkelä, Joachim Schulte, David Stern, Niklas Toivakainen and Nuno Venturinha, and by discussion at his home in the hills near Siena with the late Brian McGuinness. Patrik Forss, Carolina Lillhannus, Anna Lindelöf and Rickard Nylund have provided invaluable research assistance. The Nordic Wittgenstein Society has served as a constant source of inspiration, and colleagues and students at the philosophy unit of the University of Helsinki have provided a most supportive daily working environment. My greatest debt is to the contributors to this volume. Thank you all. Helsinki, February 2022 Thomas Wallgren

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NOTES 1. To the extent that the modern West, and its consequences, shape the planetary condition(s) the dynamics of this civilization also affect the planetary future(s). My use of the word ‘all’ in this passage ‘to all discourse of self-understanding and self-determination in our times’ is, hence, deliberate. I will not here discuss critically my use of the word ‘our’ in the phrase ‘our times’. Useful resources for addressing this topic are, for instance, Dussel 1985, Santos 2014, de la Cadena 2015 and Escobar 2018. On self-realization and self-determination as typically modern ideals, see, for instance, Kant 1977, Tugendhat 1986 and Theunissen 1982. One might read Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as articulating a view of the hopeless futility of these ideals and his Philosophical Investigations as a transformative recuperation of them. 2. Seminal contributions include Cavell 1976 [1969], Cavell 1979, Drury 2019, Pichler 2004, Rothhaupt 1996, Rothhaupt, J. G. F. and W. Vossenkuhl ed. (2013), Schulte 2001a and 2005, Stern 1996, Venturinha, N. ed. 2010, and von Wright 1982a, 1982c, 1982d and 1982e. 3. Comparable cases are Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger. However, they all published much more during their lifetime than Wittgenstein did. 4. There were four philosophical publications altogether, or five, if we count the German-only edition of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the Logischphilosophische Abhandlung from 1921, and the bilingual edition of the same from 1922, as separate publications. Wittgenstein also published the dictionary for primary schools mentioned above. See Bibliography. 5. In this estimate I follow Stern 1996: 453. According to one early estimate by Huitfeldt, there are up to five million words in the Nachlass (ibid. 473, n 19). Today the fullest information is provided in the bibliography compiled by Pichler, Biggs and Uffelmann 2019, first published as Pichler, A., M. A. R. Biggs and S. A. Szeltner 2011. 6. In this volume the names of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright are given in this order, the order in which they appear in the will, when they are referred to as the collective of literary heirs and executors defined in it. In view of substantial considerations the names may also appear in a different order, as for instance in the title of chapter 10. 7. The exact number depends on how one defines what belongs to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. For an overview of the posthumous publications out of it edited by Rhees, Anscombe and / or von Wright see Appendix 2 to this volume. The Bergen electronic edition (BEE), which aims to present all of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, was published between 1998 and 2000 under the auspices of von Wright, but it was not edited by him. See Pichler 2010. 8. Wittgenstein’s will did not oblige Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright to publish any of his writing. We may note, in particular, that even the PI (Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations) is not a work that Wittgenstein had finished, but the result of co-creation by him and his editors. It, and any other posthumous works by Wittgenstein, might not have been published, and they might have been published in a different form. To say this is to state a fact.

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It does not prejudice one’s views on the special status of the PI or on any other controversial aspect of the posthumous editorial history. 9. For discussion of the responsibility of readers, or users, of the various Wittgenstein materials, see Pichler 2004 and Pichler 2021a. 10. Readers of the various contributions to this volume will gain a more nuanced and precise idea of this aspect of Rhees’s editorial profile, and of all further suggestions and claims about the views of the editors and their work made in this Introduction. 11. One example of how the issue pointed to here has played a role in scholarly debates is the discussion of the relevance of Wittgenstein’s use of the expression ‘he who understands me’, not the expression ‘he who understands my work’, in remark 6.54 in the Tractatus. See Conant 2000 and 2002 and also the Preface to the PI. 12. This is reported by von Wright, in von Wright 1993c: 152, and by Rhees in a letter to Mr. Stonborough, 8 April 1973 (WWA Wri-FC-005). 13. The chapters by Hertzberg, Solin, Backström, Österman, Westergaard, Jakola and Wallgren in this volume (chapters 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12) are all relevant for how Rhees and von Wright as Wittgenstein editors dealt with the life/work question. That Anscombe too was sensitive to this issue is emphasized especially in Richter’s contribution (chapter 3 in this volume). 14. Updated versions of the von Wright catalogue have been published in von Wright 1982c: 42-49 and in BEE. See also the additional information to the von Wright catalogue in Wittgenstein 1993 and Wittgenstein 2003. The von Wright catalogue is also the basis for the scope and structure of BEE and for the web resource wittgensteinsource.org. In 1997 von Wright included the copies he had of lecture notes taken by people attending Wittgenstein’s classes and of copies of Wittgenstein’s correspondence in his catalogue of Wittgenstein materials kept with the Department of Philosophy, Helsinki University. The 1997 version of von Wright’s catalogue is available at https://www2.helsinki.fi/ sites/default/files/atoms/files/wittgensteinmaterials.pdf 15. See Backström’s discussion of the coded remarks in his contribution to the present volume (chapter 7). 16. For information about Wittgenstein’s lectures and publications based on them see Klagge 2019 and Pichler, Biggs and Uffelmann 2019. 17. The most noteworthy cases are the books published as McGuinness (ed.) 1984 and Gibson and O’Mahony (2020). 18. Malcolm 1958, Drury 1981 and Bouwsma 1986 are some of the most extensive reports from conversations. Flowers and Ground (eds.) 2016 provide a large collection of further testimonies. See also Wittgenstein 1993, Klagge (ed.) 2001, Wittgenstein 2003 and Drury 2019. The literary executors also all made important contributions to this genre. See Rhees (ed.) 1981, Erbacher, C., A. dos Santos Reis and J. Jung (2019) and von Wright 1958. 19. Page 12 in one of the typescript versions for von Wright’s opening address at Kirchberg in 1977. The quoted passage is crossed out in the typescript and has not been published. The typescript is kept at WWA, Wri-SF-065-b.

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20. The biography of Wittgenstein’s early years by McGuinness (1988), and the biography by Ray Monk (1990) are examples of works in which narrow ‘academic’ issues concerning the interpretation of particular philosophical remarks by Wittgenstein and the ‘larger’ issues of the unity of his life and his philosophical work form one integrated discourse. 21. Rothhaupt and Vossenkuhl (eds.) 2013 open up an interesting perspective on this large canvas. 22. Emphasis added. 23. Here Hertzberg provides a framework for discussion of a theme that reoccurs in several later chapters in this volume, especially in chapters 6, 9 and 12. 24. Some of the topics addressed by Österman in his biographical sketch are discussed in chapters 8, 11 and 12. 25. Erbacher’s review covers all letters between any of the three literary executors from the time after Wittgenstein’s death in April 1951 to Anscombe’s death in January 2001. At the National Library of Finland there are at least four letters from Anscombe to von Wright from the time before this. The number is uncertain because some letters are without date. 26. This question will gradually emerge as a major focus of interest in the present volume. See chapters 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12. 27. Discussion of the first and second issue continues in greater detail but with a congenial overall thrust in later chapters. The Part II issue is addressed especially in chapter 12. The compartmentalization issue is discussed in most chapters but is a major topic in chapters 9 and 10. 28. Westergaard’s contribution thus stands in close dialogue with the portrait of Rhees in chapter 2 in this volume. 29. Jakola has elsewhere published his detailed reconstruction of von Wright’s proposal from 1967–68 (Jakola 2021). For discussion of the philosophical themes also addressed by Jakola, see chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12 in this volume. 30. Letter from von Wright to Rhees and Anscombe 18 August 1988 (WWA, Wri-FC-006.)

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PART ONE

Portraits of Wittgenstein’s Literary Heirs

19

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CHAPTER TWO

Rush Rhees: ‘Discussion is my only medicine’ LARS HERTZBERG

1. LIFE1 Rush Rhees was born in Rochester, New York, in 1905. His father, Rush Rhees Sr, had been a professor of New Testament interpretation and was president of Rochester University, which was at the time affiliated with the Baptist faith. Rush Rhees Jr enrolled in the university in 1922 and took up philosophy. Two years later, a headline in The New York Times read ‘Radicalism of Rochester President’s Son Causes Professor to Bar Youth from Class’. Professor George Forbes had dropped Rhees from his class because, he claimed, Rhees was bent on refuting everything Forbes taught; according to Forbes he was guilty of shallow thinking and inordinate conceit. Rhees on his part is supposed to have said: ‘I am radical. Dr Forbes is not. That is why I am debarred . . . From a Puritan I have revolted into an atheist.’2 (It should be mentioned that, while Rhees, as far as I know, remained unaffiliated with any church for the remainder of his life, he later on came to have a deeply reflective understanding of religious life.) Rush Rhees Sr was abroad at the time. The clash led to Rhees leaving the university and the United States. It is my understanding that after this he only returned to his country for a few short visits, sometimes staying at the family’s cottage in Maine. From Rochester Rhees went straight to Edinburgh, where he studied with A. E. Taylor and Norman Kemp Smith. In a letter, Kemp Smith wrote about Rhees: 21

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He is quite a picture, like the young Shelley, & rather lives up to it – tho’ quite a nice & simple youth – wearing his shirt collar loose and open at the neck . . . He aspires to be a poet, but conceals this high ambition under the very thin disguise of journalism. However, his greatest influence at Edinburgh was John Anderson, who later went to teach in Australia. (Anderson had a role in the shaping of Australian realism. Thus, D. M. Armstrong acknowledged that Anderson had had a formative influence on his thinking.) Anderson, who was an ardent believer in academic freedom of speech, and who at times was a Trotskyite and an anarchist, seems to have had a long-lasting influence on Rhees’s political attitudes.3 Rhees went to teach at Manchester for four years, then visited the University of Innsbruck in order to work on the philosophy of Brentano with Alfred Kastil. At this time he was particularly interested in the concept of continuity. In 1933 Rhees was admitted as a doctoral student at Cambridge. His plan was to go on with the work on continuity. (He would write an essay on the topic later on.4) Rhees’s supervisor was G. E. Moore. At the insistence of Moore, he began attending Wittgenstein’s lectures, at first finding it hard to make sense of them. However, his doubts gradually vanished, and a friendship grew between the two philosophers. Christian Erbacher suggests that Rhees’ intelligent unruliness, his acquaintance with the University of Manchester—where Wittgenstein had once studied engineering—and his experiences in Wittgenstein’s homeland Austria may have further contributed to a mutual sympathy. In any case, three years after their first encounter, Rhees and Wittgenstein had become discussion partners also outside class.5 In that same year Rhees wrote, in a statement about his work: Notwithstanding the opportunities that were furnished to me and the time I have allowed myself . . . I have succeeded neither in preparing anything for publication nor in completing a thesis for a Ph.D. Nor can I say that I see any great likelihood for my doing so.6 This report is indicative both of his strong tendency towards self-criticism – which after all is not so very uncommon among doctoral candidates in philosophy – and a much less common ability to be totally upfront about it. However, it should be noted that at this time aiming for a doctorate was rather uncommon among those aspiring for an academic career in Britain. A

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doctorate, it was thought, made for a narrower range of competence, compared with spending the corresponding time teaching at a university.7 Wittgenstein did not share Rhees’s low opinion of his abilities. In a letter of recommendation in 1939 he wrote: I have known Mr. R. Rhees for 4 years; he has attended my lectures on philosophy and we have had a great many discussions both on philosophical and general subjects. I have always been strongly impressed by the great seriousness and intelligence with which he tackles any problem. Mr. Rhees is an exceptionally kind and helpful man and will spare no trouble to assist his students.8 In 1938 Wittgenstein asked Rhees to do an English translation of the Philosophische Untersuchungen (in the shape it had at the time). However, he did not approve of Rhees’s attempt, actually calling it awful – although he was at pains to point out that Rhees was a good man and philosopher, and that translating the text was a very difficult task.9 (Wittgenstein’s reaction should perhaps be understood as a – somewhat exaggerated – expression of the shock many writers are liable to feel on seeing their own texts in translation. I am not aware of any problems in the translation that would objectively justify Wittgenstein’s dismissal.) In 1940 Rhees was appointed to a temporary teaching position in Swansea, having worked for a time as a welder in a factory. Later on the teaching position was made permanent, and he stayed on at the department as a lecturer (refusing promotion to a senior lectureship), until he retired in 1966. Chance, it appears, had brought Rhees to Wales, to the country from which his family name originated. Wittgenstein enjoyed visiting and having discussions with Rhees in Swansea. While he was staying in Newcastle during the war, he wrote to Malcolm: ‘I am feeling rather lonely here & may try to get to some place where I have someone to talk to. E.g. to Swansea where Rhees is a lecturer in philosophy.’10 After the war, he would like to escape Cambridge for Swansea.11 Rhees started the Philosophical Society which went on to have weekly meetings for as long as the Swansea Philosophy Department continued in existence. He was a powerful source of inspiration for those who came into contact with him. Rhees had a formative influence on colleagues such as Peter Winch, Roy Holland, David Cockburn, Ilham Dilman and Howard Mounce. Cora Diamond spent a year teaching at Swansea, but she tells me his philosophical importance for her came later. A prominent student of Rhees’s was D. Z. Phillips, who was to be senior lecturer and then professor at Swansea from 1967 until his death in 2006.

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On retiring Rhees moved to London, then to Cambridgeshire. During this period he would have regular discussions with Peter Winch, Norman Malcolm (his fellow student from his Cambridge years) and Raimond Gaita. From Cambridgeshire he moved back to Swansea, where he led post-graduate seminars. He died there in 1989. For Rhees, discussion was the core of a life in philosophy. During his final illness, he is reported to have said, ‘Discussion is my only medicine. When that is finished, so am I.’12 For my own part, I had the fortune of meeting Rush Rhees on a few occasions in the 1970s and 1980s. To me he was one of those very rare people whose seriousness and lack of posturing strikes one immediately. Meeting him had the effect of making me read him in a different spirit: to discern the absolute earnestness of his searching style.

2. WORK Rhees was sparing when it came to publishing his own work. A handful of articles appeared, most of which were brought together in the collection Discussions of Wittgenstein (1970). Many of them were concerned with what might be called the philosophy of logic, which is another way of saying that they contain reflections on philosophical method. There are essays on the Tractatus, on Wittgenstein’s views on ethics, on Philosophical Investigations. Rhees was one of the first to question the sharp distinction that had been drawn between the earlier and the later Wittgenstein. The essays that have received most attention are ‘Can There Be a Private Language?’, and ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders’. In the huge discussion about private language that has taken place since his essay on the topic appeared in 1954, very little has been added to the clarity he achieves there. As for the essay on the builders, I want to return to that later.13 In 1969, D. Z. Phillips, Rhees’s erstwhile student, then colleague at Swansea, collected some of Rhees’s unpublished writings in Without Answers. Most of these papers had not been written for publication, but were part of an interchange with individual philosophers or for special occasions. Their themes, roughly, are science and society, moral philosophy, the philosophy or religion, art and education. Rhees himself edited the collection Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, with contributions by among others Hermione Wittgenstein, Fania Pascal, Maurice Drury and a postscript by Rhees himself. Apart from his own work, Rhees, along with Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, took an active part in the editing of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass.14

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While a large part of Rhees’s time was devoted to the posthumous publication of Wittgenstein’s work, most of what has appeared of his own work has been brought out posthumously through the editorship of D. Z. Phillips. The published Nachlass, seven volumes in all, consists of excerpts from Rhees’s manuscripts, letters and notes, which Phillips had made in long hand.15 What apparently inspired Phillips to undertake this Herculean task – which he completed in a surprisingly short time – was his having discovered new dimensions of depth in his former teacher’s work, centring around the concepts ‘growth of understanding’, ‘possibility of discourse’ and ‘unity of language’. Having completed the edition, Phillips devoted the remaining years of his life to the attempt to make Rhees’s work more widely known.

3. RHEES AND WITTGENSTEIN In the English-speaking philosophical establishment, Rush Rhees has come to be seen as little more than a student and expounder of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views. This characterization, however, is far from just: he was an original thinker in his own right, as is obvious from a careful reading of what he published, and even more so from the posthumous publications. In fact, the relation between his thought and that of Wittgenstein would merit careful scrutiny. There are, I believe, several reasons for the neglect of Rhees’s own philosophy. Apart from the dearth of publications in his own name, much of which consists in editorial comments or discussions of Wittgenstein’s life and his philosophy, Rhees seemed to have little concern with his own fame. He felt no need to underscore his own originality, and he was anxious to acknowledge his indebtedness, such as it was, to Wittgenstein. But independently of that, there was a genuine affinity in philosophical outlook between Wittgenstein and Rhees, as shown both in their style of doing philosophy and in their view of the philosopher’s task. Rhees seems not to have fit the conventional mould of academic philosopher any better than Wittgenstein did, as shown, for instance, by his unwillingness or inability to play the game of self-promotion. They both rejected the widely received idea of philosophy as the testing ground of various philosophical theories: realism vs idealism, materialism vs dualism, etc.; they shared the view that committing oneself to one or the other of these abstract labels had little to do with thinking seriously about the issues. Both of them exerted their influence, above all, through personal interaction with students and colleagues; this was connected with the fact that their influence, by all accounts, was not limited to a purely intellectual sphere, but was to a large extent what might be called ethical or existential. They shared the idea that, rather than

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cleverness, what philosophy requires is the strength to overcome one’s predilections concerning the way the problems of philosophy are to be understood. Much of Rhees’s writings is quite unlike Wittgenstein’s in its form of address. While Rhees is responding to someone else’s remarks, Wittgenstein’s starting point is his own intellectual temptations. Even when his notes are inspired by reading or talking about some thinker (St Augustine, Goethe, Frege, Freud, Moore, Russell), that thinker soon recedes to the background. Though Wittgenstein’s notes were not intended as contributions to current debate in philosophy, neither were they written for particular persons; rather, one might say, they were aimed at a timeless audience. Wittgenstein may not have aspired to fame; his feelings on that score were probably divided. In any case it is obvious that he was not indifferent to the sort of impact his work would have on the course of philosophy. This is clear from some of the reflections that have been assembled in Culture and Value.16 This is connected with another difference between their writings: Wittgenstein seems to have made a clear separation between two sorts of question: on the one hand, the (shall we say?) timeless and impersonal philosophical questions that are the subject matter not only of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, but also (though in a radically different form) of Philosophical Investigations; and, on the other hand, what might be labelled questions of ‘culture and value’: questions engaging his individual existence or provoked by his times, e.g. matters of art and aesthetics, religion, ethics, psychoanalysis or anthropology. While there are plenty of discussions of such topics both in his notebooks and in his lectures, no reference is made to any of them in the selection which forms the basis of Philosophical Investigations. With Rhees the situation is different.17 This brings us to some points of style and method. Wittgenstein’s aim in Philosophical Investigations is to elicit the active cooperation of the reader. Many remarks are like a tool kit: they often contain suggestions for thoughtexperiments, exercises to be carried out by the reader, or small bits of dialogue, in which the reader must learn to distinguish between the voice expressing the view of the writer’s alter ego still in the grips of misleading pictures, or misunderstanding the other party’s responses, and that of the writer himself, trying to disentangle the confusions. Rhees’s rhetoric is very different from Wittgenstein’s, though quite as distinctive. Or maybe it is better characterized as an absence of rhetoric: he does not use striking simile, formulates no epigrams. The flow in his texts is much more even than that of Wittgenstein: like that of an even breath (at the same time, his use of English has a tinge of eccentricity). Rhees often proceeds by marking off the matter under discussion – this might be language,

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conversation, faith in God, etc. – by alternately pointing out how it differs from things with which we might be tempted to assimilate it, and, on the other hand, how it resembles things with which we are not used to comparing it. The differences between their philosophical temperaments is visible even on a typographical level: Wittgenstein’s texts are made up of distinct remarks, often connected with quick shifts of temper and rhythm (sometimes moving from one genre to another), as against the continuous tread of Rhees’s writing. In Rhees’s texts there is a stronger sense of the author’s presence; this is undoubtedly connected with the way in which they came about. Wittgenstein, for the most part, is making us see how bewildering something may seem, rather than expressing his own bewilderment. In most cases, the reason he asks the questions he asks is not that he does not know the answer to them, rather, he is drawing attention to them as questions, in order to show, for instance, that they are pointless or ambiguous. In Rhees’s writing, on the other hand, the struggle seems to be present in the text itself. With Rhees, much more than with Wittgenstein, one is witnessing philosophy growing out of his own everyday experiences and encounters. (I am not suggesting that one form of writing is more valuable than the other.) Perhaps one difference in their style could be summed up by saying that in Wittgenstein the second person is continually present, whereas in Rhees it is the first person. Your troubles vs mine.

4. ‘WITTGENSTEIN’S BUILDERS’18 Rhees was not only an interpreter but, in a sense, also a critic of Wittgenstein. It is true that Wittgenstein’s thought was the fertile ground from which Rhees’s thinking grew, and in fact, calling him a critic of Wittgenstein might easily lead to misunderstanding. In most other cases, the critique of Wittgenstein has been driven by a desire to counteract his influence in philosophy. Rhees’s attitude is the opposite of this. He considered Wittgenstein’s influence in philosophy to be a salutary one, indeed, the most important contribution to philosophy in the twentieth century; at the same time, he thought, Wittgenstein on some points was liable to oversimplify matters, and hence his thoughts were in need of modification. This concerns, above all, Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of a languagegame. In his discussion of the Augustinian picture of language, Wittgenstein suggests that the builders’ game, i.e. an Augustinian language suitably amended, might be the whole language of a tribe; he also claims that all of human language could be thought of as simply consisting of a range of different language-games. Rhees finds these ideas problematic. What is

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missing in the game perspective on language is the way speaking is connected with life. Rhees reflected deeply on what is involved in the game metaphor in a way that many other readers of Wittgenstein have not: this primarily concerned the contrast between playing a game and really doing something – really meaning what one says. In what follows, I shall give an outline of Rhees’s critique of the language-game metaphor. After that, I shall make an attempt to understand how Rhees thought about the connections between speaking and life. I will suggest that one can distinguish between what might be called an anthropological and an ethical strand in his thinking, and will raise the question how these are related to one another. Consider the landscape into which Wittgenstein introduced the concept of a language-game. Starting earlier, but culminating around the turn of the previous century, there had been a shift in philosophers’ focus, within the Anglo-American tradition, from thoughts or judgements to sentences or propositions. This shift has been characterized as a rejection of what came to be called psychologism – a conception of meaning as a matter of the mental contents associated with speaking or hearing words spoken – in favour of a perspective on language as a logical structure. A basic assumption was that a judgement could, ideally, be identified on the basis of the composition of a sentence expressing the judgement. In principle, if not always in practice, it was thought, one could determine the logical properties of a judgement on the basis of the composition of the sentence expressing it. The sense was, as it were, packaged into the sequence of words (sounds or marks) of which the sentence consisted. This perspective on language offered an excuse for not looking at what speakers are actually doing when they utter words in specific contexts, since what is expressed is taken to be laid down in the form of words itself. It encouraged what I should like to call a spirit of apriorism: the feeling that we can survey the possible uses of a word or sentence by simply contemplating it, in a vacuum as it were. This inclination was what Wittgenstein was trying to battle. (‘Don’t think but look’, he says in discussing the meanings of the word ‘game’. PI 2009, § 66.) Against the fixation on words and sentences, he introduced the notion that in order to get at the sense of what someone is saying we need to be clear about its role in a larger context, in what he called a language-game. It is only as used in a context that a sentence can be said to possess a distinct form. This, it should be clear, is not a return to psychologism. For instance, the way a person’s words are to be taken is a matter that may be debated; it is not fixed, say, by the contents of her mind at the moment of speaking. Rhees, on his part, considered the holistic perspective developed by Wittgenstein an unqualified advance in our thinking about what it is to

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speak. However, in Rhees’s view Wittgenstein did not go far enough in his holism. According to Rhees, the fragmentation in the view of language evident in the emphasis on sentences (propositions) was to some degree preserved in the idea of language being made up of a range of independent language-games. This conception led to a schematic view of the relation between different uses of language: in fact, to a new apriorism (this term is not used by Rhees). Against this, Rhees emphasized the way things said are bound up with the relations between speakers, within the context of a life lived with language. As Rhees puts it: When [someone] makes the move in chess he is not telling me anything. And if I understand what he is telling me, it is not just like understanding the sort of moves he is making: knowing the rules or the uses of the expressions he is ‘moving’. There is much more of a background of common understanding than that . . . In understanding one another, there are other standards than simply those of what is grammatically correct; standards such as good faith, and so on, come in here as well. And more is taken for granted than is held in grammar books and dictionaries. You have to learn the way people speak. 19 Comparing speaking to a game might encourage us to consider simply the behaviour: the uttering of certain sounds, in conjunction with the immediate context. Rhees is telling us to look beyond this. But what is this larger context that is relevant? In fact Rhees’s discussion might be thought to point in two different directions: to what might be called the ‘having something to say’ theme (or ‘the place in life’ theme) on the one hand, and the ‘remarks hanging together’ theme on the other hand.

5. ‘THE UNITY OF LANGUAGE’ Rhees sometimes speaks about sharing a language, speaking the same language, but it is important not to give this idea the wrong emphasis. We might be tempted to put the focus on what distinguishes some cases of speaking (say, cases of speaking English or cases of playing this languagegame) from others (say, those of speaking Swedish or playing another language-game), whereas what Rhees was concerned with was the way speakers’ words are connected. (It might be said that the notion of languages as delimited from one another has no role here.) Central notions here are those of ‘a common understanding’, a shared view of ‘what makes sense, what can be understood, what it is possible to say, what one might try to say’ (WPD, p. 193).

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Now, spelling out what Rhees means by the unity of language is no simple matter. He makes it clear that he is not speaking about a common (logical) system underlying all the different things we say, the way pure mathematics underlies all the different applications of mathematics (ibid.). The unity of language is not a formal unity in the sense of formal logic.20 In fact, I believe he would have argued, making the unity of language a matter of deductive relations would be a case of putting the cart before the horse: it is only because of the way things said are interrelated in people’s lives that we can speak of utterances standing in deductive relations. How what I say in this situation is taken up is shown in how others go on with it. The dependence is shown in people’s lives with language, it is not something that can be ascertained from outside. As the matter is put in David Cockburn’s illuminating discussion of Rhees’s thoughts about the unity of language: Rhees writes: “Philosophy is concerned with the intelligibility of language, or the possibility of understanding. And in that way it is concerned with the possibility of discourse.” It is, I think, important to be clear what Rhees does not mean by this. His suggestion is not that philosophy is concerned with “the conditions of the possibility of discourse”. We are tempted to think that one of the aims of philosophy is to investigate something – the nature of language perhaps – on which our speaking with each other depends. Many philosophers have seen their task in that way; and many – perhaps including Rhees – have taken this to be one of Wittgenstein’s concerns. Rhees’s opposition to this view of philosophy is seen in remarks such as the following: “The language – what you understand when you understand the language – is not something apart from understanding people and speaking with them. Something which makes that possible”. Sharing a language with another is not what makes discussion between us possible. Sharing a language with another is nothing other than being able to speak with her.21 For Rhees, then, philosophy’s concern is with the question, not how language is possible, but what it means for there to be language. What we say does not make sense because it belongs to the language, rather speaking a language simply consists in being able to make oneself understood by means of words. ‘The unity of language’ is not to be regarded as a well-defined technical term. It is rather a way of gesturing towards certain aspects of our life with language, how the different things we say hang together and bear on one another, something that a preoccupation with language-games tends to make us overlook. Rhees, we might say, is trying to restore the balance upset by

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Wittgenstein’s critique of the philosophical idea of language as a formal unity; a critique which led Wittgenstein’s readers to suppose that he thought of language as fragmented into a range of watertight compartments. What Wittgenstein did emphasize, however, was the different things speaking can be – an emphasis that Rhees would endorse. I should like to quote a passage from a note written by Rhees in July 1958, in which a number of the themes that recur in these notes are brought up: Perhaps at this point one would have to bring in the matter of the various standards that are relevant to discourse between people; which makes it possible for them to understand one another. It is always important that we may use the same language in pretence or deceit. Genuineness and deceit. The possibility of this distinction belongs to what we mean by speaking: saying something, telling one something.22 Rhees keeps coming back to the point that the language-game metaphor encourages us to think of acquiring language as a matter of acquiring a skill or a technique. This is connected with Wittgenstein’s emphasis, especially in the early parts of the Philosophical Investigations, on the central role of drill in the acquisition of language, apparent in the remarks on ostensive definition in connection with the discussion of Augustine, in the discussion of rulefollowing, in the discussion of knowing how to continue a number series. The issue in these sequences of remarks turns on the central role of reaching conformity in our judgements. Rhees suggests that Wittgenstein tended to model his thinking about language too much on mathematics. He may well be right about this. Wittgenstein had of course to some extent been moulded by the inheritance of logicism.23 It could be suggested that in mathematics the signs used are internal to what is being said. Or differently put, to regard something as a mathematical expression is already to consider it as being used in a particular type of context. In thinking about mathematics, the emphasis in connection with learning will be on gaining mastery of the signs to be used, the criterion of mastery being conformity with one’s community; the speaker’s relation to the signs she produces will not be important. What tends to be left out in the account Rhees attributes to Wittgenstein is the importance, in learning to speak, of the speaker’s coming to express herself. (This critique, I believe, applies in particular to the early part of the Philosophical Investigations, maybe up to and including § 242.) Rhees found it particularly important to emphasize the ability to take part in conversation with others. In order to carry on a conversation one would

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have to have an understanding of the people one is talking to and the things one is talking about, one would have to see the point of remarks made. Rhees discusses this issue in some notes from September 1957: Understanding the remark he is making is not simply a question of knowing English. It is a question of finding that he is saying something intelligible; that he is saying something sensible. And what do you have to know, in order to see that? . . . It does not do to say that you have to learn the language . . ., if that means that you have to acquire a kind of equipment.24 As for finding that the other is ‘saying something sensible’: what does this amount to? I guess what Rhees has in mind here is that we must have some idea of how uttering these words in these circumstances might be an expression of this speaker: if we have no idea of what the speaker is expressing, of what sense it makes for her to utter those words in that situation, we would have no sense of the speaker having said something, whether or not it had the ring of an English sentence. In this connection, Rhees talks about ‘the growth of understanding’. This notion, according to Rhees, was central to Plato, and it was something the sophists questioned. He wrote (in May–June 1957): If you understand anything in language, you must understand what dialogue is, and you must see how understanding grows as the dialogue grows. How understanding the language grows. For the language is discourse, is speaking. It is telling people things and trying to follow them . . . You understand what is said when you learn from it, not otherwise – or not fully anyway.25 ‘Learning from it’ must involve more than simply receiving information. It may involve things like discovering alternative ways of seeing things, where this may be a way of learning about the world and at the same time learning about other people. What we have been discussing so far are what might be called the anthropological aspects of speaking and intelligibility. However, for Rhees, these issues evidently also had a moral dimension. This is connected with the centrality of the distinction between the genuine and the deceitful. In Rhees’s view, Plato’s critique of the sophists has bearing on this issue. According to the sophists, to speak intelligibly is to speak effectively (WPD p. 24). I succeed in making myself understood if I succeed in getting my

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interlocutor where I want her; if I am able the get her to agree with whatever it is I want her to agree with. Since effects are what matters to the sophists, they have no use for the distinction between the genuine and the deceitful. Accordingly, the image of language as a collection of games or a toolbox would have been adequate for their view of what it is to speak. Plato, on the other hand, says Rhees, thought it particularly important to be able to recognize discourse: to be able to recognize when something is being said, and to tell the difference between this and the imitations that were offered by the rhetoricians and the sophists . . . here the point is that there must be a distinction between what is real understanding and what passes for understanding.26 We are now moving on ground that is markedly different from the anthropological reaches of Philosophical Investigations. How are we to understand the discussion about the sophists? What are they to us? Obviously, the reason Rhees finds it important to reflect on the sophists is that in his view the sophist is someone who lurks in each one of us. The word ‘sophist’ marks a certain kind of moral temptation that besets our attempts at conversation. Sophistry is a guard against an openness we find counterproductive or embarrassing, though unlike the professional sophists we are liable to do so without acknowledging it even to ourselves. Conversations often fail because we yield to self-deception. On this reading, when Rhees criticizes the sophists he is challenging us to keep our conversations genuine, to keep them such as to contribute, if possible, to a growth of understanding on the part of the participants, rather than resort to strategies like flattery or obfuscation. We should refrain from thinking of speaking as similar to playing a game, on the one hand because this view is philosophically limiting, but on the other hand also because our own conversations will suffer if we do. What would need spelling out is how the ethical unity Rhees is speaking about here is related to the connectedness between remarks in a conversation that we were discussing earlier. That is a task that I am not able to undertake in the present context. For all their differences, there was a close temperamental affinity between Wittgenstein and Rhees, closer, I think it can be said, than that between Wittgenstein and his other literary executors, Anscombe and von Wright. The interaction between Wittgenstein and Rhees came to form a vigorous source of philosophical regeneration, succeeding, at least for a time, in giving some of its saltiness back to English-speaking philosophy. What their influence will be in the long run is hard to predict. At present, that influence seems largely to be in abeyance.27

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NOTES 1. This section is largely based on D. Z. Phillips’s introduction to Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. xi–xxii. 2. See http://www.campustimes.org/2016/03/24/when-rush-rhees-son-droppedout/. Accessed on 31 December 2019. 3. For a discussion between Wittgenstein and Rhees, in which Wittgenstein is trying to talk Rhees out of joining a Trotskyite party, see Rush Rhees ‘Postscript’ in Rhees (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 229 f. 4. ‘On Continuity: Wittgenstein’s Ideas, 1938’, in his collection Discussions of Wittgenstein (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 104–157. 5. Christian Erbacher, ‘Wittgenstein and His Literary Executors’, Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, Volume 4, Number 3 (2016), p. 4. 6. Phillips, ‘Introduction’, p. xv. 7. On this, see Cora Diamond, ‘Reflections of a Dinosaur’, in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Volume 93, November 2019, pp. 87–104. Diamond points out that at one time the British D.Phil. ‘was a degree largely for Americans’. This might explain why Rhees took the unusual step of enrolling for a doctorate. 8. Wittgenstein: Gesamtbriefwechsel/Complete Correspondence: Innsbrucker Electronic Edition, second edition, ed. Brian McGuinness et al. Innsbruck: Intelex. Quoted in Phillips, op. cit., p. xvii. 9. Erbacher, op.cit., p. 8. For the translation, see http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/ 10. Quoted in Wittgenstein, Ludwig and Rush Rhees, 2015. ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Conversations with Rush Rhees (1939–50): From the Notes of Rush Rhees’, edited by G. Citron. Mind 142 (2015), pp. 1–71. 11. Phillips, op.cit., p. xix, Citron, op.cit. 12. Phillips, op.cit., p. xx. 13. For an (incomplete) bibliography of Rhees’s life-time publications, see the memorial volume Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars – Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees, ed. by D. Z. Phillips and Peter Winch (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 200 f. 14. On Rhees as editor of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, see the contributions to the present volume by Solin, Westergaard and Jakola. 15. These are On Religion and Philosophy (1997), Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse (1998; 2nd edition 2006), Moral Questions (1998), Discussions of Simone Weil (1998), Wittgenstein’s ‘On Certainty’ (2003), In Dialogue with the Greeks, Volume I: The Presocratics and Reality (2004) Volume II: Plato and Dialectic (2004). 16. For instance: Is it just I who cannot found a school, or can a philosopher never do so? I cannot found a school, because I actually want not to be imitated. In any case not by those who publish articles in philosophical journals. —CV 1998

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17. Cp Bernt Österman’s discussion of von Wright’s editing of Culture and Value and Peter Westergaard’s discussion of Rhees as editor of Wittgenstein’s ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’ in their contributions to this volume. 18. The following section largely draws on two earlier papers of mine: ‘Rush Rhees on Philosophy and Religious Discourse’ (Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001)), pp. 431–442, and ‘Rhees on the Unity of Language’ (Philosophical Investigations 33 (2012), pp. 224–237). 19. Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, 1st edn, p. 62. First italics mine. This work will henceforth be referred to as WPD. 20. WPD, p. 193 and pp. 245 f. 21. David Cockburn, ‘Rush Rhees: The Reality of Discourse’, in John Edelman (ed.), Sense and Reality: Essays out of Swansea, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 1–22. The quotation is from pp. 1f. (The Rhees quotations are from WPD, p. 32 and p. 277.) 22. WPD p. 263 f. 23. On the contrast between speaking and the mathematical use of expressions, see Rhees, ‘Continuity: on Wittgenstein’s Ideas, 1938’, op. cit. 24. WPD pp. 206 f. 25. WPD p. 27. 26. WPD p. 258; August 1958. 27. I wish to thank David Cockburn and Thomas Wallgren for useful comments on this essay.

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CHAPTER THREE

A Portrait of Elizabeth Anscombe DUNCAN RICHTER

Three pictures of Anscombe are dominant. In one she is a scary kook, in another she is a champion of Roman Catholicism, and the third has Anscombe as a feminist. There is something to each of these, but even adding all three together might well miss something, most obviously the value of her work as a contribution not only to Catholic thinking but to philosophy in general. Starting with these three aspects of her identity I will try to present a fuller picture of her and her work. In his biography of Iris Murdoch Peter J. Conradi gives a striking description of Anscombe: Fair without being blonde, of fine profile, broad noble brow and extraordinary stamina, Anscombe was both poor and unselfconscious enough to collect cigarette stubs from the gutter, and appears in Iris’s journals being pilloried for wearing trousers at early Mass, living at 27 St John’s Street in a squalor that Iris, tolerant in such matters, finds noteworthy, and getting arrested for wandering about with her hair down at 5 a.m., then refusing to give her name to the police. —Conradi 2001: 283–284 There is clear evidence of Anscombe’s eccentricity here, but it is mostly explained by her poverty and her willingness to stick up for herself. Why 37

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should she have to give her name to the police if her only crime is being outside early in the morning with her hair down? Much of her odd behaviour involves sticking up for herself. She once talked a man in Chicago out of mugging her by getting him to see that she was a guest in his city, and there is a famous story of her, upon being refused entry into a restaurant because she was wearing trousers, simply taking them off.1 Since Anscombe often wore a tunic this might have worked as a kind of dress even if she removed her trousers, but no doubt it would have been a shock to see her undressing in this way. These stories are funny, but they also show courage and the imagination to look for, and find, a good alternative when faced with a seemingly no-win dilemma. This is exactly what she thought was lacking in people who wanted to bomb civilians during the Second World War, so her rejection of apparent dilemmas is both a feature of her character and an idea that found its way into her thinking about ethics. Another story bears closer inspection too. In her obituary of Anscombe for the Guardian, Jane O’Grady reports that: She chain-smoked for some years, but bargained with God, when her second son was seriously ill, that she would give up smoking cigarettes if he recovered. Feeling the strain of this the following year, she decided that her bargain had not mentioned cigars or pipes, and took to smoking these. —O’Grady 2001 Anscombe’s cigar-smoking is a key part of the picture of her as an eccentric, but consider the circumstances in which she made this bargain with God. There is nothing funny about them at all. The (supposedly) comical image of a woman smoking cigars is the result of a woman with a commitment to keeping her word facing serious stress, including the stress of having a child close to death. That said, it is true that Anscombe was both scary and kooky. Anthony Kenny’s friendship with her ended abruptly in 1965 when he told her that he intended to get married despite having taken an oath of celibacy when he became a priest. He was no longer a priest, but in the eyes of the Church the oath still applied. Anscombe was not sympathetic, telling him that, ‘Our greatest wish for you must be that you will be desperately unhappy in your marriage’ (Kenny 2019: 7). Before their friendship fell apart, Anscombe’s unconventional side showed itself as, Kenny remembers, he would sometimes take a bath at her house and she would sit on the edge to discuss philosophy with him (see Kenny 2019: 6).

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The second, Catholic hero, picture is closer to the truth, but a partial picture at best, and one that invites misunderstanding. She ‘read her way into the Catholic faith’ although her parents were against her growing wish to be a Catholic (Haldane 2019b: 6). Because of her parents’ opposition, she did not join the Church until her first year at Oxford. Her father was a soldier, a scientist, and an atheist. Her mother, after whom she was named, was a classics teacher and more religious, albeit only slightly so. Anscombe studied classics and philosophy, became very religious, and spoke out against unjustified military aggression. She was also against scientism. It seems therefore that she took more after her mother than her father. So far as she had an ideology it would have been Catholicism, but this is not to suggest that she ever distorted anything or was less than fully honest in order to advance a Catholic agenda. Her daughter Mary Geach says, ‘When giving me an account of a debate of hers with a noted Christian apologist, she had told me that bad arguments for the truth should be refuted’ (Geach and Gormally 2011: 10–11). Part of her rejection of consequentialism involves the refusal to do bad in order that good may come, and this includes deliberately promoting faulty reasoning. This does not mean that her religion had no influence on her philosophy. Her Catholicism may have meant that she read things, such as the work of Aquinas, that most of her contemporaries were not reading. She also seems to have found at least something of value in this work. In ‘Necessity and Truth’, she writes that: We are nowadays in some ways closer to the ancient [sic] and the medievals than we are to, say, Kant and Hegel. There are doubtless many points which go together to form this situation: but if the reviewer [i.e. Anscombe] were challenged to name what most strikes him he would point to the eclipse in recent philosophy of the notion of “the given” and the manner of the current gradual redeparture from atomistic conceptions. Asked what was given, a present-day English speaking philosopher would be very likely to say ‘the lot’. We start mediis in rebus; our philosophic activity is one of describing and clarifying this milieu to ourselves. —Anscombe 1981a: 84 Mary Geach writes that she once asked Anscombe whether she or Peter Geach (Mary’s father) was the better philosopher. Anscombe replied ‘that he had the more powerful intellect, but that she had the greater ability to see about and around a problem’. (Geach and Gormally 2011: 18). Whatever we make of the accuracy of this assessment, I think it fair to say that Anscombe believed that in philosophy it is important to look about and

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around problems. In this way, from the midst of an issue, we can clarify and describe where we are. She certainly was a Catholic, but she was also a Wittgensteinian and an individual with a mind of her own. It is potentially misleading, therefore, when Candace Vogler writes that it seemed to her, when she read Intention, that ‘there was a ghost writer at work in that slender volume’ (Vogler 2019). The alleged ghost writer in question is Aquinas. Mary Geach notes that Anscombe said she did not like to bring up Aquinas’ name because doing so tended to make one sort of person (Catholics, presumably) uncritically accepting of whatever was attributed to him and another sort (non-Catholics) uncritically dismissive of it (see Geach and Gormally 2011: 17). ‘Anscombe drew upon [Aquinas’] thought to an unknowable extent,’ Mary Geach tells us, but she did not write a lot about him, even in her unpublished papers (Geach and Gormally 2011: 8). Her correspondence with G.H. von Wright suggests sources other than Aquinas for her work on intention. Anscombe says that ‘The notion of “practical knowledge” can only be understood if we first understand “practical reasoning”,’ which, she says, means the same thing as ‘practical syllogism’ (Anscombe 1957: 57). In a letter to von Wright dated only ‘Thursday’ (apparently from 1954, not long before Easter) she says that her interest in practical syllogism comes from three things: reading the PI, especially §611 and the following passages on willing and doing, with a small group of people in Oxford; reading the Nicomachean Ethics because of her teaching duties; and her husband’s reasoning in an Aristotelian manner while taking medicine. Given the difficulty that people have had in understanding Intention I think it is worth quoting from this letter extensively. Here is the relevant part: I spent some of this last term discussing the Investigations with a small group of people here [i.e. Oxford], and in the end we got to the discussion of ‘Tun’ and ‘wollen’. (611+) This – together oddly enough with my reading Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea for teaching purposes – has got me on to a – to me – very interesting line about ‘how does one know what one is doing?’ – when e.g. one is writing a letter. I have been writing about it and even think I might go so far as to publish. I want to say that I know what I do as I know what I say. That is, not from the facts at all. The connexion with Aristotle is this: he says – and it always puzzled me very much – that the good of practical reasoning is ‘truth in agreement with right appetition’. I now understand this. “p, and q – so I do (or will do) R.” Of course this last isn’t made true by the considerations leading to it, it is made true by my doing whatever it is. The idea of some kind of desirableness modifying a

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concept of truth seemed so extraordinarily odd; and would be odd if – as one tends to suppose in advance – the truth in question is something shewn to the intelligence that arrives at it. Peter [Geach] said to me the other day “I am a big man, and I need a big dose, so I’ll take two tablespoons (doing so); do you know, my father used to reason like that?” We were of course not talking about philosophy at the time at all. It finally revealed to me what Aristotle meant by the “practical syllogism.”2 Geach, like Anscombe, had read a lot of Aquinas, so it is not wrong to suspect that Aquinas’ work influenced Anscombe’s thinking on intention. Indeed, Benjamin Lipscomb quotes a letter to Philippa Foot in which Anscombe writes that, ‘It might be useful to refer to Intention p. 65 . . . to elucidate St. Thos. use of ‘material object’ . . . or to use St. Thos. to elucidate me!’ (Lipscomb 2021: 299, note 39). But the main influences on Intention, Anscombe’s letter suggests, were Wittgenstein, Aristotle and Geach. It can be hard to pinpoint the ways in which Aquinas influenced Anscombe’s work. The importance of Christianity in her thinking, however, is self-evident. In her essay on ‘War and Murder’ she writes that, ‘The truth about Christianity is that it is a severe and practicable religion, not a beautifully ideal but impracticable one’ (Anscombe 1981c: 56). She lived her faith accordingly. Late in her life she was arrested while protesting outside an abortion clinic in Stockport, which shows that her opposition to abortion was practical as well as philosophical.3 She also opposed homosexuality, which could have complicated her relationship with Wittgenstein. When W. W. Bartley’s book appeared, in which Wittgenstein was said not only to have been gay but to have been very actively and casually so, Anscombe was ‘enraged’ and refused to believe it (Murdoch 2016: 426). ‘If by pressing a button it could have been secured that people would not concern themselves with his [i.e. Wittgenstein’s] personal life I should have pressed the button,’ she wrote to Paul Engelmann (Monk 1990: 583) Denis Paul gives evidence of the lengths to which Anscombe could go: I was present when Elizabeth Anscombe burnt a section of a few lines from a late manuscript book after obtaining a photograph of the other side of the leaf so that it would not suffer similarly. She said that this burnt passage referred to someone who was still alive and so felt herself entitled to destroy it. —Paul 2007: 13 Monk also says, however, that, having feared that Wittgenstein’s literary executors would not cooperate with his project of writing a biography of

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Wittgenstein, he found ‘the exact opposite’ to be the case (Monk 1990: xi). All three were ‘exceptionally kind, co-operative and helpful’ (Monk 1990: xi), and he thanks Anscombe especially for meeting with him several times and for letting him see Francis Skinner’s letters to Wittgenstein. The third common image of Anscombe that I mentioned above is Anscombe as a kind of feminist. When she objected to the proposed awarding of an honorary degree to President Truman, the male dons at St John’s College were told that ‘the women’ were ‘up to something’ and mobilized to defeat her (Anscombe 1957: 65). The women in question certainly included Anscombe and probably Philippa Foot. Of her Oxford colleagues, the only one ‘with whom she was entirely comfortable,’ according to Kenny, was Foot, despite Foot’s atheism (Haldane 2019a: 17). Foot, Murdoch and Mary Midgley were undergraduates at Somerville College, Anscombe at St Hugh’s. Although in different years – Anscombe matriculated in 1937, Murdoch and Midgley in 1938, and Foot in 1939 – they became friends. The balance between the sexes at Oxford shifted in their favour with the start of the Second World War, especially from May 1940, when men started to enlist or be conscripted, and then even more when the age of conscription was lowered, in 1941, to nineteen (see MacCumhaill and Wiseman 2018). The war also meant that many of the younger members of the faculty were unavailable to teach, so the education Anscombe and her friends received was somewhat old fashioned. Her tutors included Donald MacKinnon, remembered more as a theologian than as a philosopher, and Fr. Victor White, OP, whose instruction she specially requested (Berkman 2021: 709). She studied Literae Humaniores, also known as Greats, which is mostly classics (Ancient Greek and Roman language, literature, history and philosophy) but includes modern philosophy as well. Anscombe’s interest in Aquinas and her reading Greats (unlike Foot, for instance, who read the more modern Philosophy, Politics and Economics) probably made her even less inclined towards then current trends such as logical positivism and the moral philosophy of R. M. Hare. After they graduated, Anscombe, Foot, Murdoch and Midgley continued to meet in order to discuss philosophy. Murdoch said that Anscombe’s ‘ruthless authenticity’ made her ‘feel more & more ashamed of the vague self-indulgent way in which [she had] been philosophizing’ (Conradi 2001: 266). Murdoch also refers to Anscombe as ‘an old friend-foe of mine’ in a letter to Raymond Queneau (dated 12 August 1959, in Horner and Rowe 2016: 200). The four women formed a sort of quartet, with Anscombe’s religiously inflected moral seriousness creating a certain tension, but not a barrier, between them.

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Clare MacCumhaill and Rachael Wiseman argue that Hare’s moral philosophy became something of an obsession for the four. They rejected the fact/value distinction and the version of ordinary language philosophy that Hare practiced. Against the former they aimed to draw on ‘Wittgenstein’s methods and the ‘moth-eaten traditions’ that they had assimilated at Oxford’ to ‘show that a true description of the world would be one that included normative concepts’ (MacCumhaill and Wiseman 2018). Against the latter they drew on Wittgenstein again to study ‘the patterns and norms by which human life is lived’ (MacCumhaill and Wiseman 2018). Perhaps this interest in how human life is actually lived helps explain why Anscombe takes a historical view of ethical and religious language and its meaning in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, unlike Wittgenstein in the Lecture on Ethics, who writes about ethics and religion in an ahistorical and rather essentialist way. With these partial pictures behind us, perhaps it would be good to complete the picture by starting at the beginning. Though British, Anscombe was born in Limerick, Ireland in 1919. Her father, Alan Wells Anscombe, was a captain in the British Army when she was born, and the family later moved back to Britain, where her mother, Gertrude Elizabeth Anscombe (née Thomas) was a headmistress and her father a science teacher. Anscombe was the youngest of three children (and the only girl) in her family, which lived in south London. Before university she was educated at Sydenham High School, a private school for girls in southeast London.4 The Headmistress from 1917 to 1930, Miss Sanders, ‘established a rigorous curriculum, insisting that all girls were taught classics to provide a full and rounded liberal education’ (Sydenham High School website). The school’s motto is ‘Nyle ye Drede’: fear nothing, which seems to suit Anscombe rather well. It was because of her interest in metaphysics, and two topics in particular: causality and perception, that Anscombe found her way to philosophy. She had read a book called Natural Theology that seemed to assume that anything that happened must have a cause, which had puzzled her (see Anscombe 1981b: vii). Her interest in perception came from reading a book by Father Martin D’Arcy, S.J., called The Nature of Belief. After this, Anscombe says, ‘For years’ she ‘would spend time, in cafés, for example, staring at objects saying’ to herself: ‘ “I see a packet. But what do I really see? How can I say that I see anything more than a yellow expanse?” ’ (Anscombe 1981b: viii). This was before she began to study philosophy at university. H. H. Price’s lectures on phenomenalism and perception, and his book Hume’s Theory of the External World, although she did not agree with him, appealed to her because they alone seemed really to be about the issues that concerned her. Her interest in philosophy, then, was sparked by religious reading, but was

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not itself particularly religious. It was not, for instance, about the problem of evil or ethical questions or proofs of the existence of God. She shared her interest in philosophy and Catholicism with her husband, whom she met at Oxford. Geach was at Balliol College and receiving instruction from the same Dominican priest as she was, Fr. Richard Kehoe, OP (Berkman 2021: 708). They married three years later in 1941. In the same year, Anscombe graduated with First Class honours (on the strength of her papers in philosophy). For the first few years of their marriage Geach and Anscombe lived apart, as she was studying while he, a conscientious objector to the Second World War, worked in a pine forest (see Schwenkler 2019). Like Anscombe, Geach read Greats. His father had studied with Russell and Moore at Cambridge, and taught him philosophy, starting with logic, before he went to university.5 He was attracted to the work of J. M. E. McTaggart, but realized he would have to rethink when he became a Catholic. His conversion came from arguing with Catholics as an undergraduate and becoming convinced that they were right. He was received into the Church in 1938 and as a result started reading Aquinas. He says, ‘I have kept on reading Aquinas ever since; [. . .] his influence has been constant.’ (P. Geach 1991: 8). Anscombe learned a lot of philosophy from him, both while she was an undergraduate and for some time after this. However, ‘her real development was to come only under the powerful stimulus of Wittgenstein’s lectures and her personal conversations with him.’ (P. Geach 1991: 11). Anscombe read the Tractatus before Geach did, having bought a copy after browsing in Blackwell’s bookshop (see P. Geach 1991: 14). Anscombe once told Kenny that she didn’t ‘have a single idea in [her] head that wasn’t put there by Wittgenstein’ (Haldane 2019a: 19). In 1942 she moved to Newnham College, Cambridge, where she had a Research Fellowship. At Cambridge, in the autumn of 1944, she first met Wittgenstein (see Erbacher 2016: 17). In a letter to Rush Rhees dated 28 November, 1944 Wittgenstein says that among those coming to his lectures is ‘a woman, Mrs so & so who calls herself Miss Anscombe, who certainly is intelligent, though not of [Georg] Kreisel’s caliber.’ Wittgenstein’s lectures at this time were mostly on the philosophy of psychology, and Anscombe attended nearly all of them from the time she first became a graduate student onwards (see Erbacher 2016: 19). In his 1945 recommendation letter in support of Anscombe’s application for a research fellowship, Wittgenstein says that Anscombe (‘Mrs. Geach’) has attended his lectures for four terms and ‘is, undoubtedly, the most talented female student’ he has ‘had since 1930,’ when he started lecturing. Only eight or ten of his male students, he says, have equalled or surpassed her (see Golanski).

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Despite Wittgenstein’s lukewarm recommendation, Anscombe returned to Oxford in 1946 as a Research Fellow at Somerville College. She now travelled to Cambridge for weekly tutorials with Wittgenstein. At these she was joined by W. A. Hijab. At their joint request, the tutorials were on the philosophy of religion (see Monk 1990: 497–498). It was at Wittgenstein’s last lecture in Cambridge in the spring of 1947 that Anscombe met von Wright (see Erbacher 2016: 21). During this term von Wright met Anscombe, Geach and Malcolm, and they all became friends. Anscombe respected von Wright as well as liking him, discussing a variety of philosophical topics with him (as witnessed by their correspondence). Anscombe decided to learn German in 1946, which pleased Wittgenstein, who arranged for her to stay in Vienna for a few months in 1950 (see Erbacher 2016: 29). They discussed her translating the Philosophical Investigations, and he was enthusiastic about the way she translated his work. The translations about which he was enthusiastic were not necessarily those that made it into print two years after his death, but they probably did discuss her translation of the Investigations, since he moved into her house in April 1950. The ground floor and the first floor were occupied by lodgers, while Wittgenstein had a room on the second floor.6 Anscombe and Geach endured ‘a long period of comparative poverty’ before Geach managed to get an academic job at Birmingham in 1951 (Geach 1991: 12). By this time they already had three children. Wittgenstein helped them financially when their second child, John, was born, and he helped their daughter Barbara with elementary arithmetic (see Geach 1991: 14). Geach stayed in Birmingham during the week and travelled home at weekends (see Geach 1991: 19). Home life with seven children, a demanding academic position, and a largely absent husband cannot have been easy for Anscombe. On the day Wittgenstein died she was at the home of his doctor, Edward Bevan, and his wife Joan, who had invited Wittgenstein to stay with them at the very end of his life. Also present were Ben Richards, Yorick Smythies and M. O’C. Drury (see Monk 1990: 579). Drury remembered that Wittgenstein had said ‘he hoped his Catholic friends [i.e. Anscombe and Smythies] would pray for him.’ So Father Conrad Pepler, whom Smythies had brought along, said prayers. Then Dr Bevan pronounced Wittgenstein dead, and he was given a Catholic burial the next morning. Anscombe describes the circumstances of the decision to make the burial Catholic as follows: After Wittgenstein was dead we sat in the Bevans’ drawing room and Con Drury said he would like him to have [a] Catholic burial. He asked Ben, who said he would like it, and Smythies, who was a Catholic, and said he

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would. I thought they would ask me and was going to say I wouldn’t do it myself but would not oppose them; but I guess Dr Drury thought I would like it anyway and did not ask me.7 Those who made the decision were prompted by something Drury remembered. Wittgenstein had told Drury that he would have done as Tolstoy did when he gave his brother an Orthodox funeral despite the fact that Tolstoy himself was very critical of the Russian Orthodox Church. ‘When Drury mentioned this, everyone agreed that all the usual Roman Catholic prayers should be said by a priest at the graveside,’ Monk records (Monk 1990: 580). Monk also points out that Tolstoy went against his own beliefs in order to honour his brother’s, while Drury, who was Anglican, and Smythies, who was Catholic, could be regarded as having acted according to their own rather than Wittgenstein’s beliefs. On the other hand, Wittgenstein apparently had asked that his Catholic (not just Christian) friends pray for him, and even Richards, who was very close to Wittgenstein and was baptized only at the end of his life, thought that Wittgenstein would have liked a Catholic burial. So Anscombe’s somewhat reluctant acceptance of the decision is understandable. It is clear enough that Wittgenstein influenced Anscombe, but the nature of his influence might be easier to understand if we attend to how she understood his work. Of the Tractatus she says that ‘almost all that has been published about’ it (she was writing in the late 1950s, but the ‘almost all’ comment remains in the revised version of 1971) ‘has been wildly irrelevant’ and identifies the main reason for this as neglect of Frege (Anscombe 1971: 12). Philosophers with a background in empiricism or idealism, she thinks, are likely to misunderstand both Frege and the Tractatus (see Anscombe 1971: 12–13). In her essay ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’ she claims that she ‘can characterise Wittgenstein’s latest period—not his middle period or periods— as marked by the realisation consequent upon the middle work, that “it’s not as simple as all that” ’ (Geach and Gormally 2011: 201). In this essay Anscombe seems to reject attempts to derive positions or doctrines from Wittgenstein’s work. She also mentions here the tendency of Wittgensteinians to treat language-games as needing no justification and being beyond criticism. In response she says both that we ought not to talk about languagegames except in cases where the game in question can be described and, more importantly, that Wittgenstein himself, in Zettel §608–610, says that certain concepts (‘our concepts of causality’ in this case) might need or deserve to be upset. So he is not committed to accepting all language-games just as they are currently played. Relatedly, in ‘A Theory of Language?’ she says that,

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we ought to remember that there can be a difference of opinion about grammar, even though ‘grammar’ is the word for what the disagreement is about—just as there can be different beliefs about God, though the word is not the wrong one to use for the topic of disagreement. —Geach and Gormally 2011: 240 One interesting thing about this is that it suggests that a grammatical remark need not be an uncontroversial remark. This is not to deny that a series of remarks might be both grammatical and uncontroversial, but there is a tendency for readers of Wittgenstein to think of grammatical reminders and grammatical remarks as being things that, just as such, everyone will automatically agree upon.8 Anscombe denies this. So her claim that certain uses of words or concepts do not make sense is not necessarily intended to be uncontroversial or undeniable. Anscombe ends her essay on Wittgenstein by saying that he thought of his work as not a finished thing whose findings could be set down in a book but a matter of ‘constantly enquiring’ (in Geach and Gormally 2011: 206). Her final sentence is that: ‘Predictions of ‘what Wittgenstein would say’ about some question one thought of were never correct.’ In ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism,’ she talks about Wittgenstein’s ‘dislike of rationality, or would-be rationality, in religion’ (Anscombe 1981a: 122). This led him to make some mistakes, she says, as when he ‘was impatient of being told’ that when God is said to move without moving this is not meant as a paradox or contradiction, since the first ‘moves’ is transitive and the second is intransitive (i.e. the idea is that God causes other things to move but does not himself move in doing so). Instead of wanting to hear explanations of why religious beliefs might be less irrational than they sound, Wittgenstein saw religion as being like something jagged, and he wanted it to be kept jagged rather than encased under a smooth surface, as some people would have it. Of this desire of his Anscombe remarks: ‘I don’t know how to distribute this between philosophical observation on the one hand and personal reaction on the other’ (Anscombe 1981a: 122). The implication is that she did distinguish between the philosophical and the personal, but also that she did not always find herself able to draw the line in a particular case. She goes on to make a similar point about Wittgenstein’s detestation of natural theology (i.e. the attempt to prove God’s existence on the basis of natural experience and reason). It is difficult to say, she notes, ‘what part of this was philosophical (and therefore something which, if right, others ought to see) and what part personal’ (Anscombe 1981a: 123). This clarifies the distinction she means to make between the philosophical and the personal: the former can be right and such that others

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ought to see while the latter, presumably, is more like a matter of personal inclination that need not be shared and perhaps is not apt to be identified as either right or wrong. Kenny says that Anscombe once told him that, ‘On the topic of religion, Wittgenstein is sheer poison.’ (Haldane 2019a: 20) He quotes an article that Anscombe wrote for The Tablet in which she says: ‘I do not think a Catholic could accept Wittgenstein’s Tractatus if he understood it, because of its teaching on ethics’ (Anscombe 1954: 13). Despite distinguishing the personal from the philosophical, Anscombe nevertheless begins the introduction to her book on the Tractatus with some biographical material about Wittgenstein, much as Three Philosophers (co-written with Peter Geach) provides a short biography of each philosopher before it gets into the philosophy. In An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus some of this is purely biographical, concerning when and where he was born, the size of his family, his father’s occupation, and so on. Some, though, is more obviously relevant to questions of how to understand Wittgenstein’s work, such as the influence of Schopenhauer. As far as Anscombe’s other work goes, it began before she ever met Wittgenstein. Her first philosophical publication came in 1939, while she was still an undergraduate, when Anscombe published with Norman Daniel a pamphlet called ‘The Justice of the Present War Examined: A criticism based on traditional Catholic principles and on natural reason.’9 This work of applied ethics is not something she considered purely philosophical, which suggests that she may have shared something like Wittgenstein’s view of what is and is not philosophy (roughly, that ethics is not really philosophy, and philosophy proper is more or less either metaphysics or a new, Wittgensteinian alternative or solution to metaphysics). In this pamphlet Anscombe opposed not a war against Nazi Germany but the war that had been declared, on the grounds that the British government’s intentions were not ‘upright’ with regard to either means or ends, and that the probable evil effects of the war outweighed, as she saw it, the probable good effects (largely because of the government’s allegedly unjust aims) (Anscombe 1981c: 73). There was little evidence, she believed, that concern for Poland was the real reason for the British government’s going to war, and too much evidence that they would target civilians in their prosecution of the war. According to Kenny, just war theory had been ‘almost totally forgotten’ during the Second World War but has made a comeback since. He credits Anscombe as having brought about this revival more than any other individual (Haldane 2019a: 13). A year after the pamphlet was published the Archbishop of Birmingham complained that it had not been submitted to ecclesiastical authority. Anscombe and

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Daniel, reluctantly, withdrew it (see Anscombe 1981c: vii and Schwenkler 2019). The earliest ‘purely philosophical writing’ that she published, she says, was ‘A Reply to Mr C. S. Lewis’s Argument that “Naturalism” is SelfRefuting’ (Anscombe 1981b: ix). This was in the Socratic Digest around 1947. So her earliest philosophical interests mainly revolved around questions of causation (the response to Lewis concerned an argument about causes as well) and intention (as in the true intention of the British government in going to war with Germany in 1939), although her interest in phenomenalism seems distinct from this web of issues. In 1956 she almost single-handedly, and quite publicly, opposed the awarding of an honorary degree by Oxford University to President Truman. However many lives (military and civilian, US and Japanese) the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have saved (and the number is unknowable but possibly high), it meant the intentional targeting of civilians.10 Anscombe regarded this as utterly unacceptable. A year later she published a book on the concept of intention, and the year after that came her essay on ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, which, among other things, rejects consequentialism and its disregard of intention. For her inaugural lecture as the Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University, given in 1971, she chose the subject of causation, which had been the issue that first got her interested in philosophy. She held this position from 1970 until 1986, when she retired. Although the paper deals with metaphysics, in it Anscombe attacks a conception of causality that she regards as part of a way of thinking that characterizes a whole culture, and that is hard to square with belief in freedom and moral responsibility. Anscombe’s work was heavily influenced by both her religious belief and Wittgenstein. In each case, though, I think she was attracted to the way of thinking in question because it fitted with the way she already thought. She was Catholic not because she was born, or married, into it, but as a result of reading and thinking. She was not afraid to challenge the thought of other Catholics. Similarly, she was not afraid to disagree with Wittgenstein or other Wittgensteinian philosophers. Her Wittgensteinian approach to causality and intention was not a result of discipleship and did not merely repeat what Wittgenstein said. Her work in ethics is unlike Wittgenstein’s, but not completely. It is still concerned with questions of language use and of sense. And it connects with her other, perhaps more obviously Wittgensteinian, work. I have tried to move beyond caricatures to reveal a fuller picture of Anscombe as a philosopher and a human being, but it is worth thinking about the caricatures still. She can seem like a kook because she was so at

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odds with the world around her. Her Catholicism and her being a woman in a man’s world also put her at odds with most of the people around her. So in a sense she was odd. And she had the integrity to let this oddness show. She also had the strength to live the odd, difficult life to which her convictions committed her.11

NOTES 1. According to Jane O’Grady the restaurant was in Boston, Massachusetts. According to Nicholas Denyer, however, (quoting Anscombe) ‘It was a bar, and it was in Toronto!’ See Lipscomb 2021: 291 note 3. 2. Elizabeth Anscombe to Georg Henrik von Wright no date, The Georg Henrik von Wright Collection, COLL. 714.11-12, National Library of Finland. This letter is quoted with permission from M. C. Gormally. 3. See https://churchpop.com/2016/10/18/rare-pics-surface-of-elizabeth-anscombearrested-for-blocking-abortion-clinic/ for photographic evidence. 4. This was confirmed to me by Laura Hooper, Director of Marketing and Communications, Sydenham High School. Some sources give her school as Sydenham School, others as Sydenham High School. These are different schools. 5. I am indebted to Luke Gormally for information about Geach’s father. 6. For discussion of Anscombe as translator of Wittgenstein, see Backström, this volume. 7. The quotation, as well as other information in this paragraph, was provided by Luke Gormally in private correspondence. It comes from a notebook entitled ‘Anecdotes about Wittgenstein’ (Anscombe Archive, Collegium Institute, University of Pennsylvania). The quotation is published with the permission of M. C. Gormally. 8. After all, see Philosophical Investigations, part 1, §128. Oskari Kuusela argues (Kuusela 2020) that grammatical statements are not ones that must be accepted by all speakers of the language but that they are clarificatory remarks made in response to particular problems. A remark is clarificatory if and only if it clarifies, not if it ought to clarify (see Kuusela 2020: 28). So there is room for disagreement and for the rejection of proposed grammatical remarks. This does not contradict PI, part 1, §128 because that remark says only that ‘everyone would agree’ to theses advanced in philosophy, not that everyone would necessarily agree. Kuusela credits Anthony Kenny with this observation, actually made in connection with PI, part 1, §599 (Kuusela 2004: 173). 9. Her first publication of any kind was an essay on her religion, entitled ‘I am Sadly Theoretical: It is the Effect of Being at Oxford’ The Catholic Herald, 8 July 1938. It can be read in Berkman 2021. 10. Estimates I have seen of the number of lives saved by these bombings range from the thousands to the millions, but see also Rufus E. Miles, Jr.: ‘if a decision had been taken not to use the atomic bomb, there were three

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nonnuclear strategies, each of which was considered in some degree by President Truman and his military and civilian advisers, and all three of which could have been tried, seriatim, with an extremely high probability of success and with a relatively small number of deaths. The first, in fact, might have achieved its purpose with no fatalities at all’ (Miles, Jr, 1985: 124). 11. Christian Erbacher, Luke Gormally, Bernt Österman, and Thomas Wallgren have helped me make this better than it otherwise would have been. I am grateful to them all.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Georg Henrik von Wright – A Biographical Sketch BERNT Ö STERMAN

1. THE ‘MIDDLE EUROPEAN’ FINN ‘I think that Wittgenstein felt at home in my family; we had a similar middle European background and shared, on the whole, our artistic and literary valuations’, Georg Henrik von Wright wrote in a late article about Wittgenstein (von Wright 2001b: 178). However, the talk about a ‘similar middle European background’ could easily be misunderstood. Von Wright did not come from a Central European country, but from a small Nordic country, Finland. Thus, the ‘middle European background’ had all to do with his cultural heritage, in which the music of Beethoven and Schubert, and writers like Goethe, Schiller and Lichtenberg, played an important part. With Wittgenstein, von Wright also shared an affinity with Spengler’s cultural pessimism, in which the idea of the West in a state of decline was prominent. As a Finn, von Wright was also the only one of Wittgenstein’s three literary executors whose native language was not English. He belonged to the Swedish-speaking minority of Finland, as did some other well-known Finns, such as the composer Jean Sibelius, the painter Helene Schjerfbeck and the writer of the Moomin books, Tove Jansson. English was not even the first foreign language he learned; it was German (not counting Finnish). As a consequence of his Nordic origins, his name is also often mispronounced in international contexts.1 In addition to being one of the literary executors, von Wright was also Wittgenstein’s successor as professor of philosophy at 53

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Cambridge. He will also be remembered as the developer of the cataloguing system for the Nachlass known as the von Wright catalogue. However, he was also a prominent philosopher in the logical-analytical tradition, who earned recognition for his work in philosophical logic, extending the formal methods of modern logic to new fields of research such as the philosophy of norms and the philosophy of action. Later he also wrote non-formal works on the philosophy of human sciences, the philosophy of value and the philosophy of mind. In 1989 a volume dedicated to the philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright was published in the Library of Living Philosophers series. A part of von Wright’s work that has remained fairly unknown outside of the Nordic countries are the essays he wrote in Swedish, his native language.2 They included essays on the great Russian writers Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, as well as Werner Jaeger’s epic Paideia, and Spengler’s morphological philosophy of history. A concern for the state of Western civilization surfaces early, gradually turning into a critique of the modern form of life. Towards the end of his life, von Wright acquired the position of an outstanding Nordic Intellectual who took part in many public debates. He was also twice voted Finland’s leading intellectual in polls conducted by the largest newspaper in Finland, Helsingin Sanomat. People who met von Wright during his later years generally had the impression of a friendly, but somewhat old-fashioned man. A recurring characterization is that of a gentleman (Chen Bo 2016: 12; Janik 1985: 15). At his office he was never seen without a jacket and a tie. People were often struck by his ‘bushy eyebrows’ (Pichler 2016, 154; Hertzberg 2016b, 95). He was also experienced as an attentive listener, who carefully formulated his own arguments (in a low voice) (Bulygin 2016: 39; Chen Bo 2016: 12). When speaking German and English, the melody of his Swedish Finn dialect could clearly be heard. Occasionally he would also insert words from his native language, such as ‘jo’ and ‘just’ (Schulte 2016: 192–93). Slips of paper with tedious schedules that have been preserved testify to von Wright’s ability to organize his daily routines. He also appears to have had the talent of working in conditions many would experience as distracting. Family members remember how the door to his room always stood open while working at home. In summertime, spent at a cottage at Vålö in the Finnish archipelago, von Wright either worked at the dinner table between mealtimes, or sitting outside, preferably in the basking sun (see also Hertzberg 2016b: 100). Among friends, von Wright was also known as a person with a great sense of humour, who enjoyed ‘good literature, good music, good food, and . . . fine wine’ (Garzón Valdés 2016: 64; Hertzberg 2016b: 103). According to the family, however, von Wright could also appreciate simple Finnish food like sausages and mashed potatoes.

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However, beside the rational, cultivated gentleman of more official contexts and the more relaxed figure close friends could encounter, there is also another aspect of von Wright’s personality. One of his closest friends, the Finnish Art Historian and writer Göran Schildt, who knew von Wright since the mid-1930s, has drawn a picture of his friend as a highly sensitive person, who underwent sharp transitions from anxiety and pessimism to being lively and sociable, from one day to the next (Schildt 2003: 109). Schildt also thinks that there may have been a connection between von Wright’s emotional side and his analytical approach to philosophy. He suggests that the latter might have acted as a ‘useful barrier’ against his friend’s strong inclinations towards ‘emotional evaluations’ (Schildt 2003: 109). Although Schildt’s characterization of his friend stems from a time when they both were only approaching their thirties, there are indications that at least something of the sensitive character of von Wright remained with him at an older age. Lars Hertzberg has described his friend as follows: [H]is apparent cheerfulness camouflaged a strong tendency to worry: About his family’s safety, academic life in Finland, world peace, the state of the environment. —Hertzberg 2016b: 95

2. THE FORMATIVE YEARS Georg Henrik von Wright was born 14 June 1916 at Eira hospital in Helsinki, only a few hundred metres from his last home at Fabriksgatan 26 were he died 16 June 2003, two days after his eighty-seventh birthday. At the time of his birth, Finland was still a part of the Russian empire but was to declare its independence in December the following year. Before moving to Fabriksgatan in 2002 von Wright for forty-six years lived at Skepparegatan 4 in the same district of Helsinki. The summers were spent at Vålö in the Finnish archipelago some 50 km from Helsinki, where his father had built a villa in 1918. Georg Henrik was the first child of Tor von Wright and Ragni von Wright (née Alfthan). Later there would be two younger sisters. Both parents had a degree in Economics. The father was a managing clerk at the Agros company, a von Wright family company which sold agricultural machinery. Owing to the father’s work, the family spent the years 1919–1921 in New York, where they lived in Brooklyn. On this stay, Tor von Wright bought a Corona Travel typewriter with a three-row keyboard, on which the boy Georg Henrik began to write at the age of nine. It came to serve him throughout his life (as

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‘virtually impossible to wear out’), forming a liaison between the writer and his working tool that may be difficult to fully comprehend in the age of computers (von Wright 2001a: 10, 16, 29).3 Besides economics, the father had also studied philosophy under the guidance of Edward Westermarck, who also came to be much appreciated by his son (von Wright 2001a: 29; 1983b: 26). It was also the father who introduced him to philosophy by handing him copies of Wilhelm Jerusalem’s Einleitung in die Philosophie and Hans Larsson’s Psykologi in his early teens (von Wright 2001a: 32). It is noteworthy that the Austrian philosopher Jerusalem (1854–1923) was a strong defender of the idea of philosophy as a Weltanschaungslehre, rejecting a conception of philosophy as an Einzelwissenschaft (special science) (Jerusalem 1913: 1, 18). This opposition between two fundamentally different ways of understanding philosophy is close to the division in his own thought that von Wright would later often return to: the tension between narrow (logically oriented) professional work and the drive he felt to make philosophy relevant to his life (von Wright 1989: 18). However, a major incitement to the intellectual development of the young boy was the time he as a twelve-year-old spent in the South Tyrolian town Meran (Merano) 1928–29, following medical advice. It was here he became interested in mathematics and learnt German well enough to read German literature. Following his interest in the German culture, von Wright read books like Heinrich Heine’s Buch der Lieder, Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werther and J. P. Eckermann’s Gespräche mit Goethe from a young age (von Wright 2001a: 19–20, 33; 1983a: 15). Some writing for student journals during the 1930s show that he also read Nietzsche in his youth. The acquaintance with the poems of Heine also led von Wright to try his skills as a composer, resulting in the lied ‘Wenn ich bei meiner Liebsten bin’, written as a sixteen-year-old (slightly borrowing its tune from the Marseillaise). Another influence belonging to the German language sphere was Jacob Burckhardt’s Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien, which inspired von Wright to make a journey to Italy with his friend Göran Schildt in 1937. However, there were also some English writers that were important to von Wright, such as George Bernard Shaw and Aldous Huxley. He was also to become an admirer of the great Russian writers Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. The formative years included important encounters with two philosophers von Wright has called his ‘father figures’, Eino Kaila and Ludwig Wittgenstein (von Wright 2003: 84). Both meetings occurred before the war. Kaila was professor of theoretical philosophy (which at the time included psychology) at the University of Helsinki when von Wright began his studies in the autumn of 1934. Given his later success, the eighteen-year-old von Wright’s

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thoughts at the beginning of his studies seem very modest. For this is what he wrote to his aunt Mary and her husband Ragnar Numelin 21 August 1934: So, the term will soon begin, and I will take the first stumbling steps of my academic career. If it turns out to be long or short, successful or disappointing, interesting or depressive for me, only the future will tell.4 However, von Wright soon became inspired by the new ‘scientific’ trend of philosophy Kaila had brought to Finland through his connections with the Vienna circle.5 The first books Kaila recommended for von Wright to read were Carnap’s Abriss der Logistik and Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (von Wright 2003: 81). Von Wright’s master’s thesis ‘De empiriska satsernas avgränsningsproblem’ (The demarcation problem of empirical propositions), was also a work in a logical positivist vein. Kaila’s influence is explicit in claims such as that ‘metaphysics is everyday thinking gone astray’. However, the most lasting impression Kaila’s teachings had on von Wright came in the form of a strong interest in modern logic and its use as a tool of philosophy (von Wright 2003: 84). Simultaneously, von Wright also developed a sense of philosophy as an activity that wasn’t empirical but shared the quest for a strict methodology with the sciences. The course von Wright would have taken could still have been different if he had not met Ludwig Wittgenstein at Cambridge in 1939. ‘What Wittgenstein did was to completely “shake me up” ’, von Wright would later write (von Wright 1989: 11). Following the custom that Finnish postgraduate students should spend some time abroad, von Wright went to Cambridge in February 1939 and stayed until the early summer. Cambridge had not been his first option; originally, he had wanted to go to Vienna, but the political developments in Europe made it impossible. Still, Cambridge with ‘a living impressive tradition in inductive logic’ was a natural choice for him (von Wright 1989: 10). At the time, von Wright had studied the TLP under the guidance of Kaila but was unaware of the fact that Wittgenstein was teaching in Cambridge. On many occasions, von Wright has described his unfortunate first meeting with Wittgenstein in March 1939. He tried to join Wittgenstein’s ongoing series of lectures on the foundations of mathematics but was rejected by Wittgenstein who did not like ‘visitors’ appearing late in the term. However, after von Wright had sent his apologies in a note, he was invited for a private conversation with Wittgenstein over a cup of tea at Wittgenstein’s home. The main themes of the conversation were architecture and Norway. Von Wright was also invited to attend the continuation of Wittgenstein’s lecture series during the Easter term (von Wright 1989: 10–11; 2003: 83). It

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may be added that at the time, such private conversations between Wittgenstein and his students were by no means exceptional, similar invitations for tea have been described by Norman Malcolm and Theodore Redpath (Malcolm 1958: 29; Redpath 1990: 33). During the Easter term lectures, von Wright became acquainted with Malcolm, who was later to become a close friend, but also with Rush Rhees (von Wright 1989: 11). His first impressions of Wittgenstein’s lectures were similar to what many others have reported: confusion. ‘It does not really seem right to speak of the whole thing as lectures [. . .]’,6 he wrote to Kaila on 25 April 1939, the day after the first of the Easter lectures (Österman ed 2020: 144). ‘I am sure everything he says is excellent, but where does he really want to go and will he arrive anywhere at all?’,7 he exclaims in another letter to Kaila on 4 May (Österman ed 2020: 154). However, in the summer of 1939 the young von Wright left Cambridge believing that he had met a genius who was one of the greatest original talents of philosophy, a conviction he would never abandon. He had also a strong impression that Wittgenstein had given him something of vital importance, although he needed a metaphoric language to express what it was. ‘[W]hat I got from your lectures and my discussions with you during my time in Cambridge has given me a certain ‘tune’ to follow into a realm of thoughts’, von Wright wrote to Wittgenstein from the summer cottage at Vålö on 27 August 1939, on the brink of the Second World War (McGuinness ed. 2008: 308). Finland’s Winter War against the Soviet Union was fought during the three winter months of 1939–1940. Due to bronchial asthma, von Wright had been exempted from military service during peace time, was called up towards the end of the war, but did not participate in the battles (von Wright 2001a: 86). However, he did experience the bombings of Helsinki during the war – ‘Away from the front our only knowledge of the enemy is derived from his ruthless bombing, which claims many victims and destroys numerous houses’ he wrote in a letter to C. D. Broad on 22 December 1939 (Broad ed. 1940: 200). In the Continuation War 1941–1944 Finland sided with Nazi Germany in the campaign against the Soviet Union. During this time, von Wright was affiliated with the State Information Department, where one of his tasks was to write daily bulletins for foreign newspaper correspondents, summarizing what the Finnish newspapers wrote (von Wright 1989: 12; 2001a: 86–89). Between the two Finnish wars there were two important occasions in von Wright’s life. The first was the public defence of his dissertation The Logical Problem of Induction at the end of May 1941. Within the same week, he also married Elisabeth von Troil (von Wright 2001a: 83). Together they would

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have two children, Anita (1943) and Benedict (1946). After the war, in 1946, von Wright was appointed to the chair of Swedish-language philosophy at the University of Helsinki. At this time, his dissertation had already received a favourable review by Broad in a series of three articles for Mind.

3. PROFESSOR AT CAMBRIDGE AND BEYOND ‘You may have observed that I have become professor of philosophy at Cambridge. It does feel rather strange, not to say a little scary’, von Wright wrote to Ragnar Numelin at the end of May 1948,8 shortly after having been appointed as Wittgenstein’s successor at the age of thirty-one. In the spring of 1948 he had already withdrawn his application, but he was suddenly offered the position by the electoral committee. He also received a personal cable from Gilbert Ryle, one of the electors, in which Ryle assured him that he would be ‘respected for [his] work and for [himself] in Cambridge’. Von Wright’s decision to accept the invitation was certainly also influenced by the fact that during von Wright’s first visit to Cambridge after the war in 1947 Wittgenstein had told him that he wanted to see him as his successor (von Wright 1989: 15; 2001: 129, 133). During his time as professor at Cambridge von Wright gave lectures on subjects such as logic, causation, philosophy of science, epistemology and Descartes.9 In his research he made seminal discoveries in modal logic and practically invented deontic logic (von Wright 1989: 28). At the same time, he wrote essays on Dostoevsky in Swedish. In these years, von Wright’s friendship with Wittgenstein, who used to stay with the von Wrights during his visits to Cambridge, also deepened. ‘The recollection of his voice and facial expression when, seated in a chair in his sickroom, he read aloud Goethe’s Hermann und Dorothea is for me unforgettable’, von Wright would later write, in a style not that different from Eckermann’s remembrances of Goethe himself in Gespräche (von Wright 1989: 15).10 However, less than three years after assuming the position, von Wright would resign from the professorship. The decision was made in the middle of May 1951, only a few weeks after Wittgenstein’s death, when von Wright also had learnt that Wittgenstein had appointed him as one of his three heirs. ‘I see it as the most valuable gift I ever received’,11 he wrote to Kaila on 9 June 1951 (Österman ed 2020: 256). By the end of the year, he finally left Cambridge. There were many reasons for his decision. In his autobiography von Wright mentions his wish to work ‘for the future of his country’, which was rapidly recovering after the war. However, there were personal reasons like the prospects of his two children, the older of whom had begun her schooling in Finland in the autumn of 1950, when von Wright was on a

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sabbatical from Cambridge. In addition, there were problems with the house Wright was building on Cranmer Road, which the family would never eventually live in (von Wright 2001a: 150–153). Von Wright had also started to feel that the ‘obliging weight of the great philosophical traditions of Cambridge’ were harmful to his own philosophical development (von Wright 2003: 86). He was also facing a difficult choice between his position in Cambridge and his chair in Helsinki, from which he had not resigned from during the Cambridge years. ‘[B]y and large, I will be happier and more whole as a person in Helsinki than in Cambridge’,12 he wrote in the letter to Kaila (Österman ed 2020: 255). In the 1950s von Wright continued his work in philosophical logic, publishing collections of articles like Logical Studies (1957). Besides attending his own Swedish-language chair of philosophy von Wright was also acting professor of practical philosophy for most of the time and lectured on ethics and the general theory of norms and values (von Wright 1989: 32). His first collection of cultural essays in Swedish, Tanke och förkunnelse, was published in 1955. In these years he also commenced his work as an editor of Wittgenstein’s posthumously published books, starting with the only work in which all three of the literary executors were involved, the RFM (1956). In 1954 he had published the first version (in Swedish) of one of his most widely read pieces, the biographical sketch of Wittgenstein, which appeared in English one year later in The Philosophical Review and later as a part of Norman Malcolm’s memories of Wittgenstein (von Wright 1954; 1955a; 1958). In 1961 von Wright resigned from his chair at Helsinki to become a member of the Academy of Finland, which, at the time, was an organization with twelve posts for distinguished representatives of the sciences, the humanities and the arts. Von Wright was the second philosopher, after Kaila who had died in 1958. The position made it possible for him to focus on his own research. He has described the time as the acme of his philosophical career, leading to the publications of the works Norm and Action (1963), The Varieties of Goodness (1963) and Explanation and Understanding (1971) (von Wright, 2001a: 199). However, the 1960s also implied a change in how he experienced his role as a philosopher. In 1962, the new member of the Academy of Finland had given an interview in which he stressed that a philosopher, to his mind, should influence society only indirectly, through his research, and should ‘mostly avoid taking a strong stand on current tangible issues’13 (Tanttu 1962: 12). However, in 1967 von Wright published a protest against the war the USA was conducting in Vietnam in four newspapers in Finland, Sweden and Denmark, which attracted much attention. But above all it had

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an impact on himself – ‘I have been living in a turmoil of events – and emotions’, he wrote to Malcolm on 10 December 1967.14 In the autobiography he says that his political engagement meant a ‘lasting change of state of mind’, referred to as ‘humanism as a life-attitude’. ‘I want to define it as a way of taking a critical stance to events, strivings and trends in one’s time, with a view to how they affect the good of the people concerned’,15 he wrote (von Wright 2001a: 244). During the following decade, von Wright would continue to write op-eds on pertinent issues of his time, such as the situation of the intellectuals in Yugoslavia, the Nobel Prize granted to Milton Friedman and the use of nuclear power. However, he also started to look for philosophical ways of discerning and describing the roots of the problems of his time and turned to Marxist philosophy and the Frankfurt School. Von Wright saw the problems inherent in Modernity, especially the environmental problems, as strongly connected with the technological applications of modern science. Already in the early 1960s von Wright had warned against what he called the hubris of the modern technological form of life, i.e. ‘a senseless diverting of the causality of nature for human purposes’16 (von Wright 1978c: 90). At the time, however, he saw the roots of the problems as basically being connected with a problem of adjustment to a rapidly transforming civilization, with short-term policies as its primary symptom (von Wright 1978c: 89–91). However, in the 1980s he was moving towards an intrinsic critique of the technological form of life itself. Thus, the root of the problems was no longer seen as a mere shortcoming of a practical rationality adapted to simpler forms of life, but as located in the very form of rationality connected with the advance of technology. According to von Wright, the Western culture today is dominated by technical rationality, which is a purely instrumental form of thinking . Thus, it can only look at problems in terms of finding means, whereas it is incapable of dealing with ends (von Wright 1986: 17–18). During the late 1980s von Wright would also turn to a critique of one of the central tenets of Modernity, the idea of progress.17 Von Wright’s own conclusion was that progress may only be pursued by unmasking the false mythologies that surrounds it, such as the idea of progress as identified with economic growth (von Wright 1993a: 227, see also 208–209). During his last thirty years, von Wright would continue to work with ‘traditional philosophical topics’ like causality, human freedom and eventually, philosophy of mind. Reflecting his humanist orientation, human agency plays a central role in his approach to these topics. He also continued to do some formal logical work, publishing his last book in the field, Six Essays in Philosophical Logic, as late as 1996.

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4. THE PARADOXICAL VON WRIGHT I will end my biographical sketch with a look at two paradoxical features in von Wright’s philosophical work that may be taken as being very characteristic of him. The first of the tensions concerns his relationship with Wittgenstein. Almost from the beginning it seems to have been clear to him that Wittgenstein was the philosophical genius of his time. Still, von Wright was no clear-cut follower of Wittgenstein. In fact, he even suspected that Wittgenstein would have disliked much of his ‘logical-philosophical writings’ (von Wright 2001a: 126). So why did he choose to do philosophical research so different from Wittgenstein’s? The other tension was the discrepancy between his ‘narrow philosophical work’ and his ambition to make philosophy relevant to his life, which he also described as a ‘rift in his philosophical personality’ (von Wright 1989: 18). If this was a problem for him, we may ask why he didn’t simply redirect his research to questions he felt were more urgent. I will start with the question of Wittgenstein. How he and other philosophers should relate to Wittgenstein’s ‘forceful personality’, was a question von Wright often returned to. In his biographical sketch of Wittgenstein, he addressed the problem generally, as the danger that the thoughts of disciples ‘should deteriorate into a jargon’ (von Wright 1958: 18–19). However, it is clear that he was dealing with a problem he had been fighting himself. Just how strongly is evident from a letter he wrote to Göran Schildt on 15 June 1947, in which he describes how his reencounter with Wittgenstein had made him wonder if he ‘ever would be able to think a thought of his own again’18 (Kruskopf ed. 2007: 177–178). Still, von Wright would be known as the perhaps most independent among Wittgenstein’s pupils. This was also readily acknowledged by Wittgenstein, who in a conversation with Knut Erik Tranøy, called von Wright one out of ‘two or three’ of his students he did not know he had done any harm (not naming the others) (Tranøy 1976: 17). But how was it possible that von Wright managed to keep his philosophical independence, despite being subjected to Wittgenstein’s dominating philosophical personality? Von Wright’s own explanation was that his ‘style of thought’, which he referred to as ‘logico-analytic’, was so different from Wittgenstein’s (von Wright 1982: 11; 2003: 84). However, it is important to note that the difference is not just methodological. Rather, we could speak of different levels of doing philosophy. ‘I came to lay more emphasis on the means – the exposition of conceptual structures – than on what originally I saw as the end: the dissolution of a puzzlement’, von Wright has explained (von Wright 1989: 47). By ‘emphasizing the means’, von Wright could do philosophical work which may be said to rest on a level other than

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Wittgenstein’s, leaving open the question of its ultimate use for the solving or dissolving of problems. Von Wright’s ambition of making philosophy relevant to his life found an outlet in what he called his ‘essay-writing activities’. Given the quality and popularity of his essays on great writers such as Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, von Wright’s often belittling comments on his own achievements in the genre may come as surprising. Thus, for instance, he refers to them only as attempts to ‘clarify my own impressions’ and also speaks of their ‘nonprofessional nature’ (von Wright 1989: 17–18). One reason behind these characterizations was certainly that he acknowledged that he wasn’t a scholar in the fields of literature and history. However, his insistence that he only wanted to ‘clarify his own impressions’ is worth a comment, because it clearly suggests that he also was dealing with the issues discussed by the writings only indirectly, in the form of advancing comments on another’s view. (This is even clearer in his writings on Spengler.) What would seem to be at stake is similar to what we have already seen in connection with Wittgenstein, an incompatibility rooted in methodology and forms of thought. Here it comes in the shape of not being able to follow his own ‘style of thought’ in his treatment of ‘existential topics’. During the last decades of his life, a clearly visible line of development in von Wright’s thinking is the integration taking place both in relation with Wittgenstein’s philosophy and regarding the ‘rift in his philosophical personality’. The reconciliation with Wittgenstein happened in several ways. For instance, even in The Varieties of Goodness there was the Wittgensteininfluenced approach of the mapping of various uses of the word ‘good’ (see also Jakola 2020: 27–31). The idea of the aim of philosophy as making the problems vanish resurfaces in his later book, In the Shadow of Descartes (1998). However, Wittgenstein also had a more subtle impact, as a kind of force, or ideal, acting in the background that became more pronounced at the later stages of von Wright’s philosophical career. Perhaps one could say that von Wright believed himself to have found a deepened spiritual affinity between his own work and the thoughts of Wittgenstein, with the critique of Modernity as its common ground. As a corollary to this, von Wright also came to reinterpret Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. His understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a reaction against Modernity, was closely connected with his editorial work on the Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value) during the 1970s and found its strongest statement in the article ‘Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times’, which is based on von Wright’s opening lecture in Kirchberg 1977 (see also my other contribution to this volume). To the idea of a spiritual affinity may be added von Wright’s remarks about how Wittgenstein influenced his intellectual development ‘mainly by

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example’, meaning a general view of the nature of philosophy, but perhaps above all how Wittgenstein figured as a moral example through his ‘relentless search for truth’ (von Wright 1982: 11; 2001b: 178–179). The gap between what von Wright saw as his professional work and his existentially oriented writings remained a concern for von Wright during the last few decades of his life. It seems clear that one reason von Wright saw The Varieties of Goodness as his finest philosophical work was that it stands out as the work in which his professional analytical ideals and existential philosophical ambitions became united in the most harmonious way. A crucial methodological innovation is the way in which von Wright situates his investigation of moral notions between normative ethics and metaethics in the shape of a self-edifying explication of conceptual intuitions. Through its self-edifying nature, von Wright’s investigation of moral notions also forms one of the ways in which von Wright was able to implement the Wittgenstein ideal of philosophy as work on oneself (von Wright 1989: 51; Österman 2019: 6–7). He seems to have had more doubts about the method he used in his later writing on science and reason and the myth of progress, i.e. the tracing of the historical origins of some detrimental patterns of rationality and misleading conceptual identifications – not being sure whether it counted as philosophy at all. ‘Were someone to say that my activities are completely worthless, I would not know how to defend myself ’, he wrote. Still, there can be no doubt about that he felt the work he was doing was urgent: ‘I only know that I feel an internal compulsion to do it’ (von Wright 2003: 87–88).

NOTES 1. The way von Wright pronounced his name was /jorɪhenrɪk fon vrɪgt/, /je:orj/ also being possible for the first name in Swedish. I am grateful to Professor Jan Lindström for help with the phonetics. 2. The best source in English to this dimension of von Wright is a collection of essays called The Tree of Knowledge (1993e). 3. Citations from von Wright’s autobiography Mitt liv som jag minns det (von Wright 2001a), Humanismen som livshållning (von Wright 1978c), and the letters to Göran Schildt, Mary and Ragnar Numelin and Eino Kaila have been translated from Swedish by the author. The citation from Tanttu’s (1962) interview with von Wright is a translation from Finnish made by the author. 4. Von Wright to Mary and Ragnar Numelin, 21 August 1934 (ÅAL, RNC 23). Swedish original reads ‘Så börjar småningom terminen, och jag får taga mina första stapplande steg på den akademiska banan. Om denna för mig skall bliva lång eller kort, framgångsrik eller snöplig, intresseväckande eller depressiv får framtiden utvisa’.

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5. However, it would be wrong to say that Kaila was a typical logical positivist. His own main interest was synthetic rather than analytic, with the aim of creating a world view built on the results of the sciences (Niiniluoto 2012: 88). 6. Swedish original reads ‘Man kan egentligen icke kalla det hela föreläsningar [. . .]’. 7. Swedish original reads ‘Allt vad han säger är nog utmärkt, men vart vill han egentligen komma och kommer han någonstans alls?’. 8. Von Wright to Numelin, 27 May 1948 (ÅAL, RNC 23). Swedish original reads ‘Kanske ni observerat, att jag blivit professor i filosofi i Cambridge. Det känns nog ganska underligt, för att inte säga lite kusligt’. 9. ‘Förteckning över tentander samt deltagare i föreläsningar och övningar (– 1966)’ (WWA, Wri-SF-160-a). 10. ‘[Goethe] brought some manuscript poems, which he read aloud [. . .] What variety and force in his voice! What life and expression in the noble countenance, so full of wrinkles! And what eyes!’ (Von Goethe, Eckermann and Soret 1850: 154). 11. Swedish original reads ‘Jag betraktar det som den dyrbaraste gåva, jag någonsin mottagit’. 12. Swedish original reads ‘[I] stort sett kommer jag att vara en lyckligare och helare människa i Helsingfors än i Cambridge’. 13. Finnish original reads ‘filosofin tulisi yleensä välttää jyrkkien mielipiteiden esittämistä päivän konkreettisista kysymyksistä’. 14. Von Wright to Malcolm, 10 December 1967 (NLF, vWC 714.142-148). 15. Swedish original reads ‘Jag vill definera den som ett sätt att förhålla sig kritiskt till händelser, strävanden och trender i samtiden, med tanke på hur de inverkar på de berörda människornas väl’. 16. Swedish original reads ‘en vettlös dirigering av naturens kausalitet för mänskliga ändamål’. 17. Von Wright’s writings on Spengler from the early 1950s (published in von Wright 1955a) may already be seen as an indication of this development. He was also influenced by the critique of progress advanced in Wittgenstein’s 1930 ‘Sketch for a Foreword’ (included in CV: 6e). 18. Swedish original reads ‘om jag efter detta skall kunna tänka en egen tanke mera’.

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PART TWO

Understanding How the Editors Shaped Wittgenstein’s Posthumous Publications, and Appreciating the Philosophical Implications of Their Achievement

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CHAPTER FIVE

The Letters which Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright Sent to Each Other1 CHRISTIAN ERBACHER

1. A REFLECTION ON READING THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN WITTGENSTEIN’S LITERARY HEIRS AS AN EPISTOLARY NOVEL AND AS A KEY TO OPEN THE ‘BLACK BOX’ OF EDITING WITTGENSTEIN Wittgenstein entrusted three of his students with the task of publishing what they thought fit from the manuscripts and other writings he left to posterity – his Nachlass. In their attempt to do justice to this task, Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright cooperated for nearly half a century in preparing publications from Wittgenstein’s papers. While editing their volumes, they made many choices of selection and composition that shaped the appearance of the published writings of Wittgenstein. Hence, scholars have been curious to find out where the posthumously printed texts

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differ from the unpublished writings, how they differ, and how the deviances may have affected the scholarly understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (e.g. Kenny 1976; Pichler and Biggs 1993; Stern 1996). This type of investigation became possible after Wittgenstein’s extant manuscripts and typescripts became available in their entirety – first through the Cornell microfilm (von Wright 1969), then through the Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE 2000), and www.wittgensteinsource.org. Today, new archives make available the papers of Wittgenstein’s literary heirs and editors, among them the Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives (WWA) at the University of Helsinki, the Rush Rhees Collection in the Richard Burton Archive (RBA) at the University of Swansea, and The Collegium Institute Archive of G.E.M. Anscombe (AA) at the University of Pennsylvania. These archives, all of which contain documents that are closely connected to the decades of editorial work on Wittgenstein’s writings, offer the promise of letting facts replace the legendary anecdotes and suppositions that have grown around the literary executors’ work. This is also the case for an intersecting subcorpus of these archives, namely the correspondence between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright. As of today, the correspondence between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright comprises at least 930 letters spanning the period 1951–1999, and it is likely that even more letters will be found in the upcoming years. In addition to the value of this corpus as a rich quarry to be mined for philological details, I want to stress that it is of great historical interest in its own right. The correspondence between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright opens a door to a realm of intertwined actions, reasons and motives for publishing the books that the learned world has come to know of as the works of Wittgenstein. This is one of the great tales that the history of analytical philosophy can tell. Scholars who have a strong and systematic philological-philosophical interest typically compare Wittgenstein’s manuscripts or typescripts with the printed volumes and try to identify where they deviate from each other and how the deviances influence the philosophical reading, the assumption often being that deviations in the printed works reflect unfaithfulness to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. The correspondence that came into being while the editing took place, however, suggests that the editors were not ignorant – let alone igorant – let alone manipulative - when making their decisions about publishing Wittgenstein’s writings. What shines through the complete correspondence is an extraordinary effort to be faithful to Wittgenstein’s wishes, his intentions, and his work. Indeed, the desire to be faithful to their beloved teacher and his wishes seems to be what animated the three literary heirs throughout their collaborative attempt to accomplish the distinguished

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task they had been given. This devotion and the dynamics of the resulting struggle are interesting phenomena in their own right. When reading Rhees’s, Anscombe’s and von Wright’s correspondence with this focus, it becomes a literary corpus that kindles great fascination. As a literary piece, it has a clear dramatic thread: the discussion between Wittgenstein’s literary heirs in their attempt to fulfil Wittgenstein’s wishes regarding the publication of his writings. Almost none of the 930 letters fail to relate to this central theme. In fact, it seems unlikely that the three very different characters would have enjoyed any exchange of comparable intensity were it not for them having been made the literary executors of their teacher’s writings; this was the basis for their fellowship. While the plot of the correspondence thus has a beautiful and strong simplicity, the actual text is highly divers and covers many topics. The main motif of Wittgenstein and his work is intertwined with discussions of philosophical, academic, political and personal topics. These occasionally surfacing themes from the world beyond the task of editing Wittgenstein create a sense of there being three philosophers brought together through their shared duty in the midst of the philosophical developments that characterized much of twentiethcentury philosophy. In addition to these two features – the clear central theme and the great variety of other lesser themes – there is a third feature that makes reading the correspondence a thrilling literary experience: each literary executor had a strong personality, each was a full-fledged philosopher, and each contributed his or her own tone, colour and view to the conversation. While reading their correspondence, it is constantly fascinating to consider their common ground and their differences, to compare them with one another, so that the contours of their distinct characters take shape through seeing them in contrast to each other. The characters, emerging in the language they use, are recurring motifs that could be adapted for a Wagnerian opera. No static picture of their dynamic interaction can be drawn. Similarities appear here, dissimilarities there, and idiosyncrasies come to the fore and then recede, being displaced by what is common to us all. The three editors – different as they were, but bound to each other through Wittgenstein’s will and their own willingness to respond appropriately to it – were indeed what Rhees once called them: ‘that triangle whose interior angles will never equal 180°.’2 The story in the correspondence that results from this can be read as an epistolary novel. There is something that adds a great deal to the quality of a literary story, but which is problematic when reading the correspondence with a primarily scholarly interest: its fragmentariness and incompleteness. When reading the correspondence, the reading mind constantly wonders, for example, what exactly the biographical circumstances are from which the voices are

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speaking, what exactly this or that editorial measure signifies for the philosophical impression made by the resulting edited volume, or what exactly the philosophical position is from which (academically or otherwise) political issues are discussed. Such questions are triggered by the correspondence, but not answered within it. The investigative reader is thus stimulated to read related published works and further archival documents that help in interpreting Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright’s letters. To follow this impulse to consult further sources is to launch into scholarly work with the correspondence. And there are manifold gaps in the information that a scholarly reconstruction must fill in order to tell an explicit and comprehensive story about the editing of Wittgenstein’s writings. The chapters in this book bear witness of the amount of knowledge and sensitivity needed to tackle the subtle interactions of philosophical editing and reading. And this remains the case even if one focuses on a purely historical account of the editing, leaving aside the ultimate question of how the editorial decisions prejudiced the scholarly readings of Wittgenstein’s writings that were presented in the published books. 1.1 Scholarly questions arising from the incompleteness of the correspondence The correspondence is, as stated, incomplete. First of all, this prompts the question: To what extent are the extant letters an account of the literary executors’ cooperation? The letters do give quite a clear picture of their mode of cooperation; it consisted of an increasing distribution of tasks and responsibilities as well as of discussions during fairly regular meetings. The distribution of tasks can roughly be sketched like this: Anscombe and Rhees edited Philosophical Investigations (PI 1953) without von Wright, who was in the middle of moving from Cambridge to Helsinki when that editing took place (see von Wright’s afterthoughts on this matter in PU 2001). The next volume, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM 1956), all three literary executors edited together. This is in fact the only volume that the three edited together. After publishing RFM 1956, Rhees focused on editing Wittgenstein’s writings from the period 1929–1936 (i.e. the period before Wittgenstein began writing his first version of the Philosophical Investigations), while Anscombe and von Wright cooperated on editing Wittgenstein’s writings from the periods after the conclusion of Part I of PI 1953 and from before the Tractatus. Despite this clear distribution of tasks, the correspondence between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright shows that they continuously discussed details of all the edited volumes as well as many other topics that concerned them as Wittgenstein’s literary executors. The

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correspondence additionally shows that these discussions did not take place solely in writing, but also in face-to-face discussions during their meetings or ‘conferences’ – as the literary executors themselves called them. The literary executors’ conferences or meetings were held approximately once a year, and mostly in Oxford, as long as Anscombe was living there, and subsequently in Cambridge, after Anscombe and the Wittgenstein papers had moved there. There are no agendas or minutes from these meetings, so we lack a great deal of information concerning their decision-making and discussions. Much of what was discussed and decided during the conferences can only be inferred from scattered references in the correspondence, the factual situation after the meetings, and from letters they wrote to others. Concerning the latter point, for instance, the correspondence between von Wright and Norman Malcolm (kept at the National Library of Finland, NLF) and the correspondence between von Wright and Brian McGuinness (kept at WWA) contain reports from meetings and decisions, although they are of course limited to aspects that were relevant to the addressee. Similarly, Rhees, in letters to his friend Maurice O’Connor Drury (kept at RBA and Mary Immaculate College, Limerick), sometimes reported on the editing and the literary executors’ work. Sources like these are of great value for understanding and for a scholarly reconstruction of the literary executors’ work. The lack of recordings of non-written interaction between Wittgenstein’s literary executors makes it difficult to pin down the development of their interpersonal relationships. In the letters, we see that such relationships are repeatedly defined, adjusted and redefined, but often not made explicit. Let me give just one example. Almost throughout the whole of the 1980s, there was a conflict between von Wright and Anscombe. This conflict was triggered by the shutdown of the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Tübingen. It deepened into diverging views on how to support the subsequent editorial work by Michael Nedo and how to continue cooperating with the publisher Blackwell. It eventually resulted in a breakdown in any constructive communication between Anscombe and von Wright (Erbacher forthcoming). From the correspondence it is obvious that this conflict was resolved by 1990, that is, after Rhees’s death in 1989. But the only clue in the correspondence that can help us understand the change in their relationship is the mention of a dinner with Ben Richards to which Anscombe also invited von Wright. One can only speculate over what happened at this dinner or how it affected the participants. As stated, this is highly inspiring when reading the correspondence as an epistolary novel, but not very satisfying when trying to explain informational gaps. Again, the literary executors’ communication with other friends and colleagues – both in writing and in

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conversation as retrieved through oral history interviews – can provide valuable reports, observations and interpretations. A second kind of incompleteness results from the fact that the literary executors’ correspondence forms an intersection between three philosophically active lifes. Understanding the letters thus requires that light be shed on the biographical context in which they were written. To see the relationship between Wittgenstein and each of the literary heirs is paramount to understanding how they approached the task Wittgenstein gave them. But in the course of accomplishing this task, the philosophical lifes of the three also move on and interact with the editing. Rhees, for example, was occupied with teaching during the first ten years. He then retired in order to devote himself fully to editing Wittgenstein’s papers. By contrast, Anscombe’s teaching, writing and editing during the first ten years closely centred on Wittgenstein. She then concentrated on developing her own philosophical work, in England but also on many journeys abroad, not least due to being under pressure to find a permanent post. Finally, von Wright began his editorial work as a professor of philosophy at Cambridge, but he resigned soon after Wittgenstein’s death and moved back to his homeland Finland. This allowed him to investigate Wittgenstein’s papers systematically but also necessitated a great deal of travel. Such biographical aspects, which the correspondence only hints at, must be made explicit when one seeks a scholarly understanding of the literary heirs’ cooperation. But the biographical aspects may also be helpful for explaining gaps in the correspondence itself. Von Wright collected letters from Rhees and Anscombe fairly systematically and filed them according to the name of the writer. Anscombe mostly threw the letters away after having extracted the relevant information; the few selected exceptions to this rule are of substantial interest. Rhees saved more letters than Anscombe did, but he did not file them in folders according to the correspondence partners; instead, he (and/ or his literary executors) scattered them throughout the folders of his editorial projects. A third kind of incompleteness in the correspondence between three literary executors is simply that it does not necessarily take into account all their other collaborative partners. Looking only at Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright’s correspondence in the attempt to find out what happened in the history of editing Wittgenstein’s papers can distract readers from the fact that the three literary heirs were not working as a triumvirate in isolation. Each of them had their own communication partners or even cooperation partners. This extended group included Peter Geach, Georg Kreisel, Piero Sraffa and Denis Paul for Anscombe’s work; Brian McGuinness, Anthony Kenny, Maurice O’Connor Drury and many project-related partners (e.g.

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Cora Diamond, Petra von Morstein, Father Barrett) for Rhees’s work; and Norman Malcolm, André Maury, Heikki Nyman, Brian McGuinness and Anthony Kenny for von Wright’s work. Documents that illuminate these working relationships are also to be retrieved from the literary executors’ and the correspondence partners’ archives. For example, the WWA in Helsinki holds relevant correspondence between von Wright and his partners in editing, such as McGuinness or Alois Pichler, as well as correspondence with publishers (see WWA webpage and Wallgren and Österman 2014); in addition, the NLF holds von Wright’s collected correspondence with many correspondence partners, such as Malcolm and Kenny. The Rhees Collection at the RBA contains correspondence and other documents that are highly relevant for understanding Rhees’s work as Wittgenstein’s literary heir, including the letters he swapped with Kenny, McGuinness and Nedo, but certainly much more. A comprehensive scholarly reconstruction of the literary executor’s work or of the history of editing Wittgenstein requires taking into account these sources beyond the immediate exchange between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright. Last but not least, regarding the later years in the chronology of editing Wittgenstein, the literary heirs’ own archives increasingly fail to account for the development in the editing endeavour, and hence it is necessary to consult other archives. In the 1970s the Wittgenstein Archive at the University of Tübingen was established. While this institution has its own history, it is highly significant for understanding not only the history of editing Wittgenstein but also the letters the literary executors wrote in the late 1970s and 1980s (Erbacher forthcoming). And to reconstruct the history of editing Wittgenstein in the 1990s, it is surely necessary to consult material in the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) as well as documents kept by the secretaries of the board of trustees, which began working in a more formalized manner after Rhees’s death in 1989. From that time onwards, the agendas and minutes from meetings are preserved. They are now stored in the Wren Library at Trinity College Cambridge. These files continue to document the story of editing Wittgenstein beyond the immediate communication between Wittgenstein’s literary heirs. All the factors listed in Figure 5.1 – and more – enter ‘the black box of editing Wittgenstein’, which mediates between the ‘input’ of Wittgenstein’s papers and the ‘output’ of printed volumes that the scholarly community has received. To be sure, the interaction between Wittgenstein’s three literary heirs forms the centre of the editorial processes within the box. Their correspondence is a key to understanding what happened between input and output. But while this key opens the black box of editing Wittgenstein, it is not in itself the full story. To explain the dynamic networks in this box is a

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FIGURE 5.1: The ‘black box’ of editing Wittgenstein that mediates between the ‘input’ of Wittgenstein’s papers and the ‘output’ of printed volumes that the scholarly community has received. The letters and other forms of communication between Wittgenstein’s literary executors are crucial for reconstructing the making of books from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass that the learned world has come to know as Wittgenstein’s works. © Christian Erbacher.

complex and worthy task, and so also is the task of explaining the effects of these networks in the scholarly reception. This is because the full explanation would show how a scholarly formation such as ‘Wittgenstein scholarship’ comes into being and shapes the outlook of a philosophical epoch. Many diverse archival holdings that are necessary for telling the full story of editing Wittgenstein are indeed available, and the new methods of digital humanities are promising aids in the attempt to bring them together. For instance, a network of letters that are physically kept in diverse archives could be made visible through network-analysis tools. The digital presentation of Wittgenstein’s writings (www.wittgensteinsource.org) could be enriched by connecting those letter exchanges that deal with editing a certain manuscript or typescript. This would open a new dimension for research on Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, one that invites researchers to enter into what has been called the ‘third phase’ in the history of editing Wittgenstein – namely, a historical phase that has followed on the heels of the philosophical and critical phases (Erbacher 2019). This would make it possible to study what happens with the writings of a philosopher after his death, and how a scholarly formation like ‘Wittgenstein

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research’ comes into being. Making this visible is a great vision and requires much work and expertise, but it does not need to remain an intellectual dream. We are already on our way to opening the black box of editing Wittgenstein, and what we see so far is enlightening.

2. THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN RUSH RHEES, ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE AND GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT – A CALENDAR 2.1 Use and scope The remaining part of this chapter offers a calendar that may be of assistance to readers of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright’s correspondence, be it with a more literary or more scholarly interest. The calendar provides some basic analytics of the correspondence and an extraction of the most important topics for each year. Thus, the calendar is neither a factual reconstruction of what happened in the history of editing Wittgenstein in these years, nor a discussion of these events. It is a calendar of what Wittgenstein’s literary executors discussed in their written exchanges in a given year. This calendar, however, does not mean that other topics were not discussed. It should rather be read as a table of contents, indicating that something substantial may be found in the given year concerning the listed topics. Just as the table of contents for a novel does not substitute the thrill of reading the novel, this calendar has been constructed in order to facilitate and enrich the actual reading experience. * The calendar lists the letters which Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright sent to each other.3 The places where the actual documents are stored are referred to by the following abbreviations of the archive names: AA = The Collegium Institute Archive of G.E.M. Anscombe at the University of Pennsylvania NLF = National Library of Finland, Helsinki RBA = Richard Burton Archives at the University of Swansea WWA = Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki WREN = Wren Library at Trinity College Cambridge With respect to future digital editions of the correspondence and other archival material related to the development of the academic formation

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‘Wittgenstein scholarship’, the calendar entries could be used as a starting point for collecting metadata in addition to creating indexes of works and names. In the calendar, the manuscripts and typescripts that Wittgenstein’s literary executors worked on are referred to by the abbreviation of the published volumes that resulted from the editorial work. While this is anachronistic, it is hoped that it will help those who use the calendar. A list of the abbreviations is added at the end of the calendar. 2.2 Total overview A total of 929 letters have been found (see Table 5.1). Well over 800 of these are in von Wright’s collections that are stored at NLF and WWA. The communication to and from von Wright is thus well represented, while the communication between Rhees and Anscombe is not. Neither Anscombe nor Rhees archived their correspondence in the systematic way that von Wright began using in 1952. The Rhees Collection at RBA contains about forty letters that are not included in either of von Wright’s collections. The Anscombe Archive contains about eight letters which Rhees wrote to Anscombe. Anscombe did not keep everyday correspondence, but preserved only a small collection of letters from Rhees that were of philosophical interest to her. As stated above, many of the letters Rhees kept are not categorized in the RBA according to the name of the letter writer, but in files relating to Rhees’s editorial projects. From the relatively few letters between Anscombe and Rhees, one can sense the kind of discussion they had – and that their way of discussing was quite different from the way they discussed with von Wright. Hence, when studying the literary executors’ correspondence, one ought to keep in mind that it is biased towards overrepresenting the communication to and from von Wright.

TABLE 5.1: An overview of the correspondence between Wittgenstein’s literary executors between 1951–1999. Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archive

38 11 228 174 228 250 929

AA, NLF, RBA, WREN, WWA RBA, WWA NLF, RBA, WWA NLF, RBA, WREN, WWA NLF NLF, WREN, WWA AA, NLF, RBA, WREN, WWA

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Taking the disproportionate number of letters to and by von Wright into account and the bias it creates, it is clear that Wittgenstein’s literary executors were corresponding intensely during the four decades from the early 1950s to the late 1980s (see Figure 5.2). Strikingly fewer letters are found from the second half 1950s and from 1990 onwards. The former scarcity may result from an actual reduction in communication between the three, while it also seems likely that many letters from this period simply have not been preserved. The latter scarcity probably resulted from the new setup of the trustees after Rhees’s death in 1989. At that time, Peter Winch and, somewhat later, Anthony Kenny, were elected to the board of trustees that succeeded the triumvirate of Wittgenstein’s literary heirs. With this new composition of persons in the advisory board, the meetings were more formalized. Winch acted as the first secretary until his own death in 1997. In 1998, Nicholas Denyer was elected to the board. He was the last to keep the files of the trustees and the one who turned them over to the Wren Library at Trinity College in Cambridge. The overall impression from studying the correspondence is that the literary executors were constantly working on making Wittgenstein’s writings available. Oftentimes the completion of one editorial project led to the beginning of the next. It is possible to see some peaks in this flow of editorial projects in the early 1950s and the late 1960s. The 1980s are characterized by bogged down cooperation, with a hiatus in publications and

FIGURE 5.2: Year-wise distribution of the correspondence of Wittgenstein’s literary heirs (Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright). © Christian Erbacher.

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increasing internal disagreement. This coincides with disagreements related to the first big research project on Wittgenstein’s Nachlass beyond the realm of the three literary heirs, namely the Wittgenstein Archive at the University of Tübingen. 2.3 The Calendar The 1950s Decade Overview 163 letters found. Editing Wittgenstein’s writings begins with great intensity and fast progress in publishing. For 1958 and 1959 (and 1960–1961), there is a striking gap in the collected correspondence between Rhees and von Wright; it is unlikely that they stopped corresponding. 1951: Anscombe and Rhees prepare the typescript for PI 1953 – Anscombe continues translating Part I of PI 1953 – Anscombe contacts Georg Kreisel and Piero Sraffa concerning editing and translating PI 1953 – Cambridge University Press, Kegan Paul, Blackwell and Bertrand Russell are contacted in connection with printing PI 1953 – Trinity College, lawyers and George Edward Moore are contacted concerning an earlier will from Wittgenstein – the Rockefeller Foundation grants support for working on Wittgenstein’s Nachlass – Rhees receives books from Wittgenstein’s library and a box of manuscripts from Trinity College – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright publish a note in the journal MIND – Moore hands over the ‘Moore volume’ – von Wright resigns from his chair at Cambridge – Rhees organizes photographing of typescripts and manuscripts. 1952: Anscombe translates Part II of PI 1953 – Anscombe and von Wright cooperate on proofreading PI 1953 – the copyright for BBB 1958 is clarified – Rhees studies Wittgenstein’s writings on mathematics and discusses them with von Wright – von Wright contacts Friedrich Waismann concerning the Wittgenstein manuscripts in his possession – von Wright appoints Norman

TABLE 5.2: Letters 1951 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 1 – 13 – 16 – 30

Archive NLF – NLF – NLF – NLF

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TABLE 5.3: Letters 1952 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found – – 7 1 6 9 23

Archive – – NLF NLF NLF NLF NLF

TABLE 5.4: Letters 1953 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found – – 5 3 5 12 25

Archive – – NLF NLF NLF NLF NLF

Malcolm to act as literary executor in case he (von Wright) is unable to fulfil his duties – von Wright reports on experiences of lecturing on Wittgenstein in Finland – Anscombe, Rhees and von Wright discuss the publications by Ferrater Mora and Maurice Cranston – von Wright studies the Moore volume – Anscombe, Rhees and von Wright meet in Austria to make selections for RFM 1956 – Anscombe and von Wright are shown NB 1961 and Ms 142 in Austria. 1953: Proofreading of PI 1953 continues – PI 1953 is printed and published in May 1953 – Anscombe searches for errors and publishes a list of corrigenda in MIND – Friedrich August von Hayek contacts the literary executors concerning his plan to write a biography of Wittgenstein – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright meet in Oxford – Russell permits the publication of his correspondence with Wittgenstein – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the publication of NL 1960 and NM 1961 – von Wright works on his biographical sketch of Wittgenstein and an account of the origin of the Tractatus – Anscombe photocopies NB 1961 for von Wright – Anscombe tape-records her oral translation of parts of selections for RFM 1956.

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1954: Anscombe reports on lecturing on PI 1953 – Anscombe writes about the Tractatus – von Wright sojourns at Cornell and lectures on the Tractatus – von Wright types selections for RFM 1956 – Rhees receives from Russell letters written by Wittgenstein (NL 1960 and BBB 1958) with corrections in Wittgenstein’s hand – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss publishing NB 1961 – plans for a meeting in Oxford. 1955: Editing and translating of RFM 1956 continues – proofreading of RFM 1956 begins – von Wright works on an index for RFM 1956 – Anscombe lectures on the Tractatus – Anscombe and von Wright argue about how to interpret certain passages in the Tractatus – disagreement between Rhees and von Wright – Rhees and Anscombe discuss ethics and religion – meeting in Oxford in September. 1956: Trouble with proofreading and printing RFM 1956 – von Wright elaborates his index for RFM 1956 – Rhees discusses the typesetting and layout of RFM 1956 – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the publication of NB 1961 – Anscombe has NB 1961 typed and translates the remarks herself – Rhees and Anscombe discuss philosophy and religion. 1957: Anscombe publishes her own book Intention – Anscombe sends copies of NB 1961 to von Wright – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss

TABLE 5.5: Letters 1954 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 1 1 2 4 8

– – NLF NLF NLF NLF NLF

Number of letters found

Archive

1

AA – NLF NLF NLF NLF AA, NLF

TABLE 5.6: Letters 1955 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

– 4 1 8 5 19

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TABLE 5.7: Letters 1956 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archive

2 – 3 – 5 6 16

AA, NLF – NLF – NLF NLF AA, NLF

publishing NB 1961 – disagreement with Routledge & Kegan Paul concerning the copyright for NB 1961 – Rhees edits BBB 1958 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright proofread BBB 1958 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss a German edition of PI 1953 – Rhees and Anscombe discuss philosophy, religion, God and the Church – von Wright reports to Anscombe about Hintikka’s and Stenius’s writings on the Tractatus – Anscombe and von Wright meet in Oxford. 1958: Anscombe and von Wright discuss the editing of NB 1961 and NL 1957. TABLE 5.8: Letters 1957 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 4 6 5 3 6 8 32

Archive AA RBA NLF NLF NLF NLF AA, NLF, RBA

TABLE 5.9: Letters 1958 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archive

– – – – 1 1 2

– – – – NLF NLF NLF

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TABLE 5.10: Letters 1959 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

Archives

– – – – 4 1 5

– – – – NLF NLF NLF

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1959: Anscombe and von Wright proofread NB 1961 – plans for a meeting in Oxford. The 1960s Decade Overview 224 letters found. Questions about philosophy and academic careers come to the fore in the exchange between von Wright and Anscombe. Both of them spend a great deal of time lecturing and working abroad. By contrast, Rhees takes a leave of absence from his post as lecturer at the University of Swansea and eventually retires early in order to devote himself fully to his work with Wittgenstein’s writings. Anscombe’s uncertainty concerning her teaching post is eventually resolved by the end of the decade when she is appointed to the Wittgenstein chair at the University of Cambridge. The striking lack of correspondence between von Wright and Rhees continues in 1960 and 1961. Intense negotiations between the literary executors come to a conclusion through microfilming Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and transferring it to Trinity College Cambridge. 1960: Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright proofread NB 1961 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss and decide against including parts of

TABLE 5.11: Letters 1960 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 3 – 2 2 7

– – NLF – NLF NLF NLF

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Wittgenstein’s published writings in an anthology – von Wright edits Z 1967 – Anscombe is supposed to translate Z 1967 – von Wright types notebooks from which OC 1969, ROC 1977 and LW 1992 will be edited – Rhees types his copy of the so-called Big Typescript (Wi11/BT 2005) – meeting in Oxford. 1961: Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright grant permission to publish selections from RFM 1956 – Rhees studies Wi11 and compares it with PB 1964. 1962: Von Wright concludes his typing of notebooks from which OC 1969, ROC 1977 and LW 1992 will be edited – Anscombe and von Wright discuss questions of ethics – Rhees creates a copy of Wi11/BT 2005 – Rhees studies Wi11/BT 2005 and PB 1964 – von Wright reads Wi11/BT 2005 and PB 1964 – Rhees and von Wright discuss the publication of Wi11/BT 2005 and PB 1964 – Rhees wants to make visible the philosophical development that led to PI 1953 – Rhees discusses GB 1967 – Rhees loses the original Ts a copy of which was the basis for PB 1964 – von Wright reports that dictations from Wittgenstein have been seen among the papers in Waismann’s estate. 1963: Rhees and von Wright continue to discuss the publication and editing of Wi11/BT 2005 and PB 1964 – von Wright suggests that Rhees could write a preface for GB 1967 – Rhees is in contact with Brian McGuinness concerning the Wittgenstein material in Waismann’s estate – TABLE 5.12: Letters 1961 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 3 1 1 1 6

– – NLF NLF NLF NLF NLF

Number of letters found

Archive

1 – 4 2 2 2 11

NLF – NLF NLF, RBA NLF NLF NLF, RBA

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

TABLE 5.13: Letters 1962 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

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TABLE 5.14: Letters 1963 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 3 4 – – 7

– – NLF, RBA NLF, RBA – – NLF, RBA

Number of letters found

Archive

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

TABLE 5.15: Letters 1964 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1 – 5 5 2 7 20

NLF – NLF NLF, RBA NLF NLF NLF, RBA

TABLE 5.16: Letters 1965 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 1 – 7 5 14 15 42

Archives RBA – NLF NLF NLF NLF NLF, RBA

von Wright discusses editing CCO 1973 – Rhees discusses the publication and editing of LA 1966 – no meeting. 1964: Disagreement with Routledge & Kegan Paul concerning CCO 1973 – von Wright suggests to separate OC 1969, ROC 1977 and LW 1992 – Rhees finishes typing and editing PB 1964 – Rhees includes FWS 1964 in PB 1964 – Rhees prepares GB 1967 – von Wright and Rhees discuss the publication of VB 1977 – von Wright’s assistant begins decoding the coded remarks – meeting in Oxford to discuss the publication of PB 1964, Wi11/ BT 2005, OC 1969, ROC 1977 and LW 1992.

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

87

1965: Anscombe translates Z 1967 – von Wright decodes the coded remarks – von Wright makes first selection for VB 1977 – von Wright inspects Thomas Stonborough’s Wittgenstein material in Vienna and finds PT 1971 as well as Band VIII and IX – Rhees and von Wright discuss editing Wi11/BT 2005 – Rhees disagrees with von Wright’s proposal to deposit copies of Wittgenstein’s writings at Cornell University – Rhees edits PG 1969 – Denis Paul translates OC 1969 – meeting in Oxford. 1966: Anscombe and von Wright proofread Z 1967 – Paul continues to translate OC 1969 – von Wright completes deciphering the coded remarks from all writings – von Wright and Rhees argue about von Wright’s proposal to have the entire Nachlass microfilmed and copies deposited at Cornell University – Rhees and Anscombe discuss ‘immortality’ in connection with the Tractatus – von Wright discusses the publication of PT 1971 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss George Pitcher’s proposal to write a biography of Wittgenstein – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss a publication of notes taken in Wittgenstein’s classes – meeting in Oxford. 1967: An agreement concerning microfilming the entire Nachlass is signed with Cornell University – von Wright and Malcolm supervise the

TABLE 5.17: Letters 1966 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1 – 8 4 6 8 27

Archive AA – NLF, WWA NLF, WWA NLF NLF NLF, AA, WWA

TABLE 5.18: Letters 1967 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 4 – 13 9 4 5 35

Archive NLF, RBA, WREN – NLF NLF NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WREN

88

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

microfilming – negotiations with Trinity College concerning depositing the originals and turning over the copyrights after the death of the last surviving literary heir – negotiations concerning the copyright for CCO 1973 – Rhees finishes editing and publishes GB 1967 – McGuinness receives material from Thomas Stonborough – Rhees and Anscombe discuss von Wright’s essay on the origin of the Tractatus – Drury rejects the idea of writing a Wittgenstein biography – von Wright discusses the publication of CLF 1969 – translation of BBB 1958 into German – meeting in Oxford. 1968: Negotiations with Trinity College continue – negotiations with John Stonborough concerning the Austrian part of the Nachlass – transport of Rhees’s part of the Nachlass to Cambridge – Anscombe and von Wright work on editing OC 1969 – von Wright prepares a typescript for RPP 1980a – Cornell University sends a catalogue ‘The Wittgenstein Papers’– von Wright begins writing his own catalogue of Wittgenstein’s papers (von Wright 1969). 1969: Negotiations concerning CCO 1973 continue – negotiations concerning the Austrian part of the Nachlass continue – an agreement with Trinity College is signed – Anscombe is elected Professor of Philosophy; von Wright is one of the electors – Anscombe and von Wright discuss philosophy TABLE 5.19: Letters 1968 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1 – 7 8 2 6 24

Archives WWA – RBA, WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA

TABLE 5.20: Letters 1969 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archives

1 – 13 13 11 9 47

RBA – WWA RBA, WWA, WREN NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA, WREN

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

89

and logic – Rhees discusses von Wright’s catalogue for Wittgenstein’s papers (von Wright 1969) – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright proofread OC 1969 – Rhees writes a preface for OC 1969 that is not printed – PG 1969 is published – von Wright begins editing CRK 1974 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss ‘Diktat für Schlick’ – Rhees and von Wright meet in Cambridge. 1970s Decade Overview 269 letters found. The last volumes are produced according to the respective editorial styles of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright. They begin to revise the already-published books. Von Wright prepares books that result from his historical interest in the origins of Wittgenstein’s writings (e.g. PT 1971, CRK 1974, VB 1977), and his research on Wittgenstein’s Nachlass concentrates on philological details and historical interconnections. From outside the triumvirate, topics of computer-philology are brought into the discussion, and the Wittgenstein Archive at the University of Tübingen is established. 1970: Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss errors in OC 1969 – Rhees lists corrigenda for PG 1969 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss the editing of CRK 1974 – Rhees discusses his earlier suggestion to incorporate LA 1965 and GB 1967/1971 in OC 1969 – Rhees and von Wright discuss questions of probability – von Wright prepares an agenda for future editing work, including the revision of already-published volumes and publishing VB 1977, and sends it to Rhees and Anscombe – meeting in Cambridge. 1971: PT 1971 is published – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright proofread CCO 1973 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss a volume of Wittgenstein’s short texts for Suhrkamp – Rhees and von Wright revise RFM 1956/1978 – negotiations in connection with the Wittgenstein house in Vienna – Anscombe focuses on the philosophical topic of causality.

TABLE 5.21: Letters 1970 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 2 – 13 8 4 4 31

Archive RBA – WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA

90

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

TABLE 5.22: Letters 1971 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

Archives

– – 2 2 1 2 7

– – WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, WWA

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1972: Von Wright intensifies his philological investigation into the composition of RPP 1980a/b – von Wright investigates the origins of PI 1953 – von Wright and Rhees discuss principles of editing and the revision of RFM 1978 – Rhees is in disagreement with Suhrkamp – Anscombe is in disagreement with Blackwell – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss McKinnon and Kaal’s concordance – von Wright proofreads CRK 1974 – meeting in Cambridge.

TABLE 5.23: Letters 1972 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1 – 16 11 4 7 39

Archive WWA – WWA RBA, WWA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA

TABLE 5.24: Letters 1973 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archives

4 – 16 16 3 5 44

NLF, RBA – WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

91

1973: Rhees and von Wright continue to revise RFM 1978 – Anscombe translates new passages for the revised RFM 1978 – Rhees and von Wright work on revising RFM 1978 – von Wright continues his philological investigations into the composition of Wittgenstein’s works – Rhees campaigns against William Bartley’s presentation of Wittgenstein’s homosexuality, partly with Anscombe’s support – Ranchetti and Rosso visit Rhees to propose a research project for a computer-based index and transcription of the Nachlass – Anscombe visits von Wright in Helsinki. 1974: Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright proofread RFM 1978 – Rhees and von Wright prepare an index for RFM 1978 – Rhees and von Wright discuss the origins of PI 1953 – Rhees and Anscombe disagree about publishing notes taken in Wittgenstein’s classes together with Wittgenstein’s own remarks – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright support the proposal submitted to the German Research Foundation for a big research project at the University of Tübingen – Michael Nedo informs Rhees about the progress of the Tübingen project application – meeting in Cambridge. 1975: Von Wright creates a new selection for VB 1977 – von Wright and Rhees discuss the principles of selection for VB 1977 – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the revision of Z 1967/1981 TABLE 5.25: Letters 1974 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

4 – 15 11 3 3 36

Archives WWA, RBA – WWA, RBA WWA, RBA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA

TABLE 5.26: Letters 1975 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 3 3 – 3 9

– – WWA WWA – NLF, WWA NLF, WWA

92

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

1976: Anscombe translates RPP 1980b – Von Wright prepares VB 1977 and negotiates agreement with Suhrkamp – disagreements with Blackwell – Rhees disagrees with von Wright’s suggestion to publish the chapter ‘Philosophie’ from Wi11/BT2005 – the German Research Foundation turns down the application from the University of Tübingen – Nedo works on the Nachlass in Cambridge – meeting in Cambridge. 1977: Von Wright continues his investigations into philological details of, and historical interconnections between earlier versions of PI 1953 – Anscombe discusses editing principles – honorary volume for von Wright appears, the contributors include Anscombe, Rhees and Kenny, the latter criticizing Rhees’s editorial principles for PG 1969 – Anscombe and von Wright discuss editing RPP 1980a/1980b – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss publishing NPL 1993 – Rhees and von Wright attend the Wittgenstein symposium at the University of Tübingen to discuss problems of editing and computerizing Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, plus a new application for a research project at the University of Tübingen. 1978: Disagreements between Anscombe and McGuinness – Translations of VB 1977 – Peter Winch becomes the translator for the English edition of VB 1977 – Anscombe and von Wright discuss RPP 1980a/1980b. TABLE 5.27: Letters 1976 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

– – 5 7 5 8 25

Archives – – WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, WWA

TABLE 5.28: Letters 1977 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 6 10 3 7 26

– – RBA, WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

93

TABLE 5.29: Letters 1978 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1 – 8 7 7 12 35

Archive WWA – WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, WWA

TABLE 5.30: Letters 1979 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 1 – 3 4 3 6 17

Archive WWA – WWA WWA NLF NLF, WWA NLF, WWA

1979: Anscombe and von Wright continue to discuss RPP 1980a/1980b – Anscombe and von Wright discuss questions of logic – the Austrian National Library buys Wittgenstein material – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the request for an amplified agreement with the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Tübingen – meeting in Cambridge. 1980s Decade Overview 238 letters found. The correspondence is increasingly characterized by disagreements. Younger scholars enter the work of editing Wittgenstein’s papers. 1980: Anscombe and von Wright proofread RPP 1980a – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the translation of the RPP 1980a/b and possible titles for LW 1982 and LW 1992 – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the revision of Z 1981 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss legal advice concerning copyright matters – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss the events at the Wittgenstein Archive at the University of Tübingen – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss a possible meeting.

94

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

TABLE 5.31: Letters 1980 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

Archive

1 – 3 2 9 8 23

RBA – WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 4 3 7 8 22

– – WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, WWA

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

TABLE 5.32: Letters 1981 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1981: Von Wright continues to edit LW 1982 and LW 1992 – Rhees and Anscombe demand that the Wittgenstein Archive at the University of Tübingen be shut down – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss and negotiate with representatives from the University of Tübingen concerning a complete reorganization of the Wittgenstein Archive – Rhees and Anscombe allow Nedo to fetch all materials stored at the Wittgenstein Archive at the University of Tübingen – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright disagree concerning measures taken to close the Wittgenstein Archive at the University of Tübingen – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss an application to the British Academy for funding to cover the cost of preparing a complete transcript of the Nachlass, which would be transcribed in Cambridge – meeting in Cambridge. 1982: Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss GT 1985a/b – von Wright suggests they prepare a revised complete edition of Wittgenstein’s writings – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss a new application to the Austrian Wissenschaftsfonds (FWF), for the funding of Nedo’s work – Anscombe disagrees with Blackwell concerning LW 1992 – Rhees discusses the publication of the chapter ‘Philosophie’ from Wi11/BT 2005 – Rhees and Anscombe discuss publishing notes taken in Wittgenstein’s classes together with Wittgenstein’s own remarks – von Wright reports on the computerization of the Nachlass in Norway – meeting in Cambridge.

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

95

TABLE 5.33: Letters 1982 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

1 1 5 5 7 9 28

Archive RBA RBA WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WWA

TABLE 5.34: Letters 1983 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

4 3 6 5 8 6 32

Archive RBA, WREN, WWA RBA, WWA RBA, WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, RBA, WREN, WWA

TABLE 5.35: Letters 1984 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 1 – 9 5 13 8 36

Archive WWA – NLF, WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, WWA

1983: Anscombe continues to disagree with Blackwell concerning LW 1992 and stops all cooperation – von Wright proposes to publish LW 1992 and to work on a revised complete edition of all the volumes they have edited – Rhees disagrees with the notion of revision in von Wright’s proposal – Anscombe disagrees with Rhees’s proposal to publish notes taken in Wittgenstein’s classes together with Wittgenstein’s own remarks – Anscombe discusses principles of her editing – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss Nedo’s work, which is being funded by the Austrian Wissenschaftsfonds (FWF) – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project.

96

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

1984: Anscombe continues to disagree with Blackwell – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss Nedo’s work with a view to renew the application for funding from the FWF – von Wright reports on the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project – Rhees and von Wright discuss Heikki Nyman’s edition of minor writings and the chapter ‘Philosophie’ from Wi11/BT 2005 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss McGuinness’s biographical introduction to Nedo and Ranchetti’s picture biography – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright try to hinder Wilhelm Baum from publishing GT 1985a/b – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss publishing selections from Wittgenstein writings in an anthology – meeting in Cambridge. 1985: Anscombe continues to disagree with Blackwell – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss the progress of Nedo’s editorial work – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright are contacted by Ray Monk – von Wright and Anscombe discuss royalty matters relating to the hitherto published volumes – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss McGuinness’s biographical introduction to Nedo and Ranchetti’s picture biography and Nedo’s lawsuit against Suhrkamp.

TABLE 5.36: Letters 1985 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 3 2 4 5 14

– – WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, WWA

Number of letters found

Archive

– – 1 1 7 5 14

WWA WWA NLF NLF NLF, WWA

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

TABLE 5.37: Letters 1986 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

97

1986: Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss Nedo’s progress and samples of his envisaged edition – von Wright discusses scholarly criticism of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright’s editorial work – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss the use of computer technology for editorial work – von Wright reports on the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project – Anscombe disagrees with von Wright’s suggestion to apply to the Austrian Wissenschaftsfonds (FWF) for funding for the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project. 1987: Von Wright discusses PGL 1988 – Anscombe questions copyright matters relating to McGuinness’s biography – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss samples for Nedo’s edition – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss the renewal of funding for the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project through the Research Council of Norway (NFR) – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the publication of LW 1992 with Suhrkamp. 1988: Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright disagree on the issue of renewing an application to the Austrian Wissenschaftsfonds (FWF) for Nedo’s edition – Anscombe and von Wright disagree on publishing LW 1992 with Suhrkamp – Anscombe continues to disagree with Blackwell – Anscombe continues to question copyright matters relating to McGuinness’s biography – Anscombe and von Wright discuss royalty matters for VB 1977 and its translations – TABLE 5.38: Letters 1987 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

Archive

– – – – 3 5 8

– – – – NLF NLF NLF

Number of letters found

Archive

– 1 6 11 11 11 40

– WWA WWA NLF, WWA NLF NLF, WWA NLF, WWA

RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

TABLE 5.39: Letters 1988 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

98

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

TABLE 5.40: Letters 1989 Author-Recipient RR-EA EA-RR RR-VW VW-RR EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archive

– – – 1 12 8 21

– – – NLF NLF NLF NLF

Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright disagree about which manuscript may be published as a possible centenary volume consisting of a complete facsimile – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright disagree about further support for the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project – Claus Huitfeldt travels to England to seek support for a renewal of funding for the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project – Anscombe travels to Norway – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss who should publish the first volumes of Nedo’s edition – von Wright writes up an extensive summary of current and future questions of editing Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and sends it to Rhees and Anscombe – Rhees and von Wright meet in Cambridge. 1989: Anscombe and von Wright discuss PH 1989 – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the renewal of funding for Nedo’s work – Anscombe and von Wright discuss a publishing contract for the first volumes of Nedo’s edition of the Nachlass – Anscombe criticizes the final report of the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the contract with Suhrkamp for LW 1992 – Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright discuss plans for a complete edition of Wittgenstein’s writings – Rhees dies on 22 May 1989 – Von Wright goes through Rhees’s papers in Swansea and takes Rhees’s Wittgenstein material to Trinity College Cambridge – Peter Winch is elected to succeed Rhees on the board of trustees – Anscombe and von Wright meet in Cambridge. 1990s Decade Overview 36 letters found. After Rhees’s death, a board of trustees is established. From now on, coordination of the editorial work is more formalized, and the files relating to the work on Wittgenstein’s Nachlass are kept by the board’s secretary and eventually transferred to the Wren Library at Trinity College Cambridge. 1990: Anscombe and von Wright discuss a funding application to support the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen – Anscombe and von

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

99

TABLE 5.41: Letters 1990 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

Archive

5 5 10

NLF NLF NLF

Number of letters found

Archive

2 3 5

NLF NLF NLF

EA-VW VW-EA Total

TABLE 5.42: Letters 1991 Author-Recipient EA-VW VW-EA Total

Wright disagree about the final report from the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project – the board of trustees meets with Blackwell in Oxford – Anscombe and von Wright discuss a publishing contract for the first volumes of Nedo’s edition – the board of trustees meets in Cambridge. 1991: Anscombe and von Wright discuss royalties from Blackwell and a new agreement with Blackwell – Anscombe and von Wright discuss a publishing contract for Nedo’s work in connection with a complete edition of the Nachlass – von Wright writes an agenda for the board of trustees – Anscombe discusses von Wright’s critical account of the editorial decision to include Part II to PI 1953 (von Wright 1992) – The board of trustees meets in Cambridge. 1992: Anscombe and von Wright discuss the possible publication of the Nachlass through the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen – The board of trustees meets in Cambridge. 1993: – 1994: Anscombe and von Wright discuss the renewal of funding for the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen.

TABLE 5.43: Letters 1992 Author-Recipient EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 1 2 3

Archives NLF NLF, WREN NLF, WREN

100

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

TABLE 5.44: Letters 1994 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

EA-VW VW-EA Total

1 1 2

Archives NLF NLF NLF

TABLE 5.45: Letters 1995 Author-Recipient

Number of letters found

EA-VW VW-EA Total

Archives

2 1 3

NLF NLF NLF

Number of letters found

Archives

– 1 1

– NLF NLF

TABLE 5.46: Letters 1996 Author-Recipient EA-VW VW-EA Total

1995: Anscombe and von Wright discuss questions relating to royalties and taxation – Anscombe and von Wright discuss the revision of VB 1977 and rename it ‘Miscellaneous Remarks’ – meeting in Cambridge. 1996: Anscombe and von Wright discuss renaming VB 1977. 1997: – 1998: Anscombe and von Wright discuss royalty issues – Anscombe and von Wright discuss Nicholas Denyer’s election to the board of trustees – Anscombe disagrees with appointing Joachim Schulte and Peter Hacker to the board of trustees after they have already been elected – the board of trustees meets in Cambridge.

TABLE 5.47: Letters 1998 Author-Recipient EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found 3 2 5

Archives NLF NLF NLF

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

101

TABLE 5.48: Letters 1999 Author-Recipient EA-VW VW-EA Total

Number of letters found

Archives

3 4 7

NLF NLF NLF

1999: Anscombe and von Wright disagree about the composition of the board of trustees – Anscombe and von Wright discuss Nedo’s edition in connection with a contract between the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and Oxford University Press for publishing BEE 2000. TABLE 5.49: List of abbreviations used in the calendar. Band IX Band VIII BBB 1958

BEE 2000

BT 2005 CCO 1973

CLF 1969

CRK 1974 FWS 1964

GB 1967 GB 1971 GT 1985a GT 1985b

www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ms-113_f www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ms-117_f Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’, generally known as The Blue and Brown Books, edited by R. Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958). Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. The Bergen Electronic Edition, edited by The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). The Big Typescript: TS 213, edited by C. Grant Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). Letters to C. K. Ogden, with an appendix of letters by F. P. Ramsey, edited by G.H. von Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973). Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker, edited by G.H. von Wright in cooperation with W. Methlagl (Salzburg: Otto Müller), first publication in English: Letters to Ludwig von Ficker, edited by A. Janik (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1969). Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, edited by G.H. von Wright, assisted by B. F. McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974). Aus F. Waismanns stenographischer Abschrift von Reden und Gesprächen Wittgensteins zwischen Dezember 1929 und September 1931, in PB 1964; first publication in English: From F. Waismann’s shorthand transcript of Wittgenstein’s talks and conversations between December 1929 and September 1931, in PB 1975. Bemerkungen über Frazers The Golden Bough, edited by R. Rhees, Synthese, 17 (1967), 233–253. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, The Human World, 3 (1971), 18–41. Diaris Secrets / Geheime Tagebücher, Saber, 5 (1985), 24–49. Diarios Secretos (y II) / Geheime Tagebücher, Saber, 6 (1985), 30–59.

102

LA 1966 LE 1965 LPE 1993

LW 1982

LW 1992

Ms 142

NB 1961 NL 1957 NL 1960

NM 1961

OC 1969 PB 1964

PG 1969

PGL 1988 PH 1989

PI 1953 PT 1971

PU 2001

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

Lectures and Conversations, edited by C. Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966). A Lecture on Ethics, The Philosophical Review, 74 (1965), 3–12. Notes for Lectures on ‘Private Experience’ and ‘Sense Data’, edited by D. G. Stern, in Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951, edited by J. C. Klagge and A. Nordmann (Indianapolis and Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 1993). Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology / Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Vol. 1, edited by G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982). Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology / Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Vol. 2, edited by G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). Manuscript No. 142, www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ms-142_f (also published in: Philosophische Untersuchungen. Kritisch-genetische Edition, edited by J. Schulte in cooperation with H. Nyman, E. v. Savigny and G.H. v. Wright (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001)). Notebooks 1914–1916, edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961). Notes on Logic, The Journal of Philosophy, 54 (1957), 230–245. Aufzeichnungen über Logik, in Schriften, Bd. 1, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1960). Notes dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway, in Notebooks 1914–1916, edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961). On Certainty / Über Gewißheit, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969). Philosophische Bemerkungen, edited by R. Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964); first publication in English: Philosophical Remarks, edited by R. Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975). Philosophische Grammatik, edited by R. Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969); first publication in English: Philosophical Grammar, edited by R. Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974). Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-1947, edited by P. T. Geach (New York: Harvester) Philosophie, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 43 (1989), 72–203, edited by H. Nyman; first publication in English: Philosophy, edited by H. Nyman, Synthese, 87 (1991), 3–22. Philosophical Investigations / Philosophische Untersuchungen, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953). Prototractatus. An Early Version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, edited by B. F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg and G.H. von Wright (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971). Philosophische Untersuchungen. Kritisch-genetische Edition, edited by J. Schulte in collaboration with H. Nyman, E. von Savigny and G.H. von Wright (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).

LETTERS BETWEEN RHEES, ANSCOMBE AND VON WRIGHT

RFM 1956

RFM 1978

ROC 1977 RPP 1980b

VB 1977 WC 2012 Wi11 Z 1967 Z 1981

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Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics / Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, edited by G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956). Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, edited by G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees und G.E.M. Anscombe, third edition, revised and reset (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978). Remarks on Colour / Bemerkungen über die Farben, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology / Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Vol. 2, edited by G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). Vermischte Bemerkungen, edited by G.H. von Wright in cooperation with H. Nyman (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977). Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Letters and Documents, 1911–1951, edited by B. F. McGuinness (Malden, MA: Blackwell 2012). The Big Typescript, Wiener Ausgabe Band 11, edited by M. Nedo (Wien: Springer, 2000). Zettel, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967). Zettel, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).

NOTES 1. This chapter is dedicated to Brian McGuinness. 2. Letter from Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright, 2 December 1984, (WWA, Wri-FC-006). Rhees may refer to the so-called impossible tribar, also known as Penrose-Triangle; see L. S. Penrose and R. Penrose (1958), ‘Impossible Objects: A Special Type of Visual Illusion’, British Journal of Psychology, 49(1), 31–33. 3. The letters were found during three research projects (between 2012 and 2020) dealing with the history of editing Wittgenstein. The projects were funded by the Norwegian Research Council (NFR 213980), the German Research Foundation (DFG, SFB 1187), and the Academy of Finland (The Creation of Wittgenstein).

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CHAPTER SIX

The Revision of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics KIM SOLIN

1. INTRODUCTION ‘Wittgenstein’s chief contribution has been in the philosophy of mathematics.’ According to Rush Rhees, this was the sentence that Wittgenstein himself wanted to add to the biographical note that John Wisdom had prepared in 1944. Rhees tells Monk, however, that only two months after that statement, Wittgenstein gave up his own work on the philosophy of mathematics (Monk 1990: 466 ff). Nevertheless, this shows that the philosophy of mathematics at one point was central to Wittgenstein. If one wants to understand the creation of Wittgenstein, then one ought also to consider his work in the philosophy of mathematics and the process of publishing the manuscripts on mathematics. Wittgenstein’s Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, in translation the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (hereafter simply ‘the Remarks’), can be found in three editions. The first was published 1956, in the original German parallel to the English translation. It consists of 105

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selections from Wittgenstein’s writings on mathematics. The second edition, which is identical in content to the first edition, was published in 1967. The first edition of the Remarks was not well received (Monk 2007: 288 ff) and the trustees were not satisfied with their work. This is why they decided to revise it.1 The revised and expanded edition was published in 1974 in German, and contains additional material from the Nachlass. Some of the previously included material was rearranged. The third edition, which is a translation into English of the German revised and expanded edition (with some minor differences), appeared in 1978. This essay concerns the revision of the first edition into the third. To gain insight into the editorial process, I will discuss the correspondence between the two main editors of the revised edition, Rush Rhees and Georg Henrik von Wright.2 The work on the revised edition began in autumn 1970 and went on until spring 1974. I shall identify three key phases of the correspondence (the initial work, the main work, and the finalization) and give a chronological synopsis of the contents with respect to the revision.3 I will conclude the essay with a discussion of what the correspondence has shown regarding the revision in relation to the editors’ own philosophical views, and also discuss how one ought to understand the Remarks in light of the correspondence.

2. INITIAL WORK: CORRESPONDENCE OCTOBER 1970 TO SEPTEMBER 1972 The editors had met in November 1970 for one of their annual meetings, this time in Cambridge (see Erbacher’s chapter in this book). In a letter to Anscombe, von Wright suggests some future items of work he thinks they ought to discuss at the meeting, and one of the main items is the following: Reconsider the composition of the volume on the foundations of mathematics. We worked hard on making the selections – but I suspect it would have been better, if we had published the manuscripts in a more integral from.4 Already in 1965 von Wright had studied anew the manuscripts from which they had made selections and he ‘often had an uncomfortable feeling that [they] should not have made selections’.5 When in Cambridge in November 1970, von Wright also met with Henry Schollick of Basil Blackwell, and would certainly have informed him of their plans to revise the Remarks. Late in August 1971, Siegfried Unseld of Suhrkamp Verlag sent Rhees an inquiry about the Remarks. Suhrkamp wanted to publish the Remarks in

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their series on Wittgenstein and wanted the volume to be as extensive and definitive as possible. Rhees replies that the editors are making a number of additions to the text. They are keen to see it in print as soon as possible, but they are not yet finished with it, and do not want to set a more precise date for delivery. After Rhees tells von Wright about his reply to Suhrkamp, von Wright writes to Rhees that he hopes to ‘feel free to proceed with the mathematics stuff ’ after the academic year 1971–1972. Von Wright intends to visit England in May or September 1972 and this would be a good opportunity for the trustees to do joint work, von Wright writes, and adds that Rhees should nevertheless feel free to keep working on his own before that. In late March 1972, Rhees informs von Wright that Suhrkamp wants to publish in autumn, and would like to have the manuscript in April. Rhees has gone through the Remarks and found and listed a number of places where he thinks some passages that had been left out in the first edition could be inserted, although less often than he had expected; he has also found and typed up some new material that he thinks should be included. Von Wright replies that he has still not had any time to work on the revision of the Remarks, so that already for that reason, they cannot promise Suhrkamp a date of delivery.6 Von Wright is ‘very glad’ that Rhees has started working on the revision, and hopes that by the time he visits England in the second half of September, he has been able to do his part, so that they can ‘together finish the work on the revised edition’. He asks Rhees to send him the lists and typescripts he has prepared. On the 6 April 1972, Rhees sends von Wright two typescripts of manuscripts he thinks could be added to the Remarks. In von Wright’s catalogue of the manuscripts (von Wright 1969), these are MS 162 and MS 164. He sends them to von Wright with a few comments. Regarding MS 164, which is about the problem of following a rule, he writes that he has crossed out the last five pages, except for the ending three lines of which he remains uncertain. He has added paragraph numbers, and feels that the manuscript is more interesting from §21 onwards but notes that he would still be willing to print the earlier passages as well. Rhees is of the opinion that repetition in other parts of the Remarks need not ‘always be evil’.7 Regarding MS 162, Rhees writes that he has only typed up part of the manuscript, but that he finds it important, more so even than MS 164, ‘if one had to choose’. But it needs work, lacking is division into paragraphs and numbering them. He has also considered adding some material from MS 159. According to Rhees, MS 162 is about diagonalization, proof of provability and proof by induction, and as he understands it, these were central to Gödel’s work. ‘I think that some of his comments are relevant to

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the ways of thinking of those who found Gödel’s proofs ‘revolutionary’, whether or not they apply to Gödel’s own wording’, Rhees concludes.8 He refrains from sending von Wright suggestions of insertions to the now printed text, as they are ‘still lying about in pieces on the floor’; Rhees finds that it ‘easily drives [him] crazy’. He welcomes von Wright’s suggestion to meet in the second half of September. On the 10 April, von Wright thanks Rhees for the typescripts, but makes no further comments. About a month later, 4 May 1972, Rhees sends von Wright a new typescript with passages taken from MS 163. He feels certain that roughly the first five pages of the typescript should be included, much less so about the last five pages. The first five pages may be ‘less full than we might wish’, but they contain important remarks on the notion of ‘inhaltlich gedeutet’, which according to Rhees plays a considerable role in Wittgenstein’s ‘exposition of Gödel’s proof and of ‘formalised languages’ altogether’. ‘And these few remarks of Wittgenstein’s might help some to see the sort of interest which such discussions had for him’, Rhees thinks. He also writes that there are a couple of sections, one about the continuity of functions, that were left out in the first edition, but that Rhees now thinks should be included. Finally, he mentions that he agrees with von Wright in what he says in a letter recently sent to Anscombe, ‘that it would be pointless and would do more harm than good if we tried to publish ‘the entire manuscripts books’ without any omissions’.9 This is in agreement with what the editors state in the preface to the third edition, that ‘the time has not yet come to print the whole of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts’ (Wittgenstein 1978: 32). A few days before midsummer’s eve 1972, von Wright has finally read the typescripts and replies to Rhees from his summerhouse in the archipelago (he sends Anscombe a copy of the letter). He finds MS 164 ‘extremely interesting’ and thinks it is unfortunate that they did not consider it for the first edition. If they decide to publish it, it would mean a sixth part to the Remarks. One could perhaps cut out a bit more than Rhees has done, von Wright notes, ‘but not much’. He has not reached a definite opinion on whether they should publish it now. ‘One of my difficulties is to see clearly, how much this MS adds to or illuminates what W. says about Regelfolgen in the already published stuff.’ But von Wright is not as impressed by MSS 162 and 163: The discussion of the Diagonalverfahren [in MS 162], though in itself interesting, does not strike me as better than what we have already published on this topic, nor does it seem to me to add anything substantially new. [. . .] My impression of what is being said in 163 on the Gödel-

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problem is similar. I doubt whether it will make hostile critics, or readers generally, understand any better what W. is after and why he is interested in the situation created by Gödel’s results. As you know, what we printed about this – mainly as Appendix I to Part I – has been universally criticized, derided, and misunderstood. The critics have said next to nothing about in what they think W’s “mistakes” consist. The only substance which I have myself been able to find in the criticisms I have seen is the charge against W. that he did not say or know that G’s proof of the existence of undecidable truths is relative to an assumption of consistency of a system. I think myself that W’s discussion misses something important – but how important the missing point is to what he tries to say, I cannot judge. And I doubt whether the new stuff on Gödel will be helpful in this regard.10 Von Wright wants to digest his impressions, read the typescripts once more, and try to form a definitive opinion about publication. He might also suggest including the remarks on surprise in mathematics that were omitted from the first edition. ‘All the above opinions are tentative and I am more than willing to listen to different opinions. I hope we can reach a decision when we meet in September.’ Rhees immediately replies, in passing in a letter regarding other matters, that although he might change his mind, he thinks that one can argue for including some of the material from MSS 162 and 163 and that he will do so in another letter. On 10 August Rhees writes, again in passing, that he has changed his mind about MS 163, but that he maintains his view on MS 162. Von Wright replies a few days later that he will reconsider MS 162, but notes – and this will later become a concern – that if the volume becomes too large one may have to split it into two volumes; he adds that he’ll be in Cambridge in September and available for discussion. The initial discussions in Cambridge do not seem to have had a flying start, judging from a letter from Rhees to the other two on 21 September. Anscombe and von Wright have a different view than Rhees on publishing notes from Wittgenstein’s lectures. ‘We should not get anywhere by discussing it further and we must go our own ways’, Rhees writes, and concludes the letter by: ‘I hope we may succeed in getting the material on the philosophy of mathematics printed somehow.’ The correspondence is then sparse, probably since they met in person or telephoned. But on 27 September, von Wright’s last day in Cambridge before he travels to Cornell for a month, von Wright sends Rhees a concluding summary of what they have agreed upon regarding the revision, including a division of labour (see below for details). This marks the beginning of the main work on completing the revision.

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3. MAIN WORK: CORRESPONDENCE AUTUMN 1972 AND SPRING 1973 These are the changes that von Wright suggests: To Part I, he wants to add the pages on surprise and those on negation that they omitted in the first edition (a large number of the remarks on negation can also be found in the PI; the editors had left them out from the first edition as they had considered the ones in the PI to be improved versions of them). Further, he wants to separate Appendix II from Part I, combine the Appendix with what Rhees has typed up from MS 162 and, possibly, include a selection of remarks on Gödel from what Rhees has typed up from MS 163. This would form a new Part II (so, nota bene, von Wright has changed his mind regarding MSS 162 and 163). The old Parts II and III can remain unaltered, but renamed III and IV, respectively. To Parts IV and V, Rhees has suggested additions that von Wright does ‘not feel strongly about’. ‘I leave the decision in the matter to you, after reconsideration, and I shall not object to your final decision’, von Wright writes. Nevertheless, to the additions to Part V – which are about rule following – he would like footnotes or something similar with a pointer to each corresponding remark in the PI, and a reason stated in the preface as to why they have decided to include them. Von Wright then proceeds to propose the following division of labour: von Wright will be responsible for Part I and the new Part II, Rhees for the revision of the old Parts IV and V. Von Wright thinks he can do his part by the end of the year; Anscombe is willing to translate immediately. In a reply roughly a week later, Rhees agrees to the division of labour, but includes the old Part III into his assignment, since he might want to add a few things. Rhees will try to keep the deadline. Rhees, however, thinks that pointers to PI in Part V would ‘interrupt and get in the way of the reading, and it would not help the reader to understand what is being said in the passage in question. [. . .] I do not think this helps the reader to understand the discussion, I think it gets in his way. It would be useful to someone who was interested chiefly in the composition of the text, I suppose (although even on that coordinate I am not clear what the value is).’11 Rhees did eventually add some footnotes with references to PI and to PG and PR; I have not been able to determine if von Wright was content with this. In the letter of 27 September, von Wright worries that ‘the bulk of the volume’ is becoming too large. Therefore, von Wright thinks, MS 164 cannot be included in the current volume, even though it is worth publishing without omissions at some other time and in some other form. For the same reason, he doesn’t think that they can go in for a respacing of the text,

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although he is in favour of spaces in general. To this Rhees protests: ‘I should have thought the question: How illuminating is the reader going to find it? – were more important.’ He wants to include MS 164, and suggests that if it is only about the size of the volume, they could let Suhrkamp publish it in the German only version. Von Wright replies from Ithaca on the 17 October, that he might have been prejudiced against expanding the bulk of the volume substantially and that if Blackwell chooses the paper in the right way it will not become too thick – so von Wright now favours preparing MS 164 for publication, ‘and see what the totality then looks like’. Three days later, Rhees replies that he is very happy that von Wright is open to including MS 164. But now it is Rhees who has changed his mind about MS 163: As I study the BGM now, my feeling is again that the MS. 163 remarks on Gödel are not worth publishing. I could wish for some way of including the one or two paragraphs on ‘inhaltlich gedeutet’ – not because these are Wittgenstein at his best, but simply because I am weary of meeting the phrase (just now I am thinking of Stegmüller’s accounts of Gödel and of Tarski) as though it were something ganz präzise und wissenschaftlich. I keep wishing someone would shout that it’s wobbly and woolly.12 He then lists the already published passages which he for the moment thinks are the most important on Gödel.13 In addition to this, he would like to add explanations to the remarks where Wittgenstein refers to Russell’s paper ‘The Limits of Empiricism’, either in the form of a footnote or in the preface. ‘Since so many people never read the preface, a footnote might be better.’ This comes from the fact that Wittgenstein had written a whole set of remarks on Russell’s paper, and Rhees feels it should be published, although not included in the revision of the Remarks; in a reply 26 October von Wright agrees (see Wittgenstein 1974: 197, 237, 379, 387). Then they work on their own, and there are no letters regarding the Remarks until 12 December, when von Wright informs Rhees that he has now finished the revision of Part I, which essentially means the addition of two appendices on negation and surprise in mathematics, respectively. ‘The section on Gödel [from the 1956 edition], etc. will then be Appendix III [...] With these additions the whole of the cut-up typescript which originally was the second half of the early version of the Untersuchungen will have been published. And this seems to me right.’ Von Wright has had a look at the new material for Part II (a later letter reveals that von Wright has considered material from MSS 121 and 162; see below), regarding Cantor,

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but will not be able to work on it until after Christmas.14 Rhees replies a few days before New Year’s Eve that he has finished Part V (of the 1956 edition), and that the new material will amount to 10–12 pages with the current spacing. He also feels certain that MS 164 should be included (between IV and V, or at the very end), and even proposes to replace Part V by it, if necessary. He says he could give reasons for this, and adds cryptically, ‘but I doubt if they would help just here’. Rhees is much less certain regarding Parts III and IV: I have wavered back and forth over possible inclusions in III and IV. I think they are good as they stand – the best portions of the book. I wish there were a fuller and clearer discussion on what he is saying of the generality and continuity of functions in mathematics – on pages 150 to 153, for instance. But the manuscripts do not provide much. (When Tarski speaks of transforming ‘eine Klasse von Aussagen’ into ‘eine Klasse von Aussagefunktionen’, and when he speaks of ‘Erfüllung’, I do not understand very well. I think Wittgenstein would have deep criticisms of what Tarski says, but I am not intelligent enough to get clear about them. The notion of ‘function’ seems to have been ambiguous – or differently understood by different writers – for much of its history.) – If I finally do include anything further in III or IV, the whole amount will not be more than one page, I think, Und immer flüstert mir das Trägheitsgesetz, ich soll sie so bleiben lassen, wie sie sind.15 To sum up, as they enter 1973, the editors have agreed on a division of labour, finished the revision of Part I and the original Part V. The original Part II is left without revision, but a footnote is added. They are working on the original Parts III and IV, and are positive towards the inclusion of MS 164. So although they have made significant progress, the editors fail to keep the deadline they set in September. * In the first letter of 1973, 4 January, von Wright informs Rhees that he is now considering what should be done with the former Appendix II of Part I – on Cantor – and is of the opinion that it should form a new Part II of its own. What he is uncertain about is if he should add something more to it, which he thinks could be good since it is only fifteen pages long, but he has not found anything that would improve what is already there.16 He will also divide up the text into a greater number of remarks, since he thinks the editors did not pay enough attention to Wittgenstein’s own way of separating the remarks when they worked on the first edition in the early 1950s.

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Importantly, von Wright is now in complete agreement with Rhees that MS 164 should be included and, moreover, that it should not replace Part V. A month later, Rhees replies that he has parts III, IV and V in the numbering of the first edition done. He has made several additions to Part V, two of them a few pages long. Two small additions to Part IV (the final additions for the 1974 edition are the remarks added at the ends of § 36 and § 39, respectively, and the four last remarks of § 15; I have not been able to determine which two of these Rhees refers to here). He has made no additions to Part III. Rhees also agrees fully with von Wright’s comment about spacing. He writes: ‘I am only afraid of making my agreement too eager’, and continues, ‘the way the remarks are crowded together here is like placing a dirty glass in front of what Wittgenstein is saying’. If, however, they would add spacing to the whole volume, they might have to split it into two volumes. Recall that von Wright hesitated splitting the volume. Nevertheless, Rhees would prefer even that. Finally, he suggests that MS 164 be placed either between III and IV or between IV and V. On the 14 February, von Wright is ready with the new Part II: he has added the omitted Ansätze from MS 117, but nothing more. In the preface to the revised edition this is called an ‘inconsiderable expansion’; note that von Wright in the end dropped MSS 162 and 163 altogether (for a discussion of MS 162, see Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020: 125 ff. and 249 ff.). He has also divided the text into ‘sections and paragraphs in strict accordance with Wittgenstein’s own divisions in the manuscripts’ (therefore, the revised text has 62 sections in comparison to the 18 sections of the first edition). Regarding the rest of the text, von Wright makes the following highly interesting comments, which I quote in full: I then thought that we ought perhaps to perform a similar operation also on the sections and paragraphs of the old Teil II, and on the rest of the old text. [...] But on reflection, I am not going to recommend this. It seems to me that it is better that we do as originally we did – and as you yourself did when you typed out the text of 164 – namely lump sections together according to subject matter into bigger sections and give to these bigger sections a number. This would leave Teil III with 90 sections, as in the old edition, with the (important) difference however that inside the sections paragraphs should be lumped together and separated by spaces exactly as in Wittgenstein’s manuscript. This is done to some measure, but not consistently, in the old text too, but the spaces are so narrow that they are not always obvious to the eye. Therefore: the spaces must not only be consistently marked but they must also be increased. What you did in Phil.Bem. and Phil.Gramm. is the pattern of spacing which we ought to

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follow. This will increase the bulk of the volume, but I hope it will not compel us to split the volume in two.17 Further, von Wright suggests that MS 164 should be placed before the old Part V; he also sends Rhees an extensive list of comments to Rhees’s typed and edited version of MS 164, so extensive in fact, that one can claim that von Wright played a role in the preparation of it. By the end of February, von Wright has drafted a new preface, with parts from the old one, and asks for adjustments from the other two editors, ‘additions, alterations, omissions’. He also sends them Xerox copies of the parts he has revised and welcomes comments. Regarding the new Part II, on Cantor amongst other things, von Wright says that it is without doubt the weakest part of the book. ‘But can we improve it?’ Rhees replies to von Wright with a long letter about the section on Cantor and the preface. Regarding the Cantor section, Rhees says two main things. First, the following: I agree with you that the discussion is weak – when compared, e.g., with the discussion of Induktionsbeweis in the Grammatik. I feel that Wittgenstein could have done something better organized and more forceful, if he had set himself to it. – He intended to do so at the end of 1939: to write something about Cantor’s Beweismethoden and about Gödel’s, and make this a conclusion to the discussion of Russell’s logic (which I think was being developed in the manuscripts which you used for the /new/ present Part III). So he said to me in conversation, anyway. [. . .] – I do not think the discussion could be arranged in any better way than this now.18 Secondly, Rhees also notes that the section as a whole seems heavy, in fact, the whole volume seems heavy, which is one reason people have had a hard time reading it. Rhees thinks that the greater spaces between the remarks that they have been considering will make a real difference, that they will ‘do something to dispel the Dämmerung of this Cantor section’. The preface is excellent, Rhees thinks, and ‘business-like’ in Wittgenstein’s sense. Regarding the themes picked out in the preface for IV, V, VII, Rhees would, however, like to add a few themes. For instance, he would like to add Allgemeinheit and Begriffsbildung, and over three pages he extensively explains what he means (a key theme is that self-evident propositions are concept-forming propositions), only to conclude by saying that since no one ever reads a preface, it probably doesn’t matter – a rather blunt comment, considering von Wright’s efforts to write a good preface. A few days later, von Wright thanks Rhees for the comments to the preface about Allgemeinheit

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and Begriffsbildung, which he ‘found very helpful for [his] own understanding of Wittgenstein’s work on mathematics’, and he will add a few lines about those topics (see Wittgenstein 1974: 33 and Wittgenstein 1978: 32). Von Wright is still waiting for Anscombe’s comments (I have not been able to determine if Anscombe ever sent any). * In the middle of March, Rhees sends von Wright the prepared text of Parts IV, V, and VII of the new numbering and begins by stating the following: I am not at all satisfied, and I grow less so each time I go back over them. My feeling now is that it is better that we should make this text available to those who might read it – unsatisfactory though it be. If someone else later on goes through the manuscripts and expresses astonished horror at what we have done – this does not matter much. If he is someone who has become interested in these particular writings of Wittgenstein because of what is said in them, then I should welcome this interest and all its astonished horror: it will show that he is trying to understand better what he has read. And it will be the first time this has happened in connexion with these writings. It is more likely that these ‘discoveries’ will be made by someone who has not a glimmer of an understanding of the questions Wittgenstein is discussing here, but who wants to prove that he is a ‘scholar’ by discovering all these passages which the editors have left out or ‘suppressed’. Nun, das ist der Lauf der Welt.19 This sceptical attitude towards what he perceives as superficial scholarship is something that one can find in Rhees’s philosophy as a whole; I will return to this and related matters below. Paradoxically, Rhees is the one von Wright turns to for details and Rhees was indeed very thorough and knowledgeable.20 * In the same letter, Rhees informs von Wright that he would like to include some more material into Part V (of the revised edition) that the editors had left out in the first edition. This material is based on Wittgenstein’s margin notes to G. H. Hardy’s book A Course of Pure Mathematics.21 Some, but not all, remarks based on these notes were included in the first edition, and with no mention of Hardy. Here’s what Rhees says: Some things he says in Teil V are copied from the margins of his copy of Hardy’s Pure Mathematics (printing of 1941) where he had written them;

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others are somewhat different versions of what he had written there. Most of these passages – which come in MS 126, page 120 ff. – were omitted from what we printed. I think this was a mistake, because what immediately follows, on page 148 of the 1956 volume, depends on them for its understanding; and also because I think the passages are important on their own account. Some of the suggestions which Wittgenstein makes regarding ‘a different kind of variable’ are tentative. And when we decided on the text in 1955 we were too afraid of the scorn of people like Kreisel (and A.R. Anderson). I think this timidity was not excusable. And I should like to include a section of these passages – perhaps even with footnote references to Hardy’s book where they are comments on it; but I do not have much hope that I shall be able to get it into shape. If I do, then of course I shall send it on to you. (Some of these passages, by the way, were copied again in the second half on 124; which showed that Wittgenstein did not intend just to erase or discard them.)22 Rhees does not, however, want to delay the publishing process any further and worries that working out the new suggestions might take him a considerable amount of time. But already the next day, 21 March 1973, Rhees sends von Wright a typescript of the passages that he wants to include, and possibly a photocopy of the corresponding pages in Wittgenstein’s copy of Hardy’s book.23 He writes: I very much want to include the insertions as I have given them here. If you think there are very strong reasons against doing so – if you were unwilling to be party to the edition if they were included – then of course I would draw back. – I do not think it is just a personal prejudice of mine in favour of them. I think there are important reasons for printing them. But I do not think I can state these reasons clearly. I will mention only a few. And I will write them as they occur to me; because I am too dull to put them in a proper order. – The Nacheinander of the remarks themselves, and their positions vis-a-vis the remarks already printed – this is the order in which they come in the manuscript: I have not changed this.24 Rhees then lists a handful of arguments for insertions to §§ 28–34 of Part V, the overriding argument being that some of the remarks that were already printed can be understood better with the insertions (for example, § 29, § 32 and § 34) and that they also help one understand remarks like § 38, ‘The generality of functions is so to speak an unordered generality. And our mathematics is built on such an unordered generality’. Rhees comments:

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Obviously the Andeutungen [. . .] are only Andeutungen. Wittgenstein does not pretend that he has worked them out. But I do think it is important that he put forward these Andeutungen. I think it shows something important about the way he was thinking of continuity and generality of functions. This sketch does give some idea of his difficulties which we should never guess if it were left out. If Kreisel and some followers of Bernays (say) call it crude – well, of course it is. But it also shows something geniales about Wittgenstein’s way of thinking about these matters. Thinking about certain ways of speaking about generality and about completeness in mathematics. And I do not think that its ‘crudeness’ is any reason to be ashamed of it.25 Von Wright is not impressed, but he does not want to stop Rhees from adding the comments.26 Von Wright suggests footnotes indicating that they are comments to Hardy’s book and to Gödel’s paper. Rhees replies with new arguments for including the material: I will repeat only that if someone like Kreisel should say that in suggestions like these Wittgenstein is trying to do what he ought to have left to mathematicians – then he would show he had not grasped what Wittgenstein was up to. Wittgenstein was not pretending to do mathematics. He was describing a general schema or form of a procedure which could be mathematics. (In this way similar to his construction eines Sprachspiels or of the Lebensweise eines Stammes, whose grammar differed in important ways from ours, for whom ‘intelligibility’ and ‘understanding’ were different from the intelligibility or understanding we seek; and so on. And this could illuminate, or separate certain features of our speech and questions and reasonings) Wittgenstein is not suggesting that any mathematical problems would be solved through the development of ways of calculating within this allgemeines Schema. What he does suggest, I think, is that if one pays attention to the possibility of a variable so conceived – of which he says that it is “sozusagen eine topologische Einheit” – then one may be less prone to ‘mythological’ or ‘fantastic’ interpretations of the forms of calculation which mathematicians do use.27 Rhees draws the conclusion, however, that since von Wright is sceptical, they should leave them out.

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But if his remarks here do not seem to you worth printing – if they do not seem to you to open up a new understanding of what ‘die philosophischen Probleme in der Mathematik’ are – a conception which would never even come within the horizon of people like Tarski or Quine – then a fortiori they will not mean anything to other readers, and this means that they would be in the way and were better left out. Schluß damit.28 Despite von Wright’s reiterated insistence that regardless of his own doubt, the decision remains with Rhees, and despite Rhees’s extensive argumentation for inclusion, Rhees ends up not including the additional Hardy passages in Part V, §§ 28–34, of the revised edition.29 * On 23 May 1973, Rhees hands over the complete German material for the revised edition, save the preface, to Blackwell. In a letter to Anscombe, 9 May 1973, von Wright had asked her if she was all right with that, although she had not yet finished the revision of the translation; I have not found any reply from Anscombe. Blackwell, in turn, will forward the material to Suhrkamp. Apart from some minor revisions at the galley proof stage (I will account for them below), it is this material that will be printed as the revised edition of the Remarks. * The preface turns into a minor quarrel. Rhees wants von Wright to be the only one who signs it (for the 1956 edition, Rhees had indeed suggested that von Wright would be the sole editor).30 But von Wright wants all three of them to sign, since otherwise it will seem like von Wright did most of the work. Alternatively, von Wright suggests, one could consider accounting for the division of labour in the preface, but he does not like that alternative. What happens is that no one signs, just like for the first edition (and also this time, it is implicit that the editors together are responsible for the preface). Siegfried Unseld of Suhrkamp also had some comments to the preface. Concerning what von Wright says about the remarks on Cantor, Unseld wants to either drop the formulation ‘ist aber keine Ganzheit entstanden’ or replace it by ‘ist nie zu Ende geführt worden’, since in his opinion von Wright’s suggestion is not good German. Von Wright does not want to drop it, but suggests ‘Die Auseinandersetzung mit Cantor ist jedoch nie zu Ende geführt worden’, which is what they print (it was translated into ‘The confrontation with Cantor was never brought to a terminus’). The original formulation, however, shows that von Wright did not see the Cantor paragraphs as forming a whole, which says something else than them not

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being finished – von Wright seems to think that they remained rather scattered. By mid-July, the preface is done.

4. FINALIZATION: CORRESPONDENCE AUTUMN 1973 AND SPRING 1974 Once Rhees and von Wright have handed in the final typescript to the publishers and finished the preface, what remains is checking galley proofs. This is what they do in autumn 1973, and the process is smooth. Only on one occasion is there a disagreement, and that concerns the spacing. Von Wright has complained to Suhrkamp that the spaces between the remarks are too large. This is what Rhees thinks: I do not agree with your judgement about the Zwischenräume. I think these are needed more in this book than in any other. – Where a number of single sentences are separated in this way, some readers might think it looked awkward at first. But I would carry this for the sake of the clarity it brings to other passages – to the bulk of the book, in fact. [/] I had thought we were in agreement on this last February.31 And this is how von Wright responds: I am sorry that there should have arisen this misunderstanding between us concerning the Zwischenräume. I thought the way they appear in the “Bemerkungen” and “Grammatik” was ideal and never considered making them bigger still. [/] I shall not insist of shrinking them a little bit – but I must say that as they now are they seem to me absurd, particularly when they occur inside numbered sections.32 They nevertheless keep the three-line spacing, and later in the publishing process, Rhees writes to von Wright that he hopes that von Wright will come to see advantages with the larger spacing.33 * In November, von Wright informs Rhees that he has sent back the final galley proofs to Suhrkamp; Elizabeth Anscombe has also asked for them and, I presume, approved. Von Wright asks Rhees if he thinks they should have an index, like they did in the first edition, and has made notes for the revisions to Part I–IV. Rhees has indeed already proposed this (this proposal is not in the correspondence, and must have been done by other means than a letter). In January 1974, Rhees makes the index for the new Part VI (MS 164). Von

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Wright makes the index for the new passages in Parts V and VII. Here’s Rhees 17 January 1974: Here is the Register I have made for Part VI. I hope it will fit in with the existing index somehow. – There are certain headings which would be outside the list in the index you had made anyway – simply because it is a new discussion. I have tried to keep to your schema, but you may be annoyed with the results. If I had taken more time and had done the thing over again perhaps I should have had fewer deviations. – When anyone is making an index I suppose his selection of headings and his feeling of how they should be set out is determined (partly, at least) by his reading of the work. And probably no two people would produce two indexes very close one to another. This does not excuse my deviations. – It goes without saying that you are at liberty to use an axe on what I have done.34 Later in the beginning of 1974, they make some minor changes. One of the more interesting ones is that Rhees wants to remove the last remark of what is Part V of the revised edition, ‘If in the midst of life we are in death, so in sanity we are surrounded by madness.’ Wittgenstein had a number of remarks about ‘understanding’ and ‘madness’. I do not think this is one of his best. There is something hollow in the sound of it: perhaps it comes too near to being something theatrical (which means that I do not think it said what he wanted to say when he wrote it). – I think it is incongruous in this context. People will look for some way in which it bears on the sentence before it; and it does not do so.35 Indeed, in the underlying MS 127, the sentences are separated by other remarks. Von Wright agrees, but it creates a problem for him since the preface states that the whole of the first edition is included in the revised edition. They solve it by adding a footnote containing the whole remark, which can be found in Suhrkamp’s edition, but that has been removed in the third edition published by Blackwell. Surprisingly, Rhees asks von Wright the following: Do you think the ‘punctuation’ – i.e., the use of dots – in the ‘material implications’ written on pages 427 and 428 should be as Wittgenstein had it in the manuscript? and if so, will you please change it to this? – I suppose that when I was preparing the 1956 text I thought the way Wittgenstein had written the expressions was ambiguous. But now the way I ‘corrected’ them seems crazy.36

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Von Wright checks this, and is of the opinion that it should be left as Wittgenstein had it, so they change it to exactly match the manuscript. Although Rhees takes the blame, I have not been able to determine if this is a mistake made by Rhees or by the publisher (there were similar mistakes for the 1974 edition; for an example, see Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020: 120). * On 29 March 1974 von Wright sends Rhees something that one could call a final self-appraisal of the editing process: Dear Rhees, I have asked for an additional, final proof of the Index for the BGM volume and shall check that the indenting is properly done. Then Suhrkamp can go ahead with the printing, as far as I am concerned. Let us hope that also the public will be satisfied with what we have done: We have certainly done our best, but –37 Rhees replies 9 April 1974 with his own final appraisal: Dear von Wright, Like you, I have some misgivings about the BGM volume. I cannot make them articulate even to myself. I have a feeling that in some way it ought to have been done differently – and I stop there. The philosophy of mathematics was /had/ such an important part in Wittgenstein’s investigations for a great deal of his life. And it has gone almost unnoticed since his death. I do not believe – and I imagine you do not believe – that we can hope that “at a later time” people will come to appreciate it, come to understand it better. Wittgenstein has been Mode for the past half dozen years. As nearly as I can guess, this has not gone with a better understanding of his methods and of the difficulties he was raising. Probably the ‘modish’ interest in him has hindered serious study, and we can welcome its passing. – But I fear that any later interest in his writing about mathematics will be – at best – an archaeological interest in it as a curiosity. Those who dig it up and turn it over will not do so because the discussions mean much to them.38 In October 1974, von Wright personally handed over Anscombe’s translation, comprising her translation of the new and revised parts as well as some adjustments to her earlier translation, to Blackwell.39 It took until 1978, however, until the English translation, the third edition, actually appeared.40

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* In sum, the main topics of the revision were: (1) the question of a complete or at least more integral edition, (2) the division of labour, (3) the inclusion of additional manuscripts and selections, (4) the inclusion of footnotes and other scholarly apparatus, (5) the spacing of the remarks and the bulk of the volume, and (6) the preface and the index. Both editors felt uncertain with the end result and were dissatisfied with it.

5. DISCUSSION As Lars Hertzberg writes in his portrait of Rhees in this book, a major concern for Rhees was separating the genuine from the deceitful. This concern is also visible in the revision of the Remarks, for instance when Rhees argues for inclusion of the additional Hardy passages on the ground that they might help one rid oneself of mythological or fantastic interpretations of certain mathematical methods and concepts, or when he discusses the use of the phrase ‘inhaltlich gedeutet’. The mythological interpretations deceive us and Wittgenstein’s aim was to clarify what mathematicians actually do, in connection to and sometimes in contrast to what they might themselves say that they are doing. Another thing typical of Rhees is to try to point out the unique and particular characters of different discourses (Cockburn 2009: 18). Also this is evident in the correspondence on the revision of the Remarks. For instance, again in relation to the Hardy notes, when Rhees points out that Wittgenstein is writing about certain ways of speaking about generality and about completeness in mathematics. Or when he wants to include the passages on Gödel, since he thinks they are relevant to the ways of thinking of those who find Gödel’s results revolutionary, whether they apply to Gödel’s exact wording or not. Moreover, Rhees is constantly concerned with Wittgenstein’s way of speaking, with pointing out the particular character of Wittgenstein’s remarks in contrast to, say, a mathematical logician’s way of speaking about the matters. Hertzberg also points out Rhees’s quest for understanding the unity of language, in a sense which is not a formal unity.41 This concern, too, can be seen in the correspondence. One example is when Rhees argues for including the additional Hardy remarks since they make one better understand what Wittgenstein meant by ‘The generality of functions is so to speak an unordered generality. And our mathematics is built up on such an unordered generality’ (Wittgenstein 1978: V § 38; see Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020: 113–116 for a related discussion).

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Cockburn has pointed out that for Rhees ‘one’s sense of what needs to be said in philosophy, and the sense of what one says, cannot be divorced from the fact that one is addressing someone stuck at a particular point, or is in the grip of a particular confusion, or who is puzzled in the same way as oneself, and so on. To the extent that publication involves no sense of those to whom one’s words are addressed, it’s character as language is, one might say, compromised’ (Cockburn 2009: 17). Cockburn refers to an earlier paper by Hertzberg (Hertzberg 2001: 432), in which Hertzberg writes that ‘what counted for Rhees was conversation in the full sense, an exchange in which there was no doubt about who you were talking to.’ During the course of the revision, Rhees addressed von Wright on points where he thought von Wright was stuck. Von Wright indeed acknowledges this and thanks Rhees for helping him understand Wittgenstein’s ideas better. As I will argue below, von Wright saw the Remarks more as a work in formal logic, whereas Rhees saw them in the broader context of Wittgenstein’s whole philosophy. Therefore, von Wright perhaps primarily addressed logicians like Kreisel, Bernays, Tarski and Quine, while Rhees – as quoted above – did not think that they were able to appreciate the contents of the Remarks. But who did Rhees address in his editing, if we think of publishing these books as having something to say to someone? Certainly not logicians or mathematicians interested in advancing their field. My impression is that, in a sense, he addressed Wittgenstein himself. For Rhees, the editing was a way of continuing his dialogue with Wittgenstein, furthering Wittgenstein’s thought faithfully but critically.42 Von Wright on the other hand seems to have seen the editing as neutrally delivering the material to the public domain, which is evident in his more philological attitude to the Nachlass, and which is related to the fact that Wittgenstein’s philosophical style was so different from that of the author of An Essay in Modal Logic (von Wright 1951a). In a letter to Georg Kreisel, von Wright writes that there might be more important reasons for publishing to consider than only thinking of what Wittgenstein himself would have wanted.43 In stark contrast to this, Rhees has written that he never had any editorial policy except for repeatedly asking himself what Wittgenstein would have wanted.44 Von Wright was an accomplished logician. His correspondence with, for instance, Georg Kreisel shows that he was deeply involved with central questions of formal logic. So von Wright was certainly in the logical tradition in a way that one cannot say that Rhees was.45 Although topics of philosophical logic were central to Rhees (Rhees 2006: 269, 273), he never published a paper of his own in formal, symbolic logic and there are to the best of my knowledge no manuscripts of that kind. Anyway, I think that it is in this tradition, from this perspective, that von Wright edited the Remarks. Indeed,

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in a letter to Kreisel, von Wright writes: ‘I also believe that Wittgenstein’s overall attitude to mathematical logic was an unfair one, and that his bias can to some extent be attributed to the effects of ignorance.’46 In this tradition, philosophy of Wittgenstein’s kind is usually not perceived as as interesting or as deep as proving formal theorems.47 Moreover, von Wright still saw himself as a working and innovative logician in 1979, with a paper that is certainly quite far from the kind of philosophy done in the Remarks; in 2001 he still thinks that the formal ideas of the 1979 paper would be worth developing (von Wright 2001a: 169). One needs, of course, to have some mathematical interest and sensibility to approach Wittgenstein’s writings on mathematics. Rhees, too, had enough mathematical sensibility to understand Wittgenstein’s ideas, but he did not have the formal logician’s view on them. In 1947 (and reprinted in 1969), Rhees writes that [t]he alternative logics may be important in showing that you can calculate according to various rules and you would still call it calculation.48 Also perhaps that what you would call contradiction in one system you would not call a contradiction in another. They may have made clearer what ‘being logical’ or ‘being a calculus’ consists in, and shown that certain things are not essential. But the alternative logics are all supposed, I think, to be deductive systems, and in that sense they are all supposed to be logical. They do not question the distinction between logical and illogical procedure. And as far as I can see they do not touch the question ‘whether there could be an illogical world’, or the question of the truth of logic in the sense of the ‘truth’ of standards distinguishing between logical and illogical. I do not think, either, that you can settle many important philosophical questions about the nature of logical necessity or the nature of proof by reference to them. —Rhees 1969: 47–48 This is completely in line with what Rhees says in the letter of 4 April 1973 to von Wright, quoted above, when arguing for including the additional Hardy remarks. But starting in 1947, von Wright was, in his own words, ‘obsessed’ with formal logic for two to three years (von Wright 2001a: 131). Von Wright began his work in modal logic in 1949 and two years later, in 1951, he published his seminal paper on deontic logic and An Essay in Modal Logic (von Wright 1951a and 1951b). In the letter to Kreisel mentioned above, von Wright furthermore writes that he thinks that the weakest part of the Remarks is ‘Wittgenstein’s treatment of the consistency problem and the paradoxes’; this von Wright thinks is truly weak, ‘not merely unfinished and

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unsatisfactory’. This is in marked contrast to Rhees, who is likely to be influenced by Wittgenstein in what he says in the above quote. It is unclear to me if von Wright later changed his view on Wittgenstein’s treatment of consistency and paradoxes, and it would be interesting to compare his late formal work (von Wright 1987) on paraconsistent logic with that of Wittgenstein on the same topic. At a major conference in 1991, von Wright at least said that he hopes that formal paraconsistent logic could reduce ‘to its right proportions what Wittgenstein called ‘the superstitious dread and veneration by mathematicians in face of contradiction” (von Wright 1994b: 22). The quote from Wittgenstein is taken from the Remarks (Wittgenstein 1956: 53; Wittgenstein 1978: 122) and quoting that remark must reasonably mean that von Wright appreciated it. But I do not think that understanding the philosophy of the Remarks in the Rheesean sense would allow one to think that formal paraconsistent logic could achieve that. If taken as an object of comparison, paraconsistent logic might help us to see more clearly what contradictions are. Objects of comparison were, however, not what von Wright had in mind, since he also calls paraconsistent logic a new substructure upon which further developments could be made. Ten years later, in 2001, he nevertheless says that his work in logic does ‘not claim to be systems of “philosophical truths”, but rather to be “objects of linguistic comparison”, which may help us avoid the pitfalls which informal use of language easily leads to’, which is closer to Rhees’s view (von Wright 2001b: 179). Even so, I think it is clear that Rhees’s and von Wright’s views, respectively, on formal systems differed from the start, were still different during the revision of the Remarks, and to a significant degree remained different throughout their lives. But perhaps precisely because von Wright was a part of the formal tradition, he comes to be the main editor of the Remarks. This is true of the first edition (where his name was placed first in the list of editors and it was even proposed that he be the sole editor), and it is true of the revised edition in the sense that von Wright seems to have had a higher authority than Rhees to decide what goes in and what is left out. He was, perhaps, also more inclined to consider the opinions and feelings of logicians like Georg Kreisel and Alan Ross Anderson (both mentioned explicitly by Rhees), since they were his colleagues in a sense that they were not Rhees’s.49 That Rhees saw von Wright as the main editor is clear from the decision about the additional Hardy remarks. Rhees argues extensively for their inclusion, but von Wright’s hesitation – no real arguments – makes Rhees drop the whole thing. A similar situation arose regarding the inclusion of material from MSS 162 and 163. It has been said, however, that in depressed moods Rhees often deferred in argument; if someone would argue against him, he would immediately defer.50

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Related to this is their view on scholarship. Von Wright is keen in his autobiography to point out that he, not Jaakko Hintikka, was the first to conceive of distributive normal forms and that he was the inventor of deontic logic before Becker and Kalinowski (von Wright 2001a: 131 and 173). Understandable though this is, I think these kinds of considerations would have been foreign to Rhees. Indeed, there is nothing in Rhees’s thinking that he could have been the first to do, he was not engaged in that kind of activity, and in his own philosophical work he emphasised that it would work against philosophical insight if the philosopher strived to some kind of fame and glory (see, for example, Rhees 1994: 577; cf. Hertzberg’s chapter in this book). However that may be, it is certainly not easy to defend the contents of the Remarks if one simultaneously wants recognition for one’s own work in formal logic. Mühlhölzer has argued that the editors conceal Wittgenstein’s uncertainty and self-doubt, which could perhaps be called his humility, in Part III (in the numbering of the revised edition), making Wittgenstein sound dogmatic in comparison to the underlying manuscripts 117 and 122 (Mühlhölzer 2012: 26–28). Part III is the only part the editors agreed to leave unrevised. Why was it that they played down Wittgenstein’s uncertainty in the first edition? Perhaps the answer is to be found in a description that Mary Midgley gave of British philosophy in the 1950s: philosophers back then ‘were much more afraid of looking weak than they were of missing something unexpected and important’ (see Lipscomb 2021: 217–218). But, oddly, in the same period, Anscombe, influenced by Wittgenstein, encouraged Philippa Foot to express tentative, unfinished ideas (Lipscomb 2021: 183). Perhaps for publication, the editors wanted to include only finished ideas that were up to and in tune with the British standards of the day. But one is still left wondering why the editors kept Part III in this state also in the revised edition. Taking Mühlhölzer’s critique into consideration, it is surprising that the editors did not seize the opportunity to revise it, in particular as Rhees thought that they, for the first edition, had been too worried about what others would say. Mühlhölzer also argues that in comparison to the underlying manuscripts there are many significant gaps in Part III which, in addition to making Wittgenstein look dogmatic, even make him difficult to understand (Mühlhölzer 2012; see further Mühlhölzer 2010). This makes the editors’ decision to leave this part unrevised rather difficult to comprehend. For Rhees, it was not important to be able to do the kind of scholarly tracing that would help readers determine how the editors had worked, rather the point of the volumes was the treatment of philosophical problems. These two aims need not stand in contradiction to each other, of course, but as we saw Rhees was of the opinion that a scholarly apparatus would clutter

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the view of the actual philosophy and would be distracting for maintaining the philosophical focus (see Stern 1994: 443 for a critical discussion of this). Erbacher points out that while ‘von Wright would increasingly question the attempt to create a unified whole from selections of Wittgenstein’s remarks; Rhees maintained precisely this ambition’ (Erbacher 2015: 176). Nevertheless, as we saw above, von Wright was initially of the opinion that they should publish the unaltered manuscripts, but after reviewing their choices from 1956 he changed his mind and thought that it could not be done much better than that. Unfortunately, the correspondence does not reveal von Wright’s reasons for his judgement (see endnote 9). Whatever they may be, it still remained the case that during the revision there was a tension between von Wright’s more philological approach and Rhees’s more philosophical approach. When it comes to the final appraisal of the revision, I think that von Wright was worried about the reaction of the formal logicians, whereas my impression is that Rhees worried that they had given the book a form that conceals the actual philosophical content, and that what remains is pseudoscholarly interest, which has nothing to do with genuine philosophical thought. They are both dissatisfied, but, I think, on different grounds. Von Wright was not worried about scholarship taking over, on the contrary he endorsed such efforts and perhaps he was worried that the revision was not scholarly enough. Let us now before concluding consider two important things in the editorial process, the spacing of the remarks and the preface. First, the spacing of the remarks. Already for the first edition, Rhees had been dissatisfied with the spacing of the remarks (see endnote 33). They remedied this for the revised edition, but now von Wright found that there was too much space between the remarks. Rhees was not bothered by the spacing that both forces and enables one to do a slower reading of book, which Wittgenstein famously wanted and expressed by saying that he must be read slowly (Wittgenstein 1998: 63). ‘In slow reading we move beyond calculation to thought’, as Michelle Boulous Walker expresses it (Boulous Walker 2017: 16). The larger spaces not only make it easier to focus on a remark, but also to return to it, which is the way Rhees himself worked (Rhees 2006: xxi– xxiii). This is another aspect of a slow reading, that ‘the practice of returning to what we read – of rereading and being willing to reread [. . .] – is fundamental to any ethical engagement with complexity’ (Boulous Walker 2017: 31). But von Wright’s main reason for the increased spacing is philological: it is how Wittgenstein had it. He presents no reason for having slightly smaller spaces other than stating that they now look absurd. I think this is related to what von Wright means when he says that ‘keine Ganzheit

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ist entstanden’ about the Cantor remarks. He is reading the text differently from Rhees, and wants a form of unity which is similar to a paper in formal logic. From that perspective there is no ‘Ganzheit’, but what if that way of reading it does not do it justice? Maybe the kind of unity that it is aiming at was the kind of unity that Rhees sought and perhaps that unity – which is not easy to describe – becomes easier to see with larger spacing and slower reading. Although Rhees agreed that Wittgenstein could have written something more forceful and organised regarding Cantor, he nevertheless thought the spacing would alleviate some of the difficulties of that section. At any rate, I think the disagreement about spacing shows that they were reading the book in different ways.51 It is odd, though, that there was no discussion of altogether removing or substantially revising the paragraph numbering introduced by the editors for the first edition (cf. Wittgenstein 1956: vii; Wittgenstein 1974: 34). Already for the first edition, Rhees and von Wright had had different ideas about what the preface should contain.52 Regarding the revised edition, Rhees writes that he liked von Wright’s new preface and that it was businesslike in Wittgenstein’s sense. But he is also at pains to elaborate on some of the things that he thinks should go into the preface. One gets the impression that Rhees would have wanted a preface that explains what was going on in the Remarks along the lines he drew up in the letters to von Wright. But von Wright’s preface remained a kind of catalogue with a philological flavour. It is possible that a preface of the more explanatory kind Rhees wrote for the BBB would have made for a better reception of the Remarks. Indeed, in his review of the English revised edition, Michael Dummett asked for illuminations of that kind (Dummett 1979: 241–242).

6. CONCLUSION How ought we to approach and understand the published Remarks, both the original edition and the revised one, after this? Von Wright and Rhees edited from different perspectives. Von Wright’s logician’s perspective is the principal point of view. In 1991, von Wright argued that ‘logic has been the distinctive hallmark of philosophy in our era’ (von Wright 1994b: 16), and it seems to me that it was against that background that he himself worked, at least at the time when the Remarks were revised. Nevertheless, I think that what we have seen from Rhees’s letters gives us a more uncommon, yet more clarifying, perspective on the book as a whole. It is not certain that we would have this perspective, for instance that certain remarks are meant as objects of comparison and not as actual mathematics, if we had only read the finished product. Not even reading the original manuscripts and

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typescripts would necessarily have opened up this perspective.53 But the correspondence gives us this. It is an important antidote to readings of the Remarks as if they were formal work in the same sense as, say, a paper in the Journal of Symbolic Logic. So the correspondence on the revision has shown, I believe, Rhees’s mature and developed, hermeneutical understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and of the Remarks. Rhees’s perspective is more congenial with Wittgenstein’s thought as a whole than the perspective of the working logician. Von Wright’s perspective nevertheless prevailed. Was the revision an improvement to the original edition? Von Wright was happy that the whole of the second half of the early version of the PI was published. Rhees was happy that they increased the spacing, something which he had wished for already for the first edition. MS 164 had not been published before and both editors found it worthy of publication. The smaller additions and modifications were improvements enough, and an evaluation of how much they enriched the Remarks would require a more detailed analysis than I can provide here, but they certainly sharpened some parts. Problematic aspects of the first edition remained, for instance in the unrevised Part III. But although the editors themselves were not satisfied with the end result, I think it is fair to say that they did improve their original edition.54

NOTES 1. For the history of the first edition, see (Erbacher 2015: 172–176); for a background to Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts, see (Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020: 3–23). 2. In G.H. von Wright’s autobiography, Mitt liv som jag minns det, von Wright describes how the editors usually worked in pairs. He is, however, not explicit about who the main editors of the Remarks were, whereas he is detailed about this for the other volumes they edited (von Wright 2001a: 161). All three editors initially worked on the first edition, but von Wright’s name is first in the printed list of editors. Rhees had suggested that von Wright should appear as the sole editor of the first edition (von Wright to Rhees, 1 July 1955, NLF, vWC 714.200-201). The revision was done by Rhees and von Wright. 3. The synopsis is complete in the sense that it accounts for the most relevant material regarding the revision of the Remarks. It can nevertheless not replace reading the correspondence in its entirety for getting the full-fledged picture of the process. 4. Von Wright to Anscombe, 28 October 1970, NLF, vWC 714.11-12. 5. Von Wright to Anscombe, 28 June 1965, NLF, vWC 714.11-12. Indeed, already for the first edition, at least Anscombe and von Wright had concerns. Anscombe wrote to von Wright: ‘I have just finished translating the MS [. . .] written at the

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turn of 1939–40 & feel rather dubious about it – both in our not having cut it down more, it is so repetitive and dreadfully boring; and in respect of one or two of our very few cuts in it, which seem to me to have been of things essential to some that we have left in’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 4 July 1954, NLF, vWC 714.11-12). And von Wright had been ‘tormented by the question: Do we do the right thing, or not?’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 2 January 1955, NLF, vWC 714.11-12). 6. The correspondence with Suhrkamp becomes quite sour and culminates in von Wright writing to Rhees (10 April 1972) that Suhrkamp must ‘obey orders’ or the trustees will have to consider changing publisher in Germany. The conflict concerns not only the Remarks, but also – and more urgently – Suhrkamp’s handling of the Philosophical Investigations. But this is outside the scope of the current essay. 7. Anscombe had complained about repetitions in the first edition (see Erbacher 2015: 175 and endnote 5). 8. Cf. also endnote 22. 9. Actually, in the letter to Anscombe 27 April 1972, von Wright does not say that it ‘would do more harm than good’. This is the exact wording: ‘I have been looking at the manuscripts from which we selected the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics and comparing the manuscripts with the printed text. We omitted a great deal, perhaps sometimes somewhat arbitrarily, and we took some liberties with the arrangement which I would hesitate to take now. But on the whole I think we did a surprisingly good job – if I may say so in praise of ourselves – and I doubt whether it is possible to produce a substantially different and decidedly better selection. [. . .] Before I started looking at these things again, I was inclined to think that we ought to publish the manuscripts practically as they are, without any omissions. I dare say this will one day happen – and it is worth it. But I doubt whether we should think of this now. I am therefore at present more inclined to favour the idea of a revised but not substantially changed, new edition of the Remarks. [...] It may well happen that I shall have changed many of my present opinions on these matters before we meet!’ In comparison to von Wright’s reaction in 1965, see above, he has now changed his mind about the aptness of the selections the editors made for the first edition. Already in this letter, von Wright worries about the size of the revised volume (more about this below). 10. Von Wright to Rhees, 20 June 1972, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 11. Rhees to von Wright, 8 October 1972, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 12. Rhees to von Wright, 20 October 1972, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 13. These are pages 176–177 of the 1956 edition (Part V, §§ 18–19) with a reference to the bottom of page 153 of the 1956 edition (Part IV, § 42). 14. This material was sent to Elizabeth Anscombe as well, for translation and comments. She suggested that von Wright ought to include one passage that Wittgenstein had crossed out in the manuscript in order to avoid future pseudo-scholarly discoveries (I have not been able to determine which passage it is). After some hesitation, von Wright followed Anscombe’s suggestion. Moreover, von Wright asked her if she thinks they should also include what

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Rhees had left out from MS 164. Von Wright is of the opinion that the ‘writing is stronger ’ with the omissions. Anscombe never replied to this, and Rhees’s omissions remained (as stated on the first page of the preface to the revised edition). See von Wright to Anscombe, 12 December 1972 and 20 February 1973, and Anscombe to von Wright, undated 1972, NLF, vWC 714.11-12. 15. Rhees to von Wright, 28 December 1972, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 16. He has considered some of the earlier omitted ‘Ansätze’ from MS 117, and material from MS 121 and its continuation in MS 162. But not MS 163, probably for the reasons he stated earlier. See below for his final decision. 17. Von Wright to Rhees, 14 February 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. It is noteworthy that Rhees went ahead and added more numbers when adding material to the last part of the Remarks (Part VII of the revised edition). 18. Rhees to von Wright, 16 March 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 19. Rhees to von Wright, 20 March 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 20. Rhees makes the following remark about von Wright’s catalogue in-line with this scepticism about a certain kind of scholarship: ‘In your catalogue you give the last date of ‘der ersten Hälfte’ of 124 as ‘3 July, 1941’. It should be 4 July. Macht nichts. Such matters are the stuff of pseudo-scholarship. Of which we shall have plenty – have already, in fact.’ 21. For a recent discussion of these notes, see (Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020); the book contains complete images, transcripts and translations of Wittgenstein’s annotations (Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020: 261–295). Floyd and Mühlhölzer write that it is especially noteworthy that the comments are done in connection to an established mathematician and to a widely read work (Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020: vii). 22. Rhees to von Wright, 20 March 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. The original selections for the 1956 edition were made by the three editors. The manuscripts were discussed with Georg Kreisel (Georg Kreisel to von Wright, 29 January 1952, NLF, vWC 714.117-118; all letters referred to below in this Collection). In a letter to von Wright, Kreisel comments on Wittgenstein’s remarks on Gödel (from memory since he did not have the manuscript at hand, but the discussion relates to some earlier comments he had made in direct connection to Wittgenstein’s manuscript). Kreisel starts that section with ‘Wittgenstein on Gödel: (‘Suppose someone asks my advice. . .’)’, and continues by saying that he does not think that Wittgenstein had read more than the introduction of Gödel’s paper and that therefore Wittgenstein did not see that the prose of Gödel’s introduction allows for interpretations that the technical work of the rest of the paper does not (letter from Kreisel to von Wright, 27 October 1951). Wittgenstein’s critique, according to Kreisel, is therefore misinformed. Kreisel was invited to the meeting in Austria in the summer of 1952, 24 June to 10 July, where the editors first worked on the manuscripts for the Remarks (letter from von Wright to Kreisel, 10 March 1952). Kreisel accepted the invitation, but as far as I have been able to determine, he ended up not participating for personal and for other reasons (Kreisel to von Wright, 29 January 1952, 25 April 1952, 19 May 1952 and 27 June 1952; letter to Kreisel from von Wright, 10 March 1952; cf. also Kruskopf 2008: 302–303). He did, however, send the

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trustees some comments via mail to Austria (Kreisel to von Wright, 27 June 1952). Kreisel’s infamous 1958 review of the Remarks (Kreisel 1958) was sent to von Wright before it was published, to which von Wright replied; see Discussion below. In light of this, it is somewhat remarkable that Kreisel has said that he was unaware at the time of writing the review that the trustees had made selections from the manuscripts (Kanamori 2020). Kreisel’s review of the revised edition twenty years later is more moderate, yet dismissive, and with no mention of any differences between the first and the revised edition (Kreisel 1979). – Regarding A. R. Andersson, see endnote 49. 23. This photocopy has not been found in The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives. It is unclear if Rhees ever sent it to von Wright, although he mentions that he might do so in the letter. The selection of passages that Rhees wanted to include have also not been found in the archives. It is possible that this is the photocopy stored at Trinity College (see further Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020: 23–24). Wittgenstein’s copy of Hardy’s book has been lost. 24. Rhees to von Wright, 20 March 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 25. Rhees to von Wright, 20 March 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. Paul Bernays had written a critical review of the Remarks (Bernays 1959). See also endnote 22. 26. Von Wright to Rhees, 29 March 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 27. Rhees to von Wright, 4 April 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. For a note on this in relation to other Wittgenstein interpretations, phenomenology and logic, see (Solin 2018). 28. Rhees to von Wright, 4 April 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 29. Von Wright to Rhees, 12 April 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 30. The letter from Rhees to von Wright where Rhees suggests this is lost. That he did suggest this, however, is evident from a letter from von Wright to Rhees (von Wright to Rhees, 1 July 1955, NLF, vWC 714.200-201). 31. Rhees to von Wright, 12 October 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 32. Von Wright to Rhees, 15 October 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 33. Rhees to von Wright, 2 January 1974, WWA, Wri-FC-005. Indeed, already for the first edition, the publishers had made the spaces too small in Rhees’s opinion, and he hoped this would corrected in the future (Rhees to von Wright, 11 January 1956, NLF, vWC 714.200-201). 34. Rhees to von Wright, 17 January 1974, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 35. Rhees to von Wright, 25 January 1974, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 36. Rhees to von Wright, 25 January 1974, WWA, Wri-FC-005. In the revised edition, this is § 64 of Part VII; in the first edition § 43 of Part V. 37. Von Wright to Rhees, 29 March 1974, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 38. Rhees to von Wright, 9 April 1974, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 39. Von Wright to Anscombe, 23 October 1974, NLF, vWC 714.11-12. For adjustments of earlier translations, compare, for example, Part V, § 16 and § 25, of the third edition with the corresponding paragraphs in the two earlier editions. Anscombe’s translation is sometimes misleading, see (Floyd and Mühlhölzer 2020); von Wright might have been aware of this, since he – in

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addition to frequently asking Anscombe about her progress – politely suggested that Anscombe let herself be assisted by Linda McAlister, then a graduate student at Cornell University with ‘a good knowledge of Wittgenstein’s philosophy’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 2 April 1974, NLF, vWC 714.11-12). See also Joel Backström’s chapter in this book. 40. Blackwell wanted to sell all remaining copies of the second edition before publishing the new one. This is probably a reason for the delay, in addition to the time that the actual editing and typesetting took. Cf. Rhees to von Wright, 20 March 1973 and 3 June 1973, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 41. Compare PI §108. 42. In the Rhees Nachlass in Swansea, there are fragments of a fictional dialogue between Rhees and Wittgenstein, which Rhees has typed up. It is dated 29 April 1978. The dialogue concerns society and changing ones of ways of thinking and living. It is unclear to me if what Wittgenstein says is quoted from manuscripts, recalled by Rhees, or made up by Rhees. But I believe that that this fragment is at least an indication that Rhees in a sense continued his dialogue with Wittgenstein, and saw himself as furthering Wittgenstein’s thinking, rather than having an emphasis on neutrally delivering his Nachlass to the world. Erbacher has described Rhees’s editorial style as ‘co-creational’ (Erbacher 2020: 23–24). 43. Von Wright to Georg Kreisel, 10 March 1952, NLF, vWC 714.117-118. 44. Rhees to Anthony Kenny, 2 March 1977, WWA, Wri-FC-005. 45. Von Wright himself has described himself as ‘a philosopher who, over a period of almost sixty years, has at close quarters been watching and also, to some extent, participated in the development of logic’ (von Wright 1994b: 9). Formal, symbolic logic is what von Wright means by ‘logic’, and it was in that ‘spirit of modernity’ that he had been trained in logic. For a discussion illuminating this, see Bernt Österman’s chapter in this book. 46. Von Wright to Georg Kreisel, 16 January 1958, NLF, vWC 714.117-118. 47. Kreisel says the following in a letter to von Wright, 20 January 1958: ‘But with all proper respect I must say this: I find the first impression of Wittgenstein’s writing very stimulating and exciting, but on most topics on which I have thought myself, I find his thought disappointingly dull, dead and weak. This is in marked contrast to my experience with, say, Bernays or Gödel, whose thoughts I appreciate all the more if I have thought about the same topics myself ’. It is the same attitude, but from the other side, that Errett Bishop reported: ‘People tell me in so many words that when I was proving theorems I was doing something worthwhile; but when I started to think about philosophical questions, I could not possibly be doing anything deep’ (Bishop 1975: 514–515). 48. Compare also what Rhees says in a letter to Drury (19 November 1967, quoted in Citron 2015: 39): ‘In writing on mathematics, he [Wittgenstein] would invent different number systems, different ways of counting, and point to circumstances in which it would be more natural to use some such system of counting rather than our system of natural numbers. When you see the cardinal numbers in the setting of — or surrounded by — these other possibilities, then

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you may cease to feel that our system of cardinal numbers is fundamental in some way.’ 49. In his autobiography, von Wright writes that during his years as professor in Cambridge (1948–1951), Kreisel was often a guest at their house. Although Kreisel was ‘intelligent and entertaining in conversation’, von Wright later became distant to him because of his love-hate attitude towards Wittgenstein, their former teacher (von Wright 2001a: 129). A. R. Anderson was von Wright’s student at Cambridge University 1950–1952, and later became a famous modal logician. Von Wright writes that while he was professor in Cambridge, Kreisel and Anderson were two of his four most important discussion partners (von Wright 2001a: 149). It is likely that Wittgenstein’s manuscripts were discussed with Anderson, too. Like Kreisel, Anderson wrote a critical review of the Remarks (Kreisel 1958 and Anderson 1958). In his review, Anderson criticized Wittgenstein’s remarks on contradiction, including the remark that von Wright quoted in 1991 (see above). Rhees’s comments about Kreisel’s and Anderson’s inability to understand Wittgenstein’s ideas must have come very close to home for von Wright. 50. From conversation with Raimond Gaita, Turku, Finland, autumn 2018. Gaita recalled Rhees’s behaviour in seminars at King’s College, London, and how the other senior participants (including Peter Winch) would let Rhees speak without arguing against him, since otherwise he would simply defer and go quiet; the others were interested in what Rhees had to say. 51. There may be another significant aspect of the spacing. Alois Pichler has suggested to me (private correspondence, August 2022) that when Wittgenstein wrote remarks of philosophical clarification he usually separated them by one or more blank lines, whereas when he was working towards composition of philosophical works he often reduces or even omits them. The editors do not, as far as I know, discuss this, and I have not been able to determine if they were aware of it. How this relates to the Remarks would deserve further study. 52. Rhees was not satisfied with von Wright’s preface for the 1956 edition and wanted to comment on it, but he was unable to meet the deadline (Rhees to von Wright, 14 November 1955, NLF, vWC 714.200-201). If Rhees had been able to get his act together, the preface would perhaps have had a similar character to the preface he wrote to The Blue and Brown Books, a preface that von Wright and others very much appreciated (see letter from von Wright to Rhees, 31 January 1963, in the collection mentioned above). In the preface to The Blue and Brown Books, Rhees describes and reflects upon Wittgenstein’s questions and methods, which is very illuminating indeed. Strangely enough, Rhees cut down the preface to the German edition of The Blue and Brown Books (Suhrkamp 1970) to something more similar to von Wright’s preface to the Remarks. I have not been able to determine if the initiative to the cut came from Rhees himself or from Suhrkamp. 53. David Stern notes already in 1994 (so before the Bergen Electronic Edition) that the published volumes have left out much that is ‘extremely valuable’ (Stern 1994: 436). He also notes that in the Remarks a ‘large number of passages have been omitted’ (Stern 1994: 443). Stern’s idea is that the publication of the Nachlass ‘will have a substantial impact on our understanding

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of Wittgenstein’. In a sense, this is true and has been the case, of course. But as Rhees points out in a letter to von Wright (Rhees to von Wright, 22 January 1976, WWA, Wri-FC-005) it is nevertheless the case that ‘it is impossible to tell anyone what Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is, if [she] has made no long or serious study of what Wittgenstein has written. It would have been impossible for Wittgenstein himself to do this. [Wittgenstein’s remarks] can have force or sense only against the Hintergrund of the philosophizing which Wittgenstein does, or has done. Wittgenstein used to say something in this sense to people who wanted to come to his lectures. It is why he used (for example) to speak of the work of philosophy as the work of changing one’s way of looking at things, durch lange Übung.’ 54. I am grateful to Juliet Floyd and Felix Mühlhölzer for comments on this essay.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Naked, Please! Elizabeth Anscombe as Translator and Editor of Wittgenstein JOEL BACKSTR Ö M

1. INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses Elizabeth Anscombe’s work as translator and editor of Wittgenstein’s writings. I provide information about what she did and what she said about it – a central source for this is her unpublished correspondence with fellow literary executor G.H. von Wright – and discuss the possible philosophical significance of her translating and editorial choices.1 Sections 2–3 are devoted to Anscombe’s role as translator. Section 4 characterizes her general approach to editing Wittgenstein, with her ideal of ‘naked editions’ and ‘minimum editing’. Sections 5–6 briefly look at two case studies, the controversial ‘Part II’ of Philosophical Investigations and the editing of Wittgenstein’s last writings from 1949–1951. Sections 7–8 discuss the suppression of the coded entries in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914-1916.

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2. QUESTIONS OF STYLE Wittgenstein wrote primarily in German. Anscombe’s single most significant contribution to the Wittgenstein-reception in the English-speaking world may well be her translations of his texts, starting with the Philosophical Investigations in 1953.2 She gave Wittgenstein his English writer’s voice, which he himself, in his exile, had never found, for ‘fluent and idiomatic as Wittgenstein’s spoken English was, he found his thoughts cramped by writing in English’ (Geach 1988, xv).3 This achievement is often overlooked, however. The first and some later editions of the Investigations were bilingual, but most English-language readers know the Philosophische Untersuchungen only in translation, and because its sound is so natural, yet forcefully its own, people take Anscombe’s rendering of his words to be Wittgenstein himself speaking.4 This, in a way, is the ultimate achievement of translation: giving the text a life and place of its own in the new language and culture so strong that people forget it originated elsewhere.5 This very success can create problems, however, disposing readers to overlook the translator and uncritically accept the translation. Generally speaking, texts don’t have a single correct translation, but as Lawrence Venuti points out, in philosophy, ‘widespread dependence on translated texts coincides with neglect of their translated status’, where ‘the differences introduced by the fact of translation’ are overlooked (1998, 106). The response to the publication of the Investigations in 1953 is a case in point: Very few of the fifteen or so reviews that greeted it even mentioned the quality of [Anscombe’s] translating, and in these instances the comments were extremely brief, restricted to vague honorifics like “excellent,” “well done,” “on the whole very successful and reliable,” “adequate and honest” (Nakhnikian 1954:353; Workman 1955:293; Hampshire 1953:682; Findlay 1955:179). [. . .] Because of the negligible attention paid to Anscombe’s translation, criticisms were very slow in coming. [. . .W]hen they finally appeared, they continued to assume correspondence as the criterion of accuracy, an assumption that proved to be rather disingenuous because it concealed competing domestic interpretations of the German text. —Venuti 1998, 107 We will return to the question of competing domestic, i.e. philosophical, interpretations in the next section. As for honorifics, Anscombe herself confessed, when she had just finished translating the Investigations in 1953,

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that it was ‘horribly difficult to translate’, and doubted ‘whether much of a reflection of its style would be possible in English at all’; ‘at any rate’, she said, ‘it was not possible for me to achieve it. [. . .] All I could do, therefore, was to produce as careful a crib as possible’ (Erbacher, dos Santos Reis and Jung 2019, 238–239).6 The style of the Investigations has, she says, ‘a special daylight character: tough, lucid, crisp, lively and serious’, akin to that of ‘Lessing, Lichtenberg, Frege’ (Erbacher, dos Santos Reis and Jung 2019, 233). In addition to the conciseness of the text – ‘I bent over backwards to write in a spare and compressed English, since the German is spare and compressed’ (Erbacher, dos Santos Reis and Jung 2019, 239) – she thought the main difficulty in rendering Wittgenstein’s style into English was that, In general, German has possibilities of a homeliness – the very epithet sounds horrid in connexion with English – that is not in the [slightest] in conflict with the highest literary style. [. . .] Wittgenstein’s German is at once highly literary and highly colloquial. Good English, in modern times, goes in good clothes; to introduce colloquialism, or slang, is deliberately to adopt a low style. Any English style that I can imagine would be a misrepresentation of this German. —Erbacher, dos Santos Reis and Jung 2019, 238–239 A writer’s style may indeed be more or less untranslatable, as different languages are no more simply convertible than the lives in which they belong and which they help form. Here, one should consider both the cultural and the personal dimension of style – and a text transcends the category of mere genre-product precisely to the extent that the writer is personally present in it, so that one hears his voice in it. About the style of the Investigations, Anscombe further notes that, while the ‘constant characteristics of Wittgenstein’s writing are close reasoning and strong imagination’, [T]he book has also the character of great variety of tone: this is a rare character, and particularly rare in philosophical writing. (The only other examples I can think of are some of Plato’s dialogues). You get long passages of very sober, straightforward enquiry and argument; then a burst of breathless dialogue (always, of course, between himself and himself); sudden turn of humour, passages full of passionate feeling; pronouncements reached after perplexed enquiry, which have the air of being written with that feeling: And that settles everything; pieces of delicate, accurate characterisation of some particular temptation; remarks that are like a grasp [sic!] or cry of realisation. And you get certain themes, certain moods recurring [. . .] with different variations. I have long been

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tempted to compare this book with a musical composition; but hesitated to do so, until I found it elicited this reaction independently from someone who read it de novo. —Erbacher, dos Santos Reis and Jung 2019, 2397 Now, a certain, quite typical sort of analytical philosopher might respond to all this: ‘Alright, so Wittgenstein was a writer of great skill and style, but what counts philosophically is whether the problems discussed are interesting, and the arguments presented in dealing with them valid.’8 Anscombe’s characterizations, however, are not of Wittgenstein’s style or writing as opposed to his thinking, but of the thinking itself, of how it lives and moves. Thinking is no mere anonymous play of signs; it happens when someone asks a question or engages with an argument, brings an issue alive by bringing himself into his struggle with it. It is in that struggle for clarity that one grasps the sense and import of the issues, what it really is in them that concerns one, tempts and bewilders one; how one has put one’s life, and perhaps one’s fear of life, into them. Formulating arguments and objections is of no avail in itself, for even if formally valid, these might still be shallow and misleading, failing, as Wittgenstein says, to grasp the difficulty ‘at the root, where the life is’ [‘an ihrer Wurzel, wo das Leben ist’] (MS 107, 81). The point is not to express some ‘personal view’, if that is meant to contrast with simply saying something true and important. On the contrary, one will be speaking personally in the relevant sense insofar as one manages to say something true. As Wittgenstein said, ‘Someone who does not lie is original enough’ (CV, 68). If a philosopher’s own voice cannot be heard in the text, this is because it is overtaken by a collective, depersonalized voice of one kind or other: jargon, the ‘spirit of the times’, the gestures of affectation and thoughtlessness, perhaps very ‘academic’ or ‘deep’ gestures, masquerading as ‘thinking’. As Wittgenstein says, a philosopher must fight against the temptation to become ‘a citizen of any community of ideas’ (Z §455; cf. Backström 2011, 739 ff.). When Wittgenstein worries about the style of his writing – Anscombe quotes him saying, ‘I spend more time than you perhaps could ever understand, thinking about questions of style’ (Erbacher, dos Santos Reis and Jung 2019, 237) – I believe he is thinking about problems of this kind, about the difficulty of speaking, thinking, for and as oneself, and to the extent that this is so, ‘rendering his style’ in translation is a central philosophical task.9 While readers generally have taken Anscombe’s translation to heart, there have been dissenting voices – starting, as we saw, with Anscombe herself in 1953. Marjorie Perloff says that ‘for those of us who are native Austrian German-speakers’, Wittgenstein in English translation ‘often seems to distort what are in the original colloquial speech patterns and conversational

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rhythms’ (2011, 714). In her view, Anscombe’s translation ‘frequently’ turns ‘Wittgenstein’s commonsense discussion of the way “ordinary” language works [. . .] with some inaccuracy [. . .] into a curiously stilted English’ (2012, 75). There is a German and an English side to this criticism. Anscombe’s not being a native German-speaker seems indeed to have caused her to sometimes miss rhythms, but also more mundane nuances of meaning, and she was herself aware of the problem.10 Regarding the quality of her English renderings, as distinct from their accuracy as translations of the German, I would note two things. First, Anscombe knew first-hand a particular idiolect of English unknown to most readers of Wittgenstein’s works: Wittgenstein’s spoken English. To be sure, she couldn’t simply turn his spoken into written English any more than he himself could, but might not some words and turns of speech Perloff finds stilted have come naturally from Wittgenstein’s lips, or pen?11 Anscombe also, of course, knew Wittgenstein’s philosophizing firsthand, from lectures and conversations, and she had discussed details of the translation of the Investigations with him, even if this seems to have been before she undertook the translation of the whole text for publication: In 1946 I decided to learn German [. . .] I told Wittgenstein, and he said ‘Oh, I am very glad, for if you learn German, then I can give you my book to read’. This had been my hope, and it spurred me on. [. . .] We eventually read the early part of the Investigations [. . .] As we read it we discussed translating it – he would explain the import of words, and I would suggest an English rendering, about which he would be very enthusiastic. (I don’t know if I remembered any of these when I came to translate the book for its publication in 1953.) —Anscombe, Anecdotes, 46–4712 Translation is an art of its own and each text a challenge of its own, and even the closest association with Wittgenstein wouldn’t ensure ability to translate him well; thus, the first attempt at translating the Investigations, by Rush Rhees, was aborted by a dissatisfied Wittgenstein in 1938 (cf. Pichler 2019). Nonetheless, Anscombe’s sense of Wittgenstein’s way of expressing himself doubtless had dimensions that would not be there in a translator, however good otherwise, who had not known Wittgenstein personally. To conclude this section, let’s return once more to the question of personal style, and how this affects judgements of quality in writing and translating. Anthony Kenny says of Anscombe as a philosophical writer in her own right that her husband Peter Geach was ‘much the better writer’ (2019a, 20), as though there was a self-evident criterion for this. John Haldane, for his part, speaks of ‘the common experience of [Geach’s] work as being a delight to

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read and of [Anscombe’s] as inducing the sense of being dragged through a dense forest by a powerful solitary animal as it simultaneously avoids predators and pursues prey’ (2019b, 86). I find the image apt, but if someone thinks and writes like that, what sense does it make to fault the writing for not being ‘good’; the writing fits the thinking, fits the writing animal’s movements, so why should it, and how could it, be different?13 And might one not view Anscombe’s achievement as a translator of Wittgenstein not just as a sensitive rendering of the author’s style by the translator, but also as one forceful style, one powerful animal, meeting another?

3. THE SOUL OF A WORD In 2009, Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte brought out a revised, bilingual edition of the Philosophical Investigations. In their Editorial Preface, they say that because of ‘the excellence of the Anscombe translation’, the book presents not a new, but ‘a modified translation, rectifying any errors or misjudgements we discerned in hers’ (2009a, viii). One criticism they make of Anscombe’s translation concerns her rendering of Seele in Wittgenstein’s text. I want to briefly discuss this, to illustrate how apparent details of translation can both have important implications with regard to, and be influenced by, how one approaches the philosophical questions at issue. Hacker and Schulte note that the word Seele ‘cannot always be correctly rendered by “soul” ’; they say that Anscombe was ‘clearly aware of the problem, and in many remarks rightly opted for “mind” as a correct translation’ but criticize her because ‘in some remarks she questionably opted for “soul” ’ (2009a, xiv). The prime exhibit for their case is PI §283, which Anscombe rendered: And can one say of the stone that it has a soul and that is what has the pain? What has a soul, or pain, to do with a stone? Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains. For one has to say it of a body, or, if you like of a soul which some body has. And how can a body have a soul? Hacker and Schulte regard this rendering as obviously mistaken. In their view, ‘it is clear that the discussion concerns mind and body’; ‘what is at issue is mind, not soul, and the problems of mind and body, not of the soul and the body’ (2009a, xiv–xv). Hence, they render the passage: ‘And can one say of the stone that it has a mind, and that is what has the pain . . .’, etc. By contrast, in the oft-quoted string of remarks starting with ‘My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul’ (PI, II:iv, 178 / Wittgenstein 2009,

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Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment, §22), Hacker and Schulte retain Anscombe’s ‘soul’. They say that this is because in the next remark Wittgenstein writes, ‘Religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated’, which they think shows that here it is ‘primarily the soul that is under discussion’ (2009a, xv). In the remark following on that, which Anscombe rendered ‘If the picture of thought in the head can force itself upon us, then why not much more that of thought in the soul?’, Hacker and Schulte change the ending to ‘. . .that of thoughts in the mind or soul’, but in the last occurrence of Seele in these remarks, they revert to only ‘soul’ again: ‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul’ (PI, II:iv, 178 / Wittgenstein 2009, Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment, §25). Now, I wonder: why this last choice? And why, indeed, the first one? Suppose Wittgenstein hadn’t said anything about religion in this context; would it then have been alright, as Hacker and Schulte seem to imply, to have: ‘My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a mind’ and ‘The human body is the best picture of the human mind’? Hardly. It wouldn’t just have ‘ruined the rhetorical effect’, but made nonsense of the whole thing, insofar as ‘mind’ has connotations of things to do with the intellect, while the connotations of ‘soul’ are different and wider, as comes out, e.g. in Wittgenstein’s remark: ‘Anyone with a soul [Seele] must be capable of pain, joy, grief, etc. etc. And if he is also to be capable of memory, of making decisions, of making a plan for something, with this he needs linguistic expression’ (LW2, 67). The soul, this remark seems to suggest, ‘comes before’ (and remains after the advent of) the mind, insofar as ‘the mind’ is used to name our conceptually mediated intelligence. And, importantly in our context, the ‘life of the mind’ doesn’t have a physiognomy, isn’t characteristically expressed in the face, pose, gestures, tone of voice, etc., in the way the movements of the soul (joy, grief, etc.) are. It is no coincidence that people often imagine the mind as a kind of computer; while that analogy quickly breaks down when one actually tries to apply it, the point is that nobody would even try comparing the soul to a computer, a machine (whereas many have of course said that we have no soul at all, we’re simply biological machines). When Wittgenstein asks himself what ‘a human who had no soul [Seele]’ would be like, he says he can only picture a human-like body that ‘acts like an automaton [. . .] like a machine’; in whose features one could not, for instance, see ‘a suffering look’ (LW2, 66–67). Hacker and Schulte don’t really think, of course, that in the famous ‘My attitude towards him . . .’-remark Wittgenstein has suddenly inserted a brief discussion of ‘philosophy of religion’, quite unrelated to his discussions of the so-called ‘mind-body problem’ in the rest of the Investigations. But how, then, are they so certain that in the passage about the stone feeling pain, and

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others like it, they were right to exchange ‘soul’ for ‘mind’ on the strength of the claim that those passages are about ‘the problems of mind and body, not of the soul and the body’ (2009a, xiv–xv)? For the passages we have just considered (‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul’, etc.) evidently discuss the same problem. Or rather, I would suggest, they tend to unsettle the whole notion that we know what the problems and disquietudes that go into making that supposed ‘problem’, really are. Expressing essentially the same view of the matter as Hacker and Schulte, Saul Kripke said that ‘ “mind” might be a less misleading translation of “Seele” ’ in the ‘My attitude towards him . . .’-remark, ‘since for the contemporary English speaking philosophical reader it is somewhat less loaded with special philosophical and religious connotations’ (1982, 49 [text to footnote 31]). But speaking of the mind doesn’t have fewer connotations, just different ones; specifically, ‘mind’ suggests to philosophers that we are not talking about anything ‘spiritual’ or otherwise challenging to the so-called ‘scientific world-view’, while also hiding from view the fact that any special suggestion has been made. This creates a false assurance that ‘Wittgenstein is writing about the problem contemporary English speaking philosophers call “the problem of other minds” ’ (Kripke 1982, 127 [text to footnote 11]) – that is, writing about it in a way that doesn’t dissolve or transfigure the supposed problem into something quite different.14 Translating is akin to philosophizing insofar as, wittingly or unwittingly, the choice of words, along with tone and style, connects a passage with other passages, thoughts and situations, not just in the translated work but in others and in our life-experience, while severing connections with yet others, or making them harder to detect. What is the philosophical importance of the countless connections and contrasts between different uses of words such as ‘soul’, ‘mind’, ‘spirit’, ‘intellect’ and their derivatives? What is the contrast between ‘soulfulness’ and ‘mindfulness’, say, or between ‘losing one’s mind’ and ‘losing one’s soul’, and what does our marking such contrasts reveal about our life? Again, what would be the differences between our language and one ‘in whose use the “soul” of the words played no part’, in which, e.g. ‘we had no objection to replacing one word by another arbitrary one’ (PI §530)? How is this connected to the way that, for us, words can be ‘charged with [. . .] desire’, ‘hard to say’, or ‘wrung from us, – like a cry’ (PI §546)? And how is ‘soul’ related to ‘life’? Is it mere theoretical posit, or again mere metaphor, to speak of ‘the soul of a daffodil’, as Anscombe does in one of her own papers, meaning thereby, like Aristotle, the principle or form of the daffodil’s particular life (1985, 20)? When we say that sunflowers ‘turn their faces to the sun’ (Anscombe 1985, 22), are we then simply speaking in metaphor? They don’t turn their faces exactly as we do, for example not in

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anticipation of an imagined event (Anscombe 1985, 22), but does that mean that what they do is ‘simply causal’ or, on the other hand, that when we turn our faces to the warm sun, we do something completely different? The answers to such questions are not clear but need investigating – not because details and nuances of language-use would be important in themselves, but because what can superficially appear mere details may reveal central grammatical distinctions and connections that give our life its shape and find their sense in that shape. As Wittgenstein says, philosophy is ‘not a description of language usage, and yet one can learn it by constantly attending to all the expressions of life in the language’ (LW1, §121; cf. PI §254). In light of this, the confidence Hacker and Schulte display about the ‘correct’ translation of Seele appears to reveal not only a problematic understanding of translation but an attitude at odds with the spirit of Wittgenstein’s work in philosophy. The underlying, really problematic ‘translation’ is rewriting Wittgenstein in the ‘language’ of standard academic philosophy, in terms of its preconceptions of what belongs with what, how questions are to be framed and answered. In M. O’C Drury words, this assimilates Wittgenstein’s writings ‘into the very intellectual milieu they were largely a warning against’ (Drury to Rhees, Spring 1966; quoted in Erbacher 2019b, 135). What academic philosopher would say, as Wittgenstein did (Wittgenstein 2003, 147 [MS 183, 139]): ‘My soul [Seele] is more naked than that of most people & in that consists so to speak my genius’.15

4. NAKED EDITIONS Let’s now move to a discussion of Anscombe work as editor, rather than translator, of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. She sums up her basic attitude in her paradoxical declaration to fellow-editor von Wright: ‘I don’t believe in editing!’(Anscombe to von Wright, undated 1976, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). This is in reference to the work the two were then doing on publishing the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology [RPP]. In a later letter, she explains: ‘I don’t [. . .] want to make any groupings of the material, as in RFM [Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics]. As you know, I favour minimum editing’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 26 June 1976, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). The experience with the RFM, first published 1956, had left both of them wary of producing books containing selections from various manuscripts and typescripts. With the exception of ‘Part I’ of RFM, which contains a selection of remarks made and worked over by Wittgenstein himself, that book is, in Anscombe’s words, ‘really [. . .] “only remarks” [. . .] a mere selection [made by the editors], preserving chronological order, from Wittgenstein’s first-draft notebooks’ ([1969] 2011, 191). Already as she was

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translating the selected passages for RFM, Anscombe had doubts about the rightness of their editorial decisions: ‘I have just finished translating the MS [. . .] written at the turn of 1939-40 & feel rather dubious about it – both in our not having cut it down more, it is so repetitive and dreadfully boring; and in respect of one or two of our very few cuts in it, which seem to me to have been of things essential to some that we have left in’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 4 July 1954, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). Von Wright had similar doubts, and they didn’t want to make the same mistake again.16 The Zettel, edited by Anscombe and von Wright jointly and published in 1967, contained a selection of remarks, but Wittgenstein himself had made the selection; as the editors surmised, because he regarded those remarks as ‘particularly useful and intended to weave [them] into finished work if places for them should appear’ (Z, Preface).17 von Wright, of course, did bring out a selection of ‘general’ remarks from across the Nachlass specially made by him, not Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen/Culture and Value, in 1977/1980, but the other books von Wright and Anscombe co-edited – the Notebooks 1914-1916 (1961), On Certainty (1969) and RPP I & II (1980) – and the one volume Anscombe edited alone, Remarks on Colour (1977), reproduced manuscripts or typescripts in whole, or in large parts, according to the ‘minimum editing’-policy Anscombe favoured. As we shall see, however, to speak of ‘minimum editing’ here may be quite misleading, as significant and controversial omissions of material and decisions about what to put together into a particular book were involved. Nonetheless, the fact that Anscombe speaks of ‘minimum editing’ does indicate an important difference between her editorial approach and that of the third of the original literary executors, Rush Rhees.18 Rhees denied having an ‘editorial policy’ – ‘Unless this be one: In any editing I have done I have asked myself again and again what Wittgenstein would have wanted. This has guided me in what I have decided to leave out and in what I have decided to include’ (quoted in Erbacher 2019b, 116; cf. Rhees 1996, 56). Rhees thought that, thanks to his long familiarity with Wittgenstein and his ways of working (Erbacher 2019b, 117; cf. Rhees 1996, 57), he could make – of course not infallibly – the judgements necessary to reconstruct, out of Wittgenstein’s MS-materials from the 1930s, editions that would make the development of his thinking perspicuous. This ‘genetic’ or ‘co-creative’ editing approach (Erbacher, Jung & Seibel 2017, 109; Erbacher 2019b, 127), resulted in editions – particularly Philosophical Grammar (1969) – that were controversial, and were criticized for what appeared an arbitrary and opaque editing-style (see Erbacher 2019b). Rhees thought, however, that people would not properly ‘begin to appreciate the Untersuchungen until they see the discussion from which it has come. It would not be enough, just to print it together with

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the Tractatus. This would suggest that the relation between them is much simpler than in fact it is. People would still not guess the magnitude of the development which there has been. They would not see – as they do not see – what has happened: they would not see what the Untersuchungen are saying’ (Rhees to von Wright, 5 Sept. 1962, NLF, COLL.714.200-201). I will not discuss Rhees’s editing work further here; I simply want to mark the contrast with Anscombe’s approach. She underlined that, far from having any deep insight into Wittgenstein’s way of thinking, she didn’t really understand him, and her experience was that ‘[p]redictions of “what Wittgenstein would say” about some question one thought of were never correct’ (1995, 169). In a letter to Paul Engelmann, in 1958, she wrote: I must confess that I feel deeply suspicious of anyone’s claim to have understood Wittgenstein. That is perhaps because, although I had a very strong and deep affection for him, and, I suppose, knew him well, I am very sure that I did not understand him. It is difficult, I think, not to give a version of his attitudes, for example, which one can enter into oneself, and then the account is really of oneself: is for example infected with one’s own mediocrity or ordinariness or lack of complexity. . . —Quoted in Engelmann 1968, xiv This sense of incomprehension didn’t just concern Wittgenstein the man, but, insofar as these can be separated at all, his philosophy, and particularly his later thought; an incomprehension confessed to despite of, or rather as a result of Anscombe’s long and intense engagement with, and deep knowledge of, that thought.19 Given this self-confessed lack of clear understanding of the ultimate aim or sense of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, adopting a ‘minimum editing’-policy seems sensible. What else could one do but publish the texts as they stand? However, it is by no means self-evident what ‘publishing the texts as they stand’ amounts to, exactly. Anscombe didn’t consider the idea of simply publishing all of the Nachlass, an idea first broached by von Wright in 1965.20 Furthermore, she didn’t want to produce scholarly, text-critical editions; her ideal, instead, was what she called naked editions; ‘I regard the nakedness of our editions of Wittgenstein as an advantage’, she wrote to von Wright (Anscombe to von Wright, undated 1977, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). By that, she seems to have meant books presenting Wittgenstein’s manuscripts or typescripts unburdened by an apparatus of editorial notes, commentaries, etc.21 Such an editorial approach certainly has its attractions. The kind of detailed scrutiny to which scholars subject texts, which text-critical editions with their apparatus serve, has its special importance, but it is only because

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people read texts for other reasons – primarily philosophical reasons, in this case – that anyone has any interest in also finding out the kinds of things scholars can tell us about them. The ‘naked’ editions of Wittgenstein that Anscombe and her fellow editors produced are slender and so manageable volumes, relatively cheap to buy, easy to bring along on trips, etc. In short, they are books to live and think with; books of the kind that make a philosopher easily available to the public, not just to scholars. However, just as with successful translations, the apparent ‘naturalness’ of the texts thus produced may itself come to hamper and skew understanding if readers uncritically accept as ‘Wittgenstein’s writings’ texts that actually, unavoidably, result from contestable editorial decisions about what to present together within the covers of one book, and how. There are questions to ask about how ‘naked’ the editions Anscombe produced really were, and how ‘minimal’ the editing that went into making them. I will discuss one case, that of the Notebooks, in depth, after considering two others more briefly: Wittgenstein’s last writings from 1949–1951, published as OC, ROC and LW2, and the case of ‘Part II’ of the Investigations.

5. THE CONTROVERSY OVER PI, ‘PART II’ The Philosophical Investigations, as edited by Anscombe and Rhees in 1953, consisted of two parts: 693 numbered remarks in ‘Part I’ and close to 60 pages of unnumbered remarks in ‘Part II’. In their Note, the editors say that, had Wittgenstein ‘published his work himself, he would have suppressed a good deal of what is in the last thirty pages or so of “Part I” and worked what is in “Part II”, with further material, into its place’. It has been claimed, however, most influentially by Hacker and Schulte in their 2009 revised edition of the Investigations, that including ‘Part II’ (that is, MS 144/the now lost TS 234) in the book was an unjustifiable editorial sleight of hand. In their revised edition, the same material (with minor revisions) is still included for historical reasons, but only as a kind of appendix under the title ‘Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment’. ‘Whatever Wittgenstein’s final intentions were’, Hacker and Schulte write, ‘the fact is that the closest he ever came to completing the Philosophical Investigations is the current text consisting of §§1–693’, and ‘[r]eaders of Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment will be well advised to bear in mind that what we have there, unlike the Investigations, is work in progress’ (2009b, xxiii; x). As far as I can see, however, Hacker and Schulte provide no decisive arguments against regarding ‘Part II’ as a legitimate part of the Investigations, even if they raise an important question.22 ‘Part I’ clearly has – at least in part; we will return to this qualification – a very different character from ‘Part II’, insofar as the earlier parts of the book

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have been worked over, arranged and rearranged much more extensively by Wittgenstein than the material in ‘Part II’. Anscombe and Rhees never denied this; their claim was not that the material in ‘Part II’ was a finished piece of writing, but that Wittgenstein would have worked it into a partly rewritten ‘Part I’. What their Editorial Note underlines is thus the fact that, contrary to Hacker and Schulte’s claim, even ‘Part I’ was still ‘work in progress’. Anscombe, like many other commentators, emphasizes that Wittgenstein attached extreme importance to the right arrangement of his material. While the Investigations, she says, ‘does not finish with a topic’ but rather ‘zigzags back to old themes in the context of new subject matter’, it is arranged in a ‘coherent and intelligible order’, with ‘natural’ transitions from one large discussion to the next; ‘One is much more likely to be jolted and puzzled by the transition from one Bemerkung to the next, both being on the very same point, than by the transition to a different subject matter – and in such cases, puzzlement can usually be resolved by philosophical reflection’ ([1969] 2011, 189–190). She reports that Wittgenstein ‘expressed a particular dissatisfaction to [her] in Dublin in 1949’ with regard to the last 150 remarks or so of ‘Part I’, adding “I would like my whole book, if it could be, to be only so thick!’ [. . .] holding his finger and thumb about a quarter of an inch apart’ ([1969] 2011, 189–190). Anscombe thought one can see why in the text; ‘It is only in the last 150 Bemerkungen that I find some jerky transitions of topic: for example, the introduction at §547 of “negation as mental activity” [. . .] In these last 150 Bemerkungen one has the impression that the author had sought the best arrangement he could make of these materials rather than that he was traversing zigzag paths [as he says in the Preface] because this was the journey through the “wide field of thought” that he wanted to lead us on’ ([1969] 2011, 189).23 Now, insofar as ‘Part I’, too, and especially its later parts, is work in progress, why not publish it with a sample of the kind of further material that would likely have been worked into it? We need to understand both the very carefully crafted arrangement of this unfinished book’s more finished parts, with its ‘dialogic’ or ‘polyphonic’, many-voiced form of philosophic writing, which seems constantly to unsettle any philosophical ‘positions’ the text itself tries out, and its nonetheless, or perhaps precisely therefore, still unfinished character.24 What does Wittgenstein think philosophical difficulties are like, if this curious kind of book is best suited – or was the best thing he could try to produce – to clarify them? Was it just lack of time or some other external factors that prevented him from finishing it, or is the very idea of finishing a book – or ‘album’, as he says in the Preface – such as this one somehow inherently problematic?25 Reflecting on various possibilities, trying to see what speaks for and against them, may be important and illuminating, but I don’t see how it could be said with any confidence, or

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perhaps even with much sense, that reading ‘Part I’ by itself gives a better idea of Wittgenstein’s conception of what his book would or might have become, had he been able to finish it, than reading it and ‘Part II’, with the instruction provided in Anscombe’s and Rhees’s original Note. A further question, however, is why just MS 144/TS 234, rather than some other material from Wittgenstein’s later years, was elevated to the special status of ‘Part II’ of the Investigations. While Anscombe’s and Rhees’s decision to do so doesn’t appear unreasonable, I’m not aware that they provided any decisive argument for it either. In a letter to von Wright, who was at that time writing a paper on the ‘troubled history’, as he called it, of ‘Part II’ (von Wright 1992), Anscombe explains: My contribution to the belief that Wittgenstein ‘would have inserted this, with further material, into the alas considerably expurgated last 30 pages or so of the Investigations[’], was based purely on what he said to me when I visited him in Dublin [in 1949]: what he pointed to was not indeed the MS or TS of Part II (which as you remark didn’t exist at that time) but those big – or that big – MS volume which contained, as I realized later, the material in the MS of Part II. I realized this because of what Wittgenstein was discussing with me, which was the context of his pointing to that big MS volume (I think in fact he was pointing to only one volume, and thought of ‘those volumes’ because they go together[)]. —Anscombe to von Wright, 15 April 1991, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12 MS 144/TS 234 was a selection made by Wittgenstein from this mss-material on ‘philosophical psychology’ that he had been working on 1946–1949 (cf. Editor’s Preface to LW1), and Anscombe and Rhees clearly thought the MS/ TS was of exceptional philosophical quality, even if Wittgenstein hadn’t worked it into the same kind of intricate arrangement that characterizes the earlier parts of ‘Part I’. Already in 1953, long before any criticisms of the inclusion of ‘Part II’ had been made, Anscombe spoke of ‘the new degree of compactness to which Wittgenstein rose in his last period’ and said, referring to the material in ‘Part II’ in the PI, that ‘for compression, together with rich and sharp expressiveness; for wealth of incontestable observations and hard investigation; this transcends everything he ever wrote’ (Erbacher, dos Santos Reis and Jung 2019, 239).

6. ‘SINGLE TREATISES ON SINGLE TOPICS’ If, in the case of ‘Part II’ of the Investigations, Anscombe’s editing of Wittgenstein has been criticized for putting together what should have been

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kept apart, in the case of Wittgenstein’s last writings, published as On Certainty (1969), Remarks on Colour (1978) and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology II (1992), the criticism is instead that she sundered what should have been kept together.26 In their Editor’s Preface to LW2, von Wright and Heikki Nyman write (p. vi): Thematically, Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings from the last two years of his life (1949-51) can be divided into three parts. The largest of these three parts deals with the concepts of certainty, knowing, doubting, and other topics in epistemology. A second part deals with the philosophy of colour concepts; a third, with psychological concepts and in particular with the problem of the relationship between “the inner” and “the outer”, between the so-called mental states and bodily behaviour. As we will see, this tripartite thematic division of the material is less obvious than it may appear, and publishing the texts as three separate books was by no means the only possibility. Wittgenstein’s discussions of the various themes are not neatly separated into different notebooks and deciding which of the three themes particular remarks or longer swathes of text belong to is often difficult or impossible.27 While Anscombe and von Wright agreed on the ‘three themes’-division of the material, they initially had different ideas for how to publish it. Von Wright suggested an extensive selection of the last writings containing discussions of all three themes in a single volume (von Wright to Anscombe, 28 August 1967, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12; cf. a similar earlier suggestion in his letter from 11 June 1964). Anscombe wanted to publish the remarks we now know as OC separately and told von Wright she was ‘against a scrappy publication’ when ‘we have a single treatise on a single topic to put before the public’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 13 September 1967, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). Von Wright didn’t insist on his plan, and a year later, Anscombe informed him, ‘I went ahead with the certainty thing as a monograph on its own, as I always wanted it to be. I hope you will agree that this was right’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 16 September 1968, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). Von Wright was initially doubtful (von Wright to Anscombe, 21 September 1968, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12), but after reading the OC-proofs, told Anscombe he was now ‘completely convinced that you were right (against me) that the writings on certainty should be published as a book on its own. The impression it makes is strong and wonderful’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 10 March 1969, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). Rhees, whose later (1971) proposal to publish the German edition of Über Gewißheit together with ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ and ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’ was also vetoed

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by Anscombe, was more sceptical. He thought Anscombe ‘look[s] on those remarks [OC] as much more abgeschlossen [self-contained] than (I believe) they are’ (Rhees to von Wright, 19 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004). In line with his general concern that the editions should reveal the historical continuities and developments in Wittgenstein’s thinking, he worried that especially Anscombe’s Preface (also signed by von Wright) might ‘prevent people from recognizing the constant connections between these remarks [OC] and his [Wittgenstein’s] earlier discussions’ (Rhees to von Wright, 18 June 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004).28 In the Preface to OC, Anscombe wrote: ‘It seemed appropriate to publish this work by itself. It is not a selection; Wittgenstein marked it off in his notebooks as a separate topic, which he apparently took up at four separate periods during this eighteen months [Nov. 1949 to April 1951]. It constitutes a single sustained treatment of the topic’. Here, we see how Anscombe preferred not to make selections within what she considered a sustained treatment of a topic. She seems to have thought it clear what was one topic, however. But is it? On a philological level, neither Wittgenstein’s marks in the notebooks nor Anscombe’s interpretation of them are quite as unambiguous as her formulations here and in the Preface to ROC, where she says that the material she excluded was ‘marked as discontinuous with the text’, suggest.29 On a philosophical level, the idea that one can distinguish clearly between ‘the topics’ of OC, ROC and LW2 becomes blurrier the closer one looks. How, for example, should one characterize the ‘single topic’ of OC? Is it ‘certainty’? Why not, equally, ‘the nature of a world picture’, ‘cultural differences’, ‘sanity and madness’, ‘the limits of argument’, ‘faith’, or ‘the relation between logic and experience’, say? Anscombe herself later underlined the variety of questions addressed in OC, warning that ‘we should not regard [its] struggling investigations [. . .] as all saying the same thing’; for example, ‘a world-picture is not the same thing as a religious belief, even though to believe is not in either case to surmise’, and we ‘cannot get [Wittgenstein] right, but only commit frightful confusions, by making assimilations’ (1976, 130). And, on the other hand, however one might characterize the OC-discussions, wouldn’t the characterization also be applicable to ROC and LW2, even if not in precisely the same way? Thus, a central question running through the material in all three books is the conceivability of concepts, ‘grammars’ of experience, forms of life, radically different from our own. For instance, ‘Can one imagine people who don’t know pretence and to whom one cannot explain it?’ (LW2, 56; cf. 20); ‘Can’t we imagine people having colour concepts other than our own?’ (ROC, I §66; cf. ROC, III §§86–88); ‘At any rate it is important to

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imagine a language in which our concept “knowledge” does not exist’; ‘Now, how do we imagine this?’ (OC, §562; 609). The problem here is to see how things hang together in our life: what would it mean if pretence, say, were absent, what would still stay in place (cf. ROC, III §296; 304; LW2, 71–73)? The question, then, is how far we can describe (conceive) even our own grammar, as opposed to willy-nilly manifesting it in the way we talk, think and act (cf. ROC, III, §123–124; OC §501). In other words, the difficulties in understanding others are inseparable from our difficulties in understanding ourselves. Reading the materials of Wittgenstein’s last writings that his editors separated into different books together may just as well, and just as importantly, bring out differences as similarities between the discussions. Take ‘certainty’ itself; a central question recurring in the material published in LW2 is what certainty, uncertainty and doubt come to in one’s understanding of another person. And now the focus of the investigation starts shifting away from what ‘I’ am, or again ‘we’ as a community, are certain of, towards the relationship between individual people. Here, one’s certainty, or again doubt and distrust, regarding what another feels or means depends – not only, but crucially – on whether, or how well, one knows them, in a sense lacking agreed criteria and irreducible to what one knows about them (cf. LW2, 86–90). How is this interpersonal dimension related to the communal certainties within which all our inquiries are situated? Insofar as we learn the latter, ‘practices’, ‘world pictures’, etc., from other people, believing someone in some sense appears more basic than believing something – and yet, as Anscombe once remarked, despite its ‘huge importance for the theory of knowledge’, ‘Believing someone is not merely a neglected topic in philosophical discussion; it seems to be unknown’ (1979, 3; 1). Ironically, Anscombe’s editorial decision to separate the discussions in OC from those in LW2 can itself be seen as symptomatic of this neglect, and may have made it harder to see the philosophical significance of both discussions properly. Of course, if everything is in this way ‘connected with everything else’ in Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy, as von Wright once put it,30 and as the Preface of the Investigations famously suggests, this should be evident from his last writings even when published chopped up to ‘separate topics’. And so it is; after all, one can read all three books together. Couldn’t one then say that Anscombe’s ‘single topics’ approach did no harm? In a way, yes. But insofar as that approach is hegemonic in academic philosophy – making philosophy academic indeed presupposes its division into specialized areas allowing narrow ‘expert’-knowledge – editorial policies that present Wittgenstein as conforming to these hegemonic assumptions may encourage

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rather than forestall the radical misunderstandings of his philosophy that are likely in any case.

7. THE SUPPRESSION OF THE CODED ENTRIES IN NOTEBOOKS 1914-1916 In 1961, a work titled Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914-1916, edited by Anscombe and von Wright, with Wittgenstein’s German text and en face English translation by Anscombe, appeared. The book presented material from three wartime notebooks, from the period when Wittgenstein was working on what would become the Tractatus. In their Preface, the editors claimed to have ‘left out very little that is in the notebooks: the omissions almost always were of sketches of [logical] symbolism, which could not be interpreted or were otherwise uninteresting’ (NB [1961a], vi). They made no mention of the fact that on the left-hand pages of his notebooks, Wittgenstein had written entries in code31 that were all omitted from the published Notebooks, which contained only the right-hand pages with entries in plain script. In the second edition of the Notebooks from 1979, whose text had been, as the Preface says, ‘completely revised for this edition, and a number of misreadings [. . .] corrected’ (NB [1979c], 1), there was again no mention of the omitted parts of the actual notebooks’ contents. The editors, then, made two different decisions with regard to the coded entries: not to include them in their edition of the Notebooks, and not to make the first decision public. Taken together, these decisions justify speaking of a suppression of the existence of the coded entries (a strange anomaly about this suppression will be noted below). The fact of the suppression became widely known, and caused a minor scandal, only in 1985, when Wilhelm Baum published the coded entries transcribed under the title Geheime Tagebücher (The Secret Diaries, GT).32 The plain script material in the wartime notebooks is generally clearly philosophical and/or logical in character, while the coded entries are rather private or personal – but as we’ll see, the relation between the ‘philosophical’ and the ‘personal’ is itself a controversial and philosophically significant issue, and one also shouldn’t equate ‘personal’ with ‘private’.33 As far as I know, neither Anscombe nor von Wright ever publicly explained their decision to suppress the coded entries, nor is that decision discussed by them in what survives of their correspondence. In this section, I will discuss the circumstances surrounding the suppression and the possible motives for it. Then, in section 8, I explain what I see as the philosophical significance of the coded entries, and therefore, as the philosophical cost of their suppression from the published Notebooks.

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If the editors never explained their motives for the suppression of the coded entries, it is, surprisingly, also unclear to what extent they knew the actual contents of these entries. The Notebooks 1914-1916 were published in 1961, but it was only in 1964–1966 that the editors undertook the ‘exhausting and time-consuming job’ of systematically transcribing the coded passages strewn throughout Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, including the wartime notebooks.34 In his ‘Biographical Sketch’ of Wittgenstein, published in Swedish in 1954, and in English translation a year later, von Wright had actually announced to the world the existence of the wartime coded entries that he and Anscombe suppressed six years later; this is the anomaly alluded to above. There he wrote: ‘In the earliest notebooks part of the content is written in a code, which Wittgenstein continued to use throughout his life. Only a part of the notes in code have been deciphered. They appear to be of a personal nature. It is too early to pronounce on their interest for a larger public’ (1955a, 534).35 Apparently, then, the editors had transcribed, or seen transcriptions of some parts of the coded entries and decided on the strength of what these contained that the coded material as a whole wasn’t to be published. They could not have acted on any direct instruction from Wittgenstein not to publish the coded parts of the wartime notebooks, for he evidently thought the notebooks themselves, plain and coded pages, had been destroyed; the three physical notebooks on which Notebooks 19141916 was based survived only by the ‘accident’ of having been left at a house in Gmunden, rather than in Vienna with the rest of Wittgenstein’s early notebooks, which were indeed ‘destroyed by his orders in 1950’ along with ‘most’ of his notebooks from ‘all his periods of writing’ (NB [1961a], v). The fact that Wittgenstein had intended to destroy the notebooks might have led the editors to wonder whether it was right to publish even the plain text entries in them, but I have found no indication of their raising this question. Perhaps they thought that the coded entries were the reason Wittgenstein wanted the notebooks destroyed, and so publishing just the plain script portions would not go against his wishes.36 However, Wittgenstein could hardly have instructed his literary executors not to publish any remarks of his written in code, which are found across his later notebooks, too, since von Wright, with Anscombe’s and Rhees’s consent, later published Culture and Value, a collection of remarks by Wittgenstein relating to ‘subjects of a general sort, such as questions about art or about religion’ (CV, Preface), many of which had been written in code. Incidentally, the very first one of these – but that alone, of all the remarks von Wright included in his selection – comes from the wartime coded diaries.37 Why, then, might Anscombe and von Wright have decided to suppress the entries? However little they had seen of their contents, they clearly

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thought they contained private or personal material, which shouldn’t be published.38 Had ‘private’ merely meant ‘too trivially particular or subjective to be of any general interest’ (and many of the entries do fall into this category), the editors could simply have noted, in the Preface to NB, their existence and that publishing them would have been pointless. But their attitude was quite different. The correspondence of all three literary heirs shows them anxious to ensure that the passages not be made public – although why, exactly, is never articulated, but rather taken as ‘understood’ by them. When a microfilm of the entire Nachlass was produced in 1967, to be deposited at Cornell, all coded entries were censored (covered over), and von Wright assured Anscombe that he and Norman Malcolm would ‘personally supervise the “purging” of the [. . .] passages in code’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 28 April 1966, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12; cf. his letter to her from 30 December 1966). This policy of censorship seems at one point in the early 1980s to have been questioned by Anscombe, who apparently suggested publishing the coded material, ‘so as to put an end to further fuss about it’, but she soon moved back to the censorship-line.39 The coded entries were finally ‘officially’ published in 2000, as part of the Bergen Electronic Edition. What, then, might have been the perceived problem with publishing the coded entries? The fact that they sometimes bear on Wittgenstein’s sexual life may have played some part. In the wartime entries Wittgenstein often records, without further comment, either that he feels (or sometimes doesn’t feel) ‘sensuous’ (sinnlich), or that he has masturbated – an occurrence apparently special and charged enough in his mind to be noteworthy – while other entries relate to his love-life; specifically, he expresses his longing for David Pinsent. These entries contain no explicit references to, although possibly allusions to, sexual feelings (see the GTentries for 18.3.15 and 16.4.15), but the tone is unmistakably different from how one speaks of even good friends who are just friends; at one point, Wittgenstein kisses the long-awaited letter from David (GT, 21.12.14). The coded material also contains – and this is a much more prominent feature – many entries where Wittgenstein records, in strong language, his great difficulties with and contemptuous dislike for his fellow soldiers. I will argue in the next section that these entries are, strange as this may sound, the philosophically most interesting part of the coded material. But given how famously difficult, deeply unhappy and harshly judgemental a person Wittgenstein could be – as both Anscombe and von Wright had acknowledged in print already by 1961 – one wonders whether they would have thought the content or tone of those entries warranted censoring the coded parts of the notebooks. On the other hand, one might acknowledge

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that one’s friend could be difficult or unhappy and still not want private, painfully detailed, records of that difficulty and unhappiness published.40 Supposing that at least part of the reason for suppressing the coded entries was the wish to prevent Wittgenstein’s records of his sexual life and/or specifically his homosexuality41 from becoming public knowledge, or a focus of public interest, we should note that this wish, in turn, could be very differently motivated. One might be concerned with protecting a dead friend from the kind of prurient, salacious interest evoked by the sex-life of others, especially of famous people; an interest no less ‘foul’ – a word Rhees used in this context – when satisfied in the guise of scholarship.42 A quite different motive, but which may, by the person so motivated and others, be mistaken for the first one, would be a concern to protect oneself from becoming publicly associated with, and thus also being actively reminded of and having to think about, aspects of one’s friend’s life one found unpalatable. I know of no evidence to suggest that the literary executors were motivated by such self-serving motives; I mention the distinction between motives rather to warn against the automatic assumption that their motives could only have been of the self-serving kind; conventional prudery, homophobia, etc.43 A further possible motivation for the suppression of the coded entries relates not to the particular facts of a private or personal nature they might reveal, but to the mere fact of their being private/personal. One might find the prospect of people making someone’s personal life a topic of public discussion disquieting, not primarily because there were embarrassing or shameful aspects of that life, but because the outrageousness in the very idea of people discussing someone’s personal life in public, making conjectures about what their relationship to friends and loved ones was really like, etc. When ‘the object’ is still alive the outrage of treating them as an ‘object’ of discussion – insofar as that is the spirit in which they are talked about – should be obvious, but when someone is dead, we easily forget it.44 In the context of our discussion, the point is that Anscombe’s and von Wright’s decision to suppress the coded entries – like Anscombe’s famous quip that ‘If by pressing a button it could have been secured that people would not concern themselves with [Wittgenstein’s] personal life, I should have pressed the button’ (Engelmann 1968, xiv)45 – may have had motives other than a wish to conceal things regarded as shameful, or just a will to censor and control Wittgenstein’s public image according to their own predilections. Obviously, this doesn’t tell us what motives Anscombe and her fellow-trustees actually had, and I’m not aware of any evidence to settle the matter.46

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8. BRINGING WORDS BACK FROM THEIR METAPHYSICAL TO THEIR EVERYDAY USE Let’s now consider what relevance, if any, the wartime coded entries may have for understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Anscombe and von Wright seem to have assumed they had none, at least not enough to offset the drawbacks they saw in publication; if they were right, the whole suppressionbusiness would be philosophically uninteresting. In their Preface to the first edition of the Notebooks, the editors say they ‘publish this material [sc. the plain script entries] as an aid to students of the Tractatus’; the entries ‘shew clearly [. . .] what problems formed the context of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Tractatus’ (NB [1961a], v). Now, in my view, the coded entries, too, throw new light on a crucial aspect of the philosophy of the Tractatus. This is not because the coded entries contain some ‘secret doctrine’, or because philosophical thought could be explained in terms of the private life or psychology of its author. Baum’s view that their importance lies in causing ‘the plan of the literary executors to turn Wittgenstein into an atheist and a positivist’ to crumble (1991, 175, my trans.) is also clearly untenable. That the positivists misread the Tractatus should have been obvious from the start, and was made, if possible, even clearer by the extensive reflections on explicitly ethical and religious questions contained in the plain script entries in Notebooks 1914-1916. Furthermore, a main purpose of Anscombe’s early writings on the Tractatus was precisely to criticize the positivist misreading of it.47 To view the coded entries as some kind of esoteric writing appears equally misguided. Ilse Somavilla, for example, claims that The frequency of Wittgenstein’s coded entries involving his ethical and religious reflections suggest that he wanted to create a special type of text for these matters, a type clearly distinguishable from his philosophical discourse, and which by the very method of concealment should hint at the aspect of the hidden or invisible. [. . . I]f such matters were expressed in everyday language, then it would prove their nonsensicality. Their encoding is thus a means to emphasize the distinction between meaningful and nonsensical propositions, that is between the sayable and the unsayable, accentuated by a specific kind of script. —2010, 36 In my mind, this interpretation makes no sense for the wartime notebooks. As noted, the plain script entries in them also contain a mass of specifically ethical and religious reflections, so why is their nonsensicality not disguised by the use of code? And the ethically and religiously charged entries in code

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are generally expressed, pace Somavilla, precisely in the simplest ‘everyday language’, they are just written in code. This suggests a very down-to-earth reason for Wittgenstein’s use of code, namely that the passages he encoded were easily understandable, but partly embarrassing, and often contained far from flattering comments about the very people around him who might have happened to catch a glimpse of them (cf. McGuinness [1988] 1990, 212). One of the first things Wittgenstein wrote down in code was his first impression of the crew on the river patrol boat where he served at the start of the war. It reads: ‘the crew are a bunch of swine! No enthusiasm, incredible brutality, stupidity & malice!’ (GT, 15.8.14).48 As we’ll see, he goes on in this vein throughout the notebooks. There is generally a clear difference between Wittgenstein’s religious remarks in code and in plain script. The latter speak about God, as in: ‘The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God. [. . .] To pray is to think about the meaning of life’ (NB, 11.6.16). In the coded entries, by contrast, Wittgenstein doesn’t speak about God, but either directly to God, in prayer – or when not that, he is telling himself to trust in God, or hoping that God will be with him through the tribulations at the front. For example: ‘Perhaps the closeness to death will bring me the light of life! May God enlighten me! I am a worm but God will make me into a human being. May God be with me. Amen’ (GT, 4.5.16).49 The plain script entries on explicitly religious and ethical themes start with the question ‘What do I know about God and the purpose of life?’, followed by a short list of such propositions, including ‘I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely powerless. I can only make myself independent of the world – and so in a certain sense master it – by renouncing any influence on happenings’ (NB, 11.6.16). In my view, the philosophically most consequential contribution the coded entries make to our understanding of the plain script entries, and of the Tractatus, lies precisely in the light they throw on the thought ‘The world is independent of my will’ (NB, 5.7.16, included in the Tractatus at 6.373).50 That thought is directly related to the Tractarian distinction between the world of facts describable by meaningful propositions and the ‘sense’ or ‘value’ of the world that must ‘lie outside the world’ (TLP 6.41); a distinction whose corollary is that ‘ethics’ and everything ‘higher’ is inexpressible, incapable of being ‘put into words’ (TLP 6.42–421). The will ‘in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes’ is also independent of the world, and of it, too, it is thus ‘impossible to speak’ (TLP 6.423). The coded entries afford, I suggest, not only a biographical background to this thought of the independence of world and will, but help one understand the thought itself, making its sense – and the nonsense, the moral confusion in it – concrete.

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The formula itself is familiar from both stoicism and Christianity, the latter being more central for Wittgenstein, who carried Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief with him ‘like a Talisman’ during the war (GT, 11.10.14). ‘Again and again’, he writes in code, ‘I repeat Tolstoy’s words to myself: “Man is powerless in the flesh but through the spirit he is free” ’ (GT, 12.9.14).51 What, however, is the formula’s concrete meaning? Where does the idea of ‘powerlessness’ come from, and what does it signify? Note, first, that framing it in terms of one’s relation to ‘the world’ is abstract in a misleading way, insofar as what is actually at stake is one’s relations to other people. That this is what is at stake is precisely what the coded entries make very clear. From the swine-remark quoted above (GT, 15.8.14) to the last entry in code (GT, 19.8.16), the left-hand pages of Wittgenstein’s notebooks are filled with constant complaints about the character of the people he is surrounded with; ‘These are wicked, heartless people. It’s all but impossible for me to find a trace of humanity in them. God help me to live’ (GT, 27.4.16).52 Being immediately convinced that there was ‘not a single decent man in the whole crew’, the question for Wittgenstein was how he should ‘relate to all of this in future’ (GT, 25.8.14), and he soon decided ‘not to resist at all. To make myself quite light outwardly, as it were, so as to leave my inner being undisturbed’ (GT, 26.8.14), ‘for I’m after all quite powerless against all these people. I wear myself out uselessly if I defend myself ’ (GT, 6.9.14).53 Yet, as his constant complaints attest, Wittgenstein found non-resistance, indifference, impossibly difficult: How hard it is not to be annoyed with people! How hard it is to tolerate them. [. . .] Whenever I come into contact with these people at work I find their meanness so terrible that rage threatens to overcome me & break out. Again and again I resolve to tolerate it calmly & again and again I break my resolution. And how this happens I don’t really know myself. It is so enormously hard to work with people & yet not to have anything to do with them. —GT, 17.11.1454 The idea of the world’s independence of one’s will tempted Wittgenstein, I suggest, because these interpersonal difficulties plagued him. He struggled to actually make himself independent from his fellow soldiers, that is, to kill or make himself indifferent to his own responses to them, and presented this struggle as concerned with realising that this independence, this ‘powerlessness’ in relation to others, is already there. I’m not saying that his interpersonal difficulties caused Wittgenstein to be tempted by the idea of the will’s essential independence from the world, in the sense of an ‘external’

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psychological explanation. The point is rather that in the coded entries we may see what the metaphysical notion, or fantasy, of the world’s independence of my will comes to. In a certain sense the world of others is indeed ‘independent of one’s will’, insofar as one cannot make others – or for that matter oneself – be what one would wish them (or oneself) to be. This doesn’t mean, however, that there’s no essential relationship between oneself and others, that they would somehow be part of ‘the world’ within which there’s no value or sense, and that one, as ‘the ethical subject’, stands ‘outside’. The ethical sense of life, for good or ill, is played out in one’s life with others. But the difficulties of that life may tempt one to fantasize finding the sense elsewhere, away from others – which actually also means, away from oneself, although one fantasizes an escape from them to oneself, in splendid isolation. The wish to entertain such fantasies is itself a wish to misrepresent to oneself the actual moral-existential difficulty that spawns them. According to Wittgenstein’s own (later) conception, ‘metaphysical’ notions are characterized precisely by a wish to present one’s thinking – and this means: one’s life – as other than it actually is, which results in conflicts between the misrepresentation and one’s actual thought/life, in ambivalent, self-undermining claims, evasive vagueness, and a general failure of one’s words to make lucid sense.55 I suggest that the young Wittgenstein’s own ethico-philosophical pronouncements are ‘metaphysical’ in that very sense, and that this becomes clear when, following his famous injunction, we bring his early words ‘back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ (PI §116) by reading the plain script pronouncements in the Notebooks and the Tractatus against the entries in code. I know nothing about what the other soldiers were actually like, how they treated Wittgenstein, or he them, and he himself gives no concrete details. Judging simply from what and how Wittgenstein writes in the coded entries, however, it seems clear that he was quite unaware that anything could be seriously amiss with his own response to the others – a response, basically, of disgusted disdain; ‘I don’t hate them, but they disgust me’ (GT, 28.5.16).56 He realizes that this response makes him unhappy, and berates himself for finding it impossible to put himself above it – that is, above the others – but he never considers whether his response might be unjust to them. At one point he avers that perhaps they aren’t vicious, just ‘enormously narrow’ (GT, 8.5.16)57, but viewing them in this light – a view his later entries (e.g. 28.5.16) show he didn’t keep to in any case – is merely a change in the mode of disdain, from disgust to condescending pity. If that is someone’s attitude to others, this is itself a primary ethical-existential problem. The difficulty, in this case, is not to realize that ‘the world is independent of one’s will’, but to see how one’s own will, one’s own attitude, fills the world with disgustedly

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fantasized, wicked others. It may be that the others are indeed treating one meanly, but one won’t even see the evil in their treatment of oneself clearly until one rids oneself of the evil, the disgust, in one’s own attitude to them. Disgust presents (feels) itself as affirming one’s difference from the disgusting other, but is actually a feeling of unwished for but undeniable intimacy and even identification with them; an attempt to deny and ward off the unwanted closeness to the other it announces. One feels the disgusting other has come ‘too close’, has got ‘under one’s skin’, and one feels dirtied, sickened, infected by further contact with them; that is, one feels that, unless one gets away, one will somehow turn into them, one’s intimate kinship with them now fully revealed. To fantasize independence from them, ‘from the world’, is, so it seems to me, a metaphysically ‘sublimated’ variation on the common strategy – of course not a lucidly conscious one – of trying to repress and defend oneself against one’s own disgust by transforming it into an apparently more distanced, ‘objectifying’, contempt for others. Contemptuously, or with condescending pity, one looks down at them from a presumed safe position ‘far above’; it now seems as though they inhabited a different world from oneself and were not one’s concern. Similarly, the metaphysical fantasy of ‘independence from the world’ promises isolation from the shock of encountering the other person, from the challenge in their face, into which one cannot bear to look and from which one turns away in intimately disquieting disgust or cold contempt. But this very turning away has the same conflicted ambivalence as the metaphysical fantasy, for disgust and contempt are not indifference, lack of concerned connection, but desperate pretences at indifference. They are, one could say, modes of feeling (and both are strong feelings) one’s connection with and openness to the other – of feeling their humanity, which is also one’s own – when one also feels threatened by it and wants to escape; escape from the defenceless ‘nakedness of the soul’.58 The aim of these brief remarks has not been to convince anyone that this is the right view of disgust, contempt and their relation to certain metaphysical notions, but to raise a question about possible connections.59 This might seem to have taken us far afield from understanding and assessing Anscombe’s work as editor of Wittgenstein, into substantive philosophical discussion of particular issues. What I hoped to have illustrated, however, is precisely that discussions of the work of editing cannot ultimately be isolated from discussions of that second kind. What belongs to philosophy, and to the philosophical work of Wittgenstein in particular, and how various things belong there, what is and is not ‘personal’ here, is itself a substantive philosophical – which also means: a moral-existential – question. How one

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looks at editorial choices regarding inclusion and exclusion, separation and bringing together of materials, depends on how one sees that question, or that tangle of questions.

NOTES 1. I will also make use of the unpublished typescript Anecdotes about Wittgenstein [abbreviated Anecdotes] made by Luke Gormally of two Anscombe-notebooks deposited at AA (The Collegium Institute Archive of G.E.M. Anscombe, Philadelphia). Permission to quote from Elizabeth Anscombe’s letters and Anecdotes was kindly provided by Mary Geach, © M. C. Gormally. Permission to quote from Georg Henrik von Wright’s letters was kindly provided by Anita Grönberg-von Wright and Benedict von Wright. Permission to quote from Rush Rhees’s letters was kindly provided by Volker Munz. 2. Anscombe also translated RFM, NB, Z, RPP1 and (together with Denis Paul) OC, and worked hard on the translations of ROC by Linda McAlister and Margarete Schättle, and of RPP2 by C. G. Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue. She writes to von Wright: ‘I had a great deal more trouble with the Remarks on Colour than if I had translated it by myself; and I spent [. . .] a fortnight or three weeks working over the text [of RPP2] that Luckhardt translated with him’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 4 August 1978, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). In addition to her translations of Wittgenstein, Anscombe and Peter Geach also published a selection of Descartes’ philosophical writings translated by them jointly (Descartes 1954). When she quotes ancient Greek and Medieval Latin philosophers in her own writings, the translations generally seem to be her own. 3. After his return to Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein wrote of ‘the conflict in me of the English and German modes of expression’: ‘I can really work only when I can continuously converse with myself in German. But for my lectures I must now arrange things in English & so I am disturbed in my German thought; at least until a peaceful accord has formed between the two & that takes some time, perhaps very long’ (MS 183, 16.10.1930, translated in Wittgenstein 2003, 57). Apparently, no permanent peace-accords between the languages were ever signed. 4. Anscombe’s translation of PI, Anthony Kenny writes, ‘has been universally accepted as if it contained the ipsissima verba of Wittgenstein: I can think of no other English translation of a philosopher – not Jowett’s Plato, nor Kemp Smith’s Kant – that has achieved such canonical status’ (2006: 383). 5. This isn’t the only way of thinking of excellence in translation, or of what it means for a translated text to find a home in the new language. One might think, for example, that a good translation should in a certain sense make its strangeness felt, and by its strange presence enlarge the target language’s expressive range. Thus, Walter Benjamin approvingly quotes Rudolf Pannwitz’ claim that German translators mistakenly try to ‘turn Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of turning German into Hindi, Greek, English’; the translator should rather strive to ‘expand and deepen his language by means of the foreign language’ (Benjamin 1996: 262).

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6. Much later, in a letter to von Wright written while she was working on her last translation of Wittgenstein, RPP1, Anscombe says: ‘Now I don’t think of myself as an awfully good translator, I mostly understand the text pretty well [. . .]. But what I don’t like about my translation is that it is rather flat’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 4 August 1978, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). ‘My translation’ would seem to refer only to the RPP-text she was then working on, however. 7. Wittgenstein often discussed the musicality of language and music as a kind of language (e.g. Z §161; 172; cf. PI §§527–546, and further Appelqvist, this volume) and compared doing philosophy to literary composition; ‘Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten’ (CV, 28; on the difficulty of translating ‘dichten’, cf. Perloff 2011: 716, fn 3). He also wrote, in 1930: ‘I often think that the highest I wish to achieve would be to compose a melody. [. . .] But then I must tell myself that it’s quite impossible [. . .] because for that I am missing something essential or the essential. That is why I am thinking of it as such a high ideal because I could then in a way sum up my life; and set it down crystallized. And even if it were but a small, shabby crystal, yet a crystal’ (Wittgenstein 2003: 17–19 [MS 183, 9–10]). 8. For some discussion of how the standard conception of ‘style’ as ‘external’ in philosophy has been applied to Wittgenstein, and of ‘internalist’ critiques of this approach, see Kahane, Kanterian & Kuusela 2007: 19–25. 9. Wittgenstein remarks that, in contrast to Le style c’est l’homme, a slogan at home in ads for men’s fashion insofar as it takes ‘style’ simply as a collectively sanctioned category, Buffon’s actual Le style c’est l’homme même ‘opens up a quite different perspective. It says that style is the picture of the man’ (CV, 89) – in somewhat the same sense, I take it, as ‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul’ (PI, II:iv: 178/ Wittgenstein 2009, Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment, §25). As we’ll see in the next section, however, it isn’t quite clear how a writer’s ‘style’ may be related to his ‘soul’. 10. Anscombe started studying German in 1946. After they had agreed she should translate the Investigations, Wittgenstein arranged for her to spend nine months in Vienna in 1950 to get a better ear for the Austrian German in which he wrote (Erbacher 2016: 29), but that obviously didn’t give her a perfect sense of the language. In a letter to von Wright in 1969, she mentions her colleague Anselm Müller’s (a native German speaker) assistance with the OC-translation, which, she says, was ‘greatly improved as a result of his help’; he not only spotted ‘a number of errors which I was ashamed not to have noticed [. . .] but was able to talk to me instructively about the force of “doch” and “denn” in various places; this is something very difficult for a foreigner to know’ (Anscombe to von Wright, undated 1969, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). Cf. the three ‘recurrent errors [that] run through Anscombe’s translation [of PI]’ noted in Hacker & Schulte 2009a: xvi. 11. Anscombe’s knowledge of Wittgenstein included a sense of how he would not have expressed himself. Thus, she tells von Wright that although Linda McAlister, one of the translators of ROC, was otherwise able, ‘she let’s her politics (Women’s lib) affect her translation. A translation with “person” in every other line doesn’t read much like Wittgenstein. But “man” [. . .] is anathema to her’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 3 March 1976, NLF, COLL.

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714.11-12). As far as I know, there are no audio recordings of Wittgenstein speaking, in English or German, but one can get some sense of his way of expressing himself in English from his many letters and some philosophical manuscripts written in English – and, of course, from the Blue and Brown Books that he dictated in English. 12. This seems to contradict the statement by Jenny Teichman, a friend of the Anscombe-Geach family, that ‘the English version of Part I [of PI] was produced under [Wittgenstein’s] guidance’ (2001: 38). Erbacher (2016: 29; 2020: 5) takes Geach (1988, xiii) to make the same claim as Teichman, but Geach’s ‘Part I of the Investigations was complete when Wittgenstein died’ seems to refer to the German text, not the translation. 13. Mary Geach offers another apt image to characterize her mother’s writing; ‘[Anscombe] does not carry the reader along, as some authors do [. . .] Yet some people prefer her sort of writing, like the confection pannforte, all fruit and nuts, and no dough, very chewy and tough’ (Geach 2005: xiii). 14. For one articulation of what such a transformation might look like, see Toivakainen (2020); cf. the chapters in Backström, Nykänen, Toivakainen & Wallgren (2019). 15. It isn’t quite clear to me how this should be related to Wittgenstein’s concern with the style of his writing, discussed in the previous section. Surely, a naked soul has no ‘style’, any more than a naked face, although both have expressiveness (in joy or sorrow, say) and individuality, or singularity (no two faces are alike). The face addresses you in this very singularity. Perhaps a writer’s ‘style’ is, in the best case, the way in which they allow this naked address to come through their writing, in a certain sense breaking up any characterization one might give of it (of the style, or the address). 16. Already while they were selecting the material for RFM von Wright was ‘constantly tormented by the question: Do we do the right thing, or not?’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 2 January 1955, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). A decade later he wrote, ‘Last Winter I [. . .] studied the writings on the philosophy of mathematics, from which we made selections, and I often had an uncomfortable feeling that we should not have made selections’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 28 June 1965, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12; cf. his letter to her from 28 October 1970). Nonetheless, a revised and substantially expanded edition of RFM – still a selection, rather than a publication of whole mss – appeared in German in 1974, and in English translation in 1978. Solin, this volume, discusses the editorial history of the revised edition in detail. 17. The Zettel remarks were stored in a separate box, partly clipped together in bundles. The editors, or rather Anscombe’s husband Peter Geach, on their behest, arranged the material for the book, ‘keeping together what were in single bundles, and otherwise fitting the pieces as well as he could according to subject matter’, in a way the editors thought made ‘a very instructive and readable compilation’, even if the arrangement was not, they cautioned, ‘the kind of arrangement that Wittgenstein made of his “remarks”’ (Z, Preface). Arthur Gibson relates the following incident from 1967: ‘One day, he [Peter Geach] sat me down with some original Wittgenstein manuscripts. These comprised what would become the book edited by him entitled Zettel [. . .] As I sat looking at the sheets, with Geach

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opposite me, he began to remove the rusted pins that grouped the paper into batches, and rearranging the order of the sheets. I asked if the order they were in should be retained. “No”, came the reply; “They are in the wrong order.” Pins that were inserted well before Wittgenstein’s death in 1951, now look quite similar to those inserted, for example, by Rhees in the 1950s. I wondered if Geach was “correcting” the editing by previous “editors” by assuming, as Rhees sometimes seemed to do, that he knew how Wittgenstein thought, and so revised positions the manuscripts were in as if they were mental themes that could at will be changed to reveal more of the “original” intention. Nevertheless, this did not seem – then or now – to concur with all other aspects of Geach’s careful scholarship. Since he was explaining the archive’s contents, I let go of the matter’ (Gibson 2015: 31). 18. For further discussion of the topics brought up in this and the next two paragraphs see Solin, ch. 6. Österman, ch. 8., Westergaard, ch. 9, Jakola ch. 10 and Wallgren ch. 12, and ch. 1 all in this volume. 19. Consider, for instance, PI §108, where Wittgenstein discusses the central difference between the Tractatus-conception and his new understanding of language and philosophy and says there can be no question of ‘bargaining any of its rigour out of [logic]’; rather there must be a ‘turning our whole examination round [. . .] about the fixed point of our real need’. Anscombe asks: ‘But what in §108 did he mean by “the fixed point of our real need”?’, and answers, ‘I do not know, and I suspect that without understanding this we shall at best have a poor understanding of that book’ (1989, 211). – Anscombe wrote voluminously about Wittgenstein’s philosophy (e.g. Anscombe 1959; 1976; and the many essays collected in 2011 [Geach and Gormally 2011]), and the rest of her own philosophical work shows Wittgenstein’s decisive influence on every page. She told a friend, ‘I don’t have a single idea in my head that wasn’t put there by Wittgenstein’ (Kenny 2019a, 19). On this, see further Backström (2022). 20. In 1998 Anscombe wrote to her fellow-trustees, ‘When Wittgenstein left his work to us, we always accepted – despite the vagueness in Wittgenstein’s will – that one day his manuscripts should be published in full and truthfully, but free of learned commentary’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 20 November 1998, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12), but if ‘in full’ is taken in an extensive sense, this doesn’t in fact seem to have been clear to them from the start. In a letter from 1965, von Wright writes of this possibility as a new idea: ‘I have this Winter been working very intensely with the Wittgenstein Nachlass. A new idea is gradually maturing within me: We ought to publish everything which there is (with the exception of writings in code and some obviously worthless things). This is not yet a suggestion – but I believe it will mature into one’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 2 April 1965, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). 21. Another principle Anscombe followed in her endeavour to give Wittgenstein ‘naked’ to the world is expressed in a letter to von Wright from 1984, in response to a request for permission (von Wright to Anscombe and Rhees 7 March 1984, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12) to publish a collection of Wittgenstein’s writings together with the lecture notes originally published as Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (Wittgenstein 1966), all in Finnish translation: ‘I am always opposed to the publication of writings by Wittgenstein together with anything else; when the question has arisen before, it

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has also been lecture notes. [. . .] Even the separate publication of what is declared to be notes by other people doesn’t stop people from quoting them as Wittgenstein [. . .] when they are together with Wittgenstein’s writing in one volume [this] will incite people still more to take that stuff as echt’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 14 March 1984, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). In the same letter, Anscombe is very critical of the Lectures and Conversations, edited by Cyril Barrett, speaking of his ‘conflation of three sets of lecture notes in that horrid little book. How far they are from giving us a text of any lecture you can tell by seeing how long it takes you to read one of them, quite slowly, out loud.’ 22. Hugh Knott argues in two essays (2017; 2020) against Hacker’s and Schulte’s demotion of ‘Part II’. As far as I know, Hacker and Schulte have not responded to his arguments. 23. David Stern, similarly, says that the specific ‘character and methods of the Philosophical Investigations’ are best understood by studying ‘the most carefully composed part of Philosophical Investigations I, which certainly does not include §§ 425–693, and perhaps really only covers §§ 1–310 or so’ (2006, 228). Of the last third of Part I, he says: ‘The dialogue toward the end is not as evenly balanced, and has a rather less Pyrrhonian tenor than the first two thirds [. . .] It is based on material that for the most part predates 1936, and so most of it actually predates the material in §§ 1–425. It was incorporated rather rapidly around the time of the end of the second world war, and was not as carefully arranged as the preceding part’ (2006: 228). 24. Cf. Pichler (2004), Stern (2004), Wallgren (2013) and Wallgren ch. 12 (this volume). 25. On ‘the truly unfinished nature of the Investigations’, see Venturinha 2010: 149, and to the end. 26. LW2 was edited by von Wright and Heikki Nyman, Anscombe edited ROC alone, and she and von Wright are credited as co-editors of OC, but the editing was in practice done by Anscombe alone, as he acknowledges in a letter to her: ‘You have done the main job. If you think it right that I should appear as co-editor, I have no objection’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 10 March 1969, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). OC was the first of the three books to be published, and Anscombe’s editorial approach to it, described below, in effect decided the shape of the other two books, too. 27. For a detailed account of the relation between the mss and the last writings as published, as well as of the editorial history involved, see Jakola, ch. 10 in this volume. 28. Rhees’s plan is discussed in Westergaard, ch. 9, this volume. 29. See, again, Jakola, this volume. 30. In a 1970 paper on ‘Wittgenstein on Certainty’ never published in this form in print; see the longer quote and discussion in Jakola, this volume. 31. The code is simple, consisting in inverting the order of the alphabet, ‘a’ corresponding to ‘z’, etc., but to the untrained eye, it looks like gibberish. 32. The first publication of GT was in a Spanish periodical in 1985; a German book appeared in 1991 (Wittgenstein 1991; cf. Baum 1991: 172–174). Facsimiles of

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the three notebooks (MSS 101–103), including the verso-pages in code, together with a transcription into plain text, is available through The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen at wittgensteinsource.org. I use this transcription, but will refer to the coded entries as GT, followed by date of remark. The first English translation of the coded entries, by Marjorie Perloff, was published only in 2022 (Wittgenstein 2022), and I couldn’t consult it in preparing this chapter. Hence, the translations of quotations from the coded entries are my own, with the German original given in footnotes. 33. Roughly speaking: whereas calling something ‘private’ focuses on the fact that (for whatever reason) one does not want to share it with a broader ‘public’, calling it ‘personal’ focuses on the positive quality of one’s relation to the thing or (and centrally) to another person, to whom one has a personal relation. To equate ‘personal’ with ‘private’ amounts to adopting a negative and quite depersonalized view of the personal. 34. In a letter from Helsinki in December 1964, von Wright informs Anscombe: ‘My assistant, Mr [Tauno] Nyberg, and I are now decoding the passages in code. It is an exhausting and time-consuming job. But I hope we can do it and that it will not take us more than a year’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 3 December 1964, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). This decoding included the wartime notebooks; two months later, von Wright suggests, in response to news that Anscombe is also having some decoding done at Oxford, ‘that the code in the second and third of the 1914–1916 notebooks be deciphered at Oxford. My assistant has done about half of the first notebook, and it is convenient to let him finish it’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 3 February 1965, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). Anscombe had an assistant write the code into a form that could then be turned into ordinary text by computer (Anscombe to von Wright, undated 1965, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12), while von Wright and Nyberg were training themselves to ‘read the code “directly” from the manuscript’ (letter quoted above, 3 February 1965). In the end, all the decoding was done in Helsinki (cf. von Wright to Anscombe, 20 February 1965 and 10 March 1965; Anscombe to von Wright, undated 1965, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12), and in July 1966, von Wright announced: ‘I have completed the decoding job’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 3 July 1966, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). 35. A decade later, some way into the decoding process, von Wright told Anscombe: ‘Although often depressing and sometimes futile, the code-text is also of great interest and I do not regret the amount of time spent on decoding it’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 20 April 1965, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). In later reprints of the ‘Biographical Sketch’, the passage quoted above runs: ‘In the earliest notebooks a considerable part of the content is written in a code. Wittgenstein continued to use this code throughout his life. The notes in code are for the most part of a personal nature’ (von Wright 1982b: 22, also in Malcolm 1984, 9). 36. In 1957, after first studying the plain script part of the wartime notebooks seriously, von Wright wrote to Anscombe: ‘I think the notebooks should be published more or less as they are – with some minor omissions and a slight amount of “editing” only’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 29 April 1957, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). In this private setting, then, just as in the Preface to the Notebooks, he takes it for granted that the coded entries won’t be published, but also expresses no reservations about publishing material Wittgenstein thought he had destroyed.

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37. In the second, revised edition of CV (Wittgenstein 1998), the entries originally in code are marked in the text and indexed as ‘c’. 38. Already in a letter to von Wright from 1953 (Anscombe to von Wright, undated 1953, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12) Anscombe says, referring to F. A. Hayek’s projected biographical writing on Wittgenstein, that she doesn’t ‘feel in the least inclined to put personal documents – W’s code diaries, letters etc. in his [Hayek’s] hands’. What exactly ‘code diaries’ refers to here isn’t clear, but the literary executors had studied the 1914–1916 notebooks already in 1952 (von Wright 1982c: 38). 39. In 1982, when it transpired that, while studying the Wittgenstein-material held in Tübingen, Baum had ‘copied [. . .] the war time diaries written in code’ and wanted to publish them, a matter von Wright found ‘a little alarming’, he wrote to Anscombe: ‘I recall that at our last meeting you mentioned the possibility that we should publish the coded material so as to put an end to further fuss about it. I feel unsure. If we decided to publish, I could do the editing since I decoded the stuff, but “officially” the three of us must appear as editors’ (von Wright to Anscombe, 6 Feb. 1982, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). Anscombe’s apparent suggestion was never carried into effect (Baum also never got the literary executors’ permission to publish the coded entries, but went ahead regardless), and later that same year (1982), Anscombe’s preference seems to have shifted back to strict censorship (on removing all references to the code script in the ‘Picture Biography’ of Wittgenstein written by Michael Nedo, cf. Anscombe to von Wright, 13 August 1982, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12, and on von Wright’s agreement with this, von Wright to Anscombe, 2 Sept. 1982, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). In 1988, when production of a complete transcription of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, and eventually a Gesamtausgabe of his writings was discussed, Anscombe wrote: ‘We need to make some decisions – for example, I incline to think that the code passages should be left in code. The code is so childishly easy to make out that printing it removes the journalistic vulgarities that have gone on about the “Geheimschrift” [. . .]’ (Anscombe to von Wright, 18 July 1988, NLF, COLL. 714.11-12). The length to which Anscombe could go in censoring the Nachlass is illustrated by the incident recorded by Denis Paul (2007, 13), quoted, in part, by Richter, this volume. 40. In his ‘Biographical Sketch’ von Wright wrote of Wittgenstein: ‘It is probably true that he lived on the border of mental illness. A fear of being driven across it followed him throughout his life’; of his friendship: ‘I believe that most of those who loved him [. . .] also feared him’, and of his time as schoolteacher in rural Austria in the 1920s: ‘It appears that he was in constant friction with the people around him’ (1955a: 528; 540; 535). In her brief biographical remarks about Wittgenstein at the beginning of An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959), Anscombe says that he was ‘brought up in an atmosphere of extreme contempt for most kinds of low standard’, and quotes him as saying of himself, ‘I had an unhappy childhood and a most miserable youth’ (1959: 11). Rhees, for his part, explained to von Wright his unease about the Cornell microfilm drawing attention to Wittgenstein’s coded entries, even if they were censored (covered over): ‘I wis/h/ed (and do) that W. had not written those passages [JB: it’s unclear which of the coded entries Rhees refers to, exactly]. I do not know why he wanted to; but I think I do understand in a way, and I understand then also why

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he chose this ambiguous medium [i.e. code]. I fear especially that if they are published they will be published by themselves – not in the contexts (repeat: contexts) in which they were written; so that what was a minor and occasional undertone to Wittgenstein’s life and thinking, will appear as a dominant obsession’ (Rhees to von Wright, 17 December 1966, WWA, Wri-FC-004). 41. In speaking of Wittgenstein’s homosexuality, I don’t mean to prejudge any questions as to what exactly this meant for him or for the men, among them David Pinsent, he loved. 42. During the controversy over the allegations of promiscuous homosexual activity on the young Wittgenstein’s part presented in W. W. Bartley III’s ([1973] 1977) book, Rhees wrote in a long, reflective essay that ‘there are certain stories which it would be foul to relate or tell about somebody even if they were true. The word is foul’, adding that ‘this is not the same as saying that it would have been wrong for the person in question to have done what those stories relate of him. [. . .] What is foul in telling them is not, primarily, that they ascribe some depravity to the person they’re told of. What is foul is the telling. What is foul is to treat the phrase “private life” as though it were a misnomer’ (1974: 71). Anscombe, too, was engaged in the Bartley-controversy, as it unfolded in the pages of the Times Literary Supplement. In response to a favourable review of Bartley’s book (TLS, 17.8.73), she wrote a letter to the editor 16.11.73, adding brief notes in 4.1.74 and 18.1.74 (I thank Rickard Nylund for locating the letters in the TLS). Anscombe’s main objection to Bartley (16.11.73) was that the reader could not judge the veracity or plausibility of his account, because he provided no evidence to support his claims, or even any characterization of ‘the nature of the evidence’ he supposedly had, either regarding the alleged facts or their interpretation – other than his assurance that they were ‘based on conversations and other communications with friends of Wittgenstein’ (Bartley [1973] 1977, 12, fn 2). Bartley responded (TLS, 11.1.74): ‘The information in my book [. . .] is based on communications from persons who I am morally certain knew Wittgenstein and were intimately familiar with his sexual activities in the period immediately following the First World War. I checked details of information and cross-examined thoroughly. It is hardly my fault that at the time I did most of my research homosexual activity was still illegal in Austria [. . .] or that it is still regarded as reprehensible by many persons. Professor Anscombe herself indicates that to imply that a person is homosexual is libellous. How then can she expect me either to identify my informants or to facilitate their recognition in any way?’ Rhees’s response to this kind of argument was: ‘What sort of delicacy keeps Bartley from revealing [his sources’] names and does not keep him from writing [what he writes about Wittgenstein’s homosexuality]? [. . .] What sort of “friends” would they have been, whom (if we take the story) Wittgenstein trusted especially, and who are now ready to tell it and let it be printed – if only their names are not mentioned?’ (1974: 67) On the Bartley-controversy, see further, Monk (1991): 581–586. 43. Anscombe, who staunchly and publicly defended traditional Catholic teaching on sexuality, insisting that the essential tie between sex and procreation be preserved, regarded homosexual acts – as also heterosexual contraceptive intercourse – as unnatural and sinful (Anscombe 1975). Nothing necessarily follows from this fact, however, regarding her attitude to the suppression of the

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coded entries even insofar as they contained allusions to homosexuality. She would hardly have allowed her view of Wittgenstein’s sexuality to affect her appreciation of his philosophy, any more than the ‘evident [. . .] homosexuality’ in Plato’s writings (Anscombe & Geach 1961: 3) affected her appreciation of his, or was a subject she felt a need to avoid because of her appreciation. In contrast to many people with modern, permissive views on sex, Anscombe also wasn’t in the least prude. Once, after she gave a talk during which she mentioned adultery as a sin, a sophisticated student asked her, ‘But anyway, what is adultery?’ Anscombe replied: ‘Oh, don’t you know? It’s fucking someone else’s wife.’ (I have this anecdote from Roger Teichmann, personal communication.) That Anscombe was aware of Wittgenstein’s being homosexual, or at any rate not a ‘practising heterosexual’, is clear from an anecdote she recorded: ‘He once remarked that he’d never gone in for wine much, as some people did; Goethe, for example, drank a great deal of wine. He wondered whether there was anything that went with that. I said “Well, you don’t go in for women either”. He said “I did once – for one woman. But she wouldn’t have me; and she was quite right” ’ (‘Anecdotes’, 28). Von Wright, for his part, wrote in 2001: ‘Wittgenstein [. . .] was homosexual. [. . .] At the time of my first stay there [1939], the academic life in Cambridge was still clearly marked by the university’s monastic origins. Although there were two female colleges, Girton and Newham, the male dominance was total. A female don could invite a male guest for dinner at her college, but not the other way around! Under such circumstances, it is understandable that homoeroticism should appear completely natural and normal. I didn’t find it disagreeable, albeit it was alien to me. It also was not anything one had to speak of only in whispers – in contrast to the absurd laws which were still in force in England and which could brand for life anyone caught performing homosexual acts in public’ (2001a: 74, my trans.). 44. Reflecting on this outrage is a central theme in Hollingworth’s (2018) interesting, programmatically anti-biographical biography of Wittgenstein. In his ‘Biographical Sketch’, von Wright reveals a paradoxical sense of the outrage when he writes: ‘The biographical information which I acquired from conversations with Wittgenstein I did not record on paper until after his death. I felt very strongly that it would have been improper to write them down following our conversations. He did not often talk about his past and only rarely of his youth, which was to him a painful recollection. The idea that someone was collecting data for a biography would certainly have been deeply distasteful to him’ (1955a: 530, fn 4). Rhees, responding to the idea that it doesn’t matter whether Wittgenstein’s coded entries are published, since ‘there will be attacks on him and stupid smears [. . .] whatever happens’, wrote to von Wright, ‘Yes, I know there will. And of course he knew this. When these are attacks /are based/ on what he said and did in public, then I agree it does not matter’, but private writings are different, and ‘[t]he fact that W. is dead weighs nothing when I am trying to consider what he would have wanted. Or rather: it makes me less ready to go contrary to what he would have wished. And if it is true that “the inevitable publication of the material” will come after we are dead – I find no comfort in this’ (Rhees to von Wright, 17 December 1966, WWA, Wri-FC-004).

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45. This is in a letter to Paul Engelmann, who at the time (1958) was contemplating publishing some reminiscences of Wittgenstein. Anscombe went on to say, however: ‘. . . but since that [i.e. pressing the button] has not been possible and it is certain that much that is foolish will keep on being said, it seems to me reasonable that anyone who can write a truthful account of him [Wittgenstein] should do so. On the other hand to write a satisfactory account would seem to need extraordinary talent . . .’ (Engelmann 1968, xiv) – after which she records her suspicions about claims by anyone to have really understood Wittgenstein, quoted above. Engelmann took her letter to be ‘on the whole encouraging’ and cites it as ‘one of the reasons which eventually induced [him] to compile [his Memoir]’ (ibid.). 46. Clearly, neither Rhees nor von Wright objected to publishing things relating to Wittgenstein as a person and his personal life as such: both published substantial material of this kind, written by themselves and others, (e.g. Rhees 1981, ed.; von Wright 1990). By contrast, Anscombe’s personal recollections of Wittgenstein, written as a series of anecdotes, have so far remained unpublished (I quote some of these Anecdotes in the text, and others in Backstrom (2022)). 47. Already in 1954, Anscombe wrote that calling early Wittgenstein an atheist positivist was like calling Plato ‘a materialist with a contempt for mathematics’ (1954: 373), and her 1959 Tractatus-book argues that the logical positivists’ epistemological concerns, shared by modern philosophers generally, are ‘a thorough impediment to the understanding’ of the Tractatus (1959: 12–13; cf. p. 150ff.). Returning to Baum, it is symptomatic that, in defending his own reading of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy as ‘a modern version of “negative theology” ’, he doesn’t quote from the coded entries he published, but overwhelmingly from the plain script Notebooks and from the Tractatus itself (1991: 172; cf. 176–181). 48. ‘. . . die Bemannung ist eine Saubande! Keine Begeisterung, unglaubliche Rohheit, Dummheit & Bosheit!’ 49. ‘Vielleicht bringt mir die Nähe des Todes das Licht des Lebens! Möchte Gott mich erleuchten! Ich bin ein Wurm aber durch Gott werde ich zum Menschen. Gott stehe mir bei. Amen’. – As Wittgenstein noted twenty years later: ‘It is one thing to talk to God & another to talk of God to others’ (Wittgenstein 2003: 183 [MS 183, 16.2.1937]). 50. Incidentally, Anscombe says that this is the ‘part of the Tractatus that seems [. . .] most obviously wrong’, although she adds that she doesn’t herself know – this is after she had written Intention – the ‘true philosophical account’ of the relation between willing and the world (1959: 171–172). 51. ‘wie einen Talisman’ . . . ‘Immer wieder sage ich mir im Geiste die Worte Tolstois vor: “Der Mensch ist ohnmächtig im Fleische aber frei durch den Geist”.’ 52. ‘Hier sind aber böse, herzlose Menschen. Es ist mir fast unmöglich eine Spur von Menschlichkeit in ihnen zu finden. Gott helfe mir zu leben.’ – The only remark from the coded entries that made it into von Wright’s selection in CV (it is the remark that opens that collection) expresses precisely Wittgenstein’s sense of utter alienation from the human beings he lived with. The ‘Chinese’ in this remark are proxy for his fellow soldiers, whose ‘humanity’ he says he ‘cannot

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recognise’; ‘So kann ich oft nicht den Menschen im Menschen erkennen’ (GT, 21.8.14; cf. CV: 3). Compare also the closely related passage in PI, ending in the famous line ‘If a lion could talk, we could not understand him’ (PI, II, p. 223; cf. Perloff 2012: 74–76). We’ll return to the question of ‘recognising another’s humanity’. 53. . . .’nicht ein einziger anständiger Kerl in der ganzen Mannschaft’. . . ‘Wie aber soll ich mich in Zukunft zu dem Allen stellen’ . . . ‘keinen Widerstand zu leisten. Mein Äußeres sozusagen ganz leicht zu machen um mein Inneres ungestört zu lassen’ . . . ‘denn ich bin ja gegen alle diese Menschen ohnmächtig. Ich reibe mich nutzlos auf wenn ich mich wehre’. 54. ‘Wie schwer es ist sich nicht mit den Leuten zu ärgern! Wie schwer es ist zu dulden. [. . .] Wenn immer ich bei der Arbeit mit den Leuten hier in Berührung komme wird mir ihre Gemeinheit so fürchterlich daß die Wut droht in mir zu siegen & auszubrechen. Immer wieder nehme ich mir vor ruhig zu dulden & immer wieder breche ich meinen Vorsatz. Und wie dies kommt weiß ich eigentlich selber nicht. Es ist so riesig schwer mit Leuten zu arbeiten & dabei doch nichts mit ihnen zu tun zu haben.’ 55. As Wittgenstein says, ‘philosophical conflict’ arises not from mere failures of one’s words to ‘accord with established usage’ – that is not what ‘metaphysical use’ means – but because what someone describes themselves as thinking/ meaning ‘does not accord with the [actual] practice of the person giving the description’ (RPP1, §548). Wittgenstein’s discussion of the fantasy of a ‘private language’ (PI §§ 244–315) is an outstanding analysis of the sort of confusions attending such conflicts. 56. ‘Ich hasse sie nicht, aber sie ekeln mich an.’ 57. ‘ungeheuer beschränkt’ 58. We might say that while another’s humanity can be denied, it is always-already ‘recognized’, which means that the denial will be ambivalent and says more about the denier than about the ones whose humanity is denied. Thus, another isolated man on another river boat, Marlowe in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, looks in horrified fascination, in total moral confusion, at the African ‘natives’; ‘[T]he men were –– No, they were not inhuman. Well, you know, that was the worst of it – this suspicion of their not being inhuman [. . .] They howled and leaped, and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity – like yours – the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar [. . .] a dim suspicion of there being a meaning in it which you [. . .] could comprehend’ (Conrad 1996: 51–52). Cf. the critique in Achebe ([1977] 2016), and Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer, in which our common humanity is not ‘suspected’, but taken as a reality to be explored, in its sinister as well as joyful aspects. 59. Nykänen (2021) analyses a closely related problematic in Nietzsche. For more on the connections between moral difficulties and ‘metaphysics’ in Wittgenstein, see Backström 2011 and 2013.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

From a Collection of Aphorisms to the Setting of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy. G.H. von Wright’s Work on Wittgenstein’s General Remarks BERNT Ö STERMAN

1. INTRODUCTION Georg Henrik von Wright’s first meeting with Ludwig Wittgenstein took place in 1939 at Cambridge, where he had gone as a young doctoral student. His initial impressions of Wittgenstein have been described in the letters he sent to his professor and supervisor Eino Kaila in Finland. From these we learn that among other things, von Wright was greatly impressed by Wittgenstein’s figurative speech. After a private conversation with Wittgenstein at the beginning of June, in which Wittgenstein had expressed 175

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his reservations about the value of consistency proofs in mathematics, von Wright writes to Kaila (Österman ed. 2020: 166–167): [Wittgenstein] compared the situation with the following drastic picture: a potato in a dark cellar sprouts, as you know, long and confused sprouts in every direction in a mess. But if you bring them up in the light each of the sprouts shrink to a small green spot! I have a strong feeling that he is right.1 What Wittgenstein had said bears an obvious similarity to a well-known aphoristic remark about the effect of philosophical clarity on mathematics,2 which also was among the general remarks von Wright later came to select from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. The question about Wittgenstein’s general remarks would surface in 1954 in a letter von Wright wrote to Elizabeth Anscombe. At the time, the three literary executors were working on the RFM, which was to appear two years later. Von Wright had been going through some of the relevant manuscripts and found a lot of aphoristic remarks he wanted to omit from the book. Still, he suggested they could be published: Among the omitted stuff, there are many good remarks of a general nature. I have omitted them in order to avoid – as I think we should – creating the impression that the book, which we publish, is a collection of aphorisms. Perhaps some of the omitted remarks can be published on some other occasion.3 We immediately notice that von Wright talks both about ‘remarks of a general nature’ and about ‘aphorisms’, which raises questions about the relation between these two expressions. I will return to the question in sections 3 and 4. The actual work on the collection of Wittgenstein’s general remarks envisaged by von Wright started ten years later, after a meeting of the literary executors in England 1964 (Erbacher 2017: 89). From the beginning it seems clear that von Wright was the one who would be doing the principal work. There came to be two stages in it. At the first stage von Wright compiled a collection of general remarks, which included selections both from the Nachlass and from already published books. The compilation, called ‘A Collection of Remarks’, had two volumes and was described as a selection made 1965–1966.4 Since the second volume is simply called a ‘continuation’ and the pages are numbered in sequence, I have chosen to use the same abbreviation for both volumes, CoR. The collection, which

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also included the remark about the sprouting potatoes, was distributed among the literary executors and some other scholars, but it was never published as such. After completing the CoR, von Wright laid the work aside until 1974, when the second stage of the work commenced, now with the help of von Wright’s assistant Heikki Nyman.5 It resulted in the publication of the German edition Vermischte Bemerkungen: Eine Auswahl aus them Nachlass in 1977, followed by a slightly extended edition of it in 1978 and a German– English parallel edition called Culture and Value\\Vermischte Bemerkungen in 1980 with translations made by Peter Winch, which conforms to the 1978 German edition. One remark was added to the edition of Vermischte Bemerkungen that was included in Band 8 of Suhrkamp’s Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe 1984. A revised edition of the German edition was prepared by Alois Pichler 1994. In this edition the manuscript sources of the remarks are indicated and variants are described in footnotes. The remarks included were the same as in the 1984 German edition. However, in some cases they have been extended to meet the original section divisions made by Wittgenstein. In 1998, a revised bilingual edition based on the 1994 edition was published (CV 1998: xive). For this edition, Peter Winch also made numerous changes to his original translations of the remarks. I will use the abbreviation CV for the 1980 edition, when not otherwise indicated. Similarly, VB means the original edition in German from 1977. Much of the focus will be on CV, since this is the edition available in English that is the closest representation of von Wright’s own vision of the work.6 By calling the work that started in 1974 a second stage I do not only want to indicate that the work was restarted. As I want to show in my article, the restart also involved a new conception of the purpose of the publication. From the original aim of simply collecting several ‘good remarks of a general nature’ in order to present them to the public, the project turned into the providing of the background for nothing less than a reinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and its cultural significance. Consequently, understanding von Wright’s motives in his work on Wittgenstein’s general remarks is a rather complex task. To begin with, we have to understand von Wright’s original interest in Wittgenstein’s general remarks, written in a style so different from his own logical-analytical way of doing philosophy. I will suggest that it should be understood as emanating from von Wright’s more general philosophical interest in literature and art. However, we must also clarify the nature of his later understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. What made him understand Wittgenstein differently than he had done and why did he think the remarks he had collected for CV would be helpful in promoting his new vision? I will attempt to show that the changes in von

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Wright’s understanding of Wittgenstein were connected with the social reorientation that took place in his own thinking towards the late 1960s.7 What remains to be shown is why his initial interest in Wittgenstein’s aphorisms did not lead to a publication in the mid-1960s. I will suggest that the reasons were connected with a fear of misrepresenting Wittgenstein and that the turn the project took in the mid-1970s offered a kind of solution to the problem.

2. VON WRIGHT’S TWO INTERESTS That there were at least two interests connected with von Wright’s project of bringing attention to Wittgenstein’s general remarks is indicated by a careful reading of the Preface to CV. At the beginning of it we get the impression that we are dealing with remarks that merit publication for their own sake. Thus, after an introductory paragraph on the kind of remarks he had included there follows an assessment of their quality, strongly suggesting that they also have an intrinsic value: Some of these notes are ephemeral: others on the other hand – the majority – are of great interest. Sometimes they are strikingly beautiful and profound. It was evident to the literary executors that a number of these notes would have to be published. —CV: ie A few lines later, he also talks about the remarks, or at least some of the remarks, as ‘Wittgenstein’s aphorisms’, also mentioning the ‘powerful effect’ they may have as such. Thus, it seems evident, that one of the interests behind von Wright’s project was simply to publish a set of general remarks by Wittgenstein worth publishing in their own right. However, at the end of the Preface a more instrumental perspective on the general remarks emerges. The relevant passage is the following: I am all the same convinced that these notes can be properly understood and appreciated only against the background of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and, furthermore, that they make a contribution to our understanding of that philosophy. —CV: iie, author’s emphasis The quotation describes the ways in which the general remarks of CV, despite ‘not belonging directly’ to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, still are related to it.

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The first claim is that the remarks may only properly be understood in the context of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This introduces the problem of detachability (see Section 5). However, at the very end of the passage von Wright reverses the perspective of the relation between the general remarks and Wittgenstein’s philosophy, which brings us to the second interest von Wright had in publishing Wittgenstein’s general remarks. For now the focus is not on the significance the ‘surrounding philosophy’ has for how we understand the remarks, but on the claim that the remarks of CV may contribute to our understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. How should this be understood? One possibility is that the remarks simply widen the scope of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, for instance, by presenting vital elements of what we may take as his philosophy of music or philosophy of religion. However, this does not seem to be what von Wright had in mind. What he means is the significance these remarks may have for how we take what already had been understood as Wittgenstein’s philosophy. As will be further explained in Section 6, he is thinking of some core features of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as they are presented in the PI. The Preface of CV is not the only location in which von Wright advanced the idea that CV could be helpful for the understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Another important source is von Wright’s 1982 book Wittgenstein. In the Introduction, von Wright offers the following general description of the aims of his publication of Wittgenstein’s general remarks, using the German title of the work; ‘The publication of the Vermischte Bemerkungen (1977) will, I hope, contribute to a better understanding both of Wittgenstein’s roots in European culture and of his significance for our times’ (von Wright 1982a: 3). One way in which CV certainly is helpful for the understanding of Wittgenstein’s roots is by revealing some of his direct influences. Thus, it includes an often-quoted passage from 1931 in which Wittgenstein lists his main influences, such as Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler and Sraffa (CV: 19e). However, the perspective which interested von Wright even more was how CV could be used to illuminate the way in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy could be seen as a counter-reaction to problems inherent in his times. The thought of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as being rooted in a sense of alienation from his culture is also the main theme in von Wright’s article ‘Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times’ (von Wright 1982g; henceforth referred to as WRT), which had its origin in an Opening Address to the 2nd Wittgenstein symposium in Kirchberg 1977, the year VB was published. In this article von Wright uses many passages from CV in support of his interpretation of

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Wittgenstein. ‘[CV] tells us more than any other source about Wittgenstein’s intellectual character and view of life, and also about how he regarded his relationship with his times’, he writes (WRT: 203). To understand how von Wright in the mid-1970s had come to view Wittgenstein’s philosophy and its cultural embeddedness, a close reading of WRT is required. This will be a central theme of Section 6. However, I will start with an examination of von Wright’s original interest in ‘aphorisms’ by Wittgenstein meriting publication for their own sake.

3. GENERAL REMARKS AND PHILOSOPHY Von Wright often speaks about ‘general remarks’ and ‘aphorisms’, as if the terms were interchangeable. Clearly, however, the characterization of a remark as ‘general’ would seem to mark a certain range of topics. But an aphorism is a literary genre, introducing the question of the form. I will start with the question what a general remark (by Wittgenstein) is for von Wright and how it figures in his account of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and turn to the question of the aphoristic form in the next section. Von Wright often writes as there would be an easily identifiable category of ‘general topics’, which the remarks concern. Thus, for instance, the full title of the CoR reads as follows: A collection of remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein on questions connected with his Life and Work; the Nature of Philosophical Inquiry, Art, Religion and the ‘Philosophy of Life’; the I, the Will, and the World; and various other General Topics. The list at the beginning of the Preface to CV is similar, but shorter: Some of these notes are autobiographical, some are about the nature of philosophical activity, and some concern subjects of a general sort, such as questions about art or about religion. —CV: ie So, we have plenty of examples, but what is it that makes these subjects ‘general’? In this connection, I want to suggest that it is better to think of generality as having many aspects, rather than to try to look for something the examples have in common. First, there is the idea of a ‘subject of a general sort’. The opposite of this would seem to be a subject of a specific sort. This relates to the distinction between what is of general interest, concerning any human being, as opposed to what is only of interest to

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specialists. How to draw the line between the general and the specific interest may not be something we can always agree on, but it seems clear that this is a distinction we often make. Second, there is the question of the nature of things, as when von Wright, in the citations, talks about ‘the nature of philosophical inquiry’ or ‘the nature philosophical activity’. Here, the opposition to the general is the particular or the instance. Von Wright often makes a difference between Wittgenstein’s general remarks and Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This has already been seen in the passage from the 1954 letter to Anscombe, in which he apparently did not see any problems with ‘omitting the general remarks’ from the ‘philosophical work’ at hand (RFM). Similarly, at the beginning of the Preface to CV, von Wright talks about the remarks as ‘numerous notes which do not belong directly with his philosophical works although they are scattered amongst the philosophical texts’ (CV: ie). At first sight, this may seem surprising, because if we look at the characterization of general remarks offered in the CoR, it would seem that they certainly included remarks on topics that traditionally would count as philosophical – such as ‘the I’ and ‘the Will’. The remarks on subjects like music and religion that were published in CV have also often been taken as contributions to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of music and philosophy of religion. To complicate matters, von Wright also wants to say that some of Wittgenstein’s general remarks were inseparable from Wittgenstein’s philosophical work, or at least ‘not possible to separate sharply’ (CV: ie). In this section I will only try to clarify the sense in which von Wright may have thought that a general remark could belong, or not belong, with the philosophical work of Wittgenstein. How can a general remark belong with the philosophy in a work by Wittgenstein? The question surfaces in an overview of modern philosophy called Logik, filosofi och språk (Logic, philosophy and language), which von Wright first published in 1957. There, von Wright says the following about Wittgenstein’s later writings, of which only the PI (1953) and the RFM (1956) had been published at the time: And it would be possible to describe [Wittgenstein’s] later philosophical writings as an extensive collection of careful investigations of concrete examples along with, scattered here and there, often aphoristic marginal notes of a more general nature on the very activity he is conducting. —von Wright 1971b: 2048 Thus, von Wright appears to be reading the later Wittgenstein in the following way. He distinguishes between what he sees as ‘careful investigations of

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concrete examples’ and ‘aphoristic marginal notes’. The former involves elements such as Wittgenstein’s analysis of various language-games by means of tangible examples, as The Builders introduced in §2 of the PI. Most importantly, it seems clear that these also are the parts of the PI that are closest to the logical-analytical work von Wright had been doing up to the mid-1950s, representing what he saw as ‘professional philosophical work’ – principally meaning that there is a systematic approach using a wellidentifiable methodology. The latter, again, are reflections on the philosophical activity that is manifested by the PI. Some of these were also selected for the CoR, as, for instance, ‘§127. The work of a philosopher consists in marshalling recollections for a particular purpose’ (CoR: 81–82).9 Similar ‘general remarks’ on philosophy, and occasionally also on mathematics and logic, can be found among the selections von Wright made from the RFM.10 Calling the aphoristic notes ‘marginal’ may sound derogatory, but I don’t think this is how it should be taken. What von Wright had in mind was a distinction between different levels of the text, in which one had a reflective function in relation to the other. If the distinction between a systematic level and a commentary level in terms of general remarks accounts for how a general remark could belong with the philosophical work, what is a general remark that does not belong with it? The following remark, included both in the CoR and CV, may perhaps serve as an example of what von Wright was inclined to think of as a general remark that was distinct from Wittgenstein’s philosophical work: To treat somebody well when he does not like you, you need to be not only good natured, but very tactful too. —CoR: 244; CV: 11e It is noteworthy that it also belongs to the remarks that have been marked by Wittgenstein by using brackets, perhaps indicating that also he thought of it as separable or ‘different’.11

4. THE FORM OF THE APHORISM As we have seen, von Wright often speaks of Wittgenstein’s general remarks as aphorisms. What does he mean by this and what significance does it have? Some general characteristics seem easy to identify. Thus, an aphorism is meaningful in itself. Accordingly, it is an expression that may be understood in isolation from other textual contexts. Closely connected with this, is the idea of the aphorism as having value for its own sake, not excluding that it

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also may be instrumentally valuable for some given purpose. Aphorisms also purport to express general truths. Traditionally these often concern human relations, such as friendship or love. However, in von Wright’s terminology, an aphorism is a rather broad notion in respect of its subjects. Thus, as we have seen, he also seems to think of some of Wittgenstein’s remarks about the nature of philosophy as aphorisms, or ‘aphoristic’. Von Wright’s interest in aphorisms started from an early date. We have already seen that Wittgenstein’s aphoristic way of expressing himself had already caught von Wright’s attention in the early summer of 1939. He also shared Wittgenstein’s admiration for another German philosopher known for his aphorisms, C. G. Lichtenberg. In an essay from 1942, von Wright paid attention to the similarity between Lichtenberg’s way of expressing his thoughts and the aphorisms of Wittgenstein, in this case referring to the TLP (von Wright 1942: 243). In Lichtenberg, von Wright especially admired his skill of ‘transmitting to other subjects truths of a universal and timeless value’, which have their origin in an internal monologue (von Wright 1942: 244).12 The similarity between Lichtenberg and Wittgenstein is also reflected in the choice of the German title of von Wright’s publication of Wittgensteinian aphorisms, Vermischte Bemerkungen, which seems to have been influenced by the Vermischte Schriften of Lichtenberg, an early selection made out of Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher (Waste books).13 But what was the nature of von Wright’s early documented interest in aphorisms? It is noteworthy that the aphorism is a literary form. Hence, it may be illuminating to look at what von Wright has said about literature and, specifically, its relation to philosophy. We may begin by noting that von Wright was always strongly aware of the limitations of the logical-analytical tradition of philosophy that was near to himself, occasionally lamenting the ‘narrowly restricted relevance and scope’ of his own professional work. This should be understood against his ambition to make philosophy relevant to his life and his understanding of the world (von Wright 1989: 18; see also Österman 2019). However, neither did he think that modern philosophical movements like existentialism were doing any better in tackling ‘existential matters’. Von Wright’s rejection of the existential relevance of philosophy was strongly connected with the idea that these kinds of questions had their proper place in arts and literature (von Wright 1955b: 125). But what is it that literature, but not philosophy, can achieve? We find von Wright’s most elaborated views on literature in his essays on Dostoevsky, in which he stresses the great Russian writer’s capacity to depict human reality in all its complexity. The following passage, in which von Wright also addresses the shortcomings of analytical thought, captures the main idea:

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The spiritual reality of Man is much too complex to be captured unequivocally by the networks of distinctions and deductions of abstract thought [. . .] It is not a weakness, but a strength in [Dostoevsky] that his philosophical ideas are of a complex nature, approaching the contradictory, and the paradox. —von Wright 1955c: 7414 From this we also see that von Wright was no stranger to the thought that a great writer like Dostoevsky also could, or even should, be counted among the great philosophers. One of the leading ideas of his essays on Dostoevsky, precisely, is to speak about the Russian writer as a philosopher. However, it is noteworthy that von Wright does not speak of Dostoyevsky as a philosopher in a wide sense of the term, as perhaps might be expected, but as a philosopher in the deep sense of it. This is the sense of philosophy ‘which covers all serious attempts to determine the place of man in the order of things, independently of whether they use scientific or artistic ways of expression’ (von Wright 1955c: 71–72, translation by author).15 If a writer like Dostoyevsky, who wrote novels, could be one of the deep philosophers, it is hardly surprising that von Wright would associate literary artistry with someone he saw as a philosophical genius, as in the case of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Thus, in his ‘Biographical Sketch’ of Wittgenstein, von Wright predicted that one day, Wittgenstein would be ‘ranked among the classic writers of German prose’ (von Wright 1958: 51). Interestingly, aphorisms were explicitly mentioned in this connection. For this is what von Wright writes about the literary merits of the PI: The style is simple and perspicuous, the construction of sentences firm and free, the rhythm flows easily. The form is sometimes that of a dialogue, with questions and replies; sometimes, as in the Tractatus, it condenses to aphorisms —von Wright 1958: 21, author’s emphasis It may be suggested that there is something similar in what von Wright found deeply philosophical in Dostoevsky’s novels and what he could appreciate as ‘deep’ in Wittgenstein’s aphorisms. What I have in mind are features such as a complexity and openness that cannot be reformulated without a loss of meaning. This may also explain his initial reaction to what Wittgenstein had said about mathematics in June 1939. For this is what he wrote to Kaila in June 1939, possibly referring also to Wittgenstein’s figurative speech: ‘[I] think that many vital things have become clear to me, although I have difficulties in saying what’ (Österman ed. 2020: 166).16

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5. ‘IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD NOT HURRY WITH THIS’ The CoR, which had been compiled using a ‘maximum principle’,17 was never intended to be published as such. However, in an explanatory Note at the beginning of it, von Wright suggests that a publication could be obtained from it ‘through a process of sieving’. So why did the project not immediately take this direction, rather than laying idle for almost ten years? I will suggest that this had to do with difficulties relating to the process of selection, but also with conflicting aims of the project. Most importantly, the publication of Wittgenstein’s general remarks could also be seen as running counter to a basic goal of the literary executors, the promoting of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. A hint of the selection criterion, and the problems involved, is offered by the two-page explanatory Note at the beginning of the CoR. Here, von Wright writes: – Question: Could a collection be published consisting of only “detachable” remarks? Or would such a collection be too far removed from the rest of the Wittgenstein’s work to be of interest? —CoR: 3 From this we learn that one selection principle he certainly had in mind was ‘detachability’ of the remarks in relation to Wittgenstein’s philosophical work. As we have already seen in Section 3, von Wright believed that there was a clear sense in which an aphoristic remark by Wittgenstein could belong to his philosophical work, namely as a ‘marginal note’ performing a commentary function. Accordingly, a detachable general remark may be seen as a general remark that figures in a philosophical work but is not associated with it in this particular way. This also seems to have been among the selection criteria von Wright wanted to apply. The problem was only that he found it difficult to do, or as he writes in the Note But no sharp division can be made. It is, for example, often difficult to tell whether a remark should be classified as a comment on Wittgenstein’s own work – its difficulties, methods, progress – or as a comment on philosophy in general. —CoR: 3 However, it should also be noted that there was a tension between the criterion of detachability and what I have taken as von Wright’s original aim with preparing a publication of Wittgenstein’s general remarks, namely, to offer a

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collection of aphoristic remarks worth publishing in their own right. There can be no question about the fact that von Wright highly valued precisely the aphoristic remarks he found in the PI and the TLP. As we have seen, the aphorisms of the TLP had already been praised in von Wright’s biographical sketch of Wittgenstein. Many general remarks from the TLP and the PI were also selected for the CoR. In the Preface to CV, von Wright even stated that ‘many of Wittgenstein’s most impressive “aphorisms” are to be found in his philosophical works’, explicitly naming the PI and the TLP. However, von Wright’s growing awareness of how things were interconnected in Wittgenstein’s philosophical works also made him exclude the remarks he most valued – or, as he writes, ‘it did not seem to me right to tear them from their surroundings’. Eventually all remarks from published works were omitted (CV: ie). Thus, one problem was the question of finding high-quality remarks that truly were detachable from what von Wright took as the philosophical works – or remarks that could be ‘separated sharply’ as von Wright says in the Preface to CV (ie). However, as we have seen, von Wright was also worried that a compilation of detachable remarks would be too far removed from Wittgenstein’s philosophical work ‘to be of interest’. Why did he think so? Should we not rather suppose that von Wright would have considered any good general remark written by Wittgenstein as highly interesting in its own right? However, the primary question here is not von Wright’s private preferences. It rather concerns what he felt he was committed to as Wittgenstein’s heir and literary executor, i.e. the promoting of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. For this reason, he could also see a problem in publishing something that he feared was not of ‘philosophical interest’, nor connected with what he saw as the philosophical core of Wittgenstein’s thinking. Ultimately, he must have felt he might be misrepresenting the Wittgenstein he was obliged to promote.18 Given von Wright’s concerns relating to detachability and the fear of misrepresenting Wittgenstein, it is hardly surprising that he started to have second thoughts about publishing the general remarks – ‘I doubt whether my present view of the matter is definite: but it is against, rather than for, publishing anything at all’, he wrote to Anscombe in June 1965. In any case he wanted to postpone the matter: Perhaps some of us will some day have a really good idea of how to make a selection which can justifiably be published. But it is important that we should not hurry with this.19 However, it is not that difficult to see what the project craved. It became important to show that the general remarks of Wittgenstein, in one way or

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another, had a philosophical importance. Von Wright’s crucial insight was that the remarks provided a clue to a proper understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

6. RELATING WITTGENSTEIN TO HIS TIMES What von Wright came to see was that Wittgenstein’s general remarks gave a picture of Wittgenstein’s place in his culture, and the way he experienced it. Furthermore, it was possible to see Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a reaction to this culture, i.e. as an expression of his alienation from it.20 In this sense, the general remarks of Wittgenstein, or at least some subsection of them, were important in providing what I have called a setting for his later philosophy. If this is right, making them public would not contribute to a misrepresentation of Wittgenstein, as von Wright had feared. On the contrary, a collection of Wittgenstein’s general remarks would help us to get his philosophy right. But what exactly was it we were to understand about Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and what brought about the changes in von Wright’s thinking about Wittgenstein? I will start with the first question. As the main source of von Wright’s early understanding of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy I take his overview of modern philosophy from 1957. This I will compare with what von Wright says about Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in WRT, the article that was based on his Opening Address in Kirchberg 1977. As we will see, many of the elements that von Wright saw as crucial for the understanding of Wittgenstein in WRT, were already present in von Wright’s understanding of Wittgenstein in the 1950s. However, the connections he draws between them are new. In this sense, it seems right to speak of a reinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. According to von Wright’s early conception, Wittgenstein saw philosophy as an activity aimed at the dissolving of philosophical problems. This he wanted to achieve by means of a perspicuous presentation of a conceptual bundle (‘begreppshärva’ in the original Swedish), intended to show what went wrong when a philosopher started to look for the essences of things, in the form of the question what something really is? (art, language and so on). What we are supposed to realize is that there may be no unity behind our various uses of a concept. In this sense, philosophy may be seen as a kind of psychotherapy, with the aim of liberating us from our intellectual obsessions. Interestingly, in von Wright’s overview of modern philosophy from 1957 it is also suggested that there is a relation between philosophical problems and cultural circumstances, or as von Wright writes:

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Not all philosophical problems are eternal. New are being born and old die out. However, the changes are not as much dependent on the internal nature of the philosophical discussion, as on changes in the cultural milieu, where the discussion is conducted. —von Wright 1971b: 213–21421 However, there is no attempt to clarify what it precisely is that gives birth to a philosophical question in a culture, and definitely no indication that von Wright, at the time, saw philosophical questions as a symptom of a disease entrenched in a culture. If anything was to be seen as a ‘disease’, it was the obsessions of the philosophical mind itself. Before proceeding to WRT, it should be mentioned that von Wright, in the 1950s, certainly knew Wittgenstein had a difficult relation with his times. However, when the subject was brought up in von Wright’s ‘Biographical Sketch’, the focus was only on Wittgenstein’s worries about how his philosophy would be received (he thought he was writing for people of a different culture than present-day men). In this context, von Wright did not raise the question how Wittgenstein’s alienation from his times possibly was manifested in his philosophy. He only added that ‘[m]odern times were to him a dark age’, with a footnote to the Preface of the PI (von Wright 1958: 20). Twenty years later, in WRT, von Wright had found a way of connecting his view of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with Wittgenstein’s sombre vision of his times. Roughly, modern times is, or is the bearer of, the disease of which philosophical problems and obsessions are the symptom. Wittgenstein’s own philosophy is seen as a cure, albeit a modest one that only may alleviate the symptoms. Still, the idea of a therapy continues to be strongly present. Von Wright’s novel view of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is basically supported by numerous citations from VB (twelve remarks are used in all), illustrating von Wright’s new vision of the value of the compilation. Let us now take a more detailed look at the vision of Wittgenstein’s philosophy von Wright advances in WRT. The basic idea is that philosophical problems are symptoms of something that is wrong in the way people live in a modern civilization, marked by a belief in progress ‘above all thanks to the technological applications of science’ (WRT: 207). Von Wright explains it as follows: Wittgenstein [. . .] thought that the problems with which he was struggling were somehow connected with the ‘Lebensweise’ or the way people live, that is, with features of the culture or civilization to which he and his pupils belonged. His attitude to this culture was [. . .] one of censure and

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even disgust. He therefore wished these ways of life changed – but he had no faith that he or his teaching would change them. —WRT: 206 Furthermore, it is clear that the connection between philosophical problems and the way people live runs through a malfunctioning language: The problems of philosophy have their roots in a distortion or malfunctioning of the language-games which in its turn signalizes that something is wrong with the ways in which men live. —WRT: 207 As we have seen, according to von Wright, Wittgenstein did not believe he could change the way people lived. The only thing he was able to do was to address the symptoms, i.e. the philosophical problems, by providing an ‘intellectual cure’. Von Wright’s description of Wittgenstein’s intellectual cure in WRT, to ‘expose the disorder in the language-games, describe it, and thereby rid his mind of the torments produced by the unrecognized illness’, is very similar to his exposition of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method in the 1950s, except for the concluding reference to the unknown malady. It is noteworthy that the idea of a relation between philosophical questions and cultural circumstances, which was only mentioned in passing in von Wright’s 1957 overview of modern philosophy, found a much stronger expression in WRT. Not only did he advance the idea of philosophical problems as rooted in a sickness of the times, he also suggested that Wittgenstein had a deeply historical sense also of his own philosophy as representing what it had to be in his particular times (WRT: 216). I now turn to my second question, what it was that brought about the change in von Wright’s vision of Wittgenstein and consequently, also the change in his view of the significance of the general remarks. I will suggest that von Wright’s reinterpretation of Wittgenstein was greatly inspired by his discussions with Kristóf Nyíri from 1974 onwards, but also by his acquaintance with Allan Janik’s and Stephen Toulmin’s book Wittgenstein’s Vienna in 1973. Roughly, Nyíri seems to have influenced von Wright’s view of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a reaction against Modernity, whereas Janik’s and Toulmin’s work may have contributed to the idea of Wittgenstein’s thought as embodied in a culture. However, von Wright was never a mere copyist of the ideas of other thinkers. The influences he got fell onto fertile ground. In the early 1970s, when the transformations in his thinking about Wittgenstein started to occur, he was already preoccupied with his own concerns related to the state of the Western culture. This had made him turn to philosophical movements like Marxism and

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critical theory. As we shall see, especially Marxism played an important part in his new reading of Wittgenstein – not, precisely, as the idea that Wittgenstein’s thinking was Marxist in its spirit, but rather in the form of a system of thought that von Wright was mapping Wittgenstein onto during the mid-1970s. Finally, it should also be mentioned that, in the early 1970s, the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy had become a current issue for von Wright, through the literary executors’ work on the second, revised and expanded, edition of the RFM (published in 1974).22 I will start with the question of Kristóf Nyíri’s influence on von Wright’s work on Wittgenstein’s general remarks. To my knowledge, Nyíri’s visit to von Wright’s research seminar on 7 November 1974 is the only event that von Wright has explicitly mentioned as a cause of his renewed interest in Wittgenstein’s general remarks. This is what he writes to Norman Malcolm on 12 December of the same year:23 In November a Hungarian scholar by the name Nyíri visited us and read a paper to our research seminar on Wittgenstein in the “perspective” of Marx, Freud, and Musil. [. . .] A consequence of N’s visit was that I resumed the work which I [. . .] started years ago on editing a collection of Wittgenstein’s “general remarks”. I re-read the material and was deeply impressed. I must now set myself to do the work. From this we certainly get the impression that it was only after Nyíri’s visit that von Wright resumed the work that had been idle since the mid-1960s. However, this cannot be completely right. That von Wright had already started to work on a publication at the time of Nyíri’s visit is shown by an early draft of the Preface to VB that has been inserted at the beginning of the CoR. The date of the draft is 20 August 1974. Furthermore, in a letter to Nyíri written in July of the same year, von Wright had mentioned Wittgenstein’s remarks of a ‘general nature’, saying that they should be published.24 Thus, it rather seems that Nyíri’s talk gave von Wright the final impetus he needed to complete the work with his assistant Heikki Nyman (see also Erbacher 2017: 99). I want to suggest that the thought of the general remarks as a setting of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy had already begun to form under the influence of Janik’s and Toulmin’s book when Nyíri arrived in Helsinki in November 1974. However, the interaction with Nyíri was important in developing the details of the relation between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and his times. This may perhaps also explain a peculiar feature of the early draft of the Preface to VB. It almost exactly corresponds with the published Preface, except for the passage that mentions the contribution the general remarks make to the understanding of Wittgenstein’s

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philosophy. This part is lacking in the draft, suggesting that the idea was properly developed only after August 1974, possibly after Nyíri’s visit.25 Nyíri’s talk in Helsinki has not been preserved. We only know its title, ‘Wittgenstein’s philosophical anthropology as seen from the perspective of Marx’s theory of history’26 and what was said about the talk in the letter to Malcolm. However, Nyíri’s visit was followed by correspondence that sheds some light on the topics of their intellectual interaction. Of particular interest is a letter Nyíri sent to von Wright on 29 April 1975 and von Wright’s reply from 8 May. In his letter, Nyíri had enclosed a draft of his article ‘Wittgenstein’s New Traditionalism’, which was later to be printed 1976 in a Festschrift to the honour of von Wright on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. In the final article, Nyíri’s explains his central claim as follows: My purpose in the present paper is to suggest that Wittgenstein’s so-called later philosophy is the embodiment of a conservative-traditionalist view of history . . . —Nyíri 1976: 503 It is easy to see that Nyíri’s description of his aims, precisely, involves the kind of approach that was added to the final version of the Preface to CV, i.e. that Wittgenstein’s cultural stance gives us important clues to the nature of his philosophy. However, von Wright by no means whole-heartedly accepted the suggestion that Wittgenstein’s world view could be described as conservative-traditionalist. Thus, in his reply, written in German from Karlsruhe, he underlined the complexity of Wittgenstein’s position, using similar arguments that would be used in his criticism of Nyíri’s position in a later article on Wittgenstein’s relation to his times, ‘Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century’ (von Wright 1993g; first published 1990, henceforth referred to as WTC) – like the fact that Wittgenstein had many friends with a ‘pronouncedly marxist orientation’ (WTC: 89). However, clearly, some of the features Nyíri included among Wittgenstein’s conservatist traits are of interest. Most strikingly, Nyíri strongly stressed Wittgenstein’s alienation from Modernity, summarized as the belief [. . .] that man’s so-called historical progress, and especially the positive role reason is supposed to play in it, is an illusion. —Nyíri 1976: 503 Obviously, this is very much in line with the view of Wittgenstein that is so central to WRT. Moreover, the impression of a fertile interaction between

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von Wright and Nyíri is underlined by the fact that Nyíri supports his claim by referring to the ‘Sketch for a Foreword’ from 1930, which von Wright has called ‘the best and fullest articulation of [Wittgenstein’s] attitude to Modernity’ (WTC: 87–88). Another noteworthy feature of von Wright’s discussion with Nyíri is Wittgenstein’s relationship with Marx. However, it should be stressed that von Wright’s interest in Marxism had already been there for some time. Thus, Marx already played a role in von Wright’s 1971 book Explanation and Understanding. In this connection, the theoretical framework of Marxism was used quite loosely for the purpose of understanding the roots and mechanisms of historical and societal changes by connecting Marxian ideas of societal change by means of dialectical processes with von Wright’s own model of explanation for the human sciences, the practical syllogism (von Wright 1971b, 144; 158–160). However, Marx also became of interest when von Wright started to look for ways to understand and challenge the presuppositions inherent in his own Western world view in the wake of his engagement against the Vietnam war,27 or what he called a ‘critical concern for the condition of man’. Marx and ‘some writers in an undogmatic and unorthodox Marxist tradition’,28 were mentioned as thinkers he thought he could learn from in his ‘Intellectual Autobiography’ (von Wright 1989: 21). The final version of the writing was published 1989, but drafts of the parts in which Marx was mentioned had been ready in 1973.29 Here, we can also see some first signs of von Wright’s efforts to compare Wittgenstein with Marx. Thus, he describes his own, unspecified, ‘neo-Wittgensteinianism’ as related to ‘my awakening interest in Hegel and Marx’ and ‘my questioning of the political and social Weltbild with which I had been brought up and lived’ (von Wright 1989: 41). However, in the letter to Nyíri from May 1975, von Wright’s thoughts about Wittgenstein’s relation to Marx also started to involve important differences.30 Now, von Wright wanted to suggest that Wittgenstein could be seen as an ‘umgekehrten Marx’, a reversed Marx. But what did he mean by this? In the letter we only get the hint that it had something to do with the question about the extent, and how, society could be reformed by a ‘Vermenschlichung des Menschen’ (humanizing of human beings). However, what he had in mind can be clarified by going back to WRT. At first sight, the suggestion that WRT had something to do with Wittgenstein’s relation with Marx may seem surprising, for Marx is not mentioned at all in the article. However, if we investigate the genesis of WRT, things start to look different. WRT was based on von Wright’s Opening Address in Kirchberg 1977, and for this some drafts have been preserved. In one of these, Marx figures in a crucial way, although he was omitted from

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the final presentation.31 Of particular interest are the passages in section 4 of WRT, in which von Wright explains how he understands the connection between philosophical problems and forms of life in Wittgenstein, and why he thinks Wittgenstein did not believe his teaching could trigger a change in the way people lived. In WRT it reads as follows: . . . it was [Wittgenstein’s] philosophical conviction that the life of the human individual and therefore also all individual manifestations of culture are deeply entrenched in basic structures of a social nature. The structures in question are what Wittgenstein called ‘Lebensformen’, forms of life, and their embodiment in what he called ‘Sprachspiele’, languagegames. —WRT: 207 However, in the corresponding passage in the draft, there is an explicit comparison between Wittgenstein and Marx: . . . it was [Wittgenstein’s] philosophic[al] conviction that the life of the human individual and therefore also all individual manifestations of culture are deeply entrenched in basic structures of a social nature. /In this regard one can make illuminating and by no means superficial comparisons between Wittgenstein and Marx./ These structures are the “[L] ebensformen”, forms of life and their embodiments in the language games./ Marx would have said: in the productive relations./32 WRT continues: They are ‘what has to be accepted, the given’, the unquestioned basis of our judging and thinking. This basis, to be sure, is not eternal and immutable. It is a product of human history and changes with history. It is something man made, and he changes. But how this happens is, according to Wittgenstein, not to be accounted for by a theory, or foreseen. ‘Wer kennt die Gesetze, nach denen die Gesellschaft sich ändert?’, he asks, and adds: ‘Ich bin überzeugt, dass auch der Gescheiteste keine Ahnung hat’. —WRT: 20733 The corresponding passage in the draft is very similar. However, it ends with a passage which has been omitted from the published version, which, finally, also gives content to the idea of Wittgenstein as the reversed Marx:

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This surely is the very opposite to the view Marx held. Wittgenstein did not “believe” in any revolution, i.e. a calculated and predictable means of changing the ways of life. He is, in some deep sense, an anti-revolutionary.34 In the draft there is also a reference to Marx in connection with the claim that Wittgenstein thought philosophy, or his philosophy, was determined by his times. Thus, in the draft, but not in WRT, the claim that Wittgenstein was much more ‘history-conscious’ than has been recognized, is followed by the comment ‘[h]ere is another affinity with Marx’.35 Hence, the reason von Wright described Wittgenstein as a reversed Marx, had to do with their differing views on the prospects of effectuating a change in the prevailing forms of life. Whereas Marx certainly was ‘a revolutionary’, Wittgenstein was not. But why did the mapping of Wittgenstein onto Marx become so important to von Wright? Partly, the comparison with Marx may have acted as a heuristic device for understanding aspects of Wittgenstein that had been difficult to see for von Wright (Spengler is sometimes used in a similar way). However, it is also clearly of some interest that von Wright had been engaging with the thoughts of Marx before he recommenced his work on the general remarks. It may be suggested that in Wittgenstein, von Wright saw an alternative to Marx, who provided grounds for understanding the problems von Wright felt were inherent in Western culture, but also avoided some of the problems he thought were connected with Marx. Accordingly, when von Wright describes Wittgenstein as an ‘antirevolutionary’, we should perhaps also think of it as an attitude that was congenial to von Wright himself. There is another notable difference between Wittgenstein and Marx, concerning which von Wright clearly sided with the former. This concerns the attitudes they had towards one of the central characteristics of Modernity, the idea of progress through science and technology, introducing a second sense to the idea of Wittgenstein as an ‘umgekehrten Marx’. Although the modernist aspect of Marxism was not mentioned in the draft of the talk in Kirchberg 1977, von Wright dealt with the issue in another context at approximately the same time. Thus, in the essay ‘Eine zerreissfeste Weltanschaung’ (A tear-proof worldview), written in Swedish despite its German title, von Wright stressed how Marxism is allied with the belief in progress, in contradistinction to ‘deeply time-critical nonmarxist thinkers like Nietzsche, Spengler or Wittgenstein’ (von Wright 1978a: 137)36. There remains the question of why Marx was not mentioned in the final version of the Opening address, and in WRT. This we cannot tell for sure. Perhaps it only had to do with the uneasy political connections any discussion of Marx was likely to suggest during the Cold War, with the possible connotations it might have had for a philosopher who came from

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the country that served as the model of ‘Finlandization’. Even if von Wright did not accept Nyíri’s description of Wittgenstein as conservative, he was certainly not prepared to place Wittgenstein too far on the leftist side, either. It is also noteworthy that the description of Wittgenstein as ‘an antirevolutionary’ was present only in the draft that Marx was named in, as if von Wright was fighting a possible misunderstanding. Only a little over a year before Nyíri’s visit to Helsinki, Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin had published the book Wittgenstein’s Vienna. It seems possible that it had an even decisive part in the restart of the project, in drawing von Wright’s attention to the cultural background of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. However, whereas Wittgenstein’s Vienna was focused on the cultural roots of the TLP, von Wright main interest was on the PI. So, in a way, one could perhaps say that WRT is to the PI, what Wittgenstein’s Vienna was to the TLP. It may be shown that von Wright had already read Wittgenstein’s Vienna in July 1973 and that he was very impressed by the work.37 Thus, in a joint letter to the authors on 15 July 1973,38 von Wright wrote that he thinks ‘the perspective in which the book places Wittgenstein the philosopher is essentially right’.39 From the letter we also learn that von Wright thought that Janik’s and Toulmin’s way of relating Wittgenstein’s philosophical focus on language to his cultural background was on the right track: I agree in the essentials with the way in which you “derive” Wittgenstein’s concern with language from a specific Austrian tradition and in the last resort from the curious spiritual situation in “Kakanien”, von Wright wrote to the authors, using Robert Musil’s nickname for the last stage of the Habsburg empire. What von Wright meant was their attempt to present the Tractarian view of language as a reaction against the milieu of pre-war Austria-Hungary, with its ‘meaningless decoration and superfluity’ in music, arts and literature (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 205). Although the cultural context Janik and Toulmin provided for Wittgenstein’s philosophy belongs to a time earlier than most of the remarks in CV, there is obviously a connection between their hypotheses and the general remarks. CV is one of the primary sources of what Wittgenstein actually thought about music, literature and art throughout his life, providing important data that often confirm the assumptions made by Janik and Toulmin. As such, the new interest in the cultural setting of Wittgenstein’s work might have inspired von Wright to recommence his work on the general remarks that had been idle for some years. However, the connection between Janik’s and Toulmin’s book and the motivation for the publication of CV

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may have been even stronger. One thing Wittgenstein’s Vienna and WRT has in common, is the idea of Wittgenstein’s ‘fighting attitude to language’ (WRT: 209; CV: 12e). In Wittgenstein’s Vienna, the main idea is that the purpose of the TLP was to provide a ‘critique of language’ with the aim of an ‘intellectual liberation’ (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 256). According to this, the crucial philosophical move of the TLP was to delimit ‘the legitimate sphere of rational speculation from that of fantasy’, or to set the border between description (the sayable) and poetry (what can only be shown), or between fact and value (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 195, 200). This Janik and Toulmin see as similar in spirit to a set of counter-reactions to the lateHabsburgian way of life, such as Adolf Loos’s war against ornamentation in architecture and, most notably, Karl Kraus’s ‘crusade to restore the honesty of social debate’, which expressly was to be carried out through a critique of language (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 30). As we have seen, the thought of Wittgenstein as fighting a distortion of language caused by a deteriorating culture is also essential to von Wright’s view of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in WRT. However, the solution is no longer a novel theoretical framework of language, as in the case of the Tractatus, but a therapeutic approach. Still, von Wright’s view of the ultimate aim of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is similar to the view of Wittgenstein’s Vienna, in presenting the cure in the form of an intellectual liberation (WRT: 209). The most notable difference between Janik’s and Toulmin’s view of Wittgenstein and von Wright’s view, concerns Wittgenstein’s relation to Modernity. In a way, Janik and Toulmin would even seem to place Wittgenstein on the side of modern times. For they see Wittgenstein as the philosophical crown of an early twentieth century modernist movement characterized by the attempt to break free from what Stefan Zweig famously called ‘Die Welt von Gestern’. However, Janik and Toulmin also present Wittgenstein as a part of the counter-reaction to the development of the modern movement that started between the wars in the arts, but also in philosophy – which they also refer to as ‘the suicide of the modern movement’ (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 239). Roughly, the idea is that that the reformation in arts and letters turned against its ideals by becoming ‘the basis of a new orthodoxy’. In architecture, for instance, the ‘truly functional architecture’ of Loos gradually turned into the ‘exclusively structural’ operative principles of typical Bauhaus building whereas something similar happened in the development of new technical rules of musical composition after Schönberg. A counterpart in philosophy is the impact the ideas of the TLP had on philosophy. The formalism that Wittgenstein had employed for an ethical purpose, was turned into technicalities ‘that could be put to constructive

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use’. At the same time, philosophy developed into ‘an autonomous subprofession, with a specialized set of problems, methods and techniques’, a transformation Wittgenstein wanted to distance himself from (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 250–253, 258–259). Even though this development in ‘the modern movement’ certainly has some relation to the idea of progress, von Wright’s view of Wittgenstein’s relation to Modernity would seem to be closer to Nyíri’s, in which progress and the role of reason in culture, is explicitly stated as Wittgenstein’s main concern. However, there is still another feature of von Wright’s understanding of Wittgenstein, in which a trace of Wittgenstein’s Vienna perhaps may be seen. Perhaps the most controversial part of the picture von Wright advances of Wittgenstein in connection with the publication of VB and CV is the thought of language-games as something that can malfunction. For what would the relation be between the Wittgensteinian idea of the mistake of using words detached from the language-games they belong to, and the idea of a malfunctioning language-game?40 It is also noteworthy that von Wright talked about malfunctioning language-games only in WRT. In WTC it has been replaced by the idea of ‘corrupted language-games’. Still, the idea seems to be that we may have language-games that somehow are faulty as means of communication. This also happens to be an idea that has some mutual ground with Wittgenstein’s Vienna. For it would seem that the idea of malfunctioning, or corrupted, language-games presupposes the idea of authentic vs inauthentic communication, i.e. precisely, the Krausian distinction that lies at the core of Janik’s and Toulmin’s book. Moreover, in describing the late-Habsburgian deterioration of language, they use terminology similar to von Wright’s in speaking of ‘bogus language-games’, which they specify as ‘based on the pretense that the existing forms of life were other than they really were’ (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 273). Incidentally, this is still another occasion when the ideas of Karl Marx are strongly present, since the authors of Wittgenstein’s Vienna suggest that ‘bogus languagegames’ might be seen as a ‘linguistic aspect of the Marxian concept of a “false consciousness” ’ (Janik and Toulmin: 274).

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS I have presented von Wright’s work on Wittgenstein’s general remarks as going through two stages, the first being the selecting of aphorisms worth publishing for their own sake, the second the providing of a selection of general remarks as the grounds for a reinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. My principal method has been to understand von Wright’s work on Wittgenstein’s general remarks against the background of certain

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developments in his own philosophical thinking. Basically, the idea is that von Wright’s thoughts about ‘philosophical literature’ provides the context for his original interest in Wittgenstein’s aphorisms, whereas his own growing awareness of the problems inherent in modern Western culture was crucial for his reinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as being in a fight with Modernity. Whereas the latter point remains close to what has earlier been said by Erbacher (2017), my treatment of the first stage of the work also offers an answer to a question that, to my knowledge, has not been thoroughly acknowledged before: what, in the first place, made von Wright think that Wittgenstein’s aphorisms should be published? The key to this question, I believe, is in the connection between ‘deep’ aphoristic literary expressions in the writings of Wittgenstein and von Wright’s ideas of great writers as ‘philosophers in the deep sense’. To understand the transition between the stages in von Wright’s work some threads remain to be connected between sections 5 and 6 of my article. Precisely how were the problems that stood in the way of the publication of the general remarks solved, or overcome? As the most pertinent problem of the first stage, we may see the conflict between wanting to provide a collection of the most impressive aphorisms and the objective not to misrepresent Wittgenstein, which led von Wright to dispose of remarks from the TLP and the PI he saw as among the best. The idea that the remarks could provide a key to the understanding of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy gave the publication of the remarks a second purpose, which was not dependent on the literary quality of the remarks. Furthermore, CV could now be seen as a publication needed to get Wittgenstein right. It also seems possible to understand how von Wright came to think that the book might ‘not necessarily be harmful or useless’ even when read by people who had no knowledge of Wittgenstein’s philosophy – as providing an example of a man who was living the decline of the West (WRT: 212).

NOTES 1. Author’s translation. Swedish original reads ‘[Wittgenstein] förliknade situationen vid följande drastiska bild: en potatis i en mörk källare skjuter skott, som du vet, långa och förvirrade skott i alla riktningar om varandra. Men tar man upp den i ljuset krymper vart och ett av skotten samman till en liten grön fläck! Jag har en stark känsla av att han har rätt.’ 2. ‘Philosophical clarity will have the same effect on the growth of mathematics as sunlight has on the growth of potato shoots. (In a dark cellar they grow several meters long)’ (Wittgenstein 2005: 433e). 3. Von Wright to Anscombe, 1 December 1954 (NLF, vWC 714.11-12). See also Erbacher 2017: 88.

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4. ‘A Collection of Remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein [...] selected by GHvW in 1965–1966 from the then published works and existing typescripts and manuscripts’ (WWA, Witt-AM-G1). 5. According to the Preface to CV: iie, where Heikki Nyman is also mentioned. 1974 was also the year when Nyman began his work as von Wright’s assistant (information mediated by André Maury in an email to the author 27 February 2020). 6. That the revision to the 1994 and 1998 editions were suggested by Alois Pichler is evident from von Wright’s ‘Foreword to New Edition 1994’, CV 1998: xiie. 7. In this I agree with Christian Erbacher in Erbacher 2017. My ambition, however, is to provide a more elaborated contextualization of the question. 8. Author’s emphasis and translation. The original Swedish reads: ‘Och man kunde beskriva hans senare filosofiska skrifter som en omfattande samling noggranna undersökningar av konkreta exempel jämte här och där inströdda, ofta aforistiska marginalanteckningar av mera allmän art om själva den verksamhet, som han bedriver’. 9. The translation is from PI 2009, §127: 55e. Other examples are §127 and §128. 10. Here is one example from the RFM: ‘In philosophy it is always good to put a question instead of an answer to a question. For an answer to the philosophical question may easily be unfair; disposing of it by means of another question is not’ (CoR: 94, using the translation from RFM II, §5: 68e). Such remarks should not be confused with the general remarks mentioned in the 1954 letter to Anscombe. These we are likely to find among the remarks selected from the manuscripts used for the RFM (such as MS 117 and MS 122), which were included in the CoR, but not in the RFM. 11. For Wittgenstein’s ‘hints’ at a possible separation, for instance, by the use of brackets, see also CV: ie. See also Rothhaupt 2017, 112–130. 12. The Swedish original reads ‘att bära vidare till andra subject sanningar av universellt och tidlöst värde’. 13. The title Vermischte Bemerkungen was suggested by the director of Suhrkamp, Siegfried Unseld (Erbacher 2017: 102). 14. Author’s translation. The Swedish original reads ‘Människans andliga verklighet är mycket för sammansatt för att låta sig entydigt inrutas i den abstrakta tankens nätverk av distinktioner och slutledningar [...] Det är en styrka mer än en svaget hos [Dostojevskij], att hans filosofiska idéer har en komplex natur, som närmar sig det motsägelsefulla, paradoxen’. 15. The Swedish original reads ‘som täcker alla allvarliga försök att bestämma människans plats i tillvaron, oberoende av om de nyttja den vetenskapliga eller den konstnärliga formen som uttrycksmedel’. 16. Author’s translation. Swedish original reads: ‘[J]ag tror att många mycket väsentliga saker klarnat för mig, ehuru jag har svårt att säga vad’. 17. ‘I have proceeded on a “maximum principle”: selecting generously and with a view to then sieving the selected material’, von Wright to Anscombe, 28 June 1965 (NLF, vWC 714.11-12).

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18. See also the Preface to CV, in which von Wright discusses the possibility that ‘a book of this sort will reach the hands of readers to whom otherwise Wittgenstein’s philosophical work is, and will remain, unknown’ (CV: iie). Von Wright’s worries about publishing material that appeared to be external to Wittgenstein’s philosophical work seems to have been shared by the two other literary executors (Erbacher 2017: 94). 19. Von Wright to Anscombe, 28 June 1965 (NLF, vWC 714.11-12). 20. The term ‘alienation’ is used also by von Wright when he speaks about Wittgenstein’s ‘all too obvious alienation from his times’ (WRT: 205). This, I think, should be connected with Wittgenstein’s experience of the surrounding civilization as ‘fremd’ (‘alien’) to him (see also WRT: 210). 21. Author’s translation: Swedish original reads: ‘Inte alla filosofiska problem äro eviga. Nya uppstår och gamla dör bort. Men växlingarna bero inte så mycket på den filosofisk diskussionens inre natur som på förändringar i den kulturmiljö, där diskussionen förs’. 22. For an account of the editing process, see Kim Solin’s contribution to this volume. 23. Von Wright to Malcolm, 12 December 1974 (NLF, vWC 714.142-148). 24. Von Wright to Nyíri, 24 July 1974 (NLF, vWC 714.182). 25. In the draft the passage reads ‘I am all the same convinced that these notes can be properly understood and appreciated only against the background of Wittgenstein’s philosophy’, whereas the published Preface continues ‘and, furthermore, that they make a contribution to the understanding of that philosophy’ (using Peter Winch’s translation in CV). 26. ‘Research seminar, Autumn 1974’ (WWA, Wri-SF-145-a). 27. For von Wright and Vietnam, see my other contribution to this volume. 28. This is likely to refer to writers associated with the Frankfurt school , such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, and the Yugoslavian Praxis-group (e.g. Mihailo Markovic´), see also von Wright 1978c: 147. 29. Drafts of G.H. von Wright’s ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, Section I: 33 and Section II: 69 (WWA,Wri-SF-105-a). 30. Von Wright to Nyíri, 8 May 1975 (NLF, vWC 714.182). 31. Confirmed by Allan Janik, who attended von Wright’s talk in 1977, in an email to the author 3 December 2019. 32. Draft of G.H. von Wright’s opening speech in Kirchberg 1977 (WWA,Wri-SF065-b), quoted from page 3a (page numbering not consistent). Emphasis in the quotation added by author. 33. The part in German translates as ‘Who knows the laws according to which society develops? I am quite sure they are a closed book even to the cleverest of men’ (CV: 60e). 34. Draft of G.H. von Wright’s opening speech in Kirchberg 1977 (WWA,Wri-SF065-b), quoted from page 3a. 35. Draft of G.H. von Wright’s opening speech in Kirchberg 1977 (WWA,Wri-SF065-b), quoted from page 14.

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36. Author’s translation and emphasis. The original Swedish reads ‘djupt tidskritiska icke-marxistiska tänkare såsom Nietzsche, Spengler eller Wittgenstein’. 37. This is also noted by Erbacher (2017, 98). However, in Section 7 of Erbacher’s article one easily gets the impression that it was von Wright who, through his Opening Address in Kirchberg 1977, initiated the thought of reading Wittgenstein’s writings against his cultural background. 38. Von Wright to Janik and Toulmin, 15 July 1973 (FIBA, AJC 154). 39. In a letter to Walter Methlagl the following day, von Wright wrote that he found the book ‘sehr anregend und grundsätzlich richtig’ (very inspiring and basically right), von Wright to Methlagl, 16 July 1973 (WWA, Wri-FC-003). 40. Von Wright’s unusual use of ‘language-game’ in WRT has also been noted by Lars Hertzberg (2016a: 128).

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CHAPTER NINE

‘. . . finding and inventing intermediate links’: On Rhees and the Preparation and Publication of Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ PETER K. WESTERGAARD

It has also been said that as Wittgenstein is no longer here to decide on what should or should not be published, then there is only one appropriate attitude towards editing his Nachlass. If someone had learned from Wittgenstein I don’t think he’d speak so. —Rush Rhees to Antony Kenny, 2 March 1977. Rhees 1996: 57 203

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1. INTRODUCTION: A SKETCH OF A LANDSCAPE Rush Rhees was never entirely satisfied with his editions of Wittgenstein’s Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’. From the time when the notes were discovered in 1962 (MS 110,177–299), 1964 (MS 143) and 1966 (TS 211, 313–322), Rhees sought to clarify their content and where they belonged in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. Shortly after their first publication in Synthese in 1967, Rhees began an in-depth study of the material. Just a few years later, he was contemplating a new edition of the remarks. But he was forced to abandon the plan because of disagreement with Georg von Wright and Elizabeth Anscombe. The executors of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass were not always of the same opinion. In the following, I shall take a closer look at this disagreement, but only after I have outlined the story behind Rhees’s first release of the Bemerkungen. The disagreement among the executors becomes apparent in the years 1969–1970 in connection with the publication of the German edition of Über Gewißheit with Suhrkamp Verlag. The differences are exposed by Rhees’s proposal to publish Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ together with Über Gewißheit and A Lecture on Ethics. Von Wright and Anscombe reject the idea, after which Rhees abandons the idea of publishing the Bemerkungen along with other texts. But following the disagreement, Rhees continues to study the remarks. In 1971, he publishes an abridged version of the English translation in The Human World. Rhees’s third and final publication of the remarks is known as the Brynmill edition, a bilingual version from 1979. Rhees’s enduring interest in Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer is exemplary for his work with the Nachlass. Here as elsewhere, Rhees seeks to reconstruct and capture Wittgenstein’s Denkbewegungen. In Rhees’s view, the remarks should not be published ‘by themselves – since this would give rise to queer kinds of misunderstandings’.1 Von Wright and Maurice O’Connor Drury are crucial interlocutors in his work. In what follows, I will attempt to sketch aspects of Rhees’s work as one of the three executors. First, by outlining the discoveries and work that led to Rhees’s Synthese edition of the Bemerkungen; in other words, by telling the story of the origins and preparation of the Synthese edition. In this context, I shall also highlight the principles Rhees adopted when editing the remarks. What this attempt to reconstruct the origins of the edition makes clear, is that the text of the Synthese edition is based on two manuscripts compiled by Rhees himself, namely his own selection from and transcription of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer from MS 110 (a selection I shall refer to in the following as the MS 110 Frazer transcript), and his own transcription of the so-called thirteen loose sheets, MS 143 (referred to henceforth as the MS

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143 Frazer transcript). Both transcriptions act as bridges or intermediate links between Wittgenstein’s manuscripts (MS 110, TS 211, MS 143) and the final text of the Synthese edition. As for the two transcriptions that Rhees made, these are now in the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives and the Wren Library. Thus the foundation for Rhees’s editorial work on the Synthese text is a selection and transcription of remarks from MS 110 and a transcription of MS 143 that he himself had made, together with additional material from TS 211, 313–322. This ‘archaeological’ account of the origin of the Synthese edition is therefore also a story of how Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ came into being. It is an account that illustrates the editorial ‘filtering’ of text and remarks in preparation for publication. The account is based on an exchange of letters between Rhees and von Wright, letters that are now in the keeping of the National Library of Finland (NLF) and the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives (WWA).2 Following that, I will take a closer look at Rhees’s suggestion to publish Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ together with Über Gewißheit and A Lecture on Ethics. This suggestion is made while planning the first German edition of Über Gewißheit in 1970. Next, I will briefly consider the ‘connections’ or ‘links’ that Rhees identifies between the three texts and which he points out to von Wright and Anscombe. The story of Rhees’s suggestion is an occasion to explore a number of interesting narratives, about Rhees’s reflections on the content of the remarks, about the nature of his plans for their presentation, about how the executors handle and clarify suggestions relating to the form and content of a publication, and, finally, about the fundamental disagreement that arises between Rhees on the one side and von Wright and Anscombe on the other – a dispute that highlights the editorial approach adopted by von Wright and Anscombe and their aims with regard to the publication of On Certainty in 1969. The account of the origins of the Synthese edition is based primarily on the correspondence between Rhees, von Wright and Anscombe, today in the keeping of the NLF, the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, and the Richard Burton Archives. I conclude with a description of Rhees’s reaction to this disagreement and the ambivalence that creeps into his further work on the Bemerkungen as a result. 1.1 Rhees’s MS 110 Frazer transcription Following the publication of The Blue and Brown Books in 1958, Rhees turns his attention to Wittgenstein’s work of the early 1930s. A recurrent topic in the correspondence between Rhees and von Wright, in this respect, is the question of a possible publication of the so-called Moore-Volume (TS

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209) and the Big Typescript (TS 213). Rhees’s work in these years eventually culminates in the 1964 publication of Philosophische Bemerkungen. It is in the course of preparing this publication and the associated efforts to map the development in Wittgenstein’s descriptions of the sentence, of language and of ‘the relation between Sprache and Wirklichkeit’ post Tractatus that Rhees discovers Wittgenstein’s scattered remarks on Frazer in MS 110. Today, these remarks are known to us as Part I of Rhees’s Synthese edition. They appear alongside and interspersed with the various philosophical discussions that make up the latter third of the manuscript (MS 110, 177–299). Even before he came across this material, Rhees had been aware of Wittgenstein’s interest in Frazer thanks to a discussion with Drury on the topic in 1959. What prompted that discussion was Drury’s account of his own conversations with Wittgenstein. Rhees begins a letter from January 1959, with the words: ‘Dear Con, I have been thinking (though vaguely) about the remark of Wittgenstein’s you quote about Frazer’.3 Participating in a symposium about Wittgenstein broadcast on the BBC Third Programme on 12 January 1960, Drury reported that Wittgenstein sometimes ‘liked me to read out loud to him, and he would comment on what we were reading: Frazer’s Golden Bough, Prescott’s Conquest of Mexico’ (Drury 2019: 89). Having become aware of the existence of the remarks in mid-1962, Rhees makes a selection of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer, and of others relating to these, which he then prepares as a typescript. This comprises sixteen pages and has the heading ‘Wittgenstein 19.6.31’ (RRTS 110, 1, WWA). Rhees’s selection of remarks differs in several respects from the selection that Wittgenstein himself put together in TS 211, which Rhees only became aware of three years later. For Rhees, the selection criterion is the extent to which the remarks are motivated by issues to do with the philosophy of language. According to Rhees, it is certainly not the case that Wittgenstein and Frazer share the same field of interest. Rhees stresses that Wittgenstein’s remarks should be regarded as ‘drafts of what he was writing on philosophy’. Why should Wittgenstein discuss Frazer’s account of the rituals and magic of primitive peoples? Not because it throws light on religion. Wittgenstein mentions religion in his introductory remarks, but as part of his general discussion. [. . .] – And clearly he is not discussing history or anthropology. We could say he wrote partly from an interest in the “mythology in our language”. He wanted to show that certain familiar expressions belong to mythology, just as certain transitions or moves we make in speaking do. He does this by showing their kinship with moves and expressions in magical practices or ritual. —Rhees 1971:18

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Rhees’s selection and understanding of the remarks are based on the assumption that Wittgenstein’s interest in Frazer can be explained in terms of the examples of language use and modes of action described in The Golden Bough, which it is assumed Wittgenstein found potentially useful for clarifying aspects of his main philosophical objective, namely to map the use of language and concepts. ‘When Wittgenstein’s says that all the shifts from one use of a symbol in a ritual to another or “figurative” use of it are familiar or “natural” in our own ways of speaking, he would assume they were natural in the speech of those people outside ritual’ (Rhees 1982, 72). On the basis of this assumption, Rhees makes his selection of the remarks on Frazer and links them to several of Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections that either directly precede or follow them. As a kind of guiding principle for his selection, Rhees applies Wittgenstein’s remark that in ‘our language is a whole mythology deposited [unserer Sprache ist eine ganze Mythologie niedergelegt]’ (GB 242). For the same reason, Rhees’s transcription includes several of the remarks from MS 110 that touch on language and its forms, among them these two: ‘The primitive forms of our language: substantive, adjective and verb show the simple picture, to whose form language tends to bring everything [Die primitiven Formen unserer Sprache: Substantiv, Eigenschaftswort und Tätigkeitswort zeigen das einfache Bild auf deren Form sie alles zu bringen sucht]’ (RRTS 110, 11 (MS 110, 206), WWA). ‘Our language is an embodiment of ancient myths. And the ritual of the ancient myths was a language [Unsere Sprache ist eine Verkörperung alter Mythen. Und der Ritus der alten Mythen war eine Sprache]’ (RRTS 110, 13 (MS 110, 256), WWA). In September 1962, Rhees sends the MS 110 Frazer transcript to von Wright. Rhees asserts its importance and the relevance of the remarks for an understanding of Wittgenstein’s ‘language-game method’: in order to clarify the grammar of a certain use of language (a language-game), it is beneficial to compare it with other uses of language (other language-games). In his letter to von Wright, Rhees writes: ‘With regard to the genesis of the Brown Book and of the Untersuchungen: I am enclosing a copy I have typed (badly) of some remarks Wittgenstein makes in the course of the last 123 pages of Manuscript Volume VI [MS 110], during June and July 1931.’ He goes on: If we are looking for the origin of the use of ‘language games’ as a philosophical method, then I think that one source or one influence was this reflexion on the analogy of metaphysics and magic, and on Frazer’s misunderstanding of the magic about which he was writing. (A great deal of Band VI is included in the Big Typescript. But none of these remarks is.)

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I think this discussion of magic shows something very important about the use of language games. [. . .] (I do not suggest, of course, that these remarks about Frazer are as important as the logical discussions.)4 So according to Rhees, Wittgenstein’s interest in Frazer is motivated first and foremost by a desire to elucidate one or more features of our language use, and in particular those that tend to entangle us in ways that typically lead to metaphysical problems and statements. In such cases, clarification is achieved by means of a comparative methodological approach. Rhees reminds us that for Wittgenstein there is a relationship between metaphysics and magic. The evidence for this, Rhees claims, is that Wittgenstein equates metaphysics with magic in the remarks in MS 110, from July 1931, which immediately precede the notes on Frazer. Rhees begins his MS 110 Frazer transcript with the following entry: ‘I now believe that it would be right to begin my book with remarks about metaphysics as a kind of magic [Ich glaube jetzt, dass es richtig wäre, mein Buch mit Bemerkungen über die Metaphysik als eine Art von Magie zu beginnen]’ (RRTS 110, 1 (MS 110, 177, GB 233), WWA). This juxtaposition serves to throw light on the impressions that we associate with various forms of metaphysics. Rhees agrees with Drury that for Wittgenstein the ‘myths and rites’ discussed by Frazer are ‘closer to metaphysical errors than to scientific errors’.5 After reading Rhees’s MS 110 Frazer transcript ‘with great interest’,6 von Wright suggests that it could be included in the current publication plans. Rhees agrees, believing that the remarks shed light on why Wittgenstein distanced himself from the Tractatus, and that accordingly they should be drawn into the multifaceted discussion about the origins of the Philosophical Investigations. Rhees writes: ‘I do not think people will begin to appreciate the Untersuchungen until they see the discussion from which it has come’.7 Rhees and von Wright discuss how they might approach the publication of the remarks on Frazer. Von Wright suggests that they could either be incorporated into a preface or that they could ‘form another Appendix to the book [PB]’.8 But Rhees is sceptical. In February 1963, i.e. some six months after sending the MS 110 Frazer transcript to von Wright, he writes: ‘I am uncertain what should be done with the remarks about magic and Frazer. I think they ought to be published, and I do not think they should be published by themselves – since this would give rise to queer sorts of misunderstandings.’9 The two fail to reach agreement. As a result of his doubts about incorporating the remarks in the publication that was then being planned, Rhees preferred to shelve the idea. Nevertheless, by that time, he had already given copies of his MS 110 Frazer transcript to a number

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of colleagues, a circumstance he had begun to regret. In February 1965 Rhees writes to Peter Winch: Lionel Walker mentioned that you had given copies of Wittgenstein’s notes on Frazer, which I had lent you, “to three of us”. He has had the German text translated into English; and he did not have it with him at the moment, since he had “loaned it out to someone”. I wish there were no objection to this. But when once these unpublished things start being duplicated and “loaned out”, they seem to spread far and wide. Norman Malcolm lent some lecture notes to someone, and these have been printed and published in California as “Wittgenstein’s notes on Mathematics” – to Malcolm’s surprise and annoyance. If the notes on Frazer have gone to America they will probably have the same treatment.10 Winch refers to the transcription in his well-known 1964 article ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, in which he writes: ‘In what follows I have been helped indirectly, but greatly, by some unpublished notes made by Wittgenstein on Frazer, which Mr. Rush Rhees was kind enough to show me’ (Winch 1964: 320n31). About a year later, in the spring of 1964, Rhees reconsiders the situation. His suggestion this time is to publish the remarks in ‘a smallish volume’ that will also include A Lecture on Ethics, along with remarks on a number of other related topics. In other words, he believes there may be a link to A Lecture on Ethics, and that Wittgenstein’s interest in Frazer could perhaps be regarded as a natural outcome of his recent reflections on ethics and religion in that text. In the lecture, Wittgenstein aligns himself with Moore’s definition of the concept of ethics, albeit ‘in a slightly wider sense’, whereby ethics is approached as a close relation to ‘what is generally called Aesthetics’ and from the angle of broad questions such as ‘what is good’, ‘what is valuable’, ‘what is really important’, ‘what is the meaning of life’, ‘what makes life worth living’, and ‘what is the right way of living’ (LE 38). One central distinction that Wittgenstein draws in the lecture is that between scientific or theoretical statements on the one hand, and ethical or religious ones on the other. ‘A religious symbol does not rest on any opinion [Einem religiösen Symbol liegt keine Meinung zu Grunde]’ (GB 236). Further, the account that Wittgenstein gives in the lecture of the crucial experiences that underlie ethical statements has a parallel in the remarks that highlight the crucial experiences or impressions underlying the types of action we associate with magic and the use of religious language. While preparing his MS 110 Frazer transcript, Rhees writes to Drury – in conclusion to a discussion about the Lecture on Ethics:

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In the year following the ethics lecture he wrote twice about the feeling of wonder – or of reverence – which people have had for the things round about them, among which they live, and for happenings such as birth, illness, death madness, sleep, dreams. The longest was in a series of notes on Frazer towards the end of in the summer of 1931. Three or four sentences may help what I am trying to say – although I mutilate them by leaving their context. ‘Frazer begins, telling the story of the King of the Wood at Nemi, and in a tone which shows that he feels and wants us to feel that something strange and terrible is happening here. But the question ‘Why does this happen?’ has really had its answer, then: Because it is terrible. In other words, whatever in these happenings strikes us as terrible, impressive, ghastly, tragic, etc., least of all as trivial and insignificant, that is what brought them forth.’ ‘If you place together with that story of the priest-king of Nemi the phrase “the majesty of death”, you see that they are both the same. The life of the priest-king enacts what that phrase means.’11 In April 1964, Rhees writes to von Wright: ‘I had been thinking of a smallish volume which might include this [A Lecture on Ethics] together with the remarks on Frazer, for instance (which were written about a year later), and some related remarks of about this same time (there are at least two longish ones beside the remarks on Frazer). And it might include some of the later scattered remarks upon religion and upon “value” (Lebensweisheit, or call it how you will).’12 Von Wright mentions the suggestion to Anscombe two months later,13 but it is not pursued any further. Here, the stories about the origins of Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ and of the Vermischte Bemerkungen from 1977 coincide. In effect, von Wright includes most of the remarks from Rhees’s MS 110 transcription in his A Collection of Remarks from 1965–1966. Von Wright describes this material as a collection of Wittgenstein’s remarks ‘on Questions Connected with his Life and Work; the Nature of Philosophical Inquiry; Art; Religion and the “Philosophy of Life”; the I, the Will, and the World; and Various Other General Topics’. Although not intended for publication, the collection forms the basis for what would later become known as Vermischte Bemerkungen. The following year, in January 1965, A Lecture on Ethics is published together with excerpts from Wittgenstein’s 1929 and 1930 conversations with Moritz Schlick, and an essay by Rhees, ‘Some Developments in Wittgenstein’s View of Ethics’. Rhees is responsible for ‘the preparation of the [. . .] materials’ (LE, 3). It is an exemplary publication, for it illustrates an essential aspect of Rhees’s editorial approach: ‘. . . finding and inventing intermediate links’ to produce ‘that kind of understanding which consists in

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“seeing connexions” ’. What this publication allows us to infer, however, is that once again Rhees has been unable to realize his hopes of publishing the remarks on Frazer – two years after he discovered them. 1.2 Rhees’s MS 143 Frazer transcription After the publication of Philosophische Bemerkungen in 1964, Rhees begins to work with the Big Typescript, with a view to possible publication. His efforts culminate in the publication of Philosophische Grammatik in 1969. In other words, in the years after 1964 Rhees continues to focus on the many manuscripts that Wittgenstein wrote in the early 1930s, the material of his ‘middle period’. It is well known that in Rhees’s view, TS 213 was never intended for publication, despite its book-like structure, but rather as an ordered collection of material for a further stage of elaboration. In the summer of 1964, Rhees receives a letter from Anscombe, which includes Wittgenstein’s so-called thirteen loose sheets on Frazer. Known today as MS 143, these remarks form Part II of Rhees’s Synthese edition. In early November 1964, Rhees writes to von Wright: ‘I am sending you a copy of the early letter to Ramsey, and also of the later notes on Frazer, which I have typed from the pencilled pages which Elizabeth sent me. At least I believe they are later than the 1931 lot. And Elizabeth seemed to think they belonged to notes he made while he was living in her house.’14 Having received the loose sheets, Rhees devotes his attention to them and prepares a transcript. The loose sheets are of variable size. Rhees orders them according to the page numbers in Frazer that Wittgenstein references. He completes his eight-page transcription of MS 143 in the summer of 1964. It is this manuscript that Rhees sends to von Wright in November of that year. It begins with a heading and a short ‘preface’: Wittgenstein: pencilled notes on Frazer, on loose sheets. The numbers on these sheets evidently refer to pages in the abridged edition of The Golden Bough. Wittgenstein’s copy of this was given him by Raymond Townsend in July, 1936. The earlier notes on Frazer were entered in Manuskriptband VI [MS 110], in June, 1931. I doubt if Wittgenstein had a copy of the Golden Bough at that time. Drury has told me that he used to read aloud from Frazer to Wittgenstein. For this reason, I imagine that these pencilled notes are later – after July, and very likely later still. Rush Rhees. —RRTS 143, 1, WL Von Wright does not comment on the transcript. Neither does he include the material in the ‘Collection of Remarks’ that he produces in 1965–1966.

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Rhees does not revive his earlier plan to publish his MS 110 Frazer transcript, even though the newly discovered material would seem to justify the move. Instead, in 1964 he puts both transcriptions aside in order to concentrate on the massive task of editing Philosophische Grammatik. Perhaps he had even given up on the idea of publishing the notes. Two years later, Rhees is still working on Philosophische Grammatik, the aim of which is to elucidate a phase in the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy somewhere between Philosophische Bemerkungen and Philosophische Untersuchungen. In the course of this work, while reading through TS 211 in the latter half of 1966, Rhees is surprised to discover that Wittgenstein had made his own selection from the remarks on Frazer contained in MS 110. This sequence of remarks constitutes a discrete section of ten pages (TS 211, 313–322), located roughly in the middle of the 771page TS 211, dating from 1932. Wittgenstein’s selection is significantly shorter than Rhees’s MS 110 Frazer transcript. The former runs to ten pages, the latter to sixteen. At many points the two transcriptions coincide, although at others they differ. Both arrange the material chronologically, with a few exceptions. Whereas Rhees transcribes all the remarks of Frazer dating from 19 June through to 6 July 1931 (MS 110, 177–299), Wittgenstein is more selective, including only those dated 19–23 June (MS 110, 177– 205), 25 June (MS 110, 225), and July 2 (MS 110, 256–257). His selection brings together the principal themes, summarized thus: ‘Frazer’s account of the magical and religious notions of men is unsatisfactory: it makes these notions appear as m i s t a k e s [Frazers Darstellung der magischen und religiösen Anschauungen der Menschen ist unbefriedigend: sie lässt diese Anschauungen als I r r t ü m e r ercheinen]’ (TS 211, 313). What Wittgenstein does not include are the preliminary remarks from 19 June, which Rhees treats as a contextual prelude to the Frazer themes. Instead, Wittgenstein introduces the section with three early methodological remarks from 10 and 11 February (MS 110, 58, 63). His selection starts with the words: ‘We must begin with the mistake and transform it into what is true [Man muss beim Irrtum ansetzen und ihn in die Wahrheit überführen]’ (TS 211, 313, MS 110, 58). This is followed by: ‘I must plunge again and again in the water of doubt [Ich muss immer wieder im Wasser des Zweifels untertauchen]’ (TS 211, 313, MS 110, 63). Wittgenstein does not include any of the remarks that explore possible parallels between metaphysics, philosophical problems and magic. Instead, these comments are saved for TS 213. With the discovery of Wittgenstein’s own selection and transcription, Rhees returns to the possibility of publication. Since it is now obvious that Wittgenstein himself worked on the remarks and treated them as a discrete

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entity, Rhees decides to publish them on their own, and without further delay. It will always be possible to include them ‘in a volume’ with other material later on. Rhees informs von Wright of his discovery and his intentions. In a letter from March 1967, Rhees writes: There were other things I wanted to say, but I had better send this on pain of sending nothing at all. I will ask one question, though – because I have had in mind to ask it for so long. Do you think that Synthese or maybe Inquiry would publish The Notes on Frazer (in German) as an article? As I say, I have had this in mind for six months. I was interested just now to see that the notes are included in (what I am calling here) the First Typescript [TS 211], separated in a definite way from the rest of the text, but within the general paging. There are two changes in the order of paragraphs, and a few paragraphs are omitted. These are the original notes, from Band VI [MS 110]. If it were an article, then I think the later notes [MS 143], which Wittgenstein wrote when he was staying at Elizabeth’s, should be printed together with them. Together these would be about the length of an article. – If neither Synthese nor Inquiry wanted it, we could try one of the German periodicals. But I think it might be better if we could have it appear in one of the multilingual ones. I should like to have these notes published soon, if possible. They could be included in a volume later, of course. Yours, Rush Rhees When I said Synthese I believe I should have said Theoria. But I am confused, and I do not want to wait until I have been to the library to check.15 Rhees now decides to ignore the earlier ideas that he and von Wright had considered, such as including the remarks in a foreword, as an appendix, or in an independent book that ‘might include some of the later scattered remarks upon religion and upon “value” ’. He also overrules his earlier reservation about publishing the remarks on their own. The fact that Wittgenstein himself had extracted the material from MS 110 in order to treat it as an independent section of TS 211, taken together with the scope of the material (when supplemented by MS 143), were sufficient grounds to warrant publication as an article in a journal. This does not mean that Rhees now doubted his basic assumption that the remarks should rightfully be regarded as a synopsis or as examples of the philosophical reflections that led to ‘the genesis of the Brown Book and of the Untersuchungen’. For Rhees, the remarks have to be viewed and understood in the context of

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Wittgenstein’s language-philosophical investigations and his later ‘use of “language games” as a philosophical method’. However, this contextualization would now be articulated in a more indirect manner, insofar as the ongoing work of preparing Philosophische Grammatik for publication made it desirable to have the notes published soon and as an independent item. For Rhees, Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ illustrates one of the many Denkbewegungen that foreshadow the insights of Philosophische Grammatik. Accordingly, it made sense to release them prior to the publication of Philosophische Grammatik, a text which Rhees regarded as a condensation of Wittgenstein’s central thoughts post Tractatus, and as a direct prelude to The Blue and Brown Books. The Frazer remarks are one of the many ‘meandering journeys’ that give Wittgenstein’s investigations and pursuits their momentum. 1.3 The Synthese edition Von Wright’s reaction to Rhees’s discovery and enquiry are found in a letter from early April 1967. Von Wright is enthusiastic and supports the plan for publication. He writes: ‘Thank you very much for your letter of 21 March with the detailed and interesting description of the newly found Wittgenstein typescripts. I wrote immediately to Hintikka, who is Editor of Synthèse, about Wittgenstein’s notes on Frazer. Today I received his reply. He is delighted at the thought of publishing the notes (in German). He is looking forward to receiving the article from you, in due course.’16 In the meantime, and perhaps as early as late March, Rhees had begun editing Wittgenstein’s remarks with a view to publishing them as planned. In mid-April 1967, a week after receiving the letter from von Wright, Rhees replies: ‘Thank you very much for writing to Hintikka and for sending me his address. I have started putting the text together, in the light of Wittgenstein’s own typed version [TS 211, 313–322], and I hope to be able to send it to Hintikka before too long.’17 By May, or possibly June, he had completed the work. Rhees speedily prepares the manuscript for publication in Synthese. In doing so, he relies in part on his own MS 110 and MS 143 Frazer transcripts, from 1962 and 1964 respectively, and in part on the selection that Wittgenstein himself had made in 1932 from his remarks on Frazer (TS 211, 313–322). The transcriptions constitute the intermediate links between Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and the final text of the Synthese edition. Consequently, Rhees’s editing of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer for the Synthese edition can only be elucidated and understood by looking closely at where the transcriptions agree and are compatible with one another, and

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where they diverge. In the Synthese edition, Rhees includes all the remarks from TS 211 (with one single exception; he omits: ‘Nothing is so difficult as //like// doing justice to the facts [Nichts ist so schwierig, als //wie// Gerechtigkeit gegen die Tatsachen]’ (TS 211, 319)) while also complying with Wittgenstein’s own terse editorial instruction (‘zwei Bemerkungen’ (TS 211, 322)) to include two remarks from MS 110, 257 – remarks that are later included in Philosophische Untersuchungen as §122. For the ‘Introductory Note’, Rhees expands the short preface (‘Wittgenstein: pencilled notes on Frazer, on loose sheets’) that he had already written for his MS 143 Frazer transcript. This he does by adding an excerpt from the letter he had received from Drury in late April, describing the circumstances that led to the remarks: Now about the Frazer edition, I don’t think my memory deceives me. I think it would have been in 1930 that Wittgenstein said to me that he had always wanted to read Frazer but hadn’t done so, and would I get hold of a copy and read some of it out loud to him. I borrowed from the Union Library the first volume of the multi-volume edition and we only got a little way through this because he talked at considerable length about it, and the next term we didn’t start it again.18 In his ‘Introductory Note’, Rhees also includes the opening remarks from his own transcription, which are absent in Wittgenstein’s selection in TS 211. In Part I of the Synthese edition, Rhees reproduces the entire selection that Wittgenstein had made in TS 211. As closing material, he adds several remarks from his own MS 110 Frazer transcript, which Wittgenstein had omitted. Rhees introduces these latter remarks with the heading ‘[The following remarks are found in the typescript but not together with the above:] [[Die folgenden Bemerkungen stehen im Maschineskript nicht mit den obigen zusammen:]]’ (GB 242). For Rhees, these remarks supplement and expand on Wittgenstein’s own selection. It should be noted, however, that Rhees does not include all the additional remarks from his own transcription. He leaves out those that Wittgenstein would later include in TS 213 and also the remarks that relate to the description and identification of misleading terms associated with understanding and acting in accordance with a command (MS 110, 244–246 (RRTS 110, 13–15, WWA)). Part II of the Synthese edition consists essentially of Rhees’s MS 143 Frazer transcript. Accordingly, the publication retains the order of the remarks from Rhees’s MS 143 Frazer transcript, but also its misreadings. In addition, Rhees includes in Part II several quotes from Frazer’s The Golden Bough.

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From a letter that Rhees wrote to von Wright some six months later we learn that Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ was published in late summer 1967. In a handwritten postscript, Rhees writes: ‘I will send you further offprints of the Notes on Frazer in a separate packet. I am very sorry that I left out a word on page 242.’19 A few days later, von Wright sends his thanks: ‘I read with interest the printed remarks on Frazer. They made a forceful impression on me. I am glad they were published in this form. (I had been a little bit sceptical.)’20 Henceforth, von Wright now leaves out the Frazer material in his further work on A Collection of Remarks. As far as he is concerned, the Synthese edition is a success. Rhees, on the other hand, is not entirely satisfied. For he still holds out the hope that the comments ‘could be included in a volume later’.

2. THE SUGGESTIONS In summer 1969, as preparations for the publication of Philosophische Grammatik are nearing conclusion, Siegfried Unseld, the director of Suhrkamp, the German publisher of Wittgenstein’s work, suggests a Germanonly edition of On Certainty. This work had been released early that same year in the now well-known Basil Blackwell bilingual edition. It was envisaged that the new German edition should contain a brief preface of around five or six pages. Unseld also considered the possibility of including Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik in the same publication. Rhees advises against this idea. In June, Rhees asks von Wright whether he would be willing to write the foreword. Suhrkamp wants a ‘small and comparatively inexpensive’ book that gives an impression of Wittgenstein’s late thinking. Rhees writes to von Wright that Unseld ‘wanted to know whether this was a work [OC] from which people who bought the volume would get something, even if they had not studied the other writings of Wittgenstein’. And he adds: ‘I was more hesitant here, but I said I thought very many would (assuming that they had some interest in philosophy). [. . .] It seemed to me that people could get something out of it who would not have the equipment or the patience to tackle the Tractatus or the Untersuchungen.’21 At the same time, Rhees mentions to von Wright that he has some reservations about the wording of von Wright and Anscombe’s ‘Preface’ in the recently published edition of On Certainty. For Rhees, parts of the foreword are ‘very misleading’. He feels that the preface for the Germanonly edition should be entirely new. Rhees writes: ‘You say in the first paragraph: “In the middle of 1949 . . . Malcolm aroused his interest in Moore’s ‘Defence of Common Sense” ’ . . . This book [OC] contains the whole of what Wittgenstein wrote on this topic from that time until his

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death.’ Rhees finds this doubtful and feels the wording could even ‘prevent people from recognizing the constant connexions between these remarks and his earlier discussions’. In his view, Wittgenstein’s earlier writings already touch on and discuss several of the key issues in On Certainty. Rhees briefly outlines the links between the discussions in On Certainty and various remarks from the early 1930s, ‘when he began to be dissatisfied with the ways in which people spoke of “logische Möglichkeit” and “logische Unmöglichkeit”.’ Even before 1946, Wittgenstein had told Rhees about his work on Moore’s Defence of Common Sense, and about his conversations with Moore himself. Relevant topics are touched on as early as in the ‘Untersuchungen, page 221’. Rhees does not deny that Wittgenstein’s discussions with Malcolm were an essential prelude to On Certainty, but he emphasizes: ‘My point is rather that his conversations with Malcolm stimulated Wittgenstein to take up thoughts which were not new to him, and to develop them further. It is in this regard that I think your preface is misleading.’22 Von Wright agrees with Rhees that On Certainty should be published as an independent German edition. They decide in favour of the project. In a letter written in late June, von Wright admits that the wording of his foreword is incomplete. But he does not find it ‘misleading’23 and he does not mention that while working on the publication he himself had doubts about publishing the remarks on their own. In September 1968, von Wright had written to Anscombe that it was ‘perhaps’ at that point the right thing to do ‘to publish the notes on certainty as a monograph of their own’.24 Von Wright declines Rhees’s invitation to write the new preface, but suggests an alternative. He writes: I should not like to write an introduction to the German edition. The best candidate for the task I can think of is you. Then would follow Elizabeth Anscombe and Norman Malcolm. But I hope you will write it. You could do what nobody else could accomplish quite satisfactorily, namely place these last writings of L.W. in their proper setting in relation to the rest of his work. It would be valuable, if this happened, – not the least in view of what you say in the second part of your letter.25 Von Wright repeats the suggestion just a week later.26 But Rhees is similarly reluctant to take on the task, saying that Anscombe has promised to supply a text. He writes: ‘I do not think I can write a preface for Über Gewißheit. I wish I could. I have been trying to write prefaces for Philosophische Grammatik and the German Blue and Brown Book. I cannot write three coherent sentences. It is no use telling Unseld that I will write the other

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preface.’ And he adds: ‘I did have a promise from Elizabeth that she would write one.’27 A decision is taken the following month. After a brief meeting in Cambridge on November 7 between Rhees and von Wright, Rhees reluctantly accepts the task. He will try to prepare a ‘Vorwort’. During the meeting, von Wright reads some of Rhees’s notes on On Certainty, which von Wright keeps. Shortly afterwards, Rhees writes to von Wright: ‘I was grateful but surprised by your remarks on the stuff I had jotted down for Unseld on Über Gewißheit. I will try to make it into some sort of Einleitung; but I almost invariably fail: and when people depend on me I let them down. I was very glad to see you again, even though it had to be so short.’28 In the new year, Unseld suggests publishing A Lecture on Ethics together with Über Gewißheit. Following a meeting with Unseld in March, Rhees writes to von Wright and Anscombe: ‘Unseld suggested printing this [LE (‘in Franz Wurm’s German translation’)] in the same volume with Über Gewißheit. At first I thought it incongruous. On second thought, I was inclined to think it as a good idea.’ What Unseld wants, Rhees continues, is ‘the volume to be one that may introduce Wittgenstein to a wider circle of readers than the volumes printed so far can. And the Lecture on Ethics is more “gemeinverständlich” than anything else Wittgenstein has written’.29 With no objections to the suggestion, Rhees cites Wittgenstein’s ‘letter to Ficker which speaks of the Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, and says “the content will be strange to you. In reality, it isn’t strange to you, for the point of the book is ethical [der Stoff wird Ihnen ganz fremd erscheinen. In Wirklichkeit ist er Ihnen nicht fremd, denn der Sinn des Buches ist einer Ethischer]” ’. Perhaps one could highlight a similar parallel in connection with Wittgenstein’s late thought. In his letter to von Wright, Rhees says: That letter cannot be applied like that to the remarks of Über Gewißheit. But I had thought that if I could add to the sogenannte Vorwort which I have written, and which I have sent you, – if I could add to this a sketch of changes in his way of discussing ethics between the time of the Lecture and the time of these last remarks, using perhaps some of the material which I did include as an appendix to the Lecture, and if possible bringing it up more closely to 1951 – then the volume containing the Lecture and the remarks on Gewißheit would be a better introduction to Wittgenstein’s ways of thinking than either of them alone could be. In particular, I should welcome a corrective to the idea that his views on ethics can be understood without seeing them in relation to his views on logic or philosophy.30 Unseld’s suggestion to include the Lecture on Ethics thus becomes an opportunity to trace a line of development and connections in Wittgenstein’s

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thought, an exercise that could function in part to clarify Wittgenstein’s ‘views on ethics’, and in part to introduce his late philosophy and the main themes of Über Gewißheit. Rhees is intrigued by Unseld’s suggestion, but also a little hesitant. In his letter to von Wright, he writes: ‘So I am now, on the whole, in favour of the idea. Maybe you think it is haywire.’31 Rhees continues to consider the matter and, in the meantime, is obliged to reject an entirely new proposal from Unseld. Unseld’s latest idea is to publish ‘Auszüge aus den Gesprächen mit Waismann’ together with Über Gewißheit. In early March, Rhees writes to Unseld: ‘In my opinion, one should only publish Wittgenstein’s Vortrag über Ethik alongside the remarks on Über Gewi heit [Es sollte, meine ich, nur Wittgensteins Vortrag über Ethik neben den Bemerkungen Über Gewißheit gedruckt werden].’ On the other hand, he finds the link between ‘the Vortrag and the last remarks [ÜG], not only interesting but also important [dem Vortrag und den letzten Bemerkungen [ÜG], nicht nur interessant sondern auch wichtig]’.32 Rhees intends to elaborate on this connection in his introduction. Although von Wright has reservations about Unseld’s proposal, he concedes, ‘I have no strong feelings about this’. He does, however, point out that a joint publication of A Lecture on Ethics and Über Gewißheit could be detrimental to the later publication of ‘a collected volume of some of the minor writings of Wittgenstein which have now been published separately, in the Philosophical Review, in Synthese, and in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. It has also occurred to me that the “essay” on colourconcepts could be included in that collection’. For, as von Wright continues: ‘If we decide to publish such a volume we should probably want Suhrkamp to publish it too – in which case it may be awkward to have published the ethics lecture with the volume on certainty.’ Von Wright’s reservation is essentially concerned with publishing strategy, whereas Rhees’s primary consideration is the ‘interesting’ and ‘important’ links that he has identified between the lecture and the late remarks. Von Wright concludes by saying: ‘So, perhaps, I am more against than for Unseld’s proposal. But if Elizabeth is more for than against, by all means go ahead.’33 2.1 The replies Rhees pursues the matter further. In consequence of his ongoing seminars on Certainty in Swansea and his efforts to ‘see connexions’ and ‘find intermediate links’ in Wittgenstein’s late work, Rhees discovers an early anticipation of the themes in Über Gewißheit in a context that is entirely new. He promptly contacts Anscombe and von Wright. In the early evening of 10 March 1970, he sends telegrams to both. Von Wright’s reads as follows:

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London 36 10 1550 northern elt von Wright 4 skepparegatan helsingforsfinland propose including between ethics Lecture and certainty notes on frazer pages 234 to 242 and 247 to 252 many reasons for this if you object please signal otherwise proceeding rhees34 The proposal to include a shortened version of Bemerkungen über Frazer in the publication of Über Gewißheit is Rhees’s own idea. He now sees a way in which to combine the remarks with other manuscripts, which is what he has wanted to do from the very outset. There are several reasons for the proposal. In Rhees’s view, the Bemerkungen and Über Gewißheit are connected in a number of ways. At the same time, a publication that combines the two would also highlight the link between Bemerkungen and the Lecture on Ethics. This was something to which Rhees had already drawn attention in his correspondence with Drury in June 1964, shortly after coming across the MS 110 remarks on Frazer. The point Rhees had made back then was that Wittgenstein’s account, in the Lecture on Ethics, of the experiences that underlie ethical statements is echoed in the emphasis that Wittgenstein places, in the Frazer remarks, on the crucial experiences or feelings (‘of wonder – or of reverence’) that underlie the grammar of religious language.35 With his proposal, Rhees seeks to compare the connections that he has identified between these three texts. Following the release of the Synthese edition of the Bemerkungen in 1967, Rhees begins a new and detailed study of their content. He pursues this work with particular intensity in the years 1971–1975, in parallel with a series of seminars that he holds on Über Gewißheit. In this context he argues that the questions Wittgenstein discusses can be traced back as far as 1930. In the notes he makes during this study of the Bemerkungen, Rhees points to ‘certain connections’ between these and the very late writings. For example, Rhees notes: ‘ad Frazer [. . .] Connexion between (certain of the ideas in) Über Gewissheit. [. . .] Weltbild: Das Characteristische des primitiven Menschen ist dass er nicht aus Meinungen handelt’ (7–9 January 1971, RRRF, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/1). And: ad Frazer // In certain contexts, perhaps, we can say Darstellung – portrayal // p. 239 // A man’s shadow, his image or reflection (e.g. in water) . . . . /

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(cf. the words “ghost” and “shade”) / “. . . in short /that/ everything that a human being observes round and about him year in, year out . . . should play a role in his thinking (his philosophy) and his customs (practices), goes without saying – this is what we really know (contra Frazer) and what is interesting.” // cf.: “Die eigentlichen Grundlagen seines Forschens fallen dem Menschen gar nicht auf . . .” // “Grundlagen seines Forschens”: cf Weltbild in Über Gewißheit. —11 February 1971, RRRF, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/1 Returning to Rhees’s telegram, Anscombe’s response is prompt and direct. She calls Rhees and rejects the proposal he made in his telegram. Über Gewißheit must be published alone, without either A Lecture on Ethics or the remarks on Frazer. Rhees is dismayed by this categorical rejection. He writes to von Wright: ‘In any case, there was no opportunity to discuss the proposal for the volume. Probably discussion would not have achieved anything.’36 Alluding to the reservations that von Wright had expressed, with an eye to publishing strategy, Rhees adds: ‘Elizabeth was more emphatic in her veto of the suggestion that the Ethik Vortrag be printed with Über Gewißheit remarks. And I telegraphed Unseld to drop the idea. I am sorry to have put you to extra trouble.’37 But Rhees is annoyed. He feels his proposal has not been heard and that Anscombe and von Wright have been unwilling to consider the reasons behind, on the one hand, his openness to Unseld’s suggestion, and on the other, his own proposal to include the Bemerkungen. One of the reasons for this reluctance, Rhees feels, is that Anscombe and von Wright have assumed that the remarks in Über Gewißheit constitute a fairly discrete and coherent treatment of one cluster of themes. Rhees is sceptical about this assumption. And, as noted above, he has already criticized it, describing their ‘Preface’ to On Certainty as ‘misleading’ in that it is likely to entrench this assumption and ‘prevent people from recognizing the constant connections between these remarks and his [Wittgenstein’s] earlier discussions’.38 Rhees tells von Wright about the impression Anscombe’s response to his telegram has made on him, and he tactfully reiterates his reservations about von Wright and Anscombe’s assumption and decisions. He writes: I did have the impression that she had not seen the case there could be for including the Ethik Vortrag and the Bemerkungen über Frazer. But this ‘impression’ may be quite wrong. She feels strongly that the remarks ‘on certainty’ (I am not altogether happy about the title, but I cannot think of another) – that these remarks should appear by themselves. Sometimes I have wondered if she does not look on those remarks as much more abgeschlossen than (I believe) they are.39

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2.2 The reasons But what are Rhees’s reasons for wanting to publish the Bemerkungen together with Über Gewißheit? What does he have in mind? We find an answer to this question in his ‘Vorwort’ to the German-only edition of Über Gewißheit and in a letter to von Wright from March 1970. At the beginning of his ‘Vorwort’, Rhees makes the point that Wittgenstein’s references to Moore in Über Gewißheit do not warrant the conclusion that the work is ‘a piece of polemic’. Wittgenstein addresses Moore’s so-called ‘Erfahrungssätze’ because he believes ‘they all play a strange role in our speaking and thinking [sie spielen alle eine eigentümliche Rolle in unserem Sprechen und Denken]’ and that close scrutiny of the role they play ‘leads to a better understanding of human language, of thinking and language games [führt zu einem besseren Verständnis der menschlichen Sprache, des Denkens und des Sprachspiels]’ (RVÜG, 1, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/7/3). This is followed by a discussion of Wittgenstein’s famous grammatical critique of Moore’s mistaken use of the phrase ‘I know . . .’ in connection with specific ‘empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions’ (OC 136). It is these so-called ‘hinge propositions’, things that ‘stand fast for me’ without being linked to confirmation or refutation, that provide the ‘scaffolding’ for our thought. They are the ‘hinges’ on which our acting and language turn. Collectively, these propositions form a system or a whole, which the child ‘swallows [. . .], so to speak, together with what it learns’ (OC 143). Rhees emphasizes that the empirical propositions we ‘swallow’ form a system of sentences that we take for granted. ‘They do not form a hypothesis [Sie bilden nicht eine Hypotese]’ (RVÜG, 4, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/7/3). This system reflects a ‘Weltbild’, in other words, a horizon of self-evident propositions which we simply assume to be the case and which form the basis and background for our language. They constitute a world-picture that we inherit rather than develop for ourselves. ‘I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation [die selbstverständliche Grundlage] for’ our acting, thinking etc. (OC 167). For the same reason, we are unable to see behind this world-picture in order to confirm or justify it: ‘it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there – like our life’ (OC 559). It would be meaningless to attempt to justify a world-picture. A world-picture ‘is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false’ (OC 94). Moreover, Rhees reminds us that in Über Gewißheit Wittgenstein is also interested in, and seeks to describe, ‘what it would be like, if two cultures with radically different world-pictures came into contact [wie es wäre, wenn

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zwei Völkern mit radikal verschiedenen Weltbildern in Berührung kämen]’ (RVÜG, 5, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/7/3). Rhees quotes: Supposing we met people who did not regard that [being guided in my actions by the propositions of physics] as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? – If we call this “wrong” aren’t we using our languagegame as a base from which to combat theirs? —OC 609 Rhees ends the foreword by pointing out that the empirical propositions we ‘swallow’, the ‘hinge propositions’, do not constitute ‘a certain class of propositions or facts [eine bestimmte Klasse von Sätzen oder Tatsachen]’ (RVÜG, 7, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/7/3). They do not have the role of logical principles in a formal system. It is necessary to distinguish between different ‘Erfahrungssätze’ depending on the language-game we happen to be playing. In other words, these empirical propositions vary from one language-game to another. Within a language-game, certainty depends on the nature of that language-game. In Rhees’s words: ‘It is not always the same propositions which determine the language-game’s certainty. We could not give a list of sentences and say, “These are the foundations without which no languagegame would be possible” [Doch sind es nicht immer die gleiche Sätze, die die Sicherheit des Sprachspiels bestimmen. Wir könnten nicht eine Liste von Sätzen geben, und sagen, “Diese sind die Grundlagen, ohne welche kein Sprachspiel möglich wäre”].’ And he adds in conclusion: ‘We could not look for “the principles of the possibility of language-games (or of the practice of language)” [Wir könnten nicht einmal nach den “Prinzipien der Möglichkeit des Sprachspiels (oder der Praxis der Sprache)” suchen]’ (RVÜG, 6, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/7/3). Although Rhees makes no mention of Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ in his foreword, his line of argument can be related to the earlier of those remarks. In the Bemerkungen, Wittgenstein is similarly at pains to reach ‘a better understanding of human language, of thinking’. He is also interested in the ‘inherited background’ of indubitable assumptions in the magician’s or in religious language. Accordingly, he seeks to identify the statements and conceptions that occupy and serve the role of ‘Erfahrungssätze’. As we saw above, Wittgenstein makes the point also in these early remarks that the magician’s actions and world-picture are not founded on reasoning. ‘Weltbild: “Das Charakteristische des primitive Menschen ist dass er nicht aus Meinungen handelt” ’ (7–9 January 1971,

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RRRF, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/1). And finally, Frazer’s analysis of magical and religious acts comes across as a clear illustration of a situation where ‘two principles [world-pictures] really do meet which cannot be reconciled’, where ‘each man declares the other a fool and heretic’ (OC 611). In the Bemerkungen we read: ‘What narrowness of spiritual life we find in Frazer! And as a result: how impossible for him to understand a different way of life from the English one of his time!’ (RF 31). Moreover, in the course of this enquiry, he cites several examples of the kind of ‘Erfahrungssätze’ associated with the certainty of the magician. In short, Über Gewißheit is a response to questions that already interested Wittgenstein in the early 1930s. Very soon after receiving Anscombe and von Wright’s rejection of his suggestion, Rhees writes again to von Wright. In this he lists some of his ‘many reasons’ for wanting to include the Lecture on Ethics and Bemerkungen in an edition of Über Gewißheit. These are the reasons alluded to in the telegram. Rhees writes that the remarks in Über Gewißheit point ‘to discussions outside these remarks’, and he questions whether Über Gewißheit can be properly understood if read in isolation. Rhees highlights the commonalities between Über Gewißheit and Philosophische Untersuchungen. In the latter, Wittgenstein draws attention to ‘the variety in what might be called Erfahrungssätze’. He multiplies the few examples listed by Moore, having already realized that ‘[o]ur “empirical propositions” do not form a homogeneous mass [[u]nsere “Erfahrungssätze” bilden nicht eine homogene Masse]’, as he would later put it in Über Gewißheit (OC 213). Rhees draws attention to ‘the discussion of Aspekte-sehen and “Aspekt-blindheit” ’, ‘Menschenkenntnis’ and ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life’ in Part IIxi. With all this in mind, he writes: The Bemerkungen über Frazer are a discussion of the Bildhaftigkeit der Sprache or of Sprache als Darstellung. They show that the question “Why do people perform this and that form of ritual?” is one form of asking: “Why do people speak?” Such a question springs from einer Beunruhigung: it is the confused expression of einer Beunruhigung, and misleads some (like Frazer) to look for an explanation. What is important is: that when something deeply disturbing happens; or when people are alive to what is constantly there and constantly crucial in their lives – birth, death, illness, madness, the change of the seasons . . . ; then people do speak, or do carry out some sort of Darstellung. – To ask “Why?” is to weaken the impression of what happens. Compare: Someone’s friend is killed, and he sings a lament. “Why?” Die Sprache muss für sich selbst sprechen. Die Ritus muss für sich selbst sprechen.

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Rhees adds that the distinction Wittgenstein draws in A Lecture on Ethics between ‘a relative and an absolute sense’ of a word, his allusion to ‘the experience of seeing the world as a miracle’, and even ‘the experience of feeling absolutely safe’ no matter what happens, are all examples of that which can stand alone and which constitutes the ‘background against which I distinguish between true and false’ (OC 94). Rhees concludes the letter: ‘Elizabeth’s point was: that if the Lecture on Ethics were in the same volume, it could only be something “tacked on” to Über Gewißheit. I wonder.’40 Two months later, in mid-May, i.e. three months after Anscombe’s categorical rejection of Rhees’s proposal, Rhees sends a copy of this letter to Anscombe – a letter that also gives ‘a very sketchy outline of what I had in mind with the suggestion’.41 2.3 The foreword Anscombe and von Wright reject Rhees’s suggestion to publish the Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ in the German edition of Über Gewißheit in March 1970. They also reject Unseld’s suggestion to include A Lecture on Ethics. Anscombe does so categorically, while Von Wright seeks a compromise. In his response to Rhees, he writes: Thank you for your letter with the very interesting comments “round” the Über Gewissheit. Maybe Elizabeth and I had somewhat different grounds for our attitudes; I was chiefly thinking of the “external” consideration that it could be desirable to publish a separate volume of “minor writings” of Wittgenstein’s such as e.g. the Notes on Frazer and the Ethics Lecture. Von Wright suggests that in the foreword to Über Gewißheit, Rhees could include ‘references to the Untersuchungen and to the Ethics Lecture and the Notes on Frazer of the kind you make in your last letter to me. Such an essay may after all do more good than merely including in the same volume other stuff beside Über Gewissheit’. And he goes on: ‘It would make the reader aware of connexions which he could then study in closer detail in the sources, and whether these are in one or several books would not matter so much.’42 But by this time, Rhees has already prepared his foreword for Über Gewißheit – and in May it is rejected by Unseld. In June Rhees writes to von Wright that Unseld ‘thinks this Einleitung sich “doch zu sehr an einen ausgesuchten Fachkreis richtet”, and he does not want to print it with this volume which is appearing in a series not directed to any Fachkreis.’ Rhees adds: ‘I suppose he is right. I fear that Wittgenstein’s own remarks in the book will not be as intelligible to

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the general reader as Unseld wants them to be. But I hope I am wrong about this.’43 Later in the year, Über Gewißheit is released, with the familiar short ‘Vorwort’ by Anscombe and von Wright from the bilingual edition, without any concessions to Rhees’s criticism of its wording. Rhees’s attempts to have the Bemerkungen published alongside other texts have come to nothing. Rhees’s reservations about the wording of the foreword to the previous bilingual version of On Certainty are thereby rebuffed. And so too are the links that might justify a joint publication of A Lecture on Ethics and Bemerkungen. Shortly after Unseld’s rejection of Rhees’s ‘Vorwort’, von Wright announces that he is working on an article about Über Gewißheit. In a letter to Rhees, he writes: ‘Whether it [the article] will be any good, I do not know – but the task is immensely interesting. I still find your notes for Suhrkamp, i.e. the one which you gave me in England last autumn very helpful. I am therefore surprised, not to say annoyed, to hear that Unseld is not going to print your Einleitung.’44 In response, Rhees sends a copy of the rejected text to von Wright, ‘since you asked about this. But it is less likely that this will be any use to you’.45 In November, Rhees and von Wright meet in Cambridge, where the latter is making a brief visit. They talk about all that has happened over the past year. They discuss Über Gewißheit, Unseld’s proposal and Rhees’s idea of including the Bemerkungen. Von Wright updates Rhees on his article. Rhees has now concluded his seminars on Certainty in Swansea. In August, von Wright presents his article ‘Wittgenstein on Certainty’ in Helsinki (von Wright 1972: 47–60). For Rhees, the meeting is disheartening compared to the one that had been so uplifting the year before. In his seminars, Rhees had insisted that Wittgenstein’s interests differ from those of Moore, and can be traced as far back as 1930. He had argued that On Certainty is not merely a polemic against Moore and discussed the links between On Certainty and the remarks on Frazer. By contrast, von Wright in his article maintains and elaborates the views about On Certainty, its contents and what motivated it, that he and Anscombe had outlined in their own foreword. Von Wright describes the treatise as one in which Wittgenstein is concerned ‘exclusively’ with the themes of ‘knowledge and certainty, commenting on some of G.E. Moore’s views’. He asserts that the remarks ‘possess a thematic unity which makes them almost unique in Wittgenstein’s entire literary output’ (von Wright 1972: 47). The differences between their approaches to and understanding of this text are striking. Shortly after their meeting, Rhees writes to von Wright: It was a good thing that we could meet. The meeting left me feeling depressed and gloomy, and probably it was the same for you. We meet so rarely – and this cannot be helped – and we look on the work in such different ways, that no one of us can understand the conceptions and

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reactions of the others. Still, it is important that we should meet at least as often as we do now.46 In his article on ‘On Certainty’, von Wright mentions the links that Rhees has identified between Über Gewißheit and Bemerkungen in a note to his concluding discussion of a world-picture (von Wright 1972: 59n14).

3. AN ARDENT BUT IRRESOLUTE EDITOR Rhees’s reaction to these rebuffs is admirable. He refrains from any further criticism of von Wright and Anscombe. For him, the matter is closed despite their disagreement. In 1989, the Bemerkungen is published by Suhrkamp Verlag, for the first time together with other manuscripts. With the title Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften, this volume owes its existence largely to the efforts of Joachim Schulte. Following his disagreement with von Wright and Anscombe, Rhees continues to work on the Bemerkungen, extending and deepening his analysis of the material. His work now takes the form of a detailed exegetic commentary on the Synthese edition, and he repeatedly touches on the parallels between the Bemerkungen and Über Gewißheit. On 17 October 1971, he notes: ‘Return to the Frazer notes, and to the notion of “die Grundlagen seiner Forschung” but also the “Grundlagen seines Denkens und Sprechens” / The connexion of this with the remarks Über Gewißheit’ (17 October 1971, RRRF, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/1). He continued with this research until 1975, by which time it filled some 350 handwritten and typed pages. This material is now in the keeping of the Richard Burton Archives at Swansea University. Rhees’s lecture on ‘Religious Belief. Ritual and Myth’ at King’s College in March 1974, his well-known article ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual’ from 1976, and his Tübingen lecture from April 1977 are all outcomes of this immense work. Rhees’s work with the Bemerkungen also reveals various points of ambivalence following his disagreement with Anscombe and von Wright. He does not abandon the idea he first mentioned in 1967, that the Frazer material ‘could be included in a volume later’ on,47 but at the same time he becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the Synthese edition. On the other hand, he contributes his energies to an English translation of the Bemerkungen which is published on its own. For this, he makes a few cuts to the text of Part II and writes a more comprehensive ‘Introductory Note’, in which he also discusses the position of the notes in Wittgenstein’s work as a whole. For this text, he draws directly on his rejected ‘Vorwort’ to Über Gewißheit, emphasizing that in the Bemerkungen Wittgenstein is already focusing his attention on what ‘belongs to the foundations’, namely ‘everything a man perceives year in, year

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out around him’. And he adds: ‘Wittgenstein was writing about this 20 years later in his remarks On Certainty. His conception there of the “world picture” (Weltbild) in which we live and think and act contains developments not thought of in the remarks on Frazer’ (RF 21–22). Remarks on Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’ is published in the summer of 1971 in The Human World. Drury is pleased with the translation and writes to Rhees: ‘It is good that these [Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer] have now been translated and I am able to read them in detail, instead of trying to puzzle out fragments.’48 Rhees’s dissatisfaction with the Synthese edition and the publication in The Human World isn’t the only sign of his ambivalence. In addition, he is dismissive of an enquiry concerning the possibility of a new publication with a reorganization of the remarks. Even though he himself has been unclear about how to present the remarks, in April 1973, Rhees rejects a proposal he receives from Kenneth L. Ketner’s and James Eigsti49 for a text-critical bilingual edition in either a professional journal or in small book format with the title Remarks on Frazer’s Philosophical Anthropology. But despite his rejection of this version, known today as the ‘Ketner and Eigsti edition’, Rhees responds positively to a request to publish an Italian translation of the Synthese edition. In other words, Rhees gives his approval to the publication of an edition he has reservations about. In July 1973, Rhees writes to Luciano Foà: ‘We are glad to sanction your translation and publication of Wittgenstein’s Bermerkungen über Frazers “The Golden Bough”.’50 The translation Note sul “Ramo d’oro” di Frazer is published two years later along with Rhees’s ‘Introductory Note’. A French translation of the Synthese edition, Remarques sur “Le Rameau d’or” de Frazer, follows in 1977. In addition, Rhees’s in-depth study of the Synthese edition did not leave him feeling significantly clearer about its contents. In February 1972, he noted: ‘Whether Wittgenstein thought that the second group of remarks would illuminate or illustrate the sort of confusions that there are in philosophy, is not clear’ (17 February 1972, RRRF, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/ 2/5/1). Three years later he writes: ‘The first set of notes on Frazer – probably one of the least well-thought out and most confused of Wittgenstein’s writing. [. . .] His suggestions seem to have been tentative and they do not complement one another: and they often conflict’ (16 February 1975, RRRF, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/1). Post 1975, Rhees’s reading of Bemerkungen is therefore characterized by ambivalence. Having received a request to include a German translation of his abovementioned article ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual’ in Wittgenstein Schriften, Beitrag 3, three years after its original publication in 1976, Rhees begins to have serious doubts about the latter half of his text. In this section of the article, Rhees had tackled what he described as the ‘longest and most interesting of Wittgenstein’s later set of

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comments’ (Rhees 1976: 476). Writing to Joachim Schulte, who has been busy translating the article, Rhees repeats a decision he has already shared with Brian McGuinness: ‘All that which [is] marked as “Part II” – i.e. the typescript-pages 36 to 47 included must be removed and burned. Not one sentence must be printed. [. . .] I should have said from the beginning, that “Part II” was supposed to be deleted. Then you would not have wasted your time and energy on this part. I was encircled by a fog [All das, was als “Teil II” bezeichnet [ist] – d.h. Typoskriptseiten 36 bis 47 einschließlich muß herausgenommen und verbrannt werden. Kein Satz davon gedruckt. [. . .] Ich hätte vom Anfang an gesagt haben sollen, daß der “Teil II” gestrichen werden sollte. Dann hätten Sie Ihre Zeit und Energie nicht auf diesen Teil verschwenden müssen. Ich war im Nebel].’51 His instructions are followed. A few months later, the article appears in truncated form in the anthology Wittgensteins geistige Erscheinung (Rhees 1979: 35–66). Just three years later, in 1982, it is published again, this time in its original, full-length form in the anthology Wittgenstein and his Times (Rhees 1982: 69–107). In the meantime, Rhees has agreed to a new – and this time bilingual – edition of Bemerkungen. Based on the shortened text of The Human World edition and released in 1979, this independent publication is now known as the Brynmill edition. It coincides with the publication of a new English translation of the entire Synthese edition in the anthology Wittgenstein. Sources and Perspectives. The latter omits Rhees’s ‘Introductory Note’. Rhees is far from pleased with John Beversluis’ English translation, parts of which he finds ‘atrocious’.52 The Brynmill edition is the last version of the Bemerkungen that Rhees is involved with, the third in fourteen years. Over the following years, Rhees receives many enquiries about the content, principles of selection and editing of the various editions. Rhees answers these letters and questions, justifying his decisions, analysing and clarifying misunderstandings relating to the versions that he himself was not entirely happy with. In February 1976, some fifteen years after first discovering the remarks about Frazer, by which time the first two editions of Bemerkungen had already been released, Rhees received a letter from Frank Cioffi. At that point, Rhees is living in London, where he had moved four years after his early retirement in 1966 from the University College of Swansea. Cioffi has noticed the discrepancies between the Synthese and Human World editions, and the fact that several remarks from the earlier publication are omitted from the English translation of 1971. Having begun his letter with the salutation ‘Dear Professor Rhees’, Cioffi asks why the two editions are not identical. Is this the result of an oversight? Or is it deliberate? ‘[D]id you have any special reasons for leaving them out?’53 Rhees replies to this letter as well. He writes:

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225a, Greville Place, London NW6 5JP. February 26th, 1976. Dear Professor Cioffi, Thank you for your letter of February 17th; (there was some delay before it reached me). When I was preparing the English translation of Wittgenstein’s comments on The Golden Bough, I left out some that I had included in the Synthese publication. You ask whether this was inadvertent or whether I left them out deliberately. And I wonder if I understand your question. If I had left them out inadvertently, the Editor of The Human World would have called my attention to it. Some of the remarks I included in the Synthese article are more important than others. Some hang together much more closely than others. When I read the Synthese publication some months or years afterwards, parts of it gave the impression of scattered jottings (as some of them were); and others, although they were more finished and were perceptive, did not belong clearly to them (or themes) of his comments on the Golden Bough: or the connexion would not be plain at first reading. – Wittgenstein’s writings have often been called sets of rambling remarks. ([Jonathan Francis] Bennett, when he was still in Cambridge, would say ‘Wittgenstein rambles on and on . . .’ And this sort of criticism goes on and on.) I wanted to keep those comments which are more centred on a theme or question he is discussing in them, and to remove the distraction of others, even when these are interesting in themselves. I was not leaving out parts of an article which Wittgenstein had prepared for publication. I was trying to correct what I think was a fault in the text I prepared for Synthese. I think now that I should have included (and note bene, this is my judgement, not Wittgenstein’s) – I think I should have included the remark in the middle of page 244 of Synthese, and also the remark about two thirds down page 251 – although I think this should not go in that place. Your questions are very general. And I do not know what you want. Yours sincerely Rush Rhees I have never been a Professor.54

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ARCHIVES AND ABBREVIATIONS Rhees’s transcription of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer from TS 110 and of MS 143 (in copy) is kept at the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives (WWA), Helsinki, Finland. Wittgenstein’s MS 110, TS 211 and MS 143 and Rhees’s transcription of MS 143 are in the keeping of the Wren Library (WL), Trinity College, Cambridge, England. Part of Rhees’s correspondence with Drury and Rhees’s Nachlass in general are kept at the Richard Burton Archives (RBA), University of Swansea, Wales, under the catalogue signatures UNI/SU/PC/1/1/3/4. RRRF

Rhees’s Nachlass on Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer (RBA)

RRTS 110

Rhees’s transcription of remarks on Frazer from MS 110 (WWA)

RRTS 143

Rhees’s transcription of MS 143 (WL)

RVÜG

Rhees’s ‘Vorwort’ to Über Gewißheit (RBA)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks to the project The Creation of Wittgenstein (Academy of Finland) for a bursary that allowed me to complete the work on this article. Thanks to the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives (University of Helsinki) and the Richard Burton Archives (Swansea University) for their help and hospitality on various study trips. And thanks to Peter Cripps for translating the article, to Hywel Davies for references to relevant material, and to Thomas Wallgren (University of Helsinki) for the invitation to contribute to the anthology. The copyright to the letters of Rush Rhees is held by Volker Munz, who has given permission for their publication. The letters by Georg von Wright are reproduced with permission of Benedict von Wright and Anita Grönberg von Wright.

NOTES 1. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 10 February 1963, Coll. 714.200, NLF. 2. For my use of references and abbreviations see the section ‘Archives and abbreviations’ at the end of this chapter, the list of abbreviations and the bibliography to this volume. 3. Rush Rhees to Maurice O’Connor Drury 7–8 January 1959, RBA, UNI/SU/ PC/1/1/3/4. 4. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 25 October 1962, Coll. 714.200, NLF. 5. Maurice O’Connor Drury to Rush Rhees 22 April 1967, RBA, UNI/SU/ PC/1/1/3/4, Swansea University (and Drury 2019: 240).

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6. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 31 January 1963, Coll. 714.200, NLF. 7. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 25 September 1962, Coll. 714.200, NLF. 8. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 31 January 1963, Coll. 714,200, NLF. 9. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 10 February 1963, Coll. 714.200, NLF. 10. Rush Rhees to Peter Winch 17 February 1965, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/1/3/1. 11. Rush Rhees to Maurice O’Connor Drury15 June 1964, RBA, UNI/SU/ PC/1/1/3/4. 12. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 22 April 1964, Coll. 714.200, NLF. 13. Georg Henrik von Wright to Elizabeth Anscombe 11 June 1964, Coll. 714.11, NLF. 14. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 1 November 1964, Coll. 714.200, NLF. 15. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 21 March 1967, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 16. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 5 April 1967, Coll. 714.201, NLF. 17. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 13 April 1967, Coll. 714.201, NLF. 18. Maurice O’Connor Drury to Rush Rhees 22 April 1967, Drury 2019: 240. 19. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 16 September 1967, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 20. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 22 September 1967, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 21. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 18 June 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 22. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 18 June 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 23. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 29 June 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 24. Georg Henrik von Wright to Elizabeth Anscombe 21 September, Coll. 714.11, NLF. 25. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 29 June 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 26. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 4 August 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 27. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 10 August 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 28. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 12 November 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 29. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright and Elizabeth Anscombe 5 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 30. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 5 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 31. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 5 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 32. Rush Rhees to Siegfried Unseld 8 March 1970, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/7/2. 33. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 9 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 34. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 10 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 35. Rush Rhees to Maurice O’Connor Drury 15 June 1964, RBA, UNI/SU/ PC/1/1/3/4. 36. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 19 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004.

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37. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 19 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 38. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 18 June 1969, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 39. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 19 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 40. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 19 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 41. Rush Rhees to Elizabeth Anscombe 10 May 1970, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/2. 42. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 24 March 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 43. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 1 June 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 44. Georg Henrik von Wright to Rush Rhees 8 June 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 45. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 29 June 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 46. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 13 November 1970, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 47. Rush Rhees to Georg Henrik von Wright 21 March 1967, WWA, Wri-FC-004. 48. Maurice O’Connor Drury to Rush Rhees 15 June 1971, Drury 2019: 247. 49. Rush Rhees to Kenneth L. Ketner 10 April 1973, WWA, Witt-100-053. 50. Rush Rhees to Luciano Foà 24 July 1973, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/4. 51. Rush Rhees to Joachim Schulte 17 February 1979, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/10/9. 52. Rush Rhees to Ian Robinson 29 January 1979, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/4. 53. Frank Cioffi to Rush Rhees 17 February 1976, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/4. 54. Rush Rhees to Frank Cioffi 26 February 1976, RBA, UNI/SU/PC/1/2/5/4.

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CHAPTER TEN

Editorial Approaches to Wittgenstein’s ‘Last Writings’ (1949–1951): Elizabeth Anscombe, G.H. von Wright and Rush Rhees in Dialogue LASSI JAKOLA

1. ‘LAST WRITINGS’: A SPECIAL CASE IN WITTGENSTEIN’S NACHLASS? Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings stemming from 1949 to April 1951 – i.e. from roughly the last two years of his life – have been made available in three major posthumous publications: On Certainty (1969), Remarks on Colour (1977a), and, finally, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2: The Inner and the Outer (1992). In addition, twenty-five remarks from this period have been included in Vermischte Bemerkungen (1977c).1 The underlying manuscripts for these publications are the items MS 169–177 in von Wright’s catalogue (1969). In the following, I use the term ‘last writings’ to signify this group of manuscripts.2 235

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‘Last writings’ constitute a special case in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass in various respects. From a text-genetical point of view, they comprise of firstdraft material.3 With the exception of MS 172, written on loose sheets of paper, and MS 171, which is a writing block, the material comprises of seven mid-size notebooks, which are variously filled with Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks: some of them have writing on few pages only, whereas others have been written till the very last page. With the exception of the first half of MS 176 (= RoC I), which is a revised and reorganized selection of Wittgenstein’s earlier remarks from MS 173 (= RoC III), Wittgenstein did not have an occasion to revise these remarks at a later stage. No selection from these notebooks was ever dictated to a typist to form a fair copy for further work. While the exact dating of some of these notebooks is a disputed issue, one may say that – with the exception of parts of the earliest notebook MS 169 – they were probably written after Wittgenstein’s journey to the United States in summer–autumn 1949. Most of the material was written after Wittgenstein had been diagnosed with prostate cancer in November 1949.4 Besides such historical observations, some readers have suggested that Wittgenstein’s last philosophical writings are, after all, more finalized and self-contained than his first-draft materials typically tend to be. This philosophico-evaluative observation constitutes another respect in which ‘last writings’ have been viewed as a special case in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Thus G.H. von Wright – one of the main editors of these writings – pointed out in 1972 that Wittgenstein’s late remarks concerning knowledge and certainty ‘possess a thematic unity which makes them almost unique in Wittgenstein’s whole literary output’. He also added that the writings ‘can be said to summarize some of the essential novelties in his thinking’.5 Such tentative observations have later been developed further by the proponents of the so-called ‘third Wittgenstein’, who have seen in Wittgenstein’s last writings a new philosophical opening, pointing away from the therapeutically oriented Philosophical Investigations (Part I) and suggesting a more systematic philosophical enterprise.6 Accordingly, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock and Michael Brenner have even come to designate On Certainty as the third major philosophical masterpiece in Wittgenstein’s literary oeuvre, on par with the Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations.7 With such suggestions, a posthumous publication edited from Wittgenstein’s late first-draft notebooks has, surprisingly, been given a status of a thematically self-contained philosophical work of the highest quality. In this article, I shall not engage directly with the thorny topic of the ‘third Wittgenstein’. My focus is on the four posthumous editions and on the editorial history of Wittgenstein’s last writings. On the basis of my historical

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and textual observations I do, however, argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty are not as self-contained that they are often taken to be, and that the editorial and philological issues bear heavily on the discussions concerning the third Wittgenstein. And I will definitely show that G.H. von Wright’s position concerning Wittgenstein’s late writings turns out to be more ambivalent than the passage, quoted above, implies. This article commences, in Section 2, with an overview of the relations between the four posthumous publications and their underlying manuscript material. By means of visual ‘source-graphs’, I illustrate the editorial process of thematic selection and reorganization, which is the characteristic trait of these editions. In Section 3, I show that Elizabeth Anscombe, Rush Rhees and G.H. von Wright were by no means unanimous as to how they should make Wittgenstein’s last writings available to the philosophical public. The publication programme that was realized corresponds mainly to Anscombe’s vision, but both von Wright and Rhees made substantial proposals. While von Wright’s 1967–1968 unpublished – and hitherto practically unknown – edition highlighted the synchronic thematic connections within these notebooks by including thematically organized selections in one single volume under the title Last Writings, Rush Rhees proposed, in 1970, an approach which highlights diachronic thematic continuities in Wittgenstein’s thought. The editorial history of Wittgenstein’s last writings is a revealing case study, which exhibits clearly some characteristic differences in Anscombe’s, von Wright’s and Rhees’s respective editorial approaches to Wittgenstein in the late 1960s. Finally, in Section 4, I conclude with a proposal that von Wright’s and Rhees’s views may be used as rectifying devices, helping us to understand the philosophical achievement of Wittgenstein’s last years in new light, and pointing beyond the thematically (and temporally) ‘compartmentalizing’ approach which inform the posthumous publications as we know them.

2. POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATIONS FROM MS 169–177 2.1. Thematic division as an editorial guideline Since, for most readers, Wittgenstein last writings are known through the posthumous publications, it is advisable to begin with an overview of these four volumes. If we take the four publications together, the contents of MSS 169–177 have been practically published in toto. Almost all philosophical remarks contained in these notebooks have been published in (at least) one of the four volumes.8 However, the perspective changes if we view each of the four volumes alone and consider the fact that a period of twenty-three

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years elapsed between the publication of the first volume (OC) and the final one (LW2). Each of the individual books is best characterized as a selection of longer stretches of remarks from Wittgenstein’s manuscripts,9 where each of the stretches has been allocated in one (or, in one special case, two) of the four thematic groups: epistemology, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of colours or (the more elusive) general remarks. These thematic groups, then, organized in a probable chronological order,10 constitute the publications as we know them. Indeed, the thematic division is clearly the governing editorial idea behind the four publications. This guiding principle is also clearly visible in the respective names of the volumes.11 In the 1969 Editors’ Preface to On Certainty, Anscombe and von Wright give the reader an impression that the thematic division stems from Wittgenstein’s own marginal and editorial marks in the manuscripts: It seemed appropriate to publish this work by itself. It is not a selection; Wittgenstein marked it off in his notebooks as a separate topic [. . .]. It constitutes a single sustained treatment of the topic. A similar claim is made in Anscombe’s 1977 Preface to Remarks on Colour. She claims that Wittgenstein had marked (in MS 173) the remarks on ‘innerouter’, Shakespeare and on other general topics ‘as discontinuous with the text’ on colours, which is published as Part III of RoC.12 These editorial remarks suggest the following picture: in his late period, Wittgenstein was simultaneously working on separate philosophical topics and, accordingly, on thematically separate philosophical writings. While thematically distinct chains of philosophical remarks are sometimes jotted down in one and the same notebook, Wittgenstein indicated thematic transitions clearly in his notebooks. The editors, on the other hand, have simply followed Wittgenstein’s indications in bringing the material together. And, so the story goes, at least in the case of his remarks on knowledge and certainty, Wittgenstein succeeded in producing a ‘sustained treatment of the topic’, which both warrants the publication and the designation of the whole as ‘work’. From this perspective, the editorial task may appear to have been simply that of identifying the work, naming it and presenting it to the philosophical public.13 This picture, I’m afraid, is misleading and in many ways plainly wrong. Indeed, the view that the thematic demarcation is based on Wittgenstein’s own editorial marks, has been criticized by some scholars in recent years.14 One perceptive critic is Kim van Gennip (2003). Basing her criticism on textcritical considerations, she has pointed out that Wittgenstein’s alleged ‘own’ editorial marks in the notebooks are by no means unambiguous. While the

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occasional horizontal lines in the manuscripts may sometimes be interpreted as indicating thematic shifts, identical marks also occur in context where a topical change is not evident. I believe that anybody who has carefully compared the posthumous publications with the underlying manuscripts will agree with van Gennip’s observation that, unlike the Prefaces to the published editions suggest, Wittgenstein simply ‘did not unmistakably mark off these sections in his notebooks’. I am in agreement with her conclusion that the editors have evidently also ‘applied their own, alternately thematically or chronologically orientated, demarcation marks’ while parsing Wittgenstein’s remarks into thematically organized books.15 2.2. Posthumous publications and their MS sources Let us now examine the four editions in relation to their source manuscripts. There already are many accurate source-catalogues for Wittgenstein’s last writings.16 This notwithstanding, it is useful to revisit the relations between the published books and MS 169–177 again, in a slightly different graphical form, which makes the editorial process of thematic identification and selection more perspicuous. In the following ‘source-graphs’, the lowest row ‘Date’ gives information concerning the probable date of the MS. Above the dates, on the row entitled ‘The Manuscripts’, MS 169–177 are represented by horizontal bars, organized according to von Wright numbers in their rough chronological order.17 The relative length of each manuscript is represented (approximately) by the length of the bar, and the editorial division into thematic ‘sections’ within the manuscripts is marked with a vertical line within the bar. Finally, on the top row ‘Posthumous publications’, the horizontal bars represent the posthumous publications. Editors’ division of the publications into several parts or chapters is indicated by a white space between the sections. More detailed information concerning the edition’s MS sources is given in a table. Since each of the publications (with the exception of VB) is a result of juxtaposition of thematic sections from various manuscripts, this form of representation enables us to mark each of the sections identified and separated by the editors in the manuscripts and to present, by means of arrows, how such sections make up the final posthumous editions. The chosen graphical form also enables us to easily see to what extent the editors have followed the probable chronology of the manuscripts and reorganized the sections within the publications. Furthermore, by marking each section in the MSS with a raster pattern corresponding to the edition in which the section has been published, the graph will also make plain how the editors spliced the contents of the notebooks into three main complexes, thus

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breaking up the original flow of the remarks in the manuscripts. Because the publication format of VB is different, OC, RoC and LW2 will be discussed first, in chronological order of publication. 2.2.1. On Certainty (1969) On Certainty, published in 1969, was edited by Elizbeth Anscombe and G.H. von Wright together. It was the first publication from Wittgenstein’s last writings. The book contains remarks from five manuscripts, i.e. from MSS 172, 174, 175, 176 and 177. The editors have given the book’s remarks a continuous numbering from §1 to §679. The MS divisions are not indicated in the published book, but the remarks do follow the probable chronological order of the underlying notebooks. Indeed, the editors have indicated a division of the material into four temporally distinct sets by discreet horizontal lines occurring after §65, §192 and §299.18 This division and the added numbering is explained in the Editors’ Preface – however, with no clear statement concerning how the division is related to the MS notebooks and without stating explicit grounds for the dating of each set. It thus seems that the primary editorial principle being that of thematic division, the secondary editorial principle behind the composition of On Certainty was based heavily on chronological considerations.19 Concerning the chronology of MSS 169–177, one may also observe that a large part of On Certainty stems from Wittgenstein’s very last writings from 1951.

FIGURE 10.1: Source-graph: On Certainty (1969). © Lassi Jakola.

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2.2.2. Remarks on Colour (1977) Remarks on Colour was published in 1977, eight years after On Certainty. The volume, edited by Anscombe alone, contains four sections from three manuscripts: MSS 172, 173 and 176. In RoC, the manuscript divisions are respected as the material is divided into parts I (MS 176), II (MS 172) and III (MS 173). Each of the parts has a separate running numbering, given by the editor. While the collection shares On Certainty’s thematic orientation as the main editorial guideline, the three parts of RoC have not been ordered chronologically. Instead, Anscombe has clearly given precedence to the material that had been edited and revised by Wittgenstein himself – namely pp. 1–22r of MS 176, which is reproduced as Part I.20 In text-genetical respect, this section has a unique position among Wittgenstein’s last writings. Unlike practically all the other material in the late manuscripts, this stretch of remarks is an example of Wittgenstein’s own manuscript revision of earlier first-draft remarks. This first-draft material, i.e. two longer sections of remarks from MS 173, in turn, is reproduced in the edition as Part III – however, without indicating where the first section ends and second begins.21 The remarks from MS 172 constitute the temporarily earliest set of remarks, having most likely been written in Vienna in early 1950. Roughly speaking, the remarks published in RoC are earlier than those published in OC. In Editor’s Preface, Anscombe (1977) states that the chosen policy of publishing together both first-draft and revised material ‘gives a clear sample of first-draft writing and subsequent selection’, adding that the approach ‘involves the least possible editorial intervention’. It should perhaps be

FIGURE 10.2: Source-graph: Remarks on Colour (1977). © Lassi Jakola.

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stressed that RoC is, among the editions produced by Wittgenstein’s three literary executors, the one which best allows the reader to follow Wittgenstein ‘at work’, drafting and then revising and reorganizing his philosophical remarks.22 While this aspect has been noticed by some textually oriented scholars, it has been less appreciated in the volume’s general reception.23 2.2.3. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2: The Inner and the Outer (1992) Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2: The Inner and the Outer finishes the series of three major and thematically organized publications from Wittgenstein’s last writings. The book, edited by G.H. von Wright and his assistant Heikki Nyman, was published in 1992, fifteen years after Remarks on Colour and twenty-three years after On Certainty.24 The German-only edition, with a slightly revised text, appeared in 1993.25 In this edition, the MS-division is clearly followed: the book is divided into seven chapters, and it is the first in which the chapters are named according to the source MS-books. Furthermore, these chapters are organized in the probable chronological order of the manuscripts. Unlike the previous two editions, the editors have not added any running numbering system to the book’s remarks. And unlike the previous editions, this volume has a scholarly apparatus, albeit a limited one: some alternative readings, cross-references to other editions from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, and textual explanations are given in footnotes. This apparatus, however, is far from complete. Such features do, however, point to a more scholarly and philologically oriented

FIGURE 10.3: Source-graph: Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2 (1992). © Lassi Jakola.

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approach to Wittgenstein-editing, which von Wright and his assistants had pursued in Helsinki starting from the 1970s. The editorial principles behind this volume call for some comment. The name of the edition implies that the collection includes those of Wittgenstein’s remarks from 1949–1951, which concern philosophy of psychology, or more exactly, the distinction between ‘the inner and the outer’. While this designation is not entirely misleading, it has two consequences. First, it sets the edition firmly in the series of three earlier volumes containing Wittgenstein’s remarks on philosophy of psychology (RPP 1 and 2; LW1) – rather than in the context of OC and RoC.26 And second, the name easily conceals the fact the main editorial approach behind the edition seems to have been a mixture of thematic selection and aspirations for completeness. The latter approach is evident in the fact that LW2 simply makes available all the philosophical content of MS 169–177, which had not already appeared in one of the three previous publications. A major editorial guideline has thus been a via negativa of a kind: followed by the positive selection of remarks on epistemology (OC), philosophy of colours (RoC), and ‘general remarks’ (VB), this book simply contains all that was left out. But that this aspiration for completeness is still occasionally secondary to thematic selection is evident from how the editors dealt with MS 173. As we have seen, two longer sections from that notebook had already been published as Part III of RoC. The section falling between these sections, MS 173, pp. 31v–47v, is printed in LW2.27 But the issue is complicated by the fact that pp. 87r–100r from the same notebook – a section that had already been published as RoC III §296–350 – is reproduced again in LW2.28 Interestingly, this section is not marked as separate by any means in the manuscript: its inclusion seems to have been motivated by the editors’ own thematic considerations.29 And indeed, given the main thematic editorial principle, the editors have correctly included these remarks in both collections: the remarks in question concern themes such as the phenomenon of seeing, colour blindness and the peculiar character of sentences such as ‘There are people who see’, which indeed seem to be relevant for philosophy of psychology and philosophy of colours. Interestingly, the thematic division as the major editorial guideline, systematically applied, thus leads into acknowledgement that remarks from Wittgenstein’s latest period cannot straightforwardly be allocated into one – and only one – thematic pigeonhole. 2.2.4. Vermischte Bemerkungen (1977) Vermischte Bemerkungen: Eine Auswahl aus dem Nachlaß was published in 1977 – the same year as Remarks on Colour – and was edited by G.H. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman. An English translation Culture

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FIGURE 10.4: Source-graph: Vermischte Bemerkungen (1977). © Lassi Jakola.

and Value (by Peter Winch) came out in 1980. The book is not part of the same publication programme as OC, RoC and LW2, the source material of which is taken from MS 169–177 only: VB is G.H. von Wright’s selection from Wittgenstein’s whole Nachlass and consists of remarks on music, art, literature, religion and other similar cultural topics of general interest.30 The collection contains twenty-five singular remarks taken from Wittgenstein’s last writings (see Figure 10.4 and a more detailed overview in Appendix). While some of these remarks occur as short chains in the sources, this edition (unlike OC, RoC and LW2) does not reproduce longer sections from Wittgenstein’s notebooks.31 The guiding editorial principle of this edition revolves around the distinction between a ‘philosophical remark’ and a ‘general remark’, where the latter is taken to be (semi-)detachable from its immediate textual context in the manuscripts.32 von Wright’s selection from the last writings is mostly based on following the vertical-line siglum |[remark]| by means of which Wittgenstein himself marked some of his remarks in the notebooks. von Wright evidently interpreted this siglum as Wittgenstein’s own device of indicating that the remark does not directly belong to the context where it occurs.33 But not all remarks selected for publication in VB are thus marked and not all such marked remarks are reproduced in VB.34 Beside this textual criterion, von Wright has thus evidently used thematic and contextual criteria in identifying some of the remarks as belonging in the category of ‘general’ remarks.35 With two interesting exceptions, the remarks classified as ‘general’ by von Wright and published in VB do not appear in OC, RoC or LW2 (see Note i in Figure 10.4 and Appendix). The exclusion of the general remarks

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from the three editions thus signifies a clear editorial intervention into the flow of Wittgenstein’s remarks as they appear in the source manuscripts. The relative philosophical significance of this intervention, however, is best evaluated case by case.36 2.3. The publication programme in retrospect: similarities and differences As has been shown, the main editorial guideline for the publication programme of Wittgenstein’s last writings has been thematic selection. In some other respects, one may identify both similarities and differences in the editorial policies followed in the edited volumes. The editions as we know them (i) present the reader with a smooth text with no or very limited scholarly and critical apparatus in the footnotes. The editors have made choices between Wittgenstein’s textual variants. This policy is in line with the literary executors’ consciously chosen publication policy for the first round of publications from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass (see von Wright 1982: 5);37 (ii) introduce the printed text with a short editorial Preface, which gives some information concerning editorial principles and underlying source materials. From text-critical point of view, this information may today be considered insufficient, and is occasionally misleading; (iii) divide the published material into several parts on the basis of varying criteria; (iv) typically follow Wittgenstein’s division of remarks, but have introduced numbering systems of various kinds, for which no basis is available in the MSS; (v) do not indicate possible omissions of singular remarks, e.g. remarks that have been extracted from the text and published in VB or have been totally suppressed; (vi) do not indicate places, where a longer stretch of remarks has been skipped, e.g. because it has been published elsewhere or reserved for publication in a planned edition; (vii) variously follow (but do not indicate or explain in detail) the editorial marks used by Wittgenstein in the MSS, e.g. horizontal lines, vertical-lines around remarks, crossings, slashes etc.; (viii) differ as to whether the contents are represented in the temporal order in which they were written, and (ix) differ as to whether the MS divisions are indicated.

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Finally, one may add that the publication schedule and the order in which the volumes were made available have had a considerable influence on the reception of Wittgenstein’s last philosophical remarks. As a period of twentythree years elapsed between the first and the final publication, On Certainty has definitely become the publication that has mostly shaped the philosophical community’s views of Wittgenstein’s late work.

3. THREE LITERARY HEIRS, THREE PERSPECTIVES TO WITTGENSTEIN’S LAST WRITINGS Archival materials and the preserved correspondence between Wittgenstein’s literary executors open some fairly illuminating vistas on the publication policy behind the four volumes in which Wittgenstein’s last writings have been made available. On the basis of these materials, we may pinpoint when, how, why and by whom the crucial editorial decisions concerning the publication policy were made. Indeed, the publication history of these writings reaches back to mid-1950s, and goes through many phases before the publication of the first volume in 1969.38 This contribution is not the right forum for a detailed historical overview of the editorial history. Instead, in this section, I shall highlight some particularly characteristic discussions and documents, which reveal that Wittgenstein’s literary executors were by no means unanimous concerning the right format of publication of these notebooks. I sketch a critical reconstruction of their positions on the basis of preserved archival materials and correspondence. Let us begin with Anscombe. 3.1. Anscombe: Single treatises on single subjects The editions as we know them are, to a large degree, an outcome of Elizabeth Anscombe’s editorial vision. By this I mean that it was demonstrably her, who insisted that the first of the volumes, On Certainty, should be published as a thematically organized monograph of its own. This decision, made in late 1968, was crucial for the later publication history of the last writings, as it determined the format for further publications: a major part of the material having been made available as a thematically organized book, it seemed natural to follow the same principle in the following editions. As we have seen, Anscombe edited the second volume, RoC, alone. And taken together, OC and RoC did not leave much room for the final publication, LW2, which, though edited by von Wright and Nyman, simply made available everything that had not already been published in OC, RoC and VB. The correspondence between von Wright and Anscombe reveals that Anscombe had formulated her editorial preference by autumn 1967. On 13

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September she informs von Wright – who had by then drafted a detailed plan for an edition of the last writings (see Section 3.2, below) – that she is ‘against a scrappy publication when we have a single treatise on a single topic to put before the public’.39 And she added that she will return with an ‘alternative proposal for a second volume’ at a later phase – meaning clearly a volume besides the ‘treatise’ on certainty. Judging from von Wright’s answer to this letter, Anscombe had not made a proposal of this kind at an earlier phase.40 Finally, on 16 September 1968, Anscombe reports her views to von Wright in a letter, which contains some important clues concerning her editorial policy. The following passage concerns Wittgenstein’s remarks on knowledge and certainty: This writing is so clearly a first draft – it is like the long colour notebook [MS 173, L.J], with many repetitions and no doubt Wittgenstein would have made an extract from it like the short colour essay [MS 176, 1–22r, L.J] if he had lived longer – that I thought it right to preserve the notebooklike character, keeping in the dates; and also (though without numbering them) the one or two personal remarks which directly relate to the writing. I hope you agree about that. I shall be here in October and hope I shall have the other volume of last writings sketched out. It was so clear that there was a good deal of stuff to publish, that I went ahead with the certainty thing as a monograph on its own, as I always wanted it to be.41 I hope you will agree that this was right. On Certainty as ‘a monograph on its own’ – or, as she had put it a year earlier, ‘a single treatise on a single topic’: this was clearly Anscombe’s vision for Wittgenstein’s last writings. The fact that she simply ‘went ahead’ with the idea, clearly without having asked von Wright’s approval in advance, shows that she was quite adamant with her vision. Indeed, this vision soon led into publication of On Certainty. It thus seems that it was Anscombe who pushed through two crucial editorial decisions: first, to separate the publication of the last writings into several volumes, and, second, to edit On Certainty for publication first – independent of any definite plans for further publications from the late notebooks. Interestingly, the correspondence reveals that Anscombe also wrote the final Preface for OC. The Preface was first written in English, and then translated into German by Anselm Müller. Von Wright made some minor suggestions and then agreed to sign the piece together with Anscombe.42 As was pointed out above, the book’s Preface contains some quite strong claims

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concerning the thematic separation and unity of Wittgenstein’s late remarks on knowledge: it suggests that On Certainty is ‘not a selection’ but a ‘single’ and ‘sustained’ treatment of a given topic – a ‘work’ of Wittgenstein. These suggestions seem to belong fairly closely together with Anscombe’s publication vision. These views can reasonably be questioned from both philosophical and philological angles. 3.2. von Wright: One volume with three thematic chapters (1967–8) As we have seen, in her letter of 13 September 1967, Anscombe contrasted her preferred ‘single treatment of a single topic’ with a ‘scrappy’ publication. Luckily, we know what this ‘scrappy’ publication was. It was G.H. von Wright’s proposal for an edition from Wittgenstein’s last writings. Indeed, before Anscombe took over in 1967–1968, von Wright was clearly, for several years, the primus motor in preparing Wittgenstein’s last writings for publication. In early 1962, he finished a typed transcription of the late notebooks. He shared copies of his transcription with Anscombe, Norman Malcolm and Rhees. This typescript formed the basis for further editorial work. The possible structure and contents of the projected edition are discussed in various letters between Wittgenstein’s literary executors – and Malcolm – in the mid-1960s, and the topic was probably addressed in their annual meetings. Finally, in Summer 1967, von Wright made up his mind concerning the collection’s structure, drafted a German preface, and sent this draft to Anscombe. And Anscombe’s letter from September 1967 – in which the idea of thematically separate treatises is first formulated – is a critical reply to von Wright’s proposal. That von Wright did not merely have a vague idea concerning how he should like to organize the material for publication but had planned a carefully thought-out edition, is clear on the basis of further correspondence and archival materials. In a letter to Blackwell’s director Henry Schollick from May 1968, von Wright updates on the ‘last writings’ project: Miss Anscombe and I have for years been planning and working on a volume of Wittgenstein’s last writings. I have myself an opinion of its composition but Miss Anscombe, I understand, has not yet made up her mind. The problem is to decide what to include and what to omit. There exists an edited German text ready for printing. I have been waiting to hear from Miss Anscombe since last Autumn. I wish the matter were soon put in order.43 As it seems, this ‘edited German text ready for printing’ has not been preserved in the archives. Luckily, other materials related to the planned

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edition are still available at the von Wright and Wittgenstein archives in Helsinki. These materials, and the above letter, warrant the talk of an unpublished edition of Wittgenstein’s last writings, planned by G.H. von Wright in 1967–1968. On the basis of these materials, the structure and contents of von Wright’s edition can fairly accurately be reconstructed.44 The (working) title of the edition was simply ‘Wittgenstein: Last Writings’. Based on my hypothetical reconstruction, the projected edition and its sources may be presented in the following source-graph as follows:

FIGURE 10.5: Source-graph: G.H. von Wright’s unpublished edition of Wittgenstein’s ‘Last writings’. © Lassi Jakola.

As is clear from the source-graph, Figure 10.5., von Wright’s edition contained, as part I, two and a half chapters of the later LW2; as part II, the later Part I of RoC; and as Part III, the whole of what was later published as OC. Like the later editions, von Wright’s edition, too, reproduced longer sections from Wittgenstein’s notebooks; indeed, the sections seem to have been identical to those used in the later editions. And in accordance with the guiding idea followed in the published volumes, the contents of von Wright’s edition, too, were divided thematically into three groups, constituting the three main parts of the book. Thus, the sequence of the stretches of remarks in the MS notebooks was changed. Judging from the preserved table of contents, the edition would have indicated the sections taken from different manuscripts by clear divisions and given rough dates for each section.45 Since only individual pages from the edition have been preserved, we do not know whether the choices of variants and possible omissions would have been identical to the editions as we know them.

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One could say that von Wright’s 1967–1968 edition aspired to find a compromise between thematic orientation and giving a fair presentation of the late manuscripts’ contents. The edition was not as comprehensive as the four final published volumes taken together – it included nothing from MS 169–171, omitted a section from MS 172 and most of MS 173, and presented the sections taken from MS 176 in a reorganized sequence. But in comparison with the published editions, this edition would have brought together, in one single publication, a large part of the materials with which Wittgenstein was preoccupied during his final years, thus encouraging people to study the topics in connection with one another. I also find it significant that the volume had a neutral title ‘Last writings’, which may be contrasted with the thematic titles of the published editions. What was, then, in Anscombe’s view, wrong with von Wright’s proposal? – As we saw above, she considered the projected publication ‘scrappy’. The authoritative Oxford English Dictionary explains the adjective ‘scrappy’ as something ‘[c]onsisting of scraps; made up of odds and ends; disjointed, unconnected’. While ‘consisting of scraps’ remains fairly neutral, the latter paraphrase indicate that the word has a rather negative connotation.46 On a semi-neutral level, Anscombe’s choice of word may simply have to do with her discontent with editions in which the editors have selected and re-grouped the MS material: she may have thought that von Wright’s edition is too much like a scrapbook, as the editor has taken the liberty of making extractions from the MS material and of organizing these materials in a novel way.47 This, however, is clearly not all Anscombe’s letter suggests. Indeed, as she contrasts von Wright’s ‘scrappy’ plan with a ‘single treatise on a single topic’, her tone is definitely pejorative. This is yet another indication that Anscombe tended to view Wittgenstein’s discussions as thematically self-contained. This way of seeing the manuscripts is, however, not philosophically neutral. It seems that Anscombe’s view, in fact, brings in many substantial issues concerning the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. And, as it seems, in such issues, von Wright and Anscombe simply parted their ways. Unlike Anscombe, von Wright did – in 1967–1968, at any rate – not think that the discussions in the late manuscripts may that easily be thematically separated. On the contrary, he seems to have been, from early on, convinced that there are important connections between the topics. Already in 1964, he had characterized the remarks on the ‘Innen–Aussen problem’ to Anscombe as follows: This part [. . .], which is chronologically the earliest, constitutes a kind of bridge between the discussion in the Investigations and the “Zetteln” on the one hand and the discussion of knowledge and certainty which begins

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in Notebook VII [=MS 174, L.J] (and continues through Notebooks I, VI1 and VI2) [=MSS 175–7, L.J] on the other hand. Indeed, the beginning of Notebook VII [MS 174, L.J] very nicely leads up to the discussion of knowledge which begins after the double bar on p. 117. [= MS 174, 14v, L.J.]48 I believe this observation alone could be a fairly strong argument in favour of publishing the remarks together in one volume: if the ‘Innen–Aussen’ remarks indeed, as von Wright suggests, form a thematic link between the Investigations and the late remarks on knowledge, publishing On Certainty alone may make it difficult to see some thematic connections and continuities in Wittgenstein’s thought that are visible in the MS sources. This sort of worry may have come to von Wright’s mind when he learned that Anscombe had, in September 1968, decided to go on with On Certainty as a separate volume (see letter of 16 September 1968, quoted above). His first reaction was sceptical: Perhaps it is right to publish the notes on certainty as a monograph of their own. I think that my final opinion in the matter will depend upon what else of the last writings you think we ought to publish. As you may remember, my opinion after our last meeting was that we should, in addition to the notes on certainty, publish only the extract which Wittgenstein himself made from his writings on colour-concepts, and a selection from the notes on the “Innen-Aussen” problem.49 In this letter, von Wright still favours the concept which informs his 1967–1968 edition. But eventually, as we now know, Anscombe’s vision prevailed and resulted in the publication of On Certainty in 1969. Despite his initial scepticism, as von Wright saw the proofs of the upcoming book in early 1969, he quickly became a convert to Anscombe’s vision. In March 1969, he informed Norman Malcolm that a new posthumous work by Wittgenstein is now at the page-proof stage and I am reading the proofs very carefully. It is the book on certainty. I am now convinced that Elizabeth Anscombe was right against me, when she thought it ought to be published as a work which stands alone. I like it very much – and I am sure you will do the same.50 Eventually, von Wright is named together with Anscombe as an editor of the book. While the final Preface was written by Anscombe, von Wright agreed to sign it, and hence, at this point, openly agreed to Anscombe’s

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approach – despite the fact that his own proposal from 1967 had been structured differently.51 In the reception of Wittgenstein’s late thought, von Wright’s editorial approach has frequently been equated with Anscombe’s. As we have seen, this view does not quite correspond to historical reality. It seems that both before and after the publication of On Certainty, von Wright had an ambivalent and complex attitude to this volume. While he did, in a sense, appreciate it as a ‘work’ of its own, he also remained well aware of the textual and historical problems related to the format in which it was published.52 This ambivalence surfaces in some quite interesting contexts, of which the case of his article ‘Wittgenstein on Certainty’ is most noteworthy. In August 1970, von Wright organized a conference of the International Institute of Philosophy in Helsinki. In this conference, the topic of which was epistemology, he read a paper entitled ‘Wittgenstein on Certainty’. The version that was delivered in 1970 opens with observations that are in line with his 1967–1968 proposal:53 Of Wittgenstein’s philosophy a singular “holisticity” is characteristic. Everything in it is connected with everything else. It is impossible to compartmentalize the body of his thoughts and speak of Wittgenstein’s theory of knowledge, his metaphysics, or his ethics. He wrote of course an immense number of remarks which are relevant to the traditional problems in these fields. But much of what he wrote goes against the traditional ways of isolating topics for special treatment. This characterization holds not least for that which Wittgenstein has to say about theory of knowledge. In a sense he can even be said to have wanted to strike traditional epistemology dead.54 This passage is both puzzling and revealing, especially given that von Wright had, in March 1969, given his consent to Anscombe’s edition of On Certainty. Even more revealing is that this passage was not included in the revised version of the presentation, which was published in 1972. Instead, the article commences with claims that come fairly close to those expressed in the Preface to the published edition.55 The most likely reason for the omission is that the passage actually strongly undermines the thematic approach applied in On Certainty – and argued for in the Preface von Wright had himself signed. Here, it seems, several human factors enter the academic scene: As regards loyalty to his co-editor, von Wright may have reasoned that he had better simply stand behind the published edition, even though he does not completely agree with the publication format. And given his will to promote Wittgenstein’s work, von Wright may have come to think that the

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thematic format may, after all, provide the philosophers of the late 1960s a convenient ‘gateway’ to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. And he may have realized that presenting Wittgenstein as someone who simply wants to ‘strike traditional epistemology dead’ may not be the best way to introduce his thoughts into contemporary discussions. All such reasons are understandable, even though they may not quite be scholarly acceptable. All this shows, I believe, that von Wright was, from early on, surprisingly well aware of the problems associated with the thematic format, and was never absolutely content with the approach.56 3.3. Rhees: Diachronic continuities in Wittgenstein’s thought (1970)57 Rush Rhees did not actively participate in the earlier stages of the editorial work, as he was then focusing on the complexities of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts from 1930s. But around the time OC was published in 1969, he took a more active interest in the special character of Wittgenstein’s final writings. In correspondence with von Wright, Rhees opposed the view that OC constituted a kind of new opening in Wittgenstein work that was stimulated by discussions with Norman Malcolm in the USA in 1949, arguing instead that the remarks published in OC are ‘embedded into the whole of Wittgenstein’s development’, to use Christian Erbacher’s formulation.58 Rhees observed that the way Anscombe and von Wright had stressed Malcolm’s significance in their Preface, may ‘prevent people from recognizing the constant connexions between these remarks and his earlier discussions’.59 Von Wright found Rhees’s observations interesting. And as plans were made for a German-only edition of On Certainty by Suhrkamp, he warmly encouraged Rhees to draft a new Introduction for the book.60 The Suhrkamp edition was meant to be a relatively small and affordable book, which could function as a kind of introductory text to Wittgenstein’s philosophy.61 As Siegfried Unseld, the director of Suhrkamp, asked Rhees whether some further materials – e.g. ‘The Lecture on Ethics’ – might be added to it, Rhees got a new idea concerning the format of publication. In a telegram sent to both Anscombe and von Wright on 10 March 1970, he proposed that On Certainty might be published along with the 1929 ‘Lecture on Ethics’ and with the ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, the earliest part of which stem for the early 1930s.62 Rhees’s editorial plan, highlighting the long-term thematic continuities in Wittgenstein’s thought, was never realized, as Anscombe vetoed such a publication. In a disappointed tone, Rhees reported on Anscombe’s negative reaction to von Wright on 19 March 1970 as follows:

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I did have the impression that she had not seen the case there could be for including Ethik Vortrag and the Bemerkungen über Frazer. [. . .] She feels strongly that the remarks ‘on certainty’ (I am not altogether happy about the title, but I cannot think of another) – that these remarks should appear by themselves. Sometimes I have wondered if she does not look on those remarks as much more abgeschlossen [self-contained, L.J] than (I believe) they are. – There is a great deal that could be said in connexion with this.63 After this format of publication was dropped, von Wright still encouraged Rhees to write a new Introduction for the Suhrkamp edition of On Certainty. On 23 March 1970, von Wright pointed out that such an introductory essay may after all do more good than merely including in the same volume other stuff beside [Ü]ber Gewissheit. It would make the reader aware of [a] connexion which he could then study in closer detail in the sources, and whether these are in one or several books would not matter so very much. It seems that von Wright and Rhees both shared the understanding that Wittgenstein’s late remarks on knowledge should be understood in the larger context of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. And Rhees’s dissatisfaction with the name of the volume is likely based on similar considerations, too: certainty surely is not the only topic discussed in the book. Eventually, Rhees’s Introduction was not published.64 Siegfried Unseld considered it too scholarly for a publication directed at the general public.65 Hence, in the German Suhrkamp edition of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, too, Anscombe’s vision prevailed. The book’s text was also introduced by Anscombe’s and von Wright’s Preface. Rhees’s arguments for his editorial approach cannot be scrutinized in detail in this contribution.66 Here, I shall simply illustrate Rhees’s ideas concerning the Suhrkamp edition in another source-graph and then sum up briefly the characteristic points of his approach. Note that the preserved materials do not contain information concerning the exact order in which the material would have been organized in the edition. As is clear from the graph, Rhees’s plan is substantially different from the actual publication programme and from von Wright’s unpublished edition. Unlike them, this edition would have brought together material from 1929, early 1930s and from 1950–1951, with the explicit aim at illustrating certain

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FIGURE 10.6: Source-graph: Rush Rhees’s plan for a Suhrkamp edition of On Certainty (1970). © Lassi Jakola.

temporal continuities in Wittgenstein’s thought. In evaluating this editorial plan, one has to remember that Rhees’s editorial starting point was substantially different from Anscombe’s and von Wright’s. He had not actively taken part in the earlier discussions concerning Wittgenstein’s last writings. OC had already been published, and the format given to him was Suhrkamp’s preference for a semi-popular ‘introductory’ volume to Wittgenstein’s thought. Within these parameters, Rhees’s solution was essentially to present the texts in a novel way, which would bring forth the thematic continuities he had identified in Wittgenstein’s thought. The fact that his edition would have been preceded by a slightly longer Introduction and not merely by an Editors’ preface, also sets this publication plan apart from Anscombe’s and von Wright’s editions. 3.4. Three approaches to making Wittgenstein available Let us sum up the main discoveries of the historical excursion. As we have seen, Elizabeth Anscombe wanted to present Wittgenstein’s work from 1949 to 1951 as a series of novel, thematic contributions to specific philosophical topics. In contrast to this approach, Rush Rhees suggested highlighting ‘diachronic’ continuities in Wittgenstein’s thought by presenting On Certainty side-by-side with selections from Wittgenstein’s earlier work. And while von Wright maintained that Wittgenstein’s late work on psychological concepts constitutes a link between the Philosophical

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Investigations and On Certainty, his 1967–1968 edition presented ‘synchronically’ all the main topics of Wittgenstein’s last writings in one single book with a neutral title. These three editorial perspectives to Wittgenstein’s late notebooks reflect, I believe, characteristically the three literary executors’ differing views to editing Wittgenstein.67 Von Wright’s perspective reflects his historical and philological interest in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and an editorial approach, in which the primary concern is making Wittgenstein’s work available. Anscombe’s programme, on the other hand, offers a bulk of Wittgenstein’s late work in a format that introduces the late Wittgenstein as a contributor to ongoing disputes in philosophy. While this way of organizing materials may be text-critically problematic, On Certainty has been widely read and provided many generations of philosophers with a convenient access to Wittgenstein’s latest period. It may well be that considerations of this kind influenced editorial choices at the time.68 And finally, Rhees thought that, relying on his deep knowledge of the Nachlass and on his understanding of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, he could compile and introduce an edition that makes some latent philosophical connections patent. In this respect, his proposal seems to be motivated by a similar attitude to editing that resulted in Philosophische Grammatik (1969).69

4. RHEESIAN AND VON WRIGHTIAN CORRECTIVES: THE THEMATIC DIVISION REVISITED One may certainly find several points of criticisms in both Rhees’s and von Wright’s concrete editorial proposals.70 But disregarding details, the main editorial points they raise concerning Wittgenstein’s last writings seem to me both well-motivated and reasonable. I should like to finish this article by suggesting that they provide us with two useful corrective perspectives to the picture, which is suggested by the actual (‘Anscombean’) publication history. Rhees’s suggestions may be used as a warning against the idea that On Certainty constitutes a brand-new opening in Wittgenstein’s thought. This ‘Rheesian’ line to Wittgenstein’s latest period has, indeed, lately been probed by scholars, who have charted the emergence and role of epistemological themes and discussions on colour in Wittgenstein’s earlier work.71 It is well-known today that Wittgenstein’s dialogue with Moore on epistemological issues and on certainty was no novelty of the early 1950s.72 Only after these sorts of philosophico-genetical studies, can we properly evaluate to what extent Wittgenstein’s late manuscripts constitute a ‘new’ philosophical opening, as the proponents of the ‘third Wittgenstein’ have suggested.

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On the other hand, von Wright’s suggestions can be used as an antidote to the idea that Wittgenstein’s late remarks can neatly be ‘compartmentalized’ into thematic pigeonholes, which correspond to disciplinary distinctions within modern philosophy. It seems to me that von Wright’s perspective has even more potential to undermine the actual editorial policy than Rhees’s. While some scholars have criticized the existent editions roughly from a ‘von Wrightian’ point of view,73 as far as I know, this path has not yet been probed in the extent and detail that it deserves. Hence, I will conclude this article with some suggestions concerning von Wright’s perspective. As far as I can see, von Wright’s perspective invites us to undertake scholarly activities on various levels: in editorial history, we need to examine in detail the editors’ classification of remarks in MSS 169–177 into thematic sections, along with their explicit and implicit grounds for this classification; on text-critical level, we may, among other things, study and interpret Wittgenstein’s own editorial marks in the manuscripts and view them in relation to editor’s likely interpretation of them; or we need to work towards a probable chronology of remarks – in addition to the rough chronology of the manuscripts. On an interpretative level, we are invited to articulate the possible thematic interconnections between Wittgenstein’s individual remarks that occur in his last writings. It seems to me that an important contrast between the results of the latter, interpretative, task and the editors’ policy of isolating longer thematic sections will soon become apparent. That is: while one surely may classify a certain remark – or even chains of remarks – as belonging roughly to the theme of colours, epistemology or philosophy of psychology, many problems will arise, if one presumes that the notebooks may be divided into longer sections, within which all the remarks fall into one – and only one – of these categories. (As we saw above in Section 2.2.3, LW2 actually shows that this idea cannot be maintained.) Even while a given theme may set the general tune for a longer set of remarks, within such sets one will often stumble upon individual remarks that either directly connect to, or at any rate, allude to other themes. And very often among Wittgenstein’s remarks occur general observations on philosophy and philosophical problems, which surely are relevant for various, if not all, thematic contexts. What I am aiming at is this: the thematic division may be helpful and even natural when looking at and classifying individual remarks, but it is far too rough to form a general editorial guideline: it will serve as a heuristic device at best. Wittgenstein’s thought simply does not follow, thematically, the logic of yes-or-no and either-or. The thematic classifications within the late notebooks are more fruitfully studied using a scheme, which allows for extensive overlaps and gradual thematic transitions. If we want to keep the three main thematic

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FIGURE 10.7: Thematic classifications in MSS 169–177: a proposal. © Lassi Jakola.

categories, such a scheme may be represented in a Venn-diagram, where the circles indicating sets of remarks falling under a given ‘topic’ overlap. To illustrate this point, it is best to let Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks speak for themselves. The following chain of three consecutive remarks stems from MS 171, pp. 4–5 and was published in LW2 in 1992. The remarks are not separated by any editorial marks in the MS. The chain contains a smooth transition from general observations concerning concepts, via an observation concerning knowledge of one’s inner thoughts, to the concept of pretension and imagination: Our concepts, judgements, reactions never appear in connection with just a single action, but rather with the whole swirl [Germ, Gewimmel] of human actions. Only I know what I am thinking actually means nothing else than: only I think my own thoughts.

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Can one imagine people who don’t know pretence and to whom one cannot explain it? Can one imagine people who cannot lie? – What else would these people lack? We should probably also imagine that they cannot make anything up and do not understand things that are made up. —LW2: 56 This, of course, is not the only passage where thematic divisions and transitions are not clear-cut. But the quoted passage has the further virtue of giving us a philosophical reason why thematic compartmentalization goes against the grain of Wittgenstein’s later thought. As is here illustrated by the example of pretension – leading directly into certain analogies with the phenomena of lying and making things up –, our concepts simply have various connections in the complex Gewimmel of human life and action. This surely was one reason why Wittgenstein thought that, in philosophy, ‘the very nature of investigation’ compels one to ‘travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of thought’ (PI, Preface). Indeed, the thematic orientation chosen as the publication format for Wittgenstein’s last writings does not very much respect this observation, which guided the composition of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations – the only work from his later period, which he painstakingly edited, revised, reorganized and almost published.

APPENDIX. THE REMARKS FROM MS 169–177 PRINTED IN VERMISCHTE BEMERKUNGEN (1977) Twenty-five remarks from MSS 169–177 have been included in Vermischte Bemerkungen (1977). In addition, two remarks selected for VB from MS 138 appear also in MS 169, even though the former MS is the direct source. I have included these two remarks in the list, below, but have not numbered them. Out of the total 25 remarks, 19 (76%) have been indicated with the vertical-line siglum |[remark]| in Wittgenstein’s hand, whereas the remaining six (24%) have not. This fact strongly suggests, that, while von Wright took this siglum as a ‘symptom’ of a remark being of general nature, he based his final selection on various other considerations, too, all of which are not exclusively textual. This is in line with the interpretation of this siglum as signifying separability from the immediate MS context, but not ‘generality’ in von Wright’s sense. In the following table, I have listed the sources for each remark from MSS 169–177, which has been published in VB, also indicating the use of the vertical-line siglum and the immediate context of the remark in the manuscripts:

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TABLE 10.1: The remarks from MS 169–177 published in Vermischte Bemerkungen. Nr.

MS

Page

169

26v–27r |Das Verhalten von VB 1994, Schriftstellern . . .| p. 151, via MS 138, p. 3a.

27v

1

169

2

3

4

58v

62v

173

17r

35r

Remark & siglum

Published

Context Between LW2, p. 18.474 and 18.5. = LSPP2, p. 31.6 and 31.7.

Nota bene

The immediate source for VB is MS 138, this is an earlier version of the remark. The In den Tälern der VB 1994, Between immediate Dummheit . . . p. 153, via LW2, p. 18.5 and source for MS 138, VB is MS 18.6 = p.11a 138, this is LSPP2, p. 31.7 and an earlier version of 32.1. the remark. |Wenn das VB 1994, Between Christentum die p. 149. LW2, Wahrheit ist . . .| p. 37.1 and 37.2 = LSPP2, p. 53.1 and 53.2. No siglum; Kultur ist eine VB 1994, Between remark in Ordnungsregel. . . . p.149. LW2, VB but not p. 39.4 and 39.5 = in LW2 LSPP2, p. 55.7 and 55.8. |Es ist nicht VB 1994, Between unerhört, daß . . .| p.157. RoC III §69 and §70. 4–9 are |Ich glaube nicht, VB 1994, Between successive daß man p.158. LW2, Shakespeare . . .| p. 63.5 and remarks in the MS. 63.6 = LSPP2, p.87.7 and 87.8.

EDITORIAL APPROACHES

261

5

35r

|Ich könnte Shakespeare nur anstaunen . . .|

VB 1994, p.158.

6

35r–v

|Ich habe ein tiefes Mißtraun gegen . . .|

VB 1994, p.158.

7

35v

|Es ist nicht, als ob S. Typen von Menschen . . .|

VB 1994, p.158.

8

35v

|‘Der große Hertz Beethovens’ . . .|

VB 1994, p.158–9.

9

35v–36r |Der Dichter kann eigenlich nicht von sich sagen . . .|

VB 1994, p.158–9.

10

69r–v

VB 1994, p.159 and RoC III, §213.

11

75v

Ein und dasselbe Thema hat in Moll einen andern Charakter . . . |Ich glaube nicht, daß Shakespeare . . .|

12

75v

|Er konnte sich auch nicht selbst als Prophet . . .|

VB 1994, p.159.

VB 1994, p.159.

Between LW2, p. 63.5 and 63.6 = LSPP2, p.87.7 and 87.8. Between LW2, p. 63.5 and 63.6 = LSPP2, p.87.7 and 87.8. Between LW2, p. 63.5 and 63.6 = LSPP2, p.87.7 and 87.8. Between LW2, p. 63.5 and 63.6 = LSPP2, p.87.7 and 87.8. Between LW2, p. 63.5 and 63.6 = LSPP2, p.87.7 and 87.8. = RoC III, §213

Between RoC III, §253 and §254. Between RoC III, §253 and §254.

4–9 are successive remarks in the MS.

4–9 are successive remarks in the MS.

4–9 are successive remarks in the MS.

4–9 are successive remarks in the MS.

4–9 are successive remarks in the MS.

No siglum, remark both in VB and RoC 11–13 are successive remarks in the MS. 11–13 are successive remarks in the MS.

262

Nr.

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Page

Remark & siglum

Published

Context

Nota bene

13

76r

|Ich glaube, um einen Dichter zu genießen . . .|

VB 1994, p.159– 160.

14

92r–93r Wenn der an Gott glaubende um sich sieht & fragt . . .

VB 1994, p.160 and RoC III, §317

11–13 are successive remarks in the MS. No siglum, remark both in VB and RoC but not in LW2 / LSPP2.

1v

Ein Gottesbeweis sollte eigentlich etwas sein, wodurch man sich . . .

VB 1994, p. 161.

Between RoC III, §253 and §254. = RoC III, §317, between LW2, p. 74.4 and 74.5 = LSPP2, 100.3 and 100.4. Between LW2, p. 81.3 and 81.4 = LSPP2, p.109.4 and 109.5.

16

2r

Er ist dann etwa ähnlich dem Begriff ‘Gegenstand’.

VB 1994, p. 161.

Before LW2, p. 81.4 = Between LSPP2, p.109.4 and 109.5.

17

5r

|Ich kann VB 1994, Shakespeare darum p. 161. nicht verstehen . . .|

18

5r

|Mir kommt vor, seine Stücke seien . . .|

Between LW2, p. 83.6 and 7 = LSPP2, p.112.2 and 112.3. Between LW2, p. 83.6 and 7 = LSPP2, p.112.2 and 112.3.

15

MS

174

VB 1994, p. 161–2.

15 and 16 successive remarks in the MS. No siglum, remark in VB but not in LW2 15 and 16 successive remarks in the MS. No siglum, remark in VB but not in LW2 17–19 successive remarks in the MS.

17–19 successive remarks in the MS.

EDITORIAL APPROACHES

263

19

5v

|Eine Zeit mißversteht die andere . . .|

VB 1994, p. 162.

20

7v

Wie Gott den Menschen beurteilt . . .

VB 1994, p. 162.

21

8r

|Sieh Dir die Menschen an: . . .|

VB 1994, p. 162.

22

10r

|Die Philosophie hat keinen Fortschritt gemacht? . . .|

VB 1994, p. 162–3.

56r

|Gott kann mir sagen: ‘Ich richte Dich aus Deinem eigenen Munde. . . .’| |Ist der Sinn des Glaubens an den Teufel der, . . .| |Man kann sich nicht beurteilen, wenn man sich in den Kategorien . . .|

VB 1994, p. 163.

23

175

24

25

63v

176

55v

VB 1994, p. 163. VB 1994, p. 163.

Between LW2, p. 83.6 and 7== LSPP2, p.112.2 and 112.3. Between LW2, p. 85.2 and 85.3 = LSPP2, p.114.2 and 114.2. Between LW2, p. 85.3 and 85.4 = LSPP2, p.114.3 and 114.4. Between LW2, p. 86.5 and 87.1 = LSPP2, p.116.1 and 116.2 Between OC §359 and §360.

17–19 successive remarks in the MS.

No siglum, remark in VB but not in LW2

Between OC §385 and §386. Between OC §534 and §535.

Now, since the bulk of the manuscripts, from which these remarks have been extracted, has been published in the three thematic editions, it is interesting to have a look at how the editors dealt with the remarks published in VB. As a rule, the remarks have been published exclusively in VB. There are only

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two exceptions to this rule: nos. 10 and 14, which have been made available both in VB and in RoC III. The reason for this is understandable: these two remarks are among the six remarks (2, 10, 14–16 and 20), which were not marked with the vertical-line siglum in the MSS. Hence Anscombe, who edited RoC in the mid-1970s – as VB had not yet been published – did not treat them as being separable from the immediate MS context (unlike nos. 3 and 11–13, which were so marked and, accordingly, omitted from RoC). The four remaining remarks which are not marked with the vertical-line siglum (2, 15, 16 and 20), on the other hand, occur in sections, which were included in LW2, edited by von Wright and Nyman and published in 1992. Allegedly because these remarks had already been included in VB earlier, the editors decided to omit them from LW2. The issue is further complicated by the fact that von Wright also decided to omit no. 14 from LW2: this remark, occurring in the section which is a common source for RoC and LW2, had already been published by Anscombe in RoC. Consequently, no. 14 is considered ‘general’ and ‘detachable’ by von Wright – but not so by Anscombe. This is a clear case where the editor’s judgement has led into different decisions, as no basis for the decision is available in the manuscripts. Interestingly, in the early 1980s, as LW1 and LW2 were being prepared, Anscombe wrote to von Wright that it seems to her ‘quite unjustified to remove from them any remarks that are in the Vermischte Bemerkungen, for [. . .] obvious enough reasons’.75 On the basis of these examples, it is clear that extracting the six remarks not marked with the vertical-line siglum for VB was a more substantial editorial choice than extracting the rest, since the decision has no basis in the MS material and is, thus, based solely on the editor’s judgement concerning the remark’s ‘detachability’ or ‘general nature’. Admittedly, this decision may be innocent in itself: VB is, after all, a selection from the Nachlaß by G.H. von Wright. But the decision becomes questionable if we examine its repercussions with respect to the other editions: von Wright’s decision to extract the remarks for VB seems to have led him directly into omitting them from LW2. And surely, the decision to omit the remarks from LW2 is scholarly problematic, since no basis for this decision is available in the manuscripts.76

ARCHIVAL MATERIALS 1. The National Library of Finland. (NLF) COLL. 714, 11–12: The correspondence between G.H. von Wright and Elizabeth Anscombe.

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COLL. 714, 142–148: The correspondence between G.H. von Wright and Norman Malcolm. COLL. 714, 200–201: The correspondence between G.H. von Wright and Rush Rhees. 2. Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, University of Helsinki (WWA) Von Wright materials: Wri-FC-004 and Wri-FC-006: The correspondence between G.H. von Wright and Rush Rhees. Wri-FC-016: The correspondence between G.H. von Wright and Blackwell publishing (including H. Schollick and S. Chambers). Wri-SF-064-c: G.H. von Wright: ‘Wittgenstein on Certainty’, a 15-paged originally clipped typescript with minor handwritten corrections. (1970). A typescript draft of von Wright 1972, 15pp. Wittgenstein materials: Witt-AM-F1. Described by GHvW as ‘Materials for the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. With GHvW’s sketches of a preface and comments on the manuscripts. The book as then projected was never published.’ Witt-AM-H9. Described by GHvW as ‘Revisions and corrections of Wittgenstein-texts. Plan (abandoned) for a revised edition.’

NOTES 1. In this article, I use the abbreviations OC, RoC, LW2 and VB in referring to these editions. 2. The position of MS 169 within the last writings may be disputed, since the first half of this manuscript is related to MS 137 and MS 138, written in 1948– 1949. The scholars disagree whether this relation is that of a preliminary study or a later revision. For the first option, see Rothhaupt (1996: 369–370); for the latter, see van Gennip (2003: 130); and for elaboration, Rogers (2011: 47–48). The dating of this part of MS 169 to either late 1948 or early-to-late 1949 depends on the answer given to this question. 3. Any reader of Wittgenstein should bear in mind that through his philosophical career, the basic unit of Wittgenstein’s writing was a philosophical remark, and that, besides writing and revising these remarks, a major part of his compositional work consisted in reorganizing his remarks. Thus, each remark we find in Wittgenstein’s more advanced works typically has a long text-genetical pre-history in various earlier writings. MSS 169–177 is first-draft material precisely in the sense that, by and large, the remarks do not have a such earlier history in any of Wittgenstein’s writings. Schulte (1993: 2–4), in a description of Wittgenstein’s typical working method, distinguishes four stages: (i) first draft – notebooks, (ii) revised handwritten versions in notebooks of larger format (‘Bände’ or ‘Volumes’), (iii) a

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selection of remarks from (ii) dictated to a typist, and (iv) a revised and reorganized typescript on the basis of stage (iii). 4. See von Wright (1982: 46) and Pichler (1994: 138–141). The dates of the items have been carefully discussed by Rothhaupt (1996: 365–387), and more recently by Rogers (2011: 46–81). 5. Quoted after von Wright (1982: 165). Concerning von Wright’s ambivalent relation to these issues, see section 3.2. 6. See Moyal-Sharrock (ed.) (2004a), in which especially Moyal-Sharrock (2004b: 1–6; 43–63) and Stroll (2004: 22) argue that the last writings and, in particular, On Certainty mark a new stage in Wittgenstein’s thought. 7. Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner (2005: 1). 8. Personal remarks have mostly been removed; not all remarks that could be classified as ‘general’ and as natural candidates for VB have been published. In addition to omitting some remarks, the editors have omitted practically all the variant readings that appear in the manuscripts. 9. In this article, I use the term ‘section’ or ‘thematic section’ technically to refer to these thematically delimited longer stretches of remarks extracted from the MSS. 10. RoC part I being an exception, see section 2.2.2. 11. Among the posthumous publications, RFM, the two volumes of RPP and LW1 come closest to the thematic orientation followed in the publications of the last writings. 12. In the German version, the claim is even more pronounced: ‘All dieses war von Wittgenstein als nicht zum Text gehörig gekennzeichnet’. Interestingly, in the Preface to LW2, no direct claims are made that Wittgenstein himself warranted the thematic division; von Wright and Nyman (1992, x) simply state that Wittgenstein’s remarks from 1949–1951 ‘can be divided into three parts’. 13. Compare also von Wright (2001a: 151–152): ‘Under sina två sista månader i Cambridge skrev han vad som skulle bli ett av hans mest kändä och lästä verk, kallat Über Gewissheit av oss förvaltare av hans litterära kvarlåtenskap’. This passage seems to imply that the work was already there, and it was only named by the editors, who published it. Many later scholars have presented the issue in similar fashion. Even quite recently, Christian Erbacher (2015: 186) notes that the main editorial issue in creating On Certainty and Remarks on Colour was ‘not selection but rather giving them a name’). 14. See e.g. Stern (1996), Westergaard (2019) and Schulte (unpublished MS), and Section 4 below. 15. Van Gennip (2003: 129). Examples of chronological and the editors’ thematic criteria are given in the discussions concerning RoC and LW2 in Section 2. A more detailed examination of Wittgenstein’s use of sigla in these notebooks remains a desideratum. 16. E.g. Pichler (1993), Rothhaupt (1996: 368) and Rogers (2011: 76). 17. This form of representation is potentially misleading as Wittgenstein may sometimes have filled several notebooks simultaneously, or have returned to

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an older, partly used notebooks at a later stage. Cf. Rogers (2011: 46–47). The date-row is, thus, not exclusively chronologically ordered, but rather gives information on the date of the MS – or part of the MS – which is listed in the row above the date. 18. While §1–65 of On Certainty correspond to remarks taken from MS 172, §66–192 to those from MS 174, the final division at §299 is not based on MS division but on chronological and biographical considerations. The first half of MS 175, i.e. §193–299, was probably written in autumn 1950 (note the date 23.9.50 on p. 30r). In late 1950 and early 1951 Wittgenstein probably did not write down any philosophical remarks. After moving to Cambridge in February 1951, and after his hormonal cancer treatments had stopped, he surprisingly found himself in better mood for writing. Indeed, on p. 35r of MS 175 begins a continuous set of dated remarks (starting 10.3.1951), which runs until the end of the notebook and continues directly on p. 22r of MS 176 and further into MS 177. The final date in MS 177 is 27.4.1951. On dating MS 176, 1–22r, see note 20 below. 19. That thematic considerations overrule temporal ones, is especially clear from pp. 46v–51v of MS 176, which was later published in LW2: this section, separated in the MS with horizontal lines, forms a part of the temporally continuous set of dated remarks begun on p. 35r of MS 175. That temporal considerations, on the other hand, overrule considerations based on MS division, is clear from the fact that the editors do indicate the temporal division of remarks, but not the division of the published materials into five separate manuscripts. See note 18 above. 20. The exact dating of MS 176, 1–22r is a disputed issue. Being a revision of the material in MS 173, it is certainly the latest of the three parts published in RoC. This section of the notebook 176 has no dates: the dates start on p. 22r, which directly continues the set of remarks from the end of MS 175. Probably basing her opinion on these dates, Anscombe categorically dates this part ‘Cambridge in March 1951’. But it seems likely that the first half of MS 176 was written earlier: see Rogers (2011: 69–73), who supplies many arguments for a date in summer 1950 (compare, however, also Rothhaupt’s more aporetic discussion in his [1996: 386–387]). Rogers’ (ibid.: 74) arguments support von Wright’s (WWA, Witt-AM-F1) conjecture that the revision was made in June 1950, when Wittgenstein was staying at his house in Cambridge. However, a date in early autumn 1950 is also possible. In any case, MS 176 seems to be an excellent example of a notebook, which was used by Wittgenstein in two temporally distinct periods. See also note 17 above. 21. The ‘section break’ occurs between III §130 and §131 (see the table in Figure 10.2). The published text gives an impression that §131 would occur directly after §130: in reality, 16 manuscript pages separate these two remarks. 22. There was some disagreement between the editors whether they should publish Wittgenstein’s late remarks on colour as a short ‘essay’, consisting of Part I only, or as a more comprehensive collection which includes the material in MS 173, too. Anscombe preferred having both sets, while von Wright favoured publishing MS 176 only. See von Wright to Anscombe, 14 September 1967 and 21 September 1968 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12).

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23. One reason may be the lack of concordance in the original publication of RoC. A comparative concordance of RoC I and III is given in Rothhaupt (1996: 457–460). The early Finnish translation of the book (1982) contains a concordance by Heikki Nyman. 24. That the book came out so late was an unfortunate consequence of Elizabeth Anscombe’s quarrels with Blackwell and Suhrkamp concerning their publication policies and royalties: the volume was ready already in early 1980s when LW1 was published. The book’s preface is dated ‘1982, 1991’. 25. The German edition contains a remark from MS 174, 1v ‘Wenn Faust sagt . . .’, which is not included in LW2. The editors do not indicate that the remark has been omitted in LW2 and added to LSPP2. 26. RPP1 (1980a), RPP2 (1980b) and LW1 (1982). 27. This section is marked with horizontal lines in the manuscript. 28. The overlap is announced by the editors in an explanatory footnote. The overlap is indicated in Figure 10.3. 29. This supports van Gennip’s (2003: 129) thesis, made concerning On Certainty, that the editors did not merely follow Wittgenstein’s own sigla. 30. This collection and its background is discussed in more detail by Bernt Österman in his contribution to this book: on the genre of ‘general remarks’, see Section 2 of his article. See also Erbacher (2017) and Rothhaupt (2017). 31. Unlike the original 1977 publication, the revised edition by Pichler (1994) gives dates and references to MS pages, and contains useful indices. 32. See von Wright’s (1977) Vorwort to VB. 33. Joachim Schulte (1993: 6) characterized this siglum as indicating that ‘the remark in question does not belong in this context’, adding that ‘many of these remarks are of a general nature (a number of them have been printed in Culture and Value)’. In 1996, Rothhaupt (1996: 330), accepted this interpretation; in his later work, he seems to have revised his opinion and considers the verticalsiglum remarks a corpus of remarks on their own (Rothhaupt 2017: 121–2). It seems to me that the use of this siglum merits further research. 34. For a list of remarks published in VB, with information on the sigla, see Appendix. Some remarks marked with the vertical-line siglum from MS 172 remain unpublished, while some have been published in other editions. A good example of the latter category is RoC I § 57 = RoC III § 261: Anscombe has marked the vertical-line siglum with square brackets. This remark may give us important hints regarding the significance of the siglum: the remark, occurring in the context of Wittgenstein’s reflections on colour concepts, concerns sensations. On the other hand, the remark is clearly grammatical (i.e. philosophical), not a ‘general’ remark in von Wright’s sense. Hence, here the siglum primarily seems to signify some sort of separation from the immediate context. However, this remark, occurring originally in MS 173 p.77v–78r, was included in Wittgenstein own revision of these remarks in MS 176, p.13v–14r. The siglum appears in both versions. Had Wittgenstein thought that the remark is irrelevant, he probably would not have recycled it again in the same context of colour-remarks. Hence separability from the context surely does not (always) imply irrelevance for the context.

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35. See Appendix. 36. Westergaard (2019) has recently argued that in the case of the first pages of MS 174, the exclusion of the remarks printed in VB from OC is philosophically significant. Interestingly, these remarks do not have the typical siglum |[remark]|. 37. For a discussion why the editors may have favoured this ‘naked’ editorial approach, see Wallgren’s and Backström’s contributions in this volume. 38. With the exception of some items (at least MS 172) that were discovered later, Wittgenstein’s last writings were among the first manuscripts from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass that were known to his literary executors, see von Wright (1982: 37). To some extent, they were also studied from fairly early on: see Paul (2007: 294), who recalls that he studied Wittgenstein’s late notes on colour as early as 1952 and drafted a translation of the remarks on knowledge in the same year. Evidently Anscombe, too had read these notebooks. And already in his ‘Biographical sketch’ of Ludwig Wittgenstein from 1954, G. H. von Wright (1954: 20) publicly announced the plans of publishing a selection from these materials. 39. Anscombe to von Wright, 13 September 1967 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). 40. Von Wright to Anscombe, 14 September 1967 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). 41. I do not know, however, how the word ‘always’ in the passage should be interpreted. As argued above, there are no clear indications that such a position would have been formulated earlier than in 1967. On the other hand, Anscombe seems to have read Wittgenstein’s late remarks already in the early 1950s. 42. The preface and the translator are mentioned in Anscombe to von Wright, no date 1969 (between letters dated 13 March and 7 April). In his answer of 7 April 1969, von Wright sends some corrections. Interestingly, it was von Wright who suggested that the editors inform the reader that the numbering of the remarks stems from the editors. (NLF, vWC 714.11–12.) 43. Von Wright to Schollick, 29 May 1968 (WWA, Wri-FC-016). 44. See WWA: Witt-Am-F1. I have recently made available the materials preserved of this edition in Jakola 2021, which contains some necessary overlap with this section. The preserved materials include (i) two versions of von Wright’s Preface, (ii) a sheet of paper with a quotation from TS 222 (possibly a motto), (iii) a table of contents and (iv) some loose pages from the edition. 45. The temporally continuous chain of remarks in MS 175, 176 and 177 forming an exception: it would have been included as one long section, exactly as in the published version of On Certainty. 46. OED, lemma ’scrappy’. 47. In 1976 Anscombe told von Wright that she does not want to ‘make any groupings of the materials’ as they had done in the RFM. (Anscombe to von Wright, 26 June 1976 [NLF, vWC 714.11–12]). See Section 4 of Backström’s article in this volume for an elaboration of Anscombe’s ‘minimal’ approach to editing – an approach which, however, is not easy to reconcile with her preference of producing thematic monographs from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. 48. In 1960s the ‘last writings’ were typically identified by the ‘Notebook-numbers’, which are written on the cover or on the first page of most of MSS 168–177.

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Unlike von Wright-numbering, this numbering is not chronological and can, pace Westergaard 2019, hardly stem from Wittgenstein. My guess is that the numbering was made ad hoc by Anscombe – or somebody close to her – simply to facilitate reference to these items. This numbering may have been added in the mid-1950s when these notebooks were photographed. 49. Von Wright to Anscombe, 21 September 1968 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). 50. Von Wright to Malcolm, 5 March 1969 (NLF, vWC 714.142–148). A similar remark is made to Anscombe on 10 March 1969 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). 51. Interestingly, on 29 June 1969, von Wright informs Rhees that he contributed only little to the Preface and is not satisfied with all what is said in it. See von Wright to Rhees, 29 June 1969 (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 52. The positive evaluation is evident, e.g. in von Wright’s book Wittgenstein (1982, 10), where he refers to On Certainty as a ‘wonderful little book’ and adds that it has been ‘widely read and also had a considerable influence’. See also the beginning of von Wright 1972, discussed in note 55 below. 53. Prof. Lars Hertzberg, who witnessed von Wright deliver his talk in 1970, recalls that the presentation begun with a reference to ‘holisticity’ of Wittgenstein’s philosophy: this implies that von Wright, did, indeed, read the quoted paragraph. (Oral communication on 24 November 2020.) 54. WWA, Wri-SF-064-c. 55. In the published version von Wright (1982: 165) formulates many highly problematic views. (1) He states that, from late 1949 on, Wittgenstein wrote ‘almost exclusively about knowledge and certainty, commenting on G. E. Moore’s views’. – On basis of philological and historical data, this claim is not only misleading but plainly false. (2) He refers to OC as ‘Wittgenstein’s treatise on certainty’. – But the book can hardly be called a treatise, since it has been compiled from the Nachlass by the editors. (3) He claims that the last writings ‘possess a thematic unity which makes them almost unique in Wittgenstein’s whole literary output’. – This claim may be correct, but it may be taken to imply that the topic of certainty is a new one, and thematically clearly separate from the rest. Indeed, von Wright also suggests that (4) OC ‘can be said to summarize some of the novelties in his thinking’. – This suggestion, also potentially misleading (c.f. Rhees’s perspective), has later often been quoted by the proponents of the ‘third Wittgenstein’ in support of their views. 56. One aspect that may have influenced von Wright’s views is that he tended to view the literary executors’ work as consisting of several ‘rounds’ of publishing Wittgenstein. (Compare Erbacher 2015.) On the basis of archival materials, it is evident that, roughly from mid-1960s on, von Wright thought that Wittgenstein’s Nachlass should eventually be made available as it is (e.g. von Wright to Anscombe, 2 April 1965 [NLF, vWC 714.11–12]). But he also thought that this sort of Gesamtausgabe would be preceded by the first round of publishing, where the editors would present edited selections from various periods of Wittgenstein’s work. Interestingly, in von Wright’s later plan for a revised, semi-critical edition of Wittgenstein’s late notebooks, the idea of thematic separation is dropped: according to the plan, the late notebooks are to be published as they are, with no thematic or other reorganization whatsoever

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(WWA, Witt-AM-H9). This perspective of several ‘rounds’ may partly explain von Wright’s ambivalence concerning OC and the fact that he, at times (i.e. in round 1), supported publications that did not quite fill his own historical and philological standards (to be followed in round 2). 57. Rhees’s proposals have been discussed in Peter Westergaard’s 2017 and, more fully, in his contribution to this volume. On Rhees’ approach, see also Wallgren’s and Solin’s contributions in this volume. 58. Erbacher (2015: 186); compare Rhees (2003: 3–5). 59. Rhees to von Wright, 18 June 1969 (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 60. Von Wright to Rhees, 29 June 1969 (WWA: Wri-FC-004): ‘You [i.e. Rhees] could do what nobody else could accomplish quite satisfactorily, namely place these last writings of L.W. in their proper setting in relation to the rest of his work. It would be valuable, if this happened[.]’ – An English translation of Rhees’s Preface is now available in Rhees (2003: 61–66). 61. Rhees to von Wright, 18 June 1969 (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 62. Rhees to von Wright, 10 March 1970 (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 63. Rhees to von Wright, 19 March 1970, (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 64. An English translation is now available in Rhees (2003: 61–6). 65. Rhees to von Wright, 1 June 1970, (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 66. Rhees’s reasons are discussed in more detail by Peter Westergaard in his contribution to this volume. 67. See e.g. Erbacher’s (2015: 191) short characterization, which is much in line with what I propose here. 68. See note 56 concerning von Wright’s attitude. 69. The classical criticism of Rhees’s edition is Kenny (1976). Recently, many scholars have been more sympathetic to Rhees’s reconstruction work: see e.g. Paul (2007), Rothhaupt (2011) and Erbacher (2019b). 70. E.g.: Why would the particular writings selected by Rhees be the right ones to illuminate continuities in Wittgenstein’s thought? Or: If von Wright wanted to present the topics of Wittgenstein’s late period together, why is his edition still thematically unbalanced, as it heavily stresses the epistemological sections? 71. Van Gennip (2008) is a well-documented and thorough study of Wittgenstein’s earlier work on epistemological issues. Already earlier, Josef Rothhaupt (1996) carefully traced the history of colour-remarks in the whole of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. And Rhees’s own notes are now available in Rhees (2003). 72. For Norman Malcolm’s report concerning Wittgenstein’s and G. E. Moore’s discussion on certainty from 1939, see Citron, ed (2015a). 73. David Stern (1996: 447) criticized the idea of On Certainty as a work of Wittgenstein and stressed that printing the material apart from other writings included in the source notebooks was an editorial decision. Joachim Schulte (unpublished MS: 28) argues that the thematic division has ‘little or nothing to do with Wittgenstein’s own understanding of his way of doing philosophy’. And Peter Westergaard (2019: 270) has pointed out that the editors’ approach

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has many unintended consequences as it, e.g. presents the separate works as a fairly finished pieces of philosophical writing and obstructs attempts to ‘trace the frequently implicit linkages between the various topics addressed in the notebooks’. 74. The remarks printed in LW2 and LSPP2 have no running numbering. To facilitate reference to individual remarks in these editions, I adopt the convention of using decimals to indicate remarks on a given page: by writing ‘LW2, p. 18.1’ I refer to the first remark that begins on p. 18 of LW2. Note that, if some remark begins on a previous page, it is referred to by the page number (and decimal) of the previous page. 75. Anscombe to von Wright, 3 March 1980 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). 76. The research on this contribution has been funded by the Finnish Academy project The Creation of Wittgenstein, directed by Prof. Thomas Wallgren. An early draft was presented in a gathering of the Von Wright and Wittgenstein seminar at the University of Helsinki in November 2020. Besides having benefitted from various discussions with the members of the research project, thanks are due to Florian Franken-Figueiredo, Peter Hacker, Anthony Kenny, Alois Pichler, Joachim Schulte and Peter Westergaard for comments and feedback on the penultimate version. I thank Anita von Wright-Grönberg, Benedict von Wright (the copyright holders of G.H. von Wright’s unpublished writings and correspondence), Volker Munz (the copyright holder of Rush Rhees’s letters kept in Helsinki) and Mary C. Gormally (the copyright holder of Elizabeth Anscombe’s writings), who have kindly allowed me to quote from unpublished letters and archive materials.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Art’s Part in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy HANNE APPELQVIST

1. INTRODUCTION In his Foreword to the 1977 edition of Vermischte Bemerkungen, Georg Henrik von Wright writes: ‘In the manuscript material left by Wittgenstein there are numerous notes which do not belong directly with his philosophical works although they are scattered among the philosophical texts’ (CV ixe). Vermischte Bemerkungen is a selection of such notes, collected and arranged by von Wright from Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and labelled by him as ‘aphorisms’ (CV ixe). Themes that fall under this allegedly less philosophical category of remarks include culture, religion and the arts. While von Wright readily acknowledges the difficulty of separating such notes from Wittgenstein’s manuscript material, he is nonetheless committed – as an editor of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass as well as in his own work – to a distinction between philosophy proper and remarks on subjects of a more ‘general sort, such as questions about art or about religion’ (CV ixe). According to him, such remarks may at best provide an important insight into the cultural context from which Wittgenstein’s philosophy arose, but do not contribute to his philosophical enterprise.1 Von Wright’s editorial approach reflects the ethos of analytic philosophy that standardly takes the arts to have little, if any, relevance for the problems of such core areas of philosophy as metaphysics, epistemology or logic. In the Anglo-American setting, philosophy itself is typically seen as 273

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compartmentalized into more or less well-defined pockets that deal with their own specific issues and topics. Aesthetics, the field of philosophy that is perhaps most closely related to the arts and culture, is treated as a relatively narrow investigation of art, beauty and taste. As a result, aesthetics is not seen as interestingly connected with the hard core of philosophy, let alone capable of making a philosophical contribution to that core on its own terms. In my view, this very conception of philosophy in general and aesthetics in particular has played a significant role in the reception of Wittgenstein’s work. It has also significantly influenced the way in which the literary executors approached Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, as exemplified by von Wright’s way of treating Wittgenstein’s remarks on culture, religion and the arts. The way in which Wittgenstein’s Nachlass has been made available to readers and the resulting reception of Wittgenstein’s work against the analytic conception of philosophy has a long shadow. An illustrative example of the reception of Wittgenstein’s remarks on aesthetics and the arts is Severin Schroeder’s paper ‘Wittgenstein on Aesthetics’, published in the 2017 Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein. Schroeder writes in summary of his entry as follows: One of the points that will, I hope, emerge from the following presentation is that the lack of sustained work on philosophical aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s writings is not entirely accidental. For on his view, aesthetic issues are not susceptible of an abstract philosophical treatment. They belong to art criticism, rather than philosophy, and what is more, their discussion can only be addressed to an audience sharing a specific cultured taste. —Schroeder 2017, 6122 Schroeder is surely right to claim that we do not find a ‘sustained work on philosophical aesthetics’ in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, if by this we mean a treatise on the ontology of art, say, or a systematic argument on the nature of artistic expression or principles of taste. I also agree with Schroeder’s diagnosis that this is no accident. However, in my reading, the reason is not that Wittgenstein believed that aesthetic issues do not belong to philosophy, as suggested by Schroeder. After all, already in the Tractatus, logic and ethics, which Wittgenstein famously equates with aesthetics, are suggested to stand on a par, as indicated by Wittgenstein’s way of characterizing both as ‘transcendental’ (TLP 6.13, 6.421; cf. NB 77). In his later work, in turn, Wittgenstein compares work on philosophy to work in aesthetics and refers to aesthetic investigation as grammatical, a term marking the preferred

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philosophical method of his later period (Wittgenstein 2016, 9:32; Wittgenstein 1966, II: 17–18). In my reading, the main reason for the lack of sustained treatment of aesthetic issues in Wittgenstein’s corpus is that Wittgenstein’s own understanding of aesthetics does not correspond to the Anglo-American conception of the field. The very fact, noted with surprise by von Wright, that Wittgenstein’s remarks on aesthetics and the arts surface intermittently in his writing and in the context of other topics, reflects an understanding of aesthetics as intimately interconnected with philosophy in general. This is because, for Wittgenstein, aesthetic issues are not issues that could be neatly isolated from questions he is primarily concerned with, such as the constitution of meaning, the nature of linguistic understanding, or the nature of normativity. For Wittgenstein’s work is not simply the fruit of early analytic philosophy. As pointed out by many, Wittgenstein’s work has deep roots also in the German tradition of philosophy.3 Moreover, aesthetics and the arts have a much stronger philosophical relevance in the German tradition than they do in anglophone thought. When reading the work of such thinkers as Schleiermacher, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schelling, Nietzsche, Gadamer and Adorno, we find remarks on the arts (and music in particular) scattered among discussions that do not, at least to the analytically trained philosopher, seem to have anything to do with aesthetics narrowly conceived. That the arts are capable of contributing to philosophy and doing so on their own, specifically artistic or aesthetic terms is a leitmotif of the German tradition. This tradition originates in the work of Alexander Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant, who adopted Baumgarten’s seminal idea that logic and aesthetics are two mutually complementing ways of approaching reality.4 In this tradition, aesthetics is understood broadly as the investigation of the domain of sensibility, which is required for the possibility of conceptually determined cognition and manifests itself distinctly in non-conceptual aesthetic judgments. Hence, while aesthetics includes the study of art, genius, as well as aesthetic judgments and their justification (all themes that figure in Wittgenstein’s remarks included in Culture and Value, the English edition of Vermischte Bemerkungen), it is also integrally embedded in Kant’s discussion on how to apply a conceptual rule to a sensible particular and in his treatment of ethics and religion. While Kant’s philosophy undoubtedly belongs to the shared history of both analytic and continental philosophy, its reception has been somewhat different in the two traditions. Those commentators of Wittgenstein’s work, like Peter Hacker and David Pears, who have identified a connection between Kant and Wittgenstein, have thus focused on Kant’s First Critique with less

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emphasis on Kant’s own attempt to provide a unified picture of how logic and aesthetics (in the broad sense of the term) belong together (see Hacker 1986; Pears 1987). Yet, for Kant himself, the ultimate goal of philosophy was to address the wealth of human experience in a sense wider than mere discursive cognition allows. Accordingly, for him, a complete picture of what a human being is requires an account of not just knowledge but also of intentional explanation relevant for human action, pure judgments of taste, and the purposiveness of nature for our moral goals. This latter side of Kant’s work is particularly dominant in his Critique of the Power of Judgment,5 which has remained less central in the analytic world or isolated into the compartmentalized discussions of aestheticians.6 In spite of the disparity he sees between Wittgenstein’s work on philosophy of language and his remarks on art, culture and religion, von Wright acknowledges that Wittgenstein’s remarks on the arts are not limited to those that have found their way to Culture and Value (CV ixe). In fact, such remarks surface at key moments of Wittgenstein’s treatment of topics that belong to the presumably hard core of his philosophical work. Already in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein explains the central Tractarian notion of logical form by reference to music (TLP 2.0131, 3.141, 4.014). And the key question of his later work, namely, the understanding of language, is elucidated by appeal to the nonconceptual understanding of a musical theme (PI §§ 184, 527, 531). In this paper, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on music and the other arts are not simply mere illustrations of an otherwise independent philosophical account. Instead, Wittgenstein ought to be read against the background of the German tradition with respect to aesthetics and the arts. This is to say that the recurring analogy between language and music in Wittgenstein’s work is meant to contribute to problems at the very core of philosophy and do so specifically by revealing the limitations of discursive thought. In the following, I will outline the ways in which Wittgenstein appeals to music in relation to the supposedly hard logical or grammatical core of his work. The first set of examples is from the Tractatus, the second from the first part of the Philosophical Investigations. The examples thus represent Wittgenstein’s own approach to the arts in the context of texts that he himself prepared for publication. After discussing these examples, I will conclude by comparing them with an example drawn from Culture and Value. My overall goal is to show that what in Wittgenstein’s work has been perceived as idiosyncratic and superfluous references to the arts actually contributes to Wittgenstein’s philosophy when placed in the right philosophical context. I also hope that this exercise will provide a new perspective for the re-evaluation of von Wright’s methodological approach in his editorial work on Culture and Value.7

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2. MUSIC IN THE TRACTATUS It is a question debated in the community of Wittgenstein scholars whether there is a hard core in Wittgenstein’s early work insofar as such a hard core is understood as an attempt to provide a philosophical account as an answer to a set of specifically philosophical questions. But if there is such an account – whether understood as a genuine proposal or as a deep confusion to be uncovered and thrown away8 –, then it concerns the nature of linguistic sense. This account, sometimes labelled as the ‘picture theory of meaning’, treats propositions as pictures of possible states of affairs. According to the picture theory, the sense of a proposition rests on two conditions. First, as a picture, the proposition must have something in common with the reality it depicts. This common essence of propositions and possible states of affairs is logical form, which Wittgenstein claims to the ‘the form of reality’ (TLP 2.18). Second, the proposition must have elements that, as constituents of the proposition, refer to the elements of the depicted state of affairs. Whether the referential relation is effected by means of a mental act of intention or by virtue of a more or less broadly interpreted context principle, is a question of debate that we need not enter here.9 Either way, it is clear from Wittgenstein’s text that not just the proposition as a whole but also the constituents of propositions, i.e. names, have logical forms (TLP 3.31, 3.327). These correspond to the forms of the constituents of non-linguistics facts, i.e. objects, for which the names stand as representatives (TLP 2.0121–2.01231, 3.22). We can ‘picture facts to ourselves’ precisely because the elements of the picture are capable of combining together in the way in which the elements of the pictured state of affairs are imagined to be combined (TLP 2.1, 2.151). Such combining is made possible by the forms of the elements: ‘Form is the possibility of structure’ (TLP 2.033). In this way, then, logical form figures as the essential condition for the possibility of linguistic sense (TLP 6.13).10 So the logical form envisioned in the Tractatus is the form of language (or thought) as well as of non-linguistic reality. Both are conceived as structured totalities: the world is the totality of facts, while language is the totality of propositions (TLP 1.1, 4.001). Moreover, it is a central feature of propositions that they, too, have structure. This structure mirrors the structure of the pictured fact and is grounded in the forms of objects that Wittgenstein claims to be the substance of the world (TLP 2.021, 3.21). Names, as constituents of a proposition, ‘stand in a determinate relation to one another’, which is to say that the proposition is a fact as well (TLP 2.141, 3.14). In explaining this key idea of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes: ‘A proposition is not a blend of words. [. . .] A proposition is articulate.’ (TLP 3.141.) But an

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integral part of this explanation, if one given in brackets, is the following remark: ‘– (Just as a theme in music is not a blend of notes.)’ (TLP 3.141). So what are we supposed to bring home from this further remark that evokes the idea of a musical theme as an articulate structure? Here is a proposal. Like the Tractarian objects, whose essence lies in their ability to combine together in virtue of their logical forms, the notes of a scale are essentially capable of forming a musical theme. Musical notes ‘must have some pitch’, as Wittgenstein points out in the beginning of the Tractatus, in the context of explaining his notion of an object (TLP 2.0131). Just as it is impossible to imagine a note without some pitch and hence a potential role in a melody, it is impossible to imagine an object independently of its possibilities of combining with other objects (TLP 2.0121). The weight of Wittgenstein’s comparison between an object and a note should not be underestimated either, given that otherwise Wittgenstein refuses to give any examples of objects (TLP 2.024–2.0271). The reference to notes, along with the reference to specks in a visual field that must have some colour, is the only concrete illustration of the Tractarian objects that complements the abstract requirements that objects must satisfy (such as their simplicity, unalterability and subsistence) (TLP 2.0131, 2.02, 2.023, 2.024). Moreover, just as the Tractarian facts that belong to a logical space, the theme belongs to a musical space (TLP 1.13, 2.11, 2.202). But we do not encounter a musical space independently of the relations between the notes themselves, and this I take to be the point of Wittgenstein’s remark. As suggested by the opening remarks of the Tractatus, we come to contact with logical space by encountering the world as already structured. ‘The world as I found it’ is already a ‘totality of facts’, and as such structured in accordance with the possibilities determined by logical form (TLP 5.631, 1.1; see also 5.552–5.5521). The forms of the facts that comprise the world (as well as of the possible states of affairs that do not happen to obtain) are grounded in the forms of the objects, where these forms just mean the objects’ possibilities of combining with one another (TLP 2.0123–2.01231). In this sense, ‘[o]bjects contain the possibility of all situations’ (TLP 2.014). Now, just as the objects’ possibilities of combination determine their possible relations with other objects in states of affairs, so too, in a given key like D minor, A and D stand to one another in the internal relation of the dominant and the tonic. Indeed, any given interval or melody reflects the potential relations that obtain between the notes of the scale, i.e. the different tonal functions determined by the relations between the notes. What the appeal to music serves to underscore, then, is that the application of the constituents of a proposition is not prescribed from an external point of view of an ideal

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logical notation crafted by logicians,11 say, but the constituents of facts already carry within themselves their own principle of organization. So the forms of the constituent objects ground the possibility for the objects to stand in determinate relations to one another hence giving the fact an articulate structure. Every meaningful proposition, in turn, mirrors the structure of the pictured fact in virtue of its constituents, names, being related to one another in a way that corresponds to the configuration of the objects of the pictured fact (TLP 3.21). Accordingly, propositions always conform to the general propositional form ‘This is how things stand’ (TLP 4.5). However, meaningful propositions are not just articulate structures in the sense of being organized and by conforming to the general propositional form. In meaningful propositions, the constituent elements also stand for objects; they have a referential relation to reality. Musical notes lack such a reference. Hence, the point of Wittgenstein’s allusion to the articulateness of a melody in his explanation of propositions as facts must point to the form rather than the empirical content of propositions. It must point to what, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims to be the shared essence of language and reality, namely, logical form (TLP 5.4711). In hearing any melody as an articulate and complete musical thought, we thus hear the articulateness of a proposition as a fact in the purest sense of the term, abstracted from any empirical content and manifest in the general form of a proposition (TLP 4.5; see NB, 40). In elaborating the core idea of the picture theory, namely that a ‘proposition is a picture of reality’, Wittgenstein refers to the essential connection between language and the world, which is based on their shared logical form (TLP 4.0312). Again, Wittgenstein’s example is from the realm of music. He writes: A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the soundwaves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. —TLP 4.014 The emphasis here is not on the principle of demarcation between language and the world: it does not matter which phenomena listed stand for propositions and which for non-linguistic states of affairs pictured by propositions. What is relevant instead is the ‘essence of [the] pictorial character’, namely, the internal relations between the four musical phenomena, determined by logical form (TLP 4.013). As indicated by the continuation of the remark just quoted, the point is rather that ‘[t]hey all have a common logical construction’ (TLP 4.01413). In other words, the formal unity of the sound waves, the notation, the recording, and the musical

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idea reflects the formal unity of language, thought and reality – clearly a core assumption of Wittgenstein’s early account. The operative idea in Wittgenstein’s references to music in his discussion of objects, of propositions as facts, and of the essence of the pictorial character is the distinction between form and content. Wittgenstein claims that the unalterable substance of the world, namely, the objects, is form and content, where ‘form’ just means the objects’ possibilities of combination (TLP 2.025). The distinction between form and content applies equally to propositions (TLP 3.11–3.13). We find the purest instance of logical form in senseless tautologies. This is because tautologies do not determine any specific state of affairs as their empirical content (TLP 4.461, 6.2). In contrast to meaningful propositions that are capable of determining empirical content, tautologies cannot say anything about reality; they cannot determine any specific state of affairs as their content (TLP 4.023). This is because, in a tautology, the representing relations with reality ‘cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representational relation to reality’ (TLP 4.462). Accordingly, tautologies only show their own form. They ‘show that they say nothing’ (TLP 4.461). According to Wittgenstein, his ‘fundamental idea is that the “logical constants” are not representatives; there can be no representatives of the logic of facts’ (TLP 4.0312). Accordingly, propositions of logic are tautologies: they do not picture any empirical states of affairs, but only show or display their own form. (TLP 4.46–4.462.) Yet, precisely as tautologies, abstracted away from any possible empirical content, the propositions of logic ‘show the formal – logical – properties of the world’ (TLP 6.12). Again, ‘The logic of the world [. . .] is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic’ (TLP 6.22). Now consider an early notebook entry by Wittgenstein from 1915. Wittgenstein writes: ‘A tune is a kind of tautology, it is complete in itself; it satisfies itself ’ (NB 40; 4.3.15). What Wittgenstein’s remark implies, then, is that the musical theme has the form of sense without the possibility of giving empirical content to that form (TLP 3.13). So again we find music figuring as the model of logical form as reflected in tautologies. Also this idea lies undeniably at the very centre of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy proper. I would argue further that, for Wittgenstein, the philosophical advantage of evoking music in the context of philosophy of logic is related to a feature that motivated Kant’s attention to the judgment of beauty as the paradigm example of a merely reflective judgment, i.e. a judgment that has no concept as its ground nor leads to concepts (CPJ 5:237). For Kant, the judgment of beauty is by definition a judgment of the form of purposiveness, represented without a concept of a purpose, i.e. without the possibility of expressing

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a conceptual rule capturing the purpose of that form (CPJ 5:236). This point about the non-conceptuality of an aesthetic judgment is echoed in Wittgenstein’s insistence that musical themes are not like meaningful propositions that are pictures of states of affairs, but more like tautologies that do not say anything about reality, yet show their own form. And I would like to add purposive form, because of Wittgenstein’s further remark that ‘the tune is complete in itself and satisfies itself ’ even when it does not say anything (NB 40). In this way, then, the references to a musical theme make tangible the Tractarian dictum of the ineffability of logical form. What I am suggesting, dramatic as it may sound, is that logical form as the ‘essence of the world’ is displayed not just in propositions of logic but also in music. This very idea of music revealing the form of the world figures in different variations time and again in German aesthetics. We find it in Kant’s idea of absolute music as a paradigm example of ‘free beauty’ that invites a pure judgment of formal purposiveness and warrants judgments of the purposiveness of nature in general (CPJ 5:220, 5:229). We find it in Schopenhauer’s view that music is the immediate expression of the metaphysical will, which for him is the essence of reality (Schopenhauer [1819] 2011, 285); we find it in Hanslick’s claim that in the ‘tonally moving forms’ of music we hear the formal features of the movements of the human mind as well as of the universe (Hanslick [1854] 2018, 120); and we find it in Adorno’s notion of music disclosing the condition of the society (Adorno 1978, 129). While Wittgenstein’s early account of the essence of the world is more formal in character than these positions, his way of connecting music to logical form may nonetheless be seen as a version of this idea pervading German aesthetics. The above instances of appeal to music in Wittgenstein’s early work underscore his account of logic that differs significantly from the view advocated by those who take the task of logic to be the construction of an ideal logical notation intended to function as the externally prescribed discipline for thought. They make intuitively available (‘intuitively’ in Kant’s specific sense) the idea of seeing the form of a proposition independently of its content. And they underscore the central idea that logical form is inexpressible in language and available only as something that is shown or manifest (TLP p. 3, 2.172, 2.174, 4.121, 6.22). Indeed, already in February 1915, Wittgenstein writes in his notebook, ‘Musical themes are in a certain sense propositions.’ And he adds: ‘Knowledge of the nature of logic will for this reason lead to knowledge of the nature of music’ (NB 40; 7.2.1915). So is this simply a dispensable illustration of the central Tractarian dictum of the all-encompassing logical form that applies to language, thought, and indeed to any imaginable world (TLP 2.022)? Or does the remark have an

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independent philosophical relevance in Wittgenstein’s attempt to elucidate the impossibility of expressing in language the necessary condition for language (TLP 4.121)? I myself lean towards the latter alternative.

3. MUSIC IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I will now turn to Wittgenstein’s later work as articulated in the first part of the Philosophical Investigations. If we look for a line of thought that ‘belongs directly’ to the hard core of Wittgenstein philosophical work in its later period, then the most obvious candidate is Wittgenstein’s discussion on rulefollowing. The key passage reads as follows: This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was: if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. That there is a misunderstanding here is shown by the mere fact that in this chain of reasoning we place one interpretation behind another, as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it. For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it” ’ That’s why there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation. But one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another. —PI § 201 What is at stake in the paradox is the possibility of applying a general rule to a particular case, which is required for understanding (see PI § 292). What, if anything, justifies a particular application of a rule so that we can talk about behaviour as following a rule as opposed to being in mere conformity with it? It is standardly assumed that, according to Wittgenstein, it is not enough that my behaviour conforms to the rule that is constitutive of the game that provides the context of the use. If I understand, then my behaviour ought to be internally related to the rule so that I can appeal to the conceptually formulated rule in explaining my application thereof. However, in doing so, I inevitably fall back on yet new interpretations of the rule. Here, ‘interpretation’ is understood as a conceptual formulation of the original rule, as explained in the final sentence of the paragraph.

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Sections 185 to 242 of the Philosophical Investigations are usually treated as addressing the question of how the rule can determine its correct applications.14 However, immediately before these sections, in section 184, Wittgenstein gives a musical version of the more well-known mathematical example of rule-following (see PI §§ 143–149). He writes: I want to remember a tune, and it escapes me; suddenly I say “Now I know it”, and I sing it. What was it like suddenly to know it? Surely it can’t have occurred to me in its entirety in that moment! – Perhaps you will say: “It’s a particular feeling, as if it were now there” – but is it now there? Suppose I then begin to sing it and get stuck? – But may I not have been certain at that moment that I knew it? So in some sense it was there after all! – But in what sense? Perhaps you would say that the tune was there if, for example, someone sang it through, or rehearsed it in his imagination from beginning to end. I am not, of course, denying that the statement that the tune is there can also be given a quite different sense – for example, that I have a bit of paper on which it is written. —PI § 184 The challenge at hand is like that of understanding the rule determining the series of natural numbers (PI § 143). What is required for a warranted claim to knowledge of the tune is an ability to take the step from the ‘rule’, i.e. what gives identity to the tune, to its potentially infinitely many instances, namely, performances of the tune. Also Wittgenstein’s candidates for the criterion of knowing the tune – a particular feeling, performance, a mental image – go in tandem with the mathematical example (see PI §§ 147–155). However, the musical example is such that it immediately creates obstacles to the route to an interpretation given by a rephrase or a rule-formulation. While a rule-formulation may be given in the form of the bit of paper on which the tune is written, its impotence in bridging the gap between the rule and its application is blatantly clear. The written score does succeed in conveying information about the abstract shape of the tune, but in comparison to a particular performance it is but ‘a skeleton [made] out of a flourishing body’, to borrow Hanslick’s characterization of the relation between a heard performance of a musical piece and a technical analysis thereof (Hanslick [1854] 2018, 22). Besides, to ‘know a tune’ involves having a hold of its internal purposive unity, the ‘completeness of the tune’, that Wittgenstein identified as a key feature of a musical theme already in 1915 (NB, 40). The insight about the completeness of musical forms emerges also in the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein asks: ‘What happens when we learn to feel the ending of a church mode as an ending?’ (PI § 535.) Clearly, this

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feeling of closure is something we can learn. Yet, the challenge of justifying the aesthetic judgment (such as ‘This is a complete musical thought’, ‘This is where it comes to an end.’) springing from that feeling cannot be exclusively met by conceptual means. Granted, I can refer to a textbook on modal harmony and quote a rule-formulation. Or I can try to convey my judgment by means of comparisons, such as Wittgenstein’s ‘It is as if a conclusion were drawn’ (PI § 527; see Wittgenstein 2016, 9:31; Wittgenstein 1966, III: 1, 9). But if my interlocutor does not experience the ending as an ending, the rule-formulations, comparisons, or further descriptions will not resolve the matter. They do not force my interlocutor to accept my judgment (CV 79; Wittgenstein 2016, 9:30–9:31, 9:39). So the correctness of the judgment, which I must acknowledge if I am to ‘know the tune’, seems to hang in the air just as the next step to be taken in the mathematical series. In contrast to some, who read Wittgenstein’s later work as denying the relevance of rules tout court, I take the later Wittgenstein to be committed to giving an account of our ability to follow rules constitutive of language.15 There are cases where others are entitled to ask for a justification for my application of a rule. In such cases, I am obliged to try and provide a justification by explaining further the content of my judgment and do so by appealing to an expression of the rule I have applied. Yet, as Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasizes, we cannot appeal to new expressions of the rule without entering into an infinite regress (PI §§ 201, 217, 261, 292). At some point, I cannot bring up any further interpretation of the rule I have applied, but have to follow the rule ‘blindly’, i.e. without a conceptual justification.16 In my reading, it is precisely this point that is brought to the fore already in section 184 of the Philosophical Investigations, which evokes the puzzling phenomenon of knowing a musical tune. Later in the text, Wittgenstein explicitly introduces two cases of understanding: the first where I can reformulate my judgment, and the second where I follow the rule blindly. Here, in section 531, Wittgenstein reconnects the second sense of understanding to the understanding of music. He writes: We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.) In the one case, the thought in the sentence is what is common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.) —PI § 531

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These two uses of the word ‘understanding’, Wittgenstein claims, ‘make up its meaning, make up my concept of understanding’ (PI § 532). As I see it, Wittgenstein’s allusion to the ineffability of musical content is anything but incidental. The musical example is meant to illustrate the constitution of meaning by rules that cannot, however, be further interpreted by being expressed in another medium.17 What is required instead is developing a feeling for the rules of the musical system as a whole (see Wittgenstein 1966, I:15). The main point I want to bring home is that the example of a musical theme that surfaces already in the Tractatus carries over to Wittgenstein’s later view, surviving the many dramatic changes that otherwise occur in Wittgenstein’s conception of language. True, in the Philosophical Investigations, there is no appeal to an immutable logical form given in the forms of the simple objects. Nor is there any commitment to a general propositional form supposedly underlying the conventions of everyday language. But in spite of these differences, there is something that closely resembles the view that we find in the Tractatus. This is the idea that once our conceptual resources – whether understood as the Tractarian domain of meaningful propositions or Wittgenstein’s later limited scope of justifications given by reference to conceptual formulations of the applied rule – have been exhausted, the form of language shows itself. Both variants of this idea are conveyed to us by reference to the musical theme. While in 1915 Wittgenstein writes that the tune is a tautology and as such complete in itself, in the Philosophical Investigations we read: Understanding a sentence in language is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding a spoken sentence is closer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme. Why is just this the pattern of variation in intensity and tempo? One would like to say: ‘Because I know what it all means.’ But what does it mean? I’d not be able to say. As an ‘explanation’, I could compare it with something else which has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern). —PI § 527 So again music serves as the model of a kind of formal unity that is assumed for the possibility of linguistic sense. This is a formal unity that cannot be spelled out any further but must be felt or grasped in a way different from the conceptually formulated interpretations or reformulations of the sentence in question (see PI § 201).

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4. MUSIC IN CULTURE AND VALUE I will conclude by discussing one further example of what I read as a philosophically significant reference to music, but one that has ended up in Culture and Value. I do not want to suggest that von Wright had no good reasons for reading some of the remarks as detached from Wittgenstein’s core concerns in philosophy. Some remarks in Culture and Value express Wittgenstein’s personal preferences in the arts with no obvious connection to his philosophical work on language. In this respect, they are on a par with the coded remarks in MS 101 to 103 that the editors decided to omit from the published version of Notebooks 1914–1916 (see Erbacher 2017, 92). An example of this sort is Wittgenstein’s harsh judgment on Mahler’s music: If it is true, as I believe, that Mahler’s music is totally worthless, the question is what I think he should have done with his talent. For quite obviously it took a string of very rare talents to produce this bad music. Should he, say, have written his symphonies & burnt them? Or should he have done himself violence & not have written them? Should he have written them & realized that they were worthless? But how could he have realized that? —CV 76; MS 136 110b, 14.1.1948 This judgment is as telling about Wittgenstein’s own person and aesthetic sensitivities as it is about Mahler’s music. Mahler’s music may seem worthless, sentimental, lacking in sophistication and aesthetic rigour to a person who already has a certain aesthetic ideal in mind, perhaps an ideal of clarity and coolness (see CV, 2; Wittgenstein 2016, 9:18–22). To a person not so inclined and in light of another ideal, Mahler’s music may appear rich, sensuous and aesthetically satisfying. The point is that, given this personal connection, indicated by Wittgenstein himself by the phrase ‘as I believe’, the remark should perhaps not be read as contributing to his strictly philosophical work. But there are other examples where the case is less obvious. Recall the overall point I have tried to make in discussing the role of music in the Tractatus and in the Philosophical Investigations. In both works, I have suggested, Wittgenstein connects the notion of a musical theme to the essence of language. In the Tractatus, this essence is logical form: ‘To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world’ (TLP 5.4711). In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes in turn that ‘Essence is expressed in grammar’ (PI § 371). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein takes logical form to be the form of every imaginable world, whereas in the Investigations grammar

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is tied to our historically developing and culturally variable practices (TLP 2.022; PI § 199). Nevertheless, the two notions are alike in one significant respect. In contrast with empirical statements and statements of opinion that are contingent and debatable, logical form and rules of grammar alike have the status of being exempt from the demand of justification (TLP 5.473; PI §§ 240–241). Now consider the following remark, drawn from MS 134 and published in Culture and Value. I will call this the ‘Mozart remark’: The “necessity” with which the second thought succeeds the first. (Overture to Figaro.) Nothing could be more idiotic than to say it is “agreeable” to hear one after the other. – But the paradigm according to which all this is right is certainly obscure. “It is the natural development.” You gesture with your hand, would like to say: “of course!” – One could also compare the transition with a transition (the entrance of a new character) in a story, for example, or a poem. That is how this piece fits into the world of our thoughts and feelings. —CV 65; translation altered18; MS 134 78, 30.3.1947 Even though the word ‘necessity’ appears in quotation marks in the opening sentence of this remark, I would argue that the phenomenon at stake is the very same phenomenon Wittgenstein evokes in his discussion of rulefollowing (PI §§ 184, 527–535). This is the paradoxical moment of blind rule-following, explained in the Philosophical Investigations by reference to musical understanding. While the ‘paradigm according to which’ the two musical thoughts naturally follow one another is obscure in that it cannot be conceptually explained by reference to an unambiguous rule-formulation, I still experience the continuation as correct or even necessary. Moreover, this acknowledgement, guided by a feeling rather than by a conceptual rule-formulation, is an indispensable aspect of my understanding of the overture. It is indispensable despite the fact that, if another person asks me for a justification for my judgment, my response may not be any stronger than a gesture accompanied by the feeble ‘of course’. However, the feeling guiding my judgment is not a mere reaction, reducible to psychological facts. This point, familiar from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, is also signalled in the Mozart remark by Wittgenstein’s reference to the idiocy of calling the musical development ‘agreeable’. In the German tradition of aesthetics, the term ‘angenehm’ indicates a causally conditioned response to a stimulus. Moreover, it is used by Wittgenstein in this exact sense in his lectures on aesthetics in 1933, where he draws the characteristically Kantian contrast between the causally

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conditioned agreeable and the beautiful.19 The relevant sort of feeling is rather a response to the musical system. Hence, the feeling of ‘naturalness’ in my response to Mozart’s overture is something I have to develop after I have first been ‘drilled in harmony and counterpoint’, just as the feeling of closure in a church mode is something I may learn only by listening and perhaps discursively studying modal music (Wittgenstein 1966, I:15; see PI § 535). Accordingly, the correctness of one response as opposed to another that I may learn to experience (feel, see or hear) is internally connected to the rules of the musical system itself. So why is it that the Mozart remark, written on 30 March 1947, has been placed in Culture and Value and thereby assigned the character of an aphorism without much philosophical significance? The question becomes even more pressing when taken together with the fact that another remark, which I will call the ‘Chopin remark’, immediately preceding the Mozart remark in MS 134 and written on 29 March, has found its home in Zettel. After all, according to von Wright, Zettel – a work based on a collection of fragments Wittgenstein himself cut out from his manuscripts and left in a box-file – contains some of the best remarks ever written by Wittgenstein and could be read as a work complementing the Investigations, potentially intended as a bridge between its first and second part.20 In Zettel, the Chopin remark figures in a discussion on the understanding of music (Z §§ 157–175) in the broader context of Wittgenstein’s reflection on the constitution of meaning. It reads: The way music speaks. Do not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the language of information, is not used in the languagegame of giving information. Mightn’t we imagine a man who, never having had any acquaintance with music, comes to us and hears someone playing a reflective piece of Chopin and is convinced that this is a language and people merely want to keep the meaning secret from him? There is a strongly musical element in verbal language. (A sigh, the intonation of voice in question, in an announcement, in longing; all the innumerable gestures made with the voice). —Z § 160–161; MS 134, 77, 29.3.1947 That Wittgenstein placed the Chopin remark in the arrangement of remarks that became known as Zettel, thus treating it as he treated the remarks on music in the Tractatus and in the Investigations, shows that he himself took the remark to be of philosophical value. Moreover, I do not think there can be any doubt that, in the context of MS 134, the Chopin remark belongs

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together with the Mozart remark. The two remarks equally contribute to the overall theme of aesthetic understanding as a model for nondiscursive understanding of language, which I have argued to be the main motivation for Wittgenstein’s repeated references to music. Finally, if we look at the two remarks in the context of MS 134 and in light of the interpretation I have here defended, we can see that what to von Wright looked like isolated aphorisms emerging in the middle of a philosophical reflection integrally belong to that reflection. On 19 March, we find Wittgenstein evoking the idea of a melody going through his head (MS 134, 46), thus echoing the case of ‘knowing the tune’ described in PI § 184. On 21 March, he launches a long discussion on aspect seeing, a theme undoubtedly belonging to the core concerns of his later philosophy, describing in detail the conditions of the experience (Erfahrung) of seeing an aspect (MS 134, 55–76). On 27 March, he characterizes this experience as one of ‘Now I know how to go on’ (‘Jetzt weiss ich weiter’), reminiscent of the experience of the pupil knowing how to continue the mathematical series, and stresses that what is involved is neither a thought nor an interpretation (MS 134, 72–73; cf. PI §§ 179 and 201). These ideas, familiar from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, are followed by a remark on the importance of examples in philosophy (MS 134, 76; cf. PI § 593), a remark on how the tempo of reading a sentence influences the possibility of understanding that sentence (MS 134, 76– 77; CV 65), only to culminate in the Chopin and Mozart remarks (MS 134, 77; Z § 160 and MS 134, 78; CV 65). What could be read as an intermediary conclusion of this train of thought then reads: ‘Language has several roots, it has many roots, not one’ (MS 134, 80; author’s translation). I have argued that these roots include both discursive and nondiscursive elements, which is what Wittgenstein’s references to music are meant to underscore.

5. EPILOGUE In a relatively late interview from 1995, von Wright was asked about his relation to the German tradition of philosophy, especially the critical theory of the Frankfurt school and its cultural criticism. Von Wright responded by saying that, instead of belonging to the strictly logical and analytical tradition that had dominated his early work, his later writings on the state of the Western culture could, in some sense, be seen as belonging to this tradition. However, von Wright admitted that, for him, the connection between his logical analytic work and his reflection of ethics, religion and the arts had been a life-long problem. Earlier he had thought that the two sides of his intellectual work could be strictly separated. They had belonged to ‘two

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different worlds’, manifest in his choice to write on the former mostly in English and on the latter in Swedish and Finnish. Literature and the other arts had been a Sunday hobby for him, he said. In 1995, von Wright was willing to admit – if hesitantly – that reflection on the arts and cultural criticism could perhaps be seen as a form of philosophy. However, he was less optimistic about the possibility of combining the two fields of thought into a unified philosophical view.21 What I have tried to show is that Wittgenstein did not share this view.

NOTES 1. See von Wright 1982h; for a discussion on the editorial history of Culture and Value, see Christian Erbacher (2017). On von Wright’s own understanding of this ‘rift in his philosophical personality’, see Österman 2019. 2. An interesting parallel for Schroeder’s take on Wittgenstein’s approach may be found in von Wright’s remark on ‘existential questions’ that he believes are best treated by artistic means. von Wright writes, ‘. . . it is justified to ask whether philosophy is . . . the right medium for posing and treating these questions. For my own part, I do not believe so.’ (von Wright 1955b, quoted and translated from Swedish in Österman 2019, 3.) 3. Stenius 1960; Bell 1987; Moore 1987, 2007, 2013; see also Kannisto 1986, Glock 1992. 4. ‘The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have always carefully distinguished between aistheta and noeta. So let the noeta, what is known by the superior faculty of mind, be the object of logic, and aistheta the object of episteme aisthetica or AESTHETICS’ (Baumgarten 1954, § CXVI) 5. For convenience this will be referred to as CPJ from here on. 6. In his classic commentary on the Tractatus, Erik Stenius acknowledges the striking parallel between the Tractarian ineffabilia and notions that in Kant’s First Critique are claimed to fall outside the bounds of theoretical cognition, namely, religion, ethics, aesthetics, the philosophical self, the world as a whole, logical form, and the practice of philosophy (Stenius 1960, 222). However, in the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, this parallel has been treated mostly as an indication of a negative, limiting condition of meaningful language rather than seen in the full light of Kant’s overall project (see, however, Moore 2007 and 2013). 7. Österman (ch. 8 in this volume) and Wallgren (ch. 12, section 7 in this volume) offer different viewpoints on how the material included in Culture and Value may contribute to our understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophical goals. 8. This contrast corresponds roughly to the interpretative division between the so-called traditional interpretation (e.g. Anscombe 1959, Stenius 1960, Hacker 1986, Pears 1987, Glock 1996) and the so-called resolute reading (e.g. Conant 2002, Diamond 1991, Floyd 2002). While the most radical formulations of the resolute reading deny that there is anything like a philosophical theory to be

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found in the Tractatus, more moderate versions acknowledge a kind of theory but as one that collapses from within (see Bronzo 2012). 9. Again, the former view is typically defended by the traditional interpretation (Hacker 1986, Kannisto 1986, Malcolm 1986, Kenny 1981, Glock 1996); the latter view, originally put forth by Ishiguro (1969) and McGuinness (1981), is adopted by the resolute reading (see, e.g. Conant 2002, 398–405; Diamond 1991, 138–139). 10. For a more detailed explication of the notion of logical form as a condition of sense in the picture theory of language, see Appelqvist 2016. 11. This point and the resulting contrast between the Tractarian notion of logic and that of Frege and Russell has been emphasized in Kannisto 1986, 121 and Glock 1992. 12. ‘A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation’ (TLP 4.03). 13. Translation altered. The original text reads: ‘Ihnen allen is der logische Bau gemeinsam’. 14. See, for example, Baker and Hacker 2009a, 355–356 and Baker and Hacker 2009b, 25–27. 15. See, for example, Baker 2004, 52–72; Kuusela 2008, 111–145; Glüer and Wikforss 2009. 16. For a more thorough explication of this point, see Appelqvist 2017. On blindness as non-conceptuality and Wittgenstein’s rule-following discussion as an heir of Kant’s treatment of the theme, see Bell 1987. 17. On the connection between Bell’s reading of Kant and ineffability, see Moore 2007. 18. The original reads: ‘Die “Notwendigkeit”, mit der Zweite Gedanke auf den ersten folgt. (Figaro Ouvertüre.) Nichts dümmer, als zu sagen, es sei “angenehm” den einen nach dem andern zu hören! – Aber das Paradigma, wonach das alles richtig ist, ist freilich dunkel. “Es ist die natürliche Entwicklung.” Man macht eine Handbewegung, möchte sagen: “natürlich!” – Man könnte den Übergang (dem Eintritt winer neuen Figur) in einer Geschichte, z.B., oder einem Gedicht, vergleichen. So past dies Stück in der Welt unser Gedanken & Gefühle hinein.’ In MS 134 78 this remark is complemented by a quote from Goethe: ‘Man suchte nichts hinter den Phänomen; sie selbst sind die Lehre’ (Goethe).’ 19. CPJ 5: 208–210, 5: 236; M, 343–364; see Appelqvist 2018. 20. Editor’s Preface to the Finnish edition of Zettel (von Wright 1978d). 21. Lahtinen et al. 1995, 10–11.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

Unearthing the Socratic Wittgenstein THOMAS WALLGREN

1. INTRODUCTION I suggest that it is helpful to think of the role that Wittgenstein’s literary executors, Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, played in the creation of Wittgenstein as a story with two stages. In the first stage their editorial work was marked by deeply shared commitment and straightforward principles. The story of the second stage is the story of Rhees’s, Anscombe’s and von Wright’s evolving, reflective concern about how to handle their task. My narration of the first stage proceeds in two steps. In section 2 I identify basic editing principles which, as I suggest, explain much of what the literary executors did as editors of Wittgenstein during, roughly, the first two decades after his death. In section 3 I propose that the editions which followed brought immense success, fraught with deep paradox. My remarks on the second stage of the story, commencing around 1970, have five sections (4–8). Each section deals with vast and complex material. I present stylized views in the hope of bringing out philosophically interesting aspects. I conclude with some notes on the possible relevance of the discussion for fundamental issues in the self-understanding of philosophy and, thereby, for the dialectics of enlightenment in our times (section 9).

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2. GIVING WITTGENSTEIN TO THE WORLD Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright had all gone to Wittgenstein’s classes, they were all friends of Wittgenstein and all were appreciated by him for their philosophical talent. They mutually acknowledged these facts about each other and their relation to Wittgenstein. Through their lives they shared the conviction that Wittgenstein was a unique genius who would rank among the great philosophers of all times. This all served as the foundation for their cooperation as editors of the Nachlass. It was an exacting task that lasted several decades. It could only succeed because of the executors’ effortless sense of equality in their partnership and their deeply shared, unfaltering sense of the value and necessity of their joint task and of their duty towards it.1 As it evolved, the most visible element of the task was the bringing out of publications, especially books, in Wittgenstein’s name.2 Less conspicuously, Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright also took it upon themselves to search for writings by Wittgenstein, to secure their preservation, to describe and catalogue them, to make them available to scholars through archives and other unpublished resources, such as the Cornell microfilm and electronically stored transcriptions, and to translate them or promote their translation. My focus is on the first part of their endeavour; their work as editors of posthumous publications by Wittgenstein. If we turn to how Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright wanted to execute this task, three basic characteristics of the ambitions and principles stand out. The most fundamental point, one that emerges most vividly from their correspondence, is that they shared a burning desire ‘to give Wittgenstein to the world’.3 The literary executors also agreed that in the publications discussion of editorial work, decisions and commentary should be kept to a minimum.4 The third main principle that guided their endeavour, in particular during the first decades, was the ambition to publish what was good, or best, among Wittgenstein’s writings.5 The first two tasks, which the literary executors took on immediately after Wittgenstein’s death, were to bring out what we now know as Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (PI) and, in parallel with that, to search for and collect all writings of Wittgenstein and to study the findings from the point of view of what else to publish from them (von Wright 2001a: 158). It soon appeared that Wittgenstein’s literary remains were much vaster then Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright had known (von Wright 1982c: 37f.). However, the complex, somewhat amorphous nature of the material, often also called Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, emerged only gradually to them. In the editorial note to the first edition of the PI (1953) only some apparently minor issues of a technical nature are mentioned. Even before the PI was published the editors turned to what seemed to them to be the obvious choice for a second

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publication, a selection of what they thought of as Wittgenstein’s writings on the philosophy of mathematics. Despite the many challenges concerning selection, the management of variants, indexing, cross-references and layout, the first edition of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM) was published as early as 1956. RFM remains the only book by Wittgenstein that Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright edited jointly. Most later books published in Wittgenstein’s name were edited by one of them, or two of them together. In all editions the overall responsibility remained in the hands of the three original literary executors. As a matter that required no second thought, the books were all offered to a leading academic, English publisher. Moreover, the executors followed, without explanation, an overall policy of publishing the books as German–English parallel editions, if possible. The books that were the result of this process are often referred to as Wittgenstein’s ‘works’.6 Von Wright has remarked that when, at long last, LW2 was published in 1992, the literary executors had essentially accomplished the task that had been given them in Wittgenstein’s will (von Wright 2001a: 163).

3. A SUCCESS AND ITS PARADOXES In retrospect, it is easy to see that there were divergences between the literary executors’ vision of how best to realize the three original principles of editing on which they agreed with such ease in the early years. We will shortly look at some of the divergences more closely, but it may be useful to register first some basic differences in their respective approaches to the task. The primary ambition of Rhees was always to construct from various manuscripts editions that he judged Wittgenstein would have wanted to publish, or at least accepted for publication, because of the light they shed on the development of his thinking.7 From very early on he was guided by the idea that Wittgenstein did not write works on separable topics.8 Anscombe’s practice was largely guided by the quite different perception that one can find in the manuscripts works on various philosophical topics that were already there in a more or less completed form. Von Wright, like Anscombe, often expressed the view that some of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts have the character of completed works on distinct topics. When different ways of publishing were suggested by Rhees and Anscombe he usually took sides with Anscombe.9 His influential essays on the origins of the Tractatus and the PI (von Wright 1982d and 1982e) follow broadly the same line, presenting Wittgenstein’s philosophical endeavour both in the 1910s and after his return to Cambridge as aiming for the production of a work that could be published as a book. But his own editorial work, especially his work

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on Vermischte Bemerkungen / Culture and Value (VB / CV), some of his letters to Rhees, and his late concern about the idea of the PI as a work with a part II, tell a partly different story of what kind of work von Wright perceived the later Wittgenstein was engaged in and what its aims might be.10 An intriguing feature of the cooperation between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright is that the discovery of the difficulty of their task, and the discovery that different editorial decisions made by them might have deeply different philosophical implications for engagement with Wittgenstein, did not lead to sustained reflective discussion between them. In some cases issues were raised, especially by Rhees, but the overall dynamic is aptly characterized by von Wright when on 18th August 1988 he writes to Rhees and Anscombe: ‘It is much to be regretted that we never had a clear understanding . . . about the nature of the work we wanted to do with the Nachlass.’11 There were reasons for this restraint in editorial self-reflection. Factors external to an understanding of Wittgenstein would have played a role. The story of the posthumous editing begins in the early 1950s and its cultural centre of gravity is the University of Cambridge. This milieu was, it seems, at the time rather foreign to the idea that editors should be visible in their editions through multi-layered and lengthy philological commentary and philosophical interpretation.12 In the background we can sense the power of the avant-garde notion of philosophy that was in vogue in the early and midtwentieth century. It is typical of the philosophical mood in which Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright grew up, that G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, young Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and others were seen as thinkers who had liberated philosophy from impotent tradition and given it new vitality. What was fresh and new was important, and presenting it in a distilled form was the goal of all publishing, hence also of the publishing of Wittgenstein.13 However, the most forceful background factor that stood in the way of embarking on editorial self-reflection must have been Wittgenstein’s own attitude to such matters. In his writings Wittgenstein was remarkably restrictive in all referencing and in all discussion of how his work relates to work done by others. Wittgenstein was also perceived by the literary executors as working with little attention to, and even with little awareness and knowledge of, both the Western philosophical heritage at large and of the goings-on in contemporary philosophy.14 Moreover, Wittgenstein’s aversion to scholarly work of an interpretative nature would to Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright have served as an effective obstacle against discussing editorial challenges, policies and choices in prefaces or other publications. More fatefully, it also served, it seems to me, as a reason for the editors not to discuss with each other in any great detail the philosophical

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aspects of the challenges they faced and the alternatives that would have been possible.15 The fact that the ‘best writings on familiar philosophical topics’ approach dominated the posthumous publication history from 1951 to the 1990s is of fundamental importance. In consequence, Wittgenstein has often been seen as a rather conventional academic figure who authored works on easily recognizable philosophical topics. This is how Wittgenstein was created and, one might argue, this is what he has, to a large extent, become.16 The result is deeply paradoxical. In some sense the effort of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright was a tremendous success. The books they edited and published as works authored by Wittgenstein were overnight sensations in the academic world. On the other hand, this very form of success is in Wittgenstein’s case highly problematic. The psychiatrist Maurice O’Connor Drury, one of Wittgenstein’s first students when he took up lecturing in Cambridge in 1930, was a close friend of Wittgenstein. He tells us that Wittgenstein in deepest earnest warned him against becoming a professional philosopher, but he also wanted him never to give up serious thinking (Drury 2019: 90). In an oft-quoted passage, Drury wrote that one reason why he wanted to write and publish some of his impressions of Wittgenstein was that Wittgenstein at the time found his reception primarily in a world alien to him. ‘It would be,’ writes Drury, ‘a tragedy if well meaning commentators should make it appear that his writings were now easily assimilable into the very intellectual milieu they were largely a warning against.’17 What milieu did Drury have in mind? Some clues are given by Drury’s words that ‘Wittgenstein had a great horror of what Schopenhauer once described as “professorial philosophy by philosophy professors”.’18 Even though Wittgenstein was always in many ways an alien to university philosophy, he was also a Cambridge professor for some years. In a letter to von Wright Wittgenstein warned him sternly about Cambridge. ‘Cambridge is a dangerous place,’ he wrote, but he was also very active in promoting von Wright as his successor.19 Hence, it does not seem right to think that Wittgenstein, when he said to his physician’s wife, Mrs Joan Bevan, on his deathbed that his life had been a good one, that he would have implied that academic philosophy was not an important part of that good life (Malcolm, 1958: 100). But Wittgenstein was throughout his life deeply ambivalent about the worth of philosophy, whether professorial or not. His qualms need to be understood against the background of the complexities and ambivalences in his conception of philosophy and the role of philosophy in the reflective, critical formation of the self, community and culture. The more we think of Wittgenstein as an important philosopher, as one who has something original

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and important to say about what philosophy is and would need to be, or become, the deeper the existential challenge his struggle presents to anyone who today identifies him- or herself with the epithet of philosopher.

4. BEST WRITINGS VERSUS COMPLETE EDITION It only transpired gradually, in the course of many years, that the editors’ early agreement about basic editorial principles would not always pave the way for easy mutual decisions.20 In the correspondence we can see that the first challenge to the ‘best writings’ endeavour that becomes evident to the literary executors is the question of a complete edition. The idea of publishing everything in the Nachlass is already mentioned in the correspondence in 1965, but for a long time this notion lies idle.21 Hence, when the literary executors are approached in the 1970s by scholars who wish to produce electronic transcriptions of the Nachlass, they see such transcriptions as a tool merely for archival research.22 It is only after the mid-1970s that an agreement gradually emerges between Anscombe and von Wright that their goal is to bring out a ‘complete edition’. Rhees was also at first, in the 1970s, positive to the idea of a complete edition, but later he grew rather sceptical.23 However, when the editors considered what we may call ‘the everything question’ it soon appeared that it was a can of worms. Where can we draw the line between what, in all that Wittgenstein wrote and in what we know about what he said and did, does and what does not belong to his philosophy or is relevant for understanding it? Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright never discussed the issue systematically, but various issues came up at different times. The first issue that surfaced in the correspondence was the question how to deal with repetitions, variations and changes in the manuscripts and typescripts. Later many more topics arose, including the question whether letters, lecture notes, dictations, notes taken by close collaborators under the instruction or close guidance of Wittgenstein, notes in diaries, notes in plain text only or also notes in code, memoirs and memories from conversations belong to ‘everything’?24 What are the criteria? I will consider two issues. For a philosopher who said, ‘philosophy was my life’,25 how can we best define how what we might classify as personal, or as private, is related to what we think of as philosophical in what he wrote and said and what was philosophical in his life? Anscombe famously commented in a letter to Engelmann: ‘If by pressing a button it could have been secured that people would not concern themselves with his [Wittgenstein’s] personal life, I should have pressed the button.’26 But even so, Anscombe did not object to the engagement of Rhees and von Wright in publishing letters, memoirs and

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other material in which the personal plays a large role. Rhees edited a book with personal recollections of Wittgenstein (Rhees ed., 1981), but his interest in doing so was of a particular kind: he thought such materials might be helpful for the understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to those who have a serious interest in it. He severely condemned the attention paid to Wittgenstein’s personal life that was not driven by such an interest.27 Moreover, Rhees did not think all personal information would be philosophically relevant. He once commented that he was sure that Wittgenstein would have objected to the idea of having a plate with his name on a house where he had lived. In another letter, which Rhees shared with von Wright, he objected to Kristóf Nyíri about his plan to publish a dream report by Wittgenstein.28 Von Wright was also ambivalent. In an early biographical sketch, published with a memoir by Norman Malcolm, von Wright writes that ‘the idea that someone was collecting data for a biography would certainly have been deeply distasteful to him [Wittgenstein]’.29 Nevertheless, like Rhees, von Wright did think there were inner connections between life and work in Wittgenstein’s case. This explains why he was active in presenting and promoting the publication of materials about Wittgenstein’s life, which may be seen as illuminating the person rather than his philosophy, despite his early acknowledgement of Wittgenstein’s attitude to such undertakings. (Malcolm 1958, von Wright 1958, NB 1961, Engelmann 1967, CLF 1969, Wittgenstein 1973, Wittgenstein 1974b, von Wright, ed. 1990 and CC 1995.) Von Wright’s conviction that in Wittgenstein’s case it is impossible to sort out the philosophically irrelevant personal from ‘everything’ that is of relevance is already clear in the biographical sketch. He writes there that ‘the work and personality of Wittgenstein will provoke varying comments and different interpretations . . .. In Wittgenstein many contrasts meet . . . anyone who tries to understand Wittgenstein in his rich complexity’ must see any one-sided interpretation as a falsification.30 But, as in Rhees’s case, von Wright was also to some extent protective, as we can see in his changing views about the remarks by Wittgenstein written in code. At first, von Wright judged them to be to such a degree personal and external to Wittgenstein’s philosophy that he wanted them to be known and available only to serious scholars through archives. Later, when the editors had been blamed for keeping materials secret, and the coded remarks were already widely circulated and discussed, von Wright did agree to making the coded remarks available to all, as happened with the Bergen Electronic Edition.31 The ambivalences in the views of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright on the relevance of the personal / philosophical distinction for the idea of publishing everything takes us to fundamental issues in debates about the self-understanding of philosophy. Judgement about what, in Wittgenstein’s case, belongs and what does not

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belong to everything will necessarily involve controversial judgements about what philosophy is and to what extent interest in Wittgenstein and interest in his philosophy are separable.32 But other topics that in the correspondence troubled the literary executors carry philosophical weight too. The more we think that the core of philosophy is ‘thinking’, understood perhaps as the exercise of a non-personal, rational faculty that takes the form of a systematic argument towards a thesis or positions on well-defined topics, the less likely will it seem that Wittgenstein materials coming from conversations or personal letters would be essential to an ‘everything’ publication. The more we see philosophy as happening between people who engage with and react to each other, the more we are likely to take an interest in dictations, lecture notes, diaries, letters, reminiscences and reports from conversations as relevant to it. So, underlying differences in philosophical commitment about how we each understand philosophy will, in interplay with the differences in understanding what philosophy was for Wittgenstein, play a role in our judgement about the value, in a complete edition, of other texts than texts written by Wittgenstein when he was working on his own. The issue can be illustrated by the following case. Von Wright once asked Anscombe to consent to the publication in Finnish of a volume of Wittgenstein translations that would include ‘the Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief and . . . the lecture on ethics, the notes on Frazer and the paper of cause and effect which appeared in Philosophia’. Anscombe responded quickly. Her letters would rarely have sustained discussion of editorial principles but now she argues pointedly and at some length that Cyril Barrett’s notes from lectures must ‘not appear as one of a series of publications of Wittgenstein’.33 The exchange shows that Anscombe was in this case much more alert than von Wright was to the philosophical stakes that were involved. Von Wright did not come back to the matter, but in his practice he later followed Anscombe’s line. Their joint understanding of what should be included in what von Wright called ‘the complete printed edition of the Nachlass’ was from then on that only Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts should be there.34 There is to my knowledge no later discussion between the literary executors of the relevance for the Wittgenstein corpus of letters, lecture notes, personal memoirs and second-hand information about what Wittgenstein said.

5. THE ‘PART II’ QUESTION AND THE ‘WORK’ QUESTION. IS THE PI A WORK BY WITTGENSTEIN? The PI is widely regarded as the most definitive testimony of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical views. Since the 1960s some questions concerning

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editorial interventions and historical incidents that define the PI as the world has known it have attracted attention. The biggest controversy has been about what in the first 1953 edition, and in all later editions overseen by Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright during their lifetimes, was called part II of the PI. The discussion about part II owes a great deal to the fact that von Wright, in 1982, thirty years after the first publication of the PI, and again twice after that, in his publications raised concern about presenting it as a work with two parts.35 Von Wright’s essay ‘The Troubled History of the Philosophical Investigations, Part II’ (von Wright 1992) was discussed in the correspondence between him and Anscombe. Anscombe is only mildly critical. Her main concern is not about the substance of von Wright’s essay but about his use of the word ‘troubled’ in the title, which, she thinks, may not help to bring interesting issues into focus.36 In their editorial note to the 1953 edition of the PI, Rhees and Anscombe had originally justified the two parts idea with a rather inscrutable reference to Wittgenstein’s intentions. Von Wright was curious about the evidence for their reported justification. On this matter, Rhees once wrote to von Wright that when he visited Wittgenstein in Dublin in December 1948–January 1949 Wittgenstein was working on a ‘revision’ of ‘Part II’, saying that he wanted to use it for revisions of part I adding: ‘But he [Wittgenstein] did not explain just which parts of the “Part I” manuscript’ he wanted to replace with the new material. Later Rhees comments: ‘I might guess “in the blue” that he wanted to use them in re-writing, say, the last one hundred and fifty §§ of part I.’ Similarly, Anscombe informs von Wright that her view on the matter was based purely on what Wittgenstein said to her when she visited him in Dublin (this visit, too, was in 1948). Both von Wright and Anscombe note that the typescript on the basis of which ‘part II’ was printed did not yet exist at that time.37 Interesting for us is the nature of von Wright’s critical attention. He seeks to relate the reports from his colleagues to other evidence, especially to evidence about the dating of manuscripts and typescripts, which include remarks that are later published in the PI, part I. The critical attention he brings into play thus has no intrinsic relation to questions about interpreting and learning from Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In other words, von Wright approaches the part II question as if it were the kind of question that could best be decided, if indeed it is decidable at all, on the basis of two kinds of evidence: evidence concerning the external features of the texts and evidence concerning the author’s intention.38 In the letters, von Wright implicitly takes for granted that there is such a thing as a certain work by Wittgenstein, the PI, and that what was published as its part II is a candidate for belonging to it.39 Rhees and Anscombe seem to find von Wright’s approach to the matter natural. At least they do not object. Their silent

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agreement reflects a larger, implicit consensus, that informs the creation of Wittgenstein as accomplished by his original literary executors. This brings us from the particular case of the status of part II to the general question of works by Wittgenstein. Was he an author of works? And how important did he think communication though works, or books, is in philosophy? A major reason for assigning to part I of the PI a special, uniquely authoritative status among Wittgenstein’s writings is the fact that it seemed so self-evident to Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright to publish it in Wittgenstein’s name soon after his death. There are also philosophical grounds for seeing it as the most important key to his later philosophy.40 Nevertheless, it does not follow that it is innocent to regard it as a (philosophical) work by Wittgenstein; the notions of ‘work’, ‘philosophy’ and ‘author’ stand in a precarious relation in this case.41 Wittgenstein often talked with his friends about a book he was working on, about his book, and about its volumes. But he also often talked about his intention to destroy his writings and he is thought to have partly realized this intention at times.42 Wittgenstein’s qualms about publishing are sometimes brushed aside as interesting only from a psychological point of view. But we should also ask whether it is integral to Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy that his philosophical work and the book category, or work category, as well as his reluctance to publish in print at all, all stand in an uneasy relationship to each other. We may note, first, the following: We saw above that the claim that the PI is a ‘work’ with two parts is primarily based on what Anscombe and Rhees remember that Wittgenstein told them in 1948–1949. But their memory from those same conversations also gives one reason to claim that even the PI part I, is not in any standard sense a work by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein certainly did not complete it, and as Rhees emphasizes, he ‘could have no clue’ of what PI part I would have looked like if Wittgenstein would have realized his one-time intention of working what has been called part II into it, (or: into ‘it’).43 One purpose of the discussion below is to provide some resources for further discussion on this matter.

6. RUSH RHEES AND THE UNITY OF LOGIC AND ETHICS As noted above, Rhees was always more interested than Anscombe and von Wright were in the implications of editorial choices for the understanding of Wittgenstein. However, it was only after some twenty years that their differences in outlook became marked. To understand Rhees, I suggest it is useful to think of him as raising two interrelated sets of concern. He criticized the idea that the right way to edit would be to assume that we find in

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Wittgenstein’s writings investigations of separable topics – certainty, colour, mathematics, aesthetics, philosophy of psychology or mind and other topics – and that we can do justice to his work by selecting on a topical basis extracts of the writings and publish them as works by Wittgenstein. I will call the idea Rhees criticized ‘the separability idea’ or ‘the compartmentalisation idea’.44 The main advocate of this idea seems to have been Anscombe. Rhees’s other concern was about what we might call ‘the time of philosophy’. The first concern has caught the attention of scholars more than the second, the latter being of greater interest to me here.45 Both concerns together are, as I will suggest, helpful devices for bringing into focus some of Rhees’s views of what there is in Wittgenstein’s work that makes it unusual and challenging. Anscombe, and especially von Wright, looked at the physical manuscript and typescript items as the prime candidate units for publications.46 In stark contrast to this ‘external’, ‘synchronic’ or ‘documentary’ approach, Rhees’s editorial effort was guided by what we may call a ‘critical’, ‘reconstructive’ and ‘longitudinal’ or ‘diachronic’ idea.47 Rhees believed that we can only understand what philosophical work Wittgenstein undertakes at any specific time if we see how his work often goes back to and continues a movement of thought, an investigation, or several investigations that he has been engaged in before, and if we see how the investigations of seemingly disparate topics gain their direction from Wittgenstein’s comprehensive search for understanding of himself. Rhees also believed that Wittgenstein’s understanding of what such a comprehensive search needed to consider and what kind of search it would have to be – that is, his conception of subjects, methods and aims in philosophy – developed and that the understanding of its development could not be served by looking at external criteria.48 Obviously, views on these matters must involve ambitious and controversial interpretations of what Wittgenstein was concerned with and how his selfunderstanding evolved, and would hence be fundamentally at odds with the notion that the editing of Wittgenstein could be a neutral, or perhaps, a ‘naked’ enterprise.49 Arguably, the discrepancies between the approach of Anscombe and von Wright on the one hand and Rhees on the other, reflect a deep difference in their understanding of the role of philosophy, as Wittgenstein practised it and as Rhees wanted to practise it, in our lives. Philosophy was for Anscombe and von Wright not at the heart of their search for answers to the morally and existentially most fundamental questions in life. Anscombe held religious convictions that were not answerable to philosophy.50 Von Wright was throughout his life strongly inclined to think that basic features of our worldviews, including questions about meaning and the good and about moral norms and political views, do not rest on a cognitive content that could be the

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subject of rational deliberation.51 Hence, both Anscombe and von Wright thought that although philosophical work could make our concepts clearer it would in fundamental moral matters always stand in debt to semantic resources that were external to it. That is one reason why a ‘professorial’ understanding of philosophy was, arguably, not alien to them, and why they did not share Drury’s alarmism about giving Wittgenstein to the professors. Rhees’s views were closer to those of Drury than to those of Anscombe and von Wright.52 To him, any clarification in Wittgenstein’s philosophy from any one time, directed at any individual matter, could only be seen in the right light if we could also see it as one aspect of Wittgenstein’s constant struggle with the most fundamental and pressing questions in his life. For this reason, Rhees’s work was already in the 1960s, as well as later, guided throughout by the effort to lay bare the unity between what Wittgenstein studied, how he studied what he studied and what motivated his search. To Rhees, understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy would always have to involve reflection on what made the problems Wittgenstein worked on worthy of his attention; on what made these problems problems for him. I call this ‘the unity of logic and ethics idea’.53 The notes below try to give some content to this abstract notion. The point is not to show that Rhees was in the right in all respects, but rather to bring attention to how Rhees helps us see in Wittgenstein’s work challenges that have not been made easy to see by Anscombe’s and von Wright’s editorial interventions. In a way, Anscombe and von Wright also have a notion of a unity of logic (conceptual clarification) and ethics in Wittgenstein. They both thought that the idea of philosophy as therapy encapsulated something that was new and radical in Wittgenstein’s views. Nevertheless, in their hands Wittgensteinian therapy becomes a method of finding out in the case of well-defined individual conceptual problems how the idea of the problem is based on illusions of sense. Problems are solved, or dissolved – the distinction does not really matter – one by one and positions are arrived at. The only new twist as compared with traditional problem-solving philosophy is that the positions are positions about where there is sense and where there is no sense rather than positions about where there is truth and where there is falsity. One way of expressing what goes missing here is to introduce a distinction between two ways of understanding the idea that an important contribution from Wittgenstein is that he shifts the attention of philosophers from questions about truth to questions about sense or meaning. On the first, ‘binary’ understanding, in therapeutic philosophy we want to know what makes sense, or has meaning, and what does not make sense, does not mean anything. The second way of relating to, or working with, the notion of a

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shift from the search for truth to the search for meanings as an important element in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is to see it as an invitation to think of meaning as something that has qualities and depth, rather than as something that is there or not there.54 Consider just one well-known example. When Wittgenstein writes, at PI 371, that ‘Essence is expressed by grammar’ the remark can be seen as part of an effort to show that there is, or is not, such a thing as the essential meaning of our words, or the essence of what words refer to, that philosophy aspires to get right. Another way of making sense of the remark is to read it as contribution to Wittgenstein’s evolving effort to relate constructively to philosophical tradition and to take care, in his own original way, of the idea that philosophy aims at metaphysical insight.55 Anscombe and von Wright both present the Wittgensteinian idea of philosophy as therapy as a search for an understanding that makes our problems go away completely when we see that where we thought we saw a problem we were misled by nothing but an illusion.56 We might see an ethical dimension in the binary idea of philosophy as therapy: when a problem is dissolved an unrest in our soul goes away and then a moral relief has been achieved, but of a ‘punctual’ kind. It was a part of the self-understanding of Anscombe and von Wright that they did not see any major difference between their binary and punctual idea of the aims of therapeutic philosophy and a different conception according to which Wittgenstein’s philosophy aims at an evolving, enriching and deepening understanding of meaning.57 I believe that Rhees saw the matter differently. For him the difference between these two approaches to what the shift from the search for truth to the search for meaning implies was of great importance. The fact that he could not bring Anscombe and von Wright to share, or even understand, his view created an acute sense of an intellectual difference, but also of a moral distance, between him and his colleagues. That this experience was, at times, a source of pain, at least for Rhees, comes out plainly when he writes to von Wright, soon after they have met: ‘It was a good thing that we could meet. The meeting left me feeling depressed and gloomy, and probably it was the same for you. We meet so rarely . . . and we look on the work in such different ways, that no one of us can understand the conceptions and reactions of the others.’58 What did Rhees have in mind? One suggestion is that Rhees wanted to make visible how all of Wittgenstein’s work has a moral motivation and force. Rhees writes to von Wright: You will agree that you cannot tell anyone what philosophy is, if he has never been near enough the water to get his feet wet. And it is impossible to tell anyone what Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is, if he has

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made no long or serious study of what Wittgenstein has written. It would have been impossible for Wittgenstein himself to do this. And the remarks in that section of Typoskript 213 [the ‘Philosophie’ section] can have force or sense only against the Hintergrund of the philosophizing which Wittgenstein does, or has done. Wittgenstein used to say something in this sense to people who wanted to come to his lectures. It is why he used (for example) to speak of the work of philosophy as the work of changing one’s way of looking at things, durch lange Übung.59 Why would long practice play any role in philosophy? One aspect has to do with the distinction between being told what is true and understanding the justification or grounds of the truth. To the extent that there is an intrinsic relation between understanding how a truth or insight is arrived at and what the insight is, philosophical practice has to do with the quality, or depth of the understanding.60 A weighty topic; but more than that may be at stake. One of the deepest differences between Rhees’s understanding of Wittgenstein and the therapeutic understanding shared by Anscombe and von Wright is, it seems to me, that to Rhees a study of conceptual problems will typically not be a matter that can be concluded. My understanding of, say, our capacity to understand, misunderstand and fail to understand ourselves and each other may be helped if I see why, on certain occasions, the notion of logic as something sublime, or of a ‘something’, perhaps a beetle in a box that another person has and cannot show, leads me astray: how it is false, or ‘false’.61 It is part of human life that we are sometimes transparent to each other or suddenly revealed to each other, perhaps in love or joy, in shame, despair or sorrow. The sense of transparency here is moral. We can ‘see’, or know, or recognize, or report that we are being excluded or left alone, or left behind, or cared for, or longed for, or loved. One aspect of what we then ‘see’ is the weight of it. The dramatic cases are the easiest to recognize: When Cordelia in King Lear sees, through her tears, the moral corruption of her sisters and father, she sees the beetle they might have wanted to keep secret and which they may have thought they can keep secret. Perhaps she knows their qualia (if that term can be made sense of) better than they do themselves?62 But unless the truth of the notion of the inner and private, or of the sublime nature of logic, the real needs that these notions answer to, is also recognized, we will not understand why in other cases the image of the beetle, or the study of family-likeness between rules in logic and in ordinary language, will not help us; why there is often a problem with, for instance, recognizing the relative weight in any given case of betrayal and indifference. It is only if a philosophical problem that troubles us has very few roots and repercussions in our lives, that a therapeutic

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discovery will be a result that will in any simple or straightforward way make us safe from surprise. The Übung Rhees has in mind is not only needed in order to understand the possibility or impossibility of, say, giving sense to the ideas of a private language, or absolute correct rule-following, or the notions of logical and moral necessity. It is also needed in order for us to understand how the role played by justification in these matters may alter our view of what it is that the justification in philosophy is about – how it may alter our idea of what word meaning is; what we search for when we study the meaning of words.63 A further aspect of why Rhees might have insisted on Übung as necessary for getting to what is important in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is the personal nature of philosophical problems.64 Readers may be brought to philosophy by questions and problems in their lives which are different from the ones that made philosophical work important for Wittgenstein. If so, readers may learn from a study of how Wittgenstein worked on his problems how they might work on their own questions (Rhees, 1974: 76f.). Rhees wanted to represent Wittgenstein as an author to whom philosophical problems are such that we may only come to terms with them by pursuing at different times different approaches to them, seeing new connections, placing them in new contexts, making them speak to examples and discourses the relevance of which we may only be able to arrive at when our imaginations have been enriched in ways we could not have expected or guessed at before. To concretize, we may think here of the controversy between Rhees and Anscombe and von Wright over the relation between Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’ (LE), and what has been published as ‘Remarks on Frazer’ (RF) and On Certainty (OC). If we think that these give access to separable investigations we will get a different notion of the relation between Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer as being ‘much more savage than most of his savages’ and the notion of ‘hinge propositions’ in OC than we do if we think of them as closely related.65 In the former case it will, for instance, be easier than in the latter case to think that Wittgenstein would later on, in the light of the insights arrived at in OC, withdraw his notion that Frazer is more primitive than the primitive people he writes about. Or, to put the point more generally: If we think of OC as separable from RF it is easier to read OC as a pamphlet advocating cultural relativism about moral worldviews and cosmologies than if we read it as standing in continuity with the morally engaged nature of RF, in which curiosity, respect and an effort to learn from those foreign to us is a key concern.66 The general question of the unity between theoretical and moral concerns arises in the correspondence primarily in relation to the editing of RFM. Anscombe and von Wright worry that the book has not been well received

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among specialists. Rhees cuts discussion short, noting sharply: ‘I will repeat only that if someone like Kreisel should say that in suggestions like these Wittgenstein is trying to do what he ought to have left to mathematicians – then he would show that he had not grasped what Wittgenstein was up to. Wittgenstein was not pretending to do mathematics.’67 What, if anything, is the point of Rhees’s implied distinction between work in mathematics and work on something else, let us call it the ‘foundations of mathematics’? One way of approaching the matter is to ask whether, and in what sense, the notes on logic and the discussion of natural numbers in the PI are, or are not, related to human, moral concern. The question takes us, as I wish to suggest, to the heart of Rhees’s differences with Anscombe and von Wright about editing, and also to an aspect of Wittgenstein that Rhees more than most interpreters was alert in observing and wanted to bring out. The topic is, again, huge. I will provide a few remarks on the matter, first with close reference to how Rhees formulates his concern in letters (i) and then in two separate subsections (ii–iii) with reference to mainstream debates in Wittgenstein scholarship.68 (i) In trying to explain, in letters to von Wright, his preference for editions which integrate writings on seemingly different topics and from different times, one theme which Rhees often puts forward is Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following. Rhees draws attention to the close contact between Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following in mathematics and in language. He also emphasizes, again and again, the interconnectedness of the separability theme and the time-of-philosophy question. Here is one example: Rhees discusses the relation of his editing of PB to the discussion of whether to publish the Big Typescript as it is, and to related matters. He goes into great detail about the genealogy (date and ms. source) of various remarks, which he has published as two separate appendices to PB, with the titles ‘Komplex und Tatsache’ and ‘Der Begriff der Unendlichkeit in der Mathematik’. He also worries that his presentation of the details of the genealogy will make it difficult for von Wright to see ‘the wood for the trees’. The wood he wants to present, or at least some aspects of it, is explained as follows: I will only mention, without discussing it, an obvious point in which Komplex [‘Komplex und Tatsache’] bears on the double essay on Das Unendliche [‘Der Begriff der Unendlichkeit in der Mathematik’]. . . . Throughout this essay we find developing a new conception of einer Regel . . . and new developments in the conception of logical analysis; in the conception of the Anwendung mathematischer Ausdrücke, and in the

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relation of such expressions zur Wirklichkeit. . . . This was on the way towards the newer conception of Grammatik. . . . My point is here that ‘Komplex und Tatsache’ shows one of the developments which was particularly influential in this change. . . . he could no longer talk about Übereinstimmung mit der Wirklichkeit in anything like the old senses of Abbildung and Projektion. . . . It went also with the recognition of what had been wrong in the way he spoke of Elementarsätze in the Tractatus. Russell’s and Frege’s accounts of the relation of mathematics and reality; the danger of falling into the cruder formulations of the Formalist position; the faults in Russell’s account of possibility and its relation to actuality; the way Frege works with ‘identity’ . . . these questions had occupied Wittgenstein from the beginning and continued to do so . . . . Witness for instance his later discussion of: Whether there could be a people who had an applied mathematics without a pure mathematics. – This was part of his discussion of the relation between grammatical propositions and material propositions: his idea, in his later years, that there was not a sharp distinction between them.69 The letter contains much food for thought. In the passage I quote we see, among other things, Rhees’s concern with the long time over which Wittgenstein’s views on identity, logical analysis and logical form, and other topics in the philosophy of logic and mathematics develop. Rhees not only links the interpretation of the material on ‘Komplex und Tatsach’, which was written in 1931, to the work leading to the Tractatus in the 1910s. He also stresses that the material sheds light on the gradual shift to views which crystallize in Wittgenstein’s conceptions of grammar in his ‘later years’. (Interesting for the present context is, for instance, that when Rhees claims that the later Wittgenstein did not distinguish sharply between material and grammatical propositions, his claim fits what I here have called the nonbinary idea of philosophy as therapy better than it fits the binary idea.) We also see how the longitudinal interest is intimately linked to the separability question. When Rhees in the same letter continues ‘any such discussion of “grammatical rules” bore on his way of thinking about mathematical proof ’, we see how, to Rhees, our understanding of Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar, which has often been placed centrally in interpretations of his later philosophy of language and its relevance for moral philosophy (and, arguably also for political philosophy70), can benefit from a study of Wittgenstein’s work on the philosophy of logic and mathematics. Similarly, but more pointedly, Rhees comments in the following year on von Wright’s draft for a preface to OC:

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You say in the first paragraph: “In the middle of 1949 . . . .Malcolm aroused his interest in Moore’s ‘Defence of Common Sense’ . . . This book contains the whole of what Wittgenstein wrote on this topic from that time until his death.” . . . I think this is very misleading. And it may prevent people from recognizing the constant connexions between these remarks and his earlier discussions.71 These and many other places in the letters very clearly bring out how important it was to Rhees to fight the ‘separability’ idea of Wittgenstein’s work and how a longitudinal time perspective is required to make his opposition clear. It is more difficult to bring into sharp relief the many ways in which these same concerns are integral to what I call Rhees’s unity of logic and ethics idea, but I will illustrate my proposal by providing two further quotes from letters. When von Wright informs Rhees that he is about to bring out a volume with letters from Wittgenstein ‘to his Cambridge friends’, Rhees writes back: We could read the last two sentences of this letter [from Russell to Wittgenstein72] as an expansion of Wittgenstein’s answer to Russell when he was pacing up and down Russell’s room about midnight, and came in saying, ‘When I leave this room, I am going to commit suicide.’ He then started pacing up and down the room, without saying anything at all. Russell sat quiet for about three quarters of an hour, and then he asked, ‘Wittgenstein, are you thinking about your sins, or about logic?’ ‘Both’, said Wittgenstein, and went on pacing. – Russell told me this as an amusing anecdote. . . . I have not read Russell’s autobiography, but I would guess he tells the story there. . . . This idea of mit mir Selbst in’s Reine kommen, is one that recurs again and again in Wittgenstein’s reflexions on Lebensfragen or personal matters. . . . I do not think the idea will mean much to most English readers. If it does not, then English readers will get a very fragmentary idea of him and his writings.73 It is not obvious what Rhees has in mind here. But one aspect is the intimacy between his work in philosophical logic with what was deep, and perhaps to many of his readers alien, in his personal moral struggle. The same notion of this intimacy is touched upon in later letters, as, for instance, when Rhees writes to von Wright: ‘He [Unseld] suggested printing the Lecture on Ethics . . . in the same volume with Über Gewissheit. At first I thought it incongruous. On second thought, I was inclined to think it a good idea. . . . the volume containing the Lecture and the remarks on Gewissheit would be a better

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introduction to Wittgenstein’s way of thinking then either of them alone could be. In particular, I should welcome a corrective to the idea that his views on ethics can be understood without seeing them in relation to his views on logic or philosophy.’74 (ii) We may think here, also, of the relevance of Rhees’s views with respect to the difference between Kripke’s and Cavell’s Wittgenstein. Kripke’s philosophical engagement in his Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language (Kripke 1982), revolves around the idea that if not even plus can be distinguished safely from quus, no epistemic foundations are safe and relativism is invincible. In contrast, Cavell invites us to consider how Wittgenstein’s rule-following discussion gives us an opportunity to see how the human condition involves a dialectic between a search for certainty and the acknowledgement of fallibility (Cavell 1979). The difference between the perspectives can be illuminated in view of what I have called the difference between the binary and non-binary reading of Wittgenstein’s idea of philosophy as therapy and its implications for the moral valency of the idea that trust in reason is endangered by radical doubt. When we come from the binary reading, the perspective we easily assume is that Wittgenstein’s investigation stands in the Cartesian tradition of searching for a philosophical safeguard against radical doubt.75 Thus, for Kripke, the discussion of plus and quus is framed as a search for unassailable correctness in rule-following, which stands in continuity with the search for infallible inference, and, thereby, with the search for a centre of all possible rationality. Kripke thus interprets Wittgenstein as one who is searching for, and perhaps undermining our belief in, something that would fulfil the dream that has haunted Western philosophy since Parmenides, namely of finding through a use of pure conceptual argument access to a realm of being, or form of knowledge, that is free from the risks that belong to timely existence and the burden of responsibility for one’s judgement.76 When seen from another perspective, suggested by Cavell, the same investigations by Wittgenstein also include a critical interrogation of the metaphysical idea of logical or conceptual necessity as a foundational realm of a higher order. In the first kind of questioning we ask: How can we understand the idea of the crystalline purity of logical inference? In the second we ask: How can we understand the (moral?) idea that the study of that purity, of (transcendent?) logical necessity, takes us close to something of greatest importance? It is only when these two questions are brought to bear on one another that further questions arise and come to life concerning the intrinsically moral nature of the idea of pure reason and about why the word ‘necessity’ seems to have three faces; the face of laws of nature, of logical truth and of moral duty, and about what

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follows for someone who searches for a good life and self-determination from all this. (iii) Another way of linking Rhees’s anti-compartmentalist and longitudinal views to well-known later discussions in Wittgenstein scholarship is, I want to suggest, to bring them to bear on Wittgenstein’s discussion of Frege’s notion of exactness. In the PI Wittgenstein interrogates Frege’s idea that an area that does not have a sharp boundary is not really an area at all. He draws attention to the many uses of the word ‘exact’, some of which are mathematical and some not.77 One lesson is that we will get a different perspective on what exactness is, or, on what the word means, if we think of a Fregean ‘mathematically idealized’ use of the word as (i) paradigmatic and as normative for other uses than we get if we think of the different uses as (ii) complementary, implying that there is no normative hierarchy or transitivity between different contexts, or if we think of (iii) a nonmathematical ‘everyday’ use of the word ‘exact’ as primary and all other uses as derivative. The more we think that mathematical reason carries, or ought to carry, authority in our civilization or way of life, the more are we likely to be attracted by the first of these options. However, when we see this, we also see that the authority we want, then, to invest in mathematical reasoning is invested there for moral reasons, and hence open to critical investigation from that perspective.78

7. VON WRIGHT AND THE UNITY OF WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS AND HIS CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY I noted above that von Wright by and large seconded Anscombe’s vision of ‘naked’ and ‘compartmentalised’ editing. It seems to me right to say that editing of Wittgenstein that realizes this vision has the effect of ‘domesticating’ Wittgenstein; of making his writings easier to receive in standard analytic, academic philosophy than they become when they are edited along the lines preferred by Rhees. Nevertheless, even if von Wright did not feel at home in addressing the ‘Rheesean’ unity of ethics and logic idea, through some of his editorial work he in fact promoted an interest in it.79 A similar, but even more pronounced tension between von Wright’s Anscombean ‘domesticating’ editing of the Wittgenstein materials, and the ways in which he as editor has also paved the way for more transgressive and less narrowly academic, or ‘professorial’, interpretations of Wittgenstein, is evident in the case of the VB / CV. Von Wright’s work as its editor is his most personal and radical contribution to what in the present volume is called the

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creation of Wittgenstein. Two concerns were at stake for von Wright. Von Wright wanted to show to the world Wittgenstein’s artistic, and hence more than professorial, genius by giving to the world what he sieved out from the Nachlass and presented as aphorisms by Wittgenstein.80 He also wanted to show Wittgenstein’s relevance for the critique of modernity and, thereby, for social and political philosophy. We may call the latter topic the question of the unity of logic and political philosophy in Wittgenstein’s work. Only that will be discussed here.81 Von Wright’s interest is prompted by changes in his own moral and intellectual profile. In the late 1960s von Wright again, after a gap of more than twenty years, steps forward as a public intellectual who engages in discussion on the social and political upheavals of his times.82 From the early 1970s onwards, von Wright adds to his interest in current political matters engagement in discussion of social and political philosophy with Charles Taylor, with Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas from the Frankfurt School, with Mihailo Markovic and Gaja Petrovic from the Yugoslavian Praxis group and others.83 It is when these elements in his own journey have become alive to him that von Wright decides to go back to the collection of general remarks he had distilled from Wittgenstein’s writings in the 1960s and proceeds to publish VB.84 Immediately after the book had been published, von Wright presented it to the second Wittgenstein conference at Kirchberg. The key topic of his presentation was the question of what I here call the unity of logic and political philosophy, or, to use von Wright’s terminology, the question of the relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his critical views of progress and modernity.85 Von Wright’s interest is keen, even intense, but his pronouncements are extremely cautious and ambivalent. In the opening paragraphs of his foreword to VB, von Wright introduces a distinction between general remarks and philosophical remarks and he claims that what the book presents is a collection of general remarks. The distinction is immediately obscured when von Wright goes on to describe his collection. He says he has selected and arranged ‘notes’ taken from Wittgenstein’s manuscript material, which he claims have the following traits; they are ‘autobiographical’, ‘about the nature of philosophical activity’ and about ‘subjects of a general sort’. These characterizations may easily give the impression that in von Wright’s view these notes are intrinsically not philosophical and, in particular, that they are not part of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This impression is reinforced when von Wright writes that the notes are ‘scattered among the philosophical texts’. But von Wright also writes that these same notes ‘do not belong directly with his philosophical works’, that the notes are in ‘the manuscript material’, and sometimes that

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they lose some of their force when they are taken from their context.86 Von Wright’s presentation is most convoluted. In the last section of the 1982 version of the essay von Wright read at the 1977 conference at Kirchberg, he writes that he has discussed ‘three aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought . . . the view that the individual’s beliefs, judgements, and thoughts are entrenched in unquestioningly accepted language-games and socially sanctioned forms of life . . . that philosophical problems are disquietudes of the mind caused by some malfunctioning in the language-games and therewith in the life of the community. . . . [and] Wittgenstein’s rejection of the scientific-technological civilization of industrialized societies.’ (von Wright 1982g: 215.) Von Wright claims that ‘it can hardly be denied that these three aspects are closely interconnected and deeply integrated in Wittgenstein’s intellectual personality’. He adds, with no explanation or justification, that ‘there is not much reason for thinking that they [the first and the third aspect] are connected’, except in Wittgenstein’s thought in which they were, von Wright writes, connected, but perhaps only for ‘historical and psychological reasons’. Such reasons von Wright characterizes as ‘accidental or contingent’. Moreover, von Wright insists that it is only if the connection between the first and the third aspect is not only historical, psychological, accidental or contingent but also conceptual that it is ‘relevant to the understanding of his [Wittgenstein’s] philosophy’. (Ibid. 215f.) Let us remind ourselves of the textual ground for von Wright’s discussion. It is VB, that is, the selection von Wright has made based on his notion that in Wittgenstein’s writings some notes are philosophical and others are general, and not, or not directly, philosophical. So, von Wright first produces a text, the VB, which builds fundamentally on the assumption that notes, which are stripped of their context, can be readily identifiable as not philosophical when they stand alone. He then asks whether these same notes, or some of them, namely the ones that address politically explosive questions about modernity and progress, are also philosophically relevant. But the problem – whether Wittgenstein’s philosophical work and his critique of the scientific-technological civilization of industrialized societies are separate endeavours – arises only because of the terms of discussion set by von Wright himself: Von Wright’s claims both that the notes he has selected for VB ‘are’ there ‘in the manuscript material Wittgenstein left behind’ and that they are ‘scattered among the philosophical texts’. So, he claims that in some sense they belong to the philosophical texts. But he also claims that they ‘do not belong’ to them ‘directly’.’87 Von Wright’s ambivalence is also his great merit. It is not clear how to apply distinctions such as general / philosophical, personal / conceptual or

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political / non-political in these matters. In our engagement with Wittgenstein, our fundamental tools for conceptual orientation and self-understanding are constantly challenged. Von Wright probably never settled the scores on how, or whether, philosophy and the critique of modernity are linked in Wittgenstein’s thinking, nor did he achieve clarity about the same question in his own thinking.88 However, it is one of von Wright’s lasting achievements to have drawn attention, by his editing of VB together with his essays on Wittgenstein and his times, to the fact that the question stares those of us who are so inclined in the face in Wittgenstein’s work and life. A case in point, highlighted by von Wright, is Wittgenstein’s remark about cars – a remark that may strike readers who live under the shadow of climate crisis as a dark premonition: The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual. Think of the use of the motor-car producing or encouraging certain sicknesses, and mankind being plagued by such sickness until, from some cause or other, as the result of some development or other, it abandons the habit of driving.89 Von Wright quotes the passage and comments: ‘The passage is impressive when quoted out of context. But it receives a new dimension when we read it in its own context.’90 Now, what is its ‘own context’ and what ‘new dimension’ does it there receive? We may follow von Wright and say: the context that is ‘its own’ is a discussion of set theory in the RFM. But is that right? To Wittgenstein the problem with set theory was the fantasy that often accompanied interest in it, according to which set theory would open doors to a new, correct understanding of the foundations of mathematics. This idea, the idea that we understand mathematics and other cultural practices better through a reductive analysis of their supposed single or narrow base, than by investigating the variety of language-games and practices in which what we call mathematics is involved, is, I think, one element of Wittgenstein’s critique. The critique is not of set theory but of mystifications of it. It is a critique of how set theory is thought to be relevant. Arguably, a false idea of its relevance is one pathology of modernity. If that is the case, then Wittgenstein’s discussion of set theory and of the modern dream of basing mathematics on something else, of reduction, is in itself a contribution to a self-criticism of modernity and an effort to see through and cure us from one of its pathologies. That is, however, not how von Wright saw things. His

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views are, in fact, quite paradoxical. He first claims that for Wittgenstein set theory was ‘a cancer rooted deep in the body of our culture’ (von Wright 1982g: 208), the scientific-technological civilization of industrialized societies that Wittgenstein criticizes in many remarks in VB. He then suggests that set theory, and also another key topic in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, behaviouristic psychology, are both ‘only symptoms of a sickness, not its cause. The cause is in the language-games and reflects in its turn the way of life.’ (Ibid.) He continues: ‘All the philosopher can do is to expose the disorder in the language-games, describe it . . . this intellectual cure . . . will have no important consequences of a social nature.’(Ibid. 208f.) There are two paradoxical elements in what von Wright writes. The first is direct and uncomplicated. Von Wright claims that Wittgenstein sees set theory both as a sickness (‘a cancer’) and as ‘only a symptom’ and, hence, not a sickness. The second is more complicated, leaving us with the diffuse picture that in interpreting Wittgenstein’s remarks on set theory three dimensions are relevant. One is Wittgenstein’s exposition or description of the language-game of set theory. The second element is that such exposition can serve as an intellectual cure that rids the mind of the individual practising philosophy from ‘torments produced by the unrecognized illness’. (Ibid. 209.) The third is the question how, or whether, the first and second element have social consequences. The idea that philosophical arguments have no connection to social practice is difficult to fathom.91 Von Wright’s claim is, of course, in line with Wittgenstein’s claim that the sickness of a time could not be cured by a medicine invented by an individual. But what is the status of such a claim? It is certainly a claim about politics and about how historical change happens, or how it does not happen; how historical change can not be explained. The claim could be studied for its meaning and its truth. Wittgenstein did not engage in such study – his remark strikes me as an outcry, not as an idea that caught his philosophical interest. In contrast, von Wright showed keen philosophical interest in the topic, as evidenced in his essays on Marx’s philosophy of history, which he wrote at the time when he was busy editing VB (von Wright 1978). To sum up, my claim is that von Wright’s statements about what is philosophical in Wittgenstein’s writings and what is not philosophical are not very clear. The same is true of von Wright’s remarks on the relation between Wittgenstein’s remarks on his times and his remarks on other topics. Nevertheless, von Wright discovered as integral to Wittgenstein’s philosophy a theme that Rhees and Anscombe were, it seems to me, mostly blind to and which, arguably, at least according to Socrates, is integral to all philosophical investigation. The theme is the relation between work on oneself, on how

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one sees things on the one hand, and interventions in social life on the other.92

8. A BLIND SPOT In the first remark in the Philosophical Investigations there is a quote from St Augustine followed by comments. How many voices, or points of view, are part of the dialogue that commences? What is Wittgenstein’s role and presence? And how does the next remark, PI 2, speak to the dialogue in PI 1? Interest in such questions has opened space for discussion of the philosophical relevance of the form of Wittgenstein’s writing in the PI. It is in this connection that some researchers have drawn attention to how important was the part played in the studies that are the basis for what was published as the PI, not only by writing and rewriting individual remarks, but also by arranging and rearranging the order between them. The effects can be of many kinds: that linkages between topics are made visible or hidden; contrasts, possible objections and alternative developments are brought into view; our confidence in an idea is stabilized or undermined and so forth. It is in relation to such studies that the words compose, composition, polyvocality and polyphony have found a place in Wittgenstein studies.93 These terms were rarely used by Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright. In fact, in their work as Wittgenstein editors they showed almost no interest in the possible philosophical relevance of Wittgenstein’s painstaking work on the arrangement and rearrangement of his writings – of his work on its form.94 The consequence is the single most remarkable lacuna in their work as literary executors: the lack of attention to the many ways in which the PI, which they always agreed has a privileged status in the Nachlass as an essentially completed masterpiece, is different in form from any other books they published in Wittgenstein’s name. Their discussion of the part II issue testifies to this lack. Their deliberations about what kind of work Wittgenstein might have done if he had realized the intention Rhees and Anscombe ascribe to him of working material from part II and further material into part I is limited to reports about the quality of the various materials, as if the quality would be what it is regardless of how the material is used or brought to life in the composition of a dialogue between multiple voices.95 What could be the philosophical relevance and value of such a polyvocal composition? Or what philosophically relevant differences could there be between a text that is composed as a dialogue between multiple voices as compared with one that is composed as a linear argument, or, let us say, as a dialogue between only the two voices Cavell once singled out, the voice of temptation and the voice of correction (Cavell 1969: 71). To see that

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compositional work is philosophically relevant, let us first simply remind ourselves of the remark about cars in RFM: following the suggestions by von Wright we can say that with the car in the picture the critique of modernity and the philosophy of mathematics become intertwined in RFM. One might respond that this intertwining would be there anyway. But is that so? Would St Augustine be there anyway, in the PI, had Wittgenstein not quoted him? Perhaps. And is there any connection between the role played by the composition of dialogue between multiple voices, Wittgenstein’s reluctance to publish and the changes in his conception of philosophy after, roughly, 1935? Perhaps some connections can be discerned. Consider Socrates. His philosophical practice consisted in nothing but polyvocal dialogue. Moreover, he did not leave any philosophical writings behind even though there is little doubt that he knew how to write.96 Why? The more we think that philosophy is an open-ended search about how we are willing to let the words we share with others – words we owe to them, receive from them and give back to them, as gifts and curses – guide us in our effort to live upright lives, the more integral what Vlastos calls Socrates’ ‘principle of sincerity’ becomes to philosophy.97 Arguably, you can only know what I mean with what I say, with what I claim in a philosophical investigation, if you know me, how I live, how what I say about the meaning of a word bears on my life. In written exchange between strangers this internal relation between what I put forward and how I live is difficult to discern. That difficulty is a difficulty in your understanding of me, of how I understand a particular concept. Hence, the suspicion that because, or to the extent that, the principle of sincerity is vital in philosophy, written communication between strangers cannot serve philosophy well. It has become a common perception that the most perfect exemplar of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and the fullest expression of what he wanted to achieve, is to be found roughly in the first 420 of the numbered remarks in PI, part 1. But that is problematic. Rhees once wrote to von Wright that Wittgenstein had told him that he was not satisfied with the parts we know as remarks 109–133, which are essential to what in the literature is often referred to as ‘the philosophy chapter’.98 Rhees also on another occasion notes ‘what a kick I got out of it’, when Wittgenstein read aloud to him in summer 1944, presenting a remark about the activity of butter as the last remark in the book he worked on.99 This very remark, remark 693, is what we now have as the last remark in PI part I. The last sentence of the remark is put in parenthesis. It reads: ‘(It would also be possible to speak of an activity of butter when it rises in price, and if no problems are produced by this it is harmless.)’ Why was Wittgenstein pleased to end his book like this?100

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Suggestion 1: Wittgenstein was happy to keep this ‘butter remark’ as an ending because of how it stands in dialogue with the Preface, and in it, in particular with the lack of any suggestion that the purpose and value of the work would have anything at all to do with the notion that philosophy, when successful, results in truth in the sense of correct ideas, arguments or theories. If that is at least part of what Wittgenstein speaks to when he speaks about the possible legitimacy of speaking of the activity of butter, possibly the butter remark serves as a reminder that philosophy when it engages you and me, and unknown others who are not now present, but who share our language and could be part of our conversation, is neither an engagement which must bring us to agreement, nor an engagement in which disagreement must tear us apart. It is also not an engagement that must come to an end. But it has the promise that, thanks to what we learn from it, you and I will allow each other, and other others, who are not present now, to better understand and appreciate what we take on board, what burden we accept to carry and what opportunities become available if we are ready to endorse, or reject, or leave open, the acceptability of speaking in such-and-such a way of, say, the secrets of one’s own mind, or of numbers, or essences, or of the activity of butter when its price rises. Suggestion 2: A side-effect of how remark 693 of the PI speaks to the Preface is how it speaks to Wittgenstein’s qualms about remarks 109–133. When judged from the perspective of the Preface it seems disappointing that these remarks are not meandering or do not travel criss-cross vast landscapes, they do not concern many subjects, and they do not leave as much as possible to the reader. They rather run the risk of being read (as has so frequently happened) as announcing truths about philosophy that readers can take on board, sparing them the trouble of thinking and arriving at judgements themselves.101 If we keep in mind how greatly other, later work by the literary executors has reinforced the notion that Wittgenstein can be read as a philosopher who produced treatises on separable topics and arrived at positions on these topics, this seems to serve as a fateful ground for missing out on Wittgenstein, at least to the extent that the integrated, open-ended, self-transformative dimensions of his work are essential to it. But when seen from the perspective also of remark 693 we may ask: how bad is that? If someone says that we learn from Wittgenstein that philosophy leaves everything as it is, or, that we learn how to solve or dissolve some particular problems of philosophy, and no problems are produced, then what he says is harmless. I will stop here: the point here is not to insist on any particular lesson to be taken from the notion that the composition of polyvocal, or polyphonic,

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dialogue added a new philosophical quality to Wittgenstein’s writings; a quality that has consequences for how we understand what kind, or kinds, of truth philosophy searches for and the ways in which we think about the worth of that search. The point is that the topic is legitimate and that Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright have not made it easy to discern.

9. ENLIGHTENMENT OPTIMISM: FROM SOCRATES TO WITTGENSTEIN Few great philosophers have been as ambivalent about the worth of philosophy as Wittgenstein. He famously ends the preface to his only ambitious publication, the Tractatus, with a memorable note on how little we should expect from philosophy for dealing with the real problems of life. After 1933 he did not publish in print at all. Midway between the intentions at times to publish his work in print and at times to destroy it, is his desire at times, mirrored also in one paragraph in the printed preface about for whom the PI is intended, merely to make a few copies of his work to give to select friends.102 Then, after Wittgenstein’s death, came Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright. Now, in view of Wittgenstein’s will, and in view of the understanding Wittgenstein must have had about their response to it, Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright could hardly not have published a fair amount of his writings. (That they were in their right to publish and, thereby, to contribute to the creation of Wittgenstein as they did is of course indisputable.) Nevertheless, one may wonder why they did not comment on the friction between their eagerness to publish and Wittgenstein’s hesitance about publishing. It appears to me that if we want to understand Wittgenstein, we need to understand how his qualms about whether to publish at all are intrinsic to some aspects of his understanding of what philosophy is and, in particular, about the worth of philosophy. It is possible to argue that we can characterize Socratic philosophy as a philosophy which is about the meaning of words, which does not seek and does not arrive at truth, which examines self and others in a many-voiced, friendly, dialogue between equals, which thereby is a form of caring for the conditions of rational existential and political self-determination, which is always open-ended and which, still, when it has all these features, realizes one form, perhaps the highest possible form, of human wisdom and perfection. It is possible to argue that Wittgenstein’s life, work and writings constitute a practice of philosophy that is in all these respects similar to our characterization of Socratic philosophy.103 There would be only one radical difference between Socrates and Wittgenstein, but over a most fundamental matter, namely enlightenment optimism. Wittgenstein urged Drury to leave academic philosophy and never give up serious thinking. Concerning the

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necessity of the latter, he was perhaps as convinced as Socrates was. But I don’t think he could have said, as Socrates did, that a life not spent examining oneself and others is not worth living.104 Arguably, this is so because we can sense a worry in Wittgenstein that could not have been there for Socrates. The worry is the worry of those who, like Horkheimer and Adorno (1979), arrive more than twenty centuries after Socrates. They look at what we have done and what we do, and at what has happened and is happening to Europe and to the now globally dominant Western civilization, when we have during all that time partly seen ourselves and each other as following through on Socrates’ proposal that we commit ourselves to enlightenment. Wittgenstein once expressed his view about the worth of this civilization by telling von Wright, shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, that for the decay of its civilization to be completed, Europe needed ‘not one, but two or three great wars’.105 106

NOTES 1. See Erbacher 2016 and Erbacher’s contribution to the present volume. 2. See the Table of posthumous publications by Wittgenstein edited by Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright in this volume. In his will Wittgenstein gave to Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright the task to serve as the executors of his literary remains. Henceforth I will in this article refer to them as the literary executors and also as editors of Wittgenstein. When other editors than any of the three are intended I will make this explicit. 3. Quote from a letter by von Wright to Rhees, 1 September 1984 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). The full sentence and the next read: ‘It is true that we have wanted to give Wittgenstein to the world in as “naked” a form as possible – without long introductions or learned comments. This has been right.’ Two questions invite themselves. One: what ‘world’ did the executors think Wittgenstein ought to be given to? And two: what, or who, is the ‘Wittgenstein’ that should be given? Should we read von Wright as really meaning, not any ‘world’, but the world of professional philosophy? And when von Wright in the letter writes ‘Wittgenstein’ does he really have in mind something more precise, namely ‘Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings?’ (See von Wright 1982a; 5.) From conversations with colleagues I know that it may seem natural that we fill in these or similar words – such as ‘the world of academic philosophy,’ or ‘philosophical writings, not personal writings’ –, as a matter of course, assuming that we are then true to a self-evident background understanding shared by Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright. My impression is that while there are things to be said in favour of such a tendency, there are also things that can be said against it, on both points. Three further quotes from the correspondence must here suffice to provide an indication of the kind of complexity both issues – the question of Wittgenstein’s audience and of what (or who) ought to be given to this audience – involve, and involved also for Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright. On 15 September 1983 von Wright writes to Anscombe: ‘I think one can say

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that, in the past, we did our best to make Wittgenstein’s posthumous writings accessible to the world of learning.’ (NLF, vWC 714.11–12.) The next year, on 26 June, he writes to Anscombe again: ‘Our moral task was to give Wittgenstein to the world so to speak and to make him known to and read by a wide public.’ (NLF, vWC 714.11–12.) On 25 July 1988 Rhees writes to von Wright: ‘I agree with you entirely that “we must not let our own financial concerns override our duties to make, in the best possible manner, his work available to the world”.’ (WWA, Wri-FC-006.) Emphasis added. 4. Despite the deep differences in approach between Rhees on the one hand and Anscombe and von Wright on the other, to be discussed below, Rhees always agreed with Anscombe and von Wright about keeping editorial commentary to a minimum. 5. From the correspondence I get the clear impression that especially Anscombe and von Wright were in their selection of texts for publication primarily guided by their rather intuitive sense of where in the writings they recognised what they deemed good. This kind of attention guided them more, it seems to me, than the idea that they would look, first, for writings that are especially relevant for some distinct philosophical theme and then select from this material on the basis of quality. A charming aspect of the correspondence is the enthusiasm, which often shines through, when Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright write to each other about their experience of reading the Wittgenstein materials. 6. Wittgenstein himself offered the only work in philosophy which he eventually published, the TLP, first to Karl Kraus’s publisher, Jahoda & Sigel, and then to Otto Weininger’s publisher, Braumüller, not to an academic press (von Wright 1982d: 77–94 and Monk 1990, chapters 7 and 8). On the other hand, Wittgenstein approached English academic publishers when, in 1938 and 1943, he considered publishing some of his later work (von Wright 1982e: 120–122). 7. Rhees’s idea that editing needs to be sensitive to the philosophical relevance of various choices and decisions, and that a key aim should be to shed light on the development of Wittgenstein’s thinking, or on his intentions, or on both matters, recurs in at least 46 of his letters to von Wright, from the early 1950s to the 1980s. 8. See the letter from Rhees to von Wright, 2 March 1952 (NLF, vWC 714.200– 201). For later expressions of this basic attitude, see for instance the letters from Rhees to von Wright, 10 August 1972 (WWA, Wri-FC-005), 16 March 1973 (WWA, Wri-FC-005) and 26 August 1982 (NLF, Wri-FC-006). 9. In the letters Anscombe is laconic about editing principles. She writes to von Wright (in an undated letter, probably from summer 1976, NLF, vWC 714.11– 12): ‘I don’t believe in editing’ and on 26 June 1976: ‘As you know, I favour minimal editing.’ (NLF, vWC 714.11–12.) In a letter dated 13 September 1967, Anscombe writes to von Wright that she thinks of what later becomes Über Gewiβheit/On Certainty (OC) as a single treatise on a single subject. (NLF, vWC 714.11–12.) On 16 September 1968 she suggests to von Wright that OC should be published on its own. (NLF, vWC 714.11–12.) On 21 September 1968 von Wright replies that this is perhaps right. (NLF, vWC 714.11–12.) A little later, on 10 March the following year, von Wright writes to Anscombe that he is ‘completely convinced’ that OC should be published as a separate book, as she has suggested (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). But in letters to Rhees from 9 and

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24 March 1970 (1970 WWA, Wri-FC-004) and again, on 24 May 1988, von Wright expresses his ambivalence about regarding OC as a work by Wittgenstein (WWA, Wri-FC-006). The editor’s Preface to OC, signed by Anscombe and von Wright, presents the problematic Anscombean view that OC was there, ready, in the Nachlass as a work. On this topic, see also the chapters by Westergaard, Backström and Jakola in this volume. 10. For the idea that manuscripts can be seen as completed works, see von Wright 1982a: 26 and numerous letters, for instance von Wright’s letters to Rhees, 31 January 1963 (NLF, vWC 714.200–201), 2 February 1974 (NLF, Wri-FC-005), 23 November 1983 (WWA, Wri-FC-006), 1 September 1984 (WWA, WriFC-006) and 24 May 1988 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). For von Wright’s very different approach in his work as editor of VB/CV, see Österman, chapter 8 in the present volume. 11. The letter is at WWA, Wri-FC-006. 12. The sparsity of references in the publications by Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright is another reflection of the Oxbridge spirit of the time, and perhaps also of Wittgenstein’s influence on them. Cf. Denis Paul’s book (2007), with its reports about Isaiah Berlin’s concerns about the executors handling of the Nachlass. 13. A similar ‘modernist’ spirit was characteristic of phenomenological and existentialist philosophy at the time. This spirit of course has a longer history with Descartes’ Discourse and Kant’s first critique as the most formidable examples. For relevant discussion of the characteristics of modernity, see Jauss 1970, Koselleck 1979, Habermas 1985, also Wallgren 1999. For discussion of Wittgenstein in his relation to modernism, see Matar (ed.) 2017. 14. Anscombe 2019 (1953): 231–235. Von Wright 1957: 226 and 1958: 15. See also Appelqvist (this volume.) 15. We do not know all of what was discussed when the literary executors met. But for corroborative evidence for my claims, see for instance the letter from von Wright to Rhees and Anscombe, 18 August 1988, quoted above and this later comment by von Wright on a seminar on the Tübingen project: ‘The topic of the seminar was Wittgenstein’s philosophy more than the publishing of his literary remains.’ (von Wright 2001a: 164). It is striking, from the point of view taken here, that von Wright even at this late stage takes for granted that discussion of the publishing of Wittgenstein’s literary remains and discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are separable. 16. Gadamer 1960 may still be the most important contribution to the kind of discussion of ‘effective history’ (‘Wirkungsgeschichte’) appealed to here. See also Lindén, J.-I., ed. (2019). 17. Quoted by Rush Rhees in Rhees 1981: ix from a ms. by Drury from 1966. 18. Drury, Contribution to a BBC Symposium on 12 January 1960, quoted from Drury 2019: 90. Cf. CV: 75. 19. Wittgenstein wrote: ‘I have no doubts that you will be a better professor than any of the other candidates for the chair. But Cambridge is a dangerous place. Will you become superficial? smooth? The passage in your letter which makes me feel particularly uneasy is the one about your feeling enthusiasm at the thought of teaching in Cambridge. It seems to me: if you go to Cambridge you

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must go as a sober man. . . . If I wanted to play providence I’d write you a lukewarm recommendation; but I won’t. I’ll write you as good a one as you can possibly wish for. For what can I know about the future.’ (Wittgenstein, letter to von Wright, 23 February 1948. Quoted from McGuinness, ed. 2008: 423.) 20. Some scholars have made the useful proposal that we think of the editorial history as proceeding in steps or rounds, rather than as a gradual learning process marked by increasing distance and, at times, disagreement between the literary executors. I think the different narrative constructions are complementary, but I will not discuss the matter. The first use of the term ‘rounds of publication’ may be in von Wright 2001a: 163. 21. On 2 April 1965, von Wright writes to Anscombe: ‘A new idea is gradually maturing within me: We ought to publish everything which is there (with the exception of the writings in code and some obviously worthless things).’ (NLF, vWC 714.11–12.) The first mention of a complete edition of Wittgenstein’s writings that I have come across is in a letter from Walter Boehlich at Suhrkamp Verlag to Rhees, dated 3 July 1962 (NLF, vWC 714.200–201). Boelich imagines that there could soon be a ‘Gesamtwerk’ in two volumes. 22. See, for instance, the letter from Anscombe to von Wright (without date, probably summer 1980, NLF, vWC 714.11–12) and von Wright to Anscombe, 2 August 1980 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). 23. Mentions of a ‘complete works edition’ are numerous in letters from von Wright to Anscombe in the 1980s. Some might think that publishing ‘everything’, for instance as in the Bergen Electronic Edition, would be a neutral, philosophically innocent, way of ‘giving Wittgenstein to the world’. Rhees would have nothing to do with such naivety. On 4 December 1982, Rhees writes to von Wright that he thinks editors should select, not publish everything. He adds: ‘I know you will disagree.’ (On 3 October 1984 Rhees writes to von Wright that disagreements about how to computerise the Nachlass go together with ‘deepseated and antagonistic convictions’ WWA, Wri-FC-006). I think neither Anscombe nor von Wright could have written that. Under pressure from Rhees von Wright hesitates. On 20 February 1988 (WWA, Wri-FC-006) he suggests to Rhees that the Norwegian project should aim only at a transcription stored electronically, not publication, and on 18 March 1988 (WWA, Wri-FC-006) he writes to Anscombe that even a perfect transcription, if there is such a thing, is not necessarily the text one wants to see in print. For detailed documentation of the history of the Bergen Electronic Edition, and for reflection on the question of the (non-)neutrality of any editing and publication from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and the novelties of various electronic editions and resources as compared with printed editions, see Pichler 2010, 2021a and 2021b. 24. See, for instance, the letters from von Wright to Rhees, 18 November 1968 (WWA, Wri-FC-004), Rhees to von Wright, 3 October 1978 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). 25. Von Wright 1993c: 152. (Translation by author.) In a letter to Mr Stoneborough from 8 April 1973 Rhees writes similarly: ‘His [Wittgenstein’s] work in philosophy was his life.’ (WWA, Wri-FC-005.) 26. Published in Engelmann 1967: xiv. For a longer quote from the same letter and a relevant discussion of Anscombe’s views, see Backström (this volume).

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27. When Bartley published a book (Bartley 1973) which claimed to portray Wittgenstein’s sexual practices and his own thoughts about them, Rhees’s objection, expressed in a letter to von Wright 25 June 1973 (WWA, WriFC-005), was to the tone of the presentation, not to its content. See also Rhees 1974. 28. Rhees to Kristóf Nyíri, 19 June 1980 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). See also Stern 2001. 29. Von Wright 1958: 5, fn 1. 30. Von Wright 1958: 22. Emphasis added in order to stress the relevance, also to von Wright, of the question of the distinction between understanding Wittgenstein and understanding his work. See also Tractatus remark 6.54 and Conant’s discussion of this remark in Conant 2002, and Österman (this volume, chapter 4). 31. For Anscombe’s and von Wright’s early views on remarks in code, see for instance von Wright’s letters to Anscombe, 28 April and 30 December 1966 (both letters at NLF, vWC 714.11–12). For discussion of the editorial views on the coded remarks, see Backström (this volume). 32. Drury 2019. See also Klagge (ed.) 2001, and Klagge 2011, and the biographies by McGuinness (1988) and Monk (1990). 33. Letters, von Wright to Anscombe, 7 March 1984 and Anscombe to von Wright, 14 March 1984 (both letters at NLF, vWC 714.11–12). 34. Quote from a letter by von Wright to Anscombe, 16 March 1984 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). The von Wright–Anscombe consensus later became the default assumption that directed both the editing of the Bergen Electronic Edition and the Wiener Ausgabe. In practice, the notion of a complete edition was defined as the writings listed in the von Wright catalogue (von Wright 1982c: 43–49). This means, for instance, that some dictations are included, but that most of the materials derived from Wittgenstein’s collaboration with Waismann, which have been published as volume 3 in the Suhrkamp ‘Werkausgabe’ of Wittgenstein’s works, are not in the Bergen Electronic Edition (von Wright 1982c: 37f. McGuinness 1984). The Skinner materials, which have recently been published (Gibson, A and N. O’Mahony (2020), ), were not known to von Wright. 35. Von Wright 1982e, esp. 135. See also von Wright 1992. Later von Wright laments that because of an operation and his convalescence after it, he could not participate with Rhees and Anscombe in work on the publication of the PI (von Wright 2001b: 7). 36. Anscombe to von Wright, April 15 1991 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12). See also the reflections on the part II issue in Backstöm’s contribution to this volume (ch. 7). 37. The quotes in this paragraph are from letters by Rhees to von Wright, 10 August 1972 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12) and Rhees to von Wright’s assistant Heikki Nyman, 28 July 1980 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). See also the letters by von Wright to Anscombe on 2 December 1980 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12) and 12 January 1991 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12), by Anscombe to von Wright, April 15 1991 (NLF, vWC 714.11–12), von Wright 1982e: 133–135 and Hacker and Schulte 2009: xxii.

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38. Von Wright 1992. Cf. von Wright 1982e and 2001c. 39. In his essay on the origin and composition of the PI, von Wright writes, more carefully, that ‘I lean towards the opinion that Part I of the Investigations is a complete work.’ (1982e: 136). But he adds that when part II and Zettel are considered, Wittgenstein’s ‘chef d’oeuvre . . . could also be thought of as a trilogy.’ (ibid.). 40. See, for instance: Cavell 1976 and 1979, Stern 1996 and 2004, Pichler 2004, Wallgren 2006b and 2020. 41. See McGuinness 2002, Pichler 2004, Rothhaupt 1996, Schulte 2005, Stern 1996, Venturinha (ed.) 2010. 42. Anscombe 2019 (1953): 225, Schulte 2001b: 78. Malcolm 1958: 58, von Wright 1982c: 37, Von Wright 1982e: 116, von Wright 1961: v. See also, for instance, the letter from Rhees to Mr Stoneborough, 8 April 1973 (WWA, Wri-FC-005) and letters from von Wright to Rhees, 18 November 1968 (WWA, Wri-FC-004) and 31 January 1978 (WWA, Wri-FC-006) for further reports about Wittgenstein’s desire to destroy his materials, including the 1942/43 version of the PI. 43. Quote from Rhees’s letter to von Wright’s assistant Heikki Nyman, 28 July 1980 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). 44. For examples of Rhees’s early interest, see his letters to von Wright 2 March 1952 and 2 November 1955 (both at NLF, vWC 714.200–201). The term ‘compartmentalisation’ was used by von Wright in a talk given in Helsinki in 1970. On this, see Jakola (this volume). There are dozens of letters from Rhees to von Wright in which he reflects on the philosophical reasons, criteria and consequences of various editorial choices. Rhees often comments on the difficulty, or impossibility, of doing justice to Wittgenstein’s thinking by presenting him as working on topics which are isolated from, or separable from, each other. To him, the right way, or better, the obvious way, in which an editor might do justice to Wittgenstein’s effort was to try to collect material in manuscripts from different times that together would shed light on how Wittgenstein’s thinking, his philosophical questions, ideas and method, developed over time. This theme is present in a great number of letters from Rhees to von Wright from 1952 to the 1980s. On 19 March 1970, Rhees reports to von Wright that Anscombe has commented on Rhees’s proposal to publish LE with OC, that LE could only be something tacked on to OC. Rhees comments: ‘I wonder . . . .’ (WWA, Wri-FC-004.) Another typical instance is Rhees’s letter to von Wright on 10 August 1972 (WWA, Wri-FC-005), where Rhees draws attention to the connection between the work published in OC and Wittgenstein’s reaction to a lecture by Russell in 1935, and suggests that the publication of OC as a separate item risks creating a false impression of the development of Wittgenstein’s thinking and conception of philosophy. 45. For the first of Rhees’s concerns, see the incisive and detailed studies by Jakola, Solin and Westergaard in this volume. I do not claim that the first concern is less important than the second. My suggestion is rather that attention to the second sheds additional light on why compartmentalisation is problematic, at least in Wittgenstein’s case. The topics are quite grand. Here is one aspect: the

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‘time’ notion that I bring in could be understood in terms of the tension between two ideas of the time of truth and thinking, especially as they have shaped the philosophical heritage in which Wittgenstein, rather half-heartedly, always also placed himself: the idea of truth and thought as timeless vs as unfolding in (existential? historical?) time. I think it is reductive of Wittgenstein to think that the orientation to life-world, practice, language-games, etc. that is prominent in his later thinking, and arguably important already in the Tractatus (the key remark is TLP 4.002; see also 4.026, 5.5563 and 5.473–5.4733), brings with it an exclusion of the ambition to get right in what sense we must understand philosophy, or thinking, as also concerned with the concepts of timeless truth and the absolute, not only with concepts which we think of as tied for their meaning to contingent contexts. 46. For one example of von Wright’s attitude, see his letter to Anscombe, 23 November 1983 (WWA, Wri-FC-006), where he characterises a certain ms. as a ‘practically finished work’. 47. For discussion of the distinction between ‘documentary’ and ‘critical’ editing in the case of Wittgenstein, see Pichler 2021b. 48. I suggest that one aspect of what Rhees wanted to keep in view was that Wittgenstein’s later writings on certainty, set theory, behaviourism, rulefollowing, etc. are also commentaries on the kind of interest that informs his use of the notion of the absolute as it occurs in LE. My views on the importance to Rhees, as editor of Wittgenstein, of his own (changing) views on how Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy developed are indebted to a talk by Nuno Venturinha in Helsinki, July 2019 (and also, as in all such cases, to discussion over the years with numerous colleagues, students and friends). 49. Anscombe uses the word ‘naked’ to characterize her editorial ideal in a letter to von Wright (undated, probably January 1977,NLF, vWC 714.11–12) and, as we have seen, von Wright uses the same word to characterize his ideal (von Wright 1982a: 5). For discussion, see Backström, this volume. 50. See Richter (this volume) and Haldane, J. 2019a. 51. See Österman (this volume, chapter 4). See also, von Wright, 1989: 20. In Varieties of Goodness von Wright (1963) assigns a role to philosophy in moulding our understanding of the good and suggests that natural needs may provide a basis for a cognitive notion of the good of man. His investigation is, however, based on a dogmatic rejection of what he calls the autonomy of the moral good. For discussion, see Jakola (2017) and also Jakola (article ms 2022). 52. See the letter from Rhees to von Wright 8 July 1982 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). 53. Logic should be taken here in the broad sense in which it was frequently used by Wittgenstein. See for instance OC, remarks 56 and 81. Ethics is used here in the broad sense in which it was used by Wittgenstein when he wrote in a letter to von Ficker that the point of the Tractatus is ethical (Wittgenstein 1969: 35). 54. A simplifying, but not perhaps altogether false perception of Wittgenstein would be that in the TLP he supported the first ‘binary’ view of the sense / nonsense distinction and that he, in his later philosophy, developed a ‘gradual’ view of the matter.

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55. The prevalent notion that Wittgenstein is ‘anti-metaphysical’ has played a huge role in the reception of Wittgenstein. The perception of Wittgenstein as anti-metaphysical seems to me thoroughly misguided, but as long as Wittgenstein is interpreted as engaged in philosophical therapy aiming at the dissolution, or overcoming, of philosophical problems, it is difficult to get rid of. (See Wallgren 2006a, 2006b and 2013.) 56. Anscombe, 2019 (1953) and 1976, von Wright 1957. 57. In Wallgren 2020 I discuss Wittgenstein’s relation to Socrates’ conception of philosophy and to Pyrrhonian scepticism, with particular reference to Sextus. I stress the importance to Socrates and Sextus, as well as to Wittgenstein, of philosophy as open-ended searching. From this perspective suspension of judgement is less central to the characterisation of Pyrrhonism than has often been said. 58. Rhees to von Wright, 13 November 1970 (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 59. Rhees to von Wright, January 22 1976 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). For similar reflections and further explications of Rhees’s views, see for instance his letters to von Wright, 5 March 1970, 19 March 1970 and 18 June 1970 (all three letter at WWA, Wri-FC-004) and copies of letters in the von Wright correspondence from Rhees to Anthony Kenny, 2 March 1977 (WWA, Wri-FC-006) and from Rhees to Kristóf Nyíri, 19 June 1980 (WWA, WriFC-006). 60. Vlastos has drawn attention to the relevance of this topic for understanding Socrates. See Vlastos 1991. 61. Wittgenstein famous remark about a ‘beetle’ is in PI 293. Cf. the discussion of what Nagel and many others have called ‘subjective conscious experience’ and also, following C. I. Lewis, ‘qualia’. See Nagel 1974. 62. King Lear Act I, Scene 1. The full-blown theatrical version of the same idea is provided in Hamlet Act II, Scene 2 and Act III, Scene 2. See also Backström 2007 and Backström, Nykänen, Toivakainen and Wallgren, eds 2019. 63. In a letter from Rhees to von Wright from 3 July 1973 (WWA, Wri-FC-005), Rhees stresses that Wittgenstein’s investigations on Cantor and set theory were never brought to completion. Rhees suggests that this observation should guide the editorial work. In contrast to Rhees, von Wright wants to find a publishable whole, a ‘Ganzheit’ (von Wright to Rhees 16 July 1973,WWA, Wri-FC-005). If we read Wittgenstein as a philosopher who engages in a search with no end in sight, the most relevant parallel is, again, to Socrates, who insisted that his way of doing philosophy serves human wisdom even though it never arrives at knowledge. Cf. Wallgren 2006b, 2020. 64. Rhees’s insistence on the ethical and personal nature of philosophical problems can only be understood correctly if we see how it involves a distinction between what is personal in the sense of being private and not of philosophical and moral interest and what is personal but not a private matter only. I will not discuss this distinction. For indications of Rhees’s views and how they affected his editing of Wittgenstein, see the letters from Rhees to von Wright, 12 February 1970 (WWA, Wri-FC-004), 1 October 1972 (WWA, Wri-FC-005), 25 June 1973 (WWA, Wri-FC-005), 27 June 1980 (WWA, Wri-FC-006), 9 May and 8 July 1982 (both letters at WWA, Wri-FC-006), and 26 May 1988 (WWA, Wri-FC-006). In a letter from June 25 1973 (WWA,

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Wri-FC-005), Rhees distinguishes between two ways in which what Bartley says about Wittgenstein may be problematic. One problem may be about what he says, another about the way he says it. Rhees’s criticism of Bartley is about the latter issue. In the letter to Mr Stoneborough from April 1973, from which I have already quoted, Rhees writes: ‘I would discourage publishing stuff to feed the growing interest in Wittgenstein’s “personality” among people who had no interest in his work in philosophy: his work in philosophy was his life.’ 65. Remarks on Frazer quoted from Wittgenstein 1993: 131. The quote from OC, is from remark 341. 66. The example and the comments on it are mine, not Rhees’s, but I hope they are in his spirit. 67. Rhees to von Wright, 4 April 1973 (WWA, Wri-FC-005). 68. See also Solin’s chapter in the present volume. 69. Rhees to von Wright, 13 March 1968, (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 70. See the discussion of von Wright below. 71. Rhees to von Wright, 18 June 1969, (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 72. The letter from Russell to Wittgenstein that Rhees refers to, and the text place in it, is identified in the a letter by Rhees with the reference page 60 R29. (The reference must be to the ms. sent to Rhees by von Wright.) I believe it is the letter from Wittgenstein to Russell from 3 March 1914, which is letter number 38, at p. 70, in McGuinness (ed.) 2008, but I have not been able to confirm this. 73. Rhees to von Wright, February 12 1970 (WWA, Wri-FC-004). Emphasis added. Rhees guesses rightly. Russell tells the anecdote, in almost the same words, in his autobiography (Russell 1975: 330). 74. Rhees to von Wright, March 5 1970 (WWA, Wri-FC-004). 75. Cf. Toivakainen 2020. 76. I follow Theunissen’s reading of Parmenides in Theunissen 1991. 77. PI 71 and passim. 78. This is, of course, the point of Wittgenstein’s memorable remark to his students about Cantor’s paradise. Wittgenstein quoted Hilbert as saying: ‘No one is going to turn us out of the paradise which Cantor has created.’ And he commented: ‘I would say, “I wouldn’t dream of trying to drive anyone out of this paradise.” I would try to do something quite different: I would try to show you that it is not paradise – so that you’ll leave of your own accord. I would say, “You’re welcome to this; just look about you”.’ Diamond (ed.) 1976, 103. 79. Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914–1916, was published on the initiative of von Wright and he also encouraged the publication of Engelmann’s memoir (see McGuinness 1967: xi). 80. On 8 September 1967 von Wright informs Rhees that he has sent to him, under special cover, the draft of his essay on the ‘ “Entstehungsgeschichte” of the Tractatus.’ On 16 September 1967 Rhees writes back. He comments: ‘ “Aphorisms”. I do not think Wittgenstein would have used this name for them. And for me it carries a wrong suggestion. – Would he not have called them “Bemerkungen” (remarks) even then?’ (Both letters at WWA, Wri-FC-004).

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81. For insightful discussion of the former topic, see Österman 2019 and Österman, ch. 8 in this volume. 82. In his autobiography, von Wright presents an op-ed criticising the US war in Vietnam as his first contribution to public debate of contemporary issues (2001a: 243. Cf. von Wright, 1989: 19–21). In fact, von Wright in his youth, between 1934 and 1941, often published articles of a similar kind. See Backström and Wallgren (eds), (forthcoming.) 83. See von Wright, 1989: 32–43. For von Wright’s exchange with the Frankfurt School and the Praxis group, see von Wright 2001a: 249–261 and Huttunen, Laitinen and Wallgren 2019. 84. There is in the holdings of the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, a collection of general remarks extracted by von Wright. This collection was completed in 1966 (WWA, Witt-AM-023). On 14 December 1974 von Wright wrote to Brian McGuinness: ‘I have recently been rereading the “general remarks” by Wittgenstein which I “collected” from the manuscripts years ago. I came to the conclusion that they must now be published.’ (WWA, Wri-FC-007.) 85. In one manuscript version of von Wright’s talk at Kirchberg in 1977, kept at the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives of the University of Helsinki (WWA, Wri-SF-065-b), comparisons are made of Wittgenstein’s thoughts with those of both Marx and Adorno. 86. Von Wright, Foreword to the VB Edition of 1977, quoted from CV 1998. See the similar but shorter comment in von Wright 1982c: 60. 87. Emphasis added. 88. The critique of progressive modernity is a major theme in several of von Wright’s books with essays in Swedish, including von Wright 1978, 1986, 1993 and 1994. I have elsewhere discussed the problematic relation between von Wright’s Swedish language essays, with their deep criticism of progressive modernity, and his English language contributions to the analytic tradition in philosophy; a tradition that has been closely aligned with belief in the development of science and technology as a progressive enterprise. (Wallgren 2016.) 89. RFM, 3rd edition.: 132. Similar in tone and intention is: ‘Men have judged that a king can make rain; we say this contradicts all experience. Today they judge that aeroplanes and the radio etc. are means for close contact of people and spread of culture.’ OC 132. I sometimes wonder whether the Finnish company Nokia was not under the influence of Wittgenstein when, at the time around 2010, when the company was the world’s leading manufacturer of mobile phones, it made the slogan Connecting People central in its marketing. 90. The quote and discussion of it appear in von Wright 1982g: 208. For reasons unknown to me von Wright’s quotation, at 1982g: 208, differs in some details from the version in the source he refers to (RFM, 3rd edition: 132). The quote provided here follows the text in RFM, 3rd edition. 91. The opposite idea, that there is a connection, is, of course, not straightforward either. 92. Socrates pronounced: ‘I think that I am one of very few Athenians, not to say the only one, engaged in the true political art and that of the men today I alone

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practice statemanship.’ (Gorgias 522d. See also Apology 36c and passim.) In a pioneering work Hanna Pitkin drew attention to the similarities between Socrates’ and Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy in her book Wittgenstein and Justice. Pitkin thinks of their philosophy as unfolding in dialogue between two persons, primarily between ‘guide and seeker’ (Pitkin 1993 (1972), xxiii), while I emphasise the polyvocal character in the work of both thinkers. – As discussed in the previous section, Rhees was for a long time passionately engaged in editing Wittgenstein in ways which would bring forth how his work on logic was always also moral work on himself; arguably also, how any work on the philosophy of logic worth its name would have this quality. Rhees by and large neglects the question that attracted von Wright’s attention especially in the 1970s, of the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and mathematics with his critique of modernity. But there are some exceptions. One example is when Rhees writes to von Wright, on 21 April 1982: ‘During the next 19 years there were certain big changes in Wittgenstein’s method in philosophy. And with this went changes in what he would have called the “Ziel in der Philosophie”, if he had used this expression; also changes in the way he would have characterised the “depth” or the “greatness” of philosophical problems; the relation of philosophy to cultural and social conditions; and so on.’ (WWA, Wri-FC-006.) 93. Cavell 1976, Stern 1996, Rothhaupt 1996 and Pichler 2004. Wittgenstein put enormous effort into the ordering and reordering, perhaps the ‘composition’, of his many-voiced later work, in particular into the various versions of the PI. 94. Von Wright’s sustained work to trace ms. sources for the PI documented in the so-called Helsinki Ausgabe (see Wittgenstein 2001, von Wright 1982, Schulte 2001a, von Wright 2001c) does not lead to reflection on how and why Wittgenstein’s philosophical creation in later years takes the form of dialogue. Von Wright presents this feature only as a literary or stylistic merit and gives no philosophical significance to it. Similarly, Anscombe seems to have thought that in what she calls part II we see Wittgenstein at his best, as if the quality would be there before the work on arrangement and composition of dialogue (Erbacher, C., A. dos Santos Reis and J. Jung 2019: 239). But there Anscombe also suggests that the PI might be compared with a musical composition. In Anscombe’s well-known later discussion of the form of Wittgenstein’s writing she reflects on the role of the remark and on what Wittgenstein in the Preface to the PI (in Anscombe’s translation) calls the ‘criss-cross’ nature of his investigation (Anscombe 1969). Even there Anscombe does not pay attention to how much Wittgenstein worked on the composition of his polyphonic dialogue, nor does she see the possible relevance of this aspect of his work for the evolution of his views on the aims, worth and criteria of success in philosophy. The idea that Wittgenstein’s basic unit of writing is the remark is problematic insofar as it distracts from attention to the philosophical stakes of the work he did on relating remarks to each other: on interrogating a remark, or a set of remarks, through other remarks, and how through this work all remarks, even the ones the reader may cherish the most, may begin to appear less as oracles speaking final truths, than as invitations to further thinking and common search with one another.

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95. In the case of Rhees, we saw earlier that he claimed to have no clue as to how Wittgenstein would have gone about working part II into part I. Following Pichler’s groundbreaking work (2004), I submit that, pace the doubts of Rhees, we have one important clue: the clue is the shift that Wittgenstein achieves in Norway in 1936/37, from work that strives to linear presentation of separable topics, to work that takes the form of an ‘Album’, polyphonically composed. 96. Holger Thesleff, oral communication. Thesleff ’s argument is that because of the practice of ostracism it is reasonable to assume that Socrates knew how to write. 97. The idea that a clear distinction can be made between understanding somebody’s thought, or words, or argumentation, versus understanding that someone, the person, is important and problematic. I restrict attention to aspects of understanding in which the intrinsic relation between moral practice and what we take words to mean is intimate. 98. Rhees to von Wright, 30 May 1972 (WWA, Wri-FC-005). 99. Rhees to von Wright, 27 February 1969 (WWA,Wri-FC-004). 100. On remark 693 as an ending of PI, see Hacker 1996 and Schulte 2001c. 101. In his letters, Rhees is time and again at pains to explain how misleading and dangerous it is to give readers the impression that they could gain a good understanding of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy by reading his remarks on the nature of philosophy. Here is one example: ‘When you say it [the so-called philosophy chapter in the Big Typescript] is “the longest statement of Wittgenstein on the nature of philosophy”, I want to ask: Is it longer then the Unterschungen? You will say this is unfair, But if someone asked me, “What is the nature of philosophy?” it would have more sense to refer him to the Untersuchungen than to this chapter.’ (Rhees to Nyman 21 April 1982, WWA, Wri-FC-006.) 102. During his lifetime Wittgenstein often gave copies of his writings to friends to read. Wittgenstein also considered his lectures to be a form of publishing. (Malcolm 1984: 48.) 103. Building especially on Vlastos 1991 and Vlastos 1994 I have proposed a notion of Socratic philosophy along the lines summarised here (Wallgren 2006 and Wallgren 2020). Obviously the picture I draw of Socrates’ conception of philosophy is very different from the idea Wittgenstein had of it. Wittgenstein often appears to think of Socrates as an embodiment of a philosopher who searches for definitions that would contain the truth about the meaning of words, or concepts. (See for instance CV: 30.) I discuss some similarities and differences between Socrates’ and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of philosophy in the publications just mentioned. To the extent that there is truth in my proposal that a ‘Socratic’ incarnation of Wittgenstein is an incarnation of him, it is obvious that all these aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be seen in the PI, part 1 and that, therefore, his literary executors with the publication of the PI already gave to ‘the world’ all it needs to gain access to that incarnation. But later chapters in the creation of Wittgenstein (the many books published in Wittgenstein’s name after the publication of the PI) have complicated the picture.

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104. I follow Tredennick’s translation of The Apology 38a. 105. Von Wright writes: ‘Wittgenstein shared Spengler’s apocalyptic vision. Over the years it deepened into a disgust of our decaying civilisation and a wish for its collapse. “Do you really believe that Europe needs yet another great war?” I once asked him in view of the imminent outbreak of war in 1939. “Not one, but two or three”, he replied.’ (1993c: 97, my translation.) On p. 7 in a typescript version of the opening address at Kirchberg in 1977, von Wright writes: ‘When in the summer months of 1939 I expressed my horror before the impending war he [Wittgenstein] said that not one but four or five great wars was what mankind needed.’ (WWA, Wri-SF-065-b.) See also von Wright 1982b: 30. 106. Permission to quote from Elizabeth Anscombe’s letters was kindly provided by Mary Geach, © M C Gormally. Permission to quote from Rush Rhees’s letters was kindly provided by Volker Munz. Permission to quote from Georg Henrik von Wright’s letters and unpublished manuscripts was kindly provided by Anita von Wright-Grönberg and Benedict von Wright. I wish to thank Hanne Appelqvist, Joel Backström, David Cockburn, Mladen Dolar, Lars Hertzberg, Lassi Jakola, Camilla Kronqvist, Olli Lagerspetz, Niklas Toivakainen and Bernt Österman for their helpful comments on draft versions of this paper.

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335

336

APPENDIX 1

FIGURE A1.1: Facsimile of G.H. von Wright’s copy of Wittgenstein’s will kept at The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, University of Helsinki. The editor thanks the Master and Fellows of Trinity College for permission to reproduce the text of the will in the present volume.

APPENDIX 1

337

338

APPENDIX 2

339

340

Second Edition

Third Edition

Re-Issued Second Edition

Revised Fourth Edition

1967

1997

2009

PU / PI

Philosophische Untersuchungen/ Philosophical Investigations

1953

1958

Abbr.

Title

Year

Translator

P. M. S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte

G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte

G. E. M. G. E. M. Anscombe & Anscombe R. Rhees

G. E. M. G. E. M. Anscombe & Anscombe R. Rhees

G. E. M. G. E. M. Anscombe & Anscombe R. Rhees

G. E. M. G. E. M. Anscombe & Anscombe R. Rhees

Editor GermanEnglish

Basil Blackwell, Oxford Blackwell Publishers, Oxford WileyBlackwell, Oxford

GermanNote to the English Re-Issued Second Edition, 1 p. Editoral Preface Germanto the Fourth English Edition and Modified Translation, 10 p.

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Publisher

Note to Second GermanEdition, 1 p. English

Note to Second GermanEdition, 1 p. English

Editors’ Note by G. E. M. Anscombe & R. Rhees, 1 p.

Editors’ Preface Language

TABLE A2.1: Table of writings published posthumously with Ludwig Wittgenstein named as author and at least one of the following as editor: Rush Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright.

341

1958

1956

Revised Third Edition

Third Edition, Revised and Reset

1974

1978

Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations” Generally known as The Blue and Brown Books

Second Edition

1967

Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik/ Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

BBB

BGM / RFM

R. Rhees

G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G. E. M. Anscombe

G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G.E.M. Anscombe

G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G. E. M. Anscombe

G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G. E. M. Anscombe

G. E. M. Anscombe

Editors’ Preface, 3 p.

G. E. M. Anscombe

GermanEnglish

GermanEnglish

Preface by R. Rhees, 10 p.

English

Editors’ Preface English to the Revised Edition, 5 p.

Editors’ Preface German to the Revised Edition

Editors’ Preface, 3 p.

G. E. M. Anscombe

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

342

1964

1975

Philosophische Bemerkungen

Philosophical Remarks

Second Edition

PR

PB

TB / NB

Notebooks 1914– 1916

1961

1979

AL / NL

Second Edition

Abbr.

‘Aufzeichnungen über Logik September 1913 / Notes on Logic September 1913’ in Schriften

1969

Title

1960

Year

R. Rhees

Raymond Hargreaves & Roger White

Editor’s Note by R. Rhees, 5 p.

English

Anmerkung des German Herausgebers, 2 p.

Preface to the GermanSecond Edition, English 1 p.

G. E. M. G. H. von Wright & G. Anscombe E. M. Anscombe R. Rhees

Editors’ Preface, 2 p.

G. E. M. G. H. von Wright & G. Anscombe E. M. Anscombe

GermanEnglish

GermanEnglish

Editors’ Preface, 1 p.

Language

G. E. M. G. H. von Wright & G. Anscombe E. M. Anscombe

Editors’ Note on the English Second Edition, 1 p.

Translator

R. Rhees

Editor

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Publisher

343

1967

GB

RF

‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’

Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough/Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough

‘Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough”

1971

1979

Second Edition

Z

Zettel/Zettel

1967

1981

LE

‘A Lecture on Ethics’

1965

R. Rhees

R. Rhees

R. Rhees

A. C. Miles

J. Beversluis

G. E. M. G. E. M. Anscombe & Anscombe G. H. von Wright

G. E. M. G. E. M. Anscombe & Anscombe G. H. von Wright

R. Rhees

English

Introductory Note by R. Rhees, 2 p.

Introductory Note by R. Rhees, 2 p.

Preface to the Second Edition by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, 1 p.

GermanEnglish

English

German

English

Editors’ Preface GermanEnglish by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, 2 p.

No Preface

The Brynmill Press, Doncaster

The Human World, 3: 28–41

Synthese, 17 (3): 233–253

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

The Philosophical Review, 74 (1): 3–12

344

1969

1974

Philosophische Grammatik

Philosophical Grammar

Reprinted with corrections and indices

PG

ÜG/OC

Über Gewissheit/On Certainty

1969

1974

LPE

‘Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough’ in Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften

Abbr.

‘Wittgenstein’s Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data” ’

1989

Title

1968

Year

R. Rhees

R. Rhees

Anthony Kenny

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

GermanEnglish

Note in Editing, 4 p.

English

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

The Philosophical Review, 77 (3): 271–320

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

Publisher

GermanEnglish

English

German

Language

Anmerkung des German Herausgebers, 5 p.

Preface by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, 1 p.

Denis Paul G. E. M. Anscombe & & G. E. M. Anscombe G. H. von Wright

Note on the Text by R. Rhees, 5 p.

No Preface

Editors’

Preface by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, 1 p.

Translator

Denis Paul G. E. M. Anscombe & & G. E. M. Anscombe G. H. von Wright

R. Rhees

R. Rhees

Editor

345

R. Rhees

CE

‘Ursache und Wirkung: Intuitives Erfassen / Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’

1976

Peter Winch

B. F. McGuinness

G. H. von Wright & B. F. McGuinness

CRK

Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore

1974

G. H. von Wright

CCO

Letters to C. K. Ogden: with Comments on the English Translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Editor’s Note by R. Rhees, 1 p.

No Preface

GermanEnglish

German and English

Foreword by G. English H. von Wright, 3 p.

Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 6 (3–4): 391–425

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford and Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Boston

Routledge & Kegan Paul, London

1973

GermanEnglish

D. F. Pears B. F. McGuinness, & B. F. T. Nyberg & McGuinness G. H. von Wright

PT

Prototractatus: An early version of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus

1971

No Preface

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

Vorbemerkung German des Herausgebers von R. Rhees, 6 p.

Petra von Morstein

R. Rhees

‘Das Blaue Buch & Eine Philosophische Betrachtung’ in Schriften 5

1970

Otto Müller Verlag, Salzburg

German

No Preface

CLF

G. H. von Wright & Walter Methlagl

Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker

1969

346

Amended Second Edition with English Translation (Vermischte Bemerkungen / Culture and Value)

‘Vermischte Bemerkungen: Eine Auswahl aus dem Nachlaß’ in Werkausgabe Bd. 8

1980

1984

CV

VB

Vermischte Bemerkungen: Eine Auswahl aus dem Nachlaß

1977

Second Edition

BÜF / ROC

Bemerkungen über die Farben/Remarks on Colour

1977

1978

Abbr.

Title

Year

G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman

G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman

G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman

G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman

G. E. M. Anscombe

Editor

Editors’

Language

Peter Winch

Preface by G. H. von Wright, 3 p.

German

GermanEnglish

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

German Vorwort zur zweiten Ausgabe von G. H. von Wright, 1 p. Preface by G. H. von Wright, 2 p.

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Publisher

Vorwort von G. German H. von Wright, 4 p.

Linda L. Editor’s Preface GermanMcAlister & by G. E. M. English Margarete Anscombe, 1 p. Schättle

Translator

347

C. G. Luckhardt & Maximilian A. E. Aue

Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Bd. 2/Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2

1980

BPP / RPP G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman

G. E. M. BPP / RPP G. E. M. Anscombe & Anscombe G. H. von Wright

Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Bd. 1/Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1

1980

Joachim B. F. McGuinness Schulte & G. H. von Wright

BW

Preface by G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman, 1 p.

Preface by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, 1 p.

GermanEnglish

GermanEnglish

Vorwort von B. German F. McGuinness & G. H. von Wright, 3 p.

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

Blackwell Publishers, Oxford

GermanForeword to English New Edition 1994 by G. H. von Wright, 2 p. and Editorial Note by Alois Pichler, 4 p.

Peter Winch G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman & Alois Pichler

Briefe: Briefwechsel mit B. Russell, G. E. Moore, J. M. Keynes, F. P. Ramsey, W. Eccles, P. Engelmann und L. von Ficker

Revised Edition

1998

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

German Vorwort zur Neuausgabe 1994 von G. H. von Wright, 2 p.

G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman & Alois Pichler

1980

Neubearbeitung des Textes durch Alois Pihler

1994

348

Abbr. LSPP1 / LW1

CVW

PPW

Title

Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Bd. 1/Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1

‘Some Hitherto Unpublished Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Georg Henrik von Wright’

A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man: From the Diary of David Hume Pinsent 1912–1914 (Includes two letters by Wittgenstein.)

Year

1982

1983

1990

G. H. von Wright

G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman

Editor C. G. Luckhardt & Maximilian A. E. Aue

Translator

Language

Foreword by G. English H. von Wright, 4 p.

Comments on English the Letters, 2 p.

Editors’ Preface GermanEnglish by G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman, 2 p.

Editors’

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

The Cambridge Review: A Journal of University Life and Thought, 104: 56–64

Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Publisher

349

CBR

LSPP2 / LW2

LSSP

CC

PI / PU

‘Unpublished correspondence between Russell & Wittgenstein’

Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Bd. 2/Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2

Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Das Innere und das Äussere, 1949–1951

Cambridge Letters: Correspondence with Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and Sraffa

Philosophische Untersuchungen: Kritisch-genetische Edition

1990

1992

1993

1995

2001

Joachim Schulte, Heikki Nyman, Eike von Savigny & G. H. von Wright

Brian McGuinness & G. H. von Wright

G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman

G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman

Editor’s Preface: G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman

C. G. Luckhardt & Maximilian A. E. Aue

B. F. B. F. McGuinness McGuinness & G. H. von Wright

German and English

English

Vorwort von G. German H. von Wright, 5 p.

No Preface

German

Editors’ Preface GermanEnglish by G. H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman, 3 p.

Unsigned, 2 p.

Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main

Blackwell Publishers, Oxford

Suhrkamp Verlag. Frankfurt am Main

Blackwell Publishers, Oxford

Russell: The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives, 10 (2): 101–124

350

THE CREATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

The criteria for inclusion of a publication in the table are that the publication includes original writings by Wittgenstein that are published here for the first time in German or English and that at least one of the three literary heirs and executors named in Wittgenstein’s will, Rush Rhees, G.E.M. (Elizabeth) Anscombe or Georg Henrik von Wright, is one of its editors. The list seeks to be complete, i.e. to include all publications that meet these three criteria and only these publications. The table lists the publications in chronological order of first appearance. The abbreviations in the table are drawn from Pichler, A., M. A. R. Biggs and S. A. Szeltner (2011), ‘Bibliographie der deutsch- und englischsprachigen Wittgenstein-Ausgaben’, Wittgenstein-Studien, 2: 249–286. Available online: www.ilwg.eu/files/Wittgenstein_Bibliographie.pdf Abbreviations for the German title of the publication are included only in the case of publications referred to in this volume with the German abbreviations. The book Schriften published in 1960 by Suhrkamp Verlag is included in the table because it includes the first publication of ‘Aufzeichnungen über Logik’ / ‘Notes on Logic’ edited by Rhees, Anscombe or von Wright. The book has only the German text. The next item in the table, from 1961, includes ‘Aufzeichnungen über Logik’ / ‘Notes on Logic’ in German and English, with additional original materials. The book Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Das Innere und das Äussere, 1949–1951 published by Suhrkamp Verlag in German only in 1993 is included because it has at least one remark that is not included in the German-English book Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology; The Inner and the Outer, 1949–1951, Vol. 2 / Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Das Innere und das Äussere, 1949–1951, Bd. 2, published by Blackwell in 1992. Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’ was first published in the journal Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 1965), pp. 3–12. The journal editors have played a part as editors. The ground for attributing an editorial role for it to Rush Rhees is the following mention by the editors of the journal at p. 3 in the original publication: ‘We are indebted to Mr. Rush Rhees for the above information [about the text and its origin] and for help in the preparation of the following materials.’ The table has been compiled by Rickard Nylund in cooperation with the editor of the volume, Thomas Wallgren.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRINTED SOURCES Primary sources Wittgenstein, L. (1913), Review of P. Coffey, ‘The Science of Logic’, Cambridge Review, 34 (853). Wittgenstein, L. (1921), Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung, Annalen der Naturphilosophie 14 (3). Wittgenstein, L. (1922), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with an Introduction by B. Russell, London: Kegan Paul. Wittgenstein, L. (1926), Wörterbuch für Volks- und Bürgerschulen, Vienna: HölderPichler-Tempsky. Wittgenstein, L. (1929), ‘Some Remarks on Logical Form’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp., 9: 162–171. Wittgenstein, L. (1933), A Letter to the Editor, dated Cambridge, 27 May, 1933, Mind, 42 (167): 415–416. Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Philosophical Investigations / Philosophische Untersuchungen, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1956), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics / Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees, and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1961a), Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1961b), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London: Routledge. Wittgenstein, L. (1967a), ‘Bemerkungen über Frazers The Golden Bough’, Synthese, 17: 233–253. Wittgenstein, L. (1967b), Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 351

352

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wittgenstein, L. (1969a), On Certainty / Über Gewißheit, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe and D. Paul, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1970), Über Gewißheit, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Wittgenstein, L. (1971), ‘Remarks on Frazer’s “Golden Bough” ’, The Human World, 3: 18–41. Wittgenstein, L. (1974a), Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, ed. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe, Schriften 6, expanded and revised new edition, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Note sul ‘Ramo d’oro’ di Frazer, Milano: Adelphi Edizioni. Wittgenstein, L. (1977a), Remarks on Colour / Bemerkungen über die Farben, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. L.L. McAlister and M. Schättle, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1977b), ‘Remarques sur “Le Rameau d’or’ de Frazer” ’, Actes de la recherche en sciences socials, 16: 35–42. Wittgenstein, L. (1977c), Vermischte Bemerkungen, ed. G.H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd edn, revised and reset. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1979a), Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A.C. Miles and R. Rhees, Doncaster: Brynmill Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1979b), ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, in C.G. Luckhardt (ed.), Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, 61–81, trans. J. Beversluis, Hassoks, Sussex: The Harvester Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1979c), Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd edn, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1980), Culture and Value / Vermischte Bemerkungen, ed. G.H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, trans. P. Winch, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1980a), Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1980b), Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, ed. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1989), Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Wittgenstein, L. (1991), Geheime Tagebücher 1914–1916, ed. W. Baum, Wien: Turia und Kant. Wittgenstein, L. (1992), Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: The Inner and the Outer, 1949–1951, Vol. 2 / Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, 1949–1951, Bd. 2, ed. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1993), Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1951, ed. J.C. Klagge and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company. Wittgenstein, L. (1993a), Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Das Innere und das Äussere, 1949–1951, ed. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Wittgenstein, L. (1995), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Wiener Ausgabe, Band 3, Wien: Springer-Verlag.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

353

Wittgenstein, L. (1998), Culture and Value / Vermischte Bemerkungen, ed. G.H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, revised edn of the text by A. Pichler, trans. P. Winch, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Wittgenstein, L. (2001), Philosophische Untersuchungen: Kritisch-genetische Edition, ed. J. Schulte in cooperation with H. Nyman, E. von Savigny and G.H. von Wright, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Wittgenstein, L. (2003), Public and Private Occasions, ed. J.C. Klagge and A. Nordmann, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Wittgenstein, L. (2005), The Big Typescript: TS 213, German–English Scholars’ Edition, ed. and trans. M.A.E. Aue and C.G. Luckhardt, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. Wittgenstein, L. (2009), Philosophical Investigations / Philosophische Untersuchungen, ed. P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte, Revised 4th edn, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (2022), Private Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. and trans. M. Perloff, New York: W.W. Norton.

Published lectures, conversations and correspondence Diamond, C., ed. (1976), Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939: From the Notes of R.G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. McGuinness, B., ed. (2008), Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911–1951, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Wittgenstein, L. (1966), Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. C. Barrett, Berkeley, California: University of California Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1969b), Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker, ed. G.H. von Wright in cooperation with W. Methlagl, Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag. Wittgenstein, L. (1973), Letters to C.K. Ogden, ed. with an Introduction by G.H. von Wright and with an Appendix of Letters by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Oxford: Basil Blackwell and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Wittgenstein, L. (1974b), Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, ed. with an Introduction by G.H. von Wright, assisted by B.F. McGuinness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1989), Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften, ed. and trans. J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Wittgenstein, L. (2016), Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930−1933, from the Notes of G.E. Moore, ed. D.G. Stern, B. Rogers and G. Citron, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Secondary sources Achebe, C. ([1977] 2016), ‘An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness’, The Massachusetts Review, 57 (1): 14–27. Adorno, T.W. (1978), ‘On the Social Situation of Music’, Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary, 35: 128–164. Allison, H. (2001), Kant’s Theory of Taste, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, A.R. (1958), ‘Mathematics and the “Language Game” ’, The Review of Metaphysics, 11 (3): 446–458. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1954), ‘Misinformation: What Wittgenstein Really Said’, The Tablet, 17 April: 373. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957), Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1958), ‘Modern Moral Philosophy ’, Philosophy, 33 (124): 1–19. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1959), An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, London: Hutchinson University Library. Anscombe, G.E.M. ([1959] 1967), An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, London: Hutchinson University Library. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1969), ‘On the Form of Wittgenstein’s Writing’, in R. Klibansky (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy: A Survey, Vol. 3, 373–378, Florence: La Nuova Italia. Anscombe, G.E.M. ([1959] 1971), An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1973), ‘To the Editor: “Wittgenstein” ’, Times Literary Supplement, 16 November (3741): 1401. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1976), ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, in J. Hintikka (ed.), Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G.H. von Wright, Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1977), ‘Vorwort des Herausgebers’, in L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Anscombe, G.E.M. ([1976] 1981), ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’, in G.E.M. Anscombe, The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe: Volume I, From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, 112–134, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981a), The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe: Volume I, From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981b), The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe: Volume II, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981c), The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe: Volume III, Ethics, Religion and Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Anscombe, G.E.M. (2000), Intention, 2nd edn, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press. Anscombe, G.E.M. ([1985] 2005), ‘Has Mankind One Soul: An Angel Distributed Through Many Bodies?’, in M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds), Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe, 17–26, Exeter: Imprint Academic. Anscombe, G.E.M. ([1975] 2008), ‘Contraception and Chastity ’, in M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds), Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics by G.E.M. Anscombe, 170–191, Exeter: Imprint Academic. Anscombe, G.E.M. ([1979] 2008), ‘What Is It to Believe Someone?’, in M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds), Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, Philosophy and Ethics by G.E.M. Anscombe, 1–10, Exeter: Imprint Academic. Anscombe, G.E.M. ([1969] 2011), ‘On the Form of Wittgenstein’s Writing’, in M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds), From Plato to Wittgenstein: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe, 187–192, Luton: Andrews UK Ltd. Anscombe, G.E.M. ([1995] 2011), ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’, in M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds), From Plato to Wittgenstein: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe, 157–170, Luton: Andrews UK Ltd.

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von Wright, G.H. (2001a), Mitt liv som jag minns det, Helsingfors: Söderströms. von Wright, G.H. (2001b), ‘On Wittgenstein’, Philosophical Investigations, 24 (2): 177–179. von Wright, G.H. (2001c), ‘Vorwort’, in L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen: Kritisch-genetische Edition, 7–11, ed. J. Schulte in cooperation with H. Nyman, E. von Savigny and G.H. von Wright, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. von Wright, G.H. (2003), ‘What Philosophy Is for Me’, in L. Haaparanta and I. Niiniluoto (eds), Analytic Philosophy in Finland, 79–88, New York: Rodopi. von Wright, G.H. and H. Nyman (1992), ‘Vorwort der Herausgeber’, in L. Wittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: The Inner and the Outer, 1949–1951, Vol. 2, ed. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell.

ELECTRONIC RESOURCES Biggs, M. and A. Pichler (2013), Wittgenstein: Two Source Catalogues and a Bibliography, Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen 7. In: From the WAB archives: A selection from the Bergen Wittgenstein archives’ ‘Working Papers’ and audio-visual materials. Available online: http://wab.uib.no/wp-no7.pdf. Accessed: 30 May 2022. Republication by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. Original publication in: Biggs, M. and A. Pichler (1993). Biggs, M. and A. Pichler (2013): In: From the WAB archives: A selection from the Bergen Wittgenstein archives’ ‘Working Papers’ and audio-visual materials . Republication by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. Original publication in: Biggs, M. and A. Pichler (1993). Coda, A., G. Citron, B. Halder, A. Janik, U. Lobis, K. Mayr, B. McGuinness, M. Schorner, M. Seekircher and J. Wang, eds (2011), Wittgenstein: Gesamtbriefwechsel / Complete Correspondence, Innsbrucker Electronic Edition, 2nd edn, Innsbruck: InteLex. (IEA 2011) Golanski, A. (2019), https://twitter.com/alanigolanski/status/1085561866217287680. Pichler, A., M.A.R. Biggs and S.A. Uffelmann (2019), ‘Bibliographie der deutschund englischsprachigen Wittgenstein-Ausgaben’. http://www.ilwg.eu/files/ Bibliographie%20-%202019-11-26.pdf Sydenham High School website: https://www.sydenhamhighschool.gdst.net/aboutthe-school/history/ Teichman, J. ‘Anscombe, (Gertrude) Elizabeth Margaret (1919–2001)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available online: https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128. 001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-75032 Accessed: 30 May 2022. Wittgenstein, L. (2000), Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Bibliography has been compiled by Patrik Forss in cooperation with the editor of the volume, Thomas Wallgren.

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NOTE ON ARCHIVAL RESOURCES

The primary materials relating to the work of Rush Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright as editors of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass that have been used for the scholarship presented in this volume are kept at the archives listed below.

THE COLLEGIUM INSTITUTE ARCHIVE OF G.E.M. ANSCOMBE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA Abbreviation used in this volume: AA https://www.collegiuminstitute.org/anscombe-archive-info The Collegium Institute describes itself as an independent, academic community with a catholic vision founded by faculty, alumni, students and friends of the University of Pennsylvania. The Collegium Institute has The Anscombe Archive with catalogued items including unpublished manuscripts, philosophical offprints with substantial marginalia and personal correspondence with major philosophical figures, including Rhees and von Wright. The material includes Anecdotes about Wittgenstein, a typescript made by Luke Gormally of two Anscombenotebooks. At the time of finishing the manuscript for the present volume, The Collegium Institute is host to the Anscombe Papers Project: https://www. collegiuminstitute.org/anscombe-papers-project

373

374

NOTE ON ARCHIVAL RESOURCES

RICHARD BURTON ARCHIVES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SWANSEA Abbreviation used in this volume: RBA https://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/richard-burton-archives/ The Richard Burton Archives is the corporate memory and archive repository of Swansea University and holds material of local, regional and national significance. The Archives selects, preserves and makes accessible to all the records of historical value created or acquired by the University. The Archives also hold the personal papers of Rush Rhees, including manuscripts and personal correspondence with Anscombe and von Wright.

THE NATIONAL LIBRARY OF FINLAND Abbreviation used in this volume: NLF https://www.kansalliskirjasto.fi/en/collections/georg-henrik-von-wrightcollection The Georg Henrik von Wright Collection (formerly called The Bibliotheca Wrightiana) is based on items kept in Georg Henrik von Wright’s home library at Skepparegatan 4 during his lifetime, which were donated by von Wright to NLF in 2002. It includes a vast collection of philosophical and scientific books, a large collection of offprints and more than 14,000 letters of a professional or private nature. Many of von Wright’s Wittgenstein books are also kept in the National Library, including his first copies of the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations.

THE VON WRIGHT AND WITTGENSTEIN ARCHIVES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI Abbreviation used in this volume: WWA https://www2.helsinki.fi/en/projects/the-von-wright-and-wittgensteinarchives The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives (WWA) at the University of Helsinki is a humanities research infrastructure based on the Wittgenstein Archive founded by Georg Henrik von Wright during his lifetime. It was originally kept in connection with von Wright’s university office. It was donated by von Wright to the University of Helsinki in the year 2000 together with a major part of von Wright’s own literary estate (mainly manuscripts and correspondence), and scientific books owned by him, most of which are related to Wittgenstein or von Wright’s own work. WWA has functioned under its present name since 2009. The holdings of WWA have

NOTE ON ARCHIVAL RESOURCES

375

gradually expanded and they now include, among other things, the late Jaakko Hintikka’s collection of books related to Wittgenstein and von Wright. WWA holds an almost complete collection of copies of the Nachlass used by von Wright for his work on Wittgenstein, often kept with marginal notes and correspondence relating to the work. The correspondence held at WWA comprises more than 10,000 letters, complementing the correspondence kept at NLF. The Note on Archival Rources has been compiled by Anna Lindelöf in cooperation with Bernt Österman and Thomas Wallgren.

376

INDEX

The letter f following an entry indicates a page with a figure. The letter t following an entry indicates a page with a table. AA (The Collegium Institute Archive of G.E.M. Anscombe) 70, 78 Abriss der Logistik (Carnap, Rudolf) 57 Adorno, Theodor 281 aesthetics 274–5, 280–1, 286, 287–9 German 281, 287–8 AL (‘Aufzeichnungen über Logik’) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 82, 83, 342t, 350 Anderson, Alan Ross 116, 125, 134 n. 49 Anderson, John 22 angenehm (causally conditioned response to a stimulus) 87–8 Anscombe, Elizabeth (Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret) 2 archives 70, 78 Bartley, William 170 n, 42 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics), as editor 72, 81, 82, 91, 119, 130 n. 14, 145–6, 307–8 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics), as translator 91, 110, 118, 121, 146

Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’, proposals concerning 225 causality 49 censorship 156–7 certainty 153 Christianity 41 communication partners 74 complete edition, discussion concerning 94, 98, 99, 298, 300 Culture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen), as editor /translator 92, 97, 100 decoding 168 n. 34 as eccentric 37–8, 49–50 editing views 3, 92, 95, 145–8, 151, 153, 156–8, 246–8, 256, 295, 298–9, 300, 303 education 39, 42, 43, 44 family 39, 43 as feminist 42 finances 45 Foot, Philippa 41, 42, 126 Hare, R. M. 42, 43 homosexuality, thoughts on 41, 170 n. 42, 170 n. 43 377

378

Intention 40–1, 82 intention 48, 49 ‘Justice of the Present War Examined, The’ 48–9 last writings (of Wittgenstein), as editor 237, 238, 240, 241, 246–8, 250–2 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 2, as editor 153 Lecture on Ethics, A, proposals concerning 204, 210 life and career 43, 44–5, 49, 74, 84, 88 literary executers disagreement 73, 204, 205, 221, 224–5, 227, 305, 307, 308 ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’ 46, 47 ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ 43, 49 Monk, Paul 41–2 ‘Necessity and Truth’ 39 Notebooks 1914–1916, as editor 146, 154–8 Notebooks 1914–1916, as translator 82, 154 On Certainty/Über Gewißheit, as editor 88, 146, 151–2, 153, 167 n. 26, 216, 217–18, 221, 238, 246–8, 251–2, 254, 322 n. 9 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), as translator 45, 80, 138–42 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), as editor 72, 80, 81, 145–54, 301, 317, 331 n. 94 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), thoughts on 40, 82 philosophy 39–40, 43–4, 47–9, 303–5 practical syllogism 40–1 ‘Question of Linguistic Idealism, The’ 47 Remarks on Colour, as editor 146, 151, 153, 238, 241, 246, 264 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, as editor 146 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, as editor 92

INDEX

‘Reply to Mr C. S. Lewis’s Argument that “Naturalism” is Self-Refuting, A’ 49 Rhees, correspondence with 70–2, 74, 211, 225, 253 see also correspondence calendar as Roman Catholic 38–40, 41, 43, 45–6, 48, 49, 50, 170 n. 43, 303 separability/compartmentalisation idea 303 thematic editing 151, 153, 238, 255–6, 303 ‘Theory of Language, A’ 46–7 Thomas Aquinas, Saint, influence of 40, 41 style Three Philosophers 48 Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus 46, 48, 82, 158 as translator 45, 138–45 Über Gewißheit/On Certainty, as editor 88, 146, 151–2, 153, 167 n. 26, 216, 217–18, 221, 238, 246–8, 251–2, 254, 322 n. 9 unity of logic and ethics idea 304 Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value), as editor /translator 92, 97, 100 von Wright, conflict with 73 von Wright, correspondence with 70–2, 74, 246–7, 248, 251, 296, 300, 301 see also correspondence calendar von Wright, relationship with 45 war 48, 49 ‘War and Murder’ 41 Wittgenstein, relationship with 41, 44, 45–6, 141, 147, 164 n. 10, 294, 301, 302 Wittgenstein, thoughts on 41, 43, 46–8, 49, 147 ‘Wittgenstein: Last Writings’, unpublished edition, thoughts on 250 Zettel, as editor 146 Anscombe Archive 70, 78 aphorisms 176–86, 190, 197–8, 273, 286, 288, 289, 313, 317, 318 Aquinas. See Thomas Aquinas, Saint

INDEX

architecture 196 archives 70, 73, 75–6, 78, 80 Bergen Electronic Edition 70, 156 Cornell University microfilm 70, 87–8, 156 Rush Rhees Collection in the Richard Burton Archive 70, 75, 78, 231 The Collegium Institute Archive of G.E.M. Anscombe 70, 78 Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives 70, 73, 78, 231 Wittgenstein Archive, University of Bergen 75, 98, 99, 100 Wittgenstein Archive, University of Tübingen 73, 75, 80, 89, 93, 94 Wren Library, Trinity College Cambridge 75, 79, 98, 205, 231 Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 40–1 arts, the 273–6 music in Culture and Value 286–9 music in Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations) 282–5 music in Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus 276, 277–82 aspect seeing 289 ‘Aufzeichnungen über Logik’ (AL/NL 1960) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 82, 83, 342t, 350 Augustine, Saint 26, 37, 317–18 Barrett, Cyril 75 Bartley, William 91, 170 n, 42 Baum, Wilhelm 96, 154, 158 Baumgarten, Alexander 275 BBB/BBB 1958 (Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’, generally known as The Blue and Brown Books) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 80, 82, 83, 88, 134 n. 52 beetle remark 306 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics) (BGM/RFM/RFM 1956/RFM 1978) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 89, 105–6, 216, 223–4, 295

379

Anscombe, as editor 72, 81, 82, 91, 119, 130 n. 14, 145–6, 307–8 Anscombe, as translator 91, 110, 118, 121, 146 cars remark 315, 318 discussion 122–8 editorial process, finalization 119–22 editorial process, initial work 106–9 editorial process, main work 110–19 preface 118–19, 128 Rhees, as editor 72, 81, 82, 90, 91, 106–29, 308 Rhees, as indexer 119–20 set theory 315 spacing 119, 127–8, 129 Unseld, Siegfried 216 von Wright, as editor 60, 72, 81, 82, 90, 91, 106–29, 145–6, 165 n. 16, 176, 181, 182, 190, 307–8 von Wright, as indexer 82, 119–20, 119–20, 121 Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) (GB/GB 1967/GB 1971) 85, 86, 88, 89, 227, 228 Brynmill edition 229 in Human World, The 204, 228, 229–30 Ketner and Eigsti edition 228 literary executers disagreement 204, 205, 221, 224–5, 227, 307 Rhees and MS 110 Frazer transcription, as editor 204, 205–11, 212 Rhees and MS 143 Frazer transcription, as editor 204–5, 211–214 Rhees and Synthese edition, as editor 204, 205, 206, 211, 214–16, 227, 228, 229–30 Rhees, as editor 88, 151–2, 203–5, 227–30 Rhees, proposals concerning Lecture on Ethics, A 151, 204, 205, 218–21, 224–7, 253–4 Rhees, proposals concerning On Certainty/Über Gewißheit 204, 220–8, 226, 253–4 in translation 228

380

Bergen Electronic Edition 70, 156 Bevan, Edward 45 BGM. See Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics) Big Typescript: TS 213 (BT 2005) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 86, 87, 94, 96, 206, 211 Big Typescript, Wiener Ausgabe Band 11 (Wi11) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 86, 87, 92, 94, 96 Brenner, Michael 236 Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker (CLF/CLF 1969) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 88 BT 2005 (Big Typescript: TS 213) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 86, 87, 94, 96, 206, 211 Buch der Lieder (Heine, Heinrich) 56 Burckhardt, Jacob Kultur der Renaissance in Italien, Die 56 butter remark 318–19 ‘Can There Be a Private Language?’ (Rhees, Rush) 24 Cantor, Georg 111–12, 114, 118–19, 128 Carnap, Rudolf Abriss der Logistik 57 Logische Aufbau der Welt, Der 57 cars remark 315, 318 Cavell, S. 311 CCO/CCO 1973 (Letters to C. K. Ogden) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 86, 88, 89 censorship 155–7 Chopin, Frédéric 288, 289 Cioffi, Frank 229–30 CLF/CLF 1969 (Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 88 Cockburn, David 23, 30, 123 ‘Collection of Remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein, A’ (CoR) (ed. by von Wright) 176–7, 180, 182, 185, 210, 211 Collegium Institute Archive of G.E.M. Anscombe (AA) 70, 78 compartmentalisation idea 303 see also detachability, separability idea, thematic editing

INDEX

complete edition 13, 94, 95, 98, 99, 298–300 Conquest of Mexico (Prescott, William H.) 206 Conradi, Peter J. 37 Continuation War 58 CoR (‘Collection of Remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein, A’) (ed. by von Wright) 176–7, 180, 182, 185, 210, 211 Cornell University microfilm 70, 87–8, 156 ‘Wittgenstein Papers, The’ 88 correspondence between the literary executors 69–77, 298, 322 n. 5 see also under Anscombe, Elizabeth and Rhees, Rush and von Wright, Georg Henrik Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik 106–29 correspondence calendar 77–101 incompleteness 72–7 correspondence calendar 77–101 abbreviations 101–3 1950s 79, 80t–4t 1960s 79, 84t–9 1970s 89t–93t 1980s 79–80, 93–8t 1990s 98–101 overview 78t–80 year-wise distribution 79f Course of Pure Mathematics, A (Hardy, G. H.) 115–16, 122, 124, 125 Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPJ) (Kant, Immanuel) 276 CRK/CRK 1974 (Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 89, 90, 345t Culture and Value (CV) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 26, 86, 91, 92, 177, 183, 195–6, 198, 235 aesthetics 275 Anscombe, as editor /translator 92, 97, 100 coded remarks 155 MS sources 243–5 music in 286–9 Nyman, Heikki, as editor 177 remarks in 244–5, 259–64

INDEX

translations 92 von Wright, as editor 63, 87, 89, 91, 92, 100, 146, 177, 179, 183, 210, 244, 259, 264, 273, 286, 289, 296, 312–15 von Wright, thoughts on 179–80, 190–1, 197, 273 von Wright, work on aphorisms/remarks 177, 178–9, 181, 182, 186, 190, 273, 286, 289 CV. See Culture and Value Daniel, Norman ‘Justice of the Present War Examined, The’ 48–9 D’Arcy, Martin Nature of Belief, The 43 Defence of Common Sense (Moore, George Edward) 216, 217 Denyer, Nicholas 79, 100 detachability 185–6 see also compartmentalisation idea, separability idea, thematic editing dialogue 317–20 Diamond, Cora 23, 75 Diarios Secretos (GT/GT 1985b) 94, 96, 154, 156, 159, 160, 161 Diaris Secrets (GT/GT 1985a) 94, 96, 154, 156, 159, 160, 161 Discussions of Wittgenstein (Rhees, Rush) 24 Dostoevsky, Fyodor 183–4 Drury, Maurice O’Connor 24, 45–6, 74, 88, 297, 304 Rhees, correspondence with 73, 206, 209–10, 215, 228 Eckermann, J. P. Gespräche mit Geothe 56, 59 editing 2–3, 75–6f, 96, 294–7 Anscombe, Elizabeth, views on 3, 92, 95, 145–8, 151, 153, 156–8, 246–8, 256, 295, 298–9, 300, 303 censorship 155–7 compartmentalisation idea 303 see also detachability, separability idea, thematic editing

381

correspondence about 69–77 see also correspondence calendar decoding 168 n. 34 detachability 185–6 see also compartmentalisation idea, separability idea, thematic editing literary executors, principles of 293–313 philosophy 162–3 Rhees, Rush, views on 3, 122, 125, 227, 146–7, 151–2, 203, 253, 256, 295, 298–9, 302–12 separability idea 303, 308, 309, 310 see also compartmentalisation idea, detachability, thematic editing suppression 154, 155–8 thematic 151, 153–4, 237–9, 240, 243, 244, 245, 248–53, 255–6, 257–9, 303, 308, see also compartmentalisation idea, detachability, separability idea tripartite theme 151, 153–4 von Wright, Georg Henrik, views on 3, 4–5, 60, 151, 156–8, 256, 257, 270 n. 56, 295–6, 298–9, 300, 303, 312–17 Eigsti, James 228 Einleitung in die Philosophie (Jerusalem, Wilhelm) 56 enlightenment 320–1 enlightenment proposal 1 Essay in Modern Logic, An (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 123, 124 Ethica Nicomachea (Aristotle) 40–1 Explanation and Understanding (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 60, 192 First Critique (Kant, Immanuel) 275–6 Foot, Philippa 41, 42, 126 Forbes, George 21 Frankfurt School 10, 61, 289, 313 Frazer, James George 307 Golden Bough, The 206, 207–8, 215, 224 see also Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ Frege, Gottlob 46 notion of exactness 312

382

GB/GB 1967/GB 1971 (Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’). See Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ Geach, Mary 39, 40 Geach, Peter 39, 41, 44, 45, 74, 141–2 Three Philosophers 48 Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology (PGL) 97 Zettel, as editor 165 n. 17 Geheime Tagebücher (The Secret Diaries) (GT) 94, 96, 154 van Gennip, Kim 238–9 Gespräche mit Geothe (Eckermann, J. P.) 56, 59 Gödel, Kurt 107–9, 110, 111, 114, 117, 122 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von Hermann und Dorothea 59 Leiden des jungen Werther, Die 56 Golden Bough, The (Frazer, James George) 206, 207–8, 215, 224 see also Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ Gospel in Brief, The (Tolstoy, Leo) 160 grammar 47, 286–7, 309 GT/GT 1985a (Diaris Secrets) 94, 96, 154, 156, 159, 160, 161 GT/GT 1985b (Diarios Secretos) 94, 96, 154, 156, 159, 160, 161 Habermas, Jürgen 313 Hacker, Peter 100, 142–5, 148, 149 Haldane 141–2 Hanslick, Eduard 281, 283 Hardy, G. H. Course of Pure Mathematics, A 115–18, 122, 124, 125 Hare, R. M. 42, 43 Heine, Heinrich Buch der Lieder 56 Hegel, Georg W. F. 39, 192, 275 Hermann und Dorothea (Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von) 59 Hertzberg, Lars 122, 123 Hintikka, Jaakko 126, 214 Hume’s Theory of the External World (Price, H. H.) 43

INDEX

In the Shadow of Descartes (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 63 ‘Intellectual Autobiography’ (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 192 Intention (Anscombe, Elizabeth) 40–1, 82 Janik, Allan and Toulmin, Stephen Wittgenstein’s Vienna 189, 190, 195, 196, 197 Jerusalem, Wilhelm 56 Einleitung in die Philosophie 56 ‘Justice of the Present War Examined, The’ (Anscombe, Elizabeth and Daniel, Norman) 48–9 Kaila, Eino 56–7, 60 Kant, Immanuel 275–6, 280–1 Critique of the Power of Judgment 276 First Critique 275–6 Kenny, Anthony 38, 42, 44, 48, 74, 75 Anscombe, criticism of 141 Nachlass (estate) of Wittgenstein 79 Rhees, criticism of 92 Ketner, Kenneth L. 228 King Lear (Shakespeare, William) 306 Kreisel, Georg 74, 80, 116, 123–4, 131 n. 22 von Wright 125, 134 n. 49 Wittgenstein, thoughts on 133 n. 47 Kripke, Saul 144, 311 Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language 311 Kultur der Renaissance in Italien, Die (Burckhardt, Jacob) 56 LA 1966 (Lectures and Conversations) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 86, 89, 166 n. 21 language-games 27–9, 31, 46–7, 182, 189, 197, 207–8, 214, 222, 223, 316 Larsson, Hans Psykologi 56 last writings (of Wittgenstein) 148–54, 235–7 Anscombe, as editor 246–8 editorial policies 245, 264

INDEX

Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 2 235, 238, 242–3 On Certainty 235, 236, 238, 240f, 253–4 posthumous publications and their MS sources 237–46 publication programme 245–6 Remarks on Colour 241f–2 Rhees, Rush, as editor 253–5f thematic editing 151, 153–4, 237–9, 240, 243, 244, 245, 248–53, 255–6, 257–9 Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value) 243–5, 259–64 von Wright, as editor 236, 237, 248–53, 254 ‘Wittgenstein: Last Writings’, unpublished edition 237, 248–52 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1 (LW1/LW1982) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 93, 94, 264 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 2 (LW2/LW1992) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 86, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 235, 238, 246 editing 85, 94, 151, 152–3, 242, 243, 264 MS sources 242–3 source-graph 242f LE. See Lecture on Ethics, A Lecture on Ethics, A (LE) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 43, 89, 151–2, 210–11 literary executers disagreement 204, 307 Rhees, as editor 89, 151–2 Rhees, proposals concerning 204, 205, 209, 210–11, 218–21, 224–7, 253–4, 310–11 Lectures and Conversations (LA 1966) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 86, 89, 166 n. 21 Leiden des jungen Werther, Die (Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von) 56 Letters to C. K. Ogden (CCO/CCO 1973) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 86, 88, 89 Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore (CRK/CRK 1974) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 89, 90, 345t

383

Lichtenberg, C. G. 183 Sudelbücher (Waste books) 183 Vermischte Schriften 183 ‘Limits of Empiricism, The’ (Russell, Bertrand) 111 literary executors 293–4, 320, 336f–7f Anscombe, Elizabeth. See Anscombe, Elizabeth best writings versus complete edition 298–300 complete edition 13, 94, 95, 98, 99, 298–300 correspondence. See correspondence between the literary executers dialogue as writing form 317–20 disagreement 73, 204, 205, 221, 224–5, 227, 305, 307, 308–11 editing principles of 293–313 Malcolm, Norman 80–1 modernity 313, 314, 315 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations) 300–2, 317–19 Rhees, Rush. See Rhees, Rush success and its paradoxes 295–8 unity of logic and ethics 302–12 unity of logic and political philosophy 313 von Wright, Georg Henrik. See von Wright, Georg Henrik literature 183–4 logic 274, 275, 276, 306 logical form 277, 278–81, 286 Logical Problem of Induction, The (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 58, 59 Logical Studies (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 60 Logik, filosofi och spark (Logic, philosophy and language) (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 181 Logische Aufbau der Welt, Der (Carnap, Rudolf) 57 Logischphilosophische Abhandlung (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 1 see also Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) Loos, Adolf 196

384

‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’ (Anscombe, Elizabeth) 46, 47 ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch’ (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 60, 62, 155, 184, 188 Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections (Rhees, Rush) 24 Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 177 LW1/LW1982 (Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1) 93, 94, 264 LW2/LW1992 (Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 2). See Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 2 MacCumhaill, Clare 43 McGuinness, Brian 74, 75, 88, 96, 97 Rhees, correspondence with 75, 85 von Wright, correspondence with 73, 75 Mahler, Gustav 286 Malcolm, Norman 45, 58, 60, 209, 216, 217, 253 as literary executor 80–1 von Wright, correspondence/ relationship with 8, 24, 58, 73, 75 Marx, Karl 10, 39, 61, 102, 190–7, 316 Marxism 192–5, 197 mathematics 31, 105–22, 124–5, 133 n. 48, 308, 309, 312, 315 Maury, André 75 Midgley, Mary 42–3, 126 ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (Anscombe, Elizabeth) 43, 49 modernity 61, 63, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 196–7, 198, 313, 314–16 Monk, Ray 96 Moore, George Edward 80, 222, 226 Defence of Common Sense 216, 217 Moore Volume (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 80, 81, 205–6 von Morstein, Petra 75 Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele 236 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 287–8, 289 Mühlhölzer, F. 126 Murdoch, Iris 37, 42–3

INDEX

music in Culture and Value 286–9 in Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations) 282–5 in Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus 276, 277–82 Nachlass (estate) of Wittgenstein 2, 4–5, 91, 294 see also literary executors aesthetics 274 Austrian part 88 board of trustees, changes 79, 98, 100–1 categorizing 4–5 complete edition 94, 95, 98, 99, 298–300 computerization 91, 92, 94 conferences about 73 Cornell microfilm 70, 87–8, 156 correspondence about 69–77 correspondence calendar. See correspondence calendar last writings. See last writings Nedo, Michael 92, 94, 95, 96–7, 98, 99, 100 publishing of 99, 147 Stonborough, John 88 transcript 94 von Wright catalogue 4–5, 54 von Wright, G.H. 4–5, 59 National Library of Finland (NLF) 75, 78 Natural Theology (Boedder, Bernard) 43 Nature of Belief, The (D’Arcy, Martin) 43 NB/NB 1961. See Notebooks 1914–1916 ‘Necessity and Truth’ (Anscombe, Elizabeth) 39 Nedo, Michael 73, 75, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96–7, 98, 99, 100 NL/NL 1957 (‘Notes on Logic’) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 83 NL 1960 (‘Aufzeichnungen über Logik’) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 81, 82, 342t, 350 NLF (National Library of Finland) 75, 78 Norm and Action (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 60

INDEX

Norwegian Wittgenstein Project 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 Notebooks 1914–1916 (NB/NB 1961) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 81, 82–3, 84 Anscombe, Elizabeth, as translator 82 coded remarks 154–63 decoding 168 n. 34 editing 146, 154–5, 286 survival 155 ‘Notes on Logic’ (NL/NL 1957) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 83 see also ‘Aufzeichnungen über Logik’ Nyíri, Kristóf 189, 190–2, 299 ‘Wittgenstein’s New Traditionalism’ 191 ‘Wittgenstein’s philosophical anthropology as seen from the perspective of Marx’s theory of history’ 191 Nyman, Heikki 75, 96, 177 OC/OC 1961. See On Certainty On Certainty (OC/OC 1961)/Über Gewißheit (ÜG) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 228, 235, 236, 238, 246, 255–6 Anscombe as editor 88, 146, 151–2, 153, 167 n. 26, 216, 217–18, 221, 238, 246–8, 251–2, 254, 322 n. 9 editing 85, 86, 88, 89, 146, 151–3 errors in 89 literary executers disagreement 204, 307 MS sources 240f Rhees, proposals concerning 204, 205, 216–18, 219–28, 253–5f, 310–11 Schulte, Joachim 271 n. 73 source-graphs 240f, 255f Stern, David 271 n. 73 translation 87 von Wright, as editor 88, 146, 167 n. 26, 216–17, 238, 247, 251–2, 253–4, 310, 322 n. 9 Westergaard, Peter 272 n. 73

385

Pascal, Blaise 24 Paul, Denis 41–2, 74, 87 PB/PB 1964 (Philosophische Bemerkungen) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 86, 308–9 personal/private, the 154, 156, 157, 170 n. 42, 171 n. 44, 298–300, 307 PG/PG 1969 (Philosophische Grammatik [Philosophical Grammar]) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 87, 89, 92, 146, 211, 212, 214, 256 PH 1989 (‘Philosophie’) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 98 Phillips, D. Z. 23, 24, 25 ‘Philosophie’ (PH 1989) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 98 Philosophische Bemerkungen (PB/PB 1964) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 86, 308–9 Philosophische Grammatik (Philosophical Grammar) (PG/PG 1969) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 87, 89, 92, 146, 211, 212, 214, 256 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations) (PI/PI 1953) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 15 n. 8, 26, 81, 110, 182, 215, 236, 259, 294 Anscombe, as editor 72, 80, 81, 145–54, 301, 317, 331 n. 94 Anscombe, thoughts on 40, 82 Anscombe, as translator 45, 80, 138–42 aphorisms/general remarks 186, 198, 317, 318 audience 320 beetle remark 306 bilingual edition 142 butter remark 318–19 dialogue as writing form 317–20 editorial controversy 148–50 Frege’s notion of exactness 312 German edition 83 Hacker, Peter and Schulte, Joachim 142–5, 148, 149 language 30, 284, 285, 286–7 music in 282–5 origins 91

386

part II 99, 300–2 re-writing 301 Rhees, as editor 72, 85, 146–7, 148, 149, 150, 208, 301, 317 Rhees, thoughts on 24, 224 Rhees, as translator 23, 24 rule-following 282–5, 287 Seele discussion 142–5 Venuti, Lawrence 138 von Wright, as editor 198, 301 von Wright, origins research 90, 92, 331 n. 94 von Wright, thoughts on 184, 186, 195, 198, 208, 251, 255–6, 301, 331 n. 94 philosophy 1, 275–6, 296, 299–300, 306–7, 318, 320–1 aesthetics 274–5 arts, the. See arts, the aspect seeing 289 British 126 butter remark 318–19 editing 163–4 German tradition 275 language 28, 30 logical form 277, 278–81, 286 ownership of ideas 3 picture theory 277, 279 propositions 277–81 rule-following 282–5, 287, 308, 311 Socratic 320–1 tautologies 280–1 as therapy 304–5, 311–12 time of philosophy theme 303, 308 unity of logic and ethics idea 304, 310–11 unity of logic and political philosophy 313 PI/PI 1953. See Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations) Pichler, Alois 75, 177 picture theory 277, 279 Pinsent, David 156 Pitchler, George 87 Pitkin, Hanna 331 n. 92 Wittgenstein and Justice 331 n. 92 Plato 32, 33 powerlessness 159–60

INDEX

practical syllogism 40–1 Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’, generally known as The Blue and Brown Books (BBB/ BBB 1958) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 80, 82, 83, 88, 134 n. 52 Prescott, William H. Conquest of Mexico 206 Price, H. H. 43 Hume’s Theory of the External World 43 private/personal, the 154, 156, 157, 170 n. 42, 171 n. 44, 298–300, 307 Prototractatus. An Early Version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (PT/ PT 1971) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 87, 89 psychologism 28 Psykologi (Larsson, Hans) 56 PT/PT 1971 (Prototractatus. An Early Version of Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 87, 89 ‘Question of Linguistic Idealism, The’ (Anscombe, Elizabeth) 47 RBA (Richard Burton Archive), Rush Rhees Collection in the 70, 75, 78, 231 readers 2–3, 26 ‘Religious Belief. Ritual and Myth’ lecture (Rhees, Rush) 227 Remarks on Colour (ROC/ROC 1977) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 152–3, 235, 236 Anscombe, as editor 146, 151, 153, 238, 241, 246, 264 MS sources 241f–2 source-graph 241f von Wright 85, 86, 151 ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’ (GB/ GB 1967/GB 1971/RF). See Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics) (RFM/RFM 1956/ RFM 1978). See Bemerkungen

INDEX

über die Grundlagen der Mathematik Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (RPP/RPP 1980a/b) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 88, 90, 92, 93, 145, 146, 243, 347t ‘Reply to Mr C. S. Lewis’s Argument that “Naturalism” is Self-Refuting, A’ (Anscombe, Elizabeth) 49 RF (‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’). See Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ RFM/RFM 1956/RFM 1978. See Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics) Rhees, Rush 2, 24–5, 72 Anscombe, correspondence with 70–2, 74, 211, 225, 253 see also correspondence calendar archives 70, 75, 78, 231 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics), as editor 72, 81, 82, 90, 91, 106–29, 308 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics), as indexer 119–20 Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ as editor see under Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ Brown Books, as editor 83 ‘Can There Be a Private Language?’ 24 Certainty seminars 219, 226 character 125, 126 Cioffi, Frank, correspondence with 229–30 communication partners 74–5 compartmentalisation idea 303 see also detachability, separability idea, thematic editing complete edition 94, 95, 98, 298–300 death 73, 98 Discussions of Wittgenstein 24

387

Drury, Maurice O’Connor, correspondence with 73, 206, 209–10, 215, 228 editing views 3, 122, 125, 227, 146–7, 151–2, 203, 253, 256, 295, 298–9, 302–12 editing, thematic 253, 255–6, 303, 308 see also compartmentalisation idea, detachability separability idea homosexuality, thoughts on 170 n. 42 Kenny, Anthony, correspondence with 75 language-games 27–9, 31, 207, 214, 223 language, unity of 29–33, 122 last writings (of Wittgenstein), as editor 237, 253–5f Lecture on Ethics, A, as editor 89, 151–2 Lecture on Ethics, A, proposals concerning 204, 205, 209, 210–11, 218–21, 224–7, 253–4, 310–11 life, education and career 21–4, 74, 84, 229 literary executors disagreement 204, 205, 221, 224–5, 227, 305, 307, 308–11 logic 123, 124–5 Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections 24 McGuinness, Brian, correspondence with 75, 85 Nedo, Michael, correspondence with 75 On Certainty/Über Gewißheit, proposals concerning 204, 205, 216–18, 219–28, 253–5f, 310–11 On Certainty/Über Gewißheit, thoughts on editing 151–2 Phillips, D. Z. 23, 24, 25 Philosophische Bemerkungen, as editor 86, 308–9 Philosophische Grammatik, as editor 87, 92, 146, 211, 212, 214 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), as editor 72, 85, 146–7, 148, 149, 150, 208, 301, 317

388

Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), as translator 23, 24, 141 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), thoughts on 24, 224 philosophy 25–7, 115, 126, 304, 306–8, 331 n. 92 philosophy/life distinction 4 preface writing 217–18 Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’, generally known as The Blue and Brown Books, as editor 83, 134 n. 52 privacy 170 n. 42, 171 n. 44 ‘Religious Belief. Ritual and Myth’ lecture 227 ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’, as editor 151–2 rhetoric 26–7 separability idea 303, 308, 309, 310 see also compartmentalisation idea, detachability, thematic editing ‘Some Developments in Wittgenstein’s View of Ethics’ 210 time of philosophy theme 303, 308 Über Gewißheit/On Certainty, proposals concerning 204, 205, 216–18, 219–28, 253–5f, 310–11 Über Gewißheit/On Certainty, thoughts on editing 151–2 understanding 32–3 unity of logic and ethics idea 304, 310–11 von Wright, correspondence with 70–2, 74, 205–6, 207–8, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215–17, 218–20, 221–2, 224–7, 253–4, 296, 299, 301, 305–6, 308–11, 318 see also correspondence calendar Without Answers 24 Wittgenstein, relationship with 22, 23, 25–6, 33, 294, 301, 302, 318 Wittgenstein, thoughts on 27–9, 31, 122–3, 133 n. 48, 332 n. 101 Wittgenstein and his Times 229 ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual’ 227, 228–9

INDEX

‘Wittgenstein’s Builders’ 24, 27–9 Wittgensteins geistige Erscheinung 229 works 24 see also under individual titles Richard Burton Archive (RBA) 70, 75, 78, 231 Richards, Ben 45, 46, 73 ROC/ROC 1977. See Remarks on Colour RPP/RPP 1980a/b (Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 88, 90, 92, 93, 145, 146, 243, 347t rule-following 282–5, 287, 308, 311 Rush Rhees Collection in the Richard Burton Archive (RBA) 70, 75, 78, 231 Russell, Bertrand 81, 82, 310 ‘Limits of Empiricism, The’ 111 Second World War 42, 48, 49 Schildt, Göran 55 Schlick, Moritz 210 Schollick, Henry 106, 248 Schopenhauer, A 281 Schroeder, Severin ‘Wittgenstein on Aesthetics’ 274 Schulte, Joachim 100, 227, 229, 271 n. 73 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations) 142–5, 148, 149 separability idea 303, 308, 309, 310 see also compartmentalisation idea, detachability, thematic editing Shakespeare, William King Lear 306 Six Essays in Philosophical Logic (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 61 Skinner, Francis 42 slow reading 127–8 Smythies, Yorick 45–6 Socrates 318, 320–1, 330 n. 92 Somavilla, Ilse 158–9 ‘Some Developments in Wittgenstein’s View of Ethics’ (Rhees, Rush) 210 sophism/sophistry 32–3 soul, the 141–5

INDEX

Sraffa, Piero 74, 80 Stern, David 271 n. 73 Stonborough, John 88 Stonborough, Thomas 87 style 140–1 Sudelbücher (Waste books) (Lichtenberg, C. G.) 183 Suhrkamp Verlag 106–7, 253 Tanke och förkunnelse (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 60 Tarski, Alfred 111, 112 tautologies 280–1 The Collegium Institute Archive of G.E.M. Anscombe 70, 78 thematic editing see editing, thematic ‘Theory of Language, A’ (Anscombe, Elizabeth) 46–7 third Wittgenstein 236, 237, 256 Thomas Aquinas, Saint 39, 40, 44 Three Philosophers (Anscombe, Elizabeth and Geach, Peter) 48 time of philosophy theme 303, 308 TLP. See Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus Tolstoy, Leo 46 Gospel in Brief, The 160 Toulmin, Stephen and Janik, Allan Wittgenstein’s Vienna 189, 190, 195, 196, 197 Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus (TLP) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 2, 24, 26, 44, 83, 159, 196, 236, 320 see also Logischphilosophische Abhandlung aesthetics 274 Anscombe 46, 48, 82, 158 aphorisms/general remarks 186, 198 immortality 87 Janik, Allan and Toulmin, Stephen 195, 196 logical form 277, 278–81, 286–7 music in 276, 277–82, 286 Notebooks 1914–1916, coded remarks in 158, 159, 161 von Wright 81, 82, 83, 88, 186, 198 translation 138, 139, 141–5 Trinity College Cambridge 80, 84, 88, 98 see also Wren Library

389

‘Troubled History of the Philosophical Investigations. Part II’ (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 301 Über Gewißheit (ÜG)/On Certainty (OC) 228, 235, 236, 238, 246, 255–6 Anscombe as editor 88, 146, 151–2, 153, 167 n. 26, 216, 217–18, 221, 238, 246–8, 251–2, 254, 322 n. 9 editing 85, 86, 88, 89, 146, 151–3 errors in 89 literary executers disagreement 204, 307 MS sources 240f Rhees, proposals concerning 204, 205, 216–18, 219–28, 253–5f, 310–11 Rhees, thoughts on editing 151–2 Schulte, Joachim 271 n. 73 source-graphs 240f, 255f Stern, David 271 n. 73 translation 87 von Wright, as editor 88, 146, 167 n. 26, 216–17, 238, 247, 251–2, 253–4, 310, 322 n. 9 von Wright, proposals concerning 204, 219, 221, 225, 226 Westergaard, Peter 272 n. 73 ÜG. See Über Gewißheit ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ (Winch, Peter) 209 unity of logic and ethics idea 304, 310–11 unity of logic and political philosophy 313 University of Tübingen 91, 92 Wittgenstein Archive 73, 75, 80, 89, 93, 94 Unseld, Siegfried 106, 118, 216, 218, 219, 225, 226, 253, 254 Varieties of Goodness, The (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 60, 63, 64 VB/VB 1977. See Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value)

390

Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value) (VB/VB 1977) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 26, 86, 91, 92, 177, 183, 195–6, 198, 235 aesthetics 275 Anscombe, as editor /translator 92, 97, 100 coded remarks 155 MS sources 243–5 music in 286–9 Nyman, Heikki, as editor 177 remarks in 244–5, 259–64 translations 92 von Wright, as editor 63, 87, 89, 91, 92, 100, 146, 177, 179, 183, 210, 244, 259, 264, 273, 286, 289, 296, 312–15 von Wright, thoughts on 179–80, 190–1, 197, 273 von Wright, work on aphorisms/ remarks 177, 178–9, 181, 182, 186, 190, 273, 286, 289 Vermischte Schriften (Lichtenberg, C. G.) 183 Vietnam 61 Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives (WWA) 70, 73, 78, 231 von Wright catalogue 4–5, 54, 88, 89 Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 227 WAB (Wittgenstein Archive, University of Bergen) 75, 98, 99, 100 Waismann, Friedrich 85 war 42, 48, 49, 321 ‘War and Murder’ (Anscombe, Elizabeth) 41 ‘Wenn ich bei meiner Liebsten bin’ (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 56 Westergaard, Peter 272 n. 73 Wi11 (Big Typescript, Wiener Ausgabe Band 11) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 86, 87, 92, 94, 96 will of Wittgenstein 2, 159–62, 336f–7f Winch, Peter 23, 24, 79, 92, 98, 177 Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough, proposals concerning 209

INDEX

‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ 209 Winter War 58 Wiseman, Rachael 43 Without Answers (Rhees, Rush) 24 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 297, 320 see also Wittgenstein, works of aesthetics 274–5, 287–9 alienation 187, 188–9, 191 Anscombe, relationship with 41, 44, 45–6, 141, 147, 164 n. 10, 294, 301, 302 Anscombe, thoughts on 44–5 aphorisms 176–86, 190, 197–8, 273, 286, 288, 289, 313, 317, 318 archives. See archives aspect seeing 289 audience 320, 321 n. 3 beetle remark 306 butter remark 318–19 career 22, 44, 45, 57–8, 297 cars remark 315, 318 censorship 155–7 certainty 153 Chopin, Frédéric 288, 289 coded remarks 5, 154–63, 299 complete edition 13, 94, 95, 98, 99, 298–300 conditions of access to 2 as conservative-traditionalist 191 correspondence 5, 82 cultural place 187, 188–9, 191, 195 death and burial 45, 297 Drury, Maurice O’Connor, relationship with 297 editing views 296 enlightenment 320–1 form/content 280 Frazer, James George, thoughts on 206–8, 210, 212, 215, 224, 307 see also Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ Frege’s notion of exactness 312 grammar 47, 286–7, 309 Hardy, G. H. 115–18, 122, 124 health 236, 267 n. 18 homosexuality 91, 156, 157

INDEX

influences 179, 190 language 31, 138, 141, 145, 164 n. 7, 195, 196, 206–8, 220, 224, 276, 277–89 language-games 27–8, 46–7, 182, 189, 197, 207–8, 214, 222, 223, 316 last writings. See last writings lectures, publication/transmission of 5, 91, 94, 95, 109, 209 see also Lecture on Ethics, A as literary writer 184 logic 124–5, 274, 276, 280, 281 logical form 277, 278–81, 286 magic/metaphysics, thoughts on 207–8, 212, 223–4, 328 n. 55 Mahler, Gustav 286 Malcolm, Norman 216, 217 manuscripts guided by 5 Marxism 192–5 mathematics 31, 105–22, 124–5, 133 n. 48, 308, 309, 312, 315 modernity 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 196–7, 198, 313, 314–16 Moore, George Edward, interest in 216, 217, 220, 226 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 287–8, 289 music. See music Nachlass (estate) of. See Nachlass objects 278–9, 280 personality 62, 126, 156–7, 159 philosophy as therapy 304–5, 311–12 philosophy/life distinction 4, 5–6 picture theory 277, 279 Pinsent, David, relationship with 156 powerlessness, thoughts on 159–60 private/personal, the 154, 156, 157, 170 n. 42, 171 n. 44, 298–300, 307 propositions 277–81 publishing reluctance 13, 302, 318, 320 religion, thoughts on 45–6, 47–8, 158–60, 223–4

391

remarks, general/philosophical 175–82, 185–7, 189, 190–1, 197–8, 236, 244, 257–9, 265 n. 3, 273–6, 286, 288–9, 306, 313–15, 318–19, 331 n. 94 Rhees, relationship with 22, 23, 25–6, 33, 294, 301, 302, 318 rhetoric 26–7 rule-following 282–5, 287, 308, 311 Russell, Bertrand, relationship with 310 Seele discussion 142–5 set theory 315–16 sexuality 156, 157 slow reading 127 style 140, 141, 230 tautologies 280–1 themes 151, 238–9, 240 thinking 140 third Wittgenstein 236, 237, 256 understanding 284–5 unity of logic and political philosophy 313 von Wright, relationship with 53, 56, 57–8, 59, 62, 63, 294, 297 war 321 Western civilization, thoughts on 321 will of 2, 159–62, 336f–7f world, independence of 159–62 world, substance of 277, 278, 279, 280, 281 world-pictures 222–3, 228 Wittgenstein, works of 2, 26, 147–8, 151, 152–3, 302, 340t–50 see also under individual titles ‘Aufzeichnungen über Logik’ 81, 82, 342t, 350 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics). See Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’ 85, 86, 88, 89 Big Typescript: TS 213 85, 86, 87, 94, 96, 206, 211 Big Typescript, Wiener Ausgabe Band 11 85, 86, 87, 92, 94, 96 Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker 88

392

Culture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen). See Culture and Value Diarios Secretos 94, 96, 154 Diaris Secrets 94, 96, 154 Geheime Tagebücher (The Secret Diaries) 94, 96, 154 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1 93, 94, 264 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 2). See Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 2 Lecture on Ethics, A. See Lecture on Ethics, A Lectures and Conversations 86, 89, 166 n. 21 Letters to C. K. Ogden 86, 88, 89 Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore 89, 90, 345t Logischphilosophische Abhandlung 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe 177 Moore Volume 80, 81, 205–6 Notebooks 1914–1916. See Notebooks 1914–1916 ‘Notes on Logic’ 83, 342t, 350 On Certainty. See On Certainty ‘Philosophie’ 98 Philosophische Bemerkungen 85, 86, 308–9 Philosophische Grammatik (Philosophical Grammar) 87, 89, 92, 146, 211, 212, 214, 256 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations). See Philosophische Untersuchungen Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’, generally known as The Blue and Brown Books 80, 82, 83, 88 Prototractatus. An Early Version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 87 Remarks on Colour. See Remarks on Colour ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’ 307 see also Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough’

INDEX

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 88, 90, 92, 93, 145, 146, 243, 347t table of works 340t–50 Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus. See Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus Über Gewißheit. See Über Gewißheit Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value). See Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value) Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften 227 ‘Wittgenstein: Last Writings’, unpublished edition 237, 248–52 Wittgenstein’s notes on Mathematics’ (California publication) 209 Wörterbuch für Volks- und Bürgerschulen 1 Zettel 85, 87, 91, 93, 146, 165 n. 17, 288 Wittgenstein (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 179 Wittgenstein and his Times (Rhees, Rush) 229 Wittgenstein and Justice (Pitkin, Hanna) 331 n. 92 ‘Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century’ (WTC) (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 191, 197 Wittgenstein Archive, University of Bergen (WAB) 75, 98, 99, 100 Wittgenstein Archive, University of Tübingen 73, 75, 80, 89, 93, 94 ‘Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times’(WRT) (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 63, 179–80, 187, 188–9, 191, 192–4, 196, 197 ‘Wittgenstein: Last Writings’, unpublished edition (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 237, 248–52 ‘Wittgenstein on Aesthetics’ (Schroeder, Severin) 274 ‘Wittgenstein on Certainty’ (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 226–7, 252 ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual’ (Rhees, Rush) 227, 228–9 Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language (Kripke, Saul) 311

INDEX

‘Wittgenstein Papers, The’ (Cornell University) 88 ‘Wittgenstein Papers, The’ (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 4–5 Wittgenstein. Sources and Perspectives (Luckhardt, C.G.) 229 ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders’ (Rhees, Rush) 24, 27–9 Wittgensteins geistige Erscheinung (Rhees, Rush) 229 Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology (PGL) (Geach, Peter) 97 ‘Wittgenstein’s New Traditionalism’ (Nyíri, Kristóf) 191 ‘Wittgenstein’s notes on Mathematics’ (California publication) 209 ‘Wittgenstein’s philosophical anthropology as seen from the perspective of Marx’s theory of history’ (Nyíri, Kristóf) 191 Wittgenstein’s Vienna (Janik, Allan and Toulmin, Stephen) 189, 190, 195, 196, 197 wittgensteinsource.org 70, 76 WL. See Wren Library, Trinity College Cambridge world, independence of 159–62 Wörterbuch für Volks- und Bürgerschulen (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 1 Wren Library, Trinity College Cambridge (WL) 75, 79, 98, 205, 231 see also Trinity College Cambridge von Wright, Georg Henrik 2, 89, 295, 313 see also von Wright catalogue Anderson, Alan Ross, relationship with 125, 134 n. 49 Anscombe, conflict with 73 Anscombe, correspondence with 70–2, 74, 246–7, 248, 251, 296, 300, 301 see also correspondence calendar Anscombe, relationship with 45 appearance and character 54–5, 126 archives 70, 73, 78, 231 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics), as editor 60, 72, 81, 82, 90, 91,

393

106–29, 145–6, 165 n. 16, 176, 181, 182, 190, 307–8 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics), as indexer 82, 119–20, 119–20, 121 Bemerkungen über Frazers ‘The Golden Bough, proposals concerning 205–6, 207–8, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 225 censorship 156–7 coded remarks 299, 154–8 ‘Collection of Remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein, A’, as editor 176–7, 180, 182, 185, 210, 211 communication partners 75 complete edition, discussion concerning 94, 95, 98, 99, 298, 300 as composer 56 Culture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen), as editor 63, 87, 89, 91, 92, 100, 146, 177, 179, 183, 210, 244, 259, 264, 273, 286, 289, 296, 312–15 Culture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen), thoughts on 179–80, 190–1, 197, 273 Culture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen), work on aphorisms/ remarks 177, 178–9, 181, 182, 186, 190, 273, 286, 289 death 55 decoding 168 n. 34 editing views 3, 4–5, 60, 151, 156–8, 256, 257, 270 n. 56, 295–6, 298–9, 300, 303, 312–17 editing, thematic 151, 153–4, 237, 238, 244, 248–53, 255–6, 257 ‘empiriska satsernas avgränsningsproblem De’ (The demarcation problem of empirical propositions) 57 Essay in Modern Logic, An 123, 124 Explanation and Understanding 60, 192 family 55, 56, 58–60 German influence 53, 56

394

health 58 homosexuality, thoughts on 171 n. 43 honorary volume for 92 In the Shadow of Descartes 63 ‘Intellectual Autobiography’ 192 Janik, Allan and Toulmin, Stephen, influence of 189, 190, 195–7 Kaila, Eino, influence of 56–7 Kenny, Anthony, correspondence with 75 Kirchberg conference 313, 314 Kreisel, Georg 123–5, 134 n. 49 language-games 197, 316 last writings (of Wittgenstein), as editor 236, 237, 248–53, 254 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, as editor 94, 264 Lecture on Ethics, A, proposals concerning 204, 210, 219 Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, as editor 89 Lichtenberg, C. G. 183 life, education and career 53–4, 55–7, 58, 59–61, 74, 80, 84, 175 literary executers disagreement 73, 204, 205, 221, 224–5, 227, 305, 307, 308–11 literature 183–4 logic 123–5, 128 Logical Problem of Induction, The 58, 59 Logical Studies 60 Logik, filosofi och spark (Logic, philosophy and language) 181 ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Biographical Sketch’ 60, 62, 155, 184, 188 Malcolm, Norman, correspondence/ relationship with 8, 24, 58, 73, 75 Marxism 189–90, 192–5 McGuinness, Brian, correspondence with 73, 75 modernity 61, 63, 313, 314–16 Norm and Action 60 Notebooks 1914–1916, as editor 146, 154–8 Nyíri, Kristóf, influence of 189, 190–2

INDEX

On Certainty/Über Gewißheit, as editor 88, 146, 167 n. 26, 216–17, 238, 247, 251–2, 253–4, 310, 322 n. 9 On Certainty/Über Gewißheit, proposals concerning 204, 219, 221, 225, 226 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), as editor 198, 301 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), origins research 90, 92, 331 n. 94 Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), thoughts on 184, 186, 195, 198, 208, 251, 255–6, 301, 331 n. 94 philosophy 54, 55, 56, 57, 60–1, 62–4, 183, 187–8, 289–90, 303–5, 313, 314–16 philosophy/life distinction 4 Pichler, Alois, correspondence with 75 privacy 171 n. 44 progress 61 Remarks on Colour 85, 86, 151 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, as editor 92, 146 Rhees, correspondence with 70–2, 74, 205–6, 207–8, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215–17, 218–20, 221–2, 224–7, 253–4, 296, 299, 301, 305–6, 308–11, 318 see also correspondence calendar Schollick, Henry, correspondence with 248 set theory 315–16 Six Essays in Philosophical Logic 61 Tanke och förkunnelse 60 technology 61 Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus 81, 82, 83, 88, 186, 198 tripartite theme 151 ‘Troubled History of the Philosophical Investigations. Part II’ 301 Über Gewißheit/On Certainty as editor 88, 146, 167 n. 26, 216–17, 238, 247, 251–2, 253–4, 310, 322 n. 9

INDEX

Über Gewißheit/On Certainty, proposals concerning 204, 219, 221, 225, 226 unity of logic and ethics idea 304 Varieties of Goodness, The 60, 63, 64 Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value), as editor 63, 87, 89, 91, 92, 100, 146, 177, 179, 183, 210, 244, 259, 264, 273, 286, 289, 296, 312–15 Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value), thoughts on 179–80, 190–1, 197, 273 Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value), work on aphorisms/remarks 177, 178–9, 181, 182, 186, 190, 273, 286, 289 war 58, 60–1 ‘Wenn ich bei meiner Liebsten bin’ 56 Wittgenstein 179 Wittgenstein, relationship with 53, 56, 57–8, 59, 62, 63, 294, 297 Wittgenstein, thoughts on 58, 63–4, 123, 124, 125, 178–9, 181, 184, 187–97 Wittgenstein, work on his aphorisms 176, 178, 180, 181–4, 185, 186, 197–8, 289, 313 Wittgenstein, work on his general / philosophical remarks 175–9, 180–2, 185–7, 189, 190–1, 197–8, 244, 273, 276, 286, 289, 313–15 ‘Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century’ 191, 197

395

‘Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times’ 63, 179–80, 187, 188–9, 191, 192–4, 196, 197 ‘Wittgenstein: Last Writings’, unpublished edition, thoughts on 237, 248–52, 255–6 ‘Wittgenstein on Certainty’ 226–7, 252 ‘Wittgenstein Papers, The’ 4–5 works 54, 56, 61, 63 see also under individual titles ‘zerreissfeste Weltanschaung, Eine’ (A tear-proof worldview) 194 Zettel, as editor 85, 146 von Wright, Tor 55, 56 von Wright catalogue 4–5, 54, 88, 89 writing style 140–1, 317–18 WRT (‘Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times’) (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 63, 179–80, 187, 188–9, 191, 192–4, 196, 197 WTC (‘Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century’) (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 191, 197 WWA (Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives) 70, 73, 78, 231 Z/Z 1967/Z 1981 (Zettel) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 87, 91, 93, 146, 165 n. 17, 288 ‘zerreissfeste Weltanschaung, Eine’ (A tear-proof worldview) (von Wright, Georg Henrik) 194 Zettel (Z/Z 1967/Z 1981) (Wittgenstein, Ludwig) 85, 87, 91, 93, 146, 165 n. 17, 288

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