The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Political Integration and Institution-Building in an Indian State [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9780520339354

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T h e Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies of the University of California is the unifying organization for faculty members and students interested in South and Southeast Asia Studies, bringing together scholars from numerous disciplines. T h e Center's major aims are the development and support of reasearch and the language study. As part of this program the Center sponsors a publication series of books concerned with South and Southeast Asia. Manuscripts are considered from all campuses of the University of California as well as from any other individuals and institutions doing research in these areas.

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THE C O N G R E S S P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

THIS VOLUME IS SPONSORED BY THE CENTER FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN POLITICAL

INTEGRATION

AND

INSTITUTION-BUILDING I N AN I N D I A N

STATE

Richard Sisson

UNIVERSITY

OF C A L I F O R N I A

PRESS

Berkeley • Los Angeles • London

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS / BERKELEY te LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, LTD. / LONDON, ENGLAND COPYRIGHT © 1 9 7 2 , BY THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ISBN: 0-520-01808-7 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 70-129607 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

T O THE FREEDOM F I G H T E R S OF R A J P U T A N A

CONTENTS

i

INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTION AND PURPOSE

2 POLITY AND SOCIETY IN T H E PRINCELY STATES OF R A J P U T A N A Power and Authority in the Rajputana States Land Tenure and Latent Class Division Geography and Demography Social Organization and Regional Dispersion 3 T H E ORIGINS OF T H E PARTY SYSTEM I: URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL CHANGE The Rise of Popular Movements in the Urban Areas The Institutionalization of Political Protest: The Rise of Organizational Permanence Segmentation in the Organization of Political Support The Praja Mandals and the Nationalist Movement 4 T H E ORIGINS OF T H E PARTY SYSTEM II: T H E ORGANIZATION OF PEASANT MOVEMENTS The Kisan Movement in Jodhpur: The Development of Caste Cohesion The Kisan Movement in Shekhawati: Peasant Populism and Political Agitation The Kisan Sabhas and the Urban Movements: Patterns of Autonomy and Association 5

POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL I N T E G R A T I O N : T H E FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF T H E RAJASTHAN CONGRESS

18 19 24 28 32 41 43 50 60 66 73 78 83 89

97

viii

CONTENTS

Organization and Objectives of the Rajasthan Congress The Integration of the Rajputana States From Political Movement to Governing Party: Political Responsibility and the Problem of Power Party Organization at the Local Level 6

I N S T I T U T I O N A L FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY: CHANGING PATTERNS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATION IN T H E CONGRESS ORGANIZATION Social Representation in the Rajasthan Congress Variability in Social Representation: Region and Time The Politics of Elite-Caste Dominance: Cases From the Eastern Plains The Congress and the Green Uprising: Peasant Mobilization and Organizational Adaptation

7

O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION: C I R C U L A T I O N AND CONGRUENCY OF P A R T Y ELITES Representation and Political Generation The Circulation of Organizational Elites The "Congruency" of Organizational Elites Organization Men and Legislative Aspiration "Congruency" of Organizational and Legislative Elites

8 C O N F L I C T AND COHESION IN T H E LEGISL A T I V E P A R T Y : T H E MAINTENANCE OF GOVERNING COALITIONS The Problem of Ministry Formation: Public Elections and Factional Change Competition and Cohesion: The Search for Accommodation The Management of Factional Conflict: Themes from the Sukhadia Decade

97 104 111 119

124 130 145 147 1G0

178 181 187 193 195 200

204 214 232 240

CONTENTS

ix

9 FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE: INSTITUTIONAL'LINKAGES AND PRIMORDIAL TIES The Structure of Factional Alignments in the PCC: 1946-1965 The Regional Basis of Factional Change Caste and the Factional System Factional Cleavage and Generational Change 10 FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT: PARTICIPATION AND VERTICAL LINKAGE IN JODHPUR AND NAGAUR The Origins of the Congress in the Jodhpur Region Conditions of Political Conflict and the Organization of Party Factions Caste and Political Mobilization: The Politics of Ticket Allocation 11

CONCLUSION: NOTES AND PROPOSITIONS From Community of Protest to Political Party: Patterns of Institutionalization and Change Factional Conflict and Change: Complexity and Cohesion in the Congress System

260 261 265 271 277

283 286 288 299 311 312 318

GLOSSARY

326

BIBLIOGRAPHY

329

INDEX

341

TABLES

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Land and Villages Under Khalsa and Jagirdari Tenure Administrative Divisions and Districts of Rajasthan Population Characteristics of Rajasthan Size of Castes in the Rajputana States Dispersion of Major Castes by Region Regional Dispersion of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Rajasthan Recruitment of Praja Mandai Elites Political Generation and Caste Mobilization Political Generation and Level of Educational Achievement Settlement Operations by 1949 General Social Composition of the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee, 1946-1965 Caste Composition of the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee, 1946-1965 Caste Composition of the PCC Executive Committee, 1946-1965 Caste of Congress and Top Opposition Candidates in Rajasthan, 1952-1967 Representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee, 1946-1965 Caste Representation on the PCC and DCCs from the Matsya Region, 1946-1965 Caste of Congress and T o p Opposition Candidates in the Matsya Region, 1952-1967 Caste Representation on the PCC and DCCs from the Jaipur Region, 1946-1965 Caste of Congress and Top Opposition Candidates in the Jaipur Region, 1952-1967 Caste Representation on the PCC and DCCs from Shekhawati, 1946-1965

24 29 31 33 34 37 6» 63 66 75 132 133 134 135 144 150 151 155 156 162

xii

TABLES

21

Caste of Congress and T o p Opposition Candidates in Shekhawati, 1952-1967 22 Caste Representation on the P C C and DCCs from Bikaner Division, 1946-1965 23 Caste of Congress and T o p Opposition Candidates in Bikaner Division, 1952-1967 24 Caste Representation on the P C C and DCCs from Jodhpur Division, 1946-1965 25 Caste of Congress and T o p Opposition Candidates in Jodhpur Division, 1952-1967 26 Representation on the P C C by Year of Entry into Politics 27 Early Leaders of Protest Movements on the P C C by Year of Entry 28 Political Generation of Congress Candidates in the First Four General Elections 29 Change in Membership on the Pradesh Congress Committee, 1948-1965 30 Members Previously on the Pradesh Congress Committee, 1948-1965 31 Members Previously on the P C C Executive, 1949-1965 32 P C C Members Serving as Officers or Members of D C C Executive Committees, 1954-1965 33 Differences Between Old and New P C C Members Serving as Officers or Members of D C C Executive Committees 34 New P C C Members Serving as Officers or Members of D C C Executive Committees Before Election to P C C 35 Applicants for Congress Party Tickets for the Second and Third General Elections 36 P C C Candidates in the First Three General Elections 37 P C C Candidates Elected in the First Three General Elections 38 Candidates Elected to the Legislative Assembly, 1952-1962 39 P C C Members in the Congress Legislative Party 40 Legislative Dispersion of the P C C Executive Committee, 1951-1965 41 Distribution of Ministers on the Pradesh Congress Committee, 1954-1965 42 Regional Distribution of Factional Support in the Rajasthan PCC, 1954-1955 43 Regional Distribution of Factional Membership in the Congress Legislative Party, 1954-1955

163 166 167 170 171 184 184 186 188 190 192 194 194 igs 196 197 199 199 201 202 203 227 230

TABLES

Factional Distribution of Congress Legislative Party by Political Generation, 1954-1955 45 Regional Distribution of Factional Membership in the Congress Legislative Party, 1958 46 Factional Representation on the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee, 1946-1965 47 Factional Representation on the PCC Executive Committee, 1946-1965 48 Representation in the Vyas Factional Coalition by Region, 1946-1965 49 Dispersion of P C C Members in Factional Coalitions by Region, 1946-1965 50 Representation in the Sukhadia Factional Coalition by Region, 1946-1965 51 Representation in the Kumbharam Factional Coalition by Region, 1946-1965 52 Representation in the Vyas Factional Coalition by Caste, 1946-1965 53 Representation in the Sukhadia Factional Coalition by Caste, 1946-1965 54 Representation in the Kumbharam Factional Coalition by Caste, 1946-1965 55 Dispersion of P C C Members in Factional Coalitions by Caste, 1946-1965 56 Representation in the Vyas Factional Coalition by Political Generation, 1946-1965 57 Representation in the Sukhadia Factional Coalition by Political Generation, 1946-1965 58 Representation in the Kumbharam Factional Coalition by Political Generation, 1946-1965 59 Dispersion of P C C Members in Political Generations by Factional Coalition, 1946-1965 60 Caste Composition of the Nagaur D C C in 1956 61 Composition of the Nagaur D C C by Caste and District Level Faction in 1956 62 Caste Composition of the Nagaur D C C Executive Committee, 1952-1964 63 Composition of the D C C Executive Committee by Caste and Faction, 1952-1964 64 Composition of Representation from Nagaur District on the PCC, 1952-1965

XIII

44

231 343 264 265 266 267 269 271 272 273 274 275 278 279 279 280 291 293 294 295 296

xiv

TABLES

65

Composition by Caste and Faction of Applicants for the Congress Party Tickets in Nagaur District in the Second General Elections 66 Caste Composition by Constituency of Supporters for Applicants for Congress Party Tickets for the Second General Elections 67 Composition of Support by Caste for Applicants for Congress Party Tickets in Nagaur District for the Second General Elections

301

303

306

PREFACE

modernization involves an institutional imperative— the capacity and will to create, staff, and manage new institutions and to engage in new forms of organized, collective effort. This appears to be the case regardless of place or time; it is especially true where the creation of political community and order are concerned. This book addresses an aspect of the process of institutionalization—party-building in a culturally rich and complex society caught in the potentially destabilizing process of social mobilization. This study is concerned with institutional develop ment under conditions of fundamental social transformation. Rajasthan is particularly important for exploring these concerns because of its peculiar historical patterns, social organization, and systems of traditional authority. Prior to 1947 this area was composed of more than twenty semisovereign states and chiefdoms, the sense of community among them being minimal and largely limited to the ruling class. Political authority derived from sacral bases of legitimation, and provision for popular representation was severely limited until after independence. While popular political organizations and movements existed, they were restricted in structure, recruitment, and activity to separate political units. The forces militating against popular movements—traditional authority together with the eminence and power of the former ruling castes— have reached with potency into the contemporary era. The understanding and analysis of the founding, maintenance, and growth of political parties created under these conditions is important beyond the Indian situation. Field research for this study was conducted in Rajasthan from August 1963 to November 1964. Most primary data were obtained through interviews and through the state, district, and constituency POLITICAL

xvi

PREFACE

records and files of the Pradesh Congress Committee office in Jaipur. Innumerable party leaders and public officials both past and present gave freely of their time to instruct me in the political history of their state as well as to provide details, ideas, and "sensings" of the contemporary political process and vignettes of its important actors and their associations. They include leaders and cadres of the preindependence movements in the princely states as well as those who have gained prominence and position during the past two decades. They include members of the Congress as well as members of the opposition, party organization leaders and cadres as well as legislative elites, those whose political world includes Jaipur as well as those whose range is limited either by exigency or choice to rural constituencies and district towns. Much that is of value in this book derives from the openness of their reminiscences. Without their help this study would most certainly not have been possible. A majority of the information on preindependence movements came from the Praja Mandal files in the Rajasthan State archives. Most helpful in this regard was Mr. Nathuram Khadgawat, the director of the archives and himself a man of scholarship. T o Shri Harideo Joshi, past president of the Pradesh Congress Committee, I am grateful for access to selected party documents, minutes, and files, and I am also grateful to members of the PCC staff for their invaluable assistance in helping to reconstruct much of the party's "contemporary past." I have come into the intellectual debt of many during the adventure of which this is a part, particularly to that of Ralph H. Retzlaff who as tutor not only introduced me to the fascinating and complex world of South Asian politics but also offered sage advice in the execution of research. I have continually benefited from the work and intellectual stimulation of Lawrence L. Shrader, whose initial research in Rajasthan made my own efforts smoother and more productive than they would otherwise have been. From the insightful comment of my friends at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and the University of Rajasthan, particularly Rajni Kothari, Ramashray Roy, and Iqbal Narain, I learned considerably from the beginning to the end of my stay in India. Were it not for the incisive editorial pen of Mrs. Margery Riddle, the

PREFACE

xvii

burden of the reader would be much greater than it now is. I am grateful to Messrs. Indu Shekhar, Ram Acharya and Raju G. C. Thomas for valuable research assistance. Through all of this, the research, the thinking, the writing, my wife has shown a tolerance and encouragement that is nothing short of enviable. Finally, research in Rajasthan was supported by a Foreign Area Fellowship as well as partial completion of data analysis and writing. Additional funds for data processing were made available through a grant from the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley, and through assistance from the Computer Center of that university. A grant from the Academic Senate of the University of California, Los Angeles, and from the Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies of the University of California, Berkeley, enabled me to give the manuscript finished form.

T H E C O N G R E S S P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

Chapter

i

INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTION AND

PURPOSE

has witnessed the proliferation of studies concerned with social change, modernization, and development. In a normative sense, studies have frequently entailed teleological assumptions ranging from the "imperatives" of democratic faith to the "logic" of authoritarian necessity. Analytical formats have ranged in rather uneven fashion from mobilization models to social action and functional models of varying hues.1 One school of thought, for example, associated primarily with the work of Deutsch and Lerner, has gauged modernity in terms of indices such as literacy, urbanization, and access to mass media, with the level of political development or modernization being conceived as a functional concomitant of the scores a given society would receive on these indices. Another class of efforts, which has drawn heavily on selected aspects of Weber and Durkheim, has conceived modernization in terms of the increasing structural differentiation and functional specificity of roles in a society. Yet another approach, drawing inspiration from the theoretical work of Talcott Parsons, has attempted to conceptualize the differences between tradition and modernity by using a series of pattern variables as criteria. Other approaches have been primarily exercises in historical exegesis albeit under new and fashionable names. T H E PAST DECADE

i. Useful surveys and critiques of this literature include C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), especially his excellent bibliographical essay; Robert A. Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics, 17 (October 1964), io8-i»o; Ann Ruth Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development," World Politics, 16 (April 1964), 468-482; Ali A. Mazrui, "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization: A Tradition of Analysis," World Politics, s i (October 1968), 69-«3-

2

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

These conceptions, although necessary and useful for establishing common descriptive criteria for comparing widely varying societies and polities, appear inadequate to account for the continuity or collapse of social and political systems and institutions, even in those relatively few countries which would receive a more or less "high" rating on any of these developmental scales. They do not easily account for such important phenomena as political integration, legitimation, and the creation of authority. Neither are they adequate in their present formulation for analyzing the founding, maintenance, growth, or demise of political institutions —the theoretical concerns that absorb the study at hand. A somewhat different conception of development may be more useful in our analysis of the Congress party in the Indian state of Rajasthan. The conception that advises our present pursuit posits that development assumes the existence of the norm of voluntary action, a conception of the self as appropriately and actually manipulator and participant in a wide range of social affairs. 2 T h e social incidence of belief in the appropriateness of voluntary action, like most things, is a matter of degree, but crucial to our conception is the progressive expansion of this sentiment and behavioral mode beyond the confines of social and political elites. It involves a qualitative change in terms of cultural emphasis in the larger society and a quantitative change in terms of the scope of social sit2. T h i s conception captures elements common to several important formulations. I n the more contemporary literature, for example, it is found in Lerner's conception of the "empathetic personality," in much of Pye's work, a n d it is implicit in Deutsch's consideration of the consequences of social mobilization. See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: T h e Free Press, 1958); Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New H a v e n : Yale University Press, 1962); and Karl W . Deutsch, "Social Mobilization a n d Political Development," American Political Science Review, 55 (September 1961), 493-514. T h i s conception is more explicit in David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961); a n d in Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, 111.: T h e Dorsey Press, 1962). For early reports o n a most important study see Alex Inkeles, "Making M e n M o d e r n : O n the Causes a n d Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries," American Journal of Sociology, 75 (September 1969), 208-225; a n d his "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," American Political Science Review, 63 (December 1969), 1120-1141.

INTRODUCTION

3

uations to which it applies. It thus constitutes a change in psychological orientation as well as it implies the potential for the transformation of social structure. Associated with the universalization of the norm of voluntary action are the ideas of choice and contract, values which in an important way have distinguished modern from medieval and classical political philosophy. Choice assumes the recognition of alternative images of the self and society and alternative courses of action for the realization of goals as well as the sentiment and capacity to set priorities. 3 Contract likewise assumes collective choice and collective action in the achievement of specifically defined goals. It involves conscious and voluntary association for the achievement of goals either in the sense of new social means to preserve or reinstate "traditional" values or the conceptualization and formulation of new ones. Development in this conception, therefore, asserts the notion of self-conscious change—the possibility of environmental alteration and control through voluntary and collective action. More important than the existence and the incidence of these orientations toward the self and society, however, is the creation of a civic order and the capacity to create and maintain institutions. 4 3. For a suggestive model which employs the idea of choice together with increasing complexity of social organization see David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 4. T h e notion of contract, implicit in many studies of development, finds its most lucid exposition in modern sociological theory in Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (Glencoe: T h e Free Press, i960), esp. chap. 7. 4. See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, I n c , 1966). For a more thorough treatment of Eisenstadt's theory see especially his "Modernization: Growth and Diversity," India Quarterly, 20 (January-March 1964), 17-42, and his "Breakdowns of Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 12 (July 1964), 345-367. See also Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil T i e s , " British Journal of Sociology, 8 (July 1957), 130-146; and Clifford Geertz, " T h e Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States (Glencoe: T h e Free Press, 1963), 1 0 5 - 1 5 7 . For a most suggestive exploration of the question of moral order see David Rapoport, " R o m e : Fides and Obsequium, Rise and Fall," in J . Roland Pennock and J o h n W. Chapman, eds., Political and Legal Obligation (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), 229-262.

4

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN

RAJASTHAN

This applies whether institutional goals be the preservation of existing values and social relations or their displacement by new ones. It also applies to institutions originally deriving their legitimacy from sacral authority as well as to qualitatively new secularized institutions. Traditional institutions remain vital to the extent that they adapt to the assumptions of voluntary action and contract while retaining their precontractual symbols of legitimation. The founding, maintenance, and growth of new institutions are important in all spheres of social action, but these processes are particularly critical in the political sphere. Political institutions are important in the provision of integrative symbols for the affirmation of political community—whether that community be existent and real or fictive and in process. They are by definition central to the problem of governance—the making of value choices for a society and the exaction of social compliance in the pursuit of those chosen values. The performance of this function, of course, involves the accommodation of those demands and the satisfaction, however partial, of those interests that are a consequence of modernization. This includes attention not only to qualitatively new demands but to the management of social tensions made manifest and intensified by the modernization process. Finally, and most importantly, political institutions are critical in the creation of a civic order through the provision of new forms of public association and cooperation, often with a wider social scope or a focus of political action in a more inclusive public arena than had been true of previous institutions. This study derives its theoretical inspiration from the above conception of development. Specifically, it entails an analysis of the founding and institutionalization of the Congress party in the Indian state of Rajasthan. By institutionalization is meant the existence and persistence of valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior which enable the successful accommodation of new configurations of political claimants and demands in an organization." 5. T h e idea of institutionalization has a rich lineage in sociological theory dating from Weber and in organization theory dating from Barnard. T h e formulation employed here, however, is particularly indebted to the work of Eisenstadt and to the important theoretical framework advanced by Samuel

INTRODUCTION

5

It involves the potentiality of change in an organization's social structure as well as the transformation of its goals. In this conception political development is not a finite time-bound quality or process, but it is continual. It is as applicable to contemporary American politics as it is to the politics of an Indian state. Central to the study of institutionalization is the analysis of the relationship of the relevant organization to its external environments both in terms of the provision of services or benefits through its performance, whether they be material or symbolic, and the provision of participation in its performance. In the case of political parties the two are sometimes inseparable. Essential to environmental adaptation is the selection and the social salience of organizational goals, that is, the processes of goal ordering and transformation as well as the selection of clienteles and principal beneficiaries. Goal selection and symbol manipulation is a primary function of organizational leadership—it is the process of institutional "investment," and implies the quality of political entrepreneurship. Environmental adaptation also entails institutional representation in the sense of recruitment into the organization as well as effectiveness of "participants" in the making of organizational decisions and sharing in the distribution of organizational benefits. The social character of recruitment together with the configuration of goals is relevant to organizational identity and autonomy, that is, the extent to which the organization is both attitudinally and structurally distinct from other institutions and social groups. T o the extent that the institution is autonomous from solidary social groups and from other organizations, its persistence is less dependent on changes within specific sectors of its environment. The capacity of a political party to adapt to new and changing political environments is an important aspect of its institutionalization. In a competitive political format this is a critical requireHuntington. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, 17 (April 1965), 386-430, and his more recent Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, ig68), chap. 1. Also see Richard Sisson, "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Exploration," in Allan Kornberg, ed., Legislatures in Comparative Perspective (New York: David McKay, in press).

6

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

ment of parties that aim at fulfilling at least the minimal functions of a political party—the recruitment of leaders to fill strategic decision-making positions in the formal structure of public authority and the transformation of social interest into public law. 6 This adaptive capacity is particularly crucial, however, in cases where adaptation involves a change from a nationalist or protest movement in a colonial or traditional political order to the competitive requirements of a democratic political format. In societies that have known only minimal popular participation in public politics, adaptability entails the capacity to absorb new political claimants and activists in efforts to accommodate new political demands. In such situations the formation of organizational identity and the creation of autonomy are often concomitant and interactive processes which frequently are disruptive of sustained and directed collective endeavor. T h e adaptive capacity of political parties in more traditional societies is also related to their role as qualitatively new social institutions which often serve as a new form of association between more or less primordial social categories. This political role 6. T h i s definition of "party" is based upon that of Max Weber, in Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: T h e Free Press of Glencoe, 1947), p. 407. Students of political parties have offered a variety of definitions and have imputed numerous functions to this type of institution. Neumann, for example, saw parties as performing the functions of organizing the public will, of fitting party interest into the framework of a society's collective interests, of serving as the link between government and public opinion, and of selecting leaders. (Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955], pp. 396-397.) T h i s definition is also employed in an important recent work on political parties: Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 1. Almond, on the other hand, imputes the functions of "interest aggregation" to political parties, although in his scheme this function can be performed by other institutions while political parties can perform other functions: Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., Politics 0/ the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, i960), pp. 38-40. Eldersveld suggests that the functions performed by parties, in relation to the larger social system, "are merely a particular structural response . . . to the needs of a social and political system in a particular milieu" (Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis [Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964], p. 2). Definitions like functions are arbitrary conceptions. T h e "minimal" definition of political parties used herein would seem both accurate and useful.

INTRODUCTION

7

is of crucial importance in societies where there are limited and fragile institutional linkages which bind together different social groups. T o the extent that conditions of social segmentation exist within the political community, the capacity of political parties to adapt to a plurality of groups helps perform the function of social integration. The image of the party as an adaptive and qualitatively new social institution in a traditional society assumes the existence of continual political mobilization and elite recruitment. Political parties, particularly in democratic political systems, are clienteleoriented institutions whose success is ultimately dependent on the attraction of votes. This clientele orientation is itself conducive to increase in political participation, and in cases where one party enjoys hegemony in the political system, new political aspirants first tend to seek access through the dominant party. 7 Furthermore, parties in modernizing societies are often particularly motivated to stimulate mass mobilization in their attempts to fashion a more participative political culture and a more nationally oriented political community dedicated to the idea and ways of progress. Conflict between parties and also between competing factions within parties has tended to mobilize new political resources and has been conducive to increased demands for political entry and mobility within party organizations. T h e analysis of the elite structure of political parties is thus an important means of gauging patterns of social representation and the extent to which new recruitment is taking place.8 Another analytical focus in the study of institutionalization is the adaptation of organizations to their "internal environment," i.e. the problem of conflict management and organizational co7. Myron Weiner, Congress Party Elites (Bloomington, Indiana: Department of Government, Indiana University, 1967). 8. One of the most thorough and useful analyses of elites in this perspective is Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M.I.T. Press, 1966). For other studies of elites in the new states with this emphasis, for example, see Lester G. Seligman, Leadership in a New S'ation: Political Development in Israel (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 7-8; Marshall R. Singer, The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M.I.T. Press, 1964); and William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969).

8

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

hesion. The more complex the organization and the more socially plural, the greater the strain on organizational cohesion. There is, therefore, inherent tension between political mobilization and the pluralization of institutional representation, on the one hand, and the incidence of intra-organizational conflict and the measure of organizational coherence on the other. Several problems are central to the analysis of the internal environment. One is the process by which accommodation is reached among competing institutional goals both in terms of choice and priority. A second critical problem is the formation and representation of interest groups or factions within the organization and their bases of support, goal orientations, and the conditions of their continuity, fission, and coalition. Such informal organizations are not just potential sources of organizational stress but are also frequently conducive to the satisfaction of participants in the organization and thus contributive to a sense of institutional obligation and to organizational cohesion.9 A third concern, and closely related to the second, is the formal provision for organizational mobility, and the attitudes of elites—who are the incumbents of strategic positions in the formal structure of authority— at particular times to demands made by "non-elites" for a greater measure of organizational control.10 A corollary concern is the process of intragenerational and intergenerational succession and the impact of these critical tests, when they have occurred, on organizational coherence and adaptability. T h e capacity to resolve succession problems is indicative of the level of institutionaliza9. This has been a persistent theme in the theoretical and empirical literature in organization theory from the Hawthorne studies through Argyris. See, for example, F. J. Roethlisberger, Man-in-Organization: Essays of F. J. Roethlisberger (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964). In the case of India this has been suggested by Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. iJ7-«46. 10. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 165-166. The drive for control of authority positions in parties was given its classic statement by Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959). Midiels, however, gave this phenomenon a strictly elitist bias which is analytically unnecessary and empirically questionable.

INTRODUCTION

9

tion. A final problem is the character and distribution of incentives. The incentive structures of institutions vary according to organizational type, and the character and salience of incentives may change significantly over time.11 This is particularly relevant in the case of a nationalist movement turned competitive political party. There may also be variation in the salience of incentives between different classes of organizational participants; and there may be concomitant variation in salience with changes in the availability and attractiveness of alternative organizations. The problem of conflict management and organizational maintenance are particularly critical in the analysis of political parties. Political parties are characterized by a segmentary organization of political power, with the theoretical exception of totalitarian parties in their purest analytical form.12 In democratic parties, attempts to widen the scope of participation and popular appeal bring new clusters of interests into the party and this contributes to the diffusion and decentralization of power within the system.18 11. See Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), chap. 9; James G. March and Herbert A . Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), chap. 4; see especially Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A T h e o r y of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (September 1961), 129-166. is. T h e concept of segmentation, as used here, is drawn from social anthropology, and appears more useful in describing the organization of power in political parties than does "stratarchy," the concept employed by Eldersveld (p. 9). T h e former implies flexibility and change while the latter implies hierarchy and stasis. Important and useful theoretical works o n segmentation which are of interest to the political scientist include M . G . Smith, " O n Segmentary Lineage Systems," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 86 (1956), 39-80; and Meyer Fortes and E. E. EvansPritchard, eds., African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, 1940). Also see David Easton's excellent treatise, "Political Anthropology," in Bernard J. Siegel, ed., Biennial Review of Anthropology, 1959 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. a 10-248; and Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans (London: T h e Athlone Press, 1959), pp. 7 1 - 1 2 6 . For revisionist conceptions for the analysis of Communist states see R o b e r t C . T u c k e r , " T o w a r d a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," American Political Science Review, 55 (June 1961), 281-289; a r "d the Symposium o n comparative Communist studies in Slavic Review, 26 (March 1967), 1-28. 13. For a similar observation concerning faction and mobilization in a trade union see James S. Coleman et al., Union Democracy (Garden City,

10

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

A continually increasing number of units in the field of political support tends to increase the flexibility of alliance possibilities and increases the number of political expectations to be satisfied. T h e haut elite at a particular point in time is required to be increasingly responsive to new political demands to maintain or expand the powers of the faction or factional coalition which they lead. Furthermore, in the case of the Rajasthan Congress, while the segmentary configuration of political support structures has been conducive to increased responsiveness and bargaining, it has also placed restrictions on the mobilization and concentration of power for the pursuit of collective goals. An important focus of comparative study, therefore, is the determination of the degree of segmentation, the degree of autonomy of political segments, and the authority relationships which prevail between them, as well as the pattern of coalition and linkage which constitutes the web of interactions in the total support structure of the Congress system. Political parties are also systems of conflict. W e proposed above that the party is essentially a conflict-oriented institution. It is subject to competition, however, not only in its bids and appeals for electoral support but also between its component units as well. T h e segmentary organization of power discussed above is given coherence by the structure of strategic authority positions within the party. Political segments, or factions as we shall refer to them, compete not only for control over positions of public authority but also for control over those intermediate positions which make control over the formal positions of authority in the state more likely. Although a variety of issues may be the focus of conflicting views, competition for control over strategic positions in the formal structure of authority constitutes a central focus of political conflict. Conflict between units within the party are thus conducive to the mobilization of new political resources in efforts to increase the power and control of one's own faction or group in relation to that of one's opponents. T h e conscious efforts to increase participation in the Congress, whether the result of attempts to aid the party in terms of its New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1962), p. 449. A similar formulation is found in George Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe: T h e Free Press, 1955), p. 61.

INTRODUCTION

external opposition, or to aid a particular segment of the party against its internal opposition, and the concomitant responsiveness of political elites have contributed to the institutionalization of the party. There also exist within the Congress both formal and informal mechanisms for the management of conflict. The party organization has an appellate structure at each successively higher level of political organization reaching to the party high command, which has functioned as the final arbiter of intraparty conflicts. Leaders and factions in wider areas of conflict also serve as foci of appeals for groups in subordinate areas of conflict, and are willing to offer support, access, or protection to subordinate groups in return for support of that group in the larger area of conflict. Factions in wider areas of conflict are not easily repressed since they rest upon independent bases of support. Nor is there widespread desire that they should be since repression, and the risk of exit, could seriously weaken the party itself. Furthermore, the support available from higher party echelons usually comes into play when an important faction in a subordinate level of organization is under threat. Thus the conflict system itself is conducive to the maintenance of channels of access and this in turn is conducive to the persistence of units of the total support structure in the Congress system. This pattern holds true from the base to the apex of the party. The Congress party in Rajasthan provides a theoretically interesting case for the study of political institutionalization. Until independence this area of India, with the exception of a small enclave, was under the direct rule of native princes, and these traditional states were largely insulated from the social and cultural impact of British India. In this area the rules, attitudes, and sanctions of tradition reach very much into the contemporary era. The absence of cohesive and widespread mass movements challenging the traditional order prior to independence together with the immediate extension of a universal adult franchise in a society where little formal political organization or participation existed previously is in great contrast with those states which formerly constituted British India. The Congress party in Rajasthan was founded as a contract between various protest organizations shortly before independence. The analysis of how party or-

12

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

ganization and representative institutions were founded and how they developed in a situation where they were both rudimentary and young at the time of independence is of particular theoretical interest. A second important concern is c o m m u n i t y integration. Prior to 1949 Rajasthan did not constitute a common political unit but had been divided into twenty-two semisovereign princely states and chiefdoms. T h e postindependence period has witnessed not only the supplanting of traditional structures of political authority and the displacement of rulers whose traditions in some cases extended back unbroken to the tenth century, b u t has also involved the peaceful and successful abolition of a feudal system of land tenure and the co-optation and introduction of a vestigial landed nobility into the new world of democratic politics. It has also witnessed the creation of a new political c o m m u n i t y from these various regional political cultures. T h e Congress party has been the dominant political organization in Rajasthan since independence. It presided over the integration of the R a j p u t a n a states into the new political community as well as over jagirdari abolition. In many ways it reflects the role of the Congress party in the larger political system. It has been the single social or political institution that has established a complex network of political linkages between the areas of the twentytwo former states. It has been particularly important in the recruitment of political elites and in m o b i l i z i n g new social groups into the political process. Furthermore, it has served an educative function. D u r i n g the preindependence period and the interim between independence and the first General Elections, members of the Congress became accustomed to t h i n k i n g and working within the rules and procedures which characterize democratic government. Leadership selection and decision m a k i n g in the state party have provided a f o r u m in w h i c h new elites are also educated in these political rules. T h r o u g h its network of political contacts it has served to educate new political participants in both substantive and procedural matters concerning state politics. T h e state is an increasingly important unit in the Indian political system, and state politics has attracted considerable schol-

INTRODUCTION

J

3

14

arly effort in the last several years. First of all, it is at the state and district levels that India's two political cultures meet. The district, which is parochial, is based largely on primordial ties and traditional notions of ascriptive status and authority. The state, which is more participative in character, emphasizes achieved status, a national secular state, and national symbols. As has been demonstrated in several studies of Indian politics, however, it must be emphasized that "traditional" political culture has not been without its modern characteristics and that India's "modern" political culture has not been without its traditional attributes.1® But the style and mode of political behavior at each of these levels of Indian politics tend to reflect this dichotomy. It 14. These have involved efforts at comparison as well as cases with differing foci. See, for example, Myron Weiner, ed., State Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), and Iqbal Narain, et al., eds., State Politics in India (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967). Important case studies include F. G. Bailey, Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); Paul R . Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965); Angela S. Burger, Opposition in a Dominant Party System: A Study of the Jan Sangh, Praja Socialist and Socialist Parties in Uttar Pradesh, India (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969); Baldev R a j Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Marcus Franda, West Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); Paul Wallace, " T h e Political Party System of Punjab State (India): A Study of Factionalism," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1966; Lawrence L. Shrader, "Politics in Rajasthan," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1965; and Ramashray Roy, "A Study of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1965. 15. W. H. Morris-Jones, "India's Political Idioms," in Cyril H. Philips, ed., Politics and Society in India (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 133-154; Lloyd I. Rudolph, " T h e Modernity of Tradition: T h e Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India," American Political Science Review, 59 (December 1965), 975-989; Myron Weiner, "India: T w o Political Cultures," in Lucian W . Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 199-244; Rajni Kothari and Rushikesh Maru, "Caste and Secularism in India," The Journal of Asian Studies, 25 (November 1965), 33-50; and Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, " T h e Political Role of India's Caste Associations," Pacific Affairs, 33 (March i960), 5-22, and their The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

14

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

is important to determine how these political cultures interact and the impact which each has had upon the other. Second, the state level has been the object of intense political loyalty and public conflict. The assertion of provincial loyalty during the nationalist movement was made evident in the political turmoil that accompanied the partition of Bengal in 1905, in the Congress party's commitment to linguistic subnational units in the famed Nagpur Constitution of 1920, and in the subsequent formation of Orissa and Sindh as separate provinces of British India. Provincial loyalties were manifest in the process of constitution drafting after independence, and the linguistic states movements and agitations of the 1950s constituted a severe challenge to the conception and the symbols of national unity. The political potency of these movements has been registered in the progressive reconstitution of states on the basis of linguistic and cultural areas. Furthermore, the most competitive opposition parties in India have been regional in their basis of support and provincial in terms of their political orientation. Third, the state in the Indian federal system enjoys autonomous rights of political decision making on a number of important subjects as provided by the federal constitution—subjects such as education, agricultural policy and taxation, police, and institutions of local government. State-level public offices are highly prized and have been the focus of intense political competition, and voter turnout for elections to the Vidhan Sabha (State Legislative Assembly) has been higher than for elections to the national Lok Sabha (House of the People). For most political aspirants membership in the former is preferred to membership in the latter. Furthermore, with the passing of the "Tall Leadership" of the Nationalist movement, the universally revered and ultimate political arbiters in the Congress, effective power within the Congress party has become more decentralized.18 This is indicated to some extent by the important role played by chief ministers in the poli16. For a vivid description of the succession process see Michael Brecher, Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India (New York: Praeger, 1966); and his "Succession in India 1967: T h e Routinization of Political Change," Asian Survey, 7 (July 1967), 423-443.

INTRODUCTION

tics of succession after the death of prime ministers Nehru and Shastri. It has also been reflected in the allocation of party tickets for general elections, particularly those held in 1967. T h e state political arena may assume new importance with the rise of former opposition parties and coalitions to legislative dominance in state assemblies as a result of the fourth General Elections. State politics and the state Congress system are closely associated with the national polity and the national Congress. T h e state, both analytically and empirically, is most accurately conceived as a political subsystem because it has clearly definable boundaries and structural mechanisms and popular perceptions for maintaining them. In a federal system where considerable power is allotted to subordinate units through constitutional provision and guarantee the formal authority structure itself tends to encourage the maintenance of boundaries and a measure of subsystem autonomy. T h i s is particularly true in systems where authoritative positions in both polity and party are open to competition. T h u s the availability of strategic positions in the state and competition for control over them contributes to the likelihood of decentralized centers of informal political power. T h e state also harbors important symbolic attachments. It is more coincident with the political horizons of the society than is the larger national system and bestows recognizable and meaningful prestige and power upon those who hold important positions within it. T h e national Congress system, however, has played several significant roles with respect to the states. First of all, it has ultimate control over the allocation of party tickets for elections to the state legislatures and national parliament. Secondly, it has served as an arbiter of state-level conflicts within the Congress system, although there are limits on the power of the national party organization in imposing solutions that would radically alter the configuration of power in the state party. Thirdly, it serves as a point of appeal for minority groups within the party in subordinate situations of conflict. This study focuses upon three interrelated aspects of the institutionalization of the Rajasthan Congress. First, the social and political antecedents governing the emergence of the Congress in the postindependence period are explored. T h i s requires first a

i6

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

consideration of traditional authority and power and the impact of each on the organizational form and the objectives assumed by movements of political protest. It also involves an analysis of the origins of systemic political change in Rajasthan and the influence which preindependence group formation and elite recruitment in both urban and peasant movements have had on the organization of power, environmental relationships, and elite structure in the Congress since independence. These antecedents highlight the tasks that the Rajasthan Congress has faced—the tasks of weaving divers elements into a cohesive political force capable of maintaining political stability and pursuing new systemic goals. This section is cast in a historical perspective since the Congress system at successive points in time has been appreciably influenced by previous choices and actions. T h e factor of time is obviously inherent in the analysis of structural change. T h e second part of the study concerns the structure and process of organizational adaptability and autonomy—the relationship between party and society, and the organization and mobility of elites within the Congress party. This we shall attempt by analyzing the patterns of social and regional representation in the state party from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s. This will not only assist in gauging the adaptability of the party but will also serve as a partial indicator of linkages which have been established between important social groups within the Congress and which have developed between the Congress and opposition parties and groups. We shall then explore patterns of mobility and circularity among elites in strategic positions within the party organization and the legislative party. T h e third aspect of our inquiry concerns the process of conflict management and organizational integration. This requires an analysis of the organization and working of the factional system in the Congress, the character of structures of political support, and strategies employed in attempts to maintain and expand positions of political power. These informal units, or factions, have been centrally important in the organization of the Rajasthan Congress as they have been in the party in other Indian states. An effort will be made to determine the internal structure of factions, the basis of recruitment of factional membership, and the condi-

INTRODUCTION

17

tions which have been conductive to the maintenance of factional cohesion and fission. W e shall also be concerned with the relationship between factional and party obligation and the incentives for resolving intraparty conflict. Important too is the development and structure of interlevel factional linkages within the Congress system and the types of linkages w h i c h the Congress has with its political environment. Finally, we shall be concerned with the impact of factional competition on the mobilization of new political resources and on the maintenance of the open and decentralized character of the Congress system in Rajasthan.

Chapter

2

P O L I T Y A N D S O C I E T Y IN THE PRINCELY STATES OF R A J P U T A N A

M O D E R N political organization in Rajasthan has been greatly influenced by traditional social institutions and sentiments in the Rajputana states. Prior to independence, populist political groups were limited in the scope of their action and recruitment to separate princely states. Since independence factions within the Congress party of Rajasthan (as well as those within opposition parties) have been generally restricted to the major regions of the state. Some are restricted in the base of recruitment to the areas of former princely states. The dispersion of caste groups and patterns of land tenure have also varied from region to region, and the substance of these variations is crucial to understanding the rise of political protest in rural Rajasthan. The pervasiveness of regionalism during the first decade after independence prompted some important political leaders to advocate that the state be divided more or less on the basis of these traditional cultural regions. While the new political order in Rajasthan has emphasized and witnessed increasing political participation and political demands, authority relationships in the Rajputana states reflected a parochial-subject political culture. 1 T h e organization of power in the princely states was decentralized, and the scope of politics and the field of political participants was severely limited. Participation was the province of those born into the ascriptive structure of political authority and to representatives, primarily recruited from among high-caste urban groups, who were co-opted by tradi-

1. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), chap. 1; and Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development, chap. is.

POLITY AND SOCIETY IN

RAJPUTANA

19

tional authorities to fill priestly and administrative roles. In many cases recruitment to these positions was also based upon ascriptive ties, in terms not only of social group but also of long honored familial relationship«. T h e scope of political conflict was likewise primarily limited to questions of defining the "legitimate" relationship between prince and lord and the application of customary rules regulating the use of land and the collection of rents and labor. T h e framework of authority and the scope of "public" politics was not called into question until the third decade of this century. T h e organization of public authority and power, the locus of legitimacy symbols, and differential patterns of caste participation in the public affairs of the princely states have all influenced political organization and participation in preindependence populist movements and in the postindependence party system. POWER AND AUTHORITY IN THE RAJPUTANA STATES

T h e integration of the Rajputana states to create the state of Rajasthan constituted the formation of a new political community. T h e Rajputana states had never constituted a common political unit. Conflict, suspicion, and intrigue characterized the relations among these states. Many states had distinctive cultures. Language tended to coincide with territorial sovereignty: Dhundhari was spoken in Jaipur, Mewari in Udaipur, Marwari in Jodhpur, and Haraoti in Kotah, Bundi, and Jhalawar. States also had their own political heroes whose virtues and exploits were exalted and preserved in the poems of court bards. Distinctive art forms arose in most states as did bodies of literary expression. Furthermore, dress and diet varied from area to area, variations still evident today. Although there was political division and cultural distinctiveness among the Rajputana states, there was a certain perception of commonality. This perception, however, was an elite phenomenon. T h e name of the region itself, for example, arose indigenously. Colonel James Tod, in his monumental treatise written in the early nineteenth century, observed that these states were referred to locally as Rajwara or Raethana, the former being common in vulgar usage while the latter was preferred by the more

20

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

genteel. 2 These terms were corrupted into Rajputana and Rajasthan by the British, the former being preferred for administrative reference. T h e region comprising the Rajput states was conceived administratively as a distinct area by the Mughal Emperors and formed the largest portion of the province of Ajmer during the Mughal era.3 T h e r e is also a common body of Rajput folklore which glorified the stand of the Rajput states against the expansion of the Mughal Empire; and Rana Pratap, the heroic ruler of Udaipur in the seventeenth century, enjoys a position of unquestioned eminence among Rajput heroes for his unceasing opposition to the Mughals even at the expense of kin, wealth, and realm. T h i s sense of regional consciousness, at least among the ruling families and their courtiers, was also encouraged by traditions of intermarriage, although marriage sometimes prompted interstate rivalries and exacerbated old ones. While marriage did not necessarily result in increased political cooperation, it did both emphasize and encourage sentiments of common identity among the ruling houses. T h e organization of political power in each of the Rajputana states was highly segmented, and this pattern of segmentation had a profound impact upon the development of organizations of political protest. Each state was ruled by a maharaja whose position was the locus of ultimate political obligation for both commoner and lord, and he was the respository of legitimate political authority. Although local lords owed allegiance to the central darbar and were often formally restricted in the powers they could legitimately exercise within their fiefs, they enjoyed considerable autonomy in day-to-day administration, which often involved ultimate judgment in both civil disputes and criminal cases. T h e precise origin of the Rajputana states and the authority relationships that attended founding and early contact and devel». James Tod, Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan or the Central and Western Rajput States of India, edited with an introduction and notes by William Crooke, first published in 1829-183« (2 vols., London: Oxford University Press, 19*0), I, p. 1. 3. W. H. Moreland, Agrarian System of Moslem India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19*9), p. 119.

POLITY AND SOCIETY IN

RAJPUTANA

21

opment have been subjects of considerable dispute. These questions have occupied students of traditional Rajasthani society; more importantly, they have constituted major political conflicts among the actors themselves. T o d maintains that political organization was essentially feudal, with political power monopolized by a class of landed lords.4 Another eminent observer, Sir Alfred Lyall, insisted that Tod's observations were too much fashioned by the conceptual bias of late eighteenth-century historiography concerning old societies. Lyall emphasized that the legitimacy of this federated system of power rested upon the organic solidarity of Rajput social organization—the chief of the clan being the ruler of the state but exercising his powers on behalf of the larger community of the clan. 8 Political authority in this perspective did not devolve from the position of the maharaja but from Rajput clan organization within the territorial limits of the state, the clan being the ultimate repository of political authority. This conception was also proposed earlier in the century by a British administrator familiar with this area: The will of the prince is everywhere directed and controlled by a body of powerful hereditary nobles, who have rights and possessions separate from his; and who, through all times, we find ready to unite with him to defend his and their possessions against foreign encroachment, as well as to unite against him to support their order against his usurpations. These struggles are necessarily calculated to bring both parties to lean on the people for support, and consequently to infuse democratic principles into Rajput councils.8 Another position views political authority in the Rajputana 4. Tod, I, pp. 1 5 3 - 2 3 6 and passim. For a brief summary and critique of Tod's analysis see Daniel Thorner, "Feudalism in India," in Rushton Coulborn, ed.. Feudalism in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), PP- ' 3 3 - ' 5 ° 5. Sir Alfred Lyall, Asiatic Studies: Religious and Social (London: John Murray, 1882), pp. 207-219. See also the Rajputana Gazetteer, Vol. 1 (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1879), pp. 59-60; and Anil Chandra Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962), pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 3 . 6. J. Sutherland, Sketches of the Relations Subsisting Between the British Government in India and the Different Native States (Calcutta: G. H. Huttman. Military Orphan Press, 1837), p. 179.

22

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

states as having been originally invested in the hands of a sovereign prince who granted jagirdari rights to members of his clan, his caste, and to commoners either as a reward for service rendered or as an ijara—the right to collect rents with a fixed amount being surrendered to the treasury of the central darbar. T h i s conception was most persuasively documented and argued in the case of Jaipur State by the late C. U. Wills. 7 Yet another view proposes that the princely states evolved with the assertion of power by a dominant chief over surrounding territories which then assumed tributary status. None of these different views, irrespective of their historical merit, was commonly accepted by the princes and their sardars either before or during the British period. Conflict over the exercise of authority in practice, however, was resolved in favor of the ruling houses with the extension of British suzerainty over the states of Rajputana and the development of the doctrine of paramountcy. Treaties signed by the British East India Company and the Rajputana states during the first two decades of the nineteenth century committed the British to the restoration and perpetuation of a quasi-feudal system of authority. 8 First, where applicable, the British assured the return of crown lands to the maharaja which had been usurped by jagirdars or freebooters during the last half of the eighteenth century. T h e British further agreed to assist the central darbar when threatened by major thakurs and also insisted that an agreement insuring the status quo be signed by the maharaja and his chiefs subsequent to the signing of treaties between the British and the princes. 9 Article 7 of the treaty signed with Bikaner in 1808, for example, declared, "the British Government on the application of the Maharaja, will reduce to subjection the Thakoors and other inhabitants of his 7. C. U. Wills, A Report on the Land-Tenures and Special Powers of Certain Thikanedars of the Jaipur State (Delhi: I.M.H. Press, 1933). 8. For a brief description of the doctrine of paramountcy see Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph, "Rajputana Under British Paramountcy: T h e Failure of Indirect Rule," Journal of Modern History, 38 (June 1966), 138160. 9. Correspondence between Sir David Ochterlony, the Political Resident in Jaipur State, and the Political Department of the Government of India concerning the agreement between the Maharaja of Jaipur and his thakurs is to be found in Wills, Report on Land Tenures, Appendix H.

P O L I T Y A N D SOCIETY IN R A J P U T A N A

23

principality, who have revolted and thrown off his authority." 10 In 1830, the British honored this commitment and with success. Within two decades after the signing of the treaties the British had become overtly involved in the settlement of disputes and internal administration in almost all the Rajputana states. In several states British forces were employed in the maintenance of order and protection of the royal house. In other cases the British, through the organizational apparatus of the Political Department, assumed administrative control in the states, and it was not uncommon for appointees, often Englishmen, to occupy important administrative positions, including that of prime minister. T h i s process continued until shortly before independence, although the princes had made numerous efforts to exact a commitment from the British government that the internal administration of the states would be left entirely to the states themselves with the viceroy only responsible for defense, foreign affairs, and the administration and maintenance of important means of communication. Opposition to the employment of outsiders in the state administration was an important factor which the princes had in common with the protest movements which started to form in the Rajputana states from the late 1920s. Finally, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the British became involved in determining the rights of succession in cases where there was no legitimate male heir. They had become indirectly involved in questions of succession from the time treaties were signed. 11 T h e British Raj eventually assumed the responsibility of guardianship of minor princes and usually played a significant role in the administration of the state during the minority. While the government of British India became involved in the administration of the Rajputana states in an effort to maintain order, overt conflict between princes and nobles arose intermittently until shortly before independence. In several cases British forces were used to thwart rebellion against princely authority, while in others British administrators assumed control of adminis10. Sutherland, Sketches of the Relations, p. IOÎ. 11. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Madras: Orient Longmans, 1956), p. 11.

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y

24

IN

RAJASTHAN

tration where nobles of important subordinate domains were unresponsive to suggestions for internal reform. Conflicts between prince and noble and alliances attending them have in several cases been transposed to postindependence politics. T h e existence of a visible British presence in the administration and maintenance of order in these states provided the protest movements that developed a common cause with the larger nationalist movement in the British provinces. LAND TENURE AND L A T E N T CLASS DIVISION

Regardless of the precise origins of the traditional organization of power and the formal character of political authority, political power in the Rajputana states was determined by the amount and value of land controlled. T h e system of land tenure was quite complex and extremely important. Land tenure was divided into two general types—khalsa, crown lands under the direct rule and control of the central darbar,

and jagir,

estates of varying value

and size controlled by the maharaja's subordinate sardars.

The

data in T a b l e 1 indicate that the proportion of land under jagirdari tenure varied considerably from region to region. T h e regions in which jagirdari

tenure was most extensive were

Jodhpur, Bikaner, and the Shekhawati area of Jaipur State, an area almost exclusively under the control of jagirdars thikanadars.

TABLE LAND

AND V I L L A G E S

UNDER (IN

I

KHALSA

AND J A G I R D A R I

Bikaner Jaipur Jodhpur Kotah Udaipur

TENURE

PERCENT)

Land Area Division

and large

Jaipur Division also includes the former states of

Villages

Khalsa

Jagirdari

Khalsa

Jagirdari

35-7

643

53-6 59-0 23-3

46.4 41.0 76.7 18.2 66.0

49.6

27-5

80.0 41.4

50.4 72.5 20.0 58:6

81.8

34°

SOURCE: Government of India, Report of the Rajaithart-Madhya Bharat Jagir Enquiry Committee, New Delhi: Government of India Preis, 1950.

POLITY AND SOCIETY IN R A J P U T A N A

25

Alwar, Bharatpur, and Dholpur each of which had sizable khalsa holdings. T h e highest proportions of khalsa land, therefore, were held by the darbars of those states in the southern and easternmost areas of the Rajputana states—Udaipur, Kotah, and the Matsya area of Jaipur Division. T h e size of jagirs varied from the large estates such as Uniara, Sikar, and Khetri in Jaipur State to small charsas, or "hides of land" which were barely large enough to support the owner. T o d observed that in the larger estates jagirdars maintained minuscule courts with the same elaborate functional division of labor that characterized the court of the maharaja. 12 Many of the larger jagirdars also granted jagirs within their own areas while the larger thikanas maintained police forces and judicial systems separate from those of the central darbar and in certain cases had the right to levy customs and excise taxes. 13 T h e jagirdars' rights and obligations to their lord were a congeries of agreement and custom. 14 In all cases of jagirdari tenure, the rulers of these small estates paid an annual tribute to the maharaja and in some cases were responsible for a military cess as well as the supply of a certain number of soldiers, amounts being fixed according to the rental value of the particular jagir. T h e jagirs held by Rajputs were hereditary, although in principle jagirdari rights lapsed with the death of the person to whom the jagir had been awarded. This practice was ordinarily observed, however, only with respect to non-Rajput sardars. T h e formal tradition of jagirdari resumption by the state was maintained through the payment of nazarana, or investiture, by the inheritor of the jagir. By such payment, the rightful heir assumed the title and rights that had been enjoyed by his ancestors. With the exception of the Mallani area of Jodhpur and certain areas of Shekhawati, where the law of Gavelkind obtained, inheritance was governed by primogeniture. T h u s most holdings once granted continued, while in the exceptional areas

12. Tod, Annals and Antiquities, I, p. soi. 13. For the case of Jaipur State, see Wills, Report on Land Tenures, Appendix C. See the glossary for definitions of terms. 14. Government of India, Report of the Rajasthan-Madhya Bharat Jagir Enquiry Committee (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1950), pp. 1013 and 18-19. (Hereafter referred to as the Venkatachar Report.)

26

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN

RAJASTHAN

where holdings were divided in each generation the jagirs in many cases were extremely small by the time of independence and the welfare of a Rajput lord was often as dismal as that of his tenants. The other form of land tenure in Rajputana was bhumia or freehold tenure. These grants were made in recognition of important contributions and services rendered to the maharaja. Bhumia grants were particularly valued because they did not oblige the holder to pay tribute, did not involve military obligations, and, since they were granted in perpetuity, did not require the payment of nazarana. This kind of grant, however, was usually exceedingly small, and from the late nineteenth century bhumias started to enter the administrative services of the major thikanas and princely states as well as the British Indian Army and military forces of the Rajputana states. Because their holdings were quite small, the bhumias were particularly hard hit by the provisions of jagirdari resumption after independence, especially since employment in military service was terminated for many with the abolition of the State Forces.18 Bhumia discontent eventually became crystallized in the Bhumiswami Andolan, a mass political movement which did not end until 1958 when certain changes were made in the rules governing jagirdari resumption in favor of the owners of smaller jagirs.16 The rights of tenants in the traditional order were defined by custom, interpreted and applied by jagirdars and agents of the ruling prince. There was not a defined body of rights and obligations rigidly observed, however, prior to the twentieth century and then only in khalsa lands. Tenants in jagir areas rarely enjoyed formal right of occupancy, agreements being for short periods of time and rents being subject to frequent "renegotiation." Rents often amounted to as much as 50 percent of the produce. Furthermore, land made available to tenants was also subject to change, although not "in principle," during the period of a current agreement. 15. See Government of Rajasthan, Report of the Rajas than Khudkasht Enquiry Committee (n.d.), p. 6. 16. For an analysis of this movement see Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph, " T h e Political Modernization of an Indian Feudal Order: An Analysis of Rajput Adaptation in Rajasthan," Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1968), 93-128.

POLITY AND SOCIETY IN R A J P U T A N A

27

In jagirdari areas, therefore, conflict between Rajput lord and non-Rajput tenant was often extremely intense and usually concerned the formal definition of rights and obligations, the reduction of rents and abolition of forced labor, postponement of rents during times of natural catastrophe, and eventually generalized protest over social and political subjugation. This was particularly true in desert states where the dominant peasant caste, the Jats, had been lords of the land prior to the expansion and consolidation of Rajput power. 17 In other cases, primarily in khalsa areas, the position of tenants was neither so tenuous nor their economic obligations so severe. Frequently tenants enjoyed katedari and pattedari rights which provided permanent rights of occupancy and inheritance if certain rules of tenure were met and in some cases provided for the right of transfer and the assumption of mortgage. 18 In some cases, however, transfer involved the payment of high premiums and in others required the sanction of state authority. Several states started to institute limited land reforms in khalsa, but not in jagirdari, areas after World War I. By the time of independence, all the Rajputana states, with the notable exception of Jaisalmer, had tenancy acts on the books. With the exception of Jaipur and Jodhpur, however, these were largely clarifications of traditional rules rather than the legislation of new ones. 19 Traditional patterns of land ownership have several important implications for postindependence politics in Rajasthan. T h e more ambiguous and oppressive rules of tenure characteristic of jagirdari areas gave rise to cohesive peasant movements during the two decades before independence, and during the first decade 17. Tod, Annals and Antiquities, II, pp. 1 1 2 4 - 1 1 3 2 ; and Wills, Report on Land Tenures, p. 15. Prior to the establishment of the state of Bikaner in the sixteenth century by a member of the royal family of Jodhpur, Jats ruled this area in a highly confederated manner. In Jaipur during the latter part of the eighteenth century, a J a t leader by the name of Jawahir Singh established temporary control over sections of Shekhawati and made several forays into lands claimed by the maharaja. 18. For a summary of various types of tenancy, see the Venkatachar Report, pp. 38-41 and Appendix D. For a brief statement, see Government of Rajasthan, Report of the State Land Commission for Rajasthan (Jaipur: Government Central Press, 1959), p. 8. 19. Ibid.

28

T H E CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

after independence political conflict in these areas was primarily joined between Rajput lords and the former tenant castes, principally Jats, Sirvis, and Vishnois. In khalsa areas, however, where more explicitly defined and more flexible rules of tenure prevailed, political organization in rural areas assumed a plural character much earlier than in the former jagirdari areas. Furthermore, the latent class division between jagirdar and bhumia became manifest during the first decade after independence and induced an important fissure within the Rajput caste in modern politics, particuarly in the areas of former Jodhpur and Jaipur states. This cleavage together with the articulation of traditional conflicts between the lords of important landed estates and between certain nobles and princes has inhibited the development of a politics of vestigial atavism on the part of the former landed aristocracy and has contributed to the plural character of social representation in the Rajasthan party system. GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

T h e Rajputana states by 1949 had been integrated into the Indian Union to form the state of Rajasthan. T h e process of integration was piecemeal and reflected efforts on the part of the Indian government to consult with the princes and their sardars in an effort to reach agreement and association between the Indian government and the princely states based on mutual consent. Negotiations involved not only the organization of the new regional political community but also commitments and agreements concerning the protection of the material interests of princes and important nobles in the new political system. T h e administrative organization of Rajasthan reflects traditional subregional groupings. T h e new state was divided into five administrative divisions, each of which included one of the major princely states from which the respective divisions derive their names. Smaller states in most cases were transformed into separate administrative districts. Division and district have assumed importance in modern politics. T h e administrative divisions and districts of Rajasthan and the states from which they were created are outlined in Table 2. Each division more or less coincides with the major subcultures

P O L I T Y A N D S O C I E T Y IN R A J P U T A N A TABLE

29

2

A D M I N I S T R A T I V E DIVISIONS AND D I S T R I C T S OF

Administrative Division

Former States

RAJASTHAN

Current Districts

Jaipur

Matsya

Alwar, Bharatpur and Dholpur

Alwar and Bharatpur

Jaipur

Part of Jaipur, Karauli, Tonk, Kishengarh, and Ajmer-Merwara

Jaipur, Sawai Madhopur, Tonk, and Ajmer

Shekhawati

Part of Jaipur

Jhunjhunu and Sikar

Kotah

Kotah, Bundi, and Jhalawar

Kotah, Bundi, and Jhalawar

Udaipur

Udaipur, Banswara, Dungarpur, Shahpura, Pratapgarh, and Kushalgarh

Udaipur, Bhilwara, Chittorgarh, Banswara, and Dungarpur

Jodhpur

Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, and Sirohi

Jodhpur, Nagaur, Pali, Jalore, Sirohi, Barmer, and Jaisalmer

Bikaner

Bikaner

Bikaner, Churu, and Ganganagar

S O U R C E : Government of Rajasthan, Report on the Administration, ¡350-51 (Jaipur: Government of India Press, 1954). The political significance of the distinctions made in Jaipur Division is explored in Chapter 5.

of Rajasthan distinguished by land type and agricultural practice, language, social organization, and population distribution. 20 Jaipur Division coincides closely with the eastern Rajasthan Plain which slopes from the Aravalli Range to the Jumna basin in neighboring Uttar Pradesh. This division reaches from Ajmer, the western part of which is closely related in climate and soil type to Jodhpur, through the districts of Alwar and Bharatpur in the east. The land in this division is the most productive in the state and maintains the highest density of population. Jaipur Division, however, includes three politically distinct regions and will be sub20. Government of Rajasthan, Report on the Administration of Rajasthan, 1950-1931 (Jaipur: Government Press, 1954), p. 9. Ajmer-Merwara was added as a district in 1956.

30

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

divided in this way in the remainder of our analysis. The first will be referred to as the Matsya region, a highly productive agricultural area and the most densely populated area of Rajasthan. It has many cultural ties with Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, particularly Mathura and Agra. The second area includes the two districts of Jhunjhunu and Sikar, which together constitute the Shekhawati area. This area is different from the remainder of Jaipur Division in a number of ways. It is an extremely arid region, and agricultural practice is more like that of the desert districts in Jodhpur and Bikaner divisions than of the remainder of the state. It is also culturally distinctive with a dialect quite different from that spoken in other areas. Shekhawati is also largely populated by Jats which has distinguished it socially from the rest of Jaipur Division, as has the traditional autonomy of this area from the court of Jaipur State. The third area, called Jaipur, includes the districts of Jaipur, Sawai Madhopur, Tonk, and Ajmer. Kotah Division, which includes the former states of Kotah, Bundi, and Jhalawar, constitutes the southern plateau region which stretches along the eastern border of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh to the valley of the Chambal River in the south. Udaipur Division, which covers the highland region in the southernmost part of the state, is composed of the current districts of Udaipur, Bhilwara, and Chittorgarh from the former state of Udaipur. The districts of Banswara and Dungarpur, each a sovereign state prior to independence, have been added to this area. The Divisions of Jodhpur and Bikaner lie to the west of the Aravallis which cut across Rajasthan diagonally from northeast to southwest separating the dry regions of the west from the plains and hill regions of the east and south. The area covered by these divisions, which forms part of the Thar Desert, is extremely arid and irrigation is necessary in most areas for productive agriculture. Ganganagar District of Bikaner Division is one of the most agriculturally productive areas of India due to the Gang Canal constructed by the late Maharaja Ganga Singh. This district also enjoys the highest per capita income in Rajasthan. There is also considerable variation in the population of Rajasthan (Table 3). The total population at the time of the 1961

POLITY

AND

SOCIETY

IN

RAJPUTANA

3»

census was 20,155,602 with a population density of 153 persons per square mile, the lowest density of any state in India. T h e dispersion and density of population vary considerably from district to district and from region to region. T h e districts with the highest density are located in the Matsya area of Jaipur Division, while the lowest density is found in Jodhpur Division, Jaisalmer District, having but nine persons per square mile. TABLE

3

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF RAJASTHAN

Region Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner Rajasthan

Persons per Square Mile

Percent of State Population

Percent Living in Rural Areas

Percent Literate

352 a79 «79

11.i

89.1 76., 85.1 9'-4 82.4 86.1

15.2 >7-9 16.0 12.0 17.1 12.8 18.6 158

ago 82 86 '53

8-3 '9-5 7.6 21.4 10.6 100.0

74-5 83-7

SOURCE: Government of India, Census of India, ¡g6i. Paper No. / of ig6a; Final Population Totals (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1962), pp. 6, 346. The sequence of regions followed in this table will be employed in subsequent analysis.

Like the other areas of India, the bulk of the Rajasthani population (83.7 percent) lives in rural areas. Here too there is great regional variation. T h e highest proportion of population living in rural areas is found in Udaipur Division (91.4 percent) and the Matsya area of Jaipur Division (89.1 percent). T h e lowest proportions are found in Bikaner and Jaipur which have 74.5 percent and 76.1 percent respectively; this is largely accounted for by their large cities. Rajasthan's long political and social seclusion has also contributed to the state's backwardness in educational facilities, and there are those who insist that the neglect of education during the preindependence period was calculated due to the fear that it would merely encourage the erosion of princely authority as it encouraged the erosion of British authority in the British provinces.

32

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

Education until the 1930s was almost entirely limited to those residing in urban areas, and it was a m o n g sectors of the y o u n g urban educated that the first movements of political protest originated. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGIONAL DISPERSION

Caste is the most important social category in Rajasthan, as it is in other parts of India, and it has been one of the most important factors in Rajasthani politics since independence. In its purest form, caste (jati) refers to an endogamous social unit with internalized rules which determine the types and conditions of various forms of social interaction deemed acceptable with respect to other similar social units. 21 T r a d i t i o n a l l y , customary rules of behavior were enforced by jati panchayats (caste councils), although in many instances these institutions have been displaced by the structures of the modern state. T h i s configuration of relatively self-contained and self-regulating social units constituted an important dimension in the decentralized system of social and political power of the princely states. Castes in Rajasthan are numerous and widely dispersed. N o single caste n o r common g r o u p i n g of castes constitute a numerical majority, nor even a large plurality, of Rajasthan's population. A c c o r d i n g to the 1931 census, the last in which caste data were included, 393 different castes and tribes were tabulated for the R a j p u t a n a States, although 84 percent of the population was accounted for by only 42 castes and tribes ( T a b l e 4).22 Most castes in Rajasthan, therefore, are q u i t e small and tend to be concentrated in specific areas. Many are located almost exclusively in one or another of the former princely states. For the purpose of analyzing political organization and representation at the state level, it is useful to devise more generic caste categories than those dictated by ascriptive social codes. T h i s w o u l d appear to be acceptable particularly since political leaders 21. For a useful consideration of Jati, see Richard G. Fox, "Resiliency and Change in the Indian Caste System: the U m a r of U.P." Journal of Asian Studies, 26 (August 1967), 575-587. 22. Census of India, 1931, vol. 27: The Rajputana Agency (Meerut: Government of India, 1932), p. 124.

POLITY AND SOCIETY

IN

RAJPUTANA T A B L E

SIZE

OF

CASTES

Size 300,000 and over 100,000-299,999 50,000-99,999 10,000-49,999 Less than 10,000 Total

IN T H E

33

4 RAJPUTANA

STATES

Number of Castes 9 '3 20 54 297 393

SOURCE: Census of India, 1931, vol. 27: The Rajputana Agency (Mccrut: Government of I n d i a , 1932).

at the state level do not know the precise jati of their colleagues, although the general caste g r o u p i n g or varna is known. 2 3 T h u s men from one area of the state, rather than perceiving a person from another in terms of the particular caste by which he is known in his home area, perceive him in terms of a more generic social category. A Pushkarna Brahman from Jodhpur views a Bagari Brahman from Bharatpur as a Brahman, but not in terms of his particular jati. A high caste H i n d u from Jaipur knows that a m e m b e r of the Legislative Assembly from Jodhpur is an Untouchable but does not distinguish him as a Balai or a Bhambi. A R a j p u t from U d a i p u r knows that a fellow Congressman from A l w a r is a Mahajan or Bania b u t does not know whether he is a Khandelwal or a Saraogi. Because later chapters will try to demonstrate the relationship of caste to political organization and participation at the state level, we have here not to devise cast rankings with great sophistication and precision, but to use general 23. T h e concept of varna refers to the four-fold categorization of society set forth in the ancient H i n d u scriptures. T h e highest category, the Brahman, were traditionally priests. T h e Kshatriya were warriors and rulers. T h e Vaishya included men of commerce and trade who are colloquially referred to as either Banias or Mahajans, the former having a pejorative connotation. T h e Shudra included peasants and artisans. T h e Harijans, or Untouchables, are outside this classical conception of caste H i n d u social organization. It should be emphasized that varna and jati are distinct categories, the former including large numbers of the latter most of which do not interdine, intermarry or participate in other common life-rite ceremonies.

34

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

but important categories of castes and single dominant castes where they are perceived as an important social category by political actors themselves (Table 5). The largest and most politically dynamic caste in Rajasthan are the Jats. This caste is concentrated primarily in the desert areas of the state, where the most important rural populist movements TABLE

5

DISPERSION OF M A J O R C A S T E S B Y

REGION

(IN P E R C E N T )

Region Caste

Rajasthan

Matsya

Jaipur

Kotah

Udaipur

Jodhpur

Bikaner

Jat Chamar Bhil Rajput Mina Gujar Mali Kumhar Brahman Mahajan

9 7 6 6 5 5 3 3 8 7

7 «4

11 9 0 4 9 7 5 3

1 11 3

3 3 47 5 4 4 1 4 6 3

12

23 7 0 6 0 0

0

4 5 7 3 5 9 4

SOURCE : Ctnsus of India, ¡931:

10

8

2

10

8 7 3 6 1

0 3 9 1 1 3 4 5 6

2

4 9 7

The Rajpuiana Agency.

developed before independence. Jats constitute over 23 percent of the population of Bikaner Division and in 1931 were reported to be numerically predominant in all tehsils of this area with the exception of a few in Ganganagar District. The Jats are also the largest caste in Jodhpur and Jaipur divisions, but their residence is more localized than in Bikaner. In Jodhpur, Jats formed the largest single community in eight different tehsils which constitute the largest part of the two present districts of Jodhpur and Nagaur. Together with two other former tenant castes, the Sirvis in Pali District and the Vishnois in Jalore, the Jats constitute an extremely important political bloc in Jodhpur Division. In Jaipur Division, Jats are concentrated in the Shekhawati area where they form the numerically dominant caste in all tehsils as they do in

POLITY AND SOCIETY

IN

RAJPUTANA

35

four tehsils of Bharatpur District, formerly a Jat-ruled princely state. While Jats constitute the predominant peasant caste in the western regions of Rajasthan, Gujars, traditionally herdsmen, are predominant in the eastern plains and southern plateau. This caste has not been as active politically as the Jats and in many cases has not been as politically important as other smaller and more localized castes in these areas, such as the Ahirs in Alwar and the Dhakars in Kotah and Jhalawar. Also the Minas, although formally considered to be a Scheduled Tribe, have become fairly successful cultivators and have provided the Gujar community with some of its toughest political competition during the last decade. The Rajputs were the dominant caste in Rajasthan before independence and have provided many important political leaders in state politics since. As indicated in Table 5, the Rajput population is fairly evenly distributed throughout the state, and only in one former state area, Jaisalmer District, do Rajputs constitute the largest single caste.24 The proportion of the Rajput population ranged from nearly 9 percent in Jodhpur to less than 2 percent in Banswara. Rajputs were more numerous and constituted a larger part of the population in the desert states to the west of the Aravallis and in the Shekhawati area of Jaipur State than in the southern regions of Udaipur and Kotah, although Rajputs form the largest single community in three tehsils of Udaipur. T h e political activity and success of Rajputs since independence has been greatest in the areas of the old desert states.28 24. Census of India, 1931, pp. 166-168. Data included in Table 5 are used for subsequent computations concerning caste. 25. T h e Rajputs, as we have seen, do not constitute a solidary group. It should also be noted that each of these regions was dominated by a major Rajput clan, each being proud of its traditions. In the desert states of Jodhpur and Bikaner, the Rathores were predominant, the leading house being Jodhpur, while in the eastern plains the Kachhawaha clan was the most prestigious and powerful, the principal ruling family being that of Jaipur. In Udaipur Division the Sisodias constituted the most powerful clan and were rulers in all of the princely states included in this division after independence. T h e ruling families of Kotah and Bundi states were of the Chauhan clan.

36

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

Members of Brahman castes have been among the most prominent public leaders in both the former Rajputana states and in Rajasthan. Caste representatives traditionally performed priestly functions in the courts of maharajas as well as in those of the landed aristocracy. Brahmans were among the first to opt for western education and many held important positions in the administrative services of the states and the large thikanas and jagirs. They were also very prominent among those who launched movements of political dissent in the states and have been among the most important leaders in state politics since independence. Brahmans constitute the second largest group of caste Hindus in Rajasthan and include a large number of separate jatis, each of which tends to be concentrated in a particular area. Brahmans, like Rajputs, are fairly evenly distributed throughout the state, although they account for a larger proportion of the population in the desert areas and the eastern plains than they do in the regions of the south. Brahmans, therefore, do not constitute a solidary group in Rajasthan, but include a congeries of different jatis that tend to be clustered in separate areas of the state. The Mahajans are the traditional merchant or Vaishya castes of Rajasthan and since the nineteenth century have been among the most able and wealthiest businessmen and financiers in India. 26 By independence eight Marwari families, whose ancestral homes are in the desert areas of Rajasthan, held 565 directorships in industrial, banking, and insurance enterprises. The Mahajans, like Brahmans, do not constitute a solidary group but are composed of separate jatis which do not intermarry. Some castes, especially the Agarwal, are further divided between Hindus and Jains, and Jains of the same caste are also sometimes socially divided over preference of religious practice. Four castes account for approximately 80 percent of the total Mahajan population of Rajasthan. These are the Oswal, Agarwal, Maheshwari, and Khandelwal, each of which is primarily located in one area of the state. The Oswals, for example, are concentrated in the desert regions and also constitute the largest Mahajan coms6. For a brief study of the Marwari community, see Harry A. Millman, " T h e Marwari: A Study of a Group of the Trading Castes in India," Master's thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1955.

37

P O L I T Y AND SOCIETY IN R A J P U T A N A

munity in the area of former U d a i p u r State. In Jodhpur Division, this caste forms the largest single caste in five contiguous tehsils of Jalore and Sirohi districts. Agarwals, on the other hand, are extremely few in the western regions, but are concentrated in the areas of former Jaipur, Alwar, Bharatpur, and Kotah states. T h e Maheshwaris, a relatively small community, are located almost exclusively in the Jodhpur region, while the Khandelwals are restricted in numerical significance to the districts of A l w a r and Bharatpur. Members of these castes, like Brahmans, were especially active in preindependence movements. T h e regional concentration of these castes, however, has been conducive to the localization of political solidary groups based in these castes when such groups have in fact existed. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled T r i b e s constitute a significant proportion of the population of Rajasthan ( T a b l e 6). According TABLE REGIONAL

DISPERSION

AND SCHEDULED

6

OP SCHEDULED

T R I B E S IN

(IN PERCENT O F T O T A L

Region Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner

CASTES

RAJASTHAN

POPULATION)

Scheduled Castes

Scheduled Tribes

Total

«9-9

5-9 14-9

41.i

26.2

18.7 10.5 14.4

11.1 26.3

16.2

33-0 2.4

5-5 •3

25.8

34-9 43-5 16.8 16.6 26.6

SOURCE: Census of India, 1961.

to the 1961 census, combined they formed 27.6 percent of the population. Scheduled Castes are widely dispersed over the state, w i t h particular castes tending to be concentrated in fairly restricted areas. T h e highest concentration of depressed classes in Rajasthan is in the eastern and southern regions, while the proportion in the desert areas is quite low. W i t h i n the latter region the Scheduled Caste population is quite localized. Most of these castes in Jodhpur Division are located in Sirohi District, in which

38

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

the population is nearly 45 percent from these depressed classes, while in Ganganagar District of Bikaner Division over 30 percent of the population are members of Scheduled Castes.27 T h e dispersion of Scheduled Castes is greater than that of Scheduled Tribes. In all regions, at least 10 percent of the population consists of Scheduled Castes, whereas the desert regions have very few persons declared to be members of Scheduled Tribes. Like caste Hindus, there is considerable regional variation with respect to dominant Scheduled Castes and Tribes. T h e single largest Scheduled Caste is the Chamars, which constitute a sizable proportion of the depressed class population of each region and which has provided the most numerous and aggressive political activists among Scheduled Castes. Other important Scheduled Castes are Balais, Meghwals, and Raigars, all of which are found primarily in the desert regions. There are two major Scheduled Tribes—Bhils and Minas, who ruled the land where they now live before the coming of the Rajput clans. T h e Bhils are found almost exclusively in Udaipur Division, where they constitute over 60 percent of the population in Banswara and Dungarpur districts. Minas are located almost exclusively in the eastern portions of the state and constitute the single largest social group in a large number of tehsils in the districts of Alwar, Jaipur, Kotah, and even in Udaipur. Members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were not actively involved in preindependence political activity, although there are a few very notable exceptions. Encouraged by the large number of seats reserved for members of these castes and tribes in the State Legislative Assembly and the concomitant enticement and support of high caste political entrepreneurs, however, these groups have become increasingly mobilized politically since the introduction of democratic politics. As in most traditional societies, the scope of political action and the field of political participants was restricted in the Rajputana states. Yet participation was not limited to the landed aristocracy; it was socially plural. Representatives of ritually pure Hindu 27. Computed from data presented in Census of India, 1961, Paper No. 1 of 1962, Final Population Totals (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1962), p. 44.

P O L I T Y AND SOCIETY IN

RAJPUTANA

39

castes served in important official posts in court circles. Others provided important financial services to princely families. T h e character of major political conflicts in the Rajputana states, joined principally over the structure of public authority, the magnitude of inheritance, and the assumption of title, induced cleavage within the Rajput caste. While there was a strong generalized communitarian sentiment among Rajputs, due both to hypergamy and to the intermittent selection of princes from families of low station, latent division existed between rich and poor as well as between commoner families and those of royal blood. While Rajput caste solidarity was encouraged by assaults on traditional authority symbols during the preindependence movement and by land reform legislation after independence, traditional fissures in Rajput social organization eventually became manifest in political life. As indicated earlier, the parochial character of mass political culture in the Rajputana states was paralleled by regional segmentation and by social organization both of which have had a persistent impact upon political organization in the political order inaugurated after independence. T h e princely states and successor administrative divisions are distinguished and bounded in most cases by cultural discontinuities. Social organization was highly fragmented, and although in some locales certain castes tended to be numerically predominant, no caste constituted a majority of the population, with the exception of the small states of the southern highlands. Prior to the creation of Rajashthan, institutional linkage among princely states was limited and fragile. Both regional and social segmentation placed severe limits on the development of political groups both during the preindependence period and in party organization in the new political system. T h e structure of traditional authority which legitimates a "parochial-subject" political culture comes under threat once social mobilization begins, whether its origins are found within the recently parochial or within the participative sectors of society. Impetus for such change can be induced from either a generalized change in the extension of governmental activity beyond the initial scope of its extractive function or by change in the channels of social communication and the development of those faculties and

4°

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

facilities which encourage it. It can also come, as was to prove important in the case of some Rajputana states, from the inability of the participative sector of the polity to absorb those who desired entry. Finally, the organization of political authority, as shall be established more thoroughly in the next two chapters, was an important factor in determining the organization and strategy of the movements of political protest in the Rajputana states. Urban movement focused their activity upon the state darbar rather than upon subordinate units because, it was proposed, the reconstitution of the former would eventually result in the demise of the latter. Furthermore, it was the state darbar that suffered the greatest penetration of British imperial control, and the object of the British R a j provided both the critical common bond between these movements and the nationalist movement in the British provinces as well as an explanation to the backwardness and resistance to change within these princely states.

Chapter

3

T H E O R I G I N S OF T H E P A R T Y SYSTEM I: URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL CHANGE

T H E CONDITIONS under which parties are founded as well as the character of their social and organizational origins influence in varying measure their subsequent goal orientation, strategy, and internal organization. Parties that have originated from parliamentary cliques attempting to mobilize support in an expanding electorate have tended to be supportive of the regime and to be eclectic in the choice of organizational goals and public priorities. Those organized outside parliamentary institutions, on the other hand, have frequently questioned the legitimacy of the existing political format and have asserted as a price for political obligation the extension of formal and effective participation in public decision-making bodies to their clientele. Such parties have customarily emphasized, at least in formal terms, the supremacy of party organization as the locus of public responsibility rather than legislative institutions. A third form is a consequence of the diffusion of Western political ideology and culture: demands for participation not only or necessarily within an existing legislative format but in the creation of public institutions and decision rules for the universalization of participation. Ideology, action, and reaction of political associations in the colonial situation has in large measure been a function of the response of colonial authorities to demands for political entry—response sets perhaps best characterized in simple form by the French and British models.

The consequences of differential origins and conditions of party founding and development, particularly in former colonial areas, go beyond questions of participation and legitimation and include such problematics as organizational goal transformation, the rep-

42

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

resentative and "open" or "closed" character of parties, and internal party organization. W h a t are the processes that characterize the metamorphosis from movement organization to competitor for or monopolizer of control over strategic positions of public authority? How are generalized prescriptions given explicit policy content and their priorities established? What environmental and internal institutional conditions encourage a socially inclusive or exclusive party organization? W h a t was the process of founding and what has been the ontogeny of organizational development from a single association or from a coalition of associations? T h e character of coalitions, of course, can vary appreciably, and the nature of this variation is critical in the determination of strategy possibilities and the probability of organizational cohesion and maintenance. Critical variables here are the relative size, cohesion, and number of coalescing units and the timing of coalition and merger—as well as the extent and type of variation in unit goals and functional bases of support. Finally, what changes in incentive structure are associated with these patterns of institution formation and change? These considerations are central to the analysis of the formation and development of the Rajasthan Congress in this and subsequent chapters. T h e Congress party, as well as many opposition political parties and groups in Rajasthan, traces its origin to movements of social and political protest that developed in the Rajputana states prior to independence. T h e Rajasthan Congress was created as an amalgam of these preindependence organizations, each of which was limited in the scope of its political activity, planning, and recruitment to the princely state in which it was founded. These movement organizations also differed in terms of their clientele, goals, breadth of social support, and the cohesion of elites. Movements in the urban areas (Praja Mandais), for example, were only infrequently associated formally with peasant movements (Kisan Sabhas). Organizational objectives also differed: urban movements were principally concerned with the reconstitution of political authority and the expansion and redistribution of welfare benefits of the state governments; rural movements were principally concerned with the achievement of land reforms within the existing order of public authority. T h e social bases of organi-

ORIGINS, i :

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PROTEST AND POLITICAL

CHANGE

43

zational support varied among these movement organizations as well. T h e nature of political organization in these movements and the procedures of planning and mobilizing political support which developed prior to 1947 have had an appreciable influence on the development of the Congress party in postindependence politics. T h e dominant political leaders following independence had all been founders of protest movements in their respective states, and those who have continued to fill strategic political roles entered politics prior to independence. In this chapter we shall analyze the development of new forms of political association in urban areas while in the next we shall turn our attention to rural society. THE RISE OF POPULAR MOVEMENTS IN THE URBAN AREAS

T h e first movements of political protest in the Rajputana states started in the 1920s and were located in those areas that were communication centers between the states and the British provinces. 1 T h e founders and leaders of these movements were invariably those who had come into contact with the reformist movements in British India and included a number of those who had been active in the early movements of social change in their areas as well as some who had been advocates of change in customary rules governing behavior and ritual within their own castes. These early political movements were exclusively directed at achieving the redress of public grievances within the framework of the traditional polity. Protests were organized around single issues and represented the objection of interested publics to a change in an existing public rule or convention. These initial political concerns included such local and regional issues as opposition to the im1. Several of the R a j p u t a n a states, of course, bordered the British provinces and were influenced by social reform and political movements in those provinces. T h e capital cities of the m a j o r states were linked by railway with British India. More important, however, were informal channels rather than more sophisticated and "measurable" media. T r a d i t i o n a l festivals and fairs became important centers of exchange between people from the R a j p u t a n a states and British India as did commercial centers on traditional trading routes. In U d a i p u r political protest commenced in the temple town of Nathdwara, a center of religious pilgrimage. Important also were towns in which those important Marwari merchant families who became associated with the Congress movement had their ancestral homes.

44

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

position of taxes on the import of wheat, opposition to the export of certain foodstuffs and milk animals from the state, opposition to the standardization of weights and measures, and antitax movements such as the famous Bijolia agitation in Udaipur. 2 Another important object of early political dissent was the large number of positions of power and prestige in the state councils held by outsiders, often appointees of the Political Department of the Government of India, and the limited opportunities for local men to gain entry and to achieve mobility in the administrative services of the state.8 These protests were accompanied by claims that traditional customs, language, and manners were being replaced by alien forms and that to obtain high and responsible positions a white skin was a prime necessity.4 During the 1920s numerous movements developed which demanded the ousting of the widesht, both Indian and British, from positions of central importance, and in this activity elites often had the support of the maharaja and his major sardars. In Jodhpur State, for example, the Marwar Hitkarini Sabha (Jodhpur Self-Help Society) was formed in 1 9 2 3 with the approval of the state darbar for the purpose of mobilizing public support for the dismissal of the prime minister, 2. These "agitations" were extremely important in the development of support for the new political groups and became important elements in the political lexicon of these movements. The campaign against increased taxation and customs duties in the Churu area of Bikaner State resulted in the arrest of numerous local leaders which reportedly included a number of wealthy, respectable, and highly educated men who were primarily prominent local merchants, teachers, and lawyers. Hind Rajasthan (Hindi), Ajmer, February 18, 193s. The early movements against standardization in Jodhpur State and against the exporting of milk animals from the state were led by a group of socially conscious men who had been founders of the Marwar Seva Sangh (Jodhpur Service Society). Several had been associated with reform movements within their own castes. The Bijolia agitation, led by Motilal Tejawat and Manikyalal Varma, who was to become a central figure in Rajasthan politics, continued off and on between igig and 1923 and eventually prompted the state to call out the military to put down the riotous tenants. Feudal and Zamindari India, 2 (August 1923), 418-419. 3. Tarun Rajasthan (Hindi), Beawar, November 19, 1925. There was also considerable opposition to differential pay scales which favored the wideshi (literally, "foreigner") at the expense of native sons. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 5, 1928. 4. Tarun Rajasthan, August 13, 1928, and Hindustan Times, June 17, 1928.

ORIGINS, i :

URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL CHANGE

45

Sukhdeo Prashad, who had become extremely unpopular with both the ruling house and important sectors of the public.® This movement developed wide support through the use of mass meetings and was eventually successful. Public protests during this period were also organized in Jaipur State where intense resentment developed among certain nobles, officials, and merchants against the prime ministership of Sir Charles Cleveland, who was eventually forced to resign.® In Jaipur, as in Jodhpur, the popular elites received the support of local nobles and officials, many of whom felt constrained by the presence, scrutiny, and actions of British officials. There were also protests against alien elites and the Political Department in a number of other Rajputana states during this period, the most important occurring in Udaipur, Tonk, and Sirohi.7 Anti-wideshi sentiment continued until independence, and the reduction of administrative recruitment from outside the state was a continual demand of preindependence political organizations. In the late 1920s and early 1930s the protest movements in the larger states started to expand the scope of their objectives. These enlarged demands were not limited to the correction of specific existing public policies but also included expanded programs of public policy for facilities such as compulsory primary education, expanded health and medical facilities, and better and more dependable water supplies. More importantly, however, the new political elites started to pursue more universalistic political goals and to question the assumptions from which traditional rulers derived their authority to rule. These objectives included greater popular participation in the making of public policy at all levels of government, the guarantee and protection of civil liberties, and the institution of responsible government under the aegis of the maharaja. 8 5. Tarun Rajasthan, September so, 1925. 6. The Bombay Chronicle, March 30, 1923; The Rajasthan (Hindi), June 7, 1923; and " T h e Rumpus in the Jaipur State Council," Feudal and Zamindari India, 2 (1923), 197-198. 7. The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, April 19, 1923. 8. T h e universalization of political demands was in no small part due to the association of leaders of the states with the All-India States' Peoples' Congress and, in some cases, by the prompting of Congress leaders from the

46

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

T w o important occasions give witness to this change. In 1928, in an " O p e n L e t t e r " to the State Council from "Oppressed Subjects," political activists in J a i p u r State accused the state authorities of neglecting the welfare needs of the state and of employing too many unsympathetic outsiders in important public positions. T h e letter demanded, among other things, a legislative assembly with three-fourths of its members elected, popular control over the budget, the creation of elected revenue boards and municipalities for all district towns, separation of judicial, executive, and revenue functions, removal of bans on printing presses and public meetings, and the creation of a public commission to inquire into economic depression and unemployment. 9 Similar demands were states, such as Jamnalal Bajaj. In his presidential address to the AISPC in 1929, C. Y. Chintamani enumerated the demands which were to become the hallmark of the political movements in the Rajputana states. He demanded: "1. A declaration of fundamental rights in the form of a proclamation by the Ruling Prince recognizing the right of free speech, free press, free association, security of person and property, and judicial trial. (This includes the absolute cessation of banishment of people from States and the confiscation of property by the mere fiat of the Prince.) 2. The abolition of begar or forced labor. 3. The separation of judicial from executive functions and an independent judiciary, the ruler retaining only the prerogative of pardon and mercy and never acting as a court of appeal. 4. Local SelfGovernment including village panchayats and rural and municipal boards with majorities of elected members and elected chairman. 5. Legislative Councils with majorities of elected members and with at least the same powers, as are exercised by the councils in British India. 6. No law shall be passed except by the legislature. 7. The Ruler's private purse shall be absolutely separate from the state budget. (It should be fixed at not more than 10 percent of the revenues of any state and in any circumstances and any excess shall have to be voted by the legislature.) 8. Cabinet government presided over by the Ruling Prince. (In the more advanced states there should be responsible government in the sense in which this term is understood. In other States, representative government at the start, leading up to responsible government within a period of ten to fifteen years.) 9. Free elementary education to all subjects of the States of both sexes. (An irreducible minimum of 10 percent of the revenues of the State should be spent on education every year and in all circumstances.) 10. An irreducible minimum of 10 percent of the revenues of the State to be spent upon health and medical relief. 11. An economic survey to be followed by systematic measure of economic development both in rural and urban areas." N. M. Mitra, Indian Annual Register (1929), 1, p. 527. (My italics.) 9. The Indian National Herald, Lucknow, August 9, 1928.

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URBAN PROTEST AND P O L I T I C A L CHANGE

47

made in Jodhpur a year later by the Marwar Hitkarini Sabha after several years of silence. In major public meetings held in May 1929, Jai Narain Vyas, who was to become the most prominent leader in the preindependence movements in the Rajputana states and one of the central political leaders after independence, declared that responsible government and freedom of speech and association were the primary objectives of the "people," and on May 13, 1929, the executive committee of the Sabha demanded the creation of a legislative assembly under the aegis of the maharaja, a system of elections to all municipal boards, and assurance and protection of the right to free speech and assembly. 10 These early movements not only were indicative of political germination in the states but also served an educative function in political action for the new political elites. It made public protest respectable, because it sometimes had the sanction of state authority, and it served to mobilize new activists into the new but small and amorphous community of protest. These movements, on the other hand, raised grave misgivings among state authorities, and numerous laws were promulgated in an effort to discourage unsolicited public dissent. T h u s as protest became increasingly political and questioned the legitimacy of the rules of the old order, state governments became extremely active and most effective in curbing political action through the execution of summary justice, incarceration, and banishment from the state. 11 T h e repression of political dissent could be imposed in these cases without much risk of widespread public resentment or concerted reprisal on the part of the new political activists. T h e community of protest was still quite limited, and the new leaders had neither an effective organization nor common strategies and contingency plans for the 10. Tarun Rajasthan, May 20, 1929. 11. There were a number of so-called Conspiracy Cases in the Rajputana states during the late 1920s and early 1930s of which two of the most important were in Jodhpur (1929) and Bikaner (1932). In each of these cases major public figures were jailed with considerable secrecy surrounding detentions and trials. These events were used to publicize the repressive policies of the states in British India and also aroused considerable sympathy for the accused in the states themselves, although in some cases this merely intensified traditional divisions in some castes and created new ones in others. Each major agitation of this sort, however, was marked by increased recruitment to the protest movements.

48

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

new politics of confrontation. Moreover there was not yet a w i d e r public constituency receptive to the new public visions and political techniques of the new elites. Protest previously had focused u p o n specific and immediate objectives; it was n o w c o u c h e d in more universal and distant terms. T h u s the organization of these initial political movements was sporadic, unstructured, and lacked widespread public involvement and support. Initially, the strategy employed by the elites was to focus and articulate diffuse feelings of discomfort and dissent a m o n g various social groups, instead of soliciting n e w demands for which there was no ready-made base of popular support. Furthermore, support was not generated through a set of n e w institutional channels and rituals. P u b l i c meetings, and meetings of jati panchayats and caste associations were the predominant means of airing grievances, c o m m u n i c a t i n g decisions, and m o b i l i z i n g support. T h e s e proto-movements constituted experiments in a n e w form of public association and were intermittent in organization. T h u s the protesting elites were merely the pinnacle of m u t u a l l y exclusive structures of support which were also limited in the intensity of their involvement in this new form of political expression. T h e demands raised for extensive expansion of welfare policy and for the dissolution of traditional authority, however, introduced a qualitatively new dimension to politics and public life. T h e elites and these movements were restricted almost exclusively to urban areas, usually the capital cities of the state, although there were some notable exceptions. 1 2 T h e leaders of the protest movements were exclusively recruited from castes of high ritual status, had received some education in the English m e d i u m (often in the British provinces), and had become associated with and enamored of the movements of social reform and the nationalist movement in British India. T h e s e early protestors were of is. T h e movements in Udaipur and Bikaner, for example, started in rural towns but eventually focused their activities in the capital cities. Those who were arraigned in the famous Conspiracy Cases in Bikaner in 193» were all from rural towns of what now constitute Churn and Ganganagar districts. T h e movement of the center of activity to the capital cities was in no small part due to the rise of protest against the organization of traditional political authority and demands for representative government

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PROTEST AND POLITICAL

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49

two types. T h e first included men of considerable prestige who resided more or less permanently in the trading centers of British India. They were often instrumental in encouraging protest within the state, frequently acted as negotiators between the state darbar and the accused, and served to organize opinion among persons from the various states residing in British India in support of popular demands. 13 These public-relations activities raised adverse opinion about the princes and undercut their traditional image as benevolent father figures of their subjects. It was also directed at pressuring and embarrassing the British authorities by publicizing criticism of the British in the states and by pointing to the extent of British involvement in the administration of the Rajputana states. Further, it was aimed at making the leaders of the Indian National Congress, who were almost exclusively from the British provinces, aware of the political aspirations of peoples in the princely states—the complete "Indianization" of the nationalist movement. The second type of elite, which was much more important in the organization and management of the movements of political protest, included those who resided more or less permanently in the princely states, although many were often transients between their home state and British India. These were the major political entrepreneurs—the publicists, the communicators of ideas, and, most importantly, those who started movements of protest and "offered" themselves in tests against restrictive state policies governing the limits of civil disobedience. In almost all cases it was they who founded the permanent political organizations from which the Rajasthan Congress was eventually formed. This is 13. A t the time of the major agitations, prominent citizens of the state were delegated by the Congress to act as mediators, a number of whom were arrested or externed from the state. Important in this type of role were Jamnalal Bajaj, Anand Raj Surana, and Manilal Kothari among others. Furthermore, organizations of persons from the major Rajputana states had organizations in most of the major cities of British India. These organizations held protest meetings at the time of the early agitations and became quite active after the rise of permanent protest organizations in the states during the latter 1930s. These organizations publicized political activities within the states to the outside world, helped to gain support for these movements from within the Congress, and eventually served as a source of financial support for these movements.

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quite unlike the case of the feudal states of the Oriyan hills in eastern India where the burden of political activity, according to Bailey, was carried on by Congress agitators from the lowlands. 14 T h e existence of internally mobilized elites in the Rajputana states and their near absence in Orissa is no doubt important in accounting for the political success of the Congress in Rajasthan since independence as opposed to the party's limited support in those areas of Orissa which were formerly under princely rule. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL

PROTEST:

THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL PERMANENCE

These earlier political movements started to become institutionalized into permanent organizations with defined purposes and objectives during the 1930s and 1940s. T h e time of founding varied from state to state as did the intensity of their activities and scope of public involvement, but by the end of the 1930s Praja Mandals had been established in all the major Rajputana states— Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah, and Udaipur—and in several of the smaller states, notably Alwar, Bharatpur, and Sirohi, all of which bordered British India. 15 By 1946 organizations had been created in nineteen states, and by 1947 they had been established in the others. 16 Whereas the earlier movements were intermittent and shortlived, these new organizations had permanent names and were organized on a formal basis. T h e Praja Mandals had their objec14. Bailey, Politics and Social Changes, pp. 177-181. 15. T h e r e were two major types of movements which developed in the R a j p u t a n a States and each was distinct as to its origins, ultimate objectives, political activity and style, elite structure, and base of political support. T h e first were the Praja Mandals—movements which were restricted almost entirely to urban centers, although in some areas they attracted limited support from rural leaders. T h e urban movements did not all have common names. In Jodhpur (Marwar) State, this movement was called the Lok Parishad while in Bharatpur and Bikaner it was termed Praja Parishad. Herein, however, these movements will be referred to as Praja Mandals except when dealing with specific cases in the above mentioned states. T h e second type of movement was the Kisan Sabhas which derived both their leadership and support from rural areas. R u r a l protest is discussed in Chapter 4. 16. All-India States' Peoples' Congress, Rajasthan Regional Council, "Annual Report: 1946-47" (manuscript).

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51

tives and purposes enshrined in written constitutions which also established formal organizational positions and routinized methods for recruiting members and making organizational decisions. Office-bearers were elected, members paid dues, and organizational activities were assigned to functional committees. In short, the activities of the new organizations were more varied and complex than were those of previous political efforts. T h e types of objectives which promoted the rise of the earlier protests were of continuing concern but there was a new order of priorities. The ultimate objectives of these organizations were still universalistic political ideals—the creation of a representative form of government, the granting and protection of rights of political organization and public debate, identification with the promotion of the nationalist symbols and aspirations of the Indian National Congress and the merger of the Rajputana states into an independent India. Although policy statements and formal resolutions in the earlier protests had pledged commitment to these aims, however, political action and the launching of civil disobedience movements were initially over more immediate and less lofty issues. Praja Mandals were founded in several states with the tolerance of state authorities, and there were some efforts by state governments to "co-opt the revolution" by creating advisory bodies in which Praja Mandal representatives would be associated with affairs of state. This new atmosphere of reserved tolerance for public activity is captured in a letter written by Maharaja Ganga Singh to Sir Donald Field, then Prime Minister of Jodhpur State, in support of the activities of Jai Narain Vyas. Ganga Singh observed that Vyas was one of the "most bitter and hostile firebrands that Indian princes ever had to face," and he vented his feelings about the "malicious campaigns" waged by Vyas and others. Yet in a somewhat visionary passage he wrote: But they who would like to see a united and greater India marching hand in hand on the road to progress towards their respective goals cannot help realizing that the future of the Indian States depends more or less upon the character of those who in a way dominate these days the political and public life of these areas. Let me tell you, Sir Donald, that neither the glorified pillars of the Princely order nor

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the loftiest pillars among the Regency Bucks are going to survive these proletarian firebrands. Yet the mantle of centuries old sovereignty in India is going to fall upon them and some of us will, in all probability, look towards them for justice and fair play. Ganga Singh belived Vyas to be "thoroughly honest, incorruptible, and true to his conscience and political creed. Vyas Jai Narain is the only man who can wield an elevating influence over thousands of his colleagues and associates who left to themselves will build their thrones upon the ruin of all classes in Rajputana." T h e maharaja advised the prime minister that he wished Vyas to have funds to carry on his political activity. 17 T h e r e were several restrictive conditions, however, which accompanied the founding of the Praja Mandals, although they were never defined explicitly—in fact there was no body of precedents to govern what was in fact a qualitatively new dimension in the political life of the princely states. T h e political encounters that followed the founding of Praja Mandals themselves contributed to the definition of the rules of permissible political action. T h e general conditions that governed initial political activity included the cooperation of the Praja Mandal with the state government, the performance of a communications function between state and society, channeling public grievances in an orderly way, the education of public opinion, and the performance of all public activity in a "constitutional manner." 18 These conditions were accepted initially by Praja Mandals in several important states. With the resurgence of political activity in Jodhpur and the creation of the Marwar Lok Parishad, for example, Jai Narain Vyas accepted an invitation from Prime Minister Field to associate himself with the government in various advisory capacities and to encourage a more cooperative attitude within the growing movement of political protest toward state authority. Vyas 17. Letter No. 201, P.S. 54-37, dated 21 February 1937. Located in Marwar Lok Parishad Files, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, Rajasthan. 18. T h e following discussion is based upon data from Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Kotah, Bikaner, Alwar, Bharatpur, and Sirohi. Data are available only for these states, but they included the bulk of the population in Rajputana and had the most active Praja Mandals.

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was appointed to a newly created Central Advisory Board, the Educational Reforms Committee, the Unemployment Committee, and, with the severe famine conditions in 1939, the Standing Famine Relief Advisory Committee and the Doles Committee. Lok Parishad workers also became quite active in famine relief work. This period of cooperative effort, however, was not a satisfactory one. Many political activists felt that the government was not making a serious effort at alleviating public misery and was insensitive to the policy recommendations made by the Lok Parishad. It was also felt that the government's new conciliatory attitude was directed primarily at inhibiting the spread of organized political dissent and that the Lok Parishad, by cooperating, was doing violence to its ultimate aims and was risking its coherence. After consultations with Gandhi and Nehru, Vyas resigned from his positions and the Lok Parishad withdrew from active collaboration with government agencies.19 T h e relationship between the state government and the Jaipur Praja Mandal, from its formation in 1936 to 1938, was remarkably congenial. Shortly after the reorganization Pandit Hiralal Shastri, general secretary of the Mandal and first chief minister of Rajasthan after independence, in a letter to the inspector general of police conceived the organization to be a link between "public sentiment on the one hand and Government policy and viewpoint on the other." 29 T h e Praja Mandal restricted its activities to conform with Jaipuri law and abided by the more explicit directives of the IGP. In 1937, for example, when the state authorities requested that the Mandal not enlist members in villages, it was agreed to by a unanimous resolution, "provided that the Mandal is left free to work in the villages for the social and economic uplift of the people and also to study their needs and whenever necessary, to bring the same to the notice of the authorities concerned." 21 T h e Mandal also accepted the conditions imposed for holding a general meeting early in 1938: (1) no discussion of the Sikar agitation; (2) no advocacy of nonpayment of rent campaigns; 19. Hindustan Times, December 31, 1939. 20. Quoted in Hindustan T i m « , January 26, 1939. si. Ibid.

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THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

and (3) no criticism of the ruler or any members of the administration. 22 Shortly before the breakdown of Praja

Mandal-Jaipur

State cooperation, Shastri in another letter to the I G P noted: We have pulled on well for about two years and the credit goes to your patience and farsightedness. For my part, I can only say that I have tried my utmost to be reasonable. T h e position as between the Government and the Mandal in Jaipur is unique—and whatever our critics may say with regard to Government inaction in connection with the continued growth of a political association on the one hand and with regard to the Praja Mandal's moderation and slow speed on the other—Jaipur's name will go down in history for the world will see in due course of time, that there were officials and public workers in Jaipur who achieved the same object with mutual agreement, which elsewhere was almost invariably achieved after agony and heartburning on both sides. What we should all value is peace and tranquility, progress and reform in Jaipur. We have always been prepared to agree to the method of consultation and persuasion.28 T h e period of cooperation between the Jaipur Praja and the state darbar

Mandal

was interrupted in late 1938 by two important

events. T h e first, also common in other states, was the promulgation of a Public Societies Regulation A c t which directed that no organization was to be established or exist without the sanction of the government of the state. It further stipulated that, "if at any time, after permission has been granted, the activities of such so22. Hindustan Times, January 28, 1939. At this meeting, however, the Praja Mandal called for greater medical facilities in the interior, ayurvedic dispensaries, schools for larger towns, and a comprehensive inquiry into the exaction of such revenues as lagbag and chungi in the thikanas. Hindustan Times, January s i , 1938. For a discussion of the Sikar situation see Chapter 4. 23. Hindustan Times, January 26, 1939. T h e movement was also sensitive to the person of the maharaja in its demands. A t the first Annual Session of the Jaipur Praja Mandal in 1938, Chiranjilal Agarwal, Chairman of the Reception Committee, in his opening address which reiterated the demand for responsible government declared: "We would preserve the crown with all its magnificent glory, with all its historic association, with all its rights and privileges, and with all our traditional loyalty. T h e elimination of the monarchy, or causing any disaffection or disloyalty to the person and throne of His Highness, does not and can never appeal to us." Hindustan Times, May 9, 1938.

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CHANGE

55

ciety are found to be subversive of law and order or not for the good of the public, it shall be closed down by an order of the Council of State." 24 The Mandal was subsequently declared an unlawful body. The conflict with the state government was brought to a head by the second event—a ban on the entry of Seth Jamnalal Bajaj into the state to preside over a meeting of the Praja Mandal and to help organize famine relief projects in the Shekhawati area of the state. The involvement of Jamnalal gave the new situation in the state national significance.26 After consultations with Gandhi, it was decided that Jamnalal should court arrest by attempting to enter the state against the ban placed upon him. His eventual arrest and detention prompted the launching of a satyagraha in the state which attracted the support of persons not formerly associated with the activity of the protest movements.2® 24. N. M. Mitra, ed., The Indian Annual Register, I, 321-322. T h e act also gave any police officer with the rank of subinspector and above the authority to enter and demand all books, correspondence, and accounts without a warrant. It further authorized the prime minister to "ban the entry into Jaipur State of any person who is likely to create foment, by his words, or actions friction as this Regulation seeks to avoid." Similar edicts were imposed in other states during 1937 and 1938 to contain popular activity which was starting to become more intensive after the elections held in the British provinces in 1937 under the Government of India Act, 1935. 25. In an interview with a correspondent of the Times of India, Gandhi stated: "if the action of the Jaipur authorities precipitates a first class crisis, it is impossible for the Indian National Congress, and therefore all India, to stand by and look with indifference whilst Jamnalalji, for no offense whatsoever, is imprisoned and members of the Praja Mandal are dealt with likewise. T h e Congress will be neglecting its duty if, having power, it shrank from using it and allowed the spirit of the people of Jaipur to be crushed for want of support from Congress. . . . T h e policy of non-intervention by the Congress was, in my opinion, a perfect piece of statesmanship when the people of the States were not awakened. T h a t policy would be cowardice when there is all-round awakening among the people of the states and a determination to go through a long course of suffering for the vindication of their rights." Printed in M. K. Gandhi, The Indian States Problem, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1941), p. 47. 26. T h e action of the state against Jamnalal also brought a formal and public protest from the Sikar Rajput community which expressed its "deep dissatisfaction at the ban imposed on Seth Jamnalal Bajaj on his entry into the Jaipur State. T h e community believes that Sethji's sole object in visiting

56

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

T h e movement of civil disobedience launched by the Praja Mandal was not aimed at winning agreement on the part of the state darbar to establish representative government, but for winning elementary civil liberties. It was aimed at having reestablished the permissiveness which had existed previously—freedom to pursue "constructive" activities, to advocate the expansion in scope and change in content of government policy, and to "prepare" the society for responsible government. Jamnalal Bajaj was released in August 1939 and shortly thereafter the Regulation Act was repealed. His release was also accompanied by other agreements: (1) the release of political prisoners; (2) lifting of the ban on all newspapers; and (3) amendment of the Public Societies Regulation Act so that a society did not have to register with the state.27 T h e last was an important concession: it established in principle the right of citizens to organize and act politically without the sufferance of state authority. T h e period after the agreement on limited civil liberties was marked by efforts to extract agreement from the state to establish representative institutions. After the appointment of the able Mirza Ismail as prime minister, constitutional machinery was set in motion towards this end. T h e commitment on the part of the government to institute major constitutional changes was set forth in the inaugural address of Rajsevasakta S. Hiriannaiy, the chairman of the Constitutional Reforms Commission created in 1943: In Jaipur, as in British India, there has been a great awakening and it is no longer possible to be content with the constitutional arrangements which, though they might have served well in the past, may not be in harmony with modern developments in political thought. The appointment of this Commission is an indication that the Government of His Highness are aware of the needs of the times and are the State was to carry out relief measures in the famine-stricken areas in various parts of Jaipur and to secure the release of the Sikar agitation under-trials. T h e community, therefore, while appreciating the decision of Sethji not to disobey the order immediately and giving ample time to authorities for a reconsideration of their unwise policy, deplores the untimely and reactionary attitude adopted by the Jaipur Council and earnestly appeals to the Darbar to withdraw the ban order immediately so that a crisis of the first magnitude may be averted." Hindustan Times, January 31, 1939. 27. Mitra, I, 1940, pp. 281-282.

ORIGINS, i :

URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL CHANGE

57

prepared to accept and give effect to proposals for reform designed to ensure orderly progress.28 He further proposed that the question facing the commission was not whether in principle reforms would work but whether they would satisfy the new demands and expectations of the public. A l l major sectors of the public were encouraged to submit their proposals for the new constitution, and representatives of the Praja Mandal, as well as representatives of the Rajput chiefs and merchants, were given positions on the commission. 29 In 1944 a new constitution was "bestowed" by the maharaja upon his subjects. It established a bicameral legislature with elected majorities, and although the principle of ministerial responsibility did not prevail, there was provision for popularly elected officials to serve as ministers. This new basic law remained in effect in Jaipur until the integration of the Rajputana states.30 In Jodhpur State renewed demands for representative government were made in the early part of 1940, a few months after the Lok Parishad disassociated itself from the administration of the state.31 In an effort to stay public upheaval the government banned public meetings within a five-mile radius of Jodhpur City and finally placed a ban on the Lok Parishad under the Marwar Societies Registration Act of 1938.32 T h e ban on the Lok Parishad s8. Printed in Report of the Committee on Constitutional Reform, '943 (Jaipur: Superintendent of the Government Press, 1944), p. v. 29. Ibid., Appendix I. Five of the fifteen members of the commission were Praja Mandal leaders. All but one were advocates. 30. T h e new constitution was not as "liberal" as had been proposed by the commission. After independence and before the creation of Rajasthan, however, the ministry was drawn almost entirely from among Praja Mandal leaders. 31. National Call, March 25, 1940. 32. The Jodhpur Government Gazette (Extraordinary), 75 (March 28, 1940), pp. 967-970. T h e ban was accompanied by a statement that captures the governmental view of the new political activists: "If the 'LP' consisted of men of political and administrative experience, men of ripe education, or of high professional attainment, we might be well advised to give to their words and expressions that serious consideration which thoughtful citizens would undoubtedly accord. But we find, now that an insistent clamour focuses our attention on the subject, that the 'LP' consists mainly of inexperienced young men, who do not appear to have achieved much success in their various vocations, and yet would have us believe that by becoming

58

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

was followed by mass demonstrations and the arrest of its major leaders. As in Jaipur, this confrontation between the Lok Parishad and the state mobilized new men into politics. Meetings of protest were held by Marwaris in the major cities of British India, and acts of defiance were instituted by persons who had not formerly been associated with the movement. Dissenting were also a number of barristers who in an official notification were reminded of their oath to the maharaja and were threatened with disbarment if they engaged in disruptive activity.33 Deputations of community leaders, leading businessmen, and prominent members of the bar in Jodhpur City petitioned the maharaja to reach rapprochement with the Lok Parishad.34 Major efforts were instituted by the Congress high command as well as by prominent Marwaris in British India to reach a compromise, and talks were eventually instituted between Vyas and representatives of the state.36 In June, after considerable pressure from powerful political elements in British India and from the local public, an agreement was reached. The conditions of the agreement included that: (1) the Lok Parishad was to be registered with the state as a legitimate political organization; (2) it was to have full freedom in having affiliation with outside organizations; (3) any person holding an office in an outside organization was to seek permission of the state before contesting future elections on the Lok Parishad ticket; (4) the government would accept the Lok Parishad as the only political institution having the right to represent public views and aspirations; and (5) the Lok Parishad would undertake no public agitation with respect to the Indian involvement in World War II, members of the 'LP' they undergo some magical change which renders it possible for them alone to interpret to me the desires and ambitions of my people." 33. The Jodhpur Government Gazette, Notification No. 1451, April 6, 1940, p. 1065. 34. Hindustan Times, April 4, 6, and 7, 1940. 35. Efforts to arrange a settlement were initiated by Jawaharlal Nehru and involved several different deputations to Jodhpur. Hindustan Times, April i s and 28, 1940. When talks finally began, Vyas demanded: (1) official recognition of the Lok Parishad as a legitimate political body; (2) the unconditional release of all prisoners; and (3) removal of the externment orders so frequently used by state authorities. Hindustan Times, May ig, 1940.

ORIGINS, i :

URBAN PROTEST AND P O L I T I C A L CHANGE

59

although any individual might protest it if he so desired.39 This agreement involved a critical change in the principles of state policy. Not only did the state concede the right to exist of an organization whose ultimate objective was the reconstruction of public authority but it also conceded the right of formal association with political movements external to the state. More important was the acceptance in principle of the Lok Parishad as the only legitimate fount of public opinion in the state. This principle, however, was not consistently honored in fact. With a few major interruptions, including the jailing of Vyas over protests against Indian involvement in World War II and the activities surrounding the "Quit India" Movement of 1942, the Lok Parishad was accepted by the Jodhpur authorities as a legitimate organization. T h e dominant objectives from this time, therefore, were the realization of representative government and the channeling of public grievances to state authorities, an activity which absorbed a large portion of the organization's time from the mid-1940s until independence.87 T h e attitudes and policies of the state governments during the decade prior to independence were ambivalent. Rules governing the scope of permissible political activity were never clearly defined by governmental edict or by convention. T h e imposition of restrictive regulations was governed primarily by the predilections of those in power or by their perception of the potential threat posed by the Praja Mandals to their conception of public order and political sobriety. This was exacerbated by the fact that in 36. Hindustan Times, June 27, 1940. It might be noted that the chief negotiator for the government was Jaswant R a j Mehta, who was to become a member of the Congress after independence, was elected to the Lok Sabha in 1952 and 1957, and was the Congress' unsuccessful candidate in 1962. 37. Although the demand for representative political institutions was the hallmark of the Lok Parishad movement, it did not reap results until after independence. In 1941 the State Council approved a scheme of elections for a Representative Assembly but with a severely restricted franchise (Hindustan Times, March 19, 1941). Because of this the Lok Parishad decided to boycott the elections (Hindustan Times, September s8, 1941). In 1944, following the lead of Jaipur, the government invited suggestions and views on constitutional reforms from all subjects. The Jodhpur Government Gazette, Notification No. 5100/C.B. (June 3, 1944), p. 1088. A popular ministry was not formed until 1948.

6o

THE

CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

most cases restrictive action was identified with British members of the state administration. T h e oscillation of the state authorities between attitudes and policies of permissiveness and repression raised ambiguous expectations on the part of Praja Mandal elites and finally led to their rejecting the utility, or even the possibility, of achieving desired change within the rules of the traditional order and to their subordinating all objectives to the ultimate one of independence and the replacement of those rules by new ones. T h e Praja Mandals, especially after 1942, asserted themselves as autonomous political organizations, independent of state authority and support. SEGMENTATION

IN T H E ORGANIZATION OF P O L I T I C A L

SUPPORT

T h e fragmented and segmentary nature of the organization and structure of political support in the Praja Mandals has been extremely important in the organization of power in the Congress since independence. These protest organizations, which collectively were to form the Rajasthan Congress party, were never integrated into a common organizational framework prior to independence. This is in great contrast to the British provinces, where state party organizations had developed over several decades. In addition, unlike the British provinces, elites in the Rajputana states did not develop a statewide constituency prior to independence. T h e i r support was regional and parochial, and this pattern of regional segmentation has been a persistent feature of Rajasthan's politics in the postindependence period. There are several conditions which contributed to this pattern of organizational fragmentation. T h e organization of political power and traditional authority in the form of separate sovereignties placed a premium on a strategy of politically attacking these units separately. Laws and power emanated from different founts, and the political situation varied from state to state in both content and time. Secondly, the Praja Mandals were not organized and imposed from the outside; neither were they conceived as an organizational weapon to be wielded by the nationalist elite in British India to undermine the traditional structure of authority and British power in the princely states. T h e y had all been organized and had developed indigenously, and the respective elites

ORIGINS, 1: URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL CHANGE

6l

were particularly concerned with achieving their aims within their home states. In some quarters it was felt that a statewide effort would have dispersed limited political resources to such an extent that the possibility of minimal reforms may have gone by default. T h e Praja Mandals also had restricted bases of political support within each state. Almost all the movements originated and focused their activities in the capital cities, which were the major centers of communication and contact with the outside world and which were also usually the primary centers of higher education. More importantly, they were the seats of ultimate political authority and political power against which these organizations were protesting and which they hoped to change. Although there was vocal concern by the Praja Mandals over the administration of thikanas and jagirs, it was felt that once the center of traditional authority was changed, these rural appendages would collapse. Furthermore, the founders and initial activists in the Praja Mandals came principally from the state capitals and tended to keep the center of political action in a familiar area (Table 7).88 After the creation of the Praja Mandal organizations in the capitals, "outposts" were established in rural towns, usually by local leaders who had either been educated in the British provinces or who had come into contact with the nationalist movement.89 In most cases these groups were exclusively personal followings whose membership was usually restricted to the caste of the founder-leader. These local branches were also characterized by areal fragmentation. They never became linked on a district-wide basis: each remained restricted in both leadership and membership to the town in which it originated. T h e leaders and group in each town were more directly and closely associated with the 38. Membership lists of the Praja Mandals at various times are not available. T h e data used in this and subsequent tables of this chapter are based on the membership of the Rajputana Prantiya Sab ha in 1946. This organization, analyzed more thoroughly in Chapters 5 and 6, was created in that year and included the important activists of each state at that time. T h e list was obtained from the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC), Jaipur. Biographical data was obtained from P C C files and from interviews. 39. Udaipur State was a notable exception. T h e Praja Mandal leaders in this state came largely from district towns, a large proportion being from Nathdwara—an important center of religious pilgrimage. T h e towns in this state were also major centers of mass movements before independence.

62

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

political nexus in the capital city than they were with their counterparts in other rural towns. These local activists, like the city elites, were more concerned with changing the nature of the traditional polity than they were with the peculiar problems of the quasi-feudal peasant society in which they lived—problems which were to become of primary importance during the first decade after independence. TABLE

7

R E C R U I T M E N T OF P R A J A M A N D A L

EÛTES

(IN P E R C E N T )

Political Generation »9>9-»93° i93'-'936 i937-1941 1942-1946 Average percent

Capital City

District Town

Village

63 5° 45 44 48

38 36 40 44 40

0 '4 '4 12 12

N

=

'3 '4 42 18 87

There were several factors that militated against the development of a cohesive and integrated political movement among the rural towns. One of the most important was the diffusion of power within the traditional political order itself, particularly applicable to the desert areas of Jodhpur, Bikaner, and the Shekhawati area of Jaipur State. Most of these rural areas were subdivided into thikanas and jagirs which were under the de facto rule of local jagirdars. Since the locus of power in the traditional order was highly fragmented and without any real suprapower that consistently controlled the action of these local lords, there was no center of power and suppression against which an urban movement could have been mobilized and which might have linked the movements in the rural towns in a common effort for a common cause. Leaders of the Praja Mandal were recruited almost exclusively from among Brahman, Mahajan, and Kayasth castes, all of which enjoy a position of high ritual and social status. The concept of

ORIGINS, i : URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL CHANGE

63

involvement in public affairs was not alien to these castes; a number of them had long traditions of participation in affairs of state. The Praja Mandals, however, did not command the support of all segments of these castes, many of which had traditional divisions that precluded unified action. These divisions, although less strongly marked than they once were, in many cases have continued in contemporary politics.40 TABLE

8

POLITICAL GENERATION AND C A S T E

MOBILIZATION

(IN PERCENT)

Caste

'9'9-'93°

1931-1936

1937-1941

1942-1946

%OFN

Brahman Mahajan Kayasth Peasant Rajput Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim

85 8 8

62 23

26 35 3 23 6

47 32 6 10 4

3 3 31

i i 109

N

=

0 0

8 8

0

46 38 6 6 4

0 0 •3

0 0 '3

0 0 52

There were several important social groups that were conspicuously absent from positions of leadership in these movements, however. Representation from ritually "low" castes was quite limited. Low participation was particularly evident in the cases of Jaipur and Udaipur, where Untouchables constituted over 40 percent of the general population, and in Udaipur there are several regions where Scheduled Tribes constitute the vast majority of the population. Leadership of both social reform and political movements in these areas was also the province of Brah40. In several states these divisions were manipulated by the governments to limit support for the Praja Mandals. In J o d h p u r the Brahmo Samaj, a community organization of the Pushkarna Brahmans, acted to break u p meetings of the Lok Parishad a n d to oppose its leadership, which was predominantly Pushkarna. T h e Raj Bhakat Sabha was formed for like purposes and reportedly drew its support primarily from among the Oswal caste, which also supplied a number of important members of the Parishad.

64

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

man and, in a few cases, Kayasth reformers—a pattern still common today. Untouchables, with extremely few exceptions, were associated with political protest only insofar as they were the objects of "social upliftment." A t the other end of the social scale, there was limited recruitment from the Rajputs. With few exceptions Rajputs rejected the aims and political style of the Praja Mandals, although some young Rajputs educated in the British Provinces were attracted to these movements as nationalist organizations. In several cases there were reportedly attempts on the part of some young Rajputs to enter these movements only to be rejected because of a fear that their involvement would divide the movement and preclude the possibility of attracting support from peasant castes.41 Although there was some Rajput representation in the Praja Mandals, this was in areas which did not have a long tradition of conflict between Rajput lord and peasant caste tenant. Muslims and peasant castes also did not become associated with the Praja Mandals in large number. 42 Muslims in some cases had community organizations that channeled political demands to state authorities, and there had also been a tradition of protection for Muslims by the state darbars. Members of peasant castes, except in Bikaner State, entered politics through the Kisan Sabhas which served largely as caste associations of the Jat community. These organizations maintained their autonomy until after independence. T h e profile of caste recruitment varied over time. T h e data in T a b l e 8 indicate that the first protestors were almost entirely Brahman, the remainder being Mahajan and Kayasth. With the exception of one Jat leader, Sardar Harlal Singh of Shekhawati, 41. Interviews. 4s. Data are scarce concerning the political activity of Muslims in the preindependence movements. Several Muslims were active in the movements in Bharatpur, Jaipur, and Jodhpur during the 1930s and early 1940s, but by independence the number was very small. In Jodhpur and Bikaner, Muslim League branches were active shortly before independence, however, and reportedly enjoyed governmental support. T h i s may also have been true of other states. T h e one Muslim on the Prantiya Sab ha in 1946 went to Pakistan shortly after independence.

ORIGINS, i :

URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL CHANGE

65

these three castes provided all of the political rebels during the years before 1937. With the rejuvenation of public protest and the creation of permanent organizations in the years following 1936 the community of protest started to become more democratized, drawing support from a wider spectrum of social groups. T h e proportion of Brahmans in each successive period, for example, became progressively smaller, while the proportion of Mahajans continually increased. With the " Q u i t India" Movement in 1942, persons from a larger number of castes were attracted to these movements. Many had been students in British India, others until then had been primarily absorbed in the work of social uplift, principally among Harijans. T h e base of social representation, however, was never extremely broad. From 1942 to 1946, for example, 61 percent of the political recruits were either Brahman or Mahajan. It was not until the eve of the first General Elections in 19511952 that the Rajasthan Congress party, created from these Praja Mandai organizations, expanded its scope of social participation significantly. Praja Mandai leaders were highly educated men in uneducated societies, and each new political generation tended to be more highly educated than its predecessors (Table 9). Furthermore, in each successive generation a higher proportion of those with a college education had been educated in the British provinces. T h i s was accompanied by increasingly close association between the states' movements and the nationalist movement. Those initially drawn to political activism had not pursued higher education, although 67 percent had at least matriculated — a relatively high level of educational achievement at that time. With the resurgence of political activity in 1937, more highly educated men were recruited into politics, and it is from this group that many contemporary political leaders in Rajasthan are drawn. T h e period from the "Quit India" Movement of 1942 to 1946 also witnessed the recruitment of a new type of participant who, unlike those with equivalent levels of education at earlier junctures, was not conversant with the world of political ideology, constitutional thought, and the ways of British culture, particu-

66

THE

CONGRESS

TABLE POLITICAL

G E N E R A T I O N AND L E V E L (IN

Level of Education LLB College Matric. Middle Primary None Trad.» N

=

I919-I93O

0

>7 5° 8 25 0 0 12

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

9 OF E D U C A T I O N A L

ACHIEVEMENT

PERCENT)

>93 I_I 93 6

i937-1941

1942-1946

%OFN

25

42

45

33 11

0

17 «7 25 8 8 12

'9 «3

0

'5 25

20

0

0

3 3'

•5

'5 '3 i 7

21

76

10

>3

0

* Traditional education includes degrees awarded by cultural and religious institutions.

larly the English language. T h e y constituted the rise of a new type of political leader—one cast in a provincial and peculiarly Indian political idiom. THE P R A J A MANDALS AND THE NATIONALIST

MOVEMENT

W h i l e most political activity and organization was segmented on the basis of the various princely states, there were several values and structures that provided a modicum of integration for these movements before independence. First of all, the objectives and activities, although pursued separately, were common. T h e movement in each state held as its primary objective the achievement of representative government under the aegis of the maharaja. Each conceived itself as the legitimate representative of public opinion. Each demanded the expansion of welfare benefits allocated by the state. More importantly the Praja Mandals all identified with the nationalist symbols and aspirations as expressed by the Indian National Congress and conceived their activity as part of the larger effort to displace colonial rule. T h e national demands for the abolition of traditional political authority were never directed against the person of the maharaja. T h i s posture was set quite early by Gandhi, who played a major role in formulating Congress policy toward the princes, when he declared: " T h e

ORIGINS, i :

URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL C H A N G E

67

Congress seeks not to embarrass the States, it desires to help them. It does not wish to destroy them, it wishes to reform them." 43 This attitude was echoed by the Praja Mandal elites who shared a sense of historical obligation to their princes. The princes were seen as captives of the British Raj and under the constant pressure, control, and corrupting influence of the Political Department of the central government.44 The states were viewed as bastions used by the British to perpetuate and make secure the continuity of colonial rule. If the British would but quit India, the princes would bow to the wishes of their subjects. This conception of the larger political order was also used to show the common interests shared by the movements in the states and the nationalist movement in the British provinces. This "protection" of the maharaja was in some cases a calculated part of political strategy. Direct opposition to the princes would possibly have hindered the mobilization of popular support for the Praja Mandais—particularly during the critical period of their infancy. Opposition to an outside power whose presence was made evident by outsiders in the state councils was more palatable than opposition to a figure sanctified by tradition. This sentiment of opposition was complemented by the presentation of public grievances as caused by the unsympathetic attitudes and sinister aims of the wideshi. The formal association of the Praja Mandals and the Indian National Congress was a rather tenuous one, however. Although 43. Gandhi, The Indian States Problem, p. 47. 44. Opposition of the States' Peoples' movement to British involvement in the princely states was put harshly in a statement issued by the AISPC: "Both law and practice demonstrate that there is no element of sovereignty in the States and the British Paramount Power has in the course of its domination over India, created new States, abolished States, increased or reduced their areas, taken away many of their rights and frequently intervened. Even at the present moment, many States are being controlled by British officers and governed directly under orders from the Political Department of the Government of India, and the other States have to carry out the directions of this Department. . . . T h e States were, and are, the instruments of the will of British Imperialism, permanent safeguards against Indian freedom and the spread of democracy in India." AISPC, Standing Committee, People Not Bound by Treaties, February 13, 1940, pp. 2-3. T h e princes also resented British interference in the internal affairs of their states, as was noted in the preceding chapter.

68

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

the new political elites wished to have their movements absorbed into the larger nationalist movement from which they derived their inspiration, the Congress rejected these pleas. Congress policy was limited to one of benevolent understanding and moral support. Even in 1935, the Wardha Session of the Congress Working Committee stated: It should be understood . . . that the responsibility and the burden of carrying on that struggle within the States must necessarily fall on the States' people themselves. The Congress can exercise moral and friendly influence upon the States and this it is bound to do whenever possible. The Congress has no other power under existing circumstances although the people of India whether under the British, the Princes or any other people are geographically and historically one and indivisible. In the heat of controversy the limitation of the Congress is often forgotten. Indeed any other policy will defeat the common purpose.48 T h e committee believed (1) that a diversion of attention and energy would weaken the primary effort in the British provinces, the seat of colonial power; (2) that the populations of the states were not politically prepared for mass political action and that a demonstration of this would call into question the claims of the Congress movement to be the embodiment and only legitimate representative of the Indian nation; and (3) that the policy of the Congress was often unsuited to the situations in the states and might result in hampering the natural growth of freedom movements and stifling their development of a broad base of popular support. It finally directed that no Congress committees were to be established in the states.46 This posture however, was changed considerably at the Haripura Session in 1938. T h e Congress stands for the same political, social and economic free45. Congress Working Committee at Wardha Meeting, July 29-August 1, 1935. Published in Mitra, Indian Annual Register, II (July-December, 1935), 224. 46. Balvantray Mehta, The Congress Policy Towards States (Bombay: AllIndia Congress Committee, 1938), p. 26. Several Congress committees, although illicit, were established in some states, but never became active bodies. By 1928 they reportedly existed in Jodhpur, Kotah, Alwar, and Karauli states.

ORIGINS, i: URBAN PROTEST AND POLITICAL CHANGE

69

dom in the states as in the rest of India and considers the states as an integral part of India which cannot be separated. Puma Swaraj or complete independence, which is the objective of the Congress, is for the whole of India inclusive of the states, for the integrity and unity of India must be maintained in freedom as it has been maintained in subjection. The resolution also noted: "The Congress considers its right and privilege to work for the attainment of this objective in the states," but qualified this declaration by noting that "under the existing circumstances the Congress is not in a position to work effectively to this end within the states and the numerous limitations and restrictions imposed by the rulers or by British authority working through them hamper its activities." 47 This resolution had a major impact upon the Praja Mandal leaders in the Rajputana states. It represented a victory for political leaders of the states after nearly a decade of advocacy, and reflected an increasingly close association of the states' movements with the larger political community. Those Praja Mandal leaders interviewed spoke of this as a major stimulus to maintaining permanent organizations of political protest in their states. While the Praja Mandal organizations enjoyed the support and encouragement of the Congress party, the formal organizational relationships between the Congress and the Mandals remained quite limited. There were several forms of association, however, that were important. The All-India States' Peoples' Congress (AISPC), while not a joint-planning body, afforded a forum for major leaders from the princely states and the Congress leaders at the national level to discuss common problems, and several leaders from Rajputana served on the All-India Working Committee of the AISPC and as general secretaries.48 In terms of the priorities of the Congress, it was felt that such a structural arrangement was adequate until the mid-1940s, when a committee was established to bring the masses and the workers of the states into closer contact.49 47. The Leader, February 10, 1938. 48. These included Jai Narain Vyas (Jodhpur), Pandit Hiralal Shastri (Jaipur), Gokul Bhai Bhatt (Sirohi), and Manikyalal Varma (Udaipur). 49. Hindustan Times, April g, 1944.

7°

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN

RAJASTHAN

Many Praja Mandal leaders also became active in Congress affairs in Ajmer-Merwara, the Chief Commissioner's province situated at the center of the Rajputana states. Representatives from several states were elected to leadership positions in the AjmerMerwara Congress Committee and to the All-India Congress Committee from this provincial party organization.60 Thus while the Mandals were neither intimately linked within the Rajputana states nor a part of the Congress organization, major leaders were directly associated with the Congress both at a regional and national level. Most importantly, however, was the role that Congress leaders at the all-India level, primarily Gandhi and Nehru, played in the planning and timing of major political movements and agitations in the states. In the case of Rajputana, almost invariably the decision to begin or to end an agitation was taken only after consultation at Wardha, and many of the older generation of political leaders recall these talks and meetings as exceedingly influential on the style and the shaping of political movements as well as on their own personal lives. This channel of decision making was far more important than regional planning between these movements in the Rajputana states. This informal channel, however, had an importance that went well beyond the planning of political protests and agitations: it encouraged an identification of the new political elites in the Rajputana states with the all-India symbols and concerns of the nationalist movement and intensified their self-conception as being Indian, if not Rajasthani. More importantly, the Congress high command were accepted as the ultimate decision-makers and adjudicators of disputes, and this function was to be of central importance in the resolving of conflicts and the maintenance of organizational cohesion in the Rajasthan Congress after independence. The Praja Mandal movements in the Rajputana states had only limited success in achieving their aim of responsible government. T h e state authorities demonstrated considerable ability to withstand the demands of the new political elites. Legislative bodies 50. The author knows of fourteen different Praja Mandal leaders representing eight different states who served on the All-India Congress Committee before independence.

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URBAN PROTEST AND P O L I T I C A L CHANGE

71

which were established in a few states before independence were elected on a severely limited franchise, and effective participation of popular leaders in the making of law was negligible. Popular ministries were not created until after independence and after the process of states' integration had commenced. T h e community of protest itself was quite limited. T h e new political elite at the time of independence had not been able to mobilize mass movements, although in some agitations large numbers of people had temporarily become involved. T h e elite structure was limited not only in number but also in the area and social scope of its recruitment. Protest was primarily an urban phenomenon, and the political elite was recruited from among those who had been mobile and who had come into contact with a world of social action that extended beyond the confines of the traditional society in which they lived. These movement organizations, however, were successful in several important respects. Before independence state authorities had accepted the Praja Mandals as legitimate institutions and in the 1940s made efforts to reach an accommodation with them. More important in terms of political development in this region, however, the protesting elites had established permanent organizations—the first contractual political institutions in these traditional polities. T h e permanent names assigned to these organizations emphasized the identity of the new elites. Formal constitutions provided for a differentiated set of formal organizational roles and for routinized methods for selecting leaders, recruiting members, and making policy decisions. These institutions also established a plural set of organizational goals. Thus, although the Praja Mandals were not mass organizations in fact, they constituted important political and organizational innovations in the Rajputana states. T h e absence of experience in managing mass political organizations and in administrative planning in a state apparatus, however, placed the new political elites in the Rajputana states at a disadvantage compared with their counterparts in the British provinces. In British India, Congress leaders had not only had long experience in managing a complex and large-scale organization but they had also formed ministries and had gained ex-

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perience in the running of government under the provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935. The combination of the absence of experience in a common organization and the development of relatively self-contained movements prior to independence resulted in a segmentary organization of political power when the movements were merged to form the Rajasthan Congress party in 1946. Each movement had developed its own elite which was protective of its position and prerogatives, had developed its own patterns of recruitment, and had shared a separate body of specific experiences. This decentralized pattern in the development of political groups and the recruitment of political elites has been critically important in shaping the elite structure and the organization of political power in the Congress system since independence. There were several traditions, however, which were important in assisting the integration of the Rajasthan Congress. First, elites in the Praja Mandal were educated in the procedures of democratic politics at both the local and national level. This was achieved not only through selection of leadership by election of members and discussion and consultation in the making of decisions but also through the egalitarian ideology which continually motivated the movement. Furthermore, the parochial bias of political organization was not paralleled by political aspiration. The elites in the states identified with the nationalist aspirations of the Indian National Congress and aspired to association with the larger designs of the nationalist movement. Several leaders also had participated in the All-India States' Peoples' Congress and had developed close associations not only with representatives of Peoples' Movements in other princely states but with the high command of the Congress party as well. This nationalist aspiration and direct association of local elites in nationalist organizations was an important factor in the successful moves toward political integration after independence.

Chapter

4

T H E O R I G I N S OF T H E P A R T Y S Y S T E M II: T H E O R G A N I Z A T I O N OF PEASANT MOVEMENTS

mobilization was not an exclusively urban phenomenon during the preindependence period in the Rajputana states. Important peasant movements developed in several states and, although their objectives were more limited and local than those of the Praja Mandals, they engineered change in rural society. T h e Congress party has drawn many of its leaders and structures of public support from these Kisan Sabha movements.1 T h e organization of peasant movements prior to independence did not develop on a Rajputana-wide basis but, like their urban counterparts, were limited in their scope of activity and support to the state of their origin. Peasant movements were also segmented within these states on an areal basis, and in some cases there was considerable conflict over the formulation of strategy. Furthermore, these movements developed autonomously from the Praja Mandals, although leadership linkages were established in some areas through joint membership. T h e origins, organization, and objectives of the Kisan Sabha movements in Rajputana were quite different from those of the Praja Mandals. Peasant societies did not start as political organizations but were the political outgrowths of social reform movePOLITICAL

1. For a theoretically ricli treatment of the ontogeny of social movements see Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change," Social Forces, 44 (March 1966), 327-340. Also see James A. Geschwender, "Explorations in the Theory of Social Movements and Revolutions," Social Forces, 47 (December 1968), 1-27; and Maurice Pinard, "Mass Society and Political Movements: A New Formulation," American Journal of Sociology, 73 (May 1968), 682-690.

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T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

ments which originated within the Jat community during 1920s.2

T h e Kisan

the

Sab has were, in fact, caste associations of the

Jats and were used to concentrate and focus the collective energies of the caste in what was termed the "antifeudal struggle." T h e s e organizations developed exclusively in those areas of Rajputana where Jats constituted the predominant rural caste and where Rajputs, the landed aristocracy, were also found in large number. 3 Within these states the peasant associations originated and became most highly organized and their activity most intense in those areas ruled by jagirdars

rather than in those under the direct rule

2. There were other areas of Rajputana with dominant peasant castes or tribes that did not develop permanent protest movements. Although the Bhils, a Scheduled Tribe, constituted the dominant—in many areas the majority—community in Udaipur, Dungarpur, Banswara, and Kushalgarh, the only major movement of protest was the Bijolia agitation. There were two factors that militated against the rise of permanent peasant movements in these areas: (1) the relative absence of intercaste conflict because the ruling elite was quite small in number; and (2) an exceedingly low level of education and contact with the outside world among the Bhils. In the 1930s Muslim peasants in Alwar State, the Meos, launched an agitation which drew national attention (Times 0/ India, January and February 1933). T h e kisan movement in Bikaner was not as intense as it was in Jodhpur and Jaipur states owing reportedly to the "enlightened," though firm, policies of Maharaja Ganga Singh. Jats gained political access almost entirely through the urban-based Praja Parishad. In 1946, however, the darbar attempted to separate the Jats from this organization with the formation of a Jat Sabha, but this association had very limited support (Hindustan, September 27, 1946). In the Ganganagar area of Bikaner peasant protest, particularly among the Punjabi Jats and Jat Sikhs in the Gang Canal Colonies, were channeled through the Zamindar Association whidi was quite effective in pressing its claims upon the state government. Kisan Sabhas were also organized in Bharatpur and Kishengarh states, but their activity was less significant than in the desert states. 3. Government of India, Census of India, 1931 (Rajputana Agency). In Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Bikaner, Jats constituted 11.9 percent, 13.4 percent, and 23 percent and Rajputs 4.3 percent, 8.8 percent, and 5.9 percent of the total population respectively. In each of these states the Jats were the largest community. T h e Jat community in Jaipur and Jodhpur was concentrated in certain areas and it was in these that the Kisan Sabhas were located. In Jaipur, Jats constituted the largest caste in Shekhawati, Torawati, Sikar, Khetri, Malpura, and Sambhar. In Jodhpur, they were dominant in Bilara, Jodhpur, Didwana, Merta, Nagaur, Parbatsar, Mallani, and Sambhar-Marwar. Jats were the largest caste in all tehsils of Bikaner State. T h e concentration of Jats in Jaipur and Jodhpur was in those areas which were almost entirely under jagirdari tenure.

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75

MOVEMENTS

of the maharaja, and the proportion of land held by jagirdars in these states was larger than in other areas.4 T h e jagirdars on the whole were quite resistant to change, particularly to efforts aimed at the "rationalization" of the relationship between the jagirdar and his subjects by the introduction of formally defined tenancy rights, rules of land tenure, and the introduction of settlement operations—i.e., changing the payment of rents from crop to cash ( T a b l e 10). In the areas of Jat predominance and jagirdari power, these efforts at agrarian reform were resisted until well after independence. 8 TABLE SETTLEMENT

OPERATIONS BY

(IN

Division Udaipur Khalsa Non-Khalsa Jaipur Khalsa Non-Khalsa Bikaner Khalsa Non-Khalsa Jodhpur Khalsa Non-Khalsa Kotah Khalsa Non-Khalsa

10 1949

PERCENT)

Settled

Settlement in Progress

Settlement Operations Not Begun

75-5 46.6

7.2 28.2

«7-3 25-3

93-7 47-5

5-9 32.8

•4 19.7

100.0 13.0

0.0 78.4

0.0 8.6

72.0 2.1

0.0 37-2

28.0 60.8

80.3 24.8

4.9 25.8

14.8 49-4

SOURCE : Venkatachar Report, p. 35.

T h e instruments and symbols of power in the traditional rural order were highly fused. T h e R a j p u t jagirdari elite enjoyed a monopoly on land ownership, the symbols and rituals of social deference, and the right to decide on and enforce public rules. In a situation of public apathy or of common obligation to the 4. See Table 1. 5. Venkatachar Report, p. 35.

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hereditary right of a single caste to assume and manipulate these symbols and rules, the organization of power is indeed imposing and effective. Such a system of fused values is extremely resistant to change, but when one symbol of power comes under threat or attack, it involves a threat to the larger system of power. Thus, demands by Jats to share in the symbols of social dominance, such as attempts on the part of a Jat bridegroom to ride a horse to the household of his bride, or for Jats to ride elephants or any beast of burden before the hearths of prestigious Rajputs, involved threats to Rajput power, since traditional restrictions on social ritual such as these were themselves manifestations of that power. This confrontation against a single local caste which monopolized the instruments and symbols of social and economic status and power was important in kindling the Jat movements and in initially forging their cohesion. T h e rural areas of the desert states had known peasant protest prior to this century, but the development and persistence of peasant movements in the twentieth century was encouraged by increasing contact of the Jats with the outside world and particularly with movements and ideas of social reform prevalent in the British provinces. T h e vehicles for the communication of the reformist and "modern" concepts were the Arya Samaj, Jat religious leaders, and the traditional religious festivals and fairs of Rajputana and the Punjab. T h e Jats were the primary focus of the Arya Samaj effort in Rajputana, and it was in this community that the movement had its greatest impact and success. The Samaj sent pracharacks or updeshickhs (Samajist missionaries) to Rajputana from Delhi, Agra, Mathura, from the Hariana region of the Punjab, where the movement had become quite strong within the populous Punjabi Jat community, and from its Rajputana Pratinidhi Sabha (Rajputana Provincial Organization) in Ajmer. These religious bards toured Jat villages preaching and singing of social reform, of the inequities of the existing order, and of the righteousness of the cause of social purification and change. These theatrical introductions into village life are remembered not only for their didacticism and social instruction but also for their quality. One political activist of long standing put it this way:

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T h e Arya Samajist plan and program of social reform and rehabilitation came to be the precursor of social and political progress in India. Its gospel of the equal rights for all, inlcuding the Untouchables as revealed in the Vedic gospels, had a great meaning. T h e Arya Samaj infused a new faith, initiative, sense of moral and social responsibility and self-confidence in the Hindu people. They learned to assert themselves. They got a new vision and a new pattern to mould their lives upon. Perhaps it may not be an exaggeration to say that the Samaj was the spiritual father of the anti-feudal struggle and Hindu natioanlism. It indirectly prepared the foundations for an independent political life. It stressed the values of character building, moral education, purity, chastity and courage. Throughout the Shekhawati area, the Arya Samaj left an indelible mark on the lives and thought of the common people. 8 M a n y of the early leaders in the Jat movements and several w h o subsequently became prominent and powerful leaders in state politics were influenced greatly by the teachings and activities of the Samaj.7 T h e impetus for social innovation also came from among Jat Sadhus w h o came into contact w i t h advocates of religious revival and social reform in British India through their travels and pilgrimages in quest of religious truth. A n u m b e r of these religious leaders were active in the creation of schools and community associations. O n e , Swami Keshwanand, was instrumental in the founding of the Sangaria School in Bikaner State where a large n u m b e r of Jats received their education through matriculation. A n o t h e r , Swami Karmanand, was active in the early protest movements of Bikaner State, for w h i c h he served time in jail, was elected president of the Bikaner Rajya Praja Parishad, served on the Pradesh Congress C o m m i t t e e , and contested the first General Elections in 1952. In J o d h p u r State, Jat Sadhus were among the founders of the Marwar Jat Sabha and several of them served as its early officers. M a n y were also instrumental in the founding of the Jat Krishak Sudharak in 1938 at the Pushkar Fair in A j m e r Merwara. 8 6. Interview with Sardar Harlal Singh. 7. These include such prominent names as Kumbharam Arya, Sardar Harlal Singh, Chottu Singh, Jeeyalal Arya, Chiman Ram, and Hansraj Arya. 8. T h . Desh Raj, Jat Jan Sevak (n.p., n.d.), p. 206.

7

8

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

T h e traditional religious festivals and fairs of Nagaur, AjmerMerwara, and the Punjab were well attended by the Rajputana Jats. These fairs became centers of discourse in social and political protest and served to bring together Jats from the Rajputana States and also as a place to meet their caste fellows from the Punjab, where the influence of reformist movements had been felt from the early part of the twentieth century. These occasions were also used by reformist groups to propagate their own views of what the proper social order should be. T h e initial objectives of the Jat reform movements were internally oriented and were not directed at changing the status of the caste in the larger social order by direct confrontation with Rajput lords. Objectives were concerned instead with social reform—the abolition of death feasts, restraints on the magnitude of dowries, the promotion of late marriages and temperance, the encouragement of Western education, and the achievement of social mobility through employment outside the traditional sector.® T h u s the objectives of the first phase of the Jat movements involved the coexistence of processes of Sanskritization and Westernization. T h e y primarily reflected, however, the impact and internalization of values peculiar to Westernized sectors of society. While these objectives were common to Jodhpur, Shekhawati, and Bikaner, the kisan organizations in these areas varied considerably in the scope of their organization, the management of strategy, and the timing of political action. A n effective Rajputana-wide Kisan Sabha was never organized, nor were kisan organizations in Rajputana formally linked with the Kisan Sabhas in British India. 10 Each was founded in its own state and, like the Praja Mandals, maintained autonomy of political action. THE KISAN MOVEMENT IN JODHPUR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASTE COHESION

T h e kisan movement in Jodhpur State was much more cohesive than were the Jat movements in other areas of the Rajputana states. It was organized and managed by Jodhpuri Jats almost 9. Interviews with Choudhry Kumbharam Arya, R a m Niwas Mirdha, Jagan Singh, and Sardar Harlal Singh. 10. Interview with Sardar Harlal Singh.

ORIGINS, II: THE PEASANT

MOVEMENTS

79

exclusively from the area of Nagaur District. Until the creation of the Marwar Kisan Sab ha in 1946, the movement was informally organized and was exclusively oriented toward achieving change within the caste and expanding the capacity and opportunity of caste members to engage in occupations outside the agricultural sector. T h e Jodhpur kisan movement was structurally autonomous. It did not become affiliated with the Marwar Lok Parishad, and it was not responsive to the more direct overtures of political activists from the British provinces.11 Also in marked contrast to the Shekhawati and Bikaner cases, individual Jats did not participate in urban political movements in Jodhpur or as students in the universities of British India.12 T h e organization and timing of the Jat movement in Jodhpur was partially a function of its peculiar relationship with the state darbar. Unlike the community in most other states of Rajputana, Jodhpuri Jats enjoyed institutional representation in the state government. This access was centralized and was provided and largely managed by Baldev Ram Mirdha, one of the first Jats in Jodhpur to matriculate from a school where English was the medium of instruction, and who rose through the ranks to achieve the strategic position of deputy inspector of police in Jodhpur State. Because of his training and vocation, Mirdha promoted Jat participation in government jobs and in the pursuit of education to prepare members of the community for new and more important roles in public life. It was reportedly his hope that agrarian reforms could be achieved through institutional representation and pressure rather than through protest, agitation, and violence. He has been described by members of his family and close associates as having been a loyalist to the end.18 11. Interviews with Chagan R a j Chopasinawala and Narsingh Das Lunkar. A complaint of many Jat activists during this period was that the Jodhpuri Jats were too "pro-administration." ig. In a questionnaire administered by the author to members of the Legislative Assembly in 1963-1964, no Jat responded that he had engaged in student political activity. This point was also made by Nathu Ram Mirdha in an interview with Professor Lawrence L. Shrader. I am indebted to Professor Shrader for this comment. 13. T h i s point was made to the author by Ram Niwas Mirdha, the son

8o

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

It was largely because of Mirdha's position and encouragement that positions were made available for Jats in the state services, primarily in the police and railway departments.14 He was also successful in acquiring state authorization and grants for establishing and subsidizing secondary schools and hostels for kisan students, initially almost exclusively Jat. Schools and Jat boardinghouses were established in Merta, Nagaur, Parbatsar, Didwana, and Barmer as a result of these efforts.15 The experience of living and studying together in an alien urban world induced a spirit of comradeship among Jat students, and this has been an important factor in maintaining the cohesiveness of the Jat political elite from this area in postindependence politics. The founders and leaders of the Marwar Kisan Sabha and the dominant Jat political leaders in postindependence politics all either had held positions in the state services or had attended these educational institutions and lived in these community hostels. In Jodhpur, as well as Shekhawati and Bikaner, there was minimal opposition within the Jat community to the objectives of the social and political reformers, and one of the most important reasons for this was the character of traditional political organization of the Jat caste. Unlike many castes, structures of power of Baldev Ram Mirdha who from 1957 to 1967 served as Speaker of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly. T h e commitment of Baldev Ram to "law and order" is also indicated in Kishen Puri, Memoirs of the Jodhpur Police (Jodhpur: Government of Jodhpur Press, 1938), pp. 139-143. 14. Ram Dan Choudhry and several of his associates, the leaders of the Kisan Sabha in the Banner area of Jodhpur State, held administrative positions in the state railway department, and numerous other Jats were employed as workers on the railroads. Like Mirdha, they left the government service in the 1940s to devote their time to political activity. T h e r e were also two Jat companies in the state armed forces, recruited primarily from the Nagaur area, which were disbanded during World War II after they revolted against the replacement of their Jat commanding officer by a Rajput. Shekhawati Jats were recruited in the British Indian Army and several were instrumental in the early Jat movements upon their return after World War I. Interview with Ganga Ram Choudhry, son of Ram Dan Choudhry, and an M L A since ig62. 15. T h . Desh Raj, Jat Jan Sevak, p. 202. With Mirdha's encouragement a number of students from other peasant castes attended these schools, and several went on to obtain law degrees. Important in contemporary Jodhpur politics have been Poonam Chand Vishnoi, Raghunath Vishnoi, and T e j a Ram Gahlot.

ORIGINS,

II: T H E

PEASANT M O V E M E N T S

8l

and authority in traditional Jat society were diffuse. 1 6 T h e traditional jati panchayats of the Jats in these areas were reportedly ad hoc rather than permanent and hereditary in character. "Accepted" leaders were called upon at the time of disputes to pass j u d g m e n t , and cases have been reported where there was wide participation in these deliberations. T h e r e was no traditional elite w i t h i n the caste which rigorously opposed the advocates of modernization and change. T h e "accepted" leaders in the caste increasingly became those w h o achieved positions in accordance with the "modernist" aims to which the Jat movement aspired, and the dominant leaders of the Kisan Sabhas and the m a j o r Jat leaders in postindependence politics have been those w h o were educated or had held positions of status and gain in the " o u t s i d e " world prior to 1947. D u r i n g the early 1940s there was considerable unrest among the Jat community over the insecurity of land tenure and the excesses of jagirdars in exacting rents and various forms of ancillary taxes. In 1941 there had been a " n o sharing of c r o p " agitation, and conflict between Jats and jagirdars had broken out sporadically from that time on. W h i l e informal administrative representation could handle political demands within the rules of the traditional order, it was less effective when the rules themselves were called into question, especially in jagir areas where royal power was limited. T h e final phase of the Jat movement in J o d h p u r started with the f o u n d i n g of the Marwar Kisan Sabha by Baldev R a m Mirdha after his retirement from the state government in 1946 and after the return of a n u m b e r of young Jats from the British provinces where several had received their L L B degrees, and the return of Jat troops from the war. 17 T h e formal creation of the Marwar 16. A f r e q u e n t p o i n t m a d e by Jat politicians is that theirs has traditionally b e e n a democratic caste a n d that e v e n today there are n o social sanctions against those w h o choose to contest against candidates of the m a j o r J a t g r o u p s . Professor P r a d h a m finds this also to be true of Jats i n U t t a r Pradesh, M . C . P r a d h a n , The Political System of the Jats of Northern India (Lond o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967), p p . 112-218. 17. T h e precise d a t e of f o u n d i n g appears to b e o p e n to dispute. O n e source c l a i m c d that the organization was f o u n d e d i n 1946, w h i l e a n o t h e r insisted that it h a d b e e n created a f e w years p r i o r to t h a t b u t b e c a m e ac-

82

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PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

Kisan Sabha marked a major change in both the strategy and objectives of the Jat movement in Jodhpur State—a transformation from a caste-oriented and informally organized movement to a political organization directed at redefining social and economic relationships in rural society. The objective of these new organizations included: (1) jagirdari abolition and the institution of land reforms; (2) abolition of begar and other forms of forced labor and illegal cesses which had traditionally been exacted by many jagirdars from kisans; and (3) the formal definition and protection of tenancy rights. Unlike the Lok Parishad, the Kisan Sabha did not attach high priority to the creation of a new constitutional order. T h e conflict between Jat and Rajput from independence to the first General Elections was frequently violent. T h e problem of land tenure was particularly important with the immanence of jagirdari abolition. The insecurity of the jagirdars' position prompted numerous evictions of tenants, as landlords tried to appropriate as much land as possible for their own use. Even during the first General Elections there were many reports of violence— one of the last attempts to impose the ultimate method of decisionmaking in the old order. Under the leadership of Mirdha the Kisan Sabha continued as a separate organization and expanded its membership to other peasant castes and to other regions of the state. Semiautonomous kisan organizations were founded among Jats in Banner District and among Jats, Sirvis, and Vishnois in Jodhpur, Pali, and Jalore. With the creation of the "popular ministry" in Jodhpur in 1948, the Kisan Sabha assumed representation as an autonomous party and Nathu Ram Mirdha, its young general secretary and nephew of Baldev Ram, was awarded the position of agriculture minister and presided over the first major land reform measure to tive in 1946. From that year, however, Baldev Ram Mirdha served as president of the organization while the general secretary was Nathu R a m Mirdha, a dynamic young activist who was to become one of the dominant Jat leaders in Rajasthani politics. Nathu Ram served in the first popular ministry in J o d h p u r State and as a central member of the ministry in Rajasthan from 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 6 7 , with the exception of one year.

ORIGINS, I I :

THE

PEASANT

MOVEMENTS

83

be enacted in the state.18 The Marwar Kisan Sabha maintained its cohesion and autonomy until its membership entered the Congress party en masse on the eve of the first General Elections. T H E KISAN MOVEMENT IN SHEKHAWATI: P E A S A N T POPULISM AND POLITICAL AGITATION

T h e Jat movement in Shekhawati differed from its Jodhpuri counterpart in impetus, organization, and political strategy. Here the genesis of protest and political organization came largely from external sources. Protest for agrarian reforms and increased public status were made much earlier, and organizations were founded earlier than in Jodhpur, but the same degree of cohesion did not develop within their elites. The leadership of the kisan movement was segmented on an areal basis which no dominant leader ever effectively bridged. It was further divided between those who became active in the Jaipur Rajya Praja Mandal and those who did not. These differences have left their imprint on Shekhawati Jat politics since independence. T h e initial objectives and mobilization, however, were quite similar. T h e early phase of the Shekhawati movement was primarily devoted to instituting social reforms within the Jat community. This area was particularly influenced by the Arya Samajists and was the primary target of Jat reformers and nationalists from the British provinces. In 1925 the Jat Mahasabha started to advocate social reforms, and during the decade numerous educational societies were created to collect funds for the construction and administration of schools and hostels for Jat students.19 J a t 18. For a short summary of these provisions, see the Venkatachar Report, p. 40, and Appendix E. 19. A large number of Mahajan caste associations were active in supporting J a t education. These included the Tilak Seva Samiti, the Rajputana Education Society, and the Marwari Relief Society, which received donations from prominent seths of Shekhawati and whidi opened primary schools in the big villages. T h e Birla Education Trust helped sponsor schools for peasant castes in both Shekhawati and the Punjab. Birla College in Pilani, where numerous Jats received their secondary and college degrees, was the major creation of this association. T h e Bagod High School was a major center for peasant students from the areas around Jhunjhunu and Pilani. T h e most important Jat educational organization was the Jat Shikhsha

84

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reformers from the British provinces started to direct their attention and action toward the thikanas of Shekhawati. During the 1930s, the direction of reform within the Shekhawati Jat community changed from inner self-help to a commitment to changing its social and economic status by a direct confrontation with the existing order. The conditions of the peasantry in the thikanas and large jagirs were inferior to those in khalsa lands under the Jaipur darbar, and within the thikanas conditions were particularly oppressive in areas under bhumia tenure. Furthermore, in Shekhawati the Jats had no advocate in the administration of Jaipur State or in court circles of the subordinate thikanas who might have afforded at least a sense of "felt" participation in the administration and who at most might have successfully argued for selected reforms. Whereas Baldev Ram Mirdha played a restraining role in the Jodhpur J a t movement by being able to work for minimal reforms and by being able to contain the genesis of a continuous conflict between peasant and landlord, this seminal role did not exist in the Shekhawati case. Jats had neither a formal nor an informal channel of access for voicing grievance and urging reform. Neither was employment open to Jats even in lower-level positions in the administrative services as it was in Jodhpur and, to a lesser extent, in Bikaner. T h e acquisition of administrative representation, together with the liberalization and formalization of tenancy rights, were principal objectives of the Jat movements in Shekhawati. Moreover, both Jat and non-Jat "outsiders" who acted as negotiators or intermediaries between the Jats and local authorities were often divided over strategy, as were local leaders themselves. Some advocated a policy of mediation on behalf of peasant demands by the exertion of pressure within the government while others advocated and practiced a policy of mobilizing peasant dissent through nonpayment of rent campaigns and public agitation as a prelude to approaching agreement.20 T h e latter strategy became predominant. Sabha. Th. Desh Raj, Shekhawati Ke Jan Jagaran (Jaipur: Rajasthan Printers, 1961), pp. 9 - 1 1 , 66. 20. Several important leaders attempted to serve as mediators in disputes between jagirdars and Jats. These included Seth Jamnalal Bajaj, a long-time

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MOVEMENTS

85

The Shekhawati movement was marked by the widespread involvement of the Jats in public community functions, and this form of collective activity was of central importance in mobilizing the caste politically. The most important of these community functions was the famous Jat Praja Pati Maha-Yagna, a socioreligious festival held in January 1934. 21 The function lasted ten days and was reportedly the largest Yagna held in Rajputana during the twentieth century. In an effort to develop a sense of identification with the movement, every Jat household in the area was directed to bring small contributions and a donation of ghee. The ceremonies concluded with the placing of two hundred maunds of ghee on the sacrificial flames as a token of the community's dedication to the objectives of the movement and with a triumphal ride of Jats on an elephant in defiance of the rules of the Sikar thikana. The emotive impact of this move for a new collective identity on the part of the Jats prompted numerous meetings at the local level and also stimulated the printing of literature and the composing of poetry glorifying the Yagna, Jat history, and the need for social progress. The Maha-Yagna was an occasion of supreme importance in the mobilization of the Jats in Shekhawati and is remembered with great pride by those who participated in it and by younger generations told about it; it member of the Congress Working Committee whose ancestral home was in Shekhawati, Sir Chhotu Ram, the eminent J a t leader from Punjab, and members of the J a i p u r Praja Mandal, as well as Ratan Singh of the All-India Jat Mahasabha. Those who advocated direct action campaigns were numerous and prompted a number of governmental edicts curtailing their activities. During the Shekhawati J a t Andolan in 1934, for example, two decrees stipulated that those advising peasants not to pay rent would be externed from the state promptly. Jaipur Gazette (Extraordinary), Order Nos. 22053 and 22055, December 24, 1934. s i . Interviews with Jagan Singh and Sardar Harlal Singh. Also see T h . Desh Raj, Jat Jan Sevak, pp. 220-227. As early as 1931 attempts had been made to hold a large Jat Yagna. In October 1933 a Yagna was held and people were called from about five hundred villages with a special attempt to get at least one representative from each village. T h e Maha-Yagna was attended by a number of dignitaries from the British provinces and also by F. S. Young, the British Inspector-General of Police for J a i p u r State. His acceptance of an invitation to attend this religious function hindered efforts of the Sikar thikana to have the gathering banned—an observation made to the author by several planners of the Yagna with satisfaction and glee.

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RAJASTHAN

has become a dominant symbol in the folklore of the "anti-feudal struggle." Although the early 1930s witnessed the founding of a number of Jat panchayats in the various thikanas and large jagirs, and although these organizations were merged to form the Shekhawati Kisan Sab ha in 1935, local associations organized peasant protests and presented peasant demands in their respective areas. There was no single dominant Jat leader who served to integrate these local organizations. The first formal peasant organization was formed in this area in 1925 and was an extension of the All-India Jat Mahasabha which attracted several young Jat dissidents who later became central leaders in the kisan organizations and agitations in Shekhawati. 22 This association, however, fell into disrepute in the early 1930s when it was felt that it was aimed primarily at maintaining the status quo in the traditional order. Another source of organizational impetus came from urban reformers, one of whom founded the Khandela Jat Panchayat, the first local Jat association created in the Shekhawati area. In the 1930s attempts were also made by the Praja Mandal leaders to attract kisan support, and many activists from rural towns played important parts in major rural agitations as well as in mediations between peasant organizations and the thikana and Jaipur State authorities. 28 They also served as the major communication links in the dissemination of political ideas and knowledge concerning the activities going on in urban areas and in British India. Furthermore, certain leaders in the peasant movements were co-opted into the Praja Man22. Interview with Sardar Harlal Singh; also see Th. Desh Raj, Shekhawati Ke Jan Jagaran, pp. 36-37. 23. The major agreements and talks ending agitations were made by prominent outsiders. Seth Jamnalal Bajaj, together with Sir Ch. Chottu Ram, the respected Jat leader from the Punjab, were instrumental in settling the agrarian troubles in 1935 and the Jaipur-Sikar dispute of 1938 which had almost led to armed resistance on the part of the Jats. Interview. Also see the Hindustan Times, March 15, 1935. T h e Jaipur Rajya Praja Mandal became more directly involved with agrarian reforms than the Marwar Lok Parishad and instituted major investigations into peasant conditions and the implementation of state-peasant agreements. A ten-month study was launched in 1940 which resulted in recommendations for change which incorporated several policies of the Indian National Congress and which won favorable publicity but little response from the government. T h . Desh Raj, Shekhawati Ke Jan Jagaran, pp. 52-56.

ORIGINS, II: THE PEASANT MOVEMENTS

87

dal. These leadership linkages between town and rural areas became most important in the Congress' effort to develop a rural base of political support after independence. From the mid-1930s, the kisan movement started to make explicit demands for the redress of peasant grievances and these were often accompanied by public agitations. In 1935, after the famed Sikar Andolan, a number of these demands were met by the thikana authorities.24 Settlement operations were begun under the direction of a committee of British experts, remissions in rents were promised and the introduction of fixed rents pledged, and other cesses as well as internal customs were abolished. Jats were promised equal opportunities in the thikana administration, were permitted to ride elephants, camels, and horses under the same provisions as other castes, and were given permission to build more schools. The formation of a Jat Kisan Panchayat was officially sanctioned and was to advise the senior officer of the thikana in matters concerning agriculturalists. Finally, the right of Jats to agitate for the redress of their grievances in non-khalsa areas was granted. Few of these arrangements, however, were implemented fully before independence. First, the thikana did not have complete control over its subordinate jagirdars and found considerable difficulty in binding them to these agreements. Secondly, the introduction of settlement operations and the reform of revenue administration took considerable time, and this delay was perceived by the Jat leadership as a breach in the original agreements. On the other hand, outbreaks of civil disorder and violence, usually accompanying Jat efforts at testing the new agreements, were accepted as an indication of bad faith by the thikana authorities. Shortly after the 1935 agreements were reached, for example, two incidents prompted a rejection of the agreement by the British senior officer in Sikar, Capt. A. W. T . Webb. T h e first incident 24. The terms of the agreement were published in the Hindustan Times, March 15, 1935. For a summary of the implementation of reforms, see The States, June 27, 1935. Under a previous agreement—the Jat-Sikar thikana Agreement of August 23, 1934—the Sikar thikana committed itself to policies ranging from the abolition of various lags to a promise of a traveling dispensary.

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occurred in K h u d i village where a Jat bridegroom rode a horse i n his w e d d i n g procession, m u c h to the chagrin of the R a j p u t s . T h e parties were ready for armed combat, and when the state authorities ordered them to disperse, the Jats refused. T h i s resulted i n a charge by the thikana police and bodyguard. 2 8 T h e other case was in K h u d a n village where reportedly nearly one h u n d r e d armed Jats attacked Sikar revenue officials. T h e police fired u p o n the gathering which resulted in several deaths and a n u m b e r of injuries. Eventually 104 Jats were arrested. 28 Shortly after the K h u d i affair, W e b b stated that the previous agreements had been voided by Jat action: By their attempts at boycott of all other classes, by their deliberate campaign of misrepresentation and lies, by their unseemly songs and speeches, by their attempts to provoke quarrels with the Rajputs and by their attacks on or threats to public servants, the Sikar Jats have now alienated the sympathies of all their former friends and have ranged against them every community in the estate. They have done themselves incalculable harm, set back the clock of progress, and have called down upon themselves consequences which are bound to be severe. . . . T h e recent settlements with the Jats have been made a dead letter by die Jat rejection of their own part in them. T h i s fact, however, does not mean that the authorities will necessarily reverse their declared policy of reform and progress. It does mean, though, that the administration will reserve to its own judgment the rate and conditions of their future policy for the uplift of the agricultural classes.27 A s a result of the conflict at K h u d i , the Sikarwati Jat Panchayat and the Kisan Sabha were declared unlawful bodies and a n u m b e r of prominent political workers from outside the state were externed for allegedly "stirring u p the peasants." 28 Conflicts such as these continued until independence. 25. Hindustan Times, March 31, 1935, and April 9, 1935. 26. Hindustan Times, April 25 and 30, 1935. 27. Hindustan Times, April 19, 1935. 28. Jaipur Gazette (Extraordinary), Order No. 6758 and Order No. 6761, April io, 1935. T h e latter was the externment order. Those included were T h . Desh R a j Jat, Ratan Singh Jat, and Ramanand Arya Jat of Bharatpur; Hukum Singh Jat and Moolchand Agarwal of Jaipur; and Narsingh Das Agarwal of Ajmer. Caste names were included in the order. In late 1942, however, the Jaipur government made a number of concessions to the peas-

ORIGINS, II: T H E

PEASANT

MOVEMENTS

THE KISAN SABHAS AND THE URBAN

89 MOVEMENTS:

PATTERNS OF AUTONOMY AND ASSOCIATION

T h e relationship between the different kisan organizations and the Praja Mandais varied from area to area, and these patterns of association have been important in the development of the Congress party organization during the postindependence period. In two regions important segments of the Jat elites became a part of the Congress organization by virtue of their involvement in the Praja Mandai movements. T h e circumstances surrounding the formal entry of Jat groups into the Congress, however, encouraged the development of permanent political cleavages within the Jat community in those areas. T h i s proved to be true in the Shekhawati area of Jaipur State and in Bikaner. In Shekhawati several of the dominant leaders of the Kisan Sabhas held membership in the Jaipur Rajya Praja Mandai and served as important communication links between the worlds of urban and rural political protest. T h e y saw in the Praja Mandai a valuable channel of access to the larger community of political protest and to the administration in Jaipur city. Several urban leaders, particularly those from rural towns of Shekhawati, took a personal interest in peasant affairs and had taken an active part in agitations against the jagirdars as well as in negotiations with them. These leaders included Seth Jamnalal Bajaj, long-time treasurer of the Indian National Congress whose ancestral home was in Shekhawati. Furthermore, one eminent Jat leader, Sardar Harlal Singh, had held important leadership positions in the Praja Mandai from the late 1930s and eventually was elected president. Several other Jat leaders had held leadership positions in organizational outposts in rural towns. 29 These associations, struck antry in the way of tenancy rights and ownership. See T h . Desh R a j , Shekhawati Ke Jan Jagaran, pp. 58-59. T h e s e were upgraded later by the Jaipur T e n a n c y Act of 1947 and the Jaipur State-Grants Land T e n u r e s Act of 1947. See Venkatachar Report, pp. 38-40 and A p p e n d i x E. 29. Important among these were Choudhry Ishwar Singh and Choudhry Kishan Singh, both of whom eventually were elected to the Legislative Assembly after independence. Several of those w h o joined the urban movement had been tremendously affected w h e n they had met Mahatma Gandhi to discuss peasant agitations. T h e i r association with the Praja Mandal and na-

go

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

before independence, were important in the Congress' effort to develop a rural base of political support after 1947 and also assured local Jat Praja

Mandai

members of considerable control

over local Congress organizations. A segment of the preindependence Jat elite, however, rejected active involvement in the Praja

Mandai

and later declined over-

tures to enter the Congress party. First, some of these kisan

leaders

felt that the urban elites did not and could not, because of their peculiar backgrounds, understand or fully appreciate the problems of the Jat peasantry. Secondly, several of these leaders reportedly felt uncomfortable in the presence of the highly educated, English-speaking, high-caste urban elites who spoke in a political language which they could not completely comprehend. Finally, after independence this segment of the Jat elite felt that their aspirations for political success would be severely restricted by those who had maintained a tradition of cooperation with urban Congress leaders. T h i s division became magnified with the creation of the Congress party and with the allocation of

power

within the party organization, and it became polarized after the allocation of tickets for the first General Elections in 1952. Those who had been formally associated with the Praja

Mandai

were

effectively absorbed into the Congress organization, whereas those who had rejected association have constituted a major element of the opposition in the Shekhawati area—first in the form of the Krishikar Lok party and from 1957 as candidates of the Communist party. T h e pattern of political organization among the Jats of Bikaner prior to independence and shortly thereafter had a significant influence on Jat politics after the introduction of elections in tionalist movement was the function of both reverence and a desire to have outside support for influencing officers in the Political Department posted in Jaipur State. T h e most important links from the Praja Mandal in Shekhawati were Narottamlal Joshi, an advocate and subsequently Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, Ladu R a m Joshi, and Seth Jamnalal Bajaj. T h e Praja Mandal made a practice of holding meetings in rural towns and consistently addressed itself to the problems of the Jat peasantry in contrast to the Marwar Lok Parishad. Interviews with Sardar Harlal Singh and Tikaram Paliwal.

ORIGINS, II:

THE

PEASANT MOVEMENTS

gi

1952. Unlike Shekhawati and Jodhpur, Bikaner had no autonomous Jat political movement prior to independence. Preindependence political activity was concentrated in the Rajya Praja Parishad, centered in Bikaner city and some rural towns of Ganganagar and Churu districts. The organization, however, was severely limited in the scope of its activity and membership until the recruitment of Jats during the mid-1940s.80 These new recruits soon formed a distinct faction within the Parishad, and by independence formal positions of organizational leadership were controlled by members of the Jat group.81 There were several reasons for the placidity of the preindependence movements and the delayed Jat political activism in Bikaner. Chief among these was the progressive and efficient administration of Maharaja Ganga Singh and his successor, Sadul Singh. Government during their tenure was more responsive to problems of tenancy and land reform and to agricultural development than was that in Jodhpur and Jaipur. In Bikaner by 1949, for example, settlement operations had been completed in all khalsa land and had been either completed or commenced in over 90 percent of all jagirdari estates. Furthermore, although a considerable proportion of Bikaner State was under jagirdari tenure, the size of jagirs and the autonomy that their owners enjoyed was much less than in the other two great desert states.32 The excesses in the jagirdari estates of Jodhpur and especially Jaipur, so important in kindling peasant protest, were more effectively contained in Bikaner. Moreover, in Bikaner important Jat families enjoyed material benefits bestowed by the state. Selected members of the caste became highly educated, and several held important judicial and administrative positions in the state.83 30. Interviews with Raghubhir Dayal Goyal and Choudhry Kumbharam Arya. 3 1 . A t the time of independence eleven of the thirteen seats on the Pradesh Congress Committee allotted Bikaner were held by Jats. 32. Interview with Kanwar Jaswant Singh, formerly private secretary to Maharaja Ganga Singh and subsequently prime minister of Bikaner State, a minister in Rajasthan, and leader of the opposition in the Legislative Assembly. 33. T w o of the most important were Ram Chandra Choudhry and Hardutt

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T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

Representatives of families of more lowly status and economic means, however, also held government jobs as police constables and patwaris. It was from the latter type that the first political activists among the Jats were drawn. T h e Kisan Sabhas in the R a j p u t a n a states were critical in the political mobilization of important segments of rural society. In an important sense they were both function and agent of the modernization process. T h e y represented the formation of new organizations by contract and choice, and the quality of leadership selection in the development of these movements increasingly emphasized achievement and performance. T h e y encouraged the expansion of caste horizons and cooperative effort from parochial and vertical social divisions to more horizontal and inclusive ones. For example, in Jodhpur the Kisan Sabha included representatives from peasant castes other than Jat—Sirvis and Vishnois. T h e pattern of mobilization and organizational development of these institutions in Rajasthan may be usefully conceived as having passed through three phases, each successive phase being influenced by its predecessor in a Markovian sense. In the first phase these movements were locally cohesive and were internally directed: their main concern was reforming the caste from within. T h e initiation of this phase varied from region to region, and also varied in being much more highly centralized and directed in Jodhpur than in either Shekhawati or Bikaner. It also extended over a longer period of time. T h e objectives of the early kisan movements in R a j p u t a n a seem to have involved the emulation of " W e s t e r n " values much more than was true in like cases in the British provinces, particularly Madras. 34 T h i s is in large measure a function of two conditions. T h e first is the timing of inception. T h a t is to say, the Jat movements and formal associations in R a j p u t a n a commenced much later than Singh. T h e former was a judge in Bikaner State, joined the Congress after independence, and was twice a minister in the Rajasthan government for a short time. Hardutt Singh was deputy prime minister in the first popular ministry in Bikaner State. Both hold law degrees. 34. Rudolph and Rudolph, " T h e Political Role of India's Caste Associations," 5-22; and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "Varieties of Political Behavior Among Nadars of Tamilnad," Asian Survey, 6 (November ig66), 614-621.

ORIGINS, II: T H E PEASANT

93

MOVEMENTS

did those in the British provinces and thus responded to agents and an environment of change that were much more absorbed with the idea of progress. T h e second condition is social structure. 35 T h e relative absence of twice-born castes in the south, for example, and the dominant role of Brahmans in social affairs traditionally was conducive to attempts to achieve mobility by the ritual emulation of high castes. W h e r e the "intermediate" range of castes is more complex and their numbers greater, and where the relevant caste enjoys clean, but not necessarily high, ritual status, efforts to achieve mobility by the ritual emulation of high castes will tend to be low. T h e second phase of Jat mobilization in Rajasthan was marked by engagement with traditional authority. T h i s occurred much earlier in Shekhawati than in Jodhpur and Bikaner. T h e process of transformation from social movement to political action in Shekhawati and Bikaner was guided by the first generation of Jat reformers and at the time attracted the energies of young men in the caste; in Shekhawati it also attracted the participation of external political activists. T h e engagements with traditional authority induced breaches in the leadership ranks—important choice had to be made concerning strategy, the timing of demands and agitations, and the selection of leaders. In marked contrast to Shekhawati and Bikaner, a second generation of leaders assumed leadership of the movement in Jodhpur as it entered its second phase. Political leadership was assumed by those who represented the achievement and success of the social reform phase of the Jat movement. T h i s suggests the more general proposition that the cohesion of a mass social organization is facilitated by internal elite recruitment and strategy definition. It also suggests that the maintenance of cohesion in new arenas of social conflict is facilitated where succession occurs before the redefinition of strategic organizational goals. T h e development and absorption of educated men in the Shekhawati and Bikaner cases, however, was significantly different. In the former the politics of confrontation siphoned off a large number of would-be students; in the latter the more highly educated were 35. See Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph, The Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 77-79.

of

Tradition

94

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

absorbed into the state administrative apparatus and constituted a class of men distinct in origin, learning, and outlook from those who first rebelled against traditional authority. The third phase of mobilization was defined by the introduction of democratic political institutions and a competitive party system. This new political environment eventually witnessed the dissolution of autonomous kisan organizations when a large proportion of their clientele was absorbed into the Congress system. The new political format created competitive situations which aggravated old political tensions and divisions among Jat elites and induced new ones. This was most marked in Shekhawati, where an important segment of the Jat elite opted to contest against the Congress party. Elections have been conducive to increased participation among the Jats, and an expanded set of public positions has attracted and whetted the aspirations of new political claimants.36 It is important to note that the Kisan Sabhas, like the urban Praja Man dais, were organized autonomously in separate Rajputana states and were differentiated in the scope of their organizational structure and basis of public support from the time of founding. While caste movements and associations emphasized horizontal association, the effective scope of cooperative effort was bounded by traditional political authority. The authority structures among elites in each sovereignty, however, were further fragmented on the basis of region. In Shekhawati effective organization paralleled the old thikanas; in Jodhpur the movement was centered in Nagaur District, although it developed organizational appendages in other areas of the state. These divisions, latent during the initial phase of the kisan movements, became overt either during the period of direct conflict with landed interests or during initial competition for positions within the Congress party organization. The latter type of conflict situation was exacerbated by class and generational divisions within the caste. Since the first General Elections, cleavage among Jat elites 36. For an analysis of differential impacts of peasant movements on peasant participation in contemporary politics see Richard Sisson, "Peasant Movements and Political Mobilization: T h e Jats of Rajasthan," Asian Survey, 9 (December 1969), 946-963.

ORIGINS,

II:

THE

PEASANT

MOVEMENTS

95

has been further encouraged by the increasingly fragmentary opposition political environment created as a consequence of political fission within the Rajput caste.37 Unlike the Praja Mandals, however, the Kisan Sabhas were largely one-caste and one-issue organizations. Their leadership and support base was primarily Jat; their ultimate goal was land reform. As we have noted, the Praja Mandals were almost entirely urban and drew their leadership and support largely from Brahman, Mahajan, and Kayasth castes, although they did not command the support of any caste in its entirety in any of the states. While these organizations were also segmented on the basis of rural towns, their organization and experience in planning and formalized leadership selection was more extensive and complex than that of the Kisan Sabhas. T h e Kisan Sabhas, like the Praja Mandals, enjoyed support outside their immediate clientele. In Shekhawati these movements received the indirect support of the Indian National Congress and the direct support of the Arya Samaj and of Jat activists from the British provinces and the Jat-ruled state of Bharatpur. In Jodhpur, which was more politically distant from these sources of direct support, the movement received the assistance of the state darbar during its early phase. In both areas the Kisan Sabhas received the support of the Praja Mandals, although this source of support was less direct, sustained, and intense in Jodhpur. T h e creation of the Congress party, however, reduced the effectiveness of the Kisan Sabhas and the possibility of creating an effective Rajasthan-wide kisan political organization. Upon its assumption of power, the Congress gave the issue of jagirdari abolition and land reform legislation the highest priority, thus preempting the principal objective of the kisan movements. T h e possibility of an all-Rajasthan peasant party was further precluded by virtue of the access and organizational control which important leaders in Shekhawati and Bikaner assumed within the Congress party. Since the Congress became the only Rajasthan-wide political 37. Rajput mobilization and political participation is discussed in Chapter 6. For an insightful analysis of political cleavage in the Rajput community see Rudolph and Rudolph, " T h e Political Modernization of an Indian Feudal Order."

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T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

organization, access to positions of public power was to be found within rather than in opposition, where support would be regional. T h e Congress also immediately formed the government after independence. T h e demise of the Kisan Sab has became final with the entry of the Marwar Kisan Sabha into the Congress in late 1951. T h e sense of group identity, however, continued—it was merely transferred to the body of a new and different institution.

Chapter

5

P O L I T I C A L C O M M U N I T Y AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: T H E F O U N D I N G AND D E V E L O P M E N T OF T H E RAJASTHAN CONGRESS

of the Rajputana states and the creation of Rajas than as a state within the Indian Union entailed major changes in the nature of political conflict. Prior to independence the primary focus of protest and dissent was the organization of the traditional regimes in the princely states and the demand for a redefinition of political authority and legitimacy and the creation of new institutions which would provide for popular participation in the making of law. After independence principal objectives of the "peoples' movements" involved the integration of the Rajputana states and eventually the setting of political goals and the selection of governments. A second major change involved the creation of the Rajasthan Congress party and a changed configuration of power within this new amalgam of preindependence movements. Until the first General Elections, the Congress party was the political domain of those who had been active in the preindependence movements, and party leaders were those who had been the founders and dominant leaders of political movements in their respective states. THE

INTEGRATION

ORGANIZATION AND OBJECTIVES O F T H E R A J A S T H A N

CONGRESS

A year prior to independence, the Praja Mandais were merged into the Rajputana Prantiya Sabha which functioned as a provincial unit within the All-India States' Peoples' Congress. The Prantiya Sabha was the first common decision-making and organizational framework that connected the popular movements of

98

THE CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

the various Rajputana states. Until that time each protest organization had been directly connected with the nationalist movement through the AISPC, and planning and decisions concerning agitations and political activity in each of the princely states were made after consultation between leaders in these states and various leaders in the Indian National Congress. T h e desire of the populist elites in the princely states for inclusion of the Praja Mandal organizations in the Indian National Congress was finally realized in April 1948 at the Bombay Session of the All-India Congress Committee (AICC). At that session it was recommended that the territorial organization of the party be altered to provide for the formation of Congress organizations in the areas of the former princely states, and Rajputana was declared a separate provincial unit in the all-India Congress organization. 1 A t its Bharatpur Session on June 26, 1948, the Rajputana Prantiya Sabha voted to transform itself into the Rajputana Pradesh Congress Committee and established a committee to draft a constitution in consonance with the provisions laid down in the constitution of the parent association. 2 While the name and the formal relationship between the national party and the populist leaders of Rajputana were changed, the actors and the organizational format within the state party remained essentially the same. T h u s the Rajasthan Congress party was created by the merger of the Praja Mandal organizations into a common organizational format. Each of these movements brought to the new organization its own unique body of shared experiences as well as political leaders and activists, many of whom were jealous of the prerogatives and prestige which they had enjoyed as founders and planners of political protest in their respective states. T h e Rajasthan Congress since the time of its founding has reflected the segmentary character of this previous order. T h e origins of the Congress organization in Rajasthan differed significantly from those of its counterparts in the former British provinces. In the latter areas District Congress Committees had 1. M. V. Ramana Rao, Development of the Congress Constitution (New Delhi: All-India Congress Committee, 1958), p. 58. 2. Rajputana Prantiya Sabha, "Proceedings of the Bharatpur Session," June 26, 1948, Office of the Pradesh Congress Committee, Jaipur, Rajasthan.

POLITICAL C O M M U N I T Y AND INTEGRATION

99

become extremely important organizational units in the party long before independence, whereas in many parts of Rajasthan Praja Mandals had covered areas which were eventually divided into a number of separate districts. T h e creation of district-level organizational bodies in the Rajasthan Congress thus created new arenas of political conflict and placed together local groups that had been linked vertically with the political elite in the capital city prior to independence, rather than linked horizontally with other local groups in neighboring towns and rural areas. T h i s absence of a tradition of collective decision making at the local level was reflective of political organization in the Congress at the state level. T h e center of political activity between 1946 and the first General Elections was the state level Executive Committee of the Prantiya Sabha and its successor, the Pradesh Congress Committee Executive. This committee, which remained constant in form as well as membership through the change of organizational name, did not constitute a new order of political power but reflected the expansion of former parochial interests to a wider area of political conflict. T h e role of the P C C Executive during this period was equivalent to that of the Congress Working Committee at the national level. It included the major leaders from the dominant preindependence organizations, and decisions made by the committee were usually accepted as binding by its constituent political groups. 8 T h e Executive Committee formulated and publicized the policies, resolutions, and petitions for the body of protest movements. Its more prominent members served as mediators in disputes between particular local organizations and state authorities and in many cases were successful in resolving these conflicts. 4 3. Members of the Executive initially included the following: Gokul Bhai Bhatt and Pukhraj Singhi (Sirohi); Hiralal Shastri, B. S. Deshpande and Siddhraj Dhadda (Jaipur); Jai Narain Vyas and Mithalal Trivedi (Jodhpur); Manikyalal Varma and Mohanlal Sukhadia (Udaipur); Gokul Lai Asawa (Shahpura); Bhogilal Pandya (Dungarpur); Raghubhir Dayal Goyal (Bikaner); Abhinn Hari (Kotah); Bhola Nath (Alwar); and Jugal Kishore Chaturvedi (Bharatpur). Only three of these incumbencies changed in 1947-1948. T h e caste breakdown of the Executive reflects the concentrated pattern of social recruitment—eleven Brahmans, three Mahajans, and one Kayasth. 4. T h e mediators in all cases were Praja Mandal leaders from outside the state in question and most often were those who had national standing in

ÎOO

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y

IN

RAJASTHAN

T h e committee established subcommittees to study problems related to states integration, parliamentary affairs, as well as questions concerning socioeconomic development, and it assigned functional areas of public policy to a n u m b e r of its members.® T h e debates and procedures followed in the Prantiya Sabha and its successor, the P C C , served an educative function, both in terms of substantive issues and democratic political procedure, w h i c h was especially important for an area where communications media and popular political participation were minimal. T h e atmosphere was permissive, and decisions were taken in committee only after considerable deliberation and vote. 9 T h e primary objectives of this new organization were in large part a function of its raison d ' ê t r e — t h e integration of the R a j p u tana states and their inclusion as a single unit in the Indian U n i o n . T h e Executive Committee of the Prantiya Sabha at the outset summarized its claims in the following resolution: T h e resources of each Princely State are insufficient to provide adequately for the material prosperity and pleasure of the people in the modern age. None of the Princely States is competent to join the future independent federation of India as a separate unit. T h e Executive, therefore, is of the firm opinion that after the necessary delimitation of boundaries on the basis of language, culture, historical and political relations, the entirety of Rajputana should join the future Indian Federation as one unit, including Ajmer-Merwara. T h o u g h the control of governmental powers must exclusively be in the hands of the A I S P C — J a i Narain Vyas, Hiralal Shastri, Manikyalal Varma, and Gokul Bhai Bhatt. In 1946 these leaders were instrumental in bringing about settlements between Praja Mandals and state governments in Dungarpur, Kotah, Bikaner, Alwar, and Jaisalmcr. Rajputana Prantiya Sabha, "Bulletin No. 3," May 11, 1946. 5. Membership on these committees was limited primarily to the major leaders of the various Praja Mandals although "second level" leaders were sometimes included. W i t h the exception of the Provincial Election T r i b u n a l , however, all chairmen were members of the Executive Committee thus insuring centralized control. O f the thirty-six incumbencies on major functional committees from 1946-1949, twenty-two were filled by members of the P C C Executive Committee. 6. Interviews with Jugal Kishore Chaturvedi, T i k a r a m Paliwal, and Kumbharam Arya.

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the people, necessary care should also be taken to maintain the status and prestige of the rulers.7 T h e discussions of the Executive as well as the debates at sessions of the larger state committee centered upon this goal. Leaders of the Prantiya Sabha consistently asserted that the princes were opposed to states integration and that only "popular" representatives nominated by the Prantiya Sabha could be the legitimate participants from the princely states in the negotiations concerning states integration. 8 Pressure was directed, if not effectively brought to bear, not only on officials of the British R a j but also on the Congress high command which, it was felt in some quarters, might not give the Rajputana states proper priority and attention in the face of the multitude of problems surrounding the transfer of power and partition. In an effort to encourage the support of traditional elites for an integrated Rajasthan, the Prantiya Sabha deputized its dominant leaders to meet with several princes to discuss the future of the states and to offer assurances that royal status and prestige would be maintained in a united state of Rajasthan and under the rules of a new representative political order. A second dominant objective was a continuation of the common goal of the various Praja Mandal movements—the realization of responsible government in the various states, even d u r i n g the 7. R a j p u t a n a Prantiya Sabha Executive Committee, "Minutes," September 8-9, 1946. T h e conception of R a j p u t a n a held by members of the Prantiya Sabha was confined to the traditional g r o u p i n g of R a j p u t States. In 1947, for example, it vociferously rejected a plan that would have included some princely states of Gujarat, Kathiawar, and M a l w a as part of R a j p u t a n a since such a u n i o n would have been an " u n n a t u r a l " one. Prantiya Sabha, "Bulletin N o . 3," J u n e 1947 (exact date not recorded). T h e Sabha did react positively, however, w h e n informed that certain interested parties in the Jat-ruled states of B h a r a t p u r and D h o l p u r wished to merge with the United Provinces. 8. T h e Prantiya Sabha was not heard by the Cabinet Mission in 1946 and did not have representation on the Negotiating Committee of the C h a m b e r of Princes or that of the Constituent Assembly, which handled the preliminaries of states integration. Furthermore, the fear that some states might not o p t for the Indian U n i o n and an integrated R a j p u t a n a was not without foundation. D u r i n g the summer of 1947, J o d h p u r and Jaisalmer had meetings with M o h a m m e d A l i Jinnah to discuss the possibility and terms of accession to Pakistan. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, p. ii2.

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T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

period of negotiation and integration, and the acceptance of the Prantiya Sabha and its constituent units as the legitimate fount of popular political aspiration. Prior to 1947 and the introduction of representative government in the small state of Shahpura, no Rajputana state had introduced other than minimal reforms in the constitutional order. In a number of cases "popular representatives" had been co-opted into ministries but they were limited in the scope of their activity and influence. In several states limited popular representation had been granted by 1947, and in most of the others commissions had been established to draw up constitutions that would allow for more popular participation in the affairs of state.9 Popular ministries did not become "universal," however, until the integration of the states. Perhaps the most important and pervasive concern of the statelevel leadership prior to the formation of the first ministry in Rajasthan was the creation of cohesion in the new party through the maintenance of organizational discipline and political control. T h i s urge for cohesion was largely the result of an intense and common commitment to the twin objectives of integration and democratization and of a shared perception of a common antagonist in the traditional elites. On the one hand leaders felt that public dissension and conflict within the ranks of the popular movements would enable the princes and jagirdars to stall political reforms and perhaps prevent the creation of an integrated Rajputana. O n the other hand, the existence of a united Rajputana-wide popular movement would be a prerequisite to effectively pressuring Delhi for a united Rajasthan. It was the intensity with which these two objectives were shared by the dominant leaders of the Prantiya Sabha that gave the organization the cohesion it was able to achieve during those critical first few years. Efforts to forge cohesion first of all were directed at cleansing 9. By November 1946, constitutional commissions had been established in the more important Rajputana States, and Praja Mandals enjoyed representation on most (Rajputana Prantiya Sabha, "Bulletin No. 5," November 29, 1946). By the fall of 1947, however, only seven states had cabinets with Praja Mandal representatives. These were Jaipur, Udaipur, Dungarpur, who each had two representatives, and Shahpura, Jhalawar, Kishengarh, and Sirohi, who had only one apiece (Rajputana Prantiya Sabha, "Bulletin No. 5," December 1947 [exact date not recorded]).

POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND INTEGRATION

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the ranks of "ideologically oriented" elements. The Executive Committee of the Prantiya Sabha at one of its first meetings warned its members to be careful of the disruptive activities of "Communists and Royists" who, it was alleged, were bent upon dividing and weakening the movement for less than nationalist aims. 10 It later urged that neither the Socialist party nor any other "separatist" political group would be allowed to function under the banner of the Prantiya Sabha and its subordinate organizations. 11 Public conflict between members was not to be tolerated, and those who precipitated divisive activity would be expelled from the organization. Furthermore, in an effort to avoid the diffusion of energies in the popular movement, it was urged that Kisan Sabhas be discouraged because a multiplicity of parties and institutions would create confusion among the masses and would thus tend to weaken the power of the popular movements as a whole. 12 T o accomplish these objectives the Executive directed that it alone would exercise control over the planning and timing of agitations and the formulation of public positions for the party. A directive was issued to all "Praja Mandals and such other related bodies and organizations to take the formal sanction of the Provincial Executive before launching any kind of direct action whatsoever in order to get proper guidance as well as the full support of the entire province for such a serious step." 1 3 The 10. Prantiya Sabha Executive Committee, "Minutes," May n , 1946. "Royists" refer to the followers of M. N. Roy. 11. Prantiya Sabha Executive Committee, "Minutes," September 8-9, 1946. Eventually a number of Pradesh Congress Committee members resigned their positions to join the Socialist party, and a few joined the Communist party. T h e Socialist parties in Udaipur Division and Bharatpur District date from the time of these resignations. Those from Kotah who resigned eventually rejoined the Congress after the ousting of Abhinn Hari. T h e Communist party in Rajasthan, with a few interesting and notable exceptions, however, had autonomous political roots. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. This was defined further in the early part of 1947. The formal resolution stated: "The Prantiya Sabha hereby warns the rulers of the Princely States that the present state of affairs shall not continue any further. In order to counter the contemporary intolerable situation it is necessary for us to establish wider public relations on a revolutionary base, i.e., to educate, inspire and organize the mass which could take us to our cherished goal and

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THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

overall policy of the Prantiya

Sabha was set f o r t h in the f o l l o w i n g

resolution: T h i s Standing Committee must meet the situation by developing the organized strength of the people of the States and by emphasizing the need for discipline. It will continue, as before, to make a friendly approach to the government of the States, because it desires a peaceful solution of the problems facing the States. But at the same time, it cannot remain a passive spectator of inaction and reaction in the States when India is on the move. Where the peoples' movement is sought and crushed, the challenge will have to be accepted. A n y action, however, must be disciplined and authorized, and sporadic and unauthorized action must not take place, as this leads to indiscipline and weakness and injury to the peoples' cause. It has come to the notice of the Standing Committee that occasionally certain irresponsible elements in the States precipitate action and clashes between the Praja Mandals and the State Government, often in order to discredit the States Peoples' organization. Any such unauthorized action must be prohibited. Where necessity for any direct action arises, reference must be made to the Regional Council and to the General Secretary of A I S P C . " T h e p r o b l e m of organizational cohesion has b e e n a c o n t i n u i n g o n e in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the R a j a s t h a n Congress. D u r i n g this period, conflict and organizational stress was m i n i m i z e d b y the shared c o m m i t m e n t of d o m i n a n t regional leaders to a c o m m o n set of goals and their c o m m o n perception of a hostile environm e n t . W i t h the achievement of those goals and the t a m i n g of that e n v i r o n m e n t , conflict w i t h i n the party tended to b e c o m e e n d e m i c . THE INTEGRATION OF THE RAJPUTANA STATES

T h e integration of the R a j p u t a n a states was c o m p l e t e d o n May 15, 1949, nearly t w o years after independence. A l t h o u g h the Rajp u t a n a Prantiya Sabha was active in d e m a n d i n g the creation of an integrated

R a j p u t a n a and the institution of political

reforms

which will make us come out as victors in this our final struggle for independence. T h e Prantiya Sabha, therefore, directs the executive to chalk out a program on a provincial basis and should immediately translate it into action." Prantiya Sabha, "Bulletin No. 7," February 16, 1947. 14. Prantiya Sabha, "Bulletin No. 4," November 3, 1946.

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within the states, the integration of the states was negotiated exclusively by the national government and the states. Leaders of the Prantiya Sabha were consulted and they were advised, but the final decisions were made in Delhi largely by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel with the consent of the ruling princes. T h e transfer of power and the withdrawal of British protection was not sprung full blown upon the Indian princes. Neither was the relationship between the Congress and the princes an intractable conflict. In fact prince and nationalist shared a certain sentiment of anti-imperialism. 1 5 T h e rulers, for example, had resented outside interference in the administration of their states, and after W o r l d W a r I several of the major rulers made a concerted effort to exact from the British an institutional arrangement whereby the princes might air their grievances and hopefully act collectively to restrain overt British involvement in the internal administration of their domains.1® T h i s view was forcefully presented by certain princes, including the eminent prince of Bikaner, Maharaja G a n g a Singh, to the M o n t a g u - C h e l m s f o r d Commission w h i c h was established shortly after W o r l d W a r I to recommend constitutional reforms for India. W i t h the creation of the C h a m b e r of Princes by royal proclamation in 1921, the princes were institutionally associated with the administration in the British provinces. T h e i r opinions were sought by the Butler Commission and the Simon Commission, which proposed that the native states b e formally associated with the British provinces through a federal constitution. Such an arrangement became law in the Government 15. Among the more outspoken advocates of Indian nationalism among the princes were the maharajas of Bikaner and Alwar, both from Rajputana. In a major address in 1929, for example, Maharaja Ganga Singh of Bikaner stated: "We, the Princes and the people of the Indian States, are ourselves Indian, and we do most sincerely wish our motherland and fellow countrymen well; and we do equally sincerely look forward, as proudly as any British Indian, to the day when our united country would attain to the full height of its political stature as in every way an equal and fully trusted member of the comity of nations within the British Empire and as much respected as any other self-governing British Dominion." Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, I (1929), 478. 16. Ibid.., 2 (July-December, 1929), 502. For a description of this continuing concern, see D. Madhava Rao, The India Round Table Conference and After (London: Heath Cranton, 1932), pp. 53-66.

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T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

of India Act, 1935, although this portion of the act was never implemented. 1 7 T h e rulers of the princely states were also consulted in preparatory negotiations on independence. Attitudes of the ruling houses were tapped by the Cabinet Mission in 1946, and informal consultations between the princes, the Congress leaders, and the viceroy were frequent. 1 8 A formal negotiating committee was created by the C h a m b e r of Princes to meet with a counterpart from the Constituent Assembly to seek a settlement of fundamental constitutional issues and questions of royal privilege that attended the coming of puma swaraj. Representatives of the princes eventually assumed their assigned seats in the Constituent Assembly, and for the first time those representing traditional and those representing democratic authority sat in a common public assembly. Congress leaders made special efforts to urge cooperation and to establish a feeling of trust among the princes. In a public statement during the summer of 1947, Sardar Patel, the very able minister of states in the Interim Government, said: I should like to make it clear that it is not the desire of the Congress to interfere in any manner whatever with the domestic affairs of the States. They are no enemies of the Princely Order, but, on the other hand, we wish them and their people under their aegis all prosperity, contentment and happiness. Nor would it be my policy to conduct the relations of the new Department with the States in any manner which savours of the domination of one over the other; if there would be any domination, it would be that of our mutual interests and welfare. 1 9 T h i s pronouncement was within the spirit of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which asserted that neither the constitution nor lines of succession nor existing boundaries of a state would be changed without the consent of the ruling prince. 20 T h u s , although the princes did not have a deciding voice in the formulation of the final arrangements for independence, they 17. Menon, Story of the Integration, pp. 20-24. 18. Ibid., pp. 59-64. 19. Government of India, Ministry of States, White Paper on Indian States (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1950), Appendix V, p. 158. (Hereafter referred to as the White Paper.) 20. Menon, p. 69.

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were consulted and their minimal interests safeguarded in that the doctrine of paramountcy was to lapse with the granting of independence. T h e successor governments—India and Pakistan—were not to assume the role of the British toward the states after independence; new constitutional arrangements were to be negotiated. T o pave the way for normal relations between the two successor governments, the princely states were encouraged to sign Standstill Agreements and Instruments of Accession with one of the two governments. T h e former provided that "until new agreements in this behalf are made, all agreements as to matters of common concern now existing between the Crown and any Indian State shall, in so far as may be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of India or, as the case may be, the part thereof, and the State." 21 T h e latter provided for the handling of such subjects as defense, foreign affairs, and communications by the Dominion Legislature. 22 It was also stipulated, however, that the Instruments could not be changed except by subsequent mutual agreement and did not commit the princely states to accepting a future constitution. By the midnight hour of August 14, 1947, all the Raj putana states had signed both of these agreements with the new Indian government. T h e Rajputana states were integrated in five stages. T h e first step was the creation of the Matsya Union, which was formed by the merger of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur, and Karauli. 23 There were several reasons why these states commenced the process. Both Alwar and Bharatpur had experienced considerable communal unrest during the transfer of power and shortly thereafter, and both its maharajas, together with the Alwar Prime Minister Dr. N. B. Khare, had been accused from several quarters of being involved in the assassination of Gandhi. All three were held in Delhi, and the administration of these two states was assumed by the Government of India, although charges were eventually dropped. Talks among the four princes and representatives of the ministry of states began on February 27, 1948. T h e problem of 21. 22. 23. White

White Paper, Appendix IX, p. 173. Ibid.., Appendix VII, p. 165. T h e following is based largely upon Menon, pp. 238-260, and the Paper, pp. 53-55.

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deference was worked out with the Maharaja of Dholpur becoming the Rajpramukh (president) while the maharajas of Alwar and Bharatpur assumed the title of Up-Rajpramukh (vice-president). T h e agreement was signed on the day after negotiations had begun and the new union was inaugurated on March 28, 1948. T h e creation of the Matsya Union legitimized control over the area by the national government, which in fact had been governing most of it since independence. T h e second step in the integration of the Rajputana states was the formation of the United States of Rajasthan. T h e initiative for this new state came from the maharajas of Kotah, Dungarpur, and Jhalawar, all of whom had taken an active part in the preliminaries to the transfer of power. Kotah and Dungarpur, as early as 1946, had suggested the idea of a union of states from this area of Rajputana and had conferred with several princes. The proposed union included the states in the south and southeast of Rajputana, namely Banswara (including Kushalgarh), Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura, and Tonk. These states had more in common than geographical contiguity. The states of Bundi and Kotah were ruled by the same clan of Rajputs, and Jhalawar had been created from a part of Kotah State by the descendants of Zalim Singh, the able prime minister of Kotah during the early part of the nineteenth century. This area also constituted a common cultural area with respect to language and art. Dungarpur, Banswara, Pratapgarh, and Shahpura were all ruled by members of the Sisodia clan of Rajputs and the language spoken by caste Hindus in these states was Mewari. T h e decision to form a separate state of Rajasthan was the choice of the princes, who felt a greater affinity for the other Rajput states to the north than they did for the Mahratta states to the south, and representatives of the Praja Mandals in all of the states concerned.24 T h e new state was inaugurated on March 25, 1948. It was also felt that eventually Udaipur would join the new union, since considerable pressure was already being applied to the maharana, and that this would eventually result in the formation of a larger political unit which would include the rest of the 24. Interviews with the maharajas of Kotah and Jhalawar.

POLITICAL COMMUNITY

AND INTEGRATION

tog

R a j p u t a n a states. T h e movement of Udaipur into the Rajasthan U n i o n would sound the knell to a possible coalition of the larger R a j p u t a n a states. T h e princes had felt that the possibility of maintaining the territorial integrity of their states was problematic once the process of consolidation and states integration had begun. A hope was harbored by some, however, that if the integrity of the larger states could not be maintained, they would be able to b a n d together for purposes of driving a favorable bargain with the new central government. In an attempt to convince the Maharana of U d a i p u r not to merge with the Rajasthan U n i o n and to j o i n the other large Rajputana states in a united front for purposes of bargaining, Kanwar Jaswant Singh, the prime minister of Bikaner, was deputed to Udaipur to protest against this "unilateral" action contemplated by the U d a i p u r prince. 28 Jaswant Singh reminded His Highness that his forefathers had been the last of the R a j p u t princes to bow before the Moghuls, yet he was the first to bow before the Congress. T h e maharana reportedly replied that he was getting old and that his capitulation was inevitable, as was the capitulation of all his princely peers. Postponement, he felt, promised neither better conditions nor better rewards. Less than one month later, in A p r i l 1948, the third step in the process of states integration was achieved with the inclusion of U d a i p u r in the state. T h e creation of the new United States of Rajasthan left Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur as the only states that had not merged into a larger political unit. T h e merger of U d a i p u r prompted renewed action and concern on the part of these states. W i t h the approval of their respective royal houses, several m a j o r jagirdars from all states except Jaisalmer went to see Sardar Patel about the future of their interests in independent India and to talk over the conditions concerning the integration of the states which they represented. 26 Patel urged the deputation to work for 25. Interview with Kanwar Jaswant Singh. 26. Based on interviews with T h . Bhim Singh of Mandawa and T h . Bhairon Singh of Khejerla. Both of these gentlemen were from families which held very large jagirs, were in the deputation to Patel, and have played extremely important roles in Rajasthan politics since independence. Each entered the Congress party in 1954, and T h . Bhim Singh has served as a deputy minister.

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T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

an integrated Rajasthan and assured them that landed interests would be permitted representation in the decisions on jagirdari abolition and land reform. He further assured them that they would play an important role in politics under the new political order and pointed out that the new government needed those proficient in the art of administration as well as those schooled in political protest. The deputation posed a central question—in the Instrument of Accession it was agreed that there could be no change in the territorial integrity or constitutional order of acceding states without the consent of the rulers and the people. Patel reportedly replied that he was the "people" and that the people had decided. The decision now rested with the rulers and their sardars. The members of the delegation were impressed with the forthright but accommodating manner of Patel, whose facility for decision making and administration was congruent with the jagirdars' conception of the qualities that a political leader should possess. The jagirdari representatives, content that the interests of their class would not be ignored and that the terms of integration would not be unfavorable, returned to their respective states and advised their princes of the talks. The rulers subsequently held a meeting in Bikaner together with their most important chiefs and decided upon the necessity of coming to terms with the Congress government and agreed on the advisability of forming a larger state by merging with the United States of Rajasthan. This meeting was indeed an historic one. It marked the last time that the princes of the historic Rajputana states sat in common council. The Greater Rajasthan Union was eventually formed by merging the kingdoms of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner, and Jaisalmer with the United States of Rajasthan on March 30, 1949. The fifth step in the process of integration was taken on May 15, 1949, when the Matsya Union was merged with the Greater Rajasthan Union to form the state of Rajasthan. In 1956, in congruence with recommendations made by the States Reorganization Commission, Ajmer-Merwara was merged with Rajasthan.27 27. Government of India, Report of the States Reorganization Committee (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1956), pp. 135-193. Besides recommending die inclusion of Ajmer in Rajasthan, the Commission also suggested

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T h e integration of the Rajputana states was not forcefully imposed by the Indian government but rested in large measure upon the consent of the princes and the will of the popular movements in the respective states. T h e Congress government, with Sardar Patel as minister of states, however, was firm in its resolve to create from the states viable administrative and political units, and the possibility of success in forcefully opposing the central government in this resolve was not great. Furthermore, there was no great opposition to the provisions in the Covenant of the Greater Rajasthan Union and of the State of Rajasthan, which enabled the central government to legislate over a wide range of public questions. T h e major problems concerned the assignment of positions of status among the princes, agreement on the size and conditions of privy purses, expense accounts for those princes with official responsibilities in the new state, and the selection of a state capital. Each was either a personal question or a question concerning the protection of traditional prestige. What is important, however, is the attention and respect which the Congress paid to the interests of the princes. FROM POLITICAL MOVEMENT TO GOVERNING PARTY: POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF POWER

T h e creation of Rajasthan ushered in a new phase in the development of the Rajasthan Congress. T h e political community was ordered in the way advocated by the state Congress, and the introduction of representative government was assured. T h e primary concerns of the state party now became organizational develop that the A b u Road Taluk of former Sirohi State, which had been transferred to Bombay State at the time of the integration of the state, be merged with Rajasthan, and that the subtehsil of Loharu be transferred to Rajasthan. Rapasthan ceded the tehsil of Sironj to Madhya Pradesh. It should also be noted that at this time it was suggested to the Commission that Rajasthan be split up to form three states. T h e first would have been called Maru Pradesh and would have included the areas of Jodhpur and Bikaner Divisions, which constitute the dry region west of the Aravalli hills. T h e second would have included the areas of the old Matsya Union, which border on Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. T h e third would have included the southern part of Jaipur Division, Udaipur Division, and most of Kotah Division. This suggestion was not given as much attention by the members of the Commission as it was by an articulate segment of political opinion in Rajasthan.

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ment and public governance. Whereas the quest for states integration and political reform induced organizational coherence, the selection of leaders and the expansion of organizational membership provided new situations of conflict, and this further induced segmentation in the bases of political support within the party organization. Unlike many states which had formerly constituted British India, no leader enjoyed a statewide constituency in Rajasthan, largely because of the parochial character of the preindependence movements. None developed during the critical years surrounding independence. Leadership during this period was collegial and resided with those who had emerged as dominant leaders in their respective areas. T h e introduction of popular government and eventually the elective principle dramatized the segmentary character of the Congress party. Political groups were organized on the basis of region, and their recruitment and the focus of their most intense political commitment was limited to the areas of the former princely states. After the integration of the states, however, the political groups from smaller states tended to work rather closely with the elites from a larger state in its immediate area, and in some cases they eventually constituted a factional coalition within the party at the state level. This tendency toward intraregional coalition was particularly important in the case of the Udaipur group, which was linked with those of Dungarpur, Banswara, Pratapgarh, and Kushalgarh with respect to politics at the state level. Eventually Bharatpur leaders became the regional nexus which included the neighboring state of Dholpur. Congress leaders in the smaller states, however, were sensitive about their prerogatives as founders of distinct preindependence movements. In the case of Dungarpur, the founder and principal leader of the Praja Mandal, Bhogilal Pandya, was associated with the Udaipur group but maintained considerable autonomy in political bargaining. This was also true of Gokul Lai Asawa, the widely respected leader from the tiny state of Shahpura. In Banswara and Kushalgarh, where preindependence political activity was extremely limited and where no leader of stature arose, the Udaipur leaders were able to extend their political base by virtue

POLITICAL

COMMUNITY

AND

INTEGRATION

of the political access which they could provide. T h e " Y o u n g T u r k " group in the Kotah Praja Mandal developed support in Jhalawar State, where political activity prior to 1948 was minimal, through ties of kinship and caste. T h e Jaipur group developed a base of support in the area of Karauli State through several preindependence activists, particularly Chiranjilal Sharma, who were active in the Jaipur Praja Mandal. Support in T o n k was mobilized primarily through the political skills of Damodarlal Vyas, himself a "subregional" leader in Jaipur State from Malpura, a part of Jaipur which was eventually made a part of T o n k District after the integration of the states. In Bharatpur, R a j Bahadur, a young advocate who became a minister of state in the central cabinet after independence, created a Congress group in Dholpur State, which was subsequently made a part of Bharatpur District. T h u s the major groups in the Rajasthan Congress assumed regional names and were restricted to their particular areas in the base of their recruitment. Even in those cases where severe schisms developed, the parties to the split were known collectively by the name of the region and each faction negotiated as a regional unit with outside groups for political suport. T h i s regional bias in the structure of political support has continued to be a major element in the structure of Rajasthani politics and characterizes not only the Congress but all other parties as well. Besides this regional basis of political segmentation, cleavages existed within many local Congress groups. These schisms were the result of many factors and in no case was any single condition determinant. T h e intensity of conflict between factions varied as well. In Bikaner, Jaipur, and Bharatpur, cleavage existed on a rural-urban basis, and this was also coincident with caste, the Jats in each case constituting the rural faction along with some activists from rural towns.28 In Jodhpur a small minority faction was re28. T h e leader of the Jat group in Bikaner was Choudhry Kumbharam Arya, who was to bccome one of the most skillful politicians in Rajasthan. T h e Jat group formed the bulk of a coalition which also included Brahman and Mahajan activists from several rural towns. T h e leader of the urban (Bikaner City) faction was Raghubhir Dayal Goyal, an advocate and founder of the Bikaner Praja Parishad. In Jaipur the leader of the Jat faction in the Congress was Sardar Harlal Singh, while the leader of the urban faction, almost entirely recruited from Jaipur City, was Hiralal Shastri. Several

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THE CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

cruited from a single merchant (Oswal) caste, but conflict was also coincident with differences over political strategy—the caste-based faction urged a more cooperative posture towards the state darbar while the majority faction under Vyas was insistent on opposition for the realization of responsible government. 29 In J a i p u r the Azad Morcha

was formed by younger dissidents in the Praja

Man-

dal when its leaders decided against participation in the " Q u i t India Movement" of 1942. 3 0 In Kotah the Sri Praja Mandal formed by a young, highly educated group of Praja Mandal

was mem-

bers who did not share in positions of power within the parent body. 3 1 In most of these cases existing differences were augmented and new ones arose with the introduction of elective politics prior to independence even when in elementary form. Elections to municileaders such as Tikaram Paliwal, Ram Karan Joshi, and Bansilal Luhadia, most of whom were advocates, opposed Shastri and eventually joined the Sardar in successfully exorcising Shastri's power (see Chapter 8). 29. The group that was in opposition to Vyas reportedly had fairly close economic ties with the royal family although it became associated with the nationalist movement in Delhi where a major family of the group owned and managed the Indo-Europa Company. Members of this opposition faction, however, were instrumental in assisting Vyas in the Jodhpur Conspiracy Case of 1929, but formed a group opposing Vyas after the founding of the Lok Parishad in the late 1930s. The division became solidified in the activities of the Jodhpur Municipal Council in 1942. Upon Vyas' ascendance to power after independence, this group ceased to play an important role in state and district politics. 30. The Azad Morcha was dissolved in 1945 after Nehru's warning against the evils of factionalism and bickering. Its members subsequently reentered the Praja Mandal. Interview. Also reported in Mitra, India Annual Register I (1946), 187. The hostility which developed during that important period, however, was again released after Shastri became the first chief minister of Rajasthan. 31. The Sri Praja Mandal was led by Rikhab Chand Dhariwal and Rameshwar Dayal, both able young advocates. The protest against the Praja Mandal regulars began as early as 1943 but reached its apogee in 1947. Before that time the young activists had held positions of power in the regular organization. In 1947, however, Abhinn Hari, who had been ousted from power, was again reinstated as president and dislodged the younger group, reportedly with the help of Gokul Bhai Bhatt and Hiralal Shastri. After the fall of the Shastri ministry, of which Abhinn Hari was a member, his group was removed from power and was not influential after that. Subsequently a split developed between Dayal and Dhariwal, the nexus of Dayal's faction being Kayasth while Dhariwal's is Oswal.

POLITICAL C O M M U N I T Y AND INTEGRATION

" 5

palities, elections of chairmen, and selection of the first popular ministries all involved bestowal of scarce positions of public authority for which there was large demand. Before 1949 most of these conflicts were ameliorated and contained as a result of the conditions surrounding independence and states integration and by the intervention of respected "outside" mediators from both Rajputana and the Congress high command. T h e organization of power and the factional system in the Congress over the last two decades, however, reflects these cleavages that developed prior to independence. Factional conflict became acute in the state Congress upon the final integration of the Rajputana states in 1949 and the decision of the Congress high command to create a "popular" ministry in the state. A major problem was what or, as it turned out, who was to be the fount of ultimate political responsibility during the interim before the General Elections. Although there was no leader in the Rajputana states who towered above the rest either in political experience or as an ultimate adjudicator of political conflict, Jai Narain Vyas was the most widely respected leader in the Rajasthan Congress and held the confidence of the leaders of dominant factions from most areas. Vyas, it will be recalled, was the venerable leader of the Marwar Lok Parishad, had been one of its founders, and had been active in political protest movements in his state from the early 1920s. He had become attracted to the independence movement at the time of the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre when he was in Delhi to take his matriculation examinations. He had fought bravely against the traditional order, had been arrested and jailed several times, and had been one of the first to publicize the problems and protest activity in Rajputana through his newspaper, Tarun Rajasthan, which he founded and published while in political exile in Ajmer. He was held in high regard not only by his comrades but also by a number of princes, some of whom felt him to be one of the most responsible of the "young political hotheads." Vyas had a reputation for the highest degree of personal integrity and had gained wide respect with the high command, particularly with Jawaharlal Nehru, through his long service as a general secretary of the All-India States' Peoples' Congress. T h e other aspirant for the position of chief minister was Pandit

116

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

Hiralal Shastri, a founder of the Praja Mandal in Jaipur State and the first popular chief minister of that state prior to the creation of Rajasthan. Shastri, however, did not have widespread support in the state Congress for a number of reasons. First, he did not possess the charismatic appeal of Jai Narain Vyas, and his reputation had been sullied by accusations of questionable association with the Jaipur darbar during the preindependence movement. Particularly important was his stand for cooperation with state authorities during the "Quit India" Movement, a position which resulted, as we have noted, in a split within the Jaipur Praja Mandal. Shastri enjoyed a crucial source of support, however, and that was the confidence of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel who insisted that he, as minister of states in the central cabinet, would appoint the chief minister and that the chief minister would be responsible to him. It was also reported that Patel had assured the Maharaja of Jaipur, during the assignment of status among the dominant princes, that the first chief minister of Rajasthan would be a Jaipuri. At the Kishengarh session of the Pradesh Congress Committee in 1949, just prior to the final integration of the Rajputana states, Shastri was defeated by eight votes in his effort to win the confidence of the party to form the first ministry. The conflict in the PCC was resolved, although with serious misgivings, among the majority of the regional leaders when Shastri assured them that they would be consulted and would have an informal veto in the formation of his ministry.82 In February 1949, at the fourth meeting of the Pradesh Congress Committee, Manikyalal Varma moved and Jai Narain Vyas seconded a motion that Shastri be the first prime minister of the new state. The motion was passed unopposed, although not unanimously.83 Shastri's backing from Patel and the deference of the PCC to his choice were the decisive factors. In an effort to bolster his own political support, however, Shastri neglected to keep his promise to consult with the political curia in the selection of his ministers but instead chose men who, with one exception, had limited sup32. Interviews with the major politicians active at that time and from both factional coalitions. 33. Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC), "Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting," February 1949 (exact date not recorded).

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117

port within their own areas. Several had not been active members of the "freedom struggle," the ultimate affront to those who had courted arrest and gone to jail. It was reportedly Shastri's hope that by granting positions of prestige and political access to leaders of minority factions in the old state areas they might be able to expand their base of political support at the expense of their major opponents. 84 Opposition to the new ministry and the president of the P C C , G o k u l Bhai Bhatt, also a close associate of Patel, was not long in coming. O n April 30, 1949, Ram Karan Joshi, an opponent of Shastri in Jaipur State and a leader of the former Azad

Morcha,

submitted a letter to the P C C president with the signatures of oneeighth of the membership demanding an emergency meeting to discuss two resolutions—a no-confidence motion against the P C C president and a no-confidence motion against the Shastri ministry. W h e n a meeting had not been called within the stipulated twentyone day period, those who signed the letter authorized Joshi to call a meeting of the P C C which was held on June 9, 1949, with eighty members attending. A t the meeting the no-confidence motions were passed against the Shastri ministry and the P C C president with no dissenting votes.85 A t a meeting three days later Bhatt submitted his resignation as president of the P C C . Jai Narain 34. From Jaipur, Shastri chose Siddhraj Dhadda, one of his close associates, who was given two of the most important portfolios in the cabinet. From Jodhpur he chose two men: one had not been intimately associated with the preindependence movement; and the other was a member of a small faction which opposed Vyas. From Bikaner the representative was an urbanite who had little support in the Praja Parish ad and who was an opponent of the dominant leader of the area, Choudhry Kumbharam Arya. None of the dominant popular leaders was included in the cabinet, and only one was on the Pradesh Congress Committee. Furthermore, only one of the members of the Shastri ministry has continued to be an important force in Rajasthan politics—Shobha Ram, a major leader from Alwar who was elected to the Lok Sabha in the first two general elections. T h e others have either retired from politics by choice or have been retired by their failure to be awarded the Congress party ticket for the general elections. 35. PCC, "Proceedings of the Sixth Meeting," June 9, 1949. T h e motion against the Shastri ministry was moved by Sardar Harlal Singh and was seconded by one of Manikyalal Varma's political lieutenants, Kishanlal Sharma. T h e motion against Bhatt was moved by one of Shastri's vocal opponents from Jaipur, Bansilal Luhadia, and was seconded by another of Varma's followers, Harideo Joshi.

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T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y

IN

RAJASTHAN

Vyas was unanimously elected the new chief of the P C C , and a new resolution demanding the immediate resignation of the Shastri ministry was passed.86 T h e conflict in the Rajasthan P C C raised important questions as to the role of the party in the governance of the state. T h e majority opinion in the Pradesh Congress Committee maintained that the state Congress alone could serve as the embodiment of the "popular will" and claimed this authority by virtue of its having been the vanguard in the creation of the new political order. O n the other hand, Sardar Patel maintained that by virtue of his role in the creation of Rajasthan and the major role that the central government would have to play in its administration during this formative period, the chief minister would be his appointee and ultimately would be directly responsible to him. In a telegram to the P C C Executive shortly after the no-confidence motions had been passed Patel claimed: T h e Prime Minister, Pandit Hiralal Shastri, is not responsible to the Prantiya Congress Committee . . . he became Prime Minister not simply because he was elected by the PCC, and not because of the instructions of the PCC, but he was selected on my own choice. Therefore, he will continue to be Prime Minister until he loses my confidence.37 T h e Executive Committee, on the other hand, argued that such a position was not only contrary to the "principles, customs and traditions of democratic administration, but is against the declared policy of the Government of India in regard to the democratization and integration of the states." 38 It was further held that 36. P C C , "Proceedings of the Special Meeting," June 11, 1949. It was the consensus among the major leaders at the time of the formation of the Shastri ministry that it would function only through the interim until popular elections. 37. P C C , "Minutes," June 23, 1949. 38. Ibid. T h e action of the Rajasthan P C C was debated at the meeting of the A I C C on July 18, 1949, where a resolution of reprimand was passed. T h e P C C Executive by way of an extensive resolution in reply attempted to justify its position both in terms of democratic theory and in terms of the "practical" political problems raised by the rejection of intensely felt sentiments in a state Congress by an All-India Congress body. P C C , "Minutei," August 6-7, 1949.

POLITICAL

COMMUNITY

AND

INTEGRATION

" 9

Patel's argument called into question the representative character of the Congress party in the state which, it was felt, was incongruous with the historic claims of the Congress movement and was particularly paradoxical in the case of Rajasthan, where the representative claims of the Praja Mandals had been formally accepted by several princes even prior to the integration of the states. W i t h i n a few weeks after the death of Sardar Patel in late 1950, the Shastri ministry resigned and was replaced by an interim cabinet under C. S. Venkatachar, a member of the Indian Civil Service w h o had served as adviser to the R a j p r a m u k h and to the Department of H o m e and Revenue since the formation of the Shastri ministry. 39 After considerable negotiation with the high command, the majority coalition of the P C C was permitted to form the government with Jai Narain Vyas as chief minister in April 1951. T h e new ministry included leaders of the major regional factions or their deputies and continued in power until the first General Elections in 1952. 40 By 1951 Vyas was accepted as the predominant leader of the Rajasthan Congress, and the Jodhpur group was primus inter pares among the regional factions in this majority coalition at the state level. PARTY ORGANIZATION A T THE LOCAL LEVEL

T h e change from movement to ruling party and the conflict which this induced prompted efforts on the part of the party's organizational leadership to expand its base of popular support. D u r i n g the first years after founding, although the Congress Executive Committee made policy and managed agitations and negotiations, the Praja Mandals continued to serve as the local appendages of the state level association. In October 1949, how39. Government of Rajasthan, Report on the Administration of Rajasthan, 95°~5I (Jaipur: Government Press, 1954), p. 4. T h e r e was one other minister in the cabinet, B. J. Jha, ICS, w h o had been on deputation from the government of Uttar Pradesh since the spring of 1949 and had been associated with the departments of Home and Integration. 40. Hindustan Times, April 27, 1951. T h e Vyas ministry included Kanwar Jaswant Singh as a representative of the Kshatriya Mahasabha. T h i s was the first of a number of conciliatory moves made by the Congress towards the jagirdars. In an interview with the author, Jaswant Singh reported that considerable pressure was brought to bear on him to join the Congress party, but this he and his supporters were not prepared to do. 1

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THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

ever, the Executive Committee of the P C C directed that ad hoc Congress committees be formed in each of the newly created districts of the state to integrate local groups more thoroughly with the state organization and, more importantly, to create a wider base of support for the organizational leadership in its efforts to establish the party as the legitimate representative of public opinion. 41 The creation of these district committees marked a crucial step in the development of the Congress organization in Rajasthan. Prominent members of the Pradesh Congress Committee were appointed as organizers for the five administrative divisions of the state and were directed to suggest a list of names to the PCC Executive Committee for appointment to positions on the new District Congress Committees (DCC). This was to be done, however, only after consultation with local Congress activists as well as with "prominent and prestigious" persons in the area.42 T h e selection of these five organizers was critically important because their recommendations were to be considered authoritative by, although not binding on, the P C C Executive. The ancestral and political home of each of the organizers was located in the region to which he was appointed, reportedly so that the regional integrity of local party units could be maintained. Furthermore, the creation of DCCs resulted in shifts in the organization of power in those areas where factional conflict had become intense. The organizer for Jaipur Division was Sardar Harlal Singh, the Jat leader from Shekhawati, who was a major opponent of Pandit Hiralal Shastri in this division. As a result of the appointees eventually seated on the D C C Executive Committees in Jaipur, Shastri and his supporters were largely excluded from positions of power —positions which were never regained. In the two districts of the Matsya region the organizer was Master Adityendra, the quiet and reserved but effective leader from this area. Since internal conflict had not become intense in this region, appointments largely reflected a broad consensus of local party members. Both urban and rural groups received positions on the new district bodies. The organizer for Jodhpur Division was Mithalal Trivedi, an old Lok 41. PCC, Executive Committee, "Minutes," October 6, 1949.

42. Ibid.

POLITICAL C O M M U N I T Y AND INTEGRATION Parishad

121

worker and close associate of Jai Narain Vyas, at that

time the incumbent president of the state Congress. Attempts were made by Trivedi to encourage participation in the Congress by important persons who had not previously been associated with the party, but he was also instrumental in excluding from positions of power members of the Mahajan group which had opposed Vyas after 1942. Also excluded were those who had been either openly or secretly associated with traditional elements in the state. T h e undisputed leader of the Udaipur area, Manikyalal Varma, was appointed as the organizer for all districts in Udaipur Division, and the sensitive manner in which he assayed local elements at this time was important in establishing that cohesion which still exists in the Congress in this area today. In Bikaner Division the party organizer was R a m

Chandra

Choudhry, who joined the movement after independence but who was a highly respected Jat barrister and judge prior to 1948. His appointment was important because it was considered desirable by the state party leaders that a rapprochement be reached between the urban and rural elements in this area as well as between competing segments of the Jat community—conflicts in which R a m Chandra was not involved. T h e organizer for Kotah Division was Pandit Abhinn Hari, a founder but controversial leader of the Kotah Praja

Mandal,

whose appointments of "old" political work-

ers merely exacerbated the division between them and the younger, more highly educated leaders of the opposition Sri Praja

Mandal.

Abhinn Hari and his supporters were permanently ousted from positions of power within the district Congress organization with his loss of support at the state level after 1950. Until after the first General Elections formal positions of leadership in the district level organizations were reportedly filled by appointment and were restricted to those who had been affiliated with the Praja

Mandal

movements. T h i s was true not only of the

District Congress Committees and their executives but also of the Tehsil Congress Committees established subsequently, which became the political preserves of local urban groups. In most cases these local-level bodies did not function prior to 1952. Local organization in the party during this period rested almost exclusively in the informal arrangements and associations which had

122

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

developed among local activists during the preindependence movement rather than in the confines of a formal organizational format. The Congress party in Rajasthan and at the national level has demonstrated considerable flexibility in adapting to a new political environment. The years of political struggle did not result in the alienation of Praja Mandal activists from the ruling princes. The Praja Mandals consistently maintained that prince and pauper alike suffered under the colonial yoke. Since independence, efforts have been made to reach a rapprochement with traditional rulers and to absorb them into the new political system. Attention to the traditional prerogatives of the Rajputana princes continued through the process of states integration. Princes continue to hold considerable private estates and to draw their privy purses. In Rajasthan they are respected for their electoral prowess, and several have joined the Congress or have reached a political "understanding" with the party. By the first General Elections the Rajasthan Congress had changed from a confederation of urban political movements to a political party with a formal organizational structure that reached to the local level and a fairly broad social clientele. The new statewide organization had maintained cohesion during the process of states integration. It had successfully maintained against the judgments of the national party that it was the fount of political authority in the state and that the state ministry must enjoy the confidence of the Congress organization rather than the States Ministry in Delhi. The Congress also weathered intense factional struggle which resulted in a no-confidence vote against the Congress ministry by the party organization. Thus before 1952 the Rajasthan Congress had experienced the peaceful succession of leadership in the state ministry as well as in the party organization. Those who were unseated in the process both at the state and district level continued as active members of the Congress party. It had asserted its autonomy with respect to local political movements as well as its collective interest within the national party organization. The Congress leaders during this period also became increas-

POLITICAL C O M M U N I T Y

AND INTEGRATION

ingly concerned with expanding mittees were established

and

the

party organization.

123 Com-

their members became active

in

studying and handling a number of functional tasks ranging from the study of constitutional reforms to agricultural policy. W i t h the creation of district-level party institutions in 1949, and eventually at the subdistrict level, the Congress became a more complex organization with a broader scope of participation than had prevailed during the early centralist years. More important, the Congress leadership made special efforts to recruit new social forces into the party, including representatives of the traditional ruling classes. T h e party was not to be the province of any social group. It was also accepted that positions of leadership would be open to new generations of political leaders.

Chapter

6

I N S T I T U T I O N A L FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY: C H A N G I N G P A T T E R N S OF S O C I A L R E P R E S E N T A T I O N IN T H E CONGRESS ORGANIZATION

condition of political stability, particularly in competitive democratic political systems, is the existence of institutional linkages that bridge primordial social collectivities and thus augur for the development of a plural and complex set of conflict relationships. Those political systems characterized by such linkages have thus far been among the more stable in the new states, while those characterized by the recruitment of political parties and groups from single primordial collectivities have been among the more unstable. 1 T h e potentiality for pluralization, of course, is in part dependent on the number of such groups and the intensity of conflict among them at a given time. That is to say, the fewer the number of units, the more restricted the coalitional possibilities and the greater the potentiality of conflict joined by organizations formed on primordial bases. T h e larger the number, the more numerous the coalitional possibilities, and the less likely the development of conflict on a limited number of axes. A N IMPORTANT

i. See, for example, Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A CrossPolity Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M.I.T. Press, 1963), Computer Printout, Variables Nos. 149, 1 5 1 , and 15»; Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), chap. 1; Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes," Comparative Political Studies, 2 (April 1969), 7-67; and Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds.. Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967).

INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY

»25

The existence of institutional linkages at one time obviously does not insure their permanence. The development and the intensity of conflict on a primordial basis can fragment and sever an institution whether such conflict is induced by elite competition from within the relevant institution or whether it results from the manifestation and the intensification of conflict relationships in mass society that are so frequently the consequence of modernization. In either case, however, the conditions and processes by which socially plural political institutions develop and the conditions of their maintenance or collapse are important problematics in the analysis of political change. One of the important functions of the Congress party in Rajasthan has been the provision of a dominant integrative structure in a highly segmented and pluralistic society. In a sense, Rajasthan is India in microcosm. The state-society is composed of a large number of regional subcultures, none of which either singly or in a limited number coalition is in a position to dominate. Caste cleavage in several areas of the state has been severe, and public conflict between castes has often been joined by organizations recruited from single castes. Rajasthan has also been characterized by the common division between urban centers and the countryside—a form of social cleavage often exacerbated by the modernization process. The relationship between political mobilization and the absorptive capacity of political institutions and the predilections of their managers is multiple. The first question is the extent of flexibility at an initial or a given point in time in the attitudes of the institutional elite and also in those of active participants within the institutions as well as those outside who want to participate. 2 The s. It is useful to view an elite in terms of three generic postures which elites might take toward a clientele. Each gives rise to qualitatively different forms of structural change. T h e first posture is that of suppression of demands for participation or material satisfaction. This posture leads potentially to a revolutionary response on the part of the new class of political aspirants and to attempts either to change completely the elite structure or to separate from it. In terms of party systems, the latter strategy would involve the creation of new parties; in terms of whole political systems it involves attempts to create new sovereignties. A second posture involves both the inclination and capacity to absorb new participants into significant positions

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T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN

RAJASTHAN

second, in the case of political parties, concerns the scope and terms of entry to be granted new political claimants, that is to say, the extent to which status and influence is to be permitted or is to be acquired, and the political and social criteria to be used as qualification for admission. Finally, the relationship rests upon the assumption of desirability on the part of new claimants, i.e. that new claimants do exist or can be mobilized and, given this, that they wish to become a part of the relevant institution. Furthermore, it must posit that the conditions of entry are not unattractive compared to other alternatives which may exist or which might be created. In this chapter we shall attempt to assess the direction, extent, and conditions of change in the social composition of important institutional spheres in the Rajasthan Congress at both the state and district levels from the time of founding in 1946 to 1965. T h e first authority structure is the Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC) and its Executive Committee, membership in which has been extremely important for aspiring Congressmen. 3 Participation in it has proved necessary to bring power effectively to bear in the selection of parly candidates and for establishing and maintaining formal avenues of access to centers of power in the national party organization. Membership carries considerable prestige within party circles as well as in local society: it is important as a public indicator of control over local party organizations and personnel, as a source of public prestige, and as a forum in which unsuccessful party candidates may continue their "political employment." The P C C has also been utilized in some districts for facilitating the work of the state ministry by serving as a means of political communication between elite and society. In others it has been utilized as a public forum when controlled by dissident party within the formal structure of authority. The third posture is the satisfaction of demands through symbolic rewards and the paternal acquiescence to policy demands. It might be noted that elite response in the Rajasthan Congress has been characterized by the last two postures. This model is a variation of Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict, pp. »32-833. 3. For a discussion of Congress party organization see Marcus Franda, "The Organizational Development of India's Congress Party," Pacific Affairs, 35 (Fall 1962), 248-260, and Susanne H. Rudolph, The Action Arm of the Indian National Congress: The Pradesh Congress Committee (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1955).

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

127

notables for criticizing the state ministry and undermining its public credibility. T h e PCC is thus associated closely to seats of public power and through the power of ticket distribution is instrumental in determining who achieves public power. T h e District Congress Committee, particularly its Executive Committee, is the only continually active party institution at the local level. Other local Congress institutions such as Tehsil and Mandai Congress Committees, while vital in some cases, are but paper organizations in most, and where active are normally only intermittently so. Organizational power at the local level rests in the DCC Executive Committees. These institutions manage organizational affairs in the district, maintain party records, and constitute the critical communications link between the state party and local party institutions and public sentiment. DCC Executives have also been the most important local party institution in recommending candidates for elections. T h e study of representation on the DCC Executives affords a focus for analyzing the social composition of Congress elites at the local level and will enable us to establish regional variability in social recruitment to the party as well as longitudinal profiles in given areas which might differ from and be lost in an analysis of state-level party institutions alone. A third sphere of participation in the Congress is the selection of party candidates to contest elections to the state Legislative Assembly and the Lok Sabha. T h e selection of candidates is critically important to the fortunes of the party institution as well as to those of component factions. Party leaders are ordinarily desirous of allocating party tickets so that the Congress will hold a majority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly and thus enable it to form the government. Faction leaders, however, also attempt to achieve an optimum allocation of tickets to members of their own factions and to those allied with them. This is necessary to maintain, or to establish more firmly, factional cohesion and to expand factional membership. A favorable distribution of tickets to factional cohorts and their assignment to "safe" constituencies is also necessary to enable the faction to get their representatives elected and thus to participate with influence in the formation of the government and in the distribution of ministerial portfolios.

128

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

Competition for party tickets thus provides an occasion where basic lines of cleavage within the party at all levels are usually laid bare and where institutional bonds and party loyalty are severely tested. T h e process of ticket allocation is formalized, and has become an increasingly complex organizational task since the first General Elections.4 In the third General Elections, for example, formal competition for the Congress ticket was open to any active member of the party who could pay the Rs 850 application fee, make a Rs 500 deposit which was refunded if the applicant was not selected as a candidate, and who could solicit the signatures of two other active members on behalf of his application. In an effort to dramatize their case and to establish before the party the catholicity and intensity of their support, aspirants also solicit letters and petitions from various organizations, caste and community leaders and associations, and leaders in local party and governmental institutions for deposit in the appropriate constituency file in the state Congress office for review by the Pradesh Election Committee (PEC). The formal decision process in the selection of party candidates involves the district, state, and national party organizations, ultimate authority resting with the Central Election Committee (CEC). 5 Given the pervasiveness of factional competition for a favorable allocation of tickets, it is necessary for each higher party unit to have available information that is as accurate as possible concerning the factional configuration, social complexion, and political temperament of constituencies, as well as an indication of the actual qualifications, political dispositions, and public image of applicants. While factional considerations have always been critically important at all party levels in the allocation of tickets, 4. An extensive consideration of this process is included in Ramashray Roy, "Selection of Congress Candidates," Economic and Political Weekly, Parts I-V (December 31, 1966), 833-840, and (January 7, 14 and February 1 1 , 18, 1967), 17-23, 61-76, 371-376, and 407-416; and Stanley A. Kochanek, "Political Recruitment in the Indian National Congress: T h e Fourth General Elections," Asian Survey, 7 (May 1967), «98-304. 5. For a discussion of the role of the CEC in the selection of party candidates, see Stanley A. Kochanek, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 267-298.

INSTITUTIONAL

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129

such information is also useful for purposes of calculating electoral prospects given different combinations of candidates. After the closing date for applications, the PEC deputes members of the Pradesh Congress Committee to each district to serve as district observers. These officers are charged with studying the political situation in the district and each constituency within its confines, interviewing applicants for the party ticket and their supporters, and with sounding out the attitudes towards various applicants held by members of the District Congress Committee and other important political figures and community leaders in the area.6 They are then responsible for recommending to the PEC those applicants who should be awarded tickets together with second and third choices for each constituency. These recommendations together with documentary evidence are submitted to the PEC in formal District Observer Reports. The PEC then makes recommendations, when agreement can be reached, to the Central Election Committee for the selection of candidates and the assignment of constituencies. The process of ticket allocation is a central part of political life in the Rajasthan Congress, for its outcome determines in large part the measure of one's political career in the party. The selection and assignment of district observers is an important focus of conflict, as is control of the state party apparatus and formal representation on the PEC. Effort must be made to orchestrate support for applicants for the party ticket from one's faction and to exert in6. Who the district observer interviews has varied between elections, and for the same election there has been variation between districts. For both the second and third General Elections, most district observers interviewed members of the District Congress Committee including members of the DCC Executive Committee, members of Tehsil Congress Committees and their Executives, and a selection of other active members as well as the applicants. In some cases Congress members of municipal boards were interviewed in 1957. In 1962 almost all district observers interviewed members of municipal boards, in some cases opposition as well as Congress members. Members of Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads were also canvassed, and here again the opinions of non-Congressmen were sometimes sought. Also in 196s members of Mandal Congress Committees, the lowest rung on the organizational ladder, and their Executive Committees, were sometimes interviewed. Where factional conflict in a district is particularly acute and the report of the district observer is charged with being biased, a second observer is frequently deputed.

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T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

fluence that finds reflection in the reports of the district observers and in the deliberations of the P E C as well as those of the CEC. 7 Formal representation in the party organization thus has been an immensely important prerequisite to effective participation in the allocation of party tickets for the general elections. T h i s competition for party control has been critical in the changing patterns of representation in the Rajasthan Congress since independence. SOCIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE RAJASTHAN CONGRESS

One of the most significant changes within the Congress party in Rajasthan, particularly since the first General Elections, has been the expansion of its social base. This enlarged spectrum of representation has resulted from a variety of conditions and actions. First, it has been the result of a calculated policy on the part of dominant Congress leaders—those who had led movements for constitutional democratic government and independence. T h i s was prompted by three important conditions. First, to make real its claim to be the political embodiment of society, the Congress felt it of the highest priority to widen its base of social representation, although there were serious differences among major party leaders over how far and in what direction and with what speed the net should be cast. Secondly, the Congress elite realized that the new political environment placed a premium on the "logic of public numbers" and that in order to win elections and to form governments it would be necessary to provide a channel of political access to important social groups. 8 Thirdly, competition within the Congress elite itself, and eventually between district-level factions, has contributed significantly to the mobilization of new political resources within the Congress. 9 Elections for positions at all levels 7. A n analysis of ticket allocation in one district of Rajasthan is included in Chapter 10. 8. T h e influence of participation and social representation on political stability in terms of whole political systems has been widely considered in the literature. See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, 18 (August 1956), 391-409; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups," European Journal of Sociology, i (i960), 50-85; and Reinhard Bendix, " T h e Lower Classes and the 'Democratic Revolution," " Industrial Relations, 1 (October 1961), 91-116. 9. T h e relationship between factional conflict and political mobilization is a pervasive factor in the Rajasthan Congress. It is also an important factor

INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY

131

of public authority have served to mobilize and to educate politically new social groups—a changing environment over which the Congress does not have immediate control but to which it must continually respond. In an important sense, however, preindependence patterns of social representation have persisted in state-level party institutions. Caste Hindus, for example, who constitute approximately 64 percent of the state's population, have constituted the vast proportion of representatives elected to the Pradesh Congress Committee since its founding in 1946—a proportion that has ranged from a high of 96 percent during the first few years after independence to a "low" of 91 percent since 1958. T h u s in aggregate terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes, which together constitute 28 percent of the population, and Muslims, which constitute approximately 7 percent, are greatly under-represented in the state-level Congress organization. T h i s general pattern of representation, however, is not unexpected. Political mobilization before 1947 occurred within highcaste groups, all of which had long-standing traditions of participation in public affairs. These traditions of participation assumed a new structural form in the Praja Mandai movements, and it was activists from these institutions who founded the Congress party in Rajasthan. Secondly, sociopolitical movements that developed outside these Congress-oriented institutions were among ritually pure castes, and the fact of mobilization made them at once a potential political threat and politically attractive to the newly created Congress party. On the other hand, Scheduled Castes do not have effective participative traditions in public affairs. Although there were social uplift movements among these castes before independence, they were founded, led, and directed by men of high caste, 10 and emphasized social purification rather than political in the changing patterns of elite representation and mobility. A thorough analysis of conflict and mobilization, however, is reserved for Chapters 8 and g. 10. In fact almost all of the founders of Praja Mandai movements in the Rajputana states had been involved in Harijan uplift work. Furthermore, in 1935, the caste composition of presidents and secretaries of the Harijan Sevak Sangh in Rajputana was: Brahman, 43; Mahajan, 20; Kayasth, 3; Scheduled Caste, 3; Jat, g; and unknown, 13.

1 3 2

T H E

CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

R A J A S T H A N

participation. The restricted representation of Harijan groups and of Muslims in the state-level Congress organization has been compensated for, however, in the distribution of party tickets for the general elections. Scheduled Castes and Tribes through the first four general elections have enjoyed institutionalized political access provided by constituencies reserved for candidates from these social groups. In each of the four general elections Muslims have received Congress tickets in approximate proportion to their number in the state population. TABLE ii GENERAL

S O C I A L COMPOSITION O F T H E

PRADESH CONGRESS (IN

COMMITTEE,

RAJASTHAN

1946-1965

PERCENT)

Year

Caste Hindu

Other

1946-1948

95 96 96 93 9i 9«

5 4 4 7 9 9

>948-195° '954-'956 1956-1958 1958-1960 1963-1965

N

=

126

138 129 144 '5'

165

NOTE : The tenure of each PCC is ordinarily two years.

The greatest magnitude of change has occurred among caste Hindus, particularly in the membership of Brahman and Mahajan caste groups, who almost exclusively filled committee and executive positions in the Praja Mandals as well as in the Rajasthan Congress at the time of its founding.11 The data in Table 12 indicate that while representatives from these two caste groups have constituted the largest proportion of incumbencies in successive 11. Biographical data concerning PCC members used in this and subsequent chapters derive from several sources. Lists of PCC members were first obtained from the office of the Pradesh Congress Committee. Vita information was then obtained for appropriate members from the Constituency Files maintained in the PCC office and from the biographical files kept by the Legislative Assembly Secretariat. Where possible, PCC members were interviewed individually. This included over one hundred members of the PCC at various times. In other cases, basic data were obtained from informants within the Congress party whose political activity was in the same district as the person in question.

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

Pradesh Congress Committees, this proportion has continually declined since 1946. From a high of 82 percent in 1948, the proportion of Brahmans and Mahajans had declined to 58 percent of the total membership by 1963. T h e most noticeable and significant decrease occurred between the years of party consolidation immediately following independence and the period of party expansion that accompanied the first General Elections. T h i s trend marks a central change in the pattern of political recruitment and the direction of adaptation of the Rajasthan Congress. T A B L E 12 C A S T E COMPOSITION OF THE RAJASTHAN PRADESH CONGRESS COMMITTEE,

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Caste Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput Other clean castes Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim N

=

19461948

1948-

46 33 9 1

49 33 9 1 5

6

3

2 126

«95°

3 1 138

1954i95 6

1956-

34

35 27

26 18

7 11 2 2 129

>958

18 8 6 6

1 144

19581960

1963-

40

39 19

24 '9 3

>965

18

7

6

8

7

5 4 '65

2

'5i

T h e distribution of high-caste representatives on the P C C has undergone radical change since 1946 as well. T h e proportion of members from Mahajan castes has decreased in linear fashion from 33 percent in 1946 to only 19 percent in 1963, while representation from Brahman castes, which declined during the early period of institutional development, has increased slightly since 1954. (See T a b l e 12.) T h i s increase is due primarily to the entry of a new kind of Brahman—one from small rural towns and villages. T h e decreasing number of Mahajan representatives accounts for the proportional decline of high-caste representatives on the P C C since the founding of the party. T h i s pattern of representation and change is also reflected in the caste composition of the P C C Executive Committee, which has

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

134

RAJASTHAN

been dominated exclusively by men of high caste, mainly Brahman (Table 13). T h e high point of representation for Mahajan castes was 1948-1949, when the strategic positions in the Congress organization and the state ministry were dominated by the urban coalition headed by Pandit Hiralal Shastri. T A B L E 13 CASTE COMPOSITION OF THE P C C

Caste

1946-1947

Brahman Mahajan Kayasth Jat Rajput Other clean castes

10

N =

14

1948-1949

2 2 0 0

7

0

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,

i95I_I953

5 2 0 0

8

0 14

1963-1965

1 2 2 0

8

1 14

1946-1965

2 3 5 2 0

20

10 2 2 3 2 2 21

T h e decline of Mahajan representation is accounted for by several conditions. First of all, in those areas where Mahajan representation has declined most dramatically, representatives from these castes were in a minority in the party organization and found themselves unable to compete successfully for the Congress party ticket. Furthermore, during the period of intraparty conflict following the integration of the Rajputana states, Mahajans in several areas became identified with the Shastri ministry and with efforts to sustain it without the support of the Congress organization. T h i s diminished the legitimacy of these leaders in several areas of the state—namely Jaipur, Bikaner, and Jodhpur—where they were members of minority factions at the local level. In three areas—Jaipur, Udaipur, and two districts of Jodhpur Division— political aspirants from Mahajan castes have not been attracted to the Congress party since 1952 and have constituted an important segment of the Jan Sangh opposition. T h e increasingly plural character of representation in the state Congress party organization is also seen in the allocation of party tickets for the general elections as well as in the membership of the Congress Legislative Party, which comprises the successful

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

»35

electoral combatants. While Brahmans constitute the largest caste group among Congress candidates, their proportion declined after the first General Elections. T h e proportion of Mahajans receiving party tickets has remained constant in contrast to their decline in the Pradesh Congress Committee as well as in the Congress Legislative Party. TABLE

14

C A S T E OF CONGRESS AND T O P

OPPOSITION

CANDIDATES IN RAJASTHAN,

1952-1967

(IN PERCENT)

1952 Caste Brahman Mahajan Jat Other peasant Rajput Other clean castes Muslim N

=

c

'957

O

'967

1962

C

O

O

3i 14

11

30

20

18

18

20

18

12

16

..

5

3

6

7

••

C

C

O

«7

30

..

22

16

..

4«

10

17

20

5 '9

8

2

2

57

'5

40

6

5

10

5

13 7 6

2

7

116

127

127

122

5 127

1 '34

6 I25

1

11 29 7

12 12

••

NOTE: Congress (C) candidates include all recipients of the party ticket, both winners and losers. Opposition (O) candidates include winners and, where the Congress won, runners-up. The caste of many opposition candidates in the 1967 elections is not known. Therefore, caste information for these candidates has not been entered in this and subsequent tables. Computations for all tables in this chapter are for General Seats.

As Mahajan representation in the Congress organization and Legislative Party has declined, the proportion of competitive opposition candidates from these castes has increased. T h i s trend is also discernible among Brahman candidates and among peasant castes other than Jats. T h e increase in the number of competitive opposition candidates recruited from among newly mobilized peasant castes is indicative of a challenge to the Congress party in certain rural areas where the party has been dominated by Brahmans. T h e increase in the number of Rajputs receiving the Congress party ticket and the increased representation of this caste in high organizational circles, however, has been accompanied by a decrease in the number of competitive Rajput opposition candi-

136

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

dates. T h i s suggests that as the participation of a social group in important Congress party positions increases, opposition in the way of electoral candidates decreases. T h e change in the social composition of the Pradesh Congress Committee is a consequence of the mobilization and entry into the party of agricultural castes—predominantly Jat and Rajput. Jats and other peasant castes in certain areas have consistently expanded their scope of representation in the P C C and on the P C C Executive Committee. From eleven members in 1946, eight of whom were from Bikaner, peasant members on the P C C numbered thirty in 1963—an increase from 9 percent to 18 percent of the total membership. T h i s process of social democratization has been most significant in the dry areas of the state. T h e entry of peasant castes into the Congress was encouraged by Congress leaders shortly after independence to expand the base of support for the party through incentives provided to leaders of peasant castes. T h e absorption of peasant representatives into the party occurred first in Bikaner and Shekhawati. In both areas Jats had close ties with the Praja Mandals and Jat leaders held important organizational posts in the Mandals. A t the time that the Congress party in Rajasthan was founded, therefore, Jat leaders in these two areas enjoyed organizational access, although not dominance, in local party institutions and realized that the "route to Delhi" and political power was to be found through the Congress party rather than in opposition to it. Organizational control and mobility of Jat leaders in these two areas was also encouraged by factional competition at the state level. T h e coalition of Jai Narain Vyas provided access to Jat groups in Bikaner and Shekhawati in an effort to establish and insure a majority in these areas against Hiralal Shastri's urban coalition. In 1949, it will be recalled, important Jat leaders were assigned the responsibility of recommending names for District Congress Committees in these areas. Also in that year the dominant Jat leaders from each of these areas, Choudhry Kumbharam Arya of Bikaner and Sardar Harlal Singh of Shekhawati, were appointed by P C C President Jai Narain Vyas to the P C C Executive Committee. T h e entry of Jats into the Congress in Jodhpur was different,

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

»37

as was the process by which members of this and allied peasant castes eventually established control over strategic organizational positions at the district level. The organizational and elite linkages that existed between urban and rural political protest in Bikaner and Shekhawati did not prevail in Jodhpur. As we have seen, the relationship between the Jodhpur Lok Parishad and the Kisan Sabha was strained; and the Lok Parishad maintained that it represented the public interest and could alone negotiate with state authority. After independence the Lok Parishad became the Jodhpur Congress Party and renewed this old assumption in the new political order. Initial efforts to negotiate a merger of these two organizations were on terms unacceptable to the kisan leadership, because it would have entailed the loss of political autonomy without the likelihood of organizational control in the Congress. This was in part dictated by the structure of conflict and coalition in the Congress party at that time. The Jodhpur elite were a central unit of the dominant state-level coalition in the state party, and their power rested upon control of the party organization in the Jodhpur region. The granting of organizational control to Jat leaders might have undermined this source of power. In Bikaner and Shekhawati, however, the Jodhpur leaders desired the isolation of those associated with the Shastri faction at the state level, all of whom were men from urban areas. The Jat-led rural faction was an attractive ally. The estrangement of the Jodhpur Kisan Sabha from the Congress leadership in this region was made evident by the manner in which it was eventually absorbed into the Congress party in 1951. Entry was not arranged by Jai Narain Vyas, the incumbent chief minister who at that time was attempting to attract Rajputs to the party in a quest for rural support. Rather it was negotiated by Choudhry Kumbharam Arya and Mathuradas Mathur, Vyas' able and politically astute lieutenant from Jodhpur. 12 The Kisan is. This marked an important act of cooperation between a rural and an urban leader. Mathur, whose base of political support was in Jodhpur, was also competing for political favor with another political lieutenant of Vyas, Dwarkadas Purohit, who was of the same caste as Vyas, was highly educated, and was of the same political generation as Mathur. Mathur subsequently

i38

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

Sabha finally entered the Congress in 1951 with assurances of receiving 50 percent of the Congress tickets in the area for the first General Elections and of political position at the state level. T h e entry of the Kisan Sabha extended channels of access and participation not only to members of the J a t caste, as was the case in Shekhawati and to a lesser extent in Bikaner, but also to allied peasant castes, largely Sirvis and Vishnois located principally in Pali and Jalore districts. Jat representation in strategic positions within the Rajasthan Congress has continued to be high. Jats since 1949 have continually been represented on the P C C Executive Committee, and during the three years before the third General Elections five of the twenty members of this committee were Jats. Since the first General Elections Jats have consistently had at least two representatives in the state ministry, and these ministers have always been charged with strategic portfolios. Jats and other peasant castes have been competitive in the politics of ticket allocation, although the proportion of tickets for general seats received by members of these castes declined from 28 percent in 1952 to 23 percent in 1967. T h e most significant test of the Congress party's adaptability, however, was its admittance of Rajput jagirdars. T h e suggestion that the Congress open its ranks to the traditional ruling classes was neither sprung unannounced nor did it result from an immediate change in organizational strategy. Shortly after independence Rajputs were granted representation in the new political order when the Kshatriya Mahasabha was invited to nominate a representative to the Vyas ministry. 13 Congress leaders also offered became a close ally of the " J a t Group" in Jodhpur as well as at the state level and was instrumental in the unseating of Vyas as chief minister in 1954. Mathur, who has proven to be a masterful politician and administrator, has been a critical link between peasant and elite caste groups in the Rajasthan Congress. 13. T h e R a j p u t representative on the first Vyas ministry was Kanwar Jaswant Singh, previously private secretary to Maharaja Ganga Singh and prime minister of that state, who was nominated by the Kshatriya Mahasabha. Kanwar Jaswant Singh reported to the author that he was invited and encouraged to join the Congress because he would be serving in a Congress ministry, but refused.

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

139

Congress membership to important representatives of the traditional ruling elite and, in their efforts to extend the base of Congress support to the rural areas prior to the first General Elections, informally contacted leaders of the Kshatriya Mahasabha about contesting the elections as Congress candidates, thus lessening the threat of a potent and united opposition to the Congress in jagirdari areas. This was most seriously pursued in Jodhpur Division, where Jai Narain Vyas and Dwarkadas Purohit held meetings with representatives of the Kshatriya Mahasabha,14 These attempts failed not because of social or ideological incompatibility but because of lack of agreement on the percentage of seats which the jagirdars should receive. There was also difference among Congress leaders themselves: Vyas reportedly favored the allocation of 10 percent of the Congress tickets to jagirdar representatives, while Manikyalal Varma, the eminent Congress leader from Udaipur, insisted that 5 percent be a maximum. 15 These negotiations were completely broken off with the entry of the Marwar Kisan Sabha into the Congress. T h e question of Rajput entry into the party, however, was not dropped, and shortly before the 1952 elections the Maharaja of Jodhpur reportedly made a secret plane trip to see Rafi Ahmed Kidwai to discuss such a postelection possibility.16 The possibility of jagirdars entering the Congress was suggested by several important Congress leaders after the successful negotiation in 1953 of the "resumption" of jagirs by the state. Prime Minister Nehru who, along with Pandit Pant, had helped to arrange the settlement, reportedly extended an invitation to join the Congress to certain Rajput leaders involved in the negotiations on behalf of the Rajasthan Kshatriya Mahasabha.11 In Rajasthan 14. Informants have reported that the Congress negotiated with the Kisan Sabha and the maharaja simultaneously, and that efforts to usher in the kisan leaders received sharp stimulus when reports of the possibility of collaboration with the Rajputs became known. 15. T h i s has been reported by members of the Congress at that time as well as by members of the Executive Committee of the Kshatriya Mahasabha. 16. T h i s has not been publicized in Congress circles. It has been attested to, however, by two of the maharaja's closest advisers at that time. 17. Interview with Bhim Singh Mandawa. T h e Kshatriya Mahasabha had petitioned the high command to give its representatives a fair hearing. T h i s was agreed to by Prime Minister Nehru, who gave the jagirdars a choice of either Pandit Ballabh Pant, then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, or Chak-

140

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN

RAJASTHAN

this suggestion was first made by Manikyalal Varma, whose support for the move cooled after the Jat and Udaipur groups started to discuss ousting Vyas as chief minister. W i t h the intensification of Jat opposition to the admission of Rajputs into the Congress during the spring of 1954, R a j p u t entry was handled by Jai Narain Vyas who saw it as an important move in expanding Congress' support and reducing the power of existing factions within the party. 1 8 T h e invitation to apply for membership in the Congress party was met with approval by many jagirdar

M L A s . T h e r e was an

affinity on the part of some R a j p u t jagirdars

for the Congress party,

particularly among those w h o had studied in the British provinces and had been attracted to the nationalist movement. Some had participated in demonstrations against British administration during their student days. 19 In February 1954 at Nawalgarh House in ravarty Rajagopalachari to act as mediator between the Kshatriya Mahasabha and the Congress government of Rajasthan. T h e Rajputs chose Pandit Pant because of his "appreciation of Rajput problems" and because he was from northern India. Interviews with members of the Kshatriya Mahasabha Working Committee. T h e agreement was reached in an atmosphere of amity, and the jagirdars agreed to the "resumption" of their jagirs with an agreed upon scale of compensation. T h i s report, with very minor modifications, was accepted by Prime Minister Nehru and was issued as a statement of policy. T h e prime minister aptly referred to it as a "revolution by consent." See Government of Rajasthan, Report on Rajasthan Jagirdari Abolition (Jaipur, 1953), and Hindustan Times, October 30, 1953. 18. Reported by several Congress and former jagirdar MLAs. T h e move was supported by both Varma and Vyas, but received Vyas' firm support after other leaders started to shy away from the offer after the emotive response registered by Jat leaders. T h e entry of the opposition jagirdar M L A s into the Congress, therefore, has been identified with Vyas whereas it was originally common policy of several major leaders. Several non-Jat leaders were among Vyas' severest critics for pushing the entry of these M L A s and attributed Machiavellian motives to Vyas, i.e. the acquisition of more personal political support within the Congress to offset the growing numerical advantage of his opponents. It might be noted that one of the collective reasons for approaching the jagirdar M L A s was to increase support in the Congress against the increasing influence of the Jat group. 19. Several of the jagirdar M L A s had received their college education in the British provinces—almost exclusively U.P.—and several had served as elected officers in the student unions of their universities. One important Rajput leader reported that one of his closest friends was felled by a British bullet while they were part of a demonstration during the "Quit India" Movement. Others have said that they had the highest respect for top Congress leaders and the objectives of the Indian National Congress for they too were

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

141

Jaipur the Working Committee of the Kshatriya Mahasabha declared that members of the organization would be permitted to join any political party of their choice.20 Later in the month, fortythree important jagirdars—including the prestigious Rawal Madan Singh of Nawalgarh and the ranking thakur of Jodhpur, Bhavani Singh of Pokaran, together with twenty-five jagirdar MLAs—issued a joint statement appealing to all Rajasthanis to join the Congress and declaring that the desired future of India could not be realized by working in a "communal and sectarian manner." 21 In the summer of 1954 twenty-two jagirdar MLAs applied for membership in the Congress Legislative Party and were admitted.22 The February Resolution and the turn of important Rajput leaders toward the Congress is accepted by Rajput politicians as the principal turning point in the political organization and strategy of the traditional elites. The Kshatriya Mahasabha, which until that time had served as the political forum for the expression and assertion of Rajput interests, became politically moribund. It had accomplished the major purposes for which it had been renewed—the protection of jagirdari interests in the resumption of jagirs. The jagirdar MLAs who chose to opt for the Congress were on the whole younger and more highly educated than those who chose to remain in opposition.23 The average age of the new ConIndian and suffered the indignity of colonial rule as much as the person fated to live under direct British rule. Several of the former jagirdar M L A s (they ceased to be "jagirdars" when they joined the Congress) have noted that they attempted to join the Congress after returning from their studies in the British provinces but that they were excluded from membership on the basis of their birth. 20. Hindustan T i m « , February 11, 1954. 21. Hindustan Times, February 27, 1954. Madan Singh, who had close contacts with major financial supporters of the Congress from Shekhawati, served as an important link between the Congress and the Kshatriya Mahasabha. 22. Although these MLAs were admitted to the Congress Legislative Party, it was some time before they were permitted to sit on the Congress side of the aisle in the Assembly, because of the severe opposition of some Congressmen to this visible act of association. When Nehru made a trip to Jaipur shortly after their entry, several of these new Congress M L A s approached him and told him of this discriminatory practice. Within days it was corrected. 23. These computations are based on data collected from the biographical

142

T H E CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

gress MLAs was forty years, while those who continued in opposition was forty-three. The difference in level of educational achievement was much greater. Whereas only 43 percent of the opposition jagirdar MLAs had either attended college or had received a diploma from Mayo College,24 76 percent of those who joined the Congress had achieved the same educational level. On the other hand 37 percent of the opposition jagirdars had attended only through elementary school, while only 19 percent of the new Congress MLAs had not gone beyond that level of education. Rajput participation in the state organizational apparatus, however, has not been extensive, and, with the exception of Jodhpur which has a rather active and electorally successful Rajput contingent, it has not been localized regionally. Rajputs, for example, have never constituted more than 8 percent of the PCC membership, although two members of the caste have sat on the PCC Executive Committee each year since 1958. There are several reasons that account for limited Rajput representation in the party organization. First, Rajputs experienced difficulty in breaching peasant control of local-level party organizations in the desert areas where both peasant and Rajput castes predominate. Rajput entry into the Congress began only after peasant castes had begun to consolidate their position and to establish control in local party institutions. There is also a bias among Rajputs against active and sustained political involvement, particularly in the Congress organization at the local level. Primary attention is given to panchayat elections and elections to the Legislative Assembly. Organizational representation is not of extreme importance to Congress Rajputs as long as they have access to positions of power at the state and national levels and as long as their ability to attract popular votes continues. Rajput participation has been greater in the Legislative Party files in the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly Secretariat, from interviews, and from Rajasthan Congress Legislative Party, Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha Ke Teen Warsh (Jaipur: Student Book Company, 1955). 24. Mayo College was established in Ajmer by Lord Mayo, viceroy from 1869 to 1872, for the education of the Rajputana princes and major chiefs. It brought to the traditional elite the curriculum and style of English public school education. See W. W. Hunter, A Life of the Earl of Mayo, 2d ed. (London, 1876), I, 2 2 1 .

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

143

and in the acquisition of party tickets than in the party organization. Rajput applicants received a high of 15 percent of the Congress party tickets for the 1957 elections and 12 percent a decade later. This avenue of participation has reduced the threat of an aristocratic political alternative to the Congress as seen by the decreasing proportion of Rajputs found among the top opposition candidates in the general elections. It might be noted that electoral support for Rajputs before 1962 was not so much a function of organizational support as it was a consequence of traditional deference and a complex web of social clients that constituted a "vote bank" for Rajput, particularly jagirdar, candidates. But while deference and customary obligation is of continuing importance, its dependability and intensity has diminished, and with it organizational access and control has become increasingly important not only for making electoral appeals but also for lobbying for party tickets and asserting control over those organizational mechanisms through which they are allocated. Muslim and Harijan representation in the Pradesh Congress Committee has been severely limited, although the Congress has enjoyed extensive electoral support from both the Muslim community and the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Prior to 1963 the number of Muslim representatives on the P C C had never exceeded three. In 1963 the number increased to eight—four from Jodhpur, three from Udaipur, and one from Jaipur. Muslims, like Rajputs, have been particularly active in the politics of ticket allocation for the general elections and have consistently petitioned that tickets be granted members of their community where it constitutes a sizable proportion of the population. Muslim political aspirants have received from 5 percent to 7 percent of tickets allocated for general constituencies for the Legislative Assembly, which is in direct proportion to the Muslim composition of Rajasthani society. There have been very few cases in which Muslim candidates or large sections of the Muslim community have opposed the Congress or have sought an alternative vehicle of political expression. In most cases in which Muslims have contested against a Congress candidate the candidate has been a Muslim. T h e r e are several reasons for Muslim support of the Congress. First, extensive Muslim participation as a group outside the Con-

144

T H E

CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

gress would raise the spectre of communal ism on a party which was populated by a large number of Muslims and on the community itself if religion formed a basis of political faction within the party. Second, there are few attractive alternatives for Muslim political participation and support. Finally, the Muslim community has sought political protection and has not wished to risk the possible repercussions which opposition politics might entail. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes constitute the two largest generic social groups in Rajasthan, but they have enjoyed only minimal representation in the Pradesh Congress Committee. TABLE

15

REPRESENTATION O F SCHEDULED C A S T E S AND SCHEDULED ON THE R A J A S T H A N P R A D E S H CONGRESS COMMITTEE,

Scheduled Castes

Scheduled Tribes

1946-48

1

3

1948-50

2

2

«954-56 1956-58

1 5

1958-60

1963-65

Year

TRIBES

1946-1965

Total

Percent of Total PCC

4 4

3 3

6

1 3 4

6

2

8

2

2

8

6

10

7 5

T h i s vast disparity in the representation of the "backward classes" may well pose a crucial problem for the Congress over the next several decades or half century. T h u s far, however, members of these castes have been co-opted into the Congress system, and the party has been able to extend its support structure into these social sectors by virtue of the prestige and access which it has been able to afford. Since there is a large number of reserved seats for the Legislative Assembly by law, and since these afford a higher source of status than do positions in the party organization, the legislative side of the political order has satisfied demands for participation by Scheduled Castes and Tribes. There were 16 reserved constituencies out of a total of 160 in 1952 for Scheduled Castes, and 28 out of a total of 176 in both 1957 and 1962. In 1967 the number was increased to 31. There were 5 seats reserved for Scheduled Tribes in 1952, but this was increased to 20 in both

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

»45

of the succeeding general elections and to 21 in 1967. In 1952, therefore, reserved constituencies constituted 13 percent of the total while in 1957, 1962, and 1967 they constituted 28 percent of the total. T h u s the demands for representation and a sense of participation within the Congress system on the part of newly mobilized castes is assuaged by the grant of tickets for the general elections. T h e party organization has continually been staffed and controlled by representatives of politically elite castes—all of which carry clean ritual status and all of which were mobilized prior to independence. Other castes have been bought off through the electoral process. T h e party organization has served to satisfy partially the continuing demands and pressures of the more highly politicized castes which have a relatively restricted number of seats for which to contest. VARIABILITY IN SOCIAL REPRESENTATION: REGION AND T I M E

T h e social composition of the Rajasthan Congress has varied significantly between regions and through time, and change in social representation in the state Congress party is accounted for by change at the district and regional level. Differences in social structure have influenced caste representation in the party, as has the timing of caste mobilization in different regions. Where Brahmans constitute an important segment of rural society, for example, their representation in the Congress has continued to be high, while in those areas where Brahmans tend to be clustered in urban areas their representation has declined, reflecting the r e a l i zation of the Congress. T h e structure of conflict situations both between the Congress and opposition parties and groups and within the Congress itself has influenced patterns of Congress recruitment. Factional division has encouraged increased pluralism in several areas, and organizational monopoly by one caste has served to restrict the absorption of socially antagonistic castes in others. Furthermore, in several regions there have been significant differences in the social composition of different organizational units within the party. T h a t is to say, one social group may be "poorly" represented in the Pradesh Congress Committee but may enjoy greater representation in District Congress Committees or in the receipt of

146

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

party tickets for the general elections. It is for this reason that both organizational and legislative institutions of the party have to be investigated to establish a meaningful profile of social participation in the Congress system. T h e rest of this chapter is addressed to outlining the regional variation in the social composition of the Congress party in Rajasthan. W e shall attempt to establish as far as possible how the party has or has not attempted to adjust to its social environment and what the mechanisms of this adaptative process have been. In short, we are interested in analyzing the extent, direction, and the circumstances of change in high-caste representation in important party institutions. W e shall first focus upon the "wet" areas of the eastern plains and southern highlands and then the "dry" regions in the west and north. Different patterns of social representation distinguish the "wet," eastern regions from the "dry," western regions of Rajasthan, just as they distinguish areas within these larger regions. For example, the representation of castes carrying high ritual status has been particularly great in the eastern and southern parts of the state. Representatives of Brahman and Mahajan castes in these areas, with the exception of the Matsya region, have consistently accounted for over 75 percent of the members of the Pradesh Congress Committee elected from these regions since 1946, and while this proportion has varied it has not demonstrated a negative trend. T h i s pattern of high-caste dominance in the P C C is also seen in D C C Executive Committees, although district-level party institutions have been more open to the entry of new members from lower castes and have been less monopolized by high caste elites. T h e social composition of the Congress party in the "dry" regions of the west contrasts dramatically with those to the east. High-caste representation has decreased significantly since the Congress' co-optation of the Green Revolution, the potential for collective mass upheaval of a politically mobilized countryside. Since 1954, for example, Brahmans and Mahajans have not constituted more than 46 percent of P C C delegates from this region, and by 1963 they had not composed more than 28 percent. (Brahman and Mahajan caste representation as a whole on the P C C has not gone below 58 percent since 1954; see Table 12.)

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

»47

As urban high-caste representation has decreased in state-level institutions, however, it has started to increase in local institutions and in the distribution of party candidacies for the state Legislative Assembly. This represents an important process of "social pluralization in reverse," which has been largely a function of factional competition, the political mobilization of new social groups, and the provision of renewed organizational access to certain groups temporarily excluded. THE POLITICS OF ELITE-CASTE DOMINANCE: CASES FROM THE EASTERN PLAINS

The Congress party in the districts of Matsya reflects the socially plural character of political organizations and social movements that developed before independence in this region. In this sense the party in Matsya differs from that in other areas east of the Aravallis. The nationalist movement in British India was more immediately and intensely felt in the princely states of Alwar and Bharatpur than in most states of Raj putana. Both states bordered British provinces—Alwar City being but sixty miles from Delhi, and Bharatpur City being even less distance from Agra and Mathura. Political organizers and activists were sent into these states from British India, and Mathura District provided a venue for several important political conferences for political activists from Bharatpur.25 The states of Matsya were also influenced by the Arya Samaj, which found adherents from castes of high as well as low ritual status, and the political character and impact of the Arya Samaj did not go unnoticed by state authorities.26 Finally, social communication was facilitated by the relatively small geographical size of these states as well as by the density of their populations. Men of high caste were prominent among the founders and leaders of the Alwar Praja Mandal and the Bharatpur Praja 25. For example as early as 1939 a Bharatpur State Peoples' Conference was held in Mathura District with a reported eight thousand Bharatpuris in attendance. Hindustan Times, July 5, 1939. 26. Efforts were made in the Bharatpur darbar in 1939 to have the Arya Samaj registered as a political organization under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, but it was finally decided to permit it to register as a religious body. Hindustan Times, March 1 1 , 194a

148

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

Parishad, yet these organizations were politically active in rural as well as urban areas. This was a function of both recruitment and political strategy. Many Brahman leaders in both states were recruited from families in rural towns and villages. In the case of Bharatpur several were landlords from the important Bagara Brahman community—a class that had traditional differences with authorities in this Jat-ruled state. In Bharatpur the Praja Parishad also included peasant-caste representatives who held important organizational positions during the earlier years of the movement. For example, Gopilal Yadav, an eminent leader of the Ahirs—a Hindu peasant community in Bharatpur—served as president of the Parishad from 1937 to 1940. More important in the movement as a social group, however, were the Jats, the numerically dominant caste in the state. Several Jat political reformers, including Jeeva Ram, Ghisi Singh, and Thakur Desh Raj, were members of the royal family and also held important elective positions in the Parishad organization. With its increasing militancy toward the government after the "Quit India" Movement of 1942, however, many Jats left the Parishad to join the Kisan Sabha, primarily an organization of social reform but associated politically with the state darbar. While this new mode of Jat political expression did not deprive the Praja Parishad of access to rural areas, it did diminish the legitimacy of the Parishad's claim to being the single authoritative voice of the commonwealth. T h e reduction of Jat participation in the Parishad also lent credence to declarations from court circles that it, and subsequently the Congress, was the organizational tool of high-caste groups whose objectives and social orientations were inimical to those of the Jat community. In Alwar State political mobilization occurred within two peasant communities—the Meos and the Ahirs—before independence. T h e Meos, a community of Muslim peasants, launched several agitations in the 1920s and 1930s demanding agricultural reforms commensurate with those achieved in neighboring British India. 27 These agitations, inspired by contact with kin in Gurgaon District 27. Statesman, January 24, 1933. The 1933 Meo revolt was particularly important in the mobilization of the Meo community and in articulating communal cleavage within that state.

INSTITUTIONAL A D A P T A B I L I T Y

149

of the P u n j a b , encouraged demonstrations and retaliation by the Ahirs, H i n d u peasants w h o populated much of the same areas as the Meos. A h i r mobilization in Alwar, however, was neither induced by nor channeled through the Praja Mandai, and the important A h i r caste leaders remained attentive to state authority. Shortly after independence, however, y o u n g and highly educated Ahirs were attracted to the Congress, and Congress elites to this rural community, by the potential of mutual benefit. T h e level of political mobilization by independence was higher in the princely states of the Matsya region than in any other area of Rajasthan. Praja Mandai outposts had been established and political agitations launched in rural areas as well as in the capital cities. T h e intensity of this activity greatly contrasted with that in most other areas of the Rajputana states. In the first General Elections, for example, seven of the top ten constituencies in terms of voter turnout (over 60 percent of the electorate) were located in Matsya. A l l were rural and small-town constituencies. T h e social composition of representatives to the Pradesh Congress Committee elected from the districts of Matsya has been primarily Brahman and Mahajan, although this composition has been changing. From 1946 to 1963-1965, for example, high-caste representation declined from 86 percent to 68 percent. T h i s trend has also been registered on the D C C Executive Committees in this region. T h e level of M a h a j a n representation has remained quite high, however, and in A l w a r District has increased since independence. In Dholpur, which has continued to constitute a separate D C C although it was merged with Bharatpur State to form a single district in Rajasthan, Mahajans have constituted the largest g r o u p on the D C C Executive. T h e most important decrease has occurred among Brahmans, especially d u r i n g the 1950s in A l w a r District. A similar process has also occurred in U d a i p u r Division where the party elites have been traditionally recruited f r o m rural areas and small towns but where leaders from politically important low-caste groups have been co-opted, some achieving formal positions of organizational leadership. 28 28. T h e predominantly Brahman character of the preindependence movement in Udaipur has continued with slight but important changes through the past two dccades. Brahmans have constituted over 50 percent of all P C C

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

150

TABLE

16

C A S T E R E P R E S E N T A T I O N ON THE P C C FROM T H E M A T S Y A R E G I O N ,

AND

DCCS

1946-1965

(IN P E R C E N T )

I946-I948 Caste Brahman Mahajan Peasant Scheduled Castes and Tribes Rajput Others N

=

1948-1950

PCC DCC PCC DCC

•954"-'956

1958-1960

1963--1965

PCC DCC

PCC DCC

PCC DCC

53 33 7

40 33 20

29 4i 6

39 29 16

'7 50 6

30 35 11

36 32 14

32

0 0 7 '5

0 0 7

0 12 12 17

6 5 6 38

11 6 11 18

13 5 5 37

5 5 9 22

11 5 11 44

15

27

14

These trends have been accompanied by new "political investments" on the part of Congress elites, particularly during the first decade after independence when the development of institutionalized access to strategic social groups was of highest priority. Rural support in Alwar District was initially pursued by Congress elites shortly after independence through the Ahir community, several members of which had obtained law degrees during the 1940s. In 1952 two young advocates from this caste, Ghasi Ram Yadav and representatives from this area and have enjoyed a slightly higher level of representation on DCC Executives. Mahajan representation in the party organization has been uneven, and the competitiveness of members of these castes in the politics of ticket allocation has decreased significantly since 1952. Mahajans have increasingly contested as candidates of opposition parties, particularly the Jan Sangh, the major opposition party in Udaipur Division, and constituted 44 percent of the top opposition candidates in 1962. The Congress, however, has been responsive to demands for entry on the part of Scheduled Tribes and Castes. These groups have also enjoyed consistent representation in the state ministry through Bhika Bhai, a Bhil from Dungarpur, and Amritlal Yadav, a Chamar from Udaipur. Crucial in the organizational cohesion in this division has been the absence of conflict between political generations, the adroit managerial abilities of Mohanlal Sukhadia (since 1954 the chief minister), and the access to positions of power at the state level that his position of control has provided.

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

Ramjilal Yadav, successfully contested the elections as Congress candidates, and Ghasi Ram Yadav successfully contested all subsequent elections on the Congress ticket. T h e decision to absorb Ahir political aspirants into the party did not risk the alienation of support from other rural groups. T h e other significant peasant group in Alwar, the Muslim Meos, TABLE CASTE

17

OF CONGRESS AND T O P IN THE M A T S Y A (M

•952

OPPOSITION

REGION,

CANDIDATES

1952-1967

PERCENT)

1957

1 362

1967

Caste

c

O

C

O

C

O

C

Brahman Mahajan Jat Other peasant Rajput Other clean castes Muslim

3' '9 •9 '9 0 6 6 16

•3 0 67 13 0 7 0 15

25 25 '3 13 6 13 6 16

0 21 5° 0 29 0 0 17

33 27 7 •3 7 7 7 '5

25 '9 25 '3 6 '3 0 16

36 •• 21 0 14 .. 0 14 .. 14 .. 14 ..

N

=

O

who had been the focus of the communal fury that visited the state in 1947, looked on the Congress as patron and protector. T h e Muslim community sought and was extended representation in the Congress system, however, when Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, a social and political worker of long standing in the community, was granted a Congress ticket for the 1952 and 1957 elections from Bharatpur District. Tickets were also awarded to members of this community in both 1962 and 1967, although the first time that a Muslim contested as a Congress candidate from Alwar District was 1967. In Bharatpur District the pattern of organizational adaptation was somewhat different, partially because of previous political association and strategy. Immediately after independence a new effort was made to attract Jats to the Congress, and the success of this move is indicated by the extent of Jat representation on the P C C in 1948. Prior to the first General Elections, however, many

T H E CONGRESS

P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

Jats again left the party over difficulties in obtaining the Congress ticket and conflicts about achieving positions of leadershp in the party organization, and joined the Krishikar L o k party, which attracted the membership of R a j a Man Singh, the popular but temperamental younger brother of the Bharatpur r u l i n g prince. T h e president of the Rajasthan Branch of the K L P was Gopilal Yadav. Some Jat leaders were once again attracted to the Congress after the merger of the K L P with the Congress in 1955, and in the Bharatpur Congress this was followed by a curious alliance between Gopilal Yadav and R a j a Man Singh on the one hand, and the preindependence radical leaders of the Congress w h o had been displaced in the District Congress Committee Executive by the organizational elections of 1952 on the other. T h e radical leadership, ironically, had controlled the organization at the time of the first General Elections and their lack of responsiveness to Jat aspirations and the raja's expectation of authority and deference had prompted the exodus. A l t h o u g h the group closely attached to R a j a Man Singh left the party once again on the eve of the second General Elections, the reentry of Jats into the Congress resulted in a linear decline in the n u m b e r of Jat candidates counted among the top opposition candidates in Matsya even as the proportion of Congress Jat candidates also declined. T h e Congress party in Matsya attracted the participation of Rajputs before any other area of the state. R a j p u t participation, however, has been limited exclusively to the D h o l p u r area of Bharatpur District. Several Rajputs were instrumental in founding the Dholpur Praja Mandal in 1947-1948 to protest the authority of the Jat-ruled D h o l p u r State. In several cases Rajputs entered the Congress before independence; they have served as the chief elective officers of the D h o l p u r D C C and, in coalition with an urban Mahajan group, control party affairs in this area of Bharatpur District. T h e quest for R a j p u t support elsewhere in Matsya has been much more restrained, and the appeal of the Congress to Rajputs has been much more limited. T h i s has been in large part a function of previous political activity and association of important R a j p u t sardars and the limited need of the Congress for additional political support in rural areas; the Congress in A l w a r District

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

J

53

enjoys support from important segments of rural communities, namely Ahirs, Brahmans, Scheduled Castes, and Meos. In Alwar several important leaders of the Rajput community, including the maharaja, were implicated in the anti-Muslim actions of the state on the eve of independence. Rajputs in this part of Matsya have been tainted with a communalist image, a political handicap in an area which has a large Muslim population. Rajput candidates in opposition have not posed a threat to the Congress, and only one has successfully contested elections to the Legislative Assembly. There has been a long-standing rural tradition in the Congress party and its organizational antecedents in Matsya. T h i s has been a function of peasant-caste participation in early political movements as well as that of rural and small-town men of ritually high castes. Representation in all institutional spheres of the Congress system has become increasingly plural since independence, although trends have varied by sphere as well as by caste. T h e expanded scope of social participation was in large part a function of conscious policy on the part of Congress elites. This was true in the case of the Ahirs, Meos, and later the Jats. In Dholpur it was true of Rajputs, the Congress in that area being a R a j p u t Mahajan coalition. Furthermore, differential patterns of representation by institutional spheres have also been a significant characteristic. T h e higher the organizational level, the more social composition has favored high castes. T h e lower the level, the more socially plural has been representation. T h i s has been particularly important in the case of peasant castes and Harijans. T h e Congress party in the Jaipur region since independence has continued to reflect the high-caste bias of the Jaipur Praja Mandal. Rural recruitment in the Mandal, as noted in Chapter 3, was located almost exclusively in Shekhawati and was limited to members of the Jat caste. Praja Mandal outposts were located in large towns, monopolized by Brahmans, and outside of Shekawati were oriented more toward the politics of the metropole than toward the countryside. T h e large majority of representatives elected to the Pradesh Congress Committee since 1946 from the four districts of this division besides Shekhawati and Matsya—Jaipur, Sawai Madhopur, Ajmer, and T o n k — h a v e been Brahman or Mahajan. T h e propor-

154

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

tion of these groups has ranged from 88 percent in 1948 to a low of 74 percent in 1956. This pattern of social dominance has also characterized the membership of DCC Executive Committees as well. In 1953-1954. 79 percent of the incumbents were from these two groups of castes, while by 1963 this proportion had declined to 67 percent. There have been several significant changes in the composition of high-caste representatives in both the PCC delegations and DCC Executives in this area, however. The most striking change has been the considerable decrease in the number and proportion of representatives from Mahajan castes on both the PCC and the DCC Executive Committees. The Mahajan proportion of PCC representatives declined from 41 percent in 1946 to a mere 10 percent in 1963-1965, while representation on DCC Executives declined from 35 percent in 1953-1954 to 19 percent in 1963. Brahman representation, on the other hand, increased dramatically on the PCC during that period and registered a slight increase on the DCC. The decline of Mahajan representation has been most pronounced in Jaipur District. During the preindependence period, Mahajan castes from this district had contributed important members to the Praja Mandal movement. These merchant-caste participants were recruited primarily from Jaipur City and eventually became a part of the urban factional coalition headed by Pandit Hiralal Shastri. With the diminution of Shastri's authority in the party organization in 1949 and the dismissal of his ministry in 1951, this faction was discredited and lost its control over positions of organizational power.29 Those who constituted the anti-Shastri coalition in Jaipur were primarily Brahman political entrepreneurs from rural towns who did not benefit from Shastri's distribution of power and status. 29. T h e decline of Mahajan participation in the Congress party in the J a i p u r region is also suggested by the politics of ticket allocation. While Mahajan applicants received 36 percent of the party tickets allocated for the general constituencies in 1952, they received but 12 percent in 1967. T h e number of Mahajan applicants for the party ticket has also dropped significandy, particularly in Jaipur and Ajmer districts, but has remained fairly high in Sawai Madhopur and Tonk. Computed from District Observer Reports and Constituency Files, Pradesh Congress Committee Office.

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

155

Many had joined the Azad Morcha in 1942 to oppose the pro-state position taken by the Praja Mandal under Shastri's leadership during the "Quit India" Movement, and Brahman leaders had become concerned about the massive entry of Mahajans into the party durT A B L E 18 C A S T E R E P R E S E N T A T I O N ON THE P C C FROM THE J A I P U R R E G I O N ,

AND

DCCS

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Caste and Party Unit Brahman PCC DCC Mahajan PCC DCC Peasant Castes PCC DCC Rajput PCC DCC Other clean castes PCC DCC Scheduled Castes and Tribes PCC DCC Muslim PCC DCC N

19461948

1948-

'954«956

1958-

'95°

1960

«965

44

52

46

67

77

4'

48

44 36

35 35

18

10

39

«9

0

6

8 6

6 2

0 7

4

3

12

0 7

6 2

0 3

0

7

3 7

0

9 i

0 10

0 3

0 2

3 7

26

33 44

3' 42

41

3 4

.,

3

4

0

4

0

27

38

6

=

PCC DCC

1963-

34

ing the mid-1940s and their assumption of positions of political power. This cleavage then was joined on a city vs. district town as well as a caste basis. While the representation of Mahajans has decreased in Jaipur and Ajmer districts of Jaipur Division, the proportion of Brahmans has increased. The PCC delegations from these two districts

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

156

T A B L E 19 CASTE OF CONGRESS AND T O P OPPOSITION CANDIDATES IN THE JAIPUR REGION,

1952-1967

(IN PERCENT)

Caste and Political Affiliation Brahman C O Mahajan C O Jat C O Other peasant castes C O Rajput C O Other clean castes C O Muslim C O N

1952

1957

1962

«967

55 31

60 «4

52 19

54

36 '3

4 27

«5 15

12

0 8

4 '4

4 4

0

0

0 0

4 26

4

4 0 42

12 36

7 30

12

4 8

12 9

11

12

4 4

8 0

7 0

24

25

27

7 8

=

C 0

24

22

26

27

have continually been largely Brahman in composition. T h i s predominance is also reflected in control of district party institutions. Since 1953-1954 Brahmans have constituted the large majority of representatives on the D C C Executive Committee of each district, have monopolized formal positions of organizational leadership, and have been the primary recipients of tickets for elections to the Legislative Assembly. In A j m e r this reflects the persistence of preindependence patterns of social representation. 80 Those who were 30. A m o n g the Congress candidates in Ajmer in 1967, five of the seven were Brahman, and four of the Brahmans had entered politics before 1937. T h e other successful Brahman was a woman who had entered politics i n 1946.

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

'57

active in the early Congress movement in Ajmer-Merwara have continued to monopolize party positions and status. This social elitism also coincides with urban bias. Brahman representatives from Ajmer District have all been reared in urban areas, and all but one are advocates in the important cities of Ajmer, Beawar, Pushkar, and Kishengarh. In the 1967 elections all Congress Brahman candidates were defeated, although all had contested at least the two previous elections and all but one had done so successfully both times. It is noteworthy that the most successful opposition candidates have been rural men—Rajputs and members of peasant castes. Brahman dominance of the Congress organization in Jaipur District derives from a different pattern of social organization and constitutes a different profile of political recruitment and support than that of Ajmer District. Brahmans in this district are prevalent in rural areas—many of them are farmers—and the Congress party, while it has drawn heavily on Brahman leaders from Jaipur City, has also attracted the participation of Brahmans from villages and rural towns. Brahman aspirants have also received the majority of party tickets in Jaipur District, as they have in Ajmer and Bharatpur districts. Unlike the districts of Matsya, the Congress party in Jaipur Division has not attracted broad participation of peasant castes: their representation has never exceeded approximately 7 percent of the P C C and of the D C C Executive Committees. T h e allocation of party tickets has also been minimal in the case of Jats as well as other peasant castes. This pattern of social participation has also characterized the Congress in Kotah Division, where the party organization has been monopolized consistently by members of elite castes from urban areas and where the Congress secured only two of sixteen seats in the 1967 elections. Peasant participation in the Congress in Jaipur has been influenced by pre independence patterns of mobilization and organizational access. Peasant movements were located primarily in that area of Jaipur State which was eventually reorganized to form the Jhunjhunu and Sikar districts of Shekhawati. Much of the area that now constitutes Jaipur District was khalsa land, where rules of tenure were more lenient and more consistently applied than in the

i58

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

jagiridari areas to the north. Since independence Jaipuri Jats have also enjoyed political access through J a t groups at the state level: the one Congress Jat legislator from Jaipur District, Kamla Beniwal, served as a deputy minister from 1954 to 1957 and again from 1962 to 1967. Finally, those who have controlled the Jaipur Congress organizational apparatus have been in conflict with Jatled factions at the state level since 1954 and have consistently raised the spectre of communalism in their opposition to efforts from outside peasant groups to undermine their authority in local party organizations. Groups other than the Jats have proved more attractive to the Congress for political investment in Jaipur Division. This skewness in social representation may entail important electoral difficulties for the Congress party in this area during the next decade. While peasant castes in these districts were not mobilized during the first decade after independence, peasant castes, particularly other than Jats, have recently become so. This mobilization has not only been a function of the larger modernization process but has also been particularly encouraged by the institution of Panchayati Raj institutions in 1959. In 1961, for example, the largest number of panchas in Sawai Madhopur District were Mina, legally defined as a Scheduled T r i b e but in fact increasingly dynamic agriculturalists. 31 Minas constituted the second largest number of panchas in Jaipur District, Brahmans being most numerous. This same pattern was reflected in the distribution of sarpanchas (the chairmen of village panchayats) and of pradhans (the presidents of Panchayat Samitis located at the subdistrict level). In Sawai Madhopur, Minas constituted the largest number of sarpanchas and together with the Jats constituted the second largest group in Jaipur District. The mobilization of peasant castes, primarily Gujar and Mina, has been reflected in the increasing opposition to the Congress party in Jaipur Division. Of the top opposition candidates in Jaipur Division, 12 percent were from peasant castes in 1952, but this had increased to 30 percent by 1962. While most of 31. These data derive from a study of panchayat elections in Rajasthan carried out by the Evaluation Organization, Government of Rajasthan. Data other than caste have been reported in A Report on the Panchayat Election in Rajasthan, i960 published by that agency in ig6i.

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

»59

these candidates in 1952 were Jat, the large majority in 1962 were members of other peasant castes. In Jaipur Division there has been limited representation accorded to R a j p u t s in the Congress party. T h e Maharaja and Maharani of Jaipur have been invited at various times by both national and state leaders to contest elections to the Lok Sabha on the C o n gress ticket but have consistently refused. T h i s has tended to maintain a psychological distance between the R a j p u t community and the Congress. Furthermore, the experiences of Rajputs who have entered the Congress in this area have in many cases been unpleasant. R a j p u t M L A s w h o entered the Congress in 1954, for example, were refused the party ticket in 1957. 82 T h i s and subsequent barriers to R a j p u t mobility in the Congress party in Jaipur have been primarily the work of the leader of an important faction in this area because his o w n immediate center of political support has been and continues to be opposed by Rajputs. Since 1962, in the form of 32. T h e Rajputs in Udaipur Division have also been unsuccessful in achieving mobility in the Congress. Members of this community have constituted an important segment of the opposition in rural areas, and although the proportion of top opposition candidates that have been Rajput declined between 1952 and 1962, it increased sharply in 1967. T h e Congress has been successful in its efforts thus far to maintain a commitment from the royal house of Udaipur to remain neutral in political life. While Rajputs have not enjoyed representation in the Congress organization in Kotah Division, they have been important recipients of Congress tickets. Rajputs in both Kotah and Jhalawar districts were given Congress tickets in 1957 and 1962 and were singularly successful in these elections. T h e leader of the R a j p u t faction in the Congress party at the state level and minister of long standing, the late Maharaja Harish Chandra of Jhalawar, was the informal leader of the party in this area. It also had as a party notable the Maharajkumar of Kotah, who was elected to the Lok Sabha in 1962 as a Congressman. Due to lack of control over party institutions as well as what were felt to be limited privileges and power in the state ministry, this group left the Congress party in Kotah prior to the 1967 elections. Congress won none of the contests in Kotah Division in these elections. T h e exit of the Rajput group from the Congress in Kotah and Jhalawar changed the trend of the social basis of opposition. While 77 percent of the top opposition candidates in 1952 were Rajput, this had declined to 22 percent in 1962, almost exclusively in the form of Jan Sangh candidates in Kotah District. Several of those who left the Congress in 1966-1967 joined the Jan Sangh and contested as candidates of this party in the 1967 elections. For these observations and many others the author is indebted to Jujhar Singh, M.L.A.

i6o

T H E CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

the Swatantra party, Rajputs have constituted the major opposition to the Congress party in Jaipur and have been singularly attractive and successful in attracting the political support of newly mobilized peasant castes and have received the intermittent support of important leaders among the Jats. Untouchables, who constitute a sizable proportion of the population, have achieved representation in the Congress only as clients of Brahman political patrons. T h e socially closed character of the Congress has been reflected in its electoral fortunes since 1962. In that year Congress won only two of twenty-one seats in Jaipur and T o n k districts, and the successful Congress candidates were not representative of the party in the area. O n e was a Jat, and the other was a Mahajan populist who had successfully contested against the Congress from his constituency in 1957 as an independent candidate. In 1967 the Congress faired somewhat better in these two districts, winning seven of twenty-two seats, but suffered a major defeat in A j m e r District, winning only two of nine seats. T h u s while the Congress won only eleven of thirty-eight seats in 1962, they won thirteen of forty seats in 1967. T h e successful candidates included five peasant caste, including two Minas; five Brahmans, including one who contested successfully from two constituencies; two Rajputs and one Bengali. T h i s profile is neither representative of the pattern of representation for the Congress organization nor representative of the body of recipients of the party ticket for that year. THE CONGRESS AND THE GREEN UPRISING: PEASANT MOBILIZATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION

T h e most significant changes in the social composition of the Congress party in Rajasthan have occurred in the desert areas of the state. In these regions the urban elites of the Praja Mandal movements had not been able to develop direct rural support as they had in Matsya and Udaipur. T h i s was particularly true in Jodhpur, where the Congress party at the time of founding was an exclusively urban organization. In Shekhawati and Bikaner, as we have seen, Jats enjoyed representation in the party through the continuation of preindependence patterns of political association. Also unlike the areas to the east and south, there was a high level of peasant mobilization in the desert regions before 1947. T h e changed social composition of the party was initially a function of the strat-

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

161

egy of urban groups that realized the need of establishing a base of political support in the rural areas. Secondly, it was encouraged by factional competition at both the state and local levels. T h e social composition of the Congress in these regions, therefore, is radically different from that in the eastern and southern areas of the state. In the case of the two districts of S h e k h a w a t i — J h u n j h u n u and S i k a r — t h e urban monopoly of party councils that prevailed at independence declined severely with the absorption of members of the Kisan Sab has into the Congress and with continued political recruitment from the Jat community. T h e proportion of Jat P C C representatives from Shekhawati increased from 14 percent in 1946 to 62 percent in 1963, while the proportion of Brahm a n and Mahajan representatives declined from 86 percent to 23 percent during the same period. Jats enjoyed a monopoly of formal positions of authority in district Congress organizations through the 1950s and have been the most successful applicants for the Congress party ticket in this area as well. W h i l e representation on the P C C has increased, Jat representation on District Congress C o m m i t t e e Executives has decreased since reaching its apogee in 1953. From 64 percent in 1953, Jat representation declined to 46 percent in 1963. T h i s change has been accompanied by an increase in the representation of both Brahman and Mahajan castes after several years of very limited participation following the integration of the R a j p u t a n a states and the political ascendancy of the Jats that accompanied the creation of District Congress C o m m i t tees in 1948. T h e reduction of Jat representation on district party committees has been paralleled in the distribution of party tickets. W h i l e Jats were Congress candidates in 75 percent of the general constituencies in 1952, this proportion has decreased somewhat since. T h e cohesion, dominance, and subsequent decline of Jat representatives in the Shekhawati Congress has been a function of several processes and conditions. T h e first phase of Jat entry into the Congress was characterized by group solidarity and declarations of "Jat-wat"—Jat rule. T h i s cohesion was intensified as Jat aspiration met competition from urban elite incumbents of strategic organizational positions, men w h o in many cases initially supported the entry of the Jats into the party. T h e s e conflicts over control of local party institutions were complicated by factional competition

1Ô2

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

at the state level where local urban leaders were allied with a factional coalition that opposed the alleged politics of aggrandizement on the part of Jat coalition in state politics. The cohesion of the Jat faction in district party committees and efforts to mobilize T A B L E 20 CASTE REPRESENTATION ON THE P C C AND D C C S FROM SHEKHAWATI, 1946-1965 (IN PERCENT)

Caste and Party Unit Brahman PCC DCC Mahajan PCC DCC Jat PCC DCC Rajput PCC DCC Other clean castes PCC DCC Scheduled Castes and Tribes PCC DCC Muslim PCC DCC

19461948

1948-

29

50

57

33

«4

'95°

1956

19581960

0

23

1963'965 8

22

29

0 7

23 '5

18

•7

83 64

54 56

62 46

0

0

'7 0

0 4

'5 4

0

0

0 4

0 4

0 4

0

0

0 4

0 0

0 0

0

0

0 4

0 0

0 0

7

6

6 28

27

N =

PCC DCC

'954-

18

'3

•5

'3

28

new caste recruits were further stimulated by the entry of Rajputs into the Congress in 1954. In Shekhawati this included representatives of some of the most important ruling families of the region, although Rajputs have not achieved control in district party institutions. By the late 1950s, however, the cohesion of the Jat-based group

INSTITUTIONAL

163

ADAPTABILITY

within the Congress in Shekhawati had started to wane. First of all, a concerted Rajput threat to Jat dominance in the Shekhawati Congress failed to materialize after 1954, and the association of RajT A B L E ai C A S T E OF CONGRESS AND T O P OPPOSITION CANDIDATES

IN SHEKHAWATI, 1952-1967 (IN P E R C E N T )

Caste and Political Affiliation Brahman C O Mahajan C O Jat C O Other peasant castes C O Rajput C O Other clean castes C O Muslim C O N

=

c 0

'957

1962

'967

8 0

8 23

8 '4

18

«7 0

'5 '5

8 7

18

75 64

62 23

69 21

64

0 0

0 0

0 7

0

0 36

8 3»

8 43

0

0 0

0 0

0 7

0

0 0

8 8

8 0

0

12 11

'3 «3

'3 '4

11

'952

puts with the Congress served to reduce the intensity of Rajput threat to the Congress party itself. The entry of important Rajputs into the Congress divided the Rajput caste in politics, and those who remained in opposition were further divided between followers of the Bhumiswami Sangh leader, Madan Singh of Danta, on the one hand, and separate local, but politically active, Rajput notables on the other. Thus the political environment of the Congress party as well as the environment of the Jat group within the Con-

164

THE CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

gress was divided with no groups singly or in coalition being in a position to seriously challenge Jat dominance. Given these structural limitations of threat to the Jat group, two processes internal to the group had destabilizing consequences. First, the magnitude of Jat recruitment into the Congress reduced the capability of older Jat elites to satisfy demands for effective participation, and this was complicated by the increasing isolation of Shekhawati Jat leaders from power at the state level. Although venerated locally and respected in state leadership circles for their role in the "anti-feudal struggle" and the "freedom movement," the control of the old elite started to diminish in the late 1950s. Shekhawati Jats, for example, never achieved representation on the state ministry before 1967, although a Shekhawati Rajput served as deputy minister from 1959-1967. Nor was the old leadership particularly successful in electoral politics after the first General Elections: several were refused the Congress ticket in 1957 and others suffered defeat in the elections of 1962. Younger Jat leaders were elected in both of these elections. T h e lack of representation of Shekhawati Jats in state ministries, the allegedly autocratic manner in which the old leadership managed political affairs in Shekhawati, and the introduction of a new conflict arena with Panchayati Raj encouraged the formation of new political groups in both Jhunjhunu and Sikar districts led by young and well-educated Jats. T h e formation of new groups was also encouraged by the access provided these young Jat leaders by party leaders from other regions who were opposed to the Jat factional coalition at the state level. T h i s became particularly important with the increasing conflict between the Sukhadia factional coalition and that led by Choudhry Kumbharam Arya after 1958. Factional competition resulted in a new form of social pluralism in the Shekhawati Congress. First of all, there were new alignments between existing groups in the party organization, the most important being a temporary alliance of urban leaders and the "older" generation of Jat leaders. Second, it resulted in new recruitment outside the Jat caste and in the selection of non-Jats for important organizational positions. In 1953, for example, five of eight officers of the DCCs in Jhunjhunu and Sikar were Jat, while in 1963 Jats held only three of eight incumbencies. More impor-

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

165

tantly, it resulted in generational elite succession among Congress Jats. With one exception, Jat officials by 1963 were members of the younger generation of politicians. T h e Congress in Shekhawati, however, has not attempted to absorb representatives of the Rajput caste into the organization at the local level. Nor have Shekhawati Rajputs enjoyed organizational representation at the state level. Access has been achieved through informal contacts with centers of economic power at the state and national level and through a deputy ministership. This absence of institutionalized access and the limits on the number of Rajput houses that have achieved access to centers of party power has encouraged new attempts at political cooperation among Rajput groups in this area, efforts that have successfully been seized upon by the Swatantra party. T h e social composition of the Congress party in Bikaner Division is similar to that in Shekhawati. Members of the Jat caste have dominated the party organization in the three districts of this division since 1946 when Swami Karmanand, a noted Jat sanyasi and social and political worker, was elected president of the Bikaner Rajya Praja Parishad. T w o years later two Jat leaders were taken into the first popular ministry constituted in Bikaner State. Hardutt Singh, a barrister from a wealthy Jat family, was made deputy prime minister and given charge of the sensitive Home Portofolio. Choudhry Kumbharam Arya, a man of more limited formal education and from a Jat family of lower station, was made minister of revenue. Although the founders and early political entrepreneurs in Bikaner State were Mahajan and Brahman, representatives of these castes have not dominated party councils since the entry of Jats in large number after 1945. By 1946 Jats constituted 62 percent of the membership of the Prantiya Sabha from Bikaner State, the remainder being entirely Brahman and Mahajan. T h e proportion of Brahmans and Mahajans increased in 1948 reflecting the temporary political ascendancy of Raghubhir Dayal Goyal, a Mahajan and an unpopular member of the Shastri cabinet. As in Jaipur Division, the increased number of Mahajan P C C representatives from Bikaner reflected the effort of this temporary coalition to create a base of support in the party organization—a move vigorously op-

i66

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

posed by the majority factions in district party organizations. By 1963 Brahmans and Mahajans accounted for but 27 percent of P C C delegates from this division. Representation from other castes on the PCC from this area has been negligible. T A B L E 22 CASTE REPRESENTATION ON THE P C C AND DCCS FROM BIKANER DIVISION, 1946-1965 (IN PERCENT)

Caste and Party Unit Brahman PCC DCC Mahajan PCC DCC Peasant castes PCC DCC Rajput PCC DCC Other clean castes PCC DCC Scheduled Castes and Tribes PCC DCC N =

PCC DCC

'954" 1956

1958-

1963-

8 16

20 16

21 21

8

7 11

7 '7

45

62

50

73 50

64 40

0

0

8

0

0

0

0

'5

8

0 7

7 13

0

0

0 «3

0 »4

0

'3

11

19461948

1948-

3'

27

8

27

'95°

• •

62

11

3

13

28

1960

2

15

27

1965

2

6

'4

28

The social composition of the District Congress Committee Executives in Bikaner Division, however, has demonstrated different trends, particularly during the last decade. While the majority of Executive Committee members have been Jat, primarily in Ganganagar and Churu districts, this proportion has declined since the early 1960s, and the representation of Brahmans, Mahajans, and Jat Sikhs from the Gang Canal Colony of Ganganagar District has increased appreciably. This is also true of formal positions of or-

167

INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTABILITY TABLE

23

C A S T E OF CONORESS AND T O P OPPOSITION IN B K A N E R DIVISION,

CANDIDATES

1952-1967

(IN P E R C E N T )

Caste and Political Affiliation Brahman C O Mahajan C O Jat C 0 Other peasant castes C O Rajput C O Other clean castes C O Muslim C O N

'952 9

1957

1962

'967

8

«4 29

'5

21

'5

8

8

18

»5 3i

8

43 29

38

8

7 0

0

8

7 «4

'5

7 7

'5

55 42

46

0 0

0 33 9

21

38 0

8 8

8

«5

9 0

0

0 0

0

>3 '3

'4 14

>3

8

=

C O

11 12

ganizational leadership. While a majority of the formal incumbencies were held by Jats in 1953, Jats were in a minority by 1963. In several cases leadership positions were held by non-Jats who were in coalition against the historically dominant Jat group led by Choudhry Kumbharam Arya. The distribution of party tickets in this region reflects the social configuration of the DCC Executive Committees. While Jats have been the most numerous recipients of the party ticket, the proportion of Brahmans and Jat Sikhs has increased, particularly during the 1960s. This increased participation of new social groups has served to transform the organization of power in the Ganganagar

i68

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

District Congress Committee, but to a lesser extent in Churu, and prompted the departure of the long-time Congress leader of this area, Choudhry Kumbharam Arya, prior to the 1967 elections after two decades of political dominance. T h e Congress party in Ganganagar and Churu districts of Bikaner Division, as in Shekhawati, has never been confronted by a cohesive political opposition based on either primordial sentiment or ideological commitment. T h e Sikh community, important in the economic affairs of Ganganagar District, has not acted collectively in politics. In none of the districts of this division have Rajputs organized permanently for political action. Unlike Shekhawati and Jodhpur, few members of the caste are the dispossessed heirs of large landed estates, bases of social power which in the former two areas have been transformed into electoral power. Rajputs in Bikaner Division, for example, were among the least successful candidates from this caste in the first General Elections. T h e creation of a coalition of Rajput notables in opposition to the Congress, as has recently occured in Shekhawati, is much more difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the intensity of conflict between Jat and Rajput has not been as intense as it was in Shekhawati and certain areas of former Jodhpur State. Finally, the Maharaja of Bikaner, a potential focus for Rajput political organization, has chosen to limit his political ambitions to his gentleman's seat in the Lok Sabha and locally has maintained a no-contest agreement with the Congress party. T h e Congress organization and legislative delegations from this region have been socially plural, and this profile has preindependence antecedents. While initially Brahman and Mahajan in composition, the party assumed a mass character in the 1940s with the entry of Jats. While Sikhs were not attracted to the Congress in large number before independence, participation has expanded since, particularly in the distribution of party tickets. As in all other regions, however, except two districts of Udaipur Division, the Congress party has been composed predominantly of persons of clean ritual status. T h e pattern of change in social representation in Jodhpur differs in important ways from Bikaner and Shekhawati. T h e participation of peasant castes in the Congress party in this area com-

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

menced much later than in the other two regions. T h e restricted base of social representation in the party before the entry of the Kisan Sabha is indicated by Table 24. Representation on the Prantiya Sabha, the precursor to the Pradesh Congress Committee, was exclusively limited in 1946 to Brahmans, Mahajans, Kayasths, and a single Chamar. Members of these elite castes provided Rajasthan with much of its leadership before the first General Elections. Brahman and Mahajan representation on the PCC, however, declined to 46 percent by 1954 and to 27 percent by 1963-1965, the most dramatic decrease being among Brahmans—many of whom had been founders of early political movements in Jodhpur State. Peasant caste representation has remained rather steady since 1954, ranging from 23 percent to 27 percent. In D C C Executive Committees, however, it has increased from 10 percent in 1953 to 46 percent in 1963. T h i s has accompanied a decrease in Brahman as well as Mahajan representation. Jat representation in district-level institutions has occurred largely in three districts where this caste predominates—Nagaur, Jodhpur Rural, and, since i960, in Barmen While the participation of peasant castes has increased in the Congress party organization in Jodhpur, it has declined in terms of ticket allocation. It will be recalled that one of the conditions for the entry of the Marwar Kisan Sabha into the Congress in 1951 was the right to nominate 50 percent of the candidates for the first General Elections in Jodhpur Division. T h e proportion of Jat and other peasant-caste recipients of Congress party tickets has since decreased, ranging from 33 percent to 36 percent of all general constituencies. There has also been a decline in both Brahman and Mahajan receipt of party tickets as well. T h e redistribution of party tickets for successive elections, while benefiting members of several social groups, has particularly favored Rajput applicants. T h e granting of effective political access to Jodhpuri Rajputs was an especially important consequence of political strategy on the part of Congress elites. It was important in that Jodhpur in the 1952 elections had provided traditional elites with their greatest measure of electoral support. In those elections Congress candidates were able to win but four of thirty-five seats, the remainder going exclusively to representatives of the landed aristocracy.

170

T H E CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

Both dominant factions at the state level in 1957 were committed to the satisfaction of Rajput demands. The distribution of tickets in 1957 and 1962, however, was to a special class of Rajputs. All Rajput candidates were educated at least through college and T A B L E 24 CASTE REPRESENTATION ON THE P C C AND D C C S FROM JODHPUR DIVISION, 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 6 5 (IN PERCENT)

Caste and Party Unit Brahman PCC DCC Mahajan PCC DCC Peasant castes PCC DCC Rajput PCC DCC Other clean castes PCC DCC Scheduled Castes and Tribes PCC DCC Muslim PCC DCC

19461948

1948-

50

50

40

'950

21

'9581960

«3

'963>965 11

36

20

21

40

25 36

32 23

>9

0

0

25 10

23 3'

38

0

0

4 4

13 7

16

7

7 ,,

18 8

13 9

11

3

3

0 3

3 7

3

0

0

7 3

3 3

11 5

30

30

28 67

3'

N =

PCC DCC

'9541956

70

16

27

3 10

8

37

61

several held law degrees. In 1957 all candidates came from large jagirs and had been active in the Kshatriya Mahasabha and the negotiations concerning Jagirdari resumption. Two had been close advisers of the late Maharaja Hanwant Singh. Four of the five had contested elections in 1952 in opposition to the Congress, all successfully. The distribution of tickets in 1962 was similar and in-

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

171

eluded a representative of the royal house of Jaisalmer. In 1967, however, distribution was quite different. W h i l e four of the old R a j p u t candidates were granted the ticket, the other four were new and came from smaller jagirs. TABLE CASTE

OF C O N G R E S S A N D T O P IN J O D H P U R (IN

Caste and Political Affiliation Brahman C O Mahajan C O Jat C O Other peasant castes C O Rajput C O Other clean castes C O Muslim C O N

25 OPPOSITION

DIVISION,

CANDIDATES

1952-1967

PERCENT)

1952

«957

1962

1967

16 6

24 7

7 10

10

26 3

'4 11

«5 21

10

29 0

24 11

25 3

23

16 3

10 '5

11 7

10

0 80

'7 52

25 45

27

6 6

3 4

7 7

10

6 3

7 0

11 7

10

3« 35

29 27

28 29

30

=

c 0

R a j p u t participation in the Congress has been limited to four districts—Jodhpur, Pali, Sirohi, and Jalore—and in at least two districts by 1965 Rajputs had served as officers of the District Congress Committee. N o Rajput, however, has ever contested as a Congress candidate from either Barmer or Nagaur districts, the center of preindependence kisan movements. In the case of Nagaur, the absence of R a j p u t representation is due to the dominance and co-

172

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

hesion of the Jat group which has controlled the district party since 1951 without outside interference and until 1967 was exceptionally successful in the general elections. In Banner, Rajputs have until recently remained aloof from the political process just as they enjoyed autonomy from the Jodhpur darbar. There have also been conflicts between Rajputs in this area and those who initially negotiated the terms of jagirdari abolition, many of whom entered the Congress in other areas of Jodhpur. Rajputs have also enjoyed enviable political access at the national level where they found a protector in Prime Minister Nehru. Until the 1962 elections, Rajputs also enjoyed the support of Jai Narain Vyas, who had particularly close personal ties with Nehru that dated from the early days of the independence movement in Rajasthan. Rajputs in Jodhpur have also enjoyed representation on the PCC in greater measure than their caste fellows from other regions. The two Rajput representatives on the PCC Executive Committee at least until 1965 were from Jodhpur. Both were extremely able men, and one, the late Vijay Singh Siriari, was widely respected beyond his caste for his intellectual erudition and political judgment. The entry of important Rajputs into the Jodhpur Congress and the mobility and political access that they have been afforded has contributed to the political institutionalization of the Congress party in this area of the state. It first reduced the overwhelming electoral power that Rajputs were able to marshal against the Congress in 1952. And although this might have been reduced appreciably without Rajput participation in the Congress, owing to the imposition of "severe deprivations" or the use of inducements and the extension of physical protection by the state to peasant castes, the chances are that Rajputs would have remained politically important. Although the number of Rajput Congress candidates has increased and there has also been a dramatic decrease in the proportion of Rajputs among the most competitive electoral candidates, Rajputs still constitute the most competitive opposition groups. In terms of social representation, the Rajasthan Congress has undergone an immense transformation during the twenty years

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

J

73

since its founding. Only in one sense is it the same: state as well as district-level party institutions have tended to be controlled by caste Hindus while the representation of minority communities such as Muslims and Harijans has been considerably less in the party organization than their proportion of the total population. It has been commensurate, however, with respect to the allocation of party tickets. Among caste Hindus, however, this twenty-year period has witnessed pluralization and democratization in social representation in all party institutions as Brahman and Mahajan elites have been progressively displaced by representatives from other ritually pure Hindu castes. In short, the Rajasthan Congress has been transformed from a party managed by elite castes recruited largely from urban areas to a penetrative institution with elites recruited from lower levels of the caste hierarchy and from small towns and villages. An analysis of social representation only in state-level institutions and for the state as a whole, however, disguises patterns of change and continuity that have occurred at the district and regional level, patterns that vary significantly from those discernible in the larger system conceived as a whole. First of all, in all areas, representation has been socially plural. The Congress party in no area is the exclusive preserve of a single social group. Pluralization has been more noticeable in district-level party institutions than in delegations to the Pradesh Congress Committee. There has also been a marked trend toward increased pluralization in the distribution of party tickets. The incidence of social pluralization in party institutions has varied significantly from region to region. The lowest level of organzational adaptability, conceived in terms of social representation, was found in Jaipur Division where elite castes, primarily Brahman, have not been responsive to the demands for organizational entry on the part of peasant and backward castes. Social exclusiveness has also characterized the party in Kotah Division, where representatives of elite castes largely from urban areas continue to monopolize local party institutions and state delegations, and where Rajput party members were never able to achieve control over strategic positions in the party organization. While high castes have continued to be predominant in the party in Udaipur

174

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

Division, Scheduled Tribes have enjoyed increasing representation in those two districts where they are numerically dominant. T h e highest incidence of pluralization has occurred in the "dry" areas of the state. This resulted from the absorption of Jat organizations and political groups into the party and later the absorption of important members of the Rajput landed aristocracy. Where Jats entered the Congress organization en masse and established control over the party organization, however, Rajputs have not entered the Congress in great measure. This has been true in Ganganagar and Churu districts of Bikaner Division, and of Nagaur and Barmer districts of Jodhpur Division. In Shekhawati a limited number of Rajputs are members of the party but enjoy their position by virtue of factional linkages at the state level and through associations within important Marwari business interests at the national level. Where Jats have been divided, where other peasant castes have constituted the bulk of kisan representation, or where urban interests have continued to be institutionally significant, Rajputs have entered the party. This is particularly applicable to Jodhpur, Jalore, Pali, and Sirohi districts of Jodhpur Division. It is important to note the sector of Rajput society represented in the Congress. Rajputs who have become important actors in the Congress have come from large landed estates. These men were the first within their community to become politically active, all having come from participative traditions in the local social order and many having been educated to the procedures of participative politics during their education in the British provinces. Secondly, the Congress was particularly attractive because of contacts that this social element enjoyed with the prime minister, the potential for protecting economic interests, and the possibility of becoming important figures in state politics. Thirdly, this sector of the Rajput community was attractive to the Congress since it was a source of political power; that is to say, by granting entry and mobility to a limited number of men, the party could maximize its political support. Men from large jagirs and thikanas enjoyed prestige within their own caste and commanded social deference from other castes. Politically active representatives from smaller

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

175

estates have been attracted almost exclusively to opposition parties. There are two generally significant conditions of social democratization in the Congress. T h e first is the strategy of institutional development professed by party leaders during the first decade after independence. The party was conceived as an open and mass organization as a result of ideological commitment as well as of electoral necessity. This was especially characteristic of leaders from areas where the party at the time of independence was largely restricted in its activity and support to capital cities. T h e party in those areas where recruitment was primarily from rural towns and where political activity before independence has been close to rural areas was less concerned with the absorption of new caste groups into the party. Thus the principal force motivating Congress elites to expand the social base of representation in the party was pragmatic rather than ideological. It was prompted more by the desire to win elections and to govern than by abstract assumptions concerning the social meaning and mission of the party. This pragmatic orientation was conducive to flexibility in bargaining and agreement whereas a more ideological commitment might have resulted in organizational rigidity. Second, factional conflict has served both to encourage and to discourage the mobilization of new resources into the party. Where competition has existed within a caste or where competition has salience only for the local arena of conflict, the recruitment of new social resources has been encouraged. Where conflict has salience for a larger conflict arena and where the local opposition to a dominant faction enjoys affective ties with an antagonist in the larger conflict arena, recruitment into the party will tend to be closed. This we found to be true in the case of restricted recruitment of Jats and other peasant castes in Jaipur and in the case of Rajputs in Kotah and Jhalawar districts and in Udaipur Division. Congress success in elections has varied directly with change in the social basis of party representation. Congress candidates have been the least successful in those areas where social representation has been most restricted, especially in Jaipur and Kotah divisions where Congress fortunes have progressively declined since 1957. Electoral success has tended to be high in those areas where social

176

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

representation has been plural. But success here has been uneven. It should be noted that social pluralization exists in tension with organizational coherence. It will be recalled that the phase of initial pluralization after independence was characterized by a hostile political environment and the existence of commonly accepted dominant leaders in most districts. Social groups that entered the Congress party were also cohesive at the district level and had commonly accepted leaders. Dominant organizational leaders, all of whom had been "freedom fighters," performed an arbitrating function with respect to the district party. Leaders of newly recruited social groups performed the same function in those collectivities that they represented. Intraparty conflict was limited through the first General Elections and the tension and competition that did exist were successfully managed by those dominant leaders at the district level or by access and mediation at the state level. Negotiation occurred between a limited number of actors over a limited number of issues and elite agreement met in large measure with group compliance. Conflict was augmented and intensified, however, with the reduction of environmental threat in 1954 and with competition for ministerial posts and control over organizational positions. With the exception of Udaipur Division and certain other districts, those filling arbitrational roles at the district level were transformed into competitors attempting to mobilize and maintain structures of support that would enable control of the district party apparatus. Leaders of those social groups that remained cohesive continued to serve an arbitrational role within those groups but assumed increasingly the role of advocate between their group and the larger system. A third phase has been marked by the fission of caste-based political groups in many districts, divisions that have reflected difference in class and political generation as well as intense competition for mobility and control between men of the same generation. This has resulted in increased political pluralization, factional coalition, and increased recruitment of new political resources. This "postsocial pluralization" phase has also witnessed the exit of groups from the party, particularly on the eve of the fourth General Elections, and accounts for the poor performance of the Congress party

INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTABILITY

177

in several districts where social plural ization in phases one and two resulted in high levels of electoral success. Thus in those areas that have a socially plural organizational composition, factors such as political mobility, factional organization, and tension management are critical in accounting for organizational coherence or fragmentation and for performance.

Chapter 7

ORGANIZATIONAL MOBILITY AND P A R T I C I P A T I O N : C I R C U L A T I O N AND C O N G R U E N C Y OF PARTY ELITES

configuration of social representation in the Pradesh Congress Committee and its Executive has been accompanied by considerable mobility of persons in elite positions within the party. Not only have new social groups found political access through the Congress but positions of organizational power and prestige have also circulated fairly widely among representatives within each of these social categories. There have also been important changes in terms of political generation. T h e central burden of this chapter is to explore change in political generation and the incidence of elite circulation and the extent to which structurally strategic organizational and legislative roles have been monopolized by a single self-contained and self-perpetuating political elite. T H E CHANGING

It is extremely difficult to establish with authority and precision the degree of elite circulation that is optimal for a political party to maximize its capacity to persist as well as its effectiveness to pursue those objectives peculiar to it. Such an optimal incidence, it would appear, would vary according to a number of different variables or combinations of them. One such variable would be the character of the governmental format and the scope of political activity allowed. Where the instruments of coercion are effectively monopolized by a single elite at a particular point in time, the degree of circulation may be quite restricted or its incidence and the character of new political recruits controlled by design. In a more permissive political format the circulation

ORGANIZATIONAL M O B I L I T Y AND PARTICIPATION

179

may be in large measure dependent on the degree of political mobilization within the society. T h e more highly participative the society, the more responsive the elites at a given time must be to new demands in order that a party or even a regime may persist. Another factor associated with the participation-persistence equation is the character of those integrative bonds and affective ties which encourage cohesion in a political unit. In ideologically oriented parties, particularly under conditions where the dominant values of the ideology are felt to be gravely threatened, those subscribing to the ideology may consent to the continuity of a given political elite in positions of organizational power. In coalitional parties, which rest at the other end of this continuum, considerable political mobility may be necessary so that the coalition itself continues to exist and expand. This continuum could involve a number of different types of cohesive and contractual bonds, and the raison d'être of association might differ from participant to participant and from group to group. T h e dominant bond may also change over time—ideologically oriented parties tend to become more contractual as they pursue political power through elections, and coalitional parties tend to develop a more affective and collective identity as a result of their common involvement or political success. In addition to the questions of organizational persistence and effectiveness, a difficulty lies in attempts to establish the underlying meaning of the circulation of elites on the one hand and the nature and significance of those factors that have contributed to the persistence of certain members of the elite on the other. 1 A high circulation of elites may reflect the manipulation of an entrenched elite which hopes to maintain its position of power by merely affording a sense of "felt" participation to a number of political actors who are more or less apathetic and who are content merely to share in the prestige which membership in important party organizational committees can confer. Circulation 1. This question is part of a long tradition of contemplation in political and sociological inquiry. It is raised by Michels in his short critique of Pareto, although Michels himself does not assign much power to those absorbed by the corporate elite. Michels, Political Parties, p. 378.

i8o

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

might reflect the rise of political activists and a changing configuration of power among leaders and factions within the party. It might also reflect a new order of power as a result of a calculated strategy by the top elite at a particular point in time to expand the electoral power of the party—the elite thus sacrificing its unchallenged position for the purpose of expanding the power of the organization in the larger political system. T h e relationships among those who have persisted may not be highly cohesive and self-contained but may constitute a competitive situation—i.e., a group of men, each with his own political aspirations who continually jockeys for a more advantageous position for himself within the party and who controls more or less autonomous structures of political support, who attempts to attract the support of lesser leaders and groups already a part of the organizational system, and who attempts to expand his position by mobilizing new resources into the party. 2 This in itself might set in motion new political forces which develop their own bases of power and enter more and more into a bargaining relationship with those to whom they had initially extended their obligation within the party. The analysis of the elite structure of political parties is central to the study of the sociology of political parties in general and to the study of democratic parties in particular. 3 We shall attempt to 2. Eldersveld, Political Parties, pp. 9-10; Frank J . Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), pp. 153-165; and for an excellent study of the impact of new recruits on die elite structure of a party system see William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). For useful theoretical formulations see Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," in James G. March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 764-801; and William J . Crotty, ed., Approaches to the Study of Party Organization (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968). 3. A number of recent studies of political elites in the new states have addressed the question of social representation and political pluralism in elite structure. For example, see Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, pp. 390392; Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation, pp. 28, 56, and 89-96; Singer, The Emerging Elite, pp. 48-116; and Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 107-133. For a review of the literature see William Quandt, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970).

ORGANIZATIONAL

MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

l8l

determine the incidence of oligarchy in the Rajasthan Congress by analyzing several characteristics of elite circulation and congruence. First we will examine patterns of change in political generations in the party organization and candidates for the state Legislative Assembly. Second, we will determine the extent to which structurally strategic roles in the state Congress organization have circulated among different members of the party. Third, we will attempt to determine the extent to which organizational roles at different levels of the party are monopolized by the same political leaders. Fourth, we will analyze the extent of overlap in membership with respect to organizational and legislative positions. Finally, we will attempt to determine whether or not there are some leaders who have consistently held important positions in the organization and legislative parties even given a fairly high incidence of circulation of positions among members of the organization as a whole. REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL GENERATION

Generational difference within political movements and parties is a potential axis of political cleavage and conflict. This is particularly true in cases where there are marked differences in the political education and political experiences of different groups of political elites, a phenomenon which is striking in those cases where a political movement is transformed into a political party. Generational differences can be conceived as a concomitant of chronological differences in the society at large. In this case, the perception of difference by members of the society or of its institutions need not necessarily be conceived as politically relevant. Rather it is used merely for describing a generic difference in a quality. The concept of generation does assume political relevance, however, when age is either a necessary attribute in the hierarchy of political authority or where it is in itself a selfconscious base for political competition. Another conception of political generation does not use age as the central criterion, although it may be significant, but stresses differences in terms of shared political experiences, particularly crisis situations, the character of political education, and difference in the time and conditions of induction into political life. These differences are

182

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

also often accompanied by variant styles of political action and differences in political values and the character of political propriety. T h e periods of recruitment are defined by events important in the development of the Congress and in the way Congressmen refer to the political origins of their counterparts. These references vary according to the period of political entry of the person in question. T h e "old workers" often perceive those entering politics after the "Quit India" Movement as "newcomers" and, with a few notable exceptions, are often unable to distinguish the period of political recruitment of those who entered politics after independence and particularly after 1952. This is no doubt in part a function of what they consider to be important as a prerequisite to political purity. Furthermore, "newcomers" are often looked upon somewhat disparagingly since they have not experienced the reality nor the spirit of sacrifice. T o the "late newcomer," on the other hand, the distinctions between those who entered politics prior to the organization of Praja Mandals and those who entered politics afterwards, but prior to the "Quit India" Movement, are quite blurred and are not considered to be of particular importance. This group tends to be perceived as a more or less amorphous lot and are usually referred to as Praja Mandal workers or "old workers." When these "old workers" are not involved in the thick of politics, this reference carries considerable prestige, but when the worker is actually involved in politics, and particularly when he is on the "wrong" side of a conflict, the term carries a pejorative connotation. The most sophisticated distinctions are made by those who entered politics during the decade of the 1940s and who have been the dominant political leaders in postindependence politics. Their predecessors—the founders— were their political tutors during a very important period of Indian political history, while their successors in time of political entry are often those mobilized for purposes of political support. T h e major political events divide the periods of entry into four general categories. The first general category, "pre-1942," includes those who entered politics prior to the "Quit India" Movement, which had a tremendous impact in the larger Rajputana states— particularly on students from the area who were studying in the

ORGANIZATIONAL MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

l8$

British provinces. This category can be subdivided into two important periods: the first period, 1919-1936, has only the founders, who were active in initial political activity before protest became institutionalized in the form of Praja Mandal organizations; the second subdivision, 1937-1942, includes those who opted for a political vocation prior to the crisis of 1942. T h e second category, 1942 to 1947, includes those who entered politics during the " Q u i t India" Movement and shortly thereafter. T h e third category, 1947 to 1952, covers the interim between independence and the first General Elections, which was singularly important in the recruitment of new men into politics. T h e fourth category includes the post-1952 period. T h i s period can also be divided into two subcategories—those who entered politics between the first two General Elections and those w h o entered after the second General Election in 1957. T h i s distinction is particularly important to those who entered the Congress in the postindependence years.4 T h e Congress has undergone several marked changes in the pattern of representation within the Pradesh Congress Committee since its creation in 1946. Although the proportion of P C C members through 1963-1965 who entered politics prior to independence has continually decreased—from 74 percent in 1954, when a number of "old workers" still held important ministerial posts and major posts in the party organization, to 56 percent in 1963— this should not obscure the fact that the majority of P C C members in 1963-1965 had entered politics prior to independence. Major changes have also occurred within this preindependence majority. T h e proportion of those who entered politics prior to the " Q u i t India" Movement has declined from a high of 71 percent in 1946 to 22 percent in 1963. T h e most striking change, however, has occurred within the ranks of the old venerated leaders who were the creators of the initial movements of protest against princely rule. From a high of 23 percent in 1946, when representatives of this 4. A note on coding is in order. T h e " Q u i t India" Movement commenced o n August 6, 1942. T h u s those in the "pre-1942" category include all w h o entered politics before that time. Those encompassed by the 1942-1947 category includes those w h o were recruited from August 1942 to August 15, 1947. T h e 1947-1952 category includes those w h o entered the party between independence and the second General Elections.

184

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN T A B L E 26 REPRESENTATION ON THE P C C BY YEAR OF ENTRY INTO POLITICS (IN PERCENT)

Year

Pre-1942

1942-1947

1946-1948 1948-1950

71

«954-"956

34 34 34

29 38

62

1956-1958 1958-1960 1963-1965

22

»947-'952

Post-1952

N =* 1II

40

8

18

34 3° 34

7 9

25

11

123 "9 '31 128 138

28

33

group held almost all of the major decision-making posts within both the party organization and later in the first popular ministries, it declined to a negligible proportion in 1963 and included only one major early leader. T h e representation of those who entered the movement between 1942 and independence, however, has increased from 29 percent to 34 percent of the total during the same period. T h e dominant leaders of the Rajasthan Congress are those who entered politics during the decade between 1937 and 1947, and this group has consistently filled the largest share of positions on the P C C — from a high of 77 percent in 1946 to a low of 50 percent in 1963. Political activists recruited during this period have also monopolized positions in the state ministry as well as the party organization since the ousting of the Vyas ministry in the fall of 1954. T A B L E 27 EARLY LEADERS OF PROTEST MOVEMENTS ON THE P C C BY YEAR OF ENTRY (IN PERCENT)

Year

1919-1936

1937-1942

Total %

1946-1948 1948-1950

23

48

7«

«954-i956

9

35 24

9 7

24 16

1956-1958 1958-1960 1963-1965

27

8

26

62

33 34 33 23

ORGANIZATIONAL M O B I L I T Y AND

PARTICIPATION

Changes within the postindependence elite have also been considerable. Recruitment into the party was not extensive during the period between independence and the first General Elections — w i t h the exception of the six months immediately prior to the elections when a number of important political leaders were admitted to the party. This new group, however, did not make itself felt within the organizational wing of the party until several years afterwards, when many of their followers had been awarded party membership and had been enabled to vote. This new membership became particularly important in the elections to the P C C in 1954 and in all subsequent organizational elections. T h e major change has occurred within the group that includes those recruited into Congress politics after the first General Elections. From 18 percent of the membership in 1954, this group has expanded to 33 percent in 1963. Those who entered politics between 1952 and 1957 have almost completely dominated the "post-1952" group. In 19581960 only 6 percent of the P C C membership had entered the party after the second General Elections held in 1957. By 1963-1965 this proportion had only increased to 11 percent of the membership. In both 1958-1960 and 1963-1965, 22 percent of all P C C members had entered the party between the first and second General Elections. T h e configuration of political generations among Congress candidates for the state Legislative Assembly has also undergone major changes since the first General Elections. Party tickets have been increasingly awarded to more recent recruits into the party, while the proportion of representatives from older political generations has declined. T h e proportion of pre-1942 elites who received the party ticket, for example, declined from 39 percent in 1952 to but 13 percent in 1967. In the 1967 elections only 36 percent of Congress candidates had entered political life prior to independence compared with 72 percent in 1952. While the proportion of those who joined the party between independence and the first General Elections has remained fairly high and steady, the most appreciable increase has been among those who entered Congress after the first General Elections, an increase from 22 percent in 1957 to 38 percent in 1967. T h e magnitude, but not the rate, of change has been greater

i86

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N TABLE

28

POLITICAL GENERATION O P CONGRESS IN THE FIRST FOUR G E N E R A L

CANDIDATES

ELECTIONS

(IN PERCENT)

Election Year of Party Entry

>952

»957

1962

«967

Pre-1942 1942-1947

39 33 27

24 27 27 22

18 27

'3 23 27 23 '5

»947-'952 1952-1957 Post-1957

30 «4 11

among legislative aspirants than among members of the state party organization. Approximately the same proportion of P C C members in 1954 and Congress candidates in 1952 entered politics after independence. In 1957 only 32 percent of the P C C had entered politics after independence while 49 percent of party candidates had. In 1963, 44 percent of the members of the P C C and 55 percent of party nominees were postindependence recruits. Political generation and mobility has shown striking regional variation. T h e most consistent increase in the proportion of candidates who entered the party after 1952 has been in the Matsya and Jodhpur regions, while the lowest proportions are found in Kotah, Jaipur, and Bikaner, although in the last two regions representatives of the youngest generation were much more competitive in the politics of ticket allocation for the 1967 elections than they had previously been. Thus, with the notable exception of the chief minister's division (Udaipur), the Congress has enjoyed fairly consistent electoral success in those areas where relatively new party men have received the party ticket in increasingly large measure. Conversely, in those areas where new political generations within the Congress have been isolated from the legislative process, the party's success at the polls has been intermittent or diminished.8 5. Note that the increase of post-1952 entrants into the party has progressed in linear fashion in those regions characterized by pluralization of social representation among candidates for the Legislative Assembly and in the party organization, while change in political generation has been lowest

ORGANIZATIONAL M O B I L I T Y AND PARTICIPATION

187

T h e changing patterns of representation in the Congress party organization give evidence of its absorptive capacity during the critical early years. First, the marked decline in the number and proportion of founders of political movements in the party has not only been a function of time and aging but is indicative of a new kind of political leader schooled in a different political style arising in the party—the highly educated preindependence political entrepreneur who entered the political movements while still young and several years after these movements had been founded and thus had not participated in the early experiments and experiences with attempting to found popular and voluntary political organizations in a traditional society. T h e party has also demonstrated a capacity to absorb a large number of political aspirants who entered politics after independence and who thus do not share the emotive a flection which has followed from the involvement in protest movements. That representation in terms of political generation has shown no radical change is also indicative of the absorptive capacity of the party's elite structure. THE CIRCULATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL ELITES

T h e importance of representation in state-level organizational bodies has been reflected in the high level of aspiration which Congress party members have demonstrated for membership on the PCC and for control over the P C C Executive and the party presidency. Party elections have been contested with great intensity, and every P C C has had unfilled seats because of disputed returns in some areas. Elections to the PCC Executive and presidency have provided some of the most intense political activity within the party organization. T h e existence and intensity of intraparty political conflict suggests that no single elite in the party organization can control the recruitment and circulation of new organizational personnel. Since the founding of the Rajasthan Congress, new members have consistently constituted a majority of the total membership in each successive PCC. ("New" members include only those who had not served on any previous PCC for which and more intermittent in those areas with least change in social representation. It should also be noted that political generations since 1952 have been socially plural.

i88

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

data are available while "old" members include all of those who have served on at least one previous Committee.) T h e highest incidence of change was registered in the first two PCCs (Table 29). In 1948, 62 percent of the P C C members had not served on the Rajputana Prantiya Sabha in 1946. There are several reasons, as we have noted, that help to account for this TABLE

29

CHANGE IN MEMBERSHIP ON THE PRADESH CONGRESS COMMITTEE,

1948-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Year

Old

New

N «•

1948-1950

38 25

62

'47 >34 '47 '57 '59

1954"« 956 «gs6-^8

46

1958-1960

49

1963-1965

48

75 54 51 52

change. First, the Prantiya Sabha was established as a federation of the Praja Mandals active in the various Rajputana states and the membership was composed almost entirely of members of the executive committees of these preindependence organizations. Immediately after the creation of the Rajasthan Congress, elections were held for the PCC, and a number of new persons were elected although most had been active in the preindependence movements. These elections provided a new forum for conflict among groups which had in many cases presented a common front during the preindependence period. A number of the Praja Mandals, however, had experienced factional cleavage prior to 1947—particularly in Jaipur, Kotah, and Bikaner—and this new situation of conflict tended to polarize these old divisions. T h e change between 1948-1950 and 1954-1956 is no doubt due in part to the two intervening PCCs for which data are not available. 6 It is probable that some of those members who are included 6. T h e author, together with several secretaries in the state Congress party office, made numerous attempts over a period of a year to locate lists for these two PCCs but without success. It is possible to reconstruct lists from biographical files and from references made in constituency and election files,

ORGANIZATIONAL MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

189

in the "new" category in 1954-1956 served on one or the other, or both, of these two PCCs. The central condition behind this change in PCC representation, however, was the new configuration of power which arose within the state Congress when the majority coalition in the PCC won its struggle against Chief Minister Pandit Hiralal Shastri and his close associate Gokul Bhai Bhatt in late 1949 and early 1950 (see above, Chapter 5). Another source of new members on the PCC between 1950 and 1954 was the Kisan Sabha in Jodhpur Division, which merged with the Congress party in late 1951 and which was assured organizational representation as a condition of entry. From 1954, however, the proportion of new members has been approximately 50 percent of the total, although this may be somewhat less for 1963-1965 since data are not available for the PCC which served from 1960-1963. The longer the time span, the greater the probability that members of subsequent PCCs have served on at least one PCC previously. Although approximately 50 percent of the members elected to the PCC since 1954 had served before, few individuals had served on a majority of the previous PCCs. In 1954 only 14 percent of the PCC members had served on the PCC in both 1946 and 1948. The proportion of the "old" members on the 1956—195® PCC who had served in 1946, 1948, and 1954 consecutively was only 12 percent, while merely 23 percent had served on the PCC from 1954-1956. Furthermore, only 24 percent of the members of the 1956-1958 PCC had served on at least two PCCs previously. The pattern of previous membership for those elected to the PCC in 1958 and 1963 is similar. The proportion of those elected in 1958 and who had served on all PCCs previously declined to 8 percent of the total membership, while only 20 percent had served on both the 1954-1956 and the 1956-1958 PCCs. Likewise in 1963, only 11 percent of the members had been elected to the three PCCs between 1954 and i960, and only 6 percent had served on all of the PCCs between 1946 and IQ6O for which data are available. Each of those sitting on the PCC in 1963-1965 who copies of which were obtained by the author, but the resultant lists are incomplete. Data for three PCC Executive Committees are also unavailable.

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN had been elected consistently since 1946 was a major factional leader in Congress politics at the state level. No more than 28 percent of the members on any PCC since 1954 had served on at least two PCCs previously. T h e pattern of membership circulation on the Pradesh Congress Committee described above has been paralleled by the proportion of members who had served on any one previous PCC. The proportion of those who served on the Prantiya Sabha in 1946, for example, has progressively declined until in 1963 those who served in 1946 constituted only 8 percent of the total membership. A similar pattern of decline has characterized each of the other Pradesh Congress Committees. T A B L E 30 MEMBERS PREVIOUSLY ON THE PRADESH CONGRESS COMMITTEE, 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 6 5 (IN PERCENT)

Previous Year 1946 1948

1954 '956 >958

N =

1948-1950

38

'47

I954-I956

•956-1958

1958-1960

1963-196

'9 5

16 21 46

12

8 12

2

'34

'47

'9

28

38 '57

23 33 35 '59

The dispersion of old and new members of successive Pradesh Congress Committees described above indicates the high degree of circulation of personnel at the state level in the Rajasthan Congress. Not only have new members constituted a majority in each successive PCC, but the old members have not constituted a selfperpetuating organizational elite. Although between 130 and 159 seats (an average of 146) have been filled on the PCC for the years under consideration, 424 different persons have been incumbents during that time. Only a few have been members consistently. These few, however, are important Congress leaders and will attract our attention later. There has also been a high degree of mobility of elites on the

ORGANIZATIONAL

MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

igi

PCC Executive Committee. Until 1958 executive committees were appointed by the president of the PCC, although in most cases representation was granted all major factions within the party. The factional coalition with which the president was associated, however, always had a majority on the Executive prior to that time. There were major changes in personnel with major changes in the configuration of power on the PCC. These occurred when Jai Narain Vyas was elected president of the state Congress in 1949 and again with his election in 1956, a move made in the PCC at the insistence of the Congress high command in an effort to bridge the factional cleavage in the party in preparation for the 1957 elections.7 After 1958, however, the Executive Committee was elected by the Pradesh Congress Committee from among its members. Both before 1958 and after there has been a consistent turnover of top party personnel. At the time of the first General Elections in 1952, ten of the fourteen members of the Executive Committee had not been members of the executive at the time of independence. Likewise, at the time of the third General Elections in 1962, only seven of the twenty-two members had also served at the time of the first General Elections. In 1963 twelve of the twenty-one newly elected members of the Executive were members for the first time. Those who have served on the PCC Executive Committee consistently have been the dominant leaders of the Congress party in Rajasthan. The current Chief Minister, Mohanlal Sukhadia, and his early political mentor, Manikyalal Varma, have been the only two persons who have continually held a position on this body, 7. T h e election of Vyas as president of the P C C in 1956 was part of a compromise between major factional leaders who were concerned with maintaining party unity during the second General Elections. Vyas was never able to complete the appointments to the P C C Executive Committee before he resigned as President shortly after the elections. T h e Executive during that time was manned primarily by representatives of the Vyas faction, held few formal meetings, and as a committee did not have appreciable influence on the making of party policy or in the politics of ticket allocation. These important derisions were made by the major faction leaders in an informal manner and in consultation with the party high command.

192

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

except in 1956-1958 when Vyas was president of the party organization. T w o leaders have served on the Executive for the years since 1949—Choudhry Kumbharam Arya and Sardar Harlal Singh, the two powerful Jat leaders from Bikaner Division and Shekhawati, respectively. T h r e e others have been members since 1951—Ram Karan Joshi, Mathuradas Mathur, and Harideo Joshi. T A B L E 31 MEMBERS PREVIOUSLY ON THE P C C

EXECUTIVE,

1949-1965

Previous Year

i949-'95'

'95'-'953

'959-1961

1961-1963

'947 '949 '95' »959

8

4

a 4

3 4 7 '9

N

12

20

22

8

6

1961

=

'4

1963-1965 i I

4 9 9

21

Ram Karan Joshi was one of the chief lieutenants of Jai Narain Vyas and became the nominal leader of the Vyas group in Congress politics after Vyas' "retirement" from politics in 1957. Joshi has been one of the few "Vyas men" who have demonstrated consistent power in the Rajasthan Congress. Mathuradas Mathur has proven to be one of the most versatile politicians in the Rajasthan Congress, having been a close associate of Vyas who switched his allegiance to the Jodhpur Jat group at the time of the vote of noconfidence against the Vyas ministry in 1954. He was one of the few persons on whom the competing factional coalitions could agree to serve as the P C C president in i960. Harideo Joshi, a political protege of Manikyalal Varma, has served as an M L A in all four legislative assemblies and was first elected as the P C C president in 1963. It should be noted that with the exception of Ram Karan Joshi, the other members who have been consistently elected to the P C C Executive Committee have been members of either the Sukhadia-Varma group, which centers its power in Udaipur Division, or the Jat group, which draws its political strength from the desert areas of the state. It was a coalition be-

ORGANIZATIONAL

MOBILITY

AND PARTICIPATION

193

tween these two groups which ousted the "old" leadership represented in the Vyas ministry in 1954. THE "CONGRUENCY" OF ORGANIZATIONAL ELITES

Although there has been a fairly high incidence of circular mobility in the membership of the Pradesh Congress Committee and its Executive, a large proportion of those who have served on the P C C have also held important positions in district-level party organizations. 8 Prior to the first General Elections, district-level organizations were primarily extensions of the preindependence movements in the princely states and the proportion of political activists who filled dual roles was extremely high in all areas for which information was available. In Udaipur and Jodhpur, for example, nearly 95 percent of the P C C representatives in both 1946 and 1948 were simultaneously members of the D C C Executive and the Pradesh Congress Committee. By 1954, however, this proportion on a state-wide basis had declined, although not greatly, to 81 percent. It has consistently declined since 1954 until in 1963 only 68 percent of the P C C membership held positions on D C C Executives. A smaller percentage of P C C members were simultaneously elected officers of District Congress Committees. As was true of membership in D C C Executive Committees, the highest proportion was also found during the first few years after independence but had decreased noticeably by 1954. A significant decrease was registered in 1956, when presidents of District Congress Committees were made ex officio members of the Pradesh Congress Committee and did not contest elections for this state-level body. A significant difference is found between the old and new members of each P C C in terms of joint-level organization membership. A larger proportion of old P C C members have held dual positions than have the new members. In each PCC, fewer new P C C members have been officers or members of D C C Executive Committees than have those who had been previously elected to the Pradesh Congress Committee. In the case of both old and new 8. T h i s information has been computed after comparing membership lists of D C C Executive Committees and the P C C for corresponding years.

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

194

TABLE PCC

32

M E M B E R S S E R V I N G AS O F F I C E R S OR

OF D C C

E X E C U T I V E COMMITTEES,

MEMBERS

1954-1965

(IN P E R C E N T )

Year on PCC

DCC Executive

1954-1956 1956-1958 195&-1960

81

68

75

35 32 3'

69 68

1963-1965

DCC Officers

members, however, this pattern of holding joint organizational positions has tended to decline. The decrease in dual officeholders has been the result of several changed conditions and strategies employed by important groups within the Congress party. First of all, there have been more claimants for organizational positions, particularly after the first General Elections, than there have been positions. New power groups within the organizational apparatus sought positions in the party hierarchy to give organizational credence to their base of power in the party mass organization. Secondly, minority factions, which for a variety of reasons did not have wide representation on D C C Executive Committees, have been able to gain representation on the Pradesh Congress Committee. In several cases this has come about by an alliance with a dominant factional coalition at the state level that has been able to influence elections TABLE

33

D I F F E R E N C E S B E T W E E N O L D AND N E W P C C M E M B E R S S E R V I N G AS O F F I C E R S OR M E M B E R S O F D C C

EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEES

(IN P E R C E N T )

Old

New

Year on PCC

Executive

Officer

Executive

Officer

i954-'956 956-I958

81

52 48 38

75 54 55 53

60

92

1

1958-1960

1963-1965

85

79

40

20 28 21

ORGANIZATIONAL MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

195

to state-level bodies more than to district-level committees. It has also involved compromises reached t h r o u g h

the g o o d offices of

the state-level power c e n t e r — o n e faction m a i n t a i n i n g control over district-level affairs in the organization w h i l e the other has at least some representation on the P C C .

Furthermore, some

dominant

factions have purposely circulated organizational positions a m o n g members of the faction or factional coalition to satisfy m o b i l i t y aspirations of subordinate political leaders and afford a sense of participation in party affairs. TABLE NEW P C C OF D C C

34

MEMBERS SERVING AS OFFICERS OR

MEMBERS

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES BEFORE ELECTION TO

PCC

(IN PERCENT)

Year on PCC

Executive

Officer

'954-1956 1956-1958

77

1958-1960

87

59 56 56

1963-1965

84

62

89

W h i l e the proportion of P C C m e m b e r s simultaneously h o l d i n g district-level organizational posts has declined, the proportion of those w h o h a v e held such positions before their election to the P C C has tended to increase. T h i s perhaps is n o t surprising in the case of " o l d " P C C members; it is important in the case of n e w members since it indicates a h i g h degree of " i n t e r n a l " recruitment

to top-level

organizational

positions.

Since

1954 over

77

percent of the n e w members of the P C C have b e e n members of a P C C E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e before their election to this state-level body, and over 56 percent have b e e n officers. T h i s pattern of recruitment suggests the necessity of d e v e l o p i n g a base of organizational support to achieve organizational m o b i l i t y . M o r e

impor-

tantly, this pattern of career m o b i l i t y also suggests the organizational a u t o n o m y of the Rajasthan Congress. ORGANIZATION MEN AND LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATION Members

of

the

Pradesh

Congress

Committee

have

demon-

strated a h i g h and consistent desire to b e c o m e Congress legislators.

ig6

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y

IN

RAJASTHAN

A large proportion of those sitting on the P C C at the time of the General Elections, or shortly thereafter, have applied for the party ticket. 9 T h e only P C C existing at the time of an election and for which information is available is 1956-1958. In 19561957, 79 percent of the members of the P C C applied for the party ticket for the second General Elections held in 1957. In the case of the 1954-1956 P C C — t h e first elected after the first General Elections—81 percent had sought the Congress ticket in 19511952. In 1963, 85 percent of the P C C membership had applied for the ticket for the third General Elections held in 1962. Although information is not available for the 1960-1963 PCC, it is likely that nearly the same proportion applied for the ticket. A sizable proportion of the members on each P C C since 1954 has applied for the Congress ticket for the second and third General Elections. T h e continuation of legislative aspiration on the part of those who have been elected to the P C C is most striking. Many of those who sat on the P C C shortly after independence T A B L E 35 APPLICANTS

FOR C O N CRESS P A R T Y T I C K E T S

SECOND AND T HIRD G E N E R A L (IN

P C C Member

1946-1948 1948-1950 «954-'956 1956-1958 1958-1960 1963-1965

'957

THE

PERCENT)

1957

Year

FOR

ELECTIONS

1962

Applied for Party Ticket

P C C Member in 1963

Applied for Party Ticket 45 54 7' 7' 74 85

16 21 46

55

8 12

81

38 33

79 77 74

23 33 35

have demonstrated a continued interest in contesting elections. Although only 16 percent of the P C C members in 1946 were still 9. T h e following information has been obtained by comparing lists of applicants for the Congress party tickets included in the Reports of District Observers and Constituency Files in the state Congress party office with lists of members of the Pradesh Congress Committee.

ORGANIZATIONAL MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

>97

members of the P C C in 1957, 55 percent of the 1946 members applied for the party ticket for the second General Elections. Likewise, 45 percent of the 1946 members applied for the ticket in 1961-1962; only 8 percent, however, were still PCC members in 1963. T h e same pattern has held true for subsequent PCCs. For example, while only 33 percent of those sitting on the P C C in 1963 had been members in 1956-1957, nearly 74 percent had applied for the party ticket for the second General Elections. More P C C applicants have received the party tickets than applicants who were not members, although the former have not constituted the predominant proportion of party candidates. Approximately one-third of those sitting on the PCC at the time of elections have been awarded the Congress party ticket. Nearly 50 percent of those PCC members who have applied for the ticket have received it. In 1954, 34 percent of the PCC members had contested the elections for either the Legislative Assembly or the Lok Sabha in 1952, although this is perhaps a smaller proportion than that of the PCC which was sitting in 1952. In 1957, party tickets were allocated to 32 percent of the PCC membership, while in 1963, 37 percent of the members of the P C C had contested the elections in 1962 as Congress candidates. Like the party in general, the Pradesh Congress Committee has not been without its dissidents. In the case of most PCCs, some members who have not received the party ticket have contested the elections as non-Congress candidates, but this has consistently TABLE 36 P C C CANDIDATES IN THE FIRST T H R E E G E N E R A L

ELECTIONS

(IN PERCENT)

1952 Year 1946-1948 '94 s -'95° 1 954-«956 1 9 5 ^ >958 1958-1960 1963-1965

C

34 32 30 28

1957

1962

O

C

O

C

O

4 6 4 5

16 33 37 32 30 30

6 5 0 3 0 1

•4 18 31 36 34 37

8 8 4 5 3 0

198

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

been only a small proportion of those who have applied. In the second General Elections, 3 percent of the sitting PCC members contested as opposition candidates. No members of the 1963 PCC had contested the elections as opposition candidates. No members of the 1963 PCC had contested the elections against the Congress in 1962, although in the 1954 PCC, 4 percent of the members had contested against Congress candidates two years previously. A relatively small proportion of P C C representatives denied the ticket, however, have contested as opposition candidates, and prior to the 1967 elections, these dissidents did not include any important state or district faction leaders. This is one important indicator of commitment to the party institution. In the second and third General Elections, the "older" the P C C the higher the proportion of former PCC members who contested against Congress candidates. In no case, however, has this involved important Congress leaders. In the second General Elections, 6 percent and 5 percent of the 1946 and 1948 PCCs respectively had contested against the Congress candidates. In 1962 this proportion had increased slightly—to 8 percent—in each case. This suggests a fairly high level of party commitment—at least on the part of those who have held positions in the state-level organization. T h e high aspiration of PCC members to receive the party ticket was accompanied by a corresponding high degree of success in the first two General Elections. Over 80 percent of the members of each PCC since 1954 who contested the elections in 1952 were successful. This proportion dropped somewhat in the elections of 1957. In the third General Elections, however, the proportion of successful P C C candidates dropped considerably: only 47 percent of those on the 1963-1965 P C C were successful. This pattern has been particularly important with respect to elections to the state Legislative Assembly. In the first two elections, a higher proportion of PCC candidates were successful than were candidates who were not members of the committee. A high proportion of Congress candidates in the 1952 elections who were elected to the PCC in 1954 were successful. This was also true of P C C members in the 1957 elections. In each of these elections, a lower proportion of non-PCC candidates were elected, although

ORGANIZATIONAL

MOBILITY AND

PARTICIPATION

TABLE P C C

CANDIDATES THREE

(IN

37

ELECTED

GENERAL

199

IN THE

FIRST

ELECTIONS

PERCENT)

Year

'952

'957

1962

«954-1956 '956-1958

81 82

78 79

83 89

83

43 55 49 47

1958-1960 1963-1965

78

in both of the first two General Elections non-PCC candidates accounted for all but two of the Congress candidates elected from reserved seats. In the 1952 elections, Congress candidates won all sixteen of the seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, all of whom were non-PCC candidates. In the 1957 elections, non-PCC candidates accounted for thirty-one of the thirtythree reserved seats won by Congress candidates. In 1962 in the third General Elections, however, there was a marked change in both the number and proportion of P C C candidates who were elected. Only 45 percent of those Congress candidates who were sitting on the P C C in 1963 were successful in the 1962 elections, while 53 percent of the total non-PCC candidates were successful. This proportion was even less for the General TABLE

38

C A N D I D A T E S E L E C T E D T O THE

ASSEMBLY, (IN

Elections

'952

PCC Non-PCC

'957

PCC Non-PCC 1962 PCC Non-PCC

LEGISLATIVE

1952-1962

PERCENT)

General Seats

Total Seats

72

72

37

45

75 63

76

43 56

45 53

65

200

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

Seats in which only 43 percent of the P C C candidates were successful while 56 percent of non-PCC candidates were elected. Thus, although members of the organizational wing of the Congress party have shown a relatively high level of aspiration for public office, organizational representation alone has not insured a monopoly over the process of allocating tickets for the general elections. Furthermore, the allocation of tickets to nonorganizational representatives suggests that those wielding power in the party do not constitute an all-powerful and self-contained elite. This relatively open system of access for leaders and groups which do not command organizational positions has been an important element in maintaining the political adaptability of the Rajasthan Congress. "CONGRUENCY" OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELITES

T h e high level of electoral success of P C C candidates discussed above has resulted in considerable overlap of membership between the Congress Legislative Party and the Pradesh Congress Committee. The proportion of P C C legislators, however, has never constituted over 33 percent of the Congress Legislative Party in each of the first three Assemblies. This group constituted approximately 25 percent of the total P C C membership through the first two Assemblies but declined to 17 percent in the third Assembly. This overlapping membership has provided a channel of political communication between the two wings of the party. The proportion of non-PCC Congress legislators is also indicative of the pluralistic configuration of political power within the Congress party in Rajasthan, at least at the secondary level of political leadership. It is difficult to establish what proportion of joint membership is optimal for effective communication and common identification between the organizational and legislative wings of the party. It would seem important, however, that there be a fairly sizable joint membership which might tend to inhibit the rise of institutional conflict within the Congress system. Through joint membership important groups within the PCC, although not represented to the extent that they may wish, do have informal channels of access to the legislative party through factional colleagues and political

ORGANIZATIONAL

MOBILITY AND PARTICIPATION

201

T A B L E 39 P C C MEMBERS IN THE CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE PARTY (IN PERCENT) '952-"'957

Year '954-'956

1956-1958 1958-1960 1963-1965

CLP 3'* 32

PCC

' 9 5 7 " •1962 CLP

PCC

3' 33

25

1962-1967 CLP

PCC

33

'7

26 25

25

• T h e figure used for this c o m p u t a t i o n is the membership of the Congress Legislative Party as of August 27, 1954. Membership in the C L P at that time had increased from 8S, t h e n u m b e r originally elected in 1952, to 1 1 4 as a result of the entry of opposition MLAs into the Party.

friends. Of greater importance, however, is who these joint members are—whether or not they are important leaders within the Congress system. The highest proportion of overlapping membership between the party organization and the legislative party has been at the top levels. Members of the PCC Executive Committee have consistently demonstrated high aspiration for legislative careers. Over 75 percent of the members of the 1954 and 1963 PCCs contested the first and third General Elections respectively and, with the exception of those sitting on the Executive at the time of the third General Elections, over 70 percent of PCC Executive members who have contested elections have done so successfully. In 1952 and 1963, 50 percent or more of the members of the PCC Executive were also members of the Congress Legislative Party. Furthermore, most members of the Congress ministry have served simultaneously as members of the Pradesh Congress Committee, and this has provided for considerable informal communication between the legislative and organizational wings of the party. In the case of all ministries since 1954, at least 50 percent of the ministers and deputy ministers have been members of the PCC. This proportion has been highest since the consolidation of the new leadership in the party after the defeat of the Vyas Ministry in October 1954-

202

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN TABLE

L E G I S L A T I V E DISPERSION OF THE P C C

Executive : Year

E X E C U T I V E COMMITTEE,

Ministers

MLAs

'951 1952 1 959-'961 i96i-i963Ab i96i-i963Bb

3 3

6

I

I

6

2

6

4

1963-1965

6

3

5 5 3

MPs

»

6

40

Unsuccessful Candidates

•

I

Did Not Contest »

»

4 3 4 9 5

1951-1965

0 5 5 3 3

Total 3 14

20 22 22 21

* There were no popularly elected state-level representatives in Rajasthan prior to the first General Elections held in 1952. b T h e PCC Executive bridged the elections of 1962. The first Executive, 19611963A, represents the ministry which held office until the third General Elections. The second, 1961-1963!$, refers to the ministry formed immediately after those elections.

The Pradesh Congress Committee in Rajasthan has been characterized by a high degree of elite circulation which has enabled a large number of different Congressmen to participate in the highest levels of their party organization. This has been not only true of representation on the Pradesh Congress Committee but also of the powerful PCC Executive Committee as well. The replacement of elites has been through competitive election and has not been radical but gradual. The possibility of mobility in a situation where organizational position is increasingly desired has been important in maintaining a modicum of cohesion within the party organization. There has also not been a composite body of men from the party organization that has monopolized legislative positions, just as there has not been a self-contained elite that has monopolized the party organization at the state level. This "open" elite structure has enabled those who are not a part of the state-level party apparatus to contest elections and to serve as Congress legislators while at the same time it has enabled the continuation of communication links between the legislative and organizational parties through those who have held joint membership in both wings of the party. Mobility within the party organization and the access afforded those who are not members of the PCC has been impor-

ORGANIZATIONAL MOBILITY AND

203

PARTICIPATION

TABLE

4:

DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTERS ON THE PRADESH CONGRESS COMMITTEE,

Year

1954 (to O c t . ) 1954"'956

1956-1957 '957->960 1960-1962 1962-1965

On PCC

5

1954-1965

N o t on P C C

5

T o t a l Ministers

10

6

6

12

9 7

6

'5 11

8

4 4

10

8

12 18

tant in maintaining the integrity of the Rajasthan Congress. Mobility, in turn, has largely been a function of factional competition and the mobilization of new participants into the Congress system. T h e Rajasthan Congress has continually recruited new men into both the organization and legislative wings of the party, although the magnitude of recruitment has been greater within the body of aspirants for the state Legislative Assembly than the Pradesh Congress Committee. T h e Congress has also tended to be much weaker electorally in those areas where the allocation of party tickets to representatives of younger political generations has been lowest. This, as we have seen, parallels patterns of social recruitment into the party as well. Recruitment to state-level organizational positions in the party has tended to be internal and vertical rather than external and horizontal. T h e large majority of those who achieve positions on the P C C have served on the locally powerful D C C Executive Committees, and a majority have been officers of these committees. This is an important indicator of the Congress party's organizational autonomy.

Chapter 8

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION IN T H E L E G I S L A T I V E P A R T Y : T H E M A I N T E N A N C E OF GOVERNING COALITIONS

of a new structure of authority has significant implications for the organization of a party system and the informal organization of political power within particular party structures. This is true of any redefinition of the community of political participants and alteration of public authority, but it assumes special importance when the change is radical and immediate even if based upon a new "popular consensus." The formal organization of the political system involves three generically important attributes: (1) the definition of the field of political participants; (2) the definition and locus of structurally strategic political roles which usually constitute the focus and concentration of predominant political competition; and (3) the rules governing the selection of public decision makers. T H E INSTITUTION

T h e implementation of the Indian constitution and the creation of a universal franchise made the recruitment of formal political elites less controllable than had been true during the short period since independence. The fount of political responsibility and the locus of formal political power was changed in 1952 by the first General Elections, and this altered the stratification of informal political power and the strategies employed in its mobilization and employment. Prior to the first General Elections control of the party organization had meant control of the government. The conflict between 1949 and 1952 was over whether the Congress organization in the state or the Ministry of States would be the ultimate source of political authority, with the state party's position ultimately gaining credence and acceptance. After the

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION

205

General Elections, however, the party ceased to perform this legislative function, and political control came to rest in the hands of elected representatives whose constituency was not the Congress movement but the larger and more diffuse political community. W i t h its increased efforts to mobilize popular support and to establish permanent channels of contact with society, the Congress became more hierarchically organized and its rules and procedures more formal. T h i s became particularly important after 1952 when new political aspirants and politically mobile groups attempted to become more or less permanently linked with the "modern polity" and the political value of the Congress party ticket became widely known and in wide demand. T h e introduction of democratic political institutions and the creation of a mass electorate, therefore, changed the focus of political conflict. T h e ultimate focus of conflict within the Congress system, as it was in the larger political system as well, thus became control of the chief ministership, representation on the ministry, and the favorable allocation of important ministerial portfolios. Ministerial posts afford control over channels of access to political and administrative decision making. T h e s e values include such things as the allocation of licenses and permits, the granting of government loans, the allocation of jobs in the administrative services and public schools, and access for one's supporters by intercession with

private

firms.

Control

over some

government

agencies can be important in the maintenance and extension of political support through the power to withhold certain types of administrative action, to apply rules vigorously, and to keep administrative facilities responsive to public petition. A l l of these, whatever the attempts to exorcise them in public resolutions and party rhetoric, have been critical in the important political maneuvers in Rajasthan since independence. T h e institution of a new format of authority thus made necessary both representation and a position of influence in the Congress Legislative Party, from which ministers are selected and to whom they are responsible. Control of the party organization continued to be important, but for different reasons. Whereas formerly control over the strategic authority positions of the party organization had been the central focus of political conflict, it

2O6

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

now assumed a position of intermediate authority with respect to the larger electoral system. T h e most important reason for control over the party organization has been to gain an entrée to the electoral process, i.e. to obtain the maximum number of party tickets for one's faction as a prerequisite to participation in the selection of the government. This in turn has involved attempts to control the party organization at all levels and to influence the selection of persons for strategic positions of power within the party. T h e party organization has also continued to be important for the institutional access which it affords to the Congress high command at the national level and for the legitimacy which control over important organizational positions lends to the incumbent's claim to political support within the state Congress system. This is particularly important in the case of candidates who suffer electoral defeat but who can in this fashion maintain their political "presence." Control over formal positions of authority in the state has been important for a number of reasons. First, control over the authority apparatus, as in any political order, has been necessary in order to participate effectively in the making of public policy and in the distribution of social benefits. Second, politics has offered a new channel of social mobility and order of status, which is extremely important in a highly stratified society where avenues of mobility are highly restricted. It is a prestigious form of public employment. T h e political vocation has been particularly attractive to those deprived of a share in the distribution of resources in the traditional order. For others, politics has provided a means by which traditional prestige can be protected and sometimes preserved. Political participation and especially control over ministerial positions have provided not only personal prestige but also prestige and a new measure of pride and potential benefit for one's community. T h e new order of public authority has also been conducive to the development of an incentive system different from that which prevailed before independence. 1 Whereas the incentives of the i. A useful framework and set of propositions concerning "the decision to participate" is presented in Clark and Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." Briefly this model, which is instructed in im-

CONFLICT AND COHESION Praja

Mandals

207

and the Congress during its early years were pri-

marily purposive ones fired by the desire to transform the political environment and make it amenable to public control, major objectives since have been concerned with the exercise of that control; organizational

incentives have increasingly become

those

values provided by the act and the exercise of control. T h i s has been a function not only of a changed system of public authority b u t also by changed patterns of political recruitment. T h i s new unified system of formal political authority has served as the framework for the informal organization of power within the Congress system. Political conflict has been concentrated on, and the organization of factions has tended to cluster around, the resources of power as defined by the formal structure of authority in the state and in the party organization. T h e remainder of this chapter is concerned with describing the major factional units of the Congress party in state politics since 1952 and the conditions of alignment and change. 2 portant ways by the work of Barnard, March, and Simon, suggests three types of incentive systems that tend to characterize three different organizational types. The first type is termed material incentives, which include monetary rewards or values that can be converted into tangible rewards. T h e second type is solidary incentives, which are affective and intangible and have the common characteristic of frequently being independent of the precise goals of the relevant association. T h e third type is purposive incentives, which are also intangible but which "derive in the main from the stated ends of the association rather than from the simple act of associating." T h e more that an organization relies on material incentives the more it approximates a "utilitarian" type which is highly flexible, since the question of persistence is principally dependent upon the continuity and distribution of incentives. Solidary incentives characterize most service-oriented voluntary associations in which the act of association and identification with the organization's image is critical. Purposive incentives fit those organizations that derive basic unity from inviolable purposes or ends, although these are also a basic source of cleavage. Therefore, "the continual problem of purposive organizations is to select ends that divide the association from other groups in the community without at the same time dividing the association's members from one another." In the case of the Rajasthan Congress the question of goal definition was critical in the early efforts to provide the organization with coherence and continued to characterize the politics of several important representatives of early political generations after their exclusion from power. 2. Here faction is defined as any intraparty grouping or clique which is relatively permanent, whose members conceive themselves as being a part of

2O8

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

Since the formation of Rajasthan, the Congress party at the state level has been divided into two loose dominant factional coalitions, each of which has directed its energies toward obtaining majority support in the Congress Legislative Party in order to form the ministry in the state. This tendency toward "bifactionalism" has also been evident in local party organizations and in those public institutions subject to popular election and control.8 Factional coalitions at the state level have changed in their membership over time, and at no time has one leader or faction enjoyed majority control among Congress members of the Legislative Assembly. This has encouraged responsiveness among factional leaders and has been conducive to the politics of contract and compromise. These two dominant factional coalitions have been composed of four primary factional coalitions and a number of smaller ones active at the state level in Congress politics. Almost all have roots in the pre independence movement: all but one of the major faca particular intraparty group, and which acts collectively in the selection of formal political leadership, both organizational and legislative, and in the determination of party policy within both organizational and legislative parties. T h e literature, both theoretical and empirical, concerning factionalism is considerable. One of the most useful theoretical conceptions is Walter Firey, "Informal Organization and the Theory of Schism," American Sociological Review, 13 (February 1948), 15-24. Also see Raphael Zariski, "IntraParty Conflict in a Dominant Party: T h e Experience of Italian Christian Democracy," Journal of Politics, 27 (February 1965), 3-34; Robert A . Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962); Ramashray Roy, "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress," Asian Survey, 6 (December 1966), 706-715; and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Factions and Alliances in Indian City Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10 (August 1966), 320-349. 3. Brass, Factional Politics, pp. 89-94 a n d passim; and Wallace, " T h e Political Party System of Punjab State," chaps. 5-7. For an excellent survey of major forms of conflict in Rajasthan and in the state Congress, see Lawrence L. Shrader, "Rajasthan," in Weiner, ed., State Politics in India. For an early study in American politics see Allan P. Sindler, "Bifactional Rivalry as an Alternative to Two-Party Competition in Louisiana," American Political Science Review, 49 (September 1955), 641-662. A bifactional system of course can assume numerous forms ranging from two closely organized coalitions each composed of "N" units to two tighdy organized groups that cohere around a central value or authority figure or position.

C O N F L I C T A N D COHESION

20g

tional coalitions—the inchoate Rajput group—are headed by a preindependence leader, and all of the important minor factions influential in state politics have traditions that predate the integration of the Rajputana states.4 Each of these factions has been persistent, has tended to nucleate around a single leader and his close personal associates, and has served to absorb—either directly or contractually—new political aspirants and recruits. T h e most notable of the dominant state-level coalitions was headed by the late Jai Narain Vyas. Although the faction is now moribund, its former secondary leaders and associates are still locally perceived in terms of their former factional association. T h e core of this faction was recruited from among the Lok Parishad workers in former Jodhpur State, although it eventually developed firm support in other areas of Rajasthan. These groups from other regions of the state, like their counterpart in Jodhpur Division, were almost exclusively recruited from urban areas and from Brahman and Mahajan castes. While the reason for some of these attachments to Vyas were initially prompted by local conflicts with groups which were associated with anti-Vyas leaders at the state level, a major bond in the Vyas faction was the charismatic appeal of its leader—a leader who not only distinguished himself in the preindependence movement and had received the political blessings of Nehru but was also eloquent in speech, although rough in manner, and who was uncompromising in his insistence that affairs of state be conducted with the highest degree of political probity. A second dominant state-level faction has been led by Chief Minister Mohanlal Sukhadia, and the venerable political leader from Udaipur, Manikyalal Varma. T h i s faction is locally referred to interchangeably as the Sukhadia, the Varma, or the Udaipur group, since it has drawn its immediate political support from 4. It is important to distinguish between dominant state-level factional coalitions and minority factions which are active in state politics. T h e former have tended to be quite sizable in both the organizational and legislative wings of the party and, because of their size and persistence, have tended to attract smaller factions according to a number of criteria. T h e latter enjoy autonomous bases of political support in their home districts and thus form relatively self-contained support units within the state-level coalition with which they ally.

2 ÎO

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

Udaipur Division. It also has been one of the most cohesive factions, largely because of the ability and inclination of its leaders to accommodation and compromise, but also because of the political benefits which the region has enjoyed. Although its core membership has been continually recruited from Udaipur Division, the faction has been able to attract support from political leaders in other areas of the state. T h e leadership, however, has not enjoyed the political affection and permanent support of these local and non-Udaipuri groups that Vyas received from the nonJodhpuris who became members of his faction. A third dominant state-level faction has recruited its membership almost exclusively from the desert regions of the state and has been forged by the major Jat leaders of the kisan movements which arose prior to independence. T h e one non-Jat leader who has wielded considerable influence in the Jat group is Mathuradas Mathur, one of the important young leaders of the Lok Parishad in Jodhpur and a political protégé of Jai Narain Vyas. Although the Jat group has acted with considerable cohesion in Congress politics, it has been segmented on the basis of the former princely states, from which it has drawn most of its political support. T h e preeminent leader of the group until the 1967 elections was Choudhry Kumbharam Arya, who has enjoyed the charismatic appeal among the Jats that Vyas originally enjoyed among urban leaders. Kumbharam, because of his simplicity, humble origin, and his mastery of the local political idiom has become a mass leader without equal in the desert areas. His direct support, however, has been limited largely to the areas of former Bikaner State. T h e leader of the Jat faction in Jodhpur Division, which until 1966 acted in concert with Kumbharam, is Nathu Ram Mirdha, the able young former minister and current president of the Rajasthan Congress. T h e leader of the Jats in Shekhawati until the 1962 elections was Sardar Harlal Singh, an associate of Kumbharam in state politics who has enjoyed an independent base of political support in his home area. Although the criteria for inclusion in the core membership of the Jat faction is primarily ascriptive, leadership has been determined largely by political achievement: those who have been most successful politically in the Jat community have been those who have been most successful in inter-

CONFLICT AND

COHESION

211

ceding with state authority on the behalf of the community. J a t MLAs have also had a higher level of educational achievement than other caste Hindu MLAs and have also tended to be considerably younger. This is the result of the emphasis placed upon education by the social movements before independence and the assumption of leadership in these movements by those who achieved the ideals to which they inspired. The fourth dominant faction in Congress politics at the state level has been composed of Rajputs.® Although all Rajputs are locally perceived as constituting a common group within the party, the faction has been much less cohesive than its factional counterparts. Many Rajput leaders have been more closely associated politically with either the Vyas or the Sukhadia coalitions than with one another. The Rajputs have acted in concert only in pressuring for greater representation on the ministry for persons from the Rajput community and have been badly divided on votes for the position of leader of the Congress Legislative Party. The Rajput group, unlike all other state-level factional coalitions with the exception of that led by Vyas, has claimed support from all areas of the state. Each area has formed its own leadership cluster, however, and the selection of statewide leadership has been hampered by traditional jealousies and conflicts over status. State-level factions, however, have not rested upon a monolithic base of political support. Rather they have been the apex of petite segmentary political systems. The state faction is a composite of localized factions, although the scope of direct support which a particular factional leadership has enjoyed has varied with respect to time and area. At the local level the core membership of factions has tended to be drawn from a single caste, whereas at higher 5. It will be recalled that Rajputs did not join the Congress party until 1954 when twenty-two Rajput M L A s applied for and were accepted into the Congress Legislative Party. There were a few, primarily in the eastern part of the state, who joined the Congress shortly after independence, however. These Rajputs were highly educated and also tended to be younger than their counterparts who did not decide to join the Congress. It should be noted, however, that several Rajputs, while they were students in the British provinces prior to independence, had become involved in political activity and wanted to join the Congress in Rajasthan after their return from their studies. T h e nationalist movement was important in the socialization of these young Rajput students. (Interviews with Jujhar Singh and Bhim Singh Mandawa.)

212

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

levels of political organization factions are usually composites of several local factions and tend to draw their support from several castes and regions. Thus at each successively higher level of political organization, subordinate factions, which have considerable autonomy in local politics, have been organized into mutually exclusive factional coalitions which tend to nucleate around a dominant leader or faction which has its own regional base of political support. 8 Political groups at each of these levels are perceived at that level as being associated with one of these coalitions, and new leaders and groups which become a part of the Congress are co-opted into this larger factional system. This system of mutually exclusive alliances has afforded connecting links among all levels of political organization, and this has been a crucial factor in the development and maintenance of vertical cohesion within the Congress system. T h e quest for new and expanded support on the part of factions both in the party organization and in society at large has itself been conducive to the expansion of the factional system and with it the party as well. In most regions and districts there are competing factions within the Congress that tend to associate with different factions at the state level. Sometimes, however, these local factions have been associated withh the same faction at the state level while competing for positions in local party organizations for receipt of party tickets for the general elections. At the regional and district levels these factions perceive themselves as distinct political units and are also so perceived by opposition factions and political onlookers alike. For example, in discussions of local politics, " A " is referred to as being a member of "B's" group and not as being a part of that faction to which " B " pays allegiance at the state level. Factions at each level of political organization have a recognized leader, and it is this class of local elites which is so important in acting as intermediaries between the worlds of state and local politics. T h e extent of political autonomy of the local groups 6. For analyses of similar phenomena see Ramashray Roy, " A Study of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee," and his "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance in an Indian State," Asian Survey, 8 (July 1968), 553-575. For a useful earlier statement see Paul R. Brass, "Factionalism and the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh," Asian Survey, 4 (September 1964), 1037-1041.

CONFLICT AND COHESION

21J

varies. In some cases there are limits to which a subordinate faction leader can oppose the leader of the larger faction and still maintain his political support intact. These limits are defined by the social cohesion of the given subordinate faction and the alternatives of effective political access open to this local leader and his group. It is not surprising, therefore, that a new Congress member, whether he enters the party as a primary member and Mandai worker or as a sitting M L A with an autonomous base of political support, becomes associated with a faction or factional coalition and in many cases gains his entrée through co-optation by a particular group and allegiance to its leader, whose support is almost always necessary to receive a party ticket. One does not negotiate a group into the Congress which is already so wide in the scope of its public support and so highly organized that it would upset the existing balance and threaten the positions of existing elites. For one thing very few such opposition groups exist and for another elites reject the ambiguity and uncertainty of future alignments which such entry would bring. With the exception of the entry of the Rajput jagirdar MLAs into the Congress in 1954—a move which rocked the party severely—entry has been limited to lowlevel leaders and local factions which become a part of the existing equation, always altering it somewhat but never radically. The factional system within the Congress also has various forms of extensions into its political environment and this has functioned to provide a structural integrity which is often hidden under the surface of politics.7 These linkages are of many types. First of all there are members of a faction who leave or who are expelled from the Congress party for "antiparty" activity such as contesting elections against party candidates or supporting opposition candi7. See the excellent article by Rajni Kothari, " T h e Congress 'System' in India," Asian Survey, 4 (December 1964), 1 1 6 1 - 1 1 7 3 , and his earlier "Party System," The Economic Weekly, 13 (June 3, 1961), 847-854. Also see Gopal Krishna, "One Party Dominance: Development and Trends," Perspectives Supplement to the Indian Journal of Public Administration, 12 (JanuaryMarch 1966), 1-65; W. H. Morris-Jones, "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party System," Government and Opposition, 1 (September 1966), 451-466; and his "From Monopoly to Competition in India's Politics," Asian Review, 1 (November 1967), 1 - 1 2 .

214

THE

CONGRESS

P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

dates. A large number of independent MLAs fall into this category and continue to function as though they were members of the party and to wait in the wings for absorption back into the party organization. Factional linkages, however, are maintained and these "non-Congressmen" often attend the caucus of the Congress faction of which they are a part. Secondly, primordial ties have been important, particularly to the Rajput community at the state level and to other castes at lower levels. These ties sometimes involve traditional association in a particular locale. In district politics, these local linkages sometimes become a basis of political unity over and above party affiliation. Thus in some cases where a major faction declares an opposing leader and faction in the party to be its opposition and the subfaction is associated with that opposition through caste, for the purposes of local elections the subfaction might in fact unite with the opposition. There are also informal political associations which are struck between strategic leaders in the Congress system and opposition politicians on a basis of mutual benefit. T h e opposition party representative has access to centers of political and administrative decision making and can thus "get things done" for his political clients and constituents. In return, however, he sometimes serves as a weapon for the relevant Congress leader against his Congress adversaries by attempting to foment political trouble in their areas, by asking ministers who are not a part of that leader's faction embarrassing questions in the Assembly, or in serving as channels for leaks and rumors calling their integrity or ability into question. These links in the Legislative Assembly also include MLAs who desire entry into the Congress Legislative Party and who in some cases have been called upon to enter the party when the factional "balance" has started to change adversely. THE PROBLEM OF MINISTRY

FORMATION:

PUBLIC ELECTIONS AND FACTIONAL CHANGE

Factional coalitions started to form at the state level in the Rajasthan Congress shortly after the integration of the Rajputana states. The coalition of Jai Narain Vyas, it will be recalled, engineered the collapse of the first "popular" ministry in Rajasthan headed by Pandit Hiralal Shastri. This omnibus coalition main-

CONFLICT AND COHESION

215

tained its integrity through the first General Elections held in 1952. The ministry formed under Vyas in 1951 included important leaders from all major social and regional groups in the state; it did not have much time to devote to the administration of the state, however, because of the need to prepare for the first General Elections. These were critical elections for the Congress party for several reasons, and the results altered irrevocably the organization of power in the party. As we have seen, first, the urban preindependence movements from which the party was created had not developed mass support in the rural areas of the state and had not made intensive efforts toward mobilizing such support after independence. Instead, Congress leaders had directed their primary attention to the integration of the Rajputana states and to deciding who was to form the government in the new state after it was created. Second, the princes and their sardars still wielded immense power in the rural areas, many of which had not been brought under the effective administration of the state even by this time. Third, while the Congress had weathered the first succession, this conflict together with several local conflicts had encouraged dissidence in the organization. Finally, the traditional elite, the Rajputs, rather than boycotting or actively resisting the new political order, had decided to participate actively in it. This posed a serious threat to the continued dominance of the Congress in state politics and prompted a concerted but only partially successful effort on the part of Congress leaders to widen the scope of party support on the eve of the 1952 elections. In the first General Elections the Congress was able to attract only slightly over 39 percent of the popular vote for its candidates to the state Legislative Assembly and was soundly defeated in Jodhpur Division, where it won only four of thirty-five seats ( 1 1 percent).8 In three of the other four divisions of the state the Con8. The following figures have been compiled from Government of India, Election Commission, Report of the First General Elections in India, 2 (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1955), pp. 650-669. The second and third General Elections were not so crucial in changing the organization of power within the party. For a useful survey see K. L. Kamal, Party Politics in an Indian State: A Study of the Main Political Parties in Rajasthan (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co., n.d.). In 1957, although candidates who were mem-

216

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

gress was returned by a majority, and in the fourth it was not so badly defeated as in Jodhpur. T h e majority factions in each of these areas were not considered "close" associates of Vyas, although they had supported him from 1949 to 1952. Vyas himself was defeated in both of the constituencies in which he contested: in his "home" constituency he was defeated by the Maharaja of Jodhpur, who received 62.2 percent of the vote to 17.2 percent for Vyas; in the second constituency he was defeated by the dominant local jagirdar,

who received 65.7 percent of the vote to Vyas' 18.9 per-

cent. T h e defeat of Vyas in the elections was indicative of the limited base of popular support for the Lok

Parishad

movement

even in the center of its most intense activity and for its most popular and venerated leader. 9 Moreover, these elections results served not only to topple the Vyas ministry but also to limit the power of his Jodhpur faction, because after the first elections the bers of the Vyas faction were granted a larger proportion of seats in an effort by the high command to reinstate Vyas as chief minister, these candidates did not fare so well as those of Paliwal's coalition. In the 1962 elections some of Vyas' lower-level supporters chose to contest as opposition candidates, although this did not include any of his former close associates. T h e fourth General Elections have been important in changing the organization of the factional system within the Congress in that several major factional leaders, for the first time in the history of the Rajasthan Congress, openly contested against the party as opposition candidates. This included an important segment of the Jat group as well as several former secondary leaders of the Vyas coalition. It should be noted, however, that in both cases these factional coalitions were split, and large numbers of the coalition members remained in the Congress party organization. g. T h e Rajput leaders in Jodhpur held Vyas in high regard compared with the other preindependence leaders, and were ambivalent in their desire to see him defeated. It was felt that, given the preelection negotiations concerning the allocation of Congress tickets to representatives of the jagirdar class, Vyas would be more sensitive to Rajput interests than other Congress leaders were he to be elected and made chief minister. On the other hand, one of the driving forces in the Rajput election effort was an intense desire to win a decisive victory over both the Congress and the Kisan Sabha forces. Vyas was approached, however, by Rajput representatives with an offer that the Rajputs would not contest against him in Jalore District if he would agree to withdraw in favor of the maharaja in Jodhpur City. This Vyas refused to do. One of Vyas' chief political lieutenants, Dwarkadas Purohit, who had been a member of the first popular ministry in Jodhpur State, was also defeated badly in his home constituency in Jodhpur City.

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION

217

center of party power shifted from the Jodhpur-dominated

PCC

to the Congress Legislative Party. W i t h the defeat of Vyas the Congress party was faced with the immediate problem of choosing a new leader, at least for an interim period, who could serve as chief minister and effectively bridge its various factional elements at the state level. A f t e r considerable deliberation, the Congress Legislative Party on

February

22, 1952 elected T i k a r a m Paliwal, a quiet but effective and intelligent leader who had played an active role in the preindependence movement in Jaipur State and who had strengthened his political position by leading anti-Shastri sentiment in the Jaipur area. 10 H e had served as deputy chief minister under Vyas before the elections, and because he had not commanded a large personal following nor given evidence of political aggressiveness and great ambition he was felt to be a logical compromise candidate. 1 1

To

pave the way for the return of Vyas, Paliwal at the same time moved a resolution that expressed confidence in the leadership of Vyas and stated that after Vyas was reelected in a by-election he would assume his rightful position of leadership of the Congress Legislative Party. T h i s measure was likewise passed unanimously. A l t h o u g h his was to be an interim ministry, Paliwal did not hesitate to show decisiveness and direction in his administration. O n e of the most sensitive political issues in Indian politics is the formation of ministries, and in exercising this chief

minister's

prerogative Paliwal showed that his was not to be a continuation of past policy in ministerial selections. Unlike his predecessor, the new chief minister reportedly preferred to work with a smaller, more

"manageable"

cabinet

which

could

be

administratively

effective and which could work as a collective unit under the chief minister's watchful eye. 12 Also unlike Vyas, Paliwal did not pay 10. Interviews with leaders of all factions in the Congress Legislative Party at that time. 11. Hindustan Times, February 23, 1952. 12. Hindustan Times, April 9, 1952. Paliwal did not want to become a captive of the old Vyas ministry—particularly if Vyas were to choose not to contest again or were to be defeated again. This was an especially imimportant decision for Paliwal because Vyas had publicly declared after the elections that he was through with politics and planned to take the more

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

218

homage to a regional balance in the formation of his ministry. Bikaner and K o t a h had n o representation in the small cabinet of six. B r i j Sundar Sharma, the K o t a h representative in the Vyas ministry and the " l o g i c a l " choice to continue, had been defeated in the elections and d i d not stand in a by-election until after Paliwal had surrendered the chief ministership to Vyas later in the year. 1 3 T h e B i k a n e r representative on the Vyas cabinet had been C h o u d h r y K u m b h a r a m A r y a , the powerful Jat leader from that region. A l t h o u g h he had been elected and enjoyed the direct support of all b u t one of the n i n e Congressmen elected from this division, Paliwal decided not to include him primarily because of his reputation as a hard-headed administrator w h o was often difficult to control and his reputation for showing excessive favoritism to members of his caste. T h e r e was also opposition to K u m bharam in the Congress h i g h c o m m a n d because of his alleged "casteism," and d u r i n g his tour of Bikaner Division prior to the elections, P r i m e Minister N e h r u had directed that he withdraw from the elections as a Congress candidate. 1 4 T h e Jat faction in the Legislative Party, however, found representation through N a t h u R a m Mirdha, the y o u n g Jat leader in the kisan movement of J o d h p u r Division. T h e r e were t w o other notable changes in the new ministry. First of all, Paliwal d i d n o t include Mathuradas Mathur, the former education and public health minister. T h i s was particuG a n d h i a n - l i k e p a t h of d o i n g g o o d deeds and p u r i f y i n g the party organization. It was also p r o b a b l e

that V y a s w o u l d have difficulty in getting elected

in

J o d h p u r , a n d were h e to contest in his home constituency in which he was d e f e a t e d a n d w h i c h was vacated w i t h the death of the M a h a r a j a of J o d h p u r , V y a s ' political career w o u l d h a v e b e e n immeasurably curtailed. Paliwal also reportedly was n o t particularly attracted to two of Vyas' former ministers, K u m b h a r a m A r y a a n d M a t h u r a d a s M a t h u r , each of w h o m was k n o w n for his ability a n d a m b i t i o n . 13. O n l y seven of

fifteen

Congress candidates were returned f r o m Kotah

D i v i s i o n in the 195s elections a n d the most prominent of them was V e d Pal T y a g i , w h o was a staunch supporter of H i r a l a l Shastri and had served in his ministry. 14. Hindustan

Times,

D e c e m b e r 7, 1951. K u m b h a r a m is reported to have

agreed to f o l l o w N e h r u ' s directive b u t was elated when informed that final day for withdrawal of n o m i n a t i o n s had passed.

the

C O N F L I C T A N D COHESION

219

larly important since Mathur had been a close supporter of Vyas until this time and had already developed a reputation as an effective administrator and master of political compromise in his role in bringing the Marwar Kisan Sabha into the Congress fold. Another former minister and close supporter of Vyas who was left out of the new ministry was Narottam Lai Joshi, an important Praja Mandal leader from Shekhawati, who at this time still enjoyed the supporter of the kisan elements in the Congress from this area. Besides Paliwal, there was only one other minister who had also served on the Vyas ministry. This was Mohanlal Sukhadia, who together with the venerable Congress worker from Dungarpur, Bhogilal Pandya, and Amritlal Yadav, the Scheduled Caste "representative," gave Udaipur Division three of the six ministers. Paliwal and Ram Kishore Vyas were both from Jaipur District, while the Matsya region was represented by Master Bhola Nath, an associate of Vyas. The only change made in the ministry under Paliwal was the inclusion of Ram Karan Joshi from Jaipur District at the urging of J a i Narain Vyas. T h e regional and caste imbalance of the Paliwal ministry was striking and provoked resentment in critical sectors of the Congress elite. No representation had been provided the dry regions of Bikaner and Jodhpur, and there were no representatives from among the peasant castes. In fact all ministers, with the exception of the one Scheduled Caste representative, were Brahman. Although there was originally unanimous agreement that Vyas should again contest for election to the Legislative Assembly and assume his position as leader of the Congress Legislative Party, later there was considerable opposition to his contesting reelection to his old post.18 This opposition came primarily from among 15. Vyas himself was uncertain as to whether he should contest a byelection. Shortly after the elections he was approached by Manikyalal Varma who urged him to contcst again, but his suggestion was met by a short rebuff. Varma was quite upset by Vyas' behavior and argued that this was not the way that a political leader was expected to act. At this Vyas stalked out of the room and went to the washroom where he waited until Varma had left. T h e political adviser of Vyas who had attended this meeting and reported the incident to the author suggested that Vyas' behavior was so er-

220

THE CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

supporters of the new chief minister, who felt that their desires for political position and control could be better served through Paliwal rather through the uncertainty which the reelection of Vyas would bring. There was also opposition from among the vestigial supporters of the first chief minister, Pandit Hiralal Shastri, who had not forgotten the role played by Vyas in the ousting of their leader. Vyas received support from those who felt politically deprived under Paliwal. He was nominated to contest the Kishengarh by-election after a heated debate in a closed session of the P C C Election Committee. 16 Thus, although Vyas successfully contested a by-election for the Legislative Assembly and was subsequently elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party and made chief minister, he was under constant attack from several quarters until the collapse of his ministry in October 1954. Vyas' reelection as leader of the Congress Legislative Party did not occur immediately after the by-election, and by mid-September a group of dissidents who openly opposed his reinstatement had formed. Several members of this group stated that they did not oppose Vyas personally, but that they were opposed to the manner in which he was reelected and the manner in which he was being reinstated as leader of the party. It was at this time that Hiralal Shastri, the former chief minister whose supporters were counted among the dissidents, attempted to bring the Congress factions into accord. After he had engaged in extensive talks with opposition leaders, however, it was feared in most Congress quarters that Shastri himself was preparing to stage a political comeback, possibly at the expense of the party itself. Paliwal was precariously balanced between the two coalitions. ratic because h e

had sensed since the elections his dependence o n

others

for reelection a n d that his former dominant position in the Congress had b e e n irreparably damaged. 16. T h e

incumbent

MLA

from Kishengarh,

Chandmal

Mehta,

resigned

his seat so that Vyas might contest. H e was later himself elected in a by-elect i o n b u t f r o m N a g a u r District in J o d h p u r Division. V y a s received

support

f r o m M a t h u r a d a s M a t h u r , C h o u d h r y K u m b h a r a m Arya, Sardar Harlal Singh, R a m Karan Joshi, and representatives of the U d a i p u r faction. His opponents were

primarily

from Jaipur

Paliwal—Damodar

Lai

District, where

Vyas,

Virendra Singh Chauhan, and

Narain

certain

Chaturvedi,

followers of

Purshottamdas

R a m Kishore V y a s — o p p o s e d

Tikaram Sharma,

his candidacy.

CONFLICT AND

COHESION

281

The dissidents included some of his own followers whose support he did not want to lose, yet he did not want to associate himself with their efforts because his sentiments did not rest with the interests of the jagirdar opposition with whom the dissidents had been flirting. Nor did he want to risk alienating the majority faction in the Congress Legislative Party and the Congress high command. The Center, as was to occur frequendy through the second General Elections, played a major role in its several attempts to mediate and resolve this dispute. After the joint meeting of the dissident MLAs and DCC leaders, when it had become evident that the group was serious, Bhola Nath and Bhogilal Pandya, who were both in the Paliwal ministry, went to Delhi to report on the situation and to seek advice from the Congress high command. Later, the eminent Gujarati leader, Balwantray Mehta, at that time a General Secretary of the All-India Congress Committee, went to Jaipur to pacify the dissidents, but he returned to Delhi after little success.17 In the first week of October, however, Paliwal, Vyas, Manikyalal Varma, Adityendra, and the Congress Working Committee met with Nehru to talk over the problem. First they agreed that Vyas would be elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party. Second, it was agreed that suitable machinery would be set up to permit periodic consultation between the ministry and the Pradesh Congress Committee. This was to take the form of a joint meeting of the PCC and the Congress Legislative Party at the beginning and end of each legislative session for the purpose of reviewing and discussing legislation. Third, legislators were to become associate members of the PCC with no voting power, while P C C officeholders were to become associate members of the Congress Legislative Party with the same limitation. Fourth, it was agreed that informal meetings of officers of the PCC and ministers would be held periodically, and finally, it was decided that DCC presidents were to be invited by the chief minister to discuss 17. Mehta had been one of the major leaders of the All-India States' Peoples' Congress and was an old friend and close supporter of Vyas. It was primarily for these reasons that the dissidents rejected his efforts to mediate the conflict: he did not fit the image appropriate to an arbiter role. Interviews with members of the then-dissident faction.

222

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

problems with his ministers. 18 O n October 7 Vyas was unanimously elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party by seventyone of the eighty-four members voting. 19 Within two days eight Congress legislators led by Ved Pal Tyagi left the Congress Legislative Party and formed a small opposition group called the Praja party. T y a g i had been the law minister in the old Shastri cabinet and at the time of his departure was a secretary of the C L P . Raghubhir Dayal Goyal, another defector, had held four portfolios under Shastri. Although two or three other dissidents who had aligned with this group did not break with the Congress party, the Congress was still left with a minority of 76 members in a house of 160. T h e hopes of the dissidents that their leaving the party would trigger the collapse of Vyas' attempts to form a new ministry were crushed when the opposition itself supplied enough "potential" Congressmen to make the opposition attempt to pass a no-confidence motion unsuccessful. 20 T h e life of the Praja party was quite short. Only a week or so after it had been created, it was dissolved, and its members rejoined the Congress Legislative Party where they had important protectors. T h e defectors were harshly reprimanded but were pardoned their political sin when, in a meeting with Prime Minister Nehru, T y a g i apologized for his action and promised to support without reservation all Congress policies in the future as atonement. Vyas' first step to expand his control over his ministry by decreas18. Hindustan Times, October 3, 1952. A comfortable working arrangement between legislative and organizational wings of the party was not achieved until the late 1950s when the same factional coalition controlled both the ministry and the party organization. 19. Hindustan Times, October 8, 195«. so. T w o members of the opposition were admitted to the Congress Legislative Party shortly after the dissidents had crossed the floor and three others had applied to join. Another member of the opposition had promised to support the Congress in the case of a no-confidence motion while two others had promised to be absent and another had promised to abstain. Hindustan Times, October 13, 1952. T h e opposition felt that there was a very good possibility that the government could be defeated on a noconfidence motion. However, after a heated dispute over the speaker's ruling on the allotment of time to the opposition for the debate, the opposition walked out of the Assembly in protest. Hindustan Times, October 22, 1952.

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION

223

ing Paliwal's and to prepare the way for ministerial change was taken in late November. O n N o v e m b e r 26 there was a redistribution of portfolios. Vyas assumed control of the Political portfolio from Paliwal

while

that of

General

Administration,

formerly

under Paliwal, was "divided" between them. W h i l e this was accepted as a symbolic move to curtail Paliwal's position, the transfer of

Urban

Development

from

Ram

Kishore Vyas, a

close

supporter of Paliwal, to R a m Karan Joshi, a stalwart supporter of Vyas, was perhaps more significant. Each was a factional leader from Jaipur Division. 2 1 T h e growing alienation between Vyas and Paliwal came to a climax in the spring of 1953 after Vyas announced that he wanted his

cabinet

expanded

colleagues—Kumbharam

to

include and

his

two

Mathuradas.

former Ram

ministerial

Kishore

Bhogilal Pandya, and Nathu R a m Mirdha promptly

Vyas,

submitted

their resignations from the cabinet. 2 2 Paliwal publicly

opposed

the conditions which had prompted these resignations and was adamantly opposed to their being accepted. As in leadership crises in the past, the Congress high command was appealed to in an effort to reach a new settlement. Paliwal and a new-found political ally, Manikyalal Varma, proceeded immediately to Delhi for talks with highly placed party officials and, although

Paliwal

insisted

publicly

that

no

"political

rivalry"

existed between Vyas and himself, he indicated that he was seriously contemplating resigning along with his three colleagues if an acceptable solution was not found. Both Prime Minister N e h r u and Maulana A b u l Kalam Azad advised Paliwal to remain in the cabinet and reportedly reminded

him

that the chief

minister

should have discretion in the selection of his ministers and in the assignment

of

ministerial

responsibilities.

The

Congress

high

command was not able to bridge the gap between Vyas and Paliwal si. T h i s district conflict has persisted and is typical of the impact of local conflicts on intraparty alignments at the state level. In 1966 Ram Kishore Vyas was elected president of the Pradesh Congress Committee as the candidate of the dominant faction led by the Chief Minister, Mohanlal Sukhadia, while Ram Karan Joshi, who was opposed to Ram Kishore Vyas' candidacy, left the Congress in December 1966 and joined the Janta Congress of which he became president. 22. Hindustan Times, March 21, 1953.

224

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

and on March 23, Paliwal resigned from the ministry. 23 Vyas made several attempts to reach an accommodation with Paliwal but to no avail. Paliwal's resignation was finally accepted as were those of Nathu Ram Mirdha and Ram Kishore Vyas, but attempts to persuade Bhogilal Pandya to retract his resignation were successful. Vyas' opposition included not only Paliwal and his group of supporters from Jaipur Division but also others, primarily from Udaipur and Matsya, who were uneasy about the changed configuration of power that might result from the inclusion of the two strong leaders, Kumbharam and Mathuradas, into the ministry. They feared that these leaders, given their political capabilities and inclinations, would shift the base of power in the party, as well as state welfare benefits, to the desert areas of the state. Vyas, however, was committed to creating a more regionally balanced ministry and, after receiving the reluctant concurrence of the Congress high command, invited Kumbharam to join the ministry in April 1953. Although Mathuradas was not included in the ministry, he was elected chief whip of the Congress Legislative Party over Gulab Chand Kasliwal, the incumbent and supporter of Paliwal, by a vote of forty to thirty-seven, thus giving Vyas an unofficial, but very marginal, vote of confidence. T h e climax of the factional conflict between Vyas and Paliwal came during August and September 1953 when an open schism developed between the chief minister and Ved Pal Tyagi, who, despite his promised support, had issued a circular to approximately forty Congress MLAs inviting them to a meeting of Congress dissidents to be held at Paliwal's residence.24 As a result of this open affront to the Congress leadership, Vyas suspended Tyagi from the party along with Virendra Singh, a close supporter of Paliwal from the former chief minister's home district who had been extremely critical of Congress policies and of the formal Congress Legislative leadership. At a meeting of the Executive of the Congress Legislative Party on September 7, a vote of eight to four supported Vyas' action.25 Furthermore, the Executive recom23. Hindustan Times, March 24, 1953. 24. Hindustan Times, August ig, 1953. 25. Hindustan Times, September 9,1953.

CONFLICT AND COHESION

225

mended that both Tyagi and Virendra Singh be formally expelled from the Congress Legislative Party. At a meeting of fifteen leading members of the C L P shortly afterwards, Paliwal was cut short in a speech in which he accused the legislative leadership of "glaring acts of corruption and favoritism." 26 Paliwal and a few other leaders left the meeting, and shortly thereafter Paliwal resigned from the Congress Legislative Party. T h e constant threats to the continuity of the Vyas ministry was indicative of the factional cleavages in the state Congress party. Although an accommodation was reached between Vyas and his major "open" opponent, Tikaram Paliwal, in the early part of 1954, the Vyas ministry collapsed within nine months after. T h e defeat of the Vyas ministry, although a result of a large number of factors, can be attributed primarily to a widespread feeling among important leaders in the party that his was not a responsive leadership. First of all Vyas had alienated several important members of his ministry by his consistent attempts to make them hold to fairly rigid guidelines. He was particularly opposed to ministers personally intervening in the administration of the government departments under their charge, in showing favoritism in the making of administrative decisions, and in the bestowing of political benefits. Secondly, opposition had grown among some leaders who had not been able to fully realize their political aspirations during Vyas' tenure as chief minister. This group included several leaders who had originally been close political allies of Vyas and who had been among his staunchest supporters for reelection as leader of the party. It also included several important supporters of Tikaram Paliwal whose fears of seeing their position of power diminished under Vyas had in fact materialized. Thirdly, the chief minister's support for the entry of jagirdar MLAs from the opposition into the Congress Legislative Party galvanized opposi26. Hindustan Times, September 13, 1953. Immediately after Paliwal walked out of the meeting, Vyas and several of his supporters went directly to Paliwal to attempt to persuade him not to act on his threat to dissociate himself from the Congress Party. It was reported to the author by two Vyas supporters that Vyas took Paliwal's criticism as a personal affront even though he knew that there were important members of his cabinet whose behavior was not in accord with the chief minister's directives. The fact that Paliwal's claims were felt to be true added to the sting of the charge.

226

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

tion from several factions in the Vyas coalition. It intensified Jat opposition to the continued leadership of Vyas for social as well as political reasons. The Jat coalition, together with other important leaders of the Congress, felt that their positions would be diminished significantly with this new base of support which the chief minister would enjoy. Fourthly, the closest supporters of Vyas, almost all of whom were urban leaders who had been active in the Praja Mandal movements, were becoming engaged in conflict for control over the district and local party organizations with rural Jat factions, and this conflict had transposed to the state level. This served to exacerbate the division between the chief minister and that segment of his coalition at the state level which was already resentful over what it felt to be limited representation on the ministry as well as limited control over important portfolios.27 Finally, there was increasing dissent in the cabinet over the question of appointments, postings, and transfers of administrative officers. Neither the integration of gazetted officers into the administrative services of the state nor the list of seniority had been completed by 1954. Furthermore, several ministers wanted a decentralization of appointments from the chief secretary of the government to their own departments so that they might bring in officials more attuned to ministerial directives. The additional question of whether the chief secretary was to be a Rajasthani or not had also remained unanswered.28 Anti-Vyas leaders by early October 1954 had formed a coalition 27. T h e conflict developing during this time in Jodhpur is analyzed in Chapter 10. More immediate and critical in state politics at this time, however, was a campaign launched by dissident Congressmen to oust the speaker of the assembly, Narottam Lai Joshi, one of the chief minister's closest associates, who was charged with "dabbling in politics" and with being responsible for the introduction of a no-confidence motion in the Jhunjhunu DCC against the Jat-supported president of that organization. On August 5, 1954, a letter demanding Joshi's resignation and signed by sixty-six M L A s was handed to the chief minister. T h e letter was forwarded to the high command, which declared that the charges made had no bearing on Joshi's role as speaker of the assembly. Nehru also reprimanded Nathu Ram Mirdha, an instigator of the campaign, indicating that he felt the letter "highly improper," and that it "exhibits an extreme sense of irresponsibility." Hindustan Times, August so, 1954. 28. Interviews with ministerial incumbents at that time.

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION

227

which controlled the Pradesh Congress Committee and felt that it enjoyed the support of a majority of the members of the Congress Legislative Party. Both the P C C president and the P C C Executive Committee were openly opposed to the chief minister and used their formal position to criticize the activities and policies of the government. A majority of the members of the P C C belonged to factions that were starting to call for the ousting of the chief minister. With the Jat and Udaipur groups aligned, the opposition majority in the P C C was indeed formidable. Vyas had the support of a majority of the members from only two regions, and in his home region of Jodhpur enjoyed the support of only seven of the twenty-five-man delegation. 29 TABLE R E G I O N A L DISTRIBUTION

42

OF F A C T I O N A L

IN THE R A J A S T H A N P C C , (IN

Region Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner Total faction membership

SUPPORT

1954-1955

PERCENT)

Vyas

Sukhadia

Kumbharam

67 58 25 0 0 28 «5

33 32 75 100 17 20 0

83 52 85

35

56

3«

0 9 0 0

N

=

15 22 12 29 6 25 13 122

T h e chief minister also enjoyed the full support of only two members of the cabinet—Ram Karan Joshi and Master Bhola Nath, who were from Jaipur and Alwar districts respectively. Three others—Choudhry Kumbharam Arya, Mohanlal Sukhadia and Amritlal Yadav—were actively involved in the opposition coalition. T h e two others, Tikaram Paliwal and Bhogilal Pandya, 29. This and subsequent factional distributions were reconstructed through personal interviews with core members of each faction and with members from each region of the state. Agreement was almost unanimous; where it was not, factional assignments have not been made.

228

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

were also opposed to Vyas but were not actively involved in mobilizing support for his removal. Paliwal was not opposed to the continuation of Vyas as chief minister but was still opposed to a number of elements who wanted to join the ministry and favored the dropping of Kumbharam from the cabinet. Bhogilal Pandya was also opposed to certain of the "young political upstarts," but he was also associated with Manikyalal Varma, a leader of the anti-Vyas coalition. In an effort to contain his opposition Vyas initiated efforts to get rid of the "intriguing" elements of his cabinet, and this was agreed to by the president of the national Congress, U. N. Dhebar, who had voiced his staunch support for Vyas on numerous previous occasions. This, however, merely served to give the new factional coalition greater dedication to its purpose. Attempts were made to prevent an open breach in the party by the high command, which was intent on seeing Vyas remain as chief minister of the state. At a joint meeting of the PCC and the Congress Legislative Party held with Balwantray Mehta on October 4, however, it became evident that it would be impossible to bridge the gap between the two factional coalitions and that the majority coalition did not support Jai Narain Vyas. 30 One of the major problems facing the opposition coalition was the selection of its own leader. Many of the older "freedom fighters," while they were opposed to Vyas, did not want to stand against him in a public contest. Manikyalal Varma did not want to assume the problems of the chief ministership; and both Shoba Ram, the former chief minister of the Matsya Union, and Master Adityendra, the incumbent president of the PCC, refused to accept the "offer" of leadership of the rebel group. The coalition finally decided on Mohanlal Sukhadia, and on October 19 he went to Delhi for talks with the Congress high command about forming a new ministry. 81 In a last effort to bring about a recon30. Hindustan Times, October 15, 1954. 31. Sukhadia at this time did not have a reputation as a Rajasthan-wide leader and had not achieved the stature of those who had been major leaders in the preindependence movements, although he had joined the Mewar Praja Mandal before the "Quit India" Movement. He was known as a rather quiet and retiring man but an efficient and effective administrator who worked for

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229

ciliation between the two factions, Lai Bahadur Shastri was sent to Jaipur for talks with leaders of the different factions within the party. His efforts proved to be futile. O n November 6 Vyas was defeated on a no-confidence motion in the Congress Legislative Party by a vote of fifty-nine to fifty-one with one abstention and two absentees.82 T h e vote on the no-confidence motion revealed the splits within the state Congress party. Although the vote was by secret ballot, it is possible to arrive at a fairly close identification. With the exception of the Udaipur faction, which included twenty MLAs, and the Jat group, which included sixteen MLAs, most of the M L A s from the various areas were divided. In the desert regions, the M L A s from urban areas were almost wholly behind Vyas, while those from rural regions supported Sukhadia. In Jaipur the party was a congeries of local factions which tended to cluster around several prominent politicians, some of whom supported Vyas while the others supported Sukhadia. Although the Rajput group had agreed in caucus to vote for Vyas, six or seven decided to vote against him. These included legislators elected from both Udaipur and Jodhpur divisions.

compromise and shunned open factional disputes. He also had lived in the shadow of his political mentor, Manikyalal Varma, who was a dominant leader of the Vyas opposition. He received the almost undivided support of the Udaipur faction and was acceptable to other leaders who felt that he would be responsive to their demands and who feared the ascendancy of the Kumbharam faction. T h e Kumbharam group supported Sukhadia because they felt that the new governing elite would be collegial and perhaps temporary. Interviews. 32. Hindustan Times, November 7, 1954. T h e solicitation of support produced intensive activity. T h e opposition, while it had a secure majority in the PCC, was less certain of its support in the CLP. T h e anti-Vyas coalition reportedly drew up several different lists of the new ministry and the name of all central Congress M L A s appeared on at least one. Furthermore, promises of inclusion in the ministry were reportedly made to some of Vyas' close supporters as well as to members of the Rajput group, which had not enjoyed ministerial representation under Vyas. Vyas on the other hand resolutely refused to campaign actively for the retention of his position. He declared that he would stand on his record as a Congressman and chief minister. Shortly before the vote, however, he circulated a letter from Jawaharlal Nehru who extended Vyas his support and good wishes. It should be noted, however, that the prime minister did not personally intervene.

230

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N T A B L E 43 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FACTIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE P A R T Y ,

1954-1955

(IN PERCENT)

Region

Vyas

Sukhadia

Kumbharam

N =

Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner

50 58 82 16 60 50 36

50 37 18 84 10 0 0

o 5 o 0 30 50 64

16 '9 11 25 10 16 11

T h e data in T a b l e 43 indicate that the majority factional coalition was similar to that in the Pradesh Congress Committee. 33 T h e opposition to Vyas was a coalition of regional factions. T h e most important were the Udaipur-centered faction and the Jat coalition recruited from the desert areas of the state. These two dominant state-level factions were joined by important districtlevel factions from Alwar, Bundi, Kotah, Jaipur, and T o n k . T h e defeat of Vyas marked the third succession crisis in the short life of the Rajasthan Congress. Most importantly, however, it marked a transfer of power in terms of political generations. T h e new majority coalition was forged primarily by younger political professionals from these regional factions, who all had 33. Factional alignments were determined by extensive interviews with those who were members of the Congress Legislative Party at the time of the no-confidence vote. Since this was a secret ballot, there is still some question as to how several of the M L A s voted. Tikaram Paliwal, for example, released his votes, although he supported Vyas. Had he attempted to extend all of the votes of his supporters to Vyas, he would surely have failed because several—including Damodarlal Vyas and Ram Kishore Vyas—were among the most vocal supporters of Sukhadia. There were others who had expressed their support for Vyas and several, along with Paliwal, became a part of the Vyas coalition almost immediately after the vote. T h e votes of two Rajputs from Kotah Division and one from Jodhpur Division are also in question. Although these three Rajputs were vocal in their support of Vyas, they joined the Sukhadia forces less than a year after the vote. There is also some question as to how two members of the Udaipur group voted. Neither, however, received the Congress ticket in the 1957 elections, and both were supported by Vyas. T h e distribution in Table 43, however, should be fairly accurate.

CONFLICT AND

COHESION

231

entered politics prior to independence b u t after the " f o u n d e r s " of political movements in their states. It did, however, have the support of one " f o u n d e r " w i t h i n the Legislative Party and two important leaders, Master A d i t y e n d r a and Manikyalal Varma, w h o enj o y e d considerable influence within the party organization. 3 4 ( A l l b u t o n e of the m a j o r faction leaders in the Vyas coalition, however, were considered to be "founders.") TABLE

44

FACTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE

PARTY

B Y POLITICAL GENERATION, I 9 5 4 - 1 9 5 5 (IN PERCENT)

Political Generation

Vyas

Sukhadia

Pre-1937 '937-1942

45 '9 '9

8 22

45

0 3'

4 5'

1942-1947

'947-1952

1952-1962 N

=

16

22

I n terms of the factional affiliation of all members of the C o n gress Legislative Party, however, the generation difference is indeed striking. A m o n g the "non-jagirdar" M L A s , 45 percent of those in the Vyas coalition had entered politics before 1937 w h i l e only 8 percent of the Sukhadia coalition had become politically active b e f o r e that time. T h e large proportion of the Sukhadia coalition had entered politics between the " Q u i t I n d i a " M o v e m e n t and independence, although the important secondary leaders had been recruited between the f o u n d i n g of the Praja Mandal organizations a n d the 1942 movement. T h e defeat of Vyas, therefore, m a r k e d a critical change in the organization of power in the R a j a s t h a n Congress. 34. Master Adityendra was at this time the president of the Rajasthan Congress, and Manikyalal Varma, while defeated in the 1952 elections for the Lok Sabha, had been subsequently elected in a by-election.

232

THE

CONGRESS

P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

COMPETITION AND COHESION: T H E SEARCH FOR ACCOMMODATION

Crisis situations such as the unseating of J a i Narain Vyas are important tests of the cohesion of an organization. This is particularly true where those who are removed from or deprived of a measure of institutional control constitute a self-conscious class of actors in terms other than their shared deprivation. It is also true where such change in leadership entails a transformation of organizational goals or where material incentives are severely restricted and the probability of future participation in the distribution of benefits is low. Also important to the equation of incentives and the orientations of those deprived of control is the strategy pursued by those who are successful in the struggle for control both in terms of organizational policy and in terms of their relationship with their intraorganization opponents. T h e problem that confronted the new chief minister was the creation of a workable coalition in his ministry and the Congress Legislative Party that would not involve severe risk of organizational fission. This, of course, is a problem faced by any political leader. It was particularly critical, however, at this juncture in the development of the Rajasthan Congress. Sukhadia's strategy in the formation and subsequent expansion of his ministry had two important facets. First, while the central representatives of the Vyas faction on the previous ministry were dropped, Sukhadia retained a representative of the old political generation reportedly to emphasize that his had not been a "generational revolution." (There were, as we have seen, representatives of the early political generations in the majority coalition that unseated Vyas.) Secondly, Sukhadia was attentive to the sensitivities of the opposition coalition in his selection of new ministers. T h i s was particularly critical in granting representation to the J a t faction which had played a pivotal role in the succession. Instead of choosing the former J a t minister, Nathu Ram Mirdha, who was viewed with antipathy by important members of the Vyas coalition, the chief minister chose Ram Niwas Mirdha, who had only recently been elected.to the Legislative Assembly and who had not been a party to factional conflict. Sukhadia thus satis-

CONFLICT AND COHESION

233

fied in part the demand of the Jat faction for expanded representation in the ministry with the appointment of a widely respected man who had enjoyed the support of Vyas in the by-election in which he was returned to the Assembly. The other appointment, Brij Sundar Sharma, had been a member of Vyas' preelection ministry but had firmly supported Sukhadia in the no-confidence motion. While attempting to avoid alienating the Vyas group, Sukhadia also wanted to establish the independence of his coalition to affirm that his control did not rest upon the sufferance of the minority coalition. Thus no serious overtures were made to members of the opposition coalition either to join the ministry or to share in positions of authority in the Legislative Party.38 This course of action, like the succession itself, involved the risk of party defections from the minority coalition, an option that had been pursued by one small faction in 1952. The probability of such a choice being made was low, however, given the emotive commitment of Vyas to the Congress, his strategic channels of access and sources of support in the party high command, and the feeling among his major lieutenants that the governing coalition was an extremely fragile one and that control could be reestablished. Furthermore, formal association with the opposition was not an attractive option because the prospects of forming a united opposition legislative party were extremely poor, given the widely varied ideological and class composition of opposition MLAs. T h e decision of the minority coalition to continue to participate within the Congress was made evident in its efforts to elect representatives to official positions within the Legislative Party. T h e governing coalition, however, proved cohesive in the face of these threats. Early in 1955 supporters of Sukhadia were elected overwhelmingly to the Executive Committee of the C L P , and in two other contests candidates of the Vyas coalition were decisively defeated. In one Ram Kishore Vyas was elected deputy leader of the C L P over Tikaram Paliwal, who had joined the Vyas group after being excluded from effective participation in the governing coalition. In the other, the election for the chief whip, the incumbent and central member of the Sukhadia group, Mathuradas 35. Interviews with leaders of both coalitions at that time.

234

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

Mathur, defeated Ram Karan Joshi, one of Vyas' closest and most important supporters.36 Success in the containment of the Vyas coalition was accompanied by the development of conflict within the dominant coalition. This resulted from increasing pressure from the J a t faction for expanded ministerial representation and a more favorable distribution of portfolios as payment for its critical support in the succession crisis. These demands were publicly opposed by the minority coalition and by the Congress high command. Both feared the expansion of Jat power in Congress circles: the Vyas group because of threats to its organizational dominance in the desert regions, and the Center because the Jat faction probably would be less amenable and attentive to the interests and persuasion of the national party than other state party groups. The Jat demands together with a collective interest in party unity for the second General Elections prompted a search for accommodation between the non-Jat components of the governing coalition and the Vyas group. T h e initiative to begin negotiations, as so often, came from the Congress high command. In June 1955 U. N. Dhebar, the newly elected president of the national Congress, visited Rajasthan in the first of several tours to study factional alignments and the objects of intraparty conflict and to begin talks with leaders of dominant factions concerning a rapprochement and the containment of Kumbharam Arya. 37 Dhebar's "unity talks" served to intensify competition within the governing coalition, and in August, after extended talks between the high command and representatives of the Sukhadia and Vyas groups, Kumbharam was formally charged with spreading "casteism" in Rajasthan. 38 After pressure from within the state and threats from the Center, Kumbharam resigned in October.39 His resignation again made evident the in36. Hindustan Times, March 3, 1955. 37. Hindustan Times, J u n e 18, 1955. 38. Hindustan Times, August is, 1955. 39. Hindustan Times, October Î2, 1955. T h e new "anti-ministerialist" coalition also felt threatened in the state party organization. For example, Vyas was elected president of the Jaipur District Congress Committee in September 1955 and in his presidential address he declared that "groupism" in the Congress would leave only when the character of the current ministry

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION

«35

fluential role of the Center in the management of factional conflict and in the ordering of power in the Rajasthan Congress. Kumbharam's resignation left Bikaner Division without representation on the ministry and also irritated Jat leaders, who started to feel increasingly isolated from power. Shortly after he resigned, members of Kumbharam's faction demanded that a new minister be appointed from Bikaner and that he be Jat.40 Kumbharam's successor was not named until February 1956 when Ram Chandra Choudhry, a Jat from Kumbharam's home district of Ganganagar in Bikaner Division, was unexpectedly invited to join the ministry and was given charge of the Public Works and Electrical departments.41 This choice exemplified the chief minister's shrewd political sense. The new PWD minister was not a core member of the Jat faction in Bikaner and moved in social circles quite different from those preferred by Kumbharam. An urbane and able advocate who prior to independence had served as a sessions judge in Bikaner State, Ram Chandra enjoyed an autonomous base of political support among Jats in Ganganagar District, and while he had never publicly opposed Kumbharam, he was not a close and trusted associate. His selection succeeded in inducing a schism in the Bikaner Jat political elite which has never since been bridged. Also at this time Khet Singh, a Rajput and a representative of the jagirdar Congress MLAs, was appointed a deputy minister and thus became the first Rajput to serve in the government after the first General Elections. This marked Sukhadia's first open courting of Rajput favor. His selection was also significant because he came from Jodhpur Division, a center of Jat political power. It was a move to further contain

was changed. Master Adityendra, a supporter of the Sukhadia coalition through early 1955, also addressed the meeting and spoke in favor of a motion passed unanimously which called upon the high command to act in accordance with the suggestion made by Vyas in his address to change the ministry. Hindustan Times, October 1, 1955. Later, with the appointment of Mathuradas Mathur as a general secretary of the PCC after he had received no ministerial post, Jugal Kishore Chaturvedi, initially a supporter of the anti-Vyas coalition, resigned as general secretary, as did Tikaram Paliwal, a member of the P C C Executive Committee. 40. Hindustan Times, December 2, 1955. 41. Hindustan Times, February 8, 1956.

236

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

Jat power in Congress circles by appealing to the right of all major groups to have access to political power. Continued apprehension about the political aspirations and designs of Kumbharam together with the coming of the second General Elections in 1957 again prompted efforts to reach an accommodation between Sukhadia and Jai Narain Vyas. 42 T h e first significant effort to reach a rapprochement occurred in April 1956 at a general meeting of the Rajasthan PCC, when Manikyalal Varma admitted that he had played a major role in the ousting of Vyas, publicly apologized for his action, and—in a classic plea for atonement—announced that he intended to resign from the P C C and A I C C and to devote his time to constructive work among the Harijans. Adityendra also declared his intention to resign as president of the P C C and insisted that no pressure would prevent him from doing so. Sukhadia, paying homage to the respected political style of personal sacrifice, stated that he would sacrifice anything, even the chief ministership, to achieve unity within the Congress party. Talks were held between Adityendra, Vyas, Paliwal, and Dhebar, and there was talk of ministry reformation, but even with such good intentions these talks all ended in failure. T h e Vyas group still wanted no less than that the ministry resign and Delhi select a new chief minister. Talks continued through the spring with little success, but after negotiations had been held between leaders of the Rajasthan factions under the eye of Lai Bahadur Shastri, it was announced in late summer that Vyas would be elected president of the Pradesh Congress. T h e only nominee, he was declared elected on August 20.43 4s. Hindustan Times, March 25, 1956. One of the reasons that a move toward unity was so urgent at this time was that in a vote on candidates for the Rajya Sabha, only 93 of the 117 members of the Congress Legislative Party voted for Congress candidates, while 24 voted with the opposition. Rajasthan had the only opposition candidate elected to the Rajya Sabha in these biennial elections. Hindustan Times, March 31, 1956. 43. Hindustan Times, August 21, 1956. One of the major forces in urging Vyas' election was R a j Bahadur, a member of the Vyas group from Bharatpur District and a deputy minister in the central cabinet. He was also quite close to Lai Bahadur Shastri who, like R a j Bahadur, was a Shrivastava Kayasth. R a j Bahadur was prompted to support the election of Vyas not only to

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION

237

By the end of 1956, therefore, the locus of power of the two major factional alliances in the state had completely shifted. While Vyas had been chief minister, the Udaipur group was generally considered to be in control of the PCC organization and this continued to be true for the first two years after Sukhadia became chief minister. But by late 1956, although partly due to the sufferance of the Udaipur group, the Vyas factional coalition controlled the P C C organization while the former PCC faction controlled the ministry.44 In the case of Rajasthan, therefore, the basis of faction has not been engendered by the PCC and legislative wings of the party per se, but instead these organizational frameworks have been used as "organizational weapons" by factions that have had an independent base of power. One of the major reasons for the reconciliation between the Sukhadia and Vyas factions was the hope of arriving at a slate of Congress candidates for the General Elections with a minimum of strife within the party. The election of Vyas as president of the PCC, however, did not diminish the role of factions in the Rajasthan Congress, but served rather to strengthen the Vyas coalition by affording it formal access to the politics of ticket allocation for the General Elections. Factional competition was intensified with the attempts of the major faction leaders to agree upon a slate of candidates. Initial efforts toward this end were made in August 1956 when Vyas and Manikyalal Varma jointly chose district observers and placed noncontroversial figures, mostly old Congress strengthen the Vyas group in state politics and close the breach between it and the Sukhadia forces but also to make more secure his own position in the party in Bharatpur District, where the incumbent P C C President and one of its general secretaries constituted an opposition faction in Bharatpur. 44. T h e factional profile of the P C C changed radically under Vyas' presidency. T h e selection of the P C C Executive Committee was never completed, and of the nine of the fifteen positions filled, five were firm members of the Vyas faction. General secretaries and chairmen of special committees were also selected from the Vyas group. T h e resentment of the Vyas coalition was expressed when three special invitees to the first meeting of the P C C Executive Committee staged a boycott. T h e Executive Committee was not an effective body during Vyas' tenure and held only a few meetings. Appointments of members of the governing coalition, a part of the compromise which brought Vyas to the presidency, were never completed.

238

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

workers who were not aspiring for public office, in controversial districts.48 Interest in contesting the elections in 1956-1957 was much greater than it had been in 1951-1952. First of all, the factional competition within the party had placed a premium on getting candidates nominated who were members of one's own faction or coalition. Secondly, there were more persons within given factions who wanted to receive the ticket. T h e faction leader, therefore, was not only concerned with containing the power of his opposition but also with placating his own supporters, who were often being wooed by his political opposition from both within and without the Congress party. In sixteen of the twenty-six districts for which data are available, an average of 6.6 applications were made for each constituency. 46 Although considerable effort was made to reach agreed-on lists during the fall, by late December the state Congress Election Committee, which included representatives from all major statelevel factions, had been able to reach an agreement on only about one-half of the candidates. O n December 29, the Congress high command was invited to help resolve what had become an impasse.47 T h e Committee met on January 4 with Lai Bahadur Shastri and chose candidates for 123 Assembly seats while the remaining selections were made later. 48 T h e final selections made by the Central Election Committee were somewhat surprising, especially to the Sukhadia faction: four ministers and two deputy ministers were not given tickets; Mathuradas Mathur, who entertained hopes of becoming a minister, and Kumbharam Arya and six of his important associates were also omitted, and some Sukhadia supporters were assigned to "unsafe" constituencies. 49 45. For the role of the district observers, see Chapter 6. 46. T h i s computation is based on data from the Reports of District Observers of the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee. These districts include Alwar, Bharatpur, Jaipur, Ajmer, Kotah, Udaipur, Banswara, Bhilwara, Sikar, Jhunjhunu, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Banner, Nagaur, Pali, Bikaner, and Churn. 47. Rajasthan Patrika (Hindi), Jaipur, January 2, 1957. 48. Hindustan Times, January 6, 1957. 49. T h e C E C appointed a special committee under the chairmanship of K. M. Malaviya to meet with Vyas and Sukhadia which also included Morarji Desai, Lai Bahadur Shastri, Maulana Azad, and Jagjivan Ram (Rajasthan

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A N D COHESION

239

T h e ruling coalition took these selections as a vote of no-confidence by the Congress high command. Sukhadia had a series of talks with Nehru, Azad, and Shastri and along with several of his supporters expressed his unwillingness to accept the Congress ticket under these circumstances.60 This protest was quite successful, and several of those who had been refused tickets were later granted them by the high command. These included two ministers and several supporters of Kumbharam Arya in Bikaner and Jodhpur divisions, although Kumbharam himself was denied a nomination. T h e ability of the Sukhadia coalition to pressure the high command to "reallocate" tickets in its favor was indicative of the decreasing influence of the national Congress leadership in Rajasthan affairs. T h e high command had originally hoped to redress the balance between the factional coalitions at the state level by assisting the candidacy of Vyas for the presidency of the PCC. It was also encouraged by the support given to Vyas applicants for the party ticket for the General Elections. T h e high command was not successful in this venture, although the allocation of tickets was probably more favorable for the Vyas group than it would have been had the Center not attempted to impose a solution. The Center, however, always becomes involved in the politics of ticket allocation even if it is merely to give its imprimatur to decisions already reached at the state level. T h e elections witnessed factional fights which were just as intense as those waged within party meetings. A number of Congress dissidents contested in several areas, primarily the desert regions together with Jaipur District and Kotah Division. In several constituencies Congress dissidents were successful and in others were able to help assure the defeat of the Congress candidate who was Patrika, January 15, 1957). T h e ministers that were initially denied the ticket were Brij Sundar Shanna, Amritlal Yadav, Damodarlal Vyas, Badri Prasad Gupta, Sampat R a m , and Khet Singh. Kumbharam's supporters were Moti R a m Choudhry, Sardar Harlal Singh, Manphool Singh, Hansraj Arya, R a m Ratan Kochar, and Nahar Singh. Hindustan Times, January 22, 1957. 50. Hindustan Times, January 28, 1957. Besides the chief minister, these "rebels" included Manikyalal Varma, Mathuradas Mathur, Nathu R a m Mirdha, Damodar Lai Vyas, Poonam Chand Vishnoi, and Manak Chand Kothari.

240

THE

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PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

from the opposition faction. 51 Yet in no area did a leader of a district or state faction leave the party or "openly" oppose the Congress. After the results of the elections were known, claims and counterclaims of "un-Congress-like" conduct were made, but the general consensus was that the Sukhadia-supported candidates had been more successful at the polls than the Vyas group. T h e profile of the new Congress Legislative Party was greatly changed from that of its predecessor. Of the 1 1 9 Congress MLAs elected, 75 were new. Since several of Sukhadia's colleagues had been "selected out" by the high command and others had been defeated, the problem of ministry formation with the great number of new and unproven legislators proved a difficult one. It was not certain immediately after the elections, however, whether Sukhadia had the necessary backing for party leadership. T h e high command sent M. N. Choudhuri, a general secretary of the AICC, and Brij Kishore Prasad Sinha, the Central Election Commission's representative in Rajasthan, to Jaipur to ascertain who had majority support in the Congress Legislative Party. 52 Both Sukhadia and Paliwal had already submitted ministry lists to the Congress high command. After it had been established by secret ballot that Sukhadia had a clear majority, he was unanimously elected leader of the Congress Legislative Party and was subsequently invited by the governor to form the ministry. T H E M A N A G E M E N T OF F A C T I O N A L T H E M E S F R O M T H E SUKHADIA

CONFLICT: DECADE

The results of the second General Elections marked a watershed in the development of the organization of power and the rep51. Support rendered to opposition candidates was done informally. There were three general strategies employed—the withholding of support from the Congress candidate in a local area if he was from an opposition faction, the extension of material support to non-Congress candidates, and in its most extreme form the support of peripheral members of the faction as opposition candidates. There were a number of complaints of antiparty activity which resulted in expulsions from the party. Early in February, fortytwo Congress members were expelled for six years for opposing official party candidates while thirty-five were expelled later in the month for the same reason. Hindustan Times, February 11 and 23, 1957. 5*. Hindustan Times, April 3, 1957.

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resentation of groups in the Rajasthan Congress. T h e factional system and the patterns of interest accommodation that developed during the preceding ten years constituted a general pattern which prevailed during the subsequent decade but which was changed by the elections of 1967. Three significant changes in factional participation and strategy, however, occurred during the decade after the second General Elections. The first was the increasing alienation of Vyas and certain of his associates from the Congress party. The second was the creation of an omnibus governing coalition that afforded ministerial representation to all major factions within the party. T h e third change, which is analyzed in more detail in the following chapter, was the fragmentation and restructuring of existing factions and coalitions and their regional and social pluralization. The alienation of Jai Narain Vyas and important representatives of the Praja Mandal generation of political leaders from the Congress and their progressive isolation from power provided the condition for subsequent changes in the factional system. The 1957 elections entailed a major setback for the Vyas coalition. Vyas had received the support of the high command in his efforts to maintain an authoritative presence in the party, and applicants for the party ticket from his coalition received favor in their distribution. A large proportion of the Vyas candidates, however, were defeated, in many cases with the assistance of members of the Sukhadia coalition, principally the Jat faction. Furthermore, Vyas removed himself from the day-to-day affairs of the party, having decided not to contest the elections for either the Legislative Assembly or the Lok Sabha and, after unsuccessful efforts to control the PCC, resigned as its president. His participation in the party after 1958 was intermittent and ineffective. The Vyas coalition took its last action as a collective body in the fall of 1958 in an effort to unseat Sukhadia as leader of the CLP. In September Vyas and five other dissident leaders from the early Praja Mandal generation of Rajasthani Congressmen prepared a charge sheet against the Sukhadia government as an initial act in a larger campaign to remove him from office.83 All members of 53. Rajasthan Patrika, September 1 1 , 1958. T h e meeting in which plans were laid was attended by a large number of dissidents from both the Con-

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this group which nucleated around Vyas had entered public life before 1937, all but one before 1931, and each had either served as a minister in the Rajasthan government or as president of the PCC. Hiralal Shastri had been the first chief minister of the state, Vyas the second, and Tikaram Paliwal the third. Vyas had served twice as president of the PCC, while Master Adityendra had been elected three times. Bhogilal Pandya had held important portfolios under Vyas, Paliwal, and Sukhadia and had served on the PCC Executive Committee since its creation. All but one in 1958 was a member of the All-India Congress Committee. In mid-September a joint statement signed by these five men was made public and charged the Sukhadia government with "favoritism, nepotism and corruption" as well as with particular acts declared inimical to the public welfare. These charges, which were enunciated with the objectives of attracting support of several peripheral members of the governing coalition and the party high command, accomplished neither. The action served to make the governing coalition more cohesive not only in the Congress Legislative Party but also at the local level of party organization as well. Several district leaders who had dwelt on the periphery were prompted to move closer to the center of the dominant coalition.84 The chief minister forwarded the charges to the high command for review and investigation and accepted the challenge to submit his leadership to a vote of confidence in the Congress Legislative Party. This he did on October 23, 1958, and was reaffirmed in his position by a vote of seventy-two to forty-five.85 gress Legislative Party and party organizations. The most important in attendance were Jai Narain Vyas, Tikaram Paliwal, Hiralal Shastri, Bhogilal Pandya, Master Adityendra, Narottam Lai Joshi, and R a j Bahadur. With the exception of Vyas, all of these leaders were either from Jaipur or the Matsya region. 54. The charges resulted in a continuous round of meetings on the part of the Sukhadia group to plot strategy and to measure support. At one meeting it was estimated that approximately eighty Congress MLAs and twenty presidents of District Congress Committees were in attendance. Rajasthan Patrika, September ig, 1958. Sukhadia replied to all of the charges and pointed out that the loan to a Sawai Madhopur cement factory that his administration was being charged for had in fact been sanctioned by Bhogilal Pandya, one of the signers of the charge sheet, when he was Minister of Industries, Rajasthan Patrika, September 16, 1958. 55. Hindustan Times, October 24, 1958.

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243 T A B L E 45

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FACTIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE P A R T Y ,

1958

(IN PERCENT)

Region

Vyas

Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner Total faction membership

7' 50

Sukhadia 21

«4

10 22

0

30 59

67

9

51

23

119

18

23

45

=

22

69

33

N

7 5

45 31 93

7 50

Kumbharam

20

0 0

13 29

T h e data in T a b l e 45 indicate the regional dispersion of factional coalitions in the Congress Legislative Party at the time of the vote. T h e critical factors in the election were the firm control which Sukhadia enjoyed in his home region of Udaipur and his expanded support in Jaipur Division, which had increased from 29 percent in 1954 to 45 percent in 1958. H e also received the support of the Kumbharam faction which controlled the majority of Congress legislators from both Jodhpur and Bikaner divisions. Besides Udaipur, Vyas' weakest base of support was in his home region of Jodhpur, where many of his supporters had been defeated in the 1957 elections. H e enjoyed support in Matsya, Jaipur, and Kotah through his factional allies, although it will be noted that only in the Matsya region did Vyas' proportion of a regional delegation expand from what it had been in 1954. Most important in terms of party cohesion, however, was the manner in which this breach of party discipline on the part of the five signatories of the charge sheet was managed. Several members of the governing coalition, notably from Jodhpur Division, argued that the matter could not go unattended and required a firm public reprimand. W h i l e the chief minister did not press for disciplinary action against these men, their action brought an indirect reprimand from the party high command when it established a special disciplinary committee to study what action should

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be taken against them. 58 While formal disciplinary action was not taken, by raising the possibility of such action, the Center established that it did not look with favor upon public criticism of Congress governments by Congressmen of public stature even if they were founders of the party. T h e estrangement of important members of the Vyas group was made evident once more in the third General Elections. Until 1962 this coterie of leaders from early political generations had not engaged in organized opposition to the Congress. Rather they had perceived themselves to be, and had acted as though they were, a loyal opposition from within. T h e 1962 elections, however, brought a new posture. Charges of corruption and maladministration were again publicly leveled against the Sukhadia ministry and it was proposed that the only hope of saving the Congress was for all good Congressmen to actively oppose those candidates whose actions in the past had been incongruent with the larger purposes of the party.87 Opposition, however, was not to take the form of an alternative party; dissident men should not join other opposition parties. As Vyas proposed at several public meetings, their mission must be to "throw out the priests but not to destroy the temple." 58 There were important differences among the dissidents, however. Many younger Congressmen, although chagrined at not having been awarded the party ticket during the first round, feared disciplinary action. It was argued that Vyas and other dissident leaders could not provide them protection against such an eventuality, although the dominant leaders might not be disciplined themselves. It was also agreed that if changes in the distribution were made, they would surely choose to remain within the party. 89 T h e younger dissidents were concerned with immediate and tangible factors critical to their political careers rather than with the 56. Rajasthan Patrika, December so, 1958. 57. Hindustan Times, January 10, 1962. Several additional leaders joined Vyas during these elections, and they were recruited from a wider geographical area, including Udaipur Division. These leaders included Jugal Kishore Chaturvedi, Phool Chand Bapna, Bhurelal Baya, Jai Singh Ranawat, Gopilal Yadav, and Gokul Lai Asawa. 58. Rajasthan Patrika, January 10, 196s. 59. Interviews with two leaders in attendance.

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larger questions of party and public purpose and propriety which were the principal concerns of the old elite. Vyas also found that his friend and defender at the national level, Jawaharlal Nehru, was not only unreceptive to his charges against Sukhadia and unsympathetic to his aims but also made public his view that Vyas* charges were unfounded and his activity mischievous. 90 T h u s while Nehru had fully supported Vyas in 1957 and had used his influence in national party circles in an effort to pave the way for the return of Vyas as chief minister of Rajasthan, in 1962 he was prepared to offer the former chief minister no concessions. T h e decline of the Vyas coalition after the defeat of the noconfidence motion in 1958 resulted in increased pluralization and competition in the factional system at the state level. T h e Vyas group from this time was a confederation, its former leader and namesake continuing to command respect yet largely ignored in the calculations of the largely autonomous district-level factions which had composed the Vyas group. 61 T h e fragmentation of the minority coalition was accompanied by demands from Jat leaders for increased ministerial representation and for a redistribution of portfolios that would reflect more appropriately the power of the Jat group. These demands initially stipulated that the new minister be from Bikaner—the political preserve of Kumbharam Arya—although it had returned only nine Congressmen in the 1957 elections. T h e Jats also worked together to establish control over the party organization, and the Kumbharam faction was rewarded for its support of the chief minister in past crises with the presidency of the Pradesh Congress Committee from 1958 to 1962.«» 60. Rajasthan Patrika, January ig, 1962. 61. T h e major district faction leaders were Harish Chandra (Jhalawar and Kotah); R a m Karan Joshi (Jaipur); R a j Bahadur (Bharatpur); Bhola Nath (Alwar); Barkatullah Khan (Jodhpur); and Narottam Lai Joshi (Jhunjhunu). Vyas was only intermittently active in the Congress organization after 1958 and when active, ineffective. For example, although Vyas decided to contest for a position on the Pradesh Election Committee in i960, he was defeated badly, receiving only 33 votes where 114 were necessary for election. In his haste to contest, he found himself running against one of his major associates, R a j Bahadur. Hindustan Times, May 26, i960. 62. T h e president from 1958 to i960 was Sardar Harlal Singh, while the

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T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

In response to the strains within the governing coalition and persistent Jat demands for expanded participation Sukhadia unexpectedly announced in February i960 an expansion of his ministry and a redistribution of portfolios. 63 The new ministry, rather than being a minimum winning coalition, constituted an omnibus coalition. T h e changes provided for the representation of all major groups within the party. The choice of persons was particularly significant. One of the new ministers was Maharaja Harish Chandra, the former prince of Jhalawar, who had formally entered the party in 1956 after a brief career in the diplomatic service. His inclusion not only marked the first instance of a firm supporter of J a i Narain Vyas being invited to join the Sukhadia ministry but it also emphasized the chief minister's appeal for the support of Rajputs in the Congress. The second notable change was the inclusion of Ram Chandra Choudhry, Kumbharam's chief political opponent within the Jat community in Ganganagar District, who was given control over irrigation and canals, subjects of primary public concern in that district. The third important addition was Barkatullah Khan, a Muslim legislator from Jodhpur Division and member of the Vyas group, who was made a deputy minister. His appointment was particularly significant because the chief minister chose him over another Muslim legislator who was a member of his own coalition and also because Barkatullah Khan was from a critical area of Jat political power. This grand coalition produced a seven-year period of stability in Rajasthani politics, although it witnessed several important shifts in the configuration of power within the government and the Congress party organization.64 In 1964 Kumbharam Arya successfully contested a by-election and subsequently accepted Sukhadia's invitation to join the ministry. Although his inclusion was a response to the growing Jat power in the party organization, it also demonstrated Sukhadia's mastery of the political art and his ability to manipulate opposition factions. T h e action strengthened subsequent president was Mathuradas Mathur, a "compromise" candidate in the elections but an important non-Jat member of the Jat group. 63. The Statesman, February 1 1 , i960. 64. For an excellent and detailed analysis of factional conflict and ministerial representation during this period see Shrader, "Politics in Rajastlian."

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the Congress Legislative Party by reducing the potential for the development of attack upon the government from within the party as well as by reducing the risk of party defections. 88 More importantly in the long run, however, it gave rise to divisive competition within the Jat faction because the incumbent Jat minister from Jodhpur Division, Nathu Ram Mirdha, was eventually called upon to sacrifice departments under his charge in order for Kumbharam to be accommodated. Sukhadia's efforts to encourage the pluralization of intraparty competition while at the same time marshaling a more dependable base of political support continued until the eve of the fourth General Elections. In 1966 he pursued a strategy designed to diminish the power of his principal opponents in the government as well as in the party organization while feigning interest in leaving the chiefministership for a position at the national level.®6 T h e first instance of this strategy was the judicious expansion of his ministry in the spring of 1966 in which the chief minister strengthened the position of his immediate faction by promoting two deputy ministers from Udaipur Division, Ram Prasad Laddha and Niranjan Nath Acharya, to the rank of full minister. 67 These promotions were balanced, however, by side payments to both the former Vyas group and the Jat faction. In an effort to placate the former Vyas group, Chandan Mai Baid, a deputy minister from Bikaner Division, was made a full minister. More important was the increased ministerial representation provided the Jats. None, however, was a close associate of Kumbharam and all represented a younger generation of Congressmen. A n incumbent deputy minister from Jodhpur and a close associate of Nathu Ram Mirdha, 65. Eleven independent M L A s accompanied Kumbharam into the party. These legislators had received assistance from Kumbharam during the third General Elections. It should also be noted that an important opponent of Kumbharam from Jaipur Division, Damodarlal Vyas, also successfully contested a by-election for the Legislative Assembly and joined the ministry. Damodarlal Vyas, a supporter of the chief minister, served as a check, on Kumbharam and also was in a position to reduce the political influence of the royal house of Jaipur and the Swatantra Party in Jaipur Division. 66. In February 1966 Sukhadia indicated that he wished to resign but agreed to the request of Congress President Kamaraj Nadar not to relinquish his post. Hindustan Times, February 17, 1966. 67. Hindustan Times, May 1, 1966.

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T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

Paras Ram Maderna, was made a full minister while Manphool Singh from Kumbharam's home district of Ganganagar and Ram Dev Singh from Shekhawati were appointed deputy ministers. T h e last two appointments were especially significant. First of all Manphool Singh, who had enjoyed the chief minister's special attention since the third General Elections, provided an alternative channel of access to ministerial power for political interests in Ganganagar District. Likewise, Ram Dev Singh, the first Shekhawati Jat to serve on a ministry and an opponent of the old guard Jat leadership in that area, provided access to the politically strategic Jat community in his region. These appointments and their timing left the dissident leaders in the governing coalition with few options. T h e choices had indeed been "balanced" ones. T h e appointments, in terms of caste, were weighted towards the Jats, and Kumbharam could not openly concede that there were divisions within the Congress Jat community and that his was an increasingly constrained and threatened position. Such a declaration would have also risked the increasing rigidification of these divisions. While the other major dissident, Maharaja Harish Chandra, was dissatisfied with the place of Rajputs in the new ministerial equation, he could not ignore the potential consequences of this change for Kumbharam, his opponent for the chief ministership but his ally against Sukhadia. Further efforts to control the power of Kumbharam and Harish Chandra were more direct and involved the election for the presidency of the Pradesh Congress Committee and the redistribution of portfolios. Control of the P C C is critically important in an election year. T h e party organization constitutes a communications link between constituencies throughout the state and has at its disposal material resources. Control is also essential for the favorable distribution of party tickets for members of one's group. In 1962 it had been widely and authoritatively alleged that control of the organizational apparatus was used by Kumbharam to advantage in engineering the defeat of those Congress candidates not part of his coalition. 68 68. This was proposed, among other sources, in the All-India Congress Committee, Working Committee, "Report on the Congress Rivalries in

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249

While Kumbharam did not wish to contest for the presidency himself, he was adamantly opposed to the candidacy of Ram Kishore Vyas, a firm supporter of the chief minister from Jaipur District, and argued that since the Sukhadia coalition had controlled the presidency since 1962 through the tenure of Harideo Joshi it was time for equity and change. T h e Kumbharam forces, however, had difficulty in attracting a dependable man of stature to contest. His advances to Nathu Ram Mirdha, the important Jat minister from Jodhpur Division, and Mathuradas Mathur, the former P C C president, were not successful. 69 In the Congress election held in June 1966, which was a confidence vote for the Sukhadia leadership in the party organization, Kumbharam was defeated by Ram Kishore Vyas by a vote of 142 to 52.70 Although charges of corruption were levied by the Kumbharam group as well as by certain opposition leaders, the vote clearly established the dominant position of the Sukhadia coalition in the party organization. This vote of confidence was followed by the transfer of portfolios from these two major challengers to the chief minister. Sukhadia relieved Harish Chandra of the Public Works and Electrical Departments and in October transferred the portfolio of Famine Relief from Kumbharam to his former factional associate, Nathu Ram Mirdha. 71 Sukhadia made these changes in the distribution of power under the public assumption that he would probably resign as chief minister to go to the Center and thus prepare the way for the introduction of new blood into top leadership positions in the government of Rajasthan. While there was intense conflict over the allocation of party tickets, the P C C Election Committee voted unanimously that Sukhadia prepare an equitable list of candidates for all constituencies in Rajasthan and forward these to the Central Election Committee for approval. 72 While the list did not Rajasthan in 1962 Elections." T h i s report was prepared by a special committee headed by Kandu Bhai Desai. 69. Hindustan Times, May 14, 15, and 16, 1966. 70. Hindustan Times, June 3, 1966. 71. Hindustan Times, October «8 and December s i , 1966. 72. Hindustan Times, November 15, 1966.

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T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

include the chief minister's name, there was one constituency in Udaipur District for which he had made no recommendation, and he was eventually persuaded by the high command to contest from that constituency. While Kumbharam and Harish Chandra made known their displeasure with the list to the Congress high command, Sukhadia's decision to contest for election to the Legislative Assembly again rather than for the Lok Sabha prompted their resignation from the ministry and the formation of an opposition party for purposes of contesting the elections. 73 T h i s event and its consequences were significant. First of all, it marked the first occasion that important leaders of the Rajasthan Congress defected from the party and stood in public opposition to it. Prior to this, factional conflicts had been contested in General Elections but this had either taken the form of the denial of support to a candidate from an opposition faction or the extension of tacit support to an opposing candidate. While Vyas and several important leaders from early political generations had publicly opposed Congress candidates, with one exception none had contested against them. Secondly, the departure of Kumbharam and two leaders of the former Vyas coalition, Ram Karan Joshi and Harish Chandra, did not result in the defection of their factions in toto; rather, it resulted in their fission. Important representatives of the Jat community from all regions of the state remained in the Congress organization. T h e y included important leaders from Jodhpur and Shekhawati as well as from Bikaner. T h e departure of Harish Chandra did not affect the Rajput Congressmen outside Kotah Division, although all members of the Rajput faction in that region left the party with the maharaja. T h e departure of Ram Karan Joshi did little to weaken the party in Jaipur. T h e fourth General Elections in Rajasthan were especially significant ones as they were in most of the Indian states. Although the Congress party received a higher proportion of the vote than it had in 1962, it elected only 89 members to an Assembly of 184.74 Congress candidates, however, were either winners or runners-up in 173 of the 182 seats that the party contested in Rajasthan. T h e 73. Hindustan Times, December 26, 1966. 74. T h e proportion of the vote in 1962 was 40.02 percent while in 1967 it was 41.42 percent.

C O N F L I C T A N D COHESION

251

Congress also competed in a different electoral environment than it had previously: not only did it confront for the first time important former Congressmen, but it was also faced by an electoral alliance between the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh parties—the two most competitive opposition parties in the state. It is perhaps an understatement to say that the formation of the government in 1967 provided occasion for intense political bargaining, not only within the ranks of Congress legislators but between the Congress and the opposition. In this situation the role of the high command was critical, but this role was quite different from what it had been in the past. Whereas previously the Center had served as arbiter between the competing claims and interests of factions within the party, in 1967 it provided a rubric under which a legislative majority was eventually mobilized. In other words, instead of simply using its influence within the party organization, it exercised its control over the constitutional apparatus of the state.75 T h e problem of conflict management in the Rajasthan Congress after the fourth General Elections was different in a very important way from what it had been during the previous two decades. A n important consequence of the exit of Choudhry Kumbharam Arya, Harish Chandra, and Ram Karan Joshi from the party was the fragmentation of the factional system. These leaders together with Sukhadia had been managers of factional coalitions and thus at the state level had performed an aggregative and integrative 75. After confused efforts to establish a majority coalition on the part of the Congress as well as the opposition parties, President's Rule was declared on March 13, 1967 and the legislature was suspended but not dissolved (Hindustan Times, March 14, 1967). O n April 26 Sukhadia was sworn in as Chief Minister and two days later his cabinet (Hindustan Times, April 28 and 29, 1967). While there was difficulty in establishing a majority, the party has shown cohesion since the elections. On January 23, 1968, a censure motion introduced in the Assembly was defeated by a vote of 96 to 52 (Hindustan Times, January 24, 1968). Later in the spring, Congress candidates won two by-elections, one to the Lok Sabha and one to the Legislative Assembly (Hindustan Times, April 30, 1968). While some opposition were able to come to an electoral agreement in an effort to defeat the Congress, they have had less fortune in acting as a united group in the Assembly. In January 1968, Maharaja Laxman Singh, leader of the Swatantra in the Assembly announced that a merger of the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh parties was not a workable proposition (Hindustan Times, January 24, 1968).

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T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

function for regional and district factions. T h u s whereas the formation of governments had previously involved the accommodation of a relatively small number of men who managed intermediary coalitions and performed mediating roles in the larger factional system, the mobilization and maintenance of support since 1967 has involved the accommodation of a much larger number of factional units and has resulted in the progressive expansion of the size of the ministry in Rajasthan, the chief minister necessarily assuming functions previously performed by his adversaries. More importantly, the quest for accommodation—in addition to the problems of size, the definition and assignment of tasks, and ministerial management—has also created severe problems with respect to developing and implementing common policy and programs. Support is purchased and maintained at the cost of planned change. T h e most critical change in the selection of leadership and the organization of power in Rajasthan occurred in 1954 with the defeat of the Vyas ministry. Sukhadia's election as leader of the Congress Legislative Party and his selection as chief minister ushered in a new era of politics. It marked a change of political generation in control of positions of strategic authority within the party organization. This change was not immediate, but progressive, many members of early political generations constituting a part of the new leader's majority coalition. T h e character of Sukhadia's long tenure as chief minister has differed considerably from that of Vyas as has his political method and style. Whereas Vyas had been intent upon imposing his conception of proper political behavior upon his ministers and had been adamant against political pressure attempting to force his hand, Sukhadia has been the completely responsive political leader and a master of political bargaining and compromise. His shrewdness in manipulating and regulating conflict in the new political order has engendered respect and awe, if not widespread affection, within Congress party circles. Strategies used by leaders of dominant factional coalitions at the state level to manage conflict and maintain and expand their structures of political support is a useful perspective for summa-

CONFLICT AND COHESION

253

rizing the pattern of conflict and organization of power which prevailed in the Rajasthan Congress during the period after the collapse of the Vyas ministry and the assumption of power by a new class of professional politicians. T h e dependence of leaders of factional coalitions on a number of sizable autonomous subcoalitions for their continued political position has favored the master of political strategy. Expertise in political strategy was developed to a fine art under the new generation of political leaders who succeeded Vyas and who reasoned that the existence of a highly segmentary structure of political support required continual action and vigilance. T h e most persistent factional coalitions and leaders in state politics have enjoyed a continuous and sizable body of immediate supporters in the Congress Legislative Party. This is indicated by the dispersion of factional support in the three state legislative assemblies elected between 1952 and 1967. Vyas in the 1952 elections lost his base of support in Jodhpur and this he never regained, while both the Sukhadia and Kumbharam factions have enjoyed consistent electoral success in the areas from which their immediate faction is recruited. T h u s the leader of a factional coalition large enough to have power at the state level must maintain the integrity of his immediate and personal faction. T h e personal faction includes the leader's closest supporters who staff his faction from the state down to the local level. T o the extent that this immediate base of support is eroded, whether by election reverses or through factional fission, the leader loses both prestige and power in the Congress system. T h e leader places highest emphasis on maintaining and expanding the scope of his faction in his "home" region. A l l factional coalitions at the state level, however, have included a number of relatively autonomous factions over which the dominant faction leader does not have immediate control. T h i s has been especially true in the case of the chief minister, who must deal not only with an antagonistic opposition coalition but also with political aspirants in his own coalition who continually pressure for an expansion of their own position of power and who have sometimes attempted to enter liaisons to replace the chief minister himself.

254

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

In his efforts to counter this dual threat Chief Minister Sukhadia has pursued several strategies. First of all, he successfully divided the Kumbharam group in its own district by twice elevating an important Jat barrister who was not a part of the Kumbharam coalition to a ministerial post. Secondly, the chief minister has extended his good offices and support to a number of young Jat politicians from both Bikaner Division and the Shekhawati area who had not been a part of the early Jat movement. These young Jat leaders were highly educated and were finding it difficult to realize their aspirations for political mobility through the old Jat factions led by Kumbharam and Sardar Harlal Singh, who enjoyed hegemony over local political institutions and organizational bodies of the party in these regions. Sukhadia also attempted to diffuse his structure of political support by extending ministerial representation to members of the oppositional factional coalition. This was partly owing to his realization that the most salient threats to ministerial cohesion in the Rajasthan Congress have always come from within the governing coalition. With the decline of the Vyas faction, after its election reverses in the second General Elections, Sukhadia expanded his coalition by including several important members of the Vyas group in his ministry—thus reducing his dependence upon the increasingly assertive Jat group. It also afforded representation to groups which were in opposition to the Jat coalition in local party organizations and served to contain the consolidation of a cohesive and widely based Jat group in the desert areas by providing new channels of access to important centers of political and administrative decision making. This association with former members of the Vyas group continued until the fourth General Elections when several important members left the party and contested as opposition candidates. They were joined by the Kumbharam segment of the Jat faction which felt its political aspirations curbed by Sukhadia's success in developing a statewide structure of support within the Congress party. T h e pattern of conflict and strategy employed to maintain positions of power has been organized around the structure of authority within the political system. T h e change in the political format with the introduction of elections and legislative bodies

C O N F L I C T A N D COHESION

255

changed the configuration and locus of political power in the Congress system as it did in the political system as a whole. Success in the pursuit of public power became dependent upon support i n the legislative chambers which was in turn dependent upon success at the polls. T h e effective units of power in the Rajasthan Congress have been, and continue to be, factions. Members of the Congress at all levels of political organization perceive their position within the party in terms of their faction, and they orient other members of the party in terms of identifiable groups. T h e s e factions have tended to act with considerable unity in times of political crisis. Factions at the state level have tended to gravitate into two factional coalitions to pursue control, or to maintain control, of the state ministry. T h e core of political support for these statelevel coalitions, however, has been

primarily restricted to the

area formerly encompassed by a single princely state, although in the case of two factions—the Jat and the R a j p u t — t h e s e have had a wider base of support. T h e s e two factions, however, also have fault lines in their organization of support which correspond to old traditional sovereignties. T h e factional system has been openly competitive at all levels of politics during this period. T h e r e was constant competition among state-level factions not only over ministerial representation and control, b u t ambition for executive control has also encouraged continual efforts on the part of dominant leaders to attract groups of political supporters from within the Legislative Assembly as well as from without. Furthermore, factional competition has required considerable political responsiveness on the part of faction leaders not only toward those w h o support them and with whom they are aligned at a particular point in time but also toward those w h o might eventually be attracted. T h i s has been centrally important in the creation and maintenance of the "open" character of the Congress system. A l t h o u g h the ultimate focus of conflict within the Congress since 1952 has been centered in the Legislative Party, the party organization has continued to play a major role in the Congress system. It has also been the object of intense factional conflict at the state level, and conflict emanating from competition between

256

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

political groups in district and local organizational bodies has influenced patterns of factional alignment at the state level. Since selection to important committees in the party organization is by election of party members, the organizational wing of the party more accurately reflects the factional system and character of the elite structure of the party than does the Legislative Party since in the latter electoral defeat can, and has, excluded some of the most important faction leaders in the state. In their quest for positions of influence in governing the state, faction leaders must attempt to fare well in the politics of ticket allocation which is handled through the party organization. In order to exert influence in this process, it is necessary to have control over, or access to, important positions in the party from the local and district levels to the state and national level. Since the party organization plays such a crucial role in the larger political process in the Congress, factions have contested intensely for strategic positions in the party organization. T h e importance of organizational control and the politics of ticket allocation have contributed immensely to political mobilization in the Congress system. T h e Pradesh Congress Committee is representative of the elite structure of the Congress system. Party elites at the national level have performed an arbitrating function in Rajasthan. T h e y have been the ones who started moves to reach accommodation between competing factional coalitions in the state and initially participated in determining the character of the accommodation. T h e role of the Center has changed significantly from what it had been until the death of Sardar Patel in 1950. T h e high command has played an increasingly marginal role in determining the distribution of power and organizational control. It proved to be unable to maintain Vyas as chief minister and was unable to impose its will in the allocation of party tickets in 1957. T h e Center, however, is able to assist a dominant group in maintaining its position, it can help insure the minimal interests of minority coalitions, and it can exert impressive power in conditions of pervasive factionalism for short periods of time, but the Center cannot impose its will upon the relations of its state constituents unless its will is reasonably congruent with power relations within the state: the Center can per-

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION

257

suade, advise, induce, and warn, but it cannot dictate. In the case of Rajasthan, the high command has come to serve primarily the function of legitimating the pattern of power relations that have been worked out within the state party. T h e problem of succession between political generations occurred within the Rajasthan Congress without fission in the party. Leadership succession in each case, while intensely contested, did not result in defections from the party until 1967. In the case of Shastri, Vyas, and Paliwal there was a keen sense of institutional obligation, particularly strong within the early generations of political leaders. After succession, efforts were made to accommodate the interests of the leader displaced. What then have been the political conditions of party fission? These have varied both in terms of time and relevant political generation. T h e first important leader to oppose the Congress from without was its dominant preindependence leader, Jai Narain Vyas. Vyas was obsessed with what he alleged to be the corruption of Congress goals and the political life of its leaders. His was an alienation from a changed configuration of party goals, although he never made clear his own conception of appropriate social goals. His was also a critique of the party's changed incentive system after the coming of electoral politics. He felt that it attracted the wrong kind of men and for the wrong reasons, and that they were achieving mobility within the party at the expense of the more politically pure. He wished to exorcise the urge for private gain at the expense of the public good. This was critical in Paliwal's perception of Kumbharam Arya and Mathuradas Mathur during the tenure of the second Vyas ministry. This sentiment was most clearly reflected in Vyas' stipulation by formal circular to Congress legislators when he was chief minister that they not visit the government Secretariat for purposes of advocacy. This type of concern became paramount in Vyas' overt opposition to the party in 1962. But many of his supporters, the "dissidents," in fact represented the model of men whom Vyas found so inimical to the good political life. Although a dissident and isolated by 1962 even by the Congress high command, Vyas did not leave the party nor organize formal opposition to it. T h e first major schism and fission of the Rajasthan Congress

258

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

occurred in 1966 when Kumbharam Arya and Harish Chandra left the party. T h i s was prompted by conditions different from those critical in the case of the old elites. Before the fourth General Elections the customary accommodative orientation of the leader of the governing coalition and channels of access at the national level for minority coalitions were diminished. Kumbharam felt increasingly isolated within the party and felt that he had been manipulated by dominant party leaders for too long. He had continually been the focus of the most intense opposition within the Rajasthan Congress since Nehru's request that he withdraw from the first General Elections. He had accepted party directives and discipline in the form of his resignation from the Sukhadia ministry in 1955 and in his resignation from state-level positions in the organizational party upon the insistence of the high command. He also felt that one standard of action was applied to his behavior while another was applied in the case of his adversaries. His exit was induced by his progressive isolation from power through the fragmentation of his own coalition, direct threats to his status and position in the ministry, and the closure of mobility expectations with the continuation of Sukhadia in the state, rather than the national, arena. In the case of Harish Chandra the same sense of isolation existed, but more important was the removal of his channel of access and source of support at the national level with the death of Nehru in 1964 and the lessened sentiment of accommodation and protection for minority factions at the national level during the politics of ticket allocation. There were important reasons for diminished accommodative sentiment. T h e r e was first of all a fear that the sabotage activities made evident in the Kandu Bhai Desai Report would be repeated but with graver consequences in 1967 if Kumbharam had a dominant role in the election. A t the Center, primacy was placed upon the achievement of a party majority rather than upon establishing controls upon the dominant leader. T h e Kandu Bhai Desai Report had in fact recommended that the Center do all legitimately possible to strengthen the hand of the chief minister against his factional opponents. T h e fourth General Elections provided the first time that this orientation of nonaccommodation of minority

C O N F L I C T AND COHESION

259

factions was pursued in the politics of ticket allocation in Rajasthan. T h e factional system, however, has been conducive to the integration of the Rajasthan Congress. T h e departure of Congress leaders from the party resulted in the fission of their factions and therefore reduced in an important way their efficacy. Factions, as in the past, negotiate for the support of the members of the dissident coalitions. T h i s occurred in the case of Vyas, it has frequently occurred at the district level, but it occurred most dramatically at the state level in 1966. T h e possibility of factional fission has served, therefore, as a deterrent to schism. Furthermore, party discipline has never been formally applied to primary leaders of the party, but only to secondary leaders. Neither the old dissident Praja Mandalists who clustered around Vyas, Kumbharam Arya, or others cited in the Kandu Bhai Desai Report were formally disciplined although important charges were made against them. Disciplinary action, however, does affect a coalition leader in that it may result in the removal of his supporters from the party for six years, thus rendering his position within the party much less effective. Disciplinary action also reduces the possibility of those expelled to achieve positions of power within the government or legislative party. It has also greatly reduced the probability of receiving the party ticket for subsequent elections. T h e decision to leave the Congress has increasingly constituted a permanent choice for opposition politics in Rajasthan.

Chapter

p

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE: I N S T I T U T I O N A L LINKAGES AND PRIMORDIAL TIES

and base of factions within the Congress system has both reflected and has been conditioned by the changing patterns of social and political representation in the party organization. The social and political categories discussed in Chapter 6 have not constituted corporate groups but have been cut by lines dividing units within the factional system. The mobilization of new political resources often representing new and different political interests has been a function of competition between major leaders within the Congress system and their close associates as well as it has been a function of the competitive character of the larger political system. The Congress party in Rajasthan, like the factions which constitute it, has been a clientele-oriented institution, and this has encouraged the development and absorption of new bases of political support from both within the field of organized political groups and from the politically unmobilized sectors of society. This chapter analyzes the changing character of the factional system in the Congress organization and attempts to show how it has contributed to the continuity and persistence of the party. T h e changing configuration of factional cleavage in the Pradesh Congress Committee and its executive over the last two decades, which is examined first, is important in determining the extent to which Congress leaders in positions of organizational authority have constituted a self-contained or competitive unit. Furthermore, as we observed in Chapter 5, political crises accompanying an elite's attempt to maintain or to achieve a position of dominance are T H E CONFIGURATION

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE

26l

conducive to the spread of factional coalitions and the ever-present possibility of realignment of strategic factional units within a coalition. It is proposed here that competition in a segmentary system of political power is conducive to the fission of preexisting units just as it is conducive to the rise of new ones.1 The major factional coalitions in the Rajasthan Congress have tended more and more to reflect the plural pattern of representation which has characterized the party organization as a whole. These social categories, while they are important both analytically and empirically, have not constituted cohesive collectivities. Although Congressmen perceive themselves in terms of the categories which we used in the analysis of changing patterns of social representation and also perceive others in terms of the same criteria, these criteria have constituted but one of several significant forces in political organization and action. We shall analyze the changing character of the factional system in the Congress organization, therefore, in terms of three important sociopolitical indices. First, we shall attempt to determine the extent to which factions have expanded their base of support beyond the confines of the region in which they arose and where the core of their political support is concentrated. Secondly, we shall analyze factional organization in terms of caste representation and attempt to determine the extent to which the major factional coalitions have expanded their support base to include an increasing dispersion of caste groups. Thirdly, we shall analyze factional organization in terms of political generation, because this is an important indicator of the capacity of an institution, particularly during its early years, to adapt and to persist. T H E STRUCTURE OF F A C T I O N A L IN T H E PCC:

ALIGNMENTS

1946-1965

T h e members of the Pradesh Congress Committee have not constituted a corporate and cohesive elite but have been divided into 1. See Easton, "Political Anthropology," pp. 243-246; Barth, Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 4 ; M. G. Smith, "On Segmentary Lineage Systems," pp. 39-80; A. W. Southall, Alur Society (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1953), pp. 248-251; and M. Fortes and E. E. EvansPritchard, eds., African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 6-7.

262 distinct

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N factions that h a v e contested

for control

over

strategic

positions w i t h i n the party organization at all levels. T h i s s t r u g g l e has also characterized the P C C E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e , w h i c h is the central focus of decision-making a n d p o w e r in the state p a r t y organization. T h e factional system, as w e h a v e seen above, was " c r e a t e d " at the t i m e of f o u n d i n g , a n d w h i l e the political segments f r o m w h i c h the party was f o r m e d h a v e c h a n g e d both in terms of personnel a n d a l i g n m e n t , discernible lines of political

cleavage

h a v e c o n t i n u e d to characterize the system. N o single d o m i n a n t f a c t i o n e n j o y e d m a j o r i t y s u p o r t in the p a r t y organization p r i o r to 1 9 6 3 . (Sukhadia's m a j o r i t y a f t e r that t i m e was d e p e n d e n t u p o n a n u m b e r of a u t o n o m o u s b u t relatively d e p e n d a b l e units.) T h e m a j o r changes in factional a l i g n m e n t in the P C C h a v e b e e n associated w i t h critical conflicts f o r control of the m i n i s t r y a n d positions of a u t h o r i t y in the party organization. 2 It will b e r e c a l l e d a. T h e information for this chapter has been obtained from several sources and checked against several others. T h e single most important source was extensive interviews with P C C representatives from each region and factional coalition and most of the subordinate district-level factions. Informants were asked to name the factional affiliation of all members of the P C C from their region. These were checked against one another and there was almost complete agreement in these assignments. Some individuals were held suspect by important members of their coalition because they had engaged in some "political talks" with members of opposition factions. There are a number of "linkage" roles in the factional system although the obligations of those playing these roles are quite certain in times of crisis. There were also some persons, particularly in the earlier PCCs, who could not be identified in terms of factional association. In several instances members of the P C C during the early years did not take an active part in the work of the party, did not attend many meetings, and did not become involved in the early factional dramas. Prior to the creation of the Shastri Ministry there had not been competitive situations in which the state-level associations and obligations of the various regionally based groups could be tested. In 1946, for example, a large number were declared political "loners" because although they were opposed to some leaders in their regional area they had not at that time made a positive commitment to any other dominant leader. T h e information collected on the basis of interviews was checked against information contained in the Congress party files, which were placed at the author's disposal. These in many cases include lists of factional association on a regional and district basis. In the politics of ticket allocation, the political alignments of important, as well as relatively unimportant, political activists can be obtained by determining which candidates these activists supported for the Congress party ticket in their areas. T h i s is documented on vouchers of support included in each Constituency File in the state Congress party office.

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE

263

that when Pandit Hiralal Shastri was selected as the first chief minister of Rajasthan his factional coalition did not enjoy a majority in the Pradesh Congress Committee, and that the majority coalition felt unjustly excluded from power and ignored in the making of political decisions and in the formation of the ministry. This prompted collective action on the part of all other coalitions and eventually resulted in the collapse of the Shastri ministry shortly after the death of Sardar Patel, the source of Shastri's power in the Congress high command. Again, at the time of the ministry crisis in 1954, the rebel coalition led by the Udaipur and Jat coalitions enjoyed a majority in the party organization and used this majority as a base for criticizing the Vyas ministry and for mobilizing support within the Congress Legislative Party against it. Prior to the defeat of the incumbent chief minister in the autumn of that year, the anti-Vyas forces were extremely active in mobilizing support within the party organization at both the state and district levels to restrict the base of Vyas' support, and to concentrate their own, in the organizational wing as well as in the legislative wing of the party. The competition in the party organization together with the change in party leadership which resulted encouraged the rise of new political elites. These new political aspirants elected to the Pradesh Congress Committee have tended to become associated with either the Sukhadia or the Kumbharam coalition. This pattern of factional cleavage has also characterized the P C C Executive Committee. Elections to the PCC Executive have consistently encouraged considerable activity on the part of the leaders of autonomous district factions for places on this central committee in order to directly negotiate and to represent the peculiar interests of the groups they represent. This is considered much wiser, and for the district level leader involves much more prestige, than leaving advocacy on their behalf in the hands of associates of the personal faction of the dominant leader with whom they are allied at the state level. These dominant leaders, while they would prefer that representation on state-level comT h e data included in these and the following tables is as accurate as important Rajasthani Congressmen and other available information can make them. Doubtful cases have been excluded.

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

264

mittees favor their own closest supporters, have found it both necessary and desirable to support the leaders of allied factions because it affords the participation which important minor faction leaders demand in return for continued political support. T a b l e s 46 and 47 indicate the dispersion of support for factional coalitions in state politics in terms of the personal faction of the dominant factional leader and his factional allies. 3 TABLE

46

F A C T I O N A L R E P R E S E N T A T I O N ON T H E R A J A S T H A N P R A D E S H CONGRESS COMMITTEE,

1946-1965

(IN P E R C E N T )

Faction

I946-I948

1948-1950

«954-«956

1958-1960

Vyas Sukhadia Kumbharam Shastri Unattached

29

52

34 38

26

21

48

61

5 25 0

28

26

18

0 0

0 0

0 0

124

«25

'5'

N

=

«7 9 «5 29 "9

18

1963-1965

161

T h e data indicate that the elite structure of the Rajasthan Congress party has not constituted a self-contained and self-perpetuating elite but that it has included a number of political segments which have acted competitively for control of the party organization. N o t only has the elite been divided into discernible units that act collectively in the presentation of their demands, but this configuration has changed over time as a result of the shifting pattern of support in the subcoalitions which constitute the structure of political support for each of these dominant political segments in the Congress system. 4 3. T h e Jat faction will be identified as the Kumbharam faction, although Kumbharam left the party prior to the fourth General Elections. While Kumbharam was the accepted leader of the Jat faction, the core of this factional coalition has included several important Jat leaders from other desert areas. Until 1966 this central group of leaders acted collectively. When Kumbharam decided to leave the party in 1966, however, several of these leaders failed to follow his lead and remained within the Congress party. Crises of this sort, of course, are major tests of latent fault lines within corporate groups. See Simmel, Conflict, pp. 91-92. 4. T h e configuration of factions is quite similar to that found by Barth in

FACTIONAL

CONFLICT AND POLITICAL

265

CHANGE

THE REGIONAL BASIS OF FACTIONAL CHANGE

W e have noted above that the Congress party in Rajasthan was created from the various movements of political protest which arose in the Rajputana states prior to independence and that these fairly cohesive groups at the time of founding persisted in a pattern of segmentary organization. T h e factional coalitions in the T A B L E 47 FACTIONAL REPRESENTATION ON THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,

Faction

1946-1947 1949-1951

Vyas Core Allied Sukhadia Core Allied Kumbharam Core Allied Shastri Core Allied N

=

PCG

1946-1965

i95!-'953 '959-'9e1

1961-1963

1963-1965

2

2

I

0

1

0

4

4

4

4

4

4

2

2

1

I

3 1

4 6

4 7

10

5 1

5 1

1 1 0 0

0

2

2

O

0

1

3

0 1

0

2

0

0 0

0 0

«4

12

12

20

22

5

21

Rajasthan Congress which have enjoyed the greatest measure of success have tended to expand their base of political support. T h e most successful, however, have continually enjoyed wide support within the party in their own region. Efforts at factional expansion have involved attempts to develop new sources of support from other factions as well as through new recruitment into the party. For example, the base of political support of the factional coalition led by Jai Narain Vyas was originally concentrated in the area of Jodhpur State. It was an extension of the Lok Parishad movement into modern politics. Although the Jodhpur representatives did not constitute a single cohesive group within the party, his study of Swat Pathans and as conceptualized by Southall in his analysis of the A l u r . See Barth, Political Leadership, pp. 71-73, and Southall, Alur Society, pp. 248-251.

266

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

as a result of the development of factional division in the Parishad

Lok

in the early 1940s, the data included in T a b l e 48 indi-

cate that the largest segment and the largest proportion of the Vyas faction during the early years was concentrated in this area. After Vyas' assumption of power in 1950, however, the regional scope of his faction became increasingly dispersed until 1963 only TABLE

48

REPRESENTATION IN THE V Y A S COALITION BY REGION,

FACTIONAL

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Region

1946-1948

Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner

20

3 0 '4 0 63 0 35

N

=

1963-196

i954"'956

1958-1960

18

26

«4 12 9 5 38 3 65

40

23 33

34 34

7 5

10

6

0

8

«9 5 43

21

1948-1950

5 0 39

3 3 '9 0 32

19 percent of the members of his factional coalition were recruited from Jodhpur while 68 percent were recruited from the two districts of Matsya—Alwar and Bharatpur—and from Jaipur Division. It was in these two areas that Vyas developed his most dependable units of political support. T h e s e leaders were originally attracted to Vyas as a result of factional competition within their respective areas: Vyas afforded a channel of access to centers of decision-making at the state and national levels. But association itself and the continuity of factional struggle in public institutions and party organizations at the district and local levels helped maintain these lines of factional association. T h e leaders of these important district-level factions are still referred to in state politics in terms of their former association with Vyas. Vyas' faction in Jodhpur not only decreased in proportion, but more importantly it decreased in absolute numbers. Furthermore, the proportion of Vyas' supporters elected to the P C C from Jodhpur Division declined from a high of 86 percent in 1948 to merely 16 percent in 1963. (See T a b l e 49.) T h i s contrasts with the sizable

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE

8 67

T A B L E 49 DISPERSION OF PCC MEMBERS IN FACTIONAL COALITIONS BY REGION, 1946-1965 (IN PERCENT) Year and Region 1946-1948 Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner 1948-1950 Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner '95+-'95$ Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner i958-'96° Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner '963~'965 Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner

Sukhadia

Vyas

Kumbha ram

Shastri

Unattached

N =

23 0 11 67 0 0 0

54 4 0 20 0 76 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 85

0 46 22 0 '4 7 15

23 50 68 13 86 «7 0

'3 24 9 24 7 29 '3

0 4 10 7' 0 0 0

92 33 80 21 50 86 18

0 0 0 0 '7 0 45

8 63 10 7 33 '4 36

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

'3 27 10 28 6 29 11

3' «7 73 93 «7 7 0

69 74 27 7 0 30 '5

0 9 0 0 83 63 85

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

16 23 11 29 6 27 '3

44 50 56 94 15 3» 7

5° 43 44 6 23 24 0

6 7 0 0 62 44 93

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

18 30 9 32 «3 34 '5

50 59 80 97 46 35 57

5° 4' 20 3 15 16 0

0 0 0 0 38 49 43

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

22 27 10 38 '3 37 «4

268

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN

RAJASTHAN

proportion of P C C members—over 40 percent in the first three general elections—from the Matsya and Jaipur regions who continued their association with Vyas. The decline of the Vyas faction in Jodhpur was as important a factor in the demise of the Vyas coalition in the state party organization as was the fairly high incidence of defeat of his faction's candidates for the Legislative Assembly in the first three general elections. Vyas was thus unable to depend upon a large body of firm political supporters in his jockeying for power in state politics, and his inability to control the party in his "home" region damaged his political prestige. Much of the reason for the decline of the Vyas faction in state politics was the rise of the Jat faction in the desert areas where Vyas originally drew most of his political support. With the entry of the Kisan Sabha into the Congress party in Jodhpur Division, the Vyas supporters tended to be excluded from positions of power. This was due not only to the increased number of peasantcaste representatives that entered the Congress organization but also to division within the ranks of Vyas' supporters in rural towns as well as in Jodhpur City. It also resulted from the J a t faction's capacity to mobilize new political resources and to absorb those which arose autonomously and sought access in the Congress system. With the defeat of the Vyas ministry in 1954, Congressmen were provided with an alternative channel of access to positions of power at the state level. The factional coalition led by Chief Minister Mohanlal Sukhadia has been centered in Udaipur Division, which includes the area that formerly constituted Udaipur State and the two small states of Dungarpur and Banswara. Unlike the other factional coalitions, the cohesion of this faction in state politics has been maintained, although the Udaipur-based contingent has increasingly constituted a smaller proportion of the total base of factional support enjoyed by the chief minister and his close political associates. The Sukhadia faction has also continually expanded its political links and base of support into other regions of the state. The chief minister has not only been responsive to the desires of access of new political groups arising in these areas, but more than any other political leader he has been able to attract them because of the political resources at his disposal and his exceptional skill

F A C T I O N A L C O N F L I C T AND POLITICAL

269

CHANGE

in their utilization. As shown in Chapters 5 and 8, the chief minister has also been instrumental in creating cleavages within existing factions by the grant of important ministerial positions to secondary leaders of major opposition factions and has also developed direct political ties with members of important factions with which he is allied. T h e structure of political support in the Sukhadia coalition has expanded in all areas of the state. Sukhadia established support at the time of the no-confidence motion moved against the Vyas ministry in 1954 in Matsya, Jaipur, and Kotah. (See T a b l e 50.) TABLE

50

REPRESENTATION IN THE SUKHADIA FACTIONAL COALITION BY REGION,

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Region

1946-1948

1948-1950

i954"'956

Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner

«5 0 5

80

0 0 0

0 5 5 9i 0 0 0

11 9 '7 57

N =

20

22

2

4 0 47

1958-1960

1963-196;

11

11

21

16

7 42 3 '5 1 72

8

37 6

"3 8

99

With the demise of the Vyas faction in Jodhpur, Sukhadia attempted to attract local factions in opposition to the dominant Jat faction in that area. His numerical support continually increased in that region through this system of alliances with important local groups, and it expanded even more after the cooptation of members of the Vyas coalition into the ministry in i960. In Bikaner the support which Chief Minister Sukhadia extended to a local political leader, Ram Chandra Choudhry in 1956, resulted in the fission of the dominant Jat faction of the area and an increase in both number and proportion in the chief minister's coalition. Another aspect of this important structural change in the factional system has been the increasingly large proportion of P C C representatives in the various regions of Rajasthan who have been

270

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

absorbed into the Sukhadia coalition. In each region, including Udaipur, these proportions have increased appreciably since 1948. By 1963 the majority coalition headed by the chief minister enjoyed the support of a majority of the members from all regions except Jodhpur and Shekhawati, and in these areas Sukhadia's support since 1954 increased from 7 percent to 35 percent and from o percent to 46 percent respectively. (See Table 49.) T h e factional dispersion by area represented is indicative of factional competition in each area. T h e third major factional coalition, led by Kumbharam Arya, has been located primarily in the desert areas of the state—Jodhpur, Bikaner, and Shekhawati. (See Table 51.) T h e base of support for this faction was originally in the peasant groups which developed during the preindependence movement in these areas. Since the peasant castes, such as Jats, Vishnois, and Sirvis, are numerically dominant here, this faction has been primarily oriented toward its own immediate social clientele for purposes of expanding its base of political support. Although the faction was originally based in Bikaner, the home area of Kumbharam, it has extended its support into the other desert regions and also into Jaipur Division. It should be noted that the Bikaner contingent of the Kumbharam coalition steadily declined in the area of its origin, and that the predominant base of political support came to be Jodhpur Division, where the Jat faction until 1967 enjoyed considerable cohesion. (See Table 49.) The expansion of the Jodhpur segment of the Jat coalition has had important repercussions and was an important factor in Kumbharam's decision to leave the Congress during the fourth General Elections.8 T h e analysis above indicates that the successful regionally based factions within the Congress system have continually expanded their base of support beyond their home region. This has been true of all three dominant coalitions but has been particularly noticeable in the coalition led by Sukhadia, who has also enjoyed the continued cohesion of his sizable following from his home region—a condition which has not characterized the coali5. See Chapter 8.

FACTIONAL

CONFLICT AND POLITICAL

CHANGE

271

tions led b y the late Jai Narain V y a s and C h o u d h r y K u m b h a r a m A r y a . T h e increasingly plural character of factional coalitions has b e e n a result of increased c o m p e t i t i o n of political support at all levels of political organization. State-level factional coalitions have tended to r u n "parallel" in the different regions of the state and to have afforded representation to c o m p e t i n g local groups in district politics. CASTE AND THE FACTIONAL SYSTEM W e have n o t e d that w i t h increased political participation

in

the Congress system the predominance of B r a h m a n and M a h a j a n T A B L E 51 REPRESENTATION IN THE KUMBHARAM FACTIONAL

COALITION BY REGION, 1946-1965 (IN PERCENT)

Region

1946-1948

1948-1950

Matsya Jaipur Kotah Udaipur Shekhawati Jodhpur Bikaner

0 0 0 0 0 0 100 11

0 0 0 0

0 6 0 0

17 0

'4 49 3« 35

N

=

83 6

1 954"'95®

1958-1960

1963-1965

3 5 0 0 20 38 35 40

0 0 0 0

castes in the party organization has decreased. 8 H o w e v e r ,

17 62 21 29 these

new caste groups, like the old, h a v e not been associated with autonomous and socially pure factions. Political competition w i t h i n the Congress system has been c o n d u c i v e to the division of m a j o r social categories. T h i s basis of division is not so important a m o n g the B r a h m a n and M a h a j a n caste groups because these categories d o n o t constitute corporate social units. A s w e n o t e d in C h a p t e r 2, there are 6. For a discussion of "lines" of factional organizations and primordial bases of factional cohesion, see Ralph W . Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," in Michael Banton, ed., Political Systems and the Distribution of Power (New York: Frederick A . Praeger, 1965), pp. 21-61.

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

a n u m b e r of jatis within each of these caste groups. A t the local level caste groups often tend to act as collective units (see Chapter 10), b u t this has been less true at higher levels of political organization. A l t h o u g h Jats and Rajputs constitute corporate social units, neither has been cohesive in Congress politics. T h e Vyas coalition was a representative cross-section of the larger Congress party organization d u r i n g its early years. (See T a b l e 52.) A large majority of the members have always come from elite castes, primarily Brahman and Mahajan, but after 1954, the coalition attracted the support of a large proportion of the R a j p u t representatives w h o started to enter the Congress party. It never, however, attracted consistent support from either peasant castes or Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. T A B L E 5a REPRESENTATION IN THE V Y A S

COALITION BY CASTE,

FACTIONAL

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

19461948

1948-

Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput Other clean castes Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim

71

61 28 2

3

0

5 0

N

35

64

Caste

=

20

0 O

6

«95°

0 5

'954«956

19581960

1963-

4a 33 0 14 12

44 44 0 5 5

56 19 0 9 9

0 0 43

0 3 39

6

»965

0 3a

T h e caste composition of the Sukhadia g r o u p stands in striking contrast to that of Vyas. A l t h o u g h primarily composed of Brahmans, Mahajans, and Kayasths at the time of the creation of the Congress in 1946, the coalition has continually absorbed a number of new castes and caste groups, especially f r o m among the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. (See T a b l e 53.) T h i s was to be expected, because a large proportion of the population in some areas of U d a i p u r Division is Scheduled T r i b e , b u t the fac-

F A C T I O N A L C O N F L I C T AND POLITICAL CHANGE

273

tion has also included important Scheduled Caste and Scheduled T r i b e representatives from the Matsya and Jodhpur areas. A Scheduled Caste M L A from each of these areas served as a minister in the state government during the past decade. T h e most significant change in the base of caste representation in the Sukhadia group has been the absorption of members of the Jat community. W e saw that Sukhadia was able to split the Jats in TABLE

53

REPRESENTATION IN THE SUKHADIA COALITION BY CASTE,

FACTIONAL

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Caste Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput Other clean castes Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim N

=

1946-

1948-

1948

'95°

37 47 0 0 11

50 23 5 0

5 0 «9

5 0

18

22

'9541956

1958-

46

52

29 2

7 11 4 0 44

1960

20

3 4 7 12

i

70

1963'965 42 24 9 8

7 5 4 97

Kumbharam's faction by elevating one dominant member of the Jat community in Ganganagar District to the ministry. Sukhadia was also able to win over two important young Jat members of the Pradesh Congress Committee and the Congress Legislative Party from Shekhawati when they found it difficult to realize their aspirations for political control within the Shekhawati Jat faction led by Sardar Harlal Singh. T h e access which these young Jat leaders have enjoyed through their association with the chief minister together with their personal base of political support—and these are by no means unrelated—have resulted in the demise of the "old" Jat faction in Congress politics in the two districts of Shekhawati and the rise of a new dominant multicaste factional coalition led by these young Jat politicians. Sukhadia's socially composite coalition has also attracted the

274

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

support of a large number of important Rajput politicians as well. This segment of the coalition has come about as a result of a number of different conflicts. In 1954, after the entry of twentytwo jagirdar MLAs into the Congress party, several became immediately associated with Sukhadia primarily as a result of material benefits important to the former landed aristocracy—the arrangement of compensation for their jagirs. After the decline of the Vyas faction, Rajput leaders in many areas started to become more closely allied with Sukhadia because of personal benefit or competition with the Jat factions in local-level party organizations and public institutions in the desert areas. In this way, the Sukhadia coalition has attracted Rajput support not only in Udaipur Division but also in Jodhpur and Shekhawati as well.7 TABLE

54

R E P R E S E N T A T I O N IN T H E K U M B H A RAM F A C T I O N A L COALITION B Y C A S T E ,

1946-1965

(IN P E R C E N T )

Caste Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput Other clean castes Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim N

=

19461948 27

0 73 0 0 0 0 11

1948-

1950 0 0

'954«956

1958-

«963'965

6

11 11

0 3 69 0 «4

0 0

'4 63 0 11

0 0

6

100

6

0

35

1960

68

0 5

3 3 38

10

3 29

The Kumbharam faction, unlike those just described, has been based predominantly in the Jat community. (See Table 54.) Representation of peasant castes—Jats, Vishnois, Sirvis, and Jat Sikhs 7. T h e Rajput group in the Rajasthan Congress has not constituted a cohesive group. At the time of the ministerial crisis in 1954 the group held a closed meeting and unanimously agreed to support Vyas. Six Rajputs, however, supported Sukhadia, and by 1956 seven of the remaining sixteen had moved over to Sukhadia. T h e J a t group has become increasingly dispersed politically.

F A C T I O N A L C O N F L I C T AND POLITICAL

CHANGE

275

— h a v e continually constituted over 60 percent of the faction's P C C membership, and this configuration has generally been true at lower levels of political organization as well. W h i l e Jat-led factions at the district level have often included a large number of representatives from other castes because of mutually antagonistic political opponents at these lower levels, at the state level representatives of these local level, non-Jat political segments have sometimes become associated with other factional coalitions (see Chapter 10), which has sometimes eventually resulted in the fission of these local-level coalitions. A l t h o u g h representatives of peasant castes were almost exclusively aligned with the

Kum-

bharam faction throughout the 1950s, this started to change at the end of the decade. T h i s change, together with the declining base of Kumbharam's personal power and support in Congress circles, as we have noted, prompted his exit from the Congress system in late ig66. TABLE DISPERSION OF P C C

55

MEMBERS IN FACTIONAL COALITIONS B Y C A S T E ,

194&-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Year a n d Caste 1946-1948 Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput O t h e r clean castes Scheduled Castes a n d Tribes Muslim 1948-1950 Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput O t h e r clean castes Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim

Sukhadia

Vyas

'3 23 0 0

47

Kumbharam 6

Shastri

Unattached

N =

«7 21

53 39 11

0 0

0 73 0

IOO

'7 38 27 0

25

25

0

0

50

8

33 0

33 0

0 0

0 0

33

3

IOO

I

17 '4 11 0

62

49 11 0

0 0 67

21 38 11

0

63 37 9

IOO

I

57

43

0

0

7

25 0

75 0

0 0

0

4

IOO

I

18

O

I

276 Year and Caste

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN Sukhadia

Vyas

Kumbharam

n =

'95*-'956 Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput Other clean castes Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim

5° 4' 4 33 36 100 33

45 44 0 67 36 0 0

5 16 96 0 29 0 67

40 32 23 9 14 2 3

1958-1960 Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput Other clean castes Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim

63 40 7 60 56 89 33

30 49 0 40 22 O 33

7 11 93 0 22 11 33

57 35 28 5 9 9 3

1963-1965 Brahman Mahajan Peasant Rajput Other clean castes Scheduled Castes and Tribes Muslim

69 77 3« 67 50 63 57

3« 20 0 33 21 0 29

0 3 69 0 29 38 '4

59 30 29 12 '4 8 7

Social groups in an ascriptive society are frequently corporate units resistant to change. In India, where castes constitute mutually exclusive and internally oriented social groups, the avenues for change are highly restricted. Conflict and competition within the Congress system, however, has been conducive to the fission of some of these social units. This has been a function of the need for widespread support for the pursuit of power and the exercise of control over important political positions. This change, together with the expansion of political linkages across regional boundaries, has tended to make the axes of political conflict more plural and has tended to reduce the intensity of conflict which often prevails where conflicts are superimposed along an axis which divides corporate social groups.8 It should be noted that 8. For useful theoretical expositions of this proposition, see Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict, pp. i 1 3 - 2 1 8 ; Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 80-85; a n d Simmel, Conflict, pp. 61-65.

FACTIONAL

C O N F L I C T AND P O L I T I C A L

CHANGE

277

some of the most intense political conflicts have resulted in those localized areas where corporate groups have become divided politically because each perceives the other as having done violence to those sacred traditional values and rules internal to the group. A t higher levels of conflict, the intensity of local conflicts tends to be filtered out by the existence of more extensive secular political alliances, friendships, and ties. FACTIONAL CLEAVAGE AND GENERATIONAL CHANGE

It was argued in Chapter 7 that political generation has been ail important criterion in the way that Congressmen in Rajasthan perceive themselves and define others politically. For example, early activity in organizing protest against traditional authority and in undergoing personal sacrifice on behalf of political ideals and one's community has been an important element of political prestige. It has increasingly become less so, however, except in discussions of the past that are held without reference to an immediate political question. T h e transfer of dominant authority positions between political generations is critical in new political institutions, and especially so when the change includes generations of political leaders who have been educated in qualitatively different sets of political conditions and experiences. T h e organization of the factional system and its patterns of generational representation have been crucially important in facilitating this change in the Rajasthan Congress with a minimum of institutional disruption. T h e bases of both the Vyas and Sukhadia coalitions have their roots in the Praja Mandal movements which developed in the princely states prior to independence, and each faction has included founders of protest movements. (See Tables 56 and 57.) T h e Vyas coalition, however, has been weighted more heavily with members of the old political generation who entered politics prior to 1937 than others. Furthermore, a majority of the members of the Vyas coalition in each P C C before 1963 had entered politics prior to 1942—the important political watershed marked by the " Q u i t India" Movement. Congress leaders who entered politics after independence have not formed a significant proportion of the Vyas coalition either in terms of proportion or number.

278

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

T h e profile of generational representation in the Sukhadia coalition contrasts with that of Vyas in its greater recruitment from later generations of political leaders. Like the Vyas group this faction was recruited primarily during the period between 1937 and 1947 but this proportion has declined significantly since 1954. (See Table 57.) T h e total number of political leaders in the Sukhadia coalition who were recruited during the decade before independence, however, has been larger than for the Vyas coalition. Like the Vyas group, the Sukhadia faction has included a number of founders of political movements who constitute approximately the same proportion in each coalition. At the time of "generational succession" in the ministry crisis of 1954, Sukhadia, who represented the "new" generation of political elites, had the support of as many "old" leaders in the Pradesh Congress Committee as did Vyas, who represented the "old" generation of political workers. This form of political linkage facilitated the "generational" transfer of power in the Rajasthan Congress party. T A B L E 56 REPRESENTATION IN THE V Y A S FACTIONAL COALITION BY POLITICAL GENERATION,

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Political Generation 1946-1948 1948-1950 i954-«956 1958-1960 1963-1965 Before 1931 i93«-«936 i937-'94i 1942-1947 1948-1951

«952-1956 i957-'963 N

=

'9

16

'3

39

18 32

3'

0 0 0 60

26 0 0 0

37

8

5

40

35 3

10 0 40

3

0 10

38 3« 3

33 33

16

6

3 32

0

«7 7 30

Unlike the Vyas or Sukhadia coalitions, the state-level factional coalition led by Kumbharam has been particularly heavily drawn from postindependence political recruits. (See T a b l e 58.) T h i s is in large measure the result of the late timing of the kisan movements in all areas except Shekhawati. (Most of the old political generation in the Jat coalition comes from Shekhawati.) This coalition, however, does include several members who entered

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE

279

TABLE 57 REPRESENTATION IN THE SUKHADIA FACTIONAL COALITION BY POLITICAL GENERATION,

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Political Generation Before 1931 1931-1936 1937-1941 1942-1947 1948-1951 1951-1956

i957-'963

N

=

I946-I948

19 O

44 36 0 0

1948-1950

1954-1956

17

9 5 23 47 7 9

0

33 50 0

0

0

0

16

18

1958-1960

1963-1965

29

3 4 13 37

'9 3 58

'9 9 79

5 5

26

16

10

0

43

politics before independence and who were important young leaders in the urban political movements. T h e factional divisions have split political generations, and the impact of the segmentary organization of political power in the Rajasthan Congress has contributed to this. The common bond of emotive and evocative experience created by founding political movements and engaging traditional authority in political conflict has not overcome either the regional bias of those movements or other important pluralist pressures and forms of political associaTABLE 58 REPRESENTATION IN THE KUMBHARAM FACTIONAL COALITION BY POLITICAL GENERATION,

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Political Generation

I946-I948

Before 1931

0

1931-1936

O

i942-1947

27 73

I

937-I94I

1948-1951 1951-1956 1957-1963

N =

11

1948-1950

i954-*956

195&-1960

1963-1965

0 33 '7 5°

0 0 9 38 '5 38

0 0

0 0 4 32

6

34

8 28

11 39 14 36

8

36 20

25

28o

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

tion to form factions of single generations. T h e fact that the preindependence movements were themselves regional in nature, of course, has contributed to this lack of cohesion, but it should also be noted that within these regional areas the older political generations have not often constituted cohesive units. In some cases division came about prior to independence, and in others conflict over positions of power and prestige after independence induced cleavage. T h e resulting units each became associated with a different factional focus at higher levels of political organization, and the old leaders' lack of cohesion along generational lines nullified their potential threat to political elites recruited later who, had such cohesion existed, might have organized by political generation in defense. Furthermore, the existence of political linkages which cut across the boundaries of political generation made possible the transfer of authority from a chief minister representing the "old" political generation to one who represented the " n e w " with a minimum of fission within the Congress system. As we have just seen, although the factional coalition led by the representative of the "old" generation, Jai Narain Vyas, did not include a larger number of new T A B L E 59 DISPERSION OF P C C

MEMBERS IN POLITICAL GENERATIONS

BY FACTIONAL COALITION,

1946-1965

(IN PERCENT)

Year and Political Generation

Sukhadia

Vyas

Kumbharam

Shastri

Before 1931 i93'-'93 6 '937-'94'

25

30 38 24 25

0 0

'5

Before 1931 '93'-'93 6 '937"'94' '94»-'947

21

Unattached

N

=

1946-1948

1942-1946

0 '4 '9

57

0

61

16 21

5' 5'

8

6 26

18 16

0 11 3 7

21 28

30 21

'7

46

38 '3

12

'3 50

3« '4

18

37 43

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE

28l

Year and Political Generation '954-'95^

Before 1931 I93I-1936 1937-1941 1942-1947 1948-1951 1952-1956

I958-'96°

Before 1931 1931-1936 I 937 -I 94 I 1942-1947 1948-1951 1952-1956 1957-1963

¡9^3-19^5

Before 1931 1932-1936 1937-1941 1942-1947 1948-1951

'952-1956 1957-1963

Sukhadia

Vyas

Kumbharam

N =

57 50 34 43 33 19

43 50 55 3° 11 '9

0 0 10 28

7 4

62

75 38 52

25 63 39

0 0 10

46

55 4i 25 100 50 48 62 87

50 50

27

9 7 '3 0

50 48 21 0

«7 H

56

27 36 52 63 0 0

5 «7 »3 33 38

29

47 9 21

4 8

3« 37 11 37 8

2 6 21

47 «5 30 >4

political recruits, Sukhadia's coalition not only included members of newly mobilized political groups but also enjoyed the support of large numbers of old political leaders. The segmentary organization of political power that characterized the Rajasthan Congress system at the time of independence has contributed to the rise of new forms of political association between these original political units. T h e quest on the part of major leaders for expanded structures of political support has led to fission of old groups and has been conducive to the rise and absorption of new ones. Aspirations for effective participation on the part of old leaders as well as among new leaders within existing groups has also been conducive to the rise of new forms of linkage which have replaced former ties. This type of change in the organization of the factional system has been extremely im-

282

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

portant in the fission of regional and caste-based groups in the Rajasthan Congress. Furthermore, the competitive political system within the Congress party, encouraged by a segmentary organization of political power, has been conducive to the development and maintenance of plural, rather than superimposed, axes of political conflict. This, in turn, has been conducive to the maintenance of low levels of conflict intensity since leaders in such a competitive system constantly look for new resources to absorb into their structure of political support. Finally, this system of power, with conflict arising at lower levels of political organization as well as continued political competition at higher levels of political organization, has tended to maintain an open and mobile political order within the Congress system. The factional system within the Congress, like the larger Congress system itself, has constituted a new form of social linkage within the party and society, and this has inhibited the rise of a superimposed configuration of conflict axes based on corporate primordial groups. The competitive system has also been conducive to new forms of cooperative effort unknown in preindependence society and has also been conducive to the development of a bargaining political culture. The segmentary organization of political power has also placed restrictions on the permanent consolidation and centralization of power on the part of a single elite within the party. The Congress system has been characterized by a plural and competitive elite structure which has been highly mobile, rather than an oligarchical elite insulated from the pressures of political demands.

Chapter

10

F A C T I O N A L C O N F L I C T AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT: P A R T I C I P A T I O N AND V E R T I C A L L I N K A G E IN J O D H P U R AND N A G A U R

the preceding analysis of factions and the organization of power in the Congress party was restricted primarily to the state level, the organization of power in state politics, however, is not a self-contained political world set off from factional competition at lower levels of political organization. Factions at successively higher levels of political conflict rest upon a system of linkages with subordinate bases of support in much the same fashion as was found to be true in major state-level coalitions. These linkages and the responsiveness which is required for their perpetuation has been central to the maintenance of institutional integrity and channels of mobility within the Congress system. T h e analysis of the system of vertical linkages within the Congress is a central concern in this chapter. A second concern is to demonstrate the relationship between factional organization and conflict and the mobilization of political resources in the Congress system. T h e competitiveness engendered by a segmentary organization of power has oriented the party toward its political environment. Intraparty conflict in the Rajasthan Congress has contributed not only to the shifting of associations between factional units within the party at a given point in time but has also encouraged factions to become actively engaged in the mobilization of new resources for purposes of maintaining or favorably altering the "balance" of factional forces within the organization. T h e entry of new political aspirants and recruits into the party has had important repercussions on the configuraALTHOUGH

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y

284

IN

RAJASTHAN

tion of the factional system at all levels of political organization. Attempts to mobilize new political participants have been pursued in several different difections which have had differential impacts upon factional organization. These directions and relationships can be simply expressed in the following model. T h e mobi-

Political Resources Internal c o

£ a

Mobilized

Autonomous Political Opposition

Congress System

ô w

Congress Clientele

£

X.

v

Opposition Clientele

Unmobillzed

«>

Unassociated Apathetic

X.

lized sector includes those leaders and political groups that have been actively and continually in the political process.1 T h e internally mobilized sector of the model refers to the Congress system, although analytically it can apply to any unit treated as an independent variable, while the autonomously mobilized sector refers to the active political opposition. In the case of Rajasthan, the opposition can also be divided into two subsectors. First, there is the more or less permanent opposition—those who have a fairly intense commitment to an opposition party or antipathy for the Congress. T h e other subsector includes dissident Congressmen, 1. Mobilized political resources here include those political actors involved in "gladiatorial activities" as defined by Lester W . Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: R a n d McNally and Company, 1965), p. 18. These activities include holding public and party office, being a candidate for office, soliciting political funds, attending a caucus or a strategy meeting, becoming an active member in a political party, and contributing time in a political campaign. For a case in Senegal similar to that analyzed here see Jonathan S. Barker, "Political Factionalism in Sine-Saloum" (unpublished manuscript, University of T o r o n t o , March 1969).

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

285

i.e., those who have left the party as a result of factional conflict in the politics of ticket allocation but who usually wish to reenter the party for a number of purposes.2 The Congress has directed its mobilization energies in several directions. First, efforts have been made to mobilize clientele groups into the party organization on a continuing basis. This was the type of effort made by peasant-caste leaders after entering the party when they attempted to transfer their base of political support within the Kisan Sabhas and peasant castes into the Congress system. This strategy has also been employed by leaders in other locally dominant castes with varying degrees of success. These clientele bases have included economic dependence, traditional obligations, and in some cases, particularly in Shekhawati, old military ties. Secondly, attempts have been made to co-opt units from the autonomously mobilized sector of the polity. This has included efforts to engineer the entry of the jagirdar MLAs in 1954, the allocation of tickets to locally prominent politicians, and the arrangment for Congress dissidents to reenter the party. Mobilization efforts are also directed at the politically unassociated and apathetic. This has involved the co-optation of local leaders, usually in an important community, in an effort to develop dependable and continual support from that community by virtue of the access to political resources granted these new participants. This strategy has been especially important in gaining support among the more depressed social groups in Rajasthani society. Although the attraction of autonomous political resources has been important in the development of the Rajasthan Congress, most political mobilization and recruitment has taken place at the local level where the party meets society. Recruitment and mobility have thus tended to be increasingly vertical and internal rather than horizontal from external resources. s. This is an important distinction. A number of Congressmen have contested independently or on opposition party tickets in the four general elections. It should be noted, however, that the Congress party was able to form a majority after the 1962 and 1967 elections only after "independent" MLAs had entered the Congress Legislative Party. The number of Congress MLAs by the end of the life of an Assembly has always been considerably larger than it was immediately following the general elections.

286

T H E CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

T h e purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to analyze the relationship between political conflict and the mobilization of new political resources in the Congress system and to demonstrate by using a case—a "political boring" from the state to the local level—the differing bases of political factions and factional coalitions and the manner in which political groups at successively lower levels of political organization are associated with higher levels through a system of vertical linkages in the Congress system. T h e case of Nagaur District in Jodhpur Division is instructive for our purposes. It has involved competition between political leaders associated with all major factional coalitions at the state level and has known considerable political competition at the local level as a result of conflict between urban elites which trace their roots into the preindependence movement and rural elites which entered the party after independence. T h i s conflict has resulted in the mobilization of new social interests and personnel into the party, and this pattern of mobilization has had an important impact on the organization of the factional system not only in this region but at the state level as well. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONGRESS IN THE JODHPUR REGION

T h e pattern of social representation and the organization of factions in the Congress party in Jodhpur Division since 1947 has been greatly influenced by the development and organization of preindependence political movements in former Jodhpur State. Since the consolidation of the Congress party organization in Jodhpur shortly before the first General Elections in 1952, there have been two major elites within the Jodhpur Congress each deriving from one of the two major political movements which developed prior to 1947—the Marwar Lok Parishad and the Marwar Kisan Sab ha—and each having separate aims, origins, and bases of social recruitment. T h e Lok Parishad movement, as we have seen, originated in the late 1920s and centered its major political efforts in the capital city. Its recruitment as well as the scope of its political support were limited both in terms of social group and geographical area. T h e vast majority of political leaders and workers were recruited from the Pushkarna Brahman, Kayasth, Oswal, and Maheshwari

F A C T I O N A L C O N F L I C T AND P O L I T I C A L R E C R U I T M E N T

287

castes, while representation from lower castes was quite limited. As was true of its counterparts in other states, the Jodhpur movement did not command the support of all segments of these castes. The Lok Parishad also had only limited success in developing active organizations and bases of political support in either rural towns or villages, and this has restricted the political effectiveness of urban Congress elites in postindependence politics. In the case of Nagaur District, Lok Parishad "outposts" were established in five of the eight district towns between 1942 and 1947 by local leaders who had either been educated in the British provinces or who had come into contact with the nationalist movement through the Jodhpur elite or through serving "political apprenticeship«" in the British provinces. These groups were exclusively personal followings, and membership was largely restricted to the caste of the local founder-leader. Like the movement in Jodhpur City, the outpost organizations consisted of persons from high castes. Three of the five groups were primarily Brahman, one was Maheshwari, and one was a coalition of Brahmans and Oswals, created and led by a young Oswal advocate. As was true in Jodhpur City, these local units neither involved the participation nor commanded the support of any of these castes in their entirety. Furthermore, these "outposts" never became linked on a districtwide basis, but each remained segmented in both leadership and membership to the town in which it originated. Unlike the Lok Parishad, the rural Kisan Sabha, as was noted in Chapter 4, was almost exclusively a caste association of the Jat community and was dedicated primarily to the reformation of traditional systems of land tenure and ownership rather than to the achievement of representative government and Indian independence. The Jat movement was centered in Nagaur District, although it eventually developed extensions in other areas of Jodhpur State. The leaders of the movement were either highly educated or had held positions in the "modern" sector of the state—the railway, police, and armed services. In some areas the movement attracted support from smaller peasant castes, primarily Vishnois and Sirvis. In Nagaur District the Kisan Sabha developed support in all tehsils and, during the 1930s and 1940s, reformists attempted to involve the caste in a common dedication to improving its lot. These ef-

288

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y I N

RAJASTHAN

forts at mobilization brought this protest movement to the village level. In the case of Nagaur, there was no traditional elite within the Jat caste which actively opposed the advocates of modernization and change. The "accepted" leaders of the caste in its relations with other groups increasingly became those who had achieved positions in accordance with the "modernist" aims to which the Jat movement had aspired. The Congress party in Jodhpur Division, which was created entirely from the Lok Parishad shortly after independence, remained almost exclusively a citybased organization until the eve of the first General Elections, when Vyas and his two chief political lieutenants engaged in several efforts to extend the party to the rural areas. In 1951, as we have noted, the entry of the Kisan Sabha into the Congress party was arranged based 011 an agreement that gave the Kisan Sabha the right to nominate 50 percent of the Congress candidates for Jodhpur Division as well as representation in positions of power in a Congress government. From this time competition arose between leaders from these two different political traditions for control over the party apparatus and for access to positions of power in the state capital. CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL CONFLICT AND THE ORGANIZATION OF PARTY FACTIONS

The period between the first and second General Elections witnessed several major changes in the structure of political support within the district Congress organization and set the general pattern of support which has since characterized district Congress politics. This resulted primarily from competition for control of positions of power in the Congress party organization and in the allocation of party tickets for the second General Elections. In the party organization the axis of conflict was set by the Lok Parishad groups, which wanted to maintain the positions of power that they had assumed at the time of founding, and the Jat group, which wanted to transfer its base of support in the Jat community and Kisan Sabha into the Congress system. Conflict in the municipal boards often involved Lok Parishad groups and new elites which desired access to higher levels of politics and which were

F A C T I O N A L C O N F L I C T AND P O L I T I C A L R E C R U I T M E N T

289

co-opted into the Congress system by leaders in opposition to the Vyas groups. Competition within the Congress organization was of particular importance. First, the District Congress Committees participate in the allocation of Congress party tickets for elections, and control of these local party institutions is instrumental in legitimating demands of groups within the party to higher levels. Secondly, local control and participation is a prerequisite to representation in the Pradesh Congress Committee and its attendant committees. These conditions encouraged competition between district and regional elites for the support of existing tehsil-level political units and groups which had autonomous origins in urban politics after independence, particularly after the 1952 elections. It also encouraged extensive efforts on the part of the contesting groups and elites to extend their structures of support further into their own castes as well as into the previously politically unassociated and apathetic sectors of society. T h i s became particularly true in the politics of ticket allocation immediately prior to the 1957 elections. T w o types of political cleavages developed among urban groups in the district Congress during the 1952-1957 period. T h e first type involved splits within the Lok Parishad elite between those who were closely associated with Vyas and who had received his support in the allocation of tickets in 1952 and those who felt that their aspirations for a political career had not received the support from Vyas which they deserved. T w o of these dissidents had been founder-leaders of Lok Parishad outposts in their respective towns, but neither had received the party ticket in 1952. T h e other was one of Vyas' closest and most able political strategists in the Lok Parishad who had not been taken into the Vyas ministry. After Vyas' overthrow in 1954 these three leaders aligned with the Jat faction in district politics. T h e second type of cleavage resulted from the development of new political groups in four of the five towns in which there had been a preindependence movement and resulted from conflict in municipal politics—elections for municipal boards or the chairmanship of the municipality.

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

T h e r e were several characteristics which all of these urban factions—old and new—had in common. First, seven of the eight urban Congress groups were recruited almost entirely from a single caste, although each had an "outer circle" of affiliates and supporters from other castes. T h e one exception involved a BrahmanOswal coalition which had been closely affiliated with Vyas and whose leader was the lone M L A from Nagaur who continued to support Vyas after 1954. T h r e e of the urban groups were created after the first General Elections, and each of these drew its leadership and central support from a single caste. In two cases these were Brahman groups that developed in opposition to the Lok Parishad groups which were also primarily Brahman. In the third case a Brahman faction developed in opposition to a Maheshwari group that had constituted a Lok Parishad "outpost" but which shifted its loyalty from Vyas to the Jat group after 1954. In each case the dominant leaders in the new groups had entered politics after independence and had entered Congress after the first General Elections. Secondly, these leaders tended to be more highly educated than those of the older groups against whom they rebelled: the leaders of the new groups were law graduates, whereas the leaders of the old groups had either minimal or a traditionally oriented education—one being literate with no formal education and the other two having received degrees from the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan. T h e "older" leaders were also more inclined to traditional activities, pursuits, and styles of life than the earnest young lawyers. T h e rise of new urban groups, therefore, was not so much a result of unrepresented castes demanding a place in the scheme of political things, but of new political elites that wanted to participate actively in Congress politics. In the Congress party organization the conflicts between the urban factions became part of the major conflict between the Jat and Vyas groups in both tehsil and district organizations. In those tehsils where competing urban factions had developed, the Tehsil Congress Committee Executives became split between the local Vyas group and an opposing coalition which in each case included the Jat faction in the tehsil and the anti-Vyas urban group. In three of these four tehsils, however, the Vyas groups were able to maintain control of the party apparatus, although in two cases

FACTIONAL

CONFLICT

AND

POLITICAL

RECRUITMENT

291

the T C C Executive had been replaced by appointed ad hoc committees.3 In the four tehsils where the Lok Parishad

had been non-

existent, the Jat group was able to capture control of the party apparatus without competition. Although the Jat group was able to establish complete control in only four Tehsil Congress Committees and controlled only one other through a coalition, by 1956 they constituted the dominant faction on the District Congress Committee. TABLE

60

C A S T E COMPOSITION OF THE NAGUAR D C C

IN

1956

Constituency Caste

I

Brahman Jat Kayasth Mahajan Muslim Scheduled Caste

IO

2

3 0

N =

18

5 0 5 i i '4

NOTE

2

0 3

2

3 5 5 i 2

0 0 »3

4

5

6

7

8

3 7 0 i 0 0

0 13 0 0 0 0 ! 3

0 8 0 0 0 0 8

0 6 0 0 0 0

0 6 0 0 i 0 7

11

6

N

=

20

53 i 10 2

4 90

: The caste of two members is not known.

Representation on the D C C was directly related to the history of political organization and conflict in each of the constituency areas. Jat representation was related to the location and intensity of political activity of preindependence groups as well as to representation in the Legislative Assembly. Each of those constituency areas where the Jat group did not have dominant representation had been the preserve of major non-Jat leaders and groups, all of which had been associated with the Lok

Parishad

movement.

Conversely, in those areas where there was only Jat representation, the preindependence movement had been minimal or nonexistent. 3. Since the tehsils in Nagaur correspond fairly closely to electoral constituencies for the Legislative Assembly, in subsequent tables each tehsil will be represented by the related constituency. For purposes of anonymity, constituencies are indicated by numbers rather than by their actual names. Government of Rajasthan, Election Department, "Delimitation of Constituencies for General Elections, 1957" (mimeographed), p. 24.

292

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

T h e first three constituencies, where urban representatives outnumbered Jats, constituted the same areas in which the Vyas groups controlled the Tehsil Congress Committees. Furthermore, those areas of Jat predominance were precisely those from which Jat candidates had contested the 1952 elections, whereas those areas of continued urban representation were those in which members of the Vyas group had contested in 1952. T h e conflicts and resulting factional groupings in the Tehsil Congress Committees were extended to the D C C . T h e Vyas group had a majority of the representatives from only one constituency area and this was in that tehsil where the local Vyas group had maintained an elected majority in the Tehsil Congress Committee. T h e Jat group did not constitute a majority of the representatives on the D C C from constituencies 2 and 3, however, in spite of the fact that they "controlled" the T C C s in these areas through appointed convenors and ad hoc committees. T h e highest incidence of party activity and representation on the D C C was located in precisely those areas where factional conflict had been most intense and where the Lok Parishad had developed local units before independence. It is important to note that the Jat group afforded an alternative channel of access to the larger political process for dissident urban factions. Prior to 1954 the Jat faction had functioned largely as a closed and autonomous unit within the district Congress and was primarily concerned with making the Congress an organizational weapon for the realization of its own political aspirations. After that time, however, it started to attract the support of some urban factions which had not been able to achieve positions of power and access through the Vyas group and which desired to have rural support in competition for the Congress tickets and electoral support in rural areas for the 1957 elections. T h e Jat group also welcomed urban support for purposes of creating an image of being an aggregate of a number of castes, leaders, and local interests, rather than a narrowly caste-based faction out of tune with party ideology. T h i s was particularly important with respect to the political activity of the Jat group at higher levels in the party hierarchy. T h e confrontation between the Jat and Vyas groups, however,

FACTIONAL

CONFLICT

AND

POLITICAL

RECRUITMENT

293

occurred primarily in the Executive Committee of the DCC, the central decision-making body in the district Congress organization. The composition and control of the executive reflects the pattern of representation in lower Congress organizational bodies and has been important not only for conferring prestige locally and for the legitimacy it gives dominant factions in higher levels of the TABLE

61

COMPOSITION O F T H E N A G A U R D C C

BY CASTE

D I S T R I C T L E V E L FACTION IN

Constituency 1 3 3 4 5 6 7 8

N

=

Brahman V

M*

8

3

1 3

0

0 0

0

0

13

I

2 3 0 0 0 0 8

Jat V

Mahajan

M

V

0 3 0 5 0 5 0 7 0 '3 0 8 0 6 0 6 0 53

3 1 0 0 0 0 0 6

2

Other

M

V M

0 3

3 2

I

0

I

0

O

0

O

0 O

4

AND

1956

0 0

0 5

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1

2

V

M

»3 5 6 8 4 9 0 11 0 >3 0 8 0 6 0 7 »3 67

Totals 18

'4 »3 11 «3 8

6 7 90

NOTE : The caste of two members of the D C C is not known. » V = J a i Narain Vyas and M = Nathuram Mirdha. Although the organization of representatives from the J a t caste in the Nagaur Congress is referred to locally as the J a t group, the name of the dominant J a t leader is used here and in subsequent tables to refer to that group. The "other" category includes three Scheduled Castes in constituency 1 and one in constituency 2, while there was one Muslim in constituency 3 and one in constituency 4. There was one Kayasth in constituency 3.

party organization but also because of the formal role it plays in the process of ticket allocation. The major change in the social composition of the DCC Executive since 1952 has been the decrease of the urban castes and the concomitant increase of the rural Jats. Between 1952 and 1956 representation was dominated by the Brahman and Mahajan caste groups, but since 1956 they have continually declined in power while the Jats have constituted more than 50 percent of the total membership since 1958. Jat strength in the DCC Executive Committee began with the

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

294

T A B L E 62 C A S T E COMPOSITION OF THE NAGAUR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,

Caste

DCC

1952-1964

1952-1954 1954-1956 1956-1958 1958-1960 1960-1962 1962-1964

Brahman Jat Kayasth Mahajan Muslim Sched. Caste Vishnoi

3 2 1 2 0 0 0

N =

8

2 1 4 0 0 0

7

4 1 2 1 o

14

12

2

4

0

1 1 o 1 14

1

8

1

1 1 o 1 12

1

8

0

8 1 o 1 1 0 12

Note: The figures for 1952, unlike the others, are not taken from official party lists but have been gleaned from references in party files and materials. It is possible that total representation in 1952 was only 8 because the directive which called for the creation of District Congress Executive Committees in 1949 indicated that they should have between 3 and 9 members.

decline of the Vyas group in state politics and became paramount after the 1957 elections, when the Vyas candidates were badly defeated on a statewide basis. After Vyas resigned as president of the Pradesh Congress Committee in 1957, his coalition was left without control of any major positions of power at the state level. T h e Jat group became the center of a district-level coalition in 1954 which controlled 50 percent of the members of the Executive, although three members of the new coalition were incumbents on the committee and, until then, had been allied with Vyas. After 1956 the Jat group achieved an absolute majority and from 1958 controlled all but one position on the D C C Executive. Representation on the D C C Executive has been circulated widely among Jat political activists. T h e major leaders have always been represented on the D C C Executive, but the remaining positions have been rotated so that ten Jats who have not been M L A s have, at various times, been members of the Executive Committee since 1958, and, at one time or another, Jat groups from each constituency in the district have been represented. Furthermore, positions of leadership on the committee have been rotated among Jats and non-Jats in order to maintain a sense of participation among all sections of the coalition.

F A C T I O N A L CONFLICT AND P O L I T I C A L R E C R U I T M E N T

295

T A B L E 63 COMPOSITION OF THE D C C EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE BY CASTE AND FACTION, 1952-1964

Caste and

Faction 1952-1954 »954-1956 1956-1958 1958-1960 1960-1962 1962-1964

Brahman V M Jat V M Kayasth V M Mahajan V M Muslim V M Sched. Caste V M Vishnoi V M N =

V M

3 0

5

3 1

1 1

0

0 2

0 4

0 8

8

8

1 0

0 1

0 1

0 1

0 1

0 1

0

2

2 2

1 1

0 1

0 1

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 1

0 1

0 1

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 0

6 2

7 7

8

4

1 »3

1 11

1 11

2

2

1 0 0

1 0 0

The composition of the Nagaur delegation on the PCC reflects changes similar to those which occurred in the DCC and its Executive Committee. While urban castes constituted the major part of representation prior to 1954, after that time the dominant caste was Jat, and there was never more than one Vyas representative on the PCC from Nagaur District. With the exception of three persons, all representatives were the leaders of more or less autonomous factions within the support structure. There has also been considerable overlap between membership on the DCC Executive Committee and the PCC. With the exception of six of the thirty-four positions filled between 1952 and 1963, all representatives were members of the DCC Executive at

296

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y

IN

RAJASTHAN

T A B L E 64 COMPOSITION OF R E P R E S E N T A T I O N FROM N A G A U R

ON THE P C C ,

Caste and Faction 1 952-'954 '954-'956 i g s 6 - ^ 8 Brahman V M Jat V M Mahajan V M Sched. Caste V M Kayasth V M Muslim V M Vishnoi V M N

=

3 0

1 0

DISTRICT

1952-1965

1958-1960

i96ob-ig63

1963-1965

i i

1 1

0 0

0

0 4

0

0 4*

0

2

0

2

0 1

0 0

0 1

0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 1

0

1 0

0 1

0 i

0 i*

0 im

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 1

0 0

0 0

0 0 5

0 1

0 0

2

8

8

10

3* 1

1

7

* In 1958 and 1963 one J a t and the Kayasth member of the P C C were elected from constituencies in Jodhpur District although each has been politically active in Nagaur District. Each has been elected to the Legislative Assembly from Nagaur three times and one was also elected an M P in 1957. Elections from three constituencies in 1956 were disputed and only five representatives were declared elected from Nagaur in 1963. b No figures available.

the same time that they were on the Pradesh Congress Committee, and twelve of these representatives were sitting MLAs. Since 1957 the Nagaur Jat group has also been continuously represented on the P C C Executive Committee and on the Pradesh Election Committee. Between 1958 and 1962 two members of the state-level Jat group, one from Nagaur, served as presidents of the Pradesh Congress Committee and another from Nagaur was a general secretary. There has also been considerable overlap between membership

FACTIONAL

CONFLICT

AND

POLITICAL

RECRUITMENT

297

in the Legislative Assembly and membership on the D C C Executive Committee. All Congress M L A s except one have been members of the D C C Executive, and all but two have been members during their tenure as an M L A . Furthermore, all Congress party candidates, with the exception of five, were members of the Executive at the time they were granted the party ticket, and of these five, three eventually became members of the Executive after their selection for the party ticket. T h e Jat factional coalition has been the only coalition to maintain major positions of power at the state and district level since 1952. T h e Jats have been well represented on the Congress ministries and have continually held important portfolios. Since 1952 at least one member of the Jat coalition at the state level has been a member of the ministry, and with the exception of a oneyear period the Nagaur Jat group has had at least one minister in the cabinet. Since 1954 the portfolios of Agriculture, Cooperatives, and Irrigation, all of which are important in a primarily agricultural state, and especially to increasingly dynamic peasant castes, have been in the hands of the Nagaur Jat leadership. Other portfolios of importance that have been controlled by Jats for considerable periods of time have been the Transport, Public Works, and Electrical portfolios. Furthermore, the speaker of the Legislative Assembly from 1957 to 1967 was Ram Niwas Mirdha, the son of the founder of the Marwar Kisan Sabha, who has been selected not by virtue of his caste but primarily because of the high esteem and respect which he commands from all quarters of the Legislative Assembly. T h e Jats have also been predominant in two other types of politically important institutions: (1) the cooperative movement; and (2) the institutions of Panchayati Raj. T h e Jats have controlled the State Cooperative Union since its creation in 1957, and a member of the Nagaur Jat group has continually held the position of general secretary. 4 T h i s institution serves as a general clearinghouse for 4. T h e Executive Committee has also been controlled by the Jat group. From 1957 to i960, three of the eleven members were Jat while eight of the eleven were considered members of the Jat group. From i960 to 1963, eight of twenty-three members of the Executive were Jats while fifteen of the total were considered to be in the Jat group. Currently ten of the twenty-

298

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN R A J A S T H A N

a number of different cooperatives in the state and offers avenues for employment as well as allocating loans to local cooperatives. The State Cooperative Bank in Nagaur District has also been controlled by the District Jat group. The creation of elected panchayats has offered new positions of prestige and power at the local level and has provided channels through which local Jat leaders can participate in the new political order. From 1953 to 1959 there were Tehsil Panchayats which had restricted powers but which nevertheless offered a new status resource at the local level. These panchayats were almost exclusively controlled by the Jats. In 1959, new institutions of Panchayati Raj were established creating a three-tiered structure of institutions from the village to the district level.8 The Jats have maintained a small majority in these institutions, and the competition between the Rajput and Jat groups has tended to intensify the cohesion of the latter at these local levels.8 The continual control over positions of power has distinguished the Jat from other political groups in Nagaur District and Jodhpur Division. The ability to distribute valued resources at the disposal of government has been important in maintaining the cohesion of the Jat group itself and in the attraction of other local political units. The sensitivity and responsiveness of the Jat elite to the interests and demands of the peasant castes has often resulted in accusations of "casteism" being leveled against it by opposing groups both within and outside the Congress party. Other three members are J a t and fifteen are considered to be in the Jat group. Members of the Jat group have continually held elected positions of leadership on the Executive. 5. Cf. Ralph H. Retzlaff, "Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan," Indian Journal of Public Administration, 6 (April-June i960), 141-158; and Iqbal Narain, "Democratic Decentralization and Rural Leadership in India: T h e Rajasthan Experiment," Asian Survey, 4 (August 1964), 1013-102«. 6. There are eleven Panchayat Samitis in Nagaur District each of which has an elected Chairman (Pradhan). Prior to the Panchayat elections in January 1965, there were five Jat, five Rajput, and one Mahajan Pradhans, the latter being a supporter of the J a t group at the district level. In the districtlevel organization (Zila Parishad) which has an elected chairman (Pramukh) the Jats had a majority and elected a Pramukh from among the co-opted members. T h e Pramukh and two of the Jat Pradhans were members of the DCC Executive Committee and one also served as president of the State Cooperative Bank, Nagaur District.

F A C T I O N A L C O N F L I C T AND P O L I T I C A L R E C R U I T M E N T

299

groups are also responsive to the demands of their supporters, but with the exception of a few cases, these supporters are not recruited from one caste. The creation of new local institutions has also contributed to the cohesion of the Jat group first by establishing a new situation in which conflict occurs between the Rajputs and Jats, and, secondly, by offering a channel of participation in the political process which carries with it considerable prestige and power and which has reduced the demands from within the group for positions in "higher" political bodies. CASTE AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: THE POLITICS OF TICKET ALLOCATION

One of the most important aspects of Congress politics has been the competition for the party ticket for the general elections. It is at this time that the divisions within the structure of political support within the Congress became most evident. This process, as has been true of conflict for control over the party apparatus, has entailed concerted efforts on the part of factions to mobilize new political resources to support their representatives for party tickets. There have been three distinct objects of mobilization involved in the politics of ticket allocation. First, candidates or factions attempt to extend the base of their support within their own caste. Second, attempts are made to attract and mobilize the support of those castes which may have participated in elections but have not developed autonomous political organizations or elites that have become involved in politics on a continuing basis. T h e third object involves those political groups which have become politically mobilized and have continuity and autonomy in the political process but which have not become a part of the Congress system.7 7. Although the elaborate apparatus and rules governing the allocation of tickets were followed in 1956-1957, the final decision as to whom the Pradesh Election Committee would recommend for Jodhpur Division was made at an informal meeting between the leaders of the Jat, Vyas, and Rajput groups in the Jodhpur area. There was considerable dispute, but a final list was agreed upon. After this list was submitted to the Central Election Committee, the Vyas group again attempted to change the list, and a few changes were made, but those in Nagaur District remained the same. Our immediate concern, however, is not primarily with how judgments were ultimately made, but with how factions and castes at the local level participated in the process of ticket allocation.

3°°

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

T h e process of ticket allocation in 1952 was not as elaborate as it became in 1957 1962, because the Kisan Sabha and the thenCongress leadership had agreed on a formula for selecting candidates. Because the areas of Lok Parishad activity and Jat predominance were different, there was little conflict over constituencies; therefore party tickets were largely assigned and not competed for. T h e factional coalitions and structures of political support which had developed between 1954 and 1957 became more crystallized in the competition for the party ticket prior to the 1957 elections and set the pattern for factional alignments in the Congress which has continued since. Each factional coalition put up at least one member for each constituency with the major leaders in each of the coalitions applying for a ticket from at least one constituency. In no case where more than one member of the same coalition applied for the same ticket, however, did this involve a conflict within the coalition. T h e negotiations for the ticket concern not only who the recipients will be but also from what constituency recipients will contest. Thus in several cases an aspirant has applied for the ticket for more than one constituency so that if there is considerable opposition at higher levels in the party to his contesting from one place he will have an alternative to "offer." Furthermore, if two representatives from the same faction or factional coalition have applied for the ticket for the same constituency and one is given the ticket for another, then there still remains a second applicant from the group to negotiate for the ticket from the first constituency. Sometimes dominant leaders have applied from more than one constituency not only for the purpose of having alternatives but also to demonstrate the wide base of public support which they enjoy. A major corrollary to this gambit has been to have several members of the same faction apply from the same constituency to demonstrate a wide base of support for the group, thus reducing the claim of the opposing faction for the ticket. This is sometimes followed by the withdrawal of some applicants from the competition and the transfer of their support to another aspirant giving more credence to the latter's claim to widespread support from local political netas. Another aspect of strategy has involved the use of caste and community. Dominant factions often set up a Scheduled Caste candi-

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

301

date not as a serious contender for the ticket for a general seat, but to indicate "support" from the Scheduled Castes in that area for their group. Yet another strategy has been to set up a candidate from the same caste as the dominant opposition aspirant thus reducing the implicit claim of the opponent to widespread support from within his own community. T h e assumption involved here is that if an applicant does not command considerable support from his own caste in the constituency, he is a political risk. This tactic has been employed most frequently by the Jat coalition, the reverse not being possible to members of the Vyas coalition, who have never been able to attract support within the Jat caste. TABLE

65

COMPOSITION B Y C A S T E AND FACTION OF APPLICANTS FOR THE CONGRESS P A R T Y TICKETS IN N A O A U R DISTRICT IN THE SECOND G E N E R A L ELECTIONS

Vyas Group Caste

Core

Aligned

Brahman Jat Kayasth Mahajan Muslim Scheduled Caste

4 0 0 1 0 0 5

1 0 0 4 6

N

=

2

'3

Mirdha Group Core 0 11 0 0 0 0 11

Aligned

Total

5 0 1

10

2

1 4 13

11 1 7 7 6 42

T h e caste of applicants for the Congress party tickets in 1957 largely reflected the caste composition of each of the factional coalitions in the district Congress organization. 8 T h e majority of applicants from the Vyas coalition were from the ritually elite urban castes. T h e central core of the faction were primarily Brahman, and all had entered politics prior to independence and had been 8. Although forty-two persons submitted applications for Congress party tickets for Nagaur District, several were disqualified because of deadlines, failure to pay application fees, etc. There were, therefore, only thirty-one applicants accepted as official by the PCC and the District Observer. For purposes herein, however, all applications are relevant because they also are involved in the configuration of factions and patterns of political support in the district party organization.

302

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN R A J A S T H A N

involved in the Lok Parishad movement. 9 Those who were aligned had all entered politics after independence. All eighteen applicants from the Vyas group were from urban areas. The composition of the Jat group was quite different. First, Jats alone formed the central nexus of those who applied from this group. The "aligned" groups were affiliated in two different ways. Some were directly linked to the Jat group at the constituency level where mutual support was rendered in political conflicts at that level. In other cases, urban factions were loosely linked with a major non-Jat leader of the coalition who, while he was not part of the Jat support structure, was a part of the decision-making elite in the Jat group both at the state and district levels. The applicants who were affiliates of the Jat faction were all from urban areas, while the Jats were all from rural areas.10 The extension of support for applicants in the ticket allocation process followed the organization of factions. 11 In only one case did members of the Jat group support an affiliate of the Vyas group, and in no case did members of the Vyas group support applicants from the Jat group. Furthermore, this process involved attempts on the part of applicants and factions to extend their base of support and involved persons and groups which were not officially affiliated with the Congress party. 12 9. The core includes those who work together plotting strategy and who have exhibited a high degree of cohesion. The core, together with those aligned, constitute the respective factional coalitions at the district level. The Kayasth member of the Jat coalition is not considered a part of the core since he has his own supporters some of whom are in conflict with the Jats at lower levels and in other districts of Jodhpur Division. 10. Many of the Jat applicants, however, were advocates and lived in urban areas but considered themselves to be rural men and were so considered by local members of their caste. These included the four Jats who were subsequently selected for the ticket and elected. 1 1 . Each aspirant for a Congrss party ticket must submit an application to the PCC which includes biographical information, data concerning party work and public service, and the signatures of at least two party members who are in his support. Usually there are many more. District observers, as noted in Chapter 6, are subsequently appointed by the PCC to every district and they try to determine the political potentiality of each aspirant. Supporters as defined here are those who extend their written support for particular candidates to the Pradesh Congress Committee. is. The district observer and others involved in the allocation of tickets have experienced difficulty in distinguishing between Congressmen and non-

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL R E C R U I T M E N T TABLE

gOg

66

CASTE COMPOSITION B Y CONSTITUENCY OF SUPPORTERS FOR APPLICANTS FOR THE CONGRESS P A R T Y TICKETS FOR THE SECOND G E N E R A L

Constituency

Brahman

Jat

Mahajan

Muslim

Rajput

i 2 3 4 5 6

12 11 '3 i 6 i

11 12 21 22 29 9

9 4 '3 o i 0

3 7 i 0 2 0

0 o 4 0 0 0

8

5 49

t> 110

3 30

'4 27

4

r N

=

ELECTIONS

Scheduled Caste 17 '7 8 0 0

Total

3

52 5« 60 23 38 •3

2 47

30 267

: The caste of eleven supporters is not known. * The candidacy of this constituency was arranged without contest.

NOTE

There was considerable uneveness in the extent of participation by constituency and by caste. The highest incidence of participation occurred in those constituencies in which there were competing urban groups and where there had been intense conflict over control of the Tehsil Congress Committees. These were also the same constituencies which had the largest number of representatives on the District Congress Committee. Thus those areas which have had the most intense conflict among groups have also had the highest degree of activity in the Congress party. This proposition is also substantiated by competition among different caste groups. In those constituencies where participation by caste in competition for the party ticket was highest, there were competing groups from the same caste supporting different applicants for the party ticket. The highest degree of Jat participation occurred in the constituency in which the Jat caste was split between the local group, which controlled the Tehsil Panchayat and the Tehsil Congress Committee, and the Jat MLAs' group, which consisted almost entirely of Congressmen, and even when distinctions can be made, the support of nonCongressmen is not always ignored, particularly when they are prominent local persons or hold positions in panchayats and local voluntary groups such as religious and caste associations.

3°4

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN RAJASTHAN

"outsiders," although the group was primarily Jat in composition. T h e M L A had not been an integral part of the Kisan

Sabha

move-

ment and was not accepted as a districtwide Jat leader by the Jat community, but he was supported by the dominant Jat leadership in the district because of his education and political acumen. By 1957 he had also developed a considerable base of support through his position as president of the State Cooperative Bank, Nagaur, and through his position and activity in the cooperative movement in the district. 13 T h e participation of Scheduled Castes and Muslims was limited to four different constituencies. 14 Muslims focused their efforts on Constituency 8, which included the largest proportion of Muslims of any constituency in the district. Four Muslims applied for the ticket from this constituency, which was not indicative of intracommunity conflict but was rather a strategic move to indicate the widespread participation of Muslims in the Congress party and their extensive support for the party ticket. Prior to 1957 no faction had made a serious effort to co-opt Scheduled Castes into the Congress organization; nor had there been any demand from within these castes for more extensive political participation. In 1957, however, a reserved seat was estab13. One of the major complaints of the local Jat leaders was that this M L A had established a parallel Congress organization in this constituency area in order to develop a more personal base of political support. This conflict was resolved by the dominant Jat leader in the district when assurances were allegedly given that the local group would continue in positions of power in tehsil-level organizations and that punitive action would not be taken against them directly nor in the form of withheld benefits at the disposal of the MLA. 14. T h e highest number of caste and religious associations which participated in the supportive process were from among Scheduled Castes and the Muslim community, although there were also some caste associations from among the Mahajans and Brahmans. These were urban groups and only supported candidates from urban areas. Secondly, although organizations were part of larger statewide organizations, all participated on the basis of local town or tehsil units. In several cases local units of one of these associations, which represented a Scheduled Caste, opposed one another for the ticket for the reserved seat. T h e highest incidence of participation of these primordial groups was precisely in those constituencies in which competition between urban groups was most intense, including the double member constituency, in which Scheduled Castes were for the first time competing for a ticket, and in Constituency 5.

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

305

lished in Nagaur District by the merger of Constituencies 1 and 2 into a double-member constituency. Because the competition for the two seats was interlinked, it extended the conflict between the Jat and Vyas elites into the Scheduled Castes. Each faction supported a candidate for both the general and reserved seats in this new constituency. The competition for the reserved seat involved the greatest concentration of effort on the part of members of the Scheduled Castes, none of whom led or constituted an autonomous political group but rather all of whom rested their power in the Congress on the faction which had co-opted them into the Congress system and with which they were aligned. 15 The person who was eventually given the ticket, and who was subsequently elected, had not been active in politics prior to the fall of 1956, when he was coopted into the Jat group and became a member of the Congress party. He was eventually selected and maintained as the lone Scheduled Caste representative on the DCC Executive Committee. In these negotiations for the Congress party ticket, however, support for particular applicants was not extended exclusively on a caste basis, but rather the majority (56 percent) of support extended to the various applicants was received from castes other than their own. Brahman, Mahajan, Scheduled Caste, and "other" caste aspirants received respectively 81 percent, 82 percent, 65 percent, and 100 percent of their support from castes other than their own. Furthermore, with the exception of Jats, the largest share of support "units" went to aspirants whose caste was different from that of the supporters. Eighty-eight percent of Brahman support units went to non-Brahmans, 57 percent of Mahajans supported non-Mahajans, 52 percent of Muslims supported non-Muslims, and 60 percent of Scheduled Castes extended their support to aspirants whose caste carried clean ritual status. The dispersion of caste support was most noticeable among as15. It should be emphasized that while at this juncture Scheduled Caste representatives were dependent upon existing factions who could give them access, the fact of access has enabled these new activists to establish a more or less autonomous base of support which in turn has demanded more responsiveness and sensitivity on the part of the dominant elites to maintain or bargain for that support. Co-optation has been an important pattern of political mobilization among the various Scheduled Castes in other parts of Rajasthan as well.

3°6

THE

CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

pirants from urban castes. Although the central core of urban factions has been restricted largely to a single caste, these groups have continually attempted to widen the support base of their factions by attracting affiliates from other castes. This has been extremely important in the general elections where the area of conflict is considerably wider than in elections to local bodies, which have constituted the primary impetus in the rise of new urban groups. TABLE 67 COMPOSITION OF S U P P O R T B Y C A S T E FOR A P P L I C A N T S FOR CONGRESS T I C K E T S IN N A G A U R D I S T R I C T FOR T H E SECOND G E N E R A L

PARTY

ELECTIONS

Caste of Supporters Caste of Applicants Brahman Jat Mahajan Muslim Scheduled Caste Other N

= NOTE

Brahman

Jat

Mahajan

Muslim

Scheduled Caste

6 4

7 66

3

7

2

2

6 '3

18

3 0 27

21

12

0

i

7 0 «3 i

'3 5 49

11 13 no

9 0 3°

Rajput

Total

0

0 0 4 0

30 74 74 >5

19 i 47

0 0 4

55 19 267

: The caste of eleven supporters is unknown.

The highest degree of cohesiveness in the extension and receipt of support occurred in the case of Jats and Muslims. The majority of support (89 percent) for Jat aspirants came from the Jat caste, while 61 percent of the total number of Jats in the supportive process extended their support to Jat aspirants and only 39 percent to non-Jats. This, however, is not so much an indication of purposeful exclusiveness on the part of Jats and is not indicative of anti-Jat bias among other castes. The quest for support results from canvassing, the extension of support resting more upon the volition and action of the supported than upon that of the supporters. The concentration of Jat support for Jat applicants is also indicative of the cohesion which has characterized the Jat community in politics. The case of Muslim participation in the politics of ticket allocation is somewhat different and has been shaped to a large extent by

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL R E C R U I T M E N T

307

the peculiar relationship of the Muslim community to politics in general and to the Congress party in particular. T h e Muslims have not played an active role in the Congress organization although their political affinities and electoral support have been for the Congress. T h e Muslims have instead rested their claims for the Congress ticket largely on the standing policy of the party that Muslims be allotted tickets in areas where their numbers are politically significant. This standing assurance of the allocation of tickets has tended to militate against Muslims actively organizing within the Congress to pursue positions of power, and the promise of positive gain has been one reason for their not becoming part of the opposition. Another factor discouraging the participation of Muslims in politics is the specter of the communalist image, politically permissible, but not approved with respect to caste, but much less permissible with respect to religion. T h e competition for the Congress ticket has involved a complex set of relationships between castes and political groups. Although most political factions consist primarily of members from a single caste, these different political groups have been affiliated in two competing factional coalitions within each of which mutual support is extended in the pursuit of political goals. Political factions and the core of factional coalitions are recruited from a single caste or are marked by close affective ties which often reach back into the preindependence movement. In each case, the internal organization of the faction has centered around a dominant leader and a few close associates. In the Jat faction this central figure was initially Baldev Ram Mirdha, whose mantle was inherited by Nathu Ram Mirdha. The dominant leader in the opposition faction was Jai Narain Vyas, whose center of activity was in Jodhpur City. With the death of Vyas, however, this coalition has eroded. Each of these factional coalitions has involved a multicaste base of political support from the tehsil-constituency level through the state level. It should be emphasized that in the politics of ticket allocation the pattern of support has not followed strict caste lines but the support from particular castes has often been dispersed. Furthermore, this multicaste base of political action and support has involved not only political groups which have previously been mo-

3°8

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

bilized into the political process, but political conflict itself has encouraged the search for wider bases of support. This has entailed appeals not only to the caste of particular leaders and groups but to other castes as well. The multicaste base of support has been most characteristic of urban castes, some of which have been split into competing groups and all of which constitute a minority of the total electorate—a condition which has been particularly conducive to lateral association with other castes. There is also a direct relationship between the caste basis of political groups and levels of political organization. T h e "lower" the level of politics, the greater the probability that groups will have a restricted base of social recruitment. Conversely, the "higher" the level of politics, the greater the probability that membership in political groups will be recruited from a number of castes. This is not to imply that caste becomes less important in political life from the district level on up, but that political conflict has provided a new type of social activity which did not exist in the traditional social order and which is conducive to intercaste alignment and cooperation. Finally there is a pattern of interlevel "political linkages" which connect political groups from lower levels of political organization up to the state level. At each successively higher level, these coalitions involve a larger number of political groups which nucleate around a dominant faction or political leader and these groups "radiate out" in varying degrees of intensity and commitment. Thus the dominant elite must continually be responsive to the demands of subordinate groups since at each level, particularly at the regional and state levels, there are other elites which compete for their allegiance and support. The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that conflict over positions of power in the Congress organization and in local public institutions has been a primary vehicle for the mobilization of new political resources. This competition between factions has also been conducive to the development and maintenance of channels of political access within the Congress system. T h e absence of an integrated elite structure during the early years has made the Congress system more "absorptive" of new elites, and this has encouraged a change in the generation of political leadership at the local level just as it did at the state level. Elites have attempted to expand

FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL R E C R U I T M E N T

309

their structure of political support by grants of representation, and the Jat elite in particular has rotated positions of political prestige to maintain the cohesion and widen the scope of their factional coalition. Particular elites or politicians have recruited their basic political support from their caste. This channel of mobilization was of particular importance in the rise of the Jats. Secondly, existing leaders and elites have vied for the support of groups which are already a part of the Congress system and in a few cases have attracted the support of political groups outside the party. Thirdly, and of crucial importance, political groups have attempted to expand their base of support through the mobilization of "new" castes into the Congress system through the co-optation of existing caste leaders or by "creating" new leaders by the very act of co-optation and the grant of political access. This process has resulted not only from conflict between the two dominant factional coalitions at the district level but also from conflict between local groups in municipal and tehsil-level public and party institutions. It should be noted that participation in the Congress has been highest in those areas where factional conflict has been most intense. T h e structure and organization of this factional system has also been conducive to the continuity and institutionalization of the Congress party in Nagaur District. First of all, with the exception of the Jat faction, caste-based political units have existed only at the municipal and tehsil levels. At the district, divisional, and state levels (as we saw in Chapter 8) this field of political units has been divided into two factional coalitions each of which has had continuity in the political process and each of which includes a number of subordinate units from different castes. These have extended mutual support in conflict with units from the opposing coalition in elections to positions on party committees and to official posts on these committees, in the allocation of party tickets for the general elections, and in the general elections themselves. Although factional units at the lower levels of political organization have been recruited from a single caste and tend to cluster around a leader or small group of leaders from that same caste, no caste has maintained complete cohesion in politics, although the Jats, until the recent fourth General Elections, have maintained greater cohesion than others.

3io

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

Several factors have been conducive to caste fragmentation and fission in political organization. One form stems from the transfer of conflict within traditional caste elites into contemporary politics. Another type has resulted from the rise of new political aspirants from within a caste, frequently resulting in the creation of political cleavages within that community. Thirdly, there has been considerable segmentation by geographical area. At each succeedingly higher level of political organization, therefore, subordinate units have been organized into mutually exclusive support groups and the higher the level of political organization, the wider the caste base of political support. Furthermore, political groups at each of these levels of politics are locally perceived as being associated with one of these coalitions, and new leaders and groups which become a part of the Congress are co-opted into this larger factional system. This system of mutually exclusive alliances has afforded connecting links between all levels of political organization and this has been a critical factor in the development and maintenance of "vertical" cohesion within the Congress system. Finally, we have shown that the segmentary character of the Congress system has been conducive to the institutionalization of democratic politics. Major factions and elites must bargain for continued and increased political support and be responsive to the demands of those who are, or who would be, their supporters. Democratic politics has created a new kind of social endeavor which places a premium on intercaste cooperation as well as intracaste cohesion at the local level. With the rise of new generations of political aspirants and increased demands for political involvement and participation, the former will increasingly replace the latter in the successful prosecution of the political game.

Chapter

ii

CONCLUSION: NOTES PROPOSITIONS

AND

change in Rajasthan since independence has involved the transformation of the rules governing public decision-making, patterns of elite recruitment, and the constitution of the political community in both form and orientation. A new political community was formed from among the large number of princely states which prior to that time had known more conflict than cooperation. Patterns of linkage between these regions, while they did exist among the major ruling and trading families, did not include extensive communication or the sharing of common values on an intensive scale. The existence of distinct cultures bears witness to this pattern of social containment. There was also an immediate change in the structure of formal political authority—a change from a traditional structure of authority legitimated by sacral ties to a democratic authority resting upon the assumptions of political liberalism. It did not involve the slow erosion of traditional authority through incremental extensions of public participation in the making of law. There was limited public preparation and education in the procedures of the new democratic political format. Furthermore, the old order did not fall before a cohesive mass movement led by revolutionary zealots. In fact the leaders of the movements of political protest that developed under the ancien régimes advocated the retention of traditional authority symbols in a reconstituted political order—representative government under the aegis of the maharaja. Nor was there a concerted effort on the part of traditional rulers and their more ardent advocates for the retention of the traditional order. Rather there was peaceful consent, sometimes grudgingly given, for the abolition of old political communities and the creation of a new, and for the replacePOLITICAL

312

THE

CONGRESS P A R T Y I N

RAJASTHAN

ment of traditional authority by a constitutional democratic format. T h e Congress party and the political movements from which it was formed have been central agents in this great political transformation. FROM COMMUNITY OF PROTEST TO POLITICAL PARTY: PATTERNS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CHANGE

The Congress party in Rajasthan differs in several important respects from its counterparts in those states which formerly constituted British India: it differs in terms of the conditions of its creation, the nature of the experiences of its early managers, and in its capacity to adapt. Unlike the Congress in the British provinces, the party in Rajasthan was created by a political contract between various organizations of political protest active in the traditional states of Rajputana. Each of these organizations had autonomous origins, with separate elites, separate bodies of political workers and bases of political recruitment, and had shared different sets of political experiences. There were few efforts to engage in joint planning of political protest in the various states. In addressing the directions and quality of institutional change, it is useful to review the important parameters and patterns of preindependence political mobilization and recruitment and to relate these to subsequent developments in the Rajasthan Congress. The organization of political groups within the community of political protest and within the Congress system was highly segmented. At the time of independence factions were divided by region. By the time of the integration of the Rajputana states, no political group had achieved a base of support that extended beyond the territorial confines of its state. Within each of the old states there were also other political cleavages, primarily induced by differences in goals of the urban and rural interests. In some cases these rural groups were autonomous, while in others they constituted distinct factions within the larger urban-led organization. Among some urban groups there were also divisions between those who drew their immediate support from the capital cities and other groups recruited from rural towns. Cleavages also developed among both urban and rural elites. With the introduction of elections in local public bodies, such as municipalities, divisions in

CONCLUSION: NOTES AND PROPOSITIONS

these protest organizations tended to develop and usually broke down on the basis of caste. The organization of power within the Rajasthan Congress at the time of its creation reflected this pattern of segmentation. No single leader or cohesive elite was able to monopolize the positions of power within the party. Some leaders were more widely known and their reputations as founders of protest movements and their commitment and sacrifice for independence were more pronounced and respected than others. No leader, however, enjoyed support beyond the state in which his political activity had been centered. The creation of the Rajasthan Congress was a contract between collegial leaders of these regional organizations, and this fact has inhibited the rise of a single dominant and cohesive political elite within the Congress party. Political organization and competition since independence has centered around the structure of political authority in the larger political system and within the party organization. The ultimate objective of competition in the Congress has been to establish control over the state ministry or to win strategic positions of authority within the party organization. Organizational position has assisted effective participation in the selection of party candidates for elections and in the acquisition and distribution of election funds, without which the potential for exercising influence in the selection of the party's legislative leadership is limited. The organization of power within the Congress party organization has been both pyramidal and segmentary. Factions at each level of political organization have tended to stay relatively autonomous, but the relationships which prevailed at the time of founding have been changed by the formal organization of authority in the new political order. The field of political groups developed into factional coalitions centered around a dominant leader who enjoyed a sizable and dependable base of autonomous political support. The leaders of state-level factions have had to create and manage a coalition of factions in which support has been reciprocal. The dominant leader of the coalition has been expected by those within his coalition to be responsive to their aspirations for political position or gain. Leaders, on the other hand, have expected support in crisis situations in return for the

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

positions and benefits which they distribute. Factional coalitions are contracts of mutual benefit and can be broken by either supporter or supported when benefits appear more attractive through an alternative alignment, although these coalitions have usually existed over a fairly long period of time with marginal adjustments. Factional leaders at each level of political organization have also continually attempted to expand their structure of support. This has given rise to a continually competitive situation within the Congress system and has encouraged the maintenance of a segmentary configuration of power within the party in form as it has also given rise to an expanded social base of factional membership. It is within this framework that the process of institutionalization can be most clearly understood. T h e Rajasthan Congress from the time of its creation has been an adaptive organization. This has not been a matter of happenstance; it has been largely a matter of choice. While the first leaders of the party were concerned with maintaining organizational integrity, they were also consciously oriented toward attracting the political favor of new social clienteles. This was particularly true when the party prepared to face the newly created electorate. The accommodations reached affected the composition of the party in historic ways. T h e years since independence, for example, have witnessed a dramatic democratization of the Congress elite in terms of social representation. Rather than remaining an organization restricted in membership largely to elite Hindu castes from urban areas, the party has absorbed a new configuration of castes mainly from the middle and lower reaches of the stratification system. This, however, has varied from region to region; the party tends to be least competitive in those areas where mobility is most restricted. Important in this change is the type of caste group that achieved entry. Prior to the first General Elections, members of the Marwar Kisan Sabha, the most important peasant organization in the western region of the state, were absorbed into the party. T h e representation of various peasant castes in both state- and district-level committees has since become considerable. Critically important, too, was the decision to admit into the party members of the traditional ruling elite, the Rajputs, whose representatives presented

CONCLUSION:

NOTES AND

PROPOSITIONS

the Congress with its most powerful opposition in the first elections. T h i s accommodation has not only been instrumental in the democratization of the traditional landed aristocracy but has also served to divide this group politically and to inhibit the rise of a united front of Rajput chiefs. While participation in the party organization has not been extensive among Scheduled Castes and Tribes, representatives of these groups have enjoyed access through the legislative party, because the recent recruits were of higher educational achievement and less dependent upon high-caste patrons than their forefathers. T h e Congress by affording expanded representation to a larger number of caste groups has served as an important institutional linkage in Rajasthan society. It is one of the few institutions that has brought together in a fairly close political relationship a number of exclusive and self-contained primordial groups which previously had little in common. T h e Congress constitutes a qualitatively new social institution in Rajasthan society and focuses upon cooperative effort for common purposes. This integrative function is both socially and politically significant. It has tended to make political conflict in the larger polity more plural and has inhibited the development of political organizations and the definition of conflict engagements on the basis of major social divisions. T h i s pattern of representation has affirmed the autonomy of the Congress from restricted caste and class interests as well. T h e r e has been recruitment of new political generations within the Rajasthan Congress, but the competitive nature of the Congress elite structure has inhibited the rise of parties or groups within the Congress based upon time of recruitment into active politics. Rather, new political recruits have been inducted into Congress politics primarily through the factional system. As a result of this competitive system they have enjoyed considerable political mobility. Mobility, however, has been primarily vertical rather than lateral, new elite entrants having customarily served in lower-level party units before ascending to higher ones. Such participation has been conducive to the development of organizational commitment and to the creation of cooperative bonds. T h e Congress elite has also been progressively drawn from small towns and rural areas. While capital cities constituted the center

3i6

T H E CONGRESS P A R T Y IN

RAJASTHAN

of political communication and conflict prior to independence, it is now the rural town which serves as a communications bridge between the village and the larger urban area, whether it be a former capital city or the administrative headquarters of a district. Leaders of dominant state factional coalitions since the mid1950s have almost all been recruited from small towns and villages. Party factions, like the larger system of which they are a part, have increasingly cut across important social and political categories. This configuration of lines of cleavage has inhibited conflict within the Congress system from being joined on the basis of primordial groups. Through coalition and co-optation the dominant regional factions which prevailed at independence have become regionally composite coalitions drawing support from several areas of the state. Increasingly these coalitions have been composed of a plurality of castes and in some cases have brought Rajput and Jat into common political effort. The competitive system within the Congress has thus induced cleavages within these formerly corporate social groups. Intraparty competition has encouraged the development of a new and complex web of affiliations that has served an integrative function in Rajasthan politics. It is important to note that the adaptation of the Rajasthan Congress has not been accomplished through the co-optation of pliant and docile groups into visible, but ineffective, positions within the party, with the satisfaction of demands and expectations being realized through the value of institutional association and paternal calculations in the distribution of largesse. Demands for participation have been more assertive; existing elites at successive points in time have been more responsive. Access to strategic positions in the party has been open and change in incumbencies has been high. This pattern of mobility has been both intergenerational and intragenerational. There has been, for example, a progressive turnover of top party personnel. Each new Pradesh Congress Committee has included a majority of members who have not previously been members of the committee. Within that group which had previously served on the state committee, the proportion of those who had been members several times previously has progressively decreased. Furthermore, the strategic positions within the state committee—the presidency and the execu-

CONCLUSION:

NOTES AND

PROPOSITIONS

317

tive committee—have not been monopolized by the same incumbents nor by their political retainers but have been controlled by different men with more or less autonomous bases of political support. Ministerial posts have likewise not been the monopoly of a self-appointed or closed group but have been subject to the same consequences of intraparty competition. T h e changes which have taken place through elections to these state-level organizational positions together with the vagaries of public elections which have frequently resulted in the defeat of important Congress leaders have resulted in the expectation of upward as well as the acceptance of downward mobility in the Congress system. Political parties must not only recruit in order to survive, they must recruit in a manner that finds approval among their mass clienteles. There must also be provision for institutional mobility, particularly under conditions of rapid political mobilization. Institutions must also have the capacity for selecting their managers. Succession is a critical test of organizational cohesion and commitment. Demands for mobility within the Rajasthan Congress have given rise to intense contests for control of the legislative party and the party organization. There have been three types of succession contests: (1) successful no-confidence motions brought against the incumbent leadership within the Congress Legislative Party; (2) unsuccessful contests against the incumbent party leadership; and (3) the succession by consensus that occurred after the defeat of the "accepted" leader, Jai Narain Vyas, in the first General Elections. There have been two successful attempts to oust the incumbent leadership of the party organization and the ministry. T h e first, which occurred shortly after the integration of the Rajputana states, concerned the role of the state Congress and the locus of political responsibility during the interim before the first General Elections. T h i s question found majority opinion in the Pradesh Congress Committee in conflict with that of the national party leadership, particularly Sardar Patel. While the incumbent president of the P C C was defeated in a confidence motion and his position assumed by the leader of the "opposition," the incumbent chief minister continued until the death of Patel. T h e will of the state party, nevertheless, eventually prevailed. Important in the inspiration of that will was a conception of the party

3

i8

THE

CONGRESS

PARTY

IN

RAJASTHAN

as the embodiment of the public interest. Those unseated during this succession crisis continued in the party. Several ministers in the Shastri cabinet and other members of that faction received Congress tickets for the 1952 elections. T h e second successfully contested succession occurred in 1954 but was characterized not so much by differences over conception of party role and public responsibility as it was charged by political appetite, differences over leadership style, and the social distribution of public benefits. T h e challenge to the incumbent leadership was in large part a populist demand for increased political responsiveness instead of a continuation of the Vyas style of "rationallegal" politics—clear-cut cases matched with clear-cut rules defined in a universal sense. T h i s succession, while it marked a change in leadership in terms of political generation, also marked the fruition of peasant rebellion within the party. It marked the success of the Green Revolution within the Rajasthan Congress. In these, as well as in the unsuccessful succession contests, the Congress enjoyed a high level of obligation from its members. After each succession crisis and test those defeated remained in the party. Furthermore, in the case of each succession, defeated leaders have publically affirmed their party commitment. Until the eve of the 1967 elections, no major state or district leader left the party, although factional leaders have in a number of cases opposed their intraparty rivals in the general elections. With the defections of 1966, large proportions of the factions led by each of the dissident leaders stayed within the party. F A C T I O N A L C O N F L I C T AND CHANGE: C O M P L E X I T Y

AND

COHESION IN T H E CONGRESS SYSTEM

T h e character and change of the Congress system which we have just described has been in large part a function of factional competition and the outcomes of conflict at successive points in time. Political conflict has not only been important with respect to change in the Congress party itself but also with respect to its adaptation to its political environment. T o o the complexity of intraparty coalitions has increasingly reduced the autonomy and the scope of discretion of faction leaders. T h e segmentary organization of power within the Congress has

CONCLUSION:

NOTES AND PROPOSITIONS

3»9

tended to encourage continual competition for political support. This is directed toward all aspects of a group's environment. It is directed first of all toward those structures of support that are already mobilized and active within a particular area of conflict. It is also relevant with respect to potential resources either mobilized or unmobilized. Thus factional competition has been conducive to the recruitment of new political resources into the Congress system. These new resources have come from a variety of different social and political groups, as we have noted above, and have been recruited primarily by factions. Although new leaders and groups are supported by and tend to become associated with a particular faction, association can change and this is more likely to happen in the case of relatively new political recruits with an autonomous clientele than it is with either the old units of the institution or those new units that owe their political position in some measure to that center of power by which they were co-opted. Political recruitment tends to be greatest in those areas in which factional competition has been most intense. Furthermore, the greater the intensity of factional competition the greater the probability that the representation of social groups will be dispersed. We have noted that factional competition has been conducive to increased political responsiveness on the part of leaders of factions. This has been true of factions at all levels of political organization. T h e authority of factional leadership has increasingly become dependent upon political performance and the capacity to provide for the political needs and to satisfy the political aspirations of those upon whom the leader is dependent for his support. This is a reciprocal relationship. T h e dominant leader has need of political support in order to satisfy his own aspirations for a political career and to maintain the cohesion of his immediate support base. By virtue of his control over desired values and resources, whether they be symbolic, material, or positions of prestige and power, the leader is enabled and is expected to satisfy the needs and aspirations of those with whom he is aligned. This has been one of the most important factors in the rise and predominance of political managers in the Congress party since independence. T h e successful political leader is not necessarily one who is loved and admired but rather is one competent in the ac-

320

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

commodation of interests and in the provision of political and material satisfaction to those upon whom he does, or upon whom he would hope to, base his support. The master political strategist, the political professional, is the model political leader in the contemporary Rajasthan Congress. Factional competition has also served to maintain open channels of political mobility. This characteristic has been dependent upon and has been encouraged by the segmentary organization of power within the party. Mobility in such a competitive system, however, becomes a necessity given certain kinds of political conditions. First of all, political competitors in larger areas of conflict have sought support not only from among relatively autonomous groups at that level of the political arena, but have also sought support of groups that are active at lower levels of political organization. Thus minority factions in district and local party organizations and public institutions have enjoyed "protection" through the channels of access and mobility which the system of conflict has tended to provide. The leaders of autonomous factions at the local level are able to negotiate with leaders at higher levels of political organization, and the fact of bargaining and political responsiveness has resulted in mobility within the system. Furthermore, in those regions where factional conflict may not be intense and where, as in Udaipur Division, it has been regulated within the confines of the chief minister's omnibus coalition, the dominant leader must arrange mobility to maintain the cohesion of the faction internally. More importantly he must do so to keep new political aspirants and groups from seeking access through alternative party institutions. This may result in the reduced influence of the factional leadership in the Congress party from that region by virtue of reduced representation in the Congress Legislative Party as a result of electoral defeats. The lessons of the Vyas faction's experience in the first General Elections have not been lost on other factions and new recruits in the party. The legitimacy of opposition in the Rajasthan Congress has been encouraged by the necessity of continued participation of opposition factions at the state level to maintain the political effectiveness and viability of the larger institution in electoral politics. Opposition becomes more significant within a given institu-

CONCLUSION:

NOTES AND PROPOSITIONS

321

tion when it rests upon more or less autonomous bases of political support. It may be proposed that internal opposition tends to gain legitimacy when it rests on independent and enduring bases of support which cannot be destroyed or repressed without seriously weakening the institution itself. Factional competition and political bargaining have served a function of political communication within the Congress and also between the Congress and its larger political environment. New political groups tend to seek political access first through the Congress system. Such groups make demands of both an intermediate and ultimate nature—intermediate in the sense that they include aspirations for control over positions of power or guaranteed access to them, and ultimate in the sense that there is a desire to shape public policy in a particular way. The competitive system thus encourages the transmission of political messages not only from lower to higher echelons of the party organization but also from opposition parties and groups to the ruling party. The system of competition and segmentation which we have described has given rise to the integration of political groups and the creation of both vertical and horizontal linkages within the Congress party organization. This has been encouraged by the segmentary organization of political power at given points in time, but it has also been encouraged by the competition and political responsiveness which the quest for political influence and control has made mandatory. Thus at each successively lower level of political organization political groups have tended to become associated with dominant factional leaders and coalitions at higher levels to maintain and expand their political position at their own lower levels of political organization as well as to enhance their political mobility and access in larger conflict arenas. Lateral association has been important both with respect to the alliances forged between important political peers at each level of conflict as well as the types of associations which have connected the Congress system with its political environment. Elite recruitment within the party, however, has rested principally on vertical mobility. The political connections between the Congress and other parties have been the various factions within the Congress system. This web of associations has encouraged a cooperative posture between the

322

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

Congress system and its political environment by virtue of the access which important opposition political groups have enjoyed; it has also encouraged division within the organized opposition to the Congress and the pluralization of social conflict. This characteristic of the factional system, however, has been and will continue to be tested by the results of the fourth General Elections where the opposition has tended to break those lateral ties with the Congress. The development of a more cohesive opposition would place a higher premium on containing conflict within the Congress system and would reduce the effectiveness of working on the margins of the system to influence the organization of power within the party. This would perhaps be conducive to the erosion of groups at the periphery of the Congress system. The possibility of mobility and access has been conducive to the maintenance of the political integration of the Congress. Unless restrictions on mobility appear intolerable, permanent fission does not offer opportunities for increased mobility and control. For example, when the Rajasthan Congress has enjoyed only a small majority in the Legislative Assembly, defection did not offer the likelihood of a new and more viable party or governing coalition being constituted. It should be noted that the factional system has increased the structural complexity of the party organization. The Congress, however, does not have a set of formal and vital organizational appendages that penetrate specific social groups and thus provide for persistent support. Most linkages have been informal ones defined by the factional system. For example, several Congress leaders have served as trade-union leaders, but unions are politically significant in only a few urban centers. Those who do have such contacts are not professional union workers; they have neither come up through the union ranks nor have spent much time in union activities. While a Congress youth organization exists, it has had a most uninspired existence in Rajasthan. While caste associations initially provided a link between the party and important social groups, these associations have diminished in importance as party representatives from those groups have provided a more effective functional substitute. Congress party leaders are active, however, in social welfare or-

CONCLUSION:

NOTES AND

PROPOSITIONS

323

ganizations among the depressed castes, in cooperative societies, and in the institutions of Panchayati Raj, the former being largely the domain of older political generations while the latter two are largely the domain of later generations. T h e implications of this pattern of association are important. With the passing of old leaders, the customary access of the Congress to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes will become increasingly closed. Furthermore, new and more assertive leaders from among these groups will no doubt arise and will be less responsive to the paternal cues that have customarily emanated from well-intentioned, high-caste patrons. T h e intense activity within cooperatives and panchayats may encourage the increased use of state benefits for purposes of political mobilization. While this complex of environmental linkages has been important in the mobilization and maintenance of political support, the complexity of the factional system within the party has contributed most significantly to party cohesion. It should be noted that because of institutionalized channels of access provided by the segmentary organization of power within the Congress system, the departure of a faction or factional coalition may result in its demise, since some members of the coalition may balk at departure for affective reasons or would expect and be offered enhanced position in the governing coalition. T h e more complex the factional system, the less impact the defection of any single faction has on the viability of the whole. T h e decision of a leader of a coalition to opt out of the system, therefore, entails the distinct possibility of being a leader with limited followers. This was in fact the case with the fission of two important factions on the eve of the fourth General Elections. T h e Jat faction led by Kumbharam Arya was split by this decision, and a major segment of this coalition remained in the Congress party. T h e fragmented Rajput group was likewise split with the decision of its nominal leader, Maharaja Harish Chandra, to leave the party and unite in opposition with his old Jat rival. W e should emphasize that institutional persistence to one point in time does not insure continuance, although the probability of continuance may increase with length of existence. It is important that we examine the dysfunctional consequences of organizational

324

T H E CONGRESS PARTY IN RAJASTHAN

behavior both for the cohesion of the institution as well as for the quality of its environment. In the case of political parties, environmental satisfaction is critical to institutional maintenance. For example, the greater the accommodations, the greater the compromises necessary to satisfy important factions, the more diluted public may become both in terms of formulation and implementation. Thus while the factional system has provided "brakes" in the process of political mobilization and has encouraged cooperation within the Congress, it may also have tended to reduce the capacity of the party to achieve specific policy goals; and as differentiation takes place in the environment, specific goals become more salient than general and diffuse ones. At some threshold, therefore, such accommodations may become counterproductive for the actors involved. Policies are formulated and pursued which few are excited about. Policy may be formulated not so much from social conscience or from a long view of the future, but rather for the immediate satiation of political appetites and the maintenance of support at a specific time. There is an additional question which concerns the definition of public problems by an awakened electorate and the possibility of party demise. As perceptions of party become more clear and salient to the citizen, the greater the probability that public discontent will be registered in party terms. Thus calculations of leaders concerning influence and power within the party must increasingly take into account the public interest in order to maintain party strength as well as the accommodation of interests within the party organization. External orientation becomes more important as the party is unable to absorb directly newly mobilized groups; and in the long run as governmental performance becomes more important in the equation of electoral support, the sensitivity and importance of factional accommodations may diminish. The accommodation between the centrifugal forces encouraged by competition and the maintenance of organizational cohesion is a problem which faces all competitive institutions. There are no unalterable laws of human behavior that prevent political leaders from separating themselves from the institutions of which they are a part. There are differences in the thresholds of tolerance which keep political leaders pursuing their political aspirations

CONCLUSION: NOTES AND PROPOSITIONS

325

within a given institution as opposed to seeking another organizational alternative. Political leaders do make decisions and often these decisions are stimulated by notions of pride and honor just as they are by more "rational" motivations. In elective politics, the larger configuration of power within the party system is often determined by forces over which faction leaders have limited control. This influences the outcomes of their decisions just as their decisions to adhere to a party organization or to opt out of it influence the larger decision-making process in electoral politics. The analysis and propositions advanced above, therefore, are not meant as rules which political actors in Rajasthan must adhere to nor as unalterable laws of behavior which have determined their behavior over the past two decades. Rather they constitute an interpretation of the types of possibilities and constraints that the structures of political organization and behavior have placed upon choices at successive points in time. New leaders, new events, and changing interpretations of them may indeed change both those constraints and the nature, ordering, and "rating" of political possibility.

GLOSSARY

AISPC—All-India States, Peoples' Congress andolan—struggle Arya Samaj—Hindu reform movement begar—forced labor Brahman—highest priestly caste category bhumia—freehold tenure Chamar—untouchables, leatherworkers charsas—small "hides" of land durbar—the court of traditional states ghee—clarified butter harijan—name given by Gandhi to untouchables (literally "children of God") Hitkarini Sabha—self-help society ijara—right to collect rents with a fixed amount surrendered to central darbar jagir—landed estate jagirdar—large landlord Jat—agriculturalist caste Jat Krishak Sudharak—Jat caste association Jat Praja Pati Maha-Yagna—peasant socioreligious festival in "antifeudal struggle" Jat Sabha—Jat caste association jati—caste, endogamous social group with shared commensality rules jati panchayat—caste council katedari—land tenure with right of permanent occupancy and inheritance Kayasth—caste of scribes khalsa—crown lands kisan—peasant Kisan Sabha—Peasant Society Kshatriya—warrior caste category Kshatriya Mahasabha—Rajput caste association

GLOSSARY

Lok Sabha—House of the People Mahajan—trader and mercantile castes maund—a weight measurement of approximately eighty pounds nazarana—investiture neta—leader panch—member of a village panchayat Panchayati Raj—elective institutions of rural government PCC—Pradesh (state) Congress Committee pattedari—land tenure with permanent occupancy, inheritance, mortgage, and transfer rights Patwari—local revenue official pradhan—president of Panchayat Samiti pracharack—Arya Samaj missionary Praja Mandal—Peoples' Society Pratinidhi Sabha—provincial organization Prantiya Sabha—name of PCC before states' integration puma swaraj—complete independence R a j p u t — r u l i n g and warrior caste sabha—council or society sardar—chief sarpanch—president of a village panchayat Shudra—lowest category in caste H i n d u society Sirvi—peasant caste thakurs—Rajput lords thikana—large jagir thikanadars—rulers of petty kingdoms updeshickh—Arya Samaj missionary Vaishya—merchant caste category varna—four classes of caste H i n d u society: Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra Vidhan Sabha—State Legislative Assembly Vishnoi—peasant caste w idesh I—foreigner zila—district

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The Bombay Chronicle. The Civil and Military Gazette. Feudal and Zamindari India. Hind Rajasthan (Hindi). Hindustan. Hindustan Times. The Indian Annual Register. The Indian National Herald. The Leader. The National Call. Rajasthan Patrika (Hindi). The States. Statesman. Tarun Rajasthan (Hindi). UNPUBLISHED

MATERIAL

All-India States' Peoples' Congress. Rajasthan Regional Council. "Annual Report: 1946-47." Manuscript. Jones, Kenneth W. "The Arya Samaj in the Punjab: A Study of Social Reform and Religious Revivalism, 1877-1902." Unpublished Ph. D.

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dissertation, Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1966. Millman, Harry A. " T h e Marwari: A Study of a Group of the Trading Castes in India." Master's thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1955Pradesh Congress Committee. Constituency Files. (Second and Third General Elections). . Reports of District Observers. (Second and Third General Elections). Praja Mandai. Files. Rajasthan State Archives. Rajputana Prantiya Sabha. "Bulletins." (1946-1951). . Executive Committee. "Minutes." (1946-1951). . Proceedings of Special and General Meetings. (1946-1951). Roy, Ramashray. "A Study of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee." Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1965. Shrader, Lawrence L. "Politics in Rajasthan." Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1965. Wallace, Paul. " T h e Political Party System of Punjab State (India): A Study of Factionalism." Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1966. OTHER SOURCES

Personal interviews conducted in the field with ninety-seven members of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly and one hundred seventythree other selected political leaders in the state, August 1963 to November 1964.

INDEX

Acharya, Niranjan Nath, 247 Adityendra, Master, 120, 221, 2x8, 1 3 1 , 23m, 2350, «36, 242, *4*n Agarwal, Chiranjilal, 54n Agarwal caste, 36-37, 88n Ahir caste, 148-149,150-151 AU-India States' Peoples' Congress (AISPC), 4511, 4611, 5011, 69, 10011, mi Almond, Gabriel A., 6n Alwar: factions, 14, ii7n, S45n; maharaja of, losn, 107; preindependence activity, 68n, 7411, ggn; social representation in Congress, 147-153; state, 25, loon, 107, 108 Ajmer: creation of, 2911; district, 156157; Mughal province, 20; social representation in Congress, i54n, 156-157 Ajmer-Merwara, 70 Apter, David, 3n Argyris, Chris, 8n Arya Samaj, 76-77, 83, 147, i47n Arya, Choudhry Kumbharam: faction, 137, 164, 210, 229n, 250, 251, 254, 264n; Jat caste reform, 7&n; preindependence political activity, 77n, 9m, 165; role in Bikaner Division, U3n, ii7n, 239; role in state Congress, toon, 136, 192, 218, 22on, 223-224, 227, 234-236, 238, 246, 247n Arya, Hansraj, 7711, sjgn Arya, Jeeyalal, 77n Asawa, Gokul Lai, ggn, 112, 24411 Ash, Roberta, 73n Aiad Morcha, 1 1 4 , 1 1 7 , 155 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 223, 2j8n, »39 Baid, Chandan Mai, 247 Bailey, F. G., isn, son Bahadur, Raj, 113, 2j6n, 242n, 245n Bajaj, Seth Jamnalal, 46n, 4gn, 55-56, 84n, 89, gon

Baiai caste, 38 Banerjee, Anil, 2in Banias. See Mahajan castes Banks, Arthurs., i24n Banswara: district, 29, 35; population, 74n; state, 108, 112 Banton, Michael, 27m Bapna, Phool Chand, 24411 Barker, Jonathan S., 284n Banner District, 29, 8on, 2j8n Barnard, Chester I., 4n, gn, 20711 Barth, Fredrik, gn, 26m, 2640, 26sn Baya, Bhurelal, 244n Bell, Wendell, i8on Beniwal, Kamla, 158 Bendix, Reinhard, ìjon Bhai, Bhilca, 15011 Bharatpur: district, 2g, 35; faction, 236n, 237n; maharaja of, i07n, 108; preindependence movements, 6411, 74n, 88n, ggn, ìosn, 147m social representation in Congress, 147-153 passim; state, 25, 10m, 107, 112, 113. See Praja Mandali and Raj Bahadur Bhil tribe, 34, 38, 74n, ison Bhumia, 26, 28 Bhumiswami Andolan, 26 Bijolia agitation, 44n, 74n Bikaner: district, 24, 31; maharaja of, 30, 51, 74n, 91, 105, 168; party factions, lisn, U7n, 235-236, 243, 265282 passim; preindependence activity, 44n, 47n, 48n, 5on, 64n, 74n, 91-9*, ggn, loon; social representation in Congress, 165-168; state, 22, 24, »7n, 35n, loon, 109. See Choudhry Kumbharam Arya and Praja Mandals Black, C. E., in Brahman castes: candidates for Legislative Assembly, 135, 151, 156, 163, 167, 171, and passim; distribution in Rajasthan, 36-37; in Nagaur District

34*

INDEX

Congress, 291-306 passim; preindependence elites, 62-63, ggn, 13m, 14911, 286; representation on PCC and DCCs, >3S. >J4. >48. «5°. >55. l6*> , 6 6 ' '7°. and passim; representation in statelevel Congress factions, »74-275 Brass, Paul E., i j n , so8n, i i z n Brecher, Michael, 140 Bundi state, 19, 3511, 108 Burger, Angela S., i s n

Deutsch, Karl W., 1, 2n Dhadda, Siddhraj, ggn, ii7n Dhariwal, Rikhab Chand, ii4n Dhebar, U. N., 228, 234, 236 Dholpur: social representation in the Congress, 152; state, 25, 10m, 107, 112, 113. See Praja Mandai Dungarpur State, 74n, ggn, loon, i02n, 108, 112, 251 Durkheim, Emile, 1,

Cabinet Mission, 106 Caste: associations, 63n, 77-87, 138-141; definition of, 32-33; dispersion in Rajasthan, 32-40; and factions, »71-277, 290-307; represenution in the Congress, 130-177 passim Chamar caste, 34, 38, 15cm Chamber of Princes, 10m, 105, 106 Chambers, William Nisbet, i8on Chandra, Maharaja Harish, io8n, isgn, *45 n ' s 46. «48. 249, 250, 251, 258 Chapman, John W., j n Chaturvedi, Jugal Kishore, ggn, loon, »35 n -*44 n Chaturvedi, Narain, 10m, 22on Chauhan, Virendra Singh, 22on, 224-225 Chintamani, C. Y„ 46n Chopasinawala, Chagan Raj, 7gn Choudhry, Ganga Ram, 8on Choudhry, Motiram, 23gn Choudhry, Ram Chandra, 9 m , 235, 246, «69 Choudhry, Ram Dan, 8on Choudhuri, M. N., 240 Churu District, 29, 44n, 480, 2$8n Clark, Peter B., gn, 2o6n Cleveland, Sir Charles, 45 Coleman, James S., 6n, gn Communist party, i03n Conflict management: and integration, 9-11, 16-17; and strategy of coalition maintenance, 225-226, 228-22g, 232234, 246-259. See Factions Congress party. See Indian National

Easton, David, gn, 26m Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., j n Eldersveld, Samuel J., 6n, i8on Evans-Pritchard, E. E., gn, 26m

Congress Coser, Lewis A., 276a Crotty, William J., i8on

Factions: and allocation of Congress party tickets, 237-240, 299-307; and center-state relations, 221-222, 22822g, 234-235, 236-240, 256-257; definition of 207~2o8n; and elite circulation, •94-»95- 519-321; a n d general elections, 215-217, 2ig-22i, 237-240, 249252, 24g; and generational representation, 277-282; Jat (Kumbharam), 210211, 226, 234-236, 243-244, 247-24g, 263-282 passim; in Nagaur District, 288-2gg; and organizational integration and mobility, 8-10, 16-17, >94" 195; and political recruitment, 212214; in preindependence movements, 113-118; Rajput, 211-212, 22g; regional representation, 265-271; Shekhawati, 161-164; Shastri, n j n , ii4n, 1 54 _1 55. '8g, 2i8n, 220, 242n, 263-266 passim; social representation, 271-277; and strategy, 213-214, 233-234, 241, 247-250, 252-25g, 285n; Sukhadia, 209210, 227-231, 232-234, 240-252, 263282 passim; Vyas, 208-209, 214-215, 220-231, 241-245, 263-266 passim Field, Sir Donald, 51 Firey, Walter, 2o8n Fortes, Meyer, gn, 26m Fox, Richard G., J2n Franda, Marcus, i3n, i26n Frey, Frederick W., 7n, i8on

Dahrendorf, Ralf, 8n, i26n, 276n Dttrbar, 20, 22, 25, 74n, i47n Dayal, Rameshwar, 11411 Desai, Kandu Bhai, 249a Desai, Morarji, 2380 Deshpande, B. S., ggn

Gahlot, Teja Ram, 8on Gandhi, Mahatma, 53, 55, 550, 66-67, 67n, 70 Ganganagar District, 2g, 48n, 74a, 235 Geertz, Clifford, j n Geschwender, James A., 73n

INDEX Goyal, Raghubhir Dayal, gin, 9911, 11311, 165, 22s Gujar caste, 34, 35 Gupta, Badri Prasad, 23911 Hagen, Everett E., sn Hardgrave, Jr., Robert L., gtn Had, Pandit Abhinn, 99n, îojn, 1140, 121 Harijans, 33n, 13m. See Scheduled Castes and Tribes Hiriannaiy, Rajsevasakta S., 56 Hunter, W. W„ 14211 Huntington, Samuel P., 5n Ijara, 22 Indian National Congress: allocation of party tickets, 127-130, 196-200, 237239, 299-310; founding in Rajasthan, 97-104, 111-123, 312; Jat entry, 89-94, 13911, 157-158, 160-168; leadership succession, 117-119, 217, 220, 228-231; legislative-organization relations, 195203, 226-227; Legislative Party factionalism, 111-119, 214-259; organization, 126-128; origins, 11-12; peasant entry, 136-139; political adaptability, 125-126, 130-131, 136-143, 175-177, 314-316; and Praja Mandais, 4jn, 4511, 49n> 55-56. 6 i n - 66-72; Rajput entry, 138-143, 163, 169-172, 21 in; recruitment and mobility, 181-195, Si8n, 320; social representation in, 130-136, 143-172, 290-299; state-center relations, 14-15, 221-222, »3-224, 228229, 238-239 Inkeles, Alex, an Institutionalization. See Political institutionalization Ismail, Mirza, 56 Jagirdari, 22, »4-27, 28, 74-76 Jagirdars: and British East India Company, 22; and control of land, 24-26; disputes with Jats, 74-76, 81-82, 84-88; relations with Congress, lign, 139i4on, 14m, 2i6n; rights and obligations to rulers, 25-26 Jagirs, 25, 26, i4on Jaipur: division, 24, 25, 29, 31, 34; factions, M3n, U7n, 22on, 24», 245n, 247n, 265-282 passim; maharaja of, 54n, 116, 159; preindependence movement in, 45-46, 53-57, 64n, 74n, 85n. 88n, 89-90, ggn, 114, 153, 154-155;

343 social organization in, 63; social representation in Congress, 153-160; state, 19, »2n, 24, 25n, 27, 28, J5n, 59n, 85n, io»n, 109. See Praja Mandals, Pandit Hiralal Shastri, Tikaram Paliwal, and Shekhawati Jaisalmer: district 29, 35, 171; maharaja of, loin; state, 27, loon, 109, 2380 Jalore District, 29, 2i6n Jan Sangh party, 134, i5on, i59n, 25m Jat caste: candidates for Legislative Assembly, 151-152, 156, 163, 167, 169, 171; distribution in state, 34, 74n; entry into Congress, 136-138; faction, 161-165, 174, 226, 245, 246-249, 263282 passim; Jat Praja Pati MahaYagna, 85-86; members of PCC and DCCs, 150, 157-158, 162, 166, 169-170; in Nagaur District, 80-83, 291-299; and Praja Mandals, 79, nsn, 136, 148; in Rajputana states, 27-28. See Kisan Sabhas Jati. See Caste Jati panchayats, 32, 48 Janta Congress, 223n Jha, B. J., ngn Jhalawar State, i02n, 108, 15911. See Maharaja Harish Chandra Jhunjhunu District, 29, 22611, 238n, 245n Jodhpur: factions, 265-268, 22gn; first General Elections in, 215-217; maharaja of, 10m, 139, 216, 2i8n; population, 31, 34-37 passim, 74n; preindependence movement in 44-45, 47, 5053. 57-59. ®Sn. 68n, 6gn, 78-83, ggn, 113-114; social representation in Congress, 168-172; state, ig, 24, 27, 28, log. See Factions, Kisan Sabhas, Nagaur District, Praja Mandals, Jai Narain Vyas Joshi, Harideo, ii7n, 192, 249 Joshi, Ladu Ram, gon Joshi, Narottam Lai, 2ig, 226n, 24211, *45n Joshi, Ram Karan: faction, ig2, 22on, 227, 234, 251; role in Jaipur District, *45n> »5°: role in state Congress, 117, »9*. " 3 Kamal, K. L., 2i5n Karauli State, 68n, 107,113 Kasliwal, Gulab Chand, 224 Kayasth caste, 62-64, ggn, 11411, 13m, 236n, 286, 302n Khalsa, »4-25, 26, 27, 28, 75

344 Khan, Barkatullah, 2450, 246 Rhandelwal caste, 36-37 Rhejerla, Bhairon Singh, iogn Khumbharam Arya. See Choudhry Kumbharam Arya Ridwai, Rafi Ahmed, 13g Kisan Sabhas: in Bikaner, 7411, 90-9«; communication and mobilization, 7678, 92-94; in Jodhpur, 78-83, îsgn, 169, »87-288; origins, 27-28, 73-78; and Praja Mandais, 64, 8511, 86n, 8990, 95-96; in Shekhawati, 83-88 Kishengarh, 7411, io2n, 22on Kochanek, Stanley A., i»8n Rochar, Ram Ratan, 23911 Romberg, Allan, 5n Rot ah: {actions, i03n, 121, î j o n , 245n, 265-282 passim; maharaja of, 108; preindependence movement, 68n, ggn, toon, 114, 121; Rajputs, 35n; social representation in Congress, i59n, 173, 175. See Maharaja Harish Chandra Rothari, Manak Chand, Rothari, Manilal, 4gn Rothari, Rajni, i3n, 2i3n Rrishna, Gopal, 2isn Rshatriya castes, 33n. See Rajputs Kshatriya Mahasabha, lign, 138-141, 170 Laddha, Ram Prasad, 247 Land tenure system, 24-28 LaPalombara, Joseph, 6n Lerner, Daniel, 1, sn Lijphart, Arend, I24n Lipset, Seymour Martin, i24n, l j o n Lok Parishad. See Praja Mandais Lok Sabha, 5gn, lsgn, 23 m , 25 m Luhadia, Bansilal, ii4n, U7n Lunkar, Narsingh Das, 7gn Lyall, Sir Alfred, 21 Madan Singh of Danta, 163 Maderna, Paras Ram, 248 Madhya-Bharat, 24n, 25a Ma haj an castes: candidates for the Legislative Assembly, 135, 151, 156, 167, 171; distribution in state, 34, 36-37; members of PCC and DCCs, 133-134, 149-150, 153-155, 165-166, 170; in preindependence movements, 43n, 6s63, 65, 8sn, U3n, 13on. See Agarwal, Rhandelwal, Maheshwari and Oswal Maheshwari, 36-37, 286, 290 Malaviya, R. M., 23&n Mali caste, 34

INDEX Mandawa, Bhim Singh, 109, 139, 163, 211 March, James G., gn, i8on, 207n Maru, Rushikesh, i3n Marwaris, 36, i37n Masumi, Junnosuke, 2o8n Matsya: factions, 243, 266; Matsya Union, 107-108, 110, i n n , 242n; population, 31; social representation in Congress, 147-153. See Alwar and Bharatpur Mathur, Mathuradas: factional association, ig2, 210, 22on, 23gn; and Marwar Kisan Sabha, 137; role in state Congress, 192, 218-219, 223, 224, 233234, 235n, 238, 246n, 249 Mazrui, Ali A., in McClelland, David, 2n Meghwal caste, 38 Mehta, Balvantray, 68n, 221 Mehta, Chandmal, 22on Mehta, Jaswant Raj, 5gn Menon, V. P., 23n, 10m, io6n, io7n Meos, 78n, 148-149 Michels, Robert, 8n, i7gn Milbrath, Lester W „ 284n Millman, Harry A., j6n Minas, 34, 35, 38 Mirdha, Baldev Ram, 79, 8on, 81, 8jn Mirdha, Nathu Ram: factional leadership, 210-211, 218, 247, 249; and kisan movement, 82; state politics, 223-224, 226n,232,23gn Mirdha, Ram Niwas, 78n, 7gn, 233, 297 Mitra, N. M., 46n, 55n, 68n, iogn, ii4n, «37 Modernization, 1-4 Moreland, W. H., 2on Morris-Jones, W. H., i j n , s i j n Muslims: candidates for Legislative Assembly, 135, 151, 156, 163, 167, 171; and Congress in Nagaur District, 304307 passim; and preindependence movements, 64, 74n; representation in PCC and DCCs, 132, 133, i43->44155, 162, 170, 173. See Meos Nadar, Ram raj, 247n Nagaur District: factions, 289-307 passim; Jats in, 74n, 80; Kisan Sabha, 8083, 287-288; Lok Parishad, 286-287; social representation in Congress, 290299; ticket allocation, 22on, 299-307 Narain, Iqbal, isn, 29811 Nath, Master Bhola, ggn, 2450 Nathdwara, 43n, 6in

INDEX Nationalist movement: impact on Rajputana states, 4jn, iosn, 14011, 14m, 21 in; relation to Praja Man dais, 4911, 55-56, 66-7*. 8 6 1 1 Nawalgarh, Madan Singh of, 140-141 Nayar, Baldev Raj, i j n Nehru Jawaharlal: and jagirdari "resumption," 139, 14cm; and Praja Mandais, 53, 58n, 70, ii4n; role in Rajasthan Congress, 14m, 17811, 218, 221223, »s6n, 22gn, 239, 245 Neumann, Sigmund, 6n Nicholas, Ralph W., 27m Oswal caste, 36-37, 6sn, 114, 286, 287, 290 Packenham, Robert A., in Pali District, 29, ts8n Paliwal, Tikaram: as chief minister, 217221; and factional system, 2i6n, 22on, 225, 227-228, 23on, 233, 235n, 236, 242n, 298; preindependence activity, gon, 11411 Panchayats, 12911, 158, 298, 30311 Pandya, Pandit Bhogilal: factional association, 227-228, 242; preindependence activity, ggn, 112; role in state politics, 219, 221, 223, 224 Pant, Pandit Ballabh, 139, 1400 Paramountcy, 22-24, ®7n> '°7 Parsons, Talcott, 1 Participation. See Factions, Political mobilization, and Political institutionalization Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 105, 106, 109-111, 116, 118-119 Peasant movements. See Kisan Sabhas Pennock, J. Roland, 3n Pinard, Maurice, 73n Political authority: conception of, 2, 8; in Congress Party, 204-207, 313; and democratic consensus, 204-205, 311312; in Rajputana states, 18-24 Political culture, 13-14 Political generation: in PCC, 181-186; in Praja Mandals, 61-66; in state factions, 277-281 Political institutionalization: conception of, 4-9; and conflict management, 254259, 308-310; and party loyalty, 102104, 256-259; and organizational complexity, 50-60, 119-123, 126-130, »88299; and organizational mobility.

345 178-203; sequence of, 15-17; and social adaptation, 130-145, 172-177, 314-317. See Political integration. Political party, and Political succession Political integration: conception of, t , 12-14; conflict and, 252-259, 308-310; and elite circulation, 178-181; and factions, 16-17; ar< d organizational incentives, 9, 206-207; and party system, 16, 321-324; in Rajputana states, 28, 100-101, 107-111 Political mobilization: conflict and, 283286, 299-310; and participation, 7, 178-187; peasant, 92-94; preindependence, 43-48, 63-66, 73, 76-78; theory of, 125-126. See Political recruitment Political party: conflict and cohesion, 7 10, 16-17, 308-310, 317-318, 321; definition of, 6-7, 9-10; development patterns, 41-42; integration and adaptation, 5-7, 16, 124-125, 314-317. See Indian National Congress Political recruitment, 178-194, 209-210, 318-320 Political segmentation: in Congress party, 312-314; 320-323; in Kisan Sabhas, 94-95; in Praja Mandals, 60-66; significance of, 9-10. See Factions Political succession, 8, 23, 257, 317-318. See Indian National Congress Pradhan, M. C., 81 n Praja Mandals: in Alwar, 50, 68n, 147149; communications, 4311, 48-49, 6in; in Dholpur, 152; in Jaipur, 45-46, 5354, 6gn, 89-90, i02n, 114, 153, 154-'55. 188; in Jhalawar, i02n; in Kishengarh, i02n; in Rotah, 50, 68n, 114, 121, 188; Lok Parishad (Jodhpur), 44-45, 47, 51-53. 57-59. 6 S n . 691». 86n, 113-114, »38n

Sardars, 22, 25, 28 Sawai Madhopur District, 29, i54n, 242n Scalapino, Robert A., 2o8n Scheduled Castes: dispersion in state, 37-38; and factions, 271-277 passim, 300-301, 304n, so5n; preindependence movements, 63, 1 3 m ; representation in PCC and DCCs, 131, 133, 143-145, 150, 155, 166, 170

Singh, Khet, 235, 239n Singh, Madan, 14m Singh, Manphool, 23gn, 248 Singh, Nahar, 23gn Singh, Raja Man, 152 Singh, Ratan, 8sn, 88n Singh, Sardar Harlal: faction, n s n , 210, 22on, 23gn, 254, 273; leadership in kisan movement, 77, 86n, gon; leadership in Praja Mandal, 89, gon; role

347

INDEX in state Congress, 64, 11711, 120, 136, '9*. 2 4 5 n Singhi, Pukhraj, 9911 Sinha, Brij Kishore Prasad, 240 Siriari, Vijay Singh, 172 Sirohi State, 50, 520, 6gn, ggn, i02n, 11 i n Sirvi castes, 28, 34. 82, 138, 287 Sisson, Richard, 5n, 9411 Smith, M. G., gn, 26m Socialist party, losn Sorauf, Frank J., i8on Southall, A. W., 26m, 26511 Sukhadia, Mohanlal: faction and leadership, 15011, 191, 209-210, 22311, 227-252 passim, and 263-282 passim; preindependence activity, ggn, 228-22g Surana, Anand Raj, 4gn Sutherland, J., 2in, 2311 Swatantra party, 247n, 25m Tejawat, Motilal, 4411 Textor, Robert B., i24n Thikanas, 25, 26, 8511, 87n Thorner, Daniel, 2in T o n k District, 108, 1540 T o d , Colonel James, 19, 2on, 21, 25n, 27n Trivedi, Mithalal, ggn, 120 Tucker, Robert C., gn Tyagi, Ved Pal, 2i8n, 222, 224-225 Udaipur: faction, 209-210, 220n, 229-230, 237, 243, 24411, 265-282 passim; opposition to Congress, 10311, i5on; peasant movements, 74n; preindependence movement, 43n, 4811, ggn, 228-22g; social organization, 35, 36-37, 63; social representation in Congress, 149i50n, i5gn, 173-174; state, ig, 25, 108, log, 112 Uniara, 35 Urwin, Derek, i24n Uttar Pradesh, 8in, i n n , n g n , l j g n

Vaishya. See Mahajan castes Varma, Manikyalal: factional leadership, i i 7 n , 191, 221, 228, 22gn, 231, 236, 237, 23gn; preindependence activities, 44n, 6gn, ggn, loon; role in state politics, 116, 139, 140, 219, 221; role in Udaipur, 121, 209 Varna, 33 Venkatachar Report, 25n, 27n, 75n, 8sn Verba, Sidney, i3n, i8n Vishnoi caste, 28, 34, 82, 138, 287 Vishnoi, Poonam Chand, 8on, 239a Vishnoi, Raghunath, 8on Vyas, Jai Narain: biography, 115; elections, 216-217; factional leadership and organization, i g i , 192, 209, 214215, 227-231, 234-235n, 236-237, 239, 241-245, 257, 263-282 passim, 291-307 passim; and peasant castes, 136, 137; preindependence activity, 47, 51-53, 58n, 6gn, ggn, loon, i i 4 n ; and R a j p u t entry into Congress, i38n, 139-140, 172, 2i6n; role in state politics, 1 1 5 119 passim, i g i n , 216-227 Vyas, Ram Kishore, 219, 22on, 223, 224, 23on, 233, 24g Wallace, Paul, i s n , 2o8n W e b b , Captain, A. W . T . , 87, 88 Weber, Max, 1 , 4 n , 6n Weiner, Myron, 6n, 7n, 8n, i3n, 2o8n Willner, A n n R u t h , i n Wills, C. U., 22n, 25n, 27n Wilson, James Q., gn, 2o6n Yadav, Amritlal, ison, 129, 227, 239n Yadav, Ghasi Ram, 150-151 Yadav, Ramjilal, 151 Yadav, Gopilal, 148, 152, 244n Young, F. S., 85n Zald, Mayer N., 73n Zamindar Association, 74n Zariski, Raphael, 2o8n