The Construction of National Identity in Taiwan's Media, 1896-2012 [1 ed.] 9789004227699, 9789004227705

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The Construction of National Identity in Taiwan’s Media, 1896-2012

The Construction of National Identity in Taiwan’s Media, 1896-2012 By

Chien-Jung Hsu

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: The map of Taiwan in media mastheads. Collage by the author. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hsu, Chien-Jung. The construction of national identity in Taiwan’s media, 1896-2012 / by Chien-Jung Hsu. pages cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-22770-5 (hardback : acid-free paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-22769-9 (e-book) 1. Mass media-Political aspects--Taiwan--History. 2. Mass media--Social aspects--Taiwan--History. 3. Mass media policy-Taiwan--History. 4. National characteristics, Taiwan--History. 5. Group identity--Political aspects--Taiwan-History. 6. Nationalism--Taiwan--History. 7. Taiwan--Social conditions. 8. Taiwan--Politics and government. I. Title. P95.82.T28H74 2014 302.23’0951249--dc23 2014001347

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual ‘Brill’ typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see brill.com/brill-typeface. isbn 978 90 04 22770 5 (hardback) isbn 978 90 04 22769 9 (e-book) Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

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Contents Acknowledgements xi Note on Romanization xiii List of Tables xv List of Figures xvii Introduction 1 1 The Media and National Identity during the Japanese Colonial Period 5 The Japanization Policy – Dōka 6 Dōka through the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper and the Kōminka Movement 7 Dōka through National Language Education 9 Taiwanese National Identities against Japanese Colonial Rule 11 The Media and National Identities 13 Japanese Identity and the Official Media 15 Taiwanese National Identities in Taiwanese Private Media 23 Concluding Remarks 44 2 The Chinese Nationalist Party Regime and the Media, 1945-1987 46 A Colonial Power: The Chinese Nationalist Party 46 The Watershed during 1945-1949 48 A Regime of Mainlanders from China (1949-1987) 50 The Sinification of Taiwan, 1945-1949 59 Sinicizing Taiwan as a Revival Base for the Chinese Nation after 1949 60 Mass Media and China Identity 62 The Media as the KMT’s State Ideological Apparatus 63 The Mass Media in 1945-1949 64 The Mass Media in 1949-1988 71 Dissenting Magazines and National Identity 83 Chinese Identity, Liberalism and Socialism in Dissenting Magazines 85 Opposition Magazines and the Rise of Taiwanese Consciousness 87 Concluding Remarks 93 3 The Media and National Identity under Democratization 94 Democratization and the Rise of Taiwan Identity 94 Changes in Taiwan’s’ Newspapers under Democratization 100 The Decline of China Identity Newspapers: The United Daily News and the China Times 100

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The Rise of a Taiwan Identity Newspaper: The Liberty Times 103 The Rise of the Apple Daily 105 Other Newspapers: The Importance of Business Factors 108 The Electronic Media 110 Government and Media after Democratization 115 Concluding Remarks 116 4 China Identity Media 119 Newspapers 121 The United Daily News 121 The China Times 135 The Yu Family and the China Times 135 Tsai Eng-meng and the China Times 140 News Television Stations 146 TVBS 146 CTi Television 150 The Eastern Broadcasting Company 151 ERA Communication Corporation 152 Concluding Remarks 154 5 Taiwan Identity Media 156 Newspapers 157 The Independent Evening Post 157 The Taiwan Daily 162 The Taiwan Times 167 The Commons Daily 173 The Liberty Times 176 The Capital Morning Post 184 The Apple Daily 187 The Decline of Opposition Magazines 191 Underground Radio Stations 193 News Television Stations 198 Formosa Television 198 The Sanlih E-Television 202 Cyberspace 209 The Taiwan Culture BBS 211 Cyberspace from the 2000s 217 Concluding Remarks 223 Conclusion 225 Similarities in the Construction of National Identity in the Media during both the Japanese and Chinese Colonial Regimes 225

Contents

China Identity and Taiwan Identity as Rivals in the Media after Democratization 227 Elements in the Construction of National Identity after Democratization 228 Bibliography 230 Index 275

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Acknowledgements xi Note on Romanization xiii List of Tables xv List of Figures xvii Introduction 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 1 5 The Media and National Identity during the Japanese Colonial Period 5 The Japanization Policy – Dōka 6 Dōka through the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper and the Kōminka Movement 7 Dōka through National Language Education 9 Taiwanese National Identities against Japanese Colonial Rule 11 The Media and National Identities 13 Japanese Identity and the Official Media 15 The Taiwan Daily News during the Initial Period of Military Governor-General Rule, 1896-1919 15 The Taiwan Daily News and the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper 17 The Taiwan Daily News and the Kōminka Movement 18 The Taipei Broadcasting Station 19 Taiwanese National Identities in Taiwanese Private Media 23 The Taiwan People’s News and its National Identities 23 The Romanization of Newspaper Titles 26 The Use of Vernacular Chinese 27 Opposition to Dōka 28 Advocating the Maintenance of Traditional Written Chinese 29 Taiwan’s Relationship with China 31 The Mother Nation Camp 32 The Wait for Opportunity Camp 34 The Reform of Taiwan Camp 37 The Taiwan Revolution Camp and the Taiwan Masses Times and the New Taiwan Masses Times Aborigines Ignored 41 Concluding Remarks 44 Chapter 2 46 The Chinese Nationalist Party Regime and the Media, 1945-1987 46 A Colonial Power: The Chinese Nationalist Party 46 The Watershed during 1945-1949 48 A Regime of Mainlanders from China (1949-1987) 50 The Sinification of Taiwan, 1945-1949 59 Sinicizing Taiwan as a Revival Base for the Chinese Nation after 1949 60 Mass Media and China Identity 62 The Media as the KMT’s State Ideological Apparatus 63 The Mass Media in 1945-1949 64 Newspaper Ownership and China Identity 64 The 228 Massacre and Newspapers 67 Broadcast Stations 69 The Impact of the 228 Massacre 70 The Mass Media in 1949-1988 71 Newspapers 71 Radio 76 Television Stations 78 No Taiwanese Languages Allowed: Who Killed Shiyanwen? 81 Dissenting Magazines and National Identity 83 Chinese Identity, Liberalism and Socialism in Dissenting Magazines 85 Free China 85 Apollo 85 China Tide 86 Opposition Magazines and the Rise of Taiwanese Consciousness 87 The Pioneer of Taiwanese Orientation: The Taiwan Political Review 87 A Party without the Title: The Formosa Magazine 88 Debate on Taiwan Consciousness and the Rise of Taiwan Consciousness 90 Concluding Remarks 93 Chapter 3 94 The Media and National Identity under Democratization 94 Democratization and the Rise of Taiwan Identity 94 Changes in Taiwan’s’ Newspapers under Democratization 100 The Decline of China Identity Newspapers: The United Daily News and the China Times 100 The Rise of a Taiwan Identity Newspaper: The Liberty Times 103 The Rise of the Apple Daily 105 Other Newspapers: The Importance of Business Factors 108 The Electronic Media 110 Government and Media after Democratization 115 Concluding Remarks 116 Chapter 4 119 China Identity Media 119 Newspapers 121 The United Daily News 121 The Chinese Nation 123 The One-China Principle and Political Issues 127 From Peaceful Unification to Connection 131 The Concern for Chinese Democracy 133 The China Times 135 The Yu Family and the China Times 135 Chinese Nation, One-China Principle and Political Issues 136 The Concept of the Confederation of Greater China 139 Tsai Eng-meng and the China Times 140 News Television Stations 146 TVBS 146 CTi Television 150 The Eastern Broadcasting Company 151 ERA Communication Corporation 152 Concluding Remarks 154 Chapter 5 156 Taiwan Identity Media 156 Newspapers 157 The Independent Evening Post 157 Changes in the Independent Evening Post after 1988 158 Taiwanese Consciousness and Democracy 160 The Taiwan Daily 162 Change of Ownership and national identity 163 From Pro-Chinese Nationalism to Pro-Taiwan Independence 164 The Taiwan Times 167 Southern Taiwan and Taiwan Identity 168 The Commons Daily 173 The Promotion of a Radical Taiwan Identity 174 The Liberty Times 176 Relations with Taiwan’s Politicians 177 From Anti-Taiwan Independence to Pro-Taiwan Independence 178 Culture, Language and Ethnicity 182 The Capital Morning Post 184 The Construction of Taiwan Identity and the Promotion of a Democracy-Based Taiwan Independence The Apple Daily 187 Market-Oriented – A Newspaper for Most Taiwanese People’s Identity 188 The Decline of Opposition Magazines 191 Underground Radio Stations 193 News Television Stations 198 Formosa Television 198 The Sanlih E-Television 202 Opportunism: Business is Identity 203 The “Big Talk News” 205 Cyberspace 209 The Taiwan Culture BBS 211 The 228 Massacre 212 The White Terror 212 The Promotion of the Hoklo Language 213 Taiwanese Drama & Folk Songs 214 A-bian Fan Club 215 Political Talk 215 Headquarters of the Taiwanese Music Revolution Force 216 Cyberspace from the 2000s 217 The Website of the Goa-Seng-Lang Association For Taiwan Independence 217 The South News 218 The TaiwanUS.net 219 Taiwan Online 219 The Taiwan Bloggers Association 221 Concluding Remarks 223 Conclusion 225 Conclusion 225 Similarities in the Construction of National Identity in the Media during both the Japanese and Chinese Colonial Regimes China Identity and Taiwan Identity as Rivals in the Media after Democratization 227 Elements in the Construction of National Identity after Democratization 228 Bibliography 230 Bibliography 230 Index 275 Index 275

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Acknowledgements I am filled with profound appreciation for my PhD supervisors, Professor Bruce Jacobs, the late Dr Dennis Woodward and Dr Joel Atkinson, for their scholarly advice. I would like to thank all those I have interviewed, who have provided me with invaluable original sources for this book. I am particularly thankful to Waseda University, the Wu San-lien Foundation and the National Museum of Taiwan History for their kind assistance in research matters. I am grateful to the Faculty of Arts, Monash University, which provided me financial support for the completion of this book. I am also indebted to my parents, sisters and brother-in-law, Michael Later, for the generous support they provided. And my sincere and deepest appreciation goes to my wife, Jeng Tian-ren (Fantine), whose encouragement, kindness and unconditional love nourished my spirit when there were setbacks and gave me strength to continue tirelessly toward completion of this book.

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Note on Romanization For scholars of Taiwan, romanization of Chinese words remains an issue. Where known, for personal names I have used the name preferred by the individual, which on some occasions is in Taiwanese. Otherwise, I have used a simplified Wade-Giles Romanization. For all place names in Taiwan, I have used the common form used in Taiwan. For both Chinese-language publications and for the romanization of Chinese terms, all Chinese places and personal names I have used pinyin. For both Taiwanese publications and Taiwanese terms, I have used the Church Romanization. For Japanese publications and Japanese terms, I have used the Hepburn romanization of Japanese.

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List of Tables table

Caption

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.2

Primary School Enrolment Rates of Taiwanese Children 10 Japanese Comprehension Rates among Taiwanese 11 National Identities against Japan among Taiwanese Elites 12 Licensed Radios by Household (1928-1944) 21 History of the Taiwan People’s News 24 Composition of Population in Ethnic Groups in Taiwan, 1930  42 Composition of Population in Ethnic Groups in Taiwan, 1960s 51 Ethnic Distribution of Senior Positions in the KMT Taiwan Provincial Headquarters, 1947 53 Members of KMT by Ethnic Group, 1952-1988 53 CSC of the Chinese Nationalist Party by Ethnic Group, 1952-1988 54 Cabinet Members by Ethnic Group, 1950-1988 55 Government Appointments by Mainlander (MLD) and Taiwanese (TW), 1946-1992 57 Allocated Numbers by Provincial Origin in Civil Service Recruitment Examination 57 Newspapers Published in Taiwan Prior to the 228 Massacre, 19451947 66 Native Taiwanese Media Elites Killed or Presumed Killed during the 228 Massacre  68 Newspapers Closed by KMT Regime during the 228 Massacre in 1947 69 Ethnic Composition of Journalists Working for the Five Nation-Wide Newspapers, 1987 73 Number of Radio Stations by Ownership, 1988-1991 76 Composition by Ethnic Group of Journalists on Three Taiwan TV Stations, 1987 80 The Status of the Opposition Magazines, 1979-1985 84 Total Number of Newspapers Registered 101 Market Shares of the Nation-Wide Newspapers in 1990 102 Newspaper Reading Rates (1992-2008) 103 Average Daily Circulation Figures of the Liberty Times and the Apple Daily in 2007 & 2008 104 Average Circulation Figures of Four Newspapers, Mid-2009 & March 2012 104

2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

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list of tables

3.6 3.7

Market Shares of Cable TV Stations in 2006 112 TV Ratings by Household in Free-to-Air TV News Programs and 24-Hour Cable News Channels 114 TV Ratings by Household of Two Famous Talk Shows, 2010 & 2011 114

3.8

List of Figures figure Caption 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

Survey of Taiwanese & Chinese Identity (1992-2012) 97 Survey of Taiwanese & Chinese Identity (1989-2009) 98 Survey of Taiwanese & Chinese Identity (1995-2009) 98 Survey of Taiwanese & Chinese Identity (2000 & 2008) 99

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Introduction Introduction

1

Introduction Taiwanese writer Wu Cho-liu’s 吳濁流 1946 novel Orphan of Asia showed the swings and confusion surrounding the national identity of the Taiwanese people under Japanese rule (Wu Cho-liu 吳濁流 1946).1 Forty-seven years later, President Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 referred to “the sorrow of being born Taiwanese” in an interview with Shiba Ryōtarō 司馬遼太郎 to note that “until today, those who have held power over Taiwan were all foreign regimes” (Fuji 2006; Shiba Ryōtarō 司馬遼太郎 1994:485-502). Lee’s interview described the fact that Taiwan had been occupied by several alien powers. In May 2010, Benedict Anderson said, “if I were a Taiwanese, I would ask why I have to celebrate the 100th National Day of the Republic of China?”(United Daily News 2010f).2 Wu Cho-liu’s novel, Lee Teng-hui’s interview and Anderson’s question illustrate that the issue of national identity in Taiwan has been important for many years. National identity in Taiwan today is both an important political topic as well as an academic concern. Taiwanese academics have written many studies regarding issues of Taiwanese national identity, but the important matter of the role of the media in Taiwanese national identity has not been given the attention that it deserves. This book addresses this gap in the research, exploring how, in what ways, and to what extent, the media plays a role concerning the issue of national identity in Taiwan. Eric Hobsbawm (1992:10) argues, “Nationalism comes before nation and nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round.” This means that national identity is both man-made and an ideology. The media is important in sharpening people’s ideology. As Louis Althusser (2001:112) argued, “an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices.” Althusser designated a series of institutions as “ideological state apparatuses: the family, the education system, the church and the mass media” (Barker 2003:78-79). The media, especially newspapers, are a tool to construct imagined communities. According to Benedict Anderson (2006:32-36), a newspaper can construct an imagined community through making a linkage between many things and replicate the same imagined world visibly rooted in everyday life. Anderson (2006:44) also argues, “Print-capitalism gave a new 1 Wu Cho-liu published Orphan of Asia (Ajia no koji アジアの孤児) in Japanese in 1946. The Chinese edition, Yasiya de gu’er 亞細亞的孤兒, was published in 1959. The novel described the contradiction and the confusion of Taiwanese people in being neither Japanese nor Chinese. 2 October 10, 2011 was the 100th National Day of the Republic of China.

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Introduction

fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation.” The appreciation of the historical role of the media in Taiwan is therefore crucial to understanding national identity issues in Taiwan. This history in Taiwan is long, spanning three distinct political periods: the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945), the years of martial law under the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang; KMT) colonial regime (1945-1988) and democratized Taiwan (1988-present). In order to secure predominance over Taiwanese, both the Japanese government and the KMT first established a system which discriminated against Taiwanese. Both alien powers first promoted a “national language” policy to construct a national identity in schooling and then pushed national identity through the media. Between 1895 and 1988, Taiwanese people experienced first a Japanese national identity and then a Chinese one, which were constructed by the Japanese government and then the KMT while Taiwanese elites and opposition promoted alternative identities against both powers. After 1988, following democratization, Taiwanese identity became more and more popular. Media in Taiwan played a vital role in the construction of national identity over the past century. In 1896, the first Japanese newspaper published in Taiwan became an apparatus of the Japanese for propagandizing their Japanization policies. From 1896 until democratization in the early 1990s, the ruling colonial power – first Japan and then the Chinese Nationalists – and the opposition utilized the media as a tool for framing various competing national identities. After democratization, the media became a very important arena in which Taiwanese and Chinese identity camps contended. This book consists of five chapters. The first parts of both Chapters One and Two first provide a discussion of the policies of the colonial ruling powers, particularly “national language” policy, on the forming of national identity. Then, a discussion of the role of official media in national identity construction follows, as well as an exploration of alternative national identities of opposition players in the dissenting media. Chapters Three, Four and Five illustrate the change of Taiwanese people’s national identity, the changing map of the media market and the change/construction of national identity in the media following democratization. Chapter One begins with the Japanese government’s policy of Japanization of the Taiwanese people and illustrates the media’s role in the construction of national identity. The national identity of the Taiwanese people during the Japanese colonial period is a complex topic. The Japanese colonial regime stated that it tried to assimilate Taiwanese people and make them Japanese, but the Japanese government discriminated against Taiwanese who felt

Introduction

3

t­ hemselves to be second-class citizens. In addition, some Taiwanese elites considered themselves to be Chinese while others believed themselves to be ­Taiwanese. Altogether, some four different Taiwanese identities in opposi­tion to Japanese identity have been identified during the Japanese colonial period. Under Japanese rule, the media became widespread and the Japanese government used the media as a tool to construct Japanese identity. In addition, during more “liberal” times, private media also promulgated different identities. Chapter Two shows that with the arrival of the KMT in Taiwan in 1945 the KMT regime implemented a policy of the Sinification of the Taiwanese people. In this, the media played an important role. After its arrival in Taiwan, the KMT regime promoted Chinese nationalism in a manner similar to the Japanese colonial promotion of Japanese identity. The Japanese colonial government “assimilated” Taiwanese to become second-class Japanese, and the KMT regime also implemented a similar policy to Sinicize Taiwanese to become second-class Chinese. The KMT regime repressed the use of Japanese language in the media and later suppressed Taiwanese identity in all ideological state apparatuses including the media. China identity was hegemonic under the authoritarian KMT regime, but the weak voices of some opposition magazines did provide some sporadic alternatives. Chapter Three first considers Lee Teng-hui’s democratization and Taiwanization policies and then analyzes the changing map of Taiwan’s media in Taiwan’s free media market. It discusses how Lee’s policies overcame the power of the pro-China identity Mainlander elite and the changing map of Taiwan’s media on national identity. Under democratization, Taiwanization as well as a free market for media, changes in people’s national identity and the changing map of the media brought Taiwan into a new era. The voice of Taiwan identity, which has grown steadily since the early 1990s into the majority viewpoint, made it possible for some media to push Taiwan identity, and Taiwan identity media came to occupy a large share of the market. However, some China identity media persisted after democratization and some new China identity media also emerged from the 1990s onward despite the strong growth of Taiwan identity. Chapter Four thus analyzes how and why the China identity media promoted a Chinese identity in Taiwan, while Chapter Five examines pro-Taiwan identity media’s characters in the construction of national identity. Some China identity media transformed into pro-Taiwan media, while many new Taiwan identity media were also established after the early 1990s. Although Taiwan has become a democratic country and the Taiwanese have enjoyed freedom of the press, the popularization of the Internet also provides the people of Taiwan with platforms to publish their own voices

4

Introduction

on national identity since the mid-1990s. Many Taiwanese Internet users see the Internet as an alternative medium to construct national identity. Finally, the conclusion brings the arguments and the analysis together and includes some comparisons on the use of media in the construction of national identity between the Japanese and the KMT, and finally the differences and construction elements of national identity in both China and Taiwan identity media.

Japanese Colonial Period

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Chapter 1

The Media and National Identity during the Japanese Colonial Period Following the Japan-Qing war in 1894-1895, the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan and Taiwan became Japan’s first colony. The Japanese decided to make Taiwan a model colony in an effort to demonstrate to the Western powers their “modernization.” The Japanese thus built a significant amount of infrastructure in Taiwan (Jacobs 2012:7). The Japanese authorities imitated the Western colonial idea of “assimilation,” a policy known in Japanese as dōka 同化, to dominate Taiwan. Although dōka means “assimilation,” in fact Taiwanese remained second-class citizens of the Japanese Empire. During Japanese rule, the Japanese government pushed Japanese identity in official media, but many Taiwanese elites expressed a contrary identity in private newspapers. However, national identity among Taiwanese elites was not homogenous. Taiwanese elites espoused four types of national identity – the “Mother Nation Camp,” the “Wait for Opportunity Camp,” the “Reform of ­Taiwan Camp,” and the “Taiwan Revolution Camp” – though all were against Japanese identity. The aim of this chapter is first to shed light on the processes of the dōka policy the Japanese applied to Taiwan, and the Japanese official media’s role in the construction of national identity. Second, this chapter also discusses why and how Taiwanese private newspapers during the 1920s and early 1930s shaped alternative national identities in opposition to the Japanese identity. This chapter takes the official Taiwan Daily News and the Taipei Broadcasting Station as well as the Taiwanese private Taiwan People’s News, Taiwan Masses Times and New Taiwan Masses Times, as examples to examine relations between national identity and the media. Being parts of the state apparatus, both the official newspapers and broadcasters in Taiwan played an important role in this dōka policy. The government newspapers provided daily news and propagated the dōka policy. Broadcasting in Taiwan, a government monopoly, begun in 1928, was a tool of dōka and later a method to mobilize the Taiwanese people during World War II. During 1920-1936, private Taiwanese newspapers were able to criticize the official Japanese government line and construct various national identities in opposition to dōka. However, after 1937, new government controls ended dissent in the Taiwanese private newspapers. Nevertheless, for the period before

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004227699-003

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Chapter 1

1937, it is possible to compare the competing national identities expressed in the official government media and private Taiwanese media. The Japanization Policy – Dōka After the Japan-Qing War of 1894-1895, the Qing ceded Taiwan to Japan as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Japanese: Shimonoseki Jōyaku 下関条約; Chinese: Maguan tiaoyue 馬關條約) in 1895. Prior to the arrival of the Japanese authorities, the Governor of Taiwan Province, Tang Ching-sung 唐景崧, and some Qing officials in Taiwan sought to establish a Republic of Formosa (Taiwan minzhuguo 臺灣民主國), but this collapsed rapidly after Japanese forces landed on Taiwan. In accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese government allowed the people of Taiwan to choose their “nationality.” They could stay in Taiwan and become Japanese or leave. Taiwanese, who did not want to be Japanese, had two years to sell their property and migrate to other countries. After the deadline, May 8, 1897, all residents became Japanese. Based on the statistics of the Japanese government, 4,456 Taiwanese people refused to become Japanese and left Taiwan (Taiwan Governor-General Office 1938:688). Many Taiwanese could not or would not leave Taiwan, yet they nevertheless resisted Japanese nationality and rule. Taiwanese fighters used guerrilla tactics to oppose the Japanese for two decades. The Japanese government brutally suppressed this armed resistance (Matsuda 2006:188). Before 1902, according to a Japanese source, the Japanese colonial regime executed over 32,000 “bandits” (Jacobs 2008:41-42). Apart from suppressing Taiwan’s rebellion, the Japanese government attempted to apply a Japanization policy in ruling Taiwan. The Japanese government took the term “assimilation” and translated it into Japanese dōka, which became the label for Japan’s policy toward Taiwan (Chen Pei-feng 陳培 豐 2006:17). The term dōka first appeared in Genkai 言海 in 1889.1 According to another Japanese dictionary, Kōjien 広辞苑, dōka policy is when a colonial power assimilates the population in its colony, especially with regards to lifestyle and culture (Shinmura Izuru 新村出 1970:1560). After the Japan-Qing War in 1894-1895, dōka was discussed frequently as a ruling policy over Taiwan. For example, in 1898, the Management Policy over Taiwan (Japanese: Taiwan keiei sakuron 台湾経営策論), which was proposed to Governor-General 1 Genkai is a dictionary which was published by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of the Japanese government from 1889.

Japanese Colonial Period

7

Kotama Gentarō 児玉源太郎, pointed out that “assimilation of civilization” and “assimilation of nation” were the colonial policies toward Taiwan (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:29). The Japanese colonial government claimed that dōka was morally superior to European colonialism as the Taiwanese and the Yamato 大和 nation were the same people with an identical script and race (Japanese: dōbun dōshu 同文同種). An influential anthropological theory during the Meiji Period suggested that the Japanese originated in southern China and, therefore, originated in the same place as the Taiwanese. However, this was just rhetoric of racial affinity in promoting the policy of assimilation. Dōka through the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper and the Kōminka Movement From 1919 to 1936, the Japanese government employed the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper to implement dōka (Japanese: Zenshinteki naichi enchō shugi 漸進的内地延長主義). From 1937 until the end of WWII, dōka was continually carried out together with the Kōminka Movement (Japanese: Kōminka Undō 皇民化運動; Imperialization Movement) (Li Cheng-chi 李承機 2010). Before 1919, the Japanese government dispatched one admiral and six army generals to be governors-general of Taiwan. The policy over Taiwan changed following the appointment of Prime Minister Hara Takashi 原敬 in 1918. The biggest change was the appointment of civilian governors-general in Taiwan, with Den Kenjirō 田健次郎 coming to Taiwan on October 29, 1919. After Den’s arrival in Taiwan, Japan began to adopt the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper as the main theme to govern Taiwan until 1937. During this period, the colonial government repeatedly proclaimed that dōka was a program of “Fair Play” (Japanese: isshi dōjin 一視同仁; all men are treated equally) and that the ­Taiwanese would share in “Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity” (Japanese: kyōzon kyōei 共存共栄). However, the discriminatory nature of dōka remained, and many Taiwanese elites continued to oppose this unequal treatment, and accused the colonial administration of breaking its promises of “Fair Play” and “Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity.” For example, Taiwanese people could not serve in senior level positions in government and the Japanese government maintained an unfair salary difference between Taiwanese and Japanese. The discrimination against Taiwanese people was also to be seen in education. For instance, under Japanese rule, at least until 1938, Taiwanese children could only enroll in kōgakkō 公学校 (public school) while shōgakkō 小学校 (primary school) was open only to Japanese children. The Japanese colonial government again changed its policy for Taiwan when Japan prepared for World War II. The last civilian governor-general served until October 2, 1936, and then Japan appointed only military gov­ernors-

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Chapter 1

general. From 1937 until the end of the war, these military governors-general would carry out dōka together with a harsher policy known as the Kōminka Movement, which suppressed Taiwanese culture by coercing Taiwanese people to become Japanese (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:190). Between 1937 to 1945, the Kōminka Movement included the Japanization of Personal Names (Japanese: Kaiseimei 改姓名), the destruction of ancestral altars and religious temples and the mobilization of the Taiwanese people to serve in the Japanese imperial military (Matsuda 2006:210). On August 24, 1937, the Japanese government launched a movement known as “Mobilizing the Spirit of all Japanese Nationals” (Japanese: Kokumin seishin sōdōin 国民精神総動員). This movement not only intended to solidify the Japanese identity of Japanese Empire subjects during wartime, but also targeted all “nationals” including the colonial peoples of both Taiwan and Korea in an attempt to enlist their support for the Sino-Japan War (Tsai 2009:161). In addition, the Japanization of Personal Names started on February 11, 1940. Between February 1940 and November 1943, only 17,920 Taiwanese people (2.06 per cent of Taiwan’s people) assumed a Japanese name (Tsai Pai-en 蔡百恩 2007:54). In 1941, the Japanese colonial government set up the Council of Loyal Imperial Subjects (Japanese: Kōminhōkōkai 皇民奉公会) to further organize social order for the Kōminka policy in accordance with the Japanese imperial spirit. According to the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 207,083 Taiwanese people were mobilized to serve in the imperial army up until November 1943. Moreover, the Japanese government also practiced compulsory primary education to force Taiwanese people to attend schools from 1943 as the Japanese believed “education” was the main means to Japanize the Taiwanese people. However, at no stage was dōka intended to provide colonial people in Japan’s peripheries with equal rights to Japanese citizens. The Japanese in Japan proper were Japanese with full civil rights, while Taiwanese, Korean and Okinawan peoples were Japanese with only partial civil rights (Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡 人 2006:130). During Japanese rule, Japan was named the Naichi 内地 (inner land) and Japanese were called Naichijin 内地人 (people of the inner land). This historical term Naichi meant “inner land” literally in opposition to other areas such as Taiwan and Korea, which were “outside areas.” In contrast to Naichi, Taiwan was called Hontō 本島 (this island) and Taiwanese were called Hontōjin 本島人 (people of this island). These terms made obvious the Japanese discrimination against Taiwanese people as the term Naichi made Taiwan a periphery, while the term Naichijin placed Japanese people higher in the order of things than Taiwanese people. Under the discriminatory policy, Taiwan became a periphery of the Japanese nation and the Taiwanese people

Japanese Colonial Period

9

were transformed into subjects rather than citizens of the Japanese Empire, denied full citizenship rights. Dōka through National Language Education The promotion of Japanese as the “national language” was always a key theme for dōka throughout the Japanese period. Chen Pei-feng points out that dōka was practiced in many ways such as weights and measures, economy, law, marriage, the wearing of kimono and the Japanization of personal names. However, national language (Japanese: Kokugo 國語) education was the main means to practice dōka (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2006:44-45) with the Japanese government investing huge resources in this policy at schools (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2006:22). Izawa Shūji 伊沢修二 initiated this policy of dōka through national language education. Izawa pioneered modern Japanese education. He later became the first Minister of Education in the Taiwan colonial government and was also the founder of the first primary school in Taiwan for Taiwanese students, Shizangan School (Japanese: Shizangan gakudō 芝山巌学堂).2 He argued that only “education” could Japanize the Taiwanese people (Chen Peifeng 陳培豐 2006:69-77) and described national language education as the primary policy in Taiwan (Shi Gang 石剛 2005:45-47). Under Izawa, the spread of Japanese language was an important part of the construction of Japanese nationality and spirit (Shi Gang 石剛 2005:52). For instance, in May 1920, the subsequent Minister of Education in Taiwan, Hiratsuka Sakichi 平塚佐吉, argued that the “national language” was the spirit of the Japanese nation (Japanese: Yamato minzoku 大和民族) and the popularization of national language was the first mission in Taiwan’s education (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:187). The effect of both the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper and the Kōminka Movement can be shown on school enrolment and the comprehension of Japanese, the national language in Taiwan. Table 1.1 shows the primary school enrolment rates of Taiwanese children. The rate rose steadily from 1917. According to the Documents of Education Acts of Korea and Taiwan (Japanese: Chōsen kyōikurei Taiwan kyōikurei ni kansuru ken 朝鮮教育令臺灣教育令ニ 関スル件) in 1922, the comprehension and use of Japanese was the criterion used to identify Japanese nationals for the Japanese government (Chen Peifeng 陳培豐 2006:289). Table 1.2 indicates the Japanese reading comprehension by Taiwanese people. Only 2.68 percent of Taiwanese people could read Japanese in 1920, but this level gradually increased after 1920. There was a 2 The Shizangan School was a school for Taiwanese students in Taipei. In the first year, 1895, 21 Taiwanese students enrolled in the Shizangan School.

10

Chapter 1

remarkable change after 1937 as the Kōminka Movement popularized Japanese. Table 1.1

Primary School Enrolment Rates of Taiwanese Children

Year

Total

Boys

Girls

1917 1920 1925 1930 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943

13.1% 25.1% 29.5% 33.1% 41.5% 43.8% 46.7% 49.8% 53.1% 57.6% 61.6% 65.8% 71.3%

21.4% 39.1% 44.2% 48.9% 56.8% 59.1% 62.0% 64.5% 67.2% 70.6% 73.6% 76.6% 80.9%

3.7% 9.4% 13.2% 16.6% 25.1% 27.4% 30.3% 34.1% 38.1% 43.6% 48.7% 54.3% 60.9%

(Taiwan sheng xingzhengzhangguang gongshu tongjishi 臺灣省行政長官公署統計室 [­Statistical Office of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Agency] 1946:1241)

Both school enrolment rates and comprehension rates of Japanese language showed the considerable success of the Kōminka Movement. By means of the various Kōminka programs at schools, more and more young Taiwanese people were inculcated into Japanese imperial culture through to the end of World War II. To conclude, both tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the Kōminka Movement’s assimilation of Taiwanese people into becoming Japanese, at least in language. However, the use of the same national language among Taiwanese and Japanese could not change the fact that Taiwanese still remained second-class citizens right through to 1945. Owing to their being treated as second-class citizens, many of the Taiwanese elite opposed dōka and constructed alternative national identities in opposition to the Japanese.

11

Japanese Colonial Period Table 1.2

Japanese Comprehension Rates among Taiwanese

Year

Taiwanese

1905

0.38%

1915 1920 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934

1.63% 2.68% 12.36% 20.40% 22.70% 24.50% 27.00%

1935

29.70%

1936

32.90%

1937 1939 1940 1941 1942

37.80% 48.78% 51.00% 57.00% 58.00%

(Chao Shun-ta 趙勳達 2009:79; Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:254-259)

Taiwanese National Identities against Japanese Colonial Rule Under the influence of the Taisho Democracy (Japanese: Taishō demokurashī 大正デモクラシー),3 Woodrow Wilson’s principle of “self-determination” after World War I, the Korean March 1st Movement and the Chinese May Fourth Movement (Wusi yundong 五四運動),4 more and more Taiwanese intellectuals became devoted to opposition movements and began to express dissent against Japanese rule. Consequently, many Taiwanese elites tried to 3 The Taisho period was between 1912 and 1926. Matsuo Takayoshi 松尾尊兊 and Ōta Masao 太田雅夫 argue that Japanese people launched a series of political reforms and democratic movements in 1905-1925, and define it as Taisho Democracy (Chen Tsui-lien 陳翠蓮 2008:41). 4 The May Fourth Movement was a cultural and political movement to protest the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles. The Movement came to demand political modernization, democratization and science. As a result, Mr Democracy (De xiansheng 德先生) and Mr Science (Sai xiansheng 賽先生) were two of the main themes of the May Fourth Movement.

12

Chapter 1

construct a different national identity against dōka and the discriminatory policies between 1919 and the early 1930s. Taiwanese intellectuals had varied national identities during the period of Japanese colonial rule. Some believed the Han 漢 people in Taiwan were the same as the Han people in China, and that their mother nation was China with Japan merely suzerain over Taiwan. That is to say, these Taiwanese intellectuals considered Taiwanese people to be Chinese. Conversely, other Taiwanese intellectuals believed themselves to be Taiwanese and some even sought independence for Taiwan. Wakabayashi Masahiro 若林正丈 argues that Taiwanese espoused four types of national identity against Japanese identity during Japanese rule. The “Mother Nation Camp” (Japanese: Sokoku ha 祖國派) argued that Taiwanese people should use China’s assistance to liberate Taiwan from Japanese rule and once Taiwan was independent from Japan, Taiwan would return to China. The “Wait for Opportunity Camp” (Japanese: Taiki ha 待機派) expected the rise of China and claimed that Taiwanese people were the same Han people as those of the Chinese Nation. The “Reform of Taiwan Camp” (Japanese: Ittō kairyō ha 一島改良派) advocated keeping Taiwan’s characteristics such as Taiwanese languages and culture. This group did not consider Vernacular Chinese (modern Mandarin Chinese) to be a part of Taiwan’s language and urged Taiwan to stay away from China in order to maintain Taiwan’s culture and Taiwanese identity. The above three camps opposed dōka and the discriminatory rule over Taiwanese people of the Japanese government. The “Taiwan Revolution camp” (Japanese: Taiwan kakumei ha 臺灣革命派) demanded Taiwan Independence through overthrowing Taiwan’s feudalism and proceeding with a nationalistic and democratic revolution (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006:16; Waka­ bayashi Masahiro 若林正丈 1984:85-97). The positions of these camps are summarized in table 1.3. Table 1.3

National Identities against Japan among Taiwanese Elites

Relationship with China/ Orientation

Unification

Separation

Revolution Reform

Mother Nation Wait for Opportunity

Taiwan Revolution Reform of Taiwan

(Wakabayashi Masahiro 若林正丈 1984:85-97)

According to Wakabayashi, the Mother Nation Camp included most of the anti-Japan groups organized by Taiwanese elites residing in China. These elites

Japanese Colonial Period

13

wanted to liberate Taiwan with assistance from the mother nation – China. The moderate Wait for Opportunity Camp included the advocates of Vernacular Chinese, capitalists and landlords, who insisted on political reform against Japanese discriminatory colonial rule and waited for Taiwan’s return to China. The Reform of Taiwan Camp mainly included Taiwanese elites involved in the Taiwan Native Literature Movement, the Taiwanese Romanization Movement and the Vernacular Taiwanese Movement, who constructed a Taiwanese culture separate from China. The Taiwan Revolution Camp was composed of the left-wing anti-Japan movement including the left-wing “new” Taiwanese Cultural Association (Japanese: Taiwan bunka kyōkai 臺灣文化協會),5 the Taiwan Peasant Association (Japanese: Taiwan Nōmin Kumiai 臺灣農民組合) and the Taiwanese Communist Party, which advocated revolution to liberate Taiwan from Japan. The Media and National Identities In the early years of Japanese rule over Taiwan, only a few Taiwanese people could read Japanese. At that time, the market for Japanese-language newspapers and magazines was largely limited to Japanese residing in Taiwan (Li Cheng-chi 李承機 2002:84). In Japan, the laws governing newspapers were the Newspaper Regulation (Japanese: Shinbunshi jōrei 新聞紙条例) in 1897 and the Newspaper Statute (Japanese: Shinbunshi hō 新聞紙法). These laws provided for freedom of the press, and private citizens were free to open a newspaper if they so wished. The situation in colonial Taiwan was different. The relevant legislation in Taiwan was the Taiwan Newspaper Regulation (Japanese: Taiwan shinbunshi jōrei 臺灣新聞紙条例) in 1900 and the Taiwan Newspaper Statute (Japanese: Taiwan shinbunshi rei 臺灣新聞紙令) in 1918. Under these laws, Taiwanese people had to seek permission from the government to operate a newspaper. In addition, the Japanese government would censor certain sensitive words in Taiwanese newspapers and a blank or an “X” was often used in place of these words. Japanese was the official and national language for Taiwanese people. Nevertheless, in order to inform Taiwanese people of government policies, the 5 The Taiwanese Cultural Association was established by the core members of the Taiwan People’s News in Taipei in 1921. Most of the original members of the Taiwanese Cultural Association were right-wing nationalists, pro-capitalist class and landlords. In 1927, the leftwing successfully took control of the Taiwanese Cultural Association and these right-wing members withdrew.

14

Chapter 1

Japanese allowed all Taiwan newspapers to publish Literary and Vernacular Chinese-language pages until early 1937 when the Japanese government abolished the Chinese-language pages of newspapers as part of the Kōminka Movement’s aggressive Japanization push.6 Government censorship became significantly stricter after 1937. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japan War in 1937, the Japanese government applied the News Control Policy (Japanese: Shinbun tōsei 新聞統制) to regulate all news and editorials. Under this policy, Taiwanese private newspapers were denied free speech, and could not say anything about national identity (Ho I-lin 何義 麟 2010). In 1940, Japan entered the wartime government and all political parties were absorbed into a new political entity, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Japanese: Taisei Yokusankai 大政翼賛会). In 1941, the Japanese government further applied the Regulation of News in Wartime (Japanese: Shinbun no senji taiseika ni kansuru ken 新聞ノ戦時体制化ニ関スル件) to dominate all of Japan’s media including those in its colonies. Thus, between 1937 and 1945, all newspapers in Taiwan were completely under the control of the government and served as part of the imperial apparatus. Consequently, under the news control policy, the Taiwanese private newspapers could not speak for the Taiwanese people, thereby making Taiwanese private newspapers no longer able to fight against Japanese policy over Taiwan, let alone espouse anti-assimilation measures. Thus, speech in both the official and Taiwanese private newspapers became a pro-Japan chorus. More than twenty newspapers were published between 1895 and 1945 in Taiwan. Additionally, the government set up the first broadcast station, the Taipei Broadcasting Station (Japanese: Taihoku hōsōkyoku 台北放送局), in 1928. To discuss the construction of national identity during Japanese rule, this chapter takes four case studies: (1) the largest official newspaper, the Taiwan Daily News (Japanese: Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō 臺灣日日新報), (2) the Taipei Broadcasting Station, (3) the largest Taiwanese private newspaper, the Taiwan People’s News (The Taiwan Minpao 臺灣民報), and (4) the left-wing Taiwan Masses Times (Japanese: Taiwan Taishū Jihō 臺灣大衆時報) and New Taiwan Masses Times (Japanese: Shin Taiwan Taishū Jihō 新臺灣大衆時報).

6 The official newspapers abolished Chinese pages from April 1937, but the Taiwan New People’s News was allowed to publish Chinese pages until June 1937.

Japanese Colonial Period

15

Japanese Identity and the Official Media The Taiwan Daily News during the Initial Period of Military Governor-General Rule, 1896-1919 In the period immediately after taking control of Taiwan, the Japanese colonial government prioritized the crushing of armed resistance and “bandits.” Once this was accomplished, the government turned its attention to other matters including unifying and shaping Taiwan’s “media apparatuses” (Japanese: genron kikan 言論機関) into an effective tool to propagandize “nationalizing colonialism.” The Japanese considered this to be a kind of “national defense” against foreign powers, first in the war with Russia in 1904-1905 and later in World War I (Li Cheng-chi 李承機 2002:88). A major component of the government’s media policy was the Taiwan Daily News. The Taiwan Daily News began with the merger of two private newspapers – Taiwan New Post (Japanese: Taiwan Shinpō 臺灣新報) and the Taiwan Daily (Japanese: Taiwan Nippō 臺灣日報).7 In 1898, this newspaper was nominally run by a private Japanese citizen, Kubiya Zenbē 首屋善兵衛, but actually it was controlled by the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office (Sunaga Noritake 須 永徳武 et al. 2004:7-10).8 During Japanese rule, the Taiwan Daily News, Tainan New Post (Japanese: Tainan Shinpō 臺南新報)9 and Taiwan News (Japanese: Taiwan Shinbun 臺灣新聞)10 were the three big official newspapers. The Taiwan Daily News was both the largest and the only one with Taiwan-wide distribution. As an official newspaper in Taiwan, the Taiwan Daily News propagated official Japanese policy in its coverage and editorials. For example, the Taiwan Daily News was the means by which the colonial administration introduced dōka to the Taiwanese public (Taiwan Daily News 1899).

7 8

9

10

The Taiwan New Post was the first Japanese newspaper in Taiwan founded as a daily newspaper in 1896 and the Taiwan Daily was the second founded in 1897. The Taiwan Daily News kept running until the Japanese government combined the Taiwan Daily News and other five newspapers to form the Taiwan New Post (Taiwan Shinpō 臺灣新報) in 1944. The Tainan News was initially founded in Tainan as the Tai Hou Daily (Taihō Nippō 臺澎 日報) in 1899, then the Tai Hou Daily altered its name to the Tainan New Post in 1903. In 1937, it further changed its name to the Taiwan Daily (Taiwan Nippō 臺灣日報) and then it was merged with five other newspapers under the name Taiwan New Post in 1944. The Taiwan News was first founded in Taichung in 1901 as the Taichung Daily News (Taichū Mainichi Shinbun 臺中每日新聞). In 1903, it became the Central Taiwan Daily (Chū Taiwan Nippō 中臺灣日報), and it evolved into the Taiwan News in 1907. Like the Taiwan Daily, it was merged into Taiwan New Post in 1944.

16

Chapter 1

The Taiwan Daily News spread government propaganda. First, in the early years prior to 1907, the Taiwan Daily News mainly discussed colonial policy, the regional political situation in East Asia, the Japan-Russia War and propaganda promoting a national frugality movement during the war with Russia (Sunaga Noritake 須永徳武 et al. 2004:13-14). For example, following Japan’s victory in the Japan-Russia War (1904-1905), the Taiwan Daily News claimed, in its editorial on July 1, 1905, “victory is a supreme glory of the Japanese Empire as well as the happiness of Japanese nationals” (Taiwan Daily News 1905). Further, the Taiwan Daily News additionally described Japan’s rise as a major power of the world; the Taiwanese people were also proud of being nationals of Japan (Taiwan Daily News 1905) During 1908-1912, the Taiwan Daily News shifted its focus to publicizing the colonial administration’s development of the island’s infrastructure, discussing the construction of a “new culture” in Taiwan and disseminating information on selected colonial policies (Sunaga Noritake 須永徳武 et al. 2004:22). On May 30, 1908, the newspaper argued that Taiwan was a “Japanese-style colony” superior to Western colonies, and claimed Taiwan and Japan belonged to the same family (Taiwan Daily News 1908). Likewise, on December 31, 1910, it published an interpretation of a talk given by the Prime Minister of Japan, Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信, discussing the Japanese colonial policy over Taiwan (Taiwan Daily News 1910). The Taiwan Daily News also started to flesh out the dōka policy for the Taiwanese public. For example, from February 28 to March 4, 1911, it published a series of editorials to discuss concepts of assimilation in the colony (Taiwan Daily News 1911b). Furthermore, the discourses on the relationship between assimilation and colony continued being published in the Taiwan Daily News. For instance, from September 15 to September 22, 1916, the Taiwan Daily News published a series of editorials to introduce “the first colony of Japan” (Taiwan Daily News 1916). These editorials discussed the short history between Taiwan and Japan, talked about the exploration of Taiwan’s natural resources, praised Taiwan’s civilization and modernization under Japanese rule, and complimented Taiwanese people on their happiness as Japanese nationals. The national language was the vital theme of dōka during this period, and the newspaper accordingly discussed the national language policy. For example, on August 16, 1911, the Chinese page of the Taiwan Daily News argued the importance of spreading the national language, Japanese (Taiwan Daily News 1911a). There are several other themes worth noting. The Taiwan Daily News promoted the “improvement” of Taiwanese culture. It also argued for improving transportation links between Taiwan and Japan. The Taiwan Daily News reflected the ultra-nationalism and militarism of the Japanese government.

Japanese Colonial Period

17

For example, it propagated the policy of conquering South China and South Asia before 1919 (Sunaga Noritake 須永徳武 et al. 2004:28-29). Overall, as Sunaga Tokutake argues, the main discourse of the Taiwan Daily News focused on the publicizing of Japanese national prestige, colonial policy and infrastructure. Nevertheless, there were also some important discussions of the dōka policy during this period. The Taiwan Daily News and the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper Between 1920 and 1936, civilian governors-general led Taiwan. During this period the colonial administration stressed the Policy of the Extension of Japan Proper, which expanded and refocused the dōka policy. As the colonial administration’s mouthpiece, the Taiwan Daily News clearly reflected this shift. Most notably, on March 14, 1926, it repeated the claim of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō 若槻禮次郎 that the policy of ruling Taiwan and Korea was dōka by way of the Extension of Japan Proper (Taiwan Daily News 1926c). On September 14, 1932, the Taiwan Daily News reported that dōka would continue as the policy for Taiwan (Taiwan Daily News 1932). During this period, the Taiwan Daily News often discussed dōka through the Policy of the Extension of Japan Proper, and the continued importance of the spread of the national language in carrying out dōka. For instance, on January 22, 1922, the Taiwan Daily News argued that the spread of the national language was the most urgent mission as the national language was the national spirit (Taiwan Daily News 1922). The Japanese government claimed that the spirit of the Extension of Japan Proper was “Fair Play” and “Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity.” The Taiwan Daily News accordingly stressed these two themes, promoting the integration of Taiwanese people (Japanese: Hontōjin 本島人) and Japanese people (Japanese: Naichijin 内地人), the popularization of education, and the development of the Japanese spirit in the people of Taiwan (Sunaga Noritake 須永徳武 et al. 2004:29).11 On January 1, 1926, the Taiwan Daily News published many stories of Japanese (Naichijin) investment in Taiwan to promote the “Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity” policy and the suggestions of these investors to improve this policy (Taiwan Daily News 1926b). On April 5, 1927, the Taiwan Daily News said that the Japanese ruling policy over Taiwan was morally superior to other colonial powers. The Taiwan Daily News said the ruling policy was to pursue the equality of culture, politics and economy between the Taiwanese people and the people of the “motherland” (Japanese: bokoku 母國) (Taiwan Daily News 1927). 11

For example, such discussions appeared on February 3, 1923 and January 1 & 7, 1926 (­Taiwan Daily News 1923, 1926a, 1926b).

18

Chapter 1

The Taiwan Daily News was also active in attacking members of the Taiwanese elite who repeatedly challenged dōka. For example, a Taiwanese private newspaper The Formosa Youth (Taiwanese: The Tâi-oân Chheng Liân 臺灣青 年) often criticized dōka. The Taiwan Daily News condemned The Formosa Youth as a “harmful publication” on December 8, 1921 (Taiwan Daily News 1921). The Taiwan Daily News and the Kōminka Movement The Taiwan Daily News introduced the concept of the Kōminka Movement in July and October 1936 (Taiwan Daily News 1936a, 1936b). However it was not until after Japan invaded China in 1937 that the Kōminka Movement, along with the mobilization for war, became one of the two main policies affecting the Taiwanese people. The Kōminka Movement became the supreme policy of dōka, and was strongly promoted by the Taiwan Daily News. For example, on January 26, 1937 the Taiwan Daily News reported on the government’s establishment of a system to register “national language households” (Japanese: kokugo katei 国語家庭) in Su-ao 蘇澳.12 It argued that this was the first stage of Kōminka (Taiwan Daily News 1937). On August 14, 1937, the Taiwan Daily News argued that the Kōminka movement had to be carried out thoroughly in Taiwan. On January 29, 1938, the Taiwan Daily News introduced the privileges accorded to registered “national language households” in Taipei such as the right of enrolment in shōgakkō 小学校 (primary school), opportunities to serve in the government and so on (Taiwan Daily News 1938). On November 10, 1940, the Taiwan Daily News stated that the ceremony celebrating the 2,600th anniversary of the Japanese Empire was the glory of all imperial nationals (Taiwan Daily News 1940). Under this discourse, the Taiwanese people were considered a part of the Japanese nation, despite their continued second-class status in practice. On April 19, 1941, Japan set up the Council of Loyal Imperial Subjects as the second stage of Kōminka. The Taiwan Daily News reported, on June 11, the start of this Council as the “beginning of national defense,” meaning Japan was ready to mobilize the Taiwanese people to fight in World War II (Taiwan Daily News 1941). The Japanese authorities glorified patriotism with heroic stories in order to encourage Taiwanese to fight in China. For instance, on September 29, 1938, the Taiwan Daily News reported on the death of a 17-year-old female aboriginal student, Sayon Hayon サヨンハヨン, from Nan-ao 南澳.13 A Japanese school teacher working with her tribe had been conscripted and Sayon was helping to carry his baggage during a storm when she slipped into a raging river and was 12 13

Su-ao is in modern Ilan County. Now it is a township in Ilan County.

Japanese Colonial Period

19

never seen again. Two months later, the government praised Sayon Hayon and awarded the local government a “Sayon’s Bell.” In July 1941, the song “Sayon’s Bell” (Japanese: Sayon no kane サヨンの鐘) was produced; in July 1943, the movie “Sayon’s Bell” started to be shown around Taiwan. As a state ideological apparatus, the Taiwan Daily News also further propagated this story in order to arouse the Taiwanese people’s patriotic passion. These publicity efforts were so successful that the story of “Sayon’s Bell” is still well-known in Taiwan today. Following Japan’s attack on the Allies, the start of World War II in the Pacific, and Japan’s series of victories in Southeast Asia, propaganda for the Great Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Japanese: Dai Tōa Kyōeiken 大東亜共栄圏) flooded the Taiwan Daily News. In June, 1941, the Japanese government announced the voluntary soldier project (Japanese: shiganhei 志願兵) and claimed that it was a supreme honor to serve in the imperial armed forces (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:271). The Taiwan Daily News also propagated this policy in its coverage. With the intensification of the war against the United States, Japan needed more and more people to join its armed forces. The Taiwan Daily News often reported victories on the battlefields to encourage Taiwanese people to join the armed forces. On April 8, 1943, it reported the views of patriotic Taiwanese students in Japan and the wishes of these Taiwanese young people to be conscripted (Taiwan Daily News 1943a). On September 24, 1943, the Taiwan Daily News emphasized how conscription was applicable to all nationals and argued it was the supreme glory of Japanese imperial subjects (Taiwan Daily News 1943b). The discourses on national identity in this period were totally different from the previous two periods. The Second World War pushed Japan to implement vigorously its Japanization policy and the Taiwanese people were mobilized into the war effort. The Kōminka Movement, the coverage of victories from overseas, the patriotism, the propaganda of the Great Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and conscription formed the main discourses of national identity. Although the Taiwan Daily News often emphasized that the Taiwanese people were inseparable parts of the Japanese imperial nation during World War Two, the Taiwanese people never received full citizenship rights equal to the Japanese. Thus, for example, Taiwanese voting rights were much more restricted, Taiwanese never held high appointed positions even in Taiwan and Taiwanese received less pay for the same work. The Taipei Broadcasting Station The Japanese government set up Taiwan’s first broadcasting station, the Taipei Broadcasting Station (Japanese: Taihoku hōsōkyoku 台北放送局), in Taipei in

20

Chapter 1

1928. The government announced that the purpose of the station was to complete the Policy of Extension of Japan Proper as well as to improve the integration of culture and economy between Naichi (Japan) and Taiwan (Ko Chia-wen 柯佳文 2005:2). According to the announcement, the broadcast station in Taiwan was part of the state apparatus with the mission to assimilate the Taiwanese people. However, the initial targets of radio broadcasts were Japanese residents in Taiwan as the main broadcasting language was Japanese. The Taiwan New People’s News criticized this language discrimination. On August 3, 1932, the Taiwan New People’s News said that the Taipei Broadcasting Station should not ignore the Taiwanese people, especially those who did not comprehend Japanese. The Taiwan New People’s News said that the majority of entertainment programs as of July 1932 served the Naichijin and suggested that the Japanese government should improve the programs for Taiwanese audiences (Taiwan New People’s News 1932a).14 Listening to the radio during Japan’s rule was not free. The people in both Taiwan and Japan had to register each radio they owned and pay a license fee. Table 1.4 shows the numbers of registered radios by household. These data indicate that most of the radio owners were Japanese; however, the Japanese government set up many radios in schools and public places to fulfill its assimilation policy (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006:102). Consequently, the Japanese authorities also equipped temples and village assembly places with radios to receive the news and government information as well as to do radio gymnastics (Ko Chia-wen 柯佳文 2005:17-18). The intention to reach Taiwanese was evident in some of the broadcast content. Many Taiwanese participated in gymnastics routines broadcast by the station that were used to promote Japanese “spirit.”15 National language education was pursued with broadcasts of a program for Taiwanese adults known as the “Popularization of National Language Evening” from January 1930 (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006:103; Ko Chia-wen 柯佳文 2005:26). This program was intended to provide non-school students with the chance to learn Japanese as well as to share Japanese learning experiences (Ko Chia-wen 柯佳文 2005:26).

14 15

According to the Taiwan New People’s News, in July 1932, 95 programs served Japanese audiences and 20 programs served Taiwanese audiences. More than 2,000,000 Taiwanese people attended 900 gymnastics assemblies in 1938 (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006; Taiwan Governor-General Office 1940).

21

Japanese Colonial Period Table 1.4

Licensed Radios by Household (1928-1944)

Year Total

Licensed Radios by Household Taiwanese %

Japanese

%

1928 1929

7,864 9,400

1,507 1,944

19.16% 20.68%

6,357 7,456

80.84% 79.32%

1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

7,654 10,377 13,769 14,996 17,500 23,024 29,494 43,551 45,980 52,295 62,224 85,770 98,196 100,315 99,246

969 1,395 2,555 3,079 3,616 4,992 6,477 12,029 13,453 16,801 22,374 38,102 46,086 46,286 44,050

12.66% 13.44% 18.56% 20.53% 20.66% 21.68% 21.96% 27.62% 29.26% 32.13% 35.96% 44.42% 46.93% 46.12% 44.38%

6,685 8,982 11,214 11,917 13,884 18,032 23,017 31,522 32,527 35,494 39,850 47,668 52,110 54,047 55,196

87.34% 86.56% 81.44% 79.47% 79.34% 78.32% 78.04% 72.38% 70.74% 67.87% 64.04% 55.58% 53.07% 53.88% 55.62%

( Japan Broadcasting Corporation 1932:556; Ko Chia-wen 柯佳文 2005:16)

In conclusion, before 1937, the broadcast station provided Taiwanese people collective Japanese learning and even physical exercise. Although most of the radio license holders were Japanese, the Japanese colonial government was also able to use broadcasts to assimilate Taiwanese people through broadcasts in schools, temples and assembly places. The use of broadcasts expanded greatly during the Kōminka Movement. In 1938, the Japanese authorities produced a program entitled “Children News” to teach children Japanese. The program provided political news, science news and other imperial matters (Ko Chia-wen 柯佳文 2005:26). Above all, the content of this program aimed to inculcate Japanese identity in Taiwanese children. Radio was also used for war mobilization. For example, the Taipei Broadcasting Station played a role in the movement of “Mobilizing the Spirit of all Japanese Nationals” (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006:103). In addition, in 1938, the Japanese authorities officially proclaimed two purposes of the broadcasts to

22

Chapter 1

have been to attain the goal of Kōminka and the spread of the national language (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006:104). Ironically, the demands of war led the Japanese authorities to provide more Taiwanese-language programming from 1937. In 1942, the Japanese authorities even set up a second station which broadcast solely in Taiwanese (Ho I-lin 何 義麟 2006:107). After the Pacific War began in 1941, the government encouraged the Taiwanese people to buy radios. It also set up fifty “consultation offices” (Japanese: sōdanjo 相談所) for promoting radio in five cities by 1943 (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006:100). Broadcasts provided Taiwanese people with propaganda about the Pacific War (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006:100), and information about bombing by the U.S. Air Force. Moreover, as many Taiwanese still could not understand Japanese16 and the Chinese-language pages had been removed from the newspapers in 1937, these Taiwanese-language broadcasts were necessary to recruit as many Taiwanese as possible into the military. This was a critical issue for the Japanese forces, which were suffering significant reverses in the war against the Americans and were desperate for manpower (Wu San-lien 吳三連 & Tsai Peihuo 蔡培火 1980:566-567). Table 1.4 shows that the Japanese still had the majority of licensed radios by household in 1944, but the immediacy of war news might have resulted in the rapid growing numbers of licensed radios owned by Taiwanese people. Moreover, the public radios in temples, schools and assembly places meant that significantly more Taiwanese were exposed to the broadcasts than just those who owned a radio. In summary, the development of broadcasting in Taiwan can be divided into three stages. The first stage was to broadcast for Japanese in Taiwan because the main broadcasting language was Japanese and Japanese owned the vast majority of radios. The second stage was to educate Taiwanese people and to instruct them in Japanese. The third stage was to propagate the war and to mobilize the Taiwanese people. For the purpose of propaganda which targeted Taiwanese people, the Taipei Broadcasting Station set up a second broadcasting station using Taiwanese as the main broadcasting language. After the expansion of the Pacific War, radio became much more important than the newspapers in promulgating government policy.

16

As shown in table 1.2, a small majority (57%) of Taiwanese people could comprehend Japanese in 1937.

Japanese Colonial Period

23

Taiwanese National Identities in Taiwanese Private Media This section takes the right-wing Taiwan People’s News and the left-wing Taiwan Masses Times and New Taiwan Masses Times as case studies to compare Taiwanese national identities that opposed Japanese identity during the Japanese period. In general, most of the significant figures involved in the Taiwan People’s News belonged to the “Mother Nation,” “Wait for Opportunity,” and “Reform of Taiwan” Camps. On the other hand, the Taiwan Masses Times and the New Taiwan Masses Times were linked to the “Taiwan Revolution” Camp. This camp declared national liberation and even Taiwan Independence through “class struggle” and “revolution of the proletariat” against the Japanese Empire and the Taiwanese capitalist class. Both left-wing newspapers provided an alternative national identity before the early 1930s. The Taiwan People’s News and its National Identities The Taiwan People’s News (The Taiwan Minpao 臺灣民報) was a very important newspaper for Taiwan’s nationalism against Japan. This newspaper was sponsored by major Taiwanese business and landholder families, so the Taiwan People’s News is regarded as a newspaper of the right-wing capitalist class. Table 1.5 shows the brief history of the Taiwan People’s News; the newspaper actually went through four versions or stages. In 1919, Taiwanese students in Tokyo organized the Enlightenment Union, which became the New People’s Union in 1920, to demand self-determination and autonomy for Taiwan. These students published The Formosa Youth in 1920, the predecessor of the Taiwan People’s News, to express dissent against the Japanese government and to demand political rights for the Taiwanese (Chen Tsui-lien 陳翠蓮 2008:41-42). Tsai Pei-huo 蔡培火17 served as the Publisher while Lin Cheng-lu 林呈祿,18 Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰19 and 17

18

19

Tsai Pei-huo (1888-1983) was born in Taiwan. He was sponsored by Lin Hsien-tang to study in Japan. After the Chinese Nationalist Party regime came to Taiwan, he joined the KMT and was elected a legislator in 1946. Lin Cheng-lu (1886-1968) was born in Taiwan. Lin Cheng-lu studied in Japan in 1914 and he also worked in Hunan, China, in 1917. After 1918, Lin went to Tokyo to devote himself to the Taiwan autonomy movement. In 1920, he served as the Editor-in-Chief of The Formosa Youth. In 1922, he also served as the Editor-in-Chief of The Formosa. After 1923, he still served as the Editor-in-Chief of both the Taiwan People’s News and Taiwan New People’s News. In 1941, Lin made a concession to the Japanese government to change the newspaper title Taiwan New People’s News to the new title Rising South Daily. Huang Cheng-tsung (1886-1963) was born in Taiwan. Huang was a successful businessman before he studied in Japan in 1918. He then served as the Chief Editor of The Formosa Youth in 1920. In 1923, he became the Publisher of the Taiwan People’s News. In 1932, he

24

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Table 1.5

History of the Taiwan People’s News

Title

Date

Type

Annotation

The Formosa Youth (The Tâi-oân Chheng Liân) The Formosa (Tâi-oân) Taiwan People’s News (The Taiwan Minpao)

Jul. 16, 1920

Monthly

Issued in Tokyo

Apr. 1, 1922

Monthly

Issued in Tokyo

Apr. 15, 1923 Oct. 15, 1923 Jul. 12, 1925 Aug. 1, 1927

Bi-Weekly Ten-Day Weekly Weekly

Issued in Tokyo Issued in Tokyo Issued in Tokyo Approved to issue in Taipei on July 16, 1927

Mar. 29, 1930

Weekly

Issued in Taipei

Apr. 15, 1932

Daily

Approved to publish daily on January 9, 1931

Daily

Published both morning and evening editions

June 1937

Daily

Abolition of Chinese pages

Feb. 11, 1941

Daily

Became the Rising South Daily (Japanese: Kōnan Nippō 興南日報)

Taiwan New People’s News (The Taiwan Shin Minpao)

Jan. 19, 1934

Wang Min-chuan 王敏川20 served as the Editors. The original sponsors were from four of the “Five Big Business Families” members: Lin Hsien-tang 林獻堂, Ku Hsien-jung 辜顯榮, Lin Hsiung-cheng 林熊徵 and Yen Yun-nien 顏雲年.21

20

21

served as the Chief Editor of Taiwan New People’s News until 1934. Then he turned to running a business in Tokyo. After the Chinese Nationalist Party government came to Taiwan, he became a Christian missionary. Wang Min-chuan (1889-1942) was born in Taiwan. Wang served as the Chief Editor in The Formosa Youth, The Formosa and the Taiwan People’s News. In 1927, because of Wang Minchuan’s left-wing identity, he supported the Taiwanese Cultural Association’s turn to the left and withdrew from the Taiwan People’s News. In 1928, Wang Min-chuan founded the left-wing Taiwan Masses Times. During the Japanese colonial period, Taiwan had five big business families: the Taipei Banciao Lin Family (Lin Hsiung-cheng 林熊徵), the Taichung Lin Family (Lin Hsien-tang 林獻堂), the Keelung Yen Family (Yen Yun-nien 顏雲年), the Lukang Ku Family (Ku

Japanese Colonial Period

25

However, Lin Hsien-tang became the major financier of this newspaper in the following years. In 1921, the members of the New People’s Union further assembled more than one thousand Taiwanese elites in Taipei to establish the Taiwanese Cultural Association (Japanese: Taiwan bunka kyōkai 臺灣文化協會). The Formosa Youth thereafter became the official publication of this association even though it was published in Japan. To broaden the reader base from young Taiwanese to all Taiwanese people, The Formosa Youth changed its title to The Formosa (Taiwanese: Tâi-oân 臺灣) in 1922. Meanwhile, because the Japanese colonial official newspaper, the Taiwan Daily News, continuously criticized and distorted the activities and petitions of Taiwanese elites in Tokyo, these elite Taiwanese believed Taiwanese people had to possess their own Taiwanese newspaper. As a result, the biggest Taiwanese private newspaper during Japanese rule, Taiwan People’s News, was founded in Tokyo in 1923 (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:203).22 This newspaper later evolved as the Taiwan New People’s News (The Taiwan Shin Minpao 臺灣 新民報) in 1930 with the announced intention of fighting for “our four million Taiwanese people” (Japanese: Warera yonhyakumannin no Taiwan taishū 我等 四百万人の台湾大衆) (Li Cheng-chi 李承機 2005:245). In Taiwan, its series of newspapers was well-known as the Taiwan People’s News. The Taiwan People’s News was published in both Japanese and Chinese languages until 1937 when the Japanese government officially banned the Chinese pages According to Japanese policy, only newspapers authorized by the colonial government were allowed to discuss “news.” Before the mid-1920s, the Taiwan People’s News was the only such private newspaper in Taiwan, and was able to present itself as the voice of the Taiwanese. However, from 1927, left-wing newspapers the Taiwan Masses Times and the New Taiwan Masses Times would criticize the Taiwan People’s News as a medium of capitalism and the conservative bourgeoisie (Li Cheng-chi 李承機 2008:3). The Taiwan People’s News was more balanced than these critics suggested; it published some pro-left articles, and some leftists were active in running the paper.23 The Taiwan People’s News remained the most read and influential Taiwanese private newspaper until 1937. For many years the Taiwan People’s News used

22

23

Hsien-jung 辜顯榮) and the Kaohsiung Chen Family (Chen Chung-ho 陳中和). The main sponsor of the Taiwan People’s News was Lin Hsien-tang. The Japanese government did not allow the Taiwanese intellectuals to publish a newspaper in Taiwan. To get around this, they printed The Formosa Youth, The Formosa and the Taiwan People’s News in Tokyo and distributed it in Taiwan. They were later allowed to publish the Taiwan People’s News in Taiwan in 1927. For example, Chiang Wei-shui 蔣渭水, Pai Cheng-chi 白成枝 and Lu Ping-ting 盧丙丁 were considered left-wing.

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this influence to resist the Japanese. However, after Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese government put more pressure on the private newspapers, restricting the Taiwan People’s News criticism of the Japanese government. After 1937, the abolition of Chinese pages, the Kōminka Movement, the outbreak of the Sino-Japan War and the news control policy would then completely extinguish free speech in the pages of the Taiwan People’s News (Li Cheng-chi 李承機 2005:271-271).24 Three of Wakabayashi Masahiro’s Taiwanese national identities could be found in the Taiwan People’s News – the Mother Nation Camp, the Wait for Opportunity Camp and the Reform of Taiwan Camp. Five main themes show the Taiwanese national identity against Japanese identity in the Taiwan People’s News: (1) the phonetic transcription of titles of newspapers, (2) the use of Vernacular Chinese, (3) opposition to dōka, (4) advocating the maintenance of Written Chinese and (5) Taiwan’s relationship with China. I will discuss these five points and then compare the Mother Nation Camp, the Wait for Opportunity Camp and the Reform of Taiwan Camp to explore their construction of national identity. The Romanization of Newspaper Titles The use of language in a newspaper’s title could show its national identity inclination. The Romanization used in the title The Tâi-oân Chheng Liân 臺灣 青年 (The Formosa Youth) was neither Japanese nor Vernacular Chinese but Hoklo.25 Both titles of The Taiwan Minpao 臺灣民報 (Taiwan People’s News) and The Taiwan Shin Minpao 臺灣新民報 (Taiwan New People’s News) employed the Wade-Giles transliteration of Vernacular Chinese (Mandarin Chinese). The contents of the Taiwan People’s News mainly consisted of Japanese-language articles; however, they also published in Vernacular Chinese and sometimes Vernacular Taiwanese until the Chinese page was banned in 1937.

24

25

In 1941, the Taiwan New People’s News changed its name to the Rising South Daily to support the Japanese policy of advancing in Southeast Asia. In 1944, the Rising South Daily was forcibly merged with five other newspapers as the Taiwan New Post (Japanese: Taiwan Shinpō 臺灣新報). Hoklo (Taiwanese: Hōk-ló福佬 or Hō-ló 河洛, 鶴佬) was the main language in Taiwan during the Japanese ruling period; more than 75% of Taiwanese people spoke Hoklo. Hoklo is also well-known as Hokkien. In today’s Taiwan, Hoklo is also referred to as Taiwanese (Taiyu 台語) and is still the most widely spoken Taiwanese language.

Japanese Colonial Period

27

The Use of Vernacular Chinese The use of Chinese in Taiwan before the early 1920s was different to contemporary Taiwan. Taiwanese people only wrote in traditional Written Chinese (Taiwanese: Hàn-bûn漢文), which included both Literary Chinese (wenyanwen 文 言文) and Classical Chinese (guwen 古文). Taiwanese learned Classical Chinese in private schools (sishu 私塾). During the period of Japanese rule, for Taiwanese nationalists the so-called traditional Written Chinese was “Taiwan’s own language” and actually referred to both (1) traditional Written Chinese and (2) spoken Taiwanese languages – Hoklo (Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡人 2003:275) and Hakka (Kejia 客家). For the elites, the Chinese characters were read out loud and taught in spoken Taiwanese languages (Hoklo or Hakka). In this situation, Written Chinese was a purely written language with pronunciation in Hoklo or Hakka (Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡人 2003:276).26 That is to say, Taiwanese people could pronounce the traditional Written Chinese in Hoklo and Hakka, but Taiwanese people did not have a written form for their spoken language. When the Presbyterian missionaries came to Taiwan, they used the so-called Church Romanization as a phonetic alphabet for Hoklo and used this system to translate the Bible into Hoklo. Dr. James Laidlaw Maxwell completed the first Taiwanese Church Romanization of the New Testament in the U.K. in 1873, and the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan officially published the Taiwan Church News (Taiwanese: Tâi-oân-hú-siâⁿ Kàu-hōe-pò 台灣教會公報) in Church Romanization in 1885. In the beginning, The Formosa Youth and The Formosa were published in traditional Written Chinese as well as in Japanese. However, due to the influence of the Vernacular Chinese movement in China, the Chinese-language pages of the Taiwan People’s News were written in a language modeled on ­Vernacular Chinese (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:211-217; Ho I-lin 何義麟 2004a:141).27 This “Taiwanese Vernacular Chinese” was not Vernacular Chinese like that used in China as it contained vocabulary, phrases and grammar derived from Taiwan’s spoken languages and Japanese. This hybrid was usually called the Taiwan People’s News language (Taiwan minpao ti 臺灣民報體) (Li Cheng-chi 李承機 2004; 2010:215). Chen Pei-feng asserts that this effort to approximate Vernacular Chinese despite the unfamiliarity of Taiwanese elites with the language was a symbol of 26 27

Wu argues the written language was only pronounced in Hoklo, but my understanding is that the written language was also pronounced in Hakka by Hakka people. Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰 was officially regarded as the leader of Vernacular Chinese, but the Chen Jui-ming 陳瑞明 was the first one to promote Vernacular Chinese in The Formosa Youth in January 1922.

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Chapter 1

anti-dōka (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:224). The use of Vernacular Chinese in the Taiwan People’s News was an effort to make a connection with China and indicated the intention of the elite Taiwanese to establish what they imagined to be a community of the Chinese nation. They did this to display both a Chinese and a Taiwanese identity to the Japanese. Opposition to Dōka The Taiwan People’s News published many articles criticizing the dōka policy between 1920 and 1937. However, the discourses in this newspaper in the 1920s were more critical of dōka than those in the 1930s. All criticism became impossible after 1937. The main goal of The Formosa Youth, which was founded by thirty-eight Taiwanese leaders in Tokyo in January 1920, was to resist the dōka policy of suppressing Taiwanese culture (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:203). In the first issue of The Formosa Youth in July 1920, the Editor-in-Chief, Lin Cheng-lu, said in an article entitled “Awareness of Taiwanese Youth in the New Age” (Japanese: Shinjidai ni shosuru Taiwan seinen no kakugo 新時代に処する台湾青年の 覚悟), that the Japanese colonial policy and the dōka policy over alien ethnic groups were disappointing policies (Lin Cheng-lu 林呈祿 1920). Lin emphasized, however, that Taiwanese young people should adopt the mission of maintaining peaceful relations between the Japanese nation and the Han nation. He further argued that Taiwanese youth had to maintain the characteristics of the Han nation in order to improve Taiwan’s culture. That is to say, Lin Cheng-lu suggested that Taiwanese young people preserve traditional Written Chinese regardless of the Japanese forcing Taiwanese to learn Japanese. In the third issue of The Formosa Youth in August 1920, the Publisher, Tsai Pei-huo, wrote an article “My Thoughts on Assimilation” (Japanese: Gojin no dōkakan 吾人の同化観) in which he described some difficulties in the practice of dōka in Taiwan (Tsai Pei-huo 蔡培火 1920). Tsai implied that dōka was an arduous task, but he knew this was the established policy of the Japanese government. He argued that a “humanitarian” (mild) assimilation policy was better than an “extreme” (harsh) assimilation policy, and emphasized that an extreme one would be in vain. In April 1921, Tsai Shih-ku’s 蔡式穀 article, “Discussion of assimilation policy” (Japanese: Dōka seisaku ni tsuite 同化政策 に就いて), argued that even though the dōka policy supporters considered both Taiwanese Han people and the Yamato nation (Japanese nation) to be the same race of people with an identical written script (Japanese: dōbun dōshu 同文同種), Taiwan possessed a unique culture and history which were distinct from the Japanese (Tsai Shih-ku 蔡式穀 1921). The article thus suggested that the Japanese government should respect Taiwan’s culture, history and

Japanese Colonial Period

29

l­ anguages as well as to abolish discrimination against the Taiwanese Han ­people. On June 27, 1926, the Taiwan People’s News further criticized Naichijin (Japanese) in Taiwan who did not want to become Taiwanjin (Taiwanese) or a part of Taiwan. The Taiwan People’s News said that these Naichijin used privileges to promote themselves instead of respecting Taiwan (Taiwan People’s News 1926d). Interestingly, in this article the Taiwan People’s News used the term Taiwanjin to describe the Taiwanese people instead of using the term Hontojin (people of this island). This appears to show the emergence of Taiwanese consciousness in the Taiwan People’s News. The issues of fair play and equal opportunity were consistent themes in the Taiwan People’s News. On July 19, 1925, the Taiwan People’s News published an editorial, entitled “Fair Play,” to condemn the unfair disparity in education and school enrolment between Taiwanese people and Japanese in Taiwan (Taiwan People’s News 1925a). On October 24, 1926, the Taiwan People’s News complained that only one Taiwanese person had served as a county executive (Japanese: gunshu 郡守) after thirty-two years under Japanese rule. In this article, the Taiwan People’s News lashed the colonial government’s failure to fulfill its long-standing promise to promote Taiwanese people (Taiwan People’s News 1926a). On November 7 & 14, 1926, June 7, 1930, and December 5, 1931, the Taiwan People’s News criticized the failure to appoint Taiwanese to government positions. It argued that this was a failure to put into practice the “Fair Play” that had been promised (Taiwan New People’s News 1930, 1931a; Taiwan People’s News 1926b, 1926c). On March 24, 1929, it also censured the Japanese government over unfair salary differences between Taiwanese people and Japanese (Taiwan People’s News 1929). Furthermore, on January 18, 1930, the Taiwan People’s News criticized the “Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity” policy both in terms of educational opportunity and governmental appointments (Taiwan People’s News 1930). After the Taiwan People’s News evolved into the Taiwan New People’s News, it kept arguing the issue of “Fair Play.” For instance, on August 5, 1933, and June 17, 1934, the Taiwan New People’s News argued the unequal nature of “Fair Play” on both appointments and education (Taiwan New People’s News 1933, 1934d). Advocating the Maintenance of Traditional Written Chinese In the initial period of Japanese rule, as Taiwanese preferred old-style Chinese private schools (sishu 私塾) to the Japanese official public schools, the colonial government set up a course of Written Chinese (Japanese: Kanbun 漢文) at public schools in an attempt to attract more Taiwanese students (Li Peihsuan 李佩瑄 2011:22-23). The contents of the Written Chinese textbooks

30

Chapter 1

included certain Chinese classics such as the Analects of Confucius, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean and Classic of Filial Piety (Li Pei-hsuan 李佩 瑄 2011:22). They also introduced Taiwan’s natural environment, culture, history and, especially, the world’s natural science and contemporary civilization (Li Pei-hsuan 李佩瑄 2011:75). Nevertheless, the Japanese saw the continued popularity of Written Chinese as an obstacle to dōka and national language education. From 1918, the Japanese government progressively increased national language courses and reduced Written Chinese courses at schools according to the Mid-Term Implementation of Taiwan Public Schools Regulation (Japanese: Taiwan kōgakkō kisoku chū kaisei 台湾公学校規則中改正) (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2006: 97-99). The Taiwan People’s News and its antecedents promoted Written Chinese as the spirit of Han people in Taiwan, and expressed numerous proposals to retain Written Chinese education at schools. In August 1920, Tsai Pei-huo criticized the Japanese government’s discussions on the abolition/reform of Written Chinese policy in The Formosa Youth (Tsai Pei-huo 蔡培火 1920). He did not publicly oppose the policy of assimilation. He argued, however, that it was short-sighted to abolish existing Written Chinese, which millions of people used. Furthermore, Editor-in-Chief Lin Cheng-lu criticized the Japanese national language policy in schools in April 1922. He argued that Taiwanese students should study Written Chinese at school to preserve a basic characteristic of Han Taiwanese culture (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2006:319). In the first issue of the Taiwan People’s News on April 15, 1923, Tsai Hui-ju said that the people of Taiwan were the descendants of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黃帝) extending back four thousand years (Tsai Hui-ju 蔡惠如 1923). He remarked that he burst into tears for “our brothers” in Taiwan who did not understand Written Chinese. On May 15, 1923, the Taiwan People’s News published a Chinese translation of the Last Class (La Dernière Classe), written by the French writer Alphonse Daudet,28 in order to criticize the national language policy for its suppression of the mother language of the Taiwanese people (Taiwan People’s News 1923). On February 21, 1925, the Taiwan People’s News criticized the Japanese assimilation policy over the abolition of Written Chinese (Taiwan People’s News 1925b). The Taiwan People’s News said that the government used the popularization of the national language policy to assimilate 28

Alphonse Daudet (1840-1897) in his the Last Class described Alsace after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. The state schools in Alsace Lorraine were taken over by Germany and the language of instruction became German. The majority French did not accept the German annexation and continued to see themselves as French.

Japanese Colonial Period

31

Taiwanese people in order to further eliminate Written Chinese gradually. It also argued that the Taiwanese people had retained the use of Written Chinese during the previous thirty years of Japanese rule, which showed that the Taiwanese people still retained the traditional Taiwanese culture spirit despite the Japanese government’s efforts to make the Taiwanese people Japanese. After the Taiwan New People’s News replaced the Taiwan People’s News, it continued to pay attention to the preservation of Written Chinese. With the growing traffic between Taiwan, China and Southeast Asia in the 1930s, the Taiwan New People’s News argued these places constituted a Written Chinese cultural area, thus stressing the importance of Written Chinese (Taiwan New People’s News 1932b). The Taiwan New People’s News repeatedly expressed concern for Written Chinese education in schools in its editorials until the mid-1930s. On May 31, 1934, the Taiwan New People’s News published an article expressing sorrow over the abolition of Written Chinese education at school (Taiwan New People’s News 1934b). The Taiwan New People’s News further argued that it was ridiculous to claim that Written Chinese was harmful to both the Japanese national spirit and national language education. Taiwan’s Relationship with China The Taiwan People’s News generally displayed a conception of Taiwanese people as being Chinese.29 Wu San-lien 吳三連30 and Tsai Pei-huo indicated that one of the features of the Taiwan People’s News was to introduce China as the mother nation (Wu San-lien 吳三連 & Tsai Pei-huo 蔡培火 1980:550-551). The Taiwan People’s News also expressed concern about China and related issues. For example, in August 1921, Tsai Pei-huo argued that the government should encourage Vernacular Chinese education at schools to bring about the improvement of China-Japan relations (Japanese: Chū-Nichi shinzen 中日親 善) and that the improved relations was an expectation of the Taiwanese ­people (Tsai Pei-huo 蔡培火 1921). 29

30

Su Beng 史明 argues that this Chinese identity of the Taiwan People’s News was due to the Chinese business interests of many of its key figures. He further argues that their clarification of the relationship between China and Taiwan was the result of this business activity, and that the majority of Taiwanese intellectuals did not share these views as they did not think about the issue (Su Beng 史明 2010). Wu San-lien (1899-1988) was born in Tainan. He studied at the Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo and joined the Taiwan Youth Society of Tokyo in Japan. He also served in the Taiwan New People News between 1932 and 1941 in Taiwan. After World War II, he was elected a National Assemblyman in 1947, Taipei City Mayor in 1951, a member of Taiwan Provincial Assembly in 1954. He took over the Independent Evening Post in 1959.

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Chapter 1

The advocacy for the improvement of China-Japan relations in Taiwan People’s News continued until the mid-1930s. On July 18, 1934, the Taiwan New People’s News suggested that Taiwan could be the bridge between Japan and China to improve Japan-China relations (Taiwan New People’s News 1934a). On July 20, 1934, the Taiwan New People’s News argued that both Chinese and Japanese were the same people with the same culture (mainly referring to Chinese characters and Confucian heritage). It wished that peace would come to both countries and even East Asia as a whole (Taiwan New People’s News 1934c). This effort failed when Japan invaded China in 1937. This concern for China extended beyond Sino-Japanese relations. For example, on September 7, 1931, the Taiwan New People’s News appealed to Taiwanese people to help Chinese after a severe flood there, and underlined the deep relationship between Taiwan and China in this editorial (Taiwan New People’s News 1931b). Likewise, in November 1934, the Taiwan New People’s News expressed alarm that the Draft Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) would enable Chiang Kai-shek to become a dictator, thus showing its concern for China (Taiwan New People’s News 1934e). The Taiwan People’s News also raised the difficulties experienced by the many Taiwanese businessmen who visited China. Unlike Naichijin, they had to first receive a travel document (Japanese: ryoken 旅券). The Taiwan People’s News published many articles to show the people’s concern about this travel document policy. On October 21, 1924, the Taiwan People’s News argued that the Japanese government should cancel the policy and allow Taiwanese people to visit China freely (Taiwan People’s News 1924). On April 20, 1934, the Taiwan New People’s News further argued that Taiwanese people contributed to the improvement of the Japan-China relationship; therefore, the government was obliged to consider the abolition of the travel document policy. In short, these arguments regarding relations with China indicated the national identity of most of the members of the Taiwan People’s News was Chinese identity – the Mother Nation Camp and the Wait for Opportunity Camp. Yet, the Taiwan People’s News also included advocates of the Reform of Taiwan Camp. These three types of national identity held very distinct characteristics from each other. I take the writing of four members of the Taiwan People’s News – Chang Wo-chun 張我軍, Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰, Tsai Pei-huo 蔡培火 and Lai Ho 賴和 – to discuss the substantial divergence of identity between these three camps all working in the Taiwan People’s News. The Mother Nation Camp Chang Wo-chun 張我軍 was a typical member of the Mother Nation Camp. Chang Wo-chun was born in Taipei in 1902, began working in China in 1921 and

Japanese Colonial Period

33

then studied in Shanghai in 1924. In 1925, Chang served as the Chief Editor of the Chinese page of the Taiwan People’s News. In 1926, he studied in Beijing and later taught in many universities in Beijing from 1929 until returning to Taiwan in 1946. Owing to Chang Wo-chun’s background in China, he was more fluent in Mandarin than other members of the Taiwan People’s News. Unlike most Han Taiwanese intellectuals who only wrote in Literary Chinese and spoke in Taiwanese (Hoklo) and Hakka, Chang strongly advocated the use of Vernacular Chinese (Mandarin) and he also supported the Chinese May Fourth Movement in the Taiwan People’s News. In April 1924, Chang published an article, “A Letter to the Youth of Taiwan” (Zhi Taiwan qinnian de yifengxin 致台灣青年的一封信), in the Taiwan People’s News to condemn Taiwanese poets for using Literary Chinese (Chang Wochun 張我軍 1924b). He argued that these literary works were stereotyped writing and suggested that Taiwanese poets had been “rolling back and forth on piles of excrement for thousands of years” (zhishi zai fenduili gunlaigunqu gundao bainian qiannian 只在糞堆裡滾來滾去 滾到百年千年). In this way, Chang challenged Taiwanese intellectuals to reform Taiwanese literature. In November 1924, he wrote an article, “The Muddled Literary Circle of Taiwan” (Zaogao de Taiwan wenxuejie 糟糕的台灣文學界), criticizing literary circles in Taiwan and promoting a new literature (Chang Wo-chun 張我軍 1924a). These two articles triggered literary debates between those advocating using Vernacular Chinese and those in favor of Literary Chinese in 1924-1926. Chang’s conception of a new literature mainly entailed the use of Vernacular Chinese. Furthermore, he regarded Taiwanese literature as a part of Chinese literature. In January 1925, Chang published another article, “Please Work Together to Tear Down this Dilapidated Temple in Rotten Brushwood” (Qing heli chaixia zhezuo bai caocong zhong de pojiu diantang 請合力拆下這座敗 草叢中的破舊殿堂), claiming that Taiwanese literature was a branch of Chinese literature, and that since mainstream Chinese literature had evolved, Taiwanese literature had to change as well (Chang Wo-chun 張我軍 1925a). In addition, Chang also introduced the views of both Hu Shih 胡適 and Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 on the Vernacular Chinese Movement as he was deeply influenced by the May Fourth Movement. Chang Wo-chun’s claim of new literature not only promoted Vernacular Chinese literature, but also regarded Taiwanese Hoklo and Hakka as vulgar languages. In his article “The Value of the New Literature Movement: Developing the Vernacular Chinese Literature and Transforming Taiwan's Language” (Xinwenxue yundong de yiyi baihua wenxue de jianshe Taiwan yuyan de gaizao 新文學運動的意義: 白話文學的建設 台灣語言的改造) of August 1925, he claimed that the Taiwanese people should reform these vulgar Taiwanese

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languages which lacked any literary value as they were the languages of the lower classes, thereby unifying the language of the Taiwanese under the “national language” referring, of course, to Mandarin Chinese (Chang Wo-chun 張我軍 1925b; Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡人 2003:304-305; 2006:161). In this article, he argued that Taiwanese was a local language (Chinese: tuhua 土話) and suggested that the Taiwanese people combine Taiwanese with Vernacular Chinese so as to keep a link with China since Chinese intellectuals already used Vernacular Chinese in the mother nation – China. On the other hand, although the Taiwan People’s News continuously promoted Vernacular Chinese, most Taiwanese intellectuals in the Taiwan People’s News still wrote in a kind of vernacular that was “a muddle” (busan busi 不三不四) and “totally ungram­ matical” (Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡人 2003:304). As a result, Chang set out to write “Skills of Writing in China’s National Language” (Zhongguo guoyuwen zuofa 中國國語文作法) published in October 1925 to teach Taiwanese intellectuals Vernacular Chinese (Chang Wo-chun 張我軍 1925c; Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡人 2003:304). Apart from the promotion of Vernacular Chinese, Chang also continuously published Lu Xun’s 魯迅 literary works in the Taiwan People’s News. Chang Wo-chun’s promotion of Vernacular Chinese in the Taiwan People’s News disregarded the fact that the Taiwanese people did not speak Mandarin. However, many members of the Taiwan People’s News also supported Vernacular Chinese despite the fact that Chang Wo-chun’s push for Vernacular Chinese resulted in conflict with many supporters of Literary Chinese or Vernacular Taiwanese. As whole, Chang Wo-chun’s position on language and literature indicated the stance and national identity of the Mother Nation Camp. This camp believed China was the mother nation and expected Taiwan’s “return” to China, so Taiwanese people should reform literature and language commensurate with the literature and language reform in China. The Wait for Opportunity Camp Wakabayashi Masahiro (1983:232-233) quoted an autobiographical novel, Taiwan Before Dawn (Japanese: Yoakemae no Taiwan 夜明け前の台湾), of Taiwanese writer Wu Cho-liu 吳濁流 describing the sentiment of the Wait for Opportunity Camp toward the mother nation – China. This camp expected the coming revival of the mother nation and believed that the mother nation would come to rescue its Chinese compatriots in Taiwan. According to Wakabayashi Masahiro (1983:186), Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰 was a classic example of the landowner capital class belonging to the Wait for Opportunity Camp. Owing to his rich father being a landowner, Huang Cheng-tsung was well-educated and graduated from Waseda University in Tokyo in 1923. Huang Cheng-

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tsung served as the Publisher of the Taiwan People’s News and was also a businessman and a Christian missionary. Due to his capitalist background and close relationship with the main sponsor of the Taiwan People’s News, Lin Hsien-tang, Huang Cheng-tsung’s discourse on institutional reform was often concerned with the landowner capital class. Huang Cheng-tsung and Lin Hsien-tang submitted a petition of twelve requests to the Governor-General of Taiwan in October 1924 and published these twelve requests in the Taiwan People’s News on November 21, 1924. Of these twelve items, only two involved civil rights, while the rest concerned the landowner capitalist class (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2004b:135-138). Huang Cheng-tsung published some articles in the Taiwan People’s News to request institutional reform, but many articles were about the interests of the capitalist class. The arguments of Huang Cheng-tsung focused on institutional reform and national identity. In his view of nationalism and Taiwan’s relationship with China, Huang Cheng-tsung contended that Taiwan should be (1) autonomous, (2) a Taiwan of unique culture and (3) a Taiwan connected to China (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2004b:148-171). On his first point, Huang Cheng-tsung published an article “Discussion on the Reform of the Taiwanese Advisory Councils” (Taiwan pinyihui gaizaolun 台灣評議會改造論) in order to request more autonomy for Taiwan (Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰 1923b). Huang argued that 3.5 million Taiwanese people were of the Han Chinese nation possessing 4,000 years of history and that the Japanese authorities did not respect Taiwan’s unique cultural differences, thus eliminating the special characteristics of Taiwan. Huang Cheng-tsung’s argument criticized Japan’s discriminatory policy as it was applied to its colonies. In June 1924, Huang Cheng-tsung also called on the Japanese cabinet to respect the unique culture of colonial Taiwan and help Taiwan’s development under Japanese constitutional politics (Huang Chengtsung 黃呈聰 1924). On his second point, Huang Cheng-tsung argued that the Taiwanese people should reform Taiwanese society by enjoying the happiness of a new culture, cultivating and expressing people’s characteristics and constructing a uniquely Taiwanese culture which could allow Taiwan to catch up to Europe and the U.S. (Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰 1923c). Huang’s argument pointed out that Taiwan already possessed its original Chinese culture from before 1895, and this culture had evolved with the progress of Taiwan’s history and its natural environment for over 300 years. He also said, however, Taiwan’s culture was influenced by Japanese civilized culture after Japan’s arrival in Taiwan. Huang Cheng-tsung, therefore, argued that this afforded the Taiwanese people a unique opportunity to fertilize Taiwanese culture through a synthesis of Chinese traditional culture with Japanese industrial civilization to construct a

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new and unique Taiwanese culture. As with Huang’s argument, establishing the discourse of a unique culture in Taiwan signified an intention of constructing a new culture, which was also some kind of evolved Chinese culture, distinct from Japanese culture, and in opposition to the Japanese assimilation policy. Huang’s third major concern was the preservation of the link between Taiwan and China through promoting Vernacular Chinese (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2004b:160). Similar to Chang Wo-chun, Huang Cheng-tsung was a key promoter of Vernacular Chinese in the Taiwan People’s News. For instance, in January 1923, Huang Cheng-tsung published “Discussing the New Mission of Popularization of Vernacular Chinese” (Lun puji baihuawen de xinshiming 論 普及白話文的新使命) to promote Vernacular Chinese (Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰 1923a). In this article, he claimed that “Taiwan is not an independent country, and, presently, the foreign power will eliminate our Chinese character as we do not have a supporting power to preserve our Han character.” He also suggested that Taiwanese people should learn Vernacular Chinese in order to make an eternal connection to Chinese culture. Huang Cheng-tsung believed that the popularization of Vernacular Chinese had improved Chinese culture and had become the lingua franca in China (Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰 1923a). Huang said that Taiwanese culture was spawned from Chinese culture, and he further argued that although Taiwanese languages were different to Vernacular Chinese, the grammar of Taiwanese languages was closer to Vernacular Chinese than to Japanese. Most importantly, Huang asserted that China was Taiwan’s mother nation – that China was the mother of Taiwan and Taiwan was the son of China in terms of culture (Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰 1923a). In addition, Huang suggested that Taiwanese people could read modern Chinese publications if the Taiwanese people could understand Vernacular Chinese. He further argued that the Taiwanese people should utilize Vernacular Chinese to mobilize against the Japanese as well as connect to Chinese culture forever (Huang Cheng-tsung 黃呈聰 1923a). Between May and June of 1923, Huang Cheng-tsung promoted the Taiwan People’s News and his ideas in speeches were delivered around Taiwan. The Japanese government criticized this promotional tour and the discourse of nationalism as constituting an attack on Japanese rule (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2004a:157). In short, the promotion of Vernacular Chinese was a strong link to China and, most notably, Huang Cheng-tsung’s argument on Taiwan’s culture and Vernacular Chinese signified a strong Chinese identity.

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The Reform of Taiwan Camp As mentioned above, Vernacular Chinese was not widely used in Taiwan before the arrival of the Chinese Nationalist regime in 1945 and the advocates of Vernacular Chinese when the Japanese neglected the differences between Taiwanese languages and Vernacular Chinese. In contrast, Taiwanese elites within the Reform of Taiwan Camp promoted an alternative written language based on writing Taiwanese Hoklo phonetically. Like the use of Vernacular Chinese, Chen Pei-feng considered Tsai Pei-huo’s Taiwanese Hoklo Romanization movement (Japanese: Taiwango rōmaji undō 台灣語羅馬字運動)31 to be another anti-dōka symbol (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:224). However, unlike Vernacular Chinese, Tsai’s Taiwanese Romanization was not used as a language of publication in any of the major newspapers.32 Tsai Pei-huo’s idea of Taiwanese Romanization originated from the Church Romanization with which he was familiar as a Christian. Tsai Pei-huo published “The Establishment of a New Taiwan and the Roman Script” (Japanese: Shin Taiwan no Kensetsu to Rōmaji 新台湾の建設と羅馬字) in The Formosa in September 1922 to push Taiwanese Romanization (Tsai Pei-huo 蔡培火 1922). In December 1923, Tsai Pei-huo published a further two articles, “The Establishment of a New Taiwan and the Roman Script I” and “The Establishment of a New Taiwan and the Roman Script II,” in the Taiwan People’s News and argued that Taiwanese Romanization was the most efficient means to create Taiwan’s advanced civilization (Tsai Pei-huo 蔡培火 1923). Chen Tsui-lien believes that Tsai Pei-huo intended to use Taiwanese Romanization to underline the characteristics of the Taiwanese language (Hoklo) (Chen Tsui-lien 陳翠蓮 2008:117-123). Chen Pei-feng further argues that Tsai Pei-huo’s Taiwanese Hoklo Romanization movement in both The Formosa and the Taiwan People’s News was a direct challenge to the Japanese national language policy (Chen Pei-feng 陳培豐 2001:217-227). Tsai’s idea provided native Taiwanese speakers with a shortcut to learn written Taiwanese and Chen Pei-feng argued Tsai’s idea was the first Taiwanese language movement of “My hand writes what I say” (woshou xie wokou 我手寫我口) in Taiwan’s history. However, the Japanese government did not allow the use of Taiwanese Romanization, and Tsai’s promotion of Taiwanese Romanization and the Church Romanized Taiwanese Bible were officially forbidden from 1931. 31 32

Between 1910 and 1930, Tsai Pei-huo advocated using the Church Romanization to write Taiwanese. From 1931 to around 1935, Tsai Pei-huo used Japanese Kana to write Taiwanese. Tsai Pei-huo often published advertisements for the “Taiwanese Romanization Study Class” in the Taiwan People’s News and he always published his literary works in Taiwanese Romanization in the Taiwanese Church News.

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The Promotion of Vernacular Taiwanese was another important feature of the Reform of Taiwan Camp. Around 1926, articles promoting Vernacular Taiwanese began to appear in the Taiwan People’s News. Lai Ho 賴和 was a typical member of the Reform of Taiwan Camp who promoted Vernacular Taiwanese to maintain the traditional Taiwanese language, Hoklo. Lai Ho was a famous Taiwanese litterateur, a doctor who graduated from the Medical School of the Taiwan Government-General, and a Hakka, though he could not speak Hakka, only Hoklo. Before Lai Ho started to produce literature in the Taiwan People’s News, he suggested the Taiwan People’s News publish more literary works with native Taiwanese color (Lai Ho 賴和 1925). After Lai Ho became the Chief Editor of the Supplement of the Taiwan People’s News from 1926, he devoted space to the development of Taiwanese new literature and the promotion of Vernacular Taiwanese. Lai Ho recognized the serious limitations of Vernacular Chinese in expressing the Taiwanese reality when he was writing his first novel, Join the Fun (Taiwanese: Tàu-lāu-jia̍ t 鬥鬧熱), later published on January 1, 1926. He experimentally used Chinese characters to insert many Vernacular Taiwanese expressions in the dialogues of the story and thus he unconsciously suggested, in the form of creative writing, that in his mind perhaps Vernacular Taiwanese was the real Taiwanese people’s language (Lai Ho 賴和 1926b; Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡人 2003:313). Later, he began practising his vision of “literature with Taiwanese local color” (Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡人 2003:306) and promoted Vernacular Taiwanese (Taiwanese: Tâi-oân-oē-bûn 台灣話文). His essay, “Reading ‘the Comparison of the New and Old Literature’ in the Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō” (Taiwanese: Tha̍ k Tâi-ji̍t-chóa ê sin kū bûn-ha̍ k chi pí-kàu 讀臺日紙的新舊文 學之比較), officially raised the idea that without a Taiwanese written form it was necessary to create new characters or borrow from foreign languages and other orthographies to express uniquely Taiwanese ideas and concepts (Lai Ho 賴和 1926a; Wu Rwei-ren 吳叡人 2003:313). Vernacular Taiwanese borrowed similar-sounding or similar-meaning Chinese characters as proxies for Taiwanese words. For instance, Lai Ho used “Tàu-lāu-jia̍ t 鬥鬧熱” to describe “join the fun,” but this term in Mandarin Chinese should be “cou renao 湊熱鬧.” Another example is gyroscope: Lai Ho used “Kan-lo̍ k 干樂” to denote the Taiwanese word, though the Mandarin Chinese term is “tuoluo 陀螺.” It was easy to understand Lai Ho’s literary works if the reader was literate in Written Chinese and knew Hoklo. In short, Lai Ho’s use of Vernacular Taiwanese signified his position concerning the language of the Taiwanese as a people. His idea of promoting ­Vernacular Taiwanese was a resistance against the colonial power’s lang­uage, Japanese, and a rejection of the Vernacular Chinese promoted by other

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Tai­wanese elites, especially those who had been to China or had a deep relationship with China. Above all, Lai Ho’s vision of Taiwanese literature and Taiwanese written forms intended to construct a subjectivity of Taiwanese consciousness. The Taiwan Revolution Camp and the Taiwan Masses Times and the New Taiwan Masses Times Between 1928 and 1931, Taiwanese left-wing groups published two newspapers, the Taiwan Masses Times (Japanese: Taiwan Taishū Jihō 臺灣大衆時報) and the New Taiwan Masses Times (Japanese: Shin Taiwan Taishū Jihō 新臺灣大衆 時報), in their efforts to propagate their concept of Taiwanese identity as distinct from that of the Taiwan People’s News.33 Taiwan’s left-wing advocated a Taiwanese national liberation from Japan, but the left-wing constructed different concepts of national liberation in the two newspapers. In January 1927, Wang Min-chuan 王敏川 and Lien Wen-ching 連溫卿34 dominated the Taiwanese Cultural Association and transformed the Taiwanese Cultural Association into the so-called left-wing “new” Taiwanese Cultural Association. In February 1927, Wang Min-chuan withdrew from the Taiwan People’s News and later launched a boycott of the Taiwan People’s News as he considered the newspaper to belong to the landlord bourgeois. In March 1928, Wang Min-chuan and other members of the new Taiwanese Cultural Association as well as many left-wing organizations established the Taiwan Masses Times in Tokyo.35 The Taiwan Masses Times survived less than four months, having published ten issues, starting on March 24, 1928 and ending by a government ban on July 9, 1928.36 The Taiwan Masses Times put “class struggle” ahead of nationalism. The concept of a new Taiwan in the Taiwan Masses Times was to unite laborers and farmers against Japanese imperialism and the Taiwanese landlord bourgeoisie so as to construct a new and independent Taiwan. On March 24, 1928, the first issue of the Taiwan Masses Times proclaimed that its purpose was to speak for 33 34

35

36

The language used in both newspapers was Vernacular Chinese. Lien Wen-ching (1894-1957) started promoting Esperanto from 1913 and later became the Chief Editor of the La Verda Ombro. He withdrew from the Taiwanese Cultural Association in 1929 and never again became involved in any social or political movement. More than 23 left-wing organizations were involved in the Taiwan Masses Times such as the Chiayi Proletarian Youth Association, the Changhwa Youth Study Association, the Tainan Proletarian Study Association, the Taiwanese Cultural Association, the Keelung Workers’ Association and the New Society of Workers and Farmers. The Japanese government forbade the Taiwan Masses Times to circulate in Taiwan from July 1928. This governmental policy forced the Taiwan Masses Times to close in Tokyo.

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the oppressed Taiwanese people to speak against imperialism and capitalists, and to propagandize the left-wing liberation of Taiwan (Taiwan Masses Times 1928a). The Taiwan Masses Times condemned the Taiwanese capitalist class, particularly the landowner bourgeoisie, and argued that they could not represent the people of Taiwan (Taiwan Masses Times 1928b). Articles in the Taiwan Masses Times concentrated on the labor and farmer movements. For example, the second issue of the Taiwan Masses Times was a special May Day (International Workers’ Day) edition (Taiwan Masses Times 1928c). This issue discussed both the labor and farmer movements and argued that the working people in Taiwan belonged to a nation as weak as those colonies ruled by the Western imperialist powers. The following issues also discussed the social movements of the working class in Taiwan. In regard to Japan, the class struggle of the Taiwanese people was the only way to fight against Japanese imperialism. Thus, both the Japanese Empire and the right-wing capitalist class were enemies. According to the Taiwan Masses Times, only the grass roots could master ­Taiwan. In 1929, the Taiwanese Communist Party37 and the Taiwan Peasant Association38 were involved in the affairs of the Taiwanese Cultural Association, thus moving the Taiwanese Cultural Association to the radical left. From December 1930, these left-wing organizations resumed publishing a newspaper in Tokyo entitled the New Taiwan Masses Times until July 1931 when the Japanese government took action to wipe out communist and left-wing activities. Only five issues were published during these seven months. The TCP’s advocacy of proletarian revolution influenced the New Taiwan Masses Times following the impact of the Great Depression in 1929. As a result, the New Taiwan Masses Times published many articles claiming the failure of capitalism (Hu Ching-ya 胡清雅 2008:21). Under the policy of “One Country, One Party” policy of the Comintern, the TCP claimed the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan as a strategy for de-colonialization. The TCP’s slogan was “Long Live Taiwan Independence” (Hsiao & Sullivan 1983:286-287). The New Taiwan Masses Times took the same position as its predecessor against both the Japanese government and the right-wing capitalist class, but it further advocated cooperation with the Comintern and waiting for the revolution (Chen Fang-ming 陳芳明 1998a:208-209). 37

38

In March 1928, nine people established the Taiwan Communist Party in Shanghai as the “Nationality Branch of the Japanese Communist Party.” Three years later the Japanese government destroyed the TCP and its front organizations (Hsiao & Sullivan 1983:269). Chien Chi 簡吉 and Chao Kang 趙港 established the Taiwan Peasant Association (TPA) in Kaohsiung in June 1926, but the Japanese government destroyed the TPA in 1931.

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In December 1930, the first issue of the New Taiwan Masses Times claimed the effort to liberate Taiwan was an international movement, and Taiwanese should cooperate with the proletariat around the world. This issue also declared itself to be “against imperialism, against exploitation, and against oppression” in order to reach the goal of liberation (New Taiwan Masses Times 1930). The New Taiwan Masses Times provided some information about leftwing movements in other countries such as Spain, France, Russia, China and Germany. Furthermore, the New Taiwan Masses Times officially advocated revolution against Japan. In the issue of May 1931, the New Taiwan Masses Times encouraged the Taiwanese proletarian workers and peasants to take revenge on the Japanese imperialist and colonial power who oppressed the proletariat (New Taiwan Masses Times 1931b). In the issue of June 1931, the New Taiwan Masses Times openly advocated Taiwan Independence. The New Taiwan Masses Times asserted that Taiwanese people should unite with world’s proletariat to overthrow imperialism and shouted “Long Live the Taiwan Independence Movement” (New Taiwan Masses Times 1931a). Finally, the New Taiwan Masses Times was terminated under the Japanese policy to counter the left-wing in late 1931. The Taiwan Masses Times and New Taiwan Masses Times had very different viewpoints on national identity against Japanese colonial rule from the rightwing Taiwan People’s News. The main themes of Taiwanese consciousness of the right-wing Taiwan People’s News focused on “language,” “culture,” “nation,” and even establishing a connection with China. However, the argument of Taiwanese consciousness and Taiwan Independence from Japan of the left-wing newspapers was based on the “class struggle.” Both the old and new Taiwan Masses Times tried to apply “class struggle” rather than “nationalism” to counter Japanese imperialism. In addition, the Taiwanese elites of both the old and new Taiwan Masses Times advocated “Taiwan Independence” as distinct from “autonomy” under the Japanese empire. In short, the national identity of both the old and new Taiwan Masses Times was a Taiwan of the “Taiwanese proletariat,” which belonged to the “world of the proletariat” under the guidance of the Comintern. Aborigines Ignored The political movements of Taiwanese against the Japanese reached their peak between 1927 and 1931 (Chen Fang-ming 陳芳明 1998b:31-32). These political movements included both the left-wing and right-wing. Their arguments in their newspapers affirmed a strong non-Japanese national identity. However, the arguments for national identity in both right-wing and left-wing newspapers concentrated on the national identity of Han people, most being Hoklo

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with some Hakka such as Lai Ho. According to Table 1.6, the Hoklo speaking people composed the majority of the Taiwanese population and the second largest group were the Hakka. As a matter of fact, both the Taiwan People’s News and the old and new Taiwan Masses Times only published in Japanese, traditional Written Chinese, Vernacular Chinese and even Vernacular Taiwanese, but never Vernacular Hakka or aboriginal languages. Table 1.6

Composition of Population in Ethnic Groups in Taiwan, 1930

Ethnic Group

Taiwanese People

Percentage Hoklo (Hokkien) Hakka

75.5% 14.1%

Aborigines

Civilized39 Uncivilized

4.3%

Japanese Foreigners

1.2% 3.1%

5% 1.2%

(Taiwan Governor-General Office 1934:42) 39

One particular incident revealed that neither left-wing nor right-wing newspapers spoke for all Taiwanese people. Armed resistance against Japan had been almost crushed prior to the publication of both right-wing and left-wing newspapers in the mid-1910s. Yet, an incident of significant impact, the Musha Uprising (Japanese: Musha Jiken 霧社事件), occurred on October 27, 1930 and continued until November 20, 1930.40 The people of Musha were mountain aborigines who were a different race from Han Taiwanese people. The Musha Uprising shocked both the people of Taiwan and the Japanese government. Since it deeply impacted upon Taiwan, both the right-wing and left-wing camps had to comment on the uprising. 39

40

Displaying the prejudice of both Japanese and Han Taiwanese, Seiban 生番 or “raw aborigines” referred to “uncivilized aborigines” who mostly lived in the mountains of Taiwan. Jukuban 熟番 or “cooked aborigines” referred to the “civilized aborigines” who lived in the plains and hills of Taiwan. This was a considerable and important armed resistance of Taiwanese aborigines against the Japanese colonial rule. In this incident, the aboriginal rebels killed 134 Japanese on October 27, 1930. However, the Japanese government dispatched the armed forces, killing 348 aborigines. In addition, 296 aborigines also committed suicide at the end of this uprising. For more details, see the Encyclopedia of Taiwan at Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=3722.

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The right-wing Taiwan New People’s News provided a much more conservative viewpoint than did the left-wing. On November 8, 1930, the “Cold Words” (lengyu 冷語) column criticized the stupidity of using primitive weapons to fight against the “civilized” and modernly equipped Japanese army. This column used terms such as “ignorant” and “low class race” to describe the aborigines. On January 17, 1931, Lin Chin-lai 林金來 argued that the aborigines would never have used weapons against Japan if they had been well-educated. On the other hand, the editorial of the Taiwan New People’s News of January 10, 1931, said that the aborigines did not kill the Taiwanese people, but Naichijin because they knew their enemy was the Japanese. It argued the uprising was a revenge deliberately targeted at Japanese only (Taiwan New People’s News 1931c). The opinions of some nationalists with a left-wing inclination from the Taiwan New People’s News provided a different perspective. On January 10, 1931, Chiang Wei-shui 蔣渭水 in the Taiwan New People’s News criticized the Japanese police rule over Taiwan and stated that this police rule was a factor causing the incident (Hsu Chun-shu 許鈞淑 2006:17). On January 1, 1931, Pai Cheng-chih 白成枝 argued that the salient factors of this incident included economics, nationalism and discrimination. He said that the “Raw Aborigines” (Japanese: Seiban 生蕃 [uncivilized aborigines]) had to cooperate with the Taiwanese to be a part of the Taiwanese left-wing camp (Hsu Chun-shu 許鈞 淑 2006:17). Another pro-left-wing person, Liao Chin-ping 廖進平, argued on January 1, 1931 that the aborigines should cooperate with the Japanese Pro­ letarian Party to counter the Japanese government (Hsu Chun-shu 許鈞淑 2006:17-18). The radical left-wing New Taiwan Masses Times also delivered alternative messages to those of the right-wing. In March 1931, an article in the New Taiwan Masses Times argued that the Musha Uprising was a “national revolution” and further emphasized this incident gave “our Taiwanese liberalization movement a lesson” (Hsueh Ling 雪嶺 1931). The article maintained that the leftwing always neglected the aborigines and that the Taiwanese people and the aborigines were weak nations under the oppression and exploitation of imperialism. The article also suggested that the left-wing should boycott the Japanese government’s efforts to recruit laborers for its military operation against the Musha aborigines. Analyzing these arguments about the Musha Uprising in both newspapers, we know that these Taiwanese elites never considered the Taiwanese aborigines to be members of the Taiwanese nationality. As Ng Chiau-tong argued, the Han people in Taiwan asserted themselves as “Taiwanese,” but excluded the aborigines. Ng Chiau-tong considered this a blemish on the Taiwanese nationalism movement of Han people in Taiwan (Hsu Chun-shu 許鈞淑 2006:22).

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To conclude, both the right-wing and left-wing Taiwanese private newspapers provided a diversity of ideas on national identity against the Japanese assimilation policy, but they neglected the existence of the aboriginal people in Taiwan and never considered the aborigines as a part of Taiwanese people until the Musha Uprising. After the Musha Uprising of 1930, they realized the importance of the aborigines in the political movement against Japan. However, the political movement of Taiwanese people had already gradually decreased from 1931 with the rise of the Japanese militarism and was suppressed from 1937 with the approach of World War II. Concluding Remarks The Japanese colonial regime claimed to be better than the Western colonial powers as it had a Japanese-style assimilation policy, dōka, which purported to treat Taiwanese people equally in order to build the great Japanese Empire. However, many elite Taiwanese opposed the discriminatory dōka policy. The media became the apparatus in which both the Japanese government and Taiwanese people constructed their imagined communities. Both the Taiwan Daily News and Taipei Broadcasting Station were parts of the government, and their discourses and propaganda served government policy. The Taiwan Daily News not only published the dōka policy and pushed the national language, but also criticized dissent against the assimilation policy. In addition, the Japanese government utilized public radios at schools, temples and village assembly places to implement its assimilation policy. During World War II, both the Taiwan Daily News and the radio station became the megaphones of the Kōminka Movement and the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere as well as tools for mobilizing the Taiwanese people in the war. Conversely, both the right-wing nationalist Taiwan People’s News and the left-wing old and new Taiwan Masses Times showed alternative perspectives of national identity different from the government media between 1920 and 1936. Prior to 1931, both the right-wing and left-wing could freely criticize Japanese policy, though sensitive words might be censored by the government. After the rise of Japanese militarism around 1931, the left-wing New Taiwan Masses Times was closed and the Taiwan New People’s News was no longer as active in criticizing the Japanese government. Wakabayashi Masahiro categorized Taiwanese nationalist movements into four camps which constructed different types of imagined Taiwanese communities. The discourses of three – the Mother Nation Camp, the Wait for Opportunity Camp and the Reform of Taiwan Camp – could be found in the

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Taiwan People’s News. The Taiwan People’s News not only addressed both the “opposition to dōka” and “advocating the maintenance of traditional Written Chinese” in order to maintain Taiwanese Han origins, but also showed feelings of kinship and concern for China. The Taiwan People’s News stressed nationalism and emphasized Han cultural identity in opposition to assimilation and the Japanese national language policy. In short, within the Taiwan People’s News, both the Mother Nation Camp and the Wait for Opportunity Camp demonstrated their Chinese identity. Also in the Taiwan People’s New, the Reform of Taiwan Camp showed its Taiwan identity. Regarding language, apart from the official promotion of Vernacular Chinese by the Taiwan People’s News to make a connection with China, Tsai Peihuo also popularized Taiwanese Hoklo Romanization and Lai Ho further encouraged the use of Vernacular Taiwanese in order to help Taiwanese people learn a written script. Language can be considered a core of a culture and members of the Taiwan People’s News also utilized language as a tool of resistance against the Japanese. No matter what kind of language they promoted, they indicated an imagined difference of cultural and national communities behind those languages. As a consequence, the promotion of different written languages truly showed the diversity of national identities in the Taiwan People’s News. Within both the old and new Taiwan Masses Times, the Taiwan Revolution Camp indicated its intention to construct an independent proletarian Taiwan against both the Japanese Empire and the Taiwanese landlord bourgeoisie. Both left-wing newspapers had a short history of publication under Japanese rule, but they provided a very different perspective on national identity from that of the Taiwan People’s News. Both left-wing newspapers advocated a national revolution of the proletariat urging class struggle against both the Japanese Empire and the Taiwanese right-wing capitalist class. Most importantly, however, both right-wing and left-wing newspapers neglected the Taiwanese aborigines while constructing national identity and collective memory before the Musha Uprising. To conclude, there was significant diversity in the construction of national identity during Japanese colonial rule, particularly in the period of 1920-1936.

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Chapter 2

Chapter 2

The Chinese Nationalist Party Regime and the Media, 1945-1987 As a colonial regime from Mainland China without broad support or legitimacy in Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT; Kuomintang) government applied numerous measures to secure its power before democratization. Just as the Japanese colonial government conducted its Japanization policy during 1895-1945, the KMT attempted to Sinicize Taiwanese by means of inculcating Chinese nationalism. Both the Japanese government and the KMT also shared some other similarities in the way they ruled Taiwan, such as the pro­motion of “national language,” the establishment of a discriminatory system against Taiwanese and the suppression of dissenting media. In addition, in order to protect its power, the KMT proclaimed itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Chinese nation as opposed to Communist China during the period 1945-1988. The KMT regime thus portrayed both the Taiwan Independence Movement and the democratic opposition as threats to the Chinese nation on Taiwan. The KMT controlled almost all mass media in Taiwan before democratization. The media formed part of the ideological state apparatus of the colonial KMT regime, playing a vital role in propagandizing its version of Chinese ideology and attacking the Chinese Communists, the Taiwan Independence Movement and the democratic opposition. Nevertheless, some burgeoning voices of Taiwan identity emerged in the opposition magazines from the mid-1970s. This chapter thus selects newspapers such as the Taiwan New Life News, the United Daily News, the China Times, the Independent Evening Post to examine the construction of national identity in the print media. In addition, this chapter also uses radio stations and three free-to-air TV stations as cases to analyze the KMT’s policy of constructing a Chinese identity in the electronic media. Lastly, the chapter discusses the development of opposition magazines as well as the birth of Taiwan identity in opposition magazines. A Colonial Power: The Chinese Nationalist Party The claim that Taiwan belongs to China is very recent. Not only did Chairman Mao Zedong declare that Taiwan should be independent in his interview of

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004227699-004

1945-1987

47

July 16, 1936 with Edgar Snow,1 but Chiang Kai-shek also declared, in April 1938, that the KMT should help Taiwan to be independent in order to fulfill Dr Sun Yat-sen’s will.2 Chiang Kai-shek’s views shifted after the involvement of the U.S. in the Sino-Japanese war, and he successfully pushed for the “restora­tion” of Taiwan following Japan’s defeat to be added to the Cairo Declaration in 1943 (Wachman 2007:69-81). Finally, Chiang Kai-shek sought to reassert ­China’s sovereignty over Taiwan after the defeat of Japan (Wachman 2007:36). When the KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 1949 following its defeat in the Chinese civil war, Taiwan became the base for the KMT government to retake China. The KMT regime proclaimed itself as the sole legal regime for the Chinese nation, and even legislated the “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of the Communist Rebellion” (Dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi ­tiaokuan 動員戡亂時期臨時條款) in 1948, which lasted until 1991. Moreover, the KMT government also applied martial law (Jieyan fa 戒嚴法) from 1949 until 1987 in order to secure its control over Taiwan. Most importantly, the KMT tried to Sinicize the people of Taiwan so as to justify its Chinese nationalist autocratic rule over them. The KMT regime was the last of a long line of colonial regimes. From 1624 until the late 1980s, Taiwan had a series of six colonial rulers: the Dutch (16241664), the Spanish (1626-1642), the Zheng Family (1662-1683), the Manchus (1683-1895), the Japanese (1895-1945) and the KMT regime (1945-the late 1980s) (Jacobs 2008:37-52). Like the Japanese before them, the KMT regime applied systematic discrimination against native Taiwanese in order to rule over them, despite claiming that the Taiwanese were members of the same Chinese nation. The KMT also forced all Taiwanese – Hoklo, Hakka and aborigines – to speak the colonial language “Mandarin Chinese,” and fined and humiliated students who spoke their mother tongues at school. Taiwanese students also had to learn about Chinese history and geography instead of their own history 1 Chairman Mao Zedong claimed that Taiwan should be independent in his interview of July 16, 1936 with Edgar Snow. Snow asked, “Is it the immediate task of the Chinese people to regain all the territories lost to Japanese imperialism, or only to drive Japan from North China, and all Chinese territory above the Great Wall?” Mao responded, “It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of lost territories of China, and if Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa [Taiwan]. As for Inner Mongolia …” (Jacobs 2008:37). 2 Chiang Kai-shek delivered a speech of the KMT’s future and the war with Japan to the KMT Interim Representative Assembly in April 1938 (Hsiao & Sullivan 1979:463).

48

Chapter 2

and geography in Taiwan (Jacobs 2008:44-45). Moreover, both the Japanese and KMT governments quashed Taiwanese resistance very severely in the beginning. During the KMT rule, the KMT armies slaughtered 18,000-28,000 Taiwanese leaders and educated youth in the 228 Massacre (Jacobs 2008: 43-46).3 The Watershed during 1945-1949 As argued in the previous chapter, during the Japanese colonial period many Taiwanese elites considered themselves Chinese, on the pretext that the Han Taiwanese belonged to the Chinese nation. In addition, the Taiwanese elites did not consider the Taiwanese aborigines to be people of Taiwan until the Musha Uprising in 1930. These elites belonged to the “Mother Nation” camp and the “Wait for Opportunity” camp, both camps were the biggest among the four camps during Japanese rule. However, Taiwan had “returned” to China after World War II, and the “Reform of Taiwan” camp shifted their position. For instance, Tsai Pei-huo became KMT member in 1945 and was elected legislator in 1948. In addition, many of Taiwan’s left-wing, such as Chiang Wei-shui, Lu Ping-ting and Wang Min-chuan, had died before 1945 or, as in the case of Lien Wen-ching, withdrew from political life. Younger generations of the left-wing, such as Hsieh Hsueh-hung 謝雪紅, became involved with the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, the political position and national identity of the leftwing was complicated after Japan’s surrender to the Allies. In August 1945, at the end of World War II, many people of Taiwan were gratified to see the defeat of Japan in the Pacific War and expected to “return” to what many indeed saw as the “mother nation” – China. According to the Office of Strategic Service of the United States (the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States), the people of Taiwan expected the Chinese government to let Taiwanese people control Taiwan by themselves, not as a colony like Taiwan before 1945. Taiwan’s people also hoped the Chinese government would help the economy and the reconstruction of ­Taiwan with economic aid. However, the expectations of the Taiwanese people were broken. The Chinese government not only resembled the colonial Japanese government in its rule over Taiwan but also plundered the resources of Taiwan even more than the Japanese government did (Chen Tsui-lien 陳翠蓮 2006:1-3). 3 The estimated numbers of Taiwanese killed by the KMT government was revealed in the official Report of the 228 Uprising (Er’erbashijian yanjiubaogau 二二八事件研究報告) in 1994 (Lai Tse-han 賴澤涵 et al. 1994). The 228 tragedy was a banned topic during the martial law period under the KMT administration in Taiwan.

1945-1987

49

Chen Chun-sheng argues the KMT inherited the Japanese colonial structure to govern Taiwan which provided the KMT with an institutional foundation to colonize Taiwan. The KMT obtained both state and private capital and property from the Japanese government in Taiwan after Japan’s surrender to the Allies, and much of this became the KMT’s private property (Chen Chun-sheng 陳俊昇 1992:1-2; 2007). According to the Rawnsleys, these KMT colonial policies, along with the corruption and bureaucracy of the KMT government after the close of World War II, quickly generated much disappointment and resentment among the native Taiwanese against the mainland immigrants (Rawnsley & Rawnsley 2001:33). Consequently, the Taiwanese gradually reconsidered whether they were Chinese. The Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office (1945-1947)4 and the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters5 expropriated (jieshou 接收) the resources and property of the Japanese government in Taiwan. However, the “expropriation” became “plundering” (jieshou 劫收) of the Taiwanese people, and the “plundering” and corruption were also factors in the 228 Uprising (Lee Hsiao-feng 李筱峰 2004). For example, the head of the Monopoly Bureau of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office stole and sold more than seventy kilograms of opium from governmental storehouses and then explained to the Taiwanese that termites ate the opium (Tai Kuo-hui 戴國輝 & Yeh Yun-yun 葉芸芸 1992:120; Wang Chien-sheng 王建生 1992:67-68).6 In addition, Taiwan had abundant rice and sugar in the mid-1940s, but they were transferred to China and the price of rice in Taiwan in 1947 was dozens of times higher than it was during World War II when the United States Air Force was bombing Taiwan (Lee Hsiao-feng 李筱峰 1993:35-54; Wang Chien-sheng 王建生 1992:67-91).7 In addition, the KMT government also seized the property of the Japanese government with more than 400,000 hectares of Japanese public and private land as well as 32,886 buildings from the Japanese public, 4 The Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office (Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan gongshu 台灣省行政長官公署) was set up to take over Taiwan from the Japanese government in 1945-1947. 5 The Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters (Taiwan sheng jingbei zongsilingbu 台灣省警備 總司令部), set up in Chongqing 重慶, China in 1945, was in charge of work on public security and of escorting Japanese civilians, soldiers and officials to Japan. However, the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters continued to work continually as a major security agency until 1992. 6 Opium was a legal official monopoly product for sale during the Japanese administration period in Taiwan. 7 For instance, the rice price in Kaohsiung was NT$10 per Taiwanese catty in May-June 1945, but it was NT$308 per Taiwanese catty in February 1947.

50

Chapter 2

private Japanese holdings and even Taiwanese property (Chen Tsui-lien 陳翠蓮 1995:63-103; 2006:1-3).8 Moreover, according to many sources including the government Report of the 228 Uprising (Er’erba shijian yanjiu baogao 二二 八事件研究報告), in 1994, these and other widespread acts of “plundering” were some of the main factors for the 228 Incident (Lai Tse-han 賴澤涵 et al. 1994:3-27).9 The KMT’s corruption, bureaucracy and plundering disappointed the Taiwanese people. Furthermore, the 228 Massacre firmly separated native Taiwanese from Chinese Mainlanders both politically and socially (Jacobs 2008:46). During Japanese rule, many Taiwanese people used to imagine themselves as belonging to the same community as the people living across the strait, but the reality proved to be very different after the KMT arrived in Taiwan. The 228 Massacre not only deeply impacted the Taiwanese people and destroyed Taiwanese’s expectation of China, it also drew a sharp line of identity between Taiwanese and the Chinese Mainlanders. As a result, this phenomenon gradually became known as the “provincial complex” (shengji qingjie 省籍情結), which deeply influenced Taiwanese society for several decades.10 Furthermore, after witnessing the tragedy of those elites who were active in newspapers prior to the 228 Massacre, many families of the 228 Massacre victims changed over to the “pro-Taiwan Independence camp” from the “proChina camp” (zuguopai 祖國派) (Wang I-shih 王逸石 2008), and many Taiwanese elite turned to support Taiwan Independence overseas. In essence, the 228 Massacre is the watershed event for Taiwan identity and China identity, but the Taiwan identity was suppressed until it burst forth in 1988 when the first native Taiwanese President, Lee Teng-hui, came to power. A Regime of Mainlanders from China (1949-1987) The people who came to Taiwan from China with the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1945-1949 are generally referred to as Mainlanders in English and Wai­shen8 9

10

The KMT refused to allow many overseas Taiwanese to come back to Taiwan after World War II, and then plundered their property in Taiwan (Chen Tsui-lien 陳翠蓮 1995:63-103). According to the Report of the 228 Uprising, the factors of the 228 Uprising were political discrimination, expropriation of both Japanese and Taiwanese property, corruption, bureaucratism, inflation, economic monopolizing and cultural divergence. “Provincial complex” indicates the conflicts between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, particularly between the Hoklo people and the Mainlanders. The conflicts were about political power, language use, governmental positions, economic benefits, appointments in state-run enterprises and so on. This problem resulted from the KMT’s coercive power denying equal opportunity to the majority Taiwanese.

51

1945-1987

gren 外省人 in Chinese, literally meaning people from outside of (Taiwan) province. On the other hand, the Taiwanese native residents are the Hoklo, Hakka and aborigines. The Hoklo constitute the majority population in Taiwan, the Hakka the second largest group, the Mainlanders the third largest, and the Aboriginal people the fourth largest grouping. According to Table 2.1, approximately 75% of people in Taiwan are Hoklo, 13% are Hakka, 10% are Mainlander and 2% are aborigines (Jacobs 1971:137).11 Table 2.1 clearly indicates that the Mainlanders are a minority group in Taiwan. Table 2.1

Composition of Population in Ethnic Groups in Taiwan, 1960s

Ethnic Group

Percentage

Native Taiwanese

Hoklo Hakka Aborigines

75% 13% 2%

Mainlanders

Mainlanders

10%

( Jacobs 1971:137)

However, this Mainlander minority completely dominated the government between 1945 and 1988, just as the minority of Japanese had previously dominated Taiwan.12 The KMT colonial regime systematically discriminated against Taiwanese in political appointments and gave the Mainlanders all of the senior appointments (Jacobs 2008:44-45). Being a ruling power from China, the 11

12

This data was originally calculated from Chen Shao-hsing 陳紹馨 and Morton H. Fried, The Distribution of Family Names in Taiwan, Vol. Ι: The Data, 1968. The Taiwanese government also conducted some surveys of ethnic groups. The last report was the Report of Survey of Population and Housing Census in Area of Taiwan and Fujian 1990 (Zhonghuaminguo qishijiounian taimindicu hukougizhuzhai puchabaogao 中華民國七十九年臺閩 地區戶口及住宅普查報告). In 1992, the Legislative Yuan legislated a new act to cancel provincial origins on the family register. From 1992, there is no official report of household provincial origins. Ethnic identity is now only measured through news polls and other surveys. For example, in March 2000, a survey of TVBS showed 74.8% were Hoklo, 10.4% were Hakka, 11.6% were Mainlanders, 2.1% were aborigines and 1.1% refused to answer. (For more details, see the TVBS poll http://www.tvbs.com.tw/code/tvbsnews/poll/200003/ 0305.asp) President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in 1987. He passed away on January 13, 1988, and his successor, Vice-President Lee Teng-hui, who came to power in 1988, became the first native Taiwanese president.

52

Chapter 2

regime always allocated a majority of seats in the powerful Central Standing Committee (CSC) of the KMT as well as in the Cabinet to Mainlanders. The statistics provided in Tables 2.2 to 2.5 demonstrate the distribution of political power in Taiwan from 1945 to 1988. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show clearly that the minority Mainlanders always constituted the majority of both the cabinet and the KMT CSC. Conversely, according to Tables 2.3 and 2.4, native Taiwanese had become the majority of the KMT party members as early as 1975, but Mainlanders still occupied the majority of the positions in CSC until 1988. For example, in 1986, one year before the KMT lifted martial law, 65.9 per cent of KMT party members were native Taiwanese but the native Taiwanese occupied only 45 per cent of seats of the CSC. Indeed, Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that native Taiwanese obtained more seats gradually in both Cabinet and the KMT CSC, but the power composition did not reflect the distribution of ethnic groups in Taiwan. In other words, Mainlanders continued to dominate power under the authoritarian KMT’s administration until Lee Teng-hui came to office. Although Chiang Ching-kuo liberalized to a limited extent with an increased participation by native Taiwanese, he maintained Mainlander dominance and the regime’s colonial character. One of the best-known of these initiatives was the so-called Chuitaiqing 吹台青, a policy of promoting Taiwanese youth.13 In the early 1970s, this policy gradually gave native Taiwanese educated youth opportunities to become involved in politics when he served as Premier. In 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo launched a policy of “Innovation to protect Taiwan” (gexinbaotai 革新保台). He did nominate some native Taiwanese to be members of the Cabinet as well as the KMT CSC, though they always remained in the minority under him.14 Apart from Chuitaiqing, Chiang Ching-kuo’s liberalization policy also loosened some restrictions on Taiwanese society.15 For instance, in politics, Chiang Ching-kuo allowed the opposition to publish magazines, had “dialogues” (goutong 溝通) with the opposition leaders during 1984 and 1986, and even allowed 13

14

15

On December 22, 2002, former President Lee Teng-hui officially criticized “Chuitaiqing.” He said that it was a policy to buy Taiwanese off (shoumai Taiwan ren 收買台灣人) to protect KMT’s power in Taiwan. Lee also argued that the KMT regime was an alien power with China identity (Kuo Ping-yi 郭評儀 2002). For example, Chiang nominated Vice-Premier Hsu Ching-chung 徐慶鐘, Minister of Interior Lin Chin-sheng 林金生, Minster of Transportation and Communication Kao Yushu 高玉樹, Minister without Portfolio Lee Teng-hui and so forth in the cabinet. Besides, he also appointed some native Taiwanese in the Taiwan provincial government as well as the genuine power hub – the KMT CSC. Bruce Jacobs defined Chiang Ching-kuo’s “liberalization” in Chinese as “songbanghua” 鬆綁化 [loosening restriction] (Jacobs 2010:438).

53

1945-1987

Table 2.2 Ethnic Distribution of Senior Positions in the KMT Taiwan Provincial Headquarters, 1947

Native Taiwanese Mainlander

Number

Percentage

7 28

20% 80%

(Cheng Wen-hsun 鄭文勛 2007:52-’53) Table 2.3 Members of KMT by Ethnic Group, 1952-1988 Year

Total

Native Taiwanese

Mainlander

1952 1954 1957 1958 1963 1969 1972 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

282,959 403,260 509,864 564,784 667,235 950,993 1,198,418 1,448,106 1,686,724 1,792,714 1,884,766 1,934,011 1,997,636 2,070,683 2,120,979 2,187,973 2,268,974 2,356,042 2,398,155 2,422,195

26.10% 26.40% 29.90% 29.40% 30.70% 39.40% 46.20% 52.80% 56.60% 57.70% 59.70% 61.00% 61.90% 62.80% 63.50% 64.40% 65.20% 65.90% 66.10% 69.90%

73.90% 73.60% 70.10% 70.60% 69.30% 60.60% 53.80% 47.20% 43.40% 42.30% 40.30% 39.00% 38.10% 37.20% 36.50% 35.60% 34.80% 34.10% 33.90% 33.10%

(Liu I-chou 劉義周 2001:103)

54

Chapter 2

the opposition to establish a political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (Minzhu jinbu dang 民主進步黨; DPP), in 1986 (Jacobs 2010:444-472).16 However, despite this “liberalization,” people were arrested for “Taiwan Independence” right up until Chiang died (Jacobs 2012:69). Table 2.4 CSC of the Chinese Nationalist Party by Ethnic Group, 1952-1988

Year

Native Taiwanese Total (Number) Number

%

Mainlander Number

1952 1957 1963 1969 1976 1979 1981 1984 1986 198817

10 15 15 21 22 27 27 31 31 31

0 13% 13% 9% 23% 33% 33% 39% 45% 52%

10 13 13 19 17 18 18 19 17 15

0 2 2 2 5 9 9 12 14 16

% 100% 87% 87% 91% 77% 67% 67% 61% 55% 48%

(Chen Chi-min 陳啟民 2000; Economics Daily News 1988; Winckler 1984:489)  17

Under the KMT rule, Chinese ideology was hegemonic in Taiwan for more than four decades, but Taiwan consciousness also emerged from this oppression. On July 27, 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo told twelve native Taiwanese elders, in the Presidential Office, “I am also a Taiwanese” (Wo yeshi Taiwan ren 我也是台灣 人) (Jung Fu-tien 戎撫天 1987). Chiang’s words “I am also a Taiwanese” provided some scholars an opportunity to openly discuss Taiwan identity. For example, Tai Kuo-hui 戴國輝 discussed “Taiwanization” (Taiwan hua 台灣化) and Taiwanese consciousness (Taiwan ren yishi 台灣人意識) in the China Times (Zhongguo shibao 中國時報) on August 22, 1987. He also openly talked about the 228 Massacre and hoped the KMT government could clarify the his-

16

17

The opposition established the first opposition party, the DPP, on September 28, 1986 in the period of martial law. At that moment, it was illegal to form a political party, but Chiang Ching-kuo did not take any action to arrest the founders of the DPP. This was the 13th CSC members under Lee Teng-hui’s chairmanship in July 1988.

55

1945-1987

tory of the 228 Uprising in order to construct a new Taiwan identity (Tai Kuohui 戴國輝 1987).18 Table 2.5 Cabinet Members by Ethnic Group, 1950-1988 Year

Native Taiwanese

Mainlander

1950-1954 1954-1958 1958-1963 1963-1972 1972-1978 1978-1984 1984-198819

5% 6% 8% 11% 21% 32% 37%

95% 94% 92% 89% 79% 68% 63%

(Chen Chi-min 陳啟民 2000:40; United Daily News 1984) 19

Yet this would not change the fact that the KMT was a colonial regime dominated by Mainlanders from China. Although Winckler argues the regime became a “soft” authoritarianism after Chiang Ching-kuo came into power, which implied joint Mainlander-Taiwanese technocratic rule (Winckler 1984:482), native Taiwanese did not gain many important governmental appointments under this policy. Despite “Chuitaiqing” and liberalization, Chiang Ching-kuo still kept the essentials of despotism, like his father Chiang Kaishek, with violence against perceived enemies. Many political incidents and murders demonstrate his oppressive dictatorship such as the Lin I-hsiung Family Murder Case (Lin I-hsiung zhai xue’an 林義雄宅血案) in 1980,20 the Chen Wen-cheng Murder Case (Chen Wen-cheng ming’an 陳文成命案) in 18

19 20

This article was entitled “The implications and impacts of President Chiang Ching-kuo’s statement that ‘I am already a Taiwanese’” (Cong Chiang Ching-kuo zongtong de wo yijingshi Taiwan ren tan qi 從蔣經國總統的「我已經是台灣人...」談起). In this article, Tai Kuo-hui mainly discussed “Taiwan consciousness” and criticized the Japanese colonization over Taiwan. However, he also criticized both the Taiwan Independence Movement and Taiwan nationalism. Basically, Tai saw Taiwan consciousness as a local consciousness, but he also wished Taiwan could be an entity (Taiwan zhutixing 台灣主體性) separate from both the history of the Japan colonial period and the threat of Communist China. Lee Teng-hui formed a new cabinet in July 1988. Lin I-hsiung was arrested after the Kaohsiung Incident, and he refused to admit his guilt in the martial tribunal. On February 28, 1980, his mother and twin daughters were killed in their house and one daughter was severely injured. This murder is still not solved.

56

Chapter 2

198121 and the Henry Liu Murder Case (Chiang Nan an 江南案) in 1984 (Kaplan 1992:249-406).22 All of these incidents showed that the Chiang Ching-kuo regime was authoritarian and brutal despite Chiang Ching-kuo’s promotion of a few young educated Taiwanese.23 The Chinese colonial features of the regime continued to be evident under Chiang Ching-kuo not only in the cabinet and the KMT CSC, but also in civil service recruitment. On March 24, 1987, Legislator Wu Shu-chen 吳淑珍24 interrogated the administration during a parliamentary session about “Abandon Discrimination Policy against native Taiwanese” (Fangqi qishi Taiwan ren zhengce 放棄歧視臺灣人政策). Wu revealed many statistics to criticize the KMT’s discriminatory policy in the governmental appointments. She said as few as four per cent of major generals and above are native Taiwanese, only 7.3 per cent of senior police officers were native Taiwanese, and no more than 25 per cent of presidents in 28 universities were native Taiwanese (Taiwan Times 1987).25 On February 27, 1989, the Independent Morning Post (Zili zaobao 自立 早報) published a survey on government positions with the title “The civil service is the Mainlanders’ world” (Wenguan tizhi waishengji tianxia 文官體制 外省籍天下), to analyze the government power structure in which the most senior civil servants were Mainlanders in 1989 (Independent Morning Post 1989). The Independent Morning Post’s report indicated the influence of the KMT’s imbalanced policy of civil service recruitments, and this policy’s effects continued to the early 1990s. According to Table 2.6, the number of native Tai-

21

22

23 24

25

Many believe that it was a message sent by the KMT to the opposition, particularly as the day, 228, is a dark day for native Taiwanese elites. Dr Chen Wen-cheng was a Professor at Carnegie Mellon University in the U.S., and supported the Taiwanese democratic movement. He returned to Taiwan for a family visit in 1981 and died at the campus of National Taiwan University after interrogation by the Taiwan Garrison Command. Chen Wen-cheng had raised funds for the Formosa Magazine in the United States. The KMT government claimed that Chen committed suicide as he dreaded punishment, but the opposition believed it was a political murder. This case is also still not solved. In October, 1984, gangsters of the United Bamboo Gang (Zhulianbang 竹聯幫), murdered Henry Liu (Liu Yi-liang 劉宜良, well known by his pen-name Chiang Nan 江南) in the United States. The KMT government intelligence agency later admitted they sent the gangsters to kill Henry Liu. Most of the victims of these above-listed incidents were native Taiwanese; only Chiang Nan was a Mainlander (he was also an American citizen). Wu is the wife of the then future Taiwan President, Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian was in jail between June 1986 and February 1987. After Chen Shui-bian was released from prison, Chen became Wu’s assistant. Before 1993, the government appointed all universities presidents.

57

1945-1987

wanese in senior appointments slowly increased, but it still did not reflect the composition of Taiwan’s ethnic groups. Table 2.6 Government Appointments by Mainlander (MLD) and Taiwanese (TW), 1946-1992

Positions Senior Appointments Ordinary Appointments Junior Appointments Provisional Appointments

1946 MLD TW 91.9% 74.4% – –

 8.1% 25.6% – –

1981 MLD

TW

1989 MLD

TW

1992 MLD

TW

84.3% 61.4% 35.3% 43.1%

15.7% 38.6% 64.7% 56.9%

57.8% 39.1% 26.2% 36.9%

42.2% 60.9% 73.8% 63.1%

51.6% 33.4% 22.8% 34.4%

48.4% 66.6% 77.2% 65.6%

(Huang Ling-hua 黃玲華 1992; Independent Morning Post 1989; Lin Chiu-huang 林 丘湟 2006:70-71) Table 2.7 Allocated Numbers by Provincial Origin in Civil Service Recruitment Examination Province

Numbers

Province

Numbers

Sichuan 四川 Jiangsu 江蘇 Shandong 山東 Hebei 河北 Henan 河南 Guangdong 廣東 Hunan 湖南 Anhui 安徽 Hubei 湖北 Zhejiang 浙江 Guangxi 廣西 Shanxi 山西 Jiangxi 江西 Liaoning 遼寧 Fujian 福建 Shanxi 陝西 Guizhou 貴州 Yunnan 雲南

50 44 42 34 32 30 28 24 24 22 17 17 15 14 13 13 12 11

Gansu 甘肅 Jilin 吉林 Rehe 熱河 Taiwan臺灣 Liaobei 遼北 Xinjiang 新疆 Andong 安東 Chaha’er 察哈爾 Heilongjiang 黑龍江 Hejiang 合江 Nenjiang 嫩江 Ningxia 寧夏 Qinghai 青海 Songjiang 松江 Suiyuan 綏遠 Xikang 西康 Xing’an 興安 Xizang (Tibet) 西藏

9 8 8 8 7 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

(Li Chen-chou 李震洲 1991:7)

58

Chapter 2

Table 2.7 shows the allocated numbers by provincial origin for the nation-wide civil service recruitment examination; this also illustrates the reason why native Taiwanese occupied so few senior appointments. The KMT government employed the Allocation by Province for National Civil Servant Recruitment Act (Quanguoxing gongwuyuan kaoshi geshengqu luqu ding’e bili biaozhun 全 國性公務員考試各省區錄取定額比例標準) in 1948 and altered the Act in 1952. The native Taiwanese comprised approximately 90% of population in Taiwan, but the native Taiwanese could only have 1.5% of appointments according to the original act. Although the KMT government doubled the recruitment numbers of the native Taiwanese after 1952, the native Taiwanese still did not have a fair “Civil Service Recruitment Examination” until 1991 under Lee Teng-hui’s administration.26 Finally, the Lee Teng-hui government officially abolished this act in 1996. In order to reduce the complaints of the native Taiwanese, the KMT regime held a “Taiwan Provincial Civil Servant Recruitment Act” for the native Taiwan people after 1950. However, this was abolished in 1969 (Lin Chiu-huang 林丘湟 2006). Clearly, the unfair “Civil Servant Recruitment Act” caused a deliberate maldistribution of governmental appointments by ethnic group. In addition, in just the same way as the Japanese colonial rulers, the KMT used “national language” as a core method to dominate Taiwan. Cheng Ya-i argues that the KMT brought Chinese consciousness and the Chinese language (Mandarin Chinese) into Taiwan and utilized political power to make them hegemonic, while at the same time it suppressed Taiwanese culture and languages by means of education and media to underpin the colonial regime (Cheng Ya-i 鄭雅怡 2008). In July 1971, the United Daily News reported that the Taiwan Provincial Government issued an official document to force all staff of local governments to speak the “national language” (Guoyu 國語; Mandarin Chinese), and this was also part of the annual personnel performance assessment. On August 7, 1972, the United Daily News reported that the Taiwan Provincial Government had announced that local government employees and public servants must speak the national language and they must attend language examinations until they pass. Nonetheless, this measure did not work well in rural areas. According to Bruce Jacobs’ fieldwork experience in Chiayi, Taiwan during the 1970s, people in local government still spoke Hoklo.27 My childhood experience in the 1980s in Yunlin, Taiwan, was the same. Even 26

27

Before 1991, the KMT government often increased the number of civil service positions for Taiwanese, but Mainlanders still had considerable advantage in the civil service recruitments. Personal communication in July 2009, Melbourne, Australia.

1945-1987

59

though this policy did not work well in the governmental system, the KMT government did try to promote “standard Chinese,” and stated that “unqualified Chinese” must be corrected until it reached the standard of “real Chinese” (Huang Tai-shan 黃泰山 2005). This policy protected the predominance of Mainlanders as about 90 per cent of Taiwanese people did not have Mandarin Chinese as a mother tongue. To conclude, as a Chinese Mainlander regime, the KMT allocated only 1.5 per cent of civil service positions to Taiwanese as Taiwan was just one, smallsized province of China. The regulation of the use of language in government also excluded those who did not speak Mandarin Chinese well from government. The Sinification of Taiwan, 1945-1949 The KMT regime sought to de-Japanize Taiwanese and Sinicize them instead. The KMT government applied the Act of Restoring Original Names to the People of Taiwan Province (Taiwan sheng renmin huifu yuanyou xingming banfa 臺灣省人民恢復原有姓名辦法) on December 12, 1945. Controversially, however, this Act ordered that the people of Taiwan had to change their names to a Chinese name within three months, and this action caused serious problems for aborigines. The aborigines in Taiwan are a different ethnic group with a vastly different culture from Mainlanders, Hoklo and Hakka.28 However, the colonial KMT regime forced the aborigines to use Chinese names, thus compelling the aborigines to become Chinese (Yang Sheng-chan 楊昇展 2004). In short, this restoring of names policy showed the KMT’s extreme Chinese nationalism policy over Taiwanese people, especially with regard to Taiwan aborigines. The restoring/changing name policy was just the first of many measures to Sinicize Taiwanese. Another important policy was to educate Taiwanese to speak the national language, Mandarin Chinese. On December 31, 1945, the head of Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office, Chen Yi 陳儀, announced that training Taiwanese to speak “national language” was an essential policy of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office. The KMT government wanted all school teachers, staff and students to speak in the “national language” and to write in Chinese rather than Japanese within one year (Huang Ying-che 黃英哲 2007:35). The KMT government’s policy was to make Taiwan become a part of China, and to extend Chinese nationalism to Taiwan through the colonial language “Mandarin Chinese.” In fact, before 28

Both the ancestors of Hoklo and Hakka Taiwanese migrated from the southern part of China to Taiwan, but speak different languages from Mainlanders.

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Chen was appointed as the Head of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office on August 29, 1945, he had already spoken to the L’Impartial (Dagongbao 大公報),29 “After I go to Taiwan, I plan to propose education in the ‘national language’ and expect Taiwanese compatriots to comprehend the mother nation’s culture” (Huang Ying-che 黃英哲 2007:39). Chen’s announcement unveiled the KMT’s plan to change Taiwanese national identity from Japanese to Chinese. Sinicizing Taiwan as a Revival Base for the Chinese Nation after 1949 After the KMT’s defeat by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the civil war, the KMT regime fled to Taiwan and ruled there with martial law until 1987.30 As the Taiwanese people have languages, culture and history different from the Chinese Mainlanders, and the Mainlanders were a minority in Taiwan, a strategy of Sinification of the Taiwanese was employed. The KMT applied many policies to Sinicize the Taiwanese. A core theme of the KMT’s Sinification policy was Chinese nationalism. The KMT declared the Three People’s Principles of Dr Sun Yat-sen as the pillar of both the Constitution of the Republic of China and its policy in administering Taiwan. The first of the Three People’s Principles was Chinese “Nationalism” and its aim was to position the KMT as the sole legitimate ruling party in the Republic of China. Under the Constitution, Chinese nationalism became hegemonic in regulating people’s thoughts. As a result, the Taiwanese were considered the descendants of the Yan Emperor and the Yellow Emperor (Yanhuang zisun 炎黃子孫) and the people of the so-called Chinese nation (Zhonghuaminzu 中華民族). To implement Chinese nationalism, Chinese cultural propaganda was widespread in education and broadcast in the media. Schools, a vital part of the KMT’s state ideological apparatus, educated Taiwanese students to be Chinese; students had to learn the history and geography of China instead of Taiwan, and had to sing patriotic songs daily during the martial law period.31 Most importantly, as with Japanese colonial power, language education was central 29

30

31

The L’Impartial was founded on June 17, 1902 in Tianjin, China. After 1949, the L’Impartial moved to Hong Kong to continue publishing and changed its foreign name to Ta Kung Pao. Ta Kung Pao now is affiliated with to the Chinese Communist Party. On May 19, 1949, Chen Cheng, the Chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government and the Commander of the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters, announced martial law in Taiwan. For instance, during my primary school and high school years in the 1980s, we had to sing “I Love China” (Wo ai Zhonghua 我愛中華), “Plum Blossom” (Meihua 梅花 [the national flower of the ROC]), “China Will Be Strong” (Zhongguo yidingqiang 中國一定強) and so on.

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to this effort to foster Chinese identity in Taiwanese schoolchildren. Cheng Ya-i says that the KMT brought Chinese consciousness and the Chinese language into Taiwan and utilized political power to make them hegemonic. The KMT suppressed Taiwanese culture and languages through education and the media to underpin the colonial regime (Cheng Ya-i 鄭雅怡 2008). The regime insisted that Taiwanese schoolchildren become “real Chinese” (tangtangzhengzheng de Zhongguo ren 堂堂正正的中國人) who spoke the “national language.” In 1956, the Taiwan Provincial Government officially banned native Taiwanese languages in schools. From 1956 to 1987, students who violated this ban were fined (Ho I-lin 何義麟 2006:217; Lee Chin-an 李勤岸 1996).32 Huang Tai-shan believes that under the administration of the authoritarian KMT regime, speaking Mandarin Chinese was both a symbol of being Chinese and a “thought” against Communist China (Huang Tai-shan 黃泰山 2005). On October 21, 1973, Chiang Kai-shek gave a speech on the 60th anniversary of the Phonetic Symbols for the National Language (Guoyuzhuyinfuhao 國語注音符 號). Chiang announced that language was a weapon to deliver and communicate thoughts as well as part of the ideological war to counter the CCP (United Daily News 1973). Therefore, “national language” was both an important feature of the Chinese nation and a symbol to oppose Communist China. Politically, as Su Beng 史明 argues, the KMT successfully utilized the armed forces, the police, the secret agencies, education and the media to extend Chinese nationalism (Su Beng 史明 1980:695-1182). The KMT also established the notion of the “legitimate Chinese nation,” the idea that the Chinese nation was only inherited from particular Chinese ancient and modern sages (shengxian 聖賢) from the Yellow Emperor to Confucius, then to Dr Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. In this political propaganda, the KMT claimed both the KMT regime and the Republic of China were the only “legitimate heirs of the Chinese nation” (zhengtong Zhonghuaminzu jichengzhe 正統中華民族繼承者) (Huang Tai-shan 黃泰山 2005). The KMT emphasized itself as the sole legal representative of the Chinese nation so that all other political organizations were illegal or rebellious.33 Thus, the CCP, the democratic opposition and the 32

33

For example, I was often fined if I spoke Hoklo in my primary school life. However, if Mainlander students spoke the Shanghai, Sichuan or Zhejiang languages, they were safe under this rule. During the martial law period, in addition to the KMT, only the Chinese Youth Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party were legal political parties. Actually, these two parties were well known as dependencies of the KMT. The Chinese Youth Party was established in Paris in 1923, and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party was set up in Shanghai in 1946. Both parties also advocated Chinese nationalism.

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Taiwan Independent Movement were threats to the KMT’s “legitimate” ruling power. Owing to the KMT’s defeat in China, the KMT claimed that the rebel “bandit” Communist Party had occupied the Chinese mainland and that the KMT would eventually lead the Chinese people in Taiwan to restore the Chinese mainland. Thus, countering Communist China became part of the KMT’s propaganda for protecting the Chinese nation, and Taiwan became its “revival base of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghuaminzu fuxingjidi 中華民族復興基地). In reaction to the threat from the democratic movement and the Taiwan Independence Movement, the KMT falsely accused both of conspiring with the CCP against the KMT and the Chinese nation. The KMT regime claimed “the opposition (dangwai 黨外), Taiwan Independence Movement and CCP were a ‘3 in 1 enemy’” of the Chinese nation (Chen Yi-shen 陳儀深 2009).34 In conclusion, the KMT’s Sinification policy was to (1) re-educate the Taiwanese to become Chinese by means of Chinese nationalism, (2) claim the KMT regime as the sole legitimate regime of China and (3) suppress native Taiwanese languages. To reach these goals, the KMT government utilized the machinery of the state, such as schooling and the media. Mass Media and China Identity The KMT ensured that the media in Taiwan only expressed a China identity. Mainlanders closely connected to the regime held the majority ownership and supervisory positions in all major media outlets. The KMT also strictly regulated any potential dissenting media such as the opposition magazines.

34

The term of dangwai initially appeared in the 1950s, and it meant “outside the party (KMT).” For example, the Secretary-General of the KMT Central Reform Committee (Zhongyang gaizao weiyuanhui 中央改造委員會), Chang Chi-yun 張其昀, on January 7, 1952, announced to solidify dangwai against the Communists (United Daily News 1952). On April 1, 1954, the United Daily News reported that the Vice-President, Chen Cheng 陳 誠, invited dangwai persons to discuss a governmental innovation (United Daily News 1954). On December 20, 1961, the United Daily News reported the KMT Taipei city councilors criticized the non-KMT councilor, Huang Hsin-chieh 黃信介, the Chairman of the DPP in 1988-1992, with the term of dangwai (United Daily News 1961). From the 1960s, dangwai meant both “outside the party” and the opposition and then became popular from the 1970s until the founding of the DPP 1986 (Jacobs 2012:52-64).

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The Media as the KMT’s State Ideological Apparatus For the KMT, political warfare was a very important strategy to defend its power. Political propaganda was the main theme of the political warfare effort and the media thus became a key for political propaganda. The KMT’s political propaganda targeted the so-called “3 in 1” enemy of the Republic of China and the Chinese nation, and it pushed a China identity through Chinese nationalism. After Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949, he re-established his power as president in 1950 and then set up the General Political Warfare of Department of Military and appointed his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, as director. Chiang Kai-shek also ordered Chiang Ching-kuo to set up the Political Warfare Cadres School (Zhenggong ganbu xuexiao 政工幹部學校) in Taipei in 1951 (Li Sunglin 李松林 1993:141-142).35 The KMT regime established the Department of Journalism within the Political Warfare Cadres School in 1951. In 1954, the KMT regime also initiated the first graduate school of journalism in the KMT party school, National Chengchi University. Two years later, the KMT regime set up the first journalism department at the same university. In the 1950s, the KMT regime initiated its Psychological War Plan (Xinzhan jihua 心戰計畫),36 and the KMT regime utilized the resources of the Department of Journalism in the Political Warfare Cadres School to establish a Psychological War Broadcasting System (Xinzhan guangbo xitong 心戰廣播系統) against Communist China (Cheng Tsung-ming 程宗明 1998b). The KMT party school, National Chengchi University, also trained journalists to propagandize the KMT’s policy. Apart from the Psychological War Plan, the KMT regime also regulated the content of newspapers and television, as well as the language used in television. Chiang Kai-shek regarded Taiwanese languages as the symbol of “potential traitors” (Kuan Ren-chien 管仁健 2005). Therefore, the regulation of the native Taiwanese language on TV was a priority.37 The regime greatly restricted the number of native Taiwanese language programs, despite about 90 per cent of people in Taiwan speaking such languages. To fulfill this goal of regulating native Taiwanese languages in the electronic media, in 1963 the Executive Yuan announced the Regulations to Guide Broadcast and TV Station Programs (Guangbo ji dianshi wuxiandiantai jiemu fudao 35 36

37

The Political Warfare Cadres School became the Political Warfare School (Zhengzhi zuozhan xuexiao 政治作戰學校) in 1970. The KMT regime obtained funds from the United States to implement this project. The U.S. government also provided scholarships and funding, such as Fulbright Award and Asian Cultural Program (now the Asian Cultural Council) of the Rockefeller Family, to teach students and scholars about Journalism in the 1950s and 1960s. Normally, native Taiwanese languages on TV referred to Hoklo which was spoken by approximately 75% of the people of Taiwan.

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zhunze 廣播及電視無線電台節目輔導準則), restricting native Taiwanese language programing to no more than fifty per cent of total programming (Su Heng 蘇蘅 1993:227). In 1972, the KMT Culture and Communications Committee gave orders to government that all television stations must decrease native Taiwan language programs (Su Heng 蘇蘅 1993:258). This regulation became harsher in 1976, when the KMT promulgated the Radio and Television Law (Guangbo dianshi fa 廣播電視法) to regulate native Taiwanese languages programs. No TV or FM radio channel was allowed to broadcast more than thirty per cent of its programs in Taiwanese native languages (Su Heng 蘇蘅 1993:227), and, as a result, as late as 1992 less than ten per cent of programing was in native Taiwanese languages (Lee Chin-an 李勤岸 1996). In conclusion, both the “Psychological War Plan” and the KMT media policy show the KMT’s propaganda on Chinese nationalism and their influence over the mass media. First, both National Chengchi University and Political Warfare Cadre School indoctrinated journalists and journalism scholars. Then strongly indoctrinated reporters moved into the mass media to implement the KMT’s ideology. Second, well-trained scholars loyal to the party taught in other new journalism schools38 and trained more indoctrinated journalists to work in the mass media. Third, the KMT applied censorship to regulate the mass media as well as to guide the mass media on how to report. For example, chief editors of newspapers would receive a note on their office tables from the KMT regime every day when they came to work. All newspapers had to follow guidance in reporting political news (Chen Li-hung 陳立宏 2009). Through political warfare, the KMT intended to keep the Mainlanders loyal and to suppress Taiwan identity. The Mass Media in 1945-1949 Newspaper Ownership and China Identity In the Outline Plan for the Takeover of Taiwan (Jieguan Taiwan jihua gangyao 接管台灣計畫綱要), which was announced on March 23, 1945, the KMT emphasized that the government had to strengthen the Chinese nationalistic consciousness of Taiwanese through cultural institutions such as newspapers, magazines and broadcast stations (Hsu Hsu-hui 許旭輝 2007). After Japan’s surrender to the Allies, the Half-Mountain people (Banshanren 半山人)39 38

39

The Shih Jie Journalism School (Shijie xinwen zhiyexuexiao 世界新聞職業學校, now Shih Hsin University) was founded in 1956. The Department of Journalism of the Chinese Culture University was established in 1963. The Department of Mass Communication of Fu Jen Catholic University was set up in 1971. Taiwanese called China Tangshan 唐山 (“shan 山” means “mountain”) before 1945, so the people from China are Tangshanren 唐山人. Half-Mountain people (Banshanren 半山

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played an important part in the KMT takeover of Taiwan.40 For instance, in 1945, Li Wan-chu 李萬居41 was in charge of Japan’s Taiwan New Post, the later Taiwan New Life News (Taiwan xinshengbao 臺灣新生報), while Lin Chung 林 忠was responsible for Japan’s Taipei Broadcasting Station, which later became the Taiwan Broadcasting Station.42 According to Table 2.8, from the end of the Pacific War to the 228 Massacre in 1947, 22 newspapers started publication in Taiwan. The Taiwan New Life News was the biggest. Consequently, this book takes the Taiwan New Life News as a primary example in this section to analyze the history of newspapers and politics during 1945-1947. The predecessor of Taiwan New Life News was the Japanese Taiwan New Post, which was set up in 1944. After World War II, the KMT government took over the Taiwan New Post and it became a state-run newspaper entitled Taiwan New Life News. The Taiwan New Life News was more conservative than the private newspapers and adopted a pro-government position. Nonetheless, all newspapers in Taiwan during this period strongly supported Chinese nationalism and a China identity, even though many other newspapers often criticized the KMT regime (Hsu Hsu-hui 許旭輝 2007).

40

41

42

人) refers to the people who were born in Taiwan, but immigrated to China during the Japanese administration period and then came back to Taiwan after the Second World War with the KMT government. Some Half-Mountain people became involved with Taiwan’s newspapers. For example, Li Wan-chu 李萬居, Sung Fei-ju 宋斐如, Chen Mao-lin 陳茂林 and Ke Tai-shan 柯台山 were presidents or chairmen of Taiwanese newspapers between 1945 and 1947. In historical perspective, many of the Half-Mountain people went to China for patriotic reasons as Chinese nationalists opposed to the Japanese administration of Taiwan. Prior to the end of World War II, at least 80,000-90,000 Half-Mountain people lived in Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Kowloon, Shantou and Xiamen. Despite their small size, Bruce Jacobs argues, “it provides important background on Taiwanese political participation in the post-1945 Nationalist state on Taiwan” (Jacobs 1990:85-86). Li Wan-chu (1901-1966) was born in Yunlin, Taiwan and then studied in Shanghai in 1924. In 1926, he studied in France and went to China in 1932. In 1945, he came to Taiwan with the KMT regime to take over Japanese property. After the 228 Massacre in 1947, he left the Taiwan New Life News and founded a newspaper Taiwan Public Forum News (Taiwan gonglunbao 台灣公論報). Li Wan-chu was also a member of the Chinese Youth Party, and not a KMT member. Li Wan-chu joined the Chinese Youth Party in Paris while he studied in France. Lin Chung was born in Taiwan in 1914. He studied at Kyoto University in the 1930s. In 1937, he travelled to China and then stayed in China until he came back to Taiwan with the Chinese Nationalist government in 1945.

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Table 2.8 Newspapers Published in Taiwan Prior to the 228 Massacre, 1945-1947 4344454647 Newspaper

President or Chairman

People’s News (Minbao 民報)

Lin Mao-sheng 林茂生, Chen Wang-cheng 陳旺成 Shen Jui-ching 沈瑞慶 Li Wan-chu 李萬居

Rising Taiwan Daily (Xingtai ribao 興台日報) Taiwan New Life News43 (Taiwan xinshengbao 台灣新生報) Reviving New Post (Guangfu xinbao 光復新報)

Tseng Kuo-hsiung 曾國雄, Huang Chin-tien 黃金殿 Kunsheng Post (Kunshengbao 鯤聲報) Kao Huai-ching 高懷清 People’s Herald News (Renmin daobao 人民導報) Sung Fei-ju 宋斐如, Wang Tien-teng 王添灯 People’s Voice Daily (Minsheng ribao 民聲日報) Hsu Keng-nan 許庚南, Hsu Tsang-chou 徐滄洲 Eastern Taiwan Daily (Dongtai ribao 東台日報) Chen Tu-kuang 陳篤光, Wu Wan-kung 吳萬恭 China Daily News44 (Zhonghua ribao 中華日報) Lu Kuan-chun 盧冠群 Taiwan Economic Daily Hsieh Han-ju 謝漢儒 (Taiwan jingji ribao 台灣經濟日報) Great Light Post (Damingbao 大明報) Lin Tzu-wei 林子畏, Ai Lu-sheng 艾璐生 National Daily45 (Guoshi ribao 國是日報) Lin Tzu-kui 林紫貴 Commercial Daily (Gongshang ribao 工商日報) Lin Meng-lin 林夢林, Chang Ying 張熒 Peace Daily46 (Heping ribao 和平日報) Li Shang-ken 李上根 Taiwan Daily (Taiwan ribao 台灣日報) Chang Chao-huan 張兆煥 Unify Daily (Datong ribao 大同日報) Jen Hsien-chih 任先志 National Voice Daily (Guosheng ribao 國聲日報) Wang Tien-shang 王天賞 Self-Strengthening Post47 (Ziqiangbao 自強報) Chou Chuang-po 周莊柏, Ku Pei-ken 顧培根 Liberty Daily (Ziyou ribao 自由日報) Chen Mao-lin 陳茂林, Huang Wu-chen 黃吾塵 Chinese and Foreign Daily Lin Tsung-hsien 林宗賢, Cheng Wen-wei (Zhongwai ribao 中外日報) 文蔚 Reconstructing Daily (Chongjian ribao 重建日報) Ke Tai-shan 柯台山, Su Tai-kai 蘇泰楷 (Ho I-lin 何義麟 1996) 

43 44 45 46 47

Owned by the Committee of Propaganda of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office. Owned by the Department of Propaganda of the KMT. Owned by the Department of Propaganda of the Taiwan Provincial Headquarters of the KMT. Owned by the Department of Propaganda of the Ministry of Defense. Owned by the 70th Army Corps in Taichung.

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Being a state-owned newspaper, the Taiwan New Life News shouldered the responsibility to promulgate a Chinese identity for Taiwan. On October 25, 1945, the first issue of the Taiwan New Life News announced three purposes: (1) to introduce the culture of the mother nation, (2) to deliver governmental decrees, (3) to provide a voice for the Taiwanese people. Because many Taiwanese intellectuals mainly used Japanese, the official Taiwan New Life News published a Japanese-language page, unlike two other large newspapers.48 The Japanese page Chief Editor, Wu Chin-lien 吳金鍊, utilized this page for a popular column entitled “Ink Drops Column” (modilan 墨滴欄) to criticize the KMT government. The Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office announced the abolition of Japanese pages in all publications on October 3, 1946, and this act came into effect on October 25, 1946. On October 24, 1946, Wu Chin-lien published the last Japanese language article, “Re-thinking Mother-Nationization” (Zuguohua zailun 祖國化再論), in the Taiwan New Life News to define Sinification. He argued that Taiwan had not lost its consciousness of Chinese nationalism even under the administration of Japan which had lasted for 50 years. Owing to the government’s forbidding newspapers to publish in Japanese, he hoped the “Ink Drops Column” could stay in the Chinese pages (Hsu Hsu-hui 許旭輝 2007). This “Ink Drops Column” showed that even though the Taiwan New Life News published Japanese pages for Japanese-reading Taiwanese intellectuals, these Japanese pages also promoted a China identity. The 228 Massacre and Newspapers Many newspapers criticized both the Mainlanders and the KMT regime and emphasized the difference between native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders prior to the 228 Uprising. There was a popular saying among native Taiwanese, “the dogs have gone, but the pigs have come” (Taiwanese: Káu khì ti lâi 狗去豬 來) (Chi An 技安 2001; Lee Hsiao-feng 李筱峰 1996:298-299) meaning “dogs” (the Japanese) were bad, but the “pigs” (the Chinese) were worse (Jacobs 2008:45). At that time, many references to “the dogs have gone, but the pigs have come” appeared in printed media to criticize both the KMT regime and the Mainlanders.49 48

49

During this period, two other large newspapers, the People’s News (Minbao 民報) and the left-wing People’s Herald News (Renmin daobao 人民導報) always criticized the corruption and bureaucratism of the KMT regime before the 228 Massacre. For example, on February 5, 1947, the Taiwan Culture (Taiwan wenhua 台灣文化) magazine published an article that the Japanese were fierce like dogs but at least these dogs could protect the Taiwanese people’s property. The Chinese were worse as they were dirty (corrupt) and idle (bureaucratic) like pigs. On January 21, 1947, the editorial of the People’s News said the Taiwanese people used to think the Japanese were bad, but after the Chi-

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Table 2.9 Native Taiwanese Media Elites Killed or Presumed Killed during the 228 Massacre Name

Position

Wang Tien-teng 王添灯 Ai Lu-sheng 艾璐生 Hsu Cheng 徐征 Liao Chin-ping 廖進平 Wang Yu 王育 Li Jen-kui 李仁貴 Chen Hsin 陳炘 Lin Mao-sheng 林茂生 Sung Fei-ju 宋斐如 Juan Chao-jih 阮朝日 Wu Chin-lien 吳金鍊 Lin-chieh 林界 Su Hsien-chang 蘇憲章 Wu Tien-shang 吳天賞 Chiu Chin-shan 邱金山 Wang Shih-ting 王石定 Li Yen 李言 Chang Jung-tsung 張榮宗

Chairman, People’s Herald News Chairman, Great Light Post Editor-in-Chief, Great Light Post Founder, People’s News Legal Consultant, People’s News Advisor, People’s News Former Editor, Formosa Youth Chairman, People’s News Former Chairman, People’s Herald News General Manager, Taiwan New Life News Chief Editor, Taiwan New Life News Director of Printing Office in Kaohsiung, Taiwan New Life News Director of Chiayi Division, Taiwan New Life News Director of Taichung Division, Taiwan New Life News Kaohsiung Correspondent, Taiwan New Life News Chairman, National Voice Daily Chief of Reporting Division, National Voice Daily Director of Dongshi Division, Peaceful Daily

(Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2001:18-21)

Finally, the tension between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlander regime resulted in the 228 Uprising. The Taiwan New Life News covered the situation after February 28, 1947 due to popular demand. This infuriated the KMT regime and it arrested the executives and other staff. Many of these executives were killed by the KMT regime, including General Manager Juan Chao-ji 阮朝日, Chief Editor Wu Chin-lien, the Director of printing office in Kaohsiung, Lin Chieh 林界 and the Director of Kaohsiung Bureau, Chiu Chin-shan 邱金山. Table 2.9 shows the supervisors of Taiwanese newspapers who disappeared or are known to have been killed by the KMT regime during the 228 Massacre, even though most of them had strongly supported the KMT regime and China identity. Aside from two KMT newspapers (the China Daily News and the Taiwan New Life News), Table 2.10 shows that many newspapers including nese came to Taiwan, the Taiwanese people yearned for the Japanese (Lee Hsiao-feng 李 筱峰 2011; People’s News 1947).

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military-run newspapers were shut down by the KMT government during the 228 Massacre (Peng Chia-fa 彭家發 2000). Table 2.10 Newspapers Closed by KMT Regime during the 228 Massacre in 1947 Newspaper

Date of Closure

People’s Herald News People’s News Great Light Post Chinese & Foreign Daily Reconstructing Daily Young Liberty Post L’Impartial Taiwan Economic Daily Commercial Daily Self-Strengthening Daily Peaceful Daily Rising Taiwan Daily

March 13 March 13 March 13 March 13 March 13 March 5 March 5 March 17 March 17 March 17 March 23 Unknown

(Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2001:18)

Broadcast Stations On October 25, 1945,50 Chen Yi gave a speech on the Taipei Broadcasting Station to announce that Taiwan had returned to the bosom of the mother nation, China. In November 1945, by the “expropriation” of Japanese government property, the Department of Central Broadcasting Affairs of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang zhongyang guangboshiye guanlichu 國民黨中央廣播 事業管理處) officially took over the Taipei Broadcasting Station and renamed it the “Taiwan Broadcasting Station.” Thus, the Taiwan Broadcasting Station became a part of a KMT-run enterprise (Lin Ping 林平 2009:128-133). In 1945-1947, the Taiwan Broadcasting Station, as an official broadcast station, played a vital role in promoting Chinese nationalism. From December 1945, the Taiwan Broadcasting Station broad0cast daily programs teaching Mandarin Chinese as well as Chinese history and geography. A notable listener 50

The KMT regime marked “October 25” as a national holiday and named this day “Taiwan’s Retrocession Day” (Taiwan guangfujie 台灣光復節). In 1995, the DPP wanted to abolish “Taiwan's Retrocession Day.” From 2001, the “Taiwan's Retrocession Day” was no longer a national holiday. The term “Taiwan's Retrocession Day” is still controversial in Taiwan.

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was Yang Chi-chuang 楊基銓, who diligently listened to the Mandarin Chinese learning programs between 1945 and 1947. Yang described how he always carried a radio to listen to the broadcasting of Mandarin Chinese lessons by the Taiwan Broadcasting Station (Yang Chi-chuang 楊基銓 1996:186).51 The Taiwan Broadcasting Station played an important role during the 228 Uprising. According to Lin Chung 林忠, a Half-Mountain person and Director of the Taiwan Broadcasting Station in 1945-1947, more than one hundred people surrounded the Taiwan Broadcasting Station in Taipei to request that the Taiwan Broadcasting Station broadcast the situation of the 228 incident after February 28, 1947. Lin Chung promised the crowd to broadcast the news faithfully (Hsu Hsueh-chi 許雪姬 et al. 1993:26-27). On the other hand, on March 1, 1947, Chen Yi also used the Taiwan Broadcasting Station to broadcast a speech on the 228 Incident (Teng Kung-chao 鄧孔昭 1991:235-240). During the 228 Uprising, unlike the Taiwan New Life News which was compelled to close for a short period, the Taiwan Broadcasting Station continued to broadcast. But, after the Taiwan Broadcasting Station broadcast the “32 Clauses” (Sanshi’er tiao chuli dagang 三十二條處理大綱) of the 228 Settlement Committee (Er’erba shijian chuli weiyuanhui 二二八事件處理委員會) at the request of Wang Tien-teng 王添灯,52 Lin Chung was dismissed as Director of Taiwan Broadcasting Station by the KMT government (Lin Ping 林平 2009:135). The Impact of the 228 Massacre Ironically, many elites who were killed during the 228 Massacre had been devoted to the anti-Japanese movement, strongly supported China identity and even relocated to China during Japanese rule. Many, such as Chen Chengpo 陳澄波53 and Wang Tien-teng, saw China as the “mother nation” but the 51

52

53

Yang Chi-chuang (1918-2006) was a native Taiwanese who graduated from Tokyo University. He served in the Taiwan Governor-General Office and as the Chief Executive of Yilan County (Yi-lan junshou 宜蘭郡守) during the Japanese administration. After the Pacific War, he served as the Vice-Minister of Economic Affairs and the Chairman of both the Land Bank (Tudi yinhang 土地銀行) and the Hua-Nan Bank (Huanan yinhang 華南銀 行) in the KMT government. Wang Tien-teng (1901-1947), a native Taiwanese, was the Director of the Taiwan Local Autonomy League, Taipei Branch during the Japanese colonial period. After World War II, Wang served as the Director of the Three People’s Principles Youth League, Taipei Branch, of KMT and was elected as a member of Taiwan Provincial Assembly in 1946. He was also the Chairman of the People’s Herald News. He was killed by the KMT government in the 228 Massacre. Chen Cheng-po (1895-1947), a native Taiwanese, was a famous artist studying at the Tokyo University of the Arts. In 1929, he went to China to teach in Shanghai until 1933. In 1945,

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“mother nation” also killed those who died in the massacre. With many of the elite dead, the 228 Massacre largely terrorized the rest of the elite into silence. Lin Hsien-tang 林獻堂, the main sponsor of the Taiwan People’s News, strongly supported the “mother nation” during Japanese rule. However, he was put on the KMT’s 228 “black list,” but was fortunate enough to survive the slaughter. Subsequently, in 1949, he left for Japan and refused to return to Taiwan. The 228 Massacre not only silenced the Taiwanese intellectuals, it also made them avoid becoming involved with the media for a long time. With members of the elite either dead, in exile or in fear of their lives, the pro-Taiwan discourse in the media and elsewhere was severely weakened (Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2001). The Mass Media in 1949-1988 Newspapers Although many executives and staff of the Taiwan New Life News had been killed or jailed, the Taiwan New Life News remained the biggest newspaper between 1947 and 1949. After the KMT regime fled to Taiwan in 1949, the Taiwan New Life News, the China Daily News (Zhonghua ribao 中華日報) and the Central Daily News (Zhongyang ribao 中央日報) became the three big newspapers until the United Daily News (Lianhebao 聯合報; UDN) and China Times (Zhongguo shibao 中國時報) came to the fore at the end of 1950s and the 1960s (Hsu Hsu-hui 許旭輝 2007). There were three types of newspapers during the martial law period: partyowned, state-owned and private. The KMT published two newspapers, the Central Daily News and the China Daily News and operated the “Central News Agency” (Zhongyang tongxunshe 中央通訊社).54 The Taiwan Provincial Government ran the Taiwan New Life News and the Taiwan News (Taiwan xinwenbao 台灣新聞報). Additionally, the military published the Youth Warrior Daily (Qingnian zhanshibao 青年戰士報).55 The two major privately-owned newspapers were the United Daily News and the China Times (Jacobs 1976:779-784).

54

55

he served as the Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee to Welcome the Nationalist Government (Huanying guominzhengfu choubei hui 歡迎國民政府籌備會). He was also the first KMT member among Taiwan’s artists, as well as a member of the Three People’s Principles Youth League. In 1946, he served as the Councilor of Chiayi City (Jiayishi 嘉義市). He was killed by the KMT government in the 228 Massacre in March 1947. The Central Daily News was founded in 1928 in Shanghai and finally closed as an Internetonly newspaper in 2006. The China Daily News started in 1946 in Tainan. The Central News Agency was established in 1924 in Nanjing by the KMT and became the national agency of Taiwan in 1996. The Taiwan News was the southern edition of the Taiwan New Life News and separated in 1962 with the name Taiwan News. The Youth Warrior Daily was the newspaper belonging

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Both the KMT-owned newspapers and the government-owned newspapers had to follow KMT policies. In addition, the privately-owned newspapers also had to censor themselves and follow orders from the KMT (Chen Li-hung 陳立 宏 2009). Ownership was restricted to “reliable” persons,56 and the Taiwan Garrison Command or KMT headquarters would call publishers and editors with suggestions on how the story should be treated (Jacobs 1976:785-786). In other words, the political authorities also controlled the press by giving orders to newspapers. After Chiang Ching-kuo came to power, in 1975 he brought media owners into the power nucleus of the regime. Thus, he appointed the founders and heads of the China Times and United Daily News, Yu Chi-chung 余紀忠57 and Wang Ti-wu 王惕吾,58 to the KMT CSC in 1979. He also appointed the president of the Central Daily News, the China Daily News and the Central News Agency, Tsao Sheng-fen 曹聖芬, in 1981.59 Gradually, the two major privatelyowned newspapers, the United Daily News and the China Times, became important instruments through which the KMT attempted to shape public opinion. Table 2.11 shows the composition by ethnic groups of journalists from five nation-wide newspapers as of 1987. Apart from the Independent Evening Post (Zili wanbao 自立晚報), Mainlanders occupied most positions in these newspapers. The KMT regime and its partners, the United Daily News, the China Times and the Youth Daily, tended to employ Mainlanders as “reliable persons.” As stated above, the KMT regime utilized the media to regulate people’s thought and educate people to be Chinese. Chuang Wan-shou argues that the media were not only the ears and eyes of society, but also the weapon to control people’s thought as well as a tool for defending the authoritarian KMT regime (Chuang Wan-shou 莊萬壽 1999). The major newspapers used

56

57

58

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to the General Political Warfare Bureau of Ministry of Defense in 1952. Its name changed to the Youth Daily News (Qingnian ribao 青年日報) in 1984. For instance, the owners of both United Daily News and China Times were KMT members. The owner of Taiwan’s first English Newspaper, “China Post,” Yu Meng-yen 余夢燕, was a member of the KMT Central Review Committee (Zhongyang pinyi weiyuanhui 中央評議 委員會). Yu Chi-chung (1910-2002) founded the China Times in 1950. In 1942, he was the Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the Three People’s Principles Youth League. In 1948, he served as the Chief Secretary of the Discipline Committee of the KMT (Chiang Ching-kuo was the Chairman of the Discipline Committee in 1948). Wang Ti-wu (1913-1996) established the United Daily News in 1951. He was a graduate of Whampoa Military Academy (The Academy of Army Officers of the Nationalist Party) and the Director of Security for the official Chiang Kai-shek Residence. Tsao Sheng-fen was Chiang Kai-shek’s secretary in the early 1940s.

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pejorative terms to label the KMT’s enemies. For example, the Chinese Communists were called “Gongfei” 共匪 meaning “communist bandits.” Taiwan Independence was called “Taidu” 台毒 meaning “Taiwan poison,” a homophone for Taiwan Independence (Taidu 台獨). However, beginning in the 1980s, some newspapers did not use these terms. For example, the pro-Taiwan identity Independent Evening Post and Commons Daily (Minzhong ribao 民眾 日報) used “democratic personages” (minzhurenshi 民主人士) to describe the opposition rather than “outside the party” (dangwai 黨外) (Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 2009). Many had criticized the English newspaper China Post’s insufficient anti-Chinese Communist zeal because it did not call Mao Zedong “Mao Bandit Zedong” (Mao fei Zedong毛匪澤東 in Chinese). However, the Chairman of China Post Huang Yu-pei 黃遹霈 explained that if the China Post employed the term “bandit,” foreigners would regard the China Post as a strange newspaper (Hou Kun-hung 侯坤宏 2007:167). Table 2.11 Ethnic Composition of Journalists Working for the Five Nation-Wide Newspapers, 1987 Newspapers

Mainlanders

Native Taiwanese

United Daily News China Times Independent Evening Post 60 Economic Daily News61 Youth Daily News

75.0% 63.2% 43.6% 66.5% 74.2%

25.0% 36.8% 56.4% 33.5% 25.8%

(Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2001:220) 6061

As the partners of the KMT regime and its state ideological apparatus, the privately-owned United Daily News and China Times protected the KMT regime and publicized Chinese nationalism. For example, on June 27 and August 8, 1978, the UDN reported that Taiwan Independence Movement was sponsored and supported by the Chinese Communist Party to foment unrest in Taiwan 60

61

The Independent Evening Post (Zili wanbao 自立晚報) was founded by Ku Pei-ken 顧培 根 in 1947. Wu San-lien 吳三連 took over it in 1959 and made it an influential newspaper in favor of democratic and political reform during the martial law period. However, it was an urban evening newspaper with limited circulation. Therefore, it could not compete with the United Daily News, the China Times, the China Daily News, the Central Daily News and even the Youth News Daily during the martial law period. The Economic Daily News (Jingji ribao 經濟日報) is a newspaper of the United Daily News Group.

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(United Daily News 1978a, 1978c). On December 15, 1978, the UDN editorial claimed, under the title “You are a Chinese,” that people in Taiwan are Chinese, and that Taiwan Independence Movement individuals and the CCP intended to separate Taiwan from China. While this was obviously true of the Taiwan Independence Movement, it was a complete misrepresentation of the position of Beijing. The UDN emphasized that as Chinese the Taiwanese must not forget their responsibility to save the Chinese nation (United Daily News 1978b). On December 25, 1978, the UDN criticized both the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan Independence Movement, as betraying the Chinese nation, and even announced that the Taiwan Independence Movement was organized by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of Communist China (Chen Tsu-hua 陳祖華 1978). Yet, this claim of the UDN simply repeated the KMT’s political propaganda against the opposition in Taiwan. After the foundation of the DPP in September 1986, unsurprisingly the regime and its media allies changed tact. On December 12, 1986, the China Times published a news report to say only a few people supported Taiwan Independence and criticized the DPP’s aim of self-determination for Taiwan. The China Times now raised the CCP as an obstacle to Taiwan Independence of which Taiwanese should be fearful. It quoted the aggressive language of the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, Ma Yuzhen 馬毓真, which firmly opposed any statement of Taiwan Independence or Taiwan’s right to self-determination (Fu Chien-chung 傅建中 1986). On April 9 and 10, 1987, the UDN published an article entitled “The thoughts of a Chinese” (Yige Zhongguo ren de xiangfa 一個中國人的想法), which was written by Ting Pang-hsin 丁邦新. This article first described the migration history of a Mainlander from China to Taiwan and then urged the importance of national language. This article also praised the “democratic achievement” of the KMT but suddenly jumped to criticize Taiwan Independence (Ting Panghsin 丁邦新 1987). The UDN claimed that this article was popular with readers and then the UDN distributed 2,000,000 hard copies of this article to schools, social organizations and government offices (United Daily News 1987). The KMT’s domination of the media was not completely monolithic, especially after the late 1970s, even though Taiwan Independence was banned until the early 1990s. Although the owner of the China Times was a member of the KMT CSC, the China Times still made a contribution to Taiwan democracy despite its China identity when it printed the transcript of the martial law trial of the Kaohsiung Incident (Meilidao shijian 美麗島事件) in 1980.62 The China 62

On December 10, 1979, International Human Rights Day, the opposition Formosa Magazine members launched a rally for human rights and democracy in Kaohsiung. However, this rally was ended by force and the KMT regime arrested leaders of the Formosa

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Times also reported the founding of the DPP on its front page in 1986. According to Poe Ta-chung, the former chief editorial writer of the China Times, the proprietor Yu Chi-chung realized Chiang Ching-kuo’s intention to liberalize Taiwan and this could explain why the China Times was more liberal than the UDN after the late 1970s (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2011). The Independent Evening Post challenged the regime more forcefully. After Wu San-lien 吳三連 took over the Independent Evening Post and served as its president, the Independent Evening Post provided a platform to advocate Taiwan consciousness and political reform. However, the KMT regime curbed the paper by assigning a KMT representative, Hsu Chin-te 許金德,63 as chairman (Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2001:110-111). During the martial law period, though the Independent Evening Post showed concern over Taiwanese issues and the owner was a native Taiwanese, most leading administrators of the Independent Evening Post were both Mainlanders and KMT members (Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2001:114). Although many people criticized Wu San-lien’s cooperation with the KMT, his son, Wu Shu-min 吳樹民,64 believes that his father’s cooperation with the KMT regime was necessary to get a newspaper published during the martial law period. He believes that his father held a strong Taiwan identity and strove to ensure that the Independent Evening Post could continue expressing a Taiwanese voice (Wu Shu-min 吳樹民 2009). In addition, the big two local southern Taiwan newspapers, the Taiwan Times (Taiwan shibao 台灣時報), founded in 1946, and the Commons Daily, founded in 1950, were run by native Taiwanese KMT members, and were concerned with native Taiwanese issues and stories. Due to their location in Kaohsiung, both newspapers provided detailed news of the Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979. Despite these cases, the cultural hegemony of the KMT and China identity would not be challenged until the emergence of the opposition magazines when Chiang Ching-kuo’s liberalization provided the opposition a little space to speak in the national identity debate in the late 1970s, as discussed below.

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Magazine. The KMT charged the opposition leaders in martial court, and the court gave Shih Ming-teh 施明德 to a life sentence and sentenced the others to terms of twelve or fourteen years. Hsu Chin-te (1908-1990) was the member of the Central Review Committee of the KMT, a member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the Chairman of the Taiwan Television Enterprise Company (TTV). Wu Shu-ming (1941- ) was the President of the Independent Evening Post during 1988-1993.

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Radio In 1949, there were four broadcasting enterprises and ten branch stations in Taiwan. By 1987, there were thirty-three broadcasting companies in Taiwan, which included twenty privately-owned, twelve state-owned (including six military-owned) and one owned by the KMT. The ROC during this period was a one-party state, and the KMT controlled the government and military stations as well as its own party station. The guarding of the party owned-and-run Broadcasting Corporation of China (Zhongguo guangbo gongsi 中國廣播公 司; BCC) by military police forces (Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒 2009) is indicative of the blurring between the three categories during the martial law period. As Table 2.12 makes clear, the privately-run enterprises were in the majority in terms of numbers, but the stations directly controlled by the regime dominated the airwaves with their far greater wattage and reach. Of the total wattage, military-run enterprises had 51.4 per cent, while the KMT-run BCC had 43.1 per cent, a combined total of 94.5 per cent. Moreover, the KMT-owned BCC ran twenty branch stations in 1987 (Wang Chen-huan 王振寰 1993; Wei Mei-chuan 魏玫娟 1997). The KMT regime saw broadcasting as an ideological weapon in the “Psychological War” (xinzhan 心戰) carried out against the CCP. Thus, the KMT government, the central party, the armed forces and the KMT’s Broadcasting Corporation of China together with the private broadcasting enterprises carried out the policies of propaganda and anti-communism (Cheng Tsung-ming 程宗明 1998a:319-370). Table 2.12 Number of Radio Stations by Ownership, 1988-1991 Ownership

Corporation Channels

Private 20 Military 6 Government 6 KMT 1 Total 33

64 32 129 110 335

Transmitter

64 176 56 139 435

Transmitter (%) Wattage (%)65

14.0% 40.5% 12.9% 32.0% 100%

1.8% 51.4% 3.7% 43.1% 100%

(Legislative Yuan 1988:52; Wang Chen-huan 王振寰 1993:109) 65

While, generally speaking, the KMT regime controlled all broadcasting stations, its control of private stations was more indirect. Many private broadcast65

In this column, the total wattage of all radio stations is 100%.

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ers had strong relationships with the KMT government. For example, the Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of National Defense held 58 per cent of the shares of the Chengsheng Broadcasting Corporation (Zhengsheng guangbo diantai 正聲廣播電台), and the director was also from the agency (Wang Chen-huan 王振寰 1993:111). In addition, only people who possessed a close association with the KMT could apply to establish a broadcasting station during the martial law period. For instance, the owners of Tiannan 天南, Yishih 益 世 and Fengming 鳳鳴 were Mainlanders. Lin Hsiang-hsung 林翔熊, the founder of Tiannan, was the deputy general manager of the KMT TV station, China Television Company. Cardinal Yu Pin 于斌, the creator of Yishih, established Fu-Jen Catholic University with the former first lady, Soong Mayling 蔣 宋美齡, and was also the Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly in 1972 and 1978. Yuan Feng-chu 袁鳳舉, the founder of Fengming, had participated in the anti-communist war led by the KMT before 1949 (Wang Chenhuan 王振寰 1993:115-116). The Culture and Communications Committee of the KMT awarded a Chinese Second-Level Prize (huaxia erdeng jiangzhang 華 夏二等獎章) to Yuan Feng-chu on May 16, 1979 to reward his contribution to the KMT government’s broadcasting policy. The KMT also controlled the BCC through recruiting primarily Mainlander broadcasting station staff, who met the regime’s requirement of speaking standard Mandarin and were seen as loyal to the regime (Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒 2009).66 For instance, 92.3 per cent of staff were Mainlanders and only 7.7 per cent were native Taiwanese at the BCC in 1987 (Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2001:220). However, this policy was not always practical and was relaxed to a small extent over time. For example, the BCC started to recruit some Hoklo speakers in 1984 after not being able to find a reporter to interview Hoklo speaking victims and their families during the Haishan, Meishan and Haishan Yikeng coalmine disasters in 1984.67 Even though the broadcasting stations recruited staff carefully with examination by both enterprises and the Second Section of the Personnel Office,68 66

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Shih Cheng-feng is a Professor at National Dong-hwa University in Taiwan. He worked for the BCC in the early 1980s, and he believes the reason he was recruited was his ability in English. A total of 269 people died in these three disasters. 74 people died in the disaster of Haishan Coalmine (Haishan meikuang 海山煤礦) on June 20, 1984, 102 people died in the disaster of Meishan Coalmine (Meishan meikuang 煤山煤礦) on July 10, 1984 and 93 people died in the disaster of Haishan Yikeng Coalmine (Haishan yikeng meikuang 海山 一坑煤礦) on December 5, 1984. The Second Section of Personnel Office was affiliated with the Bureau of Investigation. It was in charge of security and employee loyalty to the KMT. The Second Section of Per­­

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the White Terror also occurred in broadcasting enterprises. In July of 1968, the KMT regime arrested the program director of the BCC, Tsui Hsiao-ping 崔小 萍,69 and sentenced Tsui to life imprisonment on the charge of being a communist spy (feidei 匪諜) (Hou Kun-hung 侯坤宏 2007:174). These various measures of control meant that regardless of being private, military, government and party-run, all broadcasting stations were part of the regime’s propaganda apparatus. Television Stations Television also developed as a vital arm of the KMT’s propaganda. The first TV station in Taiwan was the Experimental Educational Television Station which started on February 14, 1962 and was the forerunner of the Chinese Television System, Inc (Huashi 華視, CTS).70 Owing to its “experimental” and “educational” nature, it was not a commercial TV station and only broadcast to northern Taiwan. The first commercial television station was the Taiwan Television Enterprise Company (Taishi 台視, TTV),71 owned and operated by the Taiwan Provincial Government. TTV was set up in 1960 by the Fourth Committee of Central Headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist Party,72 and was launched by Chiang Kai-shek’s wife, Soong Mayling, on the October 10, 1962. In 1969, the KMT started a second commercial television station, a partyowned business, China Television Company (Zhongshi 中視, CTV).73 The third commercial television station was CTS, in 1971, operated by the military (Wang Wei 王唯 2006). CTS shouldered the “mission” of martial and anti-communist

69

70

71 72

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sonnel Office was abolished in 1992. The Second Section of Personnel Office in Chinese is renshishi di’erbangongshi 人事室第二辦公室, and it was well known in Taiwan as ren’er 人二. Tsui Hsiao-ping (1923-) was born in Shandong China and came to Taiwan in 1948. She was also the director of broadcast drama in the BCC and a lecturer at Fu Hsing Kang College (Zhengzhi zuozhan xuexiao 政治作戰學校 [Political Warfare School]). Tsui Hsiao-ping was released in 1977. The Chinese Television System Inc. started in 1971 and was operated by the military until 2006 when it became a part of the Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS) as a public TV station under the DPP government’s administration. TTV was operated by the Taiwan Provincial Government until 1998 and then the central government took over until 2007 when it was privatized. This was the predecessor of the Committee of Culture and Media. The Fourth Committee was in charge of the propaganda of the KMT, and its power was greater than the Government Information Office. The Fourth Committee gave orders to government departments during the martial law period. The CTV was owned by the KMT until it was sold to the China Times Group in 2005.

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propaganda. For example, every Thursday was Juguang Day (Juguangri 莒光 日)74 for ideological education in the military. Of course, all three TV stations were ultimately controlled by the KMT. The Second Section of the Personnel Office and the stations also carefully selected staff to prevent infiltration by Chinese Communist spies. Like the print media and radio, the regime used television to publicize its China identity and Chinese nationalism as well as to suppress the Chinese Communist Party, the Taiwan Independence Movement and the opposition. Table 2.13 shows that, again as with print media and radio, most personnel assigned to the stations by the regime were Mainlanders. The proportion of native Taiwanese journalists was close to half at TTV. The reason was probably that the TTV was run by Taiwan Province and it had to report more local news. Thus, the TTV had to recruit native Taiwanese-speaking staff. But the KMT regime did not allow native Taiwanese in supervisory positions. For example, the general managers of the three influential television stations were all Mainlanders during the martial law period (Wang Chen-huan 王振寰 1993:108). TV station personnel faced the constant threat of arrest during the White Terror. TTV produced a program for the KMT’s 80th anniversary on November 24, 1974. The staff found a tune suitable for the program with a Chinese-style melody, but without lyrics. The melody was “The East is Red” (Dongfanghong 东方红), a song to praise Mao Zedong. Of course, the staff were placed under arrest by the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters (Ho I-mou 何貽謀 2002).75

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In 284 BC, during China’s Warring States Period (Zhanguo Shidai 戰國時代), the state of Qi 齊 was defeated by five others and left with only two cities, Jimo 即墨 and Ju 莒. In 279 BC, Qi was able to restore its former territory beyond these two cities. This was the wellknown story, “Do not forget Ju” (Wuwang zai ju 毋忘在莒), in the Chinese history. The KMT regime sought to emulate Qi through recovering the mainland from its base on Taiwan, hence the name Juguang 莒光 (The Glory of Ju). During the martial law period, all symbols, slogans and songs of Communist China were taboo. For example, if a TV news report contained the PRC flag, the flag would become an indistinct mosaic or a black or blank picture. Thus, Taiwanese people had never heard “The East is Red” at that time. In this incident, the staff only listened to the melody without reading the lyrics, so it was a genuine mistake rather than an act of pro-communist subversion.

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Table 2.13 Composition by Ethnic Group of Journalists on Three Taiwan TV Stations, 1987 TV Station

Mainlanders

Native Taiwanese

TTV (Taishi 台視) CTV (Zhongshi 中視) CTS (Huashi 華視)

52.2% 80.0% 91.7%

47.8% 20.0% 8.3%

(Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2001:220)

The KMT’s anti-Japanese and anti-CCP propaganda forced the TV stations to observe many taboos. For instance, the Japanese kimono, Japanese songs and the PRC flag were all forbidden to appear on TV.76 Also, “live programs” from overseas were recorded in advance. This measure was to prevent the people, the flag and the slogans of the Taiwan Independence Movement from being broadcast on TV (Ho I-mou 何貽謀 2002). This precaution followed a famous incident during the Taiwan team’s championship game against the U.S. at the Little League World Series in Williamsport, Pennsylvania in 1971, which TTV broadcast live to a large audience. The World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) hired an airplane carrying a slogan, “Viva Taiwan Independence, Taiwan Go Go!,” to fly over the stadium during the game (Chen Ming-cheng 陳 銘城 1992). Generally speaking, native Taiwan languages were not welcomed by the KMT regime. Normally, the negative roles spoke Hoklo in dramas, but heroes or positive roles always spoke Mandarin (Tai Cheng-te 戴正德 1999). Many Taiwanese with Taiwan identity criticized this phenomenon after the rise of Taiwanese consciousness. They believed this practice was discrimination against native Taiwan language speaking people. The regulation of native Taiwanese languages on TV had a significant impact on the lives of ordinary Taiwanese. The TV news reports and weather forecasts were important sources of information for the people of Taiwan during the martial law period, especially the weather forecast which was very important to farmers and fishermen. Most farmers and fishermen were Hoklo-speaking during the martial law period. So were most illiterate people, who accounted for more than 25 per cent of the rural population in the early 1970s. However, there were no Hoklo TV news reports and weather forecasts. Bruce Jacobs published an article in the Central 76

Apart from the anti-communist education and propaganda, the KMT regime emphasized the Sino-Japanese War in textbooks and used “hostile to Japan” propaganda to consolidate the people’s consciousness of Chinese nationalism during the martial law period.

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Daily News to discuss the relationship between TV language and farmers on January 19, 1973. He followed the statement of Chen Li-fu 陳立夫77 on a Hoklo TV program that announced that there should be 20 minutes of Hoklo news as part of the 7:30 pm news (United Daily News 1972). Bruce Jacobs suggested that there should be Hoklo news reports and weather forecast programs, keeping Hoklo TV programs and improving them, and maintaining both Hoklo and Mandarin Chinese programs at all times. He not only talked about the relationship between farmers and both news reports and weather forecasts, but also discussed a Hoklo TV program, “Today’s Rural Village” (Jinri nongcun 今日農 村). He said, the time slot of “Today’s Rural Village” conflicted with the working time of farmers (Jacobs 1973). The time of the program was changed, but it became a Mandarin Chinese program. The KMT’s Chinese nationalism propaganda determined what was shown and, more importantly, what was not shown on TV. The symbols of the Chinese Communist Party, the Taiwan Independence Movement and even Japan were taboo. In addition, the regime was not willing to allow much native Taiwanese language on TV and also tried to use TV to discredit speakers of Taiwanese languages. No Taiwanese Languages Allowed: Who Killed Shiyanwen? “Who Killed Shiyanwen?” (Shei shale Shiyanwen? 誰殺了史豔文?) was a controversial issue in election campaigns in Taiwan after democratization began in the 1990s and 2000s. In the Taiwan Provincial Governor election campaign of 1994, an advertisement bearing that phrase78 appeared in newspapers to criticize the KMT candidate, James Soong (Soong Chu-yu 宋楚瑜).79 Soong had served as the Minister of the Government Information Office in 1979-1984, and the director of the Culture and Communications Committee of the Chi77

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Chen Li-fu (1909-2001) was the secretary to Chiang Kai-shek in 1925, the youngest Secretary-General of the KMT in 1929. He was also the Chairman of Central Daily News in 19471950 as well as the Minister without portfolio in 1949-1950. After the withdrawal to Taiwan in 1949, Chen Li-fu was forced into exile by Chiang Kai-shek for corruption. He lived in the United States from 1950 until 1965. In 1966, Chen Li-fu visited Taiwan to celebrate Chiang Kai-shek’s 80th birthday and later settled in Taiwan in 1969. This advertisement was produced by the camp of DPP candidate, Chen Ding-nan 陳定 南, and appeared in newspapers on November 22, 1994. Since then, “Who Killed Shiyanwen” has become a symbol to criticize the KMT’s policy to disparage native Taiwanese languages. James Soong was the Secretary-General to the KMT from 1989-1993, the Governor of the Province of Taiwan in 1993-1998 and later the chairman of the People First Party from 2000.

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nese Nationalist Party in 1984-1987. Both positions were responsible for media censorship. Shiyanwen was the main character in a Hoklo puppet show (budaixi 布袋 戲or zhangzhongxi 掌中戲)80 shown on a TV program called Yunzhoudaruxia Shiyanwen 雲州大儒俠史豔文 (Taiwanese: Hûn-chiu tāi-jû-kiap Sú Giāmbûn [Yunzhou Confucian Chivalrous Man, Shiyanwen]). It was a typical Taiwanese puppet show, emphasizing the spirit of traditional Confucian thought. Shiyanwen’s creator was Huang Hai-tai 黃海岱,81 who adapted it from the 18th century Chinese novel, Yesoupuyan 野叟曝言. This novel, and its puppet show derivative, preached “loyalty, filial piety, moral integrity, justice” (zhong xiao jie yi 忠孝節義), virtues the KMT regime also claimed as the spirit of the Chinese nation. Huang Hai-tai’s son, Huang Chun-hsiung 黃俊雄,82 brought the puppet show to TTV on March 2, 1970, and it set a record with a 97 per cent TV program rating (Chiang Chao-lun 江昭倫 2010; Kuan Ren-chien 管仁健 2005). Taiwanese opera (gezaixi 歌仔戲)83 was also popular on TV at the time. Both the puppet show and Taiwanese opera brought TV stations many advertising profits. However, the ruling Mainlanders did not like Hoklo puppet shows and Taiwanese opera; therefore, many criticisms were made in newspapers and the Legislative Yuan. On June 2 and 3, 1970, the Chief Editor in the UDN, Ho Fan 何凡,84 published two articles criticizing these shows for occupying too many broadcast hours and for being vulgar, rude and tasteless (Ho Fan 何凡 1970a, 1970b). On June 4, 1970, Legislator Chao Wen-I 趙文藝 criticized both shows in the Legislative Yuan and said that using the local Taiwanese language violated the policy to promote the “national language,” Mandarin Chinese. On June 21, 1970, 80

81

82 83 84

Budaixi is a folk puppet show in Taiwan. It is a ubiquitous part of native Taiwanese life. The language of Budaixi is Hoklo. In 2006, the people of Taiwan selected the puppet show as the image and spirit of Taiwan in an official activity hosted by the Executive Yuan. Both President Chen Shui-bian and Premier Su Tseng-chang attended the award ceremony. On March 2, 2010 on Shiyanwen’s 40th birthday, President Ma Ying-jeou said on TV that ­Shiyanwen is the spirit of Taiwan. Huang Hai-tai (1901-2007) was the founder of a puppet show troupe Wuzhouyuan 五洲 園 in Yunlin County. His sons and grandsons are famous TV puppet show producers in Taiwan. Huang Chun-hsiung (1933- ) is the second son of Huang Hai-tai. Taiwanese opera is popular in the lives of native Taiwanese; the language of Taiwanese opera is Hoklo. Ho Fan is the pen name of Hsia Cheng-ying 夏承楹. Hsia was the President of the Mandarin Daily News (Guoyu ribao 國語日報) and member of the Committee for the Promotion of the National Language (Guoyu tuixing weiyuanhui 國語推行委員會).

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Legislator Hsieh Chien-hua 謝建華 condemned puppet shows as pandering to low-class taste. After these criticisms, TTV reduced the broadcast hours of both the puppet show and Taiwanese opera from July 5, 1970. However, this measure did not satisfy the ruling elite. Finally, TTV axed “Yunzhoudairuxia Shiyenwen” on November 27, 1970. Nevertheless, the stations were reluctant to lose the advertising revenue and TTV, CTV and CTS each soon produced a new puppet show. In order to satisfy the Mandarin-speaking ruling class, Huang Chun-hsiung added a new character, Zhongguoqiang 中國強 (China is strong), to “Yunzhoudairuxia Shiyanwen.” When Zhongguoqiang showed up on the screen, the background music played a Mandarin Chinese song “March of Zhongguoqiang” (March of China is Strong) in the Hoklo puppet show. This ploy, however, still failed, and the KMT regime officially announced the death penalty for Shiyanwen on June 16, 1974 because it was “injuring the rest of farmers and workers” (fanghai nonggong zuoxi 妨害農工作息). The KMT regime also shut down the Taiwanese opera. Finally, in the early 1980s, Shiyanwen came back to screen again, but it had to share the limited hours of local language programs with other Hoklo TV programs.85 Shiyanwen showed the gap between the Mainlander KMT ruling elite and the people of Taiwan. Most importantly, both Taiwanese opera and the puppet show contained “Loyalty, Filial Piety, Moral Integrity and Justice,” the elements of Chinese national spirit according to the KMT regime. In addition, the scripts of both Taiwanese opera and the puppet show were also adapted from Chinese history or novels. As a result, by denying the “Chineseness” of Taiwanese language and culture, the KMT actually inadvertently helped bring about what it was trying to prevent, a strong national identification of the Taiwanese with Taiwan as distinct and separate from China. The KMT left no room for Taiwanese to be both Taiwanese and Chinese, so the Taiwanese chose to be Taiwanese rather than identify with the version of being Chinese which the KMT pushed upon them. Dissenting Magazines and National Identity According to Chiou Chwei-liang 邱垂亮, there were only six magazines related to “opposition” before the Formosa Magazine in late 1979; however, after 1979, 85

Due to language regulations, many puppet shows on TV in the early 1980s were in Mandarin Chinese, such as Qitiandaisheng Sunwukong 齊天大聖孫悟空, Sanguo Yanyi 三國 演義, Huoshao Hongliansi 火燒紅蓮寺, Fengshenbang 封神榜 and so on.

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more than thirty opposition magazines were published in five years (Chiou Chwei-liang 邱垂亮 1988:110). Although the opposition magazines contained both Taiwan identity and China identity stances, the Taiwan identity opposition magazines gradually became more popular than the China identity opposition magazines. In their “golden age” between 1979 and the early 1980s, the Taiwan identity opposition magazines opposed the national identity that the KMT regime and its mass media had constructed. The KMT government closed or banned many opposition magazines claiming that they supported the Taiwan Independence Movement or were spreading Chinese Communist propaganda. Table 2.14 shows the numbers of banned/ closed opposition magazines. Table 2.14 The Status of the Opposition Magazines, 1979-198586 Year

Numbers started to publish

Numbers closed or banned

Numbers continuing

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198587

11 7 10 7 6 23 N/A

9 4 6 4 5 19 N/A

2 6 10 13 14 18 21

(Feng Chien-san 馮建三 1995) 87

However, the opposition had its own ways to continue publishing magazines. In an article of 1985 entitled “Taiwan Magazines Play Mice to the Censor’s Cat,” the New York Times reported the opposition publications had their special ways of surviving the era of martial law (Lohr 1985). Many of these opposition magazines made a very important contribution to the development of democ86

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This data were collected by Feng Chien-san, but do not include details of the opposition magazines before 1978, thus the numbers do not always seem to be continuous and logical. Until December 15, 1985, the original records showed that there were eleven opposition magazine publishers publishing nineteen magazines. If the Length and Breadth (Zong­ heng 縱橫) and the Thunder (Leisheng 雷聲) were included, there were twenty-one magazines in 1985. In 1985, the opposition magazine publishers published 346 issues and 203 issues were banned.

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ratization and Taiwan consciousness up to the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 when the subsequent progressive deregulation of the media made them increasingly irrelevant (Huang Ching-lung 黃清龍 2009a:6). Chinese Identity, Liberalism and Socialism in Dissenting Magazines Free China The first opposition magazine was Free China (Ziyou Zhongguo 自由中國), founded in 1949 by Lei Chen 雷震, a Mainlander. Ironically, this biweekly magazine was initially sponsored by the KMT government. Then, it became a political forum that criticized Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian rule (Huang Ching-lung 黃清龍 2009a:5). As befitted its name “Free China,” this magazine favored a China identity with liberalism. Under the policy of “loyal opposition discourse” to the KMT regime, the KMT tolerated Free China in order to maintain the image of the KMT regime as the representative of “Free China” in opposition to the Communists (Chung Ya-peng 鍾雅蓬 2004; Huang Tai-shan 黃泰山 2005). Nevertheless, in 1960, the regime arrested and sentenced Lei Chen for his attempt to organize a new political party, the Chinese Democratic Party (Zhongguo minzhudang 中國民主黨), in cooperation with some native Taiwanese democrats. In 1971, after he was discharged from prison and to avoid the annexation of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, Lei Chen also drew up a blueprint for a Chinese Republic of Taiwan (Hsueh Hua-yuan 薛化 元 2009). Both Free China and Lei Chen made a contribution to Taiwanese democracy. First, Free China provided a platform to discuss democracy and political reform. Secondly, Lei Chen’s idea of the new party and the blueprint of the Chinese Republic of Taiwan had an impact on Taiwanese politics and democracy. The opposition called Lei Chen the pioneer of Taiwan democracy. Most importantly, when he was struggling between Chinese nationalism and political ideals, he chose freedom and democracy (Fan Cheng-hsiang 范正祥 2006). In short, Lei Chen’s contribution was not only related to Free China, but he also widely influenced the democratic movement and the opposition. Apollo The head of the Wen Hsing bookstore, Hsiao Meng-neng 蕭孟能, started publishing Apollo (Wenxing 文星) in 1957. Apollo came to be an influential and famous magazine after Li Ao 李敖88 took it over from the 49th issue in 1961 (Feng Chien-san 馮建三 1995:128). In 1962, there was a debate on Chinese and Western culture in Apollo (Ho Hsin-chuan 何信全 2005). After Li Ao began to 88

Li Ao (1935- ) is a famous Mainlander historian and political critic in Taiwan.

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edit Apollo, Li’s advocacy of liberalism struck at the traditional Chinese ideology which the KMT regime propagandized (Chang Li-hsuan 張俐璇 2010a). Apollo inherited the spirit of liberalism from Free China, but included more western cultural ideas in its contents. In 1965, the KMT government closed Apollo claiming that it made propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party (weifei xuanchuan 為匪宣傳). Nonetheless, Apollo was still a China identity magazine, similar to Free China, which embodied the spirit of the May Fourth Movement. China Tide In 1972, Cheng Tai-an 鄭泰安89 initiated China Tide (Xiaochao 夏潮) and Su Ching-li 蘇慶黎90 served as the general editor from the fourth issue. China Tide was a left-wing magazine with strong support for the opposition and China identity. It urged the unification of the ROC and the PRC (Chiang Shihching 江詩菁 2004:6). The main contribution of China Tide to Taiwanese consciousness was the Campaign for Native Literature Movement (Xiangtu wenxue lunzhan 鄉土文 學論戰). Even though its position was supportive of a China identity, China Tide provided an opportunity to discuss Taiwanese literature, which the KMT regime ignored. China Tide discussed the history of Taiwanese anti-Japanese literature during the Japanese period and then started the “Campaign for the Native Literature Movement” in 1977-1978. According to China Tide’s logic, Taiwan was a local area of China, but this debate allowed Taiwanese literature to appear on a stage during the martial law period, and this also awakened the Taiwanese consciousness of the Taiwanese people. Yen Shan-nung 晏山農91 argued China Tide was an experimental magazine for a multi-cultural China identity. China Tide spoke for workers and farmers and criticized American and Japanese imperialism with a passionate China identity (Yen Shan-nung 晏 山農 2007). However, notwithstanding its China identity, the KMT regime closed China Tide in 1979 (Chang Li-hsuan 張俐璇 2010b; Chiang Shih-ching 江詩菁 2004) owing to its left-wing stance. 89 90

91

Cheng Tai-an (1949~) is a famous psychiatrist in Taiwan, well-known as Cheng Han-min 鄭漢民. Su Ching-li (1946-2004) was the daughter of a leader of the Taiwan Communist Party, Su Hsin 蘇新. She strongly supported the opposition in the 1970s and the 1980s, but settled down in China because of her passionate China identity. She was also the ex-wife of Cheng Tai-an. Yen Shan-nung was a writer and Chief Editor of the supplement and forum of the China Times.

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Opposition Magazines and the Rise of Taiwanese Consciousness Taiwanese consciousness has a variety of meanings in different periods in Taiwan. In 1945-1988, I define the concepts of Taiwan consciousness as including one or more of (1) Taiwan is a separate political entity, not a local area of China, (2) the future of Taiwan should be determined by the people of Taiwan (selfdetermination, which the opposition declared in the 1970s and 1980s) or (3) supporting Taiwan Independence. During the 1970s and 1980s, the opposition magazines played an essential part in the campaign of national consciousness to oppose the Chinese identity that both the KMT government and the mass media propagandized. Despite their weak voices, the opposition magazines gave prominence to the sentiments of Taiwanese people. The Pioneer of Taiwanese Orientation: The Taiwan Political Review In August 1975, the opposition published the Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan Zhenglun 台灣政論).92 Not only did the Taiwan Political Review provide the opposition movement with a space to promote democracy, the Taiwan Political Review was also the original opposition magazine with Taiwan consciousness that challenged the China identity that the KMT constructed (Chiang 2009).93 The circulation of Taiwan Political Review increased from 10,000 to 50,000 copies until it was compelled to close in December of 1975. In support of Taiwanese consciousness, the Taiwan Political Review published an article advocating that “friends” from the thirty-five provinces of Mainland China, who had come to Taiwan more than thirty years previously, shared the same fate as Taiwanese and were already “New Taiwanese” (Huang Hua 黃華 1975:43). In this article, the Taiwan Political Review attempted 92

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Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥 (1938- ) and Huang Hsin-chieh 黃信介 (1928-1999) published the Taiwan Political Review from August 1975 until it was forced to close in December 1975 by the ruling KMT. Huang was a leader of the opposition and also later the Chairman of the DPP in 1988-1992. Kang Ning-hsiang, a Hoklo speaking person, was born in Taipei in 1938. He was elected as a legislator in 1972. He also published many other opposition magazines such as the Eighties (Bashi niandai 八十年代), Warm Current (Nuanliu 暖流) and the Asian (Yazhouren 亞洲人) in 1980 as well as a newspaper, Capital Morning Post (Shoudu zaobao 首都早報), in 1989. He was one of the leaders of the opposition in 1960s-1980s. He also served as the Deputy Minister of Defense in 2002 and the SecretaryGeneral of National Security Council in 2003. Antonio Chiang (1944- ) is well-known by his pen name Ssu-MaWen-wu 司馬文武. He was the Editor-in-Chief of the Eighties and the founder of the Journalist (Xinxinwen 新新 聞) in 1987 as well as the Editor-in-Chief of both the Capital Morning News in 1989 and the Taipei Times in 1999. He later served as the Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council of Taiwan in 2000-2004.

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to utilize “New Taiwanese” to subsume Mainlanders into a Taiwanese, not a Chinese, identity. In addition, in its last issue, Chiou Chwei-liang stated that people in Taiwan have to be concerned about their motherland, to think about the future of Taiwan, and to show their feelings and Taiwan consciousness (Chiou Chwei-liang 邱垂亮 1975:31-34). This article of Chiou Chwei-liang became the KMT’s excuse to ban the Taiwan Political Review. The head of Taiwan Political Review, Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥, said in an interview that there was nothing exceptional about including Taiwan in the title of the magazine because Taiwanese have always been Taiwanese even during the period of Japanese administration (Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥 2009). Even though the Taiwan Political Review survived for only five months, its value in promoting Taiwanese consciousness was vital for the pro-Taiwanese orientation camp in the 1970s. A Party without the Title: The Formosa Magazine In August 1979, the editor’s opening statement for the Formosa Magazine (Meilidao zazhi 美麗島雜誌) illustrated the purposes of the opposition movement in fostering Taiwan identity and promoting democracy (Taiwan Daily 2002a). The Formosa Magazine was not the first opposition magazine with a Taiwan identity. However, it was much more than a magazine – it was a political organization (Chiang 2009). On September 8, 1979, the Formosa Magazine held an opening cocktail party at the Mandarina Crown Hotel (Zhongtai bin’guan 中泰 賓館), but the China identity right-wing Gust Magazine (Jifeng zazhi 疾風雜 誌) came to harass this occasion. Unexpectedly, this incident accelerated the momentum of the opposition (Xin Taiwan yanjiu wenjiao jijinhui 新台灣研 究文教基金會 1997). The magazine reached a peak circulation of 140,000 copies (Chen Chun-pin 陳俊斌 2007:27), despite publishing only four issues before being closed down. The content of the Formosa Magazine mainly concerned politics, human rights, international affairs, labor issues and finance, but it also continued to emphasize the Taiwan consciousness, which the Taiwan Political Review had started. The Formosa Magazine introduced readers to the history of Taiwan and historical Taiwanese personages (Hsiao Shu-ling 蕭淑玲 2006:88). In the first issue of the Formosa Magazine, a poem described the lives of Taiwan pioneers to emphasize that Taiwan is the mother of the people in Taiwan (Chen Hsiu-Hsi 陳秀喜 1979:48). Another article argued that the previous alien colonial regimes in Taiwan could not survive because they did not have Taiwan identity (Lu 1979:21).

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In the second issue, the Formosa Magazine published an article to criticize those KMT people holding a Green Card,94 and said the native Taiwanese see Taiwan as a permanent home but the “alien KMT regime” just wants to grab the wealth from this treasure island and then leave Taiwan (Lin Cho-shui 林濁水 1979:12-19). In the third and fourth issues, the Formosa Magazine also discussed the history of the 18,000,000 people in Taiwan and the history of Taiwanese resistance against Japan during the Japanese period (Hsieh Tai-hsin 謝苔心 1979:99-104; Liu Feng-sung 劉峰松 1979:69-76). A principal goal of the Formosa Magazine was to organize the opposition. The KMT did not allow the opposition to form a political party, so the members of the Formosa Magazine decided to use a magazine as an organization. Shih Ming-teh 施明德, one of the founders of the Formosa Magazine, said, “we do not need to use the term ‘party’ when we want to organize a political party.” They also considered that if the KMT shut down the Formosa Magazine, they could change the signboard and then keep running it as a political organization (Shih Ming-teh 施明德 1997). Thus, the opposition used the magazine to organize the opposition and then held several rallies including a rally in Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979, International Human Rights Day. The Formosa Magazine ended tragically as the KMT regime imprisoned its core members after the December 10, 1979 rally. Not only did the pro-KMT media condemn this rally as violent, the overseas KMT Free Chinese Monthly (Boston tongxun 波士頓通訊)95 also claimed that the “violent Taiwan Independence Movement persons” caused this incident. The impact of this wellknown Kaohsiung Incident was that native Taiwanese leaders became political prisoners and the sensitive topic of “provincial complex” was inflamed. In addition, the incident solidified the opposition and encouraged the lawyers for the defendants in the Kaohsiung Incident to emerge onto the political stage. Above all, as a result of the Kaohsiung Incident, the claim of Taiwan Independence was made publicly and emphatically within Taiwan for the first time (Chen Chia-hung 陳佳宏 2009:17-18, 272).

94 95

A United States Permanent Resident Card. The Free Chinese Monthly was published in Boston in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1980, Ma Ying-jeou was the Editor-in-Chief of the Free Chinese Monthly, and the KMT also provided it funds to publish. The Free Chinese Monthly published articles to condemn the Formosa Magazine in January, February and March 1980.

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Debate on Taiwan Consciousness and the Rise of Taiwan Consciousness The first time anyone publicly presented the principles and concepts of selfdetermination in Taiwan was Dr Peng Ming-min 彭明敏96 in his “A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation,” which claimed “one-China and one-Taiwan has long been an iron fact” (Yige Taiwan yige Zhongguo zaoyi shi tie yiban de shishi 一個台灣一個中國 早已是鐵一般的事實), on September 20, 1964.97 Further, on December 29, 1971, the Taiwan Presbyterian Church claimed, “Although human rights are given by God, the people themselves have the right to decide their own destiny” (Jacobs 2005:27). The Taiwan Presbyterian Church also issued a Declaration of Human Rights on August 16, 1977, and stated, “We insist that the future of Taiwan shall be determined by the 17 million people who live here … we urge our government to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent country” (Jacobs 2005:27). In 1977, when China Tide launched the Campaign for Native Literature Movement, it provided the background for the “Debate on Taiwanese Consciousness” (Taiwan yishilunzhan 台灣意識論戰) that took place in 1983-1984. In 1983, Hou Te-chien 侯德建98 went to China. This incident aroused a debate between Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese consciousness. Many opposition magazines, including both those with a pro-Taiwan consciousness and those with a China identity, got involved in the debates, e.g. the Root Weekly (Shenggen zhoukan 生根週刊),99 the Taiwan Era (Taiwan niandai 台灣年代), 96

97

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Peng Ming-min (1923- ) was born in Taichung, Taiwan. He was a professor at National Taiwan University and a Taiwan Independence Movement leader. Dr Peng Ming-min was the Presidential Candidate of the DPP for the 1996 presidential campaign of Taiwan. “A Declaration of Formosan Self-salvation” was signed by Dr Peng Ming-min and his students, Hsieh Tsung-min 謝聰敏 and Wei Ting-chao 魏廷朝. In fact, this declaration was originally proposed by Hsieh Tsung-min, and then edited by Wei Ting-chao and Dr Peng Ming-min. After they released this declaration, the KMT government arrested them and sentenced Hsieh Tsung-min to 10 years in prison and both Dr Peng Ming-min and Wei Ting-chao to 8 years in prison (Chen Chia-hung 陳佳宏 2009:115). Hou Te-chien, a Mainlander, composed a famous song “The Descendants of the Dragon” in 1978, and the KMT regime regarded this song as the symbol of the Chinese nation. However, in 1983, when no one in Taiwan was allowed to visit China, Hou went to China. This incident angered the KMT regime, and the KMT also banned this song in Taiwan. Hou was deported to Taiwan by the Chinese authorities in 1990 and Hou later migrated to New Zealand in 1995. The Shenggen magazine was founded by Hsu Jung-shu 許榮淑, the wife of the Kaohsiung Incident defendant Chang Chun-hung 張俊宏, and two key later leaders of the DPP Wu Nai-jen 吳乃仁 and Chiou I-jen 邱義仁.

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China Tide and Forward (Qianjin 前進). Of course, the China identity magazines supported Hou Te-chien and his song, “The Descendants of the Dragon” (Long de chuanren 龍的傳人), while the Taiwan identity magazines strongly believed that Taiwan was an entity that was independent from China. This debate on the “Taiwan Complex” (Taiwan jie 台灣結) and the “China Complex” (Zhongguo jie 中國結) actually helped “Taiwanese consciousness” materialize (Chen Yi-fan 陳褘璠 2008). Most importantly, this “Debate on Taiwanese Consciousness” broke the taboo on the discourse for Taiwan Independence (Shih Min-hui 施敏輝 1985:1), and Taiwanese consciousness also openly challenged Chinese nationalism (Chih Huan-te 池煥德 1997:76). The early 1980s thus saw the galvanizing of Taiwan identity and even Taiwanese nationalism as a result of the “Debate on Taiwanese Consciousness” and the Kaohsiung Incident in Taiwan.100 Many discussions and articles of Taiwan nationalism appeared in the opposition magazines in the early 1980s. In mid-1982, during a visit of opposition central parliamentarians to the United States, the Asian (Yazhouren 亞洲人) published a joint statement of the Taiwanese Association of the United States. This statement included six requests, four of which have relevance to the issue of the Taiwan nation: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The future of Taiwan should be jointly decided by the 18 million people of Taiwan. Release the people imprisoned because of the Kaohsiung Incident and other political prisoners, especially Lin I-hsiung 林義雄 and the Reverend Kao Chun-ming 高俊明. Remove restrictions on political parties and newspapers. Completely re-elect the Legislative Yuan (Jacobs 2005:22-23).

Jacobs believes that real discussion of the Taiwan question began in mid-1983, when Lan Yi-ping 藍一平 audaciously declared, “Democratization is precisely Taiwanization” (minzhuhua jiushi Taiwan hua 民主化就是台灣化). Lan Yi-ping emphasized that while most KMT members were native Taiwanese, two-thirds of the members of the CSC were Mainlanders. Lan further noted that even though native Taiwanese form the backbone of the 600,000 Taiwan military, they had no way to occupy senior positions (Jacobs 2005:23). With the approach of the legislative election in December 1983, the discussion of Taiwan nationalism became more concrete and the topic of “self-determination” (zijue 自決) rose to the fore in opposition magazines. The opposition 100

The overseas Taiwan Independence Movement had started in 1947.

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announced that “Taiwan’s future must be jointly decided by all of Taiwan’s inhabitants” (Jacobs 2005:26-27). The Root Weekly editorialized: All of Taiwan’s residents – including those who were born and have grown up here and those people who have come to this piece of land over the past thirty years – have the right to decide their own style of life and the right to seek political, economic, social and cultural styles. This is a basic human right which all mankind jointly recognizes; it is not a dangerous view which a minority of people have plucked out of thin air or thought up on their own …. In order to enable readers to understand the developmental process of advocating self-determination as well as the Nationalist Party’s policy decisions of closing down discussions, this magazine is presenting “Democracy, Self-Determination, Save Taiwan” (minzhu 民主, zijue 自決, jiu Taiwan 救台灣) to enable readers to think deeply (Jacobs 2005:27; Shenggen zhoukan 生根週刊 [Root Weekly] 1983:1). A Taiwan consciousness had been expressed in the opposition magazines since the Taiwan Political Review in 1975, and the emerging Taiwan consciousness always had a close relationship with the democratic movement. Chen Shu-hung argues that Taiwan consciousness was the foundation stone of the opposition democratic movement (Taiwan yishi: Dangwai minzhu yundong de jishi 台灣意識: 黨外民主運動的基石) (Chen Shu-hung 陳樹鴻 1983:17-20). He said that Taiwan consciousness had increasingly influenced Taiwanese society from the 1970s and became the root of the democratic movement. Above all, Chen Shu-hung argued that the spirit of demanding “complete election of the central parliamentary organs” (zhongyang mindai quanmian gaixuan 中央民代全面改選)101 was to propose that Taiwan be an entity separate from China (Taiwan zhutixing 台灣主體). That is, he claimed that Taiwan was a sovereign nation and the people of Taiwan had the right to demand democracy (Chen Shu-hung 陳樹鴻 1983).

101

Before 1992, most of the central representatives, both legislators and representatives of the National Assembly, in Taiwan were elected in China prior to 1949 and they held the position until they died. The KMT government maintained the status quo to claim the KMT government was the legitimate government of all China.

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Concluding Remarks After the KMT took over Taiwan in 1945, it used the mass media as a tool to “Sinicize” what it viewed as a “Japanized” Taiwanese. This effort to instill a China identity in the Taiwanese took on greater urgency when Taiwan became a “revival base” for re-taking the mainland after 1949. Moreover, the KMT sought to secure its rule by subordinating the Taiwanese into a colonial hierarchy, comparable to what was previously done by the Japanese. This was carried out alongside its propaganda war against the Communists and democratic opponents of its authoritarianism. No media could report any news without the approval of the regime. The regime’s language policy in the mass media, particularly in radio programs and TV programs, promoted Mandarin Chinese and all but removed native Taiwanese languages from the media. The two big privately-owned dailies, the United Daily News and China Times, as well as the party-owned Central Daily News played key roles in the regime’s propaganda. In the discourses of these three big newspapers, the Republic of China dominated by the Chinese Nationalist Party was presented as the sole legitimate China, and the Chinese Nationalist Party was put forward as the embodiment of justice and the savior of Chinese culture. Although the KMT kept tight control over mass media (the newspapers, radio and TV), the opposition magazines were able to a limited extent during Chiang Ching-kuo’s partial liberalization to challenge the KMT’s hegemonic China identity and Chinese nationalism.

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Chapter 3

The Media and National Identity under Democratization Being a colonial regime from China, the authoritarian KMT government pushed a Chinese identity for Taiwan while repressing the Taiwan identity of the Taiwanese people until democratization in the early 1990s. After the first native Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, came to power, Lee’s democratization policy gave the Taiwanese people the right to advocate Taiwan identity openly. Identity politics in Taiwan became a very important issue alongside the development of democratization. Consequently, surveys indicated a significant change in national identity with a growth of Taiwan identity and a drop in China identity from the early 1990s. During the martial law period, most media were part of the state apparatus to propagandize China identity. However, democratization brought freedom of the press leading to changes in the portrayal of national identity in Taiwan’s media. After the early 1990s, some media continued their message of China identity from the martial law period. By contrast, the rise of some Taiwan identity or alternative/neutral media challenged the predominance of China identity media in the media market. Thereafter, there was intense competition in the media between those pushing a Taiwan identity and those pushing a China identity from the early 1990s with both having a considerable following. This chapter first discusses Lee Teng-hui’s democratization and Taiwanization policies as well as the growth of Taiwanese identity among Taiwanese people. Second, this chapter further explores the changes in the overall map of the news media market, including print and electronic, in relation to national identity under democratization. Finally, this chapter also analyses the intentions of both the pro-Taiwan Chen Shui-bian government and the pro-China Ma Ying-jeou government to influence national identity in such government media as Radio Taiwan International and the Central News Agency. Democratization and the Rise of Taiwan Identity On January 13, 1988, Vice-President Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, succeeded to the presidency after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death. As a native Taiwanese, Lee was subject to repeated attacks by Mainlander conservatives within

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the KMT during the early years of his presidency. In February and March 1990, the conservative, Non-Mainstream Faction (feizhuliupai 非主流派), composed mainly of Mainlanders, challenged Lee Teng-hui’s Mainstream Faction (zhuliupai 主流派) for the nomination as the KMT’s presidential candidate.1 However Lee Teng-hui was the victor in this political struggle. On May 11, just a few days before Lee Teng-hui’s presidential inauguration, some KMT conservatives, most of whom were of Mainland descent, established a formal organization, the New Nationalist Party Alliance (Xin Guomindang lianxian 新國民黨 連線) (Jacobs 2012:76), to oppose Lee Teng-hui. In August 1993, the New Nationalist Party Alliance became the Chinese New Party. Lee’s handling of political events further strengthened his position. In March 1990, tens of thousands of Taiwanese students launched a movement to request political reform, including the retirement of the “old thieves” (laozei 老 賊)2 in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. Lee Teng-hui responded to the petition of students and launched a “National Affairs Conference” in June 1990. After 1990, Lee Teng-hui instituted a series of political reforms which led Taiwan to democratization. In May 1991, Lee Tenghui announced the abolition of the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” (Dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan 動員戡亂時期臨時條款), established in 1948. He then carried out constitutional reform. In 1994, the Taiwan government had direct elections for the Taipei City mayor, the Kaohsiung City mayor and the governor of Taiwan Province, all of which had previously been appointed. In the same year, the National Assembly enacted a law for direct presidential elections. The first direct election of the president, held under the threat of Chinese missiles in March 1996, was a great achievement of democratization under Lee Teng-hui. Lee’s efforts received significant international recognition. For example, on May 20, 1996, Newsweek (Asian edition) praised Lee Teng-hui as “Mr Democracy.” Bruce Jacobs (2012:6) argues that Taiwan’s democratization and Taiwanization have been two very closely linked processes, whereby Taiwanization emphasizes identification with Taiwan, consciousness of Taiwan and even a Taiwanese nationalism. Bruce Jacobs (Jacobs 2012:6) further argues, “The KMT created a ‘colonial’ society in which the Chinese Mainlanders, who account for 1 The Mainstream Faction tended to be supported by native Taiwanese, but some Mainlanders also supported it, such as James Soong. 2 The “old thieves” meant the life-term members of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan who had been elected in the late 1940s in China and were then given permanent positions when the Mainland fell to the Communists and the KMT could no longer conduct elections there.

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less than fifteen per cent of Taiwan’s population, controlled the majority Taiwanese who comprise more than eighty-five per cent of population. In this context, appeals to Taiwan identity provided an important attraction to and source of strength for the opposition.” Democratization not only gave Taiwanese people rights regarding the direct election of the presidency, Taipei and Kaohsiung City mayors and the governor of Taiwan Province, it also gave Taiwanese people freedom to dissent, including over the issue of national identity. For example, the Amendment of Criminal Code Article 100, on May 15, 1992, significantly enhanced freedom of speech in Taiwan. Most importantly, non-violent advocacy of Taiwan Independence was no longer illegal according to this amendment (Jacobs 2005:38). Also, in 1992, the Lee Teng-hui government lifted most of the blacklists of overseas Taiwanese which prohibited many overseas Taiwan Independence Movement activists from returning to Taiwan.3 These remarkable policy changes facilitated the Taiwanese people’s freedom to advocate their own Taiwan national identity, a factor that would have a major impact on the media. Owing to Mainlanders having dominated Taiwan over the three decades up to 1988, Lee Teng-hui, being the first Taiwanese president of Taiwan, made Taiwan identity an important component of his leadership. Christopher Hughes has argued that the best indicator of the success of Lee’s vision for Taiwan identity was the adoption of the concept of a “Community of Shared Destiny” (shengming gongtongti 生命共同體) (Hughes 2000:76). Lee Teng-hui officially announced the “Community of Shared Destiny” on January 4, 1992 in his Report on the State of the Nation (guoqing baogao 國情報告) to the National Assembly. On May 20, 1992, in a press conference on the second anniversary of his inauguration, Lee Teng-hui claimed to have constructed a “Community of Shared Destiny” which emphasized that all people in Taiwan share the same destiny, have the same history, and live on the same land. Lee’s announcement of the “Community of Shared Destiny” would show his intention to build a nation with Taiwan identity through a policy of Taiwanization. Thus, Lee Tenghui was responsible for preparing and using the Understanding Taiwan junior high school textbooks (available from 1997), a key example in the state promulgation of Taiwan identity (Harrison 2006:196). Lee Teng-hui also tried to institute policies for Taiwanization including the learning Taiwanese languages at school, which was in stark contrast to the punishment of students who spoke Taiwanese languages during the martial law period. However, only the DPP local governments strongly supported Lee’s idea of Taiwanese language learning at schools in the 1990s, a policy which various DPP governments 3 In 1996, an amendment to the National Security Law ended the black lists.

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in Pingtung County, Ilan County and Taipei County implemented beginning in 1990. The policy was only expanded throughout the entire nation in 2001 when the DPP came to power nationally. Some other factors also facilitated Taiwan identity. On March 31, 1994, twenty-four Taiwanese tourists were killed in China in the Qiandao Lake Incident (Qiandaohu shijian 千島湖事件), which was followed by an arrogant response from the Chinese authorities. The Taiwanese people were furious at China, and this event strengthened Taiwanese identity. According to a poll in the United Daily News, Taiwanese identity rose from 33 per cent to 41 per cent immediately after this incident (United Daily News Survey Center 1994). The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when China sent missiles within a few miles of Taiwan during the first Taiwan presidential campaign, also consolidated the Taiwanese people’s identification of themselves as an independent country different from China. Figure 3.1 Survey of Taiwanese & Chinese Identity (1992-2012)

(Election Study Center of National Chengchi University 2012)

Figure 3.1 shows the results of surveys conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University. It shows that Taiwanese identity grew steadily during 1992-2012 from 17.6 per cent to 53.7 per cent. At the same time, Chinese identity has declined from 25.5 per cent to 3.1 per cent. In addition, surveys of both the pro-unification United Daily News and the pro-independence DPP, validate this growth of Taiwan identity. According to the United Daily News in Figure 3.2, Taiwan identity among Taiwan’s people has increased from 16 per-

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Figure 3.2 Survey of Taiwanese & Chinese Identity (1989~2009)

Collated by the Author from the United Daily News, 20104 Figure 3.3 Survey of Taiwanese & Chinese Identity (1995~2009)5

Collected by Author from the Democratic Progressive Party, 2009 45

4 The United Daily News did not reveal its survey details every year; the author collected these figures from its coverage. 5 The Survey Center of the DPP had only two options, “Taiwanese” and “Chinese,” in its questionnaire, but the interviewee could answer “both Taiwanese and Chinese” to respond to its survey. By contrast, the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University provides three options, “Taiwanese,” “Chinese” and “both Taiwanese and Chinese” for its poll. The Survey Center of

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Figure 3.4 Survey of Taiwanese & Chinese Identity (2000 & 2008)

(TVBS 2008)

cent in 1989 to 69 per cent in 2009. The DPP poll results shown in Figure 3.3 also show a steady increase in Taiwanese identity. TVBS surveys, which offered only the options of being “Taiwanese” or “Chinese” (without the option of “both Taiwanese and Chinese”), reported that Taiwanese identity increased from 58 per cent in 2000 to 68 per cent in 2008, while only 18 per cent of Taiwan’s people regarded themselves as Chinese in both 2000 and 2008 (see Figure 3.4). In short, all surveys of national identity have shown that the percentage of people identifying themselves as only Taiwanese has increased greatly since the early 1990s, while the proportion identifying as Chinese has declined precipitously. All of these polls have indicated a significant change in national identity of Taiwan’s people. As Taiwan identity grew under democratization, the national identity orientations of Taiwan’s media also changed, showing both increased diversity under democratization as well as a significant growth of Taiwan identity media, especially in the newspaper market. 

the DPP believes the hint of “both Taiwanese and Chinese” in the questionnaire design of the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University explains the different result from the DPP survey.

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Changes in Taiwan’s’ Newspapers under Democratization As discussed in the previous chapter, China identity newspapers monopolized Taiwan’s newspaper market under the colonial Chinese Nationalist Party regime. Only a few opposition magazines and the Independent Evening Post (Zili wanbao 自立晚報) displayed Taiwan consciousness or concern for Taiwan during the martial law period. Many of the China identity newspapers continued publishing after democratization and most retained a China identity. On the other hand, Taiwanese people could legally operate a newspaper after democratization and Taiwan identity newspapers gradually challenged the predominance of the China identity newspapers. In addition, the rise of the pro-democracy Apple Daily (Pinguo ribao 蘋果日報) has also impacted upon Taiwan’s newspaper market. The Decline of China Identity Newspapers: The United Daily News and the China Times The KMT authoritarian regime strictly limited the number of newspapers. The Taiwan New Life Newspaper, the official Taiwan provincial government organ, was the newspaper with the largest circulation in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. The Central Daily News, the newspaper of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s central committee, replaced the Taiwan New Life Newspaper as the largest newspaper until the 1960s. The rise of the United Daily News and the China Times, two private newspapers, superseded the Central Daily News from the 1970s. As a consequence, the China identity United Daily News and the China Times prevailed for more than two decades until the early 1990s, a crucial period for the rise of opposition movements. During 1977-1986, these two newspapers had about two-thirds of the newspaper circulation on Taiwan (Chen Sheue-yun 陳雪雲 1998:18). Until January 1988, only 31 legal newspapers were published in Taiwan, but the figure rose to 445 in 2000 and 2,210 in December 2011 according to statistics of the Taiwan government. Table 3.1 shows the number of newspaper publications in Taiwan from 1987, indicating the rapid growth and competition of newspapers in Taiwan. However, despite the huge number of registered newspapers, only a few newspapers with substantial circulation figures are important to Taiwan in terms of political influence. By 1986, both the United Daily News and the China Times claimed that their circulations had exceeded 1,400,000 copies per day (Wang Tsai-yun 王彩雲 et al. 1989:13-19). These figures were exaggerated in order to increase advertising revenue. Owing to the cut-throat competition between these two newspapers, on September 18, 1986, the United Daily News urged a fair audit of newspaper circulations.

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Due to democratization and the rise of Taiwan identity, the circulation of both newspapers gradually decreased. According to Brain Magazine, the average circulation of the United Daily News in April 1989 was 980,000 copies and the average circulation of the China Times in January-March 1989 was 830,000 copies (Wang Tsai-yun 王彩雲 et al. 1989:13-19). Table 3.1

Total Number of Newspapers Registered

Year

Total

1987 1988 1989 1990 1995 2000 2011

31 122 195 211 335 445 2,2106

(Batto 2004:6; Government Information Office 2011) 6

Despite the drop in their circulation, these two papers continued to dominate the market and had a powerful influence in Taiwan in the initial stages of democratization. Table 3.2 shows the circulations of nation-wide newspapers in 1990, clearly indicating that both the United Daily News and the China Times occupied by far the greatest market share, each having more than three times the circulation of the third largest newspaper. In addition, the Min Sheng Daily, Economic Daily News and United Evening News also belonged to the United Daily News Group, while both the Commercial Times and the China Times Express were subsidiaries of the China Times Group. According to these statistics, the United Daily News Group had 48.9 per cent of the market share while the China Times Group held 35.1 per cent of the market share. Together, these two groups had an oligarchic 84 per cent of the market share of nation-wide newspapers in 1990. From 1992, the rise of the Taiwan identity Liberty Times (Ziyou shibao 自由 時報) challenged the long-term dominance of the United Daily News and the China Times (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:408-410). According to Table 3.2, the Liberty Times had no significant market share in 1990, but Table 3.3 shows a rapid growth in popularity of the Liberty Times from 1992 until 2000, while the China identity United Daily News and China Times both had substantial 6 This figure was updated in December 2011.

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declines in reading rates. In addition, Table 3.3 also shows the rise and impact of the Apple Daily. The Apple Daily, which started publishing in 2003, impacted all three large newspapers from 2004 and further damaged both the United Daily News and the China Times. Table 3.2 Market Shares of the Nation-Wide Newspapers in 1990 Newspaper

Market Share

United Daily News China Times Min Sheng Daily Economic Daily News Mandarin Daily News Independent Morning Post Commercial Times United Evening News China Times Express Independent Evening Post Others7

31.0% 30.0% 9.6% 5.7% 3.9% 3.6% 2.7% 2.6% 2.4% 2.0% 6.5%

(Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:353) 7

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the rise of the Apple Daily and its competition with the Liberty Times as well as the decline of both the United Daily News and the China Times. According to an informant with information provided by a senior source in the Apple Daily in September 2009, Table 3.5 indicates the average circulation of these four big newspapers in mid-2009. Table 3.5 demonstrates a remarkable decrease in circulation of both the United Daily News and the China Times compared to the heyday of the 1970s to early 1990s. In short, Table 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 suggest a clear decline of both the China identity United Daily News and China Times as well as the growth of the Liberty Times and the Apple Daily. Table 3.4 shows the average daily circulation of the two biggest newspapers, the Liberty Times and the Apple Daily. It can be seen that the circulation of the Liberty Times led the Apple Daily by around 190,000-200,000 copies in 20072008. In addition, according to table 3.5, the Liberty Times was ahead of the 7 These included the KMT-run Central Daily, the state-run Taiwan New Life News and the military-run Taiwan Daily.

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Apple Daily by around 150,000 copies in 2009. However, according to Table 3.3, the reading rates of the two newspapers were very close, and the Apple Daily even gained marginally more readers than the Liberty Times in 2008. This is a surprising result as the Apple Daily costs NT$15, fifty per cent more than the other newspapers including the Liberty Times. In addition, according to a former senior journalist of the Apple Daily, Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, the Apple Daily always controlled its printed copies and had very limited waste, about 1,000-2,000 copies per day (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2010). Accordingly, this suggests that the actual circulation rate per copy of the Apple Daily is greater than that of the Liberty Times. Still, according to these figures, the Taiwan identity Liberty Times is the biggest newspaper in circulation. Thus, currently in Taiwan, there are two large newspapers, the Liberty Times and the Apple Daily, and two medium-sized newspapers, the United Daily News and the China Times. Table 3.3 Newspaper Reading Rates (1992-2008) Year

Liberty Times

UDN

China Times

Apple Daily

1992 1996 2000 2002 2004 2007 2008

5.1% 16.1% 22.3% 19.7% 17.6% 16.0% 16.0%

21.8% 17.4% 17.5% 12.7% 12.6% 9.8% 8.5%

21.9% 18.2% 17.2% 14.1% 11.3% 8.3% 7.1%

– – – – 11.9% 15.7% 16.3%

(Government Information Office 2010a:161)

In conclusion, both the United Daily News and the China Times reached a peak in the 1980s, but they decreased from the early 1990s owing to the challenge from the Liberty Times. National identity clearly is to be one of the key factors in this change, while the birth of the Apple Daily further impacted the newspaper market in Taiwan. The Rise of a Taiwan Identity Newspaper: The Liberty Times Lin Rung-san 林榮三 took over the Self-Strengthening Daily (Ziqiang ribao 自 強日報) and gave it a new title, the Liberty Daily (Ziyou ribao 自由日報), in 1980. In 1987, this was changed to the Liberty Times (Ziyou shibao 自由時報). The rise of the Liberty Times can be attributed, at least in part, to its Taiwan

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identity and to Lin Rung-san’s close relationship with former President Lee Teng-hui. Lin Rung-san was not only a member of the KMT Central Committee, but also the Vice-President of the Control Yuan (Jianchayuan 監察院) appointed by Lee Teng-hui during the 1990s. During the Liberty Times’ initial push to expand its market in the early 1990s, the United Daily News and the China Times together suppressed its distribution channels. The Liberty Times then set up its own distribution channels all over Taiwan. Targeting a different market from the two China identity newspapers, the Liberty Times flew the flag of Taiwan identity to appeal to Taiwan identity readers. Table 3.4 Average Daily Circulation Figures of the Liberty Times and the Apple Daily in 2007 & 20088 Year

Liberty Times

Apple Daily

2007 2008

718,559 699,706

514,612 510,702

From Audit Bureau of Circulation 2010 Table 3.5 Average Circulation Figures of Four Newspapers, Mid-2009 & March 2012 Year

Liberty Times

Apple Daily

UDN

China Times

20099 201210

681,309 640,700

530,000 500,000

250,000 200,000

200,000 167,000

Liberty Times figures from ABC, others from a senior leader in the Apple Daily 910 8

9 10

The Apple Daily joined the Audit Bureau of Circulation in 2003, but withdrew from 2009, while, the Liberty Times joined the ABC from 2007. The ABC is a foundation established in 1994; the ABC joined the International Federation of Audit Bureaux of Circulations (IFABC) in 2008. The author collected the figures of the Apple Daily, the UDN and the China Times from a senior source in the Apple Daily on September 5, 2009. According to an interview with a senior leader of the Apple Daily on March 28, 2012, the average circulation figures of the Apple Daily were slightly less than 500,000; the UDN slightly less than 200,000; and the China Times around 167,000. The senior leader estimated the figures of the UDN and the China Times from newspaper reading rate surveys from Nielsen, Taiwan. The senior leader said the free Sharp Daily (Shuangbao 爽報), which only came out on weekdays, and was published by Next Media, had impacted the

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According to an interview with a chief editor of the Liberty Times, the Taiwan identity position of the Liberty Times helped its rapid growth in circulation after the mid-1990s when it became the largest newspaper in Taiwan.11 Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 argues that the Liberty Times had a particular perspective on political news and in editorials, laying emphasis on “Native” or “Local” (Bentu 本土) and “Taiwan First” (Taiwan youxian 臺灣優先), compared to other major newspapers. Thus, the Liberty Times became the “Alternative Voice” (di’erzhong shengyin 第二種聲音) compared to the United Daily News, the China Times and even the KMT-run Central Daily following the lifting of the newspaper ban in 1989 and the early 1990s (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:304). Most importantly, the placing of itself as a Taiwanization, de-Sinification, proindependence and pro-Lee Teng-hui newspaper helped the Liberty Times target Taiwan identity readers (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:414-415). Apart from its strategy of targeting Taiwan identity, the Liberty Times also launched major promotions. In 1992, the Liberty Times initiated a lottery worth NT$160,000,000 for subscribers, paid in gold.12 In 1993, the Liberty Times promoted itself through a second lottery for its subscribers with prize money of NT$200,000,000, also paid in gold. In 1994, it further promoted a 100-day lottery to attract subscribers by offering houses, cars and other items (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:409-410). During the mid-1990s, the Liberty Times promoted itself by giving away free copies, and it was said that the free newspapers accounted for more than thirty per cent of its circulation in 1997 (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:411). These promotional activities helped the Liberty Times replace the Independent Evening Post and the Independent Morning Post as the premier Taiwan identity newspaper as well as the largest newspaper in Taiwan. The Rise of the Apple Daily The Hong Kong businessman Jimmy Lai 黎智英, owner of Next Media in Hong Kong, founded Next Media of Taiwan in late 2000.13 The Taiwan Next Media started to publish the Taiwan Next Magazine (Yizhoukan 壹週刊) in 2001 and the Taiwan Apple Daily in 2003. The birth of the Apple Daily in 2003 led Taiwan into a new era of newspapers. When the Apple Daily was ready to publish in

11 12 13

circulation of the Apple Daily. According to the Audit Bureau of Circulation, Taiwan (http://www.abc.org.tw/), the average circulation of the Sharp Daily in March 2012 was 400,000. The author conducted this interview in Taipei on October 27, 2009. The first prize was about 2,411.2 ounces of gold; the second prize was 1,205.6 ounces of gold. Many other prizes were also in gold. Jimmy Lai founded Next Media in Hong Kong in 1990, where Next Media first published the Next Magazine and the Apple Daily.

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Taiwan, it recruited many senior journalists from the China Times and the United Daily News. This action suggested that the Apple Daily was planning to be major competition. As shown earlier, Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate the rapid growth of the Apple Daily and its impact on other major newspapers. Owing to the expected impact of the Apple Daily, in early 2003 the three big newspapers – the Liberty Times, the United Daily News and the China Times – together blocked the subscription delivery channels for the Apple Daily. Hence, the Apple Daily cooperated with a small-scale delivery service, the Endeavour Delivery Press Service (Qinli shubaoshe 勤力書報社), to distribute its newspapers. As a consequence, the Apple Daily was sold mainly in convenience stores and bookshops.14 But this did not affect its circulation even though the Apple Daily’s retail price was fifty per cent higher than the other Chinese-language newspapers Most Taiwanese people jokingly describe the Apple Daily as a “pro-Yellow” newspaper (“yellow” referring to pornography in both Mandarin and Hoklo in Taiwan) rather than a pro-Pan-Blue (or pro-China) or pro-Pan-Green (or proTaiwan) newspaper.15 The Apple Daily publishes many vivid pictures, many of which are racy, to attract readers. Many critics have thus described much of the coverage in the Apple Daily as pervaded with prurience. For instance, on October 28, 2008, the Taiwan Media Watch Foundation and seven feminist organizations condemned the Apple Daily for being a pornographic newspaper as its coverage of some social incidents was too explicit sexually. These organizations urged Taiwanese people to boycott the Apple Daily. However, despite long-term critiques of the Apple Daily, it has steadily occupied a remarkable share of the newspaper market. Generally, critics argue that the Apple Daily is a market-oriented newspaper not very much focused on national identity. Unlike the other large newspapers, the Apple Daily emphasizes visual effects and sensational topics as well as democratic values (Chiang 2009; Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2010; Poe Tachung 卜大中 2011). The Apple Daily is also politically neutral and has dissatisfied both pro-Taiwan and pro-China identity politicians as it reveals political scandals on both sides of politics. The Apple Daily remains politically neutral 14 15

According to the Audit Bureau of Circulations, subscriptions only accounted for 0.33% of the circulation of the Apple Daily in 2008. From the mid-to-late 1990s, Taiwan’s media began using “Blue Camp” (lanjun 藍軍) to refer to the KMT, “Green Camp” (lüjun 綠軍) to refer to the DPP and “Yellow Camp” (huangjun 黃軍) to refer to the Chinese New Party. According to the China Times, “PanBlue” and “Pan-Green” originated in 2000 after the DPP came to power (China Times 2011). The Pan-Blue coalition includes the China identity or pro-unification camps i.e. the KMT, the People’s First Party and the Chinese New Party. The Pan-Green bloc contains the Taiwan identity or pro-independence camps i.e. the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union.

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in its editorials, and publishes columns and opinion pieces from all political perspectives. Its neutral political position seems to be a feature that attracts readers, and has helped the Apple Daily to occupy a significant part of the newspaper market. The former Publisher of the Apple Daily, Tu Nien-chung 杜念中, argues that the newspaper is neutral on issues of unification and independence, only supporting the right of the Taiwanese people to choose their future. He further argues that no political party should impose its will on the Taiwanese people. Thus, the Apple Daily has taken a neutral stance on the issue of identity (Tu Nien-chung 杜念中 2009). Many people believe that the Apple Daily is an antiCommunist, but not anti-China, newspaper according to the identity of Jimmy Lai (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2010). However, Tu Nien-chung said in an interview that the Apple Daily is a newspaper for the masses and speaks for the disadvantaged rather than any political party (Tu Nien-chung 杜念中 2009). Even though the Apple Daily avoids taking a stance on identity and remains politically neutral, it still comments on many political issues of Taiwan as well as criticizes the dictatorship in China. In another interview, Antonio Chiang, advisor to and columnist in the Apple Daily, remarked that the Apple Daily does not have any mission to preach to readers, but advocates a Greater Taiwanism (Da Taiwan zhuyi 大台灣主義) which encourages Taiwanese to keep good relations with Asian countries and face China’s challenges. The Apple Daily considers advocacy of formal Taiwan Independence to be short-sighted (Chiang 2009). Additionally, owing to its strong support for democracy as well as media ethics, the Apple Daily forbids its staff from being received by or gaining any benefits from the Chinese government. In 2004, a senior supervisor of Next Magazine, another publication of Next Media, visited China with a friend in another medium; this employee was fired by Jimmy Lai because she was received by the Chinese government (Chiang 2009). This Next Magazine incident suggests that the Apple Daily maintains a firm stance of opposing the authoritarian Chinese government. In fact, the Chinese government does not welcome any coverage of China by either the Hong Kong or Taiwan Apple Daily and journalists from these two newspapers have been denied visas to cover news in China. Antonio Chiang also believes in the authenticity of Jimmy Lai’s true love of Taiwan, because Lai not only transferred his property from Hong Kong to Taiwan, but also considers Taiwan to be the only democratic country within the Chinese world (huaren shijie 華人世界) (Chiang 2009). Thus, in summary, we can identify the Apple Daily as a pro-democracy, but politically neutral Taiwan newspaper.

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Other Newspapers: The Importance of Business Factors A newspaper’s stance on identity could help it grow, but business factors also count as the Liberty Times promotional efforts and the Apple Daily’s pictures demonstrate. Many newspapers on both sides of identity politics failed after Taiwan’s democratization. For example, several Taiwan identity newspapers closed down owing to business factors, especially financial difficulties. These newspapers included the Capital Morning Post, the Independent Morning Post, the Independent Evening Post and the Taiwan Daily. In June 1989, the opposition leader, Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥, launched the Capital Morning Post (Shoudu zaobao 首都早報), a newspaper for the expression of Taiwanese views, but Kang closed it in August 1990 owing to financial difficulties. According to Antonio Chiang, a close confidante of Kang Ninghsiang and the Editor-in-Chief of the Capital Morning Post, the opposition magazines could survive during the martial law period with very little money, but a newspaper needed advertisement income to support it. Without advertisement income, the Capital Morning Post had to shut down despite Kang Ning-hsiang’s ambition of running a good newspaper (Chiang 2009). The famous Independent Evening Post, founded in 1947, closed in 2001 after chaos within its ownership and management as well as financial difficulty. After the lifting of the press ban in 1988, the Independent Evening Post also decided to publish the Independent Morning Post (Zili zaobao 自立早報). In 1994, the KMT member Chen Cheng-chung 陳政忠 assumed control of the Independent Post Group. Because of a huge deficit, in January 1999, the Independent Morning Post closed, while the Independent Evening Post was transferred to another KMT member Chang Ching-chung 張慶忠 and the Wisdom Group (Xiangshan jituan 象山集團) in February 1999.16 In October 2000, the DPP member Wang Shih-chien 王世堅 obtained the Independent Evening Post, but the deficit continued to climb. Finally, after several years of chaos and financial difficulty, the Independent Evening Post shut down in October 2001. In addition to its ownership difficulties and deficit, the Independent Evening Post, also suffered from the rise of the Liberty Times. Thus, the Independent Evening Post was forced to close both for financial difficulty and because a new Taiwan identity newspaper, the Liberty Times, surpassed it with a superior business model. The Taiwan Daily (Taiwan ribao 台灣日報) closed in 2006. Prior to 1996, when controlled by the military, the Taiwan Daily was even more conservative than the party newspaper, the Central Daily, and had a strong China identity. 16

The Wisdom Group was comprised of newspaper, radio station, TV station and Internet media in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.

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Owing to its conservative ideology, the Taiwan Daily gradually lost its market share and announced it would stop publishing on July 13, 1996 (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:474-475). In August 1996, Yen Wen-shuan 顏文閂 and Antonio Chiang, supported by the very wealthy Taiwanese businessman, Wang Yungching 王永慶, took over the Taiwan Daily and turned it into a Taiwan identity newspaper.17 According to Brain Magazine, the circulation of the Taiwan Daily rapidly increased from more than 20,000 copies to 150,000 copies within two months (Dongnao zaozhi 動腦雜誌 1996:102-104). The Taiwan Daily became an advocate of Taiwan identity and its change to being a Taiwan identity newspaper with excellent writers helped it increase its market share. However, after the withdrawal of Wang Yung-ching from the Taiwan Daily in May 2001, the Taiwan Daily faced financial difficulties. Without Wang’s support, the Taiwan Daily finally shut down in June 2006 with a huge debt. Similar business factors also have had an impact on China identity newspapers. For example, both the biggest newspaper during the 1950s, the Taiwan New Life News, owned by the Taiwan Provincial Government and the largest newspaper during the 1960s, the KMT-owned Central Daily News, became minor newspapers after democratization. According to Wang Tsai-yun, the Taiwan New Life News still had a circulation of 220,000 copies, and the Central Daily News also had a comparable circulation of 210,000 in 1989 (Wang Tsaiyun 王彩雲 et al. 1989:13-19). But these figures probably resulted from political factors. For instance, the Taiwan New Life News had 24,366 subscribers from heads of villages, boroughs and neighborhoods (cunlilinzhang 村里鄰長) (Wang Tsai-yun 王彩雲 et al. 1989:13-19) and the Central Daily News had many subscribers from both the central and local governments and KMT organizations. From the early 1990s, both newspapers gradually lost circulation as Taiwan democratized. After Taiwan province was “frozen,” the Taiwan Provincial Governmentowned Taiwan New Life News became a central government-owned newspaper in 1997,18 and then further changed to a privately-owned newspaper in 2001. Because of financial difficulties, it targeted a new market, transforming into a professional newspaper concentrating on Cross-Strait issues and shipping after 2001. According to an interview with the former Publisher of the Taiwan 17

18

Antonio Chiang believed that Wang Yung-ching did not use his personal money to support the Taiwan Daily; he said that Wang Yung-ching only served as the Taiwan Daily’s guarantor for a loan from banks (Chiang 2009). In 1996, Lee Teng-hui decided to “freeze” the Taiwan Provincial Government from the end of 1998 to reduce bureaucracy. Thereafter, many businesses owned by the Taiwan Provincial Government became central government businesses.

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New Life News, Lu Yi-ming 呂一銘, the KMT–owned China Daily News (Zhonghua ribao 中華日報) acquired the Taiwan New Life News and it then became a KMT-owned newspaper from the late 2000s (Lu Yi-ming 呂一銘 2010).19 The KMT-owned Central Daily News stopped publishing in June 2006 owing to financial troubles, and eventually became an online publication in October 2007. According to its website, the Central Daily News also became a CrossStrait newspaper of politics and finance. Additionally, it further provided Chinese users with an option of choosing simplified Chinese characters, which showed its intention to open up to the Chinese market. In summary, it took significant capital to run a newspaper in the competitive Taiwan newspaper market after democratization. Although Taiwan identity could help a newspaper expand its market, financial difficulties such as the inability to generate advertisement income could also impact upon a newspaper. Similarly, KMT-controlled China identity newspapers such as the Central Daily News and the state-run Taiwan New Life News also found it difficult to survive in the competitive Taiwan newspaper market. The Electronic Media Democratization, the development of media technology and the release of licenses gave more people opportunities to run an electronic medium in the early 1990s. This change also provided the opposition with an opportunity to own electronic media and to challenge the KMT’s long-held supremacy over broadcast media. After liberalization of the electronic media in the mid-1990s, some opposition people set up broadcast media. First, the opposition set up many underground radio stations and cable television stations, the so-called fourth channel, from the early 1990s.20 Then the government legalized the underground radio stations and cable television stations. Opposition supporters then established a fourth free-to-air TV station in 1997 to further challenge the KMT’s monopoly of the broadcast media. Altogether, these events brought about a significant diversity of electronic media in the late 1990s. In the early 1990s, underground radio stations played an important part in Taiwanese politics as a tool for the opposition to promote democracy. In March 19 20

In 2002, the Taiwan New Life News, the Central Daily News and the China Daily News set up a joint news department to share news sources. The three channels of free-to-air TV stations from the authoritarian period were under the control of the KMT regime. Many of these new cable TV channels were not controlled by the KMT. People nicknamed these cable TV channels the “fourth channel.”

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1990, the DPP Secretary–General, Chang Chun-hung 張俊宏, set up the first pro-Taiwan underground radio station, the Voice of Democracy (Minzhu zhisheng 民主之聲), to break the monopoly of the KMT in the broadcasting media (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2002:558). In 1992, Chang Chun-hung also established the People’s Broadcasting Station (Quanmin diantai 全民電台) (Wang Tienpin 王天濱 2002:558). Afterward, various opposition leaders set up more and more underground radios stations until they were legalized in 1994. Most of these stations had Taiwan identity.21 Chia Tek-khiam argues that the so-called Taiwan identity radio stations mainly talked about democracy in the early 1990s and then turned to focus on Taiwan identity and Taiwan Independence from late 1995 (Chia Tek-khiam 謝德謙 2009). There were only two important China identity underground radio stations in Taiwan, the Voice of the Chinese New Party (Xindang zhiyin 新黨之音) and the New Concept Station (Xinsiwei diantai 新思維電台), both established in the mid-1990s and both located in Taipei. According to my experience, the two China identity radio stations focused on issues of Chinese nationalism, opposing Taiwan Independence and opposing Lee Teng-hui. Similarly, on February 28, 1990, the supporters of the DPP set up the Chungho Democratic Cable Television Station (Zhonghe minzhutai youxian dianshitai 中和民主台有線電視台) to produce programs in opposition to the KMT’s dominance of free-to-air TV news (Hsu Chia-hung 徐嘉宏 2003:69-70; Tiffen & Kwak 2005:141). Afterward, an increasing number of politicians set up cable TV stations and these stations operated as a series of small-scale pirate enterprises in the early 1990s (Tiffen & Kwak 2005:141). These cable TV stations, mostly operated by members of the DPP, labeled themselves as Democratic Cable Television (Tiffen & Kwak 2005:141). In July 1993, the Legislative Yuan enacted the Cable Television Law to legalize these cable TV stations. Nowadays, cable TV plays an important part in Taiwan’s media market. According to a report of the National Communications Commission, in December 2006 the penetration rate of cable TV in Taiwan was 81.6 per cent of all households (Peng Yun 彭芸 2006:44). To date, the main cable TV stations are TVBS, SET (Sanli dianshi 三立電視), ERA (Niandai dianshi 年代電視), EBC (Dongsen dianshi 東森電視) and CTi (Zhongtian dianshi 中天電視). All use satellite transmission and have to pay royalties to the cable TV systems in 21

After Lee Teng-hui liberalized the radio broadcasting policy, the legal broadcasting radio stations increased from 29 in 1994 to 171 in 2010 according to the Government Information Office (Government Information Office 2010b). However, some underground radio stations refused to apply for a license as they said that they did not recognize the Republic of China.

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order to hire channels to run their programs. Each TV station might have more than two programs showing on different channels of the cable TV systems. For example, TVBS has three programs running simultaneously on three different channels. Table 3.6 Market Shares of Cable TV Stations in 2006 Cable TV Station

Market Share

National Identity

Eastern Broadcasting Company (EBC)22 Sanlih Television (SET)23 Gala Television Corporation (GTV)24 Videoland TV (ONTV)26 CTI Television Incorporation (CTi TV)27 TVBS28 Star Group (Star TV)29 ERA Communications (ERA)30 Others (including FTV-N)

15.13% 14.34% 9.60% 7.88% 6.86% 6.68% 6.23% 3.85% 29.43%

China Taiwan Neutral25 Neutral China China Neutral China –

(Sun Ming-fang 孫明芳 2006:44) 222324252627282930 22

23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30

EBC runs 7 channels, including news, movies, drama and kids on Taiwan’s cable TV systems. In addition, EBC also has 2 satellite TV stations broadcasting in America and the Asia-Pacific. SET has 3 channels for news, drama and entertainment. Gala has 4 channels and it sometimes produces a political talk show on Channel 27 during election campaigns. Gala has always supported the ruling party despite its national identity. For example, the Gala opened a talk show “Google News” (Google xinwen Google 新聞) to support the 2008 DPP president candidate Frank Hsieh when the DPP was in power and then dropped it right after the presidential campaign. However, after the KMT regained power, Gala opened another talk show “Politics Online” (Zhenglun online 政論 Online) in the 2010 five special municipalities campaign, which also closed soon after this campaign. Videoland operates 6 channels including sports, drama, Japanese, movies and other entertainment channels. CTi runs 3 channels in Taiwan including news, and 2 entertainment channels, and it is also a part of the Want China Times Group. TVBS operates 3 channels including news and 2 entertainment channels. Star TV is an entertainment TV station operating 3 channels. ERA used to operate 4 channels including news and 3 entertainment channels, but an entertainment channel (Niandai zonghetai 年代綜合台) was shut down by the KMT government in December 2010.

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Table 3.6 shows the market share of the cable TV stations with EBC as the top station and SET in second place. EBC, SET, CTi, TVBS and ERA all have news programs with 24-hour coverage. Formosa TV (FTV) also has a 24-hour news channel, the Formosa Television News (FTV-N), playing on the cable TV systems. Table 3.7 gives the TV ratings for both free-to-air and 24-hour news channels. The six 24-hour news channels have progressively taken over the news role which the three original free-to-air TV stations news programs dominated in the authoritarian period. This new structure is now influencing Taiwanese society in both politics and national identity. Table 3.7 shows average TV ratings of news programs of both the free-to-air and cable TV in 2010 and 2011, and on the day before the 2010 multiple city mayoral election and the 2012 presidential election day. The ratings of the freeto-air news programs were higher than cable TV due to their advantage of being free. According to these figures, the China identity CTV news program was the leading free-to-air TV news. Regarding cable TV, the six 24-hour news channels were competitive in 2010 and 2011. Rating figures before election day show an interesting phenomenon. The ratings of the free-to-air TV stations declined prior to election days in 2010 and 2012. Almost all of the ratings of 24-hour cable news channels rose before election days in 2010 and 2012, and the ratings of both the Taiwan identity cable channels SET-N and FTV-N rose more than China identity news channels. Possible explanations for this are that the DPP supporters, many of whom are laborers and farmers, were busy at work prior to election day and only had time just prior to election day to watch TV news. Another explanation is that some people watched the news randomly until the election campaign when they became more likely to choose a station with political perspectives similar to their own. The ratings of the cable TV news channels on the day before election day are likely to be more reflective of the levels of support of the China identity KMT and the Taiwan identity DPP. Table 3.8 shows the ratings of two famous and popular political talk shows which broadcast during the same hours (21:00-23:00) from Monday to Friday. It indicates that the Taiwan identity SET-N “Big Talk News” (Dahua xinwen 大話 新聞) was almost the double of the viewers of the China identity TVBS “2100 All People Talk” (Eryilingling quanmin kaijiang 2100 全民開講) in 2010. In 2011, the SET-N “Big Talk News” also had more than 64 per cent more viewer than the TVBS “2100 All People Talk” in 2011. According to Table 3.8, the Taiwan identity “Big Talk News” is more popular than the China identity “2100 All People Talk,” which is almost certainly due to the popularity of Taiwan identity.

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Table 3.7 TV Ratings by Household in Free-to-Air TV News Programs and 24-Hour Cable News Channels31 Identity

TV Station

Type

Average for 2010 2010 Election32

Average for 2012 2011 Election33

Taiwan

FTV SET-N FTV-N Total CTV34 TVBS-N CTi-N EBC-N ERA-N Total TTV CTS Total

Free-to-Air Cable Cable

3.46 2.48 2.21 8.15 5.28 2.44 2.15 1.96 0.92 12.75 3.80 2.47 6.27

3.62 2.13 2.87 8.62 4.86 2.65 2.12 2.01 0.85 12.49 3.44 1.92 5.36

China

Neutral35

Free-to-Air Cable Cable Cable Cable Free-to-Air Free-to-Air

3.20 3.04 2.77 9.01 4.71 2.12 2.12 1.52 0.94 11.41 3.58 1.91 5.49

3.03 3.53 3.76 10.32 4.72 2.78 2.51 2.00 1.06 13.07 2.87 1.62 4.49

Collected by the author from AGB Nielsen Media Research 2011 and 2012 32333435 Table 3.8 TV Ratings by Household of Two Famous Talk Shows, 2010 & 201136 Identity

TV Programs

2010

2011

Taiwan China

SET-N Big Talk News TVBS 2100 All People Talk

2.943% 1.505%

2.735% 1.753%

Collected by the author from AGB Nielsen Media Research 2011 and 2012 31 32 33 34 35

36

The author calculated the average from figures of 1st day of every month and these TV rating figures were during prime time (19:00-19:30). This was on November 26, 2010 the day before the five special municipal city mayoral elections day. This was on January 13, 2012 the day prior to the presidential election day. CTV is a part of the China Times Group. Until 2007, TTV was a government-run station. It has remained politically neutral since becoming privately-owned in September 2007. CTS is a part of the Taiwan Broadcasting Systems which is a public TV group in Taiwan. The author calculated the average from figures for the programs on the first broadcasting day of every month.

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Government and Media after Democratization Lee Teng-hui’s policy of democratization brought freedom of the press. After Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 came to power, he further promoted a policy of “­withdrawal of party, government and military from the media,” which his ­government instituted from 2003. Thus, Chen’s media reform reorganized ­government-run media to become public media in 2006 combining both military-run CTS and the Public Television Service to form the Taiwan Broadcasting System, a public broadcasting group. The KMT also claims to have a media reform policy, but many people believe the KMT has influenced the media since it has returned to government in 2008. For example, the KMT sold much of its media to the China Times Group, which supports China identity and the KMT. Under Chen Shui-bian’s media reform policy, according to Freedom House, freedom of the press in Taiwan reached a peak in April 2008 when Taiwan was ranked 32nd in the world and 1st in Asia (Freedom House 2008); but it regressed to 48th in the world in 2011 and 2nd in Asia under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency (Freedom House 2011). In democratized Taiwan, the ruling party cannot directly control the media, but the DPP and the KMT still have attempted to influence the media and their coverage particularly in the area of national identity. After the first transition of power in 2000, the Taiwan identifying DPP employed many means to promote Taiwan identity in state media. For example, the DPP government appointed many Taiwan identity persons to serve as the leaders of the Central News Agency (CNA), the Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV), the Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS) and the Radio Taiwan International (RTI) and these persons promoted Taiwan identity through managing these media. According to interviews, the former President of CNA, Su Cheng-ping 蘇正平, used the term “Taiwan-U.S. relations (Taimei guanxi 台美關係)” instead of “Chinese-U.S. relations” (Zhongmei guanxi 中美關係) in the coverage of the Central News Agency (Su Cheng-ping 蘇正平 2009). In an interview, the former General Manager of TTV, Hu Yuan-hui 胡元輝, stated that the Taiwanese language could help foster Taiwan identity and he thus decided to air Hoklo speaking dramas during prime time. Previously, TTV only broadcast Mandarinspeaking dramas (Hu Yuan-hui 胡元輝 2009).37 The former Chairman of TBS, Cheng Tung-liao 鄭同僚, also appointed by the DPP government, claimed that he requested the Chinese Television System Corporation (CTS), affiliated to TBS, to play Taiwanese soap dramas instead of foreign soap dramas (Taiwan Broadcasting System Foundation 2009). In addition, the former Director of 37

These Hoklo dramas included “The Gangster Professor” (Liumang jiaoshou 流氓教授), “Homesickness” (Wangxiang 望鄉) and “The Empire House” (Jiangshanliou 江山樓).

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RTI, Cheryl Lai 賴秀如, said in an interview that the Central Broadcasting System (Zhongyang guangbo diantai 中央廣播電臺) altered its name to “Radio Taiwan International” in 2003 to further its claim to be Taiwan’s official radio station (Lai 2009). In addition, the DPP government set up the first Hakka TV station, Hakka Television Station (Hakka TV) in 2003 and it became a part of TBS in 2007. In 2005, the DPP government established the first TV station for aborigines, Taiwan Indigenous Television (TITV), and it also became a part of TBS. Finally, the Hoklo-speaking news program of the Public Television Service (PTS) also started to broadcast from 12:30-13:00 and 18:00-19:00 every day beginning on March 3, 2008. In short, the birth of these television stations and news programs in languages other than Mandarin Chinese demonstrated the intention of the DPP Chen Shui-bian government to construct a Taiwan identity through the building of Taiwan’s local languages. After the KMT returned to power in 2008, the KMT continued the Hakka and the Indigenous TV stations as well as the Hoklo news program. However, the China identity Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 government also wanted a return of a China identity among these state media. For example, the Ma Ying-jeou government suggested using the term “visit China” (fanghua 訪華) instead of “visit Taiwan” (fangtai 訪台) to report a foreign official visiting Taiwan in June 2008 right after Ma’s inauguration as President of the Republic of China on Taiwan on May 20 (Li Chia-fei 李佳霏 2008). Therefore, the Central News Agency also started using “visiting China” instead of “visiting Taiwan” in its coverage. For instance, CNA used “visiting China” to report news of an official Japanese goodwill mission’s visit to Taiwan on June 18, 2008. In addition, in February 2011 Ma Ying-jeou further changed the common practice in Taiwan of referring to China as “China” to “the Mainland” for all governmental institutions and documents (Taipei Times 2011). To sum up, these events indicate that both the DPP and the KMT had the same intention of influencing state media’s coverage regarding national identity after democratization. Their intentions showed up in the terms used, the changed names of media outlets, and in the programs of Taiwan native languages. Concluding Remarks Unlike the period of martial law, democratization gave people in Taiwan freedom to advocate their own national identity. The Taiwanization policies of the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian governments also facilitated the growth of Taiwan identity. Surveys in Taiwan show a steady increase in the prevalence of

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Taiwan identity along with a strong decrease in China identity. Today, most Taiwanese people consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The changes in national identity of Taiwanese people have also led to changes in media market shares of pro-China and pro-Taiwan media. Along with the growth of Taiwan identity, Taiwan identity gave the Taiwan identity media an opportunity to increase their market share. In contrast, the fall of China identity has impacted on the market share of the China identity media. Figures for both newspaper circulations and TV ratings point to a remarkable change in the newspaper market and in the diversity of national identity of TV news channels. Many China identity news media such as the United Daily News and the China Times, which continued with the same message of national identity from the martial law period, gradually lost their huge lead in market share. Conversely, some Taiwan identity newspapers increased their market share along with the growth of Taiwan identity, e.g. the Liberty Times and the Taiwan Daily. Despite the closing of Taiwan Daily in 2006, this Taiwan identity newspaper increased its market share after it transformed into a Taiwan identity medium from its previous China identity stance in 1996. The rise of the Liberty Times impacted other Taiwan identity newspapers, e.g. the Independent Evening Post. Consequently, the Liberty Times became the largest newspaper during the late 1990s. The rise of the pro-democratic, but politically neutral Apple Daily impacted the other three big newspapers – the Liberty Times as well as the United Daily News and the China Times – with the Apple Daily developing a very substantial market share. The electronic news media showed diversity in national identity beginning in the early 1990s. Many underground radio stations rose as Taiwan identity broadcasters, challenging the KMT’s broadcasting monopoly. Secondly, many illegal cable TV stations further served to break the KMT’s dominance in TV channels in the early 1990s; however, they became business cable TV systems after legalization. Thirdly, Taiwan’s extraordinary penetration of cable TV with a figure of 81.6 per cent of households gave the 24-hour cable news channels importance. TV ratings of both the free-to-air news programs and the 24-hour cable news channels indicate that both are important to Taiwanese people and that the Taiwan identity news channels have grown since the 1990s. Due to the importance of media in constructing national identity, both the DPP and the KMT powers attempted to embed their national identity in the state media. Because of democratization, neither party when in power could directly regulate the media’s portrayal of national identity, especially among privately-owned media. Under democratization, the diversity of national identity in Taiwan’s media reflected the variety of voices on the issue of national

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identity among the people of Taiwan. The following two chapters will explore in-depth this construction of national identity in the China identity media and in the Taiwan identity media.

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China Identity Media In contemporary Taiwan, people normally identify media as China identity through the terms they use to refer to China. As this chapter shows, the relationship between the media and national identity is not simple. Nevertheless, looking at how a medium refers to China is a good place to start. China identity media in Taiwan present both the Republic of China (ROC, the official country name of Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China as parts of China. These media refer to the People’s Republic of China as “the Mainland” (Dalu 大陸) or “Mainland China” (Zhongguo Dalu 中國大陸) instead of China (Zhongguo 中國), the term which most countries use to refer to the PRC. The terms “Mainland” and “Mainland China” were used to refer to China during the martial law period. In this national identity discourse, Taiwanese people are considered Chinese. The China identity media, especially newspapers, oppose Taiwan Independence, but not all of them support unification because most Taiwanese people oppose unification with China. The China identity media also use the term Neidi 內地 (inner land) to refer to China, especially in entertainment news as many Taiwanese singers and actors have worked and performed in China and Hong Kong. Using the term Neidi to refer to the Chinese Mainland became commonplace in Hong Kong after its return to China in 1997. The Chinese government prefers Hong Kong people to use Neidi. For example in 1998, the Hong Kong superstar Leon Lai 黎 明 used the term “Mainland” in a TV interview in China. The anchorman immediately told Lai that as someone from Hong Kong he should use the terms Neidi to refer to Mainland China and Neidiren 內地人 (people of the inner land) to refer to people in Mainland China (Minsheng Daily News 1998). In fact, Neidi is an official title for Mainland China. For instance, residents in both Hong Kong and Macau who want to visit the Mainland have to apply for a “‘Neidi’ Travel Permit for Hong Kong and Macau Residents” (Gang’ao jumin laiwang “neidi” tongxingzheng 港澳居民來往 “內地” 通行證). The use of Neidi in Hong Kong implies that Hong Kong is a peripheral, yet constituent, part of China, much as Taiwan was in relation to Japan during the Japanese colonial period. Hence, to use this term in the context of the relationship between China and Taiwan degrades Taiwan to a local part of China like Hong Kong. As such, the Taiwan identity media refuse to use this term.1 1 Many Taiwanese condemn the term Neidi as degrading to Taiwan. Thus, more and more Taiwanese argue that the Neidi 內地 (literally meaning the “inner land”) of Taiwan is Nantou © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004227699-006

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The term Neidi has historical connotations in Taiwan beyond Hong Kong and its entertainment scene. During the Japanese colonial period, Japan was also called内地, pronounced Naichi in Japanese, in an effort to degrade Taiwan as a periphery of the Japanese colonial empire. Neidi was then used in Taiwan to refer to the Mainland during the 1945-1949 civil war period when the KMT regime controlled both Taiwan and large parts of China. In an interview, Jung Fu-tien 戎撫天 said that he first heard this term during his childhood in the 1950s, but never heard it again until the early 2000s (Jung Fu-tien 戎撫天 2011).2 This is because the KMT regime had no interest in denigrating the territory it controlled as periphery to the “real China” controlled by the Communists. Since the mid-1990s, China identity media often use “fundamentalist faction” (jibenjiaoyi pai 基本教義派) to describe Taiwan Independence supporters while Taiwan identity media do not use such a negative term to refer to unification supporters.3 Different China identity media adopt different attitudes toward China identity. These attitudes vary between an extreme proPeople’s Republic of China view to those that have both pro-Taiwan and China identity content. Newspapers such as the United Daily News and the China Times, which continue their strong China identity from the authoritarian period, especially show their China identity in their editorials. Both the United Daily News and the China Times have remained China identity media since the lifting of martial law, but each has constructed a different China identity since democratization. In contrast, though the TV news stations may have an inclination toward China identity, the owner’s relations with politicians or political power also influences a medium’s stance on national identity. This chapter examines how, in what ways, and to what extent the major China identity media have promoted or constructed a China identity. This chapter first discusses the development of political connections of the owners of the United Daily News Group, the China Times Group and four electronic media such as TVBS, CTi, the Eastern Broadcasting Company and ERA 南投 County, not China, in order to condemn those entertainers who go to China (Hsu Chienjung 許建榮 2004). Nantou County is located at the center of Taiwan and is the only county in Taiwan that does not border on the sea or ocean. 2 Jung Fu-tien worked in the United Daily News in 1976-1989 and served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Capital Morning Post in 1989-1990. Between 1990 and 1999, he was the Executive Vice Editor-in-Chief of the China Times. In 1999-2006, he worked for the Eastern Broadcasting Company and has served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Want Daily since 2009. 3 For example, on December 6, 1994, the United Daily News implied that the swearing of Taipei City Mayor Chen Shui-bian in front of the ROC national flag was a failure of the Taiwan Independence fundamentalist faction (United Daily News 1994a).

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Communication Corporation. Then, a further analysis of news topics related to national identity in the media follows. As a rule, we can distinguish two main reasons for constructing a China identity in these media: (1) the preference of the media owner determines the national identity of a medium and (2) business factors such as obtaining business or benefits from Taiwan’s ruling parties and even from the Chinese government. Newspapers The United Daily News The United Daily News (Lianhebao 聯合報) is a typical example of a newspaper that promotes the owner’s China identity. The UDN has consistently carried out the will of founder Wang Ti-wu 王惕吾 in promoting a strong China identity despite decreasing market share as the rise of Taiwan identity has gathered pace. The United Daily News and its affiliated newspapers, United Evening News (Lianhe wanbao 聯合晚報), Economic Daily News (Jingji ribao 經濟 日報), Minsheng Daily News (Minsheng bao 民生報) and Star Daily News (Xingbao 星報), strongly articulate the concept of the Chinese nation and advocated ultimate unification with China. Many indicators demonstrated its strong China identity after democratization. The simplest and most important one was the relationship between Lee Teng-hui and the UDN after the early 1990s. The UDN started to advocate unification with China and regularly praised Lee Teng-hui in the early 1990s as Lee then claimed that Taiwan is a part of the Chinese nation. However, the UDN began to criticize Lee’s relations with the Taiwan Independence Movement from late 1992. In October 1992, the UDN reported with a major headline the speech of Li Ruihuan 李瑞环, a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, on preventing Taiwan’s independence by all available means including “bloody action” (Yi Hsing 易行 1992). In fact, Li Ruihuan did not say these words (Tsai Han-hsuan 蔡漢勳 2011). The proTaiwan Independence Taiwan Association of University Professors (TAUP) then launched an activity to “Reject UDN, Save Taiwan” (Tuibao jiu Taiwan 退 報救台灣) as TAUP considered the UDN to be the CCP’s mouthpiece to threaten Taiwan.4 Consequently, the UDN lost considerable market share after this boycott (Tsai Han-hsuan 蔡漢勳 2011). The UDN Editor-in-Chief, Huang

4 The United Daily News reported Li Ruihuan’s speech on October 30, 1992, and TAUP launched this activity on November 23, 1992.

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Nien 黃年,5 believed that Lee Teng-hui cooperated with TAUP to launch this activity against the UDN. Huang Nien argued that Lee Teng-hui at a KMT CSC meeting condemned the UDN for threatening the Taiwanese people and, later, Lee also said to a visitor in the Presidential Office that he no longer read the UDN. Huang Nien claimed that the pro-Taiwan Independence organizations cooperated with Lee Teng-hui to launch this activity to boycott the UDN (Ho Jung-hsing 何榮幸 2008). After the establishment of the pro-unification Chinese New Party (CNP) in 1993, the UDN supported the Chinese New Party. During the initial period of the Chinese New Party, Editor-in-Chief Huang Nien distributed Chinese New Party member cards to all UDN staff. During the 1994 and the 1995 elections, the UDN Group became a mobilization center for the Chinese New Party against Lee’s KMT and the DPP (Chen Li-hung 陳立宏 2009). The construction of China identity in the UDN occurred in many ways. First, the UDN strongly supported the One-China Principle, which meant that both the People’s Republic of China (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) belonged to one-China. Secondly, the UDN argued that all people of China and Taiwan belonged to the Chinese nation and were also the descendants of the Yan Emperor and the Yellow Emperor. Thirdly, the UDN strongly opposed Taiwan Independence. Fourth, the UDN always connected Taiwan and China through history and culture in order to argue Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Fifth, with the economic growth of China, the UDN sometimes tried to utilize Cross-Strait economic relations to link Taiwan and China. Finally, the UDN demonstrated its China identity in its manner of dealing with some political issues. From the perspective of a strong China identity, the UDN urged “unification” in 1990. However, in 2010 the UDN changed Taiwan’s “connection to China” to be in the future as the UDN did not support unification with the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party regime. The proprietor of the UDN, Wang Shaw-lan 王效蘭, the daughter of Wang Ti-wu, made clear her national identity in an interview, “I don’t consider myself Taiwanese. I am Chinese.” She also believed that if “Mainland China” had freedom of the press and democratic liberty, Taiwan and “Mainland China” could begin to discuss unification (Pilling 2012).

5 Huang Nien served in many important positions in the United Daily News from 1975. From the early 1990s, he wrote more than 4,000 editorials in the United Daily News. Huang Nien is the most important person at the United Daily News in the discourse on national identity.

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The Chinese Nation The Chinese nation was a core notion of the authoritarian KMT regime during the martial law period. After democratization, with the growth of Taiwan identity, fewer and fewer media promoted China identity, but the UDN continued promoting the concept of the Chinese nation. When dealing with issues of the Chinese nation, the UDN often considered important events in China to be also events for the “Chinese” in Taiwan. In 1989, the UDN condemned the Chinese Communist Party for the Tiananmen Square Massacre, asserting this was a great calamity for the Chinese nation. The UDN appealed to Chinese all over the world to support their Chinese compatriots who strove for freedom and democracy in China (United Daily News 1989a). In late 1989, the democratic movement in eastern Europe impressed the world and the UDN raised Taiwan as a democratic example to implore the CCP to launch democratic reform in order to build a greater China for the whole Chinese nation (United Daily News 1989b). On October 10, 1990, the national day of the Republic of China, the UDN claimed that the foundation of the Republic of China was to fight for the Chinese nation and to establish a rich, independent, unified and democratic China. In the same editorial, the UDN advocated overthrowing Communism so as to build a democratic and unified China. The UDN also attacked Taiwan Independence with a claim that Taiwan Independence defied the history and the will of all Chinese (United Daily News 1990b). Under democratization, the advocacy of Taiwan Independence was no longer a taboo for Taiwanese. On October 13, 1991, the opposition DPP congress approved a so-called “clause of Taiwan Independence” to advocate the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan. The UDN quoted coverage and criticisms of overseas Chinese newspapers, e.g. the Sing Tao Daily (Hong Kong), the Hong Kong Economic Times, the Macao Daily News, and even the official Chinese People’s Daily, to condemn the DPP for betraying the Chinese nation (United Daily News 1991a). Later, the UDN further argued that Taiwan Independence not only defied the Chinese nation but also infuriated the Chinese Communist Party causing it to be prepared to attack or blockade Taiwan (United Daily News 1991c). During the early 1990s, the statements of both Lee Teng-hui and Jiang Zemin that related to the Chinese nation often concerned the UDN. Prior to Lee Tenghui’s moving toward a Taiwanization policy, the UDN also praised Lee Tenghui’s address on the Chinese nation. For instance, the UDN applauded Lee’s speech on building a new age for the Chinese nation and also his statement that Taiwan could not break its relationship with the whole Chinese nation (United Daily News 1992c). On May 20, 1992, the UDN praised Lee for his iden-

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ti­fying with China, the Chinese nation and its culture, as well as expressing its appreciation for his advocacy of the unification of China. Furthermore, the UDN applauded Lee’s negation of Taiwan Independence and his claim that Taiwan and Mainland China were inalienable parts of China (United Daily News 1992b). The UDN also reported Lee’s address in relation to the Chinese nation involving his censure of Taiwan’s independence movement as separatism from the Chinese nation (United Daily News 1992a). After Jiang Zemin’s “Eight Point Proposal”6 for Taiwan in January, 1995, the UDN responded and praised Jiang’s address saying that both sides should ponder the future of the Chinese nation through peaceful means and unification as well as arguing that “one-China” was a “cultural China” and a “unified democratic China” (United Daily News 1995a, 1995b). After Lee Teng-hui raised his so-called “Six Points”7 to respond to Jiang Zemin’s “Eight Point Proposal,” the Economic Daily News contended that Lee’s statement was to protect the Republic of China and to refuse Taiwan Independence. The Economics Daily News thus expected Lee’s statement to break the deadlock in Cross-Strait relations (Economics Daily News 1995). After the mid-1990s, as China opposed Taiwan’s tilt toward Taiwan Independence and as Taiwan identity increased, conflicts between Taiwan and China gradually increased. Owing to the UDN’s opposition to Taiwan Independence, the UDN frequently employed China’s many threats to warn the Taiwan Independence Movement. For instance, during the Taiwan Strait Crisis of March 1996, the UDN not only remonstrated against China’s military exercises, but also claimed that China’s action was a warning against Taiwan Independence. The UDN also advised China to refrain from launching military exercises for the sake of the future of the Chinese nation (United Daily News 1996b). After Deng Xiaoping’s death in 1997, the UDN considered his death to be a turning point for Cross-Strait relations and for Chinese all over the world. The UDN encouraged all Chinese to ponder the future of the Chinese nation and believed that Chinese worldwide could see the coming of a non-communist and democratic China in the future following the death of the strongman (United Daily News 1997a). In July 1999 in an interview with Deutsche Welle, Lee Teng-hui defined the relationship between Taiwan and China as being a “Special State-to-State” relationship. Criticisms in the United Evening News condemned Lee Teng-hui for revealing his pro-Taiwan Independence stance. Critics said that Lee Teng-hui moved his identity from the Chinese nation toward “New Taiwanese” with an 6 For details, please refer to http://english.cri.cn/2238/2005-3-23/[email protected]. 7 For details, please refer to http://csis.org/files/media/csis/programs/taiwan/timeline/sums/ timeline_docs/CSI_19950408.htm.

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inclination to Taiwan Independence. Critics also argued that the growth of Taiwan consciousness instigated separatist intentions to establish a new nation distinct from the Chinese nation (Yen Chih-ching 嚴智徑 1999a, 1999b). Since the UDN considered Chen Shui-bian a Taiwan Independence supporter, it consistently criticized Chen for betraying the Chinese nation. The UDN argued that even though Taiwan Independence supporters intended to establish a new country, these supporters should not deny the fact that they were the descendants of the Yan Emperor and the Yellow Emperor (United Daily News 2005a). Chen Shui-bian claimed “One Country on Each Side” to describe the relationship between Taiwan and China in 2002. Afterward, Chen often repeated his statement “One Country on Each Side” and supported the use of “Taiwan” instead of the “ROC” to refer to Taiwan’s country name. The UDN thus pressed Chen not to renounce the Chinese nation. The UDN also suggested that Chen insist on a policy of “One Country on Each Side” using the ROC instead of Taiwan so that he did not undermine the principle of a Chinese nation (United Daily News 2005a). After Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election in 2008, the UDN yet again criticized former Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian as well as their links to Taiwan Independence. On Double Ten Day 2010, the UDN condemned both former presidents for transforming Taiwan consciousness, which grew under democratization, into awareness of Taiwan Independence. Meanwhile, the UDN praised the Republic of China as being the first democratic republic of the Chinese nation and claimed that the Republic of China was a democratic China (United Daily News 2010g). When the Republic of China entered its 100th year in 2011, the UDN denounced Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian’s route to Taiwan Independence and tried to convince the Taiwanese people to recognize the Republic of China and to develop peaceful relations with the People’s Republic of China. The UDN also suggested that the Republic of China could be a democratic model for the Chinese nation (United Daily News 2011g). After Taiwan’s democratization, when dealing with political issues, the UDN normally praised the Chinese nation, and the democracy of the Republic of China, while condemning Taiwan Independence. In doing so, the UDN used history, culture, language and even bloodline to preach the Chinese nation to the Taiwanese people. From the perspective of history, the UDN propagandized “the unification of China is the destiny of history” (United Daily News 1990f). The UDN also said that the “5,000-year history” of China displayed a story of the “separation and unification” of the Chinese nation, and claimed that Chinese regarded unification as normal and separation as abnormal (United Daily News 1994b). In 1995, the 100th anniversary of the end of the Japan-Qing War and the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, the UDN

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asserted that Taiwanese shared the same 100-year history of tragedy with the Chinese nation, and argued that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China (United Daily News 1995c, 1995d). The UDN saw the Understanding Taiwan textbooks as being local Taiwan history textbooks, and it criticized the proTaiwan camp’s intention to construct a Taiwanese nation consciousness (United Evening News 1994; Yen Chih-ching 嚴智徑 1997). In the aspect of culture and language, the UDN stressed that the native Taiwanese languages – Hoklo and Hakka – were “dialects” (fangyan 方言) of the Chinese language, and claimed that Taiwanese culture was an extended part of Chinese culture (United Daily News 1991b). Therefore, the UDN argued that Taiwan Independence supporters could not be independent from China as they use Chinese characters, Chinese family names and Chinese languages (United Daily News 2011d, 2011e, 2011f).8 The UDN also regarded Taiwanese religion as a part of Chinese culture. It argued, for example, that once Taiwanese claimed Taiwan to be a country independent from China, Confucius, Kuan Kung 關公, the Jade Emperor (Yuhuang dadi 玉皇大帝) and Matsu 媽祖 would all suddenly become foreigners (United Daily News 1992d).9 The UDN stated that Taiwan Independence supporters could not de-Sinicize Taiwan in the same way that the Taiwanese could not obliterate Matsu, Kuan Kung, the Dragon Boat Festival and the Mid-Autumn Festival from Taiwanese culture. The discourse of UDN also implied even if Taiwan claimed Taiwan Independence, Taiwanese were still Chinese as the Taiwanese people could not forsake the Chinese culture and gods from China (United Daily News 2007a, 2011a). These illogical arguments from the UDN on the relationship of culture and politics were especially absurd because many Mainlanders, including Chiang Kai-shek, were Christians. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the UDN’s strong China identity. Kinship was another tie to the Chinese nation in the UDN’s discourses. For instance, the UDN condemned Taiwan Independence supporters for using the DNA research of Dr Marie Lin 林媽利 to argue the difference between Taiwanese and Chinese. On November 18, 2007, Dr Marie Lin presented this research at an international conference in Taiwan. Dr Marie Lin’s research on the DNA of non-aboriginal Taiwanese showed that 85 per cent of non-aboriginal Taiwanese have aboriginal DNA and that Taiwanese are more Austronesian than Chinese in terms of genetics. According to Dr Lin’s research, the comparative study of Human Lymphocyte Antigen Haplotype between Chinese Hok­kien and non-aboriginal Taiwanese indicated that 58 per cent of Molecular 8 The UDN insisted that aboriginal languages were Chinese languages. 9 Kuan Kung, the Jade Emperor and Matsu are popular gods in traditional Taiwanese religion.

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Haplotype Genes of non-aboriginal Taiwanese originated from Taiwanese aborigines or Southeast Asian island ethnic groups, and 42 per cent of Molecular Haplotype Genes were from South China (Marie Lin 林媽利 2007). The UDN condemned the pro-Taiwan camps for using such findings to prove Taiwanese were not Chinese, and claimed that bloodline-ism had resulted in tragedy and hatred in human history (referring to the Nazi genocide against the Jews) (United Daily News 2007c). However, the UDN later contradicted itself by arguing that Taiwan Independence supporters could not de-Sinicize Taiwanese because of their blood and yellow skin (United Daily News 2011e). The One-China Principle and Political Issues The UDN promoted China identity through connecting the One-China Principle to ongoing political issues such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, the “Special State-to-State” relationship in 1999 and the Anti-Secession Law in 2005.10 The UDN blamed both Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan Independence supporters for causing the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The UDN responded to Lee Tenghui’s statement of being “a Taiwanese with dignity” (you cunyan de Taiwan ren 有尊嚴的台灣人) and to the criticisms against the pro-unification camp of many Taiwan Independence supporters by saying that they should not label some organizations or people in Taiwan as being confederates of the Chinese Communist Party.11 The United Evening News also argued that the problem of people’s confusion over their national identity resulted from the leadership of Lee Teng-hui (United Evening News 1996b). The UDN agreed with the viewpoint of Minister for Foreign Affairs Frederick Chien 錢復 when analyzing the reason for the Taiwan Strait Crisis saying there were four causes of the missile crisis: (1) President Lee’s visit to the U.S., (2) the rise of Taiwan Independence, (3) the intervention of the U.S., (4) the direct election of the presidency. The UDN further argued that Lee Teng-hui supported Taiwan Independence and this resulted in the missile crisis (United Daily News 1996c). The UDN believed that these factors contributed to the Chinese military exercise against Taiwan and that the most important factor was Taiwan Independence. Also, the UDN 10

11

The ruling DPP government used the term “Anti-Separation Law” instead of Anti-Secession Law in order to note the fact that Taiwan has never been a part of the People’s Republic of China. In the 1990s, many Taiwan identity organizations such as the Taiwan Association of University Professors and the Foundation For Nation-Building (Taiwanese: Chhòng-kok ki-kim-hoē 創國基金會) condemned both pro-China identity and unification camps for speaking on behalf of China.

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utilized the military exercise and quoted the statements of the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily to warn Taiwan Independence supporters (United Daily News 1996a, 1996b; United Evening News 1996a). When Lee Teng-hui defined relations between Taiwan and China as a “Special State-to-State” relationship in July 1999, the UDN condemned Lee Tenghui’s inclination to Taiwan Independence and criticized his statement for challenging the CCP’s One-China policy (United Daily News 1999c, 1999d; Yen Chih-ching 嚴智徑 1999a, 1999b). Owing to the close economic relations between Taiwan and China, the UDN believed Taiwan had to maintain its ties with China under the One-China Principle to help the Taiwanese economy and thought that Lee Teng-hui’s tilt toward Taiwan Independence would break the relations between China and Taiwan. The UDN argued that the Lee Tenghui government should pay the cost of the impact on Taiwan’s stock market and the loss of Taiwanese opportunities to invest in the Mainland China market (United Daily News 1999d). The UDN cited editorials of the New York Times entitled “Taipei Rocks the Boat,” “Trouble Over Taiwan,” and “Tension Over Taiwan” to censure Lee Tenghui’s “Special State-to-State” statement (United Daily News 1999a, 1999b). In August 2002, when Chen Shui-bian claimed there was “One Country on Each Side” of the Taiwan Strait in his speech to the annual assembly of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations,12 the United Evening News examined Chen Shui-bian’s intention to inherit the road to Taiwan Independence from Lee Teng-hui and believed that it would damage Taiwan’s economy (United Evening News 2002). The Economics Daily News contrasted the supposed damage which the Lee and Chen stance on sovereignty had done to Taiwan’s economy with the economic achievements of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo (Economics Daily News 2002). When the People’s Republic of China was proposing the Anti-Secession Law in early 2005, the UDN insisted that this was aimed at stopping Taiwan Independence and recognizing the status quo of the Cross-Strait relationship as one-China (United Daily News 2005b). After the PRC enacted the Anti-Secession Law, the DPP and many organizations launched a protest against the AntiSecession Law. To respond to this protest, the United Evening News insisted that it would be a rally of Taiwan Independence. The United Evening News also suggested that the Anti-Secession Law aimed only at Taiwan Independence and not at the Republic of China owing to the One-China Principle (United Evening News 2005a, 2005b).

12

The World Federation of Taiwanese Associations held this annual assembly in Tokyo and Chen Shui-bian delivered this speech to the assembly through the Internet.

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Most importantly, the UDN repetitively argued that Cross-Strait conflicts stemmed from Taiwan Independence and that Taiwan Independence would damage Taiwan’s economy. For example, the United Evening News claimed that the Taiwan stock market only fell a little on the day of the PRC passing the Anti-Secession Law; however, the stock suddenly dropped by 92 points the next day, when the DPP launched a reaction against the law (United Evening News 2005a).13 In fact, neither drop was significant, but the UDN repeatedly employed the same misleading argument to threaten Taiwanese by means of economic issues and the stock market index.14 After one million people rallied against the Anti-Secession Law in Taipei on March 26, 2005, the UDN again argued that this demonstration was a Taiwan Independence activity and condemned Chen Shui-bian’s Taiwan Independence advocacy as causing the enactment of the Anti-Secession Law (United Daily News 2005c).15 In other words, the UDN condemned supporters of Taiwan Independence, the DPP and even those Taiwanese people who dislike China, but the UDN did not criticize the CCP for using the Anti-Secession Law to threaten Taiwan. In the early 2000s, the ruling DPP launched the “Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign” (Taiwan zhengming yundong 台灣正名運動) to change the term “China” into “Taiwan” in the names of some state-run businesses. For example, in 2002, the DPP government made advances in replacing the terms “China” or “Taipei” with the term “Taiwan” on official documents. In 2003, the Foreign Ministry issued passports with the word “Taiwan” in English on the cover. In the same year, the state-run Radio Taipei International became Radio Taiwan International. 13

14

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In fact, when the PRC enacted the Anti-Secession Law on March 14, 2005, the index of the Taiwanese stock exchange dropped by 48.72 points with a closing quotation of 6155.51 points. The next day, March 15, the index of the Taiwanese stock exchange fell by 92 points with a closing quotation of 6063.48 points. For instance, the editorial of Economic Daily News on March 18, 2008 said that if China identity Ma Ying-jeou won the forthcoming election, Taiwan’s economy and stock market would be boosted despite the world’s economy already going down. This editorial also argued that if the pro-Taiwan Independence DPP won, it would not only impact the relationship of Taiwan-China but also further damage Taiwan’s economy and stock market (Economics Daily News 2008). However, after Ma Ying-jeou won the election and the falling of both Taiwan’s economy and stock market, the editorial of Economic Daily News on January 4, 2009 said that the stock market was a gamble and it was not the Ma Ying-jeou government’s duty to save the stock market (Economics Daily News 2009). The DPP cooperated with some Taiwan identity societies to launch this rally. This rally established a Taiwan record for the largest rally in a single city (Apple Daily 2005; Huang & Huang 2005).

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In 2007, the state-owned Chunghwa 中華 [Chinese] Post become Taiwan Post, the state-run “China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC)” changed its name to “CSBC Corporation, Taiwan.” The United Evening News deplored the Name Rectification Campaign, and claimed it was a “de-Sinification” policy of the ruling DPP. The United Evening News also quoted comments from the U.S. saying that the U.S. government rebuked this policy owing to the possibility that it would cause tension between Taiwan and China (United Evening News 2007a, 2007b).16 The UDN further connected the Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign to the Taiwan Independence Movement saying that Chen Shui-bian and the DPP were advocating “de-ROC” behind the mask of “de-Sinification.” The UDN viewed the ROC as the essence of the true being of Taiwan in order to condemn the ruling DPP for destroying Taiwan through de-Sinification (United Daily News 2007b). On the 100th birthday of the Republic of China, the UDN praised those Chinese in China who were keen to discuss the Revolution of 1911 (Xinhai geming 辛亥革命) and the foundation of the Republic, about which the people in Taiwan were not interested. The UDN argued that for two decades, under the administrations of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the national identity of Taiwanese people had deviated from China identity. The UDN said, under Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, that Beijing had accepted Ma Ying-jeou’s OneChina Principle and the “1992 Consensus” (Jiu’er gongshi 九二共識) and that this had rectified national identity to a China identity (United Daily News 2011b). After Ma Ying-jeou won re-election in 2012, the UDN believed the key to Ma’s victory was the “1992 Consensus” and the One-China Principle which many businessmen strongly supported (United Daily News 2012b). After KMT honorary chairman Wu Po-hsiung 吳伯雄 suggested to Chinese President Hu Jintao the idea of “One Country, Two Areas” (Yiguo liangqu 一國兩區) to define the Cross-Strait relationship on March 22, 2012, the UDN published four editorials, between March 24 and March 30, to echo “One Country, Two Areas” and praised this idea as it would help both the PRC and the ROC maintain the One-China Principle (United Daily News 2012a, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e). The UDN also argued that this concept of the “One China, Two Areas” would secure peace across the straits and help the economies of both sides. As a whole, the UDN repeatedly referred to the health of Taiwan’s economy as a rationale for its arguments in dealing with national identity and the 16

On February 9, 2007, the U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack rebuked Chen’s Name Rectification Campaign and said that the U.S. did not support changes in terminology for entities administered by Taiwan authorities or any administrative measure to unilaterally change Taiwan’s status quo toward Taiwan Independence.

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One-China Principle. Any political movement or statements related to Taiwan identity displeased the UDN, and the UDN always argued that the Taiwan identity policies of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian would threaten Cross-Strait peace and damage Taiwan’s economy. In other words, the UDN believed that only the One-China Principle could maintain peace across the Straits and therefore help Taiwan’s economy. From Peaceful Unification to Connection In November 1990, the UDN published a series of editorials promoting peaceful unification with China. The UDN proclaimed that the One-China Principle and unification were the faith and goal of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait as well as being the will of Chinese all over the world. The UDN urged that “unification in peace” was an irreplaceable consensus for Chinese on both sides of the strait. The UDN believed that democratic Taiwan provided a model for constructing a modern and wealthy China in the future. Not only did the UDN condemn separatism in Taiwan, but it also criticized the failure of Communism in China. The UDN thus declared, “we at United Daily News insist on ‘one-China’ and ‘unification,’ and thus speak for both twenty million people in Taiwan and one billion, one hundred million people in China” (United Daily News 1990f). The UDN argued it was proud to be a part of the Chinese nation. It said that Chinese in Taiwan showed economic achievement and democracy to the world and that Chinese in Mainland China demonstrated sporting power to the world. The UDN praised the unification of Germany and expected unification for Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The UDN asserted that Chinese glory, such as Taiwan’s economic achievement and democracy and China’s sporting achievement, should be shared by all Chinese (United Daily News 1990d). The UDN urged three points for unification: (1) separation was abnormal, unification was normal, (2) unification must be peaceful and (3) peace must be maintained before unification (United Daily News 1990d). The UDN believed that there was a cultural difference between Taiwan and China; the UDN thus advocated modernizing the Chinese culture in China to provide the same Chinese culture as a basis for unification (United Daily News 1990c). Owing to the CCP insisting on “One China, Two Systems,” which Deng Xiaoping proposed in 1981, the UDN suggested not unifying by “One China, Two Systems,” but by a democratic unification under Chinese culture. The UDN once again emphasized its mission to speak for the Chinese and for peaceful unification and it also suggested that both sides could promote cultural interchange and economic cooperation as first steps toward future unification in accord with the

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One-China Principle (United Daily News 1990e). This series of editorials promoting unification echoed the official Chinese Xinhua News Agency, China News Service and People’s Daily. The PRC official media responded to the UDN by praising its stance opposing separatism and urging peaceful unification (United Daily News 1990a). Yet, in 2010 the UDN altered its stand from “unification” with “Mainland China” to “connection” (Lianjielun 連結論) with “Mainland China.” The UDN said that the Editor-in-Chief Huang Nien had visited the Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, Natale Bellocchi, in the U.S. in 1990 and Huang Nien responded to Bellocchi’s question on the Cross-Strait relationship with the “Theory of Chopsticks” (Kuaizi lilun 筷子理論) (United Daily News 2011c). Huang Nien argued that one-China consisted of both Taiwan and China like a pair of chopsticks because one chopstick alone does not work. The UDN said that Huang Nien’s talk about the Theory of Chopsticks later became the UDN’s main discourse on the Cross-Strait relationship (United Daily News 2011c). After the KMT China-centric President Ma Ying-jeou came to power, relations between Taiwan and China moved closer than ever. The UDN praised the first two years of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration for improving Cross-Strait relations and argued that the development of the Cross-Strait relationship after mid-2008 was the most positive and most rapid for sixty years. The UDN argued that there was no way that Taiwan could become independent, and that the ROC’s one-China constitution also provided a foundation for unification under the One-China Principle. The UDN warned that the PRC’s One-China Principle and unification policy could destroy the ROC. Therefore, the UDN suggested piloting a new scheme which made a connection between the ROC’s oneChina constitution and the PRC’s One-China Principle (United Daily News 2010c). As the UDN did not believe that Taiwan and China could unify by peaceful means in the foreseeable future, the UDN suggested maintaining the peaceful status quo by adhering to the One-China Principle. Thus, the UDN urged a “connection” to link to China’s One-China Principle instead of “unification.” The UDN claimed that there was only one-China in the world, and that both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China were parts of China, and that both the sovereignty and territory of China were inalienable (United Daily News 2010a). To practice this new scheme of the One-China Principle, the UDN suggested that both sides maintain the One-China Principle, that Taiwan not become a puppet of a foreign power, that neither side be hostile to the other and so on. The UDN also quoted a poll about Taiwan’s future under the Cross-Strait relationship which showed that the most people in Taiwan did not want to

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unify with China.17 Therefore, the UDN urged both sides to adopt a pilot “Ongoing One-China Principle” under which both the ROC and the PRC belonged to an ongoing one-China. The UDN urged that it was better not to unify in the foreseeable future, but to adopt a scheme of “connection” instead of “unification” (United Daily News 2010b, 2010d). Analyzing the contexts of the UDN’s discourse demonstrates that the UDN did not believe the CCP would democratize itself and the UDN also thought that the Taiwanese people did not support unification with China even as the pro-unification Ma Ying-jeou came to power. However, the UDN did not give up its strong China identity, so it promoted the idea of “connection” to China. The Concern for Chinese Democracy After the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, UDN kept raising the issue of Chinese democracy. Two decades later, when the UDN stance on the OneChina Principle should have been welcomed by the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Great Firewall blocked the UDN website on some political issues in 2010 and 2011 because of the UDN’s continued concern about Chinese democracy.18 For example, the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee in October 2010 awarded the prize to imprisoned Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 for his long-term struggle for Chinese fundamental human rights and democracy. The UDN reported details of Liu Xiaobo’s story, his advocacy of Charter 08 and praised Liu Xiaobo’s contribution to Chinese human rights advocacy and democracy. The UDN argued that Liu’s Nobel Peace Prize and the spirit of the Charter 08 echoed the pursuit of political reform by hundreds of millions of Chinese including CCP leaders Peng Dehuai 彭德怀 and Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 extending back for more than sixty years (United Daily News 2010e). The United Evening News also suggested that the Nobel Peace Prize was an inspiration to reform the CCP and argued that unrest would be caused if the CCP refused to adopt political reform (United Evening News 2010b). In response, the Chinese government blocked the UDN website from around mid-October 2010 until mid-January 2011. 17

18

According to the UDN poll revealed on September 11, 2010, 31% of Taiwanese people supported Taiwan Independence, 51% supported to maintaining the status quo forever, while only 14% agreed with unification, and 4% chose not to respond (Li Chih-te 李志德 2010). Of the four main Taiwanese newspaper websites (Liberty Times, Apple Daily, UDN & China Times), China only allowed Chinese Internet users to access the UDN website before 2008. However, under international pressure during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China allowed access to the three other newspaper websites. After the Beijing Olympics, China once again restricted access, only allowing access to the UDN and the China Times websites.

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The United Evening News believed that the Taiwanese people did not take notice of Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize. The United Evening News argued that the five city mayoral elections in Taiwan attracted more attention from Taiwanese people than did this international issue. The United Evening News also believed that the empty chair of Liu Xiaobo at the Nobel Ceremony aroused the world’s concern over human rights in China as many foreign media organizations reported it (United Evening News 2010a). In addition, the UDN reported and criticized China for awarding a ridiculous Confucius Peace Prize to Honorary Chairman of the KMT Lien Chan 連戰 in opposition to the Nobel Peace Prize (Lin Tsung-sheng 林琮盛 & Tien Ssu-yi 田思怡 2010). The UDN further argued that the Nobel Peace Prize should be a triumph for all Chinese, but Beijing censored the Internet and suppressed dissidents (Lin Tsung-sheng 林琮盛 & Li Chih-te 李志德 2010). The United Evening News finally showed its impatience with the CCP. The United Evening News criticized the fact that nineteen ambassadors did not attend the Nobel Ceremony as a result of Chinese pressure and that the CCP placed some 200 dissidents into household confinement during the period. The United Evening News thus argued that the democratization of China was a “walk to the moon,” a metaphor meaning that it would be a long way to democracy (United Evening News 2010c). Another two political incidents also caused the Chinese to block the UDN website. Between late February and late March 2011, the Chinese authorities blocked the UDN website for a number of days owing to its reporting of the Chinese Jasmine Revolution. In early April 2011, the Chinese authorities arrested a famous human rights activist, artist Ai Weiwei 艾未未, and this incident also attracted the attention of the UDN. For several days, the Chinese government once again blocked the UDN website owing to its criticisms and coverage of this incident. On December 10, 2011, the United Evening News took Liu Xiaobo, Ai Weiwei and the Jasmine Revolution in North Africa and the Middle East as examples to suggest the Chinese authorities push for democratic reform (United Evening News 2011). These incidents showed the UDN’s concern for Chinese democracy. On the other side, although the UDN is strongly concerned about democracy, Chinese nationalism is the supreme principle for the UDN. For instance, both Tibet and East Turkistan reject kinship with Han Chinese. But the UDN still claims both as parts of the Chinese nation and questions the intentions of the supporters of the Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer in Taiwan. The UDN asserts that Taiwan Independence supporters intend to conspire with Tibet and East Turkistan separatists to be independent from China (United Daily News 1993, 1997b). As a result, the UDN has even said that the Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer should not be allowed to visit Taiwan (United Daily News 2009a,

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2009b). In other words, the UDN considers Tibet and East Turkistan to be inseparable part of China despite the fact that both Tibetans and Uyghurs are non-Han Chinese ethnic groups. The UDN’s stance toward both Tibet and East Turkistan suggests that the UDN does not really support democracy as it puts Chinese nationalism and China identity ahead of democracy. The China Times The China Times Group of Yu Chi-chung 余紀忠 used to include the China Times (Zhongguo shibao 中國時報), the China Times Express (Zhongshi wanbao 中時晚報) and the Commercial Times (Gongshang shibao 工商時報). In 2002, the China Times merged with CTi TV (Zhongtian dianshi 中天電視). In 2005, it further merged with China TV (Zhongshi 中視) and the Broadcasting Corporation of China (Zhongguang 中廣), which the KMT had owned, to become a media conglomerate with newspaper, TV and radio holdings.19 After Tsai Eng-meng 蔡衍明 took over the China Times Group in 2008, the group began to publish the Want Daily (Wangbao 旺報) in 2009 and the online English Want China Times in 2010.20 Because of Tsai Eng-meng’s close relations with the Chinese authorities, the China Times has not criticized the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party regime since 2008. Under Yu Chi-chung, the China Times was more liberal in its views and more critical in its coverage of China than the China Times under Tsai. Yu’s China Times was similar to the United Daily News as a newspaper that followed the owner’s identity. Tsai’s China Times is a quintessential example of how business considerations from China influence Taiwan’s media. Tsai’s China Times is apparently trying to please Beijing because of his business in China and his relationship with Beijing. The Yu Family and the China Times Comparing the coverage of the United Daily News and the China Times, the China Times was more liberal than the United Daily News before 2008. Owing to its friendliness to the opposition during the 1980s and the 1990s, President Chen Shui-bian visited the founder of the China Times, Yu Chi-chung, twice in the hospital when Yu was dying in 2002 (Huang Ching-lung 黃清龍 2009b). Huang Ching-lung believes that Yu Chi-chung’s belief system combined liberalism, realism and Chinese nationalism (Huang Ching-lung 黃清龍 2009b). 19 20

In December 2006, the China Times Group sold the Broadcasting Corparation of China to former Chinese New Party Secretary-General Jaw Shao-kong 趙少康. Tsai Eng-meng is a Taiwanese businessman who started to invest in China in 1989, when most countries boycotted China because of the Tiananmen Square Massacre.

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Thus, the China Times put forward a China identity in editorials because of its commitment to Chinese nationalism. According to an interview with a senior editor of the China Times, the China Times allowed articles discussing Taiwan Independence on its open page, the Times Forum, but no Taiwan Independence or separatist views were allowed in regular columns and editorials.21 Being a Chinese, Yu Chi-chung’s lifetime wish was to run a “really Chinese newspaper” in China. Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基,22 the former chief editorial writer of the China Times, said that the ambition of Yu Chi-chung was to run a “real” China Times publishing in Shanghai, China. Therefore, he first published the China Times Weekly (Zhongshi zhoukan 中時週刊) in Hong Kong in 1992-1995 to try to publish in China, though his experiment failed in the end (Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). Around 1994-1995, Yu Chi-chung sent Tu Nien-chung 杜念中, who later became the Publisher of Apple Daily during 2003-2012, to Shanghai to negotiate with the Chinese authorities so as to publish a professional financial newspaper or magazine, but this negotiation also failed (Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). As a China identity newspaper, the China Times showed its position toward national identity in many political issues. In addition, Yu Chi-chung’s concept of the Confederation of Greater China, considered below, also showed the attitude of the China Times toward unification. Chinese Nation, One-China Principle and Political Issues When the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 shocked the world, China Times journalist Hsu Tsung-mao 徐宗懋 was shot by the PLA in Tiananmen Square.23 To condemn the CCP’s brutality, the China Times Express published a special edition entitled “National Mourning” to express grief over this tragedy (China Times Express 1989). The China Times said that the slaughter of Chinese intellectuals effectively had killed the Chinese nation. The China Times argued that it was an unbelievable tragedy that these young Chinese intellectuals were killed by soldiers of the Chinese nation. Finally, the China Times accused the leaders of the CCP of being the transgressors of the Chinese nation (China Times 1989). 21 22

23

The writer conducted this interview in Taipei on November 9, 2009. Yu Kuo-chi was the Editor-in-Chief of the Taiwan Times in the mid-1970s and later Editorin-Chief of the Taiwan Daily until 1978. He was invited by Yu Chi-chung to serve as the Editor-in-Chief of the China Times U.S. Edition in the U.S. in 1982-1984 and became the chief editorial writer of the China Times between the late 1980s and 1996. Between 1992 and 1995, Yu was also the Publisher of the China Times Weekly. From 1996, Yu served as the Executive Deputy Publisher of the Liberty Times. Hsu Chung-mao was shot in the neck. Fortunately, he soon recovered.

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The former deputy Editor-in-Chief of the China Times, Poe Ta-chung 卜大中, said in an interview that before the mid-1990s, the China Times strongly opposed the CCP. However, the founder Yu Chi-chung slightly adjusted his attitude toward China from around the mid-1990s (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2011). According to Poe Ta-chung and Yu Kuo-chi, The China Times cooperated with a Chinese enterprise to invest in the cement industry. Yet, this business failed and some Chinese defrauded the capital of the China Times (Poe Tachung 卜大中 2011; Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). Due to the China Times being a medium of influence in Taiwan, the CCP ordered another enterprise to return the capital to the China Times. As a consequence, the China Times altered its standpoint toward the CCP to express gratitude to the CCP (Poe Ta-chung 卜 大中 2011). Poe Ta-chung cited an instance to express Yu Chi-chung’s change in attitude. Poe’s article in the China Times said that Taiwan could launch a missile aimed at Beijing because of the missile threat from China during the Taiwan Strait Crisis (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 1996). However, Yu Chi-chung was dissatisfied saying that China would be unhappy that such an editorial had been published (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2011). In addition, because of Lee Teng-hui’s inclination toward Taiwan Independence, the China Times from the mid-1990s also changed its views so as to criticize Taiwan Independence and to urge unification because of Yu’s strong China identity and dissatisfaction with Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwan identity. Poe Ta-chung also argued that Yu Chi-chung dared to express his personal feelings against Mr Democracy – President Lee Tenghui, but Yu did not dare to express dissent against both Chiangs during the martial law period (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2011). After the Chinese missile exercises during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, the China Times gradually altered its editorial criticisms to target Taiwan Independence instead of the CCP. The China Times argued that Taiwan Independence was adding fuel to the “flame of Chinese nationalism.” In other words, the China Times believed that the Chinese military exercises resulted from Taiwan Independence rather than from Chinese nationalism. In addition, the China Times sided with the PRC as fellow patriots, suggesting that Taiwan not “collaborate against China with any foreign power.” The China Times expressed thanks to Western countries for concern about Taiwan’s security, but put forward the view that Cross-Strait issues were issues for Chinese only and that they should only be resolved by Chinese (China Times 1996b). The China Times also expected the CCP to comprehend the significance of the first direct election for the presidency of the ROC, saying that the election was the path to democracy for the Chinese nation (China Times 1996a). From this perspective,

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the China Times regarded Taiwan’s first direct presidential election as a symbol for the Chinese nation’s democracy. In 1999, the China Times responded to Lee Teng-hui’s statement of “Special State-to-State” relations by condemning Lee as being the “ringleader” of Taiwan Independence who caused the Cross-Strait crisis since the United States did not support Lee’s statement. The China Times also argued that the impact of Lee’s statement was worse than the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996. The China Times, like the United Daily News, quoted coverage from the U.S., which criticized Lee’s statement. The China Times said that Lee’s statement had angered both the Chinese authorities and the U.S., and asserted that Lee’s statement would impact both the Cross-Strait relationship and the Taiwan-U.S. relationship (China Times 1999). As Yu Chi-chung believed that Lien Chan supported China identity, Yu Chichung supported him in the 2000 presidential campaign. Yu Chi-chung also said that Lien Chan told him during the 2000 presidential campaign that he would not need to change the title of the China Times after unification (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2011). Before election day, Yu Chi-chung believed that Chen Shui-bian would be the winner of the 2000 presidential election, and so Yu requested the China Times to alter the tone of its discourse after the election (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2011). After Chen Shui-bian became president, the China Times praised Chen’s inaugural address during which he said that he would not declare Taiwan Independence or change the name of the country, among other promises, during his term. The China Times further expressed its appreciation for Chen’s talk about the people of Taiwan and China as belonging to the same bloodline, history and culture in response to the national identity sentiments of people in China (China Times 2000). However, the China Times began to condemn Chen for his pro-Taiwan Independence stance in 2002 when Chen’s Shui-bian made his statement of “One Country on Each Side” to define the Cross-Strait relationship. Not waiting for the response from Beijing, the China Times immediately condemned Chen’s declaration for its negative impact on Taiwan’s national security, accusing him of betraying the promises in his inauguration speech as well as the One-China Principle contained within the Constitution (China Times 2002a, 2002b). The China Times further criticized Chen’s One Country on Each Side statement as being worse than Lee Teng-hui’s Special State-to-State speech (China Times 2002c). In 2005, when Beijing proposed the Anti-Secession Law, the China Times argued that the Constitution of the ROC suggests Taiwan and the Mainland belong to one-China (China Times 2005b). In fact, the ROC Constitution does not include any one-China provision. But the China Times said that the

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Taiwanese people uphold this one-China constitution and thus cannot consider “secession.” The China Times further argued that the PRC should not neglect the existence of the ROC, and the newspaper expected the CCP to understand that the ROC was the best arrangement for the Taiwanese people in terms of national identity (China Times 2005b). The China Times utilized the ROC to try to convince the PRC, but it also used the ROC to criticize Taiwan Independence. It argued that the only way to love Taiwan was to love the ROC. The China Times also said that Taiwanese compatriots invested in China from 1987 because they belong to the Chinese nation.24 Finally, the China Times condemned Taiwan Independence for betraying the ROC and argued that Taiwan Independence would cause the PRC’s military to invade Taiwan (China Times 2005a). After the demonstration by one million people against the Anti-Secession Law, the Commercial Times criticized the rally saying that there were few national flags and it was not a rally representing all Taiwanese people. The Commercial Times further criticized this rally for being a pro-Taiwan Independence activity contravening the ROC Constitution with its One-China Principle (Commercial Times 2005). That is to say, the China Times believed that the enactment of the Anti-Secession Law should be attributed to Taiwan’s separatism – Taiwan Independence – rather than the existence of the ROC, which the PRC has constantly negated. In addition, the China Times opposed the “Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign.” The China Times criticized Chen Shui-bian for being incompetent in ruling Taiwan and maintained that he launched de-Sinification to satisfy his personal ideology and that of Taiwan Independence Movement supporters. The China Times also cited criticisms from the U.S. which, in its views, condemned Chen’s foolishness in crossing the red line of Taiwan Independence (China Times 2007a). These criticisms by the China Times showed it to be anxious about the DPP’s de-Sinification. Additionally, the China Times claimed that the CCP would suppress Taiwan everywhere regardless of what titles Taiwan used because the CCP considered Taiwan to be an inseparable part and a province of China. Consequently, it recommended that nothing be done in relation to the title of the ROC or of Taiwan so as to maintain the status quo (China Times 2007b). The discourse of the China Times, like the United Daily News, strove to maintain the status quo under the One-China Principle. The Concept of the Confederation of Greater China The founder of the China Times, Yu Chi-chung, started to mention the idea of a Confederation of Greater China (Da Zhonghua banglian 大中華邦聯) from 24

Actually, they invested to earn money.

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the mid-1990s and he officially advocated this concept at a speech at National Central University in April 1999.25 Yu Chi-chung said that he had kept his faith in Chinese nationalism since high school. Yu asserted that he remained concerned about the Cross-Strait relationship because the future of Taiwan, whether one of unification or of independence, would impact upon the Chinese nation. He argued that the people on both sides of the strait were Chinese and the people of both sides should keep the faith of China identity. Yu contended that both sides had reached a great achievement in economics and both sides should comprehend the political difference between Taiwan and Mainland China. Because Taiwanese people did not accept “One Country Two Systems,” Yu Chi-chung suggested a Confederation of Greater China for the unification of both sides. Yu believed that a Confederation of Greater China could maintain the status quo between both sides as well as inherit Chinese culture. He also argued that a Confederation of Greater China conformed to the CCP’s insistence on the One-China Principle (Yu Chi-chung 余紀忠 1999). After this statement on a Confederation of Greater China, Yu Chi-chung visited Jiang Zemin in Beijing on May 18, 1999. Yu Chi-chung spoke with Jiang Zemin for 110 minutes on China’s future at this meeting. During the meeting, Yu Chi-chung suggested to Jiang Zemin that both sides should build the market of greater China and the Confederation of Greater China (Commercial Times 2002). The discourse of the China Times on China identity and Yu’s ambition to publish a newspaper in China so as to make the China Times became a true China Times showed Yu Chi-chung’s strong China identity. Most importantly, the concept of a Confederation of Great China, which Yu Chichung officially proclaimed in 1999 just three years before his death, demonstrated his ultimate goal of the future of the Cross-Strait relations under the special political circumstances between Taiwan and China. Tsai Eng-meng and the China Times After Tsai Eng-meng, tycoon of the Want Want Group, took over the China Times Group in November 2008 and re-named it the “Want China Times Group,” there was controversy over the unusual relationship between the Chinese government, Tsai Eng-meng and the Want China Times Group. Poe Tachung says that a venture of Next Media, which publishes the Apple Daily, had intended to purchase the China Times Group for approximately ten billion Taiwan dollars (more than US$300 million). Next Media spent several months 25

Yu Chi-chung entitled his speech“Ideas and practice during the past 50 years: A newspaperman’s witness to history” (Wushi’nianlai de li’nian yu shijian: Yige baoren wei lishi cunzheng 五十年來的理念與實踐: 一個報人為歷史存證) (Yu Chi-chung 余紀忠 1999).

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calculating the value of the China Times Group and examining its financial statements. However, just before the deal was to go ahead, Tsai Eng-meng suddenly called the owner of the China Times Group, Yu Chien-hsin 余建新, the son of Yu Chi-chung, offering to purchase the China Times Group for double the price offered by Next Media (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2011). Tsai Eng-meng obtained ownership of the China Times Group for 20.4 billion Taiwan dollars on November 3, 2008 (Chao Chih-ling 趙芷菱 2009). Many have questioned whether the Chinese government was involved in financing Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the China Times Group. Several sources have indicated that the Chinese government has repeatedly tried to purchase Taiwanese media to influence the Taiwanese people. According to Tung Li-wen 董立文, a huge amount of capital from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, totaling US$300 million, was transferred to Taiwan and Hong Kong from China in 2007 with the goal of purchasing Taiwanese media (Tung Li-wen 董立文 2011). Thus, Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the China Times Group created many doubts in Taiwan about the role of China in his purchase. In 2009, Tsai Eng-meng also acknowledged that he knew the Taiwan Affairs Office had commissioned agents to purchase the China Times Group, but Tsai denied he was the agent (Tien Shih-hao 田世昊 2009). Despite Tsai’s denial, some sources pointed to the close relationship between Tsai Eng-meng and the Chinese authorities. The Chinese government’s industrial subsidies for the Want Want China demonstrated Want Want’s close relationship with the PRC. In 2011, Want Want China received a subsidy of US$47 million dollars, accounting for 11.3% of its annual net profit, from the Chinese government.26 According to an interview with a senior Taiwan government official, the Publicity Department of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu 中國共產黨中央委員會宣傳部) became involved in Tsai’s purchase of the China Times Group.27 This senior government official further said in an interview that, according to an unidentified source, the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee did not want to see Next Media take over the China Times Group. Therefore, the Publicity Department ordered the Taiwan Affairs Office to intervene. The Taiwan Affairs Office cooperated with a senior KMT leader to convince Tsai Eng-meng to purchase the China Times Group. Some other stories demonstrate Tsai’s close relationship with the Chinese authorities. Some two weeks after Tsai’s purchase of the China Times Group, 26 27

See The Economist http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576680new-book-lays-out-scale-chinas-industrial-subsidies-perverse-advantage. The author conducted this interview in Taipei on January 9, 2012.

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on November 16, 2008, Tsai Eng-meng gave orders to the senior managers of the China Times Group to support strongly the Ma Ying-jeou administration, to clear up misunderstanding between Taiwan and China and to avoid discussing unification and independence in media of the China Times Group. However, these senior managers interpreted Tsai Eng-meng as saying that the China Times Group must suppress Taiwan Independence (Chen Mien 陳免 2008:8). One month after Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the China Times Group, on December 5, 2008, Tsai visited the director of the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang Yi 王毅, in Beijing to report his success in buying the China Times Group and to relate his intention to improve the development of Cross-Strait relations (Lin Hsing-fei 林幸妃 2009). According to an interview with a former senior editor from the China Times, in early 2009 Tsai Eng-meng said at an editorial meeting that “suppressing” the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 was necessary and that even the Americans would have done so. Tsai further said that the Tiananmen Square “Massacre” was just the propaganda of Western countries.28 The informant argued that Tsai’s point of view on the Tiananmen Square Massacre was the same as the Chinese authorities. Later, the informant indicated that Tsai had also implied that the China Times could not discuss the issues of Tibet and East Turkistan. During the negotiation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), Tsai gave an order that the China Times could not report or publish any news or comment against either the ECFA or the 1992 Consensus.29 According to this informant, in early 2009 Dr. Hung Tsai-lung 洪財隆 published an article in the China Times to criticize ECFA (Hung Tsai-lung 洪財隆 2009).30 As this article dissatisfied Tsai Engmeng, the China Times did not allow Hung to publish any further articles on ECFA. The informant concluded that the China Times editors self-censored with regard to China-related issues. On August 11, 2009, the China Times Group began publishing a business newspaper providing comprehensive coverage of China. The President of the Want Daily, Huang Ching-lung 黃清龍, said in an interview that he suggested the China Times publish a special issue dealing with Chinese affairs on the weekend and that Tsai Eng-meng then decided to issue a new newspaper concentrating on Chinese affairs (Huang Ching-lung 黃清龍 2009b). The first issue of the Want Daily announced that the market of the Mainland is both a 28 29 30

The author conducted this interview in Taipei on August 14, 2012. The initial term for ECFA was the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). The Ma Ying-jeou government re-named it ECFA in late February 2009. Hung Tsai-lung later became the Director of the Department of China Affairs of the DPP in August 2012.

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challenge and also an opportunity for Taiwan. According to an interview with a senior journalist in the Central News Agency, President Ma Ying-jeou believed that the pro-Taiwan identity English-language Taipei Times has great influence in the Western world and Ma Ying-jeou hoped for another voice to “balance” the Taipei Times.31 The informant believed that it was Ma Ying-jeou’s idea to publish an English-language Want China Times. On October 2, 2010, the China Times Group thus began publishing an online English-language newspaper, the Want China Times, to report news of “Greater China” including Taiwan. The Want China Times stated that the content of its news was “Taiwanese spirit, Chinese (Huaren 華人) perspectives and global vision” (Li Tsung-you 李宗祐 2010). This statement tying Chinese perspectives and Taiwanese spirit showed the intention of the Want China Times to connect Taiwan and China. Some other indicators also illustrate the unusual relationship between the China Times Group and the Chinese authorities. First, despite its announcement of being based on “Taiwanese spirit,” according to the same interviewee above, a remarkable amount of the Want China Times news items were drawn from the English edition of the official Chinese Xinhua News Agency. The Want China Times seems to be a representative of the Xinhua News Agency in Taiwan. Second, another anecdote about the Want Daily also indicates the influence of China on the China Times Group. The Want Daily publishes a daily feature, “Today’s History across the Strait,” On June 4, 2010, this feature discussed a story of June 4, 1983 on Taiwan and a story of June 4, 1985 from China. But no mention was made of the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989. This edition of the Want Daily aroused many criticisms on the Internet with the Internet users condemning the Want Daily for concealing the Tiananmen Square Massacre in China. Another indication in Chinese cyberspace of the relationship between the Chinese authorities and the Want China Times Group was that Chinese in China could access its website. We should note that China blocked Taiwan’s major news websites including the China Times website and only opened its cyberspace to the UDN website prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. After the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China blocked both the Apple Daily and the Liberty Times websites. In contrast to the Chinese authorities’ prohibition of the UDN website following its reports on Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei in 2010 and 2011, China opened its cyberspace for the China Times. China only blocked the China Times website during the second Chinese Jasmine Revolution in late February 2011. This suggests that China approved of the discourses and coverage of the China Times on Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei. The China Times did report the 31

The author conducted this interview in Taipei on April 19, 2011.

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news about Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei, but it neither criticized the Chinese government nor did it urge democracy for China, while the UDN did both in coverage and editorials. Many criticisms were made in Taiwan condemning the China Times for pandering to China. For example, in January 2010 the China Times unexpectedly discharged Hsia Chen 夏珍 from his position as the Editor-in-Chief because of a headline on December 26, 2009. This headline quoted a Taiwan official’s remark that the PRC’s Chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, Chen Yunlin 陈云林, was unimportant in China. President Ma Ying-jeou expressed his disagreement with this characterization of Chen and the Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation of Taiwan, Chiang Pin-kun 江丙坤, also apologized for this statement. Evidently, according to other reports, this report infuriated the Chinese authorities. According to the Apple Daily, both Tsai Eng-meng and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC were enraged by the article and, as a result, the China Times dismissed Editor-in-Chief Hsia Chen (Hsu Pei-chun 徐佩君 et al. 2010). This incident demonstrated China’s influence over the China Times, but this was not an isolated case. According to an interview with a senior journalist, a China Times journalist finished a travelogue about China and sent it to the editor for approval. However, the editor asked the journalist to obtain approval from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC instead.32 Business, which the Chinese authorities provided to the China Times Group, was also a controversial issue in Taiwan. The Chinese authorities published certain types of advertisements in the form of news coverage (zhiruxingxinwen 置入性新聞; embedded advertising or advertorials) in Taiwanese media. The Control Yuan member Frank Wu 吳豐山, in November 2010, made an investigation that confirmed China’s advertorials in the China Times were in violation of Taiwan’s legal regulations. In fact, examples of such advertorials could be found in both the China Times and the UDN (Shih 2010; Tzou 2011). Informants indicated that the Want China Times Group was actually the agent helping the Chinese authorities to place embedded advertising in Taiwan’s media.33 Although the China Times and the Want China Times Group denied these allegations, they provided no evidence in their defense. In March 2012, the Governor of China’s Fujian Province, Su Shulin 苏树林, visited Taiwan and the China Times reported details of Su Shulin’s visit. New Talk (Xintouke 新頭殼) revealed a China Times document, “2012 Propaganda Plan of the Governor of Fujian Province’s Visit to Taiwan” (Erlingyi’er Fujian sheng shengzheng fantai xuanch32 33

The author conducted this interview in Taipei on April 19, 2011. The writer conducted these interviews in Taiwan on April 14, April 19 and July 26, 2011.

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uan jihua 2012 福建省省訪台宣傳計畫), and made a detailed report about this propaganda plan and the coverage of the China Times, but the China Times still denied this. The Fujian Province authorities, however, admitted that this was a matter between the Fujian Province authorities and the Want China Times Group (Lin Chau-yi 林朝億 2012). Finally, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairwoman, Lai Shin-yuan 賴幸媛, confirmed New Talk’s coverage in the Legislative Yuan (Chen Hung-chin 陳虹瑾 2012) and the China Times was fined NT$400,000 by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Chang Chin-hwa 張錦華, a professor at National Taiwan University, said that “the China Times accepted embedded advertising from the Chinese government and has a reputation for always publishing good news about China and leaving out the bad” (Jang Show-ling 鄭秀玲 2011). Chang Chin-hwa thus argued, “it was the darkest moment for freedom of speech in Taiwan” (Taiwan yanlunziyou zuihei’an de shike 台灣言論自由最黑暗的時刻) (Tai Chihchuan 戴智權 2011). The Want China Times Group even sued the media academics who criticized the Want China Times Group. In an interview with the Liberty Times, Chang Chin-hwa said that the China Times presented advertorials paid for by the Chinese government as “news” and also served as an agency for the Chinese authorities to help China to buy “news” in the United Daily News, which were illegal activities according to Taiwan’s regulations. Chang Chin-hwa was also concerned that the purchasing of “news” by the Chinese authorities would make Taiwanese media a megaphone for China so as to propagandize Chinese official ideology and to control news coverage in Taiwan. Chang Chin-hwa further connected these Chinese embedded advertisings to Hu Jintao’s idea of media warfare against Taiwan which involved “Entering the Island [of Taiwan], Entering the Household and Entering the Mind” (rudao ruhu ruxin 入島 入戶 入心) (Tzou Jing-wen 鄒景雯 2011). Hu Jintao’s idea was a unification strategy against Taiwan through Chinese propaganda in Taiwan’s media. In light of the revelations about the Want China Times Group, it is entirely possible that the China Times is one means through which Hu’s idea of propaganda permeating through Taiwan has been put into practice. On January 20, 2012, the Washington Post published an interview with Tsai Eng-meng conducted by its Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Andrew Higgins. In this interview, Tsai Eng-meng said that when he saw the famous picture of the Tiananmen Square Massacre “tank man,” “I realized that not that many people could really have died.” Tsai also responded to a question about the discharge of Editor-in-Chief Hsia Chen saying that the reason was he “hurt me by offending people, not just mainlanders.” Tsai also believed that China “is very democratic in lots of places” (Higgins 2012). Tsai’s statements, however, infuriated many academics in Taiwan. Consequently, more than 17 societies,

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dozens of academics and more than 600 activists called for a boycott of the Want China Times Group (Luo Wei-chih 羅暐智 & Su Sheng-yi 蘇聖怡 2012).34 In addition, Tsai Eng-meng told the Washington Post that “whether you like it or not, unification is going to happen sooner or later,” and “I really hope that I can see that.” Thus, Tsai has displayed his strong identification with the PRC. Tsai Eng-meng’s interview with the Washington Post, the self-censorship of the China Times, the question of Chinese capital in Tsai’s purchase of the China Times, Tsai’s report to Wang Yi, the propaganda role of the China Times in the Fujian governor’s visit to Taiwan, and the role of the Want China Times Group in placing Chinese advertorials in the China Times and the United Daily News have aroused considerable criticism in Taiwan. The Apple Daily argued that the Want China Times Group is brainwashing Taiwanese people and propagandizing the CCP’s political ideology in Taiwan. Thus, the Apple Daily has criticized the Want China Times Group as serving as an agent for Beijing to fulfill the CCP’s will to “unify” Taiwan (Apple Daily 2012a; Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2012). In conclusion, evidence indicates that after Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the China Times Group in late 2008, the newspaper altered its position regarding China, changing its discourse and political identity so as to please the Chinese government. As such, the Apple Daily’s criticisms that the China Times has become part of the Chinese propaganda effort in Taiwan are persuasive. News Television Stations TVBS TVBS is an interesting medium in terms of national identity as it has passed through two distinct phases. TVBS has three channels in Taiwan – TVBS, TVBSN (news) and TVBS-G (entertainment). Chiu Fu-sheng 邱復生35 and Li Tao 李 濤 were two key persons in TVBS. Politically, Chiu Fu-sheng kept a good relationship with Lee Teng-hui, but Li Tao strongly supported the pro-unification Chinese New Party in the 1990s (Chen Hao 陳浩 2011; Liao Fu-shun 廖福順

34

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Wang Dan 王丹, a leader of the Chinese democratic movement in the Tiananmen Square in 1989, was the first to urge for a boycott of the Want China Times Group on his Facebook page on January 23, 2012. Chiu Fu-sheng was a Hakka born in Pingtung, Taiwan in 1947. He graduated from the Political Warfare Cadres Academy. He was elected to the KMT CSC in 2009 and again in 2011.

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2011).36 Before 1999, TVBS was mainly managed by the chairman, Chiu Fusheng. Under Chiu Fu-sheng’s administration, TVBS also produced pro-Taiwan consciousness content as a strategy to expand market share. However, Chiu Fu-sheng started investing in another TV channel, ERA, in 1998, distancing himself from TVBS and finally withdrawing from TVBS in 2002. After Li Tao became manager of TVBS in 1999, TVBS started to lean toward China identity. Initiated in 1993, TVBS was Taiwan’s first cable TV station. It set up a 24-hour news TV channel, TVBS-N, in 1995. Nowadays, most Taiwanese people consider TVBS to have a China identity channel owing to the terms it uses to refer to China and because of its two popular programs, “2100 All People Talk” and “News Nightclub” (Xinwen yezonghui 新聞夜總會), both of which strongly support the Pan-Blue camp. However, in the 1990s TVBS appeared to be concerned more with Taiwan consciousness than the three free-to-air TV channels then in existence. TVBS was originally founded with Hong Kong capital, the Hong Kong-based TVB, owning most of the TVBS shares,37 while some shares belonged to Chiu Fu-sheng. In the 1990s, TVBS was operated by Chiu Fu-sheng and Li Tao. Chiu Fu-sheng served as the chairman of TVBS until 2003 and sold his shares in 2005.38 Chen Hao argues that Chiu Fu-sheng was a smart businessman.39 Chiu used Li Tao’s “2100 All People Talk” to be close to the Chinese New Party and Mainlanders and Chiu himself also maintained a close relationship with Lee Teng-hui in order to obtain political support from Lee Teng-hui (Chen Hao 陳 浩 2011). In addition, during the mid-1990s, Chiu Fu-sheng also kept good relations with Ma Yung-cheng 馬永成, a key staff member of Chen Shui-bian. As a result, Chiu Fu-sheng’s strategy successfully helped TVBS attract both China and Taiwan identity audiences and grow in Taiwan’s electronic media market in the 1990s. In addition, Chiu’s strategy also helped TVBS obtain sponsorships and advertisements from the central KMT government, the local DPP governments and the political parties. 36 37

38 39

Li Tao firmly supported the Chinese New Party in the early 1990s and later supported the KMT after 2000. According to sources, the Malaysian businessman Robert Kuok 郭鶴年 held 30% share of TVBS, but soon withdrew from TVBS. Robert Kuok also invested in Hong Kong TVB in the early 1990s. Currently, according to the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan, the shares of TVBS are held by the Hong Kong company, but registered in Bermuda. Chen Hao was the Director of the News Department of TVBS in 1997-2002 and later became the Executive Deputy General Manager of CTi.

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Many stories depict the close relationship between Lee Teng-hui and TVBS owing to Chiu Fu-sheng. First of all, according to former senior journalist and anchor of TVBS news, Chen Ya-lin 陳雅琳, the News Department cooperated closely with the pro-Lee Teng-hui Liberty Times to share news sources in 1992. Chen Ya-lin did not say in the interview when TVBS ended this cooperation with the Liberty Times (Chen Ya-lin 陳雅琳 2011). Another incident indicated TVBS’s special relations with Lee Teng-hui. In 1994, at a formal press conference in the Presidential Office, Lee Teng-hui asked the journalists “has TVBS come yet?” Commentators believed this was a clear indicator of TVBS’s close relationship with Lee Teng-hui (Wu Kuang-chung 吳光中 1995). Moreover, Lee Teng-hui openly praised TVBS more strongly than the three free-to-air TV stations (Chen Yi-mei 陳依玫 2011). Due to TVBS’s good relations with Lee Teng-hui, Lee dubbed a Taiwanese voice-over for the program “One Step, One Footprint, Everyone Loves Taiwan” (Taiwanese: Chi̍t pō͘ chi̍t kha-ìn, ta̍ k-ê ài Tâiôan 一步一腳印 大家愛台灣), a program in the series “Beauty of Taiwan” (Taiwan zhi mei 台灣之美) series in 1995 (Chen Yi-mei 陳依玫 2011; Lang Yaling 郎亞玲 1995).40 The senior staff of TVBS such as Chen Yi-mei 陳依玫 also believed that the reasons for producing programs fostering Taiwan consciousness, e.g. the “Beauty of Taiwan,” the “Love of Taiwan” (Taiwan nianzhenqing 台灣念真 情),41 the “Song of Taiwan” (Taiwan nan’ge 台灣南歌),42 were probably related to Chiu Fu-sheng’s relations with Lee Teng-hui. In addition, when TVBS invited Hu Yuan-hui 胡元輝 to serve as the Editor-in-Chief of the news department in 1996, Chiu Fu-sheng told Hu that TVBS’ news channel would be “Native” (Bentu 本土) (Hu Yuan-hui 胡元輝 2009). After DPP politician Frank Hsieh 謝長廷 lost the vice-presidential campaign in 1996, TVBS invited him to host the program, “Frank’s Talk” (Changting wenqingtian 長廷問青天), which Frank Hsieh did until he decided to run for Kaohsiung City mayor in mid-1997. In contrast, during the 1990s only the “2100 All People Talk” program had a China identity on TVBS. In the main, because of Chiu Fu-sheng’s management of TVBS as well as its popular programs which mainly promoted Taiwanese stories, nature, cul40 41

42

TVBS produced the “Beauty of Taiwan” series from 1995. The particular program was a short documentary on Taiwan’s natural beauty and native Taiwanese people’s stories. TVBS produced the “Love of Taiwan,” hosted by the famous Taiwan identity writer and director Wu Nien-chen 吳念真, from 1995-1998. The “Love of Taiwan” mainly presented native Taiwanese stories, culture and heritage. The “Song of Taiwan” mainly introduced famous old songs of Taiwan. This program was hosted by the famous Taiwan identity singer, Tsai Cheng-nan 蔡振南. TVBS produced this program during 1998-2000.

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ture and songs, TVBS in the 1990s showed its strong commitment to Taiwan consciousness. However, between mid-1999 and 2003, TVBS gradually altered its political orientation as Li Tao, who strongly opposed Lee Teng-hui and the DPP, progressively took over management of TVBS. For example, on June 25, 1999, Li Tao ordered Liao Fu-shun 廖福順 to direct the news committee to replace Chen Yi-mei 陳依玫, who was close to Chiu Fu-sheng (Liao Fu-shun 廖福順 2011). After the major Taiwan earthquake on September 21, 1999, TVBS news and the “2100 All People Talk” both repeatedly attacked the ruling KMT led by Lee Teng-hui. As a consequence, President Lee Teng-hui criticized TVBS at the KMT CSC and asked all in attendance not to watch TVBS (Kung Wei-chun 龔 維軍 1999). TVBS then moved to oppose Lee Teng-hui personally, though it strongly supported the KMT after Lee Teng-hui resigned as KMT Chairman. After the early 2000s, TVBS also leaned politically toward China identity as a consequence of changes within the KMT. Currently, the flagship talk programs of TVBS are the “2100 All People Talk” and the “News Nightclub.” Li Tao hosts the “2100 All People Talk” and his wife, Li Yen-chiu 李艷秋, hosts the “News Nightclub.” Both talk show programs strongly support the KMT and also follow the KMT’s China orientation. Furthermore, TVBS-N also produces a weekly program entitled “China on the Way” (Zhongguo jinxingshi 中國進行式) to cover many different aspects of life in China, especially economic conditions. TVBS-N further focuses on the news of China and covers daily news from China, Hong Kong and even Macau. TVBS still produces a program similar to the Beauty of Taiwan entitled “One Step One Footprint, Discovering New Taiwan” (Yibu yijiaoyin faxian xin Taiwan 一步一腳印 發現新台灣), but this program is not typical for TVBS. During the 1990s, TVBS used the terms “Mainland” or “Mainland China” to refer to the PRC, but this did not cause people to consider TVBS a medium tending to support China identity as such usage was widespread. However, after the early 2000s, more and more people and media outlets used China to name the PRC, but TVBS did not change and even used “Neidi” to refer to China. Accordingly, people came to regard TVBS as being a China identity medium after early 2000s. However, in my observation, TVBS has not shown as much China identity as the UDN and the China Times. In conclusion, TVBS showed Taiwan consciousness during the 1990s owing to Chiu Fu-sheng’s political ties with Lee Teng-hui and market targeting strategy, and inclined to a China identity from mid-1999 owing to the famous “2100 All People Talk” and Li Tao’s relationship with the Chinese New Party and the KMT after Lee Teng-hui resigned as Chairman. Despite many Taiwanese people considering TVBS to be a pro-KMT and China identity medium, many

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academics and senior journalists still consider the news channel of TVBS (TVBS-N) to be the most professional news channel in Taiwan (Lo Shih-hung 羅世宏 2011). Although TVBS currently sides with the KMT and inclines toward the KMT’s China identity, TVBS news still criticizes both the KMT and China. CTi Television The founding of CTi (Zhongtian dianshi 中天電視) was similar to TVBS with Hong Kong businessman Yu Bun-hoi 于品海 establishing CTi Television in 1994. CTi originally operated in Hong Kong and broadcast its programs in Taiwan until Taiwan’s China Trust Group merged with it in 1996. Around 19961997, the China Trust Group relocated the headquarters of CTi from Hong Kong to Taiwan. In 2000, the China Trust Group sold CTi to the Wisdom Group and the China Times Group purchased CTi from the Wisdom Group in 2002. Before 1997, CTi’s national identity was undoubtedly related to the Hong Kong owner’s China identity and CTi retained the same identity between 1997 and 2002 when the China Times Group purchased it. After 2002, CTi’s national identity definitely followed the China Times as CTi had become a part the China Times Group. CTi intended to become a global Chinese-language news channel from its platform in Taiwan. Because the CTi staff were comprised of Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kong people, CTi came to a compromise by agreeing to apply the term “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China so as to differentiate the identity of Chinese people from all other identities throughout the world. This was a pioneering step to officially refer to the PRC as “China” in the Taiwanese media, notwithstanding CTi’s China identity. In addition, very important news items – such as the death of Deng Xiaoping – successfully demonstrated CTi’s endeavor to be a global Chinese news channel as CTi was the first news medium to reveal the death of Deng Xiaoping (Chuang Chia-tai 莊嘉台 2002). Before the early 2000s, CTi tried to project the image of a global Chinese news channel by providing Chinese news to audiences all over the world. But after 2002, the CTi’s coverage largely synchronized with the China Times due to its being a part of the China Times Group. For example, CTi applied the term “Mainland” or “Mainland China” to refer to the PRC instead of using “China” as in the 1990s. After Tsai Eng-meng purchased the China Times Group, CTi realigned itself so as to support China identity even more strongly. Most importantly, nowadays, CTi is no longer a global Chinese news channel. Rather it mixes Taiwan news with more and more China news (Chen Hao 陳浩 2011). Many people criticized CTi’s bias in favor of China’s news and also argue the famous “Sisy World News” (Wenqian de shijiezhoubao 文茜的世界周報) program glorifies China in an extreme way similar to the stance of the China Times.

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In response to these criticisms, the President of CTi, Liao Fu-shun 廖福順, believed that factors determining coverage and the news program of CTi are mainly related to business, and that national identity/ideology is only one of many factors (Liao Fu-shun 廖福順 2011). According to my interpretation of his meaning, he tried to say that the “Sisy World News” and coverage of China could provide an option to audiences who were interested in the Chinese market and news, and this Chinese ideology also conformed to Tsai Eng-meng’s interests in China. In addition, as Taiwan cannot provide enough news for a 24-hour news channel, CTi cooperates with the Al Jazeera of Qatar and Hong Kong-based Phoenix Satellite Television to share news resources (Liao Fu-shun 廖福順 2011). Phoenix Satellite Television is a pro-PRC and anti-Taiwan Independence medium and Phoenix TV always invites pro-unification journalists, politicians and academics to comment on Taiwan’s politics.43 Thus, cooperation with Phoenix TV also shows CTi’s strong China identity in addition to its being a part of the China Times Group. The Eastern Broadcasting Company The founder of the Eastern Broadcasting Company (Dongsen dianshi 東森電 視; EBC), Wang Ling-lin 王令麟, always supported the ruling party before 2006. After the American Carlyle Group took over EBC in 2006, it did not alter its orientation as the Carlyle Group did not control EBC’s coverage or programs. EBC first operated its news channel, EBC-N, from 1997 as a 24-hr news channel and then gradually expanded the number of its other channels. Most Taiwanese people see EBC as being a China identity medium. Wang Ling-lin was a KMT legislator (1989-1992, 1995-2001) and his father, Wang You-tseng 王又曾, was a member of the KMT CSC during 1994-2006.44 Accordingly, the political and national identity of EBC tended to follow Wang Ling-lin’s China identity. Nevertheless, Wang was a pragmatic businessman, and he adjusted the identity orientation for EBC to align more with the ruling party because it was good for business (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2011; Shih Cheng-feng 施正鋒 2011). Chiu Hei-yuan 瞿海源 argues both Wang You-tseng and Wang Ling-lin were supporters of the KMT under Lee Teng-hui’s administration, but both soon tried to win the favor of Chen Shui-bian after 2000 in order to further their 43 44

For example, the Phoenix TV often invites Yin Nai-ching 尹乃菁, Jaw Shao-kong 趙少康 and Shao Tsung-hai 邵宗海 to comment on Taiwan’s politics. In 2007, because of many scandals, Wang You-tseng was wanted by the Taiwanese government, but he fled to China.

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business (Chiu Hei-yuan 瞿海源 2007:181-182). After President Chen Shui-bian came to power in 2000, Wang Ling-lin often suggested to the EBC staff that they promote Taiwan identity, though most of the staff did not follow this suggestion (Wang Shih-chi 王時齊 2009). In order to please Chen Shui-bian, EBC set up a Taiwan identity talk show, “Taiwan Summit” (Taiwan gaofenghui 台灣 高峰會), in 2004 and 2005.45 According to an interview, apart from this talk show, most of the staff tended to support the Pan-Blue and were slightly inclined to China identity.46 On the other hand, according to an anchor from EBC, within both EBC America (Dongsen meizhou tai 東森美洲台) and EBC Asia (Dongsen yazhou tai 東森亞洲台) before 2008,47 the anchor was not allowed to use such terms related to Taiwan’s sovereignty such as “Taiwan’s President,” instead having to use “the leader of the Taiwan area” (Taiwan diqu lingdaoren 台灣地區領導人).48 Both EBC America and EBC Asia target overseas Chinese as well as Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao, and so both TV stations tend to use the terms that the PRC prescribes. As a result, most people in Taiwan considered EBC to be a China identity media because its use of terms is similar to those of other China identity media. After the Carlyle Group took over EBC, the China identity in its news channel continued because the foreign management was not concerned about national identity but only with profit (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2011). ERA Communication Corporation In 1998, the Chairman of TVBS, Chiu Fu-sheng, established the ERA Communication Corporation (Niandai dianshi 年代電視) with his close business partner, Ge Fu-hung 葛福鴻, the director of the entertainment department of TVBS.49 Chiu Fu-sheng turned his attention from TVBS to ERA around 19992000 (Liao Fu-shun 廖福順 2011). Chiu Fu-sheng put business first, trying to balance “blue” and “green” in a similar vein to TVBS. First, Chiu Fu-sheng 45

46 47

48 49

This talk show was hosted by Chou Yu-kou 周玉蔻. Chou Yu-kou, a Mainlander, was a KMT member. She joined the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in mid-2006 and was nominated as a Taipei City Mayor candidate in 2006. However, the TSU issued a three-year suspension of her party membership on December 1, 2006 because they did not agree with her campaign strategy. Finally, Chou Yu-kou returned to the KMT in April 2012. The author conducted this interview in Taipei on November 4, 2009. The interviewee was an anchor at EBC. EBC America, established in 2003, and EBC Asia, established in 2005, are satellite TV stations which broadcast in America and the Asia-Pacific respectively. EBC Asia also broadcasts in Hong Kong and Macao. The author conducted this interview in Taipei on November 4, 2009. The forerunner of ERA was GOGO TV operating from 1996 to 1998.

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invited both the famous “green-friendly” news anchor Lai Hsiao-chun 廖筱君 and “blue-friendly” news anchor Chang Ya-chin 張雅琴 to host news programs. Second, Chiu Fu-sheng invited the famous Taiwan identity Wang Penhu 汪笨湖 to host a program in 2002 and serve as an executive of ERA. However, Chiu also asked Hu Chung-hsin 胡忠信 to host another political talk show and serve as executive of ERA in 2004 in order to balance the politics.50 Despite the fact that most of Taiwan’s people believed ERA to have a China identity, its famous and popular talk show, the “Sound of Taiwan” (Taiwanese: Tâi-ôan-sim-siaⁿ 台灣心聲), which Wang Pen-hu hosted, had a strongly ­Taiwan identity and was pro-Chen Shui-bian between 2002 and 2005. Moreover, Hu Chung-hsin’s political talk show did not attract a large audience. Wang ­Pen-hu 汪笨湖 was a good friend of Lee Teng-hui and the “Sound of Taiwan” always gained a high TV rating. This program invariably invited people who strongly supported Taiwan identity or Taiwan Independence to participate. Owing to the popularity of the “Sound of Taiwan,” ERA produced two other similar programs during the 2004 Presidential Election, “Taiwan Call In” (­Taiwanese: Tâi-ôan call in 台灣 Call In) and “President Call In” (Taiwanese: Chóng-thóng call in 總統 Call In) which were also hosted by Wang Pen-hu. According to surveys, the “Sound of Taiwan” exceeded three per cent of TV ratings whereas another famous Taiwan identity show, “Big Talk News” on SET-N, was always below 0.8 per cent. The “Sound of Taiwan” also established a record for a live program as more than 70,000 attended a broadcast in Tainan when celebrating Chen Shui-bian’s election victory in 2004 (Chin Ming-ching 秦明 青 2008). The production of the “Sound of Taiwan” was a business success for Chiu Fu-sheng, which also established a relationship with Chen Shui-bian in a way similar to the production of pro-Taiwan consciousness programs on TVBS in the 1990s, which promoted a relationship with Lee Teng-hui. In fact, as Chen Hao argues, Chiu Fu-sheng is a smart business man and always maintains a good relationship with the ruling power (Chen Hao 陳浩 2011). Chiu supported Lee Teng-hui and maintained a tie with Chen Shui-bian in the 1990s, produced the “Sound of Taiwan” to support Chen Shui-bian in the 2000s, and became a KMT CSC member after Ma Ying-joeu’s election as president. After Lien Tai-sheng 練台生 took over ERA in 2005, ERA did not show a strong political identity toward either the Pan-Blue or Pan-Green camps. However, people still considered ERA to have a China identity, especially because of 50

Hu Chung-hsin supported Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 election; however, they fell out after the election. Hu thus came to be considered a Pan-Blue supporter strongly criti­ cizing Chen Shui-bian and the DPP.

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its entertainment channel, “Azio TV” (Dongfeng 東風). In fact, the Chinese characters “東風” in the program identification use Mao Zedong’s calligraphy (Liao Fu-shun 廖福順 2011). In addition Azio TV largely uses the term “Neidi” for China. As a consequence, Azio TV is a principal symbol depicting ERA’s identity despite the fact that Lien Tai-sheng did not push a national identity onto ERA and ERA had produced the famous Taiwan identity program “Sound of Taiwan” to support Chen Shui-bian. To sum up, TVBS, EBC and ERA resemble each other in that business factors have determined the media outlet’s national identity. In a certain sense, both Chiu Fu-sheng and Wang Ling-lin maintained a relationship with the ruling power in order to expand market share, and also to obtain advertising income from the government and financial support from state-run banks or a political support from the ruling party. In contrast, CTi shows various changes in the forming of national identity from a more global view to the China identity of Tsai Eng-meng. Concluding Remarks The two newspapers discussed above, the UDN and the China Times, show a stronger China identity than do the four television stations. Both newspapers promote China identity and also position Taiwanese culture and history as subordinate to Chinese culture and history. The UDN fully and completely follows the concept of the Chinese nation and One-China Principle in its discourses in spite of the rise of a Taiwan identity from the 1990s onward. The UDN also condemns Taiwan Independence as well as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian for betraying the Chinese nation and violating the One-China Principle. It tries to link Taiwan’s people to the Chinese nation through history, culture, religion, bloodline and even Chinese written characters. The UDN blames Taiwan Independence, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian rather than the PRC for causing crises across the Taiwan Strait. As for the future of the Cross-Strait relationship, the UDN previously strongly supported unification. However, it adjusted this idea to a softer concept of connection to China due to the disapproval of unification by most Taiwanese people as measured by surveys. The UDN continues its national identity as part of the “Chinese nation” but suggests the maintenance of two states – The People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China – under the One-China Principle. In addition, the UDN expresses deep concern for Chinese democracy; however the UDN still opposes so-called separatism from China owing to its own strong China identity.

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Before 2008, the China Times exhibited a similar outlook to that of the UDN by constructing a China identity based on the idea of the Chinese nation and the One-China Principle. In the early years of democratization, both newspapers condemned the CCP for the Beijing Massacre and requested China to launch democratic reforms. The China Times also condemned Taiwan Independence, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian for creating the threat from China. From the late 1990s until 2008, on the issue of unification the China Times advocated a Confederation of Greater China. After Tsai Eng-meng took over the China Times, it became a China-centric newspaper in order to please China. It went as far as publishing PRC embedded advertising and even served as an agency to help embed PRC propaganda in other newspapers. In contrast to the two newspapers, the four electronic media seem to have chosen their national identity based upon business or political relationships. Despite the terms used to refer to China, many China identity electronic media, especially news TV channels, do not exhibit a strong China identity or prounification stance in their coverage and programs. In fact, TVBS produced some famous programs promoting Taiwan consciousness because Chiu Fusheng wanted to maintain his relationship with Lee Teng-hui and even Chen Shui-bian in the 1990s. However, TVBS veered to support the China identity KMT following Li Tao’s gaining control, and then adopted a more moderate China identity after the early 2000s. CTi was initially a successful global Chinese news channel but later became a part of the China Times. After Tsai Eng-meng bought the China Times, CTi consequently came to be just another China-centric medium. EBC, under Wang Ling-lin’s administration, always supported the Taiwan identity ruling DPP during 2000-2006, though most Taiwanese still considered it to be a China identity medium. ERA used to produce a famous and popular political talk show, the “Sound of Taiwan,” which firmly supported Taiwan identity. But ERA tried to please “blue” as well as “green,” inviting pro-blue celebrities to host programs and to serve as executives at ERA. The impression of the Taiwanese people toward ERA as a China identity medium resulted from the terms it used to refer to China and from the China identity Azio TV channel. To conclude, the national identity of both the UDN and the China Times followed the owner’s political identity. But the national identity of TV news channels was sometimes just a bargaining chip for the media owner to establish a relationship with the ruling power in Taiwan so as to obtain benefits.

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Chapter 5

Taiwan Identity Media Since democratization under Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, discussion of national identity is no longer taboo in the media. In this new environment, Taiwan identity media have become very important. Like their China identity counterparts discussed in the previous chapter, Taiwan identity media can be largely identified by the term they use to refer to China. Taiwan identity media use “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China instead of the terms used by the China identity media, such as “Mainland China,” “the Mainland” and Neidi. Second, they consider Taiwan to be an independent country distinct from China. Third, they regard people in Taiwan as being Taiwanese instead of Chinese. Finally, most of them reject the idea of Taiwan being a Chinese nation and seek to construct a Taiwanese nation based on Lee Teng-hui’s notions of a “Community of Shared Destiny” and “Special State-to-State” relations and Chen Shui-bian’s advocacy of “One Country on Each Side.” In addition, despite the fact that the formal name of Taiwan’s regime is the Republic of China, Taiwan identity media use the term “Taiwan” rather than the “Republic of China.” Taiwan identity media also favor using “Taiwan” to refer to the ROC and “China” to refer to the PRC. With democratization and the growth of Taiwan identity, Taiwan identity media have occupied a significant place in Taiwan’s media market. Some China identity media switched to Taiwan identity and some new Taiwan identity media sprang up, breaking through the long-term dominance of the China identity media formed under the autocratic KMT regime during the martial law period. This change greatly affected the newspaper market, which had been principally dominated by the United Daily News and the China Times. Subsequently, the Taiwan identity Liberty Times overtook both the United Daily News and the China Times, and, later, the pro-democracy Apple Daily with its Greater Taiwanism took away a significant market share from the two main China-identity newspapers. Aside from the Liberty Times and the Apple Daily, the Taiwan Daily, the Independent Evening Post, the Taiwan Times, the Commons Daily and the Capital Morning Post were also important Taiwan identity newspapers that emerged after democratization. The opposition switched from opposition magazines in the 1970s-1980s to use underground radio stations as their preferred public platform from the early 1990s. Underground radio stations later became another important part in the shaping of national identity. Furthermore, it is likely that the growth of

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004227699-007

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Taiwan identity also expanded the market shares of two new television stations, FTV and SET; consequently, the relationship between Taiwan identity and business is a potentially fruitful topic when examining a Taiwan identity media. Additionally, from the early 1990s, the Internet became an alternative non-mainstream medium in Taiwan and more and more of Taiwan’s Internet users used it to express their Taiwan identity. This chapter first briefly discusses the relationship between the change of political climate and the development of the above media, and then considers the construction of a Taiwan national identity in the media, examining the reasons why various media outlets presented a Taiwan identity and the methods they used to present it. As with China identity media, each Taiwan identity media promotes or constructs a Taiwan identity for its own reasons. Generally speaking, many of the reasons for the China identity media to construct a China identity also apply to Taiwan identity media. However, there are some special reasons for the underground radio stations and the Internet users to construct a Taiwan identity. Many former opposition magazine operators or devotees transferred their battlefields from opposition magazines to underground radio stations or the Internet. By analyzing these cases, it is possible to understand the factors which influenced a medium’s view on national identity as well as to understand how a medium deals with Taiwan identity as a business. Newspapers The Independent Evening Post The Independent Evening Post (Zili wanbao 自立晚報) played an important part in Taiwanese history, especially in pushing forward democratic development during the martial law period. In fact, the Independent Evening Post, founded in 1949, was run mainly by Mainlanders until Wu San-lien became the main shareholder in 1959. Generally speaking, people in Taiwan believed that the Independent Evening Post was independent of the KMT regime; however, KMT Provincial Assembly Member Hsu Chin-te 許金德, who served as the Chairman of the Independent Evening Post, joined the newspaper with Wu Sanlien and was actually a representative of the KMT, demonstrating the KMT’s intention to control the media during the martial law period. In 1988, as discussed in Chapter Three, the Independent Evening Post also began to publish the Independent Morning Post (Zili zaobao 自立早報) and became the Independent Post Group.

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Around 1990, the Independent Post Group officially put “Native” (Bentu 本 土) in a newspaper slogan to show its Taiwan identity (Hu Yuan-hui 胡元輝 2009). In addition to its two newspapers promoting a Taiwan identity, the Independent Evening Post Cultural Press (Ziliwanbaoshe wenhua chubanbu 自立晚 報社文化出版部) also published many books related to Taiwanese history and culture, thus further promoting Taiwan identity. As one would expect from a self-proclaimed Taiwan identity newspaper, the Independent Evening Post clearly showed its Taiwanese consciousness in its supplement. For instance, the former editor of the supplement, Lin Chi-yang 林淇瀁, argued that the supplement of the Independent Evening Post should stress “Taiwan” identity in contrast to the supplements of the UDN and the China Times, which accentuated a Chinese ideology (Huang Shun-hsing 黃順 星 2008:102).1 Under Lin Chi-yang’s plan, the supplement of the Independent Evening Post provided readers with Taiwanese culture, history and literature distinct from the China identity UDN and China Times. Lin Chi-yang also applied the same policy after serving as the Editor-in-Chief of both the Independent Morning Post and Independent Evening Post. Consequently, the supplements of both newspapers put forward the Independent Post Group’s Taiwan consciousness in a cultural dimension. Both the Independent Evening Post and the Independent Morning Post expressed a deep concern for democracy and Taiwan identity in approaching political issues. Despite there being some internal problems and a change of ownership after 1994, which affected both newspapers, they remained on the side of Taiwan identity. Changes in the Independent Evening Post after 1988 The Independent Evening Post undoubtedly contributed to democracy during the martial law period, but the former President of the Independent Morning Post, Frank Wu 吳豐山, tended to support Non-Mainstream Faction Lin Yangkang 林洋港 at the beginning of the political struggle between the KMT Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Factions, while the Liberty Times strongly supported Lee Teng-hui in the early 1990s (Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2010:487-489). In addition, the Independent Morning Post also showed its conservative sympathies in opposition to the Independent Evening Post after the founding of the China identity New KMT Front in late 1989 and then the Chinese New Party in 1993 (Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2008:45-46; 2010:486-487). In the early 1990s, the former Editor-in-Chief of the Independent Morning Post, Wu Cheng-shuo 吳正 朔, also tried to alter the political stance of the Independent Morning Post away 1 Lin Chi-yang is well-known by his penname Hsiang Yang 向陽 in Taiwan.

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from favoring the DPP and distancing itself from a Taiwan identity. This change made some senior Taiwan identity journalists leave the Independent Morning Post and it also decreased its market share (Hu Yuan-hui 胡元輝 2009). These choices became fatal mistakes, displeasing many readers and causing the paper to lose market share during the rise of Taiwan identity in the early 1990s and resulting in its decline even though the Independent Morning Post later returned to support Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwanization policy. A watershed in the history of this newspaper was KMT member Chen Cheng-chung 陳政忠 assuming control of the Independent Post Group in 1994. Chen Cheng-chung’s nominated Publisher, Kuo Cheng-chao 郭正昭, said in an editorial meeting in February 1995 that the Independent Post Group was not allowed to support Taiwan Independence (Lu Tung-hsi 呂東熹 2010:534). During 1994-1995 perhaps as many as one hundred Taiwan identity senior journalists and staff left the Independent Post Group (Lu Tung-hsi 呂東 熹 2009; Wei Shu-chen 魏淑貞 2009). In the meantime, the market share of the Liberty Times steadily increased at the expense of the Independent Post Group. The Independent Morning Post closed in January 1999. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Independent Evening Post entered several years of turmoil, first passing to another KMT member Chang Ching-chung 張慶忠 and the Wisdom Group (Xiangshan jituan 象山集團) in February 1999, and then DPP member Wang Shih-chien 王世堅 in October 2000. Finally, the Independent Evening Post shut down in October 2001. Some of the paper’s former staff unsuccessfully tried to resume publishing a print edition and even publishing online. Most importantly, according to interviews with former journalists of the Independent Evening Post, most of the senior journalists of the Independent Evening Post did not consider the new owners to be real Independent Evening Post people. Particularly, for some former senior journalists of the Independent Evening Post, the original spirit of the Independent Evening Post had already passed away in 1994 (Wei Shu-chen 魏淑貞 2009). By and large, however, both the Independent Evening Post and the Independent Morning Post sided with Taiwan identity following democratization. The Independent Evening Post did have a substantial influence in Taiwanese society before the early 1990s despite being a minor afternoon daily circulating mainly in urban centers. However, Dr Wu Shu-ming 吳樹民 said in an interview that the Taiwanese people could not fight against the KMT, the Chinese ideology and the pro-China media between the late 1980s and the early 1990s by depending solely upon the Independent Evening Post, later joined by the Independent Morning Post, or even the Capital Morning Post (Shoudu zaobao 首都早報) (Wu Shu-min 吳樹民 2009). Both the Independent Evening Post and the Capital Morning Post occupied only small newspaper market shares compared to the

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China identity media in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Thus, these Taiwan identity newspapers proved feeble against the China identity newspapers during the early years of democratization. The Independent Evening Post was a “liberal” newspaper before democratization and it remained “liberal” and “independent” after democratization. According to an interview with Wu Cheng-shuo, there was no obvious conflict among national identity or ethnic groups in the Independent Evening Post prior to the Lee Teng-hui period. However, conflicts arose when the Independent Post Group moved too close Lee Teng-hui and the DPP (Wu Cheng-shuo 吳正 朔 2009), especially after the establishment of the pro-unification Chinese New Party in 1993 (Chen Tseng-chih 陳增芝 2009). Although the Independent Post Group was pro-Taiwan identity, the composition of the staff in terms of their ethnicity and their identity was diverse. For example, some editor-inchiefs in this newsgroup were pro-Chinese New Party or KMT, and often exhibited a China identity, e.g. Chen Kuo-hsiang 陳國祥, Wu Ke-ching 吳戈卿 and Wu Cheng-shuo 吳正朔. Also, after democratization, when the Independent Post Group started showing an obvious and strong Taiwan identity, some Mainlander superiors criticized both the Independent Evening Post and the Independent Morning Post for being pro-Taiwan Independence (Lu Tung-hsi 呂 東熹 2009). Finally, some senior journalists, especially the descendants of Mainlanders, chose to support the Chinese New Party because of their China identity, e.g. Lan Hsuan 蘭萱, Sung Tzu-chiang 宋自強 and Huang Te-pei 黃 德北 (Chen Tseng-chih 陳增芝 2011; Wang Mei-hsiu 王美琇 2009; Yen Shannung 晏山農 2005). Taiwanese Consciousness and Democracy Discourse as well as political coverage in the Independent Evening Post and its affiliated Independent Morning Post often showed a Taiwanese consciousness as well as support for democracy and human rights. In fact, the Independent Evening Post was Taiwan’s first newspaper to send journalists to visit China. In September 1987, journalists Li Yung-te 李永得 and Hsu Lu 徐璐 visited China when Chiang Ching-kuo was still alive to test the KMT’s tolerance. Both the Independent Evening Post and the Independent Morning Post introduced stories of Taiwan identity or Taiwan Independence Movements when such stories were neglected or distorted by China identity media. For instance on October 31, 1993, the Independent Evening Post introduced the leader of the Taiwan Independence Movement, Su Beng, and praised him for his contribution to Taiwan, his socialism and even as the pioneer of Taiwanese history research (Independent Evening Post 1993).

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The Independent Evening Post criticized the KMT for destroying the historical memory of Taiwanese. For example, in early April 1994, the KMT suddenly tore down the KMT headquarters building in Taipei, which had been part of Taipei’s municipal heritage. A journalist published a commentary, on April 13, 1994, denouncing the KMT as a “killer” for eliminating Taiwanese history and heritage. This commentary argued that the building was a part of Taiwanese history and heritage as it was the original Red Cross Hospital under Japanese rule. This building should have returned to the Taiwanese or the state after World War II, but the KMT occupied it. The article criticized the KMT for imposing an intangible Chinese ideology onto the Taiwanese and wiping out artifacts of Taiwanese tangible memory, a part of Taiwanese heritage from the Japanese ruling period (Peng Lin-sung 彭琳淞 1994). The Independent Evening Post also invited many pro-Taiwan Independence activists, academics and politicians to publish articles in support of Taiwan identity in its columns. When dealing with the issue of Taiwan Independence, the Independent Evening Post argued that Taiwan’s future should be determined by all Taiwanese people and suggested the DPP not give up the option of holding a referendum to decide the issue of whether or not to officially become the Republic of Taiwan (Independent Evening Post 1995). Democracy, human rights and Taiwanese consciousness informed the papers’ editorial positions. To commemorate the twelfth anniversary of the Kaohsiung Incident as well as International Human Rights Day, the Independent Morning Post published an editorial on December 11, 1991 urging human rights for those who were blacklisted from returning to Taiwan because they advocated Taiwan Independence or criticized the KMT government (Independent Evening Post 1991). During the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Independent Morning Post raised the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy. On March 10, 1996, the Independent Morning Post argued that all Taiwan’s people should defend Taiwan and Taiwan’s democracy, and it also urged all presidential candidates to unite together against China (Independent Morning Post 1996a). The Independent Morning Post further urged Chinese intellectuals to recognize that Taiwan had democratized and was an independent country distinct from China. The Independent Morning Post emphasized Taiwan as the only Chinese (huaren 華人) democracy and showed disappointment that no voice among China’s intellectuals condemned the CCP’s military threats to Taiwan’s democracy (Independent Morning Post 1996b). After Taiwan completed its first direct election for the presidency, the Independent Morning Post encouraged Taiwan’s government to launch talks with China in order to stand up for Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity (Independent Morning Post 1996c).

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When the United Kingdom returned Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997, the Independent Evening Post published a series of commentaries to discuss Taiwan’s future. In these comments, democracy and Taiwanese sovereignty were presented as crucial for Taiwan’s future against the threat from China. The Independent Evening Post suggested, for instance, that Taiwanese could say no to China because Taiwan is an independent country with its own constitution, military and central government. The commentaries also advised that Taiwan had to strengthen its democracy and to make constitutional reform as well as to retain the voice of Taiwan Independence. The commentators believed that the advocacy of Taiwan Independence indicated that Taiwan’s people had the right to choose their political system and to determine their future (Kuo Mincheng 郭敏政 et al. 1997). After DPP nominee Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidency, the Independent Evening Post urged Taiwan’s people to persist with their efforts to maintain Taiwan’s sovereignty with Taiwan identity. This editorial approved Lee Teng-hui’s “Special State-to-State” relations and condemned China identity politicians for betraying the Republic of China owing to their lack of Taiwan identity (Independent Evening Post 2000). Clearly, this newspaper’s political stance and Taiwan identity remained constant notwithstanding the changes of ownership and the differing political identities of its journalists. In short, the Independent Evening Post held an important place in the history of Taiwan’s democratic movement and also contributed to constructing Taiwanese consciousness. It often revealed its Taiwanese consciousness in its discourse, but “democracy” always took precedence over “identity” in its argumentation. The Taiwan Daily The forerunner of the Taiwan Daily (Taiwan ribao 台灣日報) was the Oriental Daily (Dongfang ribao 東方日報) founded in 1953. In 1964, it became the Taiwan Daily, mainly sponsored by the Taiwan Provincial Farmers’ Association (Jacobs 1976:779) and distributed in rural areas in the form of a farmer’s newspaper. In 1976, the opposition lawyer Fu Chao-shu 傅朝樞 became the owner of the Taiwan Daily and then the Taiwan Daily became a pro-opposition newspaper criticizing the KMT regime. According to Yu Kuo-chi, the Taiwan Daily maintained close relations with the opposition in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly while he served as the editor-in-chief during 1976-1978 (Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). This pro-opposition stance made its circulation reach a peak of 300,000 copies about 1977-1978.2 Chiang Ching-kuo considered the Taiwan 2 This figure was collected from The History of Taiwan’s Newspapers (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:314).

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Daily a threat to the KMT regime and ordered the Ministry of National Defense to take it over in September 1978. As a result, it became a conservative newspaper until 1996 when the newspaper became a private newspaper. Prior to 1996, when under control of the military, the Taiwan Daily was more radical than both the United Daily News and the China Times in advocating Chinese nationalism and tackling national identity. Change of Ownership and national identity In 1996, the U-Land Construction (Ruilian jianshe 瑞聯建設) took over the Taiwan Daily and its huge debt. In 1997, as mentioned in Chapter Three, Yen Wen-shuan 顏文閂 and Antonio Chiang 江春男, supported by the businessman Wang Yung-ching 王永慶, a native Taiwanese, took over the Taiwan Daily and turned it into a Taiwan identity newspaper. Following the change, the Taiwan Daily switched to support Taiwan identity and later went on to advocate Taiwan Independence and Taiwanese nationalism especially after 2001. The Taiwan Daily had a mild Taiwan identity between 1997 and 2000, but in 2000 it announced itself as “the New Spokesperson for Taiwan” (Taiwan xin daiyanren 台灣新代言人) and thereafter asserted a strong Taiwan identity. Owing to Chen Shui-bian’s winning the presidency, the Taiwan Daily moved to support Taiwan Independence, which made the main sponsor, Wang Yungching, withdraw his support in 2001. News commentators reported that the Taiwan Daily’s advocacy of Taiwan Independence intensely troubled Wang Yung-ching as such advocacy would be an obstacle for his business in China (Chiu Chan-kuan 邱展光 2001; Lin Yi-shiu 林怡秀 2001). From an interview, it is clear that Wang Yung-ching wanted Taiwan to be a state within a greater China in order to keep Taiwan’s special relationship with China (Su Chengping 蘇正平 2009). Despite being a native Taiwanese, Wang Yung-ching had expressed a China identity. For example, Wang Yung-ching released a “TenThousand Word Statement” (Wanyanshu 萬言書) on March 14, 2000 supporting Lien Chan instead of Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential election. He also claimed at a KMT think-tank conference on May 18, 2002 that people in both Taiwan and “Mainland China” were Chinese. After Wang Yung-ching left the Taiwan Daily, the Taiwan Daily moved toward a more radical Taiwan identity and support for Taiwan Independence, and stood up for the Chen Shuibian government in order to obtain financial support such as advertisements and financing from the DPP government after 2001 (Lin Chau-yi 林朝億 2009). Thus, the national identity of the Taiwan Daily after 2001 was diametrically opposed to what it had been before 1997.

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From Pro-Chinese Nationalism to Pro-Taiwan Independence In the early stage of democratization, the Taiwan Daily always demonstrated a conservative China identity. Similar to other China identity newspapers, Chinese nationalism and anti-Taiwan Independence served as the core for constructing a China identity. Thus, on February 3, 1988, the Taiwan Daily declared that defending Taiwan Independence had nothing to do with freedom of speech (Chen Ssu-yuan 陳思遠 1988). On August 15, 1989, the Taiwan Daily strongly condemned Taiwan Independence activists for being traitors to the country and argued that the opposition DPP was an illegal party in its advocacy of Taiwan Independence (Taiwan Daily 1989). Between October 28 and November 8, 1988, the Taiwan Daily published a series of articles entitled “We all are Chinese” (Women doushi Zhongguo ren 我們都是中國人), arguing that the Taiwanese people were Chinese from China (Taiwan Daily 1988). On February 3, 1992, Lee Teng-hui gave a talk for the Lunar New Year saying, “Our future is not limited to this small island. Therefore, everyone must unite and endeavor as well as strive together for the new age of the Chinese Nation” (Women de qianjing buzhi juxianyu zhege xiaodao shang yinci dajia yidingyao tuanjiefendou gongtong wei kaichuang Zhonghuaminzu de xinshidai er nuli 我們的前景 不止侷限於這個小島上，因此，大家一定要團結奮鬥，共同為開創 中華民族的新時代而努力). Between February 9 and 13, 1992, the Taiwan Daily published a series of comments, entitled “Echoes to President Lee’s Lunar New Year’s Eve talk.” These discussed the foundation for unification, political reform and the future of the Chinese nation and Chinese culture as well as condemned Taiwan Independence for betraying the Chinese nation. Owing to its strong support of Chinese nationalism before the mid-1990s, the Taiwan Daily often attacked pro-Taiwan Independence advocates. For instance, on September 23, 1995, the Taiwan Daily criticized the DPP and its pro-Taiwan Independence policy (Taiwan Daily 1995). Nonetheless, when confronted by democratization, Taiwanization and an open market, the Taiwan Daily suffered heavy losses. Because of its military background ownership, the Taiwan Daily continued to advocate Chinese nationalism until it was sold to the U-Land Construction in August 1996. As discussed above, the Taiwan Daily became a Taiwan identity newspaper under the direction of Yen Wen-shuan and Antonio Chiang from 1997, especially after businessman Wang Yung-ching cut his ties with the paper in 2001. The Taiwan Daily initially constructed a Taiwan identity through its supplement, especially in a column called “A Non-Taipei Perspective” (Feitaibei guandian 非台北觀點). According to Hu Yung-ching’s 胡詠晴 (2009) research, “A Non-Taipei Perspective” shaped an image of Taiwan through reconstructing Taiwanese history, culture and literature which the KMT had distorted with a

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Chinese perspective. Hu’s study indicates that the discourse of the “A Non-Taipei Perspective” broke the historical and cultural connections between Taiwan and China. In other words, the Taiwan Daily used its supplement to provide a cultural base to shape a Taiwan identity and to break the KMT’s long term propaganda of Chinese nationalism. From a political perspective, the Taiwan Daily began to show its radical Taiwan identity in 2001. The Taiwan Daily showed its support for Kobayashi Yoshinori’s 小林善紀 controversial Japanese manga, Neo-Pride Manifesto Special – On Taiwan (Japanese: Taiwan Ron: Shin Gōmanism Sengen Supesharu 台湾 論: 新・ゴーマニズム宣言 SPECIAL). Kobayashi Yoshinori originally published this manga in November 2000 and a Chinese version was later published in February 2001. This manga praised Lee Teng-hui’s Japanese samurai spirit, but it also stated that Taiwanese comfort women had volunteered, citing interviews with the Chairman of the Chi-Mei Corporation (Qimei qiye 奇美企業), Hsu Wen-lung 許文龍, and the Chairman of the Weltrend Semiconductor (Weiquan dianzi 偉詮電子), Tsai Kun-tsan 蔡焜燦.3 Above all, Kobayashi Yoshinori argued that Taiwan is walking its own path and that a Taiwanese nation has been born with the title “Taiwan.” Most Taiwanese considered this manga to be a pro-Taiwan Independence and a Japanese right-wing creation, and this manga also provoked many disputes between China identity and Taiwan identity camps. In promoting Taiwan Independence, the Taiwan Daily often criticized Chinese nationalism, for example, by saying that Taiwanese people had suffered much humiliation from the KMT’s propaganda of Chinese nationalism. The Taiwan Daily argued that Taiwan’s languages, folkways and cultures had been devalued as uncivilized and vulgar under the propaganda of Chinese nationalism (Taiwan Daily 2004b). During the 2004 legislative elections, the Taiwan Daily condemned those KMT candidates, who were former Chinese New Party members, for calling for Chinese nationalism in their campaigns (Taiwan Daily 2004a). The Taiwan Daily condemned China’s use of Chinese nationalism to intervene in Japan’s internal affairs so as to stop former President Lee Teng-hui from visiting Japan. The Taiwan Daily argued that China expanded its nationalism to block Taiwan from pursuing orthodox diplomacy as well as to threaten China’s neighboring countries and the democracy of those countries (Taiwan Daily 2004c). Not only did the Taiwan Daily oppose Chinese nationalism, it also demonstrated its firm support of Taiwan Independence during Chen Shui-bian’s 3 Hsu Wen-lung’s perspective angered some human rights organizations; Hsu Wen-lung then issued an announcement to make a public apology on February 26, 2001.

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presidency. In supporting Taiwan Independence, the Taiwan Daily invited many pro-Taiwan Independence columnists to write pro-Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan Independence articles. For example, the Taiwan Daily invited Shen Chien-te 沈建德, an advocate of the Taiwan Independence Movement, to write a column to promote Taiwan Independence. Shen Chien-te often argued in favor of a Taiwan which does not have a China identity and asserted that Taiwan has never been a part of China. He also stated that most Taiwanese are the offspring of Taiwanese aborigines (Shen Chien-te 沈建德 2005). In the Taiwan Daily’s discourse and coverage of national identity, it criticized China and the China identity camps in order to support Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan Independence. The Taiwan Daily supported Chen Shui-bian’s announcement of “One Country on Each Side” in 2002, and condemned China’s statement of the One-China Principle. The Taiwan Daily also strongly supported a referendum for Taiwan’s future (Taiwan Daily 2002b). The CCP announced on February 28, 2005 in its affiliated Hong Kong Wenweipo (Wenhuibao 文匯報) that it would soon enact an “Anti-Secession Law.” The Taiwan Daily reacted furiously, arguing that China purposely chose this important day – February 28 – to disclose this information to the Taiwanese as a subtle threat. The Taiwan Daily suggested that the 228 Massacre resulted from the Taiwanese welcoming “the mother nation – China” after World War II and that another serious 228 Massacre or Tiananmen Square Massacre would happen once again should China invade Taiwan (Taiwan Daily 2005b). The Taiwan Daily further contended that the Anti-Secession Law was aimed at Taiwan’s sovereignty instead of Taiwan Independence. It argued that China unilaterally made a claim of sovereignty to Taiwan through this law, and wanted use this law to “legally” justify an attack on Taiwan in the future (Taiwan Daily 2005a). On March 15, 2005, the Taiwan Daily condemned China as a shameless country that had passed the Anti-Secession Law against Taiwan. The paper also criticized the China identity media and the Pan-Blue that had kept silent about this law (Taiwan Daily 2005c). On March 4, 2006, the Taiwan Daily criticized both the Pan-Blue and China identity media for engaging in a conspiracy with China to “bash” Taiwan when Chen Shui-bian ceased the operation of the National Unification Council (Taiwan Daily 2006b). On March 18, 2006, the Taiwan Daily promoted Taiwan Independence and criticized the pro-China United Daily News in its editorial (Taiwan Daily 2006a). Although the Taiwan Daily became an advocate of Taiwan identity, it had to shut down due to its financial debt in June 2006.

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The Taiwan Times The Taiwan Times (Taiwan shibao 臺灣時報) is a newspaper based in southern Taiwan. The forerunner of the Taiwan Times was the East Taiwan Daily (Dongtai ribao 東臺日報) which was founded in Hualien in 1946 and moved to Changhua in 1964 with the new name Chinese Rise Daily (Zhongxing ribao 中 興日報). In 1967, it became the Taiwan Evening Post (Taiwan wanbao 臺灣晚 報). The Taiwan Evening Post moved to Kaohsiung in 1971 and transformed into the Taiwan Times claiming to be an independent newspaper that was “Native” (Bentu 本土), “Neutral” (zhongli 中立) and “Fair” (gongzheng 公正)” (Shih Yifen 石怡芬 2004:15). Despite being a local newspaper in southern Taiwan, the Taiwan Times had a remarkable market share. Shih Yi-fen argued that the Taiwan Times was the third largest newspaper in Taiwan between 1989 and 1994 after the China Times and the UDN, but that it then declined in a competitive media market (Shih Yi-fen 石怡芬 2004:16). The former Editor-in-Chief of the Taiwan Times, Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基, believed that the founder of the Taiwan Times, Wu Chi-fu 吳基福, a native Taiwanese, had already revealed his Taiwan identity in spite of being a KMT member in the early 1970s (Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). The Taiwan Times announced itself to be “Native” (Bentu 本土) from 1971 onward, almost two decades earlier than the Independent Evening Post. The Kaohsiung Wang family, native Taiwanese, took over the Taiwan Times from 1982 and claimed that the Taiwan Times was an independent newspaper.4 Wang Yu-chen 王玉珍, the former Publisher, played a vital role in influencing this newspaper’s identity. The former Editor-in-Chief and President of the Taiwan Times, Su Chinchiang 蘇進強, believed that Wang Yu-chen retained a strong Taiwan identity. Under Wang Yu-chen’s support in the 1990s, Su Chin-chiang invited pro-Taiwan Independence supporter Lin Chia-cheng 林嘉誠, Chuang Wan-shou 莊萬壽 and others to write columns (Su Chin-chiang 蘇進強 2011).5 Owing to the fact that Wang Yu-fa 王玉發 and his family were Taiwanese KMT members, the Taiwan Times strongly supported Lee Teng-hui before 2000. It also supported Chen Shui-bian in 2000-2008 as well as some local KMT members, but it opposed Ma Ying-jeou after 2008 (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 4 The Wang family dominated the KMT-controlled Kaohsiung City government in the 1970. Wang Yu-chen 王玉珍 and Wang Yu-fa 王玉發 were the heads of the Taiwan Times. Their brother Wang Yu-yun 王玉雲 was the KMT Kaohsiung City Mayor in 1973-1981. Wang Yu-yun’s sons Wang Chih-hsiung 王志雄 and Wang Shih-hsiung 王世雄 were KMT legislators. In addition, Wang Yu-chen was also a KMT Control Yuan member (Jianchaweiyuan 監察委員). Consequently, the Taiwanese people called the Wang family or Wang Yu-yun himself the “Southern Hegemon” (nanbatian 南霸天). 5 Su Chin-chiang was also the Chairman of the Taiwan Solidarity Union in 2005-2006.

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2010). According to an interview with an editorial writer of the Taiwan Times,6 there are a number of reasons why the Taiwan Times did not support Ma Yingjeou despite the fact that the owner was a KMT member. First of all, the local KMT members whom the paper supported, especially in southern Taiwan, sided with Taiwan identity. Second, Ma Ying-jeou was hostile to local KMT members and factions after his rise to power, which angered the Taiwan Times. Third, most Taiwanese in southern Taiwan kept a strong Taiwan identity and southern Taiwan was the Taiwan Times’ principal market. Accordingly, the Taiwan Times promoted the idea of Taiwan identity in its supplement and when editorializing on many important political issues. When considering political issues, the Taiwan Times always followed Lee Teng-hui and then Chen Shuibian on national identity and supported the DPP’s identity after 2008. Southern Taiwan and Taiwan Identity In the 1990s, the Taiwan Times revealed its Taiwan consciousness primarily in its supplement. The former Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Commons Daily, Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎, believed that the Taiwan Times focused on Taiwanese culture and history more than another important South Taiwan newspaper, Commons Daily (Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 2009).7 In contrast to the Commons Daily, the Taiwan Times provided considerable historical and cultural coverage of Taiwan in its supplement during the 1990s at a time when Lee Teng-hui was raising Taiwan identity. In an interview, Su Chin-chiang said that the Taiwan Times made an effort to run the supplement to promote Taiwanese history and culture when he served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Taiwan Times in the 1990s. After Su became the President of the Taiwan Times in 2007, he officially entitled the supplement the “Taiwan Supplement” (Taiwan fukan 臺灣副刊) to further show the Taiwan Times’ strong concern for Taiwanese culture and literature (Su Chin-chiang 蘇進強 2011). In the 1990s, the Taiwan Times had already published a series on Taiwanese histories and cultures in its supplement. The Taiwan Times often discussed Taiwan’s Austronesian aborigines and the Taiwanese history that KMT textbooks failed to reveal. Su Chin-chiang indicated that the supplement was a feature distinct from the Commons Daily, and the Taiwan Times also invited some famous Taiwan identity writers to contribute to its supplement, e.g. Wu Chin-fa 吳錦發 and Mo Shang-sang 陌上桑 (Su Chin-chiang 蘇進強 2011). Sometimes, the Taiwan Times would also use “Austronesian” to distinguish Taiwanese from Chinese while dealing with 6 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on July 26, 2011. 7 Chiu Kuo-chen resigned from the Commons Daily due to the newspaper being amalgamated by the Global Unification Group (Quanqiu tongyi jituan 全球統一集團) in 1999.

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political news. For example, in 2009, the Taiwan Times criticized aboriginal Legislator Kao-Chin Su-mei’s 高金素梅 strong China identity.8 The Taiwan Times argued that Taiwan’s aborigines had never been Chinese and that KaoChin kept a “blood relationship” with Austronesians. The Taiwan Times then contradicted itself by criticizing Kao-Chin for being an opportunist rather than a true aborigine. The Taiwan Times said that Kao-Chin identified herself as aborigine when she decided to get involved in politics, because Taiwan’s aborigines could enjoy many special privileges (Taiwan Times 2009a). In approaching political issues, the Taiwan Times was actually the first newspaper to publish pictures of the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979. After democratization, the Taiwan Times often demonstrated its strong Taiwan identity and advocacy of democracy, but it still gave Lee Teng-hui’s policies support. Thus, the newspaper supported Lee’s notion of the “Chinese nation” prior to Lee’s change to “Taiwanization” in the 1990s. For example, the Taiwan Times on April 25, 1992 suggested that Taiwan and China are consanguineous, belonging to the same Chinese nation and that this is a foundation for future unification. The Taiwan Times thus supported the status quo with the Republic of China being distinct from the People’s Republic of China. That is to say, before Lee’s Taiwanization policy, the Taiwan Times considered both the ROC and the PRC to belong to the same Chinese nation. But, the Taiwan Times argued that it should strongly defend Taiwan’s independent status as the Republic of China if China continued to suppress Taiwan in international affairs (Taiwan Times 1992a). In this context, the Taiwan Times did not negate the KMT and the CCP propaganda of the Chinese nation, but the Taiwan Times did maintain Taiwan’s sovereignty which, it argued, entitled the ROC to distinguish itself from the PRC. After the Amendment of Criminal Code Article 100 in May 1992, the advocacy of Taiwan Independence was no longer against the law. The Taiwan Times praised the establishment of the Goa-Seng-Lang Association For Taiwan ­Independence (GATI, Waishengren Taiwan duli xiehui 外省人台灣獨立促 進會)9 and said that it was a new milestone for Taiwan’s history and hoped that the foundation of GATI could make all Taiwanese people unite under the same communal destiny – Taiwan. In addition, the Taiwan Times advised

8 Kao-Chin Su-mei was a well-known actress. Her original name was Chin Su-mei 金素梅. Her father was Mainlander and her mother was an aborigine. Chin is her father’s family name and Kao is her mother’s family name. 9 The Goa-Seng-Lang Association For Taiwan Independence was established on August 23, 1992. Goa-Seng-Lang is the pronunciation of Waishengren 外省人 (Mainlander) in Taiwanese

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Mainlanders as well as pro-unification native Taiwanese that Taiwan’s people should not use “consanguinity” (Taiwan Times 1992b). On August 20, 1995, many pro-Taiwan Independence organizations launched a “We are Taiwanese” rally against the Chinese military exercises of late July as well as to counter the “We are Chinese” rally on August 13 organized by some pro-unification groups. The Taiwan Times maintained that Taiwan’s people should stand guard over the glory and dignity of being Taiwanese. The Taiwan Times condemned pro-unification supporters for being accomplices of China in asking President Lee to resign. The Taiwan Times suggested that “race” was not an essential factor for constructing a national identity and Taiwan’s people should recognize that Taiwan was an independent country from China (Taiwan Times 1995). During the Taiwan Strait Crisis and Taiwan’s first direct election for president in 1996, the Taiwan Times supported democracy to counter China and Taiwan’s pro-unification supporters. When Lee Teng-hui portrayed the idea of “New Taiwanese” in Ma Ying-jeou’s mayoral campaign rally on December 1, 1998, the Taiwan Times published a series of editorials entitled “New Taiwanism” (Xin Taiwan zhuyi 新台灣主義) in mid-December to support Lee Teng-hui’s idea as well as to criticize pro-unification advocates, especially the Chinese New Party. In 1999, the Taiwan Times strongly supported Lee Teng-hui’s statement of “Special State-to-State” relations and argued the PRC’s threat gave rise to Lee’s idea of “Special State-to-State” relations. The Taiwan Times believed that the PRC suppressed Taiwan everywhere and at all times through the One-China Principle. The Taiwan Times thus urged an independent Taiwan to strive to survive against China (Taiwan Times 1999). However, when Lee’s successor Chen Shui-bian used the expression “One Country on Each Side” to define the Cross-Strait relationship in August 2002, the Taiwan Daily, published a series of editorials severely condemning Chen’s idea for damaging Taiwan’s economy and angering China. For instance, “What is President A-bian thinking?” (A-bian zongtong daodi zaixiangsheme 阿扁總 統到底在想什麼?) published on August 4, “The national name of the Republic of China is gone” (Zhonghuaminguo guohao bujianle 中華民國國號不見 了) on August 5, “President Chen uses China to threaten Taiwan’s people” (Chen zongtong nandaoshiyong dui’ande Zhongguo lai xiabaixing 陳總統難道 是用對岸的中國來嚇百姓) on August 6, and “Return to supporting the economy” (Haishi gankuai huitou pan jingji ba 還是趕快回頭拚經濟吧) on August 9 (Taiwan Times 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d). Such editorials in the Taiwan Times resembled those in a China identity newspaper, but it soon returned to Taiwan identity after receiving complaints from readers. Su Chin-chiang explained why these editorials about Chen’s claim of “One Country on Each Side” seemed unusual compared to previous editorials of the Taiwan Times. Su

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Chin-chiang said the main reason was that Wei E 魏萼, who had China identity, served as the chief editorial writer of the Taiwan Times around 2002 and this made these editorials unlike the Taiwan Times’ traditional theme of national identity (Su Chin-chiang 蘇進強 2011).10 When China enacted the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, the Taiwan Times sided with Taiwan identity, condemning the Chinese government and its Chinese nationalism for deviating from democracy. The Taiwan Times supported the peaceful rally opposing the Anti-Secession Law, but it did not criticize Pan-Blue supporters. The Taiwan Daily and the Liberty Times, on the other hand, strongly condemned Pan-Blue supporters for keeping silent about the Anti-Secession Law. On the sixtieth anniversary of the 228 Massacre, the Taiwan Times published some editorials to commemorate this important event. For example, the Taiwan Times believed this massacre induced Taiwanese national consciousness as well as demonstrated the gap between China and Taiwan (Taiwan Times 2007). After Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, the Taiwan Times often criticized Ma for his China-friendly policies. In 2009-2010, a series of disputes on national identity arose between the Pan-Green and the Pan-Blue about the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The Pan-Green considered ECFA to be a plan to betray Taiwan, causing Taiwan identity media to criticize ECFA in their talk show programs, news reports and editorials. The Taiwan Times strongly opposed ECFA, which it regarded as a concept of opposing Taiwan identity and eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty (Taiwan Times 2009b, 2009c). From 2011, the Taiwan Times invited imprisoned former President Chen Shui-bian to publish his letters in a column, “A-bian’s Notes” (A-bian zhaji 阿扁 札記), in order to appeal to more radical Taiwan identity readers.11 In the 2012 presidential campaign, the Taiwan Times firmly disapproved of Ma Ying-jeou’s advocacy of the so-called “1992 Consensus.” The Taiwan Times considered the so-called “1992 Consensus” a falsehood and also condemned Ma Ying-jeou’s promotion of “No Unification, No Independence and No Use of Force” as another fraud. The Taiwan Times strongly denounced Ma Ying-jeou as a liar who ruled Taiwan by such fabrications and it censured China’s conspiracy with 10

11

Wei E was an academic at Tamkang University and Sun Yat-sen University, visiting professor at Peking University, and had served as the deputy director of the Committee of Cultural Affairs for the KMT in 1981-1985. He had already twice met Deng Xiaoping in 1988 and kept good relations with the Chinese authorities. In addition, Wei E also has a good relationship with Wang Yu-fa. Chen Shui-bian ceased publishing “A-bian’s Notes” in January 2012 because the DPP lost the presidential campaign. Chen Shui-bian said that he will restart it one day in the future.

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Ma Ying-jeou to deceive the Taiwanese people (Taiwan Times 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011f, 2012b). When responding to Ma Ying-jeou’s “One Country, Two Areas” policy, the Taiwan Times said that Ma Ying-jeou was a liar who merely claimed to protect the Republic of China. The Taiwan Times argued that Ma Ying-jeou was not a president of Taiwan, but a chief executive of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region of the PRC instead (Taiwan Times 2012a). While both the United Daily News and the China Times celebrated the 100th birthday of the Republic of China and presented its implications for CrossStrait relations and China’s future in their editorials of October 10, 2011, the Taiwan Times used its editorial to defend the DPP Vice-Presidential candidate, Su Chia-chuan 蘇嘉全, over the controversy regarding his wife’s farmhouse. The KMT said that the purchase by Su’s wife, Hung Heng-chu 洪恆珠, of a plot of agricultural land in Pingtung and the construction of a farmhouse on the land were all illegal. On the 100th birthday of the ROC, the Taiwan Times defended Su in this incident and criticized both the Ma Ying-jeou camp and pro-Pan-Blue media for mud-slinging (Taiwan Times 2011e). This editorial also indicated that the 100th National Day of the ROC was unimportant to the Taiwan Times, and the Taiwan Times would rather use the editorial that day to defend a vice-presidential candidate than discuss such a seemingly important day for both the China identity supporters and the China identity Ma Yingjeou government. These facts show that not only did the Taiwan Times construct a Taiwan identity in its supplement, it also became a very strong Taiwan identity newspaper. It opposed China and China-centric President Ma Ying-jeou after 2008. Yet, according to an interview,12 and by analyzing the paper’s notion of Taiwanese sovereignty, the Taiwan Times does not push for Taiwanese Independence as it believes that Taiwan is already an independent country called “Republic of China,” a view similar to the DPP’s advocacy of the status quo.13 In short, the national identity of today’s Taiwan Times by and large follows the DPP’s stance toward the relationship between Taiwan, the ROC and the PRC. The Taiwan Times supports continued independence from the PRC, and believes that Taiwan does not need to claim Taiwan Independence.

12 13

The author conducted this interview in Taipei on July 26, 2011. The DPP passed the so-called Taiwan Independence Clause (Taidu dangang 台獨黨綱) in 1991, but later passed the Resolution on Taiwan's Future (Taiwan qiantu jueyiwen 台灣 前途決議文) in 1999 to officially recognize the Republic of China.

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The Commons Daily The Commons Daily (Minzhong ribao 民眾日報) is another southern Taiwan newspaper. The forerunner of the Commons Daily, the People’s Bell Daily (Minzhong ribao 民鐘日報), was originally founded by Li Jui-piao 李瑞標 in Keelung in 1950 and was re-named the Commons Daily the following year. In 1960, the Commons Daily supported the KMT Keelung City Mayoral candidate, Li Kuo-chun 李國俊, but the opposition candidate Lin Fan-wang 林番王 won the election. This election result caused the Commons Daily to lose sponsorship from the Keelung City government, consequently forcing a move to Taipei County in 1962.14 Yet the Commons Daily moved back to Keelung after its offices suffered considerable damage in a typhoon. In order to expand market share and alleviate its plight, the Commons Daily relocated to Kaohsiung in 1978 and the paper flourished there from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. The former Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Chiu Kuo-chen, believed that the period between mid-1980s and the early 1990s was the golden age for the Commons Daily (Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 2009).15 In fact, I believe that gambling in the form of the “Joy to Masses (Dajiale 大家樂)” and the Hong Kong Mark Six Lottery (Liuhecai 六合彩) also pushed the Commons Daily up in the newspaper market. Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, farmers, fishermen and workers had a craze for these two games of chance, with most such gamblers believing that there were hints for the lottery numbers (mingpai 明牌) shown inside the pages of certain newspapers.16 Therefore, some newspapers, including the Commons Daily, published many pages of “mingpai” advertisements in order to increase their circulation. As a result, the Commons Daily was very popular in convenience stores and news agencies even in central and northern Taiwan until the mid-1990s. Apart from “mingpai” advertisements, the strong Taiwan identity stance and its activism for Taiwan Independence also helped the Commons Daily maintain market share up to the mid-1990s. However, the Commons Daily gradually declined in Taiwan’s newspaper market when the owner, Li Che-lang 李哲朗, strongly supported James Soong in the 1994 Taiwan provincial governor election as well as in 1997 when President Lee Tenghui decided to “freeze” the Taiwan Provincial Government in order to deprive 14 15 16

In 1960, the KMT regime held a national-wide county executive/mayoral campaign in 21 cities and counties. The KMT only lost its seats in Keelung City and Kaohsiung County. Chiu Kuo-chen believed the Commons Daily reached a peak circulation of 450,000, but another source said that the figure reached about 400,000 (Hen Chiao-she 很角色 2010). In the beginning, gamblers used the Patriotic Lottery (Aiguo jiangquan 愛國獎券) winning numbers to choose winning number for “Joy to Masses.” This forced the KMT government to stop the Patriotic Lottery. However, the gamblers turned to the Hong Kong Mark Six Lottery winning numbers as the winning numbers for their lottery.

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Soong of his power.17 Although Li Che-lang favored Soong, this did not influence the stance of the Commons Daily on Taiwan identity. In 1999, the Commons Daily was sold to the Global Unification Group (Quanqiu tongyi jituan 全球統一集團). In 2000, the China identity Eastern Broadcasting Company took over the Commons Daily. As a result, many senior Taiwan identity journalists left the Commons Daily after 1999. In fact, the ownership of the Commons Daily was in chaos for more than a decade after 1999, causing the Commons Daily to cease publishing for several days in May 2010. Most importantly, the Commons Daily cooperated with an official Chinese, Xiamen-based newspaper, the Straits Herald (Haixia daobao 海峡导报), from 2009, though many people believed the traditional spirit of the Commons Daily was already gone by 1999.18 From 1999, the Commons Daily did not play an important part in Taiwan’s newspaper market and the Taiwan Times became the biggest newspaper in southern Taiwan. The Promotion of a Radical Taiwan Identity According to Chiu Kuo-chen, the Commons Daily did not show too much concern for Taiwan identity until the late 1980s (Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 2009). But, the Commons Daily already reported some opposition as well as Chinese Communist Party news, thus challenging the KMT’s tolerance during the martial law period and then it displayed its strong Taiwan identity and friendliness to the discourse of Taiwan Independence in the 1990s. The owner, Li Jui-piao李 瑞標, was a businessman who had supported the democratic movement in the late 1980s (Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 2009). However, Li Jui-piao was not only a KMT member but also a member of the KMT Central Review Committee nominated by Lee Teng-hui in 1993. After his son Li Che-lang 李哲朗 took charge of the Commons Daily, the newspaper started expressing Taiwan identity in its editorials as well as support for democratization from the early 1990s (Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 2009). In order to demonstrate a strong Taiwan identity, the Commons Daily first invited many Taiwan Independence advocates to the newspaper such as the former Secretary-General of the DPP, Huang Erh-hsuan 黃爾璇, the writer, 17

18

According to Business Today on May 10, 2004, Li Che-lang supported Soong because his newspaper could obtain remarkable resources and sponsorship from the Taiwan Provincial Government (Wu Ko-huan 吳克寰 2004). An example which serves to demonstrate Li Che-lang’s strong support of James Soong is when the Editor-in-Chief, Li Wang-tai 李旺台, did not follow Li Che-lang’s order to support James Soong in 1997. Li Che-lang swiftly dismissed Li Wan-tai because of this (Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 2009). The Straits Herald is affiliated with the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

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Chung Chao-cheng 鍾肇政, the Taiwan Independence advocate, Hsu Shih-kai 許世楷, Chiou Chwei-liang 邱垂亮 and others. Secondly, in its discourse and coverage, the Commons Daily showed its friendship to Taiwan Independence. For instance, the KMT conservatives were enraged at the DPP’s 1991 “Taiwan Independence Clause” which wanted to establish a Republic of Taiwan. The Commons Daily suggested that as both the KMT and the DPP support democracy, they should hold a referendum for Taiwan’s future. The Commons Daily further condemned the KMT for refusing a referendum and argued that China and the Chinese people had no right to determine the destiny of the Taiwanese people (Commons Daily 1991). Many other factors also indicated that the Commons Daily often displayed its sympathies for Taiwan identity and/or Taiwan Independence news. For example, the Commons Daily published the full text of Professor Peng Mingmin’s 彭明敏 speech, delivered on November 2, 1992, entitled “For the Future, Taiwan should insist on one-China, one-Taiwan” (Lin Chin-san 林景山 & Chen Shih-chieh 陳世傑 1992). Peng’s speech suggested that Taiwan’s people should eradicate the KMT’s fable of recovering Mainland China. Peng also supported Lee Teng-hui’s idea of a “Community of Shared Destiny” (Lin Chin-san 林景山 & Chen Shih-chieh 陳世傑 1992). While many China identity media ignored the August 1995 “We are Taiwanese” rally, the Commons Daily on August 21, 1995 reported details of the rallies in Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung with the positive title “We are Taiwanese Great March, unprecedented in scope, where people show their heart, filled with love for Taiwan” (Zan shi Taiwan ren dayouxing shengkuan kongqian ai Taiwan de xin biaolu wuyi 咱是台灣 人大遊行 盛況空前 愛台灣的心 表露無遺). In the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, just two days before the People’s Liberation Army launched its missile exercises, the Commons Daily on March 6 used only one word in its headline, “FUCK” (gan 幹), as well as an editorial on its front page to show its fury against China. Not only did the Commons Daily criticize China, it also criticized prounification politicians including Chinese New Party and KMT Non-Mainstream members. The Commons Daily denounced those people who sided with China as China’s “fifth column,” and claimed that they had helped the KMT oppress Taiwanese and now they help China insult Taiwanese. The Commons Daily finally suggested that Taiwanese should take precautions against those people who intend to betray Taiwan. In addition, the Commons Daily criticized China identity newspapers for being overseas editions of the People’s Daily as those newspapers echoed the views of Chinese officials (Commons Daily 1996c). The Commons Daily revealed its firm support for Taiwan Independence around the mid-1990s. The Commons Daily suggested that democracy and

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Taiwan Independence could proceed in parallel, and the Commons Daily also hoped all pro-Taiwan Independence organizations could unite to accomplish the mission of Taiwan Independence (Commons Daily 1996a, 1996b). The Commons Daily firmly defended Lee Teng-hui’s concept of “Special State-toState” relations, arguing that Taiwan was already an independent country, and condemned those pro-unification supporters as well as newspapers for distorting Lee’s statement to echo China (Commons Daily 1999a, 1999b). To sum up, the Commons Daily showed concern for Taiwan identity mainly in its treatment of some important political issues beginning in the early 1990s as the Commons Daily supported Lee Teng-hui’s idea of identity and espoused Taiwan Independence. After the Commons Daily was transferred to the China identity Eastern Multimedia Group, the Commons Daily lost it place in Taiwan’s newspaper market as well as its importance in Taiwan. The Liberty Times The Liberty Times (Ziyou shibao 自由時報) has been Taiwan’s largest circulation newspaper since the late 1990s, but it had a number of forerunners from 1946 until Lin Rung-san 林榮三 took over in 1980. The first forerunner of the Liberty Times was a local newspaper in eastern Taiwan. In late 1946, the Taitung Three People’s Principles Youth League (Taidong sanminzhuyi qingniantuan 臺東三民主義青年團) founded the Taitung Herald (Taidong daobao 臺東導 報). In late 1948, KMT National Assemblyman Chen Chen-tsung 陳振宗 took over and re-named it the Taitung New Post (Taidong xinbao 臺東新報), but closed it in 1950. In 1952, the Committee Chairman of the KMT Taitung Division, Wu Jo-ping 吳若萍, re-opened it until it was taken over by Pan Yen-hsing 潘衍興, who changed its title to the Far Eastern Daily (Yuandong ribao 遠東 日報). In 1965, Wu Wan-Kung 吳萬恭 took it over and entitled it the Eastern Voice Daily (Dongsheng Ribao 東聲日報). In January 1969, Chuang Kun-yuan 莊坤元 obtained it and gave it yet another new title, the Taiwan Voice Daily (Taisheng ribao 臺聲日報), but after several months Lin Chao-keng 林朝庚 became the owner in July. In 1970, it became the Great Han Daily (Dahan ribao 大漢日報). In 1978, it moved to Changhua and became the central Taiwanbased Self-Strengthening Daily (Ziqiang ribao 自強日報). Lin Rung-san took it over in 1980 with the new title, the Liberty Daily (Ziyou ribao 自由日報), and moved it to Taipei in 1986, where it became a nation-wide newspaper. Finally, Lin Rung-san renamed the paper the Liberty Times in 1987 (Li Lin 李林 2008; Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:302-304). While the Liberty Daily, the newspaper provided lottery numbers for the “Joy to Masses,” just as the Commons Daily did during the mid-1980s. The “Joy to Masses” propelled the Liberty Daily into being a popular newspaper in central

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Taiwan. After its move to Taipei, the Liberty Times started a new era. As introduced in Chapter Three, Lin Rung-san’s relations with Lee Teng-hui, the sales promotions and the support of Taiwan identity all helped the Liberty Times successfully expand its market share until it became Taiwan’s largest newspaper by circulation. Relations with Taiwan’s Politicians In addition to establishing a distinctive Taiwan identity, the Liberty Times also cultivated close relations with Taiwan identity politicians from the late 1980s, enabling the Liberty Times to have a strong influence in Taiwanese society. The Liberty Times placed itself as a pro-Taiwanization, de-Sinification, pro-independence and pro-Lee Teng-hui newspaper. This made it the leading brand of Taiwan identity newspapers in the battle to attract more readers (Wang Tienpin 王天濱 2003:414). Being a pro-Lee Teng-hui newspaper, the Liberty Times criticized anti-Lee Teng-hui politicians and critics. In addition, the Liberty Times often criticized both the United Daily News and the China Times as prounification newspapers (Wang Tien-pin 王天濱 2003:415). Generally speaking, people in Taiwan have always considered the Liberty Times to be a Taiwan identity/independence, pro-DPP and pro-Lee Teng-hui newspaper. However, a senior editor of the Liberty Times said, in an interview, that the Liberty Times and Lee Teng-hui grew further apart after the mid-2000s.19 In an interview, the Executive Vice-President of the Liberty Times, Yu Kuo-chi, said that Huang Kun-hui 黃昆輝 became the only bridge between Lee Teng-hui and Lin Runsan for communication of political issues after the early 2000s (Yu Kuo-chi 俞 國基 2011). The Liberty Times supported the KMT candidate, Lien Chan, in the 2000 presidential campaign because of Lee Teng-hui’s support for Lien Chan. Therefore, the Liberty Times even requested its staff to sign a “Support Lien Card” (Yonglianka 擁連卡) (Chen Li-hung 陳立宏 2009). Yu Kuo-chi also indicated that just two days before election day in the 2000 presidential campaign, Lin Rung-san assembled some senior persons of the Liberty Times to discuss officially supporting Lien Chan in coverage and editorials. But, one senior journalist answered “that’s enough” and the meeting ended without any conclusion. This senior journalist later left the Liberty Times (Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). The senior editor also indicated that Lin Rung-san had good relations with Lien Chan, but the Liberty Times became critical of Lien Chan especially when he showed his China identity. For example, on April 18, 2002 in Washington, DC, 19

The author conducted this interview in Taipei on October 27, 2009. The informant is a senior editor of the Liberty Times.

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Lien Chan said, “Thank God, we all are pure Chinese” (Ganxie shen women doushi chunzheng de Zhongguo ren 感謝神 我們都是純正的中國人). This statement then became a topic in the Liberty Times to censure Lien Chan and his China identity. In addition, people in Taiwan also consider the Liberty Times an anti-James Soong newspaper. This can be traced back to 1991 when Lin Rung-san was trying to run for the presidency of the Control Yuan (Jianchayuan 監察院). Lin believed that James Soong was the mastermind behind the plan to stop him from gaining the position (Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). After Chen Shui-bian came to power in 2000, the Liberty Times moved closer to the DPP and Chen Shui-bian following the removal of Lee Teng-hui from the KMT. It also appears that the Liberty Times moved closer to the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which was under Lee Teng-hui’s influence after 2001. After the DPP took power, the Liberty Times firmly consolidated its support for Taiwan identity and even Taiwan Independence. After Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 2008, the Liberty Times still supported Chen Shui-bian. However, according to an informant, when the Supreme Court revealed evidence of Chen’s scandal and subsequent indictment in December 2008, Lin Rung-san was very angry with Chen Shui-bian and withdrew his personal support for him. Currently, it appears that the Liberty Times strongly supports the DPP because of Lin Rungsan’s Taiwan identity, but prefers Su Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌 to other DPP politicians.20 For instance, a Liberty Times columnist, Wang Kun-yi 王崑義, was discharged in 2007 because of his criticism of Su Tseng-chang in his column (Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). According to an informant, Wang Kun-yi believed that the main reason was his praise of Frank Hsieh’s ideas on Cross-Strait relations.21 From Anti-Taiwan Independence to Pro-Taiwan Independence The Liberty Times mainly showed its Taiwan identity in political news, columns and editorials, but it also made efforts to encourage the development of Taiwanese literature. From 2005, the Lin Rung-san Foundation of Culture and Social Welfare and the Liberty Times jointly granted the “Lin Rung-san Literature Award.” This literature award aimed to encourage Taiwanese to create more literature including fiction, prose and poetry on Taiwanese culture and history so as to show the vitality of Taiwanese society.

20 21

The author conducted this interview in Taipei on October 27, 2009. The informant is a senior staff of the Liberty Times. The author conducted this interview by phone on February 22, 2012. Both Su Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh were rivals for the DPP 2008 presidential candidacy nomination.

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Lin Rung-san personally displayed a strong Taiwan identity and expressed concern about the editorials, columns and the forum of the Liberty Times, the Liberty Forum (Ziyou guangchang 自由廣場), and read the forum every day (Chen Li-hung 陳立宏 2009). Additionally, Yu Kuo-chi said that when clarifying themes of politics and national identity, Lin Rung-san showed much concern for the editorials (Yu Kuo-chi 俞國基 2011). By analyzing the historical discourse of the Liberty Times on national identity, it becomes obvious that the paper presented a Taiwan identity which strongly reflected the ideas of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian during their respective terms in power. After China-centric Ma Ying-jeou’s accession to power, the Liberty Times adopted a stance opposing Ma Ying-jeou’s China identity. However, prior to the 1990s, the Liberty Times criticized Taiwan Independence as did China identity newspapers. For instance, the Liberty Times strongly criticized the DPP’s advocacy of Taiwan Independence on April 23, 1988, a few days after the DPP officially argued that Taiwanese people have the rights and freedom to advocate Taiwan Independence on April 17, 1988. After advocating Taiwan Independence was no longer a felony from 1992 because of the Amendment of Criminal Code Article 100, the Liberty Times began to display a Taiwan consciousness and to invite some Taiwan identity columnists, politicians and academics to write columns, although those articles were much milder than other Taiwan identity newspapers prior to the late 1990s. From the mid-1990s, in accord with Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwanization policy, the Liberty Times began displaying a strong Taiwan identity. Similarly to other Taiwan identity newspapers, the Liberty Times criticized China’s 1996 missile threat, but, compared to other Taiwan identity newspapers, the Liberty Times remonstrated only mildly. The Liberty Times emphasized that Taiwan’s affairs had never been China’s internal affairs and Taiwan’s democracy could be a template for China. The Liberty Times suggested that democratization could protect Taiwan’s status quo against China’s threat in international society (Liberty Times 1996a). For that reason, Lee Teng-hui maintained a vaguely nominal “One-China Policy” in 1996 prior to the “Special State-to-State” relations policy put forward in 1999. The Liberty Times further claimed that the CCP’s missile threat violated the U.S.’s Cross-Strait policy (Liberty Times 1996c). Due to the tension between Taiwan and China, there were rumors about secret CrossStrait envoys. Consequently, the United Evening News said, on March 13, that the Taiwan government planned to send a secret envoy to China to ease tension. The Liberty Times thereupon criticized the United Evening News and suggested the Taiwan government should not negotiate with the Chinese Communist Party under such threats. In this editorial, the Liberty Times also believed that the purpose of the CCP was to destroy Taiwan’s presidential

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campaign, but it failed because democracy was the strongest defense for Taiwan (Liberty Times 1996b). After Lee Teng-hui’s triumph in Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, the Liberty Times frequently supported Lee’s construction of Taiwan’s identity. The Liberty Times also supported Lee’s idea of “New Taiwanese” saying on December 3, 1998 that Lee “wishes that Taiwan’s future is no longer affected by ethnic conflicts.” In 1999, when Lee Teng-hui spoke about the “Special State-toState” relations to explain the Cross-Strait relationship, the Liberty Times firmly endorsed this idea in its editorials. The Liberty Times argued, only “Special State-to-State” relations could counter China’s “One Country, Two Systems” policy and One-China Principle. The Liberty Times also suggested Taiwan’s government not go back to the “One-China Principle,” to which Beijing and Taipei had previously agreed (Liberty Times 1999b, 1999c). However, when the U.S. put Lee Teng-hui under pressure, the Liberty Times urged America to view “Special State-to-State” relations from the perspective of democracy and a discourse of “sovereignty rests with the people” (zhuquan zai min 主權在民). The Liberty Times suggested that America review its own history and democracy, saying that America considered the U.S. and the U.K. different countries more than 200 years ago and, in the same way, Taiwanese also considered Taiwan and China to be different countries. The Liberty Times argued that America continually regarded itself as “a missionary for democracy,” therefore America should support Taiwan’s democracy as well as condemn China for being an autocratic country and a trouble-maker (Liberty Times 1999a). When Lee Teng-hui’s successor, Chen Shui-bian, announced “One Country on Each Side” in 2002, the Liberty Times regarded Chen’s statement to be the same as Lee’s “Special State-to-State” relations and suggested Chen shift his economic policy away from China. The Liberty Times contended that “One Country on Each Side” did not mean a claim of independence; it just underlined the fact that Taiwan is an independent country called the Republic of China (Liberty Times 2002). To deal with China’s Anti-Secession Law, the Liberty Times first urged Taiwanese to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty and then argued the Anti-Secession Law would also threaten regional and world peace. The Liberty Times further encouraged Taiwan’s people to walk for Taiwan during the March 26 Rally against the Anti-Secession Law and condemned PanBlue leaders for siding with China. The paper also criticized both the KMT and CCP for collaborating to sensationalize Taiwan Independence. The Liberty Times censured Lien Chan for his advocacy of “Taiwan should not be independent, China should not to use force” (Taiwan budu dalu buwu 台灣不獨 大陸 不武), saying that this statement was a surrender of Taiwan’s sovereignty to China (Liberty Times 2005a, 2005b, 2005d).

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When dealing with Chen’s ideas of the “Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign” as well as a new Constitution, the Liberty Times believed that Taiwan has to have “name rectification” and a new Constitution so as to fulfill “One Country on Each Side.” The Liberty Times thus cited the Treaty of San Francisco saying that Japan did not return Taiwan to the Republic of China. The Liberty Times argued that saying “the ROC is Taiwan” and “Taiwan is the ROC” is to veto Taiwan’s sovereignty (Liberty Times 2005c). That is to say, the Liberty Times denied the ROC’s legal control over Taiwan; yet, the Liberty Times later did recognize the ROC’s sovereignty on Taiwan. For instance, the paper argued that the Republic of China is precisely Taiwan and Taiwan is precisely the Republic of China (Liberty Times 2011b). In addition, because of Lee Teng-hui’s support of the Name Rectification and a new Constitution, the Liberty Times echoed Lee’s argument and cited Australian academic Peter Bellwood’s research saying that the Taiwanese aborigines were the origin of the Austronesian people. The Liberty Times also quoted some Chinese history to prove Taiwan has never been a part of China (Liberty Times 2006b). In 2009-2010, when the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) came to be an important issue in the Cross-Strait relationship, the Liberty Times saw ECFA as a betrayal of Taiwan’s sovereignty. The Liberty Times claimed that ECFA was an agreement to betray Taiwan politically with a mask of economics as well as implementing “Taiwan is a part of China.” The Liberty Times argued that China utilized ECFA to degrade Taiwan’s sovereignty and condemned the Ma Ying-jeou government for reducing the Cross-Strait relationship to the status of China’s internal affair (Liberty Times 2010a, 2010b). When reporting on the 100th National Day of the Republic of China on Double Ten Day of 2011, the Liberty Times did not talk about this National Day but used its editorial to discuss the crisis of China’s bubble economy and urged President Ma Ying-jeou to think about the impact of China’s coming bubble economy on Taiwan as well as the 2012 presidential campaign. During the 2012 presidential election, the Liberty Times continued to argue that the “1992 Consensus” was a falsehood to deceive the Taiwanese people. While the United Daily News firmly saw the “1992 Consensus” as a main factor in Ma Ying-jeou’s victory in the 2012 campaign, the Liberty Times strongly opposed this perspective. The Liberty Times despised Ma Ying-jeou for degrading the ROC and condemned the KMT’s collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party for betraying Taiwan and the Republic of China (Liberty Times 2012b, 2012d). When dealing with the “One Country, Two Areas” policy, the Liberty Times emphasized that the Chinese official media did not mention this idea and said that this was a KMT soliloquy (Liberty Times 2012e). In addition, the Liberty Times criticized Ma Ying-jeou for betraying the ROC to the PRC and degrading

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himself to be a “chief executive” and condemned the KMT for surrendering Taiwan’s sovereignty to China (Liberty Times 2012a, 2012c). Culture, Language and Ethnicity Most of the Liberty Times editorials focused on political events and only a few discussed cultural or historical issues relevant to constructing a Taiwan identity or a Taiwanese nation. Like the Taiwan Times, the Liberty Times also use the term “Austronesian” to indicate the ethnic difference between Taiwanese and Chinese. In addition, the Liberty Times would quote Chinese historical documents to prove that Taiwan had not been a part of China since ancient times. The Liberty Times argued that aborigines in Taiwan were Austronesian and different from Chinese. The Liberty Times believed that even though most Taiwanese ancestors came from China, they settled in Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan was a maritime country, unlike China which was a continental country. The Liberty Times further suggested that Taiwan should emphasize the ocean so as to internationalize Taiwan rather than Sinicize Taiwan (Liberty Times 2003, 2005e, 2006b). Dr Marie Lin’s research on the DNA of Taiwanese and Chinese encouraged many Taiwan identity advocates including the Liberty Times. The Liberty Times quoted her research announcing that most Taiwanese blood is different from Chinese. The Liberty Times argued that Dr Lin’s research destroys the historical arguments that both the KMT and the CCP had constructed. The Liberty Times also cited this DNA research to prove that Taiwan was a country of immigrants similar to the U.S., and to show the KMT’s long-term distortion of history in order to brainwash the Taiwanese people (Liberty Times 2007b). The Liberty Times was also concerned with what it called the Taiwanese people’s “mother languages” – Hoklo, Hakka and aboriginal languages – rather than Mandarin Chinese. The Liberty Times provided Taiwan identity readers with the “Liberty Forum” to promote these languages, which it considered an aspect of Taiwanese culture. For instance, the Liberty Times suggested that mother languages were as important to Taiwan as Lee Teng-hui’s democratization policy and compulsory education should emphasize mother language education (Liberty Times 2007a). Because the famous Taiwanese writer, Huang Chun-ming 黃春明, did not support producing Taiwanese literature in Taiwanese (Hoklo), Taiwanese writing advocate Chiung Wi-vun 蔣為文, a National Cheng Kung University academic, strongly challenged Huang Chunming at a conference on May 24, 2011. This challenge aroused a serious verbal conflict between Huang Chun-ming and Chiung Wi-vun. After this conflict, the Liberty Times firmly supported Chiung Wi-vun’s argument of promoting Taiwanese writing and also argued that Taiwanese is not a dialect of China as Taiwanese had absorbed aspects of many languages from the aborigines, the

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Netherlands, the Spanish and the Japanese. The Liberty Times thus condemned President Ma Ying-jeou’s policy to use “Minnan language” (Minnanyu 閩南語), “language of southern Fujian,” to refer to Hoklo. The newspaper argued that owing to Ma’s strong China identity, Ma and those China identity supporters would not like to see the growth of Taiwanese languages because that would help increase Taiwan identity and hinder China identity supporters from promoting Chinese culture and the idea that Taiwanese are descendants of the Yan Emperor and the Yellow Emperor (Liberty Times 2011a). As the peoples of Tibet and East Turkistan (Xinjiang) are different from Han Chinese, many Taiwan Independence proponents support and cooperate with the Free Tibet and East Turkistan independence movements. For instance, Taiwan Independence advocate Freddy Lim 林昶佐22 cooperated with the famous U.S. band, Beastie Boys, and the Milarepa Fund and obtained sponsorship from the Chen Shui-bian government to hold a Free Tibet Concert in Taipei in 2003.23 The Liberty Times also supported the spiritual leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, and the spiritual leader of the East Turkistan independence movement, Rebiya Kadeer. While many media were reporting favorably on the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, the Liberty Times reported, “Tibetan independence will be destroyed on the day that completed Qinghai-Tibet Railway starts to operate” (Qingcangtielu kaitongri Xicang duli miewangshi 青藏鐵路開通日 西藏獨立 滅亡時) to argue that not only did the construction of this railway seriously impact Tibet’s culture and ecology, but even destroyed Tibet’s hope for independence (Liberty Times 2006a). With regard to the Ma Ying-jeou government’s disapproval of the Dalai Lama’s visiting Taiwan in December 2008, the Liberty Times condemned Ma Ying-jeou for ingratiating himself with China. The Liberty Times argued that western countries welcome the Dalai Lama regardless of China’s complaints and pressure, but accused Ma Ying-jeou of surrendering Taiwan’s sovereignty to China (Liberty Times 2008). In September 2009, Freddy Lim planned to invite Rebiya Kadeer to visit Taiwan. The Ma Ying-jeou government, however, announced its disapproval of this idea, stating that Rebiya Kadeer has relations with terrorist organizations. The Liberty Times defended Rebiya Kadeer saying that, besides China, only the Ma Yingjeou government considered Rebiya Kadeer to be a terrorist. The Liberty Times 22

23

Freddy Lim is a young leader of the Taiwan Independence Movement. He is lead vocalist in the internationally known black metal band, CHTHONIC. Black metal is a kind of heavy metal. He has also been the Chairman of the Taiwan Branch of the Amnesty International since 2010. The concert was held on April 20, 2003, just following the Tokyo Free Tibet Concert on April 19, 2003.

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also said that Rebiya Kadeer had not even applied for a visitor visa when the Ma Ying-jeou government declined it. As the Ma Ying-jeou government also claimed it is illegal to advocate Xinjiang independence according to the Constitution of the Republic of China, the Liberty Times suspected that Ma Yingjeou stands with China and provocatively asked, “Can we reasonably suspect Ma Ying-jeou is a communist spy?” as a way to criticize Ma Ying-jeou (Liberty Times 2009). In short, the Liberty Times always followed both Taiwanese Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, and later sided with the opposition against President Ma Ying-jeou after 2008. Above all, today’s Liberty Times endorses all proTaiwan identity discourse against unification as well as supports both the Tibet and the East Turkistan independence movements against China. The Capital Morning Post Kang Ning-hsiang established the Capital Morning Post (Shoudu zaobao 首都 早報) in June 1989, but closed it on August 27, 1990.24 In its opening statement on June 1, 1989, Kang Ning-hsiang declared the Capital Morning Post to be a newspaper belonging to Taiwan’s society. According to an interview with Kang Ning-hsiang, the opposition, including himself, advocated lifting the press bans during the martial law period. He went on to set up the Capital Morning Post after the lifting of the press bans (Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥 2009). The Capital Morning Post inherited the spirit of the opposition magazines and its coverage and discourse was more progressive than other newspapers. The characteristics of the newspaper kept the style derived from the Taiwan Political Review in the mid-1970s and the Eighties series of magazines which were published by Kang Ning-hsiang during the martial law period. Chiou Chwei-liang, an editorial writer of the Capital Morning Post, argued that the Capital Morning Post intended to promote democracy more than it did Taiwanese nationalism. Yet, when the Capital Morning Post started publishing, it strongly supported national self-determination based on democracy and published many Taiwan identity articles to show its strong Taiwanese consciousness (Chiou Chwei-liang 邱垂亮 2010). According to the Editor-in-Chief, Jung Fu-tien 戎撫天, Kang Ning-hsiang suggested journalists and editors not defend Taiwan Independence. Later the Capital Morning Post turned to promoting strong Taiwan identity and even defended Taiwan Independence in order to occupy a market distinct from other newspapers (Jung Fu-tien 戎撫 天 2011). Despite its brief history in Taiwan, the Capital Morning Post played a vital role in Taiwanese history similar to that of the Taiwan Political Review. 24

The Capital Morning Post began a trial run from May 4, 1989.

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The Construction of Taiwan Identity and the Promotion of a Democracy-Based Taiwan Independence When discussing the newspapers and even democracy after democratization, the Capital Morning Post has been regarded by researchers as being important owing to its historical and political force. Generally speaking, the Capital Morning Post showed a concern for democracy. The most famous incident was the Capital Morning Post’s objection to General Hao Po-tsun’s 郝柏村 appointment as Taiwan’s Premier, when the Capital Morning Post used only seven characters, “Fuck! Oppose military men forming the cabinet!” (Gan fandui junrenzuge 幹 反對軍人組閣), on its front page to show its anger on May 3, 1990 (Chang Fu-chung 張富忠 & Chiu Wan-hsing 邱萬興 2005:110). In fact, compared with other Taiwan identity newspapers, the Capital Morning Post demonstrated a consistent and solid discourse in constructing Taiwan identity. To begin with, it was the first newspaper to use the term “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China, indicating that Taiwan was not a part of China. Secondly, it invited many Taiwan identity academics to write columns recounting Taiwanese history and introducing Taiwanese culture so as to promote a Taiwan identity. For the purpose of forming a Taiwan identity, the Capital Morning Post discussed aspects of Taiwan’s culture, and special topics about Taiwan’s future. It also introduced the concept of Taiwan Independence. The Capital Morning Post published many articles arguing that the KMT used traditional Taiwanese religion and gods, e.g. Matsu, Kuan Kung and the Jade Emperor, to connect Taiwan and China. They also condemned the KMT for confusing cultural identity and national identity and for the KMT’s long-standing Chinese cultural propaganda in education and media intentionally associating Taiwanese culture with the Chinese nation. The KMT’s Chinese cultural propaganda demoted Taiwanese culture to be subordinate to Chinese culture, and considered the Taiwanese people to be genuine – albeit culturally inferior – Chinese according to such propaganda. In addition, these articles censured the KMT’s Chinese nationalism for degrading Taiwan to be a peripheral area of China. Most importantly, these articles were trying to correct the “evil legacy” of the KMT’s cultural propaganda so as to strive for the survival and dignity of Taiwan’s culture, history and languages (Capital Morning Post 1990a; Huang Mei-ing 黃美英 1989; Huang Ya-hui 黃雅慧 1989; Lee Hsiao-feng 李筱峰 1989; Luo Chao-chin 羅肇錦 1990). The special topic of constructing a Taiwan identity and promoting democracy was a main feature of the Capital Morning Post. It published a series of articles entitled “Deliberation on Taiwan’s Future” (Taiwan qiantu tantao 台灣 前途探討) to discuss Taiwan’s future from its first trial issue on May 4, 1989. This discourse about Taiwan’s future continued for more than half a year. For

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example, the Capital Morning Post published Lei Chen’s blueprint for a Chinese Taiwan Democratic Nation (Zhonghua Taiwan minzhuguo 中華台灣民 主國) on May 4, 1989; through this piece the Capital Morning Post encouraged Taiwan’s people to ponder Taiwan’s future. Human rights were another concern for the Capital Morning Post. During July 8-10, 1989, it published three articles to discuss Taiwan’s sovereignty and human rights, which were written by the President of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights and the later Secretary-General of the Taiwan Independence Party, Li Sheng-hsiung 李勝雄 who argued that Taiwan becoming an independent country is the only way to protect the human rights of the Taiwanese people. Li Sheng-hsiung argued that under the KMT’s authoritarian rule with its One-China Principle, the human rights of many Taiwan Independence and democratic movement supporters had been severely abused. Li further stated that China’s intimidation of Taiwan would not only threaten Taiwan’s security but could also violate the Taiwanese people’s human rights if the CCP annexed Taiwan. As a result, Li believed only an independent Taiwan could protect ­Taiwanese human rights. In addition, the Capital Morning Post published two articles on July 24 and 25, 1989 to discuss the idea of “One Country, Two Governments” (Yiguo liangfu 一國兩府), written by pro-Taiwan Independence academic Hsiao Harry Hsinyi 蕭欣義, who argued for the possibility of Taiwan Independence. Actually, the discourse about the “Deliberation on Taiwan’s Future” had many aspects such as the notion of dual recognition, the Treaty of San Francisco and Taiwan’s sovereignty, direct election for Taiwan’s president and so forth. In addition, relations between opposition movements and Mainlanders regarding Taiwan Independence were other concerns of the Capital Morning Post relating to Taiwan’s future. The Capital Morning Post also invited many pro-Taiwan Independence academics and those on blacklists to publish articles defending Taiwan Independence. It even published Lin I-hsiung’s Draft for the Basic Law of the Republic of Taiwan in November 1989 (Lin I-hsiung 林義雄 1989). In addition, the Capital Morning Post also criticized the KMT’s anti-Taiwan Independence propaganda and showed its support for Taiwan’s “self-determination.” Some examples of this are the Capital Morning Post’s condemnation of the ROC military for putting both Taiwan Independence and the DPP on the list of enemies and arguing that the military should be the military of Taiwan’s people and not just the KMT (Capital Morning Post 1989c). In September 1989, the Capital Morning Post cited the efforts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to become independent from the USSR as models for Taiwan’s self-determination. In this editorial, the Capital Morning Post further suggested that Taiwan’s people should abandon

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Chinese racism and push Taiwanization (Bentuhua 本土化) (Capital Morning Post 1989a). The Capital Morning Post would not consider the KMT regime to be a legal regime in Taiwan unless the KMT made political reforms. The Capital Morning Post said that Taiwan’s people finally embraced freedom and democracy, but it still considered the KMT to be a colonial regime over Taiwan owing to the fact that the National Assembly members and legislators elected in China still dominated Taiwan’s parliamentary organs. The Capital Morning Post suggested that the “senior representatives” should retire. A legitimate Taiwanese ruling power must be elected by Taiwanese only (Capital Morning Post 1989d). Finally, to defend the freedom of advocating Taiwan Independence, the Capital Morning Post argued that people had the right to advocate Taiwan Independence and condemned both the KMT and the CCP’s suppression of Taiwan Independence (Capital Morning Post 1989b). In the perspective of the Capital Morning Post, only a colonial regime would accuse Taiwan Independence of rebellion. The Capital Morning Post further suggested that advocacy of Taiwan Independence was democratic, not violent or rebellious (Capital Morning Post 1990b, 1990c). In contrast to other Taiwan identity newspapers, the Capital Morning Post revealed a strong Taiwan identity during the early period of democratization. The Capital Morning Post showed itself as a pioneer in defending advocacy of Taiwan Independence, a topic some Taiwan identity newspapers still considered taboo. The Apple Daily Politically, most people in Taiwan consider the Apple Daily (Pinguo ribao 蘋果 日報) to be a politically neutral newspaper, though some people believe the Apple Daily has always supported the KMT at crucial moments. In an interview, a former journalist of the Apple Daily, Chung Nien-huang, said that the Apple Daily supported Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, but that the Apple Daily came to criticize Ma Ying-jeou because Ma’s China policy was so close to China as to neglect Taiwan’s sovereignty (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2010). In 2012, in my assessment, the Apple Daily showed it was neutral in its discourse in Taiwan’s presidential campaign. As Anthonio Chiang argues, the Apple Daily sides with Taiwan identity advocating a Greater Taiwanism, but the Apple Daily is also a market-oriented newspaper not very much focused on national identity. Still, as indicated by the contents of the Apple Daily, the Apple Daily should be deemed a Taiwan identity newspaper. First of all, the Apple Daily uses the word “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China. Secondly, it places news of China in its

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international news pages. In contrast, the Hong Kong Apple Daily puts the news of both Taiwan and China on the page of Cross-Strait news. The former Publisher of the Taiwan Apple Daily, Tu Nien-chung, said that because most Taiwanese people considered China to be a country separate from Taiwan, the Taiwan Apple Daily has to respect and support the separate identity of Taiwanese people (Tu Nien-chung 杜念中 2009). Thirdly, the Apple Daily opened a column of Yu Ai-tai 余艾苔 to show the Apple Daily’s love of Taiwan, because Yu Ai-tai 余艾苔 is homophonous of “I love Taiwan” (Yu’aitai 余愛台) (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中 2011). Finally, as Tu Nien-chung argues, the Apple Daily supports the particular national identity that most Taiwanese people support, and most Taiwanese people demonstrably support Taiwan identity. Market-Oriented – A Newspaper for Most Taiwanese People’s Identity Unlike other newspapers, the Apple Daily does not stress political news, nor does it stress national identity. The Apple Daily only follows what most Taiwanese people favor. In politics, most Taiwanese people dislike the Chinese government, are fed up with radical political advocacy, enjoy freedom, democracy and human rights and believe themselves to be Taiwanese. Consequently, the Apple Daily makes efforts to satisfy such a market in Taiwan. For instance, the Apple Daily, on the ROC’s 100th National Day in 2011, praised the DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen’s recognition of the Republic of China during the presidential campaign. The Apple Daily believed that although Tsai’s announcement of “Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan” would anger radical Pan-Green voters, her announcement was a big 100th birthday gift to the Republic of China (Apple Daily 2011a). On January 9, 2012, the Apple Daily provided readers with two front pages entitled “blue edition” (lanban 藍版) and “green edition” (lüban 綠版) during the 2012 presidential campaign. Both the KMT and the DPP presidential candidates mobilized thousands of supporters to hold rallies all over Taiwan on January 8, the last Sunday before voting day, and the Apple Daily produced two front pages with different headlines on the next day to satisfy both pro-PanBlue and pro-Pan-Green readers. Because an April 2012 survey in Taipei City showed that only 7.6 per cent of Taiwanese people can sing the Song of the National Flag (Guoqige 國旗歌) of the ROC, the Apple Daily argued that this song and the ROC National Anthem are the “absurd products” (huangmiu chanwu 荒謬產物) of the authoritarian period. The Apple Daily believed that half of Taiwanese people did not identify

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with the national anthem and the national flag because both belonged to the KMT (Apple Daily 2012b). Being a market-oriented newspaper, the Apple Daily does not hesitate to criticize China. However, it is mild on the issue of national identity reflecting most Taiwanese people’s sense of identity – a support for Taiwan’s status quo. This perspective of the Apple Daily truly reflects the attitude of most Taiwanese people toward China and their mild form of Taiwan identity. For example, the Apple Daily suggested that Chen Shui-bian should not agree to the radical Taiwan Independence camp’s proposal of a new Constitution for independence in 2004 because no more than 20 per cent of Taiwanese people supported an announcement of immediate independence (Apple Daily 2004). In 2006, the Apple Daily argued that Chen Shui-bian’s decision to end the functioning of the National Unification Commission would anger the Americans as a change to Taiwan’s status quo (Apple Daily 2006). Owing to China’s frequent claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, the Apple Daily criticized China’s lack of understanding of Taiwan. It remarked that the level of public support for unification is the lowest ever, and that the support rate for “Taiwan Independence provided that there was no threat from China” had reached 70 per cent. The Apple Daily further pointed out that China’s representatives totally misunderstood Taiwan at a Cross-Strait conference (Apple Daily 2009b). The Apple Daily questioned Ma Ying-jeou about surrendering the ROC or Taiwan’s sovereignty to China. Thus in 2010, the Apple Daily criticized the Ma Ying-jeou government’s celebration of the 100th birthday of the Republic of China, the official country title of Taiwan. It condemned the Ma regime for its weakness in failing to wave the national flag, sing the national anthem and talk about the establishment of the state when dealing with the People’s Republic of China (Apple Daily 2010d). In response to the “One Country, Two Areas” statements, the Apple Daily suggested that this was a conspiracy of both the CCP and the KMT to tackle the DPP (Apple Daily 2012c). To show disappointment with China and to warn Taiwanese about the problem of unification, the Apple Daily cited many conflicts between the people of Hong Kong and China. In early 2012, many conflicts between Hong Kong and China angered the people of Hong Kong.25 In addition, according to a poll of the University of Hong Kong in December 2011, 37.7 per cent of Hong Kong 25

For example, Kong Qingdong 孔庆东, a Peking University academic, supposedly de­­ scended from Confucius, lashed out at the Hong Kong people’s use of Cantonese (as opposed to the standard Chinese lingua franca) and claimed on TV in January 2012 that “many Hong Kong people are bastards, dogs and thieves.” In addition, more and more pregnant Chinese women occupy Hong Kong’s hospital beds to use Hong Kong’s medical

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residents consider themselves to be Hong Kong citizens but only 16.6 per cent believe themselves to be Chinese citizens. Beijing lashed out at this identity survey (Simpson 2012).26 Consequently, the tension has triggered a cyber-war between Hong Kong and Chinese Internet users. The Apple Daily quoted this survey and these problems to show the people of Hong Kong’s resentment of the “mother nation” and further argued that China’s arrogance and threats toward Taiwan also help to increase the numbers of supporters of Taiwan Independence. The Apple Daily cited a phrase from Eric Hobsbawm’s The Age of Empire 1875-1914, “Run away, the fatherland is coming,” as a metaphor to describe the relationship between Taiwan and China. They asserted that once China unites with Taiwan, Taiwan would become another Hong Kong, “where even dogs or pigs are bullied and killed by the fatherland – China” (Apple Daily 2012e). Although the Apple Daily can be considered a Taiwan identity newspaper as it prioritizes Taiwanese identity in its coverage and editorials, it also attempts to show the diversity of voices in Taiwan. Sometimes, it also uses some terms that only China identity media use. As an example, the entertainment pages of the Apple Daily sometimes used the term Neidi to refer to China, and the sporting pages, sometimes, also use Neidi to name China when Taiwanese athletes play for professional sporting teams in China. In addition, the Apple Daily invites a variety of people to write columns such as the pro-independence Lin Cho-shui 林濁水 and the pro-unificationist Jaw Shao-kong 趙少康 and Chen Wen-chien 陳文茜. Most importantly, in dealing with political affairs, the Apple Daily always put such universal values as democracy, freedom and human rights ahead of identity. On June 4, 2009, the 20th anniversary of Tiananmen Square Massacre, the Apple Daily condemned the Ma Ying-jeou government for keeping silent on this tragedy (Apple Daily 2009a). Owing to Taiwan’s freedom of the press continuing to regress under Ma Ying-jeou’s ruling, the Apple Daily has often heavily condemned the Ma Ying-jeou government for pressuring media, guiding media coverage and violating freedom of speech (Apple Daily 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011b). Another story also indicated the Apple Daily’s concerns on human rights and freedom of speech. A retired general of the Taiwan Air Force, Hsia Ying-chou 夏瀛洲, claimed in Xi’an, China on February 9, 2012, that the ROC

26

service as well as to obtain Hong Kong residency for their children. Many people in Hong Kong are also upset that Chinese tourists do not obey social customs in Hong Kong. According to this poll, 37.7% identify as Hong Kong citizens, 25.3% as Chinese Hong Kong citizens, 17.8% as Hong Kong Chinese citizens, 16.6% as Chinese citizens, 0.6% other and 2.1% no response (The University of Hong Kong 2011).

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military shares the same goal as the PRC military – to pursue unification of the Chinese nation. The Apple Daily strongly condemned Hsia’s statement in China, but the Apple Daily also firmly defended Hsia’s right to free speech (Apple Daily 2012d). In accordance with these arguments on universal values, the Apple Daily has shown a unique stance toward political issues and made itself distinct from other newspapers in Taiwan. The Apple Daily reduced greatly the market shares of both the China identity United Daily News and the China Times. It also brought a new style of newspaper to Taiwan with many photos. This practice has influenced other newspapers such as the entertainment pages of the Liberty Times. However, despite the Apple Daily’s popularity among Taiwanese, the owner, Jimmy Lai decided to sell the paper in 2012. There were many reasons for Lai selling Taiwan Next Media, the main motivation being the huge losses of Next TV (Yi dianshi 壹電視). Jimmy Lai established Next TV in July 2009 but did not receive a broadcasting licence until July 2011. Lai believed the Ma Ying-jeou government was tightening controls on Taiwan's press and intentionally obstructing Next TV’s license application (Lai 2010). In addition, most of Taiwan’s cable systems, which are largely under the control of Tsai Eng-meng’s Want China Times Group, e.g. the China Network Systems (Zhongjia wangle 中 嘉網路), blocked Next TV after it received the license, further contributing to Next Media’s losses. In an interview, Antonio Chiang suggested that three factors are involved in Jimmy Lai’s decision to sell Next Media. The first is the huge losses mentioned above. The second is that Lai had grown tired of fighting the Ma Ying-jeou government and the Want China Times Group. Third, Jimmy Lai was disappointed with Taiwan’s democracy, which happened to be the reason for Lai coming to Taiwan in 2001. Chiang further added that the KMT actively suppresses Next Media while the DPP does not offer any support and thus such a political environment may also have been a factor in Lai stepping away (Chiang 2012).27 The Decline of Opposition Magazines During the martial law period, opposition magazines were the most significant Taiwan identity media. The mid-1970s to the late 1980s was a splendid age for the opposition magazines. However, these magazines gradually vanished with 27

After several months, this controversial media deal collapsed. Jimmy Lai only sold Next TV to ERA Chairman Lien Tai-sheng on June 1, 2013.

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the advent of democratization. Beginning in the early 1990s, with the lifting of newspaper bans and a rise in the popularity of opposition radio media, the role of the opposition magazines was supplanted by both Taiwan identity news­ papers and underground radio stations, which had content that was almost identical to the opposition magazines. Many proprietors of the opposition magazines such as Kang Ning-hsiang, Chang Chun-hung and Chen Shui-bian switched their interests to newspapers or underground radio. As discussed above, Kang Ning-hsiang was the founder of the Capital Morning Post and Chang Chun-hung was a pioneer of underground radio. Chen Shui-bian cooperated with many Taiwan Independence supporters to establish the famous Taiwan New Telecommunication (Baodao xinsheng guangbo diantai 寶島新 聲廣播電台; TNT). Underground radio would have an important impact on the Taiwan identity political magazines as the underground radio was free and easily received by audiences, which included large numbers of Hoklo speaking elderly Taiwanese. Despite the opposition magazines no longer playing an important part in Taiwan after Lee Teng-hui came to power, some people still tried to publish Taiwan identity political magazines such as the Taiwan Epoch (Taiwan chunqiu 台灣春秋; October 1988-May 1990) and the New Culture (Xinwenhua 新文化; March 1989-1990). Along with the growth of Taiwan identity from the early 1990s under Lee Teng-hui’s policy, Koo Kuan-min 辜寬敏28 tried to re-build the glory of the opposition magazines in 1993. Ku thus established the Taiwan Weekly (Heibai xinwen zhoukan 黑白新聞週刊) in October 1993, but this ceased publication in 1995. Another Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan Independence Movement supporter, Chan Hsi-kuei 詹錫奎, published the New Taiwan Weekly (Xin Taiwan xinwen zhoukan 新台灣新聞週刊), a publication which stood against the Chinese military exercises during the first Taiwan presidential campaign, in March 1996.29 The New Taiwan Weekly announced itself as a political magazine which adopted both justice and a Taiwan identity. The New Taiwan Weekly tried to construct a Taiwan identity through its discourse in editorials, columns, and Taiwanese culture and history pages. In addition, the New Taiwan Weekly often introduced stories on many respected 28

29

Koo Kuan-min (1926- ) is a senior member of the DPP and a famous business man. He has been devoted to the Taiwan Independence Movement for dozens of years and was the Chairman of the Taiwan Society of Youth, a pro-Taiwan Independence organization in Japan, in the 1960s. Chan Hsi-kuei (1952- ), a writer, is well-known by his penname, Lao Bao 老包, in Taiwan. He was the Editor-in-Chief of the New Taiwan Weekly. Chan Hsi-kuei is also a firm supporter of Frank Hsieh.

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Taiwanese politicians, writers, artists, musicians and even rock music bands. The New Taiwan Weekly believed it could arouse the Taiwanese people’s passion or consciousness on Taiwan identity through these contexts, and it tried to survive despite its financial difficulties. However, the New Taiwan Weekly finally closed down in December 2008. The New Taiwan Weekly claimed that it was suppressed by the China identity Ma Ying-jeou government and therefore had to close down (Chao Ching-yu 趙靜瑜 2008). According to an interview, the magazine’s advertisers faced pressure from the Ma Ying-jeou government; as a result, financial debt forced this biggest Taiwan identity magazine, to close its doors. When the DPP was in power, the New Taiwan Weekly’s advertisement revenue was largely derived from state-run industries or business, such as the ­Chinese Petroleum Corporation, the TAIYEN Corporation (Taiwan Salt Corporation), the China Steel Corporation and the First Bank. In fact, however, the New Taiwan Weekly had previously encountered serious financial difficulties between early 2006 and early 2007 because of its firm support for Frank Hsieh. According to an interview, Hsieh’s rival, Su Tseng-chang, served as the Premier during 2006 and early 2007, while President Chen Shui-bian also favored Su Tseng-chang for the DPP’s 2008 presidential election nomination. The New ­Taiwan Weekly’s support for Frank Hsieh led it to encounter problems with retaining sponsorship from many state-run business until mid-2007 (Li Hsin-yi 李心怡 2009).30 The New Taiwan Weekly claimed its circulation reached a ­figure of 85,000 but this circulation could not be sustained. Unlike the op­­ position magazines during the martial law period, a Taiwan identity political magazine in the democratic period needed advertisement income to survive. According to Chia Tek-chiam, the underground radio stations also affected the viability of the Taiwan identity political magazines (Chia ­Tek-khiam 謝德謙 2009). Consequently, later Taiwan identity political magazines did not play an important role in Taiwan when compared to their forerunners during the martial law period. Underground Radio Stations The underground radio stations were popular from the early 1990s, reaching a peak during the mid-1990s. Most were Taiwan identity broadcasters. Because it 30

The New Taiwan Weekly supported Lee Teng-hui in long-term. In 2000, the New Taiwan Weekly also considered the KMT presidential candidate Lien Chan as an “acceptable” candidate because Lee Teng-hui nominated Lien Chan to run in 2000.

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is cheaper and easier to run an underground radio station, many members of the opposition turned away from the magazines that had been popular from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s to utilize underground radio stations to promote democracy. In the meantime, Taiwan identity and even the Taiwan Independence Movement grew rapidly after Lee Teng-hui’s lifting of the black lists, which prohibited many overseas Taiwanese from returning to Taiwan and his release of documents on the 228 Massacre. In this wave of Taiwan identity, the underground radio stations gradually adopted Taiwan identity and Taiwan Independence as their themes. However, Chia Tek-khiam 謝德謙 argues that before the mid-1990s the underground radio stations just repeated the contents of the opposition magazines (Chia Tek-khiam 謝德謙 2009).31 In addition, Lee Hsiao-feng 李筱峰 believes the Amendment of Criminal Code Article 100 also allowed Taiwanese people to advocate openly Taiwan Independence enabling the underground radio stations to propagate Taiwan Independence (Lee Hsiao-feng 李筱峰 2009). Taiwan identity underground radio propagandized strong Taiwan identity through programs and activities. The main content of these programs was to discuss news with a perspective of Taiwan identity and even Taiwan Independence, and only a few programs focused on Taiwanese culture, history and folk songs. But, much of this content criticized the KMT and Mainlanders. In discussing underground radio and its relationship with DPP politicians and election campaigns, it is more worthwhile to analyze the identity of underground radio stations and their changing political stances. Although there were many Taiwan identity underground radio stations in the 1990s, I will take the famous Taiwan New Telecommunication as an example to analyze the relationship between the underground radio stations, DPP politicians and Taiwan identity. Some pro-Taiwan Independence organizations and activists organized TNT in late 1993 (Dniux Sow-huaa 張素華 2009) and TNT started to broadcast from March 1994. Many underground radio stations applied for licenses under Lee Teng-hui’s policy of legalizing underground radio stations during the mid1990s; however, TNT refused to legalize its status under the law of the Republic of China until 2003. Being a Taiwan identity underground radio station, the main language used by TNT was Hoklo Taiwanese.32 TNT was labeled an underground radio of 31

32

Chia Tek-khiam is a member of the International Federation of Journalists and was the Director of the News Department of the Taiwan New Telecommunication between March 1998 and January 2003. TNT also set up two subsidiary stations, the Taiwanese Mandarin Station (Huayutai 華語 台) and the Hakka Station, but they became independent from TNT. The TNT Taiwanese

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“radical Taiwan Independence” in Taiwan. It was run by 17 representatives (Yu Shu-yen 尤淑嬿 2005). The main operators included Chen Shui-bian’s Formosa Foundation, the Goa-Seng-Lang Association For Taiwan Independence, the Taiwan Association of University Professors, some DPP politicians, and other pro-Taiwan Independence activists. At the end of 1994, however, a big shock struck TNT. Chen Shui-bian won the Taipei City mayoral election in December 1994 and Chen Shui-bian, Chen’s followers, and some DPP politicians suddenly withdrew their support of TNT following the election victory. According to Dniux Sow-huaa 張素華,33 a former TNT director, critics said that Chen Shui-bian had “betrayed” his comrades in the pro-Taiwan Independence underground radio stations in order to begin his “middle way” policy (Dniux Sow-huaa 張素華 2009). Many DPP politicians were originally partners of many underground radio stations, but after the DPP and its main leaders adopted new policies for elections after 1995, the DPP decided to distance itself from the radical pro-Taiwan Independence camps including the underground radio stations. After 1995, TNT considered that more and more policies of the DPP betrayed Taiwanese. For example, the DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh 施明德, together with the pro-unification Chinese New Party, launched a “Grand Reconciliation” (da hejie 大和解) and a “Grand Coalition” (da lianhe 大聯合) in 1995 when the DPP cooperated with the Chinese New Party against the KMT in the election for the Speaker of the new Legislature on February 1, 1996 (Jacobs 2012:102). Further, when Lee Teng-hui launched the “Avoid Haste, Exercise Patience” (jiejiyongren 戒急用忍) policy toward Taiwanese business investment in China, the DPP Chairman, Hsu Hsin-liang, piloted a blueprint of “Boldly Going West” (dadan xijin 大膽西進) in 1997 altering Taiwan’s protective economic stance toward China in contradiction to Lee Teng-hui’s cautious China policy. While Hsu’s policy was to open Taiwan’s door widely to China, the DPP revised Hsu’s policy to “Strengthen the Base and Head West” (qiangben xijin 強本西進) in 1998. Finally, this series of DPP’s policies infuriated ­pro-Taiwan Independence underground radio stations including TNT. As a consequence, TNT often castigated the DPP as being a betrayer of Taiwan as well as an opportunist without any ideals for Taiwan Independence. In 1998, many anchor-persons of the Taiwan identity underground radio stations including TNT often criticized Chen Shui-bian during the Taipei City

33

Mandarin Station was run by the Goa-Seng-Lang Association For Taiwan Independence but closed in 1996. The TNT Hakka Station (the current Formosa Hakka Radio Station) became independent from TNT in 1994. Dniux Sow-huaa was the Director of TNT between 1996 and 2002.

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mayoral campaign; but, interestingly, they supported Frank Hsieh for the Kaohsiung City mayoral campaign.34 In contrast, these underground radio stations, except the Nation-Building Forum (Taiwanese: Kiàn-kok-kóng-tiûⁿ 建國廣場), supported Chen Shui-bian in his run for the president in 2000. The Nation-Building Forum was originally a weekly program of TNT, but the Nation-Building Forum set itself up as a radio station in 1996. Being an illegal underground radio station, the Nation-Building Forum was frequently banned by the Taiwan government until it closed down on April 12, 2010 because of a shortage of funds.35 However, the Nation-Building Forum re-established its voice through the Internet from September 2010. In fact, the Nation-Building Forum consistently condemned the DPP and Chen Shui-bian since the DPP’s reconciliation policy of 1995, and Chen Shui-bian’s change to the middle-way policy away from Taiwan Independence. The Nation-Building Forum refused to compromise between the Taiwan Independence Movement and the DPP during elections; as a consequence, the Nation-Building Forum never supported the DPP in any election. Ironically, TNT supported Chen Shui-bian’s campaign for 2000, but the Chen Shui-bian government nevertheless banned TNT in January 2001 and March 2002. The action of Chen Shui-bian against TNT enraged many pro-Taiwan Independence activists and underground radio stations. On the other hand, TNT decided to apply for a license as a state-owned public broadcasting station from 2001 because the DPP had come to power and TNT considered that a pro-Taiwanese outlook had taken power from the KMT. But the DPP government did not support its idea of being a public broadcasting station. Later, TNT changed its plan and became a commercial broadcasting station, receiving a license in November 2003. TNT thus became a commercial broadcasting station and its funds no longer depended on donations, but on advertising income. In 2004, the commercial Super 99.1 (Daqian diantai 大千電台) invested in TNT and TNT then transformed itself into a broadcaster of music as well as changing its English name to Super FM 98.5, though it kept the same Chinese name. The new Director of Super FM 98.5, Lai Ching-hsien 賴靜 嫻, agreed with my observation that the new TNT (Super FM 98.5) wanted to mainly play music similar to the famous China identity commercial radio 34

35

Generally speaking, most Taiwan identity radio stations supported Frank Hsieh; but the Voice of Taiwan (Taiwanese: Tâi-ôan-chi-siaⁿ 台灣之聲), led by Hsu Jung-chi 許榮棋 always criticized Frank Hsieh. On December 28, 2009, the KMT government confiscated the radio equipment of the Nation-Building Forum. The Nation-Building Forum could not afford expensive equipment without donations and thus closed down.

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station, UFO (Lai Ching-hsien 賴靜嫻 2010).36 This historical moment presaged the end of the pro-Taiwan Independence TNT. Nevertheless, Lai Chinghsien argued in an interview that Super FM 98.5 was still a Taiwan identity broadcasting station (Lai Ching-hsien 賴靜嫻 2010). Currently, Super FM 98.5 plays mainly Taiwanese popular and folk song programs, and has adopted a mild Taiwan identity in its news coverage as well as in its news talk programs. The transition of TNT had an impact on pro-Taiwan Independence activists in the underground radio stations, causing many anchors to move to Happy Radio (Kuaile lianbowang 快樂聯播網) to speak for Taiwan Independence. To date, Happy Radio has become a famous pro-Taiwan Independence radio station and many deep Green politicians and Taiwan Independence activists host programs on this station. The Taiwan Independence supporter, Chen Shihmeng 陳師孟, former Sectary-General of the Presidential Office, also organized the Green Beans Talk (Lüse douzhen 綠色逗陣) to produce programs playing at Happy Radio. In an interview, Chen Shih-meng said that the Green Beans Talk only raised funds to support itself until the 2012 presidential campaign. He said that the main purpose of the Green Beans Talk was to promote Taiwan identity and to solidify the Taiwan identity supporters for the DPP candidate running for election in 2012 (Chen Shih-meng 陳師孟 2009).37 Significantly, as argued above, many personnel of Taiwan identity underground radio stations and Taiwan Independence activists condemned Chen Shui-bian for betraying Taiwan Independence after elections in 1998 and 2000, though these activists supported Chen Shui-bian after his corruption scandal emerged in 2006. Happy Radio replaced TNT and Super FM 98.5 in the role of promoting Taiwan identity and Taiwan Independence. However, many Taiwan Independence activists criticized both Super FM 98.5 and Happy Radio. The former Director of TNT News Department, Chia Tek-khiam, argued that radio stations used Taiwan identity to make money (Chia Tek-khiam 謝德謙 2009). Some criticized Happy Radio as it sold time slots to Taiwan identity supporters just to make money. Further, both Super FM 98.5 and Happy Radio played advertisements for ECFA, and this also brought a lot of criticism. In contrast, the director of Super FM 98.5, Lai Ching-hsien, argued that Super FM 98.5 was a commercial radio station like Happy Radio. She emphasized that both Super 36

37

Former Chinese New Party Secretary-General Jaw Shao-kong 趙少康 founded the UFO in 1996 as a commercial radio station for music, but the UFO subsequently adopted a China identity in its news reports and its daily news talk programs. After the DPP lost the 2012 presidential campaign, the Green Beans Talk decided to continue to operate.

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FM 98.5 and Happy Radio needed advertising income to survive, but they did not desert their Taiwan identity. Lai Ching-hsien also argued that Super FM 98.5 refused Ma Ying-jeou’s advertisement in the 2008 campaign and also used the term “China” to refer to the PRC (Lai Ching-hsien 賴靜嫻 2010). In conclusion, TNT played a significant part in constructing a Taiwan identity and opposing the KMT’s identity through its programs before 2003 as an underground radio station. TNT, however, also had a number of conflicts with DPP members concerning Taiwan Independence and the DPP’s policy toward China. After the DPP came to power, the transition by Taiwan identity radio stations, including TNT, from non-profit to for-profit was condemned by Taiwan Independence activists for betraying Taiwan identity and the Taiwan Independence Movement. In fact, there were many Taiwan identity radio stations which had tension between identity and commercial interest. This phenomenon shows that becoming a business might deeply influence the survival of Taiwan identity radio stations. The evidence suggests that they could not survive solely through donations from supporters especially after the DPP came to power. As Dniux Sow-huaa argues, many Taiwan Independence supporters probably considered the rise to power of the DPP in 2000 meant victory for the pro-Taiwan Independence camp and donations to underground radio stations were no longer seen as necessary. This forced underground radio stations to apply for a license from the government and to obtain sponsorship from advertisers after the DPP came to power (Dniux Sow-huaa 張素華 2009). News Television Stations Formosa Television The birth of the fourth free-to-air TV station, Formosan Television Incorporated (Minshi 民視; FTV), in 1997 broke the monopoly of KMT’s control over free-to-air TV. Because the funds of FTV were raised from Taiwan identity people in the early 1990s, FTV announced itself as a Taiwanese TV station. FTV also clearly identified China as being a different country from Taiwan. The China identity and pro-Pan-Blue camp always criticized FTV as pro-independence and a pro-Pan-Green medium. FTV was also a successful business. It ran one free-to-air TV channel and one cable news TV channel. FTV produced many Taiwanese dramas and was very profitable from late 1998. The founder of FTV, Chai Trong-rong 蔡同榮 (1935-214; also known in English as Trong Chai), announced that the purpose of FTV was to protect Taiwan against China and to spread awareness of Taiwanese history, geography, culture, customs and languages. He stated that the principal goal of FTV was to

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construct Taiwanese nationalism (Chen Shu-chen 陳淑貞 2010:35). In order to defend Taiwan identity and establish Taiwanese nationalism, FTV utilized many means to integrate Taiwan identity into its programs. FTV produced Taiwanese dramas and made many weekly programs constructing a Taiwan identity. The “Taiwan Story” (Taiwan Yanyi 台灣演義), a famous weekly program, presented biographies of many Taiwanese notables, stories of important incidents, a narrative of Taiwan’s democratization such as the Kaohsiung Incident, the Dr Chen Wen-cheng Murder Case, the story of Dr George Leslie Mackay, the story of Chen Ding-nan 陳定南, the history of Taiwan’s elementary schools and the development of irrigation systems. The “Taiwan Story” is actually a documentary series on Taiwan history, but it also conducted an interview with the Dalai Lama which was aired on March 8, 2009 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Tibet uprising against China on March 10, 1959 and to show FTV’s support for Tibetan independence. FTV also produces many Taiwan identity programs, such as the Taiwan identity talk show “People’s Talk” and the commentary of pro-Taiwan Independence activists like Chen Lung-chu 陳 隆志 and Li Hung-hsi 李鴻禧.38 FTV also introduced the program “Taiwan’s World Perspective” in order to review international affairs from a Taiwanese perspective. Language is another concern for FTV in constructing a Taiwan identity. While FTV was using Hoklo as the main language in Taiwanese dramas and news reports in the late 1990s, the free-to-air TTV, CTV and CTS still considered Hoklo to be a dialect (Chen Hao 陳浩 2011). FTV produces many Hoklo speaking Taiwanese dramas as well as produces a daily Hoklo speaking news report, the Noon News.39 This Noon News was the first Taiwanese speaking news broadcast among Taiwan’s commercial TV stations. According to Chen Shuchen 陳淑貞, the anchor of the FTV Noon News, the fact that approximately 72-76 per cent of the population in Taiwan speak the both Hoklo and Mandarin Chinese resulted in the birth of the Noon News. She believes that this news program was both to grow the Taiwan identity of FTV audiences as well as a strategy to expand market share (Chen Shu-chen 陳淑貞 2010:109). Before democratization, Taiwanese native languages had been long suppressed in the media by the KMT. Jackie Harrison (2010:2-3) argues that the FTV Noon News contributed to Taiwan identity after the KMT’s long-term suppression of Taiwanese native languages as well as bringing about greater awareness of Taiwanese culture. 38 39

Chen Lung-chu was an academic at the New York Law School and Li Hung-hsi was professor at National Taiwan University. FTV titled its noon news the “Bilingual Noon News.”

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In summary, FTV endeavored to promote Taiwan identity by all means. However, many critics also emerged over FTV especially from the Taiwan identity camp. Under Chen Shui-bian’s media reform policy, the Legislative Yuan enacted the so-called “Regulation to Remove Political Parties, the Government and the Military from the Media” (Dangzhengjun tuichu meiti tiaokuan 黨政軍退出媒 體條款) in 2003. Many critics focused on the relationship between FTV and its founder Chai Trong-rong, who was a legislator and a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee (CSC) at the time. Despite Chai’s claim that he had withdrawn from FTV and stepped down as chairman,40 Chai still had an office at the station. Chai went to FTV frequently. According to Lim It-hong 林一 方,41 he even slept in his FTV office suite very often while the chairman of FTV, Tien Tsai-ting 田再庭, only went to the office one day per week (Lim It-hong 林一方 2010).42 Many sources indicated that Chai Trong-rong was the real boss of FTV, and Chai Trong-rong also used FTV as a bargaining chip to negotiate with the DPP politicians. For example, Chai wanted to renew his term as the DPP caucus leader of the Legislative Yuan in June 2010, causing his rivals in the DPP to criticize him because Chai hinted that the DPP needed FTV in the 2010 campaign for the mayors of the five special municipalities (Lin Ho-ming 林河名 & Chao Ta-chih 趙大智 2010). In July 2009, the Melbourne International Film Festival’s invitation to the film “The Ten Conditions of Love,” a documentary about the Uyghur East Turkistan independence movement spiritual leader Rebiya Kadeer, angered China. China thus boycotted this film festival and withdrew both Chinese and Hong Kong movies from it. Additionally, a Chinese hacker hacked into the official website of the Melbourne International Film Festival (Hsu Chien-jung 許 建榮 2009). The DPP decided to support Rebiya Kadeer and to launch the showing of this film around Taiwan from August 2009. In the DPP CSC, Luo Wen-jia 羅文嘉 suggested FTV broadcast this documentary, but Chai Trongrong declined to purchase it. Chai indicated his powerlessness within FTV to the DPP CSC, claiming he had no position in FTV (Luo Wen-jia 羅文嘉 2009). 40

41

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In December 2003, the Legislative Yuan amended three acts – the Cable Radio Act (You­ xian guangbo dianshi fa有線廣播電視法), the Radio and Television Act (Guangbo dianshi fa 廣播電視法) and the Satellite Broadcasting Act (Weixing guangbo dianshi fa 衛星 廣播電視法) to restrict political power in influencing media. Lim It-hong is a Taiwan Independence activist, who was the producer of “Very VCD” (feichang guangdie 非常光碟), a video which criticized the KMT Taoyuan County Magistrate candidate, Eric Chu 朱立倫, in the 2005 election campaign. Tien Tsai-ting lives in Taichung, but the FTV office is located in Taipei.

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According to some articles about FTV, Chai Trong-rong only influenced the News Department and could not sway other departments. Despite all Taiwan identity media opposing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), the Business Department of FTV won its bid for an ECFA advertisement project from the Ma Ying-jeou government, and it was alleged that the News Department fought with the Business Department about this. Some people in FTV argued that FTV should not have entered a bid for this project owing to its stance on Taiwan identity (Yen Chen-kai 顏振凱 & Chang Che-ming 張 哲鳴 2009). Furthermore, the Business Department asked the News Department to restrain its coverage of the DPP’s criticism of ECFA (Lin Cho-shui 林 濁水 2009). The ECFA incident was not the only case of conflict between business and identity. FTV also cooperated with the official Chinese TV station China Central Television (CCTV) in business, with CCTV playing some Taiwanese-speaking soap dramas obtained from FTV and dubbed in Mandarin Chinese (Feng 2009). Since doing business with CCTV probably violated Taiwan’s law, Lin Cho-shui 林濁水 criticized FTV for illegally cooperating with the official Chinese TV station to produce the drama “Dr. Dadaogong” (Shenyi dadaogong 神 醫大道公)43 as well as producing the ECFA advertisement in collaboration with the KMT so as to smear Taiwan identity Taiwanese (Lin Cho-shui 林濁水 2009).44 Although FTV was a Taiwan identity TV station, Chai Trong-rong trusted Chen Kang-hsin 陳剛信, who was considered to be a supporter of China identity and the Pan-Blue, to be the general manager. Chen Kang-hsin kept good relations with KMT politicians. For example, his daughter Chen Ying 陳瑩 was one of the hosts for the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou in 2008. According to an interview with Lim It-hong, Chen Kang-hsin designed the program for Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential inauguration of 2008 (Lim It-hong 林一方 2010).45 Lim It-hong argued that Chai Trong-rong needed Chen to help run the FTV business (Lim It-hong 林一方 2010). In addition, as with most electronic 43 44

45

This drama was also supervised by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China and some other organizations of the “United Front Work” in China. For this advertisement, FTV contrived a “non-standard Mandarin Chinese” speaking comic Taiwanese character who opposed ECFA. The character was poorly educated and short-sighted. This ethnic discrimination in the ECFA advertisement drew much criticism. Chen Kang-hsin might also have had relations with China. Another daughter, Chen Lin 陳 琳, married a Chinese businessman’s son, Shen Zhen 沈臻, in 2009. It was believed that the property of Shen’s father, Shen Wen 沈雯, was worth about RMB¥ 2,000,000,000 in 2009.

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media, the majority of the staff of FTV were pro-Pan-Blue and China identity. The chairman Tien Tsai-ting even joked that only the boss of FTV was PanGreen with a Taiwan identity and that most of the managers were closer to the Pan-Blue and most of the staff were close to the Chinese New Party (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2010). Kuan Chung-hsiang 管中祥, a media scholar, agreed with this viewpoint and maintained in his analysis that the staff tended to support the Pan-Blue, thus promoting the Chinese New Party in the 1990s (Kuan Chung-hsiang 管中祥 2010). This phenomenon was the “legacy” of the KMT’s long-term control over Taiwan’s electronic media especially in television. The Taiwan identity camp only had experience in running print media, e.g. the opposition magazines before the 1990s, but media and entertainment schools in Taiwan were almost all founded by the KMT or China identity supporters. As a result, there was a lack of Taiwan identity managers in television and entertainment. It is clear from the above arguments that FTV was a commercial TV station. Thus, it was obliged to pursue profits instead of asserting national identity as its objective. Although its news reports continued to stand on the side of Taiwan identity, its business department betrayed its supporters. Finally, when national identity conflicted with the business operations of FTV, the business side seems to have won. .

The Sanlih E-Television The main financial capital for establishing the Sanlih E-Television (Sanli dianshi 三立電視; SET) came from three persons, Lin Kun-hai 林崑海, Chang Hsiu 張秀 and Chang Jung-hua 張榮華. San 三 is “three” and Lih 立 means “establishment” in Taiwanese. Therefore, they named the station Sanlih.46 SET was originally a video tape production company of live shows founded in 1983 in Kaohsiung. SET established a cable entertainment TV station in 1993, and established a cable news channel in 1998. As SET, FTV and the Liberty Times often attacked President Ma Ying-jeou’s China-friendly policies, President Ma called the three media the “sandwich” (sanmingzhi 三明治), which sounds similar to sanminzi 三民自 – an abbreviation of SET, FTV and the Liberty Times – to ridicule these media, thus expressing his unhappiness with their criticism of him. This suggests SET is a pro-Pan-Green and a Taiwan identity TV station. In today’s Taiwan, Taiwanese people consider SET a pro-Pan-Green and Taiwan identity TV station, but SET’s political identity, relations with politicians and business with China have a complicated history. 46

Chang Hsiu is the wife of Lin Kun-hai and Chang Jung-hua is the brother of Chang Hsiu.

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The leadership of SET contains different political identities. The Chairman, Lin Kun-hai, has supported the Pan-Green since 2002, but the President, Chang Jung-hua, and the former Executive Vice-President, Su Li-mei 蘇麗媚,47 have always sided with the Pan-Blue. During the 2000 Taiwan presidential campaign, SET supported the China identity candidate James Soong, inviting only James Soong to visit the station (Chen Li-hung 陳立宏 2009).48 Lin Kun-hai was a KMT member until 2002, when he joined the DPP at the encouragement of Frank Hsieh. However, in the 2004 presidential campaign, SET did not show favoritism toward either the Pan-Blue or the Pan-Green camps. Its firmly pro-Pan-Green and pro-Taiwan stance began in 2005 when Lin Kun-hai’s good friend, Frank Hsieh, became Premier. SET’s famous talk show program, “Big Talk News” (Dahua xinwen 大話新聞) demonstrated SET’s political and national identity. The “Big Talk News” started in 2002, and began to reveal Pan-Green and Taiwan identity from 2005.49 Opportunism: Business is Identity Despite SET being labeled a Pan-Green and Taiwan identity TV station, according to a senior producer in SET most of the SET staff including President Chang Jung-hua and former Executive Vice-President Su Li-mei did not support the Pan-Green. The victory of the KMT in the presidential campaign on March 22, 2008 pleased over eighty per cent of the staff in SET. But most of the SET staff were not excited during the 2012 presidential campaign due to Ma’s poor performance in the first term and some SET staff’s switched to supporting Tsai Ing-wen.50 In an interview, Chen Hao pointed out that Chang Jung-hua considered SET’s endorsement of the Pan-Green and Taiwan identity as good business because approximately fifty per cent of Taiwanese supported the Pan-Green and Taiwan identity had been embedded in Taiwan. However, only FTV maintained the “Pan-Green and Taiwan identity market” (Chen Hao 陳浩 2011). In SET’s attempts to do business with China, Chang Jung-hua has agonized about the impact of SET’s pro-Taiwan stance on the Chinese market (Chen Hao 陳浩 2011), suggesting that business has become a determining factor in SET’s identity and program content. 47 48 49

50

Su Li-mei is Chang Jung-hua’s wife. In 2011, Su Li-mei left SET in order to conduct business and produce TV dramas in China. James Soong did not visit SET, but his wife Chen Wan-shui 陳萬水 did. The SET “Big Talk News” remained neutral during the 2004 presidential campaign. President Chen Shui-bian attended the “Big Talk News,” but the other programs of SET also invited the Pan-Blue candidates and politicians. The author conducted this interview via the Internet on February 23, 2012.

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Actually, many examples showed SET to be opportunistic. Notwithstanding SET’s support of James Soong in 2000, the SET produced “A-bian and A-Chen” (A-bian yu azhen 阿扁與阿珍), a drama about President Chen Shui-bian and the first lady, Wu Shu-chen, after Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 election. Although the “Big Talk News” was the most popular political talk show program in Taiwan, an informant indicated in an interview that the SET Business Department despised the “Big Talk News” (Dahua xinwen 大話新聞) and nicknamed it “Comedy News” (Xiaohua xinwen 笑話新聞).51 According to an interviewee, the “Big Talk News” was originally produced by a subsidiary of the SET Group, Haoda Entertainment (Haoda chuanbo 浩達傳 播).52 Haoda Entertainment produced three political talk show programs broadcasting on three different TV stations: the “Big Talk News,” the “Beauty in Front-Line” (Huoxian shuangjiao 火線雙嬌) on Videoland TV and the “News Hacker” (Xinwen haike 新聞駭客) on Star TV and later on Phoenix Satellite TV. In fact, the latter two programs were famous pro-Pan-Blue talk shows. It also seems that the China factor gradually has gained influence over SET despite its support for Taiwan identity as its principal target market. SET produced a new program “Eastern Money Tide” (Dongfang daqianchao 東方大錢 潮) to replace the Taiwan identity program, “Formosan Story” (Fu’ermosa shijianbu 福爾摩沙事件簿) (Chen Ya-lin 陳雅琳 2011). Every Friday night, SET news channel broadcasts the Eastern Money Tide immediately after the “Big Talk News.”53 The Eastern Money Tide was a program of placement marketing to promote China, and the main theme of this program was to expound the great economic achievements of China and the business opportunities it offered. Both a senior producer of SET54 and Chung Nien-huang confirmed that the production and the background story of the Eastern Money Tide violated the Taiwan identity stance (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2010). At least one source believes that the Eastern Money Tide program obtains funds from China (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 2010). Based on a document from a Chinese website, it costs RMB¥ 60,000 to “cover” a “successful business story in China” on the “Eastern Money Tide” (Dichan Zhongguo 地产中国 2010). 51 52 53

54

This informant was a senior journalist and famous anchor in many TV stations and radio stations. I conducted this interview in Taiwan on November 10, 2009. The informant is a senior producer of SET. I conducted this interview in Taipei on November 3, 2009. The “Big Talk News” broadcast 9-11 PM, Monday-Friday. The Eastern Money Tide was broadcast 11-12 PM every Friday from March 2010 until it moved to the SET Financial channel in late 2011. The author conducted this interview with the senior producer on April 12, 2011.

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In addition, for the purpose of expanding the market in China, the former Executive Vice-President of SET, Su Li-mei, served in 2010 as Advisor-in-Chief to the leading Chinese online video enterprise, Beijing-based “Tudou.com” (Tudouwang 土豆网),55 to produce TV dramas. Despite the fact that Taiwanese dramas had been popular outside of Taiwan, especially in China, SET created a new term “Chinese drama” (huaju 華劇) in December 2011 to replace the traditional term “Taiwanese drama” (taiju 台劇).56 SET intended to use “Chinese drama” in order to open the overseas market. Chang Jung-hua expected the “Chinese drama” to lead a “Chinese Wave” (hualiu 華流), similar to the Korean Wave of popular soap-operas (Cheng Chiu-shuang 鄭秋霜 2012).57 The “Big Talk News” The “Big Talk News” provides a good example to show the changes in SET’s political and national identity. As mentioned above, SET’s opportunism has not necessarily been incompatible with a Taiwan identity. According to a SET senior producer, Haoda, the production company of the “Big Talk News,” decided to fully support the KMT if the KMT won the election in 2004.58 However, SET’s shift on identity caused its great popularity among the Taiwan identity audience. In fact, SET’s stance on Taiwan identity brought significant profits for SET. Therefore, the informant, a famous anchor, also indicated that the shift of SET to Taiwan identity brought SET a lot of benefits, even though many other media still stood on the side of China identity.59 According to an informant, the “Big Talk News” gradually moved close to the Pan-Green and Taiwan identity, because the Pan-Blue displeased host Cheng Hung-yi 鄭弘儀 after the 2004 presidential campaign when they refused to concede defeat in the presidential campaign and caused chaos in Taiwan.60 In addition, the “Big Talk News” revealed its sympathy toward Chen Shui-bian during the Red Shirts (hongchao 紅潮 or hongshanjun 紅衫軍) incident in

55

56 57 58 59 60

Tudou.com was the first and leading online video platform in China before the challenge of Youku.com. Su Li-mei served as the Advisor-in-Chief of Tudou.com from May 2010. In March of 2012, Youku.com merged with Tudou.com. The first “Chinese Drama” was “Inborn Pair” (Zhen’ai zhao mafan 真愛找麻煩) which began broadcasting on SET on December 13, 2011. “Korean Wave” refers to the popularity of Korean drama in East Asia since the early 2000s. The author conducted this interview in Taipei on November 3, 2009. The author conducted this interview in Taipei on November 10, 2009. The informant is a senior producer of SET. I conducted this interview in Taipei on November 3, 2009.

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2006.61 Cheng Hung-yi argued that the Red Shirts should be neutral in terms of national identity; however, the Red Shirts had a double standard toward both pro-China and Taiwan identity politicians, ignoring all scandals relating to Ma Ying-jeou and other Pan-Blue politicians. After the “Big Talk News” switched to strongly supporting the Pan-Green and Taiwan identity, the KMT claimed its popular host Cheng Hung-yi was a KMT member and then revealed the personal details in his KMT file in November 2007.62 Cheng Hung-yi responded to this incident, saying that he had initially refused to join the KMT when he served in the Taiwan Provincial Government-run Taiwan New Life News in 1986. Subsequently, however, an officer of Second Section of the Personnel Office, affiliated with the Bureau of Investigation, forced Cheng to join the KMT against Cheng’s free will (Cheng Hung-yi 鄭弘儀 2009). The former Publisher of the Taiwan New Life News, Lu Yi-ming 呂一銘, confirmed that Cheng refused to join the KMT when he served in the Taiwan New Life News (Apple Daily 2007). This action of the KMT against the “Big Talk News” indicated the powerful influence of the “Big Talk News” in Taiwanese society. Also, after Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election in 2008, his more accommodating approach to China and other controversial policies made the “Big Talk News” more popular than ever. As a result, the “Big Talk News” occupied the top ratings position among all political talk show programs in Taiwan after Ma Ying-jeou came to power. Due to the great influence of the “Big Talk News,” the high audience ratings of this news channel, and SET’s support of Frank Hsieh in the 2008 presidential campaign, the KMT tried to purchase SET’s shares in order to control the SET news channel and the “Big Talk News.” KMT Legislator Alex Tsai 蔡正元 proposed to purchase 17 per cent of SET shares through buying Hong Kong Excelsior Capital Asia’s shares of SET before the 2008 election. This intention of Alex Tsai made Lin Kuan-hai spend NT$ 1.3 billion of his own money purchasing the 17 per cent share of SET from the Hong Kong Excelsior Capital Asia of SET outright (Tang Tsai-yang 唐在揚 & Tang Hsiao-min 唐孝民 2008). This again illustrates the political influence of SET and the “Big Talk News” as well as their threat to the KMT during election campaigns.

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The former DPP Chairman, Shih Ming-teh, cooperated with China identity camps to launch a movement against Chen Shui-bian in late 2006. They wore red shirts as a symbol for this campaign; therefore, Taiwanese media called it the Red Shirts Movement. Cheng Hung-yi is a famous talk show anchor-man. In an interview, he admitted that he used to support the Pan-Blue and China identity owing to long-term Sinicized education and the circumstances of the media (Cheng Hung-yi 鄭弘儀 2009).

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Because the Ma Ying-jeou government became more accommodating to China, more and more Taiwan identity Taiwanese became fearful about this situation. According to Cheng Hung-yi, most Taiwan identity Taiwanese believed only a few media or political talk shows would speak strongly for Taiwanese. As a consequence, the “Big Talk News” became popular in terms of reflecting many Taiwanese people’s passion on Taiwan identity (Cheng Hungyi 鄭弘儀 2009). Due to the high TV rating of the “Big Talk News,” the Ma Yingjeou government monitored the program, and many officers of the Ma government often called in to the program during its on-air discussions of Ma’s policies and administration. However, the victory of the KMT in the 2008 presidency had an impact upon SET and the “Big Talk News.” The “Big Talk News” was forced to cut its broadcasting from seven days a week to five days a week from December 2008. In an interview, a senior producer of SET said that the boss of SET was pressured by the Ma Ying-jeou government and this resulted in the program’s broadcast days being cut.63 Another source said that after Ma Ying-jeou came to power, the Bureau of Investigation suddenly probed Lin Kun-hai’s residence for some unknown reasons, and this incident made Lin Kun-hai cut the program’s broadcasting days (Li Yun-shen 李雲深 2008). In addition, according to the same source, SET was testing the reaction of the audience of the “Big Talk News” to this cut. After February 2009, the program was incorporated into the News Department of SET and then SET cut the show’s budget. SET also began to self-censor after Ma’s election in 2008. The senior producer contended that the “Big Talk News” was troublesome for SET because the KMT held power and SET wanted to do business with China to produce dramas after 2008. Most importantly, under pressure from the SET leadership, this senior producer said that the “Big Talk News” could not discuss the Dalai Lama or Rebiya Kadeer, nor could it criticize China. Another senior producer of SET also indicated the same thing, saying that SET restricted the coverage of the Dalai Lama, the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the Falun Gong.64 On July 27, 2011 the “Big Talk News” criticized China’s high speed railway accident by using the titles “Neglecting human rights, suppressing freedom of press, who wants unification?” (Dui renquan de suhu xinwen de yazhi sheiyaotongyi 對人權的疏忽 新聞的壓制 誰要統一) and “What kind of country? China destroys evidence in high speed railway accident” (Zhongguo gaoti shigu huishi mieji sheme guojia 中國高鐵事故 毀屍滅跡 什麼國家) to criticize China. SET President Chang Jung-hua phoned the staff of the show and told them not 63 64

The author conducted this interview in Taipei on November 3, 2009. The author conducted this interview in Taipei on May 4, 2011.

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to use such strong phrases to criticize China. An informant from SET argued that the Chinese Internet users could strongly condemn the Chinese government on this tragedy, but the “Big Talk News” in Taiwan must keep silent.65 Additionally, according to another source, while many other media outlets attacked the Want China Times Group for Tsai Eng-meng’s denial of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in an interview with the Washington Post in January 2012, SET ordered its talk show programs, including the “Big Talk News” and the “Go New Taiwan” (Xin Taiwan jiayou 新台灣加油), to not discuss the matter.66 After Ma Ying-jeou won re-election in the 2012 presidential campaign, rumors circulated that SET would ax the “Big Talk News.” According to the same source, right after the 2012 election, SET management had suggested the “Big Talk News” should alter its political identity but they did not give a definite order. On May 15, 2012, the “Big Talk News” interviewed former President Lee Teng-hui. The same source pointed out, however, on the same day, Vice General-Manager of the SET News Department Kao Ming-hui 高明慧 talked with Cheng Hung-yi advising that SET had decided to stop the “Big Talk News” in June. Consequently, SET axed the “Big Talk News” at the end of May 2012. Many sources have discussed the potential motivations for SET canceling the “Big Talk News,” the most plausible being pressure from Beijing as SET attempts to break into the Chinese TV market (Wu et al. 2012). The closure of the “Big Talk News” infuriated many Taiwan identity supporters. Dozens of audiences protested in front of the SET Headquarters and many people called SET to express their anger. More than 8,000 Internet users supported Cheng Hung-yi and criticized SET on Facebook (Wu Chih-wei 吳志偉 2012). In conclusion, Taiwan identity, including SET Taiwanese dramas, has provided a large income for SET. But, Taiwan identity might only be a business matter for SET as SET now uses terms typical of China identity media. For example, SET news sometimes uses the term “Mainland” to refer to China, and the SET Entertainment Department and the SET entertainment news report always refer to China as the Neidi, while FTV still always uses “China.” This indicates that SET did not practice a consistent Taiwan identity. Yet, the common characteristic between SET and FTV is that most of the staff of both TV stations have the inclination to support the Pan-Blue and even China identity. In sum, most people in Taiwan considered SET a Taiwan identity or even a pro-independence TV station, and many China identity people often condemned SET. 65 66

The author conducted this interview in Taipei on August 17, 2011. The author conducted this interview via email on June 6, 2012. The interviewee is a senior staff in member SET.

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However, according to the sources within SET, the Taiwan identity is probably a market targeting strategy. Above all, the closure of the “Big Talk News” showed that SET always places business as its priority, and that “national identity” or “political identity” is subject to commercial considerations. Cyberspace Many Taiwan identity Internet users discussed politics in cyberspace in the 1990s. Such political activists on the Internet strongly believed that China identity, the KMT and the Chinese New Party media almost entirely controlled Taiwan’s media market in the 1990s. As a consequence, Internet users utilized cyberspace as an alternative medium to resist China identity media. From the early 2000s, as the Taiwan identity media gradually occupied a more considerable share of Taiwan’s media market, especially in the newspaper market, many Taiwan identity supporters still believed the Taiwan identity media was marginalized. Because of this common misperception, a substantial number of Taiwan identity Internet users devoted considerable time to promoting Taiwan identity in cyberspace and this phenomenon helped the DPP gain a considerable advantage through using the Internet during election campaigns. In fact, according to arguments in the previous chapters, it could be said that only entertainment media and entertainment circles favor a China identity, and this might be because (1) they have frequent contact with Chinese entertainment circles and do not wish to affect their business and performing opportunities in China and (2) the KMT had controlled entertainment circles for so long. This could also explain why most celebrities in entertainment generally support the KMT during election campaigns as well as China identity. According to the Chairman of the Taiwan Bloggers Association, Pan Chienchih 潘建志 (also well-known as Billy Pan on the Internet),67 many active Internet users do not believe Taiwan’s mass media. As a consequence, these Taiwan identity Internet users utilize the Internet as an alternative media resisting the China identity media (Pan Chien-chih 潘建志 2011). As a matter of fact, Taiwan’s famous and influential political bulletin board systems (BBS) and the World Wide Web (WWW; websites) always side with Taiwan identity, and such phenomena have caused some China identity senior journalists to criticize Taiwan identity Internet users on TV talk shows (Pan Chien-chih 潘建 志 2011). 67

Pan Chien-chih is the leader of the Taiwan Bloggers Association. He is a psychiatrist as well as a famous blogger.

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From the early 1990s, the bulletin board system (BBS) was popular among Taiwan’s academic Internet network and many Taiwan identity Internet users used BBS to develop Taiwan identity. Since the early 2000s, with the rapid development of Internet speed and Internet technology, the World Wide Web became mainstream for Taiwan’s Internet users. Consequently, Taiwan identity Internet users switched to surfing websites instead of BBS. BBS, an early Internet forum that now is outdated, is a computer system which runs software to allow users to connect and login to the system using a computer program. In 1972, the first public bulletin board system was “Community Memory” and the first public dial-up bulletin board system was developed by Ward Christensen in 1978 (Barry 1993). Original BBSs were accessed over a phone line by a modem and they allowed access via a Telnet, packet switched network, or packet radio connection. Once a user logged into a BBS, the user could download or upload data, read news and exchange messages with other users, either on a public message board or via e-mail. Users could also talk to other users in online chat rooms (Jones 2003). In Taiwan, BBS users had to use “Telnet” software to connect to a BBS, which is different from such Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) software as Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome and Safari to connect to websites. Also, a BBS system is a program code for text only, differing from websites which contain text, pictures, video and flash. The rise of Taiwan identity BBSs and websites echoed the story of opposition magazines in the 1970s and the 1980s. The opposition in the 1970s-1980s reacted against the KMT-controlled media, publishing small and alternative opposition magazines to give themselves a voice. Taiwan identity Internet users tried to inherit this spirit to voice their opinions. Actually, comparing the age of BBS and the age of websites, Taiwan identity Internet users provided more sources and discourse on constructing a Taiwan identity in the age of BBS prior to the early 2000s than in the age of websites. Taiwan identity Internet users provided a solid and consistent discourse on Taiwan identity in the 1990s on BBS. On the other hand, rather than saying that political websites lack healthy discussion on Taiwan identity after 2000, it is more accurate to say that political news, letters and columns from newspapers, soliloquies on political issues and offensive languages on politicians have replaced the former discussions. Taiwan identity Internet users are generally less consistent in discussing national identity issues. For example, Taiwan identity Internet users often use political hate speech, e.g. “Chinese pigs,” “Chinese brutes,” “KMT dogs,” “Taiwan betrayers,” “the corrupt KMT,” “Chinese second-class animals” in discussing national identity related issues. Thus, the Internet today lacks restraint and rationality. Similarly, China identity Internet

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users use comparable terms to criticize Taiwan identity or DPP supporters in cyberspace, but their discussions exist mostly on news websites such as the UDN website, the China Times websites and Now News. In this chapter, I mainly discuss the important Taiwan Culture BBS (Taiwan wenhua zixunzhan 台灣文 化資訊站; TWserv BBS; telnet://twserv.csie.nctu.edu.tw) to analyze the construction of Taiwan identity on BBS and then introduce some important Taiwan identity websites since 2000. The Taiwan Culture BBS In November 1994, some members of the Society of Taiwan Studies (Taiwan yanjiushe 台灣研究社) of National Chiao Tung University set up the first File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site for Taiwanese culture (Taiwan Culture Archive), which maintained a database related mainly to issues concerning Taiwanese Culture. In December 1994, they set up the first GOPHER site about Taiwanese Culture at the Taiwan Culture Database. On February 28, 1995, the Society of Taiwan Study established the Taiwan Culture BBS and it ranked in 40th place among hundreds of BBSs in its first month in Taiwan (Taiwan Culture BBS 1998). The Taiwan Culture BBS peaked between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, but it was officially shutdown in 2003 due to the closure of the Society of Taiwan Studies. The Taiwan Culture BBS Team announced its three goals on Taiwan identity: (1) to provide several kinds of net resources and services to some organizations such as Taiwan native culture groups and disadvantaged minorities to take advantage of present network technology, (2) to collect information and data related to Taiwanese culture, civilization and literature and to place them on an online database for users to access and (3) to construct the basis of a Taiwanese consciousness on the Internet and to ensure the subjectivity of Taiwan consciousness on the Internet (Taiwan Culture BBS 1998). According to this announcement, the orientation of the Taiwan Culture BBS was apparent – promoting Taiwan identity with Internet technology. The former Director of the Taiwan Culture BBS, YCLS (or Chou Yi-cheng 周 以正), said that another function of this BBS was to bring together Taiwan identity Internet users (Chou Yi-cheng 周以正 2009). There were a number of bulletin boards on the Taiwan Culture BBS mostly related to Taiwanese culture and history aiming to promote Taiwan identity. The following seven famous and influential bulletin boards of the Taiwan Culture BBS demonstrate the way that Taiwan identity was constructed.

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The 228 Massacre The former Director of the Taiwan Culture BBS, YCLS, worried that the KMT regime had destroyed 228 Massacre documents and the China identity media distorted the truth of the 228 Massacre during the transitional period from authoritarian rule to democracy. YCLS consequently decided to set up a bulletin board for the 228 Massacre (Chou Yi-cheng 周以正 2009). This board contained many 228 Massacre documents including several official reports and many articles and stories about 228 in newspapers. Both former Director of the Taiwan Culture BBS YCLS and the writer (Mattel or Hsu Chien-jung 許建榮) scanned and typed these 228 materials from official archives, books and newspapers to post on the bulletin board, and created the first and most comprehensive 228 archive on the Internet in Taiwan. This task commenced in 1995 and lasted until the Taiwan Culture BBS was shut down in 2003. It contained a huge amount of data, more than 3,000 files related to 228 and quoting from more than one hundred books, newspapers, magazines and official archives. The White Terror The White Terror in Taiwan describes the period when the KMT government arrested many anti-KMT dissidents between the 1950s and 1980s. Such arrests involved cracking down on communist activities as well as pro-Taiwan Independence and democratic movements. The White Terror bulletin board was established by Mattel in 1996, and it announced it would build up a database regarding the White Terror. The idea was to set up a White Terror bulletin board to oppose interpretations by pro-China writers or historians; the Taiwan Culture BBS wanted to correct the bias of the pro-China position. From the stance of Taiwan identity, this bulletin board explored the cases of the Taiwan Independence and democratic movements which were oppressed by the KMT government including the Chen Chih-hsiung Incident (Chen Chih-hsiung shijian 陳智雄事件),68 Professor Peng Ming-min’s “Declaration On Formosan SelfSalvation Movement,” the Kaohsiung Incident, the Kao Chun-ming incident (Kao Chun-ming shijian 高俊明事件),69 and the Dr Chen Wen-cheng Incident among others.

68 69

Chen Chih-hsiung (1916-1963) was a leader of the Taiwan Independence Movement who was executed by the KMT government in 1963. Kao Chun-ming is the Reverend of a Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. He was arrested and jailed for seven years by the KMT government after the Kaohsiung Incident as he helped hide escaped suspect Shih Ming-teh.

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The White Terror bulletin board collected more than five hundred documents of White Terror files and stories from books, magazines and newspapers. Archives of White Terror bulletin boards were often forwarded to other BBS or history and politics bulletin boards, but they seldom caused heated debates like the 228 Massacre bulletin board did. The 228 Massacre always drew criticism from pro-KMT or China identity Internet users. Taiwan identity supporters see the 228 Uprising as the birth of Taiwan Independence and most of the victims in 228 were Taiwanese (Chen Chia-hung 陳佳宏 2009). However, approximately 40 per cent of the victims of the White Terror were Mainlanders with a China identity, and many were falsely accused of being communists (Chang Yen-hsien 張炎憲 2006). This may be the reason why no disputes stemmed from the White Terror bulletin board. The Promotion of the Hoklo Language The bulletin board of Taibun (Taiwanese: Tâi-bûn 台文, the Taiwanese language called Hoklo) was set up for Hoklo learning and managed by the Board Masters, Tekhua and Abon. This board popularized “Taiwanese Romanization” (Taiwanese: Tâi-gí lô-má-jī 台語羅馬字) with many translated dramas, fairy tales and prose from several languages. Some of these were translated and transcribed by the Taiwan Culture BBS user Ló͘ Nn̄ g.70 They were intended to teach Internet users Taiwanese language. Board Master Tekhua has been a member of the Taiwanese Language Resources Database Development Team (Taiwanese: Tâi-gí-bûn gí-liāu-khò hoat-tián thoân-tuī 台語文語料庫發展團 隊) since 2001 and also of the Taiwanese Language Student Association (Taiwanese: Ha̍ k-seng Tâi-ôan gí-bûn chhiok-chìn-hōe 學生台灣語文促進會; TGB) since 1990. Abon was the Chairman of Taiwanese Language Society (Taiwanese: Tâi-gí–bûn-siā 台語文社) at National Hualien Teachers’ College in 1997-1999 and a TGB member since 1990. In addition, the Taiwanese writer and translator Lu was the Director of “Five Per Cent Taiwanese Translation Project” (Taiwanese: Gō͘ pha Tâi-e̍k kè-ōe 5%台譯計畫)71 announced in 1995. The ­activities of these three users were supported by many Taiwanese language associations such as Taiwanese Reports (Taiwanese: Tâi-bûn bóng-pò 台文 罔報), Taiwanese Newsletters (Taiwanese: Tâi-bûn thong-sìn 台文通訊), Students of the Taiwanese Language Student Association and Nation Founding 70

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Lô Tàn-chhun 盧誕春, well known by his Taiwanese nick name Ló͘ Nn̄ g 滷蛋, translated many works of literature from English to Taiwanese with Taiwanese Romanization. He also wrote much prose on the BBS. “Five Per Cent Taiwanese Translation Project” planned to publish five per cent of great Western literary works in Taiwanese.

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Foundation (Taiwanese: Chhòng-kok ki-kim-hoē 創國基金會).72 Both Taiwanese Reports and Taiwanese Newsletters promoted the learning of the Taiwanese language, while the Nation Founding Foundation advocated Taiwan Independence. Taibun was a famous and unique Taiwanese learning and teaching bulletin board during the age of BBS in the 1990s. Taiwanese learning grew in popularity throughout the 1990s; many politicians who could speak only Mandarin such as James Soong and Ma Ying-jeou had to learn Taiwanese due to Taiwanization and democratization in order to campaign for electoral office. The Taibun bulletin board provided Internet users with many documents for Taiwanese learning including a phonetic alphabet and standard Chinese characters for Taiwanese (Hoklo), and it played a vital role for Taiwanese learning in the 1990s. The Taiwanese language resources database development team, the Taiwanese Language Student Association, the Taiwanese Reports and the Taiwanese Newsletters are still active and important for the learning of the Taiwanese language in contemporary Taiwan. Taiwanese Drama & Folk Songs This bulletin board was instituted and run by Board Master Kokcheng (or Ngô Kok-cheng 吳國楨). This board furnished Internet users with native Taiwanese drama and folk songs such as puppet shows, Taiwanese operas and Taiwanese folk culture. The Taiwan Culture BBS provided the first database of Taiwanese puppet shows, Taiwanese opera and folk songs on the Taiwanese Internet in the mid-1990s. Many documents relating to Taiwanese opera and folk songs on the bulletin board were often quoted by students of universities in Taiwan for their assignments. This board provided archives related to Taiwanese opera such as the Gongyueshe 拱樂社,73 the Hoklo Opera (Heluo gezixi 河洛歌子戲),74 Liāu Khêng-ki 廖瓊枝75 as well as archives relating to some legends of Taiwanese folk song such as Tân Ta̍t 陳達76 and Ia̍p Chùn-lîn

72 73 74

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The founder of the Nation Building Foundation, Koeh Êng-kiat 郭榮桔 (1921-1998), was a leader of the Taiwan Independence Movement in Japan. The Gongyueshe was a famous and legendary group in Yunlin County from 1948 to the 1970s. The Hoklo Opera was established in 1985. The founder, Liu Chung-yuan 劉鐘元, stated that the purpose of the Hoklo Opera was to develop Taiwanese native opera distinct from China’s Hokkien speaking opera. Liāu Khêng-ki was born in 1935. She is a famous legend in Taiwanese opera. Her personal history is entwined with contemporary Taiwanese opera. Tân Ta̍t (1906-1981) was a Taiwanese folk song legend. One of his most famous songs is “To Remember” (Taiwanese: Su-siang-ki 思想起).

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葉俊麟77 and their works. The works of Ia̍p were especially political in the age of White Terror in Taiwan. His most famous songs, “To Repair the Broken Net” (Taiwanese: Pó-͘phoà-bāng 補破網) and “Hoping For Your Early Return” (Taiwanese: Bāng-lí-chá-kui 望你早歸) describe the story of White Terror in Taiwan. Both songs were banned by the KMT government during the period of martial law. Many people consider Taiwanese opera and puppet shows to be the Taiwanese national drama, but the KMT government was dismissive of Taiwanese art and only regarded Beijing opera (jingju 京劇) as the official national drama (TWOpera 2009). This debate over national drama in Taiwan, either Taiwanese opera or Beijing opera, is in many ways related to the Taiwan identity versus China identity debate in Taiwan (Chiu Kun-liang 邱坤良 2007). To sum up, Taiwanese drama and folk songs are very important symbols of Taiwanese culture and identity, and the bulletin board of Taiwanese Drama & Folk Songs tried to build up archives of these Taiwan cultural resources. A-bian Fan Club As its title suggests, this bulletin board was set up to support Chen Shui-bian for the 2000 presidential campaign. Chen Shui-bian, a Taiwan identity and Taiwan Independence politician, lost his re-election campaign for Taipei City mayor, thus ending his term as Taipei City mayor in 1998 even though he had more than 70 per cent satisfaction ratings as mayor (Huang Hui-wen 黃惠玟 1998).78 After the 1998 election, many of his supporters encouraged him to enter the 2000 presidential campaign. Thus, the A-bian Fan Club bulletin board was set up in January 1999 for Chen’s Internet supporters, the first fan club for a presidential candidate on the Internet for the 2000 presidential campaign. This board provided Internet users with the latest news on Chen as well as Chen’s official newsletter, the A-bian Newsletter.79 This board continued to run until Chen won the presidential election in 2000. Political Talk This bulletin board was the main political and national identity battlefield of the Taiwan Culture BBS. Numerous Taiwan Independence Taiwan Culture BBS Internet users launched many “Taiwan Independence vs. China unification” 77 78 79

Ia̍p Chùn-lîn (1921-1998) was a famous Taiwan folk song and love song composer. According to the United Daily News on December 7, 1998, the poll of the UDN showed a 76% approval rating for Chen Shui-bian’s governance. Chen Shui-bian’s official newsletter was the “A-bian Electronic Newsletter” (A-bian dianzibao 阿扁電子報) in 1998-2000.

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arguments against pro-China Internet users on this bulletin board.80 Thus, pro-China Internet users criticized the Taiwan Culture BBS as a Taiwan Independence BBS. In this context, a pro-Chinese New Party Internet user, GKC, accused the Taiwan Culture BBS of being under the control of pro-Taiwan Independence people (taidu fenzi 台獨份子) (GKC 1997). There were many political battles on this bulletin board. For instance, the KMT used to claim that all aborigines immigrated to Taiwan from China, and there was a rumor circulated in Taiwan by China identity people that Mountain aborigines were expelled to the mountains from the plains by Hoklospeaking Taiwanese. In order to correct this false history and unfounded rumor, Mattel collected documents on Taiwan aborigines and posted these documents not only on Political Talk but also on Tayal (a bulletin board for Taiwan aborigines). This action brought the wrath of China identity Internet users who then debated with Mattel and other pro-Taiwan Internet users (Mattel 1996a, 1996b). In addition to debates with pro-China internet users, pro-Taiwan Independence Internet users in the Taiwan Culture BBS also publicized Taiwanese Nationalism by posting documents on the BBS to promote Taiwan identity such as The Rising People (Xinxing minzu 新興民族),81 the Draft for the Basic Law of the Republic of Taiwan as well as the Establishing Our Own Nation (Jianli ziji de guojia 建立自己的國家).82 Headquarters of the Taiwanese Music Revolution Force The Headquarters of Taiwanese Music Revolution Force (HTMRF) was initiated by Freddy Lim. This group contained many bulletin boards of famous Taiwanese bands such as the Chthonic, LTK, May Day, 1976 and so on. Freddy Lim and the HTMRF members created many concerts for promoting Taiwan identity such as the Formoz Festival83 during 1998-2008 and the “Say Yes to Taiwan, Say No to China” concerts in 2000-2006 and the “Transitional Justice” concert in 2007.84 Such activities often provoked many arguments with China identity 80

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Users such as YCLS, Viol, Abook, Shungmin, Psycho, CrazyKnife, Coldroom, Mattel, Freedom, Natural, Sowjan, Barney, Bedouin and Loser also set up a secret board to discuss their strategy for promoting Taiwan Independence. Hsu Hsin-liang 許信良 published The Rising People in 1995. Hsu was the Chairman of the DPP in 1991-1993 and 1996-1998. Lin Shan-tien 林山田 published the Establishing Our Nation in 1996. Lin was Vice-Chairman of the Taiwan Independence Party (Jianguodang 建國黨) in 1996-1997. The Formoz Festival lasted from 1995 until 2008; this concert was held in every July-August during 1995-2008 to promote Taiwanese culture and Taiwanese rock and roll. In 2000-2006, this concert was normally called the “Say Yes to Taiwan, Say No to China,” and became to the “Transitional Justice” concert in 2007. This concert was held on every February 28 to memorialize the 228 Massacre.

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supporters. For example, a famous student magazine, POTS, often criticized Freddy and his team for talking too much about Taiwan identity and Taiwan Independence (Hsu Chien-jung 許建榮 2006). HTMRF was transformed into the Taiwan Rock Alliance in 2001 but still sustained the title HTMRF in the Taiwan Culture BBS. The new team Taiwan Rock Alliance continued to push Taiwan identity and Taiwan Independence through rock music concerts. To conclude, the seven representative bulletin boards reflected the intention of the Taiwan Culture BBS to construct a Taiwan identity. In the 1990s, the Taiwan Culture BBS also became a base for Taiwan identity Internet users to counter China identity media, the KMT and the Chinese New Party in cyberspace. Above all, these boards of the Taiwan Culture BBS on Taiwanese culture and history were distinctive from other BBSs in that they could provide Internet users with information on Taiwanese culture and history at a time when the World Wide Web was not yet popular in the early “dial up” stages of the 1990s.85 The contents of the Taiwan Culture BBS influenced and shaped Taiwanese consciousness and identity. However, because of its strong Taiwan identity and Taiwan Independence stances, the Taiwan Culture BBS was often attacked and challenged throughout the 1990s by those Internet users who were China identity in their outlook and orientation (Lin Hsiu-min 林修民 2009). Cyberspace from the 2000s From 2000 onward, many Taiwan identity websites became important to radical Taiwan identity Internet users. Good examples are the Goa-Seng-Lang Association For Taiwan Independence, the South News, the TaiwanUS.net, Taiwan Online and the Taiwanese Bloggers Association, which will be used here as case studies. The Website of the Goa-Seng-Lang Association For Taiwan Independence The Goa-Seng-Lang Association For Taiwan Independence (GATI) established its official website (http://www.1949er.org) on November 2, 1996. The director of this website is Lai Fa-kui 賴發奎. Owing to the Mandarin TNT radio station (TNT huayutai TNT 華語台) being shut down, GATI set up this website to propagate its ideals for Taiwan Independence. GATI issued its announcement for Taiwan Independence on this website saying, “we do not oppose one-China, but we do not agree that Taiwan belongs to China nor do we believe that Taiwan represents China because we argue that Taiwanese are not Chinese. We do 85

In the 1990s, most Internet users in Taiwan had to dial up to connect to the Internet and the bandwidth was limited in 64K.

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not consider Taiwan to be a territory of China. We regard Taiwan as being a shelter for all Taiwanese and we love her, and will protect her as much as we possibly can.”86 This statement of GATI expressed GATI’s intention to construct a Taiwan identity in opposition to a China identity. However, this website did not provide further discourse to construct Taiwan identity or propagandize ideas of Taiwan Independence. The main features of GATI website is the GATI Forum (yijian jiaoliuqu 意見交流區), which provides Internet users with a space to discuss current political events and national identity. Lai Fa-kui believes that Taiwanese people need to comprehend the essence of democracy and freedom. Therefore, he opened this forum to both Taiwan and China identity Internet users and he explicitly welcomed political discussion from China identity Internet users (Lai Fa-kui 賴發奎 2009). Lai Fa-kui further contends that the GATI website should be a battlefield of national identity against China as Taiwan cannot avoid challenges from China (Lai Fa-kui 賴發奎 2009). Most importantly, the GATI website is seen as a symbol of Mainlanders’ support for Taiwan Independence in Taiwan’s cyberspace. The South News The South News (Nanfang kuaibao 南方快報; http://www.southnews.com. tw) was established by Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 in 2000 with a statement that it was an Internet medium belonging to all Taiwan identity camps. Chiu Kuochen announced his purposes for the South News saying that the South News is the first online non-profit newspaper with an identifiable Taiwan identity. From his point of view, given that much of the public voice heard in Taiwan is controlled by the China identity media, such news and discourse are distorted by these China identity media. He believes that this phenomenon results in a complete imbalance between Taiwan identity and China identity, with most media being friendly to China and hostile to Taiwan. The media have lost their neutrality over news coverage, and this prevents Taiwan identity from pervading present-day Taiwan. Hence, he has devoted himself to the South News since 2000 (Chiu Kuo-chen 邱國禎 2000). The format of the South News is similar to that of the print media. There are many newspaper-like features in the South News such as headlines, columns, international news, finance news, Taiwan and China issues, forums and the Taiwanese bookshop. Yet, for the South News the most important issues are those of Taiwan and China, especially the topic of Taiwan identity. Since 2007, the South News has established a web TV station. Thus, the South News also 86

For more details, see http://www.1949er.org.

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provides Internet users with online news and columns as well as web videos. In addition, the South News supplies Taiwan identity activities supporters information about activities and conferences. The TaiwanUS.net The TaiwanUS.net (Taiwan haiwai wang 台灣海外網; http://www.taiwanus. net) was set up by Taiwanese American Tsai Ming-feng 蔡明峰.87 Tsai Mingfeng raised funds to start the TaiwanUS.net in the spring of 2003. The idea of the TaiwanUS.net is to cater to overseas Taiwanese especially in North America (Tsao Chi-ping 曹濟平 2009). The website server of the TaiwanUS.net is located in Canada. This website provides overseas Taiwanese with many kinds of videos and online TV which are the main feature of the TaiwanUS.net. These online videos are mainly provided by the Taiwan Independence Media (Taiwan Duli meiti 台灣獨立媒體). Because the majority of data is about Taiwan, the main team for content maintenance is located in Taiwan, led by Tsao Chi-ping 曹濟平,88 which cooperates with volunteers in North America. The TaiwanUS.net contains politics, culture, history, economics and even travel, but information about politics in Taiwan is the main theme. Above all, the TaiwanUS.net aimed to connect Taiwanese politics, culture and history to overseas Taiwanese in North America. Taiwan Online The founder of Taiwan Online (http://www.taiwanonline.cc), Lu Li 路犁, first set up the Resistance Media Board (Yu meiti duigan 與媒體對幹), in August 2000, on the Taiwanese Consciousness United Forum (Taiwan yishi lianhe luntan 台灣意識聯合論壇). Lu Li officially established the Resistance Media (http://www.anti-media.tw) (Yu meiti duikan 與媒體對抗) in 2003 and later changed its name to the Social Force (http://www.socialforce.net) in August 2008. On September 30, 2009, it changed again to Taiwan Online. According to Lu Li, the Bajhang River Incident (Bazhangxi shijian 八掌溪 事件) was the trigger for him to set up the Resistance Media (Lu Li 路犁 2011). The Bajhang River Incident took place on July 22, 2000, the third month after the DPP came to power. Four workers were trapped by a flood on the Bajhang River construction and all were killed by floodwater while waiting to be rescued. TV news services televised the incident live. After the incident, the 87 88

Tsai Ming-feng is the brother of Tsai Ming-hsien 蔡明憲, the first civilian Taiwanese ­Minister of National Defense. Tsao Chi-ping is a staff member of the Green Peace Broadcasting Station.

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opposition KMT and media forced the DPP government to take responsibility for the incident. But many DPP supporters believed it was more properly the responsibility of the KMT Chiayi County government. Finally, the Vice-Premier Yu Shyi-kun 游錫堃 stepped down over the incident. Many Taiwanese including Lu Li believed most media coverage of the Bajhang River Incident was biased, and they also believed that most media helped the KMT discredit the DPP government and abused the power of the Fourth Estate. The original title “Resistance Media” indicated the main purpose of this website was to counter the mass media. The founder of Taiwan Online said the main purpose of Taiwan Online was first to expose fake news which the mainstream media fabricated and then gradually to become a platform for criticism of the China identity media (Lu Li 路犁 2011). The characteristics of Taiwan Online were different from other Taiwan identity websites as the principal purpose was to correct the malicious misinterpretation of news by the China identity media. The China identity media misinterpreted foreign news so as to defame the Taiwan identity camp especially after the DPP came to power. A well-known incident was the China Times’ distortion of an International Monetary Fund report on governmental debts in many developing countries and the actual Taiwan financial situation in 2003. The China Times headline on October 7, 2003 said, “Our government Incurs 3.4 Trillion Debts, IMF Warns” (Wo fuzhai sandiansizhao IMF jinggao 我負債 3.4 兆 IMF 警告) to discredit the DPP government (Wang Shu-mei 王淑美 2003). However, a research fellow of the Academia Sinica of Taiwan, Chen Meng-chang 陳孟彰 and Internet user Mattel found that this was falsified news created by the China Times. Both researchers obtained the original document of IMF report which contained no statement relating to Taiwan at all. Internet user Mattel posted the analysis and details of the original document on the Internet and submitted these to both Taiwan Online and the South News enabling them to criticize the China Times (Mattel 2003). Meanwhile, after this information was revealed on the Internet, the Ministry of Finance officially published a press release to correct the news which the China Times had reported (Wan Shu-chang 萬淑彰 2003). Another story shows Taiwan Online’s strong Taiwan identity against China and Ma Ying-jeou. In December of 2001, the 13th Asian Football Confederation Women’s Championship was hosted by Taipei City and China sent its women’s football team to take part. Taipei City Mayor Ma Ying-jeou announced, “wellwishing attendees are not to carry national flags into the stadium” (Chang Chikai 張啟楷 2001) despite the Sports Affairs Council of Executive Yuan (the DPP central government) having dispatched an official document to the Taipei City government emphasizing that the “Olympic model” does not forbid attendees to carry national flags into the stadium (Hsu Chien-jung 許建榮 2007). Because

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Taipei City Mayor Ma Ying-jeou defied the order from the DPP government, Taiwan Online recruited Taiwan identity Internet users to carry national flags into the stadium in order to expose the hypocrisy of Ma Ying-jeou, who always presented himself as a patriot standing against Communist China. As a consequence, more than fifty Internet users carried national flags into the stadium, which were confiscated by the Taipei City police. In contrast, the flags of China danced in the wind in the stadium in Taipei City at the very same moment (Hsu Chien-jung 許建榮 2007). This matter eventually became a clear illustration of Ma Ying-jeou’s attitude concerning the national flag and loyalty to Taiwan. It enabled the Taiwan identity camp to use this incident to condemn Ma Ying-jeou for betraying Taiwan and Taiwan’s official country title, the Republic of China. In March 2004, Taiwan Online published a book, Resistance Media Episode I: Revealing the Political Nature of Media, for the 2004 presidential campaign (Meikang zhandou xiaozu 媒抗戰鬥小組 2004). According to this book, Taiwan Online wished the electorate to make a correct decision for the 2004 presidential campaign, because this book believed that most of the media and the Pan-Blue intended to push Taiwan into the arms of China. In short, Taiwan Online was an important website which countered China identity mass media and it provided Taiwan identity Internet users with many important and truthful foreign news reports concerning Taiwan. However, due to its strong Taiwan identity, Taiwan Online became a target for many China identity Internet users and Chinese hackers. The Taiwan Bloggers Association The Taiwan Bloggers Association (Taiwan buluoge xiehui 台灣部落格協會; TBA; http://tba.tw) was officially established on November 30, 2008. When the pro-Taiwan Independence and identity DPP lost the 2008 presidential campaign, many Taiwan identity bloggers were heartbroken by this result. Billy Pan, leader of Taiwanan Blog, held a party to heal pro-Taiwanese bloggers’ feelings on March 29, 2008 and discussed setting up a formal association for proTaiwan bloggers. Tsai Hsing-yi 蔡幸宜, the Executive-Secretary of TBA, also said the motive to set up an official association for Taiwan identity bloggers was to promote Taiwan identity through blog writing and to protect freedom of speech on the Internet. They hoped TBA could support and link up the forces of pro-Taiwan identity bloggers to stand guard over Taiwan identity and sovereignty. The most important concerns of TBA were those of freedom of speech, the future of Taiwan and the Taiwanese people. They wished to promote more Taiwanese culture and a stronger spirit of Taiwan identity (Pan Chienchih 潘建志 2011; Tsai Hsing-yi 蔡幸宜 2009). Billy Pan also identified TBA as

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a dissenting organization against the Ma Ying-jeou government and the China identity media (Pan Chien-chih 潘建志 2011). By 2009, there were about 700 officially registered members in TBA, but many more “non-registered” bloggers use the logo of the “Taiwanan Blog” on their blogs (Tsai Hsing-yi 蔡幸宜 2009). Mobilization of Taiwan identity Internet users is one feature of TBA. For example, TBA urged bloggers to attend Taiwan identity rallies against President Ma Ying-jeou on August 30, 2008,89 October 25, 200890 and May 17, 2009.91 Hundreds of bloggers assembled as a team to attend these rallies (Tsai Hsing-yi 蔡幸宜 2009). Another important incident also demonstrates the contribution of TBA. In 2009, the “High-class Mainlander Incident” (Gaoji waishengren shijian 高級外 省人事件) caused fury among Taiwanese. This incident, also well known as the Fan Lan-chin incident (Fan Lan-chin shijian 范蘭欽事件), as Fan Lan-chin 范蘭欽 is a pseudonym of Kuo Kuan-ying 郭冠英, then an officer in the Government Information Office. Kuo often used this pseudonym to publish articles on websites to insult Taiwanese and Taiwanese sovereignty. He claimed he was a high-class Mainlander and that Taiwanese had no class. He insulted Taiwanese as bumpkins (taibazi 台巴子), and called Taiwan a ghost island (Taiwan shi guidao 台灣是鬼島), suggesting Taiwan was not a country, and that Taiwan was a part of China and remains a province. And he appealed to China to use force to “liberate” Taiwan (Tseng Wei-chen 曾韋禎 2009). A TBA member found these articles stemmed from the same person and traced the articles and writer, realizing the man was none other than Kuo Kuan-ying. This member emailed the evidence to the leader of TBA, Billy Pan, who posted the evidence on his blog and sent the data to Legislator Kuan Piling 管碧玲 who presented it at a press conference. After Kuo denied the accusation, TBA then launched an action called “Identity Searching” (renrou sousuo 人肉搜索), to collect more evidence in this case. Finally, Kuo conceded he was Fan Lan-chin and he was dismissed by the government (Pan 2009; Pan Chienchih 潘建志 2011). 89

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This rally was launched by the DPP, which claimed there were more than 300,000 participants. The theme of the rally was “Protect Sovereignty, Protect Living Rights, Demand a Sunshine Act” (Hu zhuquan gu fudu yao yangguang 護主權 顧腹肚 要陽光). This rally was hosted by the DPP and the DPP claimed to have 600,000 attendees. The DPP announced that the issue of this demonstration was “Oppose Black Heart [Oppose Chinese Poor Quality Products/Fake Products], Protect Taiwan” (Fan heixin gu Taiwan 反黑 心 顧台灣). This rally was hosted by the DPP, with more than 600,000 protestors attending in Taipei. Some other Taiwan identity societies also simultaneously hosted a rally in Kaohsiung. The theme of the rally was “Oppose Being Close to China, Protect Taiwan” (Fan qingzhong hu Taiwan 反親中 護台灣).

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The Taiwan Bloggers Association contains hundreds of blogs and different blogs possess different features. These blogs maintained their unique content and the bloggers also organized activities attending many Taiwan identity rallies. Although, some radical Taiwan identity Internet users publish irrational, vitriolic comments to curse both China and the KMT on Facebook, Plurk and Twitter, many Taiwan identity Internet users, especially the TBA members, use blogs for rational discussion of the issues and to publicize their Taiwan identity. Concluding Remarks The Taiwan identity media gradually grew after Lee Teng-hui took office and played a vital part in Taiwan’s democratization. Very importantly, the Liberty Times overtook both the China identity United Daily News and China Times to occupy the largest market share of any newspaper during the early 2000s. The Liberty Times also supplanted the role of the Independent Evening Post and impacted upon the Taiwan Daily, the Commons Daily and the Taiwan Times. The foundation of the Apple Daily in 2003 further hurt the market share of the United Daily News and the China Times. As a consequence, the Liberty Times and the Apple Daily became the biggest two newspapers after 2003. In contrast, only two Taiwan identity news TV stations, FTV and SET, exist in today’s Taiwan though both have disputes and conflicts between their business interests and Taiwan identity. Many opposition magazine proprietors switched to run underground radio in the early 1990s, and this appears to have affected the standing of the Taiwan identity political magazines. From the early 1990s, the Internet gradually became an alternative media for Taiwanese. Then, many Taiwan identity Internet users set up non-profit BBS and later, websites, to construct a Taiwan identity. Essentially, the main factor which forced a medium to shut down after democratization was financial difficulty. Although the Taiwan identity market kept growing, a medium could not survive without huge capital and advertisement income. Many factors influenced the media’s Taiwan identity. First of all, the national identity of the media owner was a main dominating factor in a medium’s national identity. Secondly, market targeting might also shape a medium’s inclination in national identity. Most importantly, business interests might affect a medium’s Taiwan identity especially under pressure from China. Because cyberspace is free, Internet users can freely express their national identity in this virtual community.

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When comparing Taiwan identity print media, the Liberty Times, the Capital Morning Post and the Taiwan Times seemed to have firmly kept their Taiwan identity after democratization. The Taiwan Daily also sided with Taiwan identity from 1997. In contrast, the Commons Daily was not considered a Taiwan identity newspaper after 1999, and the Apple Daily was a pro-democracy and market-orientated newspaper rather than a Taiwan identity medium. Ideologically, these media supported Taiwanese nationalism against Chinese nationalism. Politically, the Taiwan identity media mainly used “democracy” to support their Taiwan identity such as affirming Taiwan’s national self-determination. Furthermore, most Taiwan identity media considered the Republic of China to be the official country name and saw China as a foreign threat to Taiwan. In the cultural dimension, the Taiwan identity media provided cultural or historical discourse, but this was often short-lived. Only the Independent Evening Post and the Taiwan Times expended effort to promote Taiwanese culture and history in their supplements in the 1990s. When dealing with cultural issues, “language” was often a main concern. Preserving the “mother languages” and the characteristics of “Austronesians” were the pillar in constructing a Taiwan identity against the KMT’s national language policy and ethnic Chinese nationalism. The underground radio stations replaced the opposition magazines in the 1990s, but most of them became legal broadcasting stations. According to the case studies in this chapter, TNT often provoked conflicts with the DPP over national identity until it became a commercial radio station after 2003. To date, the successor of TNT, Super FM 98.5, has claimed that it is a Taiwan identity broadcasting station, but it has nevertheless also worked with the Ma Yingjeou government such as running ECFA advertisements, which Taiwan identity supporters viewed as a betrayal. This situation also happened in both FTV and SET, with both restricting themselves in their coverage of some particular topics regarding China because they were themselves doing business with China. The funding for establishing FTV was raised from radical Taiwan identity supporters, but FTV’s business with both the KMT government and the CCP regime disappoints these supporters. SET’s business with China is also antithetical to the radical Taiwan identity which SET had espoused. With regard to cyberspace, different stages showed different features in the construction of a Taiwan identity. In the early 1990s, BBS was becoming popular on Taiwan’s campuses and played a vital role in Taiwan before the early 2000s. Through the dimension of culture, history and language in pursuit of constructing its national identity, the Taiwan Culture BBS built a base for Taiwan identity camps in Taiwan’s cyberspace. From the 2000s, cyberspace enables Taiwan identity Internet users to express strongly held political views.

Conclusion Conclusion

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Conclusion Conceptions of Taiwanese national identity changed as Taiwan experienced three distinct phases in its history: Japanese colonial rule, Chinese colonial rule and democratization. As the media have always played a pivotal role in constructing national identity in Taiwan, the story of Taiwan’s media over the last century both reflects and elucidates this history. Both the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalist colonial regimes used the media in an attempt to co-opt the national identity of the Taiwanese people and thus gain support for their rule. After democratization and Taiwanization under Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, Taiwan identity gradually came to prevail and media projecting Taiwan identity rose to occupy a substantial market share. Similarities in the Construction of National Identity in the Media during both the Japanese and Chinese Colonial Regimes There were similarities in the way the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalist colonial regimes ruled Taiwan. Both ruled as a small minority of outsiders who systematically discriminated against the majority Taiwanese. Both regimes tried to assimilate the Taiwanese to their idea of “nation” using the media to push their national identity. First, both regimes claimed that the Taiwanese shared the same “blood origins” as their rulers. The Japanese alleged that both the Taiwanese and the Yamato nation belonged to the same race. Similarly, the Chinese asserted that in common with the Han Chinese in China, the Taiwanese were descendants of the Yan and Yellow Emperors. Second, both the Japanese and the Chinese pushed the use of their own personal names with the Japanese encouraging Taiwanese people to use Japanese names while the Chinese compelled Taiwan aborigines to use Han Chinese names. Third, and perhaps most importantly, both alien regimes strongly pushed their own “national language,” either Japanese or Chinese, to promulgate their national identity through education and the media. The case studies discussed in this book, especially those in newspapers, conform with Benedict Anderson’s idea of “print-capitalism” in the construction of national identity. During the Japanese colonial period the official Japanese media, including newspapers and radio, strongly and unequivocally propagandized the Japanization policy, dōka. The national identity that government media constructed made the Taiwanese people subjects of the Japanese Empire and second-class subjects of the Yamato nation. After the Chinese Nationalists

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arrived in Taiwan, they also systematically discriminated against the Taiwanese and required that all media support a Chinese identity. Under authoritarian KMT rule, the party, the military and the government and its patron-client private media such as the United Daily News and the China Times were flooded with discourses on Chinese kinship, culture, history and even religion. Furthermore, these media strongly suppressed Taiwanese native languages and promoted Mandarin Chinese. The claim that Taiwan was a “revival base” for the Chinese nation made the KMT and the ROC, which the KMT led, the only legitimate regime and state representing China. Under this construction, the media claimed that the Chinese Communist Party, the Taiwan Independence Movement and the democratic opposition were traitors to the Chinese nation. During certain periods of Japanese and Chinese rule, Taiwanese elites with limited resources attempted to use the media to resist the official colonial perspective. During Japanese rule, Taiwanese intellectuals used media to promote alternative Chinese or Taiwanese identities against the Japanese. These Taiwanese intellectuals published some newspapers in opposition to Japanese identity especially from 1920 to 1936. The private media, however, did not speak with one voice. Right-wing and left-wing Taiwanese private media wrestled with each other over national identity. The Taiwan People’s News, the Taiwan Masses Times and the New Taiwan Masses Times formulated four types of national identity (to use the terminology of Wakabayashi Masahiro): the Mother Nation Camp, the Wait for Opportunity Camp, the Reform of Taiwan Camp and the Taiwan Revolution Camp, which all responded in various ways to official Japanese pressures for Taiwanese to accept a Japanese identity. Taiwanese elites attempted to establish alternative national identities primarily through influencing Taiwan’s languages and cultures. For the Mother Nation Camp and the Wait for Opportunity Camp, the so-called “traditional” Han culture and language – either Vernacular Chinese or traditional Written Chinese – were principal characteristics of their imagined Chinese community. In contrast, the Reform of Taiwan Camp argued that Taiwan possessed its own characteristic culture and language. The promotion of Taiwanese Romanization and Vernacular Taiwanese were typical means which the Reform of Taiwan Camp used to consolidate a Taiwanese identity. The left-wing Taiwan Revolution Camp did not consider language, culture and history to be an element for nation-building. For them, the Taiwan proletariat should construct a national identity based on class struggle. Nevertheless, none of these four camps considered the Taiwanese aborigines in their identity constructions until the Musha Uprising of 1930. Prior to then, their narratives of the national identity only included the Han people of Taiwan.

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Following the arrival of the KMT in Taiwan, the February 28 Uprising of 1947 transformed the issue of national identity, resulting in the birth of the Taiwan Independence Movement. Taiwan identity became embedded in many people’s minds and finally came to the fore after democratization. During the authoritarian KMT period, most private media expressed loyalty to the KMT’s representation of national identity. The Taiwanese elites who, during Japanese rule, strongly and openly opposed Japanese dōka were forced into a reluctant silence and were only later able to reveal a Taiwanese consciousness from the mid-1970s onward. At this point some opposition groups displayed Taiwanese consciousness in small-scale alternative media, the opposition magazines. The Taiwan Political Review was the first opposition magazine revealing Taiwanese consciousness against the hegemonic Chinese identity in the mid-1970s. In the late 1970s and 1980s, more and more opposition magazines began to depict a Taiwanese consciousness by connecting it to the broader democracy movement. In the early 1980s, the pro-Taiwan opposition magazines successfully brought Taiwanese consciousness into a Taiwanese society that had been dominated by the KMT’s Chinese nationalism. China Identity and Taiwan Identity as Rivals in the Media after Democratization After Lee Teng-hui came to power, his democratization and Taiwanization policies led Taiwan into a new era. Although conceptually distinct and not always supported by the same people, the processes of Taiwanization and democracy were two very closely linked processes because Taiwanization called for an end to discrimination against the Taiwanese majority, a concept close to that of democratic majority rule. Taiwanization facilitated the growth of Taiwan identity and surveys in Taiwan show a steady and substantial increase in the prevalence of Taiwan identity together with a corresponding decline in Chinese identity among Taiwan’s population. These changes in the national identity of the Taiwanese people have led to large increases in the market share of media supporting Taiwan identity and simultaneous declines in media supporting China identity. Some more extreme Taiwan identity supporters used underground radio stations and the Internet to push Taiwan identity in a move parallel to the opposition magazines of the KMT authoritarian period. In present-day Taiwan, there are a number of factors shaping a medium’s approach to national identity. First, democratization provides media owners a space to represent their personal beliefs, and the rise of Taiwan identity has also reshaped the media market landscape. While some Taiwan identity

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newspapers, such as the Capital Morning Post and the Independent Evening Post, failed due to financial difficulties, other Taiwan identity newspapers have thrived. Foremost among these is the Liberty Times, which was able to avoid financial problems and occupy the largest share of Taiwan’s newspaper market. This paper probably owes its success to the owner’s strong Taiwan identity and its lottery promotion in the early 1990s. Additionally, the pro-democracy Apple Daily’s moderate Taiwan identity narrative as well as its pro-democratic and non-partisan stances have contributed to its success. The growth of Taiwan identity has coincided with decrease of China identity newspapers in the market. Nevertheless, the United Daily News stands out as a paper that continues to strongly push the owner’s China identity. Second, domestic political factors, such as the owner’s relations with politicians or ruling parties, or intentions to obtain advertising from state-owned enterprises, also influence a medium’s identity. TVBS, ERA, EBC and the Taiwan Daily have shown the importance of this domestic political factor. Third, the ‘China factor’, which relates to the media owner’s business interests in China and the relationship with Chinese authorities, deeply impacts a medium’s national identity. Tsai Eng-meng’s Want China Times Group obviously serves as an example of influence by the China factor. Finally, when the owner’s preferred identity conflicts with the ‘domestic political factor’ or the ‘China factor,’ some media surrender to either the domestic political factor or the China factor. FTV is an example to show the influence of the China factor and SET is another example to demonstrate the influence of both the domestic political factor and the China factor. Elements in the Construction of National Identity after Democratization Although both China identity and Taiwan identity media oppose each other on the issue of national identity, in fact they do share some aspects in their construction of a “nation.” First, both recognize the importance of languages as a key characteristic of nation. The China identity media consider Taiwanese native languages to be local Chinese “dialects”, while the Taiwan identity media regard Taiwanese native languages to be distinctive languages. Second, both consider “bloodlines” to be an essential part of a nation. The China identity media claim that Taiwanese have blood ties with Chinese, but several Taiwan identity media believe that Taiwanese have considerable blood from Austronesians (Taiwan’s aborigines). Third, both use “history” and “culture” in their approach to promoting national identity. The China identity media maintain

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that Taiwan’s history and culture is inseparable from that of China, while the Taiwan identity media argue that Taiwan possesses a history and culture different from that of China which includes many Austronesian and other non-Chinese elements in Taiwan’s heritage. Fourth, both emphasize democracy, but the China identity media see the idea of democracy as being for the Chinese nation, while the Taiwan identity media believe Taiwan’s democracy has little to do with China. Even though many in both camps agree that at present the state should continue to use the title, “Republic of China,” the China identity and Taiwan identity media in Taiwan differ in their vision of Taiwan’s future. For the China identity media, their national identity refers to the Chinese nation and their state is both the Republic of China and a future united China or a Confederation of Greater China that includes the mainland. In contrast, the Taiwan identity media’s nation is Taiwan and their state is called the Republic of China, which many hope will change its name to the Republic of Taiwan. To conclude, at all stages, the media, as an agent in the trajectory of national identity have constructed competing national identities, reflecting various shifts in power. It is clear that over the course of one hundred years of Taiwan’s history the construction of national identity in the media has had consistent themes. For Taiwan media over the past century, language, history, culture and kinship have always been important issues. With democratization, democracy, Taiwanization and the definition of the Republic of China have also emerged as significant issues. Above all, with the rise of the People’s Republic of China and closer economic ties across the Strait, a new challenge, the “China factor,” has become another important element in shaping the national orientation of Taiwan’s media outlet.

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Index

Index

275

Index 1992 Consensus 130, 142, 171, 181 228 Massacre 48, 50, 54, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 166, 171, 194, 212, 213, 216 228 Uprising 48, 49, 50, 55, 67, 68, 70, 213 A Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation 90 Aboriginal 18, 42, 44, 51, 126, 127, 169, 182 Aborigine 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 59, 116, 127, 166, 168, 169, 181, 182, 216, 225, 226, 228 Ancestor 59, 182 Anderson, Benedict 1, 225 Anti-Communist 77, 78, 80, 107 Anti-Secession Law 127, 128, 129, 138, 139, 166, 171, 180 Anti-Separation Law 127 Anti-Taiwan Independence 151, 164, 178, 186 Article 100 96, 169, 179, 194 Assimilation 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 16, 20, 28, 30, 36, 44, 45 Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait 144 Austronesian 126, 168, 169, 181, 182, 224, 228, 229 Authoritarian 3, 52, 55, 56, 61, 72, 85, 93, 94, 100, 107, 110, 113, 120, 122, 123, 135, 186, 212, 226, 227 BBS 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 223, 224 Bentu 105, 148, 158, 167 Bentuhua 187 Black List 71, 96, 194 Blog 221, 222, 223 Blogger 209, 217, 221, 222, 223 Blood Origins 225 Blood Relationship 169 Blood Ties 228 Bloodline 125, 138, 154, 228 Bloodline-ism 127 Cabinet 35, 52, 55, 56, 185 Cable TV 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 147 Capitalism 25, 40 Capitalist 13, 23, 35, 40, 45

Censorship 14, 64, 82, 146 Central Review Committee 72, 75, 174 Central Standing Committee (CSC) 52, 54, 56, 72, 74, 91, 122, 146, 149, 151, 153, 200 Chai, Trong-rong (Trong Chai) 198, 200, 201 Chang, Chun-hung 90, 111, 192 Chang, Wo-chun 32, 33, 34, 36 Chen, Shui-bian 56, 82, 94, 115, 116, 120, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, 138, 139, 147, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 170, 171, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 189, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 200, 203, 204, 205, 206, 215 Chiang, Antonio 87, 107, 108, 109, 163, 164, 191 Chiang, Ching-kuo 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 63, 72, 75, 85, 93, 94, 128, 160, 162 Chiang, Kai-shek 32, 47, 61, 63, 72, 78, 81, 85, 126, 128 Chiang, Wei-shui 25, 43, 48 China Complex 91 China Factor 204, 228, 229 China Identity 3, 50, 52, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 74, 75, 79, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 129, 130, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 183, 190, 191, 193, 196, 197, 198. 201, 202, 203, 205,206, 208 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 48, 60, 61, 62, 73, 74, 76, 79, 80, 81, 86, 121, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135,136, 137,139, 140, 146, 155, 161, 166, 169, 179, 180, 182, 186, 187, 189, 224, 174, 179, 181, 226 Chinese Culture 35, 36, 64, 93, 126, 131, 140, 153, 164, 183, 185 Chinese History 47, 69, 79, 83, 181 Chinese Identity 2, 3, 31, 32, 36, 45, 46, 61, 67, 85, 87, 88, 94, 97, 98, 99, 226, 227 Chinese Mainland 50, 59, 62, 95, 119 Chinese Nation 2, 3, 12, 23, 24, 28, 35, 37, 46, 47, 48, 60, 61, 62, 63, 74, 82, 90, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004227699-010

276 Chinese Nation (cont.) 140, 154, 155, 156, 164, 169, 171, 185, 191, 226, 229 Chinese Nationalism 3, 46, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 73, 79, 80, 81, 85, 91, 93, 111, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 163, 164, 165, 171, 185, 224, 227 Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) 2, 3, 4, 23, 24, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76,77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 120, 122, 123, 130, 132, 134, 135, 142, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 220, 223, 224, 226, 227 Chinese New Party 95, 106, 111, 122, 135, 146, 147, 149, 158, 160, 165, 170, 175, 195, 197, 202, 209, 216, 217 Civil War 47, 60, 120 Class Struggle 23, 39, 40, 41, 45, 226 Classical Chinese 27 Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity 7, 17, 29 Colonial 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 35, 38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 70, 88, 93, 94, 95, 100, 119, 120, 187, 225, 226 Colonial Regime 2, 6, 44, 46, 47, 51, 55, 58, 61, 88, 94, 187, 225 Comintern 40, 41 Community 28, 50, 96, 156, 175, 210, 223, 226 Community of Shared Destiny 96, 156, 175 Confederation of Greater China 136, 139, 140, 155, 229 Confucius 30, 61, 126, 134, 189 Constitution 32, 35, 60, 95, 132, 138, 139, 162, 181, 184, 189 Cross-Strait 109, 110, 122, 124, 128, 129, 130, 131,132, 137, 138, 140, 142, 154, 170, 172, 178, 179, 180, 181, 188, 189 Culture 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 41, 42, 45, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 67, 77,

Index 78, 81, 83, 85, 93, 122, 124, 125, 126, 131, 138, 140, 148, 154, 158, 164, 165, 168, 178, 182, 183, 185, 192, 194, 198, 199, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 214, 219, 221, 224, 226, 228, 229 Cyberspace 143, 209, 211, 217, 218, 223, 224 Dalai Lama 134, 183, 199, 207 Dangwai 62, 73, 92 De- Sinification 105, 130, 139, 177 Democracy 11, 74, 85, 87, 88, 92, 95, 100, 107, 110, 111, 123, 125, 131, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 144, 154, 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 165, 169, 170, 171, 175, 179, 180, 184, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 212, 218, 224, 227, 228, 229 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 54, 62, 69, 74, 75, 78, 81, 87, 90, 96, 97, 98, 99, 106, 108, 111, 112, 113,115, 116, 117, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 130, 139, 142, 147, 148, 149, 153, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 171, 172, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 186, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 203, 206, 209, 211, 216, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224 Democratization 2, 3, 11, 46, 81, 91, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101,108, 109, 110, 115, 116,117, 120, 121, 123, 125, 134, 155, 156, 159, 160, 164, 169, 174, 179, 182, 185, 187, 192, 199, 214, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229 Deng Xiaoping 124, 131, 150, 171 Deutsche Welle 124 Dialect 126, 182, 199, 228 Discrimination 7, 8, 20, 29, 43, 47, 50, 56, 80, 201, 227 DNA 126, 182 Dōka 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 28, 30, 37, 44, 45, 225, 227 East Turkistan 134, 135, 142, 183, 184, 200 ECFA 142, 171, 181, 197, 201, 224 Education 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 20, 29, 30, 31, 58, 60, 61, 78, 79, 80, 182, 185, 206, 225 Embedded Advertising 144, 145, 155 Ethnicity 160, 182 Executive Yuan 63, 82, 220 Fair Play 7, 17, 29 Freedom House 115 Freedom of Speech 96, 145, 164, 190, 221 Freedom of the Press 3, 13, 94, 115, 122, 190 Fundamentalist Faction 120

Index Gene 127 Genetics 126 Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere 44 Hakka 27, 33, 38, 42, 47, 51, 59, 116, 126, 146, 182, 194, 195 Half-Mountain People 64, 65, 70 Han People 12, 28, 29, 30, 41, 43, 226 History 2, 16, 23, 24, 28, 30, 35, 37, 45, 47, 55, 60, 65, 69, 74, 79, 83, 86, 88, 89, 96, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 138, 140, 143, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 168, 169, 178, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 192, 194, 198, 199, 202, 211, 213, 214, 216, 217, 219, 224, 225, 226,228, 229 Hokkien 26, 42, 126, 214 Hoklo 26, 27, 33, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 47, 50, 51, 58, 59, 61, 63, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 106, 115, 116, 126, 182, 183, 192, 194, 199, 213, 214, 216 Hsieh, Frank 112, 148, 178, 192, 193, 196, 203, 206 Hsieh, Hsueh-hung 48 Hu, Jintao 130, 145 Huang, Cheng-tsung 23, 27, 32, 34, 35, 36 Human Rights 74, 88, 89, 90, 133, 134, 160, 161, 165, 186, 188, 190, 207 Imagined Community 1 Inauguration Speech 138 Internet 3, 4, 108, 128, 133, 134, 143, 157, 190, 196, 203, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 227 Jacobs, Bruce 52, 58, 65, 80, 81, 95 Japanese Identity 3, 5, 8, 12, 15, 21, 23, 26, 226 Japanese Nation 8, 9, 18, 28 Japanization 2, 6, 8, 9, 14, 19, 46, 225 Jaw, Shao-kong 135, 151, 190, 197 Jiang, Zemin 123, 124, 140 Kadeer, Rebiya 134, 183, 184, 200, 207 Kang, Ning-hsiang 87, 88, 108, 184, 192 Kaohsiung Incident 55, 74, 75, 89, 90, 91, 161, 169, 199, 212 Kōminka Movement 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, 21, 26, 44 Lai, Ho 32, 38, 39, 42, 45

277 Lai, Jimmy 105, 107, 191 Language Policy 2, 16, 30, 37, 45, 93, 224 Lee, Teng-hui 1, 3, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 94, 95, 96, 104, 105, 109, 111, 115, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 137, 138, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 192, 193, 194, 195, 208, 223, 225, 227 Left-Wing 13, 14, 23, 24, 25, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 67, 86, 226 Legislative Yuan 51, 76, 82, 91, 95, 111, 145, 200 Liberalism 85, 86, 135 Liberalization 43, 52, 54, 55, 75, 93, 110 Lien, Chan 134, 138, 163, 177, 178, 180, 193 Lien, Wen-ching 39, 48 Lin, Cheng-lu 23, 28, 30 Lin, Hsien-tang 23, 24, 25, 35, 71 Lin, I-hsiung 55, 91,186 Lin, Rung-san 103, 104, 176, 177, 178, 179 Literary Chinese 27, 33, 34 Local Language 34, 83, 116 Ma, Ying-jeou 82, 89, 94, 115, 116, 125, 129, 130, 132, 133, 142, 143, 144, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 178, 179, 181, 183, 184, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 198, 201, 202, 206, 207, 208, 214, 220, 221, 222 Mainland China 46, 87, 119, 122, 124, 128, 131, 132, 140, 149, 150, 156, 163, 175 Mainlander 3, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 126, 145,147, 152, 157, 160, 169, 170, 186, 194, 213, 218, 222 Mainstream Faction 95, 158 Mandarin 12, 26, 33, 34, 38, 47, 58, 59, 61, 69, 70, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 93, 106, 115, 116, 182, 194, 195, 199, 201, 214, 217, 226 Mao, Zedong 46, 47, 73, 79, 154 Market Share 101, 102, 109, 112, 113, 117, 121, 147, 154, 156, 157, 159, 167, 173, 177, 191, 199, 223, 225, 227 Martial Law 2, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 60, 61, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 84, 86, 94, 96, 100, 108, 116, 117, 119, 120, 123, 137, 156, 157, 158, 174, 184, 191, 193, 215 May Fourth Movement 11, 33, 86

278 Minnan Language 183 Mother Nation Camp 5, 12, 26, 32, 34, 44, 45, 48, 226 Musha Uprising 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 226 National Language 2, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 30, 31, 34, 37, 44, 45, 46, 58, 59, 60, 61, 74, 82, 224, 225 Nationalism 1, 16, 23, 35, 36, 39, 41, 43, 45, 60, 165 Native Literature Movement 13, 86, 90 Native Taiwanese 37, 38, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70, 73, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 126, 148, 163, 167, 170, 214 Naichi 7, 8, 17, 20, 120 Neidi 119, 120, 149, 154, 156, 190, 208 New Nationalist Party Alliance 95 Newspaper 1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, 81, 82, 87, 91, 93, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 133, 135, 136, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 209, 210, 212, 213, 218, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228 Non-Mainstream Faction 95, 158 One China Policy 128, 179 One China Two Systems 131 One Country on Each Side 125, 128, 138, 156, 166, 170, 180, 181 One Country Two Governments 186 One Country Two Systems 140, 180 Opposition 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 46, 52, 54, 56, 61, 62, 73, 74, 75, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 108, 110, 111, 123, 135, 156, 162, 164, 173, 174, 184, 192, 194, 210, 226, 227 Opposition Magazine 3, 46, 62, 75, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 100, 108, 156, 157, 184, 191, 192, 193, 194, 202, 210, 223, 224, 227 Opposition Movement 11, 87, 88, 100, 186

Index Pan-Blue 106, 147, 152, 153, 166, 171, 172, 180, 188, 198, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 221 Pan-Green 106, 153, 171, 188, 198, 202, 203, 205, 206 Peng, Ming-min 90, 212 People First Party 81 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 74, 79, 80, 85, 86, 119, 120, 122, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 137, 139, 141, 142, 144, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 169, 170, 172, 181, 185, 187, 189, 191, 198, 229 Periphery (Peripheral) 8, 119, 120, 185 Policy of Extension of Japan Proper 7, 9, 17, 20 Politburo Standing Committee 121 Presbyterian Church 27, 90, 212 Presidential Campaign 90, 97, 112, 138, 148, 171, 177, 181, 187, 188, 192, 197, 203, 205, 206, 208, 215, 221 Presidential Election 95, 113, 114, 125, 138, 153, 163, 180, 181, 193, 206, 215 Print-Capitalism 1, 225 Pro-China 3, 50, 94, 106, 117, 127, 159, 166, 206, 212, 216 Pro-Independence 97, 105, 106, 177, 190, 198, 208 Pro-People’s Republic of China 120 Pro-PRC 151 Pro-Taiwan 3, 50, 71, 73, 88, 90, 94, 106, 111, 117, 120, 121, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 138, 139, 143, 147, 153, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167, 170, 176, 177, 178, 184, 186, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 203, 212, 216, 221, 227 Pro-Unification 97,106, 122, 127, 133, 146, 151, 160, 170, 176, 190, 195 Proletariat 23, 41, 45, 226 Propaganda 16, 19, 22, 44, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 86, 93, 142, 144, 145, 146, 155, 165, 169, 185, 186 Publicity Department of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 141 Puppet Show 82, 83, 214, 215 Radio 20, 21, 22, 44, 46, 64, 70, 76, 79, 93, 94, 108, 110, 111, 115, 116, 117, 129, 135, 156, 157, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 204, 210, 217, 223, 224, 225, 227 Reading Rates 102, 103

Index Referendum 161, 166, 175 Reform of Taiwan Camp 5, 13, 23, 26, 32, 37, 38, 44, 45, 48, 226 Religion 126, 154, 185, 226 Republic of China (ROC) 1, 32, 60, 61, 63, 74, 76, 85, 86, 93, 111, 116, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 137, 138, 139, 150, 154, 156, 158, 162, 169, 170, 172, 176, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 221, 224, 226, 229 Republic of Formosa 6 Republic of Taiwan 40, 85, 123, 161, 175, 186, 216, 229 Right-Wing 13, 23, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 88, 165, 226 Self-Determination 11, 23, 74, 91, 92, 184, 186, 24 Sinification 3, 59, 60, 62, 67 Shih, Ming-teh 75, 89, 195, 206, 212 Soong, James 81, 95, 173, 174, 178, 203, 204, 214 Sovereignty 47, 128, 132, 152, 161, 162, 166, 169, 171, 172, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186, 187, 189, 221, 222 Special State-to-State 124, 127, 128, 138, 156, 162, 170, 176, 179, 180 State Apparatus 1, 3, 5, 20, 46, 94 Straits Exchange Foundation 144 Su, Beng 31, 61, 160 Su, Tseng-chang 82, 178, 193 Taisho Democracy 11 Talk Show 112, 113, 114, 149, 152, 153, 155, 171, 199, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209 Taiwan Affairs Office 74, 141, 142, 144, 201 Taiwan Association of University Professor 121, 127, 195 Taiwan Church News 27 Taiwan Complex 91 Taiwan Consciousness 54, 55, 75, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92, 95, 100, 125, 147, 148, 149, 153, 155, 158, 168, 179, 211 Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters 49, 60, 79 Taiwan Identity 3, 4, 45, 46, 50, 54, 55, 64, 73, 75, 80, 84, 88, 91, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 115,

279 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 131, 137, 143, 147, 148, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229 Taiwan Independence 12, 23, 40, 41, 46, 50, 54, 55, 62, 73, 74, 79, 80, 81, 84, 87, 89, 90, 91, 96, 107, 111, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 142, 151, 153, 154, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 226, 227 Taiwan Independence Movement 41, 46, 55, 62, 73, 74, 79, 80, 81, 84, 89, 90, 91, 96, 121, 124, 130, 139, 160, 166, 183, 192, 194, 196, 198, 212, 214, 226, 227 Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign 129, 130, 139, 181 Taiwanese Nation 126, 156, 165 Taiwan Nationalism 55, 91 Taiwan Peasant Association 13, 40 Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office 49, 59, 60, 66, 67 Taiwan Revolution Camp 5, 12, 13, 23, 39, 45, 226 Taiwan Solidarity Union 106, 152, 167, 178 Taiwan Strait Crisis 97, 124, 127, 137, 138, 161, 170, 175 Taiwan’s Culture 12, 28, 35, 36, 185 Taiwan’s History 35, 37, 169, 229 Taiwan’s Nationalism 23 Taiwanese Communist Party 13, 40 Taiwanese Cultural Association 13, 24, 25, 39, 40 Taiwanese Culture 8, 13, 16, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 58, 61, 126, 154, 158, 168, 178, 182, 185, 192, 194, 199, 211, 215, 216, 217, 221, 224 Taiwanese Elite 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 25, 27, 37, 39, 41, 43, 48, 50, 56, 226, 227 Taiwanese History 151, 158, 160, 161, 164, 168, 184, 185, 198

280 Taiwanese Identity 2, 3, 12, 28, 39, 94, 97, 99, 190, 226 Taiwanese Literature 33, 39, 86, 178, 182 Taiwanese Nationalism 43, 91, 95, 163, 166, 184, 199, 216, 224 Taiwanese Opera 82, 83, 214, 215 Taiwanese Romanization 13, 37, 213, 226 Taiwanese Romanization Movement 13, 37 Taiwanization 3, 54, 91, 94, 95, 96, 105, 116, 123, 159, 164, 169, 177, 179, 187, 214, 225, 227, 229 The Formosa Youth 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 Three People’s Principles Youth League 70, 71, 72, 176 Tiananmen Square Massacre 123, 133, 135, 136, 142, 143, 145, 166, 190, 207, 208 Tibet 57, 134, 135, 142, 183, 184, 199 Tibetan 135, 183, 199 Tsai, Eng-meng 135, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 150, 151, 154, 155, 191, 208, 228 Tsai, Ing-wen 188, 203 Tsai, Pei-huo 23, 28, 30, 31, 32, 37, 48 TV 46, 63, 64, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 93, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 135, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 155, 189, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 218, 219, 223 TV Ratings 113, 114, 117, 153

Index Underground Radio 110, 111, 117, 156, 157, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 223, 224, 227 Uyghur 135, 200 Vernacular Chinese 13, 14, 26, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 45, 226 Vernacular Taiwanese 13, 26, 34, 38, 42, 45, 226 Waishengren 169, 222 Wait for Opportunity Camp 5, 12, 13, 26, 32, 34, 44, 45, 48, 226 Wakabayashi, Masahiro 12, 26, 34, 44, 226 Wang, Min-chuan 24, 39, 48 Wang, Shaw-lan 122 Wang, Ti-wu 72, 121, 122 Washington Post 145, 146, 208 Website 110, 133, 134, 143, 200, 204, 209, 210, 211, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 White Terror 78, 79, 212, 213, 215 World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) 80 Written Chinese 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 38, 42, 45, 226 Xinjiang 57, 183 Yamato 7, 28, 225 Yellow Emperor 60, 61, 122, 125, 183, 225 Yu, Chi-chung 72, 75, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141

Index

281

282

Index